Podcasts about Shanxi

Last time we spoke about the battle of Shanggao. From late March to early April 1940, Japanese forces attacked Shanggao in Jiangxi with a multi‑pronged offensive. Chinese commanders used elastic defense and coordinated counter-moves, trading space for time through layered positions until the Japanese advanced into prepared strongpoints. As the 34th Division moved toward the town, assaults repeatedly hit ridges and bridge lines held by the 74th Corps. Heavy air strikes caused chaos, but timely flank redeployments prevented a decisive breakthrough. During the crisis around March 21–24, Chinese units maneuvered an encirclement and executed a controlled breakout at the critical moment. After intense fighting and bombing, the Japanese were routed and fell back to their original positions. The wider war did not change, yet Shanggao proved that disciplined Chinese planning could reverse Japanese offensives against superior initiative and numbers.   #207 Battle of Zhongtiao Mountain Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. By the spring of 1941, the War of Resistance against Japan had been grinding for nearly four years, and the map of China looked increasingly like a wound. Japan controlled the coastal cities, the major river valleys, and most of the productive lowland plains of the north and east. The Nationalist government had retreated far inland to Chongqing, governing a rump state of mountainous hinterland, foreign sympathies, and diminishing resources. The war had long since ceased to look like a conventional conflict between organized fronts and had settled into something grimmer and more ambiguous — a slow war of attrition fought in the mud and rocks of the Chinese interior, punctuated by Japanese offensives designed not to end the war but to compress it, to squeeze the Nationalists tighter with each season until surrender became a rational calculation rather than a humiliation. Japan had tried other methods first. In the late 1930s, Tokyo made serious overtures to Chiang Kai-shek's government, proposing a negotiated settlement that would see China aligned with Japan and the puppet Wang Jingwei government elevated as the vehicle for that arrangement. Chiang refused. He had gambled, and would continue to gamble, that the war in Europe would eventually draw in the Western powers, that American patience with Japanese aggression would run out, and that time was ultimately on China's side. The strategy required suffering in the present to buy survival in the future. Germany's invasion of Poland in September 1939 and the subsequent expansion of war across Europe only reinforced Japan's desire to accelerate its operations in China before the international situation made them impossible. By 1940, Japan signaled it intended to resolve the "China Incident" — the bureaucratic euphemism it used to avoid officially acknowledging that it was fighting a full-scale war — once and for all. The question was where. The front was hundreds of miles long. The Japanese army in China was stretched thin despite its nominal strength. Spectacular victories in the lowlands had failed to produce the political capitulation Tokyo expected. And in the mountains of Shanxi Province, a particular irritant had been festering for three years — one that the Japanese could neither ignore nor seem to dislodge. The Zhongtiao Mountains rise along the southern edge of Shanxi Province, running roughly east to west for some two hundred miles, forming a natural wall between the loess plateaus of Shanxi and the plains of northern Henan below. The range is not dramatic by Chinese standards — it is not the soaring, cloud-piercing landscape of Sichuan or Yunnan — but it is rugged, deeply ridged, and extraordinarily difficult to move through quickly. For a defending army with knowledge of the terrain, the Zhongtiao range was close to ideal. For an attacker, especially one dependent on mechanized firepower and coordinated logistics, it was a nightmare. Chinese forces had occupied the Zhongtiao Mountains since 1938, following the fall of Taiyuan and the retreat of Nationalist forces from the broader Shanxi campaign. At a moment when much of northern China was collapsing around them, the garrison there dug in and refused to move. Over the following three years, the Japanese Army mounted thirteen separate offensives against the Zhongtiao position. All thirteen failed. The mountains held. Chinese soldiers would later call it the "Eastern Maginot Line," a nickname that was simultaneously a boast and, in retrospect, a warning — the original Maginot Line, after all, had also been considered impregnable until the enemy simply went around it. But the strategic importance of Zhongtiao went beyond prestige. The mountains commanded the northern approach to the Yellow River crossings — the great geographic boundary that separated Japanese-controlled northern China from the Nationalist-held central and western regions. From their positions in the mountains, Chinese troops could threaten Japanese supply lines, protect their own river logistics, and maintain at least a symbolic presence north of the Yellow River. As long as the Zhongtiao garrison held, Japan could not claim complete control of northern China. It was also a potential launching point for a Chinese counteroffensive, should one ever become possible. The Japanese understood this perfectly. By 1940, eliminating the Zhongtiao position had become not merely desirable but strategically necessary. The First War Zone command responsible for the Zhongtiao garrison was, at least on paper, an imposing force. Between 170,000 and 180,000 men were deployed across the mountain range and its approaches, drawn from multiple armies and organized into several large groupings. The 5th Army Group under Zeng Wanzhong held the central area. The 14th Army Group under Liu Maoen operated in the eastern sector. The 4th Army Group, known as the "Iron Pillar of Zhongtiao" for its tenacious defense of the position over three years, was stationed as the backbone of the force. Individual armies were spread across specific nodes: Pei Changhui's 9th Army at Jiyuan in northern Henan; Zhao Shiling's 43rd Army at Yuanqu at the southernmost tip of Shanxi; Tang Huaiyuan's 3rd Army and Kong Lingxun's 80th Army in the Wenxi and Xiaxian areas; Wu Shimin's 98th Army at Dongfeng Town; Wu Tinglin's 15th Army near Gaoping. The man responsible for holding all of this together was Wei Lihuang, a gifted commander and one of Chiang Kai-shek's most capable generals. Wei had organized the Zhongtiao defense from the beginning, and his strategic instincts were widely respected. He was, by most accounts, the indispensable figure in the garrison's survival. The problem was that Wei had made powerful enemies. His refusal to participate in anti-Communist friction operations — at a time when the Nationalist government was increasingly focused on neutralizing the Communists even at the cost of Japanese resistance — had alienated him from a circle of powerful rivals, including the influential Hu Zongnan. Outmaneuvered at court, Wei was summoned to Chongqing in early 1941 and, under the pretext of strategic consultations, was effectively detained at Mount Emei. He never returned to his command in the Zhongtiao Mountains. The army he had built was left without its architect. The garrison that remained was compromised far beyond its missing commander, however. Three years of static defense had created conditions that corroded military discipline in predictable and insidious ways. Supply lines were unreliable, rations were short, and the soldiers garrisoning remote mountain positions had turned, by necessity and then by habit, to the local economy to sustain themselves. A bustling illicit trade in grain and opium had sprung up across the mountain zone, with Chinese troops selling what they could and buying what they needed from merchants who operated equally comfortably on both sides of the Japanese-Chinese frontier. This was not merely a logistical failure. It meant that Japanese intelligence had abundant commercial cover to infiltrate the garrison area, that security was a fiction, and that the defensive posture of the entire force had quietly shifted from warlike readiness to something closer to bureaucratic occupation. The Japanese had not missed any of this. For months before the offensive, Japanese intelligence agents had worked their way into the garrison's supply networks, trading relationships, and eventually its command structure itself. Japanese special forces had identified key headquarters positions. Informants had mapped the positions of individual units, traced the routes between them, and assessed the readiness of the men holding them. By the spring of 1941, Japanese planners believed, with considerable justification, that they could paralyze the entire Chinese command system within an hour of opening fire. This was not boasting. It was reconnaissance. Back in Chongqing, the intelligence picture was worse than unclear — it was actively distorted. The Nationalist intelligence apparatus issued warnings about Japanese troop movements near the Zhongtiao perimeter in April 1941, but the warnings were partial, their significance disputed, and the political will to act on them absent. A series of conferences were convened at Luoyang, the regional headquarters. Fortification orders were issued. Additional supplies were promised. Almost none of the follow-through actually materialized. The garrison's most powerful formation, the 4th Army Group, had already been transferred away from the area. Its absence left a hole in the defensive line that no amount of paper orders could fill. On the Japanese side, the operation that would eliminate the Zhongtiao garrison was carefully and systematically prepared. It was codenamed the "Central Plains Campaign" — a name that reflected its true ambition, which was not merely to take a mountain range but to reshape the strategic geography of the entire region. The operation was assigned to the North China Area Army under Lieutenant General Tada Shun, an experienced commander who had studied the Zhongtiao problem for years and had a clear understanding of why previous offensives had failed. The core of the attacking force was seven divisions: the 33rd, 35th, 36th, 37th, 41st, and 21st Divisions, along with several independent mixed brigades, puppet Chinese formations, cavalry, and a substantial artillery and air component. The 3rd Air Group, operating from airfields at Yuncheng and Xinxiang, would provide tactical air support throughout the operation. In total, the frontline assault force numbered approximately 100,000 men. This was not a repeat of the previous thirteen offensives, in which the Japanese had probed and pressed at the mountains frontally. This was a comprehensive annihilation plan. Tada's design exploited the geographic shape of the Zhongtiao position itself. The Chinese garrison occupied a roughly crescent-shaped area, with its back to the Yellow River and its front facing north and east into Japanese-held territory. The obvious previous approach — attacking from the north — had failed repeatedly because the terrain favored the defenders. Tada's solution was to attack from three directions simultaneously, with the town of Yuanqu on the Yellow River as the primary objective. Yuanqu was the hinge of the entire Chinese position: it controlled the main river crossings, served as the central supply point for the garrison, and sat at the narrowest point between the mountains and the water. If Yuanqu fell, the Chinese would be cut off from their supply line and divided into two separate pockets. Then each pocket could be destroyed at leisure. To execute this, Tada organized his forces into three attack groups. The eastern group, built around Lieutenant General Harada Yukichi's 35th Division with elements of the 21st Division and the 4th Independent Cavalry Brigade — totaling roughly 25,000 men with armor, artillery, and supporting puppet forces — would drive westward along the Daoqing Road, pushing through Jiyuan and Mengxian toward the eastern flank of the Chinese position. The northeastern group, under Lieutenant General Shozo Sakurai commanding the 33rd Division and an Independent Mixed Brigade, would descend from Yangcheng southward, striking at the middle of the Chinese line. The western and northwestern group, the largest, comprising the 36th, 37th, and 41st Divisions along with the 9th and 16th Independent Mixed Brigades, would push southward from multiple points between Sangchi and Zhangdian, driving straight for Yuanqu. The final element of the plan was the most audacious. Japanese special forces and paratroopers were to land behind Chinese lines on the opening night of the offensive, targeting the Chinese headquarters and communications nodes. If the Chinese command could be blinded and paralyzed in the first hours of the battle, resistance would collapse before it could organize. Given the penetration of the garrison by Japanese intelligence, the paratroopers knew precisely where to go. From late April, Japanese forces quietly moved into their assault positions. Supply dumps were stocked. Artillery was registered on Chinese positions. The attack was set for the morning of May 7, 1941. Everything was ready. The battle opened before dawn on May 7, and it opened everywhere at once. On the eastern front, Harada's 35th Division and its attached formations crossed the start line and drove westward in three parallel columns along the Daoqing Road. More than 5,000 infantrymen, 1,000 cavalry, dozens of artillery pieces, over 100 tanks and armored vehicles, and the supporting puppet troops of Zhang Lanfeng and Liu Yanfeng poured into the Chinese-held area around Jiyuan and Mengxian. The assault had an almost mechanical quality — it moved at the pace of its armor and artillery, methodically grinding through whatever lay in its path. On the northeastern front, Sakurai's 33rd Division descended from Yangcheng with more than 10,000 men, striking at Wu Shimin's 98th Army at Dongfeng Town. Wu was one of the more aggressive Chinese commanders in the garrison, and he did not wait to be overwhelmed. He threw his forces into active resistance on multiple axes, contesting each Japanese advance rather than simply absorbing it. In the fighting around Wangcun, his troops achieved one of the campaign's rare Chinese tactical successes, routing approximately 2,000 Japanese attackers and killing more than 700, including Colonel Hamada, a Japanese regimental commander. It was a genuine local victory, but it could not change the larger picture. On the western and northwestern front, the main Japanese force pushed south with its eyes fixed on Yuanqu. The coordinated weight of three divisions and two independent brigades, all moving along converging axes, was designed to be overwhelming. Individually, a Chinese unit might hold a ridge or a pass for a day. Collectively, there was no way to stop what was coming. And that same night, as the Chinese scrambled to respond to attacks on every side, Japanese paratroopers landed near Chinese headquarters positions. They found what intelligence had promised: a command system already in disarray, staffed by officers who had received no coherent orders and had lost communications with most of their subordinate units. The Japanese were not wrong when they predicted they could paralyze the Chinese command within hours. By the morning of May 8, the Chinese First War Zone headquarters had effectively ceased to function as a coordinating body. Individual armies would fight on, but they would fight alone. The second day of the battle brought the decisive blow. On the afternoon of May 8, the 9th Army under Pei Changhui — already reeling from the pressure of the eastern Japanese columns — abandoned the cities of Ji and Meng and fell back westward. The withdrawal opened a path through the Chinese line, and the Japanese exploited it immediately. That evening, with the assistance of paratroopers who had secured key access routes overnight, Japanese forces reached Yuanqu on the Yellow River's northern bank and took it. The fall of Yuanqu changed everything. At a single stroke, the Chinese garrison's supply line from the south bank of the Yellow River was severed. The main crossing points were in Japanese hands. The two halves of the Chinese position — those to the east of Yuanqu and those to the west — were now separated, unable to reinforce one another. The double encirclement that Tada had designed on paper became a physical reality on the ground. The trap had closed. May 9 brought further disaster. Japanese forces captured Wufujian, another significant point in the Chinese rear. And on this day the battle's human cost began to register in the most stark terms possible. Wang Jun, commander of the newly formed 27th Division of Kong Lingxun's 80th Army, was killed in action fighting in the southern Shanxi mountains. Major General Chen Wenqi, deputy commander of the 24th Division, died in fierce combat near Taizhai Village. And Major General Liang Xixian, having retreated with the remnants of his force to Taizhai and found every route blocked — his options reduced to surrender or death — walked into the Yellow River and drowned himself. He was not the last Chinese officer to choose death over capture. The loss of three generals in a single day was not merely tragic. It reflected something about the nature of the battle that the casualty statistics alone could not capture: the Chinese officers who fought most fiercely and refused to abandon their positions were precisely the men dying, while the broader institutional structure that should have supported them had already failed. The garrison was being consumed from its fighting edge inward. Over the following two days, the Japanese methodically tightened the ring. The eastern column, having taken Yuanqu, split into two prongs: one drove eastward, capturing Shaoyuan by the morning of May 12 and linking up with the forces that had been pressing westward from Jiyuan; the other drove westward to Wufujian, joining with the troops already there. The inner encirclement was now complete and continuous. The Yellow River crossings along the entire Chinese front were blocked. There was no route south that wasn't already under fire or in Japanese hands. The fighting in the mountain passes was, by all accounts, ferocious. At Fengmenkou — a critical pass that both sides recognized as a key chokepoint — the Chinese 9th Army committed the main force of its newly formed 24th Division along with elements of the 54th Division, fighting for every ridge and ravine. The Japanese sent reinforcements and simply absorbed the punishment, pressing forward until numbers and artillery told. By May 12, the position at Jianshan had been surrounded as well, and the outer ring of encirclement had sealed. The Chinese armies in the Zhongtiao Mountains were now divided into isolated pockets, each fighting separately, each trying to find a gap in the Japanese lines that simply wasn't there. Beyond the mountains, the Chinese high command in Luoyang was issuing desperate orders. Units that had already been overrun were instructed to hold positions they no longer occupied. Army commanders who had lost contact with their corps were told to coordinate with formations they couldn't reach. The gap between the orders flowing from headquarters and the reality on the ground had become absolute. The First War Zone command was, in practical terms, a spectator to the destruction of its own army. Of all the days in the three-week battle, May 13 was perhaps the most devastating for Chinese morale. At Cunbu, in the western sector, the 3rd Army under Lieutenant General Tang Huaiyuan had been surrounded and cut off. Tang was among the finest officers in the Nationalist army — a career soldier of exceptional ability, admired by subordinates and superiors alike, the kind of commander who by his personal presence could steady troops on the edge of breaking. He had led the 3rd Army in continuous fighting since May 7, conducting a fighting retreat that had preserved more of his force than most. But there was nowhere left to retreat to. Cunbu was surrounded on all sides. The Yellow River was behind him. The Japanese were in front. Tang Huaiyuan sat with his surviving officers and told them that he would not surrender. Then he shot himself. He was fifty-seven years old. On the same day, Cun Xingqi, commander of the 12th Division, was hit eight times during close combat and died on the field. The tally of dead general officers had now reached five in the space of a week. Tang Huaiyuan's death, unlike the others, resonated as something more than a military loss. He was a symbol of what the Zhongtiao defense had once represented: the possibility that courage and skill could compensate for disadvantages in firepower and logistics. His death seemed to say, loudly, that that possibility was exhausted. Chiang Kai-shek, when news reached him in Chongqing, personally ordered that Tang Huaiyuan be posthumously promoted and honored. The gesture was well-intentioned and entirely beside the point. Tang was dead. His army was destroyed. The gesture could not undo either fact. With the double encirclement complete and the primary Chinese resistance broken, the Japanese Army entered the second and less dramatic but equally brutal phase of its operation: the systematic clearance of what remained. Beginning around May 15, Japanese units shifted from the headlong offensive drives of the first week to methodical sweep operations, moving through the mountain terrain in organized formations, pressing into each remaining pocket and eliminating whatever resistance they found. The Yellow River's northern bank was secured by Japanese forces who established posts at the crossing points, blocking retreat and interdicting any resupply attempt. From the western front, sweep operations continued in a series of movements that lasted until well into June, each one driving Chinese remnants further into smaller and more untenable positions. Japanese after-action reports from this period read with the clinical detachment of men doing carpentry rather than fighting: so many positions cleared, so many prisoners taken, so many bodies counted. For the surviving Chinese forces, this period was one of desperate improvisation. With coordinated resistance impossible and every organized position either taken or surrounded, the remnant armies broke up into smaller columns and attempted to find their own routes out of the encirclement. Their experiences varied enormously depending on their starting position, the initiative of their commanders, and fortune. The remnants of the 3rd Army and 15th Army, under Zeng Wanzhong of the 5th Army Group, managed to push through to Yellow River crossings in the west and get their men across to the south bank, eventually reorganizing at Luoyang and Xin'an. The 93rd Army, which had occupied positions in the northeast, shook off the Japanese pursuit with sufficient speed and organization to cross at Yumenkou and escape into Hancheng County in Shaanxi Province, preserving more of its fighting strength than most. Wu Shimin's 98th Army — whose fighting at Wangcun had been one of the campaign's genuine bright spots — was pushed northward into the Taiyue Mountains, conducting guerrilla operations as it went. Wu himself was wounded during the withdrawal and would spend months recovering; he never fully recovered his health, and would die by suicide the following year. The 43rd Army under Zhao Shiling, which had held Yuanqu before its fall, managed a fighting withdrawal toward Fushan and Yicheng in the north. Pei Changhui's 9th Army conducted several days of guerrilla operations along the Daoqing Road before finding crossings at Xiaodukou and Guanyangdukou and getting across the Yellow River to safety. By May 27, the great majority of the Zhongtiao Mountain garrison had either been destroyed, captured, or withdrawn. The mountains that had held for three years were in Japanese hands. The battle, for all practical purposes, was over. The two sides emerged from the battle with starkly different accounts of what had happened, and the gap between those accounts is itself revealing. Japanese operational records claimed that their forces had killed approximately 42,000 Chinese soldiers on the battlefield, taken around 35,000 prisoners, captured enormous quantities of weapons and supplies, and inflicted total Chinese casualties exceeding 100,000. Against this, Japanese headquarters reported their own losses as 673 killed and 2,292 wounded — a ratio so lopsided that it seemed to describe a completely different kind of warfare. Whether or not the precise numbers are accurate, Japanese sources were consistent in portraying the battle as a catastrophic one-sided rout. The Chinese government's official figures, presented to the public and to allied nations, told a very different story. Nationalist records acknowledged approximately 13,751 officers and soldiers killed, wounded, gassed, or missing, while claiming Japanese casualties of around 9,900. These numbers, by the standards of the actual fighting and the geographic scale of the defeat, strained credulity. They were the numbers of a government that needed, for political and morale reasons, to minimize a disaster it could not afford to fully acknowledge. What is beyond dispute is the strategic result. The Zhongtiao garrison, which had held for three years against thirteen prior offensives, had been destroyed in twenty days. The last significant Nationalist Chinese presence north of the Yellow River in the region had been eliminated. Japan now controlled the northern bank of the river for a substantial stretch, had secured its supply lines through southern Shanxi, and had opened the door for future pressure on Luoyang and ultimately Xi'an. The mountain barrier that had allowed Chinese forces to threaten Japanese logistics was gone. It would not be rebuilt. Six senior Chinese generals had died in the battle: Wang Jun, Chen Wenqi, Liang Xixian, Tang Huaiyuan, Cun Xingqi, and others in the fighting. Their deaths were individually remarkable — men choosing death over surrender at rate that reflected both the desperate conditions of the battle and a code of honor that many of them explicitly invoked in their final moments. They were also, in aggregate, a measure of how completely the officer corps had been consumed. In the decades since the battle, historians have returned repeatedly to the question of why a position held for three years collapsed so completely in three weeks. The answers are neither simple nor flattering to the Nationalist government, and they were debated with bitter intensity in Chongqing even while the battle was still being fought. The most immediate cause was the removal of Wei Lihuang. This was not merely the loss of a capable general — it was the destruction of the institutional knowledge and personal relationships that had made the defense function. The Zhongtiao garrison was not simply a collection of soldiers in mountain positions; it was a system, carefully constructed over three years, that depended on specific command relationships, established logistics arrangements, and particular allocation of resources. Wei had built that system. Without him, and without any adequate replacement, it became something far more brittle than it appeared. Below the level of high command, the garrison's gradual corruption was an equally powerful factor. The trading networks, the opium commerce, the penetration by Japanese intelligence — these were not incidental problems but symptoms of a deeper institutional failure. An army that has spent three years in static defensive positions, chronically undersupplied and without a meaningful offensive mission, tends toward exactly this kind of decay. The Nationalist government's decision to prioritize anti-Communist friction operations over Zhongtiao's fighting readiness had removed the 4th Army Group — the backbone of the defense — and had consumed Wei Lihuang's attention and political capital at the worst possible moment. The Japanese plan, too, deserves credit it rarely receives in Chinese accounts of the battle. The three-pronged converging attack on Yuanqu was not simply overwhelming force applied to an obvious target. It was an elegant solution to the genuine tactical puzzle that the Zhongtiao mountains presented, exploiting the garrison's geographic vulnerability with a precision that turned the defenders' mountain terrain from an asset into a trap. The use of paratroopers to decapitate the Chinese command in the opening hours was a sophisticated operational concept that worked almost exactly as designed. Tada Shun was not lucky. He was thorough. Finally, there is the question of Chiang Kai-shek's own priorities. His reported weeping upon receiving news of the defeat was genuine, in the sense that the loss clearly shocked and grieved him. But the decisions that led to the defeat — Wei Lihuang's removal, the transfer of the 4th Army Group, the neglect of fortification and resupply in the months preceding the battle — had been made in Chongqing, not in the mountains. The Zhongtiao garrison had been strategically sacrificed, piece by piece, for political calculations in the internal factional struggle between Nationalists and Communists. Whether Chiang understood the cost of those choices before May 7, 1941, is debatable. After that date, it was difficult to pretend otherwise. The fall of the Zhongtiao Mountains did not end the War of Resistance, but it substantially worsened China's strategic position in the north. Over the following months, Japan used its consolidated control of southern Shanxi to increase pressure on the Yellow River line and probe toward Luoyang. The surviving Chinese armies, reorganized south of the river, were in no position to counterattack. The mountains themselves, stripped of their garrison and secured by Japanese occupation troops, became part of the extended Japanese occupation zone — a territory to be administered and exploited rather than contested. For the men who had fought there, the battle left wounds that went beyond the physical. Entire armies had to be rebuilt from remnants. Officers who had retreated, whether under orders or on their own initiative, faced boards of inquiry in an atmosphere of recrimination and blame-seeking. Some were cashiered. Some faced criminal proceedings. The search for culpability — which was genuine enough, since the failure was genuine — tended to fall on those least able to defend themselves rather than on the senior commanders and political figures whose decisions had created the conditions for defeat. The posthumous honors awarded to Tang Huaiyuan, Liang Xixian, Wang Jun, and the other officers who died in battle were heartfelt, and they were also convenient. The heroic dead could be elevated without requiring the living to answer uncomfortable questions. Their sacrifice was real. The system that wasted it was also real. In the broader history of the Second Sino-Japanese War, the Battle of Zhongtiao Mountain tends to be overshadowed by more famous engagements — Shanghai, Nanjing, Taierzhuang, the later battles along the Salween. This is partly because the Chinese side lost comprehensively and had little interest in memorializing the loss, and partly because the battle's significance was more strategic than dramatic. There was no great last stand, no single moment of heroism sufficient to redeem the catastrophe. There were only men dying in mountain passes, generals walking into rivers, and an entire defensive system disintegrating under the weight of its own contradictions. What the Battle of Zhongtiao Mountain represents, in the end, is a case study in how military positions are really lost. They are rarely lost on the battlefield alone. They are lost in the staff meetings where capable commanders are removed for political reasons. They are lost in the supply depots that never get restocked. They are lost in the informal economies that grow up when institutions stop functioning. They are lost in the intelligence assessments that are written and ignored. They are lost, finally and irreversibly, in the early morning hours when the guns open simultaneously on three sides and the men at the radios discover that no one is answering.     I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. On May 7, 1941, Japan opened a three-front assault on Zhongtiao Mountains; paratroopers disrupted command night. With the 9th Army withdrawing, Yuanqu fell on May 8, severing supply and trapping the garrison. Fighting raged through May 13, costing generals, until Japanese sweeps cleared pockets; survivors escaped south of Yellow River.

Año 1987. Región de Shanxi, China central. Una aldea de unas mil personas amanece completamente vacía: comidas a medio servir en los pucheros, pertenencias intactas, ni un solo cadáver. Solo el canto de los pájaros. La historia no se filtró hasta 2010 y, cuando lo hizo, llegó acompañada de rumores imposibles: ocho luces giratorias en el cielo, una plaga de serpientes, camiones militares cargando aldeanos en plena noche. Pekín niega que ocurriera. Internet recuerda otra cosa. Hoy abrimos en Días Extraños el expediente del «incidente del gato nocturno». Escucha el episodio completo en la app de iVoox, o descubre todo el catálogo de iVoox Originals

Last time we spoke about the second phase of the One Hundred Regiment Offensive.  During the second phase of the Hundred Regiments offensive, CCP forces emphasized strongpoint and transportation warfare across the Taihang/Jizhong area. Units were organized with wings containing Japanese positions while a central force struck deeper, as in the Renhe Dasu fighting in early October 1940. Night raids seized strongholds, while engineers and sabotage teams disrupted roads, bridges, and mobility, and ambushes targeted Japanese foraging and supply routes. Across these theaters, the strategy was consistent: make Japanese control porous by destroying or capturing local nodes and forcing constant repairs, re-routing, escorts, and slowed reinforcement, so occupation logistics and strongpoint networks could not function reliably. This approach supported wider offensives by isolating strongpoints, draining enemy strength, and giving Communist base areas room to endure and expand.   #204 The One Hundred Regiment Offensive Phase Three Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. After the two large-scale offensives carried out over wide areas of North China, the Japanese army did what it always did when control started to slip: it tried to turn mobile pressure back into something it could "manage" again. The Eighth Route Army's continued fighting had shown that Japanese-occupied space was not secure, and that base areas could still resist, strike, and persist even while under counterpressure. That was dangerous for occupation. If the enemy could keep operations going, Japanese lines of movement stayed uncertain and "stabilization" became a temporary illusion. To prevent the situation from worsening and to re-stabilize the occupied areas as quickly as possible, the Japanese mobilized heavy forces and launched retaliatory counter–"mopping-up" operations against anti-Japanese base areas in North China beginning October 6. The Japanese attempt wasn't only to punish; it was designed to take advantage of an asymmetry: the Eighth Route Army was striking and fighting continuously, and it did not have the luxury of resting, replenishing, and re-cohering as neatly as a garrison army might. Japanese commanders hoped that if they struck hard enough in enough places, the Communist main forces could be isolated, destroyed, or at least forced into a defensive posture that would break their operational tempo. At Liaodong and Yulin, Japanese reinforcements also created a second political-military stake. After the Yuliao Campaign ended, the Eighth Route Army headquarters issued instructions on October 1 to major regions, warning that enemy reinforcements in Liaodong and Yulin might use the opening to "sweep" the Taibei region. In the Communist operational mind, this wasn't just one threat; it was a pattern. A "sweep" could come as a wave that pushed inward, burned villages, destroyed supplies, and tried to force Communist forces out of their protected networks. Even if the offensive couldn't win a conventional decisive battle, it could aim to strip the base areas of people, food, and mobility—things that make guerrilla and strongpoint warfare possible. By October 19, 1940, the Eighth Route Army headquarters issued a counter–"mopping-up" operation plan, and civilian and military authorities in various regions launched counter-"mopping-up" operations accordingly. This is important background: in these campaigns, "mopping-up" was not only an army activity. The Japanese were attempting to break the base system itself—its logistics, its local administration, and the relationship between armed units and civilians who hid, moved, fed, and replaced them. So the counter-operations had to be just as systemic. The Communists needed to keep people alive, keep movement possible, and keep the enemy from consolidating inside a cleared space. In southeastern Shanxi's Taihang and Taiyue regions, the Japanese 1st Army aimed to strike the main force of the 129th Division and destroy anti-Japanese base areas by running a series of mopping operations from October 6 to December 5. The plan had a typical occupation logic: push through strongholds gradually, clear pockets methodically, and rely on local superiority—especially in manpower, logistics, and the ability to reinforce by road. And because the Communist main force had been operating without meaningful rest after the earlier offensives, the Japanese believed they could catch formations while they were still "in between battles." On October 6, in the Taihang region, more than 800 enemy troops from Wu'an in western Hebei began a "mopping-up" operation in the Yangyi area. By October 11, the Japanese posture escalated. Part of the Japanese Independent Mixed 4th Brigade departed from Liaoxian and Wuxiang, while part of the 36th Division departed from Lucheng and Xiangyuan; together they totaled over 3,000 troops. Coordinating from north and south, they carried out operations to "mop up" both banks of the Zhuozhang River between Yulin, Liaoxian, and Wuxiang, encircling and clearing the south side of the Yulin–Liaoxian highway. This emphasis on riverbanks and highway corridors reveals the Japanese method: move along terrain that controls movement, then compress enemy options until the defenders have to fight inside a narrowing space. The counter to that method required more than bravery. The Eighth Route Army's 385th and 386th Brigades, along with the 1st Column of the Decisive Battle, fought on inner lines—where they could move more rapidly between known local positions and threaten the enemy's flanks or supply behavior. Meanwhile the New 10th Brigade fought on outer lines, where it could intercept, delay, and force the enemy to spend time reacting instead of clearing. By the morning of October 15, the New 10th Brigade delivered a concrete example of that interception strategy. Two regiments ambushed an enemy motor-transport convoy at Gongjiagou on the Heliao Highway, destroying more than 40 vehicles and annihilating more than 100 Japanese soldiers escorting the convoy. The meaning of a convoy ambush is strategic even when the numbers are modest: vehicles represent speed, logistics, and reinforcement. If the enemy loses vehicles repeatedly, "mopping" becomes slower, and slower clearing creates openings for the defenders to reorganize, disperse, or shift main effort. After that, on October 17, the enemy forces that had been mopping up the convoy withdrew in different directions. Withdrawal in multiple directions is a sign that the Japanese clearing operation, meant to compress a space, had instead been forced into a reactive mode. It also hints at a recurring pattern in these years: Japanese units could clear what was already weak, but when defenders hit their movement corridors, the occupiers had to spend time and combat power simply to recover mobility. The next major sweep began October 20, 1940, and it was much larger. Nearly 10,000 troops—from the 36th Division and Independent Mixed Brigade No. 4—set off from multiple locations, including Wu'an, Liaoxian, Wuxiang, and Lucheng, to sweep the area east and west of the Qingzhang River, focusing on land between Matian and Zuohui. Crucially, that was not random ground. The Japanese sought to strike the CCP Central Committee Northern Bureau, the Eighth Route Army headquarters, and the 129th Division headquarters, along with party and government organs of the Jin-Ji-Yu Border Region, located together with Shexian and Piancheng. In other words, the Japanese targeted not just armed units but the political-administrative heart that makes base areas function. Once in the attack area, the Japanese carried out "mopping-up" operations paired with burning and killing for several days. That brutality wasn't only cruelty; it served a purpose. Burning villages, destroying crops, and killing civilians could deny the base area food and shelter while making local cooperation more difficult. Then, on October 26, the Japanese began to withdraw and carried out mopping-up in different areas on the way back. The base area was "severely damaged and destroyed," indicating that even when the Japanese didn't annihilate the main Communist force, they could still achieve degradation—hurting the system they needed to keep operating. But the Communists were not simply absorbing damage. On October 29, a force of over 500 men from the 36th Division, plus over 400 supply and laborers, was mopping up Huangyandong and advanced through Zuohui to Guanjia'nao east of Panlong, preparing to return to Wuxiang. This is where counter-mopping becomes operationally dangerous for the occupier. Supply and labor detachments move differently from combat formations, and they represent an enemy's assumption that the base area is being "cleared." The Eighth Route Army headquarters ordered, at 1:00 p.m., for the 129th Division to concentrate its main force to annihilate the enemy. That night, the 129th Division—uniting the main forces of the 385th and 386th Brigades, parts of the New 10th Brigade, and the First Column of the Death Squad—surrounded the enemy at Guanjia'nao with a plan to launch a general offensive at 4:00 a.m. The besieged enemy, besides quickly building fortifications, seized Fengkengding high ground southwest of Guanjia'nao under cover of darkness. The two high points helped defenders support one another and resist stubbornly. The battle lasted until dawn on October 31, when most of the enemy had been annihilated, leaving only more than 60 men to hold positions. Then reinforcements arrived—over 1,500 from Huangyandong—supported by more than 10 aircraft. The 129th Division withdrew, and the remaining enemy fled toward the flood, leaving behind more than 280 corpses. By then, most Japanese troops had withdrawn from the central base area. The background stake is clear: "mopping-up" could damage and burn, but if defenders could convert the Japanese attempt into a trap—especially when enemy units had become separated from their core and committed to clearing—they could turn a destructive operation into a costly one for the occupier. In early November, the Japanese continued. In Licheng south of Taihang, Japanese forces invaded Nanweiquan and Beiweiquan and then Xijing. Elsewhere, Japanese forces in Xiangyuan invaded Panlong via Xiying, attempting to attack Dongtian and the area around Zhuanbi, where the Eighth Route Army headquarters was located. In that moment, the 386th Brigade was ordered to rush to the north–south line of Damocun, east of Panlong, block the invading enemy, and cover the transfer of the Eighth Route Army headquarters. At 9:00 a.m. on November 3, 1940, fierce fighting broke out as the troops finished deploying near Damocun. The Japanese launched continuous attacks and captured some positions. The 386th Brigade held until 4:00 a.m. on November 4, then withdrew after the headquarters successfully moved. The Japanese attempt to launch a pincer attack failed, and they retreated to the Baijin Line on November 5. Even when Japanese action couldn't be fully blocked, the counter's aim was not only tactical survival but prevention of strategic encirclement—protecting the central institutions and preserving the ability to fight again. In the northern Taihang region, more than 2,500 enemy troops from Heshun arrived in Yushe on November 3 via Hanwang Town and Changcheng Town, reinforcing Japanese forces in the Yu, Liao, and Wu areas. Then they carried out repeated mopping operations south of the Yuliao Highway, including Jiangtang, Lingshang, Songjiazhuang, Guojiao, and Dayouyi. Harassment and attacks by military and civilians forced Japanese troops back into their strongholds by the 13th. A "40-day" counter-mopping operation in Taihang came to an end. The term "40-day" isn't only calendar time; it suggests that these were not one-off battles but sustained campaigns of movement, dispersal, and repeated harassment meant to drain the enemy's capacity. Starting November 17, the Japanese launched a multi-pronged attack on Qinyuan and the area north of Guodao Town. The attack involved part of the 37th Division from Qin County and Nanguan Town, part of the Independent Mixed Brigade from Pingyao, Jiexiu, and Huo County, and a battalion of the 41st Division from Hongdong—more than 7,000 troops deployed to attack Qinyuan and the north area. But the Taiyue Military Region response shows how the Communist counter-mopping wasn't always to meet force with force. To avoid the enemy's "sharp edge," the Taiyue Military Region formed two detachments—Qin East and Qin West—with leadership and main force moving to both sides of the Qin River outside the Japanese attack zone, targeting scattered Japanese troops instead of being fixed into a single killing field. By November 23, due to harassment by local armed forces, the Japanese reached the attack zone and then carried out dispersed mopping operations. Qinyuan County was the most severely damaged, with more than 5,000 people killed (about one-tenth of its population), nearly 10,000 livestock killed and over 7,000 stolen, and 30,000 to 40,000 houses destroyed. Those details are brutal, but they explain why background stakes mattered: "mopping-up" was meant to break the social base. If civilians died or fled, the guerrilla system became harder to sustain. The response from the Dayue Military Region seized the opportunity created by Japanese dispersal. On November 23, the 42nd Regiment of the Qinxi Detachment annihilated more than 100 Japanese soldiers in Guantan. On November 27, parts of the 42nd and 59th Regiments killed or wounded more than 160 in Huhanping and Mabei. The Qindong Detachment's 17th and 57th Regiments inflicted serious damage in a series of places—Guang'ao, Chenjiagou, Longfosi, Wuyuanzhen, Nanweicun, Nanli, and more. The 17th Regiment's battle at Longfosi annihilated more than 100 Japanese. Additional heavy losses were inflicted by the 212th Brigade in Jiaokou. By December 5, the Japanese were forced to withdraw from the Taiyue area in separate routes. Strategically, dispersal punished the occupier because scattered units are harder to protect and easier to ambush. Across the Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region, anti-"mopping-up" operations unfolded gradually, beginning with the Pingxi area, the first target of the Japanese on the path toward the Japanese-held headquarters and rail lines. Pingxi mattered because it directly threatened the headquarters of the Japanese North China Area Army and Beiping—the puppet regime's center—and also threatened the Pinghan and Pingsui railways, North China's main transportation lines. So Pingxi became an operational priority: if the occupier couldn't keep the rail network secure, their ability to reinforce and supply their own strongpoints suffered. On October 13, 1940, more than 10,000 Japanese and puppet troops attacked Sanpo, the central area of the Pingxi base area, in 10 routes. This attack used a methodical, steady approach: advance gradually, rely on strongholds, and cover 5 to 10 kilometers each day. In response, the Pingxi Military Sub-district countered using timely maneuvers of its main forces and extensive guerrilla warfare. Over more than a week of fighting, the enemy was constantly harassed and attacked, wearing them down. Although Japanese troops penetrated deep, they failed to identify the main force's movements. By November 21, when the encirclement tightened further, the Pingxi main force jumped out from the Sanpo area and moved southwest. Encountering the enemy at Pengtou, it then moved to the Yegu and Datai line east of Bancheng. After the Japanese entered the Sanpo area, they conducted widespread burning and killing and looted grain. Starting from the 23rd, the Japanese retreated in different routes. By the end of October, the main force had withdrawn from Pingxi, but more than 2,000 troops remained in the Pingxi anti-Japanese base area to build strongholds and roads. Strongholds were added in places like Changping and Wanping—14 strongholds alone—and villages such as Dongzhaitang and Dujiazhuang came under their control. The base area began to shrink and shrink. That shrinkage is the other background stake: even when guerrilla forces avoid annihilation, the occupier may still carve away space through fortification. On October 19, 1940, the Eighth Route Army headquarters instructed that enemy attacks in Pingxi and Taihang might turn around and attack the Beiyue area. The Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region needed to prepare quickly to crush these "mopping-up" operations, coordinating Party, government, military, and civilians and conducting in-depth combat mobilization. The main force should assemble in appropriate positions and prepare to annihilate one or two enemy forces decisively. The headquarters also instructed the 129th and 120th Divisions to cooperate actively. By November 9, 1940, the Japanese struck again in a massive sweep. The 110th Division, along with other units and more than 14,000 puppet troops, launched a "mopping-up" operation in the jurisdiction of the 1st Military Sub-district. The Japanese and puppet troops moved in coordinated lines: along the line of Yi County, Dalonghua, Wang'an Town, Laiyuan, and Chajianling from north to south, while those in Baoding and Mancheng moved east to west. The intent was to squeeze Communist sub-district forces into a narrow area for a decisive battle. On November 10, the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region issued operational guidelines and deployments for countering "mopping-up" operations. By the 12th, in response to Japanese widespread burning and killing, it further instructed that without hindering mobility, the main force could disperse a portion of troops—no more than one-third—to strike resolutely at attempts to burn and kill. That instruction captures the balance commanders tried to strike: disperse too much and you lose power; disperse too little and you become trapped by the occupier's brutality. The Japanese then attempted to pressure multiple places. On November 9, more than 6,000 enemy troops from Laiyuan, Yixian, and Baoding attacked Guantou, Yinfang, Huangtuling, and Shenbei. On the 12th, their attack failed; they burned and killed people before retreating in different routes. At that time, the 1st Military Sub-district assembled the 1st and 25th Regiments to intercept them. One enemy force of more than 800 was intercepted on the 14th as it retreated from Wujiazhuang to Yuangang; some were killed or wounded. Even so, the enemy broke through under aircraft cover and retreated to Guantou. On the way, it was intercepted again by the 20th Regiment, suffering heavy casualties, and it fled back to Mancheng. Then on November 13, more than 2,700 Japanese and puppet troops attacked the 3rd Military Sub-district; on November 14, about 2,600 advanced from Dingxiang, Dongye, and Wutai toward Fuping and its southwest area in two routes. The Japanese attacked with east-west coordination, launching joint attacks on Taiyu north of Fuping. The Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region headquarters and the command organs of the 3rd and 5th military sub-districts, along with the 2nd, 3rd, and 6th regiments and other troops, transferred to the outer line before the enemy encirclement formed. On the 16th, the Japanese launched a joint attack again on Taiyu and Zhangjiayu, and the guerrillas who failed to transfer fought hard. Commander Wang Pu and Deputy Director of the Political Department Hao Yuming were killed, and troops suffered more than 100 casualties. On November 18, the enemy from Taiyu quickly occupied Hanping City. By the 21st, enemy forces from Daying via Shentangbao and Wuwangkou, and from Wutai via Taihuai, Shizui, Longquanguan, and Xiaguan, also gathered in Fuping City. After occupying Fuping, the Japanese launched repeated attacks "sweeping" areas under the jurisdiction of the 3rd Military Sub-district from both inward and outward strongholds, conducting brutal burning and killing and destruction. On the night of November 21, the 2nd Regiment dispatched more than 30 men to raid Dangcheng and attack Japanese barracks with grenades. The Japanese panicked and fired guns and cannons all night. On the 26th, four plainclothes officers infiltrated Baoding and attacked a theater where the Japanese army was holding a meeting, causing panic among the Japanese. The enemy that had invaded the base area withdrew in different routes on the 25th. By December 3, 1940, most Japanese troops had withdrawn from the Beiyue area, but more than 1,000 remained along lines including Fuping, Wangkuai, Dangcheng, and Quyang to continue building points and roads in an attempt to occupy the area long-term. To force the enemy back, eliminate occupied points, and completely crush Japanese and puppet "mopping-up," the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region organized the Fuping–Wangkuai Campaign starting December 9, with the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 6th regiments participating. At 21:00 on December 14, the 6th Regiment attacked enemy forces in Dongzhuang. The 1st Battalion captured three fortified positions on the north mountain of Dongzhuang and rushed into the village, only for Japanese counterattacks to recapture fortified positions and kill or wound more than 170 Japanese during the counterfight. The 4th Regiment attacked the enemy in Fuping; the 2nd Regiment and guerrilla forces entered Dangcheng and Lingshan. On the 21st, more than 130 enemy soldiers escorting more than 100 pack animals carrying military supplies reached Wangkuai and were completely annihilated when they reached Wanglinkou. By December 26, an ambush in the Xuancun area of the Pinghan Railway destroyed 14 Japanese trains and their vehicles as well as three heavy artillery pieces. On the 27th, more than 1,200 enemy troops advancing from Dongzhuang in Fuping were attacked in Luoyu and Tumen, suffering more than 140 casualties. The remaining Japanese withdrew from Fuping, Dongzhuang, and Wangkuai starting New Year's Day 1941. By January 4, the 55-day anti-"mopping-up" campaign had basically ended, with the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region killing and wounding more than 2,000 Japanese and puppet troops while suffering 1,382 casualties itself. These numbers and dates show why background and stakes matter: the counter-mopping effort wasn't short. It was sustained, operationally demanding, and required continued offensive action even while facing superior Japanese resources. The pressure didn't end there. From October 25 to early November, about 4,000 Japanese troops, including the 16th Independent Mixed Brigade, launched a mopping operation in the Miyu and Loufan areas of the 8th and 3rd military sub-districts in northwestern Shanxi, but they were attacked by local soldiers and civilians. In mid-December, Japanese forces transferred additional strength: parts of the 37th Division from southern Shanxi and the 41st Division from southeastern Shanxi, along with parts of the 3rd, 9th, and 16th Independent Mixed Brigades and the 26th Division from northwestern Shanxi—totaling more than 20,000 troops—to prepare for a full-scale mopping operation in northwestern Shanxi. After the second phase of the Hundred Regiments Offensive ended, the 120th Division anticipated retaliation and actively prepared for counter-mopping. On October 30, the division was ordered to establish the Jin-Northwest Military Region, and on November 7, the military region was established in Lijiawan, Xing County. The Jin-Northwest Military Region had direct military sub-districts and six military sub-districts: the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 8th, and Yanbei. Then the occupier escalated. Starting December 14, 1940, the Japanese launched a full-scale mopping operation against the Jin-Northwest region. More than 5,000 enemy troops invaded the Mi-Yu Town area of the 8th Military Sub-district, more than 4,000 invaded Lin-Xian, and more than 6,000 attacked Xing-Xian and the area south of Bao-De from strongholds such as Lan-Xian and Qi-Lan. By December 23, Japanese forces had occupied all county towns, most market towns, and Yellow River crossings in the Jin-Northwest region except for Bao-De and He-Qu counties, and began to implement a systematic policy commonly described as the "Three Alls" policy. The "Three Alls" emphasis is the clearest expression of stakes turning lethal. Japanese troops and traitors disguised themselves as the Eighth Route Army to lure and kill masses. They sent out core detachments to attack and repeatedly sweep the area, seeking to annihilate party, government, and military leadership organs—focusing on destroying the rear organs and facilities that made Communist endurance possible. According to incomplete statistics, more than 5,000 people were brutally killed during these sweeps. In Xingxian County alone, 150,000 catties of grain were looted and burned; in the 4th Military Sub-district, more than 5,000 head of livestock were looted and killed; and more than 19,000 houses and cave dwellings were burned down. In the early stage of this anti-mopping campaign, the Jin-Sui Military Region mainly used a portion of its forces to cooperate with local troops and guerrillas in widespread guerrilla warfare. They harassed and contained the attacking enemy, disrupted enemy transportation, and covered the transfer of the masses. The main force avoided the enemy's sharp edge and moved to the outer line to seek opportunities to attack the Japanese army. This describes the classic guerrilla operational pattern: avoid being fixed into a single decisive trap, but create enough friction that enemy operations degrade into a struggle they can't sustain. repeated attacks and ambushes during the mopping period across Miyu Town and other areas—units striking repeatedly, destroying roads, cutting off enemy transportation, and attacking enemy strongholds north of Dawu. To thwart the Japanese army's plans to build roads and fortifications—plans that would make future sweeps easier—the Jin-Sui Military Region instructed, on December 27, all sub-districts to mobilize forces to disrupt Japanese road construction and fortification. The 358th Brigade attacked enemy road construction from Lanxian to Dashetou and from Puming to Chijianling; the Independent 1st Brigade sabotaged the Dawu–Linxian highway; and the 4th Column of the Death Squad sabotaged the Dawu–Fangshan highway. Part of the Independent 1st Brigade's 2nd Regiment organized over 2,000 civilians to sabotage the Dawu–Sanjiao highway twice, forcing the enemy in Linxian to detour through Fangshan to contact Lishi. The Lishi guerrillas led civilians in two sabotage attacks on the Lishi–Jundu highway, destroying over 30 "li" of road. Other units attacked strongholds along key highways and destroyed or disrupted the "maintenance committees" that surrounded newly built enemy strongholds. There were also direct raids—storming into Linxian County and capturing representatives of enemy maintenance organizations. Meanwhile, the Workers' and Patriots' Brigade carried out continuous sabotage on the Taifen Highway. As the enemy plans ran into persistent disruption, Japanese and puppet forces began to retreat in different routes starting January 2, 1941, and by January 24 they returned to their original strongholds. The Jin-Sui winter counter-mopping operation lasted 40 days, annihilated more than 2,500 enemy troops, destroyed 125 kilometers of roads and 23 bridges, and recovered all towns occupied by the enemy during the campaign. Here the stakes show through most clearly: the campaign was not merely about killing enemy troops. It was about preventing the occupier from building a durable, road-connected grid that would allow future sweeps to be faster, larger, and more decisive. At the wider campaign level, the Eighth Route Army also recorded its total effects from August 20 to December 5, covering roughly three and a half months. During that period, the Eighth Route Army fought 1,824 battles of varying sizes, killing or wounding 20,645 Japanese soldiers (including senior officers), killing or wounding 5,155 puppet troops, and capturing 281 Japanese soldiers and 18,407 puppet troops. 47 Japanese soldiers surrendered voluntarily, and 1,845 puppet troops defected, totaling 46,380 people. The Communists captured 5,942 guns and 53 artillery pieces, and destroyed extensive transportation infrastructure: 474 kilometers of railway, 1,502 kilometers of highway, 213 bridges, 37 railway stations, 11 tunnels, more than 217,000 rails, more than 1,549,000 sleepers, more than 109,000 telephone poles, and more than 424,000 kilograms of telephone wire. Five coal mines and 11 warehouses were destroyed. The narrative further adds that when including casualties of Japanese and puppet forces across related engagements—such as Fuwang and the anti–mopping operations in northwest Shanxi—the total number of casualties reached more than 50,880. Japanese statistics were also cited for damage assessment, noting destruction of track and bridges across key railways (Zhengtai, Tongpu, Pinghan), telegraph pole damage, power line cuts, and effects on coal production—such as the Jingxing New Mine being unable to produce coal for at least six months. These details underline a broader background stake: infrastructure damage was meant to weaken the occupier's ability to keep its occupation apparatus working, even after the direct battles ended. The price of that multi-month struggle was high for the Eighth Route Army as well. Over the three and a half months leading up to the Hundred Regiments Offensive, the Eighth Route Army suffered 17,000 casualties, and more than 20,000 were poisoned. During the Hundred Regiments Offensive itself, post-war statistics state that the 129th Division suffered 7,362 casualties and 450 missing persons, and the entire division suffered 7,812 casualties. When you connect these lines—offensive sabotage, counter-offensives, Japanese mopping-ups, and anti-mopping resistance—you see why this second wave of fighting mattered. It wasn't only about whether the Japanese could respond to the offensive. It was about whether both sides could sustain their operational logic: the Japanese trying to stabilize occupation through "mopping," and the Communists trying to preserve base systems through dispersal, harassment, and counter-moves that convert the occupier's clearing effort into something too costly to maintain. The background of the Hundred Regiments offensive, who authorized it, who planned it, and why, remains unclear. The Japanese response was so severe that, in retrospect, it appeared to some as if the offensive had been a mistake. Some leaders, especially Mao, may have wanted to disavow it. Indirect hints in Mao's writings in subsequent months and years suggest he may have viewed it critically or harbored misgivings from the start. It was not the kind of strategy Mao preferred. More than twenty years later, during the Cultural Revolution, Red Guards charged that Mao had not even known of the plan in advance because of Peng Dehuai's alleged duplicity, at the time, Peng was being denounced. While this seems unlikely, it may contain some substance. In his own defense against these charges, Peng stated that after the 8RA headquarters—located not in Yan'an but in Jin-Cha-Ji—planned the operation, it sent mobilization orders downward to each regional command and also notified the Central Military Affairs Commission headed by Mao. In the original plan, the action would begin in early September. But, Peng wrote, to prevent enemy discovery and to ensure simultaneous surprise assaults—thereby inflicting an even greater blow to the enemy and the puppets—they began about ten days earlier than scheduled, during the last week of August. "So we did not wait for approval from the Military Affairs Commission (this was wrong), but went right into combat earlier than planned." There is also the issue of the "spontaneous" participation of more than eighty regiments without authorization from the Eighth Route Army headquarters, and not from Yan'an as well. If Peng Dehuai's account is accepted (written in 1970, shortly before his death), then Mao and Party Central had no role in conceiving or planning the Hundred Regiments campaign. In that case, the "grand strategy" motivations for undertaking it largely vanish—except perhaps insofar as they were considered by Peng and his colleagues. One alleged motive was to counter any tendency toward capitulation by Chiang Kai-shek and the Chongqing regime: if the war heated up and the CCP threw itself into fighting, any accommodation between Chiang and Japan would look like cowardly surrender. A related consideration was the Communist leadership's sensitivity to the charge that they were simply exploiting the war to expand their influence—avoiding Japanese combat while letting KMT armies bear the real burden of fighting. The Nationalists gave major publicity to the accusation that CCP policy devoted 70 percent of effort to expansion, 20 percent to coping with the KMT, and only 10 percent to opposing Japan. A third suggested motive was to divert attention from the New Fourth Army's offensives against Nationalist forces in Central China, which were peaking around the same time. Peng Dehuai acknowledged the campaign was "too protracted," yet he defended its importance in maintaining the CCP's anti-Japanese image in the wake of anti-friction conflicts, in demonstrating the failure of the cage-and-silkworm policy, in returning at least twenty-six county seats to base control, and in keeping "wavering" elements in line. Even if these reasons mattered less than regional and tactical calculations in launching the campaign, they could always be used for propaganda afterward. Whatever misgivings Mao and Party Central may have had, the Party kept them to itself. Mao radioed congratulations to Peng after his victory, and in public statements the Hundred Regiments were turned into legend. Even if the Hundred Regiments campaign aimed to defeat Japanese pacification efforts, it did not succeed in a decisive way. Shocked and stung by the 8RA's action, the North China Area Army intensified its efforts to bring North China under tighter control. Under General Tada and then his successor, General Okamura Yasuji (July 1941–November 1944), the Japanese inflicted brutal, sustained violence against all North China bases. Between 1941 and 1944, about 150,000 Japanese troops were assigned full-time to pacification duty, supported by roughly 100,000 Chinese auxiliaries of widely varying description and effectiveness. The remainder of the NCAA (about 150,000–200,000 men) was assigned to other tasks such as garrisoning major cities and containing Nationalist forces. Communist regulars were estimated at around 250,000 within base areas and 40,000 in SKN. The Japanese and their Chinese auxiliaries invested even more heavily than before in constructing moats, ditches, palisades, and blockhouses. Japanese sources claimed that by 1942 their forces had built 11,860 kilometers of blockade line and 7,700 fortified posts, mostly in the Hebei plains and the foothills of the Taihang mountains. A massive trench ran for 500 kilometers along the western side of the Pinghan railway line, with a depopulated and constantly patrolled zone on either side. The 250 Japanese outposts established in southern Hebei by December 1940 were more than quadrupled by mid-1942. These became the key means of controlling plains areas; by the end of 1941, all Communist bases in such terrain had been reduced to guerrilla status. Many main force units—such as those under Liu Cheng'ao and Yang Xiufeng—were compelled to move westward into mountains to survive. What distinguished the new Tada–Okamura approach from earlier tactics was the much larger and more protracted search-and-destroy thrust into the core mountain-base areas. They also replaced selective repression with indiscriminate, generalized violence. These infamous "Three-All" mop-up campaigns meant: kill all, burn all, loot all. Unable to distinguish ordinary peasants from Communists, the Japanese waged war on everyone. After attempting to seal off major consolidated regions in the base areas, they sent in very large detachments to search for Communist forces, civilian cadres, and activists. They also tried to destroy base facilities and war material stockpiles; to disrupt agriculture by burning crops or interfering with planting and harvesting; and to seize grain stores. Entire villages were razed, and everything alive found there was killed. Unlike earlier mop-ups that swept through an area and then departed, these campaigns left troops in the targeted zones for extended periods, "combing" the area back and forth and building at least temporary strongpoints in more accessible parts of mountain bases. These mop-up operations took a heavy and painful toll on rural populations. No doubt the harsh tactics and atrocities frequently committed during these actions did cause many peasants, rich and poor alike, to harbor deep hatred of the Japanese and to commit more fully to the Communist side. But intra-party sources also portray cases in which repression worked even more effectively than earlier attempts to drive a wedge between party and peasantry. As one internal assessment put it: If we only stress concealment… we are bound to be divorced from the masses. The morale of the masses cannot be sustained for long either. On the other hand, if we only seek fleeting gratification in careless fighting, we may also invite still more cruel enemy suppression. That will also alienate the masses. Communist spokesmen acknowledged that, in North China base areas, the population under Party control fell from 44 million to 25 million, while the Eighth Route Army declined from 400,000 to 300,000. Local records present an even grimmer picture. By 1942, 90 percent of the plains bases had been reduced to guerrilla zones or outright enemy control. In the mountainous Taiyue district within the Jin-Cha-Lu-Yi base, one cadre admitted that "not a single county was kept intact and the government offices of all its twelve counties were exiled in Jin-yuan." All twenty-six county seats occupied following the Hundred Regiments fighting were lost. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Japan tried to regain control through retaliatory "mopping-up" operations starting in October 1940. In response, the Eighth Route Army and its commanders issued counter-measures: coordinate party, government, military, and civilians; keep mobility while dispersing forces when possible; and focus on annihilating incoming enemy units decisively. Counter-sweeps and anti-pacification actions continued through December, involving repeated ambushes and sabotage of roads, highways, and fortification efforts. 

In this week's episode of China Insider, Miles Yu reviews the moratorium of US weapon sales to Taiwan as part of a $14 billion package approved by Congress, and how the decision impacts cross-strait relations. Next, Miles covers the bilateral dialogue held between Presidents Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping and assesses the outcomes and joint statement issued by both leaders following the summit. Finally, Miles discusses the tragic mining disaster at the Liushengyu mine in Shanxi Province, and analyzes how this crisis compares to prior mining disasters and China's ongoing issues with adherence to safety regulations. China Insider is a weekly podcast project from Hudson Institute's China Center, hosted by China Center Director and Senior Fellow, Dr. Miles Yu, who provides weekly news that mainstream American outlets often miss, as well as in-depth commentary and analysis on the China challenge and the free world's future. 

Special support is being extended to the families of the 82 people killed in Friday's deadly mine accident in Shanxi province, as rescuers continue to work around the clock to search for the two missing miners on Monday and the process of ensuring every possible aid for the families of the victims progresses steadily.山西省上周五发生重大煤矿事故，造成 82 人遇难。目前相关部门正向遇难者家属提供专项帮扶。周一，救援人员仍在连夜搜救两名失联矿工，各项善后帮扶工作有序推进。A gas explosion struck the Liushenyu coal mine in Qinyuan county of Changzhi in Shanxi province at 7:29 pm on Friday, killing 82, while two remained missing.上周五晚间 7 时 29 分，山西省长治市沁源县留神峪煤矿发生瓦斯爆炸事故，事故造成 82 人遇难、2 人失联。A total of 128 people were injured and were receiving hospital treatment, including two in critical condition and two in serious condition. Another 35 people with minor injuries have returned home.事故共造成 128 人受伤并入院救治，其中 2 人病危、2 人重伤；另有 35 名轻伤人员已出院回家。Dedicated support teams have been assigned to each victim's family. The teams have been offering emotional support and psychological counseling to help ease the pain of losing a loved one, Feng Rui, a member of the support teams, told China Daily on Monday.帮扶工作组已一对一对接每位遇难者家属。帮扶人员冯瑞周一在接受《中国日报》采访时表示，工作人员持续开展情绪疏导与心理慰藉工作，帮助家属缓解丧亲之痛。"The support teams are in the process of gathering detailed information about family structure, household income and the concerns of the victims' families, which can help in carrying out more effective follow-up actions," Feng said.冯称：“工作组正在逐一摸排家属的家庭构成、收入情况以及实际诉求，以便后续开展更有针对性的帮扶工作。”He added that it is essential not only to ensure that families receive adequate compensation in a timely manner, but also to provide emotional support and long-term care.他补充道，既要保障家属及时足额获得赔偿，也要持续做好心理疏导与长期关怀工作。On Monday, surveillance video footage that caught the exact moment of the explosion was made public. It showed that dust and smoke from the powerful blast engulfed the mine shaft within seconds and were visible near the surface within a minute.周一，记录爆炸瞬间的监控视频对外公布。画面显示，剧烈爆炸产生的烟尘数秒内便吞没巷道，一分钟内就蔓延至井口区域。When a gas explosion occurs in a confined space, the resulting shock wave can cause severe injuries to the human body and also lead to the collapse of the structure, which can crush people, said Huo Kaifeng, a veteran mine rescue expert.资深矿山救援专家霍凯峰表示，密闭空间内发生瓦斯爆炸时，产生的冲击波会造成人员重伤，还会引发巷道坍塌，导致人员被掩埋。"After the explosion, the temperature shoots up, causing burns and scalding. Additionally, a gas explosion produces carbon monoxide, and oxygen levels in the confined space rapidly fall, leading to suffocation. Typically, such explosions occur without much warning, leaving very limited time for people to escape," Huo said.霍凯峰介绍：“爆炸发生后现场温度急剧升高，极易造成人员烫伤、烧伤。同时，瓦斯爆炸会产生一氧化碳，密闭空间内氧气含量快速下降，进而引发人员窒息。这类事故往往突发猝不及防，人员逃生时间极短。”On Monday, the search for the missing miners continued in treacherous conditions created by cave-ins and flooding in the tunnels.周一，救援人员在巷道坍塌、积水严重的复杂危险环境中，继续开展失联人员搜救工作。At a meeting on work safety on Sunday attended by top officials of Shanxi province, including Tang Dengjie, Party secretary of the province, officials said the accident resulted in heavy casualties, exposing numerous weaknesses in the province's work safety system. The cost was extremely severe, and the lessons learned are profound.上周日，山西省召开安全生产工作会议，省委书记唐登杰等省领导出席会议。会议指出，此次事故伤亡惨重，暴露出当地安全生产体系存在诸多漏洞，代价十分惨痛，教训极为深刻。As one of China's key coal-producing regions, Shanxi has always made coal mine safety a top priority in its work safety efforts. The province will thoroughly inspect and rectify safety risks and hazards in the coal mine sector and fundamentally reverse the current situation of frequent coal mine accidents, a statement issued after the meeting said.会后发布的通报称，山西作为国家重要煤炭生产基地，始终将煤矿安全作为安全生产工作的重中之重。全省将全面排查整治煤矿领域安全隐患，从根本上扭转煤矿事故多发的局面。The statement added that the province will thoroughly uncover and strictly investigate issues such as illegal underground operations, falsification of safety monitoring data, unclear numbers of workers going underground, and illegal subcontracting of coal production.通报还提到，山西将彻查并严肃查处井下违规作业、篡改安全监测数据、下井人员管理混乱、煤炭生产违法转包等各类问题。grieving /ˈɡriːvɪŋ/adj. 悲痛的；哀伤的explosion /ɪkˈsploʊʒn/n. 爆炸；爆发counseling /ˈkaʊnsəlɪŋ/n. 心理辅导；咨询服务treacherous /ˈtretʃərəs/adj. 危险的；暗藏风险的

President Donald Trump on Sunday wrote on Truth Social that he has told his representatives not to rush into a deal with Iran and that “time is on our side.” He added that a deal is not fully negotiated yet, but if he were to sign a deal with Iran, it will be good and proper.The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention added public health screening for Ebola at Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport. The screening applies to passengers returning from Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, and South Sudan.At least 82 people were killed and some 120 others were injured in a gas explosion at a coal mine in China's coal-producing Shanxi province. Rescue efforts are underway, and the cause of the explosion, and potential safety lapses, are under investigation.

When I reached the road leading to the Liushenyu coal mine in Qinyuan county, Shanxi province, around noon on Saturday, it had already been sealed off.Ambulances waited nearby. Rescue vehicles rushed in and out. Police cordons marked the boundary between the outside world and a rescue operation unfolding deep underground — in tunnels rendered extremely dangerous by cave-ins, flooding and toxic gases.A huge explosion rocked the coal mine at 7:29 pm on Friday. As of Saturday night, local authorities confirmed that 82 people had been killed and two remained unaccounted for. A total of 128 people were injured and taken to hospitals for treatment.For rescuers at the site, every descent into the mine shaft was driven by one hope — to find signs of life.Among those helping in the aftermath of the disaster is 54-year-old Guang Xinhai, head of the Shanxi Huayang mine rescue squad, one of China's national-level mine emergency rescue teams. Guang, who has more than three decades of experience in mine rescues, described the operation as exceptionally difficult.After receiving the call late on Friday, Guang and his 67-member team set out for Qinyuan overnight and arrived at the site in the early hours of Saturday."We searched for more than eight straight hours, checking every possible corner," Guang said after coming out of the mine on Saturday. "We want to hold on to every little hope of life and bring the miners out as soon as possible."Near the mine entrance, rescue personnel waited for their turn to descend to the affected area. As soon as one team returned above ground, another made its way down. Some rescuers, their faces blackened with coal dust, rested briefly on the open ground before heading for the next round of efforts.One rescuer, still covered in dust after emerging from the shaft, said it was the largest rescue operation he had ever joined."As long as there is hope, we will make every possible effort," he said.The difficult circumstances could be fathomed from the equipment being sent underground. Rubber boats, waterproof suits and other supplies were rushed into the mine to deal with flooded sections of the tunnel. Officials said the presence of toxic gases inside the mine shaft posed the risk of secondary disasters.Villagers living nearby recalled hearing a loud explosion on Friday evening. Some miners managed to escape on their own, but others were not so lucky. Several survivors later spoke of thick dust and a deafening noise when the accident took place.A retired miner who once worked at the mine had also rushed to the site. Familiar with the underground layout, he hoped his knowledge could help the rescue teams."I really did not want to see an accident like this happen," he said.Rescue work continues at the site. Teams of rescue personnel are working around the clock in shifts and equipment is being sent to support the search."My greatest wish now is that the miners return home safely," said Guang, the rescuer.His team has deployed robots underground to improve search efficiency and rescue safety.

Uma explosão de gás em uma mina de carvão deixou ao menos 90 mortos na província de Shanxi, no norte da China.

Ed. note: Please be advised that there's some very heavy subject matter discussed in this episode. In Part 2, we pick up where we left off in Part 1. Jenny left San Francisco for college, heading east to go to school at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign. Part of it was wanting a change of scenery. As she says, she "wanted to see snow." But all it took was a few winters before she realized how good the weather in SF is. She also wanted to return to help take care of her mom, who was getting older. This was around the time that Jenny went to China and came back determined to spread the untold histories of what happened in her homeland during WWII. The nonprofit learning curve was steep, and it was almost certainly going to mean shifting gears lifestyle-wise, due to not having as much income. During the first year of Pacific Atrocities Education's life, it was fiscally sponsored by Intersection for the Arts, an SF-based arts nonprofit. Jenny enrolled in and went to as many workshops as she could. She felt generally well-respected and taken care of. With her nascent nonprofit off and running, Jenny traveled to a part of China she had never been to before—Shanxi—to visit and talk with women who survived the war as so-called comfort women (think "sex slaves"). Jenny goes on a sidebar here to talk about some of the things the Japanese did to women during their occupation of China. It involved the Japanese not wanting their soldiers to pick up STDs while in a foreign country. If they could control the situation, i.e., enslave Chinese women to have sex with their soldiers, they could solve that "problem." So disgusting. Hearing these women's stories wasn't easy for Jenny. One story involved one of the women being pregnant after the war ended. She went back to live with her mother, who helped her along. When the baby was born, they abandoned it. Just horrible all around. We sidebar, a little, to talk about the ripple effect of wars and how it's not just tanks and bombs and guns and soldiers fighting other soldiers. There are untold numbers of innocent folks caught up in the destruction, folks whose lives are forever upended, if they even survive. Jenny says that the experience on that trip to China gave her perspective on her own childhood in the Tenderloin. She thought maybe it wasn't so bad after all. It wasn't only women in China. She went and spoke with women in California's Central Coast area about their own experiences as "comfort women." These were Filipinas who relocated to the US after the war. Most of their families didn't know their stories. And it wasn't until the Obama era that light started to be shone on them and what they'd been through. Obama's administration was the first to recognize them, but it was complicated, to say the least. Jenny talks about the delicacy of what she set out to do. Specifically, the difficulty of balancing the need to share these stories, but also to be respectful of the lives impacted by them. In addition to the research she was undertaking for Pacific Atrocities Education, Jenny was also writing a book on the topic. She was able to scan documents from the National Archives, documents the US has due to its occupation of Japan following World War II. One of the more alarming things she found in digging through archives was that the United States traded immunity with Japan's Unit 731 scientists, whose work involved developing biological weapons. Yikes. She goes on to describe other atrocious acts the Japanese undertook in China, stuff so horrible and inhumane I have trouble enumerating it here. I ask Jenny how she handles learning about such terrible stuff. She chalks it up to its being mission-driven work. We chat a little about how the people doing bad things never get held accountable, something true to this day. That immunity mentioned above was given to the Japanese scientists in exchange for the information contained in their research of biological weapons, naturally. You read that right: The US looked the other way while essentially poaching incredibly deadly weapons from its vanquished enemy. Please visit pacificatrocities.org to learn more and get involved. Their YouTube channel is called Pacific Front Untold. Follow them on Instagram @pacificatrocitiesedu. We recorded this episode at Fort Mason in April 2026. Photography by Jeff Hunt

Last time we spoke about the New Fourth Army Incident. Across the Second Sino-Japanese War, the CCP entered after the setbacks of the 1930s, seeking to become a national leader in resistance while remaining cautious toward the Nationalist government. The 1936 Xi'an Incident reshaped politics, and by August 1937 KMT–CCP agreements defined a working arrangement: the CCP acknowledged KMT leadership and integrated its forces, while still pursuing political space and autonomy. As the war progressed, the CCP focused on defining its relationship with the KMT and keeping operational independence during cooperation. Mao Zedong managed this alliance by promoting a united front against Japan, yet protecting CCP revolutionary goals and internal control. The establishment of the Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army marked this military reorganization. Throughout, the CCP feared that KMT collaboration with Japan could enable a peace settlement that would undermine communist legitimacy and restrict the party's future authority thereafter.   #202 The One Hundred Regiment Offensive Phase One Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Simultaneously with the friction between the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the Japanese were also working to take control of—and extract value from—most of the territory they had nominally conquered. Treating these two processes separately—"friction" on the one hand and "consolidation" on the other—does violence to the real difficulty of the CCP's dilemma: the Party often had to confront both problems at the same time. At certain moments, the CCP was effectively forced to wage a two-front struggle. Even so, if the worst of the KMT–CCP friction had already eased by 1941, the most serious and painful challenges posed by Japanese consolidation were still ahead. To recover anything close to reality, the two timelines have to be read together and placed on top of one another. The Japanese understood that consolidation could not be postponed, because much of the land behind the furthest reaches of their army was still only weakly under their actual control. In some places, order could be restored by relatively direct methods: rebuilding local administration and policy authority; repairing transportation and communications; enrolling Chinese personnel—usually, as it turned out, people of dubious reliability—as police or militia under puppet regimes; registering the local population; and requiring identity cards. In true old-style Chinese fashion, collective security practices were used widely. One form was the familiar bao-jia system, in one variant or another. Another was the so-called "railway-cherishing village": a village would be assigned a nearby stretch of track, and if residents failed to "cherish" it, they were held collectively responsible. Yet early Japanese weakness in northern China is vividly illustrated by an incident in the summer of 1938. Three young foreigners—vacationing from teaching in Peiping (Beijing)—were curious about events and about what people were doing. They loaded their bicycles on a southbound train, got off at Baoding, and rode west until they ran into Eighth Route Army detachments. In the early period of the war, commanders generally wanted to rely on more mobile forms of warfare. Mao, however, insisted on a strategy of de-escalation and dispersion: breaking the 8RA and New Fourth Army into small units as nuclei for combat, recruitment, political work, and base-area construction. Under this approach, few engagements could be truly dramatic in scale, and most were constrained by the need to survive. Each skirmish had to be carefully planned. The CCP would use local intelligence and the element of surprise so that a detachment could strike and withdraw before its limited ammunition ran out or before enemy reinforcements arrived. Small Japanese patrols and puppet units could be ambushed not only to seize weapons and other material, but also to inflict casualties. Active collaborators, or Japanese-sponsored administrative personnel, could be assassinated. Above all, Communist action aimed to disrupt transportation: mining roads; cutting down telegraph poles, stealing wire, and cutting rail lines; sabotaging rolling stock; and, at times, carrying off steel rails so that primitive arsenals could be supplied. Attempting derailments was also part of the effort. Destroying a bridge or a locomotive counted as a major achievement. Both the Communists and the Japanese understood that these tactics did not decisively shift the overall strategic balance. Still, they worked at other levels. For the Japanese, the result was a constant series of small wounds—painful, bleeding, and potentially infectious. Few areas in the countryside felt truly safe. Japanese field commanders documented growing frustration as they tried to eliminate resistance, restore administration, collect taxes, and prepare for more systematic and effective economic exploitation of conquered territory. Guerrilla warfare against the Japanese cannot be judged only in conventional battle terms—numbers of engagements, casualties, or territory occupied. It had to be evaluated politically and psychologically as well, exactly as Mao repeatedly emphasized. Since the CCP's wartime legitimacy depended on its patriotic claims, enough fighting had to be carried out to maintain credibility. Moreover, military success mattered for mobilizing the "basic masses," persuading wavering people to keep an open mind, and neutralizing opposition. As the logic put it, it was not that people always chose the side that was winning, but that few would ever join a side they believed was losing. One experienced cadre described the effect this way: Among the guerrilla units… there is a saying that "victory decides everything." No matter how hard it has been to recruit troops, supply the army, raise the masses' anti-Japanese fervor or win over the masses' sympathy, after a victory in battle the masses fall all over themselves to send us flour, steamed bread, meat, and vegetables. The masses' pessimistic and defeatist psychology is broken down, and many new guerrilla soldiers swarm in. But once the Japanese began to demand a heavy price for every engagement—whether the Communists won or not—this attitude began to change. In North and Central China, the Japanese earliest pacification sweeps created comparatively little trouble for the CCP. At first, the Japanese made few distinctions among Chinese forces. They simply tried to mop up or disperse them without regard to character. Over time, however, they realized that these sweeps actually made it easier for the CCP to expand. By the second half of 1939, Japanese methods became more discriminating. Chinese non-Communist forces would step aside while the Japanese hunted specifically for the 8RA, the N4A, and their local affiliates. The Japanese also made more direct appeals to non-Communist forces. According to Japanese army statistics, during the eighteen months from mid-1939 to late 1940, around 70,000 men from more or less regular Nationalist units in North China alone went over to the Japanese. The Japanese also reached informal "understandings" with several regional commanders whose forces together might have totaled as many as 300,000 men. This, of course, corresponded to what the CCP denounced as "crooked-line patriotism"—the "crooked-line" collaboration that preserved certain units so they could be used in future anti-Communist operations. When pacification efforts were intensified from late 1939 and throughout 1940, differences also appeared in the strategies Japanese armies used in North versus Central China. In North China, the approach relied heavily on military means, with political tactics limited largely to recruiting collaborators. In Central China, Japanese authorities did not hesitate to use military force, but they also attempted to supplement it with more comprehensive political and economic solutions by setting up tightly controlled "model peace zones." Although both approaches ultimately failed, they created enormous difficulties for Chinese Communists—until, in 1943, the Japanese were forced to ease off because the Pacific War against the United States became too burdensome. Careful reading of detailed intra-party documents suggests that repression also demobilized peasant support and terrorized populations into apathy, grudging acquiescence, or even active collaboration with the Japanese. In a locality already reduced from consolidated base status to guerrilla status, capacity and will were often too weak to administer complex reforms in systematic fashion. In other words, passive survival—defensive survival—was at least as important as what lay behind the heroic public images the Party projected. Systematic pacification in North China in late 1939 and 1940 radiated outward. It moved from areas held more or less firmly by the Japanese and their puppets into guerrilla and contested zones. The ultimate objective was to crush resistance or render it ineffective. The method was first to sweep the area clear of anti-Japanese elements, and then to establish a chain of interconnected strongpoints that could quickly reinforce one another. After that, puppet government would be expanded so it could take increasing responsibility for civil administration and "pacification maintenance," while Japanese forces repeated the initial steps further outward into contested territory. Violence was used selectively against individuals, groups, or villages accused of acts of resistance. This selective violence aimed to deter active participation in CCP-led programs, deprive Communist forces of a population willing to shelter them, and persuade informers to come forward. That was, at least, the theory of the strategy. In practice, the basic framework of the strategy depended on the main transport lines. Railways and roads—if properly fortified and protected—could separate resistance forces from one another and deny them one of their most effective weapons: mobility. These "cage" tactics (chiyu-lung, "jiu-lung") made it possible to enlarge pacified areas by "nibbling" outward, "as a silkworm feeds on mulberry leaves" (ts'an-shih). At the same time, the approach aimed to exploit North China's economy more effectively. To this end, the Japanese worked to improve and extend both railway and road networks. When the war began, in Shanxi the Cheng-Tai (Shijiazhuang–Taiyuan) and Tong-Pu (Datong–Tongguan) lines were metre-gauge, incompatible with the standard-gauge lines elsewhere in China—part of Yan Xishan's design to prevent deeper penetration into his province. By the end of 1939, the Japanese used forced labor to convert both lines to standard gauge. One benefit was the easier transportation of high-quality anthracite coal from the Qingxing mines (on the Cheng-Tai line) to industrial users in North China and Manchukuo. Of the newly constructed roads and railway lines, the most important was the Te-Shih line—from Dezhou in northeastern Shandong to Shijiazhuang. Construction began in June 1940 and finished in November, connecting the Tianjin–Pukou, Beiping–Hankou, and Cheng-Tai lines. This made it easier to move troops and transport raw cotton. Once the Te–Shih link was completed, the Japanese had direct connections between the point of their furthest advance at the elbow of the Yellow River and all major cities of North China, and beyond to Manchukuo. Communist sources began to speak of a "transportation war," noting with concern the moats and ditches, the blockhouses, and the frequent patrols protecting the lines. Both militarily and economically, these measures weighed heavily on forces led by the Communists in North China and on the populations under their control—especially the plains of central and eastern Hebei. One indicator of effectiveness was the rapid decline in "acts of sabotage" against North China railways in 1939 and the first half of 1940. A cadre in Jin-Cha-Ji reported in mid-1940: "The enemy has adopted a blockhouse policy, like that of the Jiangxi Soviet. They are spread like a constellation. In central Hebei alone, there are about 500, separated by one to three miles." Normal trading patterns were disrupted as Japanese or puppet occupiers took over administrative and commercial centers, and peasants found themselves caught between regulations imposed by the Communists on one side and those enforced by the other side. Finally, landlords, moneylenders, loafers, bandits—everyone who felt damaged by the new order inside base areas—could use pacification programs to try to recover influence or simply take revenge. Some became informers. After 8RA and local units were driven away, they could kill remaining cadres or activists and settle scores with the peasants who had supported them. Until the "first anti-Communist upsurge" was defeated, local elites and other disaffected elements might also seek support from Nationalists. It was even possible for an armed band to operate for several months inside consolidated regions of the CCP base, killing cadres as it went. Peng Dehuai later recalled this period in a way that underscored how pressure translated into wavering and collapse. Under the enemy's brutal pressure, in some districts the masses even hesitated or capitulated. From March to July 1940, large areas of the North China base were reduced to guerrilla regions. Before the "Cage-bursting battle",, they controlled only two county seats: Pingxun in the Taihang mountains and Pien-kuan in northwest Shanxi. Masses who previously had one set of obligations now had two—one toward the anti-Japanese regime and one toward the puppet regime. The situation in North China had not yet become a full crisis, but it was certainly serious. Action was needed to regain initiative. On 22 July 1940, Zhu De, Commander-in-Chief of the Eighth Route Army, Peng Dehuai Deputy Commander-in-Chief, and Zuo Quan Deputy Chief of Staff jointly issued the Preliminary Battle Order, laying out the strategic goals for the coming operation. The order stated: "To respond to the enemy's 'prison cage policy,' obstruct its advance toward Xi'an, create favorable conditions in the North China theater, and strike at the national resistance initiative, we have decided to take advantage of the concealment provided by tall summer millet and the rainy season to carry out a large-scale sabotage operation on the Shijiazhuang–Taiyuan railway (Zheng–Tai Line)." It required the participation of at least 22 regiments from the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region, the 129th Division, and the 120th Division. The main objective was to "completely destroy key points along the Zheng–Tai Line" and to "cut the railway for a prolonged period." On 8 August, the headquarters of the Eighth Route Army issued the Operational Battle Order, further clarifying how forces would be deployed. The Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region was assigned to attack the eastern section of the Zheng–Tai Railway (from Niangzi Pass to Shijiazhuang). The 129th Division was assigned the western section (from Niangzi Pass to Yuci). The 120th Division was tasked with targeting the northern segment of the Tongpu Railway and the Fen–Li Highway. The order also required all troops to begin combat operations on 20 August, and emphasized that "the success of the campaign should be assessed primarily by the extent of damage inflicted on the Zheng–Tai Line." The operation was prepared under strict secrecy. Various elements of the Eighth Route Army conducted thorough preparations before the campaign. Reconnaissance teams, hidden and protected with the help of local villagers, penetrated deep into areas near the Shijiazhuang–Taiyuan railway to carefully map Japanese strongholds, enemy troop dispositions, and local terrain. At the same time, both military and civilian communities mobilized to stockpile grain, ammunition, and tools needed for railway sabotage; blacksmiths were organized to manufacture crowbars, pickaxes, and other essential equipment. Specialized military training covered demolition methods and techniques for dismantling railways, including tactics such as heating and bending steel rails. Civilian mobilization played a crucial role: militia and support teams took on tasks such as transport, medical aid, and coordination with military units. In Central Shanxi alone, more than 10,000 militia members were mobilized. The Eighth Route Army headquarters repeatedly stressed the need for operational confidentiality, stating: "Before the battle begins, the plan must remain strictly classified; until preparations are completed, the campaign objective may be disclosed only to brigade-level commanders." With the cover of dense summer millet, troops secretly assembled within their designated operational areas. Before the battle, the Japanese North China Area Army estimated the strength of the communist regular forces at about 88,000 men in December 1939. Two years later, they revised the estimate to 140,000. On the eve of the battle, communist forces had grown to between 200,000 and 400,000 men, organized in 105 regiments. By 1940, the growth had become so significant that Zhu De ordered a coordinated offensive by most of the communist regular units—46 regiments from the 115th Division, 47 from the 129th, and 22 from the 120th—against Japanese-held cities and the railway lines that connected them. According to the Communist Party's official statement, the battle began on 20 August.  On August 20, 1940, the rain didn't stop the campaign—it changed the battlefield. It slowed movement, blurred distance, and turned rivers and muddy roads into obstacles that could just as easily trap your own men as your enemy's. Along the districts bordering the Zhengtai Railway, the Eighth Route Army still moved, slipping through valleys and river crossings, bypassing Japanese posts, and positioning forces on both sides of the line as night settled in. By dark, the plan became a coordinated strike meant to hit the enemy before they could properly react. Across the entire Zhengtai Railway, attacks went out with timing designed to disorient Japanese defenders—so that their "first realization" arrived only after the railway itself was already being attacked and the window to respond effectively had slipped away.   A key portion of that strike fell to the right column of the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region, centered on the 5th and 19th Regiments, with the mission of sabotaging the Niangziguan to Luanliu section. At 20:00 on August 20, part of the 5th Regiment infiltrated Niangziguan Village for the first time, overwhelmed the puppet troops stationed there, and seized the village by dawn. After that opening cut, the main force moved in to cover the engineers, destroy enemy fortifications, and blow up the Guandong Railway Bridge. When the sabotage was done, they withdrew from Niangziguan on their own initiative, leaving the enemy to deal with the destruction rather than being pulled into a long, grinding engagement.   That same night, at Mohe Beach along the Zhengtai line, another action unfolded. The 1st Company of the 1st Battalion of the 5th Regiment attacked the station and was immediately met with a counterattack by Japanese forces. By dawn on August 21, the company withdrew—an adjustment, not defeat—and then attacked again the same night after crossing the Mian River. This time the enemy retreated into barracks to resist more stubbornly, with nearly 1,000 Japanese troops holding Mohe Beach. Heavy rain had swollen the river and made foot crossing nearly impossible, but the attackers seized the village west of the station and held it. On August 22 afternoon, more than 400 Japanese troops counterattacked; the main force of the 5th Regiment hit from the north bank of the Mian River in a fire assault, killing more than 50 before withdrawing the 1st Company out of the fighting. The 19th Regiment, meanwhile, took Jucheng and Irrang stations, tightening the pressure on the railway corridor.   On August 23, 1940, the 5th Regiment recaptured Niangziguan and blew up the stone bridge east of the village, destroying the railway segment between Chengjialongdi and Mohetan. That night the 19th Regiment stormed Yirang Station and blew up the water tower and the railway, ensuring the disruption would not be temporary. From August 24 to 27, bridges near Yanhui—stone and wooden—were destroyed again and again. Under that continuous pressure, beginning on August 25, Japanese transportation along the Niangziguan to Luanliu section of the Zhengtai Road was cut off completely. Strongholds were left to fight more or less alone, unable to coordinate or move supplies the way they normally would.   While the right column worked the railway, other forces hit the system from different angles. The Central Column of the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region—comprised of the 2nd, 3rd, and 16th Regiments—took responsibility for sabotaging the Zhengtai Road segment from Niangziguan to Weishui and for striking the Jingxing Coal Mine area. On the night of August 20, the 3rd Regiment launched coordinated attacks on the Gangtou old mine and the Dongwangshe new mine of Jingxing, and with miners assisting, the 1st Battalion quickly stormed the new mine and annihilated part of the enemy garrison. The rest withdrew into bunkers, resisting as best they could. By the afternoon of the next day, the entire enemy force had been wiped out. Afterward, major buildings in the mining area were destroyed and most materials were removed so that the mine could not resume production for more than six months. The 3rd Regiment also captured Jiazhuang, reinforcing the idea that sabotage here meant disabling not just lines of movement, but also the flow of resources.   Elsewhere, Japanese positions were disrupted in smaller, targeted strikes that still added up. After the Japanese stronghold at Nanzheng destroyed the railway between Nanzheng and Weishui, the 2nd Regiment took the eastern end fortress of the Faluling Railway Bridge, covered the engineers as they blew up a section of the bridge, and briefly occupied Caizhuang. The 2nd Battalion of the 16th Regiment attacked Beiyu on the night of August 20, annihilating most defenders, and on August 21 it covered the engineers to destroy the Beiyu Stone Bridge. Other units struck Didu and annihilated most defenders in Nanyu. By August 24, the Central Column had learned that more than 1,000 Japanese troops were stationed in Jingxing County, with additional reinforcements moving toward Nanyu and Didu. Their response was practical: detachments were assigned to watch and harass along the railway while the main force gathered in mobile positions—waiting for the next opening rather than charging blindly into concentrated strength.   Meanwhile, the left column of the Jin-Cha-Ji effort—from the 2nd Regiment of the Jizhong Garrison Brigade, the Military Region Special Service Regiment, and the Pingjinghuo Detachment—focused on sabotage from Weishui to Shijiazhuang. On the night of August 20, the Pingjinghuo Detachment attacked Yanfeng and blew up the railway. The Special Service Regiment moved with massed efforts as they destroyed power lines and highways from Yanfeng to Weizhou. On the night of August 22, the Special Service Regiment attacked Shang'an Station. On August 23, the 2nd Regiment stormed Touquan Station, captured two fortresses, then withdrew from the railway line; from August 25 to 27, they destroyed the highway connecting Pingshan, Huolu, Weishui, and Yanfeng.   While the main blow was falling along the Zhengtai Railway, the 129th Division was assigned raids on the western section. That area included the Japanese Independent Mixed Brigade No. 4 headquarters, a coal mine base at Yangquan, and support from Independent Mixed Brigade No. 9 from Yuci. These raids weren't only about destruction—they were meant to disorient, to create confusion over where the main pressure truly was. After the general offensive began at 20:00 on August 20, five companies of the 16th Regiment attacked Lujiazhuang Station and captured bunkers. Two guerrilla-operating companies in Yuci worked with engineers to destroy bridges between Lujiazhuang and Duanting. The 38th Regiment surprised Shanghu and Heshangzu stations, while the 25th Regiment captured Mashou Station and pushed Japanese troops toward Shouyang. The division's right-wing sabotage unit—28th and 30th Regiments of the newly formed 10th Brigade—took on sabotage on the Yangquan–Shouyang section, splitting routes on the night of August 20 to attack stations like Langyu, Zhangjing, Qinquan, and then striking additional positions with the 30th Regiment. Across that window, stations and strongholds such as Sangzhang, Yanzigou, Langyu, and Qinquan were taken, iron bridges were destroyed, and additional stations including Potou, Xinzhuang, Saiyu, Tielugou, Xiaozhuang, and Zhangzhuang were seized or disrupted.   As the western sabotage deepened, Japanese response hardened—but the ability to coordinate weakened. With the Zhengtai line sabotaged, the western section came under the 129th Division's control except for a few places such as Shouyang. Fierce assaults forced Japanese forces to lose contact with each other within days. Strongholds were attacked, besieged, and then annihilated as communication and coordination broke down. The 129th Division mobilized local people to destroy railway facilities, stations, and installations using demolition, burning, and flooding, moving materials so the railway and related infrastructure were effectively erased rather than merely damaged.   To cover these operations, the division occupied Shinaoshan with the 14th Regiment of the general reserve. Starting the morning of August 21, Japanese forces concentrated in Yangquan and attacked Shinaoshan daily. Enemy strength reportedly rose from more than 200 to more than 600, supported by bombing and strafing and the release of poison. The 14th Regiment held out until August 25, repelling repeated attacks, and by August 26 additional pressure came again as reinforcements increased. After six days and nights—and the annihilation of more than 400 enemy soldiers—the 14th Regiment withdrew from the main peak of Shinaoshan, continuing to contain the Japanese with smaller detachments while the main force shifted to another mission.   The first phase of sabotage had succeeded, but the campaign did not allow complacency. The Japanese strengthened their presence along the railway and launched frequent counterattacks, and Japanese divisions in southern Shanxi—including the 36th, 37th, and 41st—prepared to reinforce from the north. On August 26, the Eighth Route Army Headquarters issued instructions for a second phase: continue breaking through the road, concentrate superior forces, and annihilate Japanese units smaller than a battalion that were attacking or reinforcing. In line with that guidance, the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region ordered the Jin-You Column to keep breaking through the road on August 27 for one or two days, while the 129th Division alternated daily in breaking through. Under sustained pressure, the western section of the Zhengtai Road was basically destroyed; transportation was effectively cut off except for a few towns such as Shouyang and Yangquan.   On September 2, orders were issued to conclude the Zhengtai Campaign starting from the 3rd and shift forces according to the second-step plan. As the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region launched the Mengbei Campaign, the 129th Division shifted toward attacking invading Japanese forces, while other tasks—such as attacking the He-Liao Highway and recovering cities of He and Liao—were left for later. Beginning September 2, the Military Region deployed the 2nd, 5th, 16th, and 19th Regiments toward areas north of Meng County and Shouyang to recapture enemy strongholds. With the railway sabotaged, the Japanese main force north of Meng County shifted south to reinforce, weakening garrisons and spreading panic among the strongholds. As fierce offensives intensified, garrison troops began to waver. By the afternoon of September 5, Japanese troops at Xiashe, supported by troops from Shangshe, retreated to Shangshe and fled toward Meng County overnight. That night, the 19th Regiment arrived near Shangshe and, together with the Special Service Battalion of the 2nd Military Sub-district, pursued. The 1st Battalion of the 19th Regiment advanced into Shenquan and Putian to cut off the retreat route. By 9:00 AM on September 6 the enemy was surrounded in Xingdao Village, and after five hours of intense fighting most forces were annihilated. Survivors fled east to Luolizhang Mountain, only to be surrounded again by the 19th, 5th, and 16th Regiments. By the night of September 9, most Japanese forces had been wiped out, though more than 40 men broke through in dense fog and escaped into Meng County.   The siege continued through bitter episodes involving attacks and withdrawals under poison, with both sides paying heavily for every moment of progress. Eventually, on September 11, Japanese troops in Xiyan escaped back to Meng County, helped by more than 200 Japanese already present there. Meanwhile, the Japanese attempted to counter the pressure: on September 4 they sent more than 2,000 troops to reinforce Meng County and began a counterattack. On September 10, the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region ordered the 19th and 5th Regiments to remain east and north of Meng County to coordinate with the 129th and 120th Divisions, while the rest prepared for new missions.   As fighting intensified around Zhengtai and Meng County, a parallel pressure campaign unfolded. To contain Eighth Route Army sabotage along Zhengtai, the Japanese assembled battalions from Independent Mixed 4th and 9th Brigades to strike the 129th Division. In response, the 120th Division began large-scale sabotage against the Tongpu Railway and major highways in northwestern Shanxi starting 20:00 on August 20. They captured enemy strongholds along rail and road lines, striking major bases such as Kangjiahui on the Xinjing Highway, where more than 50 Japanese and puppet troops were stationed, and also attacking other areas like Shishen, Lizhen, and Jingle. Ambushes were set to annihilate reinforcements arriving from different directions, and at 00:30 on August 21 the 2nd Battalion of the 4th Regiment attacked Kangjiahui and annihilated the defenders by dawn. Reinforcements arriving in cars were destroyed, and subsequent actions continued to expand the disruption.   Over more than 180 battles in northwestern Shanxi, the 120th Division annihilated more than 800 Japanese and puppet troops and captured or destroyed stations and strongholds including Kangjiahui, Yangfangkou, Pingshe, and Longquan. By disrupting the Tongpu Railway and transportation along the Xinjing, Taifen, and Fenli highways, they tied down Japanese forces and made it harder to reinforce Zhengtai. In practical terms, this meant the first phase of the Hundred Regiments Offensive—lasting about three weeks—ended on September 10 with major railway lines and motor roads attacked repeatedly. Roadbeds, bridges, switching yards, and installations were hit heavily; at the Qingxing coal mines, facilities were destroyed and production was halted for nearly a year.   By the end of that first phase, the campaign's logic had become clearer: once the Japanese leaned more heavily on a "cage-and-strongpoint" defense system, the same transport network that had supported their defense became less secure. When rail and road were repeatedly disrupted, strongpoints became more vulnerable—especially if Japanese units pulled out nearby detachments to respond to sabotage. So the campaign shifted from breaking transportation to attacking blockhouses and other strongpoints in contested areas, aiming to force Japanese forces back into well-defended garrisons and leave the countryside again contested by Communist forces. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. From 20 August 1940, under secrecy and rain, units of the 8th Route Army infiltrated stations, captured villages, destroyed bridges, power lines, roads, mines, and stations across multiple columns. By early September the Zhengtai and related Tongpu transport routes were repeatedly severed, forcing Japanese troops to fight isolated strongpoints and hindering reinforcement. 

Last time we spoke about the battle Yaoyi. Japan pushed hard into Hubei with a plan: surround the main Chinese forces and seize Yichang, hoping to use it to strike at Chongqing. At first, the fighting was chaotic and punishing. The Chinese side tried to hold the line and disrupt the advance, and they even managed setbacks for the Japanese, pushing back, retaking key ground, and hitting supply and positioning weaknesses. But victory came with a cost: commanders were lost, and every gain was hard-won. Still, the battle didn't unfold as a clean Chinese retreat or a simple Japanese win. As Japanese units shifted and tested for openings, the Chinese forces adjusted—delaying, regrouping, and fighting to keep their formations from being completely trapped. Eventually, Japan managed to break through at critical moments, especially through crossings and maneuvers that the Chinese had not fully sealed off. In the end, Japan succeeded in taking Yichang, but it didn't achieve the decisive annihilation it wanted.    #201 The New Fourth Army Incident and the Strained United Front Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. After the catastrophe of the early 1930s, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) entered the war against Japan in a political mood that was both hopeful and wary: it wanted to be seen as a genuine national leader of resistance, yet it also feared being absorbed—or destroyed—by the Guomindang (KMT) state it had spent years battling. That tension became the organizing principle of the war's early years. The turning point came from the Xi'an Incident in December 1936, which forced a new calculation in Nationalist politics. In the months that followed, agreements between KMT and CCP representatives were publicly proclaimed in August and September 1937, after the Shanghai fighting began. Under these arrangements, the CCP accepted constraints that in peacetime would have looked like surrender: it pledged to strive for Sun Yixian's "Three People's Principles," to end its former policies of armed revolt and sovietization, to abolish the soviet government, and to discontinue both the term "Red Army" and the expectation that its forces would operate outside central control. Communist troops would be treated as part of the national military under KMT command, and the revolution's old administrative structures were to be formally dismantled. In return, the KMT offered the CCP something just as important: space to exist publicly and politically. Liaison offices were permitted in key cities; the CCP was allowed to publish the New China Daily; and it could nominate representatives to KMT advisory bodies. Civil rights were extended—political prisoners were released—and subsidies were established to help cover administrative and military expenses in "reintegrated" areas and territories. The war thus transformed the tactical reality on the ground: the CCP could not treat the KMT as an immediate enemy, but it also could not afford to become politically passive. It had to learn how to fight Japan while building legitimacy fast enough to survive the next phase. In the first year and a half, the Party Center focused on three problems that kept returning in different forms: how the "united front" would be defined—especially what the CCP's relationship to the National government should be; how to coordinate military strategy and tactics with Nationalist units without losing control of its own operations; and how leadership should be consolidated, particularly for Mao Zedong in a party that still contained rival centers of authority. These disputes mattered not just for doctrine but for survival, because the CCP's autonomy was constantly being tested by the very alliance that was supposed to protect it. Mao's own approach to the united front combined cooperation with a refusal to surrender independence. Publicly, the CCP praised Jiang Jieshi and the KMT and promised unity, but it did so in language that was deliberately broad. In private (and in internal party debates), Mao treated unity as conditional: the CCP must not split the united front, but it also must not be "bound hand and foot." The strategic idea that emerged was political initiative under constraints—fighting when it could plausibly claim justification, keeping enough restraint that the CCP would not appear self-interested or anti-national, and deciding for itself when to engage and when to withdraw. This balance was reinforced through military reorganization. In August–September 1937, CCP forces were reorganized as the Eighth Route Army (8RA), with roughly 30,000 men drawn from Long March survivors, local forces, and new recruits. The 8RA was divided into three divisions: the 115th, 120th, and 129th, commanded by Lin Biao, He Long, and Liu Bocheng respectively. Shortly after the war began, the National government also authorized a second major Communist force: the New Fourth Army (N4A), to operate in central China. Its core came from those left behind when the Long March began in 1934—small groups surviving in difficult conditions against continuing KMT pressure. Officially authorized at 12,000, it took months to reach that strength. Nominally commanded by Ye Ting, actual military and political control rested with Xiang Ying and Chen Yi. From the start, then, the CCP's wartime "integration" with the National system coexisted with a clear effort to preserve internal control. Ideologically, the CCP worked to make its revolutionary program compatible—at least in appearance—with a national resistance coalition. On the New Democracy demonstrated how this strategy operated on two levels. In KMT-controlled spaces, its language could be read as aligning with liberal-democratic expectations: public participation, multi-party governance, legally protected civil rights. But in CCP-controlled areas, the same text could carry sharper class-based and authoritarian implications. The Party wanted a united front that broadened support without becoming committed to Nationalist limits on how society itself might be reorganized after victory. Meanwhile, even as the rhetoric of unity rose, the CCP worried about something more dangerous than military setbacks: the possibility that the KMT might accommodate Japan. Late 1939 and early 1940 made this fear harder to dismiss. Japan pursued collaboration with Wang Jingwei, culminating in the establishment of a "reorganized" government at Nanjing in March 1940. At the same time, Japanese intermediaries sought approaches to Chiang Kai-shek himself—an effort that the CCP tracked closely as a sign that peace negotiations might be possible even when battlefield conditions looked grim. Propaganda was involved, but the anxiety was real: if Japan and the Nationalists reached an arrangement, the CCP's whole wartime legitimacy-building effort could collapse overnight. As a result, the united front was interpreted inside the CCP not as a permanent coalition with the KMT, but as a flexible strategy with a cardinal purpose: to prevent peace between Japan and the Nationalists. Mao's position on the united front reflected this. For him, the alliance was meant to suspend the possibility of a China–Japan settlement, not to end the CCP's separate identity. The CCP could participate in a reconstituted national framework—possibly even a "democratic republic"—to gain legality and influence, but it should remain politically and, where possible, physically separate from the KMT. By 1939, however, the practical meaning of "flexibility" collided with reality. What had seemed, to some observers, like an unusually cordial entente began to fade. The KMT Central Committee adopted measures early in 1939 aimed at restricting Communist expansion, and armed clashes increased through the summer and continued into autumn and winter—especially around North China Communist bases. The period of rising conflict was later labeled by the CCP as the "first anti-Communist upsurge" (roughly spanning December 1939 into March 1940), but the crucial point was that both sides viewed each confrontation as a test of legal rights, moral legitimacy, and control over territory. Strategically, the CCP understood the KMT's effort as an attempt to check unauthorized growth of Communist armed power and to recover areas where influence had already slipped away—either to the Communists or, by indirect effect, to Japan. The KMT emphasized its traditional legal authority; the CCP countered with its claim to an "evolutionary" moral right to challenge the government's legitimacy. In practice, the conflict took the form of increasingly systematic military pressure, including a blockade around the Shen–Gan–Ning region. By this point, the blockade involved large numbers of troops (on the order of hundreds of thousands), halting Communist expansion and disrupting direct contact with other Communist forces farther afield, even as fighting flared along border zones and around vulnerable points in the Communist defensive perimeter. So, by the edge of the "middle years," the wartime alliance had not broken into open civil war—but it had also stopped being secure. The united front survived, yet it operated under strain: its language of cooperation continued, while "friction" between partners hardened into a central feature of the resistance struggle. Transition into the war's second phase began in early 1939, shaped by the stalemate Mao had already anticipated at the sixth plenum in late 1938. Mao argued that during this prolonged "new stage" the forces of resistance—above all, Communist-led forces—would strengthen. The overall result, however, was mixed. In Shandong and Central China, new Communist bases did take shape. But across much of North China, Japanese consolidation cost the resistance heavily in manpower and population. Base-area economies suffered serious strain, and the peasantry endured hardships more severe than at any earlier point. This stalemate had two main dimensions. The first was the growing resentment of the Nationalists toward Communist expansion—resentment made especially sharp by their own losses. As the Nationalists were driven out of regions that had previously provided them their greatest wealth and power in the central and lower Yangtze basin, they also lost the "cream" of their armies. In contrast, the CCP was spreading through the wider countryside behind Japanese lines, extending its influence and winning broader popular support. The second dimension was Japan's desire—and need—to consolidate territories it had only nominally conquered and to extract economic value from them. After all, the logic of the "China Incident" was to draw on China's labor and resources to strengthen Japan, not to bleed Japan's gains away by draining wealth into China's vast interior. A Japanese colonel, lamenting the situation, captured the frustration of this drift into deeper entanglement: he regretted that Japan had not ended the "China Incident" once its initial objectives were reached. Instead, Japan was drawn into the hinterland and became bogged down in endless attrition—leaving it with little more than "real estate" rather than the popular support it believed it would secure from those it claimed to "liberate." To improve their position, Japanese authorities—still fragmented by internal rivalry—pursued several strategies. One was a new peace offensive aimed simultaneously at Jiang Jieshi, alongside efforts to establish a "reformed" Nationalist government under Wang Jingwei, who had fled Chongqing in December 1938. Japan also recruited more collaborators and puppet officials. Finally, it carried out forceful military, political, and economic measures intended to establish effective territorial control and eliminate opposition. During the middle years of the war, the Communists described their conflicts with the Nationalists using the euphemism "friction". By 1939, what many observers—possibly incorrectly—had viewed as an unusually warm alliance began to break down. In early 1939, the KMT Central Committee adopted measures meant to restrict the CCP. From the summer onward, military clashes began and continued into autumn and winter with increasing frequency and intensity, most of them concentrated around and within the North China base areas. The Communists later labeled the period from December 1939 to March 1940 the "first anti-Communist upsurge." Naturally, each side accused the other of aggression and claimed self-defense against unjust attacks. Strategically, though, the North China "upsurge" functioned as a Nationalist attempt to limit the CCP's expansion beyond the areas assigned to it and to regain influence in regions the Communists—or the Japanese—had already taken from the KMT. Jiang Jieshi framed the matter as a defense of legal rights grounded in tradition, while the Communists asserted an "evolutionary" right to challenge the moral legitimacy of those legal claims. During 1939, the Nationalists began to blockade Shen–Gan–Ning around its southern and western perimeter. Within a year, this blockade grew to nearly 400,000 troops, including some of the last remaining Central Army units under the command of Hu Zongnan. The blockade stopped further Communist expansion, especially into Gansu and Suiyuan, and severed direct contact between SKN and Communists operating in Xinjiang (Chinese Turkestan) adjacent to Soviet Central Asia. The Xinjiang Communists—including Mao Zedong's brother—were eliminated in 1942. Meanwhile, fierce fighting erupted along the Gansu–Shaanxi border and in the north-eastern corner of SKN near the Great Wall at Suide, as the blockading forces probed for weak points. Elements of He Long's 120th Division were even pulled back from the Jin–Sui base across the Yellow River to strengthen SKN's regular defenses. Economically, the blockade was even more damaging. During 1939, central government subsidies to the Border Region budget were cut off. Trade between the Border Region and other parts of China nearly stopped, a devastating blow to a region unable to supply itself with many basic commodities. At the same time, Nationalist and regional forces also attempted to expand their military and administrative authority into Hebei, Shanxi, Henan, and Shandong—areas the CCP now considered its base zones. In resisting these efforts, the CCP predictable accused its rivals of harming resistance work and damaging the people's interests. The "experts in dissension" were said to cooperate with the Japanese and their puppets. Based on increasing collaboration by regional units with Japan, the CCP implied that this was a deliberate and cynical strategy—described as "crooked-line patriotism"—intended to preserve those units for future anti-Communist operations. Even so, the CCP tried to avoid an open break with the Nationalist regime in Chongqing. In public, it consistently portrayed these clashes as being initiated by local commanders acting beyond orders from higher authority—despite knowing this depiction was false. Jiang Jieshi, unable to refute the claim outright, effectively permitted it to serve as the justification for a firm Communist response. Mao Zedong outlined the general resistance policy as "justification, expedience, and restraint". The CCP was to fight when it could claim justification and when it could gain advantage, but not to press attacks beyond what the Nationalists would tolerate or in ways that could damage its image as selfless patriots. Communist forces were expected to keep initiative as much as possible in their own hands—deciding when to engage, whether to engage, and when to disengage. The most striking episode of the "first anti-Communist upsurge" was the rupture with Yan Xishan in December 1939. Tensions in Shanxi had been rising throughout the summer and autumn, as Yan and his conservative supporters—associated with the "Old Army"—linked the Sacrifice League and the Dare-to-die Corps of the "New Army" with Communist forces. When base areas and Japanese occupation eventually took over much of his province, Yan was forced into exile at Qiulin across the Yellow River in Shaanxi. In November, Yan ordered his Old Army to disarm the Dare-to-die forces with help from central units dispatched by Hu Zongnan. In the bloody fighting that followed, these elements gradually broke free of even nominal provincial control and fully completed their connection with Communist forces. More than 30,000 people went over to the Communists. One KMT intelligence agent described the process with bitterness and a sense of inevitability: the Communists were first "full of sweet words," flattery, and distortions designed to open things up and conceal their actions. But once they had fully entrenched themselves, and once the low-level base had been established, they turned and bit. The agent suggested they had suspected things might end this way, but were not aware how quickly events would move—or that it could happen precisely while Communist calls for "united front" and "maintenance of unity for resistance" filled the air. About a month later, in February and March 1940, elements of the 8RA beat back this so-called upsurge. Zhang Yinwu's forces were disarmed and dispersed across the plains of north Hebei. To the south, Chu Huaiping and Shi Yusan were pushed out of the base area, as was the KMT-appointed provincial governor Lu Zhonglin. Although some non-Communist forces remained in the region, the CCP's and CCLY bases were never again seriously threatened by forces affiliated with the central government. Reinforcing the CCP's accusations, Shi Yusan was later executed in 1940 by the central government for collaboration with the Japanese. By late 1939, CCP central authorities maintained that the areas where the CCP could expand its armed strength were mainly limited to Shandong and Central China. In those regions, the CCP continued trying to carve out bases where they could operate. The situation in Shandong was complicated. After the Japanese invasion, most Nationalist-affiliated forces stayed in the province, while Communist forces and bases were weaker and more scattered than further west. Only in late 1938 did major 8RA units from the 115th and 129th Divisions—led by Xu Xiangqian and Luo Ronghuan—enter Shandong to link up with the Shandong column and local guerrillas, including survivors of a large band recently decimated by the Japanese. Even with these efforts, Communist actions led to clashes not only with Japanese forces but also with various Nationalist-affiliated groups—groups that were stronger than the Communists at the time. Until late 1940, the CCP's clashes with Nationalist forces in Shandong were actually bloodier than clashes with the Japanese. The CCP understood that its Chinese rivals mistrusted one another, and that their attitudes toward the CCP varied widely. The main Nationalist forces were often not tightly affiliated with Chiang Kai-shek or the central government. Instead, they operated under independent—and at times disgruntled—regional commanders. Communist tactics were expressed through slogans emphasizing ways to win support and isolate hardliners: develop progressive forces and win over fence-sitters while isolating "die-hards"; flatter top echelons, enlist the middle ranks, and hit the rank and file; and win over Yi Xuezhong, isolate Shen Honglie, and eliminate Qin Qirong. Still, unlike other North China base areas, the Communists were unable for several years to neutralize Nationalist forces in Shandong. Even if Japanese mop-up campaigns had not weakened those Nationalists, the text suggests the Communists may still have struggled to do so. By November 1940, Xu Xiangqian claimed meaningful progress while admitting Shandong had not yet become a fully consolidated base. CCP successes were greatest along parts of the Shandong–Hebei border, around the Taishan massif in central Shandong, and near the tip of the peninsula far to the east. Elsewhere, "progressive forces" remained weak. Communist regular troops numbered about 70,000, which was far below the party center's goals of 150,000 regulars and between 1.5 and 2 million self-defense forces. Moreover, systematic economic reforms had barely begun. The CCP relied on familiar practices—confiscations, collections of "national salvation grain," contributions, and loans—alongside a conventional taxation system adjusted to favor poorer peasants. Communist expansion in Central China was even riskier, with a greater likelihood of large-scale conflict with central government forces than in the north. In much of North China, "friction" came primarily from rapid Communist expansion into areas with partial vacuums. In Central China, however, base-building required displacing an existing Nationalist military-administrative presence closely tied to Jiang Kai-shek and the Chongqing government. The burden of this expansion was carried mainly by the 6th Detachment (northern Anhui and Jiangsu) and the 5th Detachment, which was reinforced by 15,000 to 20,000 8RA troops under Huang K'o-ch'eng. As Chen Yi's 1st Detachment crossed from south to north through the corridor provided by Guan Wenwei's local forces, it became actively involved as well. This expansion—driven by increasingly urgent directives from Mao and Liu during the latter part of 1939 and into 1940—brought the N4A north of the river into ever more frequent and sharper clashes with Nationalist authorities in Anhui and Jiangsu, especially with units under Jiangsu governor Han Deqin. South of the river, though, Xiang Ying did not directly challenge Chongqing's commanders. Mao later charged that Xiang Ying may have been influenced by Wang Ming, or else he may simply have seen no realistic alternative. His forces—three detachments plus a headquarters unit—were heavily outnumbered by Qu Chutong's Nationalist units, not to mention Japanese forces and their puppets. Even if Mao insisted bases could be built "anywhere," the Shanghai–Hangzhou–Nanjing triangle was especially difficult terrain. Xiang Ying and his followers had survived with extraordinary tenacity in the mountains of South China between 1934 and 1937, enduring brutal search-and-destroy operations that were not lifted until the war began. It therefore seems unlikely that such survivors would suddenly become "right-wing capitulationists."  Yet by spring 1940, Mao was pressing Xiang Ying more intensely. The Central Committee's message was explicit: expansion was necessary in all cases. It meant reaching into all enemy-occupied areas rather than being bound by the Kuomintang's restrictions—going beyond Kuomintang limits, not waiting for official appointments, not depending on higher-ups for financing, and instead expanding armed forces freely and independently. It also meant setting up base areas without hesitation, independently mobilizing the masses in those areas, and building united front organs of political power under Communist Party leadership. The struggle between Nationalists and Communists involved more than contests for control of territory behind Japanese lines. It also involved national-level politics, ideology, and leadership. One worrying development for the CCP was the campaign throughout 1939 to expand Jiang Kai-shek's prestige and formal power—adding more titles for him across major party, government, and military positions. In early 1939, the Central Executive Committee appointed him "director-general" of the Kuomintang, a title reminiscent of the one previously held by Sun Yat-sen. In addition, during the summer and autumn of 1939 there was talk of constitutional rule. In November, the KMT announced plans to convene a constitutional assembly the following year. If Jiang could fulfill these promises, he and his government could gain new legitimacy and wider popularity. Mao and his colleagues could not allow this to go unchallenged. If the Nationalists were to have a paramount leader and authoritative spokesperson, the CCP needed one as well. The timing of Mao's famous "On the new democracy"—written in late 1939 and published the next January—was therefore no accident. Its substance had been anticipated earlier, but its final timing and full development were shaped by the KMT's constitutional movement. The CCP's entry into this competition served as both a bid for support away from the KMT and a statement of the multi-class united front that the CCP wanted to lead. Although "On the new democracy" was written in a tone that seemed moderate, it persuaded many Chinese readers that the CCP had either diluted its revolutionary objectives or postponed them to a distant future. In Kuomintang-controlled areas, the work could be read through the liberal values associated with Anglo-American democracy—popular participation, multi-party government, legally protected civil rights. In CCP-controlled territories, the same language carried stronger authoritarian, class-based meanings. In internal documents meant for party audiences rather than public consumption, the ambiguity was removed, showing a tough but patient and flexible commitment not only to resistance but also to social control and social change. During this same period, the Communists expressed deep concern about Nationalist capitulation to Japan—not only on the battlefield behind Japanese lines but also at the highest levels. Some of this concern was propaganda, but beneath propaganda lay genuine anxiety. In late 1939 and early 1940, politically aware Chinese already knew that Japan was negotiating with the unpredictable Wang Jingwei, who had fled Chongqing a year earlier. A "reorganized national government" in Nanjing was finally established in March 1940, representing the most formidable collaboration with Japan to date. Less well known, but equally important, was that Japan was also seeking an understanding directly with Jiang Kai-shek through intermediaries in Hong Kong. This effort, called "Operation Kiri"—described as spreading a "feast for Chiang"—combined intrigue with a kind of dark comedy. Reports suggested Chiang's reported interest in peace could have been a stratagem designed to discredit Wang Jingwei by keeping him waiting. But even if Chiang had no intention of coming to terms with Japan, the Communists could not be sure what the outcome would be until after the multi-pronged peace offensive had failed. By the middle of 1940, China had never been so isolated. In Europe, the "phony war" ended in the spring when Germany launched a blitz across the Low Countries. France fell soon after, and England appeared likely to be next. Japan used this moment to press China to sever its last tenuous connections to the outside world: cutting the Burma Road, trade with neutral Hong Kong, and the rail link running from Hanoi to Kunming. At the same time, Russia was engaged in a difficult and embarrassing war with Finland and reduced military aid to the Nationalists. The United States was only gradually moving away from isolationism and clearly regarded England as more important than China. In Chongqing and elsewhere in "Free China," signs of war weariness, despair, and demoralization were visible. Under these circumstances, Mao's insistence on aggressive expansion was a calculated risk—either it would deter any Japanese advance, or it would place the Communists in the strongest possible position in case a split between the KMT and the CCP became unavoidable. In Central China, the size and pace of the fighting kept increasing, starting in the final months of 1939. One flashpoint was the clash between Luo Pinghui's 5th Detachment and units of Han Deqin's Jiangsu force near Lake Gaoyou. In the following months, Guan Wenwei's forces ranged along the left bank of the Yangtze, repeatedly running into Luo's troops as they operated farther north. Luo also began receiving some 8RA reinforcements, moving them south through areas controlled by the 6th Detachment. Clearly, a major showdown was taking shape across north and central Jiangsu. At the same time, the South Yangtze Command was doing poorly. Nationalist commanders Leng Xin and Qu Chutong restricted its activities so severely that Mao and Liu gradually abandoned the idea of building a unified, consolidated base in that region. During late spring and early summer, Chen Yi moved most of his 1st and 2nd Detachments north of the Yangtze. In September, the 3rd Detachment followed suit, crossing the river into the area around Lake Chaohu, where the 4th Detachment was already stationed. After these moves, only the Headquarters Detachment—under Ye Ting and Xiang Ying—remained south of the Yangtze, positioned at Qingxian in southern Anhui. As the military situation edged toward an open confrontation, negotiations began in June 1940 between representatives of the KMT and the CCP. The core issues were Communist operating zones and the authorized strength of the armies led by the CCP. Proposals were exchanged, followed by equally sharp and hostile counter-proposals, but no agreement was reached. The KMT viewed it as a concession to permit the CCP "free rein" north of the pre-1938 course of the Yellow River, with the exception of southern Shanxi, which was to remain under the influence of Yan Xishan. In exchange, the KMT demanded that all 8RA and N4A units evacuate Central China. In effect, the KMT was offering the CCP something it was already prepared to allow, in return for the CCP giving up what it might soon be able to obtain by force of arms. Nationalist authorities then issued a set of deadlines, but without clearly stating what would happen if those deadlines were violated. On the surface, the CCP appeared to be complying in part. The movements of Chen Yi and the South Yangtze Command could look like obedience, but in reality they were responses to orders coming from their own superior leadership rather than instructions issued by the Nationalists. Even so, Xiang Ying's continued delays and evasions during the autumn and winter of 1940 remained puzzling. One possibility is that he felt—quite reasonably—that Mao had already lost confidence in him and that once he crossed to the north bank of the river he would lose his command. Another complication was that directives from Yan'an were sometimes ambiguous and even contradictory. He may also have been trying to reach secure understandings with KMT commanders about evacuation routes and guaranteed safe conduct out of the area. For a period, Han Teqin kept most of his forces—estimated at about 70,000 men, far outnumbering the N4A—in north Jiangsu, thereby blocking the expansion of the 6th Detachment and slowing further southern intrusions by 8RA troops. But by mid-summer he realized he would have to counter the N4A build-up in central Jiangsu, or else risk writing that region off to the Communists. A confusing sequence of engagements then unfolded, culminating in a decisive battle in early October 1940 near the central Jiangsu town of Huangjiao. Over the course of four days, several of Han's main-force units belonging to the 89th Army were destroyed, while others were scattered. That battle also served as a signal for the 6th Detachment to advance more aggressively in the north. In the aftermath, one of Han's principal commanders entered collaboration with the CCP, while another defected to the Nanjing government under Wang Jingwei. Although Han Teqin managed to maintain a foothold in Jiangsu until 1943, his real power had been broken. Relatively little attention was paid to the battle of Huangjiao in the Chinese press. The KMT did not want to publicize what it considered a disastrous defeat, while the Communists were satisfied to stay silent about an episode that conflicted with their proclaimed policy of a united front. As could be expected, during the autumn—after Han Teqin's defeat—KMT-CCP negotiations deteriorated further. In early December, Jiang Kai-shek personally ordered that all N4A forces withdraw from southern Anhui and southern Jiangsu by 31 December. He also ordered that the entire 8RA be positioned north of the Yellow River by the same deadline, followed one month later by the N4A. Discussions then followed between Ye Ting and Qu Chutong's deputies concerning the route to be taken, safe conduct, and—astonishingly—the money and supplies that were to be provided to the N4A to help it move. On 25 December, Mao Zedong ordered Xiang Ying to begin evacuating immediately. Yet it was not until 4 January 1941 that Ye and Xiang actually started moving. Almost immediately, Qu Chutong's forces harassed and dispersed the N4A Headquarters Group, which included administrative personnel, wounded soldiers and dependents, as well as combat-ready troops. In an attempt to reorganize, they moved southwest toward Maolin, where they were surrounded by Nationalists and, over the next several days, were cut to pieces. Losses were heavy on both sides. The CCP suffered an estimated 9,000 casualties. Xiang Ying tried twice to break out of the blockade on his own, but failed. He was then denounced as a deserter by Ye Ting, who took over full command of the doomed forces. Xiang Ying eventually escaped, but he was killed a couple of months later by one of his own bodyguards, motivated by the N4A gold reserves that he had taken with him. Up to the very end, Xiang either failed or refused to seek refuge in Liu Shaoqi's domain north of the Yangtze. The unfortunate Ye Ting was arrested and spent the rest of the war in prison. He was finally released in 1946, only to die one month later in a plane crash, along with several other high-ranking party members. On 17 January, Jiang Kai-shek declared that the New Fourth Army was dissolved for insubordination. Direct contacts between Yan'an and Chongqing nearly came to an end, and CCP military liaison offices in several cities held by the Nationalists were closed. This is what became known as the New Fourth Army incident, also referred to as the South Anhui incident. Clearly, it functioned as an act of retaliation for the defeats suffered by Han Teqin in north and central Jiangsu. It ended any realistic prospect of establishing a consolidated Communist base south of the Yangtze. Still, from a strategic perspective, these losses were ultimately more than offset by the gains achieved farther north. In fact, only a few months later, the reorganized N4A quietly began reintroducing some units into this region, where they carried out guerrilla activities without possessing a secure territorial base. Unlike the relative silence surrounding the fighting at Huangjiao, the New Fourth Army incident sparked bitter, prolonged controversy. The CCP argued that it was a second "anti-Communist upsurge," even more serious than the first. Presenting themselves as martyred patriots, they depicted their opponents as people who wanted to end the War of Resistance through what they called "Sino-Japanese cooperation" aimed at "suppressing the Communists." In their account, the Nationalists wanted to replace the war of resistance with civil war, substitute capitulation for independence, trade unity for a split, and replace light with darkness. People were telling each other the news and were horrified. Indeed, they claimed that the situation had never been as critical as it was at that moment. The Nationalist response, of course, was that provocations had been numerous and serious, and that violations of military discipline could not be tolerated. But the KMT's unwillingness to describe in detail its own defeats at the CCP's hands left it speaking in broad generalities. In the propaganda battle, the CCP clearly gained the better position and won more political capital. If it was politically valuable to be regarded as a national hero, it was even more valuable to be seen as a national martyr.  Many Chinese—and some outside—observers were genuinely alarmed and feared that civil war might openly resume. Yet, with a few exceptions, the events that culminated in the New Fourth Army incident have generally been interpreted as marking the breakdown of the second united front. That interpretation, however, is described as being wrong in two respects. First, the CCP understood the united front not as a narrow arrangement limited to a few major partners, but as a strategy that could be applied flexibly to all political, military, and social forces in China—from the highest levels of the central government down to the smallest village. Relations with Jiang Jieshi and the Guomindang regime mattered, but they did not, by themselves, constitute the whole of the united front. Even regarding Jiang and the Nationalists specifically, the common reading is said to be misguided. Throughout the war, a cardinal objective of the united front was to prevent peace between Japan and the Nationalists. Therefore, if clashes between CCP forces and those of the central government on such a large scale as at Huangjiao and Maolin could occur without leading to peace with Japan and without triggering a full-scale resumption of civil war, then this should not be understood as the end of the united front—it should be seen as its fundamental vindication. If friction at that scale could nevertheless be tolerated by Jiang Jieshi, then fears about his future accommodation with Japan were greatly reduced. Following the New Fourth Army incident, the CCP reorganized its political and military presence in Central China. The Central Plains and South-east China Bureaus were merged and renamed the Central China Bureau, with Liu Shaoqi placed in charge, reflecting the area's importance to Party Central. The New Fourth Army was also reorganized completely and substantially regularized. Chen Yi became its new acting commander, since Ye Ting was imprisoned. He directed the force, now divided into seven divisions. Each division had territorial responsibilities, and in each region the CCP claimed the establishment of a base. Indeed, base construction proceeded in earnest only after the friction of 1940 and the New Fourth Army incident. In the years that followed, the operating areas of the First through Fourth Divisions contained expanding enclaves of consolidated territory, where military dominance was joined with open party work: administrative control, the development of mass organizations, local elections, and socio-economic reforms. The other three areas fluctuated between semi-consolidated and guerrilla status. With the incident, the worst phase of the KMT-CCP conflict was now over. When CCP documents later speak of a third upsurge in 1943, they refer to something openly political. With the exception of Shandong—where a fairly strong Nationalist presence persisted for a longer time—the overall balance of power among Chinese forces behind Japanese lines had shifted in favor of the CCP by mid-1941. In subsequent years the CCP's predominance became even more pronounced, until by the end of 1943 the Communists were virtually beyond challenge by Chinese rivals.   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. After the CCP and KMT entered the united front, cooperation felt conditional from the start. Mao pushed the New Fourth Army to reorganize and preserve Communist autonomy, even as the 1937 agreements publicly pledged obedience to KMT leadership. In 1939–40 the Communists worried that Chiang might negotiate peace with Japan; so they expanded bases and military presence, triggering repeated clashes. The pressure intensified when KMT orders forced the New Fourth Army to evacuate south Anhui in late 1940. 

Last time we spoke about the battle of West Suiyuan. The Ma Clique, Muslim warlords controlling Northwest China, led by Ma Hongkui and Ma Hongbin, rebuffed Japanese overtures to ally, citing historical grievances like the 1900 invasion. Driven by patriotism, they aligned with the Nationalists, reorganizing forces into the 17th Army Group. In 1938, Ma Hongbin commanded West Suiyuan defenses, building fortifications in harsh desert and mountain terrain, blending cavalry tactics with modern training despite equipment shortages. In January 1940, Japanese and puppet troops advanced from Baotou, occupying Wuyuan and Linhe. Chinese forces, including Fu Zuoyi's 35th Army and Ma's 81st Army, employed guerrilla and mobile warfare. A major counterattack in March recaptured Wuyuan, killing Lt. Gen. Mizukawa and thousands, forcing Japanese retreat. Through ambushes and night raids, the Chinese recovered territories, securing Soviet aid routes and the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia region. Over 2,000 Ningxia soldiers perished, their sacrifices underscoring peripheral fronts' role in national resistance.   #200 The battle of Yaoyi Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. After capturing Wuhan, the Japanese army had already stretched itself dangerously thin. Most regular and Class A reserve divisions were committed to the front, yet they failed to annihilate the main Chinese force. Despite losing its core industrial and resource regions, the Nationalist government in Chongqing refused Japan's peace terms. Japan now found itself trapped in the very protracted war it had desperately sought to avoid. The logical Japanese response was to halt major advances, consolidate control over occupied areas, and conduct limited offensives to pressure Chiang Kai-shek into negotiations—essentially repeating the post-Nanjing strategy of late 1937. But the situation had deteriorated sharply: occupied territory had at least doubled, Japanese garrisons were inadequate, and strategic reserves were nearly exhausted. What might have been prudent a year earlier had become plainly unwise by late 1938.   To stabilize the front, Japan reorganized its China Expeditionary Army at the end of 1938. Large numbers of newly raised independent mixed brigades and lower-quality Class B reserve divisions were sent to relieve veteran regular and Class A divisions. The relieved units were either demobilized back to Japan or shifted north to reinforce the Kwantung Army against the Soviet threat.   By early 1940 Japan maintained roughly 24 divisions, 21 independent mixed brigades, and 2 cavalry brigades in China proper (excluding Manchuria), totaling nearly 800,000 ground troops. The enormous scale and expense strained the home economy severely. Even so, the vast occupied zones could not be effectively controlled: divisions often held only a single mobile battalion while dispersing the rest into scattered platoon- and squad-sized outposts. Guerrilla activity by both Nationalist and Communist forces not only persisted but intensified, occasionally clashing with each other in "friction" incidents.   Beyond mere occupation, Japan sought to wear down Chinese strength. With most elite Central Army units held in reserve in the southwest or around Wuhan, Japanese local offensives targeted the Fifth and Ninth War Zones, aiming to methodically destroy Chiang's best troops. Thus, while other Japanese armies focused on garrison relief and brigade substitution, the 11th Army—still holding Wuhan with seven divisions and three brigades—remained the main offensive instrument. In 1939 it captured Nanchang, then mounted major operations against the Fifth War Zone (Suizao Campaign) and Ninth War Zone (First Battle of Changsha). Except for the seizure of Nanchang, however, these offensives inflicted only limited and temporary damage on Chinese forces.   Japan's domestic economy was in even worse shape. In early 1937, it had approved a massive 2.4 billion yen naval and army rebuilding program aimed at countering the United States and Russia, but implementation had barely started when the Sino-Japanese War erupted. The conflict generated enormous war costs while military expansion continued unabated, rapidly draining the Bank of Japan's gold reserves. By the end of 1938, those reserves (valued at just 1.35 billion yen) had shrunk by more than two-thirds. To fund the Battle of Wuhan that year, Japan postponed key elements of the rebuilding plan. After Wuhan fell, the Army revised its wartime reorganization: the original target of forty divisions grew to fifty-five by early 1938, then to sixty-five divisions plus 164 Army Air Force squadrons by 1942. The funding required to equip and stockpile for this expansion escalated steadily; the 1939 expansion budget alone demanded 1.8 billion yen, pushing Japanese finances to the breaking point.   Japan repeatedly sought a way out of China, but its peace terms remained far beyond what Chongqing would accept, leaving negotiations stalled. Efforts to install puppet regimes in North and Central China—culminating in the Wang Jingwei government in 1940—aimed to "use Chinese to control Chinese" and undermine Nationalist influence, yet produced disappointing results.   The 11th Army's 1939 campaigns yielded only mediocre outcomes, hampered by chronic troop shortages. Even its divisions were tied down in occupation duties; mounting a serious offensive required pulling garrison forces, leaving no reserves to hold the line unless new units arrived. Sustained large-scale operations to seriously weaken Chinese strength demanded a major troop increase—otherwise, Japan was limited to shallow, localized attacks. Lt. Gen. Yasuji Okamura, commanding the 11th Army, recognized this clearly. In a December 1939 report, he argued that diplomacy and small offensives were futile and urged a large-scale operation backed by substantial reinforcements. His superiors, however, were preoccupied with funding the broader military buildup and could offer no extra men. The post-Wuhan "defensiveization" of operations was largely a cost-saving measure to support that expansion. Japanese ground strength in China, which peaked near 850,000 after Wuhan, had already dropped by about 50,000. Full-strength regular or Class A divisions numbered roughly 22,000 men (four regiments), while newer garrison divisions had only about 15,000 (three regiments), and independent mixed brigades just 6,000. Okamura's proposal was sensible but politically impossible; high command was even contemplating slashing China troop levels to 400,000.   The Chinese Winter Offensive of December 1939, together with counterattacks at Nanning and Kunlun Pass, inflicted serious losses and exposed the limited damage done to Chinese forces in 1939 operations. The recapture of Wuyuan in March 1940 signaled the start of a new phase. Shortly afterward, intensified Chinese guerrilla raids deep into Japanese rear areas prompted large Japanese "mop-up" operations in southern Shanxi, central Hubei, southern Jiangxi, and northern Hunan. In the Wuhan sector, repeated blows from the Winter Offensive heightened fears of Chinese forces in the Dahong and Tongbai Mountains, which threatened control over the vital Jianghan Plains rice-producing region. In mid-April 1940, the Japanese abandoned outposts at Macheng (eastern Hubei), Fengxin, and Jing'an (northern Jiangxi), withdrew elements of the 6th Division (northern Hunan), 40th Division (northern Jiangxi), and the 3rd, 13th, and 39th Divisions (Hubei), and concentrated them around Zhongxiang, Suixian, and Xinyang for a maximum-effort push.   These setbacks finally forced Tokyo to abandon deep troop reductions in China and approve reinforcements of two regular divisions for a major 1940 offensive. The revised end-1940 target became 740,000 troops in China. In spring 1940, the 11th Army—backed fully by Imperial General Headquarters and the China Expeditionary Army—began detailed preparations for a large-scale assault on China's Fifth War Zone.   On February 25, 1940, the 11th Army issued its "Guiding Strategy for the Campaign." The operational goal was to defeat the main force of China's Fifth War Zone along both banks of the Han River before the rainy season, inflict further heavy losses on Chiang Kai-shek's army through decisive victory, and thereby advance Japan's overall political and strategic position vis-à-vis China. The guiding principle called for the quickest possible preparations, with the offensive to begin around early May: first destroy Chinese forces on the left (east) bank south of the Baihe River, then completely annihilate the core units on the right (west) bank near Yichang. On April 7, under the new commander Lt. Gen. Sonobe Kazuo (who replaced Okamura Yasuji), the 11th Army produced a more detailed plan. On April 10, Imperial General Headquarters Order No. 426 ("Continental Order") authorized the China Expeditionary Army to conduct operations in central and southern China during May–June, even beyond established boundaries, to fulfill current objectives.   Japanese planners viewed the Fifth War Zone—roughly 50 divisions encircling Wuhan—with its main strength concentrated along the Han (Xiang) River in northwestern Hubei. Striking Yichang would deliver a severe blow to the zone. As the gateway to Sichuan, only 480 km from Chongqing, Yichang held immense strategic value: an inland port, Three Gorges logistics hub, and key base for air raids on Chongqing. Capturing it would directly threaten the Nationalist wartime capital and southwestern rear, advancing political leverage. Still, long-term occupation was not pre-decided; initial plans stressed inflicting maximum damage followed by withdrawal, in line with the post-Wuhan policy of avoiding permanent overextension. China, aware that holding the Jianghan Plain's rice-producing areas enabled sustained attrition against Japan, deployed guerrilla units to harass Japanese rear areas (increasing occupier losses) while tasking the River Defense Force to hold key front-line points: Jingmen, Shashi, and Yichang.   To achieve these aims, the 11th Army committed as much as possible of its seven divisions and four brigades (88 battalions total). Core units included the 3rd Division (Maj. Gen. Yamakoshi Masataka; regiments 6, 18, 34, 68), 13th Division (Maj. Gen. Tanaka Shioichi; 58, 65, 104, 116), 39th Division (Maj. Gen. Murakami Keisaku; 231–233), elements of the 40th Division, detachments from the 33rd and 34th Divisions, and others. Reinforcements comprised the Ikeda Detachment (three battalions from 6th Division), Ishimoto Detachment (four–five from 40th), Ogawa Detachment (two from 34th), and Provisional Mixed Brigade 101. Supporting assets included the 6th Field Heavy Artillery Regiment, 7th and 13th Tank Regiments, 3rd Air Group, Navy 1st China Dispatch Fleet, and 2nd Combined Air Team. The China Expeditionary Army transferred seven battalions from the 15th and 22nd Divisions (13th Army, lower Yangtze). The main effort north of the river involved roughly 48–54 battalions, or 80,000–110,000 men, making the Zaoyi (Zaoyang–Yichang) Campaign the largest Japanese operation on the central front since Wuhan. Sonobe's staff structured the offensive in two phases. Phase One targeted the Fifth War Zone's main force around Zaoyang (east of the Han River) through converging pincer movements: right flank from Xinyang (reinforced 3rd Division), left flank from Zhongxiang (reinforced 13th Division), and central thrust by the reinforced 39th Division from Suixian. The plan exploited terrain—Dahong and Tongbai Mountains—for encirclement. After seizing Minggang (right flank) and advancing from Zhongxiang (left), the pincers would close on Zaoyang, with the center (along the Xianghua Highway from Suixian) drawing Chinese forces into the trap for envelopment. Diversionary attacks south of the Yangtze, propaganda hinting at limited scope, and planted false orders helped mask intentions. Japanese radio intelligence—intercepts and direction-finding of Chinese headquarters signals—provided critical advantages, especially in later stages.   By March 1940, Chinese intelligence had already detected the 11th Army's intent to mount a major offensive from Xinyang and Wuhan into northwestern Hubei. On April 10, Chiang Kai-shek telegraphed Li Zongren and other Fifth War Zone commanders, urging immediate preparations for a preemptive strike against any push toward Shapingba and Yichang. He emphasized proactive flanking attacks on Japanese rear areas via Wusheng Pass and threats to the Pinghan Railway, while keeping main forces east of the Han River for decisive engagement once the enemy committed.   Following Military Commission directives, the Fifth War Zone devised a plan that used part of its strength for forward advances and deep raids into Japanese rear areas to harass and divert. The bulk of forces would hold the rear, seizing chances for preemptive strikes and a decisive battle east of Zaoyang or south of Jingmen–Dangyang. Deployments included: the 33rd Army Group garrisoning the Xiang River; in the center, the 45th Corps (22nd Army Group) west of Luoyangdian–Suixian and the 84th Corps (11th Army Group) north of Suixian–south of Gaocheng; in southern Henan, the 30th Corps east of Tongbai and the 68th Corps north of Pingchangguan–Minggang; the 41st Corps in reserve near Xiangyang; the 29th Army Group (with part garrisoning north of Tongqiao Zhen–Sanyangtien) concentrated in the Dahong Mountains; and the 31st Army Group positioned between Queshan and Ye Hsien as the mobile force to strike invaders. River Defense Army commander Guo Chan controlled the 26th, 75th, and 94th Armies, the 128th Division, and the 6th and 7th Guerrilla Columns. Total Chinese strength approximated 350,000–380,000 men across roughly 50–54 divisions. To mask preparations and mislead, the Japanese conducted a late-April "mop-up" near Jiujiang, staged naval feints on Poyang and Dongting Lakes, and bombed key points in Hunan and Jiangxi, simulating an imminent Ninth War Zone operation.   With forces assembled, the Japanese offensive began May 1, 1940, from Xinyang, Suixian, and Zhongxiang. The advance split into five routes: (1) Changtaiguan–Minggang–Biyang–Tanghe; (2) Xinyang–Tongbai; (3) Suixian–Zaoyang; (4) Suixian–Wujiadien; (5) Zhongxiang–Shuangkou. Employing flanking with central breakthrough, the reinforced 3rd Division (right flank, including Ishimoto Detachment from 40th Division with tanks and engineers) spearheaded from Xinyang toward Biyang, breaching the Chinese Second Army front on day one. By May 1, elements of the 3rd and 40th Divisions captured Minggang, Lion's Bridge, and Xiaolintien; on May 5 they took Biyang and Tongbai. The Chinese 31st Army Group (northeast of Biyang) linked with the 68th and 92nd Corps to hit Japanese flanks and rear. Leaving some forces west of Tongbai to press the enemy, the main 30th Corps struck Japanese flanks. After seizing Tanghe on May 7, the Japanese pushed south toward Zaoyang. On May 8–9, the 31st Army Group retook Tanghe and Xinye, pursuing vigorously. On May 8, the Japanese left flank (13th Division) attacked from Zhongxiang, breaking through the 33rd Army front the same day.   On May 3, the Japanese 13th Division—supported by over 20 tanks, 40 aircraft, artillery, and cavalry—advanced north from Zhongxiang, capturing Changshoudian and Tianjiachi. It seized Fengyao and Changjiachi by May 6. Chinese 33rd Army Group forces used favorable terrain to intercept, while the 29th Army Group struck Japanese flanks and rear at Changjiachi and Wangjiadian, and the 41st Corps fought tenaciously to halt the advance. By May 7, Japanese spearheads reached Changjiachi on the Zaoyang–Xiangyang Highway, with elements entering Shuangkou; their rear cavalry took Xinye on May 8. Fifth War Zone commander Zhang Zizhong personally led attacks along Tianjiachi–Huanglongtang, supported by fierce 29th Army Group assaults on Japanese rear.   The Japanese 39th Division and a 6th Division brigade delayed their assault on the Chinese 11th Army Group until May 4 from Suixian. After overrunning Gaocheng and Anchu on May 5, Chinese forces withdrew to Huantan–Tang Hsien–north of Gaocheng. As the 33rd Army Group faltered, part of the 11th Army Group reinforced it; the 175th Division held at Tang Hsien while the main body fell back toward Zaoyang. During the maneuver, Japanese tanks enveloped at Tang Hsien, cutting the Zaoyang–Xiangyang Highway and forcing bitter fighting by the 174th Division. To break out, Chinese abandoned Zaoyang, using the 173rd Division for rearguard resistance while the bulk shifted west of the Tang and Bai Rivers. Japanese captured Suiyangdian and Wujiadien on May 7, Zaoyang on May 8; the 173rd Division suffered heavy losses, including the death of its commander, Gen. Zhong Yi.   On May 10, Japanese completed an encirclement east of Xiangdong along the Tang and Bai Rivers—but it collapsed as Chinese exterior forces outflanked both Japanese wings and compressed the center, trapping much of the Japanese in the Xiangdong Plains. The Chinese 2nd and 31st Army Groups plus 92nd Corps pressed south, 39th and 75th Corps east, and 33rd and 29th Army Groups north against the pocket. The 94th Corps advanced along the Han–Yichang Highway deep into Jingshan, Zaoshi, Yingcheng, and Yunmeng to sever Japanese rear communications. Meanwhile, the 7th Corps and eastern Hubei guerrillas seized Jigong Shan, Lijiachai, and Liulin station on the Beijing–Hankou Railway. The 92nd and 68th Corps retook Zaoyang, Tongbai, and Minggang, encircling four Japanese divisions in the Xiangdong Plains. By May 11, battered Japanese retreated eastward under pursuit, Chinese flanking and rear attacks leaving many dead on the field. The 31st Army Group recovered Zaoyang on May 16. Chinese reports claimed 45,000 Japanese casualties, plus capture of over 60 guns, 2,000+ horses, 70+ tanks, and 400+ trucks. The 33rd Army Group fought fiercely to intercept retreating columns, driving large Japanese remnants toward Nanguadian.   Tragically, on May 16 noon, Gen. Zhang Zizhong—personally commanding his Guard Battalion and main 74th Division—was killed in action. With pressure eased on the Japanese left, they counterattacked and retook Zaoyang on May 17. Chinese forces withdrew to Xinye on the Tangbai River's west bank and north of the Tang River, regrouping for a renewed counteroffensive.   The Military Commission anticipated a Japanese withdrawal to original lines, likely along the rain-impassable Xianghua Road. Exploiting the enemy's supply shortages, exhaustion, and retreat difficulties, it ordered Fifth War Zone units to encircle and annihilate Japanese forces near the battlefield, then pursue toward Yingcheng–Huayuan. The zone promptly launched a counteroffensive. By nightfall on May 8, Japanese pincers neared junction, having inflicted serious damage on the Chinese 84th Army but achieved little else. Nonetheless, the 11th Army ordered frontline divisions to withdraw to the Tanghe–Baihe line after reaching it, preparatory to encircling Chinese forces west of the Han River. Chongqing issued general offensive orders at 8 PM and 11 PM that night. By then, six divisions of the 31st Army Group advanced south from Nanyang in the north, five from the 33rd Army Group pressed from the south, and five from the 45th and 94th Armies pursued in the southeast—nearly completing the Japanese encirclement. Intense combat erupted.   On May 10, retreating Japanese first clashed with the advancing 33rd Army Group from the south. Seizing the moment, they ordered the 13th and 39th Divisions plus Ikeda Detachment south to smash it, with the 3rd Division covering the northern flank. Full-scale battle broke out on May 12: two Japanese divisions assaulted five Chinese divisions of the 33rd Army Group, plunging them into desperate fighting. Japanese radio intercepts—including telegrams between the Military Commission and Fifth War Zone, plus Zhang Zizhong's report to Chiang on his five divisions' movements—revealed exact positions and plans. Sonobe Kazuo concentrated the 13th and 39th Divisions to strike south along the Han's east bank against Zhang's army group, while ordering the 3rd Division (south of Xinye) back to Zaoyang to guard the rear. Direction-finding had long pinpointed the 33rd Army Group headquarters radio (call signs and bearings) about 10 km northeast of Yicheng. With air support, the Japanese encircled it. On the night of May 15, the 39th Division advanced from Fangjiaji and Nanying toward Nanguadian, completing tactical encirclement by dawn on May 16. Artillery-supported four-sided assaults followed. The defending 74th Division resisted fiercely with repeated counterattacks. Fighting raged into the afternoon, with the Special Service Battalion joining. Japanese attackers swelled to over 5,000, backed by concentrated artillery and 20+ aircraft for a final push. Zhang Zizhong, wounded multiple times, continued commanding calmly until a severe chest wound killed him heroically. The exhausted, isolated 74th Division and battalion suffered devastating losses. That day, the 13th Division also routed the main 33rd Army Group force, breaking the southern encirclement. Japanese then redeployed, concentrating around Zaoyang.   In the north, 17 divisions (including six from the 31st Army Group) attacked the isolated Japanese 3rd Division from east, south, and north, severing its supply lines. With limited ammunition and no resupply, the division faced crisis; its 29th Brigade telegram pleaded: "Enemy fighting spirit extremely high... safe return very difficult; request battalion reinforcements." Yet southern Chinese forces remained undestroyed amid chaos. Japanese choices narrowed to independent 3rd Division retreat or holding for relief. They opted to lure pursuers: ordering the division southeast toward Zaoyang to draw Chinese into pursuit. From May 16–18, the 3rd Division fought a delaying retreat; relentless Chinese pursuit inflicted limited damage due to insufficient firepower, allowing escape. By evening May 18, it reached northeast of Zaoyang and prepared offensives. The 13th and 39th Divisions, after defeating the 33rd Army Group, also advanced north to the Zaoyang line.   The 3rd Division's retreat shortened Japanese lines and hastened convergence. Unsuspecting Chinese pursued to Zaoyang. After a successful counterattack northeast of Yicheng, the 13th and 39th Divisions rejoined the 3rd Division there. On May 19 morning, three Japanese divisions attacked abreast, forcing decisive battle along the Tang River. Chinese divisions collapsed within hours; the 75th Army took heavy losses, others significant casualties. Fifth War Zone ordered hasty retreat. Japanese pursued vigorously. By May 21, the 3rd Division reached Dengxian, 13th east of Laohekou, 39th Fancheng. Early that day, the 39th Division—crossing the Baihe—met fierce west-bank fire, losing Regiment Commander Kanzaki Tetsujiro and over 300 men. That evening, the 11th Army halted pursuit, ending east-bank (Xiang River) fighting. The 20+ day operation east of the Han inflicted heavy Japanese losses, far exceeding the planned duration, leaving troops exhausted. After halting, units withdrew to Zaoyang vicinity for rest and reorganization rather than immediate return to base positions. Commanders debated proceeding to Yichang west of the Han: abandoning the plan would signal Phase One failure, eroding authority and imperial trust. Most argued troop fatigue and casualties should not deter continuation. Over 1,000 tons of supplies rushed forward via six motor companies. Following east-bank termination, Japanese consolidated for the next phase targeting Yichang. Reinforcements arrived: the 4th Division from Manchuria and 18th Independent Brigade from Wuning. The 4th Division assumed Shayang–Zhongxiang positions east of the Xiang River.   The Japanese bombarded the west bank of the Han River for ninety minutes before forcing a crossing at Wangji north of Yicheng. That midnight, the 3rd Division also crossed southeast of Xiangyang. Both met little resistance and completed crossings before dawn. The 11th Army left the 40th Division at Dahongshan for rear-area mopping-up and assigned the Xiaochuan and Cangqiao Detachments to guard mobile supply depots. On May 31 night, the 3rd and 39th Divisions crossed the Xiang River at Yicheng and Oujiamiao. After seizing Xiangyang on June 1 night, the main force split into columns crossing westward. By June 3, Japanese captured Nanzhang and Yicheng. The Chinese 41st Corps fiercely counterattacked, retaking part of Xiangyang while its main body battled around Nanzhang; the 77th Corps also struck hard. On June 4, Chinese recovered Nanzhang, forcing Japanese retreat southward. Meanwhile, the 13th Division and elements of the 6th Division forced a crossing on the Han–Yichang Highway near Jiukou and Shayang to link with southern columns for a joint push. The Chinese River Defense Force shifted its main strength to key positions, using terrain to block southward advances. The 2nd and 31st Army Groups pursued south separately. Chinese abandoned Shayang on June 5; Japanese took Jingmen, Shilipu, and Shihujiao on June 6. The 77th Corps and river defense units resisted stubbornly from Jingmen to Jiangling. After retaking Yicheng, the 2nd Army Group continued pursuit. Japanese concentrated around Jingmen–Shilipu as Jiangling fell.   On June 9 morning, Japanese launched joint air-ground assaults from Dongshi to Dangyang and Yuanan. By afternoon, penetrating the Chinese right flank forced a night withdrawal to Gulaobei–Shuanlianshi–Dangyang along the Zu River to Yuanan. June 10 saw Japanese capture Gulaobei and Dangyang, pushing Chinese to Yichang outskirts. After days of heavy fighting and prohibitive losses, Chinese abandoned Yichang on their own initiative. The 2nd and 31st Army Groups then reached Dangyang north of Jingmen. On June 16, they mounted a general offensive. By June 17, Chinese briefly retook Yichang; the 2nd Army Group linked with the 77th Corps against Dangyang, while the 31st Army Group severed Dangyang–Jingmen communications and assaulted Jingmen violently. South of the Yangtze, the 5th and 32nd Divisions crossed to hit Shayang and Shilipu. By June 18, Japanese main force held stubbornly from Dangyang to the Xiang River with superior equipment. Chinese, fighting on exterior lines, formed an encirclement from Jiangling–Yichang–Dangyang–Zhongxiang–Suixian–north of Xinyang while maintaining surveillance. Thus, the Zaoyi (Zaoyang–Yichang) Campaign ended. No prior decision existed on holding Yichang long-term. Per post-Wuhan Imperial General Headquarters policy, even extended operations aimed only to inflict severe blows and erode Chinese resistance, not expand occupation. On capture day, the 11th Army declared objectives achieved, ordering reorganization, destruction of Yichang military facilities, and dumping irremovable captured supplies into the Yangtze preparatory to withdrawal. At 10 PM June 15, formal orders withdrew to the Han's east bank: 3rd and 39th Divisions first to Dangyang–Jingmen to cover, then the 13th Division. The 13th began retreating from Yichang at midnight June 16, reaching Tumenya (10 km east) by 7 AM June 17. Chinese counterattacked along the route; the 18th Army pursued and retook Yichang morning of June 17. Japanese held Yichang only four days.   Intense debate erupted between frontline commanders and Imperial General Headquarters over retaining Yichang. With Nazi Germany's Western Europe offensive underway—Paris fell June 12, the day Yichang was taken—global upheaval intensified Japanese urgency to resolve China swiftly and free resources for wider competition. Many in high command and China Expeditionary Army argued long-term occupation would threaten Chongqing more directly, aid political maneuvers, and hasten settlement, offering immense strategic value. This swayed the Emperor, who inquired at the June 15 Imperial Conference about securing it. Backed by imperial support, high command ordered temporary retention (one month) on June 16. By transmission through Expeditionary Army and 11th Army channels, the rearguard 13th Division had withdrawn 52 km. With 3rd Division cooperation, it reversed, broke Chinese resistance, and retook Yichang afternoon June 17. On July 1, to offset expanded 11th Army responsibilities, General Headquarters transferred the 4th Division from Kwantung Army (Jiamusi, Heilongjiang) to 11th Army control. July 13 orders confirmed long-term Yichang retention, redefining Wuhan-region operations to Anqing–Xinyang–Yichang–Yueyang–Nanchang. The 11th Army assigned: 13th Division to Yichang, 4th Division to Anlu, 18th Independent Mixed Brigade east/west of Dangyang; remaining units returned to original defenses.   Post-recapture, Chinese continued counterattacks on Yichang and rear lines until ordered to halt: "To adapt to international changes, preserve National Army combat strength, and facilitate reorganization, Fifth War Zone cease attacks on Yichang immediately." A stalemate followed along lines encircling Yichang, Dangyang, Jiangling, Jingmen, Zhongxiang, Suixian, and Xinyang. To shield Chongqing and Sichuan, Nationalists re-established the Sixth War Zone (briefly created post-First Changsha, abolished April 1940), appointing Chen Cheng commander-in-chief with 33rd and 29th Army Groups, River Defense Army, and 18th Army covering western Hubei, western Hunan, eastern Sichuan. The Zaoyi campaign thus concluded. Japanese combat power again proved markedly superior. Official Japanese records (11th Army/China Expeditionary Army) reported 2,700 killed, ~7,800 wounded (total ~10,500; some phases ~1,403 killed/4,639 wounded). Chinese admitted heavy losses: 36,983 killed, 50,509 wounded, 23,000 missing (total >110,000 in some accounts). Wartime Nationalist claims inflated Japanese casualties to 45,000 killed/wounded with major captures (60+ guns, 70+ tanks, 400+ trucks), likely propagandistic; Japanese sources show far lower equipment losses. With 56 battalions deployed, Japanese suffered 12–15% combat casualties; Chinese (54 divisions, ~380,000 men) incurred 25–30% or higher—underscoring firepower/equipment disparity. Japan achieved tactical success by securing Yichang long-term (as a Chongqing bombing base) but failed to annihilate the main Chinese force or compel peace. Chinese resistance thwarted full encirclement and imposed attrition, albeit at crippling cost to the Fifth War Zone—severely weakened and never fully recovering until war's end. Japanese aims were realized to a significant, though not decisive, degree.   The Fifth War Zone's operational plan was fundamentally sound. Chinese intelligence detected Japanese intentions early, accurately predicted the attack axis, and deployed accordingly. The plan included preemptive strikes at Wusheng Pass and the Guangshui section of the Pinghan Railway to harass Japanese rear areas, threaten Wuhan, gather reconnaissance, and disrupt enemy preparations. Though well conceived, these actions never materialized. In the first phase (Xiangdong operations), Chinese forces resisted while shifting the main body to outer lines, securing mobile flanking positions. This frustrated Japanese encirclement efforts in the Xiangdong Plains. Exploiting the enemy's retreat, China launched a timely counteroffensive that encircled the Japanese 3rd Division. Despite breakout support from over 100 aircraft and 200 tanks, the poorly equipped Chinese inflicted heavy casualties during the three-day siege, blunting the division's momentum.    On the southern front, the 33rd Army Group's intercepting deployment was appropriate, but insufficient strength and compromised communications allowed the Japanese 13th and 39th Divisions to counterattack decisively, inflicting major losses and claiming the heroic death of Commander-in-Chief Zhang Zizhong—whose steadfast patriotism remains a lasting source of national pride. Overall, Chinese assessments and deployments in Phase One were largely correct. The battlefield showed China retained initiative and was not wholly dominated by Japanese plans. The core issue was overestimation of Chinese combat power amid severe shortages of heavy weapons. At least three corps suffered heavy attrition, yet Japanese captured only twenty-three mountain/field guns. Relying on manpower for brute force left Chinese units critically undergunned, enabling repeated encirclement attempts but preventing decisive destruction or severe damage to encircled enemies like the 3rd Division.   Phase Two, by contrast, was entirely passive. The initial Japanese Han River crossings were largely feints, yet the west bank received scant attention in overall planning—leaving Yichang virtually undefended as main forces deployed east of the river. Post-Phase One, Japan reinforced the 11th Army with three infantry battalions and one mountain artillery battalion from the 13th Army (lower Yangtze), plus six motor transport companies rushing massive supplies forward. Chinese intelligence missed these moves, remaining complacent in expectation of Japanese withdrawal eastward. After regrouping, Japan abruptly pivoted west with rapid advances. The Military Commission and Fifth War Zone, caught unprepared, made frantic, chaotic adjustments that failed to mount effective defense. The loss of strategically vital Yichang was inevitable, complicating the resistance both militarily and psychologically. This stemmed directly from command misjudgment of Japanese strategic and operational aims. Had plans anticipated a westward thrust and retained strong reserves—or detected the 10-day regrouping window to readjust deployments—China could have retained greater initiative, inflicted more damage, and reduced its own losses.   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Japan's 11th Army launched an offensive in Hubei to encircle Chinese forces in the Fifth War Zone and seize Yichang for bombing Chongqing. Chinese troops countered effectively, encircling Japanese divisions and inflicting heavy losses, though General Zhang Zizhong was killed in action. After intense fighting east of the Han River, Japanese crossed west, captured Yichang, briefly withdrew, then retook and held it long-term. 

  Last time we spoke about the battle of south Guangxi. In late 1939, amid the Sino-Japanese War stalemate, Japan aimed to sever China's vital supply lines from French Indochina by invading southern Guangxi. The 21st Army, including the 5th Division and Taiwan Mixed Brigade landed at Qinzhou Bay on November 15, capturing Nanning by November 24 after feinting at Beihai and overcoming scattered Chinese defenses under the 16th Army Group. Chinese forces, commanded by Bai Chongxi and reinforced by the elite 5th Army launched a counteroffensive in December. The brutal Battle of Kunlun Pass saw repeated assaults. However, Japanese counterattacks in January 1940, bolstered by the 18th Division and Konoye Brigade, recaptured Kunlun Pass and Binyang by February, inflicting over 10,000 Chinese losses and forcing retreats. A stalemate ensued until September 1940, when Japan pressured Indochina. Overextended Japanese forces withdrew south, allowing Chinese to recapture Nanning on October 30 and clear Guangxi by November 17.   #199 The battle of West Suiyuan  Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Back in 1936,  the Xi'an Incident had forced a fragile alliance between the Nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists, forming a united front against Japan. This front extended to regional warlords like the Ma Clique, who controlled Ningxia, Gansu, and Qinghai. The Ma family, descendants of Muslim generals loyal to the Qing Dynasty, navigated complex loyalties but ultimately aligned with the Nationalist cause, driven by patriotism and self-preservation.   The stakes in West Suiyuan were high. Control of the region meant access to the Suiyuan-Xinjiang Highway, a lifeline for Soviet aid to China. Japanese occupation could threaten the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, a Communist stronghold, and open paths to Lanzhou and beyond. The battles here, though overshadowed by larger theaters like Shanghai or Wuhan, demonstrated how peripheral fronts contributed to the national resistance. Over 70 years later, the sacrifices of more than 2,000 Ningxia soldiers remain a poignant reminder of the human cost of resistance, their anti-Japanese merits etched forever in the annals of Chinese history.   The seeds of the Battle of West Suiyuan were sown in the turbulent years following the Xi'an Incident. This event in December 1936 led to the initial formation of a national united front against Japanese aggression. The Communist Party of China (CPC) mobilized masses in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, strengthening anti-Japanese forces and exerting pressure on the Ma Clique. Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government also influenced the Mas, solidifying their resolve to resist Japan.   The Ma Clique, a powerful Muslim warlord faction in Northwest China, was led by figures like Ma Hongkui (governor of Ningxia) and his cousin Ma Hongbin. They controlled a semi-autonomous region with a mix of Hui, Han, and Mongolian populations. Japan, seeking to exploit ethnic divisions, attempted to woo the Mas. Even after the July 7, 1937, outbreak of war, Japan persisted. On October 17, 1937, after occupying Baotou, the Japanese established the "Baotou Hui Muslim Branch" and appointed Jiang Wenhuan, a former Hui commander, to court Ma Hongkui. They sent envoys, including an imam from Northeast China, and even airdropped letters from "Manchukuo." In a dramatic move, Japanese commander Itagaki Seishiro flew to Alashan Banner to invite Ma Hongkui for talks. Ma sent Zhou Baihuang, who rebuffed Itagaki by invoking historical grievances: the Japanese role in the Eight-Nation Alliance's 1900 invasion, where Ma family members died at Zhengyang Gate. "The family feud remains unresolved, and the national humiliation is yet to be avenged; they are irreconcilable enemies," Zhou declared.   Japan's plot to persuade surrender failed, leading to a major offensive against Suiyuan and Ningxia. Large numbers of troops reinforced Baotou, and bombings targeted Ningxia. In response, Ma Hongkui began building fortifications in places like Shizuishan and Dengkou. Starting in the winter of 1937, he constructed defense fortifications in the Shizuishan area in four phases. In the Shizuishan Weizha area, trenches several meters wide and deep were dug, covered with branches, straw, and loose soil for camouflage, to prevent the passage of Japanese armored vehicles and heavy weapons. Within a hundred li north of Dengkou and Sanshenggong, all major roads were cut off, and deep trenches were dug to destroy the Japanese army's access to Ningxia. The banks of the Yellow River ferry crossings in northern Ningxia and the Helan Mountain passages were all cut into steep cliffs. Important passageways were fortified with blocking positions and hidden artillery to repel invading Japanese troops.   Among the various military commanders in Northwest China, Ma Hongbin possessed the strongest anti-Japanese spirit. Having joined the army at a young age, Ma Hongbin placed great emphasis on cultural learning and the cultivation of his personal character. Outside of military service, he was always seen with a book in hand, resembling a scholar. His long-term study fostered his upright character and patriotism. After the Japanese invasion of China, deeply moved by the nation's peril, he resolved to lead his troops to the battlefield to save the country from its crisis. In the spring of 1938, at the opening ceremony of an officer training course held in Wanghongbao, Yongning, Ma Hongbin addressed his subordinates from the podium: "Always remember that the nation comes first, the people come first, defend the land and country, and fulfill your duties. On the battlefield, you must be able to both attack and defend, and be prepared to live and die with the position, with the determination to fight to the end."   The Ma forces were reorganized into the Nationalist structure. Ma Hongkui's 15th Route Army and Ma Hongbin's 35th Division (later expanded to the 81st Army) formed the 17th Army Group, with Ma Hongkui as Commander-in-Chief and Ma Hongbin as Deputy Commander-in-Chief and Commander of the 81st Army. The officer training of the 81st Army improved the anti-Japanese consciousness and combat quality of the entire army, preparing for the counterattack against the Japanese invasion. In May 1938, due to the weakened defenses of Suiyuan (at that time, the troops of Fu Zuoyi, the chairman of Suiyuan Province, had retreated to Shanxi), most of the area was occupied by Japanese and puppet troops. The Kuomintang Central Committee appointed Ma Hongbin as the commander of the Suiyuan West Defense Command. Ma Hongbin led his 81st Army and two cavalry brigades and one infantry brigade of Ma Hongkui's troops to Wuyuan (now Wuyuan County, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region) to unify the command of the various anti-Japanese forces that had retreated into Suiyuan West. His mission was to prevent the Japanese army from advancing westward.   After arriving in Wuyuan, Ma Hongbin convened a meeting of commanders from various forces to discuss the defense against the Japanese. The various armies in western Suiyuan were of different factions and not affiliated with each other, and most adopted a policy of seeking safety and avoiding danger in their defenses. Ma Hongbin deployed the main force of his 81st Army, the 35th Division, at key passes in the Wubu Langshan area northeast of Wuyuan to serve as the first line of defense, while deploying three brigades of Ma Hongkui's troops along the line from Wuyuan to Langshan as reinforcements.   The terrain was challenging: vast deserts, mountains like Yinshan and Langshan, and the Yellow River's bends. Wubulangkou, a narrow pass between Erlang and Chashitai Mountains, was strategically vital. Defenses included anti-tank trenches and mines. These preparations reflected the Ningxia Army's blend of traditional cavalry tactics and modern training. The troops, many Hui Muslims, brought cultural cohesion and resilience, but faced equipment shortages—outdated mortars and rifles versus Japanese mechanization.   In May 1938, Ma Hongbin arrived in Linhe (now part of Bayannur, Inner Mongolia) to establish his command post. After inspecting the situation of the friendly forces in the defense zone and designating the defense zone of his subordinate 81st Army, he ordered Ma Tengjiao, commander of the 35th Division, to lead four infantry regiments, namely the 103rd and 104th Brigades, to Suiyuan Western Defense Command to fight against the Japanese. Ma Hongbin established a command post in Linhe, where he and his son, Ma Dunjing, the chief of staff of the 81st Army, deployed their troops in areas such as Wuzhen and Siyitang. Ma Dunjing directed his troops to conduct exercises in the Wuzhen and Siyitang area, and invited Soviet military advisors to provide guidance, preparing for combat with an extremely serious attitude.   To show his support for Ma Hongbin's leadership of the Suiyuan Western Defense Command, Ma Hongkui dispatched two cavalry brigades to Suiyuan Western Defense Command. The main reason why the Ma Clique army from Ningxia went to Suiyuan to fight against the Japanese was that the defense of Suiyuan was directly related to the safety of Ningxia. At the same time, after the Ma Clique army was incorporated into the anti-Japanese army, its primary task was to fight against the Japanese invaders and defend the country. In addition, the anti-Japanese enthusiasm of the people in the Northwest continued to rise. Under the impetus of the situation, it was inevitable that the Ningxia army would join the anti-Japanese war in Suiyuan.   The initial engagement came in the late summer and early autumn of 1939, as Japanese troops, driving cars, armored vehicles, and tanks, advanced from Baotou towards the defenses of the 81st Army in western Suiyuan, attempting to annihilate the main force of the 81st Army. Ma Dunjing (the third son of Ma Hongbin), Chief of Staff of the 81st Army, personally commanded the operation at the front line in Wuda Town. The Japanese advanced to the defensive positions of the 35th Division and bombarded Ma's position with heavy artillery fire. The 35th Division returned fire with 82mm mortars. Because Ma's mortars were old-fashioned, they emitted smoke upon firing, revealing their positions. The Japanese immediately unleashed over 200 shells on the 35th Division's artillery positions, silencing them and rendering them incapable of retaliating. Taking advantage of this, the Japanese, under the powerful cover of artillery and machine gun fire, swarmed in by car, tank, and armored vehicle. The 35th Division held their ground, waiting for the Japanese troops to enter effective firing range and disembark from their vehicles. Suddenly, soldiers of the 1st Battalion of the 206th Regiment jumped out of their fortifications and charged into the enemy lines, engaging the Japanese in hand-to-hand combat. The Japanese were thrown into disarray, some killed before they could even disembark. Those who did disembark suffered heavy casualties, with the remaining soldiers turning back to their vehicles and fleeing in panic. Forced to retreat after suffering a decisive blow, the 35th Division captured two Japanese vehicles, over a hundred artillery shells, dozens of boxes of ammunition, as well as firearms and officer's swords. This marked the first victory in the Suiyuan-Western Anti-Japanese War. This victory boosted morale and public spirit. When the captured vehicles entered Wuyuan County, the people cheered enthusiastically, plastering the vehicles with various celebratory slogans. An elderly local artist even composed a song to celebrate the victory and sang it on the street: "Our old Western Army (referring to Ma Hongbin's 81st Army) is really good at fighting. We drove away the Japanese soldiers, captured cars and brought them into Wuyuan City, where the whole city celebrated and welcomed them. Relying on our old Western Army, we defeated the Japanese soldiers, and the people have peace." The campaign's defining battle occurred at Wubulangkou in early 1940, following the Chinese raid on Baotou in December 1939. In the autumn of 1939, the situation in Shanxi stabilized, and Fu Zuoyi, the chairman of Suiyuan Province who had retreated to Shanxi, led his troops back to western Suiyuan, establishing the Deputy Commander's Headquarters of the Eighth War Zone to unify command of military and political affairs in western Suiyuan and actively preparing for a counter-offensive. To coordinate with the nationwide winter offensive, Fu Zuoyi decided to attack Baotou, a key Japanese stronghold, to contain the Japanese forces in North China. The Battle of Baotou was spearheaded by the newly formed 31st Division of Fu Zuoyi's 35th Army, with the 35th Division of Ma Hongbin's 81st Army providing support. Under meticulous planning, on December 20th, Sun Lanfeng's newly formed 31st Division of Fu Zuoyi's army stormed into Baotou. The Japanese army, caught off guard, panicked and suffered over a thousand casualties, scattering in all directions, losing all their supplies within the city. Fu Zuoyi then directed his troops to withdraw to the rear of western Suiyuan, luring the enemy deeper into the territory for a later battle.   The Battle of Baotou greatly angered the Japanese army. Therefore, more than 30,000 Japanese troops were mobilized from Zhangjiakou, Taiyuan, Datong, and other places, along with more than 1,500 military vehicles, armored vehicles, tanks, dozens of aircraft, and six divisions of puppet Mongolian troops, totaling more than 40,000 men. Under the command of Division Commander Kuroda, they launched a major offensive into western Suiyuan in early 1940, attempting to seize western and southern Inner Mongolia in one fell swoop. Facing the superior Japanese forces, the people and soldiers of western Suiyuan adopted a scorched-earth policy and mobile warfare to maneuver against the enemy. The specific deployment was as follows: the 7th Cavalry Division of Men Bingyue's troops blocked the Japanese troops in the Xishanzui and Maqidukou areas, and then turned to the right bank of the Yellow River to threaten the enemy's left flank; the 35th Division of Ma Hongbin's troops and the 1st Cavalry Brigade of Ma Hongkui's troops constructed positions in the Wubulangkou and Wuzhen areas, blocked the enemy, and then moved into Langshan to threaten the Japanese right flank; the 35th Army of Fu Zuoyi's troops assembled northwest of Wuyuan to launch mobile attacks on the enemy; other units chose favorable terrain to harass the exhausted enemy at any time; and the logistics personnel were transferred to the Dengkou and Shizuishan areas. Before Langshan Mountain, where the Yang family generals once fought against the Jin dynasty, a thousand-mile-long battlefield against the Japanese was set up.   Wubulangkou is located in the western part of the Yinshan Mountains. Nestled between the eastern and western ends of the rugged and precipitous Erlang Mountain and Chashitai Mountain, it forms a strategically vital location. After Fu Zuoyi returned to western Suiyuan in 1939 to serve as deputy commander of the Eighth War Zone, the Ningxia army was placed under his command. At the end of December, Fu Zuoyi's troops stormed Baotou, inflicting over a thousand casualties on the Japanese. Okabe, commander of the Japanese Mengjiang Garrison, considered the defeat at Baotou a great humiliation and declared, "We must sweep through the Hetao region and completely annihilate Fu Zuoyi's army." To eliminate future troubles, the Japanese, "determined to decisively crush the enemy's base in the Hetao region with their main force," began in January 1940, mobilizing over 30,000 Japanese and puppet troops from Zhangjiakou, Datong, and other places, along with over a thousand vehicles, aircraft, artillery, and tanks. Under the command of Division Commander Kuroda Shigetoku, they launched a three-pronged, menacing invasion of western Suiyuan.   On January 31, Kuroda led the main force of the Japanese central route, consisting of over 780 vehicles, armored vehicles, and tanks, and launched an attack at 4:30 PM on the positions of the 35th Division of the 81st Army in the area of Wubulangkou, Siyitang, and Wuzhen.    Ubulangkou, where Ma Hongbin's 35th Division was stationed, is a transliteration of the Mongolian word "Ubulak," meaning "mouth of large and small springs." Located in the southern part of present-day Urad Middle Banner, it lies at the junction of Wuliangsutai, Delingshan Township, and Wengeng Sumu, a strategically important location nestled between two mountains. When the Battle of Ubulangkou began, Ma Hongbin was in Chongqing attending a high-level military conference convened by Chiang Kai-shek, and his troops were commanded by Ma Tengjiao, commander of the 35th Division. At approximately 8:00 AM on January 31, 1940, the Japanese army amassed its forces in the Zaoshulinzi desert area, directly north of Siyitang and directly east of Ubulangkou. Their vanguard first used three aircraft to circling and bombard the positions of Ma's 205th Regiment, followed by artillery bombardment. Under the cover of aircraft and artillery, Japanese tanks, armored vehicles, and hundreds of military vehicles carrying Japanese troops launched an attack on the Siyitang and Ubulangkou positions. Following Ma Hongbin's orders, a defensive trench, 3 meters wide and 3 meters deep, had been dug in front of the 81st Army's position, stretching approximately 10 kilometers from the foot of Wubulang Pass to the north bank of the Yellow River. A 50-meter-wide pit zone preceded the trench. The two sides fought fiercely until nightfall, suffering heavy casualties and remaining evenly matched. At the Siyitang position, Ding Liangyu, the company commander of the 1st Company, 1st Battalion, 205th Regiment, was wounded and died the following day; more than 30 platoon leaders, squad leaders, and soldiers were killed. Xue Wanyou, the battalion clerk, was hit by an artillery shell, his body torn apart and his head severed. Although the officers and soldiers of Ma's 35th Division suffered heavy casualties, they held their ground. Unable to break through, the Japanese used aircraft to continuously release poison gas with the wind at their backs. Although Ma's troops had prepared simple gas masks made of gauze wrapped in sawdust, the concentration of the gas was too high, causing many to experience headaches, chest tightness, and vomiting, greatly weakening their fighting capacity and making the situation increasingly critical. Around 10 PM, Division Commander Ma Tengjiao ordered Ma Jiangong, deputy battalion commander of the 2nd Battalion of the 206th Regiment, to lead two companies from Wulanaobao to reinforce the 208th Regiment via Siyitang. Ma Jiangong was killed by a grenade in the fierce fighting. The two companies fought desperately to break free from the enemy and finally joined up with the 208th Regiment. The enemy, realizing this, reinforced their forces and intensified their attack. At 11:30 PM, the 208th Regiment's position was breached, but the enemy dared not advance rashly. The battle resumed at dawn the next day, and the fighting at the Siyitang position remained extremely fierce. Ma Tengjiao ordered the 1st Battalion of the 206th Regiment to reinforce the Siyitang position. While traversing a seven- or eight-mile stretch of open land, the reinforcements were subjected to heavy artillery fire from the Japanese, suffering heavy casualties. However, the troops braved the artillery fire, bullets, and thick smoke, breaking through the enemy's fire blockade and reaching the position. The combined forces of the Wubulangkou and Siyitang positions continued to inflict powerful blows on the Japanese army. The 205th Regiment, holding the fortified Siyitang, engaged in bayonet fighting with the Japanese army. When their bayonets bent, the soldiers would grab the enemy and bite them, or detonate grenades to die alongside them. The troops had gone two days and two nights without food or water, and coupled with the bitter cold, they were exhausted and suffering heavy casualties. The battle was exceptionally fierce, tragic, and arduous. Ma Hongbin later recalled this battle, saying, "Even the world-famous battles of Taierzhuang and Changsha, where the National Revolutionary Army fought with such heroic spirit, were no more than this."   In the early morning of February 1st, the Japanese army first bombarded the defensive positions at Wubulangkou and Siyitang with heavy artillery, and then used aircraft to dive-bomb the open area in front of Wubulangkou. Under the attack of enemy artillery and tanks combined with infantry, the 208th Regiment suffered heavy casualties, and the front-line positions at Wubulangkou were breached by the enemy. The 205th and 206th Regiments sent reinforcements, using bunkers and high ground fortifications to stubbornly resist the enemy, resulting in heavy casualties on both sides. Seeing that they could not capture the positions defended by the Ningxia army, the Japanese army released tear gas and sneezing gas. While attacking from the front, the Japanese army sent puppet Mongolian troops to flank and attack Wubulangkou from the rear of the mountain. Although the Ma troops resisted bravely, they were ultimately outnumbered, and their positions were successively breached by the enemy, forcing the remaining defenders to withdraw. In this battle, more than 1,000 officers and soldiers of the Ningxia Ma troops shed their blood in western Suiyuan, using their lives to block the enemy's advance.   Ma's troops retreated, pursued by Japanese ground forces and strafed by aircraft, suffering over a thousand casualties and forced to retreat into the desert. They continued to fight the Japanese in the quicksand, killing another 200 enemy soldiers. After a grueling six-day, six-night march, the troops successfully returned to their Dengkou base for rest. Post-war statistics show that Ma's 35th Division originally had over 5,000 men; in the battle of Wubulangkou, over 1,000 were killed and 2,000 wounded, including 700 suffering from frostbite. This battle exemplified sacrificial defense, buying time for counteroffensives.   Upon learning of the defeat of his troops in Chongqing, Ma Hongbin immediately flew back to Ningxia and rushed to Dengkou. After regrouping the troops and investigating officers who had failed in their command, he reorganized two regiments, replenished their equipment, and after a brief rest, led by Brigade Commander Ma Peiqing, returned to western Suiyuan. To cooperate with Fu Zuoyi's troops in continuing the fight against the Japanese invaders, the Ningxia army, mainly composed of the 35th Division, entered the Dala Banner area of Yimeng to fight the enemy. After occupying Wuyuan, the Japanese army believed that the Chinese army in western Suiyuan was in disarray and would be unable to recover its fighting capacity in a short time. Furthermore, due to its overextended battle lines and supply difficulties, the Japanese army had no spare troops to expand the war. Therefore, they centered their forces on Wuyuan, leaving a Japanese regiment and four divisions of puppet Mongolian troops, totaling over 15,000 men, to garrison the Hetao region, while the rest of their forces retreated eastward. After the main Japanese force withdrew, Fu Zuoyi decided to organize a campaign to recapture Wuyuan. In March 1940, he ordered his 35th Army to lead the attack on Wuyuan, while Ma's 81st Army moved from western Suiyuan to the Dalad Banner area on the south bank of the Yellow River in the Ordos League to construct fortifications and block Japanese reinforcements from Baotou. At midnight on March 20, Fu's 35th Army simultaneously launched attacks on Japanese strongholds in Wuyuan, Meilingmiao, and Xingongzhong. After two days of fierce fighting, our army finally recaptured Linhe and Wuyuan, killing Lieutenant General Mizukawa, the division commander of the Japanese army, and several thousand of his puppet troops.    Upon hearing the news, the Japanese troops in Baotou crossed the Yellow River, attempting to outflank the 35th Army from the south. However, their westward advance was met with resistance from the positions of Ma's 81st Army. During the defensive battle, Ma's troops were bombarded by more than 30 Japanese artillery pieces. Due to outdated weaponry and lack of artillery counterattack, Ma's right flank was destroyed, allowing the enemy to encircle them from the rear. To avoid being outflanked, Ma's troops retreated north to the Shawo area to regroup. Ma Hongbin ordered each regiment to exploit the enemy's difficulty in vehicular movement in the desert, employing mobile warfare tactics, advancing when the enemy advanced and retreating when the enemy retreated, maintaining a distance of five or six li from the enemy, and choosing opportune moments to attack and exhaust them. Ma's troops also frequently formed assault teams to harass the enemy at night, keeping them constantly on edge. After maneuvering with the Japanese in the desert for several days using mobile warfare, Ma Hongbin's troops occupied a hilltop southwest of Xinminbao and laid an ambush. When the enemy approached, they unleashed a sudden barrage of fire, inflicting hundreds of casualties. This blow forced the Japanese army to abandon its southern reinforcement plan and retreat north across the Yellow River near Zhaojunfen. After the Japanese retreat, the 81st Army immediately launched an attack on the puppet Mongolian cavalry south of the Yellow River. After more than a month of battles, large and small, except for Chaidengtai, which was captured by Fu Zuoyi's troops, all other puppet strongholds were wiped out by Ma Hongbin's troops, and "the entire Damian Beach area in the northeast of the Ih Ju League was recovered."   During the Qingming Festival in 1940, the 35th Division, returning to western Suiyuan, buried the officers and soldiers who died in the battle at Wubulangkou. With tears in their eyes, people buried the remains of 148 officers and soldiers at the Cemetery for Fallen Soldiers on the west side of Wubulangkou, and erected brick monuments in front of the graves according to the names on the surviving shoulder insignia of the fallen officers and soldiers' uniforms.    Casualties on all sides were significant, reflecting the intensity of the fighting. For the Japanese, two brigades and the 72nd Cavalry Regiment took heavy hits, though official reports admitted only about 1,000 losses. Given that these units were sidelined from combat for an extended period afterward, the true figure was likely far higher. Battle reports from the 26th Division alone recorded over 3,000 casualties, nearly 20% of its strength,pushing the total Japanese toll, including other units, to between 4,000 and 5,000. Puppet forces fared even worse. The "Suiyuan-Western Autonomous Allied Army" proved utterly ineffective, collapsing almost immediately against the superior Ma Clique cavalry of the Nationalist 81st Army. While the puppet Mongolian cavalry had some combat capability, their reluctance to fight for the Japanese—often against their own kin, led to half-hearted engagements and quick retreats. Combined puppet casualties and prisoners numbered around 5,000 to 6,000, bringing the overall Japanese and puppet losses to 10,000–12,000 killed or wounded. The Chinese forces, vastly outmatched in equipment and relying on brave but undertrained local security units, endured heavy sacrifices. Domestic sources estimate their casualties at 15,000–20,000.   This campaign marked the only major anti-Japanese engagement involving people from Ningxia, where over 10,000 Hui and Han fighters, under Ma Hongbin and Ma Hongkui, battled fiercely in what is now Linhe and Wuyuan in Inner Mongolia. Thousands perished, buried far from home, embodying the unyielding spirit of the Chinese nation. It stood as Northwest China's sole battlefield in the war, a point of pride for its people. Victory was hard-won, despite the Chinese having slightly more troops but far inferior weaponry. Success stemmed from the soldiers' bravery, tactical use of cavalry mobility, and crucially, the puppet Mongolians' unwillingness to fully commit. The campaign not only repelled the Japanese westward and southward advances, securing Northwest China's northern gateway and blocking incursions into Ningxia, Shaanxi, and Gansu, but also safeguarded key supply routes like the Suiyuan-Xinjiang Highway and connections to Lanzhou. This ensured a steady influx of Soviet aid, bolstering the national resistance and indirectly supporting efforts in Southwest China.   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. After a Chinese raid seized Baotou, Japan launched a major 1940 offensive with tens of thousands of troops, vehicles, armor, aircraft, and puppet Mongolian forces. Chinese defenders used scorched earth, fortifications at Wubulangkou, and mobile cavalry/desert tactics, ambushes, and night harassment. Fu Zuoyi later recaptured Wuyuan/Linhe. Casualties were heavy—Chinese estimates 15,000–20,000; Japanese/puppet losses possibly 10,000–12,000.

AI agent roles surge 455% year-on-year during the spring recruitment peakAI智能体相关职位春季招聘同比增长455%As graduation season approaches, 21-year-old Zhang Weiqi was resolute in his decision to dive into the burgeoning field of artificial intelligence.毕业季临近，21岁的张伟奇（音）毅然选择投身方兴未艾的人工智能领域。This wasn't a childhood dream — it was a passion cultivated during Zhang's studies at Shanxi University's School of Computer and Information Technology, where he encountered AI technology and decided to become a practitioner who could use it to solve real-world problems. "AI isn't just a concept in textbooks; it's a tangible, creative force that can genuinely enhance efficiency," said Zhang, who has successfully secured a position with delivery company SF Express, where his primary role involves using AI technology to improve automation testing efficiency and problem analysis.这并非他儿时的梦想，而是在山西大学计算机与信息技术学院求学期间培养的热忱。接触AI技术后，他立志成为运用这一技术解决现实难题的从业者。"人工智能绝非停留在课本里的概念，它是能够切实提升效率的创造性力量。"已成功入职顺丰速运的张伟奇表示，他的主要职责是运用AI技术提升自动化测试效率与问题分析能力。This spring's campus recruitment season has seen a surge in demand within the national talent market, particularly for roles in algorithms, research and development, and product development — and AI has become a hot track for job-seeking graduates.今年春季校园招聘季，全国人才市场对算法、研发及产品开发岗位的需求持续升温，人工智能更成为应届生求职的热门赛道。According to the latest data from recruiter Zhaopin, positions related to AI agents saw a year-on-year growth rate of 455 percent, with the average monthly salary for AI engineers at 20,804 yuan ($3,045) and 17,038 yuan for fresh graduates in AI roles. "During the interview process, the interviewers focused heavily on my experience with a major innovation project, which was crucial in helping me secure the offer," Zhang said. During his sophomore year, he participated in a companion AI project, spending nearly a year refining and practicing, ultimately focusing on the hybrid direction of "AI plus testing", which perfectly aligned with the emerging employment trend of integrating AI with traditional roles.智联招聘最新数据显示，AI智能体相关职位同比增长455%，AI工程师岗位平均月薪达20804元人民币，面向应届生的AI岗位起薪为17038元。张伟奇透露："面试过程中，考官着重询问了我参与重大创新项目的经历，这对获得录用至关重要。"大二期间，他投身一项陪伴型AI项目研究，历经近一年打磨实践，最终聚焦"AI+测试"的交叉领域，恰好契合当前人工智能与传统岗位深度融合的就业趋势。Liu Xingyan, who graduated last year and joined technology company Baidu in Beijing, said: "Entering the AI industry starts with interest, but planning is key. You need to understand the industry's direction and be clear about your own capabilities."去年入职北京百度公司的刘兴妍（音）表示："进入AI行业始于兴趣，但规划才是关键。既要洞悉行业方向，也要明晰自身能力边界。"Currently working in AI business quality assurance, Liu said that elective courses on large models during her university years helped her grasp industry trends. "The rapid development of the AI industry provides a broad stage for technical talent, offering opportunities for us to reach higher platforms and achieve rapid growth," she said.目前从事AI业务质量保障工作的她回忆，大学期间选修的大模型课程帮助她把握了行业脉搏。"AI产业的迅猛发展为我们技术人才搭建了广阔舞台，提供了攀登更高平台、实现快速成长的契机。"In recent years, Shanxi, traditionally a coal-rich province, has been vigorously promoting digital transformation, particularly in pillar industries like energy and manufacturing. The increasing variety of AI application scenarios has created more employment opportunities for local graduates.近年来，传统煤炭大省山西大力推进数字化转型，尤其在能源、制造等支柱产业领域成效显著。日益丰富的AI应用场景为当地毕业生创造了更多就业机遇。Key universities such as Shanxi University and Taiyuan University of Technology have seized the moment, deepening their focus on AI and big data-related programs while partnering with enterprises to establish training bases and industry colleges.山西大学、太原理工大学等重点高校紧抓机遇，深化人工智能与大数据相关学科建设，同时携手企业共建实训基地与产业学院。"In response to the explosive growth of the AI industry, we have strengthened traditional core computer courses while adding cutting-edge courses on large models and AI applications," said Cao Fuyuan, dean of the School of Computer and Information Technology at Shanxi University. "We are also exploring flexible training models like 'micromajors' to help students quickly acquire cross-disciplinary skills."山西大学计算机与信息技术学院院长曹付元介绍："面对AI产业的爆发式增长，我们在夯实计算机传统核心课程的同时，增设大模型与AI应用等前沿课程，并积极探索'微专业'等弹性培养模式，助力学生快速掌握跨学科技能。"Cao said that graduates from technical majors such as software engineering and electronic information engineering are in high demand, with monthly salaries generally starting above 8,000 yuan. Outstanding master's graduates entering top internet or AI unicorn companies can earn annual salaries of 300,000 to 500,000 yuan.他透露，软件工程、电子信息工程等技术类专业毕业生供不应求，月薪普遍超过8000元，优秀硕士生入职头部互联网企业或AI独角兽公司年薪可达30万至50万元。Ren Weiming, founder of Shanxi Chitu Lingying Visual Technology Co, said: "In AI job recruitment, companies value an AI portfolio that demonstrates an individual's capabilities over academic qualifications and majors. Such portfolios can directly replace traditional resumes."山西赤兔灵映视觉科技有限公司创始人任伟明指出："在AI岗位招聘中，企业更看重能够展现个人能力的AI作品集，而非学历专业背景。这类作品集可直接替代传统简历。"He emphasized that the most sought-after positions are hybrid roles like AI visual directors and AI art concept designers — positions that require practitioners to understand film language, proficiently use AI toolchains, and possess strong problem-solving skills.他强调，当前最紧缺的是AI视觉导演、AI美术概念设计师等复合型岗位，要求从业者既懂电影语言，又能熟练运用AI工具链，同时具备出色的解决问题的能力。"Aesthetic and artistic sensibility is the hardest competitive edge for machines to replicate," Ren said."审美与艺术感知力，恰恰是机器最难复制的核心竞争力。"dive into /daɪv ˈɪntuː/投身于，一头扎进burgeoning /ˈbɜːrdʒənɪŋ/迅速发展的，蓬勃兴起的sophomore /ˈsɑːfmɔːr/大学二年级学生vigorously /ˈvɪɡərəsli/大力地，强劲地cutting-edge /ˌkʌtɪŋ ˈedʒ/前沿的，尖端的unicorn /ˈjuːnɪkɔːrn/独角兽portfolio /pɔːrtˈfoʊlioʊ/作品集sought-after /ˈsɔːt ˌæftər/广受欢迎的，抢手的

Born in Shanxi province, China in 1993 Carlos Gu was raised by his single mother who supported his dancing ambitions which saw him become a Chinese National Champion dancer.He's been competing on a global stage since a young age but in 2022 he received the phone call he'd dreamed of – an invitation to join Strictly Come Dancing and a move to London – somewhere he's always imagined could be his home.His new adopted home gave him a freedom to come-out as a gay man – something he's described as being “reborn and to live the life that I've been dreaming of for years”He's about to set out on tour with fellow Strictly pro Amy Dowden – the show is called ‘Reborn 2.0' a deeply personal show that tells the story of second-chapters and new beginnings. The timing is perfect – as his dream gig got even better last Christmas when he partnered Karen Carney all the way to the final and lifted the glitterball trophy.What an incredible story... cheers! Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Thousands of visitors flock to witness beauty of blossoms around the country数千游客争睹全国花海盛景Rising temperatures herald the season to chase flowers in China. Thousands of visitors from home and abroad descend on the nation's most picturesque spring landscapes to capture the beauty of the blossoms, boosting consumption in the process.随着气温回升，中国迎来了赏花踏青的季节。成千上万的国内外游客纷纷涌向国内风景最美的春日景观，争相定格花朵盛放的美丽瞬间，这也带动了文旅消费热潮。In mid-March, Yuantouzhu scenic area in Wuxi, Jiangsu province, entered "congestion mode". By 5 pm on March 14, the area had welcomed nearly 70,000 visitors, setting a record for this year's cherry blossom season, according to Shangyou News.3月中旬，江苏省无锡市鼋头渚景区进入"拥堵模式"。据上游新闻报道，截至3月14日下午5时，该景区已接待游客近7万人次，创下今年樱花季的单日客流量纪录。"I knew it would be crowded, but I just couldn't miss such beautiful cherry blossoms," said Zhang, a tourist from Nanjing, Jiangsu, as she navigated the sea of visitors trying to capture the perfect photo. "It's so hard to get pictures of the flowers without people in them, so I had to settle for photos with strangers included."来自南京的游客张女士在人群中寻找最佳拍摄角度时说："我知道人会很多，但实在不想错过这么美的樱花。"她无奈地笑道："想拍一张没有路人入镜的照片太难了，最后只能凑合拍些带陌生人的照片。"According to travel platform Qunar, the weekend of March 14 and 15 saw searches for flower viewing-related keywords increase more than 60 percent week-on-week.据去哪儿旅行平台数据显示，3月14日至15日周末期间，"赏花"相关关键词的搜索量环比增长超过60%。Traditional hot spots, including Hangzhou in Zhejiang province, Chengdu in Sichuan province, Wuhan in Hubei province, and Kunming and Dali in Yunnan province, continue to rank among the top 15 tourist destinations this season.传统的热门赏花地依然稳居今春旅游目的地前15名，包括浙江杭州、四川成都、湖北武汉、云南昆明和大理等地。In Beijing, magnolia and mountain peach trees are already blooming, painting the city with the first burst of spring colors. Mountain peach blossoms at the Summer Palace's west dike and Olympic Forest Park entered peak blooming season in mid-March. Early cherry blossoms at Yuyuantan Park can be seen now, with Qunar reporting a 50 percent year-on-year increase in flower-viewing searches in the capital. Hotels near Qianmen, the Temple of Heaven and Chaoyang Park — known for their photogenic flower spots — are witnessing brisk bookings.在北京，玉兰和山桃已经吐蕊，为城市染上第一抹春色。颐和园西堤和奥林匹克森林公园的山桃花在3月中旬进入盛花期。玉渊潭公园的早樱也已开放，据去哪儿网数据，北京"赏花"搜索量同比增长50%。前门、天坛、朝阳公园附近因拥有绝佳的花景拍摄点，酒店预订量节节攀升。Beijing resident Li Kai said that he took half a day off from work on Wednesday to enjoy the early cherry blossoms at Yuyuantan after seeing photos on social media.北京市民李凯说，他在社交媒体上看到玉渊潭公园的樱花照片后，周三专门请了半天假去赏早樱。"The blossoms looked so beautiful against the clear water and blue sky — my mood instantly lifted," he said."清澈的湖水和蓝天映衬下的樱花美不胜收——我的心情一下子就明媚起来了。"他说。In Wuhan, early cherry blossoms have entered peak viewing season. Flight bookings to the city in March increased 12.5 percent year-on-year.在武汉，早樱已进入最佳观赏期。3月飞往武汉的航班预订量同比增长12.5%。China's spring scenery is also attracting foreigners. According to Qunar, in March, domestic flight bookings made with non-Chinese passports rose 21 percent year-on-year.中国的春日美景也吸引着外国游客。根据去哪儿网数据，3月使用非中国护照预订国内航班的旅客数量同比增长21%。Nyingchi in the Xizang autonomous region saw a 630 percent surge in foreign arrivals for its pink peach blossoms. Datong in Shanxi province, famous for apricot blossoms, recorded an increase of over 900 percent. Kashgar and Yining in the Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region saw foreign tourist numbers rise 500 percent and 350 percent, respectively.西藏林芝的桃花吸引了大量外国游客，相关订单量激增630%；以杏花闻名的山西大同，外国游客数量增幅超过900%；新疆喀什和伊宁的外国游客数量则分别增长了500%和350%。The spike in demand comes amid a sharp fall in airfares. Prices are lower by 30 to 70 percent on multiple routes compared with February. One-way flights from Beijing to Hangzhou, Wuxi or Wuhan are available for as little as 300 yuan ($44), making them even cheaper than high-speed train tickets.旅游需求激增的同时，机票价格却大幅下降。多条航线的机票价格较2月下降了30%至70%。从北京飞往杭州、无锡或武汉的单程机票最低仅需300元（约合44美元），比高铁票还便宜。Lyu Ning, dean of Beijing International Studies University's School of Tourism Sciences, said the focus of flower-viewing tours in 2026 is immersive experiences and scenario innovation.北京第二外国语学院旅游科学学院院长吕宁表示，2026年赏花旅游的核心在于沉浸式体验与场景创新。"There is a strong sense of immersion. There is a shift from superficial viewing to deep participation," she said.她说："沉浸感显著增强，正在从浅层的观看式游览向深度的参与式体验转变。"Lyu added that flower-viewing also creates a full consumption chain — transportation, accommodations, dining, experiences and shopping — transforming floral landscapes into an economic driver.吕宁还补充说，赏花活动还能带动交通、住宿、餐饮、体验、购物等全链条消费，将"花海"转化为实实在在的经济动能。herald /ˈherəld/预示；宣布 magnolia /mæɡˈnoʊliə/玉兰 brisk /brɪsk/兴旺的；轻快的 airfare /ˈeə(r)fer/机票费用

The National Meteorological Center said a prolonged spell of wet weather is set to affect large parts of China next week, raising concerns about potential secondary disasters as some areas will receive above-average rainfall.中央气象台预计，未来一周我国大部地区将出现持续降雨天气，部分地区降雨量将超过常年同期平均水平，需警惕可能引发的次生灾害。Starting on Sunday, parts of central, eastern and southern China will experience a 10-day spell of rainy weather, with affected areas likely to receive rainfall 30 to 70 percent above the seasonal average, while more than double the average rainfall is expected in some locations, the center said.中央气象台预计，3月22日起，中部、东部和南方大部地区将出现持续10天的阴雨天气，受降雨影响地区降雨量将较常年同期偏多3～7成，部分地区偏多1倍以上。From Sunday through Thursday, heavy rainfall is expected to drench southern China, according to Weather China, a website affiliated with the China Meteorological Administration.中国天气网预计，3月22日至26日，南方大部地区将出现强降雨过程。The heaviest rainfall is forecast for Monday, when eastern parts of Jiangxi province and northwestern parts of Fujian province are likely to witness very heavy downpours, the website said.预计23日降雨最强，江西东部、福建西北部等局地有暴雨。Ma Xuekuan, the National Meteorological Center's chief forecaster, said the weather pattern is the result of the interaction between frequent weak cold air masses and active warm, moist currents from the south. He warned that parts of Guizhou and Hunan provinces could experience severe convective weather, including thunderstorms, strong winds and hail.中央气象台首席预报员马学款介绍，南方地区降雨主要是由于频繁的弱冷空气与活跃的暖湿气流共同作用所致。贵州、湖南等地的部分地区将出现雷暴大风、冰雹等强对流天气。"Until late March, southern China will see frequent rain, with fresh downpours hitting already soaked areas. Guizhou, Hunan, Jiangxi and Zhejiang provinces, and northern parts of the Guangxi Zhuang autonomous region will face heightened risks of secondary disasters from prolonged rainfall," he said.马学款提醒，3月下旬，南方地区降雨天气频繁，部分强降雨落区与前期重叠，贵州、湖南、江西、浙江、广西等地发生降雨次生灾害的风险较高，需加以警惕。Feng Lei, a senior engineer at the China Meteorological Administration's Public Meteorological Service Center, advised people to monitor weather warnings closely and avoid traveling during periods of intense rain or storms.中国气象局公共气象服务中心高级工程师冯蕾提醒公众密切关注天气预警信息，尽量避免在降雨集中时段外出。She said the rainy weather could also affect renewable energy, adding that the sector should adjust energy distribution and storage plans to mitigate the impact. She also urged authorities to guard against infrastructure risks posed by severe convective weather.冯蕾表示，降雨天气会对电力新能源领域产生影响，相关行业需根据天气变化调整能源调配和储存方案。冯蕾提醒，强对流天气会对城市安全运行造成影响，需警惕大风、雷电等对基础设施的影响。The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs and the China Meteorological Administration issued a joint risk warning on Saturday for farmland waterlogging, which is expected to affect parts of Guizhou, Hunan and Jiangxi provinces from Sunday to Thursday.3月21日，农业农村部和中国气象局联合发布农田渍涝灾害风险预警，预计3月21日至26日，贵州、湖南、江西等地部分地区有农田渍涝灾害风险。Authorities have urged affected regions to strengthen ditch and canal clearance to ensure proper drainage, and ensure low water levels in reservoirs and ponds.气象和农业部门提醒相关地区及时清理沟渠，保持排水通畅，并降低水库、池塘水位。Meanwhile, northern China is experiencing a spell of unseasonal warm weather.与此同时，北方大部则正在经历一轮快速升温天气过程。Temperatures across the region are expected to remain above average for the next few days. On Wednesday, Taiyuan in Shanxi province, Jinan in Shandong province and Zhengzhou in Henan province are forecast to see new seasonal high temperatures of up to 25 C, according to Weather China.预计未来几天，北方多地气温将维持在较常年同期偏高水平。中国天气网预计，25日，山西太原、山东济南、河南郑州等城市可能迎来今年以来气温新高，最高气温预计可达25℃左右。The website cautioned that despite high maximum temperatures, northern China still faces large temperature swings, with a difference of more than 20 C between day and night temperatures in some areas. Residents are advised to dress in layers.中国天气网提醒，尽管北方地区白天最高气温回升迅速，但昼夜温差普遍较大，部分地区的昼夜温差可达20℃以上，公众请适时调整着装。a prolonged spell of /ə prəˈlɒŋd spel əv/一段长时间的secondary disaster /ˈsekənderi dɪˈzɑːstə(r)/次生灾害convective /kənˈvektɪv/对流的hail /heɪl/冰雹farmland waterlogging /ˈfɑːmlænd ˈwɔːtəlɒɡɪŋ/农田渍涝

A powerful cold front is moving eastward across China from Thursday through Sunday, bringing heavy snow and sandstorms, according to Weather China, a website affiliated with the China Meteorological Administration.据中国气象局旗下网站 “中国天气” 消息，一股强冷空气将于周四至周日自西向东影响我国，带来强降雪和沙尘暴天气。Northwest China, which was noticeably warmer than normal in early March, will see the sharpest temperature drops, with some areas experiencing decreases of more than 20 °C.3 月上旬气温显著偏高的西北地区，将迎来最剧烈的降温，部分地区降幅超过 20 摄氏度。The heaviest snowfall is expected on Friday and Saturday, affecting parts of Qinghai, Gansu, Shaanxi and Shanxi provinces, with some areas bracing for heavy to severe snow.预计周五至周六降雪最强，青海、甘肃、陕西、山西等地部分地区将出现大到暴雪。The cold front is also expected to bring strong winds and dusty weather. On Thursday, parts of the Xinjiang Uygur, Ningxia Hui and Inner Mongolia autonomous regions, as well as Gansu and Qinghai provinces, are forecast to see blowing dust or floating dust, with some areas facing sandstorms or severe sandstorms.该冷空气还将带来大风和沙尘天气。周四，新疆维吾尔自治区、宁夏回族自治区、内蒙古自治区以及甘肃、青海等地部分地区将出现扬沙或浮尘，局部有沙尘暴或强沙尘暴。cold front /ˌkəʊld ˈfrʌnt/ 冷锋snowfall /ˈsnəʊfɔːl/ 降雪sandstorm /ˈsændstɔːm/ 沙尘暴temperature /ˈtemprətʃə(r)/ 气温

China is on alert as a fresh wave of rain and snow is expected over the next three days, potentially causing travel and tourism disruptions following the Spring Festival holiday. While less widespread and intense than recent weather events, the precipitation warrants attention.气象部门发出预警，预计未来三天我国将迎来新一波雨雪天气，可能导致春节假期结束后交通和旅游出现中断。虽然此次过程的强度和影响范围不及之前，但仍需引起注意。On Sunday, significant snowfall affected Shanxi, Hebei and Henan provinces, while heavy rains drenched much of southern China. The National Meteorological Center forecasts an eastward shift in snowfall, bringing light to moderate accumulations to the Inner Mongolia autonomous region, eastern and northern North China, most of Northeast China and the northern Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region. Inner Mongolia and Heilongjiang province may experience heavy snow and localized blizzards.3月1日，山西、河北和河南等地出现显著降雪，与此同时，强降雨影响了南方大部地区。中央气象台预计，降雪区域将向东移动，内蒙古自治区、华北中东部、东北地区大部和新疆维吾尔自治区北部等地将迎来小到中雪，累计降雪量一般有1～3毫米。其中，内蒙古和黑龙江等地局地可能出现大雪或暴雪。Simultaneously, South China is bracing for heavy rainfall, with moderate to heavy precipitation expected in the southern provinces of Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan, the Guangxi Zhuang autonomous region and Taiwan. Localized downpours and possible thunderstorms are also anticipated.与此同时，华南地区将迎来强降雨，预计福建、广东、海南、广西壮族自治区和台湾等南方省份将有中到大雨。局地可能出现暴雨和雷暴天气。Offshore, strong winds will affect eastern sea areas due to an intensifying cyclone entering the sea near Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces. On Tuesday, gusts reaching 24.5 meters per second are predicted for the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, Taiwan Strait and parts of the South China Sea.在近海区域，由于入海气旋加强，江苏和浙江附近海域将出现大风。周二，预计黄海、东海、台湾海峡和南海部分海域将出现阵风达每秒24.5米的大风。Despite these localized events, forecasters predict no large-scale rain or snow across China this week, with precipitation expected to be scattered and generally light.预报员指出，尽管有这些局地天气事件，但预计本周全国范围内不会出现大范围的雨雪天气，降水总体较为分散，强度一般。However, persistent rain in eastern Southwest China will create slippery roads and reduce visibility, requiring public vigilance during travel.然而，我国西南地区东部持续的阴雨天气将导致道路湿滑和能见度降低，公众出行需注意安全。Northern China will experience a brief warming trend before a cold front arrives on Wednesday and Thursday. Conversely, the south will cool down, providing relief from recent warmth. Daytime highs in Haikou, Hainan, are expected to drop to 20 C by Wednesday.北方地区在周三和周四冷空气到来之前将经历短暂的回暖过程。与之相对，南方地区将迎来降温，使近日的回温天气得到缓解。到周三时，海南海口的白天最高气温预计将降至20摄氏度。In addition, most of China's northern winter wheat region is projected to experience near-average temperatures and 10 to 30 millimeters of rainfall over the next 10 days, which will improve soil moisture and aid the resurgence of winter wheat growth, according to agricultural forecasts.此外，农业气象预报显示，未来10天，我国北方冬麦区大部气温接近常年同期，降水量有10～30毫米。降水将有效改善土壤墒情，利于冬小麦返青生长。The Yangtze River Delta, South China and Southwest China are expected to see near-average or slightly above-average temperatures with 10 to 50 mm of precipitation, benefiting reservoir storage and providing water for spring planting, it added.预报还指出，长江中下游、华南及西南地区南部等地气温接近常年同期或偏高，降水量有10～50毫米，利于增加库塘蓄水和保障春播用水。precipitation /prɪˌsɪpɪˈteɪʃən/降水drench /drentʃ/湿透，浸透National Meteorological Center /ˈnæʃənəl ˌmiːtiərəˈlɒdʒɪkəl ˈsentər/ 中央气象台localized blizzards /ˈləʊkəlaɪzd ˈblɪzədz/局地暴雪downpour /ˈdaʊnpɔː/倾盆大雨，暴雨cyclone /ˈsaɪkləʊn/气旋gust /gʌst/一阵强风，阵风vigilance /ˈvɪdʒɪləns/警惕，警戒resurgence /rɪˈsɜːdʒəns/复苏，再现

rWotD Episode 3224: Daqin Railway (company) Welcome to random Wiki of the Day, your journey through Wikipedia's vast and varied content, one random article at a time.The random article for Monday, 2 March 2026, is Daqin Railway (company).Daqin Railway Co., Ltd. is a Chinese company that operates several railways with a total length of 1000 km, including the Daqin Railway and most assets on railway transportation of CR Taiyuan. The company is based in Datong, Shanxi. It was listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange in 2006 with IPO capital raising of $1.9 billion US dollars.Daqin Railway is a component of SSE 50 Index. The parent company of Daqin Railway was CR Taiyuan, a state-owned enterprise that the China Railway acted as its only shareholder.This recording reflects the Wikipedia text as of 01:15 UTC on Monday, 2 March 2026.For the full current version of the article, see Daqin Railway (company) on Wikipedia.This podcast uses content from Wikipedia under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License.Visit our archives at wikioftheday.com and subscribe to stay updated on new episodes.Follow us on Mastodon at @wikioftheday@masto.ai.Also check out Curmudgeon's Corner, a current events podcast.Until next time, I'm generative Kajal.

Some lesser-known or small Chinese towns and cities — with a strong festive ambience during Chinese New Year — alongside Neo-Chinese style destinations, have experienced "wealth beyond measure" during the nine-day Spring Festival holiday. Both domestic and international tourists have shown a tendency to linger in these areas.在为期9天的春节假期期间，一些不太出名的小城镇以及新中式风格的旅游目的地迎来了"泼天富贵"。国内游客和外国游客都喜欢在这些地方多玩几天。This year's extended Spring Festival holiday, which began on Feb 15 and concluded on Monday, inspired widespread travel.今年春节假期从2月15日开始，到2月23日结束，激发了人们的出游热情。"It's really stunning looking down at the lantern show from the ancient city walls. I felt like I was traveling back in time," said Sha Anna as she marveled at a lantern show on Feb 17 in Datong, Shanxi province. The Beijing resident visited the picturesque ancient city with family.北京居民沙安娜（音译）2月17日与家人一起游览了山西省大同市的古城。她在欣赏灯会时感叹道："从古城墙上俯瞰灯会，真的很震撼。我感觉自己穿越回了古代。"The city rose to popularity after the release of the Chinese-developed video game Black Myth: Wukong in 2024, which features several game scenes closely related to ancient Buddhist culture and Taoism.大同在2024年国产游戏《黑神话：悟空》发售后火了，这款游戏的几个场景与古老的佛教和道教文化密切相关。She said a desire to experience the lively festive atmosphere of Chinese New Year that differed from Beijing, led her to plan a trip to Datong — a city that boasts a rich cultural heritage. "The food here is also very delicious, especially the knife-cut noodles. The city left us with memories of historical legacies and human touch, and we will come back next Spring Festival."沙安娜说，她想体验与北京不同的热闹新年气氛，于是计划去大同旅游。大同市拥有丰富的文化遗产。她说："这里的食物也非常美味，尤其是刀削面。这座城市给我们留下了历史遗产和人情味的记忆，明年春节我们还会来。"Lively discussions on Datong and many other niche but attractive towns and small cities circulated online during the Spring Festival holiday. Their distinctive celebration practices, flavorful cuisine and strong cultural heritage have generated interest from tourists looking for unique experiences.春节期间，大同和许多其他小众但具有吸引力的城镇在网上引发了热议。它们独特的庆祝方式、风味美食和深厚的文化底蕴吸引了寻求独特体验的游客。Data from travel portal Tuniu shows that the number of tourists to Baoting Li and Miao autonomous county in South China's Hainan province and Dehong Dai and Jingpo autonomous prefecture in Southwest China's Yunnan province increased twofold compared with the previous Spring Festival period, as these places enjoy distinctive and exotic ethnic cultures. Destinations such as Chao zhou in Guangdong province, Shang rao and Jingdezhen in Jiangxi province have seen tourist numbers double year-on-year.旅游门户途牛网的数据显示，前往海南省保亭黎族苗族自治县和云南省德宏傣族景颇族自治州的游客数量比上一个春节增加了一倍，这些地方拥有独特而富有异域风情的民族文化。广东潮州、江西上饶和景德镇等目的地的游客数量同比翻了一番。Qunar, another online travel agency, noted strong enthusiasm among young people for Neo-Chinese style destinations — which blend contemporary and traditional Chinese cultures — during the holiday period. The agency reported that some history or novel-based theme parks like Millennium City Park and Wansui Mountain Wuxia City in Henan province were among the top destinations on their platform during the holiday.另一家在线旅游机构去哪儿网指出，假期期间，年轻人对新中式风格旅游目的地的热情很高。该机构报告称，河南的清明上河园和万岁山武侠城等一些历史或小说主题公园是假期期间其平台上最受欢迎的目的地之一。The extended holiday also stimulated Chinese people's desire for long-distance overseas trips. According to Qunar, between Feb 15 and Monday, its users flew to nearly 1,000 cities worldwide. The most popular overseas destinations were those with shorter flight times, friendly visa policies and milder climates, including Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.这个长假也刺激了中国人出国长途旅行的欲望。根据去哪儿网的数据，2月15日至23日期间，去哪儿网的用户飞往全球近1000个城市。最受欢迎的海外目的地是飞行时间较短、签证政策友好、气候温和的地方，包括曼谷、吉隆坡和香港。Among the travelers who went overseas was Zhang Yi, who took a four-day trip to Thailand with her family and returned to Shanghai on Sunday. "It was our third time visiting the country, but the first time celebrating Chinese New Year there. Thailand is a good place to relax," she said.张怡（音译）是出境游的游客之一，她与家人去泰国玩了四天，于周日返回上海。她说："这是我们第三次去泰国，但第一次在那里庆祝中国新年。泰国是个放松身心的好地方。"Qunar also noted that many of its users spent the Spring Festival holiday in Italy, the host nation of the recently concluded Milano Cortina 2026 Winter Olympics. "Based on our figures, flight ticket bookings to Italy on Feb 14 and Feb 15 — the day before the Spring Festival holiday started and the first day of the holiday — increased by 64 percent compared with the previous two days," it said.去哪儿网还指出，许多用户选择在意大利度过春节假期。意大利是最近结束的2026年米兰-科尔蒂纳冬奥会的主办国。该机构表示："根据我们的数据，2月14日和2月15日前往意大利的机票预订量与前两天相比增长了64%。"Additionally, the social media trend "becoming Chinese" has extended to the tourism market, with an increasing number of international travelers visiting the mainland during the Spring Festival holiday to partake in festivities. In 2024, Spring Festival was officially inscribed on the Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity by UNESCO, enhancing its global influence.此外，社交媒体上"成为中国人"的热潮也延伸到了旅游市场，越来越多的外国游客在春节期间来内地旅游。2024年春节被列入联合国教科文组织人类非物质文化遗产代表作名录，提升了其在全球的影响力。Data from Qunar shows that flight bookings to the mainland made by travelers holding non-Chinese passports grew by 20 percent year-on-year during the holiday.去哪儿网的数据显示，春节期间，持非中国护照的旅客赴内地机票预订量同比增长20%。Top destinations for these international travelers included not just big cities like Shanghai and Beijing but also lesser-known places like Jinggangshan in Jiangxi and Altay in the Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region.这些国际游客的主要目的地不仅包括上海、北京这样的大城市，还包括江西井冈山、新疆维吾尔自治区阿勒泰等不太知名的地方。"Most of these travelers came from South Korea, Vietnam, Singapore, Australia, and the United States. Domestic places with richer festive atmospheres and celebration events are most attractive to them," said Qunar, adding that travel trends among international travelers have transformed from quick sightseeing excursions to immersive experiences of Chinese traditions.去哪儿网表示："这些游客大多来自韩国、越南、新加坡、澳大利亚和美国。节日氛围和庆祝活动更丰富的国内地方对他们最有吸引力。"该机构指出，国际游客的旅游趋势已从快速观光游览转变为沉浸式体验中国传统。niche /niːʃ/ 小众的；定位明确的festive ambience /ˈfestɪv ˈæmbiəns/ 节日气氛linger in /ˈlɪŋɡə(r) ɪn/ 在……逗留；流连于picturesque /ˌpɪktʃəˈresk/ 风景如画的rise to popularity /raɪz tuː ˌpɒpjuˈlærəti/ 流行起来；走红human touch /ˈhjuːmən tʌtʃ/ 人情味year-on-year /ˌjɜːr ɒn ˈjɪr/ 同比Millennium City Park /mɪˈleniəm ˈsɪti pɑːk/ 清明上河园sightseeing excursions /ˈsaɪtsiːɪŋ ɪkˈskɜːʃənz/ 观光游览；短途旅游

Last time we spoke about the climax of the battle of Lake Khasan. In August, the Lake Khasan region became a tense theater of combat as Soviet and Japanese forces clashed around Changkufeng and Hill 52. The Soviets pushed a multi-front offensive, bolstered by artillery, tanks, and air power, yet the Japanese defenders held firm, aided by engineers, machine guns, and heavy guns. By the ninth and tenth, a stubborn Japanese resilience kept Hill 52 and Changkufeng in Japanese hands, though the price was steep and the field was littered with the costs of battle. Diplomatically, both sides aimed to confine the fighting and avoid a larger war. Negotiations trudged on, culminating in a tentative cease-fire draft for August eleventh: a halt to hostilities, positions to be held as of midnight on the tenth, and the creation of a border-demarcation commission. Moscow pressed for a neutral umpire; Tokyo resisted, accepting a Japanese participant but rejecting a neutral referee. The cease-fire was imperfect, with miscommunications and differing interpretations persisting.    #185 Operation Hainan Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. After what seemed like a lifetime over in the northern border between the USSR and Japan, today we are returning to the Second Sino-Japanese War. Now I thought it might be a bit jarring to dive into it, so let me do a brief summary of where we are at, in the year of 1939. As the calendar turned to 1939, the Second Sino-Japanese War, which had erupted in July 1937 with the Marco Polo Bridge Incident and escalated into full-scale conflict, had evolved into a protracted quagmire for the Empire of Japan. What began as a swift campaign to subjugate the Republic of China under Chiang Kai-shek had, by the close of 1938, transformed into a war of attrition. Japanese forces, under the command of generals like Shunroku Hata and Yasuji Okamura, had achieved stunning territorial gains: the fall of Shanghai in November 1937 after a brutal three-month battle that cost over 200,000 Chinese lives; the infamous capture of Nanjing in December 1937, marked by the Nanjing Massacre where an estimated 300,000 civilians and disarmed soldiers were killed in a six-week orgy of violence; and the sequential occupations of Xuzhou in May 1938, Wuhan in October 1938, and Guangzhou that same month.  These victories secured Japan's control over China's eastern seaboard, major riverine arteries like the Yangtze, and key industrial centers, effectively stripping the Nationalists of much of their economic base. Yet, despite these advances, China refused to capitulate. Chiang's government had retreated inland to the mountainous stronghold of Chongqing in Sichuan province, where it regrouped amid the fog-laden gorges, drawing on the vast human reserves of China's interior and the resilient spirit of its people. By late 1938, Japanese casualties had mounted to approximately 50,000 killed and 200,000 wounded annually, straining the Imperial Japanese Army's resources and exposing the vulnerabilities of overextended supply lines deep into hostile territory. In Tokyo, the corridors of the Imperial General Headquarters and the Army Ministry buzzed with urgent deliberations during the winter of 1938-1939. The initial doctrine of "quick victory" through decisive battles, epitomized by the massive offensives of 1937 and 1938, had proven illusory. Japan's military planners, influenced by the Kwantung Army's experiences in Manchuria and the ongoing stalemate, recognized that China's sheer size, with its 4 million square miles and over 400 million inhabitants, rendered total conquest unfeasible without unacceptable costs. Intelligence reports highlighted the persistence of Chinese guerrilla warfare, particularly in the north where Communist forces under Mao Zedong's Eighth Route Army conducted hit-and-run operations from bases in Shanxi and Shaanxi, sabotaging railways and ambushing convoys. The Japanese response included brutal pacification campaigns, such as the early iterations of what would later formalize as the "Three Alls Policy" (kill all, burn all, loot all), aimed at devastating rural economies and isolating resistance pockets. But these measures only fueled further defiance. By early 1939, a strategic pivot was formalized: away from direct annihilation of Chinese armies toward a policy of economic strangulation. This "blockade and interdiction" approach sought to sever China's lifelines to external aid, choking off the flow of weapons, fuel, and materiel that sustained the Nationalist war effort. As one Japanese staff officer noted in internal memos, the goal was to "starve the dragon in its lair," acknowledging the limits of Japanese manpower, total forces in China numbered around 1 million by 1939, against China's inexhaustible reserves. Central to this new strategy were the three primary overland supply corridors that had emerged as China's backdoors to the world, compensating for the Japanese naval blockade that had sealed off most coastal ports since late 1937. The first and most iconic was the Burma Road, a 717-mile engineering marvel hastily constructed between 1937 and 1938 by over 200,000 Chinese and Burmese laborers under the direction of engineers like Chih-Ping Chen. Stretching from the railhead at Lashio in British Burma (modern Myanmar) through treacherous mountain passes and dense jungles to Kunming in Yunnan province, the road navigated elevations up to 7,000 feet with hundreds of hairpin turns and precarious bridges. By early 1939, it was operational, albeit plagued by monsoonal mudslides, banditry, and mechanical breakdowns of the imported trucks, many Ford and Chevrolet models supplied via British Rangoon. Despite these challenges, it funneled an increasing volume of aid: in 1939 alone, estimates suggest up to 10,000 tons per month of munitions, gasoline, and aircraft parts from Allied sources, including early Lend-Lease precursors from the United States. The road's completion in 1938 had been a direct response to the loss of southern ports, and its vulnerability to aerial interdiction made it a prime target in Japanese planning documents. The second lifeline was the Indochina route, centered on the French-built Yunnan-Vietnam Railway (also known as the Hanoi-Kunming Railway), a 465-mile narrow-gauge line completed in 1910 that linked the port of Haiphong in French Indochina to Kunming via Hanoi and Lao Cai. This colonial artery, supplemented by parallel roads and river transport along the Red River, became China's most efficient supply conduit in 1938-1939, exploiting France's uneasy neutrality. French authorities, under Governor-General Pierre Pasquier and later Georges Catroux, turned a blind eye to transshipments, allowing an average of 15,000 to 20,000 tons monthly in early 1939, far surpassing the Burma Road's initial capacity. Cargoes included Soviet arms rerouted via Vladivostok and American oil, with French complicity driven by anti-Japanese sentiment and profitable tolls. However, Japanese reconnaissance flights from bases in Guangdong noted the vulnerability of bridges and rail yards, leading to initial bombing raids by mid-1939. Diplomatic pressure mounted, with Tokyo issuing protests to Paris, foreshadowing the 1940 closure under Vichy France after the fall of France in Europe. The route's proximity to the South China Sea made it a focal point for Japanese naval strategists, who viewed it as a "leak in the blockade." The third corridor, often overlooked but critical, was the Northwest Highway through Soviet Central Asia and Xinjiang province. This overland network, upgraded between 1937 and 1941 with Soviet assistance, connected the Turkestan-Siberian Railway at Almaty (then Alma-Ata) to Lanzhou in Gansu via Urumqi, utilizing a mix of trucks, camel caravans, and rudimentary roads across the Gobi Desert and Tian Shan mountains. Under the Sino-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of August 1937 and subsequent aid agreements, Moscow supplied China with over 900 aircraft, 82 tanks, 1,300 artillery pieces, and vast quantities of ammunition and fuel between 1937 and 1941—much of it traversing this route. In 1938-1939, volumes peaked, with Soviet pilots and advisors even establishing air bases in Lanzhou. The highway's construction involved tens of thousands of Chinese laborers, facing harsh winters and logistical hurdles, but it delivered up to 2,000 tons monthly, including entire fighter squadrons like the Polikarpov I-16. Japanese intelligence, aware of this "Red lifeline," planned disruptions but were constrained by the ongoing Nomonhan Incident on the Manchurian-Soviet border in 1939, which diverted resources and highlighted the risks of provoking Moscow. These routes collectively sustained China's resistance, prompting Japan's high command to prioritize their severance. In March 1939, the South China Area Army was established under General Rikichi Andō (later succeeded by Field Marshal Hisaichi Terauchi), headquartered in Guangzhou, with explicit orders to disrupt southern communications. Aerial campaigns intensified, with Mitsubishi G3M "Nell" bombers from Wuhan and Guangzhou targeting Kunming's airfields and the Red River bridges, while diplomatic maneuvers pressured colonial powers: Britain faced demands during the June 1939 Tientsin Crisis to close the Burma Road, and France received ultimatums that culminated in the 1940 occupation of northern Indochina. Yet, direct assaults on Yunnan or Guangxi were deemed too arduous due to rugged terrain and disease risks. Instead, planners eyed peripheral objectives to encircle these arteries. This strategic calculus set the stage for the invasion of Hainan Island, a 13,000-square-mile landmass off Guangdong's southern coast, rich in iron and copper but strategically priceless for its position astride the Indochina route and proximity to Hong Kong. By February 1939, Japanese admirals like Nobutake Kondō of the 5th Fleet advocated seizure to establish air and naval bases, plugging blockade gaps and enabling raids on Haiphong and Kunming, a prelude to broader southern expansion that would echo into the Pacific War. Now after the fall campaign around Canton in autumn 1938, the Japanese 21st Army found itself embedded in a relentless effort to sever the enemy's lifelines. Its primary objective shifted from mere battlefield engagements to tightening the choke points of enemy supply, especially along the Canton–Hankou railway. Recognizing that war materiel continued to flow into the enemy's hands, the Imperial General Headquarters ordered the 21st Army to strike at every other supply route, one by one, until the arteries of logistics were stifled. The 21st Army undertook a series of decisive occupations to disrupt transport and provisioning from multiple directions. To sustain these difficult campaigns, Imperial General Headquarters reinforced the south China command, enabling greater operational depth and endurance. The 21st Army benefited from a series of reinforcements during 1939, which allowed a reorganization of assignments and missions: In late January, the Iida Detachment was reorganized into the Formosa Mixed Brigade and took part in the invasion of Hainan Island.  Hainan, just 15 miles across the Qiongzhou Strait from the mainland, represented a critical "loophole": it lay astride the Gulf of Tonkin, enabling smuggling of arms and materiel from Haiphong to Kunming, and offered potential airfields for bombing raids deep into Yunnan. Japanese interest in Hainan dated to the 1920s, driven by the Taiwan Governor-General's Office, which eyed the island's tropical resources (rubber, iron, copper) and naval potential at ports like Sanya (Samah). Prewar surveys by Japanese firms, such as those documented in Ide Kiwata's Minami Shina no Sangyō to Keizai (1939), highlighted mineral wealth and strategic harbors. The fall of Guangzhou in October 1938 provided the perfect launchpad, but direct invasion was delayed until early 1939 amid debates between the IJA (favoring mainland advances) and IJN (prioritizing naval encirclement). The operation would also heavily align with broader "southward advance" (Nanshin-ron) doctrine foreshadowing invasions of French Indochina (1940) and the Pacific War. On the Chinese side, Hainan was lightly defended as part of Guangdong's "peace preservation" under General Yu Hanmou. Two security regiments, six guard battalions, and a self-defense corps, totaling around 7,000–10,000 poorly equipped troops guarded the island, supplemented by roughly 300 Communist guerrillas under Feng Baiju, who operated independently in the interior. The indigenous Li (Hlai) people in the mountainous south, alienated by Nationalist taxes, provided uneven support but later allied with Communists. The Imperial General Headquarters ordered the 21st Army, in cooperation with the Navy, to occupy and hold strategic points on the island near Haikou-Shih. The 21st Army commander assigned the Formosa Mixed Brigade to carry out this mission. Planning began in late 1938 under the IJN's Fifth Fleet, with IJA support from the 21st Army. The objective: secure northern and southern landing sites to bisect the island, establish air/naval bases, and exploit resources. Vice Admiral Nobutake Kondō, commanding the fleet, emphasized surprise and air superiority. The invasion began under the cover of darkness on February 9, 1939, when Kondō's convoy entered Tsinghai Bay on the northern shore of Hainan and anchored at midnight. Japanese troops swiftly disembarked, encountering minimal initial resistance from the surprised Chinese defenders, and secured a beachhead in the northern zone. At 0300 hours on 10 February, the Formosa Mixed Brigade, operating in close cooperation with naval units, executed a surprise landing at the northeastern point of Tengmai Bay in north Hainan. By 04:30, the right flank reached the main road leading to Fengyingshih, while the left flank reached a position two kilometers south of Tienwei. By 07:00, the right flank unit had overcome light enemy resistance near Yehli and occupied Chiungshan. At that moment there were approximately 1,000 elements of the enemy's 5th Infantry Brigade (militia) at Chiungshan; about half of these troops were destroyed, and the remainder fled into the hills south of Tengmai in a state of disarray. Around 08:30 that same day, the left flank unit advanced to the vicinity of Shuchang and seized Hsiuying Heights. By 12:00, it occupied Haikou, the island's northern port city and administrative center, beginning around noon. Army and navy forces coordinated to mop up remaining pockets of resistance in the northern areas, overwhelming the scattered Chinese security units through superior firepower and organization. No large-scale battles are recorded in primary accounts; instead, the engagements were characterized by rapid advances and localized skirmishes, as the Chinese forces, lacking heavy artillery or air support, could not mount a sustained defense. By the end of the day, Japanese control over the north was consolidating, with Haikou falling under their occupation.Also on 10 February, the Brigade pushed forward to seize Cingang. Wenchang would be taken on the 22nd, followed by Chinglan Port on the 23rd. On February 11, the operation expanded southward when land combat units amphibiously assaulted Samah (now Sanya) at the island's southern tip. This landing allowed them to quickly seize key positions, including the port of Yulin (Yulinkang) and the town of Yai-Hsien (Yaxian, now part of Sanya). With these southern footholds secured, Japanese forces fanned out to subjugate the rest of the island, capturing inland areas and infrastructure with little organized opposition. Meanwhile, the landing party of the South China Navy Expeditionary Force, which had joined with the Army to secure Haikou, began landing on the island's southern shore at dawn on 14 February. They operated under the protection of naval and air units. By the same morning, the landing force had advanced to Sa-Riya and, by 12:00 hours, had captured Yulin Port. Chinese casualties were significant in the brief fighting; from January to May 1939, reports indicate the 11th security regiment alone suffered 8 officers and 162 soldiers killed, 3 officers and 16 wounded, and 5 officers and 68 missing, though figures for other units are unclear. Japanese losses were not publicly detailed but appear to have been light.  When crisis pressed upon them, Nationalist forces withdrew from coastal Haikou, shepherding the last civilians toward the sheltering embrace of the Wuzhi mountain range that bands the central spine of Hainan. From that high ground they sought to endure the storm, praying that the rugged hills might shield their families from the reach of war. Yet the Li country's mountains did not deliver a sanctuary free of conflict. Later in August of 1943, an uprising erupted among the Li,Wang Guoxing, a figure of local authority and stubborn resolve. His rebellion was swiftly crushed; in reprisal, the Nationalists executed a seizure of vengeance that extended far beyond the moment of defeat, claiming seven thousand members of Wang Guoxing's kin in his village. The episode was grim testimony to the brutal calculus of war, where retaliation and fear indelibly etched the landscape of family histories. Against this backdrop, the Communists under Feng Baiju and the native Li communities forged a vigorous guerrilla war against the occupiers. The struggle was not confined to partisan skirmishes alone; it unfolded as a broader contest of survival and resistance. The Japanese response was relentless and punitive, and it fell upon Li communities in western Hainan with particular ferocity, Sanya and Danzhou bore the brunt of violence, as did the many foreign laborers conscripted into service by the occupying power. The toll of these reprisals was stark: among hundreds of thousands of slave laborers pressed into service, tens of thousands perished. Of the 100,000 laborers drawn from Hong Kong, only about 20,000 survived the war's trials, a haunting reminder of the human cost embedded in the occupation. Strategically, the island of Hainan took on a new if coercive purpose. Portions of the island were designated as a naval administrative district, with the Hainan Guard District Headquarters established at Samah, signaling its role as a forward air base and as an operational flank for broader anti-Chiang Kai-shek efforts. In parallel, the island's rich iron and copper resources were exploited to sustain the war economy of the occupiers. The control of certain areas on Hainan provided a base of operations for incursions into Guangdong and French Indochina, while the airbases that dotted the island enabled long-range air raids that threaded routes from French Indochina and Burma into the heart of China. The island thus assumed a grim dual character: a frontier fortress for the occupiers and a ground for the prolonged suffering of its inhabitants. Hainan then served as a launchpad for later incursions into Guangdong and Indochina. Meanwhile after Wuhan's collapse, the Nationalist government's frontline strength remained formidable, even as attrition gnawed at its edges. By the winter of 1938–1939, the front line had swelled to 261 divisions of infantry and cavalry, complemented by 50 independent brigades. Yet the political and military fissures within the Kuomintang suggested fragility beneath the apparent depth of manpower. The most conspicuous rupture came with Wang Jingwei's defection, the vice president and chairman of the National Political Council, who fled to Hanoi on December 18, 1938, leading a procession of more than ten other KMT officials, including Chen Gongbo, Zhou Fohai, Chu Minqi, and Zeng Zhongming. In the harsh arithmetic of war, defections could not erase the country's common resolve to resist Japanese aggression, and the anti-Japanese national united front still served as a powerful instrument, rallying the Chinese populace to "face the national crisis together." Amid this political drama, Japan's strategy moved into a phase that sought to convert battlefield endurance into political consolidation. As early as January 11, 1938, Tokyo had convened an Imperial Conference and issued a framework for handling the China Incident that would shape the theater for years. The "Outline of Army Operations Guidance" and "Continental Order No. 241" designated the occupied territories as strategic assets to be held with minimal expansion beyond essential needs. The instruction mapped an operational zone that compressed action to a corridor between Anqing, Xinyang, Yuezhou, and Nanchang, while the broader line of occupation east of a line tracing West Sunit, Baotou, and the major river basins would be treated as pacified space. This was a doctrine of attrition, patience, and selective pressure—enough to hold ground, deny resources to the Chinese, and await a more opportune political rupture. Yet even as Japan sought political attrition, the war's tactical center of gravity drifted toward consolidation around Wuhan and the pathways that fed the Yangtze. In October 1938, after reducing Wuhan to a fortressed crescent of contested ground, the Japanese General Headquarters acknowledged the imperative to adapt to a protracted war. The new calculus prioritized political strategy alongside military operations: "We should attach importance to the offensive of political strategy, cultivate and strengthen the new regime, and make the National Government decline, which will be effective." If the National Government trembled under coercive pressure, it risked collapse, and if not immediately, then gradually through a staged series of operations. In practice, this meant reinforcing a centralized center while allowing peripheral fronts to be leveraged against Chongqing's grip on the war's moral economy. In the immediate post-Wuhan period, Japan divided its responsibilities and aimed at a standoff that would enable future offensives. The 11th Army Group, stationed in the Wuhan theater, became the spearhead of field attacks on China's interior, occupying a strategic triangle that included Hunan, Jiangxi, and Guangxi, and protecting the rear of southwest China's line of defense. The central objective was not merely to seize territory, but to deny Chinese forces the capacity to maneuver along the critical rail and river corridors that fed the Nanjing–Jiujiang line and the Zhejiang–Jiangxi Railway. Central to this plan was Wuhan's security and the ability to constrain Jiujiang's access to the Yangtze, preserving a corridor for air power and logistics. The pre-war arrangement in early 1939 was a tableau of layered defenses and multiple war zones, designed to anticipate and blunt Japanese maneuver. By February 1939, the Ninth War Zone under Xue Yue stood in a tense standoff with the Japanese 11th Army along the Jiangxi and Hubei front south of the Yangtze. The Ninth War Zone's order of battle, Luo Zhuoying's 19th Army Group defending the northern Nanchang front, Wang Lingji's 30th Army Group near Wuning, Fan Songfu's 8th and 73rd Armies along Henglu, Tang Enbo's 31st Army Group guarding southern Hubei and northern Hunan, and Lu Han's 1st Army Group in reserve near Changsha and Liuyang, was a carefully calibrated attempt to absorb, delay, and disrupt any Xiushui major Japanese thrust toward Nanchang, a city whose strategic significance stretched beyond its own bounds. In the spring of 1939, Nanchang was the one city in southern China that Tokyo could not leave in Chinese hands. It was not simply another provincial capital; it was the beating heart of whatever remained of China's war effort south of the Yangtze, and the Japanese knew it. High above the Gan River, on the flat plains west of Poyang Lake, lay three of the finest airfields China had ever built: Qingyunpu, Daxiaochang, and Xiangtang. Constructed only a few years earlier with Soviet engineers and American loans, they were long, hard-surfaced, and ringed with hangars and fuel dumps. Here the Chinese Air Force had pulled back after the fall of Wuhan, and here the red-starred fighters and bombers of the Soviet volunteer groups still flew. From Nanchang's runways a determined pilot could reach Japanese-held Wuhan in twenty minutes, Guangzhou in less than an hour, and even strike the docks at Hong Kong if he pushed his range. Every week Japanese reconnaissance planes returned with photographs of fresh craters patched, new aircraft parked wing-to-wing, and Soviet pilots sunning themselves beside their I-16s. As long as those fields remained Chinese, Japan could never claim the sky. The city was more than airfields. It sat exactly where the Zhejiang–Jiangxi Railway met the line running north to Jiujiang and the Yangtze, a knot that tied together three provinces. Barges crowded Poyang Lake's western shore, unloading crates of Soviet ammunition and aviation fuel that had come up the river from the Indochina railway. Warehouses along the tracks bulged with shells and rice. To the Japanese staff officers plotting in Wuhan and Guangzhou, Nanchang looked less like a city and more like a loaded spring: if Chiang Kai-shek ever found the strength for a counteroffensive to retake the middle Yangtze, this would be the place from which it would leap. And so, in the cold March of 1939, the Imperial General Headquarters marked Nanchang in red on every map and gave General Okamura the order he had been waiting for: take it, whatever the cost. Capturing the city would do three things at once. It would blind the Chinese Air Force in the south by seizing or destroying the only bases from which it could still seriously operate. It would tear a hole in the last east–west rail line still feeding Free China. And it would shove the Nationalist armies another two hundred kilometers farther into the interior, buying Japan precious time to digest its earlier conquests and tighten the blockade. Above all, Nanchang was the final piece in a great aerial ring Japan was closing around southern China. Hainan had fallen in February, giving the navy its southern airfields. Wuhan and Guangzhou already belonged to the army. Once Nanchang was taken, Japanese aircraft would sit on a continuous arc of bases from the tropical beaches of the South China Sea to the banks of the Yangtze, and nothing (neither the Burma Road convoys nor the French railway from Hanoi) would move without their permission. Chiang Kai-shek's decision to strike first in the Nanchang region in March 1939 reflected both urgency and a desire to seize initiative before Japanese modernization of the battlefield could fully consolidate. On March 8, Chiang directed Xue Yue to prepare a preemptive attack intended to seize the offensive by March 15, focusing the Ninth War Zone's efforts on preventing a river-crossing assault and pinning Japanese forces in place. The plan called for a sequence of coordinated actions: the 19th Army Group to hold the northern front of Nanchang; the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Border Advance Army (the 8th and 73rd Armies) to strike the enemy's left flank from Wuning toward De'an and Ruichang; the 30th and 27th Army Groups to consolidate near Wuning; and the 1st Army Group to push toward Xiushui and Sandu, opening routes for subsequent operations. Yet even as Xue Yue pressed for action, the weather of logistics and training reminded observers that no victory could be taken for granted. By March 9–10, Xue Yue warned Chiang that troops were not adequately trained, supplies were scarce, and preparations were insufficient, requesting a postponement to March 24. Chiang's reply was resolute: the attack must commence no later than the 24th, for the aim was preemption and the desire to tether the enemy's forces before they could consolidate. When the moment of decision arrived, the Chinese army began to tense, and the Japanese, no strangers to rapid shifts in tempo—moved to exploit any hesitation or fog of mobilization. The Ninth War Zone's response crystallized into a defensive posture as the Japanese pressed forward, marking a transition from preemption to standoff as both sides tested the limits of resilience. The Japanese plan for what would become known as Operation Ren, aimed at severing the Zhejiang–Jiangxi Railway, breaking the enemy's line of communication, and isolating Nanchang, reflected a calculated synthesis of air power, armored mobility, and canalized ground offensives. On February 6, 1939, the Central China Expeditionary Army issued a set of precise directives: capture Nanchang to cut the Zhejiang–Jiangxi Railway and disrupt the southern reach of Anhui and Zhejiang provinces; seize Nanchang along the Nanchang–Xunyi axis to split enemy lines and "crush" Chinese resistance south of that zone; secure rear lines immediately after the city's fall; coordinate with naval air support to threaten Chinese logistics and airfields beyond the rear lines. The plan anticipated contingencies by pre-positioning heavy artillery and tanks in formations that could strike with speed and depth, a tactical evolution from previous frontal assaults. Okamura Yasuji, commander of the 11th Army, undertook a comprehensive program of reconnaissance, refining the assault plan with a renewed emphasis on speed and surprise. Aerial reconnaissance underlined the terrain, fortifications, and the disposition of Chinese forces, informing the selection of the Xiushui River crossing and the route of the main axis of attack. Okamura's decision to reorganize artillery and armor into concentrated tank groups, flanked by air support and advanced by long-range maneuver, marked a departure from the earlier method of distributing heavy weapons along the infantry front. Sumita Laishiro commanded the 6th Field Heavy Artillery Brigade, with more than 300 artillery pieces, while Hirokichi Ishii directed a force of 135 tanks and armored vehicles. This blended arms approach promised a breakthrough that would outpace the Chinese defenders and open routes for the main force. By mid-February 1939, Japanese preparations had taken on a high tempo. The 101st and 106th Divisions, along with attached artillery, assembled south of De'an, while tank contingents gathered north of De'an. The 6th Division began moving toward Ruoxi and Wuning, the Inoue Detachment took aim at the waterways of Poyang Lake, and the 16th and 9th Divisions conducted feints on the Han River's left bank. The orchestration of these movements—feints, riverine actions, and armored flanking, was designed to reduce the Chinese capacity to concentrate forces around Nanchang and to force the defenders into a less secure posture along the Nanchang–Jiujiang axis. Japan's southward strategy reframed the war: no longer a sprint to reduce Chinese forces in open fields, but a patient siege of lifelines, railways, and airbases. Hainan's seizure, the control of Nanchang's airfields, and the disruption of the Zhejiang–Jiangxi Railway exemplified a shift from large-scale battles to coercive pressure that sought to cripple Nationalist mobilization and erode Chongqing's capacity to sustain resistance. For China, the spring of 1939 underscored resilience amid mounting attrition. Chiang Kai-shek's insistence on offensive means to seize the initiative demonstrated strategic audacity, even as shortages and uneven training slowed tempo. The Ninth War Zone's defense, bolstered by makeshift airpower from Soviet and Allied lendings, kept open critical corridors and delayed Japan's consolidation. The war's human cost—massive casualties, forced labor, and the Li uprising on Hainan—illuminates the brutality that fueled both sides' resolve. In retrospect, the period around Canton, Wuhan, and Nanchang crystallizes a grim truth: the Sino-Japanese war was less a single crescendo of battles than a protracted contest of endurance, logistics, and political stamina. The early 1940s would widen these fault lines, but the groundwork laid in 1939, competition over supply routes, air control, and strategic rail nodes, would shape the war's pace and, ultimately, its outcome. The conflict's memory lies not only in the clashes' flash but in the stubborn persistence of a nation fighting to outlast a formidable adversary. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Japanese invasion of Hainan and proceeding operations to stop logistical leaks into Nationalist China, showcased the complexity and scale of the growing Second Sino-Japanese War. It would not merely be a war of territorial conquest, Japan would have to strangle the colossus using every means necessary.  

China launched two carrier rockets on Tuesday, signaling the start of the country's annual space mission schedule, which will feature a robotic lunar landing and two manned spaceflights.中国在周二发射了两枚运载火箭；此举标志着中国年度航天任务计划正式启动，其中包括一次月球机器人着陆任务和两次载人航天飞行。At 10:16 pm, a Long March 6A rocket blasted off from the Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center in Shanxi province, and it soon placed the Yaogan 50A remote-sensing satellite into a preset orbit.1月13日22时16分，长征六号改运载火箭在太原卫星发射中心点火起飞，随后将遥感五十号01星送入预定轨道。The satellite, built by the Shanghai Academy of Spaceflight Technology, is tasked with obtaining data to support land resource surveys, agricultural yield forecasts, and disaster prevention and mitigation.这颗由上海航天技术研究院研制建造的卫星，肩负着获取数据以支持土地资源调查、农业产量预测以及防灾减灾的任务。Data obtained by the Yaogan family, the major series of remote-sensing spacecraft in China, has been widely used by governments, public service sectors and businesses.中国主要遥感卫星系列遥感家族获取的数据已被政府、公共服务部门和企业广泛应用。The Long March 6A, which was also developed by the Shanghai academy, is a medium-lift launch vehicle. It comprises a 50-meter liquid-propelled core booster and four solid-fuel side boosters. The rocket has a liftoff weight of 530 metric tons and is tasked with transporting satellites to multiple types of orbits, including sun-synchronous, low-Earth and intermediate circular ones.长征六号改运载火箭同样由上海航天研究院研制，属于中型运载火箭。该火箭由50米长的液氧煤油核心助推器和四台固体燃料侧助推器组成，起飞重量达530吨，可将卫星送入太阳同步轨道、近地轨道及中地球圆形轨道等多类轨道。The launch marked China's first space mission in 2026 and the 624th flight of the Long March rocket fleet.此次发射标志着中国2026年首次太空任务，也是长征火箭家族的第624次飞行。At 11:25 pm, a Long March 8A carrier rocket lifted off from the Hainan International Commercial Aerospace Launch Center, a coastal spaceport in Hainan province, deploying the 18th group of low-orbit satellites for China's State-owned satellite internet network.1月13日23时25分，中国在位于海南省沿海地区的海南商业航天发射场使用长征八号甲运载火箭，成功将卫星互联网低轨18组卫星发射升空，卫星顺利进入预定轨道，发射任务获得圆满成功。These satellites were designed and developed by the China Academy of Space Technology. With their deployment, the State-run mega internet satellite network now has more than 140 satellites operating in low orbits.这些卫星由中国航天科技集团公司设计研制。随着它们的部署，国家运营的超大规模互联网卫星网络现已在低轨道运行超过140颗卫星。The Long March 8A model, developed by the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology, is 50.5 meters tall, and it has a core booster and two side boosters. The carrier rocket has a liftoff weight of 371 tons and a liftoff thrust of about 480 tons.由中国运载火箭技术研究院研制的长征八号甲运载火箭，全高50.5米，由核心助推器和两个侧助推器组成。该运载火箭起飞重量达371吨，起飞推力约480吨。It is mainly tasked with placing satellites in sun-synchronous orbits, and is capable of transporting payloads weighing up to 7 tons to a typical sun-synchronous orbit at an altitude of 700 kilometers.该火箭的主要任务是将卫星送入太阳同步轨道，能够将重达7吨的有效载荷运送至高度700公里的典型太阳同步轨道。This was the seventh time a Long March 8A rocket deployed low-orbit internet satellites.这是长征八号甲运载火箭第七次部署低轨道互联网卫星。Last year, China conducted 93 space missions, setting a new national record for orbital launches in a single year.去年，中国实施了93次航天任务，创下单年轨道发射次数的新纪录。Observers said that 2026 will also be a busy year for China's space industry, with several launches scheduled before the end of January.观察人士指出，2026年也将是中国航天事业繁忙的一年，仅1月底前就计划进行多次发射。The Chang'e 7, a key mission in the fourth phase of the country's lunar exploration project, is scheduled for launch this year.嫦娥七号是我国月球探测工程第四阶段的关键任务，计划于今年发射升空。According to the China National Space Administration, the robotic probe is designed to land on the moon's south pole, and it will survey the surface environment, search for ice and volatile components in lunar soil, and carry out high-precision detection and analysis of lunar terrain, its composition and structure.据中国国家航天局介绍，嫦娥七号计划登陆月球南极，将对月表环境进行勘测，探测月壤中的冰与挥发物成分，并对月球地形、成分及结构进行高精度探测与分析。Program planners said the Chang'e 7 spacecraft will consist of an orbiter, a lander, a rover and a small flying probe capable of reaching lunar pits to search for ice.项目规划人员表示，嫦娥七号探测器将由环月轨道器、月球着陆器、月球车以及一台小型飞行探测器组成，后者能够抵达月球陨坑寻找冰层。This year, two manned missions — the Shenzhou XXIII and the Shenzhou XXIV — are also expected to take place to make crew shifts aboard the Tiangong space station.今年还将实施两次载人飞行任务——神舟二十三号和神舟二十四号，为天宫空间站执行乘组轮换任务。One of the three Shenzhou XXIII crew members will stay a whole year aboard the space station, attempting the longest orbital journey by any Chinese astronaut.神舟二十三号飞船的三名乘组成员中，将有一人将在空间站停留整整一年，这将成为中国航天员迄今为止最长的轨道飞行任务。Industry insiders said it is highly likely that a Pakistani astronaut will participate in a flight to Tiangong this year, and will become the first foreign national aboard the Chinese space station.业内人士表示，一位巴基斯坦宇航员今年极有可能参与天宫空间站的飞行任务，并将成为中国空间站首位外国宇航员。liquid-propelled core booster液氧煤油核心助推器payload/ˈpeɪ.loʊd/n.有效载荷

For Li Wan, a 25-year-old living alone in East China's Shandong province, the blunt question "Are you dead?" wasn't an insult, but rather an 8-yuan ($1.14) investment in peace of mind.对于25岁的李婉（音译）来说，这位独自生活在中国东部山东省的年轻人，面对“你死了吗？”这样直白的问题，并非感到被冒犯，反而视作一项8元（约合1.14美元）的安心投资。Li is one of thousands of young professionals driving a viral surge for "Sileme" — translated as "Are You Dead?" — a minimalist safety app that has recently dominated the paid charts on China's Apple App Store. The app, branded as Demumu in its English version, requires no login or personal data; users simply tap a "check in today" button once a day. If they miss their check-in for consecutive days, the system automatically emails a designated emergency contact.李婉（音译）是数千名推动“Sileme”（意为“死了吗”）病毒式传播的年轻专业人士之一。这款极简安全应用近期在中国苹果应用商店的付费榜单上独占鳌头。这款英文版名为Demumu的应用无需登录或提供个人信息，用户只需每日点击一次“今日签到”按钮。若连续多日未签到，系统将自动向指定紧急联系人发送邮件。"I downloaded it because the name was amusing," said Li, who has lived alone for over a year and is often on the receiving end of her mother's concerns about lack of communication. "With the app, my mom will receive an email and can reach me if I don't check in. It enhances communication with my family."李婉（音译）她独自生活已逾一年，常因缺乏联系而成为母亲担忧的对象，她表示：“我下载这个应用是因为名字有趣。有了这个应用，如果我不按时报平安，母亲会收到邮件并能联系到我。这增强了我和家人的沟通。”The app's sudden popularity highlights a growing "safety anxiety" among China's solo dwellers. According to the 2025 China Statistical Yearbook, single-person households now account for approximately 20 percent of the country's sampled population. Industry forecasts from Beike Research Institute suggest this demographic could swell to between 150 million and 200 million people by 2030.该应用的突然走红凸显了中国独居人群日益增长的“安全焦虑”。据《2025年中国统计年鉴》显示，单人家庭目前约占全国抽样人口的20%。Beike研究院的行业预测指出，到2030年这一群体规模可能膨胀至1.5亿至2亿人。Developed by three Gen Z creators in just one month, the app was born from social media discussions about the risks of living alone. One of the developers, surnamed Guo, noted the user base has increased 50-fold since its launch.这款应用由三位Z世代创作者仅用一个月时间开发完成，其灵感源于社交媒体上关于独居风险的讨论。开发者之一郭姓人士指出，自上线以来用户基数已增长50倍。Guo said the cost of developing the app, about 1,000 yuan, has been recovered and the team plans to add the function of text messaging in the near future.郭先生表示，该应用的开发成本约1000元，现已收回成本，团队计划近期增加短信功能。While some users have criticized the name as "ominous" or "blunt", suggesting alternatives like "Are You Alive?" or "Are You Okay?", Guo argues the name is direct and reflects a shifting cultural attitude. Younger generations, he says, are becoming less hesitant about discussing mortality.尽管部分用户批评该名称“不祥”或“直白”，并建议采用“你还活着吗？”或“你还好吗？”等替代方案，郭先生认为“死了吗”这个名称直截了当，反映了文化态度的转变。他表示，年轻一代在讨论死亡话题时正变得越来越坦然。Some copycat apps with names such as "Huozheme", or "Are You Alive?" have already sprung up.一些模仿应用已如雨后春笋般涌现，其名称诸如“活着吗？”或“你还活着吗？”。The success of Sileme reflects a broader social trend where technology and community initiatives are stepping in to replace traditional family safety nets.“死了吗”的成功反映出一种更广泛的社会趋势：技术与社区倡议正逐步取代传统的家庭安全网。In Taiyuan, Shanxi province, community workers have launched a "curtain signal" initiative where elderly residents indicate they are safe by opening their curtains every morning. Meanwhile, on social media platforms like Douban, female solo dwellers have formed mutual aid communities to trade services like appliance repairs and furniture assembly, avoiding the need to invite strangers into their homes.在山西省太原市，社区工作者推出“窗帘行动”，老年居民每天早晨拉开窗帘示意自己平安无事。与此同时，在豆瓣等社交平台上，女性独居者们组建互助社区，互相提供家电维修、家具组装等服务，避免让陌生人进入家中。Wen Jun, a professor of social sciences at East China Normal University, emphasized that while apps like Sileme provide a starting point, they are not a complete solution. He argues that the government and local communities must work together to establish an "online-offline synergy" that ensures no one, whether young or old, is left truly alone in an emergency.华东师范大学社会科学教授文军强调，虽然“失联报警”这类应用程序提供了起点，但并非完整的解决方案。他认为政府和社区必须携手建立“线上线下协同机制”，确保无论老少，在紧急情况下都不会真正陷入孤立无援的境地。For now, the developers of Sileme say they are considering a name change to address user feedback, even as the app continues to trend under its provocative original title.目前，“死了吗”的开发者表示正考虑更名以回应用户反馈，尽管该应用仍以其原先的挑衅性名称持续走红。ominous/ˈɑː.mə.nəs/adj.不详的provocative/prəˈvɑː.kə.t̬ɪv/adj.挑衅性的

Saturday night and I felt the itch to record! Welcome to episode 2 of 2026 on Courtside Financial.Today we're diving deep into the battery swapping industry entering what's being called its "golden age" – this is massive infrastructure buildout happening in real-time with NIO, CATL, and others positioning for the future of EV energy replenishment.THE BATTERY SWAPPING GOLDEN AGE:The Chinese pure electric vehicle market is expected to grow 30-40% year-over-year in 2025, with sales projected to hit 19 million units by 2030. Battery swapping is no longer experimental – it's going mainstream.CATL is running two parallel strategies: "Chocolate Battery Swapping" for passenger cars and "Qiji Battery Swapping" for heavy trucks. In 2025, they partnered with NIO to build the world's largest battery swap network, signed deals with GAC, FAW, Changan, BAIC, and Chery to launch 10 new models, and partnered with JD.com to drop a battery-swapping EV at just 49,900 yuan (under $7,000 USD). Their 2026 target: over 2,500 Chocolate stations in 120 cities. By 2030, their heavy truck network will cover 180,000 kilometers.NIO completed battery swap coverage in over 2,300 county-level administrative regions by year-end 2025. As of December 30th, they operated 3,665 battery swap stations – the world's largest high-speed network. Fourth-generation stations rolled out rapidly, and fifth-generation stations launch at scale in Q1 2026. They're transforming from "exclusive to NIO" to "universal across the industry."Aulton New Energy filed to go public in Hong Kong in December 2025, aiming to become the first battery-swapping company listed there. They're the largest independent third-party provider with 521 connected stations and over 160,000 batteries under management.According to Frost & Sullivan, battery-swapping vehicle sales will grow from 269,000 units in 2024 to 1.14 million by 2030 (27.1% CAGR). Swap stations will jump from 4,400 to 24,000 (32.5% CAGR).But challenges remain: standard fragmentation across manufacturers, massive construction and operating costs, and the path to profitability still unclear. Aulton's still losing money. NIO's invested $2.5 billion USD in infrastructure with another $700 million planned over the next decade.Heavy-duty trucks are the breakthrough application – fixed routes, large batteries, continuous operation needs. CATL's dominating this space with aggressive deployment in Shanxi and Shaanxi provinces.THE AIRLINE CLASS WARS:The airline industry is experiencing K-shaped divergence. Delta and United captured nearly ALL U.S. airline profits through the first nine months of 2025. Premium cabins are thriving while budget travel craters.Airlines are expanding lounges, adding first-class seats, launching new international routes. Even Southwest – the egalitarian carrier – ended 50 years of policy by charging for checked bags and introducing assigned seating January 27th.Meanwhile, Spirit Airlines is in its SECOND bankruptcy in less than a year, fighting for survival after a blocked JetBlue acquisition and surging costs.This is a microcosm of the broader economy: wealthier consumers increasing spending share, any economic weakening hitting price-sensitive consumers hardest.THE STRUGGLE STORIES:Virgin Galactic: Down 98% since its 2020 SPAC debut, now at $3.29. They're resuming commercial flights Q4 2026 with their new Delta-class spaceplane after a two-year hiatus. Tickets: $600,000. About 700 people on the waiting list. The technology is cool, but the business model remains unproven.Saks Fifth Avenue: Named a new CEO Friday as they prepare for bankruptcy. They missed a $100+ million debt payment tied to their $2.65 billion Neiman Marcus acquisition. Now sitting on $4.7 billion in debt as luxury discretionary spending weakens.Sprinkles Cupcakes: Closed ALL locations nationwide on New Year's Eve after 20 years. The cupcake craze that peaked in the early 2010s is over.

Since the beginning of this year, various regions across China have begun providing financial incentives for marriage to boost the birth rate.今年以来，中国多个地区已开始提供结婚相关经济激励，以推动出生率提升。The number of first marriages in China plummeted to 9.17 million in 2024, a drop of over 60 percent from the 23.86 million peak in 2013. Marriage registrations have fallen from 13.47 million couples in 2013 to 6.11 million last year, according to the National Bureau of Statistics.国家统计局数据显示，2024年中国初婚人数骤降至917万，较2013年2386万的峰值下降超60%。婚姻登记对数也从2013年的1347万对降至去年的611万对。A patchwork of local initiatives aimed at fostering a marriage and birth-friendly social environment has emerged.各地已纷纷出台一系列地方性举措，旨在营造有利于结婚生育的社会环境。In Zhejiang, a coordinated provincial effort is underway to encourage couples to tie the knot. Since Oct 28, Ningbo has been offering newly registered couples 1,000 yuan ($140) in consumption vouchers that can be used for wedding-related expenses, such as banquets, photography, and travel. Similar vouchers are available in Hangzhou, Shaoxing's Keqiao district, and Jinhua's Pujiang county.在浙江，全省正协同发力鼓励情侣步入婚姻。自10月28日起，宁波向新登记结婚的夫妻发放1000元（约合140美元）消费券，可用于婚宴、摄影、旅游等婚庆相关支出。杭州、绍兴柯桥区、金华浦江县也推出了类似消费券政策。In Guangzhou's Baiyun district, Nanling village offers even more generous incentives. Early in 2025, the village announced rewards of up to 80,000 yuan for first marriages and up to 120,000 yuan for childbirth. It requires couples to maintain their marriage for at least one year before receiving the subsidy.广州白云区南岭村的激励力度更为丰厚。2025年初，该村宣布对初婚夫妻奖励最高8万元，生育子女奖励最高12万元。政策要求夫妻需维持婚姻关系至少一年方可领取补贴。He Jiamin, a Nanling village official, said that the policy's incentive effect is already evident, with a noticeable increase in registrations expected compared to previous years, Jiemian News reported on Tuesday.据界面新闻周二报道，南岭村村干部何佳敏(音译）表示，该政策的激励效果已初步显现，预计今年的婚姻登记数量将较往年有明显增长。Shanxi's approach is more direct. Since Jan 1, eligible newlyweds in Lyuliang can receive a 1,500 yuan cash bonus at the registration office without needing to apply.山西的做法则更为直接。自1月1日起，吕梁符合条件的新婚夫妻在登记处即可领取1500元现金补贴，无需额外申请。Beyond these marriage incentives, many regions are setting up comprehensive support systems covering marriage, childbirth, daycare, and education. Marriage registration is becoming more convenient, and support policies are extending beyond marriage to offer childcare subsidies, extend marriage leave, and more.除结婚激励外，多地正构建涵盖结婚、生育、托育、教育的全方位支持体系。婚姻登记流程不断简化，支持政策也从结婚延伸至育儿补贴、延长婚假等多个方面。Despite these efforts, experts emphasize that the structural decrease in the number of women of childbearing age presents a significant challenge.不过专家强调，育龄女性数量的结构性下降仍是一大挑战。From 2010 to 2020, the number of women aged 15 to 49 decreased by 57.49 million, while those in their prime childbearing years, aged 20 to 29, dropped by 34.63 million. This demographic shift is a key factor driving the decline in marriage registrations, suggesting that more comprehensive and systemic measures are essential to address these challenges.2010年至2020年间，中国15-49岁育龄女性减少5749万，其中20-29岁黄金生育年龄女性减少3463万。这一人口结构变化是婚姻登记数下降的关键因素，意味着需要更全面、系统性的措施来应对这些挑战。demographic/ˌdeməˈɡræfɪk/adj.人口结构的；人口统计的

                                                                                                                                                                                                                      Last time we spoke about the continuation of the war after Nanjing's fall. The fall of Nanjing in December 1937 marked a pivotal juncture in the Second Sino-Japanese War, ushering in a brutal phase of attrition that shaped both strategy and diplomacy in early 1938. As Japanese forces sought to restructure China's political order, their strategy extended beyond battlefield victories to the establishment of puppet arrangements and coercive diplomacy. Soviet aid provided critical support, while German and broader Axis diplomacy wavered, shaping a nuanced backdrop for China's options. In response, Chinese command decisions focused on defending crucial rail corridors and urban strongholds, with Wuhan emerging as a strategic hub and the Jinpu and Longhai railways becoming lifelines of resistance. The defense around Xuzhou and the Huai River system illustrated Chinese determination to prolong resistance despite daunting odds. By early 1938, the war appeared as a drawn-out struggle, with China conserving core bases even as Japan pressed toward central China.   #170 The Battle of Taierzhuang Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Following their victory at Nanjing, the Japanese North China Area Army sought to push southward and link up with the Japanese Eleventh Army between Beijing and Nanjing. The two formations were intended to advance along the northern and southern ends of the JinPu railway, meet at Xuzhou, and then coordinate a pincer movement into Chinese strongholds in the Central Yangtze region, capturing Jiujiang first and then Wuhan. Recognizing Xuzhou's strategic importance, Chinese leadership made its defense a top priority. Xuzhou stood at the midpoint of the JinPu line and at the intersection with the Longhai Line, China's main east–west corridor from Lanzhou to Lianyungang. If seized, Japanese control of these routes would grant mobility for north–south movement across central China. At the end of January, Chiang Kai-shek convened a military conference in Wuchang and declared the defense of Xuzhou the highest strategic objective. Chinese preparations expanded from an initial core of 80,000 troops to about 300,000, deployed along the JinPu and Longhai lines to draw in and overstretch Japanese offensives. A frightening reality loomed by late March 1938: the Japanese were nearing victory on the Xuzhou front. The North China Area Army, led by Generals Itagaki Seishirô, Nishio Toshizô, and Isogai Rensuke, aimed to link up with the Central China Expeditionary Force under General Hata Shunroku for a coordinated drive into central China. Li Zongren and his senior colleagues, including Generals Bai Chongxi and Tang Enbo, resolved to meet the Japanese at the traditional stone-walled city of Taierzhuang. Taierzhuang was not large, but it held strategic significance. It sat along the Grand Canal, China's major north–south waterway, and on a rail line that connected the Jinpu and Longhai lines, thus bypassing Xuzhou. Chiang Kai-shek himself visited Xuzhou on March 24. While Xuzhou remained in Chinese hands, the Japanese forces to the north and south were still separated. Losing Xuzhou would close the pincer. By late March, Chinese troops seemed to be gaining ground at Taierzhuang, but the Japanese began reinforcing, pulling soldiers from General Isogai Rensuke's column. The defending commanders grew uncertain about their ability to hold the position, yet Chiang Kai-shek made his stance clear in an April 1, 1938 telegram: “the enemy at Taierzhuang must be destroyed.” Chiang Kai-shek dispatched his Vice Chief of Staff, Bai Chongxi, to Xuzhou in January 1938. Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi were old comrades from the New Guangxi Clique, and their collaboration dated back to the Northern Expedition, including the Battle of Longtan. Li also received the 21st Group Army from the 3rd War Area. This Guangxi unit, commanded by Liao Lei, comprised the 7th and 47th Armies. Around the same time, Sun Zhen's 22nd Group Army, another Sichuan clique unit, arrived in the Shanxi-Henan region, but was rebuffed by both Yan Xishan, then commander of the 2nd War Area and Shanxi's chairman and Cheng Qian, commander of the 1st War Area and Henan's chairman. Yan and Cheng harbored strong reservations about Sichuan units due to discipline issues, notably their rampant opium consumption. Under Sun Zhen's leadership, the 22nd Group Army deployed four of its six divisions to aid the Northern China effort. Organized under the 41st and 45th Armies, the contingent began a foot march toward Taiyuan on September 1, covering more than 50 days and approximately 1,400 kilometers. Upon reaching Shanxi, they faced a harsh, icy winter and had no winter uniforms or even a single map of the province. They nevertheless engaged the Japanese for ten days at Yangquan, suffering heavy casualties. Strapped for supplies, they broke into a Shanxi clique supply depot, which enraged Yan Xishan and led to their expulsion from the province. The 22nd withdrew westward into the 1st War Area, only to have its request for resupply rejected by Cheng Qian. Meanwhile to the south Colonel Rippei Ogisu led Japanese 13th Division to push westward from Nanjing in two columns during early February: the northern column targeted Mingguang, while the southern column aimed for Chuxian. Both routes were checked by Wei Yunsong's 31st Army, which had been assigned to defend the southern stretch of the Jinpu railway under Li Zongren. Despite facing a clearly inferior force, the Japanese could not gain ground after more than a month of sustained attacks. In response, Japan deployed armored and artillery reinforcements from Nanjing. The Chinese withdrew to the southwestern outskirts of Dingyuan to avoid a direct clash with their reinforced adversaries. By this point, Yu Xuezhong's 51st Army had taken up a defensive position on the northern banks of the Huai River, establishing a line between Bengbu and Huaiyuan. The Japanese then captured Mingguang, Dingyuan, and Bengbu in succession and pressed toward Huaiyuan. However, their supply lines were intercepted by the Chinese 31st Corps, which conducted flanking attacks from the southwest. The situation worsened when the Chinese 7th Army, commanded by Liao Lei, arrived at Hefei to reinforce the 31st Army. Facing three Chinese corps simultaneously, the Japanese were effectively boxed south of the Huai River and, despite air superiority and a superior overall firepower, could not advance further. As a result, the Chinese thwarted the Japanese plan to move the 13th Division north along the Jinpu railway and link up with the Isogai 10th Division to execute a pincer against Xuzhou. Meanwhile in the north, after amphibious landings at Qingdao, the Japanese 5th Division, commanded by Seishiro Itagaki, advanced southwest along the Taiwei Highway, spearheaded by its 21st Infantry Brigade. They faced Pang Bingxun's 3rd Group Army. Although labeled a Group Army, Pang's force actually comprised only the 40th Army, which itself consisted of the 39th Division from the Northwestern Army, commanded by Ma-Fawu. The 39th Division's five regiments delayed the Japanese advance toward Linyi for over a month. The Japanese captured Ju County on 22 February and moved toward Linyi by 2 March. The 59th Army, commanded by Zhang Zizhong, led its troops on a forced march day and night toward Linyi. Seizing the opportunity, the 59th Army did not rest after reaching Yishui. In the early morning of the 14th, Zhang Zizhong ordered the entire army to covertly cross the Yishui River and attack the right flank of the Japanese “Iron Army” 5th Division. They broke through enemy defenses at Tingzitou, Dataiping, Shenjia Taiping, Xujia Taiping, and Shalingzi. Initially caught off guard, the enemy sustained heavy losses, and over a night more than a thousand Japanese soldiers were annihilated. The 59th Army fought fiercely, engaging in brutal hand-to-hand combat. By 4:00 a.m. on the 17th, the 59th Army had secured all of the Japanese main positions. That same day, Pang Bingxun seized the moment to lead his troops in a fierce flank attack, effectively supporting the 59th Army's frontal assault. On the 18th, Zhang and Pang's forces attacked the Japanese from the east, south, and west. After three days and nights of bloody fighting, they finally defeated the 3rd Battalion of the 11th Regiment, which had crossed the river, and annihilated most of it. The 59th Army completed its counterattack but suffered over 6,000 casualties, with more than 2,000 Japanese killed or wounded. News of the Linyi victory prompted commendations from Chiang Kai-shek and Li Zongren. General Li Zongren, commander of the 5th War Zone, judged that the Japanese were temporarily unable to mount a large-scale offensive and that Linyi could be held for the time being. On March 20, he ordered the 59th Army westward to block the Japanese Seya Detachment. On March 21, the Japanese Sakamoto Detachment, after a brief reorganization and learning of the Linyi detachment, launched another offensive. The 3rd Corps, understrength and without reinforcements, was compelled to retreat steadily before the Japanese. General Pang Bingxun, commander of the 3rd Corps, urgently telegraphed Chiang Kai-shek, requesting reinforcements. Chiang Kai-shek received the telegram and, at approximately 9:00 AM on the 23rd, ordered the 59th Army to return to Linyi to join with the 3rd Corps in repelling the Sakamoto Detachment. Fierce fighting ensued with heavy Chinese losses, and the situation in Linyi again grew precarious. At a critical moment, the 333rd Brigade of the 111th Division and the Cavalry Regiment of the 13th Army were rushed to reinforce Linyi. Facing attacks from two directions, the Japanese withdrew, losing almost two battalions in the process. This engagement shattered the myth of Japanese invincibility and embarrassed commander Seishirō Itagaki, even startling IJA headquarters. Although the 5th Division later regrouped and attempted another push, it had lost the element of surprise. The defeat at Linyi at the hands of comparatively poorly equipped Chinese regional units set the stage for the eventual battle at Tai'erzhuang. Of the three Japanese divisions advancing into the Chinese 5th War Area, the 10th Division, commanded by Rensuke Isogai, achieved the greatest initial success. Departing from Hebei, it crossed the Yellow River and moved south along the Jinpu railway. With KMT General Han Fuju ordering his forces to desert their posts, the Japanese captured Zhoucun and reached Jinan with little resistance. They then pushed south along two columns from Tai'an. The eastern column captured Mengyin before driving west to seize Sishui; the western column moved southwest along the Jinpu railway, capturing Yanzhou, Zouxian, and Jining, before turning northwest to take Wenshang. Chiang Kai-shek subsequently ordered Li Zongren to employ “offensive defense”, seizing the initiative to strike rather than merely defend. Li deployed Sun Zhen's 22nd Group Army to attack Zouxian from the south, while Pang Bingxun's 40th Division advanced north along the 22nd's left flank to strike Mengyin and Sishui. Sun Tongxuan's 3rd Group Army also advanced from the south, delivering a two-pronged assault on the Japanese at Jining. Fierce fighting from 12 to 25 February, particularly by the 12th Corps, helped mitigate the reputational damage previously inflicted on Shandong units by Han Fuju. In response to Chinese counterattacks, the Japanese revised their strategy: they canceled their original plan to push directly westward from Nanjing toward Wuhan, freeing more troops for the push toward Xuzhou. On March 15, the Japanese 10th Division struck the Chinese 122nd Division, focusing the action around Tengxian and Lincheng. Chinese reinforcements from the 85th Corps arrived the following day but were driven back on March 17. With air support, tanks, and heavy artillery, the Japanese breached the Chinese lines on March 18. The remaining Chinese forces, bolstered by the 52nd Corps, withdrew to the town of Yixian. The Japanese attacked Yixian and overran an entire Chinese regiment in a brutal 24-hour engagement. By March 19, the Japanese began advancing on the walled town of Taierzhuang. To counter the Japanese advance, the Chinese 2nd Army Group under General Sun Lianzhong was deployed to Taierzhuang. The 31st Division, commanded by General Chi Fengcheng, reached Taierzhuang on March 22 and was ordered to delay the Japanese advance until the remainder of the Army Group could arrive. On March 23, the 31st Division sallied from Taierzhuang toward Yixian, where they were engaged by two Japanese battalions reinforced with three tanks and four armored cars. The Chinese troops occupied a series of hills and managed to defend against a Japanese regiment (~3,000 men) for the rest of the day. On March 24, a Japanese force of about 5,000 attacked the 31st Division. Another Japanese unit pressed the Chinese from Yixian, forcing them to withdraw back into Taierzhuang itself. The Japanese then assaulted the town, with a 300-strong contingent breaching the northeast gate at 20:00. They were subsequently driven back toward the Chenghuang temple, which the Chinese set on fire, annihilating the Japanese force. The next day, the Japanese renewed the assault through the breached gate and secured the eastern portion of the district, while also breaking through the northwest corner from the outside and capturing the Wenchang Pavilion. On March 25, a morning Japanese onslaught was repelled. The Japanese then shelled Chinese positions with artillery and air strikes. In the afternoon, the Chinese deployed an armored train toward Yixian, which ambushed a column of Japanese soldiers near a hamlet, killing or wounding several dozen before retreating back to Taierzhuang. By nightfall, three thousand Chinese troops launched a night assault, pushing the Japanese lines northeast to dawn. The following three days subjected the Chinese defenders to sustained aerial and artillery bombardment. The Chinese managed to repulse several successive Japanese assaults but sustained thousands of casualties in the process. On March 28, Chinese artillery support arrived, including two 155 mm and ten 75 mm pieces. On the night of March 29, the Japanese finally breached the wall. Setting out from the district's southern outskirts, a Chinese assault squad stormed the Wenchang Pavilion from the south and east, killing nearly the entire Japanese garrison aside from four taken as prisoners of war. The Chinese then retook the northwest corner of the district. Even by the brutal standards already established in the war, the fighting at Taierzhuang was fierce, with combatants facing one another at close quarters. Sheng Cheng's notes preserve the battlefield memories of Chi Fengcheng, one of the campaign's standout officers “We had a battle for the little lanes [of the town], and unprecedentedly, not just streets and lanes, but even courtyards and houses. Neither side was willing to budge. Sometimes we'd capture a house, and dig a hole in the wall to approach the enemy. Sometimes the enemy would be digging a hole in the same wall at the same time. Sometimes we faced each other with hand grenades — or we might even bite each other. Or when we could hear that the enemy was in the house, then we'd climb the roof and drop bombs inside — and kill them all.” The battle raged for a week. On April 1, General Chi requested volunteers for a near-suicide mission to seize a building: among fifty-seven selected, only ten survived. A single soldier claimed to have fired on a Japanese bomber and succeeded in bringing it down; he and his comrades then set the aircraft ablaze before another plane could arrive to rescue the pilot. One participant described the brutal conditions of the battle “"The battle continued day and night. The flames lit up the sky. Often all that separated our forces was a single wall. The soldiers would beat holes in the masonry to snipe at each other. We would be fighting for days over a single building, causing dozens of fatalities." The conditions were so brutal that Chinese officers imposed severe measures to maintain discipline. Junior officers were repeatedly forbidden to retreat and were often ordered to personally replace casualties within their ranks. Li Zongren even warned Tang Enbo that failure to fulfill his duties would lead him to be “treated as Han Fuju had been.” In Taierzhuang's cramped streets, Japan's artillery and air superiority offered little advantage; whenever either service was employed amid the dense melee, casualties were roughly even on both sides. The fighting devolved into close-quarters combat carried out primarily by infantry, with rifles, pistols, hand grenades, bayonets, and knives forming the core of each side's arsenal. The battle unfolded largely hand-to-hand, frequently in darkness. The stone buildings of Taierzhuang provided substantial cover from fire and shrapnel. It was precisely under these close-quarters conditions that Chinese soldiers could stand as equals, if not superior, to their Japanese opponents, mirroring, in some respects, the experiences seen in Luodian, Shanghai, the year before. On March 31, General Sun Lianzhong arrived to assume command of the 2nd Army Group. A Japanese assault later that day was repulsed, but a Chinese counterattack also stalled. At 04:00 on April 1, the Japanese attacked the Chinese lines with support from 11 tanks. The Chinese defenders, armed with German-made 37mm Pak-36 antitank guns, destroyed eight of the armored vehicles at point-blank range. Similar incidents recurred throughout the battle, with numerous Japanese tanks knocked out by Chinese artillery and by suicide squads. In one engagement, Chinese suicide bombers annihilated four Japanese tanks with bundles of grenades. On April 2 and 3, Chi urged the Chinese defenders around Taierzhuang's north station to assess the evolving situation. The troops reported distress, crying and sneezing, caused by tear gas deployed by the Japanese against Chinese positions at Taierzhuang's north station, but the defenders remained unmoved. They then launched a massive armored assault outside the city walls, with 30 tanks and 60 armored cars, yet managed only to drive the Chinese 27th Division back to the Grand Canal. The fighting continued to rage on April 4 and 5. By then, the Japanese had captured roughly two-thirds of Taierzhuang, though the Chinese still held the South Gate. It was through this entry point that the Chinese command managed to keep their troops supplied. The Chinese also thwarted Japanese efforts to replenish their dwindling stocks of arms and ammunition. In consequence, the Japanese attackers were worn down progressively. Although the Japanese possessed superior firepower, including cannon and heavy artillery, the cramped conditions within Taierzhuang nullified this advantage for the moment. The Chinese command succeeded in keeping their own supplies flowing, a recurring weakness in other engagements and also prevented the Japanese from replenishing their dwindling stock of arms and bullets. Gradually, the Japanese maneuvered into a state of attrition. The deadlock of the battle was broken by events unfolding outside Taierzhuang, where fresh Chinese divisions had encircled the Japanese forces in Taierzhuang from the flanks and rear. After consulting their German advisors earlier, the commanders of the 5th War Area prepared a double envelopment of the exposed Japanese forces in Taierzhuang. Between March and April 1938, the Nationalist Air Force deployed squadrons from the 3rd and 4th Pursuit Groups, fighter-attack aircraft, in long-distance air interdiction and close-air support of the Taierzhuang operations. Approximately 30 aircraft, mostly Soviet-made, were deployed in bombing raids against Japanese positions. On 26 March, Tang Enbo's 20th Army, equipped with artillery units, attacked Japanese forces at Yixian, inflicting heavy casualties and routing the survivors. Tang then swung south to strike the Japanese flank northeast of Taierzhuang. Simultaneously, the Chinese 55th Corps, comprised of two divisions, executed a surprise crossing of the Grand Canal and cut the railway line near Lincheng. As a result, Tang isolated the Japanese attackers from their rear and severed their supply lines. On 1 April, the Japanese 5th Division sent a brigade to relieve the encircled 10th Division. Tang countered by blocking the brigade's advance and then attacking from the rear, driving them south into the encirclement. On 3 April, the Chinese 2nd Group Army launched a counter-offensive, with the 30th and 110th Divisions pushing northward into Beiluo and Nigou, respectively. By 6 April, the Chinese 85th and 52nd Armies linked up at Taodun, just west of Lanling. The combined force then advanced north-westward, capturing Ganlugou. Two more Chinese divisions arrived a few days later. By April 5, Taierzhuang's Japanese units were fully surrounded, with seven Chinese divisions to the north and four to the south closing in. The Japanese divisions inside Taierzhuang had exhausted their supplies, running critically low on ammunition, fuel, and food, while many troops endured fatigue and dehydration after more than a week of brutal fighting. Sensing imminent victory, the Chinese forces surged with renewed fury and attacked the encircled Japanese, executing wounded soldiers where they lay with rifle and pistol shots. Chinese troops also deployed Soviet tanks against the defenders. Japanese artillery could not reply effectively due to a shortage of shells, and their tanks were immobilized by a lack of fuel. Attempts to drop supplies by air failed, with most packages falling into Chinese hands. Over time, Japanese infantry were progressively reduced to firing only their machine guns and mortars, then their rifles and machine guns, and ultimately resorted to bayonet charges. With the success of the Chinese counter-attacks, the Japanese line finally collapsed on April 7. The 10th and 5th Divisions, drained of personnel and ammunition, were forced to retreat. By this point, around 2,000 Japanese soldiers managed to break out of Taierzhuang, leaving thousands of their comrades dead behind. Some of the escapees reportedly committed hara-kiri. Chinese casualties were roughly comparable, marking a significant improvement over the heavier losses suffered in Shanghai and Nanjing. The Japanese had lost the battle for numerous reasons. Japanese efforts were hampered by the "offensive-defensive" operations carried out by various Chinese regional units, effectively preventing the three Japanese divisions from ever linking up with each other. Despite repeated use of heavy artillery, air strikes, and gas, the Japanese could not expel the Chinese 2nd Group Army from Taierzhuang and its surrounding areas, even as the defenders risked total annihilation. The Japanese also failed to block the Chinese 20th Group Army's maneuver around their rear positions, which severed retreat routes and enabled a Chinese counter-encirclement. After Han Fuju's insubordination and subsequent execution, the Chinese high command tightened discipline at the top, transmitting a stringent order flow down to the ranks. This atmosphere of strict discipline inspired even junior soldiers to risk their lives in executing orders. A “dare-to-die corps” was effectively employed against Japanese units. They used swords and wore suicide vests fashioned from grenades. Due to a lack of anti-armor weaponry, suicide bombing was also employed against the Japanese. Chinese troops, as part of the “dare-to-die” corps, strapped explosives such as grenade packs or dynamite to their bodies and charged at Japanese tanks to blow them up.  The Chinese later asserted that about 20,000 Japanese had perished, though the actual toll was likely closer to 8,000. The Japanese also sustained heavy material losses. Because of fuel shortages and their rapid retreat, many tanks, trucks, and artillery pieces were abandoned on the battlefield and subsequently captured by Chinese forces. Frank Dorn recorded losses of 40 tanks, over 70 armored cars, and 100 trucks of various sizes. In addition to vehicles, the Japanese lost dozens of artillery pieces and thousands of machine guns and rifles. Many of these weapons were collected by the Chinese for future use. The Chinese side also endured severe casualties, possibly up to 30,000, with Taierzhuang itself nearly razed. Yet for once, the Chinese achieved a decisive victory, sparking an outburst of joy across unoccupied China. Du Zhongyuan wrote of “the glorious killing of the enemy,” and even Katharine Hand, though isolated in Japanese-controlled Shandong, heard the news. The victory delivered a much-needed morale boost to both the army and the broader population. Sheng Cheng recorded evening conversations with soldiers from General Chi Fengcheng's division, who shared light-hearted banter with their senior officer. At one moment, the men recalled Chi as having given them “the secret of war. when you get food, eat it; when you can sleep, take it.” Such familiar, brisk maxims carried extra resonance now that the Nationalist forces had demonstrated their willingness and ability to stand their ground rather than retreat. The victors may have celebrated a glorious victory, but they did not forget that their enemies were human. Chi recalled a scene he encountered: he had picked up a Japanese officer's helmet, its left side scorched by gunpowder, with a trace of blood, the mark of a fatal wound taken from behind. Elsewhere in Taierzhuang, relics of the fallen were found: images of the Buddha, wooden fish, and flags bearing slogans. A makeshift crematorium in the north station had been interrupted mid-process: “Not all the bones had been completely burned.” After the battle, Li Zongren asked Sheng if he had found souvenirs on the battlefield. Sheng replied that he had discovered love letters on the corpses of Japanese soldiers, as well as a photograph of a girl, perhaps a hometown sweetheart labeled “19 years old, February 1938.” These details stood in stark contrast to news coverage that depicted the Japanese solely as demons, devils, and “dwarf bandits.” The foreign community noted the new, optimistic turn of events and the way it seemed to revive the resistance effort. US ambassador Nelson Johnson wrote to Secretary of State Cordell Hull from Wuhan just days after Taierzhuang, passing on reports from American military observers: one had spent time in Shanxi and been impressed by Communist success in mobilizing guerrilla fighters against the Japanese; another had spent three days observing the fighting at Taierzhuang and confirmed that “Chinese troops in the field there won a well-deserved victory over Japanese troops, administering the first defeat that Japanese troops have suffered in the field in modern times.” This reinforced Johnson's view that Japan would need to apply far more force than it had anticipated to pacify China. He noted that the mood in unoccupied China had likewise shifted. “Conditions here at Hankow have changed from an atmosphere of pessimism to one of dogged optimism. The Government is more united under Chiang and there is a feeling that the future is not entirely hopeless due to the recent failure of Japanese arms at Hsuchow [Xuzhou] . . . I find no evidence for a desire for a peace by compromise among  Chinese, and doubt whether the Government could persuade its army or its people to accept such a peace. The spirit of resistance is slowly spreading among the people who are awakening to a feeling that this is their war. Japanese air raids in the interior and atrocities by Japanese soldiers upon civilian populations are responsible for this stiffening of the people.”. The British had long been wary of Chiang Kai-shek, but Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, the British ambassador in China, wrote to the new British foreign secretary, Lord Halifax, on April 29, 1938, shortly after the Taierzhuang victory, and offered grudging credit to China's leader “[Chiang] has now become the symbol of Chinese unity, which he himself has so far failed to achieve, but which the Japanese are well on the way to achieving for him . . . The days when Chinese people did not care who governed them seem to have gone . . . my visit to Central China from out of the gloom and depression of Shanghai has left me stimulated and more than disposed to believe that provided the financial end can be kept up Chinese resistance may be so prolonged and effective that in the end the Japanese effort may be frustrated . . . Chiang Kai-shek is obstinate and difficult to deal with . . . Nonetheless [the Nationalists] are making in their muddlIn the exhilaration of a rare victory”. Chiang pressured Tang and Li to build on their success, increasing the area's troop strength to about 450,000. Yet the Chinese Army remained plagued by deeper structural issues. The parochialism that had repeatedly hampered Chiang's forces over the past six months resurfaced. Although the various generals had agreed to unite in a broader war of resistance, each prioritized the safety of his own troops, wary of any move by Chiang to centralize power. For example, Li Zongren refrained from utilizing his top Guangxi forces at Taierzhuang, attempting to shift the bulk of the fighting onto Tang Enbo's units. The generals were aware of the fates of two colleagues: Han Fuju of Shandong was executed for his refusal to fight, while Zhang Xueliang of Manchuria had allowed Chiang to reduce the size of his northeastern army and ended up under house arrest. They were justified in distrusting Chiang. He truly believed, after all, that provincial armies should come under a national military command led by himself. From a national-unity standpoint, Chiang's aim was not unreasonable. But it bred suspicion among other military leaders that participation in the anti-Japanese war would erode their own power. The fragmented command structure also hindered logistics, making ammunition and food supplies to the front unreliable and easy to cut off a good job of things in extremely difficult circumstances. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Chinese victory at the battle of Tairzhuang was a much needed morale boost after the long string of defeats to Japan. As incredible as it was however, it would amount to merely a bloody nose for the Imperial Japanese Army. Now Japan would unleash even more devastation to secure Xuzhou and ultimately march upon Wuhan.

UNESCO has designated 26 new biosphere reserves in 21 countries, including two in China, bringing the world network of biosphere reserves to 785 sites across 142 countries, the organization announced Saturday.联合国教科文组织于周六宣布，在21个国家新指定26处生物圈保护区，其中包括中国的两处。至此，全球生物圈保护区网络已覆盖142个国家，共计785处保护区。The new Chinese sites are the Daqingshan Biosphere Reserve in Inner Mongolia autonomous region and the Zhouzhi Biosphere Reserve in Shanxi province.中国此次新增的两处生物圈保护区分别是内蒙古自治区的大青山生物圈保护区和陕西省的周至生物圈保护区。Covering nearly 3,900 square km in the central Yinshan Mountains, Daqingshan is the richest biodiversity hotspot in the region. The reserve is home to nearly 1,200 higher plant species, 300 vertebrate species, and 1,800 arthropod species.大青山生物圈保护区位于阴山山脉中段，总面积近3900平方公里，是该区域生物多样性最丰富的热点地区。据统计，保护区内分布有高等植物近1200种、脊椎动物300种以及节肢动物1800种。Zhouzhi Biosphere Reserve, spanning 690 square km on both the northern and southern slopes of the Qinling Range, is 96 percent forested and rises to 2,904 meters above sea level. Its striking vertical vegetation zones shelter more than 3,630 species of wild flora and fauna, including the Qinling Panda, Golden Snub-nosed Monkey, and Golden Takin.周至生物圈保护区地处秦岭山脉南北两坡，总面积690平方公里，森林覆盖率高达96%，最高海拔达2904米。保护区内显著的垂直植被带，为超过3630种野生动植物提供了栖息环境，其中包括秦岭大熊猫、川金丝猴和金毛扭角羚等珍稀物种。Among the countries gaining new designations, Angola, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Iceland, Oman and Tajikistan each received their first biosphere reserve. Sao Tome and Principe became the first nation to have its entire territory recognized as a biosphere reserve.在此次新增保护区的国家中，安哥拉、吉布提、赤道几内亚、冰岛、阿曼和塔吉克斯坦均为首次拥有本国的生物圈保护区。圣多美和普林西比则成为首个全境被认定为生物圈保护区的国家。UNESCO describes biosphere reserves as "learning places for sustainable development" that integrate biodiversity conservation with sustainable use of ecosystems.联合国教科文组织将生物圈保护区定义为“可持续发展的学习之地”，其核心功能是实现生物多样性保护与生态系统可持续利用的有机结合。autonomousadj.自治的；自主的；有自治权的/ɔːˈtɒnəməs/arthropodn.节肢动物/ˈɑːθrəpɒd/

When night fell and the lights turned on, the statue of Lushena Buddha, originally built in the Tang Dynasty (618-907) as part of the Longmen Grottoes in Luoyang, Henan province, seemed draped in a golden cassock.Against the backdrop of the night sky, the statue, whose name is the Chinese translation of the Sanskrit word "vairocana", meaning "illuminator", looked more solemn and serene, inspiring awe for the ancient piety and artistry that brought it to life.The night tour around Longmen, an artistic trove comprising more than 2,300 caves and niches carved into steep limestone cliffs over a one-kilometer-long stretch mainly from the fifth to the 10th centuries, gained popularity this summer.Since July, the site has received an average of 5,000 to 6,000 visits daily from 5 pm to 9 pm, with peak days exceeding 10,000, according to Yu Jie, Party secretary of the Longmen Grottoes Academy.President Xi Jinping's continuous attention to cave temples has significantly contributed to this popularity. Xi, who is also general secretary of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, has visited all four major cave temples in China and made many instructions about their significance and conservation since 2019.The four grottoes are all treasures of Chinese civilization with significant historical and cultural value, Xi said when he visited the Maijishan Grottoes in Tianshui, Gansu province, on Sept 11 last year.Besides Longmen and Maijishan, the four sites also include the Mogao Caves in Dunhuang, Gansu, and the Yungang Grottoes in Datong, Shanxi province, all UNESCO World Heritage sites. They are outstanding examples of Chinese grotto temples, an important Buddhist art form that was introduced to China via the ancient Silk Road during the third century.In August 2019, Xi arrived in Gansu for an inspection and made the first stop at Dunhuang. Touring the Mogao Caves, he checked the work of cultural relics protection and research, and emphasized the need to preserve the finer features of the nation's culture.The Mogao Caves site, at the religious and cultural crossroads on the ancient Silk Road, boasts more than 700 Buddhist caves featuring exquisite murals and statues from the fourth to the 14th centuries.Xi also met Fan Jinshi, honorary director of the Dunhuang Academy, who was born in Beijing and raised in Shanghai, but chose to work in Dunhuang, a remote and arid desert region in Northwest China, for six decades. Xi highlighted the "Mogao spirit", forged by heritage protectors such as Fan, which values insistence, contribution, a sense of responsibility and pioneering.Change in approachExperts noted that cave temples, often located in remote mountainous areas and exposed to the natural environment, are difficult to protect and manage, as they frequently face threats such as water damage, earthquakes, unstable rock foundations and weathering, as well as human-induced damage."Despite the difficulties, China's efforts to protect its cave temples have endured for eight decades," said Su Bomin, director of the Dunhuang Academy. "We have continuously explored technologies and accumulated experience in restoring the Mogao Caves, developing a comprehensive set of programs that have been applied not only in domestic grottoes but also to sites overseas."Su said that the approach to protecting China's cave temples is currently experiencing a leap from a "rescue restoration" mindset to one focused on "preventive protection".Hang Kan, director of the Yungang Research Institute, said that in recent years, professionals have intensified their efforts in the digital collection of information from the caves of the Yungang Grottoes, striving to "seize the information at the moment"."Grottoes are changing every day, and so is the information they carry. We want to capture every moment to preserve as much information as possible," said Hang. He added that they have collected information from 80 percent of the caves, which will serve as a reference for their long-term protection.On the other hand, restorers are actively exploring new technologies and materials for cave temple restoration. For example, in the 1970s, epoxy resin was frequently used in restoring cultural relics in caves due to its strong adhesion, excellent versatility and chemical resistance, making it an advanced new material at that time.However, after decades of use, professionals have discovered that epoxy resin materials are not good enough, as they age and deteriorate under high temperatures. Therefore, they are developing new materials.Experts from Chongqing University are exploring a way of using microorganisms in the restoration of cultural relics as an alternative to epoxy resin. By introducing specific microbial strains under suitable environmental conditions, bioadhesives can be synthesized, and these can then be applied to reinforce cracked relics, offering benefits such as greater compatibility, non-toxicity, environmental friendliness and stronger weather resistance, according to Hang."The protection of cave temples is not a once-and-for-all project. With changes in time and climate, new problems arise, bringing fresh challenges and prompting us to continuously seek new materials, innovative ideas and advanced technological methods for their preservation," he said.Unwavering commitmentBehind the progress is the persistent dedication of heritage protectors, year after year.In September last year, Xi, at Maijishan, encouraged cultural heritage professionals to inherit the "Mogao spirit", remain dedicated to safeguarding the nation's treasures and to contribute greater efforts to the preservation and innovation of China's fine traditional culture, as well as the improvement of the influence of Chinese culture.Cave temples are often located in remote areas, sometimes lacking good environmental conditions. According to Yue Yongqiang, deputy director of the Maijishan Grottoes art research institute, heritage protectors can withstand the loneliness and stay for decades because they are obsessed with the charm of traditional Chinese culture and art, find their research direction there, and are committed to intensive studies of their subjects."It's all about insistence, passion and love," said Yue.He said that predecessors such as Fan have set good examples for them. "They possess ideas and beliefs, love their cause and are not willing to give up their research, forming the precious 'Mogao spirit'," said Yue. "Their spirit has inspired more people to join, reminding us that despite the hardships, our work is very meaningful."In May, Xi visited the Longmen Grottoes and called for protecting, inheriting and promoting the treasures of Chinese culture well.Hang, director of the Yungang Research Institute, said: "Although protection is our priority, it's not reasonable to keep the relics sealed. Instead, we aim to strike a balance between protection and utilization, which means that while ensuring their protection, we explore ways to bring them back to life so they can benefit the public."He said that the institute has organized a series of innovative exhibitions related to Yungang in many cities across the country. In an upcoming exhibition in Shanghai this month, there will be dancing robots based on stone carving figurines from a cave in Yungang.Such efforts have made significant changes. "We have analyzed the data and found an interesting phenomenon: Every time we organize an exhibition in a city, visitors from that city flock to Yungang afterward. This means that exhibitions are an effective way to promote cave temples. With digital technologies, we will find more ways for such promotion," he said.

China is accelerating the construction of an integrated national computing power platform, aiming to enhance the quality and efficiency of computational resources and strengthen the country's capabilities in core technologies such as AI chips, said officials and experts.官员和专家表示，中国正在加快建设国家综合计算能力平台，旨在提高计算资源的质量和效率，加强国家在人工智能芯片等核心技术方面的能力。As the backbone of AI development, computing power has become the battleground for global technological supremacy, and China is charging ahead with unprecedented momentum despite challenges, they said.他们表示，作为人工智能发展的支柱，计算能力已经成为全球技术霸权的战场，尽管面临挑战，中国正以前所未有的势头向前迈进。The move is China's latest plan to scale up the digital infrastructure that is key to buoying its AI economy and to hone its technological prowess in strategic industries.此举是中国扩大数字基础设施的最新计划，数字基础设施对于提振其人工智能经济和磨练其在战略行业的技术实力至关重要。Vice-Minister of Industry and Information Technology Xiong Jijun emphasized the government's commitment to "guiding the orderly development of computing infrastructure and improving the supply quality of computing resources" at the 2025 China Computational Power Conference, which concluded on Sunday in Datong, Shanxi province. 上周日，在山西大同市闭幕的2025中国计算能力大会上，工业和信息化部副部长熊吉军强调，政府致力于“引导计算基础设施有序发展，提高计算资源供应质量”。He emphasized the need to accelerate breakthroughs in key technologies such as graphic processing units and algorithms for large language models, which are crucial for sharpening China's competitive edge in AI.他强调，需要加快在图形处理单元和大型语言模型算法等关键技术上的突破，这对提高中国在人工智能领域的竞争优势至关重要。Roughly defined as the ability to process data, computing power includes technologies such as chips and data centers to support information processing, data storage and network capacity in the digital economy era.计算能力大致定义为处理数据的能力，包括芯片和数据中心等技术，以支持数字经济时代的信息处理、数据存储和网络容量。Wu Hequan, an academician at the Chinese Academy of Engineering, said that computing power is an invisible yet indispensable force behind any AI-driven metamorphosis, and that without enough computing power to process data, it is impossible to support large-scale AI applications.中国工程院院士吴贺铨表示，计算能力是任何人工智能驱动的蜕变背后一股无形但不可或缺的力量，没有足够的计算能力来处理数据，就不可能支持大规模的人工智能应用。"Every yuan ($0.14) invested in computing power drives 3 to 4 yuan in GDP growth," Wu said. "In the global race for AI leadership, expanding computing power supply is critical." “在计算能力上每投入1元（0.14美元），就能带动3到4元的GDP增长，”吴说。“在争夺人工智能领导地位的全球竞争中，扩大计算能力供应至关重要。”China's total computing power has been growing at approximately 30 percent annually, driven largely by soaring demand for intelligent computing fueled by AI applications, data from the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology showed.工业和信息化部的数据显示，受人工智能应用推动的智能计算需求飙升的推动，中国的总计算能力以每年约30%的速度增长。Rao Shaoyang, director of the strategic development research institute of the China Telecom Research Institute, said, "AI is expected to contribute over 11 trillion yuan to China's GDP by 2035."中国电信研究院战略发展研究所所长饶少阳表示：“到2035年，人工智能预计将为中国的GDP贡献超过11万亿元人民币。”"That will account for 4 to 5 percent of the total economy," Rao said. "This growth could multiply computing power demand by 10 or even a hundred times." “这将占到经济总量的4%到5%，”Rao说。“这种增长可能会使计算能力需求增加10倍甚至100倍。”To address this demand, China is building a nationwide computing power platform that integrates resources across regions and industries. The platform, described as a "unified network" for computing power scheduling, already includes subplatforms from 10 provinces and municipalities such as Shanxi, Liaoning, Jiangsu and Shanghai, according to the ministry.为了满足这一需求，中国正在建设一个全国性的计算能力平台，整合跨地区和行业的资源。据该部称，该平台被描述为计算能力调度的“统一网络”，已经包括来自山西、辽宁、江苏和上海等10个省市的子平台。Its intelligent scheduling capabilities allow efficient matching of supply and demand. For example, enabling businesses in eastern China to leverage idle computing resources in western China, significantly reducing costs and improving efficiency.其智能调度功能允许有效匹配供需。例如，使华东地区的企业能够利用西部地区的闲置计算资源，从而显著降低成本，提高效率。In one notable case, a Beijing-based healthcare company completed an AI computing task using resources from the Ningxia Hui autonomous region at a cost of just 10,000 yuan, compared with the typical expense of over 2 million yuan for purchasing and maintaining servers.在一个值得注意的案例中，北京一家医疗保健公司利用宁夏回族自治区的资源完成了一项人工智能计算任务，成本仅为1万元，而购买和维护服务器的典型费用超过200万元。According to Wei Liang, vice-president of the China Academy of Information and Communications Technology, more than 100 computing service providers have joined the platform, along with over 1,000 registered enterprise users, while nearly 100 large language models have been connected, providing diverse online services to more than 1,000 developers.据中国信息通信技术研究院副院长魏亮介绍，已有100多家计算服务提供商加入了该平台，以及1000多名注册企业用户，同时连接了近100种大型语言模型，为1000多名开发人员提供了多样化的在线服务。Meanwhile, Chinese AI chip companies are also working hard to beef up their prowess in graphic processing units, prompting their stocks to be favored by investors, as the US company Nvidia's H20 chips face weak demand in China.与此同时，中国人工智能芯片公司也在努力增强其在图形处理单元方面的实力，这促使它们的股票受到投资者的青睐，因为美国公司英伟达（Nvidia）的H20芯片在中国面临疲软需求。On Monday, Chinese AI chip stocks continued their strong upward trajectory, with Cambricon Technologies emerging as a potential challenger to beverage giant Kweichow Moutai for the title of the highest-priced stock on the A-share market.周一，中国人工智能芯片股票继续强劲上涨，寒武岩科技（Cambricon Technologies）成为饮料巨头贵州茅台（贵州茅台）在a股市场上价格最高股票头衔的潜在挑战者。Cambricon closed at 1,384.93 yuan per share on Monday, surging 11.4 percent for the day. Since mid-July, its share price has more than doubled, and it has skyrocketed by more than 562 percent since September 2024. The company now trails only Moutai, which ended the session at 1,490.33 yuan per share.寒武纪周一收于每股1384.93元，当日上涨11.4%。自7月中旬以来，其股价上涨了一倍多，自2024年9月以来，其股价飙升了562%以上。该公司目前仅次于茅台，该股收于1,490.33元。The AI chip intellectual property products of Cambricon, which was founded in 2016, have powered smartphones and data server chips, including those made by Huawei Technologies Co and Alibaba Group. 寒武纪成立于2016年，其人工智能芯片知识产权产品已为智能手机和数据服务器芯片提供支持，包括华为技术有限公司和阿里巴巴集团生产的芯片。Chen Tianshi, co-founder and CEO of Cambricon Technologies, said in an earlier interview with China Daily that "there is rigid demand for AI chips in China. We don't worry about orders, as long as our technologies are strong enough".寒武纪科技联合创始人兼首席执行官陈天石在早些时候接受《中国日报》采访时表示，“中国对人工智能芯片存在刚性需求。我们不担心订单，只要我们的技术足够强大。”Pan Helin, a member of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology's Expert Committee for Information and Communication Economy, said, "The Nvidia incident offers a strategic window for ambitious Chinese AI chip designers to expand their market share."工业和信息化部信息通信经济专家委员会成员潘鹤林表示：“英伟达事件为雄心勃勃的中国人工智能芯片设计师提供了一个战略窗口，以扩大他们的市场份额。”l integrated national computing power platform n.国家综合计算能力平台/ˈɪntɪɡreɪtɪd ˈnæʃnəl kəmˈpjuːtɪŋ ˈpaʊə ˈplætfɔːm/l AI chips n.人工智能芯片/eɪ aɪ tʃɪps/

Waters rose above warning levels at 16 rivers across China over the weekend as heavy rainfall swept through several provinces, authorities said on Sunday.当局上周日表示，由于暴雨席卷了几个省份，周末中国16条河流的水位超过了警告水平。The highest waters were recorded at 3.48 meters above warning level, according to the Ministry of Water Resources. Six rivers in Chengde, Hebei province; Xiliin Gol League, Inner Mongolia autonomous region; and Datong, Shanxi province saw record-high water levels.据水利部称，最高水位比警戒水位高3.48米。河北省承德市的六条河流、内蒙古锡林郭勒盟、山西省大同市的水位创下历史新高。In Beijing, the Miyun Reservoir received its largest volume of inflow since it began operating in 1959, the ministry said.水利部表示，北京密云水库自1959年开始运行以来，入库水量最大。The Ministry of Water Resources maintained its Level IV emergency response for flood prevention and control on Sunday in Hebei, Inner Mongolia and Shanxi, as well as the provinces of Zhejiang, Fujian and Shaanxi.周日，水利部在河北、内蒙古、山西以及浙江、福建和陕西省维持了四级防洪应急响应。Two people were confirmed dead and two others were reported missing as of Saturday evening after torrential rainfall hit Fuping county in Baoding, Hebei, the county's flood control and drought relief headquarters said.河北省保定市富平县防汛抗旱指挥部表示，截至周六晚，该县暴雨袭击后，已确认两人死亡，另有两人失踪。A total of 46,235 people in the county have been affected, and 4,655 have been evacuated. Downpours on Friday and Saturday shattered daily precipitation records, according to the Baoding meteorological bureau.该县共有46235人受到影响，4655人已被疏散。据保定市气象局称，上周五和周六的暴雨打破了每日降水记录。Between 5 pm on Friday and 1 am on Saturday, Fuping recorded an average rainfall of 140.5 millimeters, with a maximum of 532 millimeters logged at the Xizhuang hydrologic station.上周五下午5点至周六凌晨1点，富平记录的平均降雨量为140.5毫米，西庄水文站记录的最大降雨量为532毫米。Search and rescue efforts were underway on Sunday in Datong after contact was lost with a van near Guqianbao township, according to the city's emergency rescue headquarters.据大同市应急救援指挥部称，周日，在古钱堡镇附近与一辆面包车失去联系后，大同市正在进行搜救工作。In Beijing's Miyun district, more than 3,000 residents were evacuated as heavy rains triggered widespread disruption. The district's meteorological observatory issued a red alert — the highest in the four-tier warning system — at 9:06 pm on Saturday.在北京密云区，由于暴雨引发了广泛的混乱，3000多名居民被疏散。该地区气象台于上周六晚上9:06发布了红色预警，这是四级预警系统中最高的一级。Between noon on Saturday and 2 am on Sunday, Miyun recorded an average of 73.5 mm of rainfall, with a peak of 315.3 mm at Huangtuliang monitoring station. The district activated a Level I flood emergency response, its most severe alert, to coordinate rescue and relief efforts.周六中午至周日凌晨2点，密云的平均降雨量为73.5毫米，黄土梁监测站的峰值降雨量为315.3毫米。该地区启动了一级洪水应急响应，这是其最严重的警报，以协调救援和救济工作。The storm forced the temporary closure of 12 major roads in Miyun, seven of which had reopened by early Sunday morning. All affected villages had re-established contact with authorities, with 3,065 residents from 149 villages safely relocated as of 5 am on Sunday.风暴迫使密云12条主要道路临时关闭，其中7条在周日凌晨重新开放。截至周日凌晨5点，所有受影响的村庄都已与当局重新建立联系，149个村庄的3065名居民已安全搬迁。Across Beijing, emergency adjustments were made to 88 suburban bus routes, including suspensions, shortened trips and detours, the municipal commission of transport said. Train operations on three railway lines were halted, and water transport services were suspended in the districts of Miyun, Huairou and Yanqing. All tourist boats and ferries were ordered to remain docked.北京市交通委员会表示，北京市对88条郊区公交线路进行了紧急调整，包括停驶、缩短行程和绕行。三条铁路线的列车停运，密云、怀柔和延庆地区的水运服务暂停。所有旅游船只和渡轮都被命令保持停靠。daily precipitationn.日降水量/ˈdeɪli prɪˌsɪpɪˈteɪʃən/evacuaten.疏散/ɪˈvækjʊeɪt/

In questa puntata di Dee Giallo Story Carlo Lucarelli racconta le storie dei più strani luoghi del mondo, dalla foresta di Hoia Baciu in Transilvania al villaggio di Shanxi in Cina.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

In questa puntata di Dee Giallo Story Carlo Lucarelli racconta le storie dei più strani luoghi del mondo, dalla foresta di Hoia Baciu in Transilvania al villaggio di Shanxi in Cina.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Full Text of ReadingsTuesday of the Fourteenth Week in Ordinary Time Lectionary: 384The Saint of the day is Saint Gregory Grassi and CompanionsSaint Gregory Grassi and Companions’ Story Christian missionaries have often gotten caught in the crossfire of wars against their own countries. When the governments of Britain, Germany, Russia, and France forced substantial territorial concessions from the Chinese in 1898, anti-foreign sentiment grew very strong among many Chinese people. Gregory Grassi was born in Italy in 1823, ordained in 1856, and sent to China five years later. Gregory was later ordained bishop of North Shanxi. With 14 other European missionaries and 14 Chinese religious, he was martyred during the short but bloody Boxer Uprising of 1900. Twenty-six of these martyrs were arrested on the orders of Yu Hsien, the governor of Shanxi province. They were hacked to death on July 9, 1900. Five of them were Friars Minor; seven were Franciscan Missionaries of Mary—the first martyrs of their congregation. Seven were Chinese seminarians and Secular Franciscans; four martyrs were Chinese laymen and Secular Franciscans. The other three Chinese laymen killed in Shanxi simply worked for the Franciscans and were rounded up with all the others. Three Italian Franciscans were martyred that same week in the province of Hunan. All these martyrs were beatified in 1946, and were among the 120 martyrs canonized in 2000. Reflection Martyrdom is the occupational hazard of missionaries. Throughout China during the Boxer Uprising, five bishops, 50 priests, two brothers, 15 sisters and 40,000 Chinese Christians were killed. The 146,575 Catholics served by the Franciscans in China in 1906 had grown to 303,760 by 1924, and were served by 282 Franciscans and 174 local priests. Great sacrifices often bring great results. Saint of the Day, Copyright Franciscan Media

It's Tuesday, July 1, A.D. 2025. This is The Worldview in 5 Minutes heard on 140 radio stations and at www.TheWorldview.com.  I'm Adam McManus. (Adam@TheWorldview.com) By Kevin Swanson and Adam McManus Chinese Communists give pastors 3 years in jail for leading church Three pastors from Linfen Covenant Home Church in Shanxi, China have been sentenced to 2-4 years of prison time for various charges related to their leading an unregistered church in the communist country. The church issued a statement, announcing that “We honor the service of Li Jie, Han Xiaodong, and Wang Qiang who suffered for righteousness, and we are willing to bear the cross with the Lord. We receive this verdict with a grateful and obedient heart.” Jesus offers this encouragement in Revelation 2:10 -- “Do not fear any of those things which you are about to suffer. Indeed, the devil is about to throw some of you into prison, that you may be tested, and you will have tribulation ten days. Be faithful until death, and I will give you the crown of life.” Brazilian homeschool mother facing $20,000 of fines Today, a Brazilian court will hear a case of a mom prosecuted for homeschooling her son.   Regiane Cichelero is facing fines of $20,000 and threats of losing custody of her child, for choosing home education on religious grounds.  Alliance Defending Freedom International has taken up the case.  Her legal counsel, Julio Pohl, pointed out that “No parent should fear state punishment for choosing to homeschool their child. Regiane made a lawful and conscientious decision to teach her son at home. We are hopeful that the court will affirm her rights and take an important step toward protecting parental rights in Brazil.”   Regiane continues to homeschool despite the risks involved. Pray for this case, which may serve as a precedent for the other 70,000 homeschooled children in Brazil.   Victory of Christian Colorado camp over transgender agenda Also, Alliance Defending Freedom has announced a favorable settlement for the Idrahaje Christian Camp in Bailey, Colorado. The camp was under threat of losing its license for refusing to submit to state requirements regarding the transgendering of bathrooms and living quarters. The name of the camp is taken from the phrase “I'd rather have Jesus more than anything!”  They use the first two letters of the first four words. The State of Colorado agreed not to take any enforcement action against Camp IdRaHaJe for violation of the gender identity requirements. The state has also clarified in a memo on its website that “churches, synagogues, mosques, or any other place that is principally used for religious purposes” are exempt from the transgendering requirements. Syria's own government helped massacre 1,500 Alawites Reuters has reported on its investigation of the Syrian massacre of 1,500 Alawites in March of this year. The perpetrators included units belonging to the new government based in Damascus. Ahmed Hussein al-Sharaa of the Free Syrian Army and Al-Qaeda took over Syria in January of this year. The new government has also instituted a constitution stating that  “The religion of the President of the Republic is Islam. … Islamic jurisprudence is the principal source of legislation.” This constitutes a step up in Islamic rule over Syria. According to Open Doors, Syria is the 18th most dangerous country worldwide for Christians. Iraq allows Muslim men to “marry” 9-year-old girls The new Iraqi government is also following Islamic Sharia law closely. Earlier this year, Iraq's parliament voted to give Islamic courts more control in family law, and permit child marriages for girls as young as nine years of age.  Supreme Court allows parents to opt kids out & requires porn sites to verify age Here in America, the U.S. Supreme Court is allowing parents opt-out rights for their elementary-aged children from having to participate in homosexual-themed lessons. That comes by a vote of 6 to 3. Writing for the majority, Justice Samuel Alito emphasized that “What the parents seek here is not the right to micromanage the public school curriculum, but rather to have their children opt out of a particular educational requirement that burdens their well-established right ‘to direct ‘the religious upbringing' of their children'” under  the free exercise clause of the First Amendment.  Another 6-3 ruling, the High Court has also upheld a Texas Law requiring pornographic websites to verify users are over 18 years of age.  Only adults will be allowed into these sinful activities. Writing for the majority, Justice Clarence Thomas concluded, ”The power to require age verification is within a State's authority to prevent children from accessing sexually explicit content.” But, in Matthew 5:27-28, Jesus said, “You have heard that it was said to those of old, ‘You shall not commit adultery.'  But I say to you that whoever looks at a woman to lust for her has already committed adultery with her in his heart.” U.S. government buying its own bonds The U.S. government is buying back its own bonds. Barchart reports the largest buyback in history occurred earlier this month.  Under the direction of Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, the department bought $10 billion of its own bonds.  Federal Reserve on the ropes The Federal Reserve issued $150 billion of bonds in May, but only managed to sell half of them.   Also, the Fed has recorded its first two-year-in-a-row financial loss, totaling $192 billion in 2023 and 2024. This is the first time this has occurred in the Fed's 110-year history. Year to date,  the federal deficit  stands at $1.37 billion as of the end of May. That's 14% higher than last year at this time.  Dad jumps into ocean off Disney Cruise ship to save daughter Here's a story demonstrating a remarkable act of courage and love on the part of a dad. A young child fell off the fourth deck of a Disney cruiseliner on Sunday.   Her father took immediate action, dove in after her. . . and held her while treading water, until a rescue boat pulled them out of the ocean waters. An eyewitness explained what happened to WPLG News. EYEWITNESS: “They were playing shuffleboard that was on the fourth floor. The parents were playing, and then the little girl was climbing up on the railing and flew off.” One passenger said,  “The ship was moving quickly, so quickly, it's crazy how quickly the people became tiny dots in the sea, and then you lost sight of them.” Another passenger said, “I saw the mother crying and but when they rescued them, I think that's when the tears really started flowing.  I prayed to God to save them, and He did!” The Disney Dream was heading back from the Bahamas to Fort Lauderdale when the incident occurred. Worldview teens share their hearts 15-year-old Titus Beran in Omaha, Nebraska wrote me at Adam@TheWorldview.com. He said, “I love the verses included in the newscast! They really help me focus back on God's Word and bring every area of life, even politics and news, into captivity to the obedience of Christ.” And 16-year-old Leah Smith in Franklin, Kentucky wrote, “I have been subscribed to The Worldview in 5 Minutes for a little over a year. I don't watch the news on a regular basis, but have been continually blessed by the ministry of this website. It is so irregular to have such a concise, non-secular newscast that makes me aware of political news, needs of persecuted Christians, and even basic information that keeps me up to date on what is going on. “When I read your newscast transcript,  I am not only encouraged by stories of fellow believers, but I am also moved to pray for the issues in our world. God is truly using your Christian newscast to reach people with the truth. It has been a blessing in my life!” What Troy's three boys enjoy about The Worldview Troy in Horseshoe Bend, Arkansas talked to his three sons -- Sovereign, age 12, Shalom, age 10, and Apollos, age 7 -- about The Worldview. They said, “I like to start my morning at breakfast listening to it.” “I like how I get to hear about people around the world who need Jesus.”  And “I like that I can hear the news which is filtered through a Biblical lens.” Troy added, “We praise the Lord for all of you and your diligent service to the Lord. It is so exciting to hear about donors from all over the world who are united to us in Christ. What an encouraging example to our younger generation. Thank you from the bottom of our hearts.” 42 Worldview listeners gave $12,534.95 to fund our annual budget And finally, toward our $123,500 goal by yesterday, June 30, to fully fund The Worldview's annual budget for our 6-member team, 42 listeners stepped up to the plate. Our thanks to Sovereign, age 12, Shalom, age 10, and Apollos, age 7, in Horseshoe Bend, Arkansas who gave $4.50, Mamie in Tulsa, Oklahoma who gave $10 as well as Esther in Bolivar, Missouri, Henry in Elizabeth City, North Carolina, Holly in San Antonio, Texas, Carol in Kingston, New York, Amy in Ennis, Texas, and Jensen, age 9, in Humboldt, Saskatchewan, Canada – each of whom gave $25. We appreciate Mark in Goodyear, Arizona who gave $30, Kayden, age 16, in Gepp, Arkansas who gave $40 as well as Kolt, age 13, in Gepp, Arkansas, Isaiah in Fruita, Colorado, Alexander in Greensburg, Pennsylvania, Phillip in Alliance, Ohio, Sarah in Rolla, Missouri, and Constance in Los Alamos, California – each of whom gave $50. We are grateful to God for Joe and Sheryl in Westmoreland, Tennessee who gave $60, Michael in Torrance, California and Marty and Christa in Humboldt, Saskatchewan, Canada – both of whom gave $75, as well as Craig in Moriarty, New Mexico, Gay in Victoria, Texas, George in Edinburgh, Indiana, Debbie in Wildwood, Missouri, Gregory in Lodi, California, Duane in Moriarty, New Mexico, Marcia in Holland, Michigan, and an anonymous donor in Atlanta, Georgia – each of whom gave $100. We were touched by the generosity of Rusty in Marshall, Illinois and Josiah in Hillsboro, Kansas – both of whom gave $200, Frances in Beacon, New York who gave $240.45, Wes in Eden Prairie, Minnesota  and LuShun in Newport News, Virginia – both of whom gave $250, Kirtis in Gepp, Arkansas who gave $300, as well as Ed in Wellsburg, Iowo and Michele in Kindersley, Saskatchewan, Canada – both of whom pledged $25/month for 12 months for a gift of $300 each. And we were moved by the sacrifice of Danielle in Brighton, Colorado who gave $450, Brad and Judy in West Chicago, Illinois who gave $500, Troy in Horseshoe Bend, Arkansas who pledged $50/month for 12 months for a gift of $600, John in Auburn, Washington who gave $1,000, Max in Macon, Georgia  who gave $1,200, an anonymous donor from Louisiana who gave $1,200, and Jeanne in Columbia, South Carolina who gave $4,000. Those 42 Worldview listeners gave a total of $12,534.95 Ready for our new grand total? Drum roll please.  (Drum roll sound effect) $125,494.50!  (People clapping and cheering sound effect)   That means we exceeded our $123,500 goal to fund the 6-member Worldview newscast team by $1,994.50! On behalf of the entire Worldview newscast team -- including Kevin Swanson and Jonathan Clark who write the newscast transcript alongside myself, Emily Munday who helps research stories, Rebakah Swanson and Kayla White who add the music, select the image, and upload the audio to multiple platforms – thank you for sharing your treasure to ensure that we can deliver accurate news from a Biblical perspective for another fiscal year. 1 John 3:18 says, “Let us not love in word or talk, but in deed and in truth.”  Those of you who were prompted by the Lord to give financially and to pray for this ministry, you showed your love in your deeds. For that, we humbly thank you.  And I assure you, we'll be vigilant stewards of every hard-earned penny which you've entrusted to us. Close And that's The Worldview on this Tuesday, July 1st, in the year of our Lord 2025. Follow us on X or subscribe for free by Spotify, Amazon Music, or by iTunes or email to our unique Christian newscast at www.TheWorldview.com.  Plus, you can get the Generations app through Google Play or The App Store. I'm Adam McManus (Adam@TheWorldview.com). Seize the day for Jesus Christ.

Last time we spoke about the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. On July 7, 1937, tensions escalated between Japan and China as the Japanese military conducted a training exercise near the Marco Polo Bridge. During the exercise, gunfire erupted, sowing confusion and leading to the unexplained disappearance of one soldier. This incident prompted Japan to demand permission to search the nearby city of Wanping, which was denied by Chinese forces, escalating tensions further. By the next day, Japanese troops attacked, resulting in fierce fighting at the bridge. Under heavy assault, Chinese defenders fought valiantly but faced overwhelming force. As the conflict intensified, both sides struggled with heavy casualties, leading to the full-scale Sino-Japanese War. The Japanese military's aggressive maneuvers and the determined Chinese resistance marked the beginning of a brutal conflict, forever altering the landscape of East Asia. The profound toll on both nations foreshadowed the horrors of war that were to come, as China prepared to defend its sovereignty against a relentless enemy.   #155 Operation Chahar 1937 Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. By the end of July of 1937 the Japanese had overwhelmed the Beiping-Tianjin region. It's pretty understandable as to how this came so fast. As we have discussed thoroughly in this series, the Japanese had gradually seized control over Northern China going back to Operation Nekka in 1933. Little by little they had carved it out. Typically when you pull out a map of a war between two nations, one nation pierces into the other and gradually seizes control of key locations until it archives victory. However with the case of the outset of the Second Sino-Japanese War its more like the Japanese are starting at multiple key locations where they have concessions, treaties or where there are autonomous regions. Thus its honestly a huge headache to follow. When the Marco Polo Bridge Incident broke out, Chiang Kai-Shek had been in Kuling, a mountain top resort where he spent his summer vacations. He received the news with composure, but his message to the nation conveyed a sense of optimism and anticipation. The embarrassment of the Sian mutiny was a thing of the past. Although he wasn't overly confident, he believed that this was the pivotal moment China had been preparing for, more so than at any time in recent years. For nearly three weeks, efforts were made to resolve the situation through diplomatic means. For the first time, Chiang was in a position to make demands. He understood they would likely be rejected, but that wasn't the main point. He asked Japan to acknowledge its responsibility for the recent turmoil, to issue an apology, and to provide compensation. After making that request, he addressed his nation with a formal commitment: China would not accept any settlement that compromised its sovereign rights or territorial integrity. No changes would be permitted regarding the status of the Hubei-Chahar Council, and local officials would not be reassigned at the request of any foreign government. Any restrictions on the Twenty-ninth Army's positions would be unacceptable. He declared that the era of Japanese expansion in North China had come to a definitive end. The Japanese army achieved significant victories on the battlefield in China, leading to the inevitable expansion of the conflict. The first major campaign following the Nanyuan victory unfolded along the mountainous border marked by the inner Great Wall, separating northern Hubei from Chahar. On the Jinpu Railway, just south of Tianjin, lies a small station known as Jinghai. Adjacent to this station is the Jian River, which had swollen to a width of 20 meters due to intermittent heavy rains in northern China after the Japanese army's occupation of Tianjin. The embankments on either side of the river were overgrown with dense reeds and grass, and a wooden arch bridge spanned the river. After landing at Dagukou in Tianjin, the 10th Division, commanded by Lieutenant General Rensuke Isogai, advanced south along the Jinpu Railway. However, as the vanguard, the 10th Regiment of the 33rd Brigade made its way through the muddy terrain towards the Jian River's wooden bridge, they were suddenly taken aback. A group of Chinese soldiers appeared, their faces vividly painted red and armed with long-handled broadswords, a sight reminiscent of the legendary Chinese figure Guan Yu, as depicted in many traditional portraits. These soldiers belonged to the 26th Independent Brigade of the 38th Division of the 29th Army, who were in retreat from Tianjin. Following the city's fall, they had retreated southward to Jinghai Station, where they prepared to make a stand. Brigade Commander Li Zhiyuan recognized their inferior numbers and weaponry compared to the Japanese forces. Drawing from painful lessons learned during the positional battles in Tianjin, he decided to divide his troops strategically: one battalion would defend the station, another would protect the county town, and a third would engage in guerrilla tactics along the Jinpu Road. If faced with a small number of Japanese soldiers, they would fight fiercely; if overwhelmed, they would attempt to encircle the attackers to prevent a direct assault on their main position. Despite the Japanese army's attempts to advance, including efforts to send an armored train into Jinghai Station, the Chinese soldiers cleverly laid straw on the tracks and buried mines, thwarting the train's progress. Once Japanese troops disembarked to mount an offensive, they were ambushed by the battalion executing guerrilla tactics, resulting in a chaotic retreat that left behind several dozen casualties. Over the course of weeks, the divisional headquarters ordered a battalion of Japanese troops to move south along the Jinpu Road, requiring them to cross the Jian River at the wooden bridge. The 26th Independent Brigade was assigned to halt this advance, and they managed to hold their ground for over 20 days. Recognizing the gravity of their situation, Brigade Commander Li Zhiyuan gathered his group and battalion commanders to emphasize the necessity of pushing back the Japanese forces. He passionately rallied them, declaring, “We must defend this river to the death. Each regiment will select a death squad. Each member will carry a long-handled broadsword and four grenades, paint their faces red and rush across the bridge to engage in melee combat!” When Li asked for volunteers to lead the death squad, the regiment commander, Zhu, eagerly stepped forward, quickly gathering a group that followed him, uniting passionately in their cause. The death squad charged across the bridge, catching the Japanese off guard with their war paint and weapons. The sudden attack left the Japanese soldiers dazed, leading to a chaotic retreat as they struggled through the muddy terrain. In the tumult, more than 200 long-handled swords struck down a significant number of Japanese troops. Those advancing from behind panicked at the sight of their retreating comrades. An officer, dismounted during the chaos, was left behind, and the Chinese soldiers, filled with zeal, pressed forward, ignoring the orders from Brigade Commander Li Zhiyuan to fall back for their own safety. Despite moments of heroism, many fell that day by the Jian River, as the officers and soldiers burned their boats and set fire to the wooden bridge, rendering retreat impossible. As the Japanese military consolidated its power in the Pingjin region, many leaders underestimated the tenacity of Chinese resistance. Plans were made to defeat the Chinese army and air force swiftly, aiming to resolve the issue in North China decisively, with no diplomatic negotiations or external interventions allowed during military operations. Now, in late July to early August, Chiang Kai-shek issued orders to improve defenses at Nankou. He mobilized Tang Enbo's 13th Army in Suidong for battle readiness, tasked Liu Ruming to sabotage railways, and directed Fu Zuoyi and Yan Xishan in Suiyuan to prepare for conflict. Troops were reorganized rapidly, with divisions merging to strengthen the 17th Army under Liu Ruming's command. Chiang insisted that Nankou's defenses be deep and wide to thwart enemy cavalry and tank assaults, rendering Japanese mechanized advantages ineffective. He called for close cooperation among commanders and a resolute defense. Tang Enbo's 13th Army, consisted of the 4th and 89th Divisions, whom established defensive positions along the Peiping-Suiyuan Railway at Nankou, with additional units positioned further back at Juyongguan. The 13th Army, was 20,000 men strong, all motivated soldiers committed to fighting the Japanese, but their equipment was woefully inadequate. The 89th Division had a few outdated artillery pieces, whilst other units were in even worse condition, hampering their effectiveness against the well-armed Japanese forces. Liu's 17th Army stationed its 84th Division at Chihcheng, Yanqing, and Longguan, effectively securing the flank of the 13th Army against potential Japanese advances from Chahar. The 21st Division was deployed in Huailai, situated along the railway to the rear of Tang's forces. Additionally, Zhao Chengshou's 1st Cavalry Army, Liu 's 143rd Division, and two Peace Preservation Brigades commenced an offensive against Mongol forces in northern Chahar. As the Japanese launched initial assaults on Nankou on August 4, fierce fighting erupted. The Chinese defenders fought valiantly, but heavy bombardments by artillery and air raids took a toll. The Japanese began using tanks to support their infantry, yet the 530th Regiment successfully repelled an attack at Deshengkou. Meanwhile, the Japanese intensified their efforts, culminating in poison gas assaults that overwhelmed Chinese positions on Longhutai, leading to significant losses. Despite the escalating pressure and casualties, the determination to hold Nankou was unwavering. On August 5, the Kwantung Army requested permission for the advance guard to move to Changpei, arguing that the Central Army's invasion of Chahar had jeopardized the security of Manchukuo. This request was denied, yet the advance guard proceeded to Changpei on August 8. This unauthorized movement by the Kwantung Army was a serious act of defiance, as Tolun lay outside Manchukuo's borders, and troop deployments required imperial authorization. Although imperial sanction had been obtained for the move to Tolun on July 28, permission for the advance guard to proceed was only granted retroactively, with the stipulation that they would not advance further into Inner Mongolia. Nevertheless, this unauthorized action ultimately compelled the high command to approve the advance to Changpei. On August 7, the Japanese army launched a large assault on Nankou with its three main divisions, aiming to breach the Great Wall and advance westward along the Pingsui Railway to flank the strategic city of Shanxi. By August 8, the Japanese forces that had captured Beiping and Tianjin deployed the entire 20th Division, commanded by Lieutenant General Kawagishi Fumisaburo, and supplemented their efforts with the 5th and 10th Divisions, along with the Sakai Brigade, to attack Nankou along the Pingsui Railway. On August 8, the Japanese 11th Independent Mixed Brigade, led by General Shigiyasu Suzuki, initiated an attack on the left flank of the 13th Corps' position at Nankou. However, their efforts were halted after three days due to challenging terrain and the determined resistance from Chinese forces.  On the same day, Chiang Kai-shek ordered the activation of the 14th Group Army, comprising the 10th, 83rd, and 85th Divisions, under General Wei Lihuang. Elements of the 14th Group Army traveled by rail from Yingchia-chuang to Yi County and then embarked on a ten-day march through the plains west of Beiping to flank and support Tang Enbo's forces. Meanwhile, the Chinese 1st Army Region launched attacks against the Japanese in Liangxiang and Chaili to divert their attention and dispatched a detachment to Heilung Pass to cover the advance of the 14th Group Army. On August 9, the central high command ordered the China Garrison Army to eliminate resistance in the area and instructed Kwantung Army Commander Ueda Kenkichi to send reinforcements from Jehol and Inner Mongolia to support the operation. The China Garrison Army deployed its 11th Independent Mixed Brigade and the 5th Division, recently arrived from Hiroshima under Lieutenant-General Itagaki Seishirö, to launch an attack on the mountainous regions around Nankou and Pataling within the Great Wall. Following intense fighting, they succeeded in crossing into Chahar.    The Kwantung Army aimed to conquer Chahar and, upon receiving approval from the Japanese General Staff, established an expeditionary headquarters on August 14, led by its chief of staff, Lieutenant General Tojo Hideki. Yes that Tojo. Tokyo's objective was to secure the strategic flank of Manchukuo, while the Kwantung Army sought to create puppet regimes in northern China and integrate the occupied territories into a Japanese sphere of influence. The Chahar Expeditionary Force comprised three mixed brigades, including Japan's only fully mechanized unit, which was equipped with medium tanks, heavy and light armored vehicles, and light tanks. The Japanese troops shifted their main attack toward Zhangjiakou via the Pingsui Railway due to pressures from the Kwantung Army eager to occupy Inner Mongolia, Suiyuan, and Chahar. They sought to eliminate threats from the rear before launching further operations along the Pinghan Line and Jinpu Line. The 11th Independent Mixed Brigade of the 20th Division of the Chinese Garrison Army was ordered to assault Chinese defenders in the Nankou area, with the goal of capturing key locations on the Great Wall, like Badaling, to facilitate the Fifth Division's advance. The Chinese assessed the Japanese strategy, believing they would first secure critical points along the Pingsui route to facilitate further incursions into Shanxi and Zhengding. They understood that holding the Nankou line was vital for both logistical support and tactical maneuvering. Nankou, a key town on the Pingsui Railway connecting Beijing to Zhangjiakou and Baotou, was surrounded by mountains and the Great Wall, marking it a significant natural defense line. As the Japanese army aimed to capture Zhangjiakou and divide their forces into Shanxi and Suiyuan, the Chinese army's control over Nankou became crucial. A renewed assault on August 11, bolstered by tanks and aircraft, successfully captured Nankou Station, allowing General Suzuki's brigade to advance toward Juyong Pass. On August 12, Tang Enbo's army launched a counterattack, encircling the Japanese forces and severing their supply and communication lines. That day, Tang Enbo sent a telegram to Luo Fanggui: “Brother Fanggui, Commander Luo of the 529th Regiment, I have received your telegram. Your regiment has recently defeated formidable enemies, laying the groundwork for our army's future victories. Your efforts bring me great relief! The Nankou position is critical to our nation's war of resistance. Despite the enemy's numerical superiority and fierce artillery fire, we cannot surrender this area. It is our fighting spirit, not our numbers or advanced weaponry, that will help us withstand these powerful foes. We vow never to abandon our positions. Life is transient, and we must embrace our fate. A hero perishing on the battlefield is the glorious destiny of a soldier.” On the same day, he also sent a telegram to Wang Zhonglian: “Brother Jieren Wang, commander of the 89th Division, I have read your telegram. Brigade Li has triumphed against formidable foes, establishing a precedent for our army's victory. Your successes bring me much comfort! The Nankou position is our glorious objective. If I perish, the country lives on. If I survive, the country perishes. We would rather die defending this position than live in disgrace. Please convey to all the officers and soldiers of your division, who share in this struggle, the importance of striving for victory!” On August 13, Tang Enbo ordered the defensive positions at Nankou to be abandoned as the remaining troops pulled back to stronger positions at Badaling and Juyongguan. Renowned journalist Fan Changjiang noted Tang Enbo's physical and emotional toll, describing him as a mere shadow of his former self after enduring relentless battles without rest. His subsequent thoughts and fears reflected the despair of facing insurmountable odds, with the Japanese army overwhelming the Nankou defenses. Casualty reports from the Battle of Nankou reveal stark discrepancies; average estimates suggest Chinese losses neared 26,000, while Japanese casualties were around 2,600,an alarming ratio of 10 to 1. Despite the devastating defeat, Tang Enbo's leadership gained national recognition for his efforts, though he viewed the loss of Nankou as a blemish on an otherwise honorable defense. The indomitable spirit displayed during the relentless struggle at Nankou, despite the defeat and challenges faced, inspired a sense of resilience among the Chinese people, reminding them that even in dire circumstances, they would not yield to oppression. Meanwhile in response to having their supply and communication lines severed, on August 14, Seishirō Itagaki dispatched the 5th Division to relieve the 11th Independent Mixed Brigade at Juyonggua. Fu Zuoyi's troops attacked Chahar from Suidong. Dong Qiwu 's troops attacked Shangdu and recaptured it on the 14th, while Shi Yushan 's troops attacked Dehua and recaptured it on the 16th. By the 16, Itagaki had arrived at Nankou and initiated an enveloping assault targeting the right flank of the 13th Army, executing a five-pronged attack at Huanglaoyuan. In anticipation, the 7th Brigade of the 4th Division, commanded by Shi Jue, was positioned to counter this maneuver. Reinforcements, including Li Xianzhou's 21st Division and Zhu Huaibing's 94th Division, were brought in, resulting in several days of intense fighting. On August 17, General Yan Xishan, Director of the Taiyuan Pacification Headquarters, ordered the 7th Group Army, commanded by Fu Zuoyi, to move the 72nd Division and three additional brigades by rail from Datong to Huailai to support Tang Enbo's forces. Chiang Kai-shek urged steadfastness in the face of adversity, emphasizing that retreat was not an option. But with communication breakdowns and logistical challenges, Tang Enbo faced dilemmas that would lead him to issue the order for his troops to break out on August 26. As the Japanese army occupied Huailai and Yanqing, Tang Enbo's forces executed a withdrawal, retreating via various routes before suffering further losses.  Meanwhile Liu Ruming's troops of the 143rd Division of the 29th Army took Zhangbei from Zhangjiakou . Proceed to Wanquan Dam , the junction of Wanquan and Zhangbei. The members of the pseudo-Mongolian military government fled to Duolun under the leadership of King De . In order to relieve the danger in Zhangjiakou, Liu Ruming's troops began to attack the enemy in Zhangbei. On August 20, they captured key points such as Bolicai Village outside Zhangbei City. At this time, the mechanized troops of the Japanese Kwantung Army led by Hideki Tojo rushed from Rehe to support Zhangbei. When passing through Guyuan, they were divided into two groups: one group of Japanese troops, the Suzuki Brigade and Homma Brigade went south to attack Zhangjiakou. On the night of August 21, the Chinese army retreated to Shenweitai, 25 kilometers south of Zhangbei County. On August 22, the Japanese army began its attack. Shenwei Tower fell at midnight on the 23rd. At the same time, another part of the Japanese army launched a roundabout attack on Wanquan County. On the morning of August 24, they captured Wanquan County, and then headed straight for Zhangjiakou along the highway with an infantry regiment and an artillery battalion. From August 25 to 27, the Japanese army attacked Bajiaotai, the highest point of Cir Mountain west of Zhangjiakou. At noon on the 27th, Zhangjiakou fell. Gao Guizi's 17th Army marched to Dushikou to resist the enemy from Duolun Akagi and Longguan and intercepted the Pingsui Railway. Gao Guizi's troops failed to withstand the Japanese attack, and the 301st Regiment of the 29th Army stationed in Xuanhua also retreated southward. On August 28, Xuanhua fell into the hands of the enemy. Meanwhile, in northern Chahar, the Chinese 1st Cavalry Army successfully captured Shangdu, Nanhaochan, Shangyi, and Huade from the puppet Mongolian Army led by Demchugdongrub. Elements of the 143rd Division secured Zhongli, while the main force advanced to Zhangbei. During this Chinese offensive, the Japanese Chahar Expeditionary Force, consisting of the mechanized 1st Independent Mixed Brigade along with the 2nd and 15th Mixed Brigades, prepared for a counteroffensive from Zhangbei to Kalgan. Tojo personally commanded the units of the 1st Independent Mixed Brigade during Operation Chahar, which would serve as his only real combat service for his career. From August 18 to 19, the Chahar Expeditionary Force launched a counterattack from Zhangbei, capturing Shenweitaiko on the Great Wall and the Hanno Dam. The scattered and ill-equipped Chinese forces were unable to halt the Japanese advance, which now threatened the Peking–Suiyuan Railway at Kalgan. On August 20, General Fu Zuoyi's 7th Group Army diverted its 200th and 211th Brigades, which had been moving south by rail to join General Tang Enbo's forces, back to defend Kalgan. Fu's remaining 72nd Division arrived to reinforce Chenpien, while his 7th Separate Brigade was dispatched to protect the railhead at Huailai.On August 21, the Japanese forces breached the defenses at the villages of Henglingcheng and Chenbiancheng. General Tang Enbo's forces, awaiting reinforcements but having suffered over 50% casualties, continued to defend Huailai, Juyong Pass, and Yanqing. Liu Ruming's 143rd Division retreated to safeguard Kalgan from the advancing Japanese troops. On August 23, as Seishirō Itagaki's 5th Division advanced toward Huailai from Chenpien against Ma Yenshou's 7th Separate Brigade, advance elements of the 14th Army Group arrived on the Japanese flank at Chingpaikou. They successfully drove off the Japanese outpost and made contact with Japanese forces advancing toward Chenpien. However, delays in crossing the Yongding River postponed their attack until it was too late to halt the Japanese advance. Due to poor communications, they also failed to coordinate with General Tang Enbo's forces during the battle. After eight days and nights of fierce fighting, on August 24, Itagaki linked up with the Kwantung Army's 2nd Independent Mixed Brigade at Xiahuayuan. By August 24, the Japanese army breached the defensive line of the Chinese defenders' Wang Wanling Division along the western Hengling, crossed the Great Wall, and advanced into the Huailai area. At this time, the Japanese forces attacking Zhangjiakou from Chabei also secured control of the railway line west of Zhangjiakou, posing a significant threat to the Chinese defenders at Nankou. On August 25, the Chinese defenders were compelled to withdraw from Nankou and retreat to Juyongguan. By August 27, they received orders to break out and relocate southward, completely evacuating the Nankou battlefield. Since Wei Lihuang's troops lost their intended target for reinforcement and Baoding along the Pinghan Line was in a state of emergency, they engaged the enemy in the Wanping area for over a month before retreating south. Following the abandonment of both Nankou and Juyongguan, the Japanese army invaded Huailai City on the night of August 27. The Chinese army suffered over 16,000 casualties, while the Japanese army reported more than 15,000 casualties. On August 26, General Tang Enbo's forces were ordered to break out toward the Sangchien River, while Liu Ruming's troops were directed to withdraw to the opposite side of the Hsiang-yang River. On August 29, a Japanese unit known as the Oui Column by the Chinese and the Ohizumi Detachment by the Japanese launched an attack. According to Hsu Long-hsuen, this unit moved south from Tushihkou, and on August 30, it attacked Yenching via Chihcheng but was repelled by the Chinese 17th Army. The unit had moved to Guyuan by August 25 and reached Xuanhua by September 7, effectively cutting the railway behind Tang's forces and east of the Chinese defenders along the Great Wall. Following the repulsion of the Oui Column's attack, the Chinese 17th Army withdrew to join the rest of Tang Enbo's forces on the far side of the Sangchien River. Kalgan fell to the Japanese on August 27. After General Fu Zuoyi's 200th and 211th Brigades failed in their counterattack to recapture Kalgan, Fu's forces retreated to the west to defend the railway to Suiyuan at Chaikoupao.  On August 30, the army high command ordered the task force and the China Garrison Army to occupy Chahar Province. The North China Area Army deployed Lieutenant General Itagaki Seishiro's Fifth Division, the theater's strategic reserve, for this operation. The Japanese forces relied on armored units to breach Chinese defenses and utilized rail lines to transport troops and supplies effectively to critical locations throughout Chahar. Although the First Independent Mixed Brigade's tanks and armored cars demonstrated proficiency, the Kwantung Army's assessment of the operation criticized the armored units for their lack of shock effect and frequent mechanical breakdowns. Additionally, these vehicles required significant supplies and maintenance, leading the army to deem them ineffective in combat situations. The Second Air Group provided crucial support for the ground offensive in Chahar. From mid-August, this air group, stationed in Chengde and Jingzhou, conducted bombing raids on enemy positions and transport routes, performed reconnaissance missions, and even airdropped supplies to encircled Japanese forces. To match the rapid advance of the mechanized ground forces, air units were repositioned to advanced airfields. After bombing Taiyuan in late August, some units returned to their home bases, leaving behind two fighter squadrons and two heavy bomber squadrons, which formed a provisional air regiment. By mid-September, the Fifth Division and the Chahar Expeditionary Force were advancing southwest through the rugged mountains of Shanxi Province and captured Datong on September 13. Five days later, anticipating a decisive battle, Lieutenant General Katsuki ordered the Fifth Division to pivot southeast toward Baoding to encircle the retreating Chinese forces. Shortly after repositioning, Itagaki learned from aerial reconnaissance that Chinese units were assembling near Pingxingguan (Dayingzhen) Pass. Concerned that these forces might advance eastward through the pass and threaten his rear, Itagaki dispatched a regimental-sized task force under the command of Major General Miura Keiji, leader of the Twenty-first Brigade, to disperse the enemy troops and control the road on both sides of the pass. Miura's task force departed by truck in the mid-afternoon of the following day, but the overland movement proved much slower and more challenging than anticipated. Travelling along a single rutted dirt track through steep mountains, the forty-nine trucks carrying his infantry and heavy weapons, including crew-served machine guns and battalion artillery, could only manage a speed of seven miles per hour. By late afternoon, the lead elements were still about five miles east of the pass when they encountered a few hundred Chinese troops who had retreated after a brief firefight. As night fell, the Japanese moved cautiously forward and reached a village approximately a mile from the pass, where they encountered stiff resistance, including mortar and automatic weapons fire. After successfully repelling a counterattack by the Chinese Seventy-third Division, Miura launched a night assault. Supported by pack artillery and heavy machine guns, two Japanese companies pushed through the pass and seized the high ground on its west side by early morning. However, Chinese reinforcements soon arrived and attempted to reclaim the lost territory, resulting in ongoing fighting for the heights on September 24. Meanwhile, the Chinese Communist 115th Division, comprising the 685th, 686th, and 687th regiments of the Eighth Route Army, consisting of around 6,000 effective troops under the command of twenty-nine-year-old Lin Biao, maneuvered south around the Japanese rear. By September 24, they had interposed themselves on the road east of the pass, effectively cutting off Miura's task force from its supply base. That same day, the Central Army's Seventy-first Division launched several sharp counterattacks against Miura's outnumbered forces west of the pass, threatening to overrun the Japanese positions. Central Army and Communist forces had planned to attack both flanks of the Japanese at dawn on September 25, but torrential rains delayed the advance of the Central Army reserves. The downpour also muffled the sounds of an approaching Japanese night assault. Utilizing the poor night security of the Chinese, Japanese assault parties surprised the Seventy-first and Eighty-fourth divisions, pushing them from their positions west of the pass. Miura mistakenly believed he controlled both sides of the pass and assumed the Chinese forces were in full retreat. Unbeknownst to him, Lin Biao's troops had blocked the eastern entrance to the pass, prompting him to order a resupply column with rations and ammunition forward from about fifteen miles east of the pass to replenish his depleted task force. The supply train, consisting of seventy horse-drawn wagons and eighty trucks, struggled to make progress along the single dirt track, where sections had become muddy bogs due to the heavy rains. Most of the hundred-plus soldiers handling the horses and wagons were untrained and unarmed. The few regular service corps soldiers carried only ten cavalry carbines, while a single infantry platoon of thirty men provided security. The eighty trucks transported another 176 men, most of whom were not infantry. Therefore, the resupply column was ill-prepared for any trouble. Following a sunken road worn down by centuries of caravans, the column approached the pass through a narrow man-made defile, with its sides rising as high as thirty-five feet above the track. Around mid-morning, about four miles east of the pass, the Chinese Communist 115th Division launched an ambush. Communist troops rained grenades and small-arms fire from the high ground overlooking the road onto the trapped convoy. Although the Japanese fought back desperately, the combination of surprise, advantageous terrain, and overwhelming numbers turned the road into a killing ground. The ambush decimated almost all of the teamsters and the infantrymen who protected the wagons. At his field headquarters, Miura heard the heavy gunfire and explosions and quickly ordered a battalion-sized rescue force to assist the convoy. However, the Chinese 685th Regiment, blocking the only road to the trapped supply train, halted the Japanese battalion. Elements of the 685th and 686th regiments then finished off the motorized convoy, with only five trucks at the rear escaping. After looting weapons, equipment, and clothing, the Communists burned the remaining vehicles and withdrew southwest into the rugged mountains. Although the Communists claimed to have killed 3,000 Japanese troops, the more realistic number is around 200. Nonetheless, Lin Biao's guerrillas had achieved a significant tactical success. While the 115th Division destroyed the Japanese resupply column east of the pass, the Central Army's Sixth and Seventh Army Groups, including the Seventy-first Division, launched a series of day and night assaults against Miura's dispersed units west of the pass. Both sides incurred heavy losses, and the Japanese struggled to maintain control of the high ground as the Chinese fanned out through the valleys and attacked from all sides. Isolated and under heavy attack, the Japanese were low on ammunition, food, and water, lacked proper cold-weather clothing in the frigid mountains, and were greatly outnumbered. They resorted to scavenging ammunition and weapons from fallen Chinese soldiers. Itagaki promptly ordered his 41st and 21st infantry regiments, supported by an infantry regiment from the Kwantung Army located about fifty miles northeast of the pass, to rescue the beleaguered task force. These regiments moved along a narrow mountain road amidst heavy rain, which slowed their progress. The relief force split up about forty miles north of Pingxingguan, with the Twenty-first Regiment swinging westward to outflank the Chinese, while the other two regiments continued toward the pass. To the northwest, the Fifteenth Brigade of the Chahar Expeditionary Force advanced southeastward from Datong to encircle the Chinese. Central Army forces defending along the inner Great Wall, about fifty miles northwest of Pingxingguan, inflicted substantial casualties on the Japanese. The Japanese Forty-first Regiment finally reached Miura on September 28, and on the same day, the Twenty-first Regiment dislodged the stubborn defenders along the Inner Great Wall, roughly forty miles northwest of the pass, disrupting the entire Chinese defense and threatening to surround the besieging forces. Nonetheless, fighting continued through September 29, when the Second Brigade broke through the Chinese Central Army's defenses and advanced westward. Facing potential encirclement and certain destruction, the Japanese Sixth Army Group withdrew southwest the following day. Japanese accounts do not specify overall losses, but Chinese reports claim nearly 3,000 Japanese casualties while acknowledging they suffered ten times that number. After five days of intense fighting in rugged terrain, Miura's forces managed to hold their ground, but their heavy losses and those sustained by relief columns rendered it a Pyrrhic victory. Both Communist and Nationalist Chinese forces retreated southwest, surviving to fight another day. The determination of the Chinese Central Army in both offensive and defensive maneuvers, combined with the skillful hit-and-run tactics of the 115th Division, inflicted significant damage on the Japanese and became a cornerstone of Chinese propaganda. On October 1, the Japanese General Staff ordered the North China Area Army to destroy the Chinese forces in Shanxi Province, which were estimated to number over twenty divisions from either the Shanxi Army or the Central Army, and were fortifying positions in Taiyuan, Yangquan, and Yuanpingzhen. The Japanese Fifth and Twentieth Divisions advanced toward Taiyuan, while the Fifteenth Division, reinforced by a mixed brigade, launched an assault south from Yuanpingzhen on October 13. The Fifteenth Division quickly encountered strong Chinese resistance from well-prepared defenses, which halted its advance. From October 19 to 26, the Twentieth Division faced thirteen Chinese divisions entrenched near Jiuguan. Although they successfully repelled numerous fierce counterattacks, the division was unable to breach the Chinese lines. A maneuver by one of its regiments to the rear of the Chinese defenses forced a withdrawal of Chinese troops. The reconstituted Fifth Division joined the pursuit of the retreating Chinese forces on November 3, reaching Taiyuan five days later. Meanwhile, the Twentieth Division, moving westward, inflicted heavy losses on the Chinese units that were withdrawing from Taiyuan. Overall, given that the offensive aimed to secure territory, it can be considered a tactical and operational success. Shortly thereafter, all Japanese forces, except for the Twentieth Division, withdrew from Shanxi Province. The Chahar campaign concluded with the Kwantung Army in control of Chahar, Suiyuan, and the northern half of Shanxi Province. The Japanese quickly established puppet regimes in the captured territories. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In July 1937, tensions between Japan and China erupted following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, leading to fierce fighting as Japanese troops attacked. Chinese defenders, under command of Chiang Kai-shek, bravely resisted despite overwhelming odds, determined to protect their sovereignty. The Battle of Nankou saw relentless assaults, tank warfare, and desperate defense tactics, revealing the depth of Chinese resolve. 

Last time we spoke about Japan's preparations for War. In late 1936, tensions soared in China as Nationalist General Chiang Kai-shek was detained by dissenting commanders who were frustrated with his focus on communism instead of the growing Japanese threat. Faced with escalating Japanese aggression, these leaders forced Chiang into a reluctant alliance with the Chinese Communist Party, marking a pivotal shift in China's strategy. Despite this union, China remained unprepared, lacking sufficient military supplies and modern equipment. Conversely, Japan, wary of Chinese modernization efforts, pushed for a preemptive strike to dismantle Chiang's regime before it could pose a serious threat. As aggressive military exercises intensified, Japan underestimated Chinese resilience. By spring 1937, both nations found themselves on the brink of war, with Japan's divided military leadership struggling to formulate a coherent strategy. Ultimately, these miscalculations would lead to the full-scale Sino-Japanese War, altering the course of history in East Asia.   #154 The Marco Polo Bridge Incident  Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Here we are at last, the beginning of the absolute cataclysm between China and Japan. Now as many of you know I run the Pacific War week by week podcast, which technically covers the second sino-japanese war, nearly to a T. So for this podcast I want to try and portray the event from the Chinese and Japanese point of view, but not in the rather dry manner of the other podcast. In the other podcast I am hampered by the week by week format and can never dig deep into the nitty gritty as they say. On the same hand I don't want to simply regurgitate every single battle of this conflict, it would be absolutely nuts. So bear with me friends as we fall down in the rabbit hole of madness together, who knows how long it will take to get out. On the night of July 7, 1937, at approximately 19:30, the 8th Squadron of the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Regiment of the Hebian Brigade of the Japanese Army, stationed in Fengtai and led by Squadron Leader Shimizu Seiro, conducted a military exercise, heading toward Lungwangmiao, approximately just under a mile northwest of the Marco Polo Bridge The exercise simulated an operation to capture the bridge. As you may have guessed it was named after the Italian explorer Marco Polo, who described it in his travels, the bridge is renowned for its intricate carvings of lions and other sculptures. However after 1937, the Marco Polo Bridge would be far less known for its history dealing with the venetian explorer and more so with an event that many would contend to be the start of WW2. At that time, troops from Japan, Britain, France, and Italy were stationed near Peiping in accordance with the Boxer Protocol of 1901. The Japanese China Garrison Army, comprising around 4,000 soldiers and commanded by Lieutenant-General Tashiro Kan'ichirō, was based in Tientsin. Its mission was to "maintain communication lines between Peiping and the seaports in the Gulf of Chihli and to protect Japanese citizens living in key areas of North China." The protocol also permitted the garrison forces of the signatory nations to conduct field drills and rifle practice without notifying the Chinese authorities, with the exception of cases involving live fire. During this period, Japanese troops were conducting nightly exercises in anticipation of a scheduled review on July 9. The night maneuver was within the army's rights under the Boxer Protocol and was not an illegal act, as later claimed by the Chinese. However, the Japanese army had courteously informed the Chinese authorities about its training plans in advance. Despite this, the atmosphere was charged with tension, and the Japanese decision to use blank ammunition during their night exercise further escalated the already volatile situation. Earlier that evening, Captain Shimizu Setsurö, a company commander, arrived at the banks of the Yungting River, where the maneuver was to take place. He noticed that the site looked different since the last exercise had occurred; Chinese troops had recently constructed new trenches and parapets from the embankment to the Lungwangmiao shelter. While eating his dinner and surveying the area, Shimizu felt a sense of unease, harboring a premonition that “something might happen that night.” After completing the first stage of the maneuver around 10:30 PM, several live rounds were fired into the assembled company from the direction of the riverbank. Shimizu immediately conducted a roll call and found one soldier missing. He promptly sent a messenger to inform the battalion commander. The exercise was then called off, and the company moved eastward to await further orders at Hsiwulitien. Battalion Commander Itsuki Kiyonaho, upon receiving the report, deemed the situation serious. Aside from the gunfire heard in the darkness from an unknown source, he expressed concern over the soldier's disappearance and sought permission from Regiment Commander Mutaguchi Renya, an absolute moron, if you listen to the pacific war podcast, well you know. Anyways to relocate the battalion to the area where the shots had been fired and to establish surveillance. As dawn approached, the troops heard several more gunshots. Within twenty minutes of the soldier's disappearance, he returned to his ranks, but Shimizu did not report this update until four hours later. Meanwhile, midnight negotiations included a Japanese request for permission to search the city of Wanping, leading both sides to believe the incident was significant. Around 11:00 PM, the Japanese forces falsely reported that one of their soldiers had gone missing during the drill and demanded permission to enter the city for a search. This request was firmly denied by Ji Xingwen, the commander of the 219th Regiment of the 37th Division of the Chinese Army. In response, Japanese troops swiftly surrounded Wanping County. To prevent further escalation, at 2:00 AM the following morning, Qin Dechun, deputy commander of the 29th Army and mayor of Beiping, agreed with the Japanese to allow both sides to send personnel for an investigation. While Matsui, the head of the Japanese secret service in Peiping, was negotiating with North Chinese authorities based on unverified reports from Japanese troops in Fengtai, Ikki Kiyonao, the battalion commander of the Japanese garrison in Fengtai, had already reported to his regiment commander, Mutaguchi Lianya. The latter approved orders for the Japanese troops in Fengtai to “immediately move out” to the Marco Polo Bridge.  On July 8, a large contingent of Japanese troops appeared at Lugou Bridge. Shen Zhongming, the platoon leader of the 10th Company of the Reserve Force of the 3rd Battalion of the 219th Regiment of the 37th Division of the 29th Army, was assisting in guarding the bridgehead. He jumped out of the trench, stood in front of the bunker, and raised his right hand to halt the advancing Japanese troops. However, the Japanese military threatened to search for their missing soldiers, pushed forward, and opened fire. Shen Zhongming was shot and died on the spot. At 4:50 AM, the Japanese army launched a fierce assault on Wanping County, capturing Shagang in the northeast of Wanping and firing the first shot of the siege. Unable to withstand the aggression, the Chinese defenders mounted a counterattack. That day, the Japanese army assaulted Wanping City three times, targeting the Pinghan Railway Bridge and the Chinese defenders at the Huilong Temple position on the left. He Jifeng, the commander of the 110th Brigade of the Chinese defenders, issued a resolute order to “live and die with the bridge” and personally commanded the front-line battle. The Chinese defenders engaged in fierce combat, fighting valiantly despite exhausting their ammunition and resorting to hand-to-hand combat with swords against the Japanese soldiers. Tragically, over 80 Chinese defenders from two platoons were killed at the bridgehead. On the same day, the Beijing authorities instructed the garrison to hold firm at the Marco Polo Bridge. Song Queyuan sent a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek to report the true events of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. The National Government's Ministry of Foreign Affairs lodged a verbal protest with the Japanese ambassador regarding the incident. Additionally, the CPC Central Committee issued a telegram urging all Chinese soldiers and civilians to unite and resist Japanese aggression. The Japanese cabinet, in a bid to mislead global public opinion, proposed a so-called policy of “resolving the incident locally without escalating it,” aiming to paralyze the KMT authorities and buy time to mobilize additional forces. In the wake of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, generals of the 29th Army, including Qin Dechun, Feng Zhian, and Zhang Zizhong, convened an emergency meeting. Following their discussions, they issued a statement demanding that their troops withdraw from the Marco Polo Bridge to de-escalate tensions. However, they expressed deep concerns about national sovereignty, stating, “We cannot simply back down. If they continue to oppress us, we will do our utmost to defend ourselves.” Concurrently, the 29th Army commanded the troops defending the Marco Polo Bridge: “The Marco Polo Bridge is your grave. You must live and die with the bridge and must not retreat.” Brigade Commander He Jifeng reinforced three directives for the defenders:  1. Do not allow the Japanese army to enter the city;  2. Firmly counterattack if the Japanese invade;  3. You are responsible for defending the territory and will never yield. If you abandon your position, you will face military law. On July 9, the 29th Army successfully eliminated a Japanese squadron and reclaimed control of the railway bridge and Longwang Temple. A temporary lull settled over the Marco Polo Bridge battlefield, during which the Japanese military made false claims that "missing Japanese soldiers had returned to their units" and described the situation as a misunderstanding that could be resolved peacefully. Subsequently, Chinese and Japanese representatives in Beijing and Tianjin engaged in negotiations. The Beijing authorities reached an agreement with the Japanese forces, which included:  (1) an immediate cessation of hostilities by both parties;  (2) the Japanese army withdrawing to the left bank of the Yongding River while the Chinese army retreated to the right bank; and  (3) the defense of Lugou Bridge being assigned to Shi Yousan's unit of the Hebei Security Team. However, the following day, while the Chinese army withdrew as agreed, the Japanese army not only failed to uphold its commitments but also dispatched a significant number of troops to launch an offensive against the Chinese forces. Reports on July 10 indicated that the Japanese army had arrived from Tianjin, Gubeikou, Yuguan, and other locations, advancing toward the Lugou Bridge with artillery and tanks, and had occupied Dajing Village and Wulidian, signaling that another outbreak of conflict was imminent. On July 11, the Japanese Cabinet decided to deploy seven divisions from the Kwantung Army, the Korean Army, and Japan to North China. On the same day, the Beiping-Tianjin authorities reached a localized agreement with the Japanese army, which entailed:  (1) a formal apology from a representative of the 29th Army to the Japanese forces, along with assurances that those responsible for the initial conflict would be held accountable;  (2) a ban on anti-Japanese activities conducted by the Communist Party, the Blue Shirts Society, and other resistance groups; and  (3) an agreement ensuring that no Chinese troops would be stationed east of the Yongding River. Concurrently, the Japanese army positioned their forces at strategic points in Wuqing, Fengtai, Wanping, and Changping, effectively encircling the city of Beijing and continuing to advance troops into its surrounding suburbs. Starting on July 11, the Japanese army began bombarding Wanping City and its surrounding areas with artillery, resulting in numerous casualties among the local population. Following the injury of regiment commander Ji Xingwen, residents were evacuated to safer locations outside the city. The conflict then spread to Babaoshan, Changxindian, Langfang, Yangcun, and other areas, with the 29th Army being deployed to various locations to confront the enemy. The Japanese military also dispatched aircraft for reconnaissance and strafing missions, leading to intermittent fighting. On July 13, Mao Zedong urged "every Communist Party member and anti-Japanese revolutionary to be prepared to mobilize to the frontline of the anti-Japanese war at any time" from Yan'an. By July 15, a CPC representative presented the "Communist Party Declaration on Cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party" to Chiang Kai-shek, proposing that this declaration serve as the political foundation for cooperation between the two parties and be publicly issued by the Kuomintang. Zhou Enlai, Qin Bangxian, and Lin Boqu continued negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek, Shao Lizi, and Zhang Chong in Lushan. Although Chiang Kai-shek recognized the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, disagreements remained regarding the reorganization of the Red Army. On July 16, the Five Ministers Conference in Tokyo resolved to mobilize 400,000 Japanese troops to invade China and to enforce a policy aimed at rapidly destroying the entire country. The following day, more than 100 Japanese soldiers arrived in Shunyi and Changping, where they reinforced fortifications on the city wall of Changping. On July 18, the Japanese army invaded Changping, Tongzhou, and other counties in the pseudo-border areas by maneuvering through various passes of the Great Wall. Japanese plainclothes teams were reported to be active in the Xiaotangshan area of Changping, raising alert levels within the Chinese army. On July 20, the Kuomintang Military and Political Department became aware that the Japanese army intended to first occupy strategic locations such as the Indigo Factory, Wanshou Mountain, and Balizhuang in the Pingxi area, before cutting off the Pingsui Road and controlling the route from Beiping to Changping. On July 21, the Japanese army violated the agreement by bombarding Wanping County and the garrison at Changxindian.  On the night of July 25, a confrontation took place at the railway station in Langfang, located between Peiping and Tientsin. The clash involved Chinese troops and a Japanese company dispatched to repair telegraph lines. General Kazuki promptly sought Tokyo's permission to respond with military force, believing that the situation required immediate action. Without waiting for authorization, he ordered a regiment from Tientsin to engage the Chinese forces and issued an ultimatum to Sung Che-yuan, stating that if the 37th Division did not completely withdraw from Peiping by noon on July 28, the Garrison Army would take unilateral action. The 77th Infantry Regiment of the 20th Division was dispatched with the Gonoi Squadron to escort a repair team to Langfang Station. Stationed near Langfang were the headquarters of the 113th Brigade of the 38th Division, along with the main force of the 226th Regiment, led by Brigade Commander Liu Zhensan and Regiment Commander Cui Zhenlun. Although the leadership of the 29th Army adopted a passive stance in the war of resistance, the forces in Langfang prepared for conflict in an organized manner. They not only evacuated the families of servicemen and relocated the regiment headquarters, but also built fortifications and deployed plainclothes teams at Wanzhuang Station, Luofa Station, and Langfang Station to swiftly destroy the railway if necessary. Despite their preparations, the commanders of the 38th Division adhered to Song Queyuan's directives. When the 5th Company, stationed at Yangcun, observed Japanese supply units continually moving toward Lugou Bridge, they sought permission to engage the enemy. However, the 38th Division later reassigned this company. The Bac Ninh Line, established after the Boxer Protocol, had granted the Japanese the right to station troops, placing the 38th Division in a vulnerable position and preventing them from stopping the Japanese before they reached Langfang. Upon the arrival of Japanese forces at Langfang Station, Chinese guards initiated negotiations, requesting the Japanese to withdraw quickly after completing their mission. The Japanese, however, insisted on establishing camps outside the station, leading to repeated arguments. As tensions mounted, the Japanese began constructing positions near the station, ultimately forcing Chinese troops to retreat and escalating the conflict. The situation reached a boiling point around 11:10 pm, when fierce gunfire and explosions erupted near Langfang Station. The Japanese army claimed they were defending the station from an attack by Chinese forces armed with rifles, machine guns, and mortars throughout the night. According to Cui Zhenlun, the head of the 226th Regiment, it was the 9th and 10th companies that could no longer tolerate the Japanese provocation and fired first, catching the enemy off guard. As the battle intensified, reinforcements from the main force of the 77th Infantry Regiment “Li Deng Unit” arrived at the scene after receiving reports of the skirmish and gradually joined the fight after 6:30 am on July 26. When dawn broke, Japanese troops stationed at Langfang began to rush out to counterattack, seeing their reinforcements arrive. Recognizing they could not eliminate the Japanese presence at the station quickly, the 226th Regiment faced heavy bombardment from the Japanese Air Force later that morning. Consequently, the headquarters of the 113th Brigade and the primary forces of the 226th Regiment hastily retreated to Tongbai Town, suffering significant losses in equipment during their withdrawal. That night, Kazuki made the unilateral decision to abandon the policy of restraint and decided to use force on July 28 "to punish the Chinese troops in the Peiping-Tientsin area." On the morning of July 27, the army high command endorsed his decision and submitted a plan to the cabinet for mobilizing divisions in Japan. The cabinet agreed, and imperial approval was sought. At that time, the Chinese army was gathering in significant numbers in Baoding and Shijiazhuang in southern Hebei, as well as in Datong, Shanxi. They had effectively surrounded the Japanese army on all sides in the Fengtai District. Meanwhile, newly mobilized units of the Kwantung Army and the Japanese Korean Army were en route to the Tianjin and Beiping areas. The 2nd Battalion of the 2nd China Garrison Infantry Regiment, commanded by Major Hirobe, was dispatched with 26 trucks to the Japanese barracks within the walls of Beiping to ensure the protection of Japanese residents. Prior discussions had taken place between Takuro Matsui, head of the Special Service Agency, and officials from the Hebei–Chahar Political Council regarding the passage of troops through the Guang'anmen gate just outside Beiping. The mayor, Qin Dechun, had granted approval for this movement. However, when Major Tokutaro Sakurai, a military and political advisor to the Council, arrived at Guang'anmen, a famous gate to Beiping, around 6:00 pm to establish contact, he found that the Chinese troops on guard had closed the gate. After further negotiations, the gates were opened at approximately 7:30 pm, allowing the Japanese units to begin passing through. Unfortunately, as the first three trucks crossed, the Chinese opened fire on them. Two-thirds of the units managed to get through before the gate was abruptly shut, leaving a portion of Hirobe's troops trapped both inside and outside. As they faced unexpectedly heavy fire from machine guns and grenades, efforts by Japanese and Chinese advisors to pacify the Chinese troops proved futile. By 8:00 pm, the Japanese launched a counterattack from both sides of the gate. The Chinese received reinforcements and encircled the Japanese forces. Despite a relief column being dispatched by Brigadier Masakazu Kawabe, commander of the brigade in the Fengtai District, by 9:30 pm, negotiations with the Chinese yielded a proposal for de-escalation: the Chinese army would maintain a distance while the Japanese inside the gate would relocate to the grounds of their legation, and those outside would return to Fengtai. Fighting ceased shortly after 10:00 pm, and at approximately 2:00 am the following day, Hirobe's unit successfully entered the barracks in the legation. The total casualties reported for the Japanese army during these confrontations were 2 dead and 17 wounded. Both fatalities were superior privates. The wounded included one major, one captain, one sergeant, two superior privates, one private first class, seven privates second class, two attached civilians, and one news reporter. Additionally, the interpreter accompanying Tokutaro Sakurai was also killed in action. On July 27, the Japanese army launched attacks on the 29th Army garrisons in Tongxian, Tuanhe, Xiaotangshan, and other locations, forcing the defenders to retreat to Nanyuan and Beiyuan. At 8:00 am on July 28, under the command of Army Commander Kiyoshi Kozuki, the Japanese army initiated a general assault on the 29th Army in the Beiping area. The primary attacking force, the 20th Division, supported by aircraft and artillery, targeted the 29th Army Special Brigade, the 114th Brigade of the 38th Division, and the 9th Cavalry Division stationed in Nanyuan. Overwhelmed by the Japanese assault, Nanyuan's defenders struggled to maintain command, leading to chaotic individual combat. Meanwhile, the main Japanese garrison brigade in Fengtai advanced to Dahongmen, effectively cutting off the Nanyuan troops' route to the city and blocking their retreat. The battle for Nanyuan concluded at 1:00 pm, resulting in the deaths of Tong Lingge, deputy commander of the 29th Army, and Zhao Dengyu, commander of the 132nd Division. As this unfolded, elements of the 37th Division of the 29th Army launched an attack on the Japanese forces in Fengtai but were repulsed by Japanese reinforcements. On that day, the Japanese Army's 1st Independent Mixed Brigade captured Qinghe Town, prompting the 2nd Brigade of the Hebei-Northern Security Force, stationed there, to retreat to Huangsi. The Japanese also occupied Shahe. In the afternoon of July 28, Song Qeyuan appointed Zhang Zizhong as the acting chairman of the Hebei-Chahar Political Affairs Committee and director of the Hebei-Chahar Pacification Office, as well as the mayor of Beiping, before leaving the city for Baoding that evening. The 37th Division was ordered to retreat to Baoding. On July 29th, a significant mutiny broke out at Tongzhou. If you remember our episode covering the Tanggu truce, Tongzhou had become the capital of the East Hubei Anti-Communist Autonomous Government headed by Yin Jukeng. In response Chiang Kai-Shek had established the East Hebei Administrative Affairs Committee, chaired by Song Queyuan. In Tongzhou, Japanese troops were stationed under the pretext of protecting Japanese residents, as stipulated by the Boxer Protocol. Initially, a unit was intended to be stationed in Tongzhou; however, Vice Minister of the Army Umezu Yoshijiro strongly opposed this plan, arguing that placing forces in Tongzhou, far from the Beiping-Tianjin Line was inconsistent with the spirit of the Boxer Protocol. Consequently, this unit was stationed in Fengtai, located southwest of Beiping. At the time of the Tongzhou Incident, the main force of the Japanese Second Regiment, which was responsible for defending Tongzhou, had been deployed to Nanyuan, south of Beijing. Consequently, only non-combat personnel remained in Tongzhou. Japan regarded the Jidong Anti-Communist Autonomous Government Security Force as a friendly ally. Back on July 27, the primary forces of the Japanese Army stationed in Tongzhou, comprising the Kayashima Unit and the Koyama Artillery Unit, received orders to advance toward Nanyuan, Beiping, leaving Tongzhou significantly under-defended. The following day, the Japanese launched a substantial attack on Nanyuan, employing aircraft to bomb Beiping. Sensing a critical opportunity, Zhang Qingyu conferred with Zhang Yantian and Shen Weigan to initiate an uprising that very night. The insurgent force included elements from the first and second corps and the teaching corps, totaling approximately 4,000 personnel. Zhang Qingyu orchestrated the uprising with a focused strategy: the first corps was divided into three groups targeting Japanese forces in Xicang, the puppet government, and various establishments such as opium dens, casinos, and brothels operated by Japanese ronin. Meanwhile, the second corps secured key intersections and facilities in Chengguan, and the teaching corps managed defenses against potential reinforcements at vital stations. At dawn on July 29, the gunfire signaling the uprising erupted. The second unit of the first corps launched an assault on the Xicang Barracks, which housed 120 troops and non-combat personnel, including the Tongzhou Guard, Yamada Motor Vehicle Unit, a Military Police Detachment, and a host of military and police units, totaling about 500 individuals. At around 3 a.m. on July 29, the sound of gunfire filled the air as the insurgents engaged the Japanese forces. Although equipped with only four field guns, several mortars, and a few heavy machine guns, the uprising's numerical superiority enabled simultaneous attacks from the east, south, and northwest. Despite their well-fortified positions and rigorous defense, the Japanese troops struggled against the relentless onslaught. For over six hours, fierce fighting ensued. The uprising troops escalated their firepower but failed to breach the Xicang Barracks initially. More than 200 members of the Japanese security forces lost their lives in the conflict. Concerned that reinforcements might arrive and flank the uprising, Zhang Qingyu ordered artillery assaults around 11 a.m., prompting a shift in the battle's dynamics. The artillery targeted a Japanese motor vehicle convoy transporting supplies and munitions, leading to the destruction of all 17 vehicles, triggering explosions that scattered bullets and shrapnel across the area. Subsequently, nearby fuel depots ignited, engulfing the surroundings in flames and creating chaos among Japanese ranks. The insurgent infantry capitalized on this confusion, wiping out most of the remaining Japanese forces, with only a handful managing to escape. As the uprising signal rang out, another faction of insurgents swiftly blocked access to Tongzhou, disrupting traffic and occupying the telecommunications bureau and radio station. They encircled the offices of the Jidong puppet government, capturing traitor Yin Rugeng, who was taken to the Beiguan Lu Zu Temple. Despite being urged to resist the Japanese, Yin hesitated and was subsequently imprisoned. The third group then targeted the Japanese secret service agency in Nishicang. Hosoki Shigeru, residing a mere lane away from the pseudo-office, responded to the gunfire by mobilizing a contingent of secret agents to confront the uprising. However, the insurgents swiftly overtook the secret service agency, resulting in Shigeru's death and the annihilation of all secret personnel. At 4:00 p.m. on July 29, the Japanese command dispatched reinforcements, compelling the insurgents to retreat from Tongzhou. The Japanese Chinese Garrison ordered air attacks on the uprising forces, with over ten bombers targeting Tongzhou. Concurrently, the Japanese Fengtai Infantry Brigade and the Second Regiment were mobilized for a rescue operation, arriving on the morning of July 30. The Japanese headquarters issued a night defense order requiring all units to be on high alert. By 5:30 p.m., commanding officers assembled to devise a strategy. With the uprising forces still positioned around the eastern, southern, and northern walls of the barracks, Tsujimura's troops implemented strict measures: all units were instructed to fortify defenses throughout the night, with the Tongzhou Guard directly protecting the barracks and the Yamada unit securing the warehouse and supply areas. They enforced silence, prohibiting any lights at night, coordinating operations under the code name "plum cherry." As the Japanese planes repeatedly bombed the area, the insurgents, lacking anti-aircraft defenses, could only mount futile counterattacks with machine guns, leading to disorder among their ranks. Many insurgents abandoned their uniforms and weapons and fled, prompting Zhang Qingyu to make the difficult decision to evacuate Tongzhou before Japanese reinforcements arrived, regrouping in Beiping with the remnants of the 29th Army. In the late hours of July 29, the security team retreated to Beiping in two groups. Upon arrival, they discovered the 29th Army had already evacuated, forcing them to retreat to Changxindian and Baoding. En route, they encountered part of the Suzuki Brigade of the Japanese Kwantung Army near Beiyuan and Xizhimen, where they faced concentrated attacks. Officers Shen Weigan and Zhang Hanming were both killed in the subsequent battles as they led their teams in desperate fights for survival. Amid the confusion, Yin Rugeng managed to escape when the convoy escorting him was broken up by Japanese forces. In a last-ditch effort, Zhang Qingyu ordered the army to split into small groups of 50 to 60, navigating through Mentougou to regroup with the 29th Army. By the time they reached Baoding, only about 4,000 personnel remained. On the morning of July 30, over a thousand troops from the Sakai Army entered Tongzhou City. They rounded up all men they encountered, searching residences for insurgents, and exhibited intentions of massacring the local population. By 4 p.m., the Kayashima Army arrived and sealed all city gates, deploying surveillance units to oversee the city and "restore public order." The Tsujimura Army removed perimeter defenses and concentrated their forces in barracks and storage facilities. Japanese troops combed through residences based on household registries, detaining those they deemed suspicious, with many later executed. As reported by the puppet county magistrate Wang Jizhang, roughly 700 to 800 individuals were executed within a few days. This brutal retaliation instilled terror throughout Tongzhou City, leading many to flee and seek refuge, often in American churches. The pervasive atmosphere of fear lasted for two to three months. The Japanese authorities framed their violent suppression as "restoring stability to East Asia" and derided the legitimate resistance of Chinese citizens as "communist harassment" and "treason." In response to the uprising, the Japanese embassy, concerned that it could trigger a repeat of the Temple Street Incident and instigate political upheaval at home, acted without government instructions. They appointed Morishima Morito to oversee negotiations with Chi Zongmo, who had replaced Yin Rugeng as the head of the "Hebei Anti-Communist Autonomous Government." On December 24, 1937, Chi submitted a formal apology to the Japanese embassy, committing to pay a total of 1.2 million yuan in reparations, with an immediate payment of 400,000 yuan, while the remaining 800,000 yuan would be disbursed by the "Provisional Government of the Republic of China." Furthermore, the Japanese demanded that the "Hebei Anti-Communist Autonomous Government" relinquish the territories where Japanese nationals had been killed and take responsibility for constructing "comfort towers." They compelled Chinese laborers to build these structures at the former site of the Governor's Office of Canal Transport in Shuiyueyuan Hutong, Nanmenli, and the northeastern corner of Xicang Square to commemorate Japanese casualties from the uprising. Additionally, they forcibly uprooted ancient trees from the Temple of Heaven, transplanting them around the "comfort towers." The Japanese military also demolished white marble guardrails at the Confucian Temple to erect a monument honoring their soldiers, resulting in the destruction of centuries-old cultural artifacts. On the morning of July 29, the Japanese Army's 11th Independent Mixed Brigade attacked Beiyuan and Huangsi. The Hebei-Northern Security Force, stationed in Huangsi, engaged the Japanese forces until 6:00 PM before retreating. Meanwhile, the 39th Independent Brigade, garrisoned in Beiyuan, fought the Japanese before withdrawing to Gucheng, eventually returning to Beiyuan. On July 31, this brigade was disarmed by the Japanese army, while the Independent 27th Brigade in the city was reorganized into a security team to maintain public order, later breaking through to Chahar Province a few days later and being assigned to the 143rd Division. Meanwhile, the 38th Division of the 29th Army, stationed in Tianjin, proactively attacked Japanese troops in Tianjin early on July 29, capturing the Japanese garrison at Tianjin General Station and launching an assault on the Japanese headquarters at Haiguang Temple and the Dongjuzi Airport. Initially, the battle progressed favorably; however, due to counterattacks from Japanese aircraft and artillery, the Chinese forces began to retreat around 3:00 PM, leading to the fall of Tianjin. Later that afternoon, the rebel forces evacuated Tong County and advanced toward Beiping. En route, they were attacked by the Japanese army north of the city and subsequently retreated to Baoding. As the 37th Division of the 29th Army received orders to retreat southward, the 110th Brigade covered the army headquarters and the Beiping troops from Wanping to Babaoshan, eventually retreating southward through Mentougou. After completing their task, they withdrew to Baoding on July 30. By the end of the 30th, the Japanese army had occupied both Beiping and Tianjin. The Japanese Independent Mixed Brigade No. 1 and the garrison brigade occupied high ground west of Changxindian and the area near Dahuichang on the evenings of the 30th and 31st, respectively. With this, the battles in Beiping and Tianjin effectively came to a close. China and Japan were at war. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. It has finally happened, China and Japan are officially at war. From 1931 until now, it had been an unofficial war between the two, yet another incident had finally broke the camel's back. There was no turning back as Japan would unleash horror upon the Chinese people. The fight for China's survival had begun. China was completely alone against a fierce enemy, how would she manage? 

  Last time we spoke about the Xi'an Incident. In December 1936, tensions in China erupted as Nationalist General Chiang Kai-shek faced a revolt led by his commanders, Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng. Disillusioned by Chiang's focus on battling communists instead of the Japanese invaders, the generals swiftly captured him in a coup. Confined in Xi'an, Chiang initially resisted their demands for a united front against Japan but eventually engaged in negotiation with Zhang and the Chinese Communist Party. As public sentiment shifted against him, Chiang's predicament led to urgent discussions, culminating in an unexpected alliance with the communists. This pact aimed to consolidate Chinese resistance against Japanese aggression, marking a critical turning point in the Second Sino-Japanese War. By December 26, Chiang was released, and this uneasy collaboration set the stage for a more unified front against a common enemy, though underlying tensions remained between the factions.   #152 China Prepares for War Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Before we jump into the Second Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945, which I honestly have no idea how long will take us, I thought it would be a good idea to dedicate two episodes to how both China and Japan prepared themselves for war.  Going all the way back to the 1910s, Chinese intellectuals began to view an outright conflict between Japan and China was inevitable. In the discussions about China's strategic options, Jiang Fangzhen pioneered a strategy of protracted warfare, a concept that would later shape China's approach during the Sino-Japanese War. Having studied in Japan during his youth, Jiang developed a keen understanding of the Japanese government and military. As early as 1917, he predicted that China and Japan would become embroiled in a long-term conflict, with the battleground likely to be west of the Peiping–Wuhan and Guangzhou–Wuhan railways. In his work titled "Guofang Lun" or “On National Defense”, Jiang reiterated the importance of protracted warfare as a means to thwart Japan's aspirations for a swift victory. He argued that China should leverage its vast population and extensive territory to extend the conflict, gradually wearing down Japanese strength and turning the situation to its advantage. Jiang recommended that China not focus on defending its coastal regions but instead confront the enemy west of the Peking–Wuhan Railway.   Chiang Kai-shek would eventually come to share Jiang's belief that “the longer the war drags on, the more advantageous it will be for China.” Despite significant public criticism, both the Nationalist government and General Zhang Xueliang, decided against military resistance when Japan invaded Manchuria in September 1931 and attacked Shanghai in 1932. Chiang was particularly hesitant to engage Japan directly, as he was also dealing with a Communist insurgency in central China. He feared that Chinese forces would suffer quick defeat, predicting that Japan would capture key coastal areas and critical infrastructure within just three days, crippling China by dismantling its military and economic lifelines. Following the invasion of North China Chiang was forced to adopt a firmer stance. The Nationalist government proposed a dual strategy of pursuing peace and security while simultaneously preparing for war. If peace proved impossible, China would mobilize its resources for ultimate victory through prolonged conflict. This approach was formalized in the National Defense Plan, which China adopted by prioritizing protracted warfare as its core strategy. After the Sino-Japanese clash in Shanghai on January 28, 1932, the Military Affairs Commission devised a plan that divided China into four defense areas along with a preparation area. While some troops were assigned local security, commanders were directed to concentrate their remaining forces for potential confrontations with Japan. That year, the Military Affairs Commission issued General Defense Guidelines that outlined two strategic responses to a potential Japanese invasion. The first, conservative approach focused on maintaining key positions and utilizing protracted warfare to impede the enemy. The second strategy advocated for decisive battles in key regions to thwart Japan's ambitions and protect China's territorial integrity, prioritizing disengagement from Japanese forces along the Yangtze River and coastline. In August 1935, German military adviser General Alexander von Falkenhausen provided recommendations to Chiang Kai-shek based on his predictions of Japanese advance routes into China. He identified three main routes: one from northern Hebei to Zhengzhou, the second from Shandong toward Xuzhou, and the third crossing the Yangtze River to Nanjing and onwards to Wuhan. He suggested treating the Yangtze River as the primary combat zone and highlighted Sichuan as a possible retreat area. Taking all of this into consideration. in 1936, a draft of a new National Defense Plan divided the country into four zones: a war zone, a defense zone, an internal security zone, and a preparation area. The war zone encompassed ten provinces and established strategies for retreating to predetermined defensive positions when necessary, with Sichuan designated as the main base for the war. In January 1937, the Chinese General Staff Department introduced its annual War Plan, outlining three possible military conflict regions between China and Japan. It proposed two main strategies: Proposal A emphasized sustained combat and retreat to fortified positions if the situation became unfavorable, aiming to eventually go on the offensive against Japan. Proposal B focused on repelling Japanese invasions along the coast and from the north, prioritizing counter offensives against Japanese units stationed near key locations. To prepare, the NRA completed several critical projects outlined in its plans, establishing military supply depots in Nanjing, Bengbu, Xinyang, Huayin, Nanchang, and Wuchang to manage logistics for supplies across various strategic railways. These depots were equipped to sustain the military, with ample ammunition and provisions, including 60 million rounds of small-arms ammunition and food for hundreds of thousands. Despite these preparations, not all projects were completed by the time war broke out in July 1937. In contrast to the Japanese military's tactics, Chinese forces prioritized defensive strategies. For example, at the Mount Lushan Military Officer Training Camp in July 1934, Chiang Kai-shek outlined four possible approaches against Japan, favoring a defense-as-offense strategy. Other options included building fortifications, tenaciously defending key positions, and employing guerrilla warfare through irregular forces to constrain enemy advances. Chiang stressed the importance of national mobilization for the war effort.  There was a significant disparity in equipment between the Japanese and Chinese armies. To give you an idea, each Japanese division included a mechanized group featuring thirty-nine light military vehicles and 21 light armored cars, supplemented by 6,000–7,000 horses, 200–300 automobiles, and specialized troops such as poison gas teams. In contrast, Nationalist divisions lacked any of these capabilities, a typical nationalist division theoretically had an armored regiment, but this unit was equipped with fewer than 72 armored vehicles. Another major weakness of the Nationalist forces was their insufficient artillery. In 1936, a division was officially assigned one artillery battalion, which was divided into three batteries totaling twelve guns. It also included a mechanized cannon company with four direct-fire weapons. By comparison, a Japanese division boasted four infantry regiments and one mountain artillery or field artillery regiment, with each artillery regiment comprising three field artillery battalions and one howitzer battalion. The infantry regiment itself included a mountain artillery section with four mountain guns, while the infantry battalion had one Type 70 mountain gun section with two guns. In total, a Japanese division possessed sixty-four artillery pieces of various calibers, four times the number of a Chinese division and of significantly higher quality. In reality, in 1936, twelve of the twenty elite Chinese “reformed divisions” still lacked artillery battalions. The ordnance available in the “reformed divisions” mostly consisted of the outdated Type 60 mountain gun. Nationwide, very few of the 200 divisions were equipped with any artillery, and those that did often used obsolete field artillery pieces or mountain artillery provided to local forces. Some units even relied on trench mortars as a makeshift solution. The artillery weapons came from various countries, but they frequently lacked necessary observation and signal components, and were often low on ammunition. The majority of mountain guns and field artillery were of the Type 75, which, while capable of providing fire support, had limited range and inflicted minimal damage. To give you an idea of the striking inadequacy of the Chinese artillery, during the Shanghai fighting in 1937, the mountain artillery of the Guangxi 21st Army Group could only reach targets within 1,200 yards, while Japanese field artillery had an effective range of 8,000 yards. Chinese-made mountain artillery suffered due to inferior steel-making technology; the gun shields were constructed from low-quality steel, and the barrels often overheated after firing just a few rounds, increasing the risk of explosions. Additionally, the equipment of local forces varied greatly in quality. In fact, some local units had superior equipment compared to Nationalist units. For example, before the Sino-Japanese War, troops from Yunnan were equipped with French antitank guns and heavy machine guns, which were better than the German water-cooled machine guns used by the Nationalist forces. However, the majority of local troops relied on inferior equipment; the 122nd Division under Wang Mingzhang from Sichuan, noted for its brave defense of Tengxian County during the Xuzhou Battle, was armed with locally produced light and heavy machine guns that frequently malfunctioned, and their Type 79 rifles, also made in Sichuan, were often outdated, with some dating back to the Qing Dynasty. These weapons had limited range and sometimes malfunctioned after fewer than one hundred rounds. Now before the war, both Nationalist and local forces acquired weaponry from diverse foreign and domestic sources. Even domestically produced weapons lacked standardization, with those made in Hanyang and Manchuria differing in design and specifications. Arms manufactured in Germany, France, Russia, Japan, and Italy were similarly inconsistent. Consequently, even within a single unit, the lack of uniformity created significant logistical challenges, undermining combat effectiveness, particularly in the early stages of the war. Despite Nationalist ordnance factories producing over three million rounds of small-arms ammunition daily, the incompatibility of ammunition and weapons diminished the usable quantity of ammunition. Chinese communications infrastructure was inadequate. In the Nationalist army, signal units were integrated into engineering units, leading to low-quality radio communications. In emergencies, telegrams could remain undelivered for days, and orders often had to be dispatched via postal services. By 1937, the entire country boasted only 3,000 military vehicles, necessitating heavy reliance on horses and mules for transport. To effectively equip twenty Nationalist divisions, 10,647 horses and 20,688 mules were needed, but by the end of 1935, only 6,206 horses and 4,351 mules were available. A statistic from 1936 indicated a 5 percent mortality rate among military horses, with some units experiencing a rate as high as 10 percent. The distribution of weaponry led to disputes during army reorganization efforts following the Northern Expedition. Although Chiang Kai-shek's forces were part of the regular army, the quality of their equipment varied significantly. Domestic production of weapons was limited, and imports could not close the gap. Priority was given to small arms; through army reorganization, Chiang aimed to diminish the influence of forces less loyal to him. Nationalist army staff officers observed that troops loyal to Chiang received the best weapons. Northwest and Northeast forces, having cultivated good relations with the KMT, were similarly better equipped, while Shanxi troops received inferior supplies. Troops associated with the Guangxi Clique were given even poorer quality weapons due to their leaders' stronger political ambitions. Troops regarded as “bandit forces,” such as those led by Shi Yousan, Li Hongchang, and Sun Dianying, were naturally assigned the least effective weaponry. This unequal distribution of arms increased some local forces' inclination to align with the KMT while alienating others, which inadvertently led to additional turmoil in the aftermath of the Northern Expedition. Logistical accounting within the Nationalist military was severely lacking. Military expenditures accounted for a significant portion of government spending, roughly 65.48 % in 1937, with personnel costs being the largest component. However, military units prioritized boosting their own resources over accurate accounting. Surpluses were not returned but rather utilized to reward military officers and soldiers for merits in battle, care for the wounded, or to create a reserve. Conversely, if deficits arose, troops would resort to “living off vacancies,” a practice in which they would fail to report desertions promptly and would falsely claim new soldiers had arrived. Military leaders typically appointed their most trusted subordinates to serve as accountants and logistic officers. As the war commenced, these issues became readily apparent. During the Battle of Shanghai in 1937, frontline soldiers sometimes went days without food and went months without pay. Wounded soldiers and civilians had to search tirelessly for medical treatment, and when main forces relocated, they often abandoned grain, ammunition, weapons, and petroleum along the way. General Chen Cheng, the commander in chief during the Battle of Shanghai, noted, “This phenomenon clearly revealed our inability to supply frontline troops, indicating that China remains a backward country with poor management.” Many logistical shortcomings severely impacted troop morale and combat effectiveness. In a 1933 speech, Chiang Kai-shek acknowledged that poor food, inadequate clothing, and ineffective logistics contributed to widespread desertion. Soldiers were further demoralized by reduced or embezzled salaries. A lack of professional medical staff and equipment hampered healthcare efforts, leading to high disease and mortality rates. According to official statistics from 1936, approximately 10 percent of soldiers fell ill annually, with a mortality rate as high as 5 percent. Japanese military authorities reported that one in three wounded Japanese soldiers died, while a Dutch military officer present during the early stages of the Sino-Japanese War observed that one in every two wounded Nationalist soldiers perished. Due to inadequate equipment and limited transport options, Nationalist forces were compelled to recruit farmers and rent vehicles, as they lacked essential facilities such as tents. This reliance on local resources inevitably led to frequent conflicts between military personnel and civilians. China is clearly a vast nation with an extensive coastline, requiring the construction of several significant fortresses during the modern era. These included Wusong, Jiangyin, Zhenjiang, Jiangning, and Wuhan along the Yangtze River, as well as Zhenhai, Humen, and Changzhou along the seacoast. Except for the Wuhan fortress, built in 1929-1930, all other fortifications were established during the late Qing Dynasty and featured uncovered cannon batteries. These fortresses suffered from inadequate maintenance, and many of their components had become outdated and irreplaceable, rendering them militarily negligible. Following the January 1932 Shanghai Incident, the Japanese military destroyed the Wusong forts, leaving the entrance to the Yangtze River completely unfortified. Consequently, there were no defenses along the coastline from Jiangsu to Shandong, allowing the Japanese to land freely. In December 1932, the Military Affairs Commission established a fortress group tasked with constructing fortresses and defensive installations, seeking assistance from German military advisers. After the North China Incident in 1935, the Nationalist government accelerated the construction of defensive structures in line with national war planning, focusing particularly on Nanjing. The Nationalists prioritized building fortifications along the seacoast and the Yellow River, followed by key regions north of the Yellow River. The government also ordered a significant quantity of heavy artillery from Germany. This included several dozen pieces of flat-fire antiaircraft and dual-purpose heavy artillery, which were installed at fortifications in Jiangyin, Zhenjiang, Nanjing, and Wuhan. By the summer of 1937, the construction of nine fortified positions was complete: Nanjing, Zhenjiang, Jiangyin, Ningbo, Humen, Mawei, Xiamen , Nantong, and Lianyungang. In total, China had established 41 forts and equipped them with 273 fortress cannons. Some defensive installations were poorly managed, with many units assigned to their perimeters lacking training and access to proper maps. The barbette positions in the fortresses were not well concealed and could hardly store sufficient ammunition. Troops stationed at these fortresses received little training. Despite these shortcomings, the fortresses and fortifications were not entirely ineffective. They bolstered Chinese positions along the defense line stretching from Cangxian County to Baoding and from Dexian County to Shijiazhuang, as well as in southern Shandong.  Before the war, China's political and economic center was situated along the seacoast and the Yangtze River. As Japanese influence expanded, the Nationalist government was compelled to establish bases in China's inner regions, very similar to how the USSR pulled back its industry further west after Operation barbarossa.The Japanese attack on Shanghai in 1932 prompted the Nationalists to relocate their capital to Luoyang. On March 5, during the Second Plenary Session of the KMT's Fourth Congress, the Western Capital Preparation Committee was formed to plan for the potential relocation of all governmental bodies to Xi'an in the event of full-scale war. In February 1933, the Central Political Conference approved the Northwest Development Bill, and in February 1934, the National Economic Commission set up a northwestern branch to oversee development projects in the region. On October 18, 1934, Chiang Kai-shek traveled to Lanzhou, recording in his diary that “Northwest China has abundant resources. Japan and Russia are poised to bully us. Yet, if we strengthen ourselves and develop northwest China to the fullest extent, we can turn it into a base for China's revival.” Interestingly, it was Sichuan, rather than the northwest, that became China's rear base during the 2nd Sino-Japanese War. In October 1934, the Communist army evacuated its Soviet base in southern China, initiating the Long March that would ultimately end in the northwest. By this time, Chiang Kai-shek had decided to designate Sichuan as the last stronghold for China. In January 1935, the Nanchang Field Headquarters of the Military Affairs Commission, responsible for combatting the Communists and serving as the supreme military and political authority over most provinces along the Yangtze River and central China, dispatched a special advisory group to Chongqing. Following this, the Nationalist army advanced into Sichuan. On February 10, the Nationalists appointed a new provincial government in Sichuan, effectively ending the province's long-standing regionalism. On March 2, Chiang traveled to Chongqing, where he delivered a speech underscoring that “Sichuan should serve as the base for China's revival.” He stated that he was in Sichuan to oversee efforts against the Communist army and to unify the provincial administration.  After the Xinhai revolution, the Republic of China was still suing the Qing Dynasty's conscription system. However, once in power, the Nationalist government sought to establish a national military service program. In 1933, it enacted a military service law, which began implementation in 1936. This law categorized military service into two branches: service in the Nationalist army and in territorial citizen army units. Men aged eighteen to forty-five were expected to serve in the territorial units if they did not enlist in the Nationalist army. The territorial service was structured into three phases: active service lasting two to three years, first reserves for six years, and second reserves until the age of forty-five. The Ministry of Military Affairs divided China into sixty divisional conscription headquarters, initially establishing these headquarters in the six provinces of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, and Hubei. By December 1936, approximately 50,000 new soldiers had been drafted. The military service law disproportionately favored the middle and upper classes. Government personnel were exempt from enlistment, allowing privileged families to register their children with government agencies. Similarly, students in middle and higher education were excused from service, while youth from poorer backgrounds often felt compelled to enlist due to financial constraints that limited their educational opportunities. Village and town leaders were responsible for executing the recruitment process and frequently conspired with army recruiters. Recruitment principles often favored wealthier families, with guidelines stating that one son should be drafted for every three sons, two for five sons, but no drafts if there was only one son. Wealthy families could secure exemptions for all their male children, while poor families might see their only son conscripted if they were unable to provide the requisite bribe. Town and village heads wielded significant power in recruitment. This new recruitment system also created numerous money-making opportunities. Military personnel assigned to escort draftees to their units would often allow draftees to escape for a fee. Additionally, draftees could monetize their service by agreeing to serve as substitutes for others. For some, being drafted became an occupation. For example, in 1936, 600 individuals were drafted in the Wuhu area of Anhui province, and accounts from regional administrators indicated that every draftee had either been traded, replaced, or seized. Beginning in 1929, the Nationalist government also instituted military training for high school students and older individuals. Students were required to participate in one theoretical class and one practical class each week, totaling three hours. Starting in 1934, students had to complete a three-month military training program before graduating. Graduates of military academies were employed as military instructors. By the end of 1936, over 237,000 high school students had undergone military training. This student military training was overseen by the Society for the Implementation of the Three People's Principles of Sun Yat-sen, which also provided political education and sometimes gathered information on students' political beliefs.  Although the Nationalists made significant efforts to improve the military training of both officers and troops, they inherited deep-seated challenges that they were unable to completely overcome. A lack of facilities, outdated training manuals, low regard for military instructors, and the ongoing influence of regionalism and warlordism hindered progress. The Japanese would also later exploit these shortcomings of the Nationalist army. The Central Military Academy, which evolved from the Whampoa Military Academy established in 1923 in Guangzhou to train officers for the Northern Expedition, became the primary training institution for junior military officers. The academy offered a basic course, lasting eighteen months, which included general education, specialized training in various subjects, and field practice. This was followed by a two-year cadet training program focused on developing the skills necessary for junior military officers. Seventeen classes were admitted before the outbreak of war. Admission to the academy was highly competitive, with military officers receiving attractive salaries. For instance, in 1935, the academy received 10,000 applications for the twelfth class, but only 7% were accepted. Upon graduation, cadets were typically assigned to divisions within the Nationalist army loyal to Chiang Kai-shek. Their training, influenced by German advisors, resulted in a high-quality cadre. In modern China, most sergeants were veterans. While some units provided training for sergeants, a lack of formal education led to their diminished status. Truly qualified sergeants were rare. During his tenure as Minister of Military Training, General Bai Chongxi proposed establishing a sergeant school and creating a professional noncommissioned officer system; however, the Ministry of Military Affairs opposed this on financial grounds. While commanding officers enjoyed rapid promotions, military instructors did not. Furthermore, there was no system for transferring instructors to field commands or assigning commanders to military academies for extended periods. Despite minor updates to cover modern warfare concepts such as tank warfare and machine guns, Qing Dynasty military manuals were still in use at the Central Military Academy at the start of the war. Yeah, 1937 they were still rocking the old Qing books. Following the establishment of the Ministry of Military Training, a bureau for military translation was set up to evaluate existing course materials and translate military manuals, but its contributions were limited. Another significant shortcoming of military instruction focused on theory at the expense of practical application.  To enhance the quality of military officers, the Nationalist army instituted specialized schools for artillery, infantry, transport, engineering, and signals starting in 1931. These institutions were considered to have high-quality administrators and facilities. The Nationalists adopted German military training models, replacing the previously used Japanese models. They appointed German advisors to oversee instructor training at military academies and established three instructional divisions. By the onset of the Sino-Japanese War, 15,000 students had graduated from programs with a German military influence, resulting in the creation of about fifty combat divisions from these instructional units. However, the progress of other Nationalist army units was limited because their training was not aligned with contemporary battlefield realities. Before World War I, troops operated in close formations due to limited firepower. The widespread introduction of machine guns after World War I necessitated a shift to dispersed formations. Although a new drill manual issued by the Ministry of Military Training in 1935 introduced small-group tactics, few units adopted these methods. General Chen Cheng highlighted another underlying issue in 1938, commenting on the outmoded focus on parade ground drills and formal military manners. He noted, “We have paid too much attention to stereotypical formality and procedures of no practical use. Sometimes, even though soldiers could not get a haircut or take a bath for several months, their camps had to be in order. They underwent intensive training in close-order drill but learned little about gun handling, marksmanship, or maneuvering. This was inappropriate in peacetime, yet we continued this practice even after the Sino-Japanese War started, even using it on highly educated youth.” In contrast, the Communist army simplified training, emphasizing two essential skills: live-fire exercises and physical endurance, which significantly enhanced troop effectiveness in the challenging terrain characteristic of the Sino-Japanese War. Ultimately, the Nationalist army's training did not reach all soldiers. Only about half of all combat soldiers received adequate training, while the rest were neglected. According to statistics from the time, there were approximately five million military personnel during the Sino-Japanese War, with three million serving in logistics. Most of these logistics personnel had received little training, leading to disastrous consequences for overall combat effectiveness. As warfare has become more complex, the role of highly trained staff officers has become increasingly important. Napoleon developed operational plans close to the front and communicated orders via courier. During World War I, military commanders collected information at their headquarters and utilized telephones and automobiles to relay orders to the front lines. In World War II, with the battlefield expanding to include land, sea, and air, senior commanders often made decisions from headquarters far from the action, relying on a significant number of staff officers with specialized skills to keep them informed. In China, however, the staff officer system was underdeveloped. By 1937, only about 2,000 commanders and staff officers had received training. Prior to the Sino-Japanese War, most commanders managed staff work themselves, with staff officers serving primarily as military secretaries who drafted orders, reports, and maps. Many staff officers had no formal military training, and as a whole, the branch lacked respect, causing the most talented officers to avoid serving in it. The situation was even more dire for staff officer departments within local forces. For example, in March 1937, Liu Ziqing, a graduate of the Whampoa Military Academy, was appointed as the director of political instruction in the Forty-fourth Army, a unit under Sichuan warlord Liu Xiang. Liu Ziqing's account illustrates the dysfunction within the ranks: “The commander in chief was not supposed to manage the army and even did not know its whereabouts... But he could appoint relatives and former subordinates—who were officials and businessmen as well—to the army. Each month they would receive a small stipend. At headquarters, there was a long table and two rows of chairs. Around ten o'clock in the morning, senior officers signed in to indicate their presence. Those with other business would leave, while the remaining officers sat down to leisurely discuss star actresses, fortune-telling, business projects, mah-jongg, and opium. Occasionally they would touch on national affairs, chat about news articles, or share local gossip. In the afternoons, they primarily played mah-jongg, held banquets, and visited madams. Most mornings, the commander usually presided over these activities, and at first, I reported for duty as well. But I soon realized it was a waste of time and came very rarely. At headquarters, most staff members wore long gowns or Western-style suits, while military uniforms were a rare sight.” Most senior military personnel were trained at the Baoding Military Academy during the early republic. 2/3rds of commanders in chief, 37 %of army commanders, and 20 % of division commanders were Baoding graduates. Higher-ranking officers were more likely to have launched their careers there. In contrast, only 10 % of division commanders and a few army commanders were graduates of the Whampoa Military Academy. Additionally, commanders trained in local military schools and those with combat experience accounted for 1/3rd of all commanders. While the prevalence of civil war provided opportunities for rapid promotion, it also hindered officers' ability to update their training or gain experience in different military branches. German advisors expressed their concerns to Chiang Kai-shek, emphasizing that officers should first serve in junior roles before taking command. During one battle in 1938, Chiang noted, “Our commanders in chief are equivalent only to our enemy's regiment commanders, and our army and division commanders are only as competent as our enemy's battalion and company commanders.” Despite not viewing high-ranking Japanese officers as great strategists, Nationalist officers respected them as highly competent, diligent, and professional commanders who rarely made critical errors. The infantry was the primary component of the Nationalist army, with middle and junior infantry officers constituting over 80 %of all army officers. A 1936 registry of military officers listed 1,105 colonels and 2,159 lieutenant colonels within the infantry, demonstrating a significant outnumbering of Baoding graduates at ranks below lieutenant colonel. However, the quality of middle and junior infantry officers declined during the Sino-Japanese War; by 1944, only 27.3 % of these officers were from formal military academies, while those promoted from the ranks increased to 28.1 %. In 1937, 80 % of officers in an ordinary infantry battalion were military academy graduates, but this percentage dropped to 20 % during the war. Its hard to tell how educated soldiers were before the war, but it is generally believed that most were illiterate. In 1929, sociologist Tao Menghe surveyed 946 soldiers from a Shanxi garrison brigade and found that only 13 percent could compose a letter independently, while the rest had either never learned to read or were unable to write. In contrast, in August 1938, General Feng Yuxiang found that 80 percent of a regiment in Hunan were literate. Regardless, during the Sino-Japanese War, the quality of recruits steadily declined. More than 90 percent of soldiers were illiterate, and few possessed any basic scientific knowledge, which hindered their ability to master their weapons. On the battlefield, they heavily relied on middle and junior officers for guidance.  In autumn 1933, General Hans von Seeckt, the architect of the post World War I German army, visited China at the personal invitation of Chiang Kai-shek. In his recommendations for military reform, he identified China's greatest problem as its excessively large forces drawn from diverse backgrounds. He stated, “At present, the most pressing goal is to... establish a small, well-equipped army with high morale and combat effectiveness to replace the numerous poorly armed and trained forces.” He suggested forming an army of sixty divisions and recommended the establishment of a training regiment for military officers to equip them with the skills needed for modern warfare. Chiang Kai-shek accepted von Seeckt's proposals, and on January 26, 1935, he convened a National Military Reorganization Conference in Nanjing. On March 1, the Army Reorganization Bureau was established in Wuchang, under the leadership of General Chen Cheng. In the same month, General Alexander von Falkenhausen took charge of the German Military Advisors Group. Before war broke out, around nineteen divisions, roughly 300,000 troops received training from German advisors and were equipped with German-style weapons. At the onset of the Sino-Japanese War, the forces stemming from the First Army of the National Revolutionary Army and the Whampoa cadets, who had fought in the Northern Expedition, held the highest reputation and were referred to as the “core central forces” by the Japanese. Other notable forces included the Guangxi Army, Northwestern Army, Northeastern Army, some Uyghur units, the Guangdong Army, and the Shanxi Army. In contrast, provincial forces such as the Yunnan Army and Sichuan Army were viewed less favorably. Nationalist forces were generally far inferior to those of the Japanese enemy. In 1937, General He Yingqin noted that Nationalist forces had failed to prevail in 1932 and 1933, even when outnumbering the Japanese by 4-1.  In November 1937, during a national defense conference, Chiang Kai-shek stated, "In recent years we have worked hard, prepared actively, and achieved national unification. By the time of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, we were in a better domestic situation and had improved military preparedness compared to before. Since 1935, our strength has doubled. It increased by more than two to three times since January 1932 or September 1931 [when Japan attacked Shanghai and Mukden]. If peace had been achievable, we should have delayed the war for two or three years. Given an additional three years, our defensive capabilities would have been drastically different... Now, if we merely compare the military strength of China and Japan, we are certainly inferior." However, such assessments were overly optimistic, as Chiang failed to recognize that Japan's military capabilities would not have stagnated. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek certainly was dealt a difficult hand of cards for the upcoming poker match he was to play. Yet the Chinese were resilient and they had to be for the absolute horror that would be inflicted upon them from 1937-1945. Until this point, their enemies had been far more lenient, the Empire of Japan would show no mercy.

  Last time we spoke about the February 26th incident. Within the turbulent “ government of assassination” period of 1936 Japan, a faction of discontented junior officers, known as the Kodoha, believed that their emperor, Hirohito, was being manipulated by corrupt politicians. In a desperate bid for what they termed a "Showa Restoration," they meticulously plotted a coup d'état. On February 26, they launched a rebellion in Tokyo, attempting to assassinate key figures they deemed responsible for undermining the emperor's authority. The young officers executed coordinated attacks on prominent leaders, resulting in several deaths, while hoping to seize control of the Imperial Palace. However, their plan unraveled when their actions met with unexpected resistance, and they failed to secure strategic locations. Dark snow blanketed the city as Hirohito, outraged by the violence, quickly moved to suppress the uprising, which ultimately led to the downfall of the Kodoha faction and solidified the military's grip on power, ushering in a new era marked by militarism and radicalism.   #151 The Suiyuan Operation Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. So we last left off with the February 26th incident breaking out in Japan, but now I would like to return to China. Now we spoke a little bit about some influential Japanese politicians in the previous episode. Prime Minister Satio Makoto oversaw Japan from May 1932 to July 1934, succeeded by Prime Minister Keisuke Okada from July 1934 to March 1936. The foreign policy of Japan towards China during the Saitō and Okada administrations exhibited a notable paradox, characterized by two conflicting elements. On one hand, Foreign Minister Hirota championed a diplomatic approach that emphasized friendship, cooperation, and accommodation with China. On the other hand, the military actively undermined the authority of the Nationalist government in northern China, creating a significant rift between diplomatic rhetoric and military action.    The Okada cabinet then endorsed the Army Ministry's "Outline of Policy to Deal with North China" on January 13, 1936. This policy document explicitly proposed the eventual detachment of five provinces, Hubei, Chahar, Shanxi, Suiyuan, and Shandong from the Nationalist government in Nanking. The approval of this outline marked a pivotal moment, as it represented the first official government endorsement of the military's longstanding agenda and underscored the army's evolution from a mere rogue entity operating in the region to the de facto authority dictating the course of Japan's policy towards China. Despite this, on January 22, during the 68th Diet session, Hirota reaffirmed his dedication to fostering better ties with China, to which a representative from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded positively. The Nationalist government in Nanjing also expressed interest in engaging in formal negotiations. However, this diplomatic initiative quickly faltered, and the expected discussions in Nanjing never took place. Shortly thereafter, a mutiny by young army officers on February 26, 1936, led to the fall of the Okada cabinet. Following Prince Konoe Fumimaro's refusal of the imperial mandate to form a new government, Hirota stepped in to establish a cabinet on March 9. General Terauchi Hisaichi was appointed as the Minister of the Army, Admiral Nagano Osami took charge of the Navy Ministry, and Baba Eiichi became the finance minister. Hirota briefly served as foreign minister until Arita Hachirö, who had just submitted his credentials as ambassador to China on March 6, returned to Japan. The Hirota Koki cabinet, established immediately following the February 26 incident further entrenched military influence in politics while allowing interservice rivalries to impede national objectives. In May 1936, Hirota, influenced by army and navy ministers, reinstated the practice of appointing military ministers solely from the ranks of high-ranking active-duty officers. He believed this would prevent associations with the discredited Imperial Way faction from regaining power. By narrowing the candidate pool and enhancing the army's power relative to the prime minister, Hirota's decision set the stage for army leaders to leverage this advantage to overthrow Admiral Yonai's cabinet in July 1940. Arita began his new job by meeting with Foreign Minister Chang Chen while hearing views from the Kwantung Army chief of staff General, Itagaki Seishiro. Yes, our old friend received a lot of promotions. Itagaki had this to say about the Kwantung Army's policy in China "The primary aim of Japan's foreign policy, is the sound development of Manchukuo based upon the principle of the indivisibility of Japan and Manchukuo. If, as is probable, the existing situation continues, Japan is destined sooner or later to clash with the Soviet Union, and the attitude of China at that time will gravely influence operations [against the Soviet Union]." The Kwantung Army's was growing more and more nervous about the USSR following its 7th comintern congress held in July and August of 1935. There it publicly designated Japan, Germany and Poland as its main targets of comintern actions. Japanese intelligence in the Red Army also knew the Soviets were gradually planning to expand the military strength so they could face a simultaneous west and east front war. This was further emboldened by the latest USSR 5 year plan. Alongside the growing Red northern menace, the CCP issued on August 1st a declaration calling upon the Nationalist Government to end their civil war so they could oppose Japan. By this time the CCP was reaching the end of its Long March and organizing a new base of operations in Yenan in northern Shanxi. The developments by the USSR and CCP had a profound effect on Japan's foreign policy in China. The Kwantung Army believed a war with the USSR was imminent and began to concentrate its main force along the border of Manchukuo. The Kwantung Army's plan in the case of war was to seize Vladivostok while advancing motorized units towards Ulan Bator in Outer Mongolia, hoping to threaten the Trans-Siberian Railway near Lake Baikal. Their intelligence indicated the USSR could muster a maximum of 250,000 troops in eastern Siberia and that Japan could deal with them with a force two-thirds of that number. The IJA at that point had inferior air forces and armaments, thus urgent funding was needed. The Kwantung Army proposed that forces in the home islands should be reduced greatly so all could be concentrated in Manchuria. To increase funding so Kwantung leadership proposed doing away with special allowances for Japanese officials in Manchuria and reorganizing the Japanese economic structure. The Kwantung leaders also knew the submarine base at Vladivostok posed a threat to Japanese shipping so the IJN would have to participate, especially against ports and airfields. All said and done, the Kwantung Army planned for a war set in 1941 and advised immediate preparations. On July 23, 1936, Kanji Ishiwara presented the army's document titled “Request Concerning the Development of Industries in Preparation for War” to the Army Ministry. He asserted that in order to prepare for potential conflict with the Soviet Union, Japan, Manchukuo, and North China must have the industries critical for war fully developed by 1941. Ishiwara emphasized the urgent need for rapid industrial growth, particularly in Manchukuo. He followed this request on July 29 with a draft of a “Policy on Preparations for War” regarding the Soviet Union, advocating for immediate reforms to Japan's political and economic systems to facilitate economic expansion and lay the groundwork for future fundamental changes. However, he cautioned that if significant turmoil erupted in economic sectors, Japan must be ready to execute a comprehensive overhaul without delay. At the same time, the Hirota cabinet initiated a review of its policy towards China. In the spring of 1936, a secret committee focused on the Current Situation was formed, consisting of officials from the Army, Navy, and Foreign ministries. Their discussions led to the adoption of the "Measures to Implement Policy toward China" by the Four Ministers Conference on August 11, along with the "Second Outline of Policy to Address North China," which the cabinet approved as part of the "Fundamentals of National Policy" on the same day. The first of these documents outlined the following actionable steps: “1. Conclusion of an anti-Communist military pact. a) To prepare for the conclusion of such a pact, a special secret committee of military experts from both countries should be organized. b) Their discussions should cover the scope and substance of the pact and ways and means of realizing the objectives of the pact.  2. Conclusion of a Sino-Japanese military alliance. A special secret committee, composed of an equal number of delegates from each nation, should be organized to prepare for the conclusion of an offensive and defensive alliance against attack by a third country.  3. Acceleration of solutions of pending questions between China and Japan. a) Engagement of a senior political adviser: The Nationalist government should engage a senior Japanese political adviser to assist in the conduct of the domestic and foreign affairs of the Nationalist government. b) Engagement of military advisers: The Nationalist government should engage military advisers, along with military instructors. c) Opening of airline services between China and Japan: Airline services between China and Japan should be opened immediately. To realize such a service, various means should be used to induce the Nanking authorities to establish an airline corporation in North China, to begin flights between Formosa and Fukien province, and to start test flights between Shanghai and Fukuoka. d) Conclusion of a reciprocal tariff treaty: A reciprocal tariff treaty should be concluded promptly between China and Japan, on the basis of the policy approved by the ministries concerned, with regard to the abolition of the special trade in eastern Hopei province and the lowering of the prohibitively high tariffs. For this purpose Japan should, if necessary, propose the creation of a special committee composed of Japanese and Chinese representatives.  4. Promotion of economic cooperation between China and Japan. Japan should promote cooperation with the common people of China to establish realistic and inseparable economic relations between China and Japan that will promote coexistence and co-prosperity and will be unaffected by changes in the Chinese political situation. “ The document also included suggestions for Japan's economic expansion into South China. This included tapping into the natural resources of the provinces of Fujian, Guangdong, and Guangxi, building a railway between Guangzhou and Swatow, and establishing air routes between Fuchoz and Taipei, which would connect to services in Japan and Thailand. It also called for survey teams to be dispatched to explore the resources of Sichuan, Gansu, Xinjiang, and Qinghai provinces, and for support to be provided to the independence movement in Inner Mongolia. However, these initiatives presented significant challenges. The preface to the "Second Outline of Policy to Deal with North China" cautioned, "In implementing this policy, we must carefully consider the Nanking government's prestige and avoid actions that could prompt it to adopt an anti-Japanese stance in response to the desires of the Chinese people."  On September 19th, six fundamental points for a settlement in North China were dictated to China to “establish a common defense against communism, promoting economic cooperation, lowering tariffs, initiating an airline service between the two nations, employing Japanese advisers, and controlling subversive Koreans." September 22 was set as the deadline for a response from China. While agreeing to some Japanese requests, the Chinese included several counter-demands that the Japanese found completely unacceptable. These demands required Japan to “(a) refrain from using armed intervention or arbitrary actions in its dealings with China, (b) recognize China as an equal and sovereign state, (c) avoid leveraging antigovernment groups or communist elements, and (d) remove any derogatory references to China from Japanese textbooks. The Chinese also insisted that any agreement regarding North China “must precede the annulment of the Tanggu and Shanghai cease-fire agreements, the disbanding of the East Hopei regime, a prohibition on unauthorized Japanese flights over North China, a ban on smuggling activities by Japanese, the restoration of China's right to control smuggling, and the disbandment of the illegal East Hopei government along with the armies of Wang Ying and Prince De in Suiyuan”. Now that mention of a Prince De in Suiyuan brings us to a whole new incident. This podcast series should almost be called “the history of Japanese related incidents in China”. Now we've spoken at great lengths about Japan's obsession with Manchuria. She wanted it for resources, growing space and as a buffer state. Japan also had her eyes set on Inner Mongolia to be used as a buffer state between Manchukuo, the USSR and China proper. Not to mention after the invasion of North China, Inner Mongolia could be instrumental as a wedge to be used to control Northern China. Thus the Kwantung Army began fostering a Mongolian independence movement back in August of 1933. They did so through a special organ led by chief of the general staff Koiso Kuniaki. He began work with the Silingol League led by Prince Sonormurabdan or “Prince So” and another influential Mongol, Prince Demchukdongrob or “Prince De”. Prince De was the West Sunid Banner in Northern Chahar. Likewise the Kwantung Army was grooming Li Xuxin, a Mongol commoner born in southern Manchuria. He had been a bandit turned soldier absorbed into Zhang Xueliangs army. Li had distinguished himself in a campaign against a group of Mongols trying to restore the Qing dynasty to further establish an independent Mongolia. During Operation Nekka Li had served in a cavalry brigade under Zu Xingwu, reputed to be the best unit in Zhang Xueliangs Northeastern border defense army. He led the army's advance unit into western Shandong. Afterwards Li suddenly became friends with Major Tanaka Hisashi, the head of the Special Service Agency at Dungliao where he defected to the Kwantung Army. He soon was leading a force too strong to be incorporated into the Manchukuo Army, thus it was disbanded, but his Kwantung Army buddies encouraged him to move to Tolun in Rehe province. At one point during the Nekka campaign, Li's army was threatened by a strong Chinese counterattack, but they had Manchukuo air support allowing them to capture Tolun. This victory launched what became the East Chahar Special Autonomous District with Li becoming a garrison commander and chief administrator.  Back in time, upon the founding of the Chinese Republic, the affairs of Inner Mongolia fell upon the Bureau of Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs. This was reorganized in 1930 into the Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs when the provinces of Chahar, Suiyuan and Ningxia were organized. Prince De had been a member of a nationalist group known as the Young Mongols, although his aim was self-determination for Inner Mongolia within China, not independence. The Nationalist government's support for Chinese settlement in Mongol territories and its disregard for Mongol perspectives quickly triggered a rise in Mongol nationalism and anti-Chinese feelings. This was exacerbated by the government's introduction of a law on October 12, 1931, requiring local Mongolian administrative units to consult with hsien officials on matters concerning their administration. The nationalist sentiment was further fueled by the presence of the neighboring Mongolian People's Republic in Outer Mongolia and the establishment of Xingan province in western Manchuria by Manchukuo authorities in March 1932. This new province included the tribes of eastern Inner Mongolia and granted them greater autonomy than other Manchukuo provinces while banning Chinese immigration into it. When Nanjing did not react to these developments, Prince De and his supporters took steps toward gaining autonomy. On July 15th, 1933, Mongol leaders from western Inner Mongolia gathered at Pailingmiao for two weeks to deliberate on a declaration for regional independence. Although many princes were initially hesitant to take this step, they reconvened on August 14 and sent a cable to Nanjing announcing their decision to create an autonomous Mongolian government. The cable was signed by Prince So and Prince De. Over the following two months, additional conferences at Pailingmiao were held to organize the new government, which would operate under Nanking's guidance but without involvement from provincial chairmen. On October 22, Prince Yun, head of the Ulanchap League and a close ally of Prince De, was elected to lead the new regime, with Prince De assuming the role of chief of its political affairs bureau. After receiving a cable from the Mongolian leaders in August, Nanjing quickly sent Minister of the Interior Huang Shao-hung and Xu Qingyang, head of the Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs, to halt the movement. However, the Mongols declined to travel to Kalgan or Kueisui to meet Huang. In November, as the leader of a special commission appointed by Nanjing, Huang reached an agreement with Yun De and other Mongolian leaders concerning a proposal that abandoned the Mongols' demand for an autonomous government. This agreement was later altered by Nanjing, and its essential points were excluded from a measure approved by the Central Political Council of the Kuomintang on January 17, 1934. The dispute reignited, fueled by the Nationalist government's rising concerns over the anticipated enthronement of Pu Yi in Manchukuo. On February 28, the Central Political Council enacted a measure that outlined "eight principles of Inner Mongolian autonomy" and created the Mongolian Local Autonomous Political Council. Since these principles did not grant authority over foreign and military affairs, powers explicitly reserved for the central government in the January measure, they were seen as a concession to the Mongols and were accepted. On March 7, the central government issued regulations to establish a semi autonomous regime for Inner Mongolia, which was officially launched at Pailingmiao on April 23. Although the council was led by three moderate princes, Prince Yun, supported by Princes So and Sha, the real administrative authority was held by Prince De, who served as the secretary-general. Most of the twenty-five council members were of Mongolian royalty, through whom Prince De aimed to fulfill his objectives. Nevertheless, the Nationalist government seemed to consider the council merely a token gesture to placate De, as Nanking never provided the promised administrative funds outlined in the "eight principle declaration." Was not much of a shock Prince De sought support from the Kwantung Army, which had established contact with him as early as June 1934. Japanese pressures in North China were starting to alter the power dynamics, and after the first Western incident in Jehol in February 1935, it compelled the relocation of Sung Queyuan's army from Chahar to Hopei, providing encouragement to Prince De. In May, he met with Kwantung Army Vice Chief of Staff Itagaki Seishirö, Intelligence Section Chief Kawabe Torashirö, and staff officer Tanaka Ryükichi, where he was officially informed for the first time about the Kwantung Army's intention to assist him. On July 25, the Kwantung Army drafted its "Essentials of Policy toward Inner Mongolia," which regarded Japanese support for cooperation between De and Li Xuxin as part of their strategic preparations for a potential conflict with the Soviet Union. Shortly after this policy was adopted, a conflict arose over who had the authority to appoint the head of the Mongol Xukung banner, situated north of the Yellow River and Paot'ou. Following the death of the previous administrator, Prince Xu declared that he had taken control of the position. In response to a request from the local abbot, Prince Yun, acting in his capacity as chairman of the Mongolian Political Council, dismissed Xu. Xu then turned to Nanking through Suiyuan Provincial Chairman Fu Zuoyi, arguing that the central government held the authority to appoint heads of administrative units. In retaliation, Prince De dispatched troops to Xukung. On November 10, Fu presented a mediation proposal, which was rejected since it not only failed to acknowledge Shih's dismissal but also demanded the withdrawal of De's forces. De refused to pull back, further intensifying his hostility toward the Nanking government. In December, the Kwantung Army attempted to move Li's forces from eastern Chahar into the six Xun to the north of Kalgan, which serves as Chahar's granary. Following the Qin-Doihara agreement, Matsui Gennosuke from the Kalgan Special Service Agency secured a deal to separate these six districts from the southern region predominantly populated by Chinese; a Mongolian peace preservation corps was tasked with maintaining order in the northern area, while a Chinese corps was responsible for the south. During the discussions for an autonomous regime centered around Song Queyuan in North China in November 1935, Kwantung Army troops were concentrated around Gubeikou. To exert pressure on Song's rear, the Kwantung Army proposed replacing the Chinese peace preservation unit in the area north of Kalgan with Li Xuxin's army, which would establish this territory as its base.   The operation commenced on December 8. In a surprise attack just before dawn, Li captured Paochang. By December 12, despite facing strong Chinese resistance and the heaviest snowfall in sixty years, Li, aided by Kwantung Army planes disguised as those of the Manchukuo Airline Corporation, had taken control of Kuyuan. Further advances were halted by an order from Kwantung Army headquarters, and on December 13, it was reported that, had the operation not been stopped, Tokyo would have issued an imperial command. The operation had faced opposition from the Tientsin army, which feared it would weaken Song Queyuan's position just as they were informing Tokyo that the autonomy movement was going smoothly. Additionally, both Britain and the United States publicly expressed strong opposition to the Kwantung Army's involvement in the autonomy movement. However, the directive was ultimately prompted by the emperor's anger upon discovering that a unit of the Kwantung Army led by Colonel Matsui Takurö had advanced to Tolun to support Li's progress. Although Li's advance was halted, the operation undeniably contributed to the formation of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council.   Although the operation was halted, the Kwantung Army remained committed to its objectives. They contended that Li's army's advance into the six districts north of Kalgan was merely a peace preservation unit moving into territory within the truce line established by the Tanggu Agreement. Consequently, on December 29, they ordered Li to advance southward. Li peacefully occupied Changpei the following day and entered Shangtu on December 31. Manchukuo civil officials were appointed to oversee the six districts, and the currency of Manchukuo was introduced, although the existing tax system initially remained unchanged. The Kwantung Army allocated silver worth 6 million yuan to support administrative expenses. This outcome, known as the Eastern Chahar incident, marked a complete success for the Kwantung Army, which then redirected its focus toward Suiyuan Province. Each year, the Kwantung Army developed a secret plan for covert operations for the following year. The 1936 plan included strategies to secure air bases for routes connecting Europe and Asia, targeting Tsinghai and Sinkiang provinces, Outer Mongolia, Western Mongolia, and even remote areas of Ningxia province. In January 1936, staff officer Tanaka Ryūkichi formulated a document titled "Essentials of Policy Toward (Northwestern) Inner Mongolia." This document advocated for the establishment of a Mongolian military government to facilitate Japanese operations in northwestern Mongolia and suggested pushing Fu Tso-yi out of Suiyuan into Shansi province. Tanaka's proposals were incorporated into the final plan of the Kwantung Army, ultimately leading to the Suiyuan incident of November 1936. In February 1936, a meeting at Pailingmiao, where Prince De proposed the independence of Inner Mongolia, resulted in the departure of Prince So and several other Mongolian leaders from the coalition. They sought to establish a rival political council at Kueisui under the protection of Fu Zuoyi. By April, De and his supporters decided to form a military government at Tehua in Chahar, which was officially inaugurated in June as the Inner Mongolian government, headed by De with Li Shou-hsin as his deputy. This new government quickly signed a mutual assistance treaty with Manchukuo, and the emperor granted De the title of prince.   In July, at a conference in Tehua, Tanaka was appointed as the head of the Special Service Agency for Inner Mongolia with the mission of implementing the army's Intelligence Section plans. He traveled to Pingtiqüan alongside Chief of Staff Itagaki and Intelligence Chief Mutō Akira to propose a local anti-Communist agreement to Fu. After failing to convince Fu, he attempted to persuade Sun Tien-ying to form a puppet army but managed to recruit only a bandit from Suiyuan, Wang Ying. The February 26 mutiny in Tokyo heightened anti-Japanese sentiments in China, resulting in increased violence. By August, the construction of an airplane hangar in Paot'ou was halted due to riots by local Chinese residents. On August 13, a group of fifteen Japanese, led by Nakajima Manzo, was ambushed while delivering ammunition to a pro-Japanese leader who was shortly thereafter assassinated. Chinese soldiers from Wang Qingkuo's 70th Division carried out the attack, and tensions escalated as the arrival of ammunition and Japanese laborers in Kalgan prompted border villages to strengthen their defenses.   By late September, Tanaka's "Guidelines for the Execution of the Suiyuan Operation" received approval, with operations set to commence in early November. The plan evolved from a covert mission into a personal initiative by Tanaka, financed largely through funds from the Kwantung Army's secret services and profits from special trading in eastern Hopei. Tanaka claimed to have transported 600,000 yen to Tehua in October and later sent 200,000 yuan into Inner Mongolia, estimating total expenses at approximately 6 million yen. He acquired new weaponry from the disbanded Northeast Army and established three clandestine forces: Wang Ying led 500 men, including artillery; Qin Xiashan commanded 3,000 from Sun Tienying's army; and Chang Futang also led 3,000 specialized units. During strategic meetings, Tanaka dismissed proposals for unified command and refusing to integrate secret units into the Mongolian army. He advocated for the slogan "Overthrow Chiang Kai-shek," while Matsui managed to include "Independence for Inner Mongolia."   The Japanese had developed the entire battle strategy. The 1st Army, commanded by Li Xuxin, would serve as the left flank, while the 2nd Army, led by Demchugdongrub, would be positioned on the right. Wang Ying's forces were designated as the central force. Their initial targets would be Hongort, Xinghe, Tuchengzi, and Guisui city, followed by a division to seize Jinging, Baotou, and Hetao. On November 13, Prince Demchugdongrub's and Wang Ying's forces left Shandu in two columns to assault Xinghe and Hongort. By the 15th, 1,500 troops reached Hongort, where they engaged the 1st Cavalry Division led by Peng Yubin. The next day, Ryukichi Tanaka, Demchugdongrub's chief advisor, sent two cavalry brigades and one infantry brigade to capture the town, effectively overrunning its defenders. Meanwhile, Wang Ying dispatched a smaller group to secure Tuchengzi.   Fu Zuoyi established his headquarters in Jining that same day. After assessing the situation, he concluded that if the enemy secured Hongort, it would diminish his defenders' morale. Consequently, he launched a counterattack. Peng Yubin led a joint force of the 1st Cavalry Division and Dong Qiwu's 218th Brigade to confront around 400 of Wang Ying's men defending Hongort and Tuchengzi. By 7 AM on the 18th, Tuchengzi was reclaimed, and at 8:30 AM, the 1st Cavalry Division entered Hongort, charging through 500 of Wang Ying's soldiers. The struggle for Hongort persisted for over three days, resulting in nearly 1,000 casualties before Fu Zuoyi regained control.   As the tide shifted against the invaders, Fu Zuoyi initiated an offensive toward the Bailing Temple, the rear base of the enemy, well-stocked and defended by 3,000 men under Prince Demchugdongrub. Fu Zuoyi ordered the 2nd Cavalry Division, along with the 211th and 315th Brigades, the 21st Artillery Regiment, and a convoy of 20 trucks and 24 armored vehicles to assault the Bailing Temple as quickly as possible. Taking advantage of the Mongolian chaos, Fu Zuoyi's 35th Brigade executed a flanking maneuver west of the Bailing Temple amid a severe snowstorm.   At 1 AM on the 24th, the battle for the Bailing Temple commenced as the Chinese engaged the Mongolians for the fortified positions around the temple. From 2 to 4 AM, the Chinese advanced closer to the temple walls, facing artillery and machine-gun fire. They launched desperate frontal assaults against the city gates, suffering heavy losses. A fierce stalemate ensued, with Japanese aerial bombardments causing significant casualties to the Chinese forces. Fu Zuoyi subsequently ordered all armored vehicles to converge at the main city gate. Despite intense fire, the armored cars managed to breach the gate, allowing Chinese infantry to flood into the temple area. The resulting carnage within the temple walls led to 900 Mongol deaths, with 300 captured as the rest fled. The Chinese suffered 300 casualties but secured the strategically vital rear base, along with a substantial stockpile of provisions, including 500 barrels of petrol, 600 rifles, 10 machine guns, vehicles, and field guns. Following the devastating defeat at Bailing Temple, the invaders regrouped at Xilamuleng Temple. On the 28th, the Japanese sent 100 vehicles to transport 3,000 troops to prepare for a significant counteroffensive to recapture Bailing Temple. On the 29th, Wang Ying personally led 2,000 cavalry north of Shangdu to Taolin in an attempt to contain the enemy. However, after he left the bulk of his forces at Xilamuleng Temple, officers from the Grand Han Righteous Army secretly began negotiating to defect to the Chinese side, undermining the forces needed for the counterattack against Bailing Temple.   The counteroffensive commenced on December 2nd, with 10 armored vehicles and 1,000 Mongol troops leading the charge at 6 AM. They were pushed back by the heavily fortified 211th Brigade, which was well-supplied with machine guns and artillery. The following day, at 3 AM, the Mongols attempted a surprise attack but faced an ambush as they crept toward the temple. They incurred hundreds of casualties, with 230 men either captured or having defected. After this, the counterattack stalled, as the Mongol forces couldn't approach within 3 miles of the temple. Subsequently, the Chinese 2nd Cavalry Division launched a pincer maneuver, causing significant casualties among the invaders. By 9 AM, the enemy had suffered 500 casualties and was in retreat. At 7 PM, Fu Zuoyi ordered another counteroffensive. By the next morning, hundreds more had been lost, and several hundred soldiers were captured. With such heavy losses, the defense of Xilamuleng Temple weakened significantly, prompting more officers to defect to the Chinese. Late on the 4th, Fu Zuoyi assembled a force comprising two cavalry regiments, one infantry regiment, one artillery battalion, four armored vehicles, and a squadron of cars to launch a nighttime assault on Xilamuleng Temple.   Meanwhile, the 2nd Cavalry Division clashed with Wang Ying's cavalry 30 miles northeast of Wulanhua. Wang Ying's 2,000 cavalry had been raiding nearby villages to create diversions, drawing enemy forces away from the Bailing-Xilamuleng theater. By the 9th, Wang Ying's cavalry were encircled in Xiaobei, where they were nearly annihilated, with Wang escaping with around a hundred guards toward Changpei. On the 7th, some Grand Han Righteous Army officers set in motion plans to defect to the Chinese side. Early on the 9th, these officers led their men to invade the residence of Japanese advisors, killing all 27 Japanese officers under Colonel Obama. Simultaneously, Fu Zuoyi's forces executed a flanking maneuver against the Xilamuleng Temple amidst the chaos. With mass defections, the Chinese forces surged into the temple area, resulting in the invader army disintegrating in confusion and surrender. After seizing the temple, the invaders were routed, their lines of communication severed, and only isolated pockets continued to resist. Taking advantage of the confusion, Fu Zuoyi launched simultaneous attacks, attempting to capture Shangdu. However, Yan Xishan sent him a telegram, ordering him to halt, stating that Shangdu fell under the jurisdiction of Shanxi and not Suiyuan.   In response to the loss, Tanaka planned a counteroffensive with Qin's troops, but Chiang kai-shek commanded a strong defense of Pailingmiao, successfully outmaneuvering Tanaka's strategies. The resurgence of Chinese forces led to the disintegration of Qin's troops, who revolted and eventually joined the Nationalist army. The Kwantung Army aimed to redeploy its forces for recovery but faced opposition from Tokyo, which criticized the situation. After Chiang kai-shek was kidnapped by Zhang Xueliang on December 12, Tanaka and Prince De seized the opportunity to reassess their strategy. Ultimately, the Kwantung Army decided to abandon efforts to reclaim Pailingmiao, marking the official end of hostilities on December 21. The Suiyuan incident ultimately strengthened Chinese resolve against Japan and increased international distrust.   The defeat of Japan's proxy forces inspired many Chinese to advocate for a more vigorous resistance against the Japanese. The triumph in Suiyuan was celebrated throughout China and surprised the international media, marking the first occasion where the Chinese army successfully halted a Japanese unit. Delegations traveled from as distant as southern Chinese provinces to encourage the defenders to continue their fight. Captured Japanese weapons and equipment served as proof of Japan's involvement in the conflict, despite Japan's Foreign Minister Hachirō Arita claiming that "Japan was not involved in this conflict in Suiyuan at all." After his defeat, Prince Demchugdongrub and his Inner Mongolian troops retreated to northern Chahar, where he had to reconstruct his army due to significant losses. The Japanese implemented new regulations for the Mongolian Army to enhance its effectiveness, and efforts to recruit new soldiers commenced.   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. More incidents and more battles to seize territory raged in North China. However things did not go according to plan for the Japanese and their puppets. The tides had turned, and now a more angry and invigorating China would begin lashing out against the encroachment. It was only a matter of time before a full blown war was declared. 

Last time we spoke about the Battle for the Great Wall of China. In 1933, the Kwantung Army faced logistical struggles and sought political deals with Chinese warlords to seize North China. Despite capturing key areas, chaos reigned as their unauthorized operations defied Tokyo's orders. When Emperor Hirohito demanded a withdrawal, the army reluctantly complied, derailing a coup attempt. Though peace talks followed, distrust persisted, and rogue Japanese commanders plotted fresh offensives. The Tanggu truce was anything but fair to China. The Japanese followed it up with continuous negotiations aimed at slicing more and more out of China. By 1935 North China was practically annexed if but all in official terms. The Japanese seized postal rights, train rights, airline rights, set up puppets to police a new demilitarized zone and seemed never appeased fully. Yet they did not only have their eye on Northern China.    #149 Incidents in North China: Operation Chahar Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. May 1935, marked the peak of Sino-Japanese efforts at reconciliation. Yet this quickly fell apart in June as the Kwantung Army continued to encroach in North China. More specifically they began to look at Chahar province. Between January and May of 1935 some 50 instances of anti-Japanese violence had broken out in North China and behind these outbursts seemed to be Yu Xuecheng, the chairman of Hubei's provincial Government. He was not alone in his efforts as many KMT members, generals in the Central Army and Blue Shirt Society also had helping hands to play. The Japanese were particularly infuriated by incessant attacks from the bandit army led by Sun Yungqin and the assassinations of two pro-Japanese figures operating in Tientsin, Pai Yuhuan and Hu Enpu. Even with th support of the Kwantung Army, maintaining law and order in the demilitarized region established by the Tanggu Trace proved a serious undertaking. The Nanjing government tried exploit the situation, encouraging Sun Yungqin's bandits to create chaos in the demilitarized region. Sun Yungqin's bandit frequently crossed the Great Wall into Rehe in raids. Each time the Kwantung Army attempted to catch them as they fled into the demilitarized region. They particularly liked to do so in the Zunhua district where the official He Xiaoyi supplied the bandits with munitions and provisions. On May 17th, the Kwantung Army was fed up and elected to cross the Great Wall to crush Sun Yungqin once and for all. The Japanese army attache at Peiping, Major Takahasi Tan, notified the Chinese authorities of this decision, claiming the Kwantung Army had the authority to do so under certain provisions within the Tanggu agreement. Beginning on May 20th, the Sugihara Mixed Brigade began its hunt and claimed to have uncovered evidence that Yu Xuecheng had helped guide Sun Yingqin's bandits away from their force. The Japanese also argued the bandits were operating in Manchuria and were calling themselves the “Northeastern Patriotic Volunteers” led by General He Yingqing, the current chairman of the Peiping Branch Military Council.  The bandits were said to have been completely crushed within 5 days by a single brigade. The Japanese also forced the resignation of Yu Xuecheng who refused to organize an anti-chiang kai-shek movement. Shortly before the operation launched, two pro-Japanese newspaper publishers, secretly supported by the Japanese Special Service Agency were assassinated in Tientsin. On May 2nd, Hu Enpu of the Kuochuan pao “national rights” was shot in bed at the Peiyang Hotel in the Japanese concession. That same night, Pai Yuhuan of Chen Pa was murdered in his home. Consul General Kawagoe reported to Tokyo, Hu Enpu and Pai Yuhuan were performing a mission through their newspapers to arouse anti-chiang Kai-shek sentiment in North China. As stated by Kawagoe "Hu and Pai did not have a particularly close personal relationship, but they were regarded with extreme suspicion by the Chinese. Since they were assassinated on the same night, we immediately suspected there was some political intrigue behind these crimes."   Japanese police looked into the matter and discovered the criminals had used a car bearing the plate number 1063 which was owned by Shen Qucheng who was a resident of the Japanese concession. Many suspects were interrogated, and given what they were saying, the Japanese suspected the man behind the assassinations was General Yang Hu, the peace preservation commissioners of Shanghai and an alleged member of the Blue Shirt Society. The Japanese also believed Yang Hu was hiding in the French concessions in Shanghai. In protest of this, the Japanese invoked the Boxer Protocol and Tanggu Truce: “1) The Sun incident and the assassinations of the pro-Japan, proManchukuo newspaperpublishers violated the North China [T'angku] Cease-fire Agreement of May 1933. The North China Cease-fire Agreement stipulated that China would not take any action disturbing the peac e on either side of a line from Lut'ai to Paoti and T'ungchou. The above provision extends to all of China and should of course be applied to any defiant deeds of Chines e officials that threaten the peac e in the Peiping-Tientsin region. The Sun incident and the assassinations of Pai and Hu are clearly contrary to the above agreement.  2) The official note exchanged by China and Japan upon the return of Tientsin in 1902 is applicabl e to the murder of Pai Yühuan. This note stated: "In the event a Chines e national who is employed by a foreign army is accused of disobeying the law, the commander of the army that employs the said Chines e national, in order that the matter may be decided in the most suitable manner has the option of punishing him personally or voluntarily delivering him to the appropriate Chinese authorities. Your government must agree to this arrangement.” Since Pai, as already stated, was in the employ of the Japanese army, his murder is clearly a deed which violates the above note."  Thus the Japanese invoked the right that the commander of the Tientsin garrison had the authority to maintain security and try any criminals. Because the Japanese Army claimed it had authority to conduct investigations, trials and deal punishment within two miles of the Peiping-Shanhaigaun rail line it insisted to do so given the recent events. This actually distorted some of the specifics of the Tanggu Treaty, thus the Japanese were on loose grounds. On May 25th, Tokyo HQ was forewarned of the actions the Kwantung Army would undertake in North China. So Tokyo sent Colonel Sakai Takashi the Tientsin army chief of staff and attache Takahasi Tan called upon Yu Qiaqi, the secretary general of the Political affairs council and General He Yingqin. In fact Sakai backed this up with a threatening public statement: “The execution of anti-Manchukuo plots under the direction of the Chinese authorities, assistance to the "Chinese Patriotic Volunteer Forces," and various acts of terrorism directed against Japan are destructive of the cease-fire agreement. The headquarters for these crimes are in Tientsin and Peiping. Should this state of affairs continue, it will become necessary to incorporate the above two cities in the demilitarized zone. The murders of Hu and Pai are violations of the provisions of the Boxer Settlement and a challenge to Japan. If similar acts hereafter occur, Japan will, on the basis of its treaty rights, be forced to consider what action is necessary for the defense of its rights”. Additionally, Sakai demanded the withdrawal of all KMT aligned units, Blue Shirt Society members, the Political Training Corps of the Peiping Branch Military Council and the 3rd Regiment Military Police from North China. He also wanted Yu Xuecheng dismissed as chairman of Hubei. The next day in a move to intimidate Yu Xuecheng, the Tientsin Army deployed armored vehicles, artillery and machine guns directly in front of his official residence. It seemed now the Japanese sought to incorporate all of Hubei into the new demilitarized region. To make this happen, Sakai had independently put forward these demands, but they were recognized as an ultimatum from Japan, one for which for now had no deadline.  Chiang Kai-Shek, Wang Jingwei, Huang Fu and He Yingqin conferred over the situation and chose to informally talk with the Japanese while they kept the press quiet on the matter. The Chinese took their time, so to pressure them further, the Kwantung Army deployed a infantry battalion and one cavalry brigade at Shanhaiguan, while the Kawaguchi detachment concentrated around Gubeikou and two air force squadrons were brought over to Jinzhou. The Tientsin Army readied two battalions at Tientsin and Tangshan, both prepared to advance to Peiping at a moments notice. After sending numerous orders not to escalate things, Tokyo HQ sent Colonel Kita Seiichi, the chief of its China desk to demand the Kwantung Army not use anymore force. Meanwhile the Imperial Japanese Navy, under the fear of Anglo-American intervention avoided escalating the situation, but kept the 3rd fleet on full alert.  Under immense pressure the Chinese buckled. At 6pm on June 10th, He Yingqin orally advised Major Takahashi that Nanjing would issue a directive ordered the immediate withdrawal of local KMT organs from Hubei; that the 51st NRA Army would depart by rail from Hubei between June 11th and 25th; that the end and 25th NRA divisions of the Central Army would also depart Hubei and that the KMT would issue a directive prohibiting anti-japanese activities throughout China. It was an incredibly embarrassing act and became known as the He-Umezu agreement. Under its provisions the Japanese had expelled the Central Army from North China, Yu Xuecheng's forces, all anti-Japanese organizations of any sort and all anti-Japanese officials were removed. The Japanese had heavily capitalized on the assassinations in Tientsin, however other incidents enabled our good friend Doihara to cause further mayhem.  Following the Tanggu truce, Song Queyuan's 29th Army, consisting of the 37th, 38th and 132nd divisions had been deployed throughout Chahar with his headquarters based at Kalgan. His troops understandably displayed a lot of anti-japanese attitude and behaviors. Like a broken record, it was only a matter of time until an incident organically presented itself. One of the first ones broke out in Changpei. According to the Japanese, so get your grains of salt ready, a group of 8 led by staff officer Kawaguchi Kiyotake of the Tientsin garrison and Ikeda Katsumi of the consulate at Kalga and planned an excursion to Inner Mongolia late October 1934. After completing all the necessary paperwork and procedures, such as securing visas and giving advance notice to the Chinese officials in the areas they would voyage, the Japanese departed Kalgan for Tolun on October 27th. Upon entering Changpei's south gate they were suddenly stopped by troops under Song Queyuans 132nd division alongside some Peace Preservation Corps men. Their commanding officer punched Ikeda as the rest of the party were threatened with Dao swords and rifles. After 40 minutes a Chinese security officer showed up to allow them all to pass through the South Gate.  The Japanese foreign Ministry and Army were obviously outraged by this incident. The vice Consul at Kalgan, Hashimoto Masayasu complained to the chief of staff of the 132nd division and Major Takahasi at Peiping lodged an official complaint with Song Queyuan. On November 25th, Song Queyuan ordered the general commanding the 132nd division, Chao Tengyu, to apologize and dismissed the officer who punched Ikeda. Song Queyuan then guaranteed safe travel for all Japanese throughout Chahar, without any inspection of their possession and he promised to withdraw his troops west of the Great Wall. All of this because a guy was punched, you can really get the sense the Chinese were walking on eggshells. In late 1934, a large contingent of Song Queyuan's cavalry had deployed to the area around Fengning in Rehe. They were defending strategic positions and establishing large peace preservation corps. The Kwantung Army repeatedly demanded they withdraw from the area and the Chinese had made promises as to such by December 31st. Rather than comply, the Chinese launched an offensive and captured 40 Manchukuo militiamen. Song Queyuan rewarded his men with a bounty of 300 silver yuan and ordered the arms of the enemy by handed to the district government of Kuyuan.  On January 17th, the Kwantung Army moved the Nagami detachment of the IJA 8th Division from Chengde to launch a punitive expedition against Song Queyuan's forces in the Kuyuan area. On the 20th the Peiping Branch Military Council informed the Kwantung Army Song Queyuan was already withdrawing his men. Thus the Nagami detachment who had advanced as far as Tat'an turned around for the Great Wall on the 22nd, when they were suddenly attacked by Song Queyuan's troops near Hungnit'an. The Kwantung Army were outraged by what they were calling the first incident in western Rehe. The so-called incident would be resolved on February 2nd nar Ta'an when Zhang Yueting acting on behalf of the NRA 37th division and Major General Tani Hisao on behalf of the IJA 7th division agreed to the following terms: “1) In the future China will strictly prohibit actions that antagonize the Japanese army and will neither move troops into Manchukuo nor adopt a threatening attitude toward Manchukuo. The Chinese will completely suspend their current spying activities, such as scouting the movements of the Kwantung Army.  2) If China violates the above pledges in the future, the Japanese  army will act independently and firmly, but the responsibility will be borne by the Chinese . If the Chinese forces increase their military strength or contemplate strengthening their fortifications, the Japanese army will regard these moves as hostile acts.  3) China is to have the government of Kuyuan district return all arms confiscated (from the Manchukuo militia and turn them over to the Japanese army at Nanweitzu by February 7.  4) The outcome of this conference will be jointly announced on February 4. In particular, the Chinese should be careful that in making their announcement they do not distort the contents of the agreement or engage in counterpropaganda”. Can you imagine there was a second incident at Changpei? 4 members of the Japanese Special Services Agency based out of Abga, some 40 miles northwest of Tolun had come to the same southgate around 4pm on June 5th, traveling to Kalgan. There they were detained by units of the 132nd division who refused to recognize their identification papers. They were apparently held without proper bedding or food, threatened with Dao swords and bayonets. The Japanese claimed it was all done under orders from Song Queyuan's chief of staff and that their officials were interrogated by the chief of military police at Changpei. On June 11th, Lt Colonel Matsui Gennosuke, the head of the Japanese Special Service Agency at Kalgan, demanded an apology from Song Queyuan and for the men responsible to be punished and for further guarantees for safe travel. Matsui also insinuated that unless Song Queyuan severed ties to Nanjing and became Pro-Japanese he might suffer the same fate that had befallen Yu Xuecheng. Clearly the Kwantung Army was looking to remove Song Queyuan's army from Chahar province. There were two major reasons for such a thing, so they could better protect the northwestern flank of Manchukuo and to support Prince De who was attempting a campaign to make Inner Mongolia independent from China.  On June 11th the Kwantung Army directed the Mukden Special Service Agency chief of staff, our old buddy, Doihara, currently in Peiping, to confer with the army attache there and with the Tientsin garrison. They were to push for Song Queyuan's army to be withdrawn south of the Yellow River as rapidly as possible. Tokyo HQ always keeping a close eye on their troublesome Kwantung Officers dispatch this notice to Doihara "Although we desire the evacuation of Song Queyuan's army from Chahar province, we disagree that we should, at this time, demand its withdrawal south of the Yellow River. Rather, its transfer to the Peiping-Hankow Railway line would be advisable." On June 13th, the General Staff advised the Kwantung Army the same message. The General staff then ordered every detachment in North China to act discreetly "If we shun excessive publicity at this time, we should, in view of the present situation, be able to achieve practical results without publicity." Since they were already getting their way in Hubei, Tokyo HQ did not want to risk rocking the boat in Chahar concurrently.  Then came a second western Rehe incident, according to the Chengde Special Service Agency, "On June 11, when a party led by a senior official of Fengning hsien was about to enter the town of Tungchatzu [in Manchukuo, about eight kilometers north of Tushihk'ou], it was attacked by rifle fire from Sung Che-yuan's troops stationed at Tushihk'ou. The next day, June 12, a member of the border police force in Hsiaoch'ang [in Manchukuo, about fifteen kilometers north of Tushihk'ou] was also fired upon by the same troops of Sung in the vicinity of Hsiaoch'ang."  On June 17th, the Kwantung Army General Minami Jiro met with the Tientsin Army chief of staff Sakai and the Special Service Agency chief at Kalgan, Matsui for a full report on the incident. After reviewing it, Minami drafted a policy to guide the Kwantung Army:  “The withdrawal of Sung Che-yuan's army will worsen the confusion in the Peiping-Tientsin region. This incident should be handled separately from the North China problem and should be negotiated locally with Sung Che-yuan. Our demands will be limited to the following:  1) withdrawal of the troops invading Manchukuo, together with their advance unit at Tolun;  2) removal of the forces back to the Kalgan area;  3) an apology by Sung Che-yuan;  4) punishment of those directly responsible for the Changpei incident; and  5) prohibition of anti-Japanese actions in the future.” The Chinese realized they needed to reach a quick settlement with the Kwantung Army. On the 18th He Yingqin met with Consul General Suma over in Nanjing. Suma was presented with a set of harsh demands from the Kwantung Army and that same day reported to the Executive Yuan he had decided to relieve Song Queyuan of his posts as governor and commander of the 29th Army. He then appointed as acting governor and provincial commissioner of civil affairs, Qin Dechun, who would take the 132nd division implicated in the Changpei incident south. The message was relayed to the Japanese military attache in Nanjing, Lt Colonel Amamiya Tatsumi. The man who relayed the message was Vice Foreign Minister Tang Yujen who also stated this "In view of the fact that China has moved voluntarily to dismiss Sung Che-yuan, to transfer his army, and to punish those responsible, we request that we not be confronted with an ultimatum in the form of various demands from the Kwantung Army with a deadline for reply." On June 19th, Nanjing officially implemented the promises made by He Yingqin and Tang Yujen and in turn the Kwantung Army wired Doihara in Peiping to stand down and wait to see if the Chinese did what they said they would. Doihara was probably disappointed he could not perform his 100th false flag operation he must have been cooking up. For any of you who watch my Youtube content, I used clips from the Chinese WW2 Drama series “Young Marshal” that depicts Doihara hilariously. You can check it out in my long format documentary on the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, its meme gold Doihara's clips, freaking out and smashing phones and such.  At 10 pm on June 23rd, Doihara, alongside Matsui and Takahasi visited Qin Dechen at his residence to negotiate a final understanding. There Doihara demanded China implement several measures to promote better relations with Japan such as withdrawing Song Queyuan's army southwest; give an apology for the Changpei incident; punish all those responsible; dissolve all the anti-japanese organizations in the region; ban Chinese immigration into Inner Mongolia; cease any oppressive actions against Mongolians and cooperate and encourage trade between Manchukuo, Inner Mongolia, North China; and appoint more Japanese military and political advisers. Just a laundry list he had worked up. So Qin Dechen apologized for the Changpei incident, stated they were already withdrawing Song Queyuan's men and dissolving all the anti-japanese organizations. Now he was orally agreeing to all of this, but he refused to put it in writing, prior to receiving the greenlight from Nanjing. Doihara understood and gave him time to talk to his government. The next day however another incident occurred, this time near Tuxukou. There a contingent of Song Queyuan's withdrawing troops fired upon Manchukuo police forces and in response the Tolun Special Service Agency dispatched a Mongolian unit led by Li Shuxin. It was not really much of an incident, just a minor confrontation all things given, so the Kwantung Army told Doihara to deal with Qin Dechen in private about it.On June 27th, Qin Dechen sent a formal reply to Doihara's demands in what became known as the Qin-Doihara agreement. It conformed with all the demands, seeing Song Queyuan's troops depart southwest while the security of Chahar was entrusted to two peace preservation units. One unit was responsible for the Chinese population, the other over the Mongolian. On August 28th, Song Queyuan was appointed garrison commander over the Peiping-Tientsin region with his 29th division joining Chao Tengyu's 132nd division and Liu Juming's 2nd division. Thus after the He-Umezu and Qin-Doihara agreements the Japanese had now expanded their influence into both Hubei and Chahar. 1935 saw a wave of incidents break out in the demilitarized region, prompting the Japanese to go into numerous negotiations with the Chinese to clamp down on anything they didn't like. Then on October 4th, Japan unleashed a document titled  “Concerning Policy towards China”: “The goal of our foreign policy is the development of East Asia and the maintenance of the security of East Asia through the cooperative concert of Japan, Manchukuo, and China, with Japan as the nucleus; this is likewise the objective of our policy toward China. To realize this objective on the basis of the outline below, the central and regional authorities of China must, by fair and just means, adjust their relations with Japan and Manchukuo so as to bring about an environment favorable to the establishment of basic relations between Japan, Manchukuo, and China.  1) China should adopt a good neighbor policy toward Japan, thoroughly suppress anti-Japanese activities, and abandon its policy of reliance on Europe and the United States. It should put this policy into practice and as a matter of course cooperate with Imperial Japan on practical problems.  2) Although China must eventually extend formal recognition to Manchukuo, until then it must recognize de facto the independence of Manchukuo and abandon its anti-Manchukuo policy. At least in North China, which borders on Manchukuo, the Chinese should promote economic and cultural cooperation with Manchukuo.  3) In view of the Communist threat emanating from Outer Mongolia and posing a common menace to Japan, Manchukuo, and China, China should cooperate in measures aimed at eliminating this menace from the region bordering Outer Mongolia.  4) When the above points have been put into effect and we recognize the good faith of China concerning friendly cooperation with Japan and Manchukuo, we shall first conclude comprehensive agreements on friendly cooperative relations between China and Japan, and thereafter draw up the agreement needed for regulating new relations between Japan, Manchukuo, and China” To this Chiang Kai-Shek replied could not recognize Manchukuo but that his government would do whatever it could peacefully to maintain economic activity between the people north and south of the Great Wall. He also stated no other country on earth was more concerned with the Communist menace in Mongolia than China. All of the appeasement efforts had brought Wang Jingwei to his boiling point and on August 8th he departed for Shanghai as he and his entire cabinet resigned. Chiang Kai-Shek personally came over and asked Wang Jingwei to withdraw his resignation given he offered him further support, and Wang Jingwei relented. Then on the morning of November 1st, after attending a meeting, Wang Jingwei was shot by a Chinese reporter for the Chenkuang Press, a company notably associated with Chiang Kai-Shek. Rumors spread the assassination attempt was inspired by anti-japanese elements such as Generals Yang Qi and Tang Shengzhi. With Wang Jingwei in the hospital, Chiang Kai-Shek was forced to take a larger role with the North China situation. Then Wang Jingwei departed for Europe seeking better medical care and wired his resignation on November 29th. Thus Chiang Kai-Shek succeeded him as president of the Executive Yuan and the coalition between him and Wang Jingwei had officially ended. With Chiang Kai-Shek now the only funnel from which action could be directed, the Japanese sent Ambassador Ariyoshi to China to persuade Chiang Kai-Shek to grant some form of autonomy for North China. By this point autonomy for North China had become part of Japan's national policy. Chiang Kai-Shek in response to this growing threat went to Taiyuan, the capital of Shanxi, to meet with Yan Xishan. There he proposed that if Yan Xishan could unite the Northern Warlords, Chiang Kai-Shek would appoint him chairman of the political affairs council, with added authority over finances and diplomacy. Chiang Kai-Shek urged him to come attend the 6th plenum of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee scheduled for November 1st. At this time Yan Xishan's Shanxi was struggling financially so he reconciled with Chiang Kai-Shek. To this effect Chiang Kai-Shek sent his vice chief of the Army General Staff Xing Pin to tour the north trying to persuade those like Song Queyuan and Han Fuju to not support the North China autonomy movement. The Japanese interpreted these efforts to thwart the autonomy movement as the underlying cause of all the anti-japanese incidents breaking out continuously. To this the Nanjing government disclaimed no responsibility and insisted they were doing everything the Japanese asked of them.  The Japanese began a massive campaign aimed at all the important leaders in North China. One man they managed to gain influence over was Yin Jukeng who on November 25th at Tungzhou, announced the inauguration of the East Hubei Anti-Communist Autonomous Council, claiming autonomy for the entire demilitarized region. Yin Jukeng's council consisted of 9 members whereupon he was chairman and took charge of foreign relations and military affairs. As you can imagine Nanjing immediately labeled him a traitor and ordered his arrest. Chiang Kai-Shek then rapidly sent word to the Japanese an official response to their “Concerning Policy towards China” document:  “To satisfy the various demands from the Japanese side, there should first of all be established in Hopei province an autonomous political administration; ultimately, this administration should be similar to that governing the southwestern region. Whether or not this administration should be extended to other regions will be determined after the results in Hopei have been ascertained.  1) Although the campaign to wipe out the Communists is progressing, the Communist bandits have fled toward Kansu. Since this raises the danger that the Communists may spread into Inner Mongolia, the defense against the Communists in North China should be conducted jointly.  2) Certain aspects of the new monetary system are not suited to North China, and appropriate modifications will be made in this respect.  3) Efforts are to be made to harmonize economic interchange among the people on both sides of the Great Wall.  4) To meet the special needs of the region, the local administration should be given authority to enable it to exercise suitable control over financial matters in North China.  5) Pending issues are to be settled locally in a rational manner.  6) The aim will be to employ talented people to carry out the above tasks and to establish an ideal government.” Chiang Kai-Shek dispatched He Yingqin to reign in the situation at Peiping, but upon his arrival he believed the situation was beyond his control. He Yingqin reported that it was his belief the only way for Nanjing to retain some degree of authority in the region was to create a new political organ to do so. Thus on December 11th, the Nationalist government established the Hubei-Chahar Political Council chaired by Song Queyuan. Song Queyuan declared the new council would assume all responsibility for administering Hubei and Chahar and promised  "to respect the wishes of the people, endeavor in particular to relieve the economic distress of the region, and maintain the peace of East Asia on the basis of Sino-Japanese amity."  Thus within all this madness now two autonomous regimes co-existed in North China. The East Hubei Anti-Communist Autonomous Council would administer 22 prefectures while the Hubei-Chahar Political Council would administer Hubei, Chahar, Peiping and Tientsin. As you might imagine, relations between these two councils was complex and ambiguous. The 22 prefectures the former administered were under the jurisdiction of the other. One was a Japanese puppet, the other was controlled by Nanjing who refused to recognize the other. Japan immediately exploited their newfound chaotic gains in North China. In May of 1936 the 2000 troops of the Tientsin garrison army was boosted to 5600 led by General Tashiro Kan'ichiro. This was done under the guise it was to defend against communists and protect Japanese citizens. The position of the commander of the Tientsin garrison was officially promoted to encompass full responsibility for the situation in North China, exactly the same as the Kwantung Army's role over Manchukuo. Thuse both the Kwantung Army and what was henceforth called the China Garrison had clearly defined roles. One would be responsible for Manchukuo, the other over North China. Japan had neutralized Rehe, Chahar and Hubei, all of whom would fall directly under their influence. But was Japan satisfied?  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Its not always through military means that nations can encroach upon other nations. Japan was showcasing how it could bully away parts of China through threats alone it was working miracles. How long could Chiang Kai-Shek carry on like this? Would it be Japan or his own people that would hang him for losing China?

Last time we spoke about Operation Nekka, the Invasion of Rehe Province. In 1932, the Kwantung Army eyed Rehe province as vital for Manchukuo's success. General Tang Yulin, ruling Rehe, initially favored Japanese interests due to economic ties, particularly in opium. Tensions escalated after a Japanese civilian was abducted, prompting military actions that led to skirmishes in Shanhaiguan. Amidst growing conflict, Zhang Xueliang mobilized forces against Tang, who eventually conceded. As Japan prepared for invasion, both sides strategized, with Chiang Kai-Shek reluctant to engage directly, fearing Japanese influence over his rivals. Operation Nekka commenced, showcasing the Kwantung Army's efficiency as they swiftly routed Chinese forces in Rehe. By March 4th, key passes were captured, but fierce resistance emerged. General Nishi faced counterattacks, leading to strategic retreats. Meanwhile, Chiang Kai-Shek struggled with internal conflicts while managing the Japanese threat. As the Kwantung Army pushed beyond the Great Wall, logistical issues arose, prompting political maneuvers to secure local warlord alliances. However, plans faltered when Zhang Qingyao, a potential ally, was assassinated.   #147 The Battle for the Great Wall of China Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Thus in the previous episode, Operation Nekka had been unleashed. The Kwangtung Army tossed 2 divisions into Rehe province with the intent of forcing its annexation into Manchukuo. They were under strict orders to not extend operations past the Great Wall of China. However they believed it was necessary to seize the main gateways along the Great Wall of China to establish their new borders, and in order to do so this absolutely required going past them. Yet military operations were not the only means to secure their goals. The Japanese forces faced significant logistical challenges, including a shortage of troops, having advanced into Rehe with only 20,000 men. Even the most resolute general in the Kwantung Army doubted that their military strength could prevail against the vast numbers of Chinese troops in the plains of Hubei. As a result, they needed to supplement their military efforts with political strategies targeting regional warlords. The tactic of bribing local elites had proven highly effective during the pacification of Manchuria, and there was no reason to think it wouldn't work in North China as well. All of these actions were carried out without any oversight from Tokyo headquarters.   On February 13, 1933, Itagaki Seishiro, who was then the head of the Mukden Special Service Agency, was transferred to the General Staff without any formal announcement of his promotion. He took up a position in Tientsin specifically to initiate political maneuvers in eastern Hubei, leading to the establishment of the Tientsin Special Service Agency. Initially, this agency sought to engage various competing warlords in North China, including Duan Qirui, Wu Peifu, and Sun Chuanfang, but eventually focused on Zhang Qingyao. Zhang had previously been a protégé of Duan Qirui, serving as the civil and military governor of Henan province. He had fought against Zhang Zuolin in 1925 before shifting his allegiance to Wu Peifu. During the second phase of the Northern Expedition, Zhang Qingyao again battled Zhang Zuolin, who was then in control of the National Pacification Army. After the Northern Expedition concluded, he allied with Yan Xishan's forces in Shanxi. So yeah it would seem he was not a man of principles nor loyalties of any kind. The Tientsin Special Service Agency initially aimed to approach Zhang Qingyao in hopes that he could orchestrate a coup d'état against Chiang Kai-Shek. They also hoped to persuade other figures such as Song Queyuan, Zhang Zuoxiang, Fang Chenwu, Xu Yusan, Zhang Tingshu, Sun Tienying, and Feng Zhanhai to join in. If successful, this could lead to a swift takeover of North China as they were advancing towards Peiping after taking the Great Wall. However, on May 7, Zhang Qingyao was assassinated, completely derailing their plans. With Zhang Qingyao dead, the agency concentrated their efforts instead to instigate riots in the Peiping-Tientsin region. They also began encouraging and propping up new political organizations that sought to form an independent northern regime. One scheme they were performing was to form a committee composed of Northern Warlords headed by Lu Zengyu, a banker who had studied in Japan. The idea was to form an anti-Chiang Kai-Shek coalition to carve out north china. The agency received a significant amount of funds to make ends meet. Itagaki alone would spend over 50,000 yen to try and bring about an anti-Chiang regime in the north. Some sources indicated over 3 billion yen being allocated to the IJA to be dished out to various Chinese warlords and elites in the form of bribes.  Meanwhile operations in the district east of the Luan River saw attacks formed against the Xumenzhai and Lengkou gateways. On April 1st, the Kwantung Army issued Order 491, seeing the Iwata detachment of the IJA 6th Division storm through the Xumenzhai gate and succeed in securing a supply route behind the great wall to help with the assaults against the other gateways in the region. By April 10th, the IJA 6th Division was making steady progress against the Lengkou gate. The next day they stormed through and captured Qienqangying, pursuing the retreating Chinese to the banks of the Luan River. Meanwhile the IJA 8th Division were facing a much more difficult situation. On the 12th, they captured Xifengkou, but their assault against Quehlingkou was going nowhere. After repeated assaults, the Chinese finally retreated, allowing the Japanese to focus on Taitouying. Thus from the 10th to the 23rd the gateways in northeastern Hubei were all falling into Japanese hands. The Kawahara Brigade was well on its way towards Nantienmen. The Operations within the Great Wall area had been fully authorized by Generals Nishi and Sakamoto. However there still existed limits upon the operations. For example, Operations order 495 issued by General Muto given on the 11th stated "Without specific orders, pursuit by the main force of ground troops is to be limited to the line connecting Hotung, Chiench'angying, and T'ait'ouying; but air units are to be limited to the Luan River."  Meanwhile the Special Service Agency in Tientsin had reported that Zhang Qingyao would stage a coup on the 21st and this prompted Song Queyuans troops to prevent the Central Army forces from fleeing towards Peiping. The Agency requested that the Kwantung Army not return to the Great Wall and instead perform a feint attack towards Peiping and Tientsin to scare the Chinese. As the plot was reaching its climax, on the 18th the Kwantung Army chief of staff, General Koiso Kuniaki issued a order for the 8th Division to strike in full force against the Gubeikou area. The Kwantung Army's plan was to bomb Miyun while launching their feint attack in combination with an all out effort to break Gubeikou. However on the night of the 18th, all of these plans changed dramatically. Suddenly General Muto issued Operations Order 498, hastily ordering all forces to withdraw to the Great Wall. Emperor Hirohito had decided to put his foot down. In Tokyo the emperor asked the vice chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant-General Mazaki Jinzaburö, "Has the Kwantung Army withdrawn from the Luan River line?" The vice chief retired from the imperial presence with a sense of guilt and wrote a confidential letter to the commander of the Kwantung Army. It was personally carried by Infantry Captain Katö [Michio] of the General Staff, who on April 19 arrived at the capital [of Manchukuo] bearing an imperial rescript. The vice chief also cabled to the chief of staff of the Kwantung Army a highly confidential dispatch, the main point of which stated, "Withdraw your troops immediately, or an imperial command will be issued." Thereupon the chief of staff of the Kwantung Army directed staff officer Endò Saburò to draft the withdrawal order. Thus as a result, the Kwantung Army began a withdrawal on the 21st, the same day the Peiping coup was to be unleashed. Those around Emperor Hirohito at this time have gone on the record to state it seemed to them, the emperor had hesitated heavily on issuing the withdrawal order. His motivations for giving the order are simply, the Kwantung Army had gone against his decrees, it was an identical situation to what had happened at Mukden in 1931. The Kwantung Army had no choice but to submit to what essentially was him “asking them to stop”. With that, operations east of the Luan River were over, for now. The order was certainly a critical blow to the Agency in Tientsin. How did they react? They doubled down on the coup effort. Likewise Koiso did not stop the 8th Division operation at Gubeikou. Instead the 8th Division was given orders "to maintain a menacing attitude toward hostile forces in North China." In accordance, the 3800 man Kawahara Brigade on direct orders from General Nishi, launched an attack against two Central Army Divisions numbered nearly 30,000 men stationed at Nantienmen. After a brutal week of battle the Kawahara Brigade seized the town. Meanwhile a battalion of 280 men led by Colonel Shimmura Eijiro attacked a central army force around 4000 strong at Xinglong. They suffered a 38% rate of casualties by the night of the 27th. The Battalion was nearly annihilated when suddenly the Chinese withdrew enabling the Japanese to slip by. Meanwhile the Piping coup did not materialize as planned on the 21st. Instead a secondary coup was initiated by Zhang Zuoxiang on the 26, but this misfired greatly. Reports began to emerge that troops led by Zhang Tingxu, Sun Tienying, Feng Zhanhai and Xu Yusan were willing to rebel in response to the failed coup attempts, but this proved completely false. A report issued on the 30th stated troops under Fang Chenwu were rebelling against Chiang Kai-Shek. However in reality Fang Chenwu only advanced his force north on May 10th and it was to join the anti-Japanese forces.  From mid April to mid May, the United States, Britain, France and Germany finally entered the fray in North China. It was an extremely chaotic situation for everyone. The Japanese military in Tokyo had no control nor idea what the Kwantung Army was doing, so when they tried to explain their actions to the international community, they continuously were walking over rakes. All the talk from Tokyo seemed incomprehensible to the other great powers. The Chinese were clamouring the entire time for a ceasefire agreement, but lacked the means to force the Japanese to do so. Japan had left the League of Nations, thus was extremely isolated and insecure in regards to foreign relations. Thus if a nation like Britain or the US had actually put their foot down, the Japanese more than likely would have backed off. Another element to this debacle was the stance of the Imperial Japanese Navy, who had made it adamantly clear they had zero intention of fighting off the British or Americans because of their unruly siblings within the Army. However, both Britain and America were too preoccupied with internal strife, mostly the result of the Great Depression, to devote considerable effort to the crisis in China. The League of Nations remained completely useless during the North China incident, similarly to how they were useless with the Manchurian incident. The Lytton Commission had performed an on the spot inquiry, and it did play a role in establishing a ceasefire by the time of the Shanghai incident, but did nothing to really help China. China had begun appealing to the League when Shanhaiguan was attacked and this prompted the nations of the league to rapidly agree to the Lytton Commission report's recommendations. In turn this led Matsuoka Yosuke to walk out on the league. With Japan out of the League, Wellington Koo proposed harsh sanctions upon Japan in response to their invasion of Rehe province. Yet they did nothing. China would continuously make pleas, but it was to no avail.  Rather than rely upon the League, the Chinese began secret talks with Japanese officials aiming first for a ceasefire. Tang Erho, Lee Shuzheng and Wang Komin attempted talks, but failed. Then Chen Yi the political vice minister of military affairs, secretly spoke with Nemoto Hiroshi, an army attache at the Shanghai legation on April 27th. They established negotiations with Nemoto speaking on behalf of the Kwantung Army and Chen Yi on behalf of Ho Yingqin. The Chinese were clearly more eager than the Japanese for a ceasefire, but the Japanese no longer had a rationale to continue their operation. Regardless the Japanese took the victors stance and demanded the Chinese withdraw from the battlefield as a prerequisite to further Japanese advances. In the first meeting, Nemoto told Chen that the Kwantung Army had already withdrawn from the area east of the Luan River to give Ho Yingqin an opportunity to consider a ceasefire. He described the action as a friendly gesture and suggested the Chinese reciprocate it by withdrawing their troops. Chen countered this by claiming Ho Yingqin had shown his own sincerity at the battle of Nantienmen by ordering his troops to withdraw to a second line of defense, hoping this would allow the Japanese to pull away from Nantienmen. However by May 1st, the Japanese claimed they had captured and secured Nantienmen, so Nemoto informed Chen the Chinese forces north of the Great Wall should withdraw to a line connecting Miyun, Pinkou, Yutien and the Luan River. On May 2nd, the Chinese sent a reply to this, completely ignoring the line idea and instead referred to the recent battle at Xinglong and explained the local commander there was eager for a victory and refused to withdraw despite being asked twice to do so. The Chinese also notified Nemoto that a Political affairs council headed by Huang Fu was being established at Peiping, and it should be through that body that further negotiations were held. The Japanese welcomed this development. Just as it seemed the Shanghai talks were paving a way to a ceasefire, the leadership of the Kwantung Army abandoned their political maneuvers in favor of a settlement. On April 30th the Tientsin Special Service Agency insisted to their Japanese colleagues, the Chinese were just buying time and not sincere in their actions. That same day the Army General Staff and Foreign Ministry suddenly refused to initiate a ceasefire on the grounds the Chinese had agreed to an armistice only to save face. Lt Colonel Nagatsu Sahishige, the army attache at Peiping urged the 8th Division to rapidly strike southwards as far as Miyun to annihilate He Yingqin's planned counteroffensive. Such an action would immediately threaten the Peiping-Tientsin region. To push the envelope, the Japanese could toss a new Division into the mix and force further negotiations when the Chinese withdrew south of Miyun. Clearly the Japanese had their eyes set on Miyun now. As such General Nishi was secretly told to capture it without any direction from Tokyo HQ, nor from most of the Kwantung Army leadership. The Operations department of the Kwantung Army also independently elected to move troops east of the Luan River again. They argued "the enemy again advances east of the Luan River and persists in its defiant attitude. Therefore we must again deal them a crushing blow." The IJA 6th Division had been evacuated to the Great Wall back on April 23rd and along the way were closely pursued by Chinese forces. General Sakamoto sent a plan to the Kwantung Army headquarters "to again drive the enemy west of the Luan River,". A lot of chaos was reigning within the Japanese military because they were in echo chambers and not relaying information to another. When the Kwantung Army Operations department suddenly proposed a new advance east of the Luan River, on May 2nd a heated exchange took place between them and the Kwantung Army Intelligence Section: “INTELLIGENCE SECTION: The defiant attitude of the enemy is a matter of degree. While it is indisputable that some of their forces continue defiant, their main force is still stationed west of the Luan River. Therefore, a defiant attitude on the part of the enemy is not sufficient reason to deal them a crushing blow. The Kwantung Army withdrew from the Luan River line only ten days ago. As we understand it, the purpose was to comply with the imperial wish. If the army begins operations on a flimsy pretext at this time, inviting intervention by the central leadership, how can the honor of the commander in chief be maintained? What we should now attack are rather the enemy forces facing the 8th Division. For this, we should employ additional strength. By dealing a severe blow to the Chinese Central Army forces in this area, we can threaten Peiping and the operation should be all the more effective.  OPERATIONS SECTION: Due to the limitations of our supply capacity, we cannot use more than a certain level of forces against the enemy facing the 8th Division. Since the enemy east of the Luan River maintains a defiant attitude, they must be punished regardless of their strength.  INTELLIGENCE SECTION: Since the seizure of Nant'ienmen the 8th Division lacks the capability of pursuing the enemy. This is an unavoidable consequence of the small strength of its force from the outset of the operation. Isn't the First [Operations] Section uncertain that the enemy can be defeated even by the main force of the 8th Division, and doesn't it intend ultimately to deploy the 6th Division southward in concert with action by the 8th Division? If this is the case, it is understandable, and this section is not necessarily against it.   OPERATIONS SECTION: That is not what this section is considering.  INTELLIGENCE SECTION: In that case, there is no clear justification for launching the operation. The objective of the operation must be plainly spelled out to all concerned, from His Majesty at the top down to the lowest private. There must not be the slightest doubt about it.” After this conversation the Intelligence department debated amongst themselves before relaying another response at midnight, ultimately not approving it. The next day the Operations department sent a telegram to the negotiations team in Peiping: “1) Under present conditions, the Kwantung Army has no intention of accepting a cease-fire proposal for the time being, particularly because there are signs suggesting intervention by third countries in the matter.  2) Previously the Kwantung Army suggested the Miyun-Yiit'ienLuan River line as the retreat line for the Chinese army; but this did not mean it was to be their front line after a cease-fire. It rather indicated a line to which the Chinese army should immediately and voluntarily retreat as evidence of their sincerity. In other words, a cease-fire cannot be negotiated until they retreat to this line and abandon their provocative attitude, and until this is confirmed by the Kwantung Army. Their mere retreat to the indicated line, in today's circumstances, is not sufficient reason for us to respond to the cease-fire proposal. According to Peking telegram 483 [not identified], it appears that the intentions of our army have been somewhat misunderstood. Even if the Chinese retreat to the indicated line and display the sincerity of their intentions, we may possibly demand a retreat line farther south. We believe negotiations in this region should be handled by the central leadership in Tokyo rather than by the Kwantung Army. Act on this understanding.”   So after this message, the Intelligence department accused the Operations department of trying to find any excuse to renew the advance and sent a wire to Nemoto on April 29th "If the Chinese suddenly perceive their mistake, . . . we will not make war for the fun of it." However the Intelligence department was suddenly overruled by Colonel Kita who cabled the negotiators that the Operations department now had full approval from Kwantung Army vice chief of staff Okamura Yasuji. When General Muto received this notice he questioned "This draft order, states that the enemy has moved into the region east of the Luan River and is showing a provocative attitude. I did not receive such a report from the Second [Intelligence] Section before my departure from Hsinching. Does this mean there has been a subsequent change in the situation?" After being informed more so, Muto simply stated he wished to wait until the chief of staff could speak to him. Obviously Muto was getting wet feet and did not want to perform any actions not in accordance with Tokyo HQ, as Emperor Hirohito had put his foot down.  On May 3rd, General Koiso and Operations Department staff officer Endo Saburo spoke with Muto, indicating they had approval of Tokyo HQ general staff and even the Emperor. So Muto relented for a second advance and issued Order 503 on May 3rd to the IJA 6th and 8th Divisions. Now the Army General Staff were dragged into the Kwantung Army's debacle fully. So they drew up an emergency draft plan for measures in North China. To this aim:  “Through continuing pressure by the military might of the Kwantung Army, applied in concert with various political measures in North China, the Chinese forces in North China are to be compelled to make a substantia] surrender or to dissolve, thereby resulting in the withdrawal of the Chinese army along the China-Manchukuo border and in the establishment of peace in this area”.  Added to this the General Staff suggested a large counteroffensive be driven along the Great Wall and a formal truce agreement should be concluded once three conditions had been met: “(a) that Chinese forces had retreated voluntarily south and west of a line connecting Hsuanhua, Shunyi, Sanho, Yüt'ien, Luanchou, and Lot'ing; (b) that anti-Japanese activities had been controlled; and (c) that the preceding had been verified by the Japanese army”. Under immense pressure from the renewed Japanese advance, the Chinese government on May 3rd, had pushed for a new body to tackle the North China situation. That was the Peiping Political Affairs Council. It was composed of 22 members, headed by Huang Fu. Huang Fu was notably a pro-Japanese official, having been a graduate of the Tokyo Land Survey department training institute and had served early as a minister of foreign affairs. Since China had zero faith anymore in the League of Nations and believed if they failed to resolve the North China issue, this all might see a new civil war break out between Chiang Kai-Shek and Wang Jingwei. Thus everyone felt the time for active resistance was over and they must place all their effort into negotiations. Chiang Kai-Shek placed a great amount of authority upon Huang Fu and trusted the man. Huang Fu began his new task by speaking with all the political and financial leaders from both sides of the conflict to see how a real ceasefire could be met through dealmaking.  Meanwhile on May 6th the IJA 6th Division unleashed a new offensive south of the Great Wall and were followed by the 8th Division on the 11th. General Muto at this time made public statements blaming the Chinese for the renewed hostilities, making it seem the Japanese had intended to stay within the Great Wall area. The 6th Division swept across the sector east of the Luan River and by the 11th the Chinese defensive line collapsed. On the 12th the 6th Division crossed the Luan River, pursuing Yu Xuechengs 51st Army. In turn this threatened He Yingqin's main force who were facing the 8th Division. In the previous battles, Yu Xuechengs men had performed quite poorly and now even under direct command of He Yingqin were proving themselves helpless against the 6th division. Additionally Itagaki's agency over in Tientsin were using radio facilities to dispatch false directives from Chinese high command, ordering the forces to retreat from the front battle line. Two to three Chinese divisions were neutralized by these fake radio messages and in turn the Chinese became very demoralized at their lines. The 8th division had driven into the Gubeikou area on the 11th and it took them only a day to dislodge the Chinese from their line near Xuxiachen. By the 13th Xuxiachen had fallen completely. On the 11th and 12th, Japanese aircraft began flying over Peiping, as a demonstration of the terror they could deliver to the city at any moment. These developments altogether were pushing the Chinese civilians to demand of their politicians and generals that they appease the Japanese. Huang Fu proposed to Nemoto on the 12th that all Chinese troops could be withdrawn from Miyun to a line extending from Shunyi to Yutien and Tangshan. This was an enormous concession and nearly mirrored the line the Japanese had demanded.  The Japanese however, rejected the concession. To make matters worse for the Chinese, He Yingqin had been notified of the large concession proposal in advance and expected the Japanese to take it. Thus he had refrained from operating in strength at Miyun and did not significantly defend the path towards Peiping. It was the belief of the Japanese commanders, if they performed a full-scale attack towards Peiping now, He Yingqin would have no choice but to withdraw towards Shunyi. With this in mind the Japanese made a proposal on the 14th:  “1) According to the reports of the Peiping military attaché, the 8th Division should be prepared to advance in a single sweep to the southern limit of Miyun, if it is deemed necessary. Preparations for this attack should be expedited.  2) In conjunction with the above, front-line aircraft should take actions implying that a major Japanese offensive is about to begin.  3) In Tokyo, it should be announced publicly, in liaison with the Foreign Ministry, that the security of Jehol province cannot be guaranteed as long as the Chinese army remains in Miyun. Furthermore, every so often Japanese aircraft should make demonstration flights over the Shunyi-T'ungchou area.” Confronted with this, the Chinese were pretty screwed. The Chinese negotiations team were frantically searching for any way to force a ceasefire. Then the secretary of the Shanghai legation, Suma Yakichiro showed up to Peiping, which the Chinese viewed as a golden opportunity. The Chinese complained to him that the Kwantung Army had resumed their offensive and that a political agency in Tientsin were trying to enact coups. Suma bluntly told them the Japanese actions were backed fully by Tokyo and despite the Chinese belief that this was false or that Japan was facing a major financial deficit, this was all untrue.  While the dialogue continued to go nowhere, the 6th division had pursued the Chinese forces to the vicinity of Fengjun. Muto believed this had gone to far so he issued orders on May 13th limiting operations to the area north of a line connecting Miyun, Pingkou, Fegjun and Yungping. Now the 6th and 8th divisions were to assemble around Xuxiachen and Zunhua. Two days later he issued this statement to the public "If the Chinese army immediately abandons its hitherto provocative attitude and withdraws some distance from the border, our army will quickly return to the line of the Great Wall and pursue its regular task of maintaining security in Manchukuo." Likewise Muto ordered the Tientsin group to inform the Chinese that the Kwantung Army would return to the Great Wall if the Chinese forces retreated to the Shunyi-Yutien-Tangshan line. Nemoto forwarded all of this to Chen Yi. On May 15th He Yingqin ordered the withdrawal of the Chinese forces to a line between Malanyu, Linnantsang and Pamencheng.  With what seemed a imminent ceasefire at hand, the Kwantung Army HQ ordered the 6th and 8th divisions to take up positions strategically favorable for the negotiations to finally begin in ernest. On the 17th a draft ceasefire plan was drawn up. It envisioned the withdrawal of the Chinese forces to the Shunyi-Yutien-Tangshan line and in return the Japanese would pull back to the Great Wall area. Huang Fu was on his way back to Peiping from Shanghai for probably the 10th time in two weeks, when the Japanese captured Fengjun and Zhunhua, routing the Chinese across the Qi Canal to the right bank of the Pai River. The 6th Division then advanced towards Yutien and Xumenchen as the 8th division stood around Xuxiachn. When the Chinese began retreating from Miyun on May 18th, the 8th division suddenly converged upon Miyun. Muto was of course delighted by their new advantageous position and even briefly began talking to his colleagues about the prospect of just marching upon Peiping. Instead he decided to sweep through Miyun, Pingku and the Qi Canal, going even further west than he had stated he would back on the 13th.  With these new orders in hand, the 6th Division quickly captured Qixien on the 19th and further pursued retreating Chinese forces to Sanho. The 8th Division entered Miyun and two days later began advancing to Huaijou. By the 23rd Huaijou had fallen as the 6th Division reached the Qi Canal. These advances threatened the Peiping-Tientsin region. Both Japanese divisions halted on the 25th as the ceasefire was issued. With that last strike Muto felt he had significantly increased their poker hand going forward. Meanwhile Itagaki's team at Tientsin were still trying to bring about a coup. In tandem with the 8th Divisions attack on Miyun, the agency tried to engineer a revolt by the militia troops led by Song Queyuan, Fang Chenwu, Sun Tienying, amongst others. The idea was for these forces to occupy Peiping while wrecking havoc upon the Chinese central army within th region. The agency had attempting recruiting Wu Peifu, but the old jade marshal was unwilling, so they turned to this former protege, the chairman of Hubei, Yu Xuecheng. However he also declined. Yu Xuecheng was also approached by Hu Hanmin, looking to form an anti-Chiang Kai-Shek campaign in cooperation with Han Fuqu and Feng Yuxiang. To this Yu Xuecheng declined as well. Itagaki kept searching for disgruntled warlords, and then turned to Li Qiashan and Xu Yusan. Xu Yusan was a former ally to Feng Yuxiang with a history of anti-Chiang Kai-Shek actions. If they got the backing of his personal army, roughly 10,000 men strong at Tangshan they could do some real damage. On May 16th Xu Yusan declared independence and took up the Manchukuo 5 color flag in direct opposition to the Kuomintang. He began issuing the slogan “Hubi for the people of Hubei” as his army marched west along the Peiping-Shanhaiguan railway. His force reached the vicinity of Tangu whereupon they had increased to 30,000 and rumors emerged they would occupy Tientsin. This began a mass panic. . . for literally a day. His army collapsed into nothing more than a rabble as now had the stomach to actually fight their fellow countrymen.  Despite this grand failure, the Tientsin group continued with other plots. At 8 pm on May 19th, a Peiping bound train from Tangu, carrying Chinese soldiers was bombed around Tientsin station. The Japanese love bombing trains as we all know. This resulted in small incidents involving Japanese and Chinese officials, giving precedent for 600 Japanese troops led by Lt General Nakamura Kotaro to reinforce Tientsin on May 23rd. There were a few other incidents were supposedly Chinese agents were tossing grenades at Japanese officials. One of these officials was Major Mori Takeshi of the Japanese Army General Staff who was working in Tientsin. However the grenade thrown at him was a dud, and before the Japanese could seize it, some local Chinese grabbed it, finding a stamp on it bearing “Tokyo Artillery Arsenal”, oops.  These numerous incidents influenced the Chinese who feared Japan was trying to force an invasion into North China. To these rumors, He Yingqin insisted they mount a proper defense of Peiping, but many were arguing they had to further retreat. Meanwhile the Tientsin agency was told to stop performing incidents and instead secure northern warlords to their future cause. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The battle for the Great Wall of China was coming to a bitter end for the Chinese forces. The Japanese were using every deceptive measure to edge further and further into China proper. It seemed clear to the Chinese, nothing would stop Japanese encroachment upon their nation, while the rest of the world simply watched on doing nothing. 

Last time we spoke about Manchukuo. In the early 1930s, Ishiwara Kanji sought to dominate Manchuria to secure resources and counter American influence. He envisioned Manchukuo as a Pan-Asian league promoting racial cooperation, despite it being a puppet state under Japan. With Puyi as a figurehead, Ishiwara aimed for autonomy, but his plans faced resistance from the Kwantung Army, which prioritized control. As conflicts arose, Ishiwara's vision of unity clashed with military interests, leading to his eventual isolation and reassignment, marking a tumultuous chapter in Manchukuo's history. In November 1931, Doihara orchestrated the "Tianjin Incident," facilitating the removal of Puyi from his home to establish the puppet state of "Manchukuo." By March 1932, Puyi was declared its ruler, but his authority was merely symbolic, overshadowed by Japanese control. Despite international condemnation, Japan solidified its grip on Manchuria, exploiting its resources and suppressing local resistance. By the late 1930s, Manchukuo became a colonial entity, suffering under harsh economic policies while Puyi's regime served as a facade for Japanese imperial ambitions.   #146 Operation Nekka: the Invasion of Rehe Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. From the very beginning of their consolidation of Manchukuo, the Kwantung Army regarded the province of Rehe, today's Jehol province, to be an integral part of it. According to some of the Kwantung Army leadership, all of Rehe would be necessary to consummate Manchukuo. In April of 1932, the IJA 8th Division based at Hirosaki in Aomori prefecture was transferred to Manchukuo under secret orders to prepare for an invasion of Rehe. Now Rehe province covers 160,00 square kilometers and back then held some 2.3 million people. Since 1926 it was ruled by General Tang Yulin. His direct command was over the NRA 36th division, consisting of 13,000 regular troops with a provincial militia of 8500 men. As was the Warlord practice of the time, Tang Yulin exploited his population. Now until July of 1932, Tang Yulin's attitude towards the emerging state of Manchukuo directly to his east was certainly favorable. That is because Tang Yulin favored the Japanese. During the debacle that was the invasion of Manchuria, Tang Yulin had done everything possible to prevent Zhang Xueliang from moving into Rehe whenever he was trying to consolidate forces there. Now Tang Yulin had no greater aspirations, its not like he loved Japan, or believed the Japanese were better leaders for his nation. What he was motivated by was a very practical concern, economics, more precisely the opium trade. Rehe number one source of income was opium, and they number one purchaser of it, was Manchuria. Thus as one can imagine, when Manchukuo was being formed, and the opium door closed on him, well he took heavy financial losses.  On July 17th of 1932, an incident broke out between the towns of Chaoyangxu and Nanling. A Japanese civilian employed by the Kwantung Army, Ishimoto Gonshiro was abducted by a Rehe militia group while taking the train from Jinzhou to Chaoyang. General Nishi Yoshikazu, the commander of the IJA 8th Division stationed at Jizhou, dispatched a small unit to rescue Ishimoto. In doing so they occupied Chaoyangxi, where they also protested the Rehe provincial government. This did not see Ishimoto handed over to them, so General Nishi bombarded Chaoyangxu and then had his forces advance upon Nanling. Even doing so, no Ishimoto to be found. So Nishi withdrew back to Jinzhou. The following year during what would become the invasion of Rehe, Ishimoto's body would be found at Chaoyangxu. Zhang Xueliang utilized this small incident to advance into Rehe. Claiming he was acting upon orders from Nanjing, he moved his Northeastern Army to the border of Rehe, due south of the Great Wall. Zhang Xueliang then threatened Tang Yulin and bribed his subordinates to defect over to him. Consequently, by late July, Tang Yulin tossed the towel and for the first time sanctioned passage of a volunteer army through Rehe. Come August Zhang Xueliang organized a volunteer force 40,000 strong, obviously all from his Northeastern army to advance from Gubeikou into Rehe, where he sought to confront the Kwantung Army if they advanced. Zhang Xueliang was heavily in contact with Chiang Kai-Shek during this period. Zhang Xueliang was making multiple proclamations about retaking Manchuria, and Chiang Kai-Shek was supporting him in that endeavor as best as he could. Meanwhile Tang Yulin was sort of stuck in the middle.  Between October 1932 to January 1933, Shanhaiguan, the strategic gateway and midpoint between Mukden and Beijing became the focal area of 3 major skirmishes.  The Boxer Protocol of 1901 dictated that some of the 8 nation alliance members, notably, France, Italy and Japan were allowed to maintain small contingents at Shanhaiguan. In 1932, the Japanese garrison there was 261, France had 61 men and Italy 69. After the establishment of Manchukuo, Japan had increased its garrison to have some more border guards in the town of Shanhaiguan itself. Of course the Chinese also had local troops, that was the 9th Independent Brigade commanded by Ho Chukuo, a force roughly of 9000 men. The first skirmish at Shanhaiguan broke out on October 1st, between Ho Chukuo's men and an armored train of troops from the IJA 8th Division. Another exact same event occurred on December 8th, both occasions were settled locally and peacefully with the Chinese offering an apology and indemnity payment. Then a third clash broke out on January 1st, but this one got out of hand.  The mastermind behind the third incident was Major Ochiai Jinkuro, the leader of the Japanese garrison at Shanhaiguan. Upon his orders, at 9pm, 3 Japanese soldiers tossed two hand grenades each into the backyard of the Japanese military police detachment and the railway track running in front of the Japanese garrison. This was of course immediately blamed upon the Chinese and at 11:30 pm Ochiai presented the local Chinese with 2 demands. The first was to evacuate the Chinese force and the second to allow the Japanese to occupy their south gate at Shanhaiguan for the time being. Now the Japanese had legitimate pretext for these demands based off the Boxer Protocol. It allowed them the right to ensure the security of the railway and telegraph lines and to defend their citizens and property within two miles of the railway zone. Since Ho Chukuo's troops allegedly disturbed the peace in said zone, the Japanese were in their right to ask them to depart.  According to Japanese sources, the Chinese refused at first then consented at 4:50 am on January 2nd. This effectively saw them surrender the south gate. However at 9:30 am the chief of staff for the Chinese Brigade requested that the takeover of said gate be postponed until the scheduled arrival of Ho Chukuo, coming over from Beiping. Ochiai turned down this request, whereupon the Chinese agreed that the south gate would be included within the area overseen by the Japanese. Yet at 10:50 am Japanese troops went to take over guarding the south gate whence Chinese guards tossed grenades at them. Yes, it is most certainly the Japanese who tossed those grenades. The Chinese account of this event is somewhat different. It asserts the Japanese attacked the gate while the issue of surrender was still being negotiated. By January 11th, China sent a formal appeal to Britain, France, the US and other signatories of the Boxer Protocol charging the Japanese for perverting the treaty to seize the south gate of Shanhaiguan. Meanwhile General Ho Chukuo called Ochiai from Qinhuangdao to tell him he would arrive by 8am on January 3rd to negotiate. But by 10am he failed to show up, as the Chinese and Japanese fired upon another. Ochiai thereupon resolved to take the south gate by force. By that point the IJA 8th Division had strengthened its position in front of Shanhaiguan. Two companies had become 10 and one air force company was made ready to strike. Additionally the commander of the 2nd China Fleet, Tsuda Shizue dispatched Hirado and the 16th Destroyer Squadron to Shanhaiguan and Qinhuangdao “to defend Japanese residents and assist the troops in case of hostilities”. At dawn on January 3rd, the Japanese launched a combined land, sea and air assault and by 2pm had taken Shanhaiguan. Ho Chukuo's forces were pushed to the Shih River where they were reinforced during the night and hastily constructed fortifications against the incoming Japanese. Henceforth a propaganda war emerged over Rehe. Japan charged that Zhang Xueliang was mobilizing large forces to advance into Rehe, while China claimed the same of the Japanese. The Chinese protested the Japanese seizure of Shanhaiguan, but none of the western powers would intervene. However the League of Nations constant condemnation of Japan ever since the Mukden incident provoked the Japanese on march 27th to simply walk out on the league. The ordeal also prompted Prince Saioji Kimmochi to dispatch Major General Umezu Yoshijiro, the chief of General affairs of the army general staff and Consul Tanaka Sotaro of the foreign ministry to go over and restrain the unruly troops at various positions in the Beiping-Tientsin region. Saionji's main concern was elevated by Army Minister Araki Sadao, who on March 6th stated to Harada Kumao “that if Japan were to land about 3 divisions at Qingdao and they strike into the Peiping-Tientsin region via Tsinan, Zhang Xueliang will probably flee even before they reach Tsinan. If we do anything at all, I'd like to act boldly and go that far”. Despite claims by various sources, mostly Chinese, the Shanhaiguan incident as it became known was not actually preplanned by the Kwantung Army, it really was an arbitrary act on the part of the garrison commander. How everything went down at Shanhaiguan provided vital intel on the Northeastern Army, and what to expect in Rehe. In December of 1932, the IJA 6th Division was dispatched to Manchuria and assigned security detail in southern Jilin province. They were given further secret orders to participate in what was going to be an operation in Rehe once they arrived to Manchuria. When the Shanhaiguan incident broke out, the Rehe operation was expedited rapidly. Therefore the IJA 6th and 8th Divisions west of the Liao River were immediately tossed into the operation. Given the foreign and domestic conditions, the Rehe operation was extremely dangerous. Tokyo HQ yet again sought to reign in the men, so they sent General Umezu to Manchuria to talk to the Kwantung leadership. The Kwantung leadership was adamant the operation be unleashed before the spring that, provided the operation did not extend beyond the Great Wall. To this Tokyo HQ yet again relented.  On January 27th of 1933, General Muto Nobuyoshi, then commander of the Kwantung Army, issued the following general order for the Rehe operation designated, Operation Nekka “The situation in Jehol has become increasingly serious day by day and has now developed into a state of affairs necessitating intervention. To strengthen the foundations of Manchukuo, the time is close at hand, as far as military operations by the Kwantung Army are concerned, to put the finishing touch on our sublime task. First, the affairs of Jehol province are unquestionably an internal problem of Manchukuo. They neither embrace nor are accompanied by any international implications. Because subjugation of the province is designed to strike a fatal blow to anti-Manchukuo, anti-Japan elements, these elements purposely confuse the distinction between Jehol and North China. They move troops into the province and, glossing over these matters, raise a loud outcry, propagandizing that Japan harbors designs of territorial aggression. In this manner they have endeavored to draw the restraining attention of the world, and every move of the Kwantung Army in Jehol—even the slightest raising of a hand or the stretching of a leg—is now the object of worldwide surveillance” At this stage the Kwantung Army treated the Rehe Operation as an internal matter of Manchukuo and did not openly talk about extending it beyond the Great Wall into Hubei. But their gunna. On January 26th, General Muto issued Order 466, kinda funny how its almost order 66, but I digress. This order directed the IJA 6th and 8th Divisions to prepare to invade Rehe. On February 9th, Muto drafted the “Rehe Subjugation Plan” to some staff officers. It stated “without specific orders, operations are not to be carid out in Hubei”. It also stipulated they should “foster and promote a climate leading to the downfall of Zhang Xueliang in North China, which is the strategic base for the disturbance of Manchukuo”. On February 27th, Muto issued Order 473 which repeated to the men again not to move into Hubei. On the 29th, Muto issued another  order “The subjugation of Jehol is purely and simply an internal problem of Manchukuo. In the light of our national policy, it must not develop into a provocation for war with China. This is why Kwantung Army Operations Order 473 stipulated that, unless specific orders are issued, operations are not to be conducted beyond the Great Wall in Hopei province. I fully expect you to issue strict orders to the various units under your command that, although our forces may act freely in Jehol, which is a part of Manchukuo, they are not, without an imperial command, allowed to take any action in Hopei province, which is separated from Jehol by the Great Wall. They should be admonished that, even in the light of local circumstances, they must never be blinded by tactical considerations and miss the main point of our national policy. (In particular, the garrison at Shanhaikuan should be doubly careful and not act beyond its authorized limits.) I have learned that His Imperial Majesty, the supreme commander, is gravely concerned about the foregoing and again issue these instructions in awe of His Majesty's concern”. Thus one can read between the lines here. Emperor Hirohito put his foot down and demanded no forces go past the great wall and to this the Kwantung Army obeyed. For Operation Nekka, the IJA 6th and 8th Division would have their own theaters of operation along a line running from Paotzu, the eastern most town in Rehe to Chaoyang. The northern zone was the IJA 6th divisions theater, the southern one was the 8th's. Geneal Sakamoto Masemon led the 6th Division and ordered his forces on February 23rd to advance north along the rail line between Tahushan and Tungliao, then on towards Tienshan, Xiawa and Chaoyang. Afterwards they would carry out operations in the Chifeng-Linxu-Tolun region.  General Nishi ordered his 8th Division, excluding one unit to advance along the border around Peipiao, towards Suichung on the 27th, then into the Lingyuan region. The other unit would secure as fast as possible the important gateways along the Great Wall of China: Qilingkou, Lenkou, Xufengkou, Lowenyukou and Manlankuan to protect their divisions flank. Afterwards they would seie Chengde and Gubeikou. However he also gave explicit orders "Without specific orders, operations must not be extended beyond the Great Wall into Hopei province,". So yeah, while they had direct orders to not advance beyond the Great Wall. . . they were going to basically capture all of the key passes of the Great Wall. Kind of playing with fire.  On the other side, on January 23rd, Zhang Xueliang was meeting with Chiang Kai-Shek and our old friend Duan Qirui to discuss how to prepare for what seemed to be an impending invasion of Rehe. Chiang Kai-Shek politely said to Duan Qirui "I sincerely hope that you will come south and give me your guidance at this time of national crisis,". The real reason he sent this request was because he did not want the Japanese to enlist their former lacky against him. At the meeting, according to a Japanese intelligence report, Zhang Xueliang insisted that Chiang Kai-Shek personally come north and assume direct command of the Northern troops. Chiang Kai-Shek refused on the grounds he had to deal with the communists in Jiangxi and sent in his place Yang Que, the current president of the Army Staff College and a graduate of the Japanese Army War College. Yang would arrive to Peiping with his staff on January 30th, where he devised a plan for joint operations with Zhang Xueliang. They anticipated the Kwantung Army would cross the Great Wall at Shanhaiguan, so their basic strategy was to concentrate a large force in its region, especially east of the Luan River. That forces mission would be to defend at all costs the front line at Qinhuangdao. The Japanese intelligence indicated the Chinese had roughly 50,000 men, including 7700 men of the 25th Division ld by Kuan Lincheng and 12800 men of the 2nd Division led by Yang Que who were sent to Miyun and Gubeikou. There were also reports that ancient art objects and documents from Peiping were being transported to Nanjing, beginning on January 10th. To the Chinese public this was shocking news as one could imagine. Operation Nekka was unleashed and showcased the rapid efficiency of the Kwantung Army. By March 2nd, the IJA 6th Division routed the 41st Army of General Sun Tienying; the IJA 14th Mixed Brigade of the IJA 8th Division captured the Lengkou pass on March 4th; while the Kawahara detachment captured Chengde near the border with Hubei. General Nishi then assembld his main force at Lingyuan as the 14th Mixed Brigade withdrew to Chapeng. On March 4th, Muto issued Order 480, directing the troops "to make preparations for operations in North China, firmly seizing the major passes along the Great Wall, mopping up resistance by remnant troops and bandits, and restoring peace and order in Jehol province." One unit of the IJA 8th Division was given the task of seizing the Gubeikou Pass and advanced to such on the 7th. Within the vicinity of Changshanyu, around 40 kilometers southwest of Chengde, they encountered 5000 advancing Chinese forces. Here one of the first of many fierce battles along the Great Wall came to be. Until roughly March 20th, the Kwantung Army was met with fierce counterattacks, coming from the main gateways of the Great Wall. Initially the fighting went tremendously wall for the Japanese, yet by March 10th, the 14th Mixed Brigade had taken Tungqiaku, Tiehmenkuan and Xifengkou. Two days later the IJA 8th Division began an assault upon Gubeikou. Nishi then sent the Hayakawa Brigade to seize Lowenyukou. Then on the 10th, after receiving reports the main passes were secured, General Muto took his HQ from Jinzhu to Changchun, believing everything was already won and done. However he would be very wrong, they had misjudged the Chinese strength.  On the 13th, Muti and Nishi received a report, that on the night of the 10th, the 14th Mixed Brigade at Xifengkou had come under heavy attack by a Chinese force led by General Song Qeyuang. Reinforcements were rapidly sent over, but they were unable to relieve the trapped brigade. On the 14th, Muto ordered Genera Sakamoto to lead the Mukai unit from the 6th Brigade to help out. With this the Chinese forces were driven off and then the Japanese began assaults upon Lengkou, Lowenyukou and Quehlingkou. On the 16th, the IJA 8th Division took Quehling, but the next day received a vicious counterattack by the NRA 116th Division. At Lowenyukou the Hayakawa Brigade was counterattacked by Song Cheyuan. The Hayakawa Brigade was still able to secure on portion of the Great Wall, it was constantly under attack and unable to progress further.  On the 22nd, Nishi was forced to order his Brigade to pull back to Chengde. Over at Lengkou, the Mukai unit managed to capture the town as the 14th Mixed Brigade at Xifengkou was attacked by the NRA 139th Division. Unable to repel the counterattacks, Nishi ordered his forces back 13 kilometers on the 24th. The battles at Quehlingkou and Lowenyukou were very intense. On March 18th, Muto realized the casualties were severe and taking the gateways was not showing progress. He therefore decided to divert the 6th Divisions attention to Lengkou in a flanking maneuver aimed at severing the Chinese supply lines to the gateways and as a result this would extend operations south of the Great Wall into the region east of the Luan River. Thus there we have it, they were going past the Great Wall against Emperor Hirohito's orders.  Operation Nekka, similar to Operation Jinzhou was deemed essential to establish and protect Manchukuo. However while the battles along the Great Wall were deemed necessary to create the borders for Manchukuo, their extension past that boundary literally brought them into the heart of North China. Unlike in Manchuria, the Chinese forces in North China held excellent morale, they were very willing to fight. On top of that, they had better logistics and were fighting on top of the Great Wall, which offered significant advantages. Thus from a tactical standpoint, the Japanese had to seize the gateways and flush out the Chinese from the areas. The Chinese remained defiant. Atop the walls the Chinese defenders would shout at the Japanese waving anti-Manchukuo and anti-Japanese flags.  Outside the ongoing battle, Chiang Kai-Shek had his own, perhaps in his mind, more important battle, the one with the communists. The encirclement campaigns had all gone to shit thus far. Added to this was the invasion of Manchuria and Shanghai. As Chiang Kai-Shek would later put it "tantamount to subjecting the Government to a pincer attack both from within and without." Basically Chiang Kai-Shek could choose to focus on the Japanese or communists. He figured going into a full war against Japan would be the end of himself and his government. Thus he worked to reach an agreement with the Japanese in May of 1932 which had ended the Shanghai incident. After doing so he released a slogan "first internal pacification, then resist external aggression". Upon doing so he unleashed his full attention upon the communists. As we have seen, Chiang Kai-Sheks last encirclement campaign proved successful. But as he was in the middle of it, Operation Nekka was unleashed. It looked extremely bad for Chiang Kai-Shek, for the KMT and for China in general. On March 20th, as a gesture to indicate to the masses Chiang Kai-Shek was doing his job, he dispatched 5 divisions, roughly 50,000 men from the Central Army north. Chiang Kai-Shek personally traveled north from Hankou to Beiping, but no further than that. Back on the 10th he had received the resignation of Zhang Xueliang, who had publicly been calling for a massive war against Japan so that Manchuria could be recovered. Chiang Kai-Shek had to replace him with General He Yingqin.  Another major development at this time, was our old and dear friend who never causes any trouble, Wang Jingwei returned from I believe his 20th time in exile. He came to resume his post as president of the Executive Yuan. Yet again Wang Jingwei was trying to reconcile with Chiang Kai-Shek. In reality and as many of you might guess, the only reason Chiang Kai-Shek never had this guy shot was because Wang Jingei had the firm backing of the left, thus in order to really grab the majority of the political class he had to play nice with him. For Wang Jingwei's part, much like starscream in transformers, yes I am using this as an analogy, hes just trying to overthrow megatron every chance he gets, but always fails like a dumb idiot. There was also the dichotomy between the two men. Wang Jingwei was seen as a civilian leader while Chiang Kai-Shek was seen as a military leader. So together they seemed like a perfect team, despite the fact they loathed each other. So Wang Jingwei became the civil administrator while Chiang Kai-Shek focused on the military. In regards to Japan, Wang Jingwei was following a conciliatory policy of "resistance on the one hand and negotiation on the other,” based on Chiang Kai-Sheks slogan "first internal pacification, then resist external aggression."  Following a fight with Zhang Xueliang in August of 1932 over the issue of defending Manchuria against the Kwantung Army, Wang Jingwei had resigned, trying to strongarm Chiang Kai-Shek to get rid of the young marshal. Thus like what had happened countless times before, Wang Jingwei said he was out on sick leave, and departed for Europe for supposed treatment. When he returned 6 months later, Operation Nekka had begun, although the Japanese troops had not yet then reached the Great Wall. Wang Jingwei immediately became acting foreign minister in place of Lu Wenkuan, a supporter of Zhang Xueliang, who was notably anti-japanese. Wang Jingwei kicked Lu Wenkuan over to Xinjiang to deal with some conflicts breaking out there, fun times for him as we know.  Meanwhile He Yingqin had been placed as the head of the Peiping branch military council, entrusted with control over all military matters in North China. He Yingqin went to work reorganizing the forces in north china in mid March, forming them into an effective battle order to face the Japanese. By bringing together the local, very disorganized forces into a unified command, He Yingqin hoped they would be capable alone to block the Japanese advance, leaving the central army out of the conflict. This was because Chiang Kai-Shek did not want to risk losing his central army, considered the most elite one in all of china. But Chiang Kai-Shek did come around to the idea of at least testing some units against the Kwantung forces. Above all Chiang Kai-Shek wanted to have his cake and eat it to. He wanted he population of China to think he was actively resisting, while in reality he was biding time. Central army units deployed around Gubeikou, the main gateway leading to the Peiping-Tientsin region. When the Kwantung army leaders were planning operation Nekka, they had believed it would not be necessary to go beyond the Great Wall, but once the fighting around the walls and gateways kicked off, they knew immediately they could not hope to take the wall areas without getting behind the enemy. Particularly they needed to get past the area east of the Luan River. Some 20 Chinese divisions had assembled in the Peiping-Tientsin region and were tossing endless counter attacks along the line of the Great Wall. In the Lengkou region a force of 7000 Central Chinese Army units had penetrated deep into Rehe and smashed the Mukai detachment of the IJA 8th Division. These counterattacks reaffirmed the Kwantung Army leadership it was necessary to go beyond the Great Wall. It should also be noted the Kwantung Army's operations in North China were not just military. The Japanese were plagued with logistical problems. There was a shortage of troops because they had driven into Rehe with only 20,000 men. Even the most determined Kwantung general did not believe their military prowess could overcome the plains of Hubei packed with an immeasurable amount of Chinese troops. Therefore they had to augment this military operation with political schemes aimed at the regional warlords. During the pacification of Manchuria, the tactic of bribing local elites had worked wonders and there was zero reason to believe it would not work in North China. All of this was done without any supervision from Tokyo HQ. On February 13th of 1933, Itagaki Seishiro, at the time chief of the Mukden Special Service Agency, was transferred to the General Staff without any official announcement of this promotion. He took a post in Tientsin, specifically to begin political maneuvers in eastern Hubei. This saw the birth of the Tientsin Special Service Agency. Initially this agency was attempting to lure all the competing warlords in North China, such as, Duan Qirui, Wu Peifu, Sun Chuanfang, but then began targeting Zhang Qingyao. Zhang Qingyao had once been the protege of Duan Qirui, acting as the civil and military governor of Henan province. He had fought against Zhang Zuolin in 1925 whereupon his allegiance had shifted over to Wu Peifu. During the second phase of the Northern Expedition, Zhang Qingyao had fought again against Zhang Zuolin, then controlling the National Pacification Army. When the Northern expedition was over, he joined Yan Xishans forces in Shanxi. Thus one could easily see he was not a man of many principals, nor any specific loyalties. The Tientsin Special Service Agency first proposed to reach out to Zhang Qingyao in the hopes he could organize a coup d'etat against Chiang Kai-Shek. It was further hoped he could get Song Queyuan, Zhang Zuoxiang, Fang Chenwu, Xu Yusan, Zhang Tingshu, Sun Tienying and Feng Zhanhai to join in. If they managed this, North China would fall in a single stroke. It was hoped this would be achieved as they were taking the Great Wall and were enroute towards Peiping. However on May 7th, Zhang Qingyao was assassinated, completely ruining the plan. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Operation Nekka had been unleashed with a large bang. 20,000 Japanese troops stormed Rehe province under strict orders not to go past the Great Wall of China. So they immediately began planning how to go past the Great Wall of China. Yet what they did not expect was the determination of the Chinese defenders, who were not going to allow them an easy time.

Welcome to China Compass on the Fight Laugh Feast Network! I'm your China travel guide, Missionary Ben. Follow me on X (@chinaadventures) where I post daily reminders to pray for China (PrayforChina.us). Check out all of the other things we are involved in @ PrayGiveGo.us. I begin by recommending a relatively unknown ministry (richardwurmbrandfoundation.com/) that I respect and support (0:44). Then we talk about the pros and cons of deporting all Chinese students in the US (9:33). Next, I talk about how I learned Mandarin (21:08), beginning 22 years ago this week, followed by an overview of the unique Chinese places to pray for this week (34:36). Finally, I tell a few more stories, beginning with the fun (also 22 years ago this week) of being surrounded by police in Shunde (43:01). We end with a couple of letters from William Borden (BordenofYale.com) dating back 120 and 112 years, respectively, as he shares (51:20) about the heathenism he witnessed and why he dressed like an Arab in Cairo. Help for Refugees: The Richard Wurmbrand Foundation https://richardwurmbrandfoundation.com/ Cancel All Chinese Student Visas? https://www.newsweek.com/congressman-stop-chinas-exploitation-our-student-visa-program-opinion-2029415 How To Teach Yourself Mandarin https://chinacall.substack.com/p/how-i-taught-myself-mandarin Don’t forget to Pray for China this week (Feb 15-22! (PrayforChina.us) Feb 15 (Sat) - Pray for Yushu in far southern Qinghai, just north of Tibet. We lived in this Tibetan region back in 2004, and visited off and on over the years. Qinghai (“Cheeng-high”) is paired with southern CO, west TX, and NM for prayer: https://prayforchina.us/states/colorado.html https://pubtv.flfnetwork.com/tabs/the-pub/podcasts/30293/episodes/3 https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yushu_City,_Qinghai https://www.asiaharvest.org/china-resources/qinghai Feb 16 (Sun) - Pray for Xingping City in Xianyang Prefecture, home to the largest airport in NW China (where I was deported). Shaanxi is paired with Kansas for prayer: www.PrayforChina.us https://open.spotify.com/episode/4s6GcIAfDjfcH5a5RNjAe8 https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xingping https://www.asiaharvest.org/china-resources/shaanxi Feb 17 - Pray for Binzhou (“Bean-joe”) Prefecture in Shandong Province. Shandong ("Mountain East"), on China's east coast, is paired with Virginia for prayer: www.PrayforChina.us https://pubtv.flfnetwork.com/tabs/the-pub/podcasts/30293/episodes/49 https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Binzhou https://www.asiaharvest.org/china-resources/shandong/1900-protestant-martyrs-in-shandong Feb 18 - Pray for Xiaodian District in Taiyuan City, the capital of north China's Shanxi Province. Shanxi (“west of the mountains”) is paired up with Nebraska for prayer: www.PrayforChina.us https://pubtv.flfnetwork.com/tabs/audio/podcasts/30293/episodes/27 https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xiaodian,_Taiyuan https://www.asiaharvest.org/china-resources/shanxi Feb 19 - Pray for hilly Leshan (“Luh-shan”), a three-million-strong city in south-central Sichuan Province. Home of the panda and many unreached Tibetans, Sichuan is matched with Texas for prayer: www.PrayforChina.us https://pubtv.flfnetwork.com/tabs/the-pub/podcasts/30293/episodes/10 https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leshan https://www.asiaharvest.org/china-resources/sichuan Feb 20 - Pray for mountainous Dehong Prefecture in western Yunnan Province, home to a number of diverse ethnicities on the porous border with Myanmar. Home to huge mountains and diverse minorities, Yunnan is paired with Arkansas/Louisiana for prayer: www.PrayforChina.us https://pubtv.flfnetwork.com/tabs/audio/podcasts/30293/episodes/28 https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dehong_Dai_and_Jingpo_Autonomous_Prefecture https://www.asiaharvest.org/china-resources/yunnan Feb 21 - Pray for Xiaoshan District, the most populated within Zhejiang’s capital, Hangzhou. Hangzhou was Hudson Taylor's first field of service and where he met his first wife, Maria. Zhejiang (“Juh-jiang”) is paired with North Carolina for prayer: www.PrayforChina.us https://pubtv.flfnetwork.com/tabs/audio/podcasts/30293/episodes/24 https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xiaoshan,_Hangzhou https://www.asiaharvest.org/china-resources/zhejiang Feb 22 (Sat) - Pray for crowded Zhongshan City in southern Guangdong Province, right between Guangzhou and Macau. We've passed through here countless times. Tropical and populous Guangdong is paired up with Florida for prayer: www.PrayforChina.us https://pubtv.flfnetwork.com/tabs/audio/podcasts/30293/episodes/15 https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zhongshan https://www.asiaharvest.org/china-resources/guangdong Borden of Yale: No Reserve, No Retreat, No Regrets (BordenofYale.com): You Have Not Seen Heathenism: https://chinacall.substack.com/p/you-have-not-seen-heathenism Borden Goes Native: https://chinacall.substack.com/p/borden-of-yale-goes-native-a-la-hudson If you enjoy this podcast, follow or subscribe on Spotify or Apple or right here on PubTV. You can also email any questions or comments to contact @ PrayforChina dot us. And don’t forget to check out everything we are involved in at PrayGiveGo.us. Luke 10:2!

This episode we are taking a trip down the Silk Road--or perhaps even the Spice Road--as we investigate references in this reign to individuals from "Tukara" who seem to have arrived in Yamato and stayed for a while. For photos and more, see our podcast webpage:  https://sengokudaimyo.com/podcast/episode-119 Rough Transcript   Welcome to Sengoku Daimyo's Chronicles of Japan.  This is episode 119: The Question of “Tukara”   Traveling upon the ocean was never exactly safe.  Squalls and storms could arise at any time, and there was always a chance that high winds and high waves could capsize a vessel.  Most people who found themselves at the mercy of the ocean could do little but hold on and hope that they could ride out whatever adverse conditions they met with.  Many ships were lost without any explanation or understanding of what happened to them.  They simply left the port and never came back home. And so when the people saw the boat pulling up on the shores of Himuka, on the island of Tsukushi, they no doubt empathized with the voyagers' plight.  The crew looked bedraggled, and their clothing was unfamiliar.  There were both men and women, and this didn't look like your average fishing party.  If anything was clear it was this:  These folk weren't from around here. The locals brought out water and food.  Meanwhile, runners were sent with a message:  foreigners had arrived from a distant place.  They then waited to see what the government was going to do.     We are still in the second reign of Takara Hime, aka Saimei Tenno.  Last episode we talked about the palaces constructed in Asuka, as well as some of the stone works that have been found from the period, and which appear to be referenced in the Nihon Shoki—at least tangentially.   The episodes before that, we looked at the expeditions the court sent to the far north of Honshu and even past Honshu to Hokkaido. This episode we'll again be looking past the main islands of the archipelago to lands beyond.  Specifically, we are going to focus on particularly intriguing references to people from a place called “Tukara”.  We'll talk about some of the ideas about where that might be, even if they're a bit  far-fetched. That's because Tukara touches on the state of the larger world that Yamato was a part of, given its situation on the far eastern edge of what we know today as the Silk Road.  And is this just an excuse for me to take a detour into some of the more interesting things going on outside the archipelago?  No comment. The first mention of a man from Tukara actually comes at the end of the reign of Karu, aka Koutoku Tennou.  We are told that in the fourth month of 654 two men and two women of “Tukara” and one woman of “Sha'e” were driven by a storm to Hiuga.  Then, three years later, the story apparently picks up again, though possibly referring to a different group of people.  On the 3rd day of the 7th month of 657, so during the second reign of Takara Hime, we now hear about two men and four women of the Land of Tukara—no mention of Sha'e—who drifted to Tsukushi, aka Kyushu.  The Chronicles mention that these wayfarers first drifted to the island of Amami, and we'll talk about that in a bit, but let's get these puzzle pieces on the table, first.  After those six people show up, the court sent for them by post-horse.  They must have arrived by the 15th of that same month, because we are told that a model of Mt. Sumi was erected and they—the people from Tukara—were entertained, although there is another account that says they were from “Tora”. The next mention is the 10th day of the 3rd month of 659, when a Man of Tukara and his wife, again woman of Sha'e, arrived.  Then, on the 16th day of the 7th month of 660, we are told that the man of Tukara, Kenzuhashi Tatsuna, desired to return home and asked for an escort.  He planned to pay his respects at the Great Country, i.e. the Tang court, and so he left his wife behind, taking tens of men with him. All of these entries might refer to people regularly reaching Yamato from the south, from a place called “Tukara”.  Alternately, this is a single event whose story has gotten distributed over several years, as we've seen happen before with the Chronicles.  .  One of the oddities of these entries is that the terms used are not consistent.  “Tukara” is spelled at least two different ways, suggesting that it wasn't a common placename like Silla or Baekje, or even the Mishihase.  That does seem to suggest that the Chronicles were phonetically trying to find kanji, or the Sinitic characters, to match with the name they were hearing.   I would also note that “Tukara” is given the status of a “kuni”—a land, country, or state—while “sha'e”, where some of the women are said to come from, is just that, “Sha'e”. As for the name of at least one person from Tokara, Kenzuhashi Tatsuna, that certainly sounds like someone trying to fit a non-Japanese name into the orthography of the time.  “Tatsuna” seems plausibly Japanese, but “Kenzuhashi” doesn't fit quite as well into the naming structures we've seen to this point. The location of “Tukara” and “Sha'e” are not clear in any way, and as such there has been a lot of speculation about them.  While today there are placenames that fit those characters, whether or not these were the places being referenced at the time is hard to say. I'll actually start with “Sha'e”, which Aston translates as Shravasti, the capital of the ancient Indian kingdom of Kosala, in modern Uttar Pradesh.  It is also where the Buddha, Siddartha Gautama, is said to have lived most of his life after his enlightenment.  In Japanese this is “Sha'e-jou”, and like many Buddhist terms it likely comes through Sanskrit to Middle Chinese to Japanese.  One—or possibly two—women from Shravasti making the journey to Yamato in the company of a man (or men) from Tukara seems quite the feat.  But then, where is “Tukara”? Well, we have at least three possible locations that I've seen bandied about.  I'll address them from the most distant to the closest option.  These three options were Tokharistan, Dvaravati, and the Tokara islands. We'll start with Tokharistan on the far end of the Silk Road.  And to start, let's define what that “Silk Road” means.  We've talked in past episodes about the “Western Regions”, past the Han-controlled territories of the Yellow River.   The ancient Tang capital of Chang'an was built near to the home of the Qin dynasty, and even today you can go and see both the Tang tombs and the tomb of Qin Shihuangdi and his terracotta warriors, all within a short distance of Xi'an, the modern city built on the site of Chang'an.  That city sits on a tributary of the Yellow River, but the main branch turns north around the border of modern Henan and the similarly sounding provinces of Shanxi and Shaanxi.  Following it upstream, the river heads north into modern Mongolia, turns west, and then heads south again, creating what is known as the Ordos loop.  Inside is the Ordos plateau, also known as the Ordos Basin.  Continuing to follow the Yellow river south, on the western edge of the Ordos, you travel through Ningxia and Gansu—home of the Hexi, or Gansu, Corridor.  That route eventually takes to Yumenguan, the Jade Gate, and Dunhuang.  From there roads head north or south along the edge of the Taklamakan desert in the Tarim basin.  The southern route travels along the edge of the Tibetan plateau, while the northern route traversed various oasis cities through Turpan, Kucha, to the city of Kashgar.  Both routes made their way across the Pamirs and the Hindu Kush into South Asia. We've brought up the Tarim Basin and the Silk Road a few times.  This is the path that Buddhism appears to have taken to get to the Yellow River Basin and eventually to the Korean Peninsula and eastward to the Japanese archipelago.  But I want to go a bit more into detail on things here, as there is an interesting side note about “Tukara” that I personally find rather fascinating, and thought this would be a fun time to share. Back in Episode 79 we talked about how the Tarim basin used to be the home to a vast inland sea, which was fed by the meltwater from the Tianshan and Kunlun mountains.  This sea eventually dwindled, though it was still large enough to be known to the Tang as the Puchang Sea.  Today it has largely dried up, and it is mostly just the salt marshes of Lop Nur that remain.  Evidence for this larger sea, however, can be observed in some of the burials found around the Tarim basin.  These burials include the use of boat-shaped structures—a rather curious feature to be found out in the middle of the desert. And it is the desert that was left behind as the waters receded that is key to much of what we know about life in the Tarim basin, as it has proven to be quite excellent at preserving organic material.  This includes bodies, which dried out and naturally turned into mummies, including not only the wool clothing they were wearing, but also features such as hair and even decoration. These “Tarim mummies”, as they have been collectively called, date from as early as 2100 BCE all the way up through the period of time we're currently talking about, and have been found in several desert sites: Xiaohe, the earliest yet discovered; Loulan, near Lop Nur on the east of the Tarim Basin, dating from around 1800 BCE; Cherchen, on the southern edge of the Tarim Basin, dating from roughly 1000 BCE; and too many others to go into in huge detail. The intriguing thing about these burials is that  many of them don't have features typically associated with people of ethnic Han—which is to say traditional Chinese—ancestry, nor do they necessarily have the features associated with the Xiongnu and other steppe nomads.  In addition they have colorful clothing  made from wool and leather, with vivid designs.  Some bodies near Hami, just east of the basin, were reported to have blonde to light brown hair, and their cloth showed radically different patterns from that found at Cherchen and Loulan, with patterns that could reasonably be compared with the plaids now common in places like Scotland and Ireland, and previously found in the Hallstadt salt mine in Central Europe from around 3500 BCE, from which it is thought the Celtic people may have originated. At the same time that people—largely Westerners— were studying these mummies, another discovery in the Tarim basin was also making waves.  This was the discovery of a brand new language.  Actually, it was two languages—or possibly two dialects of a language—in many manuscripts, preserved in Kucha and Turpan.  Once again, the dry desert conditions proved invaluable to maintain these manuscripts, which date from between the late 4th or early 5th century to the 8th century.  They are written with a Brahmic script, similar to that used for Sanskrit, which appears in the Tarim Basin l by about the 2nd century, and we were able to translate them because many of the texts were copies of Buddhist scripture, which greatly helped scholars in deciphering the languages.  These two languages were fascinating because they represented an as-yet undiscovered branch of the Indo-European language family.  Furthermore, when compared to other Indo-European languages, they did not show nearly as much similarity with their neighbors as with languages on the far western end of the Indo-European language family.  That is to say they were thought to be closer to Celtic and Italic languages than something like Indo-Iranian.  And now for a quick diversion within the diversion:  “Centum” and “Satem” are general divisions of the Indo-European language families that was once thought to indicate a geographic divide in the languages.  At its most basic, as Indo-European words changed over time, a labiovelar sound, something like “kw”,  tended to evolve in one of two ways.  In the Celtic and Italic languages, the “kw” went to a hard “k” sound, as represented in the classical pronunciation of the Latin word for 100:  Centum.  That same word, in the Avestan language—of the Indo-Iranian tree—is pronounced as “Satem”, with an “S” sound.  So, you can look at Indo-European languages and divide them generally into “centum” languages, which preserve the hard “k”, or “Satem” languages that preserve the S. With me so far? Getting back to these two newly-found languages in the Tarim Basin, the weird thing is that they were “Centum” languages. Most Centum languages are from pretty far away, though: they are generally found in western Europe or around the Mediterranean, as opposed to the Satem languages, such as Indo-Aryan, Iranian, Armernian, or even Baltic Slavic languages, which are much closer to the Tarim Basin.  So if the theory were true that the “Centum” family of Indo-European languages developed in the West and “Satem” languages developed in the East, then that would seem to indicate that a group of a “Centum” speaking people must have migrated eastward, through the various Satem speaking people, and settled in the Tarim Basin many thousands of years ago. And what evidence do we have of people who look very different from the modern population, living in the Tarim Basin area long before, and wearing clothing similar to what we associated with the progenitors of the Celts?  For many, it seemed to be somewhat obvious, if still incredible, that the speakers of this language were likely the descendants of the mummies who, in the terminology of the time, had been identified as being of Caucasoid ancestry.  A theory developed that these people were an offshoot of a group called the Yamnaya culture, which may have arisen around modern Ukraine as an admixture between the European Hunter Gatherers and the Caucasian Hunter Gatherers, around 3300-2600 BCE.  This was challenged in 2021 when a genetic study was performed on some of the mummies in the Tarim basin, as well as several from the Dzungarian basin, to the northeast.  That study suggested that the people of the Dzungarian basin had genetic ties to the people of the Afanasievo people, from Southern Siberia.  The Afanasievo people are connected to the Yamnayan culture. It should be noted that there has long been a fascination in Western anthropology and related sciences with racial identification—and often not in a healthy way.  As you may recall, the Ainu were identified as “Caucasoid” by some people largely because of things like the men's beards and lighter colored hair, which differ greatly from a large part of the Japanese population.  However, that claim has been repeatedly refuted and debunked. And similarly, the truth is, none of these Tarim mummy burials were in a period of written anything, so we can't conclusively associated them with these fascinating Indo-European languages.  There are thousands of years between the various burials and the manuscripts. These people  left no notes stashed in pockets that give us their life story.   And Language is not Genetics is not Culture.  Any group may adopt a given language for a variety of reasons.  .  Still, given what we know, it is possible that the ancient people of the Tarim basin spoke some form of “Proto-Kuchean”, but it is just as likely that this language was brought in by people from Dzungaria at some point. So why does all this matter to us?  Well, remember how we were talking about someone from Tukara?  The Kuchean language, at least, is referred to in an ancient Turkic source as belonging to “Twgry”, which led several scholars to draw a link between this and the kingdom and people called Tukara and the Tokharoi.  This leads us on another bit of a chase through history. Now if you recall, back in Episode 79, we talked about Zhang Qian.  In 128 BCE, he attempted to cross the Silk Road through the territory of the Xiongnu on a mission for the Han court.  Some fifty years earlier, the Xiongnu had defeated the Yuezhi.  They held territory in the oasis towns along the north of the Taklamakan dessert, from about the Turpan basin west to the Pamirs. The Xiongnu were causing problems for the Han, who thought that if they could contact the remaining Yuezhi they could make common cause with them and harass the Xiongnu from both sides.  Zhang Qian's story is quite remarkable: he started out with an escort of some 99 men and a translator.  Unfortunately, he was captured and enslaved by the Xiongnu during his journey, and he is even said to have had a wife and fathered a child.  He remained a captive for thirteen years, but nonetheless, he was able to escape with his family and he made it to the Great Yuezhi on the far side of the Pamirs, but apparently the Yuezhi weren't interested in a treaty against the Xiongnu.  The Pamirs were apparently enough of a barrier and they were thriving in their new land.  And so Zhang Qian crossed back again through Xiongnu territory, this time taking the southern route around the Tarim basin.  He was still captured by the Xiongnu, who spared his life.  He escaped, again, two years later, returning to the Han court.  Of the original 100 explorers, only two returned: Zhang Qian and his translator.  While he hadn't obtained an alliance, he was able to detail the cultures of the area of the Yuezhi. Many feel that the Kushan Empire, which is generally said to have existed from about 30 to 375 CE,was formed from the Kushana people who were part of the Yuezhi who fled the Xiongnu. In other words, they were originally from further north, around the Tarim Basin, and had been chased out and settled down in regions that included Bactria (as in the Bactrian camel).  Zhang Qian describes reaching the Dayuan Kingdom in the Ferghana valley, then traveling south to an area that was the home of the Great Yuezhi or Da Yuezhi.  And after the Kushan empire fell, we know there was a state in the upper regions of the Oxus river, centered on the city of Balkh, in the former territory of the Kushan empire. known as “Tokara”.  Geographically, this matches up how Zhang Qian described the home of the Da Yuezhi.  Furthermore, some scholars reconstruct the reading of the Sinic characters used for “Yuezhi” as originally having an optional reading of something like “Togwar”, but that is certainly not the most common reconstructed reading of those characters.  Greek sources describe this area as the home of the Tokharoi, or the Tokaran People.  The term “Tukhara” is also found in Sanskrit, and this kingdom  was also said to have sent ambassadors to the Southern Liang and Tang dynasties. We aren't exactly certain of where these Tokharan people came from, but as we've just described, there's a prevailing theory that they were the remnants of the Yuezhi and Kushana people originally from the Tarim Basin.  We know that in the 6th century they came under the rule of the Gokturk Khaganate, which once spanned from the Liao river basin to the Black Sea.  In the 7th and 8th centuries they came under the rule of the Tang Empire, where they were known by very similar characters as those used to write “Tukara” in the Nihon Shoki.  On top of this, we see Tokharans traveling the Silk Road, all the way to the Tang court.  Furthermore, Tokharans that settled in Chang'an took the surname “Zhi” from the ethnonym “Yuezhi”, seemingly laying claim to and giving validation to the identity used back in the Han dynasty.   So, we have a Turkic record describing the Kuchean people (as in, from Kucha in the Tarim Basin) as “Twgry”, and we have a kingdom in Bactria called Tokara and populated (according to the Greeks) by people called Tokharoi.  You can see how this one term has been a fascinating rabbit hole in the study of the Silk Roads and their history.  And some scholars understandably suggested that perhaps the Indo-European languags found in Kucha and Turpan  were actually related to this “Tokhara” – and therefore  should be called “Tocharian”, specifically Tocharian A (Kuchean) or Tocharian B (Turfanian). The problem is that if the Tokharans were speaking “Tocharian” then you wouldn't expect to just see it at Kucha and Turpan, which are about the middle of the road between Tokhara and the Tang dynasty, and which had long been under Gokturk rule.  You would also expect to see it in the areas of Bactria associated with Tokhara.  However, that isn't what we see.  Instead, we see that Bactria was the home of local Bactrian language—an Eastern Iranian language, which, though it is part of the Indo European language family, it is not closely related to Tocharian as far as we can tell. It is possible that the people of Kucha referred to themselves as something similar to “Twgry”, or “Tochari”, but we should also remember that comes from a Turkic source, and it could have been an exonym not related to what they called themselves.  I should also note that language is not people.  It is also possible that a particular ethnonym was maintained separately by two groups that may have been connected politically but which came to speak different languages for whatever reason.   There could be a connection between the names, or it could even be that the same or similar exonym was used for different groups. So, that was a lot and a bit of a ramble, but a lot of things that I find interesting—even if they aren't as connected as they may appear.  We have the Tarim mummies, which are, today, held at a museum in modern Urumqi.  Whether they had any connection with Europe or not, they remain a fascinating study for the wealth of material items found in and around the Tarim basin and similar locations.  And then there is the saga of the Tocharian languages—or perhaps more appropriately the Kuchean-Turfanian languages: Indo-European languages that seem to be well outside of where we would expect to find them. Finally, just past the Pamirs, we get to the land of Tokhara or Tokharistan.  Even without anything else, we know that they had contact with the court.  Perhaps our castaways were from this land?  The name is certainly similar to what we see in the Nihon Shoki, using some of the same characters. All in all, art and other information suggest that the area of the Tarim basin and the Silk Road in general were quite cosmopolitan, with many different people from different regions of the world.  Bactria retained Hellenic influences ever since the conquests of Alexander of Macedonia, aka Alexander the Great, and Sogdian and Persian traders regularly brought their caravans through the region to trade.  And once the Tang dynasty controlled all of the routes, that just made travel that much easier, and many people traveled back and forth. So from that perspective, it is possible that one or more people from Tukhara may have made the crossing from their home all the way to the Tang court, but if they did so, the question still remains: why would they be in a boat? Utilizing overland routes, they would have hit Chang'an or Louyang, the dual capitals of the Tang empire, well before they hit the ocean.  However, the Nihon Shoki says that these voyagers first came ashore at Amami and then later says that they were trying to get to the Tang court. Now there was another “Silk Road” that isn't as often mentioned: the sea route, following the coast of south Asia, around through the Malacca strait and north along the Asian coast.  This route is sometimes viewed more in terms of the “spice” road If these voyagers set out to get to the Tang court by boat, they would have to have traveled south to the Indian Ocean—possibly traveling through Shravasti or Sha'e, depending on the route they chose to take—and then around the Malacca strait—unless they made it on foot all the way to Southeast Asia.  And then they would have taken a boat up the coast. Why do that instead of taking the overland route?  They could likely have traveled directly to the Tang court over the overland silk road.  Even the from Southeast Asia could have traveled up through Yunnan and made their way to the Tang court that way.  In fact, Zhang Qian had wondered something similar when he made it to the site of the new home of the Yuezhi, in Bactria.  Even then, in the 2nd century, he saw products in the marketplace that he identified as coming from around Szechuan.  That would mean south of the Han dynasty, and he couldn't figure out how those trade routes might exist and they weren't already known to the court.  Merchants would have had to traverse the dangerous mountains if they wanted to avoid being caught by the Xiongnu, who controlled the entire region. After returning to the Han court, Zhang Qian actually went out on another expedition to the south, trying to find the southern trade routes, but apparently was not able to do so.  That said, we do see, in later centuries, the trade routes open up between the area of the Sichuan basin and South Asia.  We also see the migrations of people further south, and there may have even been some Roman merchants who traveled up this route to find their way to the Han court, though those accounts are not without their own controversy. In either case, whether by land or sea, these trade routes were not always open.  In some cases, seasonal weather, such as monsoons, might dictate movement back and forth, while political realities were also a factor.  Still, it is worth remembering that even though most people were largely concerned with affairs in their own backyard, the world was still more connected than people give it credit for.  Tang dynasty pottery made its way to the east coast of Africa, and ostriches were brought all the way to Chang'an. As for the travelers from Tukhara and why they would take this long and very round-about method of travel, it is possible that they were just explorers, seeking new routes, or even on some kind of pilgrimage.  Either way, they would have been way off course. But if they did pass through Southeast Asia, that would match up with another theory about what “Tukara” meant: that it actually refers to the Dvaravati kingdom in what is now modern Thailand.  The Dvaravati Kingdom was a Mon political entity that rose up around the 6th century.  It even sent embassies to the Sui and Tang courts.  This is even before the temple complexes in Siem Reap, such as Preah Ko and the more famous Angkor Wat.  And it was during this time that the ethnic Tai people are thought to have started migrating south from Yunnan, possibly due to pressures from the expanding Sui and Tang empires.  Today, most of what remains of the Dvaravati kingdom are the ruins of ancient stone temples, showing a heavy Indic influence, and even early Buddhist practices as well.  “Dvaravati” may not actually be the name of the kingdom but it comes from an inscription on a coin found from about that time.  The Chinese refer to it as  “To-lo-po-ti” in contemporary records.  It may not even have been a kingdom, but  more of a confederation of city-states—it is hard to piece everything together.  That it was well connected, though, is clear from the archaeological record.  In Dvaravati sites, we see coins from as far as Rome, and we even have a lamp found in modern Pong Tuk that appears to match similar examples from the Byzantine Empire in the 6th century.  Note that this doesn't mean it arrived in the 6th century—similarly with the coins—but the Dvaravati state lasted until the 12th century. If that was the case, perhaps there were some women from a place called “Shravasti” or similar, especially given the Indic influence in the region. Now, given the location of the Dvaravati, it wouldn't be so farfetched to think that someone might sail up from the Gulf of Thailand and end up off-course, though it does mean sailing up the entire Ryukyuan chain or really running off course and finding yourself adrift on the East China sea.  And if they were headed to the Tang court, perhaps they did have translators or knew Chinese, since Yamato was unlikely to know the Mon language of Dvaravati and people from Dvaravati probably wouldn't know the Japonic language.  Unless, perhaps, they were communicating through Buddhist priests via Sanskrit. We've now heard two possibilities for Tukara, both pretty far afield: the region of Tokara in Bactria, and the Dvaravati kingdom in Southeast Asia.  That said, the third and simplest explanation—and the one favored by Aston in his translation of the Nihon Shoki—is that Tukara is actually referring to a place in the Ryukyu island chain.  Specifically, there is a “Tokara” archipelago, which spans between Yakushima and Amami-Oshima.  This is part of the Nansei islands, and the closest part of the Ryukyuan island chain to the main Japanese archipelago.  This is the most likely theory, and could account for the entry talking about Amami.  It is easy to see how sailors could end up adrift, too far north, and come to shore in Hyuga, aka Himuka, on the east side of Kyushu.  It certainly would make more sense for them to be from this area of the Ryukyuan archipelago than from anywhere else.  From Yakushima to Amami-Oshima is the closest part of the island chain to Kyushu, and as we see in the entry from the Shoku Nihongi, those three places seem to have been connected as being near to Japan.  So what was going on down there, anyway? Well, first off, let's remember that the Ryukyuan archipelago is not just the island of Okinawa, but a series of islands that go from Kyushu all the way to the island of Taiwan.  Geographically speaking, they are all part of the same volcanic ridge extending southward.  The size of the islands and their distance from each other does vary, however, creating some natural barriers in the form of large stretches of open water, which have shaped how various groups developed on the islands. Humans came to the islands around the same time they were reaching the Japanese mainland.  In fact, some of our only early skeletal remains for early humans in Japan actually come from either the Ryukyuan peninsula in the south or around Hokkaido to the north, and that has to do with the acidity of the soil in much of mainland Japan. Based on genetic studies, we know that at least two groups appear to have inhabited the islands from early times.  One group appears to be related to the Jomon people of Japan, while the other appears to be more related to the indigenous people of Taiwan, who, themselves, appear to have been the ancestors of many Austronesian people.  Just as some groups followed islands to the south of Taiwan, some appear to have headed north.  However, they only made it so far.  As far as I know there is no evidence they made it past Miyakoshima, the northernmost island in the Sakishima islands.  Miyako island is separated from the next large island, Okinawa, by a large strait, known as the Miyako Strait, though sometimes called the Kerama gap in English.  It is a 250km wide stretch of open ocean, which is quite the distance for anyone to travel, even for Austronesian people of Taiwan, who had likely not developed the extraordinary navigational technologies that the people who would become the Pacific Islanders would discover. People on the Ryukyu island chain appear to have been in contact with the people of the Japanese archipelago since at least the Jomon period, and some of the material artifacts demonstrate a cultural connection.  That was likely impacted by the Akahoya eruption, about 3500 years ago, and then re-established at a later date.  We certainly see sea shells and corals trade to the people of the Japanese islands from fairly early on. Unlike the people on the Japanese archipelago, the people of the Ryukyuan archipelago did not really adopt the Yayoi and later Kofun culture.  They weren't building large, mounded tombs, and they retained the character of a hunter-gatherer society, rather than transitioning to a largely agricultural way of life.  The pottery does change in parts of Okinawa, which makes sense given the connections between the regions.  Unfortunately, there is a lot we don't know about life in the islands around this time.  We don't exactly have written records, other than things like the entries in the Nihon Shoki, and those are hardly the most detailed of accounts.  In the reign of Kashikiya Hime, aka Suiko Tennou, we see people from Yakushima, which is, along with Tanegashima, one of the largest islands at the northern end of the Ryukyu chain, just before you hit Kagoshima and the Osumi peninsula on the southern tip of Kyushu.  The islands past that would be the Tokara islands, until you hit the large island of Amami. So you can see how it would make sense that the people from “Tokara” would make sense to be from the area between Yakushima and Amami, and in many ways this explanation seems too good to be true.  There are a only a few things that make this a bit peculiar. First, this doesn't really explain the woman from “Sha'e” in any compelling way that I can see.  Second, the name, Kenzuhashi Tatsuna doesn't seem to fit with what we generally know about early Japonic names, and the modern Ryukyuan language certainly is a Japonic language, but there are still plenty of possible explanations.  There is also the connection of Tokara with “Tokan”, which is mentioned in an entry in 699 in the Shoku Nihongi, the Chronicle that follows on, quite literally to the Nihon Shoki.  Why would they call it “Tokan” instead of “Tokara” so soon after?  Also, why would these voyagers go back to their country by way of the Tang court?  Unless, of course, that is where they were headed in the first place.  In which case, did the Man from Tukara intentionally leave his wife in Yamato, or was she something of a hostage while they continued on their mission?   And so those are the theories.  The man from “Tukara” could be from Tokhara, or Tokharistan, at the far end of the Silk Road.  Or it could have been referring to the Dvaravati Kingdom, in modern Thailand.  Still, in the end, Occam's razor suggests that the simplest answer is that these were actually individuals from the Tokara islands in the Ryukyuan archipelago.  It is possible that they were from Amami, not that they drifted there.  More likely, a group from Amami drifted ashore in Kyushu as they were trying to find a route to the Tang court, as they claimed.  Instead they found themselves taking a detour to the court of Yamato, instead. And we could have stuck with that story, but I thought that maybe, just maybe, this would be a good time to reflect once again on how connected everything was.  Because even if they weren't from Dvaravati, that Kingdom was still trading with Rome and with the Tang.  And the Tang controlled the majority of the overland silk road through the Tarim basin.  We even know that someone from Tukhara made it to Chang'an, because they were mentioned on a stele that talked about an Asian sect of Christianity, the “Shining Religion”, that was praised and allowed to set up shop in the Tang capital, along with Persian Manicheans and Zoroastrians.  Regardless of where these specific people may have been from, the world was clearly growing only more connected, and prospering, as well. Next episode we'll continue to look at how things were faring between the archipelago and the continent. Until then thank you for listening and for all of your support. If you like what we are doing, please tell your friends and feel free to rate us wherever you listen to podcasts.  If you feel the need to do more, and want to help us keep this going, we have information about how you can donate on Patreon or through our KoFi site, ko-fi.com/sengokudaimyo, or find the links over at our main website,  SengokuDaimyo.com/Podcast, where we will have some more discussion on topics from this episode. Also, feel free to reach out to our Sengoku Daimyo Facebook page.  You can also email us at the.sengoku.daimyo@gmail.com.  Thank you, also, to Ellen for their work editing the podcast. And that's all for now.  Thank you again, and I'll see you next episode on Sengoku Daimyo's Chronicles of Japan.  

Last time we spoke about the Long March. Amidst escalating conflicts, the Red Army, led by the newly empowered Mao Zedong, faced immense pressures from the Nationalist Army. Struggling through defeats and dwindling forces, they devised a bold retreat known as the Long March. Starting in October 1934, they evaded encirclement and crossed treacherous terrain, enduring heavy losses. Despite dire circumstances, their resilience allowed them to regroup, learn from past missteps, and ultimately strengthen their strategy, securing Mao's leadership and setting the stage for future successes against the KMT. During the Long March (1934-1936), the Red Army skillfully maneuvered through treacherous terrain, evading the pursuing National Revolutionary Army. Despite harsh conditions and dwindling numbers, advances and strategic ploys allowed them to cross critical rivers and unite with reinforcements. Under Mao Zedong's leadership, they faced internal struggles but ultimately preserved their unity. By journey's end, they had transformed into a formidable force, setting the stage for future victories against their adversaries and solidifying their influence in China.   #131 The Complicated Story about Xinjiang Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. I've said probably too many times, but theres one last major series of events I'd like to cover before we jump into the beginning of the 15 year war between China and Japan. When I say Xinjiang I imagine there are two responses from you in the audience, 1) what the hell is Xinjiang or number 2) oh what about that place in northwest China. That pretty much sums it up, the history of this province, or region if you want to call it that is almost never spoken about. It was a place as we have seen multiple times in the series, where conflicts come and go like the weather. But in the 1930's things really heated up. What I want to talk about is collectively part of the Xinjiang Wars, but more specifically I want to talk about the Kumul Rebellion. There's really no way to jump right into this one so I am going to have to explain a bit about the history of Xinjiang.  Xinjiang in a political sense is part of China and has been the cornerstone of China's strength and prestige going back to the Han dynasty over 2000 years ago. In a cultural sense however, Xinjiang is more inline with the Muslim dominated middle-east. It's closer to th Turkic and Iranian speaking peoples of Central Asia. From a geographical point of view Xinjiang is very much on the periphery. It is very isolated from western asia by the massed ranks of the Hindu Kush, the Pamirs, the Tien Shan, the Indian Subcontinent of Karakoram, Kunlun, the Himalaya ranges and of course by the Gobi desert. It neither belongs to the east or west. As a province of China its the largest and most sparsely populated. It can be divided into two main regions, the Tarim Basin and Zungharia and then into two lesser but economically significant regions, the Ili Valley and Turgan Depression. The Tien Shan mountain range extends roughly eastward from the Pamir Massif, creating a formidable barrier between Zungharia and the Tarim Basin. This natural obstacle complicates direct communication between the two regions, particularly during winter. The Ili Valley, separated from Zungharia by a northern extension of the Tien Shan, is physically isolated from the rest of the province and can only be easily accessed from the west. This western area came under Russian control in the mid-nineteenth century and now forms part of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic. Now it has to be acknowledged, since the formation of the PRC in 1949, Xinjiang changed in size and ethnic composition. The CCP drove a massive Han migrant wave over. Regardless, Han's make up a minority and according to some population statistics taken during the 1940s, Xinjiang was dominated by 7 Muslim nationalities, roughly 3.5 million people out of a total population of 3.7 million. 200,000 of these were Han settlers, while 75,000-100,000 were Mongols, Russians, Tunguzic peoples (those being Sibo, Solon and Manchu), a few Tibetans, Afghans and Indians. Among the various indigenous Muslim nationalities of Xinjiang, the Uighurs stand out as the most numerous and politically important. This Turkic-speaking group primarily consists of sedentary agriculturalists who reside in the oases of the Tarim Basin, Turfan, Kumul, and the fertile lowlands of the Hi Valley. In the late 1940s, the Uyghur population in Xinjiang was estimated to be approximately 2,941,000. Following the Uyghurs, the second-largest Muslim nationality in the region is the Kazakhs, with an estimated population of around 319,000 during the late Republican Period. Kirghiz come in third, with an estimated population of about 65,000 at the same time. Both the Kazakhs and Kirghiz in Xinjiang are nomadic Turkic-speaking peoples, with the Kazakhs primarily found in the highland areas of Zungharia and the Hi Valley, while the Kirghiz inhabit the upland pastures of the Tien Shan and Pamirs. There also exist a small group of Iranian-speaking 'Mountain' Tajiks living in the upland Sarikol region in the far southwest, with an estimated population of 9,000 in the mid-1940s; a primarily urban group of Uzbeks residing in larger oasis towns and cities of the Tarim Basin, numbering approximately 8,000 in the mid-1940s; and a smaller group of Tatars settled mainly in Urumqi and the townships near the Xinjiang-Soviet border, estimated at 5,000 during the same period. Lastly, it is important to mention the Hui, a group of Chinese-speaking Muslims dispersed throughout China, particularly in Zungharia and Kumul within Xinjiang, as well as in the neighboring northwestern provinces of Gansu, Qinghai, and Ningxia. Known as 'Tungan' in Xinjiang, the Hui population was estimated at around 92,000 in the mid-1940s and held significant political and military influence during the Republican Period. Excluding the Ismaili Tajik's of Sarikol, the Muslim population of Xinjiang, whether Turkic or Chinese speaking, are Sunni following the orthodox of Hanafi Madhhab.  As for the non Muslim population, excluding the Mongols who numbered roughly 63,000 and inhabit a narrow strip of land along the northeastern frontier between Xinjiang and the Mongolian People's Republic, Tien Shan, Ili Vally and Chuguchak, most were newcomers, migrants from the mid 18th century while the region was being conquered. Again according to the same statistics from the 1940s I mentioned, Hans represented 3-4 % of the population. Although the Han population disproportionately held power with the main administrative areas, they had no sizable territorial enclaves. The Han population can basically be divided into 5 groups; descendants of exiled criminals and political offenders; Hunanese settlers who came over after Zuo Zungtang's conquests; Tientsin merchants who were supplying Zuo's army; Shanxi caravaneers who came to trade and Gansu colonists. Lastly there were the Tunguzic Peoples and Russians. The Tunguzic speaking Sibo, Solon and Manchu settled mostly in the Ili region. The Russians also tended to live in the Ili region. These were mostly White Russian refugees from the civil war.  Xinjiang's first Republican governor was Yang Zengxin, a Yunnanese native. He had previously worked as the district magistrate in Gansu and Ningxia earning a reputation as a good manager of the local Tungan Muslim population. In 1908 he was transferred to Xinjiang and quickly found himself promoted to by the last Qing governor of Xinjiang. He held out his post after the Xinhai revolution and quelled a Urumqi rebellion soon after. Yang Zengxin's survived politically by always siding with whichever faction he thought was winning. For example in 1917, President Li Yuanghong dispatched Fan Yaonan to watch over Yang and try to replace him if possible. Yang recognized quickly whichever Warlord faction held power over the Beiyang government should be courted. Thus Yang held out for a long time and his province was comparably peaceful compared to most of warlord era China. To maintain his power, Yang enacted a divide and rule style, trying to placate the conflicts between certain groups within Xinjiang, but made sure to exclude Russian influence. Basically Yang tried his best to keep groups who could come into conflict away from each other, keeping the Uyghurs of southern Xinjiang away from the pastoral nomads of Zungharia and Tien Shan. Above all Yang considered the Bolshevik Russians to be the greatest threat to his regime, in his words “The Russians ... aimed at ... isolating the country from all outside influence, and at maintaining it in a state of medieval stagnation, thus removing any possibility of conscious and organised national resistance. As their religious and educational policy, the Russian administrators sought to preserve the archaic form of Islam and Islamic culture. . . Quranic schools of the most conservative type were favoured and protected against any modernist influence”. During his 16 year of power, Yang established himself as a competent autocrat, a mandarin of the old school and quite the capable administrator. Yet his economic policies were long term exploitative causing hardship and exhausting the province. Yang realized he was reached the threshold of what the population was willing to endure and endeavored to allow corruption to emerge within his administration provided it remained within acceptable limits. IE: did not spring forward a Muslim revolution. He opened junior positions in the administration to Muslims which had a duel effect. It made the Muslim community feel like they were part of greater things, but placed said officials in the path of the populations anger, insulating senior Han officials. Ironically it would be his fellow Han Chinese officials who would become angry with him. Some were simply ambitious of his power, others felt that Xinjiang should be more closely inline with China proper.  Rumors have it that after a dinnr party, Yang deliberately surrounded himself with opium addicts, stating to his subordinates “the inveterate opium smoker thinks more of his own comfort and convenience than of stirring up unrest among his subordinates”. Needless to say, Yang later years saw him seriously alienating senior officials. By 1926 he claimed “to have created an earthly paradise in a remote region” so he seemed to be quite full of himself. That same year he turned against his Tungan subordinates. He accused many of conspiring with Ma Qi, a Tungan warlord of Xuning in Qinghai, whom he also thought were driven by Urumqi. Deprived of his formerly loyal Tungans, Yang found himself increasingly isolated. A expedition was sent to Urumqi in 1926, whr G. N Roerich noted “The Governor's residence consisted of several well-isolated buildings and enclosed courtyards. The gates were carefully guarded by patrols of heavily armed men ... The Governor's yamen seemed to us to be in a very dilapidated condition. The glass in many of the windows on the ground floor was broken and dirty papers and rags had been pasted on the window frames. Numerous retainers roamed about the courtyards and villainous bodyguards, armed with mauser pistols, were on duty at the entrance to the yamen.” It seems likely Yang had decided to leave Xinjiang at that point. He had amassed a immense personal fortune and sent much of it to his family in China proper and also to Manila where he had a bank account. Further evidence of this was provided by Mildred Cable and Francesca French, two members of the China inland Mission who reported 'Wise old Governor Yang ... as early as 1926 ... quietly arranged a way of escape for his family and for the transference of his wealth to the security of the British Concession in Tientsin. Later in the same year, accompanied by several 'luggage cases of valuables', Yang's eldest son was sent out of Sinkiang, travelling incognito, in the company of these missionaries”. It was also at this time Yang erectd a statue of himself in th public gardens at Urumqi. According to Nicholas Roerich, this memorial was paid for with forced contributions 'from the grateful population'; by all accounts the statue was in execrable taste . While the NRA was marching upon Beijing in June of 1928, Yang ordered the KMT flag to be raised in Xinjiang. This gesture indicated to all, Yang was about to depart the province. One of Yang's most dissident subordinates, a Han named Fan Yaonan decided to act. Fan Yaonan was an ambitious modernist who received his education in Japan and someone Yang distruste from day one. Fan was appointed the post of Taoyin of Aksu by the Beijing government, an appointment Yang could have easily ingored, but was grudgingly impressd by Fans abilities. Fan proved himself very useful to Yang and was soon promoted to the Taoyin of Urumqi alongside becoming the Xinjiang Provincial Commissioner for Foreign Affairs. It seems Fan and Yang mutually disliked each other. At some point in 1926 Fan got together with a small group of like minded officials, such as the engineer at Urumqi's telegraph station and the Dean of the local school of Law, and Fan told them he wanted to assasinate Yang. Some believe Fan sought to gain favor with the KMT as motivation. Regardless on July 7th of 1928, 6 days after Yang took the post of Chairman of the Xinjiang Provincial Government under the KMT, Fan attacked. On that day, Yang was invited to a banquet to celebrate a graduation ceremony at the Urumqi law school. Fan had arranged the banquet, with 18 soldiers present, disguised as waiters wearing “red bands around their arms and Browning pistols in their sleeves”. During the meal, Fan proposed a toast to the health of Yang at which time “shots rang outsimultaneously, all aimed at the Governor. Seven bulletsin all were fired, and all reached their mark. Yang, mortally wounded, but superb in death, glared an angry defiance at his foes, 'who dares do this?' he questioned in the loud voice which had commanded instant obedience for so many years. Then he fell slowly forward, his last glance resting upon the face of the trusted Yen, as though to ask forgiveness that he had not listened to the advice so often given to him”. According to Yan Tingshan who was also wounded, Fan Yaonan finished Yang Zengxin off with two shots personally. After the assassination, whereupon 16 people were killed or wounded, Fan went to Yang official residence and seized the seals of office. He then sent a letter summonig Jin Shujen, the Commissioner for Civil Affairs in Xinjiang and Yang's second in command. Jin called Fan's bluff and refusing to come, instead sending soldiers to arrest the assassin. It seems Fan greatly miscalculated his personal support as a short gun battle broke out and he was arrested by Jin and shortly thereafter executed with his complices on July 8th. And thus, Jin Shujen found himself succeeding Yang, a less able man to the job. Jin Shujen was a Han Chinese from Gansu. He graduated from the Gansu provincial academy and served for a time as the Principal of a Provincial normal school. He then entered the Imperial Civil Service, where he came to the attention of Yang, then working as the district Magistrate at Hozhou. Yang took him on as district magistrate and Jin rose through the ranks. By 1927 Jin became the Provincial Commissioner for Civil Affairs at Urumqi. After executing Fan, Jin sent a telegram to Nanjing seeking the KMT's official recognition of his new role. Nanjing had no real options, it was fait accompli, they confirmed Jin into office and under the new KMT terminology he was appointed Provincial Chairman and commander-in-chief. In other words an official warlord.  Following his seizure of power, Jin immediately took steps to secure his newfound power. His first step was to double the salaries of the secret police and army. He also expanded the military and acquired new weaponry for them. Politically, Jin maintained the same old Qing policies Yang did, pretty much unchanged. Jin did however replace many of the Yunnanese followers under Yang with Han CHinese from Gansu. Jins younger brother, Jin Shuxin was appointed Provincial Commissioner for military affairs at Urumqi and his other brother Jin Shuqi was given the senior military post at Kashgar. His personal bodyguard member Zu Chaoqi was promoted to Brigade Commander at Urumqi. Jin maintained and expanded upon Yang's system of internal surveillance and censorship, like any good dictator would. According to H. French Ridley of the China Inland Mission at Urumqi “people were executed for 'merely making indiscreet remarks in the street during ordinary conversation”. Jin also introduced a system of internal passports so that any journey performing with Xinjiang required an official passport validation by the Provincial Chairman's personal seal, tightening his security grip and of course increasing his official revenue. Travel outside Xinjiang became nearly impossible, especially for Han officials and merchants seeking trade with China proper.  Under Jin Xinjiang's economy deteriorated while his fortune accumulated. Yang had introduced an unbacked paper currency that obviously fell victim to inflation and Jin upted the anty. Within a process of several stages, he expanded the currency, causing further inflation. Under Yang the land taxes had been a serious source of the provincial revenue, but Yang was not foolish enough to squeeze the Turkic peasantry too hard, he certainly was intelligent enough to thwart peasant revolts. Jin however, not so smart, he tossed caution to the win and doubled the land taxes, way past what would be considered the legal amount. Jin also emulated Ma Fuxiang, by establishing government monopolies over various profitable enterprises, notably the gold mine at Keriya and Jade mine at Khotan. He also monopolized the wool and pelt industry, using his police and army to force the sale of lambskins at a mere 10% of their market value. Just as with Yang's regime, wealth flowed out of the province in a continuous stream, straight into banks within China proper. According to George Vasel, a German engineer and Nazi agent hired to construct airfields in Gansu during the early 1930s, he knew a German pilot named Rathje who was secretly employed by Jin to fly a million dollars worth of gold bullion from Urumqi to Beijing. Jin did his best to keep all foreign influence out of Xinjiang and this extended also to KMT officials from China proper. Jin also of course did his best to conceal his corrupt regime from Nanjing. For all intensive purposes Jin treated Xinjiang like a feudal, medieval society. He tried to limit external trade to only be through long distance caravans. All was fine and dandy until Feng Yuxiang occupied Gansu and thus disrupted the traditional trade routes. Alongside this the Soviets had just constructed a new railroad linking Frunze, the capital of Kirghiz with Semipalatinsk in western siberia. This railroad known as the Turksib was aimed primarily to develop western Turkstan, integrating it within the new soviet system. The railroad was constructed 400 miles away from the Xinjiang frontier, on purpose to limit any activities with capitalists. When the railway was completed in 1930 it virtually strangled Xinjiang. China's share of Xinjiang's market dropped by 13% and the value of trade with the Soviets which had dropped to zero since the Russian civil war was not rising past 32 million roubles by 1930. The Soviet trade gradually was seizing a monopoly over Xinjiang and this of course affected the merchants and workers who were unable to compete. The revenue of the merchants and workers declined as new taxes were levied against them. Meanwhile alongside an increase in Soviet trade, the new railway also increased Soviet political influence over Xinjiang. It was also much faster and easier to travel from China proper to Xinjiang via Vladivostok, the trans-siberian railway and Turksib than across the North-West roads of China. For the Turkic speaking Muslims of Xinjiang, it was quite impressive and many wanted to do business and mingle with the Soviets. However to do so required a visa, and thus KMT officials in Nanjing held the keys. Jin's policies towards the Turkic Muslims, Tungans and Mongols were extremely poor from the very beginning. It seems Jin held prejudice against Muslims, some citing bad experiences with them in Gansu. Whatever the case may be, Jin rapidly antagonized both his Turkic speaking and Tungan Muslim citizens by introducing a tax on the butchering of all animals in Xinjiang and forbidding Muslims to perform the Hajj to Mecca. Some point out he did that second part to thwart a loophole on leaving Xinjiang for trade. Obviously the Muslim majority of Xinjiang and the military powerhouse of Torgut Mongols in the Tien Shan bitterly resented Jin. Despite wide scale hostility against him, the first challenges at his autocratic rule came not from various minority groups, but some ambitious Han officers under his command. Palpatin would say it was ironic.  In May of 1929 the Taoyin of Altai attempted a coup against Jin, but he was forewarned and able to confine the fighting to the Shara Sume area. In the spring of 1931 troubles broke out in Urumqi as discontented Han officers and soldiers attacked Jin's yamen. The attack failed, and the instigators of the plot were all executed. The same year, Jin annexed the Kumul Khanate, known to the Chinese as Hami, finally pushing the Turkic speaking Muslims into open rebellion. Going back in time, after Zuo Zengtangs reconquest of Xinjiang in the 1870s, a few local principalities were permitted to survive on a semi-autonomous basis. Of these Kumul was the most important and was ruled by a royal family dating back to the Ming Dynasty and descended from the Chaghatay Khans. The Khanate of Kumul dominated the chief road from Xinjiang to China proper and was therefore of strategic importance to the Chinese. It extended from Iwanquan northwards to the Barkul Tagh and along the mountains to Bai and south to Xingxingxia along the Xinjiang-Gansu border. During the Xinhai Revolution of 1911, Maqsud Shah was sitting on the throne of Kumul. He was known to the Chinese as the Hami Wang, to his subjects as Khan Maqsud or Sultan Maqsud and to Europeans as the King of the Gobi. He was the last independent Khan of Central Asia as the rest were tossing their lot in with the progress of the times. During Yangs regime he was content with allowing Kumul to train its semi autonomous status, mostly because Maqsud Shah was very friendly towards the Chinese. He spoke Turkic with a marked Chinese accent and wore Chinese clothes. On the other hand he had a long whit beard and always wore a turban or Uyghur cap. He was a staunch Muslim ruling a petty oasis kingdom from an ancient and ramshackle palace in Kumul proper, one of three towns making up the capital of Kumul, known to the Chinese as Huicheng. He had a bodyguard consisting of 40 Chinese soldiers armed with mausers and had a Chinese garrison billeted in fortified Chinese town. The third city in his domain was known as New City or Xincheng, populated by a mix of Chinese and Turkic peoples. By 1928, shortly after the assassination of Yang, it was estimated Maqsud Shah ruled over roughly 25,000-30,000 Kumulliks. He was responsible for levying taxes, dispensing justice and so forth. His administration rested upon 21 Begs, 4 of whom were responsible for Kumul itself, 5 others over plains villages and the other 12 over mountain regions of Barkul and Karlik Tagh. Maqsud Shah also maintained a Uyghur militia who had a reputation as being better trained than its Chinese counterpart at Old City. Throughout Yangs regime, Kumul remained relatively peaceful and prosperous. Maqsud Shah paid a small annual tribute to Urumqi and in return the Xinjiang government paid him a formal subsidy of 1200 silver taels a year. Basically this was Yang paying for the Sultans compliance when it came to moving through his strategic Khanate. For the Uyghurs of Kumul, they were free from the typical persecution under Chinese officials. The only tax paid by citizens of Kumul was in livestock, generally sheep or goats, given annually to the Khan. The soil of the oasis was rich and well cultivated. Everything was pretty fine and dandy under Yang, but now was the time of Jin. In March of 1930, Maqsud Shah died of old age. His eldest son Nasir should have inherited the throne of Kumul, but Jin and his Han subordinates stationed in Kumul Old City had other plans. Shortly after Maqsud Shah's death, Nasir traveled to Urumqi, most likely to legitimize his rise upon the throne. Nasir was not very popular amongst his people, thus it seemed he needed Jin's aid to bolster him. However there also was the story that it was Jin who ordered Nasir to come to Urumqi to perform a formal submission. Now at the time of Maqsud Shah's death, Li Xizeng, a Han Chinese divisional commander stationed in Kumul suggested to Jin that the Khanate should be abolished and annexed officially. There was of course a great rationale for this, if Jin took control over Kumul it would offer increased revenue and new positions for his Han Chinese officials. Thus Jin ordered a resolution be drawn up by his ministers to abolish the Khanate, dividing Kumul into three separate administrative districts, Hami centered around the capital, I-ho and I-wu. When Nasir arrived in Urumqi he was given the new position of Senior Advisor to the provincial government, but forbidden to return to Kumul. Basically it was the age old government via hostage taking. Meanwhile another official named Yulbars was sent back to Kumul with a group of Chinese officials to set up the new administration.  While the people of Kumul had no love for Nasir and were taxed pretty heavily by his father, this did not mean that they wanted the Khanate to end. For the Turkic Muslims the Khanate held a religious significance. For Uyghurs there was a question of national pride associated with it. Of course there were economic issues. Within Xinjiang Han were allowed to settle, but in the Khanate there were restrictions. In the words of the Nanjing Wu Aichen on the situation “subject peoples obstinately prefer self-government to good government”. Well Jin's government was definitely not good, so what outcome does that give? The newly appointed Han administration upset the people of Kumul from the very minute of its installation. When it was announced the privilege of being except from direct taxation by Urumqi was to be abolished, ompf. To add insult to injury, one years arrears of taxes were to be collected from the Uyghurs. On top of that, Kumul was tossed wide open to Han settlers who were incentivized to settle by giving them a tax exemption for two years. Yeah that be some wild policies. To add even more misery, Kumul being situated on the chief road from northwestern Gansu to Xinjiang saw an enormous flow of refugees from famine and warfare going on in Gansu. A column of these refugees were seen by Berger Bohlin of the Sino-Swedish Expedition of 1931. His account is as follows “During my stay at Hua-hai-tze I witnessed a curious spectacle. The Chen-fan region had for a number of years been visited by failure of the crops and famine, and large numbers of people therefore emigrated to more prosperous tracts. Such an emigration-wave now passed Hua-hai-tze. It consisted of a caravan of 100 camels, transporting 150 persons with all their baggage to Sinkiang, where it was said that land was being thrown open”. It seemed to Bohlin that the refugees looked carefree and happy and that the ruler of Xinjiang, Jin Shujen, a Gansu man himself was enthusiastic to have them come settle his province. Jin had his official in charge of I-ho district Lung Xulin provide land for the would-be settlers coming from Gansu. Lung Xulin responded by forcing his Uyghur population to leave their cultivated land and simply handed it over to the refugees. The expropriated Uyghurs were compensated for their land by being given untilled lands on the fringe of the desert where most soil was barren. The Uyghurs were also assessed for their land tax based on their old holdings. To make this even worse hear this, untilled land was exempt from taxation for two years, so they didn't even get that, while the Gansu refugees were excused from tax payments for three years. So yeah the Kumul people quickly organized a petition and sent it to the yamen in Urumqi. There was zero acknowledgement from the yamen it was received and nothing was done to address the long list of grievances, especially from the Uyghurs. Instead the Gansu settlers kept flooding in and with them the price of food skyrocketed, largely because of the enormous amount of provincial troops sent in to watch over everybody. Now for the moment the Turkic speaking Muslims in the region remained relatively peaceful, and this perhaps lulled Jin into a false sense of security. But according to Sven Hedin of the Sino-Swedish Expedition “Discontent increased; the people clenched their teeth and bided their time; the atmosphere was tense and gloomy. Inflammable matter accumulated, and only a spark was needed to fire the powder magazine.”  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The history of Xinjiang is unbelievably bizarre, complicated and quite frankly really fun. Before researching this I had no idea about anything and am really enjoying this as I write it. The next episode is going to be on the Kumul Rebellion, so buckle up buckaroo.