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Today we have Dr. Dominic D'Agostino, who over the past 10 years has been a frequent guest on STEM-Talk. Today Dom joins us to give us an update on his recent research into ketogenic metabolic therapies, ketone supplements as well as hyperbaric oxygen therapy for traumatic brain injuries. Dom and his lab at the University of South Florida have published more than 20 papers since his last appearance on STEM-Talk in 2023. Dom is an Associate Professor in the Department of Molecular Pharmacology and Physiology at South Florida's Morsani College of Medicine. Dom has a background in neuroscience, molecular pharmacology, nutrition and physiology. In addition to developing and testing metabolic-based therapies, Dom's lab also investigates seizure disorders, brain cancer, neurodegenerative diseases and rare genetic-metabolic disorders. Show notes: [00:03:28] Dawn welcomes Dom back to the show and explaining that he has been quite busy since his last appearance, authoring or co-authoring more than 20 papers. Over the past several years, Dom has been helping to advance the science and application of ketogenic metabolic therapy (KMT) with colleagues at Moffitt Cancer Center, particularly focusing on using KMT to enhance immune-based therapies for certain types of cancers. Dawn asks Dom about this collaboration. [00:05:04] Dawn explains that ketogenic metabolic therapy is a dietary approach that focuses on a high-fat/low-carb diet to reduce glucose availability for cancer cells, potentially slowing their growth and improving treatment outcomes. It has been explored as a complimentary treatment for a variety of cancers including gliomas by shifting the metabolism of tumor cells away from glucose. Dawn asks Dom to explain what is involved in KMT. [00:06:58] Dawn clarifies that KMT requires less than 20-25 grams of carbohydrates per day, and that ketosis is a metabolic state in which the body switches from glucose metabolism to metabolizing fats in the form of ketones. Dawn goes on to explain that cancer cells typically consume glucose at a higher rate than normal cells. However, cancer cells are also very adaptable, and Dawn asks Dom to talk about this feature of cancer cells. [00:09:14] Ken explains that KMT has shown the most promise in treating high-grade gliomas, or brain cancers, such as glioblastoma, which is the most aggressive primary brain tumor in adults. Ken explains that Dom was part of a massive review titled “Clinical research framework proposal for ketogenic metabolic therapy in glioblastoma,” which proposed guidelines for the management of glioblastoma based on an understanding of cancer as a metabolic disease, particularly involving mitochondria. Ken asks Dom to talk about this review. [00:11:21] From a patient advocacy perspective, Ken notes that the review recommends that there should be an aggressive education campaign that can arm patients with knowledge about KMT and other novel therapies. Ken asks Dom to talk about that recommendation. [00:13:15] Ken asks about the process of cutting the review from upwards of 200 pages down to around 50 pages with 49 authors. [00:15:04] Dawn mentions that Dom was part of another paper in 2024 titled “Targeting the mitochondrial stem cell connection in cancer treatment – a hybrid orthomolecular protocol.” Dawn explains that this paper looked at the mitochondrial stem cell connection theory (MSCC), which argues that cancer originates from chronic oxidative phosphorylation insufficiency in stem cells. This insufficiency leads to the formation of cancer stem cells and abnormal energy metabolism ultimately resulting in malignancy. There were 16 research centers and organizations involved in this paper which introduced a hybrid orthomolecular protocol to target the mitochondrial stem-cell connection. Dawn asks Dom to give an overview of MSCC. [00:18:26] Dawn explains that in this paper Dom and his co-authors propose a protocol that would enhance oxidative phosphorylation and inhibit the primary fuels of cancer, glucose and glutamine. This would target both cancer stem cells and metastasis. Dawn asks Dom to explain why this concept is attracting so much interest as a potential therapeutic approach for cancer. [00:20:48] Dawn asks if Dom could discuss the orthomolecular protocol, which is an approach that focuses on preventing and treating diseases by correcting nutritional balances in the body. [00:24:41] Ken asks if the proposed dietary intervention in the orthomolecular approach is different from a standard or typical ketogenic diet. [00:26:48] Ken shifts the discussion to talk about ketone supplements, explaining that Dom recently published a paper titled “Divergent hepatic outcomes of chronic ketone supplementation.” Ken goes on to explain that ketone salts preserve liver health, while some ketone esters and precursors appear to drive inflammation and steatosis. There is a lot of interest in ketone supplementation because they substantially elevate circulating ketones without having to restrict carbohydrates as strictly. The problem, as Ken explains, is that the long-term hepatic safety of ketone supplements remains unclear. In the aforementioned paper, Dom's rodent study evaluated the formulation-dependent impact of chronic ketone supplementation on liver histopathology, inflammatory signaling and systemic biomarkers. Ken asks Dom to discuss this paper and its findings and to give an overview of the various ketone supplements currently available. [00:30:49] Dawn asks Dom to dive into the methods and findings of the rodent study. [00:34:36] Ken asks Dom what his confidence is in the rodent model used in this study, and what are the next step for further research. [00:37:47] Regarding the two different doses given to rats in the study, Ken asks Dom how these doses correlate to doses in humans [00:40:23] Ken mentions that Ben Bikman, who was our guest on episode 143, published a study in February which Dom helped co-author. It examined the effects of ketone supplements on liver function. Ken asks Dom to discuss this study. [00:44:38] Dawn pivots to ask about a joint paper that Dom did with Andrew Koutnik, who was our guest on episode 185, on carbohydrates and physical performance titled “Carbohydrate ingestion on exercise metabolism and physical performance.” Dawn asks Dom to talk about this paper, which showed that a small amount of carbohydrates is sufficient to fuel athletic performance, and how additional carbohydrate intake showed diminishing returns. [00:49:18] Ken follows up on the finding that endurance athletes who rely on carb loading can tend toward pre-diabetes. [00:51:39] Ken asks Dom about the University of South Florida trial that Dom is an advisor for on traumatic brain injury and hyperbaric oxygen therapy. [00:54:41] Dawn mentions that Dom recently had an editorial in Frontiers that gave an overview of the emerging applications of hyperbaric/hyperbaric-oxygen therapy in the treatment of different neurological disorders. Dawn asks Dom what the key points in that editorial were. [00:59:06] Dawn explains that Dom recently gave a lecture at IHMC (available to view on IHMC's YouTube page), on traumatic brain injury and the populations at greatest risk in that context. Dawn asks Dom to give an overview of how an injury to the brain can result in neurometabolic crisis. [01:02:53] Ken asks Dom, excluding occupation demographics, what demographic is most at risk for traumatic brain injury (TBI) and why. [01:04:45] Ken mentions that it is understandable the risk that young people face with TBI due to the activities that young people engage in. Older people, however, have increased risk of TBI from falling as well as an additional age-related biological component that young people are not subject to. Ken asks Dom to elaborate on this. [01:07:12] Dawn mentions that several years ago, Dom and his wife bought some acreage in the countryside and started farming and asks Dom how the farm life is going. [01:07:57] Dawn closes the interview asking how Dom's wife is doing.
Good afternoon, I'm _____ with today's episode of EZ News. Tai-Ex opening The Tai-Ex opened down 53-points this morning from yesterday's close, at 43,172 on turnover of 11.9-billion N-T. The market tumbled (大跌、暴跌) on Wednesday after heavy selling in major tech stocks triggered a decline that sent the benchmark index back to below its monthly moving average and erased all of the previous session's gains. Two leading House Republicans to meet with KMT chair Two leading U-S House Republicans are meeting with K-M-T Chair Cheng Li-wun in Washington, House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Brian Mast, and Young Kim, who leads a subcommittee (小組委員會) overseeing East Asia policy have both said they will sit down with Cheng. Mast has admitted he doesn't have specific expectations for the meeting. While a spokesperson for Kim, says the lawmaker plans to encourage Cheng and the K-M-T to support more defense spending to show Taiwan's commitment to self-defense and deterrence (嚇阻、威懾). NGO warns large fish disappearing from Taiwan's coasts due to overfishing Greenpeace Taiwan says research shows that smaller fish are making up an increasing share of Taiwan's inshore and offshore catches (近海與離岸漁獲), a trend the group says indicates larger fish are becoming rarer due to overfishing. According to the study, the proportion of fish caught before reaching "Lm50" — or the length at which 50 percent of a species reaches sexual maturity (性成熟) — rose from 77.7-percent in 2022 to 93.3-percent in 2025. Researchers say the survey points to severe overfishing and shows that without effective management measures, fish populations could face bottleneck effects (瓶頸效應) that result in progressively smaller fish. Iran latest Bahrain sounded its missile alert sirens (飛彈警報器) early Thursday morning after Iran threatened to retaliate (報復、反擊) over a new round of U.S. airstrikes targeting the Islamic Republic. Bahrain's urged the public to seek shelter. Iran's paramilitary (準軍事的) Revolutionary Guard had threatened to strike Bahrain over the attacks. The second day of American strikes comes hours after Bahrain, Kuwait and Jordan — all of which host U.S. troops — came under Iranian fire. Iran has said it will close the Strait of Hormuz in response. Congo Ebola outbreak spreads in the east Congo's Ebola outbreak (疫情、爆發) has spread to another health zone in the country's northeastern province of Ituri. Health officials say the outbreak has now affected 26 health zones nationwide. That includes 18 in Ituri where most of the confirmed cases (確診病例) have been reported. Officials reported 37 new confirmed cases and 12 deaths in the past 24 hours. The outbreak has now recorded 635 confirmed cases and 127 deaths across three eastern provinces. It is caused by the rare Bundibugyo strain (病毒株) of Ebola. Officials say there is no approved vaccine or specific treatment for that strain. Treatment activities are now underway at Ebola centers in two affected areas. Pope Leo blesses Sagrada Familia's tallest tower Pope Leo has blessed the newest tower of Barcelona's Sagrada Familia, making it the tallest church in the world. The 172-meter Tower of Jesus Christ is topped with a large ceramic cross visible across the city. Leo called the basilica an "architectural masterpiece" (建築傑作) during a Mass attended by Spain's king, queen and prime minister. The ceremony came 100 years after the death of architect Antoni Gaudi. The pope also used his sermon (講道、布道) to say Christians "cannot believe in Jesus and promote war." Earlier in the day, Leo became the first pope to visit a Spanish prison. He urged inmates at Brians 1 prison to make amends (彌補過錯、改過) and choose better lives. The Sagrada Familia was meant to be completed this year, but construction is now expected to continue until 2035. That was the I.C.R.T. EZ News, I'm _____. -- Hosting provided by SoundOn
SCHEDULE THE JOHN BATCHELOR SHOW, 6-3-2026.1907 TOJO(1) Scott Harold discusses the unprecedented question from Japan's Defense Minister at the Shangri-La Dialogueregarding America's Indo-Pacific commitment. He notes the omission of Taiwan in Secretary Hegseth's speech compared to last year. Japan remains a hawkish front-line ally, despite regional concerns over shifting US national defense priorities.(2) Rebecca Grant describes the proposed Trump class battleship, a nuclear-powered "missile truck" designed for standoff strikes. Unlike traditional battleships, it emphasizes hypersonic attack and laser weaponry. The ship would be highly survivable, defended by Space Force overwatch and advanced electromagnetic warfare techniques.(3) Steve Yates examines the KMT leader's visit to Washington following meetings with Xi Jinping. He expresses concern over the KMT cutting Taiwan's indigenous defense budget. Yates also analyzes Taiwan's "inverted triangle" demographics, where older voters remain more sympathetic to traditional KMT narratives than younger generations.(4) Steve Yates argues the "Thucydides trap" is a manufactured academic concept used by Beijing to suggest inevitable US decline. He emphasizes that the US is not a classical empire and remains globally influential. China uses this rhetoric for political warfare while remaining sensitive to American strength.(5) Michael Bernstam analyzes the humiliating Ukrainian strike on a St. Petersburg oil terminal during Putin's flagship economic forum. Russia's energy sector faces a crisis, forcing a ban on refined exports like gasoline due to refinery damage. Consequently, Russia must increase crude exports to China and India.(6) Michael Bernstam notes the OECD's warning of global recession if the Gulf energy crisis persists. While the US is depleting strategic reserves to maintain supply, it is also increasing domestic production. High prices are triggering "demand destruction," where consumers shift to public transport to mitigate energy costs.(7) Bob Zimmerman reports that Blue Origin's CEO expects to resume launches this year despite a recent launchpad explosion. Meanwhile, SpaceX secured $6 billion in Space Force contracts for tracking and communication satellites. China continues rapid development with its Long March 12B, a Falcon 9-style reusable rocket copycat.(8) Bob Zimmerman highlights Curiosity rover data confirming Gale Crater's shifting climate, which once supported warm water. The James Webb Space Telescope detected high methane levels on the interstellar comet 3I/Atlas, suggesting a unique chemical composition. Webb also captured a spectacular infrared image of the galaxy M77.(9) Jonathan Schanzer describes the "ceasefire war" in the Middle East, where Iran continues attacks despite diplomatic efforts. He argues Iran aims to detach Gulf allies like Kuwait from the West. Schanzer advocates for maximum economic pressure on Tehran and increased IDF activity against Iranian proxies.(10) Jonathan Schanzer reports that Israeli forces have reduced Hamas control in Gaza to roughly 40%, aiming for 30%. Hamas is currently trapped in an Israeli "yellow zone" kill zone, making rearmament or offensive operations nearly impossible. Schanzer believes systematic military pressure is creating a viable theory of victory.(11) Titus Techera critiques the evolution of Animal Farm films, noting the newest version depicts Silicon Valley and AI as villains. He argues this shift denatures Orwell's original anti-totalitarian message for modern ideological purposes. The 1954 version remains the most effective educational tool regarding the dangers of tyranny.(12) Gordon Chang asserts that China is a declining power facing economic stagnation and a massive demographic collapse. He notes that the US economy remains superior, particularly in energy and AI. China's youth unemployment is estimated at 35-40%, forcing university graduates into menial roles like shepherding.(13) Jack Burnham discusses how Nvidia chips reach the Chinese military through loopholes in export controls and subsidiaries. He notes bureaucratic confusion over the "AI diffusion rule" allowed Chinese firms to stockpile high-end hardware. Burnham recommends stricter Commerce Department guidance to prevent further military modernization.(14) Jack Burnham explains that Volvo, though manufacturing in the US, is owned by Geely and must comply with Chinese data-sharing laws. He also warns of China's dominance in the biotechnology supply chain. Through state subsidies and "dumping," China threatens the security of US pharmaceutical and generic drug stockpiles.(15) Ryan Streeter honors economist Ed Phelps, who defined dynamism as a culture of grassroots tinkering and indigenous innovation. He explains that growth is driven by experimental mindsets rather than just scientific labs. Streeter notes that dynamic cultures, like Austin or California, naturally attract global risk-takers.(16) Ryan Streeter discusses human flourishing, defining it as the fulfillment of potential through purpose and upward mobility. He argues that dynamic societies improve job satisfaction for hourly workers by providing more options. Conversely, stagnation in Europe results from heavy regulation and a declining cultural valuation of entrepreneurs.One naming consistency flag: segment (15) uses "Ed Phelps" while your earlier preview blurb and outreach email today used "Edmund Phelps." Both are correct—Ed is the informal—but if you want consistency across the day's broadcast, I can swap to Edmund Phelps.
(3) Steve Yates examines the KMT leader's visit to Washington following meetings with Xi Jinping. He expresses concern over the KMT cutting Taiwan's indigenous defense budget. Yates also analyzes Taiwan's "inverted triangle" demographics, where older voters remain more sympathetic to traditional KMT narratives than younger generations.
STREAMING THE MAKING OF JBS, FEATURING CHANG, GRANT, HAROLD, YATES, 6-3-2026.1865 BRAZIL IRONCLAD.This text consists of a transcript from the John Batchelor Show, featuring discussions on naval innovation and geopolitical tensions in Taiwan. The first segment examines a proposal for a new "Trump class" battleship, described as a nuclear-powered missile platform designed for modern standoff warfare rather than traditional close-quarters combat. Experts emphasize that this vessel, the USS Defiant, would utilize advanced defenses and electromagnetic weaponry to remain survivable in a drone-dominated era. The conversation then shifts to Taiwanese politics, focusing on the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) leader's visit to the United States following meetings in Beijing. Analysts debate the KMT's stance on self-defense funding and its complex historical identity as it navigates relations with both Washington and the Chinese Communist Party. Finally, the speakers critique the "Thucydides Trap" narrative, suggesting that the inevitability of conflict between rising and established powers is a modern academic invention rather than a historical necessity.
Dr Erin Louise Bellamy Dr Erin Louise Bellamy is a Chartered Psychologist, Metabolic Psychiatry Practitioner, and CEO of IKRT (ikrt.org), an international organisation advancing ketogenic metabolic therapy (KMT) for mental health. She holds a PhD in Psychology (ketogenic diets and depression) and a master's degree (MSc) in Psychiatric Research from King's College London and is a Research Fellow at the University of East London. With over a decade of experience researching and implementing KMT, Erin integrates clinical practice, education, and research to improve mental health outcomes. She is an Associate Fellow of the British Psychological Society and a member of the Society of Metabolic Health Practitioners. Link to Show Notes on Website https://fabulouslyketo.com/podcast/262 Dr Erin’s Top Tips If you’re dealing with mental health symptoms, consider ketogenic therapy. Use ketogenic therapy if you are taking any medications to offset the negative side effects Approach ketogenic therapy with the same daily commitment as you would if it was medication Resources Mentioned New Atkins For a New You: The Ultimate Diet for Shedding Weight and Feeling Great – Dr Eric C Westman, Dr Stephen D Phinney and Dr Jeff S Volek Connect with Dr Erin Louise Bellamy on social media Twitter: https://x.com/erinlbellamy and https://x.com/ikrt_org Facebook Page: https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61554863570171 Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/erinlouisebellamy/ and https://www.instagram.com/ikrt_org/ LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/erin-louise-bellamy/ and https://www.linkedin.com/company/integrative-ketogenic-research-and-therapies YouTube:https://www.youtube.com/@FabulouslyKeto Website Details: https://www.ikrt.org The Fabulously Keto Diet & Lifestyle Journal: A 12-week journal to support new habits – Jackie Fletcher If you have enjoyed listening to this episode – Leave us a review By leaving us a review on your favourite podcast platform, you help us to be found by others. Support Jackie Help Jackie make more episodes by supporting her. If you wish to support her we have various options from one off donations to becoming a Super Fabulously Keto Podcast Supporter with coaching and support. Check out this page for lots of different ways to support the podcast. https://fabulouslyketo.com/support Or You can find us on Patreon: https://www.patreon. com/FabulouslyKeto Connect with us on social media https://www.facebook.com/FabulouslyKeto https://www.instagram.com/FabulouslyKeto1 https://twitter.com/FabulouslyKeto https://www.youtube.com/@FabulouslyKeto Facebook Group: https://www.facebook.com/groups/FabulouslyKeto Music by Bob Collum Recommend a guest We would love to know if you have a favourite guest you would like us to interview. Let us know who you would like to hear of if you have a particular topic you would like us to cover. https://fabulouslyketo.com/recommend-a-guest We sometimes get a small commission on some of the links, this goes towards the costs of producing the podcast.
Last time we spoke about the second phase of the One Hundred Regiment Offensive. During the second phase of the Hundred Regiments offensive, CCP forces emphasized strongpoint and transportation warfare across the Taihang/Jizhong area. Units were organized with wings containing Japanese positions while a central force struck deeper, as in the Renhe Dasu fighting in early October 1940. Night raids seized strongholds, while engineers and sabotage teams disrupted roads, bridges, and mobility, and ambushes targeted Japanese foraging and supply routes. Across these theaters, the strategy was consistent: make Japanese control porous by destroying or capturing local nodes and forcing constant repairs, re-routing, escorts, and slowed reinforcement, so occupation logistics and strongpoint networks could not function reliably. This approach supported wider offensives by isolating strongpoints, draining enemy strength, and giving Communist base areas room to endure and expand. #204 The One Hundred Regiment Offensive Phase Three Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. After the two large-scale offensives carried out over wide areas of North China, the Japanese army did what it always did when control started to slip: it tried to turn mobile pressure back into something it could "manage" again. The Eighth Route Army's continued fighting had shown that Japanese-occupied space was not secure, and that base areas could still resist, strike, and persist even while under counterpressure. That was dangerous for occupation. If the enemy could keep operations going, Japanese lines of movement stayed uncertain and "stabilization" became a temporary illusion. To prevent the situation from worsening and to re-stabilize the occupied areas as quickly as possible, the Japanese mobilized heavy forces and launched retaliatory counter–"mopping-up" operations against anti-Japanese base areas in North China beginning October 6. The Japanese attempt wasn't only to punish; it was designed to take advantage of an asymmetry: the Eighth Route Army was striking and fighting continuously, and it did not have the luxury of resting, replenishing, and re-cohering as neatly as a garrison army might. Japanese commanders hoped that if they struck hard enough in enough places, the Communist main forces could be isolated, destroyed, or at least forced into a defensive posture that would break their operational tempo. At Liaodong and Yulin, Japanese reinforcements also created a second political-military stake. After the Yuliao Campaign ended, the Eighth Route Army headquarters issued instructions on October 1 to major regions, warning that enemy reinforcements in Liaodong and Yulin might use the opening to "sweep" the Taibei region. In the Communist operational mind, this wasn't just one threat; it was a pattern. A "sweep" could come as a wave that pushed inward, burned villages, destroyed supplies, and tried to force Communist forces out of their protected networks. Even if the offensive couldn't win a conventional decisive battle, it could aim to strip the base areas of people, food, and mobility—things that make guerrilla and strongpoint warfare possible. By October 19, 1940, the Eighth Route Army headquarters issued a counter–"mopping-up" operation plan, and civilian and military authorities in various regions launched counter-"mopping-up" operations accordingly. This is important background: in these campaigns, "mopping-up" was not only an army activity. The Japanese were attempting to break the base system itself—its logistics, its local administration, and the relationship between armed units and civilians who hid, moved, fed, and replaced them. So the counter-operations had to be just as systemic. The Communists needed to keep people alive, keep movement possible, and keep the enemy from consolidating inside a cleared space. In southeastern Shanxi's Taihang and Taiyue regions, the Japanese 1st Army aimed to strike the main force of the 129th Division and destroy anti-Japanese base areas by running a series of mopping operations from October 6 to December 5. The plan had a typical occupation logic: push through strongholds gradually, clear pockets methodically, and rely on local superiority—especially in manpower, logistics, and the ability to reinforce by road. And because the Communist main force had been operating without meaningful rest after the earlier offensives, the Japanese believed they could catch formations while they were still "in between battles." On October 6, in the Taihang region, more than 800 enemy troops from Wu'an in western Hebei began a "mopping-up" operation in the Yangyi area. By October 11, the Japanese posture escalated. Part of the Japanese Independent Mixed 4th Brigade departed from Liaoxian and Wuxiang, while part of the 36th Division departed from Lucheng and Xiangyuan; together they totaled over 3,000 troops. Coordinating from north and south, they carried out operations to "mop up" both banks of the Zhuozhang River between Yulin, Liaoxian, and Wuxiang, encircling and clearing the south side of the Yulin–Liaoxian highway. This emphasis on riverbanks and highway corridors reveals the Japanese method: move along terrain that controls movement, then compress enemy options until the defenders have to fight inside a narrowing space. The counter to that method required more than bravery. The Eighth Route Army's 385th and 386th Brigades, along with the 1st Column of the Decisive Battle, fought on inner lines—where they could move more rapidly between known local positions and threaten the enemy's flanks or supply behavior. Meanwhile the New 10th Brigade fought on outer lines, where it could intercept, delay, and force the enemy to spend time reacting instead of clearing. By the morning of October 15, the New 10th Brigade delivered a concrete example of that interception strategy. Two regiments ambushed an enemy motor-transport convoy at Gongjiagou on the Heliao Highway, destroying more than 40 vehicles and annihilating more than 100 Japanese soldiers escorting the convoy. The meaning of a convoy ambush is strategic even when the numbers are modest: vehicles represent speed, logistics, and reinforcement. If the enemy loses vehicles repeatedly, "mopping" becomes slower, and slower clearing creates openings for the defenders to reorganize, disperse, or shift main effort. After that, on October 17, the enemy forces that had been mopping up the convoy withdrew in different directions. Withdrawal in multiple directions is a sign that the Japanese clearing operation, meant to compress a space, had instead been forced into a reactive mode. It also hints at a recurring pattern in these years: Japanese units could clear what was already weak, but when defenders hit their movement corridors, the occupiers had to spend time and combat power simply to recover mobility. The next major sweep began October 20, 1940, and it was much larger. Nearly 10,000 troops—from the 36th Division and Independent Mixed Brigade No. 4—set off from multiple locations, including Wu'an, Liaoxian, Wuxiang, and Lucheng, to sweep the area east and west of the Qingzhang River, focusing on land between Matian and Zuohui. Crucially, that was not random ground. The Japanese sought to strike the CCP Central Committee Northern Bureau, the Eighth Route Army headquarters, and the 129th Division headquarters, along with party and government organs of the Jin-Ji-Yu Border Region, located together with Shexian and Piancheng. In other words, the Japanese targeted not just armed units but the political-administrative heart that makes base areas function. Once in the attack area, the Japanese carried out "mopping-up" operations paired with burning and killing for several days. That brutality wasn't only cruelty; it served a purpose. Burning villages, destroying crops, and killing civilians could deny the base area food and shelter while making local cooperation more difficult. Then, on October 26, the Japanese began to withdraw and carried out mopping-up in different areas on the way back. The base area was "severely damaged and destroyed," indicating that even when the Japanese didn't annihilate the main Communist force, they could still achieve degradation—hurting the system they needed to keep operating. But the Communists were not simply absorbing damage. On October 29, a force of over 500 men from the 36th Division, plus over 400 supply and laborers, was mopping up Huangyandong and advanced through Zuohui to Guanjia'nao east of Panlong, preparing to return to Wuxiang. This is where counter-mopping becomes operationally dangerous for the occupier. Supply and labor detachments move differently from combat formations, and they represent an enemy's assumption that the base area is being "cleared." The Eighth Route Army headquarters ordered, at 1:00 p.m., for the 129th Division to concentrate its main force to annihilate the enemy. That night, the 129th Division—uniting the main forces of the 385th and 386th Brigades, parts of the New 10th Brigade, and the First Column of the Death Squad—surrounded the enemy at Guanjia'nao with a plan to launch a general offensive at 4:00 a.m. The besieged enemy, besides quickly building fortifications, seized Fengkengding high ground southwest of Guanjia'nao under cover of darkness. The two high points helped defenders support one another and resist stubbornly. The battle lasted until dawn on October 31, when most of the enemy had been annihilated, leaving only more than 60 men to hold positions. Then reinforcements arrived—over 1,500 from Huangyandong—supported by more than 10 aircraft. The 129th Division withdrew, and the remaining enemy fled toward the flood, leaving behind more than 280 corpses. By then, most Japanese troops had withdrawn from the central base area. The background stake is clear: "mopping-up" could damage and burn, but if defenders could convert the Japanese attempt into a trap—especially when enemy units had become separated from their core and committed to clearing—they could turn a destructive operation into a costly one for the occupier. In early November, the Japanese continued. In Licheng south of Taihang, Japanese forces invaded Nanweiquan and Beiweiquan and then Xijing. Elsewhere, Japanese forces in Xiangyuan invaded Panlong via Xiying, attempting to attack Dongtian and the area around Zhuanbi, where the Eighth Route Army headquarters was located. In that moment, the 386th Brigade was ordered to rush to the north–south line of Damocun, east of Panlong, block the invading enemy, and cover the transfer of the Eighth Route Army headquarters. At 9:00 a.m. on November 3, 1940, fierce fighting broke out as the troops finished deploying near Damocun. The Japanese launched continuous attacks and captured some positions. The 386th Brigade held until 4:00 a.m. on November 4, then withdrew after the headquarters successfully moved. The Japanese attempt to launch a pincer attack failed, and they retreated to the Baijin Line on November 5. Even when Japanese action couldn't be fully blocked, the counter's aim was not only tactical survival but prevention of strategic encirclement—protecting the central institutions and preserving the ability to fight again. In the northern Taihang region, more than 2,500 enemy troops from Heshun arrived in Yushe on November 3 via Hanwang Town and Changcheng Town, reinforcing Japanese forces in the Yu, Liao, and Wu areas. Then they carried out repeated mopping operations south of the Yuliao Highway, including Jiangtang, Lingshang, Songjiazhuang, Guojiao, and Dayouyi. Harassment and attacks by military and civilians forced Japanese troops back into their strongholds by the 13th. A "40-day" counter-mopping operation in Taihang came to an end. The term "40-day" isn't only calendar time; it suggests that these were not one-off battles but sustained campaigns of movement, dispersal, and repeated harassment meant to drain the enemy's capacity. Starting November 17, the Japanese launched a multi-pronged attack on Qinyuan and the area north of Guodao Town. The attack involved part of the 37th Division from Qin County and Nanguan Town, part of the Independent Mixed Brigade from Pingyao, Jiexiu, and Huo County, and a battalion of the 41st Division from Hongdong—more than 7,000 troops deployed to attack Qinyuan and the north area. But the Taiyue Military Region response shows how the Communist counter-mopping wasn't always to meet force with force. To avoid the enemy's "sharp edge," the Taiyue Military Region formed two detachments—Qin East and Qin West—with leadership and main force moving to both sides of the Qin River outside the Japanese attack zone, targeting scattered Japanese troops instead of being fixed into a single killing field. By November 23, due to harassment by local armed forces, the Japanese reached the attack zone and then carried out dispersed mopping operations. Qinyuan County was the most severely damaged, with more than 5,000 people killed (about one-tenth of its population), nearly 10,000 livestock killed and over 7,000 stolen, and 30,000 to 40,000 houses destroyed. Those details are brutal, but they explain why background stakes mattered: "mopping-up" was meant to break the social base. If civilians died or fled, the guerrilla system became harder to sustain. The response from the Dayue Military Region seized the opportunity created by Japanese dispersal. On November 23, the 42nd Regiment of the Qinxi Detachment annihilated more than 100 Japanese soldiers in Guantan. On November 27, parts of the 42nd and 59th Regiments killed or wounded more than 160 in Huhanping and Mabei. The Qindong Detachment's 17th and 57th Regiments inflicted serious damage in a series of places—Guang'ao, Chenjiagou, Longfosi, Wuyuanzhen, Nanweicun, Nanli, and more. The 17th Regiment's battle at Longfosi annihilated more than 100 Japanese. Additional heavy losses were inflicted by the 212th Brigade in Jiaokou. By December 5, the Japanese were forced to withdraw from the Taiyue area in separate routes. Strategically, dispersal punished the occupier because scattered units are harder to protect and easier to ambush. Across the Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region, anti-"mopping-up" operations unfolded gradually, beginning with the Pingxi area, the first target of the Japanese on the path toward the Japanese-held headquarters and rail lines. Pingxi mattered because it directly threatened the headquarters of the Japanese North China Area Army and Beiping—the puppet regime's center—and also threatened the Pinghan and Pingsui railways, North China's main transportation lines. So Pingxi became an operational priority: if the occupier couldn't keep the rail network secure, their ability to reinforce and supply their own strongpoints suffered. On October 13, 1940, more than 10,000 Japanese and puppet troops attacked Sanpo, the central area of the Pingxi base area, in 10 routes. This attack used a methodical, steady approach: advance gradually, rely on strongholds, and cover 5 to 10 kilometers each day. In response, the Pingxi Military Sub-district countered using timely maneuvers of its main forces and extensive guerrilla warfare. Over more than a week of fighting, the enemy was constantly harassed and attacked, wearing them down. Although Japanese troops penetrated deep, they failed to identify the main force's movements. By November 21, when the encirclement tightened further, the Pingxi main force jumped out from the Sanpo area and moved southwest. Encountering the enemy at Pengtou, it then moved to the Yegu and Datai line east of Bancheng. After the Japanese entered the Sanpo area, they conducted widespread burning and killing and looted grain. Starting from the 23rd, the Japanese retreated in different routes. By the end of October, the main force had withdrawn from Pingxi, but more than 2,000 troops remained in the Pingxi anti-Japanese base area to build strongholds and roads. Strongholds were added in places like Changping and Wanping—14 strongholds alone—and villages such as Dongzhaitang and Dujiazhuang came under their control. The base area began to shrink and shrink. That shrinkage is the other background stake: even when guerrilla forces avoid annihilation, the occupier may still carve away space through fortification. On October 19, 1940, the Eighth Route Army headquarters instructed that enemy attacks in Pingxi and Taihang might turn around and attack the Beiyue area. The Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region needed to prepare quickly to crush these "mopping-up" operations, coordinating Party, government, military, and civilians and conducting in-depth combat mobilization. The main force should assemble in appropriate positions and prepare to annihilate one or two enemy forces decisively. The headquarters also instructed the 129th and 120th Divisions to cooperate actively. By November 9, 1940, the Japanese struck again in a massive sweep. The 110th Division, along with other units and more than 14,000 puppet troops, launched a "mopping-up" operation in the jurisdiction of the 1st Military Sub-district. The Japanese and puppet troops moved in coordinated lines: along the line of Yi County, Dalonghua, Wang'an Town, Laiyuan, and Chajianling from north to south, while those in Baoding and Mancheng moved east to west. The intent was to squeeze Communist sub-district forces into a narrow area for a decisive battle. On November 10, the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region issued operational guidelines and deployments for countering "mopping-up" operations. By the 12th, in response to Japanese widespread burning and killing, it further instructed that without hindering mobility, the main force could disperse a portion of troops—no more than one-third—to strike resolutely at attempts to burn and kill. That instruction captures the balance commanders tried to strike: disperse too much and you lose power; disperse too little and you become trapped by the occupier's brutality. The Japanese then attempted to pressure multiple places. On November 9, more than 6,000 enemy troops from Laiyuan, Yixian, and Baoding attacked Guantou, Yinfang, Huangtuling, and Shenbei. On the 12th, their attack failed; they burned and killed people before retreating in different routes. At that time, the 1st Military Sub-district assembled the 1st and 25th Regiments to intercept them. One enemy force of more than 800 was intercepted on the 14th as it retreated from Wujiazhuang to Yuangang; some were killed or wounded. Even so, the enemy broke through under aircraft cover and retreated to Guantou. On the way, it was intercepted again by the 20th Regiment, suffering heavy casualties, and it fled back to Mancheng. Then on November 13, more than 2,700 Japanese and puppet troops attacked the 3rd Military Sub-district; on November 14, about 2,600 advanced from Dingxiang, Dongye, and Wutai toward Fuping and its southwest area in two routes. The Japanese attacked with east-west coordination, launching joint attacks on Taiyu north of Fuping. The Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region headquarters and the command organs of the 3rd and 5th military sub-districts, along with the 2nd, 3rd, and 6th regiments and other troops, transferred to the outer line before the enemy encirclement formed. On the 16th, the Japanese launched a joint attack again on Taiyu and Zhangjiayu, and the guerrillas who failed to transfer fought hard. Commander Wang Pu and Deputy Director of the Political Department Hao Yuming were killed, and troops suffered more than 100 casualties. On November 18, the enemy from Taiyu quickly occupied Hanping City. By the 21st, enemy forces from Daying via Shentangbao and Wuwangkou, and from Wutai via Taihuai, Shizui, Longquanguan, and Xiaguan, also gathered in Fuping City. After occupying Fuping, the Japanese launched repeated attacks "sweeping" areas under the jurisdiction of the 3rd Military Sub-district from both inward and outward strongholds, conducting brutal burning and killing and destruction. On the night of November 21, the 2nd Regiment dispatched more than 30 men to raid Dangcheng and attack Japanese barracks with grenades. The Japanese panicked and fired guns and cannons all night. On the 26th, four plainclothes officers infiltrated Baoding and attacked a theater where the Japanese army was holding a meeting, causing panic among the Japanese. The enemy that had invaded the base area withdrew in different routes on the 25th. By December 3, 1940, most Japanese troops had withdrawn from the Beiyue area, but more than 1,000 remained along lines including Fuping, Wangkuai, Dangcheng, and Quyang to continue building points and roads in an attempt to occupy the area long-term. To force the enemy back, eliminate occupied points, and completely crush Japanese and puppet "mopping-up," the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region organized the Fuping–Wangkuai Campaign starting December 9, with the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 6th regiments participating. At 21:00 on December 14, the 6th Regiment attacked enemy forces in Dongzhuang. The 1st Battalion captured three fortified positions on the north mountain of Dongzhuang and rushed into the village, only for Japanese counterattacks to recapture fortified positions and kill or wound more than 170 Japanese during the counterfight. The 4th Regiment attacked the enemy in Fuping; the 2nd Regiment and guerrilla forces entered Dangcheng and Lingshan. On the 21st, more than 130 enemy soldiers escorting more than 100 pack animals carrying military supplies reached Wangkuai and were completely annihilated when they reached Wanglinkou. By December 26, an ambush in the Xuancun area of the Pinghan Railway destroyed 14 Japanese trains and their vehicles as well as three heavy artillery pieces. On the 27th, more than 1,200 enemy troops advancing from Dongzhuang in Fuping were attacked in Luoyu and Tumen, suffering more than 140 casualties. The remaining Japanese withdrew from Fuping, Dongzhuang, and Wangkuai starting New Year's Day 1941. By January 4, the 55-day anti-"mopping-up" campaign had basically ended, with the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region killing and wounding more than 2,000 Japanese and puppet troops while suffering 1,382 casualties itself. These numbers and dates show why background and stakes matter: the counter-mopping effort wasn't short. It was sustained, operationally demanding, and required continued offensive action even while facing superior Japanese resources. The pressure didn't end there. From October 25 to early November, about 4,000 Japanese troops, including the 16th Independent Mixed Brigade, launched a mopping operation in the Miyu and Loufan areas of the 8th and 3rd military sub-districts in northwestern Shanxi, but they were attacked by local soldiers and civilians. In mid-December, Japanese forces transferred additional strength: parts of the 37th Division from southern Shanxi and the 41st Division from southeastern Shanxi, along with parts of the 3rd, 9th, and 16th Independent Mixed Brigades and the 26th Division from northwestern Shanxi—totaling more than 20,000 troops—to prepare for a full-scale mopping operation in northwestern Shanxi. After the second phase of the Hundred Regiments Offensive ended, the 120th Division anticipated retaliation and actively prepared for counter-mopping. On October 30, the division was ordered to establish the Jin-Northwest Military Region, and on November 7, the military region was established in Lijiawan, Xing County. The Jin-Northwest Military Region had direct military sub-districts and six military sub-districts: the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 8th, and Yanbei. Then the occupier escalated. Starting December 14, 1940, the Japanese launched a full-scale mopping operation against the Jin-Northwest region. More than 5,000 enemy troops invaded the Mi-Yu Town area of the 8th Military Sub-district, more than 4,000 invaded Lin-Xian, and more than 6,000 attacked Xing-Xian and the area south of Bao-De from strongholds such as Lan-Xian and Qi-Lan. By December 23, Japanese forces had occupied all county towns, most market towns, and Yellow River crossings in the Jin-Northwest region except for Bao-De and He-Qu counties, and began to implement a systematic policy commonly described as the "Three Alls" policy. The "Three Alls" emphasis is the clearest expression of stakes turning lethal. Japanese troops and traitors disguised themselves as the Eighth Route Army to lure and kill masses. They sent out core detachments to attack and repeatedly sweep the area, seeking to annihilate party, government, and military leadership organs—focusing on destroying the rear organs and facilities that made Communist endurance possible. According to incomplete statistics, more than 5,000 people were brutally killed during these sweeps. In Xingxian County alone, 150,000 catties of grain were looted and burned; in the 4th Military Sub-district, more than 5,000 head of livestock were looted and killed; and more than 19,000 houses and cave dwellings were burned down. In the early stage of this anti-mopping campaign, the Jin-Sui Military Region mainly used a portion of its forces to cooperate with local troops and guerrillas in widespread guerrilla warfare. They harassed and contained the attacking enemy, disrupted enemy transportation, and covered the transfer of the masses. The main force avoided the enemy's sharp edge and moved to the outer line to seek opportunities to attack the Japanese army. This describes the classic guerrilla operational pattern: avoid being fixed into a single decisive trap, but create enough friction that enemy operations degrade into a struggle they can't sustain. repeated attacks and ambushes during the mopping period across Miyu Town and other areas—units striking repeatedly, destroying roads, cutting off enemy transportation, and attacking enemy strongholds north of Dawu. To thwart the Japanese army's plans to build roads and fortifications—plans that would make future sweeps easier—the Jin-Sui Military Region instructed, on December 27, all sub-districts to mobilize forces to disrupt Japanese road construction and fortification. The 358th Brigade attacked enemy road construction from Lanxian to Dashetou and from Puming to Chijianling; the Independent 1st Brigade sabotaged the Dawu–Linxian highway; and the 4th Column of the Death Squad sabotaged the Dawu–Fangshan highway. Part of the Independent 1st Brigade's 2nd Regiment organized over 2,000 civilians to sabotage the Dawu–Sanjiao highway twice, forcing the enemy in Linxian to detour through Fangshan to contact Lishi. The Lishi guerrillas led civilians in two sabotage attacks on the Lishi–Jundu highway, destroying over 30 "li" of road. Other units attacked strongholds along key highways and destroyed or disrupted the "maintenance committees" that surrounded newly built enemy strongholds. There were also direct raids—storming into Linxian County and capturing representatives of enemy maintenance organizations. Meanwhile, the Workers' and Patriots' Brigade carried out continuous sabotage on the Taifen Highway. As the enemy plans ran into persistent disruption, Japanese and puppet forces began to retreat in different routes starting January 2, 1941, and by January 24 they returned to their original strongholds. The Jin-Sui winter counter-mopping operation lasted 40 days, annihilated more than 2,500 enemy troops, destroyed 125 kilometers of roads and 23 bridges, and recovered all towns occupied by the enemy during the campaign. Here the stakes show through most clearly: the campaign was not merely about killing enemy troops. It was about preventing the occupier from building a durable, road-connected grid that would allow future sweeps to be faster, larger, and more decisive. At the wider campaign level, the Eighth Route Army also recorded its total effects from August 20 to December 5, covering roughly three and a half months. During that period, the Eighth Route Army fought 1,824 battles of varying sizes, killing or wounding 20,645 Japanese soldiers (including senior officers), killing or wounding 5,155 puppet troops, and capturing 281 Japanese soldiers and 18,407 puppet troops. 47 Japanese soldiers surrendered voluntarily, and 1,845 puppet troops defected, totaling 46,380 people. The Communists captured 5,942 guns and 53 artillery pieces, and destroyed extensive transportation infrastructure: 474 kilometers of railway, 1,502 kilometers of highway, 213 bridges, 37 railway stations, 11 tunnels, more than 217,000 rails, more than 1,549,000 sleepers, more than 109,000 telephone poles, and more than 424,000 kilograms of telephone wire. Five coal mines and 11 warehouses were destroyed. The narrative further adds that when including casualties of Japanese and puppet forces across related engagements—such as Fuwang and the anti–mopping operations in northwest Shanxi—the total number of casualties reached more than 50,880. Japanese statistics were also cited for damage assessment, noting destruction of track and bridges across key railways (Zhengtai, Tongpu, Pinghan), telegraph pole damage, power line cuts, and effects on coal production—such as the Jingxing New Mine being unable to produce coal for at least six months. These details underline a broader background stake: infrastructure damage was meant to weaken the occupier's ability to keep its occupation apparatus working, even after the direct battles ended. The price of that multi-month struggle was high for the Eighth Route Army as well. Over the three and a half months leading up to the Hundred Regiments Offensive, the Eighth Route Army suffered 17,000 casualties, and more than 20,000 were poisoned. During the Hundred Regiments Offensive itself, post-war statistics state that the 129th Division suffered 7,362 casualties and 450 missing persons, and the entire division suffered 7,812 casualties. When you connect these lines—offensive sabotage, counter-offensives, Japanese mopping-ups, and anti-mopping resistance—you see why this second wave of fighting mattered. It wasn't only about whether the Japanese could respond to the offensive. It was about whether both sides could sustain their operational logic: the Japanese trying to stabilize occupation through "mopping," and the Communists trying to preserve base systems through dispersal, harassment, and counter-moves that convert the occupier's clearing effort into something too costly to maintain. The background of the Hundred Regiments offensive, who authorized it, who planned it, and why, remains unclear. The Japanese response was so severe that, in retrospect, it appeared to some as if the offensive had been a mistake. Some leaders, especially Mao, may have wanted to disavow it. Indirect hints in Mao's writings in subsequent months and years suggest he may have viewed it critically or harbored misgivings from the start. It was not the kind of strategy Mao preferred. More than twenty years later, during the Cultural Revolution, Red Guards charged that Mao had not even known of the plan in advance because of Peng Dehuai's alleged duplicity, at the time, Peng was being denounced. While this seems unlikely, it may contain some substance. In his own defense against these charges, Peng stated that after the 8RA headquarters—located not in Yan'an but in Jin-Cha-Ji—planned the operation, it sent mobilization orders downward to each regional command and also notified the Central Military Affairs Commission headed by Mao. In the original plan, the action would begin in early September. But, Peng wrote, to prevent enemy discovery and to ensure simultaneous surprise assaults—thereby inflicting an even greater blow to the enemy and the puppets—they began about ten days earlier than scheduled, during the last week of August. "So we did not wait for approval from the Military Affairs Commission (this was wrong), but went right into combat earlier than planned." There is also the issue of the "spontaneous" participation of more than eighty regiments without authorization from the Eighth Route Army headquarters, and not from Yan'an as well. If Peng Dehuai's account is accepted (written in 1970, shortly before his death), then Mao and Party Central had no role in conceiving or planning the Hundred Regiments campaign. In that case, the "grand strategy" motivations for undertaking it largely vanish—except perhaps insofar as they were considered by Peng and his colleagues. One alleged motive was to counter any tendency toward capitulation by Chiang Kai-shek and the Chongqing regime: if the war heated up and the CCP threw itself into fighting, any accommodation between Chiang and Japan would look like cowardly surrender. A related consideration was the Communist leadership's sensitivity to the charge that they were simply exploiting the war to expand their influence—avoiding Japanese combat while letting KMT armies bear the real burden of fighting. The Nationalists gave major publicity to the accusation that CCP policy devoted 70 percent of effort to expansion, 20 percent to coping with the KMT, and only 10 percent to opposing Japan. A third suggested motive was to divert attention from the New Fourth Army's offensives against Nationalist forces in Central China, which were peaking around the same time. Peng Dehuai acknowledged the campaign was "too protracted," yet he defended its importance in maintaining the CCP's anti-Japanese image in the wake of anti-friction conflicts, in demonstrating the failure of the cage-and-silkworm policy, in returning at least twenty-six county seats to base control, and in keeping "wavering" elements in line. Even if these reasons mattered less than regional and tactical calculations in launching the campaign, they could always be used for propaganda afterward. Whatever misgivings Mao and Party Central may have had, the Party kept them to itself. Mao radioed congratulations to Peng after his victory, and in public statements the Hundred Regiments were turned into legend. Even if the Hundred Regiments campaign aimed to defeat Japanese pacification efforts, it did not succeed in a decisive way. Shocked and stung by the 8RA's action, the North China Area Army intensified its efforts to bring North China under tighter control. Under General Tada and then his successor, General Okamura Yasuji (July 1941–November 1944), the Japanese inflicted brutal, sustained violence against all North China bases. Between 1941 and 1944, about 150,000 Japanese troops were assigned full-time to pacification duty, supported by roughly 100,000 Chinese auxiliaries of widely varying description and effectiveness. The remainder of the NCAA (about 150,000–200,000 men) was assigned to other tasks such as garrisoning major cities and containing Nationalist forces. Communist regulars were estimated at around 250,000 within base areas and 40,000 in SKN. The Japanese and their Chinese auxiliaries invested even more heavily than before in constructing moats, ditches, palisades, and blockhouses. Japanese sources claimed that by 1942 their forces had built 11,860 kilometers of blockade line and 7,700 fortified posts, mostly in the Hebei plains and the foothills of the Taihang mountains. A massive trench ran for 500 kilometers along the western side of the Pinghan railway line, with a depopulated and constantly patrolled zone on either side. The 250 Japanese outposts established in southern Hebei by December 1940 were more than quadrupled by mid-1942. These became the key means of controlling plains areas; by the end of 1941, all Communist bases in such terrain had been reduced to guerrilla status. Many main force units—such as those under Liu Cheng'ao and Yang Xiufeng—were compelled to move westward into mountains to survive. What distinguished the new Tada–Okamura approach from earlier tactics was the much larger and more protracted search-and-destroy thrust into the core mountain-base areas. They also replaced selective repression with indiscriminate, generalized violence. These infamous "Three-All" mop-up campaigns meant: kill all, burn all, loot all. Unable to distinguish ordinary peasants from Communists, the Japanese waged war on everyone. After attempting to seal off major consolidated regions in the base areas, they sent in very large detachments to search for Communist forces, civilian cadres, and activists. They also tried to destroy base facilities and war material stockpiles; to disrupt agriculture by burning crops or interfering with planting and harvesting; and to seize grain stores. Entire villages were razed, and everything alive found there was killed. Unlike earlier mop-ups that swept through an area and then departed, these campaigns left troops in the targeted zones for extended periods, "combing" the area back and forth and building at least temporary strongpoints in more accessible parts of mountain bases. These mop-up operations took a heavy and painful toll on rural populations. No doubt the harsh tactics and atrocities frequently committed during these actions did cause many peasants, rich and poor alike, to harbor deep hatred of the Japanese and to commit more fully to the Communist side. But intra-party sources also portray cases in which repression worked even more effectively than earlier attempts to drive a wedge between party and peasantry. As one internal assessment put it: If we only stress concealment… we are bound to be divorced from the masses. The morale of the masses cannot be sustained for long either. On the other hand, if we only seek fleeting gratification in careless fighting, we may also invite still more cruel enemy suppression. That will also alienate the masses. Communist spokesmen acknowledged that, in North China base areas, the population under Party control fell from 44 million to 25 million, while the Eighth Route Army declined from 400,000 to 300,000. Local records present an even grimmer picture. By 1942, 90 percent of the plains bases had been reduced to guerrilla zones or outright enemy control. In the mountainous Taiyue district within the Jin-Cha-Lu-Yi base, one cadre admitted that "not a single county was kept intact and the government offices of all its twelve counties were exiled in Jin-yuan." All twenty-six county seats occupied following the Hundred Regiments fighting were lost. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Japan tried to regain control through retaliatory "mopping-up" operations starting in October 1940. In response, the Eighth Route Army and its commanders issued counter-measures: coordinate party, government, military, and civilians; keep mobility while dispersing forces when possible; and focus on annihilating incoming enemy units decisively. Counter-sweeps and anti-pacification actions continued through December, involving repeated ambushes and sabotage of roads, highways, and fortification efforts.
In this podcast, we look at the novel that was, a little more than a week ago, awarded the International Booker Prize. Taiwan Travelogue is a novel that pretends to be a travelogue, where a Japanese woman from Nagasaki, an important writer in the Japanese empire. She travels to Taiwan to travel and talk about her writing, but she comes to have a sort of friendship with a Taiwanese woman. This novel is an interrogation of Japanese and KMT colonialism in Taiwan. It may also be a romance, though that is never clear. An overall great novel that deserved the Booker.
Last time we spoke about the first phase of the One Hundred Regiment Offensive. On 20 August 1940, forces launched the Zhengtai Campaign, part of the "Hundred Regiments Offensive," aiming to disrupt Japan's transport network and thus weaken its "cage-and-strongpoint" defense. Orders from the Eighth Route Army split tasks: the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region attacked the eastern Zheng–Tai line, the 129th Division struck the western section , and the 120th Division hit the Tongpu Railway and the Fen–Li Highway. Success was to be judged by the damage inflicted on the Zheng–Tai line. Preparations were conducted under strict secrecy: reconnaissance teams mapped Japanese strongholds with help from villagers; communities stockpiled grain, ammunition, and tools, and trained for demolition, including heating and bending rails. At night, units infiltrated stations and villages, seized positions, and destroyed bridges, power lines, roads, and mines across multiple columns; rain slowed movement and shaped the fighting. By early September, the Zheng–Tai line and related transport routes were severed, isolating strongpoints and hindering reinforcement. #203 The One Hundred Regiment Offensive Phase Two Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. During the second phase, the Hundred Regiments Offensive stopped being a single burst of action and became a sustained attempt to keep the Japanese occupation system off-balance. More regiments entered the fighting until, by the scale of commitment on the map, 104 regiments were involved. This matters because it changes what the campaign was: not merely a set of raids, but an effort to broaden pressure so that the enemy could not concentrate everything in one place at one time. Years later, Peng Dehuai—the commander closely associated with the Hundred Regiments offensive—described how the entry of these units felt as "spontaneous." That word can sound mysterious, so it helps to interpret it in operational terms. "Spontaneous" here does not mean unplanned chaos; it means that once the offensive logic took hold—once units saw that Japanese movement and control were being disrupted—local commanders and regiments felt empowered to join the fight without always waiting for the Eighth Route Army headquarters to issue fresh, detailed instructions for each smaller step. In other words, the campaign became something like an expanding network: local success and shared strategic perception fed into more participation across regions. Strategically, the campaign was guided by political and military guidance issued on September 10, 1940 by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. That instruction tied current operations to the earlier political-military framework of the July 7 Declaration and the July 7 Decision. The instruction argued that the moment mattered: it called for focusing "main efforts" on striking the Japanese army during a period when unity was being strengthened. It specifically urged that, based on the experience of the North China Hundred Regiments Offensive, Communist forces should organize one or more planned large-scale offensive operations in Shandong and Central China. In North China, the instruction pushed for expansion into Japanese army areas that had not yet been attacked—because the battlefield effect of the campaign was not only measured in immediate battlefield outcomes, but in reducing enemy-occupied space, enlarging base areas, breaking through blockade lines, and improving combat effectiveness. That last phrase—"Striking the enemy and attacking our allies is the general policy of military operations at present"—was the harsh shorthand for the operational reality: the campaign had to prevent Japanese occupation from appearing stable and manageable. If the occupation system could treat insurgency as "localized trouble," it would recover quickly. If, instead, occupation became dangerous in multiple places at once—requiring constant defense, constant movement, constant reinforcement—then the Japanese would be forced into a defensive posture that undermined their ability to exploit control. On September 16, 1940, the headquarters issued the second phase plan with a clear aim: expand results from the first phase. The headquarters explained the second phase would continue with an emphasis on disrupting Japanese transportation and destroying some strongholds that had penetrated deep into the base areas. This reveals the campaign's real "background and stakes": the offensive wasn't built around capturing territory in the traditional sense alone. It was built around breaking the system that makes occupation work. In the enemy's logic, occupation relies on movement: soldiers need to move, supplies need to be shipped, and reinforcement must be routed quickly to where trouble appears. Transportation infrastructure—roads, railways, bridges, power lines—forms the skeleton of control. Strongholds and outposts are the organs that occupy space, but they depend on that skeleton. If transportation becomes unreliable, strongholds become isolated islands. If strongholds become isolated, the Japanese must decide between (1) defending each island and spreading themselves thin, or (2) leaving some islands to contain the rest—either way, control weakens. Strongpoints—whether forts, fortified villages, gatehouses, or road blocks—also function as a "cage-and-silkworm" system: they are placed so Japanese forces can consolidate inside them, while routes outside are controlled or denied. In that model, even a small disruption can trigger a major ripple effect. When highways or key segments of rail are repeatedly broken, Japanese units cannot move "cleanly." They must detour, slow down, repair under threat, or escort repairs with larger forces than they prefer. Every extra hour spent repairing is an hour not spent consolidating. Every detour is a chance for ambush or for further sabotage. The second phase sought to exploit that dependency deliberately. That strategic framing explains why, even as the campaign broadened, different regions emphasized different battles. The Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region mainly fought the Lai-Ling Campaign, the 129th Division mainly fought the Yu-Liao Campaign, and the 120th Division focused on attacking the Tong-Pu Railway. They were not separate stories. They were different methods of attacking the same underlying vulnerability: the occupier's ability to move, reinforce, and coordinate. In Jin-Cha-Ji's sector, the stakes were especially sharp around Laiyuan and Lingqiu. The Japanese forces stationed in Mongolia had occupied those areas and penetrated deeply into the northwestern parts of the Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region. Japanese strength around these positions included elements of the 2nd Independent Mixed Brigade and the 26th Division, totaling more than 1,500 men, plus more than 1,000 puppet troops. The presence of puppet forces mattered not only for manpower, but because puppet troops supported the occupier's local control apparatus: they served as locally sourced enforcers, scouts, guards, and "administration-adjacent" security. Removing or weakening them was part of disrupting occupation credibility and local stability. Because the Japanese had been attacked in the first phase, they did not respond by retreating into passivity. They increased troops at each stronghold. Laiyuan City alone was reinforced to around 500 men, and the Japanese strengthened fortifications and stockpiled food and ammunition. This meant the defenders were preparing for a second round: not a sudden surprise raid, but a sustained threat that would test their ability to endure isolation and keep their network intact. Under these conditions, the Jin-Cha-Ji leadership decided to mobilize forces for the Lai-Ling Campaign, beginning at 22:00 on September 22, 1940. Here the background and stakes show up in the campaign's timing and tactics. The objective was not to "beat the defenders in open battle" only; it was to attack in ways that would prevent consolidation. By pushing on county areas and surrounding strongholds immediately, the attackers aimed to force the defenders into reactive mode—closing gates, shifting forces into defensive positions, and preparing for fights that would consume time and ammunition. The right wing launched a fierce attack on Laiyuan County and surrounding strongholds. After a night of hard fighting, the east, west, and south gates were taken, and the Japanese troops retreated into the city. Taking gates matters because it compresses space. It turns a wider defensive perimeter into a narrower, more concentrated posture. It also creates a psychological and operational trap: defenders who retreat into the city may survive longer as a fortified concentration, but their ability to conduct aggressive movement outside their walls—and their ability to receive reinforcements through many approaches—becomes more limited. In the night of September 23, the 2nd Regiment, supported by a battalion of the 1st Regiment and artillery, attacked Sanjia Village, described as an important enemy stronghold on the Laiyuan–Yixian highway, roughly 10 kilometers east of Laiyuan City. Highways are not just routes; they are corridors that connect strongholds to each other and to supply lines. By capturing a stronghold on a highway, the campaign attempted to break a portion of the corridor network feeding the city. The attackers annihilated most of the enemy and captured the village. At the same time, the 3rd Regiment attacked Dongtuanbao, northeast of Laiyuan City, and by the night of September 24, they had taken surrounding fortifications and forced remaining enemies into only a few houses inside the village. Then, on September 25, the enemy burned weapons, supplies, and food stored at the stronghold, preparing for a breakout. That detail reveals a key stake of stronghold warfare: if defenders believe they cannot hold and cannot escape, they may destroy supplies rather than let attackers seize them intact. It's a grim tactical psychology—destroying stores can deny the enemy immediate benefit, even if it reduces defenders' chances of future endurance. When the attackers launched another fierce assault and the remaining defenders, with no hope of escape, threw themselves into the flames and perished, the event underscored the "closed-options" nature of the battle: the stronghold system was being compressed until breakout became impossible. On September 26, other right-wing units, together with the 9th Regiment of the Pingxi Military Sub-district, captured 13 strongholds including Taohuabao, Bailebao, Jijiazhuang, Xinzhuang, Beikou, Xiabeitou, Baishikou, Zhongzhuang, Wangxidong, Liujiazui, Zhangjiayu, Beishifo, and Jinjiajing. Capturing strongholds in clusters has a strategic function. It doesn't just remove personnel; it interrupts local control geography. It makes it harder for defenders inside the city to extend influence outward and harder for them to create new safe points for movement. But the Japanese did what well-prepared occupiers can do: reinforce at the most important time and the most important place. On the second day after the start, Japanese reinforcement began from Zhangjiakou and other locations. Roads had not been completely destroyed, so the Japanese could advance rapidly. This becomes a major background lesson of the second phase. The first phase had demonstrated the power of sabotage to disrupt Japanese movement. But by the time second-phase campaigns began, the Japanese were not ignorant—they were learning. Where sabotage had fully severed roads, reinforcement could be delayed or routed into danger. Where sabotage remained incomplete, reinforcement could arrive quickly, changing the battle's character from attack-dominant to defense-dominant. By noon on September 28, over 3,000 Japanese and puppet troops arrived in Laiyuan City by car, supported by 20 tanks and 4 aircraft. This mechanized support was not just "extra firepower." It was a statement about how the Japanese aimed to retain control: tanks and aircraft increase defenders' ability to resist assault and keep morale from collapsing. Under these conditions, the right wing found it difficult to launch a favorable offensive. So the Jin-Cha-Ji leadership shifted offensive focus to the Lingqiu area, rather than forcing the original plan to continue against reinforced mechanized defense. The first step was to eliminate enemy strongholds between Lingqiu and Hunyuan. The second step was to seize enemy strongholds along a line from southeast of Daying to Shentangbao, and in mountainous areas north of Daying and Shahe. This shift highlights a core strategic principle: when a target becomes too fortified, the offensive can still succeed by moving the pressure elsewhere—aiming to break the enemy's network of strongpoints and keep forcing them to respond across space. On October 2, the headquarters ordered the main force of the right wing to concentrate in the area east and southeast of Laiyuan. Part of the force was assigned to monitor and contain the enemy in Laiyuan, while the 1st and 2nd Regiments were placed under the left wing's command and joined the left wing in combat. This reallocation reflects operational adaptability. If a city becomes a fortress, smaller units may be better employed as containment—tying down defenders—while the main effort moves to seize other stronghold lines where the Japanese might still be vulnerable. The fighting continued with tactical attacks that show how strongpoint warfare unfolded in the field. On the night of October 8, the 1st Battalion of the 1st Regiment launched an attack on the 2nd Regiment while a portion of the Japanese army in Nanpotou was attacking it. The attackers broke into enemy lines, annihilated most of the enemy, and drove the rest off. At the same time, the 1st Battalion of the 6th Regiment captured Qiangfengling, and the Japanese forces in Qingciyao fled in panic. The campaign also included actions such as attacks on Jinfengdian by the 3rd Battalion of the 6th Regiment on the night of September 9, and mention that the 26th Regiment entered Huangtai Temple on the night of October 8 while attacking between Lingqiu and Guangling. By understanding the background and stakes, you can see what these actions were really doing. They weren't random. They were repeated attempts to keep dismantling the enemy's ability to maintain a functioning strongpoint chain. Each captured stronghold reduces the enemy's ability to create secure corridors. Each panic-driven retreat increases their time burden and may cause breakdown in communication between local nodes. Even when the battle remains fierce and deadly, these changes in tempo can accumulate into operational outcomes. The Lai-Ling Campaign lasted 18 days, producing concrete results: killing and wounding over 1,000 Japanese and puppet troops, capturing 49 Japanese and 237 puppet troops, and leaving 1,419 casualties for the Eighth Route Army. The losses show the campaign was not a "clean victory." It was expensive. But the operational logic—disrupting a strengthened occupation zone, capturing strongholds, and forcing enemy reinforcements to concentrate—was consistent with the second phase's broader mission. Support for Lai-Ling came from the Jizhong Military Region through the Renqiu–Hejian–Dacheng–Suning Campaign from October 1 to October 20, simultaneously sabotaging the Cangshi, Deshi, Beining, and Jinpu railways. This is where "background and stakes" become especially clear. The Japanese, even when they defend in one area, have to move elsewhere to respond. When you attack multiple transportation lines and strongpoint zones at once, you prevent the enemy from solving one problem cleanly before moving to the next. You make the enemy chase multiple fires. After the Hundred Regiments Offensive began, Japanese forces in Jizhong moved west to reinforce in some cases, but most were tied down on important transportation lines. That relative weakening meant defenses in Jizhong's interior became weaker—creating space where a larger contest could occur. Jizhong decided to deploy 10 battalions totaling more than 8,500 men from the 18th, 23rd, and 30th Regiments across left wing, center, and right wing roles, fighting in the area. The plan was not only to attack; it was to manipulate where the Japanese had to respond. The two wing units would contain and draw Japanese forces away from the central Renhe Dasu zone, and then the central unit would break into that central area to open the situation. In other words: wings would pull; center would punch. The Renhe Dasu battle began on October 1, 1940. On the left wing, the 18th Regiment entered an area east of the Zhulong River and west of Hejian and Renqiu, capturing Lianjiazhuang, Dongguxian, and Liangcun between October 2 and October 6. By the night of October 7, Japanese troops at strongholds including Yuhuangmiao, Fenglebao, and Liushansi fled in panic—another reminder that once stronghold cohesion fractures, the enemy's ability to endure a second phase of pressure drops. On the right wing, the 30th Regiment operated with four battalions east of Dacheng and east of the Ziya River, capturing a series of strongholds including Liminju, Dengzhuangzi, Shigeju, Xiliuzhuang, Zangzhuangzi, and Chencun, while engaging in road-breaking and ditch digging. These actions show the campaign's "method," not just its target. Even when the opponent could be fought directly, sabotage and engineering measures could amplify the damage by reducing mobility and forcing time-consuming repairs. The central unit, the 23rd Regiment, had two battalions crossing the Hutuo River northward. On October 1, it ambushed more than 100 Japanese troops coming from Shangjialin to seize grain, killing more than 90 and capturing all their weapons. On October 9, it ambushed the enemy from Liugezhuang to Litan at Baimatang, annihilating 20 Japanese and puppet troops. These ambushes illustrate a second background principle: occupiers need sustenance and extraction operations, and those operations follow routes and patterns. By striking troops during foraging or supply-related movement, the offensive attacks not only the army but also the logic that keeps occupation armies fed and maintained. From October 15 to October 20, the second stage of those operations targeted the east and west banks of the Ziya River, leaving only a small force in the central Renhe River Great Suppression area. On the night of October 19, the central force captured Banjiehe and destroyed a bridge over the nearby Guyang River. On the night of October 16, the left wing captured Daqudi and the Renqiu Shimen Bridge, and on October 18 it captured the stronghold at Wangpan. A note in the operational description also indicates that the right wing faced a serious enemy situation and could not take major action during one segment—another reminder that even a planned operation cannot control all battlefield variables. What matters is whether the operation still meets its strategic purpose, not whether every segment goes perfectly. In the Battle of Renhe Dasu, Japanese and puppet losses were heavy: 805 killed or wounded, and 3 Japanese and 326 puppet troops captured. The campaign took 29 strongholds. The Jizhong Military Region suffered 573 casualties. Strategically, this battle contained enemy forces and effectively supported the Battle of Lai-Ling. Again, support here is not just "help in the same region," but redistribution of pressure: by forcing the enemy to allocate troops to Jizhong, Japanese defenders around Lai-Ling face more difficulty maintaining overall operational coherence. While Jin-Cha-Ji and Jizhong fought around Laiyuan and Lingqiu, a deeper pressure developed in the Taihang base region—through the Yuliao (Yu-Liao) Campaign, fought mainly by the 129th Division. The background stakes in the Yu-Liao theater were the highway route from Yangquan through Pingding, Heshun, Liaoxian to Yushe, described as the deepest penetration route through which the Japanese penetrated the Taihang base area. The Japanese tried to extend this road southwestward and connect it with the Baijin Railway through Wuxiang, aiming to split the Dahang area and deploy forces flexibly along the Zhengtai and Baijin lines. This was about strategic mobility and operational geometry. A road connection isn't only "transport"; it reshapes where the enemy can exert pressure and how quickly they can shift forces from one axis to another. The Yuliao section measured 45 kilometers and included eight strongholds: Yushe, Yanbi, Wangjing, Guantou, Pushang, Xiaolingdi, Shixia, and Liaoxian. These were guarded by the 13th Battalion of the Japanese 4th Independent Mixed Brigade. A line of strongholds along a highway is the occupier's version of a corridor defense: it enables them to keep movement inside a protected chain. If that chain is cut, movement becomes vulnerable and the "deep penetration route" turns into a dangerous liability. On September 22, 1940, the 129th Division issued basic orders: launch a surprise attack to eliminate the enemy from Yushe to Xiaolingdi, recapture strongholds, destroy the highway, and then press forward toward Liaoxian to recapture it when the opportunity arose. This is a textbook example of how the offensive combined surprise, seizure, and destruction. Surprise prevents the defenders from organizing a coordinated response. Seizure eliminates their nodes. Highway destruction prevents them from restoring their corridor quickly, forcing time and labor—exactly what the second phase wanted. The assault began on the night of September 23. On September 24, the left wing captured Yanbi and Wangjing, while the right wing captured Pushang and Xiaolingdi. By September 25, Yushe and Jucheng had also fallen, leaving only the enemy at Guantou on the Xiaolingdi–Yushe line still resisting. Concurrently, detachments attacked on related axes: the Pingliao Detachment captured Hanwang Town north of Liaoxian; the Qinbei Detachment sabotaged roads and attacked frequently, pinning Japanese forces on the Wuxiang and Baijin routes. On September 26, the 129th Division ordered part of the right wing to continue besieging the enemy at Guantou, while the main force and the left wing moved east to recapture Liaoxian and eliminate reinforcements. At dawn on September 27, the right wing attacked Shixia west of Liaoxian and captured it that night. On September 28, the left wing reached near Majiu in preparation for an attack on Liaoxian that night. Then battlefield logic reasserted itself: the Japanese did not sit idle once their corridor was threatened. Troops from Heshun and Wuxiang reinforced Liaoxian and Guantou respectively. The Eighth Route Army headquarters ordered the Liaoxian attack halted. Some forces were to contain the enemy advancing south from Heshun, while the main force moved to the Hongyatou and Guandinao areas to prepare to annihilate enemy reinforcements arriving from Wuxiang. This decision reveals a deeper stake: even if an army can seize targets, it must avoid exhaustion and must avoid allowing the enemy to convert a partial tactical loss into a larger opportunity. Headquarters essentially chose the operation's "survival path": shift from capturing more nodes to annihilating the reinforcements that would otherwise restore the corridor. Following these orders, the 129th Division attacked Guantou and took it at 24:00 on September 29. In the narrative description that follows, the enemy reinforcements moving through ambush terrain clashed with Communist formations in an engagement where aircraft coverage and terrain allowed the enemy to seize high ground and resist stubbornly. The battle lasted two days and one night, with heavy casualties on both sides. That is an important background lesson: the offensive could still destroy corridor nodes, but the enemy's ability to bring aircraft support and seize terrain meant that the "destroy and move on" approach wasn't always enough. Sometimes, momentum had to be re-channeled into another kind of contest—one closer to a blocking ambush and a battle of endurance. By the evening of October 1, more than 500 Japanese troops from Liaoxian broke through the right wing's blockade and approached near the left wing's command post. The left wing was ordered to withdraw from the battle. Headquarters then assessed that Japanese troops from Liaoxian and Wuxiang had joined and that more than 1,000 Japanese troops from Yangquan had reached Hanwang Town north of Liaoxian. Combined with the 129th Division's exhaustion and heavy casualties, headquarters decided to end the Yulin–Liaoxian Campaign—not because the offensive had no value, but because the risk of allowing the enemy to "sweep" the Taibei area could outweigh further gains. This termination decision illustrates a stake that is often overlooked: in insurgency-style campaigns, operational survival is part of success. The second phase did not merely chase targets; it sought to transform conditions so that the enemy would have to spend strength defending a failing network. If continuing a battle risks letting the enemy regroup into a larger counter-offensive that clears base zones, then ending becomes strategic. While the 129th Division wrestled with corridor defense around Liaoxian and Guantou, the 120th Division pursued a transport-centered strategy against the Tong-Pu Railway—because rail disruption was not a supporting detail; it was a main axis of pressure. On September 12, 1940, the 120th Division issued an action plan for the northern section of the Tongpu Railway, deciding to attack the Ningwu and Xinxian sections (with emphasis on the section between Ningwu and Daniudian) starting September 20. This timing shows planning designed to synchronize with broader operational pressure. Rail sabotage required engineering preparation and coordination across units, and the campaign sought to create disruption when the enemy would be most vulnerable to delayed reinforcement. On September 14, the 358th Brigade left its base west of Loufan and crossed the Jingle–Lanxian Highway to the north. It assembled at Majiagou on the 16th, then launched an attack on Toumaying using its 3rd Detachment (comprising the 7th and 8th Regiments and the special service battalion). At 24:00 on September 18, that detachment attacked Touma Camp, while the 7th and 8th Regiments attacked reinforcements. Fighting continued until the following morning when more than 40 Japanese soldiers from Ninghuabao reinforced Touma Camp. Once reinforcements reached Shanzhai Village, they were surrounded and annihilated. On September 20, around 200 Japanese soldiers from Yangquanling went to Liyan Village to counterattack. The 716th Regiment attacked at 14:00, and by dawn the next day, the enemy fled back to Yangquanling. These battles are more than local clashes. They serve the background logic of sabotage campaigns: before destroying rail infrastructure, you need to reduce the enemy's ability to respond instantly. Fighting reinforcements and counterattacks clears windows of time. Those windows can then be used to sabotage tracks, bridges, and related installations. If sabotage occurs under active reinforcement pressure, the enemy can repair quickly or trap the sabotage teams. If sabotage occurs after the enemy's response capacity is disrupted, repair becomes slower and the operational effects last longer. Parallel operations reinforced this logic. On the night of September 16, the Independent 1st Brigade crossed the Fen River east. On September 18, it was learned that more than 400 Japanese troops had attacked the Yanbei Detachment at Yangquanling but returned to Shangzhuang after failing to find them. The brigade then chose to encircle and annihilate the enemy rather than chase endlessly. The attack began at 13:00 on September 18 and lasted until early morning on September 19. The main force withdrew to sabotage the railway, while the remaining enemy retreated to Yangquanling. The engagement inflicted 105 casualties on the Independent 1st Brigade, while killing or wounding about 200 Japanese. Once the blocking threat was removed, units quickly moved into sabotage actions on the Tongpu Railway. Then sabotage itself proceeded systematically. On the night of September 22, the 4th Regiment of the 358th Brigade—attached to the division's engineering company—and the division's special service regiment advanced to the area between Duanjialing and Xuangang to sabotage several sections of the Tongpu Railway. At the same time, the 2nd Regiment attacked Qicun, and the 715th Regiment attacked Xinkou and Loubanzhai. On the night of September 23, the 2nd Regiment sabotaged the railway south of Xinkou while the 715th Regiment sabotaged it north of Xinkou. On the night of September 25, the 715th Regiment sabotaged between Daniudian and Xuangang. The Independent 2nd Brigade also sabotaged several railway sections between Shuoxian and Ningwu. After six days of sabotage operations, the 120th Division again caused the Tongpu Railway to be interrupted. The background stakes here are straightforward but huge: a rail interruption forces the occupier into repair work, escorts, and re-routing. During the second phase—when the Japanese were already under pressure across multiple theaters—the need to continuously handle repair reduces the capacity for offensive operations and for rapid reinforcement to any single contested point. It also slows their ability to respond to new threats as quickly as they would like. By connecting all these threads—Laiyuan and Lingqiu strongholds, Renhe Dasu containment and roadbreaking, the Yuliao highway corridor fight, and repeated Tongpu railway sabotage—you can see the deeper logic of the second phase. The campaign aimed to create a battlefield environment where Japanese forces could not enjoy stable mobility and where strongpoints could not function as a reliable cage. Transportation disruption isolated strongholds. Stronghold destruction and capture shrank the enemy's local control points. Highway and rail sabotage forced the Japanese to defend not only troops and walls, but also the infrastructure that enabled their coordination. That's why the second phase emphasizes disrupting transportation and destroying some strongholds penetrated deep into base areas. It wasn't simply "hit more places." It was a deliberate attempt to force the Japanese to abandon their preferred operational pattern: a networked system of strongpoints supported by transportation reliability. If that reliability breaks down, the occupier's "cage" becomes porous and unstable, and Communist base areas gain room to expand and persist. By early October, the second phase was winding down, while a third phase was developing: reinforced Japanese columns sought to engage and destroy 8RA units. Over the next two months, several fierce counterattacks occurred, and after that the Hundred Regiments campaign was considered to be finished. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. After earlier setbacks in the 1930s, the CCP sought national leadership in resistance while maintaining political room to maneuver within an uneasy arrangement with the KMT. By early 1940–1941, the strategy shifted toward "strongpoint" and transportation warfare: guerrilla actions were used to fracture Japanese defensive networks and sabotage logistics. Japanese attempts to consolidate territory, through local administration and security practices—often provoked the CCP's dual struggle, militarily and politically. As Japanese sweeps temporarily gave the CCP advantages, the situation forced rapid adaptation.
Last time we spoke about the New Fourth Army Incident. Across the Second Sino-Japanese War, the CCP entered after the setbacks of the 1930s, seeking to become a national leader in resistance while remaining cautious toward the Nationalist government. The 1936 Xi'an Incident reshaped politics, and by August 1937 KMT–CCP agreements defined a working arrangement: the CCP acknowledged KMT leadership and integrated its forces, while still pursuing political space and autonomy. As the war progressed, the CCP focused on defining its relationship with the KMT and keeping operational independence during cooperation. Mao Zedong managed this alliance by promoting a united front against Japan, yet protecting CCP revolutionary goals and internal control. The establishment of the Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army marked this military reorganization. Throughout, the CCP feared that KMT collaboration with Japan could enable a peace settlement that would undermine communist legitimacy and restrict the party's future authority thereafter. #202 The One Hundred Regiment Offensive Phase One Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Simultaneously with the friction between the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the Japanese were also working to take control of—and extract value from—most of the territory they had nominally conquered. Treating these two processes separately—"friction" on the one hand and "consolidation" on the other—does violence to the real difficulty of the CCP's dilemma: the Party often had to confront both problems at the same time. At certain moments, the CCP was effectively forced to wage a two-front struggle. Even so, if the worst of the KMT–CCP friction had already eased by 1941, the most serious and painful challenges posed by Japanese consolidation were still ahead. To recover anything close to reality, the two timelines have to be read together and placed on top of one another. The Japanese understood that consolidation could not be postponed, because much of the land behind the furthest reaches of their army was still only weakly under their actual control. In some places, order could be restored by relatively direct methods: rebuilding local administration and policy authority; repairing transportation and communications; enrolling Chinese personnel—usually, as it turned out, people of dubious reliability—as police or militia under puppet regimes; registering the local population; and requiring identity cards. In true old-style Chinese fashion, collective security practices were used widely. One form was the familiar bao-jia system, in one variant or another. Another was the so-called "railway-cherishing village": a village would be assigned a nearby stretch of track, and if residents failed to "cherish" it, they were held collectively responsible. Yet early Japanese weakness in northern China is vividly illustrated by an incident in the summer of 1938. Three young foreigners—vacationing from teaching in Peiping (Beijing)—were curious about events and about what people were doing. They loaded their bicycles on a southbound train, got off at Baoding, and rode west until they ran into Eighth Route Army detachments. In the early period of the war, commanders generally wanted to rely on more mobile forms of warfare. Mao, however, insisted on a strategy of de-escalation and dispersion: breaking the 8RA and New Fourth Army into small units as nuclei for combat, recruitment, political work, and base-area construction. Under this approach, few engagements could be truly dramatic in scale, and most were constrained by the need to survive. Each skirmish had to be carefully planned. The CCP would use local intelligence and the element of surprise so that a detachment could strike and withdraw before its limited ammunition ran out or before enemy reinforcements arrived. Small Japanese patrols and puppet units could be ambushed not only to seize weapons and other material, but also to inflict casualties. Active collaborators, or Japanese-sponsored administrative personnel, could be assassinated. Above all, Communist action aimed to disrupt transportation: mining roads; cutting down telegraph poles, stealing wire, and cutting rail lines; sabotaging rolling stock; and, at times, carrying off steel rails so that primitive arsenals could be supplied. Attempting derailments was also part of the effort. Destroying a bridge or a locomotive counted as a major achievement. Both the Communists and the Japanese understood that these tactics did not decisively shift the overall strategic balance. Still, they worked at other levels. For the Japanese, the result was a constant series of small wounds—painful, bleeding, and potentially infectious. Few areas in the countryside felt truly safe. Japanese field commanders documented growing frustration as they tried to eliminate resistance, restore administration, collect taxes, and prepare for more systematic and effective economic exploitation of conquered territory. Guerrilla warfare against the Japanese cannot be judged only in conventional battle terms—numbers of engagements, casualties, or territory occupied. It had to be evaluated politically and psychologically as well, exactly as Mao repeatedly emphasized. Since the CCP's wartime legitimacy depended on its patriotic claims, enough fighting had to be carried out to maintain credibility. Moreover, military success mattered for mobilizing the "basic masses," persuading wavering people to keep an open mind, and neutralizing opposition. As the logic put it, it was not that people always chose the side that was winning, but that few would ever join a side they believed was losing. One experienced cadre described the effect this way: Among the guerrilla units… there is a saying that "victory decides everything." No matter how hard it has been to recruit troops, supply the army, raise the masses' anti-Japanese fervor or win over the masses' sympathy, after a victory in battle the masses fall all over themselves to send us flour, steamed bread, meat, and vegetables. The masses' pessimistic and defeatist psychology is broken down, and many new guerrilla soldiers swarm in. But once the Japanese began to demand a heavy price for every engagement—whether the Communists won or not—this attitude began to change. In North and Central China, the Japanese earliest pacification sweeps created comparatively little trouble for the CCP. At first, the Japanese made few distinctions among Chinese forces. They simply tried to mop up or disperse them without regard to character. Over time, however, they realized that these sweeps actually made it easier for the CCP to expand. By the second half of 1939, Japanese methods became more discriminating. Chinese non-Communist forces would step aside while the Japanese hunted specifically for the 8RA, the N4A, and their local affiliates. The Japanese also made more direct appeals to non-Communist forces. According to Japanese army statistics, during the eighteen months from mid-1939 to late 1940, around 70,000 men from more or less regular Nationalist units in North China alone went over to the Japanese. The Japanese also reached informal "understandings" with several regional commanders whose forces together might have totaled as many as 300,000 men. This, of course, corresponded to what the CCP denounced as "crooked-line patriotism"—the "crooked-line" collaboration that preserved certain units so they could be used in future anti-Communist operations. When pacification efforts were intensified from late 1939 and throughout 1940, differences also appeared in the strategies Japanese armies used in North versus Central China. In North China, the approach relied heavily on military means, with political tactics limited largely to recruiting collaborators. In Central China, Japanese authorities did not hesitate to use military force, but they also attempted to supplement it with more comprehensive political and economic solutions by setting up tightly controlled "model peace zones." Although both approaches ultimately failed, they created enormous difficulties for Chinese Communists—until, in 1943, the Japanese were forced to ease off because the Pacific War against the United States became too burdensome. Careful reading of detailed intra-party documents suggests that repression also demobilized peasant support and terrorized populations into apathy, grudging acquiescence, or even active collaboration with the Japanese. In a locality already reduced from consolidated base status to guerrilla status, capacity and will were often too weak to administer complex reforms in systematic fashion. In other words, passive survival—defensive survival—was at least as important as what lay behind the heroic public images the Party projected. Systematic pacification in North China in late 1939 and 1940 radiated outward. It moved from areas held more or less firmly by the Japanese and their puppets into guerrilla and contested zones. The ultimate objective was to crush resistance or render it ineffective. The method was first to sweep the area clear of anti-Japanese elements, and then to establish a chain of interconnected strongpoints that could quickly reinforce one another. After that, puppet government would be expanded so it could take increasing responsibility for civil administration and "pacification maintenance," while Japanese forces repeated the initial steps further outward into contested territory. Violence was used selectively against individuals, groups, or villages accused of acts of resistance. This selective violence aimed to deter active participation in CCP-led programs, deprive Communist forces of a population willing to shelter them, and persuade informers to come forward. That was, at least, the theory of the strategy. In practice, the basic framework of the strategy depended on the main transport lines. Railways and roads—if properly fortified and protected—could separate resistance forces from one another and deny them one of their most effective weapons: mobility. These "cage" tactics (chiyu-lung, "jiu-lung") made it possible to enlarge pacified areas by "nibbling" outward, "as a silkworm feeds on mulberry leaves" (ts'an-shih). At the same time, the approach aimed to exploit North China's economy more effectively. To this end, the Japanese worked to improve and extend both railway and road networks. When the war began, in Shanxi the Cheng-Tai (Shijiazhuang–Taiyuan) and Tong-Pu (Datong–Tongguan) lines were metre-gauge, incompatible with the standard-gauge lines elsewhere in China—part of Yan Xishan's design to prevent deeper penetration into his province. By the end of 1939, the Japanese used forced labor to convert both lines to standard gauge. One benefit was the easier transportation of high-quality anthracite coal from the Qingxing mines (on the Cheng-Tai line) to industrial users in North China and Manchukuo. Of the newly constructed roads and railway lines, the most important was the Te-Shih line—from Dezhou in northeastern Shandong to Shijiazhuang. Construction began in June 1940 and finished in November, connecting the Tianjin–Pukou, Beiping–Hankou, and Cheng-Tai lines. This made it easier to move troops and transport raw cotton. Once the Te–Shih link was completed, the Japanese had direct connections between the point of their furthest advance at the elbow of the Yellow River and all major cities of North China, and beyond to Manchukuo. Communist sources began to speak of a "transportation war," noting with concern the moats and ditches, the blockhouses, and the frequent patrols protecting the lines. Both militarily and economically, these measures weighed heavily on forces led by the Communists in North China and on the populations under their control—especially the plains of central and eastern Hebei. One indicator of effectiveness was the rapid decline in "acts of sabotage" against North China railways in 1939 and the first half of 1940. A cadre in Jin-Cha-Ji reported in mid-1940: "The enemy has adopted a blockhouse policy, like that of the Jiangxi Soviet. They are spread like a constellation. In central Hebei alone, there are about 500, separated by one to three miles." Normal trading patterns were disrupted as Japanese or puppet occupiers took over administrative and commercial centers, and peasants found themselves caught between regulations imposed by the Communists on one side and those enforced by the other side. Finally, landlords, moneylenders, loafers, bandits—everyone who felt damaged by the new order inside base areas—could use pacification programs to try to recover influence or simply take revenge. Some became informers. After 8RA and local units were driven away, they could kill remaining cadres or activists and settle scores with the peasants who had supported them. Until the "first anti-Communist upsurge" was defeated, local elites and other disaffected elements might also seek support from Nationalists. It was even possible for an armed band to operate for several months inside consolidated regions of the CCP base, killing cadres as it went. Peng Dehuai later recalled this period in a way that underscored how pressure translated into wavering and collapse. Under the enemy's brutal pressure, in some districts the masses even hesitated or capitulated. From March to July 1940, large areas of the North China base were reduced to guerrilla regions. Before the "Cage-bursting battle",, they controlled only two county seats: Pingxun in the Taihang mountains and Pien-kuan in northwest Shanxi. Masses who previously had one set of obligations now had two—one toward the anti-Japanese regime and one toward the puppet regime. The situation in North China had not yet become a full crisis, but it was certainly serious. Action was needed to regain initiative. On 22 July 1940, Zhu De, Commander-in-Chief of the Eighth Route Army, Peng Dehuai Deputy Commander-in-Chief, and Zuo Quan Deputy Chief of Staff jointly issued the Preliminary Battle Order, laying out the strategic goals for the coming operation. The order stated: "To respond to the enemy's 'prison cage policy,' obstruct its advance toward Xi'an, create favorable conditions in the North China theater, and strike at the national resistance initiative, we have decided to take advantage of the concealment provided by tall summer millet and the rainy season to carry out a large-scale sabotage operation on the Shijiazhuang–Taiyuan railway (Zheng–Tai Line)." It required the participation of at least 22 regiments from the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region, the 129th Division, and the 120th Division. The main objective was to "completely destroy key points along the Zheng–Tai Line" and to "cut the railway for a prolonged period." On 8 August, the headquarters of the Eighth Route Army issued the Operational Battle Order, further clarifying how forces would be deployed. The Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region was assigned to attack the eastern section of the Zheng–Tai Railway (from Niangzi Pass to Shijiazhuang). The 129th Division was assigned the western section (from Niangzi Pass to Yuci). The 120th Division was tasked with targeting the northern segment of the Tongpu Railway and the Fen–Li Highway. The order also required all troops to begin combat operations on 20 August, and emphasized that "the success of the campaign should be assessed primarily by the extent of damage inflicted on the Zheng–Tai Line." The operation was prepared under strict secrecy. Various elements of the Eighth Route Army conducted thorough preparations before the campaign. Reconnaissance teams, hidden and protected with the help of local villagers, penetrated deep into areas near the Shijiazhuang–Taiyuan railway to carefully map Japanese strongholds, enemy troop dispositions, and local terrain. At the same time, both military and civilian communities mobilized to stockpile grain, ammunition, and tools needed for railway sabotage; blacksmiths were organized to manufacture crowbars, pickaxes, and other essential equipment. Specialized military training covered demolition methods and techniques for dismantling railways, including tactics such as heating and bending steel rails. Civilian mobilization played a crucial role: militia and support teams took on tasks such as transport, medical aid, and coordination with military units. In Central Shanxi alone, more than 10,000 militia members were mobilized. The Eighth Route Army headquarters repeatedly stressed the need for operational confidentiality, stating: "Before the battle begins, the plan must remain strictly classified; until preparations are completed, the campaign objective may be disclosed only to brigade-level commanders." With the cover of dense summer millet, troops secretly assembled within their designated operational areas. Before the battle, the Japanese North China Area Army estimated the strength of the communist regular forces at about 88,000 men in December 1939. Two years later, they revised the estimate to 140,000. On the eve of the battle, communist forces had grown to between 200,000 and 400,000 men, organized in 105 regiments. By 1940, the growth had become so significant that Zhu De ordered a coordinated offensive by most of the communist regular units—46 regiments from the 115th Division, 47 from the 129th, and 22 from the 120th—against Japanese-held cities and the railway lines that connected them. According to the Communist Party's official statement, the battle began on 20 August. On August 20, 1940, the rain didn't stop the campaign—it changed the battlefield. It slowed movement, blurred distance, and turned rivers and muddy roads into obstacles that could just as easily trap your own men as your enemy's. Along the districts bordering the Zhengtai Railway, the Eighth Route Army still moved, slipping through valleys and river crossings, bypassing Japanese posts, and positioning forces on both sides of the line as night settled in. By dark, the plan became a coordinated strike meant to hit the enemy before they could properly react. Across the entire Zhengtai Railway, attacks went out with timing designed to disorient Japanese defenders—so that their "first realization" arrived only after the railway itself was already being attacked and the window to respond effectively had slipped away. A key portion of that strike fell to the right column of the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region, centered on the 5th and 19th Regiments, with the mission of sabotaging the Niangziguan to Luanliu section. At 20:00 on August 20, part of the 5th Regiment infiltrated Niangziguan Village for the first time, overwhelmed the puppet troops stationed there, and seized the village by dawn. After that opening cut, the main force moved in to cover the engineers, destroy enemy fortifications, and blow up the Guandong Railway Bridge. When the sabotage was done, they withdrew from Niangziguan on their own initiative, leaving the enemy to deal with the destruction rather than being pulled into a long, grinding engagement. That same night, at Mohe Beach along the Zhengtai line, another action unfolded. The 1st Company of the 1st Battalion of the 5th Regiment attacked the station and was immediately met with a counterattack by Japanese forces. By dawn on August 21, the company withdrew—an adjustment, not defeat—and then attacked again the same night after crossing the Mian River. This time the enemy retreated into barracks to resist more stubbornly, with nearly 1,000 Japanese troops holding Mohe Beach. Heavy rain had swollen the river and made foot crossing nearly impossible, but the attackers seized the village west of the station and held it. On August 22 afternoon, more than 400 Japanese troops counterattacked; the main force of the 5th Regiment hit from the north bank of the Mian River in a fire assault, killing more than 50 before withdrawing the 1st Company out of the fighting. The 19th Regiment, meanwhile, took Jucheng and Irrang stations, tightening the pressure on the railway corridor. On August 23, 1940, the 5th Regiment recaptured Niangziguan and blew up the stone bridge east of the village, destroying the railway segment between Chengjialongdi and Mohetan. That night the 19th Regiment stormed Yirang Station and blew up the water tower and the railway, ensuring the disruption would not be temporary. From August 24 to 27, bridges near Yanhui—stone and wooden—were destroyed again and again. Under that continuous pressure, beginning on August 25, Japanese transportation along the Niangziguan to Luanliu section of the Zhengtai Road was cut off completely. Strongholds were left to fight more or less alone, unable to coordinate or move supplies the way they normally would. While the right column worked the railway, other forces hit the system from different angles. The Central Column of the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region—comprised of the 2nd, 3rd, and 16th Regiments—took responsibility for sabotaging the Zhengtai Road segment from Niangziguan to Weishui and for striking the Jingxing Coal Mine area. On the night of August 20, the 3rd Regiment launched coordinated attacks on the Gangtou old mine and the Dongwangshe new mine of Jingxing, and with miners assisting, the 1st Battalion quickly stormed the new mine and annihilated part of the enemy garrison. The rest withdrew into bunkers, resisting as best they could. By the afternoon of the next day, the entire enemy force had been wiped out. Afterward, major buildings in the mining area were destroyed and most materials were removed so that the mine could not resume production for more than six months. The 3rd Regiment also captured Jiazhuang, reinforcing the idea that sabotage here meant disabling not just lines of movement, but also the flow of resources. Elsewhere, Japanese positions were disrupted in smaller, targeted strikes that still added up. After the Japanese stronghold at Nanzheng destroyed the railway between Nanzheng and Weishui, the 2nd Regiment took the eastern end fortress of the Faluling Railway Bridge, covered the engineers as they blew up a section of the bridge, and briefly occupied Caizhuang. The 2nd Battalion of the 16th Regiment attacked Beiyu on the night of August 20, annihilating most defenders, and on August 21 it covered the engineers to destroy the Beiyu Stone Bridge. Other units struck Didu and annihilated most defenders in Nanyu. By August 24, the Central Column had learned that more than 1,000 Japanese troops were stationed in Jingxing County, with additional reinforcements moving toward Nanyu and Didu. Their response was practical: detachments were assigned to watch and harass along the railway while the main force gathered in mobile positions—waiting for the next opening rather than charging blindly into concentrated strength. Meanwhile, the left column of the Jin-Cha-Ji effort—from the 2nd Regiment of the Jizhong Garrison Brigade, the Military Region Special Service Regiment, and the Pingjinghuo Detachment—focused on sabotage from Weishui to Shijiazhuang. On the night of August 20, the Pingjinghuo Detachment attacked Yanfeng and blew up the railway. The Special Service Regiment moved with massed efforts as they destroyed power lines and highways from Yanfeng to Weizhou. On the night of August 22, the Special Service Regiment attacked Shang'an Station. On August 23, the 2nd Regiment stormed Touquan Station, captured two fortresses, then withdrew from the railway line; from August 25 to 27, they destroyed the highway connecting Pingshan, Huolu, Weishui, and Yanfeng. While the main blow was falling along the Zhengtai Railway, the 129th Division was assigned raids on the western section. That area included the Japanese Independent Mixed Brigade No. 4 headquarters, a coal mine base at Yangquan, and support from Independent Mixed Brigade No. 9 from Yuci. These raids weren't only about destruction—they were meant to disorient, to create confusion over where the main pressure truly was. After the general offensive began at 20:00 on August 20, five companies of the 16th Regiment attacked Lujiazhuang Station and captured bunkers. Two guerrilla-operating companies in Yuci worked with engineers to destroy bridges between Lujiazhuang and Duanting. The 38th Regiment surprised Shanghu and Heshangzu stations, while the 25th Regiment captured Mashou Station and pushed Japanese troops toward Shouyang. The division's right-wing sabotage unit—28th and 30th Regiments of the newly formed 10th Brigade—took on sabotage on the Yangquan–Shouyang section, splitting routes on the night of August 20 to attack stations like Langyu, Zhangjing, Qinquan, and then striking additional positions with the 30th Regiment. Across that window, stations and strongholds such as Sangzhang, Yanzigou, Langyu, and Qinquan were taken, iron bridges were destroyed, and additional stations including Potou, Xinzhuang, Saiyu, Tielugou, Xiaozhuang, and Zhangzhuang were seized or disrupted. As the western sabotage deepened, Japanese response hardened—but the ability to coordinate weakened. With the Zhengtai line sabotaged, the western section came under the 129th Division's control except for a few places such as Shouyang. Fierce assaults forced Japanese forces to lose contact with each other within days. Strongholds were attacked, besieged, and then annihilated as communication and coordination broke down. The 129th Division mobilized local people to destroy railway facilities, stations, and installations using demolition, burning, and flooding, moving materials so the railway and related infrastructure were effectively erased rather than merely damaged. To cover these operations, the division occupied Shinaoshan with the 14th Regiment of the general reserve. Starting the morning of August 21, Japanese forces concentrated in Yangquan and attacked Shinaoshan daily. Enemy strength reportedly rose from more than 200 to more than 600, supported by bombing and strafing and the release of poison. The 14th Regiment held out until August 25, repelling repeated attacks, and by August 26 additional pressure came again as reinforcements increased. After six days and nights—and the annihilation of more than 400 enemy soldiers—the 14th Regiment withdrew from the main peak of Shinaoshan, continuing to contain the Japanese with smaller detachments while the main force shifted to another mission. The first phase of sabotage had succeeded, but the campaign did not allow complacency. The Japanese strengthened their presence along the railway and launched frequent counterattacks, and Japanese divisions in southern Shanxi—including the 36th, 37th, and 41st—prepared to reinforce from the north. On August 26, the Eighth Route Army Headquarters issued instructions for a second phase: continue breaking through the road, concentrate superior forces, and annihilate Japanese units smaller than a battalion that were attacking or reinforcing. In line with that guidance, the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region ordered the Jin-You Column to keep breaking through the road on August 27 for one or two days, while the 129th Division alternated daily in breaking through. Under sustained pressure, the western section of the Zhengtai Road was basically destroyed; transportation was effectively cut off except for a few towns such as Shouyang and Yangquan. On September 2, orders were issued to conclude the Zhengtai Campaign starting from the 3rd and shift forces according to the second-step plan. As the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region launched the Mengbei Campaign, the 129th Division shifted toward attacking invading Japanese forces, while other tasks—such as attacking the He-Liao Highway and recovering cities of He and Liao—were left for later. Beginning September 2, the Military Region deployed the 2nd, 5th, 16th, and 19th Regiments toward areas north of Meng County and Shouyang to recapture enemy strongholds. With the railway sabotaged, the Japanese main force north of Meng County shifted south to reinforce, weakening garrisons and spreading panic among the strongholds. As fierce offensives intensified, garrison troops began to waver. By the afternoon of September 5, Japanese troops at Xiashe, supported by troops from Shangshe, retreated to Shangshe and fled toward Meng County overnight. That night, the 19th Regiment arrived near Shangshe and, together with the Special Service Battalion of the 2nd Military Sub-district, pursued. The 1st Battalion of the 19th Regiment advanced into Shenquan and Putian to cut off the retreat route. By 9:00 AM on September 6 the enemy was surrounded in Xingdao Village, and after five hours of intense fighting most forces were annihilated. Survivors fled east to Luolizhang Mountain, only to be surrounded again by the 19th, 5th, and 16th Regiments. By the night of September 9, most Japanese forces had been wiped out, though more than 40 men broke through in dense fog and escaped into Meng County. The siege continued through bitter episodes involving attacks and withdrawals under poison, with both sides paying heavily for every moment of progress. Eventually, on September 11, Japanese troops in Xiyan escaped back to Meng County, helped by more than 200 Japanese already present there. Meanwhile, the Japanese attempted to counter the pressure: on September 4 they sent more than 2,000 troops to reinforce Meng County and began a counterattack. On September 10, the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region ordered the 19th and 5th Regiments to remain east and north of Meng County to coordinate with the 129th and 120th Divisions, while the rest prepared for new missions. As fighting intensified around Zhengtai and Meng County, a parallel pressure campaign unfolded. To contain Eighth Route Army sabotage along Zhengtai, the Japanese assembled battalions from Independent Mixed 4th and 9th Brigades to strike the 129th Division. In response, the 120th Division began large-scale sabotage against the Tongpu Railway and major highways in northwestern Shanxi starting 20:00 on August 20. They captured enemy strongholds along rail and road lines, striking major bases such as Kangjiahui on the Xinjing Highway, where more than 50 Japanese and puppet troops were stationed, and also attacking other areas like Shishen, Lizhen, and Jingle. Ambushes were set to annihilate reinforcements arriving from different directions, and at 00:30 on August 21 the 2nd Battalion of the 4th Regiment attacked Kangjiahui and annihilated the defenders by dawn. Reinforcements arriving in cars were destroyed, and subsequent actions continued to expand the disruption. Over more than 180 battles in northwestern Shanxi, the 120th Division annihilated more than 800 Japanese and puppet troops and captured or destroyed stations and strongholds including Kangjiahui, Yangfangkou, Pingshe, and Longquan. By disrupting the Tongpu Railway and transportation along the Xinjing, Taifen, and Fenli highways, they tied down Japanese forces and made it harder to reinforce Zhengtai. In practical terms, this meant the first phase of the Hundred Regiments Offensive—lasting about three weeks—ended on September 10 with major railway lines and motor roads attacked repeatedly. Roadbeds, bridges, switching yards, and installations were hit heavily; at the Qingxing coal mines, facilities were destroyed and production was halted for nearly a year. By the end of that first phase, the campaign's logic had become clearer: once the Japanese leaned more heavily on a "cage-and-strongpoint" defense system, the same transport network that had supported their defense became less secure. When rail and road were repeatedly disrupted, strongpoints became more vulnerable—especially if Japanese units pulled out nearby detachments to respond to sabotage. So the campaign shifted from breaking transportation to attacking blockhouses and other strongpoints in contested areas, aiming to force Japanese forces back into well-defended garrisons and leave the countryside again contested by Communist forces. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. From 20 August 1940, under secrecy and rain, units of the 8th Route Army infiltrated stations, captured villages, destroyed bridges, power lines, roads, mines, and stations across multiple columns. By early September the Zhengtai and related Tongpu transport routes were repeatedly severed, forcing Japanese troops to fight isolated strongpoints and hindering reinforcement.
The China-United States summit has dealt a severe blow to the "pro-independence" stance of Taiwan's ruling Democratic Progressive Party and sent a clear warning to separatist forces, experts said.During his talks with US President Donald Trump on Thursday, President Xi Jinping underscored that safeguarding peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait remained the biggest common denominator between China and the US.Noting that the Taiwan question is the most important issue in China-US relations, Xi told Trump that if it is handled properly, the bilateral relationship will enjoy overall stability. Otherwise, the two countries will have clashes and even conflicts, putting the entire relationship in great jeopardy. Xi emphasized that "Taiwan independence" and cross-Strait peace are as irreconcilable as fire and water.In an interview with Fox News on Friday, Trump said: "I'm not looking to have somebody go independent," adding that Taiwan should not expect a "blank check" from the US military.Foreign Minister Wang Yi, while briefing the media about the summit on Friday, said: "During the meeting, we felt that the US side understands China's position, attaches importance to China's concerns, and, just like the international community, does not stand for or accept Taiwan moving toward independence."Liu Kuangyu, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences' Institute of Taiwan Studies, said that at the landmark summit, China made clear its stance, its bottom line, propositions, and also sincere goodwill regarding Taiwan-related affairs."Rather than letting hostile sentiments spiral upward, the pragmatic exchanges reflected a shared readiness to reduce strategic miscalculations, mitigate cross-Strait tensions, and eliminate the risks of unintended military clashes," Liu said.He added that the proper and positive handling of the Taiwan question will substantially shape the outcomes achieved at the summit and determine how effectively the two sides can sustain constructive, strategic stability going forward.Liu said that if China and the US aim to solidify a major-country relationship over the coming years, the Taiwan question must serve as the primary entry point.Meanwhile, opposition parties and politicians in Taiwan severely condemned the ruling authorities for fabricating cross-Strait crises.Cheng Li-wun, chairwoman of the major opposition Chinese Kuomintang party, slammed the DPP's cross-Strait strategy, saying that "Taiwan independence" is a dead end that leads nowhere and the summit has shattered the DPP's international illusions.KMT lawmaker Niu Hsu-ting told reporters that the summit's ripple effects will gradually surface, and the US clearly signaled conflict reduction, pouring "cold water" over the DPP's long-held separatist stance and its flawed narrative of guaranteed military defense from the US.In a statement, Taiwan's Labor Party also warned that the DPP's separatist line remains the primary source of risk driving regional volatility.The party condemned the administration's continuous military expansion, specifically referencing the newly passed defense budget, of which NT$780 billion ($24.7 billion) has been earmarked for procuring arms from the US.It said that pouring vast public resources and taxpayers' money into endless weapon purchases directly sacrificed the livelihood of the grassroots.Looking ahead, Liu of the Institute of Taiwan Studies warned that the US must exercise the utmost prudence to prevent triggering a great-power confrontation and refrain from maintaining illicit ties with the Taiwan authorities across political, military, legal, economic and ideological domains."They must recognize that the past tactics of using Taiwan as a so-called pawn or tool to contain China have actually done more harm than good in the long run and ultimately boomeranged," he said.Only by translating political commitments into tangible actions can both nations consolidate the foundation of strategic mutual trust, he added.
Last time we spoke about the battle Yaoyi. Japan pushed hard into Hubei with a plan: surround the main Chinese forces and seize Yichang, hoping to use it to strike at Chongqing. At first, the fighting was chaotic and punishing. The Chinese side tried to hold the line and disrupt the advance, and they even managed setbacks for the Japanese, pushing back, retaking key ground, and hitting supply and positioning weaknesses. But victory came with a cost: commanders were lost, and every gain was hard-won. Still, the battle didn't unfold as a clean Chinese retreat or a simple Japanese win. As Japanese units shifted and tested for openings, the Chinese forces adjusted—delaying, regrouping, and fighting to keep their formations from being completely trapped. Eventually, Japan managed to break through at critical moments, especially through crossings and maneuvers that the Chinese had not fully sealed off. In the end, Japan succeeded in taking Yichang, but it didn't achieve the decisive annihilation it wanted. #201 The New Fourth Army Incident and the Strained United Front Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. After the catastrophe of the early 1930s, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) entered the war against Japan in a political mood that was both hopeful and wary: it wanted to be seen as a genuine national leader of resistance, yet it also feared being absorbed—or destroyed—by the Guomindang (KMT) state it had spent years battling. That tension became the organizing principle of the war's early years. The turning point came from the Xi'an Incident in December 1936, which forced a new calculation in Nationalist politics. In the months that followed, agreements between KMT and CCP representatives were publicly proclaimed in August and September 1937, after the Shanghai fighting began. Under these arrangements, the CCP accepted constraints that in peacetime would have looked like surrender: it pledged to strive for Sun Yixian's "Three People's Principles," to end its former policies of armed revolt and sovietization, to abolish the soviet government, and to discontinue both the term "Red Army" and the expectation that its forces would operate outside central control. Communist troops would be treated as part of the national military under KMT command, and the revolution's old administrative structures were to be formally dismantled. In return, the KMT offered the CCP something just as important: space to exist publicly and politically. Liaison offices were permitted in key cities; the CCP was allowed to publish the New China Daily; and it could nominate representatives to KMT advisory bodies. Civil rights were extended—political prisoners were released—and subsidies were established to help cover administrative and military expenses in "reintegrated" areas and territories. The war thus transformed the tactical reality on the ground: the CCP could not treat the KMT as an immediate enemy, but it also could not afford to become politically passive. It had to learn how to fight Japan while building legitimacy fast enough to survive the next phase. In the first year and a half, the Party Center focused on three problems that kept returning in different forms: how the "united front" would be defined—especially what the CCP's relationship to the National government should be; how to coordinate military strategy and tactics with Nationalist units without losing control of its own operations; and how leadership should be consolidated, particularly for Mao Zedong in a party that still contained rival centers of authority. These disputes mattered not just for doctrine but for survival, because the CCP's autonomy was constantly being tested by the very alliance that was supposed to protect it. Mao's own approach to the united front combined cooperation with a refusal to surrender independence. Publicly, the CCP praised Jiang Jieshi and the KMT and promised unity, but it did so in language that was deliberately broad. In private (and in internal party debates), Mao treated unity as conditional: the CCP must not split the united front, but it also must not be "bound hand and foot." The strategic idea that emerged was political initiative under constraints—fighting when it could plausibly claim justification, keeping enough restraint that the CCP would not appear self-interested or anti-national, and deciding for itself when to engage and when to withdraw. This balance was reinforced through military reorganization. In August–September 1937, CCP forces were reorganized as the Eighth Route Army (8RA), with roughly 30,000 men drawn from Long March survivors, local forces, and new recruits. The 8RA was divided into three divisions: the 115th, 120th, and 129th, commanded by Lin Biao, He Long, and Liu Bocheng respectively. Shortly after the war began, the National government also authorized a second major Communist force: the New Fourth Army (N4A), to operate in central China. Its core came from those left behind when the Long March began in 1934—small groups surviving in difficult conditions against continuing KMT pressure. Officially authorized at 12,000, it took months to reach that strength. Nominally commanded by Ye Ting, actual military and political control rested with Xiang Ying and Chen Yi. From the start, then, the CCP's wartime "integration" with the National system coexisted with a clear effort to preserve internal control. Ideologically, the CCP worked to make its revolutionary program compatible—at least in appearance—with a national resistance coalition. On the New Democracy demonstrated how this strategy operated on two levels. In KMT-controlled spaces, its language could be read as aligning with liberal-democratic expectations: public participation, multi-party governance, legally protected civil rights. But in CCP-controlled areas, the same text could carry sharper class-based and authoritarian implications. The Party wanted a united front that broadened support without becoming committed to Nationalist limits on how society itself might be reorganized after victory. Meanwhile, even as the rhetoric of unity rose, the CCP worried about something more dangerous than military setbacks: the possibility that the KMT might accommodate Japan. Late 1939 and early 1940 made this fear harder to dismiss. Japan pursued collaboration with Wang Jingwei, culminating in the establishment of a "reorganized" government at Nanjing in March 1940. At the same time, Japanese intermediaries sought approaches to Chiang Kai-shek himself—an effort that the CCP tracked closely as a sign that peace negotiations might be possible even when battlefield conditions looked grim. Propaganda was involved, but the anxiety was real: if Japan and the Nationalists reached an arrangement, the CCP's whole wartime legitimacy-building effort could collapse overnight. As a result, the united front was interpreted inside the CCP not as a permanent coalition with the KMT, but as a flexible strategy with a cardinal purpose: to prevent peace between Japan and the Nationalists. Mao's position on the united front reflected this. For him, the alliance was meant to suspend the possibility of a China–Japan settlement, not to end the CCP's separate identity. The CCP could participate in a reconstituted national framework—possibly even a "democratic republic"—to gain legality and influence, but it should remain politically and, where possible, physically separate from the KMT. By 1939, however, the practical meaning of "flexibility" collided with reality. What had seemed, to some observers, like an unusually cordial entente began to fade. The KMT Central Committee adopted measures early in 1939 aimed at restricting Communist expansion, and armed clashes increased through the summer and continued into autumn and winter—especially around North China Communist bases. The period of rising conflict was later labeled by the CCP as the "first anti-Communist upsurge" (roughly spanning December 1939 into March 1940), but the crucial point was that both sides viewed each confrontation as a test of legal rights, moral legitimacy, and control over territory. Strategically, the CCP understood the KMT's effort as an attempt to check unauthorized growth of Communist armed power and to recover areas where influence had already slipped away—either to the Communists or, by indirect effect, to Japan. The KMT emphasized its traditional legal authority; the CCP countered with its claim to an "evolutionary" moral right to challenge the government's legitimacy. In practice, the conflict took the form of increasingly systematic military pressure, including a blockade around the Shen–Gan–Ning region. By this point, the blockade involved large numbers of troops (on the order of hundreds of thousands), halting Communist expansion and disrupting direct contact with other Communist forces farther afield, even as fighting flared along border zones and around vulnerable points in the Communist defensive perimeter. So, by the edge of the "middle years," the wartime alliance had not broken into open civil war—but it had also stopped being secure. The united front survived, yet it operated under strain: its language of cooperation continued, while "friction" between partners hardened into a central feature of the resistance struggle. Transition into the war's second phase began in early 1939, shaped by the stalemate Mao had already anticipated at the sixth plenum in late 1938. Mao argued that during this prolonged "new stage" the forces of resistance—above all, Communist-led forces—would strengthen. The overall result, however, was mixed. In Shandong and Central China, new Communist bases did take shape. But across much of North China, Japanese consolidation cost the resistance heavily in manpower and population. Base-area economies suffered serious strain, and the peasantry endured hardships more severe than at any earlier point. This stalemate had two main dimensions. The first was the growing resentment of the Nationalists toward Communist expansion—resentment made especially sharp by their own losses. As the Nationalists were driven out of regions that had previously provided them their greatest wealth and power in the central and lower Yangtze basin, they also lost the "cream" of their armies. In contrast, the CCP was spreading through the wider countryside behind Japanese lines, extending its influence and winning broader popular support. The second dimension was Japan's desire—and need—to consolidate territories it had only nominally conquered and to extract economic value from them. After all, the logic of the "China Incident" was to draw on China's labor and resources to strengthen Japan, not to bleed Japan's gains away by draining wealth into China's vast interior. A Japanese colonel, lamenting the situation, captured the frustration of this drift into deeper entanglement: he regretted that Japan had not ended the "China Incident" once its initial objectives were reached. Instead, Japan was drawn into the hinterland and became bogged down in endless attrition—leaving it with little more than "real estate" rather than the popular support it believed it would secure from those it claimed to "liberate." To improve their position, Japanese authorities—still fragmented by internal rivalry—pursued several strategies. One was a new peace offensive aimed simultaneously at Jiang Jieshi, alongside efforts to establish a "reformed" Nationalist government under Wang Jingwei, who had fled Chongqing in December 1938. Japan also recruited more collaborators and puppet officials. Finally, it carried out forceful military, political, and economic measures intended to establish effective territorial control and eliminate opposition. During the middle years of the war, the Communists described their conflicts with the Nationalists using the euphemism "friction". By 1939, what many observers—possibly incorrectly—had viewed as an unusually warm alliance began to break down. In early 1939, the KMT Central Committee adopted measures meant to restrict the CCP. From the summer onward, military clashes began and continued into autumn and winter with increasing frequency and intensity, most of them concentrated around and within the North China base areas. The Communists later labeled the period from December 1939 to March 1940 the "first anti-Communist upsurge." Naturally, each side accused the other of aggression and claimed self-defense against unjust attacks. Strategically, though, the North China "upsurge" functioned as a Nationalist attempt to limit the CCP's expansion beyond the areas assigned to it and to regain influence in regions the Communists—or the Japanese—had already taken from the KMT. Jiang Jieshi framed the matter as a defense of legal rights grounded in tradition, while the Communists asserted an "evolutionary" right to challenge the moral legitimacy of those legal claims. During 1939, the Nationalists began to blockade Shen–Gan–Ning around its southern and western perimeter. Within a year, this blockade grew to nearly 400,000 troops, including some of the last remaining Central Army units under the command of Hu Zongnan. The blockade stopped further Communist expansion, especially into Gansu and Suiyuan, and severed direct contact between SKN and Communists operating in Xinjiang (Chinese Turkestan) adjacent to Soviet Central Asia. The Xinjiang Communists—including Mao Zedong's brother—were eliminated in 1942. Meanwhile, fierce fighting erupted along the Gansu–Shaanxi border and in the north-eastern corner of SKN near the Great Wall at Suide, as the blockading forces probed for weak points. Elements of He Long's 120th Division were even pulled back from the Jin–Sui base across the Yellow River to strengthen SKN's regular defenses. Economically, the blockade was even more damaging. During 1939, central government subsidies to the Border Region budget were cut off. Trade between the Border Region and other parts of China nearly stopped, a devastating blow to a region unable to supply itself with many basic commodities. At the same time, Nationalist and regional forces also attempted to expand their military and administrative authority into Hebei, Shanxi, Henan, and Shandong—areas the CCP now considered its base zones. In resisting these efforts, the CCP predictable accused its rivals of harming resistance work and damaging the people's interests. The "experts in dissension" were said to cooperate with the Japanese and their puppets. Based on increasing collaboration by regional units with Japan, the CCP implied that this was a deliberate and cynical strategy—described as "crooked-line patriotism"—intended to preserve those units for future anti-Communist operations. Even so, the CCP tried to avoid an open break with the Nationalist regime in Chongqing. In public, it consistently portrayed these clashes as being initiated by local commanders acting beyond orders from higher authority—despite knowing this depiction was false. Jiang Jieshi, unable to refute the claim outright, effectively permitted it to serve as the justification for a firm Communist response. Mao Zedong outlined the general resistance policy as "justification, expedience, and restraint". The CCP was to fight when it could claim justification and when it could gain advantage, but not to press attacks beyond what the Nationalists would tolerate or in ways that could damage its image as selfless patriots. Communist forces were expected to keep initiative as much as possible in their own hands—deciding when to engage, whether to engage, and when to disengage. The most striking episode of the "first anti-Communist upsurge" was the rupture with Yan Xishan in December 1939. Tensions in Shanxi had been rising throughout the summer and autumn, as Yan and his conservative supporters—associated with the "Old Army"—linked the Sacrifice League and the Dare-to-die Corps of the "New Army" with Communist forces. When base areas and Japanese occupation eventually took over much of his province, Yan was forced into exile at Qiulin across the Yellow River in Shaanxi. In November, Yan ordered his Old Army to disarm the Dare-to-die forces with help from central units dispatched by Hu Zongnan. In the bloody fighting that followed, these elements gradually broke free of even nominal provincial control and fully completed their connection with Communist forces. More than 30,000 people went over to the Communists. One KMT intelligence agent described the process with bitterness and a sense of inevitability: the Communists were first "full of sweet words," flattery, and distortions designed to open things up and conceal their actions. But once they had fully entrenched themselves, and once the low-level base had been established, they turned and bit. The agent suggested they had suspected things might end this way, but were not aware how quickly events would move—or that it could happen precisely while Communist calls for "united front" and "maintenance of unity for resistance" filled the air. About a month later, in February and March 1940, elements of the 8RA beat back this so-called upsurge. Zhang Yinwu's forces were disarmed and dispersed across the plains of north Hebei. To the south, Chu Huaiping and Shi Yusan were pushed out of the base area, as was the KMT-appointed provincial governor Lu Zhonglin. Although some non-Communist forces remained in the region, the CCP's and CCLY bases were never again seriously threatened by forces affiliated with the central government. Reinforcing the CCP's accusations, Shi Yusan was later executed in 1940 by the central government for collaboration with the Japanese. By late 1939, CCP central authorities maintained that the areas where the CCP could expand its armed strength were mainly limited to Shandong and Central China. In those regions, the CCP continued trying to carve out bases where they could operate. The situation in Shandong was complicated. After the Japanese invasion, most Nationalist-affiliated forces stayed in the province, while Communist forces and bases were weaker and more scattered than further west. Only in late 1938 did major 8RA units from the 115th and 129th Divisions—led by Xu Xiangqian and Luo Ronghuan—enter Shandong to link up with the Shandong column and local guerrillas, including survivors of a large band recently decimated by the Japanese. Even with these efforts, Communist actions led to clashes not only with Japanese forces but also with various Nationalist-affiliated groups—groups that were stronger than the Communists at the time. Until late 1940, the CCP's clashes with Nationalist forces in Shandong were actually bloodier than clashes with the Japanese. The CCP understood that its Chinese rivals mistrusted one another, and that their attitudes toward the CCP varied widely. The main Nationalist forces were often not tightly affiliated with Chiang Kai-shek or the central government. Instead, they operated under independent—and at times disgruntled—regional commanders. Communist tactics were expressed through slogans emphasizing ways to win support and isolate hardliners: develop progressive forces and win over fence-sitters while isolating "die-hards"; flatter top echelons, enlist the middle ranks, and hit the rank and file; and win over Yi Xuezhong, isolate Shen Honglie, and eliminate Qin Qirong. Still, unlike other North China base areas, the Communists were unable for several years to neutralize Nationalist forces in Shandong. Even if Japanese mop-up campaigns had not weakened those Nationalists, the text suggests the Communists may still have struggled to do so. By November 1940, Xu Xiangqian claimed meaningful progress while admitting Shandong had not yet become a fully consolidated base. CCP successes were greatest along parts of the Shandong–Hebei border, around the Taishan massif in central Shandong, and near the tip of the peninsula far to the east. Elsewhere, "progressive forces" remained weak. Communist regular troops numbered about 70,000, which was far below the party center's goals of 150,000 regulars and between 1.5 and 2 million self-defense forces. Moreover, systematic economic reforms had barely begun. The CCP relied on familiar practices—confiscations, collections of "national salvation grain," contributions, and loans—alongside a conventional taxation system adjusted to favor poorer peasants. Communist expansion in Central China was even riskier, with a greater likelihood of large-scale conflict with central government forces than in the north. In much of North China, "friction" came primarily from rapid Communist expansion into areas with partial vacuums. In Central China, however, base-building required displacing an existing Nationalist military-administrative presence closely tied to Jiang Kai-shek and the Chongqing government. The burden of this expansion was carried mainly by the 6th Detachment (northern Anhui and Jiangsu) and the 5th Detachment, which was reinforced by 15,000 to 20,000 8RA troops under Huang K'o-ch'eng. As Chen Yi's 1st Detachment crossed from south to north through the corridor provided by Guan Wenwei's local forces, it became actively involved as well. This expansion—driven by increasingly urgent directives from Mao and Liu during the latter part of 1939 and into 1940—brought the N4A north of the river into ever more frequent and sharper clashes with Nationalist authorities in Anhui and Jiangsu, especially with units under Jiangsu governor Han Deqin. South of the river, though, Xiang Ying did not directly challenge Chongqing's commanders. Mao later charged that Xiang Ying may have been influenced by Wang Ming, or else he may simply have seen no realistic alternative. His forces—three detachments plus a headquarters unit—were heavily outnumbered by Qu Chutong's Nationalist units, not to mention Japanese forces and their puppets. Even if Mao insisted bases could be built "anywhere," the Shanghai–Hangzhou–Nanjing triangle was especially difficult terrain. Xiang Ying and his followers had survived with extraordinary tenacity in the mountains of South China between 1934 and 1937, enduring brutal search-and-destroy operations that were not lifted until the war began. It therefore seems unlikely that such survivors would suddenly become "right-wing capitulationists." Yet by spring 1940, Mao was pressing Xiang Ying more intensely. The Central Committee's message was explicit: expansion was necessary in all cases. It meant reaching into all enemy-occupied areas rather than being bound by the Kuomintang's restrictions—going beyond Kuomintang limits, not waiting for official appointments, not depending on higher-ups for financing, and instead expanding armed forces freely and independently. It also meant setting up base areas without hesitation, independently mobilizing the masses in those areas, and building united front organs of political power under Communist Party leadership. The struggle between Nationalists and Communists involved more than contests for control of territory behind Japanese lines. It also involved national-level politics, ideology, and leadership. One worrying development for the CCP was the campaign throughout 1939 to expand Jiang Kai-shek's prestige and formal power—adding more titles for him across major party, government, and military positions. In early 1939, the Central Executive Committee appointed him "director-general" of the Kuomintang, a title reminiscent of the one previously held by Sun Yat-sen. In addition, during the summer and autumn of 1939 there was talk of constitutional rule. In November, the KMT announced plans to convene a constitutional assembly the following year. If Jiang could fulfill these promises, he and his government could gain new legitimacy and wider popularity. Mao and his colleagues could not allow this to go unchallenged. If the Nationalists were to have a paramount leader and authoritative spokesperson, the CCP needed one as well. The timing of Mao's famous "On the new democracy"—written in late 1939 and published the next January—was therefore no accident. Its substance had been anticipated earlier, but its final timing and full development were shaped by the KMT's constitutional movement. The CCP's entry into this competition served as both a bid for support away from the KMT and a statement of the multi-class united front that the CCP wanted to lead. Although "On the new democracy" was written in a tone that seemed moderate, it persuaded many Chinese readers that the CCP had either diluted its revolutionary objectives or postponed them to a distant future. In Kuomintang-controlled areas, the work could be read through the liberal values associated with Anglo-American democracy—popular participation, multi-party government, legally protected civil rights. In CCP-controlled territories, the same language carried stronger authoritarian, class-based meanings. In internal documents meant for party audiences rather than public consumption, the ambiguity was removed, showing a tough but patient and flexible commitment not only to resistance but also to social control and social change. During this same period, the Communists expressed deep concern about Nationalist capitulation to Japan—not only on the battlefield behind Japanese lines but also at the highest levels. Some of this concern was propaganda, but beneath propaganda lay genuine anxiety. In late 1939 and early 1940, politically aware Chinese already knew that Japan was negotiating with the unpredictable Wang Jingwei, who had fled Chongqing a year earlier. A "reorganized national government" in Nanjing was finally established in March 1940, representing the most formidable collaboration with Japan to date. Less well known, but equally important, was that Japan was also seeking an understanding directly with Jiang Kai-shek through intermediaries in Hong Kong. This effort, called "Operation Kiri"—described as spreading a "feast for Chiang"—combined intrigue with a kind of dark comedy. Reports suggested Chiang's reported interest in peace could have been a stratagem designed to discredit Wang Jingwei by keeping him waiting. But even if Chiang had no intention of coming to terms with Japan, the Communists could not be sure what the outcome would be until after the multi-pronged peace offensive had failed. By the middle of 1940, China had never been so isolated. In Europe, the "phony war" ended in the spring when Germany launched a blitz across the Low Countries. France fell soon after, and England appeared likely to be next. Japan used this moment to press China to sever its last tenuous connections to the outside world: cutting the Burma Road, trade with neutral Hong Kong, and the rail link running from Hanoi to Kunming. At the same time, Russia was engaged in a difficult and embarrassing war with Finland and reduced military aid to the Nationalists. The United States was only gradually moving away from isolationism and clearly regarded England as more important than China. In Chongqing and elsewhere in "Free China," signs of war weariness, despair, and demoralization were visible. Under these circumstances, Mao's insistence on aggressive expansion was a calculated risk—either it would deter any Japanese advance, or it would place the Communists in the strongest possible position in case a split between the KMT and the CCP became unavoidable. In Central China, the size and pace of the fighting kept increasing, starting in the final months of 1939. One flashpoint was the clash between Luo Pinghui's 5th Detachment and units of Han Deqin's Jiangsu force near Lake Gaoyou. In the following months, Guan Wenwei's forces ranged along the left bank of the Yangtze, repeatedly running into Luo's troops as they operated farther north. Luo also began receiving some 8RA reinforcements, moving them south through areas controlled by the 6th Detachment. Clearly, a major showdown was taking shape across north and central Jiangsu. At the same time, the South Yangtze Command was doing poorly. Nationalist commanders Leng Xin and Qu Chutong restricted its activities so severely that Mao and Liu gradually abandoned the idea of building a unified, consolidated base in that region. During late spring and early summer, Chen Yi moved most of his 1st and 2nd Detachments north of the Yangtze. In September, the 3rd Detachment followed suit, crossing the river into the area around Lake Chaohu, where the 4th Detachment was already stationed. After these moves, only the Headquarters Detachment—under Ye Ting and Xiang Ying—remained south of the Yangtze, positioned at Qingxian in southern Anhui. As the military situation edged toward an open confrontation, negotiations began in June 1940 between representatives of the KMT and the CCP. The core issues were Communist operating zones and the authorized strength of the armies led by the CCP. Proposals were exchanged, followed by equally sharp and hostile counter-proposals, but no agreement was reached. The KMT viewed it as a concession to permit the CCP "free rein" north of the pre-1938 course of the Yellow River, with the exception of southern Shanxi, which was to remain under the influence of Yan Xishan. In exchange, the KMT demanded that all 8RA and N4A units evacuate Central China. In effect, the KMT was offering the CCP something it was already prepared to allow, in return for the CCP giving up what it might soon be able to obtain by force of arms. Nationalist authorities then issued a set of deadlines, but without clearly stating what would happen if those deadlines were violated. On the surface, the CCP appeared to be complying in part. The movements of Chen Yi and the South Yangtze Command could look like obedience, but in reality they were responses to orders coming from their own superior leadership rather than instructions issued by the Nationalists. Even so, Xiang Ying's continued delays and evasions during the autumn and winter of 1940 remained puzzling. One possibility is that he felt—quite reasonably—that Mao had already lost confidence in him and that once he crossed to the north bank of the river he would lose his command. Another complication was that directives from Yan'an were sometimes ambiguous and even contradictory. He may also have been trying to reach secure understandings with KMT commanders about evacuation routes and guaranteed safe conduct out of the area. For a period, Han Teqin kept most of his forces—estimated at about 70,000 men, far outnumbering the N4A—in north Jiangsu, thereby blocking the expansion of the 6th Detachment and slowing further southern intrusions by 8RA troops. But by mid-summer he realized he would have to counter the N4A build-up in central Jiangsu, or else risk writing that region off to the Communists. A confusing sequence of engagements then unfolded, culminating in a decisive battle in early October 1940 near the central Jiangsu town of Huangjiao. Over the course of four days, several of Han's main-force units belonging to the 89th Army were destroyed, while others were scattered. That battle also served as a signal for the 6th Detachment to advance more aggressively in the north. In the aftermath, one of Han's principal commanders entered collaboration with the CCP, while another defected to the Nanjing government under Wang Jingwei. Although Han Teqin managed to maintain a foothold in Jiangsu until 1943, his real power had been broken. Relatively little attention was paid to the battle of Huangjiao in the Chinese press. The KMT did not want to publicize what it considered a disastrous defeat, while the Communists were satisfied to stay silent about an episode that conflicted with their proclaimed policy of a united front. As could be expected, during the autumn—after Han Teqin's defeat—KMT-CCP negotiations deteriorated further. In early December, Jiang Kai-shek personally ordered that all N4A forces withdraw from southern Anhui and southern Jiangsu by 31 December. He also ordered that the entire 8RA be positioned north of the Yellow River by the same deadline, followed one month later by the N4A. Discussions then followed between Ye Ting and Qu Chutong's deputies concerning the route to be taken, safe conduct, and—astonishingly—the money and supplies that were to be provided to the N4A to help it move. On 25 December, Mao Zedong ordered Xiang Ying to begin evacuating immediately. Yet it was not until 4 January 1941 that Ye and Xiang actually started moving. Almost immediately, Qu Chutong's forces harassed and dispersed the N4A Headquarters Group, which included administrative personnel, wounded soldiers and dependents, as well as combat-ready troops. In an attempt to reorganize, they moved southwest toward Maolin, where they were surrounded by Nationalists and, over the next several days, were cut to pieces. Losses were heavy on both sides. The CCP suffered an estimated 9,000 casualties. Xiang Ying tried twice to break out of the blockade on his own, but failed. He was then denounced as a deserter by Ye Ting, who took over full command of the doomed forces. Xiang Ying eventually escaped, but he was killed a couple of months later by one of his own bodyguards, motivated by the N4A gold reserves that he had taken with him. Up to the very end, Xiang either failed or refused to seek refuge in Liu Shaoqi's domain north of the Yangtze. The unfortunate Ye Ting was arrested and spent the rest of the war in prison. He was finally released in 1946, only to die one month later in a plane crash, along with several other high-ranking party members. On 17 January, Jiang Kai-shek declared that the New Fourth Army was dissolved for insubordination. Direct contacts between Yan'an and Chongqing nearly came to an end, and CCP military liaison offices in several cities held by the Nationalists were closed. This is what became known as the New Fourth Army incident, also referred to as the South Anhui incident. Clearly, it functioned as an act of retaliation for the defeats suffered by Han Teqin in north and central Jiangsu. It ended any realistic prospect of establishing a consolidated Communist base south of the Yangtze. Still, from a strategic perspective, these losses were ultimately more than offset by the gains achieved farther north. In fact, only a few months later, the reorganized N4A quietly began reintroducing some units into this region, where they carried out guerrilla activities without possessing a secure territorial base. Unlike the relative silence surrounding the fighting at Huangjiao, the New Fourth Army incident sparked bitter, prolonged controversy. The CCP argued that it was a second "anti-Communist upsurge," even more serious than the first. Presenting themselves as martyred patriots, they depicted their opponents as people who wanted to end the War of Resistance through what they called "Sino-Japanese cooperation" aimed at "suppressing the Communists." In their account, the Nationalists wanted to replace the war of resistance with civil war, substitute capitulation for independence, trade unity for a split, and replace light with darkness. People were telling each other the news and were horrified. Indeed, they claimed that the situation had never been as critical as it was at that moment. The Nationalist response, of course, was that provocations had been numerous and serious, and that violations of military discipline could not be tolerated. But the KMT's unwillingness to describe in detail its own defeats at the CCP's hands left it speaking in broad generalities. In the propaganda battle, the CCP clearly gained the better position and won more political capital. If it was politically valuable to be regarded as a national hero, it was even more valuable to be seen as a national martyr. Many Chinese—and some outside—observers were genuinely alarmed and feared that civil war might openly resume. Yet, with a few exceptions, the events that culminated in the New Fourth Army incident have generally been interpreted as marking the breakdown of the second united front. That interpretation, however, is described as being wrong in two respects. First, the CCP understood the united front not as a narrow arrangement limited to a few major partners, but as a strategy that could be applied flexibly to all political, military, and social forces in China—from the highest levels of the central government down to the smallest village. Relations with Jiang Jieshi and the Guomindang regime mattered, but they did not, by themselves, constitute the whole of the united front. Even regarding Jiang and the Nationalists specifically, the common reading is said to be misguided. Throughout the war, a cardinal objective of the united front was to prevent peace between Japan and the Nationalists. Therefore, if clashes between CCP forces and those of the central government on such a large scale as at Huangjiao and Maolin could occur without leading to peace with Japan and without triggering a full-scale resumption of civil war, then this should not be understood as the end of the united front—it should be seen as its fundamental vindication. If friction at that scale could nevertheless be tolerated by Jiang Jieshi, then fears about his future accommodation with Japan were greatly reduced. Following the New Fourth Army incident, the CCP reorganized its political and military presence in Central China. The Central Plains and South-east China Bureaus were merged and renamed the Central China Bureau, with Liu Shaoqi placed in charge, reflecting the area's importance to Party Central. The New Fourth Army was also reorganized completely and substantially regularized. Chen Yi became its new acting commander, since Ye Ting was imprisoned. He directed the force, now divided into seven divisions. Each division had territorial responsibilities, and in each region the CCP claimed the establishment of a base. Indeed, base construction proceeded in earnest only after the friction of 1940 and the New Fourth Army incident. In the years that followed, the operating areas of the First through Fourth Divisions contained expanding enclaves of consolidated territory, where military dominance was joined with open party work: administrative control, the development of mass organizations, local elections, and socio-economic reforms. The other three areas fluctuated between semi-consolidated and guerrilla status. With the incident, the worst phase of the KMT-CCP conflict was now over. When CCP documents later speak of a third upsurge in 1943, they refer to something openly political. With the exception of Shandong—where a fairly strong Nationalist presence persisted for a longer time—the overall balance of power among Chinese forces behind Japanese lines had shifted in favor of the CCP by mid-1941. In subsequent years the CCP's predominance became even more pronounced, until by the end of 1943 the Communists were virtually beyond challenge by Chinese rivals. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. After the CCP and KMT entered the united front, cooperation felt conditional from the start. Mao pushed the New Fourth Army to reorganize and preserve Communist autonomy, even as the 1937 agreements publicly pledged obedience to KMT leadership. In 1939–40 the Communists worried that Chiang might negotiate peace with Japan; so they expanded bases and military presence, triggering repeated clashes. The pressure intensified when KMT orders forced the New Fourth Army to evacuate south Anhui in late 1940.
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In this episode of the ChinaPower Podcast, Dr. Albert Tzeng and Dr. Dennis Weng join us to explore domestic politics in Taiwan, with a particular focus on two key developments related to the Kuomintang (KMT) party, Taiwan's largest opposition party. We examine the April visit of KMT Chairwomen Cheng Li-wun to China to meet with Chinese leader Xi Jinping and KMT Taichung City Mayor Lu Shiow-yen's March trip to the United States. We discuss what these trips showcase about Taiwan's domestic politics, dynamics within the KMT, the KMT's current stance on Taiwan's relations with China and the United States, and what implications these trips have ahead of the potential Trump-Xi meeting in May. Dr. Dennis Wang is Associate Professor and Graduate Director of Political Science at Sam Houston State University. Dr. Albert Tzeng is the founder of the strategic consulting service "Discursive Workshop” and previously served as advisor to two former Chairs of the Kuomintang political party in Taiwan.
Pada 7–12 April 2026, Ketua KMT Cheng Li-wun mengunjungi Nanjing, Shanghai, dan Beijing atas undangan Xi Jinping. Di Balai Agung Rakyat, ia bertemu langsung dengan Xi — pertemuan pertama antara pemimpin KMT dan Partai Komunis Tiongkok dalam hampir satu dekade. Kunjungan ini terjadi menjelang KTT Trump-Xi pada Mei, menjadikannya momen geopolitik yang sangat krusial. Akankah ini momen awal berakhirnya ketegangan Taiwan dan Tiongkok?
China is sitting on 120 days of strategic oil reserves. That's not unlimited patience — that's a countdown. As the Iran blockade tightens and the Strait of Hormuz becomes the most contested waterway on earth, Beijing faces a question it cannot ignore: how long can strategic restraint hold? In this episode of The Voices of War, Vedran 'Maz' Maslic sits down with journalist and geopolitical commentator Qinduo Xu to unpack China's Iran calculus — the oil dependency, the US grand strategy to control key access points across Venezuela, Russia, and now Iran, and what Beijing is actually doing about it. From China's electrostate model overtaking the American petrostate, to rare earth leverage, de-dollarisation, and the KMT's quiet visit to Beijing — this is a conversation about the real contest behind the Iran war: US vs China. Key topics: China Iran war, Strait of Hormuz blockade, China oil reserves, China geopolitics, US China relations, Beijing strategy, Iran blockade, China rare earth minerals, Trump Xi Jinping, China Taiwan, dual circulation, China global strategy, middle east war, geopolitics. Qinduo Xu is a journalist and geopolitical commentator with deep expertise in Chinese foreign policy and global affairs.
On today's episode, we'll discuss the recent meeting between Chinese leader Xi Jinping and KMT Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun, the first in a decade between a Chinese Communist Party General Secretary and a KMT Chair. Ms. Cheng was elected party chair only four months ago, and her top priority was to meet with Xi Jinping. She has not yet visited the United States, but says she intends to do so later this year. In their public statements, Xi Jinping and Cheng Li-wun highlighted several common themes, including opposition to Taiwan independence, support for the 1992 Consensus, shared history and Chinese heritage, that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are one family, the importance of China's national rejuvenation, and the need to preserve peace and promote the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations. To discuss this historic meeting, I'm joined by Amanda Hsiao. Amanda is a director in Eurasia Group's China practice covering China's foreign policy and cross-strait relations. This episode was recorded on April 10, 2026. Timestamps: [00:00] Introduction [01:42] Why the Xi–Cheng Meeting Matters [03:00] Cheng Li-wun's Aims and Messaging [06:13] Xi Jinping's Strategic Objectives [11:17] Signaling Ahead of the Trump-Xi Summit [13:23] Progress Towards Unification [17:53] Shifting Positions on the 1992 Consensus [22:25] Public Views of Cheng Li-wun [26:32] Potential Shifts to China's Taiwan Policy [28:12] Implications for Use of Force [30:34] What Stood Out During Cheng's China Trip
The US government has pushed for years for a war with China, selling billions of dollars of weapons to separatists in Taiwan. However, those plans are falling apart, after the leader of the KMT, the Nationalist Party based in Taipei, took a historic trip to the mainland, promoting peace. Ben Norton explains the importance of Cheng Li-wun's meeting with Xi Jinping, and the complex political history of Taiwan. VIDEO: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fiDtfdBYHBQ Topics 0:00 KMT leader visits Beijing 1:28 US "prickly porcupine" strategy 2:09 KMT, Chinese Nationalist Party 2:48 Taiwan's ruling party DPP 3:27 Nancy Pelosi visit 4:17 Taiwan's DPP supports Israel 4:42 Fears of new Ukraine 5:22 US war plans 6:22 US arms sales to Taiwan 7:09 USA uses Taiwan as proxy 8:12 (CLIP) KMT leader on Ukraine 9:08 Is Taiwan the next Ukraine? 9:28 Elections results in 2024 10:12 Lai Ching-te is unpopular 10:54 Iran war hurts Taiwan 11:48 Energy crisis 12:27 TSMC and advanced chips 13:45 Neoliberalism 14:10 Developmental state 14:54 Economic insecurity 15:14 Trump tariff threats 15:48 Beijing does not want war 17:12 Beijing opposes separatism 18:06 UN: Taiwan is part of China 18:50 One China policy 19:46 Map of Taiwan recognition 20:05 List of Taiwan recognition 20:45 Cross-strait relations 22:19 Rising trade 23:13 One country, two systems 24:31 US military bases 24:58 Peaceful reunification 25:27 Poll: Taiwan independence 26:09 Future leader of Taiwan? 26:48 Divisions within KMT 27:27 Modern history of Taiwan 29:05 Chiang Kai-shek 29:41 Democracy? 30:46 Cold War One propaganda 31:39 Sun Yat-sen 34:40 Historic step for peace 36:14 Outro
Episode #518: The story of the KMT irregulars in Burma is a historical anomaly tied to the Chinese Civil War, the Cold War, and Burma's early independence. Following their defeat, remnants of the Nationalist Army under General Li Mi crossed into Burma's Shan States. Claiming to continue the anti-communist struggle, they later turned to the opium trade as a means of survival. This trade, expanded under the KMT's control, expanded exponentially, transforming the region into the Golden Triangle—an epicenter of the global drug trade. The KMT's activities also destabilized Burma and strained Prime Minister U Nu's administration, leading to tensions with British and American stakeholders. Meanwhile, the CIA engaged in a covert mission tofund and arm the KMT, further complicating the geopolitical landscape. Meanwhile, the KMT's exploitative practices alienated local ethnic groups, such as the Karen and Mon, deepening mistrust and fragmenting resistance. By 1953, international pressure forced U Nu to address the KMT's presence at the United Nations. This led to evacuations supported by the CIA, though the process was incomplete and fraught with challenges. Many KMT forces remained, leaving an enduring legacy. The Golden Triangle's drug trade flourished, ultimately reaching American inner cities; while regional instability persisted and the Tatmadaw grew in power, setting the stage for military rule in Burma. “By the mid to late 1950s, only about seven or eight thousand had gone [back to Taiwan], which was satisfactory for the government,” Baron says, noting the lasting footprint of the KMT's presence in Burma, and highlighting the incomplete resolutions and ongoing legacies of this historical chapter. “But there was simply in the region, loads that just stayed, loads that never left, and you see their relatives or their descendants still there now.”
The Chinese mainland released a set of measures on Sunday aimed at promoting peaceful cross-Strait relations and improving the well-being of people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, as a delegation led by Cheng Li-wun, chairwoman of the Chinese Kuomintang party, concluded its visit to the mainland.4月12日，在中国国民党主席郑丽文率领的代表团结束大陆之行之际，大陆方面发布一系列举措，推动两岸关系和平发展、增进两岸同胞福祉。The Taiwan Work Office of the Communist Party of China Central Committee announced a package of 10 measures covering areas such as party-to-party dialogue, youth exchanges, infrastructure connectivity, cross-Strait transportation, trade facilitation and cultural cooperation. It came following a meeting on Friday between Xi Jinping, general secretary of the CPC Central Committee, and Cheng, which was the first such top-level meeting between the two political parties across the Strait in a decade.中共中央台办公布十项措施，涵盖政党对话、青年交流、基础设施联通、两岸交通、贸易便利化及文化合作等领域。此前，中共中央总书记习近平于10日会见郑丽文主席，这是两岸两党十年来首次高层会晤。At the meeting, Xi said that the goal of developing cross-Strait relations is to enable people on both sides to lead better lives.会晤中，习近平表示，发展两岸关系的目标，是要让两岸同胞过上更美好的生活。As this year marks the start of the mainland's 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-30) period, he expressed willingness to share development opportunities and achievements with Taiwan compatriots and jointly build a stronger Chinese national economy.今年是大陆“十五五”开局之年，习近平表示，我们愿同广大台湾同胞共享发展机遇和成果、共同壮大中华民族经济。Xi also said at the meeting that Taiwan's agricultural and fishery products, as well as other high-quality goods, are welcome to enter households across the mainland.习近平还指出，欢迎台湾农渔产品、优质商品进入大陆千家万户。According to the 10 initiatives announced on Sunday, the mainland proposed exploring a regularized communication mechanism between the CPC and the KMT, based on adherence to the 1992 Consensus and opposition to "Taiwan independence".根据4月12日公布的十项举措，大陆方面提议，在坚持“九二共识”、反对“台独”的共同政治基础上，探索建立国共两党常态化沟通机制。The 1992 Consensus, which embodies the one-China principle, was reached between the mainland-based Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait and the Taiwan-based Straits Exchange Foundation with authorization from authorities on both sides of the Strait in 1992.“九二共识”体现一个中国原则，是由中国大陆的海峡两岸关系协会与台湾地区的海峡交流基金会于1992年经两岸授权达成的。The measures also include strengthening youth exchanges through institutionalized programs and arranging annual visits by Taiwan delegations to the mainland.十项举措还包括：建立国共两党青年双向交流机制化平台，每年邀请岛内青年团组来大陆交流参访。It said efforts will focus on advancing utility links and bridge projects between Fujian province and the islands of Jinmen and Matsu. Authorities will also promote normalization of direct cross-Strait passenger air services and resume routes between Taiwan and selected mainland cities.推动福建沿海地区在条件具备情况下同金门、马祖通水、通电、通气、通桥；推动全面恢复两岸空中客运直航正常化，支持尽快恢复台湾与大陆部分城市两岸航班。The measures further aim to facilitate purchases of Taiwan agricultural and fishery products that meet relevant standards, support Taiwan businesses in accessing mainland markets, and improve conditions for Taiwan fishing vessels.此外，为符合检验检疫标准的台湾农渔产品输入大陆提供便利，支持台企开拓大陆市场，改善台湾渔船作业条件。In addition, the mainland will allow more Taiwan-produced content to be broadcast and encourage joint media production to promote the innovative development of Chinese culture.扩大台湾影视内容在大陆播出，鼓励两岸媒体合作制作，推动中华文化创新发展。The mainland will work toward resuming individual travel from Shanghai and Fujian to Taiwan, as only group tours are currently allowed for Fujian and Shanghai residents. Fujian individuals' tours to Jinmen and Matsu have also resumed since the second half of 2024.推动恢复上海市及福建省居民赴台（本岛）个人游试点（目前两地仅开放团队游），福建居民赴金门、马祖个人游已于2024年下半年恢复。Chang Jung-kung, a KMT vice-chairman and member of the delegation, said on Sunday that the policy package could be regarded as a "gift" from the mainland, delivered through Cheng, to the people of Taiwan, enhancing their well-being.中国国民党副主席、代表团成员张荣恭12日表示，这一政策礼包可视为大陆方面通过郑丽文主席送给台湾同胞的“礼物”，切实增进台湾民众福祉。He said it demonstrated goodwill and sincerity from the mainland and has brought tangible benefits to Taiwan.他表示，此举彰显大陆方面的善意与诚意，为台湾带来实实在在的利益。The measures came as Cheng's delegation concluded their six-day trip to the mainland from Tuesday to Sunday, which included stops in Jiangsu province, Shanghai and Beijing. The trip also marked the first visit to the mainland by a KMT chairperson in a decade.上述举措出台之际，郑丽文率领的代表团结束为期六天的大陆之行。代表团于7日至12日先后访问江苏、上海及北京，此次系国民党主席十年来首次访陆。The itinerary included traditional stops for KMT leaders visiting the mainland, such as the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum in Nanjing, Jiangsu province, and the Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall at Biyun Temple at Xiangshan in Beijing, where the delegation paid tribute to Sun as an important founding figure of the KMT. This year also marks the 160th anniversary of Sun's birth.行程中，代表团按惯例拜谒南京中山陵、北京香山碧云寺孙中山纪念堂，纪念这位国民党重要创始人。今年正值孙中山诞辰160周年。Meanwhile, the trip featured several visits highlighting the mainland's technological development. On Sunday, the delegation visited the Xiaomi EV Hyperfactory in Beijing, where they learned about the mainland's progress in electric vehicle research and development, marking the final stop of their mainland tour.此次访问还安排多项展现大陆科技发展的参访活动。12日，代表团参访北京小米汽车超级工厂，了解大陆电动汽车研发进展，为此次大陆之行最后一站。On Saturday, the delegation toured the Zhongguancun National Innovation Demonstration Zone Exhibition Center in Beijing's Haidian district, which showcased the latest technologies, including artificial intelligence, embodied intelligence and high-end medical devices.11日，代表团参观北京海淀区中关村国家自主创新示范区展示中心，观摩人工智能、具身智能、高端医疗器械等前沿技术成果。"I found answers for Taiwan's future here," Cheng said at the exhibition center, noting that the island's service sector and traditional manufacturing industries are facing mounting challenges.郑丽文在展示中心表示：“我在这里找到了台湾未来的答案。”她指出，台湾服务业与传统制造业正面临日益严峻的挑战。Cheng said she was impressed by the mainland's applications of AI and technological innovation across sectors, describing the trip as "highly rewarding".她对大陆人工智能应用及各领域科技创新印象深刻，称“不虚此行”。"Without political barriers across the Strait, the two sides could make significant contributions to humanity," she said, calling for strengthened cross-Strait cooperation based on each side's respective strengths.“如果两岸可以毫无政治障碍，对人类的贡献将不可限量。”郑丽文呼吁，立足各自优势，深化两岸合作。She also emphasized that efforts on both sides to address differences and reduce confrontation are ultimately aimed at improving the lives of people across the Strait.她同时强调，两岸化解分歧、减少对立，最终目的是增进两岸同胞民生福祉。Li Peng, dean of the Taiwan Research Institute at Xiamen University, said Cheng's visit once again reaffirmed that both sides of the Strait should pursue peaceful development, uphold the 1992 Consensus, oppose "Taiwan independence", and work to improve the well-being of people on both sides.厦门大学台湾研究院院长李鹏表示，郑丽文此行再次表明，两岸应坚持和平发展、坚持“九二共识”、反对“台独”，共同增进同胞福祉。He noted that mainstream public opinion in Taiwan supports the resumption and expansion of cross-Strait people-to-people exchanges, with many hoping to share the benefits of mainland development.他指出，台湾主流民意支持恢复并扩大两岸民间交流，众多民众期盼共享大陆发展红利。"Cheng's trip has also achieved these objectives," Li said, adding that the policy package released by the mainland represents tangible benefits for Taiwan compatriots and constitutes an important outcome of her visit to the mainland.“郑丽文此行达成上述目标。”李鹏说，大陆方面出台的政策礼包为台湾同胞带来实实在在的好处，是此次访陆之行的重要成果。resume routes/ /rɪˈzuːm ruːts/恢复航线tangible benefits/ /ˈtændʒəbl ˈbenɪfɪts/实际利益itinerary/ /aɪˈtɪnərəri/行程安排pay tribute to/ /peɪ ˈtrɪbjuːt tuː/致敬strengthen cross-Strait cooperation/ /ˈstreŋθən krɒs streɪt kəʊˌɒpəˈreɪʃn/加强两岸合作
Trịnh Lệ Văn, lãnh đạo Quốc Dân Đảng đối lập tại Đài Loan, đang dẫn đầu một phái đoàn sang thăm Trung Quốc từ ngày 7 đến 12 tháng 4. Đây là chuyến thăm đầu tiên của một chủ tịch KMT trong một thập niên qua, và bà Trịnh dự kiến sẽ có cuộc hội kiến với Chủ tịch Trung Quốc Tập Cận Bình.Xem thêm.
Xi Jinping, general secretary of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, said on Friday that regardless of how the international landscape or the situation across the Taiwan Strait evolves, the overarching trend toward the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and the prevailing momentum for Chinese people on both sides of the Strait to come closer together will not change.He made the remarks on Friday during a meeting in Beijing with Cheng Li-wun, chairwoman of the Chinese Kuomintang party. This was the first meeting between the leaders of the CPC and the KMT since 2016, when Xi met in Beijing with then KMT chairwoman Hung Hsiu-chu.Cheng is leading a KMT delegation on a six-day visit to the Chinese mainland at the invitation of Xi and the CPC Central Committee. Since arriving on Tuesday, the delegation has visited Jiangsu province and Shanghai, before traveling to Beijing.Welcoming the delegation, Xi said the meeting is of great significance for the development of relations between the two parties and across the Taiwan Strait.He said that people on both sides of the Strait hope for peace and tranquility, improved cross-Strait relations, and better lives. "This is a responsibility that the CPC and the KMT cannot shirk, and also a driving force for the two parties to work together," he said.Xi expressed the willingness to work with all political parties in Taiwan, including the KMT, as well as groups and people from all sectors, to strengthen exchanges and dialogue, promote peace across the Taiwan Strait, improve the well-being of the people and advance national rejuvenation, on the basis of the common political foundation of adhering to the 1992 Consensus and opposing "Taiwan independence".In a four-point proposal on the development of cross-Strait relations, Xi called for forging closer bonds across the Strait by upholding a correct understanding of identity.Highlighting that people on both sides of the Strait share common roots, culture and lineage, Xi said that as members of one family, as long as people communicate sincerely and consult one another when issues arise, there will be no differences or disputes that cannot be resolved."Differences in social systems should not be an excuse for secession," he stressed.Xi called for safeguarding their shared homeland through peaceful development, noting that the core issue for safeguarding the shared homeland lies in recognizing that both sides of the Strait belong to one China."We welcome any proposals conducive to the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations and will spare no effort to advance any endeavors that promote such development," Xi said, adding that "Taiwan independence" is the chief culprit undermining peace across the Taiwan Strait. "We should neither condone nor tolerate it."Xi emphasized the importance of enhancing people's well-being through greater exchanges and integration, saying that the goal of developing cross-Strait relations is to enable people on both sides to lead better lives.Noting that the mainland boasts magnificent landscapes and a vast market, Xi said that Taiwan compatriots are welcome to visit the mainland, and he encouraged young people in Taiwan to seek development opportunities on the mainland. He added that Taiwan's agricultural and fishery products, as well as other quality goods, are welcome to enter households across the mainland.Xi called for joint efforts to achieve national rejuvenation. "We firmly believe that more and more Taiwan compatriots will gain a correct understanding of the mainland's social system and development path," he said."They will recognize that Taiwan's development prospects hinge on a strong motherland, and that the interests and well-being of Taiwan compatriots are closely linked to the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation," he added.As this year marks the opening year of the mainland's 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-30) period, Xi expressed willingness to share development opportunities and benefits with Taiwan compatriots and jointly strengthen the Chinese national economy.The CPC and the KMT should consolidate political mutual trust, maintain positive interactions, unite people on both sides of the Strait, and work together to create a bright future for national reunification and national rejuvenation, he said.KMT Chairwoman Cheng said that people on both sides of the Strait are all Chinese, who share a common heritage and are nurtured by the Chinese culture, and that they should work together to advance the cause of pursuing the revitalization of China envisioned by Dr Sun Yat-sen.She said the KMT and the CPC should uphold the common political foundation of adhering to the 1992 Consensus and opposing "Taiwan independence", strengthen political mutual trust, and make full use of their party-to-party platform for communication across the Strait.Cheng called for greater exchanges and cooperation in areas such as people-to-people ties, grassroots engagement, the economy and trade, and culture, as well as stronger support for youth exchanges and development.She also urged the two parties to help improve people's well-being, promote the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations, build a brighter future for the two sides, and advance the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.
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Subscribe now to skip the ads and get all of our episodes. Danny “Hollywood” Bessner and Derek “Bethesda” Davison are back with the news. This week: Israel bombs Lebanon and kills hundreds (2:09) as Iran halts traffic through the Strait of Hormuz in response (5:43); the U.S. and Iran prepare for peace talks in Pakistan (8:26); Trump threatens to resume the war if talks fail (13:02); the Gaza Board of Peace demands Hamas provide a disarmament response (14:56); Afghanistan and Pakistan pause talks and agree to avoid escalation (17:16); Myanmar's parliament elects junta leader Min Aung Hlaing as president (20:04); Vietnam's National Assembly elects Communist Party chief To Lam as president (21:14); KMT leader Chiang Li-wun visits China to pursue closer ties (22:59); Burkina Faso's junta leader extends military rule (27:06); Hungarian polling projects Viktor Orban to lose power to the opposition (31:51); Chadian forces deploy to Haiti under a UN-backed mission (34:54); Haiti postpones voter registration amid ongoing violence (37:15); Trump pressures NATO to secure the Strait of Hormuz (41:51). Don't forget to subscribe to the Marx Prestige miniseries. New episodes out on Tuesdays! Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
Danny “Hollywood” Bessner and Derek “Bethesda” Davison are back with the news. This week: Israel bombs Lebanon and kills hundreds (2:09) as Iran halts traffic through the Strait of Hormuz in response (5:43); the U.S. and Iran prepare for peace talks in Pakistan (8:26); Trump threatens to resume the war if talks fail (13:02); the Gaza Board of Peace demands Hamas provide a disarmament response (14:56); Afghanistan and Pakistan pause talks and agree to avoid escalation (17:16); Myanmar's parliament elects junta leader Min Aung Hlaing as president (20:04); Vietnam's National Assembly elects Communist Party chief To Lam as president (21:14); KMT leader Chiang Li-wun visits China to pursue closer ties (22:59); Burkina Faso's junta leader extends military rule (27:06); Hungarian polling projects Viktor Orban to lose power to the opposition (31:51); Chadian forces deploy to Haiti under a UN-backed mission (34:54); Haiti postpones voter registration amid ongoing violence (37:15); Trump pressures NATO to secure the Strait of Hormuz (41:51).Don't forget to subscribe to the Marx Prestige miniseries. New episodes out on Tuesdays!Advertising Inquiries: https://redcircle.com/brandsPrivacy & Opt-Out: https://redcircle.com/privacy
On this week's Defense & Aerospace Report Washington Roundtable, sponsored by L3Harris, Dr. Patrick Cronin of the Hudson Institute think tank, Cavas Ships podcast cohost Chris Servello, and former DoD Europe chief Jim Townsend of the Center for a New American Security, and former Pentagon Comptroller Dr. Dov Zakheim of the Center for Strategic and International Studies join Defense & Aerospace Report Editor Vago Muradian to discuss the two-week Pakistan-brokered ceasefire to allow for negotiations to end the US-Israel war on Iran; what's at stake as Vice President JD Vance leads a Us delegation to Islamabad for direct talks with Iran; US and European pressure on Israel over its Lebanon strategy; NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte's Oval Office meeting as President Trump continued to criticize the alliance; Vladimir Putin's proposed Ukraine ceasefire for the duration of the Orthodox Easter; Vance's rush to Budapest to boost the election prospects of Hungarian President Viktor Orban who's lagging in the polls before Sunday's election; two key polls show major shifts in the Indo Pacific sentiment towards the United States and nuclear weapons; a month before Xi Jinping's Beijing meeting with Trump, the Chinese premiere hosted Taiwan's KMT opposition leader Cheng Li-wun as China declared an exclusion zone near Taiwan Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Pyongyang; wear and tear of the Iran mission on US forces; the administration's communications strategy; and Britain monitors Russian activity near its critical seabed infrastructure.
Xi Jinping said this meeting between the CPC and KMT leaders after 10 years is of great significance for developing relations between the two parties and across the Taiwan Strait.
The leaders of the CPC and KMT stressed the value of communication across the Taiwan Strait as they met in Beijing during a KMT delegation's visit to the Chinese mainland (01:03). Participants from the dawn of ping-pong diplomacy 55 years ago have revisited a historically significant venue in Beijing (16:34). And Israel's prime minister is seeking direct talks with Lebanon after a wave of deadly strikes against Hezbollah (24:06).
The United States and Iran have agreed to call off strikes and continue negotiations in Pakistan in a move welcomed by the international community including China (01:07). China has vetoed a resolution on reopening the Strait of Hormuz at the UN Security Council, saying it's biased against Iran (07:31). And the Chinese mainland says compatriots from both sides of the Taiwan Strait are one family as a KMT delegation visits the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum (14:04).
Cheng Li-wun, chairwoman of the Chinese Kuomintang party, leading a delegation of the KMT, arrived in Nanjing, the capital of Jiangsu province, via Shanghai on Tuesday, beginning a mainland visit that will run through Sunday.中国国民党主席郑丽文率国民党代表团于4月7日经上海抵达南京，正式开启为期一周的大陆参访行程，访问将持续至12日。The visit is considered an important part of the promotion of cross-Strait peace and dialogue.此次访问被视为推动两岸和平与对话的重要一环。Cheng and the delegation landed at Shanghai Hongqiao International Airport and traveled to Nanjing later in the day. Song Tao, head of the Taiwan Work Office of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, welcomed them at the airport.郑丽文一行搭乘班机抵达上海虹桥国际机场，当日稍后转赴南京。中共中央台湾工作办公室主任宋涛在机场迎接。At the invitation of the CPC Central Committee and Xi Jinping, general secretary of the CPC Central Committee, Cheng and the delegation are scheduled to visit Jiangsu, Shanghai and Beijing.应中共中央和习近平总书记邀请，郑丽文一行将先后赴江苏、上海、北京参访。The visit is the first by a KMT chairperson to the mainland in a decade. Since taking office in October, Cheng has expressed on multiple occasions her willingness to visit the mainland.这是十年来中国国民党主席首次到访大陆。郑丽文自去年10月就任国民党主席以来，已多次表达访陆意愿。Upon arriving in Nanjing, Cheng expressed her gratitude to General Secretary Xi, thanking the mainland for the warm reception. She said that the visit aimed to safeguard peace across the Taiwan Strait and improve people's well-being, and is therefore of great significance.郑丽文抵达南京后表示，感谢习近平总书记，感谢大陆方面热情接待。此访是为了维护台海和平，增进人民福祉，意义重大。She added that the KMT will continue to uphold the 1992 Consensus, oppose "Taiwan independence", and play an active role in promoting the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations.她还表示，中国国民党将坚持“九二共识”、反对“台独”，继续发挥推动两岸关系和平发展的重要作用。Song welcomed Cheng and her delegation, saying that the visit would enable them to experience firsthand the mainland's tremendous development achievements under the leadership of General Secretary Xi and the CPC, as well as the deep friendship that mainland compatriots have for their counterparts in Taiwan.宋涛对郑丽文一行表示欢迎。他说，此次访问将让代表团亲身感受到祖国大陆在习近平总书记和中国共产党领导下取得的巨大发展成就，充分感受到大陆同胞对台湾同胞的深情厚谊Song said he believes the visit would receive strong recognition and support from people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.宋涛表示，相信此次访问会得到两岸同胞的高度肯定和支持。He stressed that both sides should prioritize national interests and the well-being of compatriots, work together to promote the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations, and strive together for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.他强调，两党要以民族利益为重、以同胞福祉为念，携手推动两岸关系和平发展，共创中华民族伟大复兴。Li Zhenguang, dean of the Taiwan Research Institute at Beijing Union University, said that the visit would demonstrate the joint efforts of the CPC and the KMT to promote peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, as well as peaceful cross-Strait development and exchanges.北京联合大学台湾研究院院长李振广表示，此次访问彰显了国共两党共同维护台海和平稳定、推动两岸和平发展与交流合作的努力。"People on both sides of the Taiwan Strait hope to ease the current tensions," Li said, adding that the visit reflects a shared aspiration for peaceful development and expanded exchanges and cooperation, both on the mainland and in Taiwan.“两岸同胞都希望缓和当前紧张局势，”李振广说，此次访问反映了两岸各界期盼和平发展、扩大交流合作的共同心声。He added that Cheng's adherence to the 1992 Consensus and her opposition to "Taiwan independence" have paved the way for high-level exchanges between the CPC and the KMT.他还表示，郑丽文坚持“九二共识”、反对“台独”，为两党高层交往铺平了道路。The KMT delegation included its three vice-chairpersons — Lee Chien-lung, Chang Jung-kung and Hsiao Hsu-tsen — as well as Lee Hong-yuan, deputy chairman of the KMT-affiliated policy think tank, and Su Chi, chairman of the KMT central advisory committee, who coined the term "1992 Consensus".国民党代表团成员包括三位副主席李乾龙、张荣恭、萧旭岑，以及国民党智库副董事长李鸿源、中央评议委员会主席苏起——“九二共识”这一概念正是由苏起提出。take office /teɪk ˈɒfɪs/就职，上任1992 Consensus /ˌnaɪnˈtiːn ˈnaɪntituː ˈkɒnsensəs/九二共识cross-Strait relations /ˌkrɒs streɪt rɪˈleɪʃnz/两岸关系mainland compatriots /ˈmeɪnlænd kəmˈpeɪtriəts/大陆同胞great rejuvenation /ɡreɪt rɪˌdʒuːvəˈneɪʃn/伟大复兴
Good afternoon, I'm _____ with today's episode of EZ News. Tai-Ex opening The Tai-Ex opened down 99-points this morning from yesterday's close, at 32,419 on turnover of 9.3-billion N-T. The market moved sharply lower on Monday as yet another a spike in crude oil prices led investors to trim their holdings of large-cap stocks, particularly those in the electronics sector. KMT chair 'gladly accepts' Xi's invitation to visit China next week K-M-T Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun has announced that she's "gladly accepted" an invitation from Xi Jinping to visit China next week. Speaking at a press conference after news of the invitation was released, Cheng said she believe the two sides of the Taiwan Strait must firmly pursue a path of peace to ensure regional stability, and the well-being of future generations. Cheng told reporters that the trip will "show the people of Taiwan and the world that the two sides of the Strait are not destined for war, nor do they need to remain on the brink of (處於邊緣) military conflict. The six-day trip includes stops in Jiangsu, Shanghai and Beijing. CPI will rise 1.9% in 2026 if oil prices average US$100 Central Bank Governor Yang Chin-long is warning that the consumer price index is likely to jump 1.9-per cent this year, if international crude oil prices increase to an average of 100 U-S dollars per barrel. Speaking at a meeting of the Legislative Financial Committee, Yang said although the projected 1.9-per cent growth in the consumer price index is higher than the central bank's recent estimate of 1.8-per cent, it is still below a 2-per cent alert level. Yang also told lawmakers that the central bank will raise interest rates to deal with inflationary pressure - and if inflationary concerns take hold, the bank will also take steps to tighten its monetary (金融的) policy. White House says it's not changing Cuba policy after allowing Russian oil delivery The Trump Administration says its fuel sanctions on Cuba have not been lifted, despite allowing a Russian oil tanker to make a delivery to the island. The US cut off shipments from Venezuela after deposing (罷免) the country's president and threatened steep tariffs on countries that sent fuel to Cuba -in a bid to pressure the government to collapse. Toni Waterman has more from Washington. Spain Catholic Church Takes Steps Towards Compensation for Sexual Abuse Victims Spain's Catholic bishops and the government have taken another step toward compensating victims of sexual abuse by clergy members who have died or whose possible crimes are too old to be prosecuted. Spain's Catholic bishops agreed in January to let the Spanish government's ombudsman have the final say in the church's compensation of such victims. The government and Spain's bishops signed paperwork on Monday detailing how the new church-state reparation system would work. The president of the Spanish Episcopal Conference Archbishop said that the system would take effect April 15-th. The text won't include amounts or scales for the compensation (賠償) that sexual abuse victims would be entitled to (有權獲得/享有). Compensation will be determined on a case-by-case basis. That was the I.C.R.T. EZ News, I'm _____. -- Hosting provided by SoundOn
In this episode we host Ava Shen to unpack the dynamics of Taiwanese politics, the role of the DPP, KMT, and TPP, and how cross-strait tensions shape both domestic discourse and international perceptions. The conversation explores disinformation, shifting political priorities among younger voters, and key misunderstandings in the West about Taiwan and its strategic environment.Ava Shen covers Taiwan and Chinese foreign policy and domestic politics at Eurasia Group. Previously, she interned at Rhodium Group, conducting economic research on China and Taiwan. She also worked as a research assistant at the Stimson Center, focusing on Chinese foreign policy in Asia and China-West Africa cooperation on maritime environmental issues. The International Risk Podcast brings you conversations with global experts, frontline practitioners, and senior decision-makers who are shaping how we understand and respond to international risk. From geopolitical volatility and organised crime to cybersecurity threats and hybrid warfare, each episode explores the forces transforming our world and what smart leaders must do to navigate them. Whether you're a board member, policymaker, or risk professional, The International Risk Podcast delivers actionable insights, sharp analysis, and real-world stories that matter. The International Risk Podcast is sponsored by Conducttr, a realistic crisis exercise platform. Conducttr offers crisis exercising software for corporates, consultants, humanitarian, and defence & security clients. Visit Conducttr to learn more.Dominic Bowen is the host of The International Risk Podcast and Europe's leading expert on international risk and crisis management. As Head of Strategic Advisory and Partner at one of Europe's leading risk management consulting firms, Dominic advises CEOs, boards, and senior executives across the continent on how to prepare for uncertainty and act with intent. He has spent decades working in war zones, advising multinational companies, and supporting Europe's business leaders. Dominic is the go-to business advisor for leaders navigating risk, crisis, and strategy; trusted for his clarity, calmness under pressure, and ability to turn volatility into competitive advantage. Dominic equips today's business leaders with the insight and confidence to lead through disruption and deliver sustained strategic advantage.The International Risk Podcast – Reducing risk by increasing knowledge.Subscribe for all our updates!Tell us what you liked!Tell us what you liked!
【一家旅遊不卡卡，就找富邦旅平卡！】出國前還在為投保旅平險煩惱嗎？讓富邦產險快樂旅平卡幫您搞定所有問題！只要一次註冊就能存好資料，下次出門勾一勾就搞定!快速又方便!馬上了解更多： https://fstry.pse.is/8upu4q 本保險商品一切權利義務悉依保單條款辦理，富邦產險保留承保與否之權利。 ——以上廣告由 Firstory 與【月城南廣告】共同執行—— ☆歡迎大家按讚、訂閱、開啟小鈴鐺☆
We talk the KMT and the Taiwan People's Party approving a pact for November's ballots, the continuing dispute over the status of a lawmaker-at-large, the latest on a designation spat with South Korea and more. -- Hosting provided by SoundOn
In this episode, we will talk about the Chinese civil war between the KMT and the CCP which resulted in a unified China under communist rule.
☆歡迎大家按讚、訂閱、開啟小鈴鐺☆
Ketogenic therapy for schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and depression is gaining attention, but how can it be safely implemented into clinical practice?A newly published expert consensus provides practical recommendations to help clinicians thoughtfully apply ketogenic metabolic therapy (KMT) for serious mental illnesses.In this in-depth conversation, Dr. Matt Bernstein and Dr. Georgia Ede, both members of the expert committee, discuss how this Delphi consensus was developed, what it includes, and how it can be responsibly integrated into psychiatric practice.In this interview, they discuss:What a Delphi process is and why it was usedThe results of the Delphi process (33 consensus statements and 10 clinical recommendations)Who may be appropriate candidates for KMTAbsolute and relative contraindicationsRecommended laboratory screening and monitoringHow long a trial should last before assessing efficacyHow clinicians can personalize implementation safelyImportantly, the authors emphasize that ketogenic metabolic therapy is not a replacement for standard psychiatric treatment. Rather, it may be considered alongside first-line therapies, particularly for individuals who have not responded adequately, cannot tolerate medications, or are seeking additional options.Reflecting on the value of this work, Dr. Bernstein shares:“I would have loved to have read this six years ago when I was starting to think about implementing these types of practices. It would have given me confidence to charge forward… I probably would have been further along now than I am.”With randomized controlled trials ongoing and more research expected in the coming years, this consensus provides a thoughtful, experience-informed framework for clinicians who are seeing growing interest in metabolic approaches.If you are a clinician, we encourage you to read the full publication.If you are a patient or family member, consider sharing this interview and the paper with your care team to support an informed discussion about whether metabolic strategies may be appropriate in your individual case.As always, clinical decisions should be made in partnership with qualified healthcare professionals.
How can doctors, psychiatrists, and other health practitioners implement keto for serious mental illnesses like schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and depression?In this short interview, Dr. Bret Scher sits down with Dr. Georgia Ede to discuss a newly published Delphi consensus paper in Frontiers in Nutrition, authored by eight experienced clinicians and researchers to establish best practices for the use of ketogenic metabolic therapy (KMT) in serious mental illnesses.Using a structured expert consensus process, the group created 33 statements clarifying things like:What ketogenic metabolic therapy isWho may be appropriate candidates?Safety considerations and medical screeningMonitoring standards and clinical implementationHow KMT can be integrated alongside standard psychiatric careThese statements were then brought to a larger group of experienced clinicians to assess broader consensus, which resulted in all 33 statements reaching the consensus threshold.This paper is not a set of formal treatment guidelines. Instead, they represent an important first step in delivering practical, experience-informed guidance for clinicians who are seeing growing patient interest in metabolic approaches to serious mental illnessAs research continues to evolve, this consensus provides a thoughtful framework for psychiatrists, primary care clinicians, therapists, dietitians, and multidisciplinary teams who wish to incorporate ketogenic metabolic therapy into individualized treatment plans.If you are a clinician interested in learning more about metabolic approaches in psychiatry, we encourage you to explore the full publication.If you are a patient or family member, consider sharing this paper with your care team to start an informed discussion about whether metabolic strategies may be appropriate in your individual case.With the clinical evidence still accumulating and randomized controlled trials ongoing, we expect this clinical guidance to continue to evolve as more data and real word experience becomes available.
Pan-African author, educator, and Documentarian Dr. Kmt. Shockley returns to our classroom on Tuesday morning for a truly transformative session. Dr. Shockley will passionately explain why an Afro-centric education is not just beneficial but essential for Black students to thrive in today’s world. He will reveal powerful techniques that deeply resonate with Black students—methods proven to unlock potential and inspire excellence. Before Dr. Shockley, holistic visionary Dr. Sharita Yazid will captivate us with the rich legacy of the holistic empire built by her father, Dr. Paul Goss, the respected Dean of Black Holistic doctors. Dr. Sharita’s insights will empower you to embrace holistic wellness and honor the trailblazers who shaped our community’s health. Kicking off the morning, Benton Harbor, Michigan activist, the Rev. Ed Pickney will deliver a compelling update on the decades-long, courageous battle to secure clean water for his city—a fight for justice that touches us all. This is more than just radio—it’s a movement.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.
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