Podcasts about Hubei

Last time we spoke about the Hubei-Henan Campaign of 1940-1941. In November 1940, a Central Hubei operation using multiple task forces aimed to exploit Chinese dispersal, achieving only local successes and no lasting territorial gains. The Japanese then tried again in late January 1941 with a major offensive into southern Henan. Despite concentrating a large force, the campaign failed strategically. After the Henan failure, Japan attempted to regain momentum in spring 1941 by attacking western Hubei around Yichang on the Yangtze. Despite an initial barrage and rapid early gains, Japanese forces became exposed in a narrow salient. The Chinese reorganized their river defenses and launched a converging counteroffensive, driving the invaders back and ending the engagement where it began, with the Japanese suffering heavy casualties and their westward push thwarted.   #206 The Battle of Shanggao Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. The year 1940 had brought a particular humiliation. In August of that year, Communist General Peng Dehuai had launched the Hundred Regiments Offensive — a massive, coordinated assault across North China that shattered Japanese rail and supply lines, embarrassed Imperial General Headquarters, and demonstrated that the Chinese were far from finished. Japan's response had been brutal, the infamous "Three Alls" campaign of reprisals across the countryside. But the damage had been done, and the attention of Imperial General Headquarters shifted northward. The autumn of 1940 had also seen the First Battle of Changsha, where the Japanese 11th Army under General Sonobe Yahachirō pushed south into Hunan Province expecting to overwhelm the Chinese defenders and finally deal a decisive blow to Chiang Kai-shek's armies. Instead, General Xue Yue — the "Tiger of Changsha" — had allowed the Japanese to advance deep into his prepared killing ground before counterattacking from multiple directions. The Japanese had been forced to retreat in disorder, and the front in Hunan and Jiangxi settled once again into sullen stalemate. It was in this atmosphere of frustrated ambition and strategic inertia that the seeds of Shanggao were sown. By February 1941, Imperial General Headquarters had decided to redeploy the 33rd Division — then garrisoned in the town of Anyi, in northwestern Jiangxi — to North China. The transfer was scheduled to begin in early April, and it made strategic sense: the north required reinforcement, and the front in Jiangxi had been quiet enough that one division could be spared. The problem was that the 33rd Division's departure would leave a gap in Japanese dispositions, and no significant offensive operation had yet been conducted to weaken the Chinese forces that would be left facing a thinned-out Japanese line. Lieutenant General Ōga Shigeru, the energetic commander of the Japanese 34th Division, saw opportunity in the window that existed before the 33rd departed. His division was concentrated around Xishan and Wanshou Palace, astride the Xiang–Gan Highway — the main road running westward through Jiangxi — and across that highway lay the town of Shanggao and the Chinese forces defending it. Ōga proposed exploiting the presence of both divisions for a coordinated strike: a sharp, limited offensive to crush Chinese field forces around Nanchang and the Jiangxi interior before the 33rd Division's train north. The 11th Army headquarters, now commanded by General Marube, endorsed a cautious concept — a "quick strike" with limited objectives. But the 34th Division's staff, energized by Ōga's ambition, had already run well ahead of this guidance. Large-scale requisitioning of coolies for logistics was underway; training exercises aimed at the specific terrain around Shanggao had been conducted; planning had progressed in far more detail than a "limited" operation warranted. This eagerness would prove to be the Japanese undoing before the first shot was fired. Chinese intelligence networks, always attentive to the movement of porters and the telltale preparations that preceded a Japanese offensive, quickly detected the scale of these preparations and reported them to General Luo Zhuoying, commander of the Chinese 19th Army Group. By the time the Japanese columns were forming up to march, Luo had already hardened his defenses and laid the groundwork for a trap. General Luo Zhuoying was not a passive commander. He served simultaneously as commander of the 19th Army Group and as Deputy Commander of the 9th War Zone — the latter post placing him directly under General Xue Yue, the victor of Changsha. Luo had spent the lull after Changsha doing what Chinese commanders across the theater had learned was essential: reorganizing, retraining, and above all improving the defensive architecture of his sector. The plan Luo devised for meeting the anticipated Japanese offensive was elegant in its simplicity and demanding in its execution. Rather than contesting the Japanese advance at the frontier, he would allow the enemy to push westward, yielding ground through three successive defensive lines while bleeding the attackers at every step. The first and second lines would slow the Japanese, exact casualties, and stretch their logistics. The third line — anchored at Shanggao itself — would be the killing ground. There, the Chinese forces would hold fast while other formations swung around the Japanese flanks and rear to close the encirclement. The Japanese, having marched deep into Chinese-held territory with their supply lines thinning and their flanks exposed, would find themselves surrounded rather than victorious. For this plan to work, each Chinese formation had to perform its role with discipline. The 70th Corps, deployed in the north along the arc from Shitou Street through Fengxin to Jing'an, would have to conduct a controlled fighting retreat — yielding ground but making the Japanese pay for it, never breaking and running. The 49th Corps would hold the southern flank and create conditions for flanking action. And the 74th Corps — General Wang Yaowu's elite formation, comprising the 51st, 57th, and 58th Divisions — would hold the final line at Shanggao and serve as the anvil upon which the Japanese advance would shatter. The 74th Corps was by 1941 one of the most battle-hardened formations in the Nationalist Army. It had fought at Shanghai in 1937, at Wuhan in 1938, and in the hills and valleys of Jiangxi through the years since. Its men knew the terrain around Shanggao. They had prepared positions in depth, studied the approaches, and rehearsed the defensive plan Luo had designed. When the Japanese came, they would be ready. Against the Chinese 70,000 — distributed across eleven divisions in four corps, with additional provincial security forces for local coverage — the Japanese would throw roughly 20,000 men: three major formations advancing in coordinated columns. The disparity in numbers was stark, but the Japanese had the advantages of offensive initiative, air superiority, and the formidable fighting quality that the Imperial Army had demonstrated throughout the war in China. The question was whether those advantages would be enough to overcome a prepared defense wielded by a commander who had invited the attack. The operational plan devised by the Japanese 11th Army called for three columns to converge simultaneously on Shanggao from north, center, and south — a classic encirclement concept that, if executed with precision, would catch the Chinese defenders in a tightening vice. In the north, the main force of the 33rd Division under Lieutenant General Sakurai Shōzō would drive westward from its bases around Anyi and Ganzhoujie, descending the Liao River valley to threaten the Chinese right flank and prevent the 70th Corps from interfering with operations in the center.In the center, Ōga's 34th Division would advance along the Xiang–Gan Highway — the direct route from Nanchang toward Shanggao — capturing the town of Gao'an along the way and pressing relentlessly westward until it reached the main defensive positions. This was the principal striking force, the column designed to crack open the Chinese defenses and seize the objective.In the south, the Independent Mixed 20th Brigade under Major General Ikeda would cross the Jin River and advance along its south bank, eventually swinging north to link up with the 34th Division and complete the encirclement of whatever Chinese forces remained in the Shanggao area. The plan was coherent on paper. But it contained a structural flaw so serious that, in retrospect, it is difficult to understand how the 11th Army's staff allowed it to proceed uncorrected. The success of any converging operation depends on synchronization — on each column hitting its objectives on schedule and maintaining communication with the others so that each can react to developments on the other prongs. Yet the 11th Army headquarters made no recorded effort to coordinate the 33rd and 34th Divisions before the battle began. There was no forward command post established to oversee the operation. General Marube remained at Hankou, hundreds of miles to the north, throughout the battle — as remote from the fighting as a Tokyo bureaucrat. Operational decisions were left entirely to the individual divisions, with no mechanism to coordinate their actions if something went wrong. Something was going to go wrong. Luo Zhuoying had seen to that. On the morning of March 15, 1941, all three Japanese columns stepped off simultaneously, advancing into the misty hills and rice paddies of northwestern Jiangxi. In the north, Sakurai's 33rd Division moved briskly from Anyi toward Fengxin. The town fell by noon, and the division pressed westward in good order. The Japanese infantry moved confidently along the Liao River valley, experienced soldiers who had fought across China and had no particular reason to expect what was coming. The Chinese 70th Corps gave ground — as it had been ordered to — but did so on its own terms, occupying and then abandoning successive pieces of high ground along both banks of the river, making the Japanese advance uncomfortable and costly. Gradually, almost imperceptibly, the 33rd Division was being drawn forward into terrain that favored the defender. By March 18 and 19, the 33rd Division had pushed all the way to Guzhu'ao and Huamenlo — a considerable advance, but one that had taken the division far from its base at Anyi. And it was here, far from support and with flanks increasingly exposed, that the Chinese blocking forces closed in. Chinese infantry, who had been waiting in prepared positions in the high ground overlooking the river valley, launched coordinated counter-attacks that struck the 33rd Division from multiple directions. The fighting was fierce and costly. In two days of close combat, the division suffered more than 2,500 casualties — a grievous toll that represented a significant fraction of its effective strength. The northern column had been stopped dead. On March 19, Sakurai ordered the 33rd Division to reverse course. By March 23, after four days of painful withdrawal under pressure, it had pulled back to Anyi — the same place it had started. The northern prong of the Japanese offensive had accomplished nothing except the loss of thousands of men. In the south, the Independent Mixed 20th Brigade had a rougher start. Its initial attempt to cross the Gan-Jin river junction at noon on March 15 was repulsed by Chinese defenders, and it was only under cover of darkness that the brigade managed to force a crossing. Once across, it moved westward along the south bank of the Jin River, but progress was slow and contested. A detachment — the Gan River Detachment — ran into fierce resistance from the 26th Division of the Chinese 49th Corps on March 19. The brigade's main body meanwhile fought its way through the 51st Division of the 74th Corps, but the 107th Division and elements of the 51st managed to contain the advance at the Laichunling–Zhutoushan line. On the night of March 20, the main body of the 20th Brigade crossed the Jin River at Huifu to link up with the 34th Division — but a portion of its troops, cut off on the south bank, was destroyed by Chinese forces. The southern column was across the Jin River, but it had taken losses and was already engaged in ways its planners had not anticipated. In the center, the 34th Division fared best in the early going. Ōga's division moved westward from Xishan along the Xiang–Gan Highway on March 16, and by the 17th had captured Gao'an — a meaningful early success. The Chinese 74th Corps, executing Luo's plan faithfully, dispatched only screening forces east of the Tangpu River to slow the Japanese advance rather than contesting it decisively. The main body of the 74th Corps fell back to the third-line positions at Sixi, Guanqiao, and Tangpu, preparing the killing ground that Luo had designated. Simultaneously, the 26th Division and most of the 105th Division from the 49th Corps were shifted across the Gan River to operate south of the Jin River on the Japanese left flank, and the 72nd Corps was ordered to maneuver on a wide envelopment around Daxia and south of Ganfang. By March 20–21, the 34th Division had pressed forward to attack the Chinese positions at Sixi and Guanqiao. Ōga's men were confident — they had taken Gao'an, they were moving, and the objective of Shanggao lay within reach. But as the division pushed toward Shangjijia, it ran squarely into the 57th and 58th Divisions of the 74th Corps, fighting with a tenacity that told the Japanese plainly enough: this was where the Chinese intended to stand. The week of March 21–24 brought the battle to its crisis. The 34th Division hammered at the Chinese positions defending Shanggao itself, while on the flanks, the fighting took on a character that neither side had entirely anticipated. On March 21, General Wang Yaowu — commanding the 74th Corps from his headquarters in Shanggao — decided it was time to do more than absorb Japanese blows. He ordered General Li Tianxia to clear Japanese forces from the south bank of the Jin River and advance on Gao'an, with the aim of cutting the 34th Division's supply line and threatening its rear. It was an aggressive move, and if it had worked, it might have produced a decisive result earlier than history would record. It did not work — at least not immediately. That very evening, the Independent Mixed 20th Brigade, which had been reorganizing after the chaos of the river crossing, launched a powerful offensive at dawn on the 22nd. Li Tianxia's lead elements had barely set out from Shitou Street when they collided head-on with the main force of the 20th Brigade, which had crossed back from the north bank of the Jin River. The Japanese thrust was coordinated and aggressive: one column circled wide to attack Lazhu Mountain; another swung south of Hu Family west of Shitou Street to strike Li's division in the flank and rear; and nine aircraft with four artillery pieces bombarded the Chinese positions from north to south. Li's division could not hold against this convergent assault and fell back to the high ground southwest of Shitou Street. Wang Yaowu reacted quickly. He ordered Li's main body to wheel left to face the new threat and simultaneously dispatched the Army's Field Supplementary Regiment — held in reserve near Yintang — on a forced march to Huayang to block the Japanese westward drive. This regiment, racing down roads strafed by nine enemy aircraft, covered 15 li per hour and seized Huayang and the high ground to its northeast by around seven in the morning. By nine, the 20th Brigade arrived in strength and — supported by more than ten aircraft — launched a fierce assault on the regiment's positions. The regiment's officers and men held firm, taking heavy casualties but refusing to break. Frustrated at Huayang, the 20th Brigade shifted its effort to the Kuang Family area, linking up with over a thousand men who had crossed from Baichetou to the south bank and pushing along the river toward Xiongfang in an attempt to outflank the Chinese left wing. The Supplementary Regiment sent its 1st Battalion with a mortar company to meet this threat, and the two forces met in a fierce engagement. When the Japanese reinforced their assault and deployed incendiary bombs and poison gas, Xiongfang fell by early afternoon — but Li Tianxia immediately sent two regiments from his right flank to take it back, and by midnight the position was in Chinese hands again. Shitou Street and Jigong Ridge were simultaneously recaptured. The Independent Mixed 20th Brigade now found itself in an increasingly uncomfortable position, fighting with the Jin River at its back and the initiative slipping away. Meanwhile, the main event was being fought in the rubble and ridgelines around Shanggao itself. From March 22 to 25, the 34th Division and whatever remnants of the 20th Brigade could contribute threw themselves repeatedly at the defensive line anchored on Stone Arch Bridge, Xia Po Bridge, Xu Lou, Pan Family Bridge, Cloud Head Mountain, and Lei Family Mountain. This was not the fluid, mobile warfare that the Japanese had envisioned but brutal, grinding attritional combat for individual strongpoints and ridgelines, with positions changing hands multiple times in a single day. The Japanese air arm was deeply involved. Ōga's division had close air support that could operate even in poor weather, and Group 3 of the Japanese Air Force hammered the Chinese positions with sustained effort. On the morning of March 24, after the 34th Division fed in more than 3,000 additional troops transferred across the Jin River, the Air Force dispatched over seventy aircraft that dropped more than 1,700 bombs, largely destroying the defensive positions of Liao Lingqi's division. The Japanese exploited the resulting chaos and twice broke through gaps in the line — but were driven out each time by Chinese counterattacks. At noon, enemy aircraft bombarded in relays and Japanese infantry broke through at Xia Po Bridge. It was at this moment that Li Hanqing, commanding the Chinese infantry defense in that sector, did what officers throughout history have done when systems fail and only personal example can stem the tide: he personally led his officer cadre in repeated counter-attacks, hand-to-hand fighting in the rubble until the Japanese were finally expelled. By this point, the 34th Division's offensive capacity was nearly spent. At the same time — and this was the critical shift that would determine the battle's outcome — General Luo Zhuoying recognized that the moment to spring the trap had arrived. The northern column had already been broken and sent reeling back toward Anyi. The southern column was pinned against the Jin River with its back to the water. The central column was bled white against the defenses of Shanggao. Luo now ordered all his armies to close in from multiple directions. On the morning of March 22, he had already begun revising his orders; by noon on the 23rd, the forces of Liu Duoquan and Li Jue had occupied Shitou Street, Guanqiao Street, and Yanggong Market, pressing on Huifu and Gaoyao. The encirclement of the 34th Division was not yet complete, but its shape was unmistakably forming. By March 25, the 34th Division knew it was in mortal danger. Surrounded on three sides, its ammunition running low and its casualty lists growing by the hour, the division urgently appealed to the 11th Army for rescue. The message that arrived in Hankou was a shock. General Marube and his staff, who had remained at their distant headquarters throughout the battle without establishing a forward command post, had not properly grasped the scale of the disaster unfolding in Jiangxi. The lack of coordination between the 33rd and 34th Divisions — the structural flaw that had been built into the operation from its conception — had allowed Luo Zhuoying to defeat each column separately, and now the central column faced annihilation. The 11th Army responded in a scramble. Chief of Staff Kinoshita was dispatched by aircraft to Nanchang with Operations Staff Officer Lieutenant Colonel Yamaguchi and Captain Ōne to organize a relief operation. The 33rd Division — barely recovered from its own battering in the north — was ordered to sortie immediately and fight its way to the 34th Division's relief. Sakurai organized his battered 33rd Division into three rescue columns. Infantry Brigade Commander Araki Shōji took the right column, leading Infantry Regiment 215 with one mountain artillery battalion. Infantry Regiment 214 formed the left column. The divisional commander himself led the central column with the main divisional force. On March 24 and 25, all three columns sortied from strongpoints at Niuxing, Fengxin, and other positions, attacking across the Wuqiao River and through Cunqian Street toward Tangpu and Guanqiao. The relief operation brought the battle to its most complicated moment. On the morning of March 25, the 33rd Division launched a fierce assault on the forces that Luo Zhuoying had positioned to tighten the encirclement from the north — striking Zhang Yanchuan's division at Kengkou Leng, Jiezipo, and Nancha Luo. Zhang's division, struck simultaneously from the front and rear, withdrew at dusk to near Tu Di Wang Temple, where it linked up with Tang Boyin's division. What happened next became one of the most controversial decisions of the entire battle. Zhang Yanchuan was serving as deputy army commander in the absence of Li Jue from the front. Surveying the situation — his own division under heavy pressure, the 33rd Division's relief columns pushing aggressively — Zhang concluded that the position was untenable. On his own authority, without authorization from Luo Zhuoying or any superior commander, he withdrew both his own and Tang Boyin's divisions to Fenghuang Market and Zhuangfang. The consequence was immediate and severe. The withdrawal opened a corridor through which the 33rd Division entered Guanqiao and linked up with the encircled 34th Division. An encirclement that had taken days of blood and sacrifice to construct was torn open by a single unauthorized decision. Luo Zhuoying, when he received word of Zhang's withdrawal the following morning, was furious — but he could not change what had already happened. He could only adapt. The breakout itself was an ordeal. A portion of the 34th Division that attempted to escape to the east was intercepted near Huifu by a division of the 49th Corps and lost roughly half its strength before being compelled to turn back. The main body ultimately broke out on March 27, withdrawing in march order that told its own story of disaster: headquarters, baggage, artillery, casualties, field hospital, rear guard — all moving in what the records describe as "a wretched state." On the night of March 27, Japanese troops escorting the 34th Division's field hospital — a field artillery company of the 8th Battery — were completely annihilated in a Chinese night attack. When the division reached Longtuan Xu on March 28, the stretcher-bearer column carrying the wounded stretched some seven to eight kilometers along the road. That same day, the 33rd Division's Infantry Regiment 214 finally made contact with the 34th Division's headquarters, completing what amounted to a rescue of men who had already endured their defeat. The 33rd Division's mountain artillery batteries exhausted their entire ammunition supply covering the retreat and required emergency aerial resupply drops to continue. The 34th Division limped back to its original garrison on April 2. Despite the setback caused by Zhang Yanchuan's unauthorized withdrawal, Luo Zhuoying did not abandon his design. Assessing his situation on the morning of March 26, he found reason for cautious optimism: Wang Yaowu's army was still making progress at Shanggao; the Japanese south of the Jin River had largely been cleared; and Sichuan Army and Northeastern Army units that had been moving to reinforce the battle had now reached the field, meaning Chinese forces retained significant numerical superiority. He resolved to execute a second encirclement. At nine in the morning of March 26, Luo issued strict orders: Zhang Yanchuan's and Tang Boyin's divisions were to immediately comply with their original orders and block the enemy near Guanqiao; Yu Chengwan's division was to attack northward via Pan Family Bridge; Liao Lingqi's and Song Yingzhong's divisions were to press toward Guanqiao with full force; Wang Kejun's division was to strike the enemy's flank and rear east of Guanqiao; Fu Yi's division was to advance south of Jiang Family Isle; and Chen Liangji's division was to swing southeast via Changpu to complete the enemy's destruction. The second ring was being drawn. On March 28, as the 34th Division's battered column trudged eastward toward survival, Wang Kejun's division advancing from Yanggong Market moved to intercept it. The Chinese occupied high ground north and south of Yanggong Market and along Mozi Ridge, and what followed was a grinding all-day battle that fixed the Japanese column at the Xiama Bei–Huxing Ridge line. Part of the 20th Brigade, moving up from Gao'an to assist the withdrawing 34th Division, was blocked near Long Tu Market. Liao Lingqi's division pursued the enemy rear guard to the Changling–Manmei high ground, where the fighting erupted with renewed intensity. At noon, part of Li Tianxia's division arrived and deployed along the Shangluoxiang–Shanyuan–Fangtounao line to harass the Japanese right flank; part of Yu Chengwan's division reached Longxing Mountain and outflanked Guanqiao Street from the south. The surviving Japanese defenders in Guanqiao withdrew into the town for a last stand, and after Liao's division pressed the assault, street fighting raged until five in the afternoon, when over 600 defenders were annihilated. Over 2,000 troops of the Independent Mixed 20th Brigade conducted a fighting withdrawal from Long Tu Market and Yanggong Market, covered by Japanese aircraft bombing to shield the 34th Division's retreat. By noon on March 30, the Japanese had abandoned both strongpoints and scattered northeastward. One group of over 600 men fled directly into the main positions of Zhang Yanchuan's division — an ironic fate, given Zhang's earlier withdrawal — and were largely annihilated. The encircling forces had been essentially dispersed, and the two pursuit columns now pressed forward under the overall direction of General Xue Yue, who had assumed personal coordination of the chase. On March 27, Luo Zhuoying — confident that victory was secured — issued a general order for a final offensive and announced substantial cash rewards to his troops: prizes offered for the capture of Japanese officers, artillery pieces, regimental colors, and other materiel. The rewards were both a practical incentive and a mark of how far the battle had tipped. By midnight on March 31, Chen Hongshi's advance column had recovered Gao'an; Wang Tiehan's division had recovered Xiangfu Guan. On April 2, the divisions of Zhang Yanchuan and Song Yingzhong recovered Fengxin; that afternoon Wang Tiehan's division took back Xishan and Wanshou Palace — the very base from which the 34th Division had launched its offensive. By April 3, the pursuing armies had reached the vicinity of Dacheng and Ganzhoujie. On April 8 and 9, the 70th Corps recovered the outpost strongpoints around Anyi before halting operations. The Japanese had retreated into their original positions and were defending from prepared terrain. The pursuit was over. The Battle of Shanggao had lasted nineteen days and nights. No battle of the Second Sino-Japanese War was ever free of the fog of competing claims, and Shanggao was no exception. On March 29, before the pursuit had even concluded, Luo Zhuoying telegraphed Chiang Kai-shek with his accounting of the victory. His numbers were dramatic: Major General Iwanaga, the Japanese infantry commander, killed; regimental commander Colonel Hamada, killed; over 15,000 Japanese killed or wounded in total. Chinese losses, Luo reported, exceeded 20,000. Ten guns, over a thousand rifles, and numerous machine guns had been captured. His superior, General Xue Yue, was skeptical. In a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek on April 5, Xue reduced Luo's numbers by twenty percent, reporting 12,520 Japanese killed or wounded and 14 prisoners captured. The discrepancy between two Chinese commanders reporting on the same battle speaks to the difficulty of battlefield accounting in any era, and suggests something of the competitive pressures that shaped how Chinese commanders reported their victories to Chongqing. The official Chinese histories, compiled after the war in the History of the War of Resistance, reported approximately 15,000 Japanese killed or wounded, 17 prisoners taken, and significant quantities of captured materiel: 6 mountain guns, 1 mortar, 24 light machine guns, 408 rifles, 24 grenade launchers, and over 111,717 rounds of various ammunition. Chinese casualties, by the same records, were 17,119 killed or wounded and 2,814 missing. Japanese records for the battle do not survive — a consequence of the wholesale destruction of Imperial Army documentation at the war's end. Contemporary scholars, working from other sources, estimate actual Japanese combat losses at approximately 5,500 killed and wounded. This is substantially lower than the Chinese claims, as was nearly always the case in the war, but represents a significant defeat by any measure: roughly a quarter of the force committed, many of them veterans impossible to replace. Chiang Kai-shek subsequently awarded the victorious Chinese units a commendation prize of 150,000 yuan — a substantial sum that marked the battle's significance in Nationalist eyes. The outcome at Shanggao was not accidental. Several interlocking factors combined to produce a Chinese victory, and each deserves consideration. The most fundamental was Luo Zhuoying's defensive plan. The decision to trade space for time — to absorb the Japanese advance through three successive defensive lines rather than contest the frontier — required both tactical confidence and a willingness to accept initial setbacks that could easily be misread as defeat. Chinese forces had to give ground, and they did. They had to suffer through the early days of Japanese advance without breaking and running, drawing the enemy forward and allowing the encirclement to take shape. That they largely succeeded in executing this plan reflects the improving quality of the Nationalist Army by 1941: better trained, better led at the operational level, and — critically — equipped with a strategic design that matched the actual balance of forces. The defeat in detail of the Japanese columns was equally important. By neutralizing the 33rd Division in the north before it could contribute to the central effort, and by pinning the 20th Brigade against the Jin River with its back to the water, Luo's forces ensured that the 34th Division faced the third-line defenses essentially alone — outnumbered, overextended, and unsupported. The Japanese operational concept had been a three-pronged convergence; what actually materialized was a single exhausted division hammering at a prepared defense while two other columns were rendered ineffective. The absence of coordination within the Japanese 11th Army was a gift that kept giving throughout the battle. No forward command post. No mechanism for the divisions to adjust their operations in response to each other's situations. No ability to recognize, in real time, that the northern column was being destroyed and redirect resources accordingly. General Marube's decision to remain at Hankou while his men died in Jiangxi was not merely an administrative failure; it was an operational catastrophe. Japanese commanders acknowledged this failing explicitly after the battle, but the acknowledgment changed nothing for the dead. Zhang Yanchuan's unauthorized withdrawal — the single most consequential individual decision of the battle — ultimately prevented a complete annihilation of the 34th Division rather than affecting the battle's outcome. The 34th Division escaped; but it did so in a "wretched state," having lost enormous numbers of men and equipment. It broke out, not triumphed. The encirclement Luo had constructed was torn open, but the Japanese paid dearly for the breach. The consequences of Shanggao rippled outward in ways that shaped the subsequent course of the war in central China. The transfer of the 33rd Division to North China — the original logistical rationale for the entire operation — was delayed by the division's involvement and subsequent losses at Shanggao. When it finally arrived at the Battle of Central Plains  the following month, it did so on the eve of battle with no time for preparation or orientation, entering combat under severely disadvantaged conditions. The operation that was supposed to facilitate a smooth redeployment had instead damaged one of the two units involved and delayed the other. For the Chinese 74th Corps, Shanggao had an ironic consequence. The Japanese 11th Army, following the battle, formally designated the 74th Corps as a priority target — a "standing enemy" and directed its forces to seek out and destroy it in future operations. At the First Battle of Changsha that September, the 11th Army specifically oriented its forces against the 74th Corps, a testament to the lasting impression that corps's fierce resistance at Shanggao had made on its adversaries. The compliment of being specifically targeted by the enemy was one the 74th Corps had earned in blood at Shanggao's ridgelines and shattered bridges. More broadly, the battle was widely regarded at the time, and has been regarded since, as one of the most significant Chinese tactical victories of the first four years of the War of Resistance. Its significance lay not only in the casualties inflicted — those were contested and probably inflated in the Chinese records — but in what it demonstrated. The improving tactical and operational competence of the Nationalist Army was on display. The deliberate defense, the layered withdrawal, the coordinated encirclement — these were not the operations of an army that had been fighting desperately for survival since 1937 and had learned nothing. They were the operations of an army that had studied its defeats and adapted. Shanggao did not change the strategic situation in China. The front in Jiangxi remained where it had been; the Japanese still occupied Nanchang and the major cities; Chiang Kai-shek was still in Chongqing and the war was still far from over. But it demonstrated something important: that the Chinese Army, given capable commanders, a sound plan, and the discipline to execute it, could do more than survive Japanese offensives. It could reverse them, encircle them, and pursue them back to where they came from. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In March–April 1940, Japanese forces attacked Shanggao with a limited, multi-pronged plan. Chinese troops used elastic defense and coordinated counter-moves, turning initial advantages into a trap. After intense fighting and air strikes, a coordinated encirclement and timely breakout routed the Japanese, forcing retreat despite their numbers in a costly battle.

Last time we spoke about the One Hundred Regiment Offensive. During Phase Three of the One Hundred Regiment Offensive, CCP forces in the Taihang/Jizhong area emphasized strongpoint attacks and transportation warfare. Rather than trying to defeat Japanese units head-on, they used tactics such as night raids and ambushes to disrupt Japanese supply routes and communications. The underlying goal was to make Japanese logistics unstable, weakening their ability to maintain control and conduct effective operations. After CCP successes, the Japanese responded with large-scale "mopping-up" operations beginning October 6. As the Eighth Route Army continued resisting, it adopted flexible methods to counter the Japanese sweeps, especially rapid repositioning and targeted ambushes. One notable action described involves an ambush of a Japanese convoy that caused substantial enemy losses, demonstrating how disrupting enemy mobility could blunt the effectiveness of larger Japanese operations. Overall, the situation remained fluid, with both sides continually adapting their tactics in an ongoing contest for control across occupied North China.   #205 The Hubei-Henan Campaign of 1940-1941 Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. By 1940, the war had settled into a grueling stalemate, with Japanese troops occupying vast swathes of central China, including parts of Hubei, but facing persistent Chinese guerrilla and conventional resistance that prevented total consolidation. In the aftermath of the Battle of Zaoyang in the summer of 1940, Japanese forces had secured the key cities of Yichang and Shashi along the middle reaches of the Yangtze River. Yet Chinese Nationalist troops of the Fifth War Area retained firm control over the vital territories east and west of the Xiang River. Their defensive lines formed a broad arc stretching from the southwest of Yuan'an through Jingmen, north of Zhongxiang, and the rugged foothills of the Dahong Mountains, extending northwest to Suixian. These positions straddled both banks of the Xiang River, anchored on the right by the Wudang Mountains and on the left by the Tongbai range. Working in close coordination with guerrilla detachments operating in the southeast, Chinese units repeatedly harassed the Japanese garrisons that had pushed into Yichang. The constant pressure on the enemy's flanks left the Japanese forces in Yichang and Shashi dangerously exposed and hemmed in, unable to expand or consolidate their gains. To the Japanese high command, this situation had become an intolerable thorn that demanded immediate removal.   Under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, the Chinese Nationalist government faced severe strains as the war with Japan escalated. Its problems were not only military, but also political and economic. Deep ideological and territorial rivalries with the CCP meant that efforts to present a single front were constantly undermined. Although the two sides officially formed a United Front in 1937, earlier violence and competition, such as the 1927 Shanghai Massacre and the CCP's Long March of 1934 – 1935 had left distrust and strategic differences in place. As a result, Nationalist resistance was harder to coordinate than it would have been under full unity. Meanwhile, the CCP strengthened its position in northern China by expanding rural strongholds. Through land reforms and the use of guerrilla warfare, the communists were able to win local support and apply pressure to Japanese forces in ways that often did not require large, conventional armies. This strategy also drew influence and manpower away from the Nationalists' more traditional, state-centered military structure.   Economically, the Nationalists were squeezed from multiple directions. The loss of China's coastal industrial regions to Japanese occupation forced the government to rely heavily on the interior, with Chongqing becoming a key base. That geographic shift left the administration more vulnerable to shortages of critical supplies, especially raw materials, fuel, and modern weapons. On top of wartime disruption, the global Great Depression intensified fiscal and logistical difficulties, limiting how quickly and effectively the Nationalists could mobilize resources for large-scale operations. By late November 1940, these weaknesses intersected with renewed Japanese pressure. Japanese commanders were also concerned about the possibility of a major Nationalist push, particularly fears of a counteroffensive by the Thirty-first Army Group under General Tang Enbo.    Determined to break the stalemate, the Japanese launched a major offensive in late November 1940. Preparations had begun in earnest early that month. Engineers repaired and expanded highways and bridges, constructed new defensive works and airfields, and stockpiled vast quantities of rations, ammunition, steel-hulled boats, and rubber rafts in the Zhongxiang area. Five regiments were concentrated near Zhongxiang, while additional troops east and west of the Xiang River brought the total strength to more than three divisions. Along the Suixian–Xiangyang Highway, Japanese forces were reinforced to divisional strength, supported by increased artillery and tank detachments. These meticulous measures left no doubt that the enemy was ready for a large-scale operation.   By 23 November the Japanese had completed their deployments and moved into assault positions. The Japanese forces assigned to the Central Hubei Operation were placed under the overall command of Lieutenant General Waichirō Sonobe, who directed the campaign from his headquarters in Wuhan. Sonobe's 11th Army drew on a broad mix of formations, combining units from the 3rd, 4th, 15th, 17th, 39th, and 40th Divisions. The offensive backbone for the thrust into central Hubei province was reinforced by the 18th Independent Mixed Brigade, which helped supply the infantry strength needed for sustained fighting across difficult ground. In practice, this multi-division structure reflected the 11th Army's key mission in the region, acting as the main Japanese formation after the earlier Battle of Zaoyang and it emphasized coordinated divisional advances supported by attached brigades and specialized elements, including limited armored capabilities.   In terms of manpower, the Japanese force is commonly estimated at roughly 40,000 to 50,000 troops. This strength included several infantry regiments and artillery batteries, along with only limited armored elements rather than a fully armored formation. Because the operation depended on finding and exploiting opportunities quickly, it was supported by aerial reconnaissance and bombing carried out by the 3rd Air Brigade operating in central China. Infantry units formed the majority of the fighting power, while artillery was used to provide suppressive fire during advances. Air support, meanwhile, was intended to help identify and target Chinese positions—particularly along important riverine and rail corridors, where disruptions could slow resistance and complicate Chinese reinforcement or retreat.   To manage the operation across varied terrain and combat tasks, Sonobe's command used smaller combined formation often described as task forces, that could operate with some flexibility. Among them were the Kayashima Force, commanded by Major General Koichi Kayashima of the 18th Independent Mixed Brigade, consisting of the entire brigade reinforced by elements of the 40th Division. The Muragami Force, under Lieutenant General Keisaku Muragami, commander of the 39th Division, which included the full division plus supporting non-infantry units. The Hirabayashi Force, led by Lieutenant General Morito Hirabayashi of the 17th Division, formed from detachments of the 17th and 15th Divisions.The Kitana Force, commanded by Lieutenant General Kenzo Kitana of the 4th Division, incorporating portions of the 4th Division and the Kususe Armored Force. These four groups were deployed in parallel around Tangyang, Jingmen, Zhongxiang, and north of Jingshan. The Hanjima Force, commanded by Lieutenant General Fusataro Hanjima of the 3rd Division, positioned near Suixian along the Xiangyang–Hua Highway. This task-force approach helped tailor combat power to specific mission profiles—such as flanking movements, raids, or pressure on Chinese defensive lines—while keeping the overall campaign plan under a unified command.   Equipment choices also reflected the tactical environment of Hubei. The Japanese units made use of Type 95 Ha-Go light tanks for reconnaissance and for anti-infantry roles, typically best suited to the reconnaissance, pursuit, and screening functions that were available even with constrained armor numbers. For fire support, the force relied on conventional artillery, including 75mm Type 90 guns for field engagements and 105mm howitzers for heavier bombardment where stronger explosive impact was needed. Together, these assets were intended to allow Japanese formations to maneuver around Chinese positions and apply pressure in rugged landscapes where rivers, roads, and rail lines often determined the rhythm of battle.   Logistics were a decisive factor in whether the operation could sustain momentum. Sonobe's army depended heavily on existing transportation infrastructure, particularly rail lines radiating from the Wuhan hub toward forward areas such as Suizhou and Zaoyang. These routes were critical for moving ammunition, replacements, and other supplies closer to the front as the Japanese advanced. The campaign also used river transport along the Yangtze River, including motorized barges and steamers, to deliver supplies to units operating near waterways. However, reliance on these corridors came with risks: Chinese interdiction raids could disrupt shipments, forcing convoys to be escorted and increasing the time and resources required to keep the forward units supplied. Overall, this dependence on both rail and fluvial networks highlighted a central operational challenge, maintaining secure access to transportation arteries in contested territory so that the Japanese could keep fighting effectively rather than stalling as supplies dwindled.   The Central Hubei Operation was driven by an intelligence assessment that Chinese troop movements were signaling preparations for a Nationalist counteroffensive. Acting on that interpretation, the Japanese began tightening plans and positioning forces early in the final days of November 1940. On 23 November 1940, the Japanese 11th Army under Lieutenant General Waichirō Sonobe began organizing for the offensive in central Hubei. In order to conduct a coordinated advance across the Han River, the army arranged its forces into five groups, each tasked with moving in a way that supported the broader pincer-style pressure on Chinese positions. The approach also reflected lessons drawn from the earlier Zaoyang–Yichang campaign earlier in 1940, when Japanese divisions had been able to cross the Han River at multiple points, such as Dangyang, Jiukouzhen, and Shayangzhen—to help secure access toward Yichang and the Yangtze route. Logistics were built around infrastructure the Japanese had already established during prior operations. The Hankou hub supported the 11th Army through arrangements that included munitions storage, medical facilities, and transport coordination. Supplies and reinforcements were moved using truck convoys and river crossings, while forward depots—such as those at Shayangzhen northwest of Hankou—provided additional capacity, including freight handling and field hospitals. Because the area was not secure, these supply points were also guarded against threats from guerrilla activity, which could disrupt communications and threaten personnel and equipment.   Operationally, the offensive used limited artillery and air support, reflecting Japanese constraints and directives aimed at keeping the campaign short and avoiding commitments that could stretch units beyond their logistical reach. Instead of trying to grind down Chinese defenses through prolonged bombardment, the plan prioritized speed, reconnaissance, and focused disruption. Japanese intelligence preparation relied heavily on aerial reconnaissance over the Han River valley to locate Chinese positions and infer where resistance would likely concentrate. That information enabled Japanese units to coordinate select maneuvers, including converging pressure from different directions. Where river transport mattered, coordination with naval or riverine elements supported movement and resupply, with overall oversight connected to the China Expeditionary Army.   Anticipating the coming assault, the Chinese Fifth War Area headquarters acted swiftly on instructions from the National Military Council. Orders were issued to the River West Army Group (30th and 77th Corps), the Right Army Group (44th and 67th Corps), and the Central Army Group (41st and 45th Corps) to employ a flexible defensive strategy: hold key positions firmly while committing the main strength to strike the enemy's outer flanks at the decisive moment. The 59th Corps was directed to advance toward the Xiangfan area, ready to reinforce operations on either bank of the river as the situation developed.   As commander of the Fifth War Area, Li Zongren arranged the defense to meet a likely Japanese thrust along the Han River, particularly in the approaches to Wuhan and Yichang, following the wider stalemate that settled in after the 1938 fall of Wuhan. The Fifth War Area could draw on roughly 300,000 troops, though many units were understrength, and the overall readiness varied by locality. Among the formations Li Zongren placed in the most sensitive sectors was the 31st Army Group under General Tang Enbo, which Japanese planners had identified as a potential threat to Japanese intentions in the region. In keeping with the terrain and the limits on manpower, Li's defensive design relied heavily on natural barriers—most importantly the Han River itself—and on the defensibility of rugged ground. Forces were arrayed to hold or contest riverbank positions, supported by fortifications, trenches, and smaller auxiliary elements. Divisions such as the 44th were positioned with an eye toward slowing an enemy crossing and forcing the Japanese to fight for difficult approaches rather than moving rapidly. At the same time, irregular forces and prepared defensive works were used to complicate Japanese reconnaissance and to make it harder for the attacker to coordinate a clean operational flow. Strategically, Li Zongren leaned on elastic defense rather than attempting to win decisive battles at fixed lines. Regular units were supported by guerrilla-style harassment intended to strike Japanese vulnerabilities, especially supply and transportation, between forward bases and the front. Local operations, including actions coming from areas such as Xinyang, were designed to disrupt Japanese logistics in periods when the Nationalists were still managing shortages of ammunition and medical supplies. Militias in the inter-mountainous regions further reinforced this approach: instead of seeking costly frontal engagements, they concentrated on disruption, delaying movements, and making Japanese operations slower and more expensive.   At dawn on 25 November the Japanese offensive began, with columns advancing along multiple axes. On the western Xiangyang front, more than 1,000 troops from Tangyang and over 3,000 from Jingmen struck Hengdian and Yanzhimiao, shattering the positions of the Chinese 30th Corps. Simultaneously, a column moving from Zhujiafu toward Tunglinling split into several detachments and drove deep northward into Liangshuijing, Xiajiazi, and Kuaihuopu. By nightfall the River West Army Group had regrouped along the line from Hengdian through Yanzhimiao to Kuaihuopu. On 26 November the Japanese reached Xianzhu. The following day they assaulted Liuhouji and Lijiatang in a day-long battle that ended in stalemate. At dusk the 30th Corps launched a powerful counterattack; the 27th and 31st Divisions dispatched raiding parties into the enemy's rear. Unable to withstand the pressure, the Japanese fell back toward Jingmen and Zhongxiang, pursued by Chinese forces that inflicted heavy losses.   Along the Jingmen–Zhongxiang Highway the Japanese massed more than 3,000 troops to attack Changshoutian and Wangjiatian, encircling Changjiachi and Shahetian. The Chinese 149th Division withdrew in good order to the stronger Wangjiahe–Wulongguan line. On 26 November enemy strength grew to 4,000–5,000. One column advanced on Sanligang while the main body assaulted Peizhai, Wangjiahe, and Yunanmen. Fighting continued until dark without decisive result. On 27 November the main force of the 44th Corps counterattacked from Wangjiahe, converging with the 67th Corps advancing from the northwest. The coordinated assault inflicted severe casualties, yet the Japanese continued to fight stubbornly. On the Suixian front, more than 2,000 Japanese troops reached Liangshuikou on the morning of 25 November and launched a violent attack against the 123rd Division at Lishan. Two additional columns, each exceeding 1,000 men, pushed westward toward Hoyuantian and Qingmingpu; their numbers swelled steadily as darkness fell. On 26 November fierce combat raged against the 124th and 127th Divisions at Jinjishan and Qingmingpu. A separate force of 700–800 men advanced from Xihe via Langhetian to Tangjiafan. After clashing with the 41st Corps, the Japanese near Qingmingpu linked up with those at Jinjishan and moved toward Hoyuantian on 27 November. That night the detachment at Tangjiafan reached the vicinity of Huantan Zhen, confronting the 125th Division. Recognizing that the enemy had become dangerously dispersed, the War Area Command ordered its units to hold critical localities while the main forces exploited the mountainous terrain for ambushes. The tactic proved effective. Heavy fighting continued until 28 November, when the Japanese, unable to achieve their objectives, began a general withdrawal. Chinese forces west of Xiangyang immediately took up the pursuit. The enemy opposing the Right Army Group was routed and retreated along several routes. In the Suixian sector, Japanese units at Hoyuantian and Huantan Zhen were caught in converging attacks by the Central Army Group, driven back to high ground, and encircled. In a desperate attempt to relieve the trapped forces, the Japanese rushed 1,500–1,600 infantry and cavalry troops from Suixian and Yingshan through Shangshitian and Shatian in a flanking maneuver—only to be ambushed once more. Covered by aircraft and armor, the enemy withdrew toward Suixian and Xihe as Chinese troops pressed forward along the line from Chunchuan to Anchu, Lishan, and Gaocheng. By 30 November all Chinese Army Groups had restored their original positions.   The Central Hubei Operation produced uneven battlefield outcomes, particularly in reported casualties. Japanese accounts describe relatively limited losses, just 132 killed and 445 wounded attributed to advantages in air superiority, artillery, and armored support, even though the advance was complicated by difficult terrain. At the same time, Japanese forces faced persistent Chinese counterattacks along the Han River, which contributed to localized pressure and eventual withdrawal. The Japanese reported 6,439 Chinese killed  and 474 captured, but the evidence base is uncertain and the language of reporting suggests possible exaggeration or propaganda. Conversely, Chinese-era estimates reportedly placed Japanese losses at roughly 5,000 killed and 7,000–8,000 wounded, illustrating a substantial gap between competing narratives. Some alternate reconstructions suggest total Chinese casualties in the range of 20,000–30,000, depending on whether wounded and missing personnel are included. However, because wartime reporting was fragmented and inconsistent, there is no fully verifiable casualty ledger for all units involved.   Despite these tolls, the operation did not appear to achieve a decisive Chinese destruction of Japan's intended target force. The Chinese Fifth War Area, including elements associated with the 31st Army Group under Tang Enbo, suffered attrition but generally avoided annihilation. No major command-level losses are indicated in the surviving accounts, and unit formations were not described as collapsing permanently. On the material side, Japan reportedly seized rifles and supplies from positions that Chinese forces had encircled or abandoned in the short term, but overall equipment losses for either side were described as limited, consistent with the operation's restricted intensity.    Strategically, the operation offered Japan short-term tactical advantages—notably through localized envelopments and the temporary pressure of combined-arms support—but it failed to translate these gains into a sustained strategic result. The fighting also strained Japanese logistics in central China, especially given that the offensive was not followed by major reinforcements. At the same time, it exposed continuing vulnerabilities in rugged terrain where Chinese guerrilla activity and organized counteraction could offset superior firepower.   Ultimately, the Central Hubei Operation produced no net territorial gains. By the end of the week, Japanese troops had returned to positions that did not fundamentally alter control in central Hubei. Local clashes may have disturbed formations and disrupted movement temporarily, but the campaign did not create durable forward bases, did not change administrative control meaningfully, and did not permanently disrupt key supply corridors. The territorial status quo largely persisted: Chinese Fifth War Area forces maintained positions north of the Yangtze River, and there was no widespread abandonment of strongholds sufficient to indicate a strategic collapse.   In the months following the Japanese repulse in central Hubei in November 1940, enemy forces remained largely immobilized across the Jing-Xiang plains, their earlier ambitions checked by determined Chinese resistance. Seeking to regain momentum and draw Chinese strength away from other theaters, the Japanese high command prepared a massive offensive into southern Henan in late January 1941. By the end of the month they had concentrated an imposing array of seven infantry divisions, one independent cavalry brigade, three independent armored regiments, and one independent artillery regiment. In all, more than 150,000 infantrymen, over 8,000 cavalry, 550 artillery pieces, 300 tanks, and 200 armored cars stood ready. Over a hundred aircraft were massed at forward bases in Anyang, Xinxiang, Huaiyang, and Xinyang. From early January onward, ammunition and equipment had been laboriously shipped up the Yangtze and moved inland to Xinyang, while Japanese reconnaissance planes repeatedly overflew Chinese rear areas. Additional troops were concentrated in southern Henan itself.   On 20 January, as a preliminary move to pin down Chinese forces and facilitate the main effort in central Henan, the Japanese 18th Independent Mixed Brigade, together with elements of the 39th and 4th Divisions, launched a limited attack against the Chinese 29th and 33rd Army Groups. The principal assault, however, began on 24 January under the overall command of Lieutenant General Katsuichiro Enbu. The Japanese organized their southern Henan forces into three powerful columns: The Left Flank Force, built around the entire 3rd Division reinforced by the 8th Regiment of the 4th Division and the Mizuno Armored Unit, commanded by Lieutenant General Fusataro Hanjima of the 3rd Division. The Central Force, centered on the 17th Division (less one regiment) and strengthened by the 67th Regiment of the 15th Division and the Yoshimatsu Armored Unit, commanded by Lieutenant General Amaya of the 40th Division. The Right Flank Force, formed around the main body of the 40th Division, also under Lieutenant General Amaya.   In support of this main thrust, Japanese forces in northern Anhui and eastern Henan—principally the 4th Cavalry Brigade with the Hirabayashi Tank Regiment—advanced westward from Haozhou toward Woyang. The Ouda Regiment of the 21st Division pushed west from Suzhou, while the Uguchi and Kobayashi Regiments of the 35th Division, accompanied by engineer, cavalry, artillery, and tank units, moved from Kaifeng, Tongxu, and Zhuxian Zhen along the north bank of the Yellow River and through the flooded areas toward Zhengzhou. These supporting columns were intended to tie down Chinese reserves and prevent reinforcement of the southern front.   The National Military Council in Chongqing correctly assessed the enemy's intention: to drive north along the Beiping-Hankou Railway with their main strength, force a decisive battle against the Chinese field armies, and rely on the northern Anhui–eastern Henan forces to strike westward in coordination. Accordingly, the Council instructed the Fifth War Area to avoid a costly frontal engagement. Instead, a small portion of its troops would offer delaying resistance along the railway, while the main force would maneuver to the enemy's flanks and rear, severing communications and launching devastating counterattacks. In compliance, the Fifth War Area left only a single division near Xiping on the Beiping-Hankou line. The bulk of its strength—carefully concealed in depth on both sides of the enemy's expected axis of advance—remained highly mobile, ready to strike the Japanese flanks or rear the moment the enemy divided his forces or pushed toward Runan, Yancheng, or Wuyang. This elastic strategy proved decisive.   At dawn on 25 January the Japanese southern Henan forces advanced in three columns. The Left Flank Force moved along the line from Xiaolindian to Gucheng and Chashan. The Central Force struck northward from the Minggang area. The Right Flank Force crossed the Huai River between Huaijiao Zhen and Chengyang under heavy air support. Japanese planes bombed Chinese positions relentlessly. True to plan, Chinese units employed only light screening forces to harass the enemy with ambushes and flank attacks, preserving their main strength for the decisive moment.   By 26 January the Japanese had reached the line from Piyang to Gaoyi, Xingtian, and Queshan. On the 27th they pressed on to Chunshui, Shahetian, and Zhumadian. At this point Chinese mobile forces sprang into action. The 13th Corps of the 31st Army Group swung northward toward Xiangheguan, while the main body of the 85th Corps moved toward Shangcai to begin an enveloping maneuver. The 68th Corps of the 11th Army Group struck the enemy rear south of Xiangheguan; the 55th Corps advanced from Tanghe to Piyang; and the 59th Corps of the 33rd Army Group pushed toward Nanyang. On 29 January the 13th Corps attacked the Japanese Left Flank Force near Jieguanting and Xiaoshidian south of Wuyang, while the 85th Corps struck the Right Flank Force around Runan, southeast of Shangcai. The enemy's Central Force, advancing along and west of the railway, found the Chinese positions already evacuated and failed to trap any major units. The Japanese columns on the extreme flanks suffered over 3,000 casualties and lost six tanks in the fighting around Jieguanting.   By 31 January the enemy, desperate to rescue his exposed flank columns, reordered his forces. The Central Force executed turning movements on both sides: elements of the 15th Division swung right from Suiping through Shangcai to converge with troops moving north from Runan against the 85th Corps, while the main body of the 17th Division split into two columns and advanced from Suiping through Xiping toward Wuyang. Simultaneously, the main force of the 3rd Division and part of the 4th Division also converged on Wuyang, hoping to link with the 17th Division and crush the 13th Corps near Jieguanting and Xiaoshidian. Before the trap could close, however, the Chinese 13th and 85th Corps withdrew in good order to the area north of Ye Xian, between Yancheng and Shangshui, and north of the Sha River. When the Japanese broke through at Wuyang and Shangcai they found no major Chinese forces to destroy.   Meanwhile, Chinese troops from western Henan, the 59th, 55th, and 68th Corps, advanced from Tanghe, Piyang, and points north to strike the enemy rear at Wuyang. On 29 January the 84th Corps and local guerrillas in western Anhui recaptured Chengyang and continued the pursuit. The Japanese, having failed to concentrate superior strength or control the battlefield, now found themselves isolated. Their rear communications were severed, and they were under constant pressure from the 68th, 55th, and 59th Corps. After days of exhausting combat the enemy began to withdraw southward on the night of 2 February. Leaving only rear guards at Wuyang and Baoanzhai to tie down the 13th Corps, the main body of the 3rd Division moved from Fangcheng toward Nanyang and Zhenping. The 13th Corps immediately counterattacked, recaptured Baoanzhai and Wuyang, and pursued the enemy toward Fangcheng.   On the night of 2 February, as the Japanese main force approached Nanyang, the 17th Division together with elements of the 15th and 4th Divisions had already pushed south from Wuyang via Xiangheguan toward Piyang, hoping to link with forces moving east from Nanyang and trap the Chinese 68th, 55th, and 29th Corps. Fierce resistance by the 68th Corps near Xiangheguan inflicted heavy losses and forced the enemy to abandon large quantities of supplies. Further south, the 29th Corps exacted still greater casualties around Piyang. On the night of 7 February the trapped Japanese column split: part retreated along the Tanghe–Piyang highway, while the main body withdrew along the Tongbo–Xinyang highway toward Xinyang, leaving many dead behind. The Chinese 85th Corps pursued southeastward, while elements of the 13th, 29th, 55th, and 59th Corps harried the enemy toward Xinyang. By the time the fighting ended, all Chinese units had regained their original positions.   In coordination with the southern Henan offensive, the Japanese forces in northern Anhui and eastern Henan advanced westward in four columns on the morning of 25 January. The Ouda Regiment of the 21st Division struck west from Suzhou. The 4th Cavalry Brigade, reinforced by the Hirabayashi Tank Regiment, split into three routes from Bozhou to attack Woyang, Shanheji, and Shuangqiao, clashing bitterly with a Chinese cavalry division near Shizihe and Niqiuji. The Uguchi Regiment of the 35th Division advanced through the flooded areas from Tongxu and Zhuxian Zhen, while the Kobayashi Regiment moved westward along the north bank of the Yellow River near Zhengzhou. Japanese aircraft intensified their bombing of Chinese cities and front-line positions, including Zhoujiakou, Zhengzhou, Yancheng, Ye Xian, Xiangcheng, Wuyang, and Luoyang. On 29 January one enemy column reached Santaiji and suffered heavy losses under Chinese attack. Threatened on the left by forces near Huaiyang, two Chinese corps withdrew temporarily to the line from Fuyang to Taihe and Jieshou. On 5 February the Japanese captured Taihe and Jieshou, but a Chinese counterattack on the morning of 6 February regained both towns, forcing the enemy to retreat northeastward.   The Battle of Southern Henan, which opened on 25 January and concluded on 10 February after seventeen days of continuous fighting, ended in a clear Chinese victory. Japanese casualties exceeded 9,000; when the enemy withdrew from Nanyang more than 300 military vehicles were left burning on the battlefield. Large quantities of arms, ammunition, and supplies fell into Chinese hands. Chinese losses were significantly lighter. The enemy had hoped to force a decisive battle along the railway and shatter the Chinese armies of the Fifth War Area. Instead, skillful Chinese maneuver, timely flank attacks, and relentless pressure on the enemy's rear and communications had turned the Japanese offensive into a costly failure. The victory not only preserved the integrity of the central Chinese front but also demonstrated once again the effectiveness of elastic defense and mobile counteroffensive tactics against a numerically superior but overextended foe.   In the wake of their costly repulse in central Hubei the previous November and the even more humiliating defeat in Southern Henan between late January and early February 1941, the Japanese sought once more to regain the initiative in the spring of 1941. Their target was western Hubei, where Chinese forces continued to deny them freedom of movement along the middle Yangtze. The entire Japanese 13th Division garrisoned the Yichang salient. Its regiments were deployed in a defensive arc: the 65th Regiment and the 19th Artillery Regiment held positions east of the city at Longchuanpu, Tumenya, and Yaqueling; the 104th Regiment guarded the northwest approaches; and the 17th Cavalry Regiment patrolled the Yangchalu–Baishanao sector. On the west bank of the Yangtze, the 58th Regiment had constructed strong bridgehead fortifications between Chaojialing and Shangwulongkou, ready to support any renewed thrust westward.   Facing this entrenched enemy was the Chinese 26th Corps, entrusted with the critical mission of river defense on the west bank of the Yangtze opposite Yichang. The corps commander had organized his forces into three sectors. The 41st Division held the right zone, anchoring its line from Mujiatian and Tanjiataizi northward to the vicinity of Fanjiah u. The 32nd Division defended the left zone, stretching from Mujiatian through Ceyang to Xiangzikou. The 44th Division remained in corps reserve near Caojiafan, poised to reinforce either flank or exploit opportunities for counterattack.   On 6 March 1941 the Japanese struck. Having quietly reinforced their forces west of Yichang to more than three regiments, supported by cavalry and artillery, they opened the assault at 5:30 a.m. with a violent artillery barrage, followed immediately by infantry advances under cover of air strikes. Chinese security positions at Tanjiataizi and Chaojiadian were overrun. The enemy then hurled itself against the main line at Changgangling. Simultaneously, 600 to 700 Japanese troops, backed by planes and guns, assaulted Fanjiah u. After hours of bitter fighting both localities fell. On the morning of 7 March, Japanese aircraft again spearheaded the attack, enabling the capture of positions at Qianjiatai and Wujiaba. The enemy pressed on toward Qianjiachong and Yutaishan but was thrown back. Meanwhile, the force that had taken Fanjiah u clashed fiercely with the Chinese 44th Division around Taipingqiao; although the division was eventually compelled to withdraw to the eastern end of the bridge under relentless air attack, it continued to resist stubbornly. When the enemy seized Hut zeye from the direction of Fanjiah u, the 32nd Division fell back in good order to the line from Tunziqiao to Tuyanzhong, where it beat off further assaults. By this stage the Japanese had driven themselves into a dangerously narrow salient, exposed on both flanks.   Seizing the moment, the River Defense Force reorganized its lines. The 103rd Division of the 8th Corps relieved the sector from Mujiatang through Yingzishan to Chaotianguan, while the 26th Corps consolidated new positions at Yutaishan, Pijiashan, Qingshuiba, Guangongling, and Xiaopingshanba. The plan was clear: hold the enemy east of this line, then launch a converging counterstroke to destroy the invaders and restore the original front. On 8 March two guerrilla columns from the 41st Division struck at Changgangling and Fanjiayuan, while another detachment hit the enemy east of Pifengjian. More than 2,000 Japanese troops assaulted the 44th Division's positions from Gaolingpo and Dajiaobian toward Wanghuzizhong; determined resistance by the 44th Division, supported by elements of the 41st, brought the attack to a standstill. Later that day the enemy managed to penetrate the 32nd Division's line at Tianwangshi, forcing Chinese troops to fight a delaying action along the outskirts of the Shibai Fortress from Mingjiachong to Heitangou.   Dawn on 9 March brought renewed Chinese initiative. The 103rd Division occupied the line from Tutiling to Shizinao and advanced in several columns against the enemy. A portion of the 44th Division waged a grim holding action on the high ground flanking Guojiaba, suffering heavy losses but buying time for the main body to launch a powerful flank attack against the Japanese at Taipingqiao and Xianglingkou. By dusk Chinese forces had captured the enemy strongpoints at Dujiaoba and Dajiaobian along the highway, annihilating numerous enemy troops. The 32nd Division threw its main strength against the area northwest of Dajiaobian; heavy fighting raged around Wanghuzizhong into the afternoon until enemy reinforcements were driven off. The 41st Division, meanwhile, executed effective flank attacks that yielded significant gains. On 10 March the 103rd Division recaptured the high ground at Xiawulongkou and north of Tianzipo, while guerrillas of the 41st Division continued to harass the enemy through every gap in his lines. When positions at Hongshipo and Lungtanping held by the 44th Division were breached, the division withdrew to the western heights of Bomuping and faced the enemy anew.   At dawn on 11 March, after suffering severe casualties, the Japanese resorted to smoke screens and began withdrawing eastward along several routes. Chinese pursuit forces swiftly retook Xianglingkou, Guojiaba, Guangongling, Tianwangshi, and Dajiaobian. By 12 March the enemy had fallen back to a defensive line running from east of Taipingqiao to Hu z'ai and Huangnikeng. On 13 March Chinese units launched general counterattacks. Unable to withstand the pressure, the Japanese retreated to their original positions. The eight-day engagement thus ended exactly where it had begun.   The battle had been fought with only a portion of the available Chinese forces, yet it proved decisive. The Japanese, who had hoped to crack the river defenses and resume their westward drive, instead suffered 4,000 to 5,000 casualties. The swift and skillful Chinese counteroffensive not only restored the front but left the enemy shaken and apprehensive. Their design to push deeper into western Hubei was decisively thwarted, buying precious time for the broader Chinese war effort in the Yangtze theater and demonstrating once again that determined defense, timely reinforcement, and aggressive counteraction could blunt even the most carefully prepared Japanese offensive. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In November 1940, a Central Hubei Operation using five task forces attempted to exploit Chinese dispersal but achieved no territorial gains despite local successes. A larger January 1941 offensive into southern Henan deployed 150,000+ troops but again failed strategically. Despite Japanese tactical advantages and superior firepower, logistical constraints and rugged terrain favored mobile Chinese resistance. Both campaigns ended with Japanese withdrawals and restored Chinese positions, demonstrating that determined defense and timely counteraction could blunt large-scale Japanese operations.

Direction la Chine où vient d'être déployé le tout premier robot humanoïde domestique dopé à l'intelligence artificielle.On est très loin du simple aspirateur automatiqueIl s'appelle SeeLight S1, et il est conçu par l'entreprise GigaAI.Et croyez-moi, on est très loin du simple aspirateur automatique. Loin de la robotique industrielle, où la machine répète inlassablement le même mouvement dans un environnement sous cloche, le SeeLight S1 casse ce paradigme grâce à ce que le fabricant appelle l'IA incarnée.Concrètement, le robot est équipé d'un modèle d'intelligence artificielle nommé GigaBrain 1, qui agit comme un véritable cerveau.Et il ne suit pas un script préétabli.Il analyse la tâche, comprend son environnement direct et planifie lui-même la trajectoire de ses bras pour accomplir des missions complexes, comme cuisiner, plier du linge ou faire un lit.Bref, les modèles d'IA passent de la simple génération de texte à la prise de décision physique en milieu instable.Mais attention, la technologie ne suffit pas, il faut un modèle économique.Une stratégie d'acquisition par la donnéeEt c'est notre deuxième point.Comment vendre un robot qui coûte aujourd'hui près de vingt-huit mille euros l'unité ?GigaAI a choisi une stratégie d'acquisition par la donnée. En clair, l'entreprise va déployer gratuitement une centaine de ces robots dans des appartements pour des tests en conditions réelles.L'objectif n'est pas de faire du chiffre d'affaires immédiat, mais d'acheter de la donnée d'usage.Oui car les environnements domestiques sont chaotiques, avec des enfants, des animaux, des obstacles imprévus.En plaçant ces machines gratuitement chez des utilisateurs cibles, GigaAI récupère des millions de points de données pour entraîner son modèle face aux imprévus, tout en bâtissant la confiance du grand public.Maîtriser toute la chaîne de valeurEnfin, le troisième levier est éminemment stratégique et industriel.Derrière ce lancement, c'est toute une région chinoise qui se positionne. La province du Hubei a mis en place un fonds d'investissement de plus d'un milliard d'euros dédié à l'industrie de la robotique humanoïde.La volonté est évidemment de maîtriser toute la chaîne de valeur, du capteur logiciel aux moteurs physiques. Et cette intégration verticale agressive a un but très précis. GigaAI prévoit d'ouvrir sa propre usine dès la fin de l'année pour diviser par deux le coût de fabrication de son robot avant l'été prochain.Le ZD Tech est sur toutes les plateformes de podcast ! Abonnez-vous !Hébergé par Ausha. Visitez ausha.co/politique-de-confidentialite pour plus d'informations.

Folge 129: Wir haben die beste Folge hochgeladen, was ist Omnisexuell, wie viel können wir aus Videospielen lernen, warum Huebi Glatzen liebt und Zeo sein Stiefvater wird.

Smartphone manufacturer OPPO said on Monday it had imposed strict penalties on senior executives responsible for its China market, including Senior Vice-President Duan Yaohui, following backlash over a controversial Mother's Day marketing campaign, and issued a fresh apology acknowledging "serious shortcomings" in its values and judgment.智能手机厂商 OPPO 于周一表示，因母亲节争议营销活动引发舆论反弹，公司已对中国市场相关高管处以严厉处分，其中包括高级副总裁段要辉，并再次发布致歉声明，承认在价值观与判断力方面存在 “严重缺失”。The controversy stems from a promotional campaign released on Friday that drew criticism online for a line suggesting a mother had "two husbands" — her actual husband and the other her celebrity idol, whom she sees only twice a year but dresses up to meet.此次争议源于 OPPO 周五发布的一则营销宣传内容，文案中有一句表述称一位母亲拥有 “两个丈夫”，一位是现实中的丈夫，另一位是明星偶像，这位母亲一年仅能见偶像两次，却仍会精心打扮前去赴约，该内容在网络上引发批评。Some netizens said the phrasing was inappropriate and misleading, while others defended it as a form of internet humor.部分网友认为该文案措辞不当、存在误导性，也有网友认为这只是一种网络玩梗幽默，对此表示理解。OPPO had issued an initial apology on Friday and removed the materials, saying the campaign was intended to portray more diverse and multidimensional images of modern mothers, who may enjoy running marathons, engaging in literary creation and following their favorite celebrities.OPPO 已于上周五率先发布致歉声明并下架相关宣传物料，称该营销初衷是想展现现代母亲多元立体的形象，当代母亲也可以热爱马拉松、进行文学创作以及追星。In its latest statement, the company said both the offensive nature of the campaign and its initially perfunctory response exposed a lack of respect for mainstream values.OPPO 在最新声明中表示，此次营销内容引发公众反感，加之初期回应态度敷衍，暴露出企业对主流价值观缺乏敬畏与尊重。It admitted that in chasing online traffic, it had "lost its original intention" on a holiday meant to celebrate maternal affection, and failed to respond to early public criticism in a sincere and open manner.公司承认，为追逐网络流量，在本应致敬母爱的节日里 “迷失初心”，且未能以真诚坦诚的态度及时回应公众前期的质疑与批评。The company said it will launch a comprehensive internal review and restructure its content review process to ensure adherence to widely accepted social norms.OPPO 表示将开展全面内部自查整改，重构内容审核流程，确保宣传内容恪守社会公序良俗。On Sunday afternoon, the School of Chinese Language and Literature at Wuhan University in Hubei province, said in a statement posted on its official Sina Weibo account that it was "shocked" by the campaign, which was created by a team led by a former student surnamed Yu.上周日下午，武汉大学文学院通过官方新浪微博发布声明，对此次争议营销文案表示 “深感震惊”，该文案由本校一名余姓校友带领团队创作。The school said Yu was known for "upright thinking" during her studies and had once been praised for helping an elderly passenger on a bus. However, it said the Mother's Day copy produced by the team "seriously contradicts" the school's longstanding educational principles.校方称，该余姓校友在校期间思想正直，还曾因公交车上帮扶老人受到表彰，但其团队创作的这则母亲节文案，严重违背了学校一贯的育人理念。"We strongly disagree with the content, especially the use of sensational wordplay, exaggerated language and the values conveyed," the statement said, urging the alumnus to face public criticism sincerely and, together with the company, take responsibility.声明指出：“我们坚决不认同该文案内容，尤其不认同其博取眼球的文字玩梗、夸张表述以及传递的价值导向”，并呼吁该校友正视公众批评，与涉事企业一同承担责任。In a separate post, Wuhan University said it "does not agree at all" with the advertisement's wording and value orientation, calling it inconsistent with the institution's emphasis on moral education.武汉大学另行发文表示，完全不认同该广告的文案措辞与价值导向，认为其与学校立德树人、重视德育教育的理念相悖。Also on Sunday, the China Advertising Association warned against a growing tendency among some brands to seek attention using controversial or lowbrow content, urging companies to distinguish between genuine innovation and "hype" that crosses ethical boundaries.同样在周日，中国广告协会发文警示，当下部分品牌热衷靠争议化、低俗化内容博眼球的风气愈演愈烈，呼吁企业分清真正的创意创新与突破伦理底线的恶意炒作。"Creativity can be novel, but it must not violate traditional family values," the association said.中国广告协会表示：创意可以新颖独特，但绝不能违背传统家庭价值观。China Women's News also said that while creative marketing is encouraged, it must not cross ethical boundaries or deviate from widely shared social values.《中国妇女报》也发文表示，鼓励营销创意创新，但不能逾越伦理底线、背离社会主流共识价值观。It noted that the use of fan culture slang — in which admirers refer to celebrities as "husband" — ignored differences in meaning across contexts and risked offending public perceptions of motherhood, adding that innovation should be grounded in respect and responsibility.文章指出，文案套用饭圈将明星称作 “老公” 的网络俚语，忽视了语境语义差异，容易冒犯大众对母亲身份的传统认知；同时强调，营销创新必须建立在尊重与责任的基础之上。backlash /ˈbæklæʃ/n. 强烈反对；舆论反弹controversial /ˌkɒntrəˈvɜːʃl/adj. 有争议的；引发争论的perfunctory /pəˈfʌŋktəri/adj. 敷衍的；例行公事的lowbrow /ˈləʊbraʊ/adj. 低俗的；庸俗的

Last time we spoke about the battle Yaoyi. Japan pushed hard into Hubei with a plan: surround the main Chinese forces and seize Yichang, hoping to use it to strike at Chongqing. At first, the fighting was chaotic and punishing. The Chinese side tried to hold the line and disrupt the advance, and they even managed setbacks for the Japanese, pushing back, retaking key ground, and hitting supply and positioning weaknesses. But victory came with a cost: commanders were lost, and every gain was hard-won. Still, the battle didn't unfold as a clean Chinese retreat or a simple Japanese win. As Japanese units shifted and tested for openings, the Chinese forces adjusted—delaying, regrouping, and fighting to keep their formations from being completely trapped. Eventually, Japan managed to break through at critical moments, especially through crossings and maneuvers that the Chinese had not fully sealed off. In the end, Japan succeeded in taking Yichang, but it didn't achieve the decisive annihilation it wanted.    #201 The New Fourth Army Incident and the Strained United Front Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. After the catastrophe of the early 1930s, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) entered the war against Japan in a political mood that was both hopeful and wary: it wanted to be seen as a genuine national leader of resistance, yet it also feared being absorbed—or destroyed—by the Guomindang (KMT) state it had spent years battling. That tension became the organizing principle of the war's early years. The turning point came from the Xi'an Incident in December 1936, which forced a new calculation in Nationalist politics. In the months that followed, agreements between KMT and CCP representatives were publicly proclaimed in August and September 1937, after the Shanghai fighting began. Under these arrangements, the CCP accepted constraints that in peacetime would have looked like surrender: it pledged to strive for Sun Yixian's "Three People's Principles," to end its former policies of armed revolt and sovietization, to abolish the soviet government, and to discontinue both the term "Red Army" and the expectation that its forces would operate outside central control. Communist troops would be treated as part of the national military under KMT command, and the revolution's old administrative structures were to be formally dismantled. In return, the KMT offered the CCP something just as important: space to exist publicly and politically. Liaison offices were permitted in key cities; the CCP was allowed to publish the New China Daily; and it could nominate representatives to KMT advisory bodies. Civil rights were extended—political prisoners were released—and subsidies were established to help cover administrative and military expenses in "reintegrated" areas and territories. The war thus transformed the tactical reality on the ground: the CCP could not treat the KMT as an immediate enemy, but it also could not afford to become politically passive. It had to learn how to fight Japan while building legitimacy fast enough to survive the next phase. In the first year and a half, the Party Center focused on three problems that kept returning in different forms: how the "united front" would be defined—especially what the CCP's relationship to the National government should be; how to coordinate military strategy and tactics with Nationalist units without losing control of its own operations; and how leadership should be consolidated, particularly for Mao Zedong in a party that still contained rival centers of authority. These disputes mattered not just for doctrine but for survival, because the CCP's autonomy was constantly being tested by the very alliance that was supposed to protect it. Mao's own approach to the united front combined cooperation with a refusal to surrender independence. Publicly, the CCP praised Jiang Jieshi and the KMT and promised unity, but it did so in language that was deliberately broad. In private (and in internal party debates), Mao treated unity as conditional: the CCP must not split the united front, but it also must not be "bound hand and foot." The strategic idea that emerged was political initiative under constraints—fighting when it could plausibly claim justification, keeping enough restraint that the CCP would not appear self-interested or anti-national, and deciding for itself when to engage and when to withdraw. This balance was reinforced through military reorganization. In August–September 1937, CCP forces were reorganized as the Eighth Route Army (8RA), with roughly 30,000 men drawn from Long March survivors, local forces, and new recruits. The 8RA was divided into three divisions: the 115th, 120th, and 129th, commanded by Lin Biao, He Long, and Liu Bocheng respectively. Shortly after the war began, the National government also authorized a second major Communist force: the New Fourth Army (N4A), to operate in central China. Its core came from those left behind when the Long March began in 1934—small groups surviving in difficult conditions against continuing KMT pressure. Officially authorized at 12,000, it took months to reach that strength. Nominally commanded by Ye Ting, actual military and political control rested with Xiang Ying and Chen Yi. From the start, then, the CCP's wartime "integration" with the National system coexisted with a clear effort to preserve internal control. Ideologically, the CCP worked to make its revolutionary program compatible—at least in appearance—with a national resistance coalition. On the New Democracy demonstrated how this strategy operated on two levels. In KMT-controlled spaces, its language could be read as aligning with liberal-democratic expectations: public participation, multi-party governance, legally protected civil rights. But in CCP-controlled areas, the same text could carry sharper class-based and authoritarian implications. The Party wanted a united front that broadened support without becoming committed to Nationalist limits on how society itself might be reorganized after victory. Meanwhile, even as the rhetoric of unity rose, the CCP worried about something more dangerous than military setbacks: the possibility that the KMT might accommodate Japan. Late 1939 and early 1940 made this fear harder to dismiss. Japan pursued collaboration with Wang Jingwei, culminating in the establishment of a "reorganized" government at Nanjing in March 1940. At the same time, Japanese intermediaries sought approaches to Chiang Kai-shek himself—an effort that the CCP tracked closely as a sign that peace negotiations might be possible even when battlefield conditions looked grim. Propaganda was involved, but the anxiety was real: if Japan and the Nationalists reached an arrangement, the CCP's whole wartime legitimacy-building effort could collapse overnight. As a result, the united front was interpreted inside the CCP not as a permanent coalition with the KMT, but as a flexible strategy with a cardinal purpose: to prevent peace between Japan and the Nationalists. Mao's position on the united front reflected this. For him, the alliance was meant to suspend the possibility of a China–Japan settlement, not to end the CCP's separate identity. The CCP could participate in a reconstituted national framework—possibly even a "democratic republic"—to gain legality and influence, but it should remain politically and, where possible, physically separate from the KMT. By 1939, however, the practical meaning of "flexibility" collided with reality. What had seemed, to some observers, like an unusually cordial entente began to fade. The KMT Central Committee adopted measures early in 1939 aimed at restricting Communist expansion, and armed clashes increased through the summer and continued into autumn and winter—especially around North China Communist bases. The period of rising conflict was later labeled by the CCP as the "first anti-Communist upsurge" (roughly spanning December 1939 into March 1940), but the crucial point was that both sides viewed each confrontation as a test of legal rights, moral legitimacy, and control over territory. Strategically, the CCP understood the KMT's effort as an attempt to check unauthorized growth of Communist armed power and to recover areas where influence had already slipped away—either to the Communists or, by indirect effect, to Japan. The KMT emphasized its traditional legal authority; the CCP countered with its claim to an "evolutionary" moral right to challenge the government's legitimacy. In practice, the conflict took the form of increasingly systematic military pressure, including a blockade around the Shen–Gan–Ning region. By this point, the blockade involved large numbers of troops (on the order of hundreds of thousands), halting Communist expansion and disrupting direct contact with other Communist forces farther afield, even as fighting flared along border zones and around vulnerable points in the Communist defensive perimeter. So, by the edge of the "middle years," the wartime alliance had not broken into open civil war—but it had also stopped being secure. The united front survived, yet it operated under strain: its language of cooperation continued, while "friction" between partners hardened into a central feature of the resistance struggle. Transition into the war's second phase began in early 1939, shaped by the stalemate Mao had already anticipated at the sixth plenum in late 1938. Mao argued that during this prolonged "new stage" the forces of resistance—above all, Communist-led forces—would strengthen. The overall result, however, was mixed. In Shandong and Central China, new Communist bases did take shape. But across much of North China, Japanese consolidation cost the resistance heavily in manpower and population. Base-area economies suffered serious strain, and the peasantry endured hardships more severe than at any earlier point. This stalemate had two main dimensions. The first was the growing resentment of the Nationalists toward Communist expansion—resentment made especially sharp by their own losses. As the Nationalists were driven out of regions that had previously provided them their greatest wealth and power in the central and lower Yangtze basin, they also lost the "cream" of their armies. In contrast, the CCP was spreading through the wider countryside behind Japanese lines, extending its influence and winning broader popular support. The second dimension was Japan's desire—and need—to consolidate territories it had only nominally conquered and to extract economic value from them. After all, the logic of the "China Incident" was to draw on China's labor and resources to strengthen Japan, not to bleed Japan's gains away by draining wealth into China's vast interior. A Japanese colonel, lamenting the situation, captured the frustration of this drift into deeper entanglement: he regretted that Japan had not ended the "China Incident" once its initial objectives were reached. Instead, Japan was drawn into the hinterland and became bogged down in endless attrition—leaving it with little more than "real estate" rather than the popular support it believed it would secure from those it claimed to "liberate." To improve their position, Japanese authorities—still fragmented by internal rivalry—pursued several strategies. One was a new peace offensive aimed simultaneously at Jiang Jieshi, alongside efforts to establish a "reformed" Nationalist government under Wang Jingwei, who had fled Chongqing in December 1938. Japan also recruited more collaborators and puppet officials. Finally, it carried out forceful military, political, and economic measures intended to establish effective territorial control and eliminate opposition. During the middle years of the war, the Communists described their conflicts with the Nationalists using the euphemism "friction". By 1939, what many observers—possibly incorrectly—had viewed as an unusually warm alliance began to break down. In early 1939, the KMT Central Committee adopted measures meant to restrict the CCP. From the summer onward, military clashes began and continued into autumn and winter with increasing frequency and intensity, most of them concentrated around and within the North China base areas. The Communists later labeled the period from December 1939 to March 1940 the "first anti-Communist upsurge." Naturally, each side accused the other of aggression and claimed self-defense against unjust attacks. Strategically, though, the North China "upsurge" functioned as a Nationalist attempt to limit the CCP's expansion beyond the areas assigned to it and to regain influence in regions the Communists—or the Japanese—had already taken from the KMT. Jiang Jieshi framed the matter as a defense of legal rights grounded in tradition, while the Communists asserted an "evolutionary" right to challenge the moral legitimacy of those legal claims. During 1939, the Nationalists began to blockade Shen–Gan–Ning around its southern and western perimeter. Within a year, this blockade grew to nearly 400,000 troops, including some of the last remaining Central Army units under the command of Hu Zongnan. The blockade stopped further Communist expansion, especially into Gansu and Suiyuan, and severed direct contact between SKN and Communists operating in Xinjiang (Chinese Turkestan) adjacent to Soviet Central Asia. The Xinjiang Communists—including Mao Zedong's brother—were eliminated in 1942. Meanwhile, fierce fighting erupted along the Gansu–Shaanxi border and in the north-eastern corner of SKN near the Great Wall at Suide, as the blockading forces probed for weak points. Elements of He Long's 120th Division were even pulled back from the Jin–Sui base across the Yellow River to strengthen SKN's regular defenses. Economically, the blockade was even more damaging. During 1939, central government subsidies to the Border Region budget were cut off. Trade between the Border Region and other parts of China nearly stopped, a devastating blow to a region unable to supply itself with many basic commodities. At the same time, Nationalist and regional forces also attempted to expand their military and administrative authority into Hebei, Shanxi, Henan, and Shandong—areas the CCP now considered its base zones. In resisting these efforts, the CCP predictable accused its rivals of harming resistance work and damaging the people's interests. The "experts in dissension" were said to cooperate with the Japanese and their puppets. Based on increasing collaboration by regional units with Japan, the CCP implied that this was a deliberate and cynical strategy—described as "crooked-line patriotism"—intended to preserve those units for future anti-Communist operations. Even so, the CCP tried to avoid an open break with the Nationalist regime in Chongqing. In public, it consistently portrayed these clashes as being initiated by local commanders acting beyond orders from higher authority—despite knowing this depiction was false. Jiang Jieshi, unable to refute the claim outright, effectively permitted it to serve as the justification for a firm Communist response. Mao Zedong outlined the general resistance policy as "justification, expedience, and restraint". The CCP was to fight when it could claim justification and when it could gain advantage, but not to press attacks beyond what the Nationalists would tolerate or in ways that could damage its image as selfless patriots. Communist forces were expected to keep initiative as much as possible in their own hands—deciding when to engage, whether to engage, and when to disengage. The most striking episode of the "first anti-Communist upsurge" was the rupture with Yan Xishan in December 1939. Tensions in Shanxi had been rising throughout the summer and autumn, as Yan and his conservative supporters—associated with the "Old Army"—linked the Sacrifice League and the Dare-to-die Corps of the "New Army" with Communist forces. When base areas and Japanese occupation eventually took over much of his province, Yan was forced into exile at Qiulin across the Yellow River in Shaanxi. In November, Yan ordered his Old Army to disarm the Dare-to-die forces with help from central units dispatched by Hu Zongnan. In the bloody fighting that followed, these elements gradually broke free of even nominal provincial control and fully completed their connection with Communist forces. More than 30,000 people went over to the Communists. One KMT intelligence agent described the process with bitterness and a sense of inevitability: the Communists were first "full of sweet words," flattery, and distortions designed to open things up and conceal their actions. But once they had fully entrenched themselves, and once the low-level base had been established, they turned and bit. The agent suggested they had suspected things might end this way, but were not aware how quickly events would move—or that it could happen precisely while Communist calls for "united front" and "maintenance of unity for resistance" filled the air. About a month later, in February and March 1940, elements of the 8RA beat back this so-called upsurge. Zhang Yinwu's forces were disarmed and dispersed across the plains of north Hebei. To the south, Chu Huaiping and Shi Yusan were pushed out of the base area, as was the KMT-appointed provincial governor Lu Zhonglin. Although some non-Communist forces remained in the region, the CCP's and CCLY bases were never again seriously threatened by forces affiliated with the central government. Reinforcing the CCP's accusations, Shi Yusan was later executed in 1940 by the central government for collaboration with the Japanese. By late 1939, CCP central authorities maintained that the areas where the CCP could expand its armed strength were mainly limited to Shandong and Central China. In those regions, the CCP continued trying to carve out bases where they could operate. The situation in Shandong was complicated. After the Japanese invasion, most Nationalist-affiliated forces stayed in the province, while Communist forces and bases were weaker and more scattered than further west. Only in late 1938 did major 8RA units from the 115th and 129th Divisions—led by Xu Xiangqian and Luo Ronghuan—enter Shandong to link up with the Shandong column and local guerrillas, including survivors of a large band recently decimated by the Japanese. Even with these efforts, Communist actions led to clashes not only with Japanese forces but also with various Nationalist-affiliated groups—groups that were stronger than the Communists at the time. Until late 1940, the CCP's clashes with Nationalist forces in Shandong were actually bloodier than clashes with the Japanese. The CCP understood that its Chinese rivals mistrusted one another, and that their attitudes toward the CCP varied widely. The main Nationalist forces were often not tightly affiliated with Chiang Kai-shek or the central government. Instead, they operated under independent—and at times disgruntled—regional commanders. Communist tactics were expressed through slogans emphasizing ways to win support and isolate hardliners: develop progressive forces and win over fence-sitters while isolating "die-hards"; flatter top echelons, enlist the middle ranks, and hit the rank and file; and win over Yi Xuezhong, isolate Shen Honglie, and eliminate Qin Qirong. Still, unlike other North China base areas, the Communists were unable for several years to neutralize Nationalist forces in Shandong. Even if Japanese mop-up campaigns had not weakened those Nationalists, the text suggests the Communists may still have struggled to do so. By November 1940, Xu Xiangqian claimed meaningful progress while admitting Shandong had not yet become a fully consolidated base. CCP successes were greatest along parts of the Shandong–Hebei border, around the Taishan massif in central Shandong, and near the tip of the peninsula far to the east. Elsewhere, "progressive forces" remained weak. Communist regular troops numbered about 70,000, which was far below the party center's goals of 150,000 regulars and between 1.5 and 2 million self-defense forces. Moreover, systematic economic reforms had barely begun. The CCP relied on familiar practices—confiscations, collections of "national salvation grain," contributions, and loans—alongside a conventional taxation system adjusted to favor poorer peasants. Communist expansion in Central China was even riskier, with a greater likelihood of large-scale conflict with central government forces than in the north. In much of North China, "friction" came primarily from rapid Communist expansion into areas with partial vacuums. In Central China, however, base-building required displacing an existing Nationalist military-administrative presence closely tied to Jiang Kai-shek and the Chongqing government. The burden of this expansion was carried mainly by the 6th Detachment (northern Anhui and Jiangsu) and the 5th Detachment, which was reinforced by 15,000 to 20,000 8RA troops under Huang K'o-ch'eng. As Chen Yi's 1st Detachment crossed from south to north through the corridor provided by Guan Wenwei's local forces, it became actively involved as well. This expansion—driven by increasingly urgent directives from Mao and Liu during the latter part of 1939 and into 1940—brought the N4A north of the river into ever more frequent and sharper clashes with Nationalist authorities in Anhui and Jiangsu, especially with units under Jiangsu governor Han Deqin. South of the river, though, Xiang Ying did not directly challenge Chongqing's commanders. Mao later charged that Xiang Ying may have been influenced by Wang Ming, or else he may simply have seen no realistic alternative. His forces—three detachments plus a headquarters unit—were heavily outnumbered by Qu Chutong's Nationalist units, not to mention Japanese forces and their puppets. Even if Mao insisted bases could be built "anywhere," the Shanghai–Hangzhou–Nanjing triangle was especially difficult terrain. Xiang Ying and his followers had survived with extraordinary tenacity in the mountains of South China between 1934 and 1937, enduring brutal search-and-destroy operations that were not lifted until the war began. It therefore seems unlikely that such survivors would suddenly become "right-wing capitulationists."  Yet by spring 1940, Mao was pressing Xiang Ying more intensely. The Central Committee's message was explicit: expansion was necessary in all cases. It meant reaching into all enemy-occupied areas rather than being bound by the Kuomintang's restrictions—going beyond Kuomintang limits, not waiting for official appointments, not depending on higher-ups for financing, and instead expanding armed forces freely and independently. It also meant setting up base areas without hesitation, independently mobilizing the masses in those areas, and building united front organs of political power under Communist Party leadership. The struggle between Nationalists and Communists involved more than contests for control of territory behind Japanese lines. It also involved national-level politics, ideology, and leadership. One worrying development for the CCP was the campaign throughout 1939 to expand Jiang Kai-shek's prestige and formal power—adding more titles for him across major party, government, and military positions. In early 1939, the Central Executive Committee appointed him "director-general" of the Kuomintang, a title reminiscent of the one previously held by Sun Yat-sen. In addition, during the summer and autumn of 1939 there was talk of constitutional rule. In November, the KMT announced plans to convene a constitutional assembly the following year. If Jiang could fulfill these promises, he and his government could gain new legitimacy and wider popularity. Mao and his colleagues could not allow this to go unchallenged. If the Nationalists were to have a paramount leader and authoritative spokesperson, the CCP needed one as well. The timing of Mao's famous "On the new democracy"—written in late 1939 and published the next January—was therefore no accident. Its substance had been anticipated earlier, but its final timing and full development were shaped by the KMT's constitutional movement. The CCP's entry into this competition served as both a bid for support away from the KMT and a statement of the multi-class united front that the CCP wanted to lead. Although "On the new democracy" was written in a tone that seemed moderate, it persuaded many Chinese readers that the CCP had either diluted its revolutionary objectives or postponed them to a distant future. In Kuomintang-controlled areas, the work could be read through the liberal values associated with Anglo-American democracy—popular participation, multi-party government, legally protected civil rights. In CCP-controlled territories, the same language carried stronger authoritarian, class-based meanings. In internal documents meant for party audiences rather than public consumption, the ambiguity was removed, showing a tough but patient and flexible commitment not only to resistance but also to social control and social change. During this same period, the Communists expressed deep concern about Nationalist capitulation to Japan—not only on the battlefield behind Japanese lines but also at the highest levels. Some of this concern was propaganda, but beneath propaganda lay genuine anxiety. In late 1939 and early 1940, politically aware Chinese already knew that Japan was negotiating with the unpredictable Wang Jingwei, who had fled Chongqing a year earlier. A "reorganized national government" in Nanjing was finally established in March 1940, representing the most formidable collaboration with Japan to date. Less well known, but equally important, was that Japan was also seeking an understanding directly with Jiang Kai-shek through intermediaries in Hong Kong. This effort, called "Operation Kiri"—described as spreading a "feast for Chiang"—combined intrigue with a kind of dark comedy. Reports suggested Chiang's reported interest in peace could have been a stratagem designed to discredit Wang Jingwei by keeping him waiting. But even if Chiang had no intention of coming to terms with Japan, the Communists could not be sure what the outcome would be until after the multi-pronged peace offensive had failed. By the middle of 1940, China had never been so isolated. In Europe, the "phony war" ended in the spring when Germany launched a blitz across the Low Countries. France fell soon after, and England appeared likely to be next. Japan used this moment to press China to sever its last tenuous connections to the outside world: cutting the Burma Road, trade with neutral Hong Kong, and the rail link running from Hanoi to Kunming. At the same time, Russia was engaged in a difficult and embarrassing war with Finland and reduced military aid to the Nationalists. The United States was only gradually moving away from isolationism and clearly regarded England as more important than China. In Chongqing and elsewhere in "Free China," signs of war weariness, despair, and demoralization were visible. Under these circumstances, Mao's insistence on aggressive expansion was a calculated risk—either it would deter any Japanese advance, or it would place the Communists in the strongest possible position in case a split between the KMT and the CCP became unavoidable. In Central China, the size and pace of the fighting kept increasing, starting in the final months of 1939. One flashpoint was the clash between Luo Pinghui's 5th Detachment and units of Han Deqin's Jiangsu force near Lake Gaoyou. In the following months, Guan Wenwei's forces ranged along the left bank of the Yangtze, repeatedly running into Luo's troops as they operated farther north. Luo also began receiving some 8RA reinforcements, moving them south through areas controlled by the 6th Detachment. Clearly, a major showdown was taking shape across north and central Jiangsu. At the same time, the South Yangtze Command was doing poorly. Nationalist commanders Leng Xin and Qu Chutong restricted its activities so severely that Mao and Liu gradually abandoned the idea of building a unified, consolidated base in that region. During late spring and early summer, Chen Yi moved most of his 1st and 2nd Detachments north of the Yangtze. In September, the 3rd Detachment followed suit, crossing the river into the area around Lake Chaohu, where the 4th Detachment was already stationed. After these moves, only the Headquarters Detachment—under Ye Ting and Xiang Ying—remained south of the Yangtze, positioned at Qingxian in southern Anhui. As the military situation edged toward an open confrontation, negotiations began in June 1940 between representatives of the KMT and the CCP. The core issues were Communist operating zones and the authorized strength of the armies led by the CCP. Proposals were exchanged, followed by equally sharp and hostile counter-proposals, but no agreement was reached. The KMT viewed it as a concession to permit the CCP "free rein" north of the pre-1938 course of the Yellow River, with the exception of southern Shanxi, which was to remain under the influence of Yan Xishan. In exchange, the KMT demanded that all 8RA and N4A units evacuate Central China. In effect, the KMT was offering the CCP something it was already prepared to allow, in return for the CCP giving up what it might soon be able to obtain by force of arms. Nationalist authorities then issued a set of deadlines, but without clearly stating what would happen if those deadlines were violated. On the surface, the CCP appeared to be complying in part. The movements of Chen Yi and the South Yangtze Command could look like obedience, but in reality they were responses to orders coming from their own superior leadership rather than instructions issued by the Nationalists. Even so, Xiang Ying's continued delays and evasions during the autumn and winter of 1940 remained puzzling. One possibility is that he felt—quite reasonably—that Mao had already lost confidence in him and that once he crossed to the north bank of the river he would lose his command. Another complication was that directives from Yan'an were sometimes ambiguous and even contradictory. He may also have been trying to reach secure understandings with KMT commanders about evacuation routes and guaranteed safe conduct out of the area. For a period, Han Teqin kept most of his forces—estimated at about 70,000 men, far outnumbering the N4A—in north Jiangsu, thereby blocking the expansion of the 6th Detachment and slowing further southern intrusions by 8RA troops. But by mid-summer he realized he would have to counter the N4A build-up in central Jiangsu, or else risk writing that region off to the Communists. A confusing sequence of engagements then unfolded, culminating in a decisive battle in early October 1940 near the central Jiangsu town of Huangjiao. Over the course of four days, several of Han's main-force units belonging to the 89th Army were destroyed, while others were scattered. That battle also served as a signal for the 6th Detachment to advance more aggressively in the north. In the aftermath, one of Han's principal commanders entered collaboration with the CCP, while another defected to the Nanjing government under Wang Jingwei. Although Han Teqin managed to maintain a foothold in Jiangsu until 1943, his real power had been broken. Relatively little attention was paid to the battle of Huangjiao in the Chinese press. The KMT did not want to publicize what it considered a disastrous defeat, while the Communists were satisfied to stay silent about an episode that conflicted with their proclaimed policy of a united front. As could be expected, during the autumn—after Han Teqin's defeat—KMT-CCP negotiations deteriorated further. In early December, Jiang Kai-shek personally ordered that all N4A forces withdraw from southern Anhui and southern Jiangsu by 31 December. He also ordered that the entire 8RA be positioned north of the Yellow River by the same deadline, followed one month later by the N4A. Discussions then followed between Ye Ting and Qu Chutong's deputies concerning the route to be taken, safe conduct, and—astonishingly—the money and supplies that were to be provided to the N4A to help it move. On 25 December, Mao Zedong ordered Xiang Ying to begin evacuating immediately. Yet it was not until 4 January 1941 that Ye and Xiang actually started moving. Almost immediately, Qu Chutong's forces harassed and dispersed the N4A Headquarters Group, which included administrative personnel, wounded soldiers and dependents, as well as combat-ready troops. In an attempt to reorganize, they moved southwest toward Maolin, where they were surrounded by Nationalists and, over the next several days, were cut to pieces. Losses were heavy on both sides. The CCP suffered an estimated 9,000 casualties. Xiang Ying tried twice to break out of the blockade on his own, but failed. He was then denounced as a deserter by Ye Ting, who took over full command of the doomed forces. Xiang Ying eventually escaped, but he was killed a couple of months later by one of his own bodyguards, motivated by the N4A gold reserves that he had taken with him. Up to the very end, Xiang either failed or refused to seek refuge in Liu Shaoqi's domain north of the Yangtze. The unfortunate Ye Ting was arrested and spent the rest of the war in prison. He was finally released in 1946, only to die one month later in a plane crash, along with several other high-ranking party members. On 17 January, Jiang Kai-shek declared that the New Fourth Army was dissolved for insubordination. Direct contacts between Yan'an and Chongqing nearly came to an end, and CCP military liaison offices in several cities held by the Nationalists were closed. This is what became known as the New Fourth Army incident, also referred to as the South Anhui incident. Clearly, it functioned as an act of retaliation for the defeats suffered by Han Teqin in north and central Jiangsu. It ended any realistic prospect of establishing a consolidated Communist base south of the Yangtze. Still, from a strategic perspective, these losses were ultimately more than offset by the gains achieved farther north. In fact, only a few months later, the reorganized N4A quietly began reintroducing some units into this region, where they carried out guerrilla activities without possessing a secure territorial base. Unlike the relative silence surrounding the fighting at Huangjiao, the New Fourth Army incident sparked bitter, prolonged controversy. The CCP argued that it was a second "anti-Communist upsurge," even more serious than the first. Presenting themselves as martyred patriots, they depicted their opponents as people who wanted to end the War of Resistance through what they called "Sino-Japanese cooperation" aimed at "suppressing the Communists." In their account, the Nationalists wanted to replace the war of resistance with civil war, substitute capitulation for independence, trade unity for a split, and replace light with darkness. People were telling each other the news and were horrified. Indeed, they claimed that the situation had never been as critical as it was at that moment. The Nationalist response, of course, was that provocations had been numerous and serious, and that violations of military discipline could not be tolerated. But the KMT's unwillingness to describe in detail its own defeats at the CCP's hands left it speaking in broad generalities. In the propaganda battle, the CCP clearly gained the better position and won more political capital. If it was politically valuable to be regarded as a national hero, it was even more valuable to be seen as a national martyr.  Many Chinese—and some outside—observers were genuinely alarmed and feared that civil war might openly resume. Yet, with a few exceptions, the events that culminated in the New Fourth Army incident have generally been interpreted as marking the breakdown of the second united front. That interpretation, however, is described as being wrong in two respects. First, the CCP understood the united front not as a narrow arrangement limited to a few major partners, but as a strategy that could be applied flexibly to all political, military, and social forces in China—from the highest levels of the central government down to the smallest village. Relations with Jiang Jieshi and the Guomindang regime mattered, but they did not, by themselves, constitute the whole of the united front. Even regarding Jiang and the Nationalists specifically, the common reading is said to be misguided. Throughout the war, a cardinal objective of the united front was to prevent peace between Japan and the Nationalists. Therefore, if clashes between CCP forces and those of the central government on such a large scale as at Huangjiao and Maolin could occur without leading to peace with Japan and without triggering a full-scale resumption of civil war, then this should not be understood as the end of the united front—it should be seen as its fundamental vindication. If friction at that scale could nevertheless be tolerated by Jiang Jieshi, then fears about his future accommodation with Japan were greatly reduced. Following the New Fourth Army incident, the CCP reorganized its political and military presence in Central China. The Central Plains and South-east China Bureaus were merged and renamed the Central China Bureau, with Liu Shaoqi placed in charge, reflecting the area's importance to Party Central. The New Fourth Army was also reorganized completely and substantially regularized. Chen Yi became its new acting commander, since Ye Ting was imprisoned. He directed the force, now divided into seven divisions. Each division had territorial responsibilities, and in each region the CCP claimed the establishment of a base. Indeed, base construction proceeded in earnest only after the friction of 1940 and the New Fourth Army incident. In the years that followed, the operating areas of the First through Fourth Divisions contained expanding enclaves of consolidated territory, where military dominance was joined with open party work: administrative control, the development of mass organizations, local elections, and socio-economic reforms. The other three areas fluctuated between semi-consolidated and guerrilla status. With the incident, the worst phase of the KMT-CCP conflict was now over. When CCP documents later speak of a third upsurge in 1943, they refer to something openly political. With the exception of Shandong—where a fairly strong Nationalist presence persisted for a longer time—the overall balance of power among Chinese forces behind Japanese lines had shifted in favor of the CCP by mid-1941. In subsequent years the CCP's predominance became even more pronounced, until by the end of 1943 the Communists were virtually beyond challenge by Chinese rivals.   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. After the CCP and KMT entered the united front, cooperation felt conditional from the start. Mao pushed the New Fourth Army to reorganize and preserve Communist autonomy, even as the 1937 agreements publicly pledged obedience to KMT leadership. In 1939–40 the Communists worried that Chiang might negotiate peace with Japan; so they expanded bases and military presence, triggering repeated clashes. The pressure intensified when KMT orders forced the New Fourth Army to evacuate south Anhui in late 1940. 

The school spring break merging with the five-day May Day holiday this year prompted many vacationers to trade whirlwind "special forces-style" travel for immersive, multiday stays in single destinations.今年，学生春假与五天“五一”假期叠加，促使许多游客放弃“特种兵式旅游”式的走马观花，转向在一个目的地进行沉浸式、多日停留的深度游。Special forces-style travel refers to a travel trend wherein multiple attractions are covered in a short time through tightly scheduled, high-intensity itineraries. The trend, which has been around for the past few years, is particularly popular among young people.“特种兵式旅游”指的是通过紧凑、高强度的行程安排，在短时间内游览多个景点的旅游趋势。这一趋势已流行数年，在年轻人中尤为盛行。Data from multiple online travel platforms showed the rise of the "depth stay" phenomenon during this year's May Day holiday, from Friday to Tuesday, with travelers spending more time in one place to soak in the local culture and way of life.多家在线旅游平台数据显示，“五一”假期期间（5月1日至5月5日），“深度停留”现象有所上升，游客在单地停留更长时间，以沉浸体验当地文化与生活方式。According to a report from major online lifestyle platform Meituan, 75 percent of advance hotel bookings made for this year's holiday duration were for tourism and leisure. Bookings for homestays of seven days or longer increased by over 40 percent year-on-year. Self-driving tours grew by over 50 percent year-on-year, while medium — to long-term car rentals of four to seven days rose 13 percent.根据大型生活服务平台美团发布的一份报告，在今年“五一”假期期间，75%的酒店提前预订订单为旅游休闲用途，7天及以上民宿预订量同比增长超过40%，自驾游同比增长超过50%，4至7天的中长期租车订单增长13%。A report from online travel platform Fliggy showed that searches for immersive, in-depth domestic travel activities during the May Day holiday — such as river tracing, fruit picking and mountain hiking — increased 130 percent from a year earlier.在线旅游平台飞猪发布的一份报告显示，“五一”期间，溯溪、水果采摘、登山等沉浸式深度国内游活动的搜索量同比增长了130%。A travel consumption review by the online platform Tuniu revealed that bookings by travelers combining the spring break with the May Day holiday increased by more than 50 percent year-on-year, with self-driving tour users doubling and independent travelers rising by over 100 percent.在线平台途牛发布的一份旅游消费盘点显示，将春假与“五一”假期合并出行的游客预订量同比增长超过50%，其中自驾游用户数量翻倍，自由行游客数量增长超过100%。Data from travel platform Qunar indicated a broader peak pattern. Rather than a single rush from May 1 to 5, hotel bookings in popular cities increased by 15 percent during the three days before and after the holiday (April 28-30 and May 6-8), which extended the travel window. This helped ease congestion at major scenic spots and transportation hubs.旅行平台去哪儿网的数据显示，出行高峰分布更为广泛。热门城市的酒店预订量在假日前三天（4月28日至30日）和假日后三天（5月6日至8日）增长了15%，分散了5月1日至5日单点高峰的客流压力，延长了出行窗口期，这有助于缓解大型景区和交通枢纽的拥堵。Rao Yufei, 19, spent five days in Luoyang, Henan province. She visited the Luoyang Museum, the White Horse Temple and the Longmen Grottoes, sampled local delicacies at a night market and booked a hanfu photo shoot in the ancient city of Luoyi.19岁的饶宇飞在河南省洛阳市停留了五天。她游览了洛阳博物馆、白马寺和龙门石窟，在夜市品尝了当地美食，并在洛邑古城预约了一套汉服写真。"Too many stops are exhausting. Luoyang has a rich history, and every site tells a story. Rushing through would mean missing the real joy of a cultural city," said Rao.“跑太多地方太累了。洛阳历史底蕴深厚，每一处古迹都有它的故事，走马观花会错过一座文化城市真正的韵味，”，饶宇飞说。She scheduled just one attraction in the morning and one in the afternoon, allowing ample time for queues and immersive experiences. She reserved five hours for the hanfu shoot and was thrilled with the result.她安排上午只逛一个景点，下午也只逛一个，为排队和深度体验留出充足时间。她为汉服拍摄预留了五个小时，对成片效果感到非常满意。Yang Lingzi, an office worker from Beijing, traveled with her son and two other families to Wuhan, the capital of Hubei province, for a five-day stay. The group visited the Hubei Provincial Museum, East Lake, shopping streets and Huazhong University of Science and Technology.来自北京的上班族杨凌梓与儿子及另外两个家庭一同前往湖北省省会武汉，进行了为期五天的旅行。他们参观了湖北省博物馆、东湖、商业街和华中科技大学。"Staying in one city felt more relaxing. The nightlife in Wuhan was lively, with great food," she said. "We wanted a break from Beijing and to experience a different city's vibe. No rushed traveling style — just unwinding for a few days."“在一个城市待着更放松。武汉的夜生活很热闹，美食也很多，”她说。“我们想从北京的生活中抽离出来，体验一下不同城市的氛围。不赶行程，就是放松几天。”Lyu Ning, dean of Beijing International Studies University's School of Tourism Sciences, said that the introduction of spring breaks for students and the increased use of paid annual leave by parents represent a positive policy experiment.北京第二外国语学院旅游科学学院院长吕宁表示，为学生引入春假制度以及家长更多使用带薪年假，是一次积极的政策尝试。It effectively staggered passenger flows and relieved congestion during the May Day peak, she said, adding that the policy promoted diverse family tourism consumption and helped smaller cities, counties and rural destinations attract more visitors.她说，这一政策有效错开了客流高峰，缓解了“五一”假期的拥堵，也促进了家庭旅游消费的多元化，帮助中小城市、县城和乡村旅游目的地吸引了更多游客。whirlwind /ˈwɜːlwɪnd/旋风式的，匆忙的immersive /ɪˈmɜːsɪv/沉浸式的soak in /səʊk ɪn/沉浸于，感受ample time /ˈæmpəl taɪm/充足的时间staggered /ˈstæɡəd/错开的

Last time we spoke about the battle of West Suiyuan. The Ma Clique, Muslim warlords controlling Northwest China, led by Ma Hongkui and Ma Hongbin, rebuffed Japanese overtures to ally, citing historical grievances like the 1900 invasion. Driven by patriotism, they aligned with the Nationalists, reorganizing forces into the 17th Army Group. In 1938, Ma Hongbin commanded West Suiyuan defenses, building fortifications in harsh desert and mountain terrain, blending cavalry tactics with modern training despite equipment shortages. In January 1940, Japanese and puppet troops advanced from Baotou, occupying Wuyuan and Linhe. Chinese forces, including Fu Zuoyi's 35th Army and Ma's 81st Army, employed guerrilla and mobile warfare. A major counterattack in March recaptured Wuyuan, killing Lt. Gen. Mizukawa and thousands, forcing Japanese retreat. Through ambushes and night raids, the Chinese recovered territories, securing Soviet aid routes and the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia region. Over 2,000 Ningxia soldiers perished, their sacrifices underscoring peripheral fronts' role in national resistance.   #200 The battle of Yaoyi Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. After capturing Wuhan, the Japanese army had already stretched itself dangerously thin. Most regular and Class A reserve divisions were committed to the front, yet they failed to annihilate the main Chinese force. Despite losing its core industrial and resource regions, the Nationalist government in Chongqing refused Japan's peace terms. Japan now found itself trapped in the very protracted war it had desperately sought to avoid. The logical Japanese response was to halt major advances, consolidate control over occupied areas, and conduct limited offensives to pressure Chiang Kai-shek into negotiations—essentially repeating the post-Nanjing strategy of late 1937. But the situation had deteriorated sharply: occupied territory had at least doubled, Japanese garrisons were inadequate, and strategic reserves were nearly exhausted. What might have been prudent a year earlier had become plainly unwise by late 1938.   To stabilize the front, Japan reorganized its China Expeditionary Army at the end of 1938. Large numbers of newly raised independent mixed brigades and lower-quality Class B reserve divisions were sent to relieve veteran regular and Class A divisions. The relieved units were either demobilized back to Japan or shifted north to reinforce the Kwantung Army against the Soviet threat.   By early 1940 Japan maintained roughly 24 divisions, 21 independent mixed brigades, and 2 cavalry brigades in China proper (excluding Manchuria), totaling nearly 800,000 ground troops. The enormous scale and expense strained the home economy severely. Even so, the vast occupied zones could not be effectively controlled: divisions often held only a single mobile battalion while dispersing the rest into scattered platoon- and squad-sized outposts. Guerrilla activity by both Nationalist and Communist forces not only persisted but intensified, occasionally clashing with each other in "friction" incidents.   Beyond mere occupation, Japan sought to wear down Chinese strength. With most elite Central Army units held in reserve in the southwest or around Wuhan, Japanese local offensives targeted the Fifth and Ninth War Zones, aiming to methodically destroy Chiang's best troops. Thus, while other Japanese armies focused on garrison relief and brigade substitution, the 11th Army—still holding Wuhan with seven divisions and three brigades—remained the main offensive instrument. In 1939 it captured Nanchang, then mounted major operations against the Fifth War Zone (Suizao Campaign) and Ninth War Zone (First Battle of Changsha). Except for the seizure of Nanchang, however, these offensives inflicted only limited and temporary damage on Chinese forces.   Japan's domestic economy was in even worse shape. In early 1937, it had approved a massive 2.4 billion yen naval and army rebuilding program aimed at countering the United States and Russia, but implementation had barely started when the Sino-Japanese War erupted. The conflict generated enormous war costs while military expansion continued unabated, rapidly draining the Bank of Japan's gold reserves. By the end of 1938, those reserves (valued at just 1.35 billion yen) had shrunk by more than two-thirds. To fund the Battle of Wuhan that year, Japan postponed key elements of the rebuilding plan. After Wuhan fell, the Army revised its wartime reorganization: the original target of forty divisions grew to fifty-five by early 1938, then to sixty-five divisions plus 164 Army Air Force squadrons by 1942. The funding required to equip and stockpile for this expansion escalated steadily; the 1939 expansion budget alone demanded 1.8 billion yen, pushing Japanese finances to the breaking point.   Japan repeatedly sought a way out of China, but its peace terms remained far beyond what Chongqing would accept, leaving negotiations stalled. Efforts to install puppet regimes in North and Central China—culminating in the Wang Jingwei government in 1940—aimed to "use Chinese to control Chinese" and undermine Nationalist influence, yet produced disappointing results.   The 11th Army's 1939 campaigns yielded only mediocre outcomes, hampered by chronic troop shortages. Even its divisions were tied down in occupation duties; mounting a serious offensive required pulling garrison forces, leaving no reserves to hold the line unless new units arrived. Sustained large-scale operations to seriously weaken Chinese strength demanded a major troop increase—otherwise, Japan was limited to shallow, localized attacks. Lt. Gen. Yasuji Okamura, commanding the 11th Army, recognized this clearly. In a December 1939 report, he argued that diplomacy and small offensives were futile and urged a large-scale operation backed by substantial reinforcements. His superiors, however, were preoccupied with funding the broader military buildup and could offer no extra men. The post-Wuhan "defensiveization" of operations was largely a cost-saving measure to support that expansion. Japanese ground strength in China, which peaked near 850,000 after Wuhan, had already dropped by about 50,000. Full-strength regular or Class A divisions numbered roughly 22,000 men (four regiments), while newer garrison divisions had only about 15,000 (three regiments), and independent mixed brigades just 6,000. Okamura's proposal was sensible but politically impossible; high command was even contemplating slashing China troop levels to 400,000.   The Chinese Winter Offensive of December 1939, together with counterattacks at Nanning and Kunlun Pass, inflicted serious losses and exposed the limited damage done to Chinese forces in 1939 operations. The recapture of Wuyuan in March 1940 signaled the start of a new phase. Shortly afterward, intensified Chinese guerrilla raids deep into Japanese rear areas prompted large Japanese "mop-up" operations in southern Shanxi, central Hubei, southern Jiangxi, and northern Hunan. In the Wuhan sector, repeated blows from the Winter Offensive heightened fears of Chinese forces in the Dahong and Tongbai Mountains, which threatened control over the vital Jianghan Plains rice-producing region. In mid-April 1940, the Japanese abandoned outposts at Macheng (eastern Hubei), Fengxin, and Jing'an (northern Jiangxi), withdrew elements of the 6th Division (northern Hunan), 40th Division (northern Jiangxi), and the 3rd, 13th, and 39th Divisions (Hubei), and concentrated them around Zhongxiang, Suixian, and Xinyang for a maximum-effort push.   These setbacks finally forced Tokyo to abandon deep troop reductions in China and approve reinforcements of two regular divisions for a major 1940 offensive. The revised end-1940 target became 740,000 troops in China. In spring 1940, the 11th Army—backed fully by Imperial General Headquarters and the China Expeditionary Army—began detailed preparations for a large-scale assault on China's Fifth War Zone.   On February 25, 1940, the 11th Army issued its "Guiding Strategy for the Campaign." The operational goal was to defeat the main force of China's Fifth War Zone along both banks of the Han River before the rainy season, inflict further heavy losses on Chiang Kai-shek's army through decisive victory, and thereby advance Japan's overall political and strategic position vis-à-vis China. The guiding principle called for the quickest possible preparations, with the offensive to begin around early May: first destroy Chinese forces on the left (east) bank south of the Baihe River, then completely annihilate the core units on the right (west) bank near Yichang. On April 7, under the new commander Lt. Gen. Sonobe Kazuo (who replaced Okamura Yasuji), the 11th Army produced a more detailed plan. On April 10, Imperial General Headquarters Order No. 426 ("Continental Order") authorized the China Expeditionary Army to conduct operations in central and southern China during May–June, even beyond established boundaries, to fulfill current objectives.   Japanese planners viewed the Fifth War Zone—roughly 50 divisions encircling Wuhan—with its main strength concentrated along the Han (Xiang) River in northwestern Hubei. Striking Yichang would deliver a severe blow to the zone. As the gateway to Sichuan, only 480 km from Chongqing, Yichang held immense strategic value: an inland port, Three Gorges logistics hub, and key base for air raids on Chongqing. Capturing it would directly threaten the Nationalist wartime capital and southwestern rear, advancing political leverage. Still, long-term occupation was not pre-decided; initial plans stressed inflicting maximum damage followed by withdrawal, in line with the post-Wuhan policy of avoiding permanent overextension. China, aware that holding the Jianghan Plain's rice-producing areas enabled sustained attrition against Japan, deployed guerrilla units to harass Japanese rear areas (increasing occupier losses) while tasking the River Defense Force to hold key front-line points: Jingmen, Shashi, and Yichang.   To achieve these aims, the 11th Army committed as much as possible of its seven divisions and four brigades (88 battalions total). Core units included the 3rd Division (Maj. Gen. Yamakoshi Masataka; regiments 6, 18, 34, 68), 13th Division (Maj. Gen. Tanaka Shioichi; 58, 65, 104, 116), 39th Division (Maj. Gen. Murakami Keisaku; 231–233), elements of the 40th Division, detachments from the 33rd and 34th Divisions, and others. Reinforcements comprised the Ikeda Detachment (three battalions from 6th Division), Ishimoto Detachment (four–five from 40th), Ogawa Detachment (two from 34th), and Provisional Mixed Brigade 101. Supporting assets included the 6th Field Heavy Artillery Regiment, 7th and 13th Tank Regiments, 3rd Air Group, Navy 1st China Dispatch Fleet, and 2nd Combined Air Team. The China Expeditionary Army transferred seven battalions from the 15th and 22nd Divisions (13th Army, lower Yangtze). The main effort north of the river involved roughly 48–54 battalions, or 80,000–110,000 men, making the Zaoyi (Zaoyang–Yichang) Campaign the largest Japanese operation on the central front since Wuhan. Sonobe's staff structured the offensive in two phases. Phase One targeted the Fifth War Zone's main force around Zaoyang (east of the Han River) through converging pincer movements: right flank from Xinyang (reinforced 3rd Division), left flank from Zhongxiang (reinforced 13th Division), and central thrust by the reinforced 39th Division from Suixian. The plan exploited terrain—Dahong and Tongbai Mountains—for encirclement. After seizing Minggang (right flank) and advancing from Zhongxiang (left), the pincers would close on Zaoyang, with the center (along the Xianghua Highway from Suixian) drawing Chinese forces into the trap for envelopment. Diversionary attacks south of the Yangtze, propaganda hinting at limited scope, and planted false orders helped mask intentions. Japanese radio intelligence—intercepts and direction-finding of Chinese headquarters signals—provided critical advantages, especially in later stages.   By March 1940, Chinese intelligence had already detected the 11th Army's intent to mount a major offensive from Xinyang and Wuhan into northwestern Hubei. On April 10, Chiang Kai-shek telegraphed Li Zongren and other Fifth War Zone commanders, urging immediate preparations for a preemptive strike against any push toward Shapingba and Yichang. He emphasized proactive flanking attacks on Japanese rear areas via Wusheng Pass and threats to the Pinghan Railway, while keeping main forces east of the Han River for decisive engagement once the enemy committed.   Following Military Commission directives, the Fifth War Zone devised a plan that used part of its strength for forward advances and deep raids into Japanese rear areas to harass and divert. The bulk of forces would hold the rear, seizing chances for preemptive strikes and a decisive battle east of Zaoyang or south of Jingmen–Dangyang. Deployments included: the 33rd Army Group garrisoning the Xiang River; in the center, the 45th Corps (22nd Army Group) west of Luoyangdian–Suixian and the 84th Corps (11th Army Group) north of Suixian–south of Gaocheng; in southern Henan, the 30th Corps east of Tongbai and the 68th Corps north of Pingchangguan–Minggang; the 41st Corps in reserve near Xiangyang; the 29th Army Group (with part garrisoning north of Tongqiao Zhen–Sanyangtien) concentrated in the Dahong Mountains; and the 31st Army Group positioned between Queshan and Ye Hsien as the mobile force to strike invaders. River Defense Army commander Guo Chan controlled the 26th, 75th, and 94th Armies, the 128th Division, and the 6th and 7th Guerrilla Columns. Total Chinese strength approximated 350,000–380,000 men across roughly 50–54 divisions. To mask preparations and mislead, the Japanese conducted a late-April "mop-up" near Jiujiang, staged naval feints on Poyang and Dongting Lakes, and bombed key points in Hunan and Jiangxi, simulating an imminent Ninth War Zone operation.   With forces assembled, the Japanese offensive began May 1, 1940, from Xinyang, Suixian, and Zhongxiang. The advance split into five routes: (1) Changtaiguan–Minggang–Biyang–Tanghe; (2) Xinyang–Tongbai; (3) Suixian–Zaoyang; (4) Suixian–Wujiadien; (5) Zhongxiang–Shuangkou. Employing flanking with central breakthrough, the reinforced 3rd Division (right flank, including Ishimoto Detachment from 40th Division with tanks and engineers) spearheaded from Xinyang toward Biyang, breaching the Chinese Second Army front on day one. By May 1, elements of the 3rd and 40th Divisions captured Minggang, Lion's Bridge, and Xiaolintien; on May 5 they took Biyang and Tongbai. The Chinese 31st Army Group (northeast of Biyang) linked with the 68th and 92nd Corps to hit Japanese flanks and rear. Leaving some forces west of Tongbai to press the enemy, the main 30th Corps struck Japanese flanks. After seizing Tanghe on May 7, the Japanese pushed south toward Zaoyang. On May 8–9, the 31st Army Group retook Tanghe and Xinye, pursuing vigorously. On May 8, the Japanese left flank (13th Division) attacked from Zhongxiang, breaking through the 33rd Army front the same day.   On May 3, the Japanese 13th Division—supported by over 20 tanks, 40 aircraft, artillery, and cavalry—advanced north from Zhongxiang, capturing Changshoudian and Tianjiachi. It seized Fengyao and Changjiachi by May 6. Chinese 33rd Army Group forces used favorable terrain to intercept, while the 29th Army Group struck Japanese flanks and rear at Changjiachi and Wangjiadian, and the 41st Corps fought tenaciously to halt the advance. By May 7, Japanese spearheads reached Changjiachi on the Zaoyang–Xiangyang Highway, with elements entering Shuangkou; their rear cavalry took Xinye on May 8. Fifth War Zone commander Zhang Zizhong personally led attacks along Tianjiachi–Huanglongtang, supported by fierce 29th Army Group assaults on Japanese rear.   The Japanese 39th Division and a 6th Division brigade delayed their assault on the Chinese 11th Army Group until May 4 from Suixian. After overrunning Gaocheng and Anchu on May 5, Chinese forces withdrew to Huantan–Tang Hsien–north of Gaocheng. As the 33rd Army Group faltered, part of the 11th Army Group reinforced it; the 175th Division held at Tang Hsien while the main body fell back toward Zaoyang. During the maneuver, Japanese tanks enveloped at Tang Hsien, cutting the Zaoyang–Xiangyang Highway and forcing bitter fighting by the 174th Division. To break out, Chinese abandoned Zaoyang, using the 173rd Division for rearguard resistance while the bulk shifted west of the Tang and Bai Rivers. Japanese captured Suiyangdian and Wujiadien on May 7, Zaoyang on May 8; the 173rd Division suffered heavy losses, including the death of its commander, Gen. Zhong Yi.   On May 10, Japanese completed an encirclement east of Xiangdong along the Tang and Bai Rivers—but it collapsed as Chinese exterior forces outflanked both Japanese wings and compressed the center, trapping much of the Japanese in the Xiangdong Plains. The Chinese 2nd and 31st Army Groups plus 92nd Corps pressed south, 39th and 75th Corps east, and 33rd and 29th Army Groups north against the pocket. The 94th Corps advanced along the Han–Yichang Highway deep into Jingshan, Zaoshi, Yingcheng, and Yunmeng to sever Japanese rear communications. Meanwhile, the 7th Corps and eastern Hubei guerrillas seized Jigong Shan, Lijiachai, and Liulin station on the Beijing–Hankou Railway. The 92nd and 68th Corps retook Zaoyang, Tongbai, and Minggang, encircling four Japanese divisions in the Xiangdong Plains. By May 11, battered Japanese retreated eastward under pursuit, Chinese flanking and rear attacks leaving many dead on the field. The 31st Army Group recovered Zaoyang on May 16. Chinese reports claimed 45,000 Japanese casualties, plus capture of over 60 guns, 2,000+ horses, 70+ tanks, and 400+ trucks. The 33rd Army Group fought fiercely to intercept retreating columns, driving large Japanese remnants toward Nanguadian.   Tragically, on May 16 noon, Gen. Zhang Zizhong—personally commanding his Guard Battalion and main 74th Division—was killed in action. With pressure eased on the Japanese left, they counterattacked and retook Zaoyang on May 17. Chinese forces withdrew to Xinye on the Tangbai River's west bank and north of the Tang River, regrouping for a renewed counteroffensive.   The Military Commission anticipated a Japanese withdrawal to original lines, likely along the rain-impassable Xianghua Road. Exploiting the enemy's supply shortages, exhaustion, and retreat difficulties, it ordered Fifth War Zone units to encircle and annihilate Japanese forces near the battlefield, then pursue toward Yingcheng–Huayuan. The zone promptly launched a counteroffensive. By nightfall on May 8, Japanese pincers neared junction, having inflicted serious damage on the Chinese 84th Army but achieved little else. Nonetheless, the 11th Army ordered frontline divisions to withdraw to the Tanghe–Baihe line after reaching it, preparatory to encircling Chinese forces west of the Han River. Chongqing issued general offensive orders at 8 PM and 11 PM that night. By then, six divisions of the 31st Army Group advanced south from Nanyang in the north, five from the 33rd Army Group pressed from the south, and five from the 45th and 94th Armies pursued in the southeast—nearly completing the Japanese encirclement. Intense combat erupted.   On May 10, retreating Japanese first clashed with the advancing 33rd Army Group from the south. Seizing the moment, they ordered the 13th and 39th Divisions plus Ikeda Detachment south to smash it, with the 3rd Division covering the northern flank. Full-scale battle broke out on May 12: two Japanese divisions assaulted five Chinese divisions of the 33rd Army Group, plunging them into desperate fighting. Japanese radio intercepts—including telegrams between the Military Commission and Fifth War Zone, plus Zhang Zizhong's report to Chiang on his five divisions' movements—revealed exact positions and plans. Sonobe Kazuo concentrated the 13th and 39th Divisions to strike south along the Han's east bank against Zhang's army group, while ordering the 3rd Division (south of Xinye) back to Zaoyang to guard the rear. Direction-finding had long pinpointed the 33rd Army Group headquarters radio (call signs and bearings) about 10 km northeast of Yicheng. With air support, the Japanese encircled it. On the night of May 15, the 39th Division advanced from Fangjiaji and Nanying toward Nanguadian, completing tactical encirclement by dawn on May 16. Artillery-supported four-sided assaults followed. The defending 74th Division resisted fiercely with repeated counterattacks. Fighting raged into the afternoon, with the Special Service Battalion joining. Japanese attackers swelled to over 5,000, backed by concentrated artillery and 20+ aircraft for a final push. Zhang Zizhong, wounded multiple times, continued commanding calmly until a severe chest wound killed him heroically. The exhausted, isolated 74th Division and battalion suffered devastating losses. That day, the 13th Division also routed the main 33rd Army Group force, breaking the southern encirclement. Japanese then redeployed, concentrating around Zaoyang.   In the north, 17 divisions (including six from the 31st Army Group) attacked the isolated Japanese 3rd Division from east, south, and north, severing its supply lines. With limited ammunition and no resupply, the division faced crisis; its 29th Brigade telegram pleaded: "Enemy fighting spirit extremely high... safe return very difficult; request battalion reinforcements." Yet southern Chinese forces remained undestroyed amid chaos. Japanese choices narrowed to independent 3rd Division retreat or holding for relief. They opted to lure pursuers: ordering the division southeast toward Zaoyang to draw Chinese into pursuit. From May 16–18, the 3rd Division fought a delaying retreat; relentless Chinese pursuit inflicted limited damage due to insufficient firepower, allowing escape. By evening May 18, it reached northeast of Zaoyang and prepared offensives. The 13th and 39th Divisions, after defeating the 33rd Army Group, also advanced north to the Zaoyang line.   The 3rd Division's retreat shortened Japanese lines and hastened convergence. Unsuspecting Chinese pursued to Zaoyang. After a successful counterattack northeast of Yicheng, the 13th and 39th Divisions rejoined the 3rd Division there. On May 19 morning, three Japanese divisions attacked abreast, forcing decisive battle along the Tang River. Chinese divisions collapsed within hours; the 75th Army took heavy losses, others significant casualties. Fifth War Zone ordered hasty retreat. Japanese pursued vigorously. By May 21, the 3rd Division reached Dengxian, 13th east of Laohekou, 39th Fancheng. Early that day, the 39th Division—crossing the Baihe—met fierce west-bank fire, losing Regiment Commander Kanzaki Tetsujiro and over 300 men. That evening, the 11th Army halted pursuit, ending east-bank (Xiang River) fighting. The 20+ day operation east of the Han inflicted heavy Japanese losses, far exceeding the planned duration, leaving troops exhausted. After halting, units withdrew to Zaoyang vicinity for rest and reorganization rather than immediate return to base positions. Commanders debated proceeding to Yichang west of the Han: abandoning the plan would signal Phase One failure, eroding authority and imperial trust. Most argued troop fatigue and casualties should not deter continuation. Over 1,000 tons of supplies rushed forward via six motor companies. Following east-bank termination, Japanese consolidated for the next phase targeting Yichang. Reinforcements arrived: the 4th Division from Manchuria and 18th Independent Brigade from Wuning. The 4th Division assumed Shayang–Zhongxiang positions east of the Xiang River.   The Japanese bombarded the west bank of the Han River for ninety minutes before forcing a crossing at Wangji north of Yicheng. That midnight, the 3rd Division also crossed southeast of Xiangyang. Both met little resistance and completed crossings before dawn. The 11th Army left the 40th Division at Dahongshan for rear-area mopping-up and assigned the Xiaochuan and Cangqiao Detachments to guard mobile supply depots. On May 31 night, the 3rd and 39th Divisions crossed the Xiang River at Yicheng and Oujiamiao. After seizing Xiangyang on June 1 night, the main force split into columns crossing westward. By June 3, Japanese captured Nanzhang and Yicheng. The Chinese 41st Corps fiercely counterattacked, retaking part of Xiangyang while its main body battled around Nanzhang; the 77th Corps also struck hard. On June 4, Chinese recovered Nanzhang, forcing Japanese retreat southward. Meanwhile, the 13th Division and elements of the 6th Division forced a crossing on the Han–Yichang Highway near Jiukou and Shayang to link with southern columns for a joint push. The Chinese River Defense Force shifted its main strength to key positions, using terrain to block southward advances. The 2nd and 31st Army Groups pursued south separately. Chinese abandoned Shayang on June 5; Japanese took Jingmen, Shilipu, and Shihujiao on June 6. The 77th Corps and river defense units resisted stubbornly from Jingmen to Jiangling. After retaking Yicheng, the 2nd Army Group continued pursuit. Japanese concentrated around Jingmen–Shilipu as Jiangling fell.   On June 9 morning, Japanese launched joint air-ground assaults from Dongshi to Dangyang and Yuanan. By afternoon, penetrating the Chinese right flank forced a night withdrawal to Gulaobei–Shuanlianshi–Dangyang along the Zu River to Yuanan. June 10 saw Japanese capture Gulaobei and Dangyang, pushing Chinese to Yichang outskirts. After days of heavy fighting and prohibitive losses, Chinese abandoned Yichang on their own initiative. The 2nd and 31st Army Groups then reached Dangyang north of Jingmen. On June 16, they mounted a general offensive. By June 17, Chinese briefly retook Yichang; the 2nd Army Group linked with the 77th Corps against Dangyang, while the 31st Army Group severed Dangyang–Jingmen communications and assaulted Jingmen violently. South of the Yangtze, the 5th and 32nd Divisions crossed to hit Shayang and Shilipu. By June 18, Japanese main force held stubbornly from Dangyang to the Xiang River with superior equipment. Chinese, fighting on exterior lines, formed an encirclement from Jiangling–Yichang–Dangyang–Zhongxiang–Suixian–north of Xinyang while maintaining surveillance. Thus, the Zaoyi (Zaoyang–Yichang) Campaign ended. No prior decision existed on holding Yichang long-term. Per post-Wuhan Imperial General Headquarters policy, even extended operations aimed only to inflict severe blows and erode Chinese resistance, not expand occupation. On capture day, the 11th Army declared objectives achieved, ordering reorganization, destruction of Yichang military facilities, and dumping irremovable captured supplies into the Yangtze preparatory to withdrawal. At 10 PM June 15, formal orders withdrew to the Han's east bank: 3rd and 39th Divisions first to Dangyang–Jingmen to cover, then the 13th Division. The 13th began retreating from Yichang at midnight June 16, reaching Tumenya (10 km east) by 7 AM June 17. Chinese counterattacked along the route; the 18th Army pursued and retook Yichang morning of June 17. Japanese held Yichang only four days.   Intense debate erupted between frontline commanders and Imperial General Headquarters over retaining Yichang. With Nazi Germany's Western Europe offensive underway—Paris fell June 12, the day Yichang was taken—global upheaval intensified Japanese urgency to resolve China swiftly and free resources for wider competition. Many in high command and China Expeditionary Army argued long-term occupation would threaten Chongqing more directly, aid political maneuvers, and hasten settlement, offering immense strategic value. This swayed the Emperor, who inquired at the June 15 Imperial Conference about securing it. Backed by imperial support, high command ordered temporary retention (one month) on June 16. By transmission through Expeditionary Army and 11th Army channels, the rearguard 13th Division had withdrawn 52 km. With 3rd Division cooperation, it reversed, broke Chinese resistance, and retook Yichang afternoon June 17. On July 1, to offset expanded 11th Army responsibilities, General Headquarters transferred the 4th Division from Kwantung Army (Jiamusi, Heilongjiang) to 11th Army control. July 13 orders confirmed long-term Yichang retention, redefining Wuhan-region operations to Anqing–Xinyang–Yichang–Yueyang–Nanchang. The 11th Army assigned: 13th Division to Yichang, 4th Division to Anlu, 18th Independent Mixed Brigade east/west of Dangyang; remaining units returned to original defenses.   Post-recapture, Chinese continued counterattacks on Yichang and rear lines until ordered to halt: "To adapt to international changes, preserve National Army combat strength, and facilitate reorganization, Fifth War Zone cease attacks on Yichang immediately." A stalemate followed along lines encircling Yichang, Dangyang, Jiangling, Jingmen, Zhongxiang, Suixian, and Xinyang. To shield Chongqing and Sichuan, Nationalists re-established the Sixth War Zone (briefly created post-First Changsha, abolished April 1940), appointing Chen Cheng commander-in-chief with 33rd and 29th Army Groups, River Defense Army, and 18th Army covering western Hubei, western Hunan, eastern Sichuan. The Zaoyi campaign thus concluded. Japanese combat power again proved markedly superior. Official Japanese records (11th Army/China Expeditionary Army) reported 2,700 killed, ~7,800 wounded (total ~10,500; some phases ~1,403 killed/4,639 wounded). Chinese admitted heavy losses: 36,983 killed, 50,509 wounded, 23,000 missing (total >110,000 in some accounts). Wartime Nationalist claims inflated Japanese casualties to 45,000 killed/wounded with major captures (60+ guns, 70+ tanks, 400+ trucks), likely propagandistic; Japanese sources show far lower equipment losses. With 56 battalions deployed, Japanese suffered 12–15% combat casualties; Chinese (54 divisions, ~380,000 men) incurred 25–30% or higher—underscoring firepower/equipment disparity. Japan achieved tactical success by securing Yichang long-term (as a Chongqing bombing base) but failed to annihilate the main Chinese force or compel peace. Chinese resistance thwarted full encirclement and imposed attrition, albeit at crippling cost to the Fifth War Zone—severely weakened and never fully recovering until war's end. Japanese aims were realized to a significant, though not decisive, degree.   The Fifth War Zone's operational plan was fundamentally sound. Chinese intelligence detected Japanese intentions early, accurately predicted the attack axis, and deployed accordingly. The plan included preemptive strikes at Wusheng Pass and the Guangshui section of the Pinghan Railway to harass Japanese rear areas, threaten Wuhan, gather reconnaissance, and disrupt enemy preparations. Though well conceived, these actions never materialized. In the first phase (Xiangdong operations), Chinese forces resisted while shifting the main body to outer lines, securing mobile flanking positions. This frustrated Japanese encirclement efforts in the Xiangdong Plains. Exploiting the enemy's retreat, China launched a timely counteroffensive that encircled the Japanese 3rd Division. Despite breakout support from over 100 aircraft and 200 tanks, the poorly equipped Chinese inflicted heavy casualties during the three-day siege, blunting the division's momentum.    On the southern front, the 33rd Army Group's intercepting deployment was appropriate, but insufficient strength and compromised communications allowed the Japanese 13th and 39th Divisions to counterattack decisively, inflicting major losses and claiming the heroic death of Commander-in-Chief Zhang Zizhong—whose steadfast patriotism remains a lasting source of national pride. Overall, Chinese assessments and deployments in Phase One were largely correct. The battlefield showed China retained initiative and was not wholly dominated by Japanese plans. The core issue was overestimation of Chinese combat power amid severe shortages of heavy weapons. At least three corps suffered heavy attrition, yet Japanese captured only twenty-three mountain/field guns. Relying on manpower for brute force left Chinese units critically undergunned, enabling repeated encirclement attempts but preventing decisive destruction or severe damage to encircled enemies like the 3rd Division.   Phase Two, by contrast, was entirely passive. The initial Japanese Han River crossings were largely feints, yet the west bank received scant attention in overall planning—leaving Yichang virtually undefended as main forces deployed east of the river. Post-Phase One, Japan reinforced the 11th Army with three infantry battalions and one mountain artillery battalion from the 13th Army (lower Yangtze), plus six motor transport companies rushing massive supplies forward. Chinese intelligence missed these moves, remaining complacent in expectation of Japanese withdrawal eastward. After regrouping, Japan abruptly pivoted west with rapid advances. The Military Commission and Fifth War Zone, caught unprepared, made frantic, chaotic adjustments that failed to mount effective defense. The loss of strategically vital Yichang was inevitable, complicating the resistance both militarily and psychologically. This stemmed directly from command misjudgment of Japanese strategic and operational aims. Had plans anticipated a westward thrust and retained strong reserves—or detected the 10-day regrouping window to readjust deployments—China could have retained greater initiative, inflicted more damage, and reduced its own losses.   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Japan's 11th Army launched an offensive in Hubei to encircle Chinese forces in the Fifth War Zone and seize Yichang for bombing Chongqing. Chinese troops countered effectively, encircling Japanese divisions and inflicting heavy losses, though General Zhang Zizhong was killed in action. After intense fighting east of the Han River, Japanese crossed west, captured Yichang, briefly withdrew, then retook and held it long-term. 

Tourists shift focus to local destinations as uncertainty looms for outbound trips出境游不确定性隐现，游客目光转向国内目的地Rising jet fuel costs and uncertainty over international air routes are driving a shift from outbound to domestic travel, with Chinese tourism platforms predicting that this year's Labor Day holiday is expected to see a surge in domestic tourism.航空燃油价格上涨、国际航线前景不明，正促使游客从出境游转向国内游。多家国内旅游平台预测，今年五一劳动节假期将迎来国内旅游热潮。The Labor Day public holiday in China this year is a five-day break from May 1 to 5.今年中国劳动节假期为5月1日至5日，共5天。Data from online travel agency Qunar showed that bookings for long-haul trips to domestic destinations over 800 kilometers away have increased more than 30 percent year-on-year, while hotel reservations in popular third-tier and smaller cities have doubled.在线旅游平台去哪儿的数据显示，800公里以上的国内长线游预订量同比增长超30%，而热门三四线及小城市的酒店预订量翻了一番。According to a report by the online travel platform Tuniu, bookings for domestic package tours during the Labor Day holiday increased 10 percent year-on-year, with self-drive tour bookings surging over 50 percent and free independent travel bookings rising nearly 20 percent.途牛旅游网发布的报告显示，五一假期国内跟团游预订量同比增长10%，自驾游预订量增幅超50%，自由行预订量增长近20%。As overseas travel becomes less predictable, many Chinese tourists are opting for more relaxed, immersive domestic experiences. Among emerging trends is "lie-flat travel" — low-key, quality stays in smaller cities, often in star hotels that cost a fraction of those in first-tier cities.随着出境游不确定性增多，不少中国游客开始选择更悠闲、更具沉浸感的国内体验。其中，“躺平式旅行”成为新趋势——在小城市享受低调而高品质的住宿，往往入住星级酒店，花费仅为一线城市的零头。For example, an office worker surnamed Qi from Wuhan, the capital of Hubei province, chose Jiayu, a small county in Hubei, about an hour's drive from her home. "Deciding to travel to my doorstep made me feel relaxed," she said. "I booked a very nice hotel for only a third of the price in a first-tier city, saving me 1,000 yuan ($146)."例如，来自湖北武汉的上班族齐女士选择了距家约一小时车程的湖北嘉鱼县。她说：“决定到家门口旅行让我感到格外放松。我订了一家很不错的酒店，价格只有一线城市的三分之一，一下子省了1000元（约合146美元）。”Another traveler, Lyu Qing, a Beijing resident who used to take her child abroad every holiday, opted this time for Luzhou, a lesser-known city in Sichuan province. "Flights to Europe are too expensive without stopovers in the Middle East, and routes to Southeast Asia are uncertain," she said. "So I chose a small domestic city — fewer crowds, cheaper and more reliable."另一位游客吕青家住北京，以往每个假期都会带孩子出境游玩，这次则选择了不那么知名的四川泸州。她说：“飞欧洲的机票不经停中东就太贵了，东南亚航线又充满不确定性。所以我选了个国内小城，人少、便宜，也更靠谱。”Qunar data showed that hotel bookings in destinations such as Ding'an in Hainan province surged 8.7 times year-on-year, while Luzhou in Sichuan saw a fivefold increase and Zhongshan in Guangdong province a fourfold rise. The average price of luxury hotels in popular small cities is more than 40 percent lower than in first-tier cities such as Beijing and Shanghai, with some county-level luxury hotels charging as little as 300 yuan per night during the holiday peak period.去哪儿数据显示，海南定安等目的地的酒店预订量同比增长8.7倍，四川泸州增长5倍，广东中山增长4倍。热门小城市的豪华酒店均价比北京、上海等一线城市低四成以上，部分县域豪华酒店在假期高峰每晚仅需300元。The introduction of a spring break from late April to early May in about 30 cities — including Hangzhou and Ningbo in Zhejiang province, Changsha in Hunan province and Shenyang in Liaoning province — has encouraged families to travel earlier, thereby easing congestion during the traditional peak period. Qunar said that staggered spring breaks across regions have effectively extended the holiday period to 17 days, from April 24 to May 10.此外，包括浙江杭州、宁波，湖南长沙和辽宁沈阳在内的约30个城市，在4月底至5月初设置了春假，鼓励家庭提前出行，从而缓解传统高峰期的拥堵。去哪儿表示，各地错峰安排的春假实际上已将假期时段拉长至17天，即4月24日到5月10日。Tuniu said that the travel boom in Zhejiang is expected to start early, from Tuesday, driven by the spring break. The combined spring break and Labor Day holiday has created an extended "3+5" vacation, with local bookings surging by 135 percent year-on-year for the period.途牛称，受春假带动，浙江的出行热潮预计从周二起就已启动。春假与劳动节假期叠加，形成了“3+5”的超长休假模式，当地同期预订量同比飙升135%。According to Qunar, trips during the weekends before and after the holiday have increased by 20 percent year-on-year, with average round-trip airfares about 40 percent cheaper than flying on April 30 or May 5. Meanwhile, bookings for multi-city itineraries — covering two or more destinations — have risen 118 percent year-on-year, while bookings for self-drive tours have climbed nearly 60 percent.据去哪儿统计，五一假期前后的周末出行人次同比增长20%，往返机票均价比4月30日或5月5日出行便宜约四成。同时，涵盖两个及以上目的地的多城行程预订量同比增长118%，自驾游预订量增长近六成。Lyu Ning, dean of Beijing International Studies University's School of Tourism Sciences, said the shift in demand from high-end outbound travel toward domestic long-haul trips would accelerate innovation in domestic tourism products.北京第二外国语学院旅游科学学院院长吕宁表示，从高端出境游转向国内长线游的需求变化，将加速国内旅游产品创新。"Traditional sightseeing is being replaced by immersive experiences, niche destinations, light luxury getaways and loop self-drive tours," said Lyu. "Tourists now prioritize safety, immersive experiences and value for money, and are developing a growing appreciation for China's natural and cultural assets."“传统的观光游正被沉浸式体验、小众目的地、轻奢度假和环线自驾所取代。”吕宁说，“游客如今更看重安全、沉浸式体验和性价比，对国内自然和人文资源的欣赏也在不断加深。”She called on domestic destinations to benchmark international service standards and develop small but refined leisure travel concepts. She said that local governments should tap into county-level cultural and tourism resources, such as Ding'an in Hainan and Luzhou in Sichuan, and integrate hot spring wellness, healing retreats and folk customs to fill the gap in the market for high-end domestic vacations.她呼吁国内旅游目的地对标国际服务标准，打造“小而精”的休闲度假概念。吕宁表示，地方政府应充分挖掘县域文旅资源，如海南定安、四川泸州等地，将温泉康养、疗愈度假和民俗风情结合起来，填补国内高端度假市场空白。Lyu also stressed the need for smart governance. Big data and digital platforms should be used to monitor real-time crowd densities and implement dynamic early warning systems and intelligent diversion strategies. She said that strict caps on scenic area capacity, online reservations, timed entry and route diversification are essential to prevent overcrowding and ensure travel quality.吕宁还强调了智慧治理的必要性。她指出，应利用大数据和数字平台实时监测人流密度，实施动态预警和智能分流策略。严格执行景区容量上限、线上预约、分时入园和路线多样化，对于防止过度拥挤、保障出游品质至关重要。long-haul trip /ˌlɒŋ ˈhɔːl trɪp/长途旅行package tour /ˈpækɪdʒ tʊə/跟团游immersive /ɪˈmɜːsɪv/沉浸式的stopover /ˈstɒpˌəʊvə/中途停留congestion /kənˈdʒestʃən/拥堵staggered spring breaks /ˈstæɡəd sprɪŋ breɪks/错峰春假getaway /ˈɡetəweɪ/短假tap into /tæp ˈɪntuː/挖掘

Bem-vindo à Rádio Minghui. As transmissões incluem assuntos relativos à perseguição ao Falun Gong na China, entendimentos e experiências dos praticantes adquiridas no curso de seus cultivos, interesses e música composta e executada pelos praticantes do Dafa. Programa 1550: Experiência de cultivo da categoria Autoaprimoramento intitulada: “A ilusão da doença da minha mãe visava meus apegos”, escrita por uma praticante do Falun Dafa na província de Hubei, China.

Last time we spoke about the beginning of the first battle of Changsha. From Chongqing, Chiang debated defensive strategies for Hunan, ultimately adopting Plan B after Xue Yue's pleas, focusing on successive resistance north of Changsha to thwart Japanese advances. Japanese forces, under Okamura Yasuji, launched assaults in Jiangxi and Hunan. In Jiangxi, the 106th and 101st Divisions attacked Huibu and Gao'an, where Chinese troops under Luo Zhuoying and Song Kentang fiercely resisted. Gao'an fell briefly but was recaptured by the 32nd Army and the elite 74th Army, with heavy casualties on both sides, as recounted by soldier Liu Qihuai. In Hunan, Japanese units crossed the Xin Qiang River and landed at Yingtian, facing brutal opposition. At Bijia Mountain, Qin Yizhi's 195th Division held for four days; Battalion Commander Shi Enhua's reinforced unit perished entirely, their fragmented remains mourned by locals. Along the Miluo River, Chen Pei's 37th Army fortified positions, repelling waves of Japanese attacks, including suicide squads disguised as civilians. Recruit Yang Peyao's unit endured bombardments, inflicting significant enemy losses before withdrawing at dusk.   #197 The First Battle of Changsha Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Major Luo Wenlang, battalion commander of the 3rd Battalion, 55th Regiment, 19th Division of the 28th Army, harbored a peculiar quirk: he couldn't sleep soundly without unwrapping his leg bindings, a small ritual that anchored him in the chaos of war. Since the war's eruption, such luxuries were rare, and unwrapping his bindings every night became an impossibility, leaving him to endure restless slumbers. Tonight, however, sleep eluded him entirely; he tossed and turned on his makeshift bed, his mind a whirlwind of unrest. Two days after the northern Hunan battle ignited like a powder keg, the 55th Regiment received urgent orders from Division Commander Tang Boyin to race to Wukou in Pingjiang County. Their path wound through Luo Wenlang's hometown of Fulinpu, a twist of fate that stirred conflicting emotions. Entering the village under the cover of night, the entire battalion encamped in the commander's modest family village, with battalion headquarters naturally established in his ancestral home.   Luo yearned to step across that familiar threshold but dreaded it, for his parents remained oblivious to a devastating truth. They slaughtered chickens and prepared meat, hosting the battalion staff with drinks and hospitality, after all, this was their son's unit gracing their home. Luo orchestrated door planks and straw for bedding, posted sentries, and deftly evaded his parents until they retired. Before dawn broke, he mustered the troops, ensured they were fed, and led them onward, slipping away like a shadow. By noon on the 22nd, they reached Wukou, only to receive fresh directives: rush to Yingtian to bolster the 95th Division against the enemy's audacious landings. The 3rd Battalion spearheaded the division's reinforcements, marching relentlessly through day and night, arriving at Dongtang, over 30 kilometers southeast of Yingtian—on the 23rd, hearts sinking upon learning Yingtian had already fallen into enemy clutches.   Luo Wenlang sought out the retreating 95th Division Commander Luo Qi to beg for a mission, his resolve unyielding. Luo Qi, anticipating his arrival, relayed Commander Guan Linzheng's ironclad instructions: The 19th Division's reinforcements would assume Dongtang's defenses. With the main force still en route, Luo Qi tasked Luo's battalion with relieving a segment held by a replacement regiment. He handed over a map, sketching a line with a pencil, a simple stroke that thrust Luo Wenlang and his men onto the front lines of fate. An operations staff was dispatched to guide them to the position and oversee the handover.   As the troops advanced, they encountered scattered soldiers fleeing like startled rabbits; seizing a platoon leader revealed they were indeed from the replacement regiment. Mere minutes from division HQ, the enemy was already closing in, a predator's breath hot on their necks. Luo Wenlang and Deputy Battalion Commander Wu Yacui split the battalion, launching a counterattack on Dongtang from dual routes. Fortune favored them; the Japanese held only an exhausted company, crumbling under a single, ferocious charge. They swiftly deployed two companies to the positions, reserving one as a bulwark. By dusk, the full 55th Regiment arrived, accompanied by the rest of the 19th Division's reinforcements, allowing the battered 95th Division, ravaged at Yingtian, to withdraw for desperate reorganization. The regimental commander positioned Luo's 3rd Battalion on the regiment's vulnerable left wing. In the blink of an eye, it was the 27th, aligning with the 15th of the eighth lunar month. Amid the relentless great battle, few noted the calendar, and the skies hung heavy with clouds. Luo Wenlang twisted on his straw bed, his thoughts a snarled knot of anxiety and memory.   At 11 p.m., gunfire shattered the night; a barrage of machine gun bullets riddled the battalion HQ house, raining thatch and dust upon Luo like fallout from a storm. Catastrophe had struck! Luo surged toward the positions with the bugler—his battalion signal chief—and the reserve force, ascending the hilltop in a frenzy. Halfway up, he spotted 8th Company's Lieutenant Platoon Leader Rong Fayu leading over 20 soldiers in retreat. Bellowing "Why unauthorized retreat?" while brandishing his pistol, he compelled Rong to rally and turn back. The Japanese had launched a nocturnal assault; 8th Company Commander Yi Zuitao lay slain by a fatal shot, over a dozen comrades felled in brutal close combat, the survivors scattered like leaves in the wind; the high ground now belonged to the enemy.   Upon learning of Dongtang's loss, the regimental commander personally led the regimental reserve, his face etched with urgency. Under flickering lantern light, poring over the map with Luo, Division Commander Tang Boyin telephoned, his voice a whipcrack of command: Recapture it before dawn, or both would face the merciless hand of military justice. After seizing the high ground, the enemy hesitated to press further; Luo surmised the darkness concealed paths, and their numbers were not overwhelming. Forgoing the regimental reserve, he led 7th Company's 4 squads and remnants of the routed 8th Company in a stealthy ascent. Near the position, a ravine concealed over 20 8th Company soldiers, rallied by Sergeant Squad Leader Tan Tianrong, who had lurked in wait for reinforcements, dreading exposure at dawn under the enemy's gaze.   Spotting the battalion commander personally spearheading the counterattack, Tan Tianrong's face lit with fierce joy; his men, armed with grenades, surged as the vanguard. Intimate with the terrain even in blindness, they hurled explosives into bunkers, trenches, and works. The commander orchestrated the charge; the Japanese force of 40-50 men crumbled, over half slain or maimed, the remnants fleeing northward to their village stronghold. It was past 4 a.m.; the moon pierced the clouds, bathing the earth in a silvery glow. With positions reclaimed, the night revealed its secret: tonight was Mid-Autumn. Moonlight unraveled the tangled threads of his past; Luo draped his clothes over his shoulders, sat beneath the luminous orb, and wept in solitary anguish.   Before the war, devastating news had arrived: his brother Luo Yinong had been killed in Jiangxi. Luo had three brothers; the eldest shouldered half the family's burdens, their bond unbreakable. The brother had enlisted first in the 50th Army, climbing to battalion commander through sheer valor. He and his younger brother had followed suit, inspired by that call to arms.   Wartime conscription demanded only one per family, but battling the devils was a duty for the nation and its people. His brother had risen to deputy regimental commander before his end. The 50th Army notified him first. Engulfed in battle, there had been no time to console his grieving parents or tend to the funeral; it weighed on his heart like an unyielding stone. His sister-in-law, diligent and unassuming, cared for a young boy and carried another child; the long, arduous days ahead loomed like an endless shadow. The night dew brought a biting chill, the moon an icy sentinel; Luo shivered uncontrollably, his tears mingling with the frost.   The sky hung heavy with overcast gloom, yet the moon lurked beyond the clouds, casting a faint, ethereal light that warded off utter darkness. Along the road, a unit's elongated black shadow snaked southward in hurried silence, a serpent of weary resolve pressing through the night. Qin Yizhi reined in his horse, pausing to gaze back: the queue stretched onward, silent and impeccably orderly, belying the exhaustion of a force scarred by days of ferocious combat, their spirits unbroken amid the shadows. After the Japanese seized the 195th Division's defiant outpost at Bijia Mountain, they surged across the Xin Qiang River in a merciless onslaught. The river, shallow enough to wade knee-deep, offered no true impediment; the real barrier was forged from the defenders' scorching blood, a crimson testament to their unyielding stand. The 195th Division clashed in a maelstrom of cruelty; positions were heaped with corpses time and again, the Xin Qiang's waters churning blood-red in relentless cycles of carnage. From the night of the 23rd to the dawn of the 25th, respite was a forgotten dream; Okamura Yasuji, in a gesture of grim respect, inscribed Qin's name in elegant calligraphy and hung it within his command tent, a haunting trophy of the foe's tenacity.   Following their triumphant landing at Yingtian, the Japanese entangled the Ninth War Zone's left-wing defenders in a protracted snare, their advances grinding slowly like a predator toying with prey, menacing the flanks of the frontal troops with insidious intent. On the evening of the 27th, Xue Yue issued the fateful order for the 15th Army Group to withdraw to the precarious ground between the Miluo River and Shangshan City, ushering this blood-soaked force into an all-night march toward the next defensive crucible. Late into the night, a brief halt was called. Soldiers slumped to the ground, adjusting leg wraps and gear with mechanical precision; logistics teams darted through the ranks, distributing rations like lifelines; cooks, having forged ahead, arrived with steaming pots of rice soup, infusing the air with a rare warmth. Though no clamor broke the hush, a quiet camaraderie enveloped the queue, a fleeting balm against the war's chill.   The division staff claimed a flat expanse beside a farmhouse yard for their respite. Qin settled onto a stone roller used for grinding grain, nibbling at his meager ration and sipping the hot soup that steamed in the cool air. Suddenly, moonlight pierced the clouds, cascading down in silvery streams; the familiar contours of the farmhouse stirred a flood of warmth in his heart, evoking memories of home.   Chongqing, Huangshan Villa. Every window was shrouded in double layers of thick curtains, sealing out any sliver of betraying light, as if the very walls conspired to guard secrets from the encroaching night. Tonight's ethereal protagonist rose languidly from the eastern valley, its orange-red moonlight casting an aura of drowsy reluctance, as though it had not fully shaken off the slumber of the day. The feeble glow dappled the building's roof, balcony, and the surrounding hillsides, intersections, and thickets, where armed shadows lurked, capturing every rustle in the oppressive silence. Only upon close inspection could one discern the faint specks of moonlight glinting off steel helmets. Yet, beyond those fortified walls, another realm pulsed with life, a vibrant contrast to the shadowed vigilance outside. The front hall, living room, and dining room blazed with brilliant light. Vibrant flowers, dominated by chrysanthemums in full, defiant bloom, infused the air with color and fragrance; a phonograph murmured a cheerful Guangdong melody, weaving an atmosphere thick with festive joy, a deliberate illusion amid the storm of war.   Chiang Kai-shek, clad in a flowing black silk gown, strode ahead with poised grace, escorting his guests into the dining room alongside the elegantly attired Soong May-ling, their conversation laced with laughter and warmth. At the table, Soong May-ling's smile was a beacon of diplomacy, as she artfully arranged the seating to suit hierarchies and alliances, while servers in crisp white uniforms moved with nimble precision. This was Chiang Kai-shek's intimate Mid-Autumn family banquet; beyond a handful of pivotal military and political figures, the gathering brimmed with relatives. Guests and kin alike noted Chiang's buoyant spirits tonight; his smiles were wide and genuine, his discourse light and expansive, delving into casual topics with uncharacteristic ease.   In September 1939, China's War of Resistance Against Japan had entered its grueling third year. After the initial cataclysm of turmoil and disarray, the government and military had clawed their way to stability, adapting to this unprecedented historical crucible, with operations finally aligning into a semblance of order. According to figures proclaimed by Minister of Military Affairs He Yingqin to Chinese and foreign reporters on the 13th of this month, Japanese invaders had seized 521 counties across 12 provinces, a vast swath of conquest. Yet, the Japanese imperialists had exacted this toll at a staggering cost. Just prior, on August 30, the Hirannuma Cabinet, installed a mere eight months earlier, had collapsed in mass resignation. Hirannuma Kiichiro's predecessor, Konoe Fumimaro, had similarly bowed out amid governmental failures, chiefly the unmet ambitions in the Sino-Japanese War that he had boldly promised to parliament, exacerbating domestic political and economic woes. Days ago, when Wang Pengsheng briefed Chiang on Japan's turbulent politics, he quipped: "Konoe said three months to destroy China; three months didn't work, nor three years, who knows about 30 or 300. Hirannuma had no solutions, down in eight months. Does Abe have good ideas? How long can he be prime minister?" Indeed, Abe Nobuyuki, Hirannuma's successor, would endure a mere four and a half months before resigning in ignominy. Tonight's feast showcased Chiang's favored cuisines: delicate Jiangsu-Zhejiang dishes mingled with robust Sichuan flavors. Chiang abstained from alcohol, raising his cup in mere symbolic toasts to his guests. During the meal, as if by unspoken accord, no one broached the raging domestic battles or the volatile international landscape; conversations meandered through trivialities, skirting anything heavy or discordant, a fragile bubble of normalcy.   On September 3, Britain and France had declared war on Germany, shattering the global order in a seismic shift. Foreign newspapers already bandied the term "Second World War," a phrase that evoked freshness, exhilaration, and sheer terror in equal measure. China's diplomacy surged with newfound vigor. In April, Ambassador to the US Wang Zhengting had negotiated a $20 million loan with American banks on China's behalf. In May, Stalin responded to Chiang's overtures, agreeing to exchange arms for Chinese tea, wool, raw hides, and more. A month later, the first consignment of light and heavy weapons—including artillery and heavy machine guns—arrived via clandestine routes through Xinjiang and Mongolia, bolstering the central army's frontlines. In August, Hu Shih, Wellington Koo, and Chien Tai represented the Nationalist Government at the 19th League of Nations Assembly, laying bare the Japanese imperialists' atrocities in China before the world and rallying global forces for peace to support China's defiant stand. Soon after, British and American civic groups ignited "China Week" campaigns, pressing their governments to aid the beleaguered nation. Waves of foreign volunteers streamed in from distant shores: doctors, journalists, ordnance engineers, even retired soldiers clamoring to join the fray on the frontlines.   "If we could pull America into this war..." Through Soong May-ling's subtle, persuasive influence, Chiang allowed himself to daydream of that prosperous, dynamic young powerhouse across the vast ocean. Thus, on this Mid-Autumn night, his talk turned to America, to his correspondence with President Roosevelt regarding the "tung oil loan." That saga had unfolded the previous October; T.V. Soong had jetted to America, securing a loan with China's tung oil, a commodity scarce in the US, as collateral. China had boldly requested $400 million; America countered with $25 million, a classic tale of "ask high, settle low." Yet, the funds were secured. One success paved the way for many. Soong May-ling had once confided to Chiang: "In mobilizing US aid for China's resistance, I'll make a difference." When Chiang responded with a smile, "Thank you, Madam," he could scarcely foresee how his beautiful wife's extraordinary prowess in fulfilling this solemn vow would astonish him, etching eternal glory for Chinese women worldwide and elevating Soong May-ling to the zenith of her life's achievements.   The most direct echo of the First Battle of Changsha's thunderous saga resides in the Ninth War Zone's meticulous report on the northern Hunan and southern Hubei operations, submitted to the Chongqing Military Committee and Chiang Kai-shek himself, a faded relic now entombed amid the vast ocean of Nationalist Government military and political archives in Nanjing's Second Historical Archives of China. This document, a painstaking compilation of combat dispatches from divisions, armies, and army groups, stands as a testament to valor and sacrifice. Tragically, time's relentless march and human folly have ravaged this priceless artifact, leaving only shards and whispers to conjure the heart-wrenching inferno of that bloody clash.   "October 24, Year 28. Urgent. To Chongqing. Chairman Chiang. Secret. Submitted by Commander Xue on orders." The rice paper has yellowed to a deep, somber hue, brittle and parched; a careless touch could reduce it to dust. Some pages lie fractured, their remnants affixed to white paper, forever unable to reclaim their original wholeness. Leafing through page by page unleashes a pungent miasma, a scorched, acrid, decayed blend that assaults the senses. Traces of fire and water mar the original rice paper sheets, with countless fragments glued haphazardly to white backings, their sequences lost to eternity.   "...The Xin Qiang River spanning from Lujiao to Leishi Mountain, defending a front of over 110 li..." "Enemy 13th and 33rd Divisions, parts of the Hata Detachment, naval units, and artillery, cavalry, engineers totaling..." "...Began attacking us first with artillery... fortifications completely destroyed, then infantry charged; relying on our officers and men all resolved to coexist with the homeland..." "...And launched balloons to direct artillery... our army braved the cannons... repelled them, corpses filling the river, turning the water red..." "Division casualties also reached over a thousand... failed to inflict greater strikes and annihilate... deep inner guilt, besides vigorously training troops awaiting orders to kill the enemy..." "...Attack casualties heavy, then concentrated large forces... artillery fire so dense like continuous firecrackers for hours... released poison gas, Wang Street garrison all heroically sacrificed, then breached... Zhao Gongwu kowtows, October 15"   Zhao Gongwu commanded the 2nd Division under Zhang Yaoming's 52nd Army. This unit first held the line along the Xin Qiang River, then fell back to northeast of Fengjiang Bridge to staunch the enemy tide once more; after October 6, it hammered southward-marching Japanese from the west in the Yanglin Street and Dajing Street regions. Through these crucibles, the division bled over half its strength. A fragment of an envelope clings to a sheet of white paper, its words faintly visible: "Changsha 126-3 Zhang Yaoming," "Hunan Jinjing Air Mail," "Combat Process by..." and the like. The stamp remains remarkably intact—a philatelic gem now. Measuring 1.5 cm square, it features Sun Yat-sen's portrait at its center, inscribed "Republic of China Post" below, with "5" in the upper right, "fen" to the left, and "5" in each lower corner. I sat at the long table in the spacious, brightly lit reading room, staring vacantly, my thoughts grinding to a halt. These remnants are all that endure for posterity, of that monumental battle, of the scorching blood and vanished lives of countless unnamed Chinese soldiers. With hands that once gripped a rifle, I gently caressed those pages from a bygone era; they were cold, devoid of any lingering breath.   As the full moon of the 15th of the eighth month dissolved into the golden-red blaze of sunrise, Qin Yizhi's 195th Division had already plunged into the rugged mountains and dense forests encircling Fulinpu. Per directives from 15th Army Group Commander Guan Linzheng, the 195th was to forge a new defensive bastion centered on Fulinpu, 40 to 70 kilometers from Changsha. Their mandate: stall the Japanese southward juggernaut, granting precious time for allied forces to muster and fortify around the city. Despite the grueling all-night march, morale soared undimmed. The advance chief of staff doled out positions to each regiment, and the troops dove into fortification labors with fervent zeal. The 195th Division's unyielding stand along the Xin Qiang River had already etched preliminary glory upon this unit in its baptism of fire. "Fame in one battle" echoed as a battle cry throughout the division, where collective honor intertwined with personal valor. Honor and triumph formed the bedrock for soldiers and armies alike. Yet, another fire fueled their resolve.   On September 23, amid the Japanese forcing the Xin Qiang River, Guan Linzheng's voice crackled over the phone to Qin Yizhi: "Facing you is the 6th Division." The 6th Division, a name that ignited fury in Chinese troops and civilians, forever linked to the demonic specter of Tani Hisao. Moments later, the whisper spread like wildfire through every trench: "The Japanese army that perpetrated the Nanjing Massacre is right in front." Agitation rippled through the ranks; some donned fresh uniforms and shoes from their packs, casting aside the worn; others flouted discipline to bid farewells to hometown comrades: "Today we fight to the death here; see you in the next life." "Tell my mother I died fighting the Nanjing Massacre enemies."   Some company commanders commanded their mess sergeants to expend all funds on hearty feasts. All Japanese were foes, but the 6th Division embodied a blood debt, an unforgivable vendetta; the Chinese nation does not lightly forget its tormentors. In the Xin Qiang River maelstrom, the 195th Division battled with heroic ferocity. Some soldiers, in their final breaths, murmured: "Die then; it's worth it." Others lamented slaying too few devils, gritting teeth, eyes refusing to close in eternal regret. Now under Inaba Shiro's command, the 6th Division splintered southward after breaching the Xin Qiang; roughly a thousand hounded the 195th to Fulinpu. On the morning of September 29, the Japanese blundered into the 195th's meticulously laid ambush. Qin Yizhi, pulse racing with excitement and tension, fumbled the binoculars from his guard's hand. His command sliced the air: "Begin." War history chronicles: "The 6th Division advanced south from the Miluo River along the Xinshi-Liqiao road and Xinshi-Fulinpu routes. The over a thousand reaching Fulinpu were ambushed by the Nationalist 195th Division, suffering heavy losses." As Japanese artillery and aircraft unleashed hell upon the 195th's positions, Qin orchestrated a swift southward withdrawal to the environs of Shangshan City. Again, without pause, they erected fortifications and set deadly traps.   On the morning of September 30, the pursuers from Fulinpu closed in on Shangshan, their numbers swollen to over 1,500. Qin Yizhi clenched his jaw, his demeanor icy calm, allowing the Japanese to creep into the kill zone before barking: "Hit them hard!" Combat raged from dawn to dusk, obliterating over 700 foes. Qin ascended a hill, surveying through binoculars, then erupted: "Bad! The enemy is retreating." Upon receiving Qin's telegram, Guan Linzheng scrutinized the map, momentarily stunned, then replied: "Enemy shows no retreat signs yet; proceed per original plan. Your unit to block at Shangshan City line until October 2." Xianning, Okamura Yasuji's 11th Army HQ.   Combat maps bristled with markings, staff officers darting amid ringing phones and clattering telegrams. The colossal red arrow in northern Hunan had fractured into tributaries, surging over 100 km southward from the outset; one tendril pierced to Yong'an City, a mere 30 km from Changsha. Vast swaths of northern Hunan lay conquered, yet Okamura sensed the tide turning, it was time to retreat. The Chinese employed their time-honored gradual resistance, battling while retreating with cunning grace. Some units fell back directly, others amassed on flanks—what portent did that hold? In Okamura's shrewd mind loomed an equally shrewd Xue Yue; he envisioned his adversary methodically weaving a snare.   Post-Yingtian landing, the 15th Army Group's timely evasion had unraveled his "Xiang-Gan Operation Plan" like fragile thread. If encircling and annihilating the Chinese main force proved unattainable, what purpose in pressing onward? Telegrams from 3rd Division's Fujita Susumu, 6th's Inaba Shiro, and 13th's Tanaka Seiichi piled on his desk, pleading to assault Changsha—for headlines and Imperial accolades, perhaps, but blind to their exposed supply lines vulnerable to enemy thrusts? Ground logistics teetered on collapse; the air force resorted to airdrops for isolated regiments. Venturing further south would stretch lines to breaking; a severed artery spelled doom for the vanguard. When would these commanders mature into true stewards of the Imperial Army? Okamura fretted and pitied them in equal measure.   At 4 p.m. on September 30, Okamura decreed a halt to advances at Shangshan and Yong'an. He commenced orchestrating the retreat. Changsha, Yuelu Mountain, Ninth War Zone Command Forward HQ. October 1. Xue Yue stood before the map, Guan's latest telegram clutched in hand. Qin's second missive insisted on Japanese withdrawal, corroborated by 15th Army Group scouts from Yingtian: This morning (October 1), Japanese transports unloaded artillery stowed the previous night, hauling it back to Yueyang; intercepted wires revealed a regiment aborting its southward push, standing idle. Guan assessed the mosaic and commanded counteroffensives: intercept if feasible, pursue relentlessly, deny the Japanese escape; he relayed retreat indicators to Xue. Xue paced the chamber, head bowed in contemplation. Chief of Staff Wu Yizhi, Staff Director Zhao Zili, and their cadre tracked his every step with expectant eyes, awaiting the verdict. Xue's thoughts whirled through military stratagems and beyond.   Pre-war, Xue had segmented the war zone's forces into tripartite blocs: Northern Hunan under Guan Linzheng's 15th, Yang Sen's 27th, and Shang Zhen's 20th Army Groups as "A Cluster"; Northern Jiangxi Nanchang with Yunnan Army Lu Han's 1st Army Group and the 74th Army as "B Cluster"; the Wuning, Xiushui, Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi border guarded by Sichuan Army Wang Lingji's 30th Army Corps, Fan Songpu's Border Advance Army, and 8th Army; augmented by 3 armies' 7 divisions in general reserve. Before the storm broke, Xue pored over maps, tracing every mountain, river, road, and bridge, envisioning burial grounds for the invaders.   Now, beneath Changsha, 200,000 troops formed a tightening net. The "decisive battle in Changsha suburbs" blueprint had been wired to Chongqing. Chiang and the nation yearned for a resounding triumph as the resistance pivoted into a new epoch?! A masterful drama, honed over half a month's toil, neared its crescendo; yet that cunning fox appeared to sniff the trap's metallic tang, freezing in place. "Commander, phone from Minister Chen." "Brother Boling, good news." Chen Cheng's voice brimmed with levity, "Your formal appointment published. What? Ninth War Zone Commander! First to congratulate; document tomorrow." Shedding the "acting" prefix was inevitable; Chiang had intimated as much long ago. But for a man and general, true worth lay not in titles, but in forging indelible feats. Splendor was judged not by underlings, colleagues, or superiors, but by peers in the craft of war.   Unmoved by the promotion, Xue exhaled a profound sigh. Though the 15th's intelligence couldn't confirm a wholesale retreat, preparations for dual contingencies were imperative. Victories came hard; a splendid battle, harder still. He summoned Wu Yizhi and Zhao Zili to devise countermeasures for the enemy's potential flight. October 2, Sichuan Army Yang Sen's 27th Army Group, Yang Gancai's 134th Division special service company, under Company Commander Wan Mingyu, slogged through the profound mountains and forests on the northern Mufu Mountains' flanks. The 134th's covert mandate: infiltrate enemy rear via treacherous terrain, sabotage supply arteries in the Chongyang-Xianning sector, and deliver a dagger to the Japanese spine when opportunity struck, bolstering frontal defenses.   Past 3 p.m., a crystalline mountain stream materialized. Wan decreed a respite. Over 100 soldiers, drained from a half-day's ascent, collapsed like puppets with severed strings. Most propped their torsos with rifles in one hand, fanning hats to ward off the relentless forest mosquitoes with the other. Regaining breath, they devoured rations washed down with stream water. Some unfurled towels and ventured downstream, letting the cool flow rinse away layers of sweat. Then, a muted engine drone encroached from the heavens. Wan peered through the foliage: a low-flying plane vectored southward, its wings emblazoned with the Rising Sun.   A transport; Wan recognized the temporary Japanese airfield near Xianning. With lines overextended, airdrops sustained isolated units. Wan was prying open a can with his bayonet, the tip etching a cross on the lid before levering along the edge; paired with a rice ball, it promised a savory repast. His orderly proffered a cup of fresh stream water; 2nd Platoon Leader Hu Yaozong perched nearby on a rock, smirking, poised to pilfer from the opened tin. Wan warded off this Sichuan Pixian compatriot. The plane droned overhead then.   Both glanced skyward; the platoon quipped: "Open quick, damn, I'll repay two cans later." Commander: "Want cans? Sky has; shoot plane down, enough for two lifetimes, bloat your mother-in-law first." The can hailed from a prior supply raid. Platoon: "You want me to shoot the plane?" Commander: "Bastard! You shooting or not?" The platoon snatched the light machine gun from a tree fork, jamming the butt against his belly, one hand on the grip, aiming crudely: "Come down, you turtle son!" The other hand squeezed the trigger. Wan assumed jest, resuming his task. "Da-da-da..." Wan jolted; the half-opened can tumbled to his feet, spilling Japanese fish onto Chinese soil. Recoil floored the platoon; he hurled the gun like a branding iron, face ashen. Inspecting the trigger, he snarled: "Whose damn fault, why no safety?!" The gunner dashed over; tall and even-tempered: "Safety was on; how'd it fire without pulling?" Wan's initial panic: "Damn! Position exposed."   The company spearheaded the division's reinforced regiment to raze a recent Japanese depot, guarded by a mere company—but exposure doomed the regiment deep in hostile territory. The assault had been plotted for days; pre-departure, Yang Gancai had toasted them. Wan had sworn a blood oath: No return to Sichuan without success. Hu had jested then: "No Sichuan return means wanting Hunan girl as concubine." Banter was fine in peace, but in war's grip, this was no trifling errand. Wan unleashed a torrent of curses, rising to survey the environs. The main force lagged 15 km behind; advance or abort post-blunder? Enemy rear was a labyrinth; this isolated band teetered on a razor's edge. As if to compel a choice, the radio operator approached; Wan itched to lash out. In his fury and indecision, a miracle unfolded.   The transport's engines hacked like a consumptive invalid, then a witness spied the plane banking left, plummeting, its nose inexorably toward a colossal rock 3-4 km distant. It rebounded twice on the stone, nose and left wing crumpling; the fuselage, fragile as parchment, tumbled gently, skewing onto the slope amid splintered trees. Wan gaped, then bellowed: "Assemble!" The men snapped from reverie, charging downhill in a frenzied cascade. One hour later, 134th Deputy Commander and Reinforced Regiment Commander Liu decoded Wan's vanguard transmission via radio. Another hour passed before Liu received Yang Gancai's directive: Abort Mountain Leopard operation; return with documents expeditiously. One day hence, October 3, Okamura Yasuji's original retreat order from October 2 dawn, addressed to northern Hunan's 6th, 33rd Divisions, Nara and Uemura Detachments, plus its Chinese translation, landed on Xue Yue's desk.   Fifteen days later, at the Changsha Victory Celebration, unit accolades were proclaimed; for "shooting down enemy plane, obtaining vital enemy documents," meritorious honors went to 134th Commander Yang Gancai and Deputy Liu. Each received 1000 yuan and one 3rd Class Baoding Medal. Okamura's October 2 order original: Chinese forces retreated to Miluo and Xiushui Rivers banks assembling; to avoid disadvantage, this army should quickly withdraw to original positions, restore combat strength.   Withdrawal plan as follows: … Xue's October 3 order original:   "Northern Hunan frontal units with current posture immediately pursue facing enemy fiercely, must capture in Chongyang-Yueyang south area. ... Pursuit units may detach part to monitor and sweep enemy collection troops; main force execute overtaking pursuit... Already deep behind enemy advance units vigorously destroy enemy transport lines, cut escape routes."   From October 3, Chinese forces unleashed ferocious counteroffensives against the Japanese on three fronts: northern Hunan, southern Hubei, and the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi border; the invaders receded like a vanishing tide, never to reclaim their ground. The 25th and 195th Divisions hounded the 6th Division and Nara Detachment from Fulinpu back to the Miluo River, then to the Xin Qiang River. On October 8, the Japanese fled across the Xin Qiang; the 195th's 566th Brigade surged in pursuit, launching a nocturnal raid on Xitang-Jianshan. Gains were modest, but the enemy, entrenched in their den, resisted with feral tenacity. Qin commanded the brigade's withdrawal southward; northern Hunan operations concluded.   In southern Hubei, the 79th Army chased remnants of the 33rd Division from Sanyan Bridge to Pingjiang, across Nanjiang Bridge, hounding them back to their Tongcheng lair. On the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi border, 30th Army Group Commander Wang Lingji orchestrated a pincer against Japanese at Xiushui. The foes retreated to Sandu, mounting a stubborn defense. Chinese assaults faltered for three days; on the fourth night's blitz, victory crowned their efforts, expelling the invaders to their original Wuning stronghold. With both armies reclaiming pre-war lines, the First Battle of Changsha drew to its resounding close.   Over days, Xue Yue received a deluge of congratulatory telegrams and letters from the Nationalist Government, Military Committee, National Assembly, myriad civic groups, party officials, and social luminaries. As hoped, among them was Chiang Kai-shek's effusive missive, brimming with joy. For Xue Yue, this one sufficed. Chiang Kai-shek's telegram to Xue Yue:   "In this northern Hunan campaign, over half the enemy was annihilated. The triumphant news has invigorated the nation, all due to effective command and soldiers' valor; I commend without reservation. Thoroughly investigate and report meritorious personnel from this battle; also report the dead and wounded for awards and relief. With this initial victory foundation laid, our officers and men's responsibilities grow heavier; urge your subordinates to extra vigilance, redoubled effort, avoiding arrogance or complacency, to amass great achievements, my deepest hopes."   As if countering Chongqing's high-powered broadcasts, Japanese radios in Wuhan, Nanjing, Beiping, and Manchukuo blared at full volume: "In this Xiang-Gan operation, valiant Imperial forces penetrated over 100 km into northern Hunan, sweeping anti-peace elements, routing Chinese central main forces, inflicting over 40,000 enemy casualties, a pivotal triumph advancing the holy war. Having achieved objectives, Imperial troops have victoriously withdrawn..."   In the aftermath of the First Battle of Changsha, the Japanese high command spun a tale of calculated restraint, insisting their assault was merely a spoiling raid, a calculated jab never intended to seize and hold the city indefinitely. With brazen confidence, they downplayed their toll, claiming a mere 850 souls lost to death and 2,700 wounded in the fray, while boastfully asserting they had slain 44,000 Chinese defenders and taken 4,000 captive, painting a picture of overwhelming triumph amid the smoke and ruin. Yet, foreign military observers, peering through the fog of propaganda with detached scrutiny, painted a starkly different canvas. They gauged Chinese losses at a far more tempered 20,000 killed and wounded, a heavy but bearable scar on the nation's resolve, while estimating Japanese casualties soared to around 30,000, a grievous hemorrhage that belied the invaders' claims of minimal sacrifice. Military historian Michael Clodfelter, sifting through the annals of conflict, ventured an even grimmer tally: a staggering 50,000 Japanese casualties endured in the relentless clash, a testament to the ferocity of Chinese resistance and the high price of imperial ambition. In the battle's locale, neither side claimed clear victory, but globally for the resistance, it favored China. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The First Battle of Changsha unfolded in September 1939 during China's War of Resistance Against Japan. Japanese forces under Okamura Yasuji advanced into Hunan and Jiangxi, crossing rivers and capturing key positions like Yingtian amid fierce Chinese defenses led by Xue Yue. 

China's top court disclosed the details of four major cases related to the trafficking of women and children on Thursday, reaffirming its commitment to imposing severe penalties on offenders, even as the incidence of such crimes has decreased.最高人民法院4月2日公布了四起重大拐卖妇女儿童案件详情，重申对此类犯罪依法从严惩处的立场，尽管相关案件发生率已有所下降。According to the Supreme People's Court, from 2012 to 2025, the number of these criminal cases fell by nearly 78 percent, indicating that the country has effectively curbed such offenses.据最高人民法院数据，2012年至2025年间，全国拐卖妇女儿童刑事案件数量下降近78%，表明我国已有效遏制此类犯罪。The top court reiterated its strong stance on punishing these crimes harshly, highlighting the need for stricter penalties — particularly for ringleaders and those involved in serious crimes like child abduction, trafficking multiple victims, or forcing victims into prostitution.最高法重申依法严惩此类犯罪的坚定态度，强调要从严处罚，特别是对犯罪集团首要分子、重要成员以及参与拐卖多名儿童或强迫被拐卖者卖淫等严重罪行者。In cases with grave consequences, such as causing death or severe mental distress to victims or their families, the death penalty was applied without hesitation, the court emphasized.最高法指出，对于犯罪情节特别严重的案件，如造成被害人或其家庭死亡、精神严重创伤等后果的，坚决依法判处死刑。Data from 2021 to 2025 showed that the percentage of trafficking convictions resulting in sentences of 10 years or more was 10 percentage points higher than the rate for all criminal cases.2021年至2025年数据显示，拐卖妇女儿童案件中判处十年以上有期徒刑的比例，高出全部刑事案件相应比例十个百分点。One case disclosed and highlighted by the top court involved an individual surnamed Wang, who was sentenced to death for trafficking more than 10 children.最高法公布的一起典型案例中，一名王姓男子因拐卖十余名儿童被判处死刑。Wang began abducting and trafficking children in October 2001. He was initially sentenced to three years in prison in 2006 for kidnapping a child. After his release in July 2008, Wang resumed his criminal activities, leading to a 15-year sentence in December 2015 for trafficking three other children.王某于2001年10月开始拐卖儿童。2006年，他因拐骗一名儿童被判处有期徒刑三年。2008年7月刑满释放后，王某再次作案，于2015年12月因拐卖另外三名儿童被判处有期徒刑十五年。While he was serving his sentence, further investigations revealed that between October 2001 and May 2010, he was involved in the abduction and sale of 11 additional children under the age of 6 from various provinces, including Hunan, Hubei, and Sichuan, to Guangdong province. Wang profited approximately 199,000 yuan ($28,955) from these crimes.服刑期间，警方进一步侦查发现，2001年10月至2010年5月间，王某还曾从湖南、湖北、四川等地拐卖11名未满6周岁的儿童至广东省，非法获利约19.9万元人民币。Wang's actions had severe psychological and financial impacts on the victims' families, leading some to divorce or attempt suicide.王某的犯罪行为给被害儿童家庭造成严重精神打击和经济损失，部分家庭因此离异或有人试图自杀。Given the large number of children he abducted and trafficked, the particularly heinous nature of his crimes, his role as a ringleader, and his status as a repeat offender, he was finally sentenced to death and recently executed.鉴于王某拐卖儿童人数众多，犯罪情节特别恶劣，系犯罪首要分子，且属累犯，最终被判处死刑，近日已执行。The top court stated that capital punishment underscores the judiciary's firm stance against child traffickers and serves as a warning to those who might seek to profit from such criminal activities.最高法表示，死刑判决彰显了司法机关依法严惩拐卖儿童犯罪的坚定立场，也是对妄图以此牟利者的严厉警示。reiterate /riːˈɪtəreɪt/重申；反复说ringleader /ˈrɪŋˌliːdər/首要分子；主谋grave consequences /ɡreɪv ˈkɑːnsəkwensɪz/严重后果heinous /ˈheɪnəs/极其恶劣的；令人发指的

A growing number of regions across China have announced plans to remove biology and geography from the scoring system of the high school entrance examination, known as the zhongkao, starting in 2027.近年来，全国多地陆续公布中考改革新举措。不少地区将从2027年起，将生物、地理等科目移出中考计分科目，改为等级评价或开卷考试。The move is part of broader efforts to reduce the burden on students and expand access to general high school education. Jilin province was the latest to announce such reforms on March 17.旨在减轻学生负担，扩大普通高中教育资源。吉林省于3月17日成为最新宣布改革的省份。Biology and geography will no longer count toward the total zhongkao score from next year, according to a statement from the provincial education department.根据吉林省教育厅发布的通知，从明年起，生物学、地理将不再计入中考总分。The subjects will instead be assessed through open-book exams, with results presented in letter grades rather than numerical scores.而是改为开卷考试，成绩以等级形式呈现，不再采用具体分数。Similar reforms are underway nationwide.与此同时，全国多地也在推进类似改革。Huangshan in Anhui province will exclude biology and geography from zhongkao scores starting in 2027, instead requiring passing grades for admission to elite high schools.安徽黄山市明确，从2027年起，生物、地理科目不计入中考总分，但报考省级示范性普通高中的考生，相关科目需达到规定等级要求。Ji'an in Jiangxi province will introduce computer-based testing for the two subjects, with results presented as grades A through D serving as reference only.江西吉安则将这两科改为计算机考试，成绩按A、B、C、D等级呈现，仅供录取参考。Xiangtan in Hunan province has reduced scored subjects to eight with a 655-point cap, eliminating biology and geography while expanding open-book exams and admission quotas for underprivileged schools.湖南湘潭市则将中考计分科目精简为8科，总分设为655分，同时扩大开卷考试范围，并增加指标生招生名额。Gao Hang, vice-dean of the School of Education at Renmin University of China, said the model of reducing exam subjects is gaining recognition, and more regions are considering such reforms.中国人民大学教育学院副院长高杭指出，减少计分科目的改革方向已逐渐成为共识，越来越多地区正考虑跟进。The reforms typically involve three elements: converting some subjects from "exams" to "assessments", shifting from closed-book to open-book exams, and replacing numerical scores with letter grades.此类改革通常包含三方面内容：部分科目从"考试"变为"考查"，从闭卷考试变为开卷考试，以及将分数制改为等级制。"These measures help reduce academic burden and school teaching pressure, and they alleviate the anxiety of 'point-by-point competition'. In the past, a single point could separate hundreds of students in ranking. Now, the obsession with scores might diminish," Gao said.高杭表示，这些措施有助于减轻学生的学业负担和学校的教学压力，缓解"分分计较"带来的焦虑感。"过去一分之差可能拉开几百名的差距，现在对分数的过度追求有望缓解。"The reforms come as the 2022 edition of the compulsory education curriculum plan introduced new requirements, including making labor education and information technology independent subjects, and strengthening modules such as artificial intelligence, national security education and rule of law education, he added.他还提到，2022年版义务教育课程方案和课程标准对改革提出了新要求，包括将劳动教育、信息科技等列为独立学科，并加强了人工智能、国家安全、法治教育等内容。Reducing the number of scored subjects, Gao said, helps create space for students to engage with new curriculum requirements without adding to exam pressure. It also serves as a "command baton" to shift the focus from score-oriented education to holistic development.减少计分科目有助于为学生腾出空间，在不增加考试压力的前提下落实新课程要求，同时也发挥"指挥棒"作用，引导教育从"唯分数"向全面发展转变。During this year's two sessions, Liu Xiya, a national lawmaker and head of the Chongqing Xiejiawan Education Group, called for further integration of curriculum subjects, noting that in some regions, primary school students study as many as 11 subjects per week, and middle school students more than 15. "Too many subjects, too finely divided, lead to excessive burden," she said.在今年全国两会上，全国人大代表、重庆谢家湾教育集团总校长刘希娅建议进一步整合课程科目。她指出，部分地区小学生每周要学11门课，初中生则超过15门，科目过多、过细，加重了学生负担。Gao acknowledged that shifting away from a deeply entrenched culture of score-chasing will take time.高杭坦言，改变"唯分数"的积习仍需时间。"Standardized testing still has value, especially in ensuring fairness. The challenge is to balance that with the goal of fostering well-rounded development. What we're doing now is correcting the direction, but returning to the desired state will take time," he said."标准化考试仍有其价值，尤其是在保障公平性方面。关键是如何平衡公平与促进学生全面发展的目标。当前我们正在校正方向，但要回归理想状态，仍需要一个过程。"Alongside the reduction in exam subjects, multiple regions are expanding general high school capacity and increasing admission quotas.在减少计分科目的同时，多地也在扩大普通高中学位供给。Xiangtan's reform plan explicitly abolishes the previous vocational-general ratio limit, aiming to gradually increase the proportion of students entering general high schools.湘潭市的改革方案明确取消了之前的"职普比"限制，提出逐步提高普通高中录取比例。Fear of entering secondary vocational schools has been a source of anxiety and intense competition among students and parents, as many still view them as inferior to general high schools.长期以来，家长和学生普遍对进入中职学校存有焦虑，认为职业教育低于普通高中。Jilin province has also committed to expanding general high school enrollment and abolishing the vocational-general ratio limit, ensuring students' right to choose.吉林省也明确将扩大普通高中招生规模，取消"职普比"限制，保障学生自主选择权。In January, Shengsi county in Zhoushan, Zhejiang province, drew national attention by announcing the abolition of zhongkao selection functions and the introduction of a "universal direct admission to high school" mechanism, ensuring that all eligible local middle school graduates can enter general high schools.今年1月，浙江舟山嵊泗县宣布取消中考选拔功能，实行"全员直升普通高中"机制，引发全国关注。该政策确保所有符合条件的本地初中毕业生均可直接升入普通高中就读。Nationwide, general high school enrollment has been steadily increasing. In 2024, enrollment exceeded 10 million for the first time, reaching 10.36 million, with the admission rate topping 60 percent. In 2025, enrollment rose further to 10.75 million, with the admission rate climbing to 62.36 percent, according to the Ministry of Education.近年来，全国普通高中招生规模持续扩大。教育部数据显示，2024年普通高中招生首次突破千万，达1036万人，录取率超过60%；2025年招生人数增至1075万，录取率升至62.36%。Guangdong province plans to add more than 200,000 general high school places this year. Wuhan in Hubei province will add another 8,000 places on top of the 8,000 added in 2025.广东省计划今年新增普通高中学位超过20万个，湖北武汉在去年新增8000个学位的基础上再增8000个。Ding Changfa, an associate professor of economics at Xiamen University, told media outlet Yicai that many regions have built new high schools and expanded enrollment in recent years.厦门大学经济学系副教授丁长发对《第一财经》表示，近年来多地新建了普通高中并扩大了招生规模。At the same time, many vocational schools can now offer comprehensive high school classes, increasing the number of schools and places as well as easing parents' anxiety about the vocational track, Ding said.与此同时，许多中职学校也开设了综合高中班，增加了学位供给，一定程度上缓解了家长对职教路径的焦虑。underway /ˌʌndərˈweɪ/进行中的 admission quota /ədˈmɪʃən ˈkwoʊtə/招生名额 alleviate /əˈliːvieɪt/缓解 curriculum /kəˈrɪkjələm/课程 excessive burden /ɪkˈsesɪv ˈbɜːrdn/过重负担 well-rounded development /ˌwel ˈraʊndɪd dɪˈveləpmənt/全面发展 eligible /ˈelɪdʒəbl/符合条件的

Thousands of visitors flock to witness beauty of blossoms around the country数千游客争睹全国花海盛景Rising temperatures herald the season to chase flowers in China. Thousands of visitors from home and abroad descend on the nation's most picturesque spring landscapes to capture the beauty of the blossoms, boosting consumption in the process.随着气温回升，中国迎来了赏花踏青的季节。成千上万的国内外游客纷纷涌向国内风景最美的春日景观，争相定格花朵盛放的美丽瞬间，这也带动了文旅消费热潮。In mid-March, Yuantouzhu scenic area in Wuxi, Jiangsu province, entered "congestion mode". By 5 pm on March 14, the area had welcomed nearly 70,000 visitors, setting a record for this year's cherry blossom season, according to Shangyou News.3月中旬，江苏省无锡市鼋头渚景区进入"拥堵模式"。据上游新闻报道，截至3月14日下午5时，该景区已接待游客近7万人次，创下今年樱花季的单日客流量纪录。"I knew it would be crowded, but I just couldn't miss such beautiful cherry blossoms," said Zhang, a tourist from Nanjing, Jiangsu, as she navigated the sea of visitors trying to capture the perfect photo. "It's so hard to get pictures of the flowers without people in them, so I had to settle for photos with strangers included."来自南京的游客张女士在人群中寻找最佳拍摄角度时说："我知道人会很多，但实在不想错过这么美的樱花。"她无奈地笑道："想拍一张没有路人入镜的照片太难了，最后只能凑合拍些带陌生人的照片。"According to travel platform Qunar, the weekend of March 14 and 15 saw searches for flower viewing-related keywords increase more than 60 percent week-on-week.据去哪儿旅行平台数据显示，3月14日至15日周末期间，"赏花"相关关键词的搜索量环比增长超过60%。Traditional hot spots, including Hangzhou in Zhejiang province, Chengdu in Sichuan province, Wuhan in Hubei province, and Kunming and Dali in Yunnan province, continue to rank among the top 15 tourist destinations this season.传统的热门赏花地依然稳居今春旅游目的地前15名，包括浙江杭州、四川成都、湖北武汉、云南昆明和大理等地。In Beijing, magnolia and mountain peach trees are already blooming, painting the city with the first burst of spring colors. Mountain peach blossoms at the Summer Palace's west dike and Olympic Forest Park entered peak blooming season in mid-March. Early cherry blossoms at Yuyuantan Park can be seen now, with Qunar reporting a 50 percent year-on-year increase in flower-viewing searches in the capital. Hotels near Qianmen, the Temple of Heaven and Chaoyang Park — known for their photogenic flower spots — are witnessing brisk bookings.在北京，玉兰和山桃已经吐蕊，为城市染上第一抹春色。颐和园西堤和奥林匹克森林公园的山桃花在3月中旬进入盛花期。玉渊潭公园的早樱也已开放，据去哪儿网数据，北京"赏花"搜索量同比增长50%。前门、天坛、朝阳公园附近因拥有绝佳的花景拍摄点，酒店预订量节节攀升。Beijing resident Li Kai said that he took half a day off from work on Wednesday to enjoy the early cherry blossoms at Yuyuantan after seeing photos on social media.北京市民李凯说，他在社交媒体上看到玉渊潭公园的樱花照片后，周三专门请了半天假去赏早樱。"The blossoms looked so beautiful against the clear water and blue sky — my mood instantly lifted," he said."清澈的湖水和蓝天映衬下的樱花美不胜收——我的心情一下子就明媚起来了。"他说。In Wuhan, early cherry blossoms have entered peak viewing season. Flight bookings to the city in March increased 12.5 percent year-on-year.在武汉，早樱已进入最佳观赏期。3月飞往武汉的航班预订量同比增长12.5%。China's spring scenery is also attracting foreigners. According to Qunar, in March, domestic flight bookings made with non-Chinese passports rose 21 percent year-on-year.中国的春日美景也吸引着外国游客。根据去哪儿网数据，3月使用非中国护照预订国内航班的旅客数量同比增长21%。Nyingchi in the Xizang autonomous region saw a 630 percent surge in foreign arrivals for its pink peach blossoms. Datong in Shanxi province, famous for apricot blossoms, recorded an increase of over 900 percent. Kashgar and Yining in the Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region saw foreign tourist numbers rise 500 percent and 350 percent, respectively.西藏林芝的桃花吸引了大量外国游客，相关订单量激增630%；以杏花闻名的山西大同，外国游客数量增幅超过900%；新疆喀什和伊宁的外国游客数量则分别增长了500%和350%。The spike in demand comes amid a sharp fall in airfares. Prices are lower by 30 to 70 percent on multiple routes compared with February. One-way flights from Beijing to Hangzhou, Wuxi or Wuhan are available for as little as 300 yuan ($44), making them even cheaper than high-speed train tickets.旅游需求激增的同时，机票价格却大幅下降。多条航线的机票价格较2月下降了30%至70%。从北京飞往杭州、无锡或武汉的单程机票最低仅需300元（约合44美元），比高铁票还便宜。Lyu Ning, dean of Beijing International Studies University's School of Tourism Sciences, said the focus of flower-viewing tours in 2026 is immersive experiences and scenario innovation.北京第二外国语学院旅游科学学院院长吕宁表示，2026年赏花旅游的核心在于沉浸式体验与场景创新。"There is a strong sense of immersion. There is a shift from superficial viewing to deep participation," she said.她说："沉浸感显著增强，正在从浅层的观看式游览向深度的参与式体验转变。"Lyu added that flower-viewing also creates a full consumption chain — transportation, accommodations, dining, experiences and shopping — transforming floral landscapes into an economic driver.吕宁还补充说，赏花活动还能带动交通、住宿、餐饮、体验、购物等全链条消费，将"花海"转化为实实在在的经济动能。herald /ˈherəld/预示；宣布 magnolia /mæɡˈnoʊliə/玉兰 brisk /brɪsk/兴旺的；轻快的 airfare /ˈeə(r)fer/机票费用

On today's episode: Iran hits Kuwaiti oil refinery and explosions boom over Tehran from Israeli attack Iran's new Supreme Leader call for the enemies calls for the enemies of his nation to have their 'security' taken away Arizona community hits 110 degrees F, the highest March temperature recorded in the US MLB partners with Polymarket, makes integrity pact with federal commission on prediction markets Is spring really — finally — here. A Mexican teen migrant dies in a Florida jail holding ICE detainees. Asylum claim denied for the family of the boy in a bunny hat detained with his father, lawyer says. Belarus releases 250 political prisoners in a deal with the US to lift some sanctions. Epstein's former attorney tells House panel he didn't know about the abuse. Treasury Department begins taking over student loans as the Education Department gets dismantled. Iran retaliates against Gulf energy sites as stocks sink worldwide. DOJ investigation into Powell could backfire on Trump and keep Fed chair in office. There was a tense moment during President Trump's White House meeting with Japan's leader.. Pentagon seeks $200 billion in additional funds for the Iran war, AP source says. Mullin's DHS nomination advances to full Senate despite opposition from Republican Rand Paul. Pentagon seeks $200 billion in additional funds for the Iran war, AP source says. Former '19 Kids and Counting' star Joseph Duggar is arrested on a child molestation charge. The body of an American student who went missing in Barcelona has been found, police in Spain say. Kevin Spacey settles out of court with 3 men over alleged sexual assaults. ABC cancels 'Bachelorette' season with Taylor Frankie Paul, citing 2023 video. Rapper Afroman wins lawsuit against police over mocking their 2022 raid in viral music videos. How to monitor airport security lines at US airports while TSA officers go without pay. What ACA enrollees are cutting back on to afford health care, according to a new poll. Brent crude briefly tops $119 per barrel, before receding, and shakes stock markets worldwide. Average US long-term mortgage rate rises to 6.22%, highest level in more than 3 months. China's Alibaba targets $100B in AI and cloud revenue over 5 years. Uber to invest up to $1.25B in Rivian to help launch robotaxis. The top seed in March Madness survives a scare vs. a No. 16 seed and plenty of upsets on day one of the NCAA Tournament, the women’s bracket is set after First Four results, the NBA’s all-time leading scorer secures another milestone and a budding Pistons star is sidelined by a lung ailment. Another record for LeBron He ties Robert Parish by appearing in his 1,611th NBA regular-season game. FIFA fines Israel, denies key Palestinian complaint and urges Iran to fulfill World Cup schedule. Iranian women's national soccer team faces uncertainty returning home amid war, exiled player says. Pope Leo endorses Francis' divisive 2016 text on Communion after civil remarriage. Palestinians mark the start of id al-Fitr with prayers in Gaza City's Saraya yard. Iran intensifies attacks on Gulf energy sites after Israel struck its key gas field. China's Hubei province arrests 7, shuts websites in fentanyl crackdown. EU leaders blast Viktor Orbán over a Ukraine loan veto, accusing him of playing election games. —The Associated Press About this program Host Terry Lipshetz is managing editor of the national newsroom for Lee Enterprises. Besides producing the daily Hot off the Wire news podcast, Terry conducts periodic interviews for this Behind the Headlines program, co-hosts the Streamed & Screened movies and television program and is the former producer of Across the Sky, a podcast dedicated to weather and climate. Theme music The News Tonight, used under license from Soundstripe. YouTube clearance: ZR2MOTROGI4XAHRX

Free trains and dedicated buses are helping a large number of migrant workers return to jobs after the Spring Festival holiday, especially those traveling from China's central and western regions to the eastern seaboard.春节假期过后，大批外出务工者踏上返岗之路。免费专列、包车等暖心服务正助力他们便捷返岗，尤其是那些从中国中西部地区前往东部沿海地区的务工人员。On Tuesday, a traveler surnamed Yang boarded a special train free of charge at Qiandongnan Miao and Dong autonomous prefecture in Guizhou province and arrived in Foshan, Guangdong province, in South China.2月24日（正月初八），春节假期后返岗首日，来自贵州省黔东南苗族侗族自治州的杨女士免费搭乘专列抵达广东省佛山市。The prefecture's human resources department provided about 500 seats for migrant workers such as her.黔东南州人力资源和社会保障局为务工者提供了约500个座位。More free trains will depart from the prefecture through Feb 28 to destinations including cities such as Hangzhou in Zhejiang province and Guangzhou in Guangdong province. Roughly 500 free seats per service are reserved exclusively for locals who work outside their hometown.到2月28日，该州还将开设更多免费专列，开往浙江杭州、广东广州等城市，每趟专列将为外出务工人员预留约500个免费座位。Each year after the Chinese New Year holiday, firms resume operations and many workers who spent the break at home must return to their posts. That produces a short surge in travel and makes securing tickets the top priority for many.每年春节假期过后，企业复工复产，回乡探亲的务工人员都得返回工作岗位，从而形成节后出行高峰，买到车票成了许多人的头等大事。Yang told China Daily that she scanned a QR code to register after her village issued the notice, and she received a confirmation message the next day. She posted about securing the free ride online and replied to fellow villagers' queries about how to apply.杨女士向《中国日报》表示，在村里下发通知后，她扫码登记，第二天就收到了确认信息。她在网上分享了乘坐免费专列的消息，并回复了同村人关于如何申请的问题。Another beneficiary, Yang Ying from Huangping county in Qiandongnan, said past returns required multiple transfers and a day or more of exhausting travel while carrying heavy luggage.另一位受益者、来自贵州省黄平县的杨英表示，过去返岗需要在多个换乘点之间奔波，耗费一天多的时间，还得拖着沉重的行李。"I have worked in Hangzhou for more than three years. Every year, the hardest task after the holiday is getting tickets. When I saw the free train notice, I scanned, applied and received confirmation within a few days. I felt relieved," she said.她说："我在杭州务工三年多了，每年春节返岗最发愁的就是抢票，看到免费专列报名公告，我第一时间就扫码报名了，没几天就收到确认短信，心里一下子就踏实了。"Wang Wanmin, director of the prefecture's human resources and social security bureau, said they will continue to operate special trains and buses to transport 20,000 fellow townspeople to jobs, further stabilizing employment and boosting incomes.黔东南州人力资源和社会保障局局长王万敏表示，当地将继续开设专列、包车，护送2万余名外出务工人员返岗，进一步稳定就业，促进增收。Railway authorities said the China Railway Chengdu Group plans to run 32 post-festival special trains for workers, which are expected to carry about 18,000 passengers through March 6.铁路部门称，中国铁路成都局集团有限公司计划在节后开行32趟务工人员专列，预计在3月6日前运送约1.8万名旅客。The group manages lines serving provinces such as Sichuan and Guizhou, regions that are major sources of migrant labor.该公司管理四川、贵州等务工人员输出大省的铁路线路。Similar targeted services operate nationwide. Also on Tuesday, a special train for workers from Xi'an in Shaanxi province departed for Suzhou, Jiangsu province, delivering employees directly to contracted employers in Suzhou and nearby Taicang city.全国其他地方也有类似的精准服务。同样在2月24日，一列满载务工人员的专列从陕西省西安市驶往江苏省苏州市，直接将员工送至苏州及太仓市的签约企业。Officials said the transported workers had been prematched with positions in high-end intelligent manufacturing, electronic information, auto parts and precision machinery industries. Roles include technical operators, quality control staff, warehousing personnel and support service staff.据官方介绍，此次输送的务工人员已提前与高端智能制造、电子信息、汽车零部件和精密机械等行业的岗位匹配，涵盖技术操作工、品质管控、仓储物流及配套服务等。After the workers arrived at Suzhou North Railway Station, local human resources departments provided dedicated shuttle vehicles to take them directly to factory dormitories.务工人员抵达苏州北站后，当地人社部门安排专用接驳车，闭环运送务工人员直达厂区宿舍。More flexible, targeted transport has also been added. Guangdong province has introduced bus routes from labor-exporting areas to provide point-to-point service.更灵活、精准的返岗运输服务也在加码。广东省已开通从劳务输出大县到务工集中地的返岗直通车。Between Feb 19 and Feb 25, passengers could scan a code to find buses from provinces including Hunan, Jiangxi and Hubei bound for Guangzhou city, and register their return-to-work transport needs online, local media reported.据当地媒体报道，2月19日至25日，旅客可扫码查询从湖南、江西、湖北等省份发往广州的专车，并在线登记返岗出行需求。Huizhou city in Guangdong province will also set up return-to-work shuttle services at major transport hubs to provide last-mile connections for arriving migrant workers. The program is expected to serve more than 3,000 returning workers.广东省惠州市也将在主要交通枢纽设置返岗接驳专线，为返岗务工人员提供"最后一公里"的便利。该项目预计将为3000多名返岗务工人员提供服务。ree of charge /friː əv tʃɑːrdʒ/免费top priority /tɒp praɪˈɒrəti/重中之重；最优先事项shuttle services /ˈʃʌtəl ˈsɜːrvɪsɪz/接驳服务；班车服务

Last time we spoke about The Battle of Suixian–Zaoyang-Shatow. Following the brutal 1938 capture of Wuhan, Japanese forces aimed to solidify their hold by launching an offensive against Chinese troops in the 5th War Zone, a rugged natural fortress in northern Hubei and southern Henan. Under General Yasuji Okamura, the 11th Army deployed three divisions and cavalry in a pincer assault starting May 1, 1939, targeting Suixian and Zaoyang to crush Nationalist resistance and secure flanks. Chinese commander Li Zongren, leveraging terrain like the Dabie and Tongbai Mountains, orchestrated defenses with over 200,000 troops, including Tang Enbo's 31st Army Group. By May 23, they recaptured Suixian and Zaoyang, forcing a Japanese withdrawal with heavy losses, over 13,000 Japanese casualties versus 25,000 Chinese, restoring pre-battle lines. Shifting south, Japan targeted Shantou in Guangdong to sever supply lines from Hong Kong. In a massive June 21 amphibious assault, the 21st Army overwhelmed thin Chinese defenses, capturing the port and Chao'an despite guerrilla resistance led by Zhang Fakui. Though losses mounted, Japan tightened its blockade, straining China's war effort amid ongoing attrition.   #188 From Changkufeng to Nomonhan Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Well hello again, and yes you all have probably guessed we are taking another detour. Do not worry I hope to shorten this one a bit more so than what became a sort of mini series on the battle of Changkufeng or Battle of Lake Khasan. What we are about to jump into is known in the west as the battle of khalkin Gol, by the Japanese the Nomohan incident. But first I need to sort of set the table up so to say. So back on August 10th, 1938 the Litvinov-Shigemitsu agreement established a joint border commission tasked with redemarcating the disputed boundary between the Soviet Union and Japanese-controlled Manchukuo. However, this commission never achieved a mutually agreeable definition of the border in the contested area. In reality, the outcome was decided well before the group's inaugural meeting. Mere hours after the cease-fire took effect on the afternoon of August 11, General Grigory Shtern convened with a regimental commander from Japan's 19th Division to coordinate the disengagement of forces. With the conflict deemed "honorably" concluded, Japan's Imperial General Headquarters mandated the swift withdrawal of all Japanese troops to the west bank of the Tumen River. By the night of August 13, as the final Japanese soldier crossed the river, it effectively became the de facto border. Soviet forces promptly reoccupied Changkufeng Hill and the adjacent heights—a move that would carry unexpected and profound repercussions. Authoritative Japanese military analyses suggest that if negotiations in Moscow had dragged on for just one more day, the 19th Division would likely have been dislodged from Changkufeng and its surrounding elevations. Undoubtedly, General Shtern's infantry breathed a sigh of relief as the bloodshed ceased. Yet, one can't help but question why Moscow opted for a cease-fire at a juncture when Soviet troops were on the cusp of total battlefield triumph. Perhaps Kremlin leaders deemed it wiser to settle for a substantial gain, roughly three-quarters of their objectives, rather than risk everything. After all, Japan had mobilized threatening forces in eastern Manchuria, and the Imperial Army had a history of impulsive, unpredictable aggression. Moreover, amid the escalating crisis over Czechoslovakia, Moscow may have been wary of provoking a broader Asian conflict. Another theory posits that Soviet high command was misinformed about the ground situation. Reports of capturing a small segment of Changkufeng's crest might have been misinterpreted as control over the entire ridge, or an imminent full takeover before midnight on August 10. The unexpected phone call from Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov to the Japanese embassy that night—proposing a one-kilometer Japanese retreat in exchange for a cease-fire along existing lines—hints at communication breakdowns between Shtern's headquarters and the Kremlin. Ironically, such lapses may have preserved Japanese military honor, allowing the 19th Division's evacuation through diplomacy rather than defeat. Both sides endured severe losses. Initial Japanese press reports claimed 158 killed and 740 wounded. However, the 19th Division's medical logs reveal a grimmer toll: 526 dead and 914 injured, totaling 1,440 casualties. The true figure may have climbed higher, possibly to 1,500–2,000. Following the armistice, the Soviet news agency TASS reported 236 Red Army fatalities and 611 wounded. Given Shtern's uphill assaults across open terrain against entrenched positions, these numbers seem understated. Attackers in such scenarios typically suffered two to three times the defenders' losses, suggesting Soviet casualties ranged from 3,000 to 5,000. This aligns with a Soviet Military Council investigation on August 31, 1938, which documented 408 killed and 2,807 wounded. Japanese estimates placed Soviet losses even higher, at 4,500–7,000. Not all victims perished in combat. Marshal Vasily Blyukher, a decorated Soviet commander, former warlord of the Far East, and Central Committee candidate, was summoned to Moscow in August 1938. Relieved of duty in September and arrested with his family in October, he faced charges of inadequate preparation against Japanese aggression and harboring "enemies of the people" within his ranks. On November 9, 1938, Blyukher died during interrogation a euphemism for torture-induced death.Other innocents suffered as well. In the wake of the fighting, Soviet authorities deported hundreds of thousands of Korean rice farmers from the Ussuri region to Kazakhstan, aiming to eradicate Korean settlements that Japanese spies had allegedly exploited. The Changkufeng clash indirectly hampered Japan's Wuhan offensive, a massive push to subdue China. The influx of troops and supplies for this campaign was briefly disrupted by the border flare-up. Notably, Kwantung Army's 2nd Air Group, slated for Wuhan, was retained due to the Soviet threat. Chiang Kai-shek's drastic measure, breaching the Yellow River dikes to flood Japanese advance routes—further delayed the assault. By October 25, 1938, when Japanese forces captured Hankow, Chiang had relocated his capital to distant Chungking. Paradoxically, Wuhan's fall cut rail links from Canton inland, heightening Chiang's reliance on Soviet aid routed overland and by air from Central Asia. Japan secured a tactical win but missed the decisive blow; Chinese resistance persisted, pinning down a million Japanese troops in occupation duties. What was the true significance of Changkufeng? For General Koiso Suetaka and the 19th Division, it evoked a mix of bitterness and pride. Those eager for combat got their share, though not on their terms. To veterans mourning fallen comrades on those desolate slopes, it might have felt like senseless tragedy. Yet, they fought valiantly under dire conditions, holding firm until a retreat that blended humiliation with imperial praise, a bittersweet inheritance. For the Red Army, it marked a crucial trial of resolve amid Stalin's purges. While Shtern's forces didn't shine brilliantly, they acquitted themselves well in adversity. The U.S. military attaché in Moscow observed that any purge-related inefficiencies had been surmounted, praising the Red Army's valor, reliability, and equipment. His counterpart in China, Colonel Joseph Stilwell, put it bluntly: the Soviets "appeared to advantage," urging skeptics to rethink notions of a weakened Red Army. Yet, by World War II's eve, many British, French, German, and Japanese leaders still dismissed it as a "paper tiger." Soviet leaders appeared content, promoting Shtern to command the Transbaikal Military District and colonel general by 1940, while honoring "Heroes of Lake Khasan" with medals. In a fiery November 7, 1938, speech, Marshal Kliment Voroshilov warned that future incursions would prompt strikes deep into enemy territory. Tokyo's views diverged sharply. Many in the military and government saw it as a stain on Imperial Army prestige, especially Kwantung Army, humiliated on Manchukuo soil it swore to protect. Colonel Masanobu Tsuji Inada, however, framed it as a successful reconnaissance, confirming Soviet border defense without broader aggression, allowing the Wuhan push to proceed safely. Critics, including Major General Gun Hashimoto and historians, questioned this. They argued IGHQ lacked contingency plans for a massive Soviet response, especially with Wuhan preparations underway since June. One expert warned Japan had "played with fire," risking Manchuria and Korea if escalation occurred. Yet, Japanese commanders gleaned few lessons, downplaying Soviet materiel superiority and maintaining disdain for Red Army prowess. The 19th Division's stand against outnumbered odds reinforced this hubris, as did tolerance for local insubordination—attitudes that would prove costly. The Kremlin, conversely, learned Japan remained unpredictable despite its China quagmire. But for Emperor Hirohito's intervention, the conflict might have ballooned. Amid purges and the Czech crisis, Stalin likely viewed it as a reminder of eastern vulnerabilities, especially with Munich advancing German threats westward. Both sides toyed with peril. Moderation won in Tokyo, but Kwantung Army seethed. On August 11, Premier Fumimaro Konoye noted the need for caution. Kwantung, however, pushed for and secured control of the disputed salient from Chosen Army by October 8, 1938. Even winter's chill couldn't quench their vengeful fire, setting the stage for future confrontations. A quick look at the regional map reveals how Manchukuo and the Mongolian People's Republic each jut into the other's territory like protruding salients. These bulges could be seen as aggressive thrusts into enemy land, yet they also risked encirclement and absorption by the opposing empire. A northward push from western Manchuria through Mongolia could sever the MPR and Soviet Far East from the USSR's heartland. Conversely, a pincer movement from Mongolia and the Soviet Maritime Province might envelop and isolate Manchukuo. This dynamic highlights the frontier's strategic volatility in the 1930s. One particularly tense sector was the broad Mongolian salient extending about 150 miles eastward into west-central Manchukuo. There, in mid-1939, Soviet-Japanese tensions erupted into major combat. Known to the Japanese as the Nomonhan Incident and to the Soviets and Mongolians as the Battle of Khalkhin Gol, this clash dwarfed the earlier Changkufeng affair in scale, duration, and impact. Spanning four months and claiming 30,000 to 50,000 casualties, it amounted to a small undeclared war, the modern era's first limited conflict between great powers. The Mongolian salient features vast, semiarid plains of sandy grassland, gently rolling terrain dotted with sparse scrub pines and low shrubs. The climate is unforgivingly continental: May brings hot days and freezing nights, while July and August see daytime highs exceeding 38°C (100°F in American units), with cool evenings. Swarms of mosquitoes and massive horseflies necessitate netting in summer. Rainfall is scarce, but dense morning fogs are common in August. Come September, temperatures plummet, with heavy snows by October and midwinter lows dipping to –34°C. This blend of North African aridity and North Dakotan winters supports only sparse populations, mainly two related but distinct Mongol tribes. The Buriat (or Barga) Mongols migrated into the Nomonhan area from the northwest in the late 17th to early 18th centuries, likely fleeing Russian expansion after the 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk. Organized by Manchu emperors between 1732 and 1735, they settled east of the river they called Khalkhin Gol (Mongolian for "river"), in lands that would later become Manchukuo. The Khalkha Mongols, named for the word meaning "barrier" or "shield," traditionally guarded the Mongol Empire's northern frontiers. Their territories lay west of the Buriats, in what would become the MPR. For centuries, these tribes herded livestock across sands, river crossings, and desert paths, largely oblivious to any formal borders. For hundreds of years, the line dividing the Mongolian salient from western Manchuria was a hazy administrative divide within the Qing Empire. In the 20th century, Russia's detachment of Outer Mongolia and Japan's seizure of Manchuria transformed this vague boundary into a frontline between rival powers. The Nomonhan Incident ignited over this contested border. Near the salient's northeastern edge, the river, called Khalkhin Gol by Mongols and Soviets, and Halha by Manchurians and Japanese, flows northwest into Lake Buir Nor. The core dispute: Was the river, as Japan asserted, the historic boundary between Manchukuo and the MPR? Soviet and MPR officials insisted the line ran parallel to and 10–12 miles east of the river, claiming the intervening strip. Japan cited no fewer than 18 maps, from Chinese and Japanese sources, to support the river as the border, a logical choice in such barren terrain, where it served as the sole natural divider. Yet, Soviets and Mongolians countered with evidence like a 1919 Chinese postal atlas and maps from Japanese and Manchukuoan agencies (1919–1934). Unbeknownst to combatants, in July 1939, China's military attaché in Moscow shared a 1934 General Staff map with his American counterpart, showing the border east of the river. Postwar Japanese studies of 18th-century Chinese records confirm that in 1734, the Qing emperor set a boundary between Buriat and Khalkha Mongols east of the river, passing through the hamlet of Nomonhan—as the Soviets claimed. However, Kwantung Army Headquarters dismissed this as non-binding, viewing it as an internal Qing affair without Russian involvement. Two former Kwantung Army officers offer a pragmatic explanation: From 1931 to 1935, when Soviet forces in the Far East were weak, Japanese and Manchukuoan authorities imposed the river as the de facto border, with MPR acquiescence. By the mid- to late 1930s, as Soviet strength grew, Japan refused to yield, while Mongolians and Soviets rejected the river line, sparking clashes. In 1935, Kwantung Army revised its maps to align with the river claim. From late that year, the Lake Buir Nor–Halha sector saw frequent skirmishes between Manchukuoan and MPR patrols. Until mid-1938, frontier defense in northwestern Manchukuo fell to the 8th Border Garrison Unit , based near Hailar. This 7,000-man force, spread thin, lacked mobility, training, and, in Kwantung Army's eyes, combat readiness. That summer, the newly formed 23rd Division, under Kwantung Army, took station at Hailar, absorbing the 8th BGU under its command, led by Lieutenant General Michitaro Komatsubara. At 52, Komatsubara was a premier Russian specialist in the Imperial Army, with stints as military attaché in the USSR and head of Kwantung's Special Services Agency in Harbin. Standing 5'7" with a sturdy build, glasses, and a small mustache, he was detail-oriented, keeping meticulous diaries, writing lengthy letters, and composing poetry, though he lacked combat experience. Before departing Tokyo in July 1938, Komatsubara received briefings from Colonel Masazumi Inada, AGS Operations Section chief. Amid planning for Changkufeng, Inada urged calm on the Manchukuo-MPR border given China's ongoing campaigns. Guidelines: Ignore minor incidents, prioritize intelligence on Soviet forces east of Lake Baikal, and study operations against the Soviet Far East's western sector. Familiar with the region from his Harbin days, Komatsubara adopted a low-key approach. Neither impulsive nor aggressive, he kept the green 23rd Division near Hailar, delegating patrols to the 8th BGU. An autumn incident underscores his restraint. On November 1, 1938, an 8th BGU patrol was ambushed by MPR forces. Per Japanese accounts, the three-man team, led by a lieutenant, strayed too close to the border and was attacked 50 meters inside Manchukuo. The lieutenant escaped, but his men died. Komatsubara sent an infantry company to secure the site but forbade retaliation. He pursued body recovery diplomatically, protested to MPR and Soviet officials, and disciplined his officers: garrison leaders got five days' confinement for poor troop training, the lieutenant thirty days. Despite this caution, pressures at AGS and KwAHQ were mounting, poised to thrust the 23rd Division into fierce battle. Modern militaries routinely develop contingency plans against potential adversaries, and the mere existence of such strategies doesn't inherently signal aggressive intentions. That said, shifts in Japan's operational planning vis-à-vis the Soviet Union may have inadvertently fueled the Nomonhan Incident. From 1934 to 1938, Japanese war scenarios emphasized a massive surprise assault in the Ussuri River region, paired with defensive holding actions in northwestern Manchuria. However, between mid-1938 and early 1939, a clandestine joint task force from the Army General Staff  and Kwantung Army's Operations Departments crafted a bold new blueprint. This revised strategy proposed containing Soviet forces in the east and north while unleashing a full-scale offensive from Hailar, advancing west-northwest toward Chita and ultimately Lake Baikal. The goal: sever the Transbaikal Soviet Far East from the USSR's core. Dubbed Plan Eight-B, it gained Kwantung Army's endorsement in March 1939. Key architects—Colonels Takushiro Hattori and Masao Terada, along with Major Takeharu Shimanuki—were reassigned from AGS to Kwantung Army Headquarters to oversee implementation. The plan anticipated a five-year buildup before execution, with Hattori assuming the role of chief operations staff officer.  A map review exposes a glaring vulnerability in Plan Eight-B: the Japanese advance would leave its southern flank exposed to Soviet counterstrikes from the Mongolian salient. By spring 1939, KwAHQ likely began perceiving this protrusion as a strategic liability. Notably, at the outbreak of Nomonhan hostilities, no detailed operational contingencies for the area had been formalized. Concurrently, Japan initiated plans for a vital railroad linking Harlun Arshan to Hailar. While its direct tie to Plan Eight-B remains unclear, the route skirted perilously close to the Halha River, potentially heightening KwAHQ's focus on the disputed Mongolian salient. In early 1939, the 23rd Division intensified reconnaissance patrols near the river. Around this time, General Grigory Shtern, freshly appointed commander of Soviet Far Eastern forces, issued a public warning that Japan was gearing up for an assault on the Mongolian People's Republic. As Plan Eight-B took shape and railroad proposals advanced, KwAHQ issued a strikingly confrontational set of guidelines for frontier troops. These directives are often cited as a catalyst for the Nomonhan clash, forging a chain linking the 1937 Amur River incident, the 1938 Changkufeng debacle, and the 1939 conflict.Resentment had festered at KwAHQ over perceived AGS meddling during the Amur affair, which curtailed their command autonomy. This frustration intensified at Changkufeng, where General Kamezo Suetaka's 19th Division endured heavy losses, only for the contested Manchukuoan territory to be effectively ceded. Kwantung Army lobbied successfully to wrest oversight of the Changkufeng salient from Chosen Army. In November 1938, Major Masanobu Tsuji of KwAHQ's Operations Section was sent to survey the site. The audacious officer was dismayed: Soviet forces dominated the land from the disputed ridge to the Tumen River. Tsuji undertook several winter reconnaissance missions. His final outing in March 1939 involved leading 40 men to Changkufeng's base. With rifles slung non-threateningly, they ascended to within 200 yards of Soviet lines, formed a line, and urinated in unison, eliciting amused reactions from the enemy. They then picnicked with obentos and sake, sang army tunes, and left gifts of canned meat, chocolates, and whiskey. This theatrical stunt concealed Tsuji's real aim: covert photography proving Soviet fortifications encroached on Manchukuoan soil. Tsuji was a singular figure. Born of modest means, he embodied a modern samurai ethos, channeling a sharp intellect into a frail, often ailing body through feats of extraordinary daring. A creative tactician, he thrived in intelligence ops, political scheming, aerial scouting, planning, and frontline command—excelling across a tumultuous career. Yet, flaws marred his brilliance: narrow bigotry, virulent racism, and capacity for cruelty. Ever the ambitious outsider, Tsuji wielded outsized influence via gekokujo—Japan's tradition of subordinates steering policy from below. In 1939, he was a major, but his pivotal role at Nomonhan stemmed from this dynamic. Back in Hsinking after his Changkufeng escapade, Tsuji drafted a response plan: negotiate border "rectification" with the Soviets; if talks failed, launch an attack to expel intruders. Kwantung Army adopted it. Deputy Chief of Staff Major General Otozaburo Yano flew to Tokyo with Tsuji's photos, seeking AGS approval. There, he was rebuffed—Changkufeng was deemed settled, and minor violations should be overlooked amid Tokyo's aversion to Soviet conflict. Yano's plea that leniency would invite aggression was countered by notes on Europe's tensions restraining Moscow. Yano's return sparked outrage at KwAHQ, seen as AGS thwarting their imperial duty to safeguard Manchukuo. Fury peaked in the Operations Section, setting the stage for Tsuji's drafting of stringent new frontier guidelines: "Principles for the Settlement of Soviet-Manchukuoan Border Disputes." The core tenet: "If Soviet troops transgress the Manchukuoan frontiers, Kwantung Army will nip their ambitions in the bud by completely destroying them." Specific directives for local commanders included: "If the enemy crosses the frontiers … annihilate him without delay, employing strength carefully built up beforehand. To accomplish our mission, it is permissible to enter Soviet territory, or to trap or lure Soviet troops into Manchukuoan territory and allow them to remain there for some time… . Where boundary lines are not clearly defined, area defense commanders will, upon their own initiative, establish boundaries and indicate them to the forward elements… . In the event of an armed clash, fight until victory is won, regardless of relative strengths or of the location of the boundaries. If the enemy violates the borders, friendly units must challenge him courageously and endeavor to triumph in their zone of action without concerning themselves about the consequences, which will be the responsibility of higher headquarters." Major Tsuji Masanobu later justified the new guidelines by pointing to the "contradictory orders" that had hamstrung frontier commanders under the old rules. They were tasked with upholding Manchukuo's territorial integrity yet forbidden from actions that might spark conflict. This, Tsuji argued, bred hesitation, as officers feared repercussions for decisive responses to incursions. The updated directives aimed to alleviate this "anxiety," empowering local leaders to act boldly without personal liability. In truth, Tsuji's "Principles for the Settlement of Soviet-Manchukuoan Border Disputes" were more incendiary than conciliatory. They introduced provocative measures: authorizing commanders to unilaterally define unclear boundaries, enforce them with immediate force "shoot first, ask questions later", permit pursuits into enemy territory, and even encourage luring adversaries across the line. Such tactics flouted both government policy and official army doctrine, prioritizing escalation over restraint. The proposals sparked intense debate within Kwantung Army's Operations Section. Section chief Colonel Takushiro Hattori and Colonel Masao Terada outranked Tsuji, as did Major Takeharu Shimanuki, all recent transfers from the Army General Staff. Tsuji, however, boasted longer tenure at Kwantung Army Headquarters since April 1936 and in Operations since November 1937, making him the de facto veteran. Hattori and Terada hesitated to challenge the assertive major, whose reputation for intellect, persuasion, and deep knowledge of Manchuria commanded respect. In a 1960 interview, Shimanuki recalled Tsuji's dominance in discussions, where his proactive ideas often swayed the group. Unified, the section forwarded Tsuji's plan to Kwantung Army Command. Commander Lieutenant General Kenkichi Ueda consulted Chief of Staff General Rensuke Isogai and Vice Chief General Otozaburo Yano, seasoned leaders who should have spotted the guidelines' volatility. Yet, lingering grudges from AGS "interference" in past incidents like the Amur River and Changkufeng clouded their judgment. Ueda, Isogai, and Tsuji shared history from the 1932 Shanghai Incident: Tsuji, then a captain, led a company in the 7th Regiment under Colonel Isogai, with Yano as staff officer and Ueda commanding the 9th Division. Tsuji was wounded there, forging bonds of camaraderie. This "clique," which grew to include Hattori, Terada, and Shimanuki, amplified Tsuji's influence. Despite Isogai's initial reservations as the group's moderate voice, the guidelines won approval. Ueda issued them as Kwantung Army Operations Order 1488 on April 25, 1939, during a division commanders' conference at KwAHQ. A routine copy reached AGS in Tokyo, but no formal reply came. Preoccupied with the China War and alliance talks with Germany, AGS may have overlooked border matters. Colonel Masazumi Inada, AGS Operations head, later noted basic acceptance of Order 1488, with an informal expectation—relayed to Hattori and Terada—of prior consultation on violations. KwAHQ dismissed this as another Tokyo intrusion on their autonomy. Some Japanese analysts contend a stern AGS rejection might have prevented Nomonhan's catastrophe, though quelling Kwantung's defiance could have required mass staff reassignments, a disruptive step AGS avoided. Tsuji countered that permitting forceful action at Changkufeng would have deterred Nomonhan altogether, underscoring the interconnectedness of these clashes while implicitly critiquing the 1939 battle's location. Undeniably, Order 1488's issuance on April 25 paved the way for conflict three weeks later. Japanese records confirm that Khalkha Mongols and MPR patrols routinely crossed the Halha River—viewed by them as internal territory, 10 miles from the true border. Such crossings passed uneventfully in March and April 1939. Post-Order 1488, however, 23rd Division commander General Michitaro Komatsubara responded aggressively, setting the stage for escalation. The Nomonhan Incident ignited with a border clash on May 11–12, 1939, that rapidly spiraled into a major conflict. Over a dozen "authoritative" accounts exist, varying in viewpoint, focus, and specifics. After cross-referencing these sources, a coherent timeline emerges. On the night of May 10–11, a 20-man Mongolian People's Republic border patrol crossed eastward over the Halha River (known as Khalkhin Gol to Mongols and Soviets). About 10 miles east, atop a 150-foot sandy hill, lay the tiny hamlet of Nomonhan, a cluster of crude huts housing a few Mongol families. Just south flowed the Holsten River, merging westward into the broader Halha. By morning on May 11, Manchukuoan forces spotted the MPR patrol north of the Holsten and west of Nomonhan. In the MPR/Soviet perspective, Nomonhan Hill marked the Mongolia-Manchuria border. To Manchukuoans and Japanese, it sat 10 miles inside Manchukuo, well east of the Halha. A 40-man Manchukuoan cavalry unit repelled the Mongolians back across the river, inflicting initial casualties on both sides—the Manchukuoans drawing first blood. The MPR patrol leader exaggerated the attackers as 200 strong. The next day, May 12, a 60-man MPR force under Major P. Chogdan evicted the Manchukuoans from the disputed zone, reestablishing positions between the Halha and Nomonhan. The Manchukuoans, in turn, reported facing 700 enemies. Sporadic skirmishes and maneuvering persisted through the week. On May 13, two days post-clash, the local Manchukuoan commander alerted General Michitaro Komatsubara's 23rd Division headquarters in Hailar. Simultaneously, Major Chogdan reported to Soviet military command in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia's capital. What began as a Mongolian-Manchukuoan spat was poised to draw in Soviet and Japanese patrons. Attributing the May 10–11 violation hinges on border interpretations: both sides claimed the Halha-Nomonhan strip. Yet, most accounts concur that Manchukuoan forces initiated the fighting. Post-May 13 notifications to Moscow and Tokyo clarify the record thereafter. Midday on May 13, Komatsubara was leading a staff conference on the newly issued Kwantung Army Operations Order 1488—Major Tsuji Masanobu's aggressive border guidelines. Ironically, the first Nomonhan combat report arrived mid-discussion. Officers present recall Komatsubara deciding instantly to "destroy the invading Outer Mongolian forces" per Order 1488. That afternoon, he informed Kwantung Army Headquarters of the incident and his intent to eradicate the intruders, requesting air support and trucks. General Kenkichi Ueda, Kwantung commander, approved Komatsubara's "positive attitude," dispatching six scout planes, 40 fighters, 10 light bombers, two anti-aircraft batteries, and two motorized transport companies. Ueda added a caveat: exercise "extreme caution" to prevent escalation—a paradoxical blend of destruction and restraint, reflective of KwAHQ's fervent mood. Ueda relayed the details to Tokyo's Army General Staff, which responded that Kwantung should handle it "appropriately." Despite Kwantung's impulsive reputation, Tokyo deferred, perhaps trusting the northern strategic imbalance, eight Japanese divisions versus 30 Soviet ones from Lake Baikal to Vladivostok, would enforce prudence. This faith proved misguided. On May 14, Major Tsuji flew from KwAHQ for aerial reconnaissance over Nomonhan, spotting 20 horses but no troops. Upon landing, a fresh bullet hole in his plane confirmed lingering MPR presence east of the Halha. Tsuji briefed 23rd Division staff and reported to Ueda that the incident seemed minor. Aligning with Order 1488's spirit, Komatsubara deployed a force under Lieutenant Colonel Yaozo Azuma: an armored car company, two infantry companies, and a cavalry troop. Arriving at Nomonhan on May 15, Azuma learned most MPR forces had retreated westward across the Halha the prior night, with only token elements remaining, and those withdrawing. Undeterred, he pursued. The advance met scant resistance, as foes had crossed the river. However, Japanese light bombers struck a small MPR concentration on the west bank, Outpost Number 7, killing two and wounding 15 per MPR reports; Japanese claimed 30–40 kills. All agree: the raid targeted undisputed MPR territory. Hearing of May 15's events, Komatsubara deemed the Mongolians sufficiently rebuked and recalled Azuma to Hailar on May 16. KwAHQ concurred, closing the matter. Soviet leaders, however, saw it differently. Mid-May prompted Soviet support for the MPR under their 1936 Mutual Defense Pact. The Red Army's 57th Corps, stationed in Mongolia, faced initial disarray: Commander Nikolai Feklenko was hunting, Chief of Staff A. M. Kushchev in Ulan Ude with his ill wife. Moscow learned of clashes via international press from Japanese sources, sparking Chief of Staff Boris Shaposhnikov's furious inquiry. Feklenko and Kushchev rushed back to Ulaanbaatar, dispatching a mixed force—a battalion from the 149th Infantry Regiment (36th Division), plus light armor and artillery from the 11th Tank Brigade—to Tamsag Bulak, 80 miles west of the Halha. Led by Major A. E. Bykov, it bolstered the MPR's 6th Cavalry Division. Bykov and Cavalry Commander Colonel Shoaaiibuu inspected the site on May 15, post-Azum's departure. The cavalry arrived two days later, backed by Bykov (ordered to remain west of the river and avoid combat if possible). Some MPR troops recrossed, occupying the disputed zone. Clashes with Manchukuoan cavalry resumed and intensified. Notified of renewed hostilities, Komatsubara viewed it as defiance, a personal affront. Emboldened by Order 1488, he aimed not just to repel but to encircle and annihilate. The incident was on the verge of major expansion. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The ghosts of the Changufeng incident have come back to haunt both the USSR and Japan. Those like Tsuji Masanobu instigated yet another border clash that would erupt into a full blown battle that would set a precedent for both nations until the very end of WW2. 

Last time we spoke about the battle of Nanchang. After securing Hainan and targeting Zhejiang–Jiangxi Railway corridors, Japan's 11th Army, backed by armor, air power, and riverine operations, sought a rapid, surgical seizure of Nanchang to sever eastern Chinese logistics and coerce Chongqing. China, reorganizing under Chiang Kai-shek, concentrated over 200,000 troops across 52 divisions in the Ninth and Third War Zones, with Xue Yue commanding the 9th War Zone in defense of Wuhan-Nanchang corridors. The fighting began with German-style, combined-arms river operations along the Xiushui and Gan rivers, including feints, river crossings, and heavy artillery, sometimes using poison gas. From March 20–23, Japanese forces established a beachhead and advanced into Fengxin, Shengmi, and later Nanchang, despite stiff Chinese resistance and bridges being destroyed. Chiang's strategic shift toward attrition pushed for broader offensives to disrupt railways and rear areas, though Chinese plans for a counteroffensive repeatedly stalled due to logistics and coordination issues. By early May, Japanese forces encircled and captured Nanchang, albeit at heavy cost, with Chinese casualties surpassing 43,000 dead and Japanese losses over 2,200 dead.    #187 The Battle of Suixian–Zaoyang-Shatow Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Having seized Wuhan in a brutal offensive the previous year, the Japanese sought not just to hold their ground but to solidify their grip on this vital hub. Wuhan, a bustling metropolis at the confluence of the Yangtze and Han Rivers, had become a linchpin in their strategy, a base from which they could project power across central China. Yet, the city was far from secure, Chinese troops in northern Hubei and southern Henan, perched above the mighty Yangtze, posed an unrelenting threat. To relieve the mounting pressure on their newfound stronghold, the Japanese high command orchestrated a bold offensive against the towns of Suixian and Zaoyang. They aimed to annihilate the main force of the Chinese 5th War Zone, a move that would crush the Nationalist resistance in the region and secure their flanks. This theater of war, freshly designated as the 5th War Zone after the grueling Battle of Wuhan, encompassed a vast expanse west of Shashi in the upper Yangtze basin. It stretched across northern Hubei, southern Henan, and the rugged Dabie Mountains in eastern Anhui, forming a strategic bulwark that guarded the eastern approaches to Sichuan, the very heartland of the Nationalist government's central institutions. Historian Rana Mitter in Forgotten Ally described this zone as "a gateway of immense importance, a natural fortress that could either serve as a launchpad for offensives against Japanese-held territories or a defensive redoubt protecting the rear areas of Sichuan and Shaanxi". The terrain itself was a defender's dream and an attacker's nightmare: to the east rose the imposing Dabie Mountains, their peaks cloaked in mist and folklore; the Tongbai Mountains sliced across the north like a jagged spine; the Jing Mountains guarded the west; the Yangtze River snaked southward, its waters a formidable barrier; the Dahong Mountains dominated the center, offering hidden valleys for ambushes; and the Han River (also known as the Xiang River) carved a north-south path through it all. Two critical transport arteries—the Hanyi Road linking Hankou to Yichang in Hubei, and the Xianghua Road connecting Xiangyang to Huayuan near Hankou—crisscrossed this landscape, integrating the war zone into a web of mobility. From here, Chinese forces could menace the vital Pinghan Railway, that iron lifeline running from Beiping (modern Beijing) to Hankou, while also threatening the Wuhan region itself. In retreat, it provided a sanctuary to shield the Nationalist heartlands. As military strategist Sun Tzu might have appreciated, this area had long been a magnet for generals, its contours shaping the fates of empires since ancient times. Despite the 5th War Zone's intricate troop deployments, marked by units of varying combat prowess and a glaring shortage of heavy weapons, the Chinese forces made masterful use of the terrain to harass their invaders. Drawing from accounts in Li Zongren's memoirs, he noted how these defenders, often outgunned but never outmaneuvered, turned hills into fortresses and rivers into moats. In early April 1939, as spring rains turned paths to mud, Chinese troops ramped up their disruptions along the southern stretches of the Pinghan Railway, striking from both eastern and western flanks with guerrilla precision. What truly rattled the Japanese garrison in Wuhan was the arrival of reinforcements: six full divisions redeployed to Zaoyang, bolstering the Chinese capacity to launch flanking assaults that could unravel Japanese supply lines. Alarmed by this buildup, the Japanese 11th Army, ensconced in the Wuhan area under the command of General Yasuji Okamura, a figure whose tactical acumen would later earn him notoriety in the Pacific War, devised a daring plan. They intended to plunge deep into the 5th War Zone, smashing the core of the Chinese forces and rendering them impotent, thereby neutralizing the northwestern threat to Wuhan once and for all. From April onward, the Japanese mobilized with meticulous preparation, amassing troops equipped with formidable artillery, rumbling tanks, and squadrons of aircraft that darkened the skies. Historians estimate they committed roughly three and a half divisions to this endeavor, as detailed in Edward J. Drea's In the Service of the Emperor: Essays on the Imperial Japanese Army. Employing a classic pincer movement, a two-flank encirclement coupled with a central breakthrough, they aimed for a swift, decisive strike to obliterate the main Chinese force in the narrow Suixian-Zaoyang corridor, squeezed between the Tongbai and Dahong Mountains. The offensive erupted in full fury on May 1, 1939, as Japanese columns surged forward like a tidal wave, their engines roaring and banners fluttering in the dust-choked air. General Li Zongren, the commander of the 5th War Zone, a man whose leadership had already shone in earlier campaigns like the defense of Tai'erzhuang in 1938, issued urgent orders to cease offensive actions against the Japanese and pivot to a defensive stance. Based on intelligence about the enemy's dispositions, Li orchestrated a comprehensive campaign structure, assigning precise defensive roles and battle plans to each unit. This was no haphazard scramble; it was a symphony of strategy, as Li himself recounted in his memoirs, emphasizing the need to exploit the terrain's natural advantages. While various Chinese war zones executed the "April Offensive" from late April to mid-May, actively harrying and containing Japanese forces, the 5th War Zone focused its energies on the southern segment of the Pinghan Railway, assaulting it from both sides in a bid to disrupt logistics. The main force of the 31st Army Group, under the command of Tang Enbo, a general known for his aggressive tactics and later criticized for corruption, shifted from elsewhere in Hubei to Zaoyang, fortifying the zone and posing a dire threat to the Japanese flanks and rear areas. To counter this peril and safeguard transportation along the Wuhan-Pinghan Railway, the Japanese, led by the formidable Okamura, unleashed their assault from the line stretching through Xinyang, Yingshan, and Zhongxiang. Mobilizing the 3rd, 13th, and 16th Divisions alongside the 2nd and 4th Cavalry Brigades, they charged toward the Suixian-Zaoyang region in western Hubei, intent on eradicating the Chinese main force and alleviating the siege-like pressure on Wuhan. In a masterful reorganization, Li Zongren divided his forces into two army groups, the left and right, plus a dedicated river defense army. His strategy was a blend of attrition and opportunism: harnessing the Tongbai and Dahong Mountains, clinging to key towns like lifelines, and grinding down the Japanese through prolonged warfare while biding time for a counterstroke. This approach echoed the Fabian tactics of ancient Rome, wearing the enemy thin before delivering the coup de grâce. The storm broke at dawn on May 1, when the main contingents of the Japanese 16th and 13th Divisions, bolstered by the 4th Cavalry Brigade from their bases in Zhongxiang and Jingshan, hurled themselves against the Chinese 37th and 180th Divisions of the Right Army Group. Supported by droning aircraft that strafed from above and tanks that churned the earth below, the Japanese advanced with mechanical precision. By May 4, they had shattered the defensive lines flanking Changshoudian, then surged along the east bank of the Xiang River toward Zaoyang in a massive offensive. Fierce combat raged through May 5, as described in Japanese war diaries compiled in Senshi Sōsho (the official Japanese war history series), where soldiers recounted the relentless Chinese resistance amid the smoke and clamor. The Japanese finally breached the defenses, turning their fury on the 122nd Division of the 41st Army. In a heroic stand, the 180th Division clung to Changshoudian, providing cover for the main force's retreat along the east-west Huangqi'an line. The 37th Division fell back to the Yaojiahe line, while elements of the 38th Division repositioned into Liushuigou. On May 6, the Japanese seized Changshoudian, punched through Huangqi'an, and drove northward, unleashing a devastating assault on the 122nd Division's positions near Wenjiamiao. Undeterred, Chinese defenders executed daring flanking maneuvers in the Fenglehe, Yaojiahe, Liushuihe, Shuanghe, and Zhangjiaji areas, turning the landscape into a labyrinth of ambushes. May 7 saw the Japanese pressing on, capturing Zhangjiaji and Shuanghe. By May 8, they assaulted Maozifan and Xinji, where ferocious battles erupted, soldiers clashing in hand-to-hand combat amid the ruins. By May 10, the Japanese had overrun Huyang Town and Xinye, advancing toward Tanghe and the northeastern fringes of Zaoyang. Yet, the Tanghe River front witnessed partial Chinese recoveries: remnants of the Right Army Group, alongside troops from east of the Xianghe, reclaimed Xinye. The 122nd and 180th Divisions withdrew north of Tanghe and Fancheng, while the 37th, 38th, and 132nd Divisions steadfastly held the east bank of the Xianghe River. Concurrently, the main force of the Japanese 3rd Division launched from Yingshan against the 84th and 13th Armies of the 11th Group Army in the Suixian sector. After a whirlwind of combat, the Chinese 84th Army retreated to the Taerwan position. On May 2, the 3rd Division targeted the Gaocheng position of the 13th Army within the 31st Group Army; the ensuing clashes in Taerwan and Gaocheng were a maelstrom of fire, with the Taerwan position exchanging hands multiple times like a deadly game of tug-of-war. By May 4, in a grim escalation, Japanese forces deployed poison gas, a violation of international norms that drew condemnation and is documented in Allied reports from the era, inflicting horrific casualties and compelling the Chinese to relinquish Gaocheng, which fell into enemy hands. On May 5, backed by aerial bombardments, tank charges, and artillery barrages, the Japanese renewed their onslaught along the Gaocheng River and the Lishan-Jiangjiahe line. By May 6, the beleaguered Chinese were forced back to the Tianhekou and Gaocheng line. Suixian succumbed on May 7. On May 8, the Japanese shattered the second line of the 84th Army, capturing Zaoyang and advancing on the Jiangtoudian position of the 85th Army. To evade encirclement, the defenders mounted a valiant resistance before withdrawing from Jiangtoudian; the 84th Army relocated to the Tanghe and Baihe areas, while the 39th Army embedded itself in the Dahongshan for guerrilla operations—a tactic that would bleed the Japanese through hit-and-run warfare, as noted in guerrilla warfare studies by Mao Zedong himself. By May 10, the bulk of the 31st Army Group maneuvered toward Tanghe, reaching north of Biyang by May 15. From Xinyang, Japanese forces struck at Tongbai on May 8; by May 10, elements from Zaoyang advanced to Zhangdian Town and Shangtun Town. In response, the 68th Army of the 1st War Zone dispatched the 143rd Division to defend Queshan and Minggang, and the 119th Division to hold Tongbai. After staunchly blocking the Japanese, they withdrew on May 11 to positions northwest and southwest of Tongbai, shielding the retreat of 5th War Zone units. The Japanese 4th Cavalry Brigade drove toward Tanghe, seizing Tanghe County on May 12. But the tide was turning. In a brilliant reversal, the Fifth War Zone commanded the 31st Army Group, in concert with the 2nd Army Group from the 1st War Zone, to advance from southwestern Henan. Their mission: encircle the bulk of Japanese forces on the Xiangdong Plain and deliver a crushing blow. The main force of the 33rd Army Group targeted Zaoyang, while other units pinned down Japanese rear guards in Zhongxiang. The Chinese counteroffensive erupted with swift successes, Tanghe County was recaptured on May 14, and Tongbai liberated on May 16, shattering the Japanese encirclement scheme. On May 19, after four grueling days of combat, Chinese forces mauled the retreating Japanese, reclaiming Zaoyang and leaving the fields strewn with enemy dead. The 39th Army of the Left Army Group dispersed into the mountains for guerrilla warfare, a shadowy campaign of sabotage and surprise. Forces of the Right Army Group east of the river, along with river defense units, conducted relentless raids on Japanese rears and supply lines over multiple days, sowing chaos before withdrawing to the west bank of the Xiang River on May 21. On May 22, they pressed toward Suixian, recapturing it on May 23. The Japanese, battered and depleted, retreated to their original garrisons in Zhongxiang and Yingshan, restoring the pre-war lines as the battle drew to a close. Throughout this clash, the Chinese held a marked superiority in manpower and coordination, though their deployments lacked full flexibility, briefly placing them on the defensive. After protracted, blood-soaked fighting, they restored the original equilibrium. Despite grievous losses, the Chinese thwarted the Japanese encirclement and exacted a heavy toll, reports from the time, corroborated by Japanese records in Senshi Sōsho, indicate over 13,000 Japanese killed or wounded, with more than 5,000 corpses abandoned on the battlefield. This fulfilled the strategic goal of containing and eroding Japanese strength. Chinese casualties surpassed 25,000, a testament to the ferocity of the struggle. The 5th War Zone seized the initiative in advances and retreats, deftly shifting to outer lines and maintaining positional advantages. As Japanese forces withdrew, Chinese pursuers harried and obstructed them, yielding substantial victories. The Battle of Suizao spanned less than three weeks. The Japanese main force pierced defenses on the east bank of the Han River, advancing to encircle one flank as planned. However, the other two formations met fierce opposition near Suixian and northward, stalling their progress. Adapting to the battlefield's ebb and flow, the Fifth War Zone transformed its tactics: the main force escaped encirclement, maneuvered to outer lines for offensives, and exploited terrain to hammer the Japanese. The pivotal order to flip from defense to offense doomed the encirclement; with the counterattack triumphant, the Japanese declined to hold and retreated. The Chinese pursued with unyielding vigor. By May 24, they had reclaimed Zaoyang, Tongbai, and other locales. Save for Suixian County, the Japanese had fallen back to pre-war positions, reinstating the regional status quo. Thus, the battle concluded, a chapter of resilience etched into the chronicles of China's defiance. In the sweltering heat of southern China, where the humid air clung to every breath like a persistent fog, the Japanese General Staff basked in what they called a triumphant offensive and defensive campaign in Guangdong. But victory, as history so often teaches, is a double-edged sword. By early 1939, the strain was palpable. Their secret supply line snaking from the British colony of Hong Kong to the Chinese mainland was under constant disruption, raids by shadowy guerrilla bands, opportunistic smugglers, and the sheer unpredictability of wartime logistics turning what should have been a lifeline into a leaky sieve. Blockading the entire coastline? A pipe dream, given the vast, jagged shores of Guangdong, dotted with hidden coves and fishing villages that had evaded imperial edicts for centuries. Yet, the General Staff's priorities were unyielding, laser-focused on strangling the Nationalist capital of Chongqing through a relentless blockade. This meant the 21st Army, that workhorse of the Japanese invasion force, had to stay in the fight—no rest for the weary. Drawing from historical records like the Senshi Sōsho (War History Series) compiled by Japan's National Institute for Defense Studies, we know that after the 21st Army reported severing what they dubbed the "secret transport line" at Xinhui, a gritty, hard-fought skirmish that left the local landscape scarred with craters and abandoned supply crates, the General Staff circled back to the idea of a full coastal blockade. It was a classic case of military opportunism: staff officers, poring over maps in dimly lit war rooms in Tokyo, suddenly "discovered" Shantou as a major port. Not just any port, mind you, but a bustling hub tied to the heartstrings of Guangdong's overseas Chinese communities. Shantou and nearby Chao'an weren't mere dots on a map; they were the ancestral hometowns of countless Chaoshan people who had ventured abroad to Southeast Asia, sending back remittances that flowed like lifeblood into the region. Historical economic studies, such as those in The Overseas Chinese in the People's Republic of China by Stephen Fitzgerald, highlight how these funds from the Chaoshan diaspora, often funneled through family networks in places like Singapore and Thailand, were substantial, indirectly fueling China's war effort by sustaining local economies and even purchasing arms on the black market. The Chao-Shao Highway, that dusty artery running near Shantou, was pinpointed as a critical vein connecting Hong Kong's ports to the mainland's interior. So, in early June 1939, the die was cast: Army Order No. 310 thundered from headquarters, commanding the 21st Army to seize Shantou. The Chief of the General Staff himself provided the strategic blueprint, a personal touch that underscored the operation's gravity. The Army Department christened the Chaoshan push "Operation Hua," a nod perhaps to the flowery illusions of easy conquest, while instructing the Navy Department to tag along for the ride. In naval parlance, it became "Operation J," a cryptic label that masked the sheer scale unfolding. Under the Headquarters' watchful eye, what started as a modest blockade morphed into a massive amphibious assault, conjured seemingly out of thin air like a magician's trick, but one with deadly props. The 5th Fleet's orders mobilized an impressive lineup: the 9th Squadron for heavy hitting, the 5th Mine Boat Squadron to clear watery hazards, the 12th and 21st Sweeper Squadrons sweeping for mines like diligent janitors of the sea, the 45th Destroyer Squadron adding destroyer muscle, and air power from the 3rd Combined Air Group (boasting 24 land-based attack aircraft and 9 reconnaissance planes that could spot a fishing boat from miles away). Then there was the Chiyoda Air Group with its 9 reconnaissance aircraft, the Guangdong Air Group contributing a quirky airship and one more recon plane, the 9th Special Landing Squadron from Sasebo trained for beach assaults, and a flotilla of special ships for logistics. On the ground, the 21st Army threw in the 132nd Brigade from the 104th Division, beefed up with the 76th Infantry Battalion, two mountain artillery battalions for lobbing shells over rugged terrain, two engineer battalions to bridge rivers and clear paths, a light armored vehicle platoon rumbling with mechanized menace, and a river-crossing supplies company to keep the troops fed and armed. All under the command of Brigade Commander Juro Goto, a stern officer whose tactical acumen was forged in earlier Manchurian campaigns. The convoy's size demanded rehearsals; the 132nd Brigade trained for boat transfers at Magong in the Penghu Islands, practicing the precarious dance of loading men and gear onto rocking vessels under simulated fire. Secrecy shrouded the whole affair, many officers and soldiers, boarding ships in the dead of night, whispered among themselves that they were finally heading home to Japan, a cruel ruse to maintain operational security. For extra punch, the 21st Army tacked on the 31st Air Squadron for air support, their planes droning like angry hornets ready to sting. This overkill didn't sit well with everyone. Lieutenant General Ando Rikichi, the pragmatic commander overseeing Japanese forces in the region, must have fumed in his Guangzhou headquarters. His intelligence staff, drawing from intercepted radio chatter and local spies as noted in postwar analyses like The Japanese Army in World War II by Gordon L. Rottman, reported that the Chongqing forces in Chaozhou were laughably thin: just the 9th Independent Brigade, a couple of security regiments, and ragtag "self-defense groups" of armed civilians. Why unleash such a sledgehammer on a fly? The mobilization's magnitude even forced a reshuffling of defenses around Guangzhou, pulling resources from the 12th Army's front lines and overburdening the already stretched 18th Division. It was bureaucratic overreach at its finest, a testament to the Imperial Staff's penchant for grand gestures over tactical efficiency. Meanwhile, on the Nationalist side, the winds of war carried whispers of impending doom. The National Revolutionary Army's war histories, such as those compiled in the Zhongguo Kangri Zhanzheng Shi (History of China's War of Resistance Against Japan), note that Chiang Kai-shek's Military Commission had snagged intelligence as early as February 1939 about Japan's plans for a large-scale invasion of Shantou. The efficiency of the Military Command's Second Bureau and the Military Intelligence Bureau was nothing short of astonishing, networks of agents, double agents, and radio intercepts piercing the veil of Japanese secrecy. Even as the convoy slipped out of Penghu, a detailed report outlining operational orders landed on Commander Zhang Fakui's desk, the ink still fresh. Zhang, a battle-hardened strategist whose career spanned the Northern Expedition and beyond , had four months to prepare for what would be dubbed the decisive battle of Chaoshan. Yet, in a move that baffled some contemporaries, he chose not to fortify and defend it tooth and nail. After the Fourth War Zone submitted its opinions, likely heated debates in smoke-filled command posts, Chiang Kai-shek greenlit the plan. By March, the Military Commission issued its strategic policy: when the enemy hit Chaoshan, a sliver of regular troops would team up with civilian armed forces for mobile and guerrilla warfare, grinding down the invaders like sandpaper on steel. The orders specified guerrilla zones in Chaozhou, Jiaxing, and Huizhou, unifying local militias under a banner of "extensive guerrilla warfare" to coordinate with regular army maneuvers, gradually eroding the Japanese thrust. In essence, the 4th War Zone wasn't tasked with holding Chao'an and Shantou at all costs; instead, they'd strike hard during the landing, then let guerrillas harry the occupiers post-capture. It was a doctrine of attrition in a "confined battlefield," honing skills through maneuver and ambush. Remarkably, the fall of these cities was preordained by the Military Commission three months before the Japanese even issued their orders, a strategic feint that echoed ancient Sun Tzu tactics of yielding ground to preserve strength. To execute this, the 4th War Zone birthed the Chao-Jia-Hui Guerrilla Command after meticulous preparation, with General Zou Hong, head of Guangdong's Security Bureau and a no-nonsense administrator known for his anti-smuggling campaigns, taking the helm. In just three months, Zhang Fakui scraped together the Independent 9th Brigade, the 2nd, 4th, and 5th Guangdong Provincial Security Regiments, and the Security Training Regiment. Even with the 9th Army Group lurking nearby, he handed the reins of the Chao-Shan operation to the 12th Army Group's planners. Their March guidelines sketched three lines of resistance from the coast to the mountains, a staged withdrawal that allowed frontline defenders to melt away like ghosts. This blueprint mirrored Chiang Kai-shek's post-Wuhan reassessment, where the loss of that key city in 1938 prompted a shift to protracted warfare. A Xinhua News Agency columnist later summed it up scathingly: "The Chongqing government, having lost its will to resist, colludes with the Japanese and seeks to eliminate the Communists, adopting a policy of passive resistance." This narrative, propagated by Communist sources, dogged Chiang and the National Revolutionary Army for decades, painting them as defeatists even as they bled the Japanese dry through attrition. February 1939 saw Commander Zhang kicking off a reorganization of the 12th Army Group, transforming it from a patchwork force into something resembling a modern army. He could have hunkered down, assigning troops to a desperate defense of Chaoshan, but that would have handed the initiative to the overcautious Japanese General Staff, whose activism often bordered on paranoia. Zhang, with the wisdom of a seasoned general who had navigated the treacherous politics of pre-war China, weighed the scales carefully. His vision? Forge the 12th Army Group into a nimble field army, not squander tens of thousands on a secondary port. Japan's naval and air dominance—evident in the devastation of Shanghai in 1937, meant Guangdong's forces could be pulverized in Shantou just as easily. Losing Chaozhou and Shantou? Acceptable, if it preserved core strength for the long haul. Post-Xinhui, Zhang doubled down on resistance, channeling efforts into live-fire exercises for the 12th Army, turning green recruits into battle-ready soldiers amid the Guangdong hills. The war's trajectory after 1939 would vindicate him: his forces became pivotal in later counteroffensives, proving that a living army trumped dead cities. Opting out of a static defense, Zhang pivoted to guerrilla warfare to bleed the Japanese while clutching strategic initiative. He ordered local governments to whip up coastal guerrilla forces from Chao'an to Huizhou—melding militias, national guards, police, and private armed groups into official folds. These weren't elite shock troops, but in wartime's chaos, they controlled locales effectively, disrupting supply lines and gathering intel. For surprises, he unleashed two mobile units: the 9th Independent Brigade and the 20th Independent Brigade. Formed fresh after the War of Resistance erupted, these brigades shone for their efficiency within the cumbersome Guangdong Army structure. Division-level units were too bulky for spotty communications, so Yu Hanmou's command birthed these independent outfits, staffed with crack officers. The 9th, packing direct-fire artillery for punch, and the 20th, dubbed semi-mechanized for its truck-borne speed, prowled the Chaoshan–Huizhou coast from 1939. Zhang retained their three-regiment setup, naming Hua Zhenzhong and Zhang Shou as commanders, granting them autonomy to command in the field like roving wolves. As the 9th Independent Brigade shifted to Shantou, its 627th Regiment was still reorganizing in Heyuan, a logistical hiccup amid the scramble. Hua Zhenzhong, a commander noted for his tactical flexibility in regional annals, deployed the 625th Regiment and 5th Security Regiment along the coast, with the 626th as reserve in Chao'an. Though the Fourth War Zone had written off Chaoshan, Zhang yearned to showcase Guangdong grit before the pullback. Dawn broke on June 21, 1939, at 4:30 a.m., with Japanese reconnaissance planes slicing through the fog over Shantou, Anbu, and Nanbeigang, ghostly silhouettes against the gray sky. By 5:30, the mist lifted, revealing a nightmare armada: over 40 destroyers and 70–80 landing craft churning toward the coast on multiple vectors, their hulls cutting the waves like knives. The 626th Regiment's 3rd Battalion at Donghushan met the first wave with a hail of fire from six light machine guns, repelling the initial boats in a frenzy of splashes and shouts. But the brigade's long-range guns couldn't stem the tide; Hua focused on key chokepoints, aiming to bloody the invaders rather than obliterate them. By morning, the 3rd Battalion of the 625th Regiment charged into Shantou City, joined by the local police corps digging in amid urban sprawl. Combat raged at Xinjin Port and the airport's fringes, where Nationalist troops traded shots with advancing Japanese under the absent shadow of a Chinese navy. Japanese naval guns, massed offshore, pounded the outskirts like thunder gods in fury. By 2:00 a.m. on the 22nd, Shantou crumpled as defenders' ammo ran dry, the city falling in a haze of smoke and echoes. Before the loss, Hua had positioned the 1st Battalion of the 5th Security Regiment at Anbu, guarding the road to Chao'an. Local lore, preserved in oral histories collected by the Chaozhou Historical Society, recalls Battalion Commander Du Ruo leading from the front, rifle in hand, but Japanese barrages, bolstered by superior firepower—forced a retreat. Post-capture, Tokyo's forces paused to consolidate, unleashing massacres on fleeing civilians in the outskirts. A flotilla of civilian boats, intercepted at sea, became a grim training ground for bayonet drills, a barbarity echoed in survivor testimonies compiled in The Rape of Nanking and Beyond extensions to Guangdong atrocities. With Shantou gone, Hua pivoted to flank defense, orchestrating night raids on Japanese positions around Anbu and Meixi. On June 24th, Major Du Ruo spearheaded an assault into Anbu but fell gravely wounded amid the chaos. Later, the 2nd Battalion of the 626th overran spots near Meixi. A Japanese sea-flanking maneuver targeted Anbu, but Nationalists held at Liulong, sparking nocturnal clashes, grenade volleys, bayonet charges, and hand-to-hand brawls that drained both sides like a slow bleed. June 26th saw the 132nd Brigade lumber toward Chao'an. Hua weighed options: all-out assault or guerrilla fade? He chose to dig in on the outskirts, reserving two companies of the 625th and a special ops battalion in the city. The 27th brought a day-long Japanese onslaught, culminating in Chao'an's fall after fierce rear-guard actions by the 9th Independent Brigade. Evacuations preceded the collapse, with Japanese propaganda banners fluttering falsely, claiming Nationalists had abandoned defense. Yet Hua's call preserved his brigade for future fights; the Japanese claimed an empty prize. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Japanese operations had yet again plugged up supply leaks into Nationalist China. The fall of Suixian, Zaoyang and Shantou were heavy losses for the Chinese war effort. However the Chinese were also able to exact heavy casualties on the invaders and thwarted their encirclement attempts. China was still in the fight for her life.

Wuhan, die Hauptstadt der Provinz Hubei, hat drei Frauengefängnisse: das Gefängnis Hankou, das Frauengefängnis Wuhan und das Gefängnis Jiangcheng. Viele Falun-Dafa-Praktizierende, die in Hubei wegen ihres Glaubens inhaftiert werden, landen in den beiden erstgenannten Gefängnissen und werden dort gefoltert, nur weil sie Falun Dafa nicht abschwören wollen... https://de.minghui.org/html/articles/2025/12/23/188865.html

Last time we spoke about the climax of the battle of Lake Khasan. In August, the Lake Khasan region became a tense theater of combat as Soviet and Japanese forces clashed around Changkufeng and Hill 52. The Soviets pushed a multi-front offensive, bolstered by artillery, tanks, and air power, yet the Japanese defenders held firm, aided by engineers, machine guns, and heavy guns. By the ninth and tenth, a stubborn Japanese resilience kept Hill 52 and Changkufeng in Japanese hands, though the price was steep and the field was littered with the costs of battle. Diplomatically, both sides aimed to confine the fighting and avoid a larger war. Negotiations trudged on, culminating in a tentative cease-fire draft for August eleventh: a halt to hostilities, positions to be held as of midnight on the tenth, and the creation of a border-demarcation commission. Moscow pressed for a neutral umpire; Tokyo resisted, accepting a Japanese participant but rejecting a neutral referee. The cease-fire was imperfect, with miscommunications and differing interpretations persisting.    #185 Operation Hainan Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. After what seemed like a lifetime over in the northern border between the USSR and Japan, today we are returning to the Second Sino-Japanese War. Now I thought it might be a bit jarring to dive into it, so let me do a brief summary of where we are at, in the year of 1939. As the calendar turned to 1939, the Second Sino-Japanese War, which had erupted in July 1937 with the Marco Polo Bridge Incident and escalated into full-scale conflict, had evolved into a protracted quagmire for the Empire of Japan. What began as a swift campaign to subjugate the Republic of China under Chiang Kai-shek had, by the close of 1938, transformed into a war of attrition. Japanese forces, under the command of generals like Shunroku Hata and Yasuji Okamura, had achieved stunning territorial gains: the fall of Shanghai in November 1937 after a brutal three-month battle that cost over 200,000 Chinese lives; the infamous capture of Nanjing in December 1937, marked by the Nanjing Massacre where an estimated 300,000 civilians and disarmed soldiers were killed in a six-week orgy of violence; and the sequential occupations of Xuzhou in May 1938, Wuhan in October 1938, and Guangzhou that same month.  These victories secured Japan's control over China's eastern seaboard, major riverine arteries like the Yangtze, and key industrial centers, effectively stripping the Nationalists of much of their economic base. Yet, despite these advances, China refused to capitulate. Chiang's government had retreated inland to the mountainous stronghold of Chongqing in Sichuan province, where it regrouped amid the fog-laden gorges, drawing on the vast human reserves of China's interior and the resilient spirit of its people. By late 1938, Japanese casualties had mounted to approximately 50,000 killed and 200,000 wounded annually, straining the Imperial Japanese Army's resources and exposing the vulnerabilities of overextended supply lines deep into hostile territory. In Tokyo, the corridors of the Imperial General Headquarters and the Army Ministry buzzed with urgent deliberations during the winter of 1938-1939. The initial doctrine of "quick victory" through decisive battles, epitomized by the massive offensives of 1937 and 1938, had proven illusory. Japan's military planners, influenced by the Kwantung Army's experiences in Manchuria and the ongoing stalemate, recognized that China's sheer size, with its 4 million square miles and over 400 million inhabitants, rendered total conquest unfeasible without unacceptable costs. Intelligence reports highlighted the persistence of Chinese guerrilla warfare, particularly in the north where Communist forces under Mao Zedong's Eighth Route Army conducted hit-and-run operations from bases in Shanxi and Shaanxi, sabotaging railways and ambushing convoys. The Japanese response included brutal pacification campaigns, such as the early iterations of what would later formalize as the "Three Alls Policy" (kill all, burn all, loot all), aimed at devastating rural economies and isolating resistance pockets. But these measures only fueled further defiance. By early 1939, a strategic pivot was formalized: away from direct annihilation of Chinese armies toward a policy of economic strangulation. This "blockade and interdiction" approach sought to sever China's lifelines to external aid, choking off the flow of weapons, fuel, and materiel that sustained the Nationalist war effort. As one Japanese staff officer noted in internal memos, the goal was to "starve the dragon in its lair," acknowledging the limits of Japanese manpower, total forces in China numbered around 1 million by 1939, against China's inexhaustible reserves. Central to this new strategy were the three primary overland supply corridors that had emerged as China's backdoors to the world, compensating for the Japanese naval blockade that had sealed off most coastal ports since late 1937. The first and most iconic was the Burma Road, a 717-mile engineering marvel hastily constructed between 1937 and 1938 by over 200,000 Chinese and Burmese laborers under the direction of engineers like Chih-Ping Chen. Stretching from the railhead at Lashio in British Burma (modern Myanmar) through treacherous mountain passes and dense jungles to Kunming in Yunnan province, the road navigated elevations up to 7,000 feet with hundreds of hairpin turns and precarious bridges. By early 1939, it was operational, albeit plagued by monsoonal mudslides, banditry, and mechanical breakdowns of the imported trucks, many Ford and Chevrolet models supplied via British Rangoon. Despite these challenges, it funneled an increasing volume of aid: in 1939 alone, estimates suggest up to 10,000 tons per month of munitions, gasoline, and aircraft parts from Allied sources, including early Lend-Lease precursors from the United States. The road's completion in 1938 had been a direct response to the loss of southern ports, and its vulnerability to aerial interdiction made it a prime target in Japanese planning documents. The second lifeline was the Indochina route, centered on the French-built Yunnan-Vietnam Railway (also known as the Hanoi-Kunming Railway), a 465-mile narrow-gauge line completed in 1910 that linked the port of Haiphong in French Indochina to Kunming via Hanoi and Lao Cai. This colonial artery, supplemented by parallel roads and river transport along the Red River, became China's most efficient supply conduit in 1938-1939, exploiting France's uneasy neutrality. French authorities, under Governor-General Pierre Pasquier and later Georges Catroux, turned a blind eye to transshipments, allowing an average of 15,000 to 20,000 tons monthly in early 1939, far surpassing the Burma Road's initial capacity. Cargoes included Soviet arms rerouted via Vladivostok and American oil, with French complicity driven by anti-Japanese sentiment and profitable tolls. However, Japanese reconnaissance flights from bases in Guangdong noted the vulnerability of bridges and rail yards, leading to initial bombing raids by mid-1939. Diplomatic pressure mounted, with Tokyo issuing protests to Paris, foreshadowing the 1940 closure under Vichy France after the fall of France in Europe. The route's proximity to the South China Sea made it a focal point for Japanese naval strategists, who viewed it as a "leak in the blockade." The third corridor, often overlooked but critical, was the Northwest Highway through Soviet Central Asia and Xinjiang province. This overland network, upgraded between 1937 and 1941 with Soviet assistance, connected the Turkestan-Siberian Railway at Almaty (then Alma-Ata) to Lanzhou in Gansu via Urumqi, utilizing a mix of trucks, camel caravans, and rudimentary roads across the Gobi Desert and Tian Shan mountains. Under the Sino-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of August 1937 and subsequent aid agreements, Moscow supplied China with over 900 aircraft, 82 tanks, 1,300 artillery pieces, and vast quantities of ammunition and fuel between 1937 and 1941—much of it traversing this route. In 1938-1939, volumes peaked, with Soviet pilots and advisors even establishing air bases in Lanzhou. The highway's construction involved tens of thousands of Chinese laborers, facing harsh winters and logistical hurdles, but it delivered up to 2,000 tons monthly, including entire fighter squadrons like the Polikarpov I-16. Japanese intelligence, aware of this "Red lifeline," planned disruptions but were constrained by the ongoing Nomonhan Incident on the Manchurian-Soviet border in 1939, which diverted resources and highlighted the risks of provoking Moscow. These routes collectively sustained China's resistance, prompting Japan's high command to prioritize their severance. In March 1939, the South China Area Army was established under General Rikichi Andō (later succeeded by Field Marshal Hisaichi Terauchi), headquartered in Guangzhou, with explicit orders to disrupt southern communications. Aerial campaigns intensified, with Mitsubishi G3M "Nell" bombers from Wuhan and Guangzhou targeting Kunming's airfields and the Red River bridges, while diplomatic maneuvers pressured colonial powers: Britain faced demands during the June 1939 Tientsin Crisis to close the Burma Road, and France received ultimatums that culminated in the 1940 occupation of northern Indochina. Yet, direct assaults on Yunnan or Guangxi were deemed too arduous due to rugged terrain and disease risks. Instead, planners eyed peripheral objectives to encircle these arteries. This strategic calculus set the stage for the invasion of Hainan Island, a 13,000-square-mile landmass off Guangdong's southern coast, rich in iron and copper but strategically priceless for its position astride the Indochina route and proximity to Hong Kong. By February 1939, Japanese admirals like Nobutake Kondō of the 5th Fleet advocated seizure to establish air and naval bases, plugging blockade gaps and enabling raids on Haiphong and Kunming, a prelude to broader southern expansion that would echo into the Pacific War. Now after the fall campaign around Canton in autumn 1938, the Japanese 21st Army found itself embedded in a relentless effort to sever the enemy's lifelines. Its primary objective shifted from mere battlefield engagements to tightening the choke points of enemy supply, especially along the Canton–Hankou railway. Recognizing that war materiel continued to flow into the enemy's hands, the Imperial General Headquarters ordered the 21st Army to strike at every other supply route, one by one, until the arteries of logistics were stifled. The 21st Army undertook a series of decisive occupations to disrupt transport and provisioning from multiple directions. To sustain these difficult campaigns, Imperial General Headquarters reinforced the south China command, enabling greater operational depth and endurance. The 21st Army benefited from a series of reinforcements during 1939, which allowed a reorganization of assignments and missions: In late January, the Iida Detachment was reorganized into the Formosa Mixed Brigade and took part in the invasion of Hainan Island.  Hainan, just 15 miles across the Qiongzhou Strait from the mainland, represented a critical "loophole": it lay astride the Gulf of Tonkin, enabling smuggling of arms and materiel from Haiphong to Kunming, and offered potential airfields for bombing raids deep into Yunnan. Japanese interest in Hainan dated to the 1920s, driven by the Taiwan Governor-General's Office, which eyed the island's tropical resources (rubber, iron, copper) and naval potential at ports like Sanya (Samah). Prewar surveys by Japanese firms, such as those documented in Ide Kiwata's Minami Shina no Sangyō to Keizai (1939), highlighted mineral wealth and strategic harbors. The fall of Guangzhou in October 1938 provided the perfect launchpad, but direct invasion was delayed until early 1939 amid debates between the IJA (favoring mainland advances) and IJN (prioritizing naval encirclement). The operation would also heavily align with broader "southward advance" (Nanshin-ron) doctrine foreshadowing invasions of French Indochina (1940) and the Pacific War. On the Chinese side, Hainan was lightly defended as part of Guangdong's "peace preservation" under General Yu Hanmou. Two security regiments, six guard battalions, and a self-defense corps, totaling around 7,000–10,000 poorly equipped troops guarded the island, supplemented by roughly 300 Communist guerrillas under Feng Baiju, who operated independently in the interior. The indigenous Li (Hlai) people in the mountainous south, alienated by Nationalist taxes, provided uneven support but later allied with Communists. The Imperial General Headquarters ordered the 21st Army, in cooperation with the Navy, to occupy and hold strategic points on the island near Haikou-Shih. The 21st Army commander assigned the Formosa Mixed Brigade to carry out this mission. Planning began in late 1938 under the IJN's Fifth Fleet, with IJA support from the 21st Army. The objective: secure northern and southern landing sites to bisect the island, establish air/naval bases, and exploit resources. Vice Admiral Nobutake Kondō, commanding the fleet, emphasized surprise and air superiority. The invasion began under the cover of darkness on February 9, 1939, when Kondō's convoy entered Tsinghai Bay on the northern shore of Hainan and anchored at midnight. Japanese troops swiftly disembarked, encountering minimal initial resistance from the surprised Chinese defenders, and secured a beachhead in the northern zone. At 0300 hours on 10 February, the Formosa Mixed Brigade, operating in close cooperation with naval units, executed a surprise landing at the northeastern point of Tengmai Bay in north Hainan. By 04:30, the right flank reached the main road leading to Fengyingshih, while the left flank reached a position two kilometers south of Tienwei. By 07:00, the right flank unit had overcome light enemy resistance near Yehli and occupied Chiungshan. At that moment there were approximately 1,000 elements of the enemy's 5th Infantry Brigade (militia) at Chiungshan; about half of these troops were destroyed, and the remainder fled into the hills south of Tengmai in a state of disarray. Around 08:30 that same day, the left flank unit advanced to the vicinity of Shuchang and seized Hsiuying Heights. By 12:00, it occupied Haikou, the island's northern port city and administrative center, beginning around noon. Army and navy forces coordinated to mop up remaining pockets of resistance in the northern areas, overwhelming the scattered Chinese security units through superior firepower and organization. No large-scale battles are recorded in primary accounts; instead, the engagements were characterized by rapid advances and localized skirmishes, as the Chinese forces, lacking heavy artillery or air support, could not mount a sustained defense. By the end of the day, Japanese control over the north was consolidating, with Haikou falling under their occupation.Also on 10 February, the Brigade pushed forward to seize Cingang. Wenchang would be taken on the 22nd, followed by Chinglan Port on the 23rd. On February 11, the operation expanded southward when land combat units amphibiously assaulted Samah (now Sanya) at the island's southern tip. This landing allowed them to quickly seize key positions, including the port of Yulin (Yulinkang) and the town of Yai-Hsien (Yaxian, now part of Sanya). With these southern footholds secured, Japanese forces fanned out to subjugate the rest of the island, capturing inland areas and infrastructure with little organized opposition. Meanwhile, the landing party of the South China Navy Expeditionary Force, which had joined with the Army to secure Haikou, began landing on the island's southern shore at dawn on 14 February. They operated under the protection of naval and air units. By the same morning, the landing force had advanced to Sa-Riya and, by 12:00 hours, had captured Yulin Port. Chinese casualties were significant in the brief fighting; from January to May 1939, reports indicate the 11th security regiment alone suffered 8 officers and 162 soldiers killed, 3 officers and 16 wounded, and 5 officers and 68 missing, though figures for other units are unclear. Japanese losses were not publicly detailed but appear to have been light.  When crisis pressed upon them, Nationalist forces withdrew from coastal Haikou, shepherding the last civilians toward the sheltering embrace of the Wuzhi mountain range that bands the central spine of Hainan. From that high ground they sought to endure the storm, praying that the rugged hills might shield their families from the reach of war. Yet the Li country's mountains did not deliver a sanctuary free of conflict. Later in August of 1943, an uprising erupted among the Li,Wang Guoxing, a figure of local authority and stubborn resolve. His rebellion was swiftly crushed; in reprisal, the Nationalists executed a seizure of vengeance that extended far beyond the moment of defeat, claiming seven thousand members of Wang Guoxing's kin in his village. The episode was grim testimony to the brutal calculus of war, where retaliation and fear indelibly etched the landscape of family histories. Against this backdrop, the Communists under Feng Baiju and the native Li communities forged a vigorous guerrilla war against the occupiers. The struggle was not confined to partisan skirmishes alone; it unfolded as a broader contest of survival and resistance. The Japanese response was relentless and punitive, and it fell upon Li communities in western Hainan with particular ferocity, Sanya and Danzhou bore the brunt of violence, as did the many foreign laborers conscripted into service by the occupying power. The toll of these reprisals was stark: among hundreds of thousands of slave laborers pressed into service, tens of thousands perished. Of the 100,000 laborers drawn from Hong Kong, only about 20,000 survived the war's trials, a haunting reminder of the human cost embedded in the occupation. Strategically, the island of Hainan took on a new if coercive purpose. Portions of the island were designated as a naval administrative district, with the Hainan Guard District Headquarters established at Samah, signaling its role as a forward air base and as an operational flank for broader anti-Chiang Kai-shek efforts. In parallel, the island's rich iron and copper resources were exploited to sustain the war economy of the occupiers. The control of certain areas on Hainan provided a base of operations for incursions into Guangdong and French Indochina, while the airbases that dotted the island enabled long-range air raids that threaded routes from French Indochina and Burma into the heart of China. The island thus assumed a grim dual character: a frontier fortress for the occupiers and a ground for the prolonged suffering of its inhabitants. Hainan then served as a launchpad for later incursions into Guangdong and Indochina. Meanwhile after Wuhan's collapse, the Nationalist government's frontline strength remained formidable, even as attrition gnawed at its edges. By the winter of 1938–1939, the front line had swelled to 261 divisions of infantry and cavalry, complemented by 50 independent brigades. Yet the political and military fissures within the Kuomintang suggested fragility beneath the apparent depth of manpower. The most conspicuous rupture came with Wang Jingwei's defection, the vice president and chairman of the National Political Council, who fled to Hanoi on December 18, 1938, leading a procession of more than ten other KMT officials, including Chen Gongbo, Zhou Fohai, Chu Minqi, and Zeng Zhongming. In the harsh arithmetic of war, defections could not erase the country's common resolve to resist Japanese aggression, and the anti-Japanese national united front still served as a powerful instrument, rallying the Chinese populace to "face the national crisis together." Amid this political drama, Japan's strategy moved into a phase that sought to convert battlefield endurance into political consolidation. As early as January 11, 1938, Tokyo had convened an Imperial Conference and issued a framework for handling the China Incident that would shape the theater for years. The "Outline of Army Operations Guidance" and "Continental Order No. 241" designated the occupied territories as strategic assets to be held with minimal expansion beyond essential needs. The instruction mapped an operational zone that compressed action to a corridor between Anqing, Xinyang, Yuezhou, and Nanchang, while the broader line of occupation east of a line tracing West Sunit, Baotou, and the major river basins would be treated as pacified space. This was a doctrine of attrition, patience, and selective pressure—enough to hold ground, deny resources to the Chinese, and await a more opportune political rupture. Yet even as Japan sought political attrition, the war's tactical center of gravity drifted toward consolidation around Wuhan and the pathways that fed the Yangtze. In October 1938, after reducing Wuhan to a fortressed crescent of contested ground, the Japanese General Headquarters acknowledged the imperative to adapt to a protracted war. The new calculus prioritized political strategy alongside military operations: "We should attach importance to the offensive of political strategy, cultivate and strengthen the new regime, and make the National Government decline, which will be effective." If the National Government trembled under coercive pressure, it risked collapse, and if not immediately, then gradually through a staged series of operations. In practice, this meant reinforcing a centralized center while allowing peripheral fronts to be leveraged against Chongqing's grip on the war's moral economy. In the immediate post-Wuhan period, Japan divided its responsibilities and aimed at a standoff that would enable future offensives. The 11th Army Group, stationed in the Wuhan theater, became the spearhead of field attacks on China's interior, occupying a strategic triangle that included Hunan, Jiangxi, and Guangxi, and protecting the rear of southwest China's line of defense. The central objective was not merely to seize territory, but to deny Chinese forces the capacity to maneuver along the critical rail and river corridors that fed the Nanjing–Jiujiang line and the Zhejiang–Jiangxi Railway. Central to this plan was Wuhan's security and the ability to constrain Jiujiang's access to the Yangtze, preserving a corridor for air power and logistics. The pre-war arrangement in early 1939 was a tableau of layered defenses and multiple war zones, designed to anticipate and blunt Japanese maneuver. By February 1939, the Ninth War Zone under Xue Yue stood in a tense standoff with the Japanese 11th Army along the Jiangxi and Hubei front south of the Yangtze. The Ninth War Zone's order of battle, Luo Zhuoying's 19th Army Group defending the northern Nanchang front, Wang Lingji's 30th Army Group near Wuning, Fan Songfu's 8th and 73rd Armies along Henglu, Tang Enbo's 31st Army Group guarding southern Hubei and northern Hunan, and Lu Han's 1st Army Group in reserve near Changsha and Liuyang, was a carefully calibrated attempt to absorb, delay, and disrupt any Xiushui major Japanese thrust toward Nanchang, a city whose strategic significance stretched beyond its own bounds. In the spring of 1939, Nanchang was the one city in southern China that Tokyo could not leave in Chinese hands. It was not simply another provincial capital; it was the beating heart of whatever remained of China's war effort south of the Yangtze, and the Japanese knew it. High above the Gan River, on the flat plains west of Poyang Lake, lay three of the finest airfields China had ever built: Qingyunpu, Daxiaochang, and Xiangtang. Constructed only a few years earlier with Soviet engineers and American loans, they were long, hard-surfaced, and ringed with hangars and fuel dumps. Here the Chinese Air Force had pulled back after the fall of Wuhan, and here the red-starred fighters and bombers of the Soviet volunteer groups still flew. From Nanchang's runways a determined pilot could reach Japanese-held Wuhan in twenty minutes, Guangzhou in less than an hour, and even strike the docks at Hong Kong if he pushed his range. Every week Japanese reconnaissance planes returned with photographs of fresh craters patched, new aircraft parked wing-to-wing, and Soviet pilots sunning themselves beside their I-16s. As long as those fields remained Chinese, Japan could never claim the sky. The city was more than airfields. It sat exactly where the Zhejiang–Jiangxi Railway met the line running north to Jiujiang and the Yangtze, a knot that tied together three provinces. Barges crowded Poyang Lake's western shore, unloading crates of Soviet ammunition and aviation fuel that had come up the river from the Indochina railway. Warehouses along the tracks bulged with shells and rice. To the Japanese staff officers plotting in Wuhan and Guangzhou, Nanchang looked less like a city and more like a loaded spring: if Chiang Kai-shek ever found the strength for a counteroffensive to retake the middle Yangtze, this would be the place from which it would leap. And so, in the cold March of 1939, the Imperial General Headquarters marked Nanchang in red on every map and gave General Okamura the order he had been waiting for: take it, whatever the cost. Capturing the city would do three things at once. It would blind the Chinese Air Force in the south by seizing or destroying the only bases from which it could still seriously operate. It would tear a hole in the last east–west rail line still feeding Free China. And it would shove the Nationalist armies another two hundred kilometers farther into the interior, buying Japan precious time to digest its earlier conquests and tighten the blockade. Above all, Nanchang was the final piece in a great aerial ring Japan was closing around southern China. Hainan had fallen in February, giving the navy its southern airfields. Wuhan and Guangzhou already belonged to the army. Once Nanchang was taken, Japanese aircraft would sit on a continuous arc of bases from the tropical beaches of the South China Sea to the banks of the Yangtze, and nothing (neither the Burma Road convoys nor the French railway from Hanoi) would move without their permission. Chiang Kai-shek's decision to strike first in the Nanchang region in March 1939 reflected both urgency and a desire to seize initiative before Japanese modernization of the battlefield could fully consolidate. On March 8, Chiang directed Xue Yue to prepare a preemptive attack intended to seize the offensive by March 15, focusing the Ninth War Zone's efforts on preventing a river-crossing assault and pinning Japanese forces in place. The plan called for a sequence of coordinated actions: the 19th Army Group to hold the northern front of Nanchang; the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Border Advance Army (the 8th and 73rd Armies) to strike the enemy's left flank from Wuning toward De'an and Ruichang; the 30th and 27th Army Groups to consolidate near Wuning; and the 1st Army Group to push toward Xiushui and Sandu, opening routes for subsequent operations. Yet even as Xue Yue pressed for action, the weather of logistics and training reminded observers that no victory could be taken for granted. By March 9–10, Xue Yue warned Chiang that troops were not adequately trained, supplies were scarce, and preparations were insufficient, requesting a postponement to March 24. Chiang's reply was resolute: the attack must commence no later than the 24th, for the aim was preemption and the desire to tether the enemy's forces before they could consolidate. When the moment of decision arrived, the Chinese army began to tense, and the Japanese, no strangers to rapid shifts in tempo—moved to exploit any hesitation or fog of mobilization. The Ninth War Zone's response crystallized into a defensive posture as the Japanese pressed forward, marking a transition from preemption to standoff as both sides tested the limits of resilience. The Japanese plan for what would become known as Operation Ren, aimed at severing the Zhejiang–Jiangxi Railway, breaking the enemy's line of communication, and isolating Nanchang, reflected a calculated synthesis of air power, armored mobility, and canalized ground offensives. On February 6, 1939, the Central China Expeditionary Army issued a set of precise directives: capture Nanchang to cut the Zhejiang–Jiangxi Railway and disrupt the southern reach of Anhui and Zhejiang provinces; seize Nanchang along the Nanchang–Xunyi axis to split enemy lines and "crush" Chinese resistance south of that zone; secure rear lines immediately after the city's fall; coordinate with naval air support to threaten Chinese logistics and airfields beyond the rear lines. The plan anticipated contingencies by pre-positioning heavy artillery and tanks in formations that could strike with speed and depth, a tactical evolution from previous frontal assaults. Okamura Yasuji, commander of the 11th Army, undertook a comprehensive program of reconnaissance, refining the assault plan with a renewed emphasis on speed and surprise. Aerial reconnaissance underlined the terrain, fortifications, and the disposition of Chinese forces, informing the selection of the Xiushui River crossing and the route of the main axis of attack. Okamura's decision to reorganize artillery and armor into concentrated tank groups, flanked by air support and advanced by long-range maneuver, marked a departure from the earlier method of distributing heavy weapons along the infantry front. Sumita Laishiro commanded the 6th Field Heavy Artillery Brigade, with more than 300 artillery pieces, while Hirokichi Ishii directed a force of 135 tanks and armored vehicles. This blended arms approach promised a breakthrough that would outpace the Chinese defenders and open routes for the main force. By mid-February 1939, Japanese preparations had taken on a high tempo. The 101st and 106th Divisions, along with attached artillery, assembled south of De'an, while tank contingents gathered north of De'an. The 6th Division began moving toward Ruoxi and Wuning, the Inoue Detachment took aim at the waterways of Poyang Lake, and the 16th and 9th Divisions conducted feints on the Han River's left bank. The orchestration of these movements—feints, riverine actions, and armored flanking, was designed to reduce the Chinese capacity to concentrate forces around Nanchang and to force the defenders into a less secure posture along the Nanchang–Jiujiang axis. Japan's southward strategy reframed the war: no longer a sprint to reduce Chinese forces in open fields, but a patient siege of lifelines, railways, and airbases. Hainan's seizure, the control of Nanchang's airfields, and the disruption of the Zhejiang–Jiangxi Railway exemplified a shift from large-scale battles to coercive pressure that sought to cripple Nationalist mobilization and erode Chongqing's capacity to sustain resistance. For China, the spring of 1939 underscored resilience amid mounting attrition. Chiang Kai-shek's insistence on offensive means to seize the initiative demonstrated strategic audacity, even as shortages and uneven training slowed tempo. The Ninth War Zone's defense, bolstered by makeshift airpower from Soviet and Allied lendings, kept open critical corridors and delayed Japan's consolidation. The war's human cost—massive casualties, forced labor, and the Li uprising on Hainan—illuminates the brutality that fueled both sides' resolve. In retrospect, the period around Canton, Wuhan, and Nanchang crystallizes a grim truth: the Sino-Japanese war was less a single crescendo of battles than a protracted contest of endurance, logistics, and political stamina. The early 1940s would widen these fault lines, but the groundwork laid in 1939, competition over supply routes, air control, and strategic rail nodes, would shape the war's pace and, ultimately, its outcome. The conflict's memory lies not only in the clashes' flash but in the stubborn persistence of a nation fighting to outlast a formidable adversary. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Japanese invasion of Hainan and proceeding operations to stop logistical leaks into Nationalist China, showcased the complexity and scale of the growing Second Sino-Japanese War. It would not merely be a war of territorial conquest, Japan would have to strangle the colossus using every means necessary.  

The weather in Beijing trended on social media sites over the weekend as unusually heavy snowfall blanketed the capital in a thick white sheet, even as the National Meteorological Center issued a yellow alert — the third-highest level after red and orange — for cold waves across central, eastern and southern China over the next few days. A yellow alert for freezing conditions and a blue alert for blizzards were issued for some parts of Shaanxi, Henan, Anhui and Hubei provinces.周末期间，北京天气登上社交媒体热搜。异常强降雪使首都披上厚厚一层“白衣”。与此同时，国家气象中心发布寒潮黄色预警——这是仅次于红色和橙色的第三高等级预警——提示未来几天中部、东部和南部地区将出现寒潮天气。此外，陕西、河南、安徽和湖北部分地区还发布了低温冰冻黄色预警和暴雪蓝色预警。According to meteorological authorities, the snowfall and accumulation on Saturday and Sunday in Beijing was heavier in the western mountainous areas of the capital.据气象部门介绍，北京周六和周日的降雪及积雪主要集中在西部山区，降雪量明显偏大。The weather event was the result of a "return-flow snowfall pattern" in North China, which saw moisture-laden cold air move inland toward Beijing from Bohai Bay.此次天气过程源于华北地区出现的“回流降雪型”天气形势，携带充足水汽的冷空气自渤海湾向内陆推进并影响北京。As the moist air moved over the city's western terrain, clouds formed at temperatures ranging between — 10 C and — 20 C, which is optimal for rapid snowflake formation. As they fell, the snow crystals collided and bonded, creating flakes that appeared to be oversized, meteorologists said.气象专家表示，当湿润气流越过北京西部地形时，在零下10摄氏度至零下20摄氏度这一最有利于雪花快速生成的温度区间内形成云系。雪晶在下落过程中不断碰撞并相互黏结，从而形成看起来“体型较大”的雪花。The snowfall in Beijing occurred as a strong cold wave swept much of China. The National Meteorological Center said that from Sunday to Wednesday, the cold wave will bring strong winds, sharp drops in temperatures and widespread rain and snow.北京的降雪正值强寒潮影响全国大部分地区。国家气象中心表示，从周日至周三，寒潮将带来大风、显著降温以及大范围雨雪天气。The center issued a yellow cold wave alert on Sunday, warning that temperatures in central and eastern China will drop 6 C to 12 C during the period, with some areas experiencing declines of 16 C or more. The current severe winter condition is expected to peak on Monday.气象中心周日发布寒潮黄色预警，指出中东部地区气温将下降6至12摄氏度，部分地区降温幅度可能达到或超过16摄氏度。本轮严寒天气预计将在周一达到最强。On Sunday evening, the national disaster prevention, reduction and relief commission activated a Level IV emergency response — the lowest in its four-tier system — to address the rising risk of low temperature-, snow — and ice-related disasters in Anhui, Henan, Hunan and Guizhou provinces. A working group previously dispatched to Henan will continue assisting local response efforts, while additional working groups have been sent to Hunan and Guizhou to provide on-site guidance.周日晚间，国家防灾减灾救灾委员会启动四级应急响应（四级为最低级别），应对安徽、河南、湖南和贵州等地低温、雨雪和冰冻灾害风险上升的情况。此前派驻河南的工作组将继续协助地方开展应对工作，同时，新增工作组已赴湖南和贵州开展现场指导。In Altay prefecture of northern Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region, the minimum temperature in Qinghe county plunged to — 40.8 C over the weekend.在新疆维吾尔自治区北部的阿勒泰地区，青河县周末最低气温骤降至零下40.8摄氏度。Gui Jin, a homestay host in Hemu village in Altay, said the temperature there was — 38 C on Saturday. "I'd rather be in Antarctica," he joked, where he said the lowest temperature was around — 32 C on the same day.阿勒泰禾木村民宿经营者桂进表示，当地周六气温为零下38摄氏度。他打趣道：“我宁愿去南极。”他说，当天南极的最低气温大约为零下32摄氏度。Hu Xiao, an analyst with the China Meteorological Administration, said the current cold wave is bringing about dramatic changes in temperatures.中国气象局分析师胡啸表示，此次寒潮正在引发气温的剧烈变化。Earlier this month, the traditionally coldest period of winter, the weather was unusually warm nationwide, making it the third warmest on record. Now the situation has changed. "People will feel as if the weather has suddenly become frigid," Hu said.本月初，本应是一年中最寒冷的时段，全国气温却异常偏高，成为有记录以来第三暖的同期。如今形势已发生变化。胡啸表示：“人们会明显感觉到天气突然变得异常寒冷。”The cold wave is moving relatively slowly and is accompanied by ample moisture. Snowfall began in North China on Saturday, intensified in Henan province and Shandong province on Sunday, and is expected to be most widespread and strongest on Monday.此次寒潮移动速度相对缓慢，并伴有充足水汽。降雪于周六在华北地区开始，周日在河南和山东显著增强，预计周一将达到范围最广、强度最强。The weather event also marks the first widespread freezing rain of this winter. From Monday to Wednesday, sleet is expected in parts of Hubei, Hunan and Guizhou provinces and in Chongqing, with Hunan and Guizhou expected to face the brunt of it.本轮天气过程还将带来今冬首场大范围冻雨。预计周一至周三，湖北、湖南、贵州以及重庆部分地区将出现雨夹雪，其中湖南和贵州受影响最为严重。Wang Xiangxi, minister of emergency management, called for enhanced coordination and preparedness to address risks posed by low temperatures, snow, ice and freezing rain.应急管理部部长王祥喜呼吁，加强统筹协调和应急准备，切实防范低温、雨雪、冰冻和冻雨带来的风险。Officials warned that the weather event would be the largest of its kind so far this year, with complex precipitation types and elevated disaster risks in some regions. With the approach of the Spring Festival holiday and increased travel volume, they emphasized the need to be ready for worst-case scenarios.有关部门警告称，此次天气过程可能是今年以来范围最大、降水形态最为复杂的一次，部分地区灾害风险较高。随着春节临近、人员流动增加，各地需做好最不利情况的应对准备。In Hubei, China Railway Wuhan Bureau activated emergency plans to safeguard rail operations, conducting advance risk assessments about the effect of low temperatures on key equipment such as rail switches and tracks.在湖北，中国铁路武汉局集团有限公司启动应急预案，提前评估低温天气对道岔、线路等关键设备的影响，确保铁路运输安全。Crew members were deployed to remove ice and snow from tracks and carry out preventive maintenance to ensure the safety and smooth operation of railway services, the bureau said.该局表示，已组织人员清除线路冰雪并开展预防性检修，保障铁路运输安全平稳运行。In Gansu province, protective steps have been taken to reduce weather-related losses to crops. Local governments have been urged to take windproof measures for construction sites, billboards and livestock enclosures.在甘肃，各地已采取防护措施，减少恶劣天气对农作物造成的损失，并督促对施工工地、广告牌和牲畜圈舍落实防风加固措施。Energy authorities were also making efforts to ensure stable operation of electricity, gas and heating systems as the cold wave continued to affect large parts of the country.随着寒潮持续影响全国多地，能源主管部门也在采取措施，保障电力、燃气和供暖系统平稳运行。cold wave /koʊld weɪv/寒潮yellow alert /ˈjeloʊ əˈlɜːrt/黄色预警return-flow snowfall pattern /rɪˈtɜːrn floʊ ˈsnoʊfɔːl ˈpætərn/回流降雪型emergency response (Level IV) /ɪˈmɜːrdʒənsi rɪˈspɑːns/四级应急响应freezing rain /ˈfriːzɪŋ reɪn/冻雨sleet /sliːt/雨夹雪

A powerful cold wave is gripping large parts of China this week, driving temperatures sharply lower and pushing the freezing line steadily south, according to the National Meteorological Center.据国家气象中心称，本周一股强劲寒潮正席卷中国大部分地区，气温急剧下降，冰冻线持续向南推进。The center continued to issue blue alerts — the lowest of a four-tiered color-coded warning system — for a cold wave and strong winds on Tuesday morning, forecasting that the cold air will keep moving east and south through Wednesday.气象中心周二上午继续针对寒潮和大风发布蓝色预警——这是四级颜色编码预警系统中的最低级别——并预测冷空气将持续向东和向南移动至周三。Yang Shunan, chief forecaster at the center, said the cold wave has already gripped the entire northern part of the country and continues to push south.气象中心首席预报员杨舒楠表示，这波寒潮已覆盖全国北方地区，并持续向南推进。As of Tuesday afternoon, temperatures in the Inner Mongolia autonomous region, Northeast China and North China had fallen by 6 to 10 C, with some areas recording drops of 12 to 14 C. These regions, along with the Shandong and Liaodong peninsulas, have also recorded winds of up to 39 kilometers per hour, Yang said.截至周二下午，内蒙古自治区、东北地区和华北地区气温普遍下降6至10摄氏度，部分地区降温幅度达12至14摄氏度。杨舒楠表示，这些地区以及山东半岛和辽东半岛还出现了时速达39公里的强风。On Tuesday, Beijing and Tianjin recorded their coldest morning of the second half of the year at around minus 5 C, while Changchun in Jilin province, Shenyang in Liaoning province and Shijiazhuang in Hebei province also hit new seasonal lows.周二，北京和天津录得今年下半年最低气温，约为零下5摄氏度；吉林省长春市、辽宁省沈阳市和河北省石家庄市也创下本季新低。The cold wave is set to keep pressing south over the next two days, bringing the coldest conditions of the season so far to large parts of central and eastern China. In some areas of Jiangsu, Anhui and Zhejiang provinces, temperatures are expected to plunge by more than 10 C, with wind chills exacerbating the cold conditions.未来两天，寒潮将继续向南推进，给中国中部和东部大部地区带来今冬迄今最严寒的天气。江苏、安徽和浙江部分地区气温预计将骤降10摄氏度以上，寒风将使体感温度进一步降低。"The most notable features of this cold wave are its complex weather impacts and the significant temperature plunge," Yang said.杨舒楠表示：“此轮寒潮最显著的特征在于其复杂的气象影响和显著的降温幅度。”In addition to strong winds and plummeting temperatures, sand and dust storms were reported in parts of Inner Mongolia and North China in the early stages of the cold air outbreak.在冷空气来袭初期，除强风和气温骤降外，内蒙古和华北部分地区还出现了沙尘暴。Unlike the cold wave in mid-November, which took a more westerly track and brought sharper temperature drops to southern and western regions, the current system is tracking slightly farther north, resulting in the strongest cooling being concentrated north of the Yangtze River, she said.杨舒楠指出，与11月中旬那场偏西路径、导致南方和西部地区气温骤降的冷空气不同，当前这股冷空气路径略偏北，因此强降温主要集中在长江以北地区。On Wednesday morning, the nation's coldest regions will be in parts of the northeast, northwest and North China, according to the center.气象中心称，周三上午，全国最寒冷的地区将出现在东北、西北和华北的部分地区。Minimum temperatures below minus 10 C are forecast across more than 10 provincial-level regions, including the Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region as well as the provinces of Qinghai, Gansu and Hebei.预计新疆维吾尔自治区、青海省、甘肃省、河北省等十余个省级行政区最低气温将低于零下10摄氏度。Major northeastern cities such as Harbin and Changchun may see temperatures dip below minus 20 C for the first time this season. Forecasters advise commuters and students to bundle up with hats, gloves and scarves to avoid frostbite.哈尔滨、长春等东北主要城市的气温可能在本季首次跌破零下20摄氏度。气象预报员建议通勤者和学生做好保暖措施，戴好帽子、手套和围巾，以防冻伤。By Thursday, the freezing line will reach its southernmost point during this cold spell, extending into parts of Zhejiang, Anhui and Hubei. The cold wave is expected to weaken and come to an end from late Wednesday into Thursday night, Yang said.到周四，冻线将达到此轮寒潮的南端极限，延伸至浙江、安徽和湖北部分地区。杨舒楠表示，预计寒潮将于周三晚至周四夜间逐渐减弱并结束。bundle up做好保暖措施、裹紧衣物frostbite n./ˈfrɑːst.baɪt/冻伤；冻疮

Research from Asian geckos generally suggests that sticky pads are used for smooth surfaces, while claws help grip onto rougher surfaces like wood and rocks. But a new study using Australian geckos is has turned that paradigm upside-down. Then we talk about a brand new species of frog described from the mountains of central China. Become a Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/herphighlights Merch: https://www.redbubble.com/people/herphighlights/shop Full reference list available here: http://www.herphighlights.podbean.com Main Paper References: Pillai RR, Riedel J, Wirth W, Allen-Ankins S, Nordberg E, Edwards W, Schwarzkopf L. 2025. What's the point? The functional role of claws in pad-bearing taxa (Gekkota: Diplodactylidae). Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 292:20251362. DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2025.1362. Species of the Bi-Week: Li S, Shi S, Liu J, Zhao J, Gao S, Wang B. 2025. A new species of the Boulenophrys (Anura, Megophryidae) from Hubei, China. Zoosystematics and Evolution 101:1213–1226. DOI: 10.3897/zse.101.155859. Other Mentioned Papers/Studies: GEORGALIS, G. L., & JONES, M. E. (2025). A new peculiar early diverging caenophidian snake (Serpentes) from the late Eocene of Hordle Cliff, England. Comptes Rendus Palevol, 24(25), 505-530. Editing and Music: Intro/outro – Treehouse by Ed Nelson Species Bi-week theme – Michael Timothy Other Music – The Passion HiFi, https://www.thepassionhifi.com

In 2001, in the village of Dahong, nestled in the heart of China's Hubei province, the Lunar New Year was in full swing. As fireworks illuminated the night sky, another series of explosions, muffled and more sinister, suddenly resonated deep in the nearby mountain… The villagers immediately realized that tomb robbers were about to strike, and they alerted the police. Although the location of this tomb had been known about for a long time, its contents still remained a mystery… Upon entering the mausoleum, after the arrest of the looters by the police, the archeologists sent by the authorities discovered a veritable treasure trove, dating back to the Ming Dynasty. The find included thousands of breathtakingly beautiful objects made from gold, jade, and precious stones … as well as emeralds from the other side of the world. Voice of Jewels is a podcast by L'ÉCOLE, School of Jewelry Arts, with the support of Van Cleef & Arpels. With the participation of Bei He, art historian and lecturer at L'ÉCOLE, School of Jewelry Arts Written by Martin Quenehen and Aram Kebabdjian, performed by Edoardo Ballerini, and produced by Bababam. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

En 2001, dans le village de Dahong, niché au cœur de la province chinoise du Hubei, le Nouvel An lunaire battait son plein. Tandis que les feux d'artifice illuminaient le ciel, une autre série de détonations, plus sourdes, plus inquiétantes, a soudain résonné dans la montagne voisine… Les villageois ont aussitôt compris que des pilleurs de tombes tentaient de passer à l'action, et ils alertèrent immédiatement la police. L'emplacement de la tombe était connu de longue date, mais pas ce qu'elle renfermait… En pénétrant le mausolée, après l'arrestation des pillards, les archéologues envoyés par les autorités découvrirent alors un véritable trésor, datant de la dynastie Ming. Des milliers d'objets fabuleux en or, jade et pierres précieuses… Parmi lesquelles, des émeraudes venues de l'autre bout du monde. La Voix des Bijoux est un podcast de L'École des Arts Joailliers, avec le soutien de Van Cleef & Arpels. Avec la participation de Bei He, historienne de l'art et professeur à l'École des Arts Joailliers. Écrit par Martin Quenehenne et Aram Kebabdjian, interprété par Pierre-François Garel et produit par Bababam. Hébergé par Acast. Visitez acast.com/privacy pour plus d'informations.

Last time we spoke about the beginning of the Wuhan Campaign. As Japanese forces pressed toward central China, Chiang Kai-shek faced a brutal choice: defend Wuhan with costly sieges or unleash a dangerous flood to buy time. The Yellow River breached its banks at Huayuankou, sending a wall of water racing toward villages, railways, and fields. The flood did not erase the enemy; it bought months of breathing room for a battered China, but at a terrible toll to civilians who lost homes, farms, and lives. Within Wuhan's orbit, a mosaic of Chinese forces struggled to unite. The NRA, split into competing war zones and factions, numbered about 1.3 million but fought with uneven equipment and training. The Japanese, deploying hundreds of thousands, ships, and air power, pressed from multiple angles: Anqing, Madang, Jiujiang, and beyond, using riverine forts and amphibious landings to turn the Yangtze into a deadly artery. Yet courage endured as troops held lines, pilots challenged the skies, and civilians, like Wang Guozhen, who refused to betray his country, chose defiance over surrender. The war for Wuhan was not a single battle but a testament to endurance in the face of overwhelming odds.   #173 The Fall of Wuhan Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. In the last episode we began the Battle of Wuhan. Japan captured Anqing and gained air access to Jiujiang, Chinese defenses around the Yangtze River were strained. The southern Yangtze's Ninth War Zone held two key garrisons: one west of Poyang Lake and another in Jiujiang. To deter Japanese assault on Jiujiang, China fortified Madang with artillery, mines, and bamboo booms. On June 24, Japan conducted a surprise Madang landing while pressing south along the Yangtze. Madang's fortress withstood four assaults but suffered heavy bombardment and poison gas. Chinese leadership failures contributed to the fall: Li Yunheng, overseeing Madang, was away at a ceremony, leaving only partial contingents, primarily three battalions from marine corps units and the 313th regiment of the 53rd division, participating, totaling under five battalions. Reinforcements from Pengze were misrouted by Li's orders, arriving too late. Madang fell after three days. Chiang Kai-shek retaliated with a counterattack and rewarded units that recaptured Xiangshan, but further progress was blocked. Li Yunheng was court-martialed, and Xue Weiying executed.   Madang's loss opened a corridor toward Jiujiang. The Japanese needed weeks to clear minefields, sacrificing several ships in the process. With roughly 200,000 Chinese troops in the Jiujiang–Ruichang zone under Xue Yue and Zhang Fukui, the Japanese captured Pengze and then Hukou, using poison gas again during the fighting. The Hukou evacuation cut off many non-combat troops, with over 1,800 of 3,100 soldiers successfully evacuated and more than 1,300 missing drowned in the lake. Two weeks after Hukou's fall, the Japanese reached Jiujiang and overtook it after a five-day battle. The retreat left civilians stranded, and the Jiujiang Massacre followed: about 90,000 civilians were killed, with mass executions of POWs, rapes, and widespread destruction of districts, factories, and transport. Subsequently, the Southern Riverline Campaign saw Japanese detachments along the river advance westward, capturing Ruichang, Ruoxi, and other areas through October, stretching Chinese defenses thin as Japan pressed toward Wuchang and beyond. On July 26, 1938, the Japanese occupied Jiujiang and immediately divided their forces into three routes: advancing toward De'an and Nanchang, then striking Changsha, severing the Yue-Han Railway, and surrounding Wuhan in an effort to annihilate the Chinese field army. The advance of the 101st and 106th Infantry Divisions slowed south of the Yangtze River, yet the Central China Expeditionary Army remained intent on seizing Ruichang and De'an to cut off Chinese forces around Mount Lu. To this end, the 9th and 27th Infantry Divisions were deployed to the sector, with the 9th regarded as an experienced unit that had fought in earlier campaigns, while the 27th was newly formed in the summer of 1938; this contrast underscored the rapidly expanding scope of the war in China as the Japanese Army General Staff continued mobilizing reservists and creating new formations. According to the operational plan, the 101st and 106th Divisions would push south toward De'an to pin Chinese defenders, while the 9th and 27th Divisions would envelop Chinese forces south of the river. Okamura Yasuji ordered five battalions from the 9th to move toward De'an via Ruichang, and the Hata Detachment was tasked with securing the area northwest of Ruichang to protect the 9th's flank. North of the Yangtze, the 6th Infantry Division was to move from Huangmei to Guangji, with Tianjiazhen as the ultimate objective; capturing Tianjiazhen would allow the 11th Army to converge on Wuhan from both north and south of the river.  The operation began when the 9th Division landed at Jiujiang, threatening the left flank of the Jinguanqiao line. The Chinese responded by deploying the 1st Corps to counter the 9th Division's left flank, which threatened the Maruyama Detachment's lines of communication. The Maruyama Detachment counterattacked successfully, enabling the rest of the 9th Division to seize Ruichang on August 24; on the same day, the 9th attacked the 30th Army defending Mount Min. The Chinese defense deteriorated on the mountain, and multiple counterattacks by Chinese divisions failed, forcing the 1st Corps to retreat to Mahuiling. The seizure of Ruichang and the surrounding area was followed by a wave of atrocities, with Japanese forces inflicting substantial casualties, destroying houses, and damaging property, and crimes including murder, rape, arson, torture, and looting devastating many villages and livelihoods in the Ruichang area. After Ruichang and Mount Min fell, the Maruyama Detachment and the 106th Infantry Division advanced on Mahuiling, seeking to encircle Chinese forces from the northwest, with the 106th forming the inner ring and the Maruyama Detachment the outer ring; this coordination led to Mahuiling's fall on September 3. The 27th Infantry Division, arriving in late August, landed east of Xiaochikou, providing the manpower to extend Japanese offensives beyond the Yangtze's banks and outflank Chinese defenders along the river. Its main objective was to seize the Rui-wu highway, a vital route for the continued advance toward Wuhan. After the fall of Mahuiling, Japanese command altered its strategy. The 11th Army ordered the Maruyama Detachment to rejoin the 9th Infantry Division and press westward, while the 101st Infantry Division was to remain at Mahuiling and push south toward De'an along with the 106th Infantry Division. This divergent or “eccentric” offensive aimed to advance on Wuhan while protecting the southern flank. The renewed offensive began on September 11, 1938, with the 9th Infantry Division and Hata Detachment advancing west along the Rui-yang and Rui-wu highways toward Wuhan, followed days later by the 27th Infantry Division. Initially, the Japanese made solid progress from Ruichang toward a line centered on Laowuge, but soon faced formidable Chinese defenses. The 9th and 27th Divisions confronted the Chinese 2nd Army Corps, which had prepared in-depth positions in the mountains west of Sanchikou and Xintanpu. The 27th Division encountered stiff resistance from the 18th and 30th Corps, and although it captured Xiaoao by September 24, its vanguard advancing west of Shujie came under heavy attack from the 91st, 142nd, 60th, and 6th Reserve Infantry Divisions, threatening to encircle it. Only the southward advance of the 101st and 106th Divisions relieved the pressure, forcing the Chinese to redeploy the 91st and 6th Reserve Divisions to the south and thereby loosening the 27th's grip. After the redeployment, the 9th and 27th Divisions resumed their push. The 9th crossed the Fu Shui on October 9 and took Sanjikou on October 16, while the 27th seized Xintanpu on October 18. The Hata Detachment followed, capturing Yangxin on October 18 and Ocheng on October 23, further tightening Japanese control over the highways toward Wuhan. By mid-October, 11th Army commander Okamura Yasuji resolved to sever the Guangzhou-Hankou railway to disrupt Chinese lines. On October 22, the 9th and 27th Divisions attacked toward Jinniu and Xianning. By October 27, the 9th had captured Jinniu and cut the railway; the 27th Division extended the disruption further south. These actions effectively isolated Wuchang from the south, giving the Imperial Japanese Army greater leverage over the southern approaches to Wuhan. The push south by the 101st and 106th Infantry Divisions pressed toward De'an, where they encountered the entrenched Chinese 1st Army Corps. The offensive began on September 16 and by the 24th, elements of the 27th Division penetrated deep into the area west of Baishui Street and De'an's environs. Recognizing the growing crisis, Xue Yue mobilized the nearby 91st and 142nd Divisions, who seized Nanping Mountain along the Ruiwu Line overnight, effectively cutting off the 27th Division's retreat. Fierce combat on the 25th and 26th saw Yang Jialiu, commander of the 360th Regiment of the 60th Division, die a heroic death. Zhang Zhihe, chief of staff of the 30th Group Army and an underground CCP member, commanded the newly formed 13th Division and the 6th Division to annihilate the Suzuki Regiment and recapture Qilin Peak. Learning of the 27th Division's trap, Okamura Yasuji panicked and, on the 25th, urgently ordered the 123rd, 145th, and 147th Infantry Regiments and mountain artillery of the 106th Division on the Nanxun Line, along with the 149th Regiment of the 101st Division on the Dexing Line, to rush to Mahuiling and Xingzi. To adapt to mountain warfare, some units were temporarily converted to packhorse formations. On the 27th, the 106th Division broke through the Wutailing position with force, splitting into two groups and pushing toward Erfangzheng and Lishan. By the 28th, the three regiments and mountain artillery of the 106th Division advanced into the mountain villages of Wanjialing, Leimingguliu, Shibaoshan, Nantianpu, Beixijie, and Dunshangguo, about 50 li west of De'an. On the same day, the 149th Regiment of the 101st Division entered the Wanjialing area and joined the 106th Division. Commanded by Lieutenant General Junrokuro Matsuura, the 106th Division sought to break out of Baicha and disrupt the Nanwu Highway to disrupt the Chinese retreat from De'an. At this juncture, Xue Yue's corps perceived the Japanese advance as a predatory, wolf-like maneuver and deemed it a strategic opportunity to counterattack. He resolved to pull forces from Dexing, Nanxun, and Ruiwu to envelop the enemy near Wanjialing, with the aim of annihilating them. Thus began a desperate, pivotal battle between China and Japan in northern Jiangxi, centered on the Wanjialing area. The Japanese 106th Division found its rear communications cut off around September 28, 1938, as the Chinese blockade tightened. Despite the 27th Division's severed rear and its earlier defeat at Qilin Peak, Okamura Yasuji ordered a renewed push to relieve the besieged 106th by directing the 27th Division to attack Qilin Peak and advance east of Baishui Street. In this phase, the 27th Division dispatched the remnants of its 3rd Regiment to press the assault on Qilin Peak, employing poison gas and briefly reaching the summit. On September 29, the 142nd Division of the 32nd Army, under Shang Zhen, coordinated with the 752nd Regiment of the same division to launch a fierce counterattack on Qilin Peak at Zenggai Mountain west of Xiaoao. After intense fighting, they reclaimed the peak, thwarting the 27th Division's bid to move eastward to aid the 106th. Concurrently, a portion of the 123rd Regiment of the 106th Division attempted a breakout west of Baishui Street. Our 6th and 91st Divisions responded with a determined assault from the east of Xiaoao, blocking the 123rd Regiment east of Baishui Street. The victories at Qilin Peak and Baishui Street halted any merger between the eastern and western Japanese forces, enabling the Chinese army to seal the pocket and create decisive conditions for encircling the 106th Division and securing victory in the Battle of Wanjialing. After the setback at Qilin Peak, Division Commander Masaharu Homma, defying Okamura Yasuji's orders to secure Baishui Street, redirected his focus to Tianhe Bridge under a pretext of broader operations. He neglected the heavily encircled 106th Division and pivoted toward Xintanpu. By September 30, Chinese forces attacked from both the east and west, with the 90th and 91st Divisions joining the assault on the Japanese positions. On October 1, the Japanese, disoriented and unable to pinpoint their own unit locations, telegrammed Okamura Yasuji for air support. On October 2, the First Corps received orders to tighten the encirclement and annihilate the enemy forces. Deployments were made to exploit a numerical advantage and bolster morale, placing the Japanese in a desperate position. On October 3, 1938, the 90th and 91st Divisions launched a concerted attack on Nantianpu, delivering heavy damage to the Japanese force and showering Leimingguliu with artillery fire that endangered the 106th Division headquarters. By October 5, Chinese forces reorganized: the 58th Division of the 74th Army advanced from the south, the 90th Division of the 4th Army from the east, portions of the 6th and 91st Divisions from the west, and the 159th and 160th Divisions of the 65th Army from the north, tightening the surrounding cordon from four directions. On October 6, Xue Yue ordered a counterattack, and by October 7 the Chinese army had effectively cut off all retreat routes. That evening, after fierce hand-to-hand combat, the 4th Army regained the hilltop, standing at a 100-meter-high position, and thwarted any Japanese plan to break through Baicha and sever Chinese retreat toward De'an. By October 8, Lieutenant Colonel Sakurada Ryozo, the 106th Division's staff officer, reported the division's deteriorating situation to headquarters. The telegram signaled the impending collapse of the 106th Division. On October 9, Kuomintang forces recaptured strategic positions such as Lishan, tightening encirclement to a small pocket of about three to four square kilometers in Nantianpu, Leimingguliu, and Panjia. That night, the vanguard attacked the Japanese 106th Division's headquarters at Leimingguliu, engaging in close combat with the Japanese. Matsuura and the division's staff then took up arms in defense. In the early hours of October 10, Japanese forces launched flares that illuminated only a narrow arc of movement, and a limited number of troops fled northwest toward Yangfang Street. The two and a half month battle inflicted tremendous casualties on the Japanese, particularly on the 101st and 106th divisions. These two formations began with a combined strength of over 47,000 troops and ultimately lost around 30,000 men in the fighting. The high casualty rate hit the Japanese officer corps especially hard, forcing General Shunroku Hata to frequently airdrop replacement officers onto the besieged units' bases throughout the engagement. For the Chinese, the successful defense of Wanjialing was pivotal to the Wuhan campaign.  Zooming out at a macro level a lot of action was occurring all over the place. Over in Shandong, 1,000 soldiers under Shi Yousan, who had defected multiple times between rival warlord cliques and operated as an independent faction, occupied Jinan and held it for a few days. Guerrillas briefly controlled Yantai. East of Changzhou extending to Shanghai, another non-government Chinese force, led by Dai Li, employed guerrilla tactics in the Shanghai suburbs and across the Huangpu River. This force included secret society members from the Green Gang and the Tiandihui, who conducted executions of spies and perceived traitors, losing more than 100 men in the course of operations. On August 13, members of this force clandestinely entered the Japanese air base at Hongqiao and raised a Chinese flag. Meanwhile, the Japanese Sixth Division breached the defensive lines of Chinese 31st and 68th Armies on July 24 and captured Taihu, Susong, and Huangmei Counties by August 3. As Japanese forces advanced westward, the Chinese Fourth Army of the Fifth War Zone deployed its main strength in Guangji, Hubei, and Tianjia Town to intercept the offensive. The 11th Army Group and the 68th Army were ordered to form a defensive line in Huangmei County, while the 21st and 29th Army Groups, along with the 26th Army, moved south to outflank the Japanese. The Chinese recaptured Taihu on August 27 and Susong on August 28. However, with Japanese reinforcements arriving on August 30, the Chinese 11th Army Group and the 68th Army were unable to sustain counteroffensives and retreated to Guangji County to continue resisting alongside the 26th, 55th, and 86th Armies. The Chinese Fourth Army Group directed the 21st and 29th Army Groups to flank the Japanese from the northeast of Huangmei, but they failed to halt the Japanese advance. Guangji fell on September 6, and while Guangji was recovered by the Chinese Fourth Corps on September 8, Wuxue was lost on the same day. Zooming back in on the Wuhan Front, the Japanese focus shifted to Tianjiazhen. The fortress of Tianjiazhen represented the 6th Infantry Division's most important objective. Its geographic position, where the Yangtze's two banks narrow to roughly 600 meters, with cliffs and high ground overlooking the river, allowed Chinese forces to deploy gun batteries that could control the river and surrounding terrain. Chinese control of Tianjiazhen thus posed a serious obstacle to Japan's amphibious and logistical operations on the Yangtze, and its seizure was deemed essential for Japan to advance toward Wuhan. Taking Tianjiazhen would not be easy: overland approaches were impeded by mountainous terrain on both sides of the fortress, while an amphibious assault faced fortified positions and minefields in the narrow river. Recognizing its strategic importance, Chinese forces reinforced Tianjiazhen with three divisions from central government troops, aiming to deter an overland assault. Chinese preparations included breaching several dykes and dams along the Yangtze to flood expanses of land and slow the Japanese advance; however, the resulting higher water levels widened the river and created a more accessible supply route for the Japanese. Instead of relying on a long overland route from Anqing to Susong, the Japanese could now move supplies directly up the Yangtze from Jiujiang to Huangmei, a distance of only about 40 kilometers, which boosted the 6th Division's logistics and manpower. In August 1938 the 6th Infantry Division resumed its northward push, facing determined resistance from the 4th Army Corps entrenched in a narrow defile south of the Dabie Mountains, with counterattacks from the 21st and 27th Army Groups affecting the 6th's flank. The Dabie Mountains are a major mountain range located in central China. Running northwest to southeast, they form the main watershed between the Huai and Yangtze rivers. The range also marks the boundary between Hubei Province and its neighboring provinces of Henan to the north and Anhui to the east. By early September the 6th had captured Guangji, providing a staging ground for the thrust toward Tianjiazhen, though this extended the division's long flank: after Guangji fell, it now faced a 30-kilometer front between Huangmei and Guangji, exposing it to renewed Chinese pressure from the 21st and 27th Army Groups. This constrained the number of troops available for the main objective at Tianjiazhen. Consequently, the Japanese dispatched only a small force, three battalions from the Imamura Detachment, to assault Tianjiazhen, betting that the fortress could be taken within a week. The KMT, learning from previous defeats, reinforced Tianjiazhen with a stronger infantry garrison and built obstacles, barbed wire, pillboxes, and trench networks, to slow the assault. These defenses, combined with limited Japanese logistics, six days of rations per soldier, made the operation costly and precarious. The final Japanese assault was postponed by poor weather, allowing Chinese forces to press counterattacks: three Chinese corps, the 26th, 48th, and 86th, attacked the Imamura Detachment's flank and rear, and by September 18 these attacks had begun to bite, though the floods of the Yangtze prevented a complete encirclement of the eastern flank. Despite these setbacks, Japanese riverine and ground operations continued, aided by naval support that moved up the Yangtze as Matouzhen's batteries were overtaken. After Matouzhen fell and enabled a secure riverine supply line from Shanghai to Guangji, 11th Army commander Okamura Yasuji quickly sent relief supplies upriver on September 23. These replenishments restored the besieged troops near Tianjiazhen and allowed the Japanese to resume the offensive, employing night assaults and poison gas to seize Tianjiazhen on September 29, 1938, thereby removing a major barrier to their advance toward Wuhan along the Yangtze. The 11th Army pressed north along the Yangtze while the 2nd Army, commanded by Prince Naruhiko Higashikuni, concentrated the 3rd, 10th, 13th, and 16th Infantry Divisions around Hefei with initial aims at Lu'an and Heshan and the broader objective of moving toward the northern foothills of the Dabie Mountains. When Chinese forces began destroying roads west of Lu'an, Naruhiko shifted the 2nd Army's plan. Rather than pushing along a line from Lu'an to Heshan, he redirected toward the Huangchuan–Shangcheng corridor, where more intact roads remained accessible, and Chinese withdrawals in the Huangchuan–Shangceng area to counter the 11th Army's Yangtze advance allowed the 2nd Army to gain speed in the early stage of its offensive. The 10th and 13th Infantry Divisions were ordered to begin their advance on August 27, facing roughly 25,000 Chinese troops from the Fifth War Zone's 51st and 77th Corps, and achieving notable early gains. The 10th captured Lu'an on August 28, followed by the 13th taking Heshan on August 29. The 10th then seized Kushi on September 7. Meanwhile, the 13th crossed the Shi River at night in an attempt to seize Changbailing, but encountered stiff resistance from multiple Chinese divisions that slowed its progress. To bolster the effort, Naruhiko ordered the Seiya Detachment from the 10th Division—three infantry battalions—to reinforce the 13th. Despite these reinforcements, momentum remained insufficient, so he deployed the 16th Infantry Division, which had arrived at Yenchiachi, to assault Shangcheng from the north. After crossing the Shi River at Yanjiachi, the 16th outflanked Shangcheng from the north, coordinating with the 13th from the south; the Chinese withdrew and Shangcheng fell. Following this success, Naruhiko ordered the 13th and 16th Divisions to push deeper into the Dabie Mountains toward Baikou and Songfu, while the 10th and 3rd Divisions moved toward Leshan and Xinyang, with Xinyang, a crucial Beijing–Wuhan Railway node, representing a particularly important objective. The Japanese advance progressed steadily through the Dabie Mountains, with the 10th executing bold maneuvers to outflank Leshan from the south and the 3rd penetrating toward the Beijing–Wuhan railway north of Xinyang, collectively disrupting and cutting the railway near Xinyang in October. An independent unit, the Okada Detachment, operated between these forces, advancing through Loshan before sealing Xinyang on October 12. The seizure of Xinyang effectively severed Wuhan's northern artery from external reinforcement and resupply, signaling a decisive turn against Wuhan as a Chinese stronghold. While the 2nd Army advanced in the Dabie Mountains, another critical development was taking place far to the south. By the end of 1937, southern China became more crucial to the Republic of China as a lifeline to the outside world. Guangzhou and Hong Kong served as some of the last vital transportation hubs and sources of international aid for Chiang Kai-Shek, with approximately 80 percent of supplies from abroad reaching Chinese forces in the interior through Guangzhou. Imperial General Headquarters believed that a blockade of Guangdong province would deprive China of essential war materiel and the ability to prolong the war. As I always liked to term it, the Japanese were trying to plug up the leaks of supplies coming into China, and Guangzhou was the largest one. In 1936 the Hankow-Canton railway was completed, and together with the Kowloon-Canton railway formed a rapid all-rail link from south China to central and northern China. For the first sixteen months of the war, about 60,000 tons of goods transited per month through the port of Hong Kong. The central government also reported the import of 1.5 million gallons of gasoline through Hong Kong in 1938, and more than 700,000 tons of goods would eventually reach Hankou using the new railway. In comparison, the Soviet Union in 1937 was sending war materiel through Xinjiang to Lanzhou using camels, with Chinese raw materials traveling back either the same route or via Hong Kong to Vladivostok. By 1940, 50,000 camels and hundreds of trucks were transporting 2,000–3,000 tons of Soviet war material per month into China. Japanese planning for operations began in early November 1937, with the blockade's objectives centered on seizing a portion of Daya Bay and conducting air operations from there. In December 1937, the 5th Army, including the 11th Division, the Formosa Mixed Brigade, and the 4th Air Brigade, were activated in Formosa under Lt. Gen. Motoo Furusho to achieve this objective. Due to the proximity of Daya Bay to Hong Kong, the Japanese government feared potential trouble with Britain, and the operation was subsequently suspended, leading to the deactivation of the 5th Army. By June 1938, the Battle of Wuhan convinced Imperial General Headquarters that the fighting could not be localized. The headquarters reversed policy and began preparations to capture Guangzhou and to expedite the settlement of the war. During the peak of the battles of Shanghai and Nanjing, urgent demands for aerial support at the Battle of Taiyuan in the north and at Canton in the south forced the Nationalist Air Force of China to split the 28th Pursuit Squadron and the 5th Pursuit Group , based at Jurong Airbase in the Nanking defense sector. The squadron was divided into two smaller units: Lt. Arthur Chin led one half toward Canton, while Capt. Chan Kee-Wong led the other half to Taiyuan. On September 27, 1937, the 28th PS under Lt. Arthur Chin dispatched four Hawk IIs from Shaoguan Airbase, and the 29th PS under Lt. Chen Shun-Nan deployed three Hawk IIIs from Tianhe Airbase. Their mission was to intercept Japanese IJNAF G3M bombers attempting to strike the Canton–Hankow railway infrastructure. The two flights engaged the Japanese bombers over Canton, claiming at least two kills; one G3M dumped fuel and ditching off the coast of Swatow, with its crew rescued by a British freighter, though one of the gunners died of battle injuries. In October 1937, amid mounting demands and combat losses, the Chinese government ordered 36 Gloster Gladiator Mk.I fighters, whose performance and firepower surpassed that of the Hawk IIs and IIIs, and most of these would become frontline fighters for the Canton defense sector as the war extended into 1938. On February 23, 1938, Capt. John Huang Xinrui, another Chinese-American volunteer pilot, took command of the renewed 29th PS, now equipped with the Gladiators. He led nine Gladiators from Nanxiong Airbase on their first active combat over Canton, supporting three Gladiators from the 28th PS as they intercepted thirteen Nakajima E8N fighter-attack seaplanes launched from the seaplane tenders Notoro Maru and Kinugasa Maru. The battle proved challenging: most of the Gladiators' machine guns jammed, severely reducing their firepower. Despite this, five of the E8Ns were shot down, confirmed by Capt. Huang and his fellow pilots who managed to strike the Japanese aircraft with only one, two, or three functioning guns per Gladiator. Chin later revealed that the gun jams were caused by defective Belgian-made ammunition. The combat nevertheless proved tragic and costly: Lt. Xie Chuanhe (Hsieh Chuan-ho) and his wingman Lt. Yang Rutong pursued the E8Ns but were stymied by inoperable weapons, with Lt. Yang killed in the counterattack, and Lt. Chen Qiwei lost under similar circumstances. The 4th War Area Army, commanded by He Yingqin, was assigned to the defense of south China in 1938. General Yu Hanmou led the 12th Army Group defending Guangdong province. The region's defense included about eight divisions and two brigades of regular army troops stationed around Guangzhou, with an additional five divisions of regular troops deployed in Fujian. The 4th War Area Army totaled roughly 110,000 regular army troops. By this time, most regular army units in Guangxi and four Guangdong divisions had been redirected north to participate in the Battle of Wuhan. Beyond the regular army, two militia divisions were deployed near Guangzhou, and the Guangxi militia comprised five divisions. Militia units were typically raised from local civilians and disbanded as the army moved through new areas. Their roles centered on security, supply transportation, and reconnaissance. Guangdong's main defensive strength was concentrated in Guangzhou and the immediate environs to the city's east. Other Chinese forces defended Chaozhou and western Guangdong. Defensive fortifications included the Humen fortress guarding the Pearl River mouth and three defensive lines near Daya Bay. Guangzhou housed three batteries of four three-inch guns, a battery of three 120mm guns, and Soviet-supplied 37mm anti-aircraft guns. The Imperial Japanese Navy conducted an aerial and naval interdiction campaign aimed at China's communication lines to neighboring regions. Japan believed that the blockade would hasten the end of the war, and disruption of the Chinese logistics network was the primary objective in Guangdong province from August 1937 until October 1938. The 5th Fleet's blockading actions extended along the coast from Haimenchen, Zhejiang to Shantou, with the 5th Destroyer Squadron patrolling the coast south of Shantou. At times, units from the Marianas were deployed to support coastal blockade operations in south China, usually consisting of cruisers accompanied by destroyer flotillas. One or two aircraft carriers and fleet auxiliaries would also be on station. Naval interdictions focused on stopping junks ferrying military supplies from Hong Kong to coastal China. The first recorded attack occurred in September 1937 when eleven junks were sunk by a Japanese submarine. Although Japan successfully blockaded Chinese shipping and ports, foreign shipping could still enter and depart from Hong Kong. The central government had established Hong Kong as a warehouse for munitions and supplies to pass through. Aerial interdictions targeted Chinese railway bridges and trains in Guangdong. Starting in October 1937, the Japanese launched air raids against the Sunning railway, focusing on government facilities and bridges in Jiangmen and towns along the railway. By 1938, airstrikes against the Kowloon–C Canton railway became common, with damaged trains periodically found along the line. An air-defense early warning system was created to divert trains during raids into forested areas that offered overhead concealment. In May 1938, the Colonial Office and the Foreign Office approved a Chinese request to construct and operate a locomotive repair yard within the New Territories to keep the railway operational. Airstrikes against rail facilities in Guangzhou were designed to interrupt rail supplies from Hong Kong so Japan would not need to commit to land operations in south China. However, the air raids did not severely impede railway operations or stop supplies moving through Hunan or Guangxi. The blockade in south China also targeted aircraft flying out of Hong Kong. In November 1937, a Royal Navy aircraft from HMS Eagle encountered Japanese naval anti-aircraft fire off the coast of Hong Kong. In December 1937, fifteen Japanese bombers overflew Lantau Island and the Taikoo docks. In August 1938, Japanese naval aircraft shot down a China National Aviation Corporation passenger plane, and two Eurasia Aviation Corporation passenger planes were shot down the following month. Beyond military targets, the Japanese conducted politically motivated terror bombing in Guangzhou. Bombing intensified from May to June 1938 with incendiary munitions and low-level strafing attacks against ships. The Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service, operating from Formosa and the carrier Kaga, conducted about 400 airstrikes during this period and continued into July. By the end of the summer, Guangzhou's population had dwindled to approximately 600,000 from an original 1.3 million. From August 1937 to October 1938, casualties in Guangzhou were estimated at 6,000 killed and 8,000 injured. On October 12, 1938, Japanese forces from the 21st Army, including the 5th, 18th, and 104th Infantry Divisions, landed in Guangzhou, launching the operation at 4:00 am with elements of the 5th and 18th Divisions hitting Aotou and elements of the 104th Division landing at Hachung in Bias Bay. Initially totaling about 30,000 men, they were soon reinforced by a further 20,000, and resistance was minimal because most of Yu Hanmou's 12th Army Group had been redeployed to central China to defend approaches to Wuhan, leaving only two regular Chinese divisions, the 151st and 153rd, to defend the region. By the night of October 12, the Japanese had established a 10-kilometer-deep beachhead and advanced inland; on October 13 they seized the towns of Pingshan and Tamshui with little opposition, and on October 15 they converged on Waichow and captured it. The fall of Pingshan, located on the Sai Kong River with a deep, broad river and only a flimsy crossing, and Waichow, where Chinese defenses included trenches and concrete pillboxes, surprised observers since these positions had been prepared to resist invasion; nonetheless, Chinese forces fled, opening the road to Guangzhou for the Japanese. Between October 16 and 19, three Japanese columns pushed inland, with the easternmost column crossing the East River on the 16th and the 5th Infantry Division capturing Sheklung on the 19th as Chinese forces retreated. By the night of October 20, Guangzhou's defenders withdrew and adopted a scorched-earth policy to deny resources to the invaders. On October 21, Japanese tanks entered Guangzhou without infantry support, and a regiment from the 5th Infantry Division captured the Bocca Tigris forts with no resistance. With Guangzhou secured, the Guangzhou–Wuhan railway and the Hong Kong–Guangzhou railway were severed, supplies to Wuhan were cut, Chiang Kai-Shek faced a daunting and depressing task, he had to abandon Wuhan. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Yangtze became a bloodied artery as Chinese and Japanese forces clashed from Anqing to Jiujiang, Madang to Tianjiazhen. A mosaic of Chinese troops, filled with grit and missteps, held lines while civilians like Wang Guozhen refused to surrender. The siege of Wanjialing crowned Chinese resilience, even as Guangzhou buckled under a relentless blockade. The Fall of Wuhan was all but inevitable.

During the just-concluded National Day and Mid-Autumn Festival holiday, millions of travelers across China were able to travel light—sending local specialties and souvenirs home through China's fast-growing parcel delivery network. For many, the packages may have even arrived before the travelers themselves.在刚刚结束的国庆中秋双节假期期间，中国数百万游客得以轻装出行——通过中国快速发展的包裹快递网络，将当地特产和纪念品寄回家中。对许多人而言，这些包裹甚至可能比他们先到家。According to the State Post Bureau of China, the nation's postal and courier industry handled 7.23 billion parcels during the eight-day National Day and Mid-Autumn Festival holiday, which ended on Wednesday, maintaining stable operations amid a surge in tourism and holiday consumption. The daily average parcel volume exceeded 900 million, reflecting robust consumer demand and the growing vitality of the country's holiday economy.中国国家邮政局数据显示，在周三（10月8日）结束的八天国庆中秋假期期间，全国邮政快递行业共处理包裹72.3亿件，在旅游和假日消费激增的背景下保持了运营稳定。日均包裹量超9亿件，反映出强劲的消费需求和中国假日经济日益增长的活力。Courier companies embraced new "express delivery + culture and tourism" models, setting up service outlets, smart lockers and self-service boxes at railway stations, airports, hotels and scenic areas. The move offered travelers greater convenience while turning tourism flows into new consumption momentum, the bureau said.国家邮政局表示，快递公司推出“快递+文旅”新模式，在火车站、机场、酒店和景区设立服务网点、智能快递柜和自助寄件箱。此举为游客提供了更大便利，同时将旅游人流转化为新的消费动力。In popular destinations such as Kashgar in the Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region, Sanya in Hainan province, and Lhasa in the Xizang autonomous region, shipments of local specialties rose sharply during the holiday. By collaborating with merchants, courier companies helped create a "travel–purchase–ship" consumption loop. At scenic spots like Qiandao Lake in Hangzhou, Gulangyu Island in Xiamen, and Beijing Road in Guangzhou, themed courier stores and parcel lockers catered to tourists' needs for shipping souvenirs and luggage.在新疆维吾尔自治区喀什市、海南省三亚市、西藏自治区拉萨市等热门旅游目的地，假期期间当地特产的寄递量大幅增长。快递公司通过与商家合作，助力打造“旅游—购买—寄递”消费闭环。在杭州千岛湖、厦门鼓浪屿、广州北京路等景区，主题快递门店和包裹寄存柜满足了游客寄递纪念品和行李的需求。This year's "golden week" sparked strong travel and consumption momentum nationwide. By optimizing operations and diversifying services, courier firms enriched travel experiences and unlocked new consumption potential, according to the bureau.国家邮政局指出，今年“黄金周”在全国范围内激发了强劲的旅游和消费势头。快递公司通过优化运营、丰富服务类型，提升了游客的出行体验，并释放了新的消费潜力。Ahead of the holiday, shipments of popular festive goods—including mooncakes, hairy crabs, seafood, meats and fresh fruits—surged. To ensure freshness and efficiency, companies established collection points and cold-chain warehouses in provinces such as Guangdong, Guizhou, Jiangsu and Hubei, allowing goods to be dispatched directly from production sites. They also optimized trunk routes, boosted air freight capacity, and adjusted transport resources dynamically to meet the seasonal rush.假期前夕，月饼、大闸蟹、海鲜、肉类、新鲜水果等热门节庆商品的寄递量大幅上升。为保障商品新鲜度和配送效率，快递公司在广东、贵州、江苏、湖北等省份设立集货点和冷链仓库，实现商品从产地直接发运；同时优化干线运输路线、提升航空货运能力，并动态调整运输资源，以应对季节性物流高峰。On the final leg of delivery, companies adopted multi-warehouse coordination and intelligent dispatching systems to achieve "nearby delivery", speeding up services.在配送末端环节，快递公司采用多仓协同和智能调度系统，实现“就近配送”，提升了配送速度。According to the bureau, China's postal and courier sector continues to enhance service capacity while deepening integration with the cultural and tourism industries. By innovating diversified consumption scenarios, it is injecting new vitality into the holiday economy and supports stable consumption growth.国家邮政局表示，中国邮政快递行业在持续提升服务能力的同时，正深化与文旅产业的融合。通过创新多元化消费场景，快递行业为假日经济注入新活力，并助力消费稳定增长。 State Post Bureau of Chinan.中国国家邮政局 /steɪt pəʊst ˈbjʊərəʊ ɒv ˈtʃaɪnə/courier companies (in China)n.（中国的）快递公司/ˈkʊriə ˈkʌmpəniz (ɪn ˈtʃaɪnə)/

Go to http://DrinkAG1.com/adv to get a FREE Frother with your first purchase of AGZWe uncovered the sinister truth behind China's mega bridge. HAND MACHINE GHOST - LIMITED RUN! - https://thechinashow.threadless.comSupport the show here and see the Monday Exclusive show Xiaban Hou! https://www.patreon.com/advpodcastsSign up for the sticker giveaway!https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLScdk5BnaNwlkH8yjt-wgUwq6xWBZIgusPRM5ifELKgPdKxLHg/viewform?usp=headerCartoon feat. Jüri Pootsmann - I Remember Uhttps://soundcloud.com/nocopyrightsoundsTrack : Cartoon feat. Jüri Pootsmann - I Remember USome Sources - https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/09/technology/nvidia-chips-china-megaspeed.htmlSalary data in Anlong https://tjgb.hongheiku.com/xjtjgb/xj2020/53025.htmlSalary data in Fenggang https://www.gzfenggang.gov.cn/zwgk/zfxxgkzl/fdzdgknr/ghjh/gmjjhshfzgh/202502/t20250220_86927630.htmlhttps://www.researchgate.net/publication/341419632_Bone_Glue_-_The_Final_Frontier_for_Fracture_Repair_and_Implantable_Device_Stabilizationhttps://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC9941416/https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1934590925002267https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/human-neuroscience/articles/10.3389/fnhum.2016.00033/fullhttps://www.nature.com/articles/s43587-025-00930-1https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/aging/articles/10.3389/fragi.2025.1638168/fullBRIDGE SOURCES - * 1981 Liziyida Bridge (Chengdu–Kunming Railway), Sichuan* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1981_Chengdu%E2%80%93Kunming_rail_crash* 1999 Qijiang “Rainbow” Pedestrian Bridge, Chongqing* https://www.engineeringcivil.com/civil-engineering-disasters-collapse-of-bridges.html* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qijiang_Rainbow_Bridge_collapse* 2007 Jiujiang Bridge, Foshan (Guangdong)* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collapse_of_Jiujiang_Bridge* 2007 Fenghuang (Tuojiang) Bridge, Hunan (under construction)* https://www.scmp.com/article/606792/dozens-feared-dead-after-hunan-bridge-collapse* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2007_Fenghuang_Bridge_collapse* 2009 Hongqi Road Viaduct, Zhuzhou (Hunan)* https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-05/18/content_7790004.htm* 2010 Tangying Bridge, Luanchuan (Henan)* https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/556460.shtml* https://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?pid=S0718-915X2022000200193&script=sci_arttext* 2010 Nanjing Overpass (under construction), Jiangsu* https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-11/27/content_11617576.htm* 2011 Gongguan Bridge, Wuyishan (Fujian)* https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-07/15/content_12912763.htm* 2012 Hangzhou Viaduct dismantling accident, Zhejiang* https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/201207/716566.shtml* 2012 East Guangchang River Bridge, Jiangxi* https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/201208/721127.shtml* 2012 Yangmingtan Bridge (ramp), Harbin (Heilongjiang)* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yangmingtan_Bridge* 2013 Lianhuo Expressway Bridge (Mianchi, Henan)* https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-bridge-idUSBRE91003D20130201* https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-21300038* 2014 Gaozhou stone-arch bridge, Guangdong* https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-05/05/content_17487284.htm* 2014 Jinshan Bridge, Enshi (Hubei) (under construction)* https://www.mdpi.com/2076-3417/10/6/2112* 2016 Ganjiang Bridge (dismantling), Taihe (Jiangxi)* https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/201609/1009862.shtml* 2019 Wuxi S342 Overpass, Jiangsu* https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-bridge-collapse-idUSKBN1WP0JH* https://www.caixinglobal.com/2019-11-01/in-depth-overloaded-and-overturned-inside-the-deadly-wuxi-bridge-collapse-101478011.html* https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/10/11/deaths-reported-as-bridge-collapses-in-chinas-jiangsu-province* 2021 S2 Ezhou Expressway Ramp Bridge, Hubei* https://www.reuters.com/world/china/bridge-collapse-central-china-kills-four-2021-12-18/* 2024 Lixinsha Bridge, Guangzhou (Guangdong)* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_Lixinsha_Bridge_collapse* 2024 Danning (G4015) Expressway Bridge, Zhashui (Shaanxi)* https://apnews.com/article/shaanxi-china-bridge-collapse-river-dead-b077896e4b291ef82a46ed601bfd04ca* 2024 Yakang Expressway Bridge (near Kangding), Sichuan* https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/3240129/more-bodies-found-after-mountain-bridge-collapse-china* 2025 Jianzha Yellow River Bridge (under construction), Qinghai* https://abc13.com/post/china-bridge-collapse-today-kills-least-12-construction-workers-yellow-river-qinghai-province/17622521This video features copyrighted material used for commentary and educational purposes. We believe this constitutes a 'fair use' of any such copyrighted material as provided for in section 107 of the US Copyright Law.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Record-breaking passenger volumes have been reached as travelers return to their homes after the eight-day National Day and Mid-Autumn Festival holiday that ended on Wednesday, with both cross-regional travel and daily passenger flows hitting new highs, according to official data. 官方数据显示，为期 8 天的国庆中秋双节假期于 10 月 9 日（周三）落幕，返程客流叠加假期出行需求，跨区域出行总量与单日客流量双双刷新历史纪录，全国假日出行市场呈现旺盛态势。 The Ministry of Transport estimates that 2.43 billion cross-regional trips were made between Oct 1 and Wednesday, averaging 304 million trips a day. 交通运输部 10 月 9 日发布数据称，10 月 1 日至 9 日，全国跨区域累计出行量达 24.3 亿人次，日均 3.04 亿人次。 By mode of transport, railways were responsible for an estimated 153 million passenger trips, averaging 19.24 million a day, up 2.6 percent from a year earlier. Waterways saw 11.67 million, averaging 1.46 million daily, up 4.2 percent, while civil aviation handled 19.17 million, averaging 2.4 million daily, an increase of 3.4 percent. The road network, including expressways and national highways, saw about 2.25 billion passenger trips, averaging more than 280 million a day — a 6.5 percent rise year-on-year, the ministry said on Wednesday. 分运输方式看：铁路累计发送旅客 1.53 亿人次，日均 1924 万人次，同比增长 2.6%；水路累计发送旅客 1167 万人次，日均 146 万人次，同比增长 4.2%；民航累计运输旅客 1917 万人次，日均 240 万人次，同比增长 3.4%；公路（含高速公路、国道等）累计发送旅客 22.5 亿人次，日均超 2.8 亿人次，同比增长 6.5%，公路仍是假日出行的主要选择。 The travel peak began on Oct 1, with 336 million cross-regional trips made nationwide — the highest figure on record for the same period. On that day alone, China's railways handled 23.13 million passenger trips, setting a single-day record. 本次假期出行高峰自 10 月 1 日起正式开启，当日全国跨区域出行量达 3.36 亿人次，创同期历史最高纪录；仅铁路部门当日就发送旅客 2313 万人次，刷新单日发送量历史峰值，单日出行热度空前。 Major urban clusters such as the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region, the Yangtze River Delta, the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area, and the Chengdu-Chongqing economic circle were among the top destinations for travelers. 从出行目的地来看，京津冀、长三角、粤港澳大湾区、成渝地区双城经济圈等重点城市群成为热门区域，区域内人员流动频繁，城市群间互联互通优势进一步凸显。 Transportation authorities said this year's travel rush was marked by larger passenger volumes, smoother operations and improved service capacity across all transport modes. Many high-speed rail stations extended operating hours, opened additional security lanes and arranged overnight services to accommodate surging demand. 交通运输部门表示，今年假日出行高峰呈现 “客流量更大、运行更顺畅、服务能力更优” 三大特点。为应对激增的出行需求，全国多地高铁站延长运营时间、增设安检通道，并开通夜间便民服务；各大交通枢纽通过优化调度、增加运力等措施，全力保障旅客出行效率。 Self-driving remained the preferred travel option for many families. To ensure smooth journeys for new energy vehicles, local authorities expanded charging facilities and deployed mobile charging units along expressways. 自驾游仍是家庭出行的主流选择。针对新能源汽车出行需求，各地在高速公路沿线加密充电设施布局，并投放移动充电设备。 In Hunan province, 144 new charging spaces were added across 31 expressway service areas, bringing the total to more than 1,380 charging spots — including 22 ultra-fast stations capable of adding 300 kilometers of range in five minutes. In Hubei province, expressway service areas added 219 mobile chargers and 2,100 extra staff, boosting charging capacity by more than 40 percent to handle a 60 percent rise in demand. 其中，湖南省在 31 个高速公路服务区新增 144 个充电车位，全省高速服务区充电车位总量突破 1380 个，含 22 个超快充站 —— 车辆在这类站点充电 5 分钟即可补充 300 公里续航里程；湖北省在高速服务区新增 219 台移动充电设备，同时增派 2100 名工作人员，充电服务能力提升超 40%，有效应对了同比增长 60% 的充电需求。 New infrastructure has also improved accessibility. On Sept 28, a new high-speed railway linking Shenyang, Liaoning province, and Baishan, Jilin province, opened, reducing travel time between Shenyang and the popular tourist destination Changbai Mountain from about three hours to less than two. 交通新基建的落地，进一步提升了出行便捷度。9 月 28 日，辽宁沈阳至吉林白山高铁建成通车，沈阳至热门旅游目的地长白山的通行时间由原来的约 3 小时缩短至 2 小时以内，为东北旅游市场注入新活力。 In Hunan, two major expressways — the Sanglong Expressway and Luci Expressway — began operation on Sept 29, shortening travel times and connecting key tourism destinations across Hunan and Hubei provinces. 9 月 29 日，湖南省桑龙高速、炉慈高速两条重点高速公路同步通车，不仅缩短了区域通行时间，更串联起湘鄂两省重点旅游景区，促进跨区域旅游资源联动。 Civil aviation also saw strong growth. Passenger traffic during the holiday was projected to reach a record 19.2 million, up 3.6 percent year-on-year, according to the Civil Aviation Administration of China. Airlines increased capacity, with China Southern Airlines resuming Beijing Daxing-Tehran flights on Oct 3 and launching a Beijing Daxing-Doha route on Oct 16. 民航领域同样实现稳健增长。中国民用航空局数据显示，假期期间民航旅客运输量预计达 1920 万人次，同比增长 3.6%，创同期新高。各航空公司积极加密航线、增加运力：10 月 3 日，中国南方航空恢复北京大兴至伊朗德黑兰航线；10 月 16 日，南航还将开通北京大兴至卡塔尔多哈新航线，进一步丰富国际出行选择。 Cross-border travel also surged. The National Immigration Administration said average daily border crossings were expected to exceed 2 million during the holiday period, with peaks on Oct 1 and 6. It attributed the rise to growing interest in outbound travel, bolstered by visa-free entry policies and increased international flights, and said measures were taken nationwide to ensure safe and efficient customs clearance. 跨境出行热度显著回升。国家移民管理局表示，假期期间全国日均出入境人员数量预计超 200 万人次，10 月 1 日、6 日出现两次出入境高峰。据分析，出境游需求持续释放、多国免签政策便利化以及国际航班运力增加，是跨境出行增长的主要原因。全国边检机关已采取多项措施，保障旅客高效、安全通关。 China's increasingly integrated transportation network now connects more than 80 percent of county-level regions and serves about 90 percent of the nation's economy and population, underpinning both mobility and economic vitality. 目前，中国综合交通运输网络已覆盖全国 80% 以上的县级行政区，服务全国约 90% 的经济总量与人口规模，不仅为民众便捷出行提供坚实支撑，更成为激活经济活力、推动区域协调发展的重要基石。 cross-regionaladj.跨区域的/ˌkrɒsˈriːdʒənl/ deployv.部署；调配/dɪˈplɔɪ/ underpinv.翻译：巩固；支撑；为…… 奠定基础/ˌʌndəˈpɪn/

After a brief intro, I play a clip of John MacArthur accidentally sharing (10!) falsehoods about the millionaire missionary, William Borden, from a sermon back in 1988 (5:05). Next, I explain some of the details that MacArthur got wrong, and give my broader reflections on the topic (10:20). Last, I include a message about William Borden that I gave back in March of 2024 at the Collegiate Reformed Fellowship in Moscow, ID, telling the amazing true story of the Millionaire Missionary (27:05). I also share my personal connection to Borden’s story at the end (1:01:07). Welcome to China Compass on the Fight Laugh Feast Network! I'm your China travel guide, Missionary Ben. Follow me (@chinaadventures) on Twitter/X where I post new Chinese city prayer profiles every single day, including amazing pics and links to more China resources.You can also also email me (bfwesten at gmail dot com) and find everything else at PrayGiveGo.us! MacArthur Didn't Do His Homework https://chinacall.substack.com/p/macarthur-didnt-do-his-homework The True Story of the Millionaire Missionary (Borden of Yale) http://www.BordenofYale.com Pray for China places of the week (follow @chinaadventures to see which city daily): Sun, Aug 3 - Pray for Gansu. Gansu’s sister state is Oklahoma: www.Pray4Gansu.com. For even more detailed Gansu info... https://prayforchina.us/index.php/gansu/ Mon, Aug 4 - Pray for Beijing. Beijing is paired with Washington D.C. (and neighboring Maryland counties) for prayer: https://prayforchina.us/index.php/maryland/ Tue, Aug 5 - Pray for south-central China’s Guizhou Province. Guizhou is paired with the eastern Missouri for prayer. Check out my special Guizhou podcast: https://prayforchina.us/index.php/guizhou/ Wed, Aug 6 - Pray for Hebei Province, Hebei (“Huh-bay”) Province is paired with both Wisconsin and Michigan for prayer. Check out my Hebei podcast (and more): https://prayforchina.us/index.php/hebei/ Thu, Aug 7 - Pray for Heilongjiang Province (Black Dragon River), which is paired with Minnesota and the UP of Michigan for prayer. For my HLJ podcast (and more): https://prayforchina.us/index.php/heilongjiang/ Fri, Aug 8 - Pray for Henan. Henan is paired with both Kentucky and West Virginia for prayer. Here's my Henan podcast (and more): https://prayforchina.us/index.php/henan/ Sat, Aug 9 - Pray for central China’s Hubei Province, which is paired with Illinois for prayer. For more Hubei info (including a special podcast): https://prayforchina.us/index.php/hubei/ Follow or subscribe to China Compass and leave a review on your favorite podcast platform. Don’t forget: Follow @chinaadventures on X, and find everything else @ PrayGiveGo.us. Luke 10, verse 2, the harvest is plentiful but the workers are few!

After a brief intro, I play a clip of John MacArthur accidentally sharing (10!) falsehoods about the millionaire missionary, William Borden, from a sermon back in 1988 (5:05). Next, I explain some of the details that MacArthur got wrong, and give my broader reflections on the topic (10:20). Last, I include a message about William Borden that I gave back in March of 2024 at the Collegiate Reformed Fellowship in Moscow, ID, telling the amazing true story of the Millionaire Missionary (27:05). I also share my personal connection to Borden’s story at the end (1:01:07). Welcome to China Compass on the Fight Laugh Feast Network! I'm your China travel guide, Missionary Ben. Follow me (@chinaadventures) on Twitter/X where I post new Chinese city prayer profiles every single day, including amazing pics and links to more China resources.You can also also email me (bfwesten at gmail dot com) and find everything else at PrayGiveGo.us! MacArthur Didn't Do His Homework https://chinacall.substack.com/p/macarthur-didnt-do-his-homework The True Story of the Millionaire Missionary (Borden of Yale) http://www.BordenofYale.com Pray for China places of the week (follow @chinaadventures to see which city daily): Sun, Aug 3 - Pray for Gansu. Gansu’s sister state is Oklahoma: www.Pray4Gansu.com. For even more detailed Gansu info... https://prayforchina.us/index.php/gansu/ Mon, Aug 4 - Pray for Beijing. Beijing is paired with Washington D.C. (and neighboring Maryland counties) for prayer: https://prayforchina.us/index.php/maryland/ Tue, Aug 5 - Pray for south-central China’s Guizhou Province. Guizhou is paired with the eastern Missouri for prayer. Check out my special Guizhou podcast: https://prayforchina.us/index.php/guizhou/ Wed, Aug 6 - Pray for Hebei Province, Hebei (“Huh-bay”) Province is paired with both Wisconsin and Michigan for prayer. Check out my Hebei podcast (and more): https://prayforchina.us/index.php/hebei/ Thu, Aug 7 - Pray for Heilongjiang Province (Black Dragon River), which is paired with Minnesota and the UP of Michigan for prayer. For my HLJ podcast (and more): https://prayforchina.us/index.php/heilongjiang/ Fri, Aug 8 - Pray for Henan. Henan is paired with both Kentucky and West Virginia for prayer. Here's my Henan podcast (and more): https://prayforchina.us/index.php/henan/ Sat, Aug 9 - Pray for central China’s Hubei Province, which is paired with Illinois for prayer. For more Hubei info (including a special podcast): https://prayforchina.us/index.php/hubei/ Follow or subscribe to China Compass and leave a review on your favorite podcast platform. Don’t forget: Follow @chinaadventures on X, and find everything else @ PrayGiveGo.us. Luke 10, verse 2, the harvest is plentiful but the workers are few!

China wants you...to play the legendary being known as the Yeren! The Chinese government is hiring people to play the Yeren in the national parks in Hubei. Will you answer the call? Also talking about The Devil's Staircase of America.

Last time we spoke about the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. On July 7, 1937, tensions escalated between Japan and China as the Japanese military conducted a training exercise near the Marco Polo Bridge. During the exercise, gunfire erupted, sowing confusion and leading to the unexplained disappearance of one soldier. This incident prompted Japan to demand permission to search the nearby city of Wanping, which was denied by Chinese forces, escalating tensions further. By the next day, Japanese troops attacked, resulting in fierce fighting at the bridge. Under heavy assault, Chinese defenders fought valiantly but faced overwhelming force. As the conflict intensified, both sides struggled with heavy casualties, leading to the full-scale Sino-Japanese War. The Japanese military's aggressive maneuvers and the determined Chinese resistance marked the beginning of a brutal conflict, forever altering the landscape of East Asia. The profound toll on both nations foreshadowed the horrors of war that were to come, as China prepared to defend its sovereignty against a relentless enemy.   #155 Operation Chahar 1937 Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. By the end of July of 1937 the Japanese had overwhelmed the Beiping-Tianjin region. It's pretty understandable as to how this came so fast. As we have discussed thoroughly in this series, the Japanese had gradually seized control over Northern China going back to Operation Nekka in 1933. Little by little they had carved it out. Typically when you pull out a map of a war between two nations, one nation pierces into the other and gradually seizes control of key locations until it archives victory. However with the case of the outset of the Second Sino-Japanese War its more like the Japanese are starting at multiple key locations where they have concessions, treaties or where there are autonomous regions. Thus its honestly a huge headache to follow. When the Marco Polo Bridge Incident broke out, Chiang Kai-Shek had been in Kuling, a mountain top resort where he spent his summer vacations. He received the news with composure, but his message to the nation conveyed a sense of optimism and anticipation. The embarrassment of the Sian mutiny was a thing of the past. Although he wasn't overly confident, he believed that this was the pivotal moment China had been preparing for, more so than at any time in recent years. For nearly three weeks, efforts were made to resolve the situation through diplomatic means. For the first time, Chiang was in a position to make demands. He understood they would likely be rejected, but that wasn't the main point. He asked Japan to acknowledge its responsibility for the recent turmoil, to issue an apology, and to provide compensation. After making that request, he addressed his nation with a formal commitment: China would not accept any settlement that compromised its sovereign rights or territorial integrity. No changes would be permitted regarding the status of the Hubei-Chahar Council, and local officials would not be reassigned at the request of any foreign government. Any restrictions on the Twenty-ninth Army's positions would be unacceptable. He declared that the era of Japanese expansion in North China had come to a definitive end. The Japanese army achieved significant victories on the battlefield in China, leading to the inevitable expansion of the conflict. The first major campaign following the Nanyuan victory unfolded along the mountainous border marked by the inner Great Wall, separating northern Hubei from Chahar. On the Jinpu Railway, just south of Tianjin, lies a small station known as Jinghai. Adjacent to this station is the Jian River, which had swollen to a width of 20 meters due to intermittent heavy rains in northern China after the Japanese army's occupation of Tianjin. The embankments on either side of the river were overgrown with dense reeds and grass, and a wooden arch bridge spanned the river. After landing at Dagukou in Tianjin, the 10th Division, commanded by Lieutenant General Rensuke Isogai, advanced south along the Jinpu Railway. However, as the vanguard, the 10th Regiment of the 33rd Brigade made its way through the muddy terrain towards the Jian River's wooden bridge, they were suddenly taken aback. A group of Chinese soldiers appeared, their faces vividly painted red and armed with long-handled broadswords, a sight reminiscent of the legendary Chinese figure Guan Yu, as depicted in many traditional portraits. These soldiers belonged to the 26th Independent Brigade of the 38th Division of the 29th Army, who were in retreat from Tianjin. Following the city's fall, they had retreated southward to Jinghai Station, where they prepared to make a stand. Brigade Commander Li Zhiyuan recognized their inferior numbers and weaponry compared to the Japanese forces. Drawing from painful lessons learned during the positional battles in Tianjin, he decided to divide his troops strategically: one battalion would defend the station, another would protect the county town, and a third would engage in guerrilla tactics along the Jinpu Road. If faced with a small number of Japanese soldiers, they would fight fiercely; if overwhelmed, they would attempt to encircle the attackers to prevent a direct assault on their main position. Despite the Japanese army's attempts to advance, including efforts to send an armored train into Jinghai Station, the Chinese soldiers cleverly laid straw on the tracks and buried mines, thwarting the train's progress. Once Japanese troops disembarked to mount an offensive, they were ambushed by the battalion executing guerrilla tactics, resulting in a chaotic retreat that left behind several dozen casualties. Over the course of weeks, the divisional headquarters ordered a battalion of Japanese troops to move south along the Jinpu Road, requiring them to cross the Jian River at the wooden bridge. The 26th Independent Brigade was assigned to halt this advance, and they managed to hold their ground for over 20 days. Recognizing the gravity of their situation, Brigade Commander Li Zhiyuan gathered his group and battalion commanders to emphasize the necessity of pushing back the Japanese forces. He passionately rallied them, declaring, “We must defend this river to the death. Each regiment will select a death squad. Each member will carry a long-handled broadsword and four grenades, paint their faces red and rush across the bridge to engage in melee combat!” When Li asked for volunteers to lead the death squad, the regiment commander, Zhu, eagerly stepped forward, quickly gathering a group that followed him, uniting passionately in their cause. The death squad charged across the bridge, catching the Japanese off guard with their war paint and weapons. The sudden attack left the Japanese soldiers dazed, leading to a chaotic retreat as they struggled through the muddy terrain. In the tumult, more than 200 long-handled swords struck down a significant number of Japanese troops. Those advancing from behind panicked at the sight of their retreating comrades. An officer, dismounted during the chaos, was left behind, and the Chinese soldiers, filled with zeal, pressed forward, ignoring the orders from Brigade Commander Li Zhiyuan to fall back for their own safety. Despite moments of heroism, many fell that day by the Jian River, as the officers and soldiers burned their boats and set fire to the wooden bridge, rendering retreat impossible. As the Japanese military consolidated its power in the Pingjin region, many leaders underestimated the tenacity of Chinese resistance. Plans were made to defeat the Chinese army and air force swiftly, aiming to resolve the issue in North China decisively, with no diplomatic negotiations or external interventions allowed during military operations. Now, in late July to early August, Chiang Kai-shek issued orders to improve defenses at Nankou. He mobilized Tang Enbo's 13th Army in Suidong for battle readiness, tasked Liu Ruming to sabotage railways, and directed Fu Zuoyi and Yan Xishan in Suiyuan to prepare for conflict. Troops were reorganized rapidly, with divisions merging to strengthen the 17th Army under Liu Ruming's command. Chiang insisted that Nankou's defenses be deep and wide to thwart enemy cavalry and tank assaults, rendering Japanese mechanized advantages ineffective. He called for close cooperation among commanders and a resolute defense. Tang Enbo's 13th Army, consisted of the 4th and 89th Divisions, whom established defensive positions along the Peiping-Suiyuan Railway at Nankou, with additional units positioned further back at Juyongguan. The 13th Army, was 20,000 men strong, all motivated soldiers committed to fighting the Japanese, but their equipment was woefully inadequate. The 89th Division had a few outdated artillery pieces, whilst other units were in even worse condition, hampering their effectiveness against the well-armed Japanese forces. Liu's 17th Army stationed its 84th Division at Chihcheng, Yanqing, and Longguan, effectively securing the flank of the 13th Army against potential Japanese advances from Chahar. The 21st Division was deployed in Huailai, situated along the railway to the rear of Tang's forces. Additionally, Zhao Chengshou's 1st Cavalry Army, Liu 's 143rd Division, and two Peace Preservation Brigades commenced an offensive against Mongol forces in northern Chahar. As the Japanese launched initial assaults on Nankou on August 4, fierce fighting erupted. The Chinese defenders fought valiantly, but heavy bombardments by artillery and air raids took a toll. The Japanese began using tanks to support their infantry, yet the 530th Regiment successfully repelled an attack at Deshengkou. Meanwhile, the Japanese intensified their efforts, culminating in poison gas assaults that overwhelmed Chinese positions on Longhutai, leading to significant losses. Despite the escalating pressure and casualties, the determination to hold Nankou was unwavering. On August 5, the Kwantung Army requested permission for the advance guard to move to Changpei, arguing that the Central Army's invasion of Chahar had jeopardized the security of Manchukuo. This request was denied, yet the advance guard proceeded to Changpei on August 8. This unauthorized movement by the Kwantung Army was a serious act of defiance, as Tolun lay outside Manchukuo's borders, and troop deployments required imperial authorization. Although imperial sanction had been obtained for the move to Tolun on July 28, permission for the advance guard to proceed was only granted retroactively, with the stipulation that they would not advance further into Inner Mongolia. Nevertheless, this unauthorized action ultimately compelled the high command to approve the advance to Changpei. On August 7, the Japanese army launched a large assault on Nankou with its three main divisions, aiming to breach the Great Wall and advance westward along the Pingsui Railway to flank the strategic city of Shanxi. By August 8, the Japanese forces that had captured Beiping and Tianjin deployed the entire 20th Division, commanded by Lieutenant General Kawagishi Fumisaburo, and supplemented their efforts with the 5th and 10th Divisions, along with the Sakai Brigade, to attack Nankou along the Pingsui Railway. On August 8, the Japanese 11th Independent Mixed Brigade, led by General Shigiyasu Suzuki, initiated an attack on the left flank of the 13th Corps' position at Nankou. However, their efforts were halted after three days due to challenging terrain and the determined resistance from Chinese forces.  On the same day, Chiang Kai-shek ordered the activation of the 14th Group Army, comprising the 10th, 83rd, and 85th Divisions, under General Wei Lihuang. Elements of the 14th Group Army traveled by rail from Yingchia-chuang to Yi County and then embarked on a ten-day march through the plains west of Beiping to flank and support Tang Enbo's forces. Meanwhile, the Chinese 1st Army Region launched attacks against the Japanese in Liangxiang and Chaili to divert their attention and dispatched a detachment to Heilung Pass to cover the advance of the 14th Group Army. On August 9, the central high command ordered the China Garrison Army to eliminate resistance in the area and instructed Kwantung Army Commander Ueda Kenkichi to send reinforcements from Jehol and Inner Mongolia to support the operation. The China Garrison Army deployed its 11th Independent Mixed Brigade and the 5th Division, recently arrived from Hiroshima under Lieutenant-General Itagaki Seishirö, to launch an attack on the mountainous regions around Nankou and Pataling within the Great Wall. Following intense fighting, they succeeded in crossing into Chahar.    The Kwantung Army aimed to conquer Chahar and, upon receiving approval from the Japanese General Staff, established an expeditionary headquarters on August 14, led by its chief of staff, Lieutenant General Tojo Hideki. Yes that Tojo. Tokyo's objective was to secure the strategic flank of Manchukuo, while the Kwantung Army sought to create puppet regimes in northern China and integrate the occupied territories into a Japanese sphere of influence. The Chahar Expeditionary Force comprised three mixed brigades, including Japan's only fully mechanized unit, which was equipped with medium tanks, heavy and light armored vehicles, and light tanks. The Japanese troops shifted their main attack toward Zhangjiakou via the Pingsui Railway due to pressures from the Kwantung Army eager to occupy Inner Mongolia, Suiyuan, and Chahar. They sought to eliminate threats from the rear before launching further operations along the Pinghan Line and Jinpu Line. The 11th Independent Mixed Brigade of the 20th Division of the Chinese Garrison Army was ordered to assault Chinese defenders in the Nankou area, with the goal of capturing key locations on the Great Wall, like Badaling, to facilitate the Fifth Division's advance. The Chinese assessed the Japanese strategy, believing they would first secure critical points along the Pingsui route to facilitate further incursions into Shanxi and Zhengding. They understood that holding the Nankou line was vital for both logistical support and tactical maneuvering. Nankou, a key town on the Pingsui Railway connecting Beijing to Zhangjiakou and Baotou, was surrounded by mountains and the Great Wall, marking it a significant natural defense line. As the Japanese army aimed to capture Zhangjiakou and divide their forces into Shanxi and Suiyuan, the Chinese army's control over Nankou became crucial. A renewed assault on August 11, bolstered by tanks and aircraft, successfully captured Nankou Station, allowing General Suzuki's brigade to advance toward Juyong Pass. On August 12, Tang Enbo's army launched a counterattack, encircling the Japanese forces and severing their supply and communication lines. That day, Tang Enbo sent a telegram to Luo Fanggui: “Brother Fanggui, Commander Luo of the 529th Regiment, I have received your telegram. Your regiment has recently defeated formidable enemies, laying the groundwork for our army's future victories. Your efforts bring me great relief! The Nankou position is critical to our nation's war of resistance. Despite the enemy's numerical superiority and fierce artillery fire, we cannot surrender this area. It is our fighting spirit, not our numbers or advanced weaponry, that will help us withstand these powerful foes. We vow never to abandon our positions. Life is transient, and we must embrace our fate. A hero perishing on the battlefield is the glorious destiny of a soldier.” On the same day, he also sent a telegram to Wang Zhonglian: “Brother Jieren Wang, commander of the 89th Division, I have read your telegram. Brigade Li has triumphed against formidable foes, establishing a precedent for our army's victory. Your successes bring me much comfort! The Nankou position is our glorious objective. If I perish, the country lives on. If I survive, the country perishes. We would rather die defending this position than live in disgrace. Please convey to all the officers and soldiers of your division, who share in this struggle, the importance of striving for victory!” On August 13, Tang Enbo ordered the defensive positions at Nankou to be abandoned as the remaining troops pulled back to stronger positions at Badaling and Juyongguan. Renowned journalist Fan Changjiang noted Tang Enbo's physical and emotional toll, describing him as a mere shadow of his former self after enduring relentless battles without rest. His subsequent thoughts and fears reflected the despair of facing insurmountable odds, with the Japanese army overwhelming the Nankou defenses. Casualty reports from the Battle of Nankou reveal stark discrepancies; average estimates suggest Chinese losses neared 26,000, while Japanese casualties were around 2,600,an alarming ratio of 10 to 1. Despite the devastating defeat, Tang Enbo's leadership gained national recognition for his efforts, though he viewed the loss of Nankou as a blemish on an otherwise honorable defense. The indomitable spirit displayed during the relentless struggle at Nankou, despite the defeat and challenges faced, inspired a sense of resilience among the Chinese people, reminding them that even in dire circumstances, they would not yield to oppression. Meanwhile in response to having their supply and communication lines severed, on August 14, Seishirō Itagaki dispatched the 5th Division to relieve the 11th Independent Mixed Brigade at Juyonggua. Fu Zuoyi's troops attacked Chahar from Suidong. Dong Qiwu 's troops attacked Shangdu and recaptured it on the 14th, while Shi Yushan 's troops attacked Dehua and recaptured it on the 16th. By the 16, Itagaki had arrived at Nankou and initiated an enveloping assault targeting the right flank of the 13th Army, executing a five-pronged attack at Huanglaoyuan. In anticipation, the 7th Brigade of the 4th Division, commanded by Shi Jue, was positioned to counter this maneuver. Reinforcements, including Li Xianzhou's 21st Division and Zhu Huaibing's 94th Division, were brought in, resulting in several days of intense fighting. On August 17, General Yan Xishan, Director of the Taiyuan Pacification Headquarters, ordered the 7th Group Army, commanded by Fu Zuoyi, to move the 72nd Division and three additional brigades by rail from Datong to Huailai to support Tang Enbo's forces. Chiang Kai-shek urged steadfastness in the face of adversity, emphasizing that retreat was not an option. But with communication breakdowns and logistical challenges, Tang Enbo faced dilemmas that would lead him to issue the order for his troops to break out on August 26. As the Japanese army occupied Huailai and Yanqing, Tang Enbo's forces executed a withdrawal, retreating via various routes before suffering further losses.  Meanwhile Liu Ruming's troops of the 143rd Division of the 29th Army took Zhangbei from Zhangjiakou . Proceed to Wanquan Dam , the junction of Wanquan and Zhangbei. The members of the pseudo-Mongolian military government fled to Duolun under the leadership of King De . In order to relieve the danger in Zhangjiakou, Liu Ruming's troops began to attack the enemy in Zhangbei. On August 20, they captured key points such as Bolicai Village outside Zhangbei City. At this time, the mechanized troops of the Japanese Kwantung Army led by Hideki Tojo rushed from Rehe to support Zhangbei. When passing through Guyuan, they were divided into two groups: one group of Japanese troops, the Suzuki Brigade and Homma Brigade went south to attack Zhangjiakou. On the night of August 21, the Chinese army retreated to Shenweitai, 25 kilometers south of Zhangbei County. On August 22, the Japanese army began its attack. Shenwei Tower fell at midnight on the 23rd. At the same time, another part of the Japanese army launched a roundabout attack on Wanquan County. On the morning of August 24, they captured Wanquan County, and then headed straight for Zhangjiakou along the highway with an infantry regiment and an artillery battalion. From August 25 to 27, the Japanese army attacked Bajiaotai, the highest point of Cir Mountain west of Zhangjiakou. At noon on the 27th, Zhangjiakou fell. Gao Guizi's 17th Army marched to Dushikou to resist the enemy from Duolun Akagi and Longguan and intercepted the Pingsui Railway. Gao Guizi's troops failed to withstand the Japanese attack, and the 301st Regiment of the 29th Army stationed in Xuanhua also retreated southward. On August 28, Xuanhua fell into the hands of the enemy. Meanwhile, in northern Chahar, the Chinese 1st Cavalry Army successfully captured Shangdu, Nanhaochan, Shangyi, and Huade from the puppet Mongolian Army led by Demchugdongrub. Elements of the 143rd Division secured Zhongli, while the main force advanced to Zhangbei. During this Chinese offensive, the Japanese Chahar Expeditionary Force, consisting of the mechanized 1st Independent Mixed Brigade along with the 2nd and 15th Mixed Brigades, prepared for a counteroffensive from Zhangbei to Kalgan. Tojo personally commanded the units of the 1st Independent Mixed Brigade during Operation Chahar, which would serve as his only real combat service for his career. From August 18 to 19, the Chahar Expeditionary Force launched a counterattack from Zhangbei, capturing Shenweitaiko on the Great Wall and the Hanno Dam. The scattered and ill-equipped Chinese forces were unable to halt the Japanese advance, which now threatened the Peking–Suiyuan Railway at Kalgan. On August 20, General Fu Zuoyi's 7th Group Army diverted its 200th and 211th Brigades, which had been moving south by rail to join General Tang Enbo's forces, back to defend Kalgan. Fu's remaining 72nd Division arrived to reinforce Chenpien, while his 7th Separate Brigade was dispatched to protect the railhead at Huailai.On August 21, the Japanese forces breached the defenses at the villages of Henglingcheng and Chenbiancheng. General Tang Enbo's forces, awaiting reinforcements but having suffered over 50% casualties, continued to defend Huailai, Juyong Pass, and Yanqing. Liu Ruming's 143rd Division retreated to safeguard Kalgan from the advancing Japanese troops. On August 23, as Seishirō Itagaki's 5th Division advanced toward Huailai from Chenpien against Ma Yenshou's 7th Separate Brigade, advance elements of the 14th Army Group arrived on the Japanese flank at Chingpaikou. They successfully drove off the Japanese outpost and made contact with Japanese forces advancing toward Chenpien. However, delays in crossing the Yongding River postponed their attack until it was too late to halt the Japanese advance. Due to poor communications, they also failed to coordinate with General Tang Enbo's forces during the battle. After eight days and nights of fierce fighting, on August 24, Itagaki linked up with the Kwantung Army's 2nd Independent Mixed Brigade at Xiahuayuan. By August 24, the Japanese army breached the defensive line of the Chinese defenders' Wang Wanling Division along the western Hengling, crossed the Great Wall, and advanced into the Huailai area. At this time, the Japanese forces attacking Zhangjiakou from Chabei also secured control of the railway line west of Zhangjiakou, posing a significant threat to the Chinese defenders at Nankou. On August 25, the Chinese defenders were compelled to withdraw from Nankou and retreat to Juyongguan. By August 27, they received orders to break out and relocate southward, completely evacuating the Nankou battlefield. Since Wei Lihuang's troops lost their intended target for reinforcement and Baoding along the Pinghan Line was in a state of emergency, they engaged the enemy in the Wanping area for over a month before retreating south. Following the abandonment of both Nankou and Juyongguan, the Japanese army invaded Huailai City on the night of August 27. The Chinese army suffered over 16,000 casualties, while the Japanese army reported more than 15,000 casualties. On August 26, General Tang Enbo's forces were ordered to break out toward the Sangchien River, while Liu Ruming's troops were directed to withdraw to the opposite side of the Hsiang-yang River. On August 29, a Japanese unit known as the Oui Column by the Chinese and the Ohizumi Detachment by the Japanese launched an attack. According to Hsu Long-hsuen, this unit moved south from Tushihkou, and on August 30, it attacked Yenching via Chihcheng but was repelled by the Chinese 17th Army. The unit had moved to Guyuan by August 25 and reached Xuanhua by September 7, effectively cutting the railway behind Tang's forces and east of the Chinese defenders along the Great Wall. Following the repulsion of the Oui Column's attack, the Chinese 17th Army withdrew to join the rest of Tang Enbo's forces on the far side of the Sangchien River. Kalgan fell to the Japanese on August 27. After General Fu Zuoyi's 200th and 211th Brigades failed in their counterattack to recapture Kalgan, Fu's forces retreated to the west to defend the railway to Suiyuan at Chaikoupao.  On August 30, the army high command ordered the task force and the China Garrison Army to occupy Chahar Province. The North China Area Army deployed Lieutenant General Itagaki Seishiro's Fifth Division, the theater's strategic reserve, for this operation. The Japanese forces relied on armored units to breach Chinese defenses and utilized rail lines to transport troops and supplies effectively to critical locations throughout Chahar. Although the First Independent Mixed Brigade's tanks and armored cars demonstrated proficiency, the Kwantung Army's assessment of the operation criticized the armored units for their lack of shock effect and frequent mechanical breakdowns. Additionally, these vehicles required significant supplies and maintenance, leading the army to deem them ineffective in combat situations. The Second Air Group provided crucial support for the ground offensive in Chahar. From mid-August, this air group, stationed in Chengde and Jingzhou, conducted bombing raids on enemy positions and transport routes, performed reconnaissance missions, and even airdropped supplies to encircled Japanese forces. To match the rapid advance of the mechanized ground forces, air units were repositioned to advanced airfields. After bombing Taiyuan in late August, some units returned to their home bases, leaving behind two fighter squadrons and two heavy bomber squadrons, which formed a provisional air regiment. By mid-September, the Fifth Division and the Chahar Expeditionary Force were advancing southwest through the rugged mountains of Shanxi Province and captured Datong on September 13. Five days later, anticipating a decisive battle, Lieutenant General Katsuki ordered the Fifth Division to pivot southeast toward Baoding to encircle the retreating Chinese forces. Shortly after repositioning, Itagaki learned from aerial reconnaissance that Chinese units were assembling near Pingxingguan (Dayingzhen) Pass. Concerned that these forces might advance eastward through the pass and threaten his rear, Itagaki dispatched a regimental-sized task force under the command of Major General Miura Keiji, leader of the Twenty-first Brigade, to disperse the enemy troops and control the road on both sides of the pass. Miura's task force departed by truck in the mid-afternoon of the following day, but the overland movement proved much slower and more challenging than anticipated. Travelling along a single rutted dirt track through steep mountains, the forty-nine trucks carrying his infantry and heavy weapons, including crew-served machine guns and battalion artillery, could only manage a speed of seven miles per hour. By late afternoon, the lead elements were still about five miles east of the pass when they encountered a few hundred Chinese troops who had retreated after a brief firefight. As night fell, the Japanese moved cautiously forward and reached a village approximately a mile from the pass, where they encountered stiff resistance, including mortar and automatic weapons fire. After successfully repelling a counterattack by the Chinese Seventy-third Division, Miura launched a night assault. Supported by pack artillery and heavy machine guns, two Japanese companies pushed through the pass and seized the high ground on its west side by early morning. However, Chinese reinforcements soon arrived and attempted to reclaim the lost territory, resulting in ongoing fighting for the heights on September 24. Meanwhile, the Chinese Communist 115th Division, comprising the 685th, 686th, and 687th regiments of the Eighth Route Army, consisting of around 6,000 effective troops under the command of twenty-nine-year-old Lin Biao, maneuvered south around the Japanese rear. By September 24, they had interposed themselves on the road east of the pass, effectively cutting off Miura's task force from its supply base. That same day, the Central Army's Seventy-first Division launched several sharp counterattacks against Miura's outnumbered forces west of the pass, threatening to overrun the Japanese positions. Central Army and Communist forces had planned to attack both flanks of the Japanese at dawn on September 25, but torrential rains delayed the advance of the Central Army reserves. The downpour also muffled the sounds of an approaching Japanese night assault. Utilizing the poor night security of the Chinese, Japanese assault parties surprised the Seventy-first and Eighty-fourth divisions, pushing them from their positions west of the pass. Miura mistakenly believed he controlled both sides of the pass and assumed the Chinese forces were in full retreat. Unbeknownst to him, Lin Biao's troops had blocked the eastern entrance to the pass, prompting him to order a resupply column with rations and ammunition forward from about fifteen miles east of the pass to replenish his depleted task force. The supply train, consisting of seventy horse-drawn wagons and eighty trucks, struggled to make progress along the single dirt track, where sections had become muddy bogs due to the heavy rains. Most of the hundred-plus soldiers handling the horses and wagons were untrained and unarmed. The few regular service corps soldiers carried only ten cavalry carbines, while a single infantry platoon of thirty men provided security. The eighty trucks transported another 176 men, most of whom were not infantry. Therefore, the resupply column was ill-prepared for any trouble. Following a sunken road worn down by centuries of caravans, the column approached the pass through a narrow man-made defile, with its sides rising as high as thirty-five feet above the track. Around mid-morning, about four miles east of the pass, the Chinese Communist 115th Division launched an ambush. Communist troops rained grenades and small-arms fire from the high ground overlooking the road onto the trapped convoy. Although the Japanese fought back desperately, the combination of surprise, advantageous terrain, and overwhelming numbers turned the road into a killing ground. The ambush decimated almost all of the teamsters and the infantrymen who protected the wagons. At his field headquarters, Miura heard the heavy gunfire and explosions and quickly ordered a battalion-sized rescue force to assist the convoy. However, the Chinese 685th Regiment, blocking the only road to the trapped supply train, halted the Japanese battalion. Elements of the 685th and 686th regiments then finished off the motorized convoy, with only five trucks at the rear escaping. After looting weapons, equipment, and clothing, the Communists burned the remaining vehicles and withdrew southwest into the rugged mountains. Although the Communists claimed to have killed 3,000 Japanese troops, the more realistic number is around 200. Nonetheless, Lin Biao's guerrillas had achieved a significant tactical success. While the 115th Division destroyed the Japanese resupply column east of the pass, the Central Army's Sixth and Seventh Army Groups, including the Seventy-first Division, launched a series of day and night assaults against Miura's dispersed units west of the pass. Both sides incurred heavy losses, and the Japanese struggled to maintain control of the high ground as the Chinese fanned out through the valleys and attacked from all sides. Isolated and under heavy attack, the Japanese were low on ammunition, food, and water, lacked proper cold-weather clothing in the frigid mountains, and were greatly outnumbered. They resorted to scavenging ammunition and weapons from fallen Chinese soldiers. Itagaki promptly ordered his 41st and 21st infantry regiments, supported by an infantry regiment from the Kwantung Army located about fifty miles northeast of the pass, to rescue the beleaguered task force. These regiments moved along a narrow mountain road amidst heavy rain, which slowed their progress. The relief force split up about forty miles north of Pingxingguan, with the Twenty-first Regiment swinging westward to outflank the Chinese, while the other two regiments continued toward the pass. To the northwest, the Fifteenth Brigade of the Chahar Expeditionary Force advanced southeastward from Datong to encircle the Chinese. Central Army forces defending along the inner Great Wall, about fifty miles northwest of Pingxingguan, inflicted substantial casualties on the Japanese. The Japanese Forty-first Regiment finally reached Miura on September 28, and on the same day, the Twenty-first Regiment dislodged the stubborn defenders along the Inner Great Wall, roughly forty miles northwest of the pass, disrupting the entire Chinese defense and threatening to surround the besieging forces. Nonetheless, fighting continued through September 29, when the Second Brigade broke through the Chinese Central Army's defenses and advanced westward. Facing potential encirclement and certain destruction, the Japanese Sixth Army Group withdrew southwest the following day. Japanese accounts do not specify overall losses, but Chinese reports claim nearly 3,000 Japanese casualties while acknowledging they suffered ten times that number. After five days of intense fighting in rugged terrain, Miura's forces managed to hold their ground, but their heavy losses and those sustained by relief columns rendered it a Pyrrhic victory. Both Communist and Nationalist Chinese forces retreated southwest, surviving to fight another day. The determination of the Chinese Central Army in both offensive and defensive maneuvers, combined with the skillful hit-and-run tactics of the 115th Division, inflicted significant damage on the Japanese and became a cornerstone of Chinese propaganda. On October 1, the Japanese General Staff ordered the North China Area Army to destroy the Chinese forces in Shanxi Province, which were estimated to number over twenty divisions from either the Shanxi Army or the Central Army, and were fortifying positions in Taiyuan, Yangquan, and Yuanpingzhen. The Japanese Fifth and Twentieth Divisions advanced toward Taiyuan, while the Fifteenth Division, reinforced by a mixed brigade, launched an assault south from Yuanpingzhen on October 13. The Fifteenth Division quickly encountered strong Chinese resistance from well-prepared defenses, which halted its advance. From October 19 to 26, the Twentieth Division faced thirteen Chinese divisions entrenched near Jiuguan. Although they successfully repelled numerous fierce counterattacks, the division was unable to breach the Chinese lines. A maneuver by one of its regiments to the rear of the Chinese defenses forced a withdrawal of Chinese troops. The reconstituted Fifth Division joined the pursuit of the retreating Chinese forces on November 3, reaching Taiyuan five days later. Meanwhile, the Twentieth Division, moving westward, inflicted heavy losses on the Chinese units that were withdrawing from Taiyuan. Overall, given that the offensive aimed to secure territory, it can be considered a tactical and operational success. Shortly thereafter, all Japanese forces, except for the Twentieth Division, withdrew from Shanxi Province. The Chahar campaign concluded with the Kwantung Army in control of Chahar, Suiyuan, and the northern half of Shanxi Province. The Japanese quickly established puppet regimes in the captured territories. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In July 1937, tensions between Japan and China erupted following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, leading to fierce fighting as Japanese troops attacked. Chinese defenders, under command of Chiang Kai-shek, bravely resisted despite overwhelming odds, determined to protect their sovereignty. The Battle of Nankou saw relentless assaults, tank warfare, and desperate defense tactics, revealing the depth of Chinese resolve. 

  Last time we spoke about the Xi'an Incident. In December 1936, tensions in China erupted as Nationalist General Chiang Kai-shek faced a revolt led by his commanders, Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng. Disillusioned by Chiang's focus on battling communists instead of the Japanese invaders, the generals swiftly captured him in a coup. Confined in Xi'an, Chiang initially resisted their demands for a united front against Japan but eventually engaged in negotiation with Zhang and the Chinese Communist Party. As public sentiment shifted against him, Chiang's predicament led to urgent discussions, culminating in an unexpected alliance with the communists. This pact aimed to consolidate Chinese resistance against Japanese aggression, marking a critical turning point in the Second Sino-Japanese War. By December 26, Chiang was released, and this uneasy collaboration set the stage for a more unified front against a common enemy, though underlying tensions remained between the factions.   #152 China Prepares for War Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Before we jump into the Second Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945, which I honestly have no idea how long will take us, I thought it would be a good idea to dedicate two episodes to how both China and Japan prepared themselves for war.  Going all the way back to the 1910s, Chinese intellectuals began to view an outright conflict between Japan and China was inevitable. In the discussions about China's strategic options, Jiang Fangzhen pioneered a strategy of protracted warfare, a concept that would later shape China's approach during the Sino-Japanese War. Having studied in Japan during his youth, Jiang developed a keen understanding of the Japanese government and military. As early as 1917, he predicted that China and Japan would become embroiled in a long-term conflict, with the battleground likely to be west of the Peiping–Wuhan and Guangzhou–Wuhan railways. In his work titled "Guofang Lun" or “On National Defense”, Jiang reiterated the importance of protracted warfare as a means to thwart Japan's aspirations for a swift victory. He argued that China should leverage its vast population and extensive territory to extend the conflict, gradually wearing down Japanese strength and turning the situation to its advantage. Jiang recommended that China not focus on defending its coastal regions but instead confront the enemy west of the Peking–Wuhan Railway.   Chiang Kai-shek would eventually come to share Jiang's belief that “the longer the war drags on, the more advantageous it will be for China.” Despite significant public criticism, both the Nationalist government and General Zhang Xueliang, decided against military resistance when Japan invaded Manchuria in September 1931 and attacked Shanghai in 1932. Chiang was particularly hesitant to engage Japan directly, as he was also dealing with a Communist insurgency in central China. He feared that Chinese forces would suffer quick defeat, predicting that Japan would capture key coastal areas and critical infrastructure within just three days, crippling China by dismantling its military and economic lifelines. Following the invasion of North China Chiang was forced to adopt a firmer stance. The Nationalist government proposed a dual strategy of pursuing peace and security while simultaneously preparing for war. If peace proved impossible, China would mobilize its resources for ultimate victory through prolonged conflict. This approach was formalized in the National Defense Plan, which China adopted by prioritizing protracted warfare as its core strategy. After the Sino-Japanese clash in Shanghai on January 28, 1932, the Military Affairs Commission devised a plan that divided China into four defense areas along with a preparation area. While some troops were assigned local security, commanders were directed to concentrate their remaining forces for potential confrontations with Japan. That year, the Military Affairs Commission issued General Defense Guidelines that outlined two strategic responses to a potential Japanese invasion. The first, conservative approach focused on maintaining key positions and utilizing protracted warfare to impede the enemy. The second strategy advocated for decisive battles in key regions to thwart Japan's ambitions and protect China's territorial integrity, prioritizing disengagement from Japanese forces along the Yangtze River and coastline. In August 1935, German military adviser General Alexander von Falkenhausen provided recommendations to Chiang Kai-shek based on his predictions of Japanese advance routes into China. He identified three main routes: one from northern Hebei to Zhengzhou, the second from Shandong toward Xuzhou, and the third crossing the Yangtze River to Nanjing and onwards to Wuhan. He suggested treating the Yangtze River as the primary combat zone and highlighted Sichuan as a possible retreat area. Taking all of this into consideration. in 1936, a draft of a new National Defense Plan divided the country into four zones: a war zone, a defense zone, an internal security zone, and a preparation area. The war zone encompassed ten provinces and established strategies for retreating to predetermined defensive positions when necessary, with Sichuan designated as the main base for the war. In January 1937, the Chinese General Staff Department introduced its annual War Plan, outlining three possible military conflict regions between China and Japan. It proposed two main strategies: Proposal A emphasized sustained combat and retreat to fortified positions if the situation became unfavorable, aiming to eventually go on the offensive against Japan. Proposal B focused on repelling Japanese invasions along the coast and from the north, prioritizing counter offensives against Japanese units stationed near key locations. To prepare, the NRA completed several critical projects outlined in its plans, establishing military supply depots in Nanjing, Bengbu, Xinyang, Huayin, Nanchang, and Wuchang to manage logistics for supplies across various strategic railways. These depots were equipped to sustain the military, with ample ammunition and provisions, including 60 million rounds of small-arms ammunition and food for hundreds of thousands. Despite these preparations, not all projects were completed by the time war broke out in July 1937. In contrast to the Japanese military's tactics, Chinese forces prioritized defensive strategies. For example, at the Mount Lushan Military Officer Training Camp in July 1934, Chiang Kai-shek outlined four possible approaches against Japan, favoring a defense-as-offense strategy. Other options included building fortifications, tenaciously defending key positions, and employing guerrilla warfare through irregular forces to constrain enemy advances. Chiang stressed the importance of national mobilization for the war effort.  There was a significant disparity in equipment between the Japanese and Chinese armies. To give you an idea, each Japanese division included a mechanized group featuring thirty-nine light military vehicles and 21 light armored cars, supplemented by 6,000–7,000 horses, 200–300 automobiles, and specialized troops such as poison gas teams. In contrast, Nationalist divisions lacked any of these capabilities, a typical nationalist division theoretically had an armored regiment, but this unit was equipped with fewer than 72 armored vehicles. Another major weakness of the Nationalist forces was their insufficient artillery. In 1936, a division was officially assigned one artillery battalion, which was divided into three batteries totaling twelve guns. It also included a mechanized cannon company with four direct-fire weapons. By comparison, a Japanese division boasted four infantry regiments and one mountain artillery or field artillery regiment, with each artillery regiment comprising three field artillery battalions and one howitzer battalion. The infantry regiment itself included a mountain artillery section with four mountain guns, while the infantry battalion had one Type 70 mountain gun section with two guns. In total, a Japanese division possessed sixty-four artillery pieces of various calibers, four times the number of a Chinese division and of significantly higher quality. In reality, in 1936, twelve of the twenty elite Chinese “reformed divisions” still lacked artillery battalions. The ordnance available in the “reformed divisions” mostly consisted of the outdated Type 60 mountain gun. Nationwide, very few of the 200 divisions were equipped with any artillery, and those that did often used obsolete field artillery pieces or mountain artillery provided to local forces. Some units even relied on trench mortars as a makeshift solution. The artillery weapons came from various countries, but they frequently lacked necessary observation and signal components, and were often low on ammunition. The majority of mountain guns and field artillery were of the Type 75, which, while capable of providing fire support, had limited range and inflicted minimal damage. To give you an idea of the striking inadequacy of the Chinese artillery, during the Shanghai fighting in 1937, the mountain artillery of the Guangxi 21st Army Group could only reach targets within 1,200 yards, while Japanese field artillery had an effective range of 8,000 yards. Chinese-made mountain artillery suffered due to inferior steel-making technology; the gun shields were constructed from low-quality steel, and the barrels often overheated after firing just a few rounds, increasing the risk of explosions. Additionally, the equipment of local forces varied greatly in quality. In fact, some local units had superior equipment compared to Nationalist units. For example, before the Sino-Japanese War, troops from Yunnan were equipped with French antitank guns and heavy machine guns, which were better than the German water-cooled machine guns used by the Nationalist forces. However, the majority of local troops relied on inferior equipment; the 122nd Division under Wang Mingzhang from Sichuan, noted for its brave defense of Tengxian County during the Xuzhou Battle, was armed with locally produced light and heavy machine guns that frequently malfunctioned, and their Type 79 rifles, also made in Sichuan, were often outdated, with some dating back to the Qing Dynasty. These weapons had limited range and sometimes malfunctioned after fewer than one hundred rounds. Now before the war, both Nationalist and local forces acquired weaponry from diverse foreign and domestic sources. Even domestically produced weapons lacked standardization, with those made in Hanyang and Manchuria differing in design and specifications. Arms manufactured in Germany, France, Russia, Japan, and Italy were similarly inconsistent. Consequently, even within a single unit, the lack of uniformity created significant logistical challenges, undermining combat effectiveness, particularly in the early stages of the war. Despite Nationalist ordnance factories producing over three million rounds of small-arms ammunition daily, the incompatibility of ammunition and weapons diminished the usable quantity of ammunition. Chinese communications infrastructure was inadequate. In the Nationalist army, signal units were integrated into engineering units, leading to low-quality radio communications. In emergencies, telegrams could remain undelivered for days, and orders often had to be dispatched via postal services. By 1937, the entire country boasted only 3,000 military vehicles, necessitating heavy reliance on horses and mules for transport. To effectively equip twenty Nationalist divisions, 10,647 horses and 20,688 mules were needed, but by the end of 1935, only 6,206 horses and 4,351 mules were available. A statistic from 1936 indicated a 5 percent mortality rate among military horses, with some units experiencing a rate as high as 10 percent. The distribution of weaponry led to disputes during army reorganization efforts following the Northern Expedition. Although Chiang Kai-shek's forces were part of the regular army, the quality of their equipment varied significantly. Domestic production of weapons was limited, and imports could not close the gap. Priority was given to small arms; through army reorganization, Chiang aimed to diminish the influence of forces less loyal to him. Nationalist army staff officers observed that troops loyal to Chiang received the best weapons. Northwest and Northeast forces, having cultivated good relations with the KMT, were similarly better equipped, while Shanxi troops received inferior supplies. Troops associated with the Guangxi Clique were given even poorer quality weapons due to their leaders' stronger political ambitions. Troops regarded as “bandit forces,” such as those led by Shi Yousan, Li Hongchang, and Sun Dianying, were naturally assigned the least effective weaponry. This unequal distribution of arms increased some local forces' inclination to align with the KMT while alienating others, which inadvertently led to additional turmoil in the aftermath of the Northern Expedition. Logistical accounting within the Nationalist military was severely lacking. Military expenditures accounted for a significant portion of government spending, roughly 65.48 % in 1937, with personnel costs being the largest component. However, military units prioritized boosting their own resources over accurate accounting. Surpluses were not returned but rather utilized to reward military officers and soldiers for merits in battle, care for the wounded, or to create a reserve. Conversely, if deficits arose, troops would resort to “living off vacancies,” a practice in which they would fail to report desertions promptly and would falsely claim new soldiers had arrived. Military leaders typically appointed their most trusted subordinates to serve as accountants and logistic officers. As the war commenced, these issues became readily apparent. During the Battle of Shanghai in 1937, frontline soldiers sometimes went days without food and went months without pay. Wounded soldiers and civilians had to search tirelessly for medical treatment, and when main forces relocated, they often abandoned grain, ammunition, weapons, and petroleum along the way. General Chen Cheng, the commander in chief during the Battle of Shanghai, noted, “This phenomenon clearly revealed our inability to supply frontline troops, indicating that China remains a backward country with poor management.” Many logistical shortcomings severely impacted troop morale and combat effectiveness. In a 1933 speech, Chiang Kai-shek acknowledged that poor food, inadequate clothing, and ineffective logistics contributed to widespread desertion. Soldiers were further demoralized by reduced or embezzled salaries. A lack of professional medical staff and equipment hampered healthcare efforts, leading to high disease and mortality rates. According to official statistics from 1936, approximately 10 percent of soldiers fell ill annually, with a mortality rate as high as 5 percent. Japanese military authorities reported that one in three wounded Japanese soldiers died, while a Dutch military officer present during the early stages of the Sino-Japanese War observed that one in every two wounded Nationalist soldiers perished. Due to inadequate equipment and limited transport options, Nationalist forces were compelled to recruit farmers and rent vehicles, as they lacked essential facilities such as tents. This reliance on local resources inevitably led to frequent conflicts between military personnel and civilians. China is clearly a vast nation with an extensive coastline, requiring the construction of several significant fortresses during the modern era. These included Wusong, Jiangyin, Zhenjiang, Jiangning, and Wuhan along the Yangtze River, as well as Zhenhai, Humen, and Changzhou along the seacoast. Except for the Wuhan fortress, built in 1929-1930, all other fortifications were established during the late Qing Dynasty and featured uncovered cannon batteries. These fortresses suffered from inadequate maintenance, and many of their components had become outdated and irreplaceable, rendering them militarily negligible. Following the January 1932 Shanghai Incident, the Japanese military destroyed the Wusong forts, leaving the entrance to the Yangtze River completely unfortified. Consequently, there were no defenses along the coastline from Jiangsu to Shandong, allowing the Japanese to land freely. In December 1932, the Military Affairs Commission established a fortress group tasked with constructing fortresses and defensive installations, seeking assistance from German military advisers. After the North China Incident in 1935, the Nationalist government accelerated the construction of defensive structures in line with national war planning, focusing particularly on Nanjing. The Nationalists prioritized building fortifications along the seacoast and the Yellow River, followed by key regions north of the Yellow River. The government also ordered a significant quantity of heavy artillery from Germany. This included several dozen pieces of flat-fire antiaircraft and dual-purpose heavy artillery, which were installed at fortifications in Jiangyin, Zhenjiang, Nanjing, and Wuhan. By the summer of 1937, the construction of nine fortified positions was complete: Nanjing, Zhenjiang, Jiangyin, Ningbo, Humen, Mawei, Xiamen , Nantong, and Lianyungang. In total, China had established 41 forts and equipped them with 273 fortress cannons. Some defensive installations were poorly managed, with many units assigned to their perimeters lacking training and access to proper maps. The barbette positions in the fortresses were not well concealed and could hardly store sufficient ammunition. Troops stationed at these fortresses received little training. Despite these shortcomings, the fortresses and fortifications were not entirely ineffective. They bolstered Chinese positions along the defense line stretching from Cangxian County to Baoding and from Dexian County to Shijiazhuang, as well as in southern Shandong.  Before the war, China's political and economic center was situated along the seacoast and the Yangtze River. As Japanese influence expanded, the Nationalist government was compelled to establish bases in China's inner regions, very similar to how the USSR pulled back its industry further west after Operation barbarossa.The Japanese attack on Shanghai in 1932 prompted the Nationalists to relocate their capital to Luoyang. On March 5, during the Second Plenary Session of the KMT's Fourth Congress, the Western Capital Preparation Committee was formed to plan for the potential relocation of all governmental bodies to Xi'an in the event of full-scale war. In February 1933, the Central Political Conference approved the Northwest Development Bill, and in February 1934, the National Economic Commission set up a northwestern branch to oversee development projects in the region. On October 18, 1934, Chiang Kai-shek traveled to Lanzhou, recording in his diary that “Northwest China has abundant resources. Japan and Russia are poised to bully us. Yet, if we strengthen ourselves and develop northwest China to the fullest extent, we can turn it into a base for China's revival.” Interestingly, it was Sichuan, rather than the northwest, that became China's rear base during the 2nd Sino-Japanese War. In October 1934, the Communist army evacuated its Soviet base in southern China, initiating the Long March that would ultimately end in the northwest. By this time, Chiang Kai-shek had decided to designate Sichuan as the last stronghold for China. In January 1935, the Nanchang Field Headquarters of the Military Affairs Commission, responsible for combatting the Communists and serving as the supreme military and political authority over most provinces along the Yangtze River and central China, dispatched a special advisory group to Chongqing. Following this, the Nationalist army advanced into Sichuan. On February 10, the Nationalists appointed a new provincial government in Sichuan, effectively ending the province's long-standing regionalism. On March 2, Chiang traveled to Chongqing, where he delivered a speech underscoring that “Sichuan should serve as the base for China's revival.” He stated that he was in Sichuan to oversee efforts against the Communist army and to unify the provincial administration.  After the Xinhai revolution, the Republic of China was still suing the Qing Dynasty's conscription system. However, once in power, the Nationalist government sought to establish a national military service program. In 1933, it enacted a military service law, which began implementation in 1936. This law categorized military service into two branches: service in the Nationalist army and in territorial citizen army units. Men aged eighteen to forty-five were expected to serve in the territorial units if they did not enlist in the Nationalist army. The territorial service was structured into three phases: active service lasting two to three years, first reserves for six years, and second reserves until the age of forty-five. The Ministry of Military Affairs divided China into sixty divisional conscription headquarters, initially establishing these headquarters in the six provinces of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, and Hubei. By December 1936, approximately 50,000 new soldiers had been drafted. The military service law disproportionately favored the middle and upper classes. Government personnel were exempt from enlistment, allowing privileged families to register their children with government agencies. Similarly, students in middle and higher education were excused from service, while youth from poorer backgrounds often felt compelled to enlist due to financial constraints that limited their educational opportunities. Village and town leaders were responsible for executing the recruitment process and frequently conspired with army recruiters. Recruitment principles often favored wealthier families, with guidelines stating that one son should be drafted for every three sons, two for five sons, but no drafts if there was only one son. Wealthy families could secure exemptions for all their male children, while poor families might see their only son conscripted if they were unable to provide the requisite bribe. Town and village heads wielded significant power in recruitment. This new recruitment system also created numerous money-making opportunities. Military personnel assigned to escort draftees to their units would often allow draftees to escape for a fee. Additionally, draftees could monetize their service by agreeing to serve as substitutes for others. For some, being drafted became an occupation. For example, in 1936, 600 individuals were drafted in the Wuhu area of Anhui province, and accounts from regional administrators indicated that every draftee had either been traded, replaced, or seized. Beginning in 1929, the Nationalist government also instituted military training for high school students and older individuals. Students were required to participate in one theoretical class and one practical class each week, totaling three hours. Starting in 1934, students had to complete a three-month military training program before graduating. Graduates of military academies were employed as military instructors. By the end of 1936, over 237,000 high school students had undergone military training. This student military training was overseen by the Society for the Implementation of the Three People's Principles of Sun Yat-sen, which also provided political education and sometimes gathered information on students' political beliefs.  Although the Nationalists made significant efforts to improve the military training of both officers and troops, they inherited deep-seated challenges that they were unable to completely overcome. A lack of facilities, outdated training manuals, low regard for military instructors, and the ongoing influence of regionalism and warlordism hindered progress. The Japanese would also later exploit these shortcomings of the Nationalist army. The Central Military Academy, which evolved from the Whampoa Military Academy established in 1923 in Guangzhou to train officers for the Northern Expedition, became the primary training institution for junior military officers. The academy offered a basic course, lasting eighteen months, which included general education, specialized training in various subjects, and field practice. This was followed by a two-year cadet training program focused on developing the skills necessary for junior military officers. Seventeen classes were admitted before the outbreak of war. Admission to the academy was highly competitive, with military officers receiving attractive salaries. For instance, in 1935, the academy received 10,000 applications for the twelfth class, but only 7% were accepted. Upon graduation, cadets were typically assigned to divisions within the Nationalist army loyal to Chiang Kai-shek. Their training, influenced by German advisors, resulted in a high-quality cadre. In modern China, most sergeants were veterans. While some units provided training for sergeants, a lack of formal education led to their diminished status. Truly qualified sergeants were rare. During his tenure as Minister of Military Training, General Bai Chongxi proposed establishing a sergeant school and creating a professional noncommissioned officer system; however, the Ministry of Military Affairs opposed this on financial grounds. While commanding officers enjoyed rapid promotions, military instructors did not. Furthermore, there was no system for transferring instructors to field commands or assigning commanders to military academies for extended periods. Despite minor updates to cover modern warfare concepts such as tank warfare and machine guns, Qing Dynasty military manuals were still in use at the Central Military Academy at the start of the war. Yeah, 1937 they were still rocking the old Qing books. Following the establishment of the Ministry of Military Training, a bureau for military translation was set up to evaluate existing course materials and translate military manuals, but its contributions were limited. Another significant shortcoming of military instruction focused on theory at the expense of practical application.  To enhance the quality of military officers, the Nationalist army instituted specialized schools for artillery, infantry, transport, engineering, and signals starting in 1931. These institutions were considered to have high-quality administrators and facilities. The Nationalists adopted German military training models, replacing the previously used Japanese models. They appointed German advisors to oversee instructor training at military academies and established three instructional divisions. By the onset of the Sino-Japanese War, 15,000 students had graduated from programs with a German military influence, resulting in the creation of about fifty combat divisions from these instructional units. However, the progress of other Nationalist army units was limited because their training was not aligned with contemporary battlefield realities. Before World War I, troops operated in close formations due to limited firepower. The widespread introduction of machine guns after World War I necessitated a shift to dispersed formations. Although a new drill manual issued by the Ministry of Military Training in 1935 introduced small-group tactics, few units adopted these methods. General Chen Cheng highlighted another underlying issue in 1938, commenting on the outmoded focus on parade ground drills and formal military manners. He noted, “We have paid too much attention to stereotypical formality and procedures of no practical use. Sometimes, even though soldiers could not get a haircut or take a bath for several months, their camps had to be in order. They underwent intensive training in close-order drill but learned little about gun handling, marksmanship, or maneuvering. This was inappropriate in peacetime, yet we continued this practice even after the Sino-Japanese War started, even using it on highly educated youth.” In contrast, the Communist army simplified training, emphasizing two essential skills: live-fire exercises and physical endurance, which significantly enhanced troop effectiveness in the challenging terrain characteristic of the Sino-Japanese War. Ultimately, the Nationalist army's training did not reach all soldiers. Only about half of all combat soldiers received adequate training, while the rest were neglected. According to statistics from the time, there were approximately five million military personnel during the Sino-Japanese War, with three million serving in logistics. Most of these logistics personnel had received little training, leading to disastrous consequences for overall combat effectiveness. As warfare has become more complex, the role of highly trained staff officers has become increasingly important. Napoleon developed operational plans close to the front and communicated orders via courier. During World War I, military commanders collected information at their headquarters and utilized telephones and automobiles to relay orders to the front lines. In World War II, with the battlefield expanding to include land, sea, and air, senior commanders often made decisions from headquarters far from the action, relying on a significant number of staff officers with specialized skills to keep them informed. In China, however, the staff officer system was underdeveloped. By 1937, only about 2,000 commanders and staff officers had received training. Prior to the Sino-Japanese War, most commanders managed staff work themselves, with staff officers serving primarily as military secretaries who drafted orders, reports, and maps. Many staff officers had no formal military training, and as a whole, the branch lacked respect, causing the most talented officers to avoid serving in it. The situation was even more dire for staff officer departments within local forces. For example, in March 1937, Liu Ziqing, a graduate of the Whampoa Military Academy, was appointed as the director of political instruction in the Forty-fourth Army, a unit under Sichuan warlord Liu Xiang. Liu Ziqing's account illustrates the dysfunction within the ranks: “The commander in chief was not supposed to manage the army and even did not know its whereabouts... But he could appoint relatives and former subordinates—who were officials and businessmen as well—to the army. Each month they would receive a small stipend. At headquarters, there was a long table and two rows of chairs. Around ten o'clock in the morning, senior officers signed in to indicate their presence. Those with other business would leave, while the remaining officers sat down to leisurely discuss star actresses, fortune-telling, business projects, mah-jongg, and opium. Occasionally they would touch on national affairs, chat about news articles, or share local gossip. In the afternoons, they primarily played mah-jongg, held banquets, and visited madams. Most mornings, the commander usually presided over these activities, and at first, I reported for duty as well. But I soon realized it was a waste of time and came very rarely. At headquarters, most staff members wore long gowns or Western-style suits, while military uniforms were a rare sight.” Most senior military personnel were trained at the Baoding Military Academy during the early republic. 2/3rds of commanders in chief, 37 %of army commanders, and 20 % of division commanders were Baoding graduates. Higher-ranking officers were more likely to have launched their careers there. In contrast, only 10 % of division commanders and a few army commanders were graduates of the Whampoa Military Academy. Additionally, commanders trained in local military schools and those with combat experience accounted for 1/3rd of all commanders. While the prevalence of civil war provided opportunities for rapid promotion, it also hindered officers' ability to update their training or gain experience in different military branches. German advisors expressed their concerns to Chiang Kai-shek, emphasizing that officers should first serve in junior roles before taking command. During one battle in 1938, Chiang noted, “Our commanders in chief are equivalent only to our enemy's regiment commanders, and our army and division commanders are only as competent as our enemy's battalion and company commanders.” Despite not viewing high-ranking Japanese officers as great strategists, Nationalist officers respected them as highly competent, diligent, and professional commanders who rarely made critical errors. The infantry was the primary component of the Nationalist army, with middle and junior infantry officers constituting over 80 %of all army officers. A 1936 registry of military officers listed 1,105 colonels and 2,159 lieutenant colonels within the infantry, demonstrating a significant outnumbering of Baoding graduates at ranks below lieutenant colonel. However, the quality of middle and junior infantry officers declined during the Sino-Japanese War; by 1944, only 27.3 % of these officers were from formal military academies, while those promoted from the ranks increased to 28.1 %. In 1937, 80 % of officers in an ordinary infantry battalion were military academy graduates, but this percentage dropped to 20 % during the war. Its hard to tell how educated soldiers were before the war, but it is generally believed that most were illiterate. In 1929, sociologist Tao Menghe surveyed 946 soldiers from a Shanxi garrison brigade and found that only 13 percent could compose a letter independently, while the rest had either never learned to read or were unable to write. In contrast, in August 1938, General Feng Yuxiang found that 80 percent of a regiment in Hunan were literate. Regardless, during the Sino-Japanese War, the quality of recruits steadily declined. More than 90 percent of soldiers were illiterate, and few possessed any basic scientific knowledge, which hindered their ability to master their weapons. On the battlefield, they heavily relied on middle and junior officers for guidance.  In autumn 1933, General Hans von Seeckt, the architect of the post World War I German army, visited China at the personal invitation of Chiang Kai-shek. In his recommendations for military reform, he identified China's greatest problem as its excessively large forces drawn from diverse backgrounds. He stated, “At present, the most pressing goal is to... establish a small, well-equipped army with high morale and combat effectiveness to replace the numerous poorly armed and trained forces.” He suggested forming an army of sixty divisions and recommended the establishment of a training regiment for military officers to equip them with the skills needed for modern warfare. Chiang Kai-shek accepted von Seeckt's proposals, and on January 26, 1935, he convened a National Military Reorganization Conference in Nanjing. On March 1, the Army Reorganization Bureau was established in Wuchang, under the leadership of General Chen Cheng. In the same month, General Alexander von Falkenhausen took charge of the German Military Advisors Group. Before war broke out, around nineteen divisions, roughly 300,000 troops received training from German advisors and were equipped with German-style weapons. At the onset of the Sino-Japanese War, the forces stemming from the First Army of the National Revolutionary Army and the Whampoa cadets, who had fought in the Northern Expedition, held the highest reputation and were referred to as the “core central forces” by the Japanese. Other notable forces included the Guangxi Army, Northwestern Army, Northeastern Army, some Uyghur units, the Guangdong Army, and the Shanxi Army. In contrast, provincial forces such as the Yunnan Army and Sichuan Army were viewed less favorably. Nationalist forces were generally far inferior to those of the Japanese enemy. In 1937, General He Yingqin noted that Nationalist forces had failed to prevail in 1932 and 1933, even when outnumbering the Japanese by 4-1.  In November 1937, during a national defense conference, Chiang Kai-shek stated, "In recent years we have worked hard, prepared actively, and achieved national unification. By the time of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, we were in a better domestic situation and had improved military preparedness compared to before. Since 1935, our strength has doubled. It increased by more than two to three times since January 1932 or September 1931 [when Japan attacked Shanghai and Mukden]. If peace had been achievable, we should have delayed the war for two or three years. Given an additional three years, our defensive capabilities would have been drastically different... Now, if we merely compare the military strength of China and Japan, we are certainly inferior." However, such assessments were overly optimistic, as Chiang failed to recognize that Japan's military capabilities would not have stagnated. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek certainly was dealt a difficult hand of cards for the upcoming poker match he was to play. Yet the Chinese were resilient and they had to be for the absolute horror that would be inflicted upon them from 1937-1945. Until this point, their enemies had been far more lenient, the Empire of Japan would show no mercy.

  Last time we spoke about the February 26th incident. Within the turbulent “ government of assassination” period of 1936 Japan, a faction of discontented junior officers, known as the Kodoha, believed that their emperor, Hirohito, was being manipulated by corrupt politicians. In a desperate bid for what they termed a "Showa Restoration," they meticulously plotted a coup d'état. On February 26, they launched a rebellion in Tokyo, attempting to assassinate key figures they deemed responsible for undermining the emperor's authority. The young officers executed coordinated attacks on prominent leaders, resulting in several deaths, while hoping to seize control of the Imperial Palace. However, their plan unraveled when their actions met with unexpected resistance, and they failed to secure strategic locations. Dark snow blanketed the city as Hirohito, outraged by the violence, quickly moved to suppress the uprising, which ultimately led to the downfall of the Kodoha faction and solidified the military's grip on power, ushering in a new era marked by militarism and radicalism.   #151 The Suiyuan Operation Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. So we last left off with the February 26th incident breaking out in Japan, but now I would like to return to China. Now we spoke a little bit about some influential Japanese politicians in the previous episode. Prime Minister Satio Makoto oversaw Japan from May 1932 to July 1934, succeeded by Prime Minister Keisuke Okada from July 1934 to March 1936. The foreign policy of Japan towards China during the Saitō and Okada administrations exhibited a notable paradox, characterized by two conflicting elements. On one hand, Foreign Minister Hirota championed a diplomatic approach that emphasized friendship, cooperation, and accommodation with China. On the other hand, the military actively undermined the authority of the Nationalist government in northern China, creating a significant rift between diplomatic rhetoric and military action.    The Okada cabinet then endorsed the Army Ministry's "Outline of Policy to Deal with North China" on January 13, 1936. This policy document explicitly proposed the eventual detachment of five provinces, Hubei, Chahar, Shanxi, Suiyuan, and Shandong from the Nationalist government in Nanking. The approval of this outline marked a pivotal moment, as it represented the first official government endorsement of the military's longstanding agenda and underscored the army's evolution from a mere rogue entity operating in the region to the de facto authority dictating the course of Japan's policy towards China. Despite this, on January 22, during the 68th Diet session, Hirota reaffirmed his dedication to fostering better ties with China, to which a representative from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded positively. The Nationalist government in Nanjing also expressed interest in engaging in formal negotiations. However, this diplomatic initiative quickly faltered, and the expected discussions in Nanjing never took place. Shortly thereafter, a mutiny by young army officers on February 26, 1936, led to the fall of the Okada cabinet. Following Prince Konoe Fumimaro's refusal of the imperial mandate to form a new government, Hirota stepped in to establish a cabinet on March 9. General Terauchi Hisaichi was appointed as the Minister of the Army, Admiral Nagano Osami took charge of the Navy Ministry, and Baba Eiichi became the finance minister. Hirota briefly served as foreign minister until Arita Hachirö, who had just submitted his credentials as ambassador to China on March 6, returned to Japan. The Hirota Koki cabinet, established immediately following the February 26 incident further entrenched military influence in politics while allowing interservice rivalries to impede national objectives. In May 1936, Hirota, influenced by army and navy ministers, reinstated the practice of appointing military ministers solely from the ranks of high-ranking active-duty officers. He believed this would prevent associations with the discredited Imperial Way faction from regaining power. By narrowing the candidate pool and enhancing the army's power relative to the prime minister, Hirota's decision set the stage for army leaders to leverage this advantage to overthrow Admiral Yonai's cabinet in July 1940. Arita began his new job by meeting with Foreign Minister Chang Chen while hearing views from the Kwantung Army chief of staff General, Itagaki Seishiro. Yes, our old friend received a lot of promotions. Itagaki had this to say about the Kwantung Army's policy in China "The primary aim of Japan's foreign policy, is the sound development of Manchukuo based upon the principle of the indivisibility of Japan and Manchukuo. If, as is probable, the existing situation continues, Japan is destined sooner or later to clash with the Soviet Union, and the attitude of China at that time will gravely influence operations [against the Soviet Union]." The Kwantung Army's was growing more and more nervous about the USSR following its 7th comintern congress held in July and August of 1935. There it publicly designated Japan, Germany and Poland as its main targets of comintern actions. Japanese intelligence in the Red Army also knew the Soviets were gradually planning to expand the military strength so they could face a simultaneous west and east front war. This was further emboldened by the latest USSR 5 year plan. Alongside the growing Red northern menace, the CCP issued on August 1st a declaration calling upon the Nationalist Government to end their civil war so they could oppose Japan. By this time the CCP was reaching the end of its Long March and organizing a new base of operations in Yenan in northern Shanxi. The developments by the USSR and CCP had a profound effect on Japan's foreign policy in China. The Kwantung Army believed a war with the USSR was imminent and began to concentrate its main force along the border of Manchukuo. The Kwantung Army's plan in the case of war was to seize Vladivostok while advancing motorized units towards Ulan Bator in Outer Mongolia, hoping to threaten the Trans-Siberian Railway near Lake Baikal. Their intelligence indicated the USSR could muster a maximum of 250,000 troops in eastern Siberia and that Japan could deal with them with a force two-thirds of that number. The IJA at that point had inferior air forces and armaments, thus urgent funding was needed. The Kwantung Army proposed that forces in the home islands should be reduced greatly so all could be concentrated in Manchuria. To increase funding so Kwantung leadership proposed doing away with special allowances for Japanese officials in Manchuria and reorganizing the Japanese economic structure. The Kwantung leaders also knew the submarine base at Vladivostok posed a threat to Japanese shipping so the IJN would have to participate, especially against ports and airfields. All said and done, the Kwantung Army planned for a war set in 1941 and advised immediate preparations. On July 23, 1936, Kanji Ishiwara presented the army's document titled “Request Concerning the Development of Industries in Preparation for War” to the Army Ministry. He asserted that in order to prepare for potential conflict with the Soviet Union, Japan, Manchukuo, and North China must have the industries critical for war fully developed by 1941. Ishiwara emphasized the urgent need for rapid industrial growth, particularly in Manchukuo. He followed this request on July 29 with a draft of a “Policy on Preparations for War” regarding the Soviet Union, advocating for immediate reforms to Japan's political and economic systems to facilitate economic expansion and lay the groundwork for future fundamental changes. However, he cautioned that if significant turmoil erupted in economic sectors, Japan must be ready to execute a comprehensive overhaul without delay. At the same time, the Hirota cabinet initiated a review of its policy towards China. In the spring of 1936, a secret committee focused on the Current Situation was formed, consisting of officials from the Army, Navy, and Foreign ministries. Their discussions led to the adoption of the "Measures to Implement Policy toward China" by the Four Ministers Conference on August 11, along with the "Second Outline of Policy to Address North China," which the cabinet approved as part of the "Fundamentals of National Policy" on the same day. The first of these documents outlined the following actionable steps: “1. Conclusion of an anti-Communist military pact. a) To prepare for the conclusion of such a pact, a special secret committee of military experts from both countries should be organized. b) Their discussions should cover the scope and substance of the pact and ways and means of realizing the objectives of the pact.  2. Conclusion of a Sino-Japanese military alliance. A special secret committee, composed of an equal number of delegates from each nation, should be organized to prepare for the conclusion of an offensive and defensive alliance against attack by a third country.  3. Acceleration of solutions of pending questions between China and Japan. a) Engagement of a senior political adviser: The Nationalist government should engage a senior Japanese political adviser to assist in the conduct of the domestic and foreign affairs of the Nationalist government. b) Engagement of military advisers: The Nationalist government should engage military advisers, along with military instructors. c) Opening of airline services between China and Japan: Airline services between China and Japan should be opened immediately. To realize such a service, various means should be used to induce the Nanking authorities to establish an airline corporation in North China, to begin flights between Formosa and Fukien province, and to start test flights between Shanghai and Fukuoka. d) Conclusion of a reciprocal tariff treaty: A reciprocal tariff treaty should be concluded promptly between China and Japan, on the basis of the policy approved by the ministries concerned, with regard to the abolition of the special trade in eastern Hopei province and the lowering of the prohibitively high tariffs. For this purpose Japan should, if necessary, propose the creation of a special committee composed of Japanese and Chinese representatives.  4. Promotion of economic cooperation between China and Japan. Japan should promote cooperation with the common people of China to establish realistic and inseparable economic relations between China and Japan that will promote coexistence and co-prosperity and will be unaffected by changes in the Chinese political situation. “ The document also included suggestions for Japan's economic expansion into South China. This included tapping into the natural resources of the provinces of Fujian, Guangdong, and Guangxi, building a railway between Guangzhou and Swatow, and establishing air routes between Fuchoz and Taipei, which would connect to services in Japan and Thailand. It also called for survey teams to be dispatched to explore the resources of Sichuan, Gansu, Xinjiang, and Qinghai provinces, and for support to be provided to the independence movement in Inner Mongolia. However, these initiatives presented significant challenges. The preface to the "Second Outline of Policy to Deal with North China" cautioned, "In implementing this policy, we must carefully consider the Nanking government's prestige and avoid actions that could prompt it to adopt an anti-Japanese stance in response to the desires of the Chinese people."  On September 19th, six fundamental points for a settlement in North China were dictated to China to “establish a common defense against communism, promoting economic cooperation, lowering tariffs, initiating an airline service between the two nations, employing Japanese advisers, and controlling subversive Koreans." September 22 was set as the deadline for a response from China. While agreeing to some Japanese requests, the Chinese included several counter-demands that the Japanese found completely unacceptable. These demands required Japan to “(a) refrain from using armed intervention or arbitrary actions in its dealings with China, (b) recognize China as an equal and sovereign state, (c) avoid leveraging antigovernment groups or communist elements, and (d) remove any derogatory references to China from Japanese textbooks. The Chinese also insisted that any agreement regarding North China “must precede the annulment of the Tanggu and Shanghai cease-fire agreements, the disbanding of the East Hopei regime, a prohibition on unauthorized Japanese flights over North China, a ban on smuggling activities by Japanese, the restoration of China's right to control smuggling, and the disbandment of the illegal East Hopei government along with the armies of Wang Ying and Prince De in Suiyuan”. Now that mention of a Prince De in Suiyuan brings us to a whole new incident. This podcast series should almost be called “the history of Japanese related incidents in China”. Now we've spoken at great lengths about Japan's obsession with Manchuria. She wanted it for resources, growing space and as a buffer state. Japan also had her eyes set on Inner Mongolia to be used as a buffer state between Manchukuo, the USSR and China proper. Not to mention after the invasion of North China, Inner Mongolia could be instrumental as a wedge to be used to control Northern China. Thus the Kwantung Army began fostering a Mongolian independence movement back in August of 1933. They did so through a special organ led by chief of the general staff Koiso Kuniaki. He began work with the Silingol League led by Prince Sonormurabdan or “Prince So” and another influential Mongol, Prince Demchukdongrob or “Prince De”. Prince De was the West Sunid Banner in Northern Chahar. Likewise the Kwantung Army was grooming Li Xuxin, a Mongol commoner born in southern Manchuria. He had been a bandit turned soldier absorbed into Zhang Xueliangs army. Li had distinguished himself in a campaign against a group of Mongols trying to restore the Qing dynasty to further establish an independent Mongolia. During Operation Nekka Li had served in a cavalry brigade under Zu Xingwu, reputed to be the best unit in Zhang Xueliangs Northeastern border defense army. He led the army's advance unit into western Shandong. Afterwards Li suddenly became friends with Major Tanaka Hisashi, the head of the Special Service Agency at Dungliao where he defected to the Kwantung Army. He soon was leading a force too strong to be incorporated into the Manchukuo Army, thus it was disbanded, but his Kwantung Army buddies encouraged him to move to Tolun in Rehe province. At one point during the Nekka campaign, Li's army was threatened by a strong Chinese counterattack, but they had Manchukuo air support allowing them to capture Tolun. This victory launched what became the East Chahar Special Autonomous District with Li becoming a garrison commander and chief administrator.  Back in time, upon the founding of the Chinese Republic, the affairs of Inner Mongolia fell upon the Bureau of Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs. This was reorganized in 1930 into the Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs when the provinces of Chahar, Suiyuan and Ningxia were organized. Prince De had been a member of a nationalist group known as the Young Mongols, although his aim was self-determination for Inner Mongolia within China, not independence. The Nationalist government's support for Chinese settlement in Mongol territories and its disregard for Mongol perspectives quickly triggered a rise in Mongol nationalism and anti-Chinese feelings. This was exacerbated by the government's introduction of a law on October 12, 1931, requiring local Mongolian administrative units to consult with hsien officials on matters concerning their administration. The nationalist sentiment was further fueled by the presence of the neighboring Mongolian People's Republic in Outer Mongolia and the establishment of Xingan province in western Manchuria by Manchukuo authorities in March 1932. This new province included the tribes of eastern Inner Mongolia and granted them greater autonomy than other Manchukuo provinces while banning Chinese immigration into it. When Nanjing did not react to these developments, Prince De and his supporters took steps toward gaining autonomy. On July 15th, 1933, Mongol leaders from western Inner Mongolia gathered at Pailingmiao for two weeks to deliberate on a declaration for regional independence. Although many princes were initially hesitant to take this step, they reconvened on August 14 and sent a cable to Nanjing announcing their decision to create an autonomous Mongolian government. The cable was signed by Prince So and Prince De. Over the following two months, additional conferences at Pailingmiao were held to organize the new government, which would operate under Nanking's guidance but without involvement from provincial chairmen. On October 22, Prince Yun, head of the Ulanchap League and a close ally of Prince De, was elected to lead the new regime, with Prince De assuming the role of chief of its political affairs bureau. After receiving a cable from the Mongolian leaders in August, Nanjing quickly sent Minister of the Interior Huang Shao-hung and Xu Qingyang, head of the Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs, to halt the movement. However, the Mongols declined to travel to Kalgan or Kueisui to meet Huang. In November, as the leader of a special commission appointed by Nanjing, Huang reached an agreement with Yun De and other Mongolian leaders concerning a proposal that abandoned the Mongols' demand for an autonomous government. This agreement was later altered by Nanjing, and its essential points were excluded from a measure approved by the Central Political Council of the Kuomintang on January 17, 1934. The dispute reignited, fueled by the Nationalist government's rising concerns over the anticipated enthronement of Pu Yi in Manchukuo. On February 28, the Central Political Council enacted a measure that outlined "eight principles of Inner Mongolian autonomy" and created the Mongolian Local Autonomous Political Council. Since these principles did not grant authority over foreign and military affairs, powers explicitly reserved for the central government in the January measure, they were seen as a concession to the Mongols and were accepted. On March 7, the central government issued regulations to establish a semi autonomous regime for Inner Mongolia, which was officially launched at Pailingmiao on April 23. Although the council was led by three moderate princes, Prince Yun, supported by Princes So and Sha, the real administrative authority was held by Prince De, who served as the secretary-general. Most of the twenty-five council members were of Mongolian royalty, through whom Prince De aimed to fulfill his objectives. Nevertheless, the Nationalist government seemed to consider the council merely a token gesture to placate De, as Nanking never provided the promised administrative funds outlined in the "eight principle declaration." Was not much of a shock Prince De sought support from the Kwantung Army, which had established contact with him as early as June 1934. Japanese pressures in North China were starting to alter the power dynamics, and after the first Western incident in Jehol in February 1935, it compelled the relocation of Sung Queyuan's army from Chahar to Hopei, providing encouragement to Prince De. In May, he met with Kwantung Army Vice Chief of Staff Itagaki Seishirö, Intelligence Section Chief Kawabe Torashirö, and staff officer Tanaka Ryükichi, where he was officially informed for the first time about the Kwantung Army's intention to assist him. On July 25, the Kwantung Army drafted its "Essentials of Policy toward Inner Mongolia," which regarded Japanese support for cooperation between De and Li Xuxin as part of their strategic preparations for a potential conflict with the Soviet Union. Shortly after this policy was adopted, a conflict arose over who had the authority to appoint the head of the Mongol Xukung banner, situated north of the Yellow River and Paot'ou. Following the death of the previous administrator, Prince Xu declared that he had taken control of the position. In response to a request from the local abbot, Prince Yun, acting in his capacity as chairman of the Mongolian Political Council, dismissed Xu. Xu then turned to Nanking through Suiyuan Provincial Chairman Fu Zuoyi, arguing that the central government held the authority to appoint heads of administrative units. In retaliation, Prince De dispatched troops to Xukung. On November 10, Fu presented a mediation proposal, which was rejected since it not only failed to acknowledge Shih's dismissal but also demanded the withdrawal of De's forces. De refused to pull back, further intensifying his hostility toward the Nanking government. In December, the Kwantung Army attempted to move Li's forces from eastern Chahar into the six Xun to the north of Kalgan, which serves as Chahar's granary. Following the Qin-Doihara agreement, Matsui Gennosuke from the Kalgan Special Service Agency secured a deal to separate these six districts from the southern region predominantly populated by Chinese; a Mongolian peace preservation corps was tasked with maintaining order in the northern area, while a Chinese corps was responsible for the south. During the discussions for an autonomous regime centered around Song Queyuan in North China in November 1935, Kwantung Army troops were concentrated around Gubeikou. To exert pressure on Song's rear, the Kwantung Army proposed replacing the Chinese peace preservation unit in the area north of Kalgan with Li Xuxin's army, which would establish this territory as its base.   The operation commenced on December 8. In a surprise attack just before dawn, Li captured Paochang. By December 12, despite facing strong Chinese resistance and the heaviest snowfall in sixty years, Li, aided by Kwantung Army planes disguised as those of the Manchukuo Airline Corporation, had taken control of Kuyuan. Further advances were halted by an order from Kwantung Army headquarters, and on December 13, it was reported that, had the operation not been stopped, Tokyo would have issued an imperial command. The operation had faced opposition from the Tientsin army, which feared it would weaken Song Queyuan's position just as they were informing Tokyo that the autonomy movement was going smoothly. Additionally, both Britain and the United States publicly expressed strong opposition to the Kwantung Army's involvement in the autonomy movement. However, the directive was ultimately prompted by the emperor's anger upon discovering that a unit of the Kwantung Army led by Colonel Matsui Takurö had advanced to Tolun to support Li's progress. Although Li's advance was halted, the operation undeniably contributed to the formation of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council.   Although the operation was halted, the Kwantung Army remained committed to its objectives. They contended that Li's army's advance into the six districts north of Kalgan was merely a peace preservation unit moving into territory within the truce line established by the Tanggu Agreement. Consequently, on December 29, they ordered Li to advance southward. Li peacefully occupied Changpei the following day and entered Shangtu on December 31. Manchukuo civil officials were appointed to oversee the six districts, and the currency of Manchukuo was introduced, although the existing tax system initially remained unchanged. The Kwantung Army allocated silver worth 6 million yuan to support administrative expenses. This outcome, known as the Eastern Chahar incident, marked a complete success for the Kwantung Army, which then redirected its focus toward Suiyuan Province. Each year, the Kwantung Army developed a secret plan for covert operations for the following year. The 1936 plan included strategies to secure air bases for routes connecting Europe and Asia, targeting Tsinghai and Sinkiang provinces, Outer Mongolia, Western Mongolia, and even remote areas of Ningxia province. In January 1936, staff officer Tanaka Ryūkichi formulated a document titled "Essentials of Policy Toward (Northwestern) Inner Mongolia." This document advocated for the establishment of a Mongolian military government to facilitate Japanese operations in northwestern Mongolia and suggested pushing Fu Tso-yi out of Suiyuan into Shansi province. Tanaka's proposals were incorporated into the final plan of the Kwantung Army, ultimately leading to the Suiyuan incident of November 1936. In February 1936, a meeting at Pailingmiao, where Prince De proposed the independence of Inner Mongolia, resulted in the departure of Prince So and several other Mongolian leaders from the coalition. They sought to establish a rival political council at Kueisui under the protection of Fu Zuoyi. By April, De and his supporters decided to form a military government at Tehua in Chahar, which was officially inaugurated in June as the Inner Mongolian government, headed by De with Li Shou-hsin as his deputy. This new government quickly signed a mutual assistance treaty with Manchukuo, and the emperor granted De the title of prince.   In July, at a conference in Tehua, Tanaka was appointed as the head of the Special Service Agency for Inner Mongolia with the mission of implementing the army's Intelligence Section plans. He traveled to Pingtiqüan alongside Chief of Staff Itagaki and Intelligence Chief Mutō Akira to propose a local anti-Communist agreement to Fu. After failing to convince Fu, he attempted to persuade Sun Tien-ying to form a puppet army but managed to recruit only a bandit from Suiyuan, Wang Ying. The February 26 mutiny in Tokyo heightened anti-Japanese sentiments in China, resulting in increased violence. By August, the construction of an airplane hangar in Paot'ou was halted due to riots by local Chinese residents. On August 13, a group of fifteen Japanese, led by Nakajima Manzo, was ambushed while delivering ammunition to a pro-Japanese leader who was shortly thereafter assassinated. Chinese soldiers from Wang Qingkuo's 70th Division carried out the attack, and tensions escalated as the arrival of ammunition and Japanese laborers in Kalgan prompted border villages to strengthen their defenses.   By late September, Tanaka's "Guidelines for the Execution of the Suiyuan Operation" received approval, with operations set to commence in early November. The plan evolved from a covert mission into a personal initiative by Tanaka, financed largely through funds from the Kwantung Army's secret services and profits from special trading in eastern Hopei. Tanaka claimed to have transported 600,000 yen to Tehua in October and later sent 200,000 yuan into Inner Mongolia, estimating total expenses at approximately 6 million yen. He acquired new weaponry from the disbanded Northeast Army and established three clandestine forces: Wang Ying led 500 men, including artillery; Qin Xiashan commanded 3,000 from Sun Tienying's army; and Chang Futang also led 3,000 specialized units. During strategic meetings, Tanaka dismissed proposals for unified command and refusing to integrate secret units into the Mongolian army. He advocated for the slogan "Overthrow Chiang Kai-shek," while Matsui managed to include "Independence for Inner Mongolia."   The Japanese had developed the entire battle strategy. The 1st Army, commanded by Li Xuxin, would serve as the left flank, while the 2nd Army, led by Demchugdongrub, would be positioned on the right. Wang Ying's forces were designated as the central force. Their initial targets would be Hongort, Xinghe, Tuchengzi, and Guisui city, followed by a division to seize Jinging, Baotou, and Hetao. On November 13, Prince Demchugdongrub's and Wang Ying's forces left Shandu in two columns to assault Xinghe and Hongort. By the 15th, 1,500 troops reached Hongort, where they engaged the 1st Cavalry Division led by Peng Yubin. The next day, Ryukichi Tanaka, Demchugdongrub's chief advisor, sent two cavalry brigades and one infantry brigade to capture the town, effectively overrunning its defenders. Meanwhile, Wang Ying dispatched a smaller group to secure Tuchengzi.   Fu Zuoyi established his headquarters in Jining that same day. After assessing the situation, he concluded that if the enemy secured Hongort, it would diminish his defenders' morale. Consequently, he launched a counterattack. Peng Yubin led a joint force of the 1st Cavalry Division and Dong Qiwu's 218th Brigade to confront around 400 of Wang Ying's men defending Hongort and Tuchengzi. By 7 AM on the 18th, Tuchengzi was reclaimed, and at 8:30 AM, the 1st Cavalry Division entered Hongort, charging through 500 of Wang Ying's soldiers. The struggle for Hongort persisted for over three days, resulting in nearly 1,000 casualties before Fu Zuoyi regained control.   As the tide shifted against the invaders, Fu Zuoyi initiated an offensive toward the Bailing Temple, the rear base of the enemy, well-stocked and defended by 3,000 men under Prince Demchugdongrub. Fu Zuoyi ordered the 2nd Cavalry Division, along with the 211th and 315th Brigades, the 21st Artillery Regiment, and a convoy of 20 trucks and 24 armored vehicles to assault the Bailing Temple as quickly as possible. Taking advantage of the Mongolian chaos, Fu Zuoyi's 35th Brigade executed a flanking maneuver west of the Bailing Temple amid a severe snowstorm.   At 1 AM on the 24th, the battle for the Bailing Temple commenced as the Chinese engaged the Mongolians for the fortified positions around the temple. From 2 to 4 AM, the Chinese advanced closer to the temple walls, facing artillery and machine-gun fire. They launched desperate frontal assaults against the city gates, suffering heavy losses. A fierce stalemate ensued, with Japanese aerial bombardments causing significant casualties to the Chinese forces. Fu Zuoyi subsequently ordered all armored vehicles to converge at the main city gate. Despite intense fire, the armored cars managed to breach the gate, allowing Chinese infantry to flood into the temple area. The resulting carnage within the temple walls led to 900 Mongol deaths, with 300 captured as the rest fled. The Chinese suffered 300 casualties but secured the strategically vital rear base, along with a substantial stockpile of provisions, including 500 barrels of petrol, 600 rifles, 10 machine guns, vehicles, and field guns. Following the devastating defeat at Bailing Temple, the invaders regrouped at Xilamuleng Temple. On the 28th, the Japanese sent 100 vehicles to transport 3,000 troops to prepare for a significant counteroffensive to recapture Bailing Temple. On the 29th, Wang Ying personally led 2,000 cavalry north of Shangdu to Taolin in an attempt to contain the enemy. However, after he left the bulk of his forces at Xilamuleng Temple, officers from the Grand Han Righteous Army secretly began negotiating to defect to the Chinese side, undermining the forces needed for the counterattack against Bailing Temple.   The counteroffensive commenced on December 2nd, with 10 armored vehicles and 1,000 Mongol troops leading the charge at 6 AM. They were pushed back by the heavily fortified 211th Brigade, which was well-supplied with machine guns and artillery. The following day, at 3 AM, the Mongols attempted a surprise attack but faced an ambush as they crept toward the temple. They incurred hundreds of casualties, with 230 men either captured or having defected. After this, the counterattack stalled, as the Mongol forces couldn't approach within 3 miles of the temple. Subsequently, the Chinese 2nd Cavalry Division launched a pincer maneuver, causing significant casualties among the invaders. By 9 AM, the enemy had suffered 500 casualties and was in retreat. At 7 PM, Fu Zuoyi ordered another counteroffensive. By the next morning, hundreds more had been lost, and several hundred soldiers were captured. With such heavy losses, the defense of Xilamuleng Temple weakened significantly, prompting more officers to defect to the Chinese. Late on the 4th, Fu Zuoyi assembled a force comprising two cavalry regiments, one infantry regiment, one artillery battalion, four armored vehicles, and a squadron of cars to launch a nighttime assault on Xilamuleng Temple.   Meanwhile, the 2nd Cavalry Division clashed with Wang Ying's cavalry 30 miles northeast of Wulanhua. Wang Ying's 2,000 cavalry had been raiding nearby villages to create diversions, drawing enemy forces away from the Bailing-Xilamuleng theater. By the 9th, Wang Ying's cavalry were encircled in Xiaobei, where they were nearly annihilated, with Wang escaping with around a hundred guards toward Changpei. On the 7th, some Grand Han Righteous Army officers set in motion plans to defect to the Chinese side. Early on the 9th, these officers led their men to invade the residence of Japanese advisors, killing all 27 Japanese officers under Colonel Obama. Simultaneously, Fu Zuoyi's forces executed a flanking maneuver against the Xilamuleng Temple amidst the chaos. With mass defections, the Chinese forces surged into the temple area, resulting in the invader army disintegrating in confusion and surrender. After seizing the temple, the invaders were routed, their lines of communication severed, and only isolated pockets continued to resist. Taking advantage of the confusion, Fu Zuoyi launched simultaneous attacks, attempting to capture Shangdu. However, Yan Xishan sent him a telegram, ordering him to halt, stating that Shangdu fell under the jurisdiction of Shanxi and not Suiyuan.   In response to the loss, Tanaka planned a counteroffensive with Qin's troops, but Chiang kai-shek commanded a strong defense of Pailingmiao, successfully outmaneuvering Tanaka's strategies. The resurgence of Chinese forces led to the disintegration of Qin's troops, who revolted and eventually joined the Nationalist army. The Kwantung Army aimed to redeploy its forces for recovery but faced opposition from Tokyo, which criticized the situation. After Chiang kai-shek was kidnapped by Zhang Xueliang on December 12, Tanaka and Prince De seized the opportunity to reassess their strategy. Ultimately, the Kwantung Army decided to abandon efforts to reclaim Pailingmiao, marking the official end of hostilities on December 21. The Suiyuan incident ultimately strengthened Chinese resolve against Japan and increased international distrust.   The defeat of Japan's proxy forces inspired many Chinese to advocate for a more vigorous resistance against the Japanese. The triumph in Suiyuan was celebrated throughout China and surprised the international media, marking the first occasion where the Chinese army successfully halted a Japanese unit. Delegations traveled from as distant as southern Chinese provinces to encourage the defenders to continue their fight. Captured Japanese weapons and equipment served as proof of Japan's involvement in the conflict, despite Japan's Foreign Minister Hachirō Arita claiming that "Japan was not involved in this conflict in Suiyuan at all." After his defeat, Prince Demchugdongrub and his Inner Mongolian troops retreated to northern Chahar, where he had to reconstruct his army due to significant losses. The Japanese implemented new regulations for the Mongolian Army to enhance its effectiveness, and efforts to recruit new soldiers commenced.   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. More incidents and more battles to seize territory raged in North China. However things did not go according to plan for the Japanese and their puppets. The tides had turned, and now a more angry and invigorating China would begin lashing out against the encroachment. It was only a matter of time before a full blown war was declared. 

Last time we spoke about Operation Chahar. In the turbulent year of 1935, tensions surged in North China as the Kwantung Army defied Tokyo's orders, encroaching deeper into Chahar province. This period was marked by widespread anti-Japanese sentiments, fueled by local revolts and the assassination of pro-Japanese figures, which infuriated Japanese authorities. On May 20, the Kwantung Army launched an offensive against a bandit group led by Sun Yungqin, seeking to exert control over the demilitarized regions established by earlier agreements. Their swift victory forced the resignation of local officials opposing Japanese interests. As chaos escalated, the Chinese government, under pressure to appease Japan, dismantled anti-Japanese factions and dismissed key leaders. The climax in this saga came with the signing of the He-Umezu Agreement, stripping China of authority in Hubei and Chahar, signaling Japan's increasing dominance and setting the stage for further exploitation of the region.   #150 The February 26 Incident Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. While this podcast is supposed to be given through the Chinese perspective, I apologize but yet again I need to jump over to the Japanese side. You see, a very pivotal moment during the Showa era would occur in the year of 1936. I think it's crucial to understand it, and the underlying issues of it, to better understand what we will be stuck in for the unforeseeable future, the Second Sino-Japanese War. I've briefly mentioned the two factions within the Japanese military at this time, but now I'd really like to jump into them, and a major incident that made them collide. In the aftermath of WW1, 2 prominent factions emerged during this tumultuous period: the Kodoha, or Imperial Way Faction, and the Toseiha, or Control Faction. Each faction represented distinct visions for Japan's future, deeply influencing the nation's course leading up to World War II. The Kodoha rose to prominence in the 1920s, driven by a fervent belief in Japan's divine destiny and its right to expand its imperial reach across Asia. This faction was characterized by its adherence to traditional Japanese values, rooted in the samurai ethos. They viewed the Emperor as the embodiment of Japan's spirit and sought to return to the moral foundations they believed had been eroded by “Western influence”. The Kodoha was often critical of the West, perceiving the encroachment of Western thought and culture as a threat to Japan's unique identity. Their ideology emphasized a robust military force, advocating for aggressive campaigns in regions like Manchuria and China to assert Japan's dominance. Contrasting sharply with the Kodoha, the Toseiha began to emerge as a more dominant political force in the late 1930s. The Toseiha embraced a pragmatic approach, advocating for a disciplined military that could engage effectively with the complexities of modern warfare. They recognized the importance of retaining some traditional values while also integrating Western military techniques. Rather than rejecting Western influence entirely, the Toseiha believed in adapting to global shifts to ensure Japan's strength and security. The Toseiha's moderation extended to their governance strategies, as they prioritized political stability and control over radical ideology. They saw this approach as crucial for creating a robust state capable of managing Japan's expansionist ambitions without provoking the backlash that Kodoha tactics elicited. Their more calculated approach to military expansion included securing partnerships and pursuing diplomatic solutions alongside military action, thereby presenting a less confrontational image to the world. Now after Manchuria was seized and Manchukuo was ushered in, many in the Japanese military saw a crisis emerge, that required a “showa restoration' to solve. Both factions aimed to create military dictatorships under the emperor. The Kodoha saw the USSR as the number one threat to Japan and advocated an invasion of them, aka the Hokushin-ron doctrine, but the Toseiha faction prioritized a national defense state built on the idea they must build Japans industrial capabilities to face multiple enemies in the future. What really separated the two, was the Kodoha sought to use a violent coup d'etat to make ends meet, whereas the Toseiha were unwilling to go so far. The Kodoha faction was made up mostly of junior and youthful officers, typically country boys as we would call them. These were young men whose families were not the blue bloods, farmer types. They viewed the dramatic changes of Japan in light of their own family experiences, many were impoverished by the dramatic changes. A very specific thing these Kodoha boys hated were the Zaibatsu. The Zaibatsu were large Japanese business conglomerates, primarily active from the Meiji period until WW2. They combined various industries, including banking, manufacturing, and trading. Prominent examples included Mitsubishi and Sumitomo. The reason they hated the Zaibatsu was because they believed they were influenced by western thought and that they super succeeded the authority of the emperor. More or less you can think of it as “we hate the fat cats who are really running things”.   Now the Toseiha faction were willing to work with the Zaibatsu to make Japan stronger. Basically they believed them to just be a necessary evil, you had to play ball to get things rolling. Random note, Hirohito's brother Prince Chichibu sympathized with the Kodoha faction and repeatedly counseled his brother that he should implement direct imperial rule even if it meant suspending the constitution, aka a show restoration. Hirohito believed his brother who was active in the IJA at the time was being radicalized. Now I cant go through the entire history of it, but this time period is known as the “government by assassination” period for Japan. Military leaders in the IJA, IJN and from within the Kodoha and Toseiha factions kept assassinating politicians and senior officers to push envelopes forward. Stating all of that, I now want to talk about the February 26th incident and I will add I am using a specific source, simply because it's my favorite. That is Herbert P Bix's Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan. In late 1934, several officers from the Imperial Way faction at the Army Cadet School were arrested for plotting a coup. Although there were no immediate repercussions, the following year, two of the same Kodoha officers, named Isobe Asaichi and Muranaka Takaji were arrested again for distributing a document accusing Toseiha faction officers, like Major General Nagata Tetsuzan, of previously drafting coup plans against the government. This time, the army's upper echelons responded firmly, condemning Isobe and Muranaka's accusations as acts of disloyalty, resulting in both officers losing their commissions. Meanwhile, other Imperial Way officers sought retaliation against Nagata, who was rumored to be planning a major purge to eliminate factionalism within the army. Tatsukichi Minobe was a Japanese statesman and scholar of constitutional law and in the 1930s he began a movement bringing up the very real issue with the Meiji constitution in relation to the role of the emperor. In August 1935, amid a populist movement denouncing Minobe's interpretation of the constitution, Lt colonel Aizawa Saburo from Kodoha faction entered Nagata's office and fatally attacked him with his katana. This marked a significant escalation in the military struggle over state reform and the push for increased military funding, which was intertwined with the movement against Minobe. Meanwhile anti- Prime Minister Okada factions within the army, continuing to use slogans like “kokutai clarification” and “denounce the organ theory,” intensified their attacks on the emperor's advisers and hereditary peers. Senior generals from the Kodoha faction arranged a public court-martial for Aizawa, held by the 1st Division, a group heavily populated by Kodoha officers based in Tokyo. When Aizawa's trial commenced on January 12, 1936, his defense team transformed it into an emotional condemnation of the Okada cabinet, the court entourage, and Minobe's constitutional theories. This strategy garnered support across the nation, even reaching unexpected places like the imperial palace, where Dowager Empress Teimei Kogo, a staunch rightist, expressed sympathy for Aizawa. However, before the trial could progress, a military mutiny disrupted proceedings in the capital. Shockwaves rippled through the army after Army Minister Hayashi dismissed Kodoha member General Mazaki from his position overseeing military education and ordered the transfer of the 1st Division to Manchuria, which ignited the largest army uprising in modern Japanese history. The uprising was orchestrated through a series of meetings held from February 18 to 22 by key individuals including Nishida, Yasuhide Kurihara, Teruzō Andō, Hisashi Kōno, Takaji Muranaka, and Asaichi Isobe. Their plan was relatively straightforward: the officers would assassinate the most prominent adversaries of the kokutai, seize control of the administrative center of the capital and the Imperial Palace, and present their demands, which included the dismissal of certain officials and the establishment of a new cabinet led by Mazaki. They did not establish long-term goals, believing that those should be determined by the Emperor. However, it is suspected that they were prepared to replace Hirohito with Prince Chichibu if necessary. The young Kodoha officers felt they had at least implicit support from several influential Imperial Japanese Army officers after making informal inquiries. This group included figures such as Araki, Minister of War Yoshiyuki Kawashima, Jinzaburō Mazaki, Tomoyuki Yamashita, Kanji Ishiwara, Shigeru Honjō, as well as their immediate superiors, Kōhei Kashii and Takeo Hori. Later, Kawashima's successor as Minister of War remarked that if all the officers who had endorsed the rebellion were forced to resign, there would not have been enough high-ranking officers left to replace them. To articulate their intentions and grievances, the young officers prepared a document titled "Manifesto of the Uprising" “Kekki Shuisho”, which they intended to present to the Emperor. Although the document was authored by Muranaka, it was written under the name of Shirō Nonaka, the highest-ranking officer involved in the plot. The document aligned with Kokutai Genri-ha ideals, criticizing the genrō, political leaders, military factions, zaibatsu, bureaucrats, and political parties for jeopardizing the kokutai with their selfishness and disregard for the Emperor, and emphasized the need for direct action: “Now, as we face immense foreign and domestic challenges, if we do not eliminate the disloyal and unjust who threaten the kokutai, if we do not remove the villains obstructing the Emperor's authority and hindering the Restoration, the Imperial vision for our nation will come to naught [...] Our duty is to purge the malevolent ministers and military factions surrounding the Emperor and eradicate their influence; we shall fulfill this mission.” Seven targets were selected for assassination for "threatening the kokutai". Keisuke Okada served as Prime Minister, where he notably advocated for the London Naval Treaty and supported the "organ theory" of the kokutai. His actions reflect a commitment to international agreements and specific ideological principles at the time. Saionji Kinmochi, a Genrō and former Prime Minister, also supported the London Naval Treaty. However, his influence extended further, as he played a role in prompting the Emperor to establish inappropriate cabinets, impacting political stability. Makino Nobuaki, the former Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and Foreign Minister, was another key figure who supported the London Naval Treaty. He notably prevented Prince Fushimi from voicing protests to the Emperor during this period, and he established a court faction in collaboration with Saitō, further entrenching political alliances. In his capacity as Grand Chamberlain, Kantarō Suzuki supported the London Naval Treaty but faced criticism for "obstructing the Imperial virtue," suggesting tensions between political decisions and traditional values. Saitō Makoto, who served as Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and former Prime Minister, was involved in advocating for the London Naval Treaty and played a significant role in Mazaki's dismissal. He, too, formed a court faction with Makino, indicating the intricacies of court politics. Takahashi Korekiyo, as Finance Minister and former Prime Minister, engaged in party politics with the aim of diminishing military influence. His approach was focused on maintaining the existing economic structure amid the shifting political landscape. Finally, Jōtarō Watanabe, who replaced Mazaki as Inspector General of Military Education, supported the "organ theory" of the kokutai yet faced criticism for refusing to resign, despite being considered unsuitable for his position. On the night of February 25, Tokyo experienced a heavy snowfall, which uplifted the rebel officers as it evoked memories of the 1860 Sakuradamon Incident. During this event, political activists known as shishi assassinated Ii Naosuke, the chief advisor to the Shōgun, in the name of the Emperor. The rebel forces, organized into six groups, began mobilizing their troops and departing from their barracks between 3:30 and 4:00 AM. At 5:00 AM, they launched simultaneous attacks on key targets, including Okada, Takahashi, Suzuki, Saito, the Ministry of War, and the headquarters of the Tokyo Metropolitan Police. At around five o'clock on the morning of February 26, 1936, a rebellion erupted, fueled by the long-standing tensions surrounding the kokutai issues that had plagued 1935. Twenty-two junior officers led over 1,400 armed soldiers and non-commissioned officers from three regiments of the 1st Division and an infantry unit of the Imperial Guards in a mutiny in snow-covered Tokyo. The attack on Okada involved a contingent of 280 men from the 1st Infantry Regiment, commanded by 1st Lieutenant Yasuhide Kurihara. The troops encircled the Prime Minister's Residence and compelled its guards to open the gates. Upon entering the compound, they attempted to locate Prime Minister Okada but were met with gunfire from four policemen stationed there. All four policemen were killed, wounding six rebel soldiers in the process. However, the shots served as a warning for Okada, prompting his brother-in-law, Colonel Denzō Matsuo, to help him find refuge. Matsuo, who closely resembled Okada, was eventually discovered by the soldiers and killed. After comparing Matsuo's wounded face to a photograph of the prime minister, the attackers mistakenly believed they had accomplished their mission. Okada managed to escape the following day, but this information was kept confidential, and he did not play any further role in the events. After Matsuo's death, Kurihara's men took up guard positions around the compound, reinforced by sixty soldiers from the 3rd Imperial Guard. In another key operation, Captain Kiyosada Kōda led a group of 160 men to seize control of the Minister of War's residence, the Ministry of War, and the General Staff Office. Upon entering the Minister's residence at 6:30 AM, they demanded to see Minister Kawashima. Once admitted, they read their manifesto aloud and presented a document detailing several demands, including: A prompt resolution to the situation that would further "advance the cause of the Restoration." A call to prevent the use of force against the Righteous Army. The arrest of Kazushige Ugaki (Governor-General of Korea), Jirō Minami (commander of the Kwantung Army), Kuniaki Koiso (commander of the Korean Army), and Yoshitsugu Tatekawa for their roles in undermining military command. The immediate dismissal of Lieutenant Colonel Akira Mutō, Colonel Hiroshi Nemoto, and Major Tadashi Katakura from the Imperial Japanese Army for promoting "factionalism." The appointment of Araki as the new commander of the Kwantung Army. Ugaki, who served as Minister of War during two separate terms, had overseen significant reductions and modernization efforts within the army. He had also failed to support the March Incident plotters, who had hoped to install him as Prime Minister. Minami, Mutō, Nemoto, and Katakura were all influential members of the Tōsei-ha faction; Katakura had been partly responsible for reporting on the Military Academy Incident. Later that morning, Isobe encountered Katakura outside the Ministry of War and shot him non-fatally in the head. During this tumultuous period, several officers sympathetic to the rebels, including General Mazaki, General Tomoyuki Yamashita, and General Ryū Saitō, joined the uprising. Saitō praised the young officers' spirit and encouraged Kawashima to accept their demands. Shortly before 9:00 am, Kawashima indicated he needed to speak with the Emperor and left for the Imperial Palace. Meanwhile, Captain Hisashi Kōno led a team of seven, comprised mostly of civilians, to attack Makino Nobuaki, who was staying at Kōfūsō, part of the ryokan Itōya in Yugawara, Kanagawa Prefecture, with his family. Arriving at 5:45 am, they stationed two men outside while entering the inn with weapons drawn. Inside, policemen opened fire, leading to a lengthy exchange of gunfire. A policeman managed to alert Makino and his party of the danger, guiding them to a rear exit. Although the assassins fired at the escaping group, Makino successfully evaded capture. Kōno sustained a gunshot wound to the chest, and one policeman, Yoshitaka Minagawa, was killed. As Kōno was evacuated from the scene, the assailants set fire to the building. Hearing a gunshot, Kōno assumed that Makino had shot himself inside. After his recovery at a nearby military hospital, Kōno and his team were arrested by military police. Around 10:00 am, Kurihara and Nakahashi loaded a fleet of three trucks with sixty men and drove from the Prime Minister's Residence to the offices of the Asahi Shimbun, a significant liberal newspaper. They stormed the building, ordering the evacuation of employees and declaring their actions as "divine retribution for being an un-Japanese newspaper." The rebels then overturned and scattered the newspaper's type trays, containing 4,000 different characters, temporarily halting its publication. Following this attack, the men distributed copies of the uprising's manifesto to nearby newspapers before returning to the Prime Minister's Residence. On another front, 1st Lieutenant Motoaki Nakahashi of the 3rd Imperial Guard gathered 135 men and, under the pretext of paying respects at Yasukuni Shrine, marched to Takahashi Korekiyo's residence. There, he divided his forces, sending one group to attack while the other remained to guard the entrance. After breaking into the compound, Nakahashi and Lieutenant Kanji Nakajima found Takahashi in bed, where Nakahashi shot him while Nakajima delivered a fatal sword strike. Takahashi died without waking. Once his target was eliminated, Nakahashi regrouped with the soldiers and proceeded to the Imperial Palace, aiming to secure it. Entering through the western Hanzō Gate at 6:00 am, Nakahashi informed Major Kentarō Honma, the palace guard commander, that he had been dispatched to reinforce the gates due to earlier attacks. Honma, already aware of the uprisings, accepted Nakahashi's arrival. He was assigned to help secure the Sakashita Gate, the primary entrance to the Emperor's residence. Nakahashi planned to signal nearby rebel troops at police headquarters once he controlled access to the Emperor. However, he struggled to contact his allies, and by 8:00 am, Honma learned of his involvement in the uprising and ordered him, at gunpoint, to vacate the palace grounds. Nakahashi complied and returned to join Kurihara at the Prime Minister's Residence, while his soldiers remained at the gate until relieved later that day, preventing their inclusion in the government's official count of rebel forces. Elsewhere, 1st Lieutenant Naoshi Sakai led a detachment of 120 men from the 3rd Infantry Regiment to Saitō Makoto's home in Yotsuya. After surrounding the policemen on guard, five soldiers entered the residence and found Saitō and his wife, Haruko, in their bedroom. They shot Saitō dead, prompting Haruko to plead for her life, saying, "Please kill me instead!" While they pulled her away, she was unwittingly wounded by stray gunfire. Following Saitō's assassination, two officers directed another group to target General Watanabe, while the remaining men moved to strategically position themselves northeast of the Ministry of War. In Kōjimachi, Captain Teruzō Andō commanded 200 men from the 3rd Infantry Regiment to assault Suzuki's residence across from the Imperial Palace. After disarming the police on duty, they located Suzuki in his bedroom and shot him twice. When Andō moved to deliver the coup de grâce with his sword, Suzuki's wife implored to be allowed to do it herself, believing her husband to be fatally wounded. Andō obliged and, apologizing for the act, explained it was for the nation's sake. After saluting Suzuki, the soldiers left to guard the Miyakezaka junction north of the Ministry of War. Following the assault on Saitō, a party of twenty men, led by 2nd Lieutenants Tarō Takahashi and Yutaka Yasuda, headed to Watanabe's residence in Ogikubo after 7:00 AM. Despite the two-hour delay since previous attacks, no measures had been taken to alert Watanabe. As they attempted to storm the front entrance, military police inside opened fire, wounding Yasuda and another soldier. The troops then gained entry through the rear, confronting Watanabe's wife outside their bedroom. After shoving her aside, they found Watanabe using a futon as cover. He opened fire, prompting one soldier to retaliate with a light machine gun. Takahashi then rushed in and fatally stabbed Watanabe, witnessed by his nine-year-old daughter, Kazuko, who hid nearby. The soldiers departed, taking their wounded to a hospital before positioning themselves in northern Nagatachō. In a significant move, Captain Shirō Nonaka led nearly a third of the rebel forces, comprising 500 men from the 3rd Infantry Regiment, to assault the Tokyo Metropolitan Police headquarters. Their objective was to secure communication equipment and prevent dispatch of the police's Emergency Service Unit. Meeting no resistance, they quickly occupied the building, possibly due to a strategic decision to leave the situation in the military's hands. After securing the police headquarters, 2nd Lieutenant Kinjirō Suzuki led a small group to attack Fumio Gotō's residence, the Home Minister's, but found that Gotō was not home, thus allowing him to escape. This attack appeared to result from Suzuki's independent decision, rather than a coordinated effort among the officers. Despite all of these actions, the Kodoha boys had failed to secure the Sakashita Gate to the palace, which allowed the palace to maintain communication with the outside world, and they neglected to address potential naval interventions. At the Yokosuka naval base, Rear Adm. Yonai Mitsumasa and his chief of staff, Inoue Shigeyoshi, positioned marines to defend the Navy Ministry and prepared warships in Tokyo Bay to suppress the rebellion. By the morning of February 28, after unsuccessful negotiations through sympathetic officers at army headquarters, the commander under martial law transmitted an imperial order to disperse. Most troops returned to their barracks, one officer committed suicide, and the remaining leaders surrendered, resulting in the uprising ending with minimal further violence. Nevertheless, martial law in Tokyo continued for nearly five months. The rebel officers had initially planned for General Kawashima, a staunch ally of the Kodoha, to relay their intentions to the emperor, who they assumed would issue a decree for a “Showa restoration.” Despite their radical objectives of overthrowing the political order, the mutineers, like other military and civilian extremists of the 1930s, sought to operate within the imperial framework and maintain the kokutai. They believed the emperor was under the control of his advisers and lacked a genuine will of his own. Once the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and the Grand Chamberlain were removed, they expected the emperor to appoint General Mazaki as prime minister, a leader they believed would reinforce the military and effectively address the China issue. At the onset of the insurrection, they had a real chance of success. The Tokyo military police commander, General Kashii Kohei, sympathized with their cause, and the emperor's chief aide, General Honjo, was related to rebel officer Capain Yamaguchi Ichitaro. Support for the mutineers was present at military bases nationwide. Historian Hata Ikuhiko notes that the rebels contacted General Honjo by both phone and written message before attacking the Okada cabinet. As the first in the imperial entourage to learn of the mutiny, Honjo could have warned the intended targets but chose not to do so. By the time he arrived at court at 6:00 am. on the 26th, key advisors like Chief Secretary Kido, Imperial Household Minister Yuasa Kurahei, and Vice Grand Chamberlain Hirohata Tadakata were already aware of the potential danger. Suzuki was murdered, and the emperor was deeply affected, awakening to the news at 5:40 am from the chamberlain on night duty, Kanroji Osanaga. He learned that his old ministers had been attacked and a coup was underway. Upon receiving this information, Hirohito resolved to suppress the uprising. He was outraged by the killing of his ministers and feared that the rebels might use his brother, Prince Chichibu, to force him to abdicate. He donned his army uniform and summoned Honjo, ordering him to “end it immediately and turn this misfortune into a blessing.” Hirohito adopted a strategy proposed by Kido, who had acted swiftly earlier that morning, instructing Honjo to assess the Imperial Guard Division's potential actions if the mutineers advanced on the Palace. Kido aimed to prevent the establishment of a new provisional cabinet until the mutiny was fully quelled. At 9:30 am Army Minister Kawashima, who had previously met with one of the rebel officers, arrived at court. He urged the emperor to form a cabinet that would “clarify the kokutai, stabilize national life, and fulfill national defense.” Surprised by Kawashima's tone, Hirohito reprimanded him for not prioritizing the suppression of the mutiny. He also expressed his frustration to Chief of the Navy General Staff Prince Fushimi, dismissing him when he inquired about forming a new cabinet. Later that day, Kawashima met with the Supreme Military Council, consisting mainly of army officers sympathetic to the rebels. The council decided to attempt persuasion before relaying the emperor's orders a move contrary to Hirohito's directive. According to historian Otabe Yuji, an “instruction” was issued to the rebel officers at 10:50 am, acknowledging their motives and suggesting the emperor might show them leniency. This message was communicated to the ringleaders by martial law commander General Kashii. That evening, when members of the Okada cabinet came to submit their resignations, Hirohito insisted they remain in power until the mutiny was resolved. On February 27, the second day of the uprising, Hirohito announced “administrative martial law” based on Article 8 of the Imperial Constitution. This invoked his sovereign powers to address the crisis while freeing him from needing cabinet approval for his actions. Hirohito displayed remarkable energy throughout the subsequent days, sending chamberlains to summon Honjo for updates and threatening to lead the Imperial Guard Division himself when dissatisfied with the reports. Honjo, however, resisted the emperor's demands and exhibited sympathy for the rebels. During the uprising, Hirohito met with Prince Chichibu, who had recently returned from Hirosaki. Their discussions reportedly led Chichibu to distance himself from the rebels. However, rumors of his sympathy for them persisted, leading to concerns about potential conflicts within the imperial family. On the second day, Rear Admiral Yonai and his chief of staff demonstrated their loyalty to Hirohito. By February 29, the fourth day of the uprising, Hirohito had reasserted his authority, troops were returning to their barracks, and most rebel leaders were captured. Seventeen of these leaders were court-martialed and executed in July without legal representation. Shortly after, during the obon festival, Hirohito allegedly instructed a military aide to secure seventeen obon lanterns for the palace. This action, though secret, may have provided him some personal comfort amidst the turmoil. An investigation following the mutiny revealed that the rebels' sense of crisis was amplified by the recent general elections, which had shown an anti-military sentiment among voters. Despite their populist rhetoric, most ringleaders were not motivated by the agricultural depression; their goal was to support the kokutai by advocating for increased military rearmament. During this period, military spending steadily rose from 3.47% of GNP in 1931 to 5.63% in 1936. Intriguingly, the ringleaders and their senior commanders shared a desire for state control over production to mobilize resources fully for total war. While united in this goal, their ideas about how to achieve a “Showa restoration” varied greatly, with some leaders, like Isobe, calling for complete economic consolidation and a return to strong state power. The February mutiny reinforced Hirohito's belief in the constitutional framework that underpinned his military authority. He became increasingly cautious about decisions that could compromise his command and developed closer ties to the army's Control faction, justifying military spending increases. Yet, the memory of the mutiny left him feeling uncertain about the throne's stability. Now you know me, whenever I can bring up Hirohito's involvement in the war related times I gotta do. After WW2, in an apparent effort to downplay his role as supreme commander, Hirohito provided a deliberately distorted account of the February events. “I issued an order at that time for the rebel force to be suppressed. This brings to mind Machida Chuji, the finance minister. He was very worried about the rebellion's adverse effect on the money market and warned me that a panic could occur unless I took firm measures. Therefore I issued a strong command to have [the uprising] put down. As a rule, because a suppression order also involves martial law, military circles, who cannot issue such an order on their own, need the mutual consent of the government. However, at the time, Okada's whereabouts were unknown. As the attitude of the Army Ministry seemed too lenient, I issued a strict order. Following my bitter experiences with the Tanaka cabinet, I had decided always to wait for the opinions of my advisers before making any decision, and not to go against their counsel. Only twice, on this occasion and at the time of the ending of the war, did I positively implement my own ideas. Ishiwara Kanji of the Army General Staff Office also asked me, through military aide Chojiri [Kazumoto], to issue a suppression order. I don't know what sort of a person Ishiwara is, but on this occasion he was correct, even though he had been the instigator of the Manchurian Incident. Further, my chief military aide, Honjo, brought me the plan drafted by Yamashita Hobun, in which Yamashita asked me to please send an examiner because the three leaders of the rebel army were likely to commit suicide. However, I thought that sending an examiner would imply that they had acted according to their moral convictions and were deserving of respect. . . . So I rejected Honjo's proposal, and [instead] issued the order to suppress them. I received no report that generals in charge of military affairs had gone and urged the rebels to surrender.”  On February 26, when Hirohito ordered the immediate suppression of the rebels, his anger was directed not only at the insurgents who had assassinated his closest advisors but also at senior army officers who were indecisive in executing the crackdown. The following day, in addition to his role as Minister of Commerce and Industry, Machida took on the responsibilities of finance minister. Concerns over economic panic and confusion contributed to the emperor's sense of urgency, despite not being the primary motivation for his actions. Hirohito believed that every hour of delay tarnished Japan's international reputation. Since the Manchurian Incident, the emperor had frequently clashed with the military regarding encroachments on his authority, though never about fundamental policy issues. At times, he had managed to assert his political views during policy discussions, similar to his earlier influence under the Hamaguchi cabinet. The February 26 mutiny highlighted to Hirohito and Yuasa his privy seal from March 1936 to June 1940, and the first lord keeper of the privy seal to attend court regularly the necessity of fully exercising the emperor's supreme command whenever the situation demanded it. Even when faced with opposition from Honjo, Hirohito managed to gain support and assert his authority through a decisive approach. His resolution marked the end of a period during which alienated “young officers” attempted to leverage his influence as a reformist figure to challenge a power structure they could not manipulate effectively. However, Hirohito learned how to adeptly manage that establishment in most situations. The decision-making process within the government was characterized by secrecy, indirect communication, vague policy drafting, and information manipulation, creating a landscape of confusion, misunderstanding, and constant intrigue aimed at achieving consensus among elites. This was the modus operandi in Tokyo and a reflection of how the emperor operated. Once again, Hirohito reminded the tightly-knit elite that he was essential to the functioning of the system. On May 4, 1936, during his address at the opening ceremony of the Sixty-ninth Imperial Diet, while Tokyo remained under martial law, Hirohito closed the chapter on the February mutiny. Initially, he contemplated sending a strong message of censure to the military, but after considerable deliberation over three months, he ultimately chose to issue a brief, innocuous statement: “We regret the recent incident that occurred in Tokyo.” The response from his audience of Diet members and military officials was one of startled awe, with some privately expressing disappointment. Once again, at a critical juncture, Hirohito avoided an opportunity to publicly rein in the military through his constitutional role. Nonetheless, due to his behind-the-scenes actions, the drift in domestic policy that had characterized Japan since the Manchurian Incident came to an end. In the following fourteen months, the emperor and his advisors largely aligned with the army and navy's demands for increased military expansion and state-driven industrial development. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. So some very unruly young Japanese officers got the bright idea of forcing a showa restoration by killing all the culprits they believed held their emperor hostage. Little did they know, this event spelt the end of the Kodoha faction and rise of the Toseiha faction. Henceforth the military was even more in charge and would get even more insane.   

Last time we spoke about the Battle for the Great Wall of China. In 1933, the Kwantung Army faced logistical struggles and sought political deals with Chinese warlords to seize North China. Despite capturing key areas, chaos reigned as their unauthorized operations defied Tokyo's orders. When Emperor Hirohito demanded a withdrawal, the army reluctantly complied, derailing a coup attempt. Though peace talks followed, distrust persisted, and rogue Japanese commanders plotted fresh offensives. The Tanggu truce was anything but fair to China. The Japanese followed it up with continuous negotiations aimed at slicing more and more out of China. By 1935 North China was practically annexed if but all in official terms. The Japanese seized postal rights, train rights, airline rights, set up puppets to police a new demilitarized zone and seemed never appeased fully. Yet they did not only have their eye on Northern China.    #149 Incidents in North China: Operation Chahar Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. May 1935, marked the peak of Sino-Japanese efforts at reconciliation. Yet this quickly fell apart in June as the Kwantung Army continued to encroach in North China. More specifically they began to look at Chahar province. Between January and May of 1935 some 50 instances of anti-Japanese violence had broken out in North China and behind these outbursts seemed to be Yu Xuecheng, the chairman of Hubei's provincial Government. He was not alone in his efforts as many KMT members, generals in the Central Army and Blue Shirt Society also had helping hands to play. The Japanese were particularly infuriated by incessant attacks from the bandit army led by Sun Yungqin and the assassinations of two pro-Japanese figures operating in Tientsin, Pai Yuhuan and Hu Enpu. Even with th support of the Kwantung Army, maintaining law and order in the demilitarized region established by the Tanggu Trace proved a serious undertaking. The Nanjing government tried exploit the situation, encouraging Sun Yungqin's bandits to create chaos in the demilitarized region. Sun Yungqin's bandit frequently crossed the Great Wall into Rehe in raids. Each time the Kwantung Army attempted to catch them as they fled into the demilitarized region. They particularly liked to do so in the Zunhua district where the official He Xiaoyi supplied the bandits with munitions and provisions. On May 17th, the Kwantung Army was fed up and elected to cross the Great Wall to crush Sun Yungqin once and for all. The Japanese army attache at Peiping, Major Takahasi Tan, notified the Chinese authorities of this decision, claiming the Kwantung Army had the authority to do so under certain provisions within the Tanggu agreement. Beginning on May 20th, the Sugihara Mixed Brigade began its hunt and claimed to have uncovered evidence that Yu Xuecheng had helped guide Sun Yingqin's bandits away from their force. The Japanese also argued the bandits were operating in Manchuria and were calling themselves the “Northeastern Patriotic Volunteers” led by General He Yingqing, the current chairman of the Peiping Branch Military Council.  The bandits were said to have been completely crushed within 5 days by a single brigade. The Japanese also forced the resignation of Yu Xuecheng who refused to organize an anti-chiang kai-shek movement. Shortly before the operation launched, two pro-Japanese newspaper publishers, secretly supported by the Japanese Special Service Agency were assassinated in Tientsin. On May 2nd, Hu Enpu of the Kuochuan pao “national rights” was shot in bed at the Peiyang Hotel in the Japanese concession. That same night, Pai Yuhuan of Chen Pa was murdered in his home. Consul General Kawagoe reported to Tokyo, Hu Enpu and Pai Yuhuan were performing a mission through their newspapers to arouse anti-chiang Kai-shek sentiment in North China. As stated by Kawagoe "Hu and Pai did not have a particularly close personal relationship, but they were regarded with extreme suspicion by the Chinese. Since they were assassinated on the same night, we immediately suspected there was some political intrigue behind these crimes."   Japanese police looked into the matter and discovered the criminals had used a car bearing the plate number 1063 which was owned by Shen Qucheng who was a resident of the Japanese concession. Many suspects were interrogated, and given what they were saying, the Japanese suspected the man behind the assassinations was General Yang Hu, the peace preservation commissioners of Shanghai and an alleged member of the Blue Shirt Society. The Japanese also believed Yang Hu was hiding in the French concessions in Shanghai. In protest of this, the Japanese invoked the Boxer Protocol and Tanggu Truce: “1) The Sun incident and the assassinations of the pro-Japan, proManchukuo newspaperpublishers violated the North China [T'angku] Cease-fire Agreement of May 1933. The North China Cease-fire Agreement stipulated that China would not take any action disturbing the peac e on either side of a line from Lut'ai to Paoti and T'ungchou. The above provision extends to all of China and should of course be applied to any defiant deeds of Chines e officials that threaten the peac e in the Peiping-Tientsin region. The Sun incident and the assassinations of Pai and Hu are clearly contrary to the above agreement.  2) The official note exchanged by China and Japan upon the return of Tientsin in 1902 is applicabl e to the murder of Pai Yühuan. This note stated: "In the event a Chines e national who is employed by a foreign army is accused of disobeying the law, the commander of the army that employs the said Chines e national, in order that the matter may be decided in the most suitable manner has the option of punishing him personally or voluntarily delivering him to the appropriate Chinese authorities. Your government must agree to this arrangement.” Since Pai, as already stated, was in the employ of the Japanese army, his murder is clearly a deed which violates the above note."  Thus the Japanese invoked the right that the commander of the Tientsin garrison had the authority to maintain security and try any criminals. Because the Japanese Army claimed it had authority to conduct investigations, trials and deal punishment within two miles of the Peiping-Shanhaigaun rail line it insisted to do so given the recent events. This actually distorted some of the specifics of the Tanggu Treaty, thus the Japanese were on loose grounds. On May 25th, Tokyo HQ was forewarned of the actions the Kwantung Army would undertake in North China. So Tokyo sent Colonel Sakai Takashi the Tientsin army chief of staff and attache Takahasi Tan called upon Yu Qiaqi, the secretary general of the Political affairs council and General He Yingqin. In fact Sakai backed this up with a threatening public statement: “The execution of anti-Manchukuo plots under the direction of the Chinese authorities, assistance to the "Chinese Patriotic Volunteer Forces," and various acts of terrorism directed against Japan are destructive of the cease-fire agreement. The headquarters for these crimes are in Tientsin and Peiping. Should this state of affairs continue, it will become necessary to incorporate the above two cities in the demilitarized zone. The murders of Hu and Pai are violations of the provisions of the Boxer Settlement and a challenge to Japan. If similar acts hereafter occur, Japan will, on the basis of its treaty rights, be forced to consider what action is necessary for the defense of its rights”. Additionally, Sakai demanded the withdrawal of all KMT aligned units, Blue Shirt Society members, the Political Training Corps of the Peiping Branch Military Council and the 3rd Regiment Military Police from North China. He also wanted Yu Xuecheng dismissed as chairman of Hubei. The next day in a move to intimidate Yu Xuecheng, the Tientsin Army deployed armored vehicles, artillery and machine guns directly in front of his official residence. It seemed now the Japanese sought to incorporate all of Hubei into the new demilitarized region. To make this happen, Sakai had independently put forward these demands, but they were recognized as an ultimatum from Japan, one for which for now had no deadline.  Chiang Kai-Shek, Wang Jingwei, Huang Fu and He Yingqin conferred over the situation and chose to informally talk with the Japanese while they kept the press quiet on the matter. The Chinese took their time, so to pressure them further, the Kwantung Army deployed a infantry battalion and one cavalry brigade at Shanhaiguan, while the Kawaguchi detachment concentrated around Gubeikou and two air force squadrons were brought over to Jinzhou. The Tientsin Army readied two battalions at Tientsin and Tangshan, both prepared to advance to Peiping at a moments notice. After sending numerous orders not to escalate things, Tokyo HQ sent Colonel Kita Seiichi, the chief of its China desk to demand the Kwantung Army not use anymore force. Meanwhile the Imperial Japanese Navy, under the fear of Anglo-American intervention avoided escalating the situation, but kept the 3rd fleet on full alert.  Under immense pressure the Chinese buckled. At 6pm on June 10th, He Yingqin orally advised Major Takahashi that Nanjing would issue a directive ordered the immediate withdrawal of local KMT organs from Hubei; that the 51st NRA Army would depart by rail from Hubei between June 11th and 25th; that the end and 25th NRA divisions of the Central Army would also depart Hubei and that the KMT would issue a directive prohibiting anti-japanese activities throughout China. It was an incredibly embarrassing act and became known as the He-Umezu agreement. Under its provisions the Japanese had expelled the Central Army from North China, Yu Xuecheng's forces, all anti-Japanese organizations of any sort and all anti-Japanese officials were removed. The Japanese had heavily capitalized on the assassinations in Tientsin, however other incidents enabled our good friend Doihara to cause further mayhem.  Following the Tanggu truce, Song Queyuan's 29th Army, consisting of the 37th, 38th and 132nd divisions had been deployed throughout Chahar with his headquarters based at Kalgan. His troops understandably displayed a lot of anti-japanese attitude and behaviors. Like a broken record, it was only a matter of time until an incident organically presented itself. One of the first ones broke out in Changpei. According to the Japanese, so get your grains of salt ready, a group of 8 led by staff officer Kawaguchi Kiyotake of the Tientsin garrison and Ikeda Katsumi of the consulate at Kalga and planned an excursion to Inner Mongolia late October 1934. After completing all the necessary paperwork and procedures, such as securing visas and giving advance notice to the Chinese officials in the areas they would voyage, the Japanese departed Kalgan for Tolun on October 27th. Upon entering Changpei's south gate they were suddenly stopped by troops under Song Queyuans 132nd division alongside some Peace Preservation Corps men. Their commanding officer punched Ikeda as the rest of the party were threatened with Dao swords and rifles. After 40 minutes a Chinese security officer showed up to allow them all to pass through the South Gate.  The Japanese foreign Ministry and Army were obviously outraged by this incident. The vice Consul at Kalgan, Hashimoto Masayasu complained to the chief of staff of the 132nd division and Major Takahasi at Peiping lodged an official complaint with Song Queyuan. On November 25th, Song Queyuan ordered the general commanding the 132nd division, Chao Tengyu, to apologize and dismissed the officer who punched Ikeda. Song Queyuan then guaranteed safe travel for all Japanese throughout Chahar, without any inspection of their possession and he promised to withdraw his troops west of the Great Wall. All of this because a guy was punched, you can really get the sense the Chinese were walking on eggshells. In late 1934, a large contingent of Song Queyuan's cavalry had deployed to the area around Fengning in Rehe. They were defending strategic positions and establishing large peace preservation corps. The Kwantung Army repeatedly demanded they withdraw from the area and the Chinese had made promises as to such by December 31st. Rather than comply, the Chinese launched an offensive and captured 40 Manchukuo militiamen. Song Queyuan rewarded his men with a bounty of 300 silver yuan and ordered the arms of the enemy by handed to the district government of Kuyuan.  On January 17th, the Kwantung Army moved the Nagami detachment of the IJA 8th Division from Chengde to launch a punitive expedition against Song Queyuan's forces in the Kuyuan area. On the 20th the Peiping Branch Military Council informed the Kwantung Army Song Queyuan was already withdrawing his men. Thus the Nagami detachment who had advanced as far as Tat'an turned around for the Great Wall on the 22nd, when they were suddenly attacked by Song Queyuan's troops near Hungnit'an. The Kwantung Army were outraged by what they were calling the first incident in western Rehe. The so-called incident would be resolved on February 2nd nar Ta'an when Zhang Yueting acting on behalf of the NRA 37th division and Major General Tani Hisao on behalf of the IJA 7th division agreed to the following terms: “1) In the future China will strictly prohibit actions that antagonize the Japanese army and will neither move troops into Manchukuo nor adopt a threatening attitude toward Manchukuo. The Chinese will completely suspend their current spying activities, such as scouting the movements of the Kwantung Army.  2) If China violates the above pledges in the future, the Japanese  army will act independently and firmly, but the responsibility will be borne by the Chinese . If the Chinese forces increase their military strength or contemplate strengthening their fortifications, the Japanese army will regard these moves as hostile acts.  3) China is to have the government of Kuyuan district return all arms confiscated (from the Manchukuo militia and turn them over to the Japanese army at Nanweitzu by February 7.  4) The outcome of this conference will be jointly announced on February 4. In particular, the Chinese should be careful that in making their announcement they do not distort the contents of the agreement or engage in counterpropaganda”. Can you imagine there was a second incident at Changpei? 4 members of the Japanese Special Services Agency based out of Abga, some 40 miles northwest of Tolun had come to the same southgate around 4pm on June 5th, traveling to Kalgan. There they were detained by units of the 132nd division who refused to recognize their identification papers. They were apparently held without proper bedding or food, threatened with Dao swords and bayonets. The Japanese claimed it was all done under orders from Song Queyuan's chief of staff and that their officials were interrogated by the chief of military police at Changpei. On June 11th, Lt Colonel Matsui Gennosuke, the head of the Japanese Special Service Agency at Kalgan, demanded an apology from Song Queyuan and for the men responsible to be punished and for further guarantees for safe travel. Matsui also insinuated that unless Song Queyuan severed ties to Nanjing and became Pro-Japanese he might suffer the same fate that had befallen Yu Xuecheng. Clearly the Kwantung Army was looking to remove Song Queyuan's army from Chahar province. There were two major reasons for such a thing, so they could better protect the northwestern flank of Manchukuo and to support Prince De who was attempting a campaign to make Inner Mongolia independent from China.  On June 11th the Kwantung Army directed the Mukden Special Service Agency chief of staff, our old buddy, Doihara, currently in Peiping, to confer with the army attache there and with the Tientsin garrison. They were to push for Song Queyuan's army to be withdrawn south of the Yellow River as rapidly as possible. Tokyo HQ always keeping a close eye on their troublesome Kwantung Officers dispatch this notice to Doihara "Although we desire the evacuation of Song Queyuan's army from Chahar province, we disagree that we should, at this time, demand its withdrawal south of the Yellow River. Rather, its transfer to the Peiping-Hankow Railway line would be advisable." On June 13th, the General Staff advised the Kwantung Army the same message. The General staff then ordered every detachment in North China to act discreetly "If we shun excessive publicity at this time, we should, in view of the present situation, be able to achieve practical results without publicity." Since they were already getting their way in Hubei, Tokyo HQ did not want to risk rocking the boat in Chahar concurrently.  Then came a second western Rehe incident, according to the Chengde Special Service Agency, "On June 11, when a party led by a senior official of Fengning hsien was about to enter the town of Tungchatzu [in Manchukuo, about eight kilometers north of Tushihk'ou], it was attacked by rifle fire from Sung Che-yuan's troops stationed at Tushihk'ou. The next day, June 12, a member of the border police force in Hsiaoch'ang [in Manchukuo, about fifteen kilometers north of Tushihk'ou] was also fired upon by the same troops of Sung in the vicinity of Hsiaoch'ang."  On June 17th, the Kwantung Army General Minami Jiro met with the Tientsin Army chief of staff Sakai and the Special Service Agency chief at Kalgan, Matsui for a full report on the incident. After reviewing it, Minami drafted a policy to guide the Kwantung Army:  “The withdrawal of Sung Che-yuan's army will worsen the confusion in the Peiping-Tientsin region. This incident should be handled separately from the North China problem and should be negotiated locally with Sung Che-yuan. Our demands will be limited to the following:  1) withdrawal of the troops invading Manchukuo, together with their advance unit at Tolun;  2) removal of the forces back to the Kalgan area;  3) an apology by Sung Che-yuan;  4) punishment of those directly responsible for the Changpei incident; and  5) prohibition of anti-Japanese actions in the future.” The Chinese realized they needed to reach a quick settlement with the Kwantung Army. On the 18th He Yingqin met with Consul General Suma over in Nanjing. Suma was presented with a set of harsh demands from the Kwantung Army and that same day reported to the Executive Yuan he had decided to relieve Song Queyuan of his posts as governor and commander of the 29th Army. He then appointed as acting governor and provincial commissioner of civil affairs, Qin Dechun, who would take the 132nd division implicated in the Changpei incident south. The message was relayed to the Japanese military attache in Nanjing, Lt Colonel Amamiya Tatsumi. The man who relayed the message was Vice Foreign Minister Tang Yujen who also stated this "In view of the fact that China has moved voluntarily to dismiss Sung Che-yuan, to transfer his army, and to punish those responsible, we request that we not be confronted with an ultimatum in the form of various demands from the Kwantung Army with a deadline for reply." On June 19th, Nanjing officially implemented the promises made by He Yingqin and Tang Yujen and in turn the Kwantung Army wired Doihara in Peiping to stand down and wait to see if the Chinese did what they said they would. Doihara was probably disappointed he could not perform his 100th false flag operation he must have been cooking up. For any of you who watch my Youtube content, I used clips from the Chinese WW2 Drama series “Young Marshal” that depicts Doihara hilariously. You can check it out in my long format documentary on the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, its meme gold Doihara's clips, freaking out and smashing phones and such.  At 10 pm on June 23rd, Doihara, alongside Matsui and Takahasi visited Qin Dechen at his residence to negotiate a final understanding. There Doihara demanded China implement several measures to promote better relations with Japan such as withdrawing Song Queyuan's army southwest; give an apology for the Changpei incident; punish all those responsible; dissolve all the anti-japanese organizations in the region; ban Chinese immigration into Inner Mongolia; cease any oppressive actions against Mongolians and cooperate and encourage trade between Manchukuo, Inner Mongolia, North China; and appoint more Japanese military and political advisers. Just a laundry list he had worked up. So Qin Dechen apologized for the Changpei incident, stated they were already withdrawing Song Queyuan's men and dissolving all the anti-japanese organizations. Now he was orally agreeing to all of this, but he refused to put it in writing, prior to receiving the greenlight from Nanjing. Doihara understood and gave him time to talk to his government. The next day however another incident occurred, this time near Tuxukou. There a contingent of Song Queyuan's withdrawing troops fired upon Manchukuo police forces and in response the Tolun Special Service Agency dispatched a Mongolian unit led by Li Shuxin. It was not really much of an incident, just a minor confrontation all things given, so the Kwantung Army told Doihara to deal with Qin Dechen in private about it.On June 27th, Qin Dechen sent a formal reply to Doihara's demands in what became known as the Qin-Doihara agreement. It conformed with all the demands, seeing Song Queyuan's troops depart southwest while the security of Chahar was entrusted to two peace preservation units. One unit was responsible for the Chinese population, the other over the Mongolian. On August 28th, Song Queyuan was appointed garrison commander over the Peiping-Tientsin region with his 29th division joining Chao Tengyu's 132nd division and Liu Juming's 2nd division. Thus after the He-Umezu and Qin-Doihara agreements the Japanese had now expanded their influence into both Hubei and Chahar. 1935 saw a wave of incidents break out in the demilitarized region, prompting the Japanese to go into numerous negotiations with the Chinese to clamp down on anything they didn't like. Then on October 4th, Japan unleashed a document titled  “Concerning Policy towards China”: “The goal of our foreign policy is the development of East Asia and the maintenance of the security of East Asia through the cooperative concert of Japan, Manchukuo, and China, with Japan as the nucleus; this is likewise the objective of our policy toward China. To realize this objective on the basis of the outline below, the central and regional authorities of China must, by fair and just means, adjust their relations with Japan and Manchukuo so as to bring about an environment favorable to the establishment of basic relations between Japan, Manchukuo, and China.  1) China should adopt a good neighbor policy toward Japan, thoroughly suppress anti-Japanese activities, and abandon its policy of reliance on Europe and the United States. It should put this policy into practice and as a matter of course cooperate with Imperial Japan on practical problems.  2) Although China must eventually extend formal recognition to Manchukuo, until then it must recognize de facto the independence of Manchukuo and abandon its anti-Manchukuo policy. At least in North China, which borders on Manchukuo, the Chinese should promote economic and cultural cooperation with Manchukuo.  3) In view of the Communist threat emanating from Outer Mongolia and posing a common menace to Japan, Manchukuo, and China, China should cooperate in measures aimed at eliminating this menace from the region bordering Outer Mongolia.  4) When the above points have been put into effect and we recognize the good faith of China concerning friendly cooperation with Japan and Manchukuo, we shall first conclude comprehensive agreements on friendly cooperative relations between China and Japan, and thereafter draw up the agreement needed for regulating new relations between Japan, Manchukuo, and China” To this Chiang Kai-Shek replied could not recognize Manchukuo but that his government would do whatever it could peacefully to maintain economic activity between the people north and south of the Great Wall. He also stated no other country on earth was more concerned with the Communist menace in Mongolia than China. All of the appeasement efforts had brought Wang Jingwei to his boiling point and on August 8th he departed for Shanghai as he and his entire cabinet resigned. Chiang Kai-Shek personally came over and asked Wang Jingwei to withdraw his resignation given he offered him further support, and Wang Jingwei relented. Then on the morning of November 1st, after attending a meeting, Wang Jingwei was shot by a Chinese reporter for the Chenkuang Press, a company notably associated with Chiang Kai-Shek. Rumors spread the assassination attempt was inspired by anti-japanese elements such as Generals Yang Qi and Tang Shengzhi. With Wang Jingwei in the hospital, Chiang Kai-Shek was forced to take a larger role with the North China situation. Then Wang Jingwei departed for Europe seeking better medical care and wired his resignation on November 29th. Thus Chiang Kai-Shek succeeded him as president of the Executive Yuan and the coalition between him and Wang Jingwei had officially ended. With Chiang Kai-Shek now the only funnel from which action could be directed, the Japanese sent Ambassador Ariyoshi to China to persuade Chiang Kai-Shek to grant some form of autonomy for North China. By this point autonomy for North China had become part of Japan's national policy. Chiang Kai-Shek in response to this growing threat went to Taiyuan, the capital of Shanxi, to meet with Yan Xishan. There he proposed that if Yan Xishan could unite the Northern Warlords, Chiang Kai-Shek would appoint him chairman of the political affairs council, with added authority over finances and diplomacy. Chiang Kai-Shek urged him to come attend the 6th plenum of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee scheduled for November 1st. At this time Yan Xishan's Shanxi was struggling financially so he reconciled with Chiang Kai-Shek. To this effect Chiang Kai-Shek sent his vice chief of the Army General Staff Xing Pin to tour the north trying to persuade those like Song Queyuan and Han Fuju to not support the North China autonomy movement. The Japanese interpreted these efforts to thwart the autonomy movement as the underlying cause of all the anti-japanese incidents breaking out continuously. To this the Nanjing government disclaimed no responsibility and insisted they were doing everything the Japanese asked of them.  The Japanese began a massive campaign aimed at all the important leaders in North China. One man they managed to gain influence over was Yin Jukeng who on November 25th at Tungzhou, announced the inauguration of the East Hubei Anti-Communist Autonomous Council, claiming autonomy for the entire demilitarized region. Yin Jukeng's council consisted of 9 members whereupon he was chairman and took charge of foreign relations and military affairs. As you can imagine Nanjing immediately labeled him a traitor and ordered his arrest. Chiang Kai-Shek then rapidly sent word to the Japanese an official response to their “Concerning Policy towards China” document:  “To satisfy the various demands from the Japanese side, there should first of all be established in Hopei province an autonomous political administration; ultimately, this administration should be similar to that governing the southwestern region. Whether or not this administration should be extended to other regions will be determined after the results in Hopei have been ascertained.  1) Although the campaign to wipe out the Communists is progressing, the Communist bandits have fled toward Kansu. Since this raises the danger that the Communists may spread into Inner Mongolia, the defense against the Communists in North China should be conducted jointly.  2) Certain aspects of the new monetary system are not suited to North China, and appropriate modifications will be made in this respect.  3) Efforts are to be made to harmonize economic interchange among the people on both sides of the Great Wall.  4) To meet the special needs of the region, the local administration should be given authority to enable it to exercise suitable control over financial matters in North China.  5) Pending issues are to be settled locally in a rational manner.  6) The aim will be to employ talented people to carry out the above tasks and to establish an ideal government.” Chiang Kai-Shek dispatched He Yingqin to reign in the situation at Peiping, but upon his arrival he believed the situation was beyond his control. He Yingqin reported that it was his belief the only way for Nanjing to retain some degree of authority in the region was to create a new political organ to do so. Thus on December 11th, the Nationalist government established the Hubei-Chahar Political Council chaired by Song Queyuan. Song Queyuan declared the new council would assume all responsibility for administering Hubei and Chahar and promised  "to respect the wishes of the people, endeavor in particular to relieve the economic distress of the region, and maintain the peace of East Asia on the basis of Sino-Japanese amity."  Thus within all this madness now two autonomous regimes co-existed in North China. The East Hubei Anti-Communist Autonomous Council would administer 22 prefectures while the Hubei-Chahar Political Council would administer Hubei, Chahar, Peiping and Tientsin. As you might imagine, relations between these two councils was complex and ambiguous. The 22 prefectures the former administered were under the jurisdiction of the other. One was a Japanese puppet, the other was controlled by Nanjing who refused to recognize the other. Japan immediately exploited their newfound chaotic gains in North China. In May of 1936 the 2000 troops of the Tientsin garrison army was boosted to 5600 led by General Tashiro Kan'ichiro. This was done under the guise it was to defend against communists and protect Japanese citizens. The position of the commander of the Tientsin garrison was officially promoted to encompass full responsibility for the situation in North China, exactly the same as the Kwantung Army's role over Manchukuo. Thuse both the Kwantung Army and what was henceforth called the China Garrison had clearly defined roles. One would be responsible for Manchukuo, the other over North China. Japan had neutralized Rehe, Chahar and Hubei, all of whom would fall directly under their influence. But was Japan satisfied?  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Its not always through military means that nations can encroach upon other nations. Japan was showcasing how it could bully away parts of China through threats alone it was working miracles. How long could Chiang Kai-Shek carry on like this? Would it be Japan or his own people that would hang him for losing China?

Last time we spoke about the Battle for the Great Wall of China. In 1933, the Kwantung Army faced logistical struggles and sought political deals with Chinese warlords to seize North China. Despite capturing key areas, chaos reigned as their unauthorized operations defied Tokyo's orders. When Emperor Hirohito demanded a withdrawal, the army reluctantly complied, derailing a coup attempt. Though peace talks followed, distrust persisted, and rogue Japanese commanders plotted fresh offensives. Amid international tensions and League of Nations' inaction, chaos loomed over China's battle-scarred plains. As tensions rose in North China, General Muto hesitated to advance without orders from Tokyo. With imperial approval, he launched a renewed offensive on May 3rd, leading the Japanese 6th and 8th Divisions to sweep through Chinese defenses. Despite Chinese concessions led by pro-Japanese Huang Fu, the Japanese pushed toward Peiping. Failed coups and desperate peace talks ensued. By May 25th, ceasefire talks began, but Japan's strengthened position left China scrambling to secure stability.   #148 The Tanggu Truce Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. As we last left off the IJA 6th and 8th Divisions had just taken up new positions threatening the Peiping-Tientsin area. Meanwhile the Tientsin Special service Agency had tried every scheme they could think of to establish a coup against Peiping. All of these actions were done to increase Japan's poker hand at the negotiating table. On May 17th Huang Fu arrived at a very panicked Peiping. Two days prior, the Japanese had taken an even harsher stance, demanding the Chinese forces withdraw to a line running between Shunyi, Paoti and Lutai. This demand would send the Chines further west than the line agreed upon for the ceasefire. So the Chinese ignored the demand and this inturn brought the negotiations to a standstill. On the 18th the Army General staff in Tokyo drew up a new draft titled “essentials for the Guidance of North China”. Having been chasing around the Kwantung Army like a dog chasing a car, Tokyo HQ wanted to finally draft some real legislation to reign in their unruly pet. On the 19th the General staff submited an ultimatum instructed the Kwantung Army to withdraw to Manchukuo after it reached an agreement with the Chinese, specifically to obtain the right to garrison specified locations within the Great Wall. On the 21st the Kwantung Army drew up its version of a ceasefire proposal, submitted it to the General staff who approved it. Here is a complete breakdown of it: “1) The cease-fire agreement is of a purely military nature and excludes political factors. For by returning to Manchukuo in general as quickly as possible, the imperial Japanese army will demonstrate that it acts in the cause of justice and fairness and will manifest the essence of the Japanese spirit.  2) The withdrawal line of the Chinese army and the cessation line of the Japanese army should conform generally to that referred to in the "Basic Outline" of the General Staff; that is, it should conform to the policy of the Kwantung Army and to Nagatsu's proposal. However, the return of the Japanese army to Manchukuo will be voluntary, after observance of the cease-fire terms by the Chinese army has been confirmed, and will not be specifically prescribed in the text of the agreement.  3) In order to prevent any delay in the establishment of a ceasefire, the designs of the Tientsin Special Service Agency will be terminated.  4) The site of the cease-fire agreement must be selected with consideration for the issuing of commands to military units in accord with the plans of the Japanese army command with respect to any situation which may necessitate military action at any time during the course of negotiations for cease-fire. Furthermore, a location convenient to the gathering of foreign diplomatic officials and press correspondents and to meddling intervention by third powers must be carefully avoided.” On the 22nd, the Kwantung Army ordered the Tientsin agency to discontinue their activities as the Japanese were now willing to accept a ceasefire. The Japanese and Chinese then agreed on a date and place, that being located along the Peiping-Shanhaiguan railway to sign a ceasefire agreement. For the talks, the Japanese naval attache at Peiping, Lt Commander Fujiwara Kiyoma was chosen who visited Huang Fu's residence on the 22nd. Talks began and by 2am the next day, He Yingqin received a letter officially instructing him to abide by the ceasefire terms. Thus the first step had been taken. On the 25th Chinese officials Li Zuyi and Xu Yenmu rode with Fujiwara to Miyun, then a temporary HQ for the IJA 8th Division. There they passed mounds of dead chinese placed specifically along the roadside, obviously to intimidate them. They arrived to Miyun at 4am to officially show the ceasefire proposal letter to General Nish of the 8th division. Then they got a slap in the face, a new demand was tossed at them.  "As the first step, in order to verify the compliance of the Chinese army, the Japanese army may at any time use airplanes or other means to inspect the withdrawal of the Chinese army. The Chinese authorities shall afford them the necessary protection and facilities."This last minute new demand was imposed because Tokyo HQ believed it was necessary to have aerial observation to make sure both parties did not breach the agreement. The two Chinese officials did not want to devolve the talks so they signed it and returned to Peiping. The official negotiations began on May 30th at Tangu. The Kwantung delegation was led by Major General Okamura Yasuji, their vice chief of staff. He was assisted by Colonel Kita Seiichi, Lt colonel Nagatsu Sahishige, Majors Kono Etsujiro, Endo Saburo and Fujimoto Tetsukuma, Captain Okabe Eiichi and Secretary Hayashide Kenjiro of the Japanese embassy in Manchukuo. The Chinese delegation was led by Lt General Xing Pin and assisted by Chen Zungzu, Xu Yenmu, Chang Xukuang, Li Zeyu and Li Shuzheng. At the offset the Chinese Army declared Tangu under martial law as the Japanese navy dispatched the battleship Kamoi with the 14th destroyer squadron to cruise offshore. The first session of the talks began at 4pm, only lasted some 30 minutes as both sides exchanged formal credentials and such. During that night both sides proded each other trying to figure out what either would accept. Nagatsu decided to show some of the Chinese delegates a document titled “annex document concerning the Organization of Police”. This had been drafted by the Kwantung Army to try establish a demilitarized zone in northeastern Hubei, whose security would be maintained by Chinese police units. The specifics of the document said such a feat would require a force no larger than 20,000 men, with no single units exceeding 200 and they should be armed with nothing stronger than a rifle, pistol or bayont. Nagatsu personally believed this was way to much to ask of the Chinese and advised changing the wording to what the Chinese police could wield as  "shall not be constituted of armed units hostile to Japanese feelings." After seeing the faces of the Chinese upon reading the document, Nagatsu would remark "This evening the Chinese appear to have gained the impression that our proposal will be excessively harsh."  The second session of talks began at 9am the next day whereupon General Okamura presented their draft accord:  “1) The Chinese army shall immediately withdraw to the regions west and south of the line from Yench'ing to Ch'angp'ing, Kaoliying, Shunyi, T'ungchou, Hsiangho, Paoti, Lint'ingk'ou, Ningho, and Lut'ai, and undertakes not to advance beyond that line and to avoid any provocation of hostilities.  2) The Japanese authorities may at any time use airplanes or other means to verify carrying out of the above article. The Chinese authorities shall afford them protection and facilities for such purpose.  3) The Japanese army, after ascertaining the withdrawal of the Chinese army to the line stated in Article 1, undertakes not to cross the said line and not to continue to attack the Chinese troops, and shall voluntarily withdraw, in general, to the Great Wall.  4) In the regions to the south of the Great Wall and to the north and east of the line defined in Article 1, the maintenance of peace and order shall be undertaken by the Chinese police force. The said police force shall not be constituted of armed units hostile to Japanese feelings. feelings.  5) The present agreement shall come into effect upon its signature.” To these demands Xing Pin stated that since the Chinese army had alrady withdrawn to or even beyond what was asked of them, the Japanese forces should respond promptly by withdrawing from the battle zone and to the Great Wall. Xing Pin added that he hoped his Japanese colleagues understood the Chinese Army might be required to help quell bandits that might disturb the vacuum caused by the Japanese withdrawal. To this the Japanese neither agreed nor disagreed and the meeting ended by 9:20. During the interlude the Chinese frantically sought to push further concessions. But the Japanese took a hard stance and stated they would accept nothing until their demands were signed upon. Talks officially resumed at 10:57 and within only 15 minutes both teams signed a truce agreement. Not a single change had been made in the draft the Kwantung Arym had presented. By 2 pm Xing Pin began a request that the Chinese Army be permitted to deal with bandits in the evacuated zone, as police alone most likely would not be enough.  Once the Tangu truce had been signed, the Chinese began to fear rebellious warlord types, particularly Feng Yuxiang might try to exploit the demilitarized region now that the Chinese Central Army had been withdrawn. The Japanese took a solid stance opposing any exceptions to their truce and would never allow Chinese Army units within the demilitarized region. The Japanese in response to the Chinese demands stated "In case there shall be in the Demilitarized Zone armed units disturbing peace and order which the police force shall be unable to cope with, the situation will be dealt with by common accord between the two parties." The Chinese had no choice but to agree to this. The final session resumed at 3:45 pm, whereupon the Chinese tried to obtain agreement on two specific aspects of the truce:  The Japanese reconnaissance aircraft would not conduct inspection flights without giving prior warning The Japanese Army would not misconstrue a move by the Chinese Army which had already withdrawn behind the line established in the truce agreement to return to the authorized line. The Japanese simply refused to even discuss these issues and a 4:05 pm the Chinese simply signed. The Japanese then submitted 4 new demands: 1) Withdraw the two cavalry divisions [formerly of the Northeastern Army] from the area southwest of Fengning in Jehol province.  2) Move the forty divisions of the Chinese Central Army presently in the Peiping-Tientsin region to some other appropriate region for the restoration of peace and order in that region.  3) Remove the entrenchments and military establishments of the Chinese army [used by Yii Hsueh-chung's army] in the area around the mouth of the Pai River.  4) Exercise strict control over anti-Japanese activities, which are the basic cause of Sino-Japanese conflict. To this the Chinese agreed with the last 3 demands and promised to “investigate” the first. At 4:10 the truce talks officially ended. As a consequence of the Tangu Truce, the Japanese Army had gained a foothold in northeastern Hubei. They would press further in the coming years, thus this truce was basically their first step in conquering north China. As you can imagine the Japanese were not done milking every drop from the Chinese. During the entire Tangu treaty talks, the Japanese had intentionally kept everything limited to military matters. The Japanese also sought to deal with what was expected to be a collosal anti-japanese movement in north china. To this end Foreign Minister Uchida Yasuya was given a list of demands to press upon the Chinese:   1) The Peiping Political Affairs Council will unreservedly suppress all anti-Japanese movements and other related anti-Japanese activities of the Kuomintang in the area under its jurisdiction.  2) The said Council will unreservedly suppress all activities that disturb the peace in the area along the Great Wall by the use of militia units, or other means, from the area under its jurisdiction.  3) The said Council will unreservedly remove all obstacles to legal peaceful traffic across the Great Wall.  4) The said Council will, with the agreement of the Japanese, establish facilities for the maintenance of order in the cease-fire district.  The Japanese preferred this be met by a written agreement, rather than a formal treaty that would only hurt the face of China further, thus creating even more anti-japanese movements. Real talks began at Dairen on July 3rd, where the Kwantung Army suggested that responsibility for civil administration and maintenance of order in the demilitarized region be transferred from the Hubei provincial government to the Political Affairs Council at Peiping. The reason as to why, because the Japanese believed they could easily control said body. When the IJA 6th and 8th Divisions withdrew from the demilitarized zone, they had left behind small units at Miyun, Chenchangying, Xiachangcheng, Fengtai and Yutien who went to work exerted silent pressure upon the Chinese during these future negotiations happening at Dairen. The Chinese at Dairen were represented by Li Shuzheng, the director of the Peiping-Lioaning Railway; Yin Tung and Xue Qiyen of the Political affairs council and Li Qichen the head of the Mukden-Shanhaiguan Railway Bureau. General Okamura and Colonel Kita came to the meetings, but only in capacity for observation. Included in the agenda of conversation was the disposal of pro-manchukuo militia forces in the demilitarized region and railway service between China proper and Manchukuo. Now the idea to transfer administrative responsibility over the demilitarized region to the Political affairs council in Peiping offered numerous challenges. The council was essentially an organ of the Executive Yuan of the Nanjing government. Their purpose was to overlook negotiations for Nanjing. Moreover their membership lacked prestige and they commanded no military forces, thus had little influence over Northern China. If they tried to influence the demilitarized region, a single army, such as one led by Li Qichen would easily overpower their authority. Northern China was still very much warlord dominated by this period. Li Qichen was a particularly strong warlord in the region. By December of 1932 he had begun recruiting men in the Qinxi district of Liaoning where he was receiving aid from the Japanese. His men assisted the Kwantung Army at Xumenzhai and later fought under the guidance of Captain Okada Kikusaburo at Shanhaiguan. However by Japanese standards, Li Qichengs army was nothing more than a bandit force. Thus after the Tanggu Truce, the Kwantung Army chose to distance itself from Li Qicheng and instead focus all their efforts in cooperating with the Political affairs council.  Ironically one of the first things the Kwantung Army consulted with the council was a new policy to dispose of Li Qichens Army and others. Thus 4000 of Li Qichen's forces were reorganized into a peace preservation corps with the rest simply disbanded. The finer details on how this would occur were negotiated between Li Qichen and the council, meditated by Kwantung officers at Tangshan on July 16th. It was also decided the Kwantung Army would set up an office at Tangshan headed by Li Qichen who would overlook the dispersal of militia units in the demilitarized region. By August 12th, the peace preservation corps was fully established. Many pro-manchukuo militia units were reorganized via the first Dairen conference as it became known. Xu Yuan's army at Qinhuangdao was reorganized into a  reserve peace preservation corps under the direct guidance of Lt Colonel Nakano Hidemitsu. They would be stationed at Yutien. Another force station near Qinhuangdao which had been recruited by the Kwantung army during Operation Nekka was ordered to transfer 2000 of its troops to Manchukuo and have the rest disbanded. Additionally there existed some 15,000 bandits operating in the demilitarized region. The largest of these bands was the East Asia Federation Combined Forces led by Guo Yazhou. He was in league with Xu Yusan and equipped like a regular Chinese Army. Once the ceasefire had been in effect, his men were conscripted in Manchukuo and would be used unofficially by the Kwantung Army. Another large bandit army was led by Lao Haozu, known colloquially as the “old rat”. Many of these bandit groups were made up of discharged troops and deserters from pro-Manchukuo militia units. After much discussion the Political affairs council took over the civil administration for the demilitarized zone, excluding the area consisting of the Great Wall. Another large item of discussion at the first Dairen conference was the restoration of train services between China Proper and Manchukuo. During the conflict the Chinese Army had ripped up a ton of railway track between Peiping and Shanhaiguan. By April 21st trains from Peiping could only operate as far as Tanggu. Meanwhile Mancukuo's Mukden to Shanhaiguan railway was operating 3 trains a day between Shanhaiguan and Tangshan after numerous repair efforts by June 1st. Service between Tanggu and Tangshan was only restored by July 3rd when the Japanese garrison at Tientsin began guarding operations between the two cities. At Dairen both sides agreed to rapidly restore the railway service between Mukden and Peiping while making Tangshan the temporary connecting point.  The section between Shanhaiguan and Tangshan was to be administered by the Mukden- Shanhaiguan railway, thus by Manchukuo while from Peiping to Tangshan would be retained by the Chinese governed Peiping-Liaoning railway. The Chinese argued that once the railway lines were all restored, management over Tangshan to Shanhaiguan should be returned to the Chinese. However the Manchukuo representatives instead argued for joint control over the railway from Peiping to Shanhaiguan.  Despite all the agreements met at Dairen, so much remained unresolved with the demilitarized region. The area immediately adjacent to the Great Wall had not been turned over to the political affairs coucil, the demilitarized region was still infested with bandits, many council members were not keen on any of the ongoings and relations between them and the Kwantung Army were anything but cooperative. Given all of this, in October of 1933, Huang Fu and He Yingqin came to the Japanese asking if they could form more official dialogue to deal with the problems and this led to the Peiping conference of November 1933. The Chinese were led by Huang Fu, He Yingqin, Yin Zung, Yin Juken and Cao Shangming. The Japanese were led by General Okamura, Colonels Kita ad Kikuchi Monya, Lt Colonels Nemoto Hiroshi and Shibayama Kaneshiro and Secretaries Nakayama and Hanawa Yoshitaka of the Peiping Legation. Because the talks had been opened by the Chinese, they had hoped they would control the agenda and in that they were sorely mistaken. The Japanese immediately pounced upon them and brought forth such demands. “1) The Kwantung Army hopes the Political Affairs Council will, as it solidifies its ability to maintain law and order, quickly and 5 safely assume administration in the area south and west of the Great Wall, exclusive of the Great Wall.  2) For the time being, the Political Affairs Council recognizes, in the area under its jurisdiction, the various agencies designated by the Kwantung Army as necessary for the handling of transportation, economic matters, and other affairs. The council will provide assistance in the operation of these agencies.  3) For the time being, the council agrees to lease to the Japanese army the land and buildings in the area under its jurisdiction which are needed for the purpose of stationing Japanese troops.  4) To provide facilities for trade, transportation, and communications in the area south of the Great Wall, the Political Affairs Council will appoint a delegate who will immediately begin consultations with a delegate designated by the Kwantung Army.” The Chinese agreed to the second demand allowing for the establishment by the Kwantung Army at Shanhaiguan, Gubeikou, Xifengkou, Panqiaokou, Lengkou and Qielingkou that Japanese garrisons could be stationed at Shanhaiguan, Xumenzhai, Chenchangying, Taitouying, Lengkou, Xifengkou, Malankuan and Gubeikou. The Chinese also agreed to part 4 in regards to airline connections. Thus with that the Japanese had effectively taken away China's ability to defend the Great Wall. Furthermore on the pretex of guarding said Great Wall, the Kwantung Army had forced the Chinese to recognize its right to garrison troops along the area just inside the Great Wall. Fully satisfied, the Japanese delegation departed Peiping on November 10th. The Kwantung Army still sought to extend the Peiping-Liaoing railway services to Mukden, but this inevitably raised the issue of China Proper recognizing Manchukuo. In December Yin Zung, head of the Peiping-Liaoning Railway, traveled to Nanjing to discuss said issue, but would return to Peiping empty handed. Additionally Sun Fu who led a faction within the KMT, began persuading the Central Political Council to pass some legislation specifically withholding Huang Fu from holding authority in handling issues involving North China, because it was feared amongst many it would lead to a mistake that would see recognition of Manchukuo. On April 11th of 1934, Huang Fu attempted a discussion at Nanchang between himself, Chiang Kai-Shek and Wang Jingwei. The result of this discussion was him receiving greater authority over matters involving postal services, train services and tariffs. Despite this, the anti-Japanese part of the Nanjing government continued their efforts to hamper the efforts of Haung Fu and Yin Zung.  In May, Major General Ushiroku Jun of the Kwantung Army, Attache Shibayama and Usami Kanji the chief of the Manchukuo railways Bureau, began secret talks with Yin Zung over at Shanhaiguan. They all agreed to establish a new corporation, the Eastern Travel Bureau, who would receive a million yuan provided in equal shares by the Mukden-Shanhaiguan railway bureau in Manchukuo and the Peiping-Liaoning Railway Bureau. Profits and losses would be shared equally; the general manager would be chosen from one bureau with the assistant manager chosen from the other and trains would run daily from Mukden and Peiping performing a transfer at Shanhaiguan. This idea was bitterly fought over at Nanjing, but after specific amendments would be ratified by July 1st. The first train departed Peiping on July 1st and ironically it would be interrupted midway between Tanggu and Lutai by a bomb explosion on the track. Many Chinese civilians were hurt, but no incident broke out. And we all know that little bomb had to be part of some grand false flag scheme.  The establishment of air services between China Proper and Manchukuo would prove to be the most difficult one to settle. During the talks in Peiping, the Chinese agreed to provide transportation facilities that would include airline connections. But this did not materialize until February of 1935 when the Kwantung Army came up with a draft for a Sino-Japanese corporation. It would be funded equally by both sides, the Chinese would furnish the airfields and facilities, while the Kwantung Army would supply pilots and crews through the Manchukuo Aviation Corporation. The Kwantung Army also had a nefarious plot involved in this deal. By securing the civilian airline service they hoped to provide pilots and crews who at the flip of a coin could become covert military operators, providing direct flights into China Proper.  At first the Chinese showed no interest in such plans, so the Kwantung Army began military transport flights to Peiping from Jinzhou to twist their arm. By June the agreement extended to airfields at Paoting, Xuzhou and Qingdao. The Chinese fought these demands as best they could, but would continuously be outplayed. Still the Kwantung Army was impatient to implement the civilian airline change and presented a new deal in June of 1935 offering to provide 55 percent of the funding from their side. To this the Chinese counter proposed the airfields be located along the border, but the Japanese would not agree to this. By August China sent conditions to ratify the idea: “1) two-thirds of the capital investment would be provided by China and one-third by Japan 2) airport facilities would be restricted to the Peiping-Tientsin region; and  3) flight operations would be entrusted to the aviation department of the Eastern Travel Bureau.” The Japanese still made demands, now seeking flights to all 5 provinces of North China. To this the Chinese officials stated they would await instructions from Nanjing. The Kwantung Army broke off the talks and stated they would do whatever action they considered necessary to resolve the issue. By early September Fu Zuoyi, the governor of Suiyuan province authorized a military flight to Paotou, then on September 28th and October 10th, Japan conducted civilian test flights between Tiantsin, Tsinan and Qingdao.  Following the resolutions over the railway issues, on July 9th of 1934 Yin Zung went to Shanghai with Huang Fu and then to Dairen by July 23rd to meet with General Okumara, Colonel Kita and Attache Shibayama to make deals over other issues. One issue was Japanese control over the entrance of Korean and Japanese into the demilitarized region; the transfer to the Chinese of the Qing Dynasty's mausoleum in Malanyu; the disposition of the peace preservation units and the need for a postal service between China and Manchukuo. While this all sounds perhaps stupid to even mention, every single issue discussed was basically indanger of the Chinese accidentally recognizing Manchukuo, which was the crux of it all. In the end the Japanese made enormous inroads into North China through these negotiations. They forced the accommodation on rail and communication services between China Proper and Manchukuo, to normalize most trade between them and place their loyal proteges within the demilitarized region as so called police units. This was all accomplished through the Peiping Political Affairs Council who de facto had recognized Manchukuo. All of this severely weakened the position of Nanjing in North China and enhanced Japan. But it was not Japan proper, but the Kwantung Army really running the show. However there was absolute chaos going on in Japan during the times, known as “government by assassination”. Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi was assassinated on May 15th of 1932, leading to the collapse of his cabinet. On May 26th a unity cabinet was formed under Admiral Saito Makoto. Civilian politicians were being knocked out by the military, particularly right-wing military figures. Admiral Saito Makoto selected Uchida Yasuya for foreign minister. At the time he was a retired diplomat and president of the South Manchuria Railway Company. Saito was plunged into the wild times of Kwantung insubordination. To meet the chaos he advocated 3 general principals: “(a) its separation from policy toward Manchukuo and Mongolia (b) an emphasis on economic measures; and  (c) cooperation with the western powers” By reading not so between the lines, you can see the official Japanese policy was basically to let the Kwantung run amok and plan accordingly for what seemed to be an enormous annexation program targeting North China and Inner Mongolia. It was to be an extremely volatile balancing act of encroaching upon Nanjing, but not enough so to bring the wrath of the western great powers down upon Japan. Minister Uchia had served a foreign minister for 4 cabinets. In 1928 he signs the Kellogg-Briand Pact and during the Manchuria crisis he tried to fight the Kwantung Army, pushing them to stop their invasion. Yet it was also he who helped recognize Manchukuo in 1932 and he who withdrew from the League of Nations in 1933. He oversaw Operation Nekka and the resulting Tanggu Truce. All of this spat in the face of international cooperation and basically showcased Japan to be a bully. Thus he was really failing his initial goals and resigned in 1933 due to old age. He was succeeded by Hirota Koki who initially began his tenure advocating for establishing better relations with the US, USSR and China and specifically to normalize Sino-Japanese relations. Hirota was also confronted with a naval disarmament conference scheduled for 1935. There Japan would be asked to make conciliatory moves with the US. Alongside this a lot of problems were brewing with the USSR because of the establishment of Manchukuo. On the other side, Chiang Kai-Shek and Wang Jingwei continued their appeasement stance, only to see Japan seize more and more from China. Yet Chiang Kai-Shek was adament, they must finish off the internal communist threat before embarking on what seemed to be an existential threat in the form of Japan. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Kwantung Army was not only efficient at slicing up China with its dagger, but rather capable with the pen as well. Continuous negotiations were leading the Chinese to hand more and more over to Japan. How long could the Chinese people continue to support their seemingly incapable government during these times of crises?

Last time we spoke about Operation Nekka, the Invasion of Rehe Province. In 1932, the Kwantung Army eyed Rehe province as vital for Manchukuo's success. General Tang Yulin, ruling Rehe, initially favored Japanese interests due to economic ties, particularly in opium. Tensions escalated after a Japanese civilian was abducted, prompting military actions that led to skirmishes in Shanhaiguan. Amidst growing conflict, Zhang Xueliang mobilized forces against Tang, who eventually conceded. As Japan prepared for invasion, both sides strategized, with Chiang Kai-Shek reluctant to engage directly, fearing Japanese influence over his rivals. Operation Nekka commenced, showcasing the Kwantung Army's efficiency as they swiftly routed Chinese forces in Rehe. By March 4th, key passes were captured, but fierce resistance emerged. General Nishi faced counterattacks, leading to strategic retreats. Meanwhile, Chiang Kai-Shek struggled with internal conflicts while managing the Japanese threat. As the Kwantung Army pushed beyond the Great Wall, logistical issues arose, prompting political maneuvers to secure local warlord alliances. However, plans faltered when Zhang Qingyao, a potential ally, was assassinated.   #147 The Battle for the Great Wall of China Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Thus in the previous episode, Operation Nekka had been unleashed. The Kwangtung Army tossed 2 divisions into Rehe province with the intent of forcing its annexation into Manchukuo. They were under strict orders to not extend operations past the Great Wall of China. However they believed it was necessary to seize the main gateways along the Great Wall of China to establish their new borders, and in order to do so this absolutely required going past them. Yet military operations were not the only means to secure their goals. The Japanese forces faced significant logistical challenges, including a shortage of troops, having advanced into Rehe with only 20,000 men. Even the most resolute general in the Kwantung Army doubted that their military strength could prevail against the vast numbers of Chinese troops in the plains of Hubei. As a result, they needed to supplement their military efforts with political strategies targeting regional warlords. The tactic of bribing local elites had proven highly effective during the pacification of Manchuria, and there was no reason to think it wouldn't work in North China as well. All of these actions were carried out without any oversight from Tokyo headquarters.   On February 13, 1933, Itagaki Seishiro, who was then the head of the Mukden Special Service Agency, was transferred to the General Staff without any formal announcement of his promotion. He took up a position in Tientsin specifically to initiate political maneuvers in eastern Hubei, leading to the establishment of the Tientsin Special Service Agency. Initially, this agency sought to engage various competing warlords in North China, including Duan Qirui, Wu Peifu, and Sun Chuanfang, but eventually focused on Zhang Qingyao. Zhang had previously been a protégé of Duan Qirui, serving as the civil and military governor of Henan province. He had fought against Zhang Zuolin in 1925 before shifting his allegiance to Wu Peifu. During the second phase of the Northern Expedition, Zhang Qingyao again battled Zhang Zuolin, who was then in control of the National Pacification Army. After the Northern Expedition concluded, he allied with Yan Xishan's forces in Shanxi. So yeah it would seem he was not a man of principles nor loyalties of any kind. The Tientsin Special Service Agency initially aimed to approach Zhang Qingyao in hopes that he could orchestrate a coup d'état against Chiang Kai-Shek. They also hoped to persuade other figures such as Song Queyuan, Zhang Zuoxiang, Fang Chenwu, Xu Yusan, Zhang Tingshu, Sun Tienying, and Feng Zhanhai to join in. If successful, this could lead to a swift takeover of North China as they were advancing towards Peiping after taking the Great Wall. However, on May 7, Zhang Qingyao was assassinated, completely derailing their plans. With Zhang Qingyao dead, the agency concentrated their efforts instead to instigate riots in the Peiping-Tientsin region. They also began encouraging and propping up new political organizations that sought to form an independent northern regime. One scheme they were performing was to form a committee composed of Northern Warlords headed by Lu Zengyu, a banker who had studied in Japan. The idea was to form an anti-Chiang Kai-Shek coalition to carve out north china. The agency received a significant amount of funds to make ends meet. Itagaki alone would spend over 50,000 yen to try and bring about an anti-Chiang regime in the north. Some sources indicated over 3 billion yen being allocated to the IJA to be dished out to various Chinese warlords and elites in the form of bribes.  Meanwhile operations in the district east of the Luan River saw attacks formed against the Xumenzhai and Lengkou gateways. On April 1st, the Kwantung Army issued Order 491, seeing the Iwata detachment of the IJA 6th Division storm through the Xumenzhai gate and succeed in securing a supply route behind the great wall to help with the assaults against the other gateways in the region. By April 10th, the IJA 6th Division was making steady progress against the Lengkou gate. The next day they stormed through and captured Qienqangying, pursuing the retreating Chinese to the banks of the Luan River. Meanwhile the IJA 8th Division were facing a much more difficult situation. On the 12th, they captured Xifengkou, but their assault against Quehlingkou was going nowhere. After repeated assaults, the Chinese finally retreated, allowing the Japanese to focus on Taitouying. Thus from the 10th to the 23rd the gateways in northeastern Hubei were all falling into Japanese hands. The Kawahara Brigade was well on its way towards Nantienmen. The Operations within the Great Wall area had been fully authorized by Generals Nishi and Sakamoto. However there still existed limits upon the operations. For example, Operations order 495 issued by General Muto given on the 11th stated "Without specific orders, pursuit by the main force of ground troops is to be limited to the line connecting Hotung, Chiench'angying, and T'ait'ouying; but air units are to be limited to the Luan River."  Meanwhile the Special Service Agency in Tientsin had reported that Zhang Qingyao would stage a coup on the 21st and this prompted Song Queyuans troops to prevent the Central Army forces from fleeing towards Peiping. The Agency requested that the Kwantung Army not return to the Great Wall and instead perform a feint attack towards Peiping and Tientsin to scare the Chinese. As the plot was reaching its climax, on the 18th the Kwantung Army chief of staff, General Koiso Kuniaki issued a order for the 8th Division to strike in full force against the Gubeikou area. The Kwantung Army's plan was to bomb Miyun while launching their feint attack in combination with an all out effort to break Gubeikou. However on the night of the 18th, all of these plans changed dramatically. Suddenly General Muto issued Operations Order 498, hastily ordering all forces to withdraw to the Great Wall. Emperor Hirohito had decided to put his foot down. In Tokyo the emperor asked the vice chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant-General Mazaki Jinzaburö, "Has the Kwantung Army withdrawn from the Luan River line?" The vice chief retired from the imperial presence with a sense of guilt and wrote a confidential letter to the commander of the Kwantung Army. It was personally carried by Infantry Captain Katö [Michio] of the General Staff, who on April 19 arrived at the capital [of Manchukuo] bearing an imperial rescript. The vice chief also cabled to the chief of staff of the Kwantung Army a highly confidential dispatch, the main point of which stated, "Withdraw your troops immediately, or an imperial command will be issued." Thereupon the chief of staff of the Kwantung Army directed staff officer Endò Saburò to draft the withdrawal order. Thus as a result, the Kwantung Army began a withdrawal on the 21st, the same day the Peiping coup was to be unleashed. Those around Emperor Hirohito at this time have gone on the record to state it seemed to them, the emperor had hesitated heavily on issuing the withdrawal order. His motivations for giving the order are simply, the Kwantung Army had gone against his decrees, it was an identical situation to what had happened at Mukden in 1931. The Kwantung Army had no choice but to submit to what essentially was him “asking them to stop”. With that, operations east of the Luan River were over, for now. The order was certainly a critical blow to the Agency in Tientsin. How did they react? They doubled down on the coup effort. Likewise Koiso did not stop the 8th Division operation at Gubeikou. Instead the 8th Division was given orders "to maintain a menacing attitude toward hostile forces in North China." In accordance, the 3800 man Kawahara Brigade on direct orders from General Nishi, launched an attack against two Central Army Divisions numbered nearly 30,000 men stationed at Nantienmen. After a brutal week of battle the Kawahara Brigade seized the town. Meanwhile a battalion of 280 men led by Colonel Shimmura Eijiro attacked a central army force around 4000 strong at Xinglong. They suffered a 38% rate of casualties by the night of the 27th. The Battalion was nearly annihilated when suddenly the Chinese withdrew enabling the Japanese to slip by. Meanwhile the Piping coup did not materialize as planned on the 21st. Instead a secondary coup was initiated by Zhang Zuoxiang on the 26, but this misfired greatly. Reports began to emerge that troops led by Zhang Tingxu, Sun Tienying, Feng Zhanhai and Xu Yusan were willing to rebel in response to the failed coup attempts, but this proved completely false. A report issued on the 30th stated troops under Fang Chenwu were rebelling against Chiang Kai-Shek. However in reality Fang Chenwu only advanced his force north on May 10th and it was to join the anti-Japanese forces.  From mid April to mid May, the United States, Britain, France and Germany finally entered the fray in North China. It was an extremely chaotic situation for everyone. The Japanese military in Tokyo had no control nor idea what the Kwantung Army was doing, so when they tried to explain their actions to the international community, they continuously were walking over rakes. All the talk from Tokyo seemed incomprehensible to the other great powers. The Chinese were clamouring the entire time for a ceasefire agreement, but lacked the means to force the Japanese to do so. Japan had left the League of Nations, thus was extremely isolated and insecure in regards to foreign relations. Thus if a nation like Britain or the US had actually put their foot down, the Japanese more than likely would have backed off. Another element to this debacle was the stance of the Imperial Japanese Navy, who had made it adamantly clear they had zero intention of fighting off the British or Americans because of their unruly siblings within the Army. However, both Britain and America were too preoccupied with internal strife, mostly the result of the Great Depression, to devote considerable effort to the crisis in China. The League of Nations remained completely useless during the North China incident, similarly to how they were useless with the Manchurian incident. The Lytton Commission had performed an on the spot inquiry, and it did play a role in establishing a ceasefire by the time of the Shanghai incident, but did nothing to really help China. China had begun appealing to the League when Shanhaiguan was attacked and this prompted the nations of the league to rapidly agree to the Lytton Commission report's recommendations. In turn this led Matsuoka Yosuke to walk out on the league. With Japan out of the League, Wellington Koo proposed harsh sanctions upon Japan in response to their invasion of Rehe province. Yet they did nothing. China would continuously make pleas, but it was to no avail.  Rather than rely upon the League, the Chinese began secret talks with Japanese officials aiming first for a ceasefire. Tang Erho, Lee Shuzheng and Wang Komin attempted talks, but failed. Then Chen Yi the political vice minister of military affairs, secretly spoke with Nemoto Hiroshi, an army attache at the Shanghai legation on April 27th. They established negotiations with Nemoto speaking on behalf of the Kwantung Army and Chen Yi on behalf of Ho Yingqin. The Chinese were clearly more eager than the Japanese for a ceasefire, but the Japanese no longer had a rationale to continue their operation. Regardless the Japanese took the victors stance and demanded the Chinese withdraw from the battlefield as a prerequisite to further Japanese advances. In the first meeting, Nemoto told Chen that the Kwantung Army had already withdrawn from the area east of the Luan River to give Ho Yingqin an opportunity to consider a ceasefire. He described the action as a friendly gesture and suggested the Chinese reciprocate it by withdrawing their troops. Chen countered this by claiming Ho Yingqin had shown his own sincerity at the battle of Nantienmen by ordering his troops to withdraw to a second line of defense, hoping this would allow the Japanese to pull away from Nantienmen. However by May 1st, the Japanese claimed they had captured and secured Nantienmen, so Nemoto informed Chen the Chinese forces north of the Great Wall should withdraw to a line connecting Miyun, Pinkou, Yutien and the Luan River. On May 2nd, the Chinese sent a reply to this, completely ignoring the line idea and instead referred to the recent battle at Xinglong and explained the local commander there was eager for a victory and refused to withdraw despite being asked twice to do so. The Chinese also notified Nemoto that a Political affairs council headed by Huang Fu was being established at Peiping, and it should be through that body that further negotiations were held. The Japanese welcomed this development. Just as it seemed the Shanghai talks were paving a way to a ceasefire, the leadership of the Kwantung Army abandoned their political maneuvers in favor of a settlement. On April 30th the Tientsin Special Service Agency insisted to their Japanese colleagues, the Chinese were just buying time and not sincere in their actions. That same day the Army General Staff and Foreign Ministry suddenly refused to initiate a ceasefire on the grounds the Chinese had agreed to an armistice only to save face. Lt Colonel Nagatsu Sahishige, the army attache at Peiping urged the 8th Division to rapidly strike southwards as far as Miyun to annihilate He Yingqin's planned counteroffensive. Such an action would immediately threaten the Peiping-Tientsin region. To push the envelope, the Japanese could toss a new Division into the mix and force further negotiations when the Chinese withdrew south of Miyun. Clearly the Japanese had their eyes set on Miyun now. As such General Nishi was secretly told to capture it without any direction from Tokyo HQ, nor from most of the Kwantung Army leadership. The Operations department of the Kwantung Army also independently elected to move troops east of the Luan River again. They argued "the enemy again advances east of the Luan River and persists in its defiant attitude. Therefore we must again deal them a crushing blow." The IJA 6th Division had been evacuated to the Great Wall back on April 23rd and along the way were closely pursued by Chinese forces. General Sakamoto sent a plan to the Kwantung Army headquarters "to again drive the enemy west of the Luan River,". A lot of chaos was reigning within the Japanese military because they were in echo chambers and not relaying information to another. When the Kwantung Army Operations department suddenly proposed a new advance east of the Luan River, on May 2nd a heated exchange took place between them and the Kwantung Army Intelligence Section: “INTELLIGENCE SECTION: The defiant attitude of the enemy is a matter of degree. While it is indisputable that some of their forces continue defiant, their main force is still stationed west of the Luan River. Therefore, a defiant attitude on the part of the enemy is not sufficient reason to deal them a crushing blow. The Kwantung Army withdrew from the Luan River line only ten days ago. As we understand it, the purpose was to comply with the imperial wish. If the army begins operations on a flimsy pretext at this time, inviting intervention by the central leadership, how can the honor of the commander in chief be maintained? What we should now attack are rather the enemy forces facing the 8th Division. For this, we should employ additional strength. By dealing a severe blow to the Chinese Central Army forces in this area, we can threaten Peiping and the operation should be all the more effective.  OPERATIONS SECTION: Due to the limitations of our supply capacity, we cannot use more than a certain level of forces against the enemy facing the 8th Division. Since the enemy east of the Luan River maintains a defiant attitude, they must be punished regardless of their strength.  INTELLIGENCE SECTION: Since the seizure of Nant'ienmen the 8th Division lacks the capability of pursuing the enemy. This is an unavoidable consequence of the small strength of its force from the outset of the operation. Isn't the First [Operations] Section uncertain that the enemy can be defeated even by the main force of the 8th Division, and doesn't it intend ultimately to deploy the 6th Division southward in concert with action by the 8th Division? If this is the case, it is understandable, and this section is not necessarily against it.   OPERATIONS SECTION: That is not what this section is considering.  INTELLIGENCE SECTION: In that case, there is no clear justification for launching the operation. The objective of the operation must be plainly spelled out to all concerned, from His Majesty at the top down to the lowest private. There must not be the slightest doubt about it.” After this conversation the Intelligence department debated amongst themselves before relaying another response at midnight, ultimately not approving it. The next day the Operations department sent a telegram to the negotiations team in Peiping: “1) Under present conditions, the Kwantung Army has no intention of accepting a cease-fire proposal for the time being, particularly because there are signs suggesting intervention by third countries in the matter.  2) Previously the Kwantung Army suggested the Miyun-Yiit'ienLuan River line as the retreat line for the Chinese army; but this did not mean it was to be their front line after a cease-fire. It rather indicated a line to which the Chinese army should immediately and voluntarily retreat as evidence of their sincerity. In other words, a cease-fire cannot be negotiated until they retreat to this line and abandon their provocative attitude, and until this is confirmed by the Kwantung Army. Their mere retreat to the indicated line, in today's circumstances, is not sufficient reason for us to respond to the cease-fire proposal. According to Peking telegram 483 [not identified], it appears that the intentions of our army have been somewhat misunderstood. Even if the Chinese retreat to the indicated line and display the sincerity of their intentions, we may possibly demand a retreat line farther south. We believe negotiations in this region should be handled by the central leadership in Tokyo rather than by the Kwantung Army. Act on this understanding.”   So after this message, the Intelligence department accused the Operations department of trying to find any excuse to renew the advance and sent a wire to Nemoto on April 29th "If the Chinese suddenly perceive their mistake, . . . we will not make war for the fun of it." However the Intelligence department was suddenly overruled by Colonel Kita who cabled the negotiators that the Operations department now had full approval from Kwantung Army vice chief of staff Okamura Yasuji. When General Muto received this notice he questioned "This draft order, states that the enemy has moved into the region east of the Luan River and is showing a provocative attitude. I did not receive such a report from the Second [Intelligence] Section before my departure from Hsinching. Does this mean there has been a subsequent change in the situation?" After being informed more so, Muto simply stated he wished to wait until the chief of staff could speak to him. Obviously Muto was getting wet feet and did not want to perform any actions not in accordance with Tokyo HQ, as Emperor Hirohito had put his foot down.  On May 3rd, General Koiso and Operations Department staff officer Endo Saburo spoke with Muto, indicating they had approval of Tokyo HQ general staff and even the Emperor. So Muto relented for a second advance and issued Order 503 on May 3rd to the IJA 6th and 8th Divisions. Now the Army General Staff were dragged into the Kwantung Army's debacle fully. So they drew up an emergency draft plan for measures in North China. To this aim:  “Through continuing pressure by the military might of the Kwantung Army, applied in concert with various political measures in North China, the Chinese forces in North China are to be compelled to make a substantia] surrender or to dissolve, thereby resulting in the withdrawal of the Chinese army along the China-Manchukuo border and in the establishment of peace in this area”.  Added to this the General Staff suggested a large counteroffensive be driven along the Great Wall and a formal truce agreement should be concluded once three conditions had been met: “(a) that Chinese forces had retreated voluntarily south and west of a line connecting Hsuanhua, Shunyi, Sanho, Yüt'ien, Luanchou, and Lot'ing; (b) that anti-Japanese activities had been controlled; and (c) that the preceding had been verified by the Japanese army”. Under immense pressure from the renewed Japanese advance, the Chinese government on May 3rd, had pushed for a new body to tackle the North China situation. That was the Peiping Political Affairs Council. It was composed of 22 members, headed by Huang Fu. Huang Fu was notably a pro-Japanese official, having been a graduate of the Tokyo Land Survey department training institute and had served early as a minister of foreign affairs. Since China had zero faith anymore in the League of Nations and believed if they failed to resolve the North China issue, this all might see a new civil war break out between Chiang Kai-Shek and Wang Jingwei. Thus everyone felt the time for active resistance was over and they must place all their effort into negotiations. Chiang Kai-Shek placed a great amount of authority upon Huang Fu and trusted the man. Huang Fu began his new task by speaking with all the political and financial leaders from both sides of the conflict to see how a real ceasefire could be met through dealmaking.  Meanwhile on May 6th the IJA 6th Division unleashed a new offensive south of the Great Wall and were followed by the 8th Division on the 11th. General Muto at this time made public statements blaming the Chinese for the renewed hostilities, making it seem the Japanese had intended to stay within the Great Wall area. The 6th Division swept across the sector east of the Luan River and by the 11th the Chinese defensive line collapsed. On the 12th the 6th Division crossed the Luan River, pursuing Yu Xuechengs 51st Army. In turn this threatened He Yingqin's main force who were facing the 8th Division. In the previous battles, Yu Xuechengs men had performed quite poorly and now even under direct command of He Yingqin were proving themselves helpless against the 6th division. Additionally Itagaki's agency over in Tientsin were using radio facilities to dispatch false directives from Chinese high command, ordering the forces to retreat from the front battle line. Two to three Chinese divisions were neutralized by these fake radio messages and in turn the Chinese became very demoralized at their lines. The 8th division had driven into the Gubeikou area on the 11th and it took them only a day to dislodge the Chinese from their line near Xuxiachen. By the 13th Xuxiachen had fallen completely. On the 11th and 12th, Japanese aircraft began flying over Peiping, as a demonstration of the terror they could deliver to the city at any moment. These developments altogether were pushing the Chinese civilians to demand of their politicians and generals that they appease the Japanese. Huang Fu proposed to Nemoto on the 12th that all Chinese troops could be withdrawn from Miyun to a line extending from Shunyi to Yutien and Tangshan. This was an enormous concession and nearly mirrored the line the Japanese had demanded.  The Japanese however, rejected the concession. To make matters worse for the Chinese, He Yingqin had been notified of the large concession proposal in advance and expected the Japanese to take it. Thus he had refrained from operating in strength at Miyun and did not significantly defend the path towards Peiping. It was the belief of the Japanese commanders, if they performed a full-scale attack towards Peiping now, He Yingqin would have no choice but to withdraw towards Shunyi. With this in mind the Japanese made a proposal on the 14th:  “1) According to the reports of the Peiping military attaché, the 8th Division should be prepared to advance in a single sweep to the southern limit of Miyun, if it is deemed necessary. Preparations for this attack should be expedited.  2) In conjunction with the above, front-line aircraft should take actions implying that a major Japanese offensive is about to begin.  3) In Tokyo, it should be announced publicly, in liaison with the Foreign Ministry, that the security of Jehol province cannot be guaranteed as long as the Chinese army remains in Miyun. Furthermore, every so often Japanese aircraft should make demonstration flights over the Shunyi-T'ungchou area.” Confronted with this, the Chinese were pretty screwed. The Chinese negotiations team were frantically searching for any way to force a ceasefire. Then the secretary of the Shanghai legation, Suma Yakichiro showed up to Peiping, which the Chinese viewed as a golden opportunity. The Chinese complained to him that the Kwantung Army had resumed their offensive and that a political agency in Tientsin were trying to enact coups. Suma bluntly told them the Japanese actions were backed fully by Tokyo and despite the Chinese belief that this was false or that Japan was facing a major financial deficit, this was all untrue.  While the dialogue continued to go nowhere, the 6th division had pursued the Chinese forces to the vicinity of Fengjun. Muto believed this had gone to far so he issued orders on May 13th limiting operations to the area north of a line connecting Miyun, Pingkou, Fegjun and Yungping. Now the 6th and 8th divisions were to assemble around Xuxiachen and Zunhua. Two days later he issued this statement to the public "If the Chinese army immediately abandons its hitherto provocative attitude and withdraws some distance from the border, our army will quickly return to the line of the Great Wall and pursue its regular task of maintaining security in Manchukuo." Likewise Muto ordered the Tientsin group to inform the Chinese that the Kwantung Army would return to the Great Wall if the Chinese forces retreated to the Shunyi-Yutien-Tangshan line. Nemoto forwarded all of this to Chen Yi. On May 15th He Yingqin ordered the withdrawal of the Chinese forces to a line between Malanyu, Linnantsang and Pamencheng.  With what seemed a imminent ceasefire at hand, the Kwantung Army HQ ordered the 6th and 8th divisions to take up positions strategically favorable for the negotiations to finally begin in ernest. On the 17th a draft ceasefire plan was drawn up. It envisioned the withdrawal of the Chinese forces to the Shunyi-Yutien-Tangshan line and in return the Japanese would pull back to the Great Wall area. Huang Fu was on his way back to Peiping from Shanghai for probably the 10th time in two weeks, when the Japanese captured Fengjun and Zhunhua, routing the Chinese across the Qi Canal to the right bank of the Pai River. The 6th Division then advanced towards Yutien and Xumenchen as the 8th division stood around Xuxiachn. When the Chinese began retreating from Miyun on May 18th, the 8th division suddenly converged upon Miyun. Muto was of course delighted by their new advantageous position and even briefly began talking to his colleagues about the prospect of just marching upon Peiping. Instead he decided to sweep through Miyun, Pingku and the Qi Canal, going even further west than he had stated he would back on the 13th.  With these new orders in hand, the 6th Division quickly captured Qixien on the 19th and further pursued retreating Chinese forces to Sanho. The 8th Division entered Miyun and two days later began advancing to Huaijou. By the 23rd Huaijou had fallen as the 6th Division reached the Qi Canal. These advances threatened the Peiping-Tientsin region. Both Japanese divisions halted on the 25th as the ceasefire was issued. With that last strike Muto felt he had significantly increased their poker hand going forward. Meanwhile Itagaki's team at Tientsin were still trying to bring about a coup. In tandem with the 8th Divisions attack on Miyun, the agency tried to engineer a revolt by the militia troops led by Song Queyuan, Fang Chenwu, Sun Tienying, amongst others. The idea was for these forces to occupy Peiping while wrecking havoc upon the Chinese central army within th region. The agency had attempting recruiting Wu Peifu, but the old jade marshal was unwilling, so they turned to this former protege, the chairman of Hubei, Yu Xuecheng. However he also declined. Yu Xuecheng was also approached by Hu Hanmin, looking to form an anti-Chiang Kai-Shek campaign in cooperation with Han Fuqu and Feng Yuxiang. To this Yu Xuecheng declined as well. Itagaki kept searching for disgruntled warlords, and then turned to Li Qiashan and Xu Yusan. Xu Yusan was a former ally to Feng Yuxiang with a history of anti-Chiang Kai-Shek actions. If they got the backing of his personal army, roughly 10,000 men strong at Tangshan they could do some real damage. On May 16th Xu Yusan declared independence and took up the Manchukuo 5 color flag in direct opposition to the Kuomintang. He began issuing the slogan “Hubi for the people of Hubei” as his army marched west along the Peiping-Shanhaiguan railway. His force reached the vicinity of Tangu whereupon they had increased to 30,000 and rumors emerged they would occupy Tientsin. This began a mass panic. . . for literally a day. His army collapsed into nothing more than a rabble as now had the stomach to actually fight their fellow countrymen.  Despite this grand failure, the Tientsin group continued with other plots. At 8 pm on May 19th, a Peiping bound train from Tangu, carrying Chinese soldiers was bombed around Tientsin station. The Japanese love bombing trains as we all know. This resulted in small incidents involving Japanese and Chinese officials, giving precedent for 600 Japanese troops led by Lt General Nakamura Kotaro to reinforce Tientsin on May 23rd. There were a few other incidents were supposedly Chinese agents were tossing grenades at Japanese officials. One of these officials was Major Mori Takeshi of the Japanese Army General Staff who was working in Tientsin. However the grenade thrown at him was a dud, and before the Japanese could seize it, some local Chinese grabbed it, finding a stamp on it bearing “Tokyo Artillery Arsenal”, oops.  These numerous incidents influenced the Chinese who feared Japan was trying to force an invasion into North China. To these rumors, He Yingqin insisted they mount a proper defense of Peiping, but many were arguing they had to further retreat. Meanwhile the Tientsin agency was told to stop performing incidents and instead secure northern warlords to their future cause. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The battle for the Great Wall of China was coming to a bitter end for the Chinese forces. The Japanese were using every deceptive measure to edge further and further into China proper. It seemed clear to the Chinese, nothing would stop Japanese encroachment upon their nation, while the rest of the world simply watched on doing nothing. 

Last time we spoke about Manchukuo. In the early 1930s, Ishiwara Kanji sought to dominate Manchuria to secure resources and counter American influence. He envisioned Manchukuo as a Pan-Asian league promoting racial cooperation, despite it being a puppet state under Japan. With Puyi as a figurehead, Ishiwara aimed for autonomy, but his plans faced resistance from the Kwantung Army, which prioritized control. As conflicts arose, Ishiwara's vision of unity clashed with military interests, leading to his eventual isolation and reassignment, marking a tumultuous chapter in Manchukuo's history. In November 1931, Doihara orchestrated the "Tianjin Incident," facilitating the removal of Puyi from his home to establish the puppet state of "Manchukuo." By March 1932, Puyi was declared its ruler, but his authority was merely symbolic, overshadowed by Japanese control. Despite international condemnation, Japan solidified its grip on Manchuria, exploiting its resources and suppressing local resistance. By the late 1930s, Manchukuo became a colonial entity, suffering under harsh economic policies while Puyi's regime served as a facade for Japanese imperial ambitions.   #146 Operation Nekka: the Invasion of Rehe Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. From the very beginning of their consolidation of Manchukuo, the Kwantung Army regarded the province of Rehe, today's Jehol province, to be an integral part of it. According to some of the Kwantung Army leadership, all of Rehe would be necessary to consummate Manchukuo. In April of 1932, the IJA 8th Division based at Hirosaki in Aomori prefecture was transferred to Manchukuo under secret orders to prepare for an invasion of Rehe. Now Rehe province covers 160,00 square kilometers and back then held some 2.3 million people. Since 1926 it was ruled by General Tang Yulin. His direct command was over the NRA 36th division, consisting of 13,000 regular troops with a provincial militia of 8500 men. As was the Warlord practice of the time, Tang Yulin exploited his population. Now until July of 1932, Tang Yulin's attitude towards the emerging state of Manchukuo directly to his east was certainly favorable. That is because Tang Yulin favored the Japanese. During the debacle that was the invasion of Manchuria, Tang Yulin had done everything possible to prevent Zhang Xueliang from moving into Rehe whenever he was trying to consolidate forces there. Now Tang Yulin had no greater aspirations, its not like he loved Japan, or believed the Japanese were better leaders for his nation. What he was motivated by was a very practical concern, economics, more precisely the opium trade. Rehe number one source of income was opium, and they number one purchaser of it, was Manchuria. Thus as one can imagine, when Manchukuo was being formed, and the opium door closed on him, well he took heavy financial losses.  On July 17th of 1932, an incident broke out between the towns of Chaoyangxu and Nanling. A Japanese civilian employed by the Kwantung Army, Ishimoto Gonshiro was abducted by a Rehe militia group while taking the train from Jinzhou to Chaoyang. General Nishi Yoshikazu, the commander of the IJA 8th Division stationed at Jizhou, dispatched a small unit to rescue Ishimoto. In doing so they occupied Chaoyangxi, where they also protested the Rehe provincial government. This did not see Ishimoto handed over to them, so General Nishi bombarded Chaoyangxu and then had his forces advance upon Nanling. Even doing so, no Ishimoto to be found. So Nishi withdrew back to Jinzhou. The following year during what would become the invasion of Rehe, Ishimoto's body would be found at Chaoyangxu. Zhang Xueliang utilized this small incident to advance into Rehe. Claiming he was acting upon orders from Nanjing, he moved his Northeastern Army to the border of Rehe, due south of the Great Wall. Zhang Xueliang then threatened Tang Yulin and bribed his subordinates to defect over to him. Consequently, by late July, Tang Yulin tossed the towel and for the first time sanctioned passage of a volunteer army through Rehe. Come August Zhang Xueliang organized a volunteer force 40,000 strong, obviously all from his Northeastern army to advance from Gubeikou into Rehe, where he sought to confront the Kwantung Army if they advanced. Zhang Xueliang was heavily in contact with Chiang Kai-Shek during this period. Zhang Xueliang was making multiple proclamations about retaking Manchuria, and Chiang Kai-Shek was supporting him in that endeavor as best as he could. Meanwhile Tang Yulin was sort of stuck in the middle.  Between October 1932 to January 1933, Shanhaiguan, the strategic gateway and midpoint between Mukden and Beijing became the focal area of 3 major skirmishes.  The Boxer Protocol of 1901 dictated that some of the 8 nation alliance members, notably, France, Italy and Japan were allowed to maintain small contingents at Shanhaiguan. In 1932, the Japanese garrison there was 261, France had 61 men and Italy 69. After the establishment of Manchukuo, Japan had increased its garrison to have some more border guards in the town of Shanhaiguan itself. Of course the Chinese also had local troops, that was the 9th Independent Brigade commanded by Ho Chukuo, a force roughly of 9000 men. The first skirmish at Shanhaiguan broke out on October 1st, between Ho Chukuo's men and an armored train of troops from the IJA 8th Division. Another exact same event occurred on December 8th, both occasions were settled locally and peacefully with the Chinese offering an apology and indemnity payment. Then a third clash broke out on January 1st, but this one got out of hand.  The mastermind behind the third incident was Major Ochiai Jinkuro, the leader of the Japanese garrison at Shanhaiguan. Upon his orders, at 9pm, 3 Japanese soldiers tossed two hand grenades each into the backyard of the Japanese military police detachment and the railway track running in front of the Japanese garrison. This was of course immediately blamed upon the Chinese and at 11:30 pm Ochiai presented the local Chinese with 2 demands. The first was to evacuate the Chinese force and the second to allow the Japanese to occupy their south gate at Shanhaiguan for the time being. Now the Japanese had legitimate pretext for these demands based off the Boxer Protocol. It allowed them the right to ensure the security of the railway and telegraph lines and to defend their citizens and property within two miles of the railway zone. Since Ho Chukuo's troops allegedly disturbed the peace in said zone, the Japanese were in their right to ask them to depart.  According to Japanese sources, the Chinese refused at first then consented at 4:50 am on January 2nd. This effectively saw them surrender the south gate. However at 9:30 am the chief of staff for the Chinese Brigade requested that the takeover of said gate be postponed until the scheduled arrival of Ho Chukuo, coming over from Beiping. Ochiai turned down this request, whereupon the Chinese agreed that the south gate would be included within the area overseen by the Japanese. Yet at 10:50 am Japanese troops went to take over guarding the south gate whence Chinese guards tossed grenades at them. Yes, it is most certainly the Japanese who tossed those grenades. The Chinese account of this event is somewhat different. It asserts the Japanese attacked the gate while the issue of surrender was still being negotiated. By January 11th, China sent a formal appeal to Britain, France, the US and other signatories of the Boxer Protocol charging the Japanese for perverting the treaty to seize the south gate of Shanhaiguan. Meanwhile General Ho Chukuo called Ochiai from Qinhuangdao to tell him he would arrive by 8am on January 3rd to negotiate. But by 10am he failed to show up, as the Chinese and Japanese fired upon another. Ochiai thereupon resolved to take the south gate by force. By that point the IJA 8th Division had strengthened its position in front of Shanhaiguan. Two companies had become 10 and one air force company was made ready to strike. Additionally the commander of the 2nd China Fleet, Tsuda Shizue dispatched Hirado and the 16th Destroyer Squadron to Shanhaiguan and Qinhuangdao “to defend Japanese residents and assist the troops in case of hostilities”. At dawn on January 3rd, the Japanese launched a combined land, sea and air assault and by 2pm had taken Shanhaiguan. Ho Chukuo's forces were pushed to the Shih River where they were reinforced during the night and hastily constructed fortifications against the incoming Japanese. Henceforth a propaganda war emerged over Rehe. Japan charged that Zhang Xueliang was mobilizing large forces to advance into Rehe, while China claimed the same of the Japanese. The Chinese protested the Japanese seizure of Shanhaiguan, but none of the western powers would intervene. However the League of Nations constant condemnation of Japan ever since the Mukden incident provoked the Japanese on march 27th to simply walk out on the league. The ordeal also prompted Prince Saioji Kimmochi to dispatch Major General Umezu Yoshijiro, the chief of General affairs of the army general staff and Consul Tanaka Sotaro of the foreign ministry to go over and restrain the unruly troops at various positions in the Beiping-Tientsin region. Saionji's main concern was elevated by Army Minister Araki Sadao, who on March 6th stated to Harada Kumao “that if Japan were to land about 3 divisions at Qingdao and they strike into the Peiping-Tientsin region via Tsinan, Zhang Xueliang will probably flee even before they reach Tsinan. If we do anything at all, I'd like to act boldly and go that far”. Despite claims by various sources, mostly Chinese, the Shanhaiguan incident as it became known was not actually preplanned by the Kwantung Army, it really was an arbitrary act on the part of the garrison commander. How everything went down at Shanhaiguan provided vital intel on the Northeastern Army, and what to expect in Rehe. In December of 1932, the IJA 6th Division was dispatched to Manchuria and assigned security detail in southern Jilin province. They were given further secret orders to participate in what was going to be an operation in Rehe once they arrived to Manchuria. When the Shanhaiguan incident broke out, the Rehe operation was expedited rapidly. Therefore the IJA 6th and 8th Divisions west of the Liao River were immediately tossed into the operation. Given the foreign and domestic conditions, the Rehe operation was extremely dangerous. Tokyo HQ yet again sought to reign in the men, so they sent General Umezu to Manchuria to talk to the Kwantung leadership. The Kwantung leadership was adamant the operation be unleashed before the spring that, provided the operation did not extend beyond the Great Wall. To this Tokyo HQ yet again relented.  On January 27th of 1933, General Muto Nobuyoshi, then commander of the Kwantung Army, issued the following general order for the Rehe operation designated, Operation Nekka “The situation in Jehol has become increasingly serious day by day and has now developed into a state of affairs necessitating intervention. To strengthen the foundations of Manchukuo, the time is close at hand, as far as military operations by the Kwantung Army are concerned, to put the finishing touch on our sublime task. First, the affairs of Jehol province are unquestionably an internal problem of Manchukuo. They neither embrace nor are accompanied by any international implications. Because subjugation of the province is designed to strike a fatal blow to anti-Manchukuo, anti-Japan elements, these elements purposely confuse the distinction between Jehol and North China. They move troops into the province and, glossing over these matters, raise a loud outcry, propagandizing that Japan harbors designs of territorial aggression. In this manner they have endeavored to draw the restraining attention of the world, and every move of the Kwantung Army in Jehol—even the slightest raising of a hand or the stretching of a leg—is now the object of worldwide surveillance” At this stage the Kwantung Army treated the Rehe Operation as an internal matter of Manchukuo and did not openly talk about extending it beyond the Great Wall into Hubei. But their gunna. On January 26th, General Muto issued Order 466, kinda funny how its almost order 66, but I digress. This order directed the IJA 6th and 8th Divisions to prepare to invade Rehe. On February 9th, Muto drafted the “Rehe Subjugation Plan” to some staff officers. It stated “without specific orders, operations are not to be carid out in Hubei”. It also stipulated they should “foster and promote a climate leading to the downfall of Zhang Xueliang in North China, which is the strategic base for the disturbance of Manchukuo”. On February 27th, Muto issued Order 473 which repeated to the men again not to move into Hubei. On the 29th, Muto issued another  order “The subjugation of Jehol is purely and simply an internal problem of Manchukuo. In the light of our national policy, it must not develop into a provocation for war with China. This is why Kwantung Army Operations Order 473 stipulated that, unless specific orders are issued, operations are not to be conducted beyond the Great Wall in Hopei province. I fully expect you to issue strict orders to the various units under your command that, although our forces may act freely in Jehol, which is a part of Manchukuo, they are not, without an imperial command, allowed to take any action in Hopei province, which is separated from Jehol by the Great Wall. They should be admonished that, even in the light of local circumstances, they must never be blinded by tactical considerations and miss the main point of our national policy. (In particular, the garrison at Shanhaikuan should be doubly careful and not act beyond its authorized limits.) I have learned that His Imperial Majesty, the supreme commander, is gravely concerned about the foregoing and again issue these instructions in awe of His Majesty's concern”. Thus one can read between the lines here. Emperor Hirohito put his foot down and demanded no forces go past the great wall and to this the Kwantung Army obeyed. For Operation Nekka, the IJA 6th and 8th Division would have their own theaters of operation along a line running from Paotzu, the eastern most town in Rehe to Chaoyang. The northern zone was the IJA 6th divisions theater, the southern one was the 8th's. Geneal Sakamoto Masemon led the 6th Division and ordered his forces on February 23rd to advance north along the rail line between Tahushan and Tungliao, then on towards Tienshan, Xiawa and Chaoyang. Afterwards they would carry out operations in the Chifeng-Linxu-Tolun region.  General Nishi ordered his 8th Division, excluding one unit to advance along the border around Peipiao, towards Suichung on the 27th, then into the Lingyuan region. The other unit would secure as fast as possible the important gateways along the Great Wall of China: Qilingkou, Lenkou, Xufengkou, Lowenyukou and Manlankuan to protect their divisions flank. Afterwards they would seie Chengde and Gubeikou. However he also gave explicit orders "Without specific orders, operations must not be extended beyond the Great Wall into Hopei province,". So yeah, while they had direct orders to not advance beyond the Great Wall. . . they were going to basically capture all of the key passes of the Great Wall. Kind of playing with fire.  On the other side, on January 23rd, Zhang Xueliang was meeting with Chiang Kai-Shek and our old friend Duan Qirui to discuss how to prepare for what seemed to be an impending invasion of Rehe. Chiang Kai-Shek politely said to Duan Qirui "I sincerely hope that you will come south and give me your guidance at this time of national crisis,". The real reason he sent this request was because he did not want the Japanese to enlist their former lacky against him. At the meeting, according to a Japanese intelligence report, Zhang Xueliang insisted that Chiang Kai-Shek personally come north and assume direct command of the Northern troops. Chiang Kai-Shek refused on the grounds he had to deal with the communists in Jiangxi and sent in his place Yang Que, the current president of the Army Staff College and a graduate of the Japanese Army War College. Yang would arrive to Peiping with his staff on January 30th, where he devised a plan for joint operations with Zhang Xueliang. They anticipated the Kwantung Army would cross the Great Wall at Shanhaiguan, so their basic strategy was to concentrate a large force in its region, especially east of the Luan River. That forces mission would be to defend at all costs the front line at Qinhuangdao. The Japanese intelligence indicated the Chinese had roughly 50,000 men, including 7700 men of the 25th Division ld by Kuan Lincheng and 12800 men of the 2nd Division led by Yang Que who were sent to Miyun and Gubeikou. There were also reports that ancient art objects and documents from Peiping were being transported to Nanjing, beginning on January 10th. To the Chinese public this was shocking news as one could imagine. Operation Nekka was unleashed and showcased the rapid efficiency of the Kwantung Army. By March 2nd, the IJA 6th Division routed the 41st Army of General Sun Tienying; the IJA 14th Mixed Brigade of the IJA 8th Division captured the Lengkou pass on March 4th; while the Kawahara detachment captured Chengde near the border with Hubei. General Nishi then assembld his main force at Lingyuan as the 14th Mixed Brigade withdrew to Chapeng. On March 4th, Muto issued Order 480, directing the troops "to make preparations for operations in North China, firmly seizing the major passes along the Great Wall, mopping up resistance by remnant troops and bandits, and restoring peace and order in Jehol province." One unit of the IJA 8th Division was given the task of seizing the Gubeikou Pass and advanced to such on the 7th. Within the vicinity of Changshanyu, around 40 kilometers southwest of Chengde, they encountered 5000 advancing Chinese forces. Here one of the first of many fierce battles along the Great Wall came to be. Until roughly March 20th, the Kwantung Army was met with fierce counterattacks, coming from the main gateways of the Great Wall. Initially the fighting went tremendously wall for the Japanese, yet by March 10th, the 14th Mixed Brigade had taken Tungqiaku, Tiehmenkuan and Xifengkou. Two days later the IJA 8th Division began an assault upon Gubeikou. Nishi then sent the Hayakawa Brigade to seize Lowenyukou. Then on the 10th, after receiving reports the main passes were secured, General Muto took his HQ from Jinzhu to Changchun, believing everything was already won and done. However he would be very wrong, they had misjudged the Chinese strength.  On the 13th, Muti and Nishi received a report, that on the night of the 10th, the 14th Mixed Brigade at Xifengkou had come under heavy attack by a Chinese force led by General Song Qeyuang. Reinforcements were rapidly sent over, but they were unable to relieve the trapped brigade. On the 14th, Muto ordered Genera Sakamoto to lead the Mukai unit from the 6th Brigade to help out. With this the Chinese forces were driven off and then the Japanese began assaults upon Lengkou, Lowenyukou and Quehlingkou. On the 16th, the IJA 8th Division took Quehling, but the next day received a vicious counterattack by the NRA 116th Division. At Lowenyukou the Hayakawa Brigade was counterattacked by Song Cheyuan. The Hayakawa Brigade was still able to secure on portion of the Great Wall, it was constantly under attack and unable to progress further.  On the 22nd, Nishi was forced to order his Brigade to pull back to Chengde. Over at Lengkou, the Mukai unit managed to capture the town as the 14th Mixed Brigade at Xifengkou was attacked by the NRA 139th Division. Unable to repel the counterattacks, Nishi ordered his forces back 13 kilometers on the 24th. The battles at Quehlingkou and Lowenyukou were very intense. On March 18th, Muto realized the casualties were severe and taking the gateways was not showing progress. He therefore decided to divert the 6th Divisions attention to Lengkou in a flanking maneuver aimed at severing the Chinese supply lines to the gateways and as a result this would extend operations south of the Great Wall into the region east of the Luan River. Thus there we have it, they were going past the Great Wall against Emperor Hirohito's orders.  Operation Nekka, similar to Operation Jinzhou was deemed essential to establish and protect Manchukuo. However while the battles along the Great Wall were deemed necessary to create the borders for Manchukuo, their extension past that boundary literally brought them into the heart of North China. Unlike in Manchuria, the Chinese forces in North China held excellent morale, they were very willing to fight. On top of that, they had better logistics and were fighting on top of the Great Wall, which offered significant advantages. Thus from a tactical standpoint, the Japanese had to seize the gateways and flush out the Chinese from the areas. The Chinese remained defiant. Atop the walls the Chinese defenders would shout at the Japanese waving anti-Manchukuo and anti-Japanese flags.  Outside the ongoing battle, Chiang Kai-Shek had his own, perhaps in his mind, more important battle, the one with the communists. The encirclement campaigns had all gone to shit thus far. Added to this was the invasion of Manchuria and Shanghai. As Chiang Kai-Shek would later put it "tantamount to subjecting the Government to a pincer attack both from within and without." Basically Chiang Kai-Shek could choose to focus on the Japanese or communists. He figured going into a full war against Japan would be the end of himself and his government. Thus he worked to reach an agreement with the Japanese in May of 1932 which had ended the Shanghai incident. After doing so he released a slogan "first internal pacification, then resist external aggression". Upon doing so he unleashed his full attention upon the communists. As we have seen, Chiang Kai-Sheks last encirclement campaign proved successful. But as he was in the middle of it, Operation Nekka was unleashed. It looked extremely bad for Chiang Kai-Shek, for the KMT and for China in general. On March 20th, as a gesture to indicate to the masses Chiang Kai-Shek was doing his job, he dispatched 5 divisions, roughly 50,000 men from the Central Army north. Chiang Kai-Shek personally traveled north from Hankou to Beiping, but no further than that. Back on the 10th he had received the resignation of Zhang Xueliang, who had publicly been calling for a massive war against Japan so that Manchuria could be recovered. Chiang Kai-Shek had to replace him with General He Yingqin.  Another major development at this time, was our old and dear friend who never causes any trouble, Wang Jingwei returned from I believe his 20th time in exile. He came to resume his post as president of the Executive Yuan. Yet again Wang Jingwei was trying to reconcile with Chiang Kai-Shek. In reality and as many of you might guess, the only reason Chiang Kai-Shek never had this guy shot was because Wang Jingei had the firm backing of the left, thus in order to really grab the majority of the political class he had to play nice with him. For Wang Jingwei's part, much like starscream in transformers, yes I am using this as an analogy, hes just trying to overthrow megatron every chance he gets, but always fails like a dumb idiot. There was also the dichotomy between the two men. Wang Jingwei was seen as a civilian leader while Chiang Kai-Shek was seen as a military leader. So together they seemed like a perfect team, despite the fact they loathed each other. So Wang Jingwei became the civil administrator while Chiang Kai-Shek focused on the military. In regards to Japan, Wang Jingwei was following a conciliatory policy of "resistance on the one hand and negotiation on the other,” based on Chiang Kai-Sheks slogan "first internal pacification, then resist external aggression."  Following a fight with Zhang Xueliang in August of 1932 over the issue of defending Manchuria against the Kwantung Army, Wang Jingwei had resigned, trying to strongarm Chiang Kai-Shek to get rid of the young marshal. Thus like what had happened countless times before, Wang Jingwei said he was out on sick leave, and departed for Europe for supposed treatment. When he returned 6 months later, Operation Nekka had begun, although the Japanese troops had not yet then reached the Great Wall. Wang Jingwei immediately became acting foreign minister in place of Lu Wenkuan, a supporter of Zhang Xueliang, who was notably anti-japanese. Wang Jingwei kicked Lu Wenkuan over to Xinjiang to deal with some conflicts breaking out there, fun times for him as we know.  Meanwhile He Yingqin had been placed as the head of the Peiping branch military council, entrusted with control over all military matters in North China. He Yingqin went to work reorganizing the forces in north china in mid March, forming them into an effective battle order to face the Japanese. By bringing together the local, very disorganized forces into a unified command, He Yingqin hoped they would be capable alone to block the Japanese advance, leaving the central army out of the conflict. This was because Chiang Kai-Shek did not want to risk losing his central army, considered the most elite one in all of china. But Chiang Kai-Shek did come around to the idea of at least testing some units against the Kwantung forces. Above all Chiang Kai-Shek wanted to have his cake and eat it to. He wanted he population of China to think he was actively resisting, while in reality he was biding time. Central army units deployed around Gubeikou, the main gateway leading to the Peiping-Tientsin region. When the Kwantung army leaders were planning operation Nekka, they had believed it would not be necessary to go beyond the Great Wall, but once the fighting around the walls and gateways kicked off, they knew immediately they could not hope to take the wall areas without getting behind the enemy. Particularly they needed to get past the area east of the Luan River. Some 20 Chinese divisions had assembled in the Peiping-Tientsin region and were tossing endless counter attacks along the line of the Great Wall. In the Lengkou region a force of 7000 Central Chinese Army units had penetrated deep into Rehe and smashed the Mukai detachment of the IJA 8th Division. These counterattacks reaffirmed the Kwantung Army leadership it was necessary to go beyond the Great Wall. It should also be noted the Kwantung Army's operations in North China were not just military. The Japanese were plagued with logistical problems. There was a shortage of troops because they had driven into Rehe with only 20,000 men. Even the most determined Kwantung general did not believe their military prowess could overcome the plains of Hubei packed with an immeasurable amount of Chinese troops. Therefore they had to augment this military operation with political schemes aimed at the regional warlords. During the pacification of Manchuria, the tactic of bribing local elites had worked wonders and there was zero reason to believe it would not work in North China. All of this was done without any supervision from Tokyo HQ. On February 13th of 1933, Itagaki Seishiro, at the time chief of the Mukden Special Service Agency, was transferred to the General Staff without any official announcement of this promotion. He took a post in Tientsin, specifically to begin political maneuvers in eastern Hubei. This saw the birth of the Tientsin Special Service Agency. Initially this agency was attempting to lure all the competing warlords in North China, such as, Duan Qirui, Wu Peifu, Sun Chuanfang, but then began targeting Zhang Qingyao. Zhang Qingyao had once been the protege of Duan Qirui, acting as the civil and military governor of Henan province. He had fought against Zhang Zuolin in 1925 whereupon his allegiance had shifted over to Wu Peifu. During the second phase of the Northern Expedition, Zhang Qingyao had fought again against Zhang Zuolin, then controlling the National Pacification Army. When the Northern expedition was over, he joined Yan Xishans forces in Shanxi. Thus one could easily see he was not a man of many principals, nor any specific loyalties. The Tientsin Special Service Agency first proposed to reach out to Zhang Qingyao in the hopes he could organize a coup d'etat against Chiang Kai-Shek. It was further hoped he could get Song Queyuan, Zhang Zuoxiang, Fang Chenwu, Xu Yusan, Zhang Tingshu, Sun Tienying and Feng Zhanhai to join in. If they managed this, North China would fall in a single stroke. It was hoped this would be achieved as they were taking the Great Wall and were enroute towards Peiping. However on May 7th, Zhang Qingyao was assassinated, completely ruining the plan. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Operation Nekka had been unleashed with a large bang. 20,000 Japanese troops stormed Rehe province under strict orders not to go past the Great Wall of China. So they immediately began planning how to go past the Great Wall of China. Yet what they did not expect was the determination of the Chinese defenders, who were not going to allow them an easy time.

Last time we spoke about the January 28th Incident. In January of 1932, tensions escalated in Shanghai as anti-Japanese sentiments surged after Japan's invasion of Manchuria. Orchestrated by Yoshiko Kawashima, a Japanese spy, a provocation led to violence, sparking outrage among Japanese expatriates. Japan demanded apologies and compensation from China, threatening military action if their demands were unmet. As the Japanese military amassed forces in Shanghai, the Chinese 19th Route Army prepared to resist, igniting the conflict known as the January 28th Incident, marking the beginning of a fierce struggle for control. Amidst chaos, the Nanjing government struggled to respond to Japan's escalating aggression in Shanghai. Chiang Kai-Shek prioritized avoiding war, urging a diplomatic approach to protect Shanghai's economy. Despite pressure, the 19th Route Army was ordered to withdraw, but tensions flared when Japan attacked the Chinese garrison. The 19th Route Army fiercely resisted, leading to intense battles. As Japan sent reinforcements, Chiang faced mounting protests and criticism for his passive stance, questioning whether he could maintain his strategy against the encroaching enemy.   #144 The First Battle of Shanghai 1932 Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. In the last episode we covered the January 28th Incident. At 11:30 pm on January 28, Japan ordered 2,300 Japanese Marines to advance westward along every branch road on the west side of North Sichuan Road, without waiting for a response. This road, which crosses into the northern area of the International Settlement and has frequently been designated as a Japanese defense zone, includes Target Road (now known as Wujin Road in Hongkou District, Shanghai), Qiujiang Road, and Yokohama Road. Their objective was to seize the Songhu Railway defense line at Tiantong'an Station. They faced strong resistance from the 19th Route Army, further escalating the conflict. In the early hours of the 29th, Japanese aircraft launched from the Notoro seaplane carrier, which was moored on the Huangpu River, attacked the Chinese district of Zhabei. Both the Commercial Press located at No. 584 Baoshan Road and the Oriental Library, the largest private library in China with over 300,000 books, were completely destroyed. That same day the 19th Route Army sent a telegram to the entire nation concerning the situation: Do forgive me it's a rough translation “Urgent. Dear Sir and Madam, the Japanese have occupied our three northeastern provinces, changing the color of our territory and making our nation perish. Recently, they have killed and set fire in Shanghai, and vagrants are everywhere, doing the most despicable and violent things in the world. Gunboats are coming one after another, and the Marines are all landed. At 12:00 a.m. on the 28th, they openly invaded our defense line in Zhabei, Shanghai, and challenged us. Guang Nai and others are soldiers, and they only know that it is their duty to defend themselves and defend their land. They cannot give up even an inch of land or an inch of grass. They resist to save the country and protect the race. Even if they sacrifice only one person and one bullet, they will never retreat and lose the personality of the soldiers of the Republic of China. This thing and this ambition are exposed to the sun and the sun and are known to the world. The spirits of our ancestors in heaven are truly relying on it”. On the morning of January 29, Chiang Kai-shek met with He Yingqin and Zhu Peide to discuss countermeasures. Simultaneously Zhu Peide convened a meeting with He Yingqin, Gu Zhutong, Li Jishen, Deng Shizeng, Lin Wei, and others to address issues such as defense deployment, the security of Nanjing and the Yangtze River, and resistance against Japan. Chiang Kai-Shek established the principles going forward for negotiations with Japan, emphasizing the need to prepare for talks while actively resisting. He stated that negotiations must have a clear final line of defense and a maximum limit that would not compromise administrative and territorial integrity, undermine the spirit of the Nine-Power Treaty, or jeopardize national sovereignty. If these limits were exceeded and unacceptable concessions were made, a decisive battle would be fought, even at the cost of defeat and death.  The defense and military strategy for Beijing and Shanghai included the 19th Route Army defending Shanghai with full strength, while the front guard army consisting of the 87th and 88th divisions would protect Nanjing. He Yingqin would remain in Nanjing, overseeing all party, government, and military personnel left behind. Chiang, along with the Central Political Council of the Kuomintang, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the National Government, and Chen Mingshu, all expressed their commitment to resisting Japanese aggression. Chiang also sent a telegram to He Chengjun, director of the Hubei Province Pacification Office, and Xu Tingyao, commander of the Fourth Division, stating "Last night, the Japanese invaders attacked our 19th Route Defense Line in Zhabei, Shanghai, and the battle is ongoing. Our army is determined to fight to the death. Their naval forces in Han and Xun will likely engage in military operations. We urge you to remain vigilant and defend yourselves, never yielding to them. The Fourth Division should concentrate on strict defense in Wuhan and avoid dispersal. If military funds become scarce, local governments will need to raise them independently." The National Government Military Committee appointed Chiang Kai-shek, Feng Yuxiang, Yan Xishan, and Zhang Xueliang as members responsible for mobilizing the army and commanding the Shanghai War. Chiang Kai-Shek officially resumed power after resigning to prevent a surrender and committed to a prolonged resistance. On January 30, the Chinese Nationalist Government announced the relocation of the capital to Luoyang. Chiang Kai-shek sent a telegram urging resistance against the Japanese and dispatched the elite Fifth Army to reinforce Shanghai. That night, Dai Ji, the commander of the Songhu Garrison, took charge of military operations in Shanghai, overseeing the 19th Route Army. The commander-in-chief was Jiang Guangnai, with Cai Tingkai as the army commander and division commanders Qu Shounian, Mao Weishou, and Shen Guanghan. Chiang Kai-Shek then issued a telegram to his troops across the nation and again I apologize for the rough translation. "Since the Northeast Incident began, the Central Government has been enduring humiliation and maintaining peace in order to avoid war and protect the lifeline of the country. It hopes to use justice and fairness to awaken the Japanese pirates. Unexpectedly, the more we tolerate, the more arrogant they become. When the Shanghai Incident occurred, we accepted their demands with great pain, but the Japanese pirates still brazenly pressed on, repeatedly attacking our Shanghai Defense Force, bombing civilian houses, throwing bombs on the streets, and our compatriots were ravaged. The country is about to perish. Anyone with blood in his veins would rather endure it. Since the 19th Route Army has risen up to defend itself bravely, our entire army In this time of national destruction and extinction, when the revolutionary soldiers are facing imminent danger, they should fight for the dignity of the country, strive for the survival of the nation, fulfill their responsibilities for the revolution, and be determined to die rather than live in disgrace, so as to deal with the brutal Japan that destroys peace and despises faith and integrity... Chiang Kai-shek and his comrades have shared hardships for a long time. Although I am now in the opposition, I am willing to swear to live and die with the soldiers and fulfill my bounden duty. I am here to inform you in advance with my blood and sincerity, and ask you to be determined and work hard, share the same hatred with the enemy, do not be arrogant, maintain the spirit of sacrifice, stay ready to fight, and save the country from danger." From that day on, the various ministries, commissions and committees of the National Government began to move to Luoyang, but the Military Commission and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs remained in Nanjing . At the same time, the frontline troops were ordered to be jointly commanded by the Minister of Military Affairs He Yingqin and the Chief of the General Staff Zhu Peide.  Typically Chinese sources breakdown what is known as the First Battle of Shanghai into three phases. In the previous episode we looked through the event up until the point of the first phase. After the initial fighting, both the 19th route army and Japanese agreed to a ceasefire so they could strengthen their positions and at least allow some form of diplomacy to occur. This went into effect on the 29th. As we mentioned, immediately afterwards the Japanese rapidly began reinforcing their position in Shanghai. They first sent the Sasebo 26th Squadron on the 30th, bearing 474 troops of the Sasebo 3rd Special Marine Corps alongside supplies. The next day the aircraft carriers Kaga and Hosho came over with 30 aircraft from the 1st air fleet. Then the cruisers Naka, Yura and Abukuma alongside 4 torpedo boats came bearing another 2000 marines. On February 1st the Terukoku Maru brought over the Yokosuka 1st Special Marine corps, roughly 525 men who landed at Huishan Wharf. With all that said and done, roughly 7000 Japanese troops had been brought over. On February 1st, the IJN warships began bombarding Nanjing from the Yangtze River, prompting Yu Jishi to frantically demand Chiang Kai-Shek transfer more troops to Shanghai. That night the Japanese light cruiser Tenryu, the protected cruisers Hirado and Taima, and the seven ships of the Navy's 23rd Destroyer Squadron fired upon Nanjing using four 140mm guns, 12 152mm single-mounted rapid-fire guns, 12 120mm single-mounted guns, and 20 76mm single-mounted rapid-fire guns. The rich and officials fled the city for refuge, but the Japanese army did not land any men to follow up the attack. Simultaneously 40,000 Shanghai workers from over 20 Japanese owned cotton mills began an anti-Japanese strike, being heavily backed by Communists. The workers began aiding the 19th route army to blockade the Japanese in the factories and streets and sabotage what they could.  On February 2nd, the Japanese army attacked Wusong several times, but was repelled each time. On the 3rd the Japanese expanded their attacks against Zhabei, Baziqiao and other locations, but the Chinese defenders successfully repelled these assaults as well. On the 4th, the Japanese launched their first major offensive, which extended the conflict to Jiangwan and Wusong. Following a day of intense fighting, the Wusong fort was destroyed by enemy bombardment; however, the Japanese army was unable to land due to the determined resistance of the Chinese defenders. The anti-aircraft artillery company from the 88th Division, reassigned to the 4th Regiment of the 156th Brigade of the 19th Route Army, managed to shoot down a Japanese aircraft. After the failure of the general offensive, Yukiichi Shiozawa was dismissed and sent back to Japan. Vice Admiral Yoshisaburo Nomura, the newly appointed commander of the Third Fleet, succeeded Shiozawa. After Nomura assumed his role, the Japanese army began to bolster its forces. Japan had initially planned to deploy troops when tensions escalated in Shanghai, but the navy had opposed this move. However, as the situation deteriorated, the navy was compelled to seek assistance from the army. On February 2, the Japanese cabinet officially decided to send troops. In response to the urgent circumstances in Shanghai, they resolved to dispatch the Shanghai Dispatch Mixed Brigade, led by Brigade Commander Major General Shimomoto Kuma, along with the 9th Division, commanded by Lieutenant General Ueda Kenkichi. The Shanghai Dispatch Mixed Brigade and the Second Independent Tank Squadron were prioritized for transport. Concurrently, the Japanese Navy also sent the Yokosuka 2nd Special Marine Corps to Shanghai. The 24th Mixed Brigade landed in Wusong on the afternoon of February 7. By this time, the combined forces of the Japanese navy, army, and air force had exceeded 10,000 personnel. At dawn on February 8, the Japanese Army's 24th Mixed Brigade launched an attack on Zhanghuabang, Yunzaobang, and Wusong Town along three routes, but they were repelled by our forces. Meanwhile on February 4, the National Government Military Commission sent out a telegram that divided the country into four defense zones. The first zone, which includes the area north of the Yellow River, was assigned to Zhang Xueliang as the commander-in-chief. The second zone, covering the area south of the Yellow River, was placed under the command of Chiang Kai-shek. The third zone, encompassing the area south of the Yangtze River as well as Fujian and Zhejiang provinces, was led by He Yingqin. The fourth zone, which includes Guangdong and Guangxi, was commanded by Chen Jitang. The telegram also stated that, aside from maintaining troops for local stability, all commanders were to concentrate their forces within their respective defense zones to confront the aggressive Japanese. Additionally, a directive was issued for the provinces of Sichuan, Hunan, Guizhou, Hubei, Shaanxi, and Henan to send troops to serve as a general reserve. On February 5, upon learning that the Japanese army had been redeployed from mainland China to Shanghai, Chairman of the Military Commission Chiang Kai-shek sent a telegram from Luoyang to He Yingqin. He instructed that if the Japanese forces landed, the Chinese Air Force would engage in combat. Additionally, Chiang sent a message of condolence to Jiang Guangnai, Cai Tingkai, and Dai Ji of the 19th Route Army, stating "Brothers, you have been fighting valiantly for a week. Each time I reflect on the tremendous sacrifices made by the soldiers and their dedication, I feel a deep sadness... If necessary, Zhong (Zheng) can come to lead in person. When the Air Force enters the fray, the Army must establish various signals in advance to communicate with it and ensure coordinated efforts..." On the same day, the 88th Division arrived in Suzhou. On February 6, Chiang ordered the 261st Brigade of the 87th Division to move from Nanjing to reinforce Kunshan. The troops reached Kunshan on February 7. On February 8, Chiang directed He Yingqin to transfer an artillery battalion to support the 19th Route Army. Then, on February 9, Chiang Kai-shek mobilized the First Division, led by Commander Hu Zongnan, and the Seventh Division, commanded by Wang Jun, to prepare for reinforcement of the 19th Route Army in Shanghai. February 8th marks the second phase of the battle. On the 10th, to ensure that the 88th Division of the Central Army complied with the orders from the 19th Route Army of the Guangdong Army, Chiang Kai-shek sent a telegram to Yu Jishi insisting that "your troops must strictly follow the commands of Commander-in-Chief Chiang and coordinate their movements with allied forces." The Japanese Marine Corps, under Yukio Shiozawa, initiated a three-pronged encirclement attack from Hongkou. The National Army mounted a determined defense and ultimately repelled the Japanese forces, pursuing and destroying them, which significantly lowered their morale. On February 11, Chen Cheng, commander of the Central Army's 18th Army, sent a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek from Ji'an, Jiangxi, reporting that the troops had not been paid for nearly two months and were lacking food. At that time, the National Government was planning to redeploy the National Army that had been engaged in suppressing the Communists in Jiangxi to Zhejiang and Shanghai and to relocate the capital to Luoyang.  On February 12, following a battle at Caojiaqiao, the Japanese army's strategy to consolidate their forces was entirely disrupted. The next morning, February 13, the Japanese 24th Mixed Brigade crossed the Caojiaqiao Bridge in Zhuozaobang and engaged with the Nationalist army. Seizing the moment, the 19th Route Army Headquarters aimed to annihilate the Japanese forces. The Nationalist army surrounded the Japanese troops near the Yong'an Cotton Mill. Additionally, 60 members of a suicide squad launched a suicide attack, resulting in the complete destruction of 1,600 Japanese soldiers. The Japanese army faced significant losses, thwarting their attempt to swiftly capture Wusong. On February 14, Chiang ordered the 88th and 87th Divisions, which were already stationed in Nanxiang and Kunshan near Shanghai, to be reorganized into the Fifth Army. He appointed Zhang Zhizhong, a volunteer eager to fight against the Japanese, as the commander of the Fifth Army. This new army was placed under the unified command of the 19th Route Army and took over the defense line stretching from the northern end of Jiangwan through Miaoxing to the western end of Wusong. It served as the left-wing army, while the 19th Route Army acted as the right-wing, tasked with defending Jiangwan, the area south of Dachang, and the urban region of Shanghai. To replenish the 19th Route Army's losses, Chiang repeatedly ordered reinforcements from various locations. For instance, on February 15, Shangguan Yunxiang dispatched 500 active soldiers from Bengbu to the 19th Route Army; on February 17, Liang Guanying sent 500 unarmed soldiers from Qingjiangpu; and on February 19, Liu Zhi contributed 1,000 active unarmed soldiers from Henan. On February 16, Chiang Kai-shek communicated with Finance Minister Song Ziwen via telegram, stating, "Since the Japanese refuse to withdraw their troops from Shanghai, we must resist until the end. ... Food supplies in Jiangxi and Henan will dwindle, and assistance will be completely halted. Please arrange to deposit 10 million yuan in central banknotes in Nanchang and 20 million yuan in Zhengzhou. This will allow the government to continue functioning, the army to be sustained, and perhaps we can navigate this crisis and avert collapse. This is my final request. I hope you can find a way to assist." To prevent any friction between the Fifth Army and the Nineteenth Route Army over competing for military accolades, Chiang Kai-shek sent a telegram to Zhang Zhizhong and Yu Jishi on February 18. "The fight against Japan is a matter of national survival and is not a matter of honor for an individual or a certain unit. Our frontline officers and men should fully understand this. Therefore, the honor of the 19th Route Army is the honor of our entire National Revolutionary Army. There is absolutely no distinction between honor and disgrace. The Fifth Army's joining the front line is feared by the enemy and will also be slandered by the reactionaries (those who oppose the Nanjing Central Government). If we can continue to fight in the name of the 19th Route Army, it will be enough to demonstrate the strength of our National Revolutionary Army. We will share life and death, let alone honor and disgrace. I hope that this will be conveyed to the officers and men of the Fifth Army. They must unite and fight with our 19th Route Army and make no sacrifices to complete the revolutionary mission." Over on the other side, following reports of significant losses suffered by the Japanese army in Wusong, Tokyo received an imperial decree from Emperor Hirohito demanding the Shanghai incident get settled quick. In response, Chief of Staff Zairen urgently ordered the 9th Army Division, commanded by Ueda Kenkichi, to swiftly reinforce Shanghai. By the afternoon of February 13, the main contingent of the 9th Division had arrived at Shanghai Port, and by February 16, all personnel had disembarked in Wusong. Consequently, Lieutenant General Ueda took over command from Nomura. At this point, the Japanese invading forces comprised over 30,000 troops from naval, land, and air units, along with 60 to 70 field artillery pieces, more than 60 aircraft, and dozens of ships concentrated at the Wusong mouth. Ueda issued a statement late on the night of the 13th, asserting, "If anyone obstructs our division from fulfilling its mission, we will take decisive action without hesitation." On the 18th, he sent an ultimatum to Cai Tingkai, demanding, "Your army must immediately cease hostilities and withdraw from the following areas by 5:00 p.m. on February 20: on the west bank of the Huangpu River, retreat from areas connecting the western end of the concession, Caojiadu Town, Zhoujiaqiao Town, and Pushong Town to the north; on the east bank, withdraw from areas connecting Lannidu and Zhangjialou Town to the north, and retreat to a zone 20 kilometers away from the border of each concession Additionally, all military installations in the specified areas must be dismantled and no new ones established. If these demands are not met, the Japanese army will have no choice but to act freely against your forces, and your army will bear all resulting consequences." In response to Ueda's ultimatum, Tsai and Chiang ordered their front-line troops to fire heavily at Japanese positions as a warning. On the morning of February 20, Ueda commanded a full-scale attack across the front, employing tactics to break through the center while flanking from both sides. The 9th Division led the assault on the junction of Jiangwan and Miaohang, aiming to encircle Wusong from the north with the Kurume Brigade and Zhabei with the Marine Corps from the south. The Japanese began with artillery bombardments, followed by infantry and tank assaults on the Zhanghuabang and Yangshupu lines, both of which were successfully repelled by Chinese defenders. Over a thousand Japanese soldiers and several tanks in Zhabei were killed or wounded due to landmines. On February 21, Ueda personally directed thousands of infantry, supported by aircraft and artillery, to attack the Chinese defensive positions. Both sides incurred heavy casualties, and the battle continued until dawn on the 23rd. The Japanese forces attempted to encircle Jiangwan Town from Jiangwan Station, but the Chinese defenders fought valiantly, launching multiple charges and capturing Japanese Major Kong Sheng along with hundreds of soldiers. Ultimately, the Japanese army was unable to withstand the resistance and began to retreat. After the Japanese 9th Division arrived in Shanghai, it prepared to initiate a second major assault on the defenders of the city. The strategy involved a comprehensive attack stretching from Zhabei to Wusong to contain the Chinese army's strength, with primary forces concentrated on Jiangwan and Miaohang. The goal was to seize these two strategic points, achieve a breakthrough in the center, sever the link between the 5th Army and the 19th Route Army, and then defeat them individually. At dawn on February 20, the Japanese dispatched over ten aircraft for reconnaissance and bombing missions over the Miaohang area. Naval artillery and heavy army cannons heavily shelled the Miaohang positions. Simultaneously, Japanese artillery bombarded the Yunzaobang area in an effort to force a crossing and facilitate the Miaohang offensive.   By 9 am, part of the Japanese forces advanced towards the Xiaochang Temple and the Maijiazhai position, immediately conducting a fire search on our troops' positions. At noon, 3,000 Japanese soldiers launched an attack against our forces. The officers and soldiers of the 527th Regiment, defending the Maijiazhai and Zhuyuandun positions, mounted a counterattack, marking the beginning of the Battle of Miaohang. After three hours of intense fighting, the Japanese suffered significant casualties and were unable to continue, retreating to their original positions. Following this, over 2,000 Japanese troops attacked the Xiaochang Temple and Jinjiatang positions. The officers and soldiers of the 523rd Regiment, taking cover in the trenches, launched counterattacks and successfully repelled the Japanese forces. As dusk fell, the Japanese infantry halted their assaults, but naval and land artillery continued to bombard our positions in an attempt to weaken our defenses and personnel for a renewed attack the following day. On February 21, Japanese artillery relentlessly shelled the positions of the 88th Division of the Fifth Army in Miaohang. Following this, thousands of Japanese infantry launched an assault on the Yanjiazhai and Miaohang Town front. As the Japanese forces advanced, the officers and soldiers of the 523rd and 524th Regiments bravely counterattacked and successfully repelled them. However, a significant number of enemy troops coordinated a comprehensive assault on the Maijiazhai, Zhuyuandun, Xiaochangmiao, and Yanjiazhai lines south of Miaohang. Our 523rd, 524th, and 527th Regiments engaged in intense combat with the enemy, particularly at the Zhuyuandun front near Maijiazhai and Xu Xu, where the fighting was especially fierce. After a day of conflict, the enemy was temporarily pushed back. On February 22, the Japanese 9th Division launched a full-scale attack on the Miaohang position held by the 88th Division of the Fifth Army. Throughout the day, aircraft bombed the Chinese defenders, and thousands of artillery shells were fired at them. However, under the direct command of Zhang Zhizhong, the enemy faced a devastating defeat due to the coordinated three-pronged assault by the Sun Yuanliang Brigade, the Song Xilian Brigade, and the 61st Division of the 19th Route Army. The Miaohang position was ultimately saved from peril, inflicting heavy casualties on the elite forces of the Japanese 9th Division and the Kurume Mixed Brigade. This victory became known as the "Miaohang Victory." In the days that followed, the enemy continued their bombardment and attacks but were consistently repelled by the defenders. The Japanese army suffered significant losses, shifting from an all-out offensive to a more focused approach before ultimately halting their attacks. By the 25th, Ueda's overall offensive strategy had also failed. On February 24, the Japanese army decided to escalate the conflict once more, transferring the 11th and 14th divisions from Japan to join the Shanghai Expeditionary Force, which included troops already engaged in the war. At that time, the flagship of the Japanese Navy's Third Fleet, the Izumo, sustained damage from a bombing raid carried out by the suicide squad of the 19th Route Army, which sent shockwaves through Japan. Additionally, the large troop presence made a quick resolution to the war impossible. Consequently, on the 23rd, the Japanese cabinet decided to promptly reinforce the army. The General Staff then established the Shanghai Expeditionary Army Command, appointing General Shirakawa Yoshinori, the former Minister of War in the Tanaka Cabinet, to replace Ueda. They dispatched the 11th Division (led by Lieutenant General Atsutarou Atsuto), the 14th Division (led by Lieutenant General Naoaki Matsuki), and over 100 aircraft to China to initiate a larger-scale offensive in Shanghai. After several reinforcements, the Japanese forces in Shanghai, under Shirakawa's command, grew to over 90,000 troops, supported by 80 warships and 300 aircraft, significantly enhancing their combat effectiveness. In contrast, the total strength of the Chinese defenders was less than 50,000, with inadequate equipment. After a month of intense fighting, the Chinese forces had suffered heavy losses, leaving their river defenses in the Taicang Liuhe area vulnerable. Learning from the failures of the previous three commanders' frontal assaults, Shirakawa opted to land at Liuhe and flank the Songhu defenders. He directed the 9th Division and other units to launch a direct attack on Songhu and Shanghai while using the 3rd Fleet to escort the 11th Division into the Yangtze River estuary. They executed surprise landings at Liuhekou, Yanglinkou, and Qiyakou, quickly outflanking the defenders. On March 1, the Japanese forces initiated attacks in Naobei, Jiangwan, and Miaohang, employing heavy artillery, field guns, and aircraft for continuous bombardment. The infantry capitalized on this to engage in close-quarters combat, resulting in heavy casualties on both sides. Meanwhile, Shirakawa secretly instructed the 11th Division to exploit the weakness of the Chinese troops in Liuhe, forcibly landing at Qiyakou, Yanglinkou, and Liubinkou, ultimately capturing Liuhe. The fall of Liuhe posed a significant threat to the flank and rear of the Chinese army, compelling the entire force to retreat to the second line of defense (the Jiading-Huangdu line) by the evening of March 1.  After 34 days of intense fighting, they were forced to retreat to their second line of defense. At this point, the war had entered its final phase, resulting in a stalemate between the two sides. On the 2nd, the Japanese army seized Shanghai, and by March 3, they occupied Zhenru and Nanxiang, subsequently announcing a ceasefire. Now while we have been focused on the Japanese and Chinese perspectives in this, the international community was also heavily involved in the background. After the outbreak of hostilities, the British and American consuls in Shanghai offered to mediate. However despite a ceasefire being implemented the hostilities continued. So on February 2nd, Britain, America, France, Italy and Germany sent a notice to China and Japan "proposing to stop the conflict; (1) both sides immediately stop all violent acts according to the following conditions; (2) there will be no mobilization or preparation for any hostile acts between the two countries; (3) the Chinese and Japanese combatants in Shanghai will withdraw from the contact points; (4) a neutral zone will be established to separate the combatants of both sides to protect the public concession. The area will be garrisoned by neutral military and police, and various methods will be formulated by the consular corps; (5) once the two countries accept the treaty, they will not make any demands or reservations in advance, but will quickly negotiate with the assistance of neutral observers or participants in accordance with the spirit of the Kellogg-War Pact and the December 9th League of Nations resolution to resolve all outstanding issues..." Nanjing generally accepted the terms, but Japan instead proposed non-military zones be established 20 miles around the major ports of Shanghai, Hankou, Tianjin, Qingdao and Guangzhou as a sort of counter proposal. Meanwhile at the League of Nations, Yan Huiqing was drawing attention to the Shanghai incident, obviously linking it to the Manchuria incident and advocated for Article 10 of the League of Nations Charter, which was in regards to respecting territorial integrity and political independence of league nations. The League of Nations agreed and organized a committee to investigate the Shanghai incident. On February 4th Chiang Kai-Shek would write in his diary "As long as we do not lose our national sovereignty and territory, and the Japanese invaders do not put forward unacceptable conditions, we can take advantage of the opportunity of British and American intervention to negotiate with them; we cannot take a tough stance when other countries intervene, which will lead to adverse effects." By late February US Secretary of State Henry Stimson warned Japan for the second time, that the Nine Power Treaty and other treaties had to be maintained. Then on the 23rd he sent a letter reiterating the nine-power treaty and Kellogg War Pact to the League of Nations in regards to the Shanghai situation. On the 29th, a four-point plan for mediating the Shanghai incident was adopted at the League of Nations. The objective was to swiftly establish a local ceasefire agreement with the assistance of civil and military officials from various countries present in Shanghai. Following this, a round-table meeting was to be convened with representatives from nations with vested interests in Shanghai to discuss security measures for the International Settlement, the French Concession, and the local residents, as well as to address other issues. Subsequently, representatives from Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Spain, and other nations unanimously supported the plan, with Chinese representative Yan Huiqing and Japanese representative Sato Naotake also indicating their general agreement in principle. However, on March 2, the situation escalated when the Japanese army compelled the Chinese forces to retreat to their second line of defense. The Japanese side adopted a more aggressive stance, presenting four stringent conditions and insisting that the Chinese army withdraw first before halting their attacks. The Japanese forces were only willing to withdraw to the Shanghai and Wusong areas and refused to do so under the supervision of neutral countries, which the Chinese government firmly rejected. On March 3, the Japanese army launched another offensive. On that same day, U.S. Secretary of State Stimson summoned Japanese Ambassador to the United States Idebuchi, condemning Japan for accepting the League of Nations resolution on February 29 while simultaneously escalating military operations. On March 3rd a ceasefire came into effect as a formal meeting was held at the British consulate. The Chinese delegation was led by Guo Taiqi, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, along with military representatives Dai Ji, Huang Qiang, and seven others. The Japanese delegation included Shigemitsu Mamoru, Minister to China, and military representatives Ueda, Tashiro, and nine others. Officials from Britain, the United States, France, and other nations also participated in the meeting. During the negotiations, numerous contentious issues arose, particularly regarding the timing and location of the Japanese army's withdrawal. It would take until May 5th for a armistice agreement to be signed. The agreement designated Shanghai as a demilitarized zone, prohibiting China from stationing troops in the areas around Shanghai, Suzhou, and Kunshan, while permitting a limited number of Japanese units to remain in the city. China was permitted to maintain only a small police force within Shanghai. According to Chinese war reports, a total of 10,254 Japanese soldiers were killed or wounded in the Battle of Shanghai on January 28. According to Japanese data, a total of 3,091 Japanese soldiers were killed or wounded in the invasion of Shanghai: 620 Japanese soldiers were killed and 1,622 were wounded in the army; 149 Japanese soldiers were killed and 700 were wounded in the navy. Another Chinese report, stated the 19th Route Army and the Fifth Army suffered a total of 14,104 casualties 4,274 killed and 9,830 wounded. Among them, the 19th Route Army suffered 8,792 casualties, while the Fifth Army suffered 5,312 casualties. Shanghai residents faced bombardments from Japanese aircraft and artillery, resulting in over 6,080 fatalities, more than 2,000 injuries, 10,400 missing persons, and property losses totaling 1.6 billion yuan. At the onset of the war, the Japanese military intentionally targeted cultural institutions in Shanghai, such as the Commercial Press and the Oriental Library, leading to the total destruction of the Commercial Press, the oldest and largest publishing house in China. The Oriental Library, which housed millions of volumes, including over 100,000 rare ancient texts from the Song and Yuan dynasties and the Sikuquanshu compiled during the Qianlong era of the Qing Dynasty, was first devastated by artillery fire and then looted by Japanese forces. Reports from that time indicated that the Japanese army used trucks to transport the remaining books for seven consecutive days. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Thus what became known as the first battle of Shanghai had come to a not so swift end. Was its resolvement a victory for the League of Nations? Or was it just another indicator that the League of Nations was nothing but promises and pieces of paper? One man took notice of the Manchuria and Shanghai incidents, and he would soon bring Europe into a global war.