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Last time we spoke about the Battle of Taierzhuang. Following the fall of Nanjing in December 1937, the Second Sino-Japanese War entered a brutal phase of attrition as Japan sought to consolidate control and press toward central China. Chinese defense prioritized key rail corridors and urban strongholds, with Xuzhou, the JinPu and Longhai lines, and the Huai River system forming crucial lifelines. By early 1938, Japanese offensives aimed to link with forces around Beijing and Nanjing and encircle Chinese positions in the Central Yangtze region, threatening Wuhan. In response, Chiang Kai-shek fortified Xuzhou and expanded defenses to deter a pincer move, eventually amassing roughly 300,000 troops along strategic lines. Taierzhuang became a focal point when Japanese divisions attempted to press south and link with northern elements. Chinese commanders Li Zongren, Bai Chongxi, Tang Enbo, and Sun Lianzhong coordinated to complicate Japanese plans through offensive-defensive actions, counterattacks, and encirclement efforts. The victory, though numerically costly, thwarted immediate Japanese objectives and foreshadowed further attritional struggles ahead.   #171 The Flooding of the Yellow River Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. We last left off with a significant event during the Xuzhou campaign. Three Japanese divisions under General Itagaki Seishiro moved south to attack Taierzhuang and were met by forces commanded by Li Zongren, Sun Lianzhong, and Tang Enbo, whose units possessed a decent amount of artillery. In a two-week engagement from March 22 to April 7, the battle devolved into a costly urban warfare. Fighting was vicious, often conducted in close quarters and at night. The urban environment negated Japanese advantages in armor and artillery, allowing Chinese forces to contend on equal terms. The Chinese also disrupted Japanese logistics by resupplying their own troops and severing rear supply lines, draining Japanese ammunition, supplies, and reinforcements. By April 7, the Japanese were compelled to retreat, marking the first Chinese victory of the war. However both sides suffered heavy losses, with around 20,000 casualties on each side. In the aftermath of this rare victory, Chiang Kai-Shek pushed Tang Enbo and Li Zongren to capitalize on their success and increased deployments in the Taierzhuang theater to about 450,000 troops. Yet the Chinese Army remained hampered by fundamental problems. The parochialism that had crippled Chiang's forces over the preceding months resurfaced. Although the generals had agreed to coordinate in a war of resistance, each still prioritized the safety of his own troops, wary of Chiang's bid to consolidate power. Li Zongren, for example, did not deploy his top Guangxi provincial troops at Taierzhuang and sought to shift most of the fighting onto Tang Enbo's forces. Chiang's colleagues were mindful of the fates of Han Fuju of Shandong and Zhang Xueliang of Manchuria: Han was executed for refusing to fight, while Zhang, after allowing Chiang to reduce the size of his northeastern army, ended up under house arrest. They were right to distrust Chiang. He believed, after all, that provincial armies should come under a unified national command, which he would lead. From a national-unity perspective, his aspiration was not unreasonable. But it fed suspicion among other military leaders that participation in the anti-Japanese war would dilute their power. The divided nature of the command also hindered logistics, making ammunition and food supplies to the front unreliable and easy to cut off. By late April the Chinese had reinforced the Xuzhou area to between 450,000-600,000 to capitalize on their victory. However these armies were plagued with command and control issues. Likewise the Japanese licked their wounds and reinforced the area to roughly 400,000, with fresh troops and supplies flowing in from Tianjin and Nanjing. The Japanese continued with their objective of encircling Chinese forces. The North China Area Army comprised four divisions and two infantry brigades drawn from the Kwantung Army, while the Central China Expeditionary Army consisted of three divisions and the 1st and 2nd Tank Battalions along with motorized support units. The 5th Tank Battalion supported the 3rd Infantry Division as it advanced north along the railway toward Xuzhou. Fighting to the west, east, and north of Xuzhou was intense, resulting in heavy casualties on both sides. On 18 April, the Japanese advanced southward toward Pizhou. Tang Enbo's 20th Army Corps, together with the 2nd, 22nd, 46th, and 59th corps, resisted fiercely, culminating in a stalemate by the end of April. The 60th Corps of the Yunnan Army engaged the Japanese 10th Division at Yuwang Mountain for nearly a month, repelling multiple assaults. By the time it ceded its position to the Guizhou 140th Division and withdrew on 15 May, the corps had sustained losses exceeding half of its forces. Simultaneously, the Japanese conducted offensives along both banks of the Huai River, where Chinese defenders held out for several weeks. Nevertheless, Japanese artillery and aerial bombardment gradually tilted the balance, allowing the attackers to seize Mengcheng on 9 May and Hefei on 14 May. From there, the southern flank split into two parts: one force moved west and then north to cut off the Longhai Railway escape route from Xuzhou, while another division moved directly north along the railway toward Suxian, just outside Xuzhou. Simultaneously, to the north, Japanese units from north China massed at Jining and began moving south beyond Tengxian. Along the coast, an amphibious landing was made at Lianyungang to reinforce troops attacking from the east. The remaining portions of Taierzhuang were captured in May, a development symbolically significant to Tokyo. On 17 May, Japanese artillery further tightened the noose around Xuzhou, striking targets inside the city.  To preserve its strength, the Nationalist government ordered the abandonment of Xuzhou and directed its main forces to break out toward northern Jiangsu, northern Anhui, and eastern Henan. To deter the Japanese army's rapid westward advance and penetration into northern Henan and western Shandong, many leading military and political figures within the Nationalist government proposed breaching dams over the Yellow River to delay the offensive, a strategy that would have been highly advantageous to the Nationalist forces at the time. Chiang Kai-shek vetoed the proposal outright, insisting that the Nationalist army could still resist. He understood that with tens of millions of Chinese lives at stake and a sliver of hope remaining, the levee plan must not be undertaken. Then a significant battle broke out at Lanfeng. Chiang also recognized that defeat could allow the elite Japanese mechanized divisions, the 14th, 16th, and 10th, to advance directly toward Zhengzhou. If Zhengzhou fell, the Japanese mechanized forces on the plains could advance unimpeded toward Tongguan. Their southward push would threaten Xi'an, Xiangfan, and Nanyang, directly jeopardizing the southwest's rear defenses. Concurrently, the Japanese would advance along the Huai River north of the Dabie Mountains toward Wuhan, creating a pincer with operations along the Yangtze River.  Now what followed was arguably the most important and skillful Chinese maneuver of the Xuzhou campaign: a brilliantly executed strategic retreat to the south and west across the Jinpu railway line. On May 15, Li Zongren, in consultation with Chiang Kai-shek, decided to withdraw from Xuzhou and focus on an escape plan. The evacuation of civilians and military personnel began that day. Li ordered troops to melt into the countryside and move south and west at night, crossing the Jinpu Railway and splitting into four groups that would head west. The plan was to regroup in the rugged Dabie Mountains region to the south and prepare for the defense of Wuhan. Li's generals departed reluctantly, having held out for so long; Tang Enbo was said to have wept. Under cover of night, about forty divisions, over 200,000 men, marched out of Japanese reach in less than a week. A critical moment occurred on May 18, when fog and a sandstorm obscured the retreating troops as they crossed the Jinpu Railway. By May 21, Li wired Chiang Kai-shek to report that the withdrawal was complete. He mobilized nearly all of the Kuomintang Central Army's elite units, such as the 74th Army, withdrawn from Xuzhou and transferred directly to Lanfeng, with a resolute intent to “burn their boats.” The force engaged the Japanese in a decisive battle at Lanfeng, aiming to secure the last line of defense for the Yellow River, a position carrying the lives of millions of Chinese civilians. Yet Chiang Kai-shek's strategy was not universally understood by all participating generals, who regarded it as akin to striking a rock with an egg. For the battle of Lanfeng the Chinese mobilized nearly all of the Kuomintang Central Army's elite forces, comprising 14 divisions totaling over 150,000 men. Among these, the 46th Division of the 27th Army, formerly the Central Training Brigade and the 36th, 88th, and 87th Divisions of the 71st Army were German-equipped. Additionally, the 8th Army, the Tax Police Corps having been reorganized into the Ministry of Finance's Anti-Smuggling Corps, the 74th Army, and Hu Zongnan's 17th Corps, the new 1st Army, equipped with the 8th Division were elite Nationalist troops that had demonstrated strong performance in the battle of Shanghai and the battle of Nanjing, and were outfitted with advanced matériel. However, these so-called “elite” forces were heavily degraded during the campaigns in Shanghai and Nanjing. The 46th Division and Hu Zongnan's 17th Corps sustained casualties above 85% in Nanjing, while the 88th and 87th Divisions suffered losses of up to 90%. The 74th Army and the 36th Division also endured losses exceeding 75%. Their German-made equipment incurred substantial losses; although replenishment occurred, inventories resembled roughly a half-German and half-Chinese mix. With very limited heavy weapons and a severe shortage of anti-tank artillery, they could not effectively match the elite Japanese regiments. Hu Zongnan's 17th Corps maintained its national equipment via a close relationship with Chiang Kai-shek. In contrast, the 74th Army, after fighting in Shanghai, Nanjing, and Xuzhou, suffered heavy casualties, and the few German weapons it had were largely destroyed at Nanjing, leaving it to rely on a mix of domestically produced and Hanyang-made armaments. The new recruits added to each unit largely lacked combat experience, with nearly half of the intake having received basic training. The hardest hit was Li Hanhun's 64th Army, established less than a year prior and already unpopular within the Guangdong Army. Although classified as one of the three Type A divisions, the 155th, 156th, and 187th Divisions, it was equipped entirely with Hanyang-made firearms. Its direct artillery battalion possessed only about 20 older mortars and three Type 92 infantry guns, limiting its heavy firepower to roughly that of a Japanese battalion. The 195th Division and several miscellaneous units were even less prominent, reorganized from local militias and lacking Hanyang rifles. Additionally, three batches of artillery purchased from the Soviet Union arrived in Lanzhou via Xinjiang between March and June 1938. Except for the 52nd Artillery Regiment assigned to the 200th Division, the other artillery regiments had recently received their weapons and were still undergoing training. The 200th Division, had been fighting awhile for in the Xuzhou area and incurred heavy casualties, was still in training and could only deploy its remaining tank battalion and armored vehicle company. The tank battalion was equipped with T-26 light tanks and a small number of remaining British Vickers tanks, while the armored vehicle company consisted entirely of Italian Fiat CV33 armored cars. The disparity in numbers was substantial, and this tank unit did not participate in the battle.  As for the Japanese, the 14th Division was an elite Type A formation. Originally organized with four regiments totaling over 30,000 men, the division's strength was later augmented. Doihara's 14th Division received supplements, a full infantry regiment and three artillery regiments, to prevent it from being surrounded and annihilated, effectively transforming the unit into a mobile reinforced division. Consequently, the division's mounted strength expanded to more than 40,000 personnel, comprising five infantry regiments and four artillery regiments. The four artillery regiments, the 24th Artillery Regiment, the 3rd Independence Mountain Artillery Regiment, the 5th Field Heavy Artillery Regiment, and the 6th Field Heavy Artillery Regiment, possessed substantial heavy firepower, including 150mm heavy howitzers and 105mm long-range field cannons, placing them far in excess of the Nationalist forces at Lanfeng. In addition, both the 14th and later the 16th Divisions commanded tank regiments with nearly 200 light and medium tanks each, while Nationalist forces were markedly short of anti-tank artillery. At the same time, the Nationalist Air Force, though it had procured more than 200 aircraft of various types from the Soviet Union, remained heavily reliant on Soviet aid-to-China aircraft, amounting to over 100 machines, and could defend only a few cities such as Wuhan, Nanchang, and Chongqing. In this context, Japanese forces effectively dominated the Battle of Lanfeng. Moreover, reports indicate that the Japanese employed poison gas on the battlefield, while elite Nationalist troops possessed only a limited number of gas masks, creating a stark disparity in chemical warfare preparedness. Despite these disparities, Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist government were initially unaware of the updated strength and composition of the Doihara Division. Faced with constrained options, Chiang chose to press ahead with combat operations. On May 12, 1939, after crossing the Yellow River, the IJA 14th Division continued its southward advance toward Lanfeng. The division's objective was to sever the Longhai Railway, disrupt the main Nationalist retreat toward Zhengzhou, and seize Zhengzhou itself. By May 15, the division split into two columns at Caoxian and moved toward key nodes on the Longhai Line. Major General Toyotomi Fusatarou led two infantry regiments, one cavalry regiment, and one artillery regiment in the main assault toward Kaocheng with the aim of directly capturing Lanfeng. Doihara led three infantry regiments and three artillery regiments toward Neihuang and Minquan, threatening Guide. In response, the Nationalist forces concentrated along the railway from Lanfeng to Guide, uniting Song Xilian's 71st Army, Gui Yongqing's 27th Army, Yu Jishi's 74th Army, Li Hanhun's 64th Army, and Huang Jie's 8th Army. From May 15 to 17, the Fengjiu Brigade, advancing toward Lanfeng, met stubborn resistance near Kaocheng from roughly five divisions under Song Xilian and was forced to shift its effort toward Yejigang and Neihuang. The defense near Neihuang, including Shen Ke's 106th Division and Liang Kai's 195th Division, ultimately faltered, allowing Doihara's division to seize Neihuang, Yejigang, Mazhuangzhai, and Renheji. Nevertheless, the Nationalist forces managed to contain the Japanese advance east and west of the area, preventing a complete encirclement. Chiang Kai-shek ordered Cheng Qian, commander-in-chief of the 1st War Zone, to encircle and annihilate the Japanese 14th Division. The deployment plan mapped three routes: the Eastern Route Army, under Li Hanhun, would include the 74th Army, the 155th Division of the 64th Army, a brigade of the 88th Division, and a regiment of the 87th Division, advancing westward from Guide); the Western Route Army, commanded by Gui Yongqing, would comprise the 27th Army, the 71st Army, the 61st Division, and the 78th Division, advancing eastward from Lanfeng; and the Northern Route Army, formed by Sun Tongxuan's 3rd Army and Shang Zhen's 20th Army, was to cut off the enemy's retreat to the north bank of the Yellow River near Dingtao, Heze, Dongming, and Kaocheng, while attacking the Doihara Division from the east, west, and north to annihilate it in a single decisive operation.  On May 21, the Nationalist Army mounted a full-scale offensive. Yu Jishi's 74th Army, commanded by Wang Yaowu's 51st Division, joined a brigade of Song Xilian's 71st Army, led by the 88th Division, and drove the Japanese forces at Mazhuangzhai into retreat, capturing Neihuang and Renheji. The main Japanese force, more than 6,000 strong, withdrew southwest to Yangjiji and Shuangtaji. Song Xilian, commanding Shen Fazao's 87th Division, launched a sharp assault on Yejigang (Yifeng). The Japanese abandoned the stronghold, but their main body continued advancing toward Yangjiji, with some units retreating to Donggangtou and Maoguzhai. On May 23, Song Xilian's 71st Army and Yu Jishi's 74th Army enveloped and annihilated enemy forces at Donggangtou and Maoguzhai. That evening they seized Ximaoguzhai, Yangzhuang, and Helou, eliminating more than a thousand Japanese troops. The Japanese troops at Donggangtou fled toward Lanfeng. Meanwhile, Gui Yongqing's forces were retreating through Lanfeng. His superior strength, Jiang Fusheng's 36th Division, Li Liangrong's 46th Division, Zhong Song's 61st Division, Li Wen's 78th Division, Long Muhan's 88th Division, and Shen Ke's 106th Division—had held defensive positions along the Lanfeng–Yangji line. Equipped with a tank battalion and armored vehicle company commanded by Qiu Qingquan, they blocked the enemy's westward advance and awaited Japanese exhaustion. However, under the Japanese offensive, Gui Yongqing's poor command led to the loss of Maji and Mengjiaoji, forcing the 27th Army to retreat across its entire front. Its main force fled toward Qixian and Kaifeng. The Japanese seized the opportunity to capture Quxingji, Luowangzhai, and Luowang Railway Station west of Lanfeng. Before retreating, Gui Yongqing ordered Long Muhan to dispatch a brigade to replace the 106th Division in defending Lanfeng, while he directed the 106th Division to fall back to Shiyuan. Frightened by the enemy, Long Muhan unilaterally withdrew his troops on the night of the 23rd, leaving Lanfeng undefended. On the 24th, Japanese troops advancing westward from Donggangtou entered Lanfeng unopposed and, relying on well-fortified fortifications, held their ground until reinforcements arrived. In the initial four days, the Nationalist offensive failed to overwhelm the Japanese, who escaped encirclement and annihilation. The four infantry and artillery regiments and one cavalry regiment on the Japanese side managed to hold the line along Lanfeng, Luowangzhai, Sanyizhai, Lanfengkou, Quxingji, Yang'erzhai, and Chenliukou on the south bank of the Yellow River, offering stubborn resistance. The Longhai Railway was completely cut off. Chiang Kai-shek, furious upon hearing the news while stationed in Zhengzhou, ordered the execution of Long Muhan, commander of the 88th Division, to restore military morale. He also decided to consolidate Hu Zongnan's, Li Hanhun's, Yu Jishi's, Song Xilian's, and Gui Yongqing's troops into the 1st Corps, with Xue Yue as commander-in-chief. On the morning of May 25, they launched a determined counterattack on Doihara's 14th Division. Song Xilian personally led the front lines on May 24 to rally the defeated 88th Division.  Starting on May 25, after three days of intense combat, Li Hanhun's 64th Army advanced to seize Luowang Station and Luowangzhai, while Song Xilian's 71st Army retook Lanfeng City, temporarily reopening the Longhai Line to traffic. At Sanyi Village, Gui Yongqing's 27th Army and Yu Jishi's 74th Army captured a series of outlying positions, including Yang'eyao, Chailou, Cailou, Hezhai, Xuelou, and Baowangsi. Despite these gains, more than 6,000 Japanese troops offered stubborn resistance. During the fighting, Ji Hongru, commander of the 302nd Regiment, was seriously wounded but continued to fight, shouting, “Don't worry about my death! Brothers, fight on!” He ultimately died a heroic death from his wounds. By May 27, Chiang Kai-shek, concerned that the forces had not yet delivered a decisive victory at Lanfeng, personally reprimanded the participating generals and ordered them to completely encircle and annihilate the enemy west of Lanfeng by the following day. He warned that if the opportunity was missed and Japanese reinforcements arrived, the position could be endangered. The next day, Chiang Kai-shek issued another telegram, urging Cheng Qian's First War Zone and all participating units to press the offensive. The telegram allegedly had this in it “It will forever be a laughingstock in the history of warfare.” Meanwhile on the other side, to prevent the annihilation of Doihara's 14th Division, the elite Japanese 16th Division and the 3rd Mixed Brigade, totaling over 40,000 men, launched a westward assault from Dangshan, capturing Yucheng on May 26. They then began probing the outskirts of Guide. Huang Jie's Eighth Army, responsible for the defense, withdrew to the outskirts of Guide that evening. On May 28, Huang Jie again led his troops on his own initiative, retreating to Liuhe and Kaifeng, leaving only the 187th Division to defend Zhuji Station and Guide City. At dawn on May 29, Peng Linsheng, commander of the 187th Division, also withdrew his troops, leaving Guide a deserted city. The Japanese occupied Guide without a fight. The loss of Guide dramatically shifted the tide of the war. Threatened on the flanks by the Japanese 16th Division, the Nationalist forces were forced onto the defensive. On May 28, the Japanese 14th Division concentrated its forces to counterattack Gui Yongqing's troops, but they were defeated again, allowing the Japanese to stabilize their position. At the same time, the fall of Shangqiu compelled Xue Yue's corps to withdraw five divisions to block the enemy in Shangqiu, and the Nationalist Army shifted to a defensive posture with the 14th Division holding Sanyizhai and Quxingji. To the north of the battlefield, the Japanese 4th Mixed Brigade, numbering over 10,000 men, was preparing to force a crossing of the Yellow River in order to join with the nearby 14th Division. More seriously, the 10th Division, together with its 13th Mixed Brigade and totaling more than 40,000 men, had captured Woyang and Bozhou on the Henan-Anhui border and was rapidly encircling eastern Henan. By the time of the Battle of Lanfeng, Japanese forces had deployed more than 100,000 troops, effectively surrounding the Nationalist army. On May 31, the First War Zone decided to withdraw completely, and the Battle of Lanfeng ended in defeat for the Nationalists, forcing Chiang Kai-shek to authorize diverting the Yellow River embankment to relieve pressure. The consequence was a deteriorating strategic situation, as encirclement tightened and reinforcement options dwindled, driving a retreat from the Lanfeng front. The National Army suffered more than 67,000 casualties, killed and wounded more than 10,000 Japanese soldiers, Lanfeng was lost, and Zhengzhou was in danger.  As in Nanjing, this Chinese army might have lived to fight another day, but the effect on Xuzhou itself was horrific. The city had endured Japanese bombardment since August 1937, and the population's mood swung between cautious hope and utter despair. In March, Du Zhongyuan visited Xuzhou. Before he left Wuhan, friends told him that “the city was desolate and the people were terrified, all the inhabitants of Xuzhou were quietly getting on with their business … sometimes it was even calmer than Wuhan.” The Australian journalist Rhodes Farmer recalled a similar image in a book published at war's end, noting the “ordinary townsfolk who became wardens, fire-fighters and first-aid workers during the raid and then went back to their civil jobs.” Yet the mid-May departure of Nationalist troops left the city and its outskirts at the mercy of an angry Imperial Army. Bombing continued through the final days of battle, and a single raid on May 14, 1938 killed 700 people. Around Xuzhou, buildings and bridges were destroyed—some by retreating Chinese forces, some by advancing Japanese troops. Taierzhuang, the scene of the earlier iconic defense, was utterly destroyed. Canadian Jesuits who remained in Xuzhou after its fall recorded that more than a third of the houses were razed, and most of the local population had fled in terror. In rural areas around the city, massacres were repeatedly reported, many witnessed by missionaries. Beyond the atrocities of the Japanese, locals faced banditry in the absence of law enforcement, and vital agricultural work such as planting seed ground to a halt. The loss of Xuzhou was both strategic and symbolic. It dealt a severe blow to Chiang's attempt to hold central China and to control regional troop movements. Morale, which Taierzhuang had briefly boosted, was battered again though not extinguished. The fall signaled that the war would be long, and that swift victory against Japan was no longer likely. Mao Zedong's Yan'an base, far to the northwest, grasped the meaning of defeat there. In May 1938 he delivered one of his most celebrated lectures, “On Protracted War,” chiding those who had over-optimistically claimed the Xuzhou campaign could be a quasi-decisive victory and arguing that, after Taierzhuang, some had become “giddy.” Mao insisted that China would ultimately prevail, yet he warned that it could not be won quickly, and that the War of Resistance would be protracted. In the meantime, the development of guerrilla warfare remained an essential piece of the long-term strategy that the Communist armies would pursue in north China. Yet the loss of Xuzhou did not necessarily portend a long war; it could, instead, presage a war that would be terrifyingly short. By spring 1938 the Chinese defenders were desperate. There was a real danger that the entire war effort could collapse, and the Nationalist governments' notable success as protectors of a shrinking “Free China” lay in avoiding total disaster. Government propaganda had successfully portrayed a plan beyond retreat to foreign observers, yet had Tokyo captured Wuhan in the spring, the Chinese Army would have had to withdraw at speed, reinforcing perceptions of disintegration. Western governments were unlikely to intervene unless convinced it was in their interests. Within the Nationalist leadership, competing instincts persisted. The government pursued welfare measures for the people in the midst of a massive refugee relief effort, the state and local organizations, aided by the International Red Cross, housed large numbers of refugees in 1937–1938. Yet there was a harsher strain within policy circles, with some officials willing to sacrifice individual lives for strategic or political ends as the Japanese threat intensified. Throughout central China, the Yellow River, China's “Sorrow”, loomed as the dominant geographic force shaping history. The loess-laden river, notorious for floods and shifting channels, was banked by massive dikes near Zhengzhou, exactly along the line the Japanese would traverse toward Wuhan. Using the river as a military instrument was discussed as a drastic option: Chiang and Cheng Qian's First War Zone contemplated diverting or breaching the dikes to halt or slow the Japanese advance, a measure that could buy time but would unleash enormous civilian suffering. The idea dated back to 1887 floods that cost hundreds of thousands of lives, and even in 1935 Alexander von Falkenhausen had warned that the Yellow River could become the final line of defense. In 1938 Chiang, recognizing the futility of defeating the Japanese by conventional means at Zhengzhou, considered unleashing the river's force if necessary to impede the invaders. The political and strategic calculus was stark: protect central China and Wuhan, even if it required drastic and morally fraught measures. A more humane leader might have hesitated to break the dikes and spare the dams, allowing the Japanese to take Wuhan. But Chiang Kai-shek believed that if the dikes were not breached and Wuhan fell within days, the Nationalist government might be unable to relocate to Chongqing in time and would likely surrender, leaving Japan in control of almost all of China. Some have compared the choice to France's surrender in June 1940, underscoring that Chiang's decision came during the country's most terrifying assault, with Chinese forces much weaker and less trained than their European counterparts. The dilemma over whether to break the Yellow River dikes grew out of desperation. Chiang ultimately ordered General Wei Rulin to blow the dike that held the Yellow River in central Henan. There was no doubt about the consequences: floods would inundate vast areas of central China, creating a waterlogged barrier that would halt the Japanese advance. Yet for the plan to succeed, it had to be carried out quickly, and the government could offer no public warning in case the Japanese detected it and accelerated their movement. Xiong Xianyu, chief of staff in the 8th Division at the time, recorded the urgency of those hours in his diary. The Japanese were already on the north bank of the Yellow River, briefly delayed when the Chinese army blew up the railway bridge across the river. The destruction of the dikes was the next step: if the area became a sea of mud, there would be no way the Japanese could even attempt to reconstruct the bridge. Blasting the dikes proved easier in theory than in practice. Holding back such a massive body of water required substantial engineering, dams thick and well fortified. The army made its first attempts to blow the dike at the small town of Zhaokou between June 4 and 6, 1938, but the structure proved too durable; another nearby attempt failed as well. Hour by hour, the Japanese moved closer. Division commander Jiang Zaizhen asked Xiong Xianyu for his opinion on where they might breach the dams. Xiong wrote “I discussed the topography, and said that two places, Madukou and Huayuankou, were both possible.” But Madukou was too close to Zhaokou, where the breach had already failed, presenting a danger that the Japanese might reach it very soon. The village of Huayuankou, however, lay farther away and on a bend in the river: “To give ourselves enough time, Huayuankou would be best.” At first, the soldiers treated the task as a military engineering assignment, an “exciting” one in Xiong's words. Xiong and Wei Rulin conducted their first site inspection after dark, late on June 6. The surroundings offered a deceptive calm: Xiong recounted “The wind blew softly, and the river water trickled pleasantly.” Yet gauging the water level proved difficult, hampered by murky moonlight and burned-out flashlights. They spent the night in their car to determine precisely where to break the dike as soon as day broke. But daylight seemed to bring home the consequences of what they planned to do, and the soldiers grew increasingly anxious. Wang Songmei, commander of the 2nd Regiment, addressed the workers about to breach the dike: “My brothers, this plan will be of benefit to our country and our nation, and will lessen the harm that is being done to the people.In the future, you'll find good wives and have plenty of children.” Wang's words were meant to reassure the men of the political necessity of their actions and that fate would not, in the traditional Chinese sense, deny them a family because of the enormity of their deeds. General Wei confirmed that Huayuankou was the right spot, and on June 8 the work began, with about 2,000 men taking part. The Nationalist government was eager to ensure rapid progress. Xiong recorded that the “highest authorities”,, kept making telephone calls from Wuhan to check on progress. In addition, the party sent performers to sing and play music to bolster the workers' spirits. Senior General Shang Zhen announced to the laborers that if they breached the dam by midnight on June 8, each would receive 2,000 yuan; if they achieved it by six the next morning, they would still be paid 1,000 yuan. They needed encouragement, for the diggers had no artificial assistance. After the initial failures at Zhaokou, Wei's troops relied entirely on manual labor, with no explosives used. Yet the workers earned their payments, and the dike was breached in just a few hours. On the morning of June 9, Xiong recorded a rapid shift in mood: the atmosphere became tense and solemn. Initially, the river flow was modest, but by about 1:00 p.m. the water surged “fiercely,” flowing “like 10,000 horses.” Looking toward the distance, Xiong felt as though a sea had appeared before him. “My heart ached,” he wrote. The force of the water widened the breach, and a deadly stream hundreds of feet wide comprising about three-quarters of the river's volume—rushed southeast across the central Chinese plains. “We did this to stop the enemy,” Xiong reflected, “so we didn't regret the huge sacrifice, as it was for a greater victory.” Yet he and the other soldiers also saw a grim reality: the troops who had taken on the task of destroying the railway bridge and the dikes could not bear the flood's consequences alone. It would be up to the government and the people of the nation to provide relief for the countless households uprooted by the flood. In fact, the previous evening Commander Jiang had telephoned to request assistance for those flooded out of their homes.   Wei, Xiong, and their troops managed to escape by wooden boats. Hundreds of thousands of farmers trapped in the floods were far less fortunate. Time magazine's correspondent Theodore White reported on the devastation a few days later “Last week “The Ungovernable” [i.e. the Yellow River] lashed out with a flood which promised to change not only its own course but also the course of the whole Sino-Japanese War. Severe breaks in the dikes near Kaifeng sent a five-foot wall of water fanning out over a 500-squaremile area, spreading death. Toll from Yellow River floods is not so much from quick drowning as from gradual disease and starvation. The river's filth settles ankle-deep on the fields, mothering germs, smothering crops. Last week, about 500,000 peasants were driven from 2,000 communities to await rescue or death on whatever dry ground they could find”. Chiang's government had committed one of the grossest acts of violence against its own people, and he knew that the publicity could be a damaging blow to its reputation. He decided to divert blame by announcing that the dike had been broken, but blaming the breach on Japanese aerial bombing. The Japanese, in turn, fiercely denied having bombed the dikes. White's reporting reflected the immediate response of most foreigners; having heard about the atrocities at Nanjing and Xuzhou, he was disinclined to give the Japanese the benefit of the doubt. Furthermore, at the very time that the Yellow River was flooding central China, the Japanese were heavily bombing Guangzhou, causing thousands of casualties. To White, the Japanese counterargument—that the Chinese themselves were responsible, seemed unthinkable: “These accusations, foreign observers thought, were absurd. For the Chinese to check the Japanese advance at possible sacrifice of half a million lives would be a monstrous pyrrhic victory. Besides, dike-cutting is the blackest of Chinese crimes, and the Chinese Army would hardly risk universal censure for slight tactical gains.” But, of course, that is exactly what they had done. During the war the Nationalists never admitted that they, not the Japanese, had breached the dikes. But the truth quickly became widely known. Just a month later, on July 19, US Ambassador Johnson noted, in private communication, that the “Chinese blocked the advance on Chengchow [Zhengzhou] by breaching the Yellow River dikes.” Eventually some 54,000 square kilometers of central China were inundated by the floods. If the Japanese had committed such an act, it would have been remembered as the prime atrocity of the war, dwarfing even the Nanjing Massacre or the Chongqing air raids in terms of the number of people who suffered. Accurate statistics were impossible to obtain in the midst of wartime chaos and disaster, but in 1948 figures issued by the Nationalists themselves suggested enormous casualties: for the three affected provinces of Henan, Anhui, and Jiangsu, the number of dead was put at 844,489, with some 4.8 million becoming refugees. More recent studies place the numbers lower, but still estimate the dead at around 500,000, and 3–5 million refugees. In contrast, the devastating May 1939 air raids on Chongqing killed some thousands. Xiong reflected in his diary that the breaching of the Yellow River dikes was a sacrifice for a greater victory. Even to some Japanese it seemed that the tactic had been successful in the short term: the first secretary at the US Embassy in Wuhan reported that the flood had “completely checked the Japanese advance on Chengchow” and had prevented them taking Wuhan by rail. Instead, he predicted, the attack was likely to come by water and along the north shore of the Yangtze. Supporters of the dike breaches could argue that these acts saved central China and Chiang's headquarters in Wuhan for another five months. The Japanese were indeed prevented from advancing along the Long–Hai railway toward Wuhan. In the short term the floods did what the Nationalists wanted. But the flooding was a tactic, a breathing space, and did not solve the fundamental problem: China's armies needed strong leadership and rapid reform. Some historians suggest that Chiang's decision was pointless anyway, since it merely delayed the inevitable. Theodore White was right: no strategic advantage could make the deaths of 500,000 of China's own people a worthwhile price to pay. However, Chiang Kai-shek's decision can be partly explained, though not excused, by the context. We can now look back at the actions of the Nationalists and argue that they should not have held on to Wuhan, or that their actions in breaching the dam were unjustifiable in the extreme. But for Chiang, in the hot summer of 1938, it seemed his only hope was to deny Japan as much of China for as long as possible and create the best possible circumstances for a long war from China's interior, while keeping the world's attention on what Japan was doing. The short delay won by the flooding was itself part of the strategy. In the struggle raging within the soul of the Nationalist Party, the callous, calculating streak had won, for the time being. The breaking of the dikes marked a turning point as the Nationalists committed an act whose terrible consequences they would eventually have to expiate. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In late 1937, China's frontline trembled as Japanese forces closed in on Wuhan. Chiang Kai-shek faced a brutal choice: endure costly defenses or unleash a desperate gamble. Chiangs' radical plan emerged: breach the Yellow River dikes at Huayuankou to flood central China, buying time. The flood roared, washing villages and futures away, yet slowing the enemy. The battlefield paused, while a nation weighed courage against civilian suffering, victory against devastating costs.

The Joint Readiness Training Center is pleased to present the ninety-third episode to air on ‘The Crucible - The JRTC Experience' and the fourth* annual Large Scale Combat Operations Symposium. Hosted by COL Ricky Taylor, the Commander of Ops Group (COG). Today's guests are all seasoned observer-coach-trainers (OCTs) from across Operations Group, LTC Bruce Roett, LTC Amoreena York, LTC Westly “West” LaFitte, MAJ David Pfaltzgraff, MAJ Danielle Villaneuva, SGM Nancy Martinez, and MSG Bradley Robinson as well as a senior member of the JRTC's Opposing Force, MAJ Dustin Lawrence and SGM Robert Listau from the US Army Special Operations Command's Special Operations Training Detachment. Opening remarks were provided by LTG Christopher LaNeve, the Commanding General of Eighth Army and Chief of Staff for Combined Forces Command (Korea).    Our panel members are observer-coach-trainers with numerous decisive action training environment rotations between them. LTC Roett is the Task Force Senior and MSG Robinson is the Senior Enlisted Medical Advisor OCT for TF Sustainment (BSB / CSSB). LTC York is the Task Force Senior for the TF Aviation (CAB / ATF). LTC LaFitte is the Brigade Executive Officer OCT and MAJ Pfaltzgraff is the BDE S-3 Operations OCT for Brigade Command & Control (BDE HQ). MAJ Lawrence is the Battalion S-3 Operations Officer for 1-509th IN (OPFOR) “Geronimo.” MAJ Villaneuva is the BN Executive Officer OCT for TF-5 (BEB). SGM Martinez is the Senior Enlisted Advisor OCT for the Intel TF. MSG Robinson is the SGM Listau is the Senior Enlisted Advisor OCT for the Special Operations Training Detachment.   The purpose of the ‘LSCO Symposium' is to advance conversation on warfighting and share observations and lessons learned. We will discuss large scale violence today, but this discussion transcends mission sets. Train for high end competition and scale down as required.   In this episode, we delve into the realities of warfighting in large-scale combat operations (LSCO), with a strong emphasis on the core principles of maneuver warfare, fire support, and sustainment operations. LSCO demands a shift in mindset from counterinsurgency operations to a high-intensity, multi-domain fight requiring coordination across vast operational areas. Key topics include the importance of decentralized command and control (C2), rapid decision-making under pressure, and the necessity of training units to operate with dispersed formations to enhance survivability in a contested battlespace. The discussion also underscores the role of divisions in shaping the battlefield for brigades, ensuring that combat formations can mass effects at decisive points.   Additionally, the episode explores the integration of emerging technologies and lessons learned from recent conflicts, particularly the war in Ukraine, to better prepare for future engagements. The conversation addresses how logistics and fires remain the backbone of LSCO, requiring synchronization at all echelons to sustain the fight. Commanders need to think deeply about sustainment at the point of need, the role of reconnaissance in shaping the fight, and how brigades can best leverage enablers in their operations. Overall, the discussion reinforces that while the domains of warfare may evolve, the fundamental principles of war—mass, maneuver, and tempo—remain unchanged and must be mastered to ensure success on the modern battlefield.   Part of S01 “The Leader's Laboratory” series.   Don't forget to checkout our first, second, and third annual Large Scale Combat Operations Symposium, episodes sixteen, thirty, and sixty-six of ‘The Crucible.'   For additional information and insights from this episode, please check-out our Instagram page @the_jrtc_crucible_podcast   Be sure to follow us on social media to keep up with the latest warfighting TTPs learned through the crucible that is the Joint Readiness Training Center.   Follow us by going to: https://linktr.ee/jrtc and then selecting your preferred podcast format.   Again, we'd like to thank our guests for participating. Don't forget to like, subscribe, and review us wherever you listen or watch your podcasts — and be sure to stay tuned for more in the near future.   “The Crucible – The JRTC Experience” is a product of the Joint Readiness Training Center.   *The first annual LSCO Symposium was conducted at Ft. Benning/Moore but hosted by the JRTC Team.

The tide turned against the Axis and in favour of the Allies in the course of 1943. Victories at Stalingrad in Russia, in the Battle of the Atlantic, and in North Africa, came on top of American advances in the Pacific, from island to island towards Japan. That relieved some of the pressure on the British government, that had been coming under fire for the all the disasters of 1942: the shipping losses in the Battle of the Atlantic, the loss of Burma and Malaya culminating in the fall of Singapore, and the Eighth Army's retreat in front of Rommel in North Africa. Within the British government, things had changed since the start of the war, with the Conservatives Chamberlain and Halifax gone, as well as the poorly performing Labour Deputy Leader, Arthur Greenwood. Churchill and Attlee, so different in personality, had found an effective working relationship, with Attlee now officially Churchill's deputy, and deeply loyal to him. Attlee supported his boss on the big questions, such as the strategic bombing campaign against Germany, now considerably stepped up with the arrival of the Americans. That campaign was increasingly targeting civilians, making it arguably a war crime, or even simply terrorism, but it continued even though it never achieved its aim of breaking German morale. What it did do is divert a significant amount of German airpower from the Russian front to German home defence. The North African campaign had a similar effect: small scale though it was, it sucked in German troops who might otherwise have fought in Russia, and it cost the Luftwaffe dearly, helping the Soviets gain air superiority on the Eastern Front, as the Brits and the Americans won it in the West. Where Attlee differed from Churchill was over questions such as India. A terrible new famine in Bengal, handled with callousness by Churchill, ensured that the question of Indian independence remained a burning one. Attlee was also under pressure from his own party, with Labour demanding that the government adopt as immediate policy the Beveridge report, proposing major reforms to ensure the poor and workers emerged better off when Britain reconstructed itself after the war. Attlee resisted the pressure, since he felt that it was important to hold the Churchill government together, making only small changes until it had won the war, and saving the major reforms for peacetime. Illustration: The Cathedral of Lübeck in Germany burning after an air raid in 1942. Bundesarchiv Bild 146-1977-047-16, released for free public use. Music: Bach Partita #2c by J Bu licensed under an Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivatives (aka Music Sharing) 3.0 International License

The successful Allied capture of Inchon and Seoul, together with the Eighth Army’s breakout from the Pusan Perimeter, forced the North Korean army to rapidly retreat northward and brought the Allied forces to the 38th Parallel. Now, General MacArthur was faced with a decision…should the Allies dig in and consolidate their gains, daring the North Koreans to attack them? Or should they advance further to the north and take control of all Korea? In this episode, Evan and James discuss MacArthur’s fateful decision to…well, listen, and you will find out! Retreat, Hell! In this episode, Sean and James discuss the 1952 film Retreat, Hell!, which presents a sweeping overview of the legendary First Marine Division’s actions in the Korean War, from training camp, to the Inchon landing, to their battles with Chinese forces in North Korea, and finally to their eventual evacuation. Get ready to join in a rousing chorus of the Marine Corps Hymn with Sean and James as they review this fun flick.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Matthew B. Ridgway, who brought a beaten Eighth Army back from disaster in 1951, was a thinking—and fighting—man's soldier.

The Battle of Tannenberg was one of the first major battles of World War I, fought between Russia and Germany in East Prussia. The early decisions of German leadership in World War I, and consequently the Eastern Front, resulted from the German war plan of 1914. However, Eighth Army's operations in East Prussia did not adhere to the plan's original course of action. Although outnumbered, the Imperial German Army successfully and overwhelmingly outperformed the Russian First and Second Armies in mobilization, strategic and tactical execution, logistics, and reconnaissance. The Battle of Tannenberg was one of Germany's earliest, most decisive tactical victories. The Saber and Scroll Socials: The Saber and Scroll Journal (scholasticahq.com) The Saber and Scroll Journal: Volume 11, Number 2, Winter 2022: Ballard, Jeffrey: 9781637238356: Amazon.com: Books You can find the Hardtack socials, website, and Patreon via ⁠⁠linktree⁠⁠. If you have any feedback on Hardtack episodes or suggestions for future episodes, please send an email to hardtackpod@gmail.com Don't forget to rate and subscribe! Make your Own Hardtack! Hardtack Recipe (Survival Bread) - ⁠⁠Bread Dad ⁠ Sources: Duffy, Michael “Firstworldwar.com.” First World War.com - Primary Documents - The Battle of Tannenberg by Paul von Hindenburg, August 1914. Accessed July 24, 2021. https://www.firstworldwar.com/source/tannenberg_hindenburg.htm. Gurko Vasiliĭ Iosifovich. Memories & Impressions of War and Revolution in Russia, 1914-1917. London: John Murray, 2010. Hoffman, Max. “Chapter III - The Battle of Tannenberg.” Essay. In The War of Lost Opportunities, 27–38. Eschenburg Press, 2018. Showalter, Dennis E. Tannenberg: Clash of Empires, 1914. United States: Potomac Books, Inc., An imprint of the University of Nebraska Press, 2004. Strachan, Hew. The First World War. New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2013. Sweetman, John. Tannenberg 1914. London: Cassell, 2002. --- Send in a voice message: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/hardtackpod/message Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/hardtackpod/support

In this episode, LTG Willard M. Burleson III and CSM Robert H. Cobb join SMA Tilley to discuss “Fight Tonight” and the Eighth Army's enduring presence in Korea with their allied partners since 1944. In addition, they highlight why Korea is the Assignment of Choice for Servicemembers and their Families. --- Send in a voice message: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/yournextmission/message

Sin lugar a dudas el mejor y más famoso general británico del Ejército, "Monty" atesora más detractores que partidarios. En este nuevo episodio de Generales de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, separaremos el mito del hombre, y del personaje que se creó. Hablaremos de cómo afrontaba las batallas, y su papel como planificador en la cúpula del Mando Aliado Occidental. Con Antonio 🎙 Muñoz Lorente, 🎙 Antonio Gómez Latorre y 🎙 Dani CarAn. En los momentos clave, Zhukov estaba ahí. En las 60 batallas más trascendentales de la 2GM en el Frente del Este, él estuvo ahí. En las dos ocasiones donde Hitler pudo ganar la 2GM, él estuvo ahí. 🎙 Antonio Muñoz Llorente, flanqueado por 🦕 Antonio Gómez, nos cuentan la historia, los claroscuros y desmontan los mitos de, posiblemente, el mejor comandante de la guerra. Quinto episodio de la serie GENERALES DE LA SEGUNDA GUERRA MUNDIAL 1 - Rommel ▶️ https://go.ivoox.com/rf/65361795 2 - Model ▶️ https://go.ivoox.com/rf/70348388 3 - Von Manstein ▶️ https://go.ivoox.com/rf/85492962 4 - Gueorgui Zhukov ▶️ https://go.ivoox.com/rf/91896630 Corte incluido en el episodio: General Montgomery speaks to Eighth Army (1943) de British Pathé. Casus Belli Podcast pertenece a 🏭 Factoría Casus Belli. Casus Belli Podcast forma parte de 📀 Ivoox Originals. 📚 Zeppelin Books zeppelinbooks.com es un sello editorial de la 🏭 Factoría Casus Belli. ⭐️ APOYA A CASUS BELLI ⭐️ Hazte Mecenas y así nos ayudas creando más y mejor 🎙️ contenido. A cambio accede a más de 650 episodios exclusivos para 💥 FANS. 👉 bit.ly/apoyacasusbelli 📡Estamos en: 👉http://casusbelli.top 🗨️Twitter, como @casusbellipod 👉Facebook, nuestra página es @casusbellipodcast https://www.facebook.com/CasusBelliPodcast 👉Telegram, nuestro canal es @casusbellipodcast https://t.me/casusbellipodcast Y nuestro chat es https://t.me/aviones10 ⭐¿Quieres proponernos algo? También puedes escribirnos a 📧 info@podcastcasusbelli.com Si te ha gustado, y crees que nos lo merecemos, nos sirve mucho que nos des un like 👍, si nos escuchas desde la app de Ivoox. Y también que comentes. Que no mordemos 😉 🎵 La música que acompaña al pódcast es bajo licencia Creative Commons https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/3.0/ o amparado por la licencia privada de Epidemic Music, Jamendo Music o de SGAE RRDD/4/1074/1012 de Ivoox. 🎭 Las opiniones expresadas en este programa de pódcast, son de exclusiva responsabilidad individual. Que cada palo aguante su vela. Muchas gracias por escucharnos, y hasta la próxima. Escucha el episodio completo en la app de iVoox, o descubre todo el catálogo de iVoox Originals

As a young man, CSM Christopher Reaves didn't see the Army as part of his future, even after hearing stories from his father of the memorable bonds he developed as a Soldier in the Vietnam War. But when his college career didn't develop like he envisioned, Reaves gave the Army a second look and now he serves as the Senior Enlisted Advisor for 403d Army Field Support Brigade on Camp Henry. Listen to this episode as CSM Reaves talks about his Army career and how 403d AFSB serves as an important partner to 19th ESC and Eighth Army.

As a young man, CSM Christopher Reaves didn't see the Army as part of his future, even after hearing stories from his father of the memorable bonds he developed as a Soldier in the Vietnam War. But when his college career didn't develop like he envisioned, Reaves gave the Army a second look and now he serves as the Senior Enlisted Advisor for 403d Army Field Support Brigade on Camp Henry. Listen to this episode as CSM Reaves talks about his Army career and how 403d AFSB serves as an important partner to 19th ESC and Eighth Army.

As a young man, CSM Christopher Reaves didn't see the Army as part of his future, even after hearing stories from his father of the memorable bonds he developed as a Soldier in the Vietnam War. But when his college career didn't develop like he envisioned, Reaves gave the Army a second look and now he serves as the Senior Enlisted Advisor for 403d Army Field Support Brigade on Camp Henry. Listen to this episode as CSM Reaves talks about his Army career and how 403d AFSB serves as an important partner to 19th ESC and Eighth Army.

Depending on where you are in your Army career, it can seem overwhelming to look at all the options available to you. To help break down the many Army career options out there -- including options to stay longer in Korea -- we again welcome the Team 19 Retention duo of Sgt. Maj. Winter Washington and Sgt. 1st Class Samantha Recker. In addition to information that can supercharge your career, we also talk with the team about their awards from Eighth Army recognizing their performance! Don't forget to subscribe to the Every Soldier Counts Podcast so you don't miss a single episode!

Today's family stories include the desert experiences of an Eighth Army medic, the Sicilian adventures of a dispatch rider and how wooden sheep helped fool the Luftwaffe.A Goalhanger Films productionProduced by Harry LinekerExec Producer: Tony PastorTwitter: #WeHaveWays @WeHaveWaysPodWebsite: www.wehavewayspod.comEmail: wehavewayspodcast@gmail.com See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

Mike Lavigne has served across the Army as a Public Affairs specialist, with time in Eighth Army, TRADOC and most recently leading the Sergeant Major of the Army's “This is My Squad” initiative. Throughout his career, he has helped to make sure that soldiers' stories are told and promoted across the world. In this episode sits down to talk about a life of service, how his time has humbled him and also gives him a purpose he never imagined. It hasn't always been easy and there have been some tough days. Mike is extremely transparent in this episode as he unpacks the story of his life. This is just one chapter of Mike's life though, as he starts the new path in being a civilian he is finding new ways to use his talent and passions to add values to others. One of those passions in the Always in Pursuit team, which Mike has helped produce, edit and promote. We will be seeing more of Mike in the future, you'll just have to stay tuned to find out how! Find Mike Mike Lavigne on Facebook Mike Lavigne on LinkedIn Mike Lavigne on Instagram Mike Lavigne on Twitter This is also the Season 1 finale, truly amazing guests this season. We can't thank them and the audience enough for all the feedback they have shown over the last year. Don't worry though, we will still have new content in the Blog and social media during the break. Season 2 is going to be amazing and we are already hard at work interviewing guests! We will also be sharing some our most popular episodes during the break with some notes that unpack why this episode was so important to the AIP Journey!! If you enjoyed this episode of Always in Pursuit, please share with a couple of your friends and leave us a review on whatever platform you use. Also find out more about AIP and the team at www.alwaysinpursuit.org. Thank you for tuning in to the show!Check out our amazing Sponsors Adyton PBC and Learn more about MUSTR app which is streamlining systems for leaders across the Department of Defense! 

On another solo installment in the "Korean War 70th Anniversary" series, Avery picks up with the second part of the Chinese Spring Offensive that took play in April-May of 1951. After the intense Chinese assaults at the end of April, there was a temporary lull in the fighting between May 1-14 where both sides consolidated their forces and defenses for the next phase. 175,000 Chinese and North Korean troops struck at the right flank of the U.S. Eighth Army on the eastern front of the peninsula. Those six days of fighting saw the Communist forces have initial success, but eventually smash against hardened U.N. defenses, especially those of the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division. By the end of May, the Chinese and North Korean forces were in full retreat and the steps toward the truce talks beginning were finally taking shape. Enjoy!

looking at the British Army in North Africa, its tactics and training in an effort to explain the difficulties the 8th Army had fighting the Afrika Korps. Jame’s book was released last year but I’ve only recently managed to find the time to read his book 8th Army vs Rommel. And what a cracking book it is… 

Join Avery on another solo installment in the Korean War 70th Anniversary series where this episode focuses on the largest battle of the Korean War: The Chinese Spring Offensive. In late April of 1951, the III, IX and XIX People's Volunteer Army of China Groups attacked the in-depth defenses of the U.S. Eighth Army on the Korean Peninsula; approximately 700,000 Chinese and North Korean soldiers engaged 450,000 United Nations soldiers from the U.S., the U.K., Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South Korea, Puerto Rico, Turkey and the Philippines.. This episode will cover the first phase of the offensive and will briefly summarize the events of that fateful spring. Enjoy!

The second battle of El Alamein took place over 23 October to 4 November 1942.  The battle saw the Allied Eighth Army commanded by General Montgomery breach an obstacle belt and defeat their opponents in the desert.  Speaking of the victory Prime Minister Winston Churchill famously declared “before Alamein we... The post Maximising Fighting Power: Eighth Army at Alamein 1942 appeared first on Wavell Room.

As we move into Thanksgiving 2020, many of us might find it difficult to be thankful for anything in this dumpster fire of a year while others might be the exact opposite. However, 70 years ago in North Korea, many soldiers of the UN forces would be in the same boat in more ways than one. Thanksgiving Day 1950 was followed by a massive onslaught from the Chinese 13th Army as they smashed into the U.S. Eighth Army at the Ch'ongch'on River (Nov. 25 - Dec. 2, 1950). This marked the beginning of the Chinese Second Phase Offensive, the result of which saw the Chinese deal the UN forces a decisive defeat and transform the Korean War into an entirely new conflict. Join Avery for his solo presentation of one of the most chaotic blunders in American military history. Enjoy and stay safe out there!

On another solo episode of Battles & Banter, Avery dives into the brief but significant battle around the North Korean capital of Pyongyang that took place between the diminished forces of the Korean People's Army and the recently victorious United Nations forces that made up the U.S. Eighth Army. Between October 17-19, the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division and ROK 1st Infantry Division pushed into and conquered the North Korean capital, with many soldiers believing it meant the end of the war. Then between Oct. 20-22, a U.S. airborne operation took place to try to cut the North Koreans off from retreat, and resulted in a heated battle around the village of Yongyu between North Korean and Australian soldiers in an apple orchard. These U.N. victories would be the last bit of good news that Gen. MacArthur and his commanders received before the game changed again. Enjoy!

U.S. Army Colonel Steve Battle discusses the Civil Affairs staff responsibilities during the COVID-19 pandemic in the Republic of Korea. Colonel Battle serves as the G9 for Eighth Army.

What was it like to return to Germany as a war hero on the wrong side of history? Al Murray and James Holland debate a wide range of subjects including the role of Baron Beaverbrook in the production of fighter planes and why the Eighth Army were called the Eighth Army.A Goalhanger Films productionProduced by Harry Lineker & Joey McCarthyExec Producer Tony PastorTwitter: #WeHaveWays@WeHaveWaysPodEmail: wehavewayspodcast@gmail.com See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

Show Notes This week, we recap, review, and analyze Mobile Suit Zeta Gundam (機動戦士Ζガンダム) episode 28 - The Jupitris Infiltration (ジュピトリス潜入), discuss our first impressions, and provide commentary and research on physical deception and women spies. We are joined by guest-voice Adam Black, who asked us to link to One Earth Sanga, and organization he works with that "expresses a Buddhist response to ecological crises." - Wikipedia page for Operation Bodyguard, comprised of Operations Fortitude and Quicksilver.- Wikipedia page for the 23rd Headquarters Special Troops (aka the "Ghost Army"), American deception specialists operating in Europe after D-Day.- A collection of historical materials about the 23rd Headquarters. - The 23rd Headquarter's most famous alumnus, fashion designer extraordinaire Bill Blass.- An overview on dummy tanks. - New York Times article about modern Russian inflatable dummies:Andrew E. Kramer, A New Weapon in Russia’s Arsenal, and It’s Inflatable. New York Times article, Oct. 12, 2016. Available at https://nyti.ms/2dWBU8A- Some modern inflatable dummy manufacturers, so you can see pictures of just how real they look (and in case you want your own). - Books about the Second Battle of El Alamein:John Latimer, Alamein. Harvard UP (2002).James Lucas, War in the Desert: the Eighth Army at El Alamein. Beaufort (New York 1982). - Wikipedia page for Operation Bertram.- Articles and books on Operation Bertram:Rickard, J (21 April 2017), Operation Bertram, http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/operation_bertram.htmlPeter Forbes, Dazzled and Deceived: Mimicry and Camouflage. Yale UP (2011).Rick Stroud, The Phantom Army of Alamein: The Men Who Hoodwinked Rommel. A&C Black (2013)- US Naval War College page on women in espionage, with lots of great links to books, articles, and websites with additional information.- Wikipedia category page for “female wartime spies.”- Wikipedia page for “sexpionage” with definition and famous examples.- Article from The Washington Post about sexpionage in the Cold War:Dobbs, Michael. “SEXPIONAGE WHY WE CAN'T RESIST THOSE KGB SIRENS.” The Washington Post, 12 Apr. 1987.- Journal article:Martin, Amy J. “America’s Evolution of Women and Their Roles in the Intelligence Community.” Journal of Strategic Security, vol. 8, no. 3, 2015, pp. 99–109. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/26465249. Accessed 8 Jan. 2020.- More recent articles from Forbes and The Guardian about perceived strengths and advantages of women as spies.- Brief discussion of the history of women in the CIA, culminating with the appointment of Gina Haspel as Director of the CIA in 2018.- Article from The Atlantic, reviewing several books about women in espionage. Includes good excerpts with anecdotes about famous women spies and some of the thought process behind using women for espionage work:Mundy, Liza. “Female Spies and Their Secrets.” The Atlantic, June 2019. Accessed at https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/06/female-spies-world-war-ii/588058/.- Article with stories of specific women spies:Jarvis, Erika. “Five Badass Female Spies Who Deserve Their Own World War II Movie.” Vanity Fair, 26 Nov. 2016. Accessed at https://www.vanityfair.com/hollywood/2016/11/allied-world-war-2-female-spy-movies- And more stories of amazing women spies.- Defense Intelligence Agency short bios of women in espionage, page 1 and page 2.- The music in the ABC (AEUG Broadcasting Channel) is:Gemini (Instrumental Version) by Josh Woodward, licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution License. You can subscribe to the Mobile Suit Breakdown for free! on fine Podcast services everywhere and on YouTube, follow us on twitter @gundampodcast, check us out at gundampodcast.com, email your questions, comments, and complaints to gundampodcast@gmail.com.Mobile Suit Breakdown wouldn't exist without the support of our fans and Patrons! You can join our Patreon to support the podcast and enjoy bonus episodes, extra out-takes, behind-the-scenes photo and video, MSB gear, and much more!The intro music is WASP by Misha Dioxin, and the outro is Long Way Home by Spinning Ratio, both licensed under Creative Commons CC BY 4.0 license. Both have been edited for length. Mobile Suit Breakdown provides critical commentary and is protected by the Fair Use clause of the United States Copyright law. Gundam content is copyright and/or trademark of Sunrise Inc., Bandai, Sotsu Agency, or its original creator. Mobile Suit Breakdown is in no way affiliated with or endorsed by Sunrise, Bandai, Sotsu, or any of their subsidiaries, employees, or associates and makes no claim to own Gundam or any of the copyrights or trademarks related to it. Copyrighted content used in Mobile Suit Breakdown is used in accordance with the Fair Use clause of the United States Copyright law. Any queries should be directed to gundampodcast@gmail.comFind out more at http://gundampodcast.com

The Chinese Army overruns Old Baldy and American attempts to recapture it fails.  General Maxwell Taylor the commander of the Eighth Army decides to halt any further counter attacks.  The battle for Pork Chop Hill begins, the Chinese Army but this time in heavy fighting the American Army retains control of the hill.  Serious talks to begin between Communist and the United Nations about ending the Korean War.  A biography of John Foster Dulles the American Secretary of State.

The fighting along the front line in January and February 1953.  The failure of the American attack upon Spud Hill.  The life of an American infantryman in the Korean War.  Van Fleet is replaced as the commander of the Eighth Army by Maxwell Taylor.  A review of the performance of Van Fleet and the biography of Maxwell Taylor.

Lieutenant General Van Fleet the commander of the Eighth Army increase the number of artillery shells for the Army.  The poor performance of South Korean troops.  The Communist armies retreat as the Eighth Army advances.  The Soviet Union proposes peace talks.

General Ridgeway, the commander of the Eighth Army begins Operation Killer and Ripper to thrown back the Communist armies.  The Eighth Army retakes Seoul the capital of South Korea.  The Canadian Armed Forces Forces sent to Korea.  General Mac Arthur sabotages a proposed American peace offer.  A biography of Major General Hoge the new commander of the 9th Corp.

The Eighth Army pushes forward and retake the port of Inchon.  The Chinese Army launches its fourth offensive in Central Korea, they defeat three South Korean Divisions.  However an attack upon the American 23rd Regiment is a costly failure.  A biography of Colonel Freeman the commander of the American 23rd Regiment.  The New Zealand Army and Navy in the Korean War. 

The American Army undertakes its longest retreat.  The morale of the Eighth Army falls badly.  The death of General Walker and an assignment of his performance as Eighth Army Commander.  The murder of prisoners by the South Korean Government.  The French Army commitment to the Korean War.  A biography of General Matt Ridgeway, the new commander of the Eighth Army.

The Eighth Army launch their own attack towards the north but is caught off balance when the next day the Chinese Army launch their own second offensive.  The Chinese pin down most of the American troops while they crash into the right flank of the Eighth Army.  Many South Korean troops flee in panic, the American 2nd Division suffer heavy losses.  A biography of Major General Keiser.

The USO celebrates their 75th anniversary with a good cause at Guam, and 8th Army Soldiers at Camp Casey compete in the Best Warrior Competition.

On September 16th the Eighth Army begins its breakout from the Pusan perimeter.  North Korean resistance begins to weaken.  The American retake the City of Taejon finding evidence of North Korean killings of civilians and prisoners of war.  The Eighth Army links up the Tenth Corp.  A biography of Lieutenant General Milburn, the commander of the First Corp.

Operation Downfall was the proposed invasion of mainland Japan by Allied Forces near the end of WWII.  It was canceled because the atomic bombs were dropped and Japan surrendered, thereby removing the need for a military conquest.  It would have been the largest amphibious invasion in history, and it would have been the first time that a foreign power had set foot on mainland Japanese soil (in the country's 2500 year history).  Operation Downfall had two parts: Operation Olympic (Nov 1945) and Operation Coronet (March 1946).  Both were commanded by MacArthur and supported by Nimitz.  Operation Olympic involved the I, V, IX, and XI Corps storming the beaches of Kyushu (the southern main island) and taking airbases to support Operation Coronet.  Operation Coronet involved the First Army and the Eighth Army, as well as numerous British Commonwealth units, storming the beaches of Honshu near the capital city of Tokyo.  On the opposing side was Operation Ketsu Go, the Japanese defense of its main islands.  Most of Japan's forces (air and ground) were focused on the island of Kyushu.  Also, tens of millions of Japanese civilians (all able-bodied civilians, men and women) were trained in basic martial arts in order to repel the invasion.  In addition, the Japanese government created numerous suicide units to repel the invasion.  All in all, it would have been one of the bloodiest battles in history.  An estimated 1 million Americans and 10 million Japanese would have lost their lives.  For more information, read: The Japanese Army Handbook by George Forty The Pacific War Companion by Daniel Marston Military History Podcast is sponsored by Armchair General Magazine