Podcasts about Kaifeng

Hear about travel to Central China as the Amateur Traveler talks to Larry Fan, who was born in the city of Zhengzhou and recently returned to explore his birth country. Why should you go to Central China? Larry says, ” “I think it's particularly special because it's considered the cradle of Chinese civilization. Xi'an was the first imperial capital of China. Zhengzhou also happened to be one of the first capitals of the Shang dynasty. Kaifeng and Luoyang, which are two other cities I'll talk about, had also served as capitals of China during various times. It's a very influential area for Chinese civilization and often not as much talked about versus places like Beijing, Shanghai. Etc. ” Larry recommends a 7-10 day itinerary for visiting central China, covering historical and cultural highlights in Henan Province and Xi'an. Here's the detailed breakdown of his suggested itinerary: Days 1-2: Zhengzhou (Capital of Henan Province) Day 1: Zhengzhou City Tour Henan Museum Spend 2-3 hours learning about the region's history from the Shang to Tang dynasties. Guancheng Muslim District Visit the Beidajie Mosque (North Big Mosque), a Yuan dynasty mosque with Chinese architectural influences. Try local food like Xi'an torn bread with lamb soup (羊肉泡饃). Shang Dynasty Relic Park Explore ruins of the Shang Dynasty's capital, including city walls over 3,000 years old. People's Park Relax in the park and experience local activities like dancing and exercise. Erqi Memorial Tower (Feb 7th Square) Learn about the area's historical ties to railroad workers and admire the twin tower.  Zhengdong New Area (CBD) Visit the modern Central Business District featuring the iconic Corncob Building. ... https://amateurtraveler.com/travel-to-central-china/ Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

A night-time cycling trend that started with four Chinese students riding 50km for soup dumplings blew out to a reported 100,000 to 200,000 people recently, jamming major roads, overwhelming a small tourist city and drawing the attention of authorities. Following that, Chinese officials imposed restrictions on bike hire after the huge gathering blocked a highway between Zhengzhou and Kaifeng. On this episode of Morning Shot, Dr Lim Tai Wei, East Asian expert & Professor at Soka University shares his insights on the reasons behind concerns over this phenomenon. He also weighs in with a broader outlook on persistent youth unemployment in China and how Chinese youths should adjust their mindsets when it comes to job market expectations. Presented by: Audrey SiekProduced & Edited by: Yeo Kai Ting (ykaiting@sph.com.sg)Photo credits: Ma Jian / VCG via ReutersSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

For university students, grabbing a shared bike to join a few friends for an intercity evening ride covering 50 kilometers in Henan province may be the ultimate expression of enthusiasm for young cyclists. But as the number of participants grew, so did the problems. 对于大学生来说，扫一辆共享单车，和几个朋友一起在河南跨城夜骑50公里，可能是年轻骑行者热情的极大体现。但随着参与者的增多，问题也随之而来。The collective cycling trend has been a hit with university students in Henan, where groups of students big or small set off on shared bikes late at night and pedal for over five hours to cover the 50-km stretch from Zhengzhou, the provincial capital, to the city of Kaifeng.集体骑行在河南的大学生中已成为风潮，大大小小的学生在深夜骑着共享单车出发，经过五个多小时的跋涉，跨越从省会郑州市到开封市的50公里路程。The trend was inspired by four young women from Zhengzhou who set off on an impulse journey to try Kaifeng's famous guantangbao, a type of soup dumpling, on June 18. Leaving at around 7 pm, they cycled on shared bikes before being rewarded with a plate of steaming dumplings at their destination.这股“夜骑开封”的热潮源于今年6月18日。郑州的四名年轻女性为了品尝开封著名的灌汤包，踏上了一次说走就走的旅程。晚上7点左右，她们骑着共享单车出发，在目的地吃到了热气腾腾的灌汤包。Their adventure quickly went viral on social media. In fact, it became such a sensation that a hashtag, "Youth has no price, night ride to Kaifeng has it," has become a popular topic. 她们的经历迅速在社交媒体上走红。事实上，这已经引起了轰动，“青春没有售价，夜骑开封拿下！”成为了热门话题。What began as a spontaneous trip for dumplings has turned into a symbol of youthful energy and has enabled others to bask in the joy of shared experiences. The bike ride has become so popular that, on some nights, long lines of cyclists can be seen stretching across the road.最初只是为了吃灌汤包而自发进行的骑行，如今已成为青春活力的象征，也让其他人沉浸在类似经历的喜悦中。自行车骑行变得大受欢迎，在某些夜晚，可以看到骑行者在马路上排起长队。However, what began as an exciting adventure also led to a series of problems.然而，激情洋溢的冒险也引发了一系列问题。With large numbers of students riding together, the influx of cyclists caused traffic disruptions, particularly as some groups blocked lanes or rode side by side.由于大量学生一起骑车，骑行者的涌入造成了交通混乱，特别是一些团体并排骑车或堵塞车道。In response to the problem, both Zhengzhou and Kaifeng's traffic police announced temporary measures on Saturday afternoon. From 4 pm on Saturday to noon on Sunday, bike lanes along Zhengkai Avenue connecting the two cities will be closed to cyclists, they said in an announcement.针对这一问题，11月9日下午，郑州和开封的交警部门都宣布了临时措施。公告表示，从11月9日16时至10日中午，连接两市的郑开大道非机动车道将实行禁行措施。Meanwhile, residents in Kaifeng reported issues such as bikes being improperly parked near city landmarks, making it difficult for people to walk in these areas. And in Zhengzhou, a shortage of bikes at metro stations left many commuters stranded.与此同时，开封的居民反映了一些问题，如城市地标附近自行车乱停乱放，影响人们出行。而在郑州，地铁站附近的自行车数量不足给诸多通勤者带来不便。On Saturday, the three major bike-sharing platforms — Hellobike, DiDi Bike and Mobike — issued a joint notice stating that bikes will be locked if ridden outside of designated zones in Zhengzhou. It also warned people about the health risks of riding shared bikes for long distances.11月9日，三大共享单车平台哈啰、美团、青桔联合发布公告，称在郑州指定用车区域外骑行的共享单车将被锁定。公告还提醒人们注意长途骑行共享单车的健康风险。Also on Saturday, the Kaifeng government called on students to avoid riding in large groups, reminding them that "youth needs passion but also safety." It urged the students to take responsibility for their actions and consider public safety.同样在9日，开封市政府呼吁学生不要大规模集体骑行，提醒他们“青春要passion，更要平安”。官方呼吁学生们为自己的行为负责，并为公共安全考虑。Although the late night rides have been paused, the experience has left many students with fond memories.虽然夜骑活动已经暂停，但这段经历给许多学生留下了美好的回忆。Liu Lulu, a student at Henan University, said on Sunday that her experience was unforgettable and meaningful.河南大学学生刘露露10日表示，她的经历既难忘又有意义。"People sang together and cheered for each other while climbing uphill together," she said. "I could feel the passion of the young people. And it was much more than a bike ride."“大家一起唱歌，一起在爬坡时为彼此加油打气，”她说，“我能感受到年轻人的热情，这远不止是一次骑行。”She said she and other students at the university learned about the traffic restrictions and stricter controls installed on intercity cycling over the weekend.刘露露说，她和大学里的其他同学在周末了解到对跨城骑行实施的交通限制和更严格的管制。"Causing problems for the public is the last thing we want to do. Of course, we will follow the new rules and suggestions. I am sure we can show our vibrant spirit in other ways."“给公众带来麻烦是我们最不想做的事情。当然，我们会遵守新的规定和建议，相信我们可以通过其他方式展现我们朝气蓬勃的精神面貌。”shared bike共享单车intercityadj．城市间的baskv. 使……愉快而舒适vibrantadj. 充满生气的，精力充沛的

Last time we spoke about the Chiang-Gui War. China was reunified, but not was all well in Camelot. Chiang Kai-Shek initially popular, faced opposition from various factions, including Northern warlords and rival generals. The KMT decided to relocate the capital from Beijing to Nanking, which sparked resistance from those attached to Beijing's rich history. The KMT then struggled with demobilizing the massive National Revolutionary Army, which had over 2 million troops. Chiang Kai-Shek aimed to reduce this number significantly but faced challenges, including discontent among warlords like Feng Yuxiang and Yan Xishan. Tensions escalated into the Chiang-Gui War, where Chiang defeated the Guangxi Clique led by Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi. This victory, however, did not end the turmoil as Feng and Yan formed an anti-Chiang coalition with Wang Jingwei. The struggle led to a dramatic showdown, culminating in the Taiyuan Conference where Yan Xishan was promoted to commander-in-chief, setting the stage for further conflict.   #123 The Central Plains War  Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. We last left off with basically every other big dog in China getting ready to gang up on Chiang Kai-Shek. Yan Xishan was now the commander in chief of an anti-chiang coalition with his deputy commanders being Feng Yuxiang, Li Zongren and Zhang Xueliang….however Zhang Xueliang was nowhere to be found. During what has been referred to as the “telegram war” period, the Young Marshal had actually spent the entire time in Mukden frantically telegraming all the significant North Chinese warlords and generals to not join the anti-chiang movement.  To take a small sidestep. In the last episode I explained why Li Zongren, Bai Chongxi and their Guangxi clique turned against Chiang Kai-Shek, but what motivations did someone like Feng Yuxiang and his Guominjun have to do so? A severe famine hit the Guanzhong region of Shaanxi, where Feng Yuxiang held power. This famine, which occurred in the 18th year of the Republic of China, is also referred to as the "Famine of the 18th Year of the Republic of China." Within Shaanxi, a year without any harvest is called a famine year, two consecutive years of poor harvest are also labeled famine years, and three consecutive years are considered a severe famine. During the 18th year of the Republic of China, the region faced an extreme famine with virtually no harvest for six consecutive seasons over three years. Some considered it a once-in-a-century event, while others claimed it was a disaster seen once in 300 years. According to modern historical records and newspaper reports, Shaanxi experienced drought in 1928, which caused poor summer wheat yields, while autumn and winter crops could not be planted due to a lack of rain. By 1929, the drought worsened. No rain fell from spring through autumn, drying up wells and rivers like the Jing, Wei, Han, and Bao. Most trees withered, and crops failed—summer harvests only amounted to 20%, and autumn yields were nonexistent. The famine was so severe that grass roots and tree bark became scarce, with the roads littered with corpses and countless people fleeing the area. According to a report by the Shaanxi Disaster Relief Committee on September 5 of that year, 91 of the province's 92 counties were affected by the drought. Except for a few counties along the Wei River that had some green crops, the rest were barren. Among the 91 counties, 24 were extremely severely affected, 27 severely affected, 15 moderately affected, and 25 slightly affected. The most severely hit areas included Chang'an, Wugong, Fengxiang, Fufeng, Qianxian, Qishan, Meixian, Xingping, Xianyang, Lintong, Weinan, Zhouzhi, and others. Out of a total population of over 9.4 million, 2.5 million people died of starvation, approximately 400,000 fled, and over 200,000 women were sold to other regions such as Henan, Shanxi, Beiping, Tianjin, and Shandong. Back in 1927, Chiang Kai-shek established the KMT's new government in Nanking. By June, Chiang and Feng Yuxiang succeeded in uniting the two Kuomintang warlord factions during the Xuzhou Conference. In February 1928, Chiang and Feng solidified their alliance by becoming sworn brothers. Before the launch of the "Second Northern Expedition," Chiang Kai-shek had control over the central KMT government and occupied affluent areas like Shanghai, Nanjing, and Hangzhou. Feng Yuxiang, on the other hand, controlled the impoverished and remote northwest, where transportation was difficult. He saw the Northern Expedition as an opportunity to expand his own influence, particularly eyeing Beijing and Tianjin for their wealth and strategic transportation routes. After the expedition, Chiang Kai-shek, concerned about Feng's growing power, exploited tensions between Yan Xishan and Feng Yuxiang. He ceded control of Hebei, Beijing, and Tianjin to Yan Xishan, appointing him commander of the Beijing-Tianjin garrison and allowing his 3rd Army to enter Beijing. Feng's 2nd Army, however, was restricted to Nanyuan and denied entry into the city, which greatly displeased Feng. In response, he ordered his troops to retreat to Shandong and Henan, and feigned illness in Xinxiang, Henan, refusing to travel to Beijing. In the political realm Feng Yuxiang advocated for "civilian politics" and stood against dictatorship. Within the Kuomintang, he opposed Chiang Kai-shek's views, calling for the establishment of a clean government, promoting joint industrial development, providing aid to disaster victims, and fighting corruption. He also opposed salary increases for central government officials, argued for distributing leadership roles based on the strength of different factions, and rejected Chiang Kai-shek's dominance over party matters and the Nanjing government. These positions sharply conflicted with Chiang Kai-shek's ideas. After the success of the "Northern Expedition," Chiang Kai-shek proposed a reorganization of the army. This initiative sparked intense conflict between Chiang and Feng Yuxiang. On July 6, 1928, Chiang invited Feng, Yan Xishan, Li Zongren, and Bai Chongxi to a symposium in Beiping. However, Feng and other faction leaders strongly opposed Chiang's plan to reduce the army, leading to an unsatisfactory end to the meeting. On August 8, 1928, Chiang presided over the Fifth Plenary Session of the Kuomintang's Second Central Committee in Nanjing, where he sought to force the various factions to comply with his military reduction plan. Supported by the Guangdong-born members of the Central Committee, the proposal was passed, and the army reduction plan became part of the Kuomintang's official resolution. Feeling threatened by this plan, Feng traveled along the Longhai Railway, inspecting the Northwest Army, and held a commemorative military parade marking the second anniversary of the Northwest Army's Wuyuan Oath-taking Ceremony. In October 1928, after the reorganization of the Nanjing National Government, Chiang appointed Feng as Vice President of the Executive Yuan and Minister of Military Affairs, asking him to report to Nanjing immediately. Feng, however, refused, citing various excuses. Under increasing public pressure, Feng and other faction leaders were eventually forced to attend the demobilization meeting in Nanjing. On December 26, 1928, Chiang chaired a preparatory meeting for the demobilization conference, using factional politics to manipulate and divide his rivals. Feng proposed a "three haves and three demobilizations" plan, which was initially opposed by Yan Xishan and Li Zongren. Secretly, Chiang won over Yan, encouraging him to submit a proposal that would counter Feng's influence. When the National Demobilization Meeting convened on January 1, 1929, most attendees supported Yan's proposal over Feng's. The "Outline of the Procedure for the Demobilization Committee of the National Army" was passed, favoring Chiang's position. Eventually, Feng, Yan, and Li shifted from opposing each other to uniting against the demobilization process. In March 1929, as we saw in last episode, the Chiang-Gui War broke out. In order to concentrate military forces and eliminate the Guangxi clique, Chiang Kai-shek sent Shao Lizi and others to Huashan to win over Feng Yuxiang. They offered Feng the chance to continue cooperating with Chiang and send troops to help Chiang defeat Guangxi in exchange for the premiership of the Executive Yuan and the territory of Hubei and Hunan provinces. Feng agreed to Chiang's request on the surface. He then frequently deployed troops on the border between Henan and Hubei, hoping to seize the opportunity to send troops to occupy Wuhan when Chiang and Guangxi were both defeated. However, Chiang soon defeated the Guangxi clique, which increased Chiang Kai-shek's resentment and made the contradiction between Chiang and Feng irreconcilable. Now that pretty much covers Feng Yuxiang's motivations, but what about Yan Xishan? In January 1930, after Yan Xishan returned to Taiyuan from Zhengzhou, central Henan began to experience increasing turmoil. On February 10, Yan sent a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek, urging a spirit of courtesy for the country's sake that they "share the burden" to resolve party conflicts. Chiang responded on February 12 with a telegram stating, "Revolution to save the country is an obligation, not a right. The country is in dire straits, and it is not the time for us to be arrogant." By February 21, Li Zongren, Huang Shaohong, Bai Chongxi, Zhang Fakui, and Hu Zongduo all stated supported Yan Xishan to be the commander-in-chief of the anti-chiang national army, navy, and air force. In many ways the issue was simply thrust onto him. Meanwhile Yan Xishan's army went to Peiping, current day Beijing, disarming the KMT forces there and setting up a HQ. With perhaps a stronger backing, Chiang Kai-Shek would have gone to war against the anti-chiang cabal much earlier, but was reluctant to do so now. The terrain was the difficulty, he would have to fight his way into Shandong, where the local sympathy rested on Feng Yuxiang. So for now he battled them through the use of diplomacy. Within the chaos, the CCP also managed to cut their own piece of the pie by capturing Changsha in late July. They would only hold the city for a few days however, before burning it down and fleeing. Early into the conflict Chiang Kai-Shek's attention was drawn to Manchuria. The Young Marshal had not made a move in either direction and he was sitting upon an army 200,000 plus strong. Where did his sympathies truly lie, everyone was waiting to see. Chiang Kai-Shek believed chances were slim the Young Marshal would rebel against him, he was not very much like his tiger of a father. Zhang Xueliang was a thinker, an idealistic and most importantly he had been an opium addict for a long time. Such a life conditioned the young man to be a lot more passive. Zhang Xueliang seemed to be looking to pledge himself to a real leader who could deliver salvation to China. But who was the better choice for him? Chiang Kai-Shek or Wang Jingwei? Chiang Kai-Shek did not wait for an official answer to this question he hastily announced that Zhang Xueliang was his new deputy commander in chief. Feng Yuxiang and Yan Xishan followed this up by offering Zhang Xueliang a place in the Peiping state council, yet Zhang Xueliang remained quiet until the middle of September. It was a real nail bitter for both sides, Zhang Xueliang had a large, decently trained and pretty well armed army, he would tip the tides for either side. The waiting game had Yan Xishan thinking strongly about pulling out of the coalition. In the meantime the war truly began to heat up in May when Chiang Kai-Shek swore a public oath to attack Yan Xishan and Feng Yuxiang. On May 11th, both sides began engaged another along a north and south front. The main battlefield in the north was centered around Henan with a secondary front in Shandong fought mainly along the Pinghan, Longhai and Jinpu railways. In the southern theater the fighting was fought mainly in the Yuezhou, Changsha and Xiangjiang river areas. To be more specific the anti-Chiang Kai-shek army organized a total of 8 war front areas: the Guangxi clique army was the 1st front, led by Li Zongren, going north from Hunan and heading towards Wuhan; the Northwest Army was the 2nd front, led by Feng Yuxiang, with Lu Zhonglin being responsible for the Longhai and Pinghan lines in Henan; the Shanxi Army was the 3rd front, led by Yan Xishan, with Xu Yongchang responsible for the Jinpu and Jiaoji lines and the eastern section of the Longhai line in Shandong; Shi Yousan's troops were the 4th front; the Northeast Army, which was designated by Zhang Xueliang, was the 5th front though whether he took up the post or not was yet to be seen; Liu Wenhui's troops were the 6th front; He Jian's troops were the 7th front, and Fan Zhongxiu's troops were the 8th front. The Northwest Army and the Shanxi Army, as the main forces, had been fully mobilized and marched to the Longhai, Pinghan, and Jinpu lines. Yan also appointed Shi Yousan as the chairman of Shandong Province, leading his troops to attack Shandong from Henan, and appointed Sun Dianying as the chairman of Anhui Province, attacking the Bozhou area of ​​Anhui. Altogether the Anti-Chiang forces were about 260,000 men strong The fighting kicked off in mid May. The strategy of the anti-Chiang army was for the first front army, the Guangxi army led by Li Zongren to march into Hunan and advance towards Wuhan; the second front army, the Northwestern Army of Feng Yuxiang, was responsible for the Longhai and Pinghan routes in Henan Province, and would attack Xuzhou and Wuhan respectively; the third front army, the Shanxi Army of Yan Xishan was responsible for the operations along the Jinpu and Jiaoji routes in Shandong Province. It would join Feng Yuxiang to attack Xuzhou, then advance southward along the Jinpu Line and attack Nanking; Shi Yousan was in charge of the Fourth Front Army, which would use its main forces to attack Jining and Yanzhou, and would use part of its forces to join the Third Front Army in the attack on Jinan; Zhang Xueliang's Northeast Army was designated as the Fifth Front Army, and efforts were made to jointly fight against Chiang Kai-shek, but again his status was still unknown; Liu Wenhui of Sichuan was appointed as the Sixth Front Army, and He Jian of Hunan was appointed as the Seventh Front Army. In order to encourage generals of non-directly affiliated units, Shi Yousan was appointed as the chairman of Shandong Province, Wan Xuancai as the chairman of Henan Province, and Sun Dianying as the chairman of Anhui Province. After this, Fan Zhongxiu was appointed as the commander-in-chief of the Eighth Front Army. Chiang Kai-Shek deployed the NRA 2nd Corps led by Liu Zhi along the Longhai railway line; the 3rd Crops of H Chengjun was deployed on the Pinhan line; the 1st Corps of Han Fuju was deployed along the Jinpu line and Chiang Kai-Shek set up his HQ in Xuzhou to personally command forces. On May 11th, Chiang Kai-Shek issued his general attack orders, with the 2nd corps attacking Guide from Xuzhou. The two sides began clashing, with the KMT gaining the upper hand rather quickly as they held an advantage in air power. A NRA division led by Chen Jicheng occupied Mamuji due east of Guide. Then Liu Maoen defected to Chiang Kai-Shek handing his forces over at Ningling while also luring Colonel Wan Xuancai into a trap. This left Guide to be easily captured by Chiang's forces as the only other enemy division was that of Sun Dianying who withdrew to Bozhou. Although Chiang Kai-Shek had won technically the first major battle, his situation was not at all enviable.  After losing Guide, Yan Xishan urgently reinforced the Longhai Railway line area with divisions led by Yang Yaofang, Sun Laingcheng and Ji Hongchang. This saw Chiang Kai-Sheks forces suffer extremely heavy losses over the course of 10 days of fighting. Chiang Kai-Sheks forces were reeling from the fierce fighting and forced to retreat into the southwestern portion of Shandong. Along the Pinghan railway, Chiang Kai-Shek ordered He Chengjun's 3rd Corps to depart the Yancheng area and attack northwards. The 3rd Corps quickly found themselves fighting the northwest Army in the Linying and Xuchang areas. The 3rd Corps were trying to contain and isolate the northwest army who were currently receiving reinforcements along the Longhai line.  On May 25th, He Jians forces began occupying Linying and by Juny 7th Xuchang. At this time the Guangxi army invaded Hunan and by the 28th of May had taken Yongzhou, Qiyang, Hangzhou and Baoqing. On June 8th they took Changsha and Yueyang, with their vanguard entering Hubei. Feng Yuxiang took advantage of the situation to launch a full scale attack along the Pingham line. After two days of fighting, Chiang Kai-Sheks men were retreating south to Luohe. However, Feng Yuxiang made an error. His subordinates urged him to link up with the Guangxi army and attack Wuhan. Instead he ordered his forces to advance into eastern Henan where he might annihilate a large portion of Chiang Kai-Sheks army. Meanwhile Chiang Kai-Shek had suffered major defeats across the Longhai and Pingham lines and lost the key city of Changsha, his men were demoralized. By mid June Feng Yuxiang adjusted his battle plan and launched another offensive along the Longhai line as Chiang Kai-Shek came to Liuhe to supervise the battle. Chiang Kai-Shek tossed some of his elite divisions equipped with heavy artillery to attack Feng Yuxiang from Qixian to Taikang, hoping to seize Kaifeng and Chenliu. Yet he fell directly into a pocket-sized encirclement and his forces were battered. Over on the Jinpu line front, Yan Xishan had organized 6 divisions and 3 artillery regiments to perform an offensive against Jinan. They advanced south along the Jinpu line and formed two pincers against the city. Han Fuju knew he would lose considerable forces in a defense of the city and ended up simply pulling out to conserve his strength, handing Jinan over.  July brought significant change to the war. Over in Hunan, Chiang Kai-Shek organized 3 armies to counterattack Changsha; a naval fleet under Chen Skaokuan would assist them and he ordered the 8th route army under Jiang Hauangnai and Cai Tingkai to retake Hengyang. The Guangxi army could not focus on two fronts, so they abandoned Yueyang and Changsha to meet the enemy at Hengyang. The two sides fought bitterly in southern Hunan, but by July 4th the Guangxi army was forced to retreat to the province of Guangxi. Afterwards Chiang Kai-Shek's forces took Bozhou within the Longhai/Jinpu triangle area, effectively trapping forces led by Sun Dianying. On July 8th Chiang Kai-Shek diverted a bunch of divisions from the Longhai line to the Jinpu Line. By the end of the month Chiang Kai-Shek unleashed a general offensive along the Jinpu line. Feng Yuxiang retaliated by launching an offensive over the Longhai line trying to seize Xuzhou. Feng Yuxiang hoped by doing so he could unite the Jinpu and Longhai lines for a combined assault of Xuzhou. Chiang Kai-Sheks Longhai forces were quickly pushed back to an area south of Guide, but mother nature tossed a curveball. Colossal amounts of rain caused river floodings, forcing Feng Yuxiangs men to advance through mud greatly diminishing his supply lines. It was enough to give Chiang Kai-Shek time to stabilize the front as his offensive on the Jinpu line successfully recaptured Jinan by August 15th.  On August 21st Chiang Kai-Shek convened a meeting in Jinan where it was decided they would divert forces from the Jinpu line to the Longhai and Pinghan lines. They would focus the most on the Pinghan line while forces on the Longhai line would try to cut off the retreat of Feng Yuxiang's army. Chiang Kai-Shek even offered 200,00 yuan for the first unit to take Gongxian and 1 million yuan for the occupation of Luoyang and Zhengzhou. On September 6th, Chiang Kai-Shek unleashed another general offensive. Feng Yuxiang believed he had the numbers to win, so he deployed his forces pretty evenly over the Pinghan, Longhai and Zhengzhou fronts. He did urge Yan Xishan to try and help him out if his fronts could afford to spare units. Yet Yan Xishan sought to preserve his strength, and moved his Longhai forces to pull back north of the Yellow River. This action made linking up with Feng Yuxiang pretty much impossible. By the 17th Chiang Kai-Shek captured Longmen very close to Luoyang, effectively cutting off Feng Yuxiang's line of retreat heading west. Thus Feng Yuxiang had no choice but to retreat into northern Henan. Taking another sidestep, you may have noticed one of the largest players remains unmentioned, what about the Young Marshal? Back in March, Zhang Xueliang issued a telegram expressing his neutrality. This of course prompted Chiang Kai-Shek to personally call him, whence negotiations began. On June 10th, Li Shi and Zhang Xueliang discussed the conditions for him to send troops to help the NRA out. The first condition was 2 million yuan to cover the cost of deployment. On June 21st the KMT officially appointed Zhang Xueliang as deputy commander. The next day Zhang Xueliang telegramed everyone suggesting that both sides agree to a cease-fire and establish a buffer zone. In August Li Shi came to meet with Zhang Xueliang again, where the Young Marshal then demanded 5 million yuan for military use and a loan of 10 million yuan to stabilize the northeast economy. Chiang Kai-Shek agreed to the terms on the spot. Then Zhang Xueliang said if Chiang Kai-Shek could capture Jinan, he would send troops. As mentioned this occurred on August 15th. Thus Zhang Xueliang began speaking with his generals. Meanwhile on the other side, the Anti-Chiang leadership began establishing a competing government in Peiping in July whereupon they appointed many Fengtian clique members to be the heads of certain departments. Yet on September 2nd, Zhang Xueliang told Fu Zuoyi, a anti-Chiang representative that he did not support their Peiping government. Then Zhang Xueliang recalled all the Fengtian members they had appointed as officials.  Then on September 18th, Zhang Xueliang issued a telegram urging "all parties to stop fighting immediately to relieve the people's suffering and wait for Nanking to take action." At the same time, he dispatched Yu Xuzhong and Wang Shuchang with the 1st and 2nd armies of the Northeast Frontier Defense army to enter the pass. On October 9th, he officially took up office as the deputy commander for the NRA. Yan Xishan soon received word from forces in Tangshan that Zhang Xuliang was advancing, so he called for a meeting to figure out countermeasures. Zhang Xueliang then sent word to Yan Xishan that he should withdraw from occupied areas. Yan Xishan did indeed comply as Zhang Xueliang quickly occupied Ping and Tianjin without firing a shot. To maintain cordial relations with Yan Xishan, Zhang Xueliang had his army only advance into Hubei and Chahar, but left Shanxi alone. This prompted Yan Xishans forces to cross the Yellow River and retreat back into Shanxi using two routes.  Meanwhile a wave of defections to Chiang Kai-Shek began in late September, severely crippling the Pinghan line for Feng Yuxiang. Along the Longhai line, Chiang Kai-Shek's forces took Kaifeng on October 3rd and were advancing towards Zhangzhou. The KMT government then began announcing amnesty for all Generals if they would stand down. The next days many of Feng Yuxiang's subordinates called upon him to issue a ceasefire. Feng Yuxiang was basically screwed, Chiang and Zhang were surrounding him slowly as his own Generals defected or abandoned the cause. On the 5th Feng Yuxiangs deputy commander withdrew to Xinxiang, due north of the Yellow River. The next day Zhengzhou fell to the NRA 11th division of Chen Cheng. On the 5th Yan Xishan, Feng Yuxiang and Wang Jingwei jointly telegrammed Zhang Xueliang expressing their desire for a ceasefire and to open up negotiations.  By the 15th Yan Xishan and Feng Yuxiang stepped down together as commanders in chief. Yan Xishan handed command to Xu Yongchang and Feng Yuxiang to Lu Zhonglin. Both men then stated they would go temporarily abroad, though neither truly did. In truth Yan Xishan fled to Dalian under the protection of the Japanese and Feng Yuxiang hid in Yudaohe in Shanxi. That same day Lu Zhonglin telegramed to the Northwest army "withdraw defense immediately upon order inform all injured units to stop fighting and rest the people." On November 4th, Yan Xishan and Feng Yuxiang telegramed the dissolution of the anti-chiang movement, ending the war. The Central Plains War lasted roughly seven months, with both sides mobilizing more than 1.1 million troops, spending 500 million yuan, and suffering 300,000 casualties. At least half of them were young and middle-aged men from Hebei, Shandong, Henan and other provinces. It was the largest civil war in China after the Northern Expedition to unify China. The war spread to Hebei, Shandong, Henan, Shaanxi, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi and other provinces. Most of the national troops originally prepared to suppress the Communists were mobilized, allowing the Chinese Communist Party to breathe and develop. Warlords imposed additional donations and taxes on the common people and issued paper money indiscriminately. As usual the ones to suffer the most were of course the common people. Within the Central Plains, 27 counties including Luoyang in Henan Province were severely affected, with agricultural losses amounting to 160.2% of the annual output value; farmers in more than a dozen counties including lost an average of 0.22 heads of livestock and 0.07 carts per household. Within Henan Province, it was said “over 120,000 people died in the war, over 19,500 were injured, over 1,185,000 fled, and over 1,297,700 were forced into exile by the army, of which over 30,000 died in combat, not including soldiers. The total property losses, including the destruction and burning of houses, amounted to over 651,469,000 yuan. It is estimated that it will take 10 years to recover all the losses.” Source in Zhengzhou stated “Since the beginning of the war, planes have been arriving every day, dropping bombs. … Every time a bomb is dropped, five or six people are killed and several buildings are destroyed. This situation is not limited to Zhengzhou. It is the same everywhere in the battlefield cities, the counties and villages near the Longhai and Pinghan railways, even in broad daylight.”  Industry declined and agriculture went bankrupt. The war caused great damage to industrial and agricultural production, seriously hindering the development of the social economy. “The national finances and social economy were both exhausted.” For railway transportation alone saw  “capital losses amounted to 22,165,504 yuan; withdrawals from garrison troops amounted to 4,206,155 yuan; military transport losses amounted to 29,958,042 yuan; and operating losses amounted to 17,018,271 yuan. The total was more than 73 million yuan.Among agricultural products, tobacco leaves were harvested in the three provinces of Henan, Shandong and Anhui, and the war was at its most intense. The losses were between 20 and 30 million yuan. The losses were twice as much as the war expenses.”  Chiang Kai-Shek had won the war, utterly breaking his opponents. Feng Yuxiangs northwest disintegrated into four factions. Yan Xishans Shanxi army took heavy losses that they would not recover from. Zhang Xueliang profited the most, his northeast army gained further territory in North China. He would gradually incorporate a large part of the forces in Shanxi and Suiyuan and would emerge the second largest military faction in China. However, when Zhang Xueliang depleted the northeast of her military forces, this left the borders weak. Zhang Xueliang soon became focused on governing North China, taking his eyes off his powerbase of Manchuria, which Japanese eyes looked upon enviously.  Overall the Central plains war weakened the NRA, the KMT, depleted China of her overall strength and lessened efforts against the CCP. Within the background of the warlord-NRA conflict, the CCP would benefit greatly. The CCP had spread to 11 provinces, including Jiangxi, Hubei, Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hunan, Henan, Sichuan, Anhui, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang. Their Red Army formed a total of 14 armies with a total of about 100,000 people. But with the Central Plains War ended, now Chiang Kai-Shek could redirect his efforts against the Red Menace.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Chiang Kai-Shek had certainly faced a formidable enemy in the former of his past comrades in arms, Feng Yuxiang, Yan Xishan, Li Zongren and many others. At the last minute the Young Marshal saved the day, allowing the Generalissimo to retain control over the new Republic, yet in the background lurked enemies everywhere still.

Last time we spoke about the creation of the September Government. On August 12, 1927, Chiang Kai-Shek shocked everyone by agreeing to step down as the NRA faced decisive defeats and fled south of the Yangtze River. Despite attempts at reconciliation, the KMT remained fragmented, and many of Chiang Kai-Shek's supporters followed him into exile. Meanwhile, the NRA tried to regroup as they lost territory, and the NPA, led by Sun Chuanfang, launched attacks. The KMT factions eventually formed a temporary coalition, the "September Government," but struggled with internal divisions and external threats from the NPA and CCP insurgents. This time it was Wang Jingwei who walked away. After Sun Chuanfang's defeat, Tang Shengchih resisted the coalition, leading to more conflict. By late 1927, the NRA began to make advances but faced fierce resistance from NPA forces fortified by Zhang Zongchang. The KMT's instability persisted, with Wang Jingwei attempting to rebuild his power base in Guangdong amidst a CCP coup that was quickly suppressed.   #116 The Northern Expedition Part 7: The Return of the Generalissimo  Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Wang Jingwei yet again boarded a ship bound for France. With him gone, the KMT now shifted their attention back to Chiang Kai-Shek. Everyone agreed, no other figurehead could wield the unruly NRA confederacy into a coordinated fighting force. For all of his banter about the dangers of the CCP, well he had been right. While in exile, Chiang Kai-Shek had married the sister of T.V Soong, Soong Meiling in early December. Since T.V Soon was the finance Minister of the KMT, it was a given that if Chiang Kai-Shek came back he was guaranteed support from the bankers and industrialists. On December 20th, General Ho Yingqing telegraphed Nanking from the northern front line calling for an all-KMT assembly and for the Generalissimo to return as Commander in Chief, the NRA simply needed him. The Shanghai branch of the KMT began petitioning for Chiang Kai-Shek to return, then most of Nanking began petitioning. Finally on January 1st of 1928, the KTM government invited Chiang Kai-Shek by telegraph to take back the chain of command. As early as December of 1927, Chiang Kai-Shek knew the KMT would be inviting him back over. He had been working behind the scenes to make sure of that. In late December he had dispatched Lu Hosheng into northern China as a secret agent, trying to persuade some warlord leaders and their lesser subordinates to defect to the NRA from the NPA. Lu Hosheng used foreign concessions as bases of operations in numerous ports, the most significant one being Tianjin. Meanwhile Chiang Kai-Shek had also been promoting a new Central Military Academy at Nanking, whose graduates might replenish the absolutely battered ranks of the NRA corps. The academy, similar to Whampoa would be indoctrinated in KMT ideology. It was Chiang Kai-Sheks hope in the future when China was reunified to create academies in all the provinces, so the nation could have a real modern military.  Once back Chiang Kai-Shek worked to reconstruct the party. It was the repeated process of smoothing things over with specific groups within the KMT. On January 4th the former Wuhan clique Sun Fo was named Minister of Construction; T.V Soon resumed his role as finance minister and the old Guangdong base reverted to the control of Li Jishen and Huang Shaoxiung. On January 7th a lot of reshuffling occurred. The Central Political council was restored and its members included Hu Hanmin, Tan Yenkai, Qu Peiteh, CC Wu, Sun Fo, T.V Soong, Chiang Kai-Shek, Yi Peichi and Yu Yujen. A new Standing Committee was created consisting of Chiang Kai-Shek, Tan Yenkai. Yu Yujen, Tai Chitao and Ting Weifen. Tan Yenkai became the chairman of the National Government Committee. Chiang Kai-Shek regained his chairmanship over the now 73 man military council with their highest ranking member being Generals Li Zongren, Li Jishen, Bai Congxi, Qu Peiteh, Cheng Chen, Ho Yingqin, Tan Yenkai, Feng Yuxiang, Yan Xishan and Admiral Yang Shuchuang.  Along with the reconstruction came a process of centralizing power. Chiang Kai-Shek began providing financial support to the conglomeration of armies vowing loyalty to Nanking. Early on at Guangzhou, the Central Bank under T.V Soong had managed to attract generals and their troops, the same was being done at Nanking, just on a larger scale. Revenue control was something looked over with a fine-toothed comb. The first provinces to be investigated were Zhejiang and Jiangsu. On the 7th T.V Soong announced both provinces would see a monthly revenue of 10 million. After January's intense governmental restructure, Chiang finally felt secure enough to concentrate on the Northern Expedition. On February 9th, Chiang Kai-Shek got aboard a train with his general staff to inspect the frontlines near Xuzhou. Together they inspected the lines and prepared for a major spring campaign. The lines had been fairly stationary since mid December as the snow and cold took over the terrain of northern china. On February 11th, they received a message from the national government ordering them to complete plans for a final campaign to take all of northern china. The plans for such a campaign would see a rapid seizure of the north from Jiangsu to Beijing in 3 months. From Xuzhou Chiang Kai-Shek and his team traveled over the Lunghai railay to meet Feng Yuxiang at his HQ in Kaifeng. On the 16th Chiang Kai-Shek and Feng Yuxiang discussed how they would cooperate during the final campaign. Chiang Kai-Shek would also have to discuss matters with Yan Xishan, both he and Feng Yuxiang were regional commanders outside the KMT whom held considerable autonomy and status. Both also controlled highly defensible bases; the Guominjun territory ran from Shaanxi and Yan Xishan held the Shanxi…yeah that gets confusing a bit. Chiang Kai-Shek always needed to make sure their forces were content, for if they broke off from the NRA to join the NPA it would really put a damper on the northern expedition. Even if they simply became neutral it would have a profound effect. To compromise, Nanking offered nominal subordination and cooperation. Feng Yuxiang and Yan Xishan would gain material aid and status almost equal to Chiang Kai-Shek. There was also a new military restructure as the NRA had grown by a lot. The NRA had grown to nearly a million men and would now be divided into 4 collective armies. Chiang Kai-Shek was commander in chief with He Yingqin as his chief of staff. The first collective army consisted mostly of the 40 original NRA army corps that began the northern expedition. The second collective army would be led by Feng Yuxiang controlling Shaanxi and Honan. The 3rd collective army was led by Yan Xishan, controlling the north china plain. The 4th collective army was led by Li Zongren and would control Guangxi, Hunan and Hubei. Although the 4 commands were relatively equal, Chiang Kai-Shek and the Nanking government held the purse strings, which essentially made them suzerain.  Chiang Kai-Shek believed if properly coordinated the 4 collective armies would be able to perform a lightning fast campaign to take the north china plain. By 1928 the KMT was the largest political force in China. With his status and influence amongst the leadership in the KMT, Chiang Kai-Shek sought a position where he would not become dependent on some clique within the KMT, as was the case with the Wuhan situation. Thus on March 7th, he managed to get the party to appoint him as chairman. After that was settled the political council then divided up political authority amongst the other 4 commanders based on the regions they controlled. Li Jishen became the chairman of Guangzhou; Li Zongren over Wuhan; Feng Yuxiang over Kaifeng and Yan Xishan over Taiyuan. Since Chiang Kai-Shek had to focus on the northern expedition he had Tan Yenkai appointed as chairman of the Political council to manage stuff. By late March, the 1st collective Army was assembling to resume their advance after the mid-winter halt. On the other side of the east-west Lunhai railway stood a well rested and reinforced NPA. Zhang Zuolin, Zhang Zongchang and Sun Chuanfang coordinated their efforts into northern Shandong. Yet alongside them was another enemy even more dangerous, the Japanese. Going back in time somewhat, in March of 1927 when the NRA was taking over Nanking and Hankou later in April, many foreign concessions and consulates were attacked by NRA soldiers and Chinese civilians. These became known as the Nanking and Hankou incidents. Following the incidents Chiang Kai-Shek made repeated statements trying to juggle between appeasing the foreign powers and looking anti-imperialistic to the people of China. Despite all of the assurances, the foreign powers, one being the Empire of Japan, remained very concerned about the safety of their people, economic and political interests within China. Many of these foreign powers resolved not to let another Nanking incident occur again.  Now back in 1927 as the NRA were approaching Shandong the first time, the Japanese had sprung into action. Japan saw Shandong province, ever since the 21 demands debacle, as their sphere of influence. They deployed 4000 troops from the Kwangtung army over to the cities of Qingdao and Jinan, calling them the First Shandong Expeditionary forces. Their justification for this was to protect Japanese civilians against potential NRA attacks. Chiang Kai-Shek was well aware of the severe danger provoking the Japanese would provide, so he wanted to keep his forces as far away from Jinan as possible. Japanese prime minister Tanaka Giichi knew the deployment of such forces could result in another conflict with China, ironically endangering the very citizens they were trying to protect. Then all of a sudden Japan found out the split between Wuhan and Nanjing was resolved and Chiang Kai-Shek had stepped down. It was quite a surprise to the Japanese who withdrew their forces from Jinan. In his exile, Chiang Kai-Shek went to Japan and would meet on multiple occasions with prime minister Tanaka Giichi. During some of these meetings, Tanaka suggested Japan was fully willing to support Chiang Kai-Shek and not interfere in Chinese domestic affairs. Chiang Kai-Shek responded that he understood Japan's interests in China. Tanak then suggested the KMT focus on consolidating their power within the territories they already controlled, rather than advancing further north, especially not towards the Fengtian clique territory, which of course the Japanese saw as their sphere of influence. Chiang Kai-Shek had to reply that that was simply impossible. Thus their little meetings ended rather inconclusively. It put the KMT and Japanese into a sort of limbo. On one hand Chiang Kai-Shek was literally running on a platform promising to end foreign encroachment into China. On the other hand, he was not an idiot and knew he had to avoid conflict with foreign powers like Japan. By April of 1928 Feng Yuxiangs 2nd collective army and Yan Xishan's 3rd had began to battle the NPA along the Honan-Shandong border and along the Beijing-Suiyuan railway line. For Chiang Kai-Shek's 1st collective army, the northern expedition officially kicked back off on April 7th. With Feng Yuxiang and Yan Xishan softened up the NPA, Chiang Kai-Shek easily drove into Shandong along the Tianjin- Pukou railway, capturing Tengzhou by the 16th. Meanwhile Feng Yuxiangs forces pushed east, capturing Jiaxiang on the 15th. Sun Chuanfang attempted a two-pronged counter offensive against the 1st and 2nd collective NRA armies, managing to push the first back to the Longhai railway, but his attack against the 2nd failed utterly. By the 21st the combined NRA forces pushed his NPA forces from Jining towards Jinan.According to an American eye witness of Sun Chuanfangs retreat, “the great majority of the troops in this retreat literally walked the soles off their shoes, and this, combined with the scarcity of food and total lack of shelter left the vast horde without any idea of further resistance" When the Japanese learned of Sun Chuanfangs utter defeat and failure to defend the Shandong border, they yet again deployed troops. This time Japan sent the 6th IJA division on the 19th, calling them the second Shandong expeditionary force. Tanaka was actually very hesitant about sending the force but his platform had been running on protecting nationals, thus he was hamstrung. Even before he gave the order to dispatch forces, General Fukuda Hikosuke had been arriving in Jinan via the Qingdao-Jinan railway as early as April 10th. This of course was a classic example of insubordination by IJA officers in China during the late 1920's to late 1930s period. If you are interested I recommend my podcast series on General Ishiwara Kanji found over at the Pacific War Channel on Youtube or all podcast platforms. Basically Ishiwara was the number one example of insubordination leading to insane outcomes. Regardless the first group of 475 troops began to arrive by the 20th and would be followed up by 4000 more over the next few days. Now it just so happened the Japanese began arriving exactly at the same time the NPA forces were withdrawing to Jinan. To the public it looked like the NPA called upon the Japanese to come. The KMT immediately used this as propaganda against the NPA. Both the Nanking and Beiyang governments began protesting against the Japanese intervention, which never stopped the Japanese ever. Sun Chuanfang had established a second line of defense strung along the mountainous backbone of the Shandong peninsula. To the north was the railway from Jinan heading for Qingdao. As the first collective army advancing towards the line on the 27th they performed a pincer maneuver against the Lunshan railway station. After a 2 day battle around Lunshan, Chen Tiaoyuan and the 26th NRA army managed to cut the NPA off from the railway line. Again using their better mobility and speed, the NRA evaded the enemy's railway artillery by simply sweeping around behind and cutting the railway communications. After this the NRA advanced west along the railway towards the Yellow River bridge just before arriving at Jinan. This would effectively see the NPA forces around the capital region becoming isolated on the south bank of the river. To prevent the NPA's retreat out onto the peninsula along the railway, a battalion of engineers sabotaged the railway line with explosives. Within a frantic rush to escape Lungshan, Sun Chuanfang had left behind 30 boxcars full of food, ammunition and 300 soldiers. Now the first NRA units to advance into Shandong had done so along the Tianjin-Pukou railway, avoiding the main pass between Taian and Jinan. Instead they advanced up the adjoining mountains capturing some elevated points where they could deploy artillery to hit the NPA from. Although the NRA was weaker in heavy artillery, taking such heights to deploy what they had compensated that, with added flanking maneuvers. Once the NRA had blocked the NPA from retreating via rail onto the Shandong peninsula, the yellow rail bridge remained their last avenue of escape. The NPA elected to evacuate to the north bank, crossing the bridge on the 19th, yet all order soon collapsed in a mayhem of men running for it under fire. Back over in Jinan, violence and looting erupted as NPA troops grabbed what they could and fled north. Defending the barricaded perimeter of the Japanese concession area, the Kwantung army prepared to fight anyone who dared come near them.  On the 30th, the Chinese media began reporting scuffles breaking out at Jinan between Japanese and Chinese, specifically mentioning some Chinese were stabbed. Since the NRA engineers had sabotaged the railway to Qingdao on the 28th, they most likely had come into contact with Japanese patrols. As more and more Japanese landed at Qingdao enroute to Jinan, the Chinese public assumed this was a pretext for an invasion of Shandong, similar to what had occurred during WW1. There was wide scale public outcry over the supposed invasion. By this time 3000 crack Kwangtung troops with heavy artillery pieces were guarding 2000 Japanese civilians as another 2000 Japanese troops patrolling the railway to Qingdao.  The first NRA units to enter Jinan were wearing civilian clothing, encouraging civilian cooperation and gathering intelligence. On May 1st the NRA vanguard began securing a bridgehead over the north bank of the yellow river after fighting some NPA at Sangtzutien. As the main bulk of the collective first army approached Jinan they did so with extreme precaution. On the 2nd day as the NRA secured the area, Chiang Kai-Shek proclaimed order would be maintained in Jinan. That day Chiang Kai-Shek began negotiating with the Japanese to withdraw their troops, giving assurance to Major General Ryu Saito, everything would be secured in Jinan as he would have his NRA forces simply advance past Jinan further north in haste. After their talks Saito elected to begin preparing for a withdrawal and said he would entrust Jinan to Chiang Kai-Shek. General Fukuda authorized the decision and Japanese forces began withdrawing that night. However the morning of May 3rd erupted in conflict. The exact story as to what happened is a he said she said situation. The Japanese began destroying a Chinese wireless station after a clash had broken out. This left the Japanese with the only working line of communication out of Jinan, forcing all foreign media to depend on the Japanese accounts. Yes a large hmmmmm moment. According to a report given by General Fukuda, a group of Chinese soldiers, allegedly Guominjun under the command of General He Yaozu who were also responsible for the Nanking incident, broke into the Manshu Nippo newspaper office and assaulted its owner at 9:30am. A group of Japanese soldiers led by Captain Yoshiharu Kumekawa rushed to the scene and were fired upon by the Chinese soldiers. The Chinese version of what happened, had it that a sick Chinese soldier had attempted to seek treatment at a local Christian hospital with the help of a local worker, but was blocked from going down a street to the hospital by Japanese soldiers. They began shouting at another until the Japanese shot and killed both Chinese. I would like to note, after all the Pacific War is kind of my thing. There would be other famous incidents quite similar to the one in Jinan, for example the Huanggutun incident and Mukden incident, both instigated by the Kwantung army trying to perform false flag operations. It would seem very likely what occurred at Jinan was an early attempt by the Kwantung army to force an invasion of China.  Regardless from this small clash a full scale conflict broke out between the NRA and Japanese. The Japanese media reported the NRA then began destroying property and massacring Japanese civilians. A British consul general reported seeing dead Japanese corpses allegedly with their penises cut off. The Japanese eventually stormed a office that was to be a point of negotiation between the two sides. Chinese diplomat Cai Gongshi, 8 staff members, 7 NRA soldiers and a cook were killed. What went down there is contested. The Japanese would claim they were attacked from the upper floors and had no idea the office was being used for negotiations. The chinese state the building had been marked, and that Cai Gongshi's nose, ears and tongue were cut out, his eyes were gouged out, all occurring before he was executed. The other staff members were stripped naked, whipped, dragged out back over the lawn and executed with machine guns. In response to those graphic reports, Major General Ryu Saito wrote it off as Chinese propaganda, stating Cai Gongshi was simply shot in a firefight and that one cannot cut off ears, noses and such with a bayonet. I admit the Chinese account does reek of propaganda, hell they wrote such account ever since the first sino-japanese war.  Negotiations to halt the violence began quickly thereafter. Chiang Kai-Shek and General Fukuda agreed to a truce and came to an agreement very fast. The Japanese would withdraw, leaving just a small detachment to keep order and the NRA would advance north to continue their expedition. Then on the 4th the Japanese reported their chief negotiator, Colonel Sasaki Toichi was robbed and beaten nearly to death, only saved by one of Chiang Kai-Shek's officers. Chiang Kai-Shek had promised his troops would be removed by this time, thus the Japanese accused him of lying. The Japanese were outraged at what happened to Sasaki, Major General Tatekawa Yoshitsugu stated “that it was necessary for Japan to chastise the lawless Chinese soldiers in order to maintain Japan's national and military prestige". Because of this incident, General Fukuda asked prime minister tanaka to despatch reinforcements from Korea and Manchuria, which would be known as the third shandong expedition. They began arriving to Jinan on the 7th of May. With more force in Jinan, General Fukuda began issuing demands of the Chinese to be met within 12 hours. His demands were as follows: Punishment of responsible Chinese officers; the disarming of responsible Chinese troops before the Japanese army; evacuation of two military barracks near Jinan; prohibition of all anti-Japanese propaganda, and withdrawal of all Chinese troops beyond 20 li on both sides of the Qingdao–Jinan railway The Japanese knew these demands were impossible to fulfill within 12 hours. It was basically a show of force, orchestrated to humiliate the Chinese. In response Chiang Kai-Shek who had already departed the area, sent a courier to the Japanese garrison stating they would meet some of their demands, but not all. General Fukuda proclaimed their demands had not been met and launched a full scale attack upon the Chinese in Jinan beginning in the afternoon of May 8th. The fighting became quite fierce over the next two days. The Japanese used heavy artillery against the old walled city where NRA troops were desperately using as defense. The civilian population of the old parts of Jinan had not been warned about the bombardment and thus heavy casualties were incurred. By May 11th the last Chinese troops evacuated the city as the Japanese took full control over Jinan. The city would be occupied by Japan until March of 1929, whence an agreement was reached. The Chinese and Japanese would share responsibility for the Jinan Incident and all Japanese troops would be withdrawn from Shandong. The Chinese would report the Japanese occupation of Jinan to be full of murder, rape, looting and other debauchery. Chiang Kai-Shek was forced to issue an apology on May 10th and he removed a local commander, He Yaozu from his post. Its alleged after the Jinan incident Chiang Kai-Shek would begin writing in his diary each day “one way to kill the Japanese”. Henceforth Chiang Kai-Shek would note the Japanese were China's greatest enemy and that China only backed down at Jinan because "before one can settle scores, one must be strong". The Jinan incident did not only hurt the NRA, but also the NPA. Zhang Zuolin, who had always been labeled a Japanese puppet was forced to take dramatic steps to distance himself from the Japanese henceforth. In fact its alleged he even began urging the KMT to drop the war against him and unite the north and south against Japan. On May 9th he issued a public telegram stating “… in view of the situation I have ordered my troops to cease hostilities to save the country.” Now because I am the Pacific War guy I do want to mention, the Jinan Incident was one of the first events that showcased the weak nature of the Japanese chain of command. In particular that of the Kwantung army, which happened to be made up of many junior officers who would go on to join the Kodoha faction. As pointed out by historian Akira Iriye, the weak chain of command combined with the powerlessness of the Japanese civilian government would basically allow these types of junior officers to run amok on the mainland. For much of the 1930's this podcast will have to explain many developments in the Japanese military, for example I mentioned the Kodoha faction. I won't get into it here, but this radical faction would have a profound effect in the early 1930's and would push junior officers of the Kwantung army to perform numerous false flag operations trying to entice a war with China. A lot of this was the brainchild of General Kanji Ishiwara, who I really have to say is not spoken about a lot despite him arguably being a single individual who changed the world dramatically. Literally one could argue Kanji Ishiwara began WW2. Its quite a rabbit hole to explain that statement, but if you are interested I did a long 4 part series on his insane story. The man had an incredible foresight into military history and actually predicted a lot that would happen during WW2. For example he believed just after WW1 that warfare would change to heavy bombing campaigns that would wipe out entire cities, little errie. Again if its of interest to you check it out at the Pacific War Channe on Youtube or on all major podcast platforms. Now back to the war, on May 1st, the NRA vanguard had secured the north bank of the Yellow River around Santzutien. There they halted to allow the main body to catch up. To avoid Jinan and the much feared Japanese heavy artillery. Chiang Kai-Shek had first ordered the men to detour south of the city and then advance upstream to some fording points. The largest of these points was Tunga. As the NRA regrouped on the north bank, the NPA set up a new defensive line south of Tehchou and Xunteh. The first week of May say the Beiyang government toss some peace feelers. Wu Zhihui declared that rather than join the Fengtian Clique “the Northern Expedition will be continued and completed in the shortest possible time.” I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Generalissimo was back, the Northern Expedition was back on track and the NPA was running for their lives heading north. However the Jinan incident with the Japanese struck a major nerve in China, one that would come back to haunt them in the form of a 15 year long war. Yet until then, there was a grand march to be made in the direction of Beijing.

Last time we spoke about the capture of Shanghai and Nanking. By early 1927, the NRA concentrated around Sungchiang, feigning a major assault on Shanghai while secretly preparing to attack Nanking. Capturing Nanking would isolate Sun Chuanfang's forces. By February, Sun's battered armies awaited reinforcements, while the KMT incited disorder in Shanghai. The city's large workforce, influenced by the CCP, opposed Sun's alliance with northerners and foreign powers. On February 19th, the CCP launched a general strike, which was violently suppressed by Sun's forces, leading to hundreds of deaths. Despite the failed uprising, the NRA advanced, exploiting defections within Sun's ranks. By March, NRA forces captured key positions, closing in on Nanking and Shanghai. Amidst this, Chiang Kai-Shek faced internal strife with the CCP and KMT leftists, leading to disunity in the First United Front. The Wuhan faction undermined Chiang's authority, further complicating the Northern Expedition. By late March, the NRA seized Shanghai, while ongoing conflicts hinted at a potential collapse of the First United Front.   #114 The Northern Expedition Part 5: Collapse of the First United Front Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Last we left off, Chiang Kai-Shek was basically at war with this new CCP run cabal in Wuhan. They were taking away his authority one notch at a time. To counter the communist Wuhan cabal, Chiang Kai-SHek appealed to the center and right wingers in the KMT. Before the capture of Shanghai a anti-communist group with members such as Wu Chihui, Niu Yungchen and Yang Quan who had headquarters within the city had been investigating how the CCP was subverting the KMT authority. On March 6th, they began questioning the CCP leader Chen Duxiu and his Shanghai based subordinate Lo Yinung what exactly the intentions of the CCP were. Chen Duxiu said they would turn China communist, but it would take more than 20 years and thus cooperation with the KMT was a necessity. After it was found out the CCP had fomented some worker attacks upon areas in Shanghai, this produced anti KMT demonstrations along the Nanking road. Chiang Kai-Shek was gaining more loyal followers to his side as the anti-communism grew amongst the KMT members. When Shanghai was taken, Chiang Kai-Shek sent letters to members of the Wuhan cabal that he considered not under the influence of the CCP that they should come to Shanghai. On March 24th, Chiang Kai-Shek addressed a letter sent to Tan Yenkai at Wuhan “Please forward this letter to the National Government. Shanghai and Nanking have been occupied and there is much work to be done here. I hope committee member T'an and Ministers Sun [Fo] and Soong and Ch'en [Eugene] will come to Shanghai to handle affairs here so I can devote my attention to military matters” Yet he neglected to mention the insubordination running through the NRA ranks and the ongoing Nanking incident that was occurring that very day. Most of the men who received letters at Wuhan had a lot of grievances against the CCP, particularly because they felt betrayed. This of course was because initially the CCP had colluded with the left wing KMT faction, led by Wang Jingwei. But he and the rest of the left wing had been left in the dust as the CCP simply took charge. By the end of March the civil war between Wuhan and Chiang Kai-Shek was becoming more and more visible. Both Wuhan and Shanghai began using the press to attack another. From Wuhan Borodin was accusing Shanghai of being reactionaries and Shanghai was calling into question how the communist influence emanating from Wuhan could be put to an end. The Wuhan cabal then began dismissing officers loyal to Chiang Kai-Shek and turning military authority to the new Wuhan military council. Shanghai had their own cabal in the form of committees who retaliated against Wuhan. This saw a sort of battle over Jiangxi as both cabals tried to dismiss each other's favored officers. Yet the CCP within Shanghai began organizing a provisional municipal government and appointing CCP members to key positions. Upon discovering this new attack, Chiang Kai-Shek labeled the CCP committees as the enemy of the KMT and not to be recognized by the political party nor the NRA. April brought violence to the situation. In Shanghai the CCP used its new found cabal there to undermine Chiang Kai-Shek's regime. Chiang Kai-Shek responded by placing a curfew over the city and declaring publicly he would suppress all irregular movements. Word spread Chiang Kai-Shek had invited a large group of KMT civil and military leaders from Guangzhou to Shanghai where they were forming plans to counter the CCP threat in the two cities. Then word came that the CCP were seizing merchants in Wuhan and ransoming them and taking their businesses. In Shanghai non-communist workers began complaining that they were being persecuted and even physically beaten by CCP unions. So the KMT unions began gathering non-communist workers and created a labor organization with the intent of completely replacing the communist labor union at Shanghai. Thus if we see this all as a war, one front of it because the labor front. From there general strikes broke out at Shanghai and Hangzhou, on the part of the CCP to try and oust Chiang Kai-Shek. The KMT unions retaliated by burning down the CCP union HQ's in Hangzhou and Ningpo. After this the Wuhan joint council declared recent elections in Guangzhou to be illegal on the basis they had already been ordered to disband and reorganize. In response Guangzhou's government arrested agents that had been sent by Wuhan and refused to comply with Wuhans orders. Chiang Kai-Shek now was deeply concerned about the stagnating northern expedition. Each day the NRA delayed, the NPA grew larger and more coordinated. Chiang Kai-Shek still hoped to convince key KMT leaders to turn away from the CCP. To this purpose, in March, Chiang Kai-Shek sent his close colleague Zhang Jingjiang to find Wang Jingwei and ask him to come back to China. Zhang Jingjiang wrote to Wang Jingwei, notifying him the CCP were trying to take over the entire movement and that they needed him to return from Europe. Wang Jingwei returned to Shanghai by April 1st as Chiang Kai-Shek notified his agents “Comrade Wang has returned and I have had a serious conference with him about the Party and the country. From now on he will be responsible for the Party as well as political affairs. I will devote my attention to military operations. The military and civil administration, finance and diplomacy will all be under Wang and be consolidated in the central government. My armies and I will obey unanimously. Military authority and operation orders, however, I will direct as before. Wang has indicated that he thinks there should be no intra-Party conflict until the military operation has been completed and that everyone should support the C-in-C until a discussion of the matters involved can be held”. Can you say what a 180? Wang Jingwei did not trust Chiang Kai-Shek at all, and I am sure the feeling was mutual. These two guys after all had been rivals fighting for leadership over the movement. One crucial problem for Wang Jingwei, was the fact he was the leader of the leftists in the movement and only really had power when combined with the CCP. Now when Wang Jingwei came back home, he took a route going through Moscow and Vladivostok. Borodin had telegraphed him from Wuhan, telling him the CCP did not want to displace the KMT nor sought to create a communist China. Wang Jingwei stated later on that he came back to China hoping to bring the Wuhan faction back into the fold. On April the 15th Wang Jingwei took up his new position. Chiang Kai-Shek pushed Wang Jingwei to call for an all KMT gathering at Nanking to purge the CCP from the ranks. However at that time, the northern expedition had units advancing against Honan and quite a few of them had CCP officers. Wang Jingwei stated if they purged now it would threaten said units. Thus the second week of April saw an increase in violence between the two groups. Riots broke out in Guangzhou, Zhejiang and Jiangsu between unions leaving hundreds dead and wounded. The military forces at Shanghai began quelling armed workers as Chiang Kai-Shek called upon the communist unions to disband the near 5000 armed worker militias or else “they would be regarded as a conspiratorial organization … not to be permitted to exist.” On April 6th, Chiang Kai-Shek ordered some troops to raid and close down the CCP's political department in Shanghai led by Kuo Mojo. On the same day, Zhang Zuolin raided the Soviet embassy at Beijing and the Shanghai and Tianjin international concession police raided their Soviet consulates. All of the evidence found was handed over to the KMT at Shanghai. Chiang Kai-Shek hoped to use the information to prove the CCP were subverting the KMT and bring about a purge. In early April the Shanghai Control Committee urged Chiang Kai-Shek to nip the bud of what looked like a CCP uprising. Many large meetings amongst the top KMT leaders followed and all came to the conclusion the CCP was trying to seize leadership over the movement and suppress the KMT. Now I should mention by this point, this is all heavily contested. Current day CCP historians would paint a picture that Chiang Kai-Shek was the aggressor, whereas Taiwanese historians would say the opposite. What is known and I think I have fairly portrayed it, is that a sort of civil war emerged in the First United Front. Both sides from the beginning had goals they wanted to achieve at the cost to the other side. Its really one of those “who pulled the trigger first moments”.  For quite some time the Chinese and foreign press had covered the battle between the CCP and Chiang Kai-Shek. During the first two weeks of april multiple warnings had been sent by both sides openly that action would be taken. On April 11th 5000 armed workers led by the CCP were warned military response was imminent. The armed workers currently picketing were warned and their CCP leadership put out alerts in the major suburbs of Zhapei, Putung, Woosung and south shanghai. While the KMT prepared a purge against the CCP in Shanghai, the NPA launched a counteroffensive in northern Jiangsu. This would see the NRA face a succession of defeats through april. From April 3rd to the 11th the NRA fell back 100 miles through Jiangsu and Anhui, closing in towards the Yangtze.  On April 5th Wang Jingwei had landed in Shanghai, invited by Chiang Kai-Shek, however he quickly met in secrecy with Chen Duxiu. After their meeting they both agreed to issue a joint declaration re-affirming the cooperation between the left KMT and CCP. Wang Jingwei departed for Wuhan on the 6th and it was at this point Chiang Kai-Shek met up with his old buddy Du Yuesheng, the leader of the Green Gang. They formed a rival union to face the CCP unions in Shanghai. On the 9th, Chiang Kai-Shek declared martial law in Shanghai as the Central Control Commission proclaimed “party protection and national salvation”, denouncing the Wuhan CCP backed government. On the 11th Chiang Kai-Shek secretly issued orders to all the provinces under NRA control to purge communists from the KMT.  At dawn on the 12th Green Gang Members began to assault district offices controlled by the CCP unions in places like Zhabei, Pudong and Nanshi. Using the martial law decree, Chiang Kai-Shek unleashed the 26th army upon the city who quickly rounded up, disarmed and fought armed worker militias. 300 people were killed and wounded as the CCP unions tried to organize a resistance. On the 13th they denounced Chiang Kai-Shek's actions as thousands of workers demonstrated in front of the 26th army HQ. The soldiers there opened fire upon the demonstrators killing perhaps 100 or so people and wounding many more. Chiang Kai-Shek then dissolved the provincial government of Shanghai, the CCP backed labor unions and any organization with ties to the CCP. He then reorganized a network of new unions, allied to his faction of the KMT and had Du Yuesheng manage said operation. Some sources claim over 1000 CCP members and left wing supporters were arrested, 300 were executed and more than 5000 went missing. As you can imagine that figure out 5000 is also claimed by many to be 5000 dead communists. Others claim the number could have been as high as 10,000. The entire incident became known as the Shanghai Massacre. Now this event effectively ended the First United Front and ushered in the Chinese Civil War. However because of how I have been tackling the warlord Era, I'd prefer to put the civil war on the backburner. We most certainly will come back to it. After the break our their alliance, the Wuhan government still stood, but now Chiang Kai-Shek formed a separate government at Nanking. It came to no surprise when Wang Jingwei condemned Chiang Kai-Shek for the purges and became the leader of the rival Wuhan government. This formally split the KMT right-left wings and their associated NRA forces. To celebrate the dire situation of the revolutionaries, Zhang Zuolin began artillery bombarding Nanjing from across the Yangtze. Now saw a rather chaotic situation where two groups of NRA would both continue separate northern expeditions, completely uncoordinated against a far larger NPA foe.  Now another aspect of all of this, perhaps less sexy to say, was the financial disparity between the CCP and KMT. Shanghai was a reliable fiscal base, a repository of Chinese capital whose tax revenues far surpassed that of Wuhan. Especially since Wuhan was seeing unbelievable worker strikes, pushed by the CCP, her economy was free falling. Wuhans total annual revenues from affiliated provinces had shrunk to a fourth of that of Shanghai. Over at Guangzhou the Central Bank continued to hold the majority of the KMT hard currency and her silver reserves. Wuhan had been printing money like crazy, devaluing it, something a Canadian like I, knows a lot about cough cough. The KMT finance minister T.V Soong had moved to Wuhan in the beginning, but was quickly frustrated with the situation and fled for Shanghai as soon as the city was captured. Chiang Kai-Shek managed to win over the bankers and leading businessmen, which was not hard given his opponent was communism.  When violence broke out at Nanking against the foreign community, Chiang Kai-Shek was between a rock and a hard place. He needed to avoid any confrontation with the foreign powers, but his KMT base and the people of China wanted to break the chains of foreign imperialism. Thus he made some speeches stating “the objective of the national revolution is to seek international equality…. If a nation treats China fairly, China will return friendship.…as long as foreign troops and warships undertake to protest … we will not be responsible…. Incidents are unavoidable in a revolution.” Chiang Kai-Shek walked a tightrope with the foreign powers. On one hand he constantly was negotiating with them to return concessions, but he always made sure to thwart any rationales for them to militarily intervene. Whereas at Wuhan they found themselves suffering from large scale unemployment, a crumbling economy, political tensions, revenues disappearing and quite a lot of hostility from the foreign powers, Shanghai looked a hell of a lot more stable in all said categories. Borodin watched as the Wuhan regime was collapsing and began advising the CCP to ease up with labor and peasant movements to allow the economy to recover. The Wuhan government had been dealt many terrible blows, but was still standing. Come May of 1927, Wuhan began massing their troops in an attempt to showcase to the movement they could continue the northern expedition. They wanted their troops to be the first ones in North China, hopefully that would win over more support. The timing of Wuhans offensive into Honan just so happened to coincide with some of Wu Peifu's forces in Honan defecting. The commander in chief of the Wuhan forces, Tang Shengchih then performed their first offensive serving Wu Peifu a defeat near Chumatien. Tang Shengchih then advanced north, meeting defensive lines defended by Zhang Xueliang, the son of Zhang Zuolin. Within the center of this line was the town of Xiping, where the Beijing-Hankou railway crossed a formidable river. The Wuhan forces pushed Zhang Xueliang further back after 3 days of battle, until he withdrew north of Yencheng on May 15th. Zhang Xueliang again took up a defensive line along a river. He placed heavy artillery behind fortified positions and tried to hold out against the incoming NRA forces. The NRA advanced towards the river and went downstream from Yencheng, threatening to out flank Zhang Xueliang and his rearway station to his rear. Yet the Wuhan forces were not the only ones in the fight, for the Old Christian warlord, Feng Yuxiang unleashed his army from Shaanxi. Feng Yuxiang came out of the Wei River valley with his Guominjun and passed through the Tungkuan pass on May 6th. He first captured Kuanyintang, a mountain gateway leading to Luoyang. After taking Luoyang on May 28th, Feng Yuxiang was 70 miles from Chengzhou, which held the Beijing-Hankou railroad bridgehead along the Yellow River. Zhang Xueliang responded to the new threat to his rear by withdrawing further north. When Zheng Xueliang took up a position north of the Yellow River he now had a secure and shortened railway supply line, thus he could face a two front war against Wuhan and the Guominjun. Advancing quickly across northern Honan, Feng Yuxiang's cavalry vanguard beat Wuhan's NRA forces to Chengzhou and Kaifeng by late May. From there Feng Yuxiang's forces straddled the Lunghai Railway.  Meanwhile on May 10th, Chiang Kai-Shek's 1st and 6th NRA armies crossed the Yangtze into Anhui. On the 16th, Li Zongren advanced into western Anhui to attack Hefei. By the 20th Li Zngren captured Bengbu, while Chiang Kai-Shek unleashed a 4-pronged offensive through Jiangsu to reach Shandong. He Yingqin led the 1st NRA army to capture Haizhou by late may. On the 28th Li Zongren took Xuzhou. With the Beijing-Hankou railway under NRA and Guminjun control, the line of communication extended to all 3 forces. Feng Yuxiang began receiving offers from both Wuhan and Nanking at this point. Feng Yuxiang first met with Wang Jingwei and Tang Shengzhi at Zhengzhou on June 10th, before traveling to Xuzhou on the 19th to meet Chiang Kai-Shek. Both needed his help if they hoped to take North China. Feng Yuxiang of course was entirely dependent on the Soviet Union, so it seemed clear Wuhan was more in line for him. However he really needed to pick a faction that could satisfy his interests. For example, which revolutionary movement would survive its little civil war? What if Chiang Kai-Shek won over more of the Wuhan leadership and defeated the CCP cabal there? Could the Wuhan government actually challenge Chiang Kai-Shek when he held all the resource rich territories? Feng Yuxiang looked upon Wuhan's numerous economic and political issues. He also saw how aggressive their CCP peasant unions were in Hunan, constantly confiscating land. He looked at Nanking, it had enormous resources, hell Nanking promised him 2.5 million dollars a month to maintain his Guominjun, plus military aid and a nice position as chairman over the new provisional government over Honan. Despite Feng Yuxiangs takeover of Honan's lucrative Kungxien Arsenal within the Lo Valley, he had a very poor industrial foundation. He did not really have much Shaanxi personnel equipped to make the arsenal shine so to say, so he would be dependent on external aid for sometime. His aid from the Soviets in the north was quite vulnerable. The aid had to be transported over an incredibly long distance overland from the north, any intelligent warlord could cut this. Feng Yuxiang started to calculate which one would be more profitable: stick with the Soviet aid, thus join Wuhan or break with the Soviets for Nanking.  Now something else occurred that would have dire consequences for the Wuhan regime. On June 1st, Joseph Stalin sent a secret telegram to Borodin and his associate M.N Roy with orders for the Wuhan government. Without consulting Borodin, M.N Roy revealed the telegram to Wang Jingwei and it held the following instructions. Insistence that every effort be made for land to be occupied by the Communist Party. However, actions that are too aggressive should be avoided, and officials and soldiers' lands should be exempted. Make concessions to artisans, merchants and small landlords. Mobilize 20,000 communists and 50,000 revolutionary workers and farmers to raise an army. Recruit new leaders from the workers and farmers of the lower stratum to join KMT so as to alter the composition of the party. Expel all those of "old mindsets". Establish a revolutionary military court headed by well-known party officials and non-communists, to punish reactionary officials   Wang Jingwei believed following these instructions would be the death of the Wuhan government, but continued to negotiate with the soviets, because hell he had little choice when they were providing so much needed assistance. Wang Jingwei demanded the Soviets provide 15 million roubles in aid, but the Soviets only agreed to 2 million. This prompted a angry Wang Jingwei to threaten to send Borodin back to Moscow. The event became known as the “may instructions” and it compelle Wang Jingwei to break off from the USSR. However even doing so, he certainly was not joining Chiang Kai-Shek. In a vain effort to counter the CCP and Chiang Kai-Shek, Wang Jingwei sought Feng Yuxiangs help. Without informing his CCP colleagues, Wang Jingwei dispatched Deng Yanda to meet with Feng Yuxiang at Zhengzhou, offering every possible concession he could think of. Wang Jingwei had no idea Feng Yuxiang was in talks with Chiang Kai-Shek. Now Wang Jingwei was not the only one unhappy with the Soviet instructions, even Chen Duxiu would go on the record to say he did not think they fit the reality in China and telegram moscow it would be nearly impossible to implement them. The Soviets were very displeased with the situation in China, particularly that the CCP-KMT union had more or less collapsed. By late June the Soviets were considering breaking ties with the Wuhan government. This prompted a panicked Chen Duxiu and Borodin to try and quell radicals within the Wuhan clique to try and retain the small united front between the Leftist KMT and CCP. They frantically told workers and peasant unions to stop activity for a while just so things could stabilize. However ironically the Soviets saw all of this as opportunism and recalled Borodin and by early July were pulling out of the KMT deal. Needless to say, Feng Yuxiang chose to ally himself to Chiang Kai-Shek. He did so by sending a joint telegram in late June to Wang Jingwei telling him and demanding the Wuhan government expel all its soviet advisors and purge itself of communists so they could all together continue the northern expedition.  While this was going on, Tang Shengchih's forces were being mauled by heavy artillery in north china. Tang Shengchih was wounded badly, and believing Feng Yuxiang would not help them out, Wang Jingwei withdrew the forces back over to Hubei, Hunan and Jiangxi. After taking some time to recover, Tang Shengchih advanced his forces out of Wuhan through Jiangxi to face Nankings forces near Anking in Anhui. Chiang Kai-Shek had his forces respond to the threat defensively. On July 13th Chiang Kai-Shek pulled his front line forces trying to enter Shandong back. Meanwhile the civilian population of Wuhan were no longer supporting the government. Tang Shengchih began to dig in around Anking threatening Nanking. When Chiang Kai-Shek moved his frontline units near Shandong south to defend against Tang Shengchih the NPA began to claim lost territory. In early July the NPA recaptured Tengxien, Lincheng, Tsaochuang and the Tianjin-Pukou railway. Despite losing Honan in June, the NPA now enjoyed a shorted logistical line and front, allowing them to deploy their heavy artillery in concentration while Nanking was fighting a two front war. The NRA forces were being battered by the NPA. In the face of mounting losses, both the Wuhan and Nanking governments began negotiations. Wang Jingwei had procrastinated as long as he possibly could, but Feng Yuxiang was not going to help him, Chiang Kai-Shek was certainly not and the CCP and their Soviet overlords were trying to take over. Thus on July 15th, Wang Jingwei held a KMT meeting and formally published the May Instructions letter while condemning the CCP. He unleashed a purge, though he did so less bloodily compared to what had happened at Shanghai. The Wuhan and Nanking governments met and passed the “policy of uniting the party”, while all communists were kicked out of the KMT and NRA. The Wuhan government sent all their Soviet advisors back to Moscow as Wang Jingwei proclaimed the CCP had ruined the revolution publically. KMT forces loyal to Chiang Kai-Shek took over Wuhan and by July 18th the Wuhan area was cleansed of communists. However Wang Jingwei had made one demand to reunite the KMT, he demanded Chiang Kai-SHek resign from his post as commander in chief and relinquish all other political titles. Chiang Kai-Shek did just that on August 12th, the Generalissimo was no more. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The First United Front had come to an end, a new Civil War was born. Because of the war between Wuhan and Nanking, the NPA got the upper hand again, reclaiming vast amounts of territory. To reunify the KMT Wang Jingwei demanded Chiang Kai-Shek walk away, and walk he did, what would happen now to the northern expedition?

Questions, comments, feedback? Send us a message.#292> Corporate sponsor of the series: Gluck Plumbing.For all your service needs big or small in NJ with a full service division, from boiler change outs, main sewer line snake outs, camera-ing main lines, to a simple faucet leak, Gluck Plumbing Service Division has you covered. Give them a call -   732-523-1836 x 1.> We discussed the general history of the Boxer Rebellion in China, what is know of Rabbi Uziel Haga, R. Haga's report from China, the Jews of Kaifeng, TLT and China, and more.> To read R. Haga's report click here> To read more about the Boxer Rebellion click here> To join the SeforimChatter WhatsApp community click here.>  To support the podcast or to sponsor an episode follow this link or email seforimchatter@gmail.com (Zelle/QP this email address)> Subscribe to the SeforimChatter YouTube channel here.> Subscribe and read the SeforimChatter Substack here.

Last time we spoke about the tyrannical regime of Ungern-Sternberg in Mongolia. Ungern-Sternberg's secret police led by Colonel Leonid Sipailov targeted Reds and Jews, executing nearly 900 people, including over 50 Jews. Meanwhile, Ungern-Sternberg built his Asiatic Cavalry Division, aiming to form a Mongolian national army. Damdin Sukhbaatar emerged as a Red leader, trained in military tactics and part of Mongolia's independence movement. The Soviet Union supported Mongolia against Ungern-Sternberg's occupation, aiding the Mongolian People's Party. Sukhbaatar led successful campaigns against White Russians, ultimately capturing Urga. Ungern-Sternberg's forces were defeated by the Red Army, leading to his capture and execution. After his downfall, Mongolia faced internal political struggles, including purges and power struggles within the Mongolian People's Party. Meanwhile, Tibet faced its own challenges, negotiating with China and Britain over its status and borders, leading to the establishment of the McMahon Line, though China disputed the agreement. #103 the First Zhili–Fengtian War Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Well hello there, we are back in the thick of things in north China again. As a bit of a refresher, the Anhui-Zhili War of 1920 had resulted from a combination of Duan Qirui basically pissing off everyone else. The Zhili and Fengtian cliques banded together to defeat the Anhui clique, now Duan Qirui went into a bit of a self exile and most of his territory was seized. The Anhui were not down for the count, but now a fraction of what they once were and confined to Fujian and Zhejiang province. Meanwhile Zhang Zuolin and his Fengtian clique maintained their hold over Manchuria and even added some parts of Inner Mongolia to their booming empire. Cao Kun and Wu Peifu of the Zhili clique had benefited the most from the war, grabbing Beijing, Anhui and northern Zhili province, adding it to their heartland in the Yangtze Valley. Wu Peifu had largely been the mastermind behind the war effort and earned great fame as a result. He became known as a military genius, earning monikers such as “the jade marshal”.  The coalition' victory did not bring stability to north China. Jin Yunpeng was the leader of the Anfu Club and was supported and engineered to Premiership by Cao Kun and Zhang Zuolin. They supported him largely because he was the rival of Xu Shichang and a large rift was ongoing in the Anfu club because of them. Despite being a Anhui clique member, he was a relative of Zhang Zuolin by marriage and an early patron to Wu Peifu. While Duan Qirui was in power, his appointment met the needs of all 3 cliques. Thus when Duan Qirui and many of the other Anhui clique officials were cast out, Jin Yunpeng was one of the select few who kept their job. Meanwhile the Ministry of communications, foreign services and other national services all gradually shifted their allegiance to the Zhili clique. Cao Kun was now facing a lot of public hostility from Dr Sun Yat-Sen and his Canton coalition. Immediately after the Anhui-Zhili war, Zhang Zuolin left 30,000 troops within the Beijing area under one of his trusted deputies. Zhang Zuolin's real award however was the captured weapons and equipment of the Anhui forces controlling Chahar, Jehol and Suiyuan province. Random side track, I just so happen to be covering the 1930's wars in Chahr, Jehol and Suiyuan province. If thats of interest to you check out my Japanese invasion of Inner Mongolia series over on the Pacific War Channel at Youtube or listen to the podcast versions at the Pacific War Channel on all podcast platforms. Zhang Zuolin had also inherited Xu Shuzheng's job of reconquering Outer Mongolia. That area as we know had been recently taken over by the White Russian General Baron von Ungern-Sternberg who was trying to recreate some sort of Mongolian empire with him as a reincarnated Chinggis Khan. Fortunately for I would say all parties, Ungern-Sternberg was defeated and killed in late July of 1921. The communists then began to seize Mongolia, but Zhang Zuolin would become too preoccupied to face them, because of a new conflict in the south.  Wu Peifu lessened his hold over Hunan during the Anhui-Zhili War and as a result a power vacuum was filled by Hunanese forces under Tan Yankai. Tan Yankai was a KMT hero associated with Dr Sun Yat-Sen. Anhui Clique generals Wy Kuanghsin and Chang Chingyao had been left with no territory after the war and Military governor of Shaanxi, Ch'en Shufan, also a Anhui general, were all threatened. All 3 of them controlled vast sums of money from their years in government, stored in banks in the foreign concession of Hankow. Meanwhile the Hunanese military, being supported by a coalition of civilian leaders inHunan were looking to form a provincial constitution and to elect a civilian governor. The 3 disenfranchised Anhui generals sought them out and arranged to finance a Hunan invasion of Hubei. The Zhili clique general Wang Chanyuan who had been the military governor of Hubei since 1916. In July 1921 the invasion began seeing Wang Chanyuan defeated, he fled to Wuchang in August.  In response to this, Cao Kun appointed the military genius Wu Peifu to lead an army to reconquer Hubei, supported by Wu Peifu's protege Xiao Yaonan and Wang Chanyuans former subordinate Sun Chuanfang. Wu Peifu moved with his customary speed and decisiveness, moving by rail from Loyang. The Hunan Army had abandoned the Wuhan when Wu Peifu ordered naval units to move up to Wuhan. They were assailed as they moved southward up the Yangtze River. Meanwhile Wu Peifu marched his army overland and by August 27th captured Yueyang, a river port where the Dongting lake flows into the Yangtze. It also happened to hold a railway station for the Wuhan-Chansha railway. Thus Wu Peifu had effectively cut off the Hunan Army's line of retreat in one fell sweep. Trapped now, the Hunan army agreed to return to Hunan and remain there. Wu Peifu kept Yueyang and her strategic railway junction as he then turned his gaze towards Sichuan province. Sichuan's warlords had also come through the Yangtze valley to attack Yichang just a pit upstream from Yueyang. Wu Peifu's forces fought the Sichuanese for over a month until they also agreed to evacuate Hubei province. These small victories bolstered Wu Peifu's image of a military mastermind and enhanced Cao Kun. The Zhili Clique in 1921 controlled provinces containing the two north-south railway lines, the Beijing-Hankou and Tientsin-Pukow. Alongside this they also controlled two prominent east-west lines of communication, the Lunghai railway and Yangtze River. The only other big dog on the bloc at this point remained the Fengtian Clique who controlled 6 Manchuria and Inner Mongolian provinces. Yan Xishan of Shanxi at this point was content with his province, most leaving him alone, thus he remained independent and honestly that's all he really wanted.  Now when Duan Qirui had been defeated, Zhang Zuolin emerged the only significant warlord to be backed by the Japanese. In fact his realm of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia were of grave interest to the Japanese. The Japanese had just lost their poster boy, and now felt very threatened by Chinese nationalism in the south and Anglo-American cooperation, both of these forces creating anti-Japanese sentiment in China. Thus the Japanese heavily supported Zhang Zuolin, making sure his position in the northeast was very stable. However Zhang Zuolin was making things quite difficult. Zhang Zuolin publicly denounced the Zhili clique, particularly Cao Kun and Wu Peifu, labeling them puppets of Anglo-American interest and allies to the radical Dr. Sun Yat-Sen with his KMT and even CCP leanings. Relations between Zhang Zuolin and Wu Peifu were pretty bad, allegedly they began to really sour during the conference in Beijing after the Zhili-Fengtian war. Zhang Zuolin apparently referred to Wu Peifu “as a mere division commander, who only held ceremonial status to himself and Cao Kun”. Zhang Zuolin was ambitious, he was gazing at the territory south of his little empire. He also knew the Zhili clique was not whole heartedly unified, they were vulnerable. At a conference in Tientsin in April of 1921, where Jin Yunpeng was going to reorganize his cabinet, Zhang Zuolin suddenly went out of his way to treat Wang Chanyuan, now the military governor of Hubei and Hunan as an equal to himself and Cao. Now during this time period, our old friend the Christian Warlord, Feng Yuxiang, a Zhili clique member was becoming a rising star. After the Tientsin conference, the Beijing government appointed Yen Hsiangwen, the commander of the 20th division and a close associate of Wu Peifu as military governor over Shaanxi. Wu Peifu added the 7th Division and Feng Yuxiangs 16th Mixed Brigade to Yen Hsiangwens army. Feng Yuxiang's brigade performed very well under Yen Hsiangwen and he was soon rewarded with the 11th Division. Then Yen Hsiangwen committed suicide, or so its alleged on August 23rd, and Feng Yuxiang succeeded him as military governor.  Back over in Beijing, the political scene was increasingly becoming concerned with funding. The usual lenders to China had agreed that a unified Chinese government would be necessary to guarantee future loans. Premier Jin Yunpeng was doing an ample job securing the dissolving Anhui parliament at Beijing, but Dr Sun Yat-Sen remained adamantly oppositional over in Guangzhou. Any prospect of obtaining future loans were evaporating. The banking system within China was dominated by a smaller clique revolving around officials working in the ministry of communications. Many of these officials did not get along with Jin Yunpeng. Then suddenly on December 24th President Xu Shichang appointed Liang Shiyi, the head of the communication group as prime minister. Within just two days after this, the central government funding for Wu Peifu's armies in Hubei and Hunan was cut and the Anhui clique officials were all receiving full pardons. Wu Peifu was taken by complete surprise in these actions, it seemed clear to him the Fengtian, Communications officials and Anhui cliques were forming a coalition against him. Hell even some in the Zhili clique seemed to be involved. Hunan and Hubei were the vast sum of Wu Peifu's power, this was directed at him. Wu Peifu lashed out swiftly by publishing telegrams accusing Liang Shiyi of treason for recent actions during the Washington conference. While the conference was primarily about naval buildups, particularly limiting those between Britain, Japan and the US, there was also a clause signed guaranteeing the territorial integrity of China. Yet apparently Liang Shiyi had cabled the Chinese delegation to go easy on the Japanese, hoping they would reciprocate with some loans to China. Wu Peifu had hard evidence of these actions and laid them out publicly trying to force Liang Shiyi from office. However, Zhang Zuolin began publicly supporting Liang Shiyi. It would turn out the appointment of Liang Shiyi was Zhang Zuolin's doing. Regardless of Zhang Zuolin's support, Liang Shiyi would be forced out of office. Yet Wu Peifu was deserted by other Zhili generals and it seemed even Cao Kun was not whole heartedly supporting him anymore. Meanwhile Zhang Zuolin had gained support of the Communication officials, Duan Qirui, Zhang Zun and Dr Sun Yat-Sen. Yes its kind of like the sinister six getting together to fight spiderman. So Liang Shiyi stepped down, stating it was because of poor health on January 19th of 1922. Zhang Zuolin considered his sacking to be a personal attack on the part of Wu Peifu. Thus Zhang Zuolin resolved to alienate Wu Peifu from the rest of the Zhili clique and destroy him. Zhang Zuolin had a lot working for him, he was loosely related through marriage to Cao Kun and both men began meeting between their HQ's in Mukden and Baoting. Cao Kun controlled roughly 10,000 men and would definitely make for a formidable ally. However Cao Kun refused to publicly issue any statements against Wu Peifu. By March of 1922, anti-Wu Peifu figures began to meet at Tientsin where they agreed on a strategy. Dr Sun Yat-Sen would become the new president, Liang Shiyi would return as Premier, Zhang Xun would become the inspector general of Jiangsu, Anhui and Jiangxi and Duan Qirui would become the military governor of Zhili. To accomplish all of this, Dr Sun Yat-Sen and the Anhui generals Lu Yung-hsiang and Lihouchi of Zhejiang and Fujian would attack Wu Peifu from the south while the Fengtian army would attack from the north. Once Wu Peifu was defeated he would be confined to the position of inspector general over Hunan and Hubei as the sinister 6 would govern China leading to a happily ever after.  Zhang Zuolin's coalition to defeat spider man collapsed immediately. He had been counting on Japanese support, and it did not materialize. The Japanese backed Chinese 2nd Squadron based out of Shanghai had helped Wu Peifu by lending him river gunboats during some war actions in Hubei the previous year and when the first Zhili-Fengtian war broke out, they announced support for Wu Peifu. Their support made it difficult for the Anhui generals of Zhejiang and Fujian who received naval training from them to move against Wu Peifu. Likewise the Japanese backed Chinese 1st squadron based out of Guangzhou caused issues for Dr Sun Yat-Sen to get his forces into the war. When Zhang Xun tried to mobilize, the public who still hated him for his attempt to restore the Qing dynasty basically stopped him in his tracks. Duan Qirui reading the tea leaves, simply became inactive, leaving Zhang Zuolin hung to dry on his own.  As for Cao Kun, since 1920, Wu Peifu held significant power because he controlled the Hankow north-south railway line. As of 1922, he lost control of it and from his point of view Cao Kun did not seem to be a good ally. Wu Peifu would deploy roughly 100,000 troops, he was commander in chief and commander of the western front. The commanders of the central and eastern fronts were Wang Chengbin and Zhang Guorong, with Zhang Fulai as deputy commander over the eastern front. By far his best units was the 3rd division led by Feng Yuxiang. Zhang Zuolin would deploy roughly 120,000 men and was commander in chief of the Fengtian army and commander of the eastern front with Sun Liechen as deputy commander. The commander of the western front would be Zhang Jinghui and under him were deputies Bao Deshan, Zhang Xueliang and Li Jinglin.  In a direct repeat of the Zhili-Anhui war, Zhang Zuolin would attack Zhili along two fronts, east and west. Zhang Zuolin took Junliangchang as his eastern front HQ. Zhang Jinghui took his western HQ at Changxindian and divided his forces into 3 echelons. Wu Peifu took Baoding for his HQ and deployed forces across 3 fronts. Wu Peifu's forces headed by Feng Yuxiangs 3rd Division in the west deployed in the region of Liulihe; Wang Chengbin deployed at Gu'an; Zhang Guorong at Dacheng with Zhang Fulai. On April 28th, Zhang Zuolin arrived at Junliangcheng and deployed the troops along the Beijing-Fenghuang and Jindu-Fuzhou railway lines. The next day the war broke out. On the eastern front, both armies had begun to skirmish on april 21st, but on the 29th, Fengtian General Zhang Zuoxiang led the 4th battalion of the Guards brigade and the 1st Regiment of the 4th mixed Brigade to attack the Zhili 26th division. This saw the Zhili forces retreat towards Renqiu. On the 30th 10,000 Fengtian troops began an assault against Renqiu. Wang Chengbin deployed reinforcements over to Renqiu who defeated the Fengtian forces and pushed them back towards the Yaomadu and Baiyang bridges. On the 31st Dacheng was retaken by the Zhili forces. Zhang Xueliang led 10,000 infantry, 1 cavalry brigade and 1 artillery regiment to counter attack. However Feng Yuxiang's 3rd Division came over leading to a fierce battle. The Fengtian forces were defeated again and now we're pulling back towards Yangliuqing. The Zhili forces then launched an attack upon Machang on May 3rd. The Fengtian forces at Jinghai and Yangliuqing launched a counter attack. A major stalemate emerged along the Yaomadu and Baiyang bridge area. Yet by this time the war in the middle had decisively turned to the Zhili's favor, thus morale was beginning to crumble for the Fengtian. The Zhili unleashed a heavy counterattack, forcing the Fengtian forces to withdraw towards Jinghai. Meanwhile the Zhili forces captured Machang and Qinxian before defeating the Fengtian at Jinghai. By May 4th, news spread that the Fengtian in the western front had lost, causing countless to surrender in the east or retreat to Junliangcheng.  Within the Western front, the battle was mainly fought along the Beijing-Hankow railway line. On April 28th the 24th Division under Zhang Fulai and the 13th mixed brigade under Dong Zhengguo launched an attack against the Fengtian western HQ at Changxindian. They were met by the Fengtian 1st and 16th divisions. The battle was fierce, seeing heavy casualties on both sides. The Zhili forces were about to breach the Fengtian defensive lines, when Fengtian General Li Jinglin rushed over to dislodge the enemy. The Zhili forces withdrew and the next day the Fengtian forces pursued them. The two armies clashed at the Liuli river, where it seemed the Fengtian would win, but the Zhili gradually defeated them. Then the Zhili forces seized Liangxiang and began advancing upon Changxindian and Nangangwa during the night. The Fengtian forces held firm again at Changxindian, mobilizing the 9th and 2nd Brigades of the 28th Division and a Cavalry Brigade from Chahar. However ultimately the Fengtian were relying on their artillery to keep the Zhili forces at bay. Over the course of 2 days both sides were taking heavy casualties. Then on the 30th Wu Peifu personally went to the western frontlines ordered the men to cease offensive actions and focus on heavy artillery shelling of the Fengtian front lines, while he ordered a outflanking maneuver aimed at the Fengtian rear. Wu Peifu divided his forces into 3 groups and launched a fierce attack on May 4th. While this was occuring, the ex-zhili commander of the Fengtian 16th division defected over to Wu Peifu, a very typical situation of warlord era china battles. The Zhili and Fengtian forces suffered tremendously during the days of battle that followed. Many commanders were killed leading the forces on both sides. However the battle would ultimately come down to that of artillery attrition and the Fengtian were consuming more shells than the Zhili and could not replenish them in time. Wu Peifu discovered the situation for what it was and launched a frontal attack to attract the Fengtian artillery fire while also ordering the 21st mixed brigade, an elite formation to sneak behind the Fengtian rear. The 21st Mixed Brigade made a long detour through the Fenghuang mountains, managing to get behind the Fengtian lines. Now surrounded, with artillery munitions nearly exhausted, the Fengtian 16th division surrendered. Zhang Jinghui then jumped into a car heading for Tianjin as the Fengtian army in the west fell into chaos and routed. The Zhili forces stormed Changxindian on the 5th and began an attack against Fengtai. The Fengtian forces fled towards Shanhaiguan, while 30,000 of them were captured alongside their weapons and equipment. Within the middle front, Wu Peifu directed the Zhili forces to focus upon Gu'an. Fengtian General Zhang Zuoxiangs forces were stationed around Yongqing. Zhang Xueliang and Guo Songling were stationed around Ba county. Both sides launched fierce attacks and counterattacks, but gradually the Zhili overwhelmed the Fengtian and seized Shengfeng and Gu'an quickly. Zhang Zuoxiang personally led the 27th and 28th division to try and recapture them, but was repelled. On May 4th, the Zhili army erected a siege upon Yongqing from three sides. After a day of fighting the Fengtian could hold on no longer. Many surrendered outright, some fled for Tianjin, including Zhang Zuoxiang. After the fall of Yongqing the Zhili forces captured Langfang and accepted the surrender of thousands. Casualty reports suggested the Fengtian suffered 20,000 deaths, 10,00 desertions and 40,000 men were captured. However these numbers are absolutely exaggerated, in fact all battles of China's warlord Era are. Some casualty reports listed a total of 10,000 to a possible 30,000 for both sides included and even that seems high. Foreign military advisors and observers noted Wu Peifu's seemed to be far better trained and disciplined compared to their Fengtian counterparts. The Zhili forces also had superior arms, but many of Zhang Zuolin's better units impressed the foreigners with their armaments. Wu Peifu quickly occupied Beijing. Zhang Zuolin met his fleeing troops and Luanzhou, between Tientsin and Shanhaiguan where he gave every soldier 10$ tip. At this point their monthly wage was around 4.20$ thus this was a big saving grace for them. During the battle and afterwards a ton of rumors emerged. It was alleged President Xu Shichang had threatened to attack the Fengtian army from the rear with 3 neutral divisions stationed at Beijing, whether true or not he remained neutral and did not act.  Zhang Zuolin looked over the reports from commanders and found many of his best trained officers had been ignored by subordinate commanders. He also found his generals with banditry backgrounds commanding divisions did extremely poorly. These factors would greatly influence him in reorganizing his army. Meanwhile during the battle a warlord in Hunan, Zhoa Ti had rebelled, spreading rumors that Wu Peifu had been decisively defeated by Zhang Zuolin during the battle and was in fact killed in action. Feng Yuxiang quickly stormed Kaifeng and was rewarded the appointment as military governor over Hunan. He would quickly go to work recruiting troops and instructing them in the doctrines of christianity.  Despite the grand victory, Wu Peifu had major issues. The entire ordeal proved the Zhili clique was not unified. He was unable to pursue Zhang Zuolin's fleeing army into Manchuria to finish them off as a result. Instead a game of politics came about. Liang Shiyi walked away. On May 14th, Sun Chuanfang called for the resignation of the Presidents in both Beijing and Guangzhou and for the old constitution to be revived. President Xu Shichang took the message to heart and resigned on June 2nd. The Zhili clique then persuaded the ever reluctant Li Yuanhong to come back as President and he did so, not realizing he was merely a seat warmer for Cao Kun. Unable to fully defeat Zhang Zuolin, Wu Peifu negotiated a peace with the British mediating. They met on a British warship anchored off the coast of Qinhuangdao on June 18th where general guidelines suggested by the British were established. Shanhaiguan would become the border between the two cliques. Beijing now was under the fully domination of the Zhili clique, but the relationship between Wu Peifu and Cao Kun had certainly been strained.  The war also had a profound effect on south China. Dr Sun Yat-Sens government had collapsed just as he was planning his Northern Expedition. Dr Sun Yat-Sen had made the Yunnan Clique warlord Li Liejun his chief of staff. Chen Chongming opposed this, so Dr Sun Yat-Sen removed him as governor of Guangdong and as military commander of the Guangdong army. Dr Sun Yat-Sen achieved this by marching from Wuzhou along the Guangdong-Guangxi border to Guangzhou with his most loyal troops. He intended to make good on his commitment to Zhang Zuolin, to march north against Wu Peifu, albeit it was part of his northern expedition plans mind you. However Chen Chongming's forces were mostly at Nanning in Jiangxi because of a previous war there, thus he was forced to flee to Huizhou to preserve his eastern Guangdong base. Dr Sun Yat-Sen was advised by many colleagues, including a young Chiang Kai-Shek to postpone the Northern Expedition and first focus on crushing Chen Chongming.  Dr Sun Yat-Sen however believed commencing the northern expedition alongside Zhang Zuolins war was too great an opportunity to pass up. He also believed Chen Chongming would not betray the movement. So on May 6th he began an invasion into southern Jiangxi. While capturing cities in southern Jiangxi on June 13th, it was discovered Chen Chongming and Zhili clique generals were planning a mutiny in Guangzhou. Dr Sun Yat-Sen rushed back to Guangzhou to reason with Chen Chongming who surrounded his office on June 15th threatening his life. Dr Sun Yat-Sen managed to escape the situation, fleeing aboard the cruiser Haichi, then to gunboat Yungfeng. Thus Dr Sun Yat-Sen lost touch with the Guangzhou scene. Meanwhile Wu Peifu orchestrated a propaganda campaign labeling Zhang Zuolin and Liang Shiyi as pro-Japanese stooges. Dr Sun Yat-Sens alliance with Zhang Zuolin got him caught up in the mess. Many influential figures began sending letters to Dr Sun Yat-Sen suggesting he step down as head of the Guangzhou government. Most of the foreign powers in Guangzhou also added to this as the KMT forces were naval bombarding the area threatening the lives and property of many. Meanwhile Chen Chongming's forces seized Whampoa on July 14th. The Chinese 1st squadron in the area changed command to a Wu Peifu loyalist. Thus to all it seemed Dr Sun Yat-Sen was done, but he was still in the game. He still had control over the Northern Expeditionary Army, mostly 10,000 Yunnanese and Guangdong forces. Then Duan Qirui urged action to support Dr Sun Yat-Sen against Chen Chongming. Multiple KMT factions fell into a chaotic war between those loyal to Sun or Chen. Chen Chongming was under attack from all directions and could not hold Guangzhou thus he fled to Huizhou and by January 15th 1923 announced his retirement. Dr Sun Yat-Sen returned to Guangzhou and retook his generalissimo title. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Thus Zhang Zuolin's plot to defeat Wu Peifu basically backfired. Instead of alienating and defeating his rival, his allies all collapsed on him, he was defeated, humiliated and now it seemed Wu Peifu may have very well taken complete control over Beijing. Would Wu Peifu be able to reunify China? Or would they all just keep fighting, what do you think? 

Introducing Granny Wang or Wangpo, the latest internet sensation! She is now the internet's queen matchmaker, drawing in a ton of foot traffic to the theme park where she works in Kaifeng city. Is she revolutionizing the method of dating? On the show: Heyang, Li Yi & Yushun

In this episode of Hebrew Voices #172, Chinese Jews of Cincinnati, Nehemia tours the library at Hebrew Union College with its librarian, David Gilner. They go into the vault to look at documents from the Jews of Kaifeng, China, fragments … Continue reading → The post Hebrew Voices #172 – Chinese Jews of Cincinnati appeared first on Nehemia's Wall.

The Rakes read the second book in the Lotus Palace series, The Jade Temptress by Jeannie Lin. Set during the Tang Dynasty in China in Chang'an, the capital, the series touches back to the Lotus Palace, a school and home for courtesans. Mingyu is one of the most sought-after courtesans, and she crosses paths with the constable Wu Kaifeng after her protector General Deng has been found murdered. It's hard to convey through a plot summary how well Jeannie Lin builds sexual tension, but like Emma says in the episode, every scene between Mingyu and Kaifeng is charged. Support us on our Patreon!Follow us on social media: Twitter: @reformedrakesInstagram: @reformedrakesBeth's TikTokChels' TikTokEmma's TikTokChels' SubstackEmma's Substack Visit our website for transcripts and show notes: reformedrakes.comThank you for listening!

Renée Rauchalles lebt und arbeitet in ihrer Geburtsstadt München. Sie studierte an der Meisterschule für Grafik in München mit Diplom-Abschluss. Noch während des Studiums gründete sie mit dem Journalisten Gerd Hedler die Galerie am Abend in München. Sie war tätig im Bereich Buch- und Zeitschriften-Illustrationen, Gestaltung von Kunst- und Filmplakaten, Werbegrafik, Layout. Ebenso absolvierte sie eine Gesangs- und Schauspielausbildung. Nach einigen Jahren aktiver Theaterarbeit (u. a. Residenztheater München) widmet sie sich seit 1987 wieder ganz der Malerei. Im Februar 1998 gründete sie die ZEITfürKUNST-GALERIE, in der seitdem auch Literatur-Lesungen stattfinden. Veröffentlichungen in Zeitungen, Zeitschriften und Anthologien. 2001 erschien im Pustet-Verlag das Buch “Die Kunst des Sterbens”, das in Zusammenarbeit mit Prof. Dr. Bernhard Sill entstand. 2011 im konkursbuch Verlag das Buch “Mir träumte meine Mutter wieder” – Autorinnen und Autoren über ihre Mütter, in dem es um das innere Mutterbild einstiger und heutiger DichterInnen geht. Seit 2012 Redakteurin bei der Kulturzeitschrift “Literatur in Bayern” (Hrsg.: Dr. Gerd Holzheimer). Sie ist Mitglied bei ver.di, im Kunstverein Ebersberg, im Kunstverein Bad Tölz und Gründungsmitglied des 1995 in Bonn gegründeten Phantastischen Zentrums, dessen Ehrenmitglied u.a. Prof. Ernst Fuchs (1930-2015) war. 1996 Aufnahme in die WDR Galerie, 2001 in die homegallery von arthaus Innsbruck. 2005, 2006, 2009-2011, 2020 Einladung zur Biennale Florenz, 2012 zur Biennale Merida/Mexiko, 2017 Biennale Barcelona, 2009 und 2016 Teilnahme Carrousel du Louvre Paris, weitere Teilnahmen 2017 Parallax Art Fair London, 2018 Red Dot Art Basel Miami, 2019 Los Angeles Art Show, ARTEXPO New York, Monaco Yacht Show in Monaco. Einzelausstellungen und Ausstellungsbeteiligungen in München, Hamburg, Essen, Kassel, Bonn, Schweinfurt, Hof, Traunstein, Bad Tölz, Ebersberg, Wasserburg, Berg/Starnberger See, Neumarkt-St.Veit, Passau, Monschau, Innsbruck, Salzburg, Graz, Verona, Paris, London, Toronto und Minsk, 2019/20 Chongqing Hong Yi Jiuzhou, Chongqing Shi (China), Kaifeng, Henan (China), 2020 Venedig, 2021 Rom und Zürich.

Wieder einmal widmen wir uns den Krimi- und Escape-Spielen, diesmal mit einer Prise True Crime! Eine brandneue Ausgabe von “Echoes” mit den Podcast-Kolleginnen von “Mord auf Ex” steht genauso im Mittelpunkt wie die schon ältere "Echoes"-Ausgabe "Die Violine" und das historische True-Crime-Spiel “Kaifeng 982” von IDVentures. Wir haben uns alle drei Spiele angeschaut und bewertet.

In this episode we talk about the "high reward / high risk" stage of Imperial Chinese hydraulic management during the Late Ming to late Qing dynasties. Vast amounts of money, material, and expertise were poured into keeping the yellow river forced into a narrow, rapid channel. These efforts allowed the entire vast Chinese canal and irrigation system to function (including the grand canal), but at the price of constant vigilance. The river never rested, and a single season of negligence could undo years of careful maintenance. We also discuss the men who managed this system "Confucian Engineers" and use the 1841 levee breach at Kaifeng of an example of how the system operated and responded to emergencies.If you'd like to see illustrated examples of some of the tools and methods described in this episode, the National University of Taiwan has a digitized copy of a Qing Dynasty illustrated river management handbook here:https://taiwanebook.ncl.edu.tw/zh-tw/book/NTUL-9900013371/readerFor additional reading on this topic I also suggest "Controlling the Dragon: Confucian Engineers and the Yellow River in Later Imperial China" by Randall A Dodgen.

Falleció Mons. Gao, el obispo «clandestino» (fiel a Roma y no reconocido por el gobierno comunista) de Kaifeng, China. China, la política Zero Covid no ha vencido al virus. El milagro de una hermana francesa asombra a los expertos médicos y se convierte en la 70.ª curación oficial en Lourdes. Sacerdote destaca 6 virtudes de Messi para lograr la Copa Mundial Qatar 2022. Phil Lawler: En caso Pavone, el silencio del Vaticano es perjudicial. Arzobispo de Oklahoma City y nuevo secretario de la Conferencia Episcopal de EEUU: la anticoncepción alimentó la ficción de que el deseo sexual podía ser perseguido sin costos o consecuencias. El Gobierno español se carga la «familia numerosa», ¿no le cabía en las 16 que se ha inventado? La Federación Española de Familias Numerosas protesta.

Temps Le temps a passé au monastère, le quotidien est devenu une succession d'habitudes. Mon maître m'a rappelé que ce sont mes habitudes qui définissent mon image extérieure et qui, bien entendu, donnent un aperçu de ma "vraie" personne. Se lever, s'habiller, spiritualité, se laver, manger, s'entraîner, manger, se laver, spiritualité, se déshabiller, dormir. Se lever, s'habiller, spiritualité, se laver, manger, excursion d'une journée, manger, retour au monastère, se déshabiller, dormir, se lever, s'habiller, spiritualité, se laver, manger, s'entraîner, manger, se laver, spiritualité, se déshabiller, dormir. Les habitudes étaient simples, c'était une vie très méditative, sans véritables objectifs, le chemin était le but ! Aujourd'hui, c'est complètement différent, trop d'habitudes gâchent le caractère ! Les semaines se sont transformées en mois, toujours les jours de congé, nous étions dans la capitale de la province du Henan, Zhengzhou, qui, selon la plupart des Chinois, est considérée comme la région d'origine de la culture et de la nation chinoises ; c'est ainsi que Lao-tseu vient à peu près de là. Nous y avons généralement mangé de délicieux repas, j'ai en outre pu me procurer des provisions européennes (à l'époque, c'était assez fatigant), j'ai enfin pu joindre mes parents par téléphone (à une époque où les téléphones portables n'existaient pas). Nous avons pris l'habitude d'avoir des objectifs plus ambitieux pour les jours de congé, pas seulement la grande ville, mais la nature et les temples, l'histoire et la spiritualité. Par exemple, nous sommes allés à Kaifeng, l'une des anciennes capitales de l'histoire de la Chine, nous avons visité d'autres temples, rencontré différents moines et amis. Je n'ai pas vu le temps passer, j'étais ici depuis bien trop longtemps, plus de six mois, il commençait à faire froid dans les montagnes. Je n'avais jamais passé une seule journée sans chauffage, on ne peut pas s'imaginer les conséquences, les traces à suivre, les concessions que cela demande, une telle vie, en Europe on aime bien avoir chaud. Les conditions sanitaires étaient donc très limitées, qui aime enlever tous ses vêtements dans le froid ? Nous nous lavions principalement au ruisseau, les toilettes étaient pleines de touristes, sales et sans intimité, la nature était meilleure. J'avais suivi un mythe jusqu'ici en Chine, les détails n'avaient pas d'importance, mais avec le temps, j'ai commencé à regretter les CONFORTABILITÉS de la société d'abondance. Mes désirs recommençaient à m'importuner, l'ego exigeait des changements d'habitudes, du changement, des fêtes et des distractions. J'ai persuadé mon maître Yan Zi de louer une petite chambre d'hôtel dans la petite ville de Deng Feng. Enfin une douche privée, même s'il y avait rarement de l'eau chaude, mélangée dans un bac avec de l'eau chaude pour le thé, mais c'était faisable. Ici, il y avait aussi de meilleurs restaurants, car nous n'avions toujours mangé que dans le temple ou dans les échoppes alentour. Malheureusement, je n'ai que peu de photos de cette époque, trop de déménagements, trop de ballast, car le chemin est le but ! Les fruits étaient-ils plus gros à cette époque ? - Bouddha - nom d'honneur de Siddharta Gautama - 560 à 480 avant l'an zéro Copyright : https://shaolin-rainer.de (Veuillez également télécharger mon application „Shaolin-Rainer" depuis les magasins Apple et Android) Veuillez nous noter sur Apple, Google ou Spotify podcast pour nous aider à promouvoir l'émission. --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/buddha-blog-francais/message

Time Time passed in the monastery, and everyday life became a sequence of habits. My master reminded me that it was my habits that would define my outward appearance, which of course would provide insight into my "true" person. Getting up, getting dressed, spirituality, washing, eating, exercising, eating, washing, spirituality, undressing, sleeping. Get up, get dressed, spirituality, washing, eating, day trip, eating, back to the monastery, undressing, sleeping, Get up, get dressed, spirituality, washing, eating, training, eating, washing, spirituality, undressing, sleeping. The habits were simple, it was a very meditative life, with no real goals, the path was the goal! Today it is completely different, too many habits spoil the character! Weeks turned into months, always on the days off we were in the provincial capital of Henan Province, Zhengzhou, which is considered by most Chinese to be the region of origin of Chinese culture and nation; Lao Tzu, for example, comes from there. There we usually ate delicious food, I was also able to get hold of European provisions (quite exhausting at that time), finally reached my parents by phone (in a time without cell phones). We got used to more ambitious destinations for our days off, no longer just the big city, but nature and temples, history and spirituality. For example, we were in Kaifeng, one of the ancient capitals in the history of China, we visited other temples, met different monks and friends. I was not aware of the time, already too long I was here, more than half a year, it was getting cold in the mountains. Without heating I had never spent a single day, what consequences of this one can not imagine, what tracks to follow, what concessions it requires, such a life, in Europe we like it just cozy warm. The sanitary conditions were thus very limited, who likes to take off all clothes in the cold. Mainly we washed at the stream, the toilets were full of tourists, dirty and without privacy, there was the nature better. I had followed a myth here to China, the details were not important, but with time I began to miss the HOUSING from the affluent society. My desires began to bother me again, the ego demanded changes in habits, variety, partying and diversion. I persuaded my master Yan Zi to rent a small hotel room in the small town of Deng Feng. Finally a shower of our own, even if there was rarely hot water, mixed in a vat with hot tea water but still feasible. Here there were also better restaurants, we had always eaten only in the temple or in the stalls around. Unfortunately, I have from this time only a few photos, too many moves, too much ballast, because the way is the goal! Were the fruits bigger at that time? - Buddha - honorary name of Siddharta Gautama - 560 to 480 before the year zero Copyright: https://shaolin-rainer.de (Please also download my app "Buddha-Blog English" from the Apple and Android stores) Please rate us on Apple, Google or Spotify podcast to help us promote the show

Die Zeit im Kloster verging, der Alltag wurde eine Abfolge von Gewohnheiten. Mein Meister mahnte mich, dass es meine Gewohnheiten seien, die meine Aussenwirkung definieren würden, die selbstverständlich auch einen Einblick in meine "wahre" Person gewähren würden. Aufstehen, Anziehen, Spiritualität, Waschen, Essen, Training, Essen, Waschen, Spiritualität, Ausziehen, Schlafen. Aufstehen, Anziehen, Spiritualität, Waschen, Essen, Tagesausflug, Essen, zurück ins Kloster, Ausziehen, Schlafen, Aufstehen, Anziehen, Spiritualität, Waschen, Essen, Training, Essen, Waschen, Spiritualität, Ausziehen, Schlafen. Die Gewohnheiten waren einfach, es war ein sehr meditatives Leben, ohne wirkliche Ziele, der Weg war das Ziel! Heute ist das völlig anders, zu viele Gewohnheiten verderben den Charakter! Aus Wochen wurden Monate, immer an den freien Tagen waren wir in der Provinzhauptstadt der Provinz Henan, Zhengzhou, die nach der Meinung der meisten Chinesen als Ursprungsregion der chinesischen Kultur und Nation gilt; so kommt Laotse etwa von dort. Dort haben wir meist köstlich gegessen, ich konnte ausserdem europäischen Proviant ergattern (damals ziemlich anstrengend), erreichte die Eltern endlich telefonisch (in einer Zeit ohne Handys). Wir gewöhnten uns ambitioniertere Ziele für die freien Tage an, nicht mehr nur die Großstadt, sondern Natur und Tempel, Geschichte und Spiritualität. Etwa waren wir in Kaifeng, eine der alten Hauptstädte in der Geschichte Chinas, wir haben andere Tempel besucht, verschiedene Mönche und Freunde getroffen. Mir wurde die Zeit nicht gewahr, schon viel zu lange war ich hier, über ein halbes Jahr, es wurde kalt in den Bergen. Ohne Heizung hatte ich noch nie einen einzigen Tag verbracht, welche Konsequenzen daraus folgen kann man sich nicht vorstellen, welche Spuren da zu folgen waren, welche Konzessionen es verlangt, so ein Leben, in Europa mögen wir es eben mollig warm. Die sanitären Verhältnisse waren damit sehr eingeschränkt, wer zieht schon gerne in der Kälte alle Kleidung aus. Hauptsächlich wuschen wir uns am Bach, die Toiletten waren voller Touristen, dreckig und ohne Intimsphäre, da war die Natur besser. Ich war einem Mythos hierher nach China gefolgt, die Einzelheiten waren dabei nicht wichtig, aber mit der Zeit fing ich an die GEWOHNHEITEN aus der Wohlstandsgesellschaft zu vermissen. Meine Wünsche fingen wieder an mich zu belästigen, das Ego verlangte nach Veränderungen der Gewohnheiten, nach Abwechslung, Party und Zerstreuung. Ich überredete meinen Meister Yan Zi in der Kleinstadt Deng Feng ein kleines Hotelzimmer zu mieten. Endlich eine eigene Dusche, auch wenn es selten warmes Wasser gab, im Bottich mit heissem Teewasser gemischt aber doch machbar. Hier gab es auch bessere Restaurants, wir hatten ja immer nur im Tempel oder in den Buden drumherum gegessen. Leider habe ich aus dieser Zeit nur noch wenige Fotos, zu viele Umzüge, zu viel Ballast, weil der Weg ja das Ziel ist! Copyright: https://shaolin-rainer.de Bitte laden Sie sich auch meine App "Buddha-Blog" aus den Stores von Apple und Android.

Last time we spoke about the harrowing tale of what could be one of the most evil leaders in human history, depending of course which sources you read about him. Indeed Zhang Xianzhong, regardless if he was fully, half or less guilty of the crimes against humanity laid against his name, has gone down in Chinese history as a significant figure. The people of Sichuan underwent a horror and it would take two full centuries for Sichuan to regain its lost population. Thus with the fall of Zhang Xianzhong, Li Zicheng and countless South Ming claimants to the throne, who was left for the remnants of the former to rally around? Well one of the self proclaimed Emperors to the South Ming regime was still alive and….fleeing. Emperor Yongli now had an opportunity to harness the scattered Dashun, Daxi and other Ming loyalists to his cause.    This episode is the Flight & Fight of Emperor Yongli   Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on the history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War.   Well after a rather horrifying episode dedicated just to Zhang Xianzhong's regime in Sichuan we now come back to the South Ming regime. Now while Zhang Xianzhong was busy turning Sichuan into a cemetery, the South Ming Loyalists were engaged in a life or death struggle for central and southeast China. A series of Ming claimants to the dragon throne rose and fell. Li Zicheng and Zhang Xianzhong are both dead leaving their Dashun and Daxi followers in a power vacuum to be swallowed up by mere Banditry, or perhaps defecting to the Qing or Ming. As for the largest victims, the common people, they were once again caught in the middle, soon to be subjugated to war, famine and general hardship. As one scholar one put it “The long conquest of central and south China required armed struggle in county after county, community after community, forcing countless people to face the grim choices on their own doorsteps.”. When the Qing took Beijing, they faced multiple enemies. Li Zicheng fled west and the South Ming Regime sprang up in the south. It meant the Qing would be forced to divide their forces, resources and attention. But their enemies were not only not cooperating, they we're all fighting another. Hell the South Ming Regime was arguably fighting another more than the Qing at many points. It made sense to take out Li Zicheng first of course, he was an easier target since the Qing smashed his army, and there was the bonus of looking like they were avenging the regicide of Emperor Chongzhen. In the meantime the South Ming Regime was killing itself allowing the Qing to kick the door to the rotting structure and soon a bunch of South Ming self proclaimed Emperors were defeated one by one. Yet when they got to Emperor Yongli…well he kept fleeing. Then they diverted their attention to Zhang Xianzhong and took him out, probably for the betterment of humanity. Now so many remnants of Dashun, Daxi, other Ming loyalist military groups and other bandit armies were roaming around. Many warlords sprang up taking control over them. What would happen if someone began to win over all these free chess pieces so to say to their side of the war?  Now we are going to go back to Emperor Yongli's situation. As I had mentioned 2 episodes ago Qu Shishi had argued with Emperor Yongli that they needed to make a stand, and one would be made at Guilin. Qu Shisi said to the Emperor ““If you want to defend Yue, you should stay in Yue. If you abandon Yue, then Yue will be imperiled. If we take one step forward, then the people will take one step forward. But if we flee far away in a single day, the people will also flee far in a day. If we run, then we cannot defend [territory]. How can we attract people to our cause?”. Well Emperor Yongli fled regardless for the 4th or 5th time I lost count at this point, Qu Shishi stayed behind at Guilin. Qu Shisi understood the necessity not to abandon cities so easily so as to rally more forces to the cause. He had seen the previous South Ming Regimes collapse because they abandoned bases too swiftly, undermining their causes.   Qu Shisi was accompanied by Jiao Lian and they would defend Guilin from multiple Qing attacks in April and June of 1647. During the first assault Jiao had led the defense of the city facing greater numbers and having lesser firearms at his disposal. Despite the deficiency in firearms Jiao's forces defended Guilin using sword and bow to great effect. Several hundred Qinq archer cavalry charged Guilin and pelted the defenders with arrows, one of them striking Jiao, but he kept fighting and held the south gate against the invaders. This inspired his troops and soon they charged out the south gate against the Qing force, smashing many troops of the Red banner. The Qing had to flee, and Jiao's men chased them killing thousands.Eventually Jiao and his men went too far and were surrounded and outnumbered by the Qing who wheeled around on them. It is said Jiao screamed and struck the invaders with his spear, raining blood and flesh all over as he and his men hacked their way out of the encirclement. They fought for some miles, just a force of 300 men against thousands but managed to make it back to Guilin.    This minor victory prompted Qu and Jiao to stress the tactical and strategic importance of Guilin and Wuzhou, urging Emperor Yongli to return and to make Guilin a base of operations. Meanwhile Emperor Yongli was being escorted by Liu Chengyin, an ambitious career military man who was nicknamed “the Iron Club” who protected him in western Huguang. For 3 months no rations were delivered to Guilin and when the Qing learnt about its supply issues they attacked again, this time at the Wenchang gate. Jiao charged out against the enemy covered by some western cannons given to him by some catholic missionary friends. The cannons cut the Qing forces to ribbons, killing hundreds as Jiao charged out to fight them in the fields. The fighting went on for 2 days with the cannons never stopping and although the Qing regrouped to attack again they were smashed so much they had to make a retreat, being pursued yet again by Jiao's forces losing thousands of men. For this victory, Jiao was made military commissioner in chief of the left, military superintendent of Guangxi, and the Earl of Xining. Liu “Iron Club” Chengyin, it seems had been holding Emperor Yongli under house arrest at Wugang the entire time and this began to look really bad. In May of 1647, the Qing captured Baoqing and in a series of battles defeated Liu Chengyin. Emperor Yongli barely was able to escape, sometimes only being just a few miles ahead of Qing scouts. Emperor Yongli made his way through the Guni Pass to Liuzhou, but soon had to reroute to Xiangzhou. By this point locals were shooting arrows at his royal barge, not a good look at all. After the constant urging of Qu Shishi, Emperor Yongli finally decided to return to Guilin by the end of 1647.    The Qing found they were having a hard time pacifying southern and western Huguang province, it held rough terrain and a large number of enemies. Bandit groups were operating by both land and water in numbers ranging from hundreds to thousands. To make matters worse the bandits had multiple spies working within the Qing giving them warning of their movements, allowing them to hide into mountains and forests when needed. Han bannerman Luo Xiujin argued that despite their victories, the enemy would always escape their clutches via mountains. The Qing like their Ming counterparts, were having the exact same problems dealing with confrontations with wandering bandits, particularly in the rugged border country between provinces. Qing officials complained repeatedly of ambushes in mountain passes and heavy casualties. There were also reports that such ambush attacks were making common cause with the Ming loyalists, and this was certainly concerning. The Qing were realizing that the Ming could offer legitimation to bandit groups and use them to ware the Qing down.   In Autumn of 1647, after the Qing attacked Yongzhou, after 10 days of combat, the Ming suddenly charged out of the city and pushed the Qing to flee near Quanzhou where they managed to defeat Qing commander Geng Zhongming forcing him to flee for miles. This was considered the first military triumph for Emperor Yongli's regime.    By early 1648, the Qing seized Quanzhou and managed to defeat some Ming forces near Guilin who routed. The forces who had routed ended up fleeing to Guilin and they quickly set about looting the city before further fleeing. Qu Shishi remained stern as some of his fellow Ming commanders looted, burned and fled Guilin as the situation deteriorated. Guilin soon fell into a mutiny as the city was engulfed in flames. Qu refused to leave his post but  was wounded and had to leave the city by river. When the Qing prince Jirgalang heard of the problems in Guilin he seized the opportunity to assault the city. This prompted, I guess the 6th flight of Emperor Yongli at this point. Qu Shishi was urging the Emperor to stay as Jiao came rushing from Pringle to help, but Qing forces blocked his route to Guilin. Qu urged the emperor “Victory or defeat is still unsure. But if your plan is to run away, then how can this place not be in danger?” Yongli replied, “Surely my minister does not want to see the Altars of State and Grain perish?”.  Qu tried to gather forces and calm things down to defend Guilin as the enemy approached, while Jiao kept fighting to get to the city. Soon Jiao found himself surrounded and fought with his spear courageously, buying enough time for the Ming commander Hu Yiqing to show up from the east joining the fight with his cavalry. It is said, Hu Yiqing had his horses manes clipped in such a way that the Qing thought they were riding bulls and proclaimed “This bull- riding monster is not easy to stand up against!”. The cavalry of Hu managed to smash the Qing force, sending them fleeing for a few miles. Despite all of this, Emperor Jongli continued to flee all the way to Nanning, much to the outrage of Qu Shishi “How can you flee every time the wind blows two hundred li away? How can the people take heart if their leader is so tremulous?”. His words had no effect on the Emperor, in only 18 months Yongli had traveled over 1800 miles across 3 provinces, spending no more than 4 months in any given place. This led to waves of defections, and the court of Yongli began to discuss where would be the best place to set up a base of operation.    Despite the flights of Yongli, in 1648 the Ming had some major successes. Ma Jinzhong took back Changde, He Tengjiao took back Quanzhou and this drove many to the Ming cause, even Yongzhou was taken back after a 3 month siege. Riding the wave of victories, the Ming took Hengzhou and they also began to capture valuable supplies, horses and other war materials. This all forced Qu Shishi to yet again urge Emperor Yongli to go back to Guilin and this time make it his capital. Qu's reasoning was quite sound, Guilin was centrally located in a resource rich area along a river. It was easy to communicate with other sectors and coordinate offensive campaigns. But time and time again Emperor Yongli refused and this had a damaging effect on morale. Soon Ming commanders recaptured Xiangyang and Yichang and this led Emperor Yongli to feel secure enough to return to Zhaoqing, which he hoped to turn into a base of operation. At this point Yongli and many in his court thought that a Ming restoration was truly possible and they now sought to push north of the Yangzi and seize Nanjing and Kaifeng. Sun Kewang had opened up negotiations with their regime and it was expected that he could be relied upon. Qu Shishi for his part argued that now they could push east from Sichuan and north cutting Qing supply lines from Hugaung. Things would all take a dramatic turn for the worse however.   One of the Ming's commanders, Li Chixin who was a former commander under Li Zicheng had been continuously stating in public that Li Zicheng was the former emperor, making quite a bit of trouble. Li then requested permission to take Changsha and Yuezhou on his own. He managed to defeat the Qing commander Xu Yong and marched north to assault Changsha where Xu Yong had retreated. He killed thousands, captured boats, horses and other war materials and word spread of his great success. However the people of Changsha, did not see Li Chixin as their liberator, in fact they threw their lot in with Xu Yong to defend their city. Let us not forget, Li Chixin like many other former commanders of the Dashun or Daxi bandit armies had a reputation of course, who knows what populaces thought of him. Thus Li Chixins command boat when approaching the city was struck by a cannon ball and he lost over 1000 men. Xu Yong was hit by an arrow, but this did not stop him from rallying the defense of the city atop the walls. Li kept up the pressure with his siege ladders, artillery and sappers. But Xu Yong fired arrows, cannons down upon the enemy and led men into the tunnels to attack the Ming sappers costing Li Chixin some thousand men. Then Xu Yong sent secret attacks with boats on the Xiang river and they hit Li's flanks forcing him to retreat.   When Li Chixin was defeated at Changsha he was order to simply move on and relieve forces at Nanchang, but he ended he only went as far as Chaling and hunkered down. In the meantime the two Ming commanders, Du Yinxi and He Tengjiao were forming plans in Xiangtan. Du decided he would head east to rescue Jiangxi while He would try to go to Nanjing linking up with other Ming loyalists there. As part of their campaigns, Li Chixin was appointed vice minister of war and supreme commander of Shandong and Henan, while other commanders received supreme commands over other areas. But nothing came of these appointments as the Qing quickly advanced and hit He Tengjiao as he was departing from Xiangtan. He tried to find allies to help him out, but none could do anything, thus Prince Jirgalang was able to defeat He and took him as a hostage. Prince Jirgalang knew He Tengjiao had quite a lot of military capability and spent many days trying to get He to defect, but it was to no avail. Eventually Prince Jirgalang ordered his execution, or He committed suicide, no report is sure of his fate. When He Tengjiao was dead, many of his men fled to join Qu Shisi at Guilin. Another issue however was the countless “Loyal and True” who were under He Tengjiao's command, since his death they were now without any semblance of order. Bandits will be bandits and soon they were looting and pillaging everyone.    The Qing soon besieged Nanchang and took it in short time, thus dramatically collapsing the Ming control in Huguang. Many Ming commanders defected to the Qing and Emperor Yongli put Qu Shishi in charge of defending the Huguang-Jiangxi Guangdong corridor, but at this point the Qing held the Fujian coast and much of Huguang. By 1649, Li Chixin's troops began to scatter and plunder the area as the Qing pursued them. Eventually Li's forces plundered their way back north earning the moniker “white felt bandits” for the way they dressed. It was hoped by the Ming that they could still coerce Li Chixin and his white felt bandits to return back into the fold, but Li Chixin would die of illness in Guangxi in the late year. The white felt bandits soon scattered off and fell into pillaging under new commanders mostly in Huguang and Sichuan provinces.     As the Ming forces collapsed at Yongzhou in late 1649, Qu Shishi said in anguish “For 2 years I've tried to create a bulwark, and in a single morning everything has collapsed. How can it be believed that Heaven if for the Ming?”. With the death of He Tengjiao and the absolute collapse of the South Ming regime's position in Huguang, Emperor Yongli, you guessed it, fled Zhaoqing for Wuzhou in early 1650. Thus the South Ming regime was barely a thing in Huguang anymore. Now Qu Shisi began begging the emperor to stay in Zhaoqing stating “Yuedong has lots of rivers alongside mountains; [even] good cavalry cannot unite in the wilderness [to attack here]. Since the time [Li] Chengdong returned to allegiance, this has been the secure area. Its resources and tax base are abundant, ten times that of Yuexi, and both competent officials and troops north and south are connected, and we can strengthen ourselves from within and defend ourselves from outside enemies. Moreover, Zhaoqing is one thousand li from Shao[xing]. With stout crossbows mounted on the walls and entrenched brigades in defense, we can wait for royal rescue troops to come from the four [directions]. Wherever we can go, the bandits can go as well. Although the realm is vast, there is only one boundary. If we retreat an inch, we lose an inch; if we retreat a foot, we lose a foot. Now if the court hears of danger and climbs aboard a boat in the middle of the night, where can you go?”.   As you probably guessed, Yongli did not listen and continued his flight. Qing commander Kong Youde, remember that guy all the way back from the very first episodes? Well he sent Qu Shisi a letter, trying to get him to surrender. Kong Youde had been battling the Loyal and True throughout the southwest smashing many of their armies. Qu allegedly burned the letter and killed the messenger. Meanwhile back in Sichuan, Sun Kewang had begun his own program of state building and was beginning to ask the South Ming Regime to install him as a Ming Prince.    Following in his former master's gruesome footsteps, Sun looted Guizhou and severed hands, ears and noses of those who resisted, apparently only 30% of the populace was left alive. Sun set to work training his troops for months, made deals with local cities to establish economic relations all while simultaneously harassing local Ming armies. His forces eventually captured the provincial capital of Guiyang and its surrounding area and he soon began to set up a new entire new regime. But just as Sun was settling down he received word of an extraordinary opportunity unfolding in Yunnan. Thus he and his Da Xi commanders marched southwest entering Yunnan, entering a new dawn for them all.    The collapse of the Ming dynasty at Beijing and that of the Hongguang South Ming regime in Nanjing had led the people of Yunnan to revolt against their former Ming leaders. Yunnan was one of the very last places conquered by the Ming Dynasty in the late 14th century and it remained relatively the same it had been prior. It had a huge aboriginal population governed by chieftains in a system called the Tulsi system. Yunnan thus was always a bit of a quasi-feudal state controlled by the strongest chieftains. Once the Ming Dynasty fell, the chieftains began to fight another for dominance. The Chieftain family that had the largest influence historically because of their relationship with the Ming royal family was known as the Mu clan. The Mu clan was pretty oppressive to the people and even more so when the Ming collapsed. When Hongguang's regime fell, most in Yunnan began to view the Mu clan as being weak and many other clans began to attack them. One clan, the Wu clan to make this all sound more confusing, was rising to prominence at the time and challenged the Mu clan. The Wu had limited military power and the Mu quelled their challenge fairly easily. But the challenge simply encouraged more and more clans to rise up and a leader named Sha Dingzhou used the opportunity. Sha was a military officer for a chieftain who died and Sha managed to get a stronghold of the clan. While the Mu's and Wu's fought, Sha began a campaign that extended to the Vietnamese border. Then Sha tried a coup against the Mu after they quelled the Wu. Sha's force stormed the Mu palace and burnt it down, killing many in the capital of Yunnanfu. This began a war between Sha and the Mu clan for several months with Sha gaining control of the east of Yunnan. However Mu's forces and other chieftains were fighting a war of attrition and likely would win, thus Sha sought external help.    Sha Dingzhou sent a letter to Sun Kewang “inviting” him to come to the rescue of Yunnan in 1647. Unfortunately, this would be a very very big mistake. Sun Kewang claimed to be the brother in law to Mu Tianbo and declared he would avenge his sister's family. Sun Kewang showed up with 100,000 battled hardened veterans who saw a force of just a few thousand disorganized local units under Sha's command. Sun Kewang defeated Sha's army easily and piled corpses in the streets of the first city they took, immersing the city in 3 to 4 inches of blood so it is said.    Sun then took Quijing, a city he expected to simply open up the gates and submit to him as he had just massacred a previous city sending fear throughout the region. They chose to not submit and fired cannons upon the invaders. Soon Sun's men tossed up a cloud of ladders and swarming over the walls of Quijing like ants. Sun's men rounded up all those in the city and severed hands   Sun then ordered his fellow adopted brothers Liu Wenxiu to the west and Li Dingguo to the east to kill all those who would not submit. Sha Dingzhou tried to send armies to attack the invaders where he could, but every army was defeated with ease. Sha would proclaim to all his confidence with his army, but secretly he was pulling his hair out knowing soon Sun would take the province.  Sun eventually marched on Yannanfu and smashed the Sha army defending it, but rather than immediately occupying the city, Sun Kewang instead announced he was going to restore the Jiao clan, that being his sister's clan who was married to a Mu husband. By this point Liu Wenxiu and Li Dingguo had spread a ton of fear into the populace with their campaigns in the east. Despite Yannanfu having a tiny garrison within it, the city was simply falling apart because of low supplies as Sun Kewang's army simply surrounded it and waited. Thus after a few months the gates of Yunnanfu opened and Sun's forces entered the city. Soon Sun Kewang began to proclaim all those who fled the city should come back, or they would soon be killed as rebels. All the wives within Yunnanfu who lost husbands were given to Sun's men. Then he began to force the children to work cutting grass and collecting firewood. Girls of the age 10 and up were forced into drama troupes, some put into brothels. Boys 12 to 20 years of age were castrated. The adult men were killed and their bodies were tossed into the wilderness. Many former Ming officials were killed or they themselves committed suicide. To restore a semblance of order, Sun began practices employed by Zhang Xianzhong such as prohibited fires at night amongst many other rules which could earn a citizen of Yunnanfu a beating or execution depending on the rule. Yunnanfu was basically becoming a Chengdu 2.0, but perhaps not nearly as bad. Then Sun sent his armies to scour the countryside of the city killing many. It was estimated that perhaps half the population of Yunnanfu was dead. It was even alleged that coffin makers ran out of wood in Yunnanfu. Within a month, Sun's forces began to conscript laborers to cultivate enough food for the army to survive. Many homes around the city were razed to make for space for Sun's army training grounds any who resisted were killed. Sun eventually established order through fear, but realized that in Yunnan you required the support of the Tulsi system to truly control the province, so he soon began to establish relations with all the chieftains. Those who resisted of course were threatened.    Sun then began calling himself Ping Dong Wang “Prince who pacifies the East” which was met with animosity from his adoptive brothers. Sun began to place royal titles on everyone, but kept his position elevated from his adoptive brothers who were supposed to all be equal. The 3 other brothers all recognized Sun Kewang nominally as the leader, but had agreed they should all have equal rankings.  Li Dingguo began to argue they should all be equal as things were with Zhang Xianzhong, which angered Sun. Sun then publicly punished Li Dingguo, though Liu Wenxiu and Ai Nengqi would manage to get the punishment lightened. Regardless Li Dingguo was livid stating ““We are brothers. How dare you strike me? Since the death of our father we have been like hands and feet with no ruler among us, yet now we are to honor you as superior? If this is how things are going to be from now on, how can we live together in peace?”. It is alleged Sun went to Li in private and told him he had to do it publicly because if not there could be a mutiny. Sun then tried to make amends with Li, tasking him with hunting down and killing Sha Dingzhou who was on the run.   Sha had run to Lin'an and had held out against the forces of Liu Wenxiu for quite a few months. When Li Dingguo's force showed up the defenders of Lin'an showered them with gunfire, but Li being a veteran commander easily broke their walls in no time using gunpowder. Sha's forces were shocked by the speed and efficiency of Li's army as they quickly overwhelmed the city. The entire city was torched in a single day, it is said 78 thousand were massacred. Sha and his family managed to escape to a nearby town called Ami. After the massacre at Lin'an, Li Dingguo was noted to not again perform such horrible acts against civilians, it seems he was trying to build himself a reputation afterwards that he was not like Zhang Xianzhong or Sun Kewang. In early 1648, Li Dingguo surrounded the town of Ami, cutting off its water supply. After 20 days, the defenders with Sha Dingzhou ran out of water and Li began sapping Ami's walls. Li then invited Sha to a fake banquet making it seem they would allow Sha to defect and take up a grand position in the new regime. The effect led many of the defenders to defect who soon simply opened the gates to Li's men. Li was brought to Sha and his family and instead of the banquet he promised he had the entire household brought to Yunnanfu and flayed alive. Li's successes were extravagant, showing his extreme capability as a military leader. Unfortunately they also bolstered Li Dingguo as a great leader and Sun Kewang began to become quite jealous of this.    Once Sun Kewangs army had secured enough food to sustain themselves for a year, they began government building efforts. Taxes began, agricultural reform, mines were opened, weapons manufacturing, the works. The weather proved great during that year and the harvests did very well, mines produced salt, gold, silver, iron and copper and the faith in the government rose up. In fact Sun had done better than some of the former Ming officials had in the past and he soon began to mint coins, print paper notes and open new roads, which all helped reduce conflict in the province. Within a year Sun's government was gathering much praise and the people were quite content. Things were really looking good and Sun began to explore the idea of formally uniting with the Ming to resist the Qing. Sun had heard the reports about how well the Loyal and True bandits had done under the Ming regime and thought his regime might benefit from this relationship as well. This would help Sun and his inner circle gain legitimacy and at the time it looked like the Ming were doing well. However old dogs can't learn too many new tricks, and Sun's administration still held some Zhang like favorites, like harsh punishments such as decapitation, flaying and flogging. Though Sun disregarded the policy of rewarding soldiers for body counts, so there was that.   But Sun Kewang was not content, he continued to make it more apparent that his position was more and more elevated compared to his adoptive brothers. He began to erect an ancestral temple for Zhang Xianzhong and referred to him as Taizu and linking himself to Zhang. Then he asked Emperor Yongli to invest with the Ming title of prince of blood “qin wang”. Ai Nengqi was perplexed by this and said ““I can name myself prince. What's the point?” Li Dingguo also added, “We haven't conquered an inch of territory, so how can we accept enfeoffment from the court?”. Sun explained to them that only an investiture from the Ming court was legitimate and that after he was invested with the title they would all refer to him as “you highness”. As you can imagine this would also most certainly help Sun alleviate himself over another rising star, Li Dingguo who was highly popular as a field commander. Li was appointed with the major responsibility of training the troops and was noted to share hardships with the men and always led from the front gaining their respect. Li was what you call a soldier's soldier. Li Dingguo soon established 5 rules for his army; done kill people, dont commit arson, dont commit rape, dont steal livestock and dont take money from peasants. Given how soldiers usually acted in this time in history, the response of the populace was ecstasy.    In the summer of 1649, Sun dispatched his court official Yang Weizhi as his emissary to Yongli's court to ask for the investiture of Prince of Qin and offered to fight the Qing on their behalf. By this time Sun had relocated his operations in Guizhou as it was more centrally located, leaving Li Dingguo in Yunnan to train the military. For Emperor Yongli's court the request was quite disturbing, to make Sun a blood prince might put him in line for the throne. Many in the Ming court had no illusions about Sun Kewang, they thought he was trying to vie for the dragon throne himself.  The title of Prince of Qin was normally reserved for the royal family. The court was divided, Qu Shisi called for Sun's execution, many argued Sun was nothing more than a bandit. But they were in a terrible situation, suffering many military defeats at the hands of the Qing. Eventually the court consented to giving Sun the lesser  title of Duke of Jingguo. Yang Weizhi was terrified of relaying the response to Sun who might simply execute him for failing to get the title Sun wanted and made a stop at Wuzhou before returned to Guizhou. In Wuzhou Yang met with Du Yinxi who advised him to simply forge a document to make Sun think he received a better title than what he had been given. Thus with Du Yinxi's help they forged a document stating Sun was invested with the title of Prince of Pingaliao. Meanwhile another official in the Ming court forged another document stating Sun was being invested with the Prince of Qin title he had originally asked for. Turns out that official, named Chen Bangfu wanted to curry favor with Sun.  All of this was done without the awareness of Yonglis court of course.    Thus the first to arrive in Guizhou was the envoy with Chen Bangfu's forgery and Sun was absolutely delighted upon seeing it. Then Yang Weizhi showed up with his forgery of the Prince of Pingliao title, enraged Sun Kewang. Then yes as you might imagine, a real envoy from Yongli's court arrived and Sun found out the truth that he actually received the Duke of Ingguo title, really really pissing him off. To add insult to injury, his 3 other adoptive brothers were also given titles by that envoy of Yongli   In his rage, Sun  sent more emissaries to Yongli who offered him the title of Prince of Yi, but Sun refused this, demanding the title he originally requested. In the meantime Ai Nengqi died as a result of a poisoned crossbow bolt while he was pacifying a rebellious region. He had been ambushed in a forest and his army was significantly battered. He had managed to return to Yunnanfu, but the doctors there could do little to nothing to stop the poison. His army was handed over to Sun Kewangs command, significantly increasing his power. Thus the first of the adoptive children of Zhang Xianzhong was dead, and he would not be the last. Now all the way back in Sichuan the struggle raged on between the Ming loyalists and the Qing. The Qing had sent commander Li Guoying into Sichuan on a pacification campaign and as he entered the wasteland that once was Sichuan he said “For a thousand li there is no smoke [from cooking fires] and on account of the depredations of the bandit gangs, the value of rice is greater than that of pearls.”. His forces occupied Baoning in northern Sichuan where he was attacked multiple times by bandit armies such as the Kuidong bandits, Tan Hong and others. Li eventually rode out of Baoning and attacked the bandit armies fast and hard sending them fleeing into the countryside. Soon his army took Shunqing and he began to stock up supplies in preparation  for a gradual march south. In spring of 1647 he marched into Chengdu and lamented at the ghastly scene, he said to those around him“Chengdu has been down a hard road. Where are all the people?”. Bones were strewn everywhere, and there was no sign of life to be seen. He was given reports that the people of Chengdu had first fled to Yazhou and ate grass and wild plants until they starved so much they resorted to cannibalism. Li left Zheng Desheng as commander of Chengdu which must have been the worst appointment ever, but soon his troops starved, killed their commander and fled back north. Li got a report that 1330 of the 1390 men assigned to Zheng Desheng died of starvation or disease. Even Li himself was quite ill through 1647-1648 and he was hampered by bandit attacks and a very stretched supply line. Reports flooded in that every fortress was ridden with hundreds of sick and starving troops. All the garrisons the Qing commander would set up in Sichuan amounted to a few hundred starving men. The starvation did not allow him to perform a sufficient offensive, the situation became so dire most of the Qing forces had to withdraw from Sichuan with a meager force left occupying Baoning. It was not just the starvation and disease alone they had to worry about, anywhere the Qing set up shop, bandit armies emerged to harass them.    Later on in 1650, the pacification commissioner of Sichuan Zhang Chun made a report that gives quite a lot of insight. He began by describing Sichuan as a den of tigers and that of the Yao-Huang bandits. One could travel for a great distance without seeing any smoke from cooking fires. He estimated that 2-3% of the population in Sichuan was still alive. He laid blame upon the destruction caused by the Yao-Huang bandits, while leaving out that of the Qing's actions and goes on to talk about man-eating tigers found everywhere. People in Sichuan were  terrified to travel just because of tiger attacks. He claimed that in one distinct of a previous population of 506, 228 people were killed by tigers, 55 died of illness and 223 were left alive. He ended the report stating “Many people escaped the clutches of bandits only to end up in the mouths of tigers”. Wow I am just trying to imagine, surviving the horrors of Zhang Xianzhong, then the war between the Qing and Ming and now you got tigers everywhere eating people yikes.   Li Guoying immediately began demanding assistance, and Qing emperor Shunzhi began to promise supplies would be on their way from places like Shaanxi. But all supplies were quickly used up and Li still had little in terms of soldiers. Li kept arguing that as his enemies grew larger in Sichuan his forces grew smaller. The problem was the supplies and men quickly starved and got sick because there was no foundation within Sichuan to feed them. Basically it was like putting bandaids upon bandaids upon even more bandaids for a large wound that needed a doctor to fix it. Thus the situation forced Li to develop a new plan which was “tuantian” “to nourish the troops, soothe the people, and allow for both offensive and defensive warfare”. He sent Qing officials into the countryside to investigate and promote agricultural productivity. As for his army he sent them throughout the north and east of Sichuan, killing and capturing thousands of bandit armies, many part of the Yao-Huang bandits. But like always, bandits could run and hide in mountains, and thats just what they did.  It was estimated by Li that upto 100,000 Yao-Huang bandits could be in Sichuan.    By 1649, Li was promoted to minister of war and vice censor in chief of the right with jurisdiction over the armies of Sichuan. He had multiple victories, one was dislodging Liu Wenxiu from Chongqing where he killed many Daxi.  If you remember way back when, Emperor Yongli dispatched a distant family member named Zhu Rongfan to Sichuan in 1647. Zhu Rongfan began parading around as a Prince of Chu, though in reality he wasn't and amassed 100,000 followers forming a base in Kuizhou. His forces fought the Qing and scored quite a few victories, but in reality they were just a bunch of opportunistic bandits. Then Zhu Rongfan picked a fight with the Ming loyalist commander Yang Zhan who brought the Ming attention upon him. As you might have guessed, he was preparing to proclaim himself emperor as one does and South Ming officials began to investigate the situation. When pressed by them Zhu claimed to be acting on behalf of Emperor Yongli and that he was merely suppressing bandits. They also accused him of trying to claim himself as an heir apparent despite not being a prince of blood. Zhu then tried to make a getaway but was caught by other officials in 1649 who executed him.    Meanwhile the situation in Sichuan kept growing worse and worse. Just because the tyrant Zhang Xianzhong was dead did not mean his lasting effects on the province were gone. In the midst of the war between bandits, Qing and Ming, the common people were starving and dying. Rice was selling at unbelievably inflated rates. Dogs ate human flesh and lurked in city streets. Most cities were empty though because tigers and wolves were prowling them. It was reported that bandits were robbing graves and that people were resorting to cannibalism en masse. Many people fled to mountains away from the threat of other people or tigers. Lighting a fire became like a death sentence inviting anyone to attack you. Disgusting euphemisms began to be said because of all the cannibalism such as “poor man's broth / xia geng” “surplus lamb / yang rao” “scorched bones  / gu yang”. On top of the famine were the terrible diseases which there were many. “Big head plague” as it was called was when one's head erupted in red boils, it was associated with the chills, fever, swelling of the head and neck and was very contagious. There was a similar disease known as “frog fever” where the boils were more so on the shoulders and back. Then there was “horse eye” a sickness when one's eyes became big and yellow. It is also assumed the Qing brought smallpox with them and this invested the south.   By autumn of 1649 most of north and western Sichuan was pacified and a quarter of the province under nominal control of the Qing. In Southern Sichuan the South Ming loyalist Yang Zhan had held control for quite awhile, aided greatly by the hoard of treasure he salvaged from Zhang Xianzhong's naval catastrophe in 1646. He was capable of feeding his own troops and thousands of refugees who stormed over to him. Despite all his good fortune, he had to contest with warlords in Sichuan named Li Qiande, Wu Dading and Yuan Tao. The 3 warlords  invited Yang to a banquet, its always a banquet eh? And yup, they poisoned his wine, typical. After killing Yang they divided his treasure and troops and southern sichuan yet again fell into chaos.    As this all went down, word spread and Sun Kewang, similar to how he took the opportunity with Yunnan's turmoil came back to Sichuan when he heard the south was fractured.  Sun seeking to put further pressure on Emperor Yongli to invest him as a Prince of Qin, sent Liu Wenxiu and Bai Wenxuan with 200,000 to avenge Yang Zhan. Sun's forces made quick work of the warlords and bandit leaders in southern Sichuan taking several cities.Yuan and Wu were captured and sent back to Sun who mocked them saying he would enroll them as regular soldiers in his army. Wu actually did end up serving in Sun's military and for quite a long time. Yuan managed to escape and flee but was caught and killed by Liu Wenxiu. Li Qiande drowned himself when Liu Wenxiu caught up to him. Sun's forces killed countless warlords, bandit leaders and such. Now Sun's army even had elephant cavalry from Yunnan. Many simply submitted to Sun Kewang joining his forces and growing his power.   Meanwhile Li Guoying had initially profited heavily from the death of Yang Zhan, but saw with horror the force of Sun Kewang sweep through the province like a swarm. Li Guoying pleaded with Emperor Shunzhi for more troops to combat the warlord in the south and was promised a mix of Han and Manchu troops under the control of Wu Sangui. Yet even with the extra forces, now the Loyal and Trust, Kuidong bandits, Yao-Huang bandits and other groups were flocking to Sun Kewangs banner and the south of Sichuan was just a minefield of trouble.  Sun asserted his control from Guizhou and began building it up similar to what he did in Yunnan and in a short time the southwest of Sichuan became an armed camp designed specifically to resist the Qing.    Kong Youde was made prince in charge of rectifying the south in 1649 and alongside the Manchu prince Jirgalang both were dispatched and in 1650 they took Longhu, Wugang and Jingzhou. Through their efforts they took 50,000 surrendered Ming troops and many officers and moved to take Quanzhou and then entered Guangxi. Qu Shishi tried desperately to rally troops to defend Guilin, but all efforts were in vain and no significant numbers came. Qu refused to leave as all his colleagues urged him to do so. In november of 1650, Kong Youde's army surrounded Guilin. To help defend the city, Qu Shishi was aided by the Ming official Zhang Tonchang a who had served the Shaowu Emperor and aided in defeating Zhu Rongfan. He had a Fu Manchu style mustache, was loved and respected by his men for being fearless in battle. When Zhang arrived Qu said to him “I have been entrusted with staying to defend [Guilin]. So I should die here. Those without such responsibilities can flee. The frontier has already been lost. How can I think of easily fleeing?” Zhang replied that he was impressed and called Qu a true gentleman, requesting permission to die alongside him, saying, “If it's to be death, then we die together.”Qu was delighted, and the two shared wine. Qu gave his seals of office to another official to send to Yongli. So a sort of bromance if you were.   Kong Youde repeatedly offered Qu and Zhang the chance to defect, but both men refused. Kong then wined and dined them, trying to win them over but to no avail. Zhang spat back at Kong “You are no more than a dog or a sheep. You disgrace the former Sage, and you deserve to die for your crimes!” You're nothing more than the slave who used to carry a bedpan in Mao Wenlong's house! How dare you sully the name of the Sage.”. For this Zhangs feet were severed, but Kong still did not kill him. He kept insisting the Qing were better for all and gave stories of his 20 years as a soldier. Then Kong tried to have their own family members come and talk sense into them, but still it was to no avail.  Both men were eventually  imprisoned and wrote depressing and falistic poems during the captivity before being executed outside Windy Cave at the foot of the celestial crane peak in what is called today, Diecai Shan (folded Brocade hill) public park. Kong Youde allowed proper burials for the two and soon took up residence in the mansion of the former Ming Prince of Jingjiang. Now Guilin and nearby Pingle were in Qing hands. Kong Youde sought to secure Guangxi by 1651, but he was also itching to face Sun Kewang in the west.   In the wake of Qu and Zhang's deaths, Yongli fled to Nanning, hahahahaha this guy. With a more vulnerable Emperor Yongli now in Nanning, Sun Kewang saw an opportunity to establish greater control over him. Sun Kewang sent him welcoming parties, offering him military protection and boasted of how powerful and wonderful he was.    After annoying Yongli enough he was finally invested as the Prince of Qin, though he had already taken to calling himself “guozhu” “ruler of the realm” and had been making appointments on his own authority at Guiyang. Once a bandit, always a bandit as they say. He was absolutely delighted by the news and renamed Yunnanfu Kunming and Yunnan as Yunxing province. Then he dubbed his personal troops the “jiaqianjun” “royal vanguard”. Li Dingguo and Liu Wenxiu retained their old titles and sat at Sun's left and right side begrudgingly.  Yang Weizhi, the poor guy who had to bear bad news and was punished harshly for it managed to become grand secretary at Emperor Yongli's court and would subsequently try to impeach Sun. Sun responded by having his thugs bring Yang to Guiyang and upon his arrival screamed “Traitorous bandits like you will never be anything else.”. Sun had Yang beaten and dragged through the streets and was trampled to death by horses. His loss was felt heavy by many, particularly by Li Dingguo and Liu Wenxiu who had become close friends with him. They took his corpse and buried him with a ceremony. With Yang well out of the way, Sun began to construct an imperial palace in Guiyang and used imperial forms of address in his decrees and instructions. Any officials who resisted him were trampled to death by horses. Only Liu Wenxiu and Li Dingguo were exempt from calling Sun “guozhu”. He minted his own coins and constructed more ancestral temples, making further links to Zhang Xianzhong. Sun then declared his state the “Later Ming” regime. His ascension ceremony was attended by 100 officials on July 3rd 1651.   Meanwhile the Qing captured Pingle and Qingyuan as well as other towns along the Huguang-Guangxi border. Jiao Lian was captured by the Qing who tried to persuade him to join them, but he opted for suicide. Emperor Yongli feeling pressured, you guessed it, fled Nanning. This time he and his court debated whether they should flee to Fujian or Vietnam. Most wanted to go east arguing they should join up with Sun Kewang. But Emperor Yongli thought the coast was too distant and the travel too dangerous, for the time being they would camp at Xixing. But as the Qing took Nanning, Emperor Yongli fled again, almost being caught by the Qing who were within just a few miles of his entourage. This prompted Emperor Yongli to accept Sun Kewangs offer of protection. At the beginning of 1652, Sun ordered his subordinate Lt. Genge Sanpin with 3000 troops to escort Emperor Yongli to Anlong. By the time Emperor Yongli arrived his entourage was down to 2900 members. Sun figured the location was convenient for the court of Yongli as it lay in conjunction with Yunnan, Guizhou and Guangdong provinces. It was also close enough to Guiyang for Sun to keep an eye on the Emperor. Sun then set himself up as Yongl's military protector, but refused to personally greet Yongli on the principle that quote “2 dragons cannot see one another”. Thus Anlong became the ostensible Ming capital, but in reality it was just a safe place where Sun could keep the Emperor while he pursued his own objectives.   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.  So the great and horrifying father Zhang Xianzhong is dead, but his 4 adoptive sons quickly took over the family business and are causing mayhem. Sun Kewang emerged the largest brother and soon built himself an empire, matching that of  the fleeing Emperor Yongli. Now Kewang had Emperor Yongli basically under house arrest, or better said kidnapped, all was his for the taking, what stood in his way, but the might of the Qing dynasty?

After the Qing Dynasty established its rule over the heartland of China, the region known as Zhongyuan in the lower and middle reaches of the Yellow River centered on the region between Luoyang and Kaifeng in Henan Province, the Manchus fully controlled the country. Although setting up a unified dynasty, there were fewer people and Manchu culture was less developed than in Zhongyuan, which was perceived as the birthplace of Chinese civilization.Today we continue to discuss how Qing Dynasty emperor Qianlong holds Confucius in high esteem in order to stabilize his reign where Han nationality dwell.

Last time we spoke, Yang Sichang had enacted his “ten-sided net” plan and won a multitude of victories over rebels. However this plan proved to be a disaster overall and cost the Ming Dynasty more than it did any good. Now Li Zicheng had established himself as the de facto largest rebel leader amongst others who now held entire armies at their command. The Ming dynasty was rotting from within and its actions to prevent the rot simply delayed or sometimes even made it worse. With the allocation of so many resources to the northwest and center of China to deal with the rebels, the Ming northeastern frontier was weaker than ever. Seeing the absolute turmoil from within, the Qing soon realized they could allow the rebels to do much of the heavy lifting for them for now it was time for the Qing to overthrow one of the greatest dynasties in history.   Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War.   This episode is the fall of the Ming Dynasty   As things only worsened within the Ming dynasty, soon the Qing would make their move in one of the most decisive engagements fought between the 2 empires. Given the Ming's recent ability to withstand the Qing raids over the past few years, the Ming Court remained a bit more optimistic that the northeast could hold out. Hong Chengchou continuously argued they should remain defensive despite many in the Ming court pushing for offensive operations. Despite this, the Qing were making massive efforts at digging trenches for some upcoming sieges. By some estimates some trenches were 8 feet deep and 6 feet wide, dug in several rows. The siege efforts represented an evolution in Qing warfare, many differing groups were being employed and specialization was being seen. For example Koreans were manning many of the firearms and Mongols were used more for mobile warfare. At Jinzhou some Ming relief forces began to advance and upon hearing the firing of their guns, the defenders burst out of the south gate. The Ming engaged the Qing who had sent 7000 cavalry to hit them. A fierce battle was fought, but the Qing were able to move their cannons and used them to devastate the Ming. The defenders were badly hurt, having 738 dead and 793 wounded, but the Qing eventually turned away by nightfall. Despite this being a slight victory for the Ming, they had only months worth of supplies and were advised by Zu Dashou not to enter any battles lightly. But the Ming Court kept demanding more offensive operations, pushing Hong Chengchou to go forth with a force of 60,000 in July of 1641 to hit the Qing. The Qing forces were around Mount Rufeng, due south of Jinzhou. When Dorgon heard the report of 60,000 Ming incoming he urgently sent a message to Hung for aid. Hung told Dorgon to stand firm and sent him 3000 cavalry immediately to help out. Estimates vary, but its possible the Qing had up to 100,000 men in many elevated positions amongst all the siege works. When Hung arrived to the scene he stated “They say Hong Chengchou knows how to use troops. I can see that those aren't empty claims. My generals should be concerned”. Some of Hong's commanders advised a retreat, stating their supply was short, but Hong stated “now today we have this opportunity and although our food supplies are growing short, you should listen to the order of your officers. If you defend, you may die, but if you don't fight, then you'll still die, but only in battle do you have any hope of a favorable outcome”. Thus Hong led the attack personally against Hung's forces. This is getting a big confusing eh with the Hung and Hong? Hong's left and right flanks advanced haphazardly and were quickly routed by the Qing. The next day the Ming left flank panicked and fled, trampling into another and abandoning many weapons and supplies while falling victim to more Qing ambushes along the way. Over 50,000 Ming troops were lost, literally being driven into the sea. Of the left flank it is said barely 200 men survived, being ambushed all the way to Ningyuan. The left flank commander, Wang Pu would be executed for this terrible conduct. Hong Chengchou and the right flank made a fighting retreat all the way to Songshan with only 10,000 troops. Hong vowed to hold Songshan to the death with these forces, but now Jinzhou was more isolated and thus in grave danger. As the Ming dug in further, Hung told his forces all they had to do was sever the Ming supply lines and defend the coast, because the Ming were short on food and soon would fall apart. Hung returned to Shenyang and left the siege in the hands of his commanders, Dodo, Jirgalang an Abatai. Upon hearing the news, Chongzhen ordered Hong to fight to the death if necessary to protect Songshan. As the siege continued the defenders pleaded with the court to send supplies while they had only a single bowl of rice per day to survive on. Things did not fare much better for the besiegers who were also low on food supplies. It would actually be Songshan that turned itself over to the Qing before Jinzhou, in march of 1642. At Jinzhou the defenders eventually resorted to cannibalism and this finally prompted Zu Dashou to surrender the city to the Qing. Next Tashan fell with 7000 of its defenders being massacred. Xingshan fell afterwards peacefully. Many of the Ming commanders were brought to Shenyang. Eventually Hong Chengchou after refusing to eat for several days agreed to defect to the Qing, becoming the newest most prominent Ming to do so. Hong Chengchou joined the Yellow banner, working under Dorgon.    These victories, now called the battle of Song-Jin allowed the Qing to acquire a ton of war equipment. They got their hands on 3683 cannons and 1515 various guns. Now it seemed the Qing had the necessary technological tools capable of toppling the Ming Dynasty. Hong Chongzhen just before the fall of Songshan and Jinzhou proposed opening up peace talks with the Qing. But knowing the emperor's temper, Hong had sent 2 envoys secretly and by the time they reached the Qing Songshan and Jinzhou had already fallen. Nonetheless the talks occurred and the Qing in a great position demanded territorial concessions, 1 million taels of silver per year in tribute and would pull their troops back away from Ningyuan as a gesture of good faith. The 2 states would be made equals and exchange ministers to conclude the agreements. All of this was relayed to Chongzhen who assembled his court who were deeply divided over the matter. On one hand agreeing to this would stabilize the frontier and allow the Ming to devote all their resources to deal with the rebels. But on the other hand, it was dangerous to publicly announce that the Ming dynasty was now treating with the Qing. The court decided not to go through with it and the envoys left Shenyang, thus from that point onwards no real peace talks would occur again between the 2 dynasties.    The Qing brushed this off, because now they understood how strong their position was. The conquest of the Ming dynasty was now a reality if they so desired it. Hung held a conference with his advisers who all came to the conclusion that peasant rebellion within the Ming Dynasty they had all had reports of could do much of the heavy lifting. Hung would continue his raids to plunder more supplies and booty, but he also ordered his men not to rape or plunder indiscriminately. In september of 1642, the Qing sent 50,000 troops hitting Ming defenses along the Great wall, winning a series of minor battles. Then they assaulted Dongchang but were repulsed by its defenders led by Liu Zeing. Despite the minor setback, they would eventually capture Dongchang 3 months later. It turned out the defenses of places in Shandong were oriented towards the sea and the defenders were equipped and trained to counter attacks from that direction, thus they were not as prepared for cavalry attacks. The Qing then attacked Jining, where Prince Lu courageously led the defense, but the city soon fell and Prince Lu commited suicide. Ming Grand secretary Zhou Yanru then told the emperor he would lead relief troops himself. He did, and they routed quickly and were defeated, though he would send reports back to Beijing stating he had won a great victory. Zhou also had not been in the actual battlefield, but rather dining at banquets with friends while simultaneously sending a stream of victory reports to the Ming court. He was not alone in this, many other Ming officials were lying or over exaggerating their war efforts, not wanting to face the wrath of the Emperor's temper.   During the raids into Nan Zhili, Shandong and Henan in 1642-1643 the Ming records estimated the Qing had attacked 3 superior prefectures, 18 regular prefectures, 67 counties and 88 towns. They had captured almost 400,000 people, 321,000 livestock, 12,000 taels of gold and 2.2 million taels of silver, a colossal sum. Alongside all of this they of course got their hands on more firearms. Matters were even worse than the plundering however, as the Qing raided more and more starving refugees fled into Shandong and Liaodong burdening local officials. Just about nothing the Ming did could hinder the Qing, until one thing put a dent in the Qing attacks, Hung Taiji died in August of 1643. Historians think it was a stroke that killed the great ruler.   On the rebel front, in October of 1642, the great city of Kaifeng in Henan, once a former capital of China was completely destroyed by a man-made flood. The flood submerged the city and its estimated 80% of its population died, over 370,000 people. This would be a setback not only for the Ming, but also for Li Zicheng who had hoped to use its capture as a springboard for his ultimate goal, a thrust at Beijing. After the capture of Luoyang, Li had grown more aware of the necessity for a strategic base of operations so he could hit the capital. Kaifeng was not just a strategic place it also was a symbolic one, as mentioned it was a previous capital.  Li Zichengs forces had actually assaulted Kaifeng a few times between 1641-1642, but each time they were repulsed and decided to attack other cities and return. By mid july of 1642, famine was spreading with Kaifeng and Li's forces had returned to try again. They expanded defensive moats around the city to siege and wait them out. Then they got the bright idea of utilizing the Yellow River to flood out the defenders. On july 29th, an impatient Li Zicheng killed a subordinate who proposed the idea of using the river, as his efforts to do so had not yet worked. The moats had only filled up with 5 inches of water. Then on August the 10th, the defenders of the city burst out to try and make a decisive victory against the rebels. The battle was ferocious and Li Zicheng fought in the very thick of it pushing the defenders back into the city. Kaifengs walls were beginning to crumble, food was scarce and no relief armies were able to come to its aid. The usual reports of people resorting to cannibalism began, thus things were quite dire. This got the defenders to think of anyway to escape this plight, one idea was to use the river. Water levels had risen to around 4 feet deep and heavy rains were adding to this. The defenders hoped that by diverting the river, it might provide them with fish and other food sources. The commander of kaifeng in desperation sent 3000 of his best troops out in the middle of the night to cut the dikes, but his men were caught and turned back. Then in the middle of the night on october 7th, the defenders were awakened by a great roar and the river suddenly came crashing right into the city. The rebels pulled back and watched the enormous power of the river doing all the work for them. Historians are not 100% sure if the rebels had ultimately cut down the dikes or perhaps heavy rains simply collapsed them. But in any case, the river smashed through the Cao gate in the north, sweeping everything before it and rushed out the south gate. People desperately climbed towers to avoid the raging waters or made rafts. The commander of the city built some 20 boats to evacuate, Prince Zhou and other high officials, as most commoners were forced to cling to tree branches and debris praying for rescue.By dawn of october 10th, the city was fully submerged. The rebels looted what was left of the city, but it was in such a sorry state there was no point trying to occupy it as a base of operations. Thus a disappointed Li Zicheng turned further south. It was a catastrophe for the Ming, Kaifeng was a base of operations used to coordinate defensive efforts for all of Henan and specifically to protect the southern approach to Beijing. Now as Li Zichengs forces moved south, also in august of 1642, Zhang Xianzhong was embarking on a new venture. His force had been camped in Lake Chao not too far from Luzhou where he began to recruit and train a naval force. Zhang planned to attack Nanjing via the Yangtze river. For Li Zicheng, he was turning his attention towards Nanyang where Sun Chuanting was leading Ming troops. Li and Sun's forces clashed a few times, but Li was able to bait, ambush and eventually force Sun's forces to retreat towards Shaanxi and the Tong Pass. This allowed Li to hit the last position of Ming strength left in Henan, Runing.    Runing was defended by commander Yang Wenyue with only 3000 troops. Yang also happened to be an old rival of Li's who had fought him a few times outside Kaifeng. As soon as the rebels approached the city, the defenders began to break and fled. Apparently the defenders threw corpses over their walls into the moat in desperation. When Li Zicheng entered the city he faced the captured Yang and said to him “Master is an important official of the dynasty who will not submit to us. But now that we've caught you, what is your wish?”  Yang replied “I myself, without any soldiers, only want to kill you. So today I'll die at you hands. What else can I say?”.Yang was then executed in front of the Sanyi temple. Li Zicheng followed this all up by taking Xiangyang, De'an and Chentian in early 1643. At Xiangyang, Li took new steps to building up his new order. He took the residence of Prince Xiang and made the prince and his siblings earls. Prince Xiangyang was renamed Xiangjing and Li took the title of “Long Accumulated Worshiping Heaven Leading-in-Righteousness Generalissimo”, and thank god he decided to shorten that all down to commander in chief. His secondhand man, Luo Rucai took the title “generalissimo whose virtue and awe pacifies the people on behalf of heaven”, what is with these guys and these ridiculously long titles? At this point Li Zichengs force began taking all men they captured between the ages of 15-40 and enrolled them in the army, and soon they were a goliath 600,000 man strong force. A few months later, Li Zicheng adopted the title of Prince of Xinshun and began procedures for taking future cities. Now if defenders resisted for 1 day, 30% of them would be killed, if resistance lasted 2 days, 70% would be killed and if after 3 days all would die. When Chongzhen heard reports about this he was utterly disgusted. Zhang Xianzhong also upted his anty by renaming and reclassifying captured towns and prefectures in Central China even when he did even not hold them. To add to the Ming's misery, some of Zuo Lingyu's subordinates attempted a mutiny to take Nanjing, raising a ton of tension. Zuo was eventually able to quell the mutiny, but it distracted him and his forces from Zhang's operations.    At the beginning of 1643, Zhang remained the only rebel leader not directly subordinate to Li Zicheng. Zhang knew the danger posed by this and started to consolidate and legitimize his own power lest he be swallowed up by Li. Thus Zhang decided to attack Nanjing and as we mentioned he built some naval power to do so. In may Zhang's force moved into eastern Huguang capturing several cities and he soon renamed himself Prince of Xin Shun. Then Zhang targeted the capital of Huguang, Wuchang. Many of Wuchangs forces were former mutineers under Zuo Lingyu's. The city's defenses did not fare too well to say the least and fell by July the 15th. In the chaos of its capture, thousands were massacred by Zhang's men and thousands more drowning in the local river. Prince of Chu himself was drowned in a bamboo cage by Zhang's orders. The river was allegedly so full of corpses that the fish were unfit for consumption months after. Zhang took all the captured men between 15-20 enrolled them as soldiers and killed the rest in quite a grisly manner. He renamed the city Tianshoufu meaning “received from heaven” and the capital of his new Western Kingdom. Zhang then elevated the late Prince Chu's younger brother to a position of nobility within his new order. Zhang went on to make all these proclamations and promises of restructuring so much, but he only really ended up occupying the city for barely a month before being chased off by Zuo Liangyu. As he withdrew he torched the city, I guess so long for all that? When Li Zicheng got report of all these ongoings he decided to place 1000 taels for Zhang's head, demonstrating the emerging rivalry. Zhang moved on to occupy Yezhou then used his boats to strike at Changsha. Like the poor souls of Wuchang, the defenders of Changsha did not take notice of the incoming rebel force and did not make any strong defensive points along the city's northern approach. When Zhang approached the city's gates he demanded their surrender and a brief effort was made by the defenders to repel them. Knowing it was fruitless, the commander of Changsha asked if he could give his life in return for the sparing of the people. Zhang accepted this, it is said the commander's eyes remained clear and bright and he did not cry out as he was cut to pieces. The Ming Court was feeling helpless towards the declining situation, now both the frontier and interior were in utter chaos. Officials were being impeached left right and center and some executed. More and more officials poured into the imperial palace as the Emperor demanded solutions.    In spring of 1643, Li Zicheng began to consolidate his movement by eliminating rival subordinates. The first to go was Ge Guoyan after he secretly met with Luo Rucai which prompted suspicion from Li. Li then invited Ge to a banquet, got him very drunk and killed him, thus taking all of Ge's forces as his own. Subordinates Zuo Jinwang and He Yilong were dispersed, in a similar fashion. And even Luo Rucai would face elimination, it seems he had grown to popular despite the fact, unlike Zhang he never expanded his political goals and prefered the life of a wandering bandit. There is some evidence to suggest Li took out Luo because rumor had it the Ming were trying to get Luo to kill Li and defect. Luo did not fall for the banquet affair, but later would be killed by a death squad sent by Li whom caught Luo asleep with his forces in camp. Luo's forces would be taken by Li who continued his purge, which prompted some subordinates to defect to the Ming. The great purging did not go unnoticed prompting Zhang to send Li gifts, probably hoping to get on his good side, but Li sent nothing in return.    In autumn of 1643, the Ming made a large offensive against Li Zicheng. The emperor ordered Sun Chuanting to conduct an operation in Henan towards the east to crush Li once and for all. The problem for a long time though was most military strength was in the northeast thwarting off the Qing, but now it seems the court decided to divert considerable resources from the northeast in the hopes of destroying Li Zicheng in Henan. Sun Chuanting was not loved by the local gentry in Shaanxi because he raised many taxes to pay for local defenses, despite them being successful. These gentry thought if they allowed Sun to lead Ming armies away from his defensive positions, he would no longer bother them with more taxation, so they supported the idea. Sun opposed the operation for many reasons, firstmost he thought his defensive plans were bearing fruit in Shaanxi. If Li's army swelled, their supply lines would become problematic and with winter on everyone's heels, Sun figured Li's army's morale would eventually break and they would have to go west, falling upon Sun's defenses. Sun was also concerned with supplying his force in the event of an offensive operation as in the past this proved to be fatal. He advised waiting until the following spring, but was completely ignored as all the gentry were now pushing for the operation. Sun eventually had to bow to local gentry and court pressures to lead the offensive, remarking “this is the path to ruin” as he did so. Sun marched down the yellow river valley gathering Ming remnant forces in Luoyang. Sun then ordered Zuo Liangyu to take a force and advance from Jiangxi and strike south upon Runing, hoping they could perform a pincer attack. However Zuo's force was still recovering from being smashed the year earlier and had to refuse this order, something increasingly being done by commanders in the field. So Sun had to advance alone and managed to smash a rebel force at Ruzhou to the utter delight of the Ming court. They were all jubilant, except for the Vice minister of War, Zhng Fengyi who reminded them the rebels might be feinting an illusion of weakness to lure Sun into a trap. Well Sun soon won victories at Baofeng and Jia pushing the rebels further towards Xiangcheng. Despite the victories, Sun was facing the very problems he had foreseen. His troops were running low on supplies, and years upon years of scorched earth tactics had devastated the agriculture of Henan. Thus Sun's troops were at the mercy of neighboring provinces for food supplies but the officials in those regions were either unable or unwilling to send the provisions. At that point Sun's 2 subordinate commanders argued if they should go back on the defensive or continue with the offense. Sun had a spy within Li Zichengs camp telling him that Li force was on the ropes, thus Sun decided they would continue. As November hit, things got really bad, supplies worsened and Sun troops began to raid local towns or eat their own horses. The rearguard of his army then got cut off by forces under Li who spread rumors to them that Ming relief forces were not coming to their aid. This all panicked the men and the rear began to rout. Upon seeing the chaos, Sun ordered a general retreat and told his subordinates Gao Jie to protect their rear and for Bai Guang'en to lay ambushes to cover the retreat. Bai took his forces and simply bolted for the Tong Pass. Unfortunately for his almost complete infantry force, do remember they began eating all their horses afterall, well Li's cavalry found them and smashed them to pieces. Sun's army was soon routed losing 40,000 men and abandoning an incredible amount of weaponry to the rebels. Sun tried to make a stand at the Tong Pass but his forces crumbled to the rebels. Bai Guang'en not only got his force smashed, but he ended up defecting to Li and became a commander for him. Sun proceeded to retreat up the Weir River valley where he would fight a final battle at Weinan and he would die with his men. Gao Jie took his remaining forces and fled north, leaving Beijing completely open to attack. All of this convinced Li that the time was ripe to declare his intent to overthrow the Ming dynasty and formally establish his own regime which would be at Xi'an.    While that was going down, Zuo Liangyu was fighting Zhang Xianzhong's forces further south. Although Zuo's men managed to recapture Xiangyang and Nanyang, Zhang as we mentioned had taken Changsha and now fortified it. The fighting between Zuo and Zhang would continue and before long Zhang found himself setting up in Sichuan where he established his Great Kingdom of the West. It was there as I mentioned that he took Yang Sichang's corpse and desecrated it. Back in Beijing, the court now made Yu Yingui supreme commander of Shaanxi. And Yu was very skeptical about any effort to turn the tide at this point, well no duh.    With Sun Chuanting dead, Li Zicheng had several options laid bare to him. One of his subordinates advised him to take Hebei's capital next, another said they should loop around Jinling to get supplies and hit Beijing, others suggested taking a position in Henan and capturing further cities to draw more troops then go across Shanxi to hit Beijing. In the end Li liked the last plan which was advised by his subordinate Gu Junen. Yet before Li would set out to do all of this he wanted to create his own administration in Xi'an. He also decided the attack on Beijing would be done from 2 directions. Li and his subordinate Liu Zongmin would advance on Beijing from the northwest, first heading from Xi'an and seizing Ming garrisons along the way through Shaanxi and the Great Wall at Juyong pass. His other subordinate Liu Fanglian would advance from the south, crossing through Henan to hit Beijing.    Xi'an was protected by some of the largest walls in all of China and would fall without a single fight as one of its leading officials was working with the rebels. At Xi'an Li made the Prince of Qin an administrator and renamed the city Chang'an, recalling its Tang dynasty name. Li followed this up by adopting many Tang Dynasty names for office positions and cities to add legitimacy to his own name and movement. Li also began wearing dragon robes and began to distribute wealth to the people. Li's armies fanned out and conquered numerous places renaming them. One place they took was his hometown of Mizhi which he renamed Tianbao “protected by Heaven” and he began to construct a palace there. On New Years day of 1644, Li Zicheng declared his rival Shun Dynasty within the city of Xi'an, now called Chang'an. Li took the reign title, Yongchang meaning “eternal prosperity”. Li then attacked the last remaining Ming stronghold in Shaanxi, that of Yulin. The fighting was fierce, but Li's cannons broke its walls. Next to fall was Ningxia, and Qingyang where Liu Zongmin suffered an astounding 30,000 casualties but took the city. Guyuan was handed over to Bai Guang'en without a fight and soon the rebels were marching towards Gansu. Meanwhile Beijing was in full panic, some even advising a retreat to the second capital of Nanjing. In response to Li's march, the court dispatched commanders to various routes going to the capital to hinder Li. Li Mingrui the Hanlin Academy lecturer advised the emperor in front of the court that he should have a quote “southern tour to Nanjing wherein by virtue of the monarch leaving the capital like a dragon rising or a tiger leaping the masses would spontaneously rise to quell the rebels”.  Emperor Chongzhen made no note of this at court, but in private told Li he agreed but feared what would befall the Ming subjects if they learnt the Emperor was fleeing to Nanjing. They then secretly went over the logistics of how to get the Emperor to Nanjing safely. Li suggested taking men from the 8 prefectures around the capital rather than any from the northeast which would look like they are abandoning territory to the Qing. In the midst of these plans another advisor came forward, Grand Secretary Li Jiantai who argued they should raise 1 million taels of silver to recruit and fund an army to take Shanxi back. The Emperor pressed him on this and Li stated he would work with the scholar Shi Long to gather supporters from all over the northwest. The Emperor in absolute desperation liked this plan and gave the go, giving Li the double edged sword of authority. It is claimed the force that was sent out was 100,000 strong. The problem was all these men was that they were in the words of a modern scholar “dandies, spoiled rich kids, space fillers and incompetents”. Around half the force deserted after marching only 30 miles and returned to Beijing. Before any serious fighting ever occurred most of the force simply scattered. Just 3 days after the army left Beijing, the Emperor asked his Minister of War about Li's whereabouts and the official had no idea prompting Chongzhen to exclaim “how can my Minister of War not know this?”. At this point the Emperor sat down with an official to look at the numbers. The officials told him the rebels claimed to have a 1 million man strong army, but reassured him it was probably around 100,000. Then he gave the emperor a sobering account that the Ming forces around Beijing were around 80,000 strong, but only around 30,000 of them could be somewhat trusted and of that only 3000 really trusted. It was at this point the emperor revisited the southern tour idea in private while putting on a face in public that he would not leave Beijing.   News from the front indicated Shun forces had just captured Taiyuan and Datong where they killed another Ming prince. Then the Shun took Xuanfu whose defenders simply turned the city over and the populace welcomed the Shun with cheers and burning incense. Then Changping fell in March without much of a fight. When the Emperor received news of Changping's capture he got up during a court meeting and simply walked out. It is alleged he paced around the forbidden city screaming out “my minister have failed me! Failed me!”. Li Zicheng sent envoys to Beijing asking for the city to be handed over without a fight and offering a deal with the emperor whereby he would be recognized as a prince and together they would face the Qing. This offer would mean that Li would be formally be made a Prince of Shun and all territory in the northwest would be his. Second the Shun would receive a tribute of 1 million taels. Third the Shun would not take orders from Chongzhen, but would help fight the Qing and assist in quelling other rebels. Emperor Chongzhen did not accept the proposal. Chongzhen ordered many of his children to flee south and issued a directive for all his civil officials to kill themselves since they had failed to save the dynasty.    When the rebels began to attack the gates of Beijing, the defenders fired powder shots as they had all reached an agreement with rebel agents. Li Zicheng made great efforts to break the will of the defenders at Beijing before his approach. On the afternoon of April the 24th, one of Emperor Chongzhen's eunuchs gave the orders to open the city gates. Li promised the people of Beijing amnesty to all those who surrendered. Emperor Chongzhen appointed Liu Wenbing in charge of rallying the populace to defend the city to which Liu replied “If your majesty cannot do it, then how can I?”. The Emperor then went to the Qianqing palace in the forbidden city and told the empress “All is lost. As you are the Mother of All Under Heaven, you should die” she replied “I have followed your highness for 18 years and I will die without a word; today we die together with the altars of state and we will have no more regrets”.  The emperor ordered the royal family remaining in Beijing to commit suicide and for the younger ones to try and escape. The empress and many other members were able to commit suicide, but Chongzhens youngest daughter Zhaowang he had to kill himself with a sword. Allegedly, Chongzhen by this point was so utterly drunk, he accidentally cut Zhaowang's arm off in the process and left her to die in a pool of her own blood. It is also furthermore rumored she would survive the wound and would live out the rest of her life as a buddhist nun. Chongzhen and his faithful eunuch servant, Wang Cheng'en went to the base of Coal Hill and hung themselves from a tree. The Emperor left a suicide note reading in part “My inadequate virtues and weak flesh have invited punishment from Heaven. Now the treacherous rebels are invading the capital. My officials have caused all this! I must die but I am ashamed to face my ancestors. Therefore I take off my crown and cover my face with my hair. Rebels! You can dismember my body, but do not harm the common people!”.    As the Emperor lay dead, several eunuchs of the Ming Court, alongside the Minister of War, Zhang Jinyan welcomed Li Zicheng into the city. Li Zicheng initially prohibited his men from plundering Beijing, but it was not too long until the populace was subjected to rape and looting. Afterall how could Li Zicheng stop his men from the ultimate prize that was Beijing.  The Shun Dynasty was beginning to be established, but unfortunately for Li Zicheng there loomed a rather large problem at hand. That problem was in the form of the Qing empires forces at the doorstep of the now dead Ming dynasty.    Li Zicheng had a major problem, the Qing had bided their time waiting for a moment to strike and it was coming any minute now. Li Zicheng's only hope to hold them off would be to try and rush to the northeast and win over as many of the Ming defenders in the area as possible and bolster them up. In May Li Zicheng had to set forth from Beijing to meet the enemy in the northeast, leaving his subordinate Niu Jinxing in command of Beijing. Over in Shanhaiguan was commander Wu Sangui who was very unsure what to do. Then Wu learnt that the forces of Li Zicheng had abused members of his family back home and decided he would defect to the Qing. Li Zicheng heard reports of Wu's resolve and begrudgingly sent a small force quickly to attack Wu who engaged that said force around Yongping. Wu smashed the force to pieces and fled back to Shanhaiguan. Now enraged, Li and Liu went forth with an army of around 100,000 to crush Wu. Now Wu realized the Qing military were most likely better off than the rebels and after some lengthy negotiations with Prince Dorgon, Wu arranged to allow the Qing to enter China proper through Shanhaiguan unmolested in exchange for their assistance in defeating the treacherous Li Zicheng. It seems Wu believed he might be able to score himself as the next ruler of the Ming state or atleast become a Prince under the Qing. Dorgon was quite suspicious of Wu however. The offer suited the Qing of course, it would allow them to look like they were avenging the Ming Dynasty against the rebels. Before Wu had come forward, Dorgon had been planning an attack on Beijing by coming through inner mongolia, but now the alliance solved that problem entirely.    A Qing force of 140,000 came to Shanhaiguan and joined forces with Wu's. Dorgon ordered Wu to take his army as a vanguard for their combined force. Dorgon's thinking was by doing so Wu's men would take the brunt of the hard fighting and this would ensure after their victory that his forces would not be strong enough to stand up to them if he had a change of heart. Li Zicheng had set out with 100,000 men, but many of his commanders were recent turncoats such as Tang Tong and Bai Guang'en. Also for many of the rebels, the ultimate goal had been achieved, they looted Beijing, many did not have the mind to continue fighting. Li Zicheng's ultimate mistake however was not that he was engaging in combat with Wu or the Qing, but that it never occurred to him that they would join forces.   In late May the Wu/Qing and Shun forces would do battle on a field just outside Shanhaiguan. Shanhaiguan had 3 outlying castles guarding the interior approach and Wu had prepared his main defensive line at the west bank of Shihe. 40,000 Shun troops crashed into Wu's main defensive line and Wu motioned his forces back into the main castle while simultaneously sending 20,000 men to the north and west to cut off the Shun's escape routes. In the initial clashes the battle was fairly even, with both Wu and the Shun losing considerable amounts of men. Wu grew concerned that the Qing were merely going to allow his force to be smashed to pieces and then sweep in afterwards, and he had every right to think this, they most likely were doing just that. Despite the odds, Wu's force seemed to be turning the tide somewhat and this prompted Dorgon to send 2 waves of 20,000 cavalry to envelop the Shun. The next day, Wu led a charge against the Shun formation but they repulsed him right back into the castle pass. Then the Qing cavalry of the White banner led by Ajige and Dodo smashed into the Shun. Wu's men saw the Shun morale crumble and charged upon them again, bursting out of the castle. Li Zicheng was directing the battle from a high tower position and upon seeing the cavalry, he simply assumed them to be Wu's forces. dust clouds made by the charging cavalry made it very hard to see what was going on, but as the battle heated up more, Li began to see swarms of arrows raining down on his men and he realized these were Manchu people, he screamed out “the tartars have come!”. The Shun force collapsed, many were driven towards the sea and drowned. The Shun force retreated scattered, with many running back to Beijing. Li and his forces then fled as fast as they could for Beijing where they staged a very quick enthronement ceremony for Li where as he declared himself emperor. Then Li and his army plundered Beijing and most of the rebel left the city the day after, carrying off their loot.   Prince Dorgon, serving as a regent for the child Emperor of the Qing, Shunzhi, entered Beijing in May of 1644 seeing all the rebel armies flee before his men. He announced to the populace they were now under Qing rule as Li Zicheng fled west to Xi'an. Over the next 6 months, Li's authority would disintegrate throughout all the territories he had conquered. Ming loyalists, some semi-independent warlords and the Qing swallowed up everything in sight. Eventually Li found himself in the summer of 1645 being pursued by the Qing prince Ajige to the vicinity of Mount Jiugong. How Li died is not exactly known, some say he hung himself after being surrounded by some angry peasants. Others say peasants beat him to death looking for food. What is known is that his corpse was badly mutilated when it was found. Li Zichengs body was sent south to Ming authorities who decaptitied it. Our old friend Zhang Xianzhong was in Sichuan and would hold out until 1647. Ming loyalists in the south would hold out on the mainland until 1662, ironically many of Zhang Xianzhong's subordinates would be their commanders. Some Ming loyalists famously would hold out in Taiwan until 1683 still trying to reclaim the dragon throne for the Ming.   History marks the fall of the Ming dynasty to be in 1644 with the death of Emperor Chongzhen. Many historians argue various reasons for why the Ming Dynasty ultimately fell. One history stated quote “could no longer manage its resources, utilize its strengths, and maintain its focus.”. And indeed the Ming Dynasty fell as a result of gradual political, strategic and tactical errors that simply grew so large they could not be overcome. Given proper leadership,  delegation of authority and allocation of resources, the Ming Dynasty most likely could have survived. The fall of the Ming dynasty has captivated people for centuries, for it was one of the wealthiest, most powerful and prosperous empire in the world, yet it fell to peasant rebels and some unified tribal peoples of the steppe, how? As is seen with most of China's history, the fall of the Ming is seen in terms of a dynastic cycle, whereby a dynasty eventually becomes so corrupt it simply collapses upon itself and another more diligent government thats over. It is of course not as so simple as that as any of you who lasted this long can already imagine. There are various reasons for its downfall. Take for example the unbelievable factionalism of the Ming bureaucracy which in turn politicized just about every aspect of the government. By the end of its rule it certainly seemed the politics were trumping the military when it came to defending themselves. Then these problems were only made worse when more and more competent officials were jailed or executed and more and more incompetent officials were the only ones left to fill roles. The last emperor Chongzhen certainly did not make things any easier, such as when he forced Sun Chuanting to go out into the field against Li Zicheng. Also the issue of climate was striking, during the 17th century the world was witnessing what we call the last of the little ice ages. The era was marked by less solar activity and tons of volcanic eruptions that shot into the atmosphere darkened the skies. The global temperatures got cooler by around 1.-2 degrees right around 1640 in the midst of many violent upheavals. Hell remember that story about the island of Juehua being attacked because the waters had frozen allowing Nurhaci's men to cross them? It was much to the shock of the defenders and for good reason, sometimes climate can have an incredible effect on such events. The amount of natural disasters and droughts which led to wide scale famines had an enormous effect on producing the sort of situation that allowed such a large rebellion to take place. Personally having studied quite a bit about the Taiping Rebellion that will occur in the 19th century, its all quite fascinatingly similar. And trust me the fall of the Ming dynasty is quite foreshadowing.   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.  So at long last the Ming dynasty has fallen and now we have the Qing dynasty taking its seat upon the dragon throne. I thought it to be very important to explain how the Ming fell, because in many ways it will mirror how the next dynasty will fall. Stating that the Qing dynasty certainly took note of what befell the Ming and made their primary endeavor to root out corruption. But ironically it would be just that which would destroy them as well.  

This week, Patrick and Tracy welcome Elaine Isaak aka E. C. Ambrose, author of DRAKEMASTER. About DRAKEMASTER: What connects an ancient map carved in a cane, a disgraced descendant of Chinggis Khan, and a secret Chinese society? 1257 AD, Kaifeng, China: Dailus, a European bronzecaster taken as a slave by the Mongols, builds mighty siege […] The post Episode 541-With Elaine Isaak aka E. C. Ambrose appeared first on The Functional Nerds.

Back once again for the digestive aid master.  Tea! The cure for all ills. The silly boys battle their way out of the Siege of Kaifeng to, well, who knows where!  Tea is on the move and so are the silly boys. Big thanks to ZapSplat for things that go KLACK and songs what go DO-DE-DUMDUMDUM Extra to thanks to Shane Ivers at Silverman Sound for the track Medieval Banquet (which we use for any royal setting, historically accurate time period be darned!) Rate Review & Brew!

Photo:   The esteemed elder Pao Cheng (Communist transliteration: Bao Zheng) was a Chinese politician during the reign of Emperor Renzong in China's Sung Dynasty. During his twenty-five years in civil service, Bao consistently demonstrated extreme honesty and uprightness, with actions such as sentencing his own uncle, impeaching an uncle of the emperor's favourite concubine and punishing powerful families. His appointment from 1057 to 1058 as the prefect of Sung's capital Kaifeng, where he initiated a number of changes better to hear the grievances of the people, made him a legendary figure. During his years in office, he gained the honorific title Justice Pao (包青天) due to his ability to help peasants overcome corruption. 包拯画像    #PRC: The lockdowns and the elderly. Weifeng Zhong @Mercatus https://www.msn.com/en-ca/money/topstories/fed-up-with-covid-lockdown-bankers-fund-managers-looking-to-leave-shanghai/ar-AAWBzbQ?ocid=BingNewsSearch

In April 1232, a Mongol army 15,000 strong surrounded the Jin dynasty capital of Kaifeng. The siege that ensued lasted more than a year and resulted in as many as a million deaths.Read the article by James Carter: https://supchina.com/2022/04/06/a-mongol-siege-the-black-death-and-the-end-of-two-dynasties/Narrated by John Darwin Van Fleet.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Bible Study with Jairus - 1 Corinthians 11   1 Corinthians 11 introduces a perplexing question. If the chapter seems to instruct women to cover their heads, why do so few Christians practice this today? Furthermore, the passage says that women should keep silent in church (1 Corinthians 14:34). How should this be applied to today's world? These questions can be confusing to today's generation of Christians. Are Paul's words intended for a specific time and situation, or are they general principles of God for the entire Church? In other words, are Paul's words meant to be God's unchanging principles, or are they flexible guidance for specific contexts? Different churches have different understandings of this. Some people regard Paul's words as a universal principle given by the Holy Spirit. They require women to cover their heads and to avoid preaching. But other churches believe Paul's commands addressed specific social circumstances of the time, and there's no need to enforce it rigidly today. The church's position on this issue has split into two camps, conservative and liberal. Conservative churches often do not allow women to serve as pastors. But there are many female pastors in liberal churches. Some liberal churches even allow homosexuals to serve as pastors. How should Christians understand Paul's controversial words? When we study the Bible, we must understand the difference between God's unchanging principles and his specific guidance for individual circumstances. God's principles apply to all times and places, whereas his leading does not. We must always keep this difference in mind.   How to distinguish between God's principles and his guidance.   Christians have commonly made the error of confusing God's unchanging principles with his leading. God's principles reflect his unchanging nature, and they always involve his glory. His leading does not.   Brother Witness Lee gave a helpful example to illustrate the difference between God's principles and His leading. What if a young bridesmaid is trying to decide whether or not to wear a miniskirt at a wedding held at the church. This is a matter of God's unchanging principles. Wearing a miniskirt is not proper because the church is a holy place. Indecency is not acceptable. Miniskirts are not allowed in the church, regardless of time or location. [1]   What about other wedding decisions, such as details about specific time, place, colors, food,? etc. These decisions are matters of God's leading. No matter what you decide, you will not violate God's glory and principles. You may want to seek his specific leading, but you realize that your decision does not involve issues of right or wrong.   The Bible tells us that God's principles are unchanging. For example, many of the stipulations in the law given by Moses are related to God's principles. Some commands—“Do not kill, do not take the name of the Lord in vain, do not worship idols, honor your parents, do not covet, do not commit adultery”—are for all people at all times. Disobeying these commands is sin and all who sin will fall short of the glory of God (Romans 3:23). These commands should be respected universally. The law often reveals God's principles. Disobedience to these principles offends the glory of God.   On the other hand, prophets often gave specific messages that were unique to a particular time and place. Each Old Testament prophet spoke different messages to different groups of people in different circumstances. Prophets communicated God's specific leading to individuals. The law and the prophets, two main segments of the Old Testament, demonstrate these two aspects of God's revelation - God's principles and His leading.   At times, God's principles and His leading can overlap. For example, the command to respect the Sabbath was an important law included in the Ten Commandments. However, this law was abolished after the Lord Jesus came. Many Christians make a distinction between ceremonial law and moral law. A moral law will never change, while a ceremonial law can be abolished. Many believe that the Sabbath was a ceremonial law.   The Sabbath regulations reflect both God's principles and His leading. God's principles are revealed through his mercy. Because of his mercy, God chose the Jews and commanded that they should observe the Sabbath. The purpose of the Sabbath was to give God's people spiritual and physical rest, helping them stay pure until the birth of Christ as Savior of mankind. Now that Christ has come, that purpose is fulfilled.   As Lord of the Sabbath (Matthew 12:8), Jesus could heal a man on the Sabbath (Mark 3:1-5) and eat grain with his disciples on the Sabbath (Matthew 12:1). In the story recorded in Mark 3, Jesus healed a man on the Sabbath. The passage specifically mentions that these Jews were hoping to find something to accuse Jesus of. Jesus asked them, “Is it lawful on the Sabbath to do good or to do harm, to save life or to kill?” But they were silent. The Lord Jesus was angry and grieved at their hardness of heart (Mark 3:4-5). After Jesus healed the man, the Pharisees went out and consulted with the Herodians about how to kill Him (Mark 3:6).   When Jesus healed this man on the Sabbath, he was reflecting God's unchanging principles and nature. Jesus showed God's tender mercy and demonstrated that He is the Savior. The Sabbath pointed toward the birth of our Savior, who would bring healing on the Sabbath. The Sabbath demonstrates God's nature and his mercy. On the subject of the Sabbath, God's leading in the New Testament differs from His leading in the Old Testament. Although God's leading has changed, His principles have remained the same.   The Pharisees failed to recognize the difference between God's principles and His leading. They mistakenly confused God's past leading with his unchanging nature and principles. They turned God's word into unchanging dogma, killed the Lord Jesus, and persecuted many Christians.   The Pharisees are not the only ones who have made this mistake. How many people in the church throughout the ages have committed the same mistake? Many denominations have tried to turn God's past leading into unchanging principles and unyielding dogma. They have equated God's specific leading for specific denominational leaders with universal truth. As a result, they were unable to move forward and seek God's leading for a new era. They became stumbling blocks to God's fresh guidance.   Let's look at some examples that will help you learn to tell the difference between God's principles and His leading.   A Story about Head Coverings   I was saved in the Local Church Movement. Watchman Nee, the founder of the Local Church Movement, had a spiritual friendship with Brother Theodore Austin-Sparks. Theodore is an important figure in the British Inner life movement. He once studied under Mrs. Jessie Penn-Lewis, an important figure in the Inner Life movement. Both had an important impact on Watchman Nee and later the Local Church Movement.   Watchman Nee taught that women should cover their heads, so many women in the Local Church Movement did so. Initially, I observed that women covered their heads automatically after they realized that they should obey men's spiritual truth. Later, many students who came to the United States from China were saved. No one forced these new immigrants to cover their heads. There are still some older women in the church who cover their heads, but this is never the main truth taught by the church.   After Brother Watchman Nee was imprisoned, Brother Witness Lee went to Taiwan to continue building the Local Church. He also continued to have fellowship with Brother Theodore and invited him to serve in Taiwan. But later, the two of them got into a disagreement. One main reason for their conflict was the “one church, one city” doctrine, a controversial topic that Theodore criticized. Another reason for their conflict was the issue of head coverings and culture.   Brother Witness Lee told the following story in his book. When Brother Theodore saw the Taiwanese soldiers wearing hats in the meeting hall, he criticized them. He told them that covering their heads was not in line with the Bible. However, Brother Theodore was using the culture of the West to judge the culture of the East. He was not basing his assessment on the truth of the Bible.   In Chinese culture, soldiers are not allowed to remove their hats. Therefore, all the military brothers who attended the meeting kept their hats on before and after the meeting. During the meeting, they took off their hats to show respect for the Lord, but they put them back on as soon as the meeting was over. [2]   Brother Theodore hastily condemned these military brothers because he did not know that wearing hats was required by the military. These military brothers were doing their best to glorify the Lord. By the rules of their Eastern culture, they were pleasing to the Lord. Because he was looking at them with Western eyes, Theodore thought the men were sinfully covering their heads.   I believe God's specific leading is unique for these military brothers in the context of Chinese culture. As soldiers, they must obey military orders. As Christians, they should take off their hats during the meeting. But after it is over, they may put their hats back on to remain in compliance. This not only glorifies the Lord but also abides by the military regulations of the secular society.   Applying these principles is a subtle balance. Theodore, who didn't understand Eastern culture, hastily condemned these military brothers for covering their heads. He mistakenly confused God's leading with God's unchanging principles.   A story of Kaifeng Jews   The story of the Kaifeng Jews also illustrates the principle of God's principles and God's leading. Matteo Ricci came to China as a missionary in 1583 and established a good relationship with the Chinese emperor and the scholar-official class. He was in a good position to spread the Gospel among the Chinese.   Ai Tian, ​​a Jew from Kaifeng, went to Beijing to take the official exam. Hearing about a Westerner who believed in one true God as he did, he went to see Matteo Ricci. Ai Tian believed that Matteo Ricci was a Jew. When he saw a picture of Mary, Jesus, and John the Baptist in Ricci's house, he thought they were images of Rebecca and her sons Isaac and Jacob.   Matteo Ricci, on the other hand, thought that Ai Tian was a Nestorian believer. Only later did he discover that Ai Tian was a Jew. Matteo Ricci wanted the Jewish community to come to know the Messiah, so he sent messengers to the Jewish community in Kaifeng to investigate. After investigating, they found that the Jews had integrated with the local Chinese culture to a considerable degree. They had combined the Chinese tradition of ancestor worship and emperor worship with their own belief that they should not worship idols. Chinese Jews placed God's name above the emperor's name on the plaque they were worshiping. When they worshiped, they worshiped God and ignored the emperor's name.   This story of synchronism sparked debate in the Holy See. Matteo Ricci and his fellow Jesuits explained that the Chinese people were only honoring their ancestors and not worshipping them as idols, just like the Jews honored their ancestors. They asked that the Chinese be given some space so that the gospel could continue to spread in China.   But the other faction had a different view. They were jealous of Matteo Ricci's success in China, and they opposed his point of view. They insisted that Chinese ancestor worship was idolatry and should not be tolerated. In the end, this faction won. The Holy See ruled that Chinese ancestor worship was idolatry. As a result, the Chinese emperor banned the spread of Christianity in China.   I think this example demonstrates the importance of differentiating between God's principles (don't worship idols) and His leading (evangelism in China). I feel it's a great pity that the Holy See at that time did not find a way to balance the two. Their choice led to the ban of Christianity in China and delayed the propagation of the Gospel among the Chinese for hundreds of years. If they had taken a more balanced approach, perhaps China's story would have been very different.   Avoid dogmatism   Some believe that when Paul commanded the Corinthian men not to cover their heads, he was referring to the fact that men in Roman times often covered their heads when they went to worship idols. They say that Paul commanded the believers not to cover their heads to avoid an association with idol worship. This command lies within the scope of God's principles. Paul also said that men are the glory of God, so they should not cover their heads (1 Corinthians 11:7). This statement may have been directed towards the customs of Roman men at that time – covering their heads when they worshiped idols.   Some believe that the same concept applies to women as well. Perhaps Paul was instructing that women should cover their heads because the city of Corinth was very promiscuous, and covering their heads would protect them.   These statements are worth considering, but let's look at the biblical records. When talking about men not covering their heads (1 Corinthians 11:4) and women covering their heads (1 Corinthians 11:5), Paul mentioned two contexts: "praying" and "prophesying." How do we explain this? How should we respond to what Paul said? Was Paul expressing God's firm and unchanging principles? Or was Paul giving specific guidance for a particular situation?   I don't have a specific answer with regards to the head covering here. But my main point is this: we must not use God's words as mechanical, lifeless dogma but as living principles that apply in fresh ways in every era. If God's guidance on the Sabbath could change between the Old Testament and the New Testament, then we should not be dogmatic about this command.   Rick Joyner told a story about a vision he had. He said that Paul appeared to him in a vision and said, “The modern church has highly exalted my writings. Churches should not allow my words to evaluate the words of the Lord in the four Gospels. Instead, they should use the words of the Lord to evaluate my works.”[3]   According to Rick Joyner, most exegetical writings since the Reformation have revolved around Paul's letters. Of course, much of this is good. These writings help us better understand Paul's letters.   At the same time, we must be careful not to exalt Paul's teachings too much. We should not equate Paul's specific guidance in this passage with the eternal and unchanging principles of God.   Wisely discern God's principles and His leading   Everyone has different interpretations of this passage on head coverings. We must learn to differentiate between God's principles and His leading. This mindset can help us learn to accurately apply the Bible's teachings to our lives.   To make this distinction, we must ask ourselves, “Does this command relate to God's unchanging nature and glory?” If so, the command should not be compromised. On the other hand, if the command is related to God's specific leading for a specific situation, we are free to make bold changes. We can apply this principle to every area of life and Christian ministry.   Are there any traditions in your church that are hindering Christ and the Holy Spirit? Perhaps God led your denomination's leaders to make specific decisions in the past. However, God's leading may be different for you in your current context. Ask yourself, “If I make changes, will it tarnish God's glory?” If so, it's a question of principles; you must not make changes. However, if the change only affects your tradition rather than God's glory, this decision falls within the scope of God's leading. You can make bold changes.   For example, some churches do not allow the use of any musical instruments in worship. Others restrict themselves to specific musical instruments. Applying the above principles, we can realize that God's glory will not be tarnished if we use musical instruments in worship.  The use of instruments does not cause us to fall short of God's glory. Rather, we can glorify God as we worship him with musical instruments. Such a change falls into the category of God's leading. We are free to be flexible and adapt to today's culture. Churches that firmly oppose the use of musical instruments are living in legalism and dogmatism. They need to be set free from this. They are following the traditions of men, not the word of God.   Let's look at another example. Some churches teach that women cannot be pastors and that only men can baptize. However, in the early days of church planting in rural China, churches were composed entirely of women, older people, and children. There were no men at all. The only ones who were familiar with the Bible were women. Naturally, they took on the role of spiritual leaders and baptizers. In addition, the government monitored men stringently, and men were often busy with work. The government's monitoring of women was relatively lax. Therefore, in the early days of rural churches in China, many women served as leaders. I think that this demonstrates God's leading at that place and at that time. Under such circumstances, it was logical for women to serve as spiritual leaders. They did not fall short of God's glory; instead, they demonstrated His glory.   However, Paul was speaking to another cultural context in 1 Corinthians 11. Perhaps there were women in the church who were challenging Paul's authority and rebuking him for being humble (or timid) (2 Corinthians 10:1). In addition, they didn't cover their heads or remain silent. Perhaps that's why Paul said that it was better for women to cover their heads and keep silent. His command was appropriate for the context of the period.   The concept of differentiating between God's principles and leading can help you better understand His words and follow His leading in your life. Of course, we must never tamper with God's words. At the same time, we must never use God's word mechanically or dogmatically. Instead, we should remember that in any situation, God will reveal his unchanging nature and guide us in the way we should go.   [1] [2] [3]

Spiritual Encounters with Chinese Jews By Sean Song   Since the beginning of my prophetic dreams in 2015, I frequently have been taken in the Spirit to China to meet various people. In these encounters, I observed services and meetings of Chinese believers. I also traveled to different cities to meet all kinds of people. Many of these encounters were accompanied by a mysterious person. I believe it was either the Holy Spirit or angels that took me on these trips. During several of these trips, I encountered descendants of Chinese Jews, and this stunned me. I was even told in several dreams that I personally am a descendant of a Chinese Jew. After praying about these encounters, I believe God is prophetically calling the remnants of the Jews in the East to be part of the great revival that is to come in China, and the future revival to the Middle East and Israel.   Encounters with Chinese Jews I have never personally met any Chinese Jews nor am I aware of any possible connections with my own Jewish heritage, so these encounters shocked me at first. However, I will let these dreams speak for themselves. They are recorded below in chronical order.   On May 19th, 2016, I dreamt of visiting a few different places, one of which was my hometown village. In this dream, the mysterious person who accompanied me told me that the two daughters from my uncle's family are Jewish descendants. Their father is my father's cousin. Their grandfather is the older brother of my grandfather. I grew up with these two ladies in the same village. Naturally, I was surprised after being told about their Jewish heritage. I wondered if I was also a Jewish descendant. Just then my grandmother (my father's mother) appeared and told me that one of our ancestors is a Jewish woman. My grandmother also mentioned that one of our male ancestors was a sinful man who committed sinful acts with this Jewish woman. My grandmother did not mention the identity of this man, but I made note that she specifically said we were born of a Jewish woman and are therefore Jewish descendants according to Jewish tradition.   Right then, the two small Jewish girls appeared in my dream, but I conversed with them as if I did not know where they came from. I left them my US phone number and asked them to visit me if they ever came to America. Then my third aunt (my father's younger sister) appeared in the dream, and we started to discuss the heritage of these two Jewish girls. I said to my aunt, “These two Jewish girls do not look Jewish at all, do they?” I meant that they looked more Chinese in appearance. I continued speaking to my aunt, “You look more like a Jewish person or foreigner than them!” Upon saying this, her face suddenly impressed me. I noticed that her face did have foreign or non-Chinese features to it. When I woke up from the dream, I was reminded that in real life, my aunt's appearance is indeed different than the normal Chinese people I grew up with.   On October 22, 2016, I was taken in a dream to another place in China to participate in a service with a lot of people. When the service was about to close, I noticed two Jewish rabbis. One was young and the other old. The younger rabbi started in a closing prayer. Although I don't understand Hebrew, I knew in the Spirit that he was praying in Hebrew. His prayer seemed so cumbersome though. When he was halfway finished, he asked to restart his prayer and the older rabbi agreed to let him pray again. I did not know what he was praying about, but I felt he was learning to pray or minister under the older rabbi. It was clear, however, that he was not very good at it.   On April 26th, 2017, I was taken to Beijing. Most of my encounters with people there were with Chinese Christians. One man interestingly told me he was a descendant of the Jewish people. I boldly commented back to him in the dream, “Me too. I have always thought that I was one of the descendants of the ten lost tribes of Israel. I am also a Chinese Jew.”   On September 4, 2017, I dreamt I was taken to my childhood village. There I encountered another villager who claimed to be a Chinese Jew. I have never met this person in real life. To my surprise, he told me in English that he was Jewish. Of course, his identity stood out to me because of the several dreams I had prior about my Jewish lineage. Before I knew it, I was interviewing him in Chinese. He said he became a Red Revolutionist in his lifetime, and he loved China. Nonetheless, he was happy to tell me about his Jewish identity and eventually his life story. He wanted his story to be passed on to next generation. This was why I was asked to interview him.   The Amazing Stories of the Kaifeng Jews At first, these dreams puzzled me because I was not aware that any Jews lived in China before the twentieth century, nor did I think I had any personal connection with them. I knew that many Jewish people fled from Europe to China during World War II to escape Nazi rule, but I was not aware of any Jewish communities in China before that. Therefore, I started to search the internet for Chinese Jewish communities. I found stories about a group of descendants named the Kaifeng Jews who were immigrants who lived in China. A small group of them eventually moved back to Israel in 2016. However, due to Israel's immigrant policy and the fact the Kaifeng Jews were almost assimilated into Chinese culture, they had to formally convert to become Jewish.   I went on to read more stories of the Kaifeng Jews, and what I found was astonishing to me. When the Italian Jesuit priest, Matteo Ricci went to China in 1582, he found favor with a Chinese emperor. At the time, one of the Kaifeng Jews, Ai Tian, had gone to Beijing to take the imperial examination. While there, he heard that someone from the West believed in the same monist God that he did, so he went to visit Matteo Ricci. Upon seeing a picture of Mary, Jesus, and John the Baptist, he misinterpreted it as Rebecca and her two sons. He thought Matteo Ricci was a Jew, and Matteo Ricci thought Ai Tian was a follower of Nestorianism, which came to China in the sixth century.   Later, Matteo Ricci found out Ai Tian was a Jew, and this is when the West discovered the Chinese Jewish community that had been in China for over 1000 years. The Kaifeng Jews started to live in the city of Kaifeng since at least the Song dynasty (AD 960-1279). Ricci and Ai Tian started having more interactions, and Matteo Ricci wanted to convert them to Christianity. Ricci even tried to find their Torah to prove that European Jews tampered with the manuscript regarding the coming of Jesus. To his dismay, the Kaifeng community did not convert to Christianity and the Torah they found among Kaifeng Jews was the same as the European manuscripts used at that time. Ricci's people did take advantage of the opportunity to record a drawing of their temple along with many other stories. Several stones in Kaifeng describe how the Chinese Jews came to China. One of the stones suggests that some Jews received divine instruction to come to China even though many scholars suspected they came either by the Silk Road or Sea Route for doing business. Through historical records, we know the Kaifeng city was flooded and invaded many times during and after the Song dynasty, and many Jews fled North. Their community started to dwindle, and all their manuscripts were sold to western missionaries. One reason for this was also because the old rabbi there died, and his son was unlearned in Hebrew and other traditions.   An Unexpected Journey of Emotional Healing The dream I had earlier about the two rabbis makes more sense in light of the history of the Kaifeng Jewish community. I was not aware of the historical reality of the older rabbi who died and his younger son who was inept to carry on Hebrew tradition. Although I still don't know about any personal familial connection to the Kaifeng Jews, my hometown was only 196 kilometers north of Kaifeng. My village is one village away from the boarder of the Henan province where Kaifeng is. My grandmother was born in the village that bordered the Henan province. Though it's now part of another province, our hometown was part of the Henan province (before the 1900s) that now governs Kaifeng.   Interestingly, one famous Chinese celebrity, Song Dandan, openly claims that she may be a descendant of the Kaifeng Jews. Her mom is from the Henan province where Kaifeng resides. She explained that she was bullied as a child because her skin was white, and her nose was pointy. She hated the fact that her skin was so white. She was even given the nicknames “Romania girl” and “golden monkey.” Her experience is not unique. As I grew up, I realized that my skin was whiter and more different than some of my villagers and classmates. One student always picked on me for this. He gave me the nickname “little white face” which in Chinese represents a man who sells himself to women to survive.   I really hated that name and I asked him to stop, but he wouldn't. I had fights with other students who beat me up. This emotional trauma caused me to hate my skin color. I wanted to be black or darker. I tried to tan myself, but that did not work. I later read news that one can have lighter or white skin color due to premature birth. This worsened my perspective and caused me to believe I was born prematurely. I even asked my mother if this was true. Although she denied it, I still believed the lie that I was born weak. I likened “blackness” or “darker skin” to “strong” and “powerful,” while “white” meant “pale” and “weak.” I even recall discussing with a female high school classmate our desire to swap skin color because she was not happy with her dark skin, and I was not happy with my lighter skin. This was a large emotional burden I carried growing up. Years later I told this story to my African American fitness coach in Washington DC, and he laughed at me for being discriminated against for my "whiteness" in China. We soon became friends.   I don't have evidence that I am also a descendent of any Chinese Jews besides what has been revealed to me in these dreams. I even did a DNA test once and it only shows I am Chinese. However, if my dreams are true, this could be emotionally healing to me. I felt so awful about myself and my skin color when I was a child. It would be comforting if I did have some Jewish lineage and to know I was not born prematurely.   A Prophetic Remnant I don't think these prophetic dreams are solely personal. They are also meant to sound a prophetic bell for the end age. Isaiah 43:5 says, “Do not fear, for I am with you; I will bring your offspring from the east, and from the west I will gather you.” (NRSV) God is calling His remnants from all over the world to come back to Israel. Even though only a small number of Chinese Jews embarked on a journey to become a Jew by conversion, I feel there are more descendants of Jews spread among the Chinese that may not be aware of it at all. Take me for example. As a Chinese person, I never thought of the remnants of Jews in China until I had these prophetic dreams. Whether man knows it or not and whether the world acknowledges it or not, the Lord knows His people and is calling His people back to Israel and Himself. I recall other encounters with Jesus like when I received my calling to be part of the coming Chinese revival, and I felt then as I do now that God is calling His remnant of people in China to be converted to Christians.   One of the Chinese men I encountered in these dreams was a brother who served in a church. He also told me he is a Chinese Jew. Many Jewish people from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union converted to Christianity because they did not have a strong religious mindset. Yet, they became a very important part of the churches in modern Israel when they immigrated to Israel. Likewise, I feel some of these Chinese Jews will become Christians too. Lest I forget that I was also shown in another prophetic dream that the great revival coming to China will eventually spread to the Middle East. I also believe many Chinese Christians will be sent out as missionaries to Muslim countries and Israel. Among them, it's possible that Jewish descendants may come back to Israel in a different way. Maybe they will be part of the end of age revival in Israel and help usher in the return of Jesus Christ.   How exciting it is to imagine and see Israelite families saved. Though there are different ideas about how the whole household of Israel will be saved, I believe there will be a great revival in Israel in the end age. I hope the descendants of Chinese Jews play their parts in it. If it is true that God divinely instructed some Jews to go to China, there must be a great plan of God for them in the end of this age.  

The Northern Song (960-1127) capital city of Kaifeng (also known as Bianjing or Dongjing) was the largest city in the medieval world. Its population surpassed the previous capitals of Chang'an and Luoyang and dwarfed contemporary world cities such as Baghdad and Constantinople. At its peak, Kaifeng boasted a population of well over a million people and was home to hundreds of thousands of soldiers. It was also the central node of vast transportation network consisting of rivers, canals, and roads and as a result became a huge commercial center. It's wealth and prosperity has been immortalized in the famous painting Qingming shanghe tu (清明上河圖), which offers various depictions of daily life in the bustling city. Yet at what cost was this prosperity achieved? How was this vast city supplied? How did Kaifeng's consumption, and by extension the Northern Song's rapid economic and technological development as whole, impact the environment and change ecological features? And in our own age of climate change, what lessons can we draw from the history and experience of Song Kaifeng? To answer these questions, we interviewed Dr. Yuan Chen, an environmental historian of premodern China with a focus on Song Kaifeng, who will talk to us about the fascinating history of Kaifeng during the Northern Song and Kaifeng's broader impacts on China. Note: We apologize for some minor audio distortions in the interview. Contributors Yuan Chen Yuan Chen is a Postdoctoral Associate at the Franklin Humanities Institute & Global Asia Initiative at Duke University. She received her PhD from Yale University and was also a Visiting Professor at Boston College. Her current research focuses on the environmental history of premodern and early modern East Asia, and she is working on a book manuscript that seeks to explore the environmental changes of Middle Period China from the view of the imperial capital of Kaifeng and Kaifeng's ecological and economical connections with its diverse supplying regions in China and beyond. Her works have been published in several historical journals, and her teaching interests include Chinese history, Tokugawa Japan, early modern global history, environmental history, and the Silk Road. Yiming Ha Yiming Ha is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of History at the University of California, Los Angeles. His current research is on military mobilization and state-building in China between the thirteenth and seventeenth centuries, focusing on how military institutions changed over time, how the state responded to these changes, the disconnect between the center and localities, and the broader implications that the military had on the state. His project highlights in particular the role of the Mongol Yuan in introducing an alternative form of military mobilization that radically transformed the Chinese state. He is also interested in military history, nomadic history, comparative Eurasian state-building, and the history of maritime interactions in early modern East Asia. He received his BA from UCLA and his MPhil from the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. Credits Episode No. 6 Release date: January 12, 2021 Recording location: Chicago, IL/ Los Angeles, CA Transcript Bibliography courtesy of Dr. Yuan Chen Images Map of Kaifeng, c. 1100 (Image Source: West, Spectacle, Ritual, and Social Relations.") Cover Image: City Gate of Kaifeng, as depicted in the Qingming shanghe tu (view full painting here). The famous bridge scene in Qingming shanghe tu (view full painting here).   Supply of timber for the construction of the Yuqing Temple (Image Source: Chen, "China's Song-dynasty Capital of Kaifeng and its Hinterlands."). Reproduced here with permission from author. Please do not cite without permission. Song defensive forest in the north along its border with the Khitan Liao (Image Source: Chen, "Frontier, Fortification, and Forestation") Reproduced here with permission from author. Please do not cite without permission.   Rock formation in Yandang Mountain, as seen today (Image Source). For a map of Northern Song Kaifeng, please see here (map in Chinese). Select Bibliography: Chen, Julian Yuan. "China's Song-dynasty Capital of Kaifeng and its Hinterlands: An Environmental History, 960-1127). PhD. diss. Yale University, 2020. _____. "Frontier, Fortification, and Forestation: Defensive Woodland on the Song–Liao Border in the Long Eleventh Century." Journal of Chinese History Vol. 2, Special Issue 2 (2018): 313-334. Kubota Kazuo. Sōdai Kaifū no Kenkyū [Research on Kaifeng in the Song Dynasty]. Tōkyō: Kyūko shoin, 2007.  Levine, Ari Daniel. “Walls and Gates, Windows and Mirrors: Urban Defences, Cultural Memory, and Security Theatre in Song Kaifeng.” East Asian Science, Technology, and Medicine 39 (2014): 55–118.  Liu Chunying. Bei Song Dongjing cheng yanjiu [The Eastern Capital of Northern Song]. Beijing: Kexue chubanshe, 2004.  Schaab-Hanke, Dorothee. Kaifeng Around 1120: Kaifeng Around 1120 The Dongjing Meng Hua Lu by Meng Yuanlao: An Annotated Translation. Großheirath: Ostasien Verlag, 2011.  Tsui, Lik Hang. “Complaining About Lived Spaces: Responses to the Urban Living Environment of Northern Song Kaifeng.” Journal of Chinese History 2.2 (2018): 335-353.  West, Stephen H. “Spectacle, Ritual, and Social Relations: The Son of Heaven, Citizens, and Created Space in Imperial Gardens in the Northern Song.” In Baroque Garden Cultures: Emulation, Sublimation, Subversion, edited by Michel Conan, 291–321. Washington, DC: Dumbarton Oaks, 2005.  Zhou Baozhu. Song dai Dongjing yanjiu [The Eastern Capital of the Song dynasty]. Kaifeng: Henan daxue chubanshe, 1992. 

If Wuhan was the place in China that received most attention in 2020, Henan Province has certainly captured its share of attention this year. Henan in history is repeatedly referred to as the “zhongyuan,” or “central plain.” It is the thousands of years of its history as the “zhongyuan” that has created and shaped the land as the symbol of the most glorious – and the most painful memories of China.  So where and what is the “zhongyuan?” Geographically, “zhongyuan” in a broad sense includes today's Shaanxi and Shanxi provinces in China's northwest, central China's Henan and the east coast Shandong Province, all in the middle and lower reaches of the Yellow River. “Zhongyuan” in a narrow sense refers to the part of Henan today that's south of the Yellow River, mainly from Luoyang to Shangqiu, about 350 kilometers west of Luoyang. Henan has four ancient capitals, including Luoyang, Kaifeng, Zhengzhou and Anyang, more than any other Chinese province. Among the four, only Anyang is to the north of the Yellow River. We can see central China's Henan is the zhongyuan in both the narrow and broad sense. But it is important to note that “zhongyuan” is much more a cultural concept than a geographic location on a map. It played a central role in the history of Chinese civilization and in shaping the core of Chinese culture. 

Pour que lʹutopie devienne réalité Prendre soin du corps jusquʹau bout Les juifs dʹailleurs: les juifs de Kaifeng, en Chine (6/6) Photo: Corps mort avec une étiquette

Méconnues, des dizaines de communautés juives à lʹhistoire singulière existent à travers le monde. Lʹhistorienne et anthropologue française Edith Bruder met en lumière leurs mille et une manières de vivre leur identité juive. Au micro de Laurence Villoz, elle nous emmène ce dimanche à la découverte des Juifs de Kaifeng, en Chine.

The saga continues. More poking around Henan in Part 2. We'll look at the Zhou Dynasty era states that made up the province in ancient times. We'll also focus on Luoyang, Kaifeng and Anyang. If the multitude of Chinese names starts to overwhelm, go to the website at Teacup.Media and download a nice cheat sheet I put together especially for you. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

The saga continues. More poking around Henan in Part 2. We'll look at the Zhou Dynasty era states that made up the province in ancient times.  We'll also focus on Luoyang, Kaifeng and Anyang.  If the multitude of Chinese names starts to overwhelm, go to the website at Teacup.Media and download a nice cheat sheet I put together especially for you.  

The rapid expansion of the Mongol Empire in the thirteenth century cannot be attributed to a single new military invention providing technological supremacy over their enemies. The weaponry and equipment of the Mongols differed little from those of their enemies or from previous nomadic empires. Still, the Mongols were adept in employing the tools of their foes. As historian Timothy May wrote, “the Mongols rarely met a weapon they did not like.” Therefore, many questions have been raised regarding the usage, or lack thereof, of gunpowder weapons in Mongolian expansion, particularly outside of China. Today, we give a brief introduction to gunpowder weapons, both their history of use, their use by the Mongols, and the possible role of the Mongol Empire in the dissemination of these weapons. I’m your host David, and this is Kings and Generals: Ages of Conquest.   For some historians, like J.J. Saunders or Kate Raphael, the Mongols as both users of gunpowder and transmitters of its knowledge to the west is a total negative or extremely unlikely. They see no clear indication of it’s usage in the western historical sources, seeing possible mentions as too equivocal to be relied upon. But the great British sinologist Joseph Needham and his associates, after a thorough study of well over a millennium of Chinese written sources and archaeology, has demonstrated thoroughly that not only were a number of a gunpowder weapons a common feature of Chinese warfare by the thirteenth century, but that the Mongols also used these during their wars in China. More recent historians such as Iqtidar Alam Khan, Thomas T. Allsen and Stephen G. Haw, have advanced Needham’s arguments, arguing that the Mongols carried gunpowder weapons, such as bombs, fire-lances and rockets, west in their conquests over the rest of Eurasia. Stephen Haw in particular has suggested that the infamous smoke-screen employed by the Mongols in Poland at the battle of Liegnitz in 1241 was a gunpowder-based weapon.    To demonstrate this, we must very briefly give an introduction to Chinese usage of gunpowder. Chinese alchemists and engineers had been mixing various chemicals for medicinal and experimental purposes for centuries, including some of those which constitute gunpowder. Gunpowder itself was not the result of any single individual’s experiments, in the style of the old European fable of Berthold Schwarz, but rather a long series of trials combining materials -often, rather ironically, in search of elixirs to eternal life- which ultimately resulted in discovering a rather flammable substance. The first recipe for gunpowder finally appears during the Tang Dynasty in the 8th century CE, in a Taoist work urging alchemists not to mix saltpetre (potassium nitrate), sulphur and carbon-rich materials like coal, and to especially not add arsenic to the mixture, as the result would light aflame. The Chinese quickly found the energy produced by these materials quite mesmerizing when used in fireworks display, and found use for it in civil engineering and mining,  but contrary to some popular sentiments that the Chinese only used it for peaceful purposes, it appears they rather quickly applied this new material for warfare. From the 10th century to the 13th, the Chinese created a great number of weapons to violently disseminate knowledge of gunpowder. By 1044, possibly in reaction to military defeats against the newly established Tangut ruled Xi Xia Dynasty, the Song Dynasty was presented a collection of nine kinds of gunpowder weapons and three distinct gunpowder recipes in the Wujing Zongyao. This technology advanced under the Song Dynasty, which faced a collection of ever-more fearsome foes on its northern borders.   From the 10th century onwards, these weapons took a number of forms.  Bombs thrown from catapults (huopao), enclosed in pottery or fragmenting metal shells. Arrows (huojian) with incendiary packages strapped to them, launched from bows or massive mounted crossbows, developing into early rockets over the twelfth century.  Most infamous was the fire-lance (huojiang): a bamboo or metal tube capable of shooting a jet of flame three metres in length, sometimes with shrapnel and toxic materials packed into the tube to form a terrifying, flame-spouting shotgun. The proportions of consitutent chemicals were refined to increase power, with other additives such as lime to even human faeces to produce a number of horrific bombs; some to explode and throw armour piercing shrapnel, some to spread flame and destroy buildings, with others to have a choking, blinding gas dispersed by the explosion to envelop and confuse the enemy.   The Song Dynasty government was so reliant on these weapons -and so terrified of their foes acquiring them- that it prohibited the sale of any of the materials composing gunpowder to the Khitan Liao Dynasty or Tangut Xi Xia in the 11th century. Both lacked access to natural reserves of saltpetre producing lands. But with the Jurchen conquest of the Liao and Northern Song in the early 12th century, the newly formed Jin Dynasty seized not only stores of these weapons, but the knowledge and resources to produce their own. Now facing a powerful, gunpowder armed foe, this spurred a new stage of gunpowder experimentation by the Song Dynasty. The first textual references to fire-lances, rockets, and new kinds of bombs appear as Song forces desperately resisted Jin invasions. The Song were imaginative when it came to employing these against the Jurchen. The narrow crossing over the rivers into south China became the main lines of defence, and the Song quickly took to arming their ships with rockets and huopao, catapults capable of lobbing bombs against Jin troops, to destroy ships or cast poisonous clouds against men and horses. As early as 1127, Song officials were recommending that all warships be equipped with such weapons to repel the Jin. Other uses speak of the desperation of defenders, coupled with considerable access to gunpowder. The 1207 siege of Te-an is a well known example: the Song defenders filled tea sacks with rice straw, used matting and gunpowder to hurl against the Jin troops assaulting the walls. The Jin were quick to pick up such weapons too, a cause for no shortage of alarm amongst the Song court, among other things. While perhaps effective in slowing the Jin invasions of southern China, gunpowder weapons were neither key in the initial Jurchen conquests of the north, or in actually repelling them. Skilled leadership and political will, in addition to general miltiary resources and logistics, were by far the determining factors. Gunpowder weapons were another tool in an arsenal, rather than the defining strategic component as they often appear in popular imagination.    When Chinggis Khan invaded the Jin Dynasty in 1211, whole companies of Chinese siege engineers entered into his service, either willingly deserted to him or forced into service, bringign with them knowledge to construct various siege machines from catapults to rams. There is not, however, clear indication of the usage of gunpowder weapons against the Jin in these very first years of the conflict. One such Chinese siege specialist who willingly deserted, Guo Baoyu, accompanied Chinggis Khan west on his camapign against the Khwarezmian Empire. According to his biography in the Yuanshi, when the Mongols attempted to force a crossing of the Amu Darya, a number of Khwarezmian ships blocked their path. Guo Baoyu ordered a volley of huojian to be launched against the fleet. The ships were all set aflame, allowing the Mongols passage. While huojian originally and literally meant fire arrows, according to Joseph Needham, Jixing Pan, and Thomas Allsen, over the twelfth century the term came to signify rockets, when powdered gunpowder mixtures with higher percentages of saltpetre, charcoal and less sulphur made for effective rocket propellants.   In addition, the Persian historian Juvaini often makes a distinction between “fire, naphtha and stones,” being thrown into cities during Chinggis Khan’s Khwarezmian campaign, as if there were distinct incendiary weapons being used in addition to the naptha (i.e, petroleum) derived weapons more familiar in the Islamic world. According to Needham, naptha has been utilized for military purposes since the 4thc entury BCE, and remained a feature of armies in the Middle East up until the Mongol conquest. Juvaini’s flowery language makes it difficult at times to know if he was simply being poetic, or literal in terms of the weapons being used, even when he was an eyewitness to the events he describes. While Chinggis Khan certainly brought Chinese siege engineers westwards with him, it does not seem that gunpowder weapons made up a key component of his tactics. Likely, Chinggis lacked the resources to manufacture gunpowder and gunpowder weapons, and if he was making use of them, it was in limited quantities- his tactics for taking cities relied on skillful use of Chinese siege machines in great numbers alongside local forced labour and his powerful Mongol warriors. As mentioned earlier, gunpowder weapons were a tool in the arsenal, rather than a defining component. They lacked the ability to destroy walls by themselves: this was still the job of stones thrown from catapults, which the Mongols are expressly described using throughout the Khwarezmian campaign.    After Chinggis Khan’s death in 1227, his son and successor Ogedai completed the war with the Jin Dynasty, in the process cquiring greater experience with gunpowder weapons, and the natural and manpower resources to produce them. In the early 1230s there are a number of references in Chinese sources to the use of these weapons in the last years of the Mongol-Jin war. In 1231, for instance, the Jin utilized a new development in bomb technology, the heaven-shaking thunder-bomb (zhen tien lei), to sink Mongol ships in a naval engagement. These were bombs with high nitrate content in their  gunpowder mixture encased in a cast-iron shell. When set off, they created a monstrous noise like thunder, while also splintering the iron shell into a wave of armour and flesh tearing shrapnel, an early fragmentation grenade.   The most famous gunpowder engagement came the next year well recorded in a detailed description in the dynasty history of the Jin, the Jinshi, compiled under Mongol auspices in the fourteenth century. In 1232, the great Mongol general Subedei besieged the Jin capital of Kaifeng, in a year-long siege in which sides utilized gunpowder weapons. Subedei had catapults launched gunpowder bombs into the city, while the Jin defenders had a variety of gunpowder tools in their defensive arsenal. Mobile shelters pushed up to the walls of Kaifeng were annhilated by thunder-crash bombs dropped onto them via an iron chain. Additionally, great number of ‘flying-fire-spears’ (feihuojiang) were employed. Depending on the interpretation of the historian, these were either fire-lances packed with wads of shrapnel and arrows which when fired acted as a sort of flaming shot gun, while others like Jixing Pan suggets these were infact rockets.    Either way, they were used to great effect and in great numbers. At one point in the siege, a Jin commander took 450 men armed with fire-lances into the Mongol encampment, a surprise attack resulting in hundreds of Mongol troops killed or drowned then they tried to flee. The Jinshi remarked that the thunder-clap bombs and flying-fire-spears were the only two weapons of the Jin the Mongols feared. Yet, these devices could not arrest the fate of the dynasty. A scovered back in episode 14 of this series, the Emperor abandoned Kaifeng before the siege was complete, and the city fell in 1233, and the Jin Dynasty itself finally extinguished the next year.   We must emphasize again, that while terrifying, these gunpowder weapons were not themselves the key determining factors in these wars. The modern concept of all powerful, destructive guns, bombs and cannon must be ignored. The reliability of these early medieval weapons was questionable. Different proportions of the necessary chemicals, or in the design of a given weapon, might result in a device going off early, too late, or not at all. The range of these weapons was often short, and they were best utilized in the defense, in situations where their effect on enemy morale could be maximized. These bombs were not yet the secret to destroying city walls, though they could set fire to wooden structures, towers or gates along the battlements.    Regardless, they were a frightful weapon when used properly. Thus it seems unusual that Subedei, the commander of the final campaigns against the Jin who faced these gunpowder weapons, made little use of them in the great western campaign begun only a few years later. Though specialized Chinese artillery was employed against the Alans of the north Caucasus, Rus’ principalities and Hungarian, there is little direct indication of the use of gunpowder weaponry in the west. Many of the mostly wooden cities of the Rus’ principalities were burned, it is true, but the Rus’ sources generally offer no description of how this occurred, only that it did. Usually they imply the fire was started after the city already fell. In the case of the siege of Vladimir, the Nikonian Chronicle specifies that a great volume of stones were shot into the city, and that the church at Vladimir was burnt only after the Mongols stacked a great pile of wood next to it and set that on fire.   A possible indication of gunpowder usage is supplied by the Franciscan friar John de Plano Carpini, who travelled through the Rus’ principalities late in the 1240s bearing messages from the Pope to the Great Khan. In his report of his travels, Carpini offers a very accurate description of Mongol battle and siege tactics, with the intention that his observations be used to help prepare Christendom against further attacks. Carpini’s short description is worth quoting:   They reduce fortresses in the following manner. If the position of the fortress allows it, they surround it, sometimes even fencing it round so that no one can enter or leave. They make a strong attack with engines and arrows and they do not leave off fighting by day or night, so that those inside the fortress get no sleep; the Tartars however have some rest, for they divide up their forces and they take it in turns to fight so that they do not get too tired.  If they cannot capture it in this way they throw Greek fire; sometimes they even take the fat of the people they kill and, melting it, throw it on to the houses, and wherever the fire falls on this fat is almost inextinguishable. It can however be put out, so they say, if wine or ale is poured on it. If it falls on flesh, it can be put out by being rubbed with the palm of the hand.   As the Mongols, as far as is known, did not have access to Greek Fire, it seems that Carpini is attempting to describe an incendiary of unusual properties using cultural terms he was familiar with. And as Carpini’s knowledge of Mongol siege tactics largely came from his discussions with survivors in the Rus’ territories, it seems to imply that a special type of fire-causing weapon was used against the Rus’: quite possibly gunpowder weapons Subedei had brought from China.   The famous smoke screen employed by Mongol forces at the battle of Liegnitz in Poland in April 1241 may also have been a type of gunpowder weapon, as suggested by Stephen Haw.  Firstly, for those of you unaware of the context, here is the relevant quote from the description of the battle of Liegnitz, recorded in the fifteenth century Polish chroncile by Jan  Długosz.   “Among the Tatar standards is a huge one with a giant X painted on it. It is topped with an ugly black head with a chin covered with hair. As the Tatars withdraw some hundred paces, the bearer of this standard begins violently shaking the great head, from which there suddenly bursts a cloud with a foul smell that envelopes  the Poles and makes thm all but faint, so that they are incapable of fighting. We know that in their wars the Tatars have always used the arts of divination and witchcraft, and this is what they are doing now. Seeing that the all but victorious Poles are daunted by the cloud and its foul smell, the Tatars raise a great shout and return to the fray, scattering the Polish ranks that hitherto have held firm, and a great slaughter ensues.”   Haw suggests that the smoke weapon used at Liegnitz was the same as a category of smoke bombs used in Chinese warfare over the preceding centuries. Devices to deploy toxic smoke and smoke screens have been used in Chinese warfare since at least the 4th century CE, but during the Song Dynasty more effective versions were developed with gunpowder. in easily shatterable pottery containers, these weapons were packed with poisons, foul-smelling ingredients, shrapnel, arsenic and lime. Dispersed by the force of the explosion, these bombs unleashed a cloud or fog of painful gas containing lime and arsenic in order to blind, disorient and confuse enemy forces- very similar to the smoke weapon described at Liegnitz. Not understanding it was a gunpowder weapon, either a bomb or modified fire-lance, the Poles focused on the most visible ‘tool’ as the origins of the smoke, mistakenly identifying a Mongolian horse-hair standard as the device. The failure of the chronicle to describe the sound of the weapon going off could be attributed to the confusion of battle distance in time of Jan  Długosz’s compilation from the actual event. None of the contemporary Polish observers would have known what gunpowder was, and therefore failed to associate obvious things we would associate with it, such as the sound, lash of flight or actual mentions of delivering the weapon.    This is a point we must emphasize. The ambiguity of language of many western sources on the Mongols makes it difficult to  identify if a new gunpowder weapon was used. Not knowing what the device was, or lacking words for these new devices which the Mongols were almost certainly unwilling to let non-military individuals examine, it is hard to determine when a medieval author is using a term they were familiar with, such as Greek Fire or Naptha, to refer to a new technology which served a similar purpose. The fact that most chroncilers were not first hand witness, but recording accounts from survivors, means it is hard to  know how many details of a given day or battle’s events were accurately recorded, particularly as in the case of Jan  Długosz, who was writing almost two centuries after the battle of Liegnitz, and was at the mercy of whatever was recorded or survived discussing the battle in 1241.   On the other hand, it can be hard to tell if a source is  just providing a dramatic description of a more ‘mundane’ weapon. Such is the case of the Persian writer Juvaini’s account of Hulegu’s campaign in the 1250s, to which he was a direct eye-witness. Juvaini writes of how Hulegu was provided by his brother, the Grand Khan Mongke, a thousand households of Chinese catapultmen, as well as naphtha throwers. As the siege of the Nizari Assassin fortress of Maymun Diz, covered  back in episode 28, Juvaini mentions a large crossbow-like weapon deployed by Hulegu’s Chinese siege engineers, which he called an  ox-bow, in Persian, kaman-i-gav, a direct translation of the Chinese term for the weapon, ba niu nu, “eight-ox-bow.”. Juvaini writes that it delivered meteoric shafts which burnt the enemy, in comparison to stones lobbed by the defenders, which did little but harm a single person. The passage is as follows:    [A] kaman-i-gav [‘ox’s-bow’ ], which had been constructed by Khitayan craftsmen and had a range of 2,500 paces, was brought to bear on those fools, when no other remedy remained and of the devil-like Heretics many soldiers were burnt by those meteoric shafts. From the castle also stones poured down like leaves, but no more than one person was hurt thereby.   These ox-bows in Chinese warfare, as described by the Wujing Zongyao, could have gunpowder packages attached to the bolts, and were used in the same manner as Juvaini describes. While some historians like Stephen Haw see this as a clear usage of gunpowder, it must be remarked that Juvaini’s tendency for over-flowery language makes it difficult to gauge how literal this passage must be taken, though he was an eye-witness to the siege.   Generally it seems that gunpowder was little used in most of the Mongols’ western campaigns. Likely difficulties in travelling with it prevented them from taking great quantities of it, and at the time of the conquests there was not sufficient knowledge in the west which would allow them to procure more supplies. The matter was very different in the continuing Mongol wars in China, where under Khubilai Khan bombs were a main component of the wars against the Song Dynasty, which continued to employ them as well. Thousands of bombs were made every month in the Song Dynasty, though often they failed to properly supply these to the necessary border regions which needed them. One Song official in 1257 inspecting the arsenals of the border lamented how poorly supplied these vulnerable sites were in these weapons, and how despite repeated requests to the central government, amends could not be made. The Song continued to throw whatever they could against the Mongols as they advanced deeper into southern China, but by then the Mongols not only had ample supplies of these weapons for war in China, but manpower reserves, a powerful military structure and a leadership hell-bent on overrunning the south, driven by the energetic Khubilai who believed in the eventuality of his conquest. Khubilai’s great general Bayan set up ranks upon ranks of huopao during his drive to Hangzhou, lobbing stones to pound down the walls, gunpowder bombs to annhilated gates and towers and terrify the defenders withi. Against such an inplacable foe, the last of Song resistance was ground to dust.   Khubilai employed gunpowder weapons against other enemies as well. Most famously against the Japanese, where archaeological evidence, the account of the Hachiman Gudokun and the invasion scrolls of Takezaki Suenaga demonstrates the Yuan forces using iron bombs against the Japanese. Though as we mentioned in episode 26 discussing Suenaga’s scrolls, the addition of the bomb going off in the scroll was likely made later, as it is in different ink and Suenaga fails to mention such weapons. For such a boisterrous warrior like Suenaga to not mention surviving a terrifying grenade like that is rather unlikely.   It appears that an advance in gunpowder weapons was made sometime in the late thirteenth century. Near the ruins of Khubilai Khan’s summer capital of Shangdu, the earliest confirmed cannon has been found. Bearing an inscription in the ‘Phags-pa script dating it to 1298, a serial number, weighing just over 6 kilograms (13 lb 11 oz) and just under 35 cm (approx. 14 in) in length,  it suggests a product of considerable experimentation and systemization. Earlier, much more primitive and rougher models have been found which from archaological context imply they come from the last years of the Tangut Xi Xia Dynasty, crushed in 1227 by Chinggis Khan. It is probable that the evolution of fire-lances from bamboo to metal tubes was a stepping stone to larger metal tubes capable of larger gunpowder charges and projectiles, brought on by the emergency of the Mongol invasions.  Only in the last years of the 13th century did these models reach a level of standardization and sophistication to become bombards, and more and more sophisticated models are known from over the fourteenth century. There are a few passages from 13th and 14th century Chinese texts which may indicate the usage of these cannons, usually in naval engagements; where muzzle flashes seem to be described when Mongol ships fire upon fleeing Jin ships, or on small vessels at the blockade of Xiangyang launch projectiles, but from ships too small for catapult. Much like the western texts, the Chinese did not yet have a name for this new technology though. Calling them huopao, the same name for the catapults which threw gunpowder bombs, it is impossible to know, unless a description is given, which texts refer to bombs, and which to early cannons.    From 1288 we have perhaps the earliest description of small hand held guns or cannons. In the war against his rebel cousin Nayan, Khubilai Khan led his army against Nayan himself, but attacked from multiple fronts. One such operation was led by a Jurchen commander in Khubilai’s service, Li Ting. Using the word for fire-catapult or cannon, huopao, Li Ting and his small squad of Korean soldiers is described as at night sneaking into an encampment of Nayan’s men and setting off these weapons to great effect. From the context, it is clear that these weapons are too small and mobile to be catapults. In further support of this interpretation, it appears one of the actual weapons has been found. Discovered in 1970 in Heilongjiang province, nearwhere Li Ting’s troops fought Nayan, a small bronze cannon or handgun has been discovered from an archaeological site supporting a late thirteenth century context. Weighing 3 and a half kilograms, 34 cm in length, with a bore of 2 and a half centimeters, these were small, anti-personnal weapons. Not much use against walls, but devastating against men and horses. It is no suprise that Nayan’s rebellion was quickly crushed if Khubilai had men with such armaments at his disposal.   The Yuan Dynasty continued to produce cannon over the fourteenth century. One well known example from 1332 bears an inscription with its date and purpose of manufacture, intended to be used on board a ship for suppression of rebels. By the rise of Zhu Yuanzhang and the Ming Dynasty in the late fourteenth century, cannons and other  firearms were standard features of Chinese armies.  Over the Ming Dynasty, gunpowder weapons continued to advance into more deadly and efficient variants, but did not replace the basic tools of the Mongol conflict in China. Rockets, fire-lances, and bombs were used even into the Qing Dynasty, but supported by cannon, mines and two-staged rockets and even multiple-rockets launchers, similar to the famous Korean hwacha developed during the Imjin war. The Qing too would face fearsome nomads bearing firearms in the form of the Dzunghars, but by  then the military advantage was considerably in favour of the Qing.    We can also briefly note evidence for an even earlier usage of firearms, in the form of some controversial iconographic evidence in China. In the Dazu cave system in Sichuan, there is an extensive carved relief featuring individuals armed with a variety of weapons. One carved figure holds something visually very close to early designs of handguns or handcannons, from which clouds of smoke, and possibly a projectile, seem to be carved leaving. As these carvings dates to 1128, this would push back the development of the fire-arm even earlier, and suggest a much more widespread usage of cannon and gun than previously thought. However, the identification is hardly accepted. Some have suggested it was a later addition to the complex during repairs, while others have argued it is not depicting a fire-arm, but merely a wind-spirit holding a bag of wind. As it currently stands, there is no hard evidence for emergence of true fire-arms until the late thirteenth century during the Yuan Dynasty.   So did the Mongols spread gunpowder westwards? Recipes for gunpowder and even the first gunpowder weapons appear in Europe, the Islamic World and India late in the thirteenth century, after contact with Mongol armies. However, the diffusion is difficult to track due to the already mentioned ambiuigisties in terminology. It’s likely the Mongol armies did not travel with great quantities of powder and were reluctant to share it’s knowledge. It is notable though that when perhaps the earliest recipe for gunpowder is recorded in Arabic, circa 1280 by Hasan al-Rammah, he records most ingredients as being Chinese in origin, with saltpetre for instance called Chinese snow, or rockets as chinese arrows. A common word for gunpowder in Arabic and Persian meant [dawā’ in Arabic, and Persian dārū], a literal translation of the Chinese huoyao, fire-drug [ often shortened to just yao in 13th century] which implies that knowledge was transmitted directly from Chinese engineers in Mongol service. By the start of the fourteenth century, fireworks appear as  objects of regular entertainment in the Ilkhanate, and therefore transmission from the Mongols, in some fashion, seems certain.   In Europe there are tantalizing clues to transmission. A great number of diplomats, travellers, priests and merchants made the trek from Europe across the Mongol Empire and back, and many brought gifts from the Khans with them, or observed closely the Mongol army in an attempt to learn its secrets. The Franciscan friar, William of Rubruck, spent much time with a European goldsmith in Mongol service, William Buchier, the man who made the famous Silver Tree of Karakorum. Buchier appears to have worked often in conjunction with Chinese artisans in his work for the Mongols. Though Rubruck’s account does not describe gunpowder, Rubruck is known to have met, while back in Paris, the first European who did: Roger Bacon, who describes with amazement his experience viewing Chinese firecrackers going off in Europe. Even if the Mongol army itself did not directly or intentionally transfer gunpowder, or use it in quantities to replace their own bows and arrows, they opened the pathways which allowed its knowledge to move across the Eurasian continent. Over the early decades of the fourteenth century, fearsome hand guns and bombards became regular features of battlefield across the continent, the secret to gunpowder no longer restricted to the Chinese government.   Our series on the Mongols will continue, so please be sure to subscribe to the Kings and Generals Podcast to follow. If you enjoyed this and would like to help us continue bringing you great content, please consider supporting us on patreon at www.patreon.com/KingsandGenerals. This episode was researched and written by our series historian, Jack Wilson. I’m your host David, and we’ll catch you on the next none. 

En este City Tour la mexicana Tatiana Oseguera nos lleva a descubrir una de las ciudades más culturales de China: Kaifeng. Tatiana se mudó a esta interesante ciudad por temas laborales y al poco tiempo descubrió muchos de los temas culturales que hacen tan diferente a la cultura oriental de la occidental. Su predisposición para conocer el mundo, la llevó a adaptarse e irse convirtiendo en una ciudadana local. Por esa razón la invitamos que sea nuestra guía turística virtual quien en este episodio nos muestra una muy diferente, pero a su vez interesante ciudad. Esperamos disfruten el recorrido.

With the Yuan Dynasty reduced to an ever shrinking area of land around Dadu in north China, to tell the story of the expulsion of the Mongol rulers in 1368 is to tell the story of Zhu Yuanzhang, a peasant turned monk turned warlord turned emperor. Today, we give  you the rise to power of Ming Taizu, the Hongwu Emperor, his great victory at Lake Poyang and the Rise of the Ming Dynasty,  and the final Yuan efforts to hold onto their dynasty. I’m you host David, and this is Kings and Generals: Ages of Conquest.       Our last two episodes took us through the period of Mongol rule in China from Khubilai Khan’s death in 1294, through his many successors until the reign of Toghon Temur Khan, who took the throne in 1333. Toghon Temur was largely a puppet to his chancellors; first Bayan of the Merkit, and most notably Bayan’s nephew, Toghto. Though faced with a colossal economic and environmental crisis which spawned a series of uprisings in 1351, the Red Turbans, by the end of 1354 Toghto had nearly crushed the movement and restored order. But Toghon Temur Khan made the foolish decision to banish Toghto in January 1355, a decision which signalled the death blow to the Yuan Dynasty. Toghto was the last actor who could have arrested the fate of the Yuan or controled the dynasty’s resources. Within months of Toghto’s dismissal, the rebellion picked up with new energy, and the power of the Yuan court became restricted to the very north. The rest of the empire became subject to various warlords, some with nominal allegiance to the Yuan, and some seeking nothing but its utter destruction.   A few points should be emphasized. The lack of interest Toghon Temur had in governing ensured that there was no individual in the Yuan court who could step into the role of Toghto. The strengthening of the regional rulers during the chancellorship of Berke Bukha, followed by mass mobilization in Toghto’s last years left provincial, regional and local rulers newly empowered and at the heads of much stronger military forces. The famed Mongol army was one of conquest, not garrison duty: there were simply not enough Mongols to garrison all of China, leaving a light Mongol presence past even the Yellow River. Most actual Mongolian and Turkic cavalry were kept in a few strategic areas, largely centrered around the capital and the steppes. Southern China had been poorly integrated into the Yuan, where Song dynasty structures had often been hastily co-opted. With most of the Yuan government and armed forces in the north, in the south’s countryside banditry became a real problem, as years of flood, famine, locust plagues and other environmental catastrophy annihilated farmland, the local economies and regular support networks. Unable to rely on the Yuan army for protection, regional and local leaders organized local defense forces for protection against bandits, the Red Turbans or even the undisciplined newly mobilized Yuan troops, which militarized and armed the population. It must have seemed apparent that the Yuan had lost the Mandate of Heaven, the right to rule China.   In the years immediately after Toghto’s dismissal, three warlords emerged within the Red Turban movement as the most powerful, all along the Yangzi River: Zhang Shicheng, the former salt-worker who became a warlord, declared himself emperor and was nearly crushed by Toghto during the chancellor’s final campaign; Chen Youliang a former fisherman, then office clerk who became leader of the southern Red Turbans and declared his own Han Dynasty with himself as emperor; and a peasant, turned monk, turned warlord, Zhu Yuanzhang.    Born into a destitute family of tenant-farmers in 1328, Zhu Yuanzhang grew up surrounded by famine and uncertainty in central Anhwei. His grandfather had fought against the Mongols for the Song Dynasty in its final years, and Zhu grew up listening to his exploits. In summer 1344, he lost most of his family to famine within three weeks. Unable to feed him, his surviving family gave him away to a Buddhist monastery for labour. With the monastery also unable to feed him, he spent a few years wandering before the twenty year old Zhu returned to the monastery, where he learned to read and write. There he may have happily stayed, until a local battle between Yuan forces and Red Turbans in 1352 resulted in some of the Chinese troops in the Yuan army sacking and looting Zhu’s temple. Once again having lost everything, Zhu went to the only place he could: he joined a nearby Red Turban group. For a starving peasant turned monk, Zhu showed a surprising aptitude for war and gained the attention of the local Red Turban leader, Kuo Tzu-Hsing. Under Kuo’s tutelage, Zhu rose in the ranks, and within a year was given his own command and married Kuo’s adopted daughter, the future Empress Ma. By the start of 1355 Zhu was leading an army of about 30,000 men and building his own staff of educated men around him, most notably the scholar Li  Shanchang, who encouraged Zhu’s ambitions, urging him to take the city of Nanjing on the Yangzi River. His first attempt in summer 1355 was a failure, but it resulted in the deaths of Kuo Tzu-Hsing’s sons and heirs, leaving Zhu Yuanzhang in sole command of the local Red Turbans.   Gathering his strength, in April 1356 Zhu finally took Nanjing, making it his capital. This brought him to the attention of the figureheads of the Red Turbans in the north, Liu Futong and his puppet “Song Emperor,”  Han Lin-erh. The young Han Lin-erh acted as a sort of symbol for the movement, a Manichean-Buddhist saviour in addition to apparently being a descendant of the Song Emperors. Together, they had redeclared the Song Dynasty, and soon after Zhu Yuanzhang took Nanjing he was appointed governor of Jiangxi province by Han Lin-erh. This placed Zhu at the forefront of the northern Red Turbans on the Yangzi, but Zhu was careful to maintain official subordinance to this ‘Song Emperor,’ who Zhu became the most powerful defender of. In this time Zhu began developing his administrative apparatus, and under the supervision of the scholar Li Shanchang, began cultivating a reputation as a refined, dignified ruler concerned for the safety of the common people. Always he sought to have his armies minimize the destruction they caused, in contrast to the Yuan government forces and the often wild damage caused by other Red Turbans. He gained valuable administrative experience as the governor of Jiangxi, and it is not hard to imagine he was drawing his eye already to the loftiest of aspirations.   All the while, Zhu was eyeing his two powerful neighbours: Zhang Shicheng to the east, who, after a nominal submission to the Yuan government was now happily expanding along the Yangzi River, and to Zhu’s west, the warlord Chen Youliang, the major figure of the southern Red Turbans. Zhu, Zhang and Chen had before even the end of the 1350s were among the most powerful men in China, the three Yangzi lords having wealth and resources beyond any of the minor warlords or Yuan loyalists south of the Yangzi river. To the north it was a slightly different story, where the major powers after the fall of Toghto were the Yuan aligned warlords Chaghan Temur and his nephew, Koko Temur.   Chaghan Temur was a fourth-generation Naiman commander based in eastern Honan, a region his great-grandfather had helped conquer in the early thirteenth century. Both Mongolized and sinicized, having sat for civil service examinations, since the late 1340s Chaghan Temur had been fighting rebel forces with his own army. His victories over them in the early 1350s brought him rewards and titles from the Yuan court, and his power began to expand. Within a few years he was the most powerful force serving the Yuan, doing his best to stay out of the court intrigues and defeat the rebels. In the latter, Chaghan Temur had more successes. In 1358 when Liu Futong and his Song Emperor Han Lin-erh rode triumphant into Kaifeng, once the capital of the Song Dynasty, it was Chaghan Temur who drove them and their armies back, bringing the city once more under Yuan control. By 1362, Chaghan Temur and his allies had managed to restore Yuan Rule from Shanxi to Shandong, and even former enemies like Zhang Shicheng and the pirate Fang Guozhen were sending a token yearly tribute of grain to the capital of Dadu.   Of course, it is difficult to amass such power without making enemies, and Chaghan Temur’s tendency to ignore court orders, make his own appointments and strengthen himself did him no favours. Chaghan Temur was challenged by a rival, Bolod Temur, another powerful commander and father of Toghon Temur Khan’s empress. The court intrigues between the two hamstrung the ability of the Yuan to resist the rebels, and Toghon Temur Khan, in typical fashion, was totally unable to control them. In 1362 officers claiming to be serving the dynasty assassinated Chaghan Temur while he besieged  a rebel city, apparently doubting his commitment to the dynasty- and promptly fled to the same rebels they had been campaigning against. The court then confirmed Chaghan Temur’s will, granting his military and civilian positions to his adopted son, Koko Temur.   While Koko Temur’s name means ‘blue iron,’ in Mongolian, it may surprise you to learn that the final effective figure of the Yuan Dynasty was not a Mongol, but a Chinese. Born to a Chinese father and Koko Temur’s sister, his birth name was Wang Baobao, but he had been officially adopted by Chaghan Temur and in 1361 awarded his Mongolian name by the Great Khan.  Recognized as a true and loyal servant of the dynasty, Koko Temur seems to have preferred the ideals of steppe life more than his Confucian education, and carried himself in the image of a Mongol ba’atar, and had fought valiantly beside his stepfather. Immediately assuming his late stepfather’s command post, Koko Temur completed the siege, caught the men who had assassinated Chaghan Temur, and in a decidedly un-Chinese ceremony,  cut the assassins’ hearts out and sacrificed them to the spirit of Chaghan Temur.   Under the efforts of Chaghan Temur and Koko Temur, most of China north of the Yangzi was secured by the 1363, the Yuan having managed to survive a few serious scares. Rebel forces sent by Liu Futong and Han Lin-erh had raided as far as Liaodong and Shangdu, burning it in 1358, but since then the situation had somewhat stabilized. Bolod Temur continued to denounce Koko Temur, and the court intrigues did not stop. Toghon Temur Khan’s son and heir, Ayushiridara, seems to have wanted his father to abdicate the throne, as the Khan had shown utter incompetence and no leadership throughout the crisis. In alliance with his mother, Toghon Temur’s Korean empress Ki, and the chancellor, they sought to undermine Toghon Temur by convincing him to dismiss one of his chief ministers. The minister fled to Bolod Temur, who was then declared a rebel for housing the minister. Tension raised, Bolod Temur attacked Koko Temur, was defeated and fled to Dadu. At Dadu, Bolod took control of the capital in 1364, putting the chancellor to death and nearly got his hands on Ayushiridara, who fled to Koko Temur. Ayushiridara stayed there under Koko Temur’s protection until Bolod Temur’s  cruel treatment of the court resulted in his assassination in August 1365, and Koko Temur marched Ayushiridara back to Dadu.   Koko Temur was rewarded with royal titles, and ignored Ayushirirdara’s efforts to have him remove Toghon Temur. Koko Temur was by then by far the most powerful man in the north, but had no love for court politics and wanted to continue the war against the rebels. Given overall command and a large army, Koko Temur finally set out in 1366 to clear the rebels off the Yangzi, only to find that some of the Chinese commanders and former allies of Bolod Temur in his service resented this upstart and attacked him. Forced to waste time in a pointless civil war, the final chance for the Yuan to even retain the north was lost as Zhu Yuanzhang unified the south.   China’s future was decided with the opening of hostilities between Zhu Yuanzhang and Chen Youliang. While Chaghan Temur rose and fell, the Yangzi warlords quickly moved past any pretenses of ‘peasant uprising to expel the Mongols.’ By the end of the 1350s, it was a battle for imperial power between the three most likely claimants to succeed the Yuan, or at least establish a regional kingdom: Chen Youliang, Zhu Yuanzhang and Zhang Shicheng. By 1357, Chen Youliang had taken control of the Red Turbans south of the Yangzi, Zhu Yuanzhang was the preeminent member of the northern Red Turbans and the protector of the puppet Song Emperor Han Lin-Erh, and Zhang Shicheng nominally recognized Yuna overlordship, though he was clearly building his own kingdom along the coast. Chen Youliang’s state had expanded dramatically, but his eastern expansion down the Yangzi was blocked by Zhu Yuanzhang, and to the north by the effective armies of Chaghan Temur and Koko Temur. Needing more strength before he faced then, and not trusting his Yangzi rivals, Chen decided to deal with the Yangzi foes first. In summer 1360, Chen Youliang sailed down the Yangzi with 100,000 men aboard a great navy. Armies of the early 1360s were built upon peasant troops, but since the 1350s had become operationally much more sophisticated and experienced, with river warfare a key component. Since the early years of the uprisings city walls had been repaired, forcing combatants to resort to lengthy blockades or costly assaults. There is little evidence to suggest Mongol military techniques of the thirteenth century were adopted by the Chinese, cavalry taking only a minor role in these battles.   Chen Youliang’s 1360 attack utilized ships with high sterns which allowed his men to climb onto city walls. This brought him some initial success, and made him so overconfident he had a puppet emperor he had been controlling beaten to death, and had himself proclaimed Emperor of a new Han Dynasty. Chen urged Zhang Shicheng to open another front against Zhu, then sailed for Nanjing. Tricking Chen into disembarking much of his fleet north of Nanjing, Zhu Yuanzhang ambushed Chen’s army and captured much of his navy, forcing Chen to retreat. Due to conflict with Zhang Shicheng, Zhu struggled to immediately exploit this victory. The next year, 1361, Zhu Yuanzhang finally led a naval assault on Chen Youliang’s territory, but was only marginally successful, as rebellion forced him to return to his territory in early 1362. Before he departed, Zhu’s forces took Nanchang near Lake Poyang.    While Zhu struggled with treason and rebellion in his territory, Chen Youliang built another armada. The sources indicate this was a  massive effort, totalling 300,000-600,000 men, with large, red painted ships with iron covered turrets for archers and high sterns to once again climb over city walls- the same tactic which had worked so well for him in 1360. In June 1363 his fleet was outside the walls of Nanchang, and Chen believed its fall would lead to the submission of other nearby cities. Unfortunately for Chen, the walls of Nanchang had been reinforced, and his boarding tactic was unsuccessful. Chen was forced into a siege, ruining his plans and taking away his element of surprise. His forces suffered heavy losses, and as the siege dragged into summer the water levels began to lower, risking the large ships which made up the core of his fleet.    Zhu Yuanzhang did not appear to learn of this until August 1363, during which time much of his forces were occupied near the border with Zhang Shicheng. Rapidly reassembling his forces at Nanjing, he sent an army overland to relieve Nanchang, while he prepared a fleet to confront Chen Youliang. Zhu was outnumbered, with perhaps 100,000 to 200,000 men aboard much smaller ships. Further, he risked opening his flank to Zhang Shicheng and rebellion as had happened in 1361. This operation was a great risk, yet he threw all of his weight against Chen Youliang.    His fleet departed Nanjing on the 15th of August 1363, arriving at the entrance to Lake Poyang on the 24th. There he constructed fortified positions to prevent Chen’s fleet from breaking out of the lake. On the 28th, Zhu’s fleet entered the lake, and a startled Chen was forced to lift his 85 day long siege of Nanchang, suddenly realizing he had been trapped. Late on the 29th, the two fleets met off the island of Kanglang shan, where they waited until sunrise the next day. So started the battle of Lake Poyang, the most famous, and largest, naval battle in Chinese history.   On the morning of August 30th, Zhu deployed his fleet into 11 groups, taking the center with his heaviest ships and stationing his lighter vessels on the wings, likely mirrored by Chen’s larger fleet. Zhu’s wing commanders were experienced and had the wind on their side, and their catapults wreaked havoc on the enemy wings, setting ships and men aflame. In the center Chen’s larger ships pushed back Zhu, his own flagship coming under threat. Zhu was forced to retreat to shallower water where Chen’s fleet could not follow, grounding several of Zhu’s ships in the process.   The first day of battle was disappointing, and Zhu sent his top commander Xu Da back to Nanjing with the damaged ships. The next morning Zhu executed some of his officers to get them to line up for battle, but once again the fight went poorly, Chen’s numbers, larger ships and densely packed fleet proving superior in close combat.  High ranking officers were lost, and by midday Zhu had to pull back, aware that they were playing to Chen’s strengths. Finding inspiration from the fire used by his lieutenants the previous day, Zhu filled some smaller vessels with reeds and gunpowder, and with the wind shift in the afternoon sent these fireships into the densely packed enemy fleet.    Chen Youliang lost several hundred ships, 60,000 men, several squadrons and two of his brothers in the ensuing conflagration, while Zhu Yuanzhang only lost 7,000 men for the two days. The outcome was still undecided however, as Chen stil outnumbered Zhu greatly. September 1st was spent repairing and resting the fleets, and fighting resumed on the 2nd. Chen put his forces into a more open formation as defense against fireships, which allowed Zhu’s smaller vessels to isolate Chen’s ships, even sailing through Chen’s line at one point. However, Chen’s numbers were telling, and by noon Zhu withdrew, under pressure to depart from the lake by his commanders. The army he had sent by land had now relieved Nanchang, the goal of the campaign achieved. That night Zhu sailed out of  Lake Poyang, Chen following the next morning only to find himself confronted with the fortifications Zhu had constructed.    It was clear to everyone that Chen Youliang had been outmaneuvered, and several of his generals defected to Zhu. For nearly a month, Chen waited before the fortifications, trying to determine the best course of action, while Zhu goaded him with antagonizing letters and his food supplies ran lower and lower.   Finding a weak position, Chen ordered his fleet to storm it and take it. But this was part of Zhu’s plan. As Chen was making his way onto the Yangzi  river with his tightly packed fleet he sailed into another trap. Zhu was positioned upstream of Chen with more fireships, which were once more sent into Chen’s fleet. The ships that weren’t destroyed fled back down stream, and with order lost Zhu’s ships chased and captured them. Groups of ships locked in combat sailed down river, where forces Zhu had stationed also joined in. In this chaos Chen Youliang attempted to cross between ships in a smaller vessel, when he was killed by an arrow in the eye. News spread rapidly, and with it the last vestiges of resistance collapse. The following morning around 50,000 men and most of the fleet surrendered to Zhu Yuanzhang.    The victory at Lake Poyang was greater than Zhu could ever have hoped. With the death of his main rival and absorption of much of his army and fleet, he quickly annexed Chen’s former territory. By 1364, Zhu was the strongest single power in China, with double the manpower and resources of his next greatest rival, Zhang Shicheng. Zhang had failed to take advantage of Zhu’s war with Chen Youliang, and despite throwing off the pretense of submission to the Yuan Dynastyand  proclaiming himself the Prince of Wu in February 1364, his domain was easily swallowed by Zhu’s forces. Zhang was captured in 1367, and later died in prison. Zhang’s defeat freed Zhu to commit to conquering the rest of China and crush the Yuan, while the deaths of Liu Futong in 1363 and the Song Emperor Han Lin-erh in 1366 left Zhu to assume supreme command.   In January 1368 Zhu Yuanzhang proclaimed the Ming Dynasty with himself as emperor, taking the era name Hongwu, meaning “overflowing martial accomplishment,” and began the campaign to push the remnants of the Yuan from China. The Hongwu Emperor did not take part himself, sending his skilled general and boyhood friend Xu Da to do it for him. Victory had already been determined; the Hongwu Emperoe had merely to stretch his hand and seize it for himself.   The Yuan failed to react to the rise of the Ming. The strongest warlord aligned with the Yuan, Koko Temur, had spent the last years battling other Yuan warlords. When Ming armies began to advance in 1368, Koko Temur refused an order from the court to repel them due to regional concerns, and for this was declared a foe of the court, open for all to attack. Koko Temur soundly defeated all of the foes sent against him until he was finally reinstated to his position, but by then it was simply too late. The Yuan could offer no counter offensive as Ming armies crossed the Yellow River in August, general Xu Da approaching Dadu in September. Toghon Temur Khan and his heir Ayushiridara fled the city to Mongolia only days before the arrival of the Ming armies, and on the 20th of September, 1368, Dadu came into Chinese rule for the first time in over 400 years. The city fell without a fight, only a few holdouts being executed. The Hongwu Emperor renamed the city to Beiping, meaning ‘pacified north.’ In time the city became the capital of the Ming Dynasty and was renamed to Beijing, the name it holds today.   Over the next two decades, the Ming incorporated the rest of China. In distant Yunnan, the Mongol prince Basalawarmi held out against the Ming until 1382. The fleeing Toghon Temur Khan and Koko Temur were pursued into the steppes and pushed from Inner Mongolia in 1370 after a humiliating defeat, where Ayushiridara’s son Maidiribala and 50,000 Mongols were captured by the Ming forces. Khan Toghon Temur died soon after, a man broken and humilated, lamenting the loss of his capitals, his empire, yet never understanding how it had happened. Ayushiridara finally became Khan and escaped with the remainder of Yuan forces across the Gobi desert into their ancestral homeland, almost exactly a century after Khubilai Khan had declared the Yuan Dynasty. The Ming continued to probe the border, looking to hunt down the new Khan who had not  abandoned claims on China, despite Ming diplomats urging their submission. Threats, promises of support, using Ayushiridara’s son as leverage, to a rapid completion of a  dynastic history of the Yuan with its glowing portrayal of Chaghan Temur in an attempt to persuade Koko Temur, did nothing to assuage the defiance of the Mongols. This dynastic history, by the way, is the Yuan shi we have referred to so many times over this series, and its rapid completion by the start of the 1370s is part of the reason it’s full of so many errors and even repeated entries.   With Ayushiridara refusing to submit, the Ming pressed the advance. Xu Da inflicted a major defeat on Koko Temur in the Gansu corridor  which assisted Ming expansion in Sichuan and the west. In 1372 Xu Da marched with a massive army into the steppes, well over 150,000 men and torched the old capital of Karakorum, but Xu Da learned how dangerous the Mongols were in their homeland. Koko Temur simply manuevered around Xu Da for a month, exhausting the Ming army in marches into seeming nothingness, before falling upon his disillusioned foe. Xu Da’s army was annihilated, the great general forced to flee, and the impetus for Ming advance into Mongolia was broken. The Ming would never be able to conquer Mongolia, and were forced to step back to a defensive position along their borders. The only exceptions were raids and a brief period of Ming aggression during the reign of the Yongle Emperor, the Hongwu Emperor’s  son, who led a number of campaigns into the steppe. Over time, this border became entrenched and fortified, particularly in the 15th and 16th centuries, into the Great Wall of China as we know it today. Though border walls had existed prior in much earlier dynasties, it took for the Ming Dynasty for them to develop into a single connected fortification across China’s northern border, and the famous brick structure we know it as today. The Yuan did not relinquish their claims on China, though we generally call the exiled court the Northern Yuan. Confined to Mongolia, aside from raids it would not be until the 1450s and the Tumu crisis that  the Mongols would again form an existential threat to the Ming. After the death of Koko Temur in 1375 and Ayushiridara in 1378,  the northern Yuan lost their unity, falling into infighting with the Chinggisid Khans becoming puppet rulers for non-Oirat Chinggisids. It would be many years before Chinggisid unity would be reformed, albeit only briefly, in Mongolia.   So the Nothern Yuan and the Ming would form uneasy neighbours for the next centuries, sometimes at war, often conducting trade, each taking advantage of the other at various times. So would be the relationship until the 1600s, when both Ming and the northern Yuan were finally subsumed by a new enemy-  the Manchu Qing Dynasty, the descendants of the enemies of both the Mongols and the Chinese, the Jurchen. But that’s  a story for another day.       So ends the period of Mongol rule in China. We will return to the later history of Chinggisid Mongolia, but our next episodes bring out attention westwards, to the fates of the Chagatai Khanate, Ilkhanate, and Golden Horde, so be sure to subscribe to our podcast to follow. If you enjoyed this and would like to help us keep bringing you great content, then consider supporting us on patreon at www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. This episode was researched and written by our series historian, Jack Wilson. I’m your host David, and we’ll catch you on the next one. 

In one of our most powerful and informative episodes yet, Dumasani Washington, author of Zionism and the Black Church, stops by to share about the deep, prophetic, and supernatural ties between  African American & Jewish communities. He answers these questions: Why do the AA communities and Jewish communities have a supernatural connection? How have we fallen from the vision and place that we were in in the time of Dr. MLK Jr & the Civil Rights Movement? What was the main catalyst that disintegrated the African American family after they persevered through incredible hardships together? Why has the Middle East purposely turned African brothers and sisters against Israel? Why is it necessary for black Americans to stand with Israel? What does the bible say specifically about this special alliance?Dumisani Washington is a pastor, composer, author, and music teacher in Northern California. Dumisani's Israel journey began in the early 1990s in a quest to better understand the roots of his Christian faith. The trek became cultural as he studied the Jewish Diaspora and became intrigued by Israel's multi-ethnic identity; and the return of the Diaspora from Ethiopia, India/Burma, Kaifeng, and the world."Zionism and the Black Church: Why Standing with Israel Will Be a Defining Issue for Christians of Color in the 21st Century" by Dumasani Washington Institute for Black Solidarity with Israel "Disinformation: Former Spy Chief Reveals Secrets for Undermining Freedom, Attacking Religion and Promoting Terrorism"Support the show

Shalom and welcome to the Chinese Literature Podcast. Today, we have a very special Chinese Literature Podcast in celebration of Passover. We will be looking at the book The Haggadah of the Kaifeng Jews of China by Fook-Kong Wong and Dalia Yasharpour. 

Seemingly out of nowhere the small landlocked nation on the Eastern Asian Steppes, inhabited mostly by animal shepherds and nomads, challenged established Asian kingdoms and empires.  Due primarily to the vision of one person, Genghis Khan. He would unite his people and create an empire over much of Asia.  The Mongols sudden epic rise  is only matched by their sudden epic decline. Beginning with this episode, the story is told of these nomads' rise to power and conquest over China.

Mik and Verge look for some answers and energy in the face of a stiflingly boring Twitter news week. Ethnic Enclave of the Week: "Kaifeng Jews" WikiHoles: "Kaifeng " (Vergel) / "Nuisance Wildlife Management" (Miklas) / Holes begin at 10:40

Tras la revolución Rusa Lenin tuvo una idea... crear un Oblas autónomo judío y en los años de Stalin se hizo realidad... en el medio de siberia, a cinco días de viaje en el transiberiano partiendo de Moscu. Su nombre: Birobidzhan. Fecha de creación: 1928. 20 años antes que "El Estado de Israel". Más hacia el este y un poco más hacia el sur pero unos mil años antes durante la dinastía Song los primeros judíos transitando la ruta de la seda se asientan en China, en la ciudad de Kaifeng... pasan los siglos y hacia mediados del siglo XIX judíos iraquíes se asientan en Shangai, luego los seguirán judíos rusos (escapandose de la revolución rusa, vaya coincidencia) y luego le seguirán otros judíos ashkenazim antes de la Segunda Guerra Mundial. En este entretenido y apasionante episodio, con la guía de "Un Topo por el Mundo" (Faivel Lev) que visitó ambas ciudades recorremos y conocemos algunas de las comunidades judías menos conocidas del mundo. Un Topo por el Mundo en Birobidzhan: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jG3bbAuiTX8 Un Topo por el Mundo en Kaifeng: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5PanSPE7SPg

The Jewish Diaspora has seen the Jewish people scattered throughout the globe, sometimes in the remotest of places, namely as a result of continued persecution. Of all the places they've settled, however, perhaps none is as unique as the city of Kaifeng in Eastern China, which is the home of a rich and vibrant Jewish community dating back over a thousand years. Who are the Jews of Kaifeng? How did they end up in China? And is their heritage in danger of disappearing? Find out in today's enlightening episode. --- This episode is sponsored by · Anchor: The easiest way to make a podcast. https://anchor.fm/app Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/historylovescompany/support

“Now I wish to tell you [...] all the very great doings and all the very great marvels of the very great lord of the Tartars, [...] who is called Kublai Khan, which [...] means to say in our language the great lord of lords, emperor, and [...]this great Khan is the most powerful man in people and in lands and in treasure that ever was in the world, or that now is from the time of Adam our first father till this moment; and under him all the peoples are set with such obedience as has never been done under any other former king. And this I shall show you quite clearly in the course of this our second book, that it is a true thing which I have told you so that each will be sure that he is, as we say without contradiction, the greatest lord that ever was born in the world or that now is.”       So Marco Polo introduces Kublai Khan in his Description of the World, as per the classic translation of Moule and Pelliot. Having now taken you through the successful Mongol conquest of China and fall of the Song Dynasty, we’ll now look at Kublai’s reign itself, and his efforts to build a new dynasty in China. Great Khan of the Mongol Empire and simultaneously Emperor of China, Kublai Khan was one of the single most powerful men in human history, rumours of his vast wealth and might spreading across the world. Kublai Khan’s long reign will be dealt with in two halves; a first one today covering 1260 to 1279, followed by a look at Kublai’s foreign ventures, then another episode detailing his last years. I’m your host David, and this is Kings and Generals: Ages of Conquest.       Kublai’s name has popped up in several episodes even before his war with Ariq Boke, but we’ve dealt little with the man directly. Born on the 23rd of September, 1215, Kublai was the second son of Tolui and Sorqaqtani Beki, and a grandson of Chinggis Khan. Indeed, Kublai was the last of the Great Khans to have ever personally met Chinggis, though Kublai was little more than 12 years old at the time of Chinggis’ death. It was never likely that Kublai would have come to the throne: while all of Sorqaqtani’s son received the same extensive education, learning to read and write the Mongolian script, take lessons in governance and even had Chinese advisers, Kublai was the only one of her four sons who really found himself attracted to Chinese culture. In time, Kublai even came to speak some Chinese, though never learned the characters. While Sorqaqtani’s eldest son Mongke led armies on the Great Western Campaign across the steppe in the 1230s, Kublai was beginning to govern Chinese for the first time, having been given an appanage in North China by Ogedai Khaan in 1236. Like many Mongols granted territory in China, Kublai did not actually rule from China, staying in Mongolia proper. As with much of North China, Kublai’s appanage was left to the whims of tax farmers and merciless officers demanding extraordinary levies. By the time Kublai learned of it, thousands of tenants had already fled their lands. Perhaps on the council of his Chinese tutors, Kublai sought assistance and local knowledge. The tax farmers in his lands were dismissed and replaced with dedicated officials. A regular taxation system enforced, burdens lessened and by the 1240s Kublai had succeeded in encouraging a number to return. The episode was an important one for Kublai. Leaving government to operate without oversight would allow all manner of corruption and abuse into the system, depreiving the lord of his tribute and putting increased pressure onto the peasanty and farmers at the bottom. Given the chance, they would flee, leaving those petty officials to now increase the pressure on remaining tenants and continue the cycle. By curbing abuses and encouraging growth, Kublai reasoned, the lord would reap even greater rewards over time.       For most of the 1240s, Kublai was a minor figure. He was a grandson of Chinggis and thus a high ranking prince, to be sure, but one of little importance without a military record to his name- the only kind of record which mattered, as far as the Mongols were concerned. Just before 1240 Kublai married his second and most famous wife, Chabi of the Onggirat. A wise and outspoken woman, Chabi would, for most of Kublai’s long life, be one of his most significant advisers and supporters, a calming and motivating voice when he needed it most. Chabi was also a devout Buddhist, and certainly must have encouraged Kublai’s own interest in Buddhism. It’s no coincidence their first son was given a rather classically Tibetan Buddhist name, Dorji. She may very well have been a driving force in bringing more Buddhist advisers into Kublai’s fledgling court in the 1240s. In 1242, the Buddhist monk Hai-yun was summoned to Kublai, who further educated Kublai on Buddhism. In 1243, Hai-yun helped Kublai choose the Chinese Buddhist name of Zhenjin, “True Gold,” for Kublai’s second son, rendered in Mongol as Jingim. Hai-yun introduced Kublai to another Buddhist, Liu Ping-chung, who would become one of Kublai’s most prominent advisers in the years to come. While Kublai was personally more inclined to Buddhism, he did not limit himself to it. Confucian scholars such as Chao Pi, Tou Mo and most famously, Yao Shu, came to Kublai in these years. Yao Shu was highly trusted by Kublai, and the Chinese sources are replete with examples of Yao Shu turning ancient Chinese parables and stories into practical advice for Kublai as a general and in time, ruler. These  men were made responsible not just for informing Kublai of the ancient Confucian classics, but of tutoring Kublai’s sons as well. The oldest boy, Dorji, died early, and Jingim became the focus of their teaching efforts, receiving an education in Buddhism, Confucianism and even Taoism.       Confucians and Buddhists were not his only advisers; Uighurs, Turks and Central Asians served Kublai in a vareity of roles as interpeters, translators, officials and financial advisers. For military matters of course, Kublai relied on his Mongolian kinsmen. Over the 1240s and into the 1250s, Kublai cultivated what historian Morris Rossabi has termed the “kitchen cabinet,” of advisers, a wide collection of opinions and experiences which he could draw upon, men he knew for years and trusted, backed up by his wife Chabi.      As we’ve covered before, when his older brother Mongke became Grand Khan in the 1250s Kublai was thrust into the international spotlight. We needn’t go into this in great detail again; how Kublai was for the first time given a military command, against the Dali Kingdom in Yunnan. How Kublai returned to Northern China to oversee matters for Mongke there, only to annoy his brother with possible aspirations to greater autonomy and perhaps independence, an overconfidence brought on by a successful military campaign and fruitful years as a governor which saw him construct his own capital, known as Shangdu in Inner Mongolia. Mongke greatly reduced Kublai’s influence in the aftermath, and Kublai only managed to crawl back into Mongke’s favour in time to be given command of an army in a massive assault on the Song Dynasty. The sudden death of Mongke in August 1259  brought the campaign to a screeching halt. Mongke and Kublai’s youngest brother, Ariq Boke, stepped up into the regency. Kublai ignored requests to return to the imperial capital at Karakorum in Mongolia, and continued to campaign for a few more months, until his wife Chabi sent word of rumour that Ariq was going to put his name forward for the Khanate. But Kublai had already been aspiring for the throne. He may have intended to keep campaigning and build up his rather lacklustre resume as a commander, but now had to rush north earlier than he had hoped. In May of 1260, at his residence in Shangdu, Kublai declared himself Khan of the Mongol Empire, precipitating a four year civil war between himself and Ariq. Though Kublai had Ariq’s surrender by 1264, over those four years the princes in the western half of the empire took their independence, leaving Kublai ruler of a realm much reduced in size. As our previous episodes have demonstrated, Kublai sent his armies on the colossal effort to conquer southern China and its Song Dynasty, a task only completed by 1279. Kublai though, did not lead these armies himself, instead focusing on building his new empire, as we’ll go into today.       After declaring himself Khan in early 1260, his early efforts were directed at the war with Ariq Boke. Once the conflict quieted by 1261 and 62, as Ariq was pushed from Mongolia, Kublai could begin to consolidate his empire. Though he still perceived of himself as ruler of the Mongol Empire, he understood that his powerbase was in China. From the beginning, Kublai could not have merely co-opted Mongke’s administration. Since the reign of Ogedai, the Mongol imperial organization functioned through Secretariats, influenced by yet unique from the Chinese system. The Central Secretariat, based in the imperial capital, was the central government, the head of which served as a sort of Prime Minister, consulting with the Great Khan to carry out his will and laws. For Ogedai, Guyuk and Mongke, the Central Secretariat had been staffed by members of the keshig, the imperial bodyguard. The Central Secretariat delegated authority to the various Branch Secretariats, the regional offices overseeing imperial government. Branch Secretariats for North China, Central Asia  and Western Asia were the three main offices, with a Secretariat for the Rus’ Principalities in the process of being organized at time of Mongke’s death. The Secretariats struggled to carry out their will, for they were operating alongside various regional Mongol princes who had been allotted these lands as well. The conflict over whether the Secretariats or the Princes carried out administration or taxation, among other responsibilities, was a key component of government ineffiencies over the century.    With the outbreak of war with Ariq Boke, most of the top members of the former Central Secretariat had sided with Ariq Boke in Karakorum, leaving Kublai to rely on his own men. Among his earliest actions was to get the loyalty of the China Secretariat and local Mongol princes, and prevent them from allying with Ariq. Of these, Qadan was the most significant, a son of Ogedai who ruled on Kublai’s northwest frontier, the border close to Ariq’s territory and the Chagatayids. Key allies like this allowed Kublai to focus on more internal matters.    The officials of the China Secretariat were naturally brought on into Kublai’s new government. Without access to the old Central Secretariat offices though, Kublai had to establish a new one after becoming Khan. Unlike the Central Secretariats of the previous Khans, Kublai’s was not filled by men of his keshig -though they were present- but civilian administrators and his own advisers. The first to head the new Secretariat was Wang Wen-tung. In structure Kublai’s Secretariat had much more in common with the usual Chinese office, indicative of the influence of Kublai’s Confucian advisers. The head of the Secretariat was assisted by two Chancellors of the Left and Right, often serving as his replacement and primary advisers to the Khan. The Head of the Secretariat and the two Chancellors oversaw what was known as the Six Functional Ministeries, which carried out the day-to-day running of the empire: the Ministry of Personnel, responsible for civilian officials; the Ministry of Revenue, responsible for the census, taxes and tribute; the Ministry of Rites, responsible for ceremonies, sacrifices and embassies; the Ministry of War, responsible for some aspects of military command, colonies, postal stations and supplies; the Ministry of Justice, which managed law and prisons; and the Ministry of Public Works, which repaired and maintained fortifications, dams and public land.   In 1263, Kublai also re-established another Chinese institution, the Privy Council, which managed the Imperial Army and protected the capital. Kublai sought a more centralized control of the army, but in this found resistance from the Mongolian leadership and princes. While Chinggis Khan had largely replaced the traditional military leadership and chiefs, a new hereditary leadership was installed, both from his sons and non-Chinggisids. By Kublai’s time, he was dealing with well-entrenched egos born into these positions. They would answer the Khan’s summons for war, of course, but did not want to be managed in all aspects by officials in a distant capital who may not have been nomads. To compromise, Kublai organized his armed forces into three major branches. The first a “Mongol Army,” under his direct control, and that of the Privy Council. This was stationed close to the Imperial capitals, made up of Mongols, Central Asians and Turks. This was followed by the “Tammachi,” the Mongols who served the Khan, but maintained their own princes and lived out in the steppes. Then there was the “Chinese Army,” the largely infantry force of Chinese who served as garrison troops.   By 1268, in order to watch his growing bureaucracy, Kublai brought on another Chinese institution, the Censorate. The duty of the Censorate was to inspect officials and route out corruption; they would report directly back to the Khan to inform him of the goings-on in his government, of tidings which may not have reached him through regular channels. For Kublai, good governance was a high priority, and he gave his Censorate great resources and power. The Khan wanted to know what happened at all levels of government. Compared to other dynasties, Kublai’s Censorate had great power… on paper. In reality, there is little evidence for its effectiveness outside of the provinces closest to the capital. The Censorate’s first leader, a Confucian named Zhang Dehui, resigned after a dispute with Kublai on how the law applied to the Khan. To put simply, Kublai argued that it didn’t, and Kublai had him replaced with a more pliant Mongol.    Kublai’s affinity for the classic Chinese government structures should not be overstated. Employing traditional styles of governance helped placate Confucian elites and scholars, going some ways to convince them that Kublai had ‘stepped past,’ his nomad roots, but he was unwilling to let himself be tethered to it. The most obvious example was in his refusal to restore the Civil Service examination systems. Since the Tang Dynasty, most Chinese bureacrats were selected after completing these exams. The highest men in the empires were scholar officials who were well versed in Chinese history and literary classics, and jealuously guarded access to high office from those who had never completed the exams. Kublai did not want to limit himself in who he could appoint to office, preferring to keep his doors open to anyone he perceived useful or deserving, regardless of their origins. So, the non-Chinese men from his keshig could still staff high positions, and men from Central Asia could be raised to high station. Of these, none were more famous than Ahmad Fanakati, becoming Kublai’s finance minister in the 1260s. Particularly with the rebellion of Li Tan in 1262, a Mongol-aligned warlord in Shandong, Kublai’s desire to place power in the hands of the Chinese lessenged. Though the rebellion was quickly crushed,  Kublai’s chief minister of the Central Secretariat, Li Tan’s father-in-law Wang Wen-tung, was found complicit and executed. The power of Mongol-allied Chinese warlords across North China was greatly curtailed following this, and Kublai found himself far more suspicious of the Confucians in his government.   For Kublai’s empire, the old imperial capital of Karakorum was untenable. Deep in Mongolia, it was a difficult to supply and highly exposed location, now vulnerable to the mobile horsemen of Kublai’s Central Asian kinsmen- first Ariq Boke, the Chagatayids and in time, the young Ogedeid prince Qaidu. Neither could the complex bureaucracy he was building be managed from Mongolia’s Orkhon valley. Karakorum was to be effectively left abandoned,  a garrison outpost of only symbolic value. For a little over 30 years Karakorum had been the administrative centre of most of Eurasia. Never again would it regain its importance. Kublai first made Shangdu, in what is now Inner Mongolia at the edge of the steppe and Chinese frontier, his capital. Shangdu, originally called Kaiping, is most well known through Samual Taylor Coleridge’s poem Xanadu. Though it housed Kublai’s court and was in the steppe, it was built in Chinese style; roughly a square, with low, rammed earthern walls and a palace. But even Shangdu was insufficient for governing the empire. The area was unsuited to housing a great population, and would still have kept Kublai removed from his subjects. Chinese sources assert that Kublai’s Chinese advisers informed him of the need to govern from within China, but Kublai must have seen it himself. Most Imperial capitals were located more centrally, along the lower arm of the Yellow River where it cuts through the North China plain. Of these cities, none were better known than Xian, in Shaanxi province, from which a great many dynasties ruled from. The former Song and Jin capitals of Kaifeng were also located along the Yellow River. Kublai did not wish to abandon his homeland though, desiring to maintain some proximity, both for personal and security reasons. So a more northerly location was chosen: the ruins of the Jin capital of Zhongdu. Fittingly, the city had been taken by the Mongols the same year as Kublai’s birth, in 1215, and now Kublai was the one to restore it… somewhat. His new city was built just northeast of Zhongdu, straddling three rivers to provide ample water for the population. Construction began in 1267. Built in Chinese style but overseen by a Muslim engineer, it was a vast, square shape with walls of rammed earth. Within was a smaller enclosed area, housing the imperial city, palaces and residences of the Khan. This was to be Dadu, meaning great capital. To Mongols and Turks, it was Khanbaliq, the Khan’s city. Marco Polo would interpet it as Cambulac. Today, Beijing sits atop of it.       Dadu in many ways embodied Kublai’s often roughly mixed Chinese and Mongolian demands. The Chinese wanted Kublai to step into the expectations of a Chinese Emperor and conduct proper rituals to maintain the Mandate of Heaven; constructing a capital within China, building requisite temples to honour his ancestors and donning proper imperial garb helped  to present the necessary image. Yet, Kublai and his sons slept not in Dadu’s sumptuous residences, but in gers in the city’s central park; feasts were decidedly more Mongolian in terms of drunkenness and yelling; his altar sat on top of soil brought from Mongolia. In a sort of quasi-nomadization, Kublai conducted treks between Shangdu and Dadu every year, spending summers in Shangdu and winters in Dadu. Each trek was marked with Mongolian shamanistic ceremonies: flicking airag onto the ground for the departing Khan and calling out the name of his illustrious grandfather. At Shangdu Kublai hunted and feasted, doing a little bit to remind himself of his heritage and escape the demands of office.       As we’ve been iterating, the image of a legitimate emperor of China was a major part of actually ruling China. Each Chinese dynasty, it was believed, ruled with the Mandate of Heaven, the divine support necessary to control the Middle Kingdom. Victory in war meant the conqueror had Heaven’s support. But Heaven needed to be appeased through proper ritual and ceremony. Good governance and climate meant that the Dynasty had Heaven’s support. Corruption and ecological disasters, coupled with military defeats, meant Heaven had rescinded its blessing. The image of being a proper Chinese ruler was therefore necessary for any man wishing to have that divine backing. Kublai would have been reminded of this constantly by his advisers, particularly Liu Ping-chung, who urged Kublai to commit to declaring a dynasty and marking himself as the successor to the Song. In 1271 the Yuan Dynasty was officially declared. Yuan was taken from the Yijing, the Book of Changes, one of the most ancient of all Chinese classics. Yuan has connotations of primal energy and the origins of the universe; all auspicious things to refer to for a man who already had the backing of Eternal Blue Heaven.        To Kublai, taking the Dynastic name of Yuan was not an indication he was replacing the Mongol Empire. To him, Da Yuan, the Great Yuan, was another way to express Yeke Mongghol Ulus, the Great Mongol State. It was to help Chinese acceptance of his rule and maintain Heaven’s Mandate. But it was a fine line to try and present oneself as both Mongol Emperor and the Chinese Emperor, and the declaration of the Yuan may have been in part a recognition of his lack of effective power over the western Mongol Khanates. Kublai still very much saw himself as their overlord, but even he would have recognized his actual power over them was limited at best.        By declaring the Yuan Dynasty, Kublai was also demonstrating his intention was not just to loot and occupy China, but actually rule there. Now, we’ve talked alot about things Kublai ordered, declared and issued: but what did his rule actually look like? In terms of wanting to be a good ruler, what did Kublai accomplish in this regard? Well, ol’ Kublai was not just a man of ideas, but put things into action. Reconstruction of China both north and south was a primary goal of his. Northern China had hardly recovered from the prolonged Mongol-Jin warfare. Despite efforts in the past to institute regular taxation as proposed by the thanksless Yelu Chucai, much taxatio remained adhoc, local populations still being taken advantage of by Mongol officials. For the success of his Dynasty, Kublai wanted the burdens on the population relieved.       In 1261, Kublai began to provide funding for the Office for the Stimulation of Agriculture, headed by his friend and adviser Yao Shu. The stated goal of the office was to help peasants restore, develop and advance agriculture. Kublai wanted Northern China to once again reach a state of food security and be able to produce surplus as protection against shortages. A starving and discontented peasantry would pose a risk of massive uprisings, and the surplus was needed for the massive capital at Dadu. Dadu required 58 grainaries, each one holding 2,170,440 kilograms of grain, or  4,785,000 lbs. Kublai needed a reserve just to feed his capital, let alone secure northern China.        Kublai also understood it was not just a matter of providing funds and labour; the peasants needed to be protected from the Mongols. In 1262, Kublai forbade Mongols from ranging their animals through peasant fields, protecting vital cropland from becoming lunch for hundreds of goat and sheep. He also sought to abolish, once and for all, the tax farmers who sought to beggar the Chinese. Taxes needed to be simplified, and the power of the princely appanages curtailed in order for the Central Secretariat to retain dominance. For this, princes were denied their ability to collect taxes; rather than pay both the local prince and the Central Government, the taxes would go just to the government. Then, an allotment would be provided to the princes. Simplifying and reducing taxes always goes a long way to reducing stress on the folk on the bottom of the social rung. Taking this further, Kublai also reduced or completely removed taxes on entire regions to help them recover. Funds were provided for farmers to restore lands damaged during the conquest, as was grain for those in need. The Khan regularly met and sought knowledge from his advisers on how to restore the countryside and promote trade, and heaped rewards on those who provided effective ideas.       Kublai also promoted what he saw as useful professions. Generally, Chinese dynasties looked down on craftsmen and doctors, but Kublai carried on the Mongol practice of favouring those with skills. Craftsmen and doctors were exempted from certains taxes and corvee labour. For craftsmen and merchants, Kublai encouraged trade, especially from Central Asia  and on the South Asia sea routes.  In 1268 he opened the General Administration for Supervision of the Ortogh, which provided government loans to merchants taking part in caravans from Central Asia. In southern China, kilns were registered and supported by the government to aid the production of porcelains, a valuable part of the Southeast Asian sea trade.  Taxes were lowered on commercial transactions, roads and routes were improved to facilitate movement. Foreign merchants were encouraged to come to China in order to advance the overseas trade, bring their knowledge and even serve in the government: owing their work to the Khan was thought to make them more useful. It is in such a capacity that Marco Polo would work, serving it seems in Kublai’s keshig, as we’ll explore in a future episode.   For doctors and physicians, Kublai established and funded academies and hospitals for them to work in, and to learn from Muslim medical knowledge Kublai imported- a full 31 volumes of Muslim medical practices were collected for the court library. As Kublai was often in poor health and suffered terribly from gout, he was keen to support this industry and whatever relief they might bring him. Expensive drugs, ingredients and doctors were collected from across the Islamic world and even southern India and brought to China. Exempted from many tax obligations and corvee labour, and often serving upon the elite and government, medical leaders reached a very high, and very lucrative, social standing they had not previously enjoyed. By encouraging the growth in numbers of physicians and hospitals, this brought greater access of their services to people at large as well.       Within his first years as Khan, Kublai had also organized the printing of new paper currencies. The first of these was backed by silk, and the later by the silver reserve. Earlier Khans had encouraged payment in coinage over kind, and Kublai took this to the next level. He hoped to employ the same currency throughout his realm to ease trade and aid in economic stability. The earlier paper mony printed by his predecessors and the Song emperors was invalidated, though in the former Song territory the people were given a period of years to hand in the old money, including gold, silver and copper coins,  in exchange for the new. Until the late-1270s, Kublai kept tight control on how much was printed in order to prevent inflation, and the system worked quite well. Only with costs endured from the failed attack on Japan and the last years of war with the Song, did the printing of paper money escalate, though not yet to disastrous levels.   In science too, Kublai promoted cross-continental contacts. Astronomy was always of interest to Chinese monarchs and diviners, and a good mark of any emperor was formatting a new calendar. For this, considerable Muslim knowledge was imported. In 1271 the Institute of Muslim Astronomy was founded, allowing Chinese astronomers to study translated Islamic texts and instruments to design their own, and eventually provide Kublai a new, more accurate calender. Kublai also ordered the establishment of a new legal code which began to take effect in the early 1270s. It was actually more lenient than previous dynastic legal codes: only 135 crimes were punishable by death in the Yuan legal code, less than the preceeding Song, or succeeding Ming, legal codes. Executions per year during the 13th century rarely exceeded 100, with the Khan personally reviewing these cases, preffering to send them to labour or to pay a fine. The latter was an uniquely Mongol addition to the Chinese legal system. For the Mongols, such fines were regular compensation for punishments, and now too would become standard practice in China.       Kublai also gave China the basis for the provincial organization it holds today. As the first man to unite all of China in 300 years, he was able to order a country-wide provincial reorganization. Unlike previous dynasties, Tibet, Xinjiang and Yunnan were now part of China; Yunnan, for instance, had never been under Chinese suzerainty before, and has never left it since. Kublai reorganized China into 12 provinces, each governed by regional versions of the Central Secretariat. In much of the south, former Song officials were brought to staff the lower levels of government, but a system of Mongol and Central Asian daruqachi supervised and managed them.       As part of his hope to tie the various disparate regions of his empire together, Kublai sought a writing system all could use. He did not want to rely on Chinese, a script few Mongols had ever learned. But neither was the Uighur script the Mongols used for their own language fully adequate. Adopted by Chinggis Khan in 1206, it only barely covered the sounds of spoken Mongolian, and was simply incapable of representing Chinese. For this task, Kublai turned to one of his best known advisers, the ‘Phags-pa Lama. Born in 1235, in the 1240s he accompanied his uncle, the Sakya Pandita, one of the leaders of Tibetan Buddhism’s Sa-Skya sect, to the court of Ogedai’s son Koten. Basically growing up in Mongol courts, in the 1250s he found himself attached to prince Kublai, and in time Khan Kublai. Made Kublai’s personal chaplain after he became Khan, in 1264  the ‘Phags-pa Lama and his brother were appointed to govern Tibet on behalf of the Mongols. Having spent comparatively little time there, they did not do a great job. His brother died in 1267, which was soon followed by an uprising from a rival Buddhist sect, crushed with a forced reimposition of Mongol rule. With the Mongols now ruling Tibet directly, the ‘Phags-pa Lama returned to Kublai’s court, where he was given a new task: designing for Kublai a new universal script for the empire. Completing it by 1269, this was the famed Yuan square script, or ‘Phags-pa script, as named for its designer. Based on the Tibetan script, it was 41 square shaped letters written vertically and designed to capture sounds of both Chinese and Mongolian. Kublai was delighted and heaped rewards onto the ‘Phags-pa Lama, making him Imperial Perceptor and Head of all monks in Kublai’s empire, in addition to further tutoring Kublai’s son Jingim. Kublai ordered the script to be taught to all officials, and all government documents were to be issued in the new script. Surviving stone inscriptions, paper money, porcelain and state paizas from the Yuan period all feature the characteristic blocks of the ‘Phags-pa script. But aside from official and decorative purposes, the script never caught on even within the government, despite repeated proclamations from Kublai for his officials to learn it.        In keeping with the precedent of previous Khans, Kublai’s early reign encouraged the respect of religions. The legal code did not set out to prohibit any religion, and religious communities, especially Muslims, were often self-governing as long as they paid taxes. Respect was shown to Confucians, Buddhists, Taoists, Muslims, Shamanists and even those Christians in China. Like Mongke, there were members of these religions convinced that Kublai was about to, or had already, converted to their faith, so effective was Kublai at protraying himself as a friend to all. The ‘Phags-pa Lama, for instance, presented Kublai as the Buddhisatta of Wisdom to Tibetans while Marco Polo portrayed Kublai as a fine Christian monarch in his accounts. Tax exemptions were provided to religious orders, financial aid to help in rebuilding and constructing new temples, representation at court and other privileges were granted to these various communities. In exchange, they convened with the Heavens and Gods on Kublai’s behalf to bring good fortune onto the Yuan realm and maintain the Mandate of Heaven.       It should not be thought that Kublai set out to create an idealized utopia-  he was still Mongol Emperor after all, and the Mongols were only a small minority among tens of millions of Chinese. Kublai issued proclamations to keep Mongols and Chinese separate; the Chinese could not learn Mongolian or wear Mongolian clothing, and it was illegal to sell Mongolian horses to them. Marriage and intermingling were dissuaded. Most famously, Kublai organized a racial heirarchy to determine favours and certain rights. Obviously, Mongols were at the top of the hierarchy, followed by the semuren, referring to Central Asians, Muslims, various Turks and even Tangut. Below the semuren was the hanren, the northern Chinese and former denizens of the Jin Empire. Khitans and Jurchen were included among them. After 1279, another category was added, the nanren, the Southern Chinese of the late Song Dynasty. The cateogrization though was vague, subject to change and often ignored. Yet it underlined a key fact: despite all Kublai did to look like a Chinese monarch, neither he nor his successors would ever be Chinese, and that divide would not disappear after Kublai’s death. For those Mongols still in Mongolia though, Kublai certainly looked too much like a Chinese monarch for their tastes. This was not a dynamic that would promote the longevity of the Yuan Dynasty.       From 1260-1279, Kublai Khan’s reign was marked by numerous accomplishments, with the notable exception of the invasion of Japan in 1274, and of course, his loss of control over the western Khanates. He set about creating a new government structure to run his empire, utilizing talent from across Eurasia and rebuilding China after decades of war. For the first time since the collapse of the Tang Dynasty in 907, China was united under one ruler. But 1279 was to be, in many ways, the high water mark of his reign. The effort it took to manage the Yuan government was considerable, and needed tremendous personal energy on the part of the monarch to keep it running as effectively as possible. As age, health and personnal losses took the energy out of him, the 1280s ultimately marked a series of failures for Kublai, which we will explore in forthcoming episodes, so be sure to subscribe to our podcast for more. If you’d like to help us keep bringing you great content, please consider supporting us on patreon at www.patreon.com/Kingsandgenerals. This script was researched and written by our series historian, Jack Wilson. I’m your host David, and we’ll catch you on the next one. 

To coincide with the release of the Kings and Generals Biography video of the Mongol general Subutai, for our podcast we’ll present for your listening an extended version of that script, courtesy of our series historian writer. While Subutai is the most well known of all medieval Mongolian generals, the full extent of his career is rarely presented in a single document. With this episode, we’ll hopefully do just that for you; providing an idea of the vast scope of Subutai’s campaigns and his service to three generations of Chinggisids, providing along the way an idea of what made up this man’s personality, and some historiography on him. This version of the script will be accessible to read with full footnotes and sources on the academia.edu page of our series writer, Jack Wilson. I’m your host David, and this is Kings and Generals: Ages of Conquest.   Of all the generals of the Mongol Empire, none stand taller than Subutai, who led armies from China, across Iran, the Caucasus, Russia and into Eastern Europe. Yet, Subutai remains a murky figure, with difficult to access primary sources providing fertile ground for all manner of myths to grow instead. Utilizing the latest scholarship and medieval materials, we will paint for you a more accurate biography of one of history’s fiercest generals.         Perhaps the best place to start would be his name. Subutai, the most common form of his name on the internet, comes from the Chinese rendering of his name( 速不台 ). Numerous transliterations of his name exist, but perhaps the best approximation of the Mongolian is Sübe’etei. The common epithet attached to his name, Ba’atar, signifies bravery and is often translated as hero or knight.        Sübe’etei was born in northwestern Mongolia in 1175-1176, to the Uriyangqat Mongols. There has been modern confusion of the Uriyngqat Mongols, nomadic pastoralists in the Mongolian steppe, with the Turkic Uriyangqai of the forests north of Mongolia, reindeer herders who did not raise the vast herds sheep, goat or horses. This confusion has resulted in the common misconception today that Sübe’etei was a Tuvan. However, the 13th and 14th century sources clearly identify Sübe’etei as a man of the steppe, whose father herded sheep and their family having been in close contact with that of Chinggis Khan’s for five generations, a sublineage of the Mongol tribe to which Chinggis Khan belonged. Stephen Pow in his article with Jingjing Liao on Sübe’etei suggests part of the appeal to this belief of Sübe’etei as a ‘reindeer herder,’ is the irony in one of history’s greatest cavalry commanders being a man who did not learn to ride a horse until well into his adulthood.       Though specific details of Sübe’etei’s early life are lost to us, we can assume it mirrored that of other Mongolian children. He would have learned to ride a horse, shoot a bow, hunt and herd animals from a young age, the basic skills necessary for warfare on the steppe. In the politically chaotic period of late 12th century Mongolia, Sübe’etei and his family likely suffered from raids and predatory marauders. As a young boy, he found a role model in the form of a fellow Mongol named Temujin. Since the time of Sübe’etei’s great-great-grandfather Nerbi, their families had been close allies, and perhaps from Sübe’etei’s earliest days Temujin had appeared as the centre of Sübe’etei’s world. In the Secret History of the Mongols, around 1185 Temujin was elected as Khan of his Mongol lineage, the Borjigon. Per the Secret History’s account, Sübe’etei, perhaps little more than 10 years old, attended, accompanied by his older brother Ca’urqan and their older cousin, Jelme. In Sübe’etei’s most formative years, he attached himself to this rising warlord, whose family he would stay in loyal service to for the next six decades.       Sübe’etei’s role, if any, in the many trials of Temujin’s rise to power are unmentioned. At 14 years old he would have been enrolled into military service as a lightly armoured horse archer. It is not until 1203, when Sübe’etei was about 27, that we have the first described event of his life. That year, Temujin suffered a devastating setback, betrayed by his ally Toghrul, the Ong Khan of the Kereyit. Defeated in battle by Toghrul and Jamukha, another ally turned enemy, Temujin’s army was scattered and with a small force he fled to Lake Baljuna in eastern Mongolia. Slowly, his allies trickled in, one of whom was Sübe’etei’s father Qaban, driving a flock of sheep to Baljuna to feed Temujin’s hungry men. As described in the Yuan shi, Qaban was ambushed and captured by robbers. Sübe’etei and his brother Ca’urqan, not far beyond with the rest of the animals, followed the tracks of the robbers and ambushed them. Bringing down several robbers, the rest panicked and fled. Their father was rescued, and they brought the much-needed sheep to Temujin at Baljuna. Heartened by their loyalty and courage, he rewarded them; Ca’urqan was made a commander of 100, and Sübe’etei was enrolled into the keshig, the imperial bodyguard, as was common for younger brothers of unit commanders. Alongside physically protecting the Khan, the keshig also served as his closest servants, preparing his meals, protecting his herds and maintaining his belongings. The keshig also served as a training school for commanders, where the skills of leading armies, logistical needs and battle were advanced. It is here that Sübe’etei began his education as a general.       By 1206, Temujin had unified the tribes of Mongolia, taking the  title of  Chinggis Khan and declaring the Mongol Empire. Sübe’etei was among those rewarded for his service. It was not without sacrifice, as his older brother had died in the fighting against the Naiman in western Mongolia. With 95 others, in 1206 Sübe’etei was appointed to command a minggan, 1,000 men. His reputation as a ferocious warrior in the name of the Khan had already begun to be established, for at the sametime he was noted among Chinggis Khan’s Four Dogs of War: Jebe, Qubilai Noyan and Jelme Uha. Unlike Chinggis’s four Horses -Bo’orchu, Muqali, Boroqul, Cila’un Ba’atar- who were Chinggis Khan’s personal friends from his youth, the Four Dogs were among the deadliest men of the Khan’s arsenal. To paraphrase the Secret History of the Mongols, the Four Horses were the men at Chinggis’ side, while the Four Dogs were those charging wherever the Khan pointed. Brutal, daring, often cruel yet utterly loyal, the Four Dogs were Chinggis’ swords to wield against Asia. It was in this service that Sübe’etei would excel.       In the first Mongol invasions, against the Tangut Kingdom in 1209 and the Jin Dynasty in 1211, Sübe’etei’s mentions are sparse. In 1212 Sübe’etei was the first onto the walls of Huanzhou. He was richly rewarded for his role in taking the city, and for his courage he earned the title of Ba’atar. Jebe Noyan, with whom Sübe’etei was often partnered with, went on a long ranging campaign across the Jin Empire in 1213, through Manchuria and taking one of the Jin capitals, Tung-ching. It’s possible Sübe’etei accompanied him on their series of long marches, feigned retreats and sacked cities, but such is only speculation.       By 1216 Chinggis Khan was back in Mongolia, his armies having taken the Jin supreme capital of Zhongdu and left them on the backfoot. In Mongolia Chinggis had to deal with rebellions and foes who had survived the unification. One army under Boroqul was sent to subdue the forest peoples around Lake Baikal, who were in open revolt against Mongol rule; Jebe was sent to capture a fugitive Naiman prince who had usurped power in the Central Asian realm of the Qara-Khitai; Muqali was to command the armies fighting the Jin; and Sübe’etei was to accompany Chinggis’ eldest son Jochi far across the western steppes, in pursuit of Merkit tribes who had fled Mongolia and sought shelter with the Qipchap-Qangli east of the Caspian Sea. This was the Mongol Empire’s first great expansion west of the Altai Mountains. The precise dating and presence of Jochi on this western campaign has been debated by scholars, but we will follow the likeliest chronology proposed by historian Christopher Atwood. Before they set out on the long journey, the Secret History of the Mongols has Chinggis provide Sübe’etei an iron reinforced cart for the journey. This statement may perhaps be the partial origin for the myth that Sübe’etei was immensely overweight, and that no single horse could carry him, requiring instead specially made carts! No medieval source describes Sübe’etei’s weight in any capacity, but Stephen Pow noted that Rashid al-Din mentions of an elderly Uriyangqat who needed to be carried everywhere in a cart, as well as a grandson of Orda bin Jochi who was immensely obese and also required a cart to travel, for no horse could bear him. Possibly, such descriptions were confused with Sübe’etei, encouraged, Pow suggests, again by the “irony of a man [unable to] ride a horse becoming the nomadic cavalry’s greatest general.”       In two battles over late 1218 and early 1219, Sübe’etei and Jochi defeated the Merkit and their Qangli allies in what is now western Kazakhstan. On the long trek back across the steppe to Mongolia they made an unexpected meeting. The ruler of the vast Khwarezmian Empire, Muhammad II, intercepted the Mongols somewhere in central Kazakhstan.  Jochi and Sübe’etei informed Shah Muhammad they had no quarrel with him, that their task had been simply to deal with the Merkits. But Muhammad had come north looking for a fight, and the Mongols would have to do. Outnumbered, the Mongols made a good show of themselves, the right wings of both armies pushing back the opposing left. Both armies fought until darkness forced them apart. Lighting many fires to make it appear they were setting up camp, the Mongols slid away into the night. The Khwarezmians awoke the next morning to see the mysterious enemy had vanished. Horrified by the destruction wrought by this encounter in the field, Muhammad Khwarezm-shah seems to have developed a phobia of facing the Mongols in open battle.        Jochi and Sübe’etei returned to Chinggis late in summer 1219, in similar time to the arrival of news of the infamous Otrar Massacre. The Khwarezmian governor of Otrar, Shah Muhammad’s uncle, murdered a trade caravan sent by Chinggis Khan. It is unclear if the massacre took place with or without Muhammad’s support, but when Chinggis’ envoys arrived demanding punishment for the butchery, Muhammad had them executed. As Jebe had by then conquered the Qara-Khitai, the aggressive Khwarezmians were now direct neighbours of the Mongol Empire. Scarcely had Jebe, Jochi and Sübe’etei returned to Mongolia when they set out to invade the Khwarezmian Empire at the end of 1219.       The story of the Mongol invasion of Khwarezm is well told and does not require our attention here. Muhammad, seeking to avoid field battles relied on garrisons within city walls, believing the Mongols, as nomads, lackes sige capabilities. He was sorely mistaken. By spring 1220 the northern frontier of Khwarezm had collapsed. Muhammad fled deeper into his empire, and in pursuit Chinggis Khan unleashed his dogs of war: Jebe Noyan and Sübe’etei Ba’atar, supported by a third tumen under Chinggis’ son-in-law Toquchar.Across Khurasan and northern Iran sped Shah Muhammad. Jebe and Sübe’etei  followed. While Muhammad was their primary goal, as they went they took the submission of cities- those which resisted were marked for Toquchar to secure as he followed behind them until his death outside of Nishapur in November 1220. After Nishapur, Jebe and Sübe’etei split up to cover more ground. In Radkan, Sübe’etei was so pleased by the pleasant climate that he apparently avoided any bloodshed, appointed a Mongol governor and moved on. In Quchan, the Mongols committed great slaughter. In Mazandaran, Jebe captured Shah Muhammad’s mother and his harem, sending them back to Chinggis Khan.   Jebe and Sübe’etei reunited at Rayy, tracking Shah Muhammad to Hamadan. Sources differ on what exactly happened at Hamadan. Nasawi describes a battle near the city, ibn al-Athir has the Shah escape before they arrive and Juvaini wrote that the Mongols caught him on the road, wounding him with arrows before he escaped. No matter what occurred, after Hamadan Jebe and Sübe’etei lost his trail. Muhammad died a few weeks later, succumbing to pneumonia on an island in the Caspian Sea in December 1220.       Spending that winter in Azerbaijan’s Mughan Plain, Jebe and Sübe’etei spent the next two years pinballing across the Caucasus and northwestern Iran. Inflicting a devastating defeat on the Georgian King Giorgi Lasha in February 1221, by the summer they cut back to Persian ‘Iraq where cities they had previously taken were revolting. The Eldeguzid Atabegs of Azerbaijan wisely refused Georgian requests for an alliance and instead submitted to Jebe and Sübe’etei. By mid-1222, messengers had returned from Chinggis Khan, informing them that they could continue the conquest against the Qipchap tribes north of the Caucasus. Striking the enemy from unexpected directions was always a favourite ploy of Chinggis Khan, and the Qipchaq had already shown themselves to be enemies by allying with the Merkit and fighting for the Khwarezm-shah.       While passing north, Jebe and Sübe’etei took the city of Shamakhi, employing a particularly gruesome tactic. To mount the walls, corpses of locals and livestock were piled into a platform. For three days, the Mongols fought from it until it decomposed and collapsed. Such tactics had a use far greater than the individual siege, for they contributed to a dread reputation designed to discourage resistance. Upon exiting the Caucasus, Jebe and Sübe’etei were confronted by a much larger force of Alans and Qipchaqs, perhaps alerted to the Mongol approach by the Shah of Derbend. After a difficult journey through the mountains, Jebe and Sübe’etei were reluctant to fight against such odds. Sending messengers to the Qipchaq, they bribed them into abandoning the Alans. After overcoming the now isolated Alans, the Mongols then fell upon the unsuspecting Qipchaq, killing their most powerful leaders.       Under their leader Kotjen, the Qipchaq survivors fled west to the Rus’ Principalities. There, Kotjen organized an alliance between his son-in-law, Prince Mstislav the Bold of Galicia, and several other leading Rus’ princes. Modern retelling has often presented what follows, the famous Kalka River Battle, as Sübe’etei’s master stroke, perfectly drawing the Rus’ and Qipchap into a long distance feigned retreat. However, as historian Stephen Pow has recently argued, the primary sources suggest a much closer run thing. Often overlooked has been a small engagement in the lead up to the battle, where the Rus’ chronicles described a Mongol general Hamabek being caught and killed by the Rus’s Qipchaq allies. Pow argues that Hamabek is actually how the 13th century Rus’ interpreted Yama Beg, the Turkic form of Jebe’s name and that by which the Qipchaq knew him by. Bold and often leading from the front, Jebe’s recklessness evidently cost him his life, caught hiding in a kurgan and perhaps, embarrassingly, cut in half.        Jebe had been the commanding officer and something of a mentor to Sübe’etei. To suddenly lose him, thousands of kilometres away from any reinforcements and deep in enemy territory, meant Sübe’etei was thrust for the first time into independent command.  The famous nine day feigned retreat which followed may have therefore been an actual retreat. The Qipchap and Rus’ hotly pursued them, until Sübe’etei noticed the enemy had strung themselves out. At the Kalka River in May 1223, Sübe’etei turned about and brought the full weight of his army against the Qipchaps, who broke. Fleeing Qipchaps collided with the oncoming Rus’, breaking their formation as Mongol arrows rained upon them. The result was a massacre. Survivors held up on a nearby hill resisted briefly before being convinced to surrender by Sübe’etei. With guard and weapons let down, the Rus’ were slaughtered, their leaders captured and smothered under boards upon which the Mongols feasted and celebrated.       Sübe’etei had won a great victory, but was in no position for further conquest. While often presented as the great, undefeated conqueror, the Kalka Campaign had been only narrowly won. On the return journey, sometime in late 1223 or early 1224, Sübe’etei’s forces passed through the territory of the Volga Bulghars along the Volga and Kama Rivers. Laying ambushes for the Mongols had several places, the Bulghars drew the Mongols into feigned retreats, surrounding and killing many. Some modern writers of popular biographies, such as Frank McLynn and James Chambers, have Sübe’etei regroup his forces and inflict a defeat in turn upon the Bulghars. Such statements have no basis in the historical sources. The most detailed description of the encounter with the Bulghars is in the chronicle of ibn al-Athir, who describes the Mongols suffering heavy losses against the Bulghars, before moving on to campaign farther south along the Volga, attacking the Qipchaq settlement of Saqsin. Some authors may have conflated Saqsin as a location in Bulghar territory, or been misled by outdated works like those of  Abraham d’Ohsson and Rene Grousset, who presented the encounter much more favourably for Sübe’etei. The need to dismiss Sübe’etei’s defeat is necessary in order to uphold his popular image as the undefeated champion of Chinggis Khan. The most heavily utilized sources such as Juvaini and the Secret History of the Mongols provide no specific comments on, or outright ignore, the encounter with the Bulghars. In comparison, those who actually provide evidence for the encounter, such as ibn al-Athir and Friar Julian, remain much more difficult to access, allowing the exaggerated version of Sübe’etei’s record to often go about unchallenged.   We can also note another popular rumour relating to this campaign. It is sometimes claimed that Sübe’etei, while venturing into the Crimean peninsula in 1223, formed an alliance with local Ventian merchants there. The Mongols would attack representatives of Venice’s other Italian rival, Genoa, present in Crimea at the port of Sudaq, and provide exclusive trade privileges to the Venetians. In exchange, the Venetians would provide intelligence and maps for the Mongols in Europe, as well as spreading rumours of Mongol ferocity to sow dissent and fear. James Chamber’s The Devil's Horsemen forwards this, among many other false claims on Sübe’etei’s life. As historian Peter Jacskon has noted in his review of Chambers’ book, “Chambers has borrowed the whole idea from Bréhier’s L’église et l’Orient au moyen âge: it is derived ultimately from Cahun’s Introduction à l’histoire de l’Asie (1896), which has all the authority of a historical novel.” The actual Italian presence in Crimea in the early 13th century was minimal. The Mongol sack of Sudaq had nothing to do with Genoa, the major source describing the incursion, ibn al-Athir, signifies the city as a place where the Qipchaq came to sell their wares and slaves, making no mention of any Italians. Historian Denis Sinor describes Suqaq as an outpost of the empire of Trebizond, home to a mixed population of  Greeks and Armenians. Meanwhile A.C.S Peacock has argued that there is evidence that Sudaq, also known as Soldaia, at the time of the Mongol arrival to the Crimean peninsula was actually in the hands of the Seljuqs of Rum. Beyond the story of the Venetians bribing the Mongols into sacking Genoan rivals at Sudaq being false, there is simply no medieval evidence supporting any  alliance between Venice and the Mongol Empire, and appears to be in part a conflation of later Italian contacts among the Mongols, most notable in the form of Marco Polo. This was however, the acts of individual merchants, rather than the Venetian state.       While this campaign from Shah Muhammad’s death until Sübe’etei’s return to Mongolia is often termed the Great Raid, and described as if it was intended to just gain information on the west, this is a modern extrapolation. The contemporary sources describe it in terms no different than any other stage of the conquests. If a reconnaissance-in-force, then it was a great success; but if intended to seize the western steppe and subdue the Qipchap, it was a poorer showing, marred by the humiliating death of Jebe, heavy losses, a military defeat and no conquered land. The Secret History of the Mongols describes the entire campaign in a laconic line: “Sübe’etei Ba’atur had been put in a difficult situation by these peoples.” It would take well over a decade before the region saw a permanent Mongol presence, and Sübe’etei knew that in order to avenge Jebe and his own defeat, he would need to return in overwhelming force.        Upon his return to Chinggis Khan, Sübe’etei was in an imminent position. Despite his great trial in the west, he faithfully returned with loot for the Khan. Chinggis was preparing for the final campaign against the Tangut, but told Sübe’etei to visit his parents, who he had not seen in a decade. Sübe’etei simply responded, “If the emperor will be busy working and the vassal will be at rest, my heart will be in deep uneasiness.” The Khan’s loyal hound, Sübe’etei led in the conquest of the Tangut in 1226, cutting off the western half of the Tangut Kingdom, skirting along the south to subdue Uyghurs and other local tribes before striking the Tangut’s western border. There, he sacked numerous counties along the Tangut-Jin frontier in Gansu, ensuring no aid would come from that direction. 5,000 captured mares he sent to Chinggis Khan, and it was here that he learned of his master’s death in August 1227.       Chinggis Khan was the single most influential figure on Sübe’etei’s life, and in his memory he would continue to loyally serve his family. Attending the coronation of Chinggis’ son Ogedai as Khan in 1229, Sübe’etei was rewarded with an imperial princess as a wife. Soon after his enthronement, Ogedai resumed the war with the Jin Dynasty. A Mongol army commanded by Doqulqu was shockingly defeated at Dachangyuan in the first weeks of 1230 by the Jin general Pu’a and his “Loyal and Filial Army,” made up of captives and deserters from the Mongols. Ogedai lacked the authority of his father and the confidence of many of the generals, who thought his younger brother Tolui was the better captain. Such military defeats uneased the new Khan  and undermined his position. To offset this, in the last days of 1230 Ogedai led an army against the Jin accompanied by Tolui and Sübe’etei.        With the Jin Dynasty’s northern border protected by the Yellow River and its southern by the neutral Song Dynasty, access to Jin territory was through the mountains guarding Henan province’s west, a route blocked by the formidable Tongguan fort. Thre, the garrison wisely refused to be lured into a feigned retreat. Frustrated and not desiring to be stuck in a long and costly siege, Ogedai sent Sübe’etei to find a route through the hills south of the fort. Sübe’etei managed to force a smaller pass, cutting through and ransacking towns in western Henan. Through the hilly terrain his forces became spread out, and the Jin general Chenheshang with 1,000 men of the Loyal and Filial Army cornered and defeated Sübe’etei at Daohuigu 倒回谷. Suffering heavy losses of both men and horses, Sübe’etei  was forced to retreat back to a furious Ogedai. So enraged was Ogedai that he removed Sübe’etei from command, and nearly did Sübe’etei  disappear from history if Ogedai’s brother, Tolui, did not step in and vouch for him.        A new strategy was decided on, a triple pronged assault on all the Jin frontiers. Ogedai with the main army was to cross the Yellow River along its central stretch, another army would probe the eastern end while Tolui and Sübe’etei were to bypass Tongguan entirely, cutting south through Song territory to come behind Jin lines. Unable to diplomatically gain military access through Song lands, Tolui and Sübe’etei had to rush through potentially hostile territory. The result was unexpectedly successful. In the last weeks of 1231 they penetrated the Song frontiers, feeding men and horses in country untouched by the Mongol-Jin war. After a few weeks of plundering they cut north into the Jin lands. The main Jin generals, Pu’a and Hada, pulled back troops from Tongguan to catch Tolui and Sübe’etei, skirmishing over January 1232 until the Mongols were surrounded on Sanfeng Mountain that February. Pu’a sent a threat boasting that he would rape the Mongols’ women once he was done with them. When a snowstorm blew over the armies, Sübe’etei told Tolui to wait it out, telling him the Jin forces were weak people from cities who could not handle the elements, while the hardy Mongols would endure. After three days, deeming the Jin were suitably weakened, the Mongols charged down the hill and routed them.       As punishment for Pu’a’s boast, the Mongols sodomized the Jin prisoners. The captured general Hada asked for death, with his final wish to lay eyes on Sübe’etei. Perplexed when he heard of this, Sübe’etei came to see the captive Hada, telling him, “You will die momentarily. Why do you want to see me?” To which Hada replied, “Each of us vassals work for our respective masters. You are braver than other generals, and by nature you are a hero. Could that all really just be random chance? I have met you and now I shall die in peace.”       One they linked up with Ogedai’s army, Tolui and Ogedai returned north, leaving Sübe’etei as supreme commander against the Jin. With Jin offensive ability shattered, Sübe’etei invested their capital, Kaifeng. It took a year for the city to fall, in which time the Jin Emperor escaped and many losses were inflicted on the Mongols. When Sübe’etei alerted Ogedai to the city’s final surrender in early 1233, he was prepared to carry out the standard practice of massacre for the city’s prolonged resistance. In Sübe’etei’s mind, it was a well deserved punishment and one he was eager to carry out. But Ogedai was convinced by his Khitan adviser, Yelu Chucai, to spare the inhabitants. What followed is perhaps the most illustrative example of Sübe’etei’s worldview, as far as we can understand it. Sübe’etei was to limit killing to just members of the Jin imperial family, the Wanyan clan 完顏氏, and not harm the inhabitants. Having gone from being prepared to kill them all, Sübe’etei, whatever his personal thoughts on the matter, now carried out the Khan’s will to the greatest detail. Halting depredations of Kaifeng and its population, Sübe’etei allowed them to travel unhindered in search of food. Travel was permitted north of the Yellow River to organize food shipments for the beleaguered population, and Sübe’etei’s biographer in the Yuan shi goes as far as to say the people appreciated him for his efforts.       Sübe’etei led the final push against the Jin, ending their dynasty in early 1234. Back in Mongolia by 1235, Sübe’etei took part in the organization of his most well known endeavour:  the Great Western Campaign. Sübe’etei reached his apogee, the senior commander alongside the leading princes of the third generations of Chinggisids under Batu bin Jochi. With a great army, over 1236 they swallowed up the western steppe. The only organized Qipchaq resistance under their leader Bachman was swiftly crushed; the Volga Bulghars who had once ambushed Sübe’etei could do little as the great wave washed over them and destroyed their cities. One of the Mordvin principalities wisely submitted to Sübe’etei; the other foolishly offered a brief resistance. The divided Rus’ principalities were quickly picked off. The Mongols rested men and horses in the summer before resuming attacks in the winter when the frozen rivers were easily traversable. In this way, from 1237 to 1240 the Rus’ cities were burned. Few cities lasted as long as two weeks, though Mongol losses were incurred and part of the army under Guyuk and Mongke returned to Mongolia late in 1239.       By the start of 1241, Sübe’etei and Batu had brought the Mongol Empire to the edge of Europe, splitting their forces to take multiple routes through Poland, Hungary and Transylvania. Sübe’etei wanted to draw the Hungarian royal army onto ground of his choosing, forcing them to cross an exposed bridge over the Sajo River where on the far bank the treeline would hide flanking Mongol forces. King Bela IV foiled this by not crossing the bridge. The new plan was for Batu to force the bridge while Sübe’etei tried to cross downriver and outflank the Hungarians. Either impatient or Sübe’etei was behind schedule, Batu charged the bridge too early, resulting in heavy losses and the Mongols being repulsed. Angered with Sübe’etei’s failure to cross the river, a new plan was used; early on April 11th, the bridge guard was overcome by Mongol catapults. Crossing over the River, near the village of Mohi the Mongols encircled and destroyed the Hungarian royal army.       Despite the success, some Mongol princes were apprehensive of pressing on after the costly fighting. But Sübe’etei shamed them for their cowardice, telling them, “If my lord wishes to retreat, then retreat by yourself. Until I reach Bacha city on the Danube River, I will never return.” The loyal Dog of Chinggis Khan now had to whip his grandchildren into shape. So they pressed onwards, pushing as far as Austria until the Mongols began to withdraw at the end of March 1242. Finding their catapults and siege techniques ineffective against stout stone fortifications, Batu and Sübe’etei desired to step back and restrategize. The withdrawal from Hungary was methodical, campaigning as they went to reduce whoever survived the first pass.        Sübe’etei stayed with Batu up to the Volga River, where in late 1243 or 1244 Batu set up his permanent encampment. Sübe’etei scolded Batu for refusing to attend the quriltai in Mongolia to elect Ogedai’s successor, but before departing, Sübe’etei and Batu came to peace regarding the losses at the battle of Mohi. In time, Batu gave thanks to Sübe’etei, attributing to him the reason for their successes.       Sübe’etei was back in Mongolia by 1246 to meet the new Khan of Khans, Ogedai’s son Guyuk. Now aged 71, Sübe’etei was one of the few remaining individuals left who had personally known Chinggis Khan. The Franciscan Friar John de Plano Carpini, during his journey to Guyuk’s enthronement in 1246, mentions the elderly Sübe’etei, a figure of immense respect among the Mongols “known among them as ‘the knight.” Later that year, the venerable Sübe’etei went on his final campaign, a brief incursion against the Song Dynasty, as described by the Ilkhanid vizier Rashid al-Din. Yet, this campaign goes unmentioned in Chinese sources. Possibly, the elderly Sübe’etei was forced by age or illness to step back from the campaign before it could achieve anything.  Perhaps Guyuk’s death in early 1248 ended this campaign prematurely. Either way, we know Sübe’etei was back in Mongolia by 1248, for he died there later that year, somewhere along the Tula River, aged 73.  Sübe’etei, most famous of all Mongolian generals, was one of the few to die of old age.       Sübe’etei’s sons continued to serve as commanders, the most well known being Uriyangqadai, who accompanied them on the great western campaign, served with Kublai Khan against the Dali Kingdom, occupied Thang-long, modern Hanoi in Vietnam, and fought against the southern Song Dynasty. Uriyangqadai’s son Aju was another of Kublai Khan’s lead generals, who served alongside his father in Yunnan and northern Vietnam. After leading in the siege of the Song fortress-city of Xiangyang, Aju, longside Bayan of the Barrin, was the top Mongol commander in the final campaigns against the Song Dynasty. After the ferocity of Uriyangqadai and Aju, their descendants picked up the pen instead of the bow.  Aju’s son Bolianjidai was an administrator well known for his leniency, while his own son Tongtong was a scholar and academic, and from then the lineage of Sübe’etei disappears from us.       Utterly loyal to Chinggis Khan, perhaps no other commander in history could be said to have travelled so many kilometres. Depending on how one counts, Sübe’etei fought in over 50 battles and sieges against almost every major power of the thirteenth century, though despite some claims was not undefeated. Neither was he the sole strategist of the Mongols, and often his most effective campaigns were those where the planning had been in the hands of Chinggis Khan or Tolui. Sübe’etei had no care for administration, only in carrying out the Khan’s will against his enemies. Frustrated by Chinggis’ descendants, Sübe’etei still carried out their mandate with thoroughness and ferocity. To quote Stephen Pow in his email correspondence with this author, Sübe’etei “emerges from the surviving writings as very loyal to emperors, sardonic toward enemies, and ultimately loyal to Chinggis Khan’s yasa or vision in terms of carrying out missions, following orders even if they went against his own preference.  A bit of Cardinal Richelieu can perhaps be found in him – his only enemies were those of the state... and the state was the khan”.       We hope you’ve enjoyed our extended look at Sübe’etei’s life; you can find the written version of this script, featuring all the various sources and footnotes, on the academia.edu page of our series writer, Jack Wilson. If you’d like to help us continue bringing you great content, please consider supporting us on patreon at www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. I’m your host David, and we’ll catch you on the next one. 

Now that we’ve taken you through Hulegu’s campaigns during Mongke’s reign, it’s time we cut back east to Mongke himself, and the Mongol invasion of the Song Dynasty, the great and immensely wealthy masters of southern China. Among the largest and most thoroughly planned of Mongol campaigns, it was one cut suddenly short with drastic consequences for the Mongol Empire. I’m your host David, and this is Kings and Generals: Ages of Conquest.   Planning a war against the Song Dynasty was no easy task. All of Mongke’s actions of his reign from 1251-1258 can be understood as him making preparations for it: cataloguing the resources and manpower of the empire, strengthening the central government and securing his various flanks. Mongke had valuable experience to use to determine his strategy; since 1234, the Mongols had fought rounds of inconclusive warfare with the Song; penetrating deep into the Dynasty’s territory, routinely defeating armies and taking cities, yet never able to make substantial gains and frustrated by Song tenacity, all in an environment almost tailor made to hampher cavalry armies.   To understand the war with the Song, it’s  necessary to introduce the Dynasty and its ruling house of Zhao- but what a task that is! In its 300 year history the Song were among the most complex and fascinating of all of China’s imperial dynasties, a period when Chinese culture reached staggering new heights. To summarize it with any accuracy requires an entire podcast series to do so-  the Cambridge History of China managed to get it down to two volumes totalling over 2,000 pages. The Song emperors oversaw a period of amazing economic, technological, agricultural and cultural achievements. Urbanization increased; the southern Song capital of Linan, modern Hangzhou, had a population in the 13th century conservatively estimated at 1.5 million. Paper money, a massive expansion and improvement of farming and rice cultivation, foreign and overseas trade, gunpowder, porcelain… the list goes on and on for either innovations or improvements the Song undertook. The wealth of the Song was immense, and it is rightly considered a Golden Age.    The Song were a dominant force in China since the 960s, emerging in the decades after the fall of the powerful Tang Dynasty, a period of disunity called the 10 Kingdoms and 5 Dynasties.  Through great effort the Song swallowed up the other kingdoms of southern China and marched up into the north China plain, where they butted heads with the Khitan ruled Liao Dynasty. Rounds of warfare followed for the remainder of the 10th century, but a pattern which became all too routine emerged. The northern, largely cavalry based armies could outmaneuver and often annihilate the Song armies, whose offensive performance was poor even at their height. Yet the Khitans were frustrated by the defensive ability of the Song, and were unable to hold gains made against them- particularly when a giant Song crossbow speared the Khitan leader in 1005. Weeks later, the Song and Liao came to terms for the infamous Chanyuan Treaty, marking their borders and requiring the Song deliver a massive annual tribute of silk and silver to the Liao.   Part of the reason for the often criticized poor offensive military performance of the Song goes back to its founder, Zhao Kuangyin (kuang-yin), Taizu of Song. Zhao was a military man, as was his father and grandfather. Zhao owed much of his rise to the military- and also blamed it for the dissolution of the Tang Dynasty. Often, new Chinese dynasties structure themselves on what they perceived to be a key weakness of the preceding dynasty. To Zhao Kuangyin, the breakup of the Tang Dynasty came from military leaders and generals who grew too powerful, ignoring the imperial court to seek their own power, such as An Lushan in the 8th century. To Zhao, internal stability of the dynasty could only be secured with the military on a tight leash. Soon after consolidating power, the military leaders who had helped Zhao rise were eased into retirement and the army placed under permanent civilian command, the Bureau of Military Affairs. While often lambasted by later commentators, especially in the Youtube comments section, it wasn’t a horrible idea. The Song Dynasty was never beset by warlords seeking independence and still succeeded in seizing most of China. The fact the dynasty went up against some of the fiercest military powers of the medieval world could not have been predicted.   While an uneasy status quo was reached with the Khitans, in the early 12th century a major upheaval arose in the form of the Jurchen and the Jin Dynasty. In a few short years the Jin crushed the Liao; the Song allied with the Jin in an effort to seize Chinese territory and failed miserably. The alliance between Jin and Song hardly outlived the Liao Dynasty. In 1125 the Jurchens’ fearsome heavy cavalry tore through the Song; by the end of the 1120s the Song capital of Kaifeng was taken, the Song Emperor Qinzong,  whose father who had recently abdicated,  and most of the imperial family and court, were all captured. Northern China was taken,  the Song Dynasty was in turmoil and nearly collapsed. The ninth son of the abdicated emperor managed to flee south, and recentre the Dynasty around Linan, modern Hangzhou, a coastal city at the mouth of the Yangzi River. This much reduced dynasty is usually termed ‘the Southern Song,’ to distinguish from the ‘Northern,’ when it ruled most of China. Over the 1130s leadership issues among the Jurchen, difficulties campaigning in south China and renewed defensive vigour by the Song halted Jin expansion, and a treaty in 1141 marked the Huai River as the boundary between Jin and Song. The Treaty of Shaoxing reimposed similar annual tribute demands as that of the Chanyuan treaty, thousands upon thousands of taels of silver and bushels of silk to be delivered to the Jin, and the Song had to recognize the Jin Emperor as the Son of Heaven- traditionally reserved for only a single ruler of China. The treaty was a humiliation and economic burden, on top of having to lose northern China. The peace was tense, and every few decades war resumed between Jin and Song, with neither able to make gains beyond the Huai.    Relations were somewhat cordial from the 1160s to the end of the 1180s, during the long and stable reigns of Shizong of Jin and Xiaozong of Song, something of a golden age for both states, though neither abandoned their territorial claims. Their successors were not nearly as capable and lacked the will, ability or the interest to direct forces within their courts. In the early 1200s, as the Jin were distracted by the northern steppes and ecological disasters, Song revanchism reached a new height. Seeking to take advantage of perceived Jin weakness, the Song launched a surprise invasion in 1206:  before the end of the year, the Song were sending peace overtures to the Jin. Song forces were largely repulsed, the top military commander in Sichuan defected to the Jin, and the Jin counter attacked with a massive, nine pronged assault along the entirety of their 2000 kilometre long border. Despite this massive expenditure of manpower, the Jin made no gains, Peace was reached by 1208, the Song providing an increased annual tribute of 300,000 ounces of silver and bolts of silk, and heads of the ministers seen as responsible for promoting the war. Humiliating as it was, the Song at least did not have to make territorial concessions.    Perhaps the greatest consequence of that brief round of warfare was that it distracted the Jin and occupied its considerable resources from the trouble brewing on their northern frontier; the unification of the Mongol tribes under Chinggis Khan. In 1211, Chinggis Khan invaded the Jin Empire, as covered far back in episode seven. The initial Song reaction was somewhat mixed; no tears were shed in Linan for the suffering of the Jin, but whether this was something the Song should take advantage of was another matter. Either way, in the aftermath of the peace in 1208, for the next 25 years the Song court was largely dominated by the Chancellor Shih Mi-yuan, a man who urged stability and moderation rather than progress or reform. No risky military escapades would be undertaken on his watch.    The Song were unable to provide their annual tribute due to the fighting from 1211-1214. Many voices in the court loudly argued against continuing it all, for what was the use in sending it to a dying dynasty? Demonstrating his often indecisive policy making, Chancellor Shih Mi-Yuan did not actually stop the tribute, but held the allotted tribute in storage. He may have secretly resumed it in 1214, hoping to keep the peace with the Jin while avoiding angering more voices in the capital. The fact that even the Tangut and Korea had halted their payments to the Jin was not lost on Shih Mi-Yuan’s detractors. Neither was this appeasement even successful, for in spring 1217 the beleaguered Jurchen, having lost most of the northern half of their empire to the Mongols, attacked the Song. The intention was to restore both some dignity to the dynasty, and further space for the Jin court to flee from the Mongols if necessary. The result was not what they anticipated. Shih Mi-Yuan, while openly favouring the status quo and not mobilizing armies, had also ordered border defences improved and gave regional commanders greater autonomy with little interference from the central government. Song defensive forces responded quickly, and Jin offensives were not just actively repulsed, but in some cases led to successful Song campaigns into Jurchen territory. For the Jin it was a great shock, a blow to morale and resources at a time where they had little enough of either to spare. The Song and Shih Mi-yuan in particular had a new confidence against the Jin, spurning their envoys and in 1219, cutting off all diplomatic contacts with them.   About this time, in 1221, the Song sent their first diplomatic mission to the Mongols, notable in that it was recorded in a written account still accessible today, the Mengda beilu. The initial Song perceptions of the Mongols, as described in an excellent article by historian Chad Garcia, presents the Mongols as a ‘different kind of northerner.’ Contrasting them to the deceitful and malicious Jurchen of the Jin Dynasty, the Mongols are something of “noble savages;” honest, straightforward, physically strong if not attractive. Chinggis Khan is described in heroic characteristics fitting the archetypal Chinese emperor, with a large, broad forehead and long beard. No mention is made of them as especially terrifying or cruel.   As we’ve mentioned no shortage of times in the past, the absence of Chinggis Khan in the west against the Khwarezmian Empire and death of Mukhali, the commander in the Chinese theater in 1223, resulted in a great reduction of Mongol pressure on the region. The deaths of the Tangut, Jin and Song rulers over the following years allowed new voices to come to the fore. This is dealt with more fully in episode 14 of this series, but the result was a general ceasefire between them. While a brief respite, it was no more than a breath before the plunge; episode 14 also details the destruction of the Jin Empire in the early 1230s during the reign of Chinggis’ son and successor, Ogedai. Song Chancellor Shih Mi-yuan sought to stay out of the conflict and maintain Song neutrality- though the Mongols penetrated the Song border and raided in order to outmaneuver Jin forces, while also demanding an alliance against them. There was a minority of voices within the dynasty warning of the danger of the Mongols. Once the Jin no longer stood as a buffer between them, what then? Shih Mi-yuan may have been mindful of this, but was dead by autumn 1233. In the weeks before his death, as age reduced his presence in the court, the Song had agreed to assist the Mongols in the final attack on the Jin, reduced to a strip of  land along the Song northern border. The Mongols needed to ensure the Jin emperor, Aizong of Jin, could not flee into Song territory. In return for this aid, the Song were given vague promises of land to be restored.   In the first months of 1234 the Jurchen Jin Dynasty was destroyed, its last emperor killed fighting in the streets. Yet, the promises of land did not materialize; Kaifeng, once the capital of the Song Dynasty, still remained in Mongol hands. Angry and belligerent voices, particularly among those who had only fought rebels with no experience of the Mongol way of war, were particularly loud in their complaints on the matter. Seeking to restore what was ‘rightfully theirs,’ and anticipating the local Han Chinese population would gladly rise up to join them, several Song armies marched over the Huai river in the middle of 1234… and promptly found a desolated, war torn landscape, a population unable to feed these armies let alone take up arms. The Song armies began a disorganized retreat, which turned into a rout when Mongol forces returned. Foolishly, the Song had just begun a 45 year long war.   Ogedai Khaan sent armies under his sons Kochu and Koten to lead raid the Song. Generally, these were in two regions: along the central frontier on the Huai River, and more westerly in Sichuan. Sichuan, where we’ll spend much of the rest of the episode, was, before the permanent incorporation of Tibet, Xinjiang and Gansu, the westernmost part of China. Roughly a bowl surrounded by mountains cutting it off from the rest of China, the Sichuan basin juts up against the eastern reaches of Tibet. Fertile, is one of the most densely populated regions of China, the Yangzi river which flows through it providing ample moisture for rich cultivation of rice, and a route to connect with the rest of southern China. Hot, humid and famous for its thickly forested mountain slopes, Sichuan saw more than its share of it fighting in the coming decades.   In both 1235 and 1236, attacks were led upon the central border and Sichuan; Koten led a particularly large, multi-ethnic force into Sichuan in 1236. The damage was immense. By the end of the year, only 4 of Sichuan’s 58 prefectural capitals still stood and Chengdu, the regional capital, was taken. The sudden successes were soured with the death of Kochu in November 1236 and retreat of most of the forces. Attacks in the rest of the 1230s were repulsed, often by the star Song general of the period, Meng Gong.  Whether the Mongols actually wanted to fight the Song at the time is unclear- certainly in 1234, they were not planning on it. In 1238, they sent envoys to the Song for a ceasefire, which the Song rashly brushed off. Deliberately they were choosing not to hold cities. In 1241 Hanchou fell to a general massacre, followed by a sudden Mongol withdrawal. Such actions may have been a reaction to a necessity of fighting against the Southern Song. The Song had no lack of manpower to fall upon, and the trouble with any rapid assault was that it would need to be able to reliably hold onto any territory taken. Mongols could rapidly penetrate the border defenses, but the threat of being surrounded was quite real. At the very least, without sizable garrisons any city could be quickly retaken by Song forces when the Mongols moved on. The generally hot, humid weather of southern China strained the Mongols and their horses, disease spreading quickly among troops unused to the climate. The general preponderance of rivers, mountains and forest made large cavalry operations difficult to effectively operate. On top of all of this, while the Song are often derided for some sort of innate military ineffectiveness, the most pressing issue was the fierceness of the Song defenders. Resistance was strong, and it was not unusual for the Mongols to find a campaign suddenly held up by valiant defenders in one city, locking at least a portion of the Mongol army in place for months and, in some cases, years.   By the time of Ogedai’s death at the end of 1241, no major gains had been made, though the Song had suffered a good mauling. Little effort was made over the remainders of the 1240s, the Mongols dealing with the political issues relating to the regencies and short reign of Guyuk Khan. Diplomatic discussions took place in 1247, which went nowhere. The Song could in the meantime prepare border defences, repair walls and mobilize men, though at great cost. Printing yet more paper money to solve inflation did not, it turns out, do so. Taxes made it back to the capital in smaller and smaller amounts as regional governors and commanders seized them to pay for the war effort. Sichuan suffered so terribly that it apparently provided no revenue to the capital after 1234. For the Song, the yearly cost to simply keep their armies mobilized was immense. Drought, flooding, epidemics, fires and locusts struck often over the 1240s-50s, another layer of cost which, through augmenting the destruction of farmland from Mongol attacks, further strained government resources. An ever growing bureaucracy brought more corruption, more cost and more issues. The emperors of the thirteenth century showed less and less interest in governing, leaving an ever-more divided imperial court to run things. After the death of Shih Mi-yuan and the last of his followers in 1251, the Song court was hamstrung by fighting between eunuchs and bureaucrats vying for power. Despite their vast wealth, they were under immense pressure threatening to collapse the dynasty, just as Mongke Khaan prepared to hurl the weight of the Mongol Empire upon it.   Mongke knew the assault on the Song was an immense task. In 1252, sending his brother Hulegu to the far west to subdue the rest of the Islamic world, Mongke ordered his other brother Kublai to take another army against the Song. Rather than throw men at the well defended Song northern borders- a strategy so far ineffective- Mongke sent Kublai to subdue the independent kingdoms along the Song’s southwestern border in what is now China’s Yunnan province, where Song defences were much weaker.   Kublai had not yet commanded armies in person before this campaign, so Mongke provided him a guiding figure: Uriyangqadai, the son of the mighty Subutai. Setting out in late 1253 from forward bases in Gansu, the former territory of the Tangut, Kublai’s army marched in three columns; an eastern column under the Chinese defector Weng Dezhen, which marched through Sichuan, the main army under Kublai and the western column under Uriyangqadai, both marching hrough the eastern edges of Tibet. Tibet’s conquest by the Mongols is a bit of a shadowy thing, difficult to reconstruct due to only brief mentions in the sources. By the early 1250s, most of the Tibetan tribes were subdued or paying tribute to the Mongols, who had sent repeated armies into the region over the previous two decades. By the mid-1250s, Tibet was largely under Mongol authority, though it would need to be reimposed and strengthened later in the century.    Cutting through the mountains of Tibet, Kublai’s army fell upon the hills of Yunnan and the Kingdom of Dali. Founded in the 10th century, Dali controlled the valuable trade between the Song Dynasty and the kingdoms of  Guizhou, Tibet, Vietnam and the rest of Indochina. Relations with the Song were amicable, and Dali became the Song’s major supplier of horses with the loss of Northern China; but Dali was independent and somewhat isolated from the affairs of the Chinese. Central authority of the Dali kings had declined by the thirteenth century, their actual rule hardly extending beyond their capital, also called Dali. By the time of Kublai’s invasion in 1253, the Dali King was puppet for his chief minister, who had ordered the deaths of Mongol envoys. Dali’s army would be no match for the Mongol forces, even under an inexperienced commander like Kublai. Crossing a river on sheepskin rafts, Kublai’s army surprised and destroyed the main Dali army under the Chief Minister, who fled back to the capital. In the last days of 1253, Kublai’s three armies converged on Dali City. In Chinese sources, Kublai’s confucian teacher Yao Shu convinced Kublai to spare the city’s inhabitants, and in January 1254 Dali submitted to the Mongols. The victorious Kublai returned back to north China, where he was appointed administrator and got up to other problems, as detailed in episode 23.  Uriyangqadai was left to subdue the remaining local powers and prepare for the great assault on the Song, as well as recruit locals to serve in the army. He moved against the independent kingdoms of China’s modern Guizhou province, the intermediate area between Song and Dali. He returned briefly to Gansu in early 1257, but in his absence revolt broke out in Dali, bringing Uriyangqadai back into the region. His efforts eventually led him to ride into northern Vietnam, Dai Viet, called Annam in Chinese sources. His envoys were killed, and Uriyangqadai attacked the capital, Thang-long, modern day Hanoi. Thang-long was greatly damaged, the king forced to flee to an offshore island, and send a son as royal hostage to the Mongols as well as tribute. Dai Viet was now vassal of the Mongol Emperor.   Though the Yunnan-Guizhou region would not be fully pacified until the 1280s, it was secure enough to act as a staging ground for the assault on Song. With affairs in order and resources from across the empire pooled, Mongke felt confident to launch the final war on the Song. The total force was immense: as many as 600,000 in some sources to attack Song from several directions. Mongke gathered his forces in the Liupan mountains in 1258, not far from where his grandfather, Chinggis Khan, had died some thirty years prior. Mongke was to take his force against Sichuan; a second army under his cousin Taghachar, was to strike east from the Liupanshan to the Song metropolis of Xiangyang, which controlled access to the vital Song river routes; Kublai was to take a third force from north China to the central regions of the Yangzi river, focusing on the city of O-zhou, today’s Wuhan. The fourth army was under Uriyangqadai, who from Yunnan would hammer the Song from the west and link up with Kublai and Taghachar along the Yangzi.   The idea was twofold. By striking the Song along so many frontiers, they would be unable to converge against a single army, while the Song empire could be split in half. With the capital and administration based on the far eastern edge of the Song realm, the Mongols could isolate it and perhaps drive a mammoth wave of refugees to it.    In the Autumn of 1258, Mongke’s host descended upon Sichuan. 100,000 troops had recently been sent by the Song to reinforce it, but frustratingly little else had been done by the central government to help repair fortifications of that western region. During the march on Dali some five years prior, much of Sichuan was occupied, but the major population centres stood defiant. The Grand Khan himself was now taking the field against them. Sichuan’s capital, Chengdu, a population of almost one million, quickly fell and it’s plain was soon in Mongol hands.  Initial successes were significant, but as 1258 turned to 1259, Mongke found himself bogged down in sieges in eastern Sichuan. Outside of the plain of Sichuan, the province turns to rugged mountains and valleys. Recently constructed mountain tops fortresses proved difficult to take; Chongqing, one of the major cities along the Yangzi in the region, was turned into a network of fortresses. Defenders fought tooth and nail, knowing defeat meant slaughter for them and their families. Mongke’s problems grew as he sought to take Ho-chou. For five months, the city resisted his efforts,  heavy losses frustrating him. By June, rain became incessant. Humidity and the climate proved an effective weapon. Disease spread rapidly among the Mongols and their horses. Even troops levied from northern China were unused to it, and progress halted. Mongke fought the rest of the summer in the hills around Ho-chou, trying to keep up the army’s momentum. Precisely how things went in August is not agreed upon in the sources. Mongke seems to have been drinking heavily, perhaps recognizing the water spread foul diseases to his men. His judgement and reflex may have been impaired, perhaps his own fortitude suffering. The sources speak of an arrow from the defenders of a local fort, or a projectile launched from a catapult. Others, of cholera or dysentery brought on by the conditions. No matter what it was, on the 11th of August, 1259, Mongke Khaan was dead.   His army ground to a halt. Messages were sent to the other armies, and Mongke’s son Asutai quickly took his father’s body back to Mongolia for burial. According to Marco Polo, the army killed everyone they came across as they hauled his corpse. News spread quickly, the Song found new heart: the great Khaghan was dead! Taghachar Noyan’s army had already floundered outside the walls of Xiangyang. Kublai, delayed by his severe gout, had not yet even crossed the Yangzi River when he learned the news of his brother’s demise. Only Uriyangqadai had made progress, perhaps due to a greater number of locally raised troops from Dali suited to the climate. From Dali or Dai Viet, he had marched through the modern provinces of Guangxi and Hunan to reach Kublai on the Yangzi, allegedly fighting 13 battles, killing 400,000 Song soldiers and capturing several major generals.    On learning of Mongke’s death, Kublai continued to campaign for another two months, initially dismissing it simply as a rumour, then stating he had been ordered south by the Khaan, and it was his duty to carry out his will. Crossing the Yangzi, he succeeded in taking O-chou, modern Wuhan. Perhaps the desire to get something done on the campaign drove him, or perhaps a thought crossed his mind: he didn’t have much for a military reputation. Taking a major city like O-chou would alleviate that, and make him a better candidate for the leadership to succeed Mongke. Doubtless, he imagined it would be months before an election would be held, giving him ample time to score some victories for his resume.   Therefore, he was quite surprised when messages came from his wife, Chabi, in late November 1259, warning that Kublai’s youngest brother, Ariq Boke, was making moves to become Khaan. Ariq had been left as regent in Karakorum while his brothers were on campaign, and now looked to declare himself Khaan before the families had all assembled. For Kublai, this was an opportunity he could not afford to lose. Thus he departed Wuhuan in winter 1259, the Song, under their new chancellor Jia Sidao, warily watching the frontier and seeking to reclaim the lost territory. Little could they have predicted, but the age of the unified Mongol Empire had just ended. Providing no designated successor, Mongke’s death opened a vacuum, one which would tear every fracture within the empire to the surface.  Civil war across Eurasia was about to follow, and the Song were offered a brief respite from the Mongols.  Our next episodes look at the great civil wars of the Mongol Empire, so be sure to subscribe to our podcast for more. If you’d like to help us keep bringing you outstanding content, please consider supporting us on patreon at www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. I’m your host David, and we’ll catch you on the next one.

A desperate, starving crowd of thousands presses together, smothering each other in the narrow city streets; defenders clad it broken or hastily repaired lamellar armour hurry to and fro, responding to new alerts along the city walls; the constant thundering of stone slamming into the city walls; the loud cracks of bombs exploding, lobbed into houses by the enemy siege weapons and setting them alite. Screams, some ongoing and others cutting off suddenly, marking where a poor defender, foolish enough to stick his head over the ramparts, was struck by arrows. Outside the city, smoke billowed up enemy sieges machines set on fire by the defender. Beyond them, was the whinnying of tens of thousands of Mongol horses, with Chinese subjects and allies sharpening swords and preparing for the assault. Such was life in the nearly year-long siege of Kaifeng, capital of the Jin Empire and now the target of the Mongol war machine. Today, we look at the final collapse of the Jurchen ruled Jin Dynasty, ending the twenty year long Mongol conquest of Northern China. Victory here laid the groundwork for Mongol war with the masters of southern China, the Song Dynasty, setting the stage for a conflict which would eventually leave the Mongols the rulers of the Middle Kingdom. I’m your host David and this is Ages of Conquest: The Mongol Invasions!        We’ve covered the early stages of the Mongol-Jin war in previous episodes but to give a quick recap. Mongol armies under Chinggis Khan had invaded the Jin Empire in 1211. The Jin, ruled by the Jurchen, hailing from Manchuria and ancestors of the later Manchu, controlled China north of the Huai river and had enjoyed a fearsome military reputation, renowned for their heavy cavalry and horse archers. But after nearly a century of their rule, the semi-nomadic Jurchen in China had adopted Chinese culture and language, losing their formidable military edge. Jin armies were routinely swept away in the field by the Mongols, and those Jurchen and Khitans who still lived as nomads or semi-nomads were soon allied with Chinggis Khan. In 1215, the Emperor Xuanzong of Jin fled south of the Yellow River, abandoning the capital of Zhongdu, now modern Beijing, and cutting ties to his Manchurian homeland. Formerly hardy horsemen, the final emperors of the Jin Dynasty, though still ethnically Jurchen, were now little different from the Chinese. Their armies were now made up of Chinese infantry, having lost most of their access to horse producing regions. Defections from the Jin army early on in the war brought the Mongols knowledge of Chinese siege weapons, and soon the fortifications of northern China were reduced one by one.  When Chinggis Khan moved against the Khwarezmian Empire in 1219, the Jin were granted no respite, as the talented commander Mukhali was left to continue pressure on the Jin. Only Mukhali’s death in 1223 granted the Jin a brief rest, with Mongol attacks for the next few years becoming decidedly more limited.       The Jin had been in an unenviable position from 1215-1223. Mongol pressure in the north was unrelenting and of great concern, bringing the losses of hundreds of thousands of soldiers and civilians. In the west, the Tangut ruled Xi Xia, former Jin vassals, had submitted to the Mongols and joined them in attacking the Jin. In the east, the Shandong peninsula and surrounding coastline was lost to a local insurrection known as the Red Coats, an umbrella term for a collection of independent warlords, some of whom declared for the Mongols, some who declared for the Song Dynasty, and all hating the Jin. The Chinese Song Dynasty ruled almost all of China south of the Huai river,  and were a formidable economic power as well as being longtime foes of the Jin. Having lost their northern territories, and two emperors, to the Jurchen in the early 1100s, few tears were shed in the Song court for the Jin’s struggles. In 1217 the Jin invaded the Song- a shocking development considering their ongoing military issues, but one with the intention to essentially provide further room to retreat from the Mongols. Fighting continued until 1221, proving both indecisive and wasteful.       1223-1224 provided an unexpected change of events. Beginning with Mukhali’s death, we have the already noted reduction in Mongol pressure. Though Mukhali’s son and brother continued to campaign, it was without Tangut military support, as their forces had abandoned Mukhali in his final days. Furthermore, Chinggis Khan was still absent in Central Asia, though making his return. This was the first real breathing room northern China had experienced in well over a decade. In the first days of 1224, the Emperor Xuanzong of Jin died, succeeded by his third son Ningjiasu (Ning-ji-asu), known also by his chosen Chinese personal name, Wanyan Shouxi (Wan-yan Shou-shi), Wanyan being the royal clan of the Jurchen Jin.    25 years old on his ascension, Ningjiasu (Ning-ji-asu) was the closest the Jin came to a competent monarch since the death of Shizong of Jin in 1189. More evenhanded and thoughtful than Xuanzong (shuan-zong) of Jin, and more competent than the arrogant and inept Wei Shao Wang, had Ningjiasu taken the throne at any other time, he may have enjoyed a fine reputation. However, he was unable to arrest the collapse of his state, and would die only a few hours before the end of his dynasty. In life, rulers of Chinese-style dynasties are simply known as ‘the Emperor,’ and prior to the Ming Dynasty, would take era titles to delineate certain years of their reign. After their deaths, they are all given posthumous temple names, such as ‘Taizu’ for dynastic founders. Xuanzong of Jin was the posthumous title for Ningjiasa’s father, whose personal name had been Wudubu. Wudubu’s predecessor was so hated he was posthumously demoted from emperor to prince, and hence known as the Prince of Wei, or Wei Shao Wang. The posthumous temple name given to Ningjisau was Aizong, meaning, ‘pitiable ancestor.’ His Chinese personal name, Shouxu (Shou-szhu), was also turned into a pun by the Mongols, as it sounded similar to “little slave.”        Aizong of Jin, as we’ll call him had a promising start to his reign. Both the Tangut and Song emperors died in similar time, and Aizong quickly set about organizing peace between them, though no military cooperation came of this. Able to redistribute troops against the Mongols and Red Coats, the Jin also began to receive horses in trade from the Tangut. Seeking to inprove relations with the Mongols, on Chinggis Khan’s death Aizong even sent envoys bearing formal condolences to the Mongols, though they were turned away. Jin forces were able to reoccupy some territory and strengthen fortifications. As we mentioned earlier, Xuanzong of Jin had moved the capital from Zhongdu to Kaifeng in 1215. Though a foolhardy decision which brought Mongol armies back into China, it wasn’t strategically awful. Kaifeng, in the central Henan province, had been the capital of the Song Dynasty before captured by the Jurchen in the early 12th century. With massive walls, a large population and rich hinterland, the city itself was difficult to siege. Unlike Zhongdu, which was situated comparatively close to Mongolia, Kaifeng was sheltered behind the Yellow River, fordable only at select, and guarded, points. Any passage directly over the river could prove highly costly. The Mongols would thus be more inclined to ford the river further along its great bend towards the Ordos, allowing them to make an approach to the west of the city. This would bring them into mountainous territory in Shaanxi (Shaan-shi) province to Henan’s west, the passage between these provinces guarded by the fortress of Tongguan. Bordered by mountains and possessing a strong garrison, either Tongguan would have to be forced by a costly siege, or bypassed entirely by cutting south through the territory of the now neutral Song Dynasty. Indeed, this was advice Chinggis Khan was said to have given his sons on his deathbed. But since peace had now been reached between Jin and Song, it was impossible to say if they would allow Mongol troops through their country unimpeded.       Such was the problem Ogedai faced when he became Khan in 1229. Ogedai was not the military equal of his father or brothers, and to quiet questions of how fit he was to succeed his famous father, he needed to complete the conquest of the Jin. Growing bolder through the recapture of their cities, defeats of small Mongol parties and absence of any major offensives for some years, the Jin would be a test of worthiness for the new Khan. Weeks after becoming Khan, Ogedai sent an army against the Jin, perhaps to test the waters. A Mongol army of  8,000 under Doqulqu (do-khul-khu) entered Shaanxi (Shaan-shi) at the end of 1229, besieging Qingyangfu (Ching-yang-foo). After a failed Jin peace embassy, a relief force was raised under the commander Pu’a with a vanguard of the “Loyal and Filial Army.” Pu’a was a bit of a rapscallion who had led raids into Mongol occupied territory for several years, looting and carrying off captured horses and provisions, then withdrawing before Mongol forces could catch him. Through his habit of playing up minor skirmishes like they were great victories, he had earned a reputation for skill against the Mongols, though whether it was deserved was another matter. The ‘Loyal and Filial Army,’ which Pu’a had been associated with for years also had an unsavoury, though effective, reputation. Made up of deserters and captives from the Mongols it included northern Chinese, Uighurs, Naiman, Tanguts and the odd Qipchaq, these were mounted units specializing in Mongol tactics. Paid three times that of normal soldiers, to encourage defections from the diverse Mongol armies, by the 1230s this was a crack force of 7,000. Often undisciplined and unruly, they proved effective at plundering and were fine horse archers- one of Pu’a commanders, Chenheshang (Chen-hae-shang) commanded a 1,000 strong vanguard of these men.        At Dachangyuan (da-chang-yuan) in January-February 1230, Pu’a drew Doqulqu’s (Do-hool-hoo’s) force up for battle. Chenheshang led the Loyal and Filial Army as vanguard, and for the first time in the nearly 20 years of war, the Jin defeated the Mongols in open battle. After the battle, Pu’a released a captured Mongol envoy, and sent him to Ogedai with a simple message: “We’ve got all our soldiers and horses ready- come on over and fight!” Soon afterwards, Pu’a, Chanheshang and the general Hada defeated  a Mongol army investing Weizhou on the northern bank of the Yellow River in Henan.        Ogedai was furious and frightened. Doqolqu (do-khul-khu) was removed from command  and possibly poisoned. Pu’a’s boast, followed by actual Jin victories coupled with peace between Jin and Song, made the new Khan very nervous. Naysayers within his own court who whispered how the more militaristic Tolui, Ogedai’s younger brother, should have been Khan, saw this as signs of Heaven’s displeasure. Ogedai tried to quiet these whispers by saying this was like the candle flaring up before it goes out, while at the same time raising a large army to personally lead against the Jin. It should be noted that details of this campaign are often contradictory, with later authors hiding details due to the Mongol defeats suffered in the campaign. The reconstruction which will follow is based on the work of historian Dr. Christopher Atwood, and his fantastic article on Doqulqu’s death.        Ogedai set out in early 1231, praying for nine days to Eternal Blue Heaven for victory. His solution to the described defenses of the Jin- the wide and fast moving Yellow River guarding the north, the neutral Song border to the south and the fortress of Tongguan protecting the west, was to bring the full might of his army against Tongguan, to force it or bypass it.       Up to 100,000 men in Ogedai’s army, including his brother Tolui, the general Subutai freshly recalled from the western steppe, and Mongols, Khitans, Uighurs and subject Chinese, marched into Shaanxi province, already suffering from a severe famine. With such a large army and limited resource available, Ogedai needed to find a way through Tongguan quickly. The Jin commanders, Pu’a and Hada, pulled all their available troops out of Shaanxi before the Mongol advance in order to reinforce Tongguan, and it quickly became apparent that an assault on the fort would be costly and lengthy.    An attempt by Ogedai’s adopted brother Shigi Qutuqu (shi-gi hoo-too-hoo) to draw the Jin defenders into a feigned retreat resulted in heavy Mongol losses, the Jin refusing to leave the safety of their fortifications. Subutai for his part, was able to find a route through the hills south of Tongguan, and seemed likely to outflank the fort. However, his forces became spread too thin during the rough voyage, and a counterattack led by Chenheshang and 1,000 of the Loyal and Filial Troops defeated Subutai at Daohuigu (dao-hui-goo). Subutai and part of his force returned, humbled, to Ogedai, who was so furious he threatened to totally remove him from command, and was only restrained by Tolui. The Mongols withdrew from Tongguan, besieging the large city of Fenxiangfu. The city fell in May 1231, 400 catapults concentrating on one corner of the walls. Despite this victory, Ogedai’s mood was little improved, and lambasted his generals, saying “If Mukhali were alive, I would not have had to come here myself!”       Struggling to support the large army in famine stricken Shaanxi, Ogedai ordered a withdrawal to Inner Mongolia for summer 1231 and replan the assault. There, Tolui suggested a plan which their father had discussed in his final days, bypassing Tongguan by going through Song territory and arriving deep behind Jin defenses. Ogedai agreed, ordering Tolui and Subutai to take their tumens on this flanking maneuver. Meanwhile, Ogedai and the main army would attempt a crossing of the Yellow River, while a smaller force under Ochin Noyan was to try the end of the Yellow River in Shandong, guarding Ogedai from encirclement. The plan was for their armies to act as a giant pincer, striking Kaifeng from the north and southwest simultaneously, Tolui coming up behind enemy lines and preventing the Jin from marshalling all of their forces on a single army.         Nothing started off to plan. While Ogedai’s force was held up by a long siege at Hezhongfu (Hay-zhong-foo) in their effort to cross the Yellow River, early indications were that the Song would not cooperate with Tolui. At the start of 1231 the Song had killed Li Quan, the Mongol’s Red Coat ally in Shandong. Also, the envoy sent at the end of summer to request passage through Song territory had disappeared. Entering into the Song empire without their approval could mean Tolui would face resistance or an army. If Tolui was bogged down fighting Song troops, he would be unable to rendezvous with Ogedai, leaving his brother isolated. Much of Tolui’s army had been in famine stricken Shaanxi, or relocated to the barren Qinling mountains during summer 1231- lacking resources to feed perhaps 20-30,000 men, medieval authors speak of cannibalism occurring here. They could hardly eat the horses they needed for war, afterall. These starving men faced a difficult ride through hostile territory, beyond which  they needed to return to the Jin realm with strength and numbers to fight.            It is testament to Tolui’s military ability that he kept his men together through this hard ride through mountainous territory. Once they reached the Song border in November 1231, Tolui allowed his men a month of pillaging across Sichuan. This Song province was rich, fertile and untouched by the two decades of Mongol-Jin warfare, a chance for Tolui’s men to regain strength, morale and fatten their horses. It also showcased a noted weakness of the Song border defenses- Tolui’s troops travelled over 290 kilometres into Song territory before turning back. This was not the first occasion of Mongol-Song warfare: a brief clash had occurred in 1227 during the destruction of the Tangut Kingdom when Mongol forces attacking the western edge of the Jin empire had gone over the border and raided Song prefectures. The Chief Councillor of the Song Dynasty, Shih Mi-yuan, in power since 1208, was as cautious and pragmatic as he was unpopular in the empire, and he was very unpopular. Neither clash was enough for him to send Song Chinese to die at Mongol hands, and he didn’t let Tolui’s raid escalate into a full military response. Tolui was thus able to enter the southern flank of Jin ruled Henan province in January 1232.       The Jin were panicking now, and Pu’a and Hada rapidly withdrew the garrisons of Tongguan to catch Tolui. At Sanfeng mountain, Tolui and Subutai found themselves surrounded by multiple converging Jin forces under Pu’a and Hada. Pu’a sent a message to Tolui which, in the words of the Ilkhanid vizier Rashid al-Din, the Jin threatened to “do this and that to their women folk.” The actual message was certainly not so polite, and Tolui bristled at this. Surrounded, the Mongols were in a tough position. Aid came from an unexpected direction, as it suddenly began to snow forcefully, a blizzard mixed with hail. Subutai reminded Tolui that they were facing soft men from cities and small villages- the Mongols, used to harsh winters on the open steppe, put on their winter coats and waited on their horses. The Jin troops were unprepared for the early February storm, and for four days they froze and suffered. On the fourth day, deciding their enemy was suitably weakened, Tolui ordered the assault. Racing down the mountain side, the Mongols cut into the Jin and obliterated them, Pu’a and Hada both captured. As punishment for their threat to rape the Mongol women, we are told the Mongols sodomized the captured Jin troops, and made a huge mound of severed ears from the slain.    The defeat at Sanfang mountain and capture of their best generals marked the end of the Jin Dynasty’s offensive capabilities. Ogedai pushed through the northern defenses, and was soon reunited with his brother. Subutai was given overall command of the army while Ogedai and Tolui returned to Mongolia,  possibly because Ogedai had fallen quite ill.  In April 1232, Subutai began the siege of Kaifeng, a noose which took almost a year to tighten.   Ogedai  and Tolui returned to Mongolia. Precisely what occurred is unclear, but by the end of 1232 Tolui was dead. The ‘official’ verison in the Secret History of the Mongols had Ogedai fall deathly ill, and Tolui urges the spirits to take him instead, sacrificing himself for his brother- but mention of him drinking  a ‘special  brew’ prepared for him have fueled rumours that Ogedai in fact had his brother poisoned. The problem with this theory is that it relies too strongly on later antagonism between the heirs of Ogedai and Tolui. By all accounts the two brothers were extremely close, and later editing to what became the Secret History of the Mongols by Tolui’s sons may have chosen to portray their father more heroically, and by villianizing Ogedai, helped justify their eventual ascension to the throne. Other writers like Juvaini say Tolui drank himself to death. Since this was the fate Ogedai, and numerous other Mongolian princes, shared, this is rather likely. Ogedai Khaan lost his closest companion late in 1232, a loss from which he never recovered.   Back at Kaifeng, Subutai led a brutal siege. The city, so flooded with refugees that it held over 1 million people, was totally blockaded, starvation and pandemic setting in over the summer of 1232. Gunpowder weapons were used by both sides in the form of bombs lobbed by catapults, and in fire-lances by the Jin. Essentially a flame thrower, fire-lances shot a jet of fire three metres long, burning men to death horrifically and were used to effectively block breaches in the walls. You can see this in action in episode 10, season 1, of Netflix’s Marco Polo. Subutai tried various means to breach the walls of Kaifeng, but the city was skillfully defended. Sappers would approach the walls under mobile shelters, with the intention to physically dig through them. Jin defenders dropped bombs onto them, destroying both shelter and attackers. Dykes on the Yellow River were broken, flooding the plain and the city.    This resistance was valiant, but ultimately doomed. The Jin leadership was chaotic, with individuals promoted, then demoted and executed within days for perceived slights or on suspicion of treachery. Finally, in February 1233 Aizong of Jin abandoned the city with some loyal guards, leaving it to its fate. One commander left in Kaifeng, Cui Li (Tsui Li),  assassinated those still loyal to Aizong, leaving himself in control. Realizing the only way to spare the population was a voluntary surrender, on 29 May 1233 Cui Li (Tzui Li) opened the gates to Subutai. Ogedai was urged to mercy by the protests of his adviser Yelu Chucai, and Subutai was restricted to plundering, killing only 500 members of the royal Wanyan clan who were still in the city. Cui Li for his efforts was assassinated by another Jin officer, in response for an offense Cui Li had committed to the man’s wife.   By August 1233, Aizong of Jin and his ever decreasing retinue fled to Caizhou (Tsai-zhou), only 64  kilometres from the Song border. Aizong’s messages to the Song for aid, warning them they would be the next target of the Mongols, fell on deaf ears. The Song agreed to cooperate with the Mongols against the Jin, closing off Aizong’s route of escape. By November 1233, a Song army joined Subutai outside Caizhou. Caizhou was reduced to starvation, but its defenders fought tooth and nail, inflicting heavy casualties. But there could be no other end now.   As Mongol-Song forces filled in a nearby lake with bundles of reeds and sticks to gain access to the city in February 1234, Aizong declared he would not be remembered as the last Jin Emperor. He abdicated for a distant relation, a man in better shape who Aizong faintly hoped would escape and continue to resist. Barely had Aizong hanged himself and the new emperor been enthroned when the Mongols had broken through the walls. On the 9th of February, 1234, the final emperor of the Jin Dynasty died fighting in the streets alongside his men, having reigned only a few hours. So ended the Jurchen Jin Dynasty, controlling north China for a little over a century. Despite defections, defeats and numerous other setbacks, both Jurchen and Chinese alike showed loyalty to the Dynasty to the very end. Few other kingdoms had suffered the full might of the Mongols as the Jin had, and it was not an easy conquest. In 400 years, the descendants of the Jurchen, the Manchu, would come to rule both the Mongols and the Chinese, but that’s quite another story.   The Mongol-Song alliance barely outlasted the Jin. Subutai moved north with his armies not long afterwards, eager for discussions on where to take them next. The Song commander in the region, Meng Gung, withdrew as well, the devastated Henan province no place to keep an army fed. Aside from a few sites, most of the area, including Kaifeng, stayed in Mongol hands.    As we’ve noted earlier, Kaifeng had once been a capital of the Song Dynasty before it fell to the Jurchen. Long had voices in the Song clamoured to reclaim the north. Chief Councillor Shih Mi-yuan had kept these hawks in check during his long administration, but his death in late 1233 left a vacuum, one the feeble Emperor Lizong of Song could not fill. Those Song officials and commanders who had firsthand experience of conditions in the north and against the Mongols knew what a foolhardy thought a campaign there would be, and understood the limits of the Song army, an army which had never performed well offensively against either the Khitan Liao or Jurchen Jin. However, Song generals who had won battles against the Red Coats and had been uninvolved with the Caizhou campaign were ecstatic at news of the destruction of the Jin, and immediately urged war.    Assuming the local Chinese would happily rise up and supply them, two Song armies marched into Henan in summer 1234, walking into the undefended Kaifeng and Loyang, the birthplace of the founder of the Song Dynasty- and found a population hardly able to feed itself, let alone an entire army. So expectant of a gracious local population, the Song armies had brought provisions for only two weeks. Their men refused to advance further, and a retreat began… just as Mongol forces returned to deal with the incursion. The Song army at Loyang was ambushed and almost totally destroyed. For a campaign that had lasted barely a month, the Song had unwittingly began what was to be a 40 year long war resulting in the destruction of their own Dynasty.   Rather inconclusive Mongol-Song warfare continued for the rest of Ogedai’s reign- much of the Mongol armies freed up from the fall of the Jin were sent to conquer the far west. This early Mongol-Song conflict did cost the life of one of Ogedai’s sons and designated heir, Kochu, in 1236. This was perhaps the final blow to Ogedai’s interest in anything other than alcoholism, which consumed his final years even as his armies under Subutai blazed into Europe. But we’ll return to those years of Ogedai’s  reign in future episodes. Our next episode will discuss the  continued Mongol expansion into the Middle East in the 1230s, led by Chormaqun Noyan (chor-ma-huun Noyan) against the Khwarezmian prince Jalal al-Din Mingburnu, so be sure to subscribe to the Kings and Generals podcast and to continue helping us bring you more outstanding content, please visit our patreon at www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. Positive reviews on Apple Podcasts, Stitcher or any other podcast catcher of your choice are also greatly appreciated. Thank you for listening, I am your host David and we will catch you on the next one!

The party look for their missing contact Felix on the Kaifeng, a casino and resort ship the size of a large city. Naturally they almost ruin everything. Twice.Casino Arc Episode 2.Showrunners: Dylan, Kavin, Tom, Matt, and Malcolm Art by Dylan and inspired by MalcolmWatch our current campaign on Twitch (Saturdays at 9:00 PM EST): https://www.twitch.tv/saltnsorceryhttps://twitter.com/saltnsorcery for scheduling updates, news, and ways to contact us.---"Tyrant" by Kevin MacLeod (https://incompetech.com)License: CC BY (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)

Kaifeng Manuscript by Museum of the Bible

In our previous episode, we covered the whirlwind campaign of Chinggis Khan and his generals against the Jin Dynasty of North China from 1211-1215. Chinggis Khan’s empire had been baptised in the blood of the Jurchen state, and before the fall of the Jin capital to Mongol armies in 1215, Chinggis Khan returned to his homeland. A lesser conqueror would have sat proudly on his accomplishments then, having unified the Mongols and secured a lifetime’s worth of plunder from the Jin. But Chinggis Khan was no lesser conqueror. Never one to sit idle, even while his armies continued to fight in China he sent others to wipe away old enemies and uprisings and expand the economic reach of the Mongghol ulus. Unintentionally, these efforts set him on a collision course with the Khwarezmian Empire, which controlled a huge swath of territory from Transoxania in modern Central Asia to western Iran. Today, we will be looking at the uprising of the Siberian forest peoples, the fall of the Qara-Khitai, and the Otrar Massacre; the prelude to the Mongol Invasion of the Khwarezmian Empire. I’m your host David and this is the Ages of Conquest: A Kings and Generals Podcast. This is..the Mongol Conquests.       Before we delve into today’s episode, we must mention upfront that  the timeline of all of these events can be a bit messy. They all took place in a short period between 1215 and 1219 and in an area most westerners have very poor geographic knowledge of.  It is testament to Chinggis Khan’s army though, that he could have so many forces operating in different theaters over vast distances all at the same time, all of whom could succeed in their tasks and return to him triumphant. So let us begin!       Chinggis Khan crossed the Gobi desert to return to his homeland in July 1215, his first time north of the Gobi since 1211. The Jin Dynasty’s capital of Zhongdu, modern day Beijing, had fallen the month before, and he must have felt confident his presence would not be needed in that theatre for some time. In his absence, continued operations against the Jin Dynasty were led by his general Samuqa, who undertook a phenomenal circuit across the Jin realm, crossing the Yellow River and approaching their new capital at Kaifeng, darting around Jin armies and crushing those he could outmaneuver. The continued pressure kept the Jin from occupying their fallen settlements, and Chinggis could now deal with issues back at home. The danger from his length of absence was that more recently conquered peoples would find it a chance to reassert their independence- which is exactly what happened.       By 1216, unrest had spread among the forest tribes around Lake Baikal, north of Mongolia proper and only recently subjugated. It had been simmering for sometime with the Khan’s absence in China, but was set off by one of Chinggis’ lieutenants, Qorchi. Qorchi had joined Chinggis decades prior, and had ingratiated himself with the Khan with a vision of Chinggis’ future victory, and had been in turn promised at some point along the way, thirty wives. In 1216, Qorchi was finally allowed to ride north to claim them from the Tumed tribe near the southern reaches of Lake Baikal. Qorchi rode into the main camp of the Tumed and, quite gracefully [sarcasm], told them to deliver unto him thirty of their finest women. The Tumed were at that point ruled by their chief’s widow, a proud woman named Bodoqui Tarkhan. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Tumed were pretty pissed at this, and promptly captured Qorchi.        Chinggis Khan was not happy to learn of this, but hoping to avoid having to send an army deep into the Siberian forests, sent the loyal chief of another forest tribe, Quduqa Beki of the Oirat, to use diplomacy to garner Qorchi’s release. The soft touch proved no more successful, as Quduqa was captured. This was a real issue, as Quduqa was not just a chief, but also an imperial son-in-law, married to Chinggis and Borte’s second daughter, Chechiyegen (chech-i-yeg-en). It was time for armed retaliation. Chinggis summoned first the Noyan, Naya’a, who fell ill, and the duty then fell to Boroqul. One of the Khan’s ‘four steeds of war,’ an adopted son raised by Chinggis’  mother Hoelun, a high steward, cup-bearer, commander of a part of the Imperial Bodyguard, and a long time friend of the Khan, Boroqul was held in high esteem, and sending him showed how serious Chinggis took this matter. Boroqul marched north with a small army, intending to carry out the duty of his Khan. Entering Tumed territory in early 1217, Boroqul was perhaps a little too proud after the successful war against the Jin. If the mighty descendants of Wanyan Aguda had been humbled by Mongol archers, how could peoples of the Siberian forest hope to stand before them? Boroqul rode before the main army with two scouts, where he was ambushed and killed by the Tumed. With their commander lost, the Mongol army retreated.       Chinggis Khan was furious. A personal friend had been killed, a Mongol army was forced back- this was an affront he did not take lightly. Further, the rebellion spread. Other people of the forest were now in open revolt. The Kirghiz of the Yenisei River refused to provide troops, and the whole northern frontier of the empire threatened to break away. Chinggis Khan wished to lead an army himself to crush this insurrection, but was talked out of it by his close friend Bo’orchu, and a strategy was devised. In a great pincer movement, the commander Dorbei (dor-bei) Doqshin (dok-shin) was to be sent against the Tumed, while Chinggis’ eldest son Jochi was sent in a western army against the Kirghiz, preventing cooperation between the various peoples. The plan was a success. Dorbei Doqshin avoided the main routes that Boroqul had taken, cutting his own roads through the Siberian forests to surprise the Tumed at their main camp while they were in the middle of a feast. The victory was total, and the Tumed were subjugated. Quduqa Beki and Qorchi were freed, Quduqa taking the Tumed chieftainess Bodoqui Tarkhan as a wife while Qorchi got his 30 maidens. 100 Tumed were sacrificed for Boroqul’s spirit and many others were taken as slaves. Finally, Chinggis Khan took his dear friend Boroqul’s children to raise as part of the imperial household.        In the west, Jochi was also met with success. Assisted by Quduqa Beki and his Oirat, early 1218 saw Jochi subdue the remaining Oirat, Buryat, Tuvan and finally the Kirghiz. Controlling one of the northernmost grain producing regions along the Yenisei River, the Kirghiz were a formidable force and valuable to have as subjects. This region was to be Jochi’s patrimony, the seed from which the vast Golden Horde would later grow. This was just the opening move of a larger operation, however. While 1218 was the defeat of the hoi-yin irgen revolt, it was also the opening of the first western operation of the Mongols, and for this we must backtrack a small bit.       If you recall, with Chinggis Khan’s unification of the Mongols in 1206, there was a group of Naiman, under Kuchlug (whooch-loog), son of the late Tayang Khan, and Merkit, under their chief Toqto’a Beki, who fled west, making a stand on the Irtysh River in 1208 before being defeated and dispersed. Toqto’a, the long hated enemy of Chinggis who had captured his wife Borte in the 1180s, was killed there, and his sons took the remaining Merkit to the far west, while Kuchlug would make his way to the empire of the Qara-Khitai, in what is now eastern Kazakhstan and Northwestern China.        The remaining Merkit, under Toqto’a’s son Qodu, fled to the Qangli, the eastern branch of the vast Qipchaq-Cuman confederation. The Qipchaq-Cumans were a loosely connected grouping of Turkic tribes inhabiting the steppe from the borders of Hungary, to the open lands east of the former Aral Sea. Chances are, you know the Qipchaq-Cumans best for their battlemasks with the moustaches, or as enemies from the game Kingdom Come: Deliverance, set almost two centuries after the events we discuss here. With Jochi’s forces already acting in the west and subduing the Kirghiz, it was seen as a good time to not just strike back at the Merkit, but give Jochi a chance to prove his own strategic acumen.       We’ll briefly note that there is some confusion on the exact timing of this campaign against the Merkits, as some sources date it about a decade earlier, adding it onto that Irtysh River battle, or a bit later, adding it onto the great campaign against Khwarezm. But it has been convincingly argued by scholars today, such as Christopher Atwood, for a dating of 1218-1219, just after the hoi-yin irgen revolt and  before that Khwarezmian campaign. We’ll use this dating for this episode.        To the Mongols, other steppe nomads posed the greatest threat. Enemies in China would be tied down by their cities, but nomads could always withdraw and continue to pose a threat. The chance of them being unified under a charismatic leader,  like Chinggis himself had done with the Mongols, was a real danger, and their very existence as an independent steppe people challenged the growing sense of Mongol legitimacy as the masters of the peoples of the steppe. That they were harbouring Mongol enemies, from the much hated Merkit tribe, was tantamount to a declaration of war itself. With the return of much of the Mongol army from China, this was a fine time to crush the remaining Merkit, as well as Kuchlug in Qara-Khitai, which we will get to shortly.       This operation in 1217/1218 is also the first time  the famous Subutai held a major command, though it is unclear if Jochi or Subutai was the overall commander. Meeting up with the western vanguard, Toquchar, they marched across the steppe into what is now western Kazakhstan. On the Chem River, near the northeastern shore of the Caspian Sea, Jochi and Subutai caught and defeated the Merkit-Qangli force. According to a biography from the Ming era Yuan shih, the history of the Mongol Yuan Dynasty, Jochi and Subutai then pursued the fleeing Merkit-Qangli between the Ural and Volga Rivers, deep into Qipchaq territory, and destroyed the remainder. Qodu was killed, and his son or brother Qulqutan Mergen was captured.   Qulqutan Mergen deserves mention for the following anecdote, which highlights the relationship between Jochi and Chinggis Khan. As we’ve discussed, all Mongols were trained archers from childhood, but Qulqutan Mergen was considered highly skilled even among the skilled; indeed, ‘Mergen,’ means archer or shooter. In Robin Hood fashion, the captive Qulqutan sent arrows into a target, and then split those arrows in twain with his next shots, to Jochi’s delight. Jochi sent a messenger to Chinggis, asking them to spare Qulqutan’s life. Chinggis however, despised the Merkit, his long time foes, and had to deal with rumours that Jochi himself was a Merkit bastard. Chinggis’ response was, as recorded by Rashid al-Din was rather typical for the Khan:       “There is no tribe worse than the Merkit. We have fought so many battles with them and  suffered untold trouble and difficulties on account of them. Why should he be left alive to cause trouble again? I have stored up all these realms, armies and peoples for you: what need is there of him? For an enemy of the state there is no place better than the grave.”       Jochi duly did his duty and executed Qulqutan and his family, but this highlights the tension between Jochi and Chinggis which would emerge in the following years. It has been used to suggest Jochi was less sanguinary than his father, whereas this highlights a mantra Chinggis had become well acquainted with in his own youth: an enemy who is allowed to survive will only continue to be a danger in future. Had Chinggis’ own enemies taken note of that, then he would likely have perished long before.       Jochi and Subutai had a long journey back to Mongolia, but their return was interrupted by an unexpected encounter in early 1219, with a large army under the Khwarezm-shah, Muhammad II of the Anushtegenids (Anush-te-genids).  Based in the Khwarezm region just south of the Aral Sea, under the Shah Tekish, and his son Muhammad II, in the previous decades the empire had expanded dramatically with the collapse of the Seljuqs, the Ghurids and the Qara-Khitai.    Ruling the empire since 1200, Muhammad had shown himself to be an ambitious, though not always patient, man. Styling himself ‘the second Alexander the Great,’ in 1217 he had made a failed march on the Caliph in Baghdad, was gobbling up the former western territory of the Qara-Khitai and had an eye on the steppe, where much of his own military forces and family came from. In early 1219 he may have been seeking retribution for Qangli raids, or to go after the Merkit himself, when his army stumbled into that of Jochi and Subutai. Aware of Chinggis’ interests in trade with Khwarezm, the Mongols asked for free passage. Shah Muhammad, a vain man infront of a very large army and not trusting them, decidied to attack. Reluctantly, Jochi and Subutai lined up for battle. Greatly outnumbered, they fought fiercely, though Jochi was nearly killed.    With nightfall, the armies pulled back. The Mongols lit fires to make it appear they were resting for the night, then withdrew under cover of darkness. Morning broke, and the Shah looked out at an empty battlefield. This enemy had fought fiercely, much fiercer than he had anticipated, and inflicted great losses on his army. It was said that the Shah developed a phobia of sorts towards facing the Mongols in open battle, something which would have major consequences for our next episode.       Jochi and Subutai returned to Mongolia sometime in late summer 1219, coinciding with major news which also reached Chinggis. But we’ll pick up with them later, and move our attention now to the southeast, where other Mongols forces had been busy.        Kuchlug (whooch-loog), the Naiman prince we’ve mentioned several times already, fled to the empire of Qara-Khitai after the defeat on the Irtysh River in 1208. The Qara-Khitai was founded in the 1130s, by Khitans fleeing the fall of the Liao Dynasty to the Jurchen Jin Empire. One Khitan commander, Yelu Dashi, took the Khitan garrisons from Mongolia and entered Central Asia, where his well armoured Khitan cavalry proved decidedly deadly. He subdued the eastern Qarakhanids (tchara-khan-ids), then defeated the western Qarakhanids and the Seljuq Sultan Sanjar in 1141 on the Qatwan (tchat-wan) steppe, near Merv. The defeat was a major blow to the already fragmented Seljuq state, though Seljuq control in Iran would last another 50 years. In the aftermath, Yelu Dashi controlled an empire stretching across Central Asia, from the Tarim basin to Khurasan. The Anushtegenids (anush-te-genids) of Khwarezm, formerly Seljuq appointees, now became vassals of the Qara-Khitai, as Dashi’s empire was called by the Mongols, meaning ‘Black Khitans,’ or ‘black Cathay.’  The Qara-Khitai have a fascinating history,  but unfortunately, not one we have time to go into here. Buddhists, with Chinese dynastic trappings, their empire was decentralized, with many vassal kings subject to the gurkhan, the Khitan emperor. Two of their five emperors were women,  ruling an ethnically and religiously diverse realm, and for decades harboured dreams of retaking north China, though they stagnated under the long reign of Dashi’s grandson, the gurkhan Yelu Zhilugu. The Qara-Khitai had been overlords of the Naiman tribes, so after the Irtysh River defeat in 1208, the Qara-Khitai was a natural place for Kuchlug to flee. Zhilugu saw Kuchlug and his retinue as a useful ally against his own vassals, especially the troublesome Muhammad Khwarezm-shah. The gurkhan bestowed titles, favours and a daughter upon Kuchlug, who repaid this generosity by raiding the Qara-Khitai treasury during Zhilugu’s war against Muhammad.  After a series of back and forth attacks, including an incident where Zhilugu sacked his own capital after it barred his door to him, Kuchlug ambushed and captured the Gurkhan 1211, and held him captive until his death in 1213. Kuchlug seized power, but proved incapable to rule the complicated state. Muhammad Khwarezm-shah took much of the Qara-Khitai’s western territory and butted heads with Kuchlug, who challenged the Khwarezmian to personal combat. The Shah declined. Kuchlug, originally a Nestorian Christian, converted to a violent strain of Buddhism, and began persecuting Muslims within his territory, alienating the empire’s urban population. The Tarim Basin proved especially volatile, where Kuchlug nailed an imam to the doors of his own madrassa in Khotan, and his forces destroyed crops every year until starvation quieted them.        In the northeast, near the Mongolian border, Qara-Khitai vassals declared for Chinggis Khan. One such was Ozar, a Qarluq horse thief who had risen to control Almaliq, and on his declaration of loyalty, had been given one of Jochi’s daughters in marriage. Kuchlug besieged Almaliq in late 1215 and killed Ozar, though his widow succeeded in defending Almaliq and getting a messenger to Chinggis Khan on his return to Mongolia. The death of a vassal, especially a son-in-law, was something to always punish, and Kuchlug’s usurpation of Qara-Khitai was a real danger. So in late 1216 Chinggis sent his top general, Jebe Noyan, [Zev, Зэв], accompanied by the Uighur Idiqut Barchuk and Qarluq Khan Arslan, to deal with Kuchlug. The speed of the collapse of Kuchlug’s state was shocking. Securing Almaliq, Jebe pursued Kuchlug to the Qara-Khitai capital of Balasaghun. There Kuchlug was beaten, but escaped, and Jebe entered Balasaghun unopposed. With princes of the realm now declaring openly for Jebe, Kuchlug fled through the mountains into the Tarim Basin, where he was still despised.        Jebe’s forces followed suite, and upon entering the Tarim Basin, sent out a declaration of religious tolerance: whoever submitted to the Great Khan would have their freedom of worship respected, a rather marked change from Kuchlug’s policies. The region then erupted: wherever Kuchlug had garrisoned troops, the citizenry fell upon them. Kuchlug was chased from city to city, many barring their gates to him. Fleeing the Tarim Basin, he travelled through the Pamir Mountains, eventually making his way through rugged Badakhshan (bad-akh-shan) to the Wakhan (wa-han) Corridor in northern Afghanistan, where he was cornered by local hunters and handed over to Jebe. With Kuchlug’s severed head on a lance, Jebe paraded it through his territory and gained the submission of whichever cities still held out. Thus ended the Qara-Khitai, years of anarchy followed by a remarkably peaceful Mongol conquest. With hardly an arrow shot, Jebe had greatly expanded the Mongol Empire westwards, returning to Chinggis Khan in 1219 with 1,000 chestnut horses with white muzzles- the same colour as the horse Jebe had shot out from under him in 1202.       An unforeseen consequence of this conquest was that this brought the Mongol Empire to the borders of the Khwarezmian realm. Shah Muhammad had had his own ambitions to conquer Qara-Khitai and had succeeded in taking some of its western territory- only to suddenly have the remainder quickly fall to this rising power in the east, while encountering them on his northern borders.       Yet, conflict between the Mongols and the Khwarezmians was not yet inevitable.  In fact, Chinggis Khan wanted to avoid, at all costs, war with Khwarezm. The first Mongol-Khwarezmian contacts were an embassy sent out by the Khwarezm-shah in 1215, passing the ruins of Zhongdu. Chinggis was happy to generously gift them, a part of a general Mongol policy of overpaying merchants for their goods. With a surplus of silver ripped from North China, overpaying merchants was a fine way to encourage and direct trade in the difficult overland journeys, especially into Mongolia, and would be a hallmark of Mongol policy for the next century. Initial contacts seemed promising between the two states, and Chinggis sent a return embassy in 1218 to reaffirm trade and friendship. By then though, most of the Qara-Khitai realm, the bufferstate between the Khwarezmian and Mongol empires, had been ground down by the efforts of Shah Muhammad and Jebe.        Muhammad was perhaps eager to find fault in the embassy, led by Mahmud Khwarezmi, likely the same individual as Mahmud Yalavach, a significant figure under Ogedai Khan. The embassy’s message from Chinggis Khan said that the Khan considered the Shah on the same level as his dearest sons. The Shah was furious: how dare any man, even a great emperor, consider the Shah of Khwarezm a son, implying the superiority of the father?        After the initial meeting, the Shah continued to grill Mahmud Khwarezmi, who, as his name describes, was a native of Khwarezm. Mahmud managed to calm him down by telling him Chinggis’ armies were pitiful compared to the mighty forces of the Shah, and that the Khan was only interested in trade. Shah Muhammad was pacified, for now.       This embassy had been sent ahead of a larger, slow moving trade caravan, about 450 merchants and their attendants, carrying precious goods.  Sometime in late summer 1218, the caravan reached the city of Otrar on the northeastern frontier of the Khwarezmian Empire. Otrar was governed by Shah Muhammad’s uncle, Inalchuq, who, possibly on the orders of the Shah or his own vile initiative, accussed the merchants of being spies, seized their goods and finally executed them, only a single camel driver escaping. This was a shockingly short sighted decision. Even if Shah Muhammad didn’t directly order it, he did nothing to discourage it or punish Inalchuq for the act. One possibility, suggested by historian Dmitri Timokhin, was that it was ordered by the Shah’s domineering mother, Terken Khatun, Inalchuq’s sister. Terken Khatun, a strong willed woman of Qangli origin, often actively combated her son’s orders, and acted as monarch in her own right in the original Khwarezmian capital of Gurganj. Perhaps seeing war as inevitable with the Mongols, with their swift conquest of Qara-Khitai, she wished to force her son to act.       Whatever the reason, it may surprise you to learn that the Massacre of Otrar was not the direct casus belli for the Mongol invasion of Khwarezm. When that lone camel driver returned to Chinggis Khan with news of what had happened, he was mad, but had no desire to lead a full invasion of Khwarezm while the Jin were still unconquered, and the Khwarezmian army seemed fearsome enough on its own.  Trade with Khwarezm was of greater benefit than conquest, so Chinggis Khan, in early 1219, sent another embassy, led by a Muslim who had served Muhammad’s father and two Mongol notables. War would be averted and trade resumed, they told the Khwarezm-shah, if he only sent Inalchuq to Mongolia for punishment. As far as the Mongols were concerned, the massacre at Otrar was just the act of a shortsighted governor.       Muhammad was in an unenviable position: if he didn’t give up Inalchuq, war would come to Khwarezm.  If he did give up Inalchuq, he would antagonize the Qipchaq-Qangli officials in his empire loyal to his mother Terken Khatun, pitting much of the administration and military leadership against him and undermining his rule. Thus, Shah Muhammad II of Khwarezm sided with his mother and made the fateful decision to execute the Muslim envoy, breaking the cardinal rule of diplomacy with the Mongols: do not kill the envoys. The envoy’s Mongol accomplices had their beards singed off by Muhammad, and were sent back to Chinggis Khan.  They returned to him after Jochi and Subutai had come with news of their own encounter with the Khwarezm-shah, and the message seemed clear. A powerful foe in the west, who now bordered his empire, had made opening strikes against the Khan. Ignore it, and he would lose face while leaving his new western territory vulnerable to Muhammad’s armies. With his general Mukhali having been committed to the Jin realm and able to keep the pressure on them, his northern borders secure and remaining rivals to steppe legitimacy destroyed by Jochi, Subutai and Jebe, Chinggis Khan raised his armies, and unleashed hell upon Khwarezm Having explained the background to war between the Mongols and Khwarezm, you won’t want to miss our next discussion on the Mongol Invasion, so be sure to hit subscribe to the Kings and Generals podcast and to continue helping us bring you more outstanding content, please visit our patreon at www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. Thank you for listening, I am your host David and we will catch you on the next one!

Columns of Mongol rider, armed with bow, lance and mace, march through the dark defiles and narrow valleys of the Yan mountains, a confined route for warriors used to the open steppe. Here, the valleys were marked by towns and villages in close proximity, a track for their army to follow, falling upon terrified settlements whose newly collected harvests now fed hungry Mongols. After days of this claustrophobic territory, of surprising and outwitting the garrisons of the forts blocking their path, the mountains suddenly gave way, opening up to the Northern Chinese Plain: low, open country, marked by the great Yellow River, farmland and the capital of the mighty Jin Empire: Zhongdu, modern day Beijing. Northern China was now open to the Mongol horde, and the Mongol conquests were about to begin in earnest. I’m your host David and welcome to Ages of Conquest: a Kings and Generals Podcast.  This is the Mongol Conquests.   After returning from the Tangut Kingdom in early 1210, and shortly thereafter disrespecting the envoys of the new Jin Emperor, Wei Shao Wang, Chinggis Khan began his preparations, reviewing his forces and gathering intelligence. Alongside Muslim, Uighur and Ongguds  merchants and travelers who brought him information on the Jin, a few Khitan and Chinese officials had already defected to Chinggis, bringing him detailed intelligence and urging an attack. Though still mighty, the 13th century had not been kind to the Jin Dynasty. The 1190s saw a huge flood of the Yellow River, so severe it changed its course; once entering the ocean north of the Shandong peninsula, it now spilled to the south, a drastic shift which displaced entire villages, destroyed cropland and sowed discontent. War with the Song Dynasty from 1206-1208 drained Jin finances, and inflation caused the paper currency of the Jin to be near worthless.  The Jin armies, though large and their horsemen still fierce, were past their prime, many having become quite sinicized and lost the biting edge of their grandfathers. The time was as good as any for an assault upon the Altan Khan, the Golden Khan, as the Mongols called the Jin Emperors.    At the start of 1211, the Qarluqs (Kar-luk) of Almaliq (alma-lik) and Qayaliq (kaya-lik) submitted to Chinggis Khan, providing their own Turkic horsemen as auxiliaries. Chinggis positioned his son-in-law, Toquchar, in the west of Mongolia, doubtless with Qarluq forces, to act as a guard against roaming tribes or the Naiman prince Kuchlug (whooch-loog), who usurped power in Qara-Khitai that year. Feeling himself secure and that he had the favour of Eternal Blue Heaven, Chinggis Khan was ready. He marched south early in the spring of 1211 with as many men as he could muster, around 100,000 split into two armies, one commanded by himself, the other by his three oldest sons, Jochi ( Джучи, Зүчи, Züchi) Chagatai (Цагадай) and Ogedai (Өгэдэй). By May 1211, they had crossed the Gobi desert, entering what is now modern Inner Mongolia, the band of steppe between the Gobi and the Yanshan mountains which shield north China.    You may be anticipating the Mongols cinematically bursting through the Great Wall of China, or the popular internet variation wherein the Mongols ‘just went around it.’ But the Great Wall of China as it exists today was built by the Ming Dynasty in the 15th and 16th centuries, well after Chinggis’ invasion. There had been sections of walls built prior, most notably in the Qin and Han dynasties a millenium prior, but the 1000 odd years between the Han and the Ming saw only sporadic building, generally of rammed or stamped earth, which erodes comparatively quickly over time in unmaintained. The Jin Dynasty in the late 12th century had ordered the creation of several dozen kilometres of wall built in Inner Mongolia, a ditch before a rammed earth wall, marked by gates and a few forts. The base of this is still extant, a long, low, grass covered ridge which today doesn’t even block the wanderings of sheep. This wall was manned by whichever people inhabited the local area, largely from the Onggud tribe, a Turkic Nestorian people who had been on friendly terms with Chinggis Khan since 1204. The Naiman Khan had tried to urge them to attack Chinggis’ southern flank, which they refused, alerting the Mongol Khan to the scheme.    When Chinggis Khan arrived, the Onggud wisely opened the gates and submitted voluntarily to him: it was a fair assumption he may have forced his way through them had they refused. Rather than conquer the Great Wall, or go around it, we might better say that it was  opened to him. For their part, the Mongols treated the Onggud well, and a daughter of Chinggis Khan married into their ruling family- she would effectively rule the Onggud in her own right, the direct representative of Chinggis Khan. The Mongols spent the summer in Onggud territory, resting, fattening their horses on the local pasture, and taking the few Jin towns in the region- the first to fall was Fu-zhou, stormed after a brief resistance in late August 1211.       The Jin Emperor, Wei Shao Wang, was bolted awake by the news of the Mongol arrival on his doorstep. To his credit, he did not sit idle-  two large armies were mobilized and sent to the most likely route. Dividing the Northern Chinese plain from the steppe was the Yan Mountains, relatively low mountains with numerous towns and villages nestled in its many valleys. The primary defile which provides access from the steppe through the northern side of these mountains is the Yehuling, the Wild Fox Ridge, just south of Fu-zhou.    The army led by Chinggis’ sons was making its way into the Ordos to the west, but Chinggis himself was certainly to try passing through Yehuling (ye-hu-ling), a route which would lead him only a few days away from the Jin’s central capital of Zhongdu. It was here, the Jin leadership rightly supposed, that the determining battle should be fought with as much might as possible; kill the Khan, and the princes would certainly withdraw.  As Chinggis stormed Fu-zhou, a major force of crack Jurchen and Khitan cavalry, supported by Chinese infantry, all under the Jurchen commander Hushahu (hoosh-a-hu), was sent to Yehuling (ye-hu-ling). Hushahu was an unpopular, arrogant individual but influential with the Emperor, and had shown himself a cunning figure during the war against the Song Dynasty. Just a small note here; Hushahu is known by a dozen variations of Heshihlie Jiujun Hushahu (hesh-ee-hlee djioo-jun hoosh-a-hu), with some sources just calling by one of these names. Hushahu is the easiest to say, so we’ll stick with it here.   Supporting Hushahu was a smaller force under Wanyen Ho-Sha, who was sent ahead to repair the fort of Wo-shao-pao, between Fu-zhou and the entrance to the Yehuling. Together, this was a massive mobilization, given in the sources as anywhere from 300,000-500,00 men- though a good many of these were probably labourers, who would be tasked with digging ditches and building defenses along the passage.       Before the Wu-sha-pao fortifications could be completed, Chinggis sent his commander Jebe (Зэв) to surprise this smaller army in August shortly before the fall of Fu-zhou. Ho-sha escaped with much of his army, making his way to Huihebao, a fort south of the Yehuling, all before Hushahu could even reach Yehuling. Once within the defile, Hushahu set up at the narrow point within the Yehuling known as Huanerzui (Huan-er-zui), the Badger’s Mouth Pass. Here,his labourers were put to work, digging ditches and defences. His Khitan scouts informed him of the fall of Fu-zhou, and that the Mongols seemed occupied with looting the city, but Hushahu declined advice to immediately attack them. Wary of Mongol cavalry in the open field, he was hoping to use the narrow Huanerzui to protect his flanks.    A Khitan officer who had previously been sent as embassy to Chinggis Khan, Shimo Ming’an, was sent to speak to the Khan, officially to reprimand him for his actions but intended to gather intelligence and stall for time. Ming’an, a proud Khitan who admired the Mongol Khan, promptly defected and told Chinggis of Hushahu’s battle plans.  Alarmed, Chinggis’ scouts confirmed his statements.    The Jin had sent a great army to crush the invasion in one fell swoop, and Chinggis had only a part of the total Mongol force, his sons still in the west. Ming’an’s information, and Hushahu’s caution was to the Khan’s advantage. As one, the Mongols  moved into Yehuling, approaching the Jin army at Huanerzui. Jin scouts informed Hushahu of Chinggis’ sudden advance, and the Jurchen general ordered his huge army into position- wings of Jurchen and Khitan heavy cavalry and horse archers in the front, supported by a large group of Chinese infantry and the labourers who had started the fortifications. In the narrow defile, Hushahu’s army was tightly packed, unable to maneuver or envelop the smaller Mongol army.       Mongol archers got to work first, sending volleys of deadly arrows into the thick rows of Jin warriors, who had nowhere to move under the hail. One of Chinggis’ commanders, the tireless Mukhali ( Мухулай) saw opportunity, and his lancers led the first charge into the injured enemy- Chinggis followed with the imperial bodyguard, the Keshig. The Jurchen and Khitan horsemen buckled, and fell back, right into the dense rows of Chinese infantry behind them, who were trampled and crushed under the panicking horsemen. Discipline and command broke down, and the army disintegrated in the confusion, the Mongols cutting through them like a hot chainsaw through butter. As they ran, the Mongols pursued: bodies lined the road for kilometres, and the Secret History of the Mongols repeatedly described the fallen ‘heaped like rotten logs.’ Hushahu and Ho-sha met up at Huihebao (hwee-he-bao) fort several kilometres south, and put up another stand, only to be overwhelmed by the end of the day.        Huanerzui was long remembered by the Mongols as their greatest victory. Ten years later, a Taoist monk travelling through the region to meet with Chinggis Khan passed through and found bones still piled high throughout. Perhaps the finest warriors of the Jin fell that day, and the chance to nip the Mongol conquest in the bud had been ripped bloodily from their hands.       Hushahu fled to Zhongdu with nothing but bedraggled, bloody remnants of his great army. Mongol forces were briefly halted by the fortified pass of Juyongguan (joo-yong-guan), which guarded the narrow, 18 kilometre long Guangou Valley, the final barrier before entry into the North China plain, some 53 kilometres north of Zhongdu. During the Ming Dynasty, the famous Badaling section of the Great Wall was built at the north end of this valley. Badaling is the most popular tourist site of the entire wall, due to its preservation and proximity to Beijing. Indeed, it was this proximity to the capital that made it such a strategic pass, the final chokepoint before the open space of the Chinese plains. Therefore, even in the 13th century Juyongguan (joo-yong-guan) was strongly fortified with a large garrison, and the Mongols lacked any weapons to force it. So, Jebe Noyan fled before its impenetrable gate, and the defenders, eager to avenge their fallen comrades, sallied out to pursue. 30 kilometres from Juyongguan, Jebe (Zev) turned about and destroyed them. The mighty Juyongguan surrendered shortly thereafter.       By the end of October 1211, Chinggis Khan was on the North China Plain, and all hell was let loose. Chinggis made a brief effort to besiege Zhongdu itself, but this great city was far too well defended, its walls defiant and unbreachable. Leaving a force to blockade Zhongdu, Chinggis sent his armies to ravage across the plain. One army captured the imperial horse herds, depriving the Jin of much of their cavalry.  From the Jin’s western capital, Xijingto (Shi-jin-to)their eastern capital, Dongjing (dong-jing) in Manchuria, those are modern Datong and Liaoyang respectively, Mongols armies pillaged and raided. Dongjing fell to Jebe Noyan through another expertly executed feigned retreat, while Xijing stood firm against the Mongols.       Mongol armies withdrew back to Onggud territory in February 1212, loot and animals in tow, eager to give horses and riders a well deserved rest. The border passes they had fought so hard for were, somewhat surprisingly, left unoccupied. Why the Mongols chose not to garrison them is unclear- some suggest Chinggis had no ambitions beyond that initial raid, while others note that with the Mongols’ lack of administrative experience, attempting to hold territory at this point was foolish with the Jin still strong. The Jin, meanwhile, were left bloodied but still unbroken. The defeats at Huanerzui (Huan-er-zui) were horrific for the Jin, decimating their prized cavalry, but reinforcement Jurchen were called upon from Manchuria. Wei Shao Wang appointed Hushahu as Deputy Military Commander of the Empire and sent him to reoccupy the border forts, Juyongguan (joo-yong-guan) in particular.    Suspicious that the Khitan population of Manchuria may align themselves with the Mongols, Jurchen colonists were sent amongst them, an act which ironically prompted the large Khitan revolt the Jin so feared. Led by Yelu Liuge (ye-lu liu-ge), within a few months he had not only submitted to Chinggis Khan, but also declared a new Liao dynasty with himself as king. The Tangut began to raid the Jin’s western frontier, the Song ended their tribute payments to the Jin, and famine began to break out in several provinces.  To top it off, the Mongols returned in autumn 1212 after resting their horses for the summer, but this campaign was cut short when Chinggis was injured by an arrow to the leg at Xijing, and forced to withdraw.        Famine, Tangut attacks and insurrection did not abate, and only continued to spread in 1213. In July or August of that year, a healed Chinggis Khan returned to Jin China. In the valleys south of Yehuling, towns and settlements fell or surrendered with alarming speed. On the road towards Juyongguan, at modern Huai-lai, Chinggis was met by a large army under the commander Zhuhu Gaoqi. Supposedly a force of 100,000, in the narrow valley they had no room to maneuver and were crushed by the Mongols. The survivors fled to the refortified Juyongguan, where the ground for almost 50 kilometres was said to be covered by caltrops. For a month, Chinggis waited before the fort, trying to lure the garrison out. Finally he withdrew and wisely, the garrison stayed in the fort. A small Mongol force was left to watch the northern mouth, while Jebe was sent through the hills, finally coming out south below the Juyongguan, where the fortifications had not been improved. Surprising the garrison, its Khitan commander panicked and surrendered, and by the end of October 1213, the road to Zhongdu was once more open.    Things had developed rapidly in Zhongdu in the meantime. Hushahu had been ordered to remain in the city to defend it, though had spent the weeks before the Mongol return in 1213 hunting. When the Mongols returned to Juyongguan in September, a messenger had arrived from Wei Shao Wang to reprimand Hushahu for inactivity, but the panicked general killed the messenger. Now forced to act, he made his way to Zhongdu, overwhelmed the palace guards, captured and executed the emperor. He appointed Wei Shao Wang’s nephew, the 50 year old Wudubu, as Emperor, expecting him to be submissive. Hushahu’s arrogance and disrespect to the new emperor made him no allies in the court. He succeeded in defeating two Mongol raiding parties outside the walls in November, but fell ill. In Hushahu’s absence, Zhuhu Gaoqi was ordered to repulse the Mongols, on pain of death should he fail. Gaoqi failed, and hurried back to the palace before Hushahu could learn of it. Hushahu was captured and decapitated by Gaoqi, who was pardoned by Wudubu and made Vice-Commander of the Empire.    The course of this political upheaval left the Jin leadership paralyzed for two valuable months as the Mongols broke through Juyongguan. With the Mongol army before Zhongdu, the new emperor sent Chinggis a peace offering in December 1213. Recognizing the weakness of the Jin, Chinggis left a small force to blockade the Jin, and then unleashed a massive onslaught across the north China plain, a three pronged assault across the whole of Hebei province, into Shanxi and western Shandong. “Everywhere north of the Yellow River there could be seen dust and smoke and the sound of drums rose to Heaven,” was how one Chinese writer described the offensive. Almost 100 towns fell to the Mongols, farmland was destroyed, and the Mongol reputation for both invincibility, and cruelty, blossomed. The Jin had been hamstrung, unable to retaliate. By February 1214, Mongol forces were converging on Zhongdu.       While the Mongols had shown frightening success in the field and against less fortified settlements, Zhongdu was a different beast altogether. The Jin’s central capital since the early 1150s, now the site of modern Beijing, it had been keenly designed to withstand assaults. Built in a rough square, the city had almost 30 kilometres of stamped earthen walls 12 metres high. Over 900 towers were said to line these walls, lined with various types of defensive siege weapons. Before the city were three lines of moats, as well as four forts outside the main city, each with their own walls, moats, garrisons and supplies, connected to the main city by underground tunnels. The surrounding countryside had been stripped bare of not just food stores, but even stones and ties which could have been for projectiles. Each fort held 4,000 men, with another 20,000 manning the walls of the city itself. Zhongdu was well stocked, well fortified and well prepared for a siege.       The Mongols, with their siege knowledge still in its infancy, were not without their own cards to play.  They had near total freedom of movement outside of the city, and now had begun to have their forces bolstered by desertions, especially among the Chinese and Khitans in the Jin military. Some of these deserters had brought along their own catapults, and captured engineers provided knowledge to construct more. At one point, the Mongols burst through a gate of Zhongdu, or were perhaps allowed in, as they found themselves surrounded, the street behind them set on fire. That party only escaped with heavy losses. Another assault was repulsed by the garrisons of the forts. It seems some sort of disease was spreading among Chinggis’ forces as the siege dragged on, and they must have started to become frustrated. In April 1214, Chinggis sent an embassy under a Tangut officer in his service with terms, entailing the submission of the Jin and the Emperor relinquishing his title. Wudubu refused to be demoted. Since Wudubu had no bargaining position beyond ‘we haven’t starved yet!’ Chinggis sent his envoys again, with the message:     “the whole of Shandong and Hebei are now in my possession, while you retain only  Zhongdu; God has made you so weak, that should I further molest you, I know not what  Heaven would say; I am willing to withdraw my army, but what provisions will you make  to still the demands of my officers?”       Wudubu was finally convinced to come to terms, noting the reality of his situation. In May, 1214, the Jin Emperor capitulated. A daughter of Wei Shao Wang was sent in marriage to Chinggis, with 500 boys and girls for her retinue, and 3,000 horses, 10,000 liang of gold and 10,000 bolts of silk, which would have been a mighty caravan of tribute. For reference, 1 liang is equal to 50 grams. The Jin, who had once held the forefathers of Chinggis Khan in such contempt, were now his vassal, and Chinggis Khan withdrew back to Onggud territory, doubtless proud of his work.        What Chinggis Khan’s plans were from this point we will never know- perhaps he was to turn west, pursue those final few enemies like Kuchlug? Allow his men to grow fat and soft off the tribute from the Jin and enjoy his own retirement? Or perhaps, with his new vassals, march south against the Chinese Song Dynasty. But we’ll never know. For in June 1214, the anxious Wudubu, fearing himself too close to Chinggis Khan, made the ill-fated decision to abandon Zhongdu and flee to his southern capital, Kaifeng, in territory untouched by the Mongols and shielded by the mighty Yellow River. Shortly after his departure, he began to have misgivings over the 2,000 Khitans in his retinue, and tried to take their horses. The Khitans, like the Mongols, were skilled horsemen who prized their mounts. To take their horses was to take their legs, and they abandoned the fleeing Emperor, riding all the way north to Chinggis Khan in inner Mongolia.        When the Khan learned of this, he was incensed. This was the Jin Emperor breaking his word, violating the treaty in an action tantamount to preparation for future hostilies. South of the Yellow River, he would be beyond the authority of Chinggis Khan where he could plan further troubles. Zhongdu was left with a much smaller garrison and would now pay the price for Wudubu’s cowardice. In late summer the general Samukha, with Shimo Ming’an, and the 2,000 Khitans who had abandoned Wudubu marched to Zhongdu with perhaps 50,000 men. The city was reached around September 1214, and placed under siege. The garrison, forlorn but proud, stoutly manned their doomed walls. Even with it defenders reduced, an assault on the city’s mighty fortifications would be costly, so Samukha aimed to starve it out.        Wudubu hadn’t completely abandoned the city, and belatedly in early 1215 sent relief columns bearing foodstuffs and reinforcements to Zhongdu. The Mongols overcame these columns with ease, and sated their own hunger with the supplies meant for the people of Zhongdu. The noose only continued to tighten around the city. Those communities in the region still untaken were reduced: most of the Jurchen homeland in Manchuria had fallen to the Mongols and their vassal Khitan kingdom. One Jurchen commander in Manchuria, upon learning of Wudubu’s flight, deserted and founded his own kingdom in the far east of Manchuria. In the Shandong peninsula, a long simmering local uprising erupted quickly, commonly known as the Red Coats, who proved themselves staunch foes of the Jin government. Whatever Jin forces that remained had either joined the Mongols, or were already destroyed. North of the Yellow River, only a strip along it, and around Xijing in the west, remained under Jin rule.    For Zhongdu, these happenings made the chance of reinforcement grow ever dimmer. Starvation was severe in the city. All possible animals were eaten, and accusations of cannibalism seem unfortunately probable. At one point, thousands of the city’s virgins were said to have thrown themselves from the walls, rather than suffer fate at the hands of the Mongols. The city’s leadership began to fight each other, with one top commander committing suicide, while another made his way through the blockade, arriving in Kaifeng where he was executed for desertion.        In June 1215, Zhongdu finally surrendered. Mongol troops let out their pent up frustration on the poor souls still within the city. Many thousands were slaughtered, every home and shop looted. Parts of the city were said to have burned for a month. So terrible was the slaughter that a Khwarezmian embassy passing the city a few months later was horrified to see piles of human bones surrounding the city, the ground greasy with human fat and disease rampant. Some of their embassy even fell ill and died as a result.        For the Mongols, it is interesting to note what anecdotes they took away from this tragedy. Chinqai, an officer of importance in the decades to come, climbed one of Zhongdu’s towers and sent an arrow in every direction. When Chinggis learned of the feat, he was so tickled by it that he granted Chinqai ownership of everything within the range of arrows. Chinggis Khan always found a particular joy in these sorts of acts. The event most fondly reported by the Mongols was when several officers attempted to bribe Chinggis’ adopted son, Shigi Qutuqu, in splitting the loot of the city between them. He declined, stating he could not take it, as it was all the possessions of the Khan. Such loyalty to the Khan was prized greater than all the treasures of China.       There can be little doubt that the flight of Wudubu and destruction of Zhongdu a year later was an irreverseible blow to the prestige of the Jin Dynasty, alongside the obvious territorial losses. To many, coupled with years of natural disasters, disorders, and poor governance, the Mongol invasion and Wudubu’s abandonment of the north must have looked like the Jin had lost the Mandate of Heaven, the supernatural approval necessary to rule China. When Heaven rescinded its Mandate, it always awarded it elsewhere, and it seemed that Chinggis Khan had received its blessing. It should not be a surprise that the following years saw the desertions to the Mongols turn into a flood, and they were now able to staff their newly taken territory with loyal Chinese, Khitan and even Jurchen officials. Entire armies of Chinese were soon fighting for the Mongols to aid their conquest of China, something we will explore in detail in future.       Zhongdu was left a shell of its former self, and was renamed ‘Yen’ or ‘Yenching’ by the Mongols. It remained an important command centre, but only began to return to real significance again when Chinggis’ grandson Kublai built a capital near the site. But that’s a few decades ahead of us. In the meantime, Chinggis Khan returned to his homeland and found himself distracted by uprisings and the pursuit of old enemies- a path which brought him, unintentionally, into a collision course with the Khwarezmian Empire to west.        In the next episode we will explore the first western movements of the Mongols, so be sure to hit subscribe to the Kings and Generals podcast and to continue helping us bring you more outstanding content, please visit our patreon at www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. Thank you for listening, I am your host David and we will catch you on the next one!

Contrary to some popular internet opinions, the Mongol Empire was not an unprecedented, utterly unique presence on the stage of world history. It was neither the first or the last nomadic empire, though it was certainly the greatest. This depiction of the Mongol Empire as a total historical aberration is due, perhaps, to a lack of context. When one learns of the Mongols through hyperbole and dramatized retellings of the rise of Chinggis Khan, it neighbours portrayed only long enough to explain their destruction, it is easy to feel you’re learning about perhaps the only nomadic empire to really conquer anything, instead of just raiding. In this episode, we will provide first a very brief history of Mongolia based nomadic empires- not encyclopedic, but enough to give you an idea of what the precedent here was. Then, we will explain the first of what is known in Chinese history as the ‘conquest dynasties,’ the Khitan Liao Dynasty, the Tangut Xi Xia Dynasty, and the Jurchen Jin Dynasty, who laid the groundwork for the Asia Chinggis Khan would emerge into. With that background, it will make puts the events of the conquest of China into greater context for you, our dear listener, so that the significance of particular events should perhaps take greater event. Now, prepare yourself as we take a speedy 1,000 year journey through Mongolian and northern Chinese history.  In broad strokes, we must first note that the Empire founded by Chinggis Khan in 1206 was not the first empire ever based in Mongolia. For that honour we must go back over 1400 years to the Xiongnu Empire, a tribal confederation founded around 209 BCE, perhaps a reaction to the unification of China under their first imperial dynasty, the Qin Dynasty. The well known Terracotta warriors come from the magnificent tomb of the first emperor, Qin Shi Huangdi, to place this into a well known context. The Xiongnu’s military might put the Qin’s successors, the famed Han Dynasty into what was essentially a vassal relationship, forcing them to send tribute for decades. Before the rise of the Mongols, the Xiongnu were the archetypal nomadic threat to the Chinese, who struggled to find ways to successfully resist their pressure. One effort was to ‘civilize’ the Xiongnu by sending them Chinese brides and goods, to force the Xiongnu to become dependent on them. It proved expensive and unsuccessful, and with the Xiongnu based still in Mongolia, they could maintain the divide between their society and the Chinese. The Han saw more success militarily, building border walls, expanding towards Central Asia to cut off the Xiongnu from their client kingdoms on whom they depended for revenues and forming alliances with various tribes along the Xiongnu’s border- although military operations into Mongolia proper were difficult and costly for the Chinese. What finally allowed the Han to overcome the Xiongnu was the end of their long unity. Unlike effectively every other nomadic confederation to follow them, the Xiongnu maintained a remarkable degree of unity from 209 until 60 BCE. The civil war which broke out over the Xiongnu ruler’s succession was the true end of their confederation. Various claimants sought support from the Chinese, increasing Chinese influence, weakening the central authority of the Xiongnu ruler, encouraging their enemies and ultimately, resulting in the fragmentation of the confederation and rise of other powers in Mongolia.   Now, you may ask, why did we have all that preamble for events literally over a millennium before Chinggis Khan? The reason is because of trends which will be apparent in this, and future episodes: The significance of Chinese goods and tribute, as something desired by the nomads, and a tool to be used by Chinese with the intention of ‘corrupting,’ or from the Chinese point of view, ‘civilizing’ the nomads, forcing them to lose their military edge in favour of the finer things. The great military potential of the nomads, and the difficulty the various Chinese dynasties had operating militarily directly in the vast Mongolian steppe, where the nomads could easily escape on horseback or surround them And nomadic unity: when they organized, the various nomadic powers were an incredibly potent weapon. But when they fragmented, invariably due to a succession crisis, their infighting was horrific, and old micro-tribal loyalties would assert themselves over the macro-tribal confederation. Wise Chinese dynasties would play these tribes off on-another, providing goods, resources or even military support to a certain leader, keeping the nomads at each other’s throats and preventing them from unifying and directing their fearsome energy to the south.     The Xiongnu was among the most stable and longest lasting tribal union in Mongolia’s history. Among these successors included the Xianbei confederation, founded in the late first century CE, then the Rouran, the first to use the title of Khan, then the Gokturk Khaganaes, and the Uighur Khaganate, which collapsed in 840 CE. All rose to power in what is now modern Mongolia, forming mighty empires which spanned huge territory and threatened the Chinese Dynasties. The Gokturks, in particular, saw their influence stretch even to Crimea, and proved highly influential to Turkic peoples who emerged in the following centuries.   One thing we have not noted as of yet, is the make up of these empires. Were they Mongols? Proto-Mongolic? Turks? Irish? Well, prior to the Gokturks, known also as the Turkic Khaganates, who were unequivocally turkic tribes speaking turkic languages, the make up of these confederations is a messy, messy thing. Many a long academic paper has been written arguing for Mongolic, Altaic, Tungusic, Turkic, and many more, for the identity of these various earlier empires. These were all ethnically quite diverse, various tribes united by charismatic leadership or by one tribes military might. This is part of why these states suffered such violent fragmentations: once that leadership stopped being charismatic enough, generally associated with the death of a major monarch and conflict for the throne between his sons or brothers, then those old tribal ties would reassert themselves. These were not nation-states, but better thought of as military alliances. The constituent peoples who made up the empire could have all been nomads, but speaking totally unrelated languages, lacking a common identity beyond “we’re not sedentary or Chinese.”   The Uighur Khaganate, a Turkic empire, was destroyed in 840 under the assault of the Yenisei Kirghiz, who did not establish their own empire. Many Uighur moved south, to Gansu and Turfan in what is now modern China. With the fall of the Uighurs, and at a similar time the Tibetan Kingdom, China’s mighty Tang Dynasty, the most powerful Dynasty since the Han and the latest to unify the country, had lost its main rivals of the last century, and had no major nomadic threat on its border. However, the Tang Dynasty was well past its prime and collapsed in 907, creating a power vacuum across the whole of China. While China went through its favourite process of small kingdoms fighting their way back to unity, in the north a people speaking a Mongolic-language had unified, and were to proclaim their own kingdom, the first of the conquest dynasties.    Oh yes, you guessed it: the Khitans!    A nomadic group from southern Manchuria, culturally and linguistically close to the Mongols, under their chief Abaoji they declared their own empire after the final collapse of the Tang in the early 900s. Now, this was not a confederation/military alliance in the likes of the Xiongnu, where the ruler’s actual authority outside of military direction was limited, but a true, structured state, one which took on the outward trappings of a Chinese dynasty. In fact, among other things, they took their own dynastic name in the style of other Chinese Dynasties, Abaoji choosing Liao, from a river in their territory in southern Manchuria. The Khitan Liao empire incorporated much of Mongolia, Manchuria, and the very north of China, with what is now modern Beijing made their southern capital, a part of China known to their contemporaries as the 16 prefectures. The Khitans practiced a style of government which would be picked up by their nomadic successors, known as the dual administration system, to accommodate the nomadic tribesmen and vast sedentary Chinese population within their empire. Under this system, the nomadic tribes who made up the military core, command and the elite, were governed according to their own tribal customs, while the Chinese were separately administered under their own laws, its bureaucracy there based off the Tang model.   In Mongolia, the Khitan presence was not extensive, but it was notable especially in the east. Military forts and garrisons were established across the steppe, such as Bars-Hot, which were also centres of trade and provided valuable, reliable smiths. Essentially, they kept the peace, offering a stability to the region, though details on this aspect come as much from archaeology as they do the textual record: what happened on the steppe between nomads was not often of interest to Chinese writers. It does not seem to have been a level of control like that of the Manchu occupation centuries later.   Khitan rule in northern China lasted two centuries, and their name became the basis for Kitai or Cathay, the name by which China is known in a number of languages. Their rule was not uncontested: the most notable conflict was with the Song Dynasty which emerged in the south, swallowing up the petty kingdoms south of the Yellow River in the decades following the collapse of the Tang. The Song will be a dynasty we will revisit later in this series, but for now know this: while the northern conquest dynasties were ruled by nomadic or semi-nomadic peoples over a Chinese population, the Song were ruled by Chinese and considered themselves the heirs of Tang, though deliberately weakened the power of their military, to their later chagrin. The Song sought to bring the aforementioned 16 prefectures back under Chinese rule, and to this end fought a series of inconclusive wars with the Liao. The Song proved unable to wrest control from the Liao, while the Khitans were unable to push deep into Song territory, though they had a notable expedition to the Song capital of Kaifeng, culminating in the Treaty of Chanyuan in 1005, finalizing the border and the Song providing large amounts of silver and silk annually to appease the Liao. This was an often uneasy peace, one punctuated by raids and expeditions. The Song, for their part, cultivated extensive forests along their border with the Liao, an effort to hampher the cavalry which was so important to the Khitans.    The other notable relationship which emerged in this period, was with the Tangut Kingdom, known also as the Xi Xia Dynasty. The Tangut ancestors were a Tibetan people who had moved into the Gansu corridor, a sparse desert region of oasis cities, the great Ordos loop of the western Yellow River and the fertile valley known today as Ningxia. Slowly granted rights by the Tang Emperors, like many others they asserted their independence with the fall of the Tang, first as Kings, then in 1038 declaring their own empire, taking the dynastic name of Xi Xia, though they knew themselves as the State of White and High. The Tangut Kingdom was a peculiar little state: Buddhism was strong there, with Chinese Confucianism finding little ground. It was a diverse though small population of approximately three million, with Tangut rulers, about half the general population Han Chinese, and the remainder various Turkic or Tibetan peoples, a strong nomadic and agricultural element. They created their own script, visually similar to Chinese but distinct: likewise, their government had Chinese trappings but internally unique, and did not use the dual administration system of the Liao. Unfortunately due to the Mongols, little information on their internal structure survives to us. They had a strong, cavalry based military, though they lacked the great offensive potential of their neighbours in the steppes or the Khitans. Generally seen as trade oriented, especially in the 12th century they turned their attention to the silk routes in the west as much as they did the east, and had influence towards the Tarim Basin. A favoured destination for leaders in the Mongolian steppe seeking refuge, their relationship with the Khitan was amicable and had marriage relations with them: while with the Song Dynasty it often took the form of raids, urging the Khitans to join them in attack. Visually, the Tangut had a rather unique hair style which bears brief mention: known as a tufa, the head was shaved except for the bangs and temples, framing the forehead.Trust me when I say it is incredibly ugly, but it does make it easy to identify them in surviving artworks.   Though their rule was long, the Liao rulers after Abaoji were not his equals. Much like their successor conquest dynasties, the Khitan struggled between adopting Chinese customs and maintaining their nomadic heritage. One place this was manifested was the succession, something to take note of for future discussion. The Liao Emperor, often influenced by his wives,often wanted t a designated heir, as per the Chinese style. Yet the Khitan elite wanted to maintain the nomadic preference for electing who they saw as the most suitable ruler, a choice which could be from the emperor’s sons or brothers. In this case, most suitable often meant whoever had developed the greatest military reputation or contacts, or who this elite thought could be most malleable. These disputes could manifest into assassination, and neither the Liao nor the Mongols would ever find a suitable solution to this problem at the imperial level. The later Liao Emperors struggled to deal with the rebellions along their borders, such as the Tatars in Mongolia, and in Manchuria, the Bo-hai peoples of the former Bo-hai kingdom in the far east, and the Jurchen tribes in the north, and the ones to usurp the Khitans.   The Jurchen tribes were the ancestors of the Manchu, and a semi-nomadic Tungusic people, nomadizing only a part of the year and inhabiting a large swath of territory from northeastern Manchuria towards the Yalu River. The Liao court classified them into three broad groups, based on proximity to China: the ‘civilized’ Jurchen, the closest, around the Liao River who were under firm control and generally assimilated to Chinese culture. North of them were the ‘obedient’ Jurchen, under regular contact and, well, obedient. Beyond them were the largest group, the ‘wild’ Jurchen, of the middle valley of the Sungari and the eastern mountains of Heilongjiang. They were vassals of the Liao, but the court held little direct power there. Originally split between numerous small tribes and clans in spread out villages, over the eleventh century the wild Jurchen were gradually unified by the Wan-yen clan, who gained recognition and titles from the Liao. Though the Liao court held little direct control over the wild Jurchen, they could still pose a threat if they turned their might to them, and the Jurchen rankled over the perceived abuses of the Khitan border guards, a sentiment worked up by the ambitious Wan-yen chief, Aguda.    The ultimate fall of the Liao Dynasty rose from a well known incident. It was the custom of the Liao Emperor to go on seasonal hunting and fishing trips into Manchuria, during which the tribes and chiefs of the region would come and pay homage to the Liao Emperor. As a gesture of submission, each chief would stand up and dance before him. During this ceremony in winter 1112, when it came time for Aguda to dance before the emperor, he refused. Annoyed, the Liao Emperor asked him again. Again, Aguda refused. On the third time, Aguda still refused. Incensed, the Liao Emperor wanted to execute Aguda for his insolence, but was talked out of it by his chancellor, allegedly saying something along the lines of ‘what harm could he do?’   In 1113, Aguda was elected chief of the Wild Jurchen; in autumn 1114, he began raiding the Liao frontier. That winter, he crushed Liao armies sent against him, and several border prefectures surrendered to him. By the start of 1115, Aguda had declared himself emperor of a new Jin Dynasty. What followed was the shockingly quick collapse of the Liao. A campaign by the Liao Emperor against Aguda was undermined when his court appointed his uncle as emperor in his absence. The Bo-hai in the east rebelled, killed their Khitan viceroy and submitted to the Jurchen. In 1118, Aguda crossed the Liao River, and the next year the Song Dynasty opened contact with the Jin, hoping to use this as a chance to regain those lost prefectures.   After a round of failed negotiations between Jin and Liao, war resumed in 1120. The supreme capital of the Liao Dynasty fell almost immediately, the imperial tombs sacked. By 1122, the Liao Emperor fled to inner Mongolia while his empire was swallowed by the Jurchen armies, their heavy cavalry rolling over all in their path. The Tangut attempted to aid the Khitans, but their army was swiftly defeated and forced to offer tribute. The Song, their armies initially distracted by war with the Tangut and an internal revolt, were finally able to attack the Liao, though embarrassingly were repulsed. This would not be the last time the Song would ally against their current enemy with a dangerous nomadic group from the north.   The final Liao emperor was soon joined by the able general Yelu Dashi, a distant relation who brought with him the empress and a number of Khitan troops. Yelu Dashi however, quickly became disillusioned with the Liao Emperor’s incompetence and abandoned him, gathering up the Khitan garrisons of Mongolia and moving west to Central Asia. There, he founded the Qara-Khitai Empire, a state we will revisit in the future. By doing so, the garrison outposts in Mongolia were abandoned, and there was no reason at this time for the Jin to expand their presence into the steppe, leaving Mongolia in a power vacuum. The Liao Emperor was finally captured in 1125 by the Jin, and spent his final years humiliated and imprisoned. Thus ended the Liao Dynasty.   Aguda did not live to see this great success, dying in 1123 a few months after concluding the alliance treaty with the Song. The Song still hoped to gain those prefectures back, but their poor military performance, and the overwhelming might of the Jin armies, radically changed the balance of power as the Liao state disintegrated. The relationship was tense, and by the end of 1125 the Jin under Aguda’s brother attacked the Song. Once more, Jin success was shocking. By 1127, the Song capital of Kaifeng had fallen, the emperor captured and the dynasty was reeling. Jin advance forces were even able to cross the Yangtze River. Yet it seems the speed and scale of their conquest was too rapid, and they struggled to hold onto the vast territory they now controlled. Local militias sprang up to resist the Jurchen, and Song forces rallied under the command of the talented Yue Fei, who pushed the Jin back over the 1130s, culminating in a peace treaty in 1142 which set the Huai River as their border. The older Song-Liao treaty was used as a basis, and the Song had to deliver 250,000 bales of silk and bolts and silver yearly, and the Jin Emperor was to be regarded as the ‘elder brother’ of the Song emperor, now based in Hangzhou in the south. Though the war would flare up again between the two, the treaty of 1142 effectively set the borders of China until the Mongol conquests.    For the Song Dynasty, this was a grand humiliation, the total loss of northern China to the invaders. 1127 is the end of what is known as the ‘Northern Song Dynasty,’ its salvaged successor the ‘Southern Song,’ which found trade and economics more to their skill than military aspects. The Jin Dynasty, at its height in the 12th century, was perhaps the single greatest military on earth. The Jurchen state had a number of problems however. Perhaps four million Jurchens now ruled over fifty million northern Chinese. Many of the Khitans of the Liao had not left with Yelu Dashi, but remained in northern China. The Jin borders were distant, their territory vast: garrisoning the entire kingdom with just Jurchen troops was impossible. Khitans and Chinese were incorporated in large numbers into the army, but excluded from promotion in both the military and government. The Khitans, still skilled horsemen, did not forget or forgive the loss of their dynasty, and rebelled periodically. The long reign of Emperor Shizong, from 1161-1189 was a golden age for Jin rule, but saw a growing sinicization of the Jurchen rulers, separating them from their kinsmen remaining in Manchuria. Under Shizong’s successors, corruption became endemic and was compounded by intense natural disasters, particularly devastating flooding of the Yellow River in the early 1190s. Like the Liao, the Jin ruled through a dual administrative structure, and maintained the Liao practice of having five capitals, one of which was at the site of modern Beijing. Prohibitions were made preventing Jurchen from wearing Chinese clothes or to learn Chinese and vice versa, in an effort to preserve Jurchen culture, and Chinese were even forbidden from calling the Jurchen ‘barbarians.’ Unique Jurchen scripts were developed, and Jurchen bards were to play the old songs in the emperor’s presence. These efforts could not halt the steady flow of assimilation, however, and only in the Manchurian homeland, removed from the Chinese culture altogether, were any Jurchens able to resist sinicization   This was China as the Mongols would find it in the thirteenth century: the Jurchen ruled Jin Dynasty in the north, a massive military power but spread thin over its vast borders, its rulers adopting Chinese customs, important sections of its military and population, especially the Khitans, feeling alienated and disrupted by natural disasters. Conflict would be renewed with the Song Dynasty in the south in 1206, the heirs of the Tang Dynasty who still dreamt of bringing the north back under Chinese control, but though their economic might in the Asian trade routes was significant, militarily they were not the equals of the conquest dynasties. In the northwest, the Tangut ruled Xi Xia dynasty bordered the Mongolian steppe, a small but sturdy state which was the vassals of the Jin, but had no great love for the Jurchen. A fractured China, ready to descend into warfare with the correct spark. That sparks name would be Chinggis Khan.   We hope that you have enjoyed this introduction to 13th century, a basis for our explanation on the upcoming Mongol conquests, so be sure to hit subscribe to the Kings and Generals podcast and to continue helping us bring you more outstanding content, please visit our patreon at www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. Thank you for listening, I am your host David and we will catch you on the next one!

In this episode of Hebrew Voices, Hebrew Manuscripts from China, we learn how the ancient Jewish community in Kaifeng preserved Hebrew books and culture, which eventually made their way to Western libraries. I look forward to reading your comments! Podcast … Continue reading → The post Hebrew Voices #110 – Hebrew Manuscripts from China appeared first on Nehemia's Wall.

The Jin Dynasty is surrounded on all sides. It cannot get out. Soon enough, the Mongol stranglehold around Kaifeng will signal the Empire of Black & Gold's death-knell. Time Period Covered: 1224-1234 CE

The Jin Dynasty is surrounded on all sides. It cannot get out. Soon enough, the Mongol stranglehold around Kaifeng will signal the Empire of Black & Gold's death-knell.Time Period Covered:1224-1234 CE  See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

Yingying Li is an expert in cross-cultural leadership and the founder of Silicon Valley-based startup Yingfluence. Yingying’s credentials are impressive: she has a decade of experience working in the U.S., China, Brazil, India and Turkey, and is trilingual in Chinese, English, and Portuguese. Her clients as a cross-cultural management consultant include billionaires and executives from Facebook, LinkedIn, Cisco and Intel. Yingying also serves as a mentor at Founders Space, the top global accelerator for overseas startups, which was founded by Steve Hoffman (guest #5 on the podcast).  Yingying and I had a fairly epic talk, covering topics ranging from her childhood in Kaifeng, China to her journey ever farther west, and concluding with her thoughts on how to build all the needed bridges between China and the rest of the world to enable the best possible future for all of us. This is one of my favorite shows yet, and I hope you enjoy it. Find all links at the BLOG post here: https://www.crazyinagoodway.com/home/2018/8/8/yingying-li

Li Qingzhao, who lived (1084-1151) during the late Song dynasty, is recognised as one of China's greatest poets. She grew up within China's culture of highly regulated court bureaucracy. While her husband was a senior official, she became a brilliant and renowned poet But the Song dynasty was also a time of great political turmoil. In 1127, the dynasty fled its capital in the city of Kaifeng after an invasion. Li was forced to wander for years, trying to preserve as much as possible of her family's collection of books and precious artefacts. Eventually she settled down in the new capital of Hangzho and wrote a series of broadsides condemning the Song rulers for succumbing to the invaders. She established a reputation as a true patriot that has lasted to the present day in China. Presenter: Rana Mitter Producer: Ben Crighton Researcher: Elizabeth Smith Rosser.

Yu Su is a producer, collector and DJ based in Vancouver but originally from Kaifeng, China. Her music moves freely between the reflection of her cultural heritage and the landscape of the less familiar Pacific Northwest. Her collaborative project You’re Me (with Scott Gailey) further examines this approach and is critically acclaimed as a successful combination of musical composition and environmental studies. We catch up on her musical influences, classical piano training, learning curves, musings on the genre of ambient music and speaking out.

In about 1100, Zhang Zeduan painted a horizontal scroll that took as its theme the return journey that a family made back to Kaifeng, capital city of the Northern Song Dynasty (960­‐1127). 

In this final installment of the history of the life and times of the emperor Huizong, we look at the series of events that followed the Jürchens' Seige of Kaifeng in 1126-1127. What followed was the Jingkang Incident, which for centuries made the Chinese bow their heads in shame. The entire Song imperial family was captured and sent north to live out the rest of their lives in the harsh lands far beyond The Great Wall. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

In this final installment of the history of the life and times of the emperor Huizong, we look at the series of events that followed the Jürchens’ Seige of Kaifeng in 1126-1127.  What followed was the Jingkang Incident, which for centuries made the Chinese bow their heads in shame.   The entire Song imperial family was captured and sent north to live out the rest of their lives in the harsh lands far beyond The Great Wall.  But the Jin conquerors did not destroy the Song. The Zhao family continued to keep the dynasty alive in the south. 

Patricia Ebrey‘s beautifully written and exhaustively researched new book introduces readers to an emperor of China as artist, collector, father, ruler, scholar, patron, and human being. Emperor Huizong (Harvard University Press, 2014) explores the person and the reign of the eighth emperor of the Song Dynasty, who ascended the Song throne in 1100 (at age 17) and ruled almost 26 years until 1125. Huizong is perhaps best known as a ruler who was so caught up in a sensual life (painting, calligraphy, Daoism, etc.) that he failed to properly govern and left the dynastic door open to invading Jurchen forces. Ebrey offers us a much more complex and even-handed account of this fascinating figure and his world, following the life and rule of Huizong in intricate detail to try to understand the circumstances that ultimately led this man to pretend to have a stroke so that his son could ascend the throne and try to succeed where the father had failed to avert a Jin takeover. (Both were unsuccessful, and as Jurchen forces sacked Kaifeng the remnants of the Song fled southward while Huizong and his son were taken into captivity.) We learn not only about Huizong’s childhood and family life, but also about his negotiation of reforms (political and musical) at court, his faith in and relationship to Daoism, and his practice and patronage of the arts of medicine, architecture, painting, and calligraphy. Ebrey brings a masterful reading of a diverse archive of sources to bear on creating this imperial portrait, which is both an incredible feat of careful scholarship and an absolute pleasure to read. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices