Podcasts about Mao Zedong

Mao Zedong föddes i ett välbärgat bondehem och var en av grundarna av det kinesiska kommunistpartiet 1921. Han kom att inleda sin väpnade kamp 1927 i sin egen hemprovins Henan. Hans gerillakamp kom att inspirera revolutionärer i hela världen ända fram till våra dagar.Mao Zedong var obestridlig ledare i Kina under nästan tre decennier. Han kom att ställa den marxismen, som utgick från industriarbetarna, på huvudet genom att grunda sin revolution på bönderna.Detta är den första delen av två om Mao Zedong, den kommunistiske diktatorn som fortfarande inspirerar revolutionära grilla rörelser runt om i världen.I avsnitt 139 av podden Historia Nu samtalar programledare Urban Lindstedt med Hans Hägerdal, professor i historia med inriktning på Öst och Sydostasien vid Linnéuniversitetet. Han har bland annat skrivit boken Kinas ledare – 1912-2012.Mao Zedongs olika kampanjer som Det stora språnget och Kulturrevolutionen kom att kosta mellan 40 och 70 miljoner människor livet. Bara under det stora språnget ska 45 miljoner människor har dött, enligt historikern Frank Dikötter.Efter att kommunisterna besegrat Nationalisterna grundandes Folkrepubliken Kinas 1949 och Mao Zedong blev Kinas ledare ända fram till sin död 1976.Musik: Celebrating Chinese New Year av Volodymyr Piddubnyk, Soundblock AudioBild: Mao håller tal 1939. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Episode 4144 │ June 13, 2026 Xi named America's decline. Trump called it an honor to be his friend. China has been building to this moment since the first panda sent West in 1869. WHAT THIS EPISODE COVERS Part Five of the Panda Gambit series delivers the series finale — and the series close Scott Kesterson has been building toward since La Pine, Oregon said no to a data center. The episode opens with an honest corrective: this series has documented Western imperial actions against China and China's strategic return to global power, but the evidence does not support a simple story of deserved Western punishment. Mao Zedong killed between 40 and 80 million of his own people — one of the largest self-inflicted death tolls in human history — and the question of what the Han resistance networks did or did not do to stop it remains unresolved and must be asked plainly. Scott then delivers the Iran campaign weapons math that explains why Trump flew to Beijing rather than the other way around: 45% of Precision Strike Missile stockpile burned, half of THAAD interceptors gone at a production rate of 96 per year, over 1,000 Tomahawks expended representing ten years of production — all while a $50,000 Iranian drone forced a $3.4 million THAAD intercept at a 68-to-1 cost ratio that emptied American magazines. The Beijing summit of May 13-15, 2026 is examined in full: Xi's opening sentence naming the Thucydides Trap and framing China as Athens and America as Sparta, Trump's response calling it an honor to be Xi's friend, the Truth Social post six hours later in which Trump accepted Xi's framing of American decline, the room full of US corporate titans whose primary interests are already shaped toward accommodation with Beijing, and an outcome Goldman Sachs described as deal momentum becoming managed coexistence — with no rare earth deal, no AI framework, a Boeing announcement China never confirmed, and a beef agreement reversed within hours. The 157-year arc from the panda's 1869 Western introduction through the Beijing summit is mapped through the Pixiu cosmological lens. The episode closes with the sharpest distinction the series can offer: China's Mandate of Heaven flows downward from emperor to people — the American republic was founded on the structurally opposite principle that rights flow from God to each individual person, and governments are instituted to protect what each person already holds. The oligarchs operating across all three systems — Chinese, Russian, and American — are behaving as if they hold a mandate the American founding never granted them. La Pine gets the last word. KEY QUESTIONS ADDRESSED What does the Iran campaign weapons math reveal about why Trump flew to Beijing — and what does it mean that the US military cannot rebuild Tomahawk and THAAD inventories without Chinese rare earth materials? What did Xi say in his opening sentence at the Beijing summit — and what did Trump's response, both in the room and on Truth Social six hours later, reveal about the negotiating position America arrived with? Who was in the room with Trump in Beijing — and when Elon Musk sat across from Xi with Tesla's primary manufacturing base on Chinese soil, who exactly was he representing? What is the 157-year arc from the panda's 1869 Western introduction to the May 2026 summit — and how does the Pixiu cosmology explain what actually crossed the border after two days of summit diplomacy? What is the sharpest distinction between China's Mandate of Heaven cosmology and the American founding principle — and why does it matter that concentrated oligarch power is claiming a mandate the republic never granted? ABOUT BARDSFM BardsFM is a daily independent podcast covering faith, liberty, history, and information warfare. Hosted by Scott Kesterson — combat veteran, documentary filmmaker, and rancher. Over 4,100 episodes and 50 million lifetime downloads. New episodes every weekday. bards.fm

durée : 00:58:53 - Le Cours de l'histoire - par : Xavier Mauduit - Le 9 septembre 1976, Mao Zedong, président du Parti communiste chinois, décède, atteint de la maladie de Charcot. Plus tard, les membres de la bande des Quatre sont arrêtés. La Révolution culturelle chinoise est officiellement achevée. Depuis, quelles histoires de la Révolution sont racontées ? - réalisation : Maïwenn Guiziou, Thomas Beau, Jeanne Delecroix, Jeanne Coppey, Raphaël Laloum, Chloé Rouillon, Sidonie Lebot, Luce Mourand - invités : Michel Bonnin Sinologue, directeur d'études à l'EHESS., Chloé Froissart Sinologue, professeure de sciences politiques Vous aimez ce podcast ? Pour écouter tous les épisodes sans limite, rendez-vous sur Radio France

durée : 00:58:42 - Le Cours de l'histoire - par : Xavier Mauduit - En mai 1966, la Révolution culturelle éclate dans la Chine de Mao Zedong. En quelques mois, les Gardes rouges, mouvement de masse de lycéens et d'étudiants, pourchassent les intellectuels et bourgeois. Pour promouvoir l'idéologie révolutionnaire, des affiches sont diffusées dans tout le pays. - réalisation : Maïwenn Guiziou, Thomas Beau, Jeanne Delecroix, Jeanne Coppey, Raphaël Laloum, Chloé Rouillon, Sidonie Lebot, Luce Mourand - invités : Yves Chevrier Sinologue et historien, Sebastian Veg Sinologue et historien Vous aimez ce podcast ? Pour écouter tous les épisodes sans limite, rendez-vous sur Radio France

7 HoursPG-13Back in the beginning of 2021, as Pete was transitioning out of libertarianism, he and Bird got together to do a series on the Four Swords of Marxism: Vladimir Lenin, Joseph Stalin, Mao Zedong, Abimael Guzman, and added in post-Marxist, Hans-Hermann Hoppe.Here is the complete audio.Timeline Earth PodcastPete and Thomas777 'At the Movies'Support Pete on His WebsitePete's PatreonPete's SubstackPete's SubscribestarPete's GUMROADPete's VenmoPete's Buy Me a CoffeePete on FacebookPete on Twitter

The Politburo had given Mao Zedong's personal physician Li Zhisui a direct order: prepare the Chairman's body so that he can be on permanent display. Li was aghast. It was not what Mao had wanted, and besides, “How to pickle your country's leader” wasn't one of the courses he studied in medical school. But after the turbulence of the Cultural Revolution, Mao's death meant a potential political showdown between the Gang of Four, including Mao's wife, Jiang Qing, and Mao's chosen successor, Hua Guofeng. Dr. Li did not want to be caught in the middle. So Li and his team did the best they could. Spoiler alert: it involved a massage that nobody would want to give. Li Zhisui's controversial memoir, The Private Life of Chairman Mao, was published in 1994. Readers were titillated by Mao's sex life, questionable hygiene regime, and gruesome medical maladies. Defenders of Mao labeled the book pure propaganda. Dr. Li was a disloyal liar, and his collaborators and publishers were pushing anti-Mao agendas. Jeremiah is joined by Alexander Boyd, Associate Editor of the China Books Review, to discuss Mao Zedong, Li Zhisui, and Jeremiah's recent retrospective essay about The Private Life of Chairman Mao. Who was Dr. Li? What did it take to survive in the courtyards of power at the peak of Mao's paranoia? And did Dr. Li really witness all of the major events he described in his book?

TESTO DELL'ARTICOLO ➜ https://www.bastabugie.it/8561TRUMP RICORDA A XI JINPING L'INGIUSTO ARRESTO DI JIMMY LAIdi Roberto de Mattei Durante il suo viaggio in Cina, il presidente americano Trump ha sollevato con il presidente comunista cinese Xi Jinping la questione di Jimmy Lai, detenuto dal 2020 in una prigione di Hong Kong. Trump ha riferito così l'esito del colloquio: "Direi che la risposta non è stata positiva. Ha detto che è stato una specie di incubo per lui". Ma chi è Jimmy Lai?Jimmy Lai, pseudonimo di Chee-Ying Lai, è nato a Canton nel 1947 in una famiglia poverissima e conobbe fin dall'infanzia le privazioni e le violenze della Cina comunista. Ancora adolescente riuscì a fuggire clandestinamente a Hong Kong, allora colonia britannica, dove iniziò a lavorare come operaio tessile. Grazie a una straordinaria capacità imprenditoriale, costruì in pochi decenni un vero impero economico nel settore dell'abbigliamento e dell'editoria, diventando uno degli uomini più noti della città. Convertitosi al cattolicesimo, Jimmy Lai maturò progressivamente la convinzione che la libertà economica dovesse accompagnarsi alla libertà politica e religiosa. Per questo motivo mise la propria ricchezza, la propria influenza e i suoi giornali al servizio della difesa delle libertà civili di Hong Kong, minacciate dall'espansione del controllo del regime comunista cinese. Dopo l'imposizione della legge sulla sicurezza nazionale da parte della Cina, Lai divenne uno dei simboli della resistenza democratica di Hong Kong. Arrestato più volte dalla polizia locale, ormai strettamente subordinata al potere di Pechino, subì processi sempre più duri e restrizioni crescenti della libertà personale. Nonostante l'età avanzata e la possibilità di lasciare il Paese, rifiutò di abbandonare Hong Kong, scegliendo di condividere il destino del suo popolo.Nel febbraio 2026 è stato condannato a vent'anni di reclusione per "sedizione" e "cospirazione" contro il regime comunista.IL REGIME MAOISTALa sua vicenda si inserisce nella lunga storia delle persecuzioni in Cina, che inizia fin da quando il regime maoista ha conquistato il potere nel 1949, imponendo un controllo totale sulla società attraverso il terrore ideologico e la repressione. Nel caso del cattolicesimo, il problema principale per il regime era la fedeltà al Papa, considerata incompatibile con la sovranità ideologica dello Stato socialista. Per questo negli anni Cinquanta Pechino creò la "Associazione Patriottica" cinese, una struttura controllata dal Partito destinata a costruire una Chiesa "indipendente" da Roma. I vescovi e i sacerdoti che rifiutarono di aderire alla nuova organizzazione furono accusati di essere "controrivoluzionari" o "agenti imperialisti". Molti finirono, senza processo, nei laogai, i campi di lavoro forzato del sistema repressivo cinese.Tra le figure simbolo della persecuzione vi è Ignatius Kung Pin-mei, vescovo di Shanghai, arrestato nel 1955 insieme a centinaia di sacerdoti e fedeli. Trascorse oltre trent'anni tra carcere e isolamento per essersi rifiutato di rompere la comunione con il Papa. Un'altra figura emblematica fu Fan Xueyan, vescovo clandestino di Baoding, arrestato ripetutamente e morto nel 1992 in circostanze mai chiarite dopo anni di torture e detenzione. Gerolamo Fazzini nel suo Libro rosso dei martiri cinesi (Edizioni San Paolo, 2006) raccoglie la testimonianza di quattro cattolici esemplari: Gaetano Pollio, arcivescovo di Kaifeng, arrestato e mandato ai lavori forzati per sei mesi; Domenico Tang, gesuita, arcivescovo di Canton, detenuto per 22 anni, dato già per morto anche dalla sua famiglia; padre Leone Chan, 4 anni e mezzo di carcere, uno dei primi sacerdoti a far conoscere in Occidente l'incubo comunista cinese per essere riuscito a fuggire nel 1962; Giovanni Liao Shouji giovane catechista cinese anche egli internato per oltre 22 anni nei laogai, Condannati con procedimenti farsa sulla base di crimini mai compiuti furono costretti a torture e umiliazioni di ogni genere mentre in Europa, negli anni Sessanta - annota Fazzini - il verbo del maoismo veniva propagandato come il "volto buono" del comunismo, arruolando simpatizzanti anche in casa cattolica. UNA TESTIMONIANZARobert W. Greene (1911- 2003) un missionario americano in Cina, della congregazione di Maryknoll, ha raccontato a sua volta la sua testimonianza di fede durante la persecuzione comunista in Cina negli anni Cinquanta. Dopo la vittoria dei comunisti di Mao Zedong, padre Greene fu arrestato dalle autorità comuniste, accusato di essere una "spia americana" e sottoposto a lunghi interrogatori, umiliazioni e torture. Rimase prigioniero e arrivò persino a essere condannato a morte e destinato alla decapitazione durante la persecuzione anticristiana del 1952, ma venne improvvisamente liberato e deportato a Hong Kong. Una delle immagini più ricordate della sua prigionia è quella del sacerdote che, privo del rosario, utilizzava fiammiferi spezzati per contare le Ave Maria nella cella. Dopo il ritorno negli Stati Uniti, Robert Greene continuò a testimoniare pubblicamente la situazione della Chiesa perseguitata in Cina attraverso conferenze e scritti. La sua autobiografia Calvario in Cina, L'ultimo parroco di Tong'an, è stata pubblicata lo scorso anno in italiano dalla casa editrice Ares. In un articolo sul quotidiano "Libero" (Quando il comunismo cinese cominciò a conquistare il mondo, 7 dicembre 2025), attraverso le testimonianze drammatiche di padre Greene, Antonio Socci ha ricordato come funzionava la macchina infernale del maoismo: bambini trasformati in delatori, famiglie distrutte dalla propaganda e persecuzioni contro i cristiani e gli oppositori. Per decenni, migliaia di cristiani hanno subito arresti, torture, lavori forzati e morte nei campi di rieducazione. Secondo gli studi del PIME, il Pontificio Istituto per le Missioni Straniere, migliaia di sacerdoti e religiosi scomparvero durante le campagne maoiste, specialmente nel periodo della Rivoluzione culturale (1966-1976), quando chiese, monasteri e seminari vennero devastati dalle Guardie Rosse. Molte delle loro storie sono rimaste nascoste dietro la censura del regime, ma missionari, storici e testimoni hanno progressivamente ricostruito il dramma della Chiesa perseguitata in Cina che purtroppo sembra dimenticata dalla Ostpolitik della Santa Sede, mentre il dittatore comunista Xi Jinping continua a proclamarsi discepolo di Mao Zedong.

En ce moment, Xi Jinping se place au centre du jeu diplomatique mondial en pleine guerre en Ukraine. Le dirigeant suprême de la Chine se pose en acteur responsable et stable sur la scène internationale et on ne parle plus dans les médias du système politique chinois, qui repose sur la surveillance et un système d'enfermement très diversifié qui étouffe la société civile. En cette année 2026, qui marque les 60 ans du déclenchement de la Révolution culturelle par Mao Zedong, l'ouvrage du sinologue Jean-Philippe Béja - directeur de recherche émérite au CNRS/CERI - tombe à pic : Surveiller et punir en Chine, Laogai et technosurveillance de 1946 à nos jours, paru aux éditions de La Découverte.  À lire aussiCensure numérique: la Chine expérimente un modèle régionalisé

En ce moment, Xi Jinping se place au centre du jeu diplomatique mondial en pleine guerre en Ukraine. Le dirigeant suprême de la Chine se pose en acteur responsable et stable sur la scène internationale et on ne parle plus dans les médias du système politique chinois, qui repose sur la surveillance et un système d'enfermement très diversifié qui étouffe la société civile. En cette année 2026, qui marque les 60 ans du déclenchement de la Révolution culturelle par Mao Zedong, l'ouvrage du sinologue Jean-Philippe Béja - directeur de recherche émérite au CNRS/CERI - tombe à pic : Surveiller et punir en Chine, Laogai et technosurveillance de 1946 à nos jours, paru aux éditions de La Découverte.  À lire aussiCensure numérique: la Chine expérimente un modèle régionalisé

Mao Zedong lived one of the most epic and influential lives of the twentieth century. His impact on the People's Republic of China was vast. Half a century after his passing, he remains a divisive and controversial figure.Catch Giles live - 'Let's Talk' - Monday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday - from 10.00CET...on tre.radio

Ho-fung Hung on the Political Economy of China. Shownotes Ho-fung Hung Prof. Ho-fung Hung at the Johns Hopkins University: https://soc.jhu.edu/directory/ho-fung-hung/ The Conference ‘China and Us: Perspectives on Peace, Human Rights and Socio-Ecological Transformation': https://www.attac.de/china-konferenz/startseite Ho-fung, H. (2015). The China Boom. Why China Will Not Rule the World. Columbia University Press.     https://cup.columbia.edu/book/the-china-boom/9780231540223/ on Citic Press:  https://www.group.citic/en/Diversified_Portfolio/New_Consumption/Citic_Publish/ on the 1989 protests in China:  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1989_Tiananmen_Square_protests_and_massacre on the fiscal reform in China in 1994:  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tax-Sharing_Reform_of_China_in_1994 on Carl Schmitt: https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carl_Schmitt https://www.bpb.de/shop/zeitschriften/apuz/archiv/537943/ortung-und-ordnung-carl-schmitt-im-nationalsozialismus/ on Benito Mussolini:  https://www.dhm.de/lemo/biografie/benito-mussolini https://nationalgeographic.de/geschichte-und-kultur/2023/09/benito-mussolini-aufstieg-und-fall-eines-faschistischen-diktators/ the Constitution of the People's Republic of China:  https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/lawsregulations/201911/20/content_WS5ed8856ec6d0b3f0e9499913.html on Foucault's ‘Regime of Truth':  Lorenzini, D. (2015). What is a ‘Regime of Truth'?. Le foucaldien 1(1).  https://www.researchgate.net/publication/317961938_What_is_a_Regime_of_Truth the mentioned article by Ho-fung Hung in the Jacobin:  Ho-fung, H. (2023). Mussolini in Beijing. Jacobin.  https://jacobin.com/2023/02/mussolini-in-beijing on China's falling CO2 emissions:  https://www.carbonbrief.org/analysis-chinas-co2-emissions-have-now-been-flat-or-falling-for-21-months/ on renewable energy in China:  https://www.carbonbrief.org/china-briefing-5-february-2026-clean-energys-share-of-economy-record-renewables-thawing-relations-with-uk/ Ho-fung, H. (2026). The China Question. Eight Centuries of Fantasy and Fear. Cambridge University Press.  https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/china-question/C15B207366F98DC034ED279435A8CCCA on the case of Solyndra: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solyndra on the economic policy of Mao Zedong and China's relationship to the Soviet Union, Felix Wemheuer's youtube channel ‘Studying Maoist China' is recommended:  https://www.youtube.com/@felixwemheuerstudyingmaois1051 on Chile during the Cold War:  Lockhart, J. (2016). Reimagining Chile's Cold War Experience: From the Conflict's Origins to Salvador Allende's Inauguration. University of Arizona.  https://repository.arizona.edu/handle/10150/620841 on Salvador Allende:  www.britannica.com/biography/Salvador-Allende on the Paris Commune: Badiou, A. (2021). The Paris Commune: Marx, Mao, Tomorrow. Monthly Review 73(1).  https://monthlyreview.org/articles/the-paris-commune-marx-mao-tomorrow/ Weber, I. M. (2021). How China Escaped Shock Therapy. The Market Reform Debate. Routledge. https://www.routledge.com/How-China-Escaped-Shock-Therapy-The-Market-Reform-Debate/Weber/p/book/9781032008493 the mentioned publication on i.a. guerilla policymaking:  Heilmann, S. & Perry, E. J. (2011). Mao's Invisible Hand. The Political Foundations of Adaptive Governance in China. Harvard University Press.  https://www.hup.harvard.edu/books/9780674060630 the quote ‘it's easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism' is commonly attributed to Frederic Jameson:  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fredric_Jameson on Wolfgang Streeck:  https://www.mpifg.de/457994/Streeck on the 2026 Hungarian parliamentary election:  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Hungarian_parliamentary_election Relevant Episodes of Future Histories  S04E02 | Merle Groneweg zu Staatskapitalismus, Ökologie und Klimapolitik in China https://www.futurehistories.today/episoden-blog/s04/e02-merle-groneweg-zu-staatskapitalismus-oekologie-und-klimapolitik-in-china/ S03E60 | Felix Wemheuer zu unserer Zukunft mit China https://www.futurehistories.today/episoden-blog/s03/e60-felix-wemheuer-zu-unserer-zukunft-mit-china/ S02E09 | Isabella M. Weber zu Chinas drittem Weg  https://www.futurehistories.today/episoden-blog/s02/e09-isabella-m-weber-zu-chinas-drittem-weg/ Future Histories Contact & Support If you like Future Histories, please consider supporting us on Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/join/FutureHistories Contact: office@futurehistories.today Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/futurehpodcast/ Mastodon: https://mstdn.social/@FutureHistories English webpage: https://futurehistories-international.com   Episode Keywords #Ho-fungHung, #JanGroos, #Interview, #JohnHopkinsUniversity, #FutureHistories, #China, #PoliticalEconomy, #Capitalism, #MarketSocialism, #Socialism, #Mao, #Governmentality, #Democracy, #Imagination, #Society, #Communism, #ClimateChange

Neste vídeo, analisamos um dos maiores medos de Xi Jinping: que o Partido Comunista Chinês apodreça por dentro.A campanha anticorrupção de Xi não é apenas uma tentativa de limpar abusos dentro do Estado chinês. Ela também é uma ferramenta de controle político, disciplina ideológica e reorganização das lealdades dentro do Partido e do Exército de Libertação Popular.Depois de consolidar seu poder, Xi passou a falar cada vez mais em “auto-revolução” do partido, evocando o espírito de Yan'an, a antiga base revolucionária de Mao Zedong. Mas por trás dessa linguagem histórica existe uma preocupação muito concreta: evitar que a China repita o destino da União Soviética.Neste episódio, explicamos como as purgas, investigações e punições dentro do Partido Comunista Chinês revelam a obsessão de Xi com corrupção, deslealdade, facções internas e colapso político.Porque, para Xi, a maior ameaça à China talvez não venha dos Estados Unidos, de Taiwan ou de uma guerra externa. Talvez venha de dentro do próprio partido.

Last time we spoke about the New Fourth Army Incident. Across the Second Sino-Japanese War, the CCP entered after the setbacks of the 1930s, seeking to become a national leader in resistance while remaining cautious toward the Nationalist government. The 1936 Xi'an Incident reshaped politics, and by August 1937 KMT–CCP agreements defined a working arrangement: the CCP acknowledged KMT leadership and integrated its forces, while still pursuing political space and autonomy. As the war progressed, the CCP focused on defining its relationship with the KMT and keeping operational independence during cooperation. Mao Zedong managed this alliance by promoting a united front against Japan, yet protecting CCP revolutionary goals and internal control. The establishment of the Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army marked this military reorganization. Throughout, the CCP feared that KMT collaboration with Japan could enable a peace settlement that would undermine communist legitimacy and restrict the party's future authority thereafter.   #202 The One Hundred Regiment Offensive Phase One Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Simultaneously with the friction between the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the Japanese were also working to take control of—and extract value from—most of the territory they had nominally conquered. Treating these two processes separately—"friction" on the one hand and "consolidation" on the other—does violence to the real difficulty of the CCP's dilemma: the Party often had to confront both problems at the same time. At certain moments, the CCP was effectively forced to wage a two-front struggle. Even so, if the worst of the KMT–CCP friction had already eased by 1941, the most serious and painful challenges posed by Japanese consolidation were still ahead. To recover anything close to reality, the two timelines have to be read together and placed on top of one another. The Japanese understood that consolidation could not be postponed, because much of the land behind the furthest reaches of their army was still only weakly under their actual control. In some places, order could be restored by relatively direct methods: rebuilding local administration and policy authority; repairing transportation and communications; enrolling Chinese personnel—usually, as it turned out, people of dubious reliability—as police or militia under puppet regimes; registering the local population; and requiring identity cards. In true old-style Chinese fashion, collective security practices were used widely. One form was the familiar bao-jia system, in one variant or another. Another was the so-called "railway-cherishing village": a village would be assigned a nearby stretch of track, and if residents failed to "cherish" it, they were held collectively responsible. Yet early Japanese weakness in northern China is vividly illustrated by an incident in the summer of 1938. Three young foreigners—vacationing from teaching in Peiping (Beijing)—were curious about events and about what people were doing. They loaded their bicycles on a southbound train, got off at Baoding, and rode west until they ran into Eighth Route Army detachments. In the early period of the war, commanders generally wanted to rely on more mobile forms of warfare. Mao, however, insisted on a strategy of de-escalation and dispersion: breaking the 8RA and New Fourth Army into small units as nuclei for combat, recruitment, political work, and base-area construction. Under this approach, few engagements could be truly dramatic in scale, and most were constrained by the need to survive. Each skirmish had to be carefully planned. The CCP would use local intelligence and the element of surprise so that a detachment could strike and withdraw before its limited ammunition ran out or before enemy reinforcements arrived. Small Japanese patrols and puppet units could be ambushed not only to seize weapons and other material, but also to inflict casualties. Active collaborators, or Japanese-sponsored administrative personnel, could be assassinated. Above all, Communist action aimed to disrupt transportation: mining roads; cutting down telegraph poles, stealing wire, and cutting rail lines; sabotaging rolling stock; and, at times, carrying off steel rails so that primitive arsenals could be supplied. Attempting derailments was also part of the effort. Destroying a bridge or a locomotive counted as a major achievement. Both the Communists and the Japanese understood that these tactics did not decisively shift the overall strategic balance. Still, they worked at other levels. For the Japanese, the result was a constant series of small wounds—painful, bleeding, and potentially infectious. Few areas in the countryside felt truly safe. Japanese field commanders documented growing frustration as they tried to eliminate resistance, restore administration, collect taxes, and prepare for more systematic and effective economic exploitation of conquered territory. Guerrilla warfare against the Japanese cannot be judged only in conventional battle terms—numbers of engagements, casualties, or territory occupied. It had to be evaluated politically and psychologically as well, exactly as Mao repeatedly emphasized. Since the CCP's wartime legitimacy depended on its patriotic claims, enough fighting had to be carried out to maintain credibility. Moreover, military success mattered for mobilizing the "basic masses," persuading wavering people to keep an open mind, and neutralizing opposition. As the logic put it, it was not that people always chose the side that was winning, but that few would ever join a side they believed was losing. One experienced cadre described the effect this way: Among the guerrilla units… there is a saying that "victory decides everything." No matter how hard it has been to recruit troops, supply the army, raise the masses' anti-Japanese fervor or win over the masses' sympathy, after a victory in battle the masses fall all over themselves to send us flour, steamed bread, meat, and vegetables. The masses' pessimistic and defeatist psychology is broken down, and many new guerrilla soldiers swarm in. But once the Japanese began to demand a heavy price for every engagement—whether the Communists won or not—this attitude began to change. In North and Central China, the Japanese earliest pacification sweeps created comparatively little trouble for the CCP. At first, the Japanese made few distinctions among Chinese forces. They simply tried to mop up or disperse them without regard to character. Over time, however, they realized that these sweeps actually made it easier for the CCP to expand. By the second half of 1939, Japanese methods became more discriminating. Chinese non-Communist forces would step aside while the Japanese hunted specifically for the 8RA, the N4A, and their local affiliates. The Japanese also made more direct appeals to non-Communist forces. According to Japanese army statistics, during the eighteen months from mid-1939 to late 1940, around 70,000 men from more or less regular Nationalist units in North China alone went over to the Japanese. The Japanese also reached informal "understandings" with several regional commanders whose forces together might have totaled as many as 300,000 men. This, of course, corresponded to what the CCP denounced as "crooked-line patriotism"—the "crooked-line" collaboration that preserved certain units so they could be used in future anti-Communist operations. When pacification efforts were intensified from late 1939 and throughout 1940, differences also appeared in the strategies Japanese armies used in North versus Central China. In North China, the approach relied heavily on military means, with political tactics limited largely to recruiting collaborators. In Central China, Japanese authorities did not hesitate to use military force, but they also attempted to supplement it with more comprehensive political and economic solutions by setting up tightly controlled "model peace zones." Although both approaches ultimately failed, they created enormous difficulties for Chinese Communists—until, in 1943, the Japanese were forced to ease off because the Pacific War against the United States became too burdensome. Careful reading of detailed intra-party documents suggests that repression also demobilized peasant support and terrorized populations into apathy, grudging acquiescence, or even active collaboration with the Japanese. In a locality already reduced from consolidated base status to guerrilla status, capacity and will were often too weak to administer complex reforms in systematic fashion. In other words, passive survival—defensive survival—was at least as important as what lay behind the heroic public images the Party projected. Systematic pacification in North China in late 1939 and 1940 radiated outward. It moved from areas held more or less firmly by the Japanese and their puppets into guerrilla and contested zones. The ultimate objective was to crush resistance or render it ineffective. The method was first to sweep the area clear of anti-Japanese elements, and then to establish a chain of interconnected strongpoints that could quickly reinforce one another. After that, puppet government would be expanded so it could take increasing responsibility for civil administration and "pacification maintenance," while Japanese forces repeated the initial steps further outward into contested territory. Violence was used selectively against individuals, groups, or villages accused of acts of resistance. This selective violence aimed to deter active participation in CCP-led programs, deprive Communist forces of a population willing to shelter them, and persuade informers to come forward. That was, at least, the theory of the strategy. In practice, the basic framework of the strategy depended on the main transport lines. Railways and roads—if properly fortified and protected—could separate resistance forces from one another and deny them one of their most effective weapons: mobility. These "cage" tactics (chiyu-lung, "jiu-lung") made it possible to enlarge pacified areas by "nibbling" outward, "as a silkworm feeds on mulberry leaves" (ts'an-shih). At the same time, the approach aimed to exploit North China's economy more effectively. To this end, the Japanese worked to improve and extend both railway and road networks. When the war began, in Shanxi the Cheng-Tai (Shijiazhuang–Taiyuan) and Tong-Pu (Datong–Tongguan) lines were metre-gauge, incompatible with the standard-gauge lines elsewhere in China—part of Yan Xishan's design to prevent deeper penetration into his province. By the end of 1939, the Japanese used forced labor to convert both lines to standard gauge. One benefit was the easier transportation of high-quality anthracite coal from the Qingxing mines (on the Cheng-Tai line) to industrial users in North China and Manchukuo. Of the newly constructed roads and railway lines, the most important was the Te-Shih line—from Dezhou in northeastern Shandong to Shijiazhuang. Construction began in June 1940 and finished in November, connecting the Tianjin–Pukou, Beiping–Hankou, and Cheng-Tai lines. This made it easier to move troops and transport raw cotton. Once the Te–Shih link was completed, the Japanese had direct connections between the point of their furthest advance at the elbow of the Yellow River and all major cities of North China, and beyond to Manchukuo. Communist sources began to speak of a "transportation war," noting with concern the moats and ditches, the blockhouses, and the frequent patrols protecting the lines. Both militarily and economically, these measures weighed heavily on forces led by the Communists in North China and on the populations under their control—especially the plains of central and eastern Hebei. One indicator of effectiveness was the rapid decline in "acts of sabotage" against North China railways in 1939 and the first half of 1940. A cadre in Jin-Cha-Ji reported in mid-1940: "The enemy has adopted a blockhouse policy, like that of the Jiangxi Soviet. They are spread like a constellation. In central Hebei alone, there are about 500, separated by one to three miles." Normal trading patterns were disrupted as Japanese or puppet occupiers took over administrative and commercial centers, and peasants found themselves caught between regulations imposed by the Communists on one side and those enforced by the other side. Finally, landlords, moneylenders, loafers, bandits—everyone who felt damaged by the new order inside base areas—could use pacification programs to try to recover influence or simply take revenge. Some became informers. After 8RA and local units were driven away, they could kill remaining cadres or activists and settle scores with the peasants who had supported them. Until the "first anti-Communist upsurge" was defeated, local elites and other disaffected elements might also seek support from Nationalists. It was even possible for an armed band to operate for several months inside consolidated regions of the CCP base, killing cadres as it went. Peng Dehuai later recalled this period in a way that underscored how pressure translated into wavering and collapse. Under the enemy's brutal pressure, in some districts the masses even hesitated or capitulated. From March to July 1940, large areas of the North China base were reduced to guerrilla regions. Before the "Cage-bursting battle",, they controlled only two county seats: Pingxun in the Taihang mountains and Pien-kuan in northwest Shanxi. Masses who previously had one set of obligations now had two—one toward the anti-Japanese regime and one toward the puppet regime. The situation in North China had not yet become a full crisis, but it was certainly serious. Action was needed to regain initiative. On 22 July 1940, Zhu De, Commander-in-Chief of the Eighth Route Army, Peng Dehuai Deputy Commander-in-Chief, and Zuo Quan Deputy Chief of Staff jointly issued the Preliminary Battle Order, laying out the strategic goals for the coming operation. The order stated: "To respond to the enemy's 'prison cage policy,' obstruct its advance toward Xi'an, create favorable conditions in the North China theater, and strike at the national resistance initiative, we have decided to take advantage of the concealment provided by tall summer millet and the rainy season to carry out a large-scale sabotage operation on the Shijiazhuang–Taiyuan railway (Zheng–Tai Line)." It required the participation of at least 22 regiments from the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region, the 129th Division, and the 120th Division. The main objective was to "completely destroy key points along the Zheng–Tai Line" and to "cut the railway for a prolonged period." On 8 August, the headquarters of the Eighth Route Army issued the Operational Battle Order, further clarifying how forces would be deployed. The Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region was assigned to attack the eastern section of the Zheng–Tai Railway (from Niangzi Pass to Shijiazhuang). The 129th Division was assigned the western section (from Niangzi Pass to Yuci). The 120th Division was tasked with targeting the northern segment of the Tongpu Railway and the Fen–Li Highway. The order also required all troops to begin combat operations on 20 August, and emphasized that "the success of the campaign should be assessed primarily by the extent of damage inflicted on the Zheng–Tai Line." The operation was prepared under strict secrecy. Various elements of the Eighth Route Army conducted thorough preparations before the campaign. Reconnaissance teams, hidden and protected with the help of local villagers, penetrated deep into areas near the Shijiazhuang–Taiyuan railway to carefully map Japanese strongholds, enemy troop dispositions, and local terrain. At the same time, both military and civilian communities mobilized to stockpile grain, ammunition, and tools needed for railway sabotage; blacksmiths were organized to manufacture crowbars, pickaxes, and other essential equipment. Specialized military training covered demolition methods and techniques for dismantling railways, including tactics such as heating and bending steel rails. Civilian mobilization played a crucial role: militia and support teams took on tasks such as transport, medical aid, and coordination with military units. In Central Shanxi alone, more than 10,000 militia members were mobilized. The Eighth Route Army headquarters repeatedly stressed the need for operational confidentiality, stating: "Before the battle begins, the plan must remain strictly classified; until preparations are completed, the campaign objective may be disclosed only to brigade-level commanders." With the cover of dense summer millet, troops secretly assembled within their designated operational areas. Before the battle, the Japanese North China Area Army estimated the strength of the communist regular forces at about 88,000 men in December 1939. Two years later, they revised the estimate to 140,000. On the eve of the battle, communist forces had grown to between 200,000 and 400,000 men, organized in 105 regiments. By 1940, the growth had become so significant that Zhu De ordered a coordinated offensive by most of the communist regular units—46 regiments from the 115th Division, 47 from the 129th, and 22 from the 120th—against Japanese-held cities and the railway lines that connected them. According to the Communist Party's official statement, the battle began on 20 August.  On August 20, 1940, the rain didn't stop the campaign—it changed the battlefield. It slowed movement, blurred distance, and turned rivers and muddy roads into obstacles that could just as easily trap your own men as your enemy's. Along the districts bordering the Zhengtai Railway, the Eighth Route Army still moved, slipping through valleys and river crossings, bypassing Japanese posts, and positioning forces on both sides of the line as night settled in. By dark, the plan became a coordinated strike meant to hit the enemy before they could properly react. Across the entire Zhengtai Railway, attacks went out with timing designed to disorient Japanese defenders—so that their "first realization" arrived only after the railway itself was already being attacked and the window to respond effectively had slipped away.   A key portion of that strike fell to the right column of the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region, centered on the 5th and 19th Regiments, with the mission of sabotaging the Niangziguan to Luanliu section. At 20:00 on August 20, part of the 5th Regiment infiltrated Niangziguan Village for the first time, overwhelmed the puppet troops stationed there, and seized the village by dawn. After that opening cut, the main force moved in to cover the engineers, destroy enemy fortifications, and blow up the Guandong Railway Bridge. When the sabotage was done, they withdrew from Niangziguan on their own initiative, leaving the enemy to deal with the destruction rather than being pulled into a long, grinding engagement.   That same night, at Mohe Beach along the Zhengtai line, another action unfolded. The 1st Company of the 1st Battalion of the 5th Regiment attacked the station and was immediately met with a counterattack by Japanese forces. By dawn on August 21, the company withdrew—an adjustment, not defeat—and then attacked again the same night after crossing the Mian River. This time the enemy retreated into barracks to resist more stubbornly, with nearly 1,000 Japanese troops holding Mohe Beach. Heavy rain had swollen the river and made foot crossing nearly impossible, but the attackers seized the village west of the station and held it. On August 22 afternoon, more than 400 Japanese troops counterattacked; the main force of the 5th Regiment hit from the north bank of the Mian River in a fire assault, killing more than 50 before withdrawing the 1st Company out of the fighting. The 19th Regiment, meanwhile, took Jucheng and Irrang stations, tightening the pressure on the railway corridor.   On August 23, 1940, the 5th Regiment recaptured Niangziguan and blew up the stone bridge east of the village, destroying the railway segment between Chengjialongdi and Mohetan. That night the 19th Regiment stormed Yirang Station and blew up the water tower and the railway, ensuring the disruption would not be temporary. From August 24 to 27, bridges near Yanhui—stone and wooden—were destroyed again and again. Under that continuous pressure, beginning on August 25, Japanese transportation along the Niangziguan to Luanliu section of the Zhengtai Road was cut off completely. Strongholds were left to fight more or less alone, unable to coordinate or move supplies the way they normally would.   While the right column worked the railway, other forces hit the system from different angles. The Central Column of the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region—comprised of the 2nd, 3rd, and 16th Regiments—took responsibility for sabotaging the Zhengtai Road segment from Niangziguan to Weishui and for striking the Jingxing Coal Mine area. On the night of August 20, the 3rd Regiment launched coordinated attacks on the Gangtou old mine and the Dongwangshe new mine of Jingxing, and with miners assisting, the 1st Battalion quickly stormed the new mine and annihilated part of the enemy garrison. The rest withdrew into bunkers, resisting as best they could. By the afternoon of the next day, the entire enemy force had been wiped out. Afterward, major buildings in the mining area were destroyed and most materials were removed so that the mine could not resume production for more than six months. The 3rd Regiment also captured Jiazhuang, reinforcing the idea that sabotage here meant disabling not just lines of movement, but also the flow of resources.   Elsewhere, Japanese positions were disrupted in smaller, targeted strikes that still added up. After the Japanese stronghold at Nanzheng destroyed the railway between Nanzheng and Weishui, the 2nd Regiment took the eastern end fortress of the Faluling Railway Bridge, covered the engineers as they blew up a section of the bridge, and briefly occupied Caizhuang. The 2nd Battalion of the 16th Regiment attacked Beiyu on the night of August 20, annihilating most defenders, and on August 21 it covered the engineers to destroy the Beiyu Stone Bridge. Other units struck Didu and annihilated most defenders in Nanyu. By August 24, the Central Column had learned that more than 1,000 Japanese troops were stationed in Jingxing County, with additional reinforcements moving toward Nanyu and Didu. Their response was practical: detachments were assigned to watch and harass along the railway while the main force gathered in mobile positions—waiting for the next opening rather than charging blindly into concentrated strength.   Meanwhile, the left column of the Jin-Cha-Ji effort—from the 2nd Regiment of the Jizhong Garrison Brigade, the Military Region Special Service Regiment, and the Pingjinghuo Detachment—focused on sabotage from Weishui to Shijiazhuang. On the night of August 20, the Pingjinghuo Detachment attacked Yanfeng and blew up the railway. The Special Service Regiment moved with massed efforts as they destroyed power lines and highways from Yanfeng to Weizhou. On the night of August 22, the Special Service Regiment attacked Shang'an Station. On August 23, the 2nd Regiment stormed Touquan Station, captured two fortresses, then withdrew from the railway line; from August 25 to 27, they destroyed the highway connecting Pingshan, Huolu, Weishui, and Yanfeng.   While the main blow was falling along the Zhengtai Railway, the 129th Division was assigned raids on the western section. That area included the Japanese Independent Mixed Brigade No. 4 headquarters, a coal mine base at Yangquan, and support from Independent Mixed Brigade No. 9 from Yuci. These raids weren't only about destruction—they were meant to disorient, to create confusion over where the main pressure truly was. After the general offensive began at 20:00 on August 20, five companies of the 16th Regiment attacked Lujiazhuang Station and captured bunkers. Two guerrilla-operating companies in Yuci worked with engineers to destroy bridges between Lujiazhuang and Duanting. The 38th Regiment surprised Shanghu and Heshangzu stations, while the 25th Regiment captured Mashou Station and pushed Japanese troops toward Shouyang. The division's right-wing sabotage unit—28th and 30th Regiments of the newly formed 10th Brigade—took on sabotage on the Yangquan–Shouyang section, splitting routes on the night of August 20 to attack stations like Langyu, Zhangjing, Qinquan, and then striking additional positions with the 30th Regiment. Across that window, stations and strongholds such as Sangzhang, Yanzigou, Langyu, and Qinquan were taken, iron bridges were destroyed, and additional stations including Potou, Xinzhuang, Saiyu, Tielugou, Xiaozhuang, and Zhangzhuang were seized or disrupted.   As the western sabotage deepened, Japanese response hardened—but the ability to coordinate weakened. With the Zhengtai line sabotaged, the western section came under the 129th Division's control except for a few places such as Shouyang. Fierce assaults forced Japanese forces to lose contact with each other within days. Strongholds were attacked, besieged, and then annihilated as communication and coordination broke down. The 129th Division mobilized local people to destroy railway facilities, stations, and installations using demolition, burning, and flooding, moving materials so the railway and related infrastructure were effectively erased rather than merely damaged.   To cover these operations, the division occupied Shinaoshan with the 14th Regiment of the general reserve. Starting the morning of August 21, Japanese forces concentrated in Yangquan and attacked Shinaoshan daily. Enemy strength reportedly rose from more than 200 to more than 600, supported by bombing and strafing and the release of poison. The 14th Regiment held out until August 25, repelling repeated attacks, and by August 26 additional pressure came again as reinforcements increased. After six days and nights—and the annihilation of more than 400 enemy soldiers—the 14th Regiment withdrew from the main peak of Shinaoshan, continuing to contain the Japanese with smaller detachments while the main force shifted to another mission.   The first phase of sabotage had succeeded, but the campaign did not allow complacency. The Japanese strengthened their presence along the railway and launched frequent counterattacks, and Japanese divisions in southern Shanxi—including the 36th, 37th, and 41st—prepared to reinforce from the north. On August 26, the Eighth Route Army Headquarters issued instructions for a second phase: continue breaking through the road, concentrate superior forces, and annihilate Japanese units smaller than a battalion that were attacking or reinforcing. In line with that guidance, the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region ordered the Jin-You Column to keep breaking through the road on August 27 for one or two days, while the 129th Division alternated daily in breaking through. Under sustained pressure, the western section of the Zhengtai Road was basically destroyed; transportation was effectively cut off except for a few towns such as Shouyang and Yangquan.   On September 2, orders were issued to conclude the Zhengtai Campaign starting from the 3rd and shift forces according to the second-step plan. As the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region launched the Mengbei Campaign, the 129th Division shifted toward attacking invading Japanese forces, while other tasks—such as attacking the He-Liao Highway and recovering cities of He and Liao—were left for later. Beginning September 2, the Military Region deployed the 2nd, 5th, 16th, and 19th Regiments toward areas north of Meng County and Shouyang to recapture enemy strongholds. With the railway sabotaged, the Japanese main force north of Meng County shifted south to reinforce, weakening garrisons and spreading panic among the strongholds. As fierce offensives intensified, garrison troops began to waver. By the afternoon of September 5, Japanese troops at Xiashe, supported by troops from Shangshe, retreated to Shangshe and fled toward Meng County overnight. That night, the 19th Regiment arrived near Shangshe and, together with the Special Service Battalion of the 2nd Military Sub-district, pursued. The 1st Battalion of the 19th Regiment advanced into Shenquan and Putian to cut off the retreat route. By 9:00 AM on September 6 the enemy was surrounded in Xingdao Village, and after five hours of intense fighting most forces were annihilated. Survivors fled east to Luolizhang Mountain, only to be surrounded again by the 19th, 5th, and 16th Regiments. By the night of September 9, most Japanese forces had been wiped out, though more than 40 men broke through in dense fog and escaped into Meng County.   The siege continued through bitter episodes involving attacks and withdrawals under poison, with both sides paying heavily for every moment of progress. Eventually, on September 11, Japanese troops in Xiyan escaped back to Meng County, helped by more than 200 Japanese already present there. Meanwhile, the Japanese attempted to counter the pressure: on September 4 they sent more than 2,000 troops to reinforce Meng County and began a counterattack. On September 10, the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region ordered the 19th and 5th Regiments to remain east and north of Meng County to coordinate with the 129th and 120th Divisions, while the rest prepared for new missions.   As fighting intensified around Zhengtai and Meng County, a parallel pressure campaign unfolded. To contain Eighth Route Army sabotage along Zhengtai, the Japanese assembled battalions from Independent Mixed 4th and 9th Brigades to strike the 129th Division. In response, the 120th Division began large-scale sabotage against the Tongpu Railway and major highways in northwestern Shanxi starting 20:00 on August 20. They captured enemy strongholds along rail and road lines, striking major bases such as Kangjiahui on the Xinjing Highway, where more than 50 Japanese and puppet troops were stationed, and also attacking other areas like Shishen, Lizhen, and Jingle. Ambushes were set to annihilate reinforcements arriving from different directions, and at 00:30 on August 21 the 2nd Battalion of the 4th Regiment attacked Kangjiahui and annihilated the defenders by dawn. Reinforcements arriving in cars were destroyed, and subsequent actions continued to expand the disruption.   Over more than 180 battles in northwestern Shanxi, the 120th Division annihilated more than 800 Japanese and puppet troops and captured or destroyed stations and strongholds including Kangjiahui, Yangfangkou, Pingshe, and Longquan. By disrupting the Tongpu Railway and transportation along the Xinjing, Taifen, and Fenli highways, they tied down Japanese forces and made it harder to reinforce Zhengtai. In practical terms, this meant the first phase of the Hundred Regiments Offensive—lasting about three weeks—ended on September 10 with major railway lines and motor roads attacked repeatedly. Roadbeds, bridges, switching yards, and installations were hit heavily; at the Qingxing coal mines, facilities were destroyed and production was halted for nearly a year.   By the end of that first phase, the campaign's logic had become clearer: once the Japanese leaned more heavily on a "cage-and-strongpoint" defense system, the same transport network that had supported their defense became less secure. When rail and road were repeatedly disrupted, strongpoints became more vulnerable—especially if Japanese units pulled out nearby detachments to respond to sabotage. So the campaign shifted from breaking transportation to attacking blockhouses and other strongpoints in contested areas, aiming to force Japanese forces back into well-defended garrisons and leave the countryside again contested by Communist forces. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. From 20 August 1940, under secrecy and rain, units of the 8th Route Army infiltrated stations, captured villages, destroyed bridges, power lines, roads, mines, and stations across multiple columns. By early September the Zhengtai and related Tongpu transport routes were repeatedly severed, forcing Japanese troops to fight isolated strongpoints and hindering reinforcement. 

Millones de jóvenes fueron movilizados en China para atacar las “viejas ideas”, en una campaña de purgas, violencia y culto a la personalidad impulsada por Mao Zedong que transformó el país y dejó profundas cicatrices políticas y sociales.

During the Second World War, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, joined by Winston Churchill, sat down with Chinese nationalist leader Chiang Kai-Shek. The purpose of the meeting, now known as the Cairo Conference, was to strategize against the Empire of Japan and make preparations for a post-war Asia.  Nearly 30 years later, President Richard Nixon, seeing an opportunity to widen the distance between China (now Communist) and the Soviet Union, paid a visit to China to meet Mao Zedong, the chair of the Communist Party. This opened diplomatic relations between the countries.  Since then, presidents have held meetings with Chinese leaders with some regularity. And President Trump is no exception. This week, he will be meeting with Xi Jinping, the President of the People's Republic of China. From AI to Iran, there is a lot on the table. To understand what to expect from this meeting, I sat down with Andrew Harding, Policy Analyst for National Securityand Indo-Pacific Affairs at The Heritage Foundation.    Email us with thoughts, questions, or suggestions: HeritageExplains@heritage.org   More on China from Heritage Experts: https://www.heritage.org/china 

President Trump is in Beijing for a state visit to America's chief global competitor, and increasingly, its chief geopolitical rival. Trump has long targeted China as an economic foe of the U.S. while cultivating a relationship with President Xi Jinping, the most powerful Chinese leader since Mao Zedong. Nick Schifrin reports from Beijing. PBS News is supported by - https://www.pbs.org/newshour/about/funders. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy

durée : 00:58:53 - Le Cours de l'histoire - par : Xavier Mauduit, Maïwenn Guiziou - Le 9 septembre 1976, Mao Zedong, président du Parti communiste chinois, décède, atteint de la maladie de Charcot. Plus tard, les membres de la bande des Quatre sont arrêtés. La Révolution culturelle chinoise est officiellement achevée. Depuis, quelles histoires de la Révolution sont racontées ? - réalisation : Thomas Beau - invités : Michel Bonnin Sinologue, directeur d'études à l'EHESS.; Chloé Froissart Sinologue, professeure de sciences politiques

President Trump is in Beijing for a state visit to America's chief global competitor, and increasingly, its chief geopolitical rival. Trump has long targeted China as an economic foe of the U.S. while cultivating a relationship with President Xi Jinping, the most powerful Chinese leader since Mao Zedong. Nick Schifrin reports from Beijing. PBS News is supported by - https://www.pbs.org/newshour/about/funders. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy

Last time we spoke about the battle Yaoyi. Japan pushed hard into Hubei with a plan: surround the main Chinese forces and seize Yichang, hoping to use it to strike at Chongqing. At first, the fighting was chaotic and punishing. The Chinese side tried to hold the line and disrupt the advance, and they even managed setbacks for the Japanese, pushing back, retaking key ground, and hitting supply and positioning weaknesses. But victory came with a cost: commanders were lost, and every gain was hard-won. Still, the battle didn't unfold as a clean Chinese retreat or a simple Japanese win. As Japanese units shifted and tested for openings, the Chinese forces adjusted—delaying, regrouping, and fighting to keep their formations from being completely trapped. Eventually, Japan managed to break through at critical moments, especially through crossings and maneuvers that the Chinese had not fully sealed off. In the end, Japan succeeded in taking Yichang, but it didn't achieve the decisive annihilation it wanted.    #201 The New Fourth Army Incident and the Strained United Front Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. After the catastrophe of the early 1930s, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) entered the war against Japan in a political mood that was both hopeful and wary: it wanted to be seen as a genuine national leader of resistance, yet it also feared being absorbed—or destroyed—by the Guomindang (KMT) state it had spent years battling. That tension became the organizing principle of the war's early years. The turning point came from the Xi'an Incident in December 1936, which forced a new calculation in Nationalist politics. In the months that followed, agreements between KMT and CCP representatives were publicly proclaimed in August and September 1937, after the Shanghai fighting began. Under these arrangements, the CCP accepted constraints that in peacetime would have looked like surrender: it pledged to strive for Sun Yixian's "Three People's Principles," to end its former policies of armed revolt and sovietization, to abolish the soviet government, and to discontinue both the term "Red Army" and the expectation that its forces would operate outside central control. Communist troops would be treated as part of the national military under KMT command, and the revolution's old administrative structures were to be formally dismantled. In return, the KMT offered the CCP something just as important: space to exist publicly and politically. Liaison offices were permitted in key cities; the CCP was allowed to publish the New China Daily; and it could nominate representatives to KMT advisory bodies. Civil rights were extended—political prisoners were released—and subsidies were established to help cover administrative and military expenses in "reintegrated" areas and territories. The war thus transformed the tactical reality on the ground: the CCP could not treat the KMT as an immediate enemy, but it also could not afford to become politically passive. It had to learn how to fight Japan while building legitimacy fast enough to survive the next phase. In the first year and a half, the Party Center focused on three problems that kept returning in different forms: how the "united front" would be defined—especially what the CCP's relationship to the National government should be; how to coordinate military strategy and tactics with Nationalist units without losing control of its own operations; and how leadership should be consolidated, particularly for Mao Zedong in a party that still contained rival centers of authority. These disputes mattered not just for doctrine but for survival, because the CCP's autonomy was constantly being tested by the very alliance that was supposed to protect it. Mao's own approach to the united front combined cooperation with a refusal to surrender independence. Publicly, the CCP praised Jiang Jieshi and the KMT and promised unity, but it did so in language that was deliberately broad. In private (and in internal party debates), Mao treated unity as conditional: the CCP must not split the united front, but it also must not be "bound hand and foot." The strategic idea that emerged was political initiative under constraints—fighting when it could plausibly claim justification, keeping enough restraint that the CCP would not appear self-interested or anti-national, and deciding for itself when to engage and when to withdraw. This balance was reinforced through military reorganization. In August–September 1937, CCP forces were reorganized as the Eighth Route Army (8RA), with roughly 30,000 men drawn from Long March survivors, local forces, and new recruits. The 8RA was divided into three divisions: the 115th, 120th, and 129th, commanded by Lin Biao, He Long, and Liu Bocheng respectively. Shortly after the war began, the National government also authorized a second major Communist force: the New Fourth Army (N4A), to operate in central China. Its core came from those left behind when the Long March began in 1934—small groups surviving in difficult conditions against continuing KMT pressure. Officially authorized at 12,000, it took months to reach that strength. Nominally commanded by Ye Ting, actual military and political control rested with Xiang Ying and Chen Yi. From the start, then, the CCP's wartime "integration" with the National system coexisted with a clear effort to preserve internal control. Ideologically, the CCP worked to make its revolutionary program compatible—at least in appearance—with a national resistance coalition. On the New Democracy demonstrated how this strategy operated on two levels. In KMT-controlled spaces, its language could be read as aligning with liberal-democratic expectations: public participation, multi-party governance, legally protected civil rights. But in CCP-controlled areas, the same text could carry sharper class-based and authoritarian implications. The Party wanted a united front that broadened support without becoming committed to Nationalist limits on how society itself might be reorganized after victory. Meanwhile, even as the rhetoric of unity rose, the CCP worried about something more dangerous than military setbacks: the possibility that the KMT might accommodate Japan. Late 1939 and early 1940 made this fear harder to dismiss. Japan pursued collaboration with Wang Jingwei, culminating in the establishment of a "reorganized" government at Nanjing in March 1940. At the same time, Japanese intermediaries sought approaches to Chiang Kai-shek himself—an effort that the CCP tracked closely as a sign that peace negotiations might be possible even when battlefield conditions looked grim. Propaganda was involved, but the anxiety was real: if Japan and the Nationalists reached an arrangement, the CCP's whole wartime legitimacy-building effort could collapse overnight. As a result, the united front was interpreted inside the CCP not as a permanent coalition with the KMT, but as a flexible strategy with a cardinal purpose: to prevent peace between Japan and the Nationalists. Mao's position on the united front reflected this. For him, the alliance was meant to suspend the possibility of a China–Japan settlement, not to end the CCP's separate identity. The CCP could participate in a reconstituted national framework—possibly even a "democratic republic"—to gain legality and influence, but it should remain politically and, where possible, physically separate from the KMT. By 1939, however, the practical meaning of "flexibility" collided with reality. What had seemed, to some observers, like an unusually cordial entente began to fade. The KMT Central Committee adopted measures early in 1939 aimed at restricting Communist expansion, and armed clashes increased through the summer and continued into autumn and winter—especially around North China Communist bases. The period of rising conflict was later labeled by the CCP as the "first anti-Communist upsurge" (roughly spanning December 1939 into March 1940), but the crucial point was that both sides viewed each confrontation as a test of legal rights, moral legitimacy, and control over territory. Strategically, the CCP understood the KMT's effort as an attempt to check unauthorized growth of Communist armed power and to recover areas where influence had already slipped away—either to the Communists or, by indirect effect, to Japan. The KMT emphasized its traditional legal authority; the CCP countered with its claim to an "evolutionary" moral right to challenge the government's legitimacy. In practice, the conflict took the form of increasingly systematic military pressure, including a blockade around the Shen–Gan–Ning region. By this point, the blockade involved large numbers of troops (on the order of hundreds of thousands), halting Communist expansion and disrupting direct contact with other Communist forces farther afield, even as fighting flared along border zones and around vulnerable points in the Communist defensive perimeter. So, by the edge of the "middle years," the wartime alliance had not broken into open civil war—but it had also stopped being secure. The united front survived, yet it operated under strain: its language of cooperation continued, while "friction" between partners hardened into a central feature of the resistance struggle. Transition into the war's second phase began in early 1939, shaped by the stalemate Mao had already anticipated at the sixth plenum in late 1938. Mao argued that during this prolonged "new stage" the forces of resistance—above all, Communist-led forces—would strengthen. The overall result, however, was mixed. In Shandong and Central China, new Communist bases did take shape. But across much of North China, Japanese consolidation cost the resistance heavily in manpower and population. Base-area economies suffered serious strain, and the peasantry endured hardships more severe than at any earlier point. This stalemate had two main dimensions. The first was the growing resentment of the Nationalists toward Communist expansion—resentment made especially sharp by their own losses. As the Nationalists were driven out of regions that had previously provided them their greatest wealth and power in the central and lower Yangtze basin, they also lost the "cream" of their armies. In contrast, the CCP was spreading through the wider countryside behind Japanese lines, extending its influence and winning broader popular support. The second dimension was Japan's desire—and need—to consolidate territories it had only nominally conquered and to extract economic value from them. After all, the logic of the "China Incident" was to draw on China's labor and resources to strengthen Japan, not to bleed Japan's gains away by draining wealth into China's vast interior. A Japanese colonel, lamenting the situation, captured the frustration of this drift into deeper entanglement: he regretted that Japan had not ended the "China Incident" once its initial objectives were reached. Instead, Japan was drawn into the hinterland and became bogged down in endless attrition—leaving it with little more than "real estate" rather than the popular support it believed it would secure from those it claimed to "liberate." To improve their position, Japanese authorities—still fragmented by internal rivalry—pursued several strategies. One was a new peace offensive aimed simultaneously at Jiang Jieshi, alongside efforts to establish a "reformed" Nationalist government under Wang Jingwei, who had fled Chongqing in December 1938. Japan also recruited more collaborators and puppet officials. Finally, it carried out forceful military, political, and economic measures intended to establish effective territorial control and eliminate opposition. During the middle years of the war, the Communists described their conflicts with the Nationalists using the euphemism "friction". By 1939, what many observers—possibly incorrectly—had viewed as an unusually warm alliance began to break down. In early 1939, the KMT Central Committee adopted measures meant to restrict the CCP. From the summer onward, military clashes began and continued into autumn and winter with increasing frequency and intensity, most of them concentrated around and within the North China base areas. The Communists later labeled the period from December 1939 to March 1940 the "first anti-Communist upsurge." Naturally, each side accused the other of aggression and claimed self-defense against unjust attacks. Strategically, though, the North China "upsurge" functioned as a Nationalist attempt to limit the CCP's expansion beyond the areas assigned to it and to regain influence in regions the Communists—or the Japanese—had already taken from the KMT. Jiang Jieshi framed the matter as a defense of legal rights grounded in tradition, while the Communists asserted an "evolutionary" right to challenge the moral legitimacy of those legal claims. During 1939, the Nationalists began to blockade Shen–Gan–Ning around its southern and western perimeter. Within a year, this blockade grew to nearly 400,000 troops, including some of the last remaining Central Army units under the command of Hu Zongnan. The blockade stopped further Communist expansion, especially into Gansu and Suiyuan, and severed direct contact between SKN and Communists operating in Xinjiang (Chinese Turkestan) adjacent to Soviet Central Asia. The Xinjiang Communists—including Mao Zedong's brother—were eliminated in 1942. Meanwhile, fierce fighting erupted along the Gansu–Shaanxi border and in the north-eastern corner of SKN near the Great Wall at Suide, as the blockading forces probed for weak points. Elements of He Long's 120th Division were even pulled back from the Jin–Sui base across the Yellow River to strengthen SKN's regular defenses. Economically, the blockade was even more damaging. During 1939, central government subsidies to the Border Region budget were cut off. Trade between the Border Region and other parts of China nearly stopped, a devastating blow to a region unable to supply itself with many basic commodities. At the same time, Nationalist and regional forces also attempted to expand their military and administrative authority into Hebei, Shanxi, Henan, and Shandong—areas the CCP now considered its base zones. In resisting these efforts, the CCP predictable accused its rivals of harming resistance work and damaging the people's interests. The "experts in dissension" were said to cooperate with the Japanese and their puppets. Based on increasing collaboration by regional units with Japan, the CCP implied that this was a deliberate and cynical strategy—described as "crooked-line patriotism"—intended to preserve those units for future anti-Communist operations. Even so, the CCP tried to avoid an open break with the Nationalist regime in Chongqing. In public, it consistently portrayed these clashes as being initiated by local commanders acting beyond orders from higher authority—despite knowing this depiction was false. Jiang Jieshi, unable to refute the claim outright, effectively permitted it to serve as the justification for a firm Communist response. Mao Zedong outlined the general resistance policy as "justification, expedience, and restraint". The CCP was to fight when it could claim justification and when it could gain advantage, but not to press attacks beyond what the Nationalists would tolerate or in ways that could damage its image as selfless patriots. Communist forces were expected to keep initiative as much as possible in their own hands—deciding when to engage, whether to engage, and when to disengage. The most striking episode of the "first anti-Communist upsurge" was the rupture with Yan Xishan in December 1939. Tensions in Shanxi had been rising throughout the summer and autumn, as Yan and his conservative supporters—associated with the "Old Army"—linked the Sacrifice League and the Dare-to-die Corps of the "New Army" with Communist forces. When base areas and Japanese occupation eventually took over much of his province, Yan was forced into exile at Qiulin across the Yellow River in Shaanxi. In November, Yan ordered his Old Army to disarm the Dare-to-die forces with help from central units dispatched by Hu Zongnan. In the bloody fighting that followed, these elements gradually broke free of even nominal provincial control and fully completed their connection with Communist forces. More than 30,000 people went over to the Communists. One KMT intelligence agent described the process with bitterness and a sense of inevitability: the Communists were first "full of sweet words," flattery, and distortions designed to open things up and conceal their actions. But once they had fully entrenched themselves, and once the low-level base had been established, they turned and bit. The agent suggested they had suspected things might end this way, but were not aware how quickly events would move—or that it could happen precisely while Communist calls for "united front" and "maintenance of unity for resistance" filled the air. About a month later, in February and March 1940, elements of the 8RA beat back this so-called upsurge. Zhang Yinwu's forces were disarmed and dispersed across the plains of north Hebei. To the south, Chu Huaiping and Shi Yusan were pushed out of the base area, as was the KMT-appointed provincial governor Lu Zhonglin. Although some non-Communist forces remained in the region, the CCP's and CCLY bases were never again seriously threatened by forces affiliated with the central government. Reinforcing the CCP's accusations, Shi Yusan was later executed in 1940 by the central government for collaboration with the Japanese. By late 1939, CCP central authorities maintained that the areas where the CCP could expand its armed strength were mainly limited to Shandong and Central China. In those regions, the CCP continued trying to carve out bases where they could operate. The situation in Shandong was complicated. After the Japanese invasion, most Nationalist-affiliated forces stayed in the province, while Communist forces and bases were weaker and more scattered than further west. Only in late 1938 did major 8RA units from the 115th and 129th Divisions—led by Xu Xiangqian and Luo Ronghuan—enter Shandong to link up with the Shandong column and local guerrillas, including survivors of a large band recently decimated by the Japanese. Even with these efforts, Communist actions led to clashes not only with Japanese forces but also with various Nationalist-affiliated groups—groups that were stronger than the Communists at the time. Until late 1940, the CCP's clashes with Nationalist forces in Shandong were actually bloodier than clashes with the Japanese. The CCP understood that its Chinese rivals mistrusted one another, and that their attitudes toward the CCP varied widely. The main Nationalist forces were often not tightly affiliated with Chiang Kai-shek or the central government. Instead, they operated under independent—and at times disgruntled—regional commanders. Communist tactics were expressed through slogans emphasizing ways to win support and isolate hardliners: develop progressive forces and win over fence-sitters while isolating "die-hards"; flatter top echelons, enlist the middle ranks, and hit the rank and file; and win over Yi Xuezhong, isolate Shen Honglie, and eliminate Qin Qirong. Still, unlike other North China base areas, the Communists were unable for several years to neutralize Nationalist forces in Shandong. Even if Japanese mop-up campaigns had not weakened those Nationalists, the text suggests the Communists may still have struggled to do so. By November 1940, Xu Xiangqian claimed meaningful progress while admitting Shandong had not yet become a fully consolidated base. CCP successes were greatest along parts of the Shandong–Hebei border, around the Taishan massif in central Shandong, and near the tip of the peninsula far to the east. Elsewhere, "progressive forces" remained weak. Communist regular troops numbered about 70,000, which was far below the party center's goals of 150,000 regulars and between 1.5 and 2 million self-defense forces. Moreover, systematic economic reforms had barely begun. The CCP relied on familiar practices—confiscations, collections of "national salvation grain," contributions, and loans—alongside a conventional taxation system adjusted to favor poorer peasants. Communist expansion in Central China was even riskier, with a greater likelihood of large-scale conflict with central government forces than in the north. In much of North China, "friction" came primarily from rapid Communist expansion into areas with partial vacuums. In Central China, however, base-building required displacing an existing Nationalist military-administrative presence closely tied to Jiang Kai-shek and the Chongqing government. The burden of this expansion was carried mainly by the 6th Detachment (northern Anhui and Jiangsu) and the 5th Detachment, which was reinforced by 15,000 to 20,000 8RA troops under Huang K'o-ch'eng. As Chen Yi's 1st Detachment crossed from south to north through the corridor provided by Guan Wenwei's local forces, it became actively involved as well. This expansion—driven by increasingly urgent directives from Mao and Liu during the latter part of 1939 and into 1940—brought the N4A north of the river into ever more frequent and sharper clashes with Nationalist authorities in Anhui and Jiangsu, especially with units under Jiangsu governor Han Deqin. South of the river, though, Xiang Ying did not directly challenge Chongqing's commanders. Mao later charged that Xiang Ying may have been influenced by Wang Ming, or else he may simply have seen no realistic alternative. His forces—three detachments plus a headquarters unit—were heavily outnumbered by Qu Chutong's Nationalist units, not to mention Japanese forces and their puppets. Even if Mao insisted bases could be built "anywhere," the Shanghai–Hangzhou–Nanjing triangle was especially difficult terrain. Xiang Ying and his followers had survived with extraordinary tenacity in the mountains of South China between 1934 and 1937, enduring brutal search-and-destroy operations that were not lifted until the war began. It therefore seems unlikely that such survivors would suddenly become "right-wing capitulationists."  Yet by spring 1940, Mao was pressing Xiang Ying more intensely. The Central Committee's message was explicit: expansion was necessary in all cases. It meant reaching into all enemy-occupied areas rather than being bound by the Kuomintang's restrictions—going beyond Kuomintang limits, not waiting for official appointments, not depending on higher-ups for financing, and instead expanding armed forces freely and independently. It also meant setting up base areas without hesitation, independently mobilizing the masses in those areas, and building united front organs of political power under Communist Party leadership. The struggle between Nationalists and Communists involved more than contests for control of territory behind Japanese lines. It also involved national-level politics, ideology, and leadership. One worrying development for the CCP was the campaign throughout 1939 to expand Jiang Kai-shek's prestige and formal power—adding more titles for him across major party, government, and military positions. In early 1939, the Central Executive Committee appointed him "director-general" of the Kuomintang, a title reminiscent of the one previously held by Sun Yat-sen. In addition, during the summer and autumn of 1939 there was talk of constitutional rule. In November, the KMT announced plans to convene a constitutional assembly the following year. If Jiang could fulfill these promises, he and his government could gain new legitimacy and wider popularity. Mao and his colleagues could not allow this to go unchallenged. If the Nationalists were to have a paramount leader and authoritative spokesperson, the CCP needed one as well. The timing of Mao's famous "On the new democracy"—written in late 1939 and published the next January—was therefore no accident. Its substance had been anticipated earlier, but its final timing and full development were shaped by the KMT's constitutional movement. The CCP's entry into this competition served as both a bid for support away from the KMT and a statement of the multi-class united front that the CCP wanted to lead. Although "On the new democracy" was written in a tone that seemed moderate, it persuaded many Chinese readers that the CCP had either diluted its revolutionary objectives or postponed them to a distant future. In Kuomintang-controlled areas, the work could be read through the liberal values associated with Anglo-American democracy—popular participation, multi-party government, legally protected civil rights. In CCP-controlled territories, the same language carried stronger authoritarian, class-based meanings. In internal documents meant for party audiences rather than public consumption, the ambiguity was removed, showing a tough but patient and flexible commitment not only to resistance but also to social control and social change. During this same period, the Communists expressed deep concern about Nationalist capitulation to Japan—not only on the battlefield behind Japanese lines but also at the highest levels. Some of this concern was propaganda, but beneath propaganda lay genuine anxiety. In late 1939 and early 1940, politically aware Chinese already knew that Japan was negotiating with the unpredictable Wang Jingwei, who had fled Chongqing a year earlier. A "reorganized national government" in Nanjing was finally established in March 1940, representing the most formidable collaboration with Japan to date. Less well known, but equally important, was that Japan was also seeking an understanding directly with Jiang Kai-shek through intermediaries in Hong Kong. This effort, called "Operation Kiri"—described as spreading a "feast for Chiang"—combined intrigue with a kind of dark comedy. Reports suggested Chiang's reported interest in peace could have been a stratagem designed to discredit Wang Jingwei by keeping him waiting. But even if Chiang had no intention of coming to terms with Japan, the Communists could not be sure what the outcome would be until after the multi-pronged peace offensive had failed. By the middle of 1940, China had never been so isolated. In Europe, the "phony war" ended in the spring when Germany launched a blitz across the Low Countries. France fell soon after, and England appeared likely to be next. Japan used this moment to press China to sever its last tenuous connections to the outside world: cutting the Burma Road, trade with neutral Hong Kong, and the rail link running from Hanoi to Kunming. At the same time, Russia was engaged in a difficult and embarrassing war with Finland and reduced military aid to the Nationalists. The United States was only gradually moving away from isolationism and clearly regarded England as more important than China. In Chongqing and elsewhere in "Free China," signs of war weariness, despair, and demoralization were visible. Under these circumstances, Mao's insistence on aggressive expansion was a calculated risk—either it would deter any Japanese advance, or it would place the Communists in the strongest possible position in case a split between the KMT and the CCP became unavoidable. In Central China, the size and pace of the fighting kept increasing, starting in the final months of 1939. One flashpoint was the clash between Luo Pinghui's 5th Detachment and units of Han Deqin's Jiangsu force near Lake Gaoyou. In the following months, Guan Wenwei's forces ranged along the left bank of the Yangtze, repeatedly running into Luo's troops as they operated farther north. Luo also began receiving some 8RA reinforcements, moving them south through areas controlled by the 6th Detachment. Clearly, a major showdown was taking shape across north and central Jiangsu. At the same time, the South Yangtze Command was doing poorly. Nationalist commanders Leng Xin and Qu Chutong restricted its activities so severely that Mao and Liu gradually abandoned the idea of building a unified, consolidated base in that region. During late spring and early summer, Chen Yi moved most of his 1st and 2nd Detachments north of the Yangtze. In September, the 3rd Detachment followed suit, crossing the river into the area around Lake Chaohu, where the 4th Detachment was already stationed. After these moves, only the Headquarters Detachment—under Ye Ting and Xiang Ying—remained south of the Yangtze, positioned at Qingxian in southern Anhui. As the military situation edged toward an open confrontation, negotiations began in June 1940 between representatives of the KMT and the CCP. The core issues were Communist operating zones and the authorized strength of the armies led by the CCP. Proposals were exchanged, followed by equally sharp and hostile counter-proposals, but no agreement was reached. The KMT viewed it as a concession to permit the CCP "free rein" north of the pre-1938 course of the Yellow River, with the exception of southern Shanxi, which was to remain under the influence of Yan Xishan. In exchange, the KMT demanded that all 8RA and N4A units evacuate Central China. In effect, the KMT was offering the CCP something it was already prepared to allow, in return for the CCP giving up what it might soon be able to obtain by force of arms. Nationalist authorities then issued a set of deadlines, but without clearly stating what would happen if those deadlines were violated. On the surface, the CCP appeared to be complying in part. The movements of Chen Yi and the South Yangtze Command could look like obedience, but in reality they were responses to orders coming from their own superior leadership rather than instructions issued by the Nationalists. Even so, Xiang Ying's continued delays and evasions during the autumn and winter of 1940 remained puzzling. One possibility is that he felt—quite reasonably—that Mao had already lost confidence in him and that once he crossed to the north bank of the river he would lose his command. Another complication was that directives from Yan'an were sometimes ambiguous and even contradictory. He may also have been trying to reach secure understandings with KMT commanders about evacuation routes and guaranteed safe conduct out of the area. For a period, Han Teqin kept most of his forces—estimated at about 70,000 men, far outnumbering the N4A—in north Jiangsu, thereby blocking the expansion of the 6th Detachment and slowing further southern intrusions by 8RA troops. But by mid-summer he realized he would have to counter the N4A build-up in central Jiangsu, or else risk writing that region off to the Communists. A confusing sequence of engagements then unfolded, culminating in a decisive battle in early October 1940 near the central Jiangsu town of Huangjiao. Over the course of four days, several of Han's main-force units belonging to the 89th Army were destroyed, while others were scattered. That battle also served as a signal for the 6th Detachment to advance more aggressively in the north. In the aftermath, one of Han's principal commanders entered collaboration with the CCP, while another defected to the Nanjing government under Wang Jingwei. Although Han Teqin managed to maintain a foothold in Jiangsu until 1943, his real power had been broken. Relatively little attention was paid to the battle of Huangjiao in the Chinese press. The KMT did not want to publicize what it considered a disastrous defeat, while the Communists were satisfied to stay silent about an episode that conflicted with their proclaimed policy of a united front. As could be expected, during the autumn—after Han Teqin's defeat—KMT-CCP negotiations deteriorated further. In early December, Jiang Kai-shek personally ordered that all N4A forces withdraw from southern Anhui and southern Jiangsu by 31 December. He also ordered that the entire 8RA be positioned north of the Yellow River by the same deadline, followed one month later by the N4A. Discussions then followed between Ye Ting and Qu Chutong's deputies concerning the route to be taken, safe conduct, and—astonishingly—the money and supplies that were to be provided to the N4A to help it move. On 25 December, Mao Zedong ordered Xiang Ying to begin evacuating immediately. Yet it was not until 4 January 1941 that Ye and Xiang actually started moving. Almost immediately, Qu Chutong's forces harassed and dispersed the N4A Headquarters Group, which included administrative personnel, wounded soldiers and dependents, as well as combat-ready troops. In an attempt to reorganize, they moved southwest toward Maolin, where they were surrounded by Nationalists and, over the next several days, were cut to pieces. Losses were heavy on both sides. The CCP suffered an estimated 9,000 casualties. Xiang Ying tried twice to break out of the blockade on his own, but failed. He was then denounced as a deserter by Ye Ting, who took over full command of the doomed forces. Xiang Ying eventually escaped, but he was killed a couple of months later by one of his own bodyguards, motivated by the N4A gold reserves that he had taken with him. Up to the very end, Xiang either failed or refused to seek refuge in Liu Shaoqi's domain north of the Yangtze. The unfortunate Ye Ting was arrested and spent the rest of the war in prison. He was finally released in 1946, only to die one month later in a plane crash, along with several other high-ranking party members. On 17 January, Jiang Kai-shek declared that the New Fourth Army was dissolved for insubordination. Direct contacts between Yan'an and Chongqing nearly came to an end, and CCP military liaison offices in several cities held by the Nationalists were closed. This is what became known as the New Fourth Army incident, also referred to as the South Anhui incident. Clearly, it functioned as an act of retaliation for the defeats suffered by Han Teqin in north and central Jiangsu. It ended any realistic prospect of establishing a consolidated Communist base south of the Yangtze. Still, from a strategic perspective, these losses were ultimately more than offset by the gains achieved farther north. In fact, only a few months later, the reorganized N4A quietly began reintroducing some units into this region, where they carried out guerrilla activities without possessing a secure territorial base. Unlike the relative silence surrounding the fighting at Huangjiao, the New Fourth Army incident sparked bitter, prolonged controversy. The CCP argued that it was a second "anti-Communist upsurge," even more serious than the first. Presenting themselves as martyred patriots, they depicted their opponents as people who wanted to end the War of Resistance through what they called "Sino-Japanese cooperation" aimed at "suppressing the Communists." In their account, the Nationalists wanted to replace the war of resistance with civil war, substitute capitulation for independence, trade unity for a split, and replace light with darkness. People were telling each other the news and were horrified. Indeed, they claimed that the situation had never been as critical as it was at that moment. The Nationalist response, of course, was that provocations had been numerous and serious, and that violations of military discipline could not be tolerated. But the KMT's unwillingness to describe in detail its own defeats at the CCP's hands left it speaking in broad generalities. In the propaganda battle, the CCP clearly gained the better position and won more political capital. If it was politically valuable to be regarded as a national hero, it was even more valuable to be seen as a national martyr.  Many Chinese—and some outside—observers were genuinely alarmed and feared that civil war might openly resume. Yet, with a few exceptions, the events that culminated in the New Fourth Army incident have generally been interpreted as marking the breakdown of the second united front. That interpretation, however, is described as being wrong in two respects. First, the CCP understood the united front not as a narrow arrangement limited to a few major partners, but as a strategy that could be applied flexibly to all political, military, and social forces in China—from the highest levels of the central government down to the smallest village. Relations with Jiang Jieshi and the Guomindang regime mattered, but they did not, by themselves, constitute the whole of the united front. Even regarding Jiang and the Nationalists specifically, the common reading is said to be misguided. Throughout the war, a cardinal objective of the united front was to prevent peace between Japan and the Nationalists. Therefore, if clashes between CCP forces and those of the central government on such a large scale as at Huangjiao and Maolin could occur without leading to peace with Japan and without triggering a full-scale resumption of civil war, then this should not be understood as the end of the united front—it should be seen as its fundamental vindication. If friction at that scale could nevertheless be tolerated by Jiang Jieshi, then fears about his future accommodation with Japan were greatly reduced. Following the New Fourth Army incident, the CCP reorganized its political and military presence in Central China. The Central Plains and South-east China Bureaus were merged and renamed the Central China Bureau, with Liu Shaoqi placed in charge, reflecting the area's importance to Party Central. The New Fourth Army was also reorganized completely and substantially regularized. Chen Yi became its new acting commander, since Ye Ting was imprisoned. He directed the force, now divided into seven divisions. Each division had territorial responsibilities, and in each region the CCP claimed the establishment of a base. Indeed, base construction proceeded in earnest only after the friction of 1940 and the New Fourth Army incident. In the years that followed, the operating areas of the First through Fourth Divisions contained expanding enclaves of consolidated territory, where military dominance was joined with open party work: administrative control, the development of mass organizations, local elections, and socio-economic reforms. The other three areas fluctuated between semi-consolidated and guerrilla status. With the incident, the worst phase of the KMT-CCP conflict was now over. When CCP documents later speak of a third upsurge in 1943, they refer to something openly political. With the exception of Shandong—where a fairly strong Nationalist presence persisted for a longer time—the overall balance of power among Chinese forces behind Japanese lines had shifted in favor of the CCP by mid-1941. In subsequent years the CCP's predominance became even more pronounced, until by the end of 1943 the Communists were virtually beyond challenge by Chinese rivals.   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. After the CCP and KMT entered the united front, cooperation felt conditional from the start. Mao pushed the New Fourth Army to reorganize and preserve Communist autonomy, even as the 1937 agreements publicly pledged obedience to KMT leadership. In 1939–40 the Communists worried that Chiang might negotiate peace with Japan; so they expanded bases and military presence, triggering repeated clashes. The pressure intensified when KMT orders forced the New Fourth Army to evacuate south Anhui in late 1940. 

durée : 00:58:42 - Le Cours de l'histoire - par : Xavier Mauduit, Maïwenn Guiziou - En mai 1966, la Révolution culturelle éclate dans la Chine de Mao Zedong. En quelques mois, les Gardes rouges, mouvement de masse de lycéens et d'étudiants, pourchassent les intellectuels et bourgeois. Pour promouvoir l'idéologie révolutionnaire, des affiches sont diffusées dans tout le pays. - réalisation : Thomas Beau - invités : Yves Chevrier Sinologue et historien; Sebastian Veg Sinologue et historien

7 HoursPG-13Back in the beginning of 2021, as Pete was transitioning out of libertarianism, he and Bird got together to do a series on the Four Swords of Marxism: Vladimir Lenin, Joseph Stalin, Mao Zedong, Abimael Guzman, and added in post-Marxist, Hans-Hermann Hoppe.Here is the complete audio.Timeline Earth PodcastPete and Thomas777 'At the Movies'Support Pete on His WebsitePete's PatreonPete's SubstackPete's SubscribestarPete's GUMROADPete's VenmoPete's Buy Me a CoffeePete on FacebookPete on Twitter

Between 1959 and 1961, between thirty and forty million people starved to death in China. The Great Famine had many causes, and one of them was a campaign to eradicate sparrows.Shaoda Wang of the University of Chicago tells Tim Phillips about Mao Zedong's 1958 Four Pests Campaign, which led to the mass killing of sparrows, set off a chain of consequences that scientists had warned about, but political pressure had silenced. Sparrows eat crops, but they also eat the locusts and other insects that destroy the crops. Remove the sparrows and the pests go unchecked. Wang and his co-authors estimate the eradication cut national grain yields by 8-9%, accounting for roughly a fifth of the total agricultural decline during the famine.The research behind this episode:Frank, Eyal G., Qinyun Wang, Shaoda Wang, Xuebin Wang, and Yang You. 2024. "Campaigning for Extinction: Eradication of Sparrows and the Great Famine in China." NBER Working Paper 34087.To cite this episode:Phillips, Tim, and Shaoda Wang. 2025. "How killing sparrows contributed to the Great Chinese Famine.” VoxDev Talk (podcast). Assign this as extra listening. The citation above is formatted and ready for a reading list or VLE.About Shaoda WangShaoda Wang is an assistant professor at the Harris School of Public Policy, University of Chicago. His research spans environmental economics, political economy and development, with a focus on how state capacity and political incentives shape environmental and health outcomes in China and other developing countries.Research cited in this episodeThe Four Pests Campaign (1958). Launched as part of Mao Zedong's Great Leap Forward, the campaign targeted rats, flies, mosquitoes and sparrows. Sparrows were included on the grounds that they ate grain and reduced agricultural yields. Several prominent Chinese scientists warned at the time that removing sparrows would destabilise the food chain by eliminating a key predator of crop pests, particularly locusts. Their advice was ignored. The campaign resulted in the killing of an estimated two billion sparrows.County gazetteers as a data source. Official harvest data reported by local governments to the central government during the Great Leap Forward was heavily inflated; local officials faced strong political incentives to overstate output, and those exaggerated figures contributed to the famine by masking food shortages from central planners. Wang and his co-authors instead use county gazetteers: records compiled by local elites through a bottom-up process with no link to the political reward structures that distorted official reporting. Comparison between the two sources reveals the scale of over-reporting in the official data.Sparrow habitat suitability index. Rather than relying on reported sparrow kill counts, which were distorted by local officials seeking to demonstrate compliance with campaign targets, the paper constructs an index of how suitable each county's climate and ecological conditions are for sparrow habitation. Counties with high sparrow suitability were more exposed to the shock of eradication; comparing their crop yield and mortality trajectories against low-suitability counties before and after the campaign provides the causal identification strategy. The two groups followed similar trajectories before the campaign; divergence afterwards is attributed to the eradication.State food procurement as a famine amplifier. The Great Famine was not simply a production shortfall. The central government continued to export food during the famine years because inflated harvest reports gave it no signal of the actual crisis. State procurement quotas extracted grain from rural communities at a time when households were already facing starvation; the political system that caused the sparrow eradication was also the mechanism that amplified its consequences.More VoxDev Talks on this topicThe economics of ecosystems: How nature and economies interact. Eyal Frank of the University of Chicago — a co-author of the sparrows paper — on how to measure the economic value of biodiversity. His research on bats and white-nose syndrome, and on desert locusts, shows what happens when natural pest control collapses; the sparrows episode is the historical counterpart.Related reading on VoxDevThe political economy of policy learning: Evidence from China, a VoxDev article on how misaligned incentives across China's political hierarchy distort policy experimentation and produce systematically exaggerated signals — the same dynamic that inflated both the sparrow kill counts and the harvest figures during the Great Leap Forward.Autocratic rule and social capital: Evidence from Imperial China, a VoxDev article on the long-run effects of political persecution under autocratic rule in China, and how the suppression of dissent shapes economic and social behaviour across generations.The economics of conservation in low- and middle-income countries, a VoxDev article surveying the evidence on maintaining natural ecosystems, the role of governance, and the costs of losing species whose economic value is not yet understood.

Mike sits down with author and Cultural Revolution survivor Xi Van Fleet for a conversation that's equal parts personal history and cautionary tale. Xi recounts her childhood under Mao Zedong's China, where conformity wasn't encouraged—it was enforced. As a schoolgirl, she watched teachers publicly humiliated, neighbors turn on each other, and young people mobilized as ideological foot soldiers. Education gave way to indoctrination, and individuality was crushed in favor of collective obedience—the kind that produces "shiny little screws." Drawing from her first book, Mao's America, Xi lays out how mass movements rooted in ideology often rely on dividing people into opposing groups—"good" versus "bad"—to consolidate power. She also comments on how youth are frequently weaponized to accelerate cultural upheaval and dismantle traditional institutions, often by encouraging them to reject established norms and embrace radical ideologies. These patterns, she argues, aren't relics of history—they're recurring tactics. And they are showing up in America today! The conversation then turns to her latest work, Made in America, where the focus shifts from warning signs to origin stories. The central theme: the rise of Communist China wasn't inevitable—it was, in part, enabled by decisions made in the United States. Xi explores how decades of policy, economic cooperation, and ideological blind spots helped transform China into a global superpower, creating what she sees as one of America's greatest modern challenges. It's a conversation less about politics and more about people, choices, and consequences where Xi ends with a warning to America and why resisting the urge to become a "shiny little screw" might be more important than ever. Big thanks to our awesome sponsors ZipRecruiter.com/Rowe to post a job for FREE. GoodRanchers.com Use code MIKE to get $40 off your first order and free meat for life. Pestie.com/Mike to get an extra 10% off your order. AuraFrames.com/Mike Use code MIKE to get $25 off their best-selling Carver Mat frame.

In the 1950s, Mao Zedong described the relationship between China and North Korea as “as close as lips and teeth.” Over subsequent decades, the relationship has ebbed and flowed, alternating between close alignment and periods of strain. In recent months, China-NK ties appear to be warming once again. A series of high-level exchanges, including Kim Jong Un's attendance at China's Victory Day parade last September, followed by a trip to North Korea by Chinese Premier Li Qiang the following month, suggest renewed diplomatic momentum. Chinese Foreign Affairs Commission Director and Foreign Minister Wang Yi's visit to Pyongyang in mid-April is the latest sign of this trend. What is driving this renewed rapprochement between China and North Korea, and what are the implications for the United States? To explore these questions, we are joined today by Andrew Scobell. Andrew is a Distinguished Fellow at the Institute for Security and Development Policy's Asia Program and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University. His work focuses on Chinese foreign and security policy, and he has published extensively on China-North Korea relations. Timestamps: [00:00] Introduction  [01:38] China's Interests on the Korean Peninsula [04:41] A Cooling of Pyongyang-Beijing Relations? [07:48] How Beijing Views Russia-North Korea Ties  [11:26] What's Driving Chinese Interest in North Korea [14:57] Assessing Wang Yi's Visit to Pyongyang  [18:20] Shifting Stances on Denuclearization [22:09] Implications for the United States [25:48] US-China Shared Interests on the Korean Peninsula

Jesus can easily be relegated in our minds to specific areas of our lives or in popular art. We see depictions of him in paintings, music, and films. But, Jesus is more real and more present to us than any artistic representation can reproduce. This blogcast explores “Jesus Alive: Encountering the Truth of Christ" from the Ad Infinitum blog, written by Brady Baylis and read by Jonathan Harrison.I think there is something special about a cover—about taking a song, a painting, or a movie and recreating it within the modern frame of mind. Aretha Franklin's bold and unapologetic “Respect” is a perfect example, as she interprets the song as a Black woman in the 1960's. As is Jimi Hendrix's “All Along the Watchtower,” in which he narrates the song with hauntingly beautiful guitar riffs. In visual art, Andy Warhol recreates the portrait of Mao Zedong with a messy array of bright colors—an unusual depiction of the dictator. Finally, modern movies, headlined by the Cohen Brothers' True Grit, give life to old characters and stories, recreating them for new audiences.However, even the Beatles, the most covered band of all time, cannot compete with the millions of interpretations of Jesus Christ. Thousands of artists have painted Christ crucified or the Madonna and Child. Everyone from Van Gogh, Basquiat, or da Vinci have painted Jesus Christ, each in their own manner. It can be mind-numbing to try to flip through them all, viewing each painting, alien to the others, and, oftentimes, to us. There are always two questions to ask when discussing art: “What is this artist trying to say?” and “What do we think he or she is trying to say?”These questions matter much more when investigating faith. In a special way, how artists of all disciplines—including sculptors, writers, or directors—interpret Jesus will affect us. Every Catholic, no doubt, thinks of Jesus through some piece of art or another, but Jesus is more than just a collection of paints, words, or images. Jesus is alive. It is tempting to trap Him in a Caravaggio, an El Greco, or even in the Passion of the Christ—to prevent Him from challenging us. Jesus as represented in art cannot call us out in our sins; He cannot tell us the hard truths we need to wrestle with. Even further, we should not trap Jesus in the Church or solely in the Mass. Yes, we are oftentimes challenged in specific ways during the Mass, especially when a priest gives a difficult homily. It can be easy, however, to selectively hear the priest, interpreting him and hearing only what we want to hear. We often want a sanitized Jesus, one that affirms us and makes us feel good. But while Jesus resides in the tabernacle and comes to meet us in every celebration of the Eucharist, He cannot be left there. Jesus wants to encounter us personally in order for us to help others encounter Him.Jesus always challenged His disciples to worship, act, and believe in accordance with truth. Jesus was not “sanitized” or acting in the “proper way” when He overturned the tables of the money changers; He was not “sanitized” when He described the narrow way; and He surely was not clean and tidy when He died on the Cross. Jesus defied our expectations. He was filled with passion for God's truth. While He is Beauty itself, Jesus often made His listeners look away as they were unable to embrace the unsavory truth that can be hard to swallow.I enjoy going to Washington's National Gallery of Art or New York's MET, but next time I see Christ there, I will be reminded that He is not trapped in the golden walls of the frame. Jesus is alive, living in the Eucharist and in others. While it is beautiful to witness Jesus in the arts, we must remember that Christ lives in the audience, the museum goers. While the beauty of the art itself is mesmerizing, Christ is alive in flesh, both on the altar and in people who remind us that, while beautiful, Christ's message is a challenge.  Author:Brady Baylis is alum of The Catholic University of America with a degree in history and secondary education. Resources:Listen to On Mission: Eucharistic Revival: Year of MissionEucharist podcastsRead the Ad Infinitum blogBlog posts about the Eucharist Follow us:The Catholic Apostolate CenterThe Center's podcast websiteInstagramFacebookApple PodcastsSpotify Fr. Frank Donio, S.A.C. also appears on the podcast, On Mission, which is produced by the Catholic Apostolate Center and you can also listen to his weekly Sunday Gospel reflections. Follow the Center on Facebook, Instagram, X (Twitter), and YouTube to remain up-to-date on the latest Center resources.

En el Radar Empresarial de hoy presentamos una firma que probablemente resulte desconocida para muchos: Hongqi. Pese a su escasa visibilidad en Europa, esta marca china de automoción se perfila como un nuevo competidor para los fabricantes del continente. Según una información exclusiva de Reuters, mantiene conversaciones con Stellantis para facilitar su entrada en el mercado europeo. El plan contempla aprovechar alguna de las plantas que el grupo posee en España para iniciar su producción local. El fabricante de vehículos eléctricos Leapmotor actúa como puente en estas negociaciones entre ambas compañías. Se trata de una estrategia a medio plazo, con la vista puesta en 2028 como fecha clave para su desembarco en el Viejo Continente. Para entonces, Hongqi pretende lanzar alrededor de doce modelos entre eléctricos e híbridos. Europa ocupa un papel esencial en su hoja de ruta internacional, ya que aspira a comercializar un millón de unidades anuales en 2030. De ese volumen, la empresa confía en que al menos un 10% proceda de ventas fuera de China. Sus previsiones no se basan únicamente en expectativas optimistas, sino en un desempeño reciente sólido. En 2025, la compañía entregó 460.000 automóviles, un 11% más que el año anterior, encadenando además ocho ejercicios consecutivos de crecimiento. Los eléctricos tienen un peso decisivo en su negocio, con 150.000 unidades vendidas el pasado año. La marca busca replicar en Europa el éxito alcanzado por BYD, que en 2025 creció más de un 200% y en algunos momentos llegó a superar a Tesla. No obstante, Hongqi pretende diferenciarse con un posicionamiento más orientado al segmento premium y de lujo. Considerada la firma automovilística más antigua de China, su nombre significa “Bandera Roja” y está estrechamente vinculada al poder político desde su origen en 1958, cuando Mao Zedong impulsó la creación de una limusina nacional. Seis años después, se convirtió en el vehículo oficial de la élite gubernamental del país.

This week on the Mark Levin Show, it's a huge mistake if a possible U.S. offer includes a 10-year moratorium on Iranian uranium enrichment. If true, President Trump should walk away from these terms. We should just finish of the Iranian regime right now because we'll never have this opportunity again. Next, the Democrat Party sides with Iran and terrorists, including Hamas and Hezbollah. Sen Chris Murphy posted “awesome” upon reading a false report that 28 Iranian ships had escaped a U.S. blockade in the Strait of Hormuz. Sen Chuck Schuer embraces candidates like Abdul El-Said in Michigan, who compares Israel to Hamas and campaigns with Hasan Piker. Americans will not tolerate elected officials rooting for the enemy. Later, in the spirit of George Wallace, Democrats in Virginia disenfranchised millions of voters through a misleading referendum on representation, which passed in a Democrat-majority state where most Democrats voted against Republicans having any seats. But the Tazewell Circuit Court just ruled the referendum unconstitutional on two grounds: the ballot language was utterly misleading and the legislature's vote to place it on the ballot violated state law. The judge issued an injunction blocking certification and denied a stay, with a final order forthcoming and immediate appeal expected to the Virginia Supreme Court. Should society grant our rights, privileges, and freedoms to individuals like Hasan Piker, who uses those rights to advocate the destruction of the United States, the murder of a senator and an insurance CEO, the celebration of 9/11 and October 7th, and the greatness of Mao Zedong, who killed 60 million people, while showing indifference to violence and supporting stealing. His entire existence is dedicated to destroying America in every respect. Yet he is welcomed at Yale, the New York Times, and by the Democrat Party. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

A recent landmark Jamestown Foundation report maps Chinese United Front operations, the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP's) effort to co-opt and weaponize civil society against the CCP's enemies.The report, titled “Harnessing the People” and authored by researcher Cheryl Yu, identifies more than 2,000 such organizations operating in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Germany. More than 1,000 are operating in the United States.They span a wide range, including student, business, professional, cultural, and “friendship” groups as well as media outlets.In this episode, I sit down with Peter Mattis, president of The Jamestown Foundation. Few understand this complex web of Chinese influence and espionage operations as well as he does.His storied career includes roles such as senior fellow with the U.S. House Select Committee on the CCP, staff director of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC), and counterintelligence analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency.The United Front has two distinct areas of operation: inside China and outside China. Basically, every Party committee in China has a United Front department, Mattis said. But, he said, “the big part of the work that really matters to us happens outside. ... This is a system that involves hundreds of thousands of people.”“Mao Zedong described United Front work as a tool to storm and shatter the enemy's position,” Mattis said.One key task of United Front operations overseas is to find people, in particular scientists and engineers, who “are susceptible to recruitment,” Mattis said.Many seemingly innocuous civic groups in Western countries—for example, the China Overseas Friendship Association—are used to observe, identify, and then target people who could be useful for technology transfer or even intelligence purposes.How are targeted people approached? Typically, it's through one of the estimated 600 talent programs that Beijing has created for this objective, Mattis said.Programs include the Young Thousand Talents Program, which targets early-career STEM researchers, and the Hundred Talents Program, which targets scientists under 45.Out of the four Western countries explored in the report, Canada has by far the largest number of United Front organizations per capita, five times as many as the United States.Why, I asked Mattis, is Canada so important to China?“It is a soft underbelly to the United States [and] to the rest of NATO,” he replied.In Canada, he told me, there has been far less pushback against United Front organizations than in the United States.“These groups have never really had to hide themselves. They never really had to be careful, and therefore, they could just sort of move and operate,” he said.There are even high-level Canadian officials, senators or MPs, “that you see embedded essentially in a network of these United Front organizations,” Mattis said.In this episode, Mattis breaks down the playbook of Chinese United Front operations. Here's how they co-opt overseas Chinese communities, monitor and pressure dissidents, and manipulate electoral outcomes.Views expressed in this video are opinions of the host and the guest, and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.

On Thursday's Mark Levin Show, should society grant our rights, privileges, and freedoms to individuals like Hasan Piker, who uses those rights to advocate the destruction of the United States, the murder of a senator and an insurance CEO, the celebration of 9/11 and October 7th, and the greatness of Mao Zedong, who killed 60 million people, while showing indifference to violence and supporting stealing. His entire existence is dedicated to destroying America in every respect. Yet he is welcomed at Yale, the New York Times, and by the Democrat Party. Also, Tucker Carlson is over. The media will continue to promote him and his insanity. They hope to use him against the President, MAGA, and the Republicans.  But his erraticism, extremism, and long list of isms, and his public decline and unraveling, have been career and influence killing. Later, a little 100 days into office Mayor Zohran Mamdani is losing support from Marxist Islamists and Communists, who view him as a reformist making only minor tweaks rather than pursuing true revolution.  The Marxist Islamists will never be satisfied until society reaches total subjugation like Cambodia's Killing Fields. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

Before Bai Ling was labeled a “wacktress” by the tabloids, she was a prolific actress best known in the U.S. for her role in the cult classic, The Crow. Her wacky behavior and soundbites about living on the moon made her a frequent character of the early 2000s press. In this episode, Lena and Alissa unpack Bai's childhood in Mao Zedong's China, her ascent as an American star, her iconic stint on Celebrity Rehab, and the myths about Asian-American womanhood that continue to saturate the public's perception about her.  This episode was first published on 05/27/2021. To learn more about listener data and our privacy practices visit: https://www.audacyinc.com/privacy-policy Learn more about your ad choices. Visit https://podcastchoices.com/adchoices

Join us as we step into the strange Cold War world of The Chairman, a forgotten 1969 spy thriller starring Hollywood great Gregory Peck. The movie, which was partly filmed in Taiwan, is about a scientist sent behind the Bamboo Curtain to steal a miracle agricultural formula. The plot is outlandish, but behind the absurdity lies an interesting snapshot of global fears in the late 1960s, from overpopulation and famine to superpower rivalry. We follow the filming production here in Taiwan (a stand-in for off-limits communist China). This takes us to locations such as Taipei's spectacular mountainside Zhinan Temple, where Peck plays ping-pong with Mao Zedong. Yes, The Chairman was a flop – deservedly so, we think – but the film certainly makes for a fun podcast episode.

Brandon Weichert discusses his book Biohacked, explaining China's "Field of Dreams" strategy to dominate high-tech sectors by attracting Western talent and investors to their innovation hubs. This approach stems from Mao Zedong's goal to catch up to and eventually defeat the United States using its own technological expertise. Central to this effort is the Thousand Talents Program, which identifies and recruits global scientific experts — including Yale genetics students lured by offers to pay off massive student debt in exchange for industrial espionage. (1)1905

7 HoursPG-13Back in the beginning of 2021, as Pete was transitioning out of libertarianism, he and Bird got together to do a series on the Four Swords of Marxism: Vladimir Lenin, Joseph Stalin, Mao Zedong, Abimael Guzman, and added in post-Marxist, Hans-Hermann Hoppe.Here is the complete audio.Timeline Earth PodcastPete and Thomas777 'At the Movies'Support Pete on His WebsitePete's PatreonPete's SubstackPete's SubscribestarPete's GUMROADPete's VenmoPete's Buy Me a CoffeePete on FacebookPete on Twitter

In the 21st century, China stands as a global economic powerhouse, a trajectory heavily influenced by the reforms initiated in 1978 under Deng Xiaoping. This episode delves into Deng's pivotal role, positioning him as the consequential figure bridging Mao Zedong's era and the present-day leadership of Xi Jinping.Drawing on David Harvey's "A Brief History of Neoliberalism," we explore the economic, social, and ideological transformations that began with Deng's rise to power. At the outset of his reforms, China's economy was almost entirely state-controlled, marked by the "Iron Rice Bowl" system of employment and welfare, and a lagging agrarian sector organized by communes. Deng's initial aim was to lift China out of the chaos and impoverishment left by the Cultural Revolution and the Great Leap Forward.The episode examines the gradual liberalization of the Chinese economy, starting with agricultural reforms that dissolved communes in favor of individual responsibility, and the emergence of Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) as hubs of entrepreneurialism. We explore how these changes led to a surge in rural incomes initially, but also created stark urban-rural disparities and triggered the largest mass migration in world history.We also consider the concept of "neoliberalism with Chinese characteristics" and its applicability to Deng's era, where market forces were unleashed but carefully managed by the state and the Communist Party. The episode highlights key differences between Deng's approach and Xi Jinping's China, particularly in the management of capital and the state's directive role in strategic industries. While a vigorous Chinese capitalism thrives, the episode explains why a capitalist political class has not emerged to rival the Communist Party.Join us as we uncover the complex historical processes that shaped modern China, the figures who steered its course, and the ongoing debates about its unique economic and political model.Explaining History helps you understand the 20th Century through critical conversations and expert interviews. We connect the past to the present. If you enjoy the show, please subscribe and share.▸ Support the Show & Get Exclusive ContentBecome a Patron: patreon.com/explaininghistory▸ Join the Community & Continue the ConversationFacebook Group: facebook.com/groups/ExplainingHistoryPodcastSubstack: theexplaininghistorypodcast.substack.com▸ Read Articles & Go DeeperWebsite: explaininghistory.org Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Nordkoreas Machthaber Kim Jong Un soll seine Tochter als Nachfolgerin aufbauen. Bisher ist wenig bekannt über die Teenagerin. SRF-Korrespondent Samuel Emch sagt, was man weiss – und welche Signale auf sie als Nachfolgerin deuten. Weitere Themen: •Die Tagebücher eines engen Vertrauten von Mao Zedong bleiben in den USA – und damit weiterhin zugänglich für die Forschung. Die Notizen enthalten auch Ausführungen zum innersten Machtzirkel der Kommunistischen Partei. Über die Bedeutung der Tagebücher sprechen wir mit der Historikerin Ariane Knüsel. •Südafrikas Metropole Kapstadt gilt als eine der gefährlichsten Städte der Welt. Jetzt will Präsident Cyril Ramaphosa die Gang-Gewalt in den Griff bekommen und stellt der Polizei in Kapstadt rund 1'000 Soldaten an die Seite. Die Journalistin Cristina Karrer darüber, was das bringen kann. •Viele nutzten die Ostertage, um nochmal auf die Piste zu gehen. Jetzt ist in einigen Skigebieten die Saison beendet. Berno Stoffel, Direktor von Seilbahnen Schweiz, sagt, warum die Pisten nicht länger offen bleiben.

Welcome to The Times of Israel's Daily Briefing, your 20-minute audio update on what's happening in Israel, the Middle East and the Jewish world. Religion and archaeology correspondent Rossella Tercatin joins host Jessica Steinberg for today's episode. Tercatin discusses the efforts of Queen Farah Phalavi, the third wife of the former Shah of Iran, who used her art degree and wealth from soaring oil prices before the Islamic revolution, to assemble an art collection of masterpieces for the Tehran Museum of Contemporary Art, now hidden for much of the last 47 years. She also reports on a new haggadah by Bar-Ilan University biblical scholar Prof. Joshua Berman that examines what the Torah and Haggadah tell us about Egypt and Egyptian culture, and their influence on the story of Passover and the Israelites' Exodus from Egypt. Check out The Times of Israel's ongoing liveblog for more updates. For further reading: One of the most inaccessible art collections in the world awaits liberation in Tehran How the Exodus story subverts pharaonic texts to mock ancient Egypt Subscribe to The Times of Israel Daily Briefing on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, YouTube, or wherever you get your podcasts. This episode was produced by Yitzchak Ledee. IMAGE: A visitor walks past China's late leader, Mao Zedong painting series by American artist Andy Warhol at Tehran Museum of Contemporary Art in Tehran, Iran on October 19, 2021. (AP Photo/Vahid Salemi)See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

What does Xi Jinping share with Mao Zedong? Why is Confucius still central to a communist state? What really happened in Tiananmen Square—and why is it still a taboo?In this accessible and politically astute primer Everything You Wanted to Know about China*: * But Were Afraid to Ask (Bui Jones Books, 2026) acclaimed historian Jeffrey Wasserstrom tackles the questions many are afraid to ask about China. Drawing on decades of research and first-hand experience in Beijing, Shanghai, and Hong Kong, Wasserstrom offers clear, unflinching answers to topics often shrouded in cliché, censorship, or moral panic.From personality cults and protest movements to censorship, soft power, and trade wars, Everything You Wanted to Know About China (But Were Afraid to Ask) demystifies the People's Republic without exoticising it—offering a vital starting point for understanding one of the most powerful and misunderstood countries in the world.Structured as a series of conversational questions and answers—edited from an extended dialogue and reframed around key themes in History, Politics, and Culture— this is a necessary book for anyone seeking to cut through the noise. Jeffrey Wasserstrom is Chancellor's Professor of History at the University of California, Irvine. Lucas Tse is Examination Fellow at All Souls College, Oxford. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

As an Easter treat, we're bringing you a cracking tale of espionage from one of our favourite China podcasts: Face Off. We'll be back shortly with a new season called China Rules. Espionage Two young CIA agents were flown to northern China in 1952, part of a bizarre Cold War operation to overthrow Mao Zedong. The plane crashed. The two Americans were arrested, and jailed for 20 years. We fast forward to today and turn the tables: How does China spy on the US now? Who is ahead in the fight over the new technologies? Guests: John DeLury, author, Agents of Subversion; Nigel Inkster, former director operations, MI6; former agent in Beijing. Details about John Delury’s compelling book that tells the story of how two CIA operatives were captured in China and how they endured 20 years in jail. https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9781501765971/agents-of-subversion/ Nigel Inkster’s book about the US and China, the two big tech competitors. https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_Great_Decoupling/K4xfzQEACAAJ?hl=enSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

What does Xi Jinping share with Mao Zedong? Why is Confucius still central to a communist state? What really happened in Tiananmen Square—and why is it still a taboo?In this accessible and politically astute primer Everything You Wanted to Know about China*: * But Were Afraid to Ask (Bui Jones Books, 2026) acclaimed historian Jeffrey Wasserstrom tackles the questions many are afraid to ask about China. Drawing on decades of research and first-hand experience in Beijing, Shanghai, and Hong Kong, Wasserstrom offers clear, unflinching answers to topics often shrouded in cliché, censorship, or moral panic.From personality cults and protest movements to censorship, soft power, and trade wars, Everything You Wanted to Know About China (But Were Afraid to Ask) demystifies the People's Republic without exoticising it—offering a vital starting point for understanding one of the most powerful and misunderstood countries in the world.Structured as a series of conversational questions and answers—edited from an extended dialogue and reframed around key themes in History, Politics, and Culture— this is a necessary book for anyone seeking to cut through the noise. Jeffrey Wasserstrom is Chancellor's Professor of History at the University of California, Irvine. Lucas Tse is Examination Fellow at All Souls College, Oxford. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/east-asian-studies

What does Xi Jinping share with Mao Zedong? Why is Confucius still central to a communist state? What really happened in Tiananmen Square—and why is it still a taboo?In this accessible and politically astute primer Everything You Wanted to Know about China*: * But Were Afraid to Ask (Bui Jones Books, 2026) acclaimed historian Jeffrey Wasserstrom tackles the questions many are afraid to ask about China. Drawing on decades of research and first-hand experience in Beijing, Shanghai, and Hong Kong, Wasserstrom offers clear, unflinching answers to topics often shrouded in cliché, censorship, or moral panic.From personality cults and protest movements to censorship, soft power, and trade wars, Everything You Wanted to Know About China (But Were Afraid to Ask) demystifies the People's Republic without exoticising it—offering a vital starting point for understanding one of the most powerful and misunderstood countries in the world.Structured as a series of conversational questions and answers—edited from an extended dialogue and reframed around key themes in History, Politics, and Culture— this is a necessary book for anyone seeking to cut through the noise. Jeffrey Wasserstrom is Chancellor's Professor of History at the University of California, Irvine. Lucas Tse is Examination Fellow at All Souls College, Oxford. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/chinese-studies

Last time we spoke about the Wang Jingwei Regime. During the Second Sino-Japanese War, tensions between Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei escalated amid Japan's aggressive invasion. Disillusioned by Chiang's scorched-earth tactics, such as the Yellow River flood and Changsha fire, Wang defected from Chongqing in December 1938, fleeing to Hanoi to negotiate peace with Japan. An assassination attempt, likely ordered by Chiang, killed Wang's secretary Zeng Zhongming, deepening the rift and sparking retaliatory violence. Wang's group, aided by Japanese agents like Kagesa Sadaaki, navigated scandals and leaks, including a forged agreement exposed in the press. After grueling negotiations in Shanghai and Tokyo, Wang conceded to harsh Japanese terms, including limited sovereignty and economic controls. On March 30, 1940, he established the Reorganized National Government (RNG) in Nanjing, adopting the nationalist flag with a controversial yellow pennant symbolizing "peace, anticommunism, nation-building." Despite Wang's vision of constitutional democracy, the RNG functioned as a wartime puppet, isolated from Chongqing and resented as traitorous. Wang died in 1944, and the regime collapsed in 1945.   #195 The Xiang-Gan Operation Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. In the sweltering grip of August 1939, Chongqing languished under an unbearably hot summer, the air thick with humidity and the weight of impending doom. Perched on a sun-baked hillside along the southern bank of the Jialing River, roughly 10 kilometers from the chaotic heart of the city, loomed a two-story Western-style building. This fortress of stone and resolve, known as the "Huangshan Villa," stood as Chiang Kai-shek's official residence in Chongqing, a sanctuary amid the storm of war. Unless urgent meetings or crises at the Military Affairs Commission demanded his presence, it was here that Chiang orchestrated the fate of a nation on the brink.   One fateful evening, as shadows lengthened across the villa, the Bureau of Investigation and Statistics delivered a chilling report from Wang Pengsheng, the director of the Military Affairs Commission's Institute for International Affairs. Wang was no ordinary operative; he was a knowledgeable, experienced, and sharp-minded intellectual, a master of Japanese affairs, and one of Chiang's most trusted aides, his insights cutting like a blade through the fog of deception. In this urgent dispatch, Wang distilled the latest machinations from Japan. After the traitor Wang Jingwei defected to the enemy, Japan glimpsed a sinister new path to conquer China: ramping up political inducements for surrender, with brutal military offensives reduced to mere supporting roles. On June 20, the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters unleashed "strategy" tasks upon its troops in China—to incite local armies, those ragtag "miscellaneous troops," to betray their own, isolating and pulverizing the central army units. Wang Pengsheng saw through the ruse; this "attacking the heart" and "subduing strategies," drawn from the ancient wisdom of China's military sage Sun Tzu, betrayed the Japanese army's desperate straits, manpower stretched thin, supplies dwindling to the point of desperation.   Chiang Kai-shek's eyes narrowed as he gripped his red pencil, underlining a passage in the report with deliberate strokes, marking it as a thunderclap of importance or urgency: To cooperate with the establishment of the Wang puppet regime and exert military pressure on the Chongqing government, under the direction of the Imperial General Headquarters, the commander of the Japanese 11th Army, Okamura Yasuji, had formulated the "Xiang-Gan Operation Plan" targeting the main forces of the central army in the Ninth War Zone and was intensifying preparations for its implementation. The words hung heavy in the air like a gathering storm. Chiang Kai-shek rose abruptly, his body protesting with a stiff ache from hours of unyielding vigilance. He stretched his weary waist and legs, then pushed open the wooden door beside the vast sun-facing window, stepping out onto the balcony as if seeking solace from the encroaching night.   The balcony commanded a sweeping vista, a momentary escape from the suffocating confines of strategy and betrayal. Gazing downward, the "Fog Capital" Chongqing emerged in rare clarity, serene and layered beneath the fiery embrace of the evening glow. The distant murmur of the Jialing River, flowing ceaselessly like the pulse of a defiant heart, whispered a fleeting sense of ease amid the turmoil. Yet even this pause carried the echoes of war's relentless march. After the Japanese horde seized Wuhan and surged onward to claim Yueyang—only to halt their southward thrust—both Mao Zedong in his Yan'an stronghold and Chiang Kai-shek in Chongqing etched this moment as a pivotal divide in China's War of Resistance Against Japan. Mao proclaimed the war had plunged into the "stalemate phase," a grinding impasse. Chiang, ever the resolute leader, declared the "second phase of the war of resistance" ignited from this very point.   But across the vast national battlefield, the first half of 1939 roared with unquenched fury, the air thick with the acrid smoke of gunpowder. From the year's dawn, the Japanese army, bolstered by five divisions and eight mixed brigades, launched ruthless "security consolidation" operations in North China to fortify their blood-soaked conquests, only to be harried and bloodied by the Communist Eighth Route Army slipping behind enemy lines and the valiant troops of the First and Second War Zones. In late March, the Japanese 11th Army stormed Nanchang, clashing in a maelstrom of fire with the four group armies of the Ninth War Zone under the iron command of front-line commander Luo Zhuoying. For a grueling month and a half, the battle raged, the Japanese claiming the city at a staggering cost in lives. Chiang Kai-shek, his fury mounting, demanded a counterattack from the Ninth War Zone, but it crumbled into tragedy, over 20,000 souls lost, including Lieutenant General Chen Anbao, the indomitable commander of the 29th Army. Nanchang remained in enemy hands, fueling Chiang's rage like an inferno unchecked.   Then, in May, the Japanese Kwantung Army clashed with Soviet and Mongolian forces in the epic conflagration at Nomonhan. What ignited a spark of grim satisfaction in Chiang was not merely the Japanese rout, with nearly 20,000 of their ranks obliterated, but the broader ripple: this Japan-Soviet inferno would heap pressure upon the invaders in China, weakening their grasp. As the war sank into its stalemate phase, Chiang turned his gaze inward, fiercely guarding his military strength while awaiting the winds of change. He clung to a core conviction: the essence of the War of Resistance boiled down to that single, unbreakable word—"resist." Troops could be sacrificed, territories forsaken, retreats endured when battles turned dire, but surrender was unthinkable. As long as resistance endured, the nation would hold its place among the world's powers, and its leaders their rightful thrones. In time, the tides of international intrigue would shift; the imperialist giants, driven by their own insatiable interests, would not stand idly by as China fell to Japan's maw.   With resolve hardening like steel, Chiang Kai-shek strode back to his imposing desk and seized the telephone, dialing Xu Yongchang, the Minister of Military Orders. His voice cut through the line with unyielding command: instruct Deputy Chief of Staff Bai Chongxi, currently in the Ninth War Zone dissecting the bitter lessons of the Nanchang debacle, to hasten and aid Chen Cheng in crafting ironclad military deployments against the looming Japanese "Xiang-Gan Operation" and submit them without delay.   As the last defiant ray of sunlight plunged below the horizon, the sprawl of Chongqing's urban expanse succumbed to an enveloping darkness, a shroud of uncertainty. Since the government had fled southward, Chongqing had become a relentless target for Japanese bombers, their payloads raining death and devastation in waves of tragedy. By night, the city enforced ironclad blackout controls, its citizens huddling in fear behind heavy curtains, their lives reduced to whispers in the shadows. Chiang Kai-shek's mind drifted to the pre-war nights of the mountain city, when thousands of lights danced like stars upon the river's rippling waves. A deep, weary sigh escaped him, carrying the burden of a leader who refused to yield.   Far from the shadowed balconies of Chongqing, as China's War of Resistance Against Japan plunged into its harrowing third year, the misty haven of Guilin clung to its gentle, rain-soaked serenity, a fragile oasis amid the chaos of a nation torn asunder. Farmers, oblivious to the headlines screaming from distant newspapers, trudged barefoot through the lush fields, guiding massive water buffaloes with their backward-curving horns and deceptively gentle temperaments. Verdant tea groves blanketed the undulating hills, their leaves whispering secrets to the wind, while breezes carried the haunting, sweet-and-sour melodies of mountain songs that seemed to defy the encroaching shadows of war. Those weary souls fleeing the bloodied front lines stumbled into this paradise, their eyes widening in awe, as if they had crossed into a dream untouched by the nightmare raging beyond.   Nestled in the northwestern suburbs of the city, the Guilin Office pulsed with the raw energy of command, its operations post concealed within a colossal karst cave, a labyrinth of nature's own fortifications. Amid the jagged stalagmites and dripping stalactites, wires snaked like veins, cables coiled in tense anticipation, and radio antennas reached out like desperate fingers grasping for signals. These were the nerves of war, linking this hidden nerve center to the smoke-choked, blood-drenched front lines where heroes and horrors collided in the unyielding struggle for resistance.   Deputy Chief of Staff of the Military Affairs Commission and Director of the Guilin Office—Bai Chongxi—unfolded the telegram folder thrust into his hands by his confidential staff, his heart pounding with the weight of destiny:   "To Director Bai in Guilin: Telegram received. Deploy operations according to Plan A.   Zhongzheng"   Before departing Changsha, the Second Department had already whispered warnings of the Japanese horde's intent to strike southward, and fatefully, an urgent call from Xu Yongchang had demanded the swift forging of a battle plan to confront the enemy. As Bai Chongxi devoured the enemy intelligence, a bold strategy ignited in his mind like a flare in the darkness. Chen Cheng, the steadfast Commander of the Ninth War Zone, championed the tried-and-true tactic of successive resistance, but with a grim twist: retreat would be capped north of Changsha. Front-line troops would grind down the Japanese invaders, bleeding them dry before slipping to the east and west flanks. There, they would pounce on the enemy's exposed sides as the foes pressed southward, culminating in a devastating annihilation beneath the walls of Changsha with the aid of the garrison. This blueprint minimized troop movements and promised a swift, brutal clash. Yet Chen Cheng, burdened by his dual role as Minister of the Political Department of the Military Affairs Commission, had delegated command to Xue Yue as acting Ninth War Zone Commander. In heated deliberations, Xue Yue tilted toward Chen's vision, his resolve echoing the caution of survival.   But Bai Chongxi, his strategic mind a whirlwind of innovation, saw a bolder path through the storm. The Japanese forces lurking in the Wuhan area were fractured, split between the Yangtze's north and south, facing off against China's formidable heavy troops. Though intelligence on the scale of their assault remained shrouded in mystery, Bai knew their drawable forces couldn't exceed half their might, and their endurance in sustained combat would falter like a dying flame. "To swallow the attackers whole, the battlefield must be vast and unforgiving, our forces luring them deeper while retreating to the Hengyang area, stretching the enemy thin across a sprawling 200-kilometer wasteland." There, the invaders would wither in passivity, their food and ammunition lines stretched to breaking. Then, in a masterful stroke, troops from the Jiuling and Mufu Mountains would surge westward, while those west of the Xiang River drove eastward, severing every land and water escape route in a vise of total annihilation. Both plans stood as ironclad fortresses of logic, each unassailable in its reasoning, and were dispatched simultaneously to Chiang Kai-shek, the arbiter of China's fate.   By rank and protocol, Bai's vision claimed the mantle of Plan A, while Chen's bore the label of Plan B. Bai Chongxi had voiced his conviction and released it to the winds, content to let Chiang's judgment prevail. Bai Chongxi was a master of strategy, whispered among allies as the "Little Zhuge," his intellect a weapon as sharp as any blade. Yet Chen Cheng shared Chiang's Zhejiang roots and the unbreakable bonds of Huangpu camaraderie, drawing him even closer in the inner circle of trust. On such pivotal matters, Bai Chongxi often chose the path of restraint, yielding rather than clashing in futile strife. Five agonizing days after the plans vanished into the ether, Chiang's telegram pierced the tension, affirming the adoption of Plan A. A surge of quiet triumph coursed through Bai Chongxi as he signed the missive and strode toward the operations map, his steps echoing with purpose.   While strategic minds clashed in hidden caves and distant villas, the front lines pulsed with the raw grit of soldiers readying for battle. Guan Linzheng had been assigned a mount since 1930, when he became commander of the 1st Regiment of the 2nd Training Division, during the Central Plains War between Chiang, Feng, and Yan. He led the regiment to cover the retreat of the division's main force under Zhang Zhizhong. Pursued by several times their number of Feng-Yan troops, they fought while retreating in dire straits. From night to dawn, heavy fog descended, obscuring visibility beyond dozens of paces. Guan Linzheng's chestnut horse suddenly neighed loudly and charged back toward the pursuers. After trying to rein it in unsuccessfully, Guan simply ordered the troops to countercharge into the fog. Shouts of killing filled the air, gunfire intense. The Feng-Yan troops, unclear of the situation in the fog, thought Chiang reinforcements had arrived and ordered a retreat. By the time the fog cleared, they were gone. Guan's bold cunning successfully completed the cover mission, and he was promoted to brigade commander of the division's 2nd Brigade after the war.   In July 1932, during Chiang Kai-shek's fourth encirclement of the Hubei-Henan-Anhui Soviet, Guan Linzheng was brigade commander of the 4th Army's Independent Brigade. In battle, he was surrounded by Red Army troops led by Chen Geng and Cai Shenyi of the Red 25th Army Corps in the Anhui town of Zhuanfo Temple. His unit suffered heavy casualties, and a beloved horse was killed, leaving him distressed for a long time. With the outbreak of the War of Resistance, Guan Linzheng's military career entered its golden age. He believed this was truly raising an army of justice, fighting for the people and the nation. After promotions, though equipped with cars, he always kept a warhorse, often riding to survey terrain, inspect work, and command battles. In spare moments, he personally exercised and groomed the horse. That day, he led several staff on horseback to the Xin Qiang River front line, dismounting on the southern bank. 52nd Army Commander Zhang Yaoming and 195th Division Commander Qin Yizhi were waiting.   According to the Ninth War Zone deployment, the 15th Army Group had positioned Zhang Yaoming's 52nd Army and Xia Chuzhong's 79th Army, a formidable force of six divisions along the southern bank of the Xin Qiang River, stretching from Xin Qiang to Maishi beyond the provincial border. This ironclad first line of defense spanned over 100 kilometers, a vast bulwark against the gathering storm of invasion. Fifty kilometers to the south, Chen Pei's 37th Army, with its Divisions 60 and 95, held the Miluo River from Miluo to Pingjiang as the unyielding second line, ready to absorb any breach. Meanwhile, Li Jue's 70th Army, commanding Divisions 19 and 107 along the eastern bank of the Xiang River, was deployed north and south of Xiangyin, fiercely guarding the critical landing points like Yingtian, points that could spell victory or catastrophe.   195th Division Commander Qin Yizhi reported to Guan Linzheng with a voice charged with resolve: troop morale soared like a battle cry, fortifications stood complete and impenetrable, and the army's slogan for this fateful clash thundered: "Fight with the prestige of Taierzhuang!" The division's mobilization slogan echoed even fiercer: "Win fame in one battle!" Guan Linzheng nodded with grim satisfaction toward Zhang Yaoming, his eyes gleaming with the fire of shared history. Guan had once commanded the 52nd Army himself, leading it through a gauntlet of brilliant, blood-soaked battles on the anti-Japanese front. As the Japanese hordes prepared to surge across the Xin Qiang River southward, this was the first, most perilous barrier, a crucible where legends would be forged or shattered. He had entrusted his most loyal unit to the point of greatest impact, knowing full well the stakes. Zhang Yaoming and the division commanders, who had marched at his side for years through hellfire, understood the gravity: Commander Guan was setting an unassailable example, issuing orders that rippled through the ranks, no one could afford the slightest lapse, or face the merciless blade of military law!   "Who's on the north bank?" Guan Linzheng and the others sat on the hard earth, the weight of impending war pressing down; he pointed to the map's symbols for forward positions across the river, his finger tracing lines of fate. "Guarding the Bijia Mountain position is the reinforced 3rd Battalion of the 195th Division's 131st Regiment under Qin Yizhi," Zhang Yaoming replied without hesitation, his tone steady as stone. "Who's on the north bank?" Guan Linzheng repeated as if he hadn't heard, his voice a low rumble, demanding precision in the face of chaos.   Zhang Yaoming hesitated slightly, a flicker of uncertainty crossing his face, and Qin Yizhi stepped in: "3rd Battalion Commander Shi Enhua, Huangpu 8th Class."   The Central Military Academy had held its first five classes in Guangzhou's Huangpu, commonly called Huangpu Military Academy. Afterward, the school moved several times, but students continued using the Huangpu name, partly to inherit the revolutionary spirit against imperialism and feudalism from Huangpu's founding, and partly to indicate their central orthodoxy. Army generals, especially the "old Huangpu" big brothers, approved this practice, calling it Huangpu no matter where the school was.   Guan Linzheng glared at Zhang Yaoming, his gaze like sharpened steel, then pressed his knee and rose to his feet. Guan's left knee had been shattered by a bullet in 1925 during the Eastern Expedition against Chen Jiongming, a wound that had nearly claimed his leg and his future. Doctors had decreed amputation to save his life, but Liao Zhongkai, the party representative, had visited the wounded and intervened strenuously, preventing it. Otherwise, there would be no later glory for Guan Linzheng. After careful treatment and diligent exercise, the leg's function mostly recovered, though rising from a squat was slightly difficult. Zhang Yaoming reached out to help, but Guan pushed him away with a fierce independence born of countless battles. The group descended to the riverbank and stood in heavy silence, the air thick with unspoken tension. The horses either stood patiently with heads held high, vigilant sentinels, or lowered them to sniff the grass, casually plucking some to hold in their lips, oblivious to the human storm brewing.   The Xin Qiang River, an unnamed small river that had flowed quietly for countless years, had no great turbid waves in flood seasons and still shallow clear ripples in dry periods. It flowed peacefully from its source to Dongting Lake over dozens of kilometers. At this moment, it reflected the figures and thoughts of several soldiers, utterly unaware that in a dozen days, its name would leap to the front pages of newspapers nationwide, baptized in blood and etched into history.   Amid these preparations on the front lines, deeper internal conflicts simmered among the high command. Xue Yue regretted taking the position of provincial chairman, a decision that now haunted him like a specter from the battlefield's edge.   After the nationwide shock of the "Great Fire of Changsha," Zhang Zhizhong was punished with "suspension with retention," continuing to handle daily affairs amid the ashes. He sent several telegrams requesting resignation from the provincial chairmanship, expressing to the Executive Yuan his "shameless guilt and deep pain." On January 17, 1939, the Chongqing Executive Yuan passed a resolution to reorganize the Hunan Provincial Government. That night, Zhang Zhizhong received Chiang Kai-shek's telegram instructing him to hand over work and report to Chongqing.   In December 1938, when the Military Affairs Commission issued the order for Xue Yue to act as Ninth War Zone Commander, Chiang Kai-shek personally spoke with Xue, asking: "Brother Boling, do you think this arrangement is acceptable?" Boling was Xue Yue's courtesy name. Chiang, nine years older, addressed him as brother in private. Xue Yue said: "With Changsha in such a state, I truly lack the ability to handle such a major war zone task." Chiang Kai-shek understood Xue's implication about the disunity of military and political affairs making military work difficult. He said: "You go first; we can consider unifying military and political affairs later." According to He Yaozu, then director of the Military Affairs Commission Office who witnessed this: "My impression was that Xue Yue didn't want to avoid the acting commander role, but wanted to combine military and political powers. Chiang knew this, telling me 'If he's willing, let him do it,' words Chiang said to many seeking positions."   On February 1, 1939, the Nationalist Government officially appointed Xue Yue as Chairman of the Hunan Provincial Committee of the Kuomintang and Chairman of Hunan Province. With party, government, and military powers combined, troubles followed incessantly, piling upon him like relentless enemy fire. As war zone commander, he first thought of the troops. Upon taking office, Xue implemented a policy to restrict market rice prices for military grain procurement, proposing "flat prices" to acquire grain cheaply, forcing merchants underground. Upon hearing this, Xue angrily summoned major rice merchants, reprimanded them, and ordered them to deliver quotas. The result: insufficient low-price rice, with black market prices rising daily. After half a year, sharp-tongued Hunanese nicknamed him "Xue Pinggui," a name that became household, a mocking whisper that cut deeper than any blade.   Coincidentally, his father passed away. Whether Xue instructed it or subordinates "handled it," obituaries flew everywhere, sent to county-level units across the province. Each county had at least 20 units sending condolences, and higher-level cities and provincial units all sent, leading some to secretly calculate. After Xue Yue took charge in Hunan, his family members were transferred from other provinces, and arranging work according to their abilities was reasonable in that old society. His uncle-in-law Fang Xuefen became head of the Provincial Grain Bureau, brother-in-law Qiu Weiyi head of the Provincial Bank. His brother continued business, transporting Hunan rice to Guangdong for barter.   Xue Yue's talents shone not in officialdom. Only before military maps, on battlefields of gunfire and flying shells, could one find the general-like Xue Yue; "heaven-born talent" was for warfare. This descendant of an ordinary farming family in Lechang County, Guangdong, who entered Huangpu Army Primary School at 10, became commander of Sun Yat-sen's bodyguard regiment's 1st Battalion at 24, and once carried a machine gun through hails of bullets to protect Madame Sun Soong Ching-ling from rebel encirclement, earned the nickname "Tiger Cub" in blood and fire. What propelled him to life's peak was the Battle of Changsha.   On August 21, 1939, with war clouds over Changsha thickening like a noose, Xue Yue received telegrams and calls from Chiang Kai-shek, Bai Chongxi, and Chen Cheng. Chiang's telegram required immediate deployment according to "Plan A." Bai and Chen urged resolute implementation of the Chairman's instructions. Xue Yue stood motionless before the map, his mind a whirlwind of strategy and defiance.   Many articles recalling Xue Yue mentioned his daily habit, or hobby, of studying maps; he could do so all day. With battles, he looked; without, he still studied avidly. Perhaps map-reading had evolved from a commander's work need to a professional soldier's spiritual requirement, a way to express emotions, dispel worries, a soldier's way of existence. After Chiang's order to execute "Plan A," rather than comparing plans on the map for stronger bases for his preferred view, he was organizing thoughts, adjusting emotions, and gathering courage in this soul's sanctuary. Hours later, he turned and called Chief of Staff Zhao Zili, dictating three reasons to persist with "Plan B," instructing him to draft a telegram directly to Chiang Kai-shek.   He reminded Zhao that the wording should be forceful yet resilient, making the Chairman clearly feel his firm determination. The Ninth War Zone has sufficient forces and confidence to annihilate the Japanese north of Changsha. If our forces retreat to Hengyang, the Japanese 21st Army under Ando Toshikichi in Guangzhou (with 18th and 104th Divisions, Taiwan Brigade, and attached air units) might advance north along the Yue-Han Railway in support, forming a pincer on us, making the battle hard to control. Following Plan A and allowing the Japanese south would lead to Changsha's fall, exploited by enemy propaganda, causing adverse effects domestically and internationally. These three points presented the potential military and political disadvantages of Plan A as tangible, imminent dangers, more argumentative and unyieldingly firm than his original inclination toward "Plan B."   Zhao Zili quickly noted the points, his pen flying across the page with the precision of a seasoned warrior, before retreating to the staff office to draft the telegram that could alter the course of battle. A top student of Huangpu's 6th Class, quick-witted and resourceful, Zhao had risen like a comet through the ranks after a few blistering campaigns, pinning the insignia of major general to his shoulders at the tender age of 31, a feat that stirred envy among his classmates like a storm in their hearts. Zhao Zili, of course, understood Xue Yue's true intent, piercing through the layers of strategy to the raw undercurrent of determination and unresolved fury.   In May 1938, to avenge the stinging triumph at Taierzhuang, the Japanese had massed their forces in a vengeful storm, aiming to encircle and annihilate the Chinese main forces east of the Longhai Railway, striking from both east and north with ruthless precision. The northern route's 14th Division, under the cunning Dobashi Kenji, found itself surrounded in Lanfeng by a pantheon of fierce Chinese generals, Song Xilian, Yu Jishi, Hu Zongnan, Qiu Qingquan, Wang Yaowu, Li Hanlun, Gui Yongqing, Sun Tongxuan, and Shang Zhen, warriors whose names echoed like thunder across the battlefields. Chiang Kai-shek himself descended upon Zhengzhou to supervise the carnage, appointing Xue Yue as 1st Corps Commander to orchestrate the generals in a full-throttle offensive on the morning of May 25, with the ironclad goal of obliterating that longtime scourge of China and his 14th Division before the dawn of the 26th shattered the night.   The odds were a gambler's dream: 150,000 elite Chinese troops against a mere 20,000 second-rate Japanese soldiers. Victory seemed not just possible, but inevitable; Chiang invited journalists to the front lines for live dispatches, while the Wuhan Political Department feverishly prepared celebrations for the "second great Taierzhuang victory." Chiang Kai-shek was exceptionally angry, his rage boiling over in orders that scorched the ranks, reprimanding army commanders for "inept command, cowardly actions, leading to low morale and hesitation," and that "most army, division, and brigade commanders lacked courage and self-motivation, prolonging the battle." After the Lanfeng Battle, Chiang ordered the dismissal and investigation of future Nationalist Navy Commander Gui Yongqing and 1950s Taiwan Army Commander and Provincial Chairman Huang Jie, and executed 88th Division Commander Long Muhan. But he did not hold Xue Yue accountable for leadership responsibility. For a highly self-respecting person, self-blame is more painful than others' blame. Thereafter, Xue Yue spent more time buried in maps, his eyes tracing lines of terrain like a man possessed, seeking a monumental battle to avenge his wounded pride and redeem his tarnished honor.   On March 8, 1939, shortly after Xue Yue assumed the mantle of acting Ninth War Zone Commander, Chiang telegraphed him with urgent resolve: "To secure Nanchang and its rear lines, decide to strike first, take the offensive to thwart the enemy's intentions." Chiang valued Nanchang's strategic position, as did Okamura Yasuji, but Chiang was a step slow, his hesitation a fatal crack. The Japanese, wielding two divisions bolstered by the bulk of their army's tanks and artillery, seized the initiative like predators in the night, storming Nanchang before the Chinese heavy forces could muster. Chen Cheng remained the nominal Ninth War Zone Commander, relegating Xue Yue to a watchful perch in Changsha while entrusting the Nanchang front to his confidant Luo Zhuoying. Xue Yue haunted the command room day and night, monitoring the inferno through frantic phone calls and telegrams, his discomfort gnawing at him like an unhealed wound. He bore witness to Nanchang's fall and the counterattack's agonizing collapse.   The Nanchang Battle loss was not Xue's fault, but it scarred the Ninth War Zone under his watch, with generals' whispers spreading like venom, knotting his heart in a tangle of regret and resolve. Months of intense map study and on-site inspections had etched Hunan's terrain into Xue Yue's very soul, birthing a strategy that was bold, unique, and brimming with promise—a phoenix rising from the ashes of defeat. But as Zhao Zili understood with crystal clarity, Commander Xue's telegram to Chiang, a forceful plea to reverse the decision, sprang less from cold military "strategy" than from the seething "resentment" accumulated through repeated failures and humiliations, a fire that demanded reckoning. With Chen Cheng's help, Chiang finally agreed to change the plan, bending to the tide of persuasion. Xue Yue was delighted, his spirit soaring like a liberated eagle; Bai Chongxi was angry, his frustration simmering like a storm held at bay. After the battle erupted, Bai, dispatched by Chiang to assist Xue Yue, arrived at the war zone headquarters on Yuelu Mountain atop the Xiang River's west bank in Changsha but remained silent like a mute bodhisattva, his words locked away in disapproval. Even decades later, in his Memoirs of Bai Chongxi, discussing the First Battle of Changsha, he still did not consider it a victory, saying the Japanese "conducted a planned retreat without much loss, which is a fact."   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In 1939, amid the Second Sino-Japanese War's stalemate phase, Chiang Kai-shek received intelligence on Japan's Xiang-Gan Operation, aimed at pressuring Chongqing through military advances in Hunan. Deputy Chief Bai Chongxi proposed Plan A for a deep-lure annihilation south of Changsha, while Chen Cheng and Xue Yue favored Plan B for resistance north of the city. After tense debates, Chiang approved Plan B, influenced by Xue's insistence to avoid Changsha's fall and counter Japanese propaganda.   

4  Author: John Bachelor and Sean McMeakin. Title: Stalin's War: A New History of World War II - Yugoslavia, China, and the Cold War Legacy. This episode examines how Stalin outmaneuvered the West in Yugoslavia and China to expand communist influence. In Yugoslavia, Churchill was "hoodwinked" into supporting Tito over the Chetniks based on fabricated communist reports. In China, the Marshall Mission effectively cut off aid to Chiang Kai-shek, allowing Stalin-backed Mao Zedong to seize control. The Red Army's mass looting of Manchuria and Germany is detailed as a strategy to secure "booty" for the Soviet state. Ultimately, the sources argue that Lend-Lease provided the foundational resources for the Soviet Union to emerge as a global superpower and nuclear threat.1942 HARRIMAN AND STALIN

How did World War II break out in Asia in 1937? Why did Mao Zedong and his fellow communists live in caves after the Long March? How did the notorious Nanjing Massacre occur? ** Binge all six episodes of the series on Chairman Mao by joining the Empire Club today at ⁠empirepoduk.com⁠. ** Anita and William are joined once again by Rana Mitter, author of China's War with Japan 1937-1945, The Struggle for Survival (or Forgotten Ally, China's World War II), and Modern China: A Very Short Introduction. Join the Empire Club: Unlock the full Empire experience – with bonus episodes, ad-free listening, early access to miniseries and live show tickets, exclusive book discounts, a members-only newsletter, and access to our private Discord chatroom. Sign up directly at empirepoduk.com  For more Goalhanger Podcasts, head to www.goalhanger.com. Email: empire@goalhanger.com Instagram: @empirepoduk Blue Sky: @empirepoduk X: @empirepoduk Editor: Adam Thornton Researcher: Imogen Marriott Assistant Producer: Alfie Norris Producer: Anouska Lewis Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

7 HoursPG-13Back in the beginning of 2021, as Pete was transitioning out of libertarianism, he and Bird got together to do a series on the Four Swords of Marxism: Vladimir Lenin, Joseph Stalin, Mao Zedong, Abimael Guzman, and added in post-Marxist, Hans-Hermann Hoppe.Here is the complete audio.Timeline Earth PodcastPete and Thomas777 'At the Movies'Support Pete on His WebsitePete's PatreonPete's SubstackPete's SubscribestarPete's GUMROADPete's VenmoPete's Buy Me a CoffeePete on FacebookPete on Twitter

A revolutionary hero or a brutal despot? Mao Zedong has one of the most recognisable portraits on Earth. How did he rise to become the founder of the People's Republic of China?  ** Binge all six episodes of the series on Chairman Mao by joining the Empire Club today at empirepoduk.com. ** A child born in a rural village, Mao hated the Confucian traditions he grew up with. He read profusely and rebelled against his father. But how did his early life shape him into the dictator he would become? William and Anita are joined by the brilliant Rana Mitter, author of A Bitter Revolution: China's Struggle with the Modern World, Modern China: A Very Short Introduction and China's War with Japan 1937-1945, The Struggle for Survival (or Forgotten Ally, China's World War II) to discuss the origin story of Mao Zedong.  Join the Empire Club: Unlock the full Empire experience – with bonus episodes, ad-free listening, early access to miniseries and live show tickets, exclusive book discounts, a members-only newsletter, and access to our private Discord chatroom. Sign up directly at empirepoduk.com  For more Goalhanger Podcasts, head to www.goalhanger.com. Email: empire@goalhanger.com Instagram: @empirepoduk Blue Sky: @empirepoduk X: @empirepoduk Editor: James Clayden Researcher: Imogen Marriott Assistant Producer: Alfie Norris Producer: Anouska Lewis Executive Producer: Dom Johnson Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

Words like “mind control” and “brainwashing” get tossed around, but it is a very real science and a very dangerous game that former CIA operative and now conservative talk show host Buck Sexton calls by its scientific name of “menticide,” the murder of the mind. Psychological attacks are real, and the concept of menticide dates to a Dutch psychologist who studied how totalitarian governments control the thoughts of their populations. Joost Meerloo witnessed and studied the way Josef Stalin, Vladimir Lenin, and Mao Zedong used the insights from Pavlov's experiments on dogs against people. His most famous work is called The Rape of the Mind.

2. Bunker 2: Stalin, Mao, and the Communist Asian Strategy. Joseph Stalin cautiously hosted Mao Zedong in Moscow, eventually providing industrial support and military aid while seeking to secure Soviet borders through strategic Asian expansion. Guest: Nick Bunker.

In this episode, I sit down with Grace Jin Drexel, the daughter of detained Pastor Ezra Jin, the founder of one of China's largest underground house-church networks.Last October, Pastor Jin was arrested along with 27 other pastors and church leaders from Zion Church. It was one of the largest assaults on independent Christian congregations in China since the Cultural Revolution, said Drexel. She has since become a prominent voice speaking out against religious persecution in China.State repression of Zion Church began in 2018 amid a broader wave of Communist Party efforts to subjugate faith communities, Drexel said.“You saw the tearing down of crosses [and] putting portraits of Xi Jinping and Mao Zedong on church buildings,” she said.Zion Church was deemed an illegal business operation, forcing them to shift to a hybrid online model of worship. Authorities also placed an exit ban on Pastor Jin.“There's so many parts of our lives that he has missed out on. He was not able to walk me down the aisle at my wedding. He was not able to attend my baby's baptism,” Drexel said.She sees her father's detention as part of a new wave of persecution targeting not only her father's church but also many other underground churches and religious groups as well. As in 2018, authorities are again installing pictures of Xi in churches again, sometimes even replacing crosses, to “showcase who is the true leader of the church,” she said.Another sign of a new wave of suppression is the sentencing of Jimmy Lai, the 78-year-old founder of Apple Daily and a practicing Catholic. He was recently given 20 years in prison, which marks the longest sentence handed down to date under Beijing's national security law.Since Pastor Jin's arrest, he has not been allowed any family visits, phone calls, or even letters from his loved ones. He is also suffering from severe Type 2 diabetes, and Drexel is deeply concerned about his wellbeing.Views expressed in this video are opinions of the host and the guest, and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.

Xi Van Fleet grew up in China during Mao Zedong's Cultural Revolution. She was too young to be a real revolutionary Red Guard, but old enough to observe the astonishing scenes of violence and ideological fervor around her during those terrible years.I sat down with her to discuss her new book, “Made in America: The Hidden History of How the U.S. Enabled Communist China and Created Our Greatest Threat.”She says she felt compelled to write this book to help Americans understand the true nature of communism. Over the past hundred years or so, the United States has made one grave mistake after another because of this major blind spot, she says.In our deep-dive interview, Van Fleet takes me on a tour of China's history starting in the late 19th century and explains how America—over and over again—made decisions that helped the Chinese Communist Party: first to gain influence, then to defeat the Nationalists led by Chiang Kai-shek, and eventually to rescue the CCP from certain collapse in the 1970s.By visiting Beijing and re-opening US-China relations at a time when China's economy was in shambles, President Richard Nixon effectively “saved the CCP from the ruins,” she says.The history of how the United States helped the CCP survive is “hidden history,” as she calls it, one that is not taught in the schools and not discussed publicly: “A lot of people want to hide it. But in order for us to understand, we have to learn this very, very important piece of history that my book is all about.”Views expressed in this video are opinions of the host and the guest, and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.

Jesse Kelly announces his new FREE book, which uses sharp commentary and historical contrast to critique Mao Zedong’s ideology and its lasting influence. China expert Steven Mosher joins as guest to provide insight into Mao’s policies, the human cost of his rule, and the ways communist tactics continue to appear in contemporary politics. Together they examine key events from Mao’s era, compare them to modern ideological trends in the West, and explain why understanding this history remains relevant today.I'm Right with Jesse Kelly on The First TVMasa Chips: Ready to give MASA a try? Get 25% off your first order by going to http://masachips.com/JESSETV and using code JESSETV.Beam: Visit https://shopbeam.com/JESSEKELLY and use code JESSEKELLY to get our exclusive discount of up to 40% off.American Financing: Call American Financing today to find out how customers are saving an average of $800/mo. NMLS 182334, https://nmlsconsumeraccess.org APR for rates in the 5s start at 6.196% for well qualified borrowers. Call 866-891-2821 for details about credit costs and terms. Visit http://www.AmericanFinancing.net/Jesse.Follow The Jesse Kelly Show on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/@TheJesseKellyShowSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.