Wavell Room Audio Reads

It is the lot of the infantry to hold ground and get shot at. This is the mundane history of the infantry, not the story you hear during training at Catterick or Brecon. But our social media feeds show us the reality. Soldiers in Ukraine are repeatedly filmed sitting in trenches waiting to be mortared, attacked by artillery or chased by a suicide FPV drone. Encounters involving small infantry units engaging each other are rare; instead, remote firepower remains the dominant killer on the 21st century battlefield. Despite this, however, we are once again considering changes to small arms and small arms ammunition. This is being driven by discussions of lethal effect against body armour at over 600 metres. In this short commentary piece, I want to put the selection of a new rifle and ammunition into its wider societal, historical and organisational context. In the process I hope to persuade readers that the Army should not put new ammunition at the top of its priority list. Although relative to the specific environment and type of conflict, comparatively speaking, the infantry is the least lethal branch of the armed forces.1 Paradoxically, however, the infantry sits at the heart of the army's identity and purpose. As representatives of the polity, infantry soldiers embody the social contract between the citizen and the nation. As I argue in Weapon of Choice this contract is underwritten by the engineer and the rifles they create.2 Framed this way, the rifle is more than a weapon. It becomes the tangible symbol of the bond between the state and its soldiers. If the state cannot provide a reliable and effective rifle, then it has failed at upholding its side of this foundational bargain. Getting small arms acquisition wrong not only jeopardises military effectiveness but it also risks the legitimacy of the sovereign state. The stakes are therefore far greater than the practicalities of small arms calibre or the frailties of weapon design. They touch on the very principles of governance and trust between the nation and its defenders. If the state cannot provide a reliable and effective rifle, then it has failed at upholding its side of this foundational bargain. Unfortunately, since at least the middle of the 19th century, the introduction of every new service rifle with the British Army has been associated with controversy of some sort. The Martini Henry failed in the Sudan in 1884. The Short Magazine Lee-Enfield heralded arguments about the utility of the cavalry. The introduction of Fabrique Nationale's Self-Loading Rifle occurred only because the Americans rejected an intermediate calibre in the 1950s. And of course, the SA80 failed in the desert during the First Gulf War and was subsequently suspended - at the request of the UK's NATO delegate on small arms - from the Alliance's Nominated Weapon List.3 Rifle failure Given the symbolism and significance of the rifle and the long history of failure associated with its introduction into the Army, buying a new design of small arms and ammunition needs to be done with considerable care. In part this is because the UK no longer has the industrial capacity to produce a large fleet of weapons and will need to recalibrate existing ammunition production for a new calibre. Buying small batches of bespoke ammunition and specialist weapons does not necessarily create problems. However, buying a new fleet of rifles to fill the requirements of an entire Army brings with it unique practical challenges associated with introducing a new system, a new ammunition and the development of a new production line. Take, for example, the Enfield Weapon System (EWS). The EWS was the pre-cursor to the SA80. Initially designed for a 4.85mm round, the weapon was specifically intended to allow the infantry to fight from an armoured fighting vehicle and be used in close quarters. The small calibre was selected primarily because 7.62mm ammunition was completely inappropriate for use in Northern Ireland wher...

The end of the Warfare Officer? You're not unskilled, they're the wrong skills. In a rain-beaten marina on a rugged coastline, near a nameless village more familiar with fishing than fleet operations, a teenage Able Seaman sits inside a converted shipping container. Watching a laptop screen, they remotely pilot a small crewless boat through choppy waters via a suite of cameras and RADAR feeds. For all intents and purposes, they are the Captain. Down the road, on a slipway framed with lobster pots and fishing gear, a Petty Officer and Leading Hand haul 15-metres of uncrewed craft onto a trailer. With a police escort arranged and explosives securely stowed in a separate vehicle, they tow it down narrow B-roads to its next launch site. Followed by a small convoy of HGVs containing ancillary equipment and spares. Armed with little more than an expense account the skill to reverse an oversized trailer, they fulfil the traditional roles of Navigator and Officer of the Watch where moving naval fighting capabilities is concerned. These scenes stand in stark contrast to the age-old image of a Commanding Officer directing a Frigates movement across open sea from his chair on the bridge. Modern navies are undergoing a seismic shift in relevance, away from the skill set of their senior officers who cut their teeth on 5,000-tonne, 130-metre warships and bigger, and toward young operators and technicians independently deploying tiny uncrewed systems from the backs of lorries to greater maritime effect. The hierarchy of most navies has long been built around crewing entire flotillas of ships, with only a limited number of shore-based roles supporting operations from the rear. But the rise of autonomous platforms is disrupting that structure, challenging the relevance of the traditional command pipeline. In tomorrow's navy, do expert leaders qualified in seamanship and commanding operations from capital ships offer more value than an Able Seaman who can command multiple vessels from a single screen? What does it mean to grow officers through the classic path of shipboard appointments when the conventional warship is fast becoming the exception, not the rule? If most naval capability in the future is delivered from shore, operated remotely, or automated entirely, then is the role of the seagoing 'sailor' now something rare and specialised, less a core function and more a niche within a much broader system biasing towards land operations with maritime effectors deployed at reach? Today, battles at sea are already being won by lone teenagers remotely piloting a USV with helm controls mapped to a modified Xbox controller and laptop from miles away, supported by a mechanic with a Cat C+E licence hauling the latest capability on a trailer, as by a seasoned commander on the bridge of a warship with charge of a crew several hundred strong. Modern Navies are discovering that expertise in the latest iteration of nautical skills no longer guarantees expert opinion in utilising modern technology. This article argues that autonomy and uncrewed systems are reshaping naval power, placing greater importance on digital literacy and low level mechanical skills found in trades once considered vocational, rather than the strategic conversations based on traditional strategic warfare roles. Navies around the world are rapidly adopting uncrewed systems, on the surface, underwater, and in the air, to take on roles once reserved for fully crewed warships. The U.S. Navy's Ghost Fleet Overlord programme, for example, fields 90-metre drone ships that have sailed thousands of miles and even launched missiles under remote supervision by operators too junior to stand a traditional bridge watch. Australia has followed suit with Sentinel, a converted patrol boat and now the country's largest autonomous vessel, monitored by a skeleton crew of engineers camping onboard and advanced autonomy software. The Royal Navy, meanwhile, has demonstrated this shift through its NavyX...

Editor's note: This piece is slightly different to our normal ones. It's more akin to a blog and written in the first person. However, we deemed it interesting given the writer, where they are, and the wider context. Although I am not an infantryman, I am assigned to an infantry unit here in the USA. At our recent dining out, talk inevitably turned to Saint Maurice. For those who do not know, Saint Maurice is the patron saint of infantrymen. When it came time for the commander to induct a select few into the Order of Saint Maurice, I heard the script - which includes the story of Saint Maurice - as if it was for the first time. Maurice was ordered to have his legionnaires offer pagan sacrifices before battle near the Rhone at Martigny. The Theban Legion refused to participate, and also refused to kill innocent civilians in the conduct of their duty, and withdrew to the town of Agaunum. Enraged, Maximian ordered every tenth man killed, yet they still refused. A second time the General ordered Maurice's men to participate and again they refused. Maurice declared his earnest desire to obey every order lawful in the eyes of God. "We have seen our comrades killed," came the reply. "Rather than sorrow, we rejoice at the honor done to them." I had been in a funk for the preceding few weeks. Like all members of the profession of arms I had been trying to make sense of the changes in Department policy and U.S. foreign policy that had been cascading out of the National Command Authority. Everything seemed to be in flux. Opinions among my peers differed. Nothing seemed to make sense. And then I heard this story and suddenly I felt better. I am not a religious man. And even if I were, the religion of my ancestors did not include the veneration of saints (if you must know, I'm Jewish, but you can only get military inspiration from the stories of the Maccabean Revolt so many times before you need to look further afield for inspiration). But in a time when everyone is talking about "warrior culture" - and not necessarily in a way that made good sense - the story of Saint Maurice seemed like it held some sort of answer. As a good cavalryman, I went straight to the story of Saint George. As a result of his personal bravery, this man - then known as Nestor of Cappodocia - became a member of the Roman Emperor Diocletian's personal bodyguard. In 303 AD, Diocletian issued an edict in Nicodemia, now a part of Turkey, that ordered the destruction of all Christian Churches, sacred writings and books, and outlawing all Christians who did not, on the surface at least, conform to paganry. Upon seeing the edict, Nestor tore it down. For his act and his refusal to abide by the pagan emperor's edict, Nestor was imprisoned, tortured, and executed. Early Christians changed Nestor's name to George, and he became associated with bravery, dedication to faith, and decency. The legend of St. George's defeating the dragon perpetuates the might of the mounted warrior over the forces of evil. It is an Italian legend dating from the 12th Century, and the story goes like this: Near the city of Silene, a frightful dragon came to live in a marshy swamp, and its breath poisoned all who attempted to drive it away. To protect themselves, the citizens offered the dragon two sheep every day. Soon, however, they ran out of sheep, and human sacrifices were then drawn by lot. One day, the lot fell to the king's daughter. She was left in the swamp to face the dragon, and this is where St. George finds her during his travels. In a fierce combat, George defeats the dragon but does not kill it. Instead, he ties the princess' waistband around the dragon's neck and has her lead it back to the city. There he promises to slay the dragon if the people will embrace the Christian faith. This they agree to do, and he kills the dragon. Later, of course, the dragon came to represent the embodiment of evil and hatred rather than an animal, but the moral remained. The heroism and faith of S...

The Accidental Soldier is hilariously excellent - a laugh-out-loud memoir that delivers a sweet blend of comedy and storytelling. It brings British military humour vividly to life, while also navigating the serious terrain of leadership through war, fear, hope, and aspiration. It reads like a screenplay in waiting, and would make a brilliant film. Owain Mulligan, a frustrated teacher and self-declared weekend warrior (a "STAB" in old Army lingo), signs up for a tour in Iraq with the Queen's Royal Hussars in a bid for change. What follows is his story as a troop leader, a far punchier job that he had signed up for. The book is filled with comic moments. Nearly every page contains a witty remark or a hilarious anecdote - from felt-tip penis graffiti in Basra Palace to bizarre and endearing interactions with Iraqis. The opening page talks of there being too much mastaubation in the draft, but the humour is actually far more sophisticated. Mulligan's tone is light-hearted, and for veterans, the authenticity of his experience rings true, even if there are some embellishments. For civilian readers, it might leave the risky impression that war is…fun. Yet beneath the humour lies something deeper. Mulligan's comedy often feels like a mask, concealing frustration, anger, and sorrow behind a stoic façade. His writing invites empathy, and his portrayal of friction between units, allied forces, or the Foreign Office, is handled with both humour and humility. For example, being stopped for his ID card by an American soldier or interactions with obviously corrupt Iraqi officials. Beyond the storytelling, The Accidental Soldier offers an important perspective. It gives a glimpse into how soldiers truly felt during their time in Iraq. Mulligan's frustrations with the Iraqi Army and Police are clear, though often cloaked in humour. By the book's end, he begins to ask the harder questions: Was it worth it? His answer "I didn't make it any worse", is offered as a kind of modest victory. This is not a mocking critique of the war. Mulligan's deep respect for Iraq and its people is evident throughout. His sense of duty, while often buried beneath comedy, is unmistakable. The book also tackles the challenges of leadership, from handling cultural differences to dealing with death. One might come away thinking Mulligan found leadership easy - but 19 years of hindsight have surely softened the harder edges. Still, there are moments when the humour fades and the rawness of memory shines through, especially in the final pages. These scenes offer a jarring but necessary reminder of war's reality - and mark a turning point in how the book should be understood. His interaction with a local complaining about their strategy or the frustration about not being able to do more comes through as critical notes. At first glance, The Accidental Soldier might seem like another in the vein of The Junior Officers' Reading Club or Doug Beattie's numerous memoirs. It's both like them and not. The heart of this book lies in bringing the human experience to life, with humour as its main weapon. Discussing the book through The Wavell Room, we finished it feeling this was a genuine reflection - one written with respect, and one that adds real authenticity to the genre. The Accidental Soldier is brilliant. It's hilarious. It's laugh-out-loud funny. A confident 11/10. A copy of The Accidental Soldier was provided to The Wavell Room by the Publisher.

With the imminent publication of the new government's first Strategic Defence Review this article throws out a challenge. Can we make the first cheap British Army division of the modern period? Can we afford not to? The 'world-beating' delusion Britain has a 'world-beating' epidemic. It would be funny if we were not paying such a high cost for this delusion. Who started it may be debated. That it has become an empty boast is indisputable. The graph below shows the frequency of use of the phrase in Parliament. It has only got worse. How is Britain world-beating? Our social statistics certainly attract attention: 40% of adults pay no income tax, because their annual income does not exceed the £12,570 personal allowance threshold; One third of 35-45 year olds in England now rents (it was one in ten at the beginning of the century), and four in every ten of the private renters is receiving housing benefit (or they would be on the street); By the time Universal Credit is fully rolled out, one in four working age households will be receiving it; Almost one fifth of Britain's school children, apparently, have special educational needs; At the other end of the scale, Britain's graduates now collectively owe around £240 billion in student loans; Over one million16-24 years olds are neither in education, employment nor training (the NEETs), the main reason cited is 'mental health', remedied by a Personal Independence Payment (PIP) (over 3.3 million Britons in England and Wales were claiming a PIP last year). And so we could go on. How the British Army is 'world-beating' also raises questions. Marlborough's Grand Alliance army at the beginning of the 18th century was bigger. Cromwell had more cavalry regiments. The country that invented the tank can today deploy and sustain one tank regiment (plainly, there must be a reserve or you would be unable to rotate troops). The British Army is effectively air defenceless. In one of the most painful sagas of many in recent times, the Army will finally be receiving a new armoured personnel carrier, 20 years late, and with no weapon beyond a machinegun. And personnel statistics, perhaps reflecting wider society, do not make happy reading. Just five years ago, around 4,500 service personnel brought claims against the MOD. Today the number has jumped to almost 7,000 - or roughly, one in every 17th serviceman or woman on a parade square is making a claim against the MOD. Is serving in the (smaller) non-operational Army really so dangerous? Has the MOD become more negligent in the last five years? We can't go on like this. The first thing we must do is face reality and drop the 'world-beating' delusion. Good, better, best In the early 1960s, Defence Secretary Robert McNamara - America's most talented holder of the post in the second half of the 20th century - coined the phrase 'Good, better, best', in an interview with LIFE magazine. The Ford 'whizz kid' ('human IBM machine' was his other nickname) had been recruited by Kennedy to reform the bloated Department of Defence. He did, against some opposition. 'Good, better, best' referred to defence kit. The majority of defence kit, McNamara argued, just needs to be good. A small proportion needs to be better. And the smallest proportion needs to be 'the best'. The reason was cost. If each of the services proposed the best kit, every time, the defence budget would be bankrupted. Who knows what McNamara would make of Washington's trillion dollar defence budget today. His wisdom is certainly missed. Or cheap is good enough Or, perhaps, we could shorten McNamara's dictum and simply state cheap is good enough, most of the time. We were good at cheap. It was the foundation for what today would be called 'success stories'. The Land Rover story began in 1947 with Rover responding to a War Department requirement for a cheap, jeep-like, utility vehicle. Millions have since rolled off the production line. In contrast, a recently procured patrol vehicle (this auth...

Introduction President Donald Trump's attempt to end the war in Ukraine continues, but for how much longer? He has recently stated that his patience is wearing thin. Even if a meaningful ceasefire materialises, the extent to which the U.S. might provide security guarantees is still unknown. One thing that appears to be clear is that European nations will be taking the lead in any peacekeeping force used to enforce whatever peace deal might be negotiated, and that NATO security guarantees, such as Article 5, may not extend to this force. This poses a unique risk when it comes to potential nuclear escalation should further conflict occur in the future. A lack of NATO security guarantees may leave a European peacekeeping force in Ukraine vulnerable to nuclear strike. A brief hypothetical scenario may help demonstrate this. The year is 2029… President Donald Trump is coming towards the end of his second term as president, and it looks like a more pro-Ukraine candidate is going to be elected. Russia, having seen a significant easing of sanctions as part of a peace deal, has reconstituted and improved its military capability and learned its mistakes from the 2022 invasion. Worried by the possibility that the U.S. will soon be more likely to intervene to defend Ukraine, President Putin decides to act. After conducting a series of false flag operations - designed to look like Ukrainian aggression - Russia launches another invasion, banking on the European peacekeeping force being unwilling to take significant casualties, and the U.S. not intervening. However, Russia still suffers from significant command and control issues, and the European nations have also improved their own military capabilities. Russian forces make little progress and suffer heavy casualties - European casualties remain surprisingly limited. In Moscow, the prospect of another failed military operation sees pressure mounting on Putin - talks of a coup swirl. Putin decides to make good on a threat that was now falling on deaf ears. Russia launches a SS-26 Stone SSM with a 10-kiloton tactical warhead. Deliberately used in a less kinetic area of the front, targeting reconnaissance forces proving routes for a potential advance, the military impact of the detonation was limited, as was intended by Russia; however, the strategic impact was huge. With the U.S. still unwilling to provide material support, despite overwhelming condemnation of Russia's actions, Europe and Ukraine struggle to come up with a response, with Russia threatening further use of its tactical nuclear weapons. Sheltering under a Anglo-French umbrella? Anyone with a vague knowledge of the Ukraine conflict could probably poke holes in the scenario above, but it illustrates a point. A peacekeeping force in Ukraine may face the risk of nuclear escalation by Russia. The U.K. and France may offer to have Ukraine under their 'nuclear umbrella'; however, with only strategic weapons at their disposal, a nuclear response to a tactical nuclear strike would be grossly disproportionate. Given this, any force in Ukraine needs to ensure it can deal with a nuclear strike in a conventional way. This will include ensuring maneuver forces can continue to operate in a nuclear environment, as the employment of tactical nuclear weapons by Russia will likely, at least in part, be designed to limit freedom of movement. Fighting in a nuclear environment A nuclear strike would require a military force to deal with a number of challenges. The blast itself will almost certainly lead to casualties, just like a conventional munition. The thermal radiation of even a 10-kiloton warhead is likely to cause anything flammable within hundreds of meters to ignite and cause severe burns to those in the vicinity. Ionizing radiation will soon see cases of radiation sickness beginning to appear, which, even if not fatal, will require specialized medical treatment. Residual radiation from unfissioned weapon debris and radioactive fission ...

A golden opportunity in the era of Labour's Procurement Act The dust has barely settled on Labour's Procurement Act, which kicked in back in February 2025, and defence SMEs find themselves at a crossroads. On one hand, they're facing some real headaches; on the other, there's a chance to make their mark as genuine trailblazers in social impact. With government scrutiny on spending ramping up, smaller players can actually stand out from the crowd by showing they're serious about making meaningful change happen. The changing landscape of Social Value The Social Value Act was first introduced in 2012 when 'social value' was little more than a footnote in procurement discussions. It has been on quite the ride since then. Fast forward to 2020, when we saw the introduction of a proper framework with five clear themes: COVID-19 Recovery, Tackling Economic Inequality, Fighting Climate Change, Equal Opportunity, and Wellbeing. Labour hasn't wasted any time putting its stamp on things. Rayner's 'National Procurement Plan' has teeth, making Social Value non-negotiable in contracts and holding suppliers' feet to the fire. Since February, the new Act forces both buyers and suppliers to publish their Social Value KPIs in black and white. No more hiding in the shadows. The SME challenge: David vs Goliath It's a totally different ball game for SMEs compared to the big boys. When that 10% Social Value threshold landed with PPN 06/20, industry giants barely blinked - Jacobs simply bought half a consultancy and created Simetrica-Jacobs overnight. Job done. SMEs just don't have that luxury - their piggy banks aren't big enough for that kind of splash. To make matters worse, the advice they're getting often comes from forums dominated by the very primes they're competing against. Talk about the fox guarding the henhouse! The measurement problem is another thorn in their side: current systems that love to attach pound signs to everything naturally favour those with deeper pockets. When an SME takes on one apprentice, it's a big deal for them but it gets lost in the noise when compared to a multinational hiring a small army of graduates. The SME advantage: agility and authenticity But it's not all doom and gloom. Defence SMEs have some aces up their sleeves - their nimble structure means they can weave Social Value into their DNA, rather than bolting it on as an afterthought. As smaller and more flexible businesses, SMEs have the advantage of fully integrating Social Value into their core values, culture and everyday operations. Larger businesses often struggle to retrofit Social Value,but we, at RUK have been able to build it into the fabric of everything we do. This isn't just corporate speak - it translates into real-world impact. SMEs' local roots mean they actually understand what communities need. With Labour banging the drum for regional development, that local knowledge is pure gold. They can pivot quickly, create initiatives that actually matter, and build partnerships that deliver more than just PR points. Building Defence SME success in Social Value At RUK, collaboration underpins everything we do and we believe that SMEs can punch above their weight by focusing on these partnerships that matter, creating their own bespoke tracking tools. Developing a solid Social Value strategy takes graft, but we've found that having the right relationships in place makes all the difference when bidding for contracts. For RUK, Social Value isn't a box-ticking exercise; it's central to our entire approach to winning business. SMEs can flip the script on their limitations. By zeroing in on quality rather than quantity, and developing focused initiatives that play to their strengths, they can create impact that resonates far more deeply than the scattergun approach often adopted by larger players. A call to action for government and industry For this potential to be realised, we need some fundamental changes. Government bodies must craft guidelines that...

In August 2024 a surprise Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast resulted in the capture of 1,376 square kilometres of Russian territory. Over the next six months the enclave was repeatedly attacked. Ukrainian-controlled territory shrunk to an area anchored on the town of Suzhda. In the second week of March the Ukrainian defence collapsed. Units withdrew to the border zone. The Russian command hailed a bold operation involving infiltration via a gas pipeline as catalyst for the Ukrainian retreat - Operacija Potok, or Operation Flow. This article assesses Operation Flow and the wider Ukrainian withdrawal from the Kursk salient. Preparations for Operation Flow Operation Flow was three weeks in the making. Command was vested in the Chechen Lieutenant-General Apti Alaudinov. Alaudinov has been a tireless self-promoter during the Kursk campaign. Operation Flow provided him with another opportunity to burnish his credentials with the Kremlin. First, methane gas residues had to be cleared from a 15 kilometre stretch of the Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhgorod pipeline that runs north-east of Suzdha. This was not entirely successful and a number of soldiers were hospitalised with neurotropic poisoning. Some Russian bloggers reported suffocations. Next, ammunition, food and water had to be ferried down the pipeline on special barrows. Toilets were also sent down. One Russian channel described the conditions thus: 'Walk, crawl almost 16 kilometres through a narrow dirty tunnel 1.45 m in diameter with vapours from the remains of liquefied gas; sit in a pipe waiting for the command to storm for several more days. Breathe in methane vapours, excrement, vomit of those who were the first to be poisoned, and there is no longer any possibility of calling for evacuation from this point, when the enemy is closer than our own.' Volunteers were drawn from multiple units: 11th Airborne Brigade, 106 Airborne Brigade, 72nd Motor Rifle Division, 30th Separate Guards Motor Rifle Brigade, the Veterans Airborne Assault Regiment, the Vostok Airborne Assault Regiment, and Akhmat (Chechen) special forces. A total of 800 troops were involved (General Gerasimov reported a lower number of 600 to President Putin in a later staged meeting). Due to the conditions, troops had to enter in small groups of five people with a distance of at least ten meters between groups. At halts soldiers moved a couple of meters away from each other so that they could breathe. A distance of 11-12 kilometres was covered over four days. Some spent as long as a week in the pipeline. As many as four exit points are believed to have been made in the pipeline, but possibly only one used. The Ukrainians actually intercepted communications between Russians complaining about the awful conditions in the pipeline. On Saturday 8 March the order was given to break cover and infiltrate northern Suzdha. Was the pipeline operation a success? Ukrainian reporting suggests Operation Flow achieved limited tactical success. The Ukrainian command was aware of the scheme and was keeping the pipeline under surveillance. YouTube video evidence shows a group that emerged in fields was quickly struck by artillery fire and dispersed in a nearby wood line. Another group reportedly reached a two-storey building in the industrial area of Suzdha but was destroyed. In total, Ukrainian sources report only around 100 soldiers actually emerged from the pipeline. That no Russian video or imagery was presented showing soldiers hoisting unit flags - a common practice to demonstrate success - suggests Ukrainian reporting is credible. Even so, an 82nd Air Assault Brigade soldier (the formation that engaged the Russians) also reported that although his unit was aware of the plan and repelled Russians that emerged from the pipeline, a number still managed to infiltrate the area of northern Suzdha. He told this was 'the reason why his brigade was forced to destroy part of its available equipment and withdraw from the eastern flank to the...

On the eve of the invasion of Ukraine, there were around 31,000 servicewomen and female MOD employees in the Ukrainian armed forces. This represented around 15% of the total force with one in ten serving as officers (but rarely above major rank). Following Soviet-era practice, servicewomen were mainly restricted to non-combat roles such as medical staff and clerks. The neglect of servicewomen was such that there were no female-standard uniforms on issue, a deficit addressed in typical Ukrainian fashion by volunteers such as the Arm Women Now project that enlisted help to sew uniforms more compatible with the female body shape. How has the war changed this? There are a lot more Ukrainian female soldiers now: Post the invasion restrictions were eventually lifted with women able to serve in any branch, subject to selection procedures. The age limit for women enlisting was also raised to 60, matching that of men. However, compulsory mobilisation remained only for males. This meant all women enlisting were, and today continue to be, volunteers. At first, recruitment was slow, mainly due to a lack of organisation and opportunities. Many found employment through 'private' recruiting (units posting job applications), rather than centralised recruiting through MOD schemes. By October 2023, female volunteer numbers had jumped 40%. But this only added another 12,000 servicewomen, bringing the total to 43,000 after two years of war. By March 2024, the numbers had risen to 62,000, including 5,000 in officer posts, and with 10,000 serving in active combat zones. By this point, 14,000 servicewomen in total had qualified as 'participants in hostilities' (effectively 'veteran' status for which there is a financial benefit). In the summer, the number rose to 67,000, but with clarification, 19,000 were 'employees with non-military tasks'. By the end of 2024, the number had stabilised around the 68,000 mark where it stands at the time of writing. The opening of over 40 nationwide recruitment centres - a programme which only started a year ago - has helped boost numbers. Today, roughly one in five applicants at the recruitment centres are women. The roles they fill are tabulated below: Female applicants at recruitment centres and roles assigned Staff positions 24% Combat medics, doctors and nurses 22% Drone units 13% Chefs 12% Snipers (shooting specialists) 6% Communications and Cyber 6% Psychologists 3% Examples of frontline service have been varied. In March 2024, the first all-female drone unit was raised. Tetyana Bondarenko was a theatre actress before the war. Today she is call sign 'Bond' (after 007) and an expert drone pilot. Layla, call sign Saratsyn, a former IT worker with striking red dreadlocks, now commands a drone strike unit. Olga Yehorova - a keen sportswoman before the war - is an example of female sniper. She has been wounded twice, once catching shell splinters in her stomach ('the pain became unbearable' she remembered), and on a second occasion receiving a bloodied eye from a shell blast. Liudmyla Meniuk joined 24th Aidar Separate Assault Battalion in 2016 and eventually progressed from clerk, to chief sergeant of an assault company, to commander of an armoured service unit. Some have achieved fame: in November 2024 soldier Natalia Hrabarchuk downed a cruise missile with a MANPADs. Before the war she was a kindergarten teacher. This was her first launch. From left to right, and top to bottom: Sniper Olga Yehorova, theatre actress now drone pilot Tetyana Bondarenko, Commander of Armoured Service Unit Liudmyla Meniuk, and former IT worker today strike drone platoon commander Layla. Former kindergarten teacher Natalia Hrabarchuk downs a cruise missile with a MANPADs then falls to her knees with the realisation of what she has just achieved. Source: United 24 Media It is not all about the frontline. Servicewomen also serve in the GUR and SBU (Intelligence Directorate and Security Service) where they have been praised for their ...

On January 19, 2025, a ceasefire was agreed to after nearly 16 months of continuous combat in Gaza between Israel and Hamas. In short order, every side immediately began to claim victory, glory, or defeat. As predicted in 2021, Israel's victory operational concept led it down a path of two further indeterminate outcomes against Hamas and Hezbollah. Hamas initiated its genocidal total war on October 7, 2023 with a genuinely deluded sense of their own combat power, expecting Israel to collapse under the weight of a few thousand irregular fighters. Instead, the war soon turned into one of the most punishing urban conflicts of the 21st century, transforming Gaza into a ruin. The war would kill around 50,000 Palestinians, with 1,200 people killed, raped, and tortured in the initial Hamas attack, 251 hostages taken, and nearly 1,000 Israelis killed in ground combat. It would end with Hamas's governance and military capabilities, as well as the social bonds of Gaza, significantly degraded, even as the fighting continued. Acknowledging Owen's point that there is no official, singular, victory doctrine, the intended purpose of the mosaic of changes to Israeli strategic thought, often colloquially described as its 'victory doctrine', was to ensure victory into the future. This was to be achieved via, according to Eran Ortal, A "turn on the light and extinguish the fire" maneuver would be able to attack deep into enemy territory to conquer main nerve centers and inflict a decisive [military] defeat, while suppressing enemy rockets and missiles launched nearby toward Israeli forces and toward the home front. Having learned from the 2021 short war between Israel and Hamas, Israel had the benefit of additional years of capability purchases and training before October 7. While Gaza was the primary battlefield, it was ultimately used most powerfully against Hezbollah. The Cry for Total Victory It was not just the character of the attack by Hamas, the humiliation of the surprise, nor the savagery shown by Hamas on October 7, that drove the Israeli demand for victory. Over the past decades, Israel itself had become increasingly uncomfortable with the outcomes of the various wars, quick battles, and intifadas it had fought. Israeli society became more willing to unleash such destruction in the hope victory would be achieved finally. Symbiotically, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu would utilize this shift and begin to call for "total victory" against Hamas. What this actually meant in practice was never really described beyond generalised demands for the destruction of Hamas and the return of the hostages, however. It was emblematic of the overall problem with contemporary Israeli strategic thought under Netanyahu: superior military action to defeat enemy military forces that distracted from larger political questions that undermine overall strategic effectiveness. However, others attempted to fill this vacuum. The most notable idea floated was by Einat Wilf, who suggested "the Palestinians of Gaza, either collectively and individually, surrender." Specifically, that the Palestinians accept the state of Israel, to settle in Gaza as citizens, and to accept the loss of the right of return. This was the closest anyone came to defining goals that meet the real test of victory, contra Owen's peculiar assertion that victory only occurs in the military realm. No Day After Plan Israel's victory operational concept focused on high-tech enabled fires, with ground forces to cordon off territory and search and destroy enemy forces within the buildings and underground bunkers in claustrophobic close quarters battle. But those units would soon leave, and operations were then carried out by units raiding from outside the Gaza border into urban areas, as well as special operations units to engage in small unit actions. The effect of this was to destroy Hamas' standing armed units when they could be found, and slowly fracture the bonds of Gaza as flee...

"Achieving information dominance is an indispensable prerequisite of combat action." Editor's note: This style of article is also a move from our more traditional analytical articles. However, we valued the first person experience it offers and think it is of interest to our readers. The current Labour government is having a hard time of it from mainstream media and with the departure of Sue Gray as the Chief of Staff at Downing Street and a budget that already seems to be unpopular. Downing Street it is going to have to work hard to reverse what has been an unsteady number of weeks in the headlines. How can it do this and why? I have recently returned from Operation ORBITAL (the UK presence in Eastern Europe) as the media officer. During this time I was fortunate enough to work alongside Task Force Thunder in Grafenwoehr. I saw multiple elements of the NATO effort to support Ukraine from a J4, J7 and J9 perspective. Whether that be helicopter pilot training to medical serials, the state of the art facilities being used, or witnessing the biggest movement of kit and equipment across Europe since WW2. The effort from every nation and individual involved is staggering. But it seems that absolutely no one outside of military circles is aware of it. When on rest and relaxation I attended two weddings. When chatting to fellow guests I was often asked, 'Is there still a war going on?' Why has everyone forgotten about the conflict in the Ukraine? It would be very easy to blame the 24-hour news cycle and the constant demand for new stories and viewer fatigue for the war falling down the priority list in newsrooms. I would argue, however, that poor strategic communications has also diminished understanding and interest in the conflict. This opinion piece is focussing on strategic communications and not strategic command. Finding the equation When discussing the Labour Government Tony Blair's former spin doctor, Alastair Campbell, offered a solution in the New European. Campbell offered "strategic communications, which is the simultaneous development, execution and narration of the driving strategy of government." Campbell provides a solid definition of strategic communications and one we can work with, "create narratives, deliver narratives and sell the story." But how do we do it? A simple strategy model that I have used before is one developed by Arthur F. Lykke Jr who gives us the ends, ways, and means model. Many officers will be familiar with this 3-tier framework. The formula is simple: strategy = ends + ways + means. This gives us three simple questions to ask; What is the desired end-state? How can it be achieved? What resources are required? The strategic communications strategy for the war in Ukraine has a well-defined end state which is to ensure continued support form the UK public for the work being done by NATO and the UK Armed Forces. The strategic talking points and lines to take are comprehensively circulated and updated as needed. We have the ways in which we wish to do this, whether that be a certain number of views, shares or likes on social media posts, headlines or column inches in traditional print, content creation from interviews and documentary series (I highly recommend watching the INTERFLEX series on YoutTube that was created by BFBS) all underpinned by narratives we design. Where we come unstuck is the means. What resources are required to do this? I will offer a sports analogy to help explain this. What do all premier league football teams want to do? Win the league. I accept that small clubs merely wish to survive and some mid-table clubs just want to turn a profit. I am being reductive for simplicity. We have our end state: win the league. The ways are the styles of football a team or how the team coach wishes to play. Some teams want a high press and to counterattack: traditionally in England we have played a long ball attritional style with passes limited to between 6-8 from goalkeeper to a strong ...

General Sanders was evidently as blunt as he felt he could be in his valedictory communication when standing down as Chief of the General Staff (CGS). From day 1 of his appointment he was publicly candid about the size of the Army, which did not sit well with the Secretary of State for Defence; it is well known that even exceptional politicians find it difficult to cope with inconvenient truths. Nevertheless, Wallace was considered one of our better politicians. I still wonder why the shining star that was Wallace faded so quickly. I do hope there is not an unedifying explanation. Sanders' assessment of British Army decline was as explicit as he dared to be but full of implicit warnings that will be lost on most people. He was absolutely right to make the case to re-arm as fast as we can (a huge challenge given our sclerotic acquisition processes). What was left largely unsaid is the inability of the Army to prepare, deploy and sustain itself in the field. During the Cold War, when we used to spend around 6% of GDP on Defence, the Army had four deployable Divisions, that exercised as a Corps within NATO. In the same era, 'Stables' parades were a feature of unit life whereby vehicles were taken out of their garages and cleaned, repaired and maintained. Detachment, vehicle or Crew Commanders and their associated personnel became very knowledgeable about the state of their vehicles; knew their strengths, weaknesses and idiosyncrasies. Understandably, a bond was formed with the vehicle platform that was to bear these personnel into and/or in battle. Being so in touch with key equipment heightened the chance of success in combat; the like of which has been torpedoed by something called Whole Fleet Management (WFM), arguably one of the most destructive policies ever implemented. The bulk of vehicles and equipment are no longer in unit lines, but held centrally (and certainly not enough to equip a comprehensive mobilisation) and 'maintained'. With the bonds of ownership broken, prior to an exercise (or Operation), vehicles and equipment are delivered from a central pool, quite often not on time or in a good state, and preparation/repair/familiarisation eats into valuable training time. Worse still, a paucity of military vehicles is often offset by civilian rental vehicles, which detracts from training and credibility still further, and some exercises would in all likelihood fail completely if personal mobile phones were not used; which tells you more about the Army's communications systems than it does about poor signals security behaviour. Whilst WFM may make sense to accountants, it has destroyed the crucial link of familiarity between operator and vehicle platform and signals equipment, that is likely to make a difference in the crucible of combat. Even if there were sufficient numbers of vehicles, there is a NATO-wide critical lack of strategic and operational lift capacity, whether that be air, maritime, rail or by road, to get them to the right place on time. Back in the 80s the British Army had over 1,000 Main Battle Tanks (MBT). On the books today there are 200 or so. I would risk a lot of money in betting that only about 100 are actually fully serviceable. As Sanders asked when he became CGS: why would he want to reduce the size of the Army in these turbulent times? Re-arming is one thing. Increasing the size of the Army is quite another. The rot set in with the demise of the Junior Army back in the 90s, compounded, amongst other things, by a disastrous privatisation of the recruiting function. Units are much reduced in size in terms of personnel. The persistent reduction of "our most important asset"1 necessitates the Army policy direction for new capability programmes to aim for personnel levels of less than the current level or at worst: no more. The reality is that many new capabilities will require greater personnel levels than currently, particularly if the Army is to double and then triple its capability. Even if t...

Third Place (Joint) LH(EW) Lewis Batch, Northwood HQ It is more than 40 years since the Falklands conflict. Evaluate the challenges the Royal Navy face if it was to engage in a non-UN/NATO supported conflict in the Southern hemisphere. Context On 05 April 1982 the aircraft carriers HMS HERMES, HMS INVINCIBLE and their escort vessels, sailed from Portsmouth for the South Atlantic as part of the UK governments response to the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands. Then, as would apply now, the UK was not afforded protection under NATO's Article 5 'collective self-defence' (valid only for territories north of the Tropic of Cancer) and a solely British Military operation was initiated. Given the need to carry an invasion force over some 8,000 miles, the Royal Navy (RN) was to act as the main military apparatus in the transportation of the invasion force south: this was codenamed OPERATION CORPORATE. Forty-one years later and Argentina has elected a new president in Javier Milie, who is keen to re-open questions over the future of the Falklands sovereignty. This, coupled with the RN's recovery from a period of austerity-driven defence cuts, provides comparisons which are eerily reminiscent of the state of the RN in 1982. It is therefore appropriate to discuss whether the RN in 2024 could replicate a similar response to that that was launched in 1982. To make fair assessment, the following areas will be discussed: political appetite (and foreign policy), fleet size, technology, defence procurement, as well as the UK's relationship with her allies and the role of overseas bases. Political Appetite The UK government does and continues to demonstrate its desire to play a global role, meeting its commitment to international partners and defending peace and stability. This is evident from the UK's leading role in both the training and delivery of equipment to Ukraine since 2022; the commitment through OPERATION PROSPERITY GUARDIAN to ensure freedom of navigation through areas littoral to Yemen; notwithstanding swift responses to the 2021 Kabul Airlift, the evacuation of UK nationals from Sudan in 2023 and most recently, the delivery of humanitarian aid to Gaza. Importantly, it was the release of the 2021 Integrated Review and Defence Command Paper which reiterated the appetite for 'global Britain'. This manifested itself in a commitment to respond to both concurrent and new and emerging threats, focussing largely on the following methods: the need for a more forward based Navy, the ability to deploy one functioning aircraft carrier and investment in future technology, such a direct energy weapons and artificial intelligence. In short, the UK has demonstrated it maintains the political will to remain a global power in protecting its interests at home and abroad. However, this has been conducted with ever stretching resources, most notably, fewer available capital ships and a creaking support structure. Fleet Size With it established that the UK has the political will power to react to a theoretical conflict in the southern hemisphere, the next area of discussion lays with the current RN footprint and whether there is appropriate number of capital ships, auxiliary ships and supply chain to support extended deployment at high readiness. If we compare the current RN fleet with that of the task force sent in 1982, we can see numbers are significantly lower and this has continued to decrease in size. The OPERATION CORPORATE task group comprised of 127 ships: 43 RN vessels, (2 aircraft carriers, 15 frigates, 6 destroyers, 2 LPD's and 6 submarines), 24 Sea Harrier and 22 Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA). The 62 merchant vessels were British-registered vessels requisitioned by the Ministry of Defence (MoD), otherwise known as 'Ships Taken Up From Trade' (STUFT). In contrast, the current RN in its totality encompasses 66 vessels, drastically reducing to 21 when listing only capital ships:11 frigates, 6 destroyers, 2 aircraft carriers, 2 LPDs an...

Third Place (Joint) AB David Dulla, HMS TAMAR It is more than 40 years since the Falklands conflict. Evaluate the challenges the Royal Navy face if it were to engage in a non-NATO supported conflict in the Southern Hemisphere Context and Considerations Argentina surrendered their claim on the British overseas territory 74 days after invading the Falkland Islands, an outcome determined by poor strategic planning coupled with an under estimation of the United Kingdom's political appetite for a military response. Using this short war as the sole benchmark for predicting future challenges for the Royal Navy is unreliable over 40 years later, however this essay argues the same four considerations still determine the scale and success of any scenario in the future. Political, social, environmental and economic factors drive the capabilities of everyone from the Prime Minister down to a tradesman running a small painting and decorating business, with all organisations subject to conditions of which they have limited levels of control. Challenges vary depending on these factors, but conclusions will highlight financial investments, determined by social and political support, will create risks for the Royal Navy. A turbulent world outlook and the NATO perspective Politically the United Kingdom is largely divided in 2024 between the Conservative and the Labour parties. The UK have led support for Ukraine in their ongoing defence when the Russian Federation invaded in February 2022, fuelling a deterioration in East-West relations which is comparable to the Cold War 1947-1991. Meanwhile, Israel invaded Palestinian Gaza in October 2023 after responding to a Hamas attack on a music festival, following years of unrest over territorial claims traced back to political agreements made in the wake of World War II. In addition, Yemen has seen the Iranian backed Houthis carry out attacks on western merchant ships attempting to transit the Red Sea. And finally, the People's Republic of China is attempting to assert dominance in the South China Sea, with the deployment of Royal Navy and NATO allies to safeguard free trade and fisheries. With these significant and potentially escalating conflicts dominating politics, focusing on the northern hemisphere is the key focus for UK governments. This prioritisation means deploying less operational capability south of the equator, arguably challenging the speed at which the Royal Navy's main fighting force could respond in these areas. Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty stipulates an attack on British overseas territory south of the Tropic of Cancer would not qualify for collective defence between NATO Nations, and as seen in the Iraq War 2003 it is easier to make a political argument for military conflict when you are supported by other countries because resources and risks are shared. With no weapons of mass destruction found during the Iraq campaign, and 179 UK military personal losing their lives, the conflict and consequent enquiry conducted in 2016 concluded a deficient case for war where preparations were inadequate and military objectives failed. Tony Blair, the Prime Minister during the conflict, was scrutinised publicly which emphasised the personal accountability of decision makers. Poor intelligence prior to any conflict in the southern hemisphere would potentially lead to the same outcomes. Voters responded when Labours government lost the election in 2010, with a decline in electorate trust a contributing factor. Conversely, Thatcher gained popularity in her Britain-alone response seen in the Falklands, cementing the nickname 'Iron Lady' while seeing her landslide re-election in 1983 and 1987 following a conflict 8000 miles away from the UK but a beacon for political support. Both the Iraq and the Falkland conflicts were positioned as the defence of British security, but both had very different outcomes for politicians which influences their predecessors. The Royal Navy would encounter g...

Second Place LNN Esme Clayton, Joint Hospital Group Memes or missiles? Should we invest more in Information Operations? Definitions To be able to discuss this accurately, we need to first understand what the word 'meme' means. Although, it may be commonly associated by being coined by Richard Dawkins in The Selfish Gene (1976) as a 'unit' of culture. We can look for the meaning of the word further back in time all the way back to the Greeks, where they used the word 'minema' meaning 'imitated'. To think of the word simply it can be defined as a type of behaviour, picture, text, containing information which is passed from person to person. Missiles are easier to define as 'an object which is forcibly propelled at a target'. Memes - an extension of a much older concept? Firstly, to look into the benefits of investing more into information operations, it is useful to look at an example of its use in WW2. Operation Mincemeat, was a successful British operation where they deceived the Germans into thinking that the allies were planning to invade Greece and Sardinia, when the actual target was Sicily. They did this by planting fake correspondents into a corpse dressed as a Major. As you can see from this example, the British used both tactics and sensitive information, to manipulate the opponents plans. The Germans doubled the number of troops sent to Sardinia, allowing the allies to fully capture Sicily. Another example was at the D-Day landings when they used dummy tanks to distract the enemy, and suggested that the Allies would attack other places to weaken German forces in Normandy. This would be in favour of the use of information operations in warfare, as we can see that it is very difficult to decipher what is fact and what is fiction, especially in heightened stress situations such as war. With the ever increasing knowledge behind technology and artificial intelligence, it would be vital for the UK to invest further into this, as it is impossible to predict what it could be used for in the future. The importance of critical thinking and analysis However, we are also able to use this example as a disadvantage of information operations, as the Germans saw the corpse of a 'Major' and gathered the information about the British and used it to defend their country. Although, the difficulty lies when interpreting which information is useful and which has been staged. For the proper use of information operations you need three core elements - intelligence, leadership and information systems. Firstly intelligence, intelligence is ever changing and it is one of the most dynamic elements in wartime, so it needs to be acted upon with speed and accuracy, in order to get the desired outcome. A strong leader is needed to ensure that there is strong decision making, they are able to critically think and visualise the battlefield, to come up with the best options with the information gained. And finally, the ability to acquire, analyse and store the information that is obtained. And a limitation of the final element, is that the information can be leaked or hacked, showing the importance of the first two core elements, to allow the information to be acted on immediately. With the current funding the armed forces are struggling to find the correct people who are qualified and have the desired experience for the role. It is understandable that the best minds in artificial intelligence, computers and social media are attracted to the high salaries in multi-international companies. If they invested more into intelligence operations, I believe a large percentage of this investment should be utilised to train people to correctly use information operations, as well as to decipher between correct and incorrect information. Are Info Ops effective in a modern, media-savvy world? There is evidence to show that although information operations in warfare was effective in the past, however, now they are more well known and exposed, meaning that they ar...

One of the most remarkable literary achievements of the 20th century emerged in 1989 when W.W. Norton published Patrick O'Brian's multi-volume fictional re-creation of British naval life during the Napoleonic Wars. Eventually stretching to twenty books, O'Brian's account of the lives of Captain Jack Aubrey and his great friend, Doctor Stephen Maturin entranced reviewers and millions of readers. A reviewer from the New York Times stated that O'Brian's books are simply "the best historical novels ever written." "Master and Commander" is the first Hollywood movie made from O'Brian's books and what follows is not a review but rather an essay that uses the movie to frame a discussion of leadership. The focus is the character of Jack Aubrey- created by Patrick O'Brian, visualized by director Peter Weir and brought to life by actor Russell Crowe. An examination of Aubrey's behavior, thoughts and values throughout the movie provides a wealth of insight into the concept of leadership. As the movie begins, it is the spring of 1805 and we are aboard HMS Surprise, a small Royal Navy frigate with a crew of 197 souls and an armament of 28 guns. HMS Surprise serves as a tiny but exact mirror of the actual British navy and Jack Aubrey serves as an archetype of a fighting British sea-captain during the Napoleonic wars. As we will see, the movie title of "Master and Commander" is actually an incomplete description of Aubrey's role, which can more accurately be described as "Master, Commander and Leader." Each of these three roles describes a different aspect of Aubrey's performance. Each derives from a unique set of competencies but all three roles strongly complement each other. The fact that Aubrey is successful as master, commander and leader has a decisive effect on the course of events in the movie. HMS Surprise has left England under orders to find the French frigate Acheron and "sink, burn or take her as a prize." The Surprise is off the coast of Brazil and approaching a fogbank that seems to contain something suspicious. When the alarm is raised, we are introduced to Captain Jack Aubrey who peers into the fogbank, sees gunflashes and quickly realizes that the Surprise is about to be mauled by the larger, more heavily gunned enemy ship. Aubrey is energized by the prospect of combat ("straight at 'em, Mr. Mowatt!") but events quickly take a turn for the worse as Surprise's rudder is shot away and the British barely escape into the fog. We learn more of Aubrey in the wake of the Surprise's first disastrous encounter with the French. The ship's officers, somewhat in shock, are discussing the engagement and they observe that Acheron was "more like a ship of the line than a frigate" and "our shots couldn't penetrate." They all assume that the clear superiority of the French ship means the Surprise will have to abandon its mission and return to England. Their misgivings are well-founded. HMS Surprise, with 28 guns, is about as small as a ship can be and still be called a frigate. By way of comparison, the four British frigates that fought at Trafalgar were all armed with at least 36 guns. Jack Aubrey, however, sees the situation from a very different perspective. Positively radiating with decisiveness, he tells his officers that there is not a moment to lose if they are to carry out repairs and catch up with the French. As the ship recovers, we see an absolute beehive of complicated, intense activity; a visual reminder that warships of this period were the largest, most complex and deadliest moving objects in the world. In addition, these ships were a veritable "system of systems" and competent commanders had to know every aspect of their ship. We see Captain Aubrey talking gunnery with the gunner, navigation with the sailing master and ship repairs with the carpenter. Aubrey's obvious competence links to a leadership insight derived from Clausewitz. The Prussian philosopher of war once observed that great leaders need to be decisive but it...

Giving our people a platform Here at The Wavell Room, our message has always been loud and consistent: critical thinking and writing is not (and should never be) just an 'officers' sport'. Professional development amongst the serving community must always be encouraged, and given the exceptional intelligence, insight and quality of our people their voices must be heard. To that end, it is an absolute pleasure to be able to announce that the Royal Navy has granted us permission to publish the best placed articles written for this year's edition of the Lt Cdr Hooper essay competition. This annual event is open to Junior Ratings and Other Ranks in all branches of the Royal Navy, Royal Marines, Royal Fleet Auxiliary and Maritime Reserves; including those holding acting higher rank (i.e. Substantive Leading Hand / Corporal and below). The Challenge Each year, three questions are offered up for analysis and response. This year, the titles on offer were: 1. Memes or Missiles? Should we invest more in Information Operations? 2. It is more than 40 years since the Falklands conflict. Evaluate the challenges the Royal Navy face if it was to engage in a non-UN/NATO supported conflict in the Southern hemisphere. 3. Allyship in the Royal Navy. Why is it important and how is it going? Winners - 2024 It was so tough to judge this year, that some extra prize money was rustled up to allow for a Joint 3rd Place finisher. BZ to all, and we at the Wavell Room very much hope that you enjoy their musings. First Place ET(ME) Joseph Hardiman - Essay 2 Second Place Leading Naval Nurse Esme Clayton - Essay 1 Third Place (Joint) AB David Dulla - Essay 2 LH(EW) Lewis Batch - Essay 2 The Lt Cdr Hooper Prize This annual essay competition commemorating the late Lt Cdr Geoffrey William Winsmore Hooper OBE RN is open to all Junior Ratings across the Royal Navy and aims to broaden current affairs knowledge. Prize money is provided from a trust fund established in 1952 by Lt Cdr Hooper's mother. Aged only 30, Geoffrey Hooper was killed in a motor accident 2nd January 1923 in Hong Kong. Anyone keen to enter the 2025 competition should look out for the relevant RNTM on the RN Intranet.

First Prize Winner ET(ME) Joseph Hardiman, Disposal and Reserve Ships Organisation It is more than 40 years since the Falklands conflict. Evaluate the challenges the Royal Navy face if it was to engage in a non-UN/NATO supported conflict in the Southern hemisphere. The Challenge The Royal Navy faces significant challenges in engaging in a conflict in the Southern Hemisphere without UN/NATO interoperability and support. To ascertain the scope and gravity that underscores these challenges, this essay will focus upon identifying potential adversaries and the specific threats they pose to Britain. This analysis will not only highlight the viability of any hypothetical engagement but also underscore the critical nature of these threats. Secondly, addressing the lack of support is crucial. Although the possibility of forming sub alliances, as successfully done in past engagements, exists, and is explored through this essay, ultimately this scenario must be approached from a worst-case perspective. This methodology allows the Royal Navy to discern between its interoperability with NATO and its veritable shortcomings in both platform capability and lethality. Today, whilst the Royal Navy is exceptionally capable in certain areas it is too small to engage in conflicts at the scale it once could, and it cannot single-handedly meet the diverse threats emerging in an increasingly contested Southern Hemisphere. Non-traditional adversaries While it's important to note that the Royal Navy's primary adversaries lie in the Northern Hemisphere, namely Iran, China, and Russia, through careful analysis, it has become abundantly clear that the Southern Hemisphere presents a distinct set of challenges that the Royal Navy must rigorously evaluate to sustain its efficacy and lethality as a formidable fighting force. These encompass overseas British territories, inhabited by British subjects entitled to protection, as well as emerging threats from an increasingly contested region of the world. Firstly, the Falklands is still a significant point of contention for both Britain and Argentina. In 2013, a British-sanctioned referendum was conducted, which saw 99.8% of islanders voting to remain under British control. However, a poll conducted in the same year by YouGov, ascertained that only 15% of Argentinians shared the conviction of the British government, that the Islanders had a right to self-determination. This sentiment was tacitly reflected by the incumbent president Javier Milei, who in 2024 stated a desire to establish a clear "roadmap" to patriate the Falkland Islands into "Argentine hands." Although he emphasized that any pursuit would be through "diplomatic channels" the situation still presents tangible concern for Britain. Milei is a populist, whose mandate survives on catering to the wants and desires of the ordinary citizen. In a country that firmly believes the Falklands belong to them as evidenced further by their celebration of Las Malvinas day annually (Argentine name for the islands), the failure of diplomatic channels could lead Milei, much like Galtieri in 1982, to leverage an invasion of the Falklands to stoke Argentine nationalism. Global Threats While the Falkland Islands present the most tactile point of contention, it is important to underscore the issue of new emerging threats. These are evidenced by adversaries from the Northern Hemisphere intensifying their presence within the region both directly and indirectly, presenting political and economic threats to both the Royal Navy and Britain. Firstly, The Maritime Security Threat Advisory (MTSA) reported in 2024 that an Iranian vessel had entered the Southern Hemisphere, citing this as "the first" instance of this happening. This exemplifies a navy, once decimated by the United States in 1988, now exhibiting defiance and a growing confidence. It is increasingly willing to extend its influence into new regions, thereby presenting a burgeoning threat. To compound this further,...

Pride and Fall tells the story of the British Army and Royal Marines (and more broadly Defence) campaign against the Taliban in Afghanistan 2001-2014. It mixes high-level discussions with strategy with tactical vignettes. It offers a highly readable, highly credible history of the period. This book is bloody brilliant. We highly recommend it. From people who served in Afghanistan to warfare experts to those with a casual interest, Pride and Fall will help anyone understand. Miller's clarity coupled with a deep understanding of what happened during the campaign make this highly readable. He does it with an engaging style and sense of wit that few can match. Blow by blow account? In many ways Pride and Fall is a blow by blow account of the land campaign in Afghanistan. Its chapters are chronological, dealing with the campaign as it happened. It offers tactical details with a clear narrative of events. But you would be mistaken if you thought this was a narrative history. Miller brings out the personalities of the commanders and their preparations to show how they impacted the conduct of the war. For example, 'mowing the lawn' of early campaigns and 'clear hold build'. It also charts how the campaign developed - or didn't - and questions why. This analysis alone makes it a useful reference for future study. Miller identifies and explores named individuals to the level of critical analysis that he does, which is something few others have done as effectively. A veteran British reader will recognise many (now senior generals) in their formative years. The title of the book gives away the general argument about the conduct of the war. Miller's text charts the good and the bad of British strategy. Pride and Fall considers that the war lacked a strategy. But he is not entirely dismissive of Britain's efforts. The rise and increasing effectiveness of intelligence is a key success. The conduct of Op HERRICK 13 is a high point of success, one let down by a lack of resources to exploit it before the drawdown. Just because some things were bad, not all of it was. His ability to assess the relative merits and offer a nuanced view of the campaign sets it apart from more traditional 'good or bad' narrative history. Reading it from a doctrine perspective, Pride and Fall adds historical context from which to judge the effectiveness of Britain's new counter-insurgency doctrine. We might conclude, crudely, that Britain had 'all the ideas none of the gear'. But Miller wouldn't quite put it like that. Miller's wider points about how to be better should be grasped by a modern Army facing similar challenges in the future. Strategy and tactics Another theme is the interaction between strategy and tactics. The pressure on resources balanced against the reliance on the US is key throughout. London, Miller shows, struggled to stay relevant despite the commitment of British blood and treasure. Multiple Defence Secretaries, changing generals, the home front. How these big hand themes played out on the ground, and notably the C2 challenges it created, offers new angles to consider. But Pride and Fall doesn't only deal with the science of war. There are long sections detailing the ground reality. These moments offer a glimpse into the human struggles. For example, the role of Company Sergeant Major 'Billy' Roy who straps antlers to his quad bike to deliver Christmas dinners, or the more human details about living outside the wire (or more crudely, taking a **** whilst freezing on a mountain). Not to mention more relevant examples of long insertion tabs, coalition tensions, human relationships that actually win campaigns. Pride and Fall combined these tactical and human moments with a sense of how they contributed to the wider mission. It brilliantly demonstrates the British soldier (and Marines) sense of humour. Who is the author? Sergio Miller is a former Intelligence Corps officer and a regular Wavell Room contributor. His analysis of the war in Ukraine ...

BLUF: This paper proposes the creation of the structures and conditions required to train, lead and deploy a cost-effective Citizen Tri-service Reserve Force at scale during periods of stretch, tension, crisis or war. The Citizen Tri-Service Reserve Force would be available for use. (1) as a third echelon front line fighting force, (2) providing rear area and lines of communication security and (3) in homeland defence, protecting critical national infrastructure.This will be achieved by establishing cadres of experienced ex Regulars and Volunteer Reservists capable of initially training and subsequently leading the Citizen Tri-Service Reserve Force. Against a changing threat the UK is likely to require more people in uniform than we have now. The Citizen Tri-Service Reserve Force concept utilises those who have already served, putting them in place to prepare thoroughly as training and leadership cadres while saving in the short to medium term the cost of recruiting, remunerating and equipping the bulk of the rank and file (90% of the workforce). It then sets the conditions to expand when required by having experienced leadership in place to build around. Strategic background The threats facing NATO in general and the UK in particular have escalated dramatically following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Furthermore, Eastern Europe is only one of several areas of the world where tensions have risen substantially over recent months and years; any of the others of which (eg Taiwan, Middle East) could erupt so as to distract key allies at a critical moment, potentially reducing their ability to support their NATO commitments in Europe. Additionally, depending on the attitude of individual NATO members, including a possible future US President, Article 5 of the NATO Treaty may not be quite as binding as is widely assumed. All of this needs to be set against a context in which the UK has the smallest standing army since Waterloo. Our navy and air force are similarly diminutive. Our Defence remains configured primarily for discretionary campaigning (such as Iraq and Afghanistan) and has not yet fully switched to prepare for non-discretionary conflict against a peer adversary. The current SDR provides an opportunity to address this necessary change in orientation, which is likely to require the provision of mass in uniform. Why we need the ability to generate mass As demonstrated clearly in Ukraine, in a war of any duration, units become worn out and need replacing in the line to rest and recuperate. The UK has no provision for this. Secondly, if the UK is operating in Eastern Europe in support of its NATO allies, it will have extremely long lines of communication along which its ammunition, equipment, workforce and rations will need to travel. Protecting such lines of communication needs "teeth" units, including infantry, light armour and air defence, especially against drones. Thirdly, substantial additional resources are needed to support the defence of the UK's critical national infrastructure. The outgoing Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Patrick Sanders, publicly raised the importance of the UK's ability to create military mass if required in a time of crisis in January 2024. He was referring to a citizen army (the "third echelon") which history shows is needed to win our wars; under this concept, as in both World Wars, a small core of Regulars (the "first echelon") fight to buy time; the Volunteer Reserves (the "second echelon") then reinforce and help to hold the line; and the citizen army (the "third echelon") concludes the conflict. Access to large numbers of cost-effective teams and a trained workforce from all three services would be essential in such circumstances. Warfighting assumptions always expect a war to be over within weeks rather than months or years (the size of our armed forces is indeed currently based on this assumption); history, and current events in Ukraine, shows this to be over-o...

Tradition can be defined as an inherited, established and customary pattern of thought or action that can be transmitted from generation to generation due to their commonly accepted authority. In a military sense, Army traditions encompass customs and beliefs that unite different sets of soldiers. These traditions take form to us as behaviours, doctrine and actions. The British Army's website states that 'The British Army is a professional and disciplined team, with a long tradition of service to the country'.1Readers can infer that this means the Army does the nation's bidding, whether at war or peacetime, without delay or question. This endures (and has done since 1689) always; we know this from the long standing function of Parliament to authorise taxes for war and defence. It can be safely assumed then that the 'tradition' of the British Army being ever-present and ready to provide defence for the British people is a good one. Does tradition hold us back? But do Army traditions hold us back in other areas of defence? As the Army evolves and responds to current and emerging threats can it respond sufficiently? Valerii Zaluzhnyi wrote recently that technology 'boasts an undoubted superiority over tradition'.2 Arguably he was cornered into this analysis through the rigours of a war he oversaw as the Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Army, until February 24. However, Zaluzhnyi's dismissal does not make it a poor analysis; Zaluzhnyi's Army went to war with Russia and faced some of the most extreme fighting in Europe since WW2. They have had to adapt and survive whilst holding off Russian military superiority and they learned quickly that holding on to tradition and current thinking was costly. Adapting to the threat and remaining fluid is one thing; changing your approach entirely is quite another, but quite necessary according to Zaluzhnyi. When Zaluzhnyi mentioned 'traditions' (doctrine & processes), he was talking about improving the situation on the battlefield. He went so far as to state that a wholesale redesign of battlefield operations was needed to distance themselves from outdated, stereotypical thought processes that were harming his troops and country's war effort through simply being not up to task. This redesign, he concluded, would reshape Ukrainian military doctrine on a fundamental level for the better and help Ukrainian soldiers compete with and defeat Russian troops. This would however require substantial buy-in to be successfully integrated. No small task but surely too risky to ignore; the war with Russia was handing out lessons in evolutionary warfare and Zaluzhnyi was paying attention. Relevance of experience The British Army has had no such recent exposure or conflict with a peer adversary. The COIN environment in Iraq and Afghanistan taught us valuable lessons in insurgency warfare, counter-IED, ISTAR and medical support which 'had a profound impact on the Army's equipment, training and doctrine',3 but arguably did not find shortcomings in it. Consequently we have no experience of what should be retained and what should be dismissed or updated regarding our approach to warfare and warfighting. How are we to know if our doctrine will hold up in a large-scale peer to peer engagement? We have banked heavily on the Land Operating Concept (LOpC): 18 months in the making, full of NATO partner consultation input and interrogated by RUSI, ISS and DTsL; it is the doctrine that dictates how we will win future wars. General Sir Patrick Sanders said it is 'the most robustly evidenced and inclusive piece of conceptual thinking that the Army has produced in over three decades. This places the British Army at the intellectual edge of land warfare, able to lead in NATO and support our sister services across all domains'. 4 The LOpC clearly shows then that as an organisation we are attuned to the need to evolve and adapt to the changing threats around the globe. It highlights the need for need for technological sup...

"The Reservist is twice the citizen" - Winston Churchill Genesis The Royal Navy (RN) has the Maritime Reserve (MR), a 1* led Fighting Arm (FA), however, it could be argued that it is not taken seriously as a capability and is therefore not value for money. If the RN were to take the Maritime Reserve seriously, the MR would require a directed operational output, a 'head mark', a thought-out function, in conjunction with regular cadre of personnel who are taught the necessary knowledge and experience on how to employ it to enhance naval power. This article offers options for the output the MR should have in supporting the RN operationally. Its time to move on from the 'fantasy fleets'. Instead, lets discuss NATO-level, UK Defence-wide, and RN-specific strategy statements to derive function and in turn, elicit discussions of form. It will not - unlike a recent RUSI paper - look to use the Royal Naval Reserve (RNR) in addressing potential capability gaps in UK Defence. Though, its potential scope is MR wide, its focus is the RNR, as the largest MR element and the one facing the hardest questions about its future operational utility. Additionally, this paper is written in the spirit of the Chief of the Defence Staff's recent direction on embracing debate from juniors in challenging the status quo. Function The RNR/Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (RNVR) were formed in 1859 and 1903 respectively, to supply sailors in times of war for the RN; the MR now is approximately 3500 people spread across the RNR & Royal Marines Reserve (RMR) and is the only standalone reserve organisation in UK Defence. The war in Ukraine and recent events in Israelshow that Reserves are still vital for delivering national security; internationally their use also mimics how our own Naval Reserves were used during both world wars. In WW2, 68% of Naval personnel were Reservists of various kinds, who jokingly referred to their regular counterparts as the "caretakers". Such past precedents beg contemporary questions: could today's RN triple its personnel numbers swiftly in a time of major conflict, and would it need to? Today, the Maritime Reserve is a mere 10% of total RN personnel - but if the RN embraced use of reservists as Australia does (30%), could this alleviate personnel gaps too, while being better value for money? The UK is not currently under an immediate existential threat (barring a catastrophic escalation of the war in Ukraine or entanglement in a US-China conflict). However, the function of the RNR and wider reserves should be designed around a framework that recognises the possibility of direct interstate conflict - not just the precursory stages such as competition and crisis to ensure our continued national security, as articulated in the most recent Defence Command Paper (the 2023 'Refresh'). The utility of the RNR to the RN is primarily to supply Surge in war while being affordable and Niche in peacetime. Yet the recent cancelling of training on financial grounds (the infamous "In-Year Measures"), effects from COVID, and Maritime Reserve "Transformation" (a euphemistic label for various top-down reorganisations) has lowered morale, seeing an exodus from the trained strength. In NATO, there are four recognised types of reservists. Niche(specialist) capabilities that do not exist, at all or in sufficient strength, in the regular forces. Complementary. This is a capability - at the lower end of the operational spectrum - for which the full suite of military competencies is not needed, freeing regular forces. Supplementary. This is a capability at the higher end of operations to rotate or reinforce the regular forces. Surge. This is an expansion base for mobilisation in a large-scale defence emergency, the traditional Reserve role. In the Future Reserves 30 paper, the role of reservists is articulated as. The Reinforcement Reserve - reservists that routinely support defence output and activity, more akin to auxiliaries. The Operational Reserve - ...

Introduction Fear of a Regime Change Potential US Involvement Israel's historic ally, into the war. The power asymmetry between the US and Iran is striking. The US stands unmatched in its capabilities. Regional Interests Strategic Culture Nuclear Program Winning Strategic Battle of Perception What Might Come Next? More Proxy Warfare? Conclusion

Introduction Hybrid Maritime Warfare Who are the Houthis? Why are the Houthis attacking ships at the Red Sea? The Houthis and Iran The Houthis and Hezbollah Implications Conclusion Main photo courtesy of Indian Navy

Terminology versus motivation Reluctance, risk aversion, and the wrong centre of gravity Useful scenarios The Army does not have the luxury of being able to ignore criminal actors Feature image credit: MOD

"The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting" ~ Sun Tzu Concepts designed for the Indo-Pacific have value in Europe 1. 2. 3. 4. Sea control An Operational Approach: Use landing forces from the outside-in Counter-arguments Are allied marines best suited to the role of reserve? 1. 2. 3. A Scenario

Israel's New Wars is the latest book by Dr. Ehud Eilam. For nearly three decades, Eilam has studied Israel's national security and written widely, including for the Wavell Room, about how the state should protect itself. In Israel's New Wars, Eilam explores how recent conflict with Iran and its partners has differed from Israel's fighting between 1948 and 1982. It contrasts fighting conventionally and fighting non-state actors, bringing historical perspective andmes. As a book, it is focused more on the tactical aspect of military power but verges on identifying the operational thinking. Several of Eilam's arguments standout. How to prepare? Common with contemporary Western military thinking, Israel's New Wars finds a tension between exactly what type of war to prepare for. The day-to-day operations on the border or major conventional operations? This is a tension that the Israeli Defence Force has been struggling with as they veer from conflict to conflict. This is a trend that is apparent when contrasting the periods of history he uses. This tension also carries over into equipment. Looking, for example, Israel's armour, he finds a very good system of upgrades for main battle tanks. However, upgrading to defeat one threat means they are less well prepared against others. This seem more consistent with Israeli naval power or air upgrades. There are similar trends in training and how to prepare soldiers for mobilisation effectively. Whilst Eilam doesn't say it directly, he strongly implies that Israel's inability to prepare for either properly impacted its performance, ultimately leading to multiple draws in recent fighting. Earlier fighting ended in more decisive victory. Ground holding or precision strike? The book also explores the tensions of the different military strategies required. For example, conventional wars require large ground-holding operations and/or air strikes. Fighting non-state actions, however, does not. While air power is important to both, he presents an interesting discussion about the continuing utility of tubed artillery and its importance to effective military operations in both forms of operation. Another theme explored is deterrence. Eilam finds that Israel has a mixed record of deterrence. Israel has been more effective with conventional deterrence, with some success against non-state actors. However, the disparate nature of such actors often means that miscalculation leads to war or splinter groups provoke unneeded responses. Operational - Strategic This is perhaps an area where Eilam would benefit from more analysis. The book is generally tactical in its nature. It struggles to view the problems from the perspective of Israel's opponents when discussing why deterrence hasn't been effective. This theme is common in much security writing, and the baseline assumption seems to be that deterrence rests on destroying lots of the enemy. If, as he identifies, it doesn't work well, what does? Another limitation stems from this: the link between the tactical and operational. Eilam does draw some operational considerations, even some strategic ones. However, they feel underdeveloped. This is unfair; Israel's New Wars did not set out to be a full analysis. Such a task would be near impossible. But focusing on destroying things or holding ground would benefit from a little more strategic thinking. We suggest that there are deeper considerations for Israeli military thinkers out there when contrasting the wars that he seeks to do. In some ways, Eilam's line of thought is a mirror of Mary Kaldor's infamous 'new wars' theory of the 1990s. Perhaps our thinking should now be beyond that now and we wonder if Israel's New Wars was a missed opportunity to consider how balance the competiting demands of conflict. From a NATO perspective, Eilam is right to identify the tension and differences in the type of war faced then and now and how they are consistent. A decade after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the military...

If the war against Ukraine has highlighted any truth, it is that the defense industrial bases of the United States and Europe are woefully underequipped for the demands of high-intensity conventional warfare. The United States was and remains the only country that retained the kinds of stockpiles necessary to support Ukraine's defense and future offense, and it faces competing demands for those declining inventories. Yet, for a country with a nearly $900 billion budget, it seems unable to get what it needs, when it needs it, and at a scale necessary for what it anticipates as future conflicts, not the least of which is with China over Taiwan. The issue is, fundamentally, one of acquisition and procurement. The speed and urgency that drives the bureaucracy of the Department of Defense has not kept pace with the speed of innovation that drives Silicon Valley. In the age of the iPhone the Pentagon is using the Blackberry, at best (and not a late generation one, at that). There are shoots of growth through the concrete of the military's purchasing systems. Groups like the Defense Innovation Unit (; formerly known as the Defense Innovation Unit - Experimental or DIUx) have sought to bridge the gap between Washington and Silicon Valley. Authors Raj M. Shah and Christopher Kirchhoff, the former director of DIU and a driver of its creation, respectively, recount the creation of the Unit, its struggles, and its successes in the aptly titled book "". It would seem to be a tall order, make Pentagon acquisition a thrilling read, but Shah and Kirchhoff manage to pull it off and rather well. Filled with anecdotes of how the supposedly technologically cutting-edge services of the American armed forces operated in a surprisingly analogue manner, the authors tell the story of how DIU and others sought to match the warfighters' needs with Silicon Valley's innovations."Unit X" rightly focuses on the challenges of rapid innovation and rapid ingestion of new technologies. This is something for which the Pentagon, as the authors demonstrate, is not designed. "Unit X" is not a story of nifty new technologies alone. It is really about the challenge of how the United States stays ahead of China, the pacing threat in strategic competition. Here, the Chinese Communist Party enjoys considerable competitive systemic advantages. A vertically integrated authoritarian-capitalist system, Beijing can better direct resources - human or capital - with rapid efficiency and arguably fewer bureaucratic hurdles. China's aggressive corporate and military espionage campaigns have allowed it to leapfrog generations of innovation and trial and error. More alarmingly, the gap between theft and indigenous innovation is rapidly closing, with China able to develop more novel, domestic technologies at a greater rate than once anticipated. The authors close "Unit X" by focusing on Ukraine (as is de rigueur today), which for many is seen as the standard-bearer for technological innovation, testing, and deployment. Senior military leaders on both sides of the Atlantic look to Ukraine wistfully, as a model of how they wish they could innovate and ingest new technologies - they want the war-time acquisition system without the war. That last part is key - in the absence of a clear driver of change, change is not forthcoming. The problem is Ukraine is not the model they often think it is - that rapid adoption of new technologies is by consequence, not design. Those impressive and haunting first-person-video drones are used at such rates due to insufficient quantities of conventional artillery (which the United States and Europe are still failing to deliver). Those drone videos are also only the successful strikes. The ratio of failure to success decidedly favors the former over the latter, especially as Russian electronic warfare improves. Ukraine's naval successes are deeply impressive, but miss key that when included make the lessons of the Black Sea unapplicable to other thea...

The 6.8mm Elephant in the Room The United States Army has made the biggest change in a generation to its small arms fleets by replacing its standard infantry rifle (the M4) and Light Machine Gun (SAW) with a 'Next Generation Squad Weapon' (NGSW) multi-calibre system based on a new 6.8mm round with high-performance technology to be more lethal at greater range. Some NATO governments are scratching their heads about what this means for the bedrock of NATO interoperability. This decision butts up against three important contextual factors: 1. More than two years of war in Ukraine has seen an unprecedented focus on the Russian threat and subsequent multi-lateral gifting programmes to arm Ukraine, and emergency NATO memberships for Sweden and Finland. 2. The 5.56mm 'SS109' round has been the cornerstone of NATO interoperability since 1980, when it was adopted by most NATO countries, while a few influential members have recently procured new 5.56 assault rifles including France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK. 3. Since the drawdown in Afghanistan, there has been a growing movement questioning the effectiveness of 5.56 on the modern battlefield. Putting aside the classified details of the original US Army requirement for the Next Generation Squad Weapon (NGSW) programme, the Americans took a logical approach: start with the threat (the target) and work back to the weapon (the ammunition) and finally the delivery platform (the rifle/gun). This may sound obvious, but the reality is this approach is truly not the norm for military small arms procurement with NATO governments for a variety of reasons. It is commonplace for the choice of ammunition nature not to be central to the requirements simply because in-service ammunition natures have a very long service life - it is hard to change them. This article explores the major implications of the US Army's NGSW programme to future NATO small arms procurements to both dispel some myths and assist the NATO community in understanding the situation and the NGSW. Show us the money! In 2017, Lt Gen Mick Bednarek testified on the issue of what happens when a 5.56 round hits someone with body armour to a Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on small arms (Verger, 2024): "The US is facing adversaries with L2-3 body armour that precludes our lethality…regardless of range." "Our capability to eliminate this threat at medium or long range is almost gone, so we must have small arms systems that can stop and can penetrate that increased enemy protection." "I think the US Army universally realizes that the 5.56 bullet can't defeat Russian body armor." In the same article, Col Jason Bohannan (Programme Executive Office [PEO] Soldier, US DoD) is quoted referring to the NGSW programme: "…people get myopically focused on body armor…but there's a series of target sets in the battlefield that will exist for 10 years. And we're trying to balance all of that to put [the] US Army [and the DoD] at large, in an advantageous position." Fast forward to 2022 when the US Army determined the old standard to be inadequate for the modern battlefield and disrupted the foundation of NATO interoperability by introducing two new squad weapons based on a new ammunition cartridge. Before we get into the detail here is a big caveat up front - the US 6.8mm GP projectile (the XM1186) is owned by the US Department of Defence, while the hybrid case - the key component to achieving the high velocity that delivers the lethal punch for the NGSW- is owned by American producer SIG Sauer Inc. Therefore, if NATO governments want to know specifically what this projectile does, they should dust off their bi-lateral defence sharing agreements and speak to their US counterparts; but the capability behind NGSW comes from the hybrid cartridge. The SIG Sauer hybrid high performance cartridge is a lighter brass-steel composite that allows increased loads and delivers approximately 20-25% more barrel pressure and therefore muzzle velocit...

Introduction The current picture It's beneficial to acknowledge our men Are our wellbeing offerings outdated? How can we help our men? How can men tell they might be unwell? What are some barriers to help-seeking? The 'problems' with talking Culturally, we must do better Feature photo by Daniel Reche via Pexels

Introduction The Second Lebanon War - 2006 Hezbollah's Hybrid War Hezbollah in 2024 Hezbollah and Lebanon Conclusion Main picture: Hezbollah drone operator during in an exercise in the Jezzine District, southern Lebanon, on Sunday, May 21, 2023. (Wikimedia Commons)

The video of a Russian soldier executing a comrade is circulating on social media. To analyse what this execution means, we'll examine another example. On 30 January 1968 the Tet Offensive erupted. It proved a turning point in the Vietnam War. The decisive psychological blow to American public opinion was expressed in CBS anchor Walter Kronkite's famous 27 February broadcast: 'To say that we are closer to victory today is to believe, in the face of the evidence, the optimists who have been wrong in the past. To suggest we are on the edge of defeat is to yield to unreasonable pessimism. To say that we are mired in stalemate seems the only realistic, yet unsatisfactory, conclusion. On the off chance that military and political analysts are right, in the next few months we must test the enemy's intentions, in case this is indeed his last big gasp before negotiations. But it is increasingly clear to this reporter that the only rational way out then will be to negotiate, not as victors, but as an honourable people who lived up to their pledge to defend democracy and did the best they could.' No image contributed more to the growing sense of repulsion over America's commitment to South Vietnam than the street execution of a captured Viet Cong fighter: Nguyễn Văn Lém. The event took place on 1 February in a panic-gripped Saigon. Hanoi's hope of a popular uprising had failed spectacularly but Viet Cong gangs roamed the streets. Associated Press photographer Eddie Adams had spent a fruitless morning with an NBC journalist and Vietnamese camera crew looking for action. They were in the vicinity of the Ấn Quang Pagoda in downtown Saigon and preparing to leave when they noticed a commotion. A captured Viet Cong in plaid shirt and shorts was being manhandled by a group of marines. His hands were cuffed behind his back. The unfortunate Lém was brought to police chief Nguyễn Ngọc Loan. In Adam's words: 'When they were close - maybe five feet away - the soldiers stopped and backed away. I saw a man walk into my camera viewfinder from the left. He took a pistol out of his holster and raised it. I had no idea he would shoot. It was common to hold a pistol to the head of prisoners during questioning. So I prepared to make that picture - the threat, the interrogation. But it didn't happen. The man just pulled a pistol out of his holster, raised it to the VC's head and shot him in the temple. I made a picture at the same time.' Lém collapsed, a jet of blood spouting from his skull. It was all so matter-of-fact and quick. Adams at first tried to pass off the importance of the photograph. It was just some guy shooting another guy. But it was so much more than that. Americans wanted to believe they were fighting a just cause. Loan's revolver blew away that illusion. Loan ended his days as a one-legged pizzeria manager in Virginia, passing away at a relatively young age from cancer. President Jimmy Carter personally intervened to stop his deportation (pressed by House of Representative members on the grounds he had committed a war crime). Adams grew to lament the photograph that won him the 1969 Pulitzer Prize for Spot News Photography: 'Two people died in that photograph. The general killed the Viet Cong; I killed the general with my camera.' Today there is an Italian furniture shop near the spot where Lém was killed. Fifty-six years later… Fifty-six years later, three Russian soldiers were jogging on a dirt track near Robotyne in occupied Zaporizhzhia. They were spaced apart, maintaining a short distance between each other. Only the first and last soldiers were armed. Unbeknown to the trio, a Ukrainian FPV drone pilot had them in his sights. He decided to attack the unarmed soldier in the middle. This author has viewed scores of these YouTube videos. If the drone strikes the body it splits open the torso like a carcass in a butcher's shop. Heads fly off. If the warhead detonates near the limbs, one or both legs are ripped off. Or limbs are left i...

The 2024 RUSI Land Warfare Conference's ambition was unavoidably hamstrung by the forthcoming Strategic Defence Review announced by Kier Starmer's incoming Labour Government. Although many strategic and operational imperatives were explored, little substance was provided on how Army doctrine will evolve, how it will be re-organised and re-equipped, what this means for industry, and how these elements will together enable the future force to deter / counter the quartet of threats posed by Russia, China, Iran and North Korea. We have yet to see the Army's revised plan resulting from 2023's Integrated Review Refresh. We will now have to wait until at least late 2025 before a more current and meaningful blueprint is released. This is disappointing given the current geopolitical landscape. Two years ago at the same conference, General Sir Patrick Sanders refuted the idea that Russia's invasion of Ukraine would be short-term minor skirmish. Rather, he saw it as something that could foreshadow a larger and wider European conflict. Describing it as our 1937 moment, his call to arms went largely unheeded. At this year's Land Warfare Conference. Speeches by the new Secretary of State for Defence, John Healey, and the new CGS, General Sir Roly Walker, left us in no doubt about the gathering storm. An unequivocal warning provided by retired Ukrainian General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, now Ukraine's ambassador to the United Kingdom, set the tone for the entire conference: "Evil has drawn near and it is out to kill." Conscious that time and resources are limited, CGS made his objective clear: the British Army needs to be able to defeat a force three times its size. To do this, he aims to double its lethality by 2027 and to triple it by 2030. The most important point General Walker made was that there is no inexorable path to war. Conflict can be avoided through deterrence. We must become the porcupine that, through an impressive array of pin-sharp quills, makes any efforts by predators to eat it so egregious that they pre-emptively decide it's not worth the effort. The most important quill in the UK's defensive shield is its nuclear deterrent. But our conventional forces have been so hollowed-out over the last 14 years that there is a risk of nuclear weapons being our first and only response to unexpected aggression. However, the cataclysmic effect of a nuclear exchange makes it something we should avoid at all costs. This is why restoring conventional combat power across all three services is paramount. If the British Army is to meet adversaries with devastating lethality, what must it do in practical terms is not yet clear, so this article aims to articulate the key initiatives that will most enhance the Army's combat power. This is not an unrealistic shopping list of new items that cannot be afforded or delivered in two years. It represents projects already in motion or about to start and which are funded by the Equipment Plan. One - Replace Bowman with a software-defined C4I system. The current Bowman BCIP 5.6 C4I system is rapidly approaching obsolescence. An ongoing project, the Land Environment Tactical Communication & Information System (LEtacCIS) programme, plans to replace it via the Morpheus sub-programme. The goal is to deliver a fully digitised, open architecture, software-defined C4I system with an upgradable ecosystem able to run a wide range of third-party apps. A key advantage of a software-defined capability is that, like an iPhone, it can be upgraded on an ongoing basis to maintain system utility and integrity over time. New functionality, such as increased security, AI, machine learning, and algorithmic warfare applications, can be added incrementally with little effort or risk. An open architecture ensures interoperability with our allies. It allows increased technical functionality to be quickly rolled-out. Unfortunately, Morpheus was derailed by the failure to deliver EVO, a component work stream intended to open Bowman's ...

Defence is its own worst enemy Can-Do Culture So what's the problem? It isn't a matter of chance Voting with their feet If it's so terrible, why does it happen? In conclusion Image credit: MOD

Clarifying the People Problem A thought exercise Understanding the Why AFCAS 24 has just been published. The data, as ever, is fascinating and provides an incredible insight into what our people think about Armed Forces life. It also critically highlights pull factors keeping people in service, and push factors which drive people to leave the Services. There are positive and negatives to service life, and AFCAS draws out how our people feel over time. It can give as an insght into which factors have always been there, and which are getting better or worse. Here are some key extracts to think about: AFCAS also highlights the parts of The Offer that keep people serving and are most highly valued. Over a number of years now the primary "pull" factors have been Defence medical services, dental services and job security. Are there ways we can capitalise on where we are doing well? Almost certainly, if we are willing to resource a plan to do so. Do we need even more Data? A Way Forward Summary Feature image credit: MOD

It's the Policy, Stupid. Medical Policy Other Policies Lessons from America So, What Can We Learn from the US Army?

Warfare is changing faster than our military and our military-industrial approach. The warnings of world leaders, including the Prime Minister and Chief of the General Staff, that war is imminent have had little effect on our rate of preparation or adaptation . Almost no one, including those working within it, thinks the speed and scale of change in the UK Defence equipment programme in the last two years are adequate. If it were, the war in Ukraine and Chinese exercises around Taiwan should have offered little cause for alarm. 'Everything is fine' is a proposition few would defend. Our Parliament states that we are not ready to fight a major war with our current equipment and industry approach. Deterrence exists in the minds of our enemy and ill preparedness undermines credibility; not only does it make us less likely to win, it makes war itself more likely. If few individuals are satisfied with the status quo, why as a collective have we achieved so little change? Machiavelli would have a suggestion. "There is nothing more difficult to arrange, more doubtful of success, and more dangerous to carry through than initiating changes. The innovator makes enemies of all those who prospered under the old order, and only lukewarm support is forthcoming from those who would prosper under the new. Their support is lukewarm … partly because men are generally incredulous, never really trusting new things unless they have tested them by experience." Niccolo Machiavelli Changing the system that retards Defence's ability to adapt incurs the frictions he described centuries ago. To disrupt the dominance of those too comfortable, before the disaster of war falls, this article aims to pick a fight. Cunningham's law states "The best way to get the right answer on the Internet is not to ask a question; it's to post the wrong answer." This article introduces five provocations. We hope to provide arguments for the innovators, both inside and outside Government, to use to help drive change. But even here we want disagreement, seeing your own argument played back to you can help you see its flaws. For those that disagree, we hope you'll see that, as John Stuart Mill wrote "the nonconforming opinion is needed to supply the remainder of the truth, of which the received doctrine embodies only a part". Help us improve our arguments with your challenge. You came here for an argument (channelling Monty Python). We hope you enjoy it. 5 Provocations - what we are doing now is not good enough; we must: 1. Plan for dissimilar re-armament: What we deploy in month three of the war will not be more of what we deployed in month one. 2. Change the equation: move to $ cost to $ damage model:The economics of war have changed; we must too, or we lose. 3. Link frontline to factory: War is a learning competition, and we cannot afford to be in the slow class. 4. Rethink the roles of air power: Particularly control of the air and attack, in an uncrewed age. 5. Accept that the future is uncrewed: The role of humans in warfare, at all levels, will change much more than is generally assumed. We need a plan for uncrewed technology at scale. Taken together, these measures increase our chances of winning a coming war, thereby making it less likely we have to fight in the first place. Dissimilar Rearmament. By month three of the next major war, the aircraft, ships, and tanks that we start the fight with will be reduced by attrition. But we know now that we will not be able to replace or grow the numbers of the key platforms in the current equipment programme fast enough to keep fighting. They will need replacing, and we will need them in weeks and months, not years. We will need dissimilar rearmament. Neither side will be replacing their aircraft fast enough, but liberal democracies are far more dependent on airpower. In contrast, one UK drone manufacturer, Callen-Lenz, developed their uncrewed system from concept to deployed capability, with production rapidly and highly s...

On 17 February, Russian forces finally captured Avdiivka - once a city of 30,000 people - just ten kilometres from Donetsk. 110th Mechanised Brigade had defended the ruins for the last two years without relief. The end came when Russian forces infiltrated the south of the city using a concealed passage offered by a man-sized water pipe feeding Donetsk filter station. More units advanced from the north in the area of the Terrikon (slag heap) and dachas adjoining the Koksokhim (Avdiiv chemical coke plant). With 80-110 glide bombs landing on the defenders every day, and with the threat of the city being cut in two, the Ukrainian command took the prudent decision to withdraw. The next phase for Russian forces should have been an exploitation of the breach in the defence. In fact, the assault on Avdiivka which had started the previous October quite exhausted the attackers. 16,000 soldiers were killed according to a disillusioned Luhansk separatist. A staggering 531 pieces of equipment were destroyed, damaged or abandoned, including 169 tanks. It was not until the end of March that Russian forces were able to resume the advance in an organised way (although small-scale and suicidal attacks never stopped across the front lines). This article reviews the action since and specifically examines the battle for the Durna river line. Ukrainian and Russian dispositions Ukrainian and Russian dispositions are shown on the map below. For both sides, unit and formation names do not correspond to actual size. A 'brigade' may be a weak battalion. 'Battalions' are commonly just companies. Russian prisoners routinely report how a company may start with 100 men but be reduced to as few as ten fit soldiers. Caution is also needed because units are rotated (withdrawn) when exhausted. This is especially true of Russian forces. The map therefore represents all reported units/formations and where, but they may not have been present all the time, or in strength. Russian troops on this front are referred to as 'Centre Group'. They are drawn from Central Military District (CVO) and 1st DNR Army Corps. Commander 'Centre Group' is the 48-year old infantryman Colonel-General Andrei Mordvichev. He has participated in the war from the beginning rising from army commander to army group commander. CVO has been the best performing military district - ironically - as traditionally it is the reserve district in the Russian Federation and least favoured with resources. Ukrainian command in this sector falls under the Khortytsia Operational-Strategic Group (OSUV). The commander is a General Sodel [Sodol]. It is not possible to estimate troop numbers with any certainty. Both sides are depleted. The Russians continue to commit units to destruction further complicating estimation of strengths. Nor is it possible to estimate equipment numbers. With the exception of the battalion-level attack at the beginning, Russian attacks are typically platoon strength involving 1-2 tanks and as many as four AFVs. The ad hoc mix of vehicle types tells the story of Russian problems with replenishing combat losses. Ukrainian counter-attacks typically involve a single tank or AFV. Artillery and rocket fire on the Russian side involves single guns or launchers that fire one salvo then scoot. Ukrainian indirect fire has been minimal due to 'shell starvation'. FPV and Mavic-style drones rule the battlefield and both sides go to great lengths to conceal themselves, in the case of vehicles, guns and rocket launchers; or to remain underground if infantry. Camouflage is insufficient. The only true protection is total concealment. Saturated ECM has also become a prerequisite for survival. Avdiivka front - Russian operational objectives Cold War students of the Soviet Army probably remember the concept of immediate and subsequent objectives. This echeloning endures in the modern Russian Army. The immediate objective on the Avdiivka front was the Durna river line, just 10 kilometres from Avdiivka...

Precision: A History of American Warfare by James Patton Rogers is published by Manchester University Press. "Precision" is an intellectual history of America's pursuit of the titular objective - how to target adversaries, their militaries, and their infrastructure with pinpoint accuracy while, reducing harm to civilians and non-combatants. Author James Patton Rogers surveys the evolution of the American military's noble ambitions that often outreached its technological capacity and how that pursuit shaped the development and execution of strategy and doctrine. Beginning with the First World War, Rogers seats the genesis of this pursuit in the horror of the First World War, which saw widespread and in many cases pointless slaughter. Morally abhorrent to American (and indeed European sensibilities), military officers sought to prevent the recurrence of such destruction by instead achieving greater accuracy. The advent of airpower began this uneven march towards a perhaps unattainable desire - to make war clean and efficient. Military demonstrations against fixed, undefended targets with early airpower gave rise to the perhaps misguided belief that precision was indeed possible with the technology of the time. The first test of this was the Second World War. In Europe, the United Kingdom's area bombardment stood in contrast with America's ostensible 'precision' campaign. Washington sought to target industries, military facilities, and logistics hubs as opposed to applying pressure to civilian populations. Aspirational again, the efficacy of such campaigns remains debatable given the accuracy of bombsights and the cost associated with waves upon waves of bombers pursuing well-defended targets. In the Pacific, American military leaders managed to convince themselves and the public that the mass fire bombings of Japanese cities were somehow 'precise'. The apotheosis of this precision campaign was the use of the atomic bombs against Hiroshima and Nagasaki that helped bring the war to a close. Whether or not the bombings were necessary is explored by Rogers, the debate over which feeds into questions of precision - a single bomb for a single target (military in nature) achieved a strategic effect for proponents of precision. The nuclear era that followed was, and remains, Strangelovian in the extreme. Rogers' recounting of the torturous debates about nuclear strategy and doctrine is riveting, if absurd. It is hard to argue that nuclear weapons, especially thermonuclear devices are 'precision' by any measure. Yet, that destructiveness was the source of its precision for its advocates - fewer bombs or warheads per target, an idea that was naturally undermined by the presence of 'overkill' which would only make the 'rubble bounce' in the end. The American military's efforts to develop a Single Integrated Operational Plan and its component plans for nuclear targeting sought to reduce this overkill and increase precision. It was not until the Vietnam War that technology arguably began to catch up to the ambitions of precision with the first use of laser-guided munitions. Still in its infancy, it was, of course, overshadowed by the widespread, if ineffective, bombing campaigns such as Operation Rolling Thunder. Where precision truly shined, if at least in the public's mind, was during Operation Desert Storm and the allied efforts to eject Saddam Hussein's Iraqi army from Kuwait. Even here precision munitions were only a fraction of the total used, yet the widespread coverage on CNN of bombs and missiles striking their intended targets created the impression that the era of precision had dawned. Precision-strike complex Perhaps the apotheosis of American precision strike emerged in the wake of the events of 9/11 and the Global War on Terror that followed. America's precision-strike complex saw persistent surveillance and highly accurate missiles and bombs develop an extremely tight kill chain allowing the elimination of individual target...

'The Russian man is glad to see death, including his own - it reminds him of the end of everything that exists. He contemplates the ruins and fragments with pleasure…' Walter Schubart, 1938 This author has watched thirty YouTube videos of Russian soldiers committing suicide. This has been possible thanks to the revolution that has taken place on the battlefield with the proliferation of cheap drones fitted with cameras. One slit his throat. It took him almost a minute to die. Twenty-two shot themselves. Seven killed themselves by detonating grenades: the first held the grenade at arms-length and looked away; the second held the grenade to his chest; the third detonated two grenades against his ears (the head vanished); the fourth also blew his head off; the fifth, a corpulent individual of Asiatic appearance, detonated the grenade under his body armour; the sixth was an individual hiding behind a vehicle wreck; and the seventh held the grenade in front of his face. How many Russian soldiers have committed similar acts unrecorded by Ukrainian drones can only be speculated. Historically, we might associate such extreme behaviour with the Imperial Japanese Army. More recently we think of the fanaticism of terrorist organisations such as ISIS or Al Qaeda. But we would not normally frame the Russian Army in this way. This article begs the question: is the Russian Army a death cult? Suicide in Russian culture In Russia, suicide, or more broadly disdain for life, is modern and rooted in the revolutionary tradition. The most famous suicide is the poet Vladimir Mayakovsy (1893-1930). The cause however was a love affair, not revolution. His funeral was attended by 150,000 people, the largest public mourning event in Bolshevik Moscow after the funerals of Lenin and Stalin. Rejection of life - as revolutionary act - finds origins in Turgenev's Fathers and Sons (1862) which popularised the phrase 'nihilism' through the character of Bazarov: 'At the present time negation is the most beneficial of all [acts] -and we deny…everything.' Nihilism mixed fanatical asceticism with self-mortification. Life mattered little or nothing. Turgenev actually created the character as lampoon of the 'men of the sixties', but paradoxically Bazarov became an anti-hero to young Russians seeking change. The nihilism became violent through the agency of the so-called 'new men' - Lenin's predecessors - the best known of which were Varfolomei Zaitsev (1842-1882), the archetypal nihilist but unknown in the West (and the character of Shigalev in Dostoyesvky's The Possessed); and Sergey Nechaev (1847-1882) (the character of Pyotr Verkhovensky, also in The Possessed). The 'Nechaev affair' was the great cause célèbre in Russia of the period, but also remains completely unknown outside Russia except to Russian historians. The Tsarist authorities were so alarmed by the young man he was gaoled and deliberately starved to death, dying at the age of thirty-five. Before he died he co-authored with Mikhail Bakunin (1814-1876) one of the most famous tracts of revolutionary literature in world history: The Revolutionary Catechism. It starts with the famous proposition 'The revolutionary is a lost man…no interests of his own, no affairs of his own, no feelings, no attachments no belongings, not even a name if his own.' It then goes on to describe a being who 'despises', who is 'hard with himself', who 'hates', and whose object is 'ruthless destruction'. It could be a description of 'the Orcs', as Ukrainians describe the Russians they face on the other side of the trench lines. While it is undeniable that a life-denying fanaticism coloured Russian revolutionaries (and radicals and anarchists across 19th century Europe), we must still ask, but were the revolutionaries born from a wider Russian cultural substratum that disregarded life, or were they atypical of their society. Suicide in Russian society Russian men die young. Roughly one quarter die before the age of 55, mostly du...

Over the past two decades, enhancing human performance capabilities for those operating in extremis contexts (i.e., Armed Forces, Emergency Services, and First Responders) has gained considerable traction in policy-making and scientific circles. To operationalise this concept, the term Human Performance Optimisation (HPO) first emerged within the US Department of Defence (DoD) in 2006 as a conceptual framework to develop the performance capabilities of the military's most important asset - its people.1 Military tasks, by their very nature, place unique and intense physiological, psychological, and cognitive demands upon all Warfighters. In addition, the contemporary operational environment is arguably more volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA) than ever before2. Indeed, the return of peer-on-peer conflict and the emergence of unconventional, asymmetric, and hybrid threats, combined with the scale and speed of technological change, has, and will, continue to make conflict a challenging and ever-evolving affair contested not only in the land, air, and maritime environments but also in the electromagnetic, cyber and space domains.3However, it is essential to note that while the character of conflict may change, its fundamental nature remains the same: it is a human endeavour that is adversarial, dynamic, complex, and lethal.4 Given this reality, it is vital that every Warfighter, irrespective of gender, age, rank, or trade, is prepared for the demands of the contemporary operational environment. The importance of developing human performance capabilities for such demands was succinctly put by US Army Colonel (ret.) John Collins who stated that "Humans are more important than hardware, and their quality is more important than their quantities". This point was again highlighted more recently by the British Army Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Patrick Saunders, who stated that "We need 'warfighters' - whether they are cyber specialists, drone pilots or infantry soldiers - to be stronger, faster, more intelligent and more resilient." To achieve this laudable objective, the Armed Forces must develop appropriate training strategies to enable military personnel to perform to their full potential. Indeed, lessons learned over the past two decades have been internalised, resulting in a considerable improvement in the training, competence, motivation, and overall combat effectiveness of the Warfighter.5HPO represents part of this evolution and has been defined in the literature as "the process of applying knowledge, skills, and emerging technologies to improve and preserve the capabilities of military personnel to execute essential tasks". Fundamentally, HPO aims to leverage evidence-based information and best practices to make the Warfighter as resilient, capable, agile, and lethal as possible.6 In addition, due to a reduced size and budget, the Armed Forces cannot afford large numbers of non-deployable personnel. Therefore, a secondary aim of HPO is to improve individual career longevity and reduce injury rates. It is Nothing New Preparing the Warfighter for success on the battlefield is nothing new. Indeed, numerous historical examples of military leadership emphasise the same ideas promoted within this article. However, our collective understanding of the optimal approach to achieve this aim has improved considerably, driven by developments in applied sports science, physiology, psychology, and cognitive neuroscience. To conceptualise HPO, the Warfighter should be viewed as a human platform. This approach allows for the routine monitoring, analysis, and development of critical human performance capabilities no different from traditional military platforms (i.e., weapon systems, vehicles, or ISTAR assets). However, to adopt such an approach, it is essential to define critical aspects of human performance. This typically is done using the Biopsychosocial model whereby human performance capabilities are split into ...

"I don't want to get any messages saying, 'I am holding my position.' We are not holding a Goddamned thing. Let the Germans do that. We are advancing constantly and we are not interested in holding onto anything, except the enemy's balls. We are going to twist his balls and kick the living shit out of him all of the time." General George S Patton, June 1944 The debt owed to those who liberated Western Europe from Nazi oppression will underpin the D-Day 80 Commemorations. Although D-Day was essential to victory in Europe, it was not an end in itself. Study of the wider war to liberate Northwest Europe places D-Day in context and helps the military professional understand the link between the operational and strategic levels of war. One method of undertaking this study is through educational wargaming which enables learning through active participation, rather than passive receipt of information. This short read, part three of three of this mini-series, will outline how this learning experience can be achieved through use of a COTS wargame. Success on D-Day allowed the Allies to secure a firm bridgehead. The resulting campaign was a brutal attritional struggle that led to the destruction of German forces in Normandy and a dramatic breakout across France. Subsequent attempts for a quick advance into Germany failed in the face of logistical constraints and German resistance - most notably at Arnhem in September 1944. A German winter counter-offensive in the Ardennes followed and achieved surprise but was subsequently defeated. In Spring 1945 a deliberate Allied offensive breached the German defences, crossed the Rhine and the German Army surrender in May 1945. How did the Allies win? Interactive study using the wargame 1944: D-Day To The Rhine offers the military professional the opportunity to answer this question. The map for 1944: D-Day To The Rhine extends from the French Atlantic coast to Western Germany. Units are armies or corps and turns represent a month. Set-up shows how the Germans attempted to defend the region. The Allies are not committed to invading Normandy. Other options are available but come with commensurate variations in air support and German responsiveness. The Allied invasion will almost certainly succeed. This illustrates the immense and wide-ranging preparatory effort the Allies devoted to ensuring success. A subsequent breakout can be more problematic and will reflect player decision making. The Allied invasion of southern France - Op DRAGOON - opens up a new area of operation to the south of the game map. Ends, Ways and Means Balancing "Ends, Ways and Means" are integral to success and reflect the game's strategic level focus. Allied victory is determined by the "End" chosen. These range from the swift capture of Berlin through to securing Western Germany and isolation of the industrial Rhur region. In this way the game confronts the player with the historical choices the Allies faced. Central to the representation of "Means", is the use of resource points. These provide replacements and enable movement and combat. A fixed amount is given each turn, mirroring the capacity of the invasion beaches. German occupied ports can be captured to increase this amount. The Allied player faces a decision on whether success can be achieved with the fixed capacity available, or if resources must be invested to first liberate ports and increase resources. The game models "Ways" through the use of resource points for movement and combat. Units can move and fight in any order and this forces the player to think about sequencing of operations. The overall effect of these game mechanisms forces the player to confront the tensions inherent in balancing "Ends, Ways and Means." Thus the player gains some experiential insight into the historical situation, such as the prioritisation of Op MARKET-GARDEN over clearance of the Scheldt estuary, which occurred in September 1944. Chance The "chance" inherent in the nature of war...

The rise of China and the security dilemma that it presents is viewed as inevitable by significant sections of the UK policy community. Central to this is China's strong economic base, which has generated the diplomatic, informational, military and economic levers necessary for it to challenge the US-led 'rules-based' order designed to perpetuate Western power post-World War Two. However, while China is a formidable adversary and should not be underestimated, we should not be blind to the weaknesses in China's economic structure and risk overestimating its strengths and constraining ourselves conceptually. In particular, we should be cautious in using gross indicators to calculate relative power and economic growth, as in isolation these approaches can be misleading. This article compares competing methods of measuring power, before examining that while China is likely to overtake the US in terms of gross real GDP, this is not an effective metric for assessing relative power when used in isolation. Despite economic headwinds, China will still overtake the US in terms of real GDP Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is the market value of all "final goods and services produced in a specific period" in a country. Real GDP accounts for price inflation against the GDP of a chosen base year, therefore only rising output increases GDP, not inflation. This metric of real GDP benefits from being the most commonly used indicator of an economy's overall size, growth and general health, meaning that there is significantly more data available for comparative analysis. Although China has significant demographic, capital and productivity challenges, this is unlikely to prevent China from overtaking the US in real GDP. China has capitalised upon lower relative wage costs due to its large population, a central driver of its economic growth over the last 50 years. The 1978 economic reforms permitted private businesses while liberalising foreign trade and investment, since which China has experienced enormous economic growth, even compared to other rapidly growing "Asian Tiger" economies. From 1978 to the onset of the 2008 global financial crisis, China's real GDP grew by a factor of 17. The 2008 crisis reduced this breakneck growth, with China's annual real GDP growth between 2015 and 2018 falling below 7% for the first time since 1991. This was compounded by further shocks from the recent Covid pandemic and the CCP's "zero Covid" policy. Chinese policy post-2008 has increasingly relied upon state investment, improving technology and expanding domestic consumption of finished products. This transition from the previous export economic focus is assessed to be "hedging" against reduced exports due to increasing competition and international pressures such as tariffs. Nonetheless, China's real GDP should still increase 5.7% annually to 2025 and 4.7% annually until 2030, according to Centre for Economics and Business Research (CEBR) forecasts. Although there are reasons to doubt these figures - including the provision of misleading data by the Chinese state, and upcoming shocks such as increased nearshoring of supply chains and property market debt bubbles - the overall trend is clear. Chinese real GDP is on course to overtake the US by 2030. How can power be measured between states? There are three main approaches to measuring power in international relations; control over actors, control over outcomes and control over resources. In the case of control over actors, power is usually defined as an actor's ability to shape world politics following its interests. However, Nye argues that it is impossible to measure this ability systematically because it would require a comprehensive understanding of each actor's influence and interest over a potentially infinite number of events. This means that the power over outcomes approach is issue-specific, with analysis not often transferable to other situations. Therefore, it is only useful for retrospective analy...

What is the military recruitment dilemma? Military recruitment is problematic. And a key issue is that people who get paid good money can't solve it. So after six months of analysing YouTube, Facebook, Linkedin, X, Instagram, and yes, even TikTok comments - perhaps I can. The military recruitment ideas below are not meant to be taken in isolation, and most, if not all of them can be done together. If any Members of Parliament or the General Staff are reading this, please feel free to help yourselves, I know that your idea buckets must be completely barren now. 1. The Infant-Infantry Very few militaries on the planet consider children to be the solution to their needs, but very few countries are mentally agile or brave enough to survive the modern world. The British military, however, knows that an SA80 in the hands of a 14-year-old Glaswegian is just as deadly as an AK-47 in the hands of any rascally Russian Vatnik. From the trenches of Ypres, the decks of the imperial navies, the streets of Kampala and the Killing Fields of Cambodia - children have been an effective part of militaries. Some as young as nine have proven that they can carry ammunition, fit into tunnel systems and the mechanisms of aircraft, artillery and tanks, and in a pinch, they can step into any SO1 role with relative ease. Because the minimum wage is so low for younger people, this could also be a very cost-effective measure. The UK could easily raise a battalion of these "ten-pound Privates" for about half the cost of a regular one. This solution is also popular with many overworked teachers, who pity those kids clogging up overcrowded classrooms and enduring worthless education. Their hearts desire Call of Duty, Fortnite, the open sea, sky, and glory in battle - not GCSEs! 2. The British Commonwealth Legion The Enlistment of Foreigners Act 1854 gave the country the power it needed before, and by Jove, Parliament can honour us again. Whilst the concept may be a copy of the French Foreign Legion, just like the class system of the Normans, if it's good enough for the French, it's good enough for us. The UK already has a long history of Commonwealth and Sepoy armies, and we used international units before to great effect (e.g. No.10 (Inter-Allied) Commando unit in WWII). This system will yield significant numbers, and such great savings, that it can't be passed up. Anyone who's served on Herrick operations knows we could've solved the whole thing in a year for a tenth of the price if only we had a Corps of Gurkhas. Commonwealth soldiers have been fantastic, but we should open their opportunity to the whole world. Fitness and aptitude assessments, as well as English literacy testing, will be done overseas, and successful applicants will be given a one-way plane ticket and a space in basic training, after which they will fill one of the many empty bedspaces found all over the forces. They will serve a four-year minimum contract, then with one or two lucky family members (we'll work out the details later) they'll have earned their place in the country. They can continue to serve in the forces or head into the green and pleasant land as a full UK citizen and resident. 3. National Service+ This one is a favourite of the older generation, and for good reason. Wimpy young adults won't be making cringe videos on TikTok when they are getting thrashed up and down Mt Tumbledown and sweeping pinecones outside the Commanding Officer's office. Youths fighting outside Argos in Kilburn should be fighting international terrorists or the Americans outside the chow hall in Camp Lemonnier! And if they like choreographed dance instead, what better place than as the rear marker on the parade square of Horse Guards? There won't be a piece of brass unpolished as everyone between the ranks of Corporal and Warrant Officer Class 2 is given a five-person work party, and every Officer rank is issued a batsman and a personal assistant. Watch as productivity doubles, triples, and quadr...

There are not more than five primary colors… yet in combination they produce more hues than can ever be seen. ~ Sun Tzu With the first week of April 2024 being Autism Acceptance Week, this article aims to highlight the presence of autistic soldiers in the army and the benefits of-and challenges in-embracing neuroinclusivity. There was a whopping 787% rise1 in the number of Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) diagnoses in the UK between 1998 and 2018. The condition itself is not on the rise. It is, instead, increasingly understood, recognised, and then diagnosed. A key contributor to identifying autism is that every one of the 570,000 educators2 across the 29,000 schools in the country have been asked to take on a mindset that all teachers are a teacher of Special Educational Needs and Disability (SEND).3 Because of the wholesale uptick of knowledge around autism, an awakening has been unfolding. A highly common theme begins as a parent's quest to understand their child's atypical behaviours soon reveals a startling revelation: many of these parents share a unique bond with said child. Prompted by the child's seemingly inexplicable behaviours in their early years, and flagged by attentive educators, families embark on an exploration of the condition and onto a seismic path of self-discovery. This sheds light on thousands of individuals who had long-grappled with unexplained nuances in their own lives; huge numbers4 of UK adults are realising that they, too, are autistic. Evolving diagnostic criteria, increased awareness, and improved access to diagnostic services have resulted in a late-diagnosis phenomenon and a sweeping tide of awareness cascading across the country, and indeed around the world. As individuals grapple with this newfound understanding, society is witnessing a profound shift in perception, empathy, and solidarity among people navigating the complexities of being neurodivergent. Soldiers on the Spectrum While this article focuses specifically on autism for Autism Acceptance Week, there are a plethora of other conditions placing neurominorities among our ranks.5 The next time your Unit is on a CO's parade, three ranks in a hollow square, look left and right. It is likely that you will be stood amongst neurominorities, and a small number of those will be diagnosed or undiagnosed autistic soldiers. Autistic soldiers are serving throughout the organisation and scattered across the ranks. I know this because I am one. A request for information under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 also shows us that, as at February 2023, over four hundred MOD personnel were autistic.6 And since researchers estimate that there are more undiagnosed autistic people in the UK than there are diagnosed,7 it goes then that there are many serving soldiers out there grappling with the condition unbeknownst to them. I write with much conviction: the number of already serving late-diagnosed autistic personnel is certain to rise. Recognising this inevitable trend, it is important for leaders to: Gain an understanding of the unique experiences and perspectives that autism brings, be sensitive to the challenges that autistic people face, and foster a culture of complete acceptance in your workplace for people who think and experience the world differently. With a wealth of emerging content out there on what autism is, I highly recommend grabbing a brew and doing an online search or AI GPT prompt on common autism myths. This is a valuable way of encouraging meaningful and progressive discourse in your workplace since myths around autism range from dismissive to dangerous. For instance, you might like to have a go at starting a conversation around whether or not 'everybody is somewhere on the spectrum'. Ask if there is truth in this statement. Ask why people so readily believe it. Ask what the real-life implications may be for autistic people if this belief remains as pervasive as it is now. If you read that statement and instantly dismissed it as...

In light of a number of somewhat braying articles1 in the mainstream media suggesting excessive 'wokeism' is rife within the military, it seemed an opportune moment to investigate many of the claims of Defence surrounding the topic of Diversity and Inclusion. By and large, there are now two common uses of the term 'diversity': The first, more traditional usage is an indication of variety, used such as when highlighting the unrivalled diversity of life within the Amazon rainforest, or the splendid diversity of Heinz' current soup range. The second, social definition, employed more formally by Defence within this context, refers to an action, being "the recognition of differences between individuals or groups". In relation to this latter definition, a second element is attached, that of 'inclusion', which the organisation characterises as "the effect of good diversity management ensuring that all individuals, no matter what their unique differences feel they belong [and are therein able to contribute effectively] to the wider team." A prudent step, given that recognition alone without action would amount to no change. Combined, Diversity and Inclusion within this context therefore seek to optimise the relationships (through inclusion) between all the members of the force, based off understanding and acknowledgement of each individual's identified differences (Diversity). In this sense, diversity is seen as a start state, and inclusion a vehicle of action by which to optimise it. Challenges? This dual meaning of the word presents challenges when discussing diversity, as the two meanings are frequently conflated, or employed as if synonymous, which they are clearly not. For the sake of clarity this article almost exclusively refers to diversity in the traditional sense, referring to the prevalence of numerous assorted entities. The 'Defence Diversity & Inclusion Vision' sees "Defence harness[ing] the power of difference to deliver capability that safeguards our nation…". In so doing Defence relies upon variation to exploit a fundamental assumption: that 'difference' (traditional diversity) is 'powerful' (beneficial). This assumption is frequently rolled out within the often-used sentiment, or indeed statement, that 'diverse teams produce better results', that 'diversity and Inclusion are operationally essential', or any of the other combinations of similar words to the same effect. The benefits of diversity This article investigates the veracity of that assumption, finding, as one might expect, that 'it's a bit more complicated than that', and that actually, poorly managed diversity can be a net negative. In so doing, a large number of academic studies have been interrogated to form this image, spanning numerous categories of diversity, including race, sex, ability, age, culture, cognition, education and nationality. In making a generalised and reductive summary the author acknowledges that some nuance between specific groups will inevitably be lost, however has endeavoured to summarise the literature fairly thus: There are many, many benefits of diversity within teams, but also numerous downsides that should not be ignored.2 Most significantly, diverse teams typically3 outperform homogenous groups in finding optimal solutions to complex problems, especially those that require creative or innovative solutions.4 Whilst this sounds ideal, you still have to pay the piper somewhere, and the compromise is that the more diverse a team, the less effectively it communicates. Finding the 'sweet spot' can be challenging.5 Extremely diverse teams, being less cohesive and less coherent, are harder to control, and often take longer conducting both complex and simple tasks as a result. This all makes pretty logical sense, as people with increasingly different perspectives may proportionally struggle to understand each other. By contrast, homogenous teams are generally much more effective at completing simple tasks or those with a clear, dire...

With defence in an unheralded period of uncertainty it is always pleasant to find some firm ground. To that end the notion that the use of simulation in military training will increase dramatically over the next 5 years will not cause much disagreement. Against a training burden that has never been so intensive the MoD is faced with equipment costs increasing, availability of ammunition 1 decreasing and the complexity of training clashing with emerging restrictions. Simulation is a critical tool in tackling these problems. Given the scale of this challenge, coupled with the breadth (more on this later) of the UK defence industry, integrating multiple systems into a single virtual2 battlefield (or Single Synthetic Environment) demands simple, understandable, interoperable and effective standards. We are not there. Where are we? The world of defence simulation is sufficiently opaque. This piece does not intend to add to that technical layer of fog. Rather it intends to explain the current issues as simply as possible, before offering three potential solutions. In 2024 we are collectively spoiled. We are accustomed to the concept of "plug in and play" across our lives with HDMI cables, USB plugs, QI charging among others. So much so that one might casually assume that the same level of standardisation would be found in defence simulation hardware. DIS3 (or the Distributed Interactive Simulation standard) was created in 1992 from work done with SimNet (created in 1987). Despite cancellation by NATO in 2010 it is still in use within the MoD. DIS's successor HLA4 (High Level Architecture), formed from a blend of DIS and ALSP (Aggregate Level Simulation Protocol) in 1996, is still 1 year older than the Nintendo64 game Goldeneye, at 28. Despite iteration, both standards are outdated and limiting. This limitation is exacerbated by the number of adaptations being made with lenient, or in some cases no, centralised oversight (despite the valiant efforts of some in the UK through the Defence Policy for Modelling and Simulation - DMASC). Experimental Protocol Data Units (PDUs for short)5are network messages created by all parties to overcome the standard's shortfalls. Their variance, lack of regulation and lack of standardisation have created a situation akin to the simulation Tower of Babel. An unwillingness to conduct wholesale change, combined with a broader lack of understanding is now leading to the creation of an entirely unexpected problem - the launch of new products to overcome the shortfalls of DIS and HLA. Far from solving the problem by filling the gaps, this is adding to both the complexity and now the cost of new capabilities. Imagine the entire country having to use plug adaptors, just because manufacturers were unwilling to adhere to the Type G standard. Nobody would tolerate it there: so why do we tolerate it in defence? Solution 1: Unilateral not collaborative development. There are 3 potential solutions to this issue and these will be looked at in increasing order of feasibility. The MoD likes collaboration and partnerships and with the technological breadth and challenges on the global stage this has it's place. That being said, some of the biggest technological leaps of the last 20 years have been made by singular organisations headed up by empowered and focused leaders. Nowhere would this difference in approach be more apparent than when comparing Project Purple (the 2005-2007 £120M development of the first generation iPhone) and Morpheus (the now cancelled 2017-2024 £690M component of the development of the next generation of tactical communications)6 Collaboration is critical to development but when that approach drifts into "design by committee", both from MoD and industry, things go wrong. Especially when said collaboration is not being done to ensure best in class but to prop up a British defence industry landscape that is overburdened 7, when adjusted to a like for like comparison with the US DoD. One way to ...

At the end of January 2024 a Russian company from 33rd Motor Rifle Regiment 1 set off to attack in the area of Novomikhailovka, South-West of Donetsk City. The company comprised three T-72s leading one BMP-1 and seven MT-LBs (catastrophic attrition means the Russian Army now uses the MT-LB utility tracked vehicle as an APC). After leaving a hard-topped road the sub-unit fanned out to attack from the line of march across open fields. It didn't get too far. The company was not stopped by mines or other engineering obstacles. Nor was it stopped by artillery or rocket fire. There were no anti-tank engagements and no Ukrainian tanks deployed to counter-attack. In fact, none of the elements of a defensive battle studied by a British Army cadet at Sandhurst, or student at the Defence College at Shrivenham, were present. The company was stopped by $500 FPV drones loaded with explosive charges. All but one vehicle were damaged or destroyed and the survivors fled on foot. 'The price of such inability to learn is the death of people,' lamented the prominent Russian military blogger 'Rybar', 'the loss out of the blue of a heap of equipment for which industry works in three shifts, as well as landscapes of burning columns.' This article is about the developing story of 'the most important component of the battlefield' - the first person view (FPV) drone. Intensity of attacks In 2022, only a handful of FPV-drone attacks were recorded. The Ukrainian Army was the first to appreciate the potential of FPV drones (as opposed to the Mavik-style drones that were becoming ubiquitous). By the summer of 2023, the Russian Army began to use FPV drones in greater numbers. Since that period, attacks have grown exponentially on both sides. In total, there have been 3,917 Russian attacks (with video evidence) as at 8 February. About half hit. Roughly 12% result in destruction of the target (479 targets) and 15% in damage (594 targets). Around 20% miss or are inconclusive. Ukrainian use is ahead but the Russian Army is catching up. Setting aside the attrition - tactical drones of all types, with artillery, have become the biggest battlefield killers - their presence has radically altered the close battle. Both sides are now locked in a stalemate where any movement is quickly detected and threats neutralised by drones. What is being targeted? Analysis of what is being attacked shows clear differences in the targeting strategies of Ukrainian and Russian drone pilots. The Ukrainians mainly attack high-value target platforms, such as tanks, SP guns, EW systems, air defence systems, and logistic stores. The Russians overwhelmingly use FPV drones to support attacks on Ukrainian 'positions' - the trench lines and strong points. Both sides have actually been attacking trenches regularly, with important implications for the design of trenches. Building overhead cover is no longer sufficient; a trench must be at least L-shaped because skilful drone pilots are flying the drones into the trenches. Where are the attacks taking place? With geo-location, open-source monitoring of drone attacks offers insights into where the fighting occurs (much as NASA FIRMS data unintentionally but usefully records heavy artillery or rocket fire as 'heat anomalies'). Tocnhyi.info January 2024 heat maps (shown below) reveal how the most active areas for drone attacks were the Krynky bridgehead in the west and the Avdiivka-Marinka sectors in the east. At the former, Ukrainian defenders on the Dnipro right bank (at a higher elevation than the left bank) are using drones and artillery to keep a much larger Russian force at bay at the 36th Separate Marine Brigade bridgehead. Innovation and democratisation Over 200 firms are involved in drone production in Ukraine. More than 60 drone types have been developed and fielded, which is, in some respects, an unhelpful 'menagerie of drones'. Commercial training providers have sprung up, and drone 'shock companies' have been raised. Crowd-funding ...

In an era of drones, loitering munitions, precision strikes, and manoeuvre warfare; discussing fortification seems almost quaint. Surely the revolution in military affairs and its successors have rendered bunkers and fixed positions irrelevant. If the future battlefield is transparent and the kill chain is as swift as proponents anticipate, staying still is a death sentence. That is, of course, a trite assessment, but it reflects that very little consideration is given to hardened positions in the modern era. King's College London professor David Betz offers an interesting corrective to this misguided notion in his new book "The Guarded Age" (a copy of which was kindly provided for review by the publisher). In the interests of full disclosure, Betz was one of my tutors at King's whilst I pursued my MA in War Studies. Readers will now undoubtedly attempt to divine how fairly he marked my papers based on the outcome of this review. Fortifications are not just castles and bunkers, as Betz shrewdly shows. The process of fortification is, ultimately, about controlling and channelling the movement of forces and people (and data, too). Sensibly broadening the definition without losing fidelity allows for a more nuanced consideration. Fortifications are all around us when we stop and look. Indeed, much of urban design and planning incorporates fortification at a base level. As the war in Gaza illustrates, cities themselves, both before and after destruction, are perhaps the ultimate fortified position. Designed to channel the flow of people when intact, they serve as superb hardened positions when destroyed - deadly for offensive forces but ideal for defenders, enabling them to hold key positions and tie down attackers with minimal resources. Whether Haussman's redesign of Parisian streets to prevent the creation of barricades or the redesign of the Strand outside of King's College London and across from Bush House, city planning is about restricting movement and creating safety and security. From personal experience, the space outside King's was hazardous to students' health as lorries, cars, and cyclists competed for space. After considerable renovation and redesign, the space outside the Strand Campus is a delightful haven for students. There is a palpable sense of enthusiasm, tempered by shrewd professionalism, that suffuses Betz' writing and elevates his final product. "The Guarded Age" is a book that runs counter to the zeitgeist of defence and security writing, where everything is about mobility, manoeuvre, autonomy, and precision. In an era when everything seems fluid, writing about something that is fixed seems odd. In less enthusiastic hands, the case for discussing and considering what fortifications are and could be would be harder to make. Writing about fortifications of the past? Decidedly easier. Writing about fixed positions and emplacements when everything is about drones and hypersonic munitions? Vastly more difficult. Fortifications have a "strategic stratigraphy" to them, Betz writes. In essence, successive cultures, countries, or armed forces build upon the fortifications and embattlements of the past - a palimpsest approach to digging in and hardening positions. This, on reflection, is rather self-evidence but a novel way of looking at the bastions of the past and today. As others like Tim Marshall have eloquently written, geography still matters. While it does certainly change due to geological, meteorological, and cartographic developments, high ground remains high ground, channels remain channels, and the desire for strategic advantage endures. Yet beyond the positioning of fortresses, their design remains strikingly consistent - stone walls are succeeded by Hesco barriers and moats are replaced by concrete bollards. Even the designs of the past are found in use today, with medieval star forts being replicated in the Sahel. A good idea remains a good idea. Perhaps the sole exception to this rule is in the r...

NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR) must prepare to protect the integrity of elections in Kosovo. This activity should be framed as a human security task. Introduction: The need for support in Kosovo As international pressure mounts on Kosovo to hold elections in the country's Serbian majority North, democratic values are at the forefront of international discourse. The likely and forthcoming election in Northern Kosovo presents an opportunity for KFOR to implement its existing security-focused mandate in accordance with the fundamental principles of NATO and the UN's human security approach. Tensions and controversy have persisted since the ethnic Serb-Kosovars, who make up a majority in the north but a fraction of the overall Kosovar population, resigned en masse from state institutions in the region in November 2022, citing breaches of EU-mediated agreements between Serbia and Kosovo. Ethnic Albania-Kosovars replaced them following a municipal election in April 2023; the turnout was just 3.47%, which the Serb-Kosovars boycotted. Violent protests by the Serb-Kosovar community ensued in May 2023, with continued resignations of Serb-Kosovars from further state institutions in August 2023, inflaming levels of communal animosity and making prospects of an election rerun precarious. In September 2023 an armed attack in the village of Banjska on Kosovo police left four dead (a local police sergeant and three of the attackers). The deputy head of the Serbian List (the political grouping which represents most of the ethnic Serb-Kosovars) later admitted to organising and taking part in the incident. In October 2023 the Serbian List - backed by Serbian President Vucic - said it was ready to participate in new municipal elections in Northern Kosovo. By December 2023 reports emerged that ethnic Serb-Kosovars will attempt to follow the electoral commission's procedure to trigger new municipal elections. NATO can safeguard elections in Kosovo by deterring the threat of violence in coordination with the Kosovo Police and the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), providing a visible presence near polling centres to reassure and protect the local population - both Albanian-Kosovars and Serb-Kosovars - and secure the right to vote in a peaceful electoral process. Military planners should frame the support and measure its subsequent impact through the lens of NATO's human security policy. In doing so, NATO progresses its portfolio of human security-related activities and deepens its expertise in democracy support expertise. Outcomes from Election Safeguarding: The Human Security Imperative in Northern Kosovo Northern Kosovo has a complex history marked by ethnic tensions and contemporary geopolitical influences. It requires a comprehensive approach to security, particularly as it approaches flashpoints such as elections. The specified tasking of safeguarding elections should be framed as a complementary human security activity for KFOR, which will contribute towards the following outcomes: Protecting the Democratic Process Free and fair elections are the foundation of democracy, enabling citizens to express their will peacefully. However, in regions like Northern Kosovo electoral processes will be susceptible to disruption including violence. Like military forces in the Central African Republic, Nigeria, NATO itself in Afghanistan in 2005 and the forthcoming Mexico election, KFOR can help to ensure a secure environment on election day by guarding near polling stations and access routes, escorting administrative staff, and ensuring freedom of movement for residents to participate with a reduced risk of violence or fear from coercion. Preventing Conflict, Instability and Displacement A continued and enhanced show of force from KFOR will seek to deter violence before and after the election, safeguarding citizens and officials - such as beekeeper and ethnic Albanian-Kosovar Mayor Lulzim Hetemiwho has sought to sleeping in his office due ...