Podcasts about Yan

"You're not a cooler baseball player, and then you sprinkle some Jesus dust around the clubhouse." Yan Gomes spent 13 seasons behind the plate in the big leagues, and he's got a blunt take on how identity actually works — and how most guys get it backwards.Yan made history in 2012 as the first Brazilian-born player ever to reach Major League Baseball. He caught Game 7 of the 2016 World Series for Cleveland, won a ring with Washington in 2019, and finished his career with the Cubs. This past February, he went back to Brazil to coach their World Baseball Classic team — the first time he's ever put the coaching hat on.But the heart of this one is what happens after. Yan and Chris both know the strange math of retiring young from a pro sport, and they get honest about it: the bubble you live in as a player, the people you never got to meet, and why Yan's word for this season of life is simply "available."He also gets into the comparison trap that eats up Christian athletes, why his father-in-law — All-Star pitcher Atlee Hammaker — told him to stop worrying about pressure and start breathing it in, and the three verses he's built his life around: one for faith, one for family, one for friends.Plus: Chris finally gets to hear what the UT locker room said about him, and Yan admits the Gomes family dinner table is not always a picture of Christlike serenity.As always, we thank our title sponsor https://onecountry.com for making this podcast possible — catch every episode on the OneCountry app — and https://konexial.com for their continued support of the show.COACH ME UP TEAMhttps://onecountry.comhttps://konexial.comFollow us on Twitter:https://twitter.com/CoachJimmyDykeshttps://twitter.com/ChrisBurke02•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••Hosted by Jimmy Dykes and Chris BurkeProduced by Jared Mark Fincher — https://jaredmarkfincher.comAll audio is subject to copyright 2026 Jimmy Dykes Inc.Contact us at coachmeuppodcast@gmail.com

Dancing with the Stars: The Next Pro Ep 7 Recap Watch the podcast on YouTube! RHAP dives into Dancing with the Stars: The Next Pro, Season 35, as hosts Matt and Sasha Joseph break down the penultimate episode. Sporting hoodies and ski goggles in the spirit of the show’s signature preseason anonymity, they dig into the week's dramatic elimination, shifting alliances, and speculation about which pros will make it onto next season’s main roster. Guest judge Kim Johnson brings extra insight and nostalgia, while surprise appearances from Dancing with the Stars veterans stir up new energy in the ballroom. The discussion centers on the multi-round structure, where contestants first pair with returning DWTS pros like Whitney Carson, Gleb Savchenko, Jan, and Riley Arnold, followed by a fiercely competitive round of paired routines. Each duo's dynamic is unpacked—from Alan's challenge to bring out Whitney's sparkle without receiving feedback, to Salina's chemistry with Jan and bold choreography choices. The importance of “wow moments” is debated, with judges demanding stand-out performances, while the hosts question if this focus truly fits the skills being tested. Highlights from this episode include: Alan and Whitney's jive performance struggles with chemistry and the tension of a hands-off rehearsal process Salina impresses alongside Jan, blending commercial dance with salsa and earning high praise for creativity and energy Adele and Gleb's partnership stands out for technical prowess and seamless connection, drawing comparisons to top series pros AJ's intensity with Riley in rehearsals sparks talk on whether drive outweighs approachability in a potential new pro Rumor mill churns about next season's casting, possible judge panel changes, and the return of fan favorite Sharna Burgess With the DWTS: Next Pro finale and Season 35 just ahead, will technical mastery or show-stopping flair carry the day? How will shifting dynamics and rumored cast shakeups shape the upcoming season? Dive into the episode for a detailed strategy discussion, candid opinions, and all the latest ballroom buzz. Catch the full podcast for insider analysis, bold predictions, and the latest on your DWTS favorites. Chapters: 0:00 Masked Entrances and Preseason Rituals 6:31 Pros Return, Challenge Format Revealed 9:00 Alan and Whitney's Choreography Struggles 12:26 Judges Critique Alan's Partnership 14:47 Wow Moments Debate Intensifies 16:41 Selena and Yan's Viral Salsa 18:42 Adele and Gleb's Ballroom Chemistry 21:24 Riley and AJ Clash Over Intensity 26:10 Selena Outshines Alan in Quickstep 34:41 Adele and AJ Deliver Top Foxtrot 37:36 Alan's Emotional Elimination Announced 41:28 Finale Predictions and Partnerships 44:45 Season 35 Casting Rumors Detailed 50:11 Same-Sex Pairing Returns 54:22 Holiday Special and Finale Preview Join the RHAP Dancing with the Stars Facebook group: ?https://www.facebook.com/groups/rhapdwts Never miss a minute of RHAP's coverage! LISTEN: Subscribe to the podcast feed WATCH:  Watch and subscribe to the podcast on YouTube SUPPORT:  Become a RHAP Patron for bonus content, access to Facebook and Discord groups plus more great perks!

It's Redtime BoysTim "Red Hawk" Welch is joined by the legend Joe "Diesel" Riggs and BEDTIME MMA! The boys break down Islam Makhachev vs Ian Garry at UFC 330, Arman vs Ruffy, Van vs Pantoja 2, UFC 333 Volk vs Evloev, and Merab vs Petr Yan 2!⚡️Check out PrizePicks! Sign up with code "TIMBO" and play $5 to get $150 in lineups if you Win! Click https://link.prizepicks.com/LME0/TIMBO

Ben Lindbergh and Meg Rowley banter about the deepening monetary morass surrounding Mark Walter and whether it will eventually ensnare the Dodgers, the struggles of Edwin Díaz and Kyle Tucker, L.A.’s incentive to try for a bye, the Dodgers’ and Mets’ offseason oopsies, Pete Crow-Armstrong’s heroics, the hot hitting of Denae Benites and the WPBL’s offensive environment, Joshua Báez and MLB’s debutant ball, Colt Emerson’s hidden hurt, the AL’s wild card mid-off, a four-team whirlwind for Jake Rogers, the longest team trade droughts, and more. Audio intro: Jonathan Crymes, “Effectively Wild Theme” Audio outro: Alex Glossman and Ali Breneman, “Effectively Wild Theme” Link to Walter Mitty wiki Link to Ben on Walter Link to Bloomberg on Walter Link to WSJ on Walter Link to Baker on Walter Link to Reuters on Walter Link to The Athletic on Walter Link to Chelsea shares story Link to Ohtani clause story Link to Walter tweet Link to more on Walter Link to Tucker/PCA tweet Link to one-day WAR Link to Opta/PCA fun fact Link to 1957 Power game Link to FG WAR leaderboard Link to Tucker miss 1 Link to Tucker miss 2 Link to Tucker home offense Link to Tucker road offense Link to Karros comment Link to BP on Tucker Link to Tucker in the dugout Link to Tucker and Ohtani Link to Tucker summary Link to Díaz IL story Link to Dodgers bye incentive Link to Sheehan on Stearns Link to Sam on Stearns Link to Ben on the Mets Link to WPBL leaderboard Link to WPBL RA9 Link to MLB RA9 Link to BP on WPBL offense Link to Benites wiki Link to BP on Benites Link to Benites MLB comps Link to Cade Skywalker Link to Simmons Mariners tweets Link to Emerson story 1 Link to Emerson story 2 Link to Nightengale on Wilson Link to Murphy’s hidden injury Link to Watchmen quote Link to Watchmen meme template Link to Ben on debutant batters Link to debutants spreadsheet Link to MLB Báez video Link to ESPN Báez video Link to Callahan triple video Link to Callahan triple story Link to Cobb/Irwin article Link to Paine on post-deadline confusion Link to FG playoff odds Link to post-deadline odds changes Link to wild card standings Link to Crizer on the AL standings Link to Rogers fun fact Link to Rogers feature Link to Rogers wedding story Link to trade droughts article Link to Atlanta-Philly trades Link to Cleveland-KC trades Link to Dodgers-Tigers trades Link to Red Sox-Yankees trades Link to fourth out wiki Link to Jaffe on John Link to Episode 1580 Stat Blast Link to Cubs-Cardinals game Link to Cubs-Nationals game Link to Hembekides clip Link to Hembekides graph Link to Wilson overturn Link to Yan tweet 1 Link to Yan tweet 2 Link to Burgos gamelogs Link to Burgos post Sponsor Us on Patreon Give a Gift Subscription Email Us: podcast@fangraphs.com Effectively Wild Subreddit Effectively Wild Wiki Apple Podcasts Feed Spotify Feed YouTube Playlist Facebook Group Bluesky Account Twitter Account Get Our Merch! var SERVER_DATA = Object.assign(SERVER_DATA || {}); Source

In this Q&A episode of Vineyard Underground, Fritz answers real-world questions from growers across the U.S., covering late-season disease management, water and nutrient strategy, and vine removal decisions. Fritz talks through post-harvest care for young, non-bearing vines, how to handle irrigation and foliar disease pressure in different regions, and clears up confusion around growing degree days.  He also explains how to work with phosphorous acid fungicides and spray tank pH, why and how to remove struggling vines when repurposing a block, and ways to improve fruit acidity and yeast-assimilable nitrogen for better fermentations. The episode closes with guidance on supporting weaker replants surrounded by mature vines. Listeners will gain clear, field-tested guidance they can apply right away to protect vine health, improve fruit quality, and make smarter long-term decisions in their vineyards. In this episode, you will hear: How to manage irrigation and disease control for non-bearing young vines heading into fall Why negative growing degree days are set to zero and how to choose a realistic start date Best timing and methods for removing underperforming vines  How phosphorous acid fungicides fit into a spray program and why spray water pH matters Ways to boost fruit YAN and acidity, while supporting pale, third-leaf replants facing competition with mature vines Follow and Review: If you enjoyed this episode, be sure to follow the podcast and leave a 5-star review on Apple Podcasts! Your support helps us reach more listeners.

TOMMY IS BACK!Tim "Red Hawk" Welch is joined by the Tommy "GUNZ" McMillen and the legend Joe "Diesel" Riggs! The boys break down Tommy's next fight vs Marwan Rahiki at UFC Noche, they breakdown Islam Makhachev vs Ian Garry at UFC 330, and Tommy is buying a Lambo!⚡️Check out PrizePicks! Sign up with code "TIMBO" to play $5 and WIN $50 INSTANTLY Click https://link.prizepicks.com/LME0/TIMBO♠️ Check out Spade! Use Code: TIMBOSPADE10 FOR 10% OFF!!https://www.amazon.com/stores/SPADE/page/91C86242-444D-487E-9D63-3FBB1503187F?ref_=ast_bln

Walking through an Australian suburb, you might spot everything from curry leaves and lemons to tomatoes and herbs growing in front gardens or on verges. But is it legal to pick it? This guide explains when it's legal to pick produce, why permission matters, and how community gardens offer another way to grow your own food. - Australia ár gór ór bare záíle,tuñi dikiba kari fatattu loti,hosi tu hora taíyon ar borfata ya herb ókkol tarar bariza ya gór or gira ár hasé.Yan hono gaír kanuni ne siri bolla?Episod yan ót buzaibo hoñte siri fariba de yan,ar ijazot kiyalla lagéde yan,ar comaj ór yani komuniti garden hodé eçe nizor haibar gas gusala hondilla gori lagaí faribade yan.

This is a free preview of a paid episode. To hear more, please visit our Patreon. Ben Lindbergh and Meg Rowley banter about the latest apparent change in the baseball’s behavior (this time it seems to be deader) and, in a tribute to Tommy John (11:35), retrace the timeline of his trailblazing surgery and his return to a major league mound 50 years ago through contemporaneous accounts and quotes. Then (55:58) they bring on top-tier Patreon supporter Jamie Verbrugge to discuss his podcast and baseball backgrounds before answering listener emails (1:05:02) about the upper bounds of a cup of coffee, a really entertaining but trophy-less season vs. a really boring championship season, an undercover baseball robot, whether Jefry Yan would celebrate a strikeout on an overturned ball call, whether fans are suggestible enough to be fooled by fake home run distances, an ultimate frisbee-style integrity rule for baseball, the value of Ron Washington, and the advisability of bringing the infield in, followed by Stat Blasts (2:01:49) about Pete Crow-Armstrong leading his league in offense and defense, every team in a divison having the same recent record, team games with high matching run, hit, and walk totals, pitchers who got a win, a loss, and a save in a single three-game series, team games with streaks of the same start to each offensive inning, bullpens where one pitcher out-WARed all the others combined, and strikeout-free shutouts. Audio intro: Beatwriter, “Effectively Wild Theme” Audio interstitial: Sean .P, “Effectively Wild Theme” Audio outro: Liz Panella, “Effectively Wild Theme” Link to Sheehan on the ball Link to Savant drag dashboard Link to earlier ball analysis 1 Link to earlier ball analysis 2 Link to John’s statement Link to MLB.com on John’s statement Link to Reuters on John’s illness Link to Tommy John wiki Link to Frank Jobe wiki Link to Jaffe on John Link to career IP leaders Link to Grant on Posey/Avila Link to NanoNeedle article Link to Maness repair article Link to TJ timeline links Link to TJS database Link to Strom surgery article Link to Bordley surgery article 1 Link to Bordley surgery article 2 Link to Ben’s baseball/America course Link to Ben C. on Skubal and Detroit Link to Dickson on “cup of coffee” Link to Asimov’s Robot series Link to Super Baseball 2020 Link to Baseball Highlights 2045 Link to Data smell Reddit thread Link to Skenes photos Link to Yan game video Link to Yan box score Link to Yan Savant search Link to ultimate’s integrity rule Link to Arraez/Washington article Link to article on Wash in 2027 Link to SIS infield-in study Link to Ben on shifting vs. RHB Link to Stirnweiss SABR bio Link to PCA/Snuffy Blast spreadsheet Link to AL Central streaks image Link to 13-13-13 Stathead query Link to win/loss/save spreadsheet Link to leadoff streaks info Link to 2026 Guardians relievers Link to bullpen WAR gaps spreadsheet Link to Tigers-Guardians gamer Link to zero-K, zero-run games Link to listener emails database Link to MLB All-Century Team Link to BNS Jays play podcast Sponsor Us on Patreon Give a Gift Subscription Email Us: podcast@fangraphs.com Effectively Wild Subreddit Effectively Wild Wiki Apple Podcasts Feed Spotify Feed YouTube Playlist Facebook Group Bluesky Account Twitter Account Get Our Merch! var SERVER_DATA = Object.assign(SERVER_DATA || {}); Source

“The pace and trajectory of private-market growth has simply outpaced the growth of bank balance sheets,” says Dadong Yan, head of Barings Portfolio Finance, explaining the success of the asset class and the opportunities that lie ahead. In this episode of Credit Crunch, Yan joins Bloomberg Intelligence's Noel Hebert to discuss the evolution of portfolio finance from a bank-dominated lending business to an institutional investment opportunity, and how institutional capital helps to fill the financing gap created in private markets. The two talk about the importance of disciplined underwriting, diversification and structural protections, while Yan argues that controlling lender positions, proprietary data and rigorous risk management — not simply yield — will determine long-term success in the asset class. The Credit Crunch podcast is part of BI's FICC Focus series.

This week on the Hivemind, the team debates whether the market is on the cusp of a new on-chain boom or whether the lack of a major wealth-creation event in Bitcoin, ETH, or SOL will keep the upside limited.They break down the green shoots showing up across FWA, FOMO, MetaDAO and other pockets of the market, why small and mid caps may offer better opportunities than the majors, and whether exhausted sellers could be setting the stage for the next move higher.The conversation also covers Hyperliquid and tokenized stocks, the competition between crypto and AI for speculative capital, whether buy-and-hold still works, and why the next sustained rally may require a very different catalyst than previous cycles.TIMESTAMPS00:00:00 Intro00:00:50 Is On-Chain Finally Coming Back?00:09:05 Who Buys Bitcoin Next?00:21:55 Where Does Crypto Value Accrue?00:28:45 Majors vs. Small Caps00:35:30 Crypto vs. AI00:47:05 RWAs, HYPE & Tokenized Stocks00:55:55 The FWA Experiment

fWotD Episode 3386: Yongle Emperor Welcome to featured Wiki of the Day, your daily dose of knowledge from Wikipedia's finest articles.The featured article for Wednesday, 12 August 2026, is Yongle Emperor.The Yongle Emperor (2 May 1360 – 12 August 1424), personal name Zhu Di, was the third emperor of the Ming dynasty of China, reigning from 1402 to 1424. He was the fourth son of the Hongwu Emperor, the founder of the dynasty.In 1370, Zhu Di was granted the title of Prince of Yan. By 1380, he had relocated to Beiping (present-day Beijing) and was responsible for protecting the northeastern borderlands. In the 1380s and 1390s, he proved himself to be a skilled military leader, gaining popularity among soldiers and achieving success as a statesman. In 1399, he rebelled against his nephew, the Jianwen Emperor, and launched a civil war known as the Jingnan campaign. After three years of intense fighting, he emerged victorious and declared himself emperor in 1402.After ascending the throne, the Yongle Emperor elevated Beiping to the status of a second capital, diminishing the importance of Nanjing. Construction of the new capital between 1407 and 1420 employed hundreds of thousands of workers. He also supervised the reconstruction of the Grand Canal, essential for supplying Beijing and the northern armies. The Emperor strongly supported both Confucianism and Buddhism and sponsored the compilation of the vast Yongle Encyclopedia, employing around two thousand scholars. He also ordered Neo-Confucian texts to be systematized and used as textbooks for training officials. The civil service examinations, held every three years, produced qualified candidates for government service. Unlike his father, he avoided frequent purges, resulting in longer ministerial tenures and a more professional, stable administration.The Emperor made considerable efforts to reinforce the empire's hegemonic position in East Asia through an active foreign policy. Diplomatic missions and military expeditions were dispatched to regions both near and distant, including Manchuria, Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and the Timurid Empire in Central Asia. Maritime expeditions led by the eunuch admiral Zheng He extended even further, reaching the shores of Southeast Asia, India, Persia, and East Africa. The Mongols—including southeastern Uriankhai, eastern Mongols and western Oirats—remained the empire's greatest security threat, prompting the Ming court to alternately support and confront the various groups. The Emperor personally led five campaigns into Mongolia, and his decision to transfer the government from Nanjing to Beijing was driven largely by the need to closely monitor the unstable northern frontier. Although a skilled military leader, his wars were ultimately unsuccessful, as the campaign in Đại Việt lasted until the end of his reign and his Mongolian campaigns failed to secure China's northern border.This recording reflects the Wikipedia text as of 01:01 UTC on Wednesday, 12 August 2026.For the full current version of the article, see Yongle Emperor on Wikipedia.This podcast uses content from Wikipedia under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License.Visit our archives at wikioftheday.com and subscribe to stay updated on new episodes.Follow us on Bluesky at @wikioftheday.com.Also check out Curmudgeon's Corner, a current events podcast.Until next time, I'm neural Ruth.

Abu Bakr Shawky'nin [Ebubekir Şevki] The Stories [Hikayeler] filmini Ramallah'ta, Mahmud Derviş Müzesi'nin bahçesinde izledim. O akşam orada sadece film için değil, izleyici profilini gözlemlemek için de bulunuyordum. Yanımda, yazları memleketleriyle bağlarını koparmamak için Amerika'dan Ramallah'a gelen Filistinli gençler oturuyordu. Karşılaştığım bu küçük ayrıntı, biraz sonra izleyeceğim filmin temel meselesi için kusursuz bir girişti: İnsanların tarihle, aileyle ve memleketle kurdukları bağın karmaşıklığı.

Yan adawar Najeriya sun fara wani sabon yunkuri na hadin kai a tsakanin su domin fidda dan takara guda da zai fafata da shugaban kasa Bola Tinubu a zaben shekara mai zuwa. Wata kungiyar dake kiran kan ta G100 ke jagorancin wannan sabon yunkuri, yayin da ta sanar da taron da za ta yi a makon gobe. Dr Ibrahim Modibbo na daya daga cikin shugabannin ta, kuma ya yi wa Bashir Ibrahim Idris a tattaunawar da suka yi kan lamarin

Resistance training can significantly improve cardiovascular health in older adults by lowering both systolic and diastolic blood pressure, as well as offering unique benefits like increased muscle strength and quality. In this “NASM CPT Podcast” episode, host Rick Richey reviews the latest meta-analyses and systematic reviews, sharing practical insights on how resistance training helps manage hypertension and supports healthy aging. Listeners will learn why resistance training is valuable for older populations, how it compares to aerobic exercise for blood pressure control, and the importance of starting with progressive resistance to minimize soreness and build confidence. Rick also addresses specific concerns such as training postmenopausal women and individuals with sarcopenia, providing evidence that regular, structured resistance training leads to greater health benefits, especially in those over 60. After listening, fitness professionals will be equipped with research-backed strategies for designing effective, safe training programs for older adults and addressing their concerns about resistance exercises. Chapters: [00:00:00] What are the cardiovascular benefits of resistance training for older adults? [00:05:43] How does resistance training affect blood pressure in people with hypertension? [00:10:53] How does resistance training benefit postmenopausal women? [00:14:14] What is sarcopenia and how can resistance training help elderly adults? [00:15:01] How should trainers safely begin resistance training with older or inexperienced clients? [00:18:48] How can trainers help older clients build strength and confidence progressively? Show References:Wang, X., Wang, Q., Zhao, W., Wang, J., Chen, L., & Wang, L. (2025). The efficacy of resistance training for the management of hypertension: a systematic review and meta-analysis. Postepy w kardiologii interwencyjnej = Advances in interventional cardiology, 21(2), 163–170. https://doi.org/10.5114/aic.2025.151598  Henkin, J. S., Pinto, R. S., Machado, C. L. F., & Wilhelm, E. N. (2023). Chronic effect of resistance training on blood pressure in older adults with prehypertension and hypertension: A systematic review and meta-analysis. Experimental gerontology, 177, 112193. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exger.2023.112193   Rivera-Mejía, S. L., Rúa-Alonso, M. A., Rial-Vázquez, J., Nine, I., Camacho-Villa, M. A., Enríquez-González, M. A. G., Varela-Sanz, A., Fariñas, J., Revuelta-Lera, B., Fraga-Germade, E., Giráldez-Garcí A, M. A., & Iglesias-Soler, E. (2026). Resistance Training Improves Cardiovascular Health in Postmenopausal Women: Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis. Journal of applied physiology (Bethesda, Md. : 1985), 10.1152/japplphysiol.01180.2025. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1152/japplphysiol.01180.2025   Zhao, H., Cheng, R., Song, G., Teng, J., Shen, S., Fu, X., Yan, Y., & Liu, C. (2022). The Effect of Resistance Training on the Rehabilitation of Elderly Patients with Sarcopenia: A Meta-Analysis. International journal of environmental research and public health, 19(23), 15491. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph192315491 If you like what you just consumed, leave us a 5-star review, and share this episode with a friend to help grow our NASM health and wellness community! The content shared in this podcast is solely for educational and entertainment purposes. It is not intended to be a substitute for professional advice, diagnosis, or treatment. Always seek out the guidance of your healthcare provider or other qualified professional. Any opinions expressed by guests and hosts are their own and do not necessarily reflect the views of NASM. Introducing NASM One, the membership for trainers and coaches. For just $35/mo., get unlimited access to over 300 continuing education courses, 50% off additional certifications and specializations, EDGE Trainer Pro all-in-one coaching app to grow your business, unlimited exam attempts and select waived fees. Stay on top of your game and ahead of the curve as a fitness professional with NASM One. Click here to learn more. https://bit.ly/4ddsgrm

Pano kung palagi kang may nakikitang babaeng nakaputi tuwing ma-Urom (sleep paralysis) ka? Yan at ang iba pang mga experience ni Lemon ang maririnig natin sa episode Lemon, maraming salamat uli!Kung gusto nyo marinig yung episode na may Sepia Mode gaya nang na e-experience ni Urom, baka gusto nyo pakinngan: EP 263 - Ang Astral Travel ni Elle - Elle Chapter 1https://youtu.be/tKRVceub7PAEto naman ang mga sleep related horror stories:Sleep Related Scary Stories Playlist: https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLWCHva28hRRAKung meron rin kayong paranormal experiences sa at gusto nyo kwento, pwede nyo yan email sa ⁠paranormalsph@gmail.com⁠ or message nyo ako sa Facebook: ⁠https://www.facebook.com/paranormalpodcast/⁠In case first time mo makinig sa podcast, pwede ka magsimular sa Episode 1:⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠EPISODE 1 The Unexpected Visitor⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Kung di nyo pa nabalitaan, meron tayong episodes na Deep Dive, English and Tagalog, mahahanap lang yan sa YouTube:English - ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLcg83FW_a91KrMPaZK-9AkbDNNDS0venx⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Tagalog - ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLcg83FW_a91KpB4E63SE1nG_Bm7IGkgd4⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠If you enjoy this kind of conversation, you might want to subscribe :D ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Facebook⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Spotify⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠YouTube⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Tiktok⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Apple Podcast⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Matagal ka na bang listener at gusto mo support ang podcast? Pwede yan!⁠ Be a YouTube Member: ⁠⁠⁠https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCfEV5ZNv9QVAMCng124K1jg/join⁠⁠⁠You can also support us on Patreon ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://www.patreon.com/paranormalpodcast⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ We have different tiers for supporters, from the general support to early access, to joining us on the calls way in advance. No pressure, just additional help for us :) The Para Normal Podcast. Engineered and Produced by f90 Productions Rate and Review our show on Spotify, Pocket Casts, and Apple PodcastsDo you want to support the podcast? You can help keep us going by giving us a cup of joe! ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ko-fi.com/paranormalpodcast ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠For brand partnerships, advertisements, or other collaboration opportunities with our podcast, please contact our management team at ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠info@tagm.com⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Enjoy. 

Last year, an employee at Milwaukee Tool was arrested for stealing more than $1 million in tools from the Wisconsin tool maker. Matthew Yang worked in the company's IT department and manipulated the Milwaukee Tool ordering system to send tools to multiple addresses, including his own. On Friday, 32-year-old Yang was sentenced to five years in prison, which will be followed by five years of extended supervision. Yang must also pay Milwaukee Tool $1.08 million in restitution and will be on probation for nine years, according to the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel. The sentence was part of a plea deal that saw Yan plead no contest to five felonies to have nine other charges dropped. Police were contacted in April 2025 after Yang had some 9,000 pounds of tools sent to his apartment complex, which is unordinary. The freight company reached out to Milwaukee Tool's customer service to confirm the address, but the tool maker couldn't find the order in its system, according to the local Fox affiliate. Yang would create the orders, have them shipped, but then delete the order before payment processing. He did this for some 115 orders. Milwaukee Tool caught six of them, which means 109 made it to their destinations. Yang had a unique knowledge of Milwaukee Tool's operation. He worked with the company for about eight years, starting in the supply chain department before he moved to IT. During the investigation, law enforcement also found that Yang visited a local casino at least 140 times and sustained some significant losses.

Last time we spoke about the ending of the Second Battle of Changsha. In late September and early October 1941, Chinese commander Chen Cheng planned an operation to retake Yichang, a strategic Yangtze River city whose control was essential for protecting the approach to Chongqing. Japanese forces were pulling back from Changsha, weakened by supply problems and casualties, which created an opportunity for Chen to intensify his campaign. Yichang had been captured by Japan in 1940, a defeat that Chen carried as a personal and political burden. He therefore moved to encircle the Japanese 13th Division inside Yichang and drive it to collapse. Although the Chinese held a clear manpower advantage—fourteen divisions against the encircled Japanese—progress was slowed by stubborn fighting from prepared, entrenched positions. The battle inside the city produced desperate close-quarters combat and heavy casualties, showing how the fate of Yichang and the wider defense of Chongqing were tightly linked.    #214 War hits the Pacific Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War.   The guns fell silent on October 9, 1941, as the Ninth War Zone's forces restored their pre-battle positions, marking the end of the Second Battle of Changsha. The balance sheet was grim on both sides, but it was China that bore the heavier cost. The Ninth Military Front suffered 70,672 killed, wounded, or missing. The concurrent Yichang offensive added a further 21,368 casualties to the Sixth Military Front, a force that outnumbered its Japanese opponents ten to one yet still failed to retake the city. By the time the dust settled, the Chinese army had lost nearly 100,000 men across both theatres. The Chinese command was frank, at least in private, about what had gone wrong. The Japanese had moved with a speed that recalled Blitzkrieg, advancing 130 kilometres in eleven days and withdrawing at twelve kilometres a day, catching the defenders perpetually off-balance. The 26th, 37th, 10th, and 74th Corps had been picked apart piecemeal rather than fighting in concert, the original plan to destroy the Japanese south of the Miluo River coming to nothing. Elite formations had paid a disproportionate price: the 74th Corps suffered 14,521 casualties, the 37th Corps 14,015, and the 58th Division alone lost 6,192 of its 11,907 men, nearly its entire fighting strength.   Yet none of this was the story the public would hear. On October 10th, China's National Day, radio stations announced the "Second Great Victory in Northern Hunan", the annihilation of over 40,000 enemy troops. Newspapers rushed out special editions. Congratulatory telegrams flooded in from government ministries and civic organizations. Senior officials seized on the moment: Sun Ke, Premier of the Executive Yuan, declared that the victory "laid the foundation for the counter-offensive and the recapture of Hankou and Guangzhou," while General Bai Chongxi called it "the pivotal moment for us to turn defeat into victory." Chiang Kai-shek, reading through the pages of triumphant commentary produced overnight by his propagandists, was reportedly impressed by their industry, if not convinced by their content. He had not wanted to call it a victory at all, but the political calculus was unavoidable: after four years of war, an exhausted nation needed the psychological sustenance that only "victory" could provide.   The gap between public performance and private reality was nowhere more visible than in the arrival of a twenty-two-member international press delegation on October 13th. Journalists from Britain, the United States, France, the Netherlands, Portugal, Hong Kong, and major Chinese newspapers were flown to Changsha and carefully guided through selected battlefields, where they inspected mountains of war trophies and heard testimony from soldiers and civilians. They left satisfied, presenting their war souvenirs—swords, binoculars, Japanese military flags—to their audiences back home as proof of Chinese heroism and Japanese defeat. Both China and Japan were claiming victory simultaneously. The only conclusion the foreign press could draw was that one side was lying, and it was not the side that had shown them the evidence.   Chiang Kai-shek's real verdict came at the Third Nanyue Military Conference, held from October 16 to 21. His anger was withering. He condemned his generals for their obsession with defending sprawling outer perimeter lines while leaving city centres barely fortified, a mentality so rigid, he said, that the Japanese could announce the exact time of their advance and withdrawal in advance and still execute it on schedule without interference. "Generals, what a disgrace this is!" On the failure to capture prisoners, only 263 prisoners were claimed across the entire front, of whom only 16 names were actually published, he was almost incredulous: "We can definitely defeat the enemy, capture many enemy prisoners, and seize countless enemy weapons! Even if we cannot capture ten thousand prisoners, we should at least capture a thousand! If not a thousand, then at least a hundred! But now, you don't even have ten!" The conference handed down punishments to match the rhetoric. Liao Lingqi, commander of the shattered 58th Division, was sentenced to death for desertion and shot on October 22nd. His men were so outraged that three regimental commanders resigned in protest; the division was pulled from the order of battle entirely and given three months to rebuild. Li Yutang, commander of the 10th Corps, was dismissed—though the Third Battle of Changsha would begin before his replacement could take post, and he would be reinstated to play a key role in the city's defence.   On the Japanese side, the 11th Army acknowledged 1,670 killed, 5,184 wounded, and 14 missing, far fewer than Chinese claims, though post-war regimental histories suggest the true figure was higher. Lieutenant General Anami, who had championed the operation, found himself stung by the charge that the battle had served mainly as material for Chinese propaganda. On November 23rd, he reportedly reacted with visible displeasure when someone in his headquarters said as much aloud.  Anami's annoyance was easy enough to understand, but the accusation carried a troubling degree of accuracy. The Second Battle of Changsha had yielded no decisive strategic gain and no substantial alteration in the military balance. What it did generate, rather effectively, was a story and by the autumn of 1941, stories were one of the few things China still had in plentiful supply. The most consequential struggles were taking place not along the Miluo River, but in foreign ministries and embassies, in Washington and Moscow, in the messages passing between Chongqing and London, and in the increasingly strained calculations of statesmen trying to determine, amid rapidly changing circumstances, whom to support and for how long.   For Chiang Kai-shek, the challenge was never merely military. It was structural, and had been so from the outset. He had always seen clearly, precisely because he understood China's weakness, that Japan could not be defeated by China alone. The country lacked the industrial base, the logistical reach, and after four years of relentless attrition more and more the manpower needed to force a decisive result on the battlefield. China's survival depended on making its war inseparable from the wars of other powers. Since 1937, Chiang's diplomacy had pursued that single objective: convincing enough great powers that their interests were aligned with China's, and holding that coalition together long enough for Japan to be subdued. That effort turned out to be vastly more difficult than it ought to have been.   The problem started with the international order in which the war emerged. Chiang had hoped to assemble a concert of allies willing to help defend China against Japanese aggression. He was blocked not just by the reluctance of neutral states to aid China, but by the speed with which alliances shifted in the opening years of the Second World War. He had never welcomed the prospect of a general European conflict, correctly fearing that it would push China even further to the margins of world attention. Even so, he recognized that once the lines had hardened between the imperial democracies and fascism, new alignments might become possible. From his perspective, the growing amity between Berlin and Moscow was therefore disastrous. He had been eager to draw the USSR into war against Japan. Instead, the Soviets were now effectively aligned with the Nazis, who were themselves allied with Tokyo.   The world created after Versailles had already enraged many Chinese. After all, the May Fourth demonstrations of 1919 had arisen directly from the settlement reached at the Paris Peace Conference. Yet that older order had at least possessed recognizable anchors, especially the dominance of the two great European empires and the United States. Now those empires were weakening, and no one could say with confidence what the new geopolitical order would be. For all Chiang knew, Germany might emerge as Europe's new dominant power. The early years of the European war produced a bewildering spectacle of diplomatic realignment.   The Nationalist government had previously enjoyed a short-lived flirtation with Nazi Germany. In fact, Hitler's regime continued supplying Chiang with munitions in the first months of China's war against Japan. The Anti-Comintern Pact of 1936 had theoretically joined Germany, Italy, and Japan into the Axis, but mutual distrust prevented them from forming anything like a fully coherent alliance. Chiang found it useful to imply to Western powers that he might be pushed into closer alignment with Germany, a particularly disturbing possibility for the USSR, which faced enemies in both Europe and Asia. But eventually the contradictions in German policy toward East Asia became too severe. In April 1938, Germany yielded to Japanese pressure and ended its support for China.   Britain offered little meaningful help. Neville Chamberlain became prime minister in May 1937 at the head of a Conservative-led National Government, and was quickly overwhelmed by the deteriorating European situation. If Czechoslovakia was for him a "far-off country of which we know nothing," China's fate was even more distant and obscure to many,  perhaps most  policymakers in London. The Nationalists had more success in cultivating the United States. At the Nine-Power Conference in Brussels in November 1937, the Chinese delegation failed to persuade Washington to impose sanctions on Japan and confront it directly. By the middle of 1938, however, American views were beginning to shift. As Japan pushed deeper into southern China, it became increasingly obvious that the occupied territory would be closed to foreign trade. In December 1938, Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau arranged a private American loan of $25 million to China, to be repaid through shipments of tung oil, a varnish product whose real importance lay not in itself, but in what the arrangement signified: a quiet American expression of faith that Chongqing would survive. Chiang also held on to the hope of an even less likely partnership. He had become fiercely anti-Communist during the 1920s, yet in the early years of the anti-Japanese war his greatest hope still rested on Soviet entry into the conflict. Soviet advisers and pilots had aided China from 1937 to 1939, but the USSR never formally declared war on Japan. Still, as Japanese aggression in northern Asia intensified, it remained possible that the Soviets would eventually be drawn in.   Then, as so often happened whenever Chiang tried to impose some control over the course of the war, events beyond China's borders altered the struggle in fundamental ways. While Western attention remained fixed on Europe's darkening horizon, a battle with major consequences for East Asia unfolded on the frontiers of Outer Mongolia, Manchukuo, and the eastern Soviet Union. Throughout much of 1938 and early 1939, one faction within the Japanese Imperial Army sought to pressure the Soviets along their eastern frontier. The USSR appeared vulnerable; Stalin's paranoid purges had executed or exiled many of the Red Army's best officers. In May 1939, fighting broke out near Nomonhan between forces from Soviet-backed Mongolia and Japanese troops from Manchukuo. Within days, both sides had reinforced heavily, until nearly 60,000 Soviet troops faced about 40,000 soldiers from the Kwantung Army. Over the next four months, until mid-September, they fought a major battle ending in a decisive Japanese defeat and establishing the reputation of General Georgi Zhukov, who would later become one of Stalin's most celebrated wartime commanders. The much-derided Soviet Army had fought with formidable effectiveness, and the result was not only a ceasefire but also a nonaggression pact between the two sides, extinguishing, in one stroke, Chiang's hopes for a Chinese-Soviet military alliance. The final blow came after developments in northern Europe. In the Winter War of 1939–1940, the Soviet invasion of Finland led Britain and France to back a motion expelling the USSR from the League of Nations. China, then a member of the League Council, declined to use its veto to block the resolution. Stalin was enraged by Chiang's failure to prevent Soviet expulsion, and mutual suspicion thereafter poisoned relations between the two leaders for the rest of the war against Japan. China would now have to continue without further major Soviet backing.   By the spring of 1940, China's position had become deeply precarious. In March, senior Japanese negotiators sought an agreement with Chiang in Chongqing, while Wang Jingwei was trying to formalize his rival Nationalist government in Nanjing. This effort, known in Chinese as the Tong Operation, and in Japanese as Operation Kiri, led to talks in Hong Kong from March 7 to 10, 1940. Militarily, the Nationalists were in grave danger: the United States remained neutral, and Europe was in chaos. Indeed, that same spring, with France seemingly near collapse, the British government also sent out discreet feelers to explore the possibility of a negotiated peace with Germany. For China, Western assistance was nowhere in sight. The Japanese judged the moment favorable for pressing Chiang toward concessions. Faced with serious danger to his regime, Chiang allowed the door to negotiation to open just slightly.   As a consequence, the Japanese delayed full recognition of Wang Jingwei's new government. Through the summer and autumn of 1940, Tokyo remained uncertain about the defector. Prominent Japanese figures such as Count Arima Yoriyasu of the Privy Council said Wang's conduct demonstrated his untrustworthiness, and Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yōsuke continued to express interest in an agreement with Chongqing. Zhou Fohai captured the defectors' frustration, men who believed they had made the highest patriotic sacrifice when he wrote: "Chongqing sees us as collaborators, we see ourselves as heroes. We think only peace can save the country — that's why we think of ourselves as heroes. If we end up classed as heroes, then China and Japan will be at peace. If we end up classed as collaborators, then China and Japan will never be at peace."That formulation conveyed something genuine about the moral dizziness of the period. Most of the defectors were not men devoid of principles; they were men whose principles had carried them to a place that history would find exceptionally hard to pardon.   The "New Fourth Army Incident" brought to a close one of the most consequential years in modern Chinese political history. The battle of ideas unfolding in 1940 was already visible to informed contemporaries. Early in 1941, US Ambassador Nelson Johnson sent Washington a detailed assessment of the Chinese political situation in reply to another report passed along by Major Evans Carlson, an American officer who had made an extensive journey through the Chinese interior. The contrast between the two documents revealed a widening split in American views of China. Carlson, together with his travelling companion, the New Zealander Rewi Alley, had become increasingly sympathetic to the Communists after visiting their territories in 1938 and admiring their discipline. Carlson described the Nationalists as moving toward "fascism," and argued that American aid should be conditioned on Chiang's government being compelled to adopt more "democratic" institutions.   Johnson strongly disagreed. It was "only normal and natural," he wrote, that the Nationalists wanted to retain power, but during the war they had established the National Political Consultative Council, in which multiple parties, including the Communists, were represented. He also noted that the CCP could publish its own newspaper in Chongqing in a way that would have been impossible before the war. One might have expected the Nationalists to use the war as a justification "to extinguish . . . all political opposition," yet instead they had chosen to "muddle along." Johnson further thought that the influence of competing cliques inside the Nationalist Party had been overstated. Chiang Kai-shek, by contrast, had "grown in stature, as he has come to be recognized as the symbol of united resistance to Japanese encroachment"; ultimately, "it is he who makes the final decisions." Johnson did agree with Carlson that Chiang's regime was hesitant to encourage a broad-based popular movement animated by anything beyond anti-Japanese feeling, though he also pointed to Nationalist cooperative programs and county-level reforms. But he rejected the idea that American support should depend on sweeping political transformation. Chiang was committed to continuing the war against Japan, and Washington should back him in that effort. In a notably farsighted passage, Johnson wrote: "It is my view that since the fall of the Manchu dynasty and the collapse of the traditional Chinese concept of government the Chinese people have been feeling their way along toward a new evolving form of government. A definitive form of government has not yet been established and may not be established for decades; it may or may not be in the form of a democracy, but it will be a type of government that will be adapted to the needs of China and its people." The tension between these two American interpretations,  Carlson's idealized belief in the Communists and Johnson's pragmatic support for Chiang was more than a minor bureaucratic dispute. It foreshadowed a debate that would dominate American foreign policy for the next decade, and would still echo when the People's Republic was proclaimed in 1949.   The disastrous experience of 1940 seemed to cast doubt on whether any future for China existed outside the Japanese Empire. As 1941 wore on, another dreadful event shook the exhausted wartime capital. On June 5, Chongqing endured roughly five hours of bombing, driving the population into air-raid shelters. In one tunnel in the Shibati district, the conditions were even worse than usual. The large shelter was supposed to have lights and electric fans, but the generators had never been connected. Inside, the air was dark, hot, and suffocating. Around ten that evening, people began emerging from the tunnel when rumors spread that the Japanese were returning with poison-gas bombs. Air-raid wardens forced people back inside, even as others were still trying to come out. Bodies toppled over one another, and panic spread as people realized they could not breathe. Over the next few hours, hundreds died underground in the darkness. The exact number was never definitively established: the official figure was 461, though a contemporary police report placed it far higher, at 1,527. What rescuers remembered most vividly were the tortured expressions of the dead, people tangled together in each other's arms as they lost consciousness, clothing ripped to shreds by desperate hands clawing at one another, and bodies so drenched in sweat that they looked as though they had been soaked in water. One survivor, Tang Zhengchang, remembered a hand reaching out from a pile of corpses and pleading, "Sir, please help me . . ." The grip on Tang's shorts was so tight that it pulled them off; he escaped the tunnel naked from the waist down. Official descriptions of the disaster were softened. Even so, the tragedy deepened the city's gloom and in a place already saturated with grief, an added layer of darkness mattered a great deal.   Yet events elsewhere would soon offer the National Government a narrow margin of hope. Late in 1940, Franklin D. Roosevelt won re-election as president of the United States. "I am not going to send your boys into any foreign wars," he had proclaimed during the campaign against Wendell Willkie. But Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull both understood that Nazi domination of Europe posed a grave challenge to American influence there. And with China's "Open Door" to trade effectively shut by Japanese occupation, it was becoming increasingly clear that strict neutrality might not remain viable. In a 1941 report on China's domestic and foreign situation, Ambassador Johnson noted that during Germany's sweeping victories across Europe in mid-1940, the Chinese had become anxious about whether the Allies would remain committed to their cause. Britain's refusal to surrender, however, together with continuing Soviet goodwill, lifted public morale in China. People now looked toward the United States and Britain for support and felt that "victory" was "virtually theirs."   Then, on June 22, 1941, the world awoke to news that roughly three million German soldiers were advancing into the Soviet Union. Operation Barbarossa, Hitler's invasion of the USSR, dramatically overturned the nonaggression that had governed relations between the two major European dictatorships for the previous two years. It transformed the war in Europe entirely. Less obviously, it also transformed the war in Asia. Thanks to intelligence leaks, Chiang Kai-shek had already realized that war between Germany and the USSR was likely. After the neutrality treaty between the USSR and Japan was signed on April 13, 1941, Chiang predicted that the United States would be drawn into the Asian war, and even that Japan might eventually reverse course and strike the Soviet Union. If that happened, China would become the critical Asian ally of both Washington and Moscow. Stalin had been caught off guard by the German assault — largely because he ignored increasingly urgent warnings from senior colleagues receiving intelligence from well-placed spies in Germany and the Comintern, eager to preserve its alliances, now pressed the Chinese Communists to cooperate more closely with the Nationalists. On June 23, 1941, the CCP Central Committee responded with a declaration that it would "persevere in the Anti-Japanese United Front, persevere in Nationalist-Communist cooperation," and would align itself with the British, the Americans, and others resisting the "fascist rulers" of the Axis.   In Chongqing and Yan'an, the German attack on the Soviet Union was interpreted as a hopeful sign that Japan's fortunes might be beginning to turn. In Nanjing, the reaction was different. On June 22, Zhou Fohai recorded in his diary that, although the outcome "cannot be predicted," members of the Nanjing regime "all believe Germany will win and will take Moscow within two months." Zhou speculated that Japan could not easily reconcile its neutrality treaty with the USSR and its membership in the Anti-Comintern Pact, which was supposed to unite the Axis against Soviet expansionism. Still, because Germany had struck first, Japan was under no formal obligation to help. Zhou also continued to view events through a lens he had never abandoned: that of Chinese nationalism. "If Chongqing joins the Allies and they win," he wrote, "then this is good for China." If they lost, it would be disastrous for Chiang Kai-shek; but because Wang Jingwei had established a government in Nanjing under Japanese sponsorship, China now had "a foot in both boats." It was a ruthless calculation, but not a wholly dishonorable one. Zhou was not merely advancing Japanese interests. He was hedging, wagering on multiple futures in the name of a China he believed would endure beyond whatever constellation of powers happened to dominate at the moment. Whether posterity would judge that conduct prudent or collaborative was a question he could neither settle nor live to see resolved to his satisfaction.   The summer of 1941 marked a major geopolitical turning point in the war. Until then, the conflicts in China and Europe had remained separate, if desperate, struggles on the Eurasian continent. Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union now forced Japan to decide whether it too would enter war against the USSR. Debate in Tokyo was brief. Although some officials, including Foreign Minister Matsuoka, favored striking north before moving south, both the Kwantung Army and the Navy advised against helping Germany at least until Germany had succeeded in drawing substantial Soviet forces away from Siberia and into Europe. Konoye, once again prime minister, agreed. With the northern option set aside, Japanese leaders turned toward another great power instead: the United States. Japan's failure to gain further decisive momentum in China had fueled demands for broader regional expansion, especially into Southeast Asia, with its abundant oil, rubber, and other strategic resources. From 1940 onward, measures such as the pressure to close the Burma Road made it increasingly obvious that Tokyo had adopted a more aggressive posture in Asia. Unable to subdue China, Japanese policymakers chose instead to escalate the conflict still further.   Japanese political life had become ever more dominated by the unresolved war in China. As early as 1938, military expenditures consumed about 70 percent of the national budget, and that same year a National Mobilization Bill granted the government "total war control" over the zaibatsu, Japan's major industrial conglomerates. By 1940, the New Order was making itself felt throughout everyday life, with campaigns against luxury and extravagant consumption taking on new prominence. In February 1940, a parliamentarian was expelled from the Diet simply for daring to criticize the "holy war" in China. In such an atmosphere, retreat from imperial ambitions became increasingly unthinkable. That figure, 70 percent of the national budget devoted to the military is worth dwelling on, because it reveals something essential about the trap in which Japanese strategists had placed themselves. The war in China had not been won, yet abandoning it would have meant admitting a failure so severe that it would have shaken the ideological and institutional foundations of military supremacy in Japanese politics. The only apparent ways out required pushing further in: more conquest, more extraction, more expansion. The logic was brutally clear, and profoundly destructive.   The Roosevelt administration watched these developments with growing alarm. Though still formally neutral, the United States was already using Lend-Lease to provide major assistance to Britain and the Soviet Union in their struggles against Germany. It now expanded aid to China as well. On February 10, Roosevelt's representative Lauchlin Currie visited Chongqing to inform Chiang Kai-shek that the United States would soon provide $45 million in military equipment. General John Magruder, head of the small AMMISCA mission,  the American Military Mission in China had been sent to Chongqing in September 1941, as part of quiet preparation for possible Chinese entry into an alliance against Japan. The China branch of the OSS, precursor to the CIA, was led by General William "Wild Bill" Donovan, whom Roosevelt had dispatched to China in early 1941.   The Americans repeatedly tried to discourage Japan from moving south into Southeast Asia, but relations only grew more confrontational. Japan occupied the southern part of French Indochina, and in response the United States imposed an oil embargo in July 1941. The consequences were immense. Japan imported around 80 percent of its oil from the United States. Without that supply, its navy, the essential instrument for southern expansion  had reserves for perhaps eighteen months. The real question facing Tokyo, then, was not whether it must act, but how soon. Unable any longer to resist mounting military pressure for war, Konoye resigned on October 16 and was replaced as premier by General Tōjō Hideki. Tokyo accelerated its preparations for conflict with the Western powers. Planned targets included Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies, and the Philippines. I should note, if you want to learn about all of this history in more detail, you can go check out the pacific war channel on youtube. I have a chronological series that is just now talking about events like the Japanese invasion of french indochina and the road to pearl harbor.   Throughout the autumn of 1941, increasingly desperate negotiations took place between Japan and the United States. Washington insisted that Japan withdraw from China; Tokyo was equally firm that it would do no such thing. From the Japanese point of view, the demand to leave China was not a serious negotiating position but a demand for national humiliation a call to repudiate four years of war, vast casualties, and the ideological basis of Japanese militarism in a single diplomatic act. In the end, the gulf between the two positions could not be bridged.   While civilian and military leaders in Tokyo argued over the pace at which they should move toward war, few among Japan's rulers doubted that war was coming. At the imperial conference of November 5, it was formally agreed that if no satisfactory diplomatic solution had been reached by December 1, war would follow soon after. Talks in Washington between Ambassador Nomura Kichisaburō, diplomat Kurusu Saburō, and Secretary of State Cordell Hull led nowhere. On November 26, Hull delivered a note repeating the American position that Japan must withdraw from both China and Indochina. On December 1, the imperial conference resolved to go to war; the following day, the date of attack was fixed as December 8, December 7 by American time. In one sense, this was the culmination toward which the entire previous decade had been moving. The war in China had started as a localized conflict, then expanded into a continental one, and was now about to become something larger still: a truly global war, stretching from the North Atlantic to the western Pacific. China's long, lonely resistance would suddenly gain new dimensions and new allies,  though not the ones Chiang had spent four years trying to cultivate, and not under circumstances he would have chosen.   In the early morning of December 7, 1941, the US Pacific Fleet lay anchored at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii, its sailors and officers still largely asleep as dawn crept across the Pacific. The attack did not come without warning signs,  American and Japanese diplomats had been locked in increasingly desperate negotiations throughout the autumn, each side hardening its position until no room remained to maneuver. Washington had demanded that Japan withdraw from China, a condition Tokyo viewed not as a serious opening offer but as a demand for national humiliation: a call to repudiate four years of brutal war, hundreds of thousands of casualties, and the entire ideological foundation upon which Japanese militarism rested. No agreement was possible on those terms, and both sides privately knew it.   The strike force assembled in secret was formidable. Six aircraft carriers,  the Akagi, Kaga, Sōryū, Hiryū, Shōkaku, and Zuikaku had sailed under strict radio silence across the North Pacific, launching their aircraft in two successive waves before the American base had any meaningful chance to respond. The first wave of approximately 183 planes swept in just before 8 a.m., targeting the rows of battleships moored along Battleship Row and the military airfields at Wheeler, Hickam, and Ford Island simultaneously, ensuring that American aircraft could not scramble in time to mount an effective defense. A second wave of roughly 170 planes followed less than an hour later, pressing the attack on damaged ships and harbor installations.   The destruction was staggering. The battleship Arizona suffered a catastrophic magazine explosion after a armor-piercing bomb penetrated her forward decks, killing nearly 1,177 of her crew in minutes, almost half of the total American dead from the entire attack. The Oklahoma capsized after being struck by multiple torpedoes. The West Virginia and California sank at their moorings. In total, seventeen vessels were damaged or destroyed, and the vast majority of military aircraft at the nearby airfields were caught on the ground and obliterated before they could take flight. Around 2,400 Americans were killed and another 1,100 wounded, making it the deadliest single attack on American soil or territory in the nation's history to that point.   Yet the attack was not a complete strategic success for Japan. The US Pacific Fleet's aircraft carriers, the vessels that would ultimately decide the naval war in the Pacific happened to be at sea that morning and escaped unharmed. The harbor's fuel storage and repair facilities were also left largely intact, allowing the fleet to reconstitute faster than Japanese planners had anticipated. What Japan achieved in tactical devastation, it partly squandered in strategic miscalculation. The attack ended American neutrality instantly and irrevocably. The following day, President Roosevelt addressed Congress, calling December 7 "a date which will live in infamy," and within hours the United States declared war on Japan. For China, after more than four years of fighting alone, the blow that devastated Pearl Harbor paradoxically carried a thread of desperate hope at last, the great power Chiang Kai-shek had spent years trying to draw into the conflict had arrived, not under circumstances he would have chosen, but arrived nonetheless. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. After years of fighting, China's situation darkened in 1941 with intense bombing of Chongqing and fears of poison-gas attacks. Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union in June shifted alliances and pressured Japan toward wider war. Japan escalated plans for Southeast Asia, suffered an oil embargo, and negotiations with the United States broke down over withdrawing from China and Indochina. Then the Pearl Harbor attack began the Pacific War.

Vecchie drum-machines, synth modulari, delay a nastro, un basso elettrico e il suono antico del Guzheng. Gūsū attirano l'ascoltatore verso il proprio io interiore invece di prenderlo di petto. Xueyan Chen (per gli amici Yan) e Nicolas Balmer, espandono con grande sensibilità, forza e discrezione il loro universo sonoro, in un gioco di compensazione in cui ogni fonte sonora è un ornamento dell'altra. Il secondo album di Gūsū s'intitola “Inhabiting Me” (Subject To Restrictions Records). Sull'arco di sette composizioni, Yan e Nicolas intrattengono un dialogo sonoro transculturale complesso, dove il ritmo appare e scompare, dove c'è spazio per la contemplazione e il dialogo interiore, e in cui l'antico e il contemporaneo sono in relazione. Non c'è né nostalgia né futurismo. Nel lavoro di Gūsū, tradizione e sperimentazione non si fondono ma sono vicini abbastanza da riuscire a definirsi e alimentarsi a vicenda, in un continuum mutevole al centro del quale c'è quel il suono limpido di uno strumento con radici millenarie: il Guzheng.Diamo il benvenuto a Confederation Music, a Xueyan Chen e a Nicolas Balmer.

This is a free preview of a paid episode. To hear more, please visit our Patreon. Ben Lindbergh and Meg Rowley banter about the long-in-the-making major league debut of gravity-defying, strikeout-celebrating reliever Jefry Yan, Steven Kwan’s resurgence, a lineup with lots of Juniors, a scooter celebration, a double FARTBAT, Luis Arraez abandoning home plate, MLB players’ low-stakes conspiracies, a head-to-head MVP battle, the Mets’ Francisco Lindor–Juan Soto drama, the A’s firing David Forst, a pitcher plate appearance, and more. Then (1:02:46) Ben brings on YouTubers Noah Campbell (aka SOFTDRINKTV) and Taylor McNelis (aka WildLion Games) to discuss the decline in the quantity and quality of sports video games, how well baseball lends itself to gaming, the golden age of baseball video games, and whether a few new challengers might endanger MLB The Show’s dominance. Audio intro: Benny and a Million Shetland Ponies, “Effectively Wild Theme (Pedantic)” Audio interstitial: The Gagnés, “Effectively Wild Theme” Audio outro: Philip Bergman, “Effectively Wild Theme” Link to Reddit post on Yan Link to first Yan episode Link to second Yan episode Link to Yan debut story Link to Yan debut video Link to Yan leap on single Link to Guardians’ Yan mockery Link to MLBTR on Brebbia Link to Brebbia’s second EW appearance Link to previous Kwan chat Link to Kwan leaderboard Link to Kwan pillow quote Link to sports nepo babies article Link to article on baseball nepo babies Link to Ryan HoF page Link to Giants scooter celly Link to Arraez abandonment Link to @ScoringChanges explanation Link to Marlins misplay Link to EW Episode 500 Link to PCA comments Link to Saucedo comments Link to Ottavino comments Link to PCA vs. Ohtani game Link to Peralta/Lindor/Soto report Link to 2025 Yankees bullpen blowup Link to Lindor/McNeil article Link to MLBTR on Forst Link to Mikolas PA article Link to Nusbaum tweet Link to Button Mash Link to The Ringer-Verse Link to SOFTDRINKTV on YouTube Link to WildLion Games on YouTube Link to Paine on sports games 1 Link to Paine on sports games 2 Link to Jabroni Baseball video Link to EA buyout Link to EA layoffs report Link to EA layoffs report Link to College Football microtransactions Link to Ben on MVP Baseball 2005 Link to Noah on MVP Baseball 2005 Link to Super Mega Baseball 4 article Link to Metalhead on EW 1 Link to Metalhead on EW 2 Link to Taylor on SMB4 roster updates Link to Taylor’s SMB4 review Link to Zach Kram on Backyard Baseball Link to Backyard Baseball comeback article Link to Backyard Baseball wiki Link to Taylor’s Backyard Baseball review Link to Noah on MLB Power Pros Link to Indoor Baseball Link to Noah on Indoor Baseball Link to Noah on MVP 06: NCAA Baseball Link to Noah’s MLB The Show 26 review Link to Taylor’s MLB The Show 26 review Link to Power Pros wiki Link to Professional Baseball Spirits wiki Link to article about eBaseball Pro Spirit 2026 Link to Noah on eBaseball: PRO SPIRIT Link to eBaseball: PRO SPIRIT 2026 on PS5 Link to Noah on eBaseball: PRO SPIRIT 2026 news Link to Noah’s eBaseball: PRO SPIRIT 2026 review Link to Taylor’s eBaseball: PRO SPIRIT 2026 review Sponsor Us on Patreon Give a Gift Subscription Email Us: podcast@fangraphs.com Effectively Wild Subreddit Effectively Wild Wiki Apple Podcasts Feed Spotify Feed YouTube Playlist Facebook Group Bluesky Account Twitter Account Get Our Merch! var SERVER_DATA = Object.assign(SERVER_DATA || {}); Source

Jefry Yan's leaping strikeout celebration has instantly made him the most polarizing player on the Mets. Evan Roberts enjoys Yan's enthusiasm but fears his antics could provoke opponents, spark unnecessary fights, and put teammates in danger. Shaun Morash is in for Tiki Barber alongside Evan and argues that Yan's energy is exactly what this lifeless team needs.

Jefry Yan's explosive strikeout celebration has instantly divided Mets fans and irritated opponents. Evan Roberts loves the rookie reliever's energy but worries his constant jumping could eventually trigger retaliation, put teammates in danger, or even lead to an injury. Shaun Morash is in for Tiki Barber and argues that Yan's emotion is exactly what a lifeless Mets team needs, especially after Christian Scott praised the spark he brings to the clubhouse. Evan and Shaun also debate whether the Mets should ever consider trading Francisco Lindor, why Luis Garcia Jr. could replace Jazz Chisholm at second base, and whether Spencer Jones deserves a chance over Trent Grisham. Plus, Evan reveals his five NFL win-total unders, Shaun makes an early Chiefs-Bears Super Bowl prediction, and the Jets, Browns, Buccaneers, Colts, Falcons, and Giants all come under scrutiny.

On Thursday's ENN, Quarterback on Netflix. Licht on Baker. Jaylen Brown on getting traded. Harbaugh on Dart penalty. Sadiq update. RB getting paid. Yan's debut and celebration. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

Jerry worries about the Jets' QB position while Willie stays high on Aaron Glenn's defense, with both stressing the urgency of a Week 1 win over the Titans. Willie shares his hope for Geno Smith's second run in New York, then turns to the Giants as Jaxson Dart adjusts to a new offense. Before C-Lo's update, the guys react to AI Seinfeld, followed by George Lombard Jr.'s strong night in a Yankees loss, positive news on Aaron Judge, and the Red Sox closing the standings gap. Jorge Polanco snaps his 0-26 slump with a homer, Jefry Yan refuses to tame his celebrations, and C-Lo suggests Aaron Glenn could use Willie's media training. Finally, the show honors Yan's inspiring road to the majors—though Willie cautions against celebrating when down big.

The Zizhi Revolt in 314 BC upended Warring States politics and led to the rise to power of King Zhao of Yan.Support the show

Guy Swan on learning the wrong lessons. The takeaway circulating is "go with the biggest company," which forgets Mt. Gox and FTX and everything else proving size is not safety. His analogy: when a libertarian politician betrays you, libertarianism didn't break, you got scammed. He wants a rule that works forward. His sharpest point: "I don't want a rule that only works in hindsight." Anyone can now point at the source-available license. The useful question is what indicator predicts the next failure before it happens. His own heuristic broke in both directions. He had trained himself not to dismiss builders for being abrasive, and now concludes that for security specifically, a maintainer who attacks people reporting problems is telling you something. Yan Pritzker paired it with the engineering version: without a culture of safety, people stop surfacing mistakes. James O'Beirne's tripwires. He seeded wallets on-chain carrying graduated entropy over broken Coldcard seeds, five dice rolls, ten, fifteen, one and two-word passphrases, as bait. The bare seed was swept within an hour and nothing else has moved, mapping attacker capability live. The red team's numbers. Rob Hamilton and Calle have scanned over 300 repos and spent roughly $40,000 on tokens in two days, finding critical vulnerabilities at about one per person per hour. OpenSats is now funding most of that budget. Every company needs an agentic security pipeline. Yan's argument: agents are non-deterministic, so one scan proves nothing. The real work is harnesses that find, test, distill and reproduce on a loop. Swan has been building this for six to twelve months. The asymmetry is the whole problem. Attackers need one vulnerability, defenders need all of them, and the economics favor the attacker. Some have been paying up to 90% of stolen funds in fees to get transactions mined quickly. A fake Coldcard desktop app is circulating. No such application has ever existed. Trezor reported a phishing spike since disclosure, and a counterfeit Wasabi wallet reached an app store. Nobody legitimate asks for recovery words, and unsolicited migration instructions are always hostile. Yan's read on whether this repeats. He calls the bug exotic: entropy wasn't weak, it was switched off entirely. Scans across the popular hardware wallets show correct and consistent entropy use, so he thinks this specific failure is unlikely to recur elsewhere. Government overreach, the other half of the show. Suz on Liechtenstein's beneficial ownership register, roughly 31,000 entities, built in 2021 for EU anti-money-laundering compliance and now breached and offline. Yan on the Bank Secrecy Act's 1970 threshold, never inflation-adjusted, capturing dramatically more data for near-zero measured effect.

Thank you to Cameroon, Germany, and the DMV's own Yan Dollar for coming on my show for an interview! Yan discussed his song Blessed, his throat surgery recovery, and his life altering migration to the U.S.. He talked about his collaborations with Big Hookz, his label OMG Entertainment, and his journey as a producer. Yan also spoke about finding his sound, his storytelling records such as Over, and more. Stay tuned! Follow Yan Dollar on Instagram: @yandollar and X: @omgyandollar Shoutout to Big Hookz for connecting us! Follow Big Hookz on Instagram and X: @bighookz Follow me on Instagram and X: @thereelmax Website: https://maxcoughlan.com/index.html. Website live show streaming link: https://maxcoughlan.com/sports-and-hip-hop-with-dj-mad-max-live-stream.html. MAD MAX Radio on Live365: https://live365.com/station/MAD-MAX-Radio-a15096. Subscribe to my YouTube channel Sports and Hip Hop with DJ Mad Max: https://m.youtube.com/channel/UCE0107atIPV-mVm0M3UJyPg. Yan Dollar on "Sports and Hip-Hop with DJ Mad Max" visual on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tAyJrCOkI3A. 

In this special edition, guest Yan Shoshitaishvili, Associate Professor, University of Arizona, joins host ⁠Dave Bittner⁠ to share a preview of his Black Hat USA 2026 keynote "Vulnerability Research in the Agentic Age." Join Yan and Dave to hear insights on the evolution of vulnerability research, the impact of AI and LLMs on cybersecurity, and the future of human expertise in the field. If you are heading to Black Hat, check out Yan's session on Thursday, August 6 at 9:15 AM.

Anthropic says Claude escaped the sandbox three times, while a judge questions the Pentagon's blacklist. The EU launches an AI enforcement team, the FTC targets a telehealth firm's tracking pixels, and a WordPress backdoor is stopped just in time. CareCloud discloses a major data breach, a stealthy cryptominer hides in plain sight, AiTM phishing surges against law firms, and Finland severs one more digital link to Russia. Our guest is Yan Shoshitaishvili, Associate Professor, Arizona State University, previewing his Black Hat 2026 keynote "Vulnerability Research in the Agentic Age." AI scammers may deserve a promotion. Remember to leave us a 5-star rating and review in your favorite podcast app. Miss an episode? Sign-up for our daily intelligence roundup, Daily Briefing, and you'll never miss a beat. And be sure to follow CyberWire Daily on LinkedIn. CyberWire Guest Today we are joined by Yan Shoshitaishvili, Associate Professor, Arizona State University, discussing his Black Hat 2026 keynote "Vulnerability Research in the Agentic Age." Be sure to tune in this Sunday for a special edition featuring our full, extended interview with Yan. Selected Reading Anthropic AI Models Hacked Three Organizations During Tests (Bloomberg) Anthropic, Pentagon Clash Over First Amendment Claims (GovInfo Security) EU to Crack Down on AI Deepfakes, Illicit Imagery and Hacking With New Team in Brussels (SecurityWeek) FTC sues Hims & Hers for allegedly sharing patients' medical data with advertisers Meta and Snap (TechCrunch) Wordfence Finds Critical Backdoor in ARVE WordPress Plugin (Hackread) CareCloud Data Breach Impacts Over 350,000 (SecurityWeek) Cryptominer Abuses Linux PAM to Hide From SOC Analysts (Infosecurity Magazine) AiTM Phishing Becomes Top Initial Access Threat to Law Firms (Infosecurity Magazine) Finland to disconnect fiber-optic link to Russia as lease expires (The Record) AI Scammers Are Better at Building Trust Than Humans (WIRED) Share your feedback. What do you think about CyberWire Daily? Please take a few minutes to share your thoughts with us by completing our brief listener survey. Thank you for helping us continue to improve our show. Want to hear your company in the show? N2K CyberWire helps you reach the industry's most influential leaders and operators, while building visibility, authority, and connectivity across the cybersecurity community. Learn more at sponsor.thecyberwire.com. The CyberWire is a production of N2K Networks, your source for strategic workforce intelligence. © N2K Networks, Inc.

The event. A firmware flaw in Coldcard seed generation, disclosed the night before, let an attacker recompute private keys outright. By airtime, 594 Bitcoin, put at roughly $38 million on the show, had been swept from about 500 wallets. The mechanism. Yan Pritzker and Swan engineer Steve: the device's true random number generator was present and working, but a March 2021 library change meant the firmware silently stopped using it, falling back to software randomness seeded from device ID and clock. Why five years passed. The code looked correctly wired, the failure hinged on a build-time variable, and the output still looked random. Zach Herbert of Foundation said a researcher flagged something adjacent in 2022 without unraveling it. Who is exposed. Only seeds the Coldcard generated itself. Imported seeds are safe, dice rolls are safe, a long passphrase saved people. MK3 is worst hit. MK4, MK5 and Q sit near 72 bits, costly to attack but not impossible. Updating firmware does not fix it. Coinkite patched, including MK3, but the vulnerable seed is the problem, not the device. You must generate a new seed and move funds. The dice function was never affected and has now been audited. Multisig is not automatically safe. If most keys came from affected devices, an attacker can try permutations, and spending publishes your public keys and invites an RBF race. Wicked pointed people to Portland.HODL for private broadcast through Slipstream. The attacker looks unsophisticated. The sweep ran roughly 25 minutes into a handful of addresses, stopped at shallow address gaps, and queried a public node instead of running one. Block researchers identified that service, so there may be a lead. The industry reckoning. American HODL called it a Paul Revere moment and demanded podcasters and former sponsors broadcast immediately. Reardon argued the industry spent three years arguing over the wrong priorities and got caught by an entropy bug. Self-custody versus diversification. Wicked held that multi-vendor multisig with your own entropy beats any custodian. Joe Carlasare countered that every system rests on assumptions that eventually fail. Yan declined to preach one model, calling self-custody still very early. Swan's status and the scam wave. Yan confirmed Swan Vault is built on Blockstream Jade and unaffected, and reported an influx of deposits. He flagged a devious scam variant where attackers send you working seed words and ask you to deposit into them.

With the 2026 summer travel season now at its peak, China's tourism market continues to sizzle, with record-breaking passenger flows and shifting preferences reshaping the holiday landscape, according to travel agencies.各大旅行社表示，2026年暑期旅游正值旺季峰值，国内文旅市场热度持续高涨，出行人次创下新高，游客偏好不断转变，重塑了假日出行格局。Travel booking platforms are reporting strong growth. Tuniu, an online travel agency, said bookings for summer tourism products had risen 17 percent year-on-year as of late July, with domestic travel bookings up more than 20 percent. On online travel platform Qunar, summer car rental bookings have increased by nearly 60 percent year-on-year.旅游预订平台订单量大幅攀升。在线旅游服务商途牛数据显示，截至7月下旬，暑期旅游产品预订量同比上涨17%，其中国内游预订涨幅超20%；去哪儿平台暑期租车订单同比增长近60%。To further stimulate summer consumption, more than 450 million yuan ($66 million) in travel vouchers will be distributed nationwide this summer, according to the Ministry of Culture and Tourism.文化和旅游部称，今年夏季全国将发放总额超4.5亿元（折合6600万美元）文旅消费券，进一步拉动暑期消费。More than 30,000 culture and tourism consumption events will also be held across the country. Local authorities will expand the supply of high-quality tourism and cultural offerings, including summer retreats, coastal vacations, nighttime tourism, cruises and yachting, family trips, study tours, culinary experiences and museum visits, the ministry said.全国各地还将举办三万余场文旅消费活动。文旅部介绍，各地持续丰富优质文旅产品供给，涵盖避暑休闲、滨海度假、夜间文旅、邮轮游艇、亲子家庭游、研学旅行、美食体验、博物馆游览等多种业态。Family travel remains the dominant force in the summer tourism market. Parents and kids account for over 60 percent of summer travelers on Tuniu and 45 percent on Qunar. According to Qunar, the top family travel destinations this summer are Shanghai, Beijing, Chengdu in Sichuan province, Kunming in Yunnan province and Guangzhou in Guangdong province.亲子家庭游依旧是暑期旅游市场主力军。途牛平台暑期亲子游客占比超60%，去哪儿平台该比例达45%。去哪儿数据显示，今夏热门亲子目的地依次为上海、北京、四川成都、云南昆明以及广东广州。Family travel itself is also evolving. Gone are the days when parents planned trips entirely around their children's needs. This summer, as more people born after 1995 become parents, an "everyone has a good time" approach to family vacations is becoming increasingly popular, according to Qunar.亲子游模式也在不断迭代。过去父母一切围绕孩子需求规划行程的时代已然过去。去哪儿平台表示，随着大批95后步入父母行列，兼顾全家游玩体验、人人都能收获快乐的度假理念愈发流行。Hotels are adapting to the trend by offering childcare services and children's clubs. On Qunar, searches for hotels with childcare services and children's programs rose 40 percent month-on-month. The five most popular search criteria for family-friendly hotels are swimming pools, children's clubs, washing machines, refrigerators and child safety facilities.各大酒店顺应趋势，纷纷推出托管服务、儿童乐园。去哪儿平台上，带有育儿服务、儿童游乐项目的酒店搜索量环比上涨40%；亲子酒店五大热门筛选条件为：泳池、儿童俱乐部、洗衣机、冰箱、儿童安全设施。Yan Yun, a resident of Wuhan, Hubei province, in her 30s, is traveling with her 5-year-old daughter and her brother's family — five people in all — on a nine-day road trip from Shenyang and Dalian in Liaoning province to Yantai, Shandong province, from July 25 to Aug 2.湖北武汉30多岁市民严芸，带着5岁女儿以及哥哥一家，共计五人，开启了9天自驾之旅：7月25日至8月2日，从辽宁沈阳、大连一路前往山东烟台。Still on the road and renting a car for the entire trip, Yan said the journey has been highly enjoyable.全程租车自驾、旅途仍在继续的严芸坦言，这次出行体验十分美好。She said traveling with children slows the pace and requires more negotiation, making the itinerary less predictable.她说道，带孩子出游行程节奏会放缓，凡事需要互相商量，旅途计划不会一成不变。Despite the slower pace, she described the journey as a unique and rewarding experience for the whole family.虽说行程节奏舒缓，但她认为这场旅行给全家人带来了独一无二、充实美好的收获。The growing demand for richer travel experiences has become another defining feature of this summer's tourism market. Tuniu said users are increasingly seeking in-depth and experiential travel, driven by sustained demand for emotional value and experience-based consumption.游客对沉浸式深度体验的需求攀升，是今夏文旅市场另一大鲜明特点。途牛表示，受情感价值需求与体验式消费热潮带动，游客愈发偏爱深度体验游。Li Pengbo, Communist Party of China secretary of the School of Tourism Sciences at Beijing International Studies University and a professor at the school, said the shift reflects a fundamental change in consumer values.北京第二外国语学院旅游科学学院党委书记、教授李朋波表示，这种出游偏好转变，本质上是大众消费观念的更迭。"In the era of 'check-in tourism', when travel opportunities were relatively scarce, simply having been somewhere was valuable. Photos served as proof, and social media posts announced the experience.“打卡旅游盛行的年代，出游机会有限，只要抵达过某地就极具意义；拍照留存当作凭证，再发到社交平台分享，便是旅行的全部意义。”"Today, as travel becomes more routine, the marginal value of simply having been somewhere has plummeted. How did you travel? What did you feel? Do you have a story to tell? These have become the new value anchors," Li said.李教授讲道：“如今旅行早已常态化，单纯到此一游的边际价值大幅下降。人们更在意出行方式、内心感受、旅途故事，这些才是当下旅行新的价值核心。”That helps explain the rapid rise of experiences such as city walks, intangible cultural heritage workshops and local food tours, which offer stories to tell rather than simply places to show, he said.这也就能解释为何城市漫步、非遗手作体验、本地美食探访等项目迅速走红：这类旅行重在收获可讲述的旅途故事，而非单纯打卡景点。Summer also remains the peak season for both outbound and inbound travel. According to Qunar, the most popular outbound destinations include Thailand, South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Indonesia and the United States. Thailand tops the list, with skill-learning trips — in which travelers learn activities such as cooking, yoga and Muay Thai — driving a 3.3-fold increase in hotel bookings in Chiang Mai.暑期同样是出入境旅游旺季。去哪儿数据显示，热门出境目的地有泰国、韩国、马来西亚、新加坡、中国香港、印度尼西亚、美国。泰国稳居榜首，厨艺、瑜伽、泰拳等技能研学旅行热度高涨，直接带动清迈酒店预订量暴涨3.3倍。Inbound tourism is also booming, with Shanghai, Beijing, Guangzhou and Chengdu among the most popular destinations.入境游市场同样蓬勃发展，上海、北京、广州、成都最受外籍游客青睐。By source market, the leading countries for inbound travelers this summer are Thailand, Canada, the US, the United Kingdom and Russia. Greek visitors to China increased 9.5 times year-on-year, the fastest growth among all source markets. Visitor numbers from Sri Lanka, Mongolia, Sweden, Finland and Mexico also more than doubled, according to Qunar.从客源国来看，今夏来华游客主要来自泰国、加拿大、美国、英国、俄罗斯。其中希腊来华游客同比暴涨9.5倍，涨幅位居所有客源市场首位；斯里兰卡、蒙古、瑞典、芬兰、墨西哥来华人数也均实现翻倍增长。surge /sɜːdʒ/激增，热潮sizzle /ˈsɪzl/热度高涨，火爆experiential /ɪkˌspɪəriˈenʃl/体验式的plummet /ˈplʌmɪt/暴跌，大幅下降intangible /ɪnˈtændʒəbl/无形的outbound /ˈaʊtbaʊnd/出境的；外出的

China's summer travel rush is in full swing.国内暑期出行热潮全面开启。The national railway operator expects to handle 1.01 billion passenger trips over 62 days, and aviation bookings have hit new highs.国家铁路集团预计，62 天暑运期间旅客发送量将达 10.1 亿人次，民航机票预订量也创下新高。Beyond the sheer numbers, the boom is reshaping the country's cultural tourism landscape.除去亮眼的数据，这场出行热潮正在重塑国内文旅产业格局。In the first three days since the rush began on July 1, national railways carried more than 38 million passengers, according to China State Railway Group.据中国国家铁路集团有限公司消息，7 月 1 日暑运启动后的前三天，全国铁路累计发送旅客超 3800 万人次。Aviation data platform Umetrip showed over 27 million domestic flight bookings for July as of July 6, up 89 percent from a week earlier.民航数据平台航旅纵横数据显示，截至 7 月 6 日，7 月国内机票预订量超 2700 万张，较一周前增长 89%。International bookings exceeded 5.9 million, up 19 percent.国际机票预订量超 590 万张，同比上涨 19%。On July 5, travel platform Qunar recorded searches for summer flights doubling from the previous day, setting a new daily record for the season.7 月 5 日，旅游平台去哪儿网暑期航班搜索量较前一日翻倍，创下暑期单日搜索新高。The real story is not how many people are traveling, but where they are heading.本次出行热潮的核心看点不在于出行人次，而在于游客的目的地选择。Incremental traffic is flowing more to smaller cities rather than traditional tourism hubs.新增客流更多流向中小城市，而非传统热门旅游城市。Flight bookings to Qinhuangdao in Hebei province surged 2.2 times, while Yili, in the Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region, emerged as the top self-drive destination with popularity up 6.5 times, according to Qunar.去哪儿网数据显示，飞往河北秦皇岛的机票预订量暴涨 2.2 倍；新疆伊犁成为热门自驾目的地，搜索热度大涨 6.5 倍。Airlines have responded by adding routes to match the shift.各大航司顺势增开航线，适配游客出行方向的变化。China Eastern Airlines has increased Shanghai-Urumqi round-trip flights by 51 percent and seating capacity by 30 percent.东方航空将上海往返乌鲁木齐的航班班次提升 51%，运力提升 30%。After its Shanghai-Yining route was relocated to the Hongqiao hub, flight frequency surged 130 percent year-on-year and now operates daily.东航上海至伊宁航线调整至虹桥机场起降后，航班班次同比大增 130%，现已实现每日一班。"Unlike the rapid recovery period of the past two years, this summer rush marks civil aviation's transition from full recovery to high-quality development. The market logic is shifting from competing on capacity to competing on efficiency," said an expert with flight data platform Flight Manager.航班数据平台飞常准相关专家表示：“和前两年行业快速复苏阶段不同，今年暑运标志着民航业从全面复苏转向高质量发展。市场竞争逻辑也从比拼运力，转变为比拼运营效率。”What draws travelers to these lesser-known places is increasingly cultural rather than scenic.吸引游客奔赴小众目的地的核心驱动力，正从自然风光转向人文底蕴。Searches for intangible cultural heritage destinations rose 71 percent from the previous month as of June 12, according to travel platform Tongcheng, which noted that travelers are flocking to Jingdezhen in Jiangxi province, Quanzhou in Fujian province and Dali in Yunnan province, drawn by the idea of "traveling to a city for a craft".旅游平台同程旅行数据显示，截至 6 月 12 日，非遗文化目的地搜索量较上月上涨 71%。平台表示，不少游客秉持 “为一门手艺奔赴一座城” 的想法，前往江西景德镇、福建泉州、云南大理等地游玩。Research tours have evolved from sightseeing to immersion, with industrial tourism searches surging 2.3 times, according to Qunar.去哪儿网数据显示，研学旅行已从走马观花式观光转变为深度沉浸式体验，工业旅游相关搜索量暴涨 2.3 倍。Regional carriers are tapping the trend: China Express Airlines has launched themed products including Silk Road research tours in Dunhuang and Jiayuguan in Gansu province, and red tourism routes in Yan'an, Shaanxi province, while Juneyao Airlines has resumed flights to cultural destinations like Dunhuang, Jiayuguan and Xining.多家支线航空企业抢抓这一市场热潮：华夏航空推出多款主题研学产品，包含甘肃敦煌、嘉峪关丝路研学线路，以及陕西延安红色旅游专线；吉祥航空则恢复了飞往敦煌、嘉峪关、西宁等文化旅游目的地的航线。"Travelers increasingly value the experience itself, and airlines are responding with differentiated products that weave local culture into the journey," said Li Xiaojin, director of the Aviation Economics and Improvement Research Institute at Civil Aviation University of China.中国民航大学航空经济与优化研究所所长李晓津表示：“如今游客愈发看重出行体验本身，各大航司也顺势推出差异化产品，将各地特色文化融入旅途之中。”Active policy support underpins this cultural turn.文旅出行的转型离不开政策的大力扶持。In June, eight government departments, including the Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, issued joint measures to promote rail-tourism integration and expand service consumption.今年 6 月，商务部、文化和旅游部等八部门联合出台举措，推动铁路与旅游深度融合，扩大服务消费。Themed tourist trains are now running regularly. These include a panda-themed train through Sichuan province, a "Yangtze Delta Star" route, and a "Yichun" forest wellness train to Heilongjiang province, among others, China Railway announced.国铁集团介绍，多款主题旅游列车现已常态化开行，其中包括穿行四川的熊猫主题列车、“长三角之星” 旅游专列，以及开往黑龙江伊春的森林康养专列等。The fusion extends to aviation as well. "Many airlines have shifted from focusing solely on trunk routes to coordinating trunk and branch services, and from pure price competition to differentiated products and services," Li said.文旅融合的趋势同样延伸至民航领域。李晓津表示：“不少航司不再单一布局干线航线，转而统筹干线与支线网络；行业竞争也摆脱单纯的价格战，转向差异化产品与服务比拼。”The reshaping extends beyond China's borders. The outbound market is surging, and the FIFA World Cup 2026 co-hosted by the United States, Canada and Mexico provided an extra boost.文旅市场格局的重塑同样延伸至境外游领域。出境游市场热度持续攀升，由美国、加拿大、墨西哥联合承办的 2026 年国际足联世界杯进一步拉动出境出行需求。China Southern Airlines now operates seven North American routes with 38 weekly flights to meet demand.为匹配市场需求，南方航空现已开通 7 条北美航线，每周执行 38 班航班。immersion /ɪˈmɜːʃn/n. 沉浸式体验；沉浸capacity /kəˈpæsəti/n. 运力；容量integration /ˌɪntɪˈɡreɪʃn/n. 融合；一体化outbound /ˈaʊtbaʊnd/adj. 出境的；向外的

No episódio de hoje do Kiwicast, recebemos Yan Medeiros, Gabriel Kopsell e Luana Balestrin, trio que faturou R$1milhão em 61 dias e R$2 milhões em 6 meses com menos de 1 ano e meio no mercado digital.A história começa sem glamour. Yan e Gabriel se conhecem desde a escola. Tentaram dropshipping, zero resultado. Yan não acreditava no digital, achava que era mercado de gurus vendendo curso de como vender curso. Foi só quando viu Gabriel aplicando na prática que mudou de ideia. Marcaram uma janta, fecharam sociedade e entraram de cabeça.Luana é fonoaudióloga há 12 anos, especialista no público TEA. Não entendia nada de vendas. Mas tinha um conhecimento que virou produto: FonoLu Kids, uma plataforma que usa música e coreografias para melhorar a produção fonológica das crianças.Com funil de quiz, low ticket e tráfego direto, os três construíram uma operação que já soma mais de 75 milvendas e 50 mil alunos impactados. No Kiwicast, eles falaram sobre:●     Como faturaram R$1 milhão em 61 dias com low ticket e funil de quiz●     Por que validar rápido vale mais do que criar o produto perfeito●     Como funciona o funil de quiz com tráfego direto na prática●     Como a Luana entrou na sociedade e o que cada um traz para a operação●     Como a IA está mudando o jogo do digital e quais habilidades vão pesar mais●     O que separa quem escala de quem fica modelando ofertas sem resultadoAprenda com quem vive o mercado digital na prática.Dá o play e deixe nos comentários qual foi o melhor insight que você tirou do episódio.Nosso Instagram é @Kiwify

"It's a state of mind. I am choosing to live with joy." Dr. Karna Chana Fox is an educator, speaker, and director of an early childhood center. When she's not wrangling tiny humans, supporting families, or teaching future educators, you'll probably find her out on the trails training for an ultramarathon, drinking great coffee made by her husband, Yan, or at home with their beautifully busy blended family of six children, five of whom still live at home. A breast cancer survivor, Karna is passionate about honest conversations on resilience, simcha/joy, the courage to ask for help, and the life-changing power of community and belonging. In this episode Karna chats with Luis about her first Born to Run experience, her running, marring the wrong person, her dealings with breast cancer, working on her doctorate, and the state of education. Support Road Dog Podcast by: 1. Joining the Patreon Community: https://www.patreon.com/roaddogpodcast 2. Subscribe to the podcast on whatever platform you listen on. 3. Get exclusive RDP merch here: https://roaddogpodcast-shop.fourthwall.com/ GO SLEEVES: https://gokinesiologysleeves.com HAMMER NUTRITION show code: Roaddoghn20 Listeners get a special 15% off at https://www.hammernutrition.com DRYMAX show code: Roaddog2020  Listeners get a special 15% off at https://www.drymaxsports.com/products/ LUNA SANDALS "Whether I'm hitting the trails or just hanging out, LUNA Sandals are my favorite. They're designed by Barefoot Ted of Born to Run and made for every adventure—ultra running, hiking, or just kicking back. Its minimalist footwear that's good for your feet!" Check them out and get 15% off at lunasandals.com/allwedoisrun. Allwedoisrun.com Dr. Karna Chana Fox Contact Info: IG: @trailrumspringa Luis Escobar (Host) Contact: luis@roaddogpodcast.com Luis Instagram Kevin Lyons (Producer) Contact: kevin@roaddogpodcast.com yesandvideo.com Music: Slow Burn by Kevin MacLeod (incompetech.com) Licensed under Creative Commons: By Attribution 3.0 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/ Original RDP Photo: Photography by Kaori Peters kaoriphoto.com Road Dog Podcast Adventure with Luis Escobar www.roaddogpodcast.com

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This week on Hivemind, the team debates one of the biggest structural questions in crypto: can tokens and equity coexist, or do they inevitably create misaligned incentives? Using recent examples like Venice and Grass, they explore why value capture has become one of the most important topics in the industry.The conversation also covers the current state of crypto markets, Hyperliquid and Synapse, Robinhood's on-chain ambitions, AI infrastructure, open-source models, and why the long-term AI investment thesis remains intact despite recent volatility.TIMESTAMPS00:00:00 Intro & Market Outlook00:09:17 Synapse, Options & Hyperliquid00:20:10 Grass, Revenue & Token Economics00:27:20 The Token vs Equity Debate00:44:55 AI Infrastructure & The Next Trade00:57:20 Why AI Is Still A Long-Term Bull Market

Last time we spoke about the battle for Dayun Mountain. Chinese forces  under Xue Yue, believed they were encircling an exposed Japanese regiment. Acting on that assumption, Chinese units concentrated attacks to crush the "trapped " force, hoping to annihilate an elite enemy formation. Their pressure briefly seemed to succeed: on the 13th–14th, Chinese assaults compressed the Japanese positions to a small area, and individual fighting around ambush and prepared defenses produced moments where "victory appeared close." But the Chinese command misunderstood the target. The Japanese had layered deception: Dayun Mountain was held to draw attention, then replaced at night with another unit to maintain the appearance of continued occupation. Despite heavy fighting, the Dayun Mountain battle ends in stalemate by Sept. 17, and Chinese attention turns back to the primary offensive around Changsha.   #210 The Miluo River Catastrophe Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. On the morning of September 17, 1941, General Xue Yue, commander of the Ninth War Zone, sat at his desk at the headquarters on Changsha's Yuelu Mountain and fell into deep thought. Spread before him were a series of intelligence telegrams dispatched by the reconnaissance teams of his war zone and by General Yang Sen, commander of the 27th Army Group operating to the north. What they described was unambiguous and alarming. Along the north bank of the Xinqiang River, stretching westward from Yueyang, reconnaissance had identified a massive Japanese build-up: the 3rd, 4th, 6th, and 40th Divisions of the Japanese 11th Army, along with five additional detachments, had taken up positions facing the river. On the afternoon of September 16th, General Kanda, commander of the Japanese 6th Division, had personally toured the north bank accompanied by a retinue of staff officers, training his binoculars across the river for a long and deliberate survey of the Chinese defensive positions on the southern bank. Perhaps most conclusively, Chinese operatives working behind enemy lines had tapped Japanese military telephone lines and intercepted a direct communication from the 11th Army to all of its divisions, ordering them to prepare for an attack on September 18th. On any reasonable reading, the evidence pointed in one direction: a massive Japanese offensive was imminent. Yet Xue Yue, one of China's most celebrated wartime commanders and a man renowned for the tenacity with which he had defended Changsha, arrived at a different conclusion. He had been studying the record of 11th Army Commander Korechika Anami and came away convinced that Anami was a general who habitually used a mix of truth and deception in his operations—a man for whom the most obvious sign was precisely the most suspicious one. The scale of the preparations, their openness, the conspicuous presence of senior officers on the riverbank—all of it struck Xue Yue as too theatrical to be real. He concluded that Anami was feigning a frontal attack on the Xinqiang River in order to draw the main force of the war zone forward, leaving the flanks exposed for a surprise breakthrough elsewhere. Once this interpretation took hold in Xue Yue's mind, it became immovable. No subordinate could dislodge it. When intelligence reports then confirmed that the Japanese had transported the equipment for building pontoon bridges to the very banks of the Xinqiang River—a detail that left virtually no room for doubt about what was being planned—Xue Yue remained unmoved. He told his chief of staff with quiet certainty: "No rush. Let's see tomorrow." He was unaware that he had already lost his tomorrow. At dawn on September 18th, after 11th Army Commander Korechika Anami presided over the routine silent prayer ceremony that opened each day of active operations, he drew his gleaming ceremonial sword and pointed it towards northern Hunan. The battle had begun. On the Chinese side of the Xinqiang River, the first indication that this was no ordinary morning came from the sky. Air raids were a familiar occurrence along the front; the veterans of the 4th Army had grown accustomed to Japanese bombing runs. But this time was different. The number of bombs was greater, the density higher, and the bombs themselves heavier than anything the soldiers on the south bank had experienced before. Two successive waves of air attack struck the fortifications with crushing force, destroying positions that had taken months to construct. Then came the infantry. At Xiaotang, Siliufang, Tongxi Bridge, Shanmu Bridge, and a string of other crossing points along the river, dozens of tanks led the assault, pushing forward with unstoppable momentum, their treads churning up the riverbank mud as the infantry followed closely behind, advancing through fire, forcing their way across the water. On the not-so-wide front in Xiangbei, four Japanese divisions had lined up side by side—like four ferocious beasts pouncing forward simultaneously. Even the veteran soldiers of the defending Chinese forces, men who had been fighting the Japanese for years, had rarely seen such a terrifying formation. The troops defending the Xinqiang River were the 4th Army under Ou Zhen, one of the most distinguished units in the Nationalist order of battle. The 4th Army had earned the reputation of "Iron Army" during the Northern Expedition, where it had demonstrated a ferocious capacity for breaching fortified positions and defending strategic points under fire, and it had fought many of the major battles of the War of Resistance. In theory, the army consisted of four divisions: Zhang Deneng's 59th Division, Chen Kan's 90th Division, Bai Huizhang's 102nd Division, and the 60th Division, which had recently been transferred to the army's command. In practice, however, by September 18th the Iron Army had been hollowed out. During the concurrent Battle of Dayun Mountain, the Ninth War Zone and the 27th Army Group had stripped away most of the 59th and 102nd Divisions to commit them elsewhere, while the 60th Division had followed the army group as a reserve force. What remained at the Xinqiang River was the 90th Division and only a remnant of the 102nd—a fragment of what had once been a formidable fighting force. Xue Yue had planned for the first-line position to hold for three days. It held for two hours. Against a Japanese force that outnumbered the defenders several times over and enjoyed an absolute advantage in artillery and air power, the position could not stand. In just two hours, the Japanese broke through the 102nd Division's defensive line and then swung their forces around to encircle the 90th Division. With no remaining options, Xue Yue ordered both units to retreat to the second line of defense. The Xinqiang River had fallen.  The crisis at the Xinqiang River was compounded by the predicament of Yang Sen, commander-in-chief of the 27th Army Group, who should have been the force most capable of responding to the breakthrough. Instead, Yang Sen found himself trapped far to the east, bogged down in a battle on Dayun Mountain from which he could not extract himself. The situation on Dayun Mountain was one of those military embarrassments that seem almost unbelievable in retrospect. Yang Sen had committed five full divisions to encircle what was supposed to be a single regiment—the 234th Regiment of the Japanese 40th Division, which had dug into the deep mountain. What followed was a sustained humiliation. Two divisions were ground down until their combined fighting strength equalled that of one. Another division was reduced to a regimental shadow of itself. Yang Sen, who had first served in the army in 1906 and had seen virtually every variety of military difficulty in three and a half decades of Chinese warfare, said afterwards that he had rarely experienced such deception. The Shigematsu Regiment, ensconced in the mountains and dense forest, had proved maddeningly resilient. Yang Sen had committed his forces expecting a quick resolution—finish the battle on Dayun Mountain, then redeploy to defend the Xinqiang River—but the regiment would not be finished. He could not advance and he could not retreat. Just as he was preparing to intensify the assault for another day or two, certain that the enemy must finally be near collapse, the news arrived on the morning of September 18th that the Japanese had launched their general offensive across northern Hunan. By nine o'clock that morning, the Xinqiang River's first line of defense was already gone. Yang Sen immediately ordered the abandonment of the Dayun Mountain operation and commanded all divisions to redeploy back towards the Xinqiang River. But the Japanese had moved too fast. Between the first and second lines of Chinese defense there were only scattered guard units; the main force was simply not in place. The second-line troops, moreover, had been configured according to the defensive setup used during the First Battle of Changsha and were wholly unsuited to withstand such a massive, concentrated enemy thrust. The defending forces were too weak and too thinly spread to mount any gradual, coordinated resistance. The Japanese advanced through the gap as if they were in an empty field. The five divisions of the 58th Army and the 4th Army now found themselves in a desperate race against the Japanese, studying maps as they marched, trying to reach blocking positions before the enemy could. No matter what they did, they could not outrun the 11th Army. It was not merely the front-line units of the 4th Army that were endangered by the speed of the Japanese advance. Even the army headquarters itself, positioned forward in the proud tradition of the Iron Army, found itself running for its life. Army Commander Ou Zhen had been directing the battle from his headquarters in a small village called Lintang, located on the south bank of the Xinqiang River—a mere twenty kilometers behind the front line. The proximity was deliberate and characteristic of the Iron Army's ethos, a visible declaration that its commander would live or die alongside his men. On this day, it nearly proved fatal. Among those at the headquarters was Li Rupin, a native of Jing County in Anhui Province, who served as a sergeant squad leader in the 2nd Company of the 4th Army's Guard Battalion. Years later, reflecting on the events of that day, Li said without hesitation that of all his eight years fighting in the War of Resistance against Japan, that one battle was the most humiliating he had ever experienced. "The army headquarters was located in a small village called Lintang, south of the Xinqiang River, only about 20 kilometers away from the front lines," Li recalled. "The army headquarters was located in the front, which was a tradition of the 'Iron Army' to show that the commander was not afraid of danger and would live and die with his brothers. In that battle, we did not expect the enemy to break through the position so quickly. Not long after the battle started, the army headquarters had to move. Our guard battalion's task was to follow the army headquarters and serve as guards." Li described how Company Commander Chang Mingli assigned his platoon to help load the army headquarters' equipment onto trucks—huge, heavy boxes that required real effort to shift. While the loading was underway, Li caught sight of Army Commander Ou Zhen himself, speaking intently on the telephone. Li noted that Ou Zhen was ordinarily a man of few words, always seeming lost in thought, serious with the troops but not given to the kind of arbitrary reprimands that characterized lesser officers. What struck Li most vividly about the Army Commander, even in the midst of that morning's chaos, was a detail almost absurd in its incongruity: a pair of leather shoes that were always so perfectly polished they reflected light. "I heard he had studied abroad," Li added simply. Before the loading was even complete, the sound of machine gun fire erupted from the southwest of the village. A sentry reported: enemy attack detected, number unknown. Company Commander Chang, still pulling on his leggings, turned to Li and said without breaking stride: "Quickly take your squad and follow the deputy company commander. You must keep the enemy out of the village." Li took evident pride in the character of the guard battalion, comparing it unfavorably to what he saw in later years. "I see that nowadays, officers choose bodyguards who are fair-skinned and delicate, like little girls. I don't know why," he reflected. "Back then, our guard battalion, including the commander's personal bodyguards, were all big, dark-skinned men. Our squad of 12 men were all broad-shouldered and thick-waisted, and carrying a machine gun was like an ordinary person carrying a rifle." The squad carried three light machine guns, and each soldier also carried a pistol. They drilled constantly on marksmanship and physical conditioning. In the tradition of the unit, a guard soldier was expected to be able to carry his officer for dozens of miles without slowing and without fear of death. Li led his squad to the southwest corner of the village, where the 1st Company of the guard battalion was already engaged with the Japanese in a cemetery just outside the village boundary. The 1st Company commander had just descended from a rooftop when Deputy Company Commander Yan arrived and assessed the situation. "There are about 100 enemy soldiers in this direction," the 1st Company commander reported. "I don't know if there are any more in other directions." Yan replied without hesitation: "I'll take my four squads to outflank them and find out what's going on with the enemy. If it's a good opportunity, we'll wipe them out." He asked and received permission from the deputy battalion commander, who transferred three additional machine guns from the 1st Company to Yan's force. The squad slipped around to the south of the village, entered a nursery grove, and began working their way southwest to flank the enemy. "Before we even emerged from the woods, enemy machine guns opened fire," Li recalled. "The nursery grove was planted too densely, so it was inevitable that we'd bump into tree branches. We crept forward, keeping close to the ground, when the deputy company commander gave the order: 'Prepare grenades.'" Li looked back and saw that all his men had kept pace. Then Deputy Company Commander Yan's voice rang out clearly: "Charge!" He burst out of the woods at the head of the column. "Deputy Company Commander Yan is a graduate of the Whampoa Military Academy," Li said. "People say that Whampoa graduates are always at the forefront of battle. Others may not know, but several of us in our battalion are like that." The charge was furious and caught the enemy entirely off guard. "We shouted 'Charge! Kill!' and followed the deputy company commander out of the grove," Li recounted. "The enemy was about 40 or 50 meters ahead. Hearing the shouts, they hurriedly turned their guns to fire at us, but it was too late! We threw out our grenades, lay down, and fired back at the enemy. At this moment, the 1st Company also charged out of the village. The enemy could not stop them and retreated in droves. Looking around, there were no fewer than 200 of them. The enemy suffered a loss and left behind more than a dozen dead bodies." The 2nd Company did not pursue. Led by Deputy Company Commander Yan, they withdrew back to the village, where the deputy battalion commander stood at the crossroads and praised the 2nd Company for their fighting before immediately ordering them to follow the army headquarters and relocate. Li had barely grabbed his backpack and tied it to his body before gunfire erupted again outside the village. The Japanese had returned. Two battalions of the army reserve moved up to engage them, and the army's trucks and cars poured out of the village and accelerated south along the road. The guard battalion ran after them on foot. In less than half an hour, the enemy caught up. There were cavalrymen and a large truck packed with infantry. Li registered the significance of this with something close to shock: "It seems that the Xinqiang River has really been lost to the enemy, otherwise how could cars still drive across?" The battalion commander—whose surname, Li noted with dry humor, was the same as the Generalissimo's—ordered the 2nd Company under the deputy battalion commander to form a rear guard. They had one artillery platoon and two mortars between them. There was no time to prepare fortifications; the soldiers scattered on both sides of the road and found their own firing positions as best they could. When Li looked back south, the army headquarters was already a distant speck on the road. "The enemy was getting closer and closer," he recalled. "First, fifty or sixty cavalrymen charged over, brandishing swords and guns and shouting. The trucks were behind them, and we could already see two machine guns mounted on the front of the trucks." The deputy battalion commander's voice carried steadily over the noise: "Brothers, stay calm, aim carefully before you fire—we're going to slaughter a pig and drink tonight!" Nobody laughed, Li noted carefully, but nobody broke either. What followed was a running, desperate firefight. Within the range of 600 to 200 meters, the rear guard inflicted severe casualties on the advancing Japanese. Li watched soldiers toppling from their horses. One horse, shot but not immediately killed, dragged its dead rider—still entangled in the stirrups—forward at a gallop until it collapsed only a few steps from Li, the sudden impact startling him badly. The enemy dismounted from the trucks and formed attack waves, pressing the assault in shifts. The Chinese machine guns worked to suppress each wave and prevent the Japanese from closing the distance. The deputy battalion commander directed the two mortars against the densest enemy concentrations. Then one of the mortars exploded inside its own barrel, killing two gunners instantly. "I still can't figure out why," Li said years later. "The fuse of the mortar shell is on that tip, how could it explode inside the barrel?" There was no answer to be found. The two men were simply dead, and there was no time to grieve them. The rear guard repelled two enemy attacks before the deputy battalion commander ordered a withdrawal while the enemy paused to regroup. It was past two o'clock in the afternoon. "It's all just running," Li said with characteristic bluntness. "How can I not get tired? Even if I'm tired, I still have to keep running!" As they ran, Li overheard the company commander say quietly to the deputy battalion commander: "Actually, we can wipe out these enemies." The deputy battalion commander turned on him with a fierce look: "Eat it all up! Have you forgotten what we're here for again?" The exchange brought to Li's mind a memory from two years earlier, when he had first been assigned to the guard battalion. He had been transferred from the machine gun company of the 2nd Battalion, 305th Regiment of the 102nd Division at the end of 1939, appointed as deputy squad leader. Company Commander Chang had spoken to him at that time, asking why he had joined the army. "Who else would come here if not to fight the Japanese?" Li had answered. The company commander replied: "Very good, but the guard battalion's primary task is to ensure good security; that's the most important thing." The assignment had chafed at Li ever since—a natural fighter who had been a front-line machine gun squad leader, now consigned to watching other men fight. On one holiday, having drunk rather more than was wise, he had gone to the company commander and announced that he wanted to return to the 102nd Division and "mow down the Japanese with a machine gun." The company commander, who had also been drinking, chuckled and said: "Have you had enough of life? You might as well stay here and squat obediently! What do you know about life? You don't know anything! After we win, go home, get a wife, and live a good life..." Now, running south along a road contested by Japanese cavalry and infantry, with the army headquarters already out of sight ahead of him, Li perhaps understood the company commander's words in a way he had not before. The pursuit was unrelenting and grew worse before it improved. Over a hundred cavalrymen and four trucks drove after the guard unit without pause. In an attempt to split and divert the enemy, the company dispatched a platoon under Deputy Company Commander Yan himself down a different road, to lure one group of pursuers away. None of the men in that platoon returned alive. The deputy battalion commander led the remaining force in a continuing fighting retreat, engaging another Japanese contingent in a separate encounter that cost more than twenty dead and thirty wounded. Eventually the survivors managed to cross a large river, finally shaking off the pursuers, and caught up with the army headquarters at dusk. They had barely had a moment to catch their breath when night fell and they stumbled into another large Japanese force in the darkness. The 4th Army—the Iron Army, the pride of the Northern Expedition—seemed to have its commander and headquarters specifically targeted by the enemy. Driven from one position to the next throughout the day, they were eventually pushed up into the hills of Mufu Mountain and did not escape danger until the following morning. "That battle," Li Rupin concluded, "was truly humiliating." When the scale of the Japanese offensive became undeniable on the evening of September 18th, Xue Yue finally grasped the gravity of what was unfolding. It was too late to adjust his forces meaningfully; the overall numerical superiority he had enjoyed across the theater of operations had dissolved wherever the Japanese chose to strike, becoming a dangerous numerical disadvantage at each critical point. In just one day, even Yuelu Mountain—the historic height that had dominated Changsha and housed his headquarters—was no longer safe. He moved the war zone command post south to Zhuting and urgently telegraphed the Military Commission in Chongqing, requesting that Chiang Kai-shek immediately transfer troops from other war zones to provide reinforcements, warning that without them the situation would deteriorate with serious consequences for the national war effort. The telegram arrived in Chongqing, where Chiang Kai-shek and several senior military advisors sat in silence before the battle map in the Military Commission Operations Room, with the grim concentration of men watching a difficult game of chess they cannot influence. Troop movements take time. While the number of Japanese troops committed to northern Hunan was not enormous in absolute terms, they moved with unstoppable momentum. Xue Yue was requesting three to four combat corps—a mobilization from outside the Ninth War Zone that could not possibly be accomplished in the available time. Chiang Kai-shek was at a loss for what to do. He paced back and forth in the corridor adjoining the operations room. The only foreigner among the assembled staff—a blond-haired man with a prominent nose—was the Soviet military advisor Chuikov. He walked up to Chiang and fell into step beside him, pacing with him as he spoke. "Hunan and northern Hunan are in a passive position and we don't have any good solutions for the time being," Chuikov said. "Why don't we think about other things? Isn't there an ancient Chinese story called 'Besieging Wei to Rescue Zhao'?" Chuikov's specific proposal was this: if the forces of the Sixth War Zone were to attack the Japanese 13th Division at Yichang—a city in Hubei Province that had fallen to Japan in June 1940, and which was garrisoned by a division under the overall command of Anami's 11th Army—Anami Korechika would not be able to remain indifferent to the threat. Yichang was no ordinary city. It controlled the crucial choke point on the Yangtze River's waterway, and since its capture it had placed much of the river under Japanese control. More critically for the Chinese, Yichang Airport had become the closest bomber base to Chongqing, and the Japanese aircraft that harassed the wartime capital daily flew from that field. The Military Commission had long been reluctant to authorize a major attack on Yichang for these very reasons—it would not be easy to retake, and failure would be costly. But why not seize this moment? Chiang Kai-shek stopped walking, considered Chuikov's proposal, and nodded. He thanked the Soviet general for his suggestion, and the two men returned to the operations room together. Chiang instructed Chief of Staff Xu Yongchang to draft an implementation plan for combined operations: the Ninth War Zone would continue engaging the Japanese in northern Hunan, while the Sixth War Zone would simultaneously launch a counterattack against Yichang and ensure its capture. While Chongqing deliberated over the Yichang gambit, the immediate question facing the Ninth War Zone was how to organize a second line of defense following the fall of the Xinqiang River. The Japanese had also successfully landed forces on both sides of the Xiangjiang River estuary at Shangqingshan, blocking the waterway, which further constrained Chinese options. Xue Yue's solution was straightforward: he proposed deploying the 37th and 26th Armies in a line along the south bank of the Miluo River, using the river as a natural barrier to halt the Japanese advance toward Changsha. His chief of staff, Wu Yizhi, agreed without reservation and immediately instructed the operations section chief, Zhao Zili, to begin drafting the necessary orders. But Zhao Zili had been turning the strategic problem over in his mind, and he had reached a different conclusion. Zhao was a graduate of the Whampoa Military Academy's 6th class, a veteran of the Battles of Nanchang and Shanggao, and a man who had watched this war closely from his position at the center of the war zone's planning operations. At this moment he asked permission to share his thinking with his two superiors. Zhao's argument was systematic and urgent. The combined strength of the two armies—five combat divisions in total—was clearly insufficient to withstand four intact Japanese divisions in a set-piece defensive battle along the Miluo River. The 10th and 74th Armies were being summoned from elsewhere to reinforce the theater, but by Zhao's calculation they would require another four days to arrive. A static defense of the Miluo River line, therefore, would pit inadequate forces against overwhelming pressure for four days, and those forces would be destroyed long before help arrived. His alternative proposal was as follows: rather than standing and fighting at the Miluo, the two armies should conduct a deliberate fighting withdrawal—using alternating rear-guard actions and mutual cover—to fall back all the way to the south bank of the Liuyang River, in the hills immediately north of Changsha. The timing, Zhao argued, was almost providential in its precision: if the 26th and 37th Armies arrived at the Liuyang River at roughly the same moment that the 10th and 74th Armies arrived at the same position from the east, the combined force of four armies could then turn and strike the Japanese formations—which by then would have advanced more than a hundred kilometers into hostile territory with supply lines stretched thin and fighting strength degraded by continuous combat. Even if the Chinese could not completely sever the Japanese supply lines, the enemy would be exhausted, and victory under those conditions would be certain. Zhao Zili finished his presentation in one breath and waited. Xue Yue and Wu Yizhi conferred briefly. Then they decided to proceed with the original plan. Zhao Zili sighed inwardly. He got up, returned to his office, and began drafting the orders that, in his professional judgment, would lead to catastrophe. One hour later, the orders embodying Xue Yue's thinking were converted to radio waves and flew into the night sky. As some poet once asked of fate: "When the curtain rises, you don't know whether it's a comedy or a tragedy." On the morning of September 20th, in the intelligence section of the Japanese 11th Army's Special Operations headquarters, Lieutenant Colonel Hachimō rose from his seat feeling dizzy and unsteady on his feet. He had been awake for an extraordinary stretch of hours, hunched over a radio set in a state of almost superhuman concentration. He took a couple of steps before realizing he was still wearing his headset. He pulled it off, tossed it onto the radio equipment, and—holding the handrail for support—made his careful way down from the third floor to the second. Hachimō was not a professional soldier by background. Before the war, he had been a young designer at the renowned Mitsubishi Corporation. After the outbreak of hostilities, he had enlisted, taught himself the Chinese language and writing system, and dedicated himself entirely to the exacting discipline of cryptanalysis. Given the severe technological limitations of the era, what he accomplished rested on a kind of willpower and intuition that bordered on the extraordinary. His method was laborious and painstaking: he spent long hours with a headset pressed against his ear, listening to the endless stream of radio signals, detecting patterns, discerning differences and similarities among thousands of beeps and pulses. He analyzed signal traffic appearing over time and correlated it against observed enemy troop movements. He used captured battlefield documents to decode fragments of text, then leveraged those fragments to deduce the positions of commonly used characters in Chinese military telegrams. Every time the Chinese side changed their cipher, all of Hachimō's accumulated work was rendered worthless in an instant, but he would begin again—listening, thinking, starting over from nothing, with the same unbroken patience. On the perfectly timed morning of September 20th, Lieutenant Colonel Hachimō achieved what he had been working toward. He cracked the cipher in use by the Ninth War Zone for communications with its various subordinate armies, and successfully intercepted and decoded the operational deployment order that the Ninth War Zone Command had issued to all its armies on the night of September 18th—the very orders that Zhao Zili had drafted in quiet despair after his plan was rejected. Those orders told the Japanese exactly where every Chinese unit was going, what it intended to do, and when. Hachimō made his way downstairs and reported his achievement. Staff officer Kinoshita Isamu read the summary, then stood and walked without a word into the room where 11th Army Commander Anami Korechika was at work. The other officers in the room looked at Hachimō with confusion, uncertain what had just happened. After a few minutes, Anami and Kinoshita returned together. Anami stepped forward and took Hachimō's hand. "I, the Commander, congratulate you," Anami said, "on becoming the first officer to receive a certificate of merit in Operation Plus. Now I order you to go and rest immediately." The intelligence transformed the battle. Anami's original operational plan had been relatively modest in its ambition: a breakthrough along the Changsha-Yueyang highway, advancing toward Jinjing and the Xiangjiang River, with the 3rd and 4th Divisions planned for deployment toward the river. But now that the Japanese held a complete map of Chinese intentions—the positions, routes, and assignments of every army in the Ninth War Zone—a far more ambitious opportunity presented itself. What could be more valuable, or more satisfying, than the direct encirclement and annihilation of the main Chinese forces in the field? Anami immediately revised his entire operational deployment. As Chinese historical records later documented: "The Japanese intercepted and deciphered the radio telegrams issuing operational orders from the Ninth War Zone, gaining access to the Nationalist Army's operational plans and deployments. This led to a shift in their original strategic concept from a breakthrough to an encirclement of the Nationalist Army's right flank." The trap was set. The Chinese armies, following Xue Yue's orders faithfully, were marching toward positions the Japanese already knew they would occupy. The 26th Army was commanded by Xiao Zhichu, and it comprised three divisions: the 32nd Division under Wang Xiushen, the 41st Division under Ding Zhipan, and the 44th Division under Chen Yong. When Xiao received Xue Yue's orders to move his army to defend the south bank of the Miluo River, the situation was already deeply unfavorable. The Japanese had broken through the Xinqiang River line and were advancing rapidly southward; the 26th Army was positioned in the Liuyang and Yong'an area to the west, at a starting point that was even farther from the Miluo River than the Japanese forces were. The army was engaged in a race against a faster-moving enemy to reach the same objective, running from the farther starting block. The timing was unfavorable. The location was unfavorable. And the personal dimension was unfavorable as well, in a way that would prove deeply consequential, because Xue Yue and Xiao Zhichu harbored a long-standing resentment toward one another with its roots six years in the past. In 1935, both men had attended the third session of the Lushan Officers Training Corps, each holding the rank of army commander in the army but serving as battalion commanders within the training structure. The corps was nominally commanded by Chiang Kai-shek himself, with Chen Cheng as deputy commander. Xue Yue was a favorite of Chen Cheng—a celebrated battle commander who had fought his way across half of China—and he carried himself accordingly, often holding forth at length in seminars and discussions and not infrequently straying off-topic into territory where his assertions were questionable. The other senior officers present were content to listen, taking what was useful and ignoring the rest. Xiao Zhichu, however, was a man of earnest and literal disposition who simply could not let inaccuracies pass without challenge. He disputed Xue Yue's claims on several occasions, insisting on clarifying the facts, and each such correction landed on Xue Yue like a public rebuke. The estrangement that resulted between the two men was severe and lasting. By 1941, Xue had risen to command an entire war zone; Xiao remained an army commander under his authority. In the intervening years, Xiao had learned to be extremely cautious in all his dealings with his superior, acutely aware that any apparent failure or challenge might be held against him. On the night of September 19th, Xue Yue issued Xiao Zhichu an order to move the 26th Army to the second line of defense on the south bank of the Miluo River. Then, at noon on September 20th, he changed the order entirely: Xiao was to push his troops forward to the first line of defense along the riverbank, a more exposed position further north. At dawn on September 21st, Xiao Zhichu personally led his 44th Division—the division with which he had built his reputation—on a forced march toward the designated position. They were 2.5 kilometers from their destination, at the town of Wengjiang, when they encountered the Japanese 6th Division. The Japanese already knew they were coming. Having read Xue Yue's intercepted operational orders, they had deployed their forces specifically to intercept the 26th Army on the march. Within just twenty minutes of the initial encounter at Wengjiang, the entire 44th Division was completely surrounded. Xiao Zhichu reported the situation to Xue Yue by telephone. Xue Yue's response from the other end of the line was white-hot fury: "What's going on? We're surrounded before we even arrived! Why aren't we fighting? If we lose the Miluo River position, I'll kill you!" Xiao Zhichu swallowed his bitterness. Following orders, he threw the 44th Division into battle in terrain that could hardly have been more disadvantageous. They fought for a full day and a night and were unable to break through the encirclement. He ordered Wang Xiushen's 32nd Division to press forward and relieve the siege, but by the time those orders could be executed, the 32nd Division was itself under attack—surrounded on three sides by the Japanese 3rd Division at Wukou. Wang Xiushen led the entire division in a desperate battle with the river immediately at his back, suffering grievous casualties, and was eventually forced to fight his way clear rather than advance to relieve the 44th. On September 23rd, General Kanda Masazuka committed a portion of the 6th Division to a fierce assault against the rear of the already-encircled 44th Division. The situation became critical. Xiao Zhichu's army was fighting simultaneously on two fronts, and the lines were beginning to give way. It was only the timely intervention of Ding Zhipan's 41st Division, which arrived on a diagonal axis and struck the enemy threatening the 44th Division's rear, that prevented a complete collapse. When Ding Zhipan came to report to the army commander, the chief of staff of the 44th Division informed him with hollow composure that the entire division had suffered more than half casualties. The daily reality inside the encircled positions was one of sustained and grinding misery. During brief lulls in the fighting—stolen moments between one Japanese assault and the next—the soldiers would stuff a cold rice ball into their mouths and scoop up a mouthful of muddy water from the nearest roadside ditch; that was their meal. Immediately they would put down whatever they had in their hands and rush to reinforce the hastily dug earthworks, knowing another assault was imminent. The wounded lay where they had fallen, unable to be evacuated, their groans a constant sound beneath the work of digging and the distant thunder of artillery. The dead were not buried; there was simply no time. The battlefield was a scene of utter devastation. After Xiao Zhichu's repeated requests, Xue Yue finally authorized a withdrawal. The 26th Army was permitted to pull back to Putang, a position a few kilometers to the south with marginally more defensible terrain. The entire army moved overnight, arriving exhausted, and immediately began constructing new fortifications. They had barely caught their breath when the Japanese 40th and 6th Divisions came on in succession, pressing the pursuit without pause. The 41st and 44th Divisions threw themselves into the fighting and were decimated. After destroying those two divisions, the Japanese turned their full attention on the surviving 32nd Division and the army headquarters. As Xiao Zhichu swept his binoculars across the positions, watching his men lie on the ground—dead, dying, or fighting on sheer will—one phrase repeated itself in his mind: "total annihilation." It was the most despairing phrase in a soldier's vocabulary, and it seemed to be becoming a description of reality. On the evening of September 25th, as the Japanese ring tightened around the remnants of the 26th Army, a Japanese Chinese-language translator began calling out to the encircled troops in Mandarin, urging them to surrender. The entire army appeared to be at its final moment. Then, in the darkness, reinforcements arrived—in the most improbable way imaginable. The head of the army's reconnaissance section had slipped through the Japanese encirclement looking for any exit, and in doing so had stumbled upon an entire regiment of the 32nd Army that had completely lost contact with the headquarters days earlier. This regiment had suffered damage to its radio equipment and had simply not received any of the telegrams announcing changes to the army's deployment and assignments. When they arrived at their designated rendezvous point, the area was empty. They had been sending scouts in all directions trying to locate friendly forces and make sense of the situation, when they encountered the reconnaissance section chief who had been doing precisely the same thing from inside the encirclement. The two men compared unit designations and confirmed their identities. Then the section chief remembered something: the regiment's party representative was his own classmate from the Whampoa Military Academy. Old bonds held. The two men exchanged information, assessed the situation together, and without further deliberation the regimental commander led his troops on a forced march straight toward the guns. They found and struck the weakest points in the Japanese encirclement, broke through, and extracted the army headquarters and the surviving remnants of the 32nd Division. The 26th Army had been saved, but only barely, and at a terrible cost. What had before the battle been a formidable force with numerous victories was now reduced to less than one-fifth of its original strength. Wang Xiushen, commander of the 32nd Division, had previously served as commander of the great warlord Feng Yuxiang's own bodyguard brigade—a valiant and decorated general of the old Northwest Army. Division commanders Ding Zhipan and Chen Yong were similarly seasoned veterans, known for their courage and resourcefulness throughout years of hard fighting. After the battle, they and Army Commander Xiao Zhichu were utterly dejected. They had fought as hard as men could fight, under conditions as unfavorable as circumstances could devise, and they had been broken. More than forty kilometers to the west of the 26th Army's ordeal, at the point where the Miluo River flows into Dongting Lake, a second major engagement was being fought at the same time. Here, the Japanese 3rd and 4th Divisions struck at Chen Pei's 37th Army, whose two main fighting formations—Luo Qi's 95th Division and Li Tang's 140th Division—were deployed across the hills and river-network terrain of the area. The fighting was, by any measure, equally bloody and equally brutal. Before the battle, with their blood up and their honor committed, the commanders of the 37th Army's divisions had gathered their officers for ceremonies of dedication that spoke to the seriousness with which they understood what was coming. Li Tang, commander of the 140th Division, organized a frontline oath-taking ceremony at which he stood before his assembled officers and men and vowed aloud to annihilate the Japanese invaders and avenge the deaths of fallen compatriots. Luo Qi, commanding the 95th Division, sent written instructions throughout his formation: "The defense of the Shending Mountain line is not only a matter of honor for our division, but also a matter of victory or defeat for the entire battlefield. With this stubborn enemy pressing in, all our officers and soldiers should be even more courageous and loyal, resolutely defend the position, annihilate the Japanese invaders, and achieve extraordinary feats!" Song Ruike, who served at the time as a senior staff officer at the Ninth War Zone Command headquarters, recorded his recollection of the battle's progress in later years with the systematic precision that his professional training demanded. "On the morning of the 19th," Song recalled, "the enemy's main force successively advanced towards the Miluo River via Yanglin Street, Guanwang Bridge, and the Changhu-Dajing Street highway. Our 37th Army was on high alert on the south bank, while our vanguard troops were also advancing forward on the north bank. That afternoon, the enemy's vanguard encountered our troops north of Changle Street. After a fierce battle, many enemy soldiers were killed. Then, enemy cavalry and artillery, along with several thousand infantry, attacked from three sides. Our defending 1st Company fought a bloody battle, but due to being outnumbered, they suffered almost all casualties. Changle Street was occupied by the enemy. At around 7 p.m., the enemy began to attempt a crossing at Modao Beach. Our troops defending the south bank fought bravely and fought fiercely throughout the night, but the enemy failed." The first crossing attempt had been beaten back, but the respite was brief. Song continued: "At dawn on the 20th, the enemy, under the cover of aircraft and artillery, launched another forced crossing. At around 7 a.m., fierce fighting broke out between the two sides along the Wugongshi, Guiyi, and Hejiatang line." Those words, whatever courage the oaths and instructions had inspired, could not alter the underlying arithmetic of the battle. From the 21st through the 23rd of September, the 37th Army fought ferocious engagements with the Japanese 4th and 3rd Divisions across the Shending Mountain and Banjunmiao areas, absorbing casualties that could not be replaced. Song recorded the progression: "The main force of the enemy, advancing rapidly southward, captured our positions at Nanyangmiao and Banjunmiao in Wengjiang at noon on the 22nd. Our 140th Division engaged the enemy at Lishan Lane and Daxingling, and fought fiercely for two days and nights..." After the battle, the 37th Army had effectively ceased to exist as a fighting force. It had gone into the engagement with nearly fifty thousand fully equipped and manned troops. Song Ruike, reflecting on it all in his old age, acknowledged with unusual candor the limitations of his own account: "Since history cannot be reproduced, people summarize events based on memory, striving to retain the most important and valuable aspects while filtering out the unimportant and those that do not reflect the essence." The elderly Song retained the factual architecture of the battle—times, places, unit designations, tactical methods—but he knew, as any honest chronicler must, that within those facts lay a multitude of individual experiences, individual sufferings, individual deaths, that no record could fully capture. "Then what about every individual in history?" he asked. "How should their emotions, will, beliefs, their flesh and blood, their breath, and everything they sacrificed be expressed and entrusted to us?" It was a question he could not answer, and neither can history. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. After commander Zhao Zili's plan was rejected, he drafted orders anyway, but Lieutenant Colonel Hachimō of Japan's 11th Army intercepted and decoded the Ninth War Zone's deployment orders on September 20. Meanwhile, the 37th Army fought the Japanese at the Miluo River confluence with Dongting Lake, launching oaths and grim defenses before being effectively destroyed as a combat force.

Hello Interactors,Welcome to summer where Interplace turns its attention to physical geography and the environment. It's already a crazy El Niño — thanks in large part to global warming — and the United States is having a big birthday. How might these be related and what to do about it?What follows is not a celebration or a condemnation, but more of a reckoning. I look at what was built, what was deliberately forgotten, and what is now continually arriving, season by season, in forms of weather the founders could not have imagined.Although Alexander Humboldt — one of the world's most famous scientists at the time — did warn Jefferson of the effects of human-induced climate change in 1804. He based his prediction on changes he observed in forests and water systems as a result of mono-crops and industrial “steam and gas”. Jefferson ignored him.BUILDING, BURNING, BILLOWING BACKOn this momentous 250th Fourth of July, when the world is experiencing record level extreme weather events, let's reflect on how over the last 250 years the United States helped build, extract, and then burn the material and political conditions that made climate change possible. From the beginning, it tied itself to land, extraction, mobility, and expansion. Over time those commitments became an energy system built on coal, oil, gas, highways, suburbs, industrial agriculture, and a development model that treated nature as an inexhaustible storehouse. That legacy is now legible in the atmosphere itself. Let's light a Roman Candle in celebration!Even before the 4th of July fireworks celebrations create another nationwide 42% average increase in fine particulate matter (Seidel, et al., 2015), the United States bears the single largest share of cumulative historical CO₂ emissions of any nation . We represent roughly 20 percent of the global total since 1850 contributing approximately 0.2°C of warming to date (Carbon Brief, 2021; UNEP, 2023). To represent four percent of the world's current population and be responsible for nearly a fifth of its cumulative warming is not a coincidence of geography or fake news. It is the outcome of deliberate choices about how a republic would be organized, energized, and expanded across two and a half centuries.The United States has long imagined freedom in spatial terms: movement, property, settlement, mastery, frontier, and circulation. Those abstract ideals were made real through land theft and remade landscapes, as well as through infrastructure built in significant part by African and African American enslaved labor. Each step along the way depended on ever-greater throughput of energy, labor, and material. In that sense, the country's history is also a history of how thought became organized around extraction and exploitation, until those thoughts and actions themselves became a kind of common sense. But by the late nineteenth century and early twentieth centuries increased industrialization meant emissions grew. They surged during the postwar era and peaked in the early 2000s — a trajectory that maps almost exactly onto the spatial project of suburban expansion, highway construction, and fossil-fuel-dependent agriculture (Climate Change Tracker, 2024). Two-thirds of the country's cumulative warming impact derives from fossil CO₂ alone. The built environment of American freedom is as inseparable from the chemical footprint it left behind as a firecracker's scattered debris and carbon residue.This leaves us with a climate crisis that is not just the result of a few bad policy choices in the late twentieth century. We exist in a cumulative outcome of a long national project that normalized combustion as prosperity and treated atmospheric consequence as some distant abstraction. Kind of like turning up the radio to drowned out the sound of your car making a funny noise. The federal state government played a central role in this process. Not only through direct policy and subsidies, but through the development of roads, ports, power systems, agricultural regimes, and military logistics that expanded the scale of fossil dependence at every scale of national life.The fossil fuel industry understood this trajectory earlier than the public was permitted to know. A systematic analysis published in Science found that ExxonMobil's own scientists accurately projected and skillfully modeled global warming due to fossil fuel burning from as early as 1977. These projections are consistent with subsequent observations. And yet, for decades, the company publicly pushed doubt and denial (Supran, Rahmstorf, & Oreskes, 2023). Consequently, what America projects as “economic growth”, fueled enormously by the fossil fuel industry, is embedded not only in a collective national memory but in the scientific record.The irony is that America's confidence in its own permanence rested on a false sense of geography. The landscape seemed stable because the costs were displaced in the form of upstream mining, downstream pollution, hidden emissions, imported and exported harm, and deferred climate effects. The effects on the atmosphere made that displacement impossible to sustain. The ‘progress' that had been scattered across space and time returns as heat, drought, fire, flood, and increasingly volatile weather. We built a world in which the rewards of extraction were immediate while the penalties were delayed. Call it what you will — the climate crisis is just the debt of delay, dressed as disaster.KNOWING, NEGLECTING, NEUTERING KNOWLEDGEThe USA did not simply keep burning and expanding on autopilot. By the late twentieth century, it had also begun to lose the institutional capacity to understand what its own trajectory meant. The problem was no longer that the 1970's scientific picture Exxon had already portrayed was absent. The evidence was clear. By the early 1990s the United States had ratified the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and formally accepted the goal of returning greenhouse-gas emissions to 1990 levels by the end of the decade.The barrier to progress was not ignorance, but a degraded relationship between knowledge and power. This was engineered in part by more fossil fuel industry campaigns to sow doubt about science it privately accepted. Historians of science Naomi Oreskes and Erik Conway documented how a loose-knit network of industry-connected scientists ran effective campaigns to mislead the public on issues from tobacco to climate change. They exploited the media's tendency toward false balance and keeping controversy alive long after scientific consensus had been reached (Oreskes & Conway, 2010). The strategy was to make certainty seem uncertain, and it worked. For decades, political inaction persisted through every window of action that may have helped.By the mid-1990s, climate change had become legible enough for federal institutions to name, study, and plan around, but the machinery of governance was being bent in the opposite direction. Newt Gingrich and the Republicans who rose with him may not have invented anti-government politics, but they weaponized it. Curiously, through pro-governmental politics. While their rhetoric promised efficiency and modernization, in practice it often meant cutting staffs, weakening committees, abolishing subcommittees, and treating the legislature less as a site of deliberation than as a theater of permanent combat. After all, their own staffers affectionately referred to Gingrich and his wrecking crew as ‘jihadists' — even as those same politicians promulgated and attached that term as a slur toward Muslims. One of the most consequential acts of this period was the 1995 defunding of the Office of Technology Assessment. This was a bipartisan, independent body that had produced over 750 reports on complex scientific and technical questions since 1974, including major studies on energy policy, environmental risk, and the long-range consequences of atmospheric change. Gingrich had vowed to kill the OTA during his 1994 election campaign. He kept his promise, and with it eliminated one of Congress's primary mechanisms for converting scientific knowledge into durable legislative capacity (Wikipedia, Office of Technology Assessment; AAAS Science, 2019).A legislature cannot respond intelligently to a long-range atmospheric crisis if it has stripped away the very mechanisms designed to synthesize evidence, test assumptions, and tackle complex questions over time. What replaced deliberations mediated by experts was a vacuum quickly filled by industry lobbyists — the same industry that, amongst themselves, knew exactly what Gingrich was doing. Research on institutional dynamics in climate governance consistently finds that fragmented policy, weak intergovernmental coordination, and the erosion of technical capacity are among the most significant barriers to effective long-range climate action (Jaisridhar et al., 2025; Birchall, Bonnett, & Kehler, 2023).The thinning of Congress's own cognitive infrastructure in 1995 was a bureaucratic adjustment that disabled the country's capacity to govern on topics beyond the timescales and dimensions of a single administration. The political system was becoming less capable of converting recognition into sustained action precisely as the need for that conversion became most urgent. The United States not only helped create the conditions for warming but undermined its own capacity to govern the effects warming created. The atmosphere was warming and so was the willful weakening of the world's most powerful potential partner in planetary protection.CASCADES, CRISES, AND COMING TO TERMSWhat follows is not simply a warmer world, but a less legible and actionable one. Once a political system weakens its own capacity to think long-term, it becomes ill-equipped to face a future that arrives not as a single rupture but as a cascade of self-reinforcing disruptions. We've all experienced or read about hotter summers, fire, more erratic rainfall, stressed coasts, shifting storm tracks, and weather that no longer behaves as the old seasonal calendar once did. Anthropogenic warming is already increasing variability in frequency and severity of weather systems. This in turn can alter local precipitation variability, storm behavior, and the climatic conditions on which seasonal expectations have long depended (Robinson, 2021; Wang et al., 2017; Scher & Messori, 2019). In several regions, climate change is expected not only to shift average conditions but to change seasonal predictability itself — especially for rainfall — making the future harder to read through the calendars and risk assumptions modeled and built from the past (Le et al., 2023; Delsole et al., 2014).Even now, the atmosphere offers a live demonstration of this instability. On June 11, 2026, NOAA officially declared that El Niño has arrived — with a 63 percent probability of reaching “very strong” intensity, defined as sea surface temperature anomalies of at least +2°C in the equatorial Pacific. This would rank it among the largest events in the historical record (NOAA, 2026). What makes 2026 categorically different from prior super events is not just its projected intensity but its baseline. This El Niño begins from the warmest ocean temperatures in human history, layered onto anthropogenic warming that has already pushed the planet to 1.55°C above preindustrial levels.As one paper argued in April, the El Niño is the accelerant; the fuel was already stacked (Hansen et al., 2026). The World Meteorological Organization (WMO) has placed an 86 percent probability on at least one year between 2026 and 2030 surpassing 2024 as the warmest on record, with 2027 — when El Niño's thermal lag typically produces its most extreme global signals — as the most likely candidate (WMO, 2026).When that variability is layered onto long-term warming, the result is not just discomfort but a deeper erosion of climatic predictability. ENSO — the El Niño-Southern Oscillation, the coupled ocean-atmosphere system that drives El Niño's periodic warming and its counterpart La Niña's cooling across the tropical Pacific — is not a new phenomenon, but its behavior is changing. Model evidence indicates that ENSO-related rainfall variability is likely to intensify and shift eastward under greenhouse warming, creating more severe and sometimes novel climate conditions across the terrestrial tropics (Cai et al., 2021; Rifai, Li, & Malhi, 2019). The question is no longer whether the climate will change, but how many of the social and political structures built on climatic regularity can survive that change.Climate change is often presented as a technical or environmental problem to be solved. Especially amidst a culture of pervasive techno-optimism. But climate change is way more fundamental than this. It's a reordering of the relationship between how we need to think and the geography in which we exist. This includes political geography and a reordering of political imagination as it relates to physical geography. The old originally envisioned republic of the USA assumed that land could be mastered, seasons could be predicted, and institutions could absorb shock without losing coherence. Those assumptions no longer hold.The old assumption that infrastructure could be planned around stationary baselines is increasingly at odds with the evidence. We can already see how energy systems show measurable vulnerability to climatic uncertainty and extremes. Modeled systems evidence declines in reliability and large performance gaps when future weather variation is not adequately incorporated into planning (Perera et al., 2020; Ouyang et al., 2023).As a result, the challenge ahead is not adaptation to these changes in the narrow sense, but reconstruction of our relationship to them in the broad sense. This may seem impossible in today's American political system, but truly Democratic societies will need stronger scientific institutions, more durable legislative capacity, and trustworthy public agencies able to interpret risk before disaster becomes routine. They will need not only infrastructure, but intelligence. Embodied intelligence — embodied engagement with physical and social environments rather than as a purely singular-brain augmented by LLM computation. This includes a renewed ability to gather, preserve, and act on knowledge over long horizons.The literature on adaptation governance is clear that resilience depends on organizational learning, intergovernmental collaboration, inclusive planning, and long-term institutional capacity. Short-term, reactive, market or donor-driven interventions that respond to emergencies without building the durable frameworks that prevent them won't work (Birchall et al., 2026; Rahman & Islam, 2024). What this means practically is the reconstitution of the kind of congressional expertise that was dismantled in 1995. We need not merely revive the OTA but to imagine a broader democratic intelligence infrastructure capable of thinking on the timescales that climate change demands — decades, generations, and centuries. Without that, climate change will continue to be experienced as a succession of emergency, political, or market conditions rather than as a governable transformation.We can do this. After all, a country that once imagined itself through movement, expansion, and mastery made a certain kind of freedom seem natural. A new kind of freedom can be made to seem natural too. But right now our current system returns prosperity for many — but heat, flood, instability, and constraint for all. What was built now must be lived within — good and bad — while what was extracted must now live in the atmosphere — all bad. What gets burned today, will burn more later. The political order that was built through extraction, combustion, and territorial expansion must confront the atmospheric and hydrological consequences of those choices.That confrontation will only intensify. Past century's cumulative emissions have already committed the planet to changes that will outlast any government, living generation, or institution that exists. Including you and me. The next 250 years will belong less to societies that imagine escape than to those that can build the institutional intelligence, infrastructural redundancy, and long-term public capacity required to inhabit a less legible and hospitable climate (Ouyang et al., 2023; Jaisridhar et al., 2025).So, as you watch the rocket's red glare and bombs bursting in air — sending even more smoke, chemicals and debris everywhere — know the flag will still be there. But to endure, it must repair an institution to be once again knowledgeable and fair.ReferencesBirchall, S. J., Villeneuve, K., Rose, D., Baran, N. N., & Adams, S. (2026). Exploring the modifying effects of adaptive capacity on resilience to climate change across 4 coastal cities in British Columbia, Canada. Cities.Birchall, S. J., Bonnett, N. L., & Kehler, S. (2023). The influence of governance structure on local resilience: Enabling and constraining factors for climate change adaptation in practice. Urban Climate.Cai, W., McPhaden, M., Grimm, A., Rodrigues, R., Taschetto, A., Garreaud, R., … Vera, C. (2020). Climate impacts of the El Niño–Southern Oscillation on South America. Nature Reviews Earth & Environment.Cai, W., Santoso, A., Collins, M., Dewitte, B., Karamperidou, C., Kug, J., … Zhong, W. (2021). Changing El Niño–Southern Oscillation in a warming climate. Nature Reviews Earth & Environment.Carbon Brief. (2021). Analysis: Which countries are historically responsible for climate change?Climate Change Tracker. (2024). United States of America: Historic contribution to global warming since 1850.Delsole, T., Yan, X., Dirmeyer, P., Fennessy, M., & Altshuler, E. (2014). Changes in seasonal predictability due to global warming. Journal of Climate.Holgate, C., Evans, J., Taschetto, A., Gupta, S. A., & Santoso, A. (2022). The impact of interacting climate modes on east Australian precipitation moisture sources. Journal of Climate.Jaisridhar, P., Nirosha, R., Jasimudeen, S., Senthilkumar, M., Ponsneka, I., & Raja, P. (2025). Institutional dynamics in climate change adaptation: A bibliometric analysis. Frontiers in Environmental Science.Le, P., Randerson, J., Willett, R., Wright, S., Smyth, P., Guilloteau, C., Mamalakis, A., & Foufoula-Georgiou, E. (2023). Climate-driven changes in the predictability of seasonal precipitation. Nature Communications.Oreskes, N., & Conway, E. M. (2010). Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful of Scientists Obscured the Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming. Bloomsbury Press.Ouyang, H., Tang, X., Zhang, R., Baklanov, A., Brasseur, G., Kumar, R., Han, Q., & Luo, Y. (2023). Resilience building and collaborative governance for climate change adaptation in response to a new state of more frequent and intense extreme weather events. International Journal of Disaster Risk Science.Perera, A., Nik, V., Chen, D., Scartezzini, J., & Hong, T. (2020). Quantifying the impacts of climate change and extreme climate events on energy systems.Rahman, M. M., & Islam, M. S. (2024). Institutional dynamics and climate adaptation: Unveiling the challenges and opportunities in coastal Bangladesh.Rifai, S., Li, S., & Malhi, Y. (2019). Coupling of El Niño events and long-term warming leads to pervasive climate extremes in the terrestrial tropics.Robinson, W. (2021). Climate change and extreme weather: A review focusing on the continental United States.Scher, S., & Messori, G. (2019). How global warming changes the difficulty of synoptic weather forecasting.Supran, G., Rahmstorf, S., & Oreskes, N. (2023). Assessing ExxonMobil's global warming projections.UNEP. (2023). Current and historic contributions to global warming and emissions in the United States from 1850 to 2021. Statista.Wang, X., Jiang, D., & Lang, X. (2017). Future extreme climate changes linked to global warming intensity. Science Bulletin.Hansen, J., Kharecha, P., Morgan, D., & Vest, J. (2026, April 15). Super-Duper El Niño. Columbia University Earth Institute.National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. (2026, June 11). El Niño forms, expected to strengthen, say NOAA forecasters [Press release].NOAA Climate Prediction Center. (2026, June 11). ENSO diagnostic discussion. National Weather Service.Seidel, D. J., & Birnbaum, A. N. (2015). Effects of Independence Day fireworks on atmospheric concentrations of fine particulate matter in the United States. Atmospheric Environment.World Meteorological Organization. (2026). Global annual-to-decadal climate update 2026–2035. WMO. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit interplace.io

A new study suggests that the way you deliver magnetic field stimulation to an Alzheimer's brain may matter just as much as the stimulation itself -- and the findings point toward a more personalized approach to treatment. In this episode, R Blank breaks down a 2025 study by Geng, Liu, Yan, and Zheng published in Brain Research, which compared intermittent versus continuous extremely low frequency magnetic field exposure in Alzheimer's disease mice. The results revealed that the optimal stimulation pattern depends on the stage of disease progression -- a finding with real implications for how we think about magnetic field therapies. R Blank also connects this to the broader body of research on ELF-MF and neurodegeneration that he and his father Doctor Martin Blank explored in their book Overpowered. In This Episode What extremely low frequency magnetic fields are and how researchers are studying them as a potential Alzheimer's therapy Why intermittent stimulation outperformed continuous stimulation in adult Alzheimer's mice -- and why the reverse was true in aged mice What theta and gamma brain wave oscillations have to do with memory and cognition Featured Study Read the full study: Intermittent ELF-MF exposure effectively ameliorates pathologic features associated with adult AD mice See all studies at shieldyourbody.com/research

Plenty of talk about the success of Yan Diomande in this year's World Cup. Christian Vallejos joins the show to talk about seeing Yan as a 16yo playing in the UPSL. We discuss the rise of soccer in Florida and the role of the UPSL in developing talent.

THE WHITE HOUSE CARD IS HERE!"Suga" Sean O'Malley's head coach Tim Welch joins Demetrious Johnson to break down UFC Freedom 250 on the latest episode of 'The MightyCast'!Timecodes0:00 Intro 1:20 PrizePicks CODE MIGHTYCAST 1:58 Welcome Tim Welch! 2:20 Tim is BUZZIN' Off a Nicotine Patch 3:22 Tim Tries to Corrupt Mighty

durée : 00:16:43 - Les émissions culturelles de France Culture - par : Marie Labory - Du mélancolique “Sukima” de Gao Yan au très violent “Zange” de Santa Inoué, un point sur les œuvres de deux mangakas qui repensent les codes de la narration. - réalisation : Laurence Malonda, Boris Pineau, Aïssatou N'Doye, Jules Barbier, Zohra Vignais, Lise Ripoche, Mathi Adjinsoff - invités : Pauline Croquet Journaliste au service culture du Monde, spécialisée manga et animation , Fausto Fasulo Directeur des rédaction d'ATOM et Mad Movies Vous aimez ce podcast ? Pour écouter tous les épisodes sans limite, rendez-vous sur Radio France

In Australia, no wedding or school dance is complete without the Nutbush, Australia's unofficial national dance. The Nutbush – a simple line dance to the song “Nutbush City Limits,” by Ike and Tina Turner – has become as stereotypically Australian as kangaroos, boomerangs, and Vegemite.And yet, hardly anyone outside of Australia even knows the Nutbush exists. Here at Decoder Ring, we certainly didn't – until we started getting emails from Australians asking us to investigate its origins. How did an American song become the soundtrack for an Australian national tradition? Who invented the iconic steps, and why does every Australian know them?Our producer Max Freedman put on his dancing shoes to get some answers. The global, century-spanning story of the Nutbush involves Australia, Tennessee, Denmark, primary schools, gay discos, and demonstrates that even the goofiest cultural touchstones can go surprisingly deep.In this episode you'll hear from culture journalists David Mack and Angus Kidman; Nutbush researchers Panizza Allmark and Jon Stratton; dance historians Erica Okamura and Richard Powers; Dr. Fiona Chatteur, Jeremy Santolin, and Brian Kerr.This episode was written and produced by Max Freedman and edited by Evan Chung, our supervising producer. Merritt Jacob is Senior Technical Director.If you have any cultural mysteries you want us to decode, email us at DecoderRing@slate.com or leave a message on our hotline at (347) 460-7281.Get more of Decoder Ring with Slate Plus! Join for exclusive bonus episodes of Decoder Ring and ad-free listening on all your favorite Slate podcasts. Subscribe from the Decoder Ring show page on Apple Podcasts or Spotify. Or, visit slate.com/decoderplus for access wherever you listen.Further ViewingHow to do ‘The Nutbush' - Australian Line Dance Dancin' the Madison on “The Buddy Deane Show” (1960)Alley Cat Tutorial — Spark Physical EducationThe Nutbush on Countdown (December 5, 1976)Tina Turner — Nutbush City Limits, The Midnight Special (1973)Tina Turner — Are You Breaking My Heart, Countdown (1980)Tina Turner: How “The Best” Became Rugby League's Anthem | ABC NewsTina Turner's Electrifying 1993 NRL Grand Final PerformanceSources for This EpisodeAllmark, Panizza, and Jon Stratton. “Doing the Nutbush: How Australia Got Its Very Own Line Dance.” Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural Studies, vol. 39, no. 1, 2025, pp. 79–94.Allmark, Panizza, and Jon Stratton. “The Nutbush Dance Reframed: Further Analysis Related to ‘Doing the Nutbush.'” Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural Studies, vol. 39, no. 1, 2025, pp. 95–103.Andrews, Shirley. Take Your Partners: Traditional Dancing in Australia. 3rd ed., Hyland House, 1979.Bloomfield, Anne. “Health or Art? The Case for Dance in the Curriculum of British State Schools 1909–1919.” History of Education, vol. 36, no. 6, 2007, pp. 681–696.Bloomfield, Anne. “The Quickening of the National Spirit: Cecil Sharp and the Pioneers of the Folk-Dance Revival in English State Schools (1900–26).” History of Education, vol. 30, no. 1, 2001, pp. 59–75.Gbogbo, Mawunyo. “Tina Turner and Her Australian Connections: How The Best Became Rugby League's Anthem and Why Is the Nutbush Mandatory at Gatherings?” ABC News, 24 May 2023.Jones, Benjamin T. “Australian Politics Explainer: The White Australia Policy.” The Conversation, 9 Apr. 2017.Kidman, Angus. “Tina Turner: How Australia Saved Her Career.” Angus Kidman, 13 Aug. 2023.Meiners, Jeff. So We Can Dance? In Pursuit of an Inclusive Dance Curriculum for the Primary School Years in Australia. 2017. University of South Australia, Doctor of Education thesis.Spencer, Eliza. “Australia and the Nutbush: The Quest for the Origin of a Cultural Phenomenon Goes On.” The Guardian, 5 May 2024.Ward, Mary. “The Mysterious Allure of the Nutbush and Why the Dance Is Uniquely Australian.” Sydney Morning Herald, 25 May 2023.Zhuang, Yan. “Australia Remembered Tina Turner with a Dance.” New York Times, 25 May 2023.Need to set up your Slate Plus feed? If you subscribed through Slate.com, check out our FAQ at slate.com/podcastfaqs for easy instructions. Members subscribed via Apple Podcasts get automatic access—no setup required. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

In Australia, no wedding or school dance is complete without the Nutbush, Australia's unofficial national dance. The Nutbush – a simple line dance to the song “Nutbush City Limits,” by Ike and Tina Turner – has become as stereotypically Australian as kangaroos, boomerangs, and Vegemite.And yet, hardly anyone outside of Australia even knows the Nutbush exists. Here at Decoder Ring, we certainly didn't – until we started getting emails from Australians asking us to investigate its origins. How did an American song become the soundtrack for an Australian national tradition? Who invented the iconic steps, and why does every Australian know them?Our producer Max Freedman put on his dancing shoes to get some answers. The global, century-spanning story of the Nutbush involves Australia, Tennessee, Denmark, primary schools, gay discos, and demonstrates that even the goofiest cultural touchstones can go surprisingly deep.In this episode you'll hear from culture journalists David Mack and Angus Kidman; Nutbush researchers Panizza Allmark and Jon Stratton; dance historians Erica Okamura and Richard Powers; Dr. Fiona Chatteur, Jeremy Santolin, and Brian Kerr.This episode was written and produced by Max Freedman and edited by Evan Chung, our supervising producer. Merritt Jacob is Senior Technical Director.If you have any cultural mysteries you want us to decode, email us at DecoderRing@slate.com or leave a message on our hotline at (347) 460-7281.Get more of Decoder Ring with Slate Plus! Join for exclusive bonus episodes of Decoder Ring and ad-free listening on all your favorite Slate podcasts. Subscribe from the Decoder Ring show page on Apple Podcasts or Spotify. Or, visit slate.com/decoderplus for access wherever you listen.Further ViewingHow to do ‘The Nutbush' - Australian Line Dance Dancin' the Madison on “The Buddy Deane Show” (1960)Alley Cat Tutorial — Spark Physical EducationThe Nutbush on Countdown (December 5, 1976)Tina Turner — Nutbush City Limits, The Midnight Special (1973)Tina Turner — Are You Breaking My Heart, Countdown (1980)Tina Turner: How “The Best” Became Rugby League's Anthem | ABC NewsTina Turner's Electrifying 1993 NRL Grand Final PerformanceSources for This EpisodeAllmark, Panizza, and Jon Stratton. “Doing the Nutbush: How Australia Got Its Very Own Line Dance.” Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural Studies, vol. 39, no. 1, 2025, pp. 79–94.Allmark, Panizza, and Jon Stratton. “The Nutbush Dance Reframed: Further Analysis Related to ‘Doing the Nutbush.'” Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural Studies, vol. 39, no. 1, 2025, pp. 95–103.Andrews, Shirley. Take Your Partners: Traditional Dancing in Australia. 3rd ed., Hyland House, 1979.Bloomfield, Anne. “Health or Art? The Case for Dance in the Curriculum of British State Schools 1909–1919.” History of Education, vol. 36, no. 6, 2007, pp. 681–696.Bloomfield, Anne. “The Quickening of the National Spirit: Cecil Sharp and the Pioneers of the Folk-Dance Revival in English State Schools (1900–26).” History of Education, vol. 30, no. 1, 2001, pp. 59–75.Gbogbo, Mawunyo. “Tina Turner and Her Australian Connections: How The Best Became Rugby League's Anthem and Why Is the Nutbush Mandatory at Gatherings?” ABC News, 24 May 2023.Jones, Benjamin T. “Australian Politics Explainer: The White Australia Policy.” The Conversation, 9 Apr. 2017.Kidman, Angus. “Tina Turner: How Australia Saved Her Career.” Angus Kidman, 13 Aug. 2023.Meiners, Jeff. So We Can Dance? In Pursuit of an Inclusive Dance Curriculum for the Primary School Years in Australia. 2017. University of South Australia, Doctor of Education thesis.Spencer, Eliza. “Australia and the Nutbush: The Quest for the Origin of a Cultural Phenomenon Goes On.” The Guardian, 5 May 2024.Ward, Mary. “The Mysterious Allure of the Nutbush and Why the Dance Is Uniquely Australian.” Sydney Morning Herald, 25 May 2023.Zhuang, Yan. “Australia Remembered Tina Turner with a Dance.” New York Times, 25 May 2023. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

In Australia, no wedding or school dance is complete without the Nutbush, Australia's unofficial national dance. The Nutbush – a simple line dance to the song “Nutbush City Limits,” by Ike and Tina Turner – has become as stereotypically Australian as kangaroos, boomerangs, and Vegemite.And yet, hardly anyone outside of Australia even knows the Nutbush exists. Here at Decoder Ring, we certainly didn't – until we started getting emails from Australians asking us to investigate its origins. How did an American song become the soundtrack for an Australian national tradition? Who invented the iconic steps, and why does every Australian know them?Our producer Max Freedman put on his dancing shoes to get some answers. The global, century-spanning story of the Nutbush involves Australia, Tennessee, Denmark, primary schools, gay discos, and demonstrates that even the goofiest cultural touchstones can go surprisingly deep.In this episode you'll hear from culture journalists David Mack and Angus Kidman; Nutbush researchers Panizza Allmark and Jon Stratton; dance historians Erica Okamura and Richard Powers; Dr. Fiona Chatteur, Jeremy Santolin, and Brian Kerr.This episode was written and produced by Max Freedman and edited by Evan Chung, our supervising producer. Merritt Jacob is Senior Technical Director.If you have any cultural mysteries you want us to decode, email us at DecoderRing@slate.com or leave a message on our hotline at (347) 460-7281.Get more of Decoder Ring with Slate Plus! Join for exclusive bonus episodes of Decoder Ring and ad-free listening on all your favorite Slate podcasts. Subscribe from the Decoder Ring show page on Apple Podcasts or Spotify. Or, visit slate.com/decoderplus for access wherever you listen.Further ViewingHow to do ‘The Nutbush' - Australian Line Dance Dancin' the Madison on “The Buddy Deane Show” (1960)Alley Cat Tutorial — Spark Physical EducationThe Nutbush on Countdown (December 5, 1976)Tina Turner — Nutbush City Limits, The Midnight Special (1973)Tina Turner — Are You Breaking My Heart, Countdown (1980)Tina Turner: How “The Best” Became Rugby League's Anthem | ABC NewsTina Turner's Electrifying 1993 NRL Grand Final PerformanceSources for This EpisodeAllmark, Panizza, and Jon Stratton. “Doing the Nutbush: How Australia Got Its Very Own Line Dance.” Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural Studies, vol. 39, no. 1, 2025, pp. 79–94.Allmark, Panizza, and Jon Stratton. “The Nutbush Dance Reframed: Further Analysis Related to ‘Doing the Nutbush.'” Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural Studies, vol. 39, no. 1, 2025, pp. 95–103.Andrews, Shirley. Take Your Partners: Traditional Dancing in Australia. 3rd ed., Hyland House, 1979.Bloomfield, Anne. “Health or Art? The Case for Dance in the Curriculum of British State Schools 1909–1919.” History of Education, vol. 36, no. 6, 2007, pp. 681–696.Bloomfield, Anne. “The Quickening of the National Spirit: Cecil Sharp and the Pioneers of the Folk-Dance Revival in English State Schools (1900–26).” History of Education, vol. 30, no. 1, 2001, pp. 59–75.Gbogbo, Mawunyo. “Tina Turner and Her Australian Connections: How The Best Became Rugby League's Anthem and Why Is the Nutbush Mandatory at Gatherings?” ABC News, 24 May 2023.Jones, Benjamin T. “Australian Politics Explainer: The White Australia Policy.” The Conversation, 9 Apr. 2017.Kidman, Angus. “Tina Turner: How Australia Saved Her Career.” Angus Kidman, 13 Aug. 2023.Meiners, Jeff. So We Can Dance? In Pursuit of an Inclusive Dance Curriculum for the Primary School Years in Australia. 2017. University of South Australia, Doctor of Education thesis.Spencer, Eliza. “Australia and the Nutbush: The Quest for the Origin of a Cultural Phenomenon Goes On.” The Guardian, 5 May 2024.Ward, Mary. “The Mysterious Allure of the Nutbush and Why the Dance Is Uniquely Australian.” Sydney Morning Herald, 25 May 2023.Zhuang, Yan. “Australia Remembered Tina Turner with a Dance.” New York Times, 25 May 2023. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

In the late 1980s, a child exposed to fallout from the Chernobyl disaster lay in a hospital bed while doctors told his family there were no clear answers and no reliable path forward. Decades later, that same child, Yan Leyfman, walks into exam rooms as a hematology oncology fellow, expected to deliver clarity inside a system that still runs on delay, uncertainty, and institutional self preservation.This episode traces the throughline from early life shaped by radiation exposure and hospice level uncertainty to a career inside academic medicine, translational research, and oncology media. Yan built his identity around survival and usefulness, moving from patient to physician while carrying the memory of what it feels like to sit on the other side of the table. He helped launch MedNews Week during the COVID crisis to push back on misinformation and expand access to medical knowledge, stepping into a public role while still in training.The conversation stays grounded in the friction between personal narrative and system reality. Clinical training demands efficiency, hierarchy, and emotional distance. Cancer care demands time, clarity, and human connection. Those forces collide in real patient encounters where prior authorization delays, insurance barriers, and fragmented care pathways shape outcomes as much as any treatment protocol.Yan speaks openly about mentorship, belonging, and the drive to make meaning out of survival. The discussion pushes further into what the healthcare system actually rewards, what it quietly strips away, and how quickly empathy can erode under institutional pressure. The episode also examines the role of medical media, where education, industry influence, and narrative control often blur together.This is a conversation about identity under construction, about what happens when someone who remembers powerlessness steps into a role that carries authority, and about whether that memory can survive long enough to change anything.RELATED LINKSYan Leyfman on LinkedInYan Leyfman on InstagramSurviving ChernobylFEEDBACKLike this episode? Rate and review Out of Patients on your favorite podcast platform. For guest suggestions or sponsorship email podcasts@matthewzachary.comSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Last time we spoke about the second phase of the One Hundred Regiment Offensive.  During the second phase of the Hundred Regiments offensive, CCP forces emphasized strongpoint and transportation warfare across the Taihang/Jizhong area. Units were organized with wings containing Japanese positions while a central force struck deeper, as in the Renhe Dasu fighting in early October 1940. Night raids seized strongholds, while engineers and sabotage teams disrupted roads, bridges, and mobility, and ambushes targeted Japanese foraging and supply routes. Across these theaters, the strategy was consistent: make Japanese control porous by destroying or capturing local nodes and forcing constant repairs, re-routing, escorts, and slowed reinforcement, so occupation logistics and strongpoint networks could not function reliably. This approach supported wider offensives by isolating strongpoints, draining enemy strength, and giving Communist base areas room to endure and expand.   #204 The One Hundred Regiment Offensive Phase Three Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. After the two large-scale offensives carried out over wide areas of North China, the Japanese army did what it always did when control started to slip: it tried to turn mobile pressure back into something it could "manage" again. The Eighth Route Army's continued fighting had shown that Japanese-occupied space was not secure, and that base areas could still resist, strike, and persist even while under counterpressure. That was dangerous for occupation. If the enemy could keep operations going, Japanese lines of movement stayed uncertain and "stabilization" became a temporary illusion. To prevent the situation from worsening and to re-stabilize the occupied areas as quickly as possible, the Japanese mobilized heavy forces and launched retaliatory counter–"mopping-up" operations against anti-Japanese base areas in North China beginning October 6. The Japanese attempt wasn't only to punish; it was designed to take advantage of an asymmetry: the Eighth Route Army was striking and fighting continuously, and it did not have the luxury of resting, replenishing, and re-cohering as neatly as a garrison army might. Japanese commanders hoped that if they struck hard enough in enough places, the Communist main forces could be isolated, destroyed, or at least forced into a defensive posture that would break their operational tempo. At Liaodong and Yulin, Japanese reinforcements also created a second political-military stake. After the Yuliao Campaign ended, the Eighth Route Army headquarters issued instructions on October 1 to major regions, warning that enemy reinforcements in Liaodong and Yulin might use the opening to "sweep" the Taibei region. In the Communist operational mind, this wasn't just one threat; it was a pattern. A "sweep" could come as a wave that pushed inward, burned villages, destroyed supplies, and tried to force Communist forces out of their protected networks. Even if the offensive couldn't win a conventional decisive battle, it could aim to strip the base areas of people, food, and mobility—things that make guerrilla and strongpoint warfare possible. By October 19, 1940, the Eighth Route Army headquarters issued a counter–"mopping-up" operation plan, and civilian and military authorities in various regions launched counter-"mopping-up" operations accordingly. This is important background: in these campaigns, "mopping-up" was not only an army activity. The Japanese were attempting to break the base system itself—its logistics, its local administration, and the relationship between armed units and civilians who hid, moved, fed, and replaced them. So the counter-operations had to be just as systemic. The Communists needed to keep people alive, keep movement possible, and keep the enemy from consolidating inside a cleared space. In southeastern Shanxi's Taihang and Taiyue regions, the Japanese 1st Army aimed to strike the main force of the 129th Division and destroy anti-Japanese base areas by running a series of mopping operations from October 6 to December 5. The plan had a typical occupation logic: push through strongholds gradually, clear pockets methodically, and rely on local superiority—especially in manpower, logistics, and the ability to reinforce by road. And because the Communist main force had been operating without meaningful rest after the earlier offensives, the Japanese believed they could catch formations while they were still "in between battles." On October 6, in the Taihang region, more than 800 enemy troops from Wu'an in western Hebei began a "mopping-up" operation in the Yangyi area. By October 11, the Japanese posture escalated. Part of the Japanese Independent Mixed 4th Brigade departed from Liaoxian and Wuxiang, while part of the 36th Division departed from Lucheng and Xiangyuan; together they totaled over 3,000 troops. Coordinating from north and south, they carried out operations to "mop up" both banks of the Zhuozhang River between Yulin, Liaoxian, and Wuxiang, encircling and clearing the south side of the Yulin–Liaoxian highway. This emphasis on riverbanks and highway corridors reveals the Japanese method: move along terrain that controls movement, then compress enemy options until the defenders have to fight inside a narrowing space. The counter to that method required more than bravery. The Eighth Route Army's 385th and 386th Brigades, along with the 1st Column of the Decisive Battle, fought on inner lines—where they could move more rapidly between known local positions and threaten the enemy's flanks or supply behavior. Meanwhile the New 10th Brigade fought on outer lines, where it could intercept, delay, and force the enemy to spend time reacting instead of clearing. By the morning of October 15, the New 10th Brigade delivered a concrete example of that interception strategy. Two regiments ambushed an enemy motor-transport convoy at Gongjiagou on the Heliao Highway, destroying more than 40 vehicles and annihilating more than 100 Japanese soldiers escorting the convoy. The meaning of a convoy ambush is strategic even when the numbers are modest: vehicles represent speed, logistics, and reinforcement. If the enemy loses vehicles repeatedly, "mopping" becomes slower, and slower clearing creates openings for the defenders to reorganize, disperse, or shift main effort. After that, on October 17, the enemy forces that had been mopping up the convoy withdrew in different directions. Withdrawal in multiple directions is a sign that the Japanese clearing operation, meant to compress a space, had instead been forced into a reactive mode. It also hints at a recurring pattern in these years: Japanese units could clear what was already weak, but when defenders hit their movement corridors, the occupiers had to spend time and combat power simply to recover mobility. The next major sweep began October 20, 1940, and it was much larger. Nearly 10,000 troops—from the 36th Division and Independent Mixed Brigade No. 4—set off from multiple locations, including Wu'an, Liaoxian, Wuxiang, and Lucheng, to sweep the area east and west of the Qingzhang River, focusing on land between Matian and Zuohui. Crucially, that was not random ground. The Japanese sought to strike the CCP Central Committee Northern Bureau, the Eighth Route Army headquarters, and the 129th Division headquarters, along with party and government organs of the Jin-Ji-Yu Border Region, located together with Shexian and Piancheng. In other words, the Japanese targeted not just armed units but the political-administrative heart that makes base areas function. Once in the attack area, the Japanese carried out "mopping-up" operations paired with burning and killing for several days. That brutality wasn't only cruelty; it served a purpose. Burning villages, destroying crops, and killing civilians could deny the base area food and shelter while making local cooperation more difficult. Then, on October 26, the Japanese began to withdraw and carried out mopping-up in different areas on the way back. The base area was "severely damaged and destroyed," indicating that even when the Japanese didn't annihilate the main Communist force, they could still achieve degradation—hurting the system they needed to keep operating. But the Communists were not simply absorbing damage. On October 29, a force of over 500 men from the 36th Division, plus over 400 supply and laborers, was mopping up Huangyandong and advanced through Zuohui to Guanjia'nao east of Panlong, preparing to return to Wuxiang. This is where counter-mopping becomes operationally dangerous for the occupier. Supply and labor detachments move differently from combat formations, and they represent an enemy's assumption that the base area is being "cleared." The Eighth Route Army headquarters ordered, at 1:00 p.m., for the 129th Division to concentrate its main force to annihilate the enemy. That night, the 129th Division—uniting the main forces of the 385th and 386th Brigades, parts of the New 10th Brigade, and the First Column of the Death Squad—surrounded the enemy at Guanjia'nao with a plan to launch a general offensive at 4:00 a.m. The besieged enemy, besides quickly building fortifications, seized Fengkengding high ground southwest of Guanjia'nao under cover of darkness. The two high points helped defenders support one another and resist stubbornly. The battle lasted until dawn on October 31, when most of the enemy had been annihilated, leaving only more than 60 men to hold positions. Then reinforcements arrived—over 1,500 from Huangyandong—supported by more than 10 aircraft. The 129th Division withdrew, and the remaining enemy fled toward the flood, leaving behind more than 280 corpses. By then, most Japanese troops had withdrawn from the central base area. The background stake is clear: "mopping-up" could damage and burn, but if defenders could convert the Japanese attempt into a trap—especially when enemy units had become separated from their core and committed to clearing—they could turn a destructive operation into a costly one for the occupier. In early November, the Japanese continued. In Licheng south of Taihang, Japanese forces invaded Nanweiquan and Beiweiquan and then Xijing. Elsewhere, Japanese forces in Xiangyuan invaded Panlong via Xiying, attempting to attack Dongtian and the area around Zhuanbi, where the Eighth Route Army headquarters was located. In that moment, the 386th Brigade was ordered to rush to the north–south line of Damocun, east of Panlong, block the invading enemy, and cover the transfer of the Eighth Route Army headquarters. At 9:00 a.m. on November 3, 1940, fierce fighting broke out as the troops finished deploying near Damocun. The Japanese launched continuous attacks and captured some positions. The 386th Brigade held until 4:00 a.m. on November 4, then withdrew after the headquarters successfully moved. The Japanese attempt to launch a pincer attack failed, and they retreated to the Baijin Line on November 5. Even when Japanese action couldn't be fully blocked, the counter's aim was not only tactical survival but prevention of strategic encirclement—protecting the central institutions and preserving the ability to fight again. In the northern Taihang region, more than 2,500 enemy troops from Heshun arrived in Yushe on November 3 via Hanwang Town and Changcheng Town, reinforcing Japanese forces in the Yu, Liao, and Wu areas. Then they carried out repeated mopping operations south of the Yuliao Highway, including Jiangtang, Lingshang, Songjiazhuang, Guojiao, and Dayouyi. Harassment and attacks by military and civilians forced Japanese troops back into their strongholds by the 13th. A "40-day" counter-mopping operation in Taihang came to an end. The term "40-day" isn't only calendar time; it suggests that these were not one-off battles but sustained campaigns of movement, dispersal, and repeated harassment meant to drain the enemy's capacity. Starting November 17, the Japanese launched a multi-pronged attack on Qinyuan and the area north of Guodao Town. The attack involved part of the 37th Division from Qin County and Nanguan Town, part of the Independent Mixed Brigade from Pingyao, Jiexiu, and Huo County, and a battalion of the 41st Division from Hongdong—more than 7,000 troops deployed to attack Qinyuan and the north area. But the Taiyue Military Region response shows how the Communist counter-mopping wasn't always to meet force with force. To avoid the enemy's "sharp edge," the Taiyue Military Region formed two detachments—Qin East and Qin West—with leadership and main force moving to both sides of the Qin River outside the Japanese attack zone, targeting scattered Japanese troops instead of being fixed into a single killing field. By November 23, due to harassment by local armed forces, the Japanese reached the attack zone and then carried out dispersed mopping operations. Qinyuan County was the most severely damaged, with more than 5,000 people killed (about one-tenth of its population), nearly 10,000 livestock killed and over 7,000 stolen, and 30,000 to 40,000 houses destroyed. Those details are brutal, but they explain why background stakes mattered: "mopping-up" was meant to break the social base. If civilians died or fled, the guerrilla system became harder to sustain. The response from the Dayue Military Region seized the opportunity created by Japanese dispersal. On November 23, the 42nd Regiment of the Qinxi Detachment annihilated more than 100 Japanese soldiers in Guantan. On November 27, parts of the 42nd and 59th Regiments killed or wounded more than 160 in Huhanping and Mabei. The Qindong Detachment's 17th and 57th Regiments inflicted serious damage in a series of places—Guang'ao, Chenjiagou, Longfosi, Wuyuanzhen, Nanweicun, Nanli, and more. The 17th Regiment's battle at Longfosi annihilated more than 100 Japanese. Additional heavy losses were inflicted by the 212th Brigade in Jiaokou. By December 5, the Japanese were forced to withdraw from the Taiyue area in separate routes. Strategically, dispersal punished the occupier because scattered units are harder to protect and easier to ambush. Across the Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region, anti-"mopping-up" operations unfolded gradually, beginning with the Pingxi area, the first target of the Japanese on the path toward the Japanese-held headquarters and rail lines. Pingxi mattered because it directly threatened the headquarters of the Japanese North China Area Army and Beiping—the puppet regime's center—and also threatened the Pinghan and Pingsui railways, North China's main transportation lines. So Pingxi became an operational priority: if the occupier couldn't keep the rail network secure, their ability to reinforce and supply their own strongpoints suffered. On October 13, 1940, more than 10,000 Japanese and puppet troops attacked Sanpo, the central area of the Pingxi base area, in 10 routes. This attack used a methodical, steady approach: advance gradually, rely on strongholds, and cover 5 to 10 kilometers each day. In response, the Pingxi Military Sub-district countered using timely maneuvers of its main forces and extensive guerrilla warfare. Over more than a week of fighting, the enemy was constantly harassed and attacked, wearing them down. Although Japanese troops penetrated deep, they failed to identify the main force's movements. By November 21, when the encirclement tightened further, the Pingxi main force jumped out from the Sanpo area and moved southwest. Encountering the enemy at Pengtou, it then moved to the Yegu and Datai line east of Bancheng. After the Japanese entered the Sanpo area, they conducted widespread burning and killing and looted grain. Starting from the 23rd, the Japanese retreated in different routes. By the end of October, the main force had withdrawn from Pingxi, but more than 2,000 troops remained in the Pingxi anti-Japanese base area to build strongholds and roads. Strongholds were added in places like Changping and Wanping—14 strongholds alone—and villages such as Dongzhaitang and Dujiazhuang came under their control. The base area began to shrink and shrink. That shrinkage is the other background stake: even when guerrilla forces avoid annihilation, the occupier may still carve away space through fortification. On October 19, 1940, the Eighth Route Army headquarters instructed that enemy attacks in Pingxi and Taihang might turn around and attack the Beiyue area. The Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region needed to prepare quickly to crush these "mopping-up" operations, coordinating Party, government, military, and civilians and conducting in-depth combat mobilization. The main force should assemble in appropriate positions and prepare to annihilate one or two enemy forces decisively. The headquarters also instructed the 129th and 120th Divisions to cooperate actively. By November 9, 1940, the Japanese struck again in a massive sweep. The 110th Division, along with other units and more than 14,000 puppet troops, launched a "mopping-up" operation in the jurisdiction of the 1st Military Sub-district. The Japanese and puppet troops moved in coordinated lines: along the line of Yi County, Dalonghua, Wang'an Town, Laiyuan, and Chajianling from north to south, while those in Baoding and Mancheng moved east to west. The intent was to squeeze Communist sub-district forces into a narrow area for a decisive battle. On November 10, the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region issued operational guidelines and deployments for countering "mopping-up" operations. By the 12th, in response to Japanese widespread burning and killing, it further instructed that without hindering mobility, the main force could disperse a portion of troops—no more than one-third—to strike resolutely at attempts to burn and kill. That instruction captures the balance commanders tried to strike: disperse too much and you lose power; disperse too little and you become trapped by the occupier's brutality. The Japanese then attempted to pressure multiple places. On November 9, more than 6,000 enemy troops from Laiyuan, Yixian, and Baoding attacked Guantou, Yinfang, Huangtuling, and Shenbei. On the 12th, their attack failed; they burned and killed people before retreating in different routes. At that time, the 1st Military Sub-district assembled the 1st and 25th Regiments to intercept them. One enemy force of more than 800 was intercepted on the 14th as it retreated from Wujiazhuang to Yuangang; some were killed or wounded. Even so, the enemy broke through under aircraft cover and retreated to Guantou. On the way, it was intercepted again by the 20th Regiment, suffering heavy casualties, and it fled back to Mancheng. Then on November 13, more than 2,700 Japanese and puppet troops attacked the 3rd Military Sub-district; on November 14, about 2,600 advanced from Dingxiang, Dongye, and Wutai toward Fuping and its southwest area in two routes. The Japanese attacked with east-west coordination, launching joint attacks on Taiyu north of Fuping. The Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region headquarters and the command organs of the 3rd and 5th military sub-districts, along with the 2nd, 3rd, and 6th regiments and other troops, transferred to the outer line before the enemy encirclement formed. On the 16th, the Japanese launched a joint attack again on Taiyu and Zhangjiayu, and the guerrillas who failed to transfer fought hard. Commander Wang Pu and Deputy Director of the Political Department Hao Yuming were killed, and troops suffered more than 100 casualties. On November 18, the enemy from Taiyu quickly occupied Hanping City. By the 21st, enemy forces from Daying via Shentangbao and Wuwangkou, and from Wutai via Taihuai, Shizui, Longquanguan, and Xiaguan, also gathered in Fuping City. After occupying Fuping, the Japanese launched repeated attacks "sweeping" areas under the jurisdiction of the 3rd Military Sub-district from both inward and outward strongholds, conducting brutal burning and killing and destruction. On the night of November 21, the 2nd Regiment dispatched more than 30 men to raid Dangcheng and attack Japanese barracks with grenades. The Japanese panicked and fired guns and cannons all night. On the 26th, four plainclothes officers infiltrated Baoding and attacked a theater where the Japanese army was holding a meeting, causing panic among the Japanese. The enemy that had invaded the base area withdrew in different routes on the 25th. By December 3, 1940, most Japanese troops had withdrawn from the Beiyue area, but more than 1,000 remained along lines including Fuping, Wangkuai, Dangcheng, and Quyang to continue building points and roads in an attempt to occupy the area long-term. To force the enemy back, eliminate occupied points, and completely crush Japanese and puppet "mopping-up," the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region organized the Fuping–Wangkuai Campaign starting December 9, with the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 6th regiments participating. At 21:00 on December 14, the 6th Regiment attacked enemy forces in Dongzhuang. The 1st Battalion captured three fortified positions on the north mountain of Dongzhuang and rushed into the village, only for Japanese counterattacks to recapture fortified positions and kill or wound more than 170 Japanese during the counterfight. The 4th Regiment attacked the enemy in Fuping; the 2nd Regiment and guerrilla forces entered Dangcheng and Lingshan. On the 21st, more than 130 enemy soldiers escorting more than 100 pack animals carrying military supplies reached Wangkuai and were completely annihilated when they reached Wanglinkou. By December 26, an ambush in the Xuancun area of the Pinghan Railway destroyed 14 Japanese trains and their vehicles as well as three heavy artillery pieces. On the 27th, more than 1,200 enemy troops advancing from Dongzhuang in Fuping were attacked in Luoyu and Tumen, suffering more than 140 casualties. The remaining Japanese withdrew from Fuping, Dongzhuang, and Wangkuai starting New Year's Day 1941. By January 4, the 55-day anti-"mopping-up" campaign had basically ended, with the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region killing and wounding more than 2,000 Japanese and puppet troops while suffering 1,382 casualties itself. These numbers and dates show why background and stakes matter: the counter-mopping effort wasn't short. It was sustained, operationally demanding, and required continued offensive action even while facing superior Japanese resources. The pressure didn't end there. From October 25 to early November, about 4,000 Japanese troops, including the 16th Independent Mixed Brigade, launched a mopping operation in the Miyu and Loufan areas of the 8th and 3rd military sub-districts in northwestern Shanxi, but they were attacked by local soldiers and civilians. In mid-December, Japanese forces transferred additional strength: parts of the 37th Division from southern Shanxi and the 41st Division from southeastern Shanxi, along with parts of the 3rd, 9th, and 16th Independent Mixed Brigades and the 26th Division from northwestern Shanxi—totaling more than 20,000 troops—to prepare for a full-scale mopping operation in northwestern Shanxi. After the second phase of the Hundred Regiments Offensive ended, the 120th Division anticipated retaliation and actively prepared for counter-mopping. On October 30, the division was ordered to establish the Jin-Northwest Military Region, and on November 7, the military region was established in Lijiawan, Xing County. The Jin-Northwest Military Region had direct military sub-districts and six military sub-districts: the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 8th, and Yanbei. Then the occupier escalated. Starting December 14, 1940, the Japanese launched a full-scale mopping operation against the Jin-Northwest region. More than 5,000 enemy troops invaded the Mi-Yu Town area of the 8th Military Sub-district, more than 4,000 invaded Lin-Xian, and more than 6,000 attacked Xing-Xian and the area south of Bao-De from strongholds such as Lan-Xian and Qi-Lan. By December 23, Japanese forces had occupied all county towns, most market towns, and Yellow River crossings in the Jin-Northwest region except for Bao-De and He-Qu counties, and began to implement a systematic policy commonly described as the "Three Alls" policy. The "Three Alls" emphasis is the clearest expression of stakes turning lethal. Japanese troops and traitors disguised themselves as the Eighth Route Army to lure and kill masses. They sent out core detachments to attack and repeatedly sweep the area, seeking to annihilate party, government, and military leadership organs—focusing on destroying the rear organs and facilities that made Communist endurance possible. According to incomplete statistics, more than 5,000 people were brutally killed during these sweeps. In Xingxian County alone, 150,000 catties of grain were looted and burned; in the 4th Military Sub-district, more than 5,000 head of livestock were looted and killed; and more than 19,000 houses and cave dwellings were burned down. In the early stage of this anti-mopping campaign, the Jin-Sui Military Region mainly used a portion of its forces to cooperate with local troops and guerrillas in widespread guerrilla warfare. They harassed and contained the attacking enemy, disrupted enemy transportation, and covered the transfer of the masses. The main force avoided the enemy's sharp edge and moved to the outer line to seek opportunities to attack the Japanese army. This describes the classic guerrilla operational pattern: avoid being fixed into a single decisive trap, but create enough friction that enemy operations degrade into a struggle they can't sustain. repeated attacks and ambushes during the mopping period across Miyu Town and other areas—units striking repeatedly, destroying roads, cutting off enemy transportation, and attacking enemy strongholds north of Dawu. To thwart the Japanese army's plans to build roads and fortifications—plans that would make future sweeps easier—the Jin-Sui Military Region instructed, on December 27, all sub-districts to mobilize forces to disrupt Japanese road construction and fortification. The 358th Brigade attacked enemy road construction from Lanxian to Dashetou and from Puming to Chijianling; the Independent 1st Brigade sabotaged the Dawu–Linxian highway; and the 4th Column of the Death Squad sabotaged the Dawu–Fangshan highway. Part of the Independent 1st Brigade's 2nd Regiment organized over 2,000 civilians to sabotage the Dawu–Sanjiao highway twice, forcing the enemy in Linxian to detour through Fangshan to contact Lishi. The Lishi guerrillas led civilians in two sabotage attacks on the Lishi–Jundu highway, destroying over 30 "li" of road. Other units attacked strongholds along key highways and destroyed or disrupted the "maintenance committees" that surrounded newly built enemy strongholds. There were also direct raids—storming into Linxian County and capturing representatives of enemy maintenance organizations. Meanwhile, the Workers' and Patriots' Brigade carried out continuous sabotage on the Taifen Highway. As the enemy plans ran into persistent disruption, Japanese and puppet forces began to retreat in different routes starting January 2, 1941, and by January 24 they returned to their original strongholds. The Jin-Sui winter counter-mopping operation lasted 40 days, annihilated more than 2,500 enemy troops, destroyed 125 kilometers of roads and 23 bridges, and recovered all towns occupied by the enemy during the campaign. Here the stakes show through most clearly: the campaign was not merely about killing enemy troops. It was about preventing the occupier from building a durable, road-connected grid that would allow future sweeps to be faster, larger, and more decisive. At the wider campaign level, the Eighth Route Army also recorded its total effects from August 20 to December 5, covering roughly three and a half months. During that period, the Eighth Route Army fought 1,824 battles of varying sizes, killing or wounding 20,645 Japanese soldiers (including senior officers), killing or wounding 5,155 puppet troops, and capturing 281 Japanese soldiers and 18,407 puppet troops. 47 Japanese soldiers surrendered voluntarily, and 1,845 puppet troops defected, totaling 46,380 people. The Communists captured 5,942 guns and 53 artillery pieces, and destroyed extensive transportation infrastructure: 474 kilometers of railway, 1,502 kilometers of highway, 213 bridges, 37 railway stations, 11 tunnels, more than 217,000 rails, more than 1,549,000 sleepers, more than 109,000 telephone poles, and more than 424,000 kilograms of telephone wire. Five coal mines and 11 warehouses were destroyed. The narrative further adds that when including casualties of Japanese and puppet forces across related engagements—such as Fuwang and the anti–mopping operations in northwest Shanxi—the total number of casualties reached more than 50,880. Japanese statistics were also cited for damage assessment, noting destruction of track and bridges across key railways (Zhengtai, Tongpu, Pinghan), telegraph pole damage, power line cuts, and effects on coal production—such as the Jingxing New Mine being unable to produce coal for at least six months. These details underline a broader background stake: infrastructure damage was meant to weaken the occupier's ability to keep its occupation apparatus working, even after the direct battles ended. The price of that multi-month struggle was high for the Eighth Route Army as well. Over the three and a half months leading up to the Hundred Regiments Offensive, the Eighth Route Army suffered 17,000 casualties, and more than 20,000 were poisoned. During the Hundred Regiments Offensive itself, post-war statistics state that the 129th Division suffered 7,362 casualties and 450 missing persons, and the entire division suffered 7,812 casualties. When you connect these lines—offensive sabotage, counter-offensives, Japanese mopping-ups, and anti-mopping resistance—you see why this second wave of fighting mattered. It wasn't only about whether the Japanese could respond to the offensive. It was about whether both sides could sustain their operational logic: the Japanese trying to stabilize occupation through "mopping," and the Communists trying to preserve base systems through dispersal, harassment, and counter-moves that convert the occupier's clearing effort into something too costly to maintain. The background of the Hundred Regiments offensive, who authorized it, who planned it, and why, remains unclear. The Japanese response was so severe that, in retrospect, it appeared to some as if the offensive had been a mistake. Some leaders, especially Mao, may have wanted to disavow it. Indirect hints in Mao's writings in subsequent months and years suggest he may have viewed it critically or harbored misgivings from the start. It was not the kind of strategy Mao preferred. More than twenty years later, during the Cultural Revolution, Red Guards charged that Mao had not even known of the plan in advance because of Peng Dehuai's alleged duplicity, at the time, Peng was being denounced. While this seems unlikely, it may contain some substance. In his own defense against these charges, Peng stated that after the 8RA headquarters—located not in Yan'an but in Jin-Cha-Ji—planned the operation, it sent mobilization orders downward to each regional command and also notified the Central Military Affairs Commission headed by Mao. In the original plan, the action would begin in early September. But, Peng wrote, to prevent enemy discovery and to ensure simultaneous surprise assaults—thereby inflicting an even greater blow to the enemy and the puppets—they began about ten days earlier than scheduled, during the last week of August. "So we did not wait for approval from the Military Affairs Commission (this was wrong), but went right into combat earlier than planned." There is also the issue of the "spontaneous" participation of more than eighty regiments without authorization from the Eighth Route Army headquarters, and not from Yan'an as well. If Peng Dehuai's account is accepted (written in 1970, shortly before his death), then Mao and Party Central had no role in conceiving or planning the Hundred Regiments campaign. In that case, the "grand strategy" motivations for undertaking it largely vanish—except perhaps insofar as they were considered by Peng and his colleagues. One alleged motive was to counter any tendency toward capitulation by Chiang Kai-shek and the Chongqing regime: if the war heated up and the CCP threw itself into fighting, any accommodation between Chiang and Japan would look like cowardly surrender. A related consideration was the Communist leadership's sensitivity to the charge that they were simply exploiting the war to expand their influence—avoiding Japanese combat while letting KMT armies bear the real burden of fighting. The Nationalists gave major publicity to the accusation that CCP policy devoted 70 percent of effort to expansion, 20 percent to coping with the KMT, and only 10 percent to opposing Japan. A third suggested motive was to divert attention from the New Fourth Army's offensives against Nationalist forces in Central China, which were peaking around the same time. Peng Dehuai acknowledged the campaign was "too protracted," yet he defended its importance in maintaining the CCP's anti-Japanese image in the wake of anti-friction conflicts, in demonstrating the failure of the cage-and-silkworm policy, in returning at least twenty-six county seats to base control, and in keeping "wavering" elements in line. Even if these reasons mattered less than regional and tactical calculations in launching the campaign, they could always be used for propaganda afterward. Whatever misgivings Mao and Party Central may have had, the Party kept them to itself. Mao radioed congratulations to Peng after his victory, and in public statements the Hundred Regiments were turned into legend. Even if the Hundred Regiments campaign aimed to defeat Japanese pacification efforts, it did not succeed in a decisive way. Shocked and stung by the 8RA's action, the North China Area Army intensified its efforts to bring North China under tighter control. Under General Tada and then his successor, General Okamura Yasuji (July 1941–November 1944), the Japanese inflicted brutal, sustained violence against all North China bases. Between 1941 and 1944, about 150,000 Japanese troops were assigned full-time to pacification duty, supported by roughly 100,000 Chinese auxiliaries of widely varying description and effectiveness. The remainder of the NCAA (about 150,000–200,000 men) was assigned to other tasks such as garrisoning major cities and containing Nationalist forces. Communist regulars were estimated at around 250,000 within base areas and 40,000 in SKN. The Japanese and their Chinese auxiliaries invested even more heavily than before in constructing moats, ditches, palisades, and blockhouses. Japanese sources claimed that by 1942 their forces had built 11,860 kilometers of blockade line and 7,700 fortified posts, mostly in the Hebei plains and the foothills of the Taihang mountains. A massive trench ran for 500 kilometers along the western side of the Pinghan railway line, with a depopulated and constantly patrolled zone on either side. The 250 Japanese outposts established in southern Hebei by December 1940 were more than quadrupled by mid-1942. These became the key means of controlling plains areas; by the end of 1941, all Communist bases in such terrain had been reduced to guerrilla status. Many main force units—such as those under Liu Cheng'ao and Yang Xiufeng—were compelled to move westward into mountains to survive. What distinguished the new Tada–Okamura approach from earlier tactics was the much larger and more protracted search-and-destroy thrust into the core mountain-base areas. They also replaced selective repression with indiscriminate, generalized violence. These infamous "Three-All" mop-up campaigns meant: kill all, burn all, loot all. Unable to distinguish ordinary peasants from Communists, the Japanese waged war on everyone. After attempting to seal off major consolidated regions in the base areas, they sent in very large detachments to search for Communist forces, civilian cadres, and activists. They also tried to destroy base facilities and war material stockpiles; to disrupt agriculture by burning crops or interfering with planting and harvesting; and to seize grain stores. Entire villages were razed, and everything alive found there was killed. Unlike earlier mop-ups that swept through an area and then departed, these campaigns left troops in the targeted zones for extended periods, "combing" the area back and forth and building at least temporary strongpoints in more accessible parts of mountain bases. These mop-up operations took a heavy and painful toll on rural populations. No doubt the harsh tactics and atrocities frequently committed during these actions did cause many peasants, rich and poor alike, to harbor deep hatred of the Japanese and to commit more fully to the Communist side. But intra-party sources also portray cases in which repression worked even more effectively than earlier attempts to drive a wedge between party and peasantry. As one internal assessment put it: If we only stress concealment… we are bound to be divorced from the masses. The morale of the masses cannot be sustained for long either. On the other hand, if we only seek fleeting gratification in careless fighting, we may also invite still more cruel enemy suppression. That will also alienate the masses. Communist spokesmen acknowledged that, in North China base areas, the population under Party control fell from 44 million to 25 million, while the Eighth Route Army declined from 400,000 to 300,000. Local records present an even grimmer picture. By 1942, 90 percent of the plains bases had been reduced to guerrilla zones or outright enemy control. In the mountainous Taiyue district within the Jin-Cha-Lu-Yi base, one cadre admitted that "not a single county was kept intact and the government offices of all its twelve counties were exiled in Jin-yuan." All twenty-six county seats occupied following the Hundred Regiments fighting were lost. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Japan tried to regain control through retaliatory "mopping-up" operations starting in October 1940. In response, the Eighth Route Army and its commanders issued counter-measures: coordinate party, government, military, and civilians; keep mobility while dispersing forces when possible; and focus on annihilating incoming enemy units decisively. Counter-sweeps and anti-pacification actions continued through December, involving repeated ambushes and sabotage of roads, highways, and fortification efforts. 

This week on Sinica, I speak with Andrew Seth Meyer, professor of history at CUNY Brooklyn College and the author of a remarkable new book from Oxford University Press, To Rule All Under Heaven: A History of Classical China from Confucius to the First Emperor. Sixteen years in the making, it's the first proper one-volume narrative history of the Warring States in English aimed at a general reader — a gap in the field that Andy has now decisively filled. We talk about why this period — the roughly 260 years between Confucius's death and Qin's unification in 221 BCE — really is the deepest layer of Chinese political history that still genuinely matters, and we try together to find the line between responsible historical reasoning about modern China and the kind of lazy essentialism that reaches for Han Feizi every time Xi Jinping makes a speech. Along the way we get into the displacement of the hereditary aristocracy by the shi, the Lüshi Chunqiu as a piece of political genius, why the standard caricature of “Legalist” Qin is wrong, and what it means that the Chinese state is still, in some real sense, running on operating software written in the 4th century BCE.8:14 – The 16-year gestation, why no general-reader Warring States book existed in English, and what made Andy think he could be the one to write it11:06 – The romanization headaches: Wei vs. Wey, King Zhao of Qin vs. King Zhao of Yan, and the special agonies of writing about early China for an English audience14:31 – Why he organized the book by state rather than strictly chronologically — and what that structure lets him do18:14 – The relevance question: how to take the deep continuity of Chinese political life seriously without falling into the orientalist “eternal China” trap25:52 – Why the Warring States is properly called a revolution: the destruction of Zhou-era hereditary aristocracy and the rise of the shi33:15 – Fukuyama's claim that Qin built the world's first genuinely modern state — is “modern” the right word?36:30 – Qin's 38 commanderies, why the radical version lasted only 15 years, and the Han retreat: aristocracy or regional autonomy?39:46 – Reading the Hundred Schools as embedded political actors rather than tidy textbook categories — and the Jixia Academy as ancient Brookings44:06 – The Lüshi Chunqiu as a brilliant piece of political propaganda, and what its tripartite cosmological structure was actually arguing52:31 – Why the cartoon-legalist version of the Qin is wrong: the 70 erudites, the Taishan stelae, and what the book-burning episode really was57:05 – The axial age question: pattern-matching or something real?1:00:40 – What the Warring States actually has to teach us about China in 2026: zhong guo as aspiration, not description1:05:08 – How the Warring States is taught in China and Taiwan today, and what archaeology is doing to the field1:08:36 – Constant self-reinvention as the real Chinese legacy, and why no plausible future China fully repudiates the CCPPaying it forward:Avital Rom (postdoc at Cambridge, early Chinese cultural history, editor of a forthcoming volume on disability and impairment in early China)Liang Cai (Notre Dame, new book on Han-era jurisprudence and legal traditions)Recommendations:Andy: Hadestown on Broadway — and Anaïs Mitchell's original concept albumKaiser: To Say Nothing of the Dog: or, How We Found the Bishop's Bird Stump at Last by Connie Willis (audiobook especially recommended)See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

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Last time we spoke about the battle Yaoyi. Japan pushed hard into Hubei with a plan: surround the main Chinese forces and seize Yichang, hoping to use it to strike at Chongqing. At first, the fighting was chaotic and punishing. The Chinese side tried to hold the line and disrupt the advance, and they even managed setbacks for the Japanese, pushing back, retaking key ground, and hitting supply and positioning weaknesses. But victory came with a cost: commanders were lost, and every gain was hard-won. Still, the battle didn't unfold as a clean Chinese retreat or a simple Japanese win. As Japanese units shifted and tested for openings, the Chinese forces adjusted—delaying, regrouping, and fighting to keep their formations from being completely trapped. Eventually, Japan managed to break through at critical moments, especially through crossings and maneuvers that the Chinese had not fully sealed off. In the end, Japan succeeded in taking Yichang, but it didn't achieve the decisive annihilation it wanted.    #201 The New Fourth Army Incident and the Strained United Front Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. After the catastrophe of the early 1930s, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) entered the war against Japan in a political mood that was both hopeful and wary: it wanted to be seen as a genuine national leader of resistance, yet it also feared being absorbed—or destroyed—by the Guomindang (KMT) state it had spent years battling. That tension became the organizing principle of the war's early years. The turning point came from the Xi'an Incident in December 1936, which forced a new calculation in Nationalist politics. In the months that followed, agreements between KMT and CCP representatives were publicly proclaimed in August and September 1937, after the Shanghai fighting began. Under these arrangements, the CCP accepted constraints that in peacetime would have looked like surrender: it pledged to strive for Sun Yixian's "Three People's Principles," to end its former policies of armed revolt and sovietization, to abolish the soviet government, and to discontinue both the term "Red Army" and the expectation that its forces would operate outside central control. Communist troops would be treated as part of the national military under KMT command, and the revolution's old administrative structures were to be formally dismantled. In return, the KMT offered the CCP something just as important: space to exist publicly and politically. Liaison offices were permitted in key cities; the CCP was allowed to publish the New China Daily; and it could nominate representatives to KMT advisory bodies. Civil rights were extended—political prisoners were released—and subsidies were established to help cover administrative and military expenses in "reintegrated" areas and territories. The war thus transformed the tactical reality on the ground: the CCP could not treat the KMT as an immediate enemy, but it also could not afford to become politically passive. It had to learn how to fight Japan while building legitimacy fast enough to survive the next phase. In the first year and a half, the Party Center focused on three problems that kept returning in different forms: how the "united front" would be defined—especially what the CCP's relationship to the National government should be; how to coordinate military strategy and tactics with Nationalist units without losing control of its own operations; and how leadership should be consolidated, particularly for Mao Zedong in a party that still contained rival centers of authority. These disputes mattered not just for doctrine but for survival, because the CCP's autonomy was constantly being tested by the very alliance that was supposed to protect it. Mao's own approach to the united front combined cooperation with a refusal to surrender independence. Publicly, the CCP praised Jiang Jieshi and the KMT and promised unity, but it did so in language that was deliberately broad. In private (and in internal party debates), Mao treated unity as conditional: the CCP must not split the united front, but it also must not be "bound hand and foot." The strategic idea that emerged was political initiative under constraints—fighting when it could plausibly claim justification, keeping enough restraint that the CCP would not appear self-interested or anti-national, and deciding for itself when to engage and when to withdraw. This balance was reinforced through military reorganization. In August–September 1937, CCP forces were reorganized as the Eighth Route Army (8RA), with roughly 30,000 men drawn from Long March survivors, local forces, and new recruits. The 8RA was divided into three divisions: the 115th, 120th, and 129th, commanded by Lin Biao, He Long, and Liu Bocheng respectively. Shortly after the war began, the National government also authorized a second major Communist force: the New Fourth Army (N4A), to operate in central China. Its core came from those left behind when the Long March began in 1934—small groups surviving in difficult conditions against continuing KMT pressure. Officially authorized at 12,000, it took months to reach that strength. Nominally commanded by Ye Ting, actual military and political control rested with Xiang Ying and Chen Yi. From the start, then, the CCP's wartime "integration" with the National system coexisted with a clear effort to preserve internal control. Ideologically, the CCP worked to make its revolutionary program compatible—at least in appearance—with a national resistance coalition. On the New Democracy demonstrated how this strategy operated on two levels. In KMT-controlled spaces, its language could be read as aligning with liberal-democratic expectations: public participation, multi-party governance, legally protected civil rights. But in CCP-controlled areas, the same text could carry sharper class-based and authoritarian implications. The Party wanted a united front that broadened support without becoming committed to Nationalist limits on how society itself might be reorganized after victory. Meanwhile, even as the rhetoric of unity rose, the CCP worried about something more dangerous than military setbacks: the possibility that the KMT might accommodate Japan. Late 1939 and early 1940 made this fear harder to dismiss. Japan pursued collaboration with Wang Jingwei, culminating in the establishment of a "reorganized" government at Nanjing in March 1940. At the same time, Japanese intermediaries sought approaches to Chiang Kai-shek himself—an effort that the CCP tracked closely as a sign that peace negotiations might be possible even when battlefield conditions looked grim. Propaganda was involved, but the anxiety was real: if Japan and the Nationalists reached an arrangement, the CCP's whole wartime legitimacy-building effort could collapse overnight. As a result, the united front was interpreted inside the CCP not as a permanent coalition with the KMT, but as a flexible strategy with a cardinal purpose: to prevent peace between Japan and the Nationalists. Mao's position on the united front reflected this. For him, the alliance was meant to suspend the possibility of a China–Japan settlement, not to end the CCP's separate identity. The CCP could participate in a reconstituted national framework—possibly even a "democratic republic"—to gain legality and influence, but it should remain politically and, where possible, physically separate from the KMT. By 1939, however, the practical meaning of "flexibility" collided with reality. What had seemed, to some observers, like an unusually cordial entente began to fade. The KMT Central Committee adopted measures early in 1939 aimed at restricting Communist expansion, and armed clashes increased through the summer and continued into autumn and winter—especially around North China Communist bases. The period of rising conflict was later labeled by the CCP as the "first anti-Communist upsurge" (roughly spanning December 1939 into March 1940), but the crucial point was that both sides viewed each confrontation as a test of legal rights, moral legitimacy, and control over territory. Strategically, the CCP understood the KMT's effort as an attempt to check unauthorized growth of Communist armed power and to recover areas where influence had already slipped away—either to the Communists or, by indirect effect, to Japan. The KMT emphasized its traditional legal authority; the CCP countered with its claim to an "evolutionary" moral right to challenge the government's legitimacy. In practice, the conflict took the form of increasingly systematic military pressure, including a blockade around the Shen–Gan–Ning region. By this point, the blockade involved large numbers of troops (on the order of hundreds of thousands), halting Communist expansion and disrupting direct contact with other Communist forces farther afield, even as fighting flared along border zones and around vulnerable points in the Communist defensive perimeter. So, by the edge of the "middle years," the wartime alliance had not broken into open civil war—but it had also stopped being secure. The united front survived, yet it operated under strain: its language of cooperation continued, while "friction" between partners hardened into a central feature of the resistance struggle. Transition into the war's second phase began in early 1939, shaped by the stalemate Mao had already anticipated at the sixth plenum in late 1938. Mao argued that during this prolonged "new stage" the forces of resistance—above all, Communist-led forces—would strengthen. The overall result, however, was mixed. In Shandong and Central China, new Communist bases did take shape. But across much of North China, Japanese consolidation cost the resistance heavily in manpower and population. Base-area economies suffered serious strain, and the peasantry endured hardships more severe than at any earlier point. This stalemate had two main dimensions. The first was the growing resentment of the Nationalists toward Communist expansion—resentment made especially sharp by their own losses. As the Nationalists were driven out of regions that had previously provided them their greatest wealth and power in the central and lower Yangtze basin, they also lost the "cream" of their armies. In contrast, the CCP was spreading through the wider countryside behind Japanese lines, extending its influence and winning broader popular support. The second dimension was Japan's desire—and need—to consolidate territories it had only nominally conquered and to extract economic value from them. After all, the logic of the "China Incident" was to draw on China's labor and resources to strengthen Japan, not to bleed Japan's gains away by draining wealth into China's vast interior. A Japanese colonel, lamenting the situation, captured the frustration of this drift into deeper entanglement: he regretted that Japan had not ended the "China Incident" once its initial objectives were reached. Instead, Japan was drawn into the hinterland and became bogged down in endless attrition—leaving it with little more than "real estate" rather than the popular support it believed it would secure from those it claimed to "liberate." To improve their position, Japanese authorities—still fragmented by internal rivalry—pursued several strategies. One was a new peace offensive aimed simultaneously at Jiang Jieshi, alongside efforts to establish a "reformed" Nationalist government under Wang Jingwei, who had fled Chongqing in December 1938. Japan also recruited more collaborators and puppet officials. Finally, it carried out forceful military, political, and economic measures intended to establish effective territorial control and eliminate opposition. During the middle years of the war, the Communists described their conflicts with the Nationalists using the euphemism "friction". By 1939, what many observers—possibly incorrectly—had viewed as an unusually warm alliance began to break down. In early 1939, the KMT Central Committee adopted measures meant to restrict the CCP. From the summer onward, military clashes began and continued into autumn and winter with increasing frequency and intensity, most of them concentrated around and within the North China base areas. The Communists later labeled the period from December 1939 to March 1940 the "first anti-Communist upsurge." Naturally, each side accused the other of aggression and claimed self-defense against unjust attacks. Strategically, though, the North China "upsurge" functioned as a Nationalist attempt to limit the CCP's expansion beyond the areas assigned to it and to regain influence in regions the Communists—or the Japanese—had already taken from the KMT. Jiang Jieshi framed the matter as a defense of legal rights grounded in tradition, while the Communists asserted an "evolutionary" right to challenge the moral legitimacy of those legal claims. During 1939, the Nationalists began to blockade Shen–Gan–Ning around its southern and western perimeter. Within a year, this blockade grew to nearly 400,000 troops, including some of the last remaining Central Army units under the command of Hu Zongnan. The blockade stopped further Communist expansion, especially into Gansu and Suiyuan, and severed direct contact between SKN and Communists operating in Xinjiang (Chinese Turkestan) adjacent to Soviet Central Asia. The Xinjiang Communists—including Mao Zedong's brother—were eliminated in 1942. Meanwhile, fierce fighting erupted along the Gansu–Shaanxi border and in the north-eastern corner of SKN near the Great Wall at Suide, as the blockading forces probed for weak points. Elements of He Long's 120th Division were even pulled back from the Jin–Sui base across the Yellow River to strengthen SKN's regular defenses. Economically, the blockade was even more damaging. During 1939, central government subsidies to the Border Region budget were cut off. Trade between the Border Region and other parts of China nearly stopped, a devastating blow to a region unable to supply itself with many basic commodities. At the same time, Nationalist and regional forces also attempted to expand their military and administrative authority into Hebei, Shanxi, Henan, and Shandong—areas the CCP now considered its base zones. In resisting these efforts, the CCP predictable accused its rivals of harming resistance work and damaging the people's interests. The "experts in dissension" were said to cooperate with the Japanese and their puppets. Based on increasing collaboration by regional units with Japan, the CCP implied that this was a deliberate and cynical strategy—described as "crooked-line patriotism"—intended to preserve those units for future anti-Communist operations. Even so, the CCP tried to avoid an open break with the Nationalist regime in Chongqing. In public, it consistently portrayed these clashes as being initiated by local commanders acting beyond orders from higher authority—despite knowing this depiction was false. Jiang Jieshi, unable to refute the claim outright, effectively permitted it to serve as the justification for a firm Communist response. Mao Zedong outlined the general resistance policy as "justification, expedience, and restraint". The CCP was to fight when it could claim justification and when it could gain advantage, but not to press attacks beyond what the Nationalists would tolerate or in ways that could damage its image as selfless patriots. Communist forces were expected to keep initiative as much as possible in their own hands—deciding when to engage, whether to engage, and when to disengage. The most striking episode of the "first anti-Communist upsurge" was the rupture with Yan Xishan in December 1939. Tensions in Shanxi had been rising throughout the summer and autumn, as Yan and his conservative supporters—associated with the "Old Army"—linked the Sacrifice League and the Dare-to-die Corps of the "New Army" with Communist forces. When base areas and Japanese occupation eventually took over much of his province, Yan was forced into exile at Qiulin across the Yellow River in Shaanxi. In November, Yan ordered his Old Army to disarm the Dare-to-die forces with help from central units dispatched by Hu Zongnan. In the bloody fighting that followed, these elements gradually broke free of even nominal provincial control and fully completed their connection with Communist forces. More than 30,000 people went over to the Communists. One KMT intelligence agent described the process with bitterness and a sense of inevitability: the Communists were first "full of sweet words," flattery, and distortions designed to open things up and conceal their actions. But once they had fully entrenched themselves, and once the low-level base had been established, they turned and bit. The agent suggested they had suspected things might end this way, but were not aware how quickly events would move—or that it could happen precisely while Communist calls for "united front" and "maintenance of unity for resistance" filled the air. About a month later, in February and March 1940, elements of the 8RA beat back this so-called upsurge. Zhang Yinwu's forces were disarmed and dispersed across the plains of north Hebei. To the south, Chu Huaiping and Shi Yusan were pushed out of the base area, as was the KMT-appointed provincial governor Lu Zhonglin. Although some non-Communist forces remained in the region, the CCP's and CCLY bases were never again seriously threatened by forces affiliated with the central government. Reinforcing the CCP's accusations, Shi Yusan was later executed in 1940 by the central government for collaboration with the Japanese. By late 1939, CCP central authorities maintained that the areas where the CCP could expand its armed strength were mainly limited to Shandong and Central China. In those regions, the CCP continued trying to carve out bases where they could operate. The situation in Shandong was complicated. After the Japanese invasion, most Nationalist-affiliated forces stayed in the province, while Communist forces and bases were weaker and more scattered than further west. Only in late 1938 did major 8RA units from the 115th and 129th Divisions—led by Xu Xiangqian and Luo Ronghuan—enter Shandong to link up with the Shandong column and local guerrillas, including survivors of a large band recently decimated by the Japanese. Even with these efforts, Communist actions led to clashes not only with Japanese forces but also with various Nationalist-affiliated groups—groups that were stronger than the Communists at the time. Until late 1940, the CCP's clashes with Nationalist forces in Shandong were actually bloodier than clashes with the Japanese. The CCP understood that its Chinese rivals mistrusted one another, and that their attitudes toward the CCP varied widely. The main Nationalist forces were often not tightly affiliated with Chiang Kai-shek or the central government. Instead, they operated under independent—and at times disgruntled—regional commanders. Communist tactics were expressed through slogans emphasizing ways to win support and isolate hardliners: develop progressive forces and win over fence-sitters while isolating "die-hards"; flatter top echelons, enlist the middle ranks, and hit the rank and file; and win over Yi Xuezhong, isolate Shen Honglie, and eliminate Qin Qirong. Still, unlike other North China base areas, the Communists were unable for several years to neutralize Nationalist forces in Shandong. Even if Japanese mop-up campaigns had not weakened those Nationalists, the text suggests the Communists may still have struggled to do so. By November 1940, Xu Xiangqian claimed meaningful progress while admitting Shandong had not yet become a fully consolidated base. CCP successes were greatest along parts of the Shandong–Hebei border, around the Taishan massif in central Shandong, and near the tip of the peninsula far to the east. Elsewhere, "progressive forces" remained weak. Communist regular troops numbered about 70,000, which was far below the party center's goals of 150,000 regulars and between 1.5 and 2 million self-defense forces. Moreover, systematic economic reforms had barely begun. The CCP relied on familiar practices—confiscations, collections of "national salvation grain," contributions, and loans—alongside a conventional taxation system adjusted to favor poorer peasants. Communist expansion in Central China was even riskier, with a greater likelihood of large-scale conflict with central government forces than in the north. In much of North China, "friction" came primarily from rapid Communist expansion into areas with partial vacuums. In Central China, however, base-building required displacing an existing Nationalist military-administrative presence closely tied to Jiang Kai-shek and the Chongqing government. The burden of this expansion was carried mainly by the 6th Detachment (northern Anhui and Jiangsu) and the 5th Detachment, which was reinforced by 15,000 to 20,000 8RA troops under Huang K'o-ch'eng. As Chen Yi's 1st Detachment crossed from south to north through the corridor provided by Guan Wenwei's local forces, it became actively involved as well. This expansion—driven by increasingly urgent directives from Mao and Liu during the latter part of 1939 and into 1940—brought the N4A north of the river into ever more frequent and sharper clashes with Nationalist authorities in Anhui and Jiangsu, especially with units under Jiangsu governor Han Deqin. South of the river, though, Xiang Ying did not directly challenge Chongqing's commanders. Mao later charged that Xiang Ying may have been influenced by Wang Ming, or else he may simply have seen no realistic alternative. His forces—three detachments plus a headquarters unit—were heavily outnumbered by Qu Chutong's Nationalist units, not to mention Japanese forces and their puppets. Even if Mao insisted bases could be built "anywhere," the Shanghai–Hangzhou–Nanjing triangle was especially difficult terrain. Xiang Ying and his followers had survived with extraordinary tenacity in the mountains of South China between 1934 and 1937, enduring brutal search-and-destroy operations that were not lifted until the war began. It therefore seems unlikely that such survivors would suddenly become "right-wing capitulationists."  Yet by spring 1940, Mao was pressing Xiang Ying more intensely. The Central Committee's message was explicit: expansion was necessary in all cases. It meant reaching into all enemy-occupied areas rather than being bound by the Kuomintang's restrictions—going beyond Kuomintang limits, not waiting for official appointments, not depending on higher-ups for financing, and instead expanding armed forces freely and independently. It also meant setting up base areas without hesitation, independently mobilizing the masses in those areas, and building united front organs of political power under Communist Party leadership. The struggle between Nationalists and Communists involved more than contests for control of territory behind Japanese lines. It also involved national-level politics, ideology, and leadership. One worrying development for the CCP was the campaign throughout 1939 to expand Jiang Kai-shek's prestige and formal power—adding more titles for him across major party, government, and military positions. In early 1939, the Central Executive Committee appointed him "director-general" of the Kuomintang, a title reminiscent of the one previously held by Sun Yat-sen. In addition, during the summer and autumn of 1939 there was talk of constitutional rule. In November, the KMT announced plans to convene a constitutional assembly the following year. If Jiang could fulfill these promises, he and his government could gain new legitimacy and wider popularity. Mao and his colleagues could not allow this to go unchallenged. If the Nationalists were to have a paramount leader and authoritative spokesperson, the CCP needed one as well. The timing of Mao's famous "On the new democracy"—written in late 1939 and published the next January—was therefore no accident. Its substance had been anticipated earlier, but its final timing and full development were shaped by the KMT's constitutional movement. The CCP's entry into this competition served as both a bid for support away from the KMT and a statement of the multi-class united front that the CCP wanted to lead. Although "On the new democracy" was written in a tone that seemed moderate, it persuaded many Chinese readers that the CCP had either diluted its revolutionary objectives or postponed them to a distant future. In Kuomintang-controlled areas, the work could be read through the liberal values associated with Anglo-American democracy—popular participation, multi-party government, legally protected civil rights. In CCP-controlled territories, the same language carried stronger authoritarian, class-based meanings. In internal documents meant for party audiences rather than public consumption, the ambiguity was removed, showing a tough but patient and flexible commitment not only to resistance but also to social control and social change. During this same period, the Communists expressed deep concern about Nationalist capitulation to Japan—not only on the battlefield behind Japanese lines but also at the highest levels. Some of this concern was propaganda, but beneath propaganda lay genuine anxiety. In late 1939 and early 1940, politically aware Chinese already knew that Japan was negotiating with the unpredictable Wang Jingwei, who had fled Chongqing a year earlier. A "reorganized national government" in Nanjing was finally established in March 1940, representing the most formidable collaboration with Japan to date. Less well known, but equally important, was that Japan was also seeking an understanding directly with Jiang Kai-shek through intermediaries in Hong Kong. This effort, called "Operation Kiri"—described as spreading a "feast for Chiang"—combined intrigue with a kind of dark comedy. Reports suggested Chiang's reported interest in peace could have been a stratagem designed to discredit Wang Jingwei by keeping him waiting. But even if Chiang had no intention of coming to terms with Japan, the Communists could not be sure what the outcome would be until after the multi-pronged peace offensive had failed. By the middle of 1940, China had never been so isolated. In Europe, the "phony war" ended in the spring when Germany launched a blitz across the Low Countries. France fell soon after, and England appeared likely to be next. Japan used this moment to press China to sever its last tenuous connections to the outside world: cutting the Burma Road, trade with neutral Hong Kong, and the rail link running from Hanoi to Kunming. At the same time, Russia was engaged in a difficult and embarrassing war with Finland and reduced military aid to the Nationalists. The United States was only gradually moving away from isolationism and clearly regarded England as more important than China. In Chongqing and elsewhere in "Free China," signs of war weariness, despair, and demoralization were visible. Under these circumstances, Mao's insistence on aggressive expansion was a calculated risk—either it would deter any Japanese advance, or it would place the Communists in the strongest possible position in case a split between the KMT and the CCP became unavoidable. In Central China, the size and pace of the fighting kept increasing, starting in the final months of 1939. One flashpoint was the clash between Luo Pinghui's 5th Detachment and units of Han Deqin's Jiangsu force near Lake Gaoyou. In the following months, Guan Wenwei's forces ranged along the left bank of the Yangtze, repeatedly running into Luo's troops as they operated farther north. Luo also began receiving some 8RA reinforcements, moving them south through areas controlled by the 6th Detachment. Clearly, a major showdown was taking shape across north and central Jiangsu. At the same time, the South Yangtze Command was doing poorly. Nationalist commanders Leng Xin and Qu Chutong restricted its activities so severely that Mao and Liu gradually abandoned the idea of building a unified, consolidated base in that region. During late spring and early summer, Chen Yi moved most of his 1st and 2nd Detachments north of the Yangtze. In September, the 3rd Detachment followed suit, crossing the river into the area around Lake Chaohu, where the 4th Detachment was already stationed. After these moves, only the Headquarters Detachment—under Ye Ting and Xiang Ying—remained south of the Yangtze, positioned at Qingxian in southern Anhui. As the military situation edged toward an open confrontation, negotiations began in June 1940 between representatives of the KMT and the CCP. The core issues were Communist operating zones and the authorized strength of the armies led by the CCP. Proposals were exchanged, followed by equally sharp and hostile counter-proposals, but no agreement was reached. The KMT viewed it as a concession to permit the CCP "free rein" north of the pre-1938 course of the Yellow River, with the exception of southern Shanxi, which was to remain under the influence of Yan Xishan. In exchange, the KMT demanded that all 8RA and N4A units evacuate Central China. In effect, the KMT was offering the CCP something it was already prepared to allow, in return for the CCP giving up what it might soon be able to obtain by force of arms. Nationalist authorities then issued a set of deadlines, but without clearly stating what would happen if those deadlines were violated. On the surface, the CCP appeared to be complying in part. The movements of Chen Yi and the South Yangtze Command could look like obedience, but in reality they were responses to orders coming from their own superior leadership rather than instructions issued by the Nationalists. Even so, Xiang Ying's continued delays and evasions during the autumn and winter of 1940 remained puzzling. One possibility is that he felt—quite reasonably—that Mao had already lost confidence in him and that once he crossed to the north bank of the river he would lose his command. Another complication was that directives from Yan'an were sometimes ambiguous and even contradictory. He may also have been trying to reach secure understandings with KMT commanders about evacuation routes and guaranteed safe conduct out of the area. For a period, Han Teqin kept most of his forces—estimated at about 70,000 men, far outnumbering the N4A—in north Jiangsu, thereby blocking the expansion of the 6th Detachment and slowing further southern intrusions by 8RA troops. But by mid-summer he realized he would have to counter the N4A build-up in central Jiangsu, or else risk writing that region off to the Communists. A confusing sequence of engagements then unfolded, culminating in a decisive battle in early October 1940 near the central Jiangsu town of Huangjiao. Over the course of four days, several of Han's main-force units belonging to the 89th Army were destroyed, while others were scattered. That battle also served as a signal for the 6th Detachment to advance more aggressively in the north. In the aftermath, one of Han's principal commanders entered collaboration with the CCP, while another defected to the Nanjing government under Wang Jingwei. Although Han Teqin managed to maintain a foothold in Jiangsu until 1943, his real power had been broken. Relatively little attention was paid to the battle of Huangjiao in the Chinese press. The KMT did not want to publicize what it considered a disastrous defeat, while the Communists were satisfied to stay silent about an episode that conflicted with their proclaimed policy of a united front. As could be expected, during the autumn—after Han Teqin's defeat—KMT-CCP negotiations deteriorated further. In early December, Jiang Kai-shek personally ordered that all N4A forces withdraw from southern Anhui and southern Jiangsu by 31 December. He also ordered that the entire 8RA be positioned north of the Yellow River by the same deadline, followed one month later by the N4A. Discussions then followed between Ye Ting and Qu Chutong's deputies concerning the route to be taken, safe conduct, and—astonishingly—the money and supplies that were to be provided to the N4A to help it move. On 25 December, Mao Zedong ordered Xiang Ying to begin evacuating immediately. Yet it was not until 4 January 1941 that Ye and Xiang actually started moving. Almost immediately, Qu Chutong's forces harassed and dispersed the N4A Headquarters Group, which included administrative personnel, wounded soldiers and dependents, as well as combat-ready troops. In an attempt to reorganize, they moved southwest toward Maolin, where they were surrounded by Nationalists and, over the next several days, were cut to pieces. Losses were heavy on both sides. The CCP suffered an estimated 9,000 casualties. Xiang Ying tried twice to break out of the blockade on his own, but failed. He was then denounced as a deserter by Ye Ting, who took over full command of the doomed forces. Xiang Ying eventually escaped, but he was killed a couple of months later by one of his own bodyguards, motivated by the N4A gold reserves that he had taken with him. Up to the very end, Xiang either failed or refused to seek refuge in Liu Shaoqi's domain north of the Yangtze. The unfortunate Ye Ting was arrested and spent the rest of the war in prison. He was finally released in 1946, only to die one month later in a plane crash, along with several other high-ranking party members. On 17 January, Jiang Kai-shek declared that the New Fourth Army was dissolved for insubordination. Direct contacts between Yan'an and Chongqing nearly came to an end, and CCP military liaison offices in several cities held by the Nationalists were closed. This is what became known as the New Fourth Army incident, also referred to as the South Anhui incident. Clearly, it functioned as an act of retaliation for the defeats suffered by Han Teqin in north and central Jiangsu. It ended any realistic prospect of establishing a consolidated Communist base south of the Yangtze. Still, from a strategic perspective, these losses were ultimately more than offset by the gains achieved farther north. In fact, only a few months later, the reorganized N4A quietly began reintroducing some units into this region, where they carried out guerrilla activities without possessing a secure territorial base. Unlike the relative silence surrounding the fighting at Huangjiao, the New Fourth Army incident sparked bitter, prolonged controversy. The CCP argued that it was a second "anti-Communist upsurge," even more serious than the first. Presenting themselves as martyred patriots, they depicted their opponents as people who wanted to end the War of Resistance through what they called "Sino-Japanese cooperation" aimed at "suppressing the Communists." In their account, the Nationalists wanted to replace the war of resistance with civil war, substitute capitulation for independence, trade unity for a split, and replace light with darkness. People were telling each other the news and were horrified. Indeed, they claimed that the situation had never been as critical as it was at that moment. The Nationalist response, of course, was that provocations had been numerous and serious, and that violations of military discipline could not be tolerated. But the KMT's unwillingness to describe in detail its own defeats at the CCP's hands left it speaking in broad generalities. In the propaganda battle, the CCP clearly gained the better position and won more political capital. If it was politically valuable to be regarded as a national hero, it was even more valuable to be seen as a national martyr.  Many Chinese—and some outside—observers were genuinely alarmed and feared that civil war might openly resume. Yet, with a few exceptions, the events that culminated in the New Fourth Army incident have generally been interpreted as marking the breakdown of the second united front. That interpretation, however, is described as being wrong in two respects. First, the CCP understood the united front not as a narrow arrangement limited to a few major partners, but as a strategy that could be applied flexibly to all political, military, and social forces in China—from the highest levels of the central government down to the smallest village. Relations with Jiang Jieshi and the Guomindang regime mattered, but they did not, by themselves, constitute the whole of the united front. Even regarding Jiang and the Nationalists specifically, the common reading is said to be misguided. Throughout the war, a cardinal objective of the united front was to prevent peace between Japan and the Nationalists. Therefore, if clashes between CCP forces and those of the central government on such a large scale as at Huangjiao and Maolin could occur without leading to peace with Japan and without triggering a full-scale resumption of civil war, then this should not be understood as the end of the united front—it should be seen as its fundamental vindication. If friction at that scale could nevertheless be tolerated by Jiang Jieshi, then fears about his future accommodation with Japan were greatly reduced. Following the New Fourth Army incident, the CCP reorganized its political and military presence in Central China. The Central Plains and South-east China Bureaus were merged and renamed the Central China Bureau, with Liu Shaoqi placed in charge, reflecting the area's importance to Party Central. The New Fourth Army was also reorganized completely and substantially regularized. Chen Yi became its new acting commander, since Ye Ting was imprisoned. He directed the force, now divided into seven divisions. Each division had territorial responsibilities, and in each region the CCP claimed the establishment of a base. Indeed, base construction proceeded in earnest only after the friction of 1940 and the New Fourth Army incident. In the years that followed, the operating areas of the First through Fourth Divisions contained expanding enclaves of consolidated territory, where military dominance was joined with open party work: administrative control, the development of mass organizations, local elections, and socio-economic reforms. The other three areas fluctuated between semi-consolidated and guerrilla status. With the incident, the worst phase of the KMT-CCP conflict was now over. When CCP documents later speak of a third upsurge in 1943, they refer to something openly political. With the exception of Shandong—where a fairly strong Nationalist presence persisted for a longer time—the overall balance of power among Chinese forces behind Japanese lines had shifted in favor of the CCP by mid-1941. In subsequent years the CCP's predominance became even more pronounced, until by the end of 1943 the Communists were virtually beyond challenge by Chinese rivals.   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. After the CCP and KMT entered the united front, cooperation felt conditional from the start. Mao pushed the New Fourth Army to reorganize and preserve Communist autonomy, even as the 1937 agreements publicly pledged obedience to KMT leadership. In 1939–40 the Communists worried that Chiang might negotiate peace with Japan; so they expanded bases and military presence, triggering repeated clashes. The pressure intensified when KMT orders forced the New Fourth Army to evacuate south Anhui in late 1940.