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Trump Pushes to 'open Up' China - China in Focus

- U.S. Suppliers Get Rare Earth Reprieve from China - China to Continue Rare Earths To EU - U.S. Auto Imports Plummet in May - China EV Exports Up 19% This Year - Should U.S. Automakers Get Out of China? - Cadillac Unveils Optiq-V - Ram Gets Back in NASCAR - VinFast Bleeds More Red Ink - Marelli Could File for Chapter 11 - Autoline Poll Results

- U.S. Suppliers Get Rare Earth Reprieve from China - China to Continue Rare Earths To EU - U.S. Auto Imports Plummet in May - China EV Exports Up 19% This Year - Should U.S. Automakers Get Out of China? - Cadillac Unveils Optiq-V - Ram Gets Back in NASCAR - VinFast Bleeds More Red Ink - Marelli Could File for Chapter 11 - Autoline Poll Results

Dit zou je niet verwachten van de man achter Lightyear...'Ik voelde me een gefaalde ondernemer.'

Fmr U.S.-based Truck Firm Shared Data W/ China- China in Focus

  Last time we spoke about the Xi'an Incident. In December 1936, tensions in China erupted as Nationalist General Chiang Kai-shek faced a revolt led by his commanders, Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng. Disillusioned by Chiang's focus on battling communists instead of the Japanese invaders, the generals swiftly captured him in a coup. Confined in Xi'an, Chiang initially resisted their demands for a united front against Japan but eventually engaged in negotiation with Zhang and the Chinese Communist Party. As public sentiment shifted against him, Chiang's predicament led to urgent discussions, culminating in an unexpected alliance with the communists. This pact aimed to consolidate Chinese resistance against Japanese aggression, marking a critical turning point in the Second Sino-Japanese War. By December 26, Chiang was released, and this uneasy collaboration set the stage for a more unified front against a common enemy, though underlying tensions remained between the factions.   #152 China Prepares for War Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Before we jump into the Second Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945, which I honestly have no idea how long will take us, I thought it would be a good idea to dedicate two episodes to how both China and Japan prepared themselves for war.  Going all the way back to the 1910s, Chinese intellectuals began to view an outright conflict between Japan and China was inevitable. In the discussions about China's strategic options, Jiang Fangzhen pioneered a strategy of protracted warfare, a concept that would later shape China's approach during the Sino-Japanese War. Having studied in Japan during his youth, Jiang developed a keen understanding of the Japanese government and military. As early as 1917, he predicted that China and Japan would become embroiled in a long-term conflict, with the battleground likely to be west of the Peiping–Wuhan and Guangzhou–Wuhan railways. In his work titled "Guofang Lun" or “On National Defense”, Jiang reiterated the importance of protracted warfare as a means to thwart Japan's aspirations for a swift victory. He argued that China should leverage its vast population and extensive territory to extend the conflict, gradually wearing down Japanese strength and turning the situation to its advantage. Jiang recommended that China not focus on defending its coastal regions but instead confront the enemy west of the Peking–Wuhan Railway.   Chiang Kai-shek would eventually come to share Jiang's belief that “the longer the war drags on, the more advantageous it will be for China.” Despite significant public criticism, both the Nationalist government and General Zhang Xueliang, decided against military resistance when Japan invaded Manchuria in September 1931 and attacked Shanghai in 1932. Chiang was particularly hesitant to engage Japan directly, as he was also dealing with a Communist insurgency in central China. He feared that Chinese forces would suffer quick defeat, predicting that Japan would capture key coastal areas and critical infrastructure within just three days, crippling China by dismantling its military and economic lifelines. Following the invasion of North China Chiang was forced to adopt a firmer stance. The Nationalist government proposed a dual strategy of pursuing peace and security while simultaneously preparing for war. If peace proved impossible, China would mobilize its resources for ultimate victory through prolonged conflict. This approach was formalized in the National Defense Plan, which China adopted by prioritizing protracted warfare as its core strategy. After the Sino-Japanese clash in Shanghai on January 28, 1932, the Military Affairs Commission devised a plan that divided China into four defense areas along with a preparation area. While some troops were assigned local security, commanders were directed to concentrate their remaining forces for potential confrontations with Japan. That year, the Military Affairs Commission issued General Defense Guidelines that outlined two strategic responses to a potential Japanese invasion. The first, conservative approach focused on maintaining key positions and utilizing protracted warfare to impede the enemy. The second strategy advocated for decisive battles in key regions to thwart Japan's ambitions and protect China's territorial integrity, prioritizing disengagement from Japanese forces along the Yangtze River and coastline. In August 1935, German military adviser General Alexander von Falkenhausen provided recommendations to Chiang Kai-shek based on his predictions of Japanese advance routes into China. He identified three main routes: one from northern Hebei to Zhengzhou, the second from Shandong toward Xuzhou, and the third crossing the Yangtze River to Nanjing and onwards to Wuhan. He suggested treating the Yangtze River as the primary combat zone and highlighted Sichuan as a possible retreat area. Taking all of this into consideration. in 1936, a draft of a new National Defense Plan divided the country into four zones: a war zone, a defense zone, an internal security zone, and a preparation area. The war zone encompassed ten provinces and established strategies for retreating to predetermined defensive positions when necessary, with Sichuan designated as the main base for the war. In January 1937, the Chinese General Staff Department introduced its annual War Plan, outlining three possible military conflict regions between China and Japan. It proposed two main strategies: Proposal A emphasized sustained combat and retreat to fortified positions if the situation became unfavorable, aiming to eventually go on the offensive against Japan. Proposal B focused on repelling Japanese invasions along the coast and from the north, prioritizing counter offensives against Japanese units stationed near key locations. To prepare, the NRA completed several critical projects outlined in its plans, establishing military supply depots in Nanjing, Bengbu, Xinyang, Huayin, Nanchang, and Wuchang to manage logistics for supplies across various strategic railways. These depots were equipped to sustain the military, with ample ammunition and provisions, including 60 million rounds of small-arms ammunition and food for hundreds of thousands. Despite these preparations, not all projects were completed by the time war broke out in July 1937. In contrast to the Japanese military's tactics, Chinese forces prioritized defensive strategies. For example, at the Mount Lushan Military Officer Training Camp in July 1934, Chiang Kai-shek outlined four possible approaches against Japan, favoring a defense-as-offense strategy. Other options included building fortifications, tenaciously defending key positions, and employing guerrilla warfare through irregular forces to constrain enemy advances. Chiang stressed the importance of national mobilization for the war effort.  There was a significant disparity in equipment between the Japanese and Chinese armies. To give you an idea, each Japanese division included a mechanized group featuring thirty-nine light military vehicles and 21 light armored cars, supplemented by 6,000–7,000 horses, 200–300 automobiles, and specialized troops such as poison gas teams. In contrast, Nationalist divisions lacked any of these capabilities, a typical nationalist division theoretically had an armored regiment, but this unit was equipped with fewer than 72 armored vehicles. Another major weakness of the Nationalist forces was their insufficient artillery. In 1936, a division was officially assigned one artillery battalion, which was divided into three batteries totaling twelve guns. It also included a mechanized cannon company with four direct-fire weapons. By comparison, a Japanese division boasted four infantry regiments and one mountain artillery or field artillery regiment, with each artillery regiment comprising three field artillery battalions and one howitzer battalion. The infantry regiment itself included a mountain artillery section with four mountain guns, while the infantry battalion had one Type 70 mountain gun section with two guns. In total, a Japanese division possessed sixty-four artillery pieces of various calibers, four times the number of a Chinese division and of significantly higher quality. In reality, in 1936, twelve of the twenty elite Chinese “reformed divisions” still lacked artillery battalions. The ordnance available in the “reformed divisions” mostly consisted of the outdated Type 60 mountain gun. Nationwide, very few of the 200 divisions were equipped with any artillery, and those that did often used obsolete field artillery pieces or mountain artillery provided to local forces. Some units even relied on trench mortars as a makeshift solution. The artillery weapons came from various countries, but they frequently lacked necessary observation and signal components, and were often low on ammunition. The majority of mountain guns and field artillery were of the Type 75, which, while capable of providing fire support, had limited range and inflicted minimal damage. To give you an idea of the striking inadequacy of the Chinese artillery, during the Shanghai fighting in 1937, the mountain artillery of the Guangxi 21st Army Group could only reach targets within 1,200 yards, while Japanese field artillery had an effective range of 8,000 yards. Chinese-made mountain artillery suffered due to inferior steel-making technology; the gun shields were constructed from low-quality steel, and the barrels often overheated after firing just a few rounds, increasing the risk of explosions. Additionally, the equipment of local forces varied greatly in quality. In fact, some local units had superior equipment compared to Nationalist units. For example, before the Sino-Japanese War, troops from Yunnan were equipped with French antitank guns and heavy machine guns, which were better than the German water-cooled machine guns used by the Nationalist forces. However, the majority of local troops relied on inferior equipment; the 122nd Division under Wang Mingzhang from Sichuan, noted for its brave defense of Tengxian County during the Xuzhou Battle, was armed with locally produced light and heavy machine guns that frequently malfunctioned, and their Type 79 rifles, also made in Sichuan, were often outdated, with some dating back to the Qing Dynasty. These weapons had limited range and sometimes malfunctioned after fewer than one hundred rounds. Now before the war, both Nationalist and local forces acquired weaponry from diverse foreign and domestic sources. Even domestically produced weapons lacked standardization, with those made in Hanyang and Manchuria differing in design and specifications. Arms manufactured in Germany, France, Russia, Japan, and Italy were similarly inconsistent. Consequently, even within a single unit, the lack of uniformity created significant logistical challenges, undermining combat effectiveness, particularly in the early stages of the war. Despite Nationalist ordnance factories producing over three million rounds of small-arms ammunition daily, the incompatibility of ammunition and weapons diminished the usable quantity of ammunition. Chinese communications infrastructure was inadequate. In the Nationalist army, signal units were integrated into engineering units, leading to low-quality radio communications. In emergencies, telegrams could remain undelivered for days, and orders often had to be dispatched via postal services. By 1937, the entire country boasted only 3,000 military vehicles, necessitating heavy reliance on horses and mules for transport. To effectively equip twenty Nationalist divisions, 10,647 horses and 20,688 mules were needed, but by the end of 1935, only 6,206 horses and 4,351 mules were available. A statistic from 1936 indicated a 5 percent mortality rate among military horses, with some units experiencing a rate as high as 10 percent. The distribution of weaponry led to disputes during army reorganization efforts following the Northern Expedition. Although Chiang Kai-shek's forces were part of the regular army, the quality of their equipment varied significantly. Domestic production of weapons was limited, and imports could not close the gap. Priority was given to small arms; through army reorganization, Chiang aimed to diminish the influence of forces less loyal to him. Nationalist army staff officers observed that troops loyal to Chiang received the best weapons. Northwest and Northeast forces, having cultivated good relations with the KMT, were similarly better equipped, while Shanxi troops received inferior supplies. Troops associated with the Guangxi Clique were given even poorer quality weapons due to their leaders' stronger political ambitions. Troops regarded as “bandit forces,” such as those led by Shi Yousan, Li Hongchang, and Sun Dianying, were naturally assigned the least effective weaponry. This unequal distribution of arms increased some local forces' inclination to align with the KMT while alienating others, which inadvertently led to additional turmoil in the aftermath of the Northern Expedition. Logistical accounting within the Nationalist military was severely lacking. Military expenditures accounted for a significant portion of government spending, roughly 65.48 % in 1937, with personnel costs being the largest component. However, military units prioritized boosting their own resources over accurate accounting. Surpluses were not returned but rather utilized to reward military officers and soldiers for merits in battle, care for the wounded, or to create a reserve. Conversely, if deficits arose, troops would resort to “living off vacancies,” a practice in which they would fail to report desertions promptly and would falsely claim new soldiers had arrived. Military leaders typically appointed their most trusted subordinates to serve as accountants and logistic officers. As the war commenced, these issues became readily apparent. During the Battle of Shanghai in 1937, frontline soldiers sometimes went days without food and went months without pay. Wounded soldiers and civilians had to search tirelessly for medical treatment, and when main forces relocated, they often abandoned grain, ammunition, weapons, and petroleum along the way. General Chen Cheng, the commander in chief during the Battle of Shanghai, noted, “This phenomenon clearly revealed our inability to supply frontline troops, indicating that China remains a backward country with poor management.” Many logistical shortcomings severely impacted troop morale and combat effectiveness. In a 1933 speech, Chiang Kai-shek acknowledged that poor food, inadequate clothing, and ineffective logistics contributed to widespread desertion. Soldiers were further demoralized by reduced or embezzled salaries. A lack of professional medical staff and equipment hampered healthcare efforts, leading to high disease and mortality rates. According to official statistics from 1936, approximately 10 percent of soldiers fell ill annually, with a mortality rate as high as 5 percent. Japanese military authorities reported that one in three wounded Japanese soldiers died, while a Dutch military officer present during the early stages of the Sino-Japanese War observed that one in every two wounded Nationalist soldiers perished. Due to inadequate equipment and limited transport options, Nationalist forces were compelled to recruit farmers and rent vehicles, as they lacked essential facilities such as tents. This reliance on local resources inevitably led to frequent conflicts between military personnel and civilians. China is clearly a vast nation with an extensive coastline, requiring the construction of several significant fortresses during the modern era. These included Wusong, Jiangyin, Zhenjiang, Jiangning, and Wuhan along the Yangtze River, as well as Zhenhai, Humen, and Changzhou along the seacoast. Except for the Wuhan fortress, built in 1929-1930, all other fortifications were established during the late Qing Dynasty and featured uncovered cannon batteries. These fortresses suffered from inadequate maintenance, and many of their components had become outdated and irreplaceable, rendering them militarily negligible. Following the January 1932 Shanghai Incident, the Japanese military destroyed the Wusong forts, leaving the entrance to the Yangtze River completely unfortified. Consequently, there were no defenses along the coastline from Jiangsu to Shandong, allowing the Japanese to land freely. In December 1932, the Military Affairs Commission established a fortress group tasked with constructing fortresses and defensive installations, seeking assistance from German military advisers. After the North China Incident in 1935, the Nationalist government accelerated the construction of defensive structures in line with national war planning, focusing particularly on Nanjing. The Nationalists prioritized building fortifications along the seacoast and the Yellow River, followed by key regions north of the Yellow River. The government also ordered a significant quantity of heavy artillery from Germany. This included several dozen pieces of flat-fire antiaircraft and dual-purpose heavy artillery, which were installed at fortifications in Jiangyin, Zhenjiang, Nanjing, and Wuhan. By the summer of 1937, the construction of nine fortified positions was complete: Nanjing, Zhenjiang, Jiangyin, Ningbo, Humen, Mawei, Xiamen , Nantong, and Lianyungang. In total, China had established 41 forts and equipped them with 273 fortress cannons. Some defensive installations were poorly managed, with many units assigned to their perimeters lacking training and access to proper maps. The barbette positions in the fortresses were not well concealed and could hardly store sufficient ammunition. Troops stationed at these fortresses received little training. Despite these shortcomings, the fortresses and fortifications were not entirely ineffective. They bolstered Chinese positions along the defense line stretching from Cangxian County to Baoding and from Dexian County to Shijiazhuang, as well as in southern Shandong.  Before the war, China's political and economic center was situated along the seacoast and the Yangtze River. As Japanese influence expanded, the Nationalist government was compelled to establish bases in China's inner regions, very similar to how the USSR pulled back its industry further west after Operation barbarossa.The Japanese attack on Shanghai in 1932 prompted the Nationalists to relocate their capital to Luoyang. On March 5, during the Second Plenary Session of the KMT's Fourth Congress, the Western Capital Preparation Committee was formed to plan for the potential relocation of all governmental bodies to Xi'an in the event of full-scale war. In February 1933, the Central Political Conference approved the Northwest Development Bill, and in February 1934, the National Economic Commission set up a northwestern branch to oversee development projects in the region. On October 18, 1934, Chiang Kai-shek traveled to Lanzhou, recording in his diary that “Northwest China has abundant resources. Japan and Russia are poised to bully us. Yet, if we strengthen ourselves and develop northwest China to the fullest extent, we can turn it into a base for China's revival.” Interestingly, it was Sichuan, rather than the northwest, that became China's rear base during the 2nd Sino-Japanese War. In October 1934, the Communist army evacuated its Soviet base in southern China, initiating the Long March that would ultimately end in the northwest. By this time, Chiang Kai-shek had decided to designate Sichuan as the last stronghold for China. In January 1935, the Nanchang Field Headquarters of the Military Affairs Commission, responsible for combatting the Communists and serving as the supreme military and political authority over most provinces along the Yangtze River and central China, dispatched a special advisory group to Chongqing. Following this, the Nationalist army advanced into Sichuan. On February 10, the Nationalists appointed a new provincial government in Sichuan, effectively ending the province's long-standing regionalism. On March 2, Chiang traveled to Chongqing, where he delivered a speech underscoring that “Sichuan should serve as the base for China's revival.” He stated that he was in Sichuan to oversee efforts against the Communist army and to unify the provincial administration.  After the Xinhai revolution, the Republic of China was still suing the Qing Dynasty's conscription system. However, once in power, the Nationalist government sought to establish a national military service program. In 1933, it enacted a military service law, which began implementation in 1936. This law categorized military service into two branches: service in the Nationalist army and in territorial citizen army units. Men aged eighteen to forty-five were expected to serve in the territorial units if they did not enlist in the Nationalist army. The territorial service was structured into three phases: active service lasting two to three years, first reserves for six years, and second reserves until the age of forty-five. The Ministry of Military Affairs divided China into sixty divisional conscription headquarters, initially establishing these headquarters in the six provinces of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, and Hubei. By December 1936, approximately 50,000 new soldiers had been drafted. The military service law disproportionately favored the middle and upper classes. Government personnel were exempt from enlistment, allowing privileged families to register their children with government agencies. Similarly, students in middle and higher education were excused from service, while youth from poorer backgrounds often felt compelled to enlist due to financial constraints that limited their educational opportunities. Village and town leaders were responsible for executing the recruitment process and frequently conspired with army recruiters. Recruitment principles often favored wealthier families, with guidelines stating that one son should be drafted for every three sons, two for five sons, but no drafts if there was only one son. Wealthy families could secure exemptions for all their male children, while poor families might see their only son conscripted if they were unable to provide the requisite bribe. Town and village heads wielded significant power in recruitment. This new recruitment system also created numerous money-making opportunities. Military personnel assigned to escort draftees to their units would often allow draftees to escape for a fee. Additionally, draftees could monetize their service by agreeing to serve as substitutes for others. For some, being drafted became an occupation. For example, in 1936, 600 individuals were drafted in the Wuhu area of Anhui province, and accounts from regional administrators indicated that every draftee had either been traded, replaced, or seized. Beginning in 1929, the Nationalist government also instituted military training for high school students and older individuals. Students were required to participate in one theoretical class and one practical class each week, totaling three hours. Starting in 1934, students had to complete a three-month military training program before graduating. Graduates of military academies were employed as military instructors. By the end of 1936, over 237,000 high school students had undergone military training. This student military training was overseen by the Society for the Implementation of the Three People's Principles of Sun Yat-sen, which also provided political education and sometimes gathered information on students' political beliefs.  Although the Nationalists made significant efforts to improve the military training of both officers and troops, they inherited deep-seated challenges that they were unable to completely overcome. A lack of facilities, outdated training manuals, low regard for military instructors, and the ongoing influence of regionalism and warlordism hindered progress. The Japanese would also later exploit these shortcomings of the Nationalist army. The Central Military Academy, which evolved from the Whampoa Military Academy established in 1923 in Guangzhou to train officers for the Northern Expedition, became the primary training institution for junior military officers. The academy offered a basic course, lasting eighteen months, which included general education, specialized training in various subjects, and field practice. This was followed by a two-year cadet training program focused on developing the skills necessary for junior military officers. Seventeen classes were admitted before the outbreak of war. Admission to the academy was highly competitive, with military officers receiving attractive salaries. For instance, in 1935, the academy received 10,000 applications for the twelfth class, but only 7% were accepted. Upon graduation, cadets were typically assigned to divisions within the Nationalist army loyal to Chiang Kai-shek. Their training, influenced by German advisors, resulted in a high-quality cadre. In modern China, most sergeants were veterans. While some units provided training for sergeants, a lack of formal education led to their diminished status. Truly qualified sergeants were rare. During his tenure as Minister of Military Training, General Bai Chongxi proposed establishing a sergeant school and creating a professional noncommissioned officer system; however, the Ministry of Military Affairs opposed this on financial grounds. While commanding officers enjoyed rapid promotions, military instructors did not. Furthermore, there was no system for transferring instructors to field commands or assigning commanders to military academies for extended periods. Despite minor updates to cover modern warfare concepts such as tank warfare and machine guns, Qing Dynasty military manuals were still in use at the Central Military Academy at the start of the war. Yeah, 1937 they were still rocking the old Qing books. Following the establishment of the Ministry of Military Training, a bureau for military translation was set up to evaluate existing course materials and translate military manuals, but its contributions were limited. Another significant shortcoming of military instruction focused on theory at the expense of practical application.  To enhance the quality of military officers, the Nationalist army instituted specialized schools for artillery, infantry, transport, engineering, and signals starting in 1931. These institutions were considered to have high-quality administrators and facilities. The Nationalists adopted German military training models, replacing the previously used Japanese models. They appointed German advisors to oversee instructor training at military academies and established three instructional divisions. By the onset of the Sino-Japanese War, 15,000 students had graduated from programs with a German military influence, resulting in the creation of about fifty combat divisions from these instructional units. However, the progress of other Nationalist army units was limited because their training was not aligned with contemporary battlefield realities. Before World War I, troops operated in close formations due to limited firepower. The widespread introduction of machine guns after World War I necessitated a shift to dispersed formations. Although a new drill manual issued by the Ministry of Military Training in 1935 introduced small-group tactics, few units adopted these methods. General Chen Cheng highlighted another underlying issue in 1938, commenting on the outmoded focus on parade ground drills and formal military manners. He noted, “We have paid too much attention to stereotypical formality and procedures of no practical use. Sometimes, even though soldiers could not get a haircut or take a bath for several months, their camps had to be in order. They underwent intensive training in close-order drill but learned little about gun handling, marksmanship, or maneuvering. This was inappropriate in peacetime, yet we continued this practice even after the Sino-Japanese War started, even using it on highly educated youth.” In contrast, the Communist army simplified training, emphasizing two essential skills: live-fire exercises and physical endurance, which significantly enhanced troop effectiveness in the challenging terrain characteristic of the Sino-Japanese War. Ultimately, the Nationalist army's training did not reach all soldiers. Only about half of all combat soldiers received adequate training, while the rest were neglected. According to statistics from the time, there were approximately five million military personnel during the Sino-Japanese War, with three million serving in logistics. Most of these logistics personnel had received little training, leading to disastrous consequences for overall combat effectiveness. As warfare has become more complex, the role of highly trained staff officers has become increasingly important. Napoleon developed operational plans close to the front and communicated orders via courier. During World War I, military commanders collected information at their headquarters and utilized telephones and automobiles to relay orders to the front lines. In World War II, with the battlefield expanding to include land, sea, and air, senior commanders often made decisions from headquarters far from the action, relying on a significant number of staff officers with specialized skills to keep them informed. In China, however, the staff officer system was underdeveloped. By 1937, only about 2,000 commanders and staff officers had received training. Prior to the Sino-Japanese War, most commanders managed staff work themselves, with staff officers serving primarily as military secretaries who drafted orders, reports, and maps. Many staff officers had no formal military training, and as a whole, the branch lacked respect, causing the most talented officers to avoid serving in it. The situation was even more dire for staff officer departments within local forces. For example, in March 1937, Liu Ziqing, a graduate of the Whampoa Military Academy, was appointed as the director of political instruction in the Forty-fourth Army, a unit under Sichuan warlord Liu Xiang. Liu Ziqing's account illustrates the dysfunction within the ranks: “The commander in chief was not supposed to manage the army and even did not know its whereabouts... But he could appoint relatives and former subordinates—who were officials and businessmen as well—to the army. Each month they would receive a small stipend. At headquarters, there was a long table and two rows of chairs. Around ten o'clock in the morning, senior officers signed in to indicate their presence. Those with other business would leave, while the remaining officers sat down to leisurely discuss star actresses, fortune-telling, business projects, mah-jongg, and opium. Occasionally they would touch on national affairs, chat about news articles, or share local gossip. In the afternoons, they primarily played mah-jongg, held banquets, and visited madams. Most mornings, the commander usually presided over these activities, and at first, I reported for duty as well. But I soon realized it was a waste of time and came very rarely. At headquarters, most staff members wore long gowns or Western-style suits, while military uniforms were a rare sight.” Most senior military personnel were trained at the Baoding Military Academy during the early republic. 2/3rds of commanders in chief, 37 %of army commanders, and 20 % of division commanders were Baoding graduates. Higher-ranking officers were more likely to have launched their careers there. In contrast, only 10 % of division commanders and a few army commanders were graduates of the Whampoa Military Academy. Additionally, commanders trained in local military schools and those with combat experience accounted for 1/3rd of all commanders. While the prevalence of civil war provided opportunities for rapid promotion, it also hindered officers' ability to update their training or gain experience in different military branches. German advisors expressed their concerns to Chiang Kai-shek, emphasizing that officers should first serve in junior roles before taking command. During one battle in 1938, Chiang noted, “Our commanders in chief are equivalent only to our enemy's regiment commanders, and our army and division commanders are only as competent as our enemy's battalion and company commanders.” Despite not viewing high-ranking Japanese officers as great strategists, Nationalist officers respected them as highly competent, diligent, and professional commanders who rarely made critical errors. The infantry was the primary component of the Nationalist army, with middle and junior infantry officers constituting over 80 %of all army officers. A 1936 registry of military officers listed 1,105 colonels and 2,159 lieutenant colonels within the infantry, demonstrating a significant outnumbering of Baoding graduates at ranks below lieutenant colonel. However, the quality of middle and junior infantry officers declined during the Sino-Japanese War; by 1944, only 27.3 % of these officers were from formal military academies, while those promoted from the ranks increased to 28.1 %. In 1937, 80 % of officers in an ordinary infantry battalion were military academy graduates, but this percentage dropped to 20 % during the war. Its hard to tell how educated soldiers were before the war, but it is generally believed that most were illiterate. In 1929, sociologist Tao Menghe surveyed 946 soldiers from a Shanxi garrison brigade and found that only 13 percent could compose a letter independently, while the rest had either never learned to read or were unable to write. In contrast, in August 1938, General Feng Yuxiang found that 80 percent of a regiment in Hunan were literate. Regardless, during the Sino-Japanese War, the quality of recruits steadily declined. More than 90 percent of soldiers were illiterate, and few possessed any basic scientific knowledge, which hindered their ability to master their weapons. On the battlefield, they heavily relied on middle and junior officers for guidance.  In autumn 1933, General Hans von Seeckt, the architect of the post World War I German army, visited China at the personal invitation of Chiang Kai-shek. In his recommendations for military reform, he identified China's greatest problem as its excessively large forces drawn from diverse backgrounds. He stated, “At present, the most pressing goal is to... establish a small, well-equipped army with high morale and combat effectiveness to replace the numerous poorly armed and trained forces.” He suggested forming an army of sixty divisions and recommended the establishment of a training regiment for military officers to equip them with the skills needed for modern warfare. Chiang Kai-shek accepted von Seeckt's proposals, and on January 26, 1935, he convened a National Military Reorganization Conference in Nanjing. On March 1, the Army Reorganization Bureau was established in Wuchang, under the leadership of General Chen Cheng. In the same month, General Alexander von Falkenhausen took charge of the German Military Advisors Group. Before war broke out, around nineteen divisions, roughly 300,000 troops received training from German advisors and were equipped with German-style weapons. At the onset of the Sino-Japanese War, the forces stemming from the First Army of the National Revolutionary Army and the Whampoa cadets, who had fought in the Northern Expedition, held the highest reputation and were referred to as the “core central forces” by the Japanese. Other notable forces included the Guangxi Army, Northwestern Army, Northeastern Army, some Uyghur units, the Guangdong Army, and the Shanxi Army. In contrast, provincial forces such as the Yunnan Army and Sichuan Army were viewed less favorably. Nationalist forces were generally far inferior to those of the Japanese enemy. In 1937, General He Yingqin noted that Nationalist forces had failed to prevail in 1932 and 1933, even when outnumbering the Japanese by 4-1.  In November 1937, during a national defense conference, Chiang Kai-shek stated, "In recent years we have worked hard, prepared actively, and achieved national unification. By the time of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, we were in a better domestic situation and had improved military preparedness compared to before. Since 1935, our strength has doubled. It increased by more than two to three times since January 1932 or September 1931 [when Japan attacked Shanghai and Mukden]. If peace had been achievable, we should have delayed the war for two or three years. Given an additional three years, our defensive capabilities would have been drastically different... Now, if we merely compare the military strength of China and Japan, we are certainly inferior." However, such assessments were overly optimistic, as Chiang failed to recognize that Japan's military capabilities would not have stagnated. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek certainly was dealt a difficult hand of cards for the upcoming poker match he was to play. Yet the Chinese were resilient and they had to be for the absolute horror that would be inflicted upon them from 1937-1945. Until this point, their enemies had been far more lenient, the Empire of Japan would show no mercy.

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00:00 Intro01:12 Police Clash With Protesters in Different Parts of China03:19 Lawmakers Sound Alarm on Harvard's Links to Chinese Entities06:13 Passing of Bills That Counter China Signals US Policy Shift10:45 RFK Jr. Criticizes WHO, Citing China's Growing Influence13:38 Taiwan's President Says He's Willing to Talk with Beijing14:39 Eftimiades: China Leverages Entire Society for Intel

Tong Ge was born and raised in China and moved to Canada in 1988. She began writing the China China trilogy in 2004 with the first book: The House Filler. Although she was challenged by learning to write in English and by her long- term disability, she persevered and since 2012 has published poetry and prose in English and Chinese in publications such as Prism, Ricepaper, Flow, Canadian Stories, and The Polyglot. Tong Ge lives in Calgary, Alberta. Make sure to check out this author on her website https://tong-ge.com/You can listen to the podcast on Apple Podcast, Spotify, Google Podcast, or visit my website www.drkatherinehayes.com

Tong Ge was born and raised in China and moved to Canada in 1988. She began writing the China China trilogy in 2004 with the first book: The House Filler. Although she was challenged by learning to write in English and by her long- term disability, she persevered and since 2012 has published poetry and prose in English and Chinese in publications such as Prism, Ricepaper, Flow, Canadian Stories, and The Polyglot.

Join this channel to get access to perks: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCAURsT8pIRGXBVT__Rh_OmA/join Support us on Patreon for BONUS episodes each month & other perks: https://www.patreon.com/thesavegpodcast In this weeks episode we kick off discussing Daniel's recent trip to Montreal and how we love walkable cities. Trump is causing all kinds of chaos as protestors mount in huge numbers all across the United States. The latest protests are around the confusing deportation of persons to El Salvador. China responds to tariffs in hilarious viral TikToks as the economic giant refuses to back down from the US. Many Chinese manufacturers of luxury US goods take to social media encouraging consumers to buy directly from the source at large price reductions. Who knows when all this madness will calm down- this could be a long four year term. Finally, it is also a big month for Canada as we are having a federal election with pre-voting already kicked off and final voting to take place next week. Hope you all enjoy the episode. BOOK CANADIAN ROCKIES TRIP WITH US (August 2025): https://trovatrip.com/trip/north-america/canada/canada-with-rose-lee-aug-17-2025

April 24, 2025 ~ Patrick Anderson, Founder and CEO of Anderson Economic Group discusses the back and forth between China and Donald Trump over a possible tariff deal.

Week of 04/17/2025 | Episode 8/12 - ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Listen on Spotify⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ -⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Listen on Apple⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ -

Week of 04/16/2025 | Episode 5/12 - ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Listen on Spotify⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ -⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Listen on Apple⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ -

Week of 04/16/2025 | Episode 6/12 - ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Listen on Spotify⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ -⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Listen on Apple⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ -

Week of 04/17/2025 | Episode 7/12 - ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Listen on Spotify⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ -⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Listen on Apple⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ -

Week of 04/14/2025 | Episode 1/12 - ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Listen on Spotify⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ -⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Listen on Apple -

Hernández Zapata nos dice, por ejemplo, que Estados Unidos lleva años demostrando problemas de índole económico que podrían conducir a una situación como la actual. Le preguntamos por los secretos que pueden abrir la puerta de un mercado como el chino y nos responde que, probablemente, el primer paso sea abandonar el "eurocentrismo" y dejar de pensar que la occidental es la mejor manera de entender el mundo.

This episode tackles the complexity of Sino-Serbian relations vis-à-vis the EU from a historical and regional perspective. Serbia is a European EU-candidate country, but it has a long history of advocating for a non-aligned international position. Furthermore, in recent years Serbia has emerged as a key Chinese partner in Europe, with intensified economic and socio-political cooperation and the gradual establishment of a so-called “Ironclad Friendship”. In 2024, Serbia was one of three countries on Xi Jinping's European tour and the first in Europe to commit to building a “community with a shared future” with China. Based on extensive empirical research, the development of Sino-Serbian relations is presented with a special emphasis on the role of culture in international relations, e.g. the role of discourse and public opinion. In this episode hosted by Dr Outi Luova, Senior Instructor Jelena Gledić from the University of Belgrade, Serbia, highlights lessons for a resilient and sustainable future of China-Europe relations and the potential enlargement of the EU. Transcript: https://www.utu.fi/fi/ajankohtaista/podcast/reconnect Publications by Jelena Gledić: - on Serbian public opinion on China: Serbian public opinion on China in the age of COVID-19. An unyielding alliance. Jelena Gledić, Richard Q. Turcsányi, Matej Šimalčík Kristína Kironská, Renáta Sedláková (2021) https://sinofon.cz/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/SRB-poll-report.pdf - on the drivers of Serbian public opinion on China: Analysing Drivers of Serbian Public Opinion on China: The “Iron Friendship” in Global and Local Contexts. Jelena Gledić. The Review of International Affairs. - Vol. 75, No. 1190 (2024), p. 5–28. https://doi.fil.bg.ac.rs/pdf/journals/iipe_ria/2024-1190/iipe_ria-2024-75-1190-1.pdf - on China's categorization of foreign relations: Evolving Paradigms of International Order: Chinese Categorisation of Foreign Relations. Jelena Gledić. Harvesting the Winds of Change: China and the Global Actors. [ed. Aleksandar Mitić, Katarina Zakić]. - ISBN 978-86-7067-338-0. - Vol. 4, No. 1 (2024), p. 191–214. https://doi.fil.bg.ac.rs/pdf/eb_ser/iipe_dijalozi_kina/2024-4-1/iipe_dijalozi_kina-2024-4-1-ch10.pdf ReConnect China - Generating independent knowledge for a resilient future with China for Europe and its citizens. Find out more about the project here: www.reconnect-china.ugent.be/ CHERN – the China in Europe Research Network – is a platform for knowledge exchange about China in Europe among academic and non-academic communities. Find out more about the project here https://china-in-europe.net/

- China Warns Tesla Over Musk's Politics - ICE Outsells NEV In China - U.S. Car Dealers Average More Sales In 2024 - Ford Invests $4.7 Billion Into German Operations - Canada Investigates Tesla Over EV Rebates - Traton Forecasts Weak Truck Sales - Used Porsche Taycan Prices Falling Fast - Cadillac Officially Joins Formula 1 - Ford Launches Scholarships for Mechanics - Autoline Poll Results

- China Warns Tesla Over Musk's Politics - ICE Outsells NEV In China - U.S. Car Dealers Average More Sales In 2024 - Ford Invests $4.7 Billion Into German Operations - Canada Investigates Tesla Over EV Rebates - Traton Forecasts Weak Truck Sales - Used Porsche Taycan Prices Falling Fast - Cadillac Officially Joins Formula 1 - Ford Launches Scholarships for Mechanics - Autoline Poll Results

We start with this week’s China propaganda update (2:27), followed by a look at a 112 y/o letter from Borden in Cairo (34:05). Next, we look at how to Pray for China this week (39:19) followed by an insane team schedule that I unearthed from exactly 12 years ago in NW China (46:06). Follow me on X (@chinaadventures) where I post daily reminders to pray for China (PrayforChina.us). If you enjoy this podcast, follow or subscribe wherever you listen to podcasts. You can also email any questions or comments to contact @ PrayforChina dot us. And don’t forget to check out all the things we are doing at PrayGiveGo.us. Luke 10:2! China/Russia vs Ukraine/USA: https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202502/1329289.shtml The “Real China” Breaks Through: https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202502/1329281.shtml Death Sentence for Child Trafficker: https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202502/1329258.shtml China: US Violates Human Rights: https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202503/1329294.shtml Borden’s Arab Homestay: https://open.substack.com/pub/chinacall/p/arab-homestay Pray for China (PrayforChina.us) Mar 1 (Sat) - Pray for Tongling in Anhui Province, which is paired with Iowa for prayer: www.PrayforChina.us Anhui Podcast: Beheaded https://pubtv.flfnetwork.com/tabs/audio/podcasts/30293/episodes/31 Mar 2 (Sun) - Pray for Siming District in Xiamen Prefecture of SE China's Fujian Province, which is paired with South Carolina for prayer: www.PrayforChina.us Fujian podcast and more info…https://prayforchina.us/index.php/fujian/ Mar 3 (Mon) - Pray for Chengguan (“CityGate”) District, the urban core of Lanzhou, capital of Gansu Province, which is paired for prayer with its sister state of Oklahoma: www.Pray4Gansu.com Here's my Gansu podcast (and more)... https://prayforchina.us/index.php/gansu/ Mar 4 (Tue) - Pray for Shijingshan District in the suburbs of west-central Beijing, which is paired with Washington DC (and MD) for prayer: prayforchina.us/index.php/maryland/ My Tiananmen Crosspolitic interview: https://pubtv.flfnetwork.com/tabs/the-pub/videos/30786 Mar 5 (Wed) - Pray for Kaili City, the most populated in Qiandongnan Prefecture in Guizhou Province, which is paired with Missouri for prayer: www.prayforchina.us/states/missouri.html Here's the Guizhou podcast (and more)... https://prayforchina.us/index.php/guizhou/ Mar 6 (Thu) - Pray for landlocked Nada Town, the largest in Danzhou Prefecture on Hainan Island, which is paired with Hawaii for prayer: www.PrayforChina.us Here's the Hainan pod: https://pubtv.flfnetwork.com/tabs/the-pub/podcasts/30293/episodes/37 Mar 7 (Fri) - Pray for Yongnian District in Handan City, in southern Hebei Province. “Huh-bay” is paired with both Wisconsin and Michigan for prayer: https://prayforchina.us/index.php/michigan/ Here's my Hebei pod: https://pubtv.flfnetwork.com/tabs/the-pub/podcasts/30293/episodes/39 Mar 8 (Sat) - Pray for Nangang District, the most populated in Harbin City, the capital of Heilongjiang, which is paired with MN and the UP of MI for prayer: https://prayforchina.us/index.php/michigan/ My Heilongjiang podcast: https://pubtv.flfnetwork.com/tabs/the-pub/podcasts/30293/episodes/20 Listen to hear the "Insane Adventures" I share at the end of today's podcast...

We start with this week’s China propaganda update (2:27), followed by a look at a 112 y/o letter from Borden in Cairo (34:05). Next, we look at how to Pray for China this week (39:19) followed by an insane team schedule that I unearthed from exactly 12 years ago in NW China (46:06). Follow me on X (@chinaadventures) where I post daily reminders to pray for China (PrayforChina.us). If you enjoy this podcast, follow or subscribe wherever you listen to podcasts. You can also email any questions or comments to contact @ PrayforChina dot us. And don’t forget to check out all the things we are doing at PrayGiveGo.us. Luke 10:2! China/Russia vs Ukraine/USA: https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202502/1329289.shtml The “Real China” Breaks Through: https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202502/1329281.shtml Death Sentence for Child Trafficker: https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202502/1329258.shtml China: US Violates Human Rights: https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202503/1329294.shtml Borden’s Arab Homestay: https://open.substack.com/pub/chinacall/p/arab-homestay Pray for China (PrayforChina.us) Mar 1 (Sat) - Pray for Tongling in Anhui Province, which is paired with Iowa for prayer: www.PrayforChina.us Anhui Podcast: Beheaded https://pubtv.flfnetwork.com/tabs/audio/podcasts/30293/episodes/31 Mar 2 (Sun) - Pray for Siming District in Xiamen Prefecture of SE China's Fujian Province, which is paired with South Carolina for prayer: www.PrayforChina.us Fujian podcast and more info…https://prayforchina.us/index.php/fujian/ Mar 3 (Mon) - Pray for Chengguan (“CityGate”) District, the urban core of Lanzhou, capital of Gansu Province, which is paired for prayer with its sister state of Oklahoma: www.Pray4Gansu.com Here's my Gansu podcast (and more)... https://prayforchina.us/index.php/gansu/ Mar 4 (Tue) - Pray for Shijingshan District in the suburbs of west-central Beijing, which is paired with Washington DC (and MD) for prayer: prayforchina.us/index.php/maryland/ My Tiananmen Crosspolitic interview: https://pubtv.flfnetwork.com/tabs/the-pub/videos/30786 Mar 5 (Wed) - Pray for Kaili City, the most populated in Qiandongnan Prefecture in Guizhou Province, which is paired with Missouri for prayer: www.prayforchina.us/states/missouri.html Here's the Guizhou podcast (and more)... https://prayforchina.us/index.php/guizhou/ Mar 6 (Thu) - Pray for landlocked Nada Town, the largest in Danzhou Prefecture on Hainan Island, which is paired with Hawaii for prayer: www.PrayforChina.us Here's the Hainan pod: https://pubtv.flfnetwork.com/tabs/the-pub/podcasts/30293/episodes/37 Mar 7 (Fri) - Pray for Yongnian District in Handan City, in southern Hebei Province. “Huh-bay” is paired with both Wisconsin and Michigan for prayer: https://prayforchina.us/index.php/michigan/ Here's my Hebei pod: https://pubtv.flfnetwork.com/tabs/the-pub/podcasts/30293/episodes/39 Mar 8 (Sat) - Pray for Nangang District, the most populated in Harbin City, the capital of Heilongjiang, which is paired with MN and the UP of MI for prayer: https://prayforchina.us/index.php/michigan/ My Heilongjiang podcast: https://pubtv.flfnetwork.com/tabs/the-pub/podcasts/30293/episodes/20 Listen to hear the "Insane Adventures" I share at the end of today's podcast...

In the final hour of the Marc Cox Morning Show * Trump levee's tariffs against China; China responds * Jason Chaffetz, FOX News Contributor and Host of the 'Jason in the House' podcast, joins Marc & Kim to talk about USAID's budget being cut and his Podcast 'Jason in the House' * Ryan Wiggins, host of Wiggins America, stops by the studio to talk about the Grammys, and the Democrats needing balance in their offices * Former FOX 2 News Anchor Elliot Davis on the homeless problem in St Louis Thanks for listening!!!

Vor CDU-Parteitag: Welche Koalition strebt Merz an? / Neuer Handelskrieg? Trump verhängt Zölle gegen Kanada, Mexiko und China / China will gegen US-Zölle klagen und kündigt Gegenmaßnahmen an / Scholz in Großbritannien bei Premier Starmer / Israels Premier Netanyahu bricht zu US-Visite auf / Die Grammys und die Brände von Los Angeles // Beiträge von: Barbara Kostolnik, Claudia Sarre, Benjamin Eyssel, Torben Ostermann, Julio Segador, Nils Dampz / Moderation: Matthias Stadelmann

AfD unterstützt Unionspläne zur Migrationsbegrenzung / Teenager nach tödlicher Verfolgungsjagd festgenommen / Kennedy warnt vor Ernennung ihres Cousins / US-Richter setzt Fördermittel-Stopp vorübergehend aus / Mindestens 24 Verletzte bei israelischen Luftangriffen im Libanon / Australischer Wein boomt wieder in China / China erzeugt Mäuse mit zwei männlichen Eltern

Confirmation Circus Chaos. China! China! CHINA! @bradbinkley | Linktree https://linktr.ee/bradbinkley Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Welcome to China Compass on the Fight Laugh Feast Network! I'm your China travel guide, Missionary Ben. You can follow me on X (@chinaadventures) where I post daily reminders to pray for China (PrayforChina.us). You can also email me with any questions or comments @ contact at PrayforChina dot us. You can also find easy links to everything we are involved in @ PrayGiveGo.us. Summary: First, I take a few minutes to look at China’s current struggles (1:30). Then I take another look at Jimmy Carter’s China legacy (8:03). Next I talk about my first true departure for China 22 years ago this week, and what I thought I was getting into by moving to China for a “year” (26:08). Lastly, I discuss Borden’s adventures in Cairo in January of 1913 (39:11) and William Milne’s Journals from 200+ years ago (46:00). China’s Economic Struggles https://finance.yahoo.com/news/beijing-subsidizing-everything-microwaves-dishwashers-071203328.html Interview with President Carter re: China Legacy https://www.cartercenter.org/news/features/p/china/president-carter-on-normalizing-relations-with-china.html The Millionaire Missionary in Cairo (1913) BordenofYale.com https://chinacall.substack.com/p/borden-of-yale-riots-debates-and The Memoirs of William Milne (200th Anniversary Edition) https://a.co/d/bALLtAf Pray for China: Jan 11 - Pray for Xiangtan Prefecture in south-central China's mountainous Hunan Province, and the homeland of Mao Zedong (childhood home pictured). Hunan literally translates to “south of the lake” and is paired with both Indiana and Ohio for prayer: www.PrayforChina.us For more info… https://pubtv.flfnetwork.com/tabs/audio/podcasts/30293/episodes/22 https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xiangtan https://www.asiaharvest.org/china-resources/hunan #prayforchina

Illinois Congressman Darin LaHood is a senior member of the House Ways and Means committee and is also a senior member of the House Intelligence committee.Congressman LaHood talks:-2017 taxes cut bill-Eliminating taxes on tips -Moving in and moving out of congressional offices -Darin's bill - Supporting America's Children and Families Act-What happens the first day President Trump takes office-Speaker Johnson's vote to re-elect-The biggest threat to the United States  To subscribe to The Pete McMurray Show Podcast just click here

Welcome to China Compass on the Fight Laugh Feast Network! I'm your China travel guide, Missionary Ben. You can follow me on X (@chinaadventures) where I post daily reminders to pray for China (PrayforChina.us). You can also email me with any questions or comments @ contact at PrayforChina dot us. You can also find easy links to everything we are involved in @ PrayGiveGo.us. Summary: First, I take a few minutes to look at China’s current struggles (1:30). Then I take another look at Jimmy Carter’s China legacy (8:03). Next I talk about my first true departure for China 22 years ago this week, and what I thought I was getting into by moving to China for a “year” (26:08). Lastly, I discuss Borden’s adventures in Cairo in January of 1913 (39:11) and William Milne’s Journals from 200+ years ago (46:00). China’s Economic Struggles https://finance.yahoo.com/news/beijing-subsidizing-everything-microwaves-dishwashers-071203328.html Interview with President Carter re: China Legacy https://www.cartercenter.org/news/features/p/china/president-carter-on-normalizing-relations-with-china.html The Millionaire Missionary in Cairo (1913) BordenofYale.com https://chinacall.substack.com/p/borden-of-yale-riots-debates-and The Memoirs of William Milne (200th Anniversary Edition) https://a.co/d/bALLtAf Pray for China: Jan 11 - Pray for Xiangtan Prefecture in south-central China's mountainous Hunan Province, and the homeland of Mao Zedong (childhood home pictured). Hunan literally translates to “south of the lake” and is paired with both Indiana and Ohio for prayer: www.PrayforChina.us For more info… https://pubtv.flfnetwork.com/tabs/audio/podcasts/30293/episodes/22 https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xiangtan https://www.asiaharvest.org/china-resources/hunan #prayforchina

China appears to have ended 2024 on a high note, quietly unveiling its sixth-generation stealth fighters during their maiden test flights over Sichuan on 26 December, coinciding with Mao Zedong's 131st birth anniversary. This advancement signals China's potential for airpower superiority and self-sufficiency, despite continued restrictions on technology transfers. As tensions persist in the South China Sea, East China Sea, and Taiwan Strait, China's military progress is likely to provoke an arms race and stimulate further technological development. The real question remains whether these advancements will act as a deterrent or indicate the potential for a larger conflict on the horizon. Read the column here: Read the column here: https://theprint.in/opinion/eye-on-china/chinas-6th-gen-fighter-jets-can-provoke-an-arms-race-the-us-is-now-upstaged/2426121/

Welcome to this New Year's mashup edition of China Compass and the Prison Pulpit! Nearly every week, I mention the Appendix to my little book, Unbeaten, which details my arrest, interrogation, and deportation from China in 2018. This appendix, entitled Remember My Chains, is the written version of a message I’ve given all over the world about how to pray for the persecuted church. You can get my book and the sermon, Remember My Chains, at Unbeaten.vip, or read it for free on Substack where it was just posted yesterday: https://chinacall.substack.com/p/remember-my-chains The following notes follow the basic flow of today's podcast... Borden of Yale: The Millionaire Missionary BordenofYale.com William Borden’s plea for more missionaries to serve in China: Beginning in September, he managed to visit at least thirty colleges and seminaries before sailing for Egypt in December. Spending one to three days in each place gave opportunities for private conversations as well as meetings. On many occasions, with the background of his experience at sea he would ask, “Are you steering or drifting?” ... Often Borden would meet one to whom it seemed too high, with another question: “Are you willing to be made willing?” “If ten men are carrying a log…nine of them on the little end and one at the heavy end, and you want to help, which end will you lift on?” .... In proportion to the population at the time, there were five hundred times as many ministers of the gospel in the United States as there were ordained missionaries in China. Wang Yi on the need for more evangelistic, church planting pastors in China: "Our churches are becoming crowded with middle class professionals. The gospel needs to enter the city more deeply. It must enter the drains, enter in with the petitioners and the marginalized peoples. If your church still has no pastors; if there are no pastors in your city, your community, or even your street; if your company has a GM but there is no pastor there; if the university you work for has a Party committee secretary but there is no pastor, then I must ask: do you know the average ratio of prostitutes to pastors in China? Do you know the ratio of thieves to pastors, of corrupt officials to pastors?" Wang Yi’s New Year’s (Twenty Year) Resolutions... Read the full letter: https://chinacall.substack.com/p/wang-yi-family-newsletter-11-27-2018 A Couple of New Year’s Stories from Northwest China: 7 or 8 years ago tonight, my team and I got chased all over a Chinese village on New Year’s Eve… 19 years ago tonight my father and I almost got ourselves killed in China, in more ways than one… Recommended Resource: Borden of Yale: The Millionaire Missionary BordenofYale.com

Washington's initial thinking about AI regulation has evolved from a knee-jerk fear response to a more nuanced appreciation of its capabilities and potential risks. Today on Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I talk with technology policy expert Neil Chilson about national competition, defense, and federal vs. state regulation in this brave new world of artificial intelligence.Chilson is the head of AI policy at the Abundance Institute. He is a lawyer, computer scientist, and former chief technologist at the Federal Trade Commission. He is also the author of “Getting Out of Control: Emergent Leadership in a Complex World.”In This Episode* The AI risk-benefit assessment (1:18)* AI under the new Trump Administration (6:31)* An AGI Manhattan Project (12:18)* State-level overregulation (15:17)* Potential impact on immigration (21:15)* AI companies as national champions (23:00)Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation. The AI risk-benefit assessment (1:18)Pethokoukis: We're going to talk a bit about AI regulation, the future of regulation, so let me start with this: Last summer, the Biden administration put out a big executive order on AI. I assume the Trump administration will repeal that and do their own thing. Any idea what that thing will be?We have a lead on the tech, we have the best companies in the world. I think a Trump administration is really going to amp up that rhetoric, and I would expect the executive order to reflect the need to keep the US and the lead on AI technology.Chilson: The Biden executive order, repealing it is actually part of the GOP platform, which does not say a lot about AI, but it does say that it's definitely going to get rid of the Biden executive order. I think that's the first order of business. The repeal and replace process . . . the previous Trump administration actually had a couple of executive orders on AI, and they were very big-picture. They were not nearly as pro-regulatory as the Biden executive order, and they saw a lot of the potential.I'd expect a shift back towards a vision of AI as a force for good, I'd expect to shift towards the international dynamics here, that we need to keep ahead of China in AI. We have a lead on the tech, we have the best companies in the world. I think a Trump administration is really going to amp up that rhetoric, and I would expect the executive order to reflect the need to keep the US and the lead on AI technology.That emphasis differs from the Biden emphasis in what way?The Biden emphasis, when you read the executive order, it has some nice language up top about how this is a great new technology, it's very powerful, but overwhelmingly the Biden executive order is directed at the risk of AI and, in particular, not existential risk, more the traditional risks that academics who have talked about the internet have had for a long time: these risks of bias, or risks to privacy, or risks to safety, or deepfakes. And to be honest, there are risks to all of these technologies, but the Biden executive order to really pounded that home, the emphasis was very much on what are the problems that this tech could cause and what do we as the federal government need to do to get in here and make sure it's safe for everybody?I would expect that would be a big change. I don't see, especially on the bias front, I don't see a Trump administration emphasizing that as a primary thing that the federal government needs to fix about AI. In fact, with people like Elon Musk having the ear of the president, I would expect maybe to go in the opposite direction, that these ideas around bias are inflated, that these risks aren't really real, and, to the extent that they are, that it's no business of the federal government to step in and tell companies how to bias or de-bias their products.One thing that sort of confuses me on the Elon Musk angle is that it seemed that he was — at least used to be — very concerned about these somewhat science-fictional existential risks to AI. I guess my concern is that we'll get that version of Musk again talking to the White House and maybe he says, “I'm not worried about bias, but I'm still worried about it killing us all.” Is there any concern there, that that theme, which I think seems to have faded a little bit from the public conversation (maybe I'm wrong) that that will reemerge.I agree with you that I think that theme has faded. The early Senate hearings were very much in that vein, they were about the existential risk, and some of that was the people who were up there talking. This is something that's been on the mind of some of the leaders of the cutting edge of the tech space, and it's part of the reason why they got into it. There's always been a tension there. There is some sort of dynamic here where they're like, “This stuff is super dangerous and super powerful, so I need to be the one creating it and controlling it.” I think Musk still kind of falls in that bucket, so I share a little bit of that concern, but I think you're right that Congress has said, “Oh, those things seem really farfetched. That's not how we're going to focus our time.” I would expect that to continue even with a Musk-influenced administration.I actually don't think that there is necessarily a big tension between that and a pushback against the sort of red-tape regulatory approach to AI that was kind of the more traditional pessimistic, precautionary approach to technology, generally. I think Musk is a guy who hates red tape. I think he's seen it in his own businesses, how it's slowed down launches of all sorts. I think you can hate red tape and be worried about this existential risk. It's not necessarily in intentioned, but it'll be interesting to see how those play out, how Musk influences the policy of the Trump administration on AI.AI under the new Trump Administration (6:31)One issue that seemed to be coming up over and over again is differing opinions among technologists, venture capitalists, about the open-source issue. How does that play out heading into a Trump administration? When I listen to the Andreessen Horowitz podcast, those guys seem very concerned.They're going to get this software. They're going to develop it themselves. We can't out-China China. We should lean into what we're really good at, and that is a dynamic software-development environment, of which open source is a key component.So there's a lot of disagreements about how open source plays out. Open source, it should be pointed out first, is a core technology across everything that people who develop software use. Most websites run on open source software. Most development tools have a huge open source component, and one of the best ways to develop and test technology is by sharing it with people and having people build on it.I do think it is a really important technology in the AI space. We've seen that already, people are building smaller models, doing new things in open source that it costs a lot of money to do in the first instance, maybe in a closed source.The concerns that people raise is that this, especially in the national security space or the national competition, that this sort of exposes our best research to other countries. I think there's a couple of responses to that.The first one is that closed source is no guarantee that those people don't have that technology as well. In fact, most of these models fit on the thumb drive. Most of these AI labs are not run like nuclear facilities, and it's much easier to smuggle a thumb drive out than it is to smuggle a gram of plutonium or something like that. They're going to get this software. They're going to develop it themselves. We can't out-China China. We should lean into what we're really good at, and that is a dynamic software-development environment, of which open source is a key component.It also offers, in many ways, an alternative to centralized sources of artificial intelligence models, which can offer a bunch of user interface-based benefits. They're just easier to use. It's much easier to log into OpenAI and use their ChatGPT than it is to download and build your own model, but it is really nice as a competitive gap filler to have thousands and thousands of other that might do something specific, or have a specific orientation, which you can train on your own. And those exist because of the open source ecosystem. So I think it solves a lot of problems, probably a lot more than it creates.So what would you expect — let's focus on the federal level — for this congress, for the Trump administration, to do other than broadly affirm that we love AI, we hope it continues? Will there be any sort of regulatory rule, any sort of guidance, that would in any way constrain or direct this technology? Maybe it's in the area of the frontier models, I don't know.I think we're likely to see a lot of action at the use level: What are the various uses of various applications and how does AI change that? So in transportation and healthcare . . . this is a general purpose technology, and so it's going to be deployed in lots of spaces, and a lot of these spaces already have a lot of regulatory frameworks in place, and so I think we'll see lots of agencies looking to see, “Hey, this new technology, does it really change anything about how we regulate medical devices? If it does, how do we need to accommodate that? What are the unique risks? What are the unique opportunities that maybe the current framework doesn't really allow for?”I think we'll see a lot of that. I think, once you get up to the abstract model level, it's much harder to figure out what problem both are we trying to solve at the model level and do we have the capability to solve at the model level. If we're worried about people developing bio weapons with this technology, is making sure the model doesn't allow that, is that useful? Is it even possible? Or should we focus those attentions maybe down on, people can't secure the components that they need to execute a biohazard? Would that be a more productive place? I don't see a lot of action, honestly, at the model level.Maybe there'll be some reporting requirements or training requirements. The executive order had those, although they used something called the Defense Production Act — I think probably unconstitutionally, how they use that. But that's going to go away. If that gets filled in by Congress, that there's some sort of reporting regime — maybe that's possible, but Congress doesn't seem to be able to get those types of really high-level tech regulations across the line. They haven't done it with privacy legislation for a long time and everybody seems to think that would be a good idea.I think we'll continue to see efforts at the agency level. One thing Congress might do is they might spend some money in this space, so maybe there will be some new investment or maybe the national laboratories will get some money to do additional AI research. That has its own challenges, but most of them are financial challenges, they're not so much whether or not it's going to impede the industry, so that's kind of how I think it'll likely play out at the federal level.An AGI Manhattan Project (12:18)A report just came out (yesterday, as we're recording this) from the outside advisory group on US-China relations that advises the government, and they're calling for a Manhattan Project to get to an artificial general intelligence, I assume before China or anybody else.Is that a good idea? Do you think we'll do that? What do you make of that recommendation, which caused quite a stir when it came out?For the most part, artificial general intelligence, I don't understand what the appeal of that is, frankly . . . Why not train something that could do something specific really well?Yeah, it's a really interesting report. If you read through the body of the report, it's pretty standard international competitiveness analysis that says, “What are the supply chains for chips? How does it look? How do we compare on talent development? How do we compare on the industry backing investment?” Things like that. And we compare very well, overall, the report says.But then, all of a sudden at the top level, the first recommendation talks about artificial general intelligence. This is the kind of AI that doesn't exist yet, but it's the kind that could basically do everything a human could do at the intellectual level that a human could do it. It's interesting because that recommendation, it doesn't seem to be founded on anything that's actually in the report. There's no other discussion in the report about artificial general intelligence, or how important it is strategically, or anything like that, and yet, they want to spend Manhattan Project-level amounts of money — I think in today's dollars, that'd be like $30 billion to create this artificial general intelligence. I don't know what to make of that, and, more than that, I think it's very unlikely to move the policy discussion. Maybe it moves the Overton window, so people are talking like, “Yeah, we need a Manhattan Project,” but I don't think that it's likely to do anything.For the most part, artificial general intelligence, I don't understand what the appeal of that is, frankly. It has a sort of theoretical appeal, that we could have a computer that could do all the things that a person could do, but in the modern economy, it's actually better to have things that are really good at doing a specific set of things rather than having a generalist that you can deploy lots of different places, especially if you're talking about software. Why not train something that could do something specific really well? I think that would slot into our economy better. I think it's much more likely to be the most productive value of the intense computation time and money that it takes to train these types of models. So it seems like a strange thing to emphasize in our federal spending, even if we're talking about the national security implications. It would seem like it'd be much better to train a model that's specifically built for some type of drone warfare or something rather than trying to make it good at everythi ng and then say, “Oh, now we're going to use you to fly drones.” That doesn't seem to make a ton of sense.State-level overregulation (15:17)We talked about the federal level. Certainly — and not that the states seem to need a nudge, but if they see the Washington doing less, I'm sure there'll be plenty of state governments saying, “Well then we need to do more. We need to fill up the gap with our state regulation.” That already seems to be happening. Will that continue to happen and can the Trump administration stop that?I think it will continue to happen, the question is what kind of gap is left by the Trump administration. I would say what the Biden administration left was a vision gap. They didn't really have an overarching vision for how the US was going to engage with this technology at the federal level, unlike the Clinton administration which set out a pretty clear vision for how the federal government planned to engage on the early version of the internet. What it said was, for some really good reasons, we're going to let the commercial sector lead on development here.I think sending a signal like that could have sort of bully-pulpit effect, especially in redder states. You'll still see states like California and New York, they're listening to Europe on how to do stuff in this space.Still? Are we still listening to . . . Who are the people out there who think, “They've got it figured out”? I understand that maybe that's your initial impulse when you have a new technology and you're like, “I don't know what to do, so who is doing something on it?” But we've had a little bit of time and I just don't get anybody who would default to be like, “Man, we're just going to look at a couple of EU white papers and off to the races here in our state.”I think we're starting to see . . . the shopping of bills that look a lot like the way privacy has worked across the states, and in some cases are being pushed by the same organizations that represent compliance companies saying, “Hey, yeah, we need to do all this algorithmic bias auditing, or safety auditing, and states should require it.”I think a lot of this is a hangover of the social media fights. AI, if you poll it just at that level, if you're like, “Hey, do you think AI is going to be good or bad for your job or for the economy?” Americans are somewhat skeptical. It's because they think of AI in the cultural context that includes Terminator, and automation, and so they think of it that way. They don't think about the thousands of applications on their phones that use artificial intelligence.So I think there's a political moment here around this. The Europeans jumped in on and said, “Hey, we're the first to regulate in this space comprehensively.” I think they're dialing that back since some of their member states are like, “Hey, this is killing our own homegrown AI industry.” But for some reason, you're right, California and New York seem to be embracing that, and I think they probably will continue to. At the very local level, at the state level, there's just weird incentives to do something and then you don't really pay a lot of consequences down the road.Having said that, there was a controversial bill that was very aggressively pushed, SB 1047, in California over the summer, and it got killed. It got canned by Gavin Newsom in the end. And I think that's a sort of a unique artifact of California's “go along to get along” legislature process where even people who don't support bills vote for them, kind of knowing that Gavin, or that the governor, will bring down the veto when it doesn't make political sense.All of this is to say, California's going to California. I think we're starting to see, and what concerns me is, we're starting to see the shopping of bills that look a lot like the way privacy has worked across the states, and in some cases are being pushed by the same organizations that represent compliance companies saying, “Hey, yeah, we need to do all this algorithmic bias auditing, or safety auditing, and states should require it.”There's a Texas draft bill that has been floated right now, and you wouldn't think that Texas would be on the frontier of banning differential effects in bias from AI. It doesn't really sound particularly red-state-y, but these things are getting shopped around and if it moves in Texas, it'll move other places too. I worry about that level of red tape coming at the state level, and that's just going to be ground warfare on the legislative front at the state level.So federal preemption, what is that and how would that work? And is that possible?It's really hard in this space because the technology is so general. Congress could, of course, write something that was very broad and preempted, certain types of regulation of models, and maybe that's a good idea, I've seen some draft language around that.On the other hand, I do believe in federalism and these aren't quite the same sort of network-based technologies that only make sense in a national sweep. So maybe there's an argument that we should let states suffer the consequences of their own regulatory approaches. That hurts my heart a little bit just to think about the future because there are a lot of talented people in those states who are going to find out it's the lawyers who are their main constraint. Those types of transaction costs, they will slow us down. I think if it looks like we're falling behind in the US because we can't get out of our own way regulatorily, I think there will be more impulse to fix things.There are some other creative solutions such as interstate compacts to try to get people to level up across multiple states about how they're going to treat AI and allow innovation to flourish, and so I think we'll see more of those experiments, but it is really hard at the federal level to preempt just because there's so many state-based interests who are going to push back against that sort of thing.Potential impact on immigration (21:15)As far as AI influencing what we do elsewhere — one thing you wrote about recently in a really great essay, which I've already drawn upon in some of these questions is — thinking about immigration and AI talent coming to the United States — what I think is now a widely accepted understanding, that this is an important technology and we certainly want to be the leader in this technology — does that change how we think about immigration, at least very high-skilled immigration?We should be wanting the most talented people to come here and stay here.I think it should. Frankly, we should have changed our minds about some of this stuff a long time ago. We should be wanting the most talented people to come here and stay here. The most talented people in the world already come here for school often. When I was in computer science grad school, it was full of people who really desperately wanted to stay in the US and build companies and build products, and some of them struggled really hard to figure out a way to do it legally.I think that making it easier for those people to stay is essential to keeping not just our lead in the world, I don't want to say it that way — I mean that's important, I think national competitiveness is sort of underrated, I think that is valuable — but those people are the most productive in the US system where they can get access to venture capital that's unlike any other part of the planet. They can get access to networks of talent that are unavailable on other parts of the planet. Keeping them here is good for the US, but I think it's good overall for technological development, and we should really, really, really focus on how to make that easier and more attractive.AI companies as national champions (23:00)This isn't necessarily a specific AI issue, but again, as you said earlier, it seems like a lot of the debate, initially, is really a holdover from the social media debates about moderation, and bias, and all that, and a lot of those sorts of people, in many cases, and frameworks just got globed onto AI.Another aspect is the antitrust, and now we're worried about these big companies owning these platforms, and they're biased.Do we begin to look at issues of how we look at our big companies who have been leading in AI, doing a lot of R&D — does the politics around Big Tech change if we begin to see them as our vanguard companies that will keep us ahead of China?. . . in contrast to the Biden sort of “big-is-bad” rhetoric that they sort of leaned into entirely, I think a Trump administration is going to bring more nuance to that in some ways. And I do think that there will be more of a look towards our innovative companies as being the vanguard of what we do in the US.I think it already has, honestly. You saw early on, the Senate hearings around AI were totally inflected with the language of social media and that network-effects type of ecosystem. AI does not work like that. It doesn't work the same way. In fact, the feedback loops are so much faster from these models, we saw things like Google Gemini that had ahistorical renderings of the founding fathers, and that got so much shouting on Twitter, and on X, and lots of other places that Google very quickly adjusted, tweaked its path. I think we're seeing the toning down of that rhetoric and the recognition that these companies are creating a lot of powerful, useful products, and that they are sort of national champions.Trump, on the campaign trail, when asked about breaking up Google for an ongoing antitrust litigation was like, “Hold on guys, breaking up these companies might not be in our best interest. There might be other ways we can solve these types of problems.” I think that that level of, in contrast to the Biden sort of “big-is-bad” rhetoric that they sort of leaned into entirely, I think a Trump administration is going to bring more nuance to that in some ways. And I do think that there will be more of a look towards our innovative companies as being the vanguard of what we do in the US.Now, having said that, obviously I think there's tons of AI development that is not inside of these largest companies in the open source space, and especially in the application layer, building on top of some of these foundation models, and so I think that ecosystem is also extremely important. Things that sort of preference the big companies over the small ones, I would have a lot of concerns about, and there have been regulatory regimes proposed that, even while opposed by some of the bigger companies, would certainly be possible for them to comply with in a way that small companies would struggle to comply with, and open-source developers just don't have any sort of nexus with which to comply, since there is no actual business model that's propping that type of approach up. So I'd want to keep it pretty neutral between the big companies, the small companies, and open source, while having the cultural recognition that big companies are extremely valuable to the US innovation ecosystem.If you had some time with, I don't know, somebody, the president, the vice president, the Secretary of Commerce, someone in an elevator going from the first to the 10th floor, and you had to quickly say, “Here's what you need to be keeping in mind about AI over the next two to four years,” what would you say?I think the number one thing I would say is that, at the state level, we're wrapping a lot of red tape around innovative companies and individuals, and that we need to find a way to clear that thicket or stop it from growing any further. That's the number one challenge that I see facing this.Secondary to that, I would say the US government needs to figure out how to take advantage of these tools. The federal government is slow to adopt new technologies, but this technology has a lot of applications to the types of government work that hundreds of thousands of federal employees do every day, and so finding ways to streamline using AI to do the job better I think is really valuable, and I think it would be worth some investment at the federal level to think about how to do that well.On sale everywhere The Conservative Futurist: How To Create the Sci-Fi World We Were PromisedMicro Reads▶ Economics* Productivity During and Since the Pandemic - San Francisco Fed* The Effect of COVID-19 Immigration Restrictions on Post-Pandemic Labor Market Tightness - St. Louis Fed* Trump Plans Tariffs on Canada, China and Mexico That Could Cripple Trade - NYT▶ Business* Nvidia's new AI audio model can synthesize sounds that have never existed - Ars* Europe's Mistral expands in Silicon Valley in hunt for AI staff - FT▶ Policy/Politics* Musk Wants $2 Trillion of Spending Cuts. 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Denmark Gives It a Try. - NYT* These batteries could harness the wind and sun to replace coal and gas - Wapo▶ Robotics/AVs* On the Wings of War - NYT▶ Up Wing/Down Wing* ‘Genesis' Review: Rise of the New Machines - WSJ* The Myth of the Loneliness Epidemic - Asterisk▶ Substacks/Newsletters* The Middle Income Trap - Conversable Economist * America's Productivity Boom - Apricitas Economics* The Rise of Anthropic powered by AWS - AI Supremacy* Data to start your week - Exponential View* Trump's economic team is on a collision course with reality - Slow Boring* Five Unmanned SpaceX Starships to Mars in 2026 with Thousands of Teslabots - next BIG futureFaster, Please! is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit fasterplease.substack.com/subscribe

U.S. Revives WWII Airfields to Counter ChinaFleming: Looks Like the Run Up to WWIIBRICS Summit Seeking to Challenge U.S.-Led World Order?New Rules to Ban Some U.S. Investment in Chinese AIIndia Seeks Return to Pre-2020 Position with ChinaZooming In: Long-Time Border Issues Between India, ChinaRice: How Should U.S. Address China Threat to Taiwan?Documentary on Organ Harvesting Screened in DelawareMonkeys Killed by Soil Infection at Hong Kong Zoo

Ken Wilcox, former CEO of Silicon Valley Bank, discusses his book "The China Business Conundrum" and the challenges of doing business in China. He explains the concept of "one bed, two dreams," highlighting the disparity in goals between western and Chinese joint venture partners. Wilcox details his bank's entry into China, emphasizing the strategic invitations and control exerted by the Chinese Communist Party. He recounts the extensive regulations and control mechanisms, including a three-year restriction on using Chinese currency. Despite the challenges, Wilcox values the experience, noting the complex interdependence between the U.S. and China.If you have any questions, comments, or suggestions for Gene, please email him at contact@economicsexplored.com  or send a voice message via https://www.speakpipe.com/economicsexplored. About this episode's guest: Ken WilcoxKen Wilcox was the CEO of Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) from 2001 to 2011, then the CEO of SVB's joint venture with Shanghai Pudong Development Bank (SPDB-SVB) in Shanghai until 2015, followed by four years as its Vice Chairman. He currently serves on the boards of the AsiaSociety of Northern California, the Asian Art Museum, and UC San Diego's 21st Century China Center, as well as Columbia Lake Partners, a European venture-debt fund. He is on the Board of Advisors of the Fudan University School of Management in Shanghai and an Adjunct Professor at U.C. Berkeley.Ken holds a PhD in German from Ohio State University and an MBA from Harvard Business School. He has given numerous speeches in both English and Chinese, published a variety of articles in the banking press, and recently wrote the management book Leading Through Culture: How Real Leaders Create Cultures That Motivate People to Achieve Great Things (Waterside Productions, 2020) and its accompanying workbook, How About You? (Waterside Productions, 2023). His account of establishing an innovation bank in China, The China Business Conundrum: Ensure that Win-Win Doesn't Mean Western Companies Lose Twice, is forthcoming from Wiley.To connect with Ken, please visit: www.linkedin.com/in/kenwilcoxsvb/Timestamps for EP259Introduction and Overview of the Podcast (0:00)Ken Wilcox's Journey into China (4:40)Challenges and Strategic Invitations in China (8:10)Guanxi and Corruption in Business Relationships (14:13)State Control and Joint Venture Challenges (20:42)Impact of SVB's Collapse and Final Reflections (40:02)TakeawaysJoint ventures in China often suffer from differing goals between Western companies and their Chinese partners, a phenomenon Ken Wilcox refers to as "One Bed, Two Dreams."The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) holds significant control over both private and state-owned companies, making it difficult for foreign businesses to operate independently.Guanxi, a system of mutual obligation and trust, plays a critical role in business relationships in China, but it often involves navigating corruption and complex social expectations.Foreign companies entering China are often targeted for their intellectual property, and the CCP uses strategic partnerships to gain technological insights.Ken Wilcox's experience with Silicon Valley Bank in China illustrates the frustrations foreign firms face due to slow regulatory processes and overwhelming state control.Links relevant to the conversationKen's book “The China Business Conundrum”:https://www.amazon.com.au/China-Business-Conundrum-Win-Win-Companies/dp/1394294166Previous Economics Explored episodes on China:China's Economic Future Under Xi & the Australia-China Relationship w/ Emmanuel Daniel – EP253 https://economicsexplored.com/2024/09/17/chinas-economic-future-under-xi-the-australia-china-relationship-w-emmanuel-daniel-ep253/Enterprise China: what western businesses need to know w/ Prof. Allen Morrison  – EP171https://economicsexplored.com/2022/12/26/enterprise-china-what-western-businesses-need-to-know-w-prof-allen-morrison-ep171/Why we're in the Decisive Decade with China & what the West should do w/ Dr Jonathan D. T. Ward – EP182https://economicsexplored.com/2023/04/09/why-were-in-the-decisive-decade-with-china-what-the-west-should-do-w-dr-jonathan-d-t-ward-ep182/China, Taiwan & the Indo-Pacific w/ Dr Greta Nabbs-Keller – EP146https://economicsexplored.com/2022/07/04/china-taiwan-the-indo-pacific-w-dr-greta-nabbs-keller-ep146/Lumo Coffee promotion10% of Lumo Coffee's Seriously Healthy Organic Coffee.Website: https://www.lumocoffee.com/10EXPLOREDPromo code: 10EXPLORED 

As the People's Republic of China celebrates 75 years as a nation, its military capability and territorial ambitions continue to expand. Dr. Brendan Mulvaney, Director of the China Aerospace Studies Institute at National Defense University, updates us on what that means for their challenge to US air capabilities. And we have a bumper crop of airpower headlines, including about the SR-71. All powered by GE!

Where is China today? Will its rise continue to benefit the vast majority of its population? Or is Xi Jinping's increasingly repressive government committing one of the biggest blunders of modern history? This is the final episode in the China-trilogy, the product of hours of conversations I've had with ChinaTalk's Jordan Schneider and MIT professor Yasheng Huang. In part 1, we discussed the deep currents of Chinese history, shaping the country's destiny from its early technological lead to its more recent decline and stagnation. In part 2, we discussed China during and after Mao, trying our best to explain the Chinese economic miracle. In this final episode, we discuss questions about China's present and future, guided by lessons from its recent past. We touch upon issues such as: The causes and consequences of Xi Jinping's rise Why both Chinese leaders and Western observers misunderstand China's miracle – and why this matters for the future Why China is on course towards a sudden eruption of political chaos As always, we finish with my guest's reflections on humanity. LINKS You can read my essays and get the On Humans newsletter at ⁠OnHumans.Substack.com⁠. Are you a long-term listener? Feeling generous today? Join the wonderful group of my patrons at ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Patreon.com/OnHumans⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠! For other episodes on economic history, see my series on the ⁠⁠⁠⁠Birth of Modern Prosperity⁠⁠⁠⁠, with Daron Acemoglu, Oded Galor, Brad DeLong, and Branko Milanovic. MENTIONS Scholars Gordon Tullock | Joseph Torigian CCP figures Hua Guofeng 华国锋 | "Gang of Four" 四人幫 | Deng Xiaoping 邓小平 | Zhao Ziyang 赵紫阳 | 习近平 China's history | Xi Jinping | Chinese miracle | China's political leadership | Xi Jinping reforms | Hu Jintao policies | China leadership generations | Chinese Communist Party | Deng Xiaoping reforms | Chinese economy | China's political control | Chinese corruption | Rural poverty in China | China's environmental policies | China economic inequality | Chinese rural income | Chinese political system | China's globalized economy | Chinese private sector | China geopolitical tensions | China-West relations | Chinese GDP growth | CCP succession | Xi Jinping succession | Autocracy in China | China's term limits | China's leadership transitions | Vietnam-China war | China's authoritarianism | Chinese economic growth | Xi Jinping's leadership style | Chinese politics and reforms | China's environmental issues | China's green policies | Urban-rural gap

Donate (no account necessary) | Subscribe (account required) Join Bryan Dean Wright, former CIA Operations Officer, as he dives into today's top stories shaping America and the world on The Wright Report. In this episode, we cover: Wages Falling for Blue-Collar Workers: New data reveals significant wage drops for blue-collar workers due to the influx of illegal aliens—agriculture down 25%, manufacturing down 17%, and transportation down 14%. Kamala Harris vs. Donald Trump's Tariff Plan: Kamala Harris claims Trump's tariffs will cost Americans an extra $4,000 annually. A detailed fact-check suggests the actual impact could vary, with potential costs being much lower or even zero. International News Highlights: Israel: Six hostages, including an American, were killed by Palestinian terrorists, sparking national outrage and debate over how to handle the ongoing conflict. Brazil: A clash between Elon Musk's X (formerly Twitter) and Brazil's Marxist government over censorship and control of information could have global economic repercussions. China: China's manufacturing sector is in decline, presenting a strategic opportunity for the US and Europe to leverage tariffs and weaken the Communist Party's economic base. "And you shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free." - John 8:32

Cut taxes on SS and Tips? President decides rates? China - inflation ticking up YEN volatility - NOT OVER PLUS we are now on Spotify and Amazon Music/Podcasts! Click HERE for Show Notes and Links DHUnplugged is now streaming live - with listener chat. Click on link on the right sidebar. Love the Show? Then how about a Donation? Follow John C. Dvorak on Twitter Follow Andrew Horowitz on Twitter DONATIONS ? Warm Up - Cut taxes on SS and Tips? - President decides rates? - China - inflation ticking up - YEN volatility - NOT OVER - Announcing the WINNER for the UNH CTP Market Update - CRISIS AVERTED - August doldrums - but big week of Eco Data - Market Punishing earnings misses - more than usual - Same old  = going back to the Mega-Cap trade while pulling other sectors down - PPI out - changing direction Crisis Averted - Monday (last) Yen plunge then pick up - Come on - Japan markets fell 12% then rallied 10%  - intervention anyone? --- Clearly there is an invisible hand at work here ---- Plus Japan officials waled back their "hawkish" comments ---- 17 years of ZERO or NEGATIVE rates, markets don't want to give that up --- Do you know why this is all happy pappy now? How did they resolve the 2 day crisis? (Hint - $$$$) - Japanese markets have recovered ALL of the losses since last Monday - ALL Volume/Vacations - August - Volumes are down across the board. Aside from a couple of days when markets moved lower - Will probably continue to see slow markets (unless some outside shock) through Labor Day - However  - big week of ECO data - - CPI, PPI, UMich, Import/Export prices, Retail Sales (no one has a clue what the trajectory is from here) Month to Date MTD IWN iShs Russell 2000 Value ETF -7.87% IWM iShs Russell 2000 ETF -7.10% IWO iShs Russell 2000 Grwth ETF -6.15% IWD iShs Russell 1000 Val ETF -2.45% IWB iShs Russell 1000 ETF -1.68% IWF iShs Russell 1000 Gwth ETF -1.00% Really? - Former President Donald Trump this week repeated his plan to eliminate taxes on Social Security benefits for seniors. - The Republican nominee called for "no tax for seniors on Social Security" during a "Fox & Friends" interview Wednesday - Of course Harris/Walz also want to cut taxes on SS now... ***** Some "experts" say that this will hurt the solvency of SS and Medicare even more - now expected to run out in 2035 --- Oh - let's eliminate taxes on TIPS ---- The Waiters & waitresses workforce and tipped in service industry are about 4 Million people (1% of population Where do we stand on this.. - Presidents having a direct say - or vote - on Fed decisions? Switcher-rooo - Chipotle Mexican Grill announces that Brian Niccol, Chairman and CEO has accepted the role as Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Starbucks (SBUX) and will be leaving the Company effective August 31, 2024 - -On the news, SBUX up 17% and CMG down 10% China - China's consumer prices rose by a more-than-expected 0.5% in July from a year ago, according to data from the National Bureau of Statistics released Friday. - Analysts polled by Reuters had expected a slight pickup in the consumer price index to 0.3% in July from a year ago, versus 0.2% in June. - Is this good news or bad? PPI - July Core PPI 0.0% vs. 0.2% Briefing.com consensus; prior revised to 0.3% from 0.4% -- Disinflation is speeding up - nearing DEFLATION concerns - Tomorrow - CPI Another one... - Home Depot on Tuesday topped quarterly expectations, but cautioned that sales will be weaker than expected in the back half of the year as high interest rates and consumer uncertainty dampen demand. - The home improvement retailer said it now expects full-year comparable sales to decline by 3% to 4% compared to the prior fiscal year. It had previously expected comparable sales, a metric that takes out the impact of store openings and closures and other one-time factors,

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I’m your host & China travel guide, missionary Ben. You can follow me on X @chinaadventures, and you can email me with any questions or comments @ bfwesten at gmail dot com. B.F. Westen is my pen name, btw. If you want to learn more about our prayer and missionary projects and get any of the books I’ve helped to publish, check out the website www.PrayGiveGo.us for easy access to all of these things. On last week’s podcast I shared my extended interview with Evangelina, and her beautiful song reminding us to pray for the persecuted. This week’s podcast features a ½ hour interview with her brother “Jaime”, who talks in depth about his arrest and deportation from China in 2011, when he was just 14. Jaime is also one of the 10 being sentenced in Nashville. He, along with his sister and another young man, were sentenced on July 30th. Similarly to the other defendants (except for their dad, “Uncle Bundo”, who was given 6 months in jail), they were let off with a combination of home detention and probation. Here is the update that was posted online this week… Update: The four defendants today have been given time served (which covers the 21 months of pretrial probation), followed by 90 days of home detention, followed by 3 years of probation. But before my interview with Jaime, I spent some time remembering a brother, a friend, a missionary, who passed away in a plane crash in Canada (Merritt, BC) a few days ago (Sunday evening, July 27th), leaving behind a wife and five kids (from their late teens to mid 20s). For security reasons, I will just share his first name, Geoff. Listen to the podcast for my thoughts on his life and legacy.

I’m your host & China travel guide, missionary Ben. You can follow me on X @chinaadventures, and you can email me with any questions or comments @ bfwesten at gmail dot com. B.F. Westen is my pen name, btw. If you want to learn more about our prayer and missionary projects and get any of the books I’ve helped to publish, check out the website www.PrayGiveGo.us for easy access to all of these things. On last week’s podcast I shared my extended interview with Evangelina, and her beautiful song reminding us to pray for the persecuted. This week’s podcast features a ½ hour interview with her brother “Jaime”, who talks in depth about his arrest and deportation from China in 2011, when he was just 14. Jaime is also one of the 10 being sentenced in Nashville. He, along with his sister and another young man, were sentenced on July 30th. Similarly to the other defendants (except for their dad, “Uncle Bundo”, who was given 6 months in jail), they were let off with a combination of home detention and probation. Here is the update that was posted online this week… Update: The four defendants today have been given time served (which covers the 21 months of pretrial probation), followed by 90 days of home detention, followed by 3 years of probation. But before my interview with Jaime, I spent some time remembering a brother, a friend, a missionary, who passed away in a plane crash in Canada (Merritt, BC) a few days ago (Sunday evening, July 27th), leaving behind a wife and five kids (from their late teens to mid 20s). For security reasons, I will just share his first name, Geoff. Listen to the podcast for my thoughts on his life and legacy.

Food photography. We know it's now crucial to the success of a cookbook. But it wasn't always so. We'll tell what we've seen over three dozen cookbooks published in the last twenty-five years.We're Bruce Weinstein & Mark Scarbrough. We're the team behind dozens of cookbooks, tens of thousands of published original recipes, and a long career in the food publishing business.Here are the segments for this episode of COOKING WITH BRUCE & MARK:[01:09] One-minute cooking tip: Pick the smallest chicken.[03:40] What's happened to food photography in cookbooks over the twenty-five years we've been in the food business? How has photography changed with the advent of the internet? We'll give you an overview of food photography from our three-dozen-cookbook persepctive.[19:32] What's making us happy info this week? China China and conserves (a lower-sugar jam with chilis or other aromatics).

Last time we spoke about the end of WW1 and China's bitter experience at the Paris Peace conference. Yes it WW1 brought a lot of drama to China. Yuan Shikai and later prominent figures like Duan Qirui took the poor habit of making secret deals with the Japanese that would very much bite them in the ass later in Paris. The Chinese delegation came to Paris hoping to secure major demands, most notably to solve the ongoing Shandong Problem. Instead they quite literally found out there were secret deals between China and Japan that completely hindered their war aims. To add insult to injury the western powers, notably Britain had also made secret double dealings with Japan. In the end Japan got her way, China did not, it was so embarrassing the Chinese delegation did not bother signing the Treaty of Versailles. Things could not possible get any worse eh?   #92 The New Culture Movement   Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. To say this is a big event in Modern Chinese history is certainly an understatement. I have to acknowledge over on my personal channel the Pacific War channel I made an episode on this topic. I had no idea what I was getting myself into, but I am very glad I tackled it. It was the first time a large portion of Chinese audience members came forward and thanked me for covering the subject. I was honestly a bit baffled, the episode picked up steam, I thought, hmmm why is this getting views, its a rather boring, non battle more political episode. Well case and point, this story is really the birth of modern China. If you go searching for books on this subject you will find so many of its impact on just about every facet of China today and even on other nations. Now there is two major subjects at play here, the May fourth movement and the New Cultural movement. I am going to do my best to try and cohesively tell this, but its a rather difficult one to be honest. For the sake of cohesion and to be blunt while writing this I just don't think I will manage to fit both subjects into one episode, I first am going to tackle what exactly the “New Cultural Movement” was and I am guessing I will have to leave the May Fourth Movement for next episode.  The New Cultural Movement is intertwined with the May Fourth Movement, or you could call it the progenitor. In essence it was a progressivist movement that sprang up in the 1910's and would continue through the 1920's criticizing traditional Chinese ideology and promoting a new culture. This new culture was influenced by new age science and modern ideals. It's during this period you find many of China's big scholars start speaking out and making names for themselves. Now we have been talking in length about numerous issues that hit China during the 1910's such as WW1, Yuan Shikai's craziness, secret deals getting leaked to the public, the Shandong Problem, the Treaty of Versailles and all of these summed up were just more and more humiliation for China. The people of China were fed up. The people of China wanted change. Now its hard to encompass all that was sought out, but there are 6 large themes of this New Cultural movement that I shall list.  The first change the public wanted was because of their outdated writing system, they wanted a more vernacular one. Second the confucian based tradition patriarchal family model was very outdated and it was a hindrance against individual freedom and women's rights. Third the people wanted China to be a real nation, one amongst the other nations of the world, not stuck in its Confucian model. Fourth the people wanted China to adopt a more scientific approach to things rather than the traditional confucian belief system. Fifth, the Chinese people wanted democracy human rights, all of the enlightened values other nations had. Lastly China had always been a nation who looked at the past rather than towards the future, this had to end.  Now before we hit each of these lets summarize a bit of this time period, the environment and feeling of the day. The Qing Dynasty had fallen during the Xinhai revolution seeing the rise of Yuan Shikai. Yuan Shikai stamped down on all opposition, this included intellectuals also, many were exiled. There of course was a lot of animosity to Yuan Shikai, he was after all the guy who for a lack of better words, stole the leadership from Dr Sun Yat-Sen and he crushed the second revolution. One of these intellectual exiles found himself in Tokyo, Zhang Shizhao, there he founded a political magazine called The Tiger. The Tiger ran for about a year in 1915 and would have a significant impact on other political journals in China. The Tiger was known for probing political questions of the day, its writers often grappled with how underlying cultural values and beliefs shape politics. It inspired others to write similar magazines, notably, Chen Duxiu Now also in 1915 as we know, the Twenty-One Demands were issued, Yuan Shikai was forced to sign the Thirteen demands and all of this got leaked to the public. In 1915, Chen Duxiu founded the magazine “Jinggao qingnian” “New Youth”and he would have future intellectuals as editors of it such as Li Dazhao, Hu Shih and Lu Xun. In its first issue titled Jinggao qingnian literally translate as “letter to Youth”, it encouraged young people to “be independent and not enslaved, be progressive and not conservative, be in the forefront and not lagging behind, be internationalist and not isolationist, be practical and not rhetorical, and be scientific and not superstitious.” Chen Duxiu advocated for science and democracy, these would become rallying cries often in the form of “Mr. Democracy and Mr. Science”. This would spring forth more literature like “Xinchao” “the Renaissance” founded by the Renaissance Society in 1918 whose members included Beijing students directly inspired by Chen Duxiu, Hu Shih and Li Dazhao. The Renaissance promoted western political and social ideology, encouraging the youth of China to embrace progressive politics. The New Youth was by far the most influential magazine. In 1917 Chen Duxiu and Zhang Shizhao moved to Beijing University where they became acquaintances and alongside others built up a community that would usher in the New Culture Movement. At this time the intellectual powerhouses were Peking University and Tsinghua University in Beijing and Shanghai which had a booming publishing industry. Many scholars who would contribute to the New Culture movement would be found at Peking University such as Cai Yuanpei, who served as president of the University in 1916. Cai Yuanpei was a colleague of our old friend Li Shizeng whom both founded the Diligent Work-Frugal Study movement, sending worker-students to France. It was Cai Yuanpei who recruited those like Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao and Hu Shih. Chen Duxiu served as the dead of the School of Arts and Letters at the university; Li Dazhao became its librarian and Hu Shih helped translate and perform numerous lectures.  These men would lead the fight for “baihua wenxue” or the Vernacular Literature Movement. Yes there's a lot of movements in this episode. Now Baihua is a form of written Chinese based on the numerous varieties of Chinese spoken in the country vs, “classical Chinese”. This probably sounds a bit confusing, but think of it this way. Going all the way back to the Shang dynasty a process of creating Chinese characters was gradually standardized by the time of the Qin dynasty, so thats 1200 BC to 206 BC. Over the following dynasties the Chinese calligraphy is created, however what also occurs is the evolution of language. The Chinese language branched off into numerous dialects, thus all over China people are speaking different but related forms of Chinese, yet the way they write is using this “classical Chinese writing”. As you might imagine, by the time of the 20th century, the classical chinese writing is so vastly different from what people are speaking, by this time its Mandarin, Cantonese, Hokkien, and many many more. Classical Chinese had become extremely outdated.  Chinese intellectuals in the early 20th century were looking to reform the literary system. Two of the big proposals that came about were to simplify Chinese characters and create a Chinese writing system using the latin alphabet. Professor at Peking University, Qian Xuantong was a leading figure on the Latinization movement. Chen Dixiu on the topic of Chinese characters had said  “backward, difficult to recognize, and inconvenient to write”. He blamed them for China being stuck in conservatism and having lacked modernization. There was a movement to switch to pinyin to spell out Chinese characters, for those who don't know Pinyin is alphabetically written Chinese, aka the only way Craig is able to read most of his sources haha. The plan to formalize this never occurred, but there was a real fight for it. Many scholars began writing in Baihua, one of the most famous works was Lu Xun's “A Madman's Diary”. In essence it was a short story criticizing early 20th century Chinese society, trying to challenge its audience into conventional thinking vs traditional understanding. The story has Lu Xun's madman seeing family and village members around him performing cannibalism which he has attributed to some confucian classics. Basically he implies China's traditional culture was mentally cannibalistic. Building somewhat on this theme, Chen Duxiu wrote in the New Youth how Mr. Confucius needed to be replaced by Mr. Science and Mr. Democracy. Meanwhile Hu Shih argued “a dead language cannot produce a living literature”. He further argued a new written format would allow the Chinese people with less education to read texts, articles, books and so forth. It was classical Chinese that was holding the less educated back. Basically he was criticizing how scholars basically held a monopoly on information. Hu Shih was highly praised for his efforts, one man named Mao Zedong would have a lot to say about how grateful China should be to him. Mao Zedong of course was a assistant at Peking University's library at the time. Now alongside the battle to change the written language of China, there was a feminist movement as well. Women suffered greatly under the traditional system. Prior to the 20th century Women in China were considered essentially different from Men as you can imagine. Confucius argued that an ordered and morally correct society would refrain from the use of force. Violence and coercion were deviant and unwelcomed. Instead a correct person would aim to become “junzi” meaning gentleman or a person of integrity. For society to remain stable, it was crucial correct hierarchies were established. Servants obey masters, subjects obey rulers, children obey parents and women obey men.The association of Women with Yin and Men with Yang, two qualities considered important by Daoism, still had women occupying a lower position than men in the hierarchical order. The I Ching stated “Great Righteousness is shown in that man and woman occupy their correct places; the relative positions of Heaven and Earth”. Women of course were supposed to be submissive and obedient to men, normally forbidden to participate in politics, military and or communal aspects. The traditional Confucian led Chinese society simply valued men over women. To get into the most hardcore aspect of this, did you know China had a near 2000 year history of female infanticide? It was written by many Christian missionaries arriving in the late 16th century to China that they witnessed newborns being thrown into rivers or in the rubbish. The primary cause of this practice was poverty, shortages of food. Confucianism influenced this practice quite a bit. Male children were to work, provide and care for their elders, while females were to be married off as quickly as possible. During the 19th century “ni nu” to drown girls was widespread, because of the mass famines. Exposure to the elements, strangulation, tossing a child into a basket and casting it off were normalized. Buddhists would build these things called “baby towers” for people to dump children at. Later on in 1930, Rou Shi a famous member of the May Fourth movement would write a short story titled “A Slave-Mother” portraying how extreme poverty in rural communities led to female infanticide. Hell turn the clock even more to the 1970's and we got the One-Child Policy where females were often aborted or abandoned. Alongside this infant girls at the age of 5 or 6 would often have the feet bound, a centuries old practice that would increase their marriageability. This hobbled them for life. When women married, their families pretty much abandoned them. Often this marriages were arranged and the new wife could expect to be at the autocratic mercy of her mother in law henceforth. If her husband died there was great social pressure for her to remain unmarried and chaste for the rest of her life. It goes without saying, suicide rates in China were the highest among young women. During the late 19th century the ideal woman was “xiangqi liangmu /a good wife and loving mother”. During the early 20th century the new ideal was becoming “modeng funu / modern woman”. Women wanted to pursue education and careers outside the home. Whether it was by choice or a financial necessity, Chinese women increasingly left the domestic sphere. They entered the workforce in all available forms, typically but not limited to factories, offices, and the entertainment industry. Yet the traditional social norms limited their opportunities in work, education and politics. Women according to the traditional system were not supposed to make speeches in the streets. But those like Liang Qichao began calling for the liberation of women, to let them be educated, allow them to participate in Chinese society.  The confucian social order held the hierarchy of husband over wife, but within the New Culture Movement that criticized Confucianism and traditions, now there was a deep want for women to be seen as human beings, as independent people who should become actors in the public sphere. When those like Chen Duxiu began writing and lecturing about tossing aside the old and looking at the new, this also included women. Thus the New Culture Movement had a large aspect of gender equality and female emancipation. There was also the aspect of dress. By the 1920's women would abandon traditional garments of embroidered hip or knee length jackets and trousers. They began wearing short jackets, skirts and the qipao, a one piece dress. Unlike the traditional women's clothing that hung loosely around the body, the Qipoa was form fitting. A women's suffrage movement began, though it would take some time. So you might be seeing the theme here, the old, traditional, confucian past, was needing a new replacement. The written language needed to be updated, women needed to be more equal to men. How about the nation of China itself? The New Culture leaders wanted to see China as a nation amongst nations, not one culturally unique. They began doing what many nations did around the turn of the century, they looked outwards. They looked at foreign doctrines, particularly those that emphasized cultural criticism and were nation building. Many of these intellectuals were the lucky few who went abroad, received foreign educations. They took western and Japanese ideas, seeing what could be used to create a new model for China and her vast population. Many were enthralled by President Woodrow Wilson's 14 points and ideals of self-determination. The Xinhai revolution had ushered in a Chinese nationalist spirit which demanded resistance to foreign impositions and the elimination of domestic autocracy. They had overthrown the Manchu, now they wanted to overthrow the global powers who had been encroaching upon their nation since the mid 19th century. So many of these intellectuals had hoped with the end of the war would come an end to their national disgrace.  The intellectuals argued China's failure to modernize was caused by both external and internal factors. Externally, foreign powers had been encroaching upon China for decades. Foreign powers had gone to war and defeated China, forcing her to sign unequal treaties. Internally China's economy, social system and cultural values were holding her back. This brought forward the need for a “new culture” to kick start the development of a new state. They argued China needed educational and social progress to remedy the states diplomatic weakness and endemic poverty. China's economy, social fabric and international standing needed to be improved, and the answer was programs of public education. Yet to do so, the less educated needed to be able to read and participate, ie: vernacular writing.  Liang Qichao was a huge influence on ideas to build China as a modern state. He created the “Xinmin Congbao / new citizen”, a biweekly journal first publishing in Yokohama Japan back in 1902. The journal covered numerous topics like politics, religion, law, economics, geography, current affairs and such. Basically Li Qichao was showing the Chinese public never before heard theories. Liang Qichao got Chinese people to think about the future of China. What did it even mean to identify as Chinese? He allowed more Chinese to look out into the world, so they could see many different paths and ideas. There were countless, Darwinism, liberalism, pragmatism, socialism all these new “isms” could be the tools to a realization of a strong and unified China. And of course there was Marxism, many Chinese laborers who went to Russia saw first hand what the Bolsheviks had accomplished. The principal of Peking University, Cai Yuanpei would resign on May 9th, 1919 causing a huge uproar. What once united all these intellectual New Culture movement types, gradually changed after the May fourth movement. Hu Shih, Cai Yuanpei and liberal minded intellectuals urged for protesting students to return to their classrooms, but those like Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao urged for more radical political action. Marxist study groups would form and with them the first meetings of the Chinese Communist Party. This is of course a story for future podcasts, but it should be noted there would be a divide amongst these intellectuals as to how China should be “modern”. Li Dazhao for example advocated for fundamental solutions, while Hu Shih criticized such thinking “calling for the study of questions, less study of isms”. Those like Chen Dixiu and Li Dazhao would quickly find followers like Mao Zedong.  Now the overall theme here has been “toss out Confucius!” but it was not all like that. Part of the movement much like the Meiji restoration, was to usher in some new, but to incorporate the old so to not lose ones entire culture. For those of you who don't know I began my time on youtube specifically talking about the history of Tokugawa to Showa era Japan. The Meiji restoration was an incredible all encompassing hyper modernization, that for the life of me I can't find a comparison to. But an interesting aspect of it was the “fukko / restore antiquity”. It often goes unmentioned, but the Japanese made these enormous efforts to crop out the outside influences such as Confucianism, Buddhism and such, to find the ancient cultures of their people. This eventually led to an evolution of Shintoism, thus Japan not only wanted to adopt new ideas from the rest of the world, they wanted to find the important aspects of their own cultural history and retain it, make sure they did not lose what made them Japanese. The same can be said of China here.  Yigupai or the “doubting antiquity school” was a group of scholars who applied a critical historiographical approach to Chinese historical sources. They took their ancient texts and really analyzed them to see what was truly authentic, what should be kept. Hu Shih initiated the movement. He had studied abroad and was deeply influenced by western thinking and argued at Peking University that all Chinese written history prior to the Eastern Zhou, that is the second half of the Zhou dynasty needed to be carefully dissected. Many were concerned with the authenticity of pre-Qin texts and began questioning the writers of past dynasties. There was also Gu Jiegang who formed the “Gushibian / Debates on Ancient history” movement and published magazines of the same name. Later in 1922 there was the Critical Review Journal, involving numerous historians. Their work dismantled many beliefs or at minimum cast some doubt on ancient textual writings that had been around for millennia. For example there was the belief Yu the Great or Yu the Engineer who was the first to make real flood control efforts during the Xia Dynasty was an animal or deity figure. There was the notion of peaceful transition of power seen from the Yao to Shun dynasties, but the group found evidence this was all concocted by philosophers of the Zhou dynasty simply to support their political philosophy. They were basically detectives finding the bullshit in their ancient history and this had a profound effect on the current day thinking. The doubting antiquity group's proved the history of China had been created iteratively. Ancient texts had been repeatedly edited, reorganized, hell many had fabricated things to make ends meet for themselves, you could not take their word at face value. They argued all of the supernatural attributes of historical figures had to be questioned, a lot of it was not possible and thus not authentic versions of their history. But the group also were victims of their own criticisms. Many of them would criticize parts of antiquity history simply to get rid of things they didn't like or that got in the way of current day issues. There was also another element to the doubting antiquity movement. Students were pushed to look over things in ancient Chinese history, chinese folklore that Confucian schools dismissed or ignored.  Within the background of the Twenty-One Demands, the Sino-Japanese Treaty, the double promising of Britain and other secret deals made over the future of China had angered her people greatly. The common people of China did not feel represented nor heard at all. Japan was encroaching upon them in Manchuria and now Shandong. Their leadership were either making secret deals to secure their own objectives, or they were completely powerless to other nations and crumbling, such as the case at Versailles. With so many students and laborers going abroad witnessing the civilizations of other nations in the west and Japan, they yearned for the things those people had. Democratic and egalitarian values were at the very forefront of the New Culture Movement. Western science, democracy, bills of rights, racial equality, equality of opportunity, opportunity to venture into politics, the list can go on, these were things alien to China. The people began to enchant the masses with such ideas, while simultaneously criticizing traditional Chinese ethics, her customs, literature, history, philosophy, religion, social and political institutions and such. Liberalism, pragmatism, utilitarianism, anarchism, socialism, communism were thrown around like yardsticks so the people could measure China's traditional culture against them. How did such “isms” match up? Within the current crisis in China which one of these isms might benefit them the most? Overall the movement kept up the greatest theme of needing to look forward. China had always looked to the past. They had suffered so immensely, they were after all enduring the century of humiliation as it would famously become known. It was humiliation after humiliation. How could they change so the past would stop haunting them? Things like the Boxer Protocol, how could China rid itself of these humiliating indemnity payments? Britain's Opium had ushered in a poison that still plagued them, how could they finally rid China of it? The war and encroachment of nations like Britain, Russia and Japan, how could they stop them from continuing these actions? China could not stay the way she was anymore, she had to change. Thus overall within every facet of the movement's ideology, they kept emphasizing to stop looking in the past for answers for today. Today would require looking abroad and within and it would not be easy.  This episode and I do apologize it must be all over the place for you, encompasses a lot of the thoughts and feelings, but its part of a great event known as the May Fourth movement of 1919. China is basically for the first time really going to try and adopt fundamental changes, to become a real modern state. If it were not for lets say, the descent into warlordism, perhaps the Chinese Republican dream could have been started in 1919. Regardless, China will see an incredible amount of change in a short amount of time.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The New Culture Movement saw numerous intellectuals rise up and challenge the prevailing social and political order of their nation. They tried to give the public new answers to old questions, and above all else hope. Hope for a better tomorrow. It was to be a arduous journey, but students would be the vanguard into a new age for China.

Last time we spoke about the Twenty-One Demands and the rise of the Walrus Emperor, Yuan Shikai. Japan certainly had their work cut out for them during WW1. Seizing upon every possible opportunity Japan occupied Shandong province after the siege of Tsingtao and forced China to accept the unbelievable twenty-one demands. Yuan Shikai tried to stall and negotiate, eventually reaching thirteen demands, but yet again China was served a terrible humiliation that even became a national day henceforth. Then Yuan Shikai completely, organically, not fault of his own because the Hongxian emperor over a new dynasty. The new monarchy of China lasted a solid 83 days, before Yuan Shikai was forced to abdicate lest every single province declare their independence. All of this was occurring during the vacuum of WW1, which was still raging on. Yuan Shikai was back to being president, over a fractured nation.   #91 China & the Treaty of Versailles   Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Yuan Shikai's short-lived monarchy did not end China's national crisis. When he abdicated, you would assume this would have eased tensions a bit, but then the people of China found out Yuan Shikai was going to stay on as president. The people were livid. As you can imagine, the calls for his abdication were followed up by calls for him to step down as president. In early April of 1916 Cai E, speaking on behalf of Yunnan, Guizhou and Guangxi put forward 6 demands to solve the crisis. 1) Yuan Shikai had to step down and go into exile 2) his stooges, 13 principal monarchist supports were to be executed 3) Yuan Shikai's vast property was to be confiscated 4) Yuan Shikai's descendants were to be stripped of citizenship. Apparently Yuan Shikai ignored these demands off the bat, prompting Cai E to add 5) Yuan Shikai would be charged with treason and punished by law passed by Congress. In April and May of 1916, more provinces declared independence, Guangdong, Zhejiang, Shaanxi, Sichuan and Hunan. Their provincial leaders, many of whom were Yuan Shikai loyalists like Chen Yi of Sichuan or Tang Xiangming of Hunan labeled him an illegal leader, condemned him as a villain and severed their ties to him. Talk about choosing your friends wisely eh? Thus by May of 1916 most of southern china was independent, waiting for Yuan Shikai to step down, and most likely it would be Li Yuanhong who would take the presidency. Dr Sun Yat-Sen did not play a significant role in this anti-Yuan Shikai movement. He did make grand speeches, in April of 1916 for example he said “only after the principal culprit Yuan is exterminated could the constitution be restored and the republic be revived. If Yuan continues to rule, the country cannot be preserved. All Chinese  must annihilate the evil thoroughly and never be tolerant towards Yuan, for only after the national thief is wiped out could the republic attain peace.” A barrage of telegrams, letters and personal envoys showed up to Yuan Shikai's offices asking him to step down.  Yuan Shikai's initial reaction was simply to try and suppress his challengers. On April 1st he proposed conditions to Cai E for solving the “crisis”, these were, repealing provincial independence, returning administrative order, disbanding new military units and halting conflicts. Meanwhile Yuan sent secret telegrams to his military commanders at the frontlines ordering the annihilation of the rebels. These men working under him basically had to go with it, his fortune was theirs as they say. But as we have seen, the battles were not going well for him. While he had the best army in China, he could not stand alone against everyone else. Thus he began talking to his closest officials about leaving politics. He also began talking about who would pick up after him. His successor would need to be capable of controlling his northern army, to coordinate his network of military leaders and address the current nations financial issues. Yuan Shikai also began screaming and lashing out at those who were once close to him and betrayed him. Such men Chen Yi in Sichuan, Tang Xiangming in Hunan, but above all, Feng Guozhang made him most bitter. As Yuan Shikai thought over his retirement plans, his enemies did not let up at all. Liang Qichao set up the “Junwuyuan”, Military Affairs Council in Zhaoqing, Guangdong on May 8th, 1916. This was a rival government to the Beiyang republic, who began issuing proclamations and coordinated with rebel provincial leaders. The council supported Li Yuanhong as president and according to Liang Qichao's speeches to the public “the existing national crisis was single-handedly created by Yuan. If Yuan remains in office, the country will confront upheavals and tumult continuously. Once Yuan departs from politics, all military conflicts will immediately vanish.” Yet again China was seeing a north and south governmental divide.  According to Yuan Shikai's daughter, Yuan Jingxue, his health deteriorated in early 1916 and he suffered from major depression. Now Yuan Shikai was certainly not a physically healthy guy, again the Walrus quips hold validity. He often got ill, he rarely left the presidential palace, and kept himself very isolated. I would imagine this was to thwart assassination attempts. Apparently all the men in his family lineage tended to die before 50. Regardless, his overeating probably was the main culprit. Despite all of this, he stubbornly would not step down, even while sick in bed he continued to read official documents at the bedside. By June he was quite bedridden and few came to see him, just his closest friends and colleagues Xu Shichang and Duan Qirui. Yuan Shikai was a strong believer in Chinese medicine and tried to fight off his family who emplored him to seek western medicine until he allowed the French doctor J.A Bussiere to treat him. Dr. Bussiere diagnosed him with uremia and tried to treat him, but it was not working. Anticipated death was at the door, Yuan Shikai called upon Xu Shichang, Duan Qirui and Wang Shizhen to his bedside where he handed over his last will. He told them he bitterly regretted the monarchy move and blamed everyone for misleading him, what a mensch. Now he trusted these 3 men to care for his family and as for his successor, he told them it clearly needed to be Li Yuanhong. He asked them to swear to him that they would submit to Li Yuanhong for the good of the nation. Then he breathed his last breath and was dead by June 6th of 1916. At the age of 56 Yuan Shikai, a colossal figure of modern Chinese history was gone.  Now this was perhaps one of the most pivotal moments in modern Chinese history, for you see Yuan Shikai had ushered in something. Yuan Shikai from the beginning of his rule, did so with the might of his Beiyang Army. He built up this army, he modeled it a lot upon the imperial Japanese army. He had procured, some would simply say embezzled and stolen funds to make this army the best in China. His intentions can be seen as merely to solidify his power, but in the long term it was also to build a modern unified army for China. Like everyone else before him, he was tackling the issue of modernization. His process was a lot like a mafia however. He installed men loyal to him in various positions, by this point I've named countless of them. Many of these men were basically military-governors. They were trained to lead armies and they all had ambitions politically. There were of course those outside the Beiyang Clique as it came to be called, such as Dr Sun Yat-Sen's Kuomintang and the provinces that all declared independence like Sichuan, Guangdong, Hunan, Guangxi, Yunnan, later on the CCP will be a player as well. He had set up this elaborate system, that we will call Warlord control, I literally just made that up. Yuan Shikai's warlords were the baddest of the bunch and with him as the father of Warlords he at least had a firm grasp over China. However when Yuan Shikai decided to play monarch, he royally, pun intended screwed up his own system. This caused what has occurred throughout China's history, a North-South divide. New Warlords were emerging in the south, but even Yuan Shikai's Warlords were slowly breaking off from him. When Yuan Shikai died, while on the surface it looked like China would unify….it most certainly was not.  Its honestly a very complex and confusing situation, known as China's Warlord Era. On the face of it, China had the “Beiyang Government”, who at all times had a president, cabinets etc etc, but it was all a charade. In reality, the Warlords would fight another for dominance over the military forces in China, as that was what really controlled China. The Beiyang Clique would divide into other cliques, and all over China numerous Cliques and associated Warlords would come and go. But, I just wanted to tease you a bit, for coherency sake I'd like to finish China's experience of WW1. After Yuan Shikai's death, Li Yuanhong assumed the presidency on June 7th. Li Yuanhong ordered a state funeral costing half a million dollars, taken from Yuan Shikai's associates such as Xu SHichang and Duan Qirui. In his presidential order Li Yuanhong praised Yuan Shikai for his vital role in the Xinhai revolution and for his industrious spirit, not saying a thing about the monarchy phase. The government flew the Beiyang flag at half mast. With that the anti-Yuan war was over. Liang Qichao dismantled his rival government and the anti-yuan provinces repealed their independence proclamations. All provinces recognized Li Yuanhong as president, a very good start. Now the historical narrative had it, that Li Yuanhong's rise to the presidency was actually at gunpoint. After Yuan Shikai's death, there was a sealed box with the names Xu Shichang, Li Yuanhong and Duan Qirui found in it. None of the men wanted to stick their neck out to seize the presidency. Its said Duan Qirui forced Li Yuanhong to take the job, but Li Yuanhong was very nervous about it. Why was he? The Beiyang military leaders were all northerners, Li of course was a southerner who also had been the enemy. Duan Qirui consulted his senior military colleagues who all hated the idea of Li Yuanhong being president. But Duan Qirui fought to get the unpopular man as president, because he thought he would make for an excellent puppet. Duan Qirui meanwhile maintained his current position, which was premier. For you Americans who might not be familiar with Parliamentary type systems this is how the Beiyang Government quasi worked. The National Assembly aka parliament elects a president and vice president for 5 year terms and a premier who chooses and leads a cabinet. Typically in these types of systems, the Presidency is more of a ceremonial role. Li Yuanhong's vice president was Feng Guozhang, Yuan Shikai was rolling in his grave. Meanwhile with the provisional constitution restore, political parties were allowed back and 3 factions emerged: Dr Sun Yat-Sen's Kuomintang; Liang Qichao's Constitution Research Clique and Tang Hualong's Constitution Discussions Clique. The first order of business for the new government was the creation of a national army. You might be thinking, err what about WW1? Well with southern China armed and dangerous still, there was a looming fear of further rebellions. There was also the enormous fear, some Beiyang general would renegade and overthrow the government. Meanwhile there was of course WW1. Last episode we talked about China sending laborers to work for France, Britain, Russia and later America. 1916 for the most part saw China providing the labor services, while trying to fix their own nation. Then on February 17th of 1917, the French cargo ship SS Athos was sunk by German U-boat U-65. The ship was carrying 900 Chinese workers on their way to France and 543 of them were killed. Premier Duan Qirui and Liang Qichao both wanted to join the war on the Entente side, seeing it as a tool to help China. President Li Yuanhong and Dr. Sun Yat-Sen both opposed the idea. Duan Qirui strong armed the issue, having China break diplomatic ties with Germany. Duan Qirui also was up to something else. In January of 1917, Prime Minister Terauchi of Japan sent a secret envoy who happened to be a private business man named Nishihara Kamezo. Nishihara was given the task of finding out who really controlled the current Beiyang Army, or better said, who controlled the strongest inner clique within it. That man was Duan Qirui. Nishihara had the financial backing of the current minister of finance, Shoda Kazue who also was the former president of the Joseon Bank in Korea. Together they were offering a private loan, done so through private banks to quote “help develop China”. This was absolutely not the case. They negotiated a series of 8 loans totaling 145 million yen to Duan Qirui, to assist him in maintaining his cliques military. You see like everyone else, Duan Qirui feared other northern warlord types would become stronger than his group, can't let that happen now. To receive these loans, Japan was asking for confirmation of its claims over the former German empires concessions, ie : Kiautschou Bay in Shandong; control over the Shandong railways and some additional rights within Manchuria. All of this was to be kept hush hush, but it would not remain so. I can't get into it too much here, it will be covered in another episode, but a Duan Qirui's deal was leaked and it looked to the public that Duan Qirui was trying to take over China using Japanese aid. Li Yuanhong had Duan Qirui removed from his position as Duan Qirui and the majority of the Beiyang Generals ran over to Tianjin forming a sort of base of operations. Then in a rather insane twist, General Zhang Xun offered to mediate the situation between the Government and Duan and by mediate, I mean he showed up to the capital with his army literally besieging it. Yes, boy that escalated quickly, can't get into the insane story here, again it will be told in a future episode, but Zhang Xun with German funds and arms occupied Beijing and tried to dissolve parliament in an attempt to install Puyi as emperor over the rebirthed Qing dynasty.  Needless to say, Li Yuanhong freaked the hell out, reappointed Duan Qirui as premier and begged him to come save Beijing. Duan Qirui defeated the rebels and forced Li Yuanhong to resign as president so Feng Guozhang could take up the role. Duan Qirui then refused to restore parliament which will literally blow the door open to the Warlord wars, but for out story we return to the issue of WW1. Having already broken diplomatic ties to Germany, there was still the issue of whether or not to declare war. An intense debate was ignited involving nearly all the influential figures in China. It constituted an unprecedented movement for China. China had neer before taken an active role in a global event, one being played out very far from her borders. By participating in the war, some hoped to regain sovereign rights to Shandong. Liang Qichao criticized German militarism and said he believed Germany could not win. He also argued in order to improve China's standing, they had to align her with the victors of the war. On the other side, Dr Sun Yat-Sen argued entering the war would alienate China from Germany. Unlike Britain, France and Russia, Germany had not inflicted as much harm to China in the past. He believed Britain and Russia were far more imperialistic and thus bigger threats. He also argued it would be a material gain at the loss of spirit, thus he wanted to see China remain neutral. Duan Qirui was frustrated as Li Yuanhong added his voice to the matter saying he also did not want to enter the war. While this argument was going on, the KMT began establishing a military government in southern China and elected Dr Sun Yat-Sen to be their generalissimo.  Regardless, Duan Qirui took matters into his own hands and declared war on the Central Powers on August 14th. German and Austro-Hungarian concessions in Tientsin and Hankow were quickly seized. Duan Qirui hoped by entering the war, China might gain some international prestige and eliminate some unequal treaties. He alongside many others hoped to get rid of the indemnity payments, like the Boxer Protocol and to regain control over the Shandong Peninsula. Notably China continued to send laborers to help the war effort, but never sent troops. China's actual participation in the Great War remained very minimal. It was constrained to confiscating some German ships along their coast and continuing to support the allies with labor. China tried multiple times to offer naval and military assistance, or even a token combat unit to the western front, but it never came to be. Honestly a lost opportunity. If you check out my episode on southeast asia during ww1 or my Asia during WW1 documentary, you will see nations like Thailand did send forces and profited pretty heavily from the experience.  Germany surrendered on November 11th of 1918, and hopes were so high in China they declared a 3 day national holding. China had achieved her primary goal, being granted a seat at the Paris Peace Conference. She had been given two seats as she had not provided combat troops like other nations who had more seats. For example Japan was given 5 seats since they did provide combat troops. Now because of Dr Sun Yat-Sen's southern government, there basically was two sets of envoys sent to Paris. The Beiyang or Northern government members and Sun Yat-Sen's southern government members. Heading the Beiyang was Lu Zhengxiang who was accompanied by Wellington Koo, Cao Rulin, Hu Weide, Alfred Sze and some other advisors. On behalf of the southern government was Wu Chaoshu and although not an official delegate so was C.T Wang. Overall Lu Zhengxiang was the leader of China's delegation, but Wellington Koo, sort of a master negotiator came to become the main man.  China's demands at the conference were territorial, economic and political. In regards to territory, the “delegation proposed the internationalization of the Manchurian railways and rivers” and for foreign treaty ports and communities to remain short-term in order for China to transition them back into her ownership for a long term strategy. In regards to politics, China wanted “the elimination of all legation guards, removal of all foreign troops stationed in China, and the abolition of extraterritorial rights”. In regards to economics, China sought to regain full sovereignty over her tariffs and railways. All together these demands would be a dramatic improvement of her international standings. It would place her on a much more equal footing with the great powers. Now for those of you less familiar with WW1, this came directly at the time of one of America's worth presidents in my opinion, President Woodrow Wilson's 14 points. Again I will do the boring professor like thing by listing the points, but dont worry its in a summarized form: 1. Open diplomacy without secret treaties 2. Economic free trade on the seas during war and peace 3. Equal trade conditions 4. Decrease armaments among all nations 5. Adjust colonial claims 6. Evacuation of all Central Powers from Russia and allow it to define its own independence 7. Belgium to be evacuated and restored 8. Return of Alsace-Lorraine region and all French territories 9. Readjust Italian borders 10. Austria-Hungary to be provided an opportunity for self-determination 11. Redraw the borders of the Balkan region creating Roumania, Serbia and Montenegro 12. Creation of a Turkish state with guaranteed free trade in the Dardanelles 13. Creation of an independent Polish state 14. Creation of the League of Nations   Given the points, such as the right of self-determination of peoples, the Chinese delegates felt pretty good about their stance. However, what would prove to be the crux between China and her goals were a series of secret agreements and treaties between the Great Powers, China and Japan. Remember Duan Qirui's little loans? Well when China declared war on the Central Powers, this put her in alliance with Japan, as now they were both part of the Entente. Another large event had unfolded in 1917, the October revolution, seeing Russia fall to communism. The Entente declared the communist government a threat. Vice chief of the Imperial Japanese army general staff, Tanaka Giichi sought to form a military pact with China, including a military alliance against the new common enemy. In late January of 1917 Tanaka sent a message to the Japanese military attache in Beijing to form a Sino-Japanese agreement, but to try and get the Chinese to suggest the idea first.  The Chinese obviously would be suspicious of forming any type of agreement with Japan given the Shandong situation and Japan's encroachment into Manchuria. Japanese foreign minister Motono Ichiro offered a military cooperation similar to what the Entente were doing in France, stating if they could operate their military forces in France, why not in Manchuria. The Japanese also hinted as the possibility of just sending troops into Manchuria even if China didn't agree to it. On March 3rd, 1918 the Germans and Soviets signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, leaving some 100,000 German POW's scattered about Siberia and this scared China quite a bit. Thus on March 8th, the Japanese government began forming plans for a Sino-Japanese agreement and informed the Chinese ambassador in Tokyo, Zhang Zongxiang about it. A team led by Major General Saito Suejiro went to Beijing to negotiate the terms of the agreement. On March 25th, Zhang Zongxiang and Minister Motono both agreed enemy forces were spreading rampantly along the Russia border, threatening the far east. Thus they agreed to a joint defense agreement. This got leaked to the public in early April and opposition in China spread dramatically. Japan pretty much made its intents with the Sino-Japanese alliance known. The alliance would allow for free movement of Japanese troops with Chinese territory, that some resources would be commandeered for the military, a bit of domestic politics would probably be interfered with also and they pretty much were going to plant pro-Japanese forces across China. On May 3rd, Tanaka Giichi visited Zhang Zongxiang and demanded an apology from the Chinese side for doubting Japans intentions and failing to ratify things. He stated if China did not agree to the alliance, the Nishihara loans would be withheld. Duan Qirui could not stomach that so negotiations recommenced on May 16th and the agreement was signed.  The Sino-Japanese agreement consisted of 12 major articles: The second article establishes the parties of the agreement were equals,;  the third article specified that the Chinese authorities must "try their best" to cooperate with the Japanese military in the relevant regions and prevent them from "experiencing any obstacles" in their operations. The fourth article specified that Japanese troops would be "entirely withdrawn" from Chinese territory at the termination of the war. The seventh article specified the placement of liaison officers in each party's military to facilitate communication between the two parties and specified that both parties must provide whatever resources are required to facilitate their joint defense. As usual, Japan demanded the negotiations be made secret, but it was leaked immediately.  Now back to Paris, China had thus agreed to grant Japan several things and it contradicted what she sought at the peace talks. For one thing, she sought to reclaim the Shandong Peninsula. Back in 1915 Yuan Shikai's government had signed the thirteen-demands, but Wellington Koo argued that it had been an unequal treaty imposed upon China in a moment of weakness.  Wellington Koo, gave an impassioned speech about the importance of Shandong province to China, describing it as "the cradle of Chinese civilization, a Holy Land for the Chinese. It was the birth land of Confucius and Mencius. If Japan was allowed to continue its lease of the Shandong territory, then it would provide the government of Tokyo with a strategic "gateway" to all of north China”. As for the second Sino-Japanese treaty in which China agreed to allow Japan's occupation of Shandong amongst other things, well the Chinese delegation had no idea about this agreement. Yes the delegation team found out about this agreement at Paris, go figure. So yeah it was a pretty big surprise when the Japanese delegation literally read out the treaties signed with Duan Qirui et al, very embarrassing for the Chinese delegation. Then to make matters even worse the Entente powers, specifically Britain and France also acknowledged they had signed secret agreements with Japan giving her the rights to Shandong since she had entered the war to help them. You could hear the sad violin music beginning to play. The Chinese delegation in absolute desperation looked towards the United States for help, hoping Woodrow Wilson's right to self-determination would bend to their favor. Woodrow said Shandong should be given to Japan, probably hoping to add Japan's favor in forming the League of Nations. The global powers then pretty much ignored the Chinese delegation. Hence forth the Chinese felt Woodrow Wilson had betrayed China, though as much as I hate to say it, it really wasn't his fault. He was simply balancing a number of secret agreements made and there were many promising Japan Shandong.  Thus in article 156 of the Treaty of Versailles the official transfer of the Shandong peninsula was given to the Empire of Japan rather than being returned to China. China denounced this transfer stating Shandong was the birthplace of Confucious, the greatest Chinese philosopher and it would be on par to Christians conceding jerusalem. China demanded Shandong Peninsula be returned to China, an abolition of all the privileges afforded to foreign powers in China such as extraterritoriality and to cancel the thirteen demands with the Japanese government. The Western powers refused all of China's demands and dismissed them. As a result Wellington Koo refused to sign the Treaty of Versailles in protest. Thus China was yet again humiliated. Worse, the ongoing news of what was going on at Versailles had caused probably one of the greatest movements in modern Chinese history to be unleashed back home. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. China was absolutely devastated by the treaty of versailles. Their fractured nation had been the victim of double dealings and now the Shandong problem would plague them for some years. However back home, an incredible movement was quicking up fueled by the anger of students and workers.