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Al and Kevin talk about Tiny Garden Timings 00:00:00: Theme Tune 00:00:30: Intro 00:01:25: Anti Relationship Drama Rant 00:05:34: Actual Intro 00:06:56: What Has Kevin Been Up To 00:16:46: Anti Capitalist Rant 00:30:31: What Has Al Been Up To 00:42:44: Game News 01:03:41: Tiny Garden 01:18:27: Outro Links Len’s Island 1.0 Update Sun Haven 2.5 Update Moonstone Island “Evolutions” Update Disney Dreamlight Valley “Mysteries of Skull Rock” Update Snacko 1.0.1 Update Fantasy Life i: The Girl Who Steals Time “Roguelike” Update Harvest Moon: Home Sweet Home coming to Steam/Consoles Contact Al on Mastodon: https://mastodon.scot/@TheScotBot Email Us: https://harvestseason.club/contact/ Transcript (0:00:30) Al: Hello, farmers, and welcome to another episode of the harvest season. (0:00:34) Al: My name is Al. (0:00:35) Kev: My name is Kevin last I’ve been told (0:00:37) Al: And we’re here, and we’re here today to talk about Cottagecore Games. (0:00:42) Kev: Cottage core games whoo (0:00:45) Al: Oh, (0:00:48) Al: oh, we are here. (0:00:51) Al: We’re going to talk about when we are here, I’m alive. (0:00:54) Kev: No (0:00:54) Al: So if I sound tired, this episode is because I’ve had a very busy Saturday. (0:00:58) Al: We were meant to record on Sunday, (0:01:00) Al: to schedule a meeting with me on a Sunday instead. (0:01:04) Al: So I’m doing that. It’s not a work thing. (0:01:06) Al: Don’t worry, I’m not doing work at the weekend. (0:01:08) Al: But it wasn’t really a meeting I could get out of. (0:01:11) Al: So we rescheduled to Saturday, the day that I have all of the family stuff. (0:01:15) Al: So much stuff, way too much stuff. (0:01:15) Kev: Mm-hmm (0:01:17) Al: So I am here and I’m alive. (0:01:18) Kev: Now he’s getting his performance review from his family tomorrow, that’s the me (0:01:26) Al: I saw I saw a TikTok of a couple who do like weekly. (0:01:30) Al: Weekly Relationship Review and people like people got so annoyed about it and I’m like, I don’t understand why you’re annoyed about this. (0:01:38) Al: It’s not they’re not like judging each other and giving each other a right, a raise. (0:01:44) Al: They’re they’re discussing the things that they’re they’ve done and they’re discussing what they’ve got coming up this week and they’re seeing if there’s anything they need to plan and talk about. (0:01:44) Kev: - Yeah. (0:01:52) Al: This is a very good thing to do. (0:01:54) Al: And I think a lot I think the world will be a lot a better place if a lot more people who were in relationships did. (0:02:00) Al: This but I know most people who are in relationships don’t even want to be in those relationships. (0:02:02) Kev: - Yeah. (0:02:05) Al: Miserable people, measurable people who just want to mock somebody and I think the world would be a better place without those relationships. (0:02:15) Al: So but but hey, I actually love my wife. (0:02:16) Kev: Ohhh, goodness. (0:02:18) Al: So sue me. (0:02:22) Kev: I’ll come out guns blazing this episode, um… (0:02:25) Al: I just I get so annoyed with the boomer joke of like all my ball and chain. (0:02:30) Al: My wife is like, OK, like leave them then. (0:02:32) Kev: Yeah, it (0:02:37) Kev: Yeah, yeah (0:02:37) Al: I just I show and why are you staying there? (0:02:40) Al: I mean, this is why your kids are terrible people, because you they don’t know what a family looks like, because you’re just going to hate your your partner and resent them for it and then take it out on your children. (0:02:53) Kev: Yeah, it’s it’s fascinating. Well, I mean obviously one the you know that attitude mentality has somewhat shifted to a degree (0:03:04) Kev: but it’s fascinating just (0:03:06) Kev: To you know, there’s been studies done and whatever I’ve read some stuff like because you know back in the day (0:03:12) Kev: You your dating pool was limited to pretty much whoever was in the neighborhood, right? (0:03:14) Al: Hmm. Yeah, yeah. Least objection will prepare us on my street. (0:03:19) Kev: Right (0:03:21) Kev: Yep, right, so you know (0:03:23) Kev: That kind of environment leads to the ball and chain mentality, right? (0:03:29) Kev: But you know current day and age with the online and the you know, generally easier ish travel (0:03:39) Kev: Obviously that’s no longer the case (0:03:42) Al: Also, you can be single, right? Like, I’m not saying it’s easy, right? Like, as someone who has (0:03:45) Kev: You can’t sure (0:03:48) Kev: Yeah (0:03:49) Al: basically never been single, right? Like, I got married when I was 22, like, I, you know, (0:03:51) Kev: Uh-huh (0:03:56) Al: been with, well, first got together with my wife when I was 16, right? So, like, I am not a single (0:04:02) Al: person. I have very rarely been a single person, but you can do that. That’s the thing you can do. (0:04:08) Kev: You, you can. Yeah. (0:04:09) Al: Like, if you hate someone, you don’t have to- (0:04:11) Kev: You can. (0:04:12) Al: you don’t have to spend your time with them! You can just not, and you can have friends instead. (0:04:14) Kev: Yeah. Yeah. (0:04:16) Al: And I suspect, if there were more people who didn’t stay in loveless marriages, (0:04:21) Al: then maybe being single would be less terrible as well, because there would be more single people. (0:04:24) Kev: Yeah, yeah, well again, you know the culture back then very different right like marriage was (0:04:25) Al: Crazy idea. (0:04:32) Al: Yeah, but it’s not a solved problem. There are still a lot of miserable people, (0:04:35) Kev: It is not you’re right you’re (0:04:36) Al: and there’s a lot of people who think that marriage is just one of the things you have to do. (0:04:40) Kev: Yeah, you know you’re right that pressure is absolutely still there um yeah (0:04:46) Al: Quite often external to the person who’s being pressured into it, I suspect. (0:04:49) Kev: Absolutely absolutely (0:04:55) Al: Friendships are important, and we need to have friendships and not assume that the only (0:04:59) Al: relationship that matters is a romantic one. There we go, I’m done. (0:05:02) Al: One name. (0:05:02) Kev: Okay, well, you know, yes, these are true. You’re saying things that are true and not particularly objectionable, but you know, you’re, you’re arguing against the hundreds of years of weird cultural nonsense so yeah, yeah, so. (0:05:17) Al: Well, there is that. (0:05:20) Al: Listeners, listeners object to it. (0:05:22) Al: I want to see your arguments for why everyone should get married. (0:05:26) Al: I will vehemently disagree with them because they’re stupid, (0:05:27) Al: and you probably don’t believe them. (0:05:29) Al: But give me them anyway. (0:05:30) Al: It’ll be fun to have an argument. (0:05:32) Kev: That’s what we do on this show. We argue against. (0:05:35) Al: We’re going to talk about Tiny Garden this episode. (0:05:37) Al: So this is the… (0:05:37) Kev: I thought we were here to delve into culturally in a relationship mechanics. (0:05:43) Al: It’s a relationship episode. (0:05:45) Al: Kevin, tell me about like. (0:05:47) Al: Tell me about your relationships, and no don’t I don’t I don’t think I don’t think the pod needs to hear them (0:05:49) Kev: Oh, yeah, I mean, that’s it. Well, romantic ones, that’s easy. They don’t exist. Otherwise, well, that’s, that’s, yeah, okay. (0:06:03) Kev: Okay, moving on, um. (0:06:04) Al: I don’t think I don’t think the podcast needs to hear your therapy. (0:06:08) Kev: Yeah, no, that that is little of my therapist is for him. Okay, I love my family but good heavens I can’t live with them can’t live without them sort of deal. (0:06:19) Kev: Yeah. (0:06:19) Al: Can’t live with them, have to live with them. (0:06:21) Kev: Yeah. (0:06:22) Al: We are going to talk about Tiny Garden. (0:06:24) Al: It is the Polly Pocket farming game. (0:06:26) Kev: Yep. (0:06:28) Al: Kevin has not played it, he thought about playing it and never did. (0:06:31) Al: I have played it a little bit. (0:06:34) Al: And so it’s going to be a reasonably… (0:06:36) Al: Kevin watched some videos. (0:06:37) Al: You watched some videos, right? (0:06:38) Kev: Yeah, yeah, I mean it’s not like it’s a particularly in-depth game, right like yeah, so even (0:06:43) Al: No, no, let’s start. (0:06:44) Al: Well, let’s save that. (0:06:45) Al: Save that for the, save that for the, save it for the pod. (0:06:46) Kev: Okay. All right. Well, okay (0:06:48) Al: We’re already in the pod. (0:06:49) Al: Save it for the appropriate section, Kevin. (0:06:52) Al: Before that, we have a bunch of news. (0:06:54) Al: This has been a reasonably busy Newsweek. (0:06:56) Al: But first of all, Kevin, what have you been up to? (0:06:59) Kev: Okay, not a lot of work as I tend to do because I’m I don’t know work (0:07:07) Kev: but (0:07:08) Kev: aside from that, let’s see here um okay you know i’m gonna take a brief second to (0:07:14) Kev: talk about zone the zone zero my segment for nobody but me um so the 2.0 update came out (0:07:16) Al: Go for it. (0:07:20) Kev: I didn’t have internet when it did but I have internet again i’ve caught up i’ve done the 2.0 (0:07:25) Kev: stuff and you know it’s added a lot of stuff that anyone who plays the game might be interested but (0:07:31) Kev: for people who don’t it did i’d be talking nonsense the the big thing I think is interesting (0:07:36) Kev: is kind of the tonal shift. (0:07:38) Kev: So Zenless Zone Zero, the 1.0, the chapter 1, whatever, the first year of the game, (0:07:46) Kev: it was the aesthetic, the tone of it was very, it’s going to sound very like 2000, like (0:07:55) Kev: OTS, you know, that decade specifically. (0:07:59) Kev: People have flip phones and they’re still like CRTs and stuff like that. (0:08:04) Kev: And it’s very sci-fi heavy. (0:08:08) Kev: The main characters are hackers. (0:08:11) Kev: And there’s these like monsters that spawn out of fake matter called the ether or whatever. (0:08:19) Kev: Anyways, the point is it’s very sci-fi heavy. (0:08:21) Kev: That’s the tone and not like super futurama or Jetsons futuristic sci-fi, just like current, (0:08:30) Kev: you know, more current day looking tech. (0:08:34) Kev: But that’s the tone. (0:08:35) Kev: I’m just comparing it to like Genshin is much more fantasy based. (0:08:38) Kev: I’m just painting the picture because they shifted the tone in 2.0, the protagonists join a temple of monks like you know like, sort of a, gosh I wish I had the proper names, (0:09:05) Kev: But you know the stereotypical like (0:09:08) Kev: Temple out in the mountains where monks are trading wonder martial arts and mysticism and that sort of thing (0:09:15) Kev: And so that’s that’s kind of the direction they’re going with (0:09:20) Kev: There’s a new like city area that you’re spending your time in. It’s very much based off (0:09:26) Kev: that kind of (0:09:28) Kev: Not so rural Japan China, but like out in the mountains sort of area (0:09:34) Kev: So it’s a very different feeling from the (0:09:38) Kev: Bay City, which is very like (0:09:42) Kev: Metropolitan lots of big buildings and skyscrapers and whatever that that one feels more like I don’t know Beijing (0:09:49) Kev: I guess you know very modern type China and this one is a more this new area. This new tone is much more traditional (0:09:57) Kev: Chinese (0:09:59) Kev: And you know, it’s it’s it’s fun. I’ll nothing’s nearly wrong (0:10:03) Kev: It’s just I don’t feel so different because the whole first year of the game (0:10:07) Kev: your your tacker person. (0:10:08) Kev: and you you you do hacker things and now you’re training to be a mystic very very odd to me at least but but but anyways regardless the game is still fun I’m still playing it yada yada so that’s that let’s see what else Pokemon unite all Kremie came out all Kremie is great it’s a supporter it does all the things you’d want it to do it it decorates and heals your team it’s unite it creates (0:10:28) Al: - Ah, nice. (0:10:30) Al: - Ow, creamy. (0:10:38) Kev: it’s a giant cake and stands on top of it and it just spreads globs of healing whipped cream to all your teammates I like all Kremie it’s very fun I mean I like all Kremie the Pokemon period and it’s great and unite so yay all Kremie um let’s see other than that uh oh you know I’m gonna take a second here to talk about card games okay so (0:11:08) Kev: you probably don’t keep up with magic the gathering years have you heard anything about magic the gathering recently mm-hmm okay okay okay yeah yeah yeah (0:11:12) Al: I used to play a lot of magic when I worked in an office because there was a magic (0:11:19) Al: league there, but I’ve not kept up basically since 2019. I’m aware that there’s been a lot of (0:11:28) Al: crossover sets recently. There was a Doctor Who one, I believe, A Lord of the Rings one, (0:11:32) Al: a Final Fantasy one, so I’m aware that they’re doing a lot of crossovers just now and there are (0:11:38) Al: many opinions about that shall we see. (0:11:38) Kev: y’all (0:11:40) Kev: there are many opinions. So the Final Fantasy one came out a week ago, I think, the Final (0:11:42) Al: Right, yeah. (0:11:46) Kev: Fantasy crossover set. And this one is a particularly contentious set for two reasons. One, it is (0:11:55) Kev: what they call a standard set, meaning that it is in the card pool. In previous crossovers (0:12:03) Kev: sets, they would kind of, you know, they wouldn’t be standard legal or tournament legal or whatever, (0:12:08) Kev: You know, they’d be kind of more for funs easy. (0:12:08) Al: Oh, interesting. Okay. (0:12:10) Kev: Or, you know, just for between friends or whatever, right? (0:12:12) Kev: This one is in, in your face, like in the card pool. (0:12:17) Kev: And a lot of people aren’t happy about it because there’s the (0:12:19) Kev: crossovers have been so prevalent lately. (0:12:22) Kev: Um, but you know, that that’s, that’s one discussion. (0:12:26) Kev: The other issue that isn’t less of opinions and more just like out cry (0:12:32) Kev: outrage, um, is the insane pricing. (0:12:37) Kev: uh… because magic the gathering has gone through the roof (0:12:40) Kev: in terms of cost (0:12:41) Kev: uh… (0:12:43) Kev: so okay you know here out for comparison (0:12:46) Kev: uh… any other game pokemon yugioh (0:12:49) Kev: work on a whatever (0:12:51) Kev: a pre-constructed deck they go out to the store and buy off the shelf (0:12:55) Kev: can be let’s say fifteen dollars on average us_d (0:12:57) Al: Mm-hmm, yep, yep. (0:12:58) Kev: okay (0:12:59) Kev: uh… it is what it is just maybe (0:13:00) Al: Science, science fair, science fair. (0:13:02) Kev: yeah right it’s it’s it’s fine (0:13:04) Kev: you know dig to get you started to a product that you can actually start (0:13:08) Kev: start playing the game, right? (0:13:10) Kev: In Magic the Gathering, so they come out with commander decks, you know, there’s different formats and command is the popular one (0:13:18) Kev: That’s that’s their primary like pre-constructed deck thing that comes out (0:13:25) Kev: Right now they came out or it was just last year they had updated the MSRP to be about you believe (0:13:32) Kev: $45 (0:13:34) Al: Oh, for a… because a commander’s 40 cards, is that right? Oh, a hundred, right? Okay, sorry. (0:13:35) Kev: USD (0:13:40) Kev: To be fair it is it is a bigger deck right, but it’s in my opinions (0:13:42) Al: My bad. A hundred cards for for $45, that’s wild. (0:13:46) Kev: You know (0:13:47) Kev: It’s pricey. It’s it’s very pricey, right? (0:13:51) Kev: I’m just you know, I think that illustrates the scale of like how much magic costs now, right? Okay (0:13:57) Kev: Final fantasy set because they know final fantasy is popular people (0:14:02) Kev: They know a Hasbro Hasbro is the the current owner of the magic franchise and makes these pricing decisions (0:14:10) Kev: They know people are gonna be excited. They marked up the MSRP for the Final Fantasy set (0:14:19) Kev: The a (0:14:21) Kev: Commander pre-con for Final Fantasy is I believe 70 USD MSRP (0:14:28) Kev: I’d say that because a lot of (0:14:30) Kev: You know, it’s a lot of local card games and shops that will run carry these products (0:14:36) Kev: they will mark up their products anyways even if there is an MSR (0:14:40) Kev: so you know these things are going through the roof like over $100 and (0:14:45) Kev: whatnot and so it’s insanity and that’s not even the premium they came out with (0:14:51) Kev: these premium versions of these decks where like the everything’s foil or (0:14:54) Kev: whatever those are 125 MSRP I think something ridiculous so so obviously you (0:15:04) Al: Hmm. Yeah. (0:15:08) Kev: You know, they are just… (0:15:10) Kev: They are just robbing the customers blind, and obviously people aren’t happy, but they are still selling like hotcakes because I don’t know, that’s the magic of players I guess. (0:15:20) Kev: As I’ve been on record, I have dabbled in magic, but I’m not very keen on those prices, so I don’t pick up a lot. (0:15:28) Kev: But, I do like Final Fantasy, and here’s the kicker, right, if the cards suck, that’d be easier just to not play, but a lot of the cards are good looking, or they look fun to play or whatever. (0:15:40) Kev: So, the temptation is there. (0:15:42) Kev: So, what I did is instead of buying any Final Fantasy stuff for magic, I went back to the actual Final Fantasy trading card game, which I need to remind people actually exists. (0:15:54) Kev: It’s still going, it’s still coming out with stuff. (0:15:56) Kev: So yeah, I did a game night with some friends, and we played out of not wanting to spend money, we dusted off some Final Fantasy decks, and that’s it. (0:16:10) Kev: That was fun. And man, the Final Fantasy TCG, it’s pretty good. (0:16:14) Kev: I like the rhythm of the game, it’s not insane or busted right now. (0:16:18) Kev: And the cards, it’s a very weird thing, but the card stock, they’re very thick and durable, it’s not a flimsy paper cardboard thing. (0:16:26) Kev: It’s very nice, it feels almost plastic-y. (0:16:30) Kev: But anyways, yeah, I picked up and played some Final Fantasy TCG, that’s fun stuff, just because magic’s insane. (0:16:40) Kev: I’m not gonna do that again right now. (0:16:42) Kev: But that that’s that’s all I’ve been going on not not too terribly much. What about you l what you’ve been up to? (0:16:46) Al: Well I want to go on an anti-capitalist rant first. So your comments about them, you know, (0:16:49) Kev: I mean as we do (0:16:56) Al: marking up the stuff, it reminds me of a thing I’ve been annoyed about recently, where people (0:17:04) Al: will go “oh everything’s expensive” and then other people go “oh that’s just supply and demand” (0:17:09) Al: as if supply and demand is like some inherent law of physics that means that (0:17:16) Al: the price is out of our hands. The demand is high therefore the price must be high. (0:17:23) Al: Yeah that’s not how that works. It’s not like the price is determined by, you know, (0:17:29) Al: what a seller wants to sell for it and what a buyer wants to buy for it and meeting somewhere (0:17:32) Kev: Mm-hmm. (0:17:34) Kev: Right. (0:17:36) Al: where, you know, if they try and put it too high then people won’t buy it blah blah blah etc etc. (0:17:40) Kev: Mm-hmm. (0:17:41) Al: And supply and demand just says that as demand, as supply increases… (0:17:47) Al: and demand decreases, no, is that what I said? There’s a point in the middle where they meet (0:17:53) Al: and you’ve got like a ideal price, if you will, based on the amount of supply and the amount of (0:17:53) Kev: Yes (0:17:57) Kev: Mm-hmm (0:17:59) Al: demand. And all really supply and demand means is that if there’s a high demand and a low supply, (0:18:05) Al: they can charge basically whatever they want, right? Like that is how it’s not like the price (0:18:12) Al: has to be sold for a certain point, right? Like they just go, we know people are (0:18:16) Al: going to buy it, therefore supply and demand says we can charge more, and we’ll get more money. (0:18:22) Kev: Mm-hmm (0:18:23) Al: Right? Like that is just how it works. And I just, it gets really frustrating when people are like, (0:18:27) Al: “Oh, it’s just supply and demand.” As if, “Oh, don’t look at me. I’m not the one deciding the (0:18:32) Al: price. Supply and demand is deciding the price.” What are you talking about? That’s not how this (0:18:38) Al: works, right? Like we decide prices, and if people think it’s too high, and they don’t buy it like (0:18:45) Al: you have done. (0:18:46) Al: enough people did what you were doing, they would have to decrease the price to sell (0:18:48) Kev: Yeah. Well. (0:18:50) Al: it. (0:18:51) Al: But of course, we are willing to spend the money. (0:18:54) Al: Enough people are willing to spend the money that they can just sell it for whatever they (0:18:58) Al: want and people will keep going up. (0:19:01) Al: You know, it’s like how, it’s the reason the Mario Kart world is $80. (0:19:07) Al: It’s because they know people will buy it and supply and demand for the record makes (0:19:11) Al: no sense in our digital economy, right? (0:19:15) Al: like there is no there is no (0:19:15) Kev: Yeah, and it is. (0:19:16) Al: it’s infinite supply so theoretically supply and demand should say that if (0:19:21) Al: there’s infinite supply there should be a very very low price it just like that (0:19:26) Kev: Yeah well, well, yeah (0:19:28) Al: is but no that’s not how it actually works because that’s the price is based (0:19:33) Al: on what people are actually willing to pay but that’s if you if you took purely (0:19:35) Kev: Yes, yeah (0:19:38) Al: supply and demand and nothing else and said this is what this means digital (0:19:42) Al: games should be free. (0:19:43) Kev: Well, that’s it. Well, here’s the thing, right? Okay, as I’m sure you can, I’ve only took like two economics class. I do a little economics though, but here’s the thing, right? Supply into it. That is, what is supply? You want to dive into that? That’s what determines supply. Now we’re getting into something, right? (0:19:58) Al: All right, yeah, okay, fair enough. Fair enough. I guess like the supply for a digital game (0:20:06) Al: is the number of consoles that are, right? Like you’re not going to… (0:20:08) Kev: Yeah, or, or, right, it’s, yeah, and, and in terms of the price. (0:20:13) Kev: Right, like the, you know, that, what did you see in economics? (0:20:16) Kev: You see the, you see like a graph, right? (0:20:19) Kev: Which is like, I guess number of units and number of, uh, and the price or whatever. (0:20:23) Kev: And so you’re right. (0:20:24) Kev: Um, it, uh, it gets weird digitally, but what determines that graph? (0:20:30) Al: That’s my point. That’s my point is there’s so, there’s so many things that break down. (0:20:31) Kev: Where does, yeah. (0:20:33) Al: It’s not in an, in a, in a, I love the, have you ever had the physics joke, um, which is, uh, Oh, two seconds. (0:20:43) Al: Let me double check so I don’t end up saying it. (0:20:46) Kev: Is it, I mean, I know a couple physics joke as an engineer, nerd, major, degree holder. (0:20:53) Al: So, there was the physics joke, right, where there’s a farmer whose chicken wouldn’t lay (0:20:59) Kev: Uh-huh, yep. (0:20:59) Al: any eggs. And to solve the problem, he hires a physicist. And the physicist says, “Oh, (0:21:06) Al: I’ve come up with a solution, but my solution requires a spherical chicken in a vacuum.” (0:21:08) Kev: Uh-huh. (0:21:12) Al: And the point of that joke is that so many things in physics are theoretical and only (0:21:17) Kev: Yeah, yeah. (0:21:19) Al: work in a very specific set of scenarios. (0:21:23) Al: And you can’t then necessarily say, “This happens here, therefore that happens in (0:21:28) Al: the real world as well.” (0:21:29) Al: And I feel like a lot of economics of that is that as well. (0:21:32) Al: It’s like in this perfect ideal economic world where these 10 things all exist, then this (0:21:36) Kev: Yeah (0:21:39) Kev: No (0:21:39) Al: will happen. (0:21:40) Al: And it’s like, but that’s not how the world works. (0:21:42) Al: And digital games is a perfect example of how that just completely falls on us. (0:21:46) Al: It falls over, right? (0:21:47) Al: Like, because it just, it doesn’t make any sense. (0:21:49) Al: What is supply when you’re talking about a digital thing? (0:21:52) Al: It’s not a thing. (0:21:53) Al: Right? (0:21:54) Al: It doesn’t make any sense. (0:21:54) Kev: Yeah, and and I’m really we yeah, you know we can get down to it really if (0:22:02) Kev: This would be a more interesting conversation if you know, we were looking at just supply factors like okay (0:22:09) Kev: How do you distribute, you know, what are the competition yada yada, whatever, right? (0:22:13) Kev: But we all know the truth in the current day and age late-stage capitalism, whatever you want to call it (0:22:19) Kev: there is a significant portion of that price being determined by (0:22:24) Kev: The shareholders the see the executives. They just want a whole lot of money (0:22:30) Kev: the day (0:22:32) Kev: That’s that’s what it all boils down to oh (0:22:34) Al: Yeah, yeah. (0:22:36) Kev: Man, man. Okay, you know, all right since we’re on this (0:22:40) Kev: The absurdity of economics and and prices I’ll go back. I’ll go right back to magic (0:22:46) Kev: Are you familiar with magic 30? (0:22:48) Al: I am not. Is it a version of Magic where you have 30 cards? (0:22:52) Kev: No (0:22:52) Al: Ah, good guess though, right? (0:22:55) Kev: Yeah, oh that mmm, you know, I actually I think standards 40 so you’re not far off that that would be fun, but um, okay (0:23:05) Kev: Okay, here it is so this was a couple years ago (0:23:11) Kev: Magic the Gathering (0:23:14) Kev: Whatever Hasbro was to the coast whatever they released a project called magic 30 or it’s the med the 30th anniversary edition set (0:23:23) Al: - Ah, okay, yep. (0:23:25) Kev: Okay, this was this was a 2022 that the year was okay (0:23:30) Kev: and so (0:23:32) Kev: it’s it’s probably the most absurd like magic product ever released because (0:23:40) Kev: each box (0:23:41) Kev: This product contained 15 booster packs and these booster packs the cards inside them were like, oh, you know (0:23:48) Kev: Very classic original magic cards or whatever with original art (0:23:53) Kev: So much so that (0:23:55) Kev: It was so faithful to the original stuff that because magic rotates and has you know form different formats (0:24:01) Kev: They actually said okay. None of these cards are actually going to be playable (0:24:06) Kev: They’re just not gonna be legal in anything. It is basically just fake real fake cards that we’re printing. We’re collecting I guess (0:24:16) Kev: Okay (0:24:18) Kev: How how much would you pay for a box of (0:24:23) Kev: 15 packs of fake cards. (0:24:24) Kev: Real fake cards, Al. (0:24:26) Al: I mean it depends what it is, right? Like, so let’s create a scenario where this is Pokémon, (0:24:32) Al: right? It’s essentially just like a collector’s deck that you can never use in tournaments. (0:24:36) Al: I’m not going to use it in tournaments, it doesn’t really affect how much I would pay for it, right? (0:24:40) Al: Like I’m a sucker who will pay stupid amounts of money for collector’s things, (0:24:45) Al: so probably way too much money. I think if we’re… So if we’re just talking a deck, (0:24:48) Kev: Okay, give me (0:24:51) Al: so we’re talking… How many… Was that a 40 pack, a standard set? (0:24:52) Kev: Yeah (0:24:54) Kev: It was 15 packs is what it was here. Yep. No, no (0:24:57) Al: Oh, 15 packs. Oh, it’s not even a deck, right? OK. So let’s go with… (0:25:06) Al: I feel like in the world where this is Pokémon, maybe I’m paying like £5 a pack, (0:25:08) Kev: You know what hope (0:25:14) Al: because that’s more… I think it’s like £3 a pack just now in the UK, (0:25:18) Al: so we’re maybe talking like £75. And that would feel like… That would maybe feel like a lot, (0:25:22) Kev: Okay. (0:25:24) Al: and I’d be like oh I don’t know how (0:25:27) Kev: Okay. (0:25:28) Kev: So let’s see, five pounds, I’ll just forget. (0:25:30) Kev: Okay, that’s about six, seven USD. (0:25:32) Kev: Okay, sure. (0:25:34) Kev: So times 15, that’s, what is that? (0:25:36) Kev: 50 plus 25, that’s 75. (0:25:38) Kev: Okay, so that’s 75 pounds, (0:25:40) Kev: which yeah, about 100 USD maybe. (0:25:42) Kev: Okay, okay, I see what you’re saying, right? (0:25:45) Al: But like, that’s not “I’m definitely going to buy that.” (0:25:47) Al: That’s “Ooh, that feels like a lot. (0:25:50) Kev: Yeah, sure, sure, sure. (0:25:50) Al: Maybe I would buy it if it was something I really wanted.” (0:25:52) Kev: Right. (0:25:53) Kev: Yeah, okay, that’s the crazy price. (0:25:55) Kev: And then that’s good, okay. (0:25:57) Kev: Yeah, okay, I understand. (0:25:58) Kev: You know what, I can see that. (0:26:01) Kev: Yeah, you know what? (0:26:02) Kev: I could agree with that price, right? (0:26:04) Kev: For the hardcore collector who really wants the thing. (0:26:07) Kev: Yeah, you know what, I could say that. (0:26:09) Kev: All right, now, what if I told you the price (0:26:12) Kev: of this magic product was 10 times what you just told me? (0:26:16) Al: What? Ten times. So what? A thousand? A thousand dollars. That is… (0:26:20) Kev: 10 times. (0:26:22) Kev: USD. Yup, 999 technically. laughs (0:26:28) Al: I mean, OK, right. So we laugh at that, but Pokemon basically did that, right? With their… (0:26:33) Al: They had a collector’s box, limited edition, and it was several hundred dollars. I can’t even remember (0:26:40) Kev: - Sure, wasn’t four digits. (0:26:41) Al: it was. But like, I mean, that was more than that was, I wasn’t four digits, it was. (0:26:46) Al: Three digits, but I feel like it was not far off it, and it did include, it did include, (0:26:50) Al: like, you know, very nice dice and card sleeves and stuff like that. I can’t remember how (0:26:54) Kev: oh yes you know if you get a nice uh is it like the charizard premium collection is that the one (0:26:55) Al: much it was. Do you know the box I’m talking about? No, no, no, I’m talking about there (0:27:00) Kev: you’re talking or is it a different one oh oh the the one yes the really nice one that they (0:27:02) Al: was like an. Yes, the like all black one, I can’t remember what it was called. (0:27:06) Kev: did in a direct yes yes I remember that yes yeah yeah to be fair like didn’t that have like a full (0:27:13) Kev: set of cards or whatever like it wasn’t just packs even right like it was like designed as a game (0:27:19) Kev: almost right that you could play with someone um oh gosh the (0:27:21) Al: Yes. Yes. Oh, there we go. It’s the class. I think it’s the classic box set. Yes, it (0:27:25) Kev: classic yeah black something like that I can’t remember um (0:27:30) Al: was a full set. You could play a full game and it looks like it’s brand new here. It’s (0:27:32) Kev: yeah yeah yeah pokum (0:27:35) Al: £400. So quite a lot. So that’s maybe what? $500. And we’re talking and presumably the (0:27:37) Kev: yep yeah yeah yeah okay (0:27:45) Al: packs were just the packs. There wasn’t anything else with them. (0:27:50) Kev: Yeah, okay. I’m looking on Pokemon Center. It says 400 USD, I think (0:27:52) Al: Yeah. Okay. And it was like recreations of the original cards and it was like full on (0:27:55) Kev: But regardless at least it was a full dang set. They could play with you know people, right? (0:28:02) Kev: Yeah, yeah (0:28:03) Al: nostalgia, but it was a full set. You could sit down with just this box and play an entire (0:28:09) Kev: Yeah, you could play different games and stuff right at least it’s that right this was literally (0:28:15) Kev: MT the MTG 3 was literally 15 packs. That’s all it was (0:28:19) Al: That’s wild, so we’re talking more than twice the price of this, (0:28:24) Al: and it doesn’t include any of the extra stuff. It’s just 50. (0:28:24) Kev: Yep (0:28:26) Kev: Nope not even I mean, I mean maybe you could make a deck it wouldn’t work probably but you know like (0:28:33) Kev: You can’t you can’t play you can’t open this and play again with friends. I don’t think unless you’re just making up (0:28:34) Al: And this box is insanely expensive, this Pokémon one. (0:28:41) Kev: Yeah, yeah it is (0:28:42) Al: You know, for what it is, of course it’s sold out, because everything Pokémon sells out. (0:28:46) Al: But yeah, wow, that’s mad. (0:28:48) Kev: Yeah, I know yeah, that’s yep, that’s wild um oh wow actually I’m looking online you can buy (0:28:56) Kev: There’s one here on TZG player for like 250 is that right huh anyways, but still yeah (0:29:02) Al: Still, still too much money. (0:29:04) Kev: Yeah, no, that’s a lot. Don’t get me wrong, but I just (0:29:07) Al: And that’s a quarter of the price of 15 packs of this magic one. Mad. That’s, that is wild. (0:29:09) Kev: Yeah (0:29:12) Kev: Magic 30th (0:29:14) Kev: Good times (0:29:15) Al: All right. Are we done with the anti-capitalist rants? Capitalism is bad. We hate it. (0:29:16) Kev: so yeah (0:29:17) Kev: So (0:29:20) Kev: We’re done (0:29:22) Al: Don’t, don’t abuse supplying to man to rip people off just because you can. (0:29:24) Kev: Hasbro is bad (0:29:28) Kev: I will say this (0:29:30) Kev: So about Magic 30th (0:29:34) Kev: They were going to have a limited run or whatever (0:29:38) Kev: Oh, there’s going to be X number of boxes produced or whatever (0:29:42) Kev: And so, you know, it was a big deal (0:29:44) Kev: Okay, we’re launching the sale on this time on the website, yada yada (0:29:48) Kev: We got down the sale, I think, after like an hour (0:29:52) Kev: There was no explicit reason given (0:29:54) Kev: But most people assume they didn’t sell a thing (0:29:58) Kev: That’s what I’m thinking (0:30:00) Kev: Or what most people think (0:30:02) Al: That’s crazy. (0:30:02) Kev: Anyways, there you go (0:30:03) Al: It’s a thousand it’s a thousand pounds as well. (0:30:04) Kev: Your fun anecdote in Magic history (0:30:06) Al: I’m looking at it on on the UK site, it’s a thousand pounds. (0:30:06) Kev: Yup, yup (0:30:10) Kev: Oh, goodness (0:30:11) Al: Each display worthy box includes 15 card for 15 card booster packs. (0:30:16) Al: Oh, wait, it’s not 15 packs, it’s four packs. (0:30:18) Kev: Oh, I misread that, it’s four p- (0:30:22) Kev: Oh, yeah (0:30:23) Al: It’s 60, it’s 60 cards. (0:30:24) Kev: 60 cards, oh my gosh (0:30:26) Kev: Oh, that’s incredible (0:30:29) Al: That is so stupid. (0:30:30) Kev: Tell me about your week out (0:30:32) Al: Uh, but I’ve been playing Mario Kart, that’s that’s all I’ve been playing. (0:30:38) Kev: Man (0:30:40) Kev: So you talked about it, I talked about it (0:30:44) Kev: I don’t know if we stressed how good Knockout Tour is (0:30:46) Kev: That’s a good mode. (0:30:47) Al: Yeah, so I’ve been, when we last talked about it, I had not played the knockout tour by that point. (0:30:54) Al: I was going through the Grumprees, three-starring them. I finished the Grumprees, they’re all (0:30:59) Al: three-starred, and I am halfway through the knockout tours, three-starring them. Yeah, (0:31:04) Al: I really like them. I will say, it is a bit frustrating when you go through, because it’s (0:31:10) Al: eight gates, you have to go through with the last one being, that’s your final position unless you (0:31:15) Al: you get an octave before. (0:31:17) Al: And so to get three star in a knockout tour, you have to come first in every single gate, (0:31:24) Al: which is a lot of work. (0:31:27) Al: And I’ve been a couple of times where I’ve gone, yeah, there’s a couple of times where (0:31:31) Al: I have gone, like, it takes a while to get through the first gate, but after you got (0:31:35) Al: the first gate, you can quite often get a lot of gates, right? (0:31:38) Kev: Yeah (0:31:38) Al: There’s one knockout tour that I’m struggling on just now where I sometimes get knocked (0:31:42) Al: out of the third gate, which is very frustrating, but most of them, it’s like, if you get past (0:31:47) Al: that first gate, unless you mock up, you probably can do it reasonably easy, but getting past (0:31:52) Al: that first gate can be difficult. (0:31:55) Al: There’s been multiple times where I’ve gotten first on the first seven gates, and then coming (0:32:00) Al: forth. (0:32:01) Al: And it is so frustrating because like in a grand prix, if you could, I know, but in like (0:32:02) Kev: I mean that’s Mario Kart. Winning is losing. (0:32:06) Al: a grand prix, if you come, if you come first, first, first, fourth, you would get one star, (0:32:12) Al: go you’d win and get a one star. (0:32:14) Al: is if you come first, first, first, first, first, first, (0:32:17) Al: you come fourth. So it’s like, like, I understand that. That’s the point of the race. It just (0:32:24) Kev: - Yep. (0:32:24) Al: makes it really, and it like, it doesn’t really matter because I’m going to play it until I get (0:32:27) Al: three stars, right? But it’s just a little bit frustrating to be like, I was first every time (0:32:32) Al: and then I got knocked. I got hit by just too many shells and now I’m done. What I do really like is, (0:32:38) Kev: Yep (0:32:39) Al: I don’t know if there’s no rubber banding, but there definitely seems to be less rubber banding (0:32:43) Kev: Well that I mean, I think that’s kind of the (0:32:43) Al: in the knockout tour. (0:32:48) Kev: Why it works so well because you’re gonna have less people that you can’t rubber band if there’s only you know (0:32:53) Kev: Now half the contestants or whatever. All right, like instead of rubber band (0:32:55) Al: Well, it’s not, it’s not, yeah, I mean, right from the start though, like if you get out (0:32:59) Al: ahead of the pack really early, you can make a really big lead, which is important to be (0:33:06) Al: able to actually, you know, because you’re going to get hit, right? You can’t keep getting (0:33:09) Kev: Mm hmm. We’re right, right. Yeah. Yeah, yeah. (0:33:10) Al: in horns to not get hit by blue, blue shells, and you can’t get enough stuff. As soon as (0:33:16) Al: someone has like three red shells, you’re dead, right? You can’t protect from that unless (0:33:21) Al: you like get hit by the second one just before you go through another. (0:33:25) Al: So you’re going to get hit, and so you need that good distance to make sure that you (0:33:29) Kev: Yep. Yep. (0:33:35) Kev: Yeah. Mm hmm. (0:33:36) Al: have enough time. But on the other hand, it means that if someone gets ahead quickly, (0:33:40) Kev: Yep. (0:33:41) Al: it’s really hard to catch up with them. (0:33:43) Kev: It is. Um. (0:33:45) Al: Whereas in our Grand Prix, you can like hang back for like two laps and then just smoke everyone. (0:33:50) Kev: I think Bullet Bill or Golden Shroom. (0:33:51) Al: You can’t do that. You cannot do that in a knockout tour. (0:33:54) Kev: Yeah. Yep. Absolutely. (0:33:56) Al: But it’s fun. I’m enjoying it. I’m definitely enjoying it. (0:33:58) Kev: Yeah. Yeah. I mean, yeah. (0:34:00) Al: It definitely feels like what they wanted to do with the Grand Prix, but they didn’t. (0:34:03) Kev: Mm hmm. Yeah. (0:34:03) Al: And so I’m more frustrated now that the Grand Prix have these weird in-between bits. (0:34:09) Kev: That’s the thing. They’re not even in between bits. They’re just part of the race. (0:34:13) Al: Yeah. Yeah. (0:34:13) Kev: Like, that’s the weird part, right? Like, they told us they’re in between, but it’s not. (0:34:17) Kev: Um, that’s the weird part. (0:34:18) Al: It just means that the first lap on your next one is on the previous course. (0:34:25) Al: And then the second lap is like half the previous course and half the new course. (0:34:29) Al: And then you get one lap on the course. It’s just such a weird setup. (0:34:32) Kev: Yeah, and it’s it’s not there’s nothing inherently wrong with it especially since they designed this whole island it makes sense right but it’s still boggles my mind that they didn’t include the classic grand prive you know three laps around a track. (0:34:46) Al: Yeah, that’s the thing. That’s the thing. Anyway, but whatever. I’m still really loving the game. (0:34:48) Kev: Um, yeah. (0:34:50) Kev: Yeah. (0:34:53) Al: It is good fun. I like a lot of the changes they made. It feels, well, that’s the thing. (0:34:54) Kev: Yeah, it’s good it’s it’s Mario Kart shocker. (0:34:58) Al: It feels good because I don’t, there’s not a huge number of kart racers that feel good to race for (0:35:02) Al: me. And that’s a really important thing about Mario Kart. And they’ve, they’ve, they’ve, they (0:35:03) Kev: Mm-hmm (0:35:06) Kev: Yep, that is true (0:35:09) Al: hit it out of the park with that. Like all the changes they made make it feel smoother and feel (0:35:14) Al: nicer, like, you know, what I was talking to you about, like, when (0:35:16) Kev: Yeah (0:35:16) Al: you get hit by cars and stuff like that, it just all feels more fun. (0:35:18) Kev: Yeah (0:35:19) Kev: You’re right (0:35:21) Kev: You’re right. Yeah, I agree. It is it like just (0:35:25) Kev: Mechanically does feel more fluid because you’re right like in the old days when you got hit that was just like a hard stop (0:35:30) Al: Yeah, spin around three times and come to a halt. (0:35:31) Kev: Here you kind of tumble forward a little (0:35:34) Kev: Yeah (0:35:36) Kev: Yeah, I agree. Um, I mean, yeah overall like I agree. It’s it’s it’s good (0:35:42) Kev: I wish we I think it just needs more (0:35:46) Kev: We don’t actually it has a battle mime in try that but we need the three lap (0:35:52) Kev: Classy Grand Prix and we need more to actually do with free range. The free range is kind of nothing right now (0:36:00) Al: Yeah, it’ll be interesting to see if they add more in the future. (0:36:00) Kev: Like you (0:36:02) Kev: Yeah (0:36:03) Al: I don’t know. (0:36:04) Al: We’ll see. (0:36:04) Al: I’m not, I’m not, I’m not like, Oh, they must do it. (0:36:05) Kev: And I (0:36:07) Al: Or it would be a bad game. (0:36:08) Al: Like if it never changes again, I don’t think it’s not worth the money, (0:36:09) Kev: Yeah, oh yeah for sure oh (0:36:12) Al: but I would also like more please. (0:36:13) Kev: Oh, yeah, yeah, absolutely. Yeah, it’s (0:36:16) Kev: not a bad game. I need to stress that just, there’s, there’s just potential, you can feel it, (0:36:21) Kev: but you can feel what you can do, right? Like, can you imagine a, you know, I feel like there should (0:36:27) Kev: be modes that use the free range, like, sort of like tag, basically, right? Or, or, you know, (0:36:32) Al: Mmm, yeah, yeah, yeah. (0:36:34) Kev: something like that, something to chase, chase a rabbit or whatever, stuff like that, to give you (0:36:39) Kev: an excuse to run around the island, not just on the tracks. And, you know, that’s kind of what they (0:36:42) Al: Do you know what I hope they do? I really hope that they charged as much as they charged for (0:36:43) Kev: want. You tell. (0:36:48) Al: this game because they intend on not doing paid DLC but what they would do in paid DLC they’re (0:36:56) Al: adding industry updates. That would be really nice and it’s like yeah because then they get (0:36:59) Kev: that would be nice (0:37:01) Kev: I can see it going either way (0:37:03) Al: more money overall if they do that than if they charge less money and then charge the DLC because (0:37:07) Al: not everyone’s going to buy the DLC. But it (0:37:12) Al: would I think it would lead a lot of people to be less frustrated because I think if they add (0:37:17) Al: if they do a DLC and they charge for it people are gonna be like even more money you want even (0:37:18) Kev: Mm-hmm. (0:37:21) Kev: Yeah. (0:37:22) Al: more of my money and I think that would be not great and if they added more as free updates I (0:37:27) Kev: Yeah. (0:37:28) Al: think people would go oh okay uh there’ll be people who like this should have been in the beginning (0:37:30) Kev: What? (0:37:33) Al: but I think those people are stupid and that’s not how games work anymore deal with it it’s like (0:37:35) Kev: Yeah. (0:37:38) Kev: Yeah! (0:37:39) Al: it’s like the people who, it’s like the people who talk about (0:37:42) Al: er, so it’s one thing talking about Pokemon Scarlet and Violet and saying this is how the (0:37:46) Kev: Yeah, the game should have worked (0:37:46) Al: games always should have been, right? Like I’m putting that to the side. I’m not, I’m not talking (0:37:50) Al: about those, but I’ve seen people, I have heard people say this is what Breath of the Wild should (0:37:55) Al: have been with the Switch 2 update. And I’m like, no, it’s not. That is, that is an eight year old (0:37:58) Kev: what those people aren’t saying (0:38:02) Al: game. You cannot possibly believe that you think this game should have looked like this eight years (0:38:08) Al: ago. When this game came out, people adored how it (0:38:12) Al: looked amazing. The Switch, it still does. Even if you don’t have the update, it still (0:38:14) Kev: It still does shock her. (0:38:18) Al: looks amazing. It just looks even better if you have the update. It’s absolutely bizarre (0:38:22) Kev: Yeah, eggs (0:38:24) Al: that people are like, “This sort of shows.” But shut up. That is not how this works. That (0:38:28) Kev: Sheets oh (0:38:30) Al: is not how this works. (0:38:30) Kev: That’s insanity (0:38:33) Kev: Well, you know, okay on the topic on the topic of the DLC is it’s interesting because I think if they and I do think they’re (0:38:42) Kev: Gonna support the game because as you said, that’s just how (0:38:45) Kev: Games are now. Um, I think there there has to be free (0:38:52) Kev: because you know (0:38:53) Kev: He they’ve they’ve kind of put them corner themselves because in previous Mario Kart’s DLC is very or you know (0:39:00) Kev: It’s obvious what you do. You add more tricks, right? Here’s your next cup. Here’s you know, daddy out of here’s (0:39:05) Kev: Four cups buy them for ten bucks or whatever here. You can’t do that at least not had a (0:39:10) Kev: that easily right because you (0:39:13) Kev: They’re not gonna jam a new section of the island and gate it off with the DLC (0:39:14) Al: Oh, yeah, good point. (0:39:17) Al: That’s a good point. (0:39:19) Al: We’re going to need another island or the island get expanded or something like that. (0:39:19) Kev: right, so (0:39:22) Kev: Yeah, so (0:39:25) Kev: There’s I think there’s a couple I think there’s a couple things one (0:39:25) Al: Hmm. (0:39:28) Kev: I think we’re gonna see free modes like we’re talking about right like I don’t know what but they’re gonna I think they’re (0:39:31) Al: Yeah. (0:39:32) Kev: Gonna use more of the island because they have the island that would that’s obvious use more use it more, right? (0:39:37) Kev: There might be you know, maybe they will introduce three lap mode and then they can sell DLC tracks (0:39:43) Kev: Just you know your classic. Okay, here’s four tracks (0:39:44) Al: Yeah, so you know what, you’ve made me come to the conclusion. (0:39:49) Al: I think what’s going to happen is there will be those feature updates will be free (0:39:52) Kev: You (0:39:55) Al: and then new tracks will probably be paid. (0:39:55) Kev: Yeah (0:39:58) Al: I suspect that’s what’s going to happen. (0:39:58) Kev: That’s that is what I also suspect I do think yeah, yep, that’s (0:40:01) Al: That is a good point. (0:40:03) Al: Because then they can charge for like a whole other island, right? (0:40:07) Kev: Yep or just tracks if they want to do you know if they go back to three laps, but yeah or just another island yeah (0:40:09) Al: I can’t see. I can’t. I can’t see. (0:40:14) Al: I’m doing that going like the whole point is this America world also here are some (0:40:18) Al: tracks you can only do in if you if you choose them in the menu. (0:40:20) Kev: Yeah, that’s a good point. I guess (0:40:23) Al: Like that feels weird and you go into free room in free room free room and you (0:40:27) Al: choose which island you want to free room on or there’s a bridge between the two (0:40:29) Kev: Yeah (0:40:31) Al: islands or something like that. (0:40:33) Kev: Okay, the bridge might work yeah, but you raise a good point it could be a whole new island I I can see that (0:40:38) Kev: But but overall like yeah, I think we’re in agreement. There’s gonna be some sort of features modes (0:40:43) Kev: Whatever they’re gonna end those are gonna be free. Absolutely (0:40:46) Al: Also, let us free Rome on Rainbow Road, please, and thank you. (0:40:49) Kev: That it (0:40:51) Kev: I (0:40:52) Al: Maybe Rainbow Road is the bridge. (0:40:55) Kev: Hear people talk about that because of course, but there’s a part where you’re literally crashing there (0:40:58) Al: Yeah, I know. (0:41:03) Kev: How you gonna free-rope that (0:41:05) Al: But, I mean, if you fall off, you go back. (0:41:09) Kev: You just okay, all right (0:41:09) Al: You have to go back to the start of it. (0:41:10) Al: There you go. (0:41:12) Al: I can see why it would be annoying, and I know why they haven’t done it, but that doesn’t (0:41:15) Kev: Yeah, okay (0:41:15) Al: mean I don’t want to do it. (0:41:18) Kev: You know (0:41:20) Kev: On the rainbow road like on this in this one (0:41:23) Kev: I there’s points where I think it’s the absolute best rainbow road they’ve ever done and there’s points where it’s the worst one (0:41:32) Kev: Like I think the lot of it is great. It’s fantastic. It’s it’s a it’s a real spectacle this one (0:41:38) Kev: But then there’s points where you’re not actually on the rainbow road. There’s bits where you dip on water and other weird stuff (0:41:45) Kev: I don’t like that, but but that just me (0:41:48) Al: I haven’t done it enough to have a full opinion because I actually got (0:41:53) Al: that Grand Prix I got in on my second try. I got three stars. So I was like, “Oh, oh well.” (0:41:58) Kev: No dang, look at you hotshot. (0:42:01) Al: So it’s the only one. Other ones took me many, many, many more tries. But yeah, (0:42:05) Al: that one I was like, “Oh my word, I just got it in the second try. That’s wild.” (0:42:09) Kev: Nice. (0:42:10) Al: Because I actually, the first time I did it, I got 1-1-4-1. And so I was like, “Oh no, (0:42:15) Kev: Oh, dang. (0:42:17) Al: If I get– I think I can– (0:42:18) Al: do this, and then I managed to get it the second time. (0:42:20) Al: It was very satisfying, but– (0:42:21) Al: So I need to go back and do it some more. (0:42:23) Al: I don’t think I’ll be getting a second time in the– (0:42:26) Al: is there a knockout tour with Rainbow Road? (0:42:28) Kev: I don’t remember off the I don’t think there is now I’m guessing there isn’t (0:42:32) Al: Yeah, OK. (0:42:34) Al: So I’ll need to go back and try it, just– (0:42:37) Al: either with the Grand Prix or just on its own. (0:42:38) Kev: Yeah, I guess nothing else from your week you want to talk about (0:42:39) Al: All right, should we talk about some “Cottagecore” games? (0:42:43) Al: 40 minutes in. (0:42:45) Al: We’ve got some news. (0:42:47) Al: So first of all, Lens Island. (0:42:48) Al: 1.0 is now out, I believe, I think you talked about it with Cody in the last episode, so we (0:42:52) Kev: We did (0:42:53) Al: don’t need to go over much, but it’s now out! Huzzah! They also di

In this episode, Jacob speaks with Japan analyst Tobias Harris to unpack rising tensions in U.S.-Japan trade relations amid the Trump administration's tariff blitz. They explore how Japan—historically a close U.S. ally—is reacting to unclear demands, internal U.S. policy chaos, and the potential collapse of trust in American economic leadership. Tobias breaks down the limits of personal diplomacy, the legacy of Shinzo Abe, and why Japan is quietly building plan B trade alliances. They also cover Japan-China relations, a political shift in South Korea, and how domestic rice prices could determine Prime Minister Ishiba's fate. Global stakes, local politics—fully intertwined.--Timestamps:(00:00) - Introduction(01:14) - Japan-US Trade Relations(04:00) - Internal US Negotiation Issues(09:39) - Japan's Strategic Dilemmas(14:09) - Hypotheticals and Future Scenarios(18:50) - Impact of Abe's Relationship with Trump(24:10) - Japanese Relations with China(25:25) - Japan's Efforts to Repair Relations(28:31) - South Korea's New Leadership(29:57) - Challenges in Japan-South Korea Relations(36:13) - Japanese Domestic Politics(40:50) - The Importance of Rice in Japanese Politics(46:48) - Growing Interest in Japan--Referenced in the Show:Tobais' SubStack - https://observingjapan.substack.com/ --Jacob Shapiro Site: jacobshapiro.comJacob Twitter: x.com/JacobShap--The Jacob Shapiro Show is produced and edited by Audiographies LLC. More information at audiographies.com --Jacob Shapiro is a speaker, consultant, author, and researcher covering global politics and affairs, economics, markets, technology, history, and culture. He speaks to audiences of all sizes around the world, helps global multinationals make strategic decisions about political risks and opportunities, and works directly with investors to grow and protect their assets in today's volatile global environment. His insights help audiences across industries like finance, agriculture, and energy make sense of the world.--This podcast uses the following third-party services for analysis: Podtrac - https://analytics.podtrac.com/privacy-policy-gdrp

中国国旗【北京時事】中国遼寧省大連市で邦人２人が殺害されたことが３日、分かった。 Two Japanese nationals have been killed in the northern Chinese city of Dalian, sources familiar with Japan-China relations said Tuesday.

Two Japanese nationals have been killed in the northern Chinese city of Dalian, sources familiar with Japan-China relations said Tuesday.

  Last time we spoke about China's preparations for War. In December 1936, the tension in China reached a boiling point as Nationalist General Chiang Kai-shek was captured by his own commanders, Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng. Disillusioned by Chiang's focus on fighting communists instead of the encroaching Japanese forces, the generals sought a unified response to Japanese aggression. After being held in Xi'an, Chiang reluctantly agreed to collaborate with the Chinese Communist Party, marking a significant shift in strategy against Japan. Amidst the rising chaos, Chiang's government reviewed historical military strategies and prepared for a prolonged conflict. However, they faced challenges, including inadequate supplies and a lack of modern equipment compared to the Japanese. By 1937, China was ill-prepared for war, with Chiang later expressing regret about their military readiness. Despite these setbacks, the alliance formed with the communists laid a foundation for a united Chinese front against the brutalities of the Sino-Japanese War that would follow.   #153 Japan Prepares for War Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. So in the last episode we talked about how China was preparing itself for war, now its time for Japan. Since Japan's invasion of North China, Japanese field armies had promoted a series of autonomous zones in northern China. Officers from the Kwantung Army, skeptical of China's capacity to modernize, believed that the vast region would inevitably fragment into regional factions. This policy effectively maintained a weak and divided China, which served Japan's to defend Manchukuo. However many Japanese military leaders frequently pointed to the threat posed by the KMT's five-year plan, initiated in 1933 with assistance from German military advisors, aimed at modernizing and expanding the national army. To counter what they perceived as a Chinese threat, the field armies advocated for a preemptive war to dismantle Chiang Kai-shek's regime. Any attempt by Tokyo to alter the military's China policy faced vigorous opposition from the Kwantung Army, which, in February 1937, pushed for intensified covert actions to expel the KMT from northern China and supported a preemptive war to secure strategic areas for future operations against the Soviet Union. At a March meeting in Tokyo, staff officers from the China Garrison and Kwantung armies insisted that any concessions to China would be a grave mistake and would likely yield only temporary outcomes. In early spring 1937, Prince Konoe Fumimaro inherited a China policy fraught with competing views, however, there was consensus that China must not distract the empire from its preparations against the USSR. The end goal was clear, but the means to achieve it remained uncertain. The cabinet's approval of the "Fundamentals of National Policy" in August 1936 indicated a need for stability as the army and navy reconfigured Japan's war machine. The challenge lay in aligning long-term strategic goals with practical short-term interests in northern China without upsetting the existing balance of power. Expanding demands propelled the army's contingency planning, which had traditionally focused on safeguarding Japanese interests and the approximately 13,000 Japanese citizens residing in the region. Tokyo typically responded to serious incidents by deploying troops from homeland garrisons to address localized emergencies and then withdrawing them. However, by the mid-1930s, the growing Soviet threat to Manchukuo rendered this doctrine obsolete. Incidents in northern China gained strategic importance as they diverted resources from the Kwantung Army's preparations against the Soviet Union. Disruptions in northern China hindered access to essential raw materials necessary for army modernization and rearmament, while hostile Chinese forces threatened the Kwantung Army's strategic left flank in the event of war with the Soviets. With these considerations in mind, the army revised its operational war plans, assuming that northern China would serve as Japan's strategic rear area for operations against the USSR. In 1911 Japan's plan for general war mandated thirteen divisions to occupy southern Manchuria, capture Beijing, and subsequently occupy Zhejiang and Fujian. Limited contingency operations in northern China required two divisions to secure rail communications from Beijing to the coast. In the weeks following the 1931 Manchurian Incident, the General Staff in Tokyo drafted plans to counter a Sino-Soviet alliance, anticipating a 2 month campaign involving 15-16 divisions, with the majority engaged against the Soviet Red Army. 2 divisions were designated to secure northern China, while smaller units would monitor the Inner Mongolian front to protect Japan's western flank in Manchuria. After further refinement, the General Staff identified three contingencies for China in early 1932: maintaining the traditional mission of safeguarding Japanese interests and citizens with a standard two-division force; ensuring a secure line of communication between the Chinese capital and the sea with the China Garrison Army, which consisted of approximately 1,700 officers and men, reinforced by one division; and, in a worst-case scenario of all-out war, deploying three divisions to reinforce the Kwantung Army, along with 7 additional divisions and 3 cavalry brigades to suppress resistance in northern China and the Shandong Peninsula, while two additional divisions secured key areas in central China. Between 1932-1936, China received less attention as the General Staff focused on the Soviet military buildup in the Far East. Anxiety, stemming from the Soviet buildup in the Far East, was a pervasive concern reflected in the draft rearmament plan submitted to the throne on May 21, 1936, as part of the national budget formulation process. The army proposed countering the Soviet threat by enhancing Japanese strategic mobility in Manchukuo through the renovation and expansion of airfields, ports, roads, and rail infrastructure, and by constructing army air force arsenals, storage depots, and medical facilities. The positioning of Japanese divisions in eastern Manchuria suggested their wartime objectives, with the Kwantung Army relying on a mobile independent mixed brigade composed of armored car and mounted cavalry units stationed in Gongzhuling, central Manchuria, as its immediate response force for contingencies in northern China. Major units were not concentrated in western Manchuria, where they would be expected to deploy before any planned invasion of northern China. Nevertheless, General Staff planners remained vigilant regarding developments in China, where the resurgence of nationalism, Communist movements advancing north of the Yellow River in February 1936, and the spread of anti-Japanese sentiments across northern China raised the specter of limited military operations escalating into full-scale warfare. China's improving military capabilities would likely hinder Japanese forces from accomplishing their objectives. For example, around Shanghai, Chinese defenses were bolstered by extensive, in-depth, and permanent fortifications. In mid-September 1936, the General Staff in Tokyo issued orders to preempt significant outbreaks in northern China by repositioning a division in Manchukuo closer to the boundary. If hostilities broke out, the China Garrison Army, supported by Kwantung Army units, would launch punitive operations against Chinese forces as necessary. Higher headquarters expected local commanders to act swiftly and decisively, employing rapid maneuvers and shock tactics to address outbreaks with minimal force. Given that no alternative responses were considered, Japanese operational planning for northern China relied on an all-or-nothing approach to force deployment, even for minor incidents. Yet, the senior leadership of the army remained deeply divided over its China policy. Influenced by Ishiwara, the General Staff wanted to avoid military actions that could lead to a full-scale war with China, focusing instead on advancing the army's extensive rearmament and modernization program. In contrast, a majority of high-ranking officers in the Army Ministry and General Staff, particularly within the 2nd Operations Section and the Kwantung Army, favored forceful action against China, believing it necessary to quell rising anti-Japanese sentiments. Drawing from past experiences, these officers anticipated that the Chinese would quickly capitulate once hostilities commenced. This lack of a unified military strategy reflected broader disagreements among the army's leadership regarding operations in China. While operational planning called for the permanent occupation of large regions in northern and central China, the General Staff aimed to contain outbreaks to maintain focus on Soviet threats. There was a clear absence of long-term operational planning; instead, the army concentrated on initial battles while relegating planning for prolonged combat operations to contingent circumstances. In summary, the Japanese army preferred to avoid military force to address Chinese issues whenever feasible but was equally unwilling to concede to Chinese demands. Since 1914, Tosui Koryo or “Principles of Command” had served as the foundational doctrine for senior Japanese army commanders and staff officers engaged in combined arms warfare at the corps and army levels. The advent of new weapons, tactics, and organizational changes during World War I compelled all major military forces to reassess their existing military doctrines across strategic, operational, and tactical dimensions. In response, Japan modified the Principles of Command to blend its traditional post-Russo-Japanese War focus on the intangible factors in battle with the newest concepts of modern total war. A revision in 1918 recognized the significance of “recent great advances in materiel” for total warfare, yet it maintained that ultimate victory in battle relied on dedication, patriotism, and selfless service. In the 1920s, the General Staff's Operations Section, led by Major General Araki Sadao, who would become the leader of the Kodoha faction, had produced the most significant and impactful revision of the Principles. A staunch anti-communist and ideologue who valued the intangible elements of combat, Araki appointed Lieutenant Colonel Obata Toshishiro and Captain Suzuki Yorimichi as the principal authors of the manual's rewrite. Obata, a Soviet expert, was strongly influenced by German General Count Alfred von Schlieffen's classic theories of a “war of annihilation,” while Suzuki, the top graduate of the thirtieth Staff College class, shared Araki's focus on “spiritual” or intangible advantages in warfare. Both men were brilliant yet arrogant, working in secrecy to create a doctrine based on what Leonard Humphreys describes as “intense spiritual training” and bayonet-led assaults to counter the opponent's material superiority.  The latest version of the Principles of Command preserved the operational concept of rapid Japanese mobile offensive operations, aiming to induce a decisive battle or “kaisen” early in the campaign. It reaffirmed the sokusen sokketsu or “rapid victory' principle of rapid warfare. Attaining these goals relied exclusively on offensive action, with the army expecting commanders at all levels to press forward, defeat enemy units, and capture key territories. The troops were indoctrinated with a spirit of aggression and trained to anticipate certain victory. The emphasis on offensive action was so pronounced that Araki eliminated terms like surrender, retreat, and defense from the manual, believing they negatively affected troop morale. This aggressive mindset also infused the Sento Koryo or “Principles of Operations”, first published in 1929 as a handbook for combined arms warfare tailored for division and regimental commanders. The manual emphasized hand-to-hand combat as the culminating stage of battle, a principle regarded as unchanging in Japanese military doctrine since 1910. Senior commanders were expected to demonstrate initiative in skillfully maneuvering their units to encircle the enemy, setting the stage for climactic assaults with cold steel. Infantry was deemed the primary maneuver force, supported by artillery. To complement rapid infantry advances, the army developed light and mobile artillery. Operationally, encirclement and night attacks were vital components of victory, and even outnumbered units were expected to aggressively envelop enemy flanks. In assaults against fortified positions, units would advance under the cover of darkness, avoiding enemy artillery fire and positioning themselves for dawn attacks that combined firepower with shock action to overwhelm enemy defenses. In encounters with opposing forces, commanders would maneuver to flank the enemy, surround their units, and destroy them. If forced onto the defensive, commanders were expected to seize opportunities for decisive counterattacks to regain the initiative. These high-level operational doctrines were distilled into tactical guidelines in the January 1928 edition of the Infantry Manual or “Hohei Soten”, which saw a provisional revision in May 1937 . Both editions opened with identical introductions emphasizing the necessity for a rapid victory through the overpowering and destruction of enemy forces. Infantry was identified as the primary arm in combined arms warfare, and soldiers were taught to rely on cold steel as fundamental to their attacking spirit. The 1928 Infantry Manual underscored the commander's role in instilling a faith in certain victory or “hissho shinnen”, drawing from the glorious traditions of Japanese military history. The 1928 infantry tactics employed an extended skirmish line with four paces between soldiers. Individual initiative in combat was generally discouraged, except under exceptional circumstances, as success relied on concentrating firepower and manpower on narrow frontages to overwhelm defenders. An infantry company would create a skirmish line featuring two light machine gun squads and four rifle squads, preparing for a bayonet-driven breakthrough of enemy defenses. For the final assault, the infantry company would line up along a 150-yard front, likely facing casualties of up to 50% while breaching the enemy's main defensive line. Historical analysis reveals the shortcomings of these tactics. During World War I, armies constructed extensive, multi-layered defenses, trenches, pillboxes, and strong points, each independent yet all covered by artillery. If assaulting infantry suffered heavy losses breaching the first line, how could they successfully prosecute their assault against multiple defense lines? The 1937 revision elaborated on new tactics to overcome entrenched Soviet defenses, drafted in anticipation of arms and equipment that were either in development or production but not yet available for deployment. This became official doctrine in 1940, but as early as summer 1937, units from the China Garrison Army were field-testing these new tactics. The provisional manual adopted combat team tactics, forming an umbrella-like skirmish formation. This involved a light machine gun team at the forefront with two ammunition bearers flanking it to the rear. Behind the machine gun team were riflemen arranged in a column formation, maintaining six paces between each. The light machine gun provided cover fire as the formation closed in on the enemy for hand-to-hand combat. Increased firepower expanded the assault front to 200 yards. The combination of wider dispersion and night movement aimed to reduce losses from enemy artillery fire while the infantry advanced through successive lines of resistance. Commanders at the platoon level were responsible for leading the final assault into enemy lines, with increased tactical responsibility shifting from platoon to squad leaders, allowing for greater initiative from junior officers and non-commissioned officers. This emphasis on broader dispersal and fluidity on the battlefield required frontline infantry to exhibit aggressiveness and initiative. Contrary to popular belief, the Japanese military did not solely rely on the bayonet or an offensive spirit during engagements with Chinese forces. They effectively employed superior firepower and modern equipment within their combined arms framework, using heavy weapons and artillery to soften enemy positions before launching infantry attacks. Without such firepower, unsupported infantry attacks would have struggled to achieve their objectives. In January 1937, the Imperial Japanese Army consisted of approximately 247,000 officers and men, organized in a structure comprising seventeen standing infantry divisions, four tank regiments, and fifty-four air squadrons equipped with a total of 549 aircraft. The China Garrison Army and the Taiwan Garrison Army each included two infantry regiments, while a separate independent mixed brigade was stationed in Manchuria. Two divisions were permanently based in Korea, with four more assigned on a rotating basis to the Kwantung Army in Manchukuo. The remainder of the forces were stationed in the Japanese home islands. A substantial pool of reservists and partially trained replacements was available to mobilize, enabling the expansion of peacetime units to their wartime strength as needed. Conscription provided the primary source of enlisted manpower for the army, though a handful of young men volunteered for active duty. For conscription purposes, Japan was divided into divisional areas, which were further subdivided into regimental districts responsible for conscription, mobilization, individual activations, and veteran affairs within their jurisdictions. Typically, conscripts served with the regiment associated with their region or prefecture. However, the Imperial Guards regiments in Tokyo selected conscripts from across the nation, as did the Seventh Infantry Division, which recruited from the sparsely populated Hokkaido area and from regular army units stationed in Korea, China, and Taiwan. Draftees from Okinawa Prefecture usually served with Kyushu-based regiments. All males reaching the age of 20 underwent an army-administered pre-induction physical examination conducted between December 1 and January 30 of the following year. This evaluation classified potential conscripts into three categories: A “suitable for active duty”, B1, and B2, while others were deemed unfit for the demands of military life. In 1935, 29.7% of those examined received A classifications, while 41.2% were graded as B1 or B2. Among the 742,422 individuals eligible for conscription in 1937, approximately 170,000 were drafted, amounting to 22.9% of the cohort; this figure had remained relatively consistent since the post-Russo-Japanese War years. Within the conscripted group, 153,000 men were classified as A and an additional 17,000 as B. Conscripts served for two years of active duty, with variations based on their military specialty and any prior civilian military training. After their discharge, they were subject to a lengthy reserve obligation. In total, 470,635 individuals fell into the B category, being otherwise fit for service but excess to the army's active personnel needs. These men were assigned to the First Replacement Pool, where they underwent around 120 days of basic military training, primarily focused on small arms usage and fundamental tactics. Regular officers and NCOs led the training in their respective regimental districts. Following their initial training, the army called these replacements and reservists to active duty annually for several days of refresher training. Army leaders regarded discipline as the cornerstone of military effectiveness. Basic training emphasized the necessity of unquestioning obedience to orders at all levels. Subsequent training focused on fieldcraft, such as utilizing terrain strategically to surprise or encircle the enemy. However, training exercises often lacked diversity due to the limited maneuver areas available in Japan, leading to predictable solutions to field problems. The training regimen was rigorous, merging strict formal discipline and regulated corporal punishment with harsh informal sanctions and unregulated violence from leaders to instill unwavering compliance to orders. As an undergrad taking a course specifically on the Pacific War, it was this variable my professor argued contributed the most to the atrocities performed by the Japanese during WW2. He often described it as a giant pecking order of abuse. The most senior commanders abused, often physically their subordinates, who abused theirs, going through the ranks to the common grunts who had no one else but civilians and the enemy to peck at so to speak. Of course there were a large number of other variables at play, but to understand that you outta join my Patreon Account over at the www.patreon.com/pacificwarchannel , where I made a fan favorite episode on “why the Japanese army performed so many atrocities”. In there I basically hit a big 10 reason list, well in depth, I highly recommend it! As the concept of the “Imperial Army” and the cult of the emperor gained prominence, appeals to imperial symbols and authority bolstered this unquestioning obedience to superiors, who were seen as the conduits of the emperor's will. It was during this period that the term kogun or “imperial army” gained favor over kokugun or “national army”, reflecting a deliberate effort by military authorities to forge a direct connection between the military and the imperial throne. The 1937 Japanese infantry division was structured as a square formation, with a peacetime strength established at approximately 12,000 officers and men organized into two brigades, each comprising about 4,000 personnel, formed from two infantry regiments, about 2,000 men each. The division included a field artillery regiment, an engineer regiment, and a transport battalion as organic units. Each infantry regiment was composed of three battalions, approximately 600 men each, which contained three rifle companies, 160 men each and a weapons platoon. A rifle company consisted of three rifle platoons and one light machine gun platoon. Regiments also included infantry assault gun platoons, and battalions contained a heavy machine gun company. Upon mobilization, a fourth infantry company augmented each battalion, along with reserve fillers, nearly 5,000 personnel assigned as transport and service troops, raising the authorized wartime strength of an infantry division to over 25,000 officers and men.  Reforms implemented in 1922 reduced personnel numbers in favor of new and improved weapons and equipment. Among these advancements, the 75 mm Type 90 field artillery piece, which boasted increased range and accuracy, was integrated into the forces in 1930, along with the 105 mm Type 10 howitzer and 75 mm pack mountain artillery which could be disassembled for transport using pack animals. These became standard artillery components for divisions. The emphasis on light, mobile, and smaller-caliber field artillery enabled swift deployment during fast-moving engagements. By minimizing the size of the baggage train, infantry and artillery units could quickly set up off the march formation and maneuver around enemy flanks. Army leaders further streamlined road march formations by eliminating the fourth artillery battery from each regiment, thus sacrificing some firepower for enhanced speed and mobility. Heavier artillery pieces were still used in set-piece battles where mobility was less critical. In a typical 1936 division, the field artillery regiment, equipped with Type 90 field artillery or lighter Type 94 mountain artillery, had thirty-six guns. Training focused on quality rather than quantity, reflecting the conservative doctrine of “one-round-one-hit”. Live-fire training was infrequent due to the scarcity of artillery firing ranges in Japan. Ammunition stockpiles were inadequate for anticipated operational needs; government arsenals produced over 111,000 artillery shells in 1936, which was fewer than one-tenth of the quantities specified in wartime consumption tables. Similar industrial shortcomings also hampered advancements in motorization and armor. Motorization proved costly and relied on foreign supply, presenting challenges given the inferior road networks in Manchuria, northern China, and the Soviet Far East. Military estimates suggested a need for 250,000 trucks to fully motorize the army, a goal beyond the capabilities of the nascent Japanese automotive industry, which produced fewer than 1,000 cars annually until 1933. Japanese tanks, described as “handcrafted, beautifully polished, and hoarded” by Alvin Coox, suffered from shortages similar to heavy artillery and ammunition. The army prioritized light weighing ten tons or less and medium tanks sixteen tons or less due to the necessity of deploying armor overseas, size and weight were crucial for loading and unloading from transport ships. Smaller tanks were also more suitable for the terrains of northern China and Manchuria, as they could traverse unbridged rivers using pontoons or ferries. The Japanese industrial base, however, struggled to mass-produce tanks; by 1939, factories were producing an average of only twenty-eight tanks of all models per month. Consequently, in 1937, foot soldiers remained as reliant on animal transport for mobility as their ancestors had been during the Russo-Japanese War. Despite enjoying technological and material superiority over disorganized Chinese forces, these deficiencies in heavy artillery, armor, and vehicles would prove catastrophic against more formidable opponents. Another significant factor constraining Japanese industry's capacity to produce tanks, trucks, and artillery was the 1936 decision to expand the army's air wing and homeland air defense network. This policy diverted resources, capital, and technology away from the army's ground forces. The nascent Japanese Army Air Force or “JAAF” aimed to support ground operations through reconnaissance, bombing enemy bases, and achieving air superiority. However, direct support for ground operations was limited, and Japanese military planners did not anticipate that aerial bombardment could supplement or replace artillery bombardments. The expanded air arm's strategic mission centered on executing preemptive air strikes against Soviet air bases in the Far East to thwart potential air attacks on Japan. By the mid-1930s, the army had approximately 650 aircraft, roughly 450 of which were operational. The JAAF emphasized rigorous training that prioritized quality over quantity, producing only about 750 pilots annually up until December 1941. Basic flight skills were developed through this training, while specialized tactical instruction was deferred to newly established pilot units. According to logistics doctrine, Japanese maneuver units typically operated within a 120 to 180-mile radius of a railhead to facilitate resupply and reinforcement. A field train transport unit was responsible for moving supplies daily from the railhead to a division control point for distribution. The division established a field depot to manage the transfer of supplies from field transport to company and lower-echelon units. At the depot, transport troops would hand over supplies to a combat train that ferried ammunition, rations, and equipment directly to frontline units. Horse-drawn wagons and pack animals were the primary means of transportation. Each wartime division included a transport battalion, which varied in size from approximately 2,200 to 3,700 personnel, depending on the type of division supported. The division typically carried enough supplies for one day. Upon mobilization, the logistical framework was reinforced with the addition of an ordnance unit, a field hospital, a sanitation unit, and additional field and combat trains. The size of the transport regiment grew from around 1,500 officers and men with over 300 horses to nearly 3,500 troops and more than 2,600 animals. In the battalion, one company generally transported small-arms ammunition while two companies handled artillery shells and two others carried rations; this arrangement was flexible based on operational needs. Pack horses and dray horses were assigned to each company to carry or tow infantry assault artillery, mortars, artillery ammunition, and rations. Infantry soldiers carried minimal rations, approximately two and a half pounds, primarily rice, along with tinned condiments and salt. Consequently, the field train included a field kitchen stocked with fresh vegetables, rice or bread, soy sauce, and pickles. Each evening, a forward echelon train distributed supplies received from the field transport unit to the combat unit's bivouac area. When combat seemed imminent, a section of the transport battalion would move forward to deliver essential combat supplies, ordnance, equipment, medical supplies, directly to frontline units. These units would also handle resupply, medical evacuation, and repair of ordnance and equipment once fighting commenced.  On the evening of September 18, 1936, the fifth anniversary of the Manchurian Incident, Chinese troops from the Twenty-Ninth Army clashed with Japanese soldiers from the Seventh Company's rear-guard medical unit at Fengtai. When a Japanese officer arrived on horseback, a Chinese soldier struck his horse, prompting the Chinese troops to retreat to their barracks. Major Ichiki Kiyonao, the battalion commander, ordered an emergency assembly, surrounded the Chinese encampment, and demanded that Chinese authorities surrender the aggressors immediately. To defuse the situation, Major General Kawabe Masakazu, the brigade commander and Ichiki's superior, instructed Regimental Commander Mutaguchi to resolve the incident swiftly. Mutaguchi negotiated an agreement that required the Chinese to apologize, punish those responsible, withdraw from the vicinity of the Japanese barracks, and maintain a distance of two miles. Although Mutaguchi and Ichiki wanted to disarm the Chinese forces, they ultimately complied with Kawabe's wishes and allowed the Chinese to retain their weapons “in the spirit of Bushido.” Later, the Chinese claimed the Japanese had refrained from disarming them due to their fear of the strength and influence of the 29th Army. This insult infuriated Mutaguchi, who vowed not to make any further concessions and promised to eliminate the anti-Japanese provocateurs decisively if another incident occurred. He warned his officers against allowing an “overly tolerant attitude toward the Chinese” to undermine the prestige of the imperial army and emphasized the need for swift, decisive action to prevent such incidents in the future. Tensions were further exacerbated by large-scale Japanese field exercises conducted from late October to early November. These maneuvers, the largest ever executed by Japanese forces in China, mobilized about 6,700 active-duty and reserve troops for a series of complex battle drills, night maneuvers, and tactical field problems. During these exercises, Japanese troops were quartered in Chinese homes. Although local residents were compensated for any damage caused, the exercises nonetheless heightened tensions between the two sides. The fallout from the Suiyuan Fiasco in December 1936, coupled with a tumultuous summer and fall, led to rising anti-Japanese sentiment and prompted Tokyo to caution the Kawabe brigade against actions that might escalate the already precarious situation. In March 1937, during the annual personnel assignments, Ishiwara was promoted to major general and appointed chief of the 1st Department Operations of the General Staff. However, Army Vice Minister Umezu, a hardliner regarding China and a rival of Ishiwara, successfully maneuvered the Hayashi cabinet into approving the command choices for army and navy ministers, overriding Ishiwara's proposals. General Sugiyama Hajime, another hawk on China, replaced the terminally ill General Nakamura Kotaro as army minister shortly after Nakamura's appointment and remained in that position until June 1938. Lieutenant General Imai Kiyoshi, army vice chief of staff and an Ishiwara supporter, was also battling a terminal illness that rendered him largely ineffective during his short five-month tenure from March to August 1937. Imai was expected to play a crucial role in high command because the army chief of staff, Prince Kan'in, had been appointed in 1931 as a figurehead due to internal factions preventing agreement on a candidate. Ishiwara further complicated his conciliatory approach by selecting Colonel Muto Akira, a known hardliner who believed force was the only means to resolve the Japan-China conflict, for the vital position of chief of Operations Section within the General Staff. From Kwantung Army headquarters, Commanding General Ueda Kenkichi and his chief of staff, Lieutenant General Tojo Hideki, advocated for a preemptive war against China to serve the Kwantung Army's interests. In contrast, the China Garrison Army, under Lieutenant General Tashiro and his chief of staff, adopted a more moderate stance, aligning with central headquarters' policy of restraint. The China Garrison Army estimated the 29th Army to consist of 15,000–16,000 troops, with its main strength centered around Peking and an additional 10,000 troops in the surrounding area. Starting in spring 1937, Japanese units began observing tactical indicators suggesting that the Chinese were preparing for war. These indicators included increased guard presence at Peking's gates in June, bolstering units near the Marco Polo Bridge to over two battalions, preparing new fighting positions, digging trenches and constructing concrete pillboxes near the Marco Polo Bridge, infiltrating agents into Japanese maneuver areas for intelligence on night tactical exercises, and heightened strictness among Chinese railroad guards evident since late June. Nevertheless, the Japanese commanders did not view China as a formidable opponent. They believed that Chinese armies would quickly disintegrate due to what they perceived as a lack of fighting spirit and ineffective leadership. By 1937, Japan's national policy was shifting away from the persistent and aggressive efforts of field armies to undermine Chinese political authority in northern China toward a more conciliatory stance. This shift resulted in increased tensions between field armies and the General Staff in Tokyo, leading to substantial fractures among senior officers regarding the “solution” to their so-called China problem. Those tensions broke the camels back that year.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Japanese grossly underestimated their enemy and their own logistical capabilities. There was to say “too many cooks in the kitchen” of the Japanese military and competing visions ultimately were leading Japan and China into an official full blown war. Japan assumed they could bully China until it was so fragmented it would be a simple matter of grabbing the pieces it liked, that was not to be the case at all.   

Hiroshi Moriyama, secretary-general of Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party, on Tuesday called for concrete results on pending issues between Japan and China, apparently referring to Tokyo's demand that Beijing remove its restrictions on imports of Japanese fisheries products.

Episode 165 Chapter 25, Electronic Music from Japan, China, and The Asia-Pacific, Part 2. Works Recommended from my book, Electronic and Experimental Music  Welcome to the Archive of Electronic Music. This is Thom Holmes. This podcast is produced as a companion to my book, Electronic and Experimental Music, published by Routledge. Each of these episodes corresponds to a chapter in the text and an associated list of recommended works, also called Listen in the text. They provide listening examples of vintage electronic works featured in the text. The works themselves can be enjoyed without the book and I hope that they stand as a chronological survey of important works in the history of electronic music. Be sure to tune-in to other episodes of the podcast where we explore a wide range of electronic music in many styles and genres, all drawn from my archive of vintage recordings. There is a complete playlist for this episode on the website for the podcast. Let's get started with the listening guide to Chapter 25, Electronic Music from Japan, China, and The Asia-Pacific, Part 2.  from my book Electronic and Experimental music. In the playlist, the musical works are in chronological order by region (e.g., China, Taiwan).   Playlist: ELECTRONIC MUSIC FROM CHINA AND THE ASIA-PACIFIC   Time Track Time Start Introduction –Thom Holmes 01:39 00:00 China     1.     Fengjiangzou, “败臼,” (2021). From a survey of contemporary Chinese electronic music produced by the Unexplained Sounds Group. 03:36 01:40 2.     Yan Jun, “In A Sense That Yet To Be Made” (2022). From a cassette release. Yan Jun, musician and poet, born in Lanzhou and based in Beijing. 46:44 05:16 3.     Zhu Wenbo, Zhao Cong, Li Song, "3 lines" (live recording 2023 in Wujing, Beijing). “Sounds from transducer feedback, elastic ropes and other objects (foil, paper…).” Trio of improvising electronic musicians. 08:59 52:00 Taiwan     4.     Scattered Purgatory, “破城入山” (Ramming the Town, Roaming the Mountain) (2014). Experimental drone/folk/rock band from Taipei, Taiwan comprised of members Lu Li-Yang and Lu Jiachi. 07:48 01:00:58 5.     Mong Tong, “介紹 (Jiè Shào)” and “地府 (Dì Fǔ)” (2021). Mong Tong is a Taiwanese psychedelic music band formed by brothers Hom Yu and Jiun Chi. From the album, Music From Taiwan Mystery. 06:27 01:08:44 6.     Mong Tong, “天庭 (Tiān Tíng)” (2021). From the album, Music From Taiwan Mystery. 07:38 01:15:08 Thailand     7.     Rik Wachirapilun, “สังวาส (Fuck)” (1999). Rik is a Thai musician whose music combines elements from Thai, Indian, Arabic and Western New Wave/Indie Rock cultures. 04:15 01:22:46 Indonesia     8.     Otto Sidharta, “Gamelan” (1980). From the album, Otto Sidharta, Indonesian Electronic Music 1979-1992. 11:28 01:27:02 9.     Melcyd, “Hellephant” (2015). From the cassette compilation, Pekak! Indonesian Noise 1995-2015: 20 Years of Experimental Music from Indonesia. “Melcyd is an experimental music group that was born in the indie-pop scene of Yogyakarta city and shifted to a more experimental form in their later period as a music group.” 06:12 01:38:24 10.   Theonugraha, “Ngayau” (2015). From the cassette compilation, Pekak! Indonesian Noise 1995-2015: 20 Years of Experimental Music from Indonesia. 04:01 01:44:36 11.   To Die, “Di Lautan Kegamangan” (2015). From the cassette compilation, Pekak! Indonesian Noise 1995-2015: 20 Years of Experimental Music from Indonesia. A list of recordings can be found here. 04:25 01:48:38 Philippines     12.   Jose Maceda, “Ugnayan” excerpt (1973/2009). Ugnayan, music for 20 radio stations. This release is a stereo mix of the original twenty tracks recorded under the supervision of the composer in 1973 in the Philippines. 22:21 01:53:02 13.   Jose Maceda, “Strata” (1987). 19:42 02:15:22 New Zealand     14.   Douglas Lilburn, “The Return” (1965). Narrator, Tim Elliott; Technical Supervision, Willi Gailer; Maori Voice, Mahi Potiki. Tape work with voices. Douglas Lilburn (1915-2001) has been described as the "grandfather of New Zealand music," having worked in both conventional classical styles as well as pioneering electro-acoustic music in New Zealand. 17:00 02:34:58 15.   Annea Lockwood, “Tiger Balm” (1970/1987). Revised Tape, Annea Lockwood; Engineering Assistance, Peter Grogono. “Tiger Balm was originally mixed in 1970 at Peter Zinovieff's Putney Studio in London. It was revised by the composer in her own studio a number of years later. This is the revised version.” Born in New Zealand, Annea Lockwood moved to England in 1961, studying composition at the Royal College of Music, London and followed courses in electronic music with Gottfried Michael Koenig. 10:26 02:51:56 16.   Douglas Lilburn, “Soundscape with Lake and River” (1979). 11:01 03:02:22 17.   Ros Bandt, “Stack (Red Rhythmic Pulses In Red Paint and Electrified Steel)” (2000). Concept, composed, performed, sound design, art direction, design, photography, Ros Bandt. Bandt is a musicologist, sound sculptor and instrument designer. 09:57 03:13:22 18.   Rory Storm, “My Little Sun” (2005). Sound artist from New Zealand. Electric guitar, drum loop, bass guitar, keyboards, samples, acoustic guitar, field recording, vocals, tape, piano, ocarina, Metasynth, Rory Storm. 05:41 03:23:16   Opening and closing voicings, Anne Benkovitz. Additional opening, closing, and other incidental music by Thom Holmes. My Books/eBooks: Electronic and Experimental Music, sixth edition, Routledge 2020. Also, Sound Art: Concepts and Practices, first edition, Routledge 2022. See my companion blog that I write for the Bob Moog Foundation. For a transcript, please see my blog, Noise and Notations. Original music by Thom Holmes can be found on iTunes and Bandcamp.

The economy and trade ministers from Japan, China and South Korea on Sunday confirmed the three countries' intentions to promote free trade.

WORLD: Japan, China, SKorea meet to talk peace | Mar. 23, 2025Visit our website at https://www.manilatimes.netFollow us:Facebook - https://tmt.ph/facebookInstagram - https://tmt.ph/instagramTwitter - https://tmt.ph/twitterDailyMotion - https://tmt.ph/dailymotionSubscribe to our Digital Edition - https://tmt.ph/digitalSign up to our newsletters: https://tmt.ph/newslettersCheck out our Podcasts:Spotify - https://tmt.ph/spotifyApple Podcasts - https://tmt.ph/applepodcastsAmazon Music - https://tmt.ph/amazonmusicDeezer: https://tmt.ph/deezerStitcher: https://tmt.ph/stitcherTune In: https://tmt.ph/tunein#TheManilaTimesVisit our website at https://www.manilatimes.netFollow us:Facebook - https://tmt.ph/facebookInstagram - https://tmt.ph/instagramTwitter - https://tmt.ph/twitterDailyMotion - https://tmt.ph/dailymotionSubscribe to our Digital Edition - https://tmt.ph/digitalSign up to our newsletters: https://tmt.ph/newslettersCheck out our Podcasts:Spotify - https://tmt.ph/spotifyApple Podcasts - https://tmt.ph/applepodcastsAmazon Music - https://tmt.ph/amazonmusicDeezer: https://tmt.ph/deezerStitcher: https://tmt.ph/stitcherTune In: https://tmt.ph/tunein#TheManilaTimes Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Japanese Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya and his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, on Saturday agreed that their countries will work on resolving pending issues and strengthen cooperation to promote a mutually beneficial strategic relationship.

The foreign ministers of Japan, China and South Korea will hold a trilateral meeting in Tokyo on Saturday, the South Korean Foreign Ministry said Tuesday.

U.S. President Donald Trump alleged Monday that Japan and China are guiding their currencies lower.

Robert Ward hosts Professor Suzuki Kazuto, Professor at the Graduate School of Public Policy at the University of Tokyo, and Dr Elli-Katharina Pohlkamp, Director at Agora Strategy Group, to explore Japan's economic security policy. Robert, Professor Suzuki and Dr Pohlkamp discuss: Recent developments in Japan's economic security strategyThe European perspective on Japan's economic security policyKey differences between Japan and Europe's economic security approachesThe future of Japan-China economic relations The following books are recommended by our guests to gain a clearer picture of the topics discussed: Aoyama Michiko, What You Are Looking for Is in the Library, (New York: Doubleday, 2023), 256pp. Okamoto Yukio, Japan and the United States: The Journey of a Defeated Nation - A Diplomat's Memoir by Yukio Okamoto, (Vermont: Tuttle Publishing), 388pp.We hope you enjoy the episode and please follow, rate, and subscribe to Japan Memo on your podcast platform of choice. If you have any comments or questions, please contact us at japanchair@iiss.org. Date recorded: 30 January 2025 Japan Memo is recorded and produced at the IISS in London. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Japan, China and South Korea are making arrangements to hold a meeting of their foreign ministers in Tokyo as early as March 22, several sources said Thursday.

Late last year, at our annual STATE OF ASIA conference, we hosted a conversation on the economic developments in Japan, China, and India.After decades of stagnation, Japan's economy is showing optimism from structural shifts like labor market reforms and wage increases that are finally starting to pay off.In China, growth has peaked and the government is yet to succeed in convincing its population it's okay to spend money.All the while, India is now the fastest-growing developing economy and scrambling to shed its protectionist past in order to create a lot more much-needed jobs.This, and much more, was discussed in three 12-minute conversations by:Garima Mohan, Senior Fellow in the Indo-Pacific program at the German Marshall Fund of the United StatesAlicia García Herrero, Chief Economist Asia Pacific at NatixisYumiko Murakami, General Partner at MPower Partners Fund, L.P.More information on the conference, the speakers, plus videos and summaries, are available on our website.This episode is from Asia Society Switzerland's STATE OF ASIA podcast, bringing you exclusive, engaging conversations with leading minds on issues that shape Asia and affect us all. More info and other episodes: https://asiasociety.org/switzerland/podcast-state-asia. 

Late last year, at our annual STATE OF ASIA conference, we hosted a conversation on the economic developments in Japan, China, and India.After decades of stagnation, Japan's economy is showing optimism from structural shifts like labor market reforms and wage increases that are finally starting to pay off. In China, growth has peaked and the government is yet to succeed in convincing its population it's okay to spend money.All the while, India is now the fastest-growing developing economy and scrambling to shed its protectionist past in order to create a lot more much-needed jobs. This, and much more, was discussed in three 12-minute conversations by:Garima Mohan, Senior Fellow in the Indo-Pacific program at the German Marshall Fund of the United StatesAlicia García Herrero, Chief Economist Asia Pacific at NatixisYumiko Murakami, General Partner at MPower Partners Fund, L.P.More information on the conference, the speakers, plus videos and summaries, are available on our website.Stay up-to-date on all events and activities at Asia Society Switzerland: subscribe to the newsletter and support our work by becoming a member. -STATE OF ASIA is a podcast from Asia Society Switzerland.  Season 8, episode 6 - Published: February 11, 2025Host/Editor: Remko Tanis, Programs and Editorial Manager, Asia Society Switzerland

Last time we spoke about the reunification of Xinjiang. In Yarkland, chaos erupted as inflation soared, forcing Chinese officials to retreat to fortified New City. As insurgents advanced, Colonel Chin's forces looted and fled, igniting violence against Uyghurs and Hindu moneylenders. By April, rebels captured Kashgar, fracturing Chinese control. Amid shifting alliances, Abdullah revealed a conflict among Muslim troops, leading to a brief Uyghur-Kirghiz unity against the Chinese. After the execution of leader Temur, Abdullah seized Yarkland, while Tawfiq Bay rallied forces, leaving the Tungans besieged amidst chaos. In the tumultuous landscape of 1930s Xinjiang, Ma Chongying's Tungan forces, alongside young Uyghur conscripts, captured Kumul and advanced toward Urumqi. Despite fierce battles, including a significant clash at Kitai, Sheng Shihtsai struggled to maintain control amid shifting loyalties and external pressures. As the TIRET emerged under Khoja Niyas Hajji, internal conflicts and Soviet interventions escalated. Ultimately, Ma Chongying retreated to Russia, leaving Sheng in power, but the region remained fraught with tension and uncertainty.   #136 Ishiwara Kanji Part 1: The Man who Began WW2? Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. “The board is set, the pieces are moving. We come to it at last, the great battle of our time.” Famously said by Gandalf the White. 1931 was the year the Japanese initiated a 15 year long war with China. For those of you who perhaps joined this podcast recently and don't know, I am Craig and I operate the Pacific War Channel on Youtube. I have been covering the 15 year long China War forever it seems, so when we finally reached this part in our larger story I sat down and thought about how to first tackle this. One thing I really believe needs to be said at the beginning, is a lot of what happened was put into motion by one man, Ishiwara Kanji. For those of you who joined my patreon or later listened to my Ishiwara Kanji series on my channel, this one might be a bit of a refresher. But for those of you who have never heard the name of this man, well let me tell you a story about how a single man caused WW2. Kanji Ishiwara was born on January 18, 1889, in Tsuruoka, located in Yamagata Prefecture, Japan. He was the second son of a policeman who hailed from a lineage of samurai that had historically served the Shonai Domain. This domain had a notable history, particularly during the Boshin War, where Ishiwara's clan supported the Tokugawa Shogunate. Following the defeat of the Shogunate, clans like Ishiwara's found themselves marginalized in the new political landscape of Meiji Era Japan. The power dynamics shifted significantly, with domains such as Choshu and Satsuma gaining the majority of influential governmental positions, while those that had aligned with the Shogunate were largely excluded from power. At the young age of 13, Ishiwara embarked on his military career by enrolling in a military preparatory school in Sendai. He continued his education for two years at the Central Military Preparatory School in Tokyo, where he honed his skills and knowledge in military affairs. In 1907, he entered the Imperial Japanese Military Academy as a member of its 21st class. After two years of rigorous training, he graduated in July 1909, receiving a commission as a Lieutenant and taking on the role of platoon commander in an infantry regiment stationed in the Tohoku region. In 1910, following Japan's annexation of Korea, Ishiwara's regiment was deployed to the Korean Peninsula, where he served in a small garrison in Ch'unch'on. His time there involved two years of occupation duty, during which he gained valuable experience in military operations and leadership. After returning to Tohoku in 1912, Ishiwara pursued further education and successfully passed the examinations required for entry into the Army Staff College in 1915. His dedication and exceptional performance were evident throughout his studies, culminating in his graduation at the top of his class in November 1918. This achievement earned him a prestigious place among the elite ranks of the Gunto Gumi, a distinguished group within the Japanese military, and he was honored with the imperial sword, a symbol of his status and accomplishments. In 1920, Ishiwara found himself facing a challenging assignment within the Department of Military Training. Eager for a change, he applied for service in China and was subsequently assigned to the Central China Garrison in Hankow. Over the course of a year, he traveled extensively through central China, immersing himself in the culture and landscape before returning to Tokyo in 1921. Upon his return, he took on the role of lecturer at the Army Staff College, where he shared his knowledge and experiences with aspiring military leaders. Despite his desire for another assignment in China, Ishiwara's superiors redirected him to Europe, a common practice for promising young officers at the time. He spent three years in Germany, where he dedicated himself to studying languages and military history. By 1925, at the age of 36 and having attained the rank of Major, he received a prestigious assignment to the faculty of the Army Staff College, where he lectured on the history of warfare. From the outset, Ishiwara distinguished himself as an unconventional officer. His eccentricities were well-known; he was often seen as argumentative and struggled with numerous health issues, including recurrent kidney infections, gastrointestinal problems, tympanitis, and other ailments that plagued him throughout his career. Additionally, his ancestry played a significant role in his military life, particularly in the context of the Japanese military's values during the 1930s. Officers from disgraced clans often felt compelled to demonstrate exceptional loyalty to the Emperor, striving to overcome the stigma associated with their lineage, a legacy of distrust that lingered from the early Meiji period. Ishiwara's character was marked by a certain oddity; he was a nonconformist with a fiercely independent spirit. Many biographers note that while he excelled academically, he often disregarded military decorum, particularly in terms of his dress and personal appearance. Early in his career, he voiced his concerns about perceived inequalities within the military, particularly the favoritism shown towards graduates of the staff college. Such outspoken criticism was considered reckless, yet it reflected his deep-seated beliefs. An avid reader, Ishiwara immersed himself in a wide range of subjects, including politics, religion, history, and philosophy, revealing a restless and inquisitive mind. His unconventional behavior and intellectual pursuits garnered attention from his peers, many of whom regarded him as a brilliant thinker. While military personnel are typically required to study military history, few pursue it with the same fervor as Ishiwara. He developed a profound obsession with understanding military history beyond the standard curriculum. His critical examination of the Russo-Japanese War led him to conclude that Japan's victory was largely a matter of luck. He believed that Japan had adopted the von Moltke strategy of annihilation, but the sheer size of Russia made it impossible to defeat them swiftly. Ishiwara posited that had Russia been better prepared, Japan would likely have faced defeat, and it was only through a unique set of circumstances that Japan avoided a protracted conflict. This realization prompted Ishiwara to advocate for a significant shift in Japan's defense planning, emphasizing the need to adapt to the realities of modern warfare. His studies extended to World War I, where he critically analyzed the distinctions between short and prolonged conflicts. He recognized that extended wars often evolved into total wars, where political, economic, and social factors became as crucial as military strategy. This line of thinking led him to categorize wars into two types: “kessenteki senso” (decisive war) and “jizokuteki senso” (continuous war). Ishiwara viewed these categories as part of a cyclical pattern throughout history, with each type influencing the other in a dynamic interplay. During his time in Germany, Ishiwara immersed himself in the study of prominent military theorists such as Carl von Clausewitz, Helmuth von Moltke, and Hans Delbrück. He found himself particularly captivated by Delbrück's concepts of Niederwerfungstrategie, or "strategy of annihilation," which emphasizes the importance of achieving victory through decisive battles, and Ermattungsstrategie, meaning "strategy of exhaustion," which focuses on wearing down the enemy over time. These theories resonated deeply with Ishiwara, as he recognized parallels between his own ideas and the insights presented in these influential works. This realization prompted him to analyze historical conflicts, viewing the Napoleonic Wars as the quintessential example of annihilation warfare, while interpreting the campaigns of Frederick the Great as emblematic of exhaustion warfare. As Ishiwara advanced in his studies, he became increasingly convinced, much like many of his contemporaries, that Japan and the United States were inevitably on a collision course toward war, driven by conflicting power dynamics and ideological differences. He anticipated that such a conflict would not be swift but rather a drawn-out struggle characterized by a strategy of exhaustion. However, this led him to grapple with a pressing dilemma: how could Japan effectively prepare for a prolonged war when its natural resources were evidently insufficient to sustain such an endeavor? This predicament prompted him to rethink the broader context of Asia. Ishiwara held a strong belief that Asia was a distinct entity, fundamentally different from the West, and he envisioned a future where Asian nations would liberate themselves and unite in solidarity. His enthusiasm was particularly ignited during the Xinhai Revolution of 1911, while he was a young cadet stationed in Korea. The prospect of China revitalizing itself filled him with hope. However, his later experiences in China led to a profound disillusionment. Throughout the 1920s, he encountered rampant banditry, conflicts during the warlord era, and pervasive chaos and disorder. The widespread poverty and instability he witnessed shattered his earlier optimistic vision of China's potential for progress and reform, leaving him with a more sobering understanding of the challenges facing the region. He wrote this during that time “Looking at the situation in China, I came to harbor grave doubts as to the political capacities of the chinese race and came to feel that, though they were a people of high cultural attainment, it was impossible for them to construct a modern state”. Despite his profound disappointment with the political issues plaguing China, he was equally appalled by the way his Japanese colleagues treated the Chinese people. He vividly recalled feelings of shame when he witnessed fellow colleagues in Hankow disembarking from rickshaws and carelessly tossing coins at the feet of the rickshaw pullers. This behavior struck him as not only disrespectful but also indicative of a broader attitude of racial superiority that he believed needed to be addressed. He frequently expressed in his writings that the Japanese needed to abandon their feelings of racial superiority. Ironically, he often juxtaposed this belief with his conviction that Japan had a duty to guide nations like China toward their rightful destiny. While he advocated for racial equality between Japan and China, he held a markedly different view regarding China's political landscape. Like many of his contemporaries, he believed that China required significant reform and modernization, which he felt Japan was uniquely positioned to facilitate. To Ishiwara, the pressing issue was that if Japan did not assist China in its development, Western powers would aggressively intervene, further subjugating the nation. He viewed Japan's role as one of liberation for China, rather than domination. Additionally, Ishiwara connected the impending conflict between Japan and the United States to the broader dynamics of Japan-China relations, suggesting that the outcome of this war would significantly impact the future interactions between the two nations. Ishiwara, like many Japanese military officers of his time, subscribed to the concept of Kokutai, a complex and multifaceted cultural phenomenon that served as a spiritual driving force within the Japanese military. The Kokutai can be understood as the essence of Japan's national character. Japan operated as a constitutional monarchy, embodying both the Kokutai (the national body or character) and Seitai (the governmental structure). This duality created a unique ideological framework: one aspect emphasized the traditional reverence for the emperor, while the other focused on the official government apparatus.   To simplify this intricate relationship, one might say, “Japan is governed simultaneously by the emperor and the government.” However, this characterization is inherently confusing, as it encapsulates a significant contradiction. Article 4 of the former Japanese constitution stated, “The emperor is the head of the empire, combining in himself the right of sovereignty, uniting the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, although subject to the consent of the imperial diet.” This provision suggests the existence of an absolute monarch who is nonetheless expected to heed the advice of democratically elected representatives, creating a paradox that would contribute to the tensions leading to the Pacific War. A critical issue that arose from this constitutional framework was that the military was explicitly stated to be under the control of the emperor, rather than the political diet. Consequently, many military leaders perceived themselves as being beholden to the Kokutai, an ideology that evolved significantly from the Meiji era into the Showa era. For instance, consider a high-ranking military officer who views the political elite as corrupt individuals who have effectively taken the emperor hostage, acting against his will and, by extension, against the will of the Japanese people. Such a perspective could lead to radical actions, including attempts to overthrow the government to restore what they believed to be the rightful authority of the emperor. This ideological conflict presents a fascinating and complex rabbit hole that merits further exploration. Ishiwara had a unique view of the Kokutai. In his early education he wrote this about his doubt on understanding it as a principal. “Even though I, myself, because of my training…had come to have an unshakeable faith in the kokutai I began to lack confidence that I could imparts this belief to others –to the common soldier, to the civilian, to non-Japanese”. Ishiwara grappled with a profound question: how could the concept of Kokutai—the national essence of Japan—be relevant beyond the borders of Japan? He pondered how its significance could extend beyond the specific national interests of Japan. If a Japanese soldier were to lay down his life for the Kokutai, what meaning would that sacrifice hold for individuals of different races and nationalities? Furthermore, he sought to understand how the Kokutai's universal value could be connected to other ideologies outside Japan. In his quest for answers, Ishiwara turned to Nichiren Buddhism. This spiritual framework allowed him to weave together his thoughts on warfare, historical narratives, and the national purpose of Japan. Interestingly, Ishiwara did not come from a religious background; he had briefly explored Christianity but did not pursue it further. Similarly, Shintoism did not fully resonate with his beliefs. Nichiren Buddhism, however, presented a compelling alternative. It is characterized by a strong sense of patriotism and an apocalyptic vision, positioning itself as a holy mission intended for all of humanity, with Japan at its center. This belief system embodies a quasi-ideology of world regeneration, casting Japan as a moral leader destined to guide others. Given this context, it is easy to see how the Kokutai and Nichiren Buddhism complemented each other seamlessly. By leveraging the principles of Nichiren Buddhism, Ishiwara envisioned a way to elevate the Kokutai from a strictly nationalistic doctrine to a more universal ideology that could resonate globally. His introduction to these ideas came through Tanaka Chigaku, a prominent figure in the Kokuchukai, or "National Pillar Society," which was a nationalist organization rooted in Nichiren Buddhism and based in Tokyo. This connection provided Ishiwara with a framework to articulate a vision of Japan that transcended its geographical boundaries, linking the Kokutai to a broader, more inclusive mission. After attending a public meeting held by Tanaka, he quickly converted to Kokuchukai and he would write down in his journal “I was attracted to the Nichiren faith's view of the kokutai”. Nichiren buddhism. One element of Kokuchukai's Nichirenism that strongly attracted Ishiwara was its aggressive passages. He justified much of Japan's military actions on the Asian continent by drawing parallels to Nichiren's concept of wielding the sword to uphold righteousness. He frequently quoted Nichiren's assertion that “the significance of the art of war appears in the wonderful law.” Ishiwara became deeply immersed in Nichiren's teachings and came to believe in its prophecy of a “Zendai mimon no dai toso,” or a titanic world conflict unprecedented in human history, akin to a global Armageddon. Following this conflict, he envisioned a period of universal and eternal peace under the harmony of “the wonderful law.” While in Germany, Ishiwara became convinced that if Japan and the United States were destined for war and the U.S. emerged victorious, the kokutai would be obliterated. He traveled back to Japan via the Trans-Siberian Railway, stopping in Harbin, where he met with Nichiren followers. He shared his thoughts on a “final war,” asserting that it would arise from religious prophecy and his military analysis. He cautioned that Japan must prepare for this impending conflict, declaring that “the final war is fast approaching.” Upon returning to Japan in 1925, he was filled with determination to lecture at the Army Staff College about this final war. His audience consisted of the army's promising young officers, to whom he taught about Frederican and Napoleonic campaigns, Moltke, World War I, and, of course, his insights on the looming conflict. The Army Staff College repeatedly requested him to expand his lectures due to their popularity. In 1927, he drafted an essay titled “Genzai oyobi shorai Nihon no kokubo / Japan's Present and Future National Defense,” in which he discussed the inevitable war between the U.S. and Japan. This essay garnered significant attention from his colleagues. Later, in April 1931, he briefed his fellow Kwantung officers using this essay, advocating for decisive action on the Asian mainland. In 1928, he was scheduled to give another course on European warfare, but he contracted influenza and had to take a leave of absence. As he was recovering, he developed tympanitis in his ear, which required a six-month hospitalization. This was just one of many health issues that would affect him over time. Eventually, he became involved in an elite study group focused on war theories, led by Major Suzuki. This group included young reformist officers who discussed political and military matters. He continued his work on the concept of total war and ultimately wrote “Sensoshi taikan / General Outline of the History of War,” which he presented as a lecture to Kwantung officers in Changch'un, Manchuria, on July 4, 1929. The work underwent revisions in 1931 and 1938 and was published as a book of the same title after 1941. As he began lecturing using Sensoshi taiken he also circulated amongst an inner circle within the Kwantung army “kokuun tenkai no konpon kokusakutaru man-mo mondai kaiketsuan / Plan for the solution of the Manchuria and Mongolia problem as a basic national policy to revolutionize our country's destiny”, what a title. As you might guess the plan called for occupying Manchuria in preparation for the upcoming war with America. By the way, all of his lectures and works would gain so much fame, he was asked in 1936 to adapt the materials for a text on military history for Emperor Hirohito.  The 1930s were a particularly tense period for Japan. The Japanese leadership perceived Marxism as a pervasive threat, believing it was undermining the nation. Many liberal voices argued that the military budget was excessive and called for cuts. To Ishiwara, this was madness; he questioned how Japan could afford to disarm. While Marxists claimed that communism would rescue Japan, liberals argued that true democracy was the answer. In contrast, Ishiwara and many in the military believed that the Kokutai would be Japan's salvation. Ishiwara advocated his final theories of warfare, asserting that the impending apocalypse would not lead to an American synthesis, but rather a decisive victory for the Japanese Kokutai that would unify the world. “Japan must be victorious not for the sake of her own national interest, but for the salvation of the world. The last war in human history is approaching, Nichiren's titanic world conflict, unprecedented in human history”. From the outset of his initial theories, Ishiwara was convinced that the final war would be characterized by a strategy of exhaustion. However, World War I and the advancements of the 1920s introduced new technologies like tanks, poison gas, and airplanes. The airplane, in particular, led Ishiwara to believe that the defensive stalemate observed in World War I was nearing its end. He argued that airpower could deliver bomb loads beyond all known defenses, including naval surface units, fortifications, and armies equipped with automatic weapons. Ishiwara predicted that the final war would unleash unimaginable horrors on the world's greatest cities. Cities like London, Shanghai, Paris, and even Tokyo could be devastated within a single day of the outbreak of hostilities. Air bombardment would deliver victory and he would be quite right about that in regards to what would happen to Japan. He believed such a war would be waged only once and “we will enter an age where war will become impossible because of the ultimate development of war technology”. Ishiwara contended that Japan should exert direct or indirect control over Manchuria and, to a lesser extent, certain regions of China. He claimed that Japan had a moral responsibility to the Asian continent and a unique connection to Manchuria and China. He emphasized the need to stabilize China, as its people faced threats from chaos, corruption, and conflict. Ishiwara argued that Japan would ultimately need to take a more proactive role in stabilizing China, especially in Manchuria, for the sake of peace and the well-being of the Chinese population. He wrote in 1930 “To save China, which has known no peace, is the mission of Japan, a mission, which, at the same time, is the only means for the salvation of Japan itself. To accomplish this task it is an urgent matter that the interference of the United States be eliminated”. Ironically, he was advocating that in order to prepare for a conflict with the US, Japan must take a stronger hand in Manchuria and China…which would probably force the United States to confront her. He advocated against the strategy of a decisive battle at sea, instead emphasizing a continental strategy. “If the worst comes about and the war at sea turns against us, if proper measures have been taken, Japanese forces on the Asian mainland can be made self-sufficient and the war continued.” Above all else, Manchuria was the key, alongside parts of Mongolia and China.  In 1931, he started advocating for reforms in China, suggesting that it would be beneficial for the country to accept guidance from Japan. He viewed China as Japan's most important ally in the event of a conflict with the United States. He argued that Japan should make every effort to avoid getting involved in a war with China and should strive to prevent any actions that might provoke such a situation. Yet as he continued his writing he began to see the diplomatic issues play out between China and Japan and came to the conclusion, “every attempt should be made to avoid provoking China, but in the event that it is impossible to bring about China's understanding, then Nanking should be swiftly attacked and north and central China occupied” way to go 0-60. His attitudes to Britain and Russia were quite similar, every effort should be made to remain friendly, but in the case of war Hong Kong and Malaya should be quickly occupied or in the case of the USSR, predetermined objectives inside Siberia should be seized quickly. Let's delve into the historical landscape of Manchuria during the late 1920s, a period marked by intense geopolitical maneuvering among Russia, China, and Japan. The region found itself caught in a complex struggle for dominance, exacerbated by the fragmentation of Chinese authority due to rampant warlordism. This instability effectively severed Manchuria's ties to the rest of China, creating an opportunity for Japan to solidify and expand its influence. The situation in Manchuria, often referred to as the "Manchurian Problem," revolved around a pivotal question for Japanese policymakers: How could Japan consolidate its hold over Manchuria and further its interests in the face of an increasingly assertive China? Japan identified three primary strategies to address this challenge: Control of the South Manchuria Railway: Securing this vital transportation artery would grant Japan significant leverage over southern Manchuria. However, this strategy was fraught with complications, as it necessitated ongoing confrontations with Chinese political forces that opposed Japanese dominance. Utilization of the Kwantung Army: This military force stationed in Manchuria was crucial for projecting Japanese power. Members of the Kwantung Army were particularly concerned about the Northern Expedition led by Chiang Kai-shek, which threatened the stability of their ally, Zhang Zuolin, known as the "Tiger of Manchuria." While Zhang had been cooperative and acted in Japan's interests, his support could not be guaranteed indefinitely. Japanese Colonization: This approach involved encouraging Japanese settlers to move into Manchuria, thereby establishing a demographic presence that could help legitimize Japan's claims to the territory. This method, often likened to a “filibuster,” aimed to create a Japanese cultural and economic foothold in the region. Each of these strategies presented distinct pathways forward, each with its own implications for the future of Manchuria and its relationship with China. The Kwantung Army, in particular, was increasingly alarmed by the rise of anti-Japanese sentiment as the Northern Expedition advanced northward. The army viewed Manchuria not only as a territory of strategic interest but also as a crucial buffer against the Soviet Union. The growing instability posed by Chiang Kai-shek's forces and the potential loss of influence over Zhang Zuolin were significant threats that needed to be addressed. Ultimately, many within the Kwantung Army believed that the only viable solution to secure Japan's interests in Manchuria would be to formally detach the region from China, a move that would likely require military intervention. This belief underscored the precarious balance of power in Manchuria during this tumultuous period and foreshadowed the escalating conflicts that would shape the region's future. In June 1927, senior officers of the Kwantung Army were summoned to a crucial meeting convened by Premier Tanaka Giichi. The primary objective of this gathering was to establish Japan's strategic policy regarding China and Manchuria. Within the ranks of the Kwantung Army, a more radical faction led by Colonel Komoto Daisaku was determined to eliminate Zhang Zuolin, who had increasingly become perceived as a significant barrier to Japanese ambitions in Manchuria. This faction's resolve culminated in the assassination of Zhang Zuolin in 1928, an event infamously known as the Huanggutun Incident, where a bomb was placed on the train tracks to ensure his demise. However, the outcome of this assassination did not unfold as the Kwantung Army officers had anticipated. Instead of the anticipated rise of their chosen puppet leader, General Yang Yuting, control of Manchuria fell to Zhang Zuolin's son, Zhang Xueliang. Unsurprisingly, Zhang Xueliang was deeply angered by the murder of his father and was far from compliant with Japanese interests. Consequently, the Kwantung Army found itself in a precarious position, as their aggressive policies in Manchuria backfired, leading to a situation that was even more unfavorable than before. The investigation into the assassination was notably half-hearted, resulting in the dismissal of Colonel Komoto from his position. This political fallout also led to the collapse of Tanaka's cabinet, leaving the Kwantung Army feeling both embarrassed and enraged over their diminished influence in Manchuria. The Japanese colonists residing in Manchuria, feeling increasingly threatened, began to call upon the Kwantung Army for protection against Chinese nationalists who sought to expel them from the region. In this climate of uncertainty, the Kwantung Army was left scrambling for strategies to detach Manchuria from Chinese control. In 1928, Lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara was consulted extensively by Kwantung officers regarding his perspectives on the Manchurian situation. Although he had not yet fully developed his Final War theory at this time, he articulated the fundamental principles behind it, emphasizing the urgent need for decisive action to assert control over Manchuria. Over the following years, Kwantung officers made concerted efforts to shape policy in favor of their interests in Manchuria, with Ishiwara's ideas gaining traction and stimulating discussions among his high-ranking peers. By October 1928, Ishiwara successfully secured a position on the Kwantung Army staff as an operations officer, with Colonel Komoto Daisaku as his primary supporter. Komoto recognized Ishiwara as the dynamic force needed to advance the aggressive Manchurian policies that the Kwantung Army sought to implement. This collaboration marked a significant turning point in the Kwantung Army's approach to Manchuria, as they aimed to solidify their control and influence in the region amidst growing tensions. When Ishiwara arrived at Port Arthur, he encountered a chaotic and demoralized atmosphere at the headquarters of the Kwantung Army. This turmoil was largely a consequence of the disastrous bombing of Zhang Zuolin, which had resulted in significant operational failures. The investigation into this assassination triggered numerous changes within the Kwantung Army's leadership, many of which were quite restrictive and stifling. Despite the catastrophic impact of the Zhang Zuolin incident on Komoto's career, he continued to advocate for a forceful resolution to the escalating Manchurian crisis. Ishiwara appeared to share this perspective, and during the early months of 1929, he collaborated closely with Komoto to devise military operations aimed at countering Chinese forces in the Mukden region. However, by the spring of 1929, Komoto's position became increasingly precarious, leading to his official dismissal. By May, he had been reassigned to a relatively insignificant divisional post in Japan, and by June, he was completely removed from the army. Nevertheless, this did not signify the end of his influence over Manchurian affairs. His successor was Lieutenant Colonel Itagaki Seishiro, a longtime associate of Ishiwara from their days at the Sendai Military Preparatory School. This connection suggested that while Komoto may have been sidelined, the strategic direction in Manchuria would continue to be shaped by familiar faces and longstanding relationships. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. A young, brilliant but perhaps insane man named Ishiwara Kanji began a fruitful military career. After spending considerable time in China, Ishiwara came to a dramatic conclusion, China needed to be saved, and to do so Japan needed to invade Manchuria. He began lecturing like minded youth and built a cult following, directing Japan towards war with China.  

Jacob Shapiro returns from paternity leave, jumping right into a discussion about the surprising implications of Trump's recent comments on military intervention and territorial ambitions. He compares his sixth-grade imagination of invading Qatar to Trump's statements about Greenland and the Gulf of Mexico, exploring the potential geopolitical ripple effects of such rhetoric. The conversation also delves into the economic landscape, particularly how anticipated tariffs under a Trump administration could impact U.S. relations with Canada and Mexico, as well as the broader implications for inflation and the labor market. Additionally, Jacob highlights a noteworthy thaw in Japan-China relations, suggesting that Japan may be recalibrating its foreign policy approach amidst changing global dynamics. Finally, the episode touches on Germany's evolving political climate and the potential for impactful reforms as the country navigates its economic challenges. --Timestamps:Chapters:(00:00) - Intro (we're so back)(03:16) - The Shift in Foreign Policy Perspectives(12:21) - Trump's Foreign Policy(19:34) - Macro-Econ Checkup(25:18) - The Impact of Immigration on Labor Markets and Inflation(35:17) - Shifting Dynamics: US Energy Policy and International Relations(40:54) - Japan's Evolving Foreign Policy(46:47) - The Shifting Political Landscape in Germany(53:11) - The Economic Shift in Germany--Jacob Shapiro Site: jacobshapiro.comJacob Twitter: x.com/JacobShapCI Site: cognitive.investmentsSubscribe to the Newsletter: bit.ly/weekly-sitrep--The Jacob Shapiro Show is produced and edited by Audiographies LLC. More information at audiographies.com --Jacob Shapiro is a speaker, consultant, author, and researcher covering global politics and affairs, economics, markets, technology, history, and culture. He speaks to audiences of all sizes around the world, helps global multinationals make strategic decisions about political risks and opportunities, and works directly with investors to grow and protect their assets in today's volatile global environment. His insights help audiences across industries like finance, agriculture, and energy make sense of the world.Cognitive Investments is an investment advisory firm, founded in 2019 that provides clients with a nuanced array of financial planning, investment advisory and wealth management services. We aim to grow both our clients' material wealth (i.e. their existing financial assets) and their human wealth (i.e. their ability to make good strategic decisions for their business, family, and career).--This podcast uses the following third-party services for analysis: Podtrac - https://analytics.podtrac.com/privacy-policy-gdrp

Japanese Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya and his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, agreed at a meeting in Beijing on Wednesday to strengthen communication between the two sides.

Welcome to Courtside Financial, where we dive deep into the most pressing developments in the global auto industry!

Close to 90pctof people in both Japan and China have unfavorable impressions of each other's countries, a joint opinion poll by Japan's Genron NPO and China International Communications Group showed Monday.

Japanese Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya and his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, held their first phone talks on Wednesday and reaffirmed the policy of promoting a mutually beneficial strategic relationship between the two countries.

The Japanese and Chinese governments are working toward easing China's prolonged import ban on Japanese fishery products introduced in response to treated water releases into the sea from the Fukushima No.1 nuclear plant, Japanese government sources said Friday.

Tourism ministers from Japan, China and South Korea said Wednesday that they aim to increase the annual number of tourists among the three countries to 40 million, or 10 million more than before the COVID-19 pandemic, by 2030.

Foreign ministers from, Japan, China, South Korea and Association of Southeast Asian Nations member states affirmed Saturday that the Chiang Mai initiative, a regional currency swap arrangement for addressing financial crises, will be utilized in time of natural disasters as well.

Japan and China held strategic dialogue between their vice foreign minister-class officials Monday for the first time since January 2020.

The Japanese and Chinese governments are planning to hold a meeting of their foreign chiefs on the sidelines of an Association of Southeast Asian Nations-related gathering in Laos this month, it has been learned.

NOW IN 22 DIFFERENT LANGUAGES. CLICK ON THE LOWER LEFT HAND CORNER “TRANSLATE” TAB TO FIND YOURS! By Jeff J. Brown Pictured above: the city of Le Havre was flattened by totally gratuitous, genocidal Allied bombing across Normandy, during and following D-Day in France on June 6, 1944. Come to think of it, Le Havre...

World news in 7 minutes. Tuesday 28th May 2024.Today: Papua New Guinea emergency. Korea, Japan, China talks. Israel Rafah "mistake". UK national service. Lithuania Nauseda wins. Spain Ukraine agreement. Qatar turbulence. Sudan siege. Egypt electric taxis. US storms. Argentina Milei visists. And the oldest flight attendant in the world.With Stephen DevincenziTranscripts are avilable for our amazing supporters at send7.org/transcriptsOur weekly news quiz for our amazing supporter is here send7.org/quizIf you enjoy the podcast please help to support us at send7.org/supportWe give 10% of our profit to Effective Altruism charities.Contact us at podcast@send7.org or send an audio message at speakpipe.com/send7Please leave a rating on Apple podcasts or Spotify.We don't use AI! Every word is written and recorded by us!SEND7 (Simple English News Daily in 7 minutes) tells the most important world news stories in intermediate English. Every day, listen to the most important stories from every part of the world in slow, clear English. Whether you are an intermediate learner trying to improve your advanced, technical and business English, or if you are a native speaker who just wants to hear a summary of world news as fast as possible, join Stephen Devincenzi, Ben Mallett and Juliet Martin every morning. Transcripts can be found at send7.org/transcripts. Simple English News Daily is the perfect way to start your day, by practising your listening skills and understanding complicated stories in a simple way. It is also highly valuable for IELTS and TOEFL students. Students, teachers, and people with English as a second language, tell us that they listen to SEND7 because they can learn English through hard topics, but simple grammar. We believe that the best way to improve your spoken English is to immerse yourself in real-life content, such as what our podcast provides. SEND7 covers all news including politics, business, natural events and human rights. Whether it is happening in Europe, Africa, Asia, the Americas or Oceania, you will hear it on SEND7, and you will understand it.For more information visit send7.org/contact

Russell Clark is a hedge fund investor who has lived and worked in both Japan and China. He writes the widely followed Substack Capital Flows and Asset Markets: https://www.russell-clark.com/Steve and Russell discuss:0:00 Introduction0:52 Russell's background and experiences in Japan13:25 Hong Kong and finance31:53 China property bubble48:54 Dollar status as global reserve currency56:09 Japan and China economies from a long run perspective1:05:07 Inflation, US economy, and macro observationsMusic used with permission from Blade Runner Blues Livestream improvisation by State Azure.--Steve Hsu is Professor of Theoretical Physics and of Computational Mathematics, Science, and Engineering at Michigan State University. Previously, he was Senior Vice President for Research and Innovation at MSU and Director of the Institute of Theoretical Science at the University of Oregon. Hsu is a startup founder (SuperFocus, SafeWeb, Genomic Prediction, Othram) and advisor to venture capital and other investment firms. He was educated at Caltech and Berkeley, was a Harvard Junior Fellow, and has held faculty positions at Yale, the University of Oregon, and MSU. Please send any questions or suggestions to manifold1podcast@gmail.com or Steve on X @hsu_steve.

Hurruah! It's 2024 and Ted and Gareth are back for another year of dribbling over tech. On this show an investigation into the sexy streamings on Twitch, Google's and Apples app store action, the Incognito mode judgment, Nuclear container ships, a tough tablet from Samung, a little ebook reader from Onyx, Samsung AI, Motorola AI, Microsoft AI, Google AI and the Retroid Pocket 4. With Gareth Myles and Ted Salmon Join us on Mewe RSS Link: https://techaddicts.libsyn.com/rss Direct Download iTunes | Google Podcasts | Stitcher | Tunein | Spotify  Amazon | Pocket Casts | Castbox | PodHubUK Feedback, Fallout and Contributions Logitech G Yeti Orb Microphone - HardwareZone Review SoundCore AeroFit Pro Earphones - Ted's Review - (with free SoundCore Motion 100) …but no Marshall Acton III which I begged Santa for - the mean, petty-minded bag'o'shyte Swan Stainless Steel Bean to Cup Coffee to Go Machine News, Mews and Views Google and Apple might have to play nice with external app stores in Japan China's Nuclear-Powered Container Ship: A Fluke Or The Future Of Shipping? Game Over: The Tech That Died in 2023 Police to be able to run face recognition searches on 50m driving licence holders Portable, non-invasive, mind-reading AI turns thoughts into text 2023 vs 2022 – UK Broadband and Mobile Speeds vs the World Google agrees to settle $5 billion lawsuit accusing it of tracking Incognito users Cleavage but no underbust, please for those who present as women: Twitch bans "implied nudity" among streamers Hardline on the hardware Sony dips toes into VR, publishes patent for trackball foot controller Onyx Boox Palma review: The bite-sized e-reader Samsung Galaxy Tab Active 5 images and specs leak featuring S Pen The Wearables Watch This awesome [absurd-looking] watch lets you play your favourite classic games on your wrist The retro gaming watch The original Pixel Watch's long-awaited notification sync feature finally arrives Phone Zone Motorola Razr: next-gen edition slated to launch as first-gen AI-powered foldable smartphone You won't need a Samsung phone to benefit from Galaxy S24's AI call translation The Name of the Game Don't throw your Stadia controller away - Google extends its Bluetooth support to the end of 2024 Retroid announces the Pocket 4 and Pocket 4 Pro, but you'll have to wait to get oneKeep an eye on Retro Game Corps for a review before purchasing. Flap your trap about an App Dell shows demos of an enhanced Copilot that automatically manages your system Microsoft Copilot launches as a standalone Android app Windows 11 will let you reinstall your OS through Windows Update without wiping your files Google Gallows & Chrome Coroner Chrome now defaults to desktop mode on ‘premium' Android tablets Google Clock's weather forecasts get a big redesign for alarms Google is preparing a paid version of Bard Hark Back (Ideas down below if needed/wanted) The Long Telephone cable Bargain Basement: Best UK deals and tech on sale we have spotted Amazon Basics 48-Count AA & AAA High-Performance Batteries Value Pack - 24 Double AA Batteries and 24 Triple AAA Batteries (48-Count) - £11.61 (sub  & save option too) Sanodesk Electric Standing Desk £76 from £90 HONOR X6a - £93.97 RRP: £129.99 Elgato Stream Deck XL £190 from £230 Sony WH-1000XM5 Noise Cancelling Wireless Headphones - £239.00 RRP: £316.67 (and £47.80 x 5 months for me) Dell Inspiron 14 5435 Laptop 16:10 FHD+ (1920 x 1200) Display | AMD Ryzen 7 7730U | 16 GB 4266MHz LPDDR4x RAM | 1TB SSD | AMD Radeon Graphics | UK/Irish Qwerty Backlit Keyboard | Platinum Silver £549 from £679 INIU USB C Charger Cable £9.99 Was: £12.99 + 35% off Samsung Galaxy Watch6 Classic 43mm Bluetooth £294 from £369 Main Show URL: http://www.techaddicts.uk | PodHubUK Contact:: gareth@techaddicts.uk | @techaddictsuk Gareth - @garethmyles | Mastodon | garethmyles.com | Gareth's Ko-Fi Ted - tedsalmon.com | Ted's PayPal | Mastodon | Ted's Amazon YouTube: Tech Addicts

With China at risk of falling into a debt deflation loop, lessons from Japan's deflation journey could provide some insight.----- Transcript -----Daniel Blake: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Daniel Blake from the Morgan Stanley Asia and Emerging Market Equity Strategy Team. Laura Wang: And I'm Laura Wang, Chief China Equity Strategist. Daniel Blake: And on this special episode of the podcast, we'll discuss what lessons Japan's deflation journey can offer for China. It's Thursday, October 26th at 10 a.m. in Singapore and Hong Kong. Daniel Blake: So in the period from 1991 to 2001, known as Japan's lost decade, Japan suffered through a prolonged economic stagnation and price deflation. While the corporate sector stopped deleveraging in the early 2000's. It wasn't until the Abenomics program, introduced under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2013, that Japan emerged from deflation and started the process of a gradual recovery in corporate profitability. China's economic trajectory has been very different from Japan's over the last 30 years, but we now see some parallels emerging. Indeed, the risk of falling into a Japanese style stagnation is becoming more acute over the past year as a deep cyclical downturn in the property sector combines with the structural challenge that our economists call the 3D journey of debt, demographics and deflation. So, Laura, before we dig into the comparison between China and Japan's respective journeys to set the stage, can you give us a quick snapshot of where China's equity market is right now and what you expect for the rest of the year? Laura Wang: Sure, Daniel. China market has been through a quite volatile ten months so far this year with a very exciting start given the post COVID reopening. However, the strong macro momentum didn't sustain. Property sales is still falling somewhere between 30 to 50% each month on a year over year basis. And challenges from local government debt issue and early signs of deflationary pressure suggest that turn around for corporate earnings growth could still take longer to happen. We had downgraded China within the global emerging market context at the beginning of August, mainly out of these concerns, and we think more patience is needed at this point. We would like to see more meaningful easing measures to stimulate the demand and help reflate the economy, as well as clear a road map to address some of the structural issues, particularly around the local government debt problem. In contrast to China, Japan's equity market is very strong right now, and Morgan Stanley's outlook continues to be bullish from here. So, Daniel, why is it valuable to compare Japan's deflationary journey since the 1990s and China's recent challenges? What are some of the bigger similarities? Daniel Blake: I think we'll come back to the 3D's. So on the first to them, on debt we do have China's aggregate total debt around 290% of GDP. So that compares with Japan, which was about 265% of GDP back in 1990. So this is similar in the sense that we do have this aggregate debt burden sitting and needs to be managed. Secondly, on demographics, we've got a long expected but now very evident downturn in the share of the labor force that is in working age and an outright decline in working age population in China. And this is going to be a factor for many years ahead. China's birth rate or total number of births is looking to come down to around 8 million this year, compared with 28 million in 1990. And then a third would be deflation. And so we are seeing this broaden out in China, particularly the aggregate GDP level. So in Japan's case, that deflation was mainly around asset price bubbles. In China's case, we're seeing this more broadly with excess capacity in a number of industrial sectors, including new economy sectors. And then this one 4th D which is similar in both Japan's case and China now, and that's the globalization or de-risking of supply chains, as you prefer. When we're looking at this in Japan's case, Japan did face a more hostile trade environment in the late 1980s, particularly with protectionism coming through from the US. And we've seen that play out in the multipolar world for China. So a number of similarities which we can group under 4D's here. Laura Wang: And what are some of the key differences between Japan/China? Daniel Blake: So the first key difference is we think the asset price bubble was more extreme in Japan. Secondly, in China, most of the debt is held by local governments and state owned enterprises rather than the private corporate sector. And thirdly, China is at a lower stage of development than Japan in terms of per capita incomes and the potential for underlying growth. So, Laura, when you're looking ahead, what would you like to see from Chinese policymakers here, both in the near term as well as the longer term? Laura Wang: As far as what we can observe, Chinese policymakers has already started to roll out a suite of measures on the fronts of capital markets, monetary and fiscal policy side over the past 12 months. And we do expect more to come. Particularly on the capital market reform side, there are additional efforts that we think policymakers can help enforce. In our view, those actions could include capital market restructuring, funds flow and liquidity support, as well as further efforts encouraging enhancement of shareholder returns. To be more specific, for example, introducing more benchmark indices with a focus on corporate governance and shareholder returns, further tightening and enforcing the listing rules for public companies, m ore incentives for long term institutional participation, improving capital flow management for foreign investors, and implementing incentives to encourage dividend payouts and share buybacks. Those could all work quite well. Regulatory and even legislative support to help implement these measures would be extremely crucial. Daniel Blake: And what is your outlook for China's medium to long term return on equity path from here? And what are the key catalysts you're watching for that? Laura Wang: Given some of the structure challenges we discussed earlier, we do see a much wider forked path for China's long term growth ROE trajectory. We see MSCI China's long term ROE stabilizing at around 11% in the next 5 to 7 years in our base case. This means there should still be up to around two percentage point of recovery upside from the current levels, thanks to a combination of corporate self-help, the product cycle, policy support from the top and the low base effect. However, further upside above 11% will require a significant reflationary effort from the policymakers, both short term cyclical and long term structural, in combination with a more favorable geopolitical environment. Therefore, we believe prompt and forceful actions from policymakers to stabilize the economy to avoid more permanent negative impact on corporate and consumer behaviors are absolutely needed at this point. Now, let me turn this back to you, Daniel. What is your outlook for Japan's return on equity journey from here, and are there any risks to your bullish view? Daniel Blake: So we have seen Japan looking back from 2013 to now move from below book value in terms of aggregate valuations and a return on equity of just 4%, so much lower than even your bear case. So it's moved up from that level to 9% currently and we're seeing valuations moving up accordingly. We think that's further to go and we think Japan can actually reach 12% sustainable return on equity by 2025 and that's helped by return of nominal GDP growth in Japan and further implementation of governance improvements at the corporate level. So in terms of the risks, I think they are primarily external. We do see Japan's domestic economy in a pretty good place. We think BOJ can exit yield curve control and negative rates without a major shock. So externally we are watching China's risks of moving into a debt deflation loop, as we're discussing here, but also the potential impacts if the US or a global recession were to play out. So clearly we're watching very closely the Fed's efforts and global central bank efforts to achieve a soft landing here. Daniel Blake: So, Laura, thanks for taking the time to talk. Laura Wang: Sure. It's been great speaking with you, Daniel. Daniel Blake: And thanks for listening. If you enjoy Thoughts on the Market, please leave us a review on Apple Podcasts and share the podcast with a friend or colleague today.

Recorded October 4, 2023 Signed on Oct. 1, 1953, in the wake of the armistice, the U.S.-South Korea alliance has matured into a dynamic partnership, deterring conflict and fostering cooperation with respect to trade, technology and people-to-people ties. This expert panel reflected on the legacy and future of the alliance. This program was jointly hosted by The Korea Society, the Korea Defense Veterans Association and the Korea-Pacific Program at the UC San Diego School of Global Policy and Strategy. About the Speakers: Thomas J. Byrne joined The Korea Society as its President in August of 2015 following a distinguished career that included Senior Vice President of Moody's Investor Services and Senior Economist of the Asia Department at the Institute of International Finance. Byrne has an M.A. degree in International Relations with an emphasis on economics from The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). Before doing graduate work at SAIS, he served in South Korea for three years as a U.S. Peace Corps volunteer. His commentary on Korean affairs has appeared in the Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, The Washington Post and The Financial Times among others. Stephen Haggard is the Lawrence and Sallye Krause Distinguished Professor and director of the Korea-Pacific Program at the UC San Diego School of Global Policy and Strategy. He teaches courses on the international relations of the Asia-Pacific at GPS covering political economy as well as security issues. He has done extensive research on North Korea in particular. In addition, he has a long-standing interest in transitions to and from democratic rule and the current phenomenon of democratic backsliding. His recent research on South Korea addresses the issue of political polarization, including with respect to foreign policy. Allison Hooker is a foreign policy and national security specialist with 20 years of experience in the U.S. Government working on Asia. She served as Deputy Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Asia, where she led the coordination and implementation of U.S. policy toward the Indo-Pacific region. Prior to that, Hooker served as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for the Korean Peninsula, where she staffed the U.S.-DPRK Summits in Singapore, Hanoi, and the DMZ. Prior to her service at the White House, Hooker was a senior analyst for North Korea in the Department of State and staffed the Six-Party Talks on North Korea's nuclear program. She received a Masters' of Arts Degree in International Affairs from the George Washington University, and has been a research fellow at Osaka University and Keio University, where she focused on Japan-Korea relations, and Japan-China relations, respectively. Youngwan Kim is a career diplomat who joined the Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Korea in 1993. He worked at various Ministries of the Korean Government, including Foreign Ministry, Unification Ministry, and Office for Government Policy Coordination, Prime Minister's Office. Prior to his current post as Consul General in LA, he served as Director-General for National Security and Foreign Policy at the Prime Minister's office. He also worked as Director-General for Planning and Management of the Foreign Ministry. His most recent foreign post was a Member of the Panel of Experts, UN Security Council Sanctions Committee at the United Nations headquarter. His foreign posts also include Washington D.C., New York, Beijing and Baghdad. Munseob Lee is an economist who concentrates his research efforts on macroeconomics, growth and development, firm dynamics, and Korea. He has investigated the factors that determine the growth of firms, with a particular focus on how government purchases can promote long-term growth of small businesses. Additionally, he examined the disproportionate effect of inflation, revealing that low-income households and black families are the most affected by rising prices in the United States. Lee, who is an Associate Director in GPS's Korea-Pacific Program, teaches courses including Fiscal and Monetary Policy, Macroeconomics of Development and The Korean Economy. In 2019, General Curtis “Mike” Scaparrotti completed a distinguished 41-year career in the U.S. Army as the Commander, U.S. European Command and Supreme Allied Commander Europe, NATO. Prior to that he served as the Commander of U.S. Forces Korea / United Nations Command / Combined Forces Command in Seoul from 2013 to 2016. Other prominent postings in his highly-decorated career include Director of the Joint Staff, Commander of the International Security Assistance Force, the Deputy Commander of U.S. Forces – Afghanistan, the Commanding General of I Corps and Joint Base Lewis-McChord, and the Commanding General of the 82nd Airborne Division. Additionally, over the years, General Scaparrotti served in key leadership positions at the tactical, operational, and strategic level. He has commanded forces during Operations Iraqi Freedom, Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan), Support Hope (Zaire/Rwanda), Joint Endeavor (Bosnia-Herzegovina), and Assured Response (Liberia). General Scaparrotti holds a Master's degree in Administrative Education from the University of South Carolina. In addition to his work with The Cohen Group, General Scaparrotti sits on the boards iof the Atlantic Council and Patriot Foundation, and is a Senior Fellow at the National Defense University. Yoo Myung-hee served at the Ministries of Trade, Industry and Energy and Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Republic of Korea for nearly three decades before becoming Korea's first female trade minister (2019-2021). In a variety of roles she designed and implemented Korea's trade policy and negotiation strategies and led numerous bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations as Korea's chief negotiator, including the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (RCEP) and Korea's free trade agreements with the United States and ASEAN. As trade minister, she contributed to international initiatives to ensure supply chain resilience and to address digital trade policy. She received her BA and MPA from Seoul National University and JD from Vanderbilt University Law School and currently teaches at the Graduate School of International Studies of Seoul National University. For more information, please visit the link below: https://www.koreasociety.org/policy-and-corporate-programs/item/1745-the-u-s-republic-of-korea-alliance-at-70-legacy-and-future

Discover the surge in gold buying across Japan, China, and Singapore, backed by compelling data and insights. Learn how Asian countries are aggressively increasing their gold bullion reserves and the potential implications for the global financial landscape.

im "ö1 mittagsjournal" gesendet am 29.8.23

Always remember that Lofi Poli Sci is more than just me, it's the we, that we be. Episode Link: https://youtu.be/TPZdpN6HOls Episode 7 Season 8 (series 726) Official Website: www.lofipolisci.com Instagram: lofi_poli_sci_podcast YouTube Channel: https://www.youtube.com/c/LofiPoliSciPodcast LinkedIn: Michael Pickering #lofipolisci #lofi #politicalscience #news #worldnews #globalnews #podcast #podcasting #casting #media #polisci #politics #Japan #China #BRICS #Antarctica #India #Uganda

AP Correspondent Laurence Brooks reports on G-7 Japan China

In this week-in-review, Weston Nakamura follows up with market themes from earlier in the week. Starting with the frenzy and crash in Chinese bank stocks against a resilient Japanese equity market, Weston revisits the Japan - China market divergence call.  Then, its over to Niigata Japan, where G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bankers have convened to discuss inflation, Russian sanctions, banking crises, and a host of other measures - but instead, find themselves with only one issue in mind: the looming US debt ceiling debate. Finally, Weston follows up with market reactions to earnings out of Nissan Motor and Honda Motor, after steelmaker JFE Holdings had just raised guidance citing strong production demand from the automotive sector, no longer hindered by a semiconductor chip supply crunch. -- Follow Market Depth On Spotify: https://spoti.fi/3mVTs9U Follow Market Depth On Apple Podcasts: https://apple.co/40dA2vm Follow Weston: https://twitter.com/acrossthespread Follow Blockworks: https://twitter.com/Blockworks_  Get top market insights and the latest in crypto news. Subscribe to Blockworks Daily Newsletter: https://blockworks.co/newsletter/ --or Disclaimer: Nothing discussed on Market Depth should be considered as investment advice. Please always do your own research & speak to a financial advisor before thinking about, thinking about putting your money into these crazy markets.

World News in 7 minutes. Monday 3rd April 2023. Support us and read the transcripts at send7.org/transcriptsToday: Finland election. Ukraine update. France no scooters. Pakistan stampedes. Africa pirates. Guatemala Taiwan. Japan China relations. Israel protests. South Africa LGBT protests. Russia explosion. Ryuichi Sakamoto.With Stephen Devincenzi.Please leave a rating on Apple podcasts or Spotify.Contact us at podcast@send7.org or send an audio message at speakpipe.com/send7If you enjoy the podcast please help to support us at send7.org/supportSEND7 (Simple English News Daily in 7 minutes) tells the most important world news stories in intermediate English. Every day, listen to the most important stories from every part of the world in slow, clear English. Whether you are an intermediate learner trying to improve your advanced, technical and business English, or if you are a native speaker who just wants to hear a summary of world news as fast as possible, join Stephen Devincenzi, Namitha Ragunath and Juliet Martin every morning. Transcripts can be found at send7.org/transcripts. Simple English News Daily is the perfect way to start your day, by practising your listening skills and understanding complicated stories in a simple way. It is also highly valuable for IELTS and TOEFL students. Students, teachers, and people with English as a second language, tell us that they listen to SEND7 because they can learn English through hard topics, but simple grammar. We believe that the best way to improve your spoken English is to immerse yourself in real-life content, such as what our podcast provides. SEND7 covers all news including politics, business, natural events and human rights. Whether it is happening in Europe, Africa, Asia, the Americas or Oceania, you will hear it on SEND7, and you will understand it. For more information visit send7.org/contact

AP correspondent Charles de Ledesma reports on Russia Ukraine War Leaders.

In this episode, host Matthew Schnurr joins Mackenzie's Chief Fixed Income Strategist, Dustin Reid.  Together, they discuss the recent BoC meeting and the hike of 25 basis points, and the upcoming Fed meeting. Dustin also shares thoughts on broader economics within North America diving into GDP data, labor markets, and others. They last look at the current economic environments of Japan and China.    Learn by Key Topics:  (1:02) Recent interest hikes by Bank of Canada  (8:38) Outlook on interest rates  (20:24) Looking into broader economics within North America (28:01) Bank of Japan & China    At Mackenzie, we want to create a more invested world, partnering with advisors to help investors become more knowledgeable, more educated, and more invested so they can meet their full potential. Learn more at mackenzieinvestments.com

In this episode of Japan Memo, Robert Ward and Yuka Koshino host Professor Takahara Akio, Director of the JICA Ogata Sadako Research Institute for Peace and Development, Professor of Contemporary Chinese Politics at the University of Tokyo, Distinguished Research Fellow at the Japan Forum on International Relations, Senior Adjunct Fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs and Senior Researcher at the Tokyo Foundation for Policy Research.Robert, Yuka, and Takahara-sensei provide a historical overview of the Japan-China diplomatic relationship since its normalisation, analyse the current state of bilateral relations between the two and offer their perspectives on the future of Sino-Japanese ties going forward. Topics discussed include:The key turning points in the last five decadesJapan and China's public and government level perceptions of each otherPotential channels for cooperation between the neighbouring statesFormer Prime Minister Abe Shinzo's legacy in Japan-China relationsHow Japan effectively manages its inherently contradictory relationship with China The following literature is recommended by our guest to gain a clearer picture of Japan and Japanese society today:Our guest recommends listeners browse through major Japanese newspapers over the course of a week to gain a better sense of the pulse of contemporary Japanese politics and society We hope you enjoy the episode and please follow, rate, and subscribe to Japan Memo on the podcast platform of your choice.Date of Recording: 31 August 2022Japan Memo is recorded and produced at the IISS in London. Our GDPR privacy policy was updated on August 8, 2022. Visit acast.com/privacy for more information.

This week, Mike welcomes new co-host, Jude Blanchette, Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSIS, to interview Mike on the strategic and political legacy of Shinzo Abe, following the assassination of the former Japanese Prime Minister on July 8. The two start by discussing how Abe's personal background and the geopolitical climate in Japan impacted Abe's political career, his influence on Japan's foreign policy by the end of his term in 2020, and the evolution of domestic and international perception of Abe as a leader. They then unpack Abe's impact on Japan-China relations and U.S.-Japan relations, and how he successfully lead Japan to productive cooperation with both major powers. They wrap up the discussion by assessing the long-term impact of Shinzo Abe on Japan's foreign policy, and the lasting policies and partnerships that will carry Japan forward over the coming years.  

In this episode of the ChinaPower Podcast, CSIS Japan Chair Christopher Johnstone joins us to discuss the current state of Japan-China relations. Mr. Johnstone argues that Prime Minister Kishida's policies have picked up from where his predecessors left off in terms of taking a more hardline China policy. He states that China's deepening relations with Russia and its assertive behavior in Asia is alarming Tokyo, weighing on Japanese public sentiment toward China, and fueling proposals to increase defense spending. Despite these tensions however, Mr. Johnstone notes that he has not seen significant Chinese economic coercion toward Japan in recent years, which speaks to the close economic relations that persist between the two countries. Lastly, Mr. Johnstone comments on rising Japanese support for Taiwan, discussing the growing Japanese consensus that Japan's security and Taiwan's are increasingly linked.