Podcasts about Yamagata

Last time we spoke about General Zhukov's armor offensives at Nomohan. Following heavy Japanese losses in May and June, General Georgy Zhukov arrives in June, reorganizes the Soviet 1st Army Group, and bolsters it with tanks, artillery, and reinforcements. The July offensive sees General Komatsubara's forces cross the Halha River undetected, achieving initial surprise. However, General Yasuoka's tank assault falters due to muddy terrain, inadequate infantry support, and superior Soviet firepower, resulting in heavy losses. Japanese doctrine emphasizing spiritual superiority clashes with material realities, undermining morale as intelligence underestimates Soviet strength. Zhukov learns key lessons in armored warfare, adapting tactics despite high casualties. Reinforcements pour in via massive truck convoys. Japanese night attacks and artillery duels fail, exposing logistical weaknesses. Internal command tensions, including gekokujo defiance, hinder responses. By August, Stalin, buoyed by European diplomacy and Sorge's intel, greenlights a major offensive. Zhukov employs deception for surprise. Warnings of Soviet buildup are ignored, setting the stage for a climactic encirclement on August 20.   #191 Zhukov Steel Ring of Fire at Nomohan Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. On the night of August 19–20, under cover of darkness, the bulk of the Soviet 1st Army Group crossed the Halha River into the expanded Soviet enclave on the east bank. Two weeks of nightly Soviet sound effects had paid off: Japanese perimeter troops failed to distinguish the real deployment from the frequently heard simulations. Zhukov's order of battle was as follows: "Northern force, commanded by Colonel Alekseenko—6th Mongolian Cavalry Division, 601st Infantry Regiment (82nd Division), 7th Armored Brigade, 2 battalions of the 11th Tank Brigade, 82nd Artillery Regiment, and 87th Anti-tank Brigade. Central force, where Zhukov was located, commanded by his deputy, Colonel Petrov—36th Motorized Infantry Division, 82nd Infantry Division (less one regiment), 5th Infantry Machine Gun Brigade. Southern force, commanded by Colonel Potapov—8th Mongolian Cavalry Division, 57th Infantry Division, 8th Armored Brigade, 6th Tank Brigade, 11th Tank Brigade (less two battalions), 185th Artillery Regiment, 37th Anti-tank Brigade, one independent tank company. A mobile strategic reserve built around the 212th Airborne Regiment, the 9th Mechanized Brigade, and a battalion of the 6th Tank Brigade was held west of the Halha River." The Soviet offensive was supported by massed artillery, a hallmark of Zhukov's operations in the war against Germany. In addition to nearly 300 antitank and rapid-fire guns, Zhukov deployed over 200 field and heavy artillery pieces on both sides of the Halha. Specific artillery batteries were assigned to provide supporting fire for each attacking infantry and armored unit at the battalion level and higher. In the early hours of August 20, the sky began to lighten over the semiarid plain, with the false promise of a quiet Sunday morning. The air was clear as the sun warmed the ground that had been chilled overnight. General Komatsubara's troops were in no special state of readiness when the first wave of more than 200 Soviet bombers crossed the Halha River at 5:45 a.m. and began pounding their positions. When the bombers withdrew, a thunderous artillery barrage began, continuing for 2 hours and 45 minutes. That was precisely the time needed for the bombers to refuel, rearm, and return for a second run over the Japanese positions. Finally, all the Soviet artillery unleashed an intensive 15-minute barrage at the forwardmost Japanese positions. Komatsubara's men huddled in their trenches under the heaviest bombardment to which they or any other Japanese force had ever been subjected. The devastation, both physical and psychological, was tremendous, especially in the forward positions. The shock and vibration of incoming bombs and artillery rounds also caused their radiotelegraph keys to chatter so uncontrollably that frontline troops could not communicate with the rear, compounding their confusion and helplessness. At 9:00 a.m., Soviet armor and infantry began to move out along the line while their cover fire continued. A dense morning fog near the river helped conceal their approach, bringing them in some sectors to within small-arms range before they were sighted by the enemy. The surprise and disarray on the Japanese side was so complete, and their communications so badly disrupted, that Japanese artillery did not begin firing in support of their frontline troops until about 10:15 a.m. By then, many forward positions were overrun. Japanese resistance stiffened at many points by midday, and fierce combat raged along the front, roughly 40 miles long. In the day's fighting, Colonel M. I. Potapov's southern force achieved the most striking success. The 8th MPR Cavalry Division routed the Manchukuoan cavalry holding Komatsubara's southern flank, and Potapov's armor and mechanized infantry bent the entire southern segment of the Japanese front inward by about 8 miles in a northwesterly direction. Zhukov's central force advanced only 500–1,500 yards in the face of furious resistance, but the frontal assault engaged the center of the Japanese line so heavily that Komatsubara could not reinforce his flanks. Two MPR cavalry regiments and supporting armor and mechanized infantry from Colonel Ilya Alekseenko's northern force easily overran two Manchukuoan cavalry units guarding the northern flank of the Japanese line, about 2 miles north of the Fui Heights. But the heights themselves formed a natural strong point, and Alekseenko's advance was halted at what became the northern anchor of the Japanese line. As the first phase of the Soviet offensive gathered momentum, General Ogisu, the 6th Army's new commander, assessed the situation. Still unaware of Zhukov's strength, he reassured KwAHQ that "the enemy intends to envelop us from our flanks, but his offensive effectiveness is weak… Our positions in other areas are being strengthened. Set your mind at ease." This optimistic report contributed to Kwantung Army's delay in reinforcing the 23rd Division. Some at KwAHQ suspected this might be another limited Soviet push, like Aug 7–8, that would soon end. Others worried it was a diversion prior to a larger offensive and were concerned but not alarmed about Komatsubara's position. On Aug 21–22, Potapov's southern force pierced the Japanese main defense line at several points, breaking the southern sector into segments that the attackers sealed off, encircled, and ground down. Soviet armor, mechanized infantry, and artillery moved swiftly and with deadly efficiency. Survivors described how each pocket of resistance experienced its own hellish period. After the Japanese heavy weapons in a pocket were neutralized, Soviet artillery and tanks gradually tightened the ring, firing at point-blank range over open sights. Flame-throwing tanks incinerated hastily constructed fortifications and underground shelters. Infantry mopped up with grenades, small arms, and bayonets. By the end of Aug 23, Potapov had dismembered the entire Japanese defensive position south of the Holsten River. Only one significant pocket of resistance remained. Meanwhile, Potapov's 8th Armored Brigade looped behind the Japanese, reaching southeast of Nomonhan, some 11 miles east of the river junction, on the boundary claimed by the MPR, and took up a blocking position there athwart the most likely line of retreat for Japanese units south of the Holsten. In those two days, the Japanese center yielded only a few yards, while the northern flank anchored at Fui Heights held firm. Air combat raged over the battlefield. Soviet air units provided tactical support for their armor and infantry, while Kwantung Army's 2nd Air Group strove to thwart that effort and hit the Soviet ground forces. Before Nomonhan, the Japanese air force had not faced a modern opponent. Japanese fliers had roamed largely unchallenged in Manchuria and China from 1931 to 1939. At Nomonhan, the Soviets enjoyed an advantage of roughly 2:1 in aircraft and pilots. This placed an increasingly heavy burden on Japanese air squadrons, which had to fly incessantly, often against heavy odds. Fatigue took its toll and losses mounted. Soviet and Japanese accounts give wildly different tallies of air victories and losses, but an official Japanese assessment after the battle stated, "Nomonhan brought out the bitter truths of the phenomenal rate at which war potential is sapped in the face of superior opposition." As with tank combat, the Soviet air superiority was qualitative as well as quantitative. In June–early July, the Soviet I-16 fighters did not fare well against the Japanese Type 97 fighter. However, in the lull before the August offensive, the Soviets introduced an improved I-16 with armor-plated fuselage and windshield, making it virtually impervious to the Type 97's light 7.7-mm guns. The Japanese countered by arming some planes with heavier 12.7-mm guns, which were somewhat more effective against the new I-16s. But the Soviet pilots discovered that the Type-97's unprotected fuel tank was an easy mark, and Japanese planes began to burn with horrendous regularity. On Aug 23, as Ribbentrop arrived in Moscow to seal the pact that would doom Poland and unleash war in Europe, the situation at Nomonhan was deemed serious enough by Kwantung Army to transfer the 7th Division to Hailar for support. Tsuji volunteered to fly to Nomonhan for a firsthand assessment. This move came too late, as Aug 23–24 proved the crucial phase of the battle. On Tue night, Aug 22, at Japanese 6th Army HQ, General Ogisu ordered a counterattack to push back the Soviet forces enveloping and crushing the Japanese southern flank. Komatsubara planned the counterattack in minute detail and entrusted its execution to his 71st and 72nd Regiments, led by General Kobayashi Koichi, and the 26th and 28th Regiments of the 7th Division, commanded by General Morita Norimasa. On paper this force looked like two infantry brigades. Only the 28th Regiment, however, was near full strength, though its troops were tired after marching about 25 miles to the front the day before. This regiment's peerless commander was Colonel Morita Toru (unrelated to General Morita). The chief kendo fencing master of the Imperial Army, Morita claimed to be invulnerable to bullets. The other three regiments were seriously understrength, partly due to combat attrition and partly because several of their battalions were deployed elsewhere on the front. The forces Kobayashi and Morita commanded that day totaled less than one regiment each. It was not until the night of Aug 23 that deployment and attack orders filtered down to the Japanese regiment, battalion, and company commanders. Due to insufficient truck transport and the trackless terrain, units were delayed reaching their assigned positions in the early morning of Aug 24, and some did not arrive at all. Two battalions of the 71st Regiment did not reach Kobayashi in time; his attack force that morning consisted of two battalions of the 72nd Regiment. Colonel Sumi's depleted 26th Regiment did not arrive in time, and General Morita's assault force consisted of two battalions of the 28th Regiment and a battalion-equivalent independent garrison unit newly arrived at the front. Because of these delays, the Japanese could not reconnoiter enemy positions adequately before the attack. What had been planned as a dawn assault would begin between 9:30 and 10:00 a.m. in broad daylight. The light plane carrying Tsuji on the final leg of his flight from Hsinking-Hailar-Nomonhan was attacked by Soviet fighters and forced to land behind the 72nd Regiment's staging area. Tsuji managed to reach General Kobayashi's command post by truck and on foot, placing him closer to the fighting than he anticipated. Just before the counterattack began, a dense fog drifted across part of the battlefield, obscuring visibility and limiting artillery effectiveness. Using the fog to mask their movement, lead elements of the 72nd Regiment moved toward a distant stand of scrub pines. As they approached, the trees began to move away—the stand was a well-camouflaged Soviet tank force. The tanks then maneuvered to the south, jeopardizing further Japanese advance. As the fog cleared, the Japanese found themselves facing a much larger enemy force. A vastly heavier Soviet barrage answered their renewed artillery fire. Kobayashi and Morita discovered too late that their counterattack had walked into the teeth of far stronger Soviet forces. One account calls it "The Charge of Two Light Brigades."   Kobayashi's 72nd Regiment encountered the Soviet T-34, with its thick sloped armor and 76-mm gun—the most powerful tank in 1939. In addition, the improved Soviet BT-5/7 tanks, powered by diesel, were less prone to ignition. On gasoline-powered vehicles, the Soviets added wire netting over the ventilation grill and exhaust manifold, reducing the effectiveness of hand-thrown gasoline bombs. Japanese infantry regiments suffered near 50% casualties that day. Nearly every battalion and company commander was lost. Kobayashi was gravely wounded by a tank shell fragment and nearly trampled by fleeing troops. He survived the battle and the Pacific War but died in a Soviet POW camp in 1950. Morita's 28th Regiment fared little better. It was pinned down about 500 yards from the Soviet front lines by intense artillery. Unable to advance and not permitted to retreat, Morita's men dug into the loose sand and withstood the bombardment, but were cut to pieces. Shortly after sunset, the remnants were ordered to withdraw, but both regiments were shattered. Tsuji, a survivor, rejoined Komatsubara at his command post. Upon receiving combat reports from the 72nd and 28th Regiments, General Komatsubara "evinced deep anxiety." 6th Army chief of staff Major General Fujimoto Tetsukuma, at Komatsubara's command post, "appeared bewildered," and announced he was returning to headquarters, asking if Tsuji would accompany him. The major declined and later recalled that he and Komatsubara could barely conceal their astonishment at Fujimoto's abrupt departure at such a time. Meanwhile, at the northern end of the line, Colonel Alekseenko's force had been hammering at Fui Heights for 3 days without success. The position was held by about 800 defenders under Lieutenant Colonel Ioki Eiichiro, consisting of two infantry companies; one company each of cavalry, armored reconnaissance, and combat engineers; and three artillery batteries (37-mm and 75-mm guns). The defenders clung tenaciously to the strongpoint created by the heights and their bunkers, inflicting heavy losses on Alekseenko's force. The unexpectedly strong defense disrupted the timing of the entire Soviet offensive. By Aug 23, Zhukov was exasperated and losing patience with the pace in the north. Some of Zhukov's comrades recall a personable chief who played the accordion and urged singing during happier times. Under stress, his harshness and temper surfaced. Zhukov summoned Alekseenko to the telephone. When the northern commander expressed doubt about storming the heights immediately, Zhukov berated him, relieved him on the spot, and entrusted the attack to Alekseenko's chief of staff. After a few hours, Zhukov called again and, finding that the new commander was slow, fired him as well and sent a staff member to take charge. Accounts record that his tirades sometimes included the phrase "useless bag of shit," though others note harsher language was used toward generals who did not meet expectations. That night, reinforced by the 212th Airborne Regiment, heavier artillery, and a detachment of flame-throwing tanks, the northern force renewed its assault on Fui Heights. The battered Japanese defenders were thoroughly overmatched. Soviet artillery fired at two rounds per second. When the last Japanese artillery was knocked out, they no longer could defend against flame-throwing tanks. From several miles away, Colonel Sumi could see the heights shrouded in black smoke and red flames "spitting like the tongues of snakes."  After Aug 22, supply trucks could no longer reach Fui Heights. The next afternoon, Colonel Ioki's radio—the last link to the 23rd Division—was destroyed. His surviving men fought on with small arms and grenades, repelling Soviet infantry with bayonet charges that night. By the morning of Aug 24, Ioki had about 200 able-bodied men left of his original 800. Soviet tanks and infantry had penetrated defenses at several points, forcing him to constrict his perimeter. Red flags flew on the eastern edge of the heights. Ioki gathered his remaining officers to discuss last measures. With little ammunition and almost no food or water, their situation seemed hopeless. But Ioki insisted on holding Fui Heights to the last man, arguing that the defense should not be abandoned and that orders to break out should come only with reinforcements and supplies. Some subordinates urged retreat. Faced with two dire options, Ioki drew his pistol and attempted suicide, but a fellow officer restrained him. Rather than see his men blown to bits, Ioki decided to abandon Fui Heights and retreat east. Those unable to walk received hand grenades with the injunction to blow themselves up rather than be captured. On the night of Aug 24–25, after moonrise, the remaining resistance at the heights was quelled, and Soviet attention shifted south. Ioki's battered remnant slipped out and, the next morning, encountered a Manchukuoan cavalry patrol that summoned trucks to take them to Chaingchunmiao, forty miles away. Russians occupying Fui Heights on Aug 25 counted the corpses of over 600 Japanese officers and men. After securing Fui Heights, the Soviet northern force began to roll up the Japanese northern flank in a wide arc toward Nomonhan. A day after the fall of Fui Heights, elements of the northern force's 11th Tank Brigade linked up with the southern force's 8th Armored Brigade near Nomonhan. A steel ring had been forged around the Japanese 6th Army. As the Japanese northern and southern flanks dissolved under Zhukov's relentless assaults, Komatsubara's command ceased to exist as an integrated force. By Aug 25 the Japanese lines were completely cut, with resistance remaining only in three encircled pockets. The remnants of two battalions of General Morita's "brigade" attempted a renewed offensive on Aug 25, advancing about 150 yards before being hammered by Soviet artillery and tanks, suffering heavier casualties than the day before. The only hope for the surrounded Japanese troops lay in a relief force breaking through the Soviet encirclement from the outside. However, Kwantung Army was spread thin in Manchuria and, due to a truck shortage, could not transport the 7th Division from Hailar to the combat zone in time. By Aug 26 the encirclement had thickened, with three main pockets tightly invested, making a large-scale breakout nearly impossible. Potapov unleashed a two-pronged assault with his 6th Tank Brigade and 80th Infantry Regiment. Japanese artillery from the 28th Regiment temporarily checked the left wing of the armored attack, but the Soviet right wing overran elements of Sumi's 26th Regiment, forcing the Japanese to retreat into a tighter enclave. Morita, the fencing-master commander who claimed to be immune to bullets, was killed by machine-gun fire while standing atop a trench encouraging his men. The Japanese 120-mm howitzers overheated under the August sun; their breech mechanisms swelled and refused to eject spent casings. Gunners had to leap from behind shelter to ram wooden rods down the barrels, drastically reducing rate of fire and life expectancy. Komatsubara's artillery units suffered a bitter fate. Most were deployed well behind the front lines with their guns facing west toward the Halha. As the offensive developed, attackers often struck the batteries from the east, behind them. Even when crews could turn some guns to face east, they had not preregistered fields of fire there and were not very effective. Supporting infantry had already been drawn off for counterattacks and perimeter defense. One by one, Japanese batteries were smashed by Soviet artillery and tanks. Crews were expected to defend their guns to the last man; the guns themselves were treated as the unit's soul, to be destroyed if captured. In extremis, crews were to destroy sensitive parts like optics. Few survived. Among those who did was a PFC from an annihilated howitzer unit, ordered to drive one of the few surviving vehicles, a Dodge sedan loaded with seriously wounded men, eastward to safety during the night. Near a Holsten River bridge he encountered Soviet sentries. The driver hesitated, then honked his horn, and the guards saluted as the sedan sped past. With water supplies exhausted and unable to reach the Halha or Holsten Rivers, the commander of the easternmost enclave ordered his men to drain radiator water from their vehicles. Drinking the foul liquid, at the cost of immobilizing their remaining transport, signaled that the defenders believed their situation was hopeless. On Aug 27 the rest of the Japanese 7th Division, two fresh infantry regiments, an artillery regiment, and support units totaling barely 5,000 men—reached the northeastern segment of the ring around Komatsubara. One day of hard fighting revealed they lacked the strength to break the encirclement. General Ogisu ordered the 7th Division to pull back and redeploy near his own 6th Army headquarters, about 4 miles east of Nomonhan and the border claimed by the enemy. There would be no outside relief for Komatsubara's forces. Throughout Aug 27–28, Soviet aircraft, artillery, armor, and infantry pounded the three Japanese pockets, compressing them into ever-smaller pockets and grinding them down. The surrounded Japanese fought fiercely and inflicted heavy casualties, but the outcome was inevitable. After the remaining Japanese artillery batteries were silenced, Soviet tanks ruled the battlefield. One by one, major pockets were overrun. Some smaller groups managed to slip through Soviet lines and reach safety east of the border claimed by the MPR, where they were left unmolested by the Red Army. Elements of Potapov's 57th and 82nd Divisions eliminated the last remnants of resistance south of the Holsten by the evening of Aug 27. North of the Holsten, during the night of Aug 28–29, a group of about 400 Japanese tried to slip east through the Soviet lines along the riverbank. They were spotted by the 293rd Regiment (57th Division), which struck them. The fleeing Japanese refused to surrender and were wiped out attempting to recross the Holsten.   Japanese soldiers' refusal to surrender is well documented. Surrender was considered dishonorable; the Army Field Manual was silent on surrender. For officers, death was not merely preferable to surrender; it was expected, and in some cases required. The penal code (1908, not revised until 1942) stated that surrender was dereliction of duty; if a commander did his best to resist, imprisonment could follow; if not, death. Stemming from Bushido, regimental colors were treated as sacred. On the afternoon of Aug 28, with much of his 64th Regiment destroyed, Colonel Yamagata saw no alternative but to burn the regimental colors and then commit suicide. Part of the flagpole had been shattered; the chrysanthemum crest damaged. Yamagata, Colonel Ise (artillery regimental commander), an infantry captain, a medical lieutenant, and a foot soldier—the last survivors of the headquarters unit—faced east, shouted "banzai" for the emperor, drenched the pennant in gasoline, and lit it. Yamagata, Ise, and the captain then shot themselves. The flag and crest were not entirely consumed, and the unburned remnants were buried beneath Yamagata's unmarked body. The medical officer and the soldier escaped and reported these rites to 6th Army HQ, where the deaths of the two colonels were mourned, but there was concern over whether the regimental colors had been entirely destroyed. On Aug 29, Lieutenant Colonel Higashi Muneharu, who had taken command of the 71st Regiment, faced the same dilemma. The regimental standard was broken into four pieces and, with the flag and chrysanthemum crest, drenched with fuel and set on fire. The fire kept going out, and the tassels were especially hard to burn. It took 45 minutes to finish the job, all under enemy fire. Afterward, Higashi urged all able to join him in a suicide charge, and the severely wounded to "kill themselves bravely when the enemy approached." Soviet machine-gun fire and grenades felled Higashi and his followers within moments. When it became clear on Aug 29 that all hope was lost, Komatsubara resolved to share the fate of his 23rd Division. He prepared to commit suicide, entrusted his will to his aide, removed his epaulets, and burned his code books. General Ogisu ordered Komatsubara to save himself and lead as many of his men as possible out of the encirclement. Shortly before midnight on Aug 30, the bulk of the Soviet armor briefly pulled back to refuel and resupply. Some of the Soviet infantry also pulled back. Komatsubara and about 400 survivors of his command used the opportunity to slip through the Soviet lines, guiding wounded by starlight to safety at Chiangchunmiao on the morning of Aug 31. Tsuji was among the survivors. In transit, Komatsubara was so distraught he needed to be restrained from taking his own life. A fellow officer took his pistol, and two sturdy corporals helped to support him, preventing him from drawing his sword. On August 31, Zhukov declared the disputed territory between the Halha River and the boundary line through Nomonhan cleared of enemy troops. The Sixth Army had been annihilated, with between 18,000 and 23,000 men killed or wounded from May to September (not counting Manchukuoan losses). The casualty rate in Komatsubara's 23rd Division reached 76%, and Sumi's 26th Regiment (7th Division) suffered 91% casualties. Kwantung Army lost many of its tanks and heavy guns and nearly 150 aircraft. It was the worst military defeat in modern Japanese history up to that time. Soviet claims later put total Japanese casualties at over 50,000, though this figure is widely regarded as inflated. For years, Soviet-MPR authorities claimed 9,284 casualties, surely an underestimate. A detailed unit-by-unit accounting published in Moscow in 2002 put Soviet losses at 25,655 (9,703 killed, 15,952 wounded), plus 556 MPR casualties. While Soviet casualties may have exceeded Japanese losses, this reflects the fierceness of Japanese defense and questions Zhukov's expenditutre of blood. There was no denying, however, that the Red Army demonstrated substantial strength and that Kwantung Army suffered a serious defeat. Knowledgeable Japanese and Soviet sources agree that given the annihilation of Komatsubara's forces and the dominance of Soviet air power, if Zhukov had pressed beyond Nomonhan toward Hailar, local Japanese forces would have fallen into chaos, Hailar would have fallen, and western Manchuria would have been gravely threatened. But while that might have been militarily possible, Moscow did not intend it. Zhukov's First Army Group halted at the boundary line claimed by the MPR. A Japanese military historian notes that "Kwantung Army completely lost its head." KwAHQ was enraged by the battlefield developments. Beyond the mauling of the Sixth Army at Nomonhan, there was anxiety over regimental colors. It was feared that Colonel Yamagata might not have had time to destroy the imperial crest of the 64th Regiment's colors, which could have fallen into Soviet hands. Thousands of dead and wounded littered the field. To preserve "face" and regain leverage, a swift, decisive counterstroke was deemed necessary. At Hsinking, they decided on an all-out war against the USSR. They planned to throw the 7th, 2nd, 4th, and 8th Divisions into the Sixth Army, along with all heavy artillery in Manchukuo, to crush the enemy. Acknowledging shortages in armor, artillery, and air power, they drafted a plan for a series of successive night offenses beginning on September 10. This was viewed as ill-advised for several reasons: September 10 was an unrealistic target given Kwantung Army's limited logistical capacity; it was unclear what the Red Army would be doing by day, given its superiority in tanks, artillery, and air power; autumn would bring extreme cold that could immobilize forces; and Germany's alliance with the Soviet Union isolated Japan diplomatically. These factors were known at KwAHQ, yet the plan proceeded. Kwantung Army notified AGS to "utilize the winter months well," aiming to mobilize the entire Japanese Army for a decisive spring confrontation. However, the Nomonhan defeat coincided with the Hitler-Stalin pact's diplomatic fallout. The push for close military cooperation with Germany against the Soviet Union was discredited in a single week. Defeated and abandoned by Hitler, pro-German, anti-Soviet policy advocates in Tokyo were furious. Premier Hiranuma Kiichiro's government resigned on August 28. In response, more cautious voices in Tokyo asserted control. General Nakajima, deputy chief of AGS, went to Hsinking with Imperial Order 343, directing Kwantung Army to hold near the disputed frontier with "minimal strength" to enable a quick end to hostilities and a diplomatic settlement. But at KwAHQ, the staff pressed their case, and Nakajima eventually approved a general offensive to begin on September 10. The mood at KwAHQ was ebullient. Upon returning to Tokyo, Nakajima was sternly rebuked and ordered to stand down. General Ueda appealed to higher authority, requesting permission to clear the battlefield and recover the bodies of fallen soldiers. He was denied and later relieved of command on September 6. A reshuffle followed at KwAHQ, with several senior officers reassigned. The Japanese Foreign Ministry directed Ambassador Togo Shigenori to negotiate a settlement in Moscow. The Molotov-Togo agreement was reached on September 15–16, establishing a temporary frontier and a commission to redemarcate the boundary. The local cease-fire arrangements were formalized on September 18–19, and both sides agreed to exchange prisoners and corpses. In the aftermath, Kwantung Army leadership and the Red Army leadership maintained tight control over communications about the conflict. News of the defeat spread through Manchuria and Japan, but the scale of the battle was not fully suppressed. The Kwantung Army's reputation suffered further from subsequent punishments of officers deemed to have mishandled the Nomonhan engagement. Several officers were compelled to retire or commit suicide under pressure, and Ioki's fate became a particular symbol of the army's dishonor and the heavy costs of the campaign. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In August 1939, Soviet General Georgy Zhukov launched a decisive offensive against Japanese forces at Nomonhan. Under cover of darkness, Soviet troops crossed the Halha River, unleashing massive air and artillery barrages on August 20. Fierce fighting ensued, with failed Japanese counterattacks, the fall of Fui Heights, and annihilation of encircled pockets by Soviet tanks and infantry. 

Last time we spoke about General Zhukov's arrival to the Nomohan incident. The Kwantung Army's inexperienced 23rd Division, under General Komatsubara, suffered heavy losses in failed offensives, including Colonel Yamagata's assault and the annihilation of Lieutenant Colonel Azuma's detachment, resulting in around 500 Japanese casualties. Tensions within the Japanese command intensified as Kwantung defied Tokyo's restraint, issuing aggressive orders like 1488 and launching a June 27 air raid on Soviet bases, destroying dozens of aircraft and securing temporary air superiority. This provoked Moscow's fury and rebukes from Emperor Hirohito. On June 1, Georgy Zhukov, a rising Red Army tactician and tank expert, was summoned from Minsk. Arriving June 5, he assessed the 57th Corps as inadequate, relieved Commander Feklenko, and took charge of the redesignated 1st Army Group. Reinforcements included mechanized brigades, tanks, and aircraft. Japanese intelligence misread Soviet supply convoys as retreats, underestimating Zhukov's 12,500 troops against their 15,000. By July, both sides poised for a massive clash, fueled by miscalculations and gekokujo defiance.   #190 Zhukov Unleashes Tanks at Nomohan Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. At 4:00 a.m. on July 1, 15,000 heavily laden Japanese troops began marching to their final assembly and jump-off points. The sun rose at 4:00 a.m. and set at 9:00 p.m. that day, but the Japanese advance went undetected by Soviet/MPR commanders, partly because the June 27 air raid had temporarily cleared Soviet reconnaissance from the skies. On the night of July 1, Komatsubara launched the first phase. The 23rd Division, with the Yasuoka Detachment, converged on Fui Heights, east of the Halha River, about eleven miles north of its confluence with the Holsten. The term "heights" is misleading here; a Japanese infantry colonel described Fui as a "raised pancake" roughly one to one-and-a-half miles across, about thirty to forty feet higher than the surrounding terrain. For reasons not fully explained, the small Soviet force stationed on the heights was withdrawn during the day on July 1, and that night Fui Heights was occupied by Komatsubara's forces almost unopposed. This caused little stir at Zhukov's headquarters. Komatsubara bided his time on July 2.   On the night of July 2–3, the Japanese achieved a brilliant tactical success. A battalion of the 71st Infantry Regiment silently crossed the Halha River on a moonless night and landed unopposed on the west bank opposite Fui Heights. Recent rains had swollen the river to 100–150 yards wide and six feet deep, making crossing difficult for men, horses, or vehicles. Combat engineers swiftly laid a pontoon bridge, completing it by 6:30 a.m. on July 3. The main body of Komatsubara's 71st and 72nd Infantry Regiments (23rd Division) and the 26th Regiment (7th Division) began a slow, arduous crossing. The pontoon bridge, less than eight feet wide, was a bottleneck, allowing only one truck at a time. The attackers could not cross with armored vehicles, but they did bring across their regimental artillery, 18 x 37-mm antitank guns, 12 x 75-mm mountain guns, 8 x 75-mm field guns, and 4 x 120-mm howitzers, disassembled, packed on pack animals, and reassembled on the west bank. The crossing took the entire day, and the Japanese were fortunate to go without interception. The Halha crossing was commanded personally by General Komatsubara and was supported by a small Kwantung Army contingent, including General Yano (deputy chief of staff), Colonel Hattori, and Major Tsuji from the Operations Section. Despite the big air raid having alerted Zhukov, the initial Japanese moves from July 1–3 achieved complete tactical surprise, aided by Tsuji's bold plan. The first indication of the major offensive came when General Yasuoka's tanks attacked predawn on July 3. Yasuoka suspected Soviet troops south of him attempting to retreat across the Halha to the west bank, and he ordered his tanks to attack immediately, with infantry not yet in position. The night's low clouds, no moon, and low visibility—along with a passing thunderstorm lighting the sky—made the scene dramatic. Seventy Japanese tanks roared forward, supported by infantry and artillery, and the Soviet 149th Infantry Regiment found itself overwhelmed. Zhukov, hearing of Yasuoka's assault but unaware that Komatsubara had crossed the Halha, ordered his armor to move northeast to Bain Tsagan to confront the initiative. There, Soviet armor clashed with Japanese forces in a chaotic, largely uncoordinated engagement. The Soviet counterattacks, supported by heavy artillery, halted much of the Japanese momentum, and by late afternoon Japanese infantry had to dig in west of the Halha. The crossing had been accomplished without Soviet reconnaissance detecting it in time, but Zhukov's counterattacks, the limits of Japanese armored mobility across the pontoon, and the heat and exhaustion of the troops constrained the Japanese effort. By the afternoon of July 3, Zhukov's forces were pressing hard, and the Japanese momentum began to stall. Yasuoka's tanks, supported by a lack of infantry and the fatigue and losses suffered by the infantry, could not close the gap to link with Komatsubara's forces. The Type 89 tanks, designed for infantry support, were ill-suited to penetrating Soviet armor, especially when faced with BT-5/BT-7 tanks and strong anti-tank guns. The Type 95 light tanks were faster but lightly armored, and suffered heavily from Soviet fire and air attacks. Infantry on the western bank struggled to catch up with tanks, shot through by Soviet artillery and armor, while the 64th Regiment could not keep pace with the tanks due to the infantry's lack of motorized transport. By late afternoon, Yasuoka's advance stalled far short of the river junction and the Soviet bridge. The infantry dug in to withstand Soviet bombardment, and the Japanese tank regiments withdrew to their jump-off points by nightfall. The Japanese suffered heavy losses in tanks, though some were recovered and repaired; by July 9, KwAHQ decided to withdraw its two tank regiments from the theater. Armor would play no further role in the Nomonhan conflict. The Soviets, by contrast, sustained heavier tank losses but began to replenish with new models. The July offensive, for Kwantung Army, proved a failure. Part of the failure stemmed from a difficult blend of terrain and logistics. Unusually heavy rains in late June had transformed the dirt roads between Hailar and Nomonhan into a mud-filled quagmire. Japanese truck transport, already limited, was so hampered by these conditions that combat effectiveness suffered significantly. Colonel Yamagata's 64th Infantry Regiment, proceeding on foot, could not keep pace with or support General Yasuoka's tanks on July 3–4. Komatsubara's infantry on the west bank of the Halha ran short of ammunition, food, and water. As in the May 28 battle, the main cause of the Kwantung Army's July offensive failure was wholly inadequate military intelligence. Once again, the enemy's strength had been seriously underestimated. Moreover, a troubling realization was dawning at KwAHQ and in the field: the intelligence error was not merely quantitative but qualitative. The Soviets were not only more numerous but also far more potent than anticipated. The attacking Japanese forces initially held a slight numerical edge and enjoyed tactical surprise, but the Red Army fought tenaciously, and the weight of Soviet firepower proved decisive. Japan, hampered by a relative lack of raw materials and industrial capacity, could not match the great powers in the quantitative production of military materiel. Consequently, Japanese military leaders traditionally emphasized the spiritual superiority of Japan's armed forces in doctrine and training, often underestimating the importance of material factors, including firepower. This was especially true of the army that had carried the tactic of the massed bayonet charge into World War II. This "spiritual" combat doctrine arose from necessity; admitting material superiority would have implied defeat. Japan's earlier victories in the Sino-Japanese War, Russo-Japanese War, the Manchurian incident, and the China War, along with legendary medieval victories over the Mongol hordes, seemed to confirm the transcendent importance of fighting spirit. Only within such a doctrine could the Imperial Japanese Army muster inner strength and confidence to face formidable enemies. This was especially evident against Soviet Russia, whose vast geography, population, and resources loomed large. Yet what of its spirit? The Japanese military dismissed Bolshevism as a base, materialist philosophy utterly lacking spiritual power. Consequently, the Red Army was presumed to have low morale and weak fighting effectiveness. Stalin's purges only reinforced this belief. Kwantung Army's recent experiences at Nomonhan undermined this outlook. Among ordinary soldiers and officers alike, from the 23rd Division Staff to KwAHQ—grim questions formed: Had Soviet materiel and firepower proven superior to Japanese fighting spirit? If not, did the enemy possess a fighting spirit comparable to their own? To some in Kwantung Army, these questions were grotesque and almost unthinkable. To others, the implications were too painful to face. Perhaps May and July's combat results were an aberration caused by the 23rd Division's inexperience. Nevertheless, a belief took hold at KwAHQ that this situation required radical rectification. Zhukov's 1st Army Headquarters, evaluating recent events, was not immune to self-criticism and concern for the future. The enemy's success in transporting nearly 10,000 men across the Halha without detection—despite heightened Soviet alert after the June 27 air raid—revealed a level of carelessness and lack of foresight at Zhukov's level. Zhukov, however, did not fully capitalize on Komatsubara's precarious position on July 4–5. Conversely, Zhukov and his troops reacted calmly in the crisis's early hours. Although surprised and outnumbered, Zhukov immediately recognized that "our trump cards were the armored detachments, and we decided to use them immediately." He acted decisively, and the rapid deployment of armor proved pivotal. Some criticized the uncoordinated and clumsy Soviet assault on Komatsubara's infantry on July 3, but the Japanese were only a few hours' march from the river junction and the Soviet bridge. By hurling tanks at Komatsubara's advance with insufficient infantry support, Mikhail Yakovlev (11th Tank Brigade) and A. L. Lesovoi (7th Mechanized Brigade) incurred heavy losses. Nonetheless, they halted the Japanese southward advance, forcing Komatsubara onto the defensive, from which he never regained momentum. Zhukov did not flinch from heavy casualties to achieve his objectives. He later told General Dwight D. Eisenhower that if the enemy faced a minefield, their infantry attacked as if it did not exist, treating personnel mine losses as equal to those that would have occurred if the Germans defended the area with strong troops rather than minefields. Zhukov admitted losing 120 tanks and armored cars that day—a high price, but necessary to avert defeat. Years later, Zhukov defended his Nomonhan tactics, arguing he knew his armor would suffer heavy losses, but that was the only way to prevent the Japanese from seizing the bridge at the river confluence. Had Komatsubara's forces advanced unchecked for another two or three hours, they might have fought through to the Soviet bridge and linked with the Yasuoka detachment, endangering Zhukov's forces. Zhukov credited Yakovlev, Lesovoi, and their men with stabilizing the crisis through timely and self-sacrificing counterattacks. The armored car battalion of the 8th MPR Cavalry Division also distinguished itself in this action. Zhukov and his tankmen learned valuable lessons in those two days of brutal combat. A key takeaway was the successful use of large tank formations as an independent primary attack force, contrary to then-orthodox doctrine, which saw armor mainly as infantry support and favored integrating armor into every infantry regiment rather than maintaining large, autonomous armored units. The German blitzkrieg demonstrations in Poland and Western Europe soon followed, but, until then, few major armies had absorbed the tank-warfare theories championed by Basil Liddell-Hart and Charles de Gaulle. The Soviet high command's leading proponent of large-scale tank warfare had been Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky. His execution in 1937 erased those ideas, and the Red Army subsequently disbanded armored divisions and dispersed tanks among infantry, misapplying battlefield lessons from the Spanish Civil War. Yet Zhukov was learning a different lesson on a different battlefield. The open terrain of eastern Mongolia favored tanks, and Zhukov was a rapid learner. The Russians also learned mundane, but crucial, lessons: Japanese infantry bravely clambering onto their vehicles taught Soviet tank crews to lock hatch lids from the inside. The BT-5 and BT-7 tanks were easily set aflame by primitive hand-thrown firebombs, and rear deck ventilation grills and exhaust manifolds were vulnerable and required shielding. Broadly, the battle suggested to future Red Army commander Zhukov that tank and motorized troops, coordinated with air power and mobile artillery, could decisively conduct rapid operations. Zhukov was not the first to envision combining mobile firepower with air and artillery, but he had rare opportunities to apply this formula in crucial tests. The July offensive confirmed to the Soviets that the Nomonhan incident was far from a border skirmish; it signaled intent for further aggression. Moscow's leadership, informed by Richard Sorge's Tokyo network, perceived Japan's renewed effort to draw Germany into an anti-Soviet alliance as a dangerous possibility. Stalin and Vyacheslav Molotov began indicating to Joachim von Ribbentrop and Adolf Hitler that Berlin's stance on the Soviet–Japanese conflict would influence Soviet-German rapprochement considerations. Meanwhile, Moscow decided to reinforce Zhukov. Tens of thousands of troops and machines were ordered to Mongolia, with imports from European Russia. Foreign diplomats traveling the Trans-Siberian Railway reported eastbound trains jammed with personnel and matériel. The buildup faced a major bottleneck at Borzya, the easternmost railhead in the MPR, about 400 miles from the Halha. To prevent a logistics choke, a massive truck transport operation was needed. Thousands of trucks, half-tracks, gun-towing tractors, and other vehicles were organized into a continuous eight-hundred-mile, five-day shuttle run. The Trans-Baikal Military District, under General Shtern, supervised the effort. East of the Halha, many Japanese officers still refused to accept a failure verdict for the July offensive. General Komatsubara did not return to Hailar, instead establishing a temporary divisional HQ at Kanchuerhmiao, where his staff grappled with overcoming Soviet firepower. They concluded that night combat—long a staple of Japanese infantry tactics—could offset Soviet advantages. On July 7 at 9:30 p.m., a thirty-minute Japanese artillery barrage preceded a nighttime assault by elements of the 64th and 72nd Regiments. The Soviet 149th Infantry Regiment and supporting Mongolian cavalry were surprised and forced to fall back toward the Halha before counterattacking. Reinforcements arrived on both sides, and in brutal close-quarters combat the Japanese gained a partial local advantage, but were eventually pushed back; Major I. M. Remizov of the 149th Regiment was killed and later posthumously named a Hero of the Soviet Union. Since late May, Soviet engineers had built at least seven bridges across the Halha and Holsten Rivers to support operations. By July 7–8, Japanese demolition teams destroyed two Soviet bridges. Komatsubara believed that destroying bridges could disrupt Soviet operations east of the Halha and help secure the border. Night attacks continued from July 8 to July 12 against the Soviet perimeter, with Japanese assaults constricting Zhukov's bridgehead while Soviet artillery and counterattacks relentlessly pressed. Casualties mounted on both sides. The Japanese suffered heavy losses but gained some positions; Soviet artillery, supported by motorized infantry and armor, gradually pushed back the attackers. The biggest problem for Japan remained Soviet artillery superiority and the lack of a commensurate counter-battery capability. Japanese infantry had to withdraw to higher ground at night to avoid daytime exposure to artillery and tanks. On the nights of July 11–12, Yamagata's 64th Regiment and elements of Colonel Sakai Mikio's 72nd Regiment attempted a major assault on the Soviet bridgehead. Despite taking heavy casualties, the Japanese managed to push defenders back to the river on occasion, but Soviet counterattacks, supported by tiresome artillery and armor, prevented a decisive breakthrough. Brigade Commander Yakovlev of the 11th Armored, who led several counterattacks, was killed and later honored as a Hero of the Soviet Union; his gun stands today as a monument at the battlefield. The July 11–12 action marked the high-water mark of the Kwantung Army's attempt to expel Soviet/MPR forces east of the Halha. Komatsubara eventually suspended the costly night attacks; by that night, the 64th Regiment had suffered roughly 80–90 killed and about three times that number wounded. The decision proved controversial, with some arguing that he had not realized how close his forces had come to seizing the bridge. Others argued that broader strategic considerations justified the pause. Throughout the Nomonhan fighting, Soviet artillery superiority, both quantitative and qualitative, became painfully evident. The Soviet guns exacted heavy tolls and repeatedly forced Japanese infantry to withdraw from exposed positions. The Japanese artillery, in contrast, could not match the Red Army's scale. By July 25, Kwantung Army ended its artillery attack, a humiliating setback. Tokyo and Hsinking recognized the futility of achieving a decisive military victory at Nomonhan and shifted toward seeking a diplomatic settlement, even if concessions to the Soviet Union and the MPR were necessary. Kwantung Army, however, opposed negotiations, fearing it would echo the "Changkufeng debacle" and be read by enemies as weakness. Tsuji lamented that Kwantung Army's insistence on framing the second phase as a tie—despite heavy Soviet losses, revealed a reluctance to concede any territory. Differences in outlook and policy between AGS and Kwantung Army—and the central army's inability to impose its will on Manchukuo's field forces—became clear. The military establishment buzzed with stories of gekokujo (the superiority of the superior) within Kwantung Army and its relations with the General Staff. To enforce compliance, AGS ordered General Isogai to Tokyo for briefings, and KwAHQ's leadership occasionally distanced itself from AGS. On July 20, Isogai arrived at General Staff Headquarters and was presented with "Essentials for Settlement of the Nomonhan Incident," a formal document outlining a step-by-step plan for Kwantung Army to maintain its defensive position east of the Halha while diplomatic negotiations proceeded. If negotiations failed, Kwantung Army would withdraw to the boundary claimed by the Soviet Union by winter. Isogai, the most restrained member of the Kwantung Army circle, argued against accepting the Essentials, insisting on preserving Kwantung Army's honor and rejecting a unilateral east-bank withdrawal. A tense exchange followed, but General Nakajima ended the dispute by noting that international boundaries cannot be determined by the army alone. Isogai pledged to report the General Staff's views to his commander and take the Essentials back to KwAHQ for study. Technically, the General Staff's Essentials were not orders; in practice, however, they were treated as such. Kwantung Army tended to view them as suggestions and retained discretion in implementation. AGS hoped the Essentials would mollify Kwantung Army's wounded pride. The August 4 decision to create a 6 Army within Kwantung Army, led by General Ogisu Rippei, further complicated the command structure. Komatsubara's 23rd Division and nearby units were attached to the 6 Army, which also took responsibility for defending west-central Manchukuo, including the Nomonhan area. The 6 Army existed largely on paper, essentially a small headquarters to insulate KwAHQ from battlefield realities. AGS sought a more accountable layer of command between KwAHQ and the combat zone, but General Ueda and KwAHQ resented the move and offered little cooperation. In the final weeks before the last battles, General Ogisu and his small staff had limited influence on Nomonhan. Meanwhile, the European crisis over German demands on Poland intensified, moving into a configuration highly favorable to the Soviet Union. By the first week of August, it became evident in the Kremlin that both Anglo-French powers and the Germans were vying to secure an alliance with Moscow. Stalin knew now that he would likely have a free hand in the coming war in the West. At the same time, Richard Sorge, the Soviet master spy in Tokyo, correctly reported that Japan's top political and military leaders sought to prevent the escalation of the Nomonhan incident into an all-out war. These developments gave the cautious Soviet dictator the confidence to commit the Red Army to large-scale combat operations in eastern Mongolia. In early August, Stalin ordered preparations for a major offensive to clear the Nomonhan area of the "Japanese samurai who had violated the territory of the friendly Outer Mongolian people." The buildup of Zhukov's 1st Army Group accelerated still further. Its July strength was augmented by the 57th and 82nd Infantry Divisions, the 6th Tank Brigade, the 212th Airborne Brigade, numerous smaller infantry, armor, and artillery units, and two Mongolian cavalry divisions. Soviet air power in the area was also greatly strengthened. When this buildup was completed by mid-August, Zhukov commanded an infantry force equivalent to four divisions, supported by two cavalry divisions, 216 artillery pieces, 498 armored vehicles, and 581 aircraft. To bring in the supplies necessary for this force to launch an offensive, General Shtern's Trans-Baikal Military District Headquarters amassed a fleet of more than 4,200 vehicles, which trucked in about 55,000 tons of materiel from the distant railway depot at Borzya. The Japanese intelligence network in Outer Mongolia was weak, a problem that went unremedied throughout the Nomonhan incident. This deficiency, coupled with the curtailment of Kwantung Army's transborder air operations, helps explain why the Japanese remained ignorant of the scope of Zhukov's buildup. They were aware that some reinforcements were flowing eastward across the Trans-Siberian Railway toward the MPR but had no idea of the volume. Then, at the end of July, Kwantung Army Intelligence intercepted part of a Soviet telegraph transmission indicating that preparations were under way for some offensive operation in the middle of August. This caused a stir at KwAHQ. Generals Ueda and Yano suspected that the enemy planned to strike across the Halha River. Ueda's initial reaction was to reinforce the 23rd Division at Nomonhan with the rest of the highly regarded 7th Division. However, the 7th Division was Kwantung Army's sole strategic reserve, and the Operations Section was reluctant to commit it to extreme western Manchukuo, fearing mobilization of Soviet forces in the Maritime Province and a possible attack in the east near Changkufeng. The Kwantung Army commander again ignored his own better judgment and accepted the Operations Section's recommendation. The main strength of the 7th Division remained at its base near Tsitsihar, but another infantry regiment, the 28th, was dispatched to the Nomonhan area, as was an infantry battalion from the Mukden Garrison. Earlier, in mid-July, Kwantung Army had sent Komatsubara 1,160 individual replacements to make up for casualties from earlier fighting. All these reinforcements combined, however, did little more than replace losses: as of July 25, 1,400 killed (including 200 officers) and 3,000 wounded. Kwantung Army directed Komatsubara to dig in, construct fortifications, and adopt a defensive posture. Colonel Numazaki, who commanded the 23rd Division's Engineer Regiment, was unhappy with the defensive line he was ordered to fortify and urged a slight pullback to more easily defensible terrain. Komatsubara, however, refused to retreat from ground his men had bled to take. He and his line officers still nourished hope of a revenge offensive. As a result, the Japanese defensive positions proved to be as weak as Numazaki feared. As Zhukov's 1st Army Group prepared to strike, the effective Japanese strength at Nomonhan was less than 1.5 divisions. Major Tsuji and his colleagues in the Operations Section had little confidence in Kwantung Army's own Intelligence Section, which is part of the reason why Tsuji frequently conducted his own reconnaissance missions. Up to this time it was gospel in the Japanese army that the maximum range for large-scale infantry operations was 125–175 miles from a railway; anything beyond 200 miles from a railway was considered logistically impossible. Since Kwantung Army had only 800 trucks available in all of Manchukuo in 1939, the massive Soviet logistical effort involving more than 4,200 trucks was almost unimaginable to the Japanese. Consequently, the Operations Staff believed it had made the correct defensive deployments if a Soviet attack were to occur, which it doubted. If the enemy did strike at Nomonhan, it was believed that it could not marshal enough strength in that remote region to threaten the reinforced 23rd Division. Furthermore, the 7th Division, based at Tsitsihar on a major rail line, could be transported to any trouble spot on the eastern or western frontier in a few days. KwAHQ advised Komatsubara to maintain a defensive posture and prepare to meet a possible enemy attack around August 14 or 15. At this time, Kwantung Army also maintained a secret organization codenamed Unit 731, officially the Epidemic Prevention and Water Purification Department of the Kwantung Army. Unit 731 specialized in biological and chemical warfare, with main facilities and laboratories in Harbin, including a notorious prison-laboratory complex. During the early August lull at Nomonhan, a detachment from Unit 731 infected the Halha River with bacteria of an acute cholera-like strain. There are no reports in Soviet or Japanese accounts that this attempted biological warfare had any effect. In the war's final days, Unit 731 was disbanded, Harbin facilities demolished, and most personnel fled to Japan—but not before they gassed the surviving 150 human subjects and burned their corpses. The unit's commander, Lieutenant General Ishii Shiro, kept his men secret and threatened retaliation against informers. Ishii and his senior colleagues escaped prosecution at the Tokyo War Crimes Trials by trading the results of their experiments to U.S. authorities in exchange for immunity. The Japanese 6th Army exerted some half-hearted effort to construct defensive fortifications, but scarcity of building materials, wood had to be trucked in from far away—helped explain the lack of enthusiasm. More importantly, Japanese doctrine despised static defense and favored offense, so Kwantung Army waited to see how events would unfold. West of the Halha, Zhukov accelerated preparations. Due to tight perimeter security, few Japanese deserters, and a near-absence of civilian presence, Soviet intelligence found it hard to glean depth on Japanese defensive positions. Combat intelligence could only reveal the frontline disposition and closest mortar and artillery emplacements. Aerial reconnaissance showed photographs, but Japanese camouflage and mock-ups limited their usefulness. The new commander of the 149th Mechanized Infantry Regiment personally directed infiltration and intelligence gathering, penetrating Japanese lines on several nights and returning crucial data: Komatsubara's northern and southern flanks were held by Manchukuoan cavalry, and mobile reserves were lacking. With this information, Zhukov crafted a plan of attack. The main Japanese strength was concentrated a few miles east of the Halha, on both banks of the Holsten River. Their infantry lacked mobility and armor, and their flanks were weak. Zhukov decided to split the 1st Army Group into three strike forces: the central force would deliver a frontal assault to pin the main Japanese strength, while the northern and southern forces, carrying the bulk of the armor, would turn the Japanese flanks and drive the enemy into a pocket to be destroyed by the three-pronged effort. The plan depended on tactical surprise and overwhelming force at the points of attack. The offensive was to begin in the latter part of August, pending final approval from Moscow. To ensure tactical surprise, Zhukov and his staff devised an elaborate program of concealment and deception, disinformation. Units and materiel arriving at Tamsag Bulak toward the Halha were moved only at night with lights out. Noting that the Japanese were tapping telephone lines and intercepting radio messages, 1st Army Headquarters sent a series of false messages in an easily decipherable code about defensive preparations and autumn-winter campaigning. Thousands of leaflets titled "What the Infantryman Should Know about Defense" were distributed among troops. About two weeks before the attack, the Soviets brought in sound equipment to simulate tank and aircraft engines and heavy construction noises, staging long, loud performances nightly. At first, the Japanese mistook the sounds for large-scale enemy activity and fired toward the sounds. After a few nights, they realized it was only sound effects, and tried to ignore the "serenade." On the eve of the attack, the actual concentration and staging sounds went largely unnoticed by the Japanese. On August 7–8, Zhukov conducted minor attacks to expand the Halha bridgehead to a depth of two to three miles. These attacks, contained relatively easily by Komatsubara's troops, reinforced Kwantung Army's false sense of confidence. The Japanese military attaché in Moscow misread Soviet press coverage. In early August, the attaché advised that unlike the Changkufeng incident a year earlier, Soviet press was largely ignoring the conflict, implying low morale and a favorable prognosis for the Red Army. Kwantung Army leaders seized on this as confirmation to refrain from any display of restraint or doubt, misplaced confidence. There were, however, portents of danger. Three weeks before the Soviet attack, Colonel Isomura Takesuki, head of Kwantung Army's Intelligence Section, warned of the vulnerability of the 23rd Division's flanks. Tsuji and colleagues dismissed this, and General Kasahara Yukio of AGS also went unheeded. The "desk jockey" General Staff officers commanded little respect at KwAHQ. Around August 10, General Hata Yuzaburo, Komatsubara's successor as chief of the Special Services Agency at Harbin, warned that enemy strength in the Mongolian salient was very great and seriously underestimated at KwAHQ. Yet no decisive action followed before Zhukov's attack. Kwantung Army's inaction and unpreparedness prior to the Soviet offensive appear to reflect faulty intelligence compounded by hubris. But a more nuanced explanation suggests a fatalistic wishful thinking rooted in the Japanese military culture—the belief that their spiritual strength would prevail, leading them to assume enemy strength was not as great as reported, or that victory was inevitable regardless of resources. Meanwhile, in the rational West, the Nazi war machine faced the Polish frontier as Adolf Hitler pressed Stalin for a nonaggression pact. The German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact would neutralize the threat of a two-front war for Germany and clear the way for Hitler's invasion of Poland. If the pact was a green light, it signaled in both directions: it would also neutralize the German threat to Russia and clear the way for Zhukov's offensive at Nomonhan. On August 18–19, Hitler pressed Stalin to receive Ribbentrop in Moscow to seal the pact. Thus, reassured in the West, Stalin dared to act boldly against Japan. Zhukov supervised final preparations for his attack. Zhukov held back forward deployments until the last minute. By August 18, he had only four infantry regiments, a machine gun brigade, and Mongolian cavalry east of the Halha. Operational security was extremely tight: a week before the attack, Soviet radio traffic in the area virtually ceased. Only Zhukov and a few key officers worked on the plan, aided by a single typist. Line officers and service chiefs received information on a need-to-know basis. The date for the attack was shared with unit commanders one to four days in advance, depending on seniority. Noncommissioned officers and ordinary soldiers learned of the offensive one day in advance and received specific orders three hours before the attack.   Heavy rain grounded Japanese aerial reconnaissance from August 17 to midday on the 19th, but on August 19 Captain Oizumi Seisho in a Japanese scout plane observed the massing of Soviet forces near the west bank of the Halha. Enemy armor and troops were advancing toward the river in dispersed formations, with no new bridges but pontoon stocks spotted near the river. Oizumi sent a warning to a frontline unit and rushed back to report. The air group dispatched additional recon planes and discovered that the Japanese garrison on Fui Heights, near the northern end of Komatsubara's line, was being encircled by Soviet armor and mechanized infantry—observed by alarmed Japanese officers on and near the heights. These late discoveries on August 19 were not reported to KwAHQ and had no effect on the 6th Army and the 23rd Division's alertness on the eve of the storm. As is common in militaries, a fatal gap persisted between those gathering intelligence and those in a position to act on it. On the night of August 19–20, under cover of darkness, the bulk of the Soviet 1st Army Group crossed the Halha into the expanded Soviet enclave on the east bank.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. By August, European diplomacy left Moscow confident in a foothold against Germany and Britain, while Sorge's intelligence indicated Japan aimed to avoid a full-blown war. Stalin ordered a major offensive to clear Nomonhan, fueling Zhukov's buildup in eastern Mongolia. Kwantung Army, hampered by limited logistics, weak intelligence, and defensive posture, faced mounting pressure. 

On this episode of Japan Station, Alex Litz of Expedition Japan joins us to talk about tourism in Japan, Yamagata Prefecture and places/events to check out during a visit to Yamagata.

Last time we spoke about the beginning of the Nomohan incident. On the fringes of Manchuria, the ghosts of Changkufeng lingered. It was August 1938 when Soviet and Japanese forces locked in a brutal standoff over a disputed hill, claiming thousands of lives before a fragile ceasefire redrew the lines. Japan, humiliated yet defiant, withdrew, but the Kwantung Army seethed with resentment. As winter thawed into 1939, tensions simmered along the Halha River, a serpentine boundary between Manchukuo and Mongolia. Major Tsuji Masanobu, a cunning tactician driven by gekokujo's fire, drafted Order 1488: a mandate empowering local commanders to annihilate intruders, even luring them across borders. Kwantung's leaders, bonded by past battles, endorsed it, ignoring Tokyo's cautions amid the grinding China War. By May, the spark ignited. Mongolian patrols crossed the river, clashing with Manchukuoan cavalry near Nomonhan's sandy hills. General Komatsubara, ever meticulous, unleashed forces to "destroy" them, bombing west-bank outposts and pursuing retreats. Soviets, bound by pact, rushed reinforcements, their tanks rumbling toward the fray. What began as skirmishes ballooned into an undeclared war.   #189 General Zhukov Arrives at Nomohan Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Though Kwantung Army prided itself as an elite arm of the Imperial Japanese Army, the 23rd Division, formed less than a year prior, was still raw and unseasoned, lacking the polish and spirit typical of its parent force. From General Michitaro Komatsubara downward, the staff suffered a collective dearth of combat experience. Intelligence officer Major Yoshiyasu Suzuki, a cavalryman, had no prior intel background. While senior regimental commanders were military academy veterans, most company and platoon leaders were fresh reservists or academy graduates with just one or two years under their belts. Upon arriving in Manchukuo in August 1938, the division found its Hailar base incomplete, housing only half its troops; the rest scattered across sites. Full assembly at Hailar occurred in November, but harsh winter weather curtailed large-scale drills. Commanders had scant time to build rapport. This inexperience, inadequate training, and poor cohesion would prove costly at Nomonhan. Japan's army held steady at 17 divisions from 1930 to 1937, but the escalating China conflict spurred seven new divisions in 1938 and nine in 1939. Resource strains from China left many under-equipped, with the 23rd, stationed in a presumed quiet sector, low on priorities. Unlike older "rectangular" divisions with four infantry regiments, the 23rd was a modern "triangular" setup featuring the 64th, 71st, and 72nd. Materiel gaps were glaring. The flat, open terrain screamed for tanks, yet the division relied on a truck-equipped transport regiment and a reconnaissance regiment with lightly armored "tankettes" armed only with machine guns. Mobility suffered: infantry marched the final 50 miles from Hailar to Nomonhan. Artillery was mostly horse-drawn, including 24 outdated Type 38 75-mm guns from 1907, the army's oldest, unique to this division. Each infantry regiment got four 37-mm rapid-fire guns and four 1908-era 75-mm mountain guns. The artillery regiment added 12 120-mm howitzers, all high-angle, short-range pieces ill-suited for flatlands or anti-tank roles. Antitank capabilities were dire: beyond rapid-fire guns, options boiled down to demolition charges and Molotov cocktails, demanding suicidal "human bullet" tactics in open terrain, a fatal flaw against armor. The division's saving grace lay in its soldiers, primarily from Kyushu, Japan's southernmost main island, long famed for hardy warriors. These men embodied resilience, bravery, loyalty, and honor, offsetting some training and gear deficits. Combat at Nomonhan ramped up gradually, with Japanese-Manchukuoan forces initially outnumbering Soviet-Mongolian foes. Soviets faced severe supply hurdles: their nearest rail at Borzya sat 400 miles west of the Halha River, requiring truck hauls over rough, exposed terrain prone to air strikes. Conversely, Hailar was 200 miles from Nomonhan, with the Handagai railhead just 50 miles away, linked by three dirt roads. These advantages, plus Europe's brewing Polish crisis, likely reassured Army General Staff and Kwantung Army Headquarters that Moscow would avoid escalation. Nonetheless, Komatsubara, with KwAHQ's nod, chose force to quash the Nomonhan flare-up. On May 20, Japanese scouts spotted a Soviet infantry battalion and armor near Tamsag Bulak. Komatsubara opted to "nip the incident in the bud," assembling a potent strike force under Colonel Takemitsu Yamagata of the 64th Infantry Regiment. The Yamagata detachment included the 3rd Battalion, roughly four companies, 800 men, a regimental gun company, three 75-mm mountain guns, four 37-mm rapid-fires, three truck companies, and Lieutenant Colonel Yaozo Azuma's reconnaissance group, 220 men, one tankette, two sedans, 12 trucks. Bolstered by 450 local Manchukuoan troops, the 2,000-strong unit was tasked with annihilating all enemy east of the Halha. The assault was set for May 22–23. No sooner had General Komatsubara finalized this plan than he received a message from KwAHQ: "In settling the affair Kwantung Army has definite plans, as follows: For the time being Manchukuoan Army troops will keep an eye on the Outer Mongolians operating near Nomonhan and will try to lure them onto Manchukuoan territory. Japanese forces at Hailar [23rd Division] will maintain surveillance over the situation. Upon verification of a border violation by the bulk of the Outer Mongolian forces, Kwantung Army will dispatch troops, contact the enemy, and annihilate him within friendly territory. According to this outlook it can be expected that enemy units will occupy border regions for a considerable period; but this is permissible from the overall strategic point of view". At this juncture, Kwantung Army Headquarters advocated tactical caution to secure a more conclusive outcome. Yet, General Michitaro Komatsubara had already issued orders for Colonel Takemitsu Yamagata's assault. Komatsubara radioed Hsinking that retracting would be "undignified," resenting KwAHQ's encroachment on his authority much as KwAHQ chafed at Army General Staff interference. Still, "out of deference to Kwantung Army's feelings," he delayed to May 27 to 28. Soviet air units from the 57th Corps conducted ineffective sorties over the Halha River from May 17 to 21. Novice pilots in outdated I 15 biplanes suffered heavily: at least 9, possibly up to 17, fighters and scouts downed. Defense Commissar Kliment Voroshilov halted air ops, aiding Japanese surprise. Yamagata massed at Kanchuerhmiao, 40 miles north of Nomonhan, sending patrols southward. Scouts spotted a bridge over the Halha near its Holsten junction, plus 2 enemy groups of ~200 each east of the Halha on either Holsten side and a small MPR outpost less than a mile west of Nomonhan. Yamagata aimed to trap and destroy these east of the river: Azuma's 220 man unit would drive south along the east bank to the bridge, blocking retreat. The 4 infantry companies and Manchukuoan troops, with artillery, would attack from the west toward enemy pockets, herding them riverward into Azuma's trap. Post destruction, mop up any west bank foes near the river clear MPR soil swiftly. This intricate plan suited early MPR foes but overlooked Soviet units spotted at Tamsag Bulak on May 20, a glaring oversight by Komatsubara and Yamagata. Predawn on May 28, Yamagata advanced from Kanchuerhmiao. Azuma detached southward to the bridge. Unbeknownst, it was guarded by Soviet infantry, engineers, armored cars, and a 76 mm self propelled artillery battery—not just MPR cavalry. Soviets detected Azuma pre dawn but missed Yamagata's main force; surprise was mutual. Soviet MPR core: Major A E Bykov's battalion roughly 1000 men with 3 motorized infantry companies, 16 BA 6 armored cars, 4 76 mm self propelled guns, engineers, and a 5 armored car recon platoon. The 6th MPR Cavalry Division roughly 1250 men had 2 small regiments, 4 76 mm guns, armored cars, and a training company. Bykov arrayed north to south: 2 Soviet infantry on flanks, MPR cavalry center, unorthodox, as cavalry suits flanks. Spread over 10 miles parallel to but east of the Halha, 1 mile west of Nomonhan. Reserves: 1 infantry company, engineers, and artillery west of the river near the bridge; Shoaaiibuu's guns also west to avoid sand. Japanese held initial edges in numbers and surprise, especially versus MPR cavalry. Offsets: Yamagata split into 5 weaker units; radios failed early, hampering coordination; Soviets dominated firepower with self propelled guns, 4 MPR pieces, and BA 6s, armored fighters with 45 mm turret guns, half track capable, 27 mph speed, but thin 9 mm armor vulnerable to close heavy machine guns. Morning of May 28, Yamagata's infantry struck Soviet MPR near Nomonhan, routing lightly armed MPR cavalry and forcing Soviet retreats toward the Halha. Shoaaiibuu rushed his training company forward; Japanese overran his post, killing him and most staff. As combat neared the river, Soviet artillery and armored cars slowed Yamagata. He redirected to a low hill miles east of the Halha with dug in Soviets—failing to notify Azuma. Bykov regrouped 1 to 2 miles east of the Halha Holsten junction, holding firm. By late morning, Yamagata stalled, digging in against Soviet barrages. Azuma, radio silent due to faults, neared the bridge to find robust Soviet defenses. Artillery commander Lieutenant Yu Vakhtin shifted his 4 76 mm guns east to block seizure. Azuma lacked artillery or anti tank tools, unable to advance. With Yamagata bogged down, Azuma became encircled, the encirclers encircled. Runners reached Yamagata, but his dispersed units couldn't rally or breakthrough. By noon, Azuma faced infantry and cavalry from the east, bombardments from west (both Halha sides). Dismounted cavalry dug sandy defenses. Azuma could have broken out but held per mission, awaiting Yamagata, unaware of the plan shift. Pressure mounted: Major I M Remizov's full 149th Regiment recent Tamsag Bulak arrivals trucked in, tilting odds. Resupply failed; ammo dwindled. Post dusk slackening: A major urged withdrawal; Azuma refused, deeming retreat shameful without orders, a Japanese army hallmark, where "retreat" was taboo, replaced by euphemisms like "advance in a different direction." Unauthorized pullback meant execution. Dawn May 29: Fiercer Soviet barrage, 122 mm howitzers, field guns, mortars, armored cars collapsed trenches. An incendiary hit Azuma's sedan, igniting trucks with wounded and ammo. By late afternoon, Soviets closed to 50 yards on 3 fronts; armored cars breached rear. Survivors fought desperately. Between 6:00 and 7:00 p.m., Azuma led 24 men in a banzai charge, cut down by machine guns. A wounded medical lieutenant ordered escapes; 4 succeeded. Rest killed or captured. Komatsubara belatedly reinforced Yamagata on May 29 with artillery, anti tank guns, and fresh infantry. Sources claim Major Tsuji arrived, rebuked Yamagata for inaction, and spurred corpse recovery over 3 nights, yielding ~200 bodies, including Azuma's. Yamagata withdrew to Kanchuerhmiao, unable to oust foes. Ironically, Remizov mistook recovery truck lights for attacks, briefly pulling back west on May 30. By June 3, discovering the exit, Soviet MPR reoccupied the zone. Japanese blamed:  (1) poor planning/recon by Komatsubara and Yamagata,  (2) comms failures,  (3) Azuma's heavy weapon lack. Losses: ~200 Azuma dead, plus 159 killed, 119 wounded, 12 missing from main force, total 500, 25% of detachment. Soviets praised Vakhtin for thwarting pincers. Claims: Bykov 60 to 70 casualties; TASS 40 killed, 70 wounded total Soviet/MPR. Recent Russian: 138 killed, 198 wounded. MPR cavalry hit hard by Japanese and friendly fire. Soviet media silent until June 26; KwAHQ censored, possibly misleading Tokyo. May 30: Kwantung Chief of Staff General Rensuke Isogai assured AGS of avoiding prolongation via heavy frontier blows, downplaying Soviet buildup and escalation. He requested river crossing gear urgently.   This hinted at Halha invasion (even per Japanese borders: MPR soil). AGS's General Gun Hashimoto affirmed trust in localization: Soviets' vexations manageable, chastisement easy. Colonel Masazumi Inada's section assessed May 31: 1. USSR avoids expansion.  2. Trust Kwantung localization.  3. Intervene on provocative acts like deep MPR air strikes. Phase 1 ended: Kwantung called it mutual win loss, but inaccurate, Azuma destroyed, heavy tolls, remorse gnawing Komatsubara. On June 1, 1939, an urgent summons from Moscow pulled the young deputy commander of the Byelorussian Military District from Minsk to meet Defense Commissar Marshal Kliment Voroshilov. He boarded the first train with no evident concern, even as the army purges faded into memory. This rising cavalry- and tank-expert, Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov, would later help defend Moscow in 1941, triumph at Stalingrad and Kursk, and march to Berlin as a Hero of the Soviet Union.Born in 1896 to a poor family headed by a cobbler, Zhukov joined the Imperial Army in 1915 as a cavalryman. Of average height but sturdy build, he excelled in horsemanship and earned the Cross of St. George and noncommissioned status for bravery in 1916. After the October Revolution, he joined the Red Army and the Bolshevik Party, fighting in the Civil War from 1918 to 1921. His proletarian roots, tactical skill, and ambition propelled him: command of a regiment by 1923, a division by 1931. An early advocate of tanks, he survived the purges, impressing superiors as a results-driven leader and playing a key role in his assignment to Mongolia. In Voroshilov's office on June 2, Zhukov learned of recent clashes. Ordered to fly east, assess the situation, and assume command if needed, he soon met acting deputy chief Ivan Smorodinov, who urged candid reports. Europe's war clouds and rising tensions with Japan concerned the Kremlin. Hours later, Zhukov and his staff flew east. Arriving June 5 at Tamsag Bulak (57th Corps HQ), Zhukov met the staff and found Corps Commander Nikolai Feklenko and most aides clueless; only Regimental Commissar M. S. Nikishev had visited the front. Zhukov toured with Nikishev that afternoon and was impressed by his grasp. By day's end, Zhukov bluntly reported: this is not a simple border incident; the Japanese are likely to escalate; the 57th Corps is inadequate. He suggested holding the eastern Halha bridgehead until reinforcements could enable a counteroffensive, and he criticized Feklenko. Moscow replied on June 6: relieve Feklenko; appoint Zhukov. Reinforcements arrived: the 36th Mechanized Infantry Division; the 7th, 8th, and 9th Mechanized Brigades; the 11th Tank Brigade; the 8th MPR Cavalry Division; a heavy artillery regiment; an air wing of more than 100 aircraft, including 21 pilots who had earned renown in the Spanish Civil War. The force was redesignated as the First Army Group. In June, these forces surged toward Tamsag Bulak, eighty miles west of Halha. However, General Michitaro Komatsubara's 23rd Division and the Kwantung Army Headquarters missed the buildup and the leadership change, an intelligence failure born of carelessness and hubris and echoing May's Azuma disaster, with grave battlefield consequences. Early June remained relatively quiet: the Soviet MPR expanded the east-bank perimeter modestly; there was no major Japanese response. KwAHQ's Commander General Kenkichi Ueda, hoping for a quick closure, toured the Fourth Army from May 31 to June 18. Calm broke on June 19. Komatsubara reported two Soviet strikes inside Manchukuo: 15 planes hit Arshan, inflicting casualties on men and horses; 30 aircraft set fire to 100 petroleum barrels near Kanchuerhmiao. In fact, the raids were less dramatic than described: not on Kanchuerhmiao town (a 3,000-person settlement, 40 miles northwest of Nomonhan) but on a supply dump 12 miles south of it. "Arshan" referred to a small village near the border, near Arshanmiao, a Manchukuoan cavalry depot, not a major railhead at Harlun Arshan 100 miles southeast. The raids were strafing runs rather than bombs. Possibly retaliation for May 15's Japanese raid on the MPR Outpost 7 (two killed, 15 wounded) or a response to Zhukov's bridgehead push. Voroshilov authorized the action; motive remained unclear. Nonetheless, KwAHQ, unused to air attacks after dominating skies in Manchuria, Shanghai (1932), and China, was agitated. The situation resembled a jolt akin to the 1973 North Vietnamese strike on U.S. bases in Thailand: not unprovoked, but shocking. Midday June 19, the Operations Staff met. Major Masanobu Tsuji urged swift reprisal; Colonel Masao Terada urged delay in light of the Tientsin crisis (the new Japanese blockade near Peking). Tsuji argued that firmness at Nomonhan would impress Britain; inaction would invite deeper Soviet bombardments or invasion. He swayed Chief Colonel Takushiro Hattori and others, including Terada. They drafted a briefing: the situation was grave; passivity risked a larger invasion and eroded British respect for Japanese might. After two hours of joint talks, most KwAHQ members supported a strong action. Tsuji drafted a major Halha crossing plan to destroy Soviet MPR forces. Hattori and Terada pressed the plan to Chief of Staff General Rensuke Isogai, an expert on Manchukuo affairs but not operations; he deferred to Deputy General Otozaburo Yano, who was absent. They argued urgency; Isogai noted delays in AGS approval. The pair contended for local Kwantung prerogative, citing the 1937 Amur cancellation; AGS would likely veto. Under pressure, Isogai assented, pending Ueda's approval. Ueda approved but insisted that the 23rd Division lead, not the 7th. Hattori noted the 7th's superiority (four regiments in a "square" arrangement versus the 23rd's three regiments, with May unreliability). Ueda prioritized Komatsubara's honor: assigning another division would imply distrust; "I'd rather die." The plan passed on June 19, an example of gekokujo in action. The plan called for reinforcing the 23rd with: the 2nd Air Group (180 aircraft, Lieutenant General Tetsuji Gigi); the Yasuoka Detachment (Lieutenant General Masaomi Yasuoka: two tank regiments, motorized artillery, and the 26th Infantry of the 7th). Total strength: roughly 15,000 men, 120 guns, 70 tanks, 180 aircraft. KwAHQ estimated the enemy at about 1,000 infantry, 10 artillery pieces, and about 12 armored vehicles, expecting a quick victory. Reconnaissance to Halha was curtailed to avoid alerting the Soviets. Confidence ran high, even as intel warned otherwise. Not all leaders were convinced: the 23rd's ordnance colonel reportedly committed suicide over "awful equipment." An attaché, Colonel Akio Doi, warned of growing Soviet buildup, but operations dismissed the concern. In reality, Zhukov's force comprised about 12,500 men, 109 guns, 186 tanks, 266 armored cars, and more than 100 aircraft, offset by the Soviets' armor advantage. The plan echoed Yamagata's failed May 28 initiative: the 23rd main body would seize the Fui Heights (11 miles north of Halha's Holsten junction), cross by pontoon, and sweep south along the west bank toward the Soviet bridge. Yasuoka would push southeast of Halha to trap and destroy the enemy at the junction. On June 20, Tsuji briefed Komatsubara at Hailar, expressing Ueda's trust while pressing to redeem May's failures. Limited pontoon capacity would not support armor; the operation would be vulnerable to air power. Tsuji's reconnaissance detected Soviet air presence at Tamsag Bulak, prompting a preemptive strike and another plan adjustment. KwAHQ informed Tokyo of the offensive in vague terms (citing raids but withholding air details). Even this caused debate; Minister Seishiro Itagaki supported Ueda's stance, favoring a limited operation to ease nerves. Tokyo concurred, unaware of the air plans. Fearing a veto on the Tamsag Bulak raid (nearly 100 miles behind MPR lines), KwAHQ shielded details from the Soviets and Tokyo. A June 29–30 ground attack was prepared; orders were relayed by courier. The leak reached Tokyo on June 24. Deputy Chief General Tetsuzo Nakajima telegrammed three points: 1) AGS policy to contain the conflict and avoid West MPR air attacks;  2) bombing risks escalation;  3) sending Lieutenant Colonel Yadoru Arisue on June 25 for liaison. Polite Japanese diplomatic phrasing allowed Operations to interpret the message as a suggestion. To preempt Arisue's explicit orders, Tsuji urged secrecy from Ueda, Isogai, and Yano, and an advanced raid to June 27. Arisue arrived after the raid on Tamsag Bulak and Bain Tumen (deeper into MPR territory, now near Choibalsan). The Raid resulted in approximately 120 Japanese planes surprising the Soviets, grounding and destroying aircraft and scrambling their defense. Tsuji, flying in a bomber, claimed 25 aircraft destroyed on the ground and about 100 in the air. Official tallies reported 98 destroyed and 51 damaged; ground kills estimated at 50 to 60 at Bain Tumen. Japanese losses were relatively light: one bomber, two fighters, one scout; seven dead. Another Japanese bomber was shot down over MPR, but the crew was rescued. The raid secured air superiority for July.   Moscow raged over the losses and the perceived failure to warn in time. In the purge era, blame fell on suspected spies and traitors; Deputy Mongolian Commander Luvsandonoi and ex-57th Deputy A. M. Kushchev were accused, arrested, and sent to Moscow. Luvsandonoi was executed; Kushchev received a four-year sentence, later rising to major general and Hero. KwAHQ celebrated; Operations notified AGS by radio. Colonel Masazumi Inada rebuked: "You damned idiot! What do you think the true meaning of this little success is?" A withering reprimand followed. Stunned but unrepentant, KwAHQ soon received Tokyo's formal reprimand: "Report was received today regarding bombing of Outer Mongolian territory by your air units… . Since this action is in fundamental disagreement with policy which we understood your army was taking to settle incident, it is extremely regretted that advance notice of your intent was not received. Needless to say, this matter is attended with such farreaching consequences that it can by no means be left to your unilateral decision. Hereafter, existing policy will be definitely and strictly observed. It is requested that air attack program be discontinued immediately" By Order of the Chief of Staff  By this time, Kwantung Army staff officers stood in high dudgeon. Tsuji later wrote that "tremendous combat results were achieved by carrying out dangerous operations at the risk of our lives. It is perfectly clear that we were carrying out an act of retaliation. What kind of General Staff ignores the psychology of the front lines and tramples on their feelings?" Tsuji drafted a caustic reply, which Kwantung Army commanders sent back to Tokyo, apparently without Ueda or other senior KwAHQ officers' knowledge: "There appear to be certain differences between the Army General Staff and this Army in evaluating the battlefield situation and the measures to be adopted. It is requested that the handling of trivial border-area matters be entrusted to this Army." That sarcastic note from KwAHQ left a deep impression at AGS, which felt something had to be done to restore discipline and order. When General Nakajima informed the Throne about the air raid, the emperor rebuked him and asked who would assume responsibility for the unauthorized attack. Nakajima replied that military operations were ongoing, but that appropriate measures would be taken after this phase ended. Inada sent Terada a telegram implying that the Kwantung Army staff officers responsible would be sacked in due course. Inada pressed to have Tsuji ousted from Kwantung Army immediately, but personnel matters went through the Army Ministry, and Army Minister Itagaki, who knew Tsuji personally, defended him. Tokyo recognized that the situation was delicate; since 1932, Kwantung Army had operated under an Imperial Order to "defend Manchukuo," a broad mandate. Opinions differed in AGS about how best to curb Kwantung Army's operational prerogatives. One idea was to secure Imperial sanction for a new directive limiting Kwantung Army's autonomous combat actions to no more than one regiment. Several other plans circulated. In the meantime, Kwantung Army needed tighter control. On June 29, AGS issued firm instructions to KwAHQ: Directives: a) Kwantung Army is responsible for local settlement of border disputes. b) Areas where the border is disputed, or where defense is tactically unfeasible, need not be defended. Orders: c) Ground combat will be limited to the border region between Manchukuo and Outer Mongolia east of Lake Buir Nor. d) Enemy bases will not be attacked from the air. With this heated exchange of messages, the relationship between Kwantung Army and AGS reached a critical moment. Tsuji called it the "breaking point" between Hsinking and Tokyo. According to Colonel Inada, after this "air raid squabble," gekokujo became much more pronounced in Hsinking, especially within Kwantung Army's Operations Section, which "ceased making meaningful reports" to the AGS Operations Section, which he headed. At KwAHQ, the controversy and the perception of AGS interference in local affairs hardened the resolve of wavering staff officers to move decisively against the USSR. Thereafter, Kwantung Army officers as a group rejected the General Staff's policy of moderation in the Nomonhan incident. Tsuji characterized the conflict between Kwantung Army and the General Staff as the classic clash between combat officers and "desk jockeys." In his view, AGS advocated a policy of not invading enemy territory even if one's own territory was invaded, while Kwantung Army's policy was not to allow invasion. Describing the mindset of the Kwantung Army (and his own) toward the USSR in this border dispute, Tsuji invoked the samurai warrior's warning: "Do not step any closer or I shall be forced to cut you down." Tsuji argued that Kwantung Army had to act firmly at Nomonhan to avoid a larger war later. He also stressed the importance, shared by him and his colleagues, of Kwantung Army maintaining its dignity, which he believed was threatened by both enemy actions and the General Staff. In this emotionally charged atmosphere, the Kwantung Army launched its July offensive. The success of the 2nd Air Group's attack on Tamsag Bulak further inflated KwAHQ's confidence in the upcoming offensive. Although aerial reconnaissance had been intentionally limited to avoid alarming or forewarning the enemy, some scout missions were flown. The scouts reported numerous tank emplacements under construction, though most reports noted few tanks; a single report of large numbers of tanks was downplayed at headquarters. What drew major attention at KwAHQ were reports of large numbers of trucks leaving the front daily and streaming westward into the Mongolian interior. This was interpreted as evidence of a Soviet pullback from forward positions, suggesting the enemy might sense the imminent assault. Orders were issued to speed up final preparations for the assault before Soviet forces could withdraw from the area where the Japanese "meat cleaver" would soon dismember them. What the Japanese scouts had actually observed was not a Soviet withdrawal, but part of a massive truck shuttle that General Grigori Shtern, now commander of Soviet Forces in the Far East, organized to support Zhukov. Each night, Soviet trucks, from distant MPR railway depots to Tamsag Bulak and the combat zone, moved eastward with lights dimmed, carrying supplies and reinforcements. By day, the trucks returned westward for fresh loads. It was these returning trucks, mostly empty, that the Japanese scouts sighted. The Kwantung interpretation of this mass westbound traffic was a serious error, though understandable. The Soviet side was largely ignorant of Japanese preparations, partly because the June 27 air raid had disrupted Soviet air operations, including reconnaissance. In late June, the 23rd Division and Yasuoka's tank force moved from Hailar and Chiangchunmiao toward Nomonhan. A mix of military and civilian vehicles pressed into service, but there was still insufficient motorized transport to move all troops and equipment at once. Most infantry marched the 120 miles to the combat zone, under a hot sun, carrying eighty-pound loads. They arrived after four to six days with little time to recover before the scheduled assault. With Komatsubara's combined force of about 15,000 men, 120 guns, and 70 tanks poised to attack, Kwantung Army estimated Soviet-MPR strength near Nomonhan and the Halha River at about 1,000 men, perhaps ten anti-aircraft guns, ten artillery pieces, and several dozen tanks. In reality, Japanese air activity, especially the big raid of June 27, had put the Soviets on alert. Zhukov suspected a ground attack might occur, though nothing as audacious as a large-scale crossing of the Halha was anticipated. During the night of July 1, Zhukov moved his 11th Tank Brigade, 7th Mechanized Brigade, and 24th Mechanized Infantry Regiment (36th Division) from their staging area near Tamsag Bulak to positions just west of the Halha River. Powerful forces on both sides were being marshaled with little knowledge of the enemy's disposition. As the sun scorched the Mongolian steppes, the stage was set for a clash that would echo through history. General Komatsubara's 23rd Division, bolstered by Yasuoka's armored might and the skies commanded by Gigi's air group, crept toward the Halha River like a predator in the night. Fifteen thousand Japanese warriors, their boots heavy with dust and resolve, prepared to cross the disputed waters and crush what they believed was a faltering foe. Little did they know, Zhukov's reinforcements, tanks rumbling like thunder, mechanized brigades poised in the shadows, had transformed the frontier into a fortress of steel. Miscalculations piled like sand dunes: Japanese scouts mistook supply convoys for retreats, while Soviet eyes, blinded by the June raid, underestimated the impending storm. Kwantung's gekokujo spirit burned bright, defying Tokyo's cautions, as both sides hurtled toward a brutal reckoning. What began as border skirmishes now threatened to erupt into full-scale war, testing the mettle of empires on the edge. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Patrols in May led to failed Japanese offensives, like Colonel Yamagata's disastrous assault and the Azuma detachment's annihilation. Tensions rose with air raids, including Japan's June strike on Soviet bases. By July, misjudged intelligence set the stage for a major confrontation, testing imperial ambitions amid global war clouds.

The J2/J3 100 Year Vision League kicked off at the weekend, so Jon Steele and James Taylor got together to discuss the big talking points from the opening round of fixtures. In part 1, Jon reviews the East groups, with a particular focus on Yokohama FC v Yamagata, then picks his East MBP and games to watch for matchday 2 (to 24:25). Then in part 2, James talks about Imabari v Kanazawa and Kagoshima v Miyazaki, discusses the postponements, picks a West MBP and games to watch (to end).   Thank you for your support of the J-Talk Podcast and J-Talk: Extra Time. *Join the J-Talk Podcast Patreon here: https://patreon.com/jtalkpod *Find our JLeague Chat Discord server here: https://discord.gg/UwN2ambAwg *Follow JTET on Bluesky here: @jtalket.bsky.social

Sprinter Ryota Yamagata, 100m Japan Record Holder, to Be Keio Univ. Lecturer

On today’s episode of HI Now Daily, we're two weeks away from Valentine's Day so we're stopping by Watanabe Floral to check out what deals they've got in store for you! Plus, Honolulu Med Spa breaks down what whole-body health really means. Then, we’re introducing the new host of HI Now Japan seeing the first interview of her trip to Yamagata.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Listen to this podcast featuring highlights from our expert roundtable discussion to learn about the most pressing issues in pediatric influenza vaccines, including current vaccine technologies, recent vaccine uptake and epidemiologic trends, and how to discuss the vast benefits of timely vaccination in pediatric patients with their parents and caregivers. Topics covered include:Groups at High Risk for ComplicationsGuideline Recommendations for Influenza VaccinationAvailable Seasonal Flu Vaccine Formulations and Their CharacteristicsPractical Considerations for Selecting Pediatric Influenza VaccinesUptake of Influenza Vaccines in Children: Reversing the TrendsPresenters:Ravi Jhaveri, MD, FIDSA, FPIDS, FAAPDivision HeadPediatric Infectious DiseasesAnn & Robert H. Lurie Children's Hospital of ChicagoProfessor of PediatricsNorthwestern University Feinberg School of MedicineChicago, IllinoisTina Q. Tan, MD, FAAP, FIDSA, FPIDSProfessor of PediatricsFeinberg School of Medicine of Northwestern UniversityPediatric Infectious Diseases AttendingMedical Director, International Adoptee ClinicPresident, Lurie Medical/Dental StaffAnn & Robert H. Lurie Children's Hospital of ChicagoChicago, IllinoisJennifer M. Walsh, DNP, CPNP-PC, CNECertified Pediatric Nurse Practitioner, Primary CareAssistant ProfessorGeorge Washington UniversitySchool of NursingWashington, DCLink to full program: https://bit.ly/45UVzy6Get access to all of our new episodes by subscribing to the Decera Clinical Education Infectious Diseases Podcast on Apple Podcasts, YouTube Music, or Spotify. Hosted by Simplecast, an AdsWizz company. See pcm.adswizz.com for information about our collection and use of personal data for advertising.

Rachel Yamagata is an accomplished musician and singer who has recorded several acclaimed albums, including Starlit Alchemy just a few months ago, and performed and recorded with the likes of Rhett Miller, Jason Mraz, and Bright Eyes. When she's not making beautiful music, she's watching her back yard like a hawk. Like a hawk that takes on several ambitious backyard projects. Relax in Rachel's sonic virtual yard and drift off while she tells you about the persistent squirrels, whether you can ever have enough gravel, why you actually can't ever have enough gravel, and why it's so important to call Cobra Kai to deal with snakes. No, not the morally ambiguous Karate Kid dojo, just this guy Kai who happens to be really good with snakes. The critters are all taken care of. Shh. Sleep time.Listen to Rachael's latest album, Starlit Alchemy, on the streaming service of your choice. Find out more about Rachel by visiting her website, www.RachaelYamagata.com.Hey Sleepy Heads, is there anyone whose voice you'd like to drift off to, or do you have suggestions on things we could do to aid your slumber?Email us at: sleepwithcelebs@maximumfun.org.Follow the Show on:Instagram @sleepwcelebsBluesky @sleepwithcelebsTikTok @SleepWithCelebsJohn is on Bluesky @JohnMoeJohn's acclaimed, best-selling memoir, The Hilarious World of Depression, is now available in paperback._________________________________________________________________________Join | Maximum FunIf you like one or more shows on MaxFun, and you value independent artists being able to do their thing, you're the perfect person to become a MaxFun monthly member. Photo Credit: Eric Daniels @ericwdanielss

Happy New Year, everyone! In a vainglorious attempt to get 2026 off to a flying start, we do our best to review the J2 season across a pair of bumper episodes (Part 2 is on the way). In the early stages of this pod, James and Jon wax lyrical about a quartet of J2 clubs: champions Mito (Start to 04:30), runners-up Nagasaki (04:30 to 08:30), as well defeated Play-Off sides Tokushima (08:30 to 11:00) and Iwata (11:00 to 15:45). Then there's a chance for James to take a breather as Jon chats in-depth to special guest contributor Steve Fryer about another team vanquished in the Play-Offs, Omiya (15:45 to 59:40). James is back on deck to talk to Jon about a further trio of teams after that: Tosu (59:40 to 01:03:55), Yamagata (01:03:55 to 01:08:00), and finally Imabari (01:08:00 to 01:12:55). The pod ends with dynamite drop-ins from two of our regular club-specific contributors: Martin Spivey tells us all about Akita's 2025 campaign (01:12:55 to 01:21:40), before Leslie Mabon does similar for Iwaki (01:21:40 to Finish). We hope everyone enjoys the bumper pod - thank you to all of our contributors! *Support The J-Talk Podcast Patreon here: https://www.patreon.com/jtalkpod *Join in with the discussion on our JLeague Chat Discord server: https://discord.gg/6Tr3MBAy

Sprinter Ryota Yamagata, Holder of 100m Japan Record, Announces His Marriage

Bereaved people and others Thursday gathered to remember the victims of a train derailment accident that occurred in Shonai, Yamagata Prefecture, northeastern Japan, 20 years ago.

In April two years ago, in Oguni Town, Yamagata Prefecture, a bullet fired by a hunter engaged in a bear extermination operation struck another man in the leg, causing serious injuries that resulted in permanent aftereffects. The injured man has filed a lawsuit against the town, seeking approximately 30 million yen in damages. Episode notes: ‘Man Disabled in Bear Cull Shooting; Town Seeks Damages from Hunter': https://barrierfreejapan.com/2025/12/15/man-disabled-in-bear-cull-shooting-town-seeks-damages-from-hunter/

I would like to thank Patreon member Xizer for suggesting this one, as Xizer put it    “An in depth look at General Kanji Ishiwara would be interesting. The man was the architect for the Mukden Incident that led to the Second Sino Japanese War, but he was vehemently opposed to the abuse and exploitation Japan's colonialism indulged in. His vocal condemnation of the brutality and excesses of the Imperial Japanese military foreign policy and Tojo in particular led to his removal, but he couldn't be executed for popularity in the rank and file. Even at the trials after the war he remained defiant, declaring that President Truman should be tried alongside the Axis War criminals for firebombing Japanese cities. He was truly a fascinating figure.   Indeed Kanji Ishiwara is a fascinating character and his story has a startling impact on the Pacific War and global history as a whole. Now by the time I am reading this the script got out of hand, its a long one haha, so it might have to be a multi parter, but I want to limit the first part to Ishiwara and how the Mukden Incident occurred first. It might come further down the road but I will finish the story of this fascinating man later on after hitting up more Patrons desired subjects, without further adieu enjoy part one of Kanji Ishiwara.    Kanji Ishiwara was born in Tsuruoka, Yamagata prefecture on January 18th of 1889. He was the second son of a policeman who was a descendent of a samurai family serving the Shonai Domain. His clan supported the Tokugawa Shogunate during the Boshin War and as a result of their defeat, alongside other Shogunal allied clans would see themselves shut off from larger governmental positions in Meiji Era Japan. Not to go too deep down that rabbit hole, but domains like Choshu and Satsuma would see the lionshare of higher positions, while domains who served on the opposite side would be cast out more.   Ishiware began his army career at the military preparatory school in Sendai at the age of 13, followed up by 2 years at the Central military preparatory school in tokyo. In 1907 he entered the military academy as a member of its 21st class. He left the academy in july of 1909 with the commission of Lieutenant and an assignment as platoon commander of an infantry regiment in Tohoku. After the annexation of Korea in 1910 his regiment was shipped over to the peninsula and he served at Ch'unch'on in a small garrison. After two years of occupation duty, Ishiwara returned to Tohoku and in 1915 passed the examinations necessary to enter the Army Staff college. He held an outstanding record, graduating top of his class in november of 1918 and would be amongst the elite ranks of the Gunto Gumi, receiving the imperial sword.   Now in 1920 he had a frustrating assignment with the department of military training he applied for service in China and received an assignment to the Central china garrison in Hankow. He spent a year traveling through central china before returning back to Tokyo in 1921 where he worked as a lecturer at the army staff college. He sought another China assignment, but his superiors sent him instead to Europe, as they did with all their promising young officers. He went to Germany for 3 years, studying languages and military history. In 1925, he was now a Major, 36 years of age and he received an assignment to the faculty of the army staff college to lecture about the history of war. Now from the very beginning of his character, Ishiwara proved himself a very unconventional officer. He was on the eccentric side, quite argumentative and burdened with a lot of health problems. He had multiple kidney infections, gastro-intestinal problems, tympanitis and other ailments that clawed at him. You also cant forget his ancestry which was important to the Japanese military even in the 1930s. Many of those that came from a disgraced clan had the habit of going above and beyond in terms of imperial loyalty, sort of like a way to rid themselves of the stigma of distrust that was seen in the early Meiji years.   Ishiwara was a bit bizarre, he was nonconforming, quite an independent spirit you would say. Many biographers of his point out, while he held an outstanding record in his education, this went alongside things like his disregard for military punctilio, such as his dress and appearance. In his early career he spoke out against inequalities he saw within the military such as what he saw as favoritism for staff college graduates. Such talk was quite reckless. He read a lot about politics, religion, history and philosophy, he seemed to have quite the restless mind. His behavior drew attention from his colleagues, many deeming him brilliant.   Now everyone in any military has to learn about military history, but not all seek to learn it outside the required readings and such. Ishiwara is one of those rare individuals who was obsessed with learning more about military history. He read about the Russo Japanese war and took quite a critical look at it. He believed the Japanese victory was due to a large part because of luck. He thought Japan had taken the von Moltke strategy of annihilation, but Russia was simply to large to be dislodged from Asia with a swift stroke. If Russia had preserved herself better, he believed Japan would have lost and it was only by a peculiar set of circumstances that Japan had avoided a war of endurance. Ishiwara believed if such a set of circumstance occurred again, Japan defense planning would need to change dramatically to base itself on the realities of modern warfare. This led him to read thoroughly about WW1 in europe and he looked critically at the differences between a short duration vs long duration war. How prolonged conflicts eventually became total wars where politics, economics and social order played larger roles, than just that of the military. This led him to think of categories for different types of war such as “kessenteki senso / decisive war” and “jizokuteki senso / continuous war”. He viewed these two types as flowing back and forth throughout history, in a cyclical rhythm.    While in Germany he studied Clausewitz, von Moltke and the works of Hans Delbruck. He was particularly taken by Delbrucks niederwerfungstragie “strategy of annihilation, the decisive battle” and ermattungsstrategie “the strategy of exhaustion”. He could see his own theorizes more fleshed out in such works and took quite a liking to them. This brought him to analyze the Napoleonic war as the archetype of the war of annihilation and the wars of Frederick the Great as that of a war of exhaustion.    Now further on in his studies, Ishiwara became convinced like many of his colleagues, that Japan and the United States for reasons of power and ideology were on a set course for war. He also concluded such a war would be a protracted one, that of a strategy of exhaustion. But how could Japan prepare for such a protracted war when her natural resources were so clearly inadequate. This led him to think more so about Asia. Ishiwara believed Asia was an entity distinctly different from the west. He held beliefs that Asia should be liberated and unite. During the Xinhai revolution of 1911, as a young cadet in Korea, Ishiwara was quite excited by the idea China might revitalize itself, but he became disillusioned during his time in China later. In the 1920's he dealt with bandits, warlord era conflicts, chaos and disorder, seeing poverty everywhere, all of this shattered his image of China progressing and reforming herself. He wrote this during that time “Looking at the situation in China, I came to harbor grave doubts as to the political capacities of the chinese race and came to feel that, though they were a people of high cultural attainment, it was impossible for them to construct a modern state”. Despite how disappointed he was with the political problems of China, he was likewise disgusted with how his Japanese colleagues treated the Chinese. He recalled feelings of shame when he saw fellow colleagues in Hankow descending from rickshaws and tossing coins to the ground at the rickshaw mens feet. He would constantly write of how the Japanese needed to shed their racial superiority feelings, but funny enough he would write this alongside his beliefs it was necessary for Japan to help guide nations like China to their destiny. While he may have held beliefs in racial equality between Japan and China, he certainly did not think the same of China's politics. Like the majority of his colleagues he believed China required reform and modernization that Japan should usher in. To Ishiwara the issue at hand was if Japan did not help China, the west would aggressively do so and thus subjugate her further. To Ishiwara China needed liberation. Ishiwara also linked the incoming war between Japan and the United States to play a large role for what would occur between China and Japan.   Ishiwara like many Japanese officers held beliefs concerning the Kokutai. I will try to summarize exactly what the Kokutai is, but honestly its a unbelievably complex cultural phenomenon. The Kokutai was a spiritual motive force that influenced the Japanese military. It can be viewed as the national character of Japan. Japan was a constitutional monarchy that held the Kokutai (national body or character)  and Seitai (government body/structure). Thus there was in reality two ideologies, one held the traditional belief focusing on that of the emperor and that of the official government. If I were to give you a overly confusing summary, I would tell you “Japan is run by the emperor and the government simultaneously” this of course if confusing as hell, and it should be. Article 4 of the former Japanese constitution held “the emperor is the head of the empire, combining in himself the right of sovereignty, uniting the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government, although subject to the consent of the imperial diet”. Its like saying you have an absolute monarch, but he will be listening and following the democratically elected people. This contradiction would lead to the Pacific War. A large issue that would emerge is that the constitution literally said the navy and army were controlled by the Emperor and not the political diet. Thus many in the military viewed themselves subject to the Kokutai, which as an ideology would evolve dramatically from the Meiji era to the Showa Era. For example, what if you are a military high ranking officer who views the political elites as nothing more than criminals, taking the emperor hostage against his will and thus against the will of the Japanese people. Well this might lead you to try and overthrow the government to make sure the Emperor was really in charge as you think he should be. A real rabbit hole I could go down.   Ishiwara had a unique view of the Kokutai. In his early education he wrote this about his doubt on understanding it as a principal. “Even though I, myself, because of my training…had come to have an unshakeable faith in the kokutai I began to lack confidence that I could imparts this belief to others –to the common soldier, to the civilian, to non-Japanese”. His issue was how did the Kokutai apply outside Japan? How could its value transcend the national boundaries and interests of Japan? If a Japanese soldier was to sacrifice his life for the Kokutai, how did this take on any meaning for men of all races? How could the kokutai's supra-national value by linked to other outside ideologies?   Ishiwara found some answers to these questions in Nichiren Buddhism. It seems here he was able to combine his conceptions about war, history and national purpose. Now Ishiwara did not come from a religious family. He dabbled in christianity for a bit, but did not pursue it. Shinto likewise did not sufficiently fulfill Shiwara' beliefs. Nichiren Buddhism is strongly patriotic, has a apocalyptic character to it and represents a holy mission to be the religion for all mankind with the center of propagation as Japan. There was this kind of quasi idea of world regeneration behind it with Japan as the moral righteous leader. Thus as you can imagine the Kokutai and Nichiren buddhism sort of fit like a glove in many ways.    Utilizing Nichiren Buddhism, the kokutai could be raised from its purely national dogma and be amplified to the entire world. Ishiwara was introduced to all of this by Tanaka Chigaku who was part of the Kokuchukai “national pillar society” a nichiren nationalist organization with an HQ in tokyo. After attending a public meeting held by Tanaka, he quickly converted to Kokuchukai and he would write down in his journal “I was attracted to the Nichiren faith's view of the kokutai”. Nichiren buddhism.    One aspect of Kokuchukai's nichirenism that greatly appealed to Ishiwara was its combative passages. Ishiwara would justify and attribute much of the military force Japan used on the asian continent drawing parallels to Nicherns idea of drawing the sword to defend righteousness. He often quoted nichirens statement “that the significance of the art of war appears in the wonderful law”. Ishiwara become engulfed by the nichiren doctrine and came to believe in its prediction that there would be a “Zendai mimon no dai toso / titanic world conflict, unprecedented in human history”, something like a global armageddon. After this would come a reign of universal and eternal peace under the harmony of “the wonderful law”.   While in Germany Ishiwara became convinced that if Japan and the United States were destined for war and the US won that war, the kokutai would be destroyed. He took the trans-siberian railway enroute back to Japan and stopped in Harbin. There he met with Nichiren believers and he spoke to them about his idea of “a final war”. He stated he believed it would come through religious prediction and his military analysis. He warned everyone Japan must hasten herself for it and that “the final war is fast approaching”. Ishiwara came back to Japan in 1925 fired up with conviction to lecture at the army staff college about his final war. His audience was the army's bright and youthful officers. He taught them Frederican and Napoleonic campaigns, Moltke and WW1 and of course his thoughts on the future conflict before them all. The Army staff college continuously called for him to expand his lectures because they were so popular. Then in 1927 he drafted an essay titled “Genzai oyobi shorai Nihon no kokubo / Japan's present and future national defense”. Here he spoke about the inevitable war between the US and Japan. These were quite provocative and took a hell of a lot of attention from colleagues. Later on in april of 1931, he would brief his fellow Kwantung officers using the essay, arguing the need for decisive action on the asian mainland.   In 1928 he would have given another course on European war, but he came down with influenza and was forced to take leave. As he was getting better he was hit with a case of tympanitis in his ear and had to be hospitalized for 6 months. It was to be one of many ailments that would grind at his health. He eventually was drawn into an elite study circle to talk about war theories led by Major Suzuki. The group consisted of young reformist type officers who talked about political and military issues. He carried on his work on the final war and eventually wrote “Sensoshi taikan / general outline of the history of war” which was delivered as a lecture before Kwantung officers at Changch'un in Manchuria on July 4th of 1929. It would receive revisions in 1931, 1938 and became a book of the same title after 1941. As he began lecturing using Sensoshi taiken he also circulated amongst an inner circle within the Kwantung army “kokuun tenkai no konpon kokusakutaru man-mo mondai kaiketsuan / Plan for the solution of the Manchuria and Mongolia problem as a basic national policy to revolutionize our country's destiny”, what a title. As you might guess the plan called for occupying Manchuria in preparation for the upcoming war with America. By the way, all of his lectures and works would gain so much fame, he was asked in 1936 to adapt the materials for a text on military history for Emperor Hirohito.    Now the 1930's were quite a tense time for Japan. The Japanese leadership saw Marxism everywhere, and believed it was withering away their nation. Japanese liberal types were arguing the military budget was out of hand, many were calling for reduction. To Ishiwara it was insanity, how could Japan not arm itself? Marxists preached communism would save Japan; Liberals preached true democracy would save Japan; Ishiwara and many in the army preached the Kokutai would save Japan. Ishiwara preached his final war theories and that the coming apocalypse would not see an American synthesis, but a supreme victory for the Japanese kokutai that would unify the world. “Japan must be victorious not for the sake of her own national interest, but for the salvation of the world. The last war in human history is approaching, Nichiren's titanic world conflict, unprecedented in human history”.   From the offset of his initial theories, Ishiwara believed the final war would be a strategy of exhaustion. But WW1 and the 1920's brought technological advances such as tanks, poison gas and the airplane. The airplane in particular made Ishiwara believe the defensive stalemate seen in WW1 was coming to an end. Airpower could deliver bomb loads past all known defenses such as naval surface units, fortresses, armies with automatic weapons. He believed the final war would see absolute horrors brought upon the greatest cities of the world. London, Shanghai, Paris even Tokyo would be wiped out within a day of the commencement of hostilities. Air bombardment would deliver victory and he would be quite right about that in regards to what would happen to Japan. He believed such a war would be waged only once and “we will enter an age where war will become impossible because of the ultimate development of war technology”.   Ishiwara argued Japan must directly or indirectly control Manchuria and to a lesser degree over parts of China. He asserted Japan had a moral obligation to the asian continent and a special relationship to Manchuria and China. China must be stabilized, for her people were threatened by turmoil, corruption and conflict. He argued Japan would be eventually obliged for the sake of peace and the welfare of the Chinese people to take a more active effort to stabilize her, particularly in Manchuria. He wrote in 1930 “To save China, which has known no peace, is the mission of Japan, a mission, which, at the same time, is the only means for the salvation of Japan itself. To accomplish this task it is an urgent matter that the interference of the United States be eliminated”. Ironically, he was advocating that in order to prepare for a conflict with the US, Japan must take a stronger hand in Manchuria and China…which would probably force the United States to confront her. He advocated against the strategy of a decisive battle at sea, instead emphasizing a continental strategy. “If the worst comes about and the war at sea turns against us, if proper measures have been taken, Japanese forces on the Asian mainland can be made self-sufficient and the war continued.” Above all else, Manchuria was the key, alongside parts of Mongolia and China.    In 1931 he began writing about how China needed to reform and it would be in her best interest to accept Japanese guidance. He saw China as the most valuable ally to be beside Japan in the event of war with the United States. If anything he argued Japan must try to not become involved in a war with China, every effort should be made to avoid provoking such an event. Yet as he continued his writing he began to see the diplomatic issues play out between China and Japan and came to the conclusion, “every attempt should be made to avoid provoking China, but in the event that it is impossible to bring about China's understanding, then Nanking should be swiftly attacked and north and central China occupied” way to go 0-60. His attitudes to Britain and Russia were quite similar, every effort should be made to remain friendly, but in the case of war Hong Kong and Malaya should be quickly occupied or in the case of the USSR, predetermined objectives inside Siberia should be seized quickly.    Now lets talk about Manchuria, specifically Manchuria in the late 1920's. Manchuria was in a huge tug of war between Russia, China and Japan. Her ties to China proper were severed by years of warlordism allowing Japan to grow her position. For Japan, the quote “manchurian problem” as it would be known centered on a single question “how to consolidate and expand it under Japanese influence in the face of an expanding China”. Japan saw 3 viable methods, taking control over the south manchuria railway, using the kwantung army and Japanese colonists, the good old filibuster approach. Each of these 3 methods offered different approaches to the same problem which of course would have very different outcomes.    Controlling the railway allowed quite a lot of control over southern Manchuria. The issue with this of course being Japan having to constantly fight off Chinese political efforts against such control. Zhang Zuolin, the Tiger of Manchuria and arguably greatest of the warlords of China held control over Manchuria and was firmly acting in Japanese interests, but for how long would he play ball? To the Kwantung Army members operating in and around Manchuria, the northern expedition of Chiang Kai-shek was getting out of hand and threatening Zhang Zuolin and thus their interests as well. Anti-Japanese sentiment was only getting worse as the northern expedition climbed north. The Kwangtung army sought more than anything to assert and retain their control over Manchuria, because it offered a buffer against the USSR. Anything that threatened that control had to be dealt with. Ultimately it was believed by many in the Kwantung Army that Manchuria would have to be separated officially from China and in order for this to occur, Japan would most likely need to use force.    Senior officers of the Kwantung army were invited in June of 1927 for a meeting called upon by Premier Tanaka Giichi. The purpose of the meeting was to formulate Japan's policy toward China and Manchuria. A more radical Kwantung army group headed by Colonel Komoto Daisaku sought to eliminate Zhang Zuolin, as he was increasingly being seen as a major obstacle to Japanese ambitions in Manchuria. Well they would do just that in 1928 when Zhang Zuolin was assassinated via a bomb placed on train tracks known as the Huanggutun incident. The assassination did not work out as the Kwantung Army officers thought it would. Instead of their groomed puppet General Yang Yuting taking up the role as leader of Manchuria, it went instead to Zhang Zuolin's son, Zhang Xueliang, who lets just say was not too happy the Japanese had obviously killed his father. Thus the Kwantung Army did not assert the forceful policy they wanted in Manchuria, they had actually made it worse for them.   The half-hearted investigation into those responsible for killing Zhang Zuolin, led to the removal of Colonel Komoto from his post. Tanaka's cabinet was toppled. The Kwantung army were now embarrassed and angry that their stance in Manchuria was weakened. The Japanese colonists within Manchuria felt more threatened and called more so upon the Kwantung army for protection against Chinese nationalists wishing to kick them out. The Kwantung army was grasping at straws trying to think of a way to sever Manchuria from China. In 1928, Ishiwara was a lt colonel and he was consulted in length by Kwantung officers about his views on the Manchurian problem. While he had not fully hashed out his Final War theory by this point, he nonetheless spoke about the fundamentals of it, arguing the necessity of taking action to control Manchuria. For the next few years, all efforts were made by Kwantung officers to influence policy towards Manchuria. Ishiwara's ideas were being stimulated and influencing the debate over Manchuria amongst his high ranking colleagues. In October of 1928, Ishiwara sought and received an appointment to the Kwantung army staff. The assignment was to be as an operations officer and his number one backer was Colonel Komoto Daisaku. It seemed Komoto saw Ishiwara as the firebrand necessary to push the Manchurian policies they wanted.   When Ishiwara arrived at Port Arthur, he found the Kwantung Army HQ in a state of confusion and demoralization. This of course was a large part due to the cluster fuck of a failure from the bombing of Zhang Zuolin. The investigation into the assassination led to many shifts within the Kwantung army staff, many quite restrictive. Even though Komoto's career was shattered by the Zhang Zuolin failure, he kept arguing to his colleagues that the Manchurian crisis hamukdend to be resolved by force. Ishiwara it seems agreed with this and during the early months of 1929 worked alongside Komoto, planning operations against Chinese forces in the Mukden area. By spring of 1929, Komoto was officially being kicked out. By May he was relegated to a divisional backwater in Japan and by June he was out of the army. This did not mean however that he lost influence on Manchurian affairs. Komoto's replacement was Lt Colonel Itagaki Seishiro and old comrade of Ishiwara since Sendai military preparatory school.    For the next two and a half years, Ishiwara and Itagaki worked alongside other Kwantung Army staff to solve the Manchurian problem as they saw it. By the mid 1931's the idea Manchuria needed to be seized via force was now the mainstream viewpoint for the Kwantung army in general. Ishiwara believed firmly that Japan could no longer stand idle in Manchuria, because every day that went by saw little by little, Japan relinquishing rights and interests in Manchuria to China, and at some point they would simply be kicked out. To “quit manchuria” would be a national disaster, they would lose their buffer state, the resources and the land for their booming population to emigrate to. Simply put Manchuria was the steroid keeping Japan alive, she needed it to continue to grow. Ishiwara would often say “manchuria provides Japan with breathing space” where have we heard that type of talk before?. To the military heads in Tokyo Ishikawa would often assert Manchuria had to be seized via force, because of the soviethreat of the USSR and communism as a whole “In view of the traditional russian policy in that area, once the soviets advanced into manchuria, it would become a base for the communization of asia. Not only would the internal stability of manchuria become impossible to maintain, but Japan would be unable to maintain its own national defense, and China's defenses, too, would become imperialized". The Army HQ in Tokyo likewise agreed Manchuria was the vital defensive line against the USSR. But unlike the Kwantung army who sought all of Manchuria, the heads in Tokyo sought to absorb southern Manchuria via the south manchurian railway and did not seek anything north of it. Ishiwara however assumed the only way Japan could prevent the USSR from placing pressure on southern Manchuria was no less that Japan having to occupy northern Manchuria and even further north towards the Amur River so Japan could control the mountain ranges flanking western and eastern frontiers of northern manchuria.  Once Japan controlled northern Manchuria, Ishiwara stated in 1931 “With the solution of our defense problems in the north, we would then be free to plan an advance in any direction: to China proper, for example, or even to Southeast Asia”.   Ishiwara took all of this a step further, after Manchuria was conquered, Japan would have to somehow administer and pacify the peoples of it. Ishiwara argued the stability of Manchuria would be developed through the special talents of various races living there. The Chinese would develop the small businesses in the region, the Koreans would use their paddy farming knowledge, etc. These racial ideas would contribute to the development of Manchukuo and the greater east asia co-prosperity sphere. But above all else, Manchuria would serve the interests of Japan, many of which would be exploitative and economic in nature.    By early 1930 Ishiwara and Itagaki worked out a plan using the same strategy used during the Russo-Japanese war, a surprise night attack. The Kwantung army would assault the Liaoning area hitting important Chinese garrisons. The plans had to be meticulous as the Kwantung army was severely smaller than most of the Manchurian forces led by Zhang Xueliang. Around Mukden alone Zhang held 20,000 men well equipped with aircraft and tanks. Throughout all of Manchuria, if a war arose, Zhang could assemble roughly 250,000 troops to bear down on an enemy. The Kwantung army meanwhile could muster 10,000 men which were basically garrison units around the railway. They did not have significant aircraft nor mechanized forces at hand, and were pretty poorly equipped to boot. Ishiwara's answer to the disparity in forces called for the use of intelligence and rigorous training. He sought to perfect specific assault techniques so that when the conflict broke out, the Japanese would use lightning speed and effective concentration of force to overwhelm the Chinese. The plan overall was remarkably simplistic, wagering everything on dealing a crushing blow at the center of Zhang Xueliangs military powerbase at the Peitaying barracks at Mukden. If this fell, he predicted the enemy's morale would break, giving the Kwantung the necessary military and psychological momentum to subdue the surrounding areas. If the USSR got involved, the plan would have gone to utter shit.   One important variable Ishiwara highlighted was the necessity to pull off the operation before any attempt to restructure the domestic order in Japan occurred. Ishiwara knew his arguments and those of his colleagues would influence the heads in Tokyo, and they had to act before they did. However the heads at Tokyo and the Kwantung army held very different perspectives on when to act. In June of 1931 the Central army HQ stated in its General Outline of a solution to the Manchurian problem “we must defer the question of military action for a whole year. During this time the foreign ministry would attempt to dampen anti japanese activities in manchuria through negotiations with the government of Nanking. In the meantime the government would launch an information campaign to try and drive acquiescence at home and aboard for military action ”. Ishiwara as you can imagine was very bitter about the idea of prolonging for a year and argued the international environment meant they must strike immediately. The Soviet 5 year plan was still in mid course; the US, Britain and France had yet to overcome their financial crisis and could offer limited resistance in the far east and most obviously the Nationalist regime in China was still busy in its unification efforts south of the Great wall, but that would change soon. If they waited a year all of this would change for the worse, the time was now or never to Ishiwara.   In july of 1931 Ishiwara and Itagki organized a final major staff reconnaissance designed to get the newest Kwantung officers up to date with northern Manchuria. To cover for what they were doing they told high command it was a survey against the USSR, but it was of course to investigate the Chinese power in northern manchuria. On their return trip, the party heard of the disappearance of one Kwantung staff officer, captain Nakamura Shintaro. Ishiwara and the others found out when they reached Port Arthur and the rumor spread that Captain Nakamura had been killed by Chinese soldiers under “mysterious circumstances”. Now over the past few months there had been violent riots, murders, work strikes and other incidents occurring in Manchuria. The Nakamura affair flared all of these tensions up. Seeing the paint on the wall, Chinese and Japanese foreign ministries tried to negotiate the issue, but those at the central army HQ like Nagata Tetsuzan who were sympathetic to the impatience of their Kwantung colleagues felt compelled to aid them. For Ishiwara the issue was clear as he wrote “the Nakamura incident adds just one more issue to the others. What the army should do now is to ignore the foreign ministry and solve the problem by taking matters into its own hands”. And that is just what he did. The Kwantung officers took their forces outside the railway zone, which they had been restricted to and without waiting for approval from Itagaki who was in Japan at the time, initiated the steps to despatch an armored train and a mixed regiment of infantry and artillery forces to go to Mukden to get the Chinese military to help investigate the Nakamura disappearance. Tokyo got word of this and dispatched a telegram to stop their departure from the railway and to not use the Nakamura incident as a way to use force to solve the manchurian problem.   For Ishiwara this was the last straw. On August 20th he sent a message to Nagata condemning the current diplomatic situation and that negotiations were an utter waste of time. “There is no way to settle the matter except by placing it in the hands of the army. If central hq finds it so difficult to trust its field personnel then it had better replace them with representatives more suitable to the conditions it imagines to exist in Manchuria”. Ishiwara doubled down and pushed for a plot to provoke military conflict outside of Mukden. As he wrote in almost a messianic Nichiren conviction ‘I will be the pillar of Japan; I will be the eyes of Japan; I will be the great vessel of Japan” .   “Gekokujo / ruling from below” is a Japanese historical term referring to when subordinates defy or manipulate their superiors. Ishiwara and his like minded close colleagues were about to perform Gekokujo. On september 18th, 1931 a bomb was planted by the Kwantung army on the tracks of the south manchuria railway at Liutiaokou and it exploded. Japanese troops under the guise the bomb was a “chinese terrorist attack” moved to swiftly overrun the Peitaying barracks. Ishiwara's plot had finally unfolded. 

On The BIG Show today, we talk about the station master that retired in Yamagata, Japan! Check out the full article here: https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/cat-train-stationmaster-in-japans-yamagata-retires Connect with us on Instagram: @kiss92fm @Glennn @angeliqueteo @officialtimoh Producers: @shalinisusan97 @snailgirl2000See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Noel catches up with Rachael Yamagata. The singer-songwriter's latest album, Starlit Alchemy, is her first in over nine years. Rachael discusses the album's journey. She began her musical career with the band Bumpus before becoming a solo artist and releasing her amazing debut album, Happenstance. She was part of 30 Rock's "I Need a Kidney" episode. Rachael covered "I'm Going to Go Back There Someday" for Muppets: The Green Album. After departing Warner Bros., Rachael became an independent artist. She discusses the hurdles she's faced as one.

This month sustainability focused, Japan based consultants, educators and entrepreneurs Tove Kinooka and JJWalsh discuss Sustainable Japan Day event and awards featured by the Japan Times ⁨@thejapantimes⁩ - One Young World - Sustainability in the Himalaya mountains with Carole Fuchs - Tech for Impact event in Tokyo October - Global Perspectives workshops and INTRApreneurship training programs - Digital Collage September event ICHIGO BLOOM - Responsible Finance and Investing with Morisawa Michiyo - Wooden Barrels Craft Award Yamaroku Shoyu Shodoshima - Made-in-Japan apparel - Sustainable Forestry in Wakayama - Zero-Carbon baseball stadium HANSHIN Tigers - GLIN impact capital investments in startups with social and environmental impact - Outrage & Optimism podcast ⁨@OutrageandOptimism⁩ - HGPI Health and Environment intersection - Yamaroku Soy Sauce - Yamagata rural revival ..LINKS- Sustainable Japan day event 2025 on September 18 https://sustainable.japantimes.com/sjd-2025 - UNICHARM circularity in diaper business for babies and elderly - recycled pulp & recycle used https://www.unicharm.co.jp/en/csr-eco/education.html - One Young World https://www.oneyoungworld.com/ ⁨@OneYoungWorld⁩ - Global Perspectives workshops & Intra-preneurship training https://www.globalperspectives.biz/intrapreneurship- Tech 4 Impact Summit https://tech4impactsummit.com/- Digital Collage event in Sept 2025 Ichigo Bloom Tokyo https://ichigobloom.jp/digital-collage-explore-the-hidden-footprint-of-our-digital-lives-tokyo-21-september-2025/- Morisawa Michiyo feature about Responsible Investing https://sustainable.japantimes.com/unraveling/25- Yamaroku Shoyu SHODOSHIMA island https://yama-roku.net/en- Factelier made-in-japan clothing apparel https://factelier.com/aboutus/- WAKAYAMA sustainable forestry https://nakagawa-forestry.com/about- Hanshin Tigers Zero Carbon Baseball Stadium https://zerocarbon-bp.hanshin.co.jp/park/map.html- GLIN social and environmental impact funding, startups and investing https://glinimpact.com/en/insight/insight-investment20231017- Japan Health and Environmental policy intersection advising and diplomacy https://hgpi.org/en/- Netchu Rural Revitalization in Yamagata - reusing abandoned schools to...

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After a summer break, the JTET boys are back with a 15-minute mini-pod to clean deck before J2 returns! This time, James and Jon look back at Round 3 of the Emperor's Cup (held on 16th July) from a J2 perspective. Recording solo, James covers 5 of the pertinent matchups, with Jon (also in isolation this time) talking you though the other 5 (including Hiroshima's high-scoring win at Fujieda). Before time is up, Jon also briefs you on the forthcoming Round 24 fixtures in J2 this weekend, and casts a glance at the midweek Emperor's Cup Round of 16 games on the horizon for Akita and Yamagata. Thanks for waiting patiently for the uploads during our slow summer - we'll have a full review of J2 Round 24 as usual next week!

This month Yamagata city in Japan's Yamagata prefecture welcomed students from Swan Hill, Victoria. The two cities have shared their sister city relationship since 1980. Keina Takeda reports from Yamagata. - 山形県山形市では今月、姉妹都市であるビクトリア州スワンヒルから留学生を迎え、学生や市民との交流会が開催されました。現地から、武田恵奈のリポートです。

James Taylor and Jon Steele return with another action-packed JTET. In part 1, James rounds up 9 games from J2 matchday 21. In part 2, James and Jon discuss the recent managerial changes at Yamaguchi and Yamagata, analyse Sapporo v Kumamoto, offer a tribute to Hitoshi Morishita, select their Most Bravo Player, and preview the coming weekend's fixtures.   Thank you for your support of the J-Talk Podcast and J-Talk: Extra Time. *Join the J-Talk Podcast Patreon here: https://patreon.com/jtalkpod *Find our JLeague Chat Discord server here: https://discord.gg/UwN2ambAwg *Follow JTET on Bluesky here: @jtalket.bsky.social

James Taylor and Jon Steele are back with a bumper episode of JTET reviewing another entertaining weekend of J2. First, James has a roundup of 7 games from matchday 19 (start to 05:35). Then he was joined by Jon to discuss three goalfests: Nagasaki v Omiya (05:35 to 20:20); Yamagata v Sendai (20:20 to 33:00); and Tokushima v JEF United (33:00 to 44:00). Next, the boys choose their Most Bravo Players and discuss the J.League's monthly awards for May (44:00 to 51:40), and end the episode with a preview of the coming weekend's league fixtures (51:40 to end).   Thank you for your support of the J-Talk Podcast and J-Talk: Extra Time. *Join the J-Talk Podcast Patreon here: https://patreon.com/jtalkpod *Find our JLeague Chat Discord server here: https://discord.gg/UwN2ambAwg *Follow JTET on Bluesky here: @jtalket.bsky.social

In this week's JTET, James Taylor and Jon Steele review the latest Levain Cup and J2 action. In part 1, James has a roundup of 2 Levain Cup games and 6 league matches from matchday 17 (start to 05:45). In part 2, James and Jon talked about Iwata's cup win over Gamba Osaka (05:45 to 14:40) and Kofu's dismantling of Yamagata in the league (14:40 to 27:55), selected their Most Bravo Player (27:55 to 32:05), discussed some managerial news (32:05 to 40:15), and previewed league and cup fixtures (40:15 to end).   Thank you for your support of the J-Talk Podcast and J-Talk: Extra Time. *Join the J-Talk Podcast Patreon here: https://patreon.com/jtalkpod *Find our JLeague Chat Discord server here: https://discord.gg/UwN2ambAwg *Follow JTET on Bluesky here: @jtalket.bsky.social

Se puede decir, sin temor a equivocarse, que el Ferrari Enzo nace de una verdadera borrachera de éxitos… solo así se explica el atrevimiento de llamar Enzo a un Ferrari. Sí el Commendatore se levantase de su tumba y viese y probase el Enzo, ¿qué opinaría? ¿Le gustaría más que “su” F-40? Cualidades no le faltan, pero… Vamos a hablar de esa borrachera de éxitos. Y es que tras los títulos de Ferrari con Lauda-Scheckter la segunda mitad de la década de 1970 llegó una sequía. Ferrari ganó el Mundial de constructores en 1975, 76, 77 y 79 y Lauda el de pilotos en el 75 y 77 y Scheckter en el 79… pero luego las cosas se torcieron. No llegaban los éxitos deportivos, Enzo fallecía en 1988 y la marca italiana entraba en pérdidas. Y en esa tesitura Gianni Agnelli, todopoderoso jefe de Fiat, que ya era dueña de Ferrari, nombra a Luca Cordero di Montezemolo presidente de Ferrari. Luca es un tipo que merece un vídeo para el sollito, porque su carrera de éxitos abarca el automóvil, la Copa América de vela, el futbol o las marcas de “espirituosos” como Cinzano. Y de la mano de Luca llega la revolución: Se ficha como jefe del equipo Ferrari a Jean Todt, como piloto a Schumacher, se gana el Mundial de Constructores en 1999 para hacer el doblete en el 2000… luego llegarían un total de ¡6 consecutivos de marcas! Y ¡otros 5 consecutivos de pilotos!… y encima las ventas iban viento en popa… Era el momento de buscar un sucesor al F-50 y a primeros de los 2000 Ferrari se decide a diseñar y construir un sucesor digno a esta saga… algo realmente difícil. Ya sabéis todos lo unido que han estado siempre Ferrari y Pininfarina, su diseñador de cabecera. Y algunos, no todos, que Pininfarina no es de mis diseñadores favorito… me parecen muy buenos, pero no los mejores. En el caso del Enzo también fue responsabilidad de Pininfarina su diseño, pero fue un diseño muy personal de Ken Okuyama a quién se le encargó la responsabilidad de supervisar el diseño de este modelo… a partir de este momento, pondré especial cuidado en que distingáis lo que es opinión de lo que son datos. Vamos con los datos: Okuyama nació en Japón, concretamente en Yamagata, un año antes que yo, en 1959… o sea, que sigue siendo un chaval… Estudió diseño en el Art Center College of Design de Pasadena, California, Estados Unidos de Norteamérica. Trabajó en General Motors y luego en Porsche, donde participo en el diseño del 911 Generación 996. Y de ahí pasó a Pininfarina. Y ahora vamos con las opiniones: Okuyama tiene raíces japonesas, formación norteamericana, comienzos de influencia USA para rematar participando en el diseño del 996… ¿recordáis lo que dije en el video dedicado a la historia del 911? Os lo recuerdo: “Al responsable de los faros de este 996 habría que haberlo despedido” … ¿fue Okuyama? Por sus obras le reconoceréis y aparte del 996 y del Enzo, Okuyama ha diseñado el Ferrari 599, el Mitsubishi Colt CZC y diversos modelos de la marca japonesa Kode, entre ellos el Kode7, el Kode9 y el Kode57, en mi opinión, todos espectaculares, pero ninguno realmente bonito. Para mí no fue un acierto poner al frente de este modelo que pretendía ser un homenaje a Enzo a este diseñador… y no, no voy a decir que el Enzo sea feo, ¡ni mucho menos! pero desde luego no es el Ferrari más bonito ni desde luego, y este es su mayor pecado, el Ferrari “más Ferrari” … pero la culpa no fue solo suya, porque los ingenieros aerodinámicos se lo pusieron difícil a Okuyama. La parte frontal debía permitir una buena entrada de aire para sacar partido del efecto suelo y en la trasera, más de lo mismo, nada de alerones sustituido por un elaborado efecto suelo. El motor de 5.998 cm3 no era tan grande y pesado como pudieses esperar… por algo utilizaba tecnología de F1. El bloque era de aluminio, las bielas de titanio, con un cigüeñal muy ligero y 4 árboles de levas en culata con taqués hidráulicos. El tacto era como el de un motor de competición, con fulgurantes subidas de vueltas, pero con el tacto refinado de un coche de calle y un sonido espectacular. El rendimiento era excepcional, 660 CV a 7.800 rpm con la línea roja en las 8.200 rpm. El par era de nada menos que 657 Nm a 5.500 rpm. Eso supone una potencia especifica de 110 CV por litro de cilindrada en un motor que no necesitaba recurrir el turbo. Voy a ser sincero: Mi experiencia al volante de un Enzo ha sido limitada, apenas unas decenas de kilómetros por carretera y unas pocas, poquísimas vueltas, al circuito Fiorano, cerca de Maranello. Y siempre con un responsable de la marca en el asiento de la derecha, expectante como si te fuera a examinar… seguramente lo hacía. Me bastaron, eso sí, para entender que este modelo es realmente excepcional, probablemente un paso adelante hacia la perfección igual o mayor de lo que supuso el F40 respecto al GTO o el F50 respecto al F40. En la revista CEROaCIEN hay una comparativa del GTO, el F40 y el F50 y el afortunado y competente probador, Richard Haseltine dice dos frases que no puedo evitar transcribir literalmente. La primera: “El Ferrari Enzo redefine tu percepción de la velocidad”. Me parece una excelente definición de lo que consigue el Enzo, una eficacia de tal magnitud, sobre todo en las curvas rápidas, las “de verdad”, que te obliga a resetear tus referencias… se puede ir más rápido, mucho más rápido, de lo que imaginas. La segunda, anticipa mi conclusión: “Pocos coches pueden igualar en sensaciones y disfrute al Enzo. Pero, si hay que mojarse con una elección, el F40 le roba el espectáculo. La mayoría de los superdeportivos se van desvaneciendo con el tiempo… El F40 es diferente, su magnetismo brilla más intensamente cada año que pasa” … nada más que añadir.

After another busy weekend of J2 action, JTET is back to run through all of the big talking points from Round 4 of the 2025 season. James starts things off with a quick round-up of the bulk of the fixtures (Start to 04:15). After that, you'll hear Jon in conversation with Akita supporter Martin Spivey as they discuss his trip to ND Soft Stadium in Yamagata for the big Tohoku Derby. After talking about Martin's pleasant bus trip to the ground, and the match itself (04:15 to 26:00), the boys pick out some Most Bravo Players from Round 4 (26:00 to 35:45), and finish the pod with a short preview of the big matches coming up in Round 5 this weekend (35:45 to Finish). We hope everyone enjoys the show - thanks to Martin for delaying his dinner to chat to us! *Join The J-Talk Podcast Patreon here: https://patreon.com/jtalkpod *Find our JLeague Chat Discord server here: https://discord.gg/UwN2ambAwg *Follow JTET on Bluesky here: @jtalket.bsky.social

The JTET boys are back to pick over the bones of the opening round in J2 2025! Kicking off a new, streamlined pod format, Jon runs through the scores on the doors from Round 1 in a whistle-stop roundup (Start to 03:15). Jon then sat down with James to discuss their 'Match of the Week', focusing in detail on Omiya's return to J2 life against Yamagata at a sold-out NACK-5 Stadium in Saitama (03:15 to 20:40). The gentlemen then move on to regular segments 'Most Bravo Player' (20:40 to 25:00), then bring up the rear with a look ahead to the key games on the upcoming Round 2 slate (25:00 to Finish). Stay tuned for J3 content in 'J-Talk: Short Corner', coming soon! Please consider joining The J-Talk Podcast Patreon here: https://patreon.com/jtalkpod You can also get involved with our JLeague Chat Discord server here: https://discord.gg/UwN2ambAwg If that's not enough, JTET is on Bluesky at @jtalket.bsky.social

Send us a textEpisode 45 transports us to Tohoku in the north-east of Japan's main island of Honshu. Tohoku is a large region comprised of six prefectures – Fukushima, Yamagata, Akita, Miyagi, Iwate and Aomori – known for its open and striking landscapes and distinct local traditions. Leading us on this exploration is photographer Alfonso Calero. With more than 20 years of experience as a professional photographer, Alfonso leads small photography tours to Japan each year, including his 10-day autumn tour in Tohoku.Alfonso's tour focuses on the natural landscapes of Tohoku including the mountains, forests, lakes and rivers of Towada-Hachimantai National Park and rugged rock formations of the Sanriku Coast. The tour balances its focus on landscape with cultural destinations including Towada Art Center and the samurai district of Kakunodate. Full details of the tour can be found on Alfonso's website and you can also follow him on Instagram, Facebook and YouTube. I hope that this episode piques your interest in Alfonso's photography and tours and Tohoku as a destination. Easily accessible thanks to Japan's Shinkansen / Bullet Train network, Tohoku is in every other sense a world away from the congestion, neon and hum of Tokyo. Outland Japan is a bi-weekly podcast hosted by Peter Carnell - a freelance tour guide based in northern Nagano – that transports you to rural, regional and the wilds of Japan in pursuit of stories that lie outside the neon hum of Tokyo and golden trimmings of Kyoto. Stories of travel, life and culture beyond the big cities. Follow the show on Instagram, Facebook and YouTube. Please note, prior to October 2024, Outland Japan was named Snow Country Stories Japan.

In part three of our epic road trip through Northern Honshu, Japan, we journey deep into the spiritual heart of Yamagata Prefecture to explore the sacred Dewa Sanzan. This trio of holy mountains—Haguro, Gassan, and Yudono—offers a profound glimpse into Japan's ancient Shugendo traditions. Our focus is on Mt. Haguro, the “Mountain of the Present,” where we climb the iconic 2,446 stone steps lined with towering cedar trees and discover the breathtaking five-story pagoda, a symbol of the region's rich heritage. At the summit, we visit the Sanjingosaiden Shrine, a holy space that unites the three mountain deities. This part of the journey is both physically invigorating and spiritually rewarding, immersing travelers in the serene beauty and deep cultural significance of Japan's ancient pilgrimage routes. After our adventure at Dewa Sanzan, we unwind at Yūsuitei Isagoya, a luxurious ryokan in Yamagata. Nestled near the coast, this traditional inn offers a rejuvenating onsen experience with stunning views of the Sea of Japan. We savor a multi-course kaiseki dinner featuring fresh, seasonal ingredients unique to the region, paired with impeccable hospitality. This stop is the perfect balance of relaxation and indulgence, offering a taste of authentic Japanese luxury. Tune in to hear more about this unforgettable leg of our road trip, including tips for navigating the 2,446 stone steps of Mt. Haguro and making the most of your stay at Yūsuitei Isagoya. For more behind the scenes this and all of our explorations in Japan, be sure to check out our Destinations and Japan pages.

In this episode of Pure Life Podcast, we dive into part two of our unforgettable Northern Honshu Road Trip in Japan, this time exploring the cultural and scenic wonders of Yamagata Prefecture. Our journey begins at the breathtaking Yamadera Temple, a mountaintop complex with awe-inspiring views and serene hiking trails that make the climb well worth the effort. From the tranquil beauty of this ancient temple to the surrounding lush landscapes, we share why Yamadera is a must-visit for anyone seeking a spiritual and immersive Japanese experience. Next on this epic Northern Honshu Road Trip, we head to the enchanting Ginzan Onsen, a picturesque town straight out of Japan's Edo period. With its charming riverfront lined by traditional inns and shops, this hidden gem transports you to a bygone era. We also share highlights from our stay at the iconic Notoya Ryokan, including a humorous mishap in the onsen that's sure to make you smile. If you're looking for an off-the-beaten-path adventure filled with culture, history, and unforgettable moments, tune in for this episode packed with tips and insights to help you plan your own Yamagata getaway! For more behind the scenes this and all of our explorations in Japan, be sure to check out our Destinations and Japan pages.

It's a new year, yes it is!Happy New Year to everyone, we hope you had a lovely time and are ready for what is going to be a jam-packed week of wrestling! As a precursor, Matt flies solo this week with the Marigold Standard this week, reviewing a great Korakuen Hall show, the debut of two new rookies and the inaugural Twinstar Tag Team Cup, all before giving his predictions ahead of Marigold First Dream on January 3rd!Subscribe to our PATREON: https://patreon.com/TheStardomCast The website: https://www.talkjoshi.com Subscribe to the Podcast: https://linktr.ee/talkjoshiJoin our Discord Server: https://discord.gg/bbDcAwcTwitter: https://www.twitter.com/marigoldpodcast Buy our Merch: https://teespring.com/en-GB/stores/podmania-podcasting-network YouTube: https://tinyurl.com/2s4zrf3r Buy Rob's NEW Stardom Book – Chasing the Dream: 50 of Stardom's Greatest Matches Right Here: https://tinyurl.com/2eemszmtAdvertising Inquiries: https://redcircle.com/brandsPrivacy & Opt-Out: https://redcircle.com/privacy

After a few weeks off, J2 returned for the promotion playoffs, and James Taylor and Jon Steele have a review of the semi-finals. First, they discuss Nagasaki v Sendai (start to 15:05), then they focus on Yamagata v Okayama (15:05 to 27:00). After that, they select their Most Bravo Player and look ahead to the playoff final (27:00 to 39:40).   J3's first ever promotion playoffs also took place last weekend, and in J-Talk: Short Corner Mike Innes reviews the semi-finals: Toyama v FC Osaka (39:40 to 42:40) and Matsumoto v Fukushima (42:40 to 45:05). Mike also talks about the first leg of the relegation playoff between Kochi and YSCC (45:05 to 47:35), then previews the concluding weekend of the J3 season (47:35 to end).   Thanks as always for your support of JTET, JTSC, and the J-Talk Podcast! Join the JLeague chat Discord server here: https://discord.gg/p6PVbF9E Join the J-Talk Podcast Patreon here: https://www.patreon.com/jtalkpod

Last time we spoke about Operation Capital. In late November, General Gill's 32nd Division secured Limon and aimed for Ormoc, while General Arnold's 7th Division prepared to flank Japanese forces. Intense fighting marked the attack on Kilay Ridge, resulting in a costly victory for the Americans. Meanwhile, Japanese operations faltered as supplies dwindled. By December, Allied plans for Luzon's invasion were set, but delays in securing air support complicated the Mindoro operation. Across the seas, naval battles raged, revealing the fierce struggle for control in the Pacific. In December, the Chinese launched renewed attacks on fortified Japanese positions in Bhamo, but faced fierce resistance. While the 113th Regiment struggled, the 114th found early success aided by coordinated artillery and air support. As casualties mounted, General Honda ordered reinforcements for Hara's garrison, leading to a desperate counterattack. Despite heavy losses, Japanese forces managed to retreat to safety. Amid ongoing skirmishes, the Allies realized their strategies would need revision to face the shifting tide of battle effectively. This episode is the Fall of Ormoc Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Last we left off,  the Japanese were preparing to initiate their Wa offensive, General Arnold's troops had successfully taken control of Shoestring Ridge and were poised to launch a fresh attack aimed at Ormoc. By December 4, the tanks of the 776th Amphibian Tank Battalion were positioned near Balogo, ready to strike the enemy positions ahead of the main assault. The next morning, these tanks targeted the weakened Japanese defenses at Balogo and Tabgas before subsequently withdrawing.There were numerous finger ridges inland which were cut by deep ravines and gorges that came to within a few hundred yards of the coast line. The entrenched Japanese, using reverse slope tactics, were able to deliver deadly fire on the advancing infantry. In many cases the reverse slopes were so steep that effective artillery fire could not be placed upon them. The 2d Battalion, 184th Infantry, moved forward slowly toward a small hill which faced the Palanas River, and at 0858 it encountered enemy small arms fire from the western slope of the hill. Using grenades, the battalion pushed forward, but at 0938 the Japanese opened up with three light machine guns. The supporting weapons of the 2d Battalion fired on the enemy positions to the front. At 1037, as the battalion reached the military crest of the hill, the Japanese launched a small counterattack on the left flank of Company E. This attack was repulsed, but the companies continued to receive small arms and machine gun fire. At 1325 the 1st Battalion renewed its advance and proceeded without incident, finding the situation "very quiet" to its front. At 1435 the battalion dug in for the night approximately 300 yards south of Balogo. The 3d Battalion moved through the gap between the 1st and 2d Battalions and across the front of the 2d Battalion on the right toward Hill 380, which consisted of a series of ridges. As the 3d Battalion advanced toward the hill, it came under machine gun fire on each flank. With artillery support, the troops reached the top of the second ridge of Hill 380 and dug in, nine of the men having been wounded. At 1635 the battalions of the 184th Infantry received orders to set up night defense positions in depth and to hold the "positions at all costs." Colonel O'Sullivan decided that the 3d Battalion was to bear the brunt of the advance of the 184th Infantry on 6 December and push on to Hill 380. On the right of the 184th the 17th Infantry had had a busy day in working toward its objective, Hill 918. At 0800 on 5 December the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 17th Infantry, with the 1st Battalion on the left, had moved through the 32d Infantry. At 0906 the advance elements of the 1st Battalion secured a ridge south of the main ridge leading from Hill 918, and at 1000 the entire battalion closed on this ridge. In the face of sporadic rifle and machine gun fire, the leading platoons pushed forward to secure a ridge that led west from Hill 918. As the advance platoons neared the crest of this ridge, they received intense rifle, machine gun, and mortar fire to the front and on both flanks from the 2d Battalion, 12th Independent Infantry Regiment. At the same time the rest of the battalion, in attempting to reach a forward ridge and support the leading platoons, also encountered cross fire that came down the intervening draw. As enemy gunfire pinned down the troops, the 1st Battalion lost contact with Company G, 2d Battalion, and a gap developed between the 1st and 2d Battalions. At the end of 5 December the 17th Infantry had secured the ridge west of Hill 918 and the 184th Infantry had secured a line extending from the beach 300 yards south of Balogo east to the high ground southeast of the Palanas River. Company K, 32d Infantry, had filled a gap that had existed between the 17th and 184th Infantry Regiments, while the 3d Battalion, 184th Infantry, had crossed the Palanas River and, advancing up the southwest slope of Hill 380, reached the top of the first ridge.  The next day the 2d Battalion had driven forward with Company E on the right and Company G on the left. Company E went east along the Bucan River for approximately 1,000 yards and then turned northeast to ascend Hill 918. At first, however, the company had to secure a small ridge southwest of Hill 918 on which was a small but dense banana grove. Company E encountered and destroyed a small enemy force on this ridge, after which the company reorganized and at approximately 1300 began to ascend Hill 918 itself. When Company E reached the military crest of the hill, the Japanese began heavy firing with grenade launchers and at least three machine guns. The enemy fire swept the crest of the hill and prevented any movement over the lip of the ridge. Meanwhile, Company G went to the left of Company E and secured a small ridge about 1,200 yards from the line of departure and west of Hill 918. The advance platoon of Company G then received fire from automatic weapons that were emplaced in a draw to the left front of the platoon. The rest of the company attempted to move around to the right of the ridge but also encountered automatic weapons fire coming from another draw. Since high cogon grass covered the area, observation was limited to a matter of inches. At about 1300, elements of the 13th Independent Infantry Regiment counterattacked through a gap between Company G and Company A of the 1st Battalion. A machine gun platoon, which was thrown in to plug the gap, succeeded in stopping the attempted Japanese advance. Company G, however, continued to be pinned down by the enemy fire directed at its front. Company F, the reserve company, was then committed to take a position between G and E Companies. Its mission was to come abreast of Company E, take Hill 918, and then turn west and wipe out the resistance in front of Company G. At 1415 Company F moved up Hill 918 and reached Company E without opposition. Three spurs led down from Hill 918. The one occupied by Company E ran southwest, that occupied by Company F ran west, and the third ran northwest. As the two commanders started to launch a coordinated assault from their respective spurs, their companies received a concentration of about fifty rounds of mortar fire but pushed through this fire and secured the crests of both spurs. They immediately came under automatic weapons and rifle fire from the northwest ridge. Since the left flank of Company F was in the tall cogon grass, it was practically impossible for the company to observe the enemy. On the other hand, Company E was on bare and open ground which exposed it to machine gun and mortar fire from Hill 918. Both companies also came under long-range machine gun fire from the vicinity of Kang Dagit, northeast of Hill 918. It was impractical to attempt an envelopment to the right, since the flank of Company E rested on a deep ravine which ran to the bed of the Bagan River. An envelopment to the left would have necessitated going down the hill, circling behind Company G, and attacking east from the positions of the 1st Battalion. Because of these unfavorable conditions, Companies E and F with their wounded withdrew to make a line with Company G. Meanwhile, the Japanese continued their preparations for Operation Wa, which was already set to fail from the outset. General Makino's 16th Division could only advance a composite battalion of 500 men, which incurred 200 casualties en route. Additionally, General Yamagata's 26th Division was still mobilizing to reach the assembly area, with only one forward battalion prepared for action. Consequently, feeling inadequately prepared, General Suzuki requested a delay in the attack, and General Yamashita effectively rescheduled it to the night of December 6. From his new headquarters in Lubi, Suzuki communicated this update to the 16th and 26th Divisions, but due to radio issues, Makino was never informed. Meanwhile, General Bruce's 77th Division was organizing a risky amphibious invasion of Ormoc. As per General Hodge's strategy, Rear-Admiral Arthur Struble's Task Group 78.3, consisting of around a dozen destroyers, was assigned the task of transporting and landing the 77th Division, along with its supplies and equipment, at the barrio of Desposito located southeast of Ormoc. Upon landing, Bruce's forces were to advance northward, capture Ormoc, and then proceed up the Ormoc corridor to connect with units from General Sibert's 10th Corps. To facilitate this operation, the 5th Air Force would provide continuous air support—both day and night—for the assault convoy en route to the target, during the landings, and for the return trip. In addition, General Gill's 32nd Division was set to initiate an offensive southward along Highway 2 towards Ormoc while the 7th Division pressed northward to seize the elevated terrain south of the Panilahan River. Consequently, on December 5, the 127th Regiment commenced its advance past Colonel Hettinger's 3rd Battalion, facing staunch resistance from General Kataoka's 1st Division, which was well-entrenched on the high ground 1,000 yards south of the Leyte River bridge. The well-camouflaged enemy defenses consisted of numerous foxholes and ten-foot-deep spider holes, many of which were connected by interlacing communication trenches. The terrain that the troops traversed was adapted to defensive fighting, and the 1st Division took full advantage of this fact. There were deep ravines and steep hills where the enemy had dug in on both the forward and reverse slopes. The entire area was covered by heavy rain forest with dense underbrush. The nearly constant rainfall made observation difficult and the maps for the area were very inaccurate. The 77th Division continued to assemble its troops on Tarragona Beach, on the east coast of Leyte, and during the night of December 5 the loading of supplies and equipment on the landing ships began. The loading was slowed by frequent air alerts. The division had previously been told that the convoy would be unable to stay in the landing area more than two hours and consequently there was no attempt to bulk load supplies, since they would take too long to unload. All supplies and equipment to support the initial assault had to be mobile-loaded, that is, loaded on the vehicles taken with the division so that the supplies could be brought ashore in the vehicles upon debarkation. There were only 289 vehicles in the initial convoy, including tanks, M8s, and M10s that could not carry supplies. The LVTs were filled with supplies rather than troops in order that they could be discharged from the landing ships into the water and go ashore fully loaded. Furthermore, since the supplies were mobile they could be moved either by water or inland by motor. The 77th Division gave the highest priority to ammunition, water, and rations.  Makino also initiated his segment of the Wa offensive, with around 150 Japanese troops stealthily advancing towards the Buri airstrip. At that time, Major-General Joseph Swing's 11th Airborne Division was tasked with securing the Burauen area, although most of the division was engaged in combat for the mountain passes leading to Albuera. Additionally, Major-General Henry Jones' 38th Division had been deployed at Leyte to prepare for future operations but could also reinforce Swing, along with portions of General Bradley's 96th Division, if needed. At 06:00 on December 6, the 287th Field Artillery Observation Battalion, located northwest of Burauen, spotted Makino's troops crossing the main road south of their position and moving east toward the Buri field. While the artillery team communicated this information to the 24th Corps, the Japanese forces advanced into the swamp near the airfield prior to initiating their assault. At 06:30 the 16th Division launched its surprise attack. Led by a Filipino, the Japanese broke into the American bivouac area while the men were still asleep. Some were bayoneted while in their blankets, or before they could seize their weapons. Others held the Japanese off until they could retreat, shoeless and in their shorts and undershirts, either up the bluff to the headquarters of the 5th Bomber Command, or to the road, where an infantry company had come up in support. The service troops were "firing at everything that moves and… probably inflicting casualties among our troops."  Swift promptly responded by deploying the 1st Battalion of the 187th Glider Regiment to counterattack toward Buri, while Hodge assigned the 1st Battalion of the 382nd Regiment to Swift's command. The battalion was to proceed immediately to the aid of the two companies of the 11th Airborne Division in the Buri airfield area. General Hodge emphasized that the area was "critical" and "must be kept closed." It would be "dangerous" to let the enemy "get into the service troops along the road and around airfields." One reinforced company of the 1st Battalion was already in the area and the rest of the battalion made ready to follow. This reinforcement allowed one bolstered company to quickly support the service troops, effectively holding back the enemy while the glider units took position near the airfield. When the Americans launched a coordinated counteroffensive, they succeeded in driving the Japanese from the Buri airfield by nightfall, though some resistance remained at the edges of the airstrip. Meanwhile, Arnold maintained his offensive, with the 184th Regiment advancing through Hill 380 to secure Balogo, while the 17th Regiment captured the abandoned enemy positions on Hill 918 and moved up Hill 380 to join the 184th. By midday, the loading of the 77th Division was complete, and the convoy gathered off Dulag to await the arrival of Struble's escorting destroyers. At 13:30, Struble's main convoy set sail, having been preceded by four slower LSTs under the protection of two destroyers. While American transports and destroyers navigated silently toward Ormoc Bay, General Tominaga activated the airborne segment of Operation Wa. He planned to deploy an initial wave of 40 Mitsubishi Ki-57 transports, carrying 409 paratroopers, primarily targeting the Buri, San Pablo, and Bayug airstrips to capture them. In a related secondary attack, two pairs of transports would drop smaller groups of paratroopers over the Dulag and Tacloban airstrips to destroy as many American aircraft and facilities as possible. The transports would have Ki-43 fighters as escorts, and 21 medium bombers were dispatched to bomb and strafe the Buri, San Pablo, and Bayug airstrips shortly before the paratroopers' descent. Two additional waves were scheduled, the first five hours after the initial assault, comprising 270 troops in 21 aircraft, followed by a third wave of 80 soldiers six hours later. These follow-up operations were intended to assist in eliminating any remaining resistance, after which a defense would be established at the captured airfield. The primary goal of this operation was to incapacitate the enemy airstrips to ensure the safe arrival of the last TA convoys with critical reinforcements to Leyte. The attack was synchronized with Admiral Okawachi's eighth convoy, which included three destroyers, two subchasers, and five transport ships carrying Major-General Kurisu Takeo's 68th Brigade, having departed from Manila on December 5 and expected to reach Albuera two days later. After taking off at 15:30, Tominaga's first echelon headed towards the Burauen area. Just before dark, thirty-nine Japanese transports with supporting bombers and fighters roared over the Burauen airfields. Several incendiary bombs fell on the San Pablo strip, setting a gasoline dump afire and burning a liaison plane. Despite American fighters destroying 18 planes, they managed to deploy over 300 paratroopers by 19:00 following preparatory bombing and the deployment of a smoke screen. However, the intense anti-aircraft fire caused some confusion, leading pilots to drop soldiers at incorrect locations. Still, approximately 60 paratroopers descended on Buri, while more than 250 landed at San Pablo.  Meanwhile the secondary attacks on the Dulag and Tacloban strips completely miscarried. Two transports flew over the former installation; one dropped about five paratroopers and then crashed, while the other crashed about 4,500 yards northeast of the field. Over Tacloban two medium bombers converted to transports lowered their flaps and wheels preparatory to landing, but one was shot down, and the other crashed. Nonetheless, upon landing, the paratroopers quickly advanced along both the north and south sides of the San Pablo strip. They talked in loud tones and allegedly called out in English, "Hello--where are your machine guns?" Most of the enemy forces assembled on the north side of the airstrip. They burned three or four more liaison planes, a jeep, several tents, and another gasoline dump, throwing ammunition on the latter. Fortunately for the Americans, inclement weather combined with significant Japanese transport losses prevented the subsequent waves of reinforcements from being dispatched. On the night of 6-7 December, the Air Corps service personnel had abruptly quitted the Buri airfield, leaving behind carbines, rifles, grenades, small arms ammunition, and machine guns. 2d Lt. Rudolph Mamula of the 767th Tank Battalion had been ordered to take charge of the situation, co-ordinate the action of forces on the airstrip, and recover abandoned armament and ammunition. Apparently he was unsuccessful, because later in the day the Japanese made "the best use" of the same arms and ammunition. By the middle of the morning, on 7 December, the enemy had completely occupied the Buri airstrip. In response, Swift quickly ordered the 674th Glider Field Artillery Battalion to abandon their artillery and support the 127th Airborne Engineer Battalion, which was near San Pablo preparing to reclaim the airstrip. General Krueger also reacted swiftly, allocating two battalions from the 148th Regiment to Hodge's command, who dispatched them toward San Pablo. However, before their arrival, Swift's forces had already initiated their counteroffensive at dawn on December 7, successfully driving the paratroopers back to the northwest until they ran out of ammunition. Fortunately, the Japanese chose to retreat towards Buri rather than continue the battle at San Pablo. At 14:00, upon the arrival of the 148th battalions, Swift promptly ordered them to launch an attack towards Buri. The 1st and 2d Battalions of the 149th Infantry, 38th Division, were alerted at 0200 on 7 December for movement to the San Pablo airstrip. The advance elements of the 1st Battalion were greeted at the San Pablo airstrip by General Swing, who is reported to have said: "Glad to see you. I am General Swing of the 11th Airborne Division. We've been having a hell of a time here. Last night approximately seventy-five Jap paratroopers dropped on us of which we have accounted for about fifty. Fifteen hundred yards from here on an azimuth of 273° is another airstrip just like this one. Between here and there are about twenty-five Jap troopers. It is now 1400. I want that strip secure by nightfall." The commanding officer of the 1st Battalion decided to attack with Companies A and C abreast, Company A on the right, with approximately a 200-yard frontage for each company. A section of heavy machine guns was attached to each unit, and a platoon of 81-mm. mortars from Company D was to support the attack from positions on the San Pablo airstrip. The 1st Battalion set out at 14:30, moving the first 400 yards without any issues, but eventually encountered a rain-swollen swamp that impeded their progress, resulting in the companies losing contact with one another. By nightfall, only Companies A and C had reached the airstrip but were unable to initiate their attack due to the late hour. Simultaneously, the 1st Battalion of the 187th Glider Regiment and the 1st Battalion of the 382nd Regiment advanced towards Buri and successfully joined the 1st Battalion of the 149th Regiment at the western end of the airstrip by the end of the day. In the meantime, Arnold continued his limited offensive on December 7, with the 184th Regiment facing little resistance as it ascended the high ground overlooking the Tabgas River.  At dawn the 17th Infantry sent out patrols. The one from the 1st Battalion located an enemy heavy machine gun, two light machine guns, and a mortar, emplaced 150 yards from the battalion's lines. When the patrol returned, mortar fire was placed on the position and it was wiped out. The 1st Battalion moved out at approximately 0900. Though long-range fire fell on the troops and small arms fire hit the left flank of Company C, the men continued to push forward. The battalion found several ridges leading up Hill 380--a knifelike ridge in front of Company C and a double ridge in the form of a horseshoe, with its closed end toward the hill, in front of Company B. Company B moved across the double ridge while Company C forced its passage through machine gun and rifle fire across the closed part of the horseshoe. At 1600 the two companies re-established contact on the northernmost ridge leading to Hill 380. At 1630 the Japanese with machine guns launched a counterattack against the right flank of the 3d Battalion, 184th Infantry, and the left flank of the 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry. The 3d Battalion, 184th, was pinned down but did not yield any ground. The troops on the front lines of the 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry, at first were forced back slightly but in a few minutes regained the lost ground. They dug in for the night on the crest of the ridge. After its dawn patrols had reported on 7 December, the 2d Battalion, 17th Infantry, jumped off to the attack. Company E secured the first of the three spurs leading from Hill 380, and continued forward to the middle spur in the face of light fire that came from in front of the company in the area the 17th Infantry wished to secure. Presently the fire grew to considerable intensity and the company's section of light machine guns and two platoons of heavy machine guns moved onto the middle spur, where they neutralized the enemy position. While this action was going on, Companies G and F moved to the first spur. Company G received orders from the battalion commander to make a wide envelopment of Hill 380 and then assault the hill from the east. At 0930 the company dropped below the military crest of the southern slope of Hill 380 unobserved and made its way very slowly over the steep terrain and through the thick cogon grass. At 1200 the 49th Field Artillery Battalion laid a five-minute preparatory fire in front of the battalion. The American troops then routed the surprised Japanese defenders and killed the majority of them as the others fled into the mountains northeast of the hill. Apparently realizing that Hill 380 was the key to defense of the Tabgas River valley and Hill 606, troops of the 26th Division poured long-range machine gun fire from Hill 606 into Company G and at the same time halted the company with small arms fire from the immediate left along the ridge. At 1355, after a heavy mortar barrage, about fifty men from the 26th Division counterattacked the positions of Company G, but the company held firm and mowed down the attackers with fire from its rifles and automatic weapons. The position on the hill was maintained. Although Company G occupied the top of Hill 380, it was not in a position to aid the advance of Company E. The Japanese troops were dug in on the reverse slopes and could only be rooted out by close-in fighting. The commanding officer of the 2d Battalion committed Company F down the main spur from the east, supported by Companies E and G and the machine guns from Company H. As soon as Company F started down the ridge, the enemy concentrated fire upon it both from the north and the west. In a matter of minutes Company F was reduced to a point where the number of its riflemen hardly equaled one platoon. The company commander secured an additional platoon from Company G and renewed the assault behind a concentration of 100 rounds of 60-mm. mortar fire and 80 rounds of 81-mm. mortar fire. The attack succeeded, and the enemy force was overrun and annihilated. Company E thereupon moved to the main ridge and helped mop up the area. At 0700 the 3d Battalion, 17th Infantry, moved out, reaching the source of the Palanas River at 1400. An enemy force of about fifty men was observed in a natural bowl to its immediate front. The battalion placed long-range rifle and machine gun fire on the group as two platoons from Company K attacked from the flank. They destroyed the entire Japanese force without any casualties to the American troops. The 3d Battalion then crossed the Palanas River and went into night perimeter at Kang Cainto. At 1907 eight rounds of artillery fire fell into the area, killing seven men and wounding eighteen others. At the end of the day the 184th Infantry was on the banks of the Tabgas River and the 17th Infantry had secured Hill 380, which commanded the Tabgas River valley. Arnold's offensive had become so precarious that Yamagata was forced to halt his division's advance towards Burauen and instead redirect them to defend Albuera, only sending his advance battalion to participate in the Wa offensive. The situation was about to worsen for Yamagata as Struble's convoy finally arrived off Deposito just before dawn. At 06:34, an enemy shore battery opened fire, and at 06:40, the destroyers responded by targeting their assigned locations. As the Japanese communicated this information to higher command, Okawachi received orders to land the 68th Brigade at San Isidro. Additionally, the 1st Combined Base Air Force and the 4th Air Army were directed to unleash all their resources against the landing forces. With Suzuki absent, Major-General Tomochika Yoshiharu took charge of the defense of Ormoc, promptly instructing the Mitsui Shipping Unit to secure defensive positions on Red Roof Hill. Meanwhile, the Imahori Detachment was ordered to advance south through Ormoc to confront the enemy. Elements of the 77th Regiment, which had just arrived by barge at Ipil, were also tasked with reinforcing the defense of Ormoc. Furthermore, Suzuki commanded the 16th and 26th Divisions to halt the Wa offensive and retreat immediately towards Ormoc. In Manila, Okawachi and Yamashita were preparing to send two provisional companies from the 58th Independent Mixed Brigade to garrison the Camotes Islands to counter the arrival of enemy reinforcements and suppress guerrilla activity in the region. Meanwhile, after Okawachi's latest convoy was detected, 57 P-47s were dispatched to strike the Japanese vessels while the 68th Brigade was being disembarked. In one of the fiercest aerial battles of the Leyte Campaign, the fighters strafed the vessels and dropped 94 1000-pound and six 500-pound bombs on enemy shipping, successfully destroying all five transports and damaging two destroyers. However, the 68th Brigade landed, albeit lacking most of its equipment, supplies, and heavy weaponry. Back at Ormoc Bay, General Bruce's first wave, composed of the leading battalions from the 305th and 307th Regiments, successfully landed on the White Beaches without encountering opposition at 07:07, and the troops quickly moved inland. The subsequent four waves of troops, including two battalions from the 306th Regiment, came ashore without incident. At 08:20, around 138 Japanese aircraft launched an assault on Struble's convoy. Despite the 5th Air Force executing a commendable interception of the attackers, some determined enemy planes managed to breach the anti-aircraft defenses and strike the American ships. On the morning of December 7, three years to the day after she fired the opening shot of the Pearl Harbor attack, the destroyer Ward came under attack by several Japanese kamikazes while patrolling off the invasion area. One bomber hit her hull amidships, bringing her to a dead stop. When the resulting fires could not be controlled, Ward's crew was ordered to abandon ship, and she was sunk by gunfire from O'Brien, whose commanding officer, William W. Outerbridge, had been in command of Ward during her action in Hawaii three years before. Nevertheless, their attempt to thwart this crucial invasion once again ended in failure. By 11:00, approximately 10,000 troops and most of the supplies had been landed, but under relentless air attack, Struble ultimately decided to withdraw and return to San Pedro Bay. Meanwhile, Bruce's forces were expanding their initial beachhead inland, with the 305th Regiment capturing crossings over the Bagonbon River and the 307th Regiment securing a bridge over the Baod River. Due to a lack of organized resistance, Bruce chose to continue advancing north along the highway to extend the division's foothold to Ipil. Consequently, the 307th began its northward advance around 10:45, gradually facing stiffer opposition as it approached its goal. By 14:55, they reached the outskirts of Ipil and commenced an assault on the defenses of two companies from the 77th Regiment, successfully killing 66 Japanese soldiers as they cleared the barrio and established a night perimeter on the northern edge by 17:40. With Bruce's forces having secured a two-mile beachhead, Yamagata's 26th Division found itself caught between two robust American divisions, leaving the route to Ormoc largely open for the 77th Division. On December 8, as the first two companies of the 12th Independent Regiment arrived to bolster the Mitsui Shipping Unit, the 307th Regiment resumed its advance northward, swiftly reaching the Panalian River where they began meeting stronger resistance. Successfully repelling enemy counterattacks, the 307th continued to push forward and achieved a total gain of 2,000 yards by day's end. At the same time, since half of the 2nd Raiding Brigade could not be airdropped during the now-halted Wa offensive, the Japanese decided to land them at the Valencia airstrip over the coming days to reinforce the defenders in Ormoc. Furthermore, Okawachi and Yamashita designated the Takahashi Detachment, organized around the 5th Regiment, as an emergency reinforcement to depart for Leyte immediately alongside the Ito Naval Landing Unit of SNLF Marines. Additionally, the 39th Regiment of the 10th Division was assigned to prepare for a counter-landing in the Carigara Bay region. Meanwhile, as the 26th Division began to withdraw along the coast to retreat through the ridges towards Ormoc, the 184th and 17th Regiments captured the Hill 606 positions and moved forward to the Sibugay River. During the night of 7-8 December, the Japanese brought forward two machine guns and emplaced them directly in front of Company A of the 1st Battalion, 382d Infantry. At dawn the machine guns opened up. Their low, grazing fire pinned down the company, but Pfc. Warren G. Perkins, in the face of enemy bullets, located the guns and called mortar fire upon the site. The mortar concentration, falling within fifty yards of Perkins, silenced the machine guns and startled the Japanese. Pvt. Ova A. Kelley took advantage of the confusion and charged with his M1 rifle and a carbine. Kelley killed eight of the enemy before he himself was slain. The rest of Company A followed Kelley and secured the edge of the airstrip where it set up a perimeter. During 8 December the Americans consolidated their positions. The following day, the 1st Battalion of the 149th Regiment launched an assault to the north, successfully crossing the airstrip and eliminating approximately 50 paratroopers before being halted by enemy fire. By nightfall, the 1st Battalion of the 382nd Regiment repelled another determined counterattack, killing an additional 50 Japanese soldiers and leaving around 100 paratroopers trapped on the airstrip. Concurrently, the 17th and 184th Regiments advanced through Albuera without opposition, continuing their movement through challenging terrain towards Gungab. In the early hours of December 9, Struble's initial resupply convoy reached Deposito, delivering the remainder of the 306th Regiment. As a result, its 1st Battalion was assigned to the 307th Regiment and promptly engaged in the northward attack. Progressing gradually through the formidable enemy ridge defenses, the 307th ultimately captured Camp Downes, while the 305th Regiment secured the northeastern area. During this advance, the rest of the 77th Regiment also arrived by barge at Palompon, where they were immediately deployed to bolster the defenders in Ormoc.  Ormoc, the largest and most important commercial center in western Leyte, possessed a concrete and pile pier at which a vessel with a sixteen-foot draft, and two smaller vessels, could anchor at the same time. On the route to Ormoc and in the town itself, the Japanese dug strong defensive positions. The favored sites were in bamboo thickets, on reverse slopes, along creek beds, and under buildings. Individual spider holes about six feet deep were covered with logs and earth and "beautifully camouflaged." Against such positions, artillery and mortar fire did little more than daze the defenders. Each position had to be searched out and destroyed. The next day, for the final assault on Ormoc, Bruce planned to deploy the 307th Regiment to attack along the highway, while the 306th Regiment would move northeast to encircle the opposing enemy forces. After a significant artillery barrage, Bruce first dispatched Company A of the 776th Amphibian Tank Battalion, supported by the rocket fire from LCMs and LCVs, to launch an assault on the city's strong enemy defenses. Following this, the 306th and 307th Regiments advanced, with the latter encountering minimal resistance until approaching the outskirts of Ormoc. Despite facing fierce opposition, the Mitsui Unit was effectively driven back, allowing the 307th to enter the city while the 306th advanced northeast with little resistance. The two regiments then pressured the enemy like squeezing a tube of toothpaste, ultimately forcing the determined defenders to retreat to the hills north of Ormoc, where the Imahori Detachment was gathering. However, some defenders remained behind, valiantly fighting to delay the American advance. Positioned in spider holes beneath the buildings, they resisted until overwhelmed.  At the same time that the 77th Division was entering Ormoc, the 32nd Division was pushing southward toward Ormoc Valley, the 11th Airborne Division was working westward over the mountains toward the town, and the 7th Division was pushing northward along the eastern coast of Ormoc Bay in an attempt to make a juncture with the 77th Division. General Bruce advised General Hodge: "Have rolled two sevens in Ormoc. Come seven come eleven." As his troops were reducing Ormoc, General Bruce also made a report on the status of the attack and referred to a promise that had been made by the commanding general of the 5th Air Force: "Where is the case of Scotch that was promised by General Whitehead for the capture of Ormoc. I don't drink but I have an assistant division commander and regimental commanders who do…" In its advance to the north, the 77th Division reportedly killed around 1,506 Japanese soldiers and captured 7 prisoners, at a cost of 123 men killed, 329 wounded, and 13 missing. The capture of Ormoc had significant consequences: it split the Japanese forces and isolated the remaining elements of the 26th Division; it diverted and eliminated previously uncommitted enemy reserves, easing the pressure on other fronts; it expedited the connection between the 10th Corps and the 24th Corps; and it prevented the Japanese from using Ormoc as a port, through which many reinforcements and supplies had been funneled into the campaign. Consequently, the Japanese had faced a clear defeat on Leyte Island; nevertheless, they were determined to continue fighting to the death, senselessly sending more troops into battle, which unnecessarily extended the campaign by several additional months. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Japanese forces prepared Operation Wa while U.S. troops engaged in intense battles for strategic positions like Hill 918 and Balogo amid challenging terrain and strong defenses. Despite initial setbacks, American forces regrouped, successfully counterattacking Japanese positions and securing strategic areas, while Japanese reinforcements struggled amid heavy losses and unfavorable weather conditions.

Last time we spoke about Fall of Peleliu. As American forces pressed down the Ormoc Valley, General Kataoka launched a counterattack with limited success, and Colonel Hettinger's 128th Regiment clashed at Breakneck Ridge but couldn't capture Corkscrew Ridge. Meanwhile, Japanese troops fortified defenses, resulting in intense fighting along Kilay and Shoestring Ridges. By November 23, the Americans had solidified their positions around Limon, disrupting Japanese supply lines and forcing a shift in enemy tactics. Simultaneously, Colonel Nakagawa's last forces on Peleliu fought desperately. As American flamethrowers targeted enemy caves, Nakagawa, with only a few soldiers remaining, chose an honorable death, marking the brutal end of the battle. American forces eventually secured Peleliu after extensive losses. Hidden Japanese troops would later survive in caves until 1947, finally surrendering. Lastly China's Operation Ichi-Go saw brutal losses as Japanese forces captured Guilin and Liuzhou, killing civilians and decimating Chinese forces.  This episode is Operation Capital Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  By the end of November, General Gill's 32nd Division had successfully secured the Limon area and was prepared to advance south toward Ormoc. However, they first needed to clear enemy forces from Kilay Ridge. At the same time, General Arnold's 7th Division had strengthened its position on Shoestring Ridge and was preparing to attack the rear of General Yamagata's 26th Division, which was moving east to participate in an offensive against the Burauen airstrips. In the north, Colonel Clifford's 1st Battalion had been under heavy pressure in recent days. With the arrival of the 2nd Battalion, 184th Regiment, however, he was now ready to go on the offensive. On December 1, following intense preparations, the Americans launched an attack on the Japanese-held knolls at the southeastern end of the ridge. They captured the first knoll easily but were halted by intense fire on the second. The next day, Colonel Hettinger's 2nd Battalion continued the assault, this time overcoming all resistance and securing Kilay Ridge for the Americans. Clifford's relieved battalion had suffered 26 killed, 2 missing, and 101 wounded, yet estimated Japanese casualties at 900. Meanwhile, by November 30, General Cunningham's 112th Cavalry Regiment had advanced to a ridge roughly 2,500 yards east of Highway 2 and about 5,000 yards southeast of Limon. Here, they encountered a heavily fortified enemy force that held its ground. Unable to dislodge them, Cunningham sent Troop A northwest on December 2 to connect with the 126th Regiment at the Leyte River. Meeting no resistance, the 1st Squadron also began moving northwest, while Cunningham's 2nd Squadron continued its attempts to take the Japanese-held ridge without success. Facing south, Arnold planned to advance northward with two regiments side-by-side, but his offensive would be postponed until the 17th Regiment arrived on December 3. The next day, patrols were sent forward in preparation for a full assault, reaching as far north as Balogo. Meanwhile, the Japanese were finalizing their own Burauen offensive, codenamed Operation Wa, set to launch on December 5. However, the plan was already faltering: by the end of November, the 16th Division was reduced to only 2,000 men, and the 26th Division was still moving slowly to its assembly point. In response, the recently arrived 3rd Battalion of the 77th Regiment, brought to Ipil by landing barges, was promptly sent to support Yamagata. The 68th Brigade, expected to arrive shortly, was to secure the Albuera sector, blocking any enemy advance toward Ormoc. Additionally, General Tominaga planned to airdrop two regiments from the 2nd Raiding Brigade onto the Burauen airstrips to coordinate with the ground attack. Meanwhile, the Imahori Detachment, pushed out of Daro in late November, remained on standby for action in the Ormoc sector as it retreated toward Dolores. At sea, Admiral Okawachi had deployed the seventh convoy of Operation TA, organized into three echelons to transport supplies and equipment. The first group, consisting of three submarines and one subchaser, departed Manila on November 28 and reached Ipil two days later, successfully unloading cargo but losing one submarine grounded at Masbate. The second group of two submarines left Manila on November 30, unloading at Palompon the next day, although both were later destroyed in a nighttime destroyer sweep. On December 1, a third group of three transports, T-9, T-140 and T-159 and two destroyers,  Take and Kuwa, under the command of Lieutenant-Commander Yamashita Masamichi, departed Manila, reaching Ormoc the next day, where they were attacked by a separate destroyer division during the night. The convoy, under Lieutenant-Commander Yamashita Masamichi, was docked at Ormoc City when it was engaged at 00:09 on December 3 by three ships of Destroyer Division 120 under the command of Commander John C. Zahm. The American destroyers attacked the transports as they were unloading but came under heavy attack from Yokosuka P1Y "Frances" bombers, shore batteries, submarines that were known to be in the harbor, and the Japanese destroyers. As a result, Kuwa was sunk and Commander Yamashita was killed. Take also attacked Cooper with torpedoes and escaped, though with some damage. Cooper finally sank at about 00:15 with the loss of 191 lives (168 sailors were rescued from the water on December 4 by Consolidated PBY Catalina flying boats). At 00:33, the two surviving US destroyers were then ordered to leave the bay, and the victorious Japanese successfully resupplied Ormoc Bay once more. This phase of the Battle of Ormoc Bay has gone down in history as the only naval engagement during the war in which the enemy brought to bear every type of weapon: naval gunnery, naval torpedoes, air attack, submarine attack, shore gunnery, and mines. Meanwhile, as the Battle of Leyte continued, Generals MacArthur and Krueger were preparing the crucial invasion of Luzon. On October 3, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved MacArthur's Operation Musketeer III over a possible invasion of Formosa, which would have required moving along extended and vulnerable supply lines. However, naval commanders feared an Allied convoy navigating the narrow waters of the central Visayas would be vulnerable to heavy air attacks from numerous nearby enemy airfields. This concern prompted the Americans to plan a preliminary operation, codenamed Love. One option involved securing positions in Aparri to provide fighter cover for supply ships, which could then take a safer route around northern Luzon through open seas. MacArthur, however, favored capturing Mindoro to establish airfields that would protect naval convoys en route to Luzon. Although enemy air attacks posed a risk during the initial invasion and resupply of forces on Mindoro, the establishment of these airfields would give the Allies a shorter, safer route to Lingayen Gulf with improved air protection and reduced exposure to the unpredictable typhoon season compared to the northern Luzon route. The Mindoro operation was scheduled for December 5, followed by a large-scale invasion of Luzon with landings at Lingayen Gulf on December 20, anticipating that the airfields on Mindoro would be operational by then. For Operation Love III, Krueger organized the Western Visayan Task Force, which included the 19th Regiment and the 503rd Parachute Regiment, under the command of Brigadier-General William Dunckel. The initial plan involved a combined airborne and amphibious landing on December 5 to secure the San Jose area near the southwest coast, facilitating the immediate use of its airstrips to support the Luzon operations and counter the numerous enemy airfields on the peninsula. However, delays in the development of airfields on Leyte and the ongoing need for air support for Leyte ground forces led to significant changes in the original Mindoro plan. Consequently, the airborne phase was canceled, and arrangements were made for the parachute regiment to be transported by sea. Ultimately, the prolonged development of airfields on Leyte, resulting in insufficient air support, combined with the urgent need to rehabilitate essential naval units, led to a ten-day postponement of the Mindoro operation to December 15. This delay impacted the Leyte campaign significantly, allowing the released shipping to be utilized for an amphibious assault on Ormoc. As a result, on November 23, General Bruce's 77th Division landed on Leyte in the rear areas of the 24th Corps and was readied for this new assault. Krueger decided to deploy this division for a major push to expedite the conclusion of the Leyte campaign. However, we must now shift our focus from the Philippines to recent developments in New Britain. Following the initial landings at Jacquinot Bay, the 6th Brigade was fully assembled at Cutarp by December 16. Their mission was to halt the Japanese forces from moving westward from Wide Bay and to conduct patrols toward Milim. At the same time, the 13th Brigade was tasked with safeguarding Jacquinot Bay against potential enemy advances from the north or south. To the north, the 36th Battalion was positioned at Cape Hoskins, with two of its companies deployed to Bialla Plantation by December 6 to patrol towards the Balima River and counter any Japanese offensives from Ea Ea. Under this increasing pressure, the enemy was compelled to retreat, leaving the Ea Ea-Ulamona region clear. Due to this unexpected withdrawal and the challenges of beaching barges at Bialla, General Ramsay decided to permit the 36th Battalion to advance toward Ea Ea. After leaving a small detachment at Cape Hoskins, the Australians landed unopposed at Ea Ea on January 13, while a New Guinea company similarly landed on Lolobau Island. To the south, half of the 14th/32nd Battalion successfully landed at Sumpun on December 28, moving closer to the Japanese buildup at the northern end of Henry Reid Bay. By January 7, the rest of the battalion had gathered at Sumpun, and by the end of January, they conducted an amphibious operation to set up a new base at Milim. At the same time, the 6th Brigade also started moving into the Kiep-Milim area, completing this transition by February 11. However, we will now shift our focus away from New Britain and turn our attention to Burma to discuss the continuation of Operation Capital. As previously noted, by the end of November, General Slim's 14th Army had effectively chased the retreating Japanese troops to the Chindwin River, while General Festing's 36th Division advanced to Pinwe, tightening the noose around General Katamura's 15th Army from the north. To the east, General Li Hong's 38th Division had successfully encircled Bhamo, and General Li Tao's 22nd Division along with Colonel Easterbrooke's 475th Regiment were progressing along the Bhamo-Myitson road. On the Salween front, General Wei's Y-Force captured Longling and Mangshi, the key targets of his offensive. However, amid the intense fighting at Mangshi, the 53rd Army executed a broad flanking maneuver through the mountains towards the Chefang Pass, where General Matsuyama's 56th Division was establishing new positions. Fortunately for Matsuyama, the Yoshida Force, anticipating this movement, launched a successful counterattack south of Kongjiazhai, effectively stalling the enemy advance long enough for the withdrawing Japanese forces to regroup. Meanwhile, Wei had dispatched the 71st Army to advance along the Burma Road and the 6th Army to break through Mengga, launching a rapid assault on the hastily prepared Japanese defenses on November 24. The 2nd Army chose to bypass these defenses, continuing south towards Wanding. Despite fierce resistance from the defenders, the determined Chinese forces made significant progress in the following days, ultimately compelling the outnumbered Japanese to withdraw to Wanding on November 28. In response, General Matsui's 113th Regiment established a delaying position at Zhefang, successfully repelling enemy attacks until December 1, which provided crucial time for the retreating forces to regroup at Wanding. By that time, however, Wei's divisions were significantly weakened, lacking 170,000 men from their required strength due to a lack of replacements. As a result, the Chinese command decided to postpone their offensive for thirty days while they awaited additional supplies and reinforcements, as well as a decisive victory at Bhamo that would enable Wei to connect with General Sultan's forces. Meanwhile, while the 30th Division advanced towards Namhkam, the 38th Division had been persistently assaulting Colonel Hara's garrison in the final two weeks of November.  On 15 November, the 113th Regiment attacked and took the outpost positions south of Bhamo and, although the defenders were successful in twice retaking them, on the 17th the positions were finally relinquished. The enemy force brought increasing pressure on the Bhamo outpost positions on all sides while completing preparations for a general attack on the main core of resistance. In the enemy's preparation for the general attack, concentrations of artillery fire and air bombardment caused severe damage. Planes flying out of Myitkyina, averaged 200 sorties a day between the middle of November and 4 December. Every building in Bhamo was destroyed and all defensive positions were badly damaged. Early in the air bombardment period, fire destroyed most of the rations and food supplies began to run dangerously low. Despite the heavy bombardment, the Garrison continued to fight calmly and effectively. Meanwhile, north of Bhamo, where the Chinese had not moved closer to the city than the containing detachment the 113th had left opposite the Japanese outpost at Subbawng, the 114th was making more progress. That regiment bypassed the Subbawng position on 21 November and moved two miles west along the south bank of the Taping River into Shwekyina. Outflanked, the Japanese quickly abandoned Subbawng and the rest of the 114th came up to mop up the Shwekyina area, freeing advance elements of the 114th to move directly south through the outlying villages on Bhamo. On 28 November the 114th was pressing on the main northern defenses of Bhamo. In this period of 21-28 November the division commander, General Li, did not alter the mission he had given the 113th of entering Bhamo, but by his attention to the 114th he seemed to give tacit recognition to the altered state of affairs. The first Chinese attack on Bhamo itself was given the mission of driving right into the city. Made on the south by the Chinese 113th Regiment, the attack received heavy air support from the 10th Air Force. It succeeded in moving up to the main Japanese defenses in its sector, but no farther. American liaison officers with the 113th reported that the regimental commander was not accepting their advice to coordinate the different elements of the Allied force under his command or supporting him into an artillery-infantry-air team, and that he was halting the several portions of his attack as soon as the Japanese made their presence known. However, the 113th's commander might well have argued that he and his men faced the most formidable Japanese position yet encountered in Burma. Aerial photography, prisoner of war interrogation, and patrolling revealed that the Japanese had been working on Bhamo since the spring of 1944. They had divided the town into three self-contained fortress areas and a headquarters area. Each fortress area was placed on higher ground that commanded good fields of fire. Japanese automatic weapons well emplaced in strong bunkers covered fields of sharpened bamboo stakes which in turn were stiffened with barbed wire. Anti-tank ditches closed the gaps between the lagoons that covered so much of the Japanese front. Within the Japanese positions deep dugouts protected aid stations, headquarters, and communications centers. The hastily improvised defenses of Myitkyina were nothing like this elaborate and scientific fortification. Manned by some 1200 Japanese under Colonel Hara and provisioned to hold out until mid-January 1945, Bhamo was not something to be overrun by infantry assault. Although the Chinese managed to destroy several enemy outposts beyond the fortress town, they were unable to penetrate the formidable defenses established by the fierce Japanese troops. After a significant air and artillery bombardment, the 113th Regiment launched another attack at the beginning of December but once again failed to achieve a breakthrough. In contrast the 114th's aggressive commander had been most successful in the early days of December. With less than half the air support given the 113th and with no help from the 155-mm. howitzers, he had broken into the northern defenses and held his gains. The decision to give the 114th first call on artillery support posed a problem in human relations as well as tactics. This was the first time the 38th Division had ever engaged in the attack of a fortified town. All its experience had been in jungle war. Faced with this new situation, the 113th Regiment's commander seemed to have been at a loss to know what to do. The 114th, on the contrary, had gone ahead with conspicuous success on its own, and now was being asked to attempt close coordination with artillery and air support. Its commander hesitated for a day, then agreed to try an attack along the lines suggested by the Americans. The tactics developed by the 114th Regiment by 9 December took full advantage of the capabilities of air and artillery support. Since the blast of aerial bombardment had stripped the Japanese northern defenses of camouflage and tree cover it was possible for aerial observers to adjust on individual bunkers. So it became practice to attempt the occupation of one small area at a time. First, there would be an artillery preparation. Two 155-mm. howitzers firing from positions at right angles to the direction of attack would attempt to neutralize bunkers in an area roughly 100 by 300 yards. Thanks to the small margin of error in deflection, the Chinese infantry could approach very close to await the lifting of fire. The 105's would lay down smoke and high explosive on the flanks and rear of the selected enemy positions. Aerial observers would adjust the 155's on individual positions. When it was believed that all Japanese positions had been silenced the Chinese infantry would assault across the last thirty-five yards with bayonet and grenade. As casualties increased, Hara's garrison continually weakened under relentless assaults, with the outnumbered soldiers bracing themselves to fight to the last man in defense of Bhamo. Determined to prevent the Bhamo Garrison from meeting the same fate as the Lameng and Tengchong Garrisons, General Honda ordered Colonel Yamazaki Shiro's reinforced 55th Regiment to advance towards Namyu and execute a surprise counterattack to assist Hara's beleaguered troops. Departing from Namhkam on the night of December 5, the Yamazaki Detachment stealthily made their way to Namyu, where the 90th Regiment had recently established its primary position atop Hill 5338. Additionally, General Naka's 18th Division was instructed to support this initiative, with Lieutenant-Colonel Fujimura Yoshiaki's 56th Regiment ordered to move through Tonkwa to join the attack. Due to the enemy's successful Ichi-Go offensive, General Wedemeyer and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek made the decision to withdraw the elite 22nd and 38th Divisions from Burma. They planned to deploy these divisions to defend Kunming as part of the Alpha Plan. Not even the most optimistic Chinese could for the moment interpret that the Japanese thrust was confined to the American air bases in China, and no one on the Allied side could feel really sure where the 11th Army would halt, though the summer uniforms worn by the Japanese suggested to American observers that the Japanese might be outrunning their supply lines. Theater headquarters thus concluded that Chongqing and Kunming were under direct, immediate threat. In response, having adopted the code name Alpha, Wedemeyer first presented a detailed plan to the Generalissimo on November 21. This plan was divided into several phases. The period to December 31 was set for Phase I of ALPHA, in which the Chinese forces in contact with the Japanese in south and southeast China would try to slow their advance. The Americans would assist in demolitions, help plan prepared positions, and give the maximum of air support. American officers would fill liaison and advisory roles with the Chinese Army down through division level. Other Americans would work closely with the operations, intelligence, and supply officers of higher Chinese headquarters. Plainly, the mission of Phase I was to win time within which to complete a concentration for defense of Kunming. In Phase II, Chinese forces would be placed across the principal avenues of approach to Kunming while a central reserve would be built up around Kunming itself. To guarantee the availability of dependable Chinese troops two divisions of the Chinese Army in India would be flown in from Burma, together with the 53rd Army from the Salween front. About 87500 troops would be brought to the Kunming area from less menaced sectors of China.  As a result, although Sultan was able to keep the 38th Division and intended to send the 14th Division back to China, General Liao was instructed on December 5 to ready the 22nd Division for airlift to China, with Colonel Easterbrooke's 475th Regiment assigned to relieve them north of Tonkwa. However, before this relief could occur, the Fujimura column attacked Tonkwa on December 8 and effectively pushed back the Chinese garrison. The Japanese continued their assault northward the next morning, but this time, Chinese-American forces were able to stop the enemy's progress. In the following days, Japanese patrols further tested American positions, and sporadic artillery and mortar fire harassed soldiers in their foxholes, but no significant assault took place. While the Chinese withdrew on December 12, American patrols discovered the enemy's apparent assembly areas, leading to artillery fire directed at them. Meanwhile, following a heavy artillery bombardment, the Yamazaki Detachment surprised the 90th Regiment on  December 9th. The battalion received a heavy bombardment followed by a Japanese attack which penetrated its lines and isolated its 1st and 2d Companies. This was bad enough, but worse followed the next morning. Colonel Yamazaki massed three battalions in column to the east of the road, and, attacking on a narrow front, broke clean through by leap-frogging one battalion over another as soon as the attack lost momentum. The third Japanese battalion overran the 2d Artillery Battery, 30th Division, and captured four cannon and 100 animals. The battery commander died at his post.  Despite this setback, the Chinese remained undeterred, exhibiting a fighting spirit that surprised the Japanese. The 88th Regiment swung its forces toward the Japanese penetration, which was on a narrow front, and since the terrain was hilly in the extreme the Japanese could see Chinese reinforcements converging on the battle site. So vigorously did the Chinese counterattack that one lone Chinese soldier fought his way almost into the trench that held Colonel Yamazaki and the 33d Army liaison officer, Colonel Tsuji. Writing in his diary, Tsuji remarked: "This was the first experience in my long military life that a Chinese soldier charged Japanese forces all alone." The Chinese, comprising as they did three regiments of a good division, could not be indefinitely withstood by the four Japanese battalions. Destroying the four pack howitzers they had captured, the Japanese sought only to hold their positions until the Bhamo garrison could escape. Facing intense pressure from a numerically superior enemy, Yamazaki managed to fend off Chinese counterattacks over the subsequent days, striving to create a favorable moment for the Bhamo Garrison to withdraw. By December 14, with the 114th Regiment advancing into central Bhamo, Hara's remaining 900 soldiers destroyed all their artillery and focused their efforts on the southern front. As night fell, they desperately climbed the steep 50-foot banks of the Irrawaddy and charged the Chinese lines at daybreak. Utilizing the cover of early morning fog, Hara's men successfully penetrated the Chinese positions and began their final retreat towards Namhkam. Once the garrison was safe, the Japanese term for "success" was relayed to the waiting Yamazaki Detachment, which subsequently began to disengage, having suffered 150 fatalities and 300 injuries. The Bhamo Garrison, on the other hand, sustained approximately 310 killed and 300 wounded since the onset of the Allied offensive, with about 870 of the original 1,180 men surviving. At this point, only 50 miles remained between Sultan's forces and Y-Force. Meanwhile, the Fujimura column attacked again on December 13. The Japanese activity had apparently been preparation for attack, and on the morning of the 13th men checked their weapons with care and looked to the arranging of their ammunition in convenient spots. The American positions had the advantage of excellent fields of fire across open paddy fields. Looking toward the south and the west, the men of the 475th could see the dark green mass of leaves, trunks, and brush making the jungle that hid the Japanese assembly areas and, farther back, the Japanese gun positions. Following a ten-minute preparation, the Japanese attacked one American flank at 0600 and the other at 0610. The 475th's fire power met the Japanese as soon as they were clearly defined targets, and stopped the attacks within an hour. At one point a Japanese force of about a platoon tried to cover the open space by a concerted rush only to be cut down with thirty or forty casualties. There were no further Japanese attacks that day. The following morning, the 14th, the Japanese repeated their tactics of the 13th, and that effort too was beaten off, at the cost of several men killed. The 475th's entry into combat had the result on the men noted by observers in many previous wars, for they now spent hours digging themselves in more deeply and improving their positions. The 3d Battalion to the north near Mo-hlaing was subject only to artillery fire. That the Japanese at one point were actually within small arms range of the 2d Battalion while apparently not capable of doing more than shelling the 3d with their infantry guns suggested that the 3d might be able to take in reverse the Japanese pocket that pressed on the 2d Battalion. After two days of fierce combat, Easterbrooke's troops ultimately prevailed, launching a robust counteroffensive on December 15 that secured the Tonkwa area. Following these minor operations, both sides experienced a week of skirmishes around the American perimeter defenses until the final Japanese withdrawal, as the Bhamo Garrison had already been liberated. By the end of the battle, the 475th had lost 15 men killed, while an estimated 220 Japanese casualties were inflicted. Following these developments, Honda reorganized his forces, instructing the 56th Division, along with the attached Yamazaki Detachment, to defend the Wanding-Namhkam sector. He also dispatched the Yoshida Force and the 4th Regiment to reserve positions in Hsenwi while retaining the 18th Division at Mongmit. To the west, after the captures of Kalemyo on November 14 and Kalewa on November 28, General Tanaka's 33rd Division was compelled to establish new positions in the Shwegyin-Mutaik sector. In response, Slim directed the 4th Corps to cross the Chindwin River and seize Pinlebu. The 268th Indian Brigade was dispatched across the river at Sittaung, followed by Major-General Thomas “Pete” Rees' 19th Indian Division on December 4. Meanwhile, the 11th East African Division fought fiercely to expand the bridgehead at Kalewa. For the crossing a ‘Chindwin Navy' was formed, with two wooden gunboats mounting a Bofors and two Oerlikon cannons and two pairs of Browning machine-guns. They were built at Kalewa and named Pamela, after Mountbatten's youngest daughter, and Una, after Slim's. Thus Slim became the only general to have designed, built, christened, launched and commissioned ships for the Royal Navy. Their task was to protect the Inland Waterways Transport's lighters, barges and launches, built by Fourteenth Army's Chief Engineer, Brigadier Bill Hasted, who felled forests to create them and for which outboard motors were flown in. The IEME recovered MV Ontario, patched, caulked and repainted her. In due course IWT craft carried some 38000 tons of stores. The task of establishing a firm bridgehead across the Chindwin was accomplished by the East Africans clearing a series of Japanese positions along either side of Myittha river gorge on December 2 after recce by the Sea Reconnaissance Unit (SRU).  As the bridgehead was expanded, bridging equipment for what, at 1154 feet, would be the longest floating bridge in the world was assembled and constructed in sections on the Myittha and floated down to the Chindwin and completed in just 28 working hours between December 7 and 10. Meanwhile Brigadier Mackenzie's 32nd Indian Brigade completed its three-day crossing of the Chindwin at Mawlaik using only two rafts named ‘Horrible Charlie' and ‘Stinking Henry'. Unbeknownst to the British and Indian forces, Katamura had already set his withdrawal to the Irrawaddy River in motion, ordering the beleaguered 15th and 53rd Divisions on December 1 to fall back to Kyauk Myaung and Kyaukse, respectively. On December 4, the 33rd Division began its gradual retreat toward Monywa, leaving the 213th Regiment behind as a rear guard to monitor the enemy in the Shwegyin-Mutaik sector. The 31st Division, now under Lieutenant-General Kawata Tsuchitaro, would cover the retreat from its positions at Kambalu and Shwebo. Consequently, Rees, acting on Slim's orders to take risks for speed, made swift progress through the challenging Zibyu Range, with his advance elements connecting with the 36th Division at Banmauk on December 16. After a lengthy pause regarding the Pinwe situation, Festing's patrols entered the towns of Indaw and Katha without opposition on December 10. From these locations, the 26th and 72nd Indian Brigades were set to move towards Kunchaung, while the 29th Indian Brigade continued its advance along the road to Takaung. Throughout this period, Japanese resistance was significantly less fierce than anticipated. Consequently, just days into the operation, Slim realized that his original strategy to encircle Katamura's 15th Army on the Shwebo Plain in front of the Irrawaddy would be ineffective. If the Japanese were indeed planning to fight from behind the river, the 14th Army would be extended from Tamu and exposed to counterattacks at a critical moment while attempting to cross one of the most daunting river obstacles. A revised strategy was therefore necessary, but Slim had only one card left to play for this situation. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. General MacArthur was now preparing a massive invasion of Luzon. Amidst ongoing air attacks, plans shifted to secure Mindoro for air support. Meanwhile, in Burma, Chinese and Japanese forces clashed over Bhamo, with the Japanese garrison ultimately escaping. It seemed everywhere things were going badly for the Japanese, how much longer would they hold out?

En otoño de 2024 hicimos lo que llamamos un "viaje de retales" por Japón, porque añadimos destinos que teníamos pendientes desde hace bastante tiempo pero que, por una cosa o por otra, se habían ido cayendo de las planificaciones. Compramos además dos pases JR East Tohoku Pass, y aprovechamos así para añadir más sitios lejanos y sacarle partido a estos pases. Dale al play y escucharás sobre Kusatsu Onsen, Yamagata, Yamadera, Ginzan Onsen, Hirosaki, Tokio y Narita. Luego, en Japonismo mini hablamos de la nueva zona de Donkey Kong en Universal Studios en Osaka y de futuros viajes, leemos algunos comentarios de japonistas y, en la palabra japonesa, qué apropiado, te contamos cómo decir "viaje". ¡Mata ne! ¿Quieres colaborar con el programa? - Colabora en Patreon - Únete a la Comunidad Japonismo - Reserva hoteles en Japón (y en todo el mundo) - Consigue seguro de viajes (¡no sólo para Japón!) - Busca los mejores vuelos - Lleva Internet (pocket wifi o SIM) - JR Pass para viajes ilimitados en tren ---- Continúa la conversación en: - Web: https://japonismo.com - Discord: https://discord.gg/hZrSa57 - Facebook: https://facebook.com/japonismo - Twitter: https://twitter.com/japonismo - Instagram: https://instagram.com/japonismo - Pinterest: https://pinterest.com/japonismo - Newsletter semanal: http://eepurl.com/di60Xn

Jon Steele and James Taylor have all the important action from the final day of the regular J2 season, with the second automatic promotion spot and the playoff participants still to be decided. In Part 1, Jon talks us through the matches that decided 2nd place, Yamaguchi v Yokohama FC and Nagasaki v Ehime (start to 17:25). In part 2, James leads a clockwatch roundup of the playoff contenders' games: Kagoshima v Okayama, Yamagata v JEF United, and Sendai v Oita (17:25 to 42:25). After that, there's a look far ahead into the future to preview the playoff semi finals (42:25 to 58:00), and then it's time to elect the final Most Bravo Player of the regular season (58:00 to end).   Thanks as always for your support of JTET, JTSC, and the J-Talk Podcast! Join the JLeague chat Discord server here: https://discord.gg/p6PVbF9E Join the J-Talk Podcast Patreon here: https://www.patreon.com/jtalkpod

Last time we spoke about the advance to Ormoc Valley. As October 1944 unfolded in the Leyte campaign, American forces steadily pushed Japanese troops inland. Despite fierce resistance, they captured key positions, like Dagami, Catmon Hill, and multiple airstrips. While the Japanese reinforced areas like Ormoc, American regiments advanced through challenging conditions, relying on artillery amid minimal air support due to weather and resource constraints. By month's end, American forces had inflicted heavy casualties on the Japanese, securing vital beachheads and pushing closer to full control of Leyte. After suffering losses at Leyte Gulf, the 7th Fleet withdrew, leaving Kenney's P-38s to defend Tacloban airfields amid Japanese air raids. As kamikaze attacks grew, USS Franklin sustained heavy casualties, while the Americans pressed forward, capturing Carigara on Leyte. Meanwhile, Australian forces began reclaiming New Britain, pushing Japanese forces back through guerilla warfare. Facing tough jungle conditions, Australian and native troops gradually secured strategic positions by December, reinforcing the Allied grip in the Pacific. This episode is the Battle of Ormoc Bay Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As we have seen over the past few weeks, the Battle of Leyte Gulf saw Generals MacArthur's forces land and successfully defeat the 16th Division of Leyte Island as well as seized Carigara and Pinamopoan over the northern coast. The 24th Division also engaged the enemy's reinforcements, centred around the elite 1st Division during the battle for the northern entrance into the Ormoc Valley. Meanwhile Admiral Okawachi and General Yamashita aimed to bring more reinforcements to Leyte which would lead to another air-naval battle. The previous week, Colonel Verbeck's 21st Regiment was engaged in a mission to capture Breakneck Ridge, fiercely defended by Colonel Miyauchi's 57th Regiment. Simultaneously, General Kataoka mobilized his remaining two regiments to initiate a broad, four-pronged assault on the Pinamopoan perimeter. However, the rugged terrain slowed their movement toward assembly areas. On the morning of November 8 a typhoon, moving in from the west, swept over the entire island of Leyte. Jan Valtin, a member of the 24th Division, graphically describes it: "From the angry immensity of the heavens floods raced in almost horizontal sheets. Palms bent low under the storm, their fronds flattened like streamers of wet silk. Trees crashed to earth. In the expanse of… [cogon] grass the howling of the wind was like a thousand-fold plaint of the unburied dead. The trickle of supplies was at a standstill. On Carigara Bay the obscured headlands moaned under the onslaught of the… seas. Planes were grounded and ships became haunted things looking for refuge. Massed artillery… barrages to the summit of Breakneck Ridge sounded dim and hollow in the tempest. Trails were obliterated by the rain. The sky was black." In the midst of the storm, the 21st's infantry attacked. As the typhoon swept across the island, Verbeck's forces launched a three-pronged assault on Breakneck Ridge and Hill 1525, facing staunch resistance from Miyauchi's defenders but making considerable progress toward Hill 1525. Notably, plans for General Suzuki's offensive were found on a deceased Japanese officer, enabling General Krueger to redeploy his forces effectively. On 10 November General Mudge sent elements of the 1st Cavalry Division to patrol the area of the mountains of central Leyte extensively. From 5 November through 2 December, elements of the 1st Cavalry Division extensively patrolled the central mountain area and had many encounters with small forces of the enemy. At all times the supply situation was precarious. The 12th Cavalry established high in the foothills, at the entrance to the passes through the mountains, a supply base that was also a native camp, a hospital, and a rest camp. About 300 Filipino carriers were kept here under the protection of the guerrillas. The carriers had been hired for six days at a time and were not allowed to leave without a pass from their Filipino leader. This precaution was necessary, since the ration-carrying assignment was extremely arduous. The cavalrymen would frequently skirmish with the 41st Regiment and the 169th and 171st Independent Battalions during this period. Brigadier-General Julian Cunningham's 112th Cavalry Regiment, expected by November 14, was tasked with relieving General Mudge's 1st Cavalry Division in the Carigara-Barugo area to enable a southwest advance from the central mountains and ease pressure on General Irving's 24th Division.  General Bradley's 96th Division was directed to capture the high ground between Jaro and Dagami, with the 382nd Regiment remaining at Dagami to inflict significant losses on the 16th Division while securing Bloody Ridge. By November 4, the 382nd Regiment had made some progress into Bloody Ridge. The night of 4-5 November was not quiet. The Japanese delivered harassing fire on the 1st Battalion, and at 2205 elements of the 16th Division launched a heavy assault against the perimeter of the 2d Battalion. An artillery concentration immediately stopped the attack, and the Japanese fled, leaving 254 dead and wounded behind them. The following morning, after the artillery had fired a preparation in front of the 1st and 2d Battalions, the two battalions renewed the attack at 0900 and two companies from the 3d Battalion protected the regimental left (south) flank. The battalions advanced about 1,000 yards before they encountered any strong resistance. The defenses of the 16th Division consisted of a great many concrete emplacements, concealed spider holes, and connecting trenches. By nightfall, at 1700, the two battalions, assisted by the tanks from Company A, 763d Tank Battalion, successfully reduced the enemy to their front and captured the ridge. Each battalion formed its own perimeter and made plans to renew the attack on 6 November. At 0830 the 1st Battalion, with light tanks in support, moved out in the attack westward against a strong enemy force that was well entrenched in foxholes and pillboxes. Each of these defensive positions had to be reduced before the advance could continue. At 1300 the 2d Battalion moved to the high ground on the right flank of the 1st. The 1st Battalion encountered a strong concrete enemy pillbox which was believed to be a command post, since there were no firing apertures. As grenades had no effect it became necessary finally to neutralize the pillbox by pouring gasoline down the ventilation pipes and setting it afire. Two officers and nineteen enlisted men of the enemy were killed in the pillbox. The Japanese continued to fight tenaciously. There was no withdrawal, but by the end of the day only isolated pockets of enemy resistance remained. The Japanese 16th Division was taking a bad beating. Its supply of provisions had run out. All the battalion commanders, most of the company commanders, and half the artillery battalion and battery commanders had been killed. On the night of 6 November the 16th Division contracted its battle lines and on the following day took up a new position in the Dagami area. The new position ranged from a hill about four and a half miles northwest of Dagami to a point about three and three-fourths miles northwest of Burauen. On 7 November all three battalions of the 382d Infantry engaged the enemy and maintained constant pressure against his positions. The 1st and 3d Battalions advanced west, while the 2d Battalion drove north and west. The 3d Battalion encountered -the more determined resistance. Advancing, preceded by tanks, it met heavy enemy machine gun and rifle fire. A large enemy force assaulted the troops at close quarters and tried to destroy the tanks, but when the 382d Infantry introduced flamethrowers and supporting machine guns, the attackers fell back in disorder. The regiment overran the Japanese defensive positions and killed an estimated 474 of the enemy. Company E of the 2d Battalion had remained in the Patok area, engaged in patrolling and wiping out isolated pockets of enemy resistance. On 8 November strong patrols from the 1st and 2d Battalions probed west into the hills. They encountered the left flank of the enemy supporting position at a point about 2,600 yards west of Patok. A very heavy rainfall on the night of 8-9 November made an assault against the position impossible on 9 November. After all-night artillery fire, the 1st and 3d Battalions moved out at 0900 on 10 November. They met no resistance, but progress was slow because of the swamps. By 1225 the two battalions, supported by a platoon of light tanks, occupied the ridge formerly held by elements of the 16th Division. The 1st Battalion had advanced 2,500 yards. The 382d Infantry had destroyed all organized enemy resistance in its sector and removed the threat to Dagami.  Meanwhile, General Arnold's 7th Division stationed at the Burauen-Abuyog area began sending patrols from Baybay toward Ormoc to prepare for a larger advance, while the 2nd Battalion, 32nd Regiment moved to Baybay, successfully ambushing the Japanese unit advancing to Abuyog. Concurrently, Okawachi sent his fourth convoy from Manila, consisting of three transports, four frigates, and six destroyers under Admiral Kimura. This convoy carried the bulk of General Yamagata's 26th Division and approximately 3,500 tons of supplies, followed by another echelon of three transports with the remainder of the 1st Division. The echelon reached Ormoc the next day, unloaded successfully, and departed without issue. However, the main convoy encountered air attacks as it approached Ormoc Bay, beginning its debarkation by nightfall. On 10 November the 38th Bomb Group, based on Morotai, sent 32 B-25 Mitchells escorted by 37 P-47 Thunderbolts to attack TA-4 near Ponson Island. Reaching the convoy just before noon, the B-25s attacked at minimum altitude in pairs, sinking the two largest transports, Takatsu Maru and Kashii Maru, disabling a third, and sinking two of the patrol craft escorts at a cost of seven bombers, for which the group was awarded the Distinguished Unit Citation. Although Yamagata's troops were finally ashore by November 10, most of the supplies couldn't be unloaded due to ongoing enemy air attacks. Shortly after leaving Ormoc, American planes intercepted the convoy, destroying two transports and one frigate, while further damaging another frigate and a destroyer. Meanwhile, Okawachi dispatched a third convoy, consisting of five transports, a submarine chaser, and five destroyers under Rear Admiral Hayakawa Mikio, transporting special troops and heavy equipment of the 26th Division. When one transport ran aground on Luzon's Bondoc Peninsula, Kimura sent two frigates and three destroyers to transfer its cargo to Ormoc. As a result, Hayakawa's convoy arrived at Ormoc Bay on November 11 and began unloading. However, ULTRA intercepts had detected the enemy convoy departing Manila, prompting Admiral Halsey to redeploy Task Force 38 under Admiral McCain. While under repair at Manila on 29 October, Nachi and Kumano were attacked by aircraft from USN Task Force 38. Nachi was hit by a single bomb to her aircraft deck, and this, as well as strafing attacks, killed 53 crewmen and further delayed repairs. On 5 November, again in Manila Bay, Nachi was attacked by three waves of U.S. planes from the aircraft carriers USS Lexington and Ticonderoga. She escaped the first wave undamaged, but was hit by five bombs and two or three torpedoes in the second wave while attempting to get underway. During the third wave, Nachi was hit by five torpedoes in her port side, which severed her bow and stern, and by an additional 20 bombs and 16 rockets. Nachi's flag commander, Vice Admiral Kiyohide Shima, was ashore for a conference at the time of the attack, but arrived at dockside in time to see his flagship blown apart. The central portion of the vessel sank in 102 feet (31 m) of water about 12 nautical miles (22 km) northeast of Corregidor. McCain launched an attack on Kimura's convoy. Just as unloading began, 347 planes struck, sinking all four transports and four destroyers, including the flagship Shimakaze, on which Hayakawa lost his life. This costly reinforcement operation thus ended in partial failure, with most equipment lost and over 1,500 casualties. Nevertheless, elements of the 1st Division moved immediately toward the Limon area, while Yamagata's units, though short on weaponry, were ordered to assemble at Dolores to prepare for joining the Imahori Detachment at Daro. At the same time, noticing the rapid advance of the enemy into the Carigara area, Yamashita concluded that Suzuki's proposed offensive toward Tacloban was destined for failure. He ordered the main force of the 35th Army to join the 16th Division in the advantageous mountainous positions of the Burauen-Dagami area to regain control of the recently captured airstrips, thereby limiting operations in the Carigara area to a holding action. Concurrently, as this adjustment to the tactical plan was made, Yamashita communicated his growing belief that the overall situation offered little hope for victory on Leyte and unsuccessfully tried to persuade General Terauchi to shift the decisive battle to Luzon. As a result of Terauchi's decision, the 68th Brigade was still to be sent to Leyte; the 23rd Division was scheduled to go to Manila in mid-November before returning to Leyte; and the 10th and 19th Divisions were planned for movement to the island by the end of the year. With the plans finalized for continuing the decisive battle on Leyte, Terauchi's headquarters departed Manila for Saigon on November 17. Back on Leyte, on November 9, the weary, mud-stained troops of the 21st Regiment launched another attack, with the 3rd Battalion assaulting the center of Breakneck Ridge and the 2nd Battalion targeting OP Hill, though they made only minor gains. Additionally, Verbeck's 1st Battalion attacked Limon but was repelled by heavy enemy fire, and fresh Japanese troops subsequently counterattacked the Hill 1525 position, forcing the Americans to retreat. Finally, Colonel Chapman's 2nd Battalion reached the western slopes of Hill 1525 in the afternoon, but it was too late for them to take part in the battle. On November 10, Verbeck continued his assault, successfully capturing OP Hill and making significant headway in the area. At the same time, Chapman's 2nd Battalion began advancing westward to establish a roadblock on Highway 2, approximately 2000 yards south of Limon. Meanwhile, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Clifford's 1st Battalion of the 34th Regiment landed on the western shore of Carigara Bay and initiated a wide envelopment around the western flank of the 57th Regiment to secure the high ground known as Kilay Ridge. Additionally, Mudge's cavalrymen pressed forward toward Mount Minoro. On this day, Yamashita's adjustments to the tactical plan finally reached Suzuki's headquarters. As a result, Suzuki abandoned his initial strategy and directed Yamagata to move his troops quickly to Albuera to prepare for an offensive eastward, dubbed Operation Wa. To replace the 26th Division in upcoming operations on the Jaro front, Suzuki decided to deploy the 30th Division, which had not yet departed Mindanao, instructing them to land at Ipil and prepare to support the Imahori Detachment, already skirmishing with Bradley's patrols. On November 11, following a heavy artillery barrage, Verbeck resumed his assault, although the 2nd Battalion quickly found itself pinned down, while the 1st Battalion successfully secured a ridge 300 yards southwest of OP Hill. The next morning, the 1st and 3rd Battalions advanced against the crest of Breakneck Ridge, successfully capturing the objective before being halted by Japanese artillery fire. At the same time, Chapman's 2nd Battalion reached Highway 2, and Clifford's 1st Battalion, supported by elements of the guerrilla 96th Regiment, arrived in the Cabiranan area. By November 13, Verbeck's 1st and 2nd Battalions advanced 600 and 400 yards, respectively, without encountering opposition. Breakneck Ridge was secured, although the Japanese maintained control over several nearby spurs, particularly Corkscrew Ridge. Nonetheless, the 21st Regiment reported approximately 1,779 Japanese soldiers killed, suffering 630 casualties in the process. Additionally, Clifford's 1st Battalion successfully reached Kilay Ridge undetected and quickly established defensive positions. At 0855 on 13 November a column of Filipino men, women, and children entered the perimeter and brought approximately thirty-five boxes of rations from Consuegra. The battalion left the area at 0930 and reached the ridge without opposition. Trenches and prepared gun positions without a man in them honeycombed the ridge from one end to the other. It was evident that elements of the 1st Division had intended to occupy the area in the latter stages of the battle for Limon. On 14 November Colonel Clifford ordered his battalion to entrench itself along the ridge in positions that would afford the best tactical advantage. The battalion established strong points and observation posts on the knolls, placed blocks on the trails leading through the area, and sent out reconnaissance patrols to locate enemy positions. Colonel Clifford made arrangements to utilize the Filipinos as carriers. These men were to use a trail on the north end of the ridge and bring supplies to the battalion from a supply dump at Consuegra. The first human pack train arrived in the area at 1010 with twenty-eight cases of rations and a supply of batteries for the radios. At 1125 enemy artillery shelled the southern end of the ridge and twenty minutes later shifted its fire to the Limon area. The battalion did not succeed in establishing physical contact with the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry, which was operating east of the road, but it was able to make radio contact. Throughout the day, patrols of the battalion were active in searching out enemy positions. Meanwhile the 112th Cavalry was landed at Carigara and attached to the 1st Cavalry Division to strengthen the assault on the central Leyte mountains. Meanwhile, the reserve 32nd Division, led by Major-General William Gill, was also dispatched to the island to relieve the fatigued 24th Division. This newly arrived division was assigned the mission of capturing Limon and advancing down the Ormoc Valley toward Ormoc. On the Japanese side, after receiving the rest of his division, Kataoka chose to move the 1st Regiment to the left flank to assist the 57th, which had also been bolstered by two fresh battalions. This combined force aimed to launch an attack along the main road toward Pinamopoan while the 49th Regiment and the 171st Independent Battalion sought to envelop the enemy's left flank toward Colasian. By mid-November, the headquarters of the 102nd Division and most of the 364th Independent Battalion had also arrived in Ormoc, with Lieutenant-General Fukei Shinpei taking command of the 41st Regiment and his other battalions on the island as they advanced toward Mount Pina. Furthermore, despite significant losses to enemy aircraft, five air regiments had reinforced the 4th Air Army, enabling General Tominaga to make the 4th Air Division fully operational, a unit that had previously focused solely on base activities and anti-submarine patrols. The replenishment of naval air strength was progressing well, with replacement aircraft for the 1st Combined Base Air Force outnumbering losses by 26% in November. On November 15, the Combined Fleet opted to cease training carrier air groups and instead focus on expanding the base air forces. The 3rd Air Fleet, stationed in the homeland, was tasked with training replacement units for deployment to the Philippines. Due to the successful reinforcement of Japanese air forces in the Philippines and General Kenney's ongoing inability to provide close air support, Halsey once again directed Task Force 38 to attack enemy airbases on Luzon. On November 13 and 14, McCain's carriers conducted several strikes against Japanese airfields in Luzon, resulting in a significant decrease in enemy air operations over Leyte. On 13 November 1944, on the threat of American carrier strikes on Luzon, Kiso was ordered to return to Brunei that evening carrying Vice Admiral Kiyohide Shima. Before she could leave for Brunei, she was attacked on 13 November while underway in Manila Bay by more than 350 carrier planes of Task Force 38's carrier task groups 38.1's Hornet, Monterey and Cowpens, TG 38.3's Essex, Ticonderoga and Langley and TG 38.4's Enterprise and San Jacinto. Three bombs hit Kiso to starboard - one in the bow, one near her boiler rooms and one near her aft gun mounts. Kiso sank in shallow water 13 kilometres (7.0 nmi; 8.1 mi) west of Cavite. Captain Ryonosuke Imamura and 103 of her crew survived, but 175 crewmen went down with the ship. Akebono, while alongside destroyer Akishimo at Cavite pier near Manila, was attacked in a USAAF air raid. A direct bomb hit set both ships ablaze, and the following day a large explosion on Akishimo blew a hole in Akebono, which sank upright in shallow water, with 48 crewmen killed and 43 wounded. After returning to Manila, Hatsuharu was caught in an air raid in Manila Bay. A series of near misses buckled plates and set fires, causing the ship to sink in shallow water. The attack killed 12 crewmen and injured 60 more, but 218 survived. Several other vessels were also sunk. Meanwhile, on November 14, the Hi-81 convoy, comprising the escort carriers Shinyo and Akitsu Maru, destroyer Kashi, seaplane tender Kiyokawa Maru, submarine chaser No. 156, seven escort ships, five oilers, and three transports, left Imari Bay under Rear-Admiral Sato Tsutomu. The convoy carried most of Lieutenant-General Nishiyama Fukutaro's 23rd Division and headed into the Yellow Sea, wary of enemy submarines. After stopping for the night in Ukishima Channel near the Gotō Islands, Sato's convoy resumed its journey on November 15 but was soon ambushed by two submarine wolfpacks. Commander Charles Loughlin's submarines were the first to strike, successfully hitting the Akitsu Maru with two torpedoes, which later sank, resulting in the loss of 2,046 lives, including most of the 64th Regiment. After the attack, Sato withdrew to Strange Island, located off the coast of Korea, to take refuge for the day. On the morning of November 17, the convoy resumed its journey but was soon detected by a B-29 Superfortress as it made its way toward the Shushan Islands. By late afternoon, Commander Gordon Underwood's submarines launched an assault on the Japanese ships, successfully striking the transport vessel Mayasan Maru, which sank quickly, resulting in the loss of 3,437 men, including most of the 72nd Regiment. Almost twelve hours later 200 kilometers off Saishu Island, Spadefish surfaced and attacked the Shinyo with six torpedoes. Four struck the carrier on the starboard at 11:03 pm, and it caught fire. At least 1,130 Japanese sailors went down with their ship; only about seventy survived, including Ishii. Kashi immediately dropped several depth charges where the Spadefish was thought to be. An oil slick and other debris eventually made the Japanese believe they had sunk Spadefish so the Kashi broke off the engagement, but Spadefish had escaped apparently without serious damage. Only minor cracks were reported to have appeared on the submarine after the alleged "sinking" by Kashi. Underwood's final strike was against the submarine chaser No. 156, which sustained three torpedo hits and sank rapidly. Following some rescue efforts, Sato continued his advance on November 21, eventually arriving in Kaohsiung five days later. Half of the convoy then proceeded to San Fernando, where the remaining members of the 23rd Division disembarked on December 2.  Yet thats it for today for the Philippines as we now need to shift over to Morotai.With Japanese reinforcements pushed back into the interior of the secured island, General Persons directed the 31st Division to capture several islands off New Guinea that served as observation points for Japanese outposts monitoring Allied movements. On November 15, the 2nd Battalion of the 167th Regiment landed on Pegun Island, followed by a successful attack on Bras Island the next day. By November 18, with the Mapia Islands secured, Company F of the 124th Regiment was sent to occupy the unguarded Asia Islands on November 19. In the Aitape region, Major-General Jack Stevens' 6th Australian Division was assigned to relieve American forces, similar to the Australian efforts on New Britain and Bougainville, in order to free up troops for the Philippines Campaign. By late October, a base had been successfully set up, allowing the 19th Brigade to arrive by mid-November, with the 17th Brigade scheduled for early December, and the 16th by year-end. Under General Blamey's orders, the new Australian garrisons were to adopt a more active approach than the American units had, so Stevens planned not only to secure the airfield and radar installations in the Aitape-Tadji area, but also to carry out extensive patrols in support of intelligence and guerrilla operations aimed at weakening the enemy in Wewak.  One of General Stevens' tasks was to give maximum help to AIB. and Angau units in the area in their tasks of gaining Intelligence, establishing patrol bases and protecting the native population. These AIB. and Angau units had been active in the Sepik-Aitape triangle since the time of the landing of American forces at Aitape in April 1944, and the 6th Division came into an area where, from the outset, practically all the deep patrolling had been done by groups of Australians. In the Aitape area, prior to the arrival of the Division (said the report of the 6th Division), Angau long-range patrols operated without troop support and, for their own protection, inaugurated a type of guerilla warfare. Selected village natives called "sentries" were taught to use grenades and Japanese rifles. The sentries, besides furnishing Intelligence, accounted for large numbers of enemy. This system was continued. As each area was freed the sentries were rewarded and returned to their villages. By early November, the 2/10th Commando Squadron had established a patrol base at Babiang, conducting numerous patrols throughout the month. Intelligence gathered suggested the Japanese forces were weakened, poorly nourished, and mainly focused on sourcing food. In response, Stevens planned two significant December operations: to sever the enemy's communication line along the Malin-Walum-Womisis-Amam axis and to neutralize enemy positions east of the Danmap River. By November 25, the seasoned 2/7th Commando Squadron had arrived at Babiang, and by month-end, the 19th Brigade took over the area. The commandos then advanced southward, setting up a base at Tong on December 4 and establishing an outpost at Kumbum three days later. Now to finish this week's episode let's explore the B-29 Superfortress operations during this time. After the Formosa Air Battle and the Omura raid on October 25, General LeMay's 20th Bomber Command conducted four missions in November. Three of these supported Southeast Asia operations as part of “PAC-AID,” while the fourth targeted the Omura Aircraft Factory, a key focus for the command. On November 3, 44 B-29s from India effectively bombed the Malegon Railway Yards at Rangoon. Two days later, 53 bombers hit Singapore's King George VI Graving Dock, the largest of several dry docks at Singapore and one of the world's best. The first of 53 Superforts attacking was over target at 0644, and the bombardier, Lt. Frank McKinney, put a I,ooo-pound bomb into the target within 50 feet of the aiming point, the caisson gate; Lt. Bolish McIntyre, 2 planes back, laid another alongside. This was the sort of pickle-barrel bombing the Air Corps had talked about before the war. Strike photos showed a rush of water into the dock, presumptive evidence that the gate had been strained, and subsequent reconnaissance photos indicated that the dock was out of use (A-2's estimate of three months of unserviceability was to prove quite accurate). There were other hits on the dock, on a 465-foot freighter in it, and on adjacent shops. For “baksheesh,” as the boys had learned to say in India, seven B-29's bombed the secondary target, Pangkalanbrandan refinery in Sumatra, and reported direct hits on the cracking plant. The Japanese, evidently relying on the inaccessibility of Singapore, put up a feeble defense, but the long trip took a toll of two planes and twelve crewmen, including Col. Ted L. Faulkner, commander of the 468th Group. On November 11, 96 B-29s launched from China to strike Omura under difficult weather; only 29 reached the aircraft factory unsuccessfully, while 24 more bombed Nanking with limited results. The month's final mission on November 27 saw 55 B-29s severely damage the Bang Soe marshaling yards in Bangkok. Meanwhile, in the Marianas, General Hansell's 21st Bomber Command prepared for strikes on the Japanese Home Islands. In order to properly plan missions to Japan, up-to-date reconnaissance photos of the proposed targets were needed. Other than information which was used during the Doolittle Raid in 1942, there was scant information about the locations of Japanese industry, especially the aircraft industry. On November 1, two days after arriving on Saipan, a 3rd Photographic Reconnaissance Squadron F-13A Superfortress (photo reconnaissance-configured B-29) took off bound for Tokyo. The aircraft flew over Tokyo at 32000 feet for 35 minutes taking picture after picture. A few fighters made it up to the camera plane's altitude but did not attack. These photos, along with other intelligence, gave the 21st Bomber Command the locations of the Japanese aircraft manufacturing plants and enabled mission planners to plan missions for the combat crews to attack. In honor of his mission, the aircraft was named "Tokyo Rose". In response, about ten G4Ms launched from Iwo Jima attacked Isley Field on Saipan the next day, scoring five bomb hits but losing three bombers. Hansell responded with a practice strike on Iwo Jima on November 5, though results were again limited. On November 7, the Japanese launched a follow-up attack, but it again resulted in minimal damage and cost them three bombers. A retaliatory strike by 17 B-29s the next day also fell short: one squadron had to jettison its bombs into the ocean, while another dropped its load through a gap in the undercast. Between Japanese attacks, American aircrew inexperience, delays in constructing airfields in the Marianas, and the slow movement of B-29s to Saipan, the 21st Bomber Command was behind schedule in its planned offensive against Japan. By November 15, only half of the 73rd Bombardment Wing's authorized 180 B-29s had arrived, but by November 22, around 118 bombers were finally in place. At this point, General Arnold ordered Hansell to begin Operation San Antonio I, marking the first strike against Tokyo. The chosen target was Nakajima's Musashi Aircraft Engine Plant, which supplied 27% of Japan's combat aircraft engines. On November 24, 111 B-29s took off for Japan, collectively carrying 277.5 tons of bombs. However, 17 bombers aborted mid-flight, and six others couldn't bomb due to mechanical issues. For the first time, the B-29s encountered the Jet stream, which was a high-speed wind coming out of the west at speeds as high as 200 mph at precisely the altitudes at which the bombers were operating. This caused the bomber formations to be disrupted and made accurate bombing impossible. As a result, only 24 B-29s bombed the Musashi plant, while 64 hit nearby dock and urban areas instead. The Japanese fighter response was less intense than expected, with the Americans claiming to have downed seven fighters, likely destroyed 18 more, and damaged nine, losing just one bomber in return. Another B-29 was lost on the return trip after running out of fuel and ditching. Despite disappointing bombing results in the mission—only 48 bombs struck the factory area, causing damage to just 1% of the building area and 2.4% of the machinery, with 57 killed and 75 injured—the raid exposed the weaknesses in Japan's air defense and showed the six million residents of Tokyo that they were vulnerable to attack. Given the limited impact of the November 24 mission, Hansell decided to launch a second major strike, dubbed San Antonio II, targeting Musashi once more. However, in the early hours of November 27, two G4M bombers from Iwo Jima carried out a low-altitude raid on Isley Field, escaping after destroying one B-29 and damaging eleven others.  Later that day, twelve bomb-equipped Mitsubishi A6M "Zero" fighters from the IJN's 252 Kōkūtai (252 Air Group) accompanied by two Nakajima C6N "Myrt" reconnaissance aircraft for navigation purposes departed Iwo Jima for Saipan. The attackers flew just above sea level to avoid US radar, and one of the A6Ms was forced to divert to Pagan after its propeller struck a wave; this aircraft was shot down by a USAAF Thunderbolt while attempting to land. The remaining eleven A6Ms arrived over Saipan at noon, shortly after XXI Bomber Command's second raid on Tokyo had departed. These aircraft strafed Isley Field destroying three or four B-29s and damaging up to two others. One of the Japanese pilots landed his fighter on Isley Field and fired on airfield personnel with his pistol until he was killed by rifle fire; this incident was witnessed by Brigadier General Haywood S. Hansell, the commander of XXI Bomber Command. None of the ten other A6Ms survived; four were shot down by USAAF fighters and six by anti-aircraft guns. The U.S. gunners also downed a USAAF Thunderbolt in circumstances which an official assessment later described as "inexcusable". Of the 81 bombers launched, 19 aborted, and those that reached Tokyo found the target covered by clouds, forcing them to drop bombs by radar over Tokyo's docks, urban areas, and the cities of Hamamatsu, Shizuoka, Numazu, and Osaka. Ultimately, for the loss of one Superfortress, the damage caused by this second strike was minimal. However, the strong Japanese response led Hansell to relocate some B-29s from Isley to safer Guam, strengthen Saipan's defenses and radar, and plan coordinated air-sea operations to neutralize Iwo Jima's staging fields. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Americans pressed through Leyte's treacherous terrain and fierce resistance, aiming to secure strategic positions. Typhoons, enemy reinforcements, and brutal battles tested them harshly, but they advanced steadily. Despite heavy losses and airstrikes from both sides, American forces captured Breakneck Ridge and pushed onward, inching closer to victory.

Time is running out for promotion playoff hopefuls in Japan's 2nd and 3nd tiers, and James Taylor, Jon Steele and Mike Innes bring you every twist and turn in the battle to finish in the top 6. First, James and Jon discuss games involving J2's top 7: Shimizu v Iwaki, Yokohama FC V Tochigi and JEF United v Nagasaki (start to 12:05); Okayama v Fujieda, Mito v Yamagata, and Kumamoto v Sendai (12:05 to 26:10). Then they choose their Most Bravo Players (26:10 to 30:00) and look ahead to the final day of the regular season (30:00 to 40:15). After that, the action just keeps coming, as Mike brings you a full roundup of another dramatic J3 matchday in J-Talk: Short Corner (40:15 to end).   Thanks as always for your support of JTET, JTSC, and the J-Talk Podcast! Join the JLeague chat Discord server here: https://discord.gg/p6PVbF9E Join the J-Talk Podcast Patreon here: https://www.patreon.com/jtalkpod

Josep Cuní habla con Margarita Orfila, arqueóloga jubilada y catedrática de arqueología de la Universidad de Granada con respecto a cómo la inteligencia artificial ha ayudado a completar el mapa de las figuras que conocíamos en Nazca, Perú. Hasta 303 nuevos geoglifos han sido identificadas gracias a la IA, lo cual duplica el número que hasta ahora se conocía sobre estas misteriosas figuras descubiertas por la arqueóloga Maria Reiche en la década de 1940. Se trata de una investigación desarrollada por parte del Instituto Nazca de la Universidad de Yamagata de Japón e IBM Research. Esto abre la puerta a esclarecer uno de los mayores misterios de la arqueología americana.Escuchar audio

The JTET team are back with another episode full of talking points. In part 1, Jon Steele and James Taylor discuss Yamagata v Yokohama FC (start to 13:55), Oita v JEF United (13:55 to 25:50), and Mito v Ehime (25:50 to 33:20). Then, after anointing this week's Most Bravo Players (33:20 to 41:15), Jon and James took a look ahead to the weekend's action (41:15 to 49:20). To round out the episode, Mike Innes has a full review of J3 round 26 in J-Talk: Short Corner (49:20 to end).   Thanks as always for your support of JTET, JTSC, and the J-Talk Podcast! Buy tickets for J-Talk Live at the Yokohama Football Film Festival here: https://teket.jp/6232/38395 Join the JTET/JTSC Discord server here: https://discord.gg/p6PVbF9E Join the J-Talk Podcast Patreon here: https://www.patreon.com/jtalkpod

JTET co-hosts James Taylor and Jon Steele were reunited after a couple of months for a review of J2 round 27, focusing on three games in particular: Yamagata v Nagasaki (03:50 to 13:45), JEF United v Iwaki (13:45 to 21:45), and Fujieda v Yamaguchi (21:45 to 27:45). The match analysis was followed by Most Bravo Player selections (27:45 to 32:10) and a preview of the round 28 fixtures (32:10 to 41:05). After that, Mike Innes returns with a full review of J3 round 24 in J-Talk: Short Corner (41:05 to end).   Thanks as always for your support of JTET, JTSC, and the J-Talk Podcast! Buy tickets for J-Talk Live at the Yokohama Football Film Festival here: https://teket.jp/6232/38395 Join the JTET/JTSC Discord server here: https://discord.gg/p6PVbF9E Join the J-Talk Podcast Patreon here: https://www.patreon.com/jtalkpod

Scheduling conflicts meant Jon Steele and James Taylor couldn't get together for a recording, so instead they each chose two games from J2 round 24 to talk about. In part 1, Jon talks about Kofu v Nagasaki (to 03:40) and Mito v Yokohama FC (to 06:00) before electing a Most Bravo Player (to 07:30). Then in part 2, James reviews Yamagata v Iwaki (to 08:50) and JEF United v Kumamoto (to 09:50) and chooses his MBP (to 10:50). To round out the episode, James previews the round 25 games that take place on the first weekend of August (to end).   *To get some pass notes on any of the games that we don't discuss on the pod, feel free to join our dedicated JTET/JTSC Discord server here: https://discord.gg/pngqMZ7hwD

There were big results at both ends of J2 last weekend, so James Taylor and Jon Steele had plenty of talking points to get their teeth into. They start by discussing Ehime's shock win over Shimizu (to 09:30) and Sendai's dramatic draw with Nagasaki (to 17:30), then cover important wins for Tochigi over Oita (to 24:20) and Kagoshima over Yamagata (to 34:30). That's followed by Most Bravo Player (to 39:00) and a preview of the next set of fixtures (to 47:10).   After that it's J-Talk: Short Corner – Mike Innes rounds up all the J3 teams who played in the Emperor's Cup round 2 last Wednesday (to 56:55) and then reviews another fascinating round of league fixtures, before finishing with a look at the table and the coming weekend's games (to end).   *To get some pass notes on any of the games that we don't discuss on the pod, feel free to join our dedicated JTET/JTSC Discord server here: https://discord.gg/pngqMZ7hwD

Join Baldwin County Foodies on Facebook w/Chace Yamagata here: https://www.facebook.com/groups/207305618093185/discussion/preview

After a packed double-header of Golden Week matches in both J2 and J3, the JTET team are back to catch you up on all of the major talking points from last week's action. In Part 1, James and Jon look back on some of the big games from last Friday in J2 (Round 13). The focus is placed initially on Yamagata's exciting 2-2 draw against Okayama (02:00 to 10:10), then the boys talk about Fujieda's massive home win over Gunma in the relegation dogfight (10:10 to 20:50). In Part 2, the gentlemen turn their attentions to Monday's J2 slate (Round 14). Under examination are Tokushima's statement win away at Okayama (21:00 to 31:15), followed by more relegation dogfight news with under-new-management Mito's win at home to Kumamoto (31:15 to 43:30). After a quick break, James and Jon then select their 'Most Bravo Player' of the Golden Week games (43:35 to 48:45), and preview the upcoming Round 15 games on the weekend card (48:45 to 54:45). It's then time to hand over the reigns to Mike Innes for the regular 'J-Talk: Short Corner' segment of the pod, with all of the J3 action from the holiday period rounded up (54:45 to Finish). Mike also looks ahead to the weekend's J3-inflected football, as the third tier takes a break to allow most teams to take part in prefectural tournament finals/Emperor's Cup qualifying games. Hope everyone enjoys the pod, and their weekend football!

James Taylor, Jon Steele and Mike Innes joined forces for another full and frank review of all the latest J2 and J3 football. First, James and Jon discussed Okayama v Shimizu (start to 07:20), Akita v Yokohama FC (to 17:35), Mito v Fujieda (to 24:55), and Tokushima v Yamagata (to 34:20). Then, they chose their Most Bravo Players of the weekend (to 37:50), and previewed a busy weekend of Golden Week football (to 47:05). After that, Mike Innes takes over for a run through of the Levain Cup games involving J3 teams (to 53:55) and a roundup of the matchday 11 league fixtures (to 1:10:50), before ending with a preview of the holiday weekend's fixtures (to end).   *To get some pass notes on any of the games that we don't discuss on the pod, feel free to join our dedicated JTET/JTSC Discord server here: https://discord.gg/pngqMZ7hwD

It's Harper's Choice this week and she's taking us back to the aughts with Rachael Yamagata's Happenstance! It's just family this week, and we talk about falling in and out of love, which WB/CW shows have featured Rachael's music, and what we were all doing in 2005. Come for the terrible jokes, stay to find out if Andrew really saw Jeremy Allen White in that White Castle drive-thru line! Edited & Produced by Stefanie Senior (@stefmsenior) Follow Andrew Ambrose Lee on Instagram (⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠@andrewambroselee⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠) Follow Michael Limentato on Twitter (⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠@limentaco⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠) & Instagram (⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠@limentaco⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠) Follow Harper Thomson on Instagram (⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠@harpingabout⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠) Follow Stenley Philippe on Instagram (⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠@snapasten⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠) Cover Art by Megan Rika Young (Twitter: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠@meganrika⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ Instagram: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠@meganrika⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠) Theme Song by OTNES (Twitter: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠@mxotnes⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ Instagram: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠@mxotnes⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠) Follow us at (@ibmtltt) on⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Tiktok⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ &⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ Instagram⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠, and email us at ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ivebeenmeaningtolistentothat@gmail.com⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ Leave us a rating or review on Apple Podcasts or Spotify! Have a good daaay! --- Send in a voice message: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/ibmtltt/message

After a packed week of J2 action, Jon and James are back to have their say on the big talking points from two full rounds of second-tier thrills and spills. In Part 1, the focus is on last Wednesday's midweek fixtures. The boys discuss a tight (ahem) home victory for JEF Chiba against a hapless Tochigi (Start to 07:00), then move on to cover Nagasaki's impressive win at home to inconsistent Yamagata (07:00 to 11:55). In Part 2, attention turns to Sunday's Round 9 action. James and Jon shared their views on Nagasaki's exciting 4-3 win at Kumamoto (11:55 to 20:50), as well as a pulsating draw between Ehime and Okayama at Ningineer Stadium (20:50 to 28:20). At listener/contributor Martin Spivey's request, the boys also took a few moments to talk about Akita's freewheeling victory away at Oita (28:20 to 32:30). In Part 3, the JJs handed out their 'Most Bravo Player' gong for this week (32:20 to 36:45), and finished things off by looking ahead to this weekend's Round 10 slate of matches (36:45 to Finish). We hope everyone enjoys the show! *To get some pass notes on any of the games that we don't discuss on the pod, feel free to join our dedicated JTET/JTSC Discord server here: https://discord.gg/pngqMZ7hwD

Recorded on March 14, 2024 Book talk begins at 21:00 Our Summer Tops KAL has begun and goes until to June 1, 2024.  It needs to be an adult-sized top that you consider to be appropriate for use in the summer, and we will leave the parameters of that to you!  Come chat with us about summer tops on our KAL thread, and check out our Summer Tops bundle for pattern ideas!   Virtual Knitting Group via Zoom   EVENTS Tracie and Barb will  NoCKRs - April 25-28, 2024 at the St Francis Retreat Center in San Juan Bautista, CA Fiber Frolic - June 1 at the Soul Food Farm outside Vacaville, CA KNITTING Barb Finished: 2 Knitted Knockers   Tracie finished: Tracie's Fresh Favorite Tee by Christen Clement Designs in Queen City Yarn Coleman in the Maple colorway Tracie's Pixie Dust  by Dani Sunshine in Berroco Vintage Handpaintsin a light blue/pale green/purple colorway 1 Knitted Knocker Tracie's Emotional Support Chicken by Annette Corsino, using Hayfield Spirit Chunky Barb is working on: CAPROCK tee by Yamagata using Araucania Ollagua Knitted Knockers Rock It Tee #2 by Tanis Lavallee, using Knit Picks Lindy Chain, in the colors Clarity, Rouge, and U Blue Pinnacles Beanie by Nancy Bates, from the Knitting the National Parks by Nancy Bates, using a kit Barb has cast on: Barb's Emotional Support Chicken by Annette Corsino, using worsted weight leftovers Tracie cast on: Bee Beautiful Tee by Pia Trans in  in Carpool Cotton Bamboo in the Copper colorway She continues to work on: Fiddly Bits Cowl by Jana Pihota using fingering scraps   If you would like to make Knitted Knockers, here is some useful info - From the Knitted Knockers.org website: “Knitted Knockers are special handmade breast prostheses for women who have had breast cancer and undergone mastectomy or lumpectomy. Traditional breast prosthetics can be hot, heavy and sticky. They typically require special bras or camisoles with pockets and can't be worn for weeks after surgery. Knitted Knockers are soft, comfortable, beautiful and when placed in a regular bra they take the shape and feel of a real breast. They are adjustable, washable and can even be worn while swimming. Our special volunteer knitters provide these FREE to those requesting them” Please visit the Knitted Knockers website, Knitted Knockers Homepage for all the information that you need.   This webpage is especially helpful for information on approved yarns and color information: Yarns and colors Very Important: Please note that neutral colors are preferred.  If you want, you can use bright colors on the bottom of your knocker, but the top of it needs to be in a neutral color.  Patterns: So many choices!  Please go to this section to pick and download your (free) pattern: Knitted Knockers Patterns.  Hint:  The Bottoms Up Knocker for Double Point Needles pattern works great with magic loop too…and has the easiest “start” to your knocker!   BOOKS Barb  read: If It Bleeds by Stephen King - 5 stars The Mystery Guest (Molly the Maid #2) - 3 stars Tracie read:  Forever... by Judy Blume - 4 stars I'll Take Care of You by Caitlin Rother - 4.5 stars The Bone Jar by S.W. Kane - 3 stars   Info from Tracie's "Thumbs Up" about the sweater shaver: The Substack article about pilling is here The excellent sweater shaver can be purchased here

Recorded Wednesday, February 21, 2024 Book talk begins at 31:30 Our Summer Tops KAL has begun and goes until to June 1, 2024.  It needs to be an adult-sized top that you consider to be appropriate for use in the summer, and we will leave the parameters of that to you!  Come chat with us about summer tops on our KAL thread, and check out our Summer Tops bundle for pattern ideas! Virtual Knitting Group via Zoom Events Tracie and Barb will  NoCKRs - April 25-28, 2024 at the St Francis Retreat Center in San Juan Bautista, CA Fiber Frolic - June 1 at the Soul Food Farm outside Vacaville, CA   KNITTING Barb Finished: Bankhead Hat #27 by Susie Gourley Velvet Pullover by Claudia Quintinella, using Serendipidye Kings Mountain Fingering in the Piccadilly colorway, Invictus Yarn Adventure in the Don't Look  Under the Lilacs, Invictus Yarns Master of My Feet in the Adagio colorway, AND Knit Picks Palette in the Aster and Bluebells colorway. 2 Knitted Knockers   Tracie finished: 2 Soap Sacks by Haley Waxberg in Knockers yarn (And the bar shampoo and conditioner Tracie can be purchased at https://viori.com/) Beginner's Rainbow Rabbit by Claire Garland in sparkly periwinkle Tahki Linguine for Lauren's 12th birthday Jen by Josée Paquin in Marianated Yarns Scrumptious HT in Sea of Glass and Indigo Bunting, Laneras Barefoot in Coral and Invictus Yarns Unconquerable Sole BFL in the Powerful colorway 1 Knitted Knocker   If you would like to make Knitted Knockers, here is some useful info -   From the Knitted Knockers.org website: “Knitted Knockers are special handmade breast prostheses for women who have had breast cancer and undergone mastectomy or lumpectomy. Traditional breast prosthetics can be hot, heavy and sticky. They typically require special bras or camisoles with pockets and can't be worn for weeks after surgery. Knitted Knockers are soft, comfortable, beautiful and when placed in a regular bra they take the shape and feel of a real breast. They are adjustable, washable and can even be worn while swimming. Our special volunteer knitters provide these FREE to those requesting them” Please visit the Knitted Knockers website, Knitted Knockers Homepage for all the information that you need.   This webpage is especially helpful for information on approved yarns and color information: Yarns and colors Very Important: Please note that neutral colors are preferred.  If you want, you can use bright colors on the bottom of your knocker, but the top of it needs to be in a neutral color.  Patterns: So many choices!  Please go to this section to pick and download your (free) pattern: Knitted Knockers Patterns.  Hint:  The Bottoms Up Knocker for Double Point Needles pattern works great with magic loop too…and has the easiest “start” to your knocker! Barb working on: Cheeky Cables Socks  by Mary Lukas using Universal Yarns Zesty Sock in the Pearl colorway CAPROCK tee by Yamagata using Araucania Ollagua Knitted Knockers   Barb has cast on: Pinnacles Beanie by Nancy Bates, from the Knitting the National Parks by Nancy Bates, using a kit Rock It Tee #2 by Tanis Lavallee, using Knit Picks Lindy Chain, in the colors Clarity, Rouge, and U Blue   Frogged:  Colourwheel DK 1 Ball Scarf by Sirdar, using a Sirdar Colourwheel in the Follow the Rainbow Colorway   Tracie cast on: Pixie Dust by Dani Sunshine in Berroco Vintage Handpaints in light blue/pale green/purple 1 Knitted Knocker   She continues to work on: Fresh Favorite Tee by Christen Clement Designs in Queen City Yarn Coleman in the Maple colorway Fiddly Bits Cowl by Jana Pihota using fingering scraps   BOOKS Look What You Made me Do: Confronting Heartbreak & Harassment in Big Law by Erin Gordon - 4 stars The Loyal Wife by Natalie Barelli - 3 stars Trail of the Lost: The Relentless Search to Bring Home the Missing Hikers of the Pacific Coast Trail by Andrea Lankford - 5 stars The Secret Place (Dublin Murder Squad, #5) - 4 stars Patient Care: Death and Life in the Emergency Room, by Paul Seward - 4 stars   Tracie read: The River's Edge (Jackman & Evans #10) by Joy Ellis - 2.5 stars for someone not familiar with the series Ill Wind (Anna Pigeon #3) by Nevada Barr - 3 1/2 stars - takes a while to get going How Lucky by Will Leitch - 3 stars.  Wanted to like it more!  But got frustrated with situation and too worried for main character American Girl by Wendy Walker - 3 stars.  Have not thought about it since I finished it Tunnel Vision: A True Story of Multiple Murder and Justice in Chaos at America's Biggest Marine Base by N.P. Simpson - 4.5 stars The Island of Lost Girls by Alex Marwood - 4 stars Her Last Move by John Marrs - 2 stars

Recorded on January 24, 2024 Book Talk starts at 19:28 Our Fall Sweater KAL has ended!  Please stayed tuned to the end of the episode to find out if you won a prize.  We had 107 completed sweaters - way to go! Our Summer Tops KAL will run February 1 to June 1, 2024.  It needs to be an adult-sized top that you consider to be appropriate for use in the summer, and we will the parameters of that to you.  Come chat with us about summer tops on our KAL thread, and check out our Summer Tops bundle for pattern ideas!   Events Tracie and Barb will  NoCKRs - April 25-28, 2024 at the St Francis Retreat Center in San Juan Bautista, CA.  The retreat is full but you can still get on the waiting list!   KNITTING Barb Finished: Bankhead Hat #27 by Susie Gourley   Tracie finished: Socks to match my Archer in Dizzy Blonde Studios Dizzy Color in Delete and Lisa Souza Dyeworks Deluxe Sock in Cornflower   Barb working on: Colourwheel DK 1 Ball Scarf by Sirdar, using a Sirdar Colourwheel in the Follow the Rainbow Colorway Cheeky Cables Socks  by Mary Lukas using Universal Yarns Zesty Sock in the Pearl colorway Velvet Pullover by Claudia Quintinilla/Ewe Knit Toronto, using  Serendipidye Kings Mountain Fingering in the Piccadilly colorway, Invictus Yarn Adventure in the Don't Look Under the Lilacs colorway, Invictus Yarns Master of my Feet in the Adagio and the Bobby color ways   Barb has cast on: Bankhead Hat #28 CAPROCK tee by Yamagata using Araucania Ollagua   Tracie has cast on: Beginner's Rainbow Rabbit by Claire Garland in periwinkle Tahki Linguine from the NYFR destash   She continues to work on: Jen by Josée Paquin in Marianated Yarns Scrumptious HT in Sea of Glass and Indigo Bunting, Laneras Barefoot in Coral and Invictus Yarns Unconquerable Sole BFL in the Powerful colorway Fresh Favorite Tee by Christen Clement Designs in Queen City Yarn Coleman in the Maple colorway Fiddly Bits Cowl by Jana Pihota using fingering scraps   BOOKS Barb read: Impossible Things Before Breakfast: Adventures in the Ordinary by Rebecca Front - 4 stars 56 Days by Catherine Ryan Howard - 3 stars Prom Mom - by Laura Lipman - 5 stars Last Dance, Last Chance and Other True Cases (Crime Files #8) by Ann Rule - 4 stars High Country (Anna Pigeon #12) by Nevada Barr - 5 stars   Tracie read: Wham! George Michael and Me by Andrew Ridgeley - 4.5 stars Wrecker by Carl Hiaasen - 3 stars 13 1/2 by Nevada Barr - 3 stars Bunny by Mona Awad - 3 stars Deadly Pretender: the Double Life of David Miller by Karen Kingsbury   Tracie recommends the TV show Jury Duty on Prime Video/FreeVee