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In this compelling episode, Pastor Kelly shares the inspiring story of Joni Eareckson Tada, who transformed her life-altering paralysis into a powerful testimony of faith and perseverance. Her journey challenges us to find strength in our own faith during life's trials, demonstrating that even the most daunting obstacles can be overcome.
Last time we spoke about the Japanese counteroffensive against the Marine beachhead on Bougainville. Things were looking bad for the Japanese before they got even worse. The Japanese had underestimated the amount of Marines on Bougainville and sent Major Mitsuhiro with his special units to try and hit the marine left flank, later to join up with the Iwasa detachment. Mitsuhiro's men were in for a hell of a surprise when they attacked a larger force than expected. They took heavy losses before pulling back into the interior of the island to search for Iwasa. Meanwhile Iwasa also bit off more than he could chew with a counteroffensive targeting the Piva trail. In the end the marines not only repelled the attacks, but also greatly expanded their perimeter. We also spoke about the battle of Changde seeing the forces of Yokoyama crush multiple Chinese armies and unleash chemical and biological warfare in the area. This episode is the Battle of Sattelberg Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. Vice Admiral John Henry Towers the commander of pacific air force circled a plan to recapture Wake island and use it as a springboard to latte assault the Marshalls that were around 500 miles south. Admiral Spruance favored opening a new campaign much father southeast, where the fleet could count on more land base air support in the south pacific. Spruance wanted to launch an offensive into the Gilbert Islands, some 600 miles southeast of the Marshalls. Admiral Nimitz was swapped by this and in turn twisted King's arm. And thus was born Operation Galvanic, the simultaneous capture of the Ellice islands, the Gilbert Islands and Nauru set for November 15th. Since his victorious return from the battle of Midway a year earlier, Admiral Raymond Spruance had privately longed for a major command at sea. But it was an admirals way to lobby for a job and he would not be surprised when Nimitz told him one morning in May of 1943 “There are going to be some changes in the high command of the fleet. I would like to let you go, but unfortunately for you I need you here” Spruance replied “Well, the war is an important thing. I personally would like to have another crack at the Japs, but if you need me here, this is where I should be.” The next day the two met again and Nimitz said “I have been thinking this over during the night. Spruance, you are lucky. I've decided that I am going to let you go, after all.” Nimitz reported to King the new assignment during their meeting in San Francisco a month later. On May 30th, Spruance received the rank of vice admiral and shortly after was detached from the CINCPAC staff and placed in command of the Central Pacific Force, later to be designated the 5th Fleet. It would be the largest seagoing command in the history of the US Navy. Spruance would have little more than four months to plan the largest and most complex amphibious operation yet attempted. Naval forces and landing troops would be taken from far flung parts of the south pacific and USA mainland. His key commanders had not yet been identified. Spruance immediately recruited a chief of staff with a lot of experience and initiative, his old friend and shipmate, Captain Charles “Carl” Moore. Moore had been serving in Washington as a member of Admiral King's war planning staff. Spruance asked Moore to select other key staff officers, poaching many from naval HQ. Moore would arrive to Pearl Harbor on August 5th and took up a spare bedroom in Nimitz and Spruance house atop Makalapa Hill. Now Spruance was the type of manager that delegated everything possible, he once said “Looking at myself objectively, I think I am a good judge of men; and I know that I tend to be lazy about many things, so I do not try to do anything that I can pass down the line to someone more competent than I am to do it.” Moore was perfectly fine with this philosophy. Some would say Spruance was a bit lazy, the man did seem to bore rather easily and was a compulsive walker, often spent days just walking, grabbing staff with him. Moore wrote about such an instance once that occurred a few days after he arrived to Hawaii “Raymond is up to his tricks already, and yesterday took me on an eight mile hike in the foothills. It was hot and a hard pull at times, and particularly so as we carried on a lively conversation all the way which kept me completely winded.” On this occasion Moore tried to talk to Spruance about operation Galvanic, but Spruance kept changing subjects. A few days later Moore would write to his wife “Yesterday Raymond stepped up the pace and the distance and we covered over 10 miles in three hours. My right leg caught up with my left and both were wrecked by the time I got back. . . . If he can get me burned to a crisp or crippled from walking he will be completely happy.” Spruance wanted Kelly Turner to command his amphibious fleet. Turner at that point held a year of hard experience in the South Pacific. He was the navy's preeminent amphibious specialist. Spruance knew the man well both at sea and at the Naval War College. Spruance told Nimitz in Juen“I would like to get Admiral Kelly Turner from Admiral Halsey, if I can steal him,” However with the northern Solomons campaign in high gear, Halsey was not too keen to release Turner. Nimitz sent a personal note to Hasley explaining that he had been ordered to wage a new offensive in the central Pacific: “This means I must have Turner report to me as soon as possible.” Unfortunately for Hasley, Turner also took some of their best staff officers with him. Major General Holland Smith would command the invasion troops, designated the 5th amphibious corps or ‘VAC”. Smith was one of the pioneers of amphibious warfare. He had persuaded the navy to adopt Andrew Higgen's shallow draft boats as landing craft and successfully trained several divisions in amphibious operations over at Camps Elliot and Pendleton in California. He fought hard to get combat command in the Pacific and was backed up by Secretary Knox and Admiral King. Nimitz did not know the man well, but Spruance had worked with him in the 1930's when they were both stationed in the Caribbean. Turner and Smith would make quite the combustible pair. Both men were aggressive, ambitious and quite overbearing. They were both used to running things without competition. Both were prone to fits of rage and this earned them the nicknames “terrible turner and Howlin'mad'smith”. At Guadalcanal Turner once offended General Vandegrift by infringing upon his command, this led Spruance to wonder “whether we could get the operation planned out before there was an explosion between them.” Smith had met Kelly Turner once in Washington and he found the admiral to be precise and courteous, describing him as “an exacting schoolmaster, affable in an academic manner. He could be plain ornery. He wasn't called ‘Terrible Turner' without reason.” For Operation Galvanic, Turner expected to be above Smith in the chain of command. This was consistent with how Operation Watchtower went about. But Smith wanted direct command of all amphibious troops throughout the operation, prior, during and after the landings, and he wanted to directly report to Spruance. Spruance wanted nothing to do with such arguments and because of his laissez-faire style this meant Moore would be acting as referee between Turner and Smith. Here is what Moore had to say of it “Holland Smith particularly complained about Kelly Turner. He was a whining, complaining type. He loved to complain. He loved to talk and loved to complain, and he would come and sit on my desk and growl about Turner. ‘All I want to do is kill some Japs. Just give me a rifle. I don't want to be a commanding general. Just give me a rifle, I'll go out there and shoot some Japs. . . . I'm not worried about anything else around here.' See, that kind of a line. I was trying to soothe him down, and Turner would come and complain about that blankety-blank Smith, couldn't get any cooperation out of him, and so forth.”Through these referee'd battles a compromise was met. Turner would be in command of the landing forces until the shore commander went ashore and assumed command of the troops. When turner was informed, all the troops ashore would fall under the command of the 5th amphibious corps and thus report to Smith. This model was accepted by both men and would remain in force throughout the Pacific War. So at this point its important to note the US Navy had still not fully recovered from the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, and was still in the process of building the largest fleets the world had ever seen. You have probably heard this phrase many times: “World War Two would be won through British brains, American brawn, and Russian blood.” As said at the Tehran conference of December 1943 by Joseph Stalin. That brawn was simply incredible. From the start of the war until the end of 1943, the US would commission 7 aircraft carriers, the Essex, Lexington, Yorktown, Bunker Hill, Intrepid, Wasp and Hornet. Of the new Essex-class, 9 light carriers would be commissioned the Independence, Princeton, Belleau Wood, Cowpens, Monterey, Cabot, Langley, Bataan and San Jacinto. Of the new Independence class there would be 35 escort carriers, no worries not going to list them all haha. There would also be 6 new battleships the South Dakota, Indiana, Massachusetts, Alabama, Iowa and New Jersey; 4 new heavy cruisers, the Baltimore, Boston, Canberra and Quincy; 16 light cruisers, 212 destroyers, 234 destroyer escorts and 92 submarines. To match this in the same period, Japanese commissioned two aircraft carriers the Junyo and Hiyo; one light aircraft carrier the Ryuho; 4 escort carriers the Unyo, Chuyo, Kaiyo and Shinyo; 2 superbattleships the Yamato and Musashi; 4 light cruisers the Agano, Oyodo, Noshiro and Yahagi; 22 destroyers, 15 destroyer escorts and 61 submarines. Thus it was absolutely clear, the Americans had a significant advantage in naval production. On September 4th, the 5th amphibious corps of Smith were officially established. Smith proceeded to train and control the units assigned to operation Galvanic which included Major General Julian Smith's 2nd Marine division and Major General Ralph Smith's 27th division, that's a lot of Smiths. As the 5th amphibious force and corps were still undergoing organization during the planning phase of the Gilberts operations, much of the burden for tacticaling planning fell initially onto the staffs of the two divisions involved. Julian Smith was informed in august his job was to capture the Tarawa and Apamama atolls. Ralph Smith was told he was to invade Nauru, but Holland Smith believed Nauru offered too many problems. Nauru was 390 miles west of the Gilberts and would place strain on available shipping. Simultaneous landings in the two places would further widen the dispersal of supporting fleet element, a dangerous division of forces in view of the presumed possibility of a Japanese naval counterattack. Finally, the terrain on Nauru would make an amphibious assault and the land fighting extremely costly to be warranted by the strategic advantages to be gained. Makin Atoll was considered no less suitable than Nauru as an air base for operations against the Marshalls and was thought to be considerably less well defended. Makin was also only about 105 miles north of Tarawa making it possible to concentrate the supporting fleet in one area and thus avoid the danger of excessive dispersion. So in early October, Spruance and Nimitz made the decision to invade Makin Atoll instead. Unfortunately the Americans did not have great intelligence on the Gilberts, so they had to do some photographic coverage of Tarawa and Makin between July and October 1943. The USS Nautilus contributed a lot to the intelligence effort by obtaining hydrographic and each conditions for both atolls, such as their surfs, reefs, beaches, lagoon entrance, current data, tidal data and so forth. The unsexy logistical stuff no one talks about. If you want to invade a beach, you have to know about said beach. During September and October a total of 16 former residents and travelers of the islands were attached to Turners staff to help out. Many of these were Australian, New Zealanders, Fijian naval reserve officers, officials of the Western pacific high commission, Australian army reserve officers and enlisted men and a few civilians. Another source of information was given by Lt Colonel James Roosevelt who had taken part in the raid upon Makin. For the landings at Makin, Turner's task for 54 and 53. He would have at his disposal 4 destroyer transports, one Cargoship, one LSD and 9 LSTS to transport the reinforced 165th regiment of Colonel Gardiner Conroy. He would be supported by the 7th army defense battalion, detachments of the 105th infantry regiment, 27th division, units of the 193rd tank battalion, 152nd engineer battalion, coastal artillery and anti-aircraft batteries of the 98th and 93rd Coastal artillery battalions, a platoon from the 5th Amphibious corps reconnaissance company, sundry medical, signal, ordnance, quartermaster and bomb disposal detachments. Their screening force would be 4 older battleships, 4 heavy cruisers, 13 destroyers and 3 escort carriers. The Tarawa force would be given one destroyer transport, 1 attack transport, 12 Destroyer transports, 3 AKA's, one LSD and 12 LST's under Rear Admiral Harry Hill, screened by 3 battleships, 3 heavy cruisers, 3 light cruisers, 21 destroyers and 5 escort carriers. Turner would also make a legendary decision. He appointed Colonel Eareckson, the veteran of the Aleutian Islands campaign to be commander of the support Aircraft, thus establishing a centralized system of ground control for support aircraft in amphibious operations. Eareckson became famous for his innovative tactics such as using radar equipped B-17's to guide P-38's to attack Kawanishi flying boats during the Aleutian islands campaign. He also pioneered low level bombing raids through the brutal aleutian weather. Aerial support, both at the tactical and strategic level would be provided by Rear admiral Charles Pownalls carrier task force 50 formed around 6 lage and 5 small carriers and by Rear admiral John Hoovers shore based aircraft; consisting of task groups 57.2/3/4. Both forces had to destroyer aircraft and air/harbor facilities at Tarawa, Mille, Jaluit, Makin and Nauru while simultaneously providing air support. Hoover also was responsible for conducting photographic reconnaissance over the Marshalls. After the air strikes and naval bombardment obliterated the Japanese defenses and installations, Turner planned to assault the beaches with the troops ferried using amphibian tractors, followed up by LCVPS and medium tanks in LCMS. For Tarawa, Ralph Smith's plan was a bit more elaborate and extreme, he was going to attempt something never done before. The amphibious assault of Tarawa had unique problems. There was no immediate means of achieving depth of deployment. The landing forces would initially be pinned down on a long narrow beach. The island offered basically no room for flank maneuvers and the aerial and naval bombardments would do little. Ralph assigned a major role to troops of a different regiment than the one that made up the main landing force. Detachments X and Y, of the 3rd Battalion, 105th Infantry and 193rd Tank Battalion, led by Maj. Edward T. Bradt would be the first to land on the west coast of Butaritari, designated Red Beaches. This would be followed up quickly by the 1st and 3rd Battalions. On the right, the 3rd Battalion Landing Team would land on Red Beach 2 and seize the right half of the division beachhead to about 1,600 yards inland. Then they would move right to clear the area around Ukiangong Village and Ukiangong Point. Over on the left, the 1st Battalion Landing Team would land on Red Beach 1, seize the division beachhead in its zone of action and move left to capture the area from the north end of Red Beach to Flink Point. Meanwhile the reinforced 2nd Platoon of Company G, 165th Regiment, and 19 marines of the 4th Platoon of the 5th Amphibious Corps Reconnaissance Company were going to land on Kotabu island, lying just north of Flink point. This would secure the seward approaches into the lagoon. After two hours while the troops consolidated their beachhead the Z detachment of the 105th regiment led by Captain William Ferns would land on Yellow beach 2 on the north side of the island between On Chong's and King's Wharfs. The detachment would split into two groups, one heading east to clear Kings wharf the other west to clear On Chong's wharf. After this a wave of the 165th battalion would advance west. Comparing the two, Julian's plan was a lot more simple, it called for the landing at Betio of 3 battalions; the 2nd battalion, 8th marines, 2nd battalion and the 2nd and 3rd battalions 2nd marines. Colonel David Shoup and Colonel Elmer Hall would lead the 3 battalions.The 1st battalion, 2nd marines would be held in reserve. The corps reserve for Tarawa, Makin or Apamama would be Colonel Maurice Holmes 6th marines. Once the beachhead was secured, troops would advance across the island to the south, seizing the airfield and mopping up enemy positions along the major beaches To further prepare for Operation Galvanic, Admiral Pownall led three carriers, the Lexington, Princeton and Belleau Wood to strike the Gilberts on September 18th. Supported by 38 Liberators flying out of Canton, Funafuti and Guadalcanal, Pownall made 6 separate and unopposed air strikes against Tarawa. A ton of fuel and ammunition was destroyed, several buildings were wrecked and a small freighter was sunk. Attacks on Makin saw three flying boats lit on fire with some damage done to shore installations. What was more important than these strikes was the photographic coverage that accompanied them. Zero fighter interception was found at either, though two Japanese medium bombers were shot down northwest of Makin. According to the diary of a Japanese laborer, 28 laborers were killed during a strike on Makin, most likely from a direct bomb hit to a shelter. On Beito they hit a runway, though it would be quickly repaired. Pownall tried to keep the strikes going but now saw an interception from 18 zeros which shot down 5 of his aircraft. To follow up the raid on the Gilberts, Admiral Montgomery hit Wake with one of the largest carrie strike forces to date. The Essex, Lexington, Yorktown, Cowpens, Independence and Belleau Wood with support from land based aircraft hit Wake on October 5th and 6th. Over 67 Japanese planes were reported to be destroyed in the air and on the ground. Shore installations were also battered heavily. Then beginning on november 13th, land-based bombers of Admiral Hoover made nightly raids against Tarawa, Makin, Nauru and some central Marshall islands. Meanwhile between November 13-17th, Major General Willis Hale's 7th air force's heavy bombers flew 141 bombing sorties against the Gilberts and Marshalls. They dropped over 173 tons of bombs, destroying at least 5 Japanese aircraft and inflicting heavy damage to their facilities and installations. Against the Americans, the Japanese forces in the area initially were that of Rear Admiral Abe Koso's 6th base force operating on Kwajalein. Koso commanded the 61st guard unit on Kwajalian, 62nd guard unit on Jaluit, 63rd guard unit on Taroa, 64th guard unit at Wotje, 65th guard unit at Wake, 43rd guard unit at Nauru, a detachment of the 63rd guard unit at Ocean island and another detachment of the 51st guard unit on Makin. For the Marshalls he had the 22nd air flotilla consisting of 46 Zeros, 40 kates, 3 vals, 5 flying boats and 11 reconnaissance aircraft. The raid of Makin back in 1942 alerted the Japanese to its significance so they sent the 6th Yokosuka SNLF to help occupy the Gilberts. During the spring of 1943, the IJN created the 3rd special base force of Rear-Admiral Shibazaki Keiji who would defend Tarawa, Makin, Apamama, Nauru and Ocean island. The Sasebo 7th SNLF would be sent to Tarawa, the 2nd Yokosuka SNLF to Nauru. The Japanese went to work on Makin and Tarawa constructing concrete and log emplacements for guns of all sizes. They used coconut tree logs to build tank barricade, tank pits, laid underwatch obstacles and dugouts for riflemen and machine gunners. On Makin the airbase was expanded and by july 1943 was able to take land based bombers. The Marshalls, Marianas and Carolines alongside other islands would be reinforced in preparation for expected American offensives. Four new south sea detachments were formed and tow mobile amphibious brigades that would be used for counterlandings. The Japanese were outmanned and outgunned, but they would make the Americans pay in blood for every inch of land, island by island. Now it is time for us to travel back to Green Hell as the allies were preparing to hit Sattelberg. By November 9th, the Australians knew the Japanese had two out posts west of Jivevaneng, at Green and Coconut ridges with another strong patrol base at Steeple Tree Hill. Whitehead decided to deploy the 2/24th battalion on the right to guard the enemy along the Palanko road; the 2/48th would take up the center advancing along the sattelberg road supported by the 1st tank battalion and the 2/23rd would take the left advancing along Sisi. Major General Frank Berryman would be appointed the new commander of the 2nd corps, as General Morshead was appointed commander of the New Guinea Force. The date for the new offensive was set for November 17th. A preliminary advance was made by a company along the sattelberg road to seize the enemy held Green Ridge. Under the support of heavy machine gun and artillery fire. At 8:20am two batteries and the company of the 2/2nd machine gun battalion fired upon Green Ridge. Captain Isaksson's company of the 2/48th then moved up, but were unable to properly follow up the bombardment. The men advanced at a slow rate up the ridge because of thick bamboo. Both the nearby near and far features were strongly defended and would only be captured by 10 and 12:4-pm respectfully. The capture of the Far feature took the machine gunners 26,000 rounds to keep the enemy heads down for the infantry to storm their positions. Captain Brocksopp's company occupied Green Ridge, Isakssons took White Trunk Tree lying on the junction of Sattelberg road and the Sisi track by 1:40pm. 5 men were killed in the process, 18 Japanese died on Green Ridge. At first light on November 17th, four Matilda tanks led by Major Samuel Hordern led the way to the start line converted under the noise of a deadly rocket barrage. Beginning at 6:30am rocket propelled bombs were fired from jeeps. These 30 pound bombs had a maximum range of 1200 yards. Several of them ended up being duds, but those that did explode had a very lethal effect, killing within a radius of 50 yards. On top of this came artillery and mortar bombardments, until Horderns tanks began smashing Coconut ridge with the infantry close behind them. A company of the 2/23rd would find Sisi unoccupied and continued north to help defend Green Ridge. Around 50 yards up the track the Australians found the first signs of opposition, a heavy machine gun post. The tanks fired blindly at the enemy defenses, mostly pillboxes and foxholes. Despite the terrifying attack, the Japanese held their ground and replied using machine guns, mortars and grenades, until the tanks blew them and their defenses to pieces. Halfway to Coconut ridge, the Matilada's had to halt to refill their ammunition. Within all of the excitement, the tank crews had run out of ammunition for their Besa guns. The Besa's had been firing bursts of around 50 rounds when they could have been firing 10s. Three deeps loaded with ammunition at Jivevaneng rushed forward as the tanks backed up some 60 yards to protect their approach. All of this was coordinated using walkie talkies, an absolutely crucial technology of the war. Meanwhile the 2/24th continued north to attack Japanese positions along the Palank road and to the south the 2/23rd met resistance halfway to Steeple Tree. At 10:20am, Horderns tanks were resuming their advance, eliminating pockets of resistance one by one. Upon reaching the Kunai Knoll on the southern Coconuts, two Matilda's became disabled. Upon seeing the halting tanks, the Japanese unleashed as much firepower as they could pinning down the infantry alongside their tanks. Lt Colonel Robert Ainslie ordered the men to advance on without the tanks. The men stormed the slopes of the Kunai Knoll, forced to crawl forward under heavy fire. It became a fierce battle, the Australians were unable to make much ground and forced to dig in for the night. Two companies dug in on the slopes of the Kunai Knoll while a third dug in near White Trunk Tree. Despite the terrifying tank attack, the Japanese did not flinch and fought throughout the day to halt the Australian advance. However during the night the Australians unleashed an artillery bombardment forcing the Japanese to abandon the ridge. The next morning, the Australians found the ridge abandoned and went to work repairing the two disabled tanks so they could continue the advance. Three more Matildas wielding 2 pounders and 3 inch Howitzers were brought up. The 2/2rd now advanced towards Mararuo, pushing the Japanese up a spur. The tanks advanced again, allowing the Australians to go another 250 yards until they were met again with heavy resistance. The Japanese held very strong positions upon the 2600 foot Steeple Tree Hill. Their system of defense was to have positions at every possible line of approach near bamboo obstacles. The Japanese would wait to fire until the infantry were just a few yards away to cause maximum damage. Armed with 37mm anti-tank guns the Japanese did all they could to neutralize the tank menace. By nightfall the attackers were forced to pull back to Coconut ridge and during the night the Japanese launched counter attacks using grenades and small arms. The next morning at 8am the Australians resumed their advance. The tanks led the way, but they were met with extremely fast and well coordinated anti-tank measures. At around 100 yards from the start line, the advance was halted by an anti-tank ditch 6 feet wide and 4 feet deep. Major Moodie's engineers of the 2/13th field company were able to dislodge the tanks and soon the tanks were overrun an 81mm mortar position. The tanks ran havoc upon a Woodpecker and two light machine gun positions, then after another 150 yards ran into another tank ditch around 10am. Lt Farquhars platoon charged past the tanks to give the engineers room to dislodge them only to see the tanks hit another ditch when they came forward again. The men fashioned two fougasses out of 4 gallon drums filled with petrol to hit the defenders of one of the slopes later to be named Fougasse Corner. A fougasse by the way is a projectile weapon, typically using a 40 gallon drum with a flammable substance like petrol. They would be inclined and when triggered using an explosive charge, shot a flame going perhaps 10 feet up, 3 feet wide for about 30 yards. Picture a really big flamethrower burst. This was unleashed on the slope causing roughly 20 casualties. The Japanese would leave 46 of their dead abandoning the slope when the Australians charged into them. The Japanese then launched a counterattack against the Fougasse Corner leading to more casualties, but were repelled. To the north, the 2/24th launched an attack on a knoll near the summit of the 2200 Feature. After an artillery bombardment, Lt Caples platoon took the unoccupied knoll, but soon the Japanese began encircling them. They fought until 2:30pm when the Australians finally established a secure position on the knoll. Meanwhile, General Katagiri was preparing to send the 79th regiment to attack the mouth of the Song River. Katagiri was facing a dire supply situation. Although 2-3 barges came up daily to bring supplies to Kanimi and Lakona, once the supplies landed they had to be carried overland and that was the crux of the problem. The main roads, Kanimi to Ago to Lakona to Wario to Sattelberg and secondary roads leading to Zageheme and Merikeo were all steep and mountainous, taking 5 days to traverse. This led the supply line to the front lines to be inconsistent. From the Diary entry of an unknown Japanese infantry man at Sattelberg October 15th "I eat potatoes and live in a hole and cannot speak in a loud voice. I live the life of a mud rat or similar creature" At the same time the 2/15th battalion had sent a diversionary force led by Major Newcomb with orders to "in conjunction with the opening of the attack towards Sattelberg… you are to command a diversionary force, broaden the apparent front of the attack on Sattelberg by simulating a new threat towards Wareo" The 2/15th set out on November 17th and reached Garabow the next day. They began bombarding it to cause the distraction. This was done to support Whiteheads offensive while in the east Brigadier Porter was going to cut the enemy's main supply line by attacking along the coast. Porter sent the 2/32nd battalion to take some high ground at Pabu. On November 19th, the 2/32nd were able to seize Pabu, avoiding any enemy, finding the hill unoccupied. The next morning the 2/32nd began patrolling and found large numbers of Japanese 500 yards to their west, and that said enemy then found them. Katagiri feared a possible attack upon Bonga so he decided to launch a secondary counteroffensive on November 21st. Meanwhile the 2/48th resumed their advance, this time without Horderns tanks who could not traverse past 250 yards because of bamboo obstacles. By 9:30am the tanks were able to bypass the obstacles and caught up to the infantry. At 10am, Whitehead gave the order “Go ahead as fast as possible” and 50 minutes later the skirmishing began upon the first enemy positions. The Australians pushed on slowly in a sluggish battle but were able to capture Steeple Tree by the late afternoon. At the same time the 2/23rd were trying to drive the enemy away from the southern approaches to Steeple Tree, gradually linking up with the 2/48th. To the north the 2/24th once again found themselves halted. The Japanese had created strong bamboo obstacles along the slopes that were difficult to traverse. In an attempt to force the issue, Wootten committed another troop of tanks to assist the 2/24th, but it would take a lot of time before the Matildas could climb the 2200 Feature. But the Japanese were caught between two enemy forces and were forced to pull back to Sattelberg during the night. The next morning the 2/48th resumed their advance while the 2/23rd patrolled towards Mararuo. Meeting no opposition the troops moved ahead quickly. At 4:35pm the enemy unleashed machine gun fire at point blank range upon them. The 2/48th tossed mortars and their tank support who crushed the enemy defenses, rapidly overwhelming the enemy, sending them scattering. But on November 22nd, Katagiri finally launched his counterattack using the bulk of the 79th regiment against Porters positions along the Song. Katagiri also sent the Fujii detachment led by Lt Colonel Fujii to attack Pabu. It just so happened Davies Company had left Pabu to search for the main Japanese supply road, and they came across Horace's Hoof in the afternoon. A company sized force of the Fujii detachment began their attack forcing Davies company back towards Pabu. But that is it for New Guinea as we now need to travel over to Bougainville. Generals Geiger and Turnage ordered a group of naval and marine engineers with construction personnel led by Civil Engineer corps officer Commander William Painter to construct airfields in the interior of the island. They were escorted by units of the 21st marines and used aerial photographs to find an area about 3 miles inland, roughly 1 mile beyond the defensive perimeter where suitable sites were located for two airstrips to be made. Unable to expand the perimeter properly because of the swamps around them, Turnage directed the 21st marines to establish a strong outpost at the junction of the East-West and Numa Numa trails to cover the new airfield sites. On November 13th, the inexperienced 2nd battalion, 21st marines of Lt Colonel Eustace Smoak set out with E company in the lead. Unbeknownst to them, Colonel Hamanoue had just realized the tactical value of said junction and sent a battalion to occupy Coconut Grove the previous day. The men had managed to establish a solid defensive perimeter. At 11:05 Company E ran right into an ambush. The Japanese unleashed machine gun and mortar fire with sniper support from the treelines. E companies commander sent a report back to Colonel Smoak, one of many panicked and incoherent reports he would receive from said company. This was the first combat experience for the 2nd battalion, 21st marines. Smoak rushed forward and established his command post close to the action. He ordered F company to relieve E company who had suffered heavy casualties. F company however, advanced too far to the right and suffered a lot of casualties in a disorganized manner. Unable to get artillery support, Smoak ordered his units to begin digging in for the night. The next morning, 5 light tanks of the 1st battalion, 21st regiment came up to support Smoak. While Smoak organized his forces, a air strike hit the Coconut grove area at 9:05am consisting of around 20 Avengers carrying 100lb bombs using 1 second delay fuses. The marines then performed an artillery barrage before resuming their advance upon the grove. The Japanese fired upon the tanks, managing to disable two of them. At this point Smoak ordered the disorganized assault to halt and began regrouping his men to attack again. This time they were able to break the Japanese resistance and by late afternoon established a perimeter around the Coconut Grove. The marines found 40 dead Japanese, the baptism under fire for the 2nd battalions, 21st marines cost them 20 dead men and 39 wounded. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Operation Galvanic was being prepared and in the meanwhile, a large number of air raids were hitting numerous places in the central pacific. The advance to sattelberg was getting closer day by day, the boys on Bougainville were finding inhospitable Japanese around every corner.
Last time we spoke about the Komiatum Offensive in New Guinea. The drive to Lae and Salamaua was raging on New Guinea. Mount Tambu was assaulted and the allies received hellish casualties trying to take it. The legendary Bull Allen saved countless lives during this action, but Mount Tambu simply couldn't be captured. The allies chose to isolate and surround mount Tambu instead. The allies secured took the sugarcane knoll, the timbered knoll and then found a path heading to Komiatum. Nakano ordered his men to hold Komiatum ridge, but their situation became more and more desperate. Allied artillery and aerial bombardment alongside the enveloping maneuvers were taking a toll, the Japanese had suffered 900 casualties since July 23rd. With more men dying minute by minute, Nakano ordered a withdrawal from Komiatum still believing the primary target of the allies was Salamaua. This episode is the Fall of Kiska & Battle of Vella Lavella Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. So before venturing back to the frigid northern aleutians, we have a lot of action to talk about in the south Pacific. On August 3rd, General Sasaki was forced to order a withdrawal from Munda. General Griswold sent a message over to Admiral Hasley declaring “Our ground forces today wrested Munda from the Japs and present it to you as sole owner”. Halsey in his typical fashion replied “keep ‘em dying”. Despite the blood, sweat and tears taking Munda, as a whole, operation cartwheel had fallen a month behind schedule. As Griswold noted “the months fighting had not been the Americans' finest hour in the Solomon islands campaign”. Halsey would add to it “the smoke of charred reputations still makes me cough”. Now just because Munda had fallen did not mean the work was all done, there was to be cleanup operations of course. General Sasaki ordered his forces to retreat northwards, most were enroute to the Kure 6th farm; the 13th regiment and Sasaki's HQ were going to Bairoko; the 3rd battalion, 23rd regiment and Yokosuka 7th guns were heading to Baanga island. The Americans would be in hot pursuit. General Griswold divided the cleanup operations, giving the 25th division the task of advancing across New Georgia to seize Bairoko Harbor and the Piru Plantation. General Hodge 's 43rd division was given the task of seizing the islands of Arundel and Baanga. General Collins would deploy the 1st battalion, 27th regiment and Colonel Dalton's 161st regiment to advance up the Bairoko trail; the rest of Colonel Douglas Sugg's 27th would advance along the Zieta Trail towards the Piru plantation. General Sasaki learnt on August 6th, the American navy had scored a small but conclusive victory when 6 US destroyers sunk 3 IJN destroyers, the Arashi, Kawakaze and Hagikaze during the Naval battle of Vella Gulf. This of course meant the Japanese reinforcement convoy had failed, thus Sasaki wasted no time ordered a general withdrawal to Kolombangara by the way of Baanga Island. Sasaki needed to give the men more time, so he reinforced the Yano battalion with the 12th company of the 3rd battalion, 23rd regiment who were left to defend the Kure 6th farm. Major Yano Keiji, a veteran of Guadalcanal, selected a rough terrain east and south of Zieta village and the Kure 6th farm to dig in. The Americans would later refer to it as “Zieta Garden”. The garden was to be Yano's first line of defense across the Zieta river. There was a bit of high ground due north of Zieta Village which would have been easier to defend, but he needed his men to protect the trail running to Lulu Channel and Baanga, his only line of communications. The 3rd battalion, 23rd regiment in the meantime were securing Baanga. General Sasaki radioed his plans to the 8th Fleet, but to his surprise was told to hold onto New Georgia until late September for “future operations”. Sasaki was bewildered by this, but understood Admiral Samejima then commanding the 8th fleet was trying to direct a land battle, and obviously he was not experienced in such things. What Sasaki did not know at the time was Samejima was being instructed by General headquarters to do this. On August 7th, the Army and Navy had agreed to pull out of the Central Solomons and would cooperate to bolster Bougainville's defenses. A revisión later on August 13th would instruct Koga, Kusaka and Imamura to hold onto as much of New Georgia as possible while Bougainville was being reinforced. Full evacuation of New Georgia was set for late September to early October, but the actual dates were dependent on the Bougainville progress. On August 8th Sugg's 2nd battalion advanced through a deep ravine going roughly 2 miles up the trail when his men were met with heavy machine gun fire. The Yano battalion was defending the barge supply route through the Lulu channel as their comrades and supplies made their way to Baanga. On August 9th, the 27th began their assault upon the Kure 6th Farm, employing a envelopment maneuver. The Yano battalion was holding them at bay, but gradually the allied forces were confining the Japanese into a smaller and smaller pocket. Meanwhile the 1st battalion was advancing north along the Munda-Bairoko trail where they joined Colonel Liversedge's men. On the 10th, Hodge ordered the 169th regiment to hit Baanga and on the 11th patrols from their 3rd battalion had located the Japanese strongpoint on its southwest tip. By nightfall, the American assault of the Kure 6th Farm forced Colonel Yano to withdraw back across the Zieta River to form a new defensive perimeter. His men performed a fighting withdrawal throughout the night seeing many Japanese scream and throw rocks at the Americans. The usual night time activities that kept the allied forces miserable. On the 12th the Americans unleashed an artillery bombardment upon the Kure 6th Farm positions not realizing they had already been abandoned. The 89th had fired 2700 rounds, the heaviest concentration of the operation on completely empty positions. The Americans advanced over Yano's old positions, crossed the river and fell upon Yano's new defensive perimeter. On that day General Barker assumed command of the 43rd division as General Hodge returned to his command of the Americal Division. Barker began by sending L Company of the 169th regiment to occupy Baanga. L Company were met with unexpectedly heavy Japanese fire suffering 28 casualties before they were forced to pull back. Meanwhile on August 13th, Sugg's 3rd battalion with E company managed to launch their main assault against the Yano battalion. They were attempting a envelopment maneuver against Yano's flanks, but heavy resistance saw Yano's right flank repel the attack. On the left there was a marshy plain that hindered the American advance forcing them to go too far left and thus failing to apply enough pressure. Although the assault failed, the unexpected left advance saw some gain. A patrol from H company stumbled across a heavily used trail leading to the Lulu channel. They established a roadblock that night allowing ambush efforts to hit the trail. The roadblock convinced Yano he was soon to be cut off, so he immediately prepared a withdrawal to Baanga. In the meantime, Barker decided to use Vela Cela island as a launching point for an assault against Maanga. On August the 14th, the 3rd battalion, 169th regiment began occupying the small island before using it as a springboard to land at Baanga. However the Americans quickly found themselves surrounded by a mangrove swamp and the Japanese began tossing counter attacks until night fell. Yano's forces repelled numerous American attacks from the 3rd battalion throughout the day, afternoon and night. The Japanese threw back one attack led by four marine tanks, which had crossed the river on a bridge engineers built. While doing this his men also began their retreat westwards. H Company met a brief exchange with Yano's men, but Yano decided not to seriously clash with them and withdrew his battalion to Baanga by the 15th. The 27th occupied Zieta village, making contact with Schultz 3rd battalion, 148th infantry over on Zieta Hill to the north. After this the 27th would advance upon Piru plantation and Sunday Inlet, too which they also ran into mangrove swamps greatly hindering them. The fight for the Zieta area had cost them 168 casualties, the americans were seeing a continuous flow of fierce counterattacks at Baanga, prompting Barker to decided he would reinforce the beachhead with the 2nd battalion 169th regiment and the 1st and 3rd battalions of the 172nd regiment. At this point General Griswold and Admirals Halsey and Wilkinson were trying to figure out what to do next. Halsey's original plan after the taking of Munda was to attack Kolombangara, but the recent performance of the Japanese defenders made the Americans quite skittish about performing an amphibious invasion. The battle for Munda point was one of the fiercest defenses the Japanese had put up. More than 30,000 troops had been brought over to face 5000 Japanese defenders within their network of entrenchments. As pointed out by the commander in chief of the US Navy planning memorandum “If we are going to require such overwhelming superiority at every point where we attack the Japanese, it is time for radical change in the estimate of the forces that will be required to defeat the Japanese now in the Southwest and Central Pacific.” Munda Point airfield would become a landmark victory because of the 6000 foot runway it would soon provide, alongside taxiways and its capacity as a base of operations. Halsey would later declare its airfield “to be the finest in the south pacific” and the Seabees would be awarded with a citation for their great efforts. Commander Doane would receive a special mention “by virtue of his planning, leadership, industry, and working ‘round the clock' to make serviceable the Munda Airfield on August 14th, 1943, a good four days ahead of the original schedule.” The seabees work was a testament not only to their morale and organization, but also the fact they held superior equipment. Admiral Nimitz would go on the record to state “one of the outstanding features of the war in both the North and South Pacific areas has been the ability of US forces to build and use airfields, on a terrain and with a speed which would have been considered fantastically impossible in our pre-war days.” Overall the Georgia campaign would go on the be an essential component in the strangulation of Rabaul, as pointed out by historian Eliot Morison “The Central Solomons ranks with Guadalcanal and Buna-Gona for intensity of human tribulation. We had Munda and we needed it for the next move, toward Rabaul; but we certainly took it the hard way. The strategy and tactics of the New Georgia campaign were among the least successful of any allied campaign in the Pacific”. Allied intelligence indicated Kolombangara had roughly 10,000 Japanese defenders, thus Halsey was inclined to seek an alternative method rather than slugging it out. He thought perhaps they could bypass Kolombangara completely and instead land on Vella Lavella. If they managed to pull that off, it would cut off the Japanese supply line to Kolombangara which was basically surviving on fishing boats and barges based out of Buin. Halsey noted “Kolombangara was 35 miles nearer the Shortlands and Kahili. According to coast-watchers, its garrison numbered not more than 250, and its shoreline would offer at least one airstrip.” A reconnaissance carried out back on July 22nd reported very few enemy troops on the island and that it held a feasible airfield site at Barakoma which also had beaches capable for LST's to land at. Thus Halsey approved the plan and Griswold formed the Northern Landing Force, placed under the command of Brigadier General Robert McClure. The force consisted of the recently arrived 35th regiment of the 25th division attached to the 25th cavalry reconnaissance troops, all led by Colonel Everett Brown; the 4th defense battalion, the 58th naval construction battalion and the Naval base group. To hit Vella Lavella they would require air supremacy and artillery planted upon Piru Plantation and the Enogai-Bairoko area. General Twinnings AirSols had 161 fighters back on July 31st, but by August 18th they would have 129 functioning. Twining had sufficient strength in bombers as the number of light and medium bombers had dropped by less than a dozen, at around 129. For heavy bombers his increased from 48 to 61. It was critical Munda airfields be fully operational by mid august, sothe Seabees of the 73rd and 24th naval construction battalions went to work. Admiral Fitch's plan for Munda airfield called for a 6000 long foot runway with a minimum 8 inch coral surface and taxiways and revetments ready for over 200 fighters by September 25th. Eventually this would also include 48 heavy bombers. The immediate job was the fighter strip as always, you prepare your defenses against air attacks before you bring in the heavy bombers. He had a week to make the field operational. Commander Doane of the 73rd Seabees had two critical assets. The first was Munda was by far the best airfield site in the Solomons. Beneath one to 3 feet of topsoil was solid coral and there was a plentiful supply of live coral which hardened like concrete, great for the surfacing. Second the 73rd was the best equipped battalion yet to arrive to the solomons with D-7 and D-8 bulldozers, ¾ yard power shovels, 8 yard carryalls and 7 ton rollers. Weather was good and the moon was bright for the week permitting night time work without lights. The immediate threat would have been a 12cm of the Yokosuka 7th SNLF at Baanga, but they never fired upon them. Again, wars are won by logistics and it can't be expressed enough what a colossal amount the Seabees did for the Pacific War. By August 14th, Mulcahy flew over to set up his HQ and the VMF-123 and VMF-124 flew into the base with a R4D carrying their gear and personnel. For the incoming invasion P-40s would be coming from Segi while Corsairs would be launched from Munda. Admiral Kusaka had reformed his 1st Base air force thanks to the arrival of his long-sought reinforcements. In mid July reinforcements arrived to the Solomons in the form of the 201st Kokutai Aerial Bomb group and carrier Division 2's naval bombers from Ryujo. The overall strength of the 1st base air force was now at around 230 aircraft of various types. The land-based bombers would go to Rear Admiral Ueno Keizo's 25th air flotilla over in Rabaul. They were tasked with night bombing raids against Guadalcanal and New Georgia now. Naval fights and bombers would be merged into the 1st combined air attack force, later reformed into the 26th air flotilla led by Rear Admiral Sakamaki Munetake. There job was to destroy any enemy shipping in New Georgia and to conduct interceptions over the Munda-Buin areas. It was understood the Americans held numerical superiority, but the Japanese were willing to take them on hoping their fighting spirit would prevail. Meanwhile, back on the night of August 12th, Admiral Wilkinson deployed an advance party of 14 men led by Captain George Kriner to perform a reconnaissance of Vella Lavella. They would be reinforced by Companies E and G of the 103rd regiment when the scouts found 40 Japanese around Biloa and another 100 5 miles north of Barakoma. They had reached the island secretly using 4 PT boats, though Japanese floatplanes would made to bomb one of them. After the successful arrival of the advance party at Barakoma, F Company of the 103rd landed on August 14th to reinforce the beachhead. The main invasión force designated Task Force 31 led by Admiral Wilkinson would consist of 10 destroyers, 5 destroyer transports, 12 LCI's, 3 LST's and two subchasers. At 3:05am the 1st transport group of the force departed consisting of the destroyer transports with 6 escort destroyers were carrying the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 35th regiment. Captain Ryan led the group aboard Nicholas while Wilkinson was aboard Cony. The second transport group made up of the smaller vessels carried the Seabees and support personally following an hour behind with 4 destroyer escorts led by Captain William Cooke. After the force departed Guadalcanal they were to approach the Gizo Strait around midnight, before beginning to unload in the early hours of august 15th, under the cover of fighters. However Wilkinson would not be aware his force was spotted by a G3M Betty bomber which reported back to Admiral Samaki who immediately launched a strike force. By 8am, the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 35th regiment had landed. While the 3rd battalion began their unloading process enemy aircraft appeared. 48 Zeros and 6 Vals were intercepted by American fighters. By 9:15 all the troops were landed, now the equipment began to be unloaded. The Japanese launched two waves from Buin, the first appeared at 12:30, made up of 48 Zero's and 11 Vals. They were intercepted leading to no damage being done to the landing forces. 7 Zeros came in low to strafe the beach but were turned away by fire from 65 automatic weapons aboard the LST's. LST's in the past lacked adequate anti aircraft protection, thus 20 20mm guns were borrowed from Guadalcanal and set to use. At 5:30 32 Zero's and 8 Vals showed up but they too were intercepted. By 6pm the LSTs were beginning to retract. The strikes had amounted to 12 men killed on the beach and 40 wounded, it could have been much worse. The Japanese reported losing 9 Zeros and 8 Vals for the day while the Americans would claim to have lost a total of 5 fighters. Without any real land battle the amphibious invasion of Vella Lavella was a resounding success. After darkness settled in, Admiral Ueno's 5th air attack force over in Rabaul launched their final attempt against the American convoys. At 5:30pm, 3 Betty's that had launched out of Vunakanau were spotting the convoy and reporting their movements. They came across the LCI's southeast of Gatukai and the LSTs as they were approaching the Gizo strait. 23 Bettys in 3 Chutai's, one armed with torpedoes the other two with bombs approached. The torpedo armed Betty's attacked the LCI's while the bombers went for the LST's. The American destroyers tossed up a lot of anti aircraft fire as the torpedoes and bombs failed to hit targets. 4 Betty's would be damaged badly for their efforts. The Japanese reaction to the terrible results was to form an unrealistic plan to wipe out the American invasion by sending a single battalion to the island. When the landings became known, officers of the 8th fleet and 17th army formed a conference. They estimated, with accuracy surprisingly, that the landing force was around a brigade in strength. One officer proposed the idea to send a battalion to counterland. General Imamura's HQ calmly pointed out that sending a single battalion against a brigade would be like “pouring water on a hot stone”. The men were desperately more needed for the defense of Bougainville. The Japanese knew they were vastly outnumbered in the Solomons and that the fight for the central solomons was pretty much lost. They believed their only chance to successfully defend the rest of the solomons was to carry out a slow retreat in order to build up forces in Bougainville and Rabaul. It was decided that two rifle companies of the Miktami battalion and a platoon from the Yokosuka 7th SNLF would be sent to Horaniu on the northeast corner of Vella Lavella. These forces would establish a barge staging base between Kolombangara and the Shortlands. Alongside this Rekata bay would be evacuated and its 7th Kure SNLF would set up a relay base at Choiseul. Imamura nad Kusaka planned to hold Horaniu for as long as possible, trying to establish a new supply route along the west coast of Choiseul. For the Horaniu operation, Admiral Ijuins destroyer squadron of Sazanami, Shigure, Hamakaze and Isokaze were going to escort 22 barges, supported by 3 torpedo boats and two subchasers. The small armada departed Rabaul on August 17th, but Ijuin's destroyers were spotted quickly by an allied search plane 100 miles out of Rabaul. In fact, Wilkinson was anticipating the Japanese heading for Kolombangara or perhaps Barakoma. He sent 4 destroyers, the Nicholas, O'Bannon, Taylor and Chevalier under Captain Thomas Ryan. Ryan had been an ensign in Yokohama during the 1923 Great Kanto earthquake, where he saved the love of one Mrs. Slack from the burning Grand Hotel. This earned him the medal of honor making him 1 of 18 men to receive the medal of honor during the interwar period of 1920-1940. Ryans force departed Tulagi while the other American convoy, the 2nd echelon led by Cooke were landing equipment at Barakoma. By nightfall Ryans squadron were coming up the slot while the enemy convoy was being harassed by 4 Avengers. The Avengers failed to score hits, but the anti aircraft gunfire alerted Ryan, as the Japanese were reversing course heading in his direction. At 12:29am on August 18th O'Bannon made radar contact and a few minutes later the Americans could see the Japanese ships. At 12:32 the Japanese spotted Ryans force, prompting Ijuin to order a 45 degree turn northwest to try and lure the enemy away from the convoy. As his ruse succeeded there would be a pretty ineffective long range gun and torpedo duel seeing Hamakaze and Isokaze taking slight damage. Meanwhile the Japanese barges were racing to the coast. Ryan believed he had foiled the reinforcement when he engaged the destroyers . But because Chevalier was facing some mechanical failures and could not keep up speed to chase the Japanese destroyers, Ryan decided to turn back to engage the already landed reinforcements at Horaniu. However they managed to escape north too quickly, thus the Horaniu operation was quite a bit of success, with a lot of luck at play. Now we are shifting over to the frigid north waters of the Aleutians. The fall of Attu and Munda were pivotal moments of the Pacific war that completely changed the course of their respective campaigns. When Munda was taken, the Japanese realized the central solomons were a lost cause and began to move all resources and men they could to Bougainville. When Attu was taken, the Japanese realized the Aleutian islands campaign was a lost cause and decided to evacuate the forces on Kiska. The battle of the pips and miraculous evacuation of Kiska was completed by the end of July. Kiska was pummeled on July 26th and 27th under clear sunny weather. 104 tons of bombs hit Kiska's installation on the 26th in a large attack consisting of 32 B-24's, 24 P-38 lightnings and 38 P-40's. On the 27th it was hit with 22 tons of bombs. On August 1st Lt Bernard O'Donnel conducted the first reconnaissance sweep since the July 27th bombing and observed no Japanese fights, no anti aircraft fire and no ships at harbor. Meanwhile the blockade was being performed by Giffen and Griffen's task force who bombarded Kiska. Intelligence crews working on aerial photographs of the island and its installations noted a number of odd features. Practically all the buildings around 23 in all appeared destroyed, but with rubble patterns suggesting demolition rather than bombing. The Japanese also appeared to have done no repair work on the craters in the north head runway, which was very odd, it was around the clock kind of work for them. All the garrisons trucks seemed to be parked on the beach in clusters and it seemed they were not moving day to day. Some pilots reported a bit of activity, like narrowly missing flak and some vehicles and ships seen moving below, but Kinkaids HQ noted all these reports were coming from green pilots. Experienced fliers were not reporting such things. Radio traffic had vanished, some wondering if the bombing was so tremendous it destroyed all the radios. Generals Butler and DeWitt believed the Green pilots, but Generals Buckner and Holland Smith were very suspicious, pointing out that the Japanese had already carried out a secret massive evacuation at Guadalcanal. In fact Buckner and Smith kept asking Kinkaid to toss some Alaskan scouts ashore in rubber boats at night prior to an invasion to report if the island was abandoned or not. But Kinkaid had the last say in the matter and declined to do so. Kinkaid's decision was to go ahead with a full scale invasion of the island. In his words “if the enemy had evacuated the island, the troop landings would be a good training exercises, a super dress rehearsal, excellent for training purposes”. On August 12th, Captain George Ruddel, leading a squadron of 4 fighters circled low over the anti aircraft gun positions on Kiska, received no flak so he landed on her North head runway dodging nearly 30 craters. The 3 other fighters followed suit and the pilots performed a tiny expedition for some time. They found no sign of people, just destroyed buildings and abandoned equipment. Nonetheless Ruddels report would not stop Kinkaid, only some scolding for doing something so dangerous. The invasion of Kiska, codenamed operation cottage, was set for August 15th. The invasion force was 30,000 Americans and 5300 Canadians under the overall command of Major General Charles Harrison Corlet. It consisted of Brigadier General Archibald Arnolds 7th division; Buckner's 4th regiment; Colonel Roy Victor Rickards 87th mountain infantry regiment, the 13th Canadian Brigade known as the Greenlight Force which consisted of the Canadian Fusiliers regiment, the 1st Battalion of Winnipeg Grenadiers, the Rocky Mountain Rangers regiment and Le Regiment de Hull led by Major General George Pearkers; there was also Colonel Robert Fredericks 1st Special Service force consisting of 2500 paratroops of elite American-Canadian commandos. Kiska marked the first time Canadian conscripts were sent to a combat zone in WW2. The men were equipped in Arctic gear, trained mostly at Adak, practicing amphibious landings using LCI's and LCT's. The naval forces were commanded by Admiral Rockwell were more than 100 warships strong, with Admiral Baker leading a group to bombard Kiska with over 60 tons on August 14th. The journey to the abandoned island was pretty uneventful. On August 15th, Admiral Rockwell dispatched the transports to gather off Kiska during a period of light fog. Major General Corlett's plan was to stage a diversionary landing using a detachment of Alaskan Scout led by Colonel Verbeck to hit Gertrude Cove which was assumed to be heavily fortified. While this occurred an advance force of the 1st, 2nd and provisional battalions of the 1st regiment, 1st special service force would secure the western side of the island, known as Quisling cove. The main force would land at a beach on the north near the Kiska volcano. Colonel Verbecks scouts and Colonel Robert Fredericks commands were the first to come ashore. They were met by empty machine gun nests as they climbed Lard Hill, Larry Hill and Lawson Hill, interesting names. They investigated caves and ravines only to find destroyed equipment. But perhaps the enemy was simply further up in the hills saving their ammunition to ambush them. During the morning the main force landed on Kiskas northern side whereupon they immediately began climbing some cliffs to reach objectives. In the process each battalion of the 87th mountain regiment captured Robber Hill, Riot Hill and Rose Hill. US Army Lt George Earle recalled this of the unique landscapes of Kiska “At one end was a perfectly shaped steaming volcano, cloudcushioned, well- wrapped […] all around were cliff-walled shores and, when visible, a bright green matting of waist-high tundra scrub and deep lush mosses – a great green sponge of slopes rising to a rocky knife-edge crest nearly eight hundred feet above the shore up in the fog, and zigzagging its ridge-line backbone toward the […] four-thousand foot cone of the volcano”. Lt Earle also noted the incessant rain and fog, Kiska saw roughly 250 days of rain per year on average and held a ton of clouds blotting out sunshine. On the day the allied force landed the island was blanketed with a thick fog. As the allied forces advanced they ran into a variety of booby traps the Japanese had taken a lot of time to leave behind, these included; typical land mines, improvised 155m shells with trigger wires, M-93 mine's laid upside down wired to blocks of TNT, timed bombs, candle bombs, and the classic grenades with trip wire. There was to be several casualties from booby traps. In the fog as timed bombs or other traps went off, allied forces opened fire towards noises believing the enemy was upon them. There was some friendly fire incidents amongst the Americans and Canadians, but not as much that has been perpetuated by quite a few videos on Youtube mind you. Its actually a myth thats been perpetuated in many books, in fact the main source I have been using for the Aleutian islands campaign is guilty of it sad to say. The friendly fire incidents on Kiska was not a large skirmish between American and Canadian forces that resulted in many deaths or wounded, no that was pretty much summed up to booby traps, a lot of them. If you want to know more about this, I did a podcast interview on my youtube channel, the Pacific War channel with Brad St.Croix, a historian focused on Canadian military history. The episode is titled the Canadian experience during the Pacific War, and Brad had a lot of, going to admit, vented anger about debunking this myth haha. Please go check it out, I have to admit of all my podcast episodes it has not received many views and I am sad at this because there's a lot of interesting stuff, like how Canada was going to be part of Operation Downfall. Anyways. The Americans and Canadians suspected the Japanese might be retreating into the interior or hiding in fight pits, so they were tense the entire time, after the stories from Attu who could blame them. The crack of a single rifle fire, would be met with more, but it always died down quickly. Corlett's forces continued to climb uphill towards Link Hill and Ranger Hill in the direction of the main enemy camp at Kiska harbor. They found all the fortifications they came across abandoned. The second wave of the main force were brought over consisted of the 1st regiment, 1st special service force who landed at Little Kiska Island unopposed. By August 18th Corlett was confident the enemy was not on Kiska, but he continued the search nonetheless, into the caves and ravine, until August 22nd. To quote Ian Toll's 2nd book of his pacific war trilogy “Considering the expenditure of naval ordnance and aerial bombs on an island that had been vacated by the enemy, and the tremendous investment of shipping and troops in a bloodless invasion, the Kiska operation had been slightly farcical. In Pearl Harbor, the news was received in good humor. Nimitz liked to tell visitors how advance elements of the huge invasion force, creeping inland with weapons at the ready, were warmly greeted by a single affable dog that trotted out to beg for food” Indeed the capture of Kiska which ushered the end to the Aleutians campaign, was kind of a enormous blunder when you consider the amount of resources allocated to it. You always have to consider these resources could have been brought to the south pacific, but hindsight is hindsight. After the battle of Attu, the allies expected an absolute bloodbath on Kiska. For Corlett's men, the americans suffered 18 deaths, 170 wounded, the Canadians 4 killed and 4 wounded, 130 men also got trench foot. The destroyer Abner Read struck a Japanese mine on August 18th, suffering 70 dead and 47 wounded to bring the total casualties to 313. Generals Buckner and DeWitt sought an invasion of Paramushiro, but the joint chiefs of staff would gradually reject the idea because it was simply seen to be easier to drive through the central or south pacific to Japan. But I would like to point out, if the south and central pacific campaigns did not go well, the idea of hitting the Japanese home islands from the Aleutians could have been a very real thing. Kinkaid, Butler, Eareckson amongst many others would leave the north pacific to deploy in other theaters. It was only really Buckner who remained, DeWitt returned to the west coast, as did the majority of forces. Wanted a feel good end to this one. So the allied forces on Kiska found more than just booby traps, turns out the Japanese had abandoned a number of dogs on the island, so the allied troops adopted many of them and turned them into unit mascots and pets. Surviving photos of the soldiers and the dogs are abundant and cute. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The amphibious assault of Vella Lavella was a huge success, though now the battle for the small island was on. The farcical battle of Kiska had ushered in the end of the Aleutian islands campaign, birthing a long persisting myth to this very day of an incredible friendly fire battle.
Last time we spoke about the battle of Attu. The American forces were gradually taking the high grounds from the Japanese. The stalemate at Jarmin's pass had caused severe casualties upon the Americans, but they managed to get the Japanese to withdraw from the Pass by May 17th. Jarmin's Pass would receive its name after Captain John Jarmin and his platoon died fighting atop it on May 14th. We also spoke about the silent service and how the Mark 14 torpedo was gradually fixed so the submariners would be better equipped to strangle Japan of her lifeblood, her merchant fleet. Lastly we spoke about the horrifying Changjiao Massacre that occurred during the West Hubei Offensive and the plight of the common Chinese people during the brutal second sino-japanese war. But today we are going to finish up the story of the battle for Attu. This episode is the Fall of Attu Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. So we left off in the Frigid Northern island of Attu on May 16th, with General Brown being relieved of command of the 7th division by the Aleutian veteran Brigadier General Eugene Landrum. Given the evidence on hand today, it seems Brown had really irritated Admiral Kinkaid and his other military superiors, coupled with miscommunication or better said lack of. The misunderstandings that arose saw Brown kicked out, but before he departed he had the chance to speak to Landrum. Landrum was shocked when he saw the situation for what it really was and sympathized with Brown. He ordered all of Brown's plans to continue as they were. Now back on Attu, the Northern Force of Colonel Culin was making a major breakthrough by cutting off Lt's Goto and Honna and their forces in Jarmin Pass. They were forced to abandon their positions during the night of the 16th, slipping away and successfully eluding all the American forces as they joined Colonel Yamasaki's main body at Chichagof. The following morning the Americans failed to realize off the bat that they were no longer facing any Japanese atop Jarmin Pass, as a result of the thick fog. Eventually the lack of bullets coming down upon them brought the realization that the brutal massacre valley struggled which had to this point claimed 1100 American casualties had ended. Over in the south Colonel Wayne Zimmerman walked atop the crest of Jarmin pass where he stumbled upon the corpse of Captain John Jarmin and the bodies of his comrades surrounded by mangled bodies of dead Japanese. The pass which was called Massacre-Holtz pass was renamed after Jarmin who died on the 14th. The pass would receive a renaming There was an eerie silence over the pass that day. On May 18th the various Americans forces finally established contact through Jarmin Pass and now looked towards Chichagof where the Japanese were looking to make a stand. Despite successfully dislodging them, the Japanese had managed to withdraw in order, establishing yet again well-prepared defenses on the jagged heights of Chichagof Valley. Landrum decided to give the men another day to recuperate and plan out their attack and as he noted later “I know this country and my heart bled for the boys. I had to send them up there. I know how cold and bitter it was on the mountains. But I knew death was bitterer.”.On May 18th the American officers got together to formulate a plan to assault the Japanese. Colonel Culin would lead one Pincer and Colonel Zimmerman the other, this was part of Major General Browns original plan. Zimmerman's 2nd battalions, of the 17th and 32nd infantry with the 3rd battalion of the 17th infantry in reserve would seize Clevesy pass. Once that was taken, the Southern force would then advance down Jim Fish Valley to seize Sarana Nose on the right side and Buffalo Ridge on the left thus securing the approaches to Chichagof harbor. Culin's Northern Force and the 1st battalion of the 4th regiment would capture the northern slopes of Prendergast ridge in preparation for the final assault against Chichagof. Culin and Zimmerman shuffled their more exhausted units into reserve, allowing fresher troops to take the lead. Meanwhile in his Kingfisher Colonel Eareckson flew reconnaissance missions almost constantly, scouting, coordinating and occasionally dropping messages to isolated units he could find. Eareckson relayed targets back to the bomber units so they could try to hit the enemy who had been alluding them heavily for days because of the deep fog. Colonel Talley's Engineers were also at work, building a road towards Engineer hill to help move the artillery piece further inland. Admiral Rockwell also sent a force of PT boats to carry further supplies ashore, hoping to reduce the enormous traffic jam of supplies along the beaches. During the night of May 18th, Zimmerman and Culin sent scouts to probe the enemy defenses at Clevesy Pass. On the morning of the 19th, the offensive began, with Zimmerman sending his 2nd battalion 17th regiment to hit Clevesy pass supported by an artillery barrage and Culin sent his two battalions against the Chichagof heights. By noon, the 2nd battalion, 32nd regiment joined the southern attack. Culins advance finds out the Japanese position at the Chichagof heights are quite formidable. Lt Honna has taken a position at a place called Point Able, a mountain blocking the Southern forces advance. Lt Honna who spoke perfect english notably would be spending the fighting at Point Able lobbing elaborate insults and taunts at the American invaders. For Zimmerman's men, they had the support of a ton of artillery and some aerial bombardments to soften up Clevesy Pass allowing the men to capture a toehold on the high grounds. However Zimmerman's men quickly found themselves embroiled in a major battle, as Dr. Paul Tatsuguchi tells us via his diary “The hard fighting of our 303rd Battalion in Massacre Bay is fierce and it is to our advantage. Have captured enemy weapons and used that to fight enemy closing under fog.” Lt Honna and his 303rd independent battalion fought like madmen to hold Point Able. The next day, Zimmerman sent some companies to perform an early morning attack to seize Cold Mountain while the Japanese reigned machinegun fire upon them. By noon the American attacks had reduced the Japanese to a force of 50 men upon Nees Point who were tossing back continuous american attacks. Meanwhile Culins men were fighting their way inch by inch over bloodstained hills. By the end of the 20th, they gained a few hundreds yards. Also on the 20th, the 1st battalion, 4th regiment entered the fray, hitting Clevesy pass and beginning their ascension to Prendergast ridge. General Buckner's men were able to reach the top of the ridges the following night before turning their advance towards Sarana-Holtz Pass. The USS Nassau launched its final mission of the day, sending some Wildcats to bomb and strafe the Japanese positions in the Chichagof Harbor in the afternoon. Again we hear from Dr. Tatsuguchi's diary “Was strafed when noon, amputating a patient's arm. It is the first time since moving over to Chichagof Harbor that I went in an air raid shelter… Nervousness of our CO is severe and he has said his last word to his officers and NCOs-that he will die tomorrow – gave all his articles away. Hasty chap this fellow. The officers on the front are doing a fine job. Everyone who heard this became desperate and things became disorderly.” After hitting the Japanese the USS Nassau left for Adak having lost 5 pilots and 8 aircraft to the bitter frigid weather. The next day, General Buckner came over to Attu to support his 4th regiment and had Colonel Eareckson fly him up Massacre Valley to look around Point Able. Buckner apparently even manned the aircrafts machine gun strafing the Japanese trenches. That day Eareckson's bombers managed to destroy every building in Chichagof village. Eareckson himself would later that day walk over to the frontlines, borrow a rifle from an infantry man and proceeded to shoot at Point Able. For this he was rewarded with an enemy bullet that wounded him. Buckner would get him a Purple Heart to pin to his chest and a firm kick in his ass upon saying “for being where you had no business being”. I think in Eareckson's defense, a General manning a machine gun on an aircraft was just as hilariously improper. Zimmermans men continued to push up the mountains against the Japanese, and during the nightfall Company E of the 32nd regiment made a daring charge up the slopes of Point Able ferociously wiping out Honna company down to the last man. Honna would die from a gunshot wound having fought to the bitter end. To the north, Culins man successfully captured Hill 4, leading towards Prendergast ridge, when General Landrum suddenly ordered them to instead support the Southern Forces advance upon Fish Hook ridge. Fish Hook Ridge overlooked Chichagof harbor still held by Colonel Yamasaki who was suffering daily artillery and aerial bombardments. Yamasaki's men were ordered to hold the beach at all cost. To the left was Jim Fish Valley and Sarana Nose to the right. The defenses on both sides of the entrance to the harbor rendered a direct approach upon Chichagof harbor quite difficult. Sailed from the west, Admiral Kawase was performing reconnaissance around the Komadorski islands and reported back that the size of the American fleet at Attu was enormous. It seems this report finally sunk in with Tokyo HQ, because they made their decision to evacuate the aleutian garrisons via submarine, thus ending anymore reinforcing. The following day, 19 G4M bombers launched from Paramushiro, and through the fog found a patch of clear sky over Holtz Bay where they dropped packages over Chichagof Harbor before they attacked the American vessels. They lost two Betty's for their efforts inflicting basically no damage upon the American warships. On the morning of May 22nd, Zimmermans forces ran into the remnants of the 303rd battalions, the 4th company and a few survivors of the 2nd company on Sarana Nose. Zimmerman ordered his reserve 3rd battalion, 17th regiment to hit the peak after the big guns got to smash it for 30 minutes. The big guns referred to 32 heavy machineguns, 14 37 mm anti-tank guns, 23 81mm mortars, a section of 75mm pack howitzers and 4 batteries of 105mm howitzers, a lot of shock and aye. THe bombardment devastated the entrenched Japanese allowing the men to take Sarana Nose with relative ease, annihilating the handful of Japanese. Meanwhile on the left flank, the 4th regiment advanced upon Prendergast Ridge supported by artillery. To the north, Culin attacks stalled due to heavy resistance, so Landrum ordered him to hold his position. Despite Landrums recent broken leg he assumed personally command of the southern force. May 22nd's aerial photos showed that leading a direct assault up the valley floor would bring the southern force into an inferno of lead from the surrounding ridges that overlooked the valley. So instead they would secure Fish Hook Ridge first. Fish Hook ridge was a rugged semicircular snow covered, knife edge ridge which bent like a fish hook around 2 miles towards Chichagof Harbor. The Japanese had made a defensive line of snow trenches, rifle pits and machine gun nests connected by snow tunnels along the slopes of Washburn and Newman Peaks. These extended further south to the slopes of Brewer Peak, Buffalo ridge and to the floor of Jim Fish Valley. The entire defensive line blocked the Holtz-Sarana and Holtz-Chichagof passes and the entrance to Jim Fish Valley. Zimmerman sent his 2nd battalion, 32nd regiment to seize a high plateau to the left side of Jim fish valley. Again, before his men charged up the plateau, artillery made sure to pound the area, and again the Americans would find mangled survivors. At this point the Japanese situation was dire. They were desperately low on food, isolated and fighting a battle of attrition against an enemy enjoying every advantage. Yamasaki and his men were trapped behind their innermost defensive perimeter, but his delaying action left him in possession of a defensive firepower more concentrated than before. Despite the hundreds of casualties they had suffered, Yamasaki now counted with more soldiers to defend each yard of ground. May 23rd began with a heavy fog and very snowy weather, preventing Zimmermans men from launching their main attack. He was only able to send the 2nd Battalion, 17th Regiment and 2nd Battalion, 32nd Regiment to relieve the exhausted 4th Regiment. Company A of the 4th infantry had a horrible experience when 9 Japanese machine gun nests with attached riflemen pinned them down. Then an unexpected event occurred as told to us by Lt Winfield Mapes “quite suddenly a lone figure jumped up and ran across the open snow towards the nearest Jap hole. He had an M1 and bunch of hand grenades. He threw a grenade into the first hole and began firing. He moved right on into the circle of Jap holes around the machine gun. Deliberately, he walked up the edge of the holes one by one, […] then […] tossed a grenade. Nine times he did this […] [Private Fred M.] Barnett is just a guy […] who said, “Hell, I just got all fed-up and disgusted; and decided I'd get the damn thing over with,” and voiced the words of a nation” When Barnett reappeared he walked calmly downhill signaled the two companies to advance. Barnett had charged nine successive Japanese emplacements, wiping them all out without taking a scratch. Private Barnett received the distinguished service cross for his actions. Other smaller units probed the ridge, but all were stopped by Japanese resistance on Buffalo Ridge. To the west, Culins men were pressing towards a junction beneath Fish Hook ridge, finally linking up again with the southern force, planning to coordinate an offensive the next morning. That day, General Butler's P-38 Lightnings intercepted a wave of 16 Betty's managing to shot down 9 of them while losing 2 Lightnings in the process. Because of these large losses, the Japanese would not commit anymore airforces from Paramushiro. On the morning of May 24th, a coordinated assault against the ridge began. The 2nd Battalion, 17th Infantry of the Southern Force moved over the southern slopes of Prendergast Ridge, while the 3rd Battalion, 32nd Infantry, plus two companies from the 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry, advanced along the northern slopes. Heavy Japanese machine-gun fire, repelled both forces back to their lines of departure on Prendergast Ridge as they attempted to negotiate their way across the “Bahai Bowl.” The 2nd Battalion, 32nd Infantry Regiment and 3rd Battalion, 17th Infantry Regiment advanced up Jim Fish Valley where Japanese fire from Buffalo Ridge halted them near the southern end of Lake Cories. The Americans were fighting for every inch of snow and ice covered muskeg they advanced upon and the casualties were mounting heavily. Dr.Tatsuguchi's diary tells us“Naval gun firing, aerial bombardment, trench warfare, the worst is yet to come. The enemy is constructing a position. Bn. Commander died at Umanose [Fish Hook Ridge]. They cannot accommodate their patients. It has been said that at Massacre Bay district, the road coming through sector unit headquarters is isolated. Am suffering from diarrhea and feel dizzy.” Aerial and artillery bombardment was carried out the entire day, unfortunately a bit too much so, as some friendly fire occurred, yet again the fog a constant enemy. Eventually Landrum was forced to order the 4th regiment to reinforce the southern advance because of the intense resistance. By the end of the day two companies of Culins 3rd battalion, 32nd regiment managed to get into the Holtz-Sarana Pass. Meanwhile the American Engineers had built up the road to Engineer Hill allowing Landrum to order every artillery piece available to be brought along it up to Massacre Valley. On the 25th, artillery and aerial bombardments soften up the approaches for the 3rd battalion, 32nd infantry on the left and the 2nd battalion, 17th regiment on the right against the pass. While this assault began, the 2nd battalion, 32nd infantry and the 3rd battalion, 17th infantry resumed their assault but were met with intense resistance from the Japanese along Buffalo ridge. The defenders as usual enjoyed extremely good concealment, utilizing fresh snow to their advantage making them practically invisible. The 2nd Battalion, 17th Infantry supported by the 1st Battalion, 4th Battalion charged through snow and bullets, seizing Newman Peak, which overlooked the pass. By nightfall, Zimmerman controlled the base of the ridge with some isolated slopes in the hands of scattered companies. It was at this point the logistics for the Americans took a turn for the worse. They were not much further from their beach landings areas and the supplies were trickling up slower and slower. This was an indication that time was of the essence, the longer the battle went on, the more the chances were that logistical issues would strangle them. When May 26th rolled around, with it came some clear weather giving the American airforces a chance to bomb the defensive lines with rare precision. Again from Dr. Tatsuguchi's diary we receive this “Hit by naval gun firing, it felt like the Missumi barracks blew up and things lit up tremendously. Consciousness becomes vague. One tent burn down by a hit from incendiary bombs. Strafing planes hit the next room, two hits from a 50 caliber shell, one stopped in the ceiling and the other penetrated. My room is an awful mess from sand and pebbles that have come from the roof. First Lt. from medical corps is wounded. There was a ceremony to grant the Imperial Edict. The last line of Umanose [Fish Hook Ridge] was broken through. No hope for reinforcements. Will die for the cause of Imperial Edict.” Culin sent forces to secure the Holtz-Sarana Pass gradually pushing back the concealed defenders, foxhole by foxhole. Company K advance up a 2500 foot crest of Washburn Peak and found themselves face to face with Japanese trenches. Private Joe Martinez with his rifle in hand decided to walk into the enemy fire as he tossed grenades killing 5 Japanese. He managed to reach the crest of the ridge before collapsing from a mortal gunshot wound he received over 50 yards further down the hill. He was posthumously awarded with the medal of honor, the only one earned on Attu. The Northern force eventually overwhelmed the Japanese snow trenches and seized the northwestern portion of Fish Hook. The only remaining obstacle now in the war were the trapped Japanese upon Buffalo ridge. The 4th regiment advanced along Fish Hook ridge, pushing the Japanese all the way to the summit of West Peak by the end of May 26th. The next day the weather turned around on them, with frigid slush like weather and the typical foggy concealment aiding the Japanese. Yamasaki took the advantage by dispatching reinforcements. Zimmerman's reinforced the advance against Buffalo ridge, tossing the 2nd battalion, 32nd infantry and companies C & D from the regiments 1st battalion alongside a lot of artillery support. But yet again the Japanese held firm, successfully halting the American advance just 200 yards from the ridges crest. On the 28th, another assault was launched against Buffalo Ridge supported by artillery. This time, the 2nd battalion, 32nd regiment managed to reach the top of the ridge facing significantly less resistance. Yard by yard the Americans seized most of Buffalo ridge by the end of the day. While that was going on, the forces advancing along Jim Fish Valley reached the southern portion of Lake Cories where they established a defensive position to hold up for the night. Landrum expected the 29th to be the final offensive to take Chichagof. The Americans now dominated the high grounds. The 1st battalion, 17th infantry held the Holtz Bay area; the 3rd battalion, 32nd infantry were atop Fish Hook Ridge; 1st battalion 4th infantry held positions along the Holtz Bay-Sarana Pass and atop West Peak; the 2nd battalion, 17th infantry and 1st/2nd battalions of the 32nd occupied Buffalo Ridge; and the 3rd battalion, 17th infantry held Jim Fish Valley. 4 75mm mountain guns and a battery of 105mm howitzers were placed on Hogback ridge while 60 artilleryman took up spotting positions on Engineer hill to direct the bombardments. Everything was in place for a final battle. The Japanese had their backs to the sea, crammed into a crowded area of low flat ground counting only 800 soldiers left. Two Japanese soldiers had been captured a day earlier and they confessed the remaining strength of their garrison. This prompted Landrum to order leaflets dropped over the Japanese positions. The leaflets carried a message from General Landrum to Colonel Yamasaki informing him of his hopeless situation and asking for his unconditional surrender. Landrum also added in “that the Japanese soldierly conduct thus far had been worthy of the highest military tradition”. Landrum asked Yamasaki to send a delegation to the American lines under a white flag. Landrum was trying to avoid the senseless slaughter, hoping Yamasaki might prove himself to be different from the countless other Japanese commanders who chose to resist to the last man. Landrum also was trying to prod the common Japanese soldiers to see if they would surrender in the face of the inevitable. Yamasaki ordered all paper burnt and personally oversaw all his wounded men given a fatal dose of morphine and their comrades showered the dying men with grenades. The Japanese, knowing full well the submarines originally set to come rescue them were no longer coming, the American destroyer picket line was preventing this. There was nowhere to pull back to, but the Japanese did not surrender, no Yamasaki chose to go out in a blaze of glory, fit to make the late Saigo Takamori proud. Yamasaki took his ancestral katana, while his men fixed bayonets. They were going to banzai charge at the weakest point in the American lines during the night, the Jim Fish Valley floor. They hoped this suicidal thrust might see a breakthrough upon which they could charge towards the American position at Engineer hill, hoping to capture their artillery to bear down upon them and to destroy their supplies. If they could manage to destroy the american supplies, they could theoretically then flee into the southern mountains where they might delay the americans enough to be rescued. The slim hope of victory depended on lightning speed, defeat would see their complete annihilation. By nightfall Yamasaki got his men ready, the 1st company and remnant of the other 2 companies of the 303rd independent battalion took the left flank, Yamasaki, his HQ and non-combat forces too a rear position and the remnants of the 83rd independent battalion took the right flank. In the early morning of May 29th, nearly a thousand screaming Japanese charged, as described by Nisei interpreter Peter Nakao later on “ It was pitch black when the enemy began the banzai attack. […] All of a sudden, the enemy was upon us. We could not see anything in the darkness except for tracer bullets flying in every direction. […] Leaving bayonetted dead and wounded behind them, the Japanese went past us and continued to the medic unit station to our rear. Then they headed for the ammunition dump behind the medics” The Japanese had smashed into the reserve Company B, 32nd regiment. The inexperienced men of that company had set up camp dead-center in Chichagof Valley, and had also withdrawn to the rear during the night to make breakfast, so their deserted positions where quickly overwhelmed and they fled for their lives to Buffalo ridge. Yamasaki let them flee and took his men in the direction of Engineer Hill. Yamasaki's timing was brilliant, he had taken the Americans by surprise and his forces were sweeping up the base of Engineer hill easily getting past the enfilading fire from the ridges by daybreak. The Japanese savagely swarmed a field hospital, exterminating all the sick and wounded men inside along with its chaplain. 12 Americans in a tent outside survived the horror by pretending to be dead, though they were severely trampled upon twice by charging Japanese. At this point the American initial shock and panic had worn off and General Archibald Arnold rallied the men. He set to work organizing artillerymen, engineers and service troops to establish hidden defensive positions. They lacked automatic weapons, but the ragtag force consisting mostly of the 50th engineers met the charging Japanese with grenades and M1 Garand bullets. Eventually the 4th regiment came forward with automatic weapons successfully slowing down the Japanese banzai charge. The Engineers then fixed their bayonets and engaged the Japanese in hand to hand combat forcing them to fall back. Yamasaki was gunned down by an M1 Garand bullet and his men were unable to maintain the momentum. Nearly half of the Japanese, now isolated and surrounded began pulling the pins of their grenades as they held them to their chests, 500 men committed suicide en masse. Several Americans witnessed the Japanese squatting in a thick shadowy cluster in the first weak gray light of morning seeping through the fog, with one man standing and appearing to speak to the others. The thumps of their detonating grenades and agonized cries of dying men created a crescendo, that died away leaving the grounds littered with disemboweled bodies. American reporter Robert Sherroid described the scene as such “The explosive charge blasted away their vital organs. Probably one in four held a grenade against his head. There were many headless Jap bodies between Massacre [Bay] and Chichagof. Sometimes the grenade split the head in half, leaving the right face on one shoulder, the left face on the other. […] Two bodies were burned to crisps, one atop the other, fused into one charred hump” After the battle was over, the Americans erected a wooden interpretive sign at the foot of Clevesy Pass honoring Yamasaki, a rare gesture considering the intensity of the war at the time. The battle of Attu was done. The Americans found and interred 2351 corpses, but guessed hundreds more Japanese bodies were buried all over the place. They took 28 prisoners in all, mostly men knocked unconscious by shell explosions or too badly wounded to kill themselves. Scouring the landscape over the following days, a few dozen more Japanese were found hiding in foxholes, often in small groups. The US soldiers called upon them to surrender, but these men usually killed themselves with grenades or opened fire to receive a bullet back. Two Japanese gave themselves up willing however. One was from San Francisco, the other, a short, fat and good humored man dubbed “the Japanese 8-ball”, by the GI's was treated kindly and even allowed to eat in the mess tents. PFC Howard Sparrs described the 8-Balls capture as such “ [Private Emerson] Burgett pulled out a Jap battle flag which he held up in front of the little fellow. The Jap shook his head violently in the negative and gestured so not a doubt remained – “Take it away!” The inner pockets of his coat revealed an assorted, and incidentally excellent, collection of […] pornography […] on silk handkerchiefs. The little Jap smiled innocently as Burgett gazed appraisingly over the collection (which, by the way, he pocketed)” The Japanese lost approximately 2850 men dead, the Americans had 549 deaths, 1148 wounded and around 2100 evacuated due to frostbite, trench foot, hypothermia and other ailments. A number of lessons were learnt from the battle, including new landing techniques, and the necessity for rubberized, thoroughly waterproofed boots. Can't express the importance of that last one enough, I once got a black toe in my stupid youth drinking outdoors with some friends in like -35 degree weather in bad boots, does not end well. The men on Attu had been given expensive, thick and insulated leather hunting boots, but these become absolutely useless once soaked in water. After Attu, improved winter kits emerged, and cases of hypothermia, frostbite or trench foot would become very rare among American soldiers even during bitterly cold campaigns in Italy and France. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The bitter and bloody and cold campaign for Attu was now finally over. Colonel Yamasaki decided to go out in a blaze of glory with his men, in a fashion that would make the last samurai Saigo Takamori proud.
Last time we spoke about Admiral Yamamoto's Operation I-Go. The empire of the rising sun had to do something about the allied advance up the solomons and New Guinea. Yamamoto devised a grand counter air offensive to hinder the allies airfield building in the regions. However, this was not 1941, it was 1943 and the Japanese aviation crews and pilots were not the same men they once were. The war was taking its toll on the effectiveness of Japan's airpower and it was showcased during Operation I-Go. Despite the wild claims of the pilots who would have Japan's leadership believe they shutdown every allied aircraft in existence, the reality was they had only inflicted enough damage to set back the allied timetables for 10 days. Unbeknownst to the Japanese also was that allied cryptanalysts were continuing to break their codes and found out fateful information about the mastermind behind Operation I-Go. But today you need to grab your onions cause were are talking about Chindits. This episode is the return of the Chindits Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. For a few weeks we have been covering what basically can be described as the major strategic shift during the Pacific War. I know I repeat it so often, but the battle of guadalcanal was the real turning point of the Pacific War. It led the allies to grab the initiative for the rest of the war and as a result the Japanese were forced to take a defensive stance. The taking of guadalcanal and the Buna-Gona-Sanananda areas led to a lot of shuffling for both sides. And with all that shuffling came heavy losses and resources being forcefully allocated to certain areas at the cost of others. Now up in the frigid northern waters of the north pacific, the 6 hour battle of the komandorski islands had nearly ended in an American debacle. If admiral Hosogaya had pressed his advantage, he would have most likely destroyed the Salt Lake City alongside several other warships. But as we saw, the high explosive shell fired by a single man had prompted Hosogay to falsely believe American airforces were attacking him and he pulled out. Hosogaya's conservative decision was condemned by his superiors and he was forced into retirement as a result. Admiral McMorris's force suffered damage to 3 ships and lost 7 men, but he walked away and the Japanese convoy failed its mission. It was to be Japan's last attempt to resupply the Attu and Kiska garrisons with surface ships, all future runs would be done via submarine. Thus the success of Admiral Kinkaids daring blockade had sealed the fate of the Japanese garrisons on the two islands. Yet before the Americans could begin invading these two islands they needed to perform basically the same strategy their colleagues were doing in the south pacific. They needed to secure advance bases and island hop their way west. One of the first major moves came when Admiral Kinkaid and General Buckner made the joint decision to move the Army, Navy and Air Force headquarters out to Adak. Adak was a thousand miles nearer to the enemy, but concentrating so much on the island created its own problems. A year prior, there had been only 5000 people in the Aleutians, now there were nearly 40,000. The bottleneck became so severe, Buckner's soldiers were being supplies with just 10 rounds of ammunition per weapon and food rations were very limited. The men were living off canned vegetables and the occasional shiploads of foul-smelling mutton from New Zealand. Mutton in general was notably not very loved amongst American forces. Australians took a notice of this as Americans began to complain in Australia that they were tired of eating it all the time there. Actually a hilarious rumor emerged amongst the Americans in Australia that General MacArthur owned a sheep ranch and was being enriched at their expense. Yes I managed to toss another punch at Dougey. Medical problems began to emerge in the Aleutians as many American bodies began to reject the environment, that is polite talk for Americans who can't handle a bit of cold. Lingering head colds became so bad, the men began to refer to it as “Aleutian malaria”. I mean I do get it, snow can suck, the cold sucks, waking up at 6am to record this podcast only to look out my window at what is becoming a hours shoveling of my driveway sucks, Canadian problems 101. As for the US Navy, the north pacific submarine force had spent the first few months of Kinkaids command simply gathering strength, building up enough to make a final push, but nothing too exciting. A new PT boat squadron had been assembled employing the Higgens model. Now I don't know about all of you, but the idea of being on a tiny PT boat in the Aleutians sounds horrifying. If you might recall in January, 4 torpedo boats led by Lt CLinton McKeller had departed King cove to sail for Dutch Harbor. They sailed through a squall, coated with 4 inches of ice. The 4 boats made it to the nearest harbor, Dora Harbor on Unimak and were stuck there for nearly a week. There anchored they were bashed around by howling 80 knot winds, and Pt-27 smashed into some jagged rocks, Pt-28 went aground and sank, pt-22 crashed on a reef and sank, but McKellar was able to keep his crews intact. The two surviving boats had to be rescued some days later by the tender Virginia E. The devastating experiences of the McKeller's men led to this new squadron of PT boats being outfitted with hot-air heaters. To compare to the PT boat crews miseries, the experience of the pilots in the Aleutians was not any better. Butler lost 11 planes due to bad weather in January alone. The weather improved in February allowing for some missions, but they were hampered terribly by a technological issue. The B-24 liberators constantly had their bomb-bay rack mechanisms freeze on them. Thus the bombing missions half the time went bust. Now Admiral Kinkaid suggested an attack on Kiska in January of 1943. The plan found its way to the Casablanca conference in north africa where president FDR, Sir Winston CHurhcill and the allied combined chiefs of staff hammered out the fine details. Kinkaid's plan to attack Kiska actually managed to become an item debated at the conference. The allied leaders approved it and sent it over to the US joint chiefs of staff to develop it into a real operation, which became code named Operation Landcrab. The task was handed over to General John DeWitt, who recommended using the 35th infantry division, but the war department decided instead to use the southwestern 7th motorized division. However this division was trained in desert warfare. The rationale for this was due to Rommel's recent defeat and the lack of need for desert trained troops in Europe.Well obviously the desert tactics nor the tanks, truck and other armored vehicles were of any use to the Aleutians, the entire division required training in arctic amphibious operations which would take over 3 months. Luckily amphibious assault specialists like Major General Holland “Howlin Mad” Smith, Colonels Castner, Eareckson, Alexander and Carl Jones were accustomed to the Aleutian theater and helped retrain the 7th division at Los Angeles. By February Washington had assigned an insufficient number of ships for the invasion of Kiska. This prompted Kinkaid to suggest instead of attacking Kiska to bypass her and hit Attu. Attu was believed to only have a garrison of 500 men and Kinkaid believed seizing Attu, just west of Kiska would prompt the Japanese to abandon Kiska. Thus operation Landcrab was greenlit and ready to go, and all the major commanders of the theater would meet at a conference in San Diego to hash out the final details. The San diego conference quickly deteriorated into a series of arguments between two new commanders, rear-admiral William Ward Smith and Vice admiral Francis Warren Rockwell and the experienced Alaskan leaders Buckner and DeWitt. They squabbled over reconnaissance issues, in truth the Americans did not have a good picture of the western Aleutians. Bucker pointed out that the Navy, Army and Airforce had 4 different sets of map coordinates and asked the issue be rectified. This led the Alaska Scout leader Colonel Castner to urge Major General Albert Eger Brown who would be commanding the 7th infantry division to perform a reconnaissance personally. Brown however did not do this. Furthermore Buckner requested they employ a battalion of his ground forces for the operation to improve their low morale. Rockwell argued his shipping capacity was overstretched, leading DeWitt to assign the commercial ship Perida to take Buckner's troops into the battle. Rockwell then complained the commercial ship would not be able to land his troops quickly enough to protect them it the enemy resisted the landings and Brown threw back at him the addition of these troops just disrupted the entire mission. So as you can see a lot of dick waving. In the end they reached a compromise, to hold Buckner's 4th regiment in reserve at Adak, ready to ship out in less than a day to hit Attu if needed. On April 18th, reconnaissance revealed there were at least 1600 Japanese on Attu, prompting Rockwell to commit the entire 7th division, 10,000 men in all and the extra 4th regiment for operation landcrab. Now before the men his the island Rockwell sent a small team of combat specialists to come up behind the Japanese to prevent them from falling back into the mountains where they could hold out for weeks or even months. Captain Willoughby's Scout battalion, 410 officers and men, trained vigorously in a short amount of time for the operation. They replaced all of their rifles and submarine guns with automatic rifles, machine guns and mortars and soft lead bullets for armor piercing bullets as those could penetrate ice without ricocheting. The mens packs were filled to the brim with grenades. Meanwhile General Butler began a bombing campaign to soften up the island. A terrible storm prevented air raids during the first half of april seeing winds his 115 miles per hour and gusts over 127. Nonetheless over 1175 combat sorties would be made in april, with over 4000 pounds of bombs falling on Attu. Though it should be mentioned most of the bombers dropped their loads blind as Attu was covered in a thick fog. Finally on April 24th, the 7th division departed San Francisco at 1pm aboard 5 transports. The Aleutian campaign was soon coming to an end. But now we need to grab our onions and travel back to Burma to talk about good ol Wingate and the boys. Back in Burma, Wingates forces were beginning the last phase of operation Longcloth, fleeing for their lives back to India. Now Fort Hertz and the new Ledo Road had been protectedAt his headquarters in Wuntho Wingate had to make a choice: retire back to India or press on and cross the Irrawaddy. Being Wingate he chose to press on with the Japanese hot on the Chindits trail. Now I do apologize I believe this will be the second time I am rehashing most of the Chindit story, I sort of am forced to do so as a result of how the week by week format laid out this story on the youtube channel. Think of it as a refresher to finish off the operation. Major calvert's Column 3 and Fergussons column 5 headed towards the Gokteik Gorge to blow up its viaduct; Colonel Alexander's southern group was to rendezvous with the Kachin guerillas at Mongmit; and Wingate would personally lead columns 7 and 8 to hit Inywa one of the main based of the Burmese independence forces. Wingates northern force made its way to the Irrawaddy's principal northern tributary, the Shweli by March 17th. Here the river was so wide, their ropes and dinghies would not suffice, the crossing had to be made by boat. The approach to the stream was over open paddy fields, where they could easily be spotted and gundowned. Another major issue of course was the Burmese liberation Army. Wingate began by sending an envoy across the river to treat with the BLA and they promptly decamped. While this was going on Wingate discovered the local boats and their skilled native paddlers could help move his forces. They helped tow the Chindats RAF circular dinghies using 1500 lb net weights. Upon seeing how the locals managed Wingate wrote notes that in the future he should employ at least 40 men to each column who were skilled in handling boats and that 80 percent of his men needed to know how to swim. Yes many of these Chindits did not know how to swim. The mules as usual proved to be difficult to get across, leading 40 to be abandoned while the rest were tethered to boats and paddled across. Fergusson's Column 5 crossed the Irrawaddy at Tigyaing with assistance of local villagers, missing the Japanese pursuers by a hair's breadth. Fergusson turned south, but then received orders from Wingate to abandon his mission to help Calvert and instead rejoin the rest of the brigade. Calvert completely unaware of these orders, faced a game of hide and seek with the Japanese, leaving them boody traps as they marched. At Tigyaing, Calverts group's rearguard were being hit by the Japanese as they crossed the river. Further south of him, the Southern group had crossed the river at Taguang on March 10th, continuing east. Wingate's men were making their own way eastwards, but the supply drops were becoming less and less frequent and the amount of wounded men was increasing. Wingate was forced to leave many men behind as the Japanese continued to pressure them. On march the 15th, the Southern group met up with Calvert's column 3 near Pegon where they exchanged information. Despite orders to head for Mongmit, Major dunlop and Colonel Alexander decided to advance to Namhkan, crossing the Shweliriver and making an escape for China. As the southern group continued they ran into Fergusson's column 5 on March 20th at Inbale Chaung. There they received orders to continue with the original plans, so they redirected themselves to Mongmit again. There they were supposed to meet with the Kachin guerrillas, but they were so late the Kachin had departed. Meanwhile Calvert and Fergusson were having a rough time as an entire Japanese battalion had arrived at Myitson and they were fanning out patrols to hunt them down. On March 23rd, Calvert found one of these patrols near the Nam Mit River and laid a trap killing 100 of them. In his words ‘We let fly with everything we had and a lot of Japs could never have known what hit them. It was one of the most one-sided actions I have ever fought in.' He paid for the ambush with a dozen Gurkhas. Calvert's column made its way towards Gokteik, their glittering prize when disappointment was dealt to them. They received orders from Wingate to withdraw back to India. Wingate also took the care to tell his commanders not to call it a “retreat”, but instead to tell their men they were marching north to cooperate with parachute troops in an attack on Bhamo and Indaw. This was to deceive the enemy if men were captured and to simply boost morale. Calvert complied with the order, but in a bit of defiance decided he wanted to hit a railway on the retreat. Reading Calvert's mind Wingate sent an additional message to Calvert saying he needed to get out as fast as possible and not perform any additional strikes, he finished with this “we can get new equipment and wireless sets. But it will take 25 years to get another man. These men have done their job, their experience is at a premium”. Wingate at this point decided they needed a good supply drop and ordered one for March 24th in a paddy field near the village of Baw, which happened to be held by a Japanese company. This was the same location for the rendezvous with Fergussons column who were in bad need for supplies having been forced to butcher their own mules for meat and eat stews of monkeys, rats, locusts and cockroaches. Disaster struck. Wingate sent his forces to attack the Japanese company at Baw leading the RAF pilots seeing the confused battle to only drop one third of the supplies. Fergusson met up with Wingate on the 25th finding his superior to be a bit manic. Wingate was now claiming because of their actions, the Japanese commander would be hard pressed to annihilate them all to save face. Wingate faced a daunting issue, the Japanese would contest the passage of the Irrawaddy, how would they get through now? He decided to try a bluff, they would march back to Inywa and cross at the identical point they had taken to go east, thinking the Japanese would never expect it. To do this they would have to kill all their remaining mules and lighten their loads, perhaps we can take a moment of silence for these poor mules. Wingate told the men once they got across the river they were to break up into smaller groups, try to sabotage more railway installations and make their way back to Assam. The forces made a dreadful march back to Inywa, slaughtering their mules as they went, much to the grief of the muleteers. It became clear early the Japanese were following them. Colonel Tomotoki Koba had set up three defensive lines between the Chindits and the Indian border: 1 at the Irrawaddy, 1 along the Mu valley and 1 following the line of the Chindits. Koba's orders were pretty simply, to drive the Chindits into a trap as if they were wild beasts to hunt. Wingate attempted feints and decoys, such as sending Fergusson's Column 5 towards the village of Hintha. This decoy worked great for everyone else of course, as Fergussons men suffered heavy casualties for their efforts. The feints and decoys worked as the bamboozled Japanese never fully caught up to the main body, failing to capture the Chindits in the Shweli loop as it was known. By 4pm on 28th, the main body reached Inywa where they lucked out greatly. It turned out the Japanese had neglected to commandeer the boats along the Shweli. Wingate was able to commander a number of local boats and his men began to cross the river. Column 7 went first followed by 2 and 8. But Column 8 as they made their way were fired upon by Japanese patrols. It was fortunate for the Chindits the Japanese patrols were small and lacked heavy machine guns. Even so, the mortar and rifle fire was enough for Wingate to call off the rest of the columns leaving column 7 on the other side of the river to make their own way home to India. Wingate took the rest of the forces to a secure bivouac 10 miles south east of Inywa where he ordered the men to disperse into 5 smaller groups. It was now every man for himself as they say. The first group to really suffer was Fergussons column 5. After the bitter fight at Hintha, he sent word to Wingate advised him where they should be rendezvousing for a supply drop. But when Fergusson got to the location, there was no drop and no Wingate. Fergusson's radio radio was destroyed at Hintha so he had to rely on runners and now knew he basically was on his own. Fergusson decided to take his column and head for the Kachin hills. When his men tried to cross the Shweli it turned into a disaster. Many men were swept away by a flood and most of their animals alone with them. 46 men had to be abandoned on a sandbank in the middle of the river and in Fergusson's words “‘the decision which fell on me there was as cruel as any which could fall on the shoulders of a junior commander'. His men staggered on half crazed with hunger and thirst. After 15 days they reached the Chindwin on April 24th and would limp over to Imphal 2 days later. Their column suffered horribly, 95 survivors out of an original 318. Major Ken Gilkes column 7 managed to get to China with 150 survivors and would fly back to India. Wingates dispersed groups would have a particularly horrible time on their way home. They had tales to tell of Japanese atrocities, the treachery of Burman villagers, the constant battle to stay awake, the agony of hunger and thirst and the feeling of being hunted down like beasts. Their menu more often the naught was python meat and nettles. There also began a rumor amongst the dispersed groups that Wingate had intentionally taken the easy way out for himself while using the rest of them as decoys. As for Wingates group, his original thinking was that the trek would take 2 weeks but it took roughly 22 days. They spent 2 full days around the Irrawaddy trying to find a safe way across as the Japanese patrols attacked them. On April 13th, with the help of friendly locals who provided paddlers and bamboo rafts they got across. They planned to go across in three groups, and unfortunately for the last group who was acting rearguard they would be left behind. The starving survivors made their way to the Wuntho-Indaw railway then through the Mangin range. At this point all of the food ran out, making even the Python stews seem appetizing. They would make the mistake of trying to buy rice from a pro-Japanese village who began hitting gongs to summon the Japanese causing them to run. At another more neutral village they were able to buy some buffalo meat. As they continued through the Mangin range they nearly died of starvation if it was not for a stroke of luck when one of their Burmese interpreters contacted a local monastery who sold them chicken, tomatoes, rice bananas and 5 pigs. Refreshed they continued and by the 23ed of april could see the Chindwin river. Wingate recounted stating ‘Behold the Chindwin. It is a poor heart that never rejoices.' The 30 mile trek to the Chindwin was the hardest part of the journey. When finally facing the great river Wingate was forced to divide his men into those deemed strong enough to swim across and those who needed a boat. It took 5 men 7 hours to hack some elephant grass to make rafts. Wingate and others swam the Chindwin at a narrow point 500 yards or so wide. Even the strong swimmers were in danger of drowning, many forced to float on their backs. Wingate himself was pretty close to being swept away but managed to keep afloat using a pack for buoyancy. Everyone who got to the other side of the river were utterly exhausted. To their misery they soon heard the incoming Japanese on the other side of the river. As they hit the first village they came across they devoured the meals they could find. But they had left countless non swimming comrades on the other side and Wingate was desperate to send rescue parties. They found a post manned by some Gurkha rifles and obtained their help grabbing local boats and taking a flotilla back over the Chindwin to save the men they could find. In the end Wingates small group of 43 would see 34 survivors reach Assam. Meanwhile far to the south, Dunlop and Alexander's southern group were the furthest away from India. They decided to try and head back to Fort Hertz, but would be ambushed many times along the way. They crossed at the head of the Irrawaddy using stealth to avoid clashes with the Japanese. With the help of locals who gave them food and boats they made it across by April 20th, but after crossing were hit again by the Japanese suffering heavy casualties. Now down to 350 men, they continued towards the Mu River where they were ambushed yet again on the 28th. Colonel Alxander would be killed among others, as Dunlop recounted "Clarke told me that the last mortar bomb had blown away most of the Colonel Alexander and officer De La Rue's legs. Edmonds and some orderlies had carried them away into the jungle, but that no one could now be found who knew of their whereabouts." Dunlop led the force of exhausted men to the Chindwin river fighting off multiple Japanese patrols. They would wander into early may and were saved by Karen guerilla forces a very lucky break. Lastly, Calverts column 3 made their way to the Shewli river by March 27th with Japanese patrols hot on their trail. Calvert decided the best course of action was to break up into 9 smaller groups. Out of the 360 men in Column 3, 205 eventually recrossed the Chindwin by mid April. Calvert personally would lead a group to detonate more explosives across the Burmese railway. So ends operation longcloth. Two major things to note were Wingates character and behavior during the expedition. For the first, it is not surprising to see that extreme stress brought up the brittle personality of mr Wingate. It seems in his own mind, Wingate could never be at fault. Wingate clearly had not factored the importance of river crossings, which is unforgivable given Burma's riverine system. The crossings over the Irrawaddy showcased Wingates glory hunting nature. Wingate also was draconian in his punishment of the men. He told his men if any of them plundered villages or lost their own equipment he would have them shot. This went beyond normal army code. If sentries fell asleep and were caught, Wingate gave them 3 choices; be shot, make their own way back home or be flogged, not surprisingly everyone chose to be flogged. Wingate's behavior likewise kept switching from mania to depression given the circumstances. The casualty figures of the operation were appalling. Out of 3000 men of the 77th brigade that Wingate took into Burma, 2182 returned; 450 were killed in action and the rest went missing. Out of the southern group 260 men out of the 1000 survived. What had been achieved to justify such losses? There are arguments made on both sides. General Slim said of the operation “They had blown up bridges and cuttings on the Mandalay–Myitkyina railways that supplied the Japanese northern front, and attempted to reach across the Irrawaddy to cut the Mandalay–Lashio line. Exhaustion, difficulties of air supply, and the reaction of the Japanese, prevented this, and the columns breaking up into small parties made for the shelter of 4 Corps. About a thousand men, a third of the total force, failed to return. As a military operation the raid had been an expensive failure. It gave little tangible return for the losses it had suffered and the resources it had absorbed. The damage it did to Japanese communications was repaired in a few days, the casualties it inflicted were negligible, and it had no immediate effect on Japanese dispositions or plans.'” Even Wingates supporters admit the operation was a failure, some describing it “an engine without a train”. Fergusson would add it ‘What did we accomplish? Not much that was tangible. What there was became distorted in the glare of publicity soon after our return. We blew up bits of railway, which did not take long to repair; we gathered some useful intelligence; we distracted the Japanese from some minor operations, and possibly from some bigger ones; we killed a few hundreds of an enemy which numbers eighty millions; we proved that it was feasible to maintain a force by supply dropping alone.' Really in the end, Wingates exploits were used for propaganda purposes lifting the terrible morale amongst the British. The sacrifice of over 800 men for a rather pointless operation had to be glorified for if not it would have crushed morale further. Sit Winston Churchill would say of Longcloth on July 24th of 1943 ‘There is no doubt that in the welter of inefficiency and lassitude which has characterised our own operations on the Indian front, this man, his force and his achievements stand out; and no question of seniority must obstruct the advance of real personalities in their proper station in war.' Wingate performed a press conference on May 20th to spin the allied propaganda machine. Reuters called them “the british ghost army”, the daily mail hailed Wingate as “clive of Burma”. Wingate had performed the typical British habit of turning obvious defeats into glorious victories, it was very much his Dunkirk. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The mad onion man Wingate successfully, or unsuccessfully performed Operation Longcloth. His exploits became legendary, but perhaps one should look closer at the reality behind what occurred in the depths of Burma.
Last time we spoke about the first adventure of the Chindits. Eccentric and quite literally madman Wingate was championed by Wavell to create a guerrilla unit to perform operations in Burma. Wingate soon readjusted the group to be a long range penetration group known as the Chindits. Their purpose was to disrupt the Japanese behind their front lines. The eccentric Wingate proved to be capable of turning men into onion wearing jungle warriors and they marched into the jungle to sabotage railway lines to hinder the Japanese. Their first mission was met with tremendous disaster after disaster, but surprisingly by the end they had achieved their goal of blowing up some railway. We finished off by talking about a lesser known allied partner during the Pacific War, Free France. The Japanese had ignored them for a long time, but eventually enough was enough and they seized Guangzhouwan from Free France thus ending their position in China. But today we are venturing back to the Aleutians. This episode is Landing at Amchitka and Invasion of the Russels Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. Now the last time we were in the Aleutians, the Americans had taken Adak back on August 30th of 1942. There they began building a new airfield from which they could continue to reclaim the Aleutian island chain. However the Japanese did not give up on their northern possessions and reoccupied Attu Island by late October. The Japanese acted so boldly because they believed the Amerians were not able to construct an airtstip yet on the neighboring island of Amchitka. Also during October, Kiska was reinforced by massive amounts of anti-aircraft weapons and an impressive underground network of bunkers. Now initially the plan for the Aleutians for the Japanese was simply a large feint that would see them gradually withdrawing to the northern Kuriles while bleeding the americans of lives and resources. However all the American activity in the north was surprising Japanese high command and they now were beginning to believe the Americans sought to hop along the Aleutian island chain all the way to the home islands to potentially invade Japan from the north, a rather insane war strategy to be sure. As a result, the Japanese high command decided not to abandon the Aleutians for the winter and on November 1st, the formulated a joint plan to strengthen the defenses of Kiska and Attu by February of 1943. They also sought to create a seaplane base at the unoccupied island of Shemya. Now on the other side, the US army planned to occupy Tanaga along with Atka after the Adak base was established, but for the time being this was not a pressing issue. What was a pressing issue was a concern that the Japanese might seize Amchitka, 60 miles east of Kiska. Admiral Nimitz directed Theobald to preempt any such occupation and for Colonel Talley to go with a party of Alaskan scouts to go to the island to see if it was possible to build an airfield there. The Alaskan scouts landed on the island having to hid, while Japanese reconnaissance aircraft flew overhead. They found test holes all over the island that had been made by Japanese patrols. Contrary to the Japanese reports, the Alaskan scouts determined Amchitka was long, narrow and flat, except of course for a volcano at one end, but this indicated it could operate an airfield. Given the viability of the island and the presence of the Japanese holes testing its viability likewise, the race was on. Thus Admiral Nimitz approved the invasion of Amchitka codenamed Operation Longview. General Marshall approved the plan to advance upon Amchitka and agreed to assign troops for an invasion. While planning for the Amchitka occupation was underway, major changes in command structure also were going on. On January 4th of 1943, Theobald was transferred out of his command assumed by Rear Admiral Thomas Kincaid. Likewise Theobalds second in command, rear admiral W.W Smith was also replaced by rear admiral Charles McMorris. Kincaid was a combat veteran who liked action and was more to Buckner's liking as he immediately went on the offensive, arranging for a task force to deliver the Army's Amchitka occupation forces of 2000 men led by Brigadier General Lloyd Jones. Beginning in early November upon discovering the Japanese reoccupation of Attu, General Butler sent missions against the island. Colonel William Eric Eareckson led the airforce to hit Attu, successfully destroying several beach installations, sank a cargo ship and took out 9 Zero fighters at Holtz Bay. During the first 6 months of 1943, Attu and Kiska would be attacked by the 11th air force who would hit the islands with over 3,000,000 pounds of bombs. In July Kiska alone would be hit by 900,000 pounds of bombs. Liberators, mitchells, dauntless, lightnings and warhawks took part in the aerial attacks making the islands untenable. This is quite a lesser known aspect of the Pacific War. The American airfield on Adak was little more than 200 miles away from the Japanese on Kiska and nearly twice that distance from Attu. Any day weather permitted it, American aircraft departed from Adak to strike at the Japanese, it was grueling work fighting the Japanese and mother nature. Over on the Japanese side on November 23rd the first Shemya convoy departed from Paramushiro, carrying 1100 troops of the 303rd independent battalion escorted by the light cruisers Abukuma, Kiso, Tama and the destroyers Hacuoshimo, Wakaba and Usugumo led by Admiral Hosogaya. But before the convoy was able to get to the island, the Americans sent a wave of B-24's on November 27th which managed to sink the transport Cherrybourne Maru just off Attu waters. Hosogaya began receiving reports indicating a North Pacific task force was in the vicinity as well. This prompted Hosogaya to postpone the Shemya landings and return back to Paramushiro. Ironically there was no American task force in the north pacific as Admiral Theobald had literally taken the majority of warships with him for the invasion of North Africa. Eareckson's constant aerial attacks forced Hosogaya to consolidate his vessels at all times and prompted him to take the entire convoy to Kiska landing the troops there on December 2nd. On December 18th, Earecksons aerial forces smashed Amchitka, destroying every building on the island. Mere hours after the report of the damage, General Buckner decided to send the Alaska scouts in. The Alaska Scouts, were also known as Castner's Cutthroats, led by Colonel Lawrence Castner. The scouting expedition showed further signs the Japanese had been on the island recently doing the same type of work as them. Thus operation longview's timetable had to be increased. The scouts reported a fighter strip could be built up in 2 to possibly 3 weeks and a main airfield in 3-4 months time. By the end of the year the 11th air force had managed to take down 50 enemy planes in combat and lost around a dozen in the combat. However, over 80 other aircraft had been lost to a multitude of other causes, such as good old mother nature. Operating in the far reaches of the north was extremely dangerous, and the weather seemed to be taking a heavier toll than the Japanese. In spite of mother nature, Eareckson's bombers continued their work using rather innovative means. Eareckson pioneering a low-level bombing technique to raid the enemy and thwart the effects of the unpredictable Aleutian weather. To overcome the shortness of the daylight cycle, he was forced to bomb at night and to do so he would use a single plane that preceded the main force by a minute to drop incendiary bombs to illuminate the area. It was a very Japanese type of strategy, perhaps he was learning from his enemy. As I had mentioned the 11th air force would literally drop more than a million pounds of bombs over Attu, Kiska and other islands under Earecksons command. Earecksons personally was in the air ever flyable day of the campaign excluding one brief October mission to the States. On January 4th, Admiral Kinkaid, an American admiral who had seen action in more big naval battles than anyone else, finally arrived at Kodiak to replace Theobald. The day after, Kinkaid ordered the full troop landings on Amchitka to be executed. Butler was very pleased to have a “fighting admiral”. Heavy cruiser Indianapolis, light cruisers Detroit, Raleigh and 7 destroyers led by Admiral McMorris were to do the job. Yet mother nature did not comply, the weather became severe forcing the americans to postpone the operation for a few days. Meanwhile Butler sent a reconnaissance over Amchitka and more air strikes against Attu and Kiska. These runs led to the sinking of the freighter Montreal Maru off the Komandorski islands, hey I am from Montreal and the Kotohiro Maru off Attu. Because of the nonstop pressure from the 11th air fleet, the Japanese were only able to pull off 8 resupply runs for Kiska and 4 for Attu between December 17th to January 30th. Basically it was similar to the situation on Guadalcanal, trying to stop the Japanese from receiving provisions. By the night of January 11th the weather continued to look bad, but as the storms slacked just a bit, Admiral McMorris decided to depart with the 2100 Engineer and army troops led by Brigadier General Lloyd Jones. It was a risk to be sure, you could not trust any windows of decent weather to be open for very long. McMorris also ordered the destroyer Worden to take a detachment of Alaska Scouts led by Lt COlonel William Verback to hit Constantine harbor. The destroyer blasted through the surf at the harbor mouth shortly before dawn, successfully landing Verbeck's scouts. But as the Worden made her departure from the harbor mouth a brutal current smashed her onto a pinnacle rock, leaving her powerless. The destroyer Dewey was sent racing off to assist her, but the Worden would capsize and kill 14 of her crew before the rescue could be made. Like I said, mother nature was taking a heavier toll than the Japanese. Verbecks scouts did a full reconnaissance of the island finding no Japanese forces, so the rest of the convoy came in. They came ashore the same way they had come ashore at Adak, wading through icy surf. They were soaked with ice water and oil. It was miserable, but Amchitka was quickly secured. The American engineers went to work immediately to construct the new airfield. They would have 12 days before a Japanese aircraft emerged to the scene, it was a floatplane which reported their presence back to Kiska. The men made good use of the 12 days and it was the same story as what occurred on Adak before. Men toiling without rest in winter rain and wind, in the bitter cold surf of Constantine harbor, wading through black Aleutian mud, climbing over rocks and heavy tundra. They unloaded, carried ashore, stored and protected their arms, ammunition, food, fuel and other equipment, even the smallest of kindling. Her in the Aleutians, the soldiers bodily needs were more than that in a place like the south pacific, I can assure you I live in a place where we get the nasty combination of ice rain and snow, its not fun to be out in that. The Japanese commanders were shocked by the unexpected occupation of Amchitka which lay only 50 miles from their main base at Kiska. The Japanese began their own series of air strikes against Amchitka hoping to hinder the construction of the airfield. They knew if the American completed an airfield the already relentiles air attacks would increase. The Japanese air raids caused considerable damage over the course of the following days, but the american engineers performed miracles and managed to complete the Amchitka runway by the end of January, allowing a P-40 squadron to be landed on January 28th. After this the Japanese bombing missions became more sporadic until February 18th when they ceased. Just like the Americans, mother nature was just as cruel to the Japanese and they simply could not spare anymore aircraft bombing Amchitka, they had to have a reserve to defend themselves. Now additional air forces were joining the daily raids against Kiska using Amchitka as a launch pad. The Japanese were being whittled down slowly but surely in the north. Yet we need to leave the north and head back south to the Solomons. After the epic conclusion of the Guadalcanal campaign, culminating with the success of Operation KE, the Japanese Empire now had to switch to the defensive. During Operation KE, on February the 1st, the Americans received a cascade of sighting reports from coastwatchers and scouting aircraft. Some 20 Japanese destroyers had headed down the slot and a small Japanese infantry force was landed in the Russell Islands. Likewise allied flights over the Japanese held anchorage off Buin noted a sharp increase in the number of ships. Now the third run of Operation KE took place on the night of February 7th and lifted 1796 men off Guadalcanal and the Russell Islands. This prompted Admirals Nimitz and Halsey to commence their campaign to move up the solomons and thwart any Japanese incursions moving down them. In January they wanted to hit the Japanese base at Munda, but lacked the necessary forces for such an operation. One place in the solomons they could perform an operation against was the Russell Islands to the southeast. Admiral Halsey decided it would be advantageous to seize the Russell Islands and develop them while preventing their use to the Japanese. Thus operation Cleanslate was born. The idea behind it was simple, take the island away from Japanese use, further limited the Japanese operational capacity in the solomons and the Russell Islands could be used as a launching pad to hit other places like New Georgia. As Air Force historian Kramer Rohfleisch put it “for allied operations worked in such a way, that each fresh base became a successive cancer in the structure of the enemy's defense lines, sending out its tentacles and relentlessly destroying the equipment and personnel opposing it”. Operation Cleanslate was to be the first step in the conquest of the central and northern solomon islands, all to culminate with the final drive against the stronghold of Rabaul. By the end of January Halsey received permission from Nimitz to proceed with the invasion. The americans would dispatch an infantry battalion and anti-aircraft units from Guadalcanal into 2 destroyers to occupy the Russell Islands. Likewise the Japanese quickly beat them to the punch by landing around 400 troops as indicated by their aerial reconnaissance. As we know however, this was not a reinforcement of the island, but a part of Operation KE. The 17th army sought to use the Russell islands as a backup extraction point if the destroyers failed to get the men off Guadalcanal. Halsey was forced to postpone Operation Cleanslate, believing the Japanese were going to put up a large fight for the Russell Islands. In early february the Americans still were unaware the Japanese had evacuated Guadalcanal, but Hasley finally kicked off Operation Cleanslate regardless on the 7th. The 103rd and 169th regiments of Major General John Hester along with the 3rd marine raider battalion, anti aircraft units from the 10th and 11th marine defense battalions and ACORN 3: a naval engineering force of the 35th naval construction battalion. Admiral Turner was given command of the operations with his task force 64 consisting of 8 destroyers, 5 minesweepers, 12 tank landing craft and a number of barges and torpedo boats. He was going to receive assistance from Admiral Fitch's land based aircraft to cover the transports and 2 other task forces. Task force 18 led by Admiral Giffen consisting of heavy cruisers Wichita, Louisville and 3 destroyers and Task force 68 led by Rear Admiral Aaron Merrill consisting of light cruisers Montpelier, Cleveland, Denver, Columbia and 4 destroyers. The other task forces would be in close proximity just in case things got dicey. Of course unbeknownst to the Americans the Japanese had evacuated the Russell Islands by the 10th closing off Operation KE. Australians and New Zealand coastwatcher alongside US army, marine and naval air reconnaissance saw a ton of abandoned equipment on the Russell Islands, which Halsey ignored as he was deadset to carry out Operation Cleanslate as planned, fearing the enemy might try to reinforce the islands still. On February the 20th the first echelon of the Russells Occupation force departed Guadalcanal under strict radio silence. It was an uneventful trip and the transports were divided into 3 groups to hit their landing sites. The 10rd regiment landed on Banika easily taking control over the island. The 3rd marine raider battalion did the same at Pavuvu. The landings went unopposed, but the Marines quickly found out that the 10 man rubber rafts used for their landings had motor issues. Alongside this the 169th field artillery battalion somehow managed to get lost and took over 19 hours to land instead of 2, but by the end of the day the islands were firmly in American hands. The men began digging themselves into defensive positions. As soon as reports came in that the islands were secure, Halsey began pouring Seabees into the islands and supplied their 2 new fighter strips with lavish amounts of ammunition and aviation fuel in anticipation of expanding the air operations in the central solomons. But the Russell Islands were at the absolute limit of Hasleys designated border, technically they were over that border. No more westward progress could occur without good old General MacArthurs blessing. So the men simply set to work, and by the end of hte month over 9000 soldiers were in the Russells and the construction of a new airbase was occurring in Banika and a torpedo boat base at Wernham Cove. Upon learning of the American seizure of the Russells, the Japanese launched a surprise air strike. 12 Vals and 25 zeros struck the unfinished airfield and torpedo boat base on March 6th without any warning. They caused little damage, but would just be the beginning of a 3 month long campaign of night air attacks. By late may the airfield at Banika alongside the torpedo boat base, a training center and staging area for the future operation against new georgia. Operation Cleanslate may have been lackluster when it came to combat, but acted as a great practice run for what was to be the future of island hoping warfare in the solomons. The landing craft tank veterans of operation cleanslate would help teach others, increasing Americans amphibious capabilities. The American also learned a very valuable lesson when it came to loading and landing operations. They had certainly come a long way from the earlier experience of operation Watchtower. Now back to the issue of Hasley's operation stepping on the toes of MacArthur's area. Upon taking the Russell Islands, Halsey had his eyes on Munda Point, where there was a new Japanese fighter strip in New Georgia, around 120 miles to the west. The terrain looked suitable for a large bomber field, something highly desired. But MacArthur stood in the way, so they were going to have to talk. A face to face summit was made in early april, forcing Halsey to cross the Coral sea to present himself to the general at the AMP building in Brisbane. There was no reason to believe this was going to be a warm meeting. Halsey to this point had certainly not appreciated MacArthur's credit snatching communiques. In fact one aide to Halsey had referred to General MacArthur as quote “a self-advertising son of a bitch”. MacArthur had also declined an invitation from Admiral Nimitz to attend a command conference in Noumea in September of 1942, a slight insult if you were. He instead sent Sutherland and Kenney in his place to which one of Nimitz staff officers remarked “MacArthur found himself unable to be present”. When Halsey met MacArthur face to face, believe or not they instantly took a liking to another. Within just 5 minutes Halsey wrote “I felt as if we were lifelong friends. I have seldom seen a man who makes a quicker, stronger, more favorable impression. He was then 63 years old, but he could have passed as 50. His hair was jet black; his eyes were clear; his carriage was erect. If he had been wearing civilian clothes, I still would have known at once that he was a soldier”. MacArthur was equally impressed writing about Halsey “He was of the same aggressive type as John Paul Jones, David Farragut, and George Dewey. His one thought was to close with the enemy and fight him to the death. . . . I liked him from the moment we met, and my respect and admiration increased with time.” In the year that followed the admiral and general would effectively coordinate their operations in the south pacific. As Kenney and Kinkaid had learned, and as Halsey was in turn, MacArthur was accustomed to deference but did not bristle at well reasoned opposition. MacArthur could yield to sound arguments. Of course heated arguments occurred between the two men. Halsey's long term chief of staff, Robert Carney witnessed one in 1943 where he said “The admiral, with his “chin sticking out a foot,” told MacArthur that he was placing his “personal honor . . . before the security of the United States and the outcome of the war!” MacArthur responded “Bull, that's a terrible indictment. That's a terrible thing to say. But, I think in my preoccupation, I've forgotten some things. . . . You can go on back now. The commitment will be met.” Imagine that, MacArthur almost admitting a mistake, that goes to show the character of Halsey. What they were arguing about was Hasley proposing to attack New Georgia and it turned out to be inline with MacArthurs thinking. MacArthur approved the operation on the spot and it would intersect with his own plans for an offensive up the north coast of New Guinea. Because of the seizure of the Russell Island's, D-Day for the invasion of New Georgia would be originally set for May 15th, but would get postponed to June 30th. However that is far into the future for us! I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Amchitka and the Russell Islands were taken unopposed and with relative ease. The Americans were being cautious in their actions, but little by little they were breaking down Japan's new defensive posture, a few islands down and many more to come.
Joni Earekcson Tada is in our hall of fame of heroes. She is overflowing with grit and grace and has impacted the lives of hundreds of thousands of people, all while living with quadriplegia. Joni never fails to show up to the good/hard work before her, and she challenges us to do the same each and every day. Join us as we hear Joni's powerful perspective on finding our callings within our unique limitations.
Well-loved Christian author, speaker and disability advocate Joni Eareckson Tada recently had a bout with pneumonia even as she battles breast cancer. Host Taylor Berglund shares more about Tada's condition as believers around the globe pray for her recovery.
Well-loved author, speaker and disability advocate Joni Eareckson Tada was hospitalized recently while fighting breast cancer. Then she was diagnosed with pneumonia. Listen to learn more about her challenges and please keep "Joni" in prayer.
Joni Eareckson Tada, who became a quadriplegic after diving into shallow water decades ago, was hospitalized at the end of March in her ongoing battle with breast cancer. Listen to this Charisma News podcast to learn more about how this well-loved author, artist and disability advocate is doing.
Mrs. Joni Eareckson Tada, founder, and CEO of Joni and Friends International Disability Center in Agoura Hills, CA, encourages believers toward a deeper trust in the Lord as they recognize God’s sovereign design of the church, as it needs all parts, especially those that seem weaker.
This second episode of Matrix News features John Burns and Reggie Prime, directors of Matrix’s Industrial Services group. Together, they discuss their experience in providing wastewater reduction and optimization strategies for clients in the food/beverage industry and beyond, and share tips for businesses seeking to streamline and improve their wastewater treatment process.
March 3, 2012 @ the Westin Bonaventure Hotel