Podcasts about Nakano

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Play Episode Listen Later Jul 3, 2026 29:26

FULL EPISODE! This time on the PURE TOKYOSCOPE Podcast, authors Matt Alt (⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Pure Invention: How Japan Made the Modern World⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠) and Patrick Macias (⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Mondo Tokyo: Dispatches from a Secret Japan⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠) once again gallop at high speed through Japan's vintage toy nerd supermall known as Nakano Broadway! What did they find? Who will survive and what will be left of them? LISTEN NOW AND FIND OUT!⁠Join the PURE TOKYOSCOPE Patreon!⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠You'll get access to full episodes, bonus content, our Discord server, and an archive of past episodes. ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Head over to Pure TokyoScope Patreon to subscribe today!⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠INFO⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Matt Alt on Bluesky⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Patrick Macias on Bluesky⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Pure TokyoScope on YouTube⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠The podcast is produced by ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠jaPRESS LLC⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠© and edited by Patrick MaciasTheme song by Marxy, v.o. by RInRin Doll

Yoshiko Nakano and Georgina Challen, "Meiji Graves in Happy Valley: Stories of Early Japanese Residents in Hong Kong" (Hong Kong UP, 2024)

New Books in History

Play Episode Listen Later Jun 19, 2026 57:13

The connections between Hong Kong and Japan began far earlier than many realise. Yet only recently has Hong Kong's historic Japanese community received the attention it deserves through Meiji Graves in Happy Valley: Stories of Early Japanese Residents in Hong Kong (Hong Kong UP, 2024). In this compelling book, Dr Yoshiko Nakano and Georgina Challen guide readers into the Meiji era, reconstructing history through the lives of ordinary people whose stories have long been overlooked. During our interview, Yoshio explained her desire to place this research within a broader East-West framework, a cross-cultural perspective reflected in her own collaboration and long-term friendship with Georgina. Perhaps the book's most moving aspect is the authors' compassion for Kiya Saki, a karayuki-san (sex worker) from Nagasaki who migrated to Hong Kong and later died by suicide. Yoshiko and Georgina spoke movingly about discovering her story. Like Saki, both have experienced life far from home and understand the challenges of building a life as a sojourner. Her tragic fate inspired them to investigate the lives of early Japanese residents through the meticulous study of 470 graves in Happy Valley. Beyond individual tragedies, the book reveals a diaspora divided by deep social tensions. While the Meiji state sought to project the image of a modern, civilised nation, the Japanese community in Hong Kong was effectively a ‘community of two halves'. Elite business figures, including Mitsubishi managers, existed alongside marginalised karayuki-san and boarding-house operators. Yet from this division emerged a remarkable story of solidarity. Through institutions, wealthier members of the community funded healthcare, financial assistance, and dignified burials for those in need. Driven by the necessity of mutual support in a foreign colonial port, they transformed a fragmented group of migrants into a resilient and organised community. This dynamic resonates with Michel Foucault's concept of heterotopia, which views the cemetery as a counter-site where distinctions of class, gender, and status dissolve. The Meiji graves vividly illustrate this reality. In death, social divisions that shaped everyday life become impossible to conceal: the graves of marginalised karayuki-san lie alongside those of the community's elite. Together, they offer a unique window into a history shaped by colonialism, human trafficking, global trade, and Japan's transformation into a world power. Richly narrated and grounded in extensive archival research, Meiji Graves in Happy Valley fills an important gap in the histories of both Hong Kong and Japan. By recovering the experiences of ordinary migrants, merchants, workers and sojourners, it reveals the human stories behind larger processes of migration, empire, and modernisation, offering a fresh perspective on the intertwined histories of Hong Kong and Japan. Yoshiko Nakano is a professor in the Department of International Design Management at Tokyo University of Science. She previously taught Japanese studies at the University of Hong Kong. Georgina Challen holds an MA in literary and cultural studies from the University of Hong Kong. Born in England, she grew up in Switzerland and has called Hong Kong home since 1990. Bing Wang receives her PhD at the University of Leeds in 2020. Her research interests include the exploration of overseas Chinese cultural identity and critical heritage studies. She is also a freelance translator. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/history

university stories science england japan phd chinese japanese hong kong elite switzerland driven leeds graves residents nagasaki east west happy valley mitsubishi michel foucault meiji nakano tokyo university yoshio hong kong hong kong

Yoshiko Nakano and Georgina Challen, "Meiji Graves in Happy Valley: Stories of Early Japanese Residents in Hong Kong" (Hong Kong UP, 2024)

New Books Network

Play Episode Listen Later Jun 17, 2026 55:13

Yoshiko Nakano and Georgina Challen, "Meiji Graves in Happy Valley: Stories of Early Japanese Residents in Hong Kong" (Hong Kong UP, 2024)

New Books in East Asian Studies

Play Episode Listen Later Jun 17, 2026 57:13

Yoshiko Nakano and Georgina Challen, "Meiji Graves in Happy Valley: Stories of Early Japanese Residents in Hong Kong" (Hong Kong UP, 2024)

New Books in Chinese Studies

Play Episode Listen Later Jun 17, 2026 55:13

Yoshiko Nakano and Georgina Challen, "Meiji Graves in Happy Valley: Stories of Early Japanese Residents in Hong Kong" (Hong Kong UP, 2024)

New Books in Urban Studies

Play Episode Listen Later Jun 17, 2026 55:13

Yoshiko Nakano and Georgina Challen, "Meiji Graves in Happy Valley: Stories of Early Japanese Residents in Hong Kong" (Hong Kong UP, 2024)

New Books in Japanese Studies

Play Episode Listen Later Jun 17, 2026 55:13

L'ode à la réconciliation de Ryota Nakano avec son film «Mon grand-frère et moi»

Reportage culture

Play Episode Listen Later May 8, 2026 3:16

Que deviennent ceux qui restent lorsqu'un membre de la famille décède ? Cette question est au cœur du travail cinématographique du réalisateur japonais Ryota Nakano. L'auteur de la comédie multiprimée La Famille Asada, sortie en 2020, est de retour avec un nouveau film, Mon grand-frère et moi. Inspiré par l'autobiographie de l'autrice Riko Murai, ce film traite du deuil familial, mais avec une bonne dose d'humour qui transforme des situations tragiques en véritable comédie humaine. À lire aussi«5 centimètres par seconde» de Yoshiyuki Okuyama, un film romantique et japonais

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L'ode à la réconciliation de Ryota Nakano avec son film «Mon grand-frère et moi»

Reportage Culture

Play Episode Listen Later May 8, 2026 3:16

film japon famille inspir conciliation nakano ryota

S7 Ep21: Boosting farmers' profits

VoxDev Talks

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 29, 2026 30:10

Decades of agricultural development policy have chased yield. Bigger harvests, better seeds, more fertiliser. But how can we make farming more profitable? Craig McIntosh of UC San Diego is academic lead on a J-PAL Policy Insight covering twenty-three randomised evaluations of credit and grants for farmers in low- and middle-income countries. He tell Tim Phillips that although yields and revenues often rise, profit rarely responds in the same way. When farmers are already running their farms close to the margin, costs rise at the same rate as income, and the household bank balance does not move much. What can we bundle with credit to change that situation?The research behind this episode:Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL). 2026. "Can relaxing credit constraints boost farmers' profits?” J-PAL Policy Insights. Last modified February 2026. Academic leads: Craig McIntosh and Tavneet Suri; insight authors: Leonie Rauls and Rebecca Toole.To cite this episode:Phillips, Tim, and Craig McIntosh. 2026. “Boosting farmers' profits?" VoxDev Talks (podcast). Assign this as extra listening. The citation above is formatted and ready for a reading list or VLE.About the guestCraig McIntosh is Professor of Economics at the School of Global Policy and Strategy, UC San Diego. His research spans development finance, agricultural credit, cash transfer design and the evaluation of large-scale anti-poverty interventions. Research cited in this episodeMicrocredit take-up among farmers. Across four randomised evaluations of traditional microcredit aimed at farmers, in Morocco, Ethiopia, Bangladesh and Malawi, take-up sat between 13 and 33 percent. Standard microcredit repayment begins a week or two after disbursement, which is incompatible with a crop cycle that pays out cash once or twice a year. Group liability also breaks down in agriculture, where shocks like drought or floods hit borrowers together rather than one at a time.Tailoring credit to the agricultural cycle. Restructured loans push take-up much higher. Nakano and Magezi in Tanzania allowed rice farmers to defer 80 percent of repayment until harvest; 39 percent borrowed and over 92 percent repaid. William Jack and co-authors in Kenya offered dairy farmers asset-collateralised loans for a water tank; take-up reached 44 percent against 2.4 percent for a typical joint-liability product. Lambon-Quayefio, Manjeer and Udry in Ghana offered digital credit with a three-month grace period; 59 percent of farmers took it up.Sell low, buy high. Burke and co-authors in Kenya showed that smallholders routinely sell at the post-harvest price trough and buy back grain at hungry-season prices 20 to 40 percent higher. Harvest-time loans that allowed farmers to delay sales had take-up of 64 percent and produced returns around 29 percent for borrowers. Treated villages also saw flatter price trajectories, generating spillover benefits for non-borrowers.Lean-season credit. Fink, Jack and Masiye in Zambia found that lean-season loans let farmers stop hiring out their labour and instead work their own land. Output rose by 9 percent. Loan repayments were comparable to the gain, leaving farmers roughly even on profits.Selection into credit markets. Beaman, Karlan, Thuysbaert and Udry in Mali first offered loans, then offered grants to those who had refused. Returns to capital among would-be borrowers were on the order of 130 percent. Returns among those who had refused the loan were close to zero. Credit appears to self-target toward farmers who can use it productively, which is regressive in welfare terms and also exactly what a capital-scarce economy needs credit markets to do.Input subsidy programmes (ISPs). Jayne and co-authors reviewed eighty studies of fertiliser subsidies across sub-Saharan Africa. Yields rise while subsidies are in place; profitability is mixed; targeting is frequently politically distorted, often skewed toward better-connected or wealthier farmers. The standout randomised exception is Carter, Laajaj and Yang in Mozambique, where two-thirds of recipients had never used fertiliser before; the programme produced sustained gains and a high benefit-cost ratio. By contrast, Gignoux and co-authors in Haiti found a fertiliser-voucher subsidy crowded out farmers' own input spending and lowered yields once the subsidy ended.Cash transfers and diversification. In six studies measuring both farm and non-farm outcomes, three found households doubled down on agriculture and three saw movement into non-farm enterprises. The Zambian Child Grant evaluation by Handa and co-authors saw women invest in seeds, fertiliser and livestock and start non-farm businesses, with household income roughly doubling.Bundled input programmes. Four randomised evaluations bundled credit or a grant with information, training or market access. All four lifted revenues; three of the four lifted incomes or profits. Harou and co-authors in Tanzania showed that fertiliser vouchers alone and soil testing alone did nothing; only the combination raised yields and revenues. Ashraf, Gine and Karlan's Kenya study on French-bean and baby-corn export found credit increased programme participation from 27 to 41 percent, even where it did not further raise income among participants.

Hiromi Kawakami - El cielo es azul y tierra blanca, El señor Nakano y las mujeres, Vidas frágiles, noches oscuras (Biblioterapia)

Crónicas Lunares

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 29, 2026 21:02

El cielo es azul, la tierra blanca te ayuda a abrazaramores maduros y cotidianos, reduciendo la ansiedad por “perfección” y fomentando gratitud en las relaciones. El señor Nakano y las mujeres despierta alegría en lo ordinario, ideal para superar rutinas monótonas y cultivar empatía optimista. Vidas frágiles, noches oscuras transforma la fragilidad en fortaleza, aliviando soledades y promoviendo conexiones auténticas con esperanza. Juntos, generan catarsis emocional, inspiran resiliencia serena y convierten la lectura en un acto de amor propio y crecimiento diario. ¡Leerlos es como un abrazo cálido al alma: te dejan másligero, más conectado y lleno de optimismo vital! Si los integras en tu rutina con reflexiones guiadas, verás transformaciones maravillosas. Estoy aquí para acompañarte en este hermoso camino. ¡Disfrútalos con el corazón abierto!

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The Ballot: Tam Nakano with Scott Edwards

Hit The Books

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 14, 2026 111:40 Transcription Available

Ryan is joined by Scott Edwards to discuss the WON Hall of Fame case of Tam Nakano.Leave a comment, question, or reaction at 9495-BALLOT or 949-522-5568.Watch Scott's "Tam Nakano's Legacy: A Personal Look at STARDOM's Twilight Dream | Five Star" VideoRyan's Stardom Attendance Research: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1e4L0czWWhPRyh0ap2AdGLfOPUAjJq6iWfhIgHro-Hdg/edit?usp=sharingLINK DUMP:Tam Nakano vs Saya Kamitani: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wp4Q22HbQlwTam Nakano vs Giulia: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TLI0P-uK_q8Tam Nakano vs Arisa Hoshikli: https://www.dailymotion.com/video/x7tabdpSubscribe to The Ballot wherever you get podcasts.Subscribe to the Count Out! Youtube channel.Support this podcast at — https://redcircle.com/hit-the-books-realistic-wwe-fantasy-booking/exclusive-contentAdvertising Inquiries: https://redcircle.com/brandsPrivacy & Opt-Out: https://redcircle.com/privacy

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3.182 Fall and Rise of China: Second Soviet Counter Offensive over the Heights

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 29, 2025 37:15

Last time we spoke about the Russian Counter Offensive over the Heights. On the Manchurian frontier, a Japanese plan hatched in the hush before dawn: strike at Hill 52, seize the summit, and bargain only if fate demanded. Colonel Sato chose Nakano's 75th Regiment, delivering five fearless captains to lead the charge, with Nakajima rising like a bright spark among them. Under a cloak of night, scouts threaded the cold air, and at 2:15 a.m. wires fell away, revealing a path through darkness. By dawn, a pale light brushed the crest; Hill 52 yielded, then Shachaofeng did, as dawn's demands pressed forward. The Russians responded with a thunder of tanks, planes, and relentless artillery. Yet the Japanese braced, shifting guns, moving reinforcements, and pressing a discipline born of training and resolve. The battlefield fractured into sectors, Hill 52, Shachaofeng, the lake, each demanding courage and cunning. Night winds carried the buzz of flares, the hiss of shells, and the stubborn clang of rifles meeting armor. The Russians tried to reweave their strength, but Japanese firepower and tenacious assaults kept the line from bending. By nightfall, a quiet resolve settled over the hills; the cost was steep, but the crest remained in Japanese hands. #182 The Second Russian Counteroffensive over the heights Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. The Japanese retained their hard won positions despite fierce Russian counterattacks. For the Japanese command structure at the front, 3 August was of prime importance. Suetaka concluded that he could not merely direct the fighting around Changkufeng nor abandon Kyonghun, given his need to manage relations with Korea Army Headquarters and central authorities, as well as the special characteristics of these battles and his grave concerns about the Wuchiatzu front to the north. By 5 p.m., the newly arrived 37th Brigade commander, Morimoto Nobuki, was assigned control of all sectors from Hill 52 and Changkufeng to Shachaofeng, establishing his command post at the former site of the 75th Regiment at Chiangchunfeng. The Japanese estimated losses from the Soviet counterattacks on 2–3 August as follows: Hill 52-Changkufeng, at least 300 Soviet casualties and four tanks; Shachaofeng, about 300 casualties and several tanks, plus several heavy machine guns knocked out. By 17:00 on 3 August, Russian strength committed to the front and immediate rear was assessed at ten infantry battalions, 40 artillery pieces, and 80 tanks. Japanese casualties on the 2nd and 3rd totaled 16 killed and 25 wounded. Suetaka judged the Soviet bombardments on 3 August powerful, but their infantry assaults were not particularly bold, likely due to their heavy losses on the 2nd. Even though morale was not high, there were signs of reinforcements from elite units, including armor and large artillery formations. Suetaka concluded the Russians would again attempt to retake the Shachaofeng sector and positions around Changkufeng. During the night of 3–4 August, the 75th Infantry, still on alert against resumed enemy counterattacks, intensified security and worked energetically to strengthen defenses. K. Sato remained at Chiangchunfeng to complete the turnover to the 37th Brigade and to brief Morimoto. The regiment established its new command post for the right sector at the foot of Fangchuanting. Throughout the night, Soviet vehicles with blinking lights were observed moving south along the high ground east of Khasan, and a new buildup of mechanized forces and artillery appeared in the area. At 05:30, 36 tanks were seen advancing to Hill 29, followed by the apparent withdrawal of 50–60 Russian horsemen into the same area. At 07:00 on 04 August, Soviet artillery began a bombardment. Although there was a lull around noon, by 14:00 intensity peaked, described as "like millions of lightning bolts striking at once." After another quiet spell, enemy guns renewed their tempo at 19:30, targeting Hill 52 and Changkufeng. The Russians' artillery was not precisely zeroed in; "many of the shells plopped into the Tumen, which delighted us considerably." Beginning on the 4th, Soviet artillery sought to cut lines of communication by bombarding the river crossing site, disrupting daytime supply. Japanese artillery records add: "Until today, this battalion had been fired on only by field artillery; now 122-mm. howitzers went into action against us. We sustained no losses, since the points of impact were 100 meters off. Apparently, the Russians conducted firing for effect from the outset, using data provided by the field artillery in advance." Around midnight, Ichimoto, the old commander of the 1st Infantry Battalion, arrived at the 75th Regiment Headquarters to resume command. He was "itching to fight." K. Sato described the casualties in detail, but "he didn't look beaten at all." "To the contrary, the colonel was strong and in excellent spirits. Yet while he wasn't pessimistic, one could not call him optimistic." At the battalion site, about 100 men were in operational condition out of an original 400. Some soldiers were hauling ammunition, rations, and position materiel; others were cremating the dead, since corpses would rot in the August heat. Japanese casualties on 4 August were light: the 75th Infantry lost five killed and three wounded; among attached engineers, the platoon leader and two men were wounded. Ammunition expenditure was very low. The Japanese press noted that although the Russians had been reported retreating behind the lake to the northeast, investigation showed a redeployment forward from south of Changkufeng. An American observer in Tokyo stated that "the best information obtainable is that the Russians now occupy the lower slopes of Changkufeng, while the Japanese still occupy the heights." From this period dates a series of pleas from the 19th Division for the dispatch of long-range artillery from the Kwantung Army. Suetaka believed that the addition of long-range artillery was necessary and feasible. As Kitano predicted, Suetaka submitted his recommendation at 05:00 on 5 August for the attention of the Korea Army commander and the AGS deputy. As dawn approached on 5 August, the Korea Army received Suetaka's request. A message was dispatched to the vice minister of war and the AGS deputy, and an inquiry was sent to Hsinking. The note detailed Soviet artillery on the Changkufeng front, eight to ten batteries of field and mountain guns, including 10-cm cannons and two or three 15-cm howitzers, and described how these long-range pieces kept up a slow fire beyond Japanese firing range. Overnight, Soviet traffic pressed along the high ground east of Khasan, and by 06:30 the horizon brimmed with new threat: 48 tanks concentrated near Hill 29, with fresh artillery deployed once the Russians realized their own guns were receiving scant challenge from the Japanese. Movement across the lake suggested continued armor in play; at dawn, 10 to 15 tanks lingered on the Crestline, while closer still, six Russian tanks prowled near the southern edge of Khasan. By 03:00, Changkufeng came under bombardment again. K. Sato urged the mountain artillery to answer dawn with counterfire against the high ground east of Khasan and against Hill 29. Between 05:00 and 05:40, the artillery struck armor concentrations, knocked out two tanks, and forced the rest toward the east of Hill 29. Observation posts were neutralized, and cavalry was driven north. At the same hour, the Soviet barrage against the Japanese rear intensified, targeting lines of communication across the Tumen. The Sozan link failed by day, and telephone lines to the artillery battalion were severed, though signalmen managed to restore communications. The river crossings, Fangchuanting, Hill 52, and Shachaofeng bore the brunt of the shelling, with 15-cm blasts jolting the frontline. "From today enemy shellfire was coned and grew increasingly accurate, until every area along our front was deprived of its dead angles and our casualties mounted." The Hill 52 zone endured a slow siege, but tank fire from the eastern heights remained severe. Noguchi's company, positioned south of Changkufeng, found itself trapped in crossfire from positions across the lake. Suetaka, his front-line subordinates, and their worries about artillery superiority pressed onward. He did what he could with the resources at hand, and, in the morning, shifted a two-15-cm howitzer battery from Kyonghun to the sector opposite Changkufeng, a modest increment in reach but a needed one. At 10:00, Suetaka ordered replenishment of frontline strength. He calculated the enemy's power and their own limits: the Russians had deployed three or four infantry battalions, around 120–130 tanks, 50–60 armored cars, about 1,000 mounted troops, and three or four artillery battalions. Yet he found a glimmer in their morale; "the morale of our own units has risen, as we have been dealing grievous blows to the foe on occasion and have been steadily breaking hostile intentions." By 5 August, he noted, fifty enemy tanks had already fallen. Morimoto watched the ominous lull that threatened another attritional test and warned that the situation demanded constant vigilance. "Even if the front seems quiet, we must tighten security, reinforce positions, and not give the foe even the slightest advantage to exploit." The 5th saw only four Japanese soldiers wounded, three from the 75th and one from the mountain artillery, while ammunition usage remained low. Anti-aircraft guns west of Sozan drove off two aircraft that appeared over Changkufeng at 11:45, triggering a counterbarrage from the northeast of Khasan. A few Soviet planes skimmed over Hill 52 and Changkufeng in the afternoon, but their flights felt more like reconnaissance than threat. Across the line, the Russians continued to probe the east side. Northeast of Khasan, waves of infantry and trucks, dozens at a time, slipped south, while roughly 20 tanks began their own southern march. The Russians worked to erect new positions along the Khansi heights. In the meantime, conversations in Moscow pressed toward a decision, with intelligence predicting that a breakthrough would come by noon on the 5th. Around midnight on 5 August, Morimoto observed that the Russians' forward elements seemed to have been pulled back and the front lay quiet. He ordered vigilant guard duties, stressing that crossing the border, trespassing, and fomenting trouble were prohibited by all units and even by scouts. Meanwhile, the Japanese had been preparing for night attacks and consolidating positions. Throughout the foggy night, mechanized units moved on the Crestline east of Khasan. At daybreak, a platoon leader north of Changkufeng reported tanks heading toward Hill 29, estimating the total force at about 70 tanks and 50 troop-laden trucks. Japanese observers at Hill 52 detected new artillery positions on both sides of Hill 29 and 40 tanks on the Crestline south of the hill. By 07:00, the high ground was covered by no fewer than 100 tanks, with 8 or 9 infantry battalions deployed ahead and behind. As early as 03:00, K. Sato had urged his artillery liaison officer to ensure friendly guns fired at daybreak against the Hill 29 sector to thwart the enemy's intentions in advance. When morning fog lifted a bit at 06:00, Kamimori's mountain artillery battalion "hit the tanks very well," and front-line officers spotted shell impacts, though visibility improved only until 10:00, when mist again hampered observation. By 07:00, Soviet guns began firing from near Hill 29, triggering a duel in which the Japanese outranged them. Around 09:00, as the fog lifted from the higher crest of Changkufeng, Japanese gunners added their fire against the 40 Russian tanks near Hill 29. From Fangchuanting, the lone Japanese mountain piece also engaged armor and troop-laden trucks around Hill 29. As time wore on, the Soviet artillery showed its power, and Hill 52 became a beehive of shelling. From 11:00 onward the defenders began to suffer more and more casualties, with works shattered in succession. Flank fire from Gaho and heavy guns from Maanshan took a toll. The 100 tanks deployed on the Crestline north and south of Hill 29 delivered furious low-trajectory fire, gradually turning the front walls of our firing trenches into something resembling a saw. Russian shellfire pounded defenses at Hill 52, Noguchi Hill, and Changkufeng. Between 02:00 and 05:00 the Russian shells had been dispersed; now they concentrated their bombardment. They even struck the rear headquarters of the 37th Brigade and the 75th Regiment. The crossings at Sozan and Matsu'otsuho took heavy hits, and Sato worried that friendly batteries would become exposed to counter-battery fire if they opened up too soon. A peak of intensity arrived near 13:30 as the Soviet ground assault began. Now 30 Soviet aircraft bombed Changkufeng, Fangchuanting, and Hill 52, and Russian tanks moved toward Hill 52, with infantry 300–400 meters behind. To blunt the assault, Hirahara ordered ammunition caches and instructed troops not to open fire prematurely. The Soviet infantry and tanks pressed to a line about 900 meters from the Japanese, paused briefly, then continued. By 14:00, the advance resumed, led by three battalions and 50 tanks. Lieutenant Saito, commanding the 3rd Battalion's antitank battery, waited until tanks were 800 meters away and then opened fire with his three pieces. In a furious exchange between 13:50 and 14:30, as armor closed to 300 meters, the Japanese stopped 14 tanks and seriously damaged others in the rear. One antitank squad leader, a corporal, would later receive a posthumous citation for destroying more than ten tanks. Several tanks fled into a dip near Khasan; some Soviet troops were reportedly crushed by their own tanks in the melee. Supporting Saito's fire were Hisatsune's regimental guns and the captured antitank gun at Changkufeng, which the Japanese used to engage armor along the lake's slopes. Noguchi's unit fired battalion guns against the tanks while the attached mountain pieces bombarded the Russians despite intense counterbattery fire. At Hill 52, liaison lieutenant Fuji'uchi observed the shelling and coordinated infantry–artillery actions with a platoon leader, never flinching even after being buried in trenches three times by shell blasts; he was killed near 14:00. Captain Shiozawa, the mountain battery commander, took charge of directing fire and also was also slain. The Russians' assault pushed forward; 16 tanks followed behind the vanguard, moving along the Crestline behind Hill 52, and joined the tanks in firing but did not advance further. To the rear, a large force moved along the lake north of Hill 52 until checked by fire from Noguchi's positions. A dozen Russian tanks converged southwest of Khasan at 16:00. Master Sergeant Kobayashi, acting platoon leader of the engineers, proposed a close-quarter demolition attack since Japanese antitank strength was limited. After approval from Hirahara, at around 16:30 he and 13 men crept forward 300 meters undetected. Twenty meters from the tanks, Kobayashi urged his men: "One man, one tank! Unto death for us all!" The assault wrecked six to eight (or possibly ten) of the 12 enemy tanks and killed many crew members inside and outside the vehicles, but Kobayashi and seven of his men were killed; only one soldier, Kabasawa, survived to perform a posthumous rescue of a fallen comrade. Of the 60 Russian tanks and at least four battalions that rushed to Hill 52, only one tank charged into the hill positions. At 17:30, this machine reached within 150 meters of the 11th Company lines but was destroyed by armor-piercing heavy machine-gun fire. Back at the 75th Regiment command post, K. Sato received reports from the line units, but hostile fire cut communications with Hill 52 in the afternoon. His antitank guns were increasingly inoperable, and casualties mounted. He reinforced Hill 52 first with heavy machine guns and then with an infantry company. North of Hill 52, Noguchi had been in position with an infantry platoon, a machine-gun platoon, and the battalion gun battery. By 09:30, enemy bombardment forced him to pull back temporarily to the lower Scattered Pines area to avoid needless casualties. At Akahage or "Red Bald" Hill, Noguchi left only lookouts. Around 16:00, about two enemy companies were observed moving toward Changkufeng. Noguchi redirected fire to meet the threat. The Japanese, pinned by infantry and four tanks approaching within 150 meters, endured infantry guns and other tanks in a protracted exchange. Shelling continued until sundown. Casualties mounted; the machine-gun platoon leader, Master Sergeant Harayama, fell with 20 of his men. "It was a hard battle, but we retained our positions, and the enemy advance toward Changkufeng was checked." After sunset there were occasional fire exchanges; tanks remained visible burning. Soviet troops attempting to breach barriers faced hand-grenade assaults. A great deal of noise signaled casualties being evacuated and tanks salvaged behind enemy lines, but no fresh assaults followed. The effective barrage by the 2nd Mountain Artillery Battalion helped deter further attempts. Around 13:30 the advance began. Soviet ground troops laid down a barrage of field, heavy, and mountain gunfire against Hill 52, Noguchi Hill, and Fangchuanting until sunset. Casualties were heaviest between 15:00 and 17:00. Soviet cutoff fire against the Tumen crossings continued even after the sun went down. Japanese close-support artillery attracted instantaneous counterbattery fire. Enemy planes also seemed to be bombing in quest of the artillery sites. On the sector defended by T. Sato, throughout the night of 5-6 August, Russian movements had been frequent on the Kozando-Paksikori road and east of Khasan, trucks and tanks making round trips. The roar of engines and rumbling of vehicles were especially pronounced on the lake heights. Headlights shone brightly, causing Japanese lookouts to speculate that the Russians were putting on a demonstration to suggest that their main offensive effort was being aimed against Hill 52. Nevertheless, the left sector unit was ready for an enemy dawn assault, which did materialize around 06:00. One or two Soviet battalions struck forward, encountered a torrent of fire at 300 meters, and fled, leaving 30 bodies behind. Near 09:00 the left sector experienced a fierce series of bombardments; all of the men except lookouts took cover in trenches. The Soviet guns thundered unrelentingly, apparently in preparation for an offensive. At 14:30 several dozen bombers struck. Simultaneously, a wave of 60 tanks moved forward, followed by three battalions of infantry. Major Obo, battalion commander on the right wing, had his heavy machine guns, battalion guns, and line companies engage the foot soldiers, while antitank and regimental guns concentrated against armor. The tanks fanned out and approached within 700 meters, stopping to fire on occasion in "mobile pillbox" fashion. Despite unrelenting enemy tank and artillery shelling, the Japanese regimental guns, and the rapid-fire pieces in particular, shifted position and laid down raiding fire. In conjunction with heavy weapons belonging to Takenouchi's battalion, Obo's men succeeded in stopping 20 tanks. The rest of the armored group continued to push forward. The Russian infantry had pressed on another 200 meters behind the tanks, but eventually they lost momentum 400 meters from the Japanese positions. Having managed to separate the tanks from the infantry, the Japanese units staged close-in assaults in concert with heavy weapons and smashed ten more tanks. Thirty machines had been immobilized by now after a furious struggle lasting five hours. Although Lieutenant Ikue was killed by machine-gun fire, his mountain artillery platoon, emplaced at Shachaofeng, rendered yeoman service, stopping 20 tanks. The forward elements of Soviet infantry, still firing from 400 meters behind the tanks, had apparently abandoned the attack. Second-line forces seemed to have pulled far back, northeast of the lake. Several dozen Soviet bombers struck Takenouchi's left-wing battalion around 14:30 and lost one plane to machine-gun fire. At the same time, 50 Soviet tanks closed to 800 meters. Engaging this armored formation were battalion guns, heavy field artillery, and mountain artillery attached to the sector unit, as well as heavy weapons firing from the neighboring battalion. In succession the tanks were knocked out, perhaps 20 in all. Under cover of artillery and bombing, a battalion of Soviet infantry, who had been advancing behind the tanks, got as close as 30 or 40 meters before being checked by guns firing from the Nanpozan area and by the vigorous resistance of the defenders. The enemy withdrew 600 meters and began to dig in. T. Sato noted at 19:00 that, although the Russians on the right and left sectors seemed to have sustained considerable losses, they apparently were "planning something at point-blank range in front of our positions." The 73rd Infantry would therefore cope with a twilight or night attack by the one battalion and several tanks immediately facing it. On 06:08, immediately after large-scale air attacks involving four-engine bombers between noon and 14:00, enemy barrages began. Enemy artillery positions, 6,000–7,000 meters away, were not engaged by the Japanese since their gunners were trained only at 1,000 meters. Longer ranges were ineffective, would betray the guns, and would waste ammunition. Near 16:00 50 tanks appeared at 3,000 meters, and infantry could also be seen, wearing high boots and marching around the lake. Although the Russians may have closed to 200 or 300 meters, Tominaga received no impression that their foot soldiers were particularly aggressive. Soviet armored tactics were poor: some tanks were moving, some stopped, but they did their firing from rises, which made them easy targets. Perhaps it was because of the terrain, undulating and swampy. Without armor-piercing rounds, the Japanese guns could not penetrate the heaviest armor, so they aimed at the treads or at the belly when the tank was on a rise. Tominaga's weapons were aided by rapid-fire pieces and machine guns and by the 15-cm howitzers from across the river. Of the ten targets which came within effective range, Tominaga's battery claimed five light tanks. Major Takenouchi remembered a tank-led Soviet attack that day on Takenouchi's sector. The enemy infantry deployed in good order four kilometers from the defenses. As the formations drew closer, the Japanese counted more than 40 tanks and 3,000 ground troops. The commander knew he had a serious problem, for there were only 20 antitank shells for the rapid-fire guns. When the Russians got within 4,000 meters, the Japanese opened fire with all available heavy weapons. The attackers hit the ground and continued to advance in creeping formation, although the terrain consisted of paddy fields. All the Japanese could see were Russians, wearing reddish-purple trousers and carrying rifles, deployed every 200 meters behind the front lines and apparently exhorting the soldiers. These must have been the "enforcers." The Japanese let the tanks close to 800 meters before opening fire with their precious antitank ammunition. Both the lead and the last tanks were knocked out, but there were by now only four or five shells left, and the firing had to be stopped. Fortunately for the Japanese, the tanks never again advanced, perhaps because of the wet terrain. The Soviet infantry, however, pressed forward tenaciously all day and wormed their way close to the front edge of the barbed wire under cover of artillery and machine guns. Throughout the day, pleas for reinforcement were made frequently by the two Japanese line companies, but the battalion had no reserves, only the few soldiers in the command team. Requests were met with the reply to "hold on for a while; help is coming." Luckily, there was no close-quarter fighting by the time night fell, but the Russians did lay down concerted machine-gun fire after dark. When dawn broke without a Soviet assault, Major Takenouchi surmised that the barrage of machine-gun fire laid down by Russian infantry the evening before must have been intended to cover disengagement from the lines or to check a Japanese attack. Now, in daylight, Russian assault troops which had closed to the entanglements the day before had pulled back to a distance of 400 or 500 meters and could be seen constructing positions. At 19:10 Morimoto warned that while the Soviet offensive had bogged down, "all units are to be wary of attacks after twilight and are to crush them in good time." Ito, in charge at Changkufeng, was consequently alert, although regimental headquarters did not particularly share his concern. Ito had only two infantry squads from the 6th Company and Hisatsune's regimental gun battery, 121 men in all. A little after 20:00, Ito received a report from lookouts that enemy troops were advancing onto the southern skirt. At 20:30 two Soviet companies attacked the advanced lines, hurling grenades. One Japanese squad was almost wiped out; "they died heroic deaths, leaping into a hostile force which outnumbered them 20:1." Immediately, the Russians surged toward the main Japanese positions farther up the hill, while other strong elements sought to encircle the crest on the left. Accompanying the Soviet troops were "wardens." From north, east, and south the Japanese defenses were being overrun, and the regimental guns were in jeopardy. Wounded men fell back and down the hill, one by one. Lieutenant Hisatsune personally sought to repulse the Russians. Taking his command team, a dozen men under a master sergeant, and the two regimental gun squads which possessed only captured rifles, he led a desperate charge at 21:10. With fixed bayonets, the Japanese rushed forward, yelling loudly and hurling rocks, since there were not enough grenades. The Russians retreated in confusion, pursued by the Japanese. Hisatsune cut down several Russians, was wounded badly by grenades, but plunged into the enemy one last time before meeting a "matchlessly heroic death" at 21:40. Almost all of the noncoms and soldiers fell with him. Suddenly, at 21:20, Ito's antitank squad leader staggered to the 75th Regiment command post at Fangchuanting, his face mangled. "Changkufeng is in danger! Avenge us!" Nishimura and the reinforcements had to run 1,200 meters to reach the hill. Major Ichimoto also worked desperately to retrieve men from logistical chores; somehow he assembled 45. Grabbing every grenade available at the command post, Ichimoto ran with his men to the relief of Changkufeng. Next, Regimental Aide Suko sent 10 soldiers, the last being headquarters clerks and runners. When 16 men from the 2nd Company turned up, having delivered their supplies, Suko rushed them out, also. At regimental headquarters there now remained only a dozen soldiers and one heavy machine gun. By then, the Russians had climbed up and across Changkufeng peak and were pushing halfway down the Japanese slope of the hill. Enemy machine guns fired fiercely, but it was mainly grenades that felled Murakoshi's unit; although few were killed, half of the lead platoon was wounded. Murakoshi, struck by a grenade fragment, tied a cloth around his knee and kept on running. Clinging to Changkufeng, Ito now had little more than 50 men left—only seven of his own soldiers, the rest gunners. The latter had lost their pieces, however, and had never been armed with rifles in the first place. The survivors had to use stones, picks, and shovels to grapple with the foe in the trenches. A little before 22:00, the 17-man contingent under Nishimura arrived. Ten minutes later, Ichimoto rushed up with his 45 men, bunched closely. The survivors, inferior to the reinforcements in numbers, were heartened immensely. Soon afterward, at 22:30, the regimental warrant officer, Nishizawa, caught up with another dozen soldiers, and Murakoshi brought 16 more at 23:00. Wild fighting ensued, furious grenade exchanges, the crisscrossing of fire, and shouts and flashes. Ichimoto remembered that by the time he arrived, the last remnants of Ito's company were fighting hand-to-hand in the trenches on the north side in utter darkness. Thirty meters from the peak, he and Nishimura scouted the situation. Then, having combined the 120 reinforcements into one line, Ichimoto drew his sword and led the charge. In the constant flashes, shapes could be discerned rather well. The Russian machine guns were firing "crazily," all tracers, probably to warn away their own troops. But the firing was very high, sometimes ten meters over the heads of the Japanese, perhaps because of the darkness, the 40-degree slope near the crest, and the angle of the guns. Much of the fire was considerably lower, but the Japanese had only to observe the roots of the tracer fire and stay down, ducking behind boulders. The Soviets had been committing new troops steadily, and a considerable amount of heavy weapons had been emplaced. Near midnight the Russians were driven south, down the cliff, but most of the Japanese had been killed or wounded, and ammunition was exhausted. The mere dozen unscathed survivors were pushed back, but Master Sergeant Isobe and his platoon from Inokuma's company reached the crest in the nick of time at 02:00. With this reinforcement, Ichimoto led a new charge and again drove the enemy below the cliff. At 22:50 P.M., Inokuma set out with only 49 men, crossed the border, and headed for the enemy's rear. First to be encountered, probably at 01:00, were several dozen Soviet soldiers, armed with machine guns, who were surprised and almost destroyed, abandoning more than 20 corpses. Inokuma veered north along Khasan, cutting down Russian phone lines on the way. The Japanese detected no evidence of enemy retreat. Instead, voices and the sound of oars on the lake could be heard from the eastern foot of Changkufeng, perhaps they came from Soviet reinforcements. Inokuma decided that the best course would be to plunge ahead and take the Russians by surprise. On his own initiative, he began his new operation, although by now he had lost permanent touch with the assault teams. At 02:00, Inokuma's unit broke silently through the "imperfect" lines of barbed wire and charged through another enemy force of company size which was equipped with machine guns. Next, Inokuma directed an attack against a concentration just behind the company location, a unit estimated to number two battalions massing west of the Khasan crossing. The Russians were "stunned" by the assault. According to Akaishizawa, the enemy were killing their own men by wild firing. A portion fled north, leaving over 30 bodies behind. At the same time, the foe called down fire from all areas, causing very heavy Japanese casualties. Inokuma charged, managed to scatter the foe, and seized the cliff. By now he had only a half-dozen men left. His own sword had been shattered and his pistol ammunition exhausted; he picked up a Russian rifle and bayoneted several enemy soldiers. Now the Soviet troops, who had fallen back once, were approaching again from the right rear. Inokuma charged once more, shouting. The Russians retreated to the foot of the heights on the northeast. Daybreak was near. Already hit several times, Inokuma sought to resume the attack, this time from the rear of hostile forces desperately engaging Ichimoto's elements on Changkufeng crest. Akaishizawa said his last orders were, "Ito is just ahead. Charge on!" Although he had only a few soldiers left, Inokuma was trying to move forward when a bullet or a grenade fragment struck him in the head, and he died at 03:00. Sergeant Okumura, although wounded seriously, had remained with Inokuma to the last and defended the positions that had been reached. He saw to it that Inokuma's corpse was recovered first and next struggled to evacuate the wounded. Only then did he withdraw. Around 07:00, Okumura got back to Fangchuanting with one unscathed and two badly wounded soldiers. A day later, the seriously injured but indestructible M. Saito appeared at the regiment command post, somehow dragging a rifle and light machine gun with his one good arm, for "we were always trained to respect our weapons." It was estimated that, during the fighting throughout 6 August, the Russians lost 1,500 killed and wounded as well as 40 tanks knocked out in K. Sato's right sector alone. Japanese casualties were heavy on the 6th. The 75th Infantry lost three officers; 44 enlisted men were killed and 85 wounded. In the engineer platoon seven were killed and five wounded out of 19 men. The 54 killed and 90 wounded in the right sector amounted to 17 percent of the 843 men available. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Japanese leadership under Colonel Sato assigned Nakano's 75th Regiment for a dawn assault, seizing Hill 52 and Shachaofeng despite fierce Soviet counterattacks,tanks, aircraft, and heavy artillery. Across the front, sustained bombardment, shifting fire, and nocturnal maneuvers characterize the period. Yet the crest endured, losses mounting but resolve unbroken, until the sun dipped and the hillside remained stubbornly Japanese

american china japan fall wild japanese kings russian movement night north tokyo enemy charge longer engaging twenty moscow offensive northeast soviet thirty counter heights overnight requests wounded observation brigades generals soviets fuji grabbing daybreak clinging casualties battalion infantry accompanying ammunition sato regiment kobayashi ito headlights avenge ags manchurian saito pacific war flank shelling nakano morimoto nakajima matsu obo nishimura noguchi china podcast okumura infantry battalion suko craig watson one japanese

3.181 Fall and Rise of China: Soviet Counter Offensive over the Heights

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 22, 2025 34:26

Last time we spoke about the Japanese Victory over Changkufeng. Japan's generals hatched a plan: strike at night, seize the peak, then bargain if need be. Colonel Sato, steady as a compass, chose Nakano's brave 75th Regiment, selecting five fearless captains and a rising star, Nakajima, to lead the charge. Ahead, scouts and engineers threaded a fragile path through darkness, while distant Soviet tanks rumbled like distant thunder. At 2:15 a.m., wire breached and soldiers slipped over the slope. The crest resisted with brutal tenacity, grenades flashed, machine guns spit fire, and leaders fell. Yet by 5:15 a.m. dawn painted the hill in pale light, and Japanese hands grasped the summit. The dawn assault on nearby Hill 52 and the Shachaofeng corridor followed, with Takeshita's and Matsunobe's units threading through fog, fire, and shifting trenches. Narukawa's howitzers answered the dawn with measured fury, silencing the Soviets' early artillery as Japanese infantry pressed forward. By daybreak, the Russians were driven back, their lines frayed and retreating toward Khasan. The price was steep: dozens of officers dead or injured, and a crescent of smoke and memory left etched on every face. #181 The Russian Counter Offensive over the Heights Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. After admitting the loss of Changkufeng and Shachaofeng by dawn on 31 July, the Russian government issued a communique the next day asserting that Soviet troops had "hurled back a Japanese division… after a two-day battle" involving tanks, artillery, and aircraft. Some hours after the Japanese penetration, Soviet regulars rushed to the scene and drove out the invaders. Japanese losses amounted to 400 men; Soviet losses were 13 killed and 55 wounded. On Soviet soil, the Japanese abandoned five cannons, 14 machine guns, and 157 rifles, while the Russians admitted losing one tank and one gun. A Soviet reconnaissance pilot may have fallen into Japanese hands after bailing out. "Both before and during the Japanese attack… Soviet troops did not once cross the Manchukuoan frontier,which deprived them of the possibility of surrounding or outflanking the invaders." By 1 August, Russian ground forces were deployed and the Soviet Air Force took action. Soviet aircraft appeared at 24:30 to reconnoiter. Soon after, more than ten planes flew in formation, launching strikes against forward units. Eight sorties, light bombers and fighters, roughly 120–150 aircraft in flights of two or three dozen, bombed and strafed. Raids were conducted by as many as 30 planes, though no Soviet losses were reported. The Russians also hit targets on the Korean side of the Tumen. The 75th Regiment judged that the Soviet Air Force sought only to intimidate. Russian planes dropped several dozen bombs on the Kyonghun bridge, but the span was not struck; damage was limited to the railway, producing an impression of severity that was misleading. The lack of air cover troubled the troops most. Japanese casualties on 1 August were modest: three men wounded in the 75th Infantry, and one wounded and a horse killed in the 76th. However the three Japanese battalions expended over 15,000 machine-gun and 7,000 rifle rounds that day. The appearance of Soviet air power at Changkufeng drew anxious international attention. Shanghai reports electrified observers, who anticipated that major Russo-Japanese hostilities would transform the China campaign overnight. Some observers were openly dismayed, foreseeing a prolongation of the mainland war with potential benefits to Soviet interests. Japanese Army spokesmen sought to downplay the situation. Officers in Hsinking told correspondents that the raids, while serious, represented only a face-saving measure. The Red Army was reportedly attempting to compensate for losses at Changkufeng and other disputed positions, but aside from the bombings, the frontier remained quiet. If the Russians were serious, observers noted, they would have bombed the vital Unggi railway bridge, which remained untouched; raids focused on minor bridges, with limited damage. In Tokyo, foreign observers believed the appearance of about 50 Soviet heavy bombers over North Korea signaled an extension of the incidents and that the Japanese government was taking urgent measures. Military leaders decided not to escalate but prepared for emergencies. The Korea Army Headquarters denied Soviet bombing of Harbin in Manchuria or Najin and Chongjin in Korea. Regarding retaliation, an American correspondent reported that the Japanese military had no intention of bombing Russian territory. Although Soviet use of aircraft introduced a new dimension of danger, the main efforts remained ground-based on both sides. After Japanese troops cleared Changkufeng and Shachaofeng, the Russians appeared to be redeploying to contract their defensive frontage; no troops or works remained west of Khasan. Four or five Russian infantry companies and ten artillery pieces stood between the lake and Paksikori, while the main forces, with numerous gun sites, were concentrated west of Novokievsk. On the Kwantung Army front in southeast Manchuria, no changes were observed. "The Russians were apparently shocked by their defeat at Changkufeng and must suddenly have resorted to negative, conservative measures." Korea Army Headquarters assessed the situation as of the evening of 31 July: "The enemy must fear a Japanese advance into the Novokievsk plain and therefore is concentrating his main forces in that district. Our interests require that we anticipate any emergency, so we must prepare the necessary strength in the Kyonghun region and reinforce positions at Wuchiatzu." At 20:45 on the 31st, the 19th Division received a detailed message from the Hunchun garrison commander describing his northward deployments. Suetaka was heartened; he "earnestly desired to bring about the end of the incident as a result of the fighting of 30–31 July but was equally resolved to defend the border firmly, based on Japanese interpretation of the Hunchun pact, in case the Soviet side did not perform intensive self-reflection." First, Suetaka issued instructions from Kyonghun at 8:15 on the 31st via K. Sato: "It is our intention that Changkufeng and the high ground northwest of Shachaofeng be secured, as well as the high ground south of Shachaofeng if possible. Enemy attacks are to be met at our positions, but you are not to pursue far." Second, Colonel Tanaka was instructed not to fire as long as Russian artillery did not bombard friendly forces. "Except for preparing against counterassaults, your actions will be cautious. In particular, harassing fire against inhabited places and residents is prohibited." Suetaka was finally armed with formal authority, received at 22:05 on 1 August. He did not delay in implementing it. At 23:00 he ordered the immediate rail movement of strong reinforcements: the alerted infantry brigade headquarters, as well as four infantry battalions and the remaining mountain artillery battalion. Thus, Suetaka could deploy forward not only the forces he had requested but also a brigade-level organization to assume control of the now sizeable combat elements massed at the front for "maneuvers." Earlier that afternoon he had already moved his division's message center forward to the Matsu'otsuho heights at the Tumen, and he regularly posted at least one staff officer there so that the center could function as the division's combat headquarters. An additional matter of explosive potential was built into the divisional order: provision of Japanese Air Force cover for rail movements forward, although use of aircraft had been prohibited by all higher headquarters; Nakamura intended only ground cover. At the front, Japanese units spent most of their time consolidating their hard-won positions. By 3 on 1 August, a column of Soviet forces with vehicles was observed moving from the east side of Khasan. Late in the day, the division received an extremely important telegram from the 2nd (Intelligence) Section of the Kwantung Army: "According to a special espionage report from our OSS in Khabarovsk city, Red Army authorities there have decided to retake the high ground along Changkufeng." From other intelligence, the Kwantung Army concluded that the Russians were rebuilding in the Novokievsk region. Frequent movements observed immediately to the rear of the Soviet battle zone caused K. Sato to grow apprehensive about a dawn counterattack on the 1st, and he reinforced Changkufeng with the 6th Company. The second of August was marked by continuation of Soviet air attacks and the anticipated Russian counteroffensive. According to Japanese intelligence, Marshal Blyukher had arrived in Khabarovsk, and Lieutenant General Sokolov was in Voroshilov. An offensive buildup, estimated at about 3,000 men plus tanks and guns, was reported in the Kozando area by evening on the 1st. Hirahara, commanding the battalion at Changkufeng, grew concerned about Hill 52. With day's end approaching, he reinforced the defenses further and ordered the battalion medical officer to establish a dressing station at Fangchuanting. Around 15:00 Soviet artillery began firing at forward areas, especially gun positions; the bombardments were described as severe. Japanese artillery sought to conserve ammunition, firing only at worthwhile, short-range targets. Main Russian ground actions focused on the far-right (Hill 52) and far-left (Shachaofeng) sectors, not Changkufeng. In line with Hirahara's orders, two infantry companies and four heavy machine guns were moved by 8:00 from Changkufeng to the heights 800 meters southeast. Soviet heavy artillery pounded the zone between Fangchuanting and Hill 52; observing the enemy became difficult. Russian planes engaged at 9:00 fighters, then bombers, to soften defenses and gun positions. Meanwhile, the Soviets deployed firepower southeast of Khasan, while two infantry battalions and more than ten tanks advanced through the pines on the western slopes. Japanese regimental guns and two machine-gun platoons at Hill 52 attacked the enemy heavy machine guns and neutralized them. By 10:00 the Russians had advanced with heavy weapons to the high ground 800 meters from Hill 52. From Changkufeng, the battalion guns engaged heavy weapons. Hirahara moved with the engineers and battalion guns to the heights to which he had transferred reinforcements earlier, took command, and prepared an assault. Initially, Soviet troops advanced in formation, but after cresting a dip, they dispersed and moved onto the high ground opposite Hill 52. Heavily armed, they drew within 700 meters, with artillery and heavy machine guns providing coverage. By 10:00 Sato requested Shiozawa's mountain guns across the Tumen to unleash a barrage against Hill 52's front. For about half an hour, the battery fired. By 10:30, the Soviet advance grew listless. Believing the moment ripe, Hirahara deployed his men to charge the foe's right wing, ordering rapid movement with caution against eastern flank fire. On the heights north of Hill 52, Inagaki watched the struggle; with the telephone out and the situation urgent, he brought up firepower on his own initiative. Taking the main body of the 1st Machine Gun Company, along with the battalion guns, he moved out at noon, making contact with the 10th Company on Hill 52 around 14:00, where the Japanese machine guns and battalion guns joined the fray. The Russians, losing momentum, were checked by Japanese heavy weapons and by mountain guns from Hill 82. Hirahara's main battalion advanced onto the high ground north of Hill 52 around noon. By 15:00, two enemy companies began to fall back, climbing the western slopes of Hill 29 as the main forces retreated piecemeal to a dip. By 16:00, Suetaka observed that his units were continuing to secure their positions and were "gradually breaking the hostile intention." Despite heat and rain, front-line troops showed fatigue but remained vigilant. Between 11:00 and 16;00, Sato inspected the lines and directed defensive positions, particularly at Hill 52. After a poor initial performance, the Russians awaited reinforcements before attempting another assault on Hill 52. They moved up a mechanized corps, and by 15:00 50 tanks massed east of Maanshan. Around 17:00, the Russians began moving south along the high ground across Khasan. Another two Soviet battalions advanced along the Tumen hills, led by armor. Hirahara anticipated an assault at twilight, especially after 18:00, when nine bombers struck Hill 52. Earlier, Takeshita had received reports from the antitank commander, Lieutenant Saito, that at 17:00 several enemy tanks and three infantry battalions were advancing from Hill 29. Convinced of an imminent Soviet strike, Takeshita ordered the defense to conceal its efforts and to annihilate the foe with point-blank fire and hand-to-hand fighting. He sought to instill confidence that hostile infantry could not reach the positions. Before 19:00, the enemy battalions came within effective range, and Japan opened with all available firepower. Rapid-fire antitank guns set the lead tank alight; the remaining tanks were stopped. Support came from Hisatsune's regimental guns and two antitank gun squads atop Changkufeng. The Russian advance was checked. By nightfall, Soviet elements had displaced heavy weapons about 400 meters from Japanese positions. As early as 16:00, Suetaka ordered a mountain artillery squad to cross the river. Sato told Takeshita at 7:30 that there would be a night attack against Hill 52. Takeshita was to annihilate the foe after allowing them to close to 40–50 meters. The Russians did mount a night assault and pressed close between 8 and 9 p.m. with three battalions led by four tanks. The main force targeted Takeshita; all ten Russian heavy machine guns engaged that side. Japanese machine guns and battalion guns joined the fray. The Russians pressed within 30 meters, shouted "Hurrah! Hurrah!" and hurled grenades before advancing a further 15 meters. The Japanese repelled the first waves with grenades and emplaced weapons, leaving light machine guns and grenade dischargers forward. Soviet illuminating shells were fired to enable closer approaches within 100 meters. Japanese grenade-discharger fire blasted the forces massed in the dead space before the works. While the Hill 52 night attack collapsed, other Russian units, smaller in strength and with one tank leading, moved against the hill on the left that the Japanese had not yet occupied that morning. The Russians advanced along the Khasan slope north of Hill 52, came within point-blank range, and shouted but did not charge. By 22:00, the Japanese, supported by machine guns, had checked the foe. Thereupon, the 6th Company, now under a platoon leader, Narusawa, launched a counterattack along the lake. "The enemy was bewildered and became dislocated. Buddies were heard shouting to one another, and some could be seen hauling away their dead." The Soviet troops held back 300–400 meters and began to dig in. Sato decided artillery should sweep the zone in front of Hill 52. At 21:30, he requested support, but the mountain guns could not open fire. Still, by 23:00, not a shadow of an enemy soldier remained on the Hill 52 front, where the Japanese spent the night on alert. In the northern sector, eight Russian tanks crossed the Japanese-claimed border at 5:25 on 2 August and moved south to a position northwest of Shachaofeng. Around 7 Russian artillery opened fire to "prepare" the Japanese while a dozen heavy bombers attacked. An hour later, the ground offensive began in earnest, with one and a half to two infantry battalions, a dozen machine guns, and several tanks. Supporting Takenouchi's left wing were several batteries of mountain artillery and two heavy batteries. Well-planned counterfire stopped the offensive. There was little change north of Shachaofeng and in the southeast, where Kanda's company held its positions against attack. On Takenouchi's front, Akaishizawa notes 120-degree daytime heat and nighttime chill. Men endured damp clothes and mosquitoes. To keep warm at night, soldiers moved about; during the day they sought shade and camouflage with twigs and weeds. No defense existed against cold night rain. Nocturnal vigilance required napping by day when possible, but the intense sun drained strength. For three days, Imagawa's company had only wild berries and dirty river water to eat. At 6:00 on 2 August, Colonel Tanaka exhorted his artillery to "exalt maximum annihilation power at close range, engage confirmed targets, and display firepower that is sniperlike—precise, concentrated, and as swift as a hurricane." Tanaka devised interdiction sectors for day and night attacks. At 10:30, the artillery laid down severe fire and eventually caused the enemy assault to wither. Around 24:40, Rokutanda's battalion detected a Russian battalion of towed artillery moving into positions at the skirt of Maanshan. When the first shells hit near the vanguard, a commander on horseback fled; the rest dispersed, abandoning at least eight artillery wagons and ten vehicles. Suetaka, observing from the Kucheng BGU, picked up the phone and commended the 3rd Battalion. Japanese casualties on 2 August were relatively light: ten men killed and 15 wounded. Among the killed, the 75th Infantry lost seven, the 76th Infantry two, and the engineers one. Among the wounded, the 75th suffered nine and the 76th six. Infantry ammunition was expended at an even higher rate than on 30–31 July. In Hirahara's battalion area, small arms, machine guns, ammunition, helmets, knapsacks, and gas masks were captured. A considerable portion of the seized materiel was employed in subsequent combat, as in the case of an antitank gun and ammunition captured on 31 July. Soviet casualties to date were estimated at 200–250, including 70 abandoned corpses. Twelve enemy tanks had been captured, and five more knocked out on 1–2 August; several dozen heavy bombers and about 5,000 Soviet ground troops were involved in the concerted offensives. Nevertheless, reports of an imminent Soviet night attack against Hill 52 on 2–3 August alarmed Suetaka as much as his subordinates. Shortly after 20:00 accompanied by his intelligence officer, Suetaka set out for the hill, resolved to direct operations himself. Somewhat earlier, the division had sent Korea Army Headquarters a message, received by 18:30, reflecting Suetaka's current outlook: 30 to 40 Soviet planes had been bombing all sectors since morning, but losses were negligible and morale was high. The division had brought up additional elements in accord with army orders, and was continuing to strive for nonenlargement, but was "prepared firmly to reject the enemy's large-scale attacks." Impressed by the severity of the artillery and small-arms fire, Suetaka deemed it imperative "quickly to mete out a decisive counterassault and thus hasten the solution of the incident." But Japanese lines were thinly held and counterattacks required fresh strength. This state of affairs caused Suetaka to consider immediate commitment of the reinforcements moving to the front, although the Korea Army had insisted on prior permission before additional troops might cross the Tumen. Suetaka's customary and unsurprising solution was again to rely on his initiative and authorize commitment of every reinforcement unit. Nearest was T. Sato's 73rd Regiment, which had been ordered the night before to move up from Nanam. Under the cover of two Japanese fighters, these troops had alighted from the train the next morning at Seikaku, where they awaited orders eagerly. K. Sato was receiving reports about the enemy buildup. At 20:10 orders were given to the 73rd Regiment to proceed at once to the Matsu'otsuho crossing and be prepared to support the 75th. Involved were T. Sato's two battalions, half of the total infantry reinforcements. Suetaka had something else in mind: his trump, Okido's 76th Infantry. At 23:40 he ordered this regiment, coming up behind the 73rd, to proceed to Huichungyuan on the Manchurian side of the Tumen, via Kyonghun, intercept the enemy, and be ready to go over to the offensive. On the basis of the information that the division planned to employ Okido's regiment for an enveloping attack, K. Sato quickly worked out details. He would conceal the presence of the reinforcements expected momentarily from the 73rd Regiment and would move Senda's BGU and Shimomura's battalion to Huichungyuan to cover the advance of the 76th Regiment and come under the latter's control. Japanese forces faced the danger of Soviet actions against Changkufeng from the Shachaofeng front after midnight on 2 August. Takenouchi had been ready to strike when he learned that the enemy had launched an attack at 01:00 against one of his own companies, Matsunobe's southwest of Shachaofeng. Therefore, Takenouchi's main unit went to drive off the attackers, returning to its positions at 02:30. The Russians tried again, starting from 04:00 on 03 August. Strong elements came as close as 300 meters; near 05:00 Soviet artillery and heavy weapons fire had grown hot, and nine enemy fighters made ineffective strafing passes. By 06:30 the Russians seemed thwarted completely. Hill 52 was pummeled during the three battles on 2 August. Taking advantage of night, the Russians had been regrouping; east of the hill, heavy machine guns were set up on the ridgeline 500 meters away. From 05:00 on 03 August, the Russians opened up with heavy weapons. Led by three tanks, 50 or 60 infantrymen then attacked from the direction of Hill 29 and reached a line 700–800 meters from the Japanese defenses. Here the Russian soldiers peppered away, but one of their tanks was set ablaze by gunfire and the other two were damaged and fled into a dip. Kamimori's mountain artillery reinforcements reached Nanpozan by 07:15 on 03 August. Tanaka issued an order directing the battalion to check the zone east of Hill 52 as well as to engage artillery across Khasan. A site for the supply unit was to be selected beyond enemy artillery range; on the day before, Russian shells had hit the supply unit of the 3rd Mountain Artillery Battalion, killing two men and 20 horses. The exposed force was ordered to take cover behind Crestline 1,000 meters to the rear. After 09:00 on 03 August, the artillery went into action and Japanese morale was enhanced. Near 09:00, Soviet bombardment grew pronounced, accompanied by bomber strikes. The Japanese front-line infantry responded with intensive fire, supported by mountain pieces and the regimental guns atop Changkufeng. Enemy forces stayed behind their heavy weapons and moved no further, while their casualties mounted. At 11:00 the Russians began to fall back, leaving only machine guns and snipers. One reason the Soviets had been frustrated since early morning was that K. Sato had seen the urgency of closing the gap midway between Changkufeng and Hill 52 (a site called Scattered Pines) and had shifted the 2nd Company from Changkufeng. Between 06:00 and 07:40, the company fired on Soviet troops which had advanced north of Hill 52, and inflicted considerable casualties. A corporal commanding a grenade launcher was cited posthumously for leading an assault which caused the destruction of three heavy machine guns. In the afternoon, the Japanese sustained two shellings and a bomber raid. Otherwise, the battlefield was quiet, since Russian troops had pulled back toward Hill 29 by 15:00 under cover of heavy weapons and artillery. At Hill 52, however, defense posed a problem, for each barrage smashed positions and trenches. During intervals between bombardments and air strikes, the men struggled to repair and reinforce the facilities. Changkufeng was again not attacked by ground troops during the day but was hit by planes and artillery. Trifling support was rendered by the mountain gun which had been moved to the Manchurian side of the Tumen. Japanese infantry reinforcements were on the way. By 23:00 on 02 August, T. Sato had left Shikai. His 73rd Regiment pushed forward along roads so sodden that the units had to dismantle the heavy weapons for hauling. The rate of advance was little more than one kilometer per hour, but finally, at 05:20 on 03 August, he reached Chiangchunfeng with the bulk of two battalions. The esprit of the other front-line troops "soared." K. Sato, who was commanding all forces across the Tumen pending Morimoto's setting up of headquarters for the 37th Brigade, had T. Sato take over the line to the left of Changkufeng, employing Takenouchi's old unit and the 73rd Regiment to cover Shachaofeng. T. Sato set out with his battalions at 06:00 amid heavy rain. By 07:30, under severe fire, he was in position to command the new left sector. According to division orders to Morimoto, this zone was to include the heights south and northwest of Shachaofeng, but, in the case of the former, it was "permissible to pull back and occupy high ground west of the heights south of Shachaofeng." T. Sato contemplated using his regiment to encircle the foe on the north side of the lake, while Okido's 76th Infantry formed the other prong. Most of the day afterward, Soviet artillery was active; the Japanese responded with barrages of their own. Eventually, from 15:30, the entire enemy front-line force in this sector began falling back under violent covering fire. Morimoto's initial operations order, received at 18:00, advised T. Sato officially that he was coming under command of the 37th Brigade. The night of 03–04 August passed with the units uneasy, striving to conduct security and reconnaissance while working on the battered defenses. Total Japanese casualties on 3 August were light again: six men killed and ten wounded, four of the dead and seven of the wounded being suffered by the 75th Infantry, the rest by Takenouchi's battalion. Ammunition was expended at a lower rate than on the preceding day. The Japanese War Ministry reported no significant change since nightfall on 03 August. Thereafter, the battlefield seemed to return to quiescence; Japanese morale was high. In the press abroad, Changkufeng attracted overriding attention. The world was no longer talking of "border affrays." Three-column headlines on page 1 of the New York Times announced: "Soviet Hurls Six Divisions and 30 Tanks into Battle with Japanese on Border, 2 Claims Conflict, Tokyo Reports Victory in Manchukuo and Foes' Big Losses, Moscow Asserts It Won." The startling claim that six Soviet divisions were in action seemed to have been supplied for external consumption by Hsinking as well as Seoul. According to Nakamura Bin, the Russians employed 4,000 to 5,000 men supported by 230 tanks. Although Japanese casualties were moderate, Soviet artillery bombardment had stripped the hills of their lush summer grass. According to the uninformed foreign press, "the meager information showed both sides were heavily armed with the most modern equipment. The Russians were using small, fast tanks and the Japanese apparently were forewarned of this type of weapon and were well supplied with batteries of armor-piercing antitank guns." On 03 August the Russians lost 200 men, 15 tanks, and 25 light artillery pieces. One feature of the fighting was Japanese use of "thousands of flares" to expose fog-shrouded enemy ranks during a Soviet night attack. During the "first phase counteroffensive" by the Russians on 2–3 August, the 75th Regiment judged that the enemy's choice of opportunities for attacking was "senseless"; once they started, they continued until an annihilating blow was dealt. "We did not observe truly severe attacking capacity, such as lightning breakthroughs." With respect to tactical methods, the Japanese noted that Soviet offensive deployment was characterized by depth, which facilitated piecemeal destruction. When Russian advance elements suffered losses, replacements were moved up gradually. Soviet artillery fired without linkage to the front-line troops, nor was there liaison between the ground attacks staged in the Shachaofeng and Hill 52 sectors. Since enemy troops fought entirely on their own, they could be driven off in one swoop. Additionally, although 20–30 Russian tanks appeared during the counterattacks, their cooperation with the infantry was clumsy, and the armor was stopped. Soviet use of artillery in mobile warfare was "poorness personified." "Our troops never felt the least concern about hostile artillery forces, which were quite numerous. Even privates scoffed at the incapability of Russian artillery." It seemed that "those enemies who had lost their fighting spirit had the habit of fleeing far." During the combat between 31 July and 03 August, the defeated Russians appeared to fear pursuit and dashed all the way back to Kozando, "although we did not advance even a step beyond the boundary." On 4 August Suetaka prepared a secret evaluation: the enemy attacks by day and night on 2 August were conducted by front-line corps built around the 40th Rifle Division. "In view of the failure of those assaults, the foe is bound to carry out a more purposeful offensive effort, using newly arrived corps reinforcements." Russian actions on 02 August had been the most serious and persistent offensive efforts undertaken since the outset of the incident, but they were about the last by the front-line corps whose immediate jurisdiction lay in the region of the incident. Consequently, the enemy's loss of morale as a result of their defeat on 30–31 July, combined with their lack of unity in attack power, caused the attacks to end in failure. "We must be prepared for the fact that enemy forces will now mount a unified and deliberate offensive, avoiding rash attacks in view of their previous reversal, since large new corps are coming up." I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In the shadowed night, Japan's Sato chose Nakano's 75th to seize a peak, sending five captains and a rising Nakajima into darkness. At 2:15 a.m., they breached wires and climbed the slope; dawn lit a hard-won crest, then Hill 52 and Shachaofeng yielded to resolve and fire. The day wore on with brutal artillery, fluttering bombers, and relentless clashes. By August's edge, casualties mounted on both sides, yet Japanese regiments held fast, repelling night assaults with grit.

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Nakano Broadway: Il Labirinto del Collezionismo

Giappone nel mondo

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 20, 2025 14:36

SCUSATE PER MOTIVI TECNICI HO RICARICATO LA PUNTATAla versione uscita ieri era stata corrotta. grazie per la comprension eEsploriamo Nakano Broadway, l'edificio che ha ridefinito il concetto di collezionismo in Giappone. Dalle sue radici nell'architettura metabolista degli anni '60 ai segreti nascosti tra i suoi tredici piani, scopriamo come è nato l'impero di Mandarake. Analizziamo la differenza tra la moderna cultura otaku di Akihabara e il fascino vintage di questo labirinto urbano unico al mondo. Un viaggio tra manga d'epoca, orologi rari e atmosfere della Tokyo che fu.Ascoltaci sul tuo lettore di podcast - Giappone nel mondo - Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/0sQVMNeMTKFivcSJkEsIr4 Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/it/podcast/giappone-nel-mondo/id1481765190?l=en-GB YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/@giapponenelmondo YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/@plot-twister Instagram GnM: https://www.instagram.com/giapponenelmondo/ Instagram PlotTwister: https://www.instagram.com/plottwistertv/#podcast #giappone #italia #cultura #storia #nakanobroadway #mandarake #metabolismo #tokyovintage #mangacollection #gekiga #showaera #visitjapan #otakuculture #storiadelgiappone #podcastitaliani #youtubeitalia #viaggioingiappone #esplorazione #giapponenelmondo

spotify broadway tokyo dalle giappone analizziamo akihabara labirinto nakano ascoltaci collezionismo mandarake

3.180 Fall and Rise of China: A premature Japanese Victory over Changkufeng

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 15, 2025 35:46

Last time we spoke about the battle over Changfukeng Hill. In the frost-bit dawn by the Chaun and Tumen, two empires faced a cliff of fate: Soviet and Japanese, each convinced that Changkufeng belonged to them. Diplomats urged restraint, yet Tokyo's generals brewed a daring plan, strike at night, seize the crest, then bargain. Sato and Suetaka debated risk and restraint, weighing "dokudan senko" against disciplined action as rain hissed on the ground. Night fell like velvet. Nakano, a quiet, meticulous regimental leader, gathered the 75th Regiment's veterans, choosing five fearless captains and a rising star, Nakajima, to carry the charge. Scouts and engineers moved ahead, weaving a fragile path across the Tumen: wire-cutters in the dark, signals humming softly, and the thunder of distant Soviet tanks rolling along the shore. At 02:15, after breaches breached and silent men slid through wire, the Japanese surged up the slopes with bayonets glinting, swords ready, and nerves as taut as steel. The crest lunged with savage resistance: grenades flashed, machine guns roared, and leaders fell. By 05:15, dawn broke, and the hill, Course of blood and courage, stood in Japanese hands. #180 A premature Japanese Victory over Changkufeng Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. On 31 July 1938, dawn seemed to indicate Changkufeng Hill was in Japanese hands. From his command post, Colonel Sato Kotoku, his regimental staff, and most of Hirahara's 3rd Battalion had been anxiously watching the progress of the 1st Battalion's operations since 12:30 on 31 July. Around 03:00, the Japanese infantry commanders issued "heroic orders to charge," audible above the withering fire. Sato expected the crest to fall in little more than an hour; when no signal shell burst over the hill, he grew apprehensive, praying for success with his heart breaking. A mile away on Hill 52, the troops could discern no voices, only gunfire and the spectacular glow of flares and tracers. As one soldier recalled "It was like fireflies," another soldier added "it was like a carnival". To Sasai, on the heights at Kucheng, it was, as he put it, "c'était un grand spectacle." By the way I think its one of the only times I've read a Japanese soldier using French, what he said translates to "it was a large spectacle", I am from Quebec so I speak baguette. The mist moved up Changkufeng Hill, and Japanese troops followed it, fighting for hours. Fearing Nakano's battalion might have been wiped out, Sato's staff prayed for fog. Sato later admitted, "By dawn we were failing to take our objectives." At the base of Chiangchunfeng, Sato held the 6th Company in reserve, ready to attack Changkufeng from the left. He would have preferred not to commit it, given the danger of an accidental fire-fight with friendly forces. Nevertheless, as combat intensified, Sato decided to push the company into support of the 1st Battalion. After orders at 03:15, Ito moved toward the northwest side of Changkufeng. The Russians laid down heavy fire, especially from a well-placed machine-gun position on the far left. Ito's company, suffering heavy and needlessly casualties, had to hold near the middle of the slope. A runner was sent to the regimental command post requesting artillery support after dawn. By 04:30, Sato could discern the Changkufeng crest, where fierce close-quarters fighting raged between Japanese and Russians on the south edge, while the enemy continually sent reinforcements, troops followed by tanks, up the northern slope. Ito's company was visible on the western slope, bravely bearing a Japanese flag. 10-15 minutes later, grenade-discharger fire began to blast the Soviet positions. At 04:40, Ito, redeploying at dawn, observed elements of the 1st Company near the hill's summit. Contact was established with Inagaki's men. The Russians began to show signs of disarray under the grenade dischargers and the heavy weapons deployed by the reserve battalion at Chiangchunfeng. Thereupon Ito's company charged as well, capturing the northwest corner of Changkufeng roughly concurrently with the main body of the 1st Battalion under Sakata. Ito was wounded and evacuated; two sergeants were later cited in dispatches. Meanwhile, the 10th Company, led by Takeshita of the 3rd Battalion, was to conduct a separate night assault against fire points around Hill 24, about 1,000 meters north of Changkufeng. The aim was to disrupt Russian withdrawal along the slopes to the rear and to hinder reinforcements. At midnight, the company left the skirts of Chiangchunfeng in fog and darkness. Moving stealthily over the undulating terrain, they faced knee-deep bogs and tall vegetation. After evading sentries, they penetrated behind the enemy. By 02:00, five teams totaling 16 men under Sergeant Uchibori were ready to strike Hill 24. Takeshita led the charge from the right and overran the defenders by 02:20. The Russians, numbering 20 to 30 riflemen with one machine gun, fled toward Khasan, leaving four soldiers behind whom the Japanese bayoneted. Takeshita's company continued to consolidate Hill 24, awaiting counterattacks, which soon followed. At 04:00, eight tanks, with headlights on, launched an attack from the Shachaofeng sector, supported by an infantry company . Takeshita reinforced Uchibori's unit with assault teams; the Russian infantry were routed, and five tanks were knocked out. At dawn, about 100 Soviet troops were observed retreating from the direction of Changkufeng, surprised and mowed down by heavy and light machine guns at ranges of about 300 meters. At 06:30, the Soviets attacked again with an infantry battalion and a machine-gun company from north of Khasan. The Japanese allowed them to close, then concentrated the firepower of both infantry platoons plus heavy machine guns. After a 30-minute firefight with heavy casualties on the Soviet side, the Russians fell back. Again, at 07:10, the Soviets struck from the north of Khasan, this time with one company and five tanks. Russian infantry, supported by three tanks, pushed in front of the Japanese positions, but machine-gun and small-arms fire forced them to retreat eastward, the tanks being stopped 50 meters from the lines. Meanwhile, two Japanese enlisted men on patrol near the lake encountered armor; they attacked and, after taking casualties, returned with captured ammunition and equipment. One rapid-fire piece had been providing covering fire behind Takeshita's unit and opened fire on three tanks attacking north of Changkufeng, helping to stop them. As daybreak arrived, Takeshita's company cleared the battlefield, retrieved casualties, and reinforced the defenses. Then an order from the regiment transferred the main body to Changkufeng. Leaving one platoon at Hill 24, Takeshita came directly under Hirahara's command. Takeshita was later officially cited by the regiment. If Hill 52 fell, Changkufeng would be lost. The Russians understood the importance of this constricted sector as well. Their armor could swing south of Khasan, while the terrain to the north was boggier and could be made impassable by the field-artillery battery emplaced on the Korean side of the Tumen. To check hostile reinforcements into this vital region, Sato had dispatched an infantry element to Hill 52 early. Northward, he had 1st Lieutenant Hisatsune emplacement the two 75-millimeter mountain pieces belonging to his infantry gun battery, together with two of 2nd Lieutenant Saito's three 20-millimeter anti-tank guns and the two 37-millimeter infantry rapid-fire guns belonging to 2nd Lieutenant Kutsukake's battalion gun battery. At 23:00 on 30 July, in accord with Nakano's orders, Hisatsune moved these six guns to the ridgeline between Changkufeng and Hill 52. Apart from the guns to the left, defense of Hill 52 was entrusted to the experienced Master Sergeant Murakoshi Kimio, 2nd Platoon leader in Nakajima's company. After the Shachaofeng affair, Murakoshi was ordered to occupy the hill. Moving along the shore on 30 July, his unit encountered neither friendly nor hostile troops. The regimental records note that "some enemy unit came into the dip east of Hill 52 since morning on the 30th, and both sides were watching each other." Murakoshi deployed his three rifle squads, totaling 34 men. After Nakano's battalion jumped off on 31 July, the platoon observed not only the "fireworks display" but also Soviet motorized units with lights aglow, moving on high ground east of Khasan. Later, tanks could be heard clanking toward Hill 52. Around 04:00, Murakoshi organized anti-tank teams and sent them into action. Most accounts emphasize the anti-tank efforts, rather than the fire of Murakoshi's machine gunners. Three privates, carrying anti-tank mines, undertook daring assaults once the terrain obliged the Russian tanks to slow. They laid their mines, but the soil proved too soft, and the attempt failed. In the most publicized episode, Private First Class Matsuo, nicknamed a "human bullet," was badly wounded by machine-gun fire from a tank and knocked from the vehicle, but he managed to reboard with a satchel charge and, it is said, stop the tank at the cost of his life. The platoon leader and his remaining 20 men, having withdrawn 200 meters below their positions, poured torrents of fire at the infantry accompanying the tanks. Flames from the antitank mine assaults provided blazing targets. In concert with Hisatsune's six infantry guns emplaced on the Crestline southeast of Changkufeng, Murakoshi knocked out the remaining two tanks. When the tanks were immobilized, the Soviet troops did not press forward; exposed to Japanese fire, their losses mounted. By daybreak, the Russians had pulled back. Official records describe one Soviet company with four heavy machine guns, led by mounted officers. After hours of intense combat, Colonel Sato and his staff observed that all operations were succeeding by dawn. It was fortunate that Japanese units had posed a threat from the east; only then did the Russians begin to retreat. "But what an incomparably heroic first combat it had been… the scene at Changkufeng was sublime and inspiring. Private feelings were forgotten, and all bowed their heads in respect for the gallant fighting by matchless subordinates." As soon as Sato confirmed that Changkufeng had been occupied, he sent an aide to assess casualties. "When the colonel learned about the death of his capable and dependable officers," a lieutenant recalled, "he… murmured, 'Is that so?' and closed his eyes. The dew glistened on his lids." Meanwhile, in addition to the battle of annihilation at Changkufeng, Major Takenouchi of Okido's regiment was to conduct the dawn assault in the Shachaofeng area. His 1st Battalion and attached elements numbered 379 men; Kanda's company of the Kucheng Border Guard Unit added another 49. An engineer platoon was attached. At 18:00 on 30 July, Takenouchi issued his orders. According to that evening's regimental maps, north of Khasan were two battalions of Soviet infantry and 20 tanks. South of Shachaofeng, the Russians had entanglements and machine-gun nests, with additional emplacements to the rear, west of the lake, and armor moving south toward Changkufeng. Northwest of Shachaofeng lay the main body of Takenouchi's battalion. Signal lines connected his headquarters with Sato's command post. The only Soviet patrol activity noted, as of evening, was in the direction of Matsunobe. Around 02:00, machine guns chattered south of Changkufeng, signaling an increasing intensity of Sato's night assault. On Takenouchi's front, the Russians went on alert, firing illuminating shells and opening fire from the north side of Changkufeng. At 02:30, Matsunobe's unit finished breakfast and moved to the jump-off site. The terrain was difficult and there was considerable enemy tracer fire, but, thanks to effective reconnaissance, the force reached its destination without loss by 04:00. Matsunobe eliminated an outpost unit using rear-area scouts who struck from the rear and gave the enemy little opportunity to respond. Then the Japanese prepared for the main attack as they awaited daybreak. At 04:00, the supporting mountain artillery platoon took position between Matsunobe and Takenouchi. Throughout this period, the sounds of fighting grew more violent toward Changkufeng; machine guns were especially active. At 05:00, three enemy tanks could be seen moving up the northern slope of Changkufeng, but soon after news arrived that friendly forces had seized the crest. With sunrise imminent, the Japanese guns assumed their role. The longest-range support Takenouchi could expect was Narukawa's two 15-centimeter howitzers, emplaced across the Tumen north of Sozan. This battery took position at 04:20, after which the commander went to join Sato just behind the front. Several thousand meters of telephone line had been strung across the river, linking observation post and battery. Narukawa watched the fierce struggle at Changkufeng and prepared to support the dawn assault, while honoring the desperate effort of Ito's company for covering fire. Firing began at 05:10, though range data were not adequate. After little more than ten rounds, the enemy heavy machine guns on the Shachaofeng front subsided. A veteran artilleryman proudly remarked, "These were the first howitzer shells ever fired against the Soviet Army." At 05:20, Takenouchi's own heavy weapons added effective counterfire. Matsunobe and his company had crept to a line 150 meters in front of the Russian positions, taking advantage of dead angles and covered by light machine guns. Three Soviet tanks, however, had pressed forward against the main body. Two Private First Class soldiers, members of a close-quarters team, waited until the lead tank reversed course, then dashed in from the rear and blew it up. Two other soldiers attacked the third tank with mines but could not destroy it because of the tall grass. In a dramatic action that always thrilled Japanese audiences, a Private First Class jumped aboard with a portable mine, while a superior private jammed explosives into the tank's rear and allegedly blew off both treads, though the tank continued firing. While Matsunobe's company laid a smoke screen and prepared to charge, the Soviet tank was knocked out by rapid-fire guns. Master Sergeant Sudo's platoon seized the opportunity to race forward 15 meters and overrun two firing points at 05:40. When the Russians counterattacked with 60 infantrymen and three new tanks, Matsunobe ordered the grenade-discharger squad to fire while he had Sudo pull back to the foot of the hill. Close-quarter teams knocked out the tanks in succession. By this time the Russians had been shaken badly, allowing Matsunobe's main force to surge into two more positions. Five or six remaining Soviet soldiers were wiped out by a combination of Japanese pursuit fire and Soviet gunfire emanating from east of Khasan. After 06:00, the Japanese held the high ground at Shachaofeng. Kanda's unit had achieved a similar result, swinging around Matsunobe and skirting the left of the Soviet positions. Russian artillery opened from the east, but the Japanese used the terrain to advantage and suffered no casualties. Around this time, enemy forces in the Changkufeng area began to retreat, a portion by motor vehicle. Takenouchi had Matsunobe secure the site and, at 06:13, directed the main battalion to advance toward the north side of Khasan. A stubborn four-hour battle then ensued as Soviet forces delayed their retreat and the covering unit occupied the northern edge of the lake. Takenouchi estimated the enemy's strength at two infantry companies, a company of 12 heavy machine guns, and one heavy battery. Several Russian counterattacks were mounted against Matsunobe, while Takenouchi reinforced Kanda. The battalion attacked with great intensity and by 10:30 had managed to encircle the right flank of the enemy defenses at the northwest edge of Khasan. The Russians began to fall back, though one company of infantry resisted vigorously. At 10:50, the Soviet rear-guard company opened fire with machine guns while several tanks delivered heavy machine-gun and cannon fire. Soviet artillery, firing rapidly, also joined the resistance to Takenouchi's advance. Firepower pinned down the Japanese in this sector from late morning until nightfall. For reasons of necessity as well as doctrine, the night assault on Changkufeng Hill received no artillery support. The dawn assault to clear Shachaofeng, however, required all available firepower, even if limited. Firing diagrams reflect no howitzer fire directed north of Changkufeng; this is understandable since Narukawa had only two pieces to handle numerous targets. A Soviet tank element was driven off, west of the lake, by 03:00 from the skirt of Chiangchunfeng by 3rd Battalion heavy weapons. Sasai, at the Kucheng command post, contends that Japanese artillery scored a significant success: school-tactics were followed, and the battery stood ready in case the night assault by the infantry failed. By dawn, Russian remnants clung to the crest, though the infantry had "peeled the skin" from their defenses. "In the morning, one of our howitzer shells hit near Changkufeng, whereupon the last of the enemy fled." Survivors of the night assault recalled no direct artillery support by Japanese artillery, though firing charts suggest some; Soviet sources dispute this. Regimental records note: "After firing against positions southwest of Shachaofeng, the Narukawa battery fired to cut off the enemy's retreat path from Shachaofeng and to neutralize the foe's superior artillery. Results were great." In the morning, Sato returned to Chiangchunfeng, observed the difficult anti-artillery combat by the Narukawa battery, and commended their performance. He watched howitzer fire disrupt Soviet artillery positions opposite Shachaofeng and estimated enemy strength at a battalion. Sato saw Russian horse-drawn artillery blasted from its sites and pulled back north of Khasan. Narukawa's first targets were positions and tanks south of Shachaofeng. Northeast of the lake, one battery of Russians headed north after dawn. In Narukawa's firing pattern, north of the lake, a Soviet motorized unit of more than ten vehicles withdrew in the afternoon. A new Russian artillery formation moving north of Khasan that afternoon received the heaviest fire from the howitzers. On that day Narukawa's two active pieces fired a total of 74 rounds. The only other Japanese artillery support for the infantry consisted of the half-battery of 75-millimeter mountain guns already forward. The platoon under 2nd Lieutenant Ikue moved west of Shachaofeng, starting from behind Kanda at 04:00, and bombarded Soviet positions to the northeast. Firing a lighter projectile than Narukawa's pieces, Ikue's men fired 162 shells and 37 shrapnel rounds at the Russians. Colonel Tanaka, the artillery regiment commander, reached the front during the night as battle's fury peaked from Changkufeng. Tanaka's mission was to take over Narukawa's battery and support infantry combat from dawn. Upon establishing his headquarters, Tanaka sent a liaison officer to the 75th Regiment. The 3rd Mountain Artillery Battalion completed unloading at Shikai Station in the night, and at 03:40, it entered emplacements on the north side of Nanpozan. Tanaka ordered Rokutanda to repel any enemy attacks that might be staged from Changkufeng and north of Yangkuanping. The battalion made good use of prior surveys and proved helpful in thwarting offensive attempts from the vicinity of Shachaofeng after daybreak. Rokutanda also coordinated with Narukawa to cut off the Soviet retreat route after enemy motorized and infantry forces began to fall back from Shachaofeng. At Changkufeng, once the last Russians had been routed, two hours of quiet settled over both sides. The Japanese busied themselves with cleaning up the field, retrieving casualties, and bearing the dead to the rear. The few Japanese historians who have worked with 75th Regiment records have argued with a dramatic passage describing dawn: "From 05:15, after the top had been secured by us, the fog began to drift in. At about 05:30 rain started to drench the whole area; therefore, enemy artillery had to stop firing. God's will." Sakata counters that no Russian artillery shelled the peak after his men had cleared it. Sato agrees; only in the afternoon did at least 20 Soviet guns, emplaced north of the lake, open fire at Changkufeng. At first, Russian shells fell harmlessly into a pond nearby; Sato recalls fish splashing out. Thereafter, Soviet gunners gradually corrected their aim, but the Japanese took cover behind rocks and sustained no casualties. Soviet shellfire may have begun at dawn but appeared to be directed mainly toward Shachaofeng, where Soviet defenders were not evicted until an hour after Changkufeng fell. Tanaka, however, argues that when he arrived at the front at 05:00, Russian artillery was firing on objectives west of the Tumen, and several shells struck his men and guns. Japanese firing charts show that Soviet guns initially bombarded Takenouchi's sector at Shachaofeng from two positions north and northeast of Khasan. After these Russian positions were forced to evacuate, the new Soviet gun unit that arrived in the afternoon engaged not only Changkufeng but also the area of the Japanese regimental headquarters. A Japanese military history suggests that Chiangchunfeng, the site of the observation post for the heavy field-artillery battery, was hit early in the morning, just after Takenouchi's ground assault against Shachaofeng had begun. The only other Russian artillery fire noted is the early-morning bombardment of the region of Hill 52. This shelling emanated from a point southeast of the lake but appeared directed primarily against Hisatsune's guns, which pulled back to Changkufeng at 06:00. Takeshita's company, which had jumped off at 02:00 and struck to the rear of Changkufeng toward the heights southwest of Shachaofeng, sustained severe enemy artillery fire after dawn. The main body secured the positions it had captured, while one platoon occupied Hill 24. On Takenouchi's front, intense enemy artillery fire continued after the Shachaofeng district was cleared, but the battalion maintained its position throughout the day. At 20:00, Takenouchi pulled back to the heights northwest of Shachaofeng. Elements of Matsunobe's unit on the right flank clung to advanced positions southeast of Shachaofeng. Regarding the theological allusion to merciful rain at dawn, no interviewee recalled a torrential downpour at Changkufeng. One soldier remembered descending from the crest at 08:30, taking breakfast, and returning for battlefield cleanup an hour later, at which time it began to drizzle. The 75th Regiment's weather record for Sunday, 31 July, simply states, "Cloudy; sunrise 05:08." At 06:40, Colonel Sato ordered Hirahara's 3rd Battalion to relieve Nakano's mauled 1st Battalion and Ito's company atop Changkufeng. The 1st Battalion was to become the regimental reserve force, assemble at Chiangchunfeng, and collect its dead and wounded. Shortly after 08:00, Hirahara arrived at the crest of Changkufeng. Sakata was still upright, blood-streaked. "It's all right now," Hirahara told him. "You can go down." Sakata limped away with the remnants of the 1st Battalion. At the command post he met Sato, who praised him, promised to replace his damaged sword with one of his own, and told him to head for the hospital. When he protested, Sato bellowed, more in pride than anger, "To the hospital with you!" Sakata went, leaving Kuriyama as acting company commander. That morning, Sato climbed Changkufeng and gave Hirahara instructions. He commended the heavy field artillery battery commander, Narukawa, for his effective support of Takenouchi's dawn attack at Shachaofeng. Before returning to his command post, Sato carefully supervised the collection of Japanese dead. He looked into the face of each man and bade him farewell, a regiment officer recalls. "His sincerity and sorrow inspired reverence in all of us." In the afternoon, Sato sent Oshima back to Haigan to report the victory to forces in the rear, to visit the families of the fallen, and to "exert a beneficial influence on the native inhabitants lest they become confused and upset by the recent fighting." After the Russians had been ousted from Changkufeng and Shachaofeng, information became available to Japanese headquarters concerning the extent of the victory and the price. The 75th Regiment put Soviet casualties at 300 men in each area and claimed a total of 17 tanks knocked out during the operations—seven at Changkufeng, three at Hill 52, seven at Shachaofeng. Assault infantrymen noted that few Soviet bodies were found in the crestline positions, other than those cut down by cold steel; many Russians were presumably wounded by grenades. Colonel Sato asserts that 30 Soviet corpses were picked up in the Changkufeng area after the night attack. Most Japanese survivors judge that Soviet casualties were at least double those incurred by their own forces. The Japanese used much of the materiel they had captured. The price had been grim in the assault units: 45 killed, 133 wounded. In both Colonel Nakano's and Colonel Takenouchi's battalions, about 25 percent of the officers and almost 10 percent of the men were killed or wounded. The main assault waves, chiefly the 1st and 2nd infantry companies and 1st Machine-Gun Company of Colonel Nakano's unit, suffered as many as one-half or two-thirds casualties, down to platoons and squads. Before the night attack, Colonel Nakano's battalion had a total of 401 men. The strength of Shimomura's battalion had diminished by only 17: Hirahara's by 10. Nakano's unit lost over 80 percent of all Japanese killed and wounded in the Changkufeng–Hill 52 sector. Japanese accounts were lavish in their praise of Colonel Sato's conception and execution of the night-dawn assaults. "Everybody had conducted several inspections of the front, yet only two or three individuals were acquainted with the precise sector where we carried out our assault." The costly lack of comprehensive intelligence necessitated reduction of firing points in succession and made the assault on the peak, the true key, possible only at the end. "This was a rather difficult method. It would have been better to have thrown one small unit against one firing point invariably and to have used the main force to break through the depth of the foe swiftly." On the larger benefits of the night operation, Akaishizawa wrote, "We prevented the main hostile forces, numbering several thousand troops concentrated east of Khasan about 600 or 700 meters behind Changkufeng, from laying a finger on us." Sato regards the night attack as a success: "The Soviets would have taken over the entire region unless checked." But with respect to Suetaka's words of praise for Sato himself, one candid division staff officer does not share what he calls "extravagant laudation." "The night-attack plan had been devised long in advance. I do not see anything particularly brilliant about it. Only in terms of results could one call the assault well done." Sakata concurs but stresses that training paid off: "All the men in my company followed their leaders to the crest and thus displayed their teamwork and unity," despite the unexpectedly severe casualties. The Soviets seemed particularly apprehensive about the possibility of Japanese armored operations. Antitank weapons were deployed on the eastern slopes of Changkufeng, ready to fire against the axis of Hill 52, which theoretically was good tank country. Illuminating shells and flares were employed profusely in concert with heavy machine guns firing blue tracers from the time Japanese troops entered the zone of wire defenses. Tanks supplemented the fire network, as did artillery zeroed in east of Khasan. But it was the grenades, in "heaps and mounds," that troubled the attackers most: "This tactic must be one of the most important aspects of Soviet infantry training, together with snipers. Our night assault unit did not sustain too many casualties until the crest but, since we could not run up into the positions, the foe was able to hurl many milk-bottle-size grenades. Our forces must be given more training with hand grenades". The first phone call to Seoul did not come until Changkufeng had been assaulted and cleared. Around 05:00 the division learned that victory had been achieved at Changkufeng; the first reports mentioned no Japanese casualties. "Thank God!" was the reaction. Suetaka and the major toasted Sato's victory with sake. "At 06:00, one company of the Sato unit occupied Shachaofeng and expelled the Soviet forces across the border." Not long afterward, the division, like the 75th Regiment, began to learn the extent of the casualties. Although personal sorrow displaced initial elation, there was grim satisfaction that the insolent Russians had been ousted and the dignity of the Imperial Army maintained. It was hoped and expected that the Korea Army would share this view. Seoul had learned of the Japanese assaults only after the fact and in a rather cursory fashion. Nakamura ordered the front-line units to secure the heights and to localize the affair by limiting the strength used in that area and by ensuring cautious action. Nakamura's orders to not expand upon the victory were criticized heavily. However Tsuchiya recalled "The decision was taken too easily. Perhaps some had covert opposition, but no one spoke up. I think there was some misunderstanding of individual positions. Yet the crisis should have been analyzed carefully. It is too bad that there was no direct supervision by the Chief of Staff." For Tsuchiya, the Korea Army would have been in trouble if the incident had dragged on because of Soviet buildup and Japanese casualties and low mobilization. Although Nakamura likely wished the 19th Division to abandon unnecessary actions regardless of victory or defeat, he did not seem to care; he showed no intention of inspecting the local scene. Yet Tsuchiya felt such a keen sense of responsibility that he was prepared to commit suicide if matters went wrong. Inada argued that Nakamura did not visit the front to avoid expanding the troubles and disturbing the troops. Analyzing the Korea Army's nebulous control, Imaoka notes that Nakamura had only recently arrived in Korea and had little time before fighting began, but something seemed lacking in the army's exercise of command. Thus, Nakamura never met Suetaka until after the incident had been resolved, although the governor-general came from Seoul to visit Suetaka at the battlefront and to express appreciation in person. "It was quite proper to adhere to the policy of nonenlargement, but the Korea Army should have furnished more positive operational guidance in such a case when a subordinate division was in serious trouble." There were important lessons to be learned here, Tsuchiya recalled "The 19th Division attacked the Russians twice in 36 hours without army orders or approval. How is it that the division commander, a lieutenant general and certainly not an reckless man, could have been allowed so much margin to act independently?" Some suggest that Suetaka tended to violate the spirit of the law, especially in force majeure. Others think that Suetaka was loyal, deliberate, and law-abiding, a worrier who could be expected to follow orders. Why risk one's career—one's life, given that self-censure loomed—when headquarters' decision was available? Military discipline and national interest dictated prior consultation and compliance. Or did Suetaka, like other notable generals, think gambles were justified by the goddess of Victory? I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. A daring Japanese night assault, led by Colonel Sato and his bold captains, threaded through fog, wire, and enemy fire. As dawn broke, the crest fell into Japanese hands, after brutal stand-ins on Hill 52 and Shachaofeng. Glinting grenades, roaring tanks, and disciplined infantry forged the victory, at a heavy price: dozens of officers and many men lost.

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3.179 Fall and Rise of China: Lake Khasan Conflict II

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 8, 2025 47:47

Last time we spoke about the beginning of the battle of lake Khasan. On a frost-bitten dawn by the Chaun and Tumen, two empires, Soviet and Japanese, stared at Changkufeng, each certain the ridge would decide their fate. Diplomats urged restraint, but Tokyo's generals plotted a bold gamble: seize the hill with a surprise strike and bargain afterward. In the Japanese camp, a flurry of trains, orders, and plans moved in the night. Officers like Sato and Suetaka debated danger and responsibility, balancing "dokudan senko", independent action with disciplined restraint. As rain hammered the earth, they contemplated a night assault: cross the Tumen, occupy Hill 52, and strike Changkufeng with coordinated dawn and night attacks. Engineers, artillery, and infantry rehearsed their movements in near-poetic precision, while the 19th Engineers stitched crossings and bridges into a fragile path forward. Across the river, Soviet scouts and border guards held their nerve, counting enemy shadows and watching for a break in the line. The clash at Shachaofeng became a lightning rod: a small force crossed into Manchurian soil in the restless dark, provoking a broader crisis just as diplomacy teetered. #179 From Darkness to Crest: The Changkufeng Battle Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. As remarked in the 19th division's war journal "With sunset on the 30th, the numbers of enemy soldiers increased steadily. Many motor vehicles, and even tanks, appear to have moved up. The whole front has become tense. Hostile patrols came across the border frequently, even in front of Chiangchunfeng. Tank-supported infantry units were apparently performing offensive deployment on the high ground south of Shachaofeng." Situation maps from the evening indicated Soviet patrol activity approaching the staging area of Nakano's unit near the Tumen, moving toward Noguchi's company to the left of Chiangchunfeng, and advancing toward Matsunobe's unit southwest of Shachaofeng. Russian vessels were depicted ferrying across Khasan, directly behind Changkufeng, while tanks moved south from Shachaofeng along the western shores of the lake. The 19th division's war journal states "Then it was ascertained that these attack forces had gone into action. All of our own units quietly commenced counteraction from late that night, as scheduled, after having systematically completed preparations since nightfall." Meanwhile, to the north, the Hunchun garrison reinforced the border with a battalion and tightened security. All evidence supported the view that Suetaka "in concept" and Sato"(in tactics" played the main part in the night-attack planning and decisions. Sato was the only infantry regimental commander at the front on 30 July. One division staff officer went so far as to say that Suetaka alone exerted the major influence, that Sato merely worked out details, including the type of attack and the timing. Intertwined with the decision to attack Changkufeng was the choice of an infantry regiment. The 76th Regiment was responsible for the defense of the sector through its Border Garrison Unit; but the latter had no more than two companies to guard a 40-mile border extending almost to Hunchun, and Okido's regimental headquarters was 75 miles to the rear at Nanam. T. Sato's 73rd Regiment was also at Nanam, while Cho's 74th Regiment was stationed another 175 miles southwest at Hamhung. Thus, the regiment nearest to Changkufeng was K. Sato's 75th, 50 miles away at Hoeryong. Although Suetaka had had time to shuffle units if he desired, Sasai suggested that troop movements from Nanam could not be concealed; from Hoeryong they might be termed maneuvers. Suetaka undoubtedly had favorites in terms of units as well as chiefs. K. Sato had served longest as regimental commander, since October 1937; Okido's date of rank preceded K. Sato's, but Okido had not taken command until 1938. He and Cho were able enough, but they were unknown quantities; T. Sato and Cho were brand-new colonels. Thus, K. Sato was best known to Suetaka and was familiar with the terrain. While he did not regard his regiment as the equal of units in the Kwantung Army or in the homeland, K. Sato's training program was progressing well and his men were rugged natives of Nagano and Tochigi prefectures. From the combat soldier's standpoint, the Changkufeng Incident was waged between picked regulars on both sides. The matter of quantitative regimental strength could have played no part in Suetaka's choice. The 74th, 75th, and 76th regiments each possessed 1,500 men; the 73rd, 1,200. Even in ordinary times, every unit conducted night-attack training, attended by Suetaka, but there was nothing special in July, even after the general inspected the 75th Regiment on the 11th. It had been said that the most efficient battalions were selected for the action. Although, of course, Sato claimed that all of his battalions were good, from the outset he bore the 1st Battalion in mind for the night attack and had it reconnoiter the Changkufeng area. Some discerned no special reasons; it was probably a matter of numerical sequence, 1st-2nd-3rd Battalions. Others called the choice a happy coincidence because of the 1st Battalion's 'splendid unity' and the aggressive training conducted by Major Ichimoto, who had reluctantly departed recently for regimental headquarters. Coming from the 75th Regiment headquarters to take over the 1st Battalion was the 40-year-old aide Major Nakano. By all accounts, he was quiet, serious, and hard-working, a man of noble character, gentle and sincere. More the administrative than commander type, Nakano lacked experience in commanding battalions and never had sufficient time to get to know his new unit (or they, him) before the night assault. He could hardly be expected to have stressed anything particular in training. Since there was no battalion-level training, the most valid unit of comparison in the regiment was the company, the smallest infantry component trained and equipped to conduct combat missions independently. Sato valued combat experience among subordinates; Nakano's 1st Battalion was considered a veteran force by virtue of its old-timer company commanders. All but one had come up through the ranks; the exception, young Lieutenant Nakajima, the darling of Sato, was a military academy graduate. For assault actions synchronized with those of the 1st Battalion, Sato selected Ito, the one line captain commanding the 6th Company of the 2nd Battalion, and Takeshita, 10th Company commander, one of the two line captains of the 3rd Battalion. In short, Sato had designated five veteran captains and a promising lieutenant to conduct the night-attack operations of 30-31 July, the first Japanese experience of battle against the modern Red Army. During the last two weeks of July, numerous spurious farmers had gambled along the lower reaches of the Tumen, reconnoitered the terrain, and prepared for a crossing and assault. Scouts had operated on both the Manchurian and Korean sides of the river. Major Nakano had conducted frequent personal reconnaissance and had dispatched platoon and patrol leaders, all heavy-weapons observation teams, and even the battalion doctor to Sozan Hill, to Chiangchunfeng, and close to enemy positions. In Korean garb and often leading oxen, the scouts had threaded their way through the Changkufeng sector, sometimes holing up for the night to observe Soviet movements, soil and topography, and levels of illumination. From this data, Nakano had prepared reference materials necessary for an assault. Hirahara, then located at Kucheng BGU Headquarters, had established three observation posts on high ground to the rear. After Chiangchunfeng had been occupied, Hirahara had set up security positions and routes there. Regarding Changkufeng, he had sought to ensure that even the lowest private studied the layout. Formation commanders such as Takeshita had volunteered frequently. Sato had also utilized engineers. Since the order to leave his station on 17 July, Lieutenant Colonel Kobayashi had had his regiment engage in scouting routes, bridges, and potential fords. Sato's 1st Company commander had prepared a sketch during 3% hours of reconnaissance across from Hill 52 during the afternoon of 18 July. Captain Yamada's intelligence had contributed to the tactical decisions and to knowledge of Russian strength and preparations. The most important information had been his evaluation of attack approaches, suggesting an offensive from the western side, preferably against the right flank or frontally. This concept had been the one applied by the regiment in its night assault two weeks later; Yamada had died on the green slopes he had scanned. Cloudy Saturday, 30 July, had drawn to a close. The moment had been at hand for the 75th Regiment to storm the Russians atop Changkufeng. Setting out from Fangchuanting at 22:30, Nakano's battalion, about 350 strong, had assembled at a fork one kilometer southwest of Changkufeng. The roads had been knee-deep in mud due to intermittent rain and downpours on 29–30 July. Now the rain had subsided, but clouds had blotted out the sky after the waning moon had set at 22:30. Led by Sakata's 1st Platoon leader, the men had marched silently toward the southern foot of Changkufeng; the murk had deepened and the soldiers could see no more than ten meters ahead. It had taken Sakata's men less than an hour to push forward the last 1,000 meters to the jump-off point, where they had waited another two hours before X-hour arrived. Scouts had advanced toward the first row of wire, 200–300 meters away. Platoon Leader Amagasa had infiltrated the positions alone and had reconnoitered the southeastern side of the heights. Sakata had heard from the patrols about the entanglements and their distance and makeup. While awaiting paths to be cut by engineer teams, the infantry had moved up as far as possible, 150 meters from the enemy, by 23:30. Although records described Changkufeng as quite steep, it had not been hard to climb until the main Russian positions were reached, even though there were cliffs. But as the craggy peak had been neared, the enemy defenses, which had taken advantage of rocks and dips, could not have been rushed in a bound. It had been 500 meters to the crest from the gently sloping base. The incline near the top had been steep at about 40 degrees and studded with boulders. Farther down were more soil and gravel. Grass had carpeted the foot. Japanese Army radio communications had been in their infancy; wire as well as runners had served as the main means of linking regimental headquarters with the front-line infantry, crossing-point engineers, and supporting guns across the Tumen in Korea. From Chiangchunfeng to the 1st Battalion, lines had been installed from the morning of 29 July. Combat communications had been operated by the small regimental signal unit, 27 officers and men. In general, signal traffic had been smooth and reception was good. Engineer support had been rendered by one platoon, primarily to assist with wire-cutting operations. Nakano had ordered his 1st Company to complete clearing the wire by 02:00. At 23:30 the cutters had begun their work on the right with three teams under 1st Lieutenant Inagaki. Since the proposed breach had been far from the enemy positions and there were no outposts nearby, Inagaki had pressed the work of forced clearing. The first entanglements had been breached fairly quickly, then the second. At about midnight, a dim light had etched the darkness, signaling success. There had been two gaps on the right. On the left side, Sakata's company had hoped to pierce the barbed wire in secrecy rather than by forced clearing. Only one broad belt of entanglements, actually the first and third lines, had been reconnoitered along the south and southeastern slopes. Sakata had assigned one team of infantry, with a covering squad led by Master Sergeant Amagasa, to the engineer unit under 2nd Lieutenant Nagayama. Covert clearing of a pair of gaps had begun. The Russian stakes had been a meter apart and the teams cut at the center of each section, making breaches wide enough for a soldier to wriggle through. To the rear, the infantry had crouched expectantly, while from the direction of Khasan the rumble of Soviet armor could be heard. At 00:10, when the first line of wire had been penetrated and the cutters were moving forward, the silence had been broken by the furious barking of Russian sentry dogs, and pale blue flares had burst over the slopes. As recalled by an engineer "It had been as bright as day. If only fog would cover us or it would start to rain!" At the unanticipated second line, the advancing clearing elements had drawn gunfire and grenades. But the Russians had been taken by surprise, Sakata said, and their machine guns had been firing high. Two engineers had been wounded; the security patrol on the left flank may have drawn the fire. Sakata had crawled up to Lieutenant Nagayama's cutting teams. One party had been hiding behind a rock, with a man sticking out his hand, grasping for the stake and feeling for electrified wire. Another soldier lay nearby, ready to snip the wire. The enemy had seemed to have discerned the Japanese, for the lieutenant could hear low voices. Although the cutters had been told to continue clearing in secrecy, they had by now encountered a line of low barbed wire and the work had not progressed as expected. Forced clearing had begun, which meant that the men had to stand or kneel, ignoring hostile fire and devoting primary consideration to speed. The infantrymen, unable to delay, had crawled through the wire as soon as the cutters tore a gap. Ten meters behind the small breaches, as well as in front of the Soviet positions, the Japanese had been troubled by fine low strands. They had resembled piano-wire traps, a foot or so off the ground. The wires had been invisible in the grass at night. As one soldier recalled "You couldn't disengage easily. When you tried to get out, you'd be sniped at. The wires themselves could cut a bit, too." Sakata had kept up with the clearing teams and urged them on. On his own initiative, Amagasa had his men break the first and third lines of wire by 01:50. Meanwhile, at 01:20, Nakano had phoned Sato, reporting that his forces had broken through the lines with little resistance, and had recommended that the attack be launched earlier than 2:00. Perhaps the premature alerting of the Russians had entered into Nakano's considerations. Sato had explained matters carefully, that is, rejected the suggestion, saying Changkufeng must not be taken too early, lest the enemy at Shachaofeng be alerted. The entire battalion, redeployed, had been massed for the charge up the slope. In an interval of good visibility, the troops could see as far as 40 meters ahead. A little before 02:00, Nakano had sent runners to deliver the order to advance. When the final obstructions had been cut, Nagayama had flashed a light. Then a white flag had moved in the darkness and the infantry had moved forward. Sakata's company, heading directly for Changkufeng crest, had less ground to traverse than Yamada's, and the point through which they penetrated the wire had been at the fork, where there appeared to have been only two lines to cut. The soldiers had crawled on their knees and one hand and had taken cover as soon as they got through. It had been 02:15 when the battalion traversed the barbed wire and began the offensive. The Japanese Army manual had stated that unaimed fire was seldom effective at night and that it had been imperative to avoid confusion resulting from wild shooting. At Changkufeng, the use of firearms had been forbidden by regimental order. Until the troops had penetrated the wire, bayonets had not been fixed because of the danger to friendly forces. Once through the entanglements, the men had attached bayonets, but, although their rifles had been loaded, they still had not been allowed to fire. The men had been traveling light. Instead of the 65 pounds the individual rifleman might ordinarily carry, knapsack, weapons and ammunition, tools, supplies, and clothing, each helmeted soldier had only 60 cartridges, none on his back, a haversack containing two grenades, a canteen, and a gas mask. To prevent noise, the regulations had prescribed wrapping metal parts of bayonets, canteens, sabers, mess kits, shovels, picks, and hobnails with cloth or straw. The wooden and metal parts of the shovel had been separated, the canteen filled, ammunition pouches stuffed with paper, and the bayonet sheath wrapped with cloth. Instead of boots, the men had worn web-toed, rubbersoled ground socks to muffle sound. Although their footgear had been bound with straw ropes, the soldiers occasionally had slipped in the wet grass. Considerations of security had forbidden relief of tension by talking, coughing, or smoking. Company commanders and platoon leaders had carried small white flags for hand signaling. In Sakata's company, the platoons had been distinguished by white patches of cloth hung over the gas masks on the men's backs, triangular pieces for the 1st Platoon, square for the second. Squad leaders had worn white headbands under their helmets. The company commanders had strapped on a white cross-belt; the platoon leaders, a single band. Officer casualties had proven particularly severe because the identification belts had been too conspicuous; even when the officers had lay flat, Soviet illuminating shells had made their bodies visible. On the left, the 2nd Company, 70–80 strong, had moved up with platoons abreast and scouts ahead. About 10 meters had separated the individual platoons advancing in four files; in the center were Sakata and his command team. The same setup had been used for Yamada's company and his two infantry platoons on the right. To the center and rear of the lead companies were battalion headquarters, a platoon of Nakajima's 3rd Company, and the Kitahara Machine-Gun Company, 20 meters from Nakano. The machine-gun company had differed from the infantry companies in that it had three platoons of two squads each. The machine-gun platoons had gone through the center breach in the entanglements with the battalion commander. Thereafter, they had bunched up, shoulder to shoulder and with the machine guns close to each other. Kitahara had led, two platoons forward, one back. The night had been so dark that the individual soldiers had hardly been able to tell who had been leading and who had been on the flanks. The 2nd Company had consolidated after getting through the last entanglements and had walked straight for Changkufeng crest. From positions above the Japanese, Soviet machine guns covering the wire had blazed away at a range of 50 meters. Tracers had ripped the night, but the Russians' aim had seemed high. Soviet illuminating shells, by revealing the location of dead angles among the rocks, had facilitated the Japanese approach. Fifty meters past the barbed wire, Sakata had run into the second Soviet position. From behind a big rock, four or five soldiers had been throwing masher grenades. Sakata and his command team had dashed to the rear and cut down the Russians. The captain had sabered one soldier who had been about to throw a grenade. Then Master Sergeant Onuki and the others had rushed up and overran the Russian defenses. The Japanese had not yet fired or sustained casualties. There had been no machine guns in the first position Sakata had jumped into; the trenches had been two feet deep and masked by rocks. To the right, a tent could be seen. Blind enemy firing had reached a crescendo around 02:30. The Russians had resisted with rifles, light and heavy machine guns, hand grenades, rifle grenades, flares, rapid-fire guns, and a tank cannon. "The hill had shaken, but our assault unit had advanced, disregarding the heavy resistance and relying only on the bayonet." The battalion commander, Major Nakano, had been the first officer to be hit. Moving to the left of Sakata's right-hand platoon, he had rushed up, brandishing his sword, amid ear-splitting fire and day-like flashes. He had felled an enemy soldier and then another who had been about to get him from behind. But a grenade had exploded and he had dropped, with his right arm hanging grotesquely and many fragments embedded in his chest and left arm. After regaining consciousness, Nakano had yelled at soldiers rushing to help him: "You fools! Charge on! Never mind me." Staggering to his feet, he had leaned on his sword with his left hand and pushed up the slope after the assault waves, while "everybody had been dashing around like mad." Sakata had encountered progressive defenses and more severe fire. The main body of the company had lost contact with other elements after getting through the entanglements. Sakata had thought that he had already occupied an edge of Changkufeng, but about 30 meters ahead stood a sharp-faced boulder, two or three meters high, from which enormous numbers of grenades had been lobbed. The Japanese, still walking, had come across another Soviet position, manned by four or five grenadiers. Sword in hand, Sakata had led Sergeant Onuki and his command team in a rush : "The enemy was about to take off as we jumped them. One Russian jabbed the muzzle of his rifle into my stomach at the moment I had my sword raised overhead. He pulled the trigger but the rifle did not go off. I cut him down before he could get me. The others ran away, but behind them they left grenades with pins pulled. Many of my men fell here and I was hit in the thighs". Onuki had felled two or three Russians behind Sakata, then disposed of an enemy who had been aiming at Sakata from the side. It had been around 03:00. On the right, the 1st Company had made relatively faster progress along the western slopes after having breached two widely separated belts of barbed wire. Once through the second wire, the troops had found a third line, 150 meters behind, and enemy machine guns had opened fire. Thereupon, a left-platoon private first class had taken a "do or die" forced clearing team, rushed 15 meters ahead of the infantry, and tore a path for the unit. At 03:00, Yamada had taken his men in a dash far up the right foot of the hill, overran the unexpected position, and captured two rapid-fire guns. The company's casualties had been mounting. Yamada had been hit in the chest but had continued to cheer his troops on. At 03:30, he had led a rush against the main objective, tents up the hill, behind the antitank guns. Yamada had cut down several bewildered soldiers in the tents, but had been shot again in the chest, gasping "Tenno Heika Banzai!" "Long Live the Emperor!", and had fallen dead. His citation had noted that he had "disrupted the enemy's rear after capturing the forwardmost positions and thus furnished the key to the ultimate rout of the whole enemy line." Sergeant Shioda, though wounded badly, and several of the men had picked up their commander's body and moved over to join Lieutenant Inagaki. On the left, Kadowaki had charged into the tents with his platoon and had played his part in interfering with the Russian rear. After this rush, the unit had been pinned down by fire from machine-gun emplacements, and Kadowaki had been wounded seriously. His platoon had veered left while watching for an opportunity to charge. Eventual contact had been made with Sakata's company. The assault on the right flank had been failing. With the death of Yamada, command of the company had been assumed temporarily by Inagaki. He and his right-flank platoon had managed to smash their way through the entanglements; Inagaki had sought to rush forward, sword in hand. Furious firing by Soviet machine guns, coupled with hand grenades, had checked the charge. Losses had mounted. Still another effort had bogged down in the face of enemy reinforcements, supported not only by covered but by tank-mounted machine guns. Russian tanks and trucks had appeared to be operating behind Changkufeng. Sergeant Shioda had been trying to keep the attack moving. Again and again, he had pushed toward the Soviet position with five of his surviving men, to no avail. The left-flank platoon had sought to evade the fierce fire by taking advantage of rock cover and hurling grenades. Finally, a private first class had lobbed in a grenade, rushed the machine gun, and silenced the weapon. By now, precious time and lives had been lost. Either instinctively or by order, the 1st Company had been shifting to the left, away from the core of the enemy fire-net. Inagaki had decided to veer left in a wide arc to outflank Changkufeng from the same side where the 2nd Company and most of the battalion were at-tacking. There would be no further attempts to plunge between the lake and the heights or to head for the crest from the rear. Military maps had indicated tersely that remnants of the 1st Company had displaced to the 2nd Company area at 04:00, sometime after the last charge on the right by Yamada. On the left front, in the sector facing the main defenses on Changkufeng crest, Sakata had fallen after being hit by a grenade. A machine gunner had improvised a sling. "I had lost a lot of blood," Sakata had said, "and there were no medics. Onuki, my command team chief who had been acting platoon leader, had been killed around here. I had ordered Warrant Officer Kuriyama to take the company and push on until I could catch up." As Sakata lay on the ground, he had seen the battalion commander and the Nakajima company move past him in the darkness. Nakano had said not a word; Sakata had not known the major had been maimed. "I still hadn't felt intense pain," Sakata had recalled. "I had rested after the first bad feelings. In about 15 minutes I had felt well enough to move up the hill and resume command of my company." With both Nakano and Sakata wounded, individual officers or noncoms had kept the assault moving. The 1st Platoon leader, Kuriyama, had been securing the first position after overrunning it but had become worried about the main force. On his own initiative, he had brought his men up the hill to join the rest of the company, while the battalion aide, 2nd Lieutenant Nishimura, had made arrangements to deploy the heavy machine guns and reserve infantry in support. Before 4 A.M., these troops under Kitahara and Nakajima had caught up with the remnants of the 2nd Company, which had pressed beyond the third position to points near the Soviet Crestline. By the time Sakata had regained his feet and moved toward the peak, somewhere between 03:30 and 04:00, the Japanese had been pinned down. Most of the losses had been incurred at this point. "Iron fragments, rock, sand, blood, and flesh had been flying around," Akaishizawa had written. Grenades had caused the preponderance of wounds after the men had penetrated the barbed wire. Deaths had been inflicted mainly by the Soviet "hurricane" of small arms and machine-gun fire and by ricochets ripping from man to man. Six Russian heavy weapons had kept up a relentless fire from three emplacements, and milk-bottle-shaped grenades had continued to thud down on the Japanese. The grenades had hindered the advance greatly. Mainly at the crest, but at every firing position as well, the Russians had used rifle grenades, primarily to eliminate dead angles in front of positions. There had been low piano wire between firing points, and yellow explosive had been planted amidst rock outcroppings and in front of the emplacements. "The Russians had relied exclusively on fire power; there had been no instance of a brave enemy charge employing cold steel." Only 20 meters from the entrenchments atop Changkufeng, Kitahara had been striving to regain the initiative and to hearten the scattered, reeling troops. One Japanese Army motto had concerned the mental attitude of commanders: "When surprised by the enemy, pause for a smoke." Kitahara had stood behind a rock, without a helmet, puffing calmly on a cigarette—a sight which had cheered the men. Sakata could not forget the scene. "It really happened," he had said, respectfully. As soon as Sakata had reached the forward lines, he had joined Kitahara (the senior officer and de facto battalion commander till then) and three enlisted men. All had been pinned behind the large boulder, the only possible cover, which had jutted in front of the Soviet crestline positions. Fire and flame had drenched the slopes, grenades from the peak, machine guns from the flank. The eastern skies had been brightening and faces could be discerned. Troubled by the stalemate yet not feeling failure, Sakata had said nothing about his own wounds but had told Kitahara he would lead his 2nd Company in a last charge up the left side of Changkufeng if only the machine gun company could do something about the enemy fire, especially some Soviet tanks which had been shooting from the right. "The enemy must have learned by now," the regimental records had observed, "that our forces were scanty, for the Soviets exposed the upper portions of their bodies over the breastworks, sniped incessantly, and lobbed illuminating shells at us." Agreeing with Sakata that the "blind" Japanese would have to take some kind of countermeasure to allow his two available heavy machine guns to go into concerted action, Kitahara had ordered illuminating rounds fired by the grenade dischargers. He had clambered atop the boulder and squatted there amidst the furious crossfire to spot for his guns, still only 20 meters from the Russian lines. Perhaps it had been the golden spark of Kitahara's cigarette, perhaps it had been the luminescence of his cross-bands, but hardly a moment later, at 04:03 am, a sniper's bullet had caught the captain between the eyes and he had toppled to his death. Nakajima had wanted to support Sakata's stricken company as well. The lieutenant had seen the advantage of outflanking the emplacements from the far left of Changkufeng where the fire of two Soviet heavy machine guns had been particularly devastating. Nakajima had swung his reserve unit around the crest to the southwest side, pressed forward through deadly grenade attacks, and had managed to reach a point ten meters from the Russian positions. Perched on the cliff's edge, he had prepared to continue: "Nakajima, who had been calming his men and looking for a chance to advance, leaped up and shouted, "Right now! Charge!" Sword in hand, he led his forces to the front on the left and edged up against the crest emplacements. But the enemy did not recoil; grenades and machine gun fusillades burst from above on all sides. Men fell, one after another. [During this final phase, a platoon leader and most of the key noncoms were killed.] A runner standing near Nakajima was hit in the head by a grenade and collapsed. Nakajima picked up the soldier's rifle, took cover behind a boulder, and tried to draw a bead on a Russian sniper whom he could see dimly 20 meters away through the lifting mist. But a bullet hit him in the left temple and he pitched forward, weakly calling, "Long Live the Emperor!" A PFC held the lieutenant up and pleaded with him to hang on, but the company commander's breath grew fainter and his end was at hand. The time was 4:10 am". Nakajima's orderly said of the event "Lieutenant Nakajima charged against the highest key point on Changkufeng, leading the reserve unit, and ensured the seizure of the hill. The lieutenant was wearing the boots which I had always kept polished but which he had never worn till this day." Akaishizawa added that Nakajima had purified himself in the waters of the Tumen before entering combat, in traditional fashion. Lieutenant Yanagihara had penned a tribute to his young fellow officer, the resolute samurai "Lt. Nakajima must have been expecting a day like today. He was wearing brand-new white underclothes and had wrapped his body with white cloth and the thousand-stitch stomach band which his mother had made for him. .. . Was not the lieutenant's end the same as we find in an old tanka verse? "Should you ask what is the Yamato spirit, the soul of Japan: It is wild cherry blossoms glowing in the rising sun." On this main attack front, Soviet heavy machine guns and tanks had continued to deliver withering fire against the Japanese remnants, while Russian snipers and grenadiers had taken an increasing toll. Shortly after 04:00, enemy reinforcements had appeared at the northeast edge. Of the company commanders, only Sakata had still been alive; the other three officers had died between 03:30 and 04:30. A machine gunner who had been pinned down near the crest had commented: "It must have been worse than Hill 203" (of bloody Russo-Japanese War fame). Between a half and two-thirds of each company had been dead or wounded by then. Sakata had still been thinking of ways to rush the main positions. After Kitahara had been shot down, he had moved around to investigate. A colleague had added: "The agony of the captain's wounds had been increasing. He rested several times to appease the pain while watching intently for some chance to charge once more." Now, Sakata had been wounded again by grenade fragments tearing into the right side of his face. "It hadn't been serious," Sakata had insisted. As he had limped about, he could see his platoon leader, Kuriyama, sniping at a Russian grenadier. Much would depend on the effectiveness of supporting firepower. With the death of Kitahara, control of the machine-gun company had been assumed by Master Sergeant Harayama. There had been almost no time to coordinate matters before Kitahara had fallen, but Harayama as well as Sakata had known that the infantry could not break loose until the Soviet heavy weapons had been suppressed. Working with another sergeant, Harayama had ordered his gunners to displace forward and rush the positions 20 meters away. The one heavy machine gun set up for action had been the first to fire for the Japanese side at Changkufeng, after its crew had manhandled it the last few meters to the first Soviet trench below the crest. The trench had been empty. Thereupon, the gunner had opened up against tents which could be seen 20 meters to the rear. Other friendly machine guns had begun to chatter. Kuriyama had dashed up and secured the southeast edge of the heights. Enemy resistance had begun to slacken. What appeared to be two small Soviet tanks, actually a tank and a tractor had been laying down fire near the tents in an apparent effort to cover a pullback. The two vehicles had advanced toward the Japanese and sought to neutralize the heavy machine guns. A squad leader had engaged the tractor, set it afire, and shot down the crewmen when they had tried to flee. Next, the tank had been stopped. The Japanese lead gun had consumed all of its armor-piercing (AP) ammunition—three clips, or 90 rounds—in 10 or 15 seconds. No more AP ammunition had been available; one box had been with the last of the six squads struggling up the heights. "More AP!" had yelled the 1st Squad leader, signaling with his hand—which had at that moment been hit by a Russian slug. A tank machine-gun bullet had also torn through the thumb and into the shoulder of the squad's machine gunner, whereupon the 21-year-old loader had taken over the piece. Similar replacements had occurred under fire in all squads, sometimes more than once in the same unit. "It had been a fantastic scene," Sakata had commented. "Just like grasshoppers! But they had finally neutralized the heavy weapons." The knocked-out Russian vehicles had begun to blaze while the eastern skies had lightened. New enemy tanks (some said many, others merely three) had lumbered up the slopes, but the Japanese heavy machine guns had continued to fire on them, and the tanks had stopped. If the machine guns had gone into action minutes later, the Russian armor might have continued to the top, from which they could have ripped up the surviving Japanese infantrymen: "So we gunners fired and fired. I could see my tracers bouncing off the armor, for there was still no AP. We also shot at machine guns and infantry. Since we carried little ammo for the night attack, my gun ran out, but by then the enemy had been ousted. We had originally expected that we might have to fire in support of the infantry after they took the crest. We lost none of our own heavy machine guns that night, overran four Maxims and captured mountains of hand grenades. By dawn, however, our machine gun company had lost more than half of its personnel—about 40 men". The light-machine-gun squad leader had been wounded in the hand by a grenade near the site where Sakata had been hit. Nevertheless, the superior private had clambered up the slope with his men. After 04:00, when he and his squad had been pinned down with the infantry below the crest, he had heard Japanese heavy machine guns firing toward the foe on the right: "Our units were in confusion, bunched up under terrific fire in a small area. Getting orders was impossible, so I had my light machine gun open up in the same direction at which the heavies were firing. We could identify no targets but tried to neutralize the enemy located somewhere on the crest. Although Soviet flares were going off, we never could glimpse the enemy clearly. But we heard the Russians yelling "Hurrah!" That ought to have been the signal for a charge; here it meant a retreat". But, of the ten men in this Japanese machine-gun squad, only four had been in action when dawn had come. The turning point had arrived when the machine-guns belonging to Sakata, and the reserves of the late Nakajima, had torn into the Russian emplacements, tanks, and tents behind. Others had said the key had been the fire of grenade dischargers belonging to the same units. A high-angle weapon, the grenade discharger, had been light, effective, and ideal for getting at dead space. In terms of ammunition, it had been especially useful, for it could fire hand grenades available to the foot soldier. Undoubtedly, the combined action of the grenade dischargers and machine guns (heavy and light) had paved the way for a last charge by the infantry. The four light machine guns of the 2nd and 4th companies had played their part by pouring flank fire against the Russians, who had clung to the position although Kuriyama's platoon had made an initial penetration. At about 04:30, Japanese assault forces could be seen dimly, in the light of dawn, exchanging fire with the Russians only a few meters away on the southern edge of Changkufeng Hill. At the same time, on the northern slopes, enemy reinforcements numbering 50 men with trucks and tanks had been scaling the hill. Around 04:45, Japanese grenades began to burst over the heads of the last enemy atop Changkufeng; the Russians had wavered. After the heavy weapons had finally begun to soften up the Soviet positions, Sakata had judged that there were not many Russians left. He had jumped into the first trench, ahead of his only surviving platoon leader, Kuriyama, and several soldiers. Two or three Russians had been disposed of; the rest had fled. By then the 2nd Company had been chopped down to a platoon; about 40 men still lived. There had been no cheer of banzai, as journalists had written; it would have drawn fire to stand up and raise one's arms. But Sakata had remained proud of the assertion by Sato that, from Chiangchunfeng, he had observed the last rush and knew the "real story," that "Sakata was the first to charge the peak." The regimental eulogist had written that Sakata's earnestness "cut through iron, penetrated mountains, and conquered bodily pain." As for Inagaki, about 15 or 20 minutes after the badly wounded Sakata had managed to reach the point where Kitahara and Nakajima had been pinned down near the Crestline, the lieutenant had arrived with the remnants of Yamada's company, probably by 04:20. The records would have us believe that Sakata had been able to coordinate the next actions with Inagaki despite the storm of fire: "The acting battalion commander [Sakata] resumed the charge with a brand-new deployment—his 2nd Company on the right wing and the 1st Company on the left." Actually, all Sakata could think of had been to charge; it had been too confused a time to issue anything like normal orders as acting battalion commander: "About all I remember asking Inagaki was: "What are you doing over here? What happened to your company commander?" I think he told me that Yamada had been killed and resistance on the right flank had been severe. Undoubtedly, he acted on his own initiative in redeploying. Nor was there any particular liaison between my company and Inagaki's force." To the left of Sakata's survivors were the vestiges of Nakajima's platoon, and further to the left, the outflanking troops brought up by Inagaki. These forces gradually edged up to the rear of the foe, in almost mass formation, on the western slope just below the top. "The enemy soldiers who had been climbing up the northern incline suddenly began to retreat, and Inagaki led a charge, fighting dauntlessly hand-to-hand." As a result of the more or less concerted Japanese assaults, "the desperately resisting enemy was finally crushed and Changkufeng peak was retaken completely by 05:15," three hours after the night attackers had jumped off. Akaishizawa had said that the troops "pushed across the peak through a river of blood and a mountain of corpses. Who could withstand our demons?" Sato's regimental attack order had called for the firing of a green star shell to signal success. At 05:15, according to the records, "the signal flared high above Changkufeng, showering green light upon the hill; the deeply stirring Japanese national flag floated on the top." Sakata thought that this must have been 10 or 20 minutes after the hill was taken, but he remembered no flare. "After the last charge I had no time to watch the sky!" The flare had probably been fired from a grenade launcher by the battalion aide or a headquarters soldier. After the final close-quarter fighting, Sakata had pressed forward while the survivors came up. The captain had deployed his men against possible counterattack. Later he had heard that Soviet tanks had lumbered up to reinforce the peak or to counterattack but that, when they observed the Japanese in possession of the crest, they had turned back. Only after his men had secured the peak had Sakata talked to Inagaki about sharing defensive responsibility. The records described Sakata's deployments at 05:20, but there had been painfully few men to match the tidy after-action maps. Did Sakata and his men push across the peak? "Not downhill a bit," he had answered. "We advanced only to the highest spot, the second, or right-hand peak, where we could command a view of the hostile slope." He had merely reconnoitered to deploy his troops. The senior surviving Japanese officer atop Changkufeng heights had been Sakata. What had happened to Major Nakano, who had been wounded shortly after jump-off? Although his right arm had been shattered, he had dragged himself to his feet, once he had regained consciousness, and kept climbing to catch up. His men had pleaded with him to look after his terrible wounds, but he had insisted on advancing, leaning on his sword and relying on spiritual strength. "Left! Move left!" he had been heard to shout, for the faltering Japanese had apparently been of the opinion that they were at the enemy's rear. Instead, they had pressed against the Russians' western wing, directly in front of the enemy works, from which murderous fire had been directed, especially from machine-gun nests ripping at their flanks. With sword brandished in his uninjured hand, high above his head, Nakano had stood at the corner of the positions. The explosion of an enemy grenade had illuminated him "like the god of fire," and he had been seen to crumple. He had died a little before 0500, to the left of where young Nakajima had fallen at 0430. His citation had said: "The battalion commander captured Changkufeng, thanks to his proper combat guidance and deployments. He provided the incentive to victory in the Changkufeng Incident." A eulogist had called Nakano a "human-bullet demon-unit commander": "All who observed this scene were amazed, for it was beyond mortal strength. One could see how high blazed the flame of his faith in certain victory and what a powerful sense of responsibility he had as unit commander. Major Nakano was a model soldier." When Nakano had pitched forward, badly wounded PFC Imamura had tried to protect the commander's corpse. Imamura had killed a soldier who appeared from behind a boulder, had lunged at another two or three, but had toppled off the cliff. Two other Japanese privates—a battalion runner and PFC Iwata—had been lying nearby, hurt seriously; but when they saw Imamura fall to his death, leaving the major's body undefended, they had dragged themselves to the corpse, four meters from the foe. Iwata, crippled and mute, had hugged Nakano's corpse until other soldiers managed to retrieve it. While death had come to Nakano, Sakata had been fighting with no knowledge of what was going on to his left. Pinned behind a boulder, he had had no way of checking on the battalion commander. Only after Sakata had charged onto the crest and asked for the major had he been told by somebody that Nakano had been killed. He had not even been sure where the commander had fallen. Such had been the time of blood and fury when battalion chief, company commanders, and platoon leaders had fought and died like common soldiers, pressing on with saber or pistol or sniping rifle under relentless cross-fire. Pretty patterns of textbook control had meant nothing. Life—and victory—depended on training, initiative, raw courage, and the will to win. The result of this combination of wills could not be ascertained, on 31 July 1938, until dawn brightened the bleeding earth on Changkufeng Hill. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Tokyo gambled on a night strike to seize Changkufeng, while diplomacy urged restraint. Amid mud, smoke, and moonless skies, Nakano led the 1st Battalion, supported by Nakajima, Sakata, Yamada, and others. One by one, officers fell, wounds multiplying, but resolve held. By 05:15, shattered units regrouped atop the peak, the flag rising as dawn bled into a costly, hard-won victory.

3.178 Fall and Rise of China: Lake Hasan

Asian American / Asian Research Institute (AAARI) - The City University of New York (CUNY)

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 1, 2025 34:56

Last time we spoke about the beginning of a conflict between the USSR and Japan. In the frost-hardened dawns by the Chaun and Tumen, two powers eye a ridge called Changkufeng, each seeing a prize and fearing a trap. On the Soviet side, weary front-line troops tighten their grip, while Moscow's diplomats coaxed restraint through Seoul and Harbin. As July unfolds, Tokyo's generals push a dangerous idea: seize the hill with a surprise strike, then bargain for peace. Seoul's 19th Division is readied in secret, trains loaded with men and horses, movement masked, prayers whispered to avoid widening the rift. Japanese scouts in white Hanbok disguise, peering at trenches, wire, and watchful Russians. Russian border guards appear as shadows, counters slipping into place, yet both sides hold their fire. On July 29, a skirmish erupts: a platoon crosses a shallow line, clashes flare, and bodies and banners ripple in the cold air. #178 Night Attacks and Diplomatic Strains: The Lake Khasan Conflict Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. A second troop train was scheduled to depart Agochi for Nanam on the night of 29 July, carrying back the initial elements of the 75th Infantry. At Haigan, regimental commander Sato was pulling on his boots at 16:00 when the division informed him that fighting had broken out near Shachaofeng since 15:00 and that the Russians were assembling forces in that area. Suetaka ordered Sato's 3rd Battalion, which had not been slated to leave until the following night, to proceed to Kucheng; the remainder of the regiment was to assemble at Agochi. After consulting with Division Staff Officer Saito at Agochi, Sato returned to Haigan with the conclusion that "overall developments did not warrant optimism, it was imperative to prepare to move the entire regiment to the battlefield." One of Sato's first actions was to telephone a recommendation to the division that he be allowed to occupy Hill 52, which commanded the approaches to Changkufeng from south of Khasan. Suetaka approved, and at 17:30, Yamada's company was ordered to proceed to Shikai along with Hirahara's battalion. Meanwhile, Suzuki's 15th Heavy Field Artillery Regiment, which had been among the last units ordered to leave, had finished loading at Agochi by about 15:00. Sato recommended to Suetaka that a portion of Suzuki's regiment be attached to him; this was why Suetaka decided to transfer one of the two batteries to the 75th Infantry. The rest of the heavy artillery concentrated at Kyonghun. Suetaka's orders, issued at 18:20, called for Sato to have two of his battalions, the 1st and 3rd, cross the Tumen as soon as possible, with engineer support. Attached was Narukawa's heavy battery. Sato's mission was twofold: to assist Senda and to watch the enemy in the Changkufeng area. Sato arrived at 21:15 in Shikai. There, he assembled a number of his officers, including Yamada, and explained his plan: the 1st Company plus machine guns were to cross the Tumen from Sozan ahead of the other units, occupy Hill 52 with an element, and concentrate the main body at the foot of Fangchuanting to await Hirahara's battalion. A portion of the 19th Engineers would go to Sozan to assist the 1st Company with its river crossing. Amid heavy rain and darkness, the various units set out at 22:15. The platoon sent to Hill 52 arrived before dawn on the 30th, the rest of the forces somewhat later, though Sato had intended to move everybody across the river by the early hours. On the 29th the engineer regiment commander, Kobayashi, had also arrived at Shikai. He ordered Captain Tomura to handle the crossing in the vicinity of Sozan, as well as preparations for a future offensive with the main body. When Kobayashi reached Kucheng, he learned from Hirahara not only about the front-line situation but also about Sato's important plans: "The K. Sato force is going to cross the river tonight, 29–30 July. A night attack will be launched against Changkufeng on the night of 30–31 July." Kobayashi issued orders to his two commanders to assist the crossing by Nakano's infantry unit, 1st Battalion, 75th Regiment at Matsu'otsuho and Sozan, and, in addition, to cooperate with the position attack by Nakano and help in the assault at Hill 52. Most of these young officers, such as Seutaka dishing out orders were performing what the Japanese termed "dokudan senko" or "arbitrary or independent action". Japanese operational regulations actually contained a section dealing with dokudan senko, by which initiative, not imperiousness, was meant. Two elements were involved: control but encouragement of self-reliant thinking. This subject became important in training officers, all of whom, including such infantry experts as Suetaka, were well acquainted with the requirements. Combat missions were stipulated in operations orders, but, if these were not realistic, initiative was to come into play, though only when there was no time to contact superiors. By the same token, commanders had to be ready to assume full responsibility if matters turned out adversely. "We were disciples of the 'Moltke' system of AGS control, with dual authority vis-à-vis the local forces and the chief of staff." The Korea Army's version of events on 29 July, there was no mention of any report received from the division prior to 17:30. Details did not reach Seoul, in the form of printed divisional intelligence reports and operational orders, until 1 August. The late afternoon report from Kyonghun provided the Korea Army authorities with little solid information, but Seoul had to notify higher headquarters immediately. Kitano sent messages to Tokyo and Hsinking at 19:15. The command and Kwantung Army were told that, in addition to Senda's assault party, 40 Japanese soldiers were deployed west of Changkufeng and at Yangkuanping. The division's main forces had begun the rail pullback from the 28th, leaving behind only two infantry battalions and a mountain artillery battalion for the time being. At 21:20 on 29 July, Korea Army Headquarters received the text of Suetaka's full report, which concluded: "With a view toward a possible emergency, the division suspended movement back of the 75th Regiment and is making necessary arrangements to have them advance instead. The latest affair derives sheerly from the enemy's unlawful challenge. It is my firm belief that the nature of this incident differs completely from the one at Changkufeng and should be handled separately. At present, since communication with the forward lines is not good, Lieutenant Colonel Senda (who is at the front) has been entrusted with command, but I assume entire responsibility for the consequences." Instead of boarding their trains at Agochi, Sato's regiment and supporting engineers moved to the Manchurian side of the Tumen as soon as possible. Suetaka called Sato's 2nd Battalion to Kyonghun as divisional reserve. Subsequent dispatches claimed that: (1) Senda's unit, which had driven off intruders in the Shachaofeng area once, was engaged against new Soviet forces (sent at 18:20, 29th); (2) Senda's unit had expelled trespassers, and a combat situation had developed near Shachaofeng (22:00, 29th); (3) fighting was going on in the vicinity of Shachaofeng (06:40, 30th). Korea Army Headquarters, however, obtained no more important communication concerning the events of 29 July than a report, sent that evening by Suetaka, that revealed his concern about a possible Soviet attack in the Wuchiatzu sector near the neck of the long Changkufeng appendix. After the clash at Shachaofeng, a general officer, Morimoto, happened to be visiting Colonels Okido and Tanaka in Nanam. Both of them were said to be of the pronounced opinion that no troubles ought to be provoked with the USSR while the critical Hankow operation lay ahead; yet Suetaka apparently had some intention of striking at the Soviet intruders, using the 75th Regiment. They urged that this policy not be adopted and that Suetaka be approached directly; the channel through Y. Nakamura, the division chief of staff, was hopeless. Although in agreement, General Morimoto declined to approach Suetaka; since the latter seemed to have made up his mind, it would be inappropriate to "meddle" with his command. Suetaka was functioning as an operations chief at that time. Apart from the mobilization staff officer, who was not enthusiastic about aggressive action, the only other officer who may have affected the decisionmaking process was the Hunchun OSS chief, Maj. Tanaka Tetsujiro, a positive type who shared Suetaka's views and was probably with him on the 29th as well as 30th. Although developments at Suetaka's command post were known more as the result of silence than of elucidation, we possessed considerable information about thinking at the Korea Army level: "Suetaka contacted us only after his men had driven out the enemy near Shachaofeng. Till then, the front had been relatively quiet and we were of the opinion all or most of the deployed forces were on their way home. We at Seoul had no foreknowledge of or connection with the 29 July affair. Reports came in; we never sent specific orders. Triggered by the affray at Shachaofeng, the division attacked on its own initiative. It was our understanding that very small Japanese forces had been committed to evict a dozen enemy scouts and that, when a platoon of ours got atop the hill, they observed surprisingly huge hostile concentrations to the rear. This was probably why the platoon pulied back, although much has been made of the desire to obey the nonaggravation policy to the letter. We at Seoul felt that this was a troublesome matter—that our side had done something unnecessary. When the division finally made its report, the army had to reach some decision. There were two irreconcilable ways of looking at things. We might condemn what had been done, and the division ought to be ordered to pull out promptly, having arbitrarily and intolerably acted against the known facts that Imperial sanction for use of force had been withheld and Tokyo had directed evacuation of the moved-up units. The opposing, eventually predominant view was that the division commander's course of action ought to be approved. Perusal of small-scale maps of the locale indicated a clear violation of the frontier, something not proved in the case of Changkufeng. We shared the division commander's interpretation. His BGU had its mission, and he was acting with foresight to solve matters positively and on his own, since he was the man closest to the problem. General Nakamura felt that the latest development was inevitable; our units did not cross the Tumen until the Soviets attacked us in force. Therefore, the division's actions were approved and a report was rendered promptly to Tokyo. It could be said that our outlook served to "cover" the division commander, in a way. But if IGHQ had ordered us to desist, we would have". Nakamura added: "I was of the opinion the only solution was to drive the Soviet troops outside Manchukuoan territory; therefore, I approved the action by the division." Such sanction had been granted on the basis of information supplied to Seoul by Suetaka on the evening of 29 July, again post facto. At 01:20 on the 30th, Nakamura wired Suetaka a message characterized by gracious phrasing that suggested his grave concern: "One ought to be satisfied with expelling from Manchurian territory the enemy attacking our unit on the . . . heights southwest of Shachaofeng. It is necessary to keep watch on the enemy for the time being, after having pulled back to the heights mentioned above, but we desire that matters be handled carefully to avoid enlargement; in case the foe has already pulled back south of Shachaofeng . . . he need not be attacked." Nakamura also sent a wire to the AGS chief, the War Minister, and the Kwantung Army commander. After conveying the information received from Suetaka, Nakamura continued: "In spite of the fact that our troops have been patient and cautious . . . this latest incident [near Shachaofeng] started with Soviet forces' arrogant border trespassing and . . . unlawful challenge. Therefore, I am convinced that this affair must be dealt with separately from the incident at Changkufeng. Nevertheless, I shall endeavor to handle matters so that the incident will not spread and shall make it my fundamental principle to be satisfied with evicting from Manchurian territory the hostile forces confronting us. The Korea Army chief of staff is being dispatched quickly to handle the incident". The Korea Army, "painfully slow to act," says a Kwantung Army major, was merely the intermediary link, the executor of Tokyo's desires. In the case of remote Shachaofeng, there was an inevitable gap between on-the-spot occurrences and AGS reactions. By then, Arisue, Kotani, and Arao, Inada's observers, had returned to Japan—an important fact, given the "Moltke" system of staff control. Nevertheless, their return must have exerted significant effects on central operational thinking. Kotani remembered that his AGS subsection had given him a welcome-home party on the night of 29 July when an emergency phone call was received from the duty officer. "It was about the clash at Shachaofeng. The festivities came to an abrupt end and I headed for the office. From then till the cease-fire on 11 August, I remained at the AGS night and day." Since the 19th Division had furnished higher headquarters with minimal information, Tokyo, like Seoul, had only a few ostensible facts to act upon. But this had been the first combat test for the Korea Army, which needed all the encouragement and assistance possible. Although Japanese field armies, notably the Kwantung Army, were notorious for insubordination, one could not overemphasize the fact that the Korea Army was meek and tractable. If Nakamura had concluded that Suetaka acted properly (which reports from Seoul indicated), the AGS could hardly demur. It would have been unrealistic to think that Tokyo, although cautious, was "softer" about the Russian problem than front-line forces. There had been no concern over time lags; details were Seoul's province. Reaction took time at every level of the chain of command. Decision making in the Japanese Army had been a many-layered process. The Army general staff had been of the opinion that initial guidance ought to have been provided to the Korea Army soon, particularly since there had been evidence of failure to convey intentions promptly to the front and no high command staff officer remained to direct matters. After hearing from Seoul twice about the Shachaofeng affair, the responsible Army general staff officers conferred at length. Stress had been laid on the indivisibility of the Shachaofeng and Changkufeng incidents. It had also been evident that further information was required. On that basis, a "handling policy for the Shachaofeng Incident" was drafted, and Tada notified the Korea and Kwantung armies accordingly on 30 July. Nakamura had received the telegram at 16:50 and had its contents retransmitted to Kitano, then at Kyonghun: "Shachaofeng Incident is progressing along lines of our policy, leave things to local units, which have been adhering to the principle of nonenlargement. Have them report on front-line situation without fail." The Army general staff and the Korea Army were calling for prudence, but the division, well down the rungs of the ladder of command, was initiating actions that jeopardized the government's basic policy. Earlier quibbling about restraints on "unit-size" elements crossing into Manchuria had been abandoned after the firefight near Shachaofeng on 29 July. At 15:30, Takenouchi's battalion, part of the 76th Regiment, had been directed to assist Senda near Yangkuanping; at 18:20 Suetaka was ordering the 75th Regiment to head for the Kucheng sector and be ready to assault the Russians in the Changkufeng area. Support was to be provided by Kobayashi's engineers, by Iwano's transportation men, and by Suzuki's heavy guns. Of particular interest had been Suetaka's acceptance of Sato's recommendation that elements be sent to occupy Hill 52, a measure linked with a possible Japanese attack against Changkufeng. Sato had decided by evening that the new situation required rapid deployment of his forces across the river. At Shikai, he conducted a briefing of his officers. Suetaka's orders conveyed orally by staff officers had stipulated: "The division will take steps to secure the border line immediately, even if the situation undergoes change. The Sato unit will advance immediately to the left shore, reinforce Senda's unit, and maintain a strict watch on the enemy in the Changkufeng area." Around 23:20, the last elements ordered forward arrived at Shikai station. Sato instructed only his headquarters and the Ito company to get off. The rest of the troop train primarily the 1st [Nakano's] Battalion was to move on to Hongui. From there, the soldiers proceeded to the Tumen near Sozan. With his staff and Ito's company, Sato trudged in silence through the mud from Shikai to the shore at Matsu'otsuho, starting at 00:30 and reaching the crossing site at 03:00. Reconnaissance had proved satisfactory, Sato remembered. At the crossings, the hardworking engineers rowed his 1st and 3rd battalions across, company by company. Near dawn, around 04:30, he traversed the river. The movement had been completed in about an hour. When Sato's infantry finally got across, they proceeded to the skirt of Fangchuanting and assembled in secrecy. Not until about 08:00 did the regimental headquarters, Ito's company, and Hirahara's battalion reach Hill 147, already held by Noguchi's company west of Changkufeng. By then, plans had fallen behind schedule by at least several hours because of difficulties in train movement forward. Sato also remembered torrential rains; other officers mentioned darkness. Members of Nakano's battalion pinpointed a shortage of engineer boats from Kucheng. Engineers rowed some boats downstream during the night, but six of them were kept at Matsu'otsuho. This left only three boats for moving the 400 men of the 1st Battalion, the unit slated to storm Changkufeng, across the river at Sozan. Sato had wanted all of his troops across well before dawn on the 30th. A division staff officer rightly thought that Suetaka had already advised Sato, in secret, to "attack at an opportune time," and that the night of 29–30 July had been intended for the surprise assault. "Perhaps there was not enough time for all the attack preparations." Kobayashi's engineers admitted problems in moving boats to Sozan: "Although the water level had gone up because of daily rains recently, there were still many shallows and the current was irregular. Not only was it hard to move downstream, but dense fog also complicated the work. Nevertheless, the units at both sites were able to accomplish the river-crossing operation approximately as scheduled". Meanwhile, after reconnoitering Soviet defenses along the Manchurian bank, Suzuki, commander of the 15th Heavy Field Artillery Regiment, crossed the Kyonghun Bridge on 30 July with his 1st Battery and established positions on the edge of Shuiliufeng Hill. Once Captain Narukawa was attached to the 75th Infantry on 29 July, he dispatched his 2nd Battery by train to Shikai that night. Although firing sites had been surveyed northwest of Sho-Sozan, the battery had to traverse two weak, narrow bridges in the darkness. With two 15-centimeter howitzers to haul, plus five caissons and wagons, the unit faced tense moments. The gun sites themselves were worrisome: they were scarcely masked from observation from Changkufeng, and the single road to them from the unloading station ran through a paddy area and was similarly exposed. By 1200 hours on 30 July, Sato exerted operational control over the following units: his own forces, Nakano's battalion east of Fangchuanting; Hirahara's reinforced battalion west of Chiangchunfeng; a platoon from Nakajima's infantry company on Hill 52; and Noguchi's company on Hill 147; and from other forces, Senda's 2nd (Kanda) BGU Company; two reinforced companies from Takenouchi's battalion of Okido's 76th Regiment near Shachaofeng; and a 75-mm half-battery from the 25th Mountain Artillery on the Manchurian side with Sato. On the Korean shore, another half-battery comprising two 15-centimeter howitzers from Narukawa's unit of the 15th Heavy Field Artillery was in place. The 19th Engineers operated near the crossing sites, though one platoon remained at Fangchuanting. Sato said, "We were now deployed at last, to cope with any situation." His command post was set in foxholes on open ground at Chiangchunfeng, a central hill that offered excellent observation and control over actions around Changkufeng to the east and Shachaofeng to the north. Not content with suspending the pullout of units and deploying additional combat troops across the Tumen, Suetaka decided to recall division headquarters, mountain artillery, cavalry, signal, medical, and veterinary personnel from Nanam. At dawn on 30 July, Nanam issued orders for Colonel Tanaka to move 500 men and 300 horses to Agochi by rail; most of the increment came from Tanaka's horse-drawn 25th Mountain Artillery. The colonel reached the Korean side of the Tumen at 05:00 on 31 July. The preceding emergency measures were being implemented by Suetaka, even as he received Nakamura's calming telegram of 30 July enjoining nonexpansion. Changkufeng Hill was not even mentioned. Nakamura's concern was typified by Kitano flying to the front. At 10:00 on 30 July, Kitano sent the division chief of staff a cautious follow-up cable: "Based on the consistent policy for handling the Changkufeng Incident and on the army commander's earlier telegram, kindly take steps to ensure careful action in connection with the affair in the Shachaofeng vicinity lest there be enlargement." At 13:45, Nakamura transmitted another restraining message to Suetaka: "The division is to secure … Chiangchunfeng and … the heights southwest of Shachaofeng, using present front-line units. Unless there is an enemy attack, however, resort to force will depend on separate orders." Several hours later, at 16:50, Nakamura received instructions from Tada: the Shachaofeng case was being left to the local forces, who were pursuing the desired policy of nonenlargement, but prompt reporting was desired. At 19:30, the retransmitted message was received by Kitano, already at the front with Suetaka at Kyonghun. After his units had crossed the Tumen on 30 July, Sato Kotoku ordered a strict watch and directed preparations for an assault based on the plans. He conferred with Senda at Chiangchunfeng and observed the enemy. Even after dawn, the frontline commanders who had crossed the river remained uncertain about when the attack would be staged. While Sato's force conducted reconnaissance to prepare for a daytime offensive, orders arrived around 08:00 indicating, "We intend a night attack, so conceal your activities." Daytime movements were prohibited. Sato then explained the impression he had derived from Senda and the intelligence on which he based his estimates: " Exploiting the impasse in diplomatic negotiation, the enemy side had steadily reinforced front-line offensive strength and trespassed anew near Shachaofeng. They now had a battalion and a half of infantry plus 20 artillery pieces in the area, some south of Shachaofeng and the others at four positions immediately east of Lake Khasan. At least a dozen (maybe 20) tanks were deployed in the sector opposite us. About 300 well-armed, active Russian troops were at Changkufeng. I decided that an attack ought to be staged that night. First of all, we were going to chill the insolent enemy by a courageous night assault—a method characteristic of the Imperial Army. Then all kinds of fire power were to be combined in a surprise attack against the positions. Our intention was to jo lt the Russians, demonstrate the true strength of our combat fire, and, by a combination of night and dawn attacks, cut down losses which our left-flank units would have incurred if a night assault alone were staged. We had considered two plans—a night attack against Changkufeng by the 3rd Battalion from the north, or by the 1st Battalion from the south. On 30 July, I decided to execute the second plan, using my 1st (Nakano's) Battalion, to avoid simultaneous involvement around Shachaofeng where the foe was by now alerted." The Japanese Army ordinarily favored surprise assaults without supporting guns, since firepower was regarded as secondary in close combat and artillery was in short supply. According to the regimental journal, telephone contacts from the morning of the 30th indicated that the division commander shared the same line of thinking as Sato. By noon, Suetaka made his stance explicit. A phone call from Kucheng conveyed to Sato the gist of a critical division order: first, a detailed briefing on Soviet troop concentrations and dispositions, firing positions, troops, and armor south of Shachaofeng; entanglements and forces at Changkufeng; large concentrations behind west of Khasan; tanks and ground formations moving north of the lake; a heavy concentration near the lake to the northwest; one confirmed and two suspected positions along the eastern shore and another with artillery far to the south. Then the order stated that K. Sato's forces, including the Takenouchi battalion from the 76th Infantry, one mountain artillery platoon, and one engineer platoon were to strengthen their positions and, at the same time, promptly evict from Manchurian territory the intruding and advancing enemy. However, pursuit must not be pushed too far lest the border be crossed. Shortly after noon, Suetaka issued another order to form a new force under Senda, who was to strengthen border security along the Shuiliufeng–Hunchun line. As with Sato, Senda was to eject the intruding and advancing enemy from Manchurian soil but not pursue them across the border. By midafternoon, Sato knew not only what he wanted to do but also Suetaka's intentions. At 15:30, he assembled all subordinate officers at Chiangchunfeng and dictated minute attack instructions. Intelligence indicated that the enemy continued to fortify points of importance along the Changkufeng–Shachaofeng line. Sato's plan was to annihilate hostile elements that had crossed the border north and south of Changkufeng. His concept went beyond a frontal assault. While Nakano's battalion would jump off south of Changkufeng, one reinforced company, Takeshita's 10th was to attack north. Since the sun rose at about 05:00, Sato intended to wipe out the enemy during three hours of darkness. Another battalion, Hirahara's 3rd would be held in reserve, with Ito's 6th Company ready to launch a night attack against Changkufeng from the northwest if necessary. Small forces deployed southeast at Hill 52 were to block the arrival of Soviet reinforcements around the southern shores of Khasan. Only after Changkufeng was secured and fire swept the high ground south of Shachaofeng would a reinforced battalion, Takenouchi's 1st from the 76th Regiment undertake a dawn assault to clear the Russians from that sector. An engineer platoon would assist both the night and dawn assault battalions with obstacle clearing. There would be no artillery support until dawn, when the available guns were to provide maximum coverage. Notably, even the movement of a single antitank gun warranted mention. Sato concluded the attack order by directing that each unit mask its intentions after sunset. Takenouchi was to act to check the enemy as soon as the sun went down. In connection with the dawn barrage against the enemy southwest of Shachaofeng, key personnel were to study the best way to exploit sudden fire described as gale and lightning. They were also to be ready to destroy enemy tanks. A green star shell would be fired to signal the success of the night attack. The code words were shojiki "honesty" and ydmo "bravery". At midnight, the regiment commander would be at the northwest foot of Chiangchunfeng. The order stressed typical night-attack precautions: secrecy and concealment, avoidance of confusion, antitank defense, and flare signaling of success. Sato added his own flair with his daily motto as code words and the reference to "whirlwind" fire. Impending action times were explicitly set when the order was issued at 15:30 on the 30th, more than ten hours before the 1st Battalion was to jump off. The key to success in a night assault lay in an absolute prohibition on firing by their side, and bold, courageous charging. Sato reminded his men that life is granted again after death. Nakano then assembled his company commanders east of Fangchuanting and issued his battalion order at 18:30. A few hours after Sato's briefing of the assault commanders, Suetaka arrived at the 75th Regiment command post. This visit late on 30 July is central to allegations that Sato, not Suetaka, conceived and executed the night attack on his own initiative. Divisional orders giving Sato his core mission had already been conveyed by telephone. After 16:00, Suetaka boarded a motorboat at Kucheng and went to the Manchurian side to verify front-line conditions. Soviet snipers south of Yangkuanping fired several shots, but his craft reached the Matsu'otsuho landing and proceeded to Chiangchunfeng to meet Sato. Sato described the situation: "frontline enemy forces had been reinforced steadily and had begun a vigorous offensive. The foe was provoking us, and the matter had grown very serious. I had already issued orders at 15:30 to take the initiative and deal the enemy a smashing blow." I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. On a frost-bitten dawn by the Chaun and Tumen, Russia and Japan lock eyes over Changkufeng. Diplomats urge restraint, yet Tokyo's generals push a bold gamble: seize a hill with a surprise strike and bargain later. Japanese divisions, engineers, and artillery edge toward the border, while Soviet sentries brace for a confrontation that could widen the war.

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From Cool Japan to Your Japan in 2025: What Japan Gets Rightand WrongAbout Cultural Promotion

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 21, 2025 46:51

Japans global appeal is undeniablebut how well do official narratives match what international audiences actually want? Drawing on his role as a Cool Japan Producer for the Japanese Cabinet Office, Benjamin W. Boas highlights the need to shift from a government-branded Cool Japan paradigm to the more participatory, fan-driven Your Japan. He examines whats working (content exports, inbound-tourism touchpoints, local city branding) and what still misses the mark (top-down campaigns, language access, and diversity). Boas shares behind-the-scenes examples from NHK WORLD programs and community-level projects in Nakano, and addresses todays so-called overtourism, arguing that many pain points are really problems of mismanagement. In contrast to top-down efforts, grassroots phenomena are filling the gap: from overseas anime fandoms to the growth of riichi (Japanese) mahjong clubs in New York City, organic cultural movements are shaping Your Japanthe personal Japan fans embrace on their own terms. He concludes with practical recommendations for educators, policymakers, and creatives on aligning domestic priorities with overseas expectations.

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153: Give My Regards to Nakano Broadway!

Go Home Heat: A Wrestling Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 24, 2025 25:33

FULL EPISODE! This time on the PURE TOKYOSCOPE Podcast, authors Matt Alt (⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Pure Invention: How Japan Made the Modern World⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠) and Patrick Macias (⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Mondo Tokyo: Dispatches from a Secret Japan⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠) try to catch their breath and make sense of the madness after a speed run through Nakano Broadway, Tokyo's insane otaku (and luxury watch?) shopping center!⁠⁠Join the PURE TOKYOSCOPE Patreon!⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠You'll get access to full episodes, bonus content, our Discord server, and an archive of past episodes. ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Head over to Pure TokyoScope Patreon to subscribe today!⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠INFO⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Matt Alt on Bluesky⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Patrick Macias on Bluesky⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Pure TokyoScope on YouTube⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠The podcast is produced by ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠jaPRESS LLC⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠© and edited by Patrick MaciasTheme song by Marxy, v.o. by RInRin Doll

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Mizkan's Megan Frank on Modernizing 100-Year-Old Brands Without Losing Their Soul

BRAVE COMMERCE

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 7, 2025 22:33

In this episode of BRAVE COMMERCE, Rachel Tipograph and Sarah Hofstetter sit down with Megan Frank, SVP of Marketing and R&D at Mizkan, the 221-year-old, family-owned food company behind iconic brands like RAGÚ, Bertolli, Nakano, and the newly acquired Zing Zang.With a portfolio of legacy brands that have stood the test of time, Megan shares how she keeps them relevant to today's consumer while staying true to their roots. She discusses the importance of preserving core brand assets, creating a culture of empowerment, and leveraging frameworks like OGSM to connect long-term vision to short-term action.Megan also explains how her team drives speed and agility within a family-owned structure, how retail partnerships are managed through data-backed joint business planning, and why consolidating media and shopper marketing under one team has unlocked more seamless consumer journeys.Key takeaways:Legacy brands can move fast. Clear vision and accountability empower teams to act with speed across functions.Relevance requires evolution. Megan shares how timeless assets and modern activations work together to engage new consumers.Data drives accountability. A custom measurement model helps Mizkan shift retailer conversations toward results-based planning. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

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The Hit List - Week 8: Kota Ibushi vs Ricochet, Giulia vs Tam Nakano, The Sandman vs Sabu and more!

Play Episode Listen Later Aug 3, 2025 46:18

Go Home Heat welcome back an old member of the crew as Jared, KP, Rae, and the returning Nick; review 5 unforgettable matches. Matches including Kota Ibushi vs Ricochet at Dominion 2014 in New Japan, Tam Nakano vs Giulia in the main event of All-Star Grand Queendom 2023, the 2006 Cage of Death match between team ROH and team CZW, Toshiaki Kawada passing the torch to Satoshi Kojima at AJPW Realize 2005, and the infamous Sabu vs The Sandman at ECW November To Remember 1997.

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- 191 - Pacific War Podcast - Fall of Wewak - July 15 - 22, 1945

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Play Episode Listen Later Jul 15, 2025 41:42

Last time we spoke about the end of the Bougainville campaign. In June 1945, the Australia and Allied forces intensified their campaign in the Pacific, spearheaded by General Hammer, as they battled entrenched Japanese troops on Bougainville. Following the capture of the Soraken Peninsula, the Australians aimed to control the strategic Hongorai River but faced fierce resistance. Meanwhile, General Kanda adjusted his strategies, pulling back Japanese forces to a defensive perimeter around Buin, allowing his troops to regroup. Australian battalions, notably the 24th and 57th/60th, pressed forward, making significant gains despite encountering numerous obstacles, including concealed mines and relentless counterattacks. The turning point came when they crossed the Hongorai River, marking a vital milestone in their advance. Ultimately, the combination of perseverance and tactical maneuvers set the stage for future successes within the broader context of the Pacific Theater. This episode is the Fall of Wewak Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. In the last episode we finished off the Bougainville campaign. Now its been 4 long ass grueling years for the boys fighting in New Guinea. Today we are finally going to finish that story. As we last saw, by early April 1945, General George Stevens and his 6th Australian Division were making significant strides in their Wewak offensive. The campaign, aimed at capturing the strategically important town of Wewak, was crucial for disrupting Japanese forces in New Guinea and aiding in their eventual defeat. Brigadier King's 16th Brigade had effectively secured the But and Dagua areas, notable locations that played vital roles in the region's agricultural landscape and supply lines. Simultaneously, Brigadier Moten's 17th Brigade was concentrating its efforts along the Ninab River, a key waterway that would facilitate the final drive toward Maprik, a town essential for both its infrastructure and resources. Facing intense Australian pressure, the remnants of General Mano's 41st Division were forced to retreat northwestward to Wora, a strategic village located near the coast, while the Miyake Force reorganized itself along the defensive line formed by the Imbia, Neligum, Kumbungua, and Bainy rivers. This area is characterized by its rugged terrain, dense jungles, and numerous waterways, making it a challenging environment for military operations. On April 3, General Moten ordered the 2/7th Battalion to advance toward Maprik and the Agricultural Station, aiming to seize this vital supply center. At the same time, the 2/6th Battalion was tasked with moving towards the Screw River to block any potential enemy retreats to the north. Hayforce, a composite group of Australian troops, was directed to push forward to the Maprik-Marui road. This mission was critical as it aimed to establish a new airfield, designated as Hayfield, to alleviate the pressing supply issues faced by Australian forces. The Australians began their assault towards Maprik, yet they quickly discovered that the enemy was well-prepared to defend this food-producing region. Throughout the week, they were largely limited to patrol actions as they engaged with scattered enemy forces. Concurrently, Hayforce advanced eastward, encountering strong resistance at Wora on April 10. This strategic location, once teeming with activity, had become a focal point for Japanese defense. On April 12, feeling increasingly under pressure, General Mano opted to abandon Wora, allowing him to concentrate his forces more effectively at Bainyik. This decision was pivotal, as it permitted Australian forces to secure the site of the proposed airstrip, enhancing their logistical capabilities. Meanwhile patrols had been pressing on from village to village. On 28th March, for example, Sergeant J. W. Hedderman, of the 2/6th, a notable leader in these as in earlier operations, had led a reconnaissance to Kulkuil and Gwanginan. Next day he led a fighting patrol which took Kulkuil with a carefully-planned surprise attack. On the 30th Lieutenant Errey's platoon (16), with Hedderman as platoon sergeant, attacked Gwanginan. Hedderman confused the enemy by shouting to imaginary platoons to right and left (thus incidentally drawing fire on himself); and when the leading section was halted he brought down supporting fire and enabled it to move again. A man was wounded within 10 yards of the enemy's pits; Hedderman went forward, killed two Japanese with grenades, and dragged his comrade to safety. The enemy were 25 to 30 strong and the attack failed despite these gallant efforts. Hedderman covered the withdrawal, firing until all others had gone. On 30th March a patrol found Mairoka clear of the enemy and on 4th April Lieutenant Gordon's platoon established a patrol base there. On the 7th Errey's platoon attacked a village to the east of the Milak villages but without success, Lieutenant Errey being killed, and Sergeant Layfield wounded. Chicanambu was occupied on the 9th. On April 15, two companies from the 2/6th pushed eastward towards the Screw River. Over the next five days, they faced strong opposition as they engaged in fierce skirmishes and patrol actions to secure critical territories, ultimately capturing Wambak, Kombichagi, and Bungara. Each of these locations represented not only strategic advantages but also a deepening impact on the local population and the broader campaign dynamics. On April 15, 1945, the 2/7th Battalion launched its main assault, with one company advancing towards the line of Nimrod Creek. This location, nestled within the dense jungles of New Guinea, proved to be strategically significant yet perilous. As they approached, Australian troops encountered heavily defended and camouflaged pillboxes, fortifications designed to protect the Japanese troops stationed in the area. Despite the challenges, they managed to secure a long, kunai-covered spur to the northeast of a critical area known as Maprik 2 by the following day. On April 17, another company from the 2/7th continued the offensive, advancing toward a target referred to as Maprik 1. They reached a point approximately 400 yards northwest of the objective but soon found themselves in a precarious situation as they became surrounded on both flanks the next day. It was not until April 19 that they successfully broke through to the southwest, escaping their encirclement. The House Tamboran feature, a prominent ridge north of Maprik 1, was finally secured on April 20. This strategic high ground was essential for controlling the surrounding terrain and allowing further advances in the area. The following day, the 2/7th began probing towards the Maprik airstrip and Bainyik. Their efforts to secure the airstrip were fruitful within the next few days; however, they faced staunch resistance at both Maprik 2 and Bainyik, where Japanese forces continued to mount a determined defense. On April 25, the Australians crossed the Screw River, a vital waterway that flows through this region, on their way toward Midpum Creek, which they reached the following day. This movement was crucial for maintaining momentum in the campaign. While the 2/7th Battalion was engaged in heavy fighting, patrols from the 2/6th Battalion successfully secured the Neligum villages, although they encountered strong Japanese resistance at Mangumbu. This locality, bordered by lush vegetation and steep hills, served as a vital defensive position for Japanese forces. Simultaneously, intelligence reports about a small enemy contingent under Lieutenant-Colonel Takenaga Masaharu positioned at Tau prompted a swift response. On April 16, a platoon from the 2/5th Battalion departed from Aitape, a coastal town known for its strategic significance during the campaign. They tracked down the Japanese troops and engaged them at Kubriwat on April 24. After the Kubriwat engagement, Colonel Takenaga's troops managed to shake off pursuit by the Australians; yet as the Australians continued to harass them, Takenaga ultimately decided that they would surrender. They took a leaflet containing a notice of surrender that one of the soldiers had been carrying, added some conditions underneath in English, tied it to a pole for the Australians to find, and left the area. Scouts from Miles' platoon then found the leaflet and brought it back with them. On May 2, the Australian platoon spotted Takenaga's unit near Womgrer village, and asked a native to help them make contact. Two truce bearers from the Japanese side came to the Australians to negotiate, and on the following day Takenaga's unit surrendered at Womgrer and were disarmed. At the time of surrender, Takenaga's unit consisted of 42 men: five officers (including Takenaga), four warrant officers, and 33 non-commissioned officers and soldiers. They were equipped with five light machine guns, 17 rifles, five pistols, and 750 rounds of ammunition. The prisoners, escorted by Miles' platoon, marched for three days in an orderly fashion to Maprik Airport, and were then transported to Aitape. Takenaga's unit were held in Aitape for around one month, before being broken up and sent to prison camps in Lae and in Australia, where they received good treatment. They were all interrogated, and in particular, Takenaga was transported to Manila for a detailed interrogation. As well as giving character information about the commanders of the 18th Army, Takenaga gave his opinion of how the Allies should deal with Emperor Hirohito: "If the Emperor is killed then the Japanese people will resist until the bitter end, but if there is an order from the Emperor then they will probably surrender peacefully." Back in the Maprik sector, while Hayforce conducted probing operations and successfully captured Yentagim in early May, the Miyake Force began a withdrawal toward the Loanim-Yamil-Kumbungua line. This defensive line was a series of natural features and fortified positions designed to obstruct the advancing Australian troops. On the northern flank, the 2/6th Battalion also continued to patrol eastward, successfully securing the strategically important Mangumbu on May 2. This advancement not only disrupted enemy operations but also paved the way for further Australian advances in the region. On May 8, 1945, the 2/7th Battalion launched a decisive attack, successfully capturing part of the Kumbungua Ridge, a strategically significant high ground dominating the surrounding terrain. Two flame-throwers had now been received by the 2/7th and on 8th May these were used to drive the enemy from part of the narrow steep-sided Kumbungua ridge. The Japanese made off, abandoning 30 weapon-pits, but engaged the Australians from a knoll farther up the ridge. Just three days later, they captured the southern end of the ridge while another company moved to occupy Waigakum 1, a forward position that offered a crucial vantage point over the area. Flame-throwers were proving very effective. On 10th May the 2/7th occupied Waigakum 1, and on the 11th a platoon with flame-throwers attacked and took a position where the defenders abandoned 50 packs. Another platoon approached the knoll at the south end of the Kumbungua ridge from the south, attacked up a steep slope and put to flight the defenders who abandoned 25 packs and 100 sticks of gelignite. The Japanese opened fire, however, from higher up and, the ground being unsuitable for defence, the platoon withdrew. By May 13, following effective air support that softened enemy defenses, central Kumbungua was found abandoned by Japanese forces, a testament to the pressure the Australians had applied. The following day, after another heavy bombardment from both aircraft and artillery, the entire ridge was finally secured, marking a significant accomplishment in the campaign. Pressing on, the Australians cleared the area northeast of Kalabu by May 26. However, they faced stiff resistance and found it challenging to make further advances. As a result, the 2/7th Battalion reorganized to defend the captured positions, consolidating their gains to ensure they could withstand potential counterattacks from the tenacious enemy. In the meantime, on May 17, Waigakum 2 fell to Australian troops. This success forced the cutoff remnants of General Mano's 41st Division to begin their retreat to the east, as the Australians patrolled further towards Malba, another critical location along their advance. The loss of Waigakum to the 2/7th Battalion in mid-May had a very upsetting effect on the Japanese. It was the point of junction between Miyake Force, now 800 strong, and the 41st Division and, according to General Yoshiwara, this loss led directly to the withdrawal from Kalabu and Loanim. On the 19th a platoon, guided by natives, surprised six Japanese in a garden south-east of Kalabu. Here Private Jenkins" came upon one Japanese asleep outside a weapon-pit. As he was within feet of me (wrote Jenkins later) I thought it was an excellent opportunity to take a prisoner so I woke him with a light kick and pulled him to his feet with my left hand, keeping my Owen gun in my right. I had managed to get my prisoner some paces from his position when a slight noise alerted his mates and they opened fire on the patrol. With this the Jap broke from my grasp and I was forced to shoot him. One other Japanese was killed and the others made off.Turning their attention northward, the 2/6th Battalion attempted to attack the village of Jamei on May 20. However, they were met with fierce resistance from Japanese defenders, which compelled the Australians to bombard the area intensively with artillery and air strikes until the enemy was finally forced to retreat on May 25. While the Australians were continuing to probe towards Yamil, elements of the 2/7th Battalion executed successful attacks in the Malba area, which was ultimately secured by the end of the month. This marked a crucial step in their advance as they pushed deeper into enemy territory. Meanwhile, in the coastal sector, Brigadier King's 16th Brigade concentrated its efforts east of the But River, extending up to the Kofi area. At the same time, Brigadier Martin's 29th Brigade assembled at But, preparing for the final drive toward Wewak, a town that had become a strategic target for Allied forces in their campaign to eradicate Japanese presence in New Guinea. On April 14, the 2/1st Battalion passed through the lines of the 2/2nd Battalion, launching an attack toward the Karawop-Wisling area. This sector, known for its rugged topography and dense underbrush, finally fell to the relentless Australian assaults two days later after a series of intense company-level attacks. On April 25, the 2/1st Battalion occupied the crucial 1800 Feature without facing any opposition. This high ground provided them with significant tactical advantages in the ongoing conflict. Meanwhile, the 2/3rd Battalion, positioned to the north, successfully launched an attack on Boiken Plantation. Their efforts were rewarded as they advanced to Kalimboa the following day, further consolidating Australian positions in the region. On April 27, 1945, the 2/2nd Battalion moved swiftly through the advancing lines, pushing forward to Hawain and crossing the river in their quest to engage Japanese forces. Concurrently, the 2/3rd Battalion patrolled south along Boiken Creek, where they encountered significant enemy resistance in the Koanumbo area. After a series of determined assaults, this area was ultimately secured by May 2, allowing the Australians to fortify their positions. At this point in the campaign, Brigadier Martin's 19th Brigade took over the advance towards Cape Wom, and subsequently, the strategic objective of Wewak. This movement coincided with preparations by Lieutenant-Colonel Eric Hennessy's 2/6th Commando Regiment, which was organizing for a surprise landing east of Cape Moem, a critical maneuver aimed at outflanking Japanese defenses. On May 3, the 2/4th Battalion advanced from Hawain, managing to cover six miles without facing any opposition. By the next day, they reached Wom without incident. As night fell, Australian patrols had already established a presence along the Waringe River, preparing for further actions. During this time, patrols targeted Japanese stragglers in the vicinity, eliminating several and gathering intelligence. Reconnaissance units were then sent forward to Minga Creek to assess enemy positions while the 2/4th secured Yarabos on May 7, progressively tightening the noose around Japanese defenses. Meanwhile, the 2/8th Battalion, positioned on the right flank, engaged in a series of minor clashes, successfully capturing Ranimboa on May 4, followed by Numikim just days later. These advances were crucial in pressuring the remaining Japanese forces, which, under Generals Adachi and Nakano, were increasingly evident in their abandonment of the substantial base at Wewak. Their main forces began to withdraw over the rugged terrain of the Prince Alexander Mountains, leaving behind strong rearguards tasked with covering their exit routes from Wewak. To counter this withdrawal, the 2/11th Battalion and the 2/7th Commando Squadron were dispatched on a wide encircling movement towards the Sauri villages and Wirui Mission, aiming to cut off the retreating Japanese forces. Meanwhile, the 2/4th Battalion crossed Minga Creek and launched an attack towards Wewak on May 8, seeking to claim the final strategic stronghold. Two days later, bolstered by supporting tanks and artillery, the 2/4th Battalion initiated a vigorous assault on Wewak Point. This area, positioned at the very tip of the peninsula, was essential for controlling the coastal approaches to Wewak. After a hard-fought engagement, the Australians successfully seized the entirety of Wewak Point, subsequently mopping up the remaining Japanese soldiers who had entrenched themselves in the caves along the cliffs, effectively concluding the intense fighting in this region. At 12.15 two companies were ordered to mop up.cThat afternoon a flame-thrower fired into a bunker apparently lit a dump of bombs which blew up. Smith's company found several occupied caves and, since the Japanese would not surrender, merely picqueted them until engineers arrived and blew up the entrances, sealing the Japanese in. It was estimated that about 50 perished in the caves; by midnight 65 other dead had been counted and three 75-mm guns and two 20-mm had been captured. In a brilliant action the Australians, supported by tanks and more than 40 field guns, had lost only 2 killed and 17 wounded. Mopping up was continued next day, and no live Japanese remained on the point by midday. Finally it was estimated that from 180 to 200 Japanese had been killed. On May 11, 1945, following their progress along the Big Road, the 2/11th Battalion set out to occupy the strategic 620, 710, and 770 Features. However, they soon encountered unexpected resistance over the following days. This was not merely an isolated skirmish; it was part of a broader engagement as they pressed their advance against the entrenched Japanese defenders. Meanwhile, an important operation was unfolding to the west. The 2/9th and 2/10th Commando Squadrons, supported by a small flotilla formed around the sloop Swan, successfully landed on Dove Bay's Red Beach, located just to the west of Forok Point. This maneuver was critical, as it disrupted Japanese supply lines and provided the Australians with a foothold to cut off the Wewak Road. Following their landing, the squadrons dispatched patrols eastward, further isolating Japanese forces. The next day, the 2/3rd Machine-Gun Battalion secured the junction of the Wewak Road and Forok Creek, a key point for controlling the surrounding areas, while the 2/9th Commando Squadron patrolled past Mandi, gaining valuable intelligence. The 2/4th Battalion, capitalizing on this chaos, pressed forward to secure the Wewak airfield and the Wirui Mission, both of which were vital for maintaining air support and supply routes in the theater of operations. On May 13, the 2/11th Battalion successfully captured the 620 Feature, a crucial hill that provided vantage points over the battlefield. However, they struggled to take the 710 Feature the next day, as Japanese resistance intensified in the rugged foothills south of the Big Road. On 14th May, the 2/11th being heavily engaged in the foothills south of the Big Road, Lt Martin had ordered the 2/4th to attack Wirui Mission, which was on a steep kunai-covered hill about 300 feet high dominating the airfield. Approaching from the east through tall kunai the leading com-pany with a troop of tanks soon took the first objective-dominating ground about half way up the hill. Captain Smith's company passed through and, with the tanks, whose crews estimated that they killed about 30 Japanese, reached the top. By nightfall the top and the eastern slopes were held but the Japanese were fighting back from bunkers on the north-west slopes. Next day Smith's company attacked these remaining bunkers. The lead-ing section was halted by intense fire after several men had been hit. Private Kenna, in the supporting section, which was firing on the bunkers at a range of only 50 yards, stood up in the kunai grass in full view of the enemy and fired his Bren at one of the Japanese machine-gun posts. The Japanese machine-gunners returned his fire but failed to hit him. Kenna then said to Private Rau who was beside him that the Japanese "had a bead on him" and he asked for Rau's rifle. Still standing, he fired four rifle shots and silenced the enemy post. He then took the Bren again and opened fire on another post about 70 yards away and silenced it too. The remaining post was then knocked out by a tank; soon the 2/4th and 2/11th were in contact. About 40 Japanese were killed and perhaps 20 escaped in the fight for the mission. Large quantities of weapons, vehicles, generators, tele-phones and other equipment were found there. Possession of Wirui Mission gave complete control of the Wewak coastal plain. Captured papers made it possible to make a fairly precise estimate of the forces immediately round Wewak: Kato Force, built round the 25th Airfield Battalion and about 300 strong, was holding from Sauri to Wirui Creek; Jinka Force, about 400 strong, was holding from Wirui Creek to the east, including Boram airfield, and south into the range as far as Passam; to the east was Aoyama Force, of unknown strength; the coastal plain to a depth of about 1,000 yards was not held in strength, and it was thought that there would be little opposition on the coast at least as far as Boram airfield Supported by artillery fire and through persistent efforts, the 2/11th finally took the 710 Feature on May 15, which allowed them to begin patrolling towards the 770 Feature and the nearby Klewalin, two additional strongholds that were key to the entire operation. Simultaneously, since May 11, the 2/7th Commando Squadron had been engaged in fierce fighting. They maneuvered through a series of knolls in the Sauri villages area, which they ultimately cleared by May 16, further tightening the noose around Japanese defenses. On that same day, after intense air and naval bombardments prepared the way, the 2/8th Battalion began their advance toward Boram. This crucial location fell into their hands unopposed by nightfall, allowing significant advances in the Australian front line. However, on May 17, as the 2/8th Battalion continued its push to the mouth of Boram Creek, they encountered a strongly-held Japanese position. This area, characterized by intricate terrain and dense jungle cover, presented formidable challenges as they sought to advance further into Japanese-occupied territory. The enemy bunkers would remain a formidable obstacle until May 20, when a heavy bombardment finally rendered them inoperative. Following this, the Australians seized the opportunity to exploit their gains and advanced further east to occupy Cape Moem. This maneuver allowed them to establish contact with the commando force at Brandi Plantation just two days later, strengthening their foothold along the coast. On May 24, the 2/11th Battalion occupied the strategic 770 feature after enduring its own heavy bombardment. Three days later, they managed to destroy the last remnants of enemy forces south of the 710 feature, marking a significant step in the campaign. On May 25, the 2/4th Battalion also launched a patrol into the village of Koigin, taking the location after a sharp and intense fight. However, amidst these operations, Brigadier Martin fell ill with malaria and was temporarily replaced by Lieutenant-Colonel John Bishop, a shift that would guide the troops through the operational challenges ahead. By the end of May, the 6th Division had pushed most remnants of the Japanese 18th Army away from the coast, including their vital base at Wewak. The Japanese forces were now confined within the rugged, mountainous terrain, squeezed between the 17th Brigade, positioned forward of Maprik to the west, and the remainder of the 6th Division to the north. In preparation for the next phase of their campaign, General Moten set out to secure the line from Solongan to Kulauru Mission. The 2/5th Battalion relieved the 2/7th Battalion and moved against Kulauru and Ulupu, while the 2/6th Battalion advanced towards Yamil. The Australians acted swiftly and decisively, rapidly capturing Newton's Knoll and Palketia during the first week of June. On June 10, after extensive air strikes and bombardments weakened enemy defenses, the 2/6th Battalion successfully entered Yamil. Just three days later, on June 13, the 2/5th Battalion continued their momentum by capturing Yamil 3 and Yuman as the beleaguered Miyake Force began its retreat towards Ulupu, indicating the deteriorating situation for Japanese forces in the region. Despite the Australians' relentless advance and the heavy bombardment inflicted upon them, the Japanese remained determined to defend Kunai Spur. Their tenacity meant that the Australians could only secure Yamil 4 on June 24, underscoring the intensity of the fighting in this strategic area. At this critical juncture, the 2nd New Guinea Battalion arrived in the Hayfield area to patrol southwards towards Kwimbu, Mikau, and Kunjinge. These movements further reinforced the Australian positions and set the stage for the continuing efforts to dismantle the last remnants of Japanese resistance in the region. On June 11, 1945, the 2/8th Battalion successfully seized Hill 1 after a concentrated air and artillery bombardment that softened up the enemy defenses. This pivotal victory allowed them to establish a critical foothold in the area, vital for subsequent operations. Just five days later, on June 16, both artillery and aircraft targeted Hill 2 and Shiburangu, two crucial positions that had become points of interest in the ongoing campaign. After numerous attempts and repeated efforts by the infantry, the Australians ultimately captured Hill 2, a strategic vantage point that further pressured Japanese forces in the region.At 8 a.m. on 16th June aircraft struck both Hill 2 and Shiburangu and then the artillery began a program in which 3,000 rounds were fired. One company began to advance on Hill 2 at 9.30. Warrant-Officer Fisk's platoon, which was forward, met heavy fire from snipers on both flanks and machine-gun fire from the hills and lost one man killed and one wounded. It withdrew to the cover of the spur and moved to outflank the enemy on the left. Meanwhile at 9.45 a second company had taken the pocket without opposition. At 10 a.m. the first company was still held. The men rested under the lip of the hill while the artillery again bombarded the enemy's positions and flame-throwers were brought forward. At 1.30 the company surged over the crest of the hill and, after close fighting in which each bunker was grenaded, the surviving Japanese fled leaving 38 visible dead and perhaps another 20 buried by the air and artillery bombardment. The Australians lost 2 killed and 3 wounded. "Aerial bombing coupled with artillery concentration does not deter the enemy from fighting nor unsettle him unduly," wrote the battalion diarist. "Such fanatical resistance in face of such odds makes the capturing of these strong points no light task." Meanwhile, the 2/4th Battalion worked diligently to clear the eastern side of the Koigin-Tazaki track, progressing 600 yards south of Koigin by June 13. This advancement helped secure vital supply routes and reinforced the Australians' operational capabilities. On June 14, the Australians continued their momentum by successfully securing Mount Kawakubo, another significant terrain feature. Five days later, on June 19, the 2/4th and 2/11th Battalions launched a coordinated attack towards Tazaki. Thanks to the overwhelming support of air and artillery bombardments, Tazaki ultimately fell into Australian hands by June 24, marking yet another victory in their relentless push against Japanese defenses. On June 22, the 2/8th captured the last knoll before Shiburangu. Following this success, artillery began to register targets on Shiburangu, setting the stage for a significant assault. By June 27, after a particularly heavy air and artillery bombardment that saturated the area with firepower, the 2/8th Battalion launched a bold attack to seize Shiburangu. Utilizing an outflanking maneuver, they managed to surprise the fierce defenders, overcoming their determined resistance. As the 2/4th Battalion cleared the remaining enemy pockets in the Tazaki area, the 2/8th Battalion pressed their advantage, attacking and securing the area to the west on July 3. The two battalions effectively linked up two days later, solidifying their control over the region and paving the way for further advances in the campaign. Looking back to the southwest, after nearly three weeks of stiff resistance, the Japanese finally abandoned Kunai Spur on July 3, 1945. This withdrawal opened the door for Australian forces, who swiftly occupied Ulupu just two days later. The effort to clear the surrounding area began in earnest, but it wasn't until July 8 that the strongly-held northern knoll was taken after intense fighting. On July 9, through a sustained bombardment, the Japanese were driven out of Ulum, marking a significant breakthrough; their defense system had been shattered. Following this success, patrols from the 2/5th Battalion advanced rapidly, moving forward about 2000 yards with only minor skirmishes. They reached and occupied Kulauru Mission on July 11, reinforcing the Australians' control over the area. Pressing northeast, the remaining Japanese forces in the vicinity were rapidly dispersed, and by July 18, Ilipem fell into Australian hands. During this time, the 2/6th Battalion was busy securing the Ulunkohoitu Ridge, further consolidating the Australians' hold on the region. At the same time, the 2nd New Guinea Battalion had been probing south and east, successfully securing critical locations such as Kongambe, Kwandaning, Naila, and Gisanambu. With the Japanese now regrouping along the Kaboibus-Ahegulim-Gwalip line, General Moten aimed to accelerate the advance, directing both the 2nd New Guinea Battalion and the rested 2/7th Battalion to converge on Gwalip. Meanwhile, the 2/5th and 2/6th Battalions pressed east towards Kaboibus. Despite facing challenges and some failed attacks against Dunbit and Aoniaru, the New Guineans were able to concentrate their forces near Gwalip by July 22, and five days later, Sigora fell to their determined assault. On July 30, they launched an attack and captured Ulama, nearly catching General Mano's headquarters at Winge in the process, which forced the defenders to retreat towards Suaui. As momentum continued to build, the 2/5th Battalion pressed on, supported by heavy air strikes. By August 1, they had successfully taken Gwenik, further disrupting Japanese lines. The following day, as the Australians advanced along the Kaboibus Ridge, they successfully occupied the Kaboibus villages. To their astonishment, they encountered only minor opposition, underscoring the disarray within the Japanese ranks as the Australians continued their relentless push through the region. On August 4, 1945, the 2/5th Battalion successfully seized Ahegulim, a strategic location that added to their momentum. Three days later, they captured Malabeim, completing their objectives in the region. Following this success, the Australians began probing towards Mount Irup, further extending their influence over the landscape. Concurrently, on August 6, the 2/7th Battalion embarked on a wide movement from Sigora aimed at Kiarivu, reaching this target two days later. This advance was part of a broader campaign in which New Guinean troops also secured key areas such as Miyamboara and Mananingi, reflecting the persistent efforts of Moten's 17th Brigade as they conducted their final offensive actions. Turning to the eastern front, the 8th Brigade's 30th and 35th Battalions had relieved the 2/4th and 2/11th Battalions in early July, taking charge of the Wirui Creek-Mandi area. On July 13, Brigadier Martin, who had resumed command of the 19th Brigade, ordered the 2/8th Battalion to capture the critical positions known as The Blot and Hambrauri. Following this directive, the Australians successfully attacked and seized The Blot the very next day. On July 16, Hambrauri 1 fell into Australian hands without opposition, allowing them to begin probing towards another strategically important feature: St. Patrick's. After significant preparations and a heavy bombardment, St. Patrick's was captured on July 21. The following day, the 2/8th Battalion captured Hambrauri 2 with little resistance, showcasing their growing operational effectiveness. During this time, the 2/1st Battalion executed a diversionary thrust along the Sambukaua Track, drawing Japanese attention away from main Australian advances. Simultaneously, the 2/6th Commando Regiment faced daring infiltration attempts to the west in the vicinity of Boiken, further complicating the operational landscape. On June 24 five Japanese approaching along the beach entered the Angau compound at Wisling, stole 3 Owen guns, a pistol, and 3 Japanese rifles. A patrol followed these marauders, killed 2 and retrieved the weapons. Next day about 10 Japanese ambushed a party of the 2/10th Commando Squadron south of Boiken Plantation and killed Lieutenant Martin and wounded 4 others; and that night about 20 stole into the plantation. On June 28 signs were found that some 35 Japanese had slept the previous night 400 yards from a commando perimeter. On July 23 a commando patrol had a sharp clash with perhaps 40 Japanese in the hills south of Wanpea and more than 15 miles west of Wewak; 8 Japanese were killed as well as 4 Australians. The Japanese were justly proud of the valour and successes of the raiding parties which harassed the Australians between Wewak and Dagua in May, June and July. Several groups were organised and trained for these enterprises, the most celebrated being led by Lieutenant Saito Hachiro of the 78th Regiment who had first earned fame as a patrol leader in the Huon Peninsula fighting. In June his party set off to raid Maprik, but was intercepted, Saito and most of his followers being killed. From June 15 onwards two parties of raiders operated in the Karawop and Boiken areas with the object of diverting their enemy's strength away from the 51st Division farther east. These parties, which claimed to have killed more than 100 Australians (a wild overestimate) were the ones coped with by the 2/6th Commando Regiment. Another series of raids in late July and early August were considered less successful, because of improved Australian security measures. On July 25, Japanese General Adachi issued orders for a "last stand" around the areas of Nyakombi and Sassuia. The main body of the 18th Army was now in an are facing north and west. The 51st Division was on the right opposing the troops advancing from Wewak, the 20th Division in the centre and the 41st on the left. Yoshiwara had now reported that the food resources of the Sepik area were less than had been believed, though there might be more in the hinterland. Already about 2,800 troops were stationed in the Sepik Valley from Marienberg to about Kanganaman and were living off the country. Adachi decided to make a last stand in the area embracing, in the north, Nyakombi and Sassuia. Here they would fight on "as long as ammunition and food are available and at least until the end of September". Liaison was to be maintained with the force in the Sepik area which was to prepare to carry on "ambush warfare" after the main force had been wiped out. This plan had been conveyed to Field Marshal Terauchi, commanding the Southern Army, and he approved it on 8th July. Despite its many setbacks during the campaign, Terauchi sent a citation to the 18th Army. It was the first time that a Japanese army had been so honoured. The citation ran: "To the 18th Army and all attached units: With Lieut-General Hatazo Adachi as your com-mander, you have fought vigorously for three years in north-east New Guinea, where numerous epidemics prevailed and where the terrain was hitherto unknown to any Japanese. When the enemy occupied the west coast in April 1944, to cut off supplies, you learned to live off grass and trees, and by making the best of the situation, you conquered all unfavourable conditions. Officers and soldiers alike displayed the true spirit of the Japanese Army. Wherever you encountered the enemy, you crushed them and inflicted many casualties. You have inspired fear into the hearts of the enemy and diverted their sea and air strength, thereby contributing much to the Southern Army's operations and furthermore, to all the Armies of the Empire. You were able to accomplish this through the excellent leadership, planning, fidelity and character of your Army Commander. By the sense of sincerity, loyalty and moral obligation of all the troops, you have set a model for all men to follow. I hereby present this citation and proclaim this to all the Armies." Amidst these developments, Major General Stevens was orchestrating a series of troop reliefs along the front lines. King's 16th Brigade was set to replace the 19th Brigade, which in turn would relieve the 17th Brigade to the west, ensuring continuous pressure on Japanese positions while maintaining the momentum of the Australian advance. Consequently, on July 28, 1945, the 2/2nd Battalion relieved the 2/8th in the Hambrauri area, immediately dispatching patrols to probe towards Numoikum. Their operational efforts culminated in the successful seizure of Mount Shoto on August 2. By August 6, with the backing of artillery fire, the Australians had secured Numoikum and Rindogim. However, this marked the last offensive action in the area, as the Australians shifted their focus to patrolling forward in order to consolidate their gains. By the end of the Aitape-Wewak Campaign, the 6th Division had sustained significant casualties, with 442 men killed and 1,141 wounded, while inflicting heavy losses on Japanese forces, estimated at around 9,000 killed and capturing 269 prisoners. With this chapter closed, it was time to shift the scene to Balikpapan, where the conclusion of the Borneo Campaign awaited. As we rejoin the action, by July 9, General Milford's 7th Australian Division had largely secured the Balikpapan area. Brigadier Chilton's 18th Brigade executed a successful landing at Penadjam, Djinabora, and Teloktebang on the western side of the bay. Simultaneously, Brigadier Eather's 25th Brigade advanced towards Batuchampar along Milford Highway, while Brigadier Dougherty's 21st Brigade secured key positions in the Sepinggang and Manggar areas. On July 10, the 2/31st Battalion secured the Cello position and the fallen-timber area directly in front with crucial support from artillery and tanks. In a bold move, one of their companies launched an attack towards the position known as Coke; however, this assault was met with fierce resistance and was ultimately repelled by intense crossfire from well-entrenched defenders. To the left of their advance, the 2/6th Commando Squadron probed toward Sumber Kiri, successfully securing the village and bolstering the Australians' hold in the region. At this moment, the 2/27th Battalion took over the left flank at Manggar, which allowed the exhausted 2/14th Battalion to probe towards Sambodja without risk of being outflanked. The next day, as the 2/27th moved through the 2/14th to occupy Lamaru, the 2/25th Battalion began the process of relieving the weary 2/31st, ensuring that fresh forces could continue the advance. On July 12, the commandos initiated probing operations towards a position known as Charm, successfully occupying both Cloncurry and Abash in the following two days. These captures were significant in securing the area and maintaining the momentum of the Australian advance through Balikpapan. After extensive patrolling on both sides of the highway, the 2/25th Battalion finally dispatched two companies on July 14 to occupy the strategic locations of Cart and Calm. These efforts led to the successful securing of Cocoa, Calm, and Chair, all achieved without resistance. That same day, to the east, patrols discovered Amborawang and the ridges north of Bale unoccupied. Recognizing this opportunity, the 2/27th Battalion moved into the area three days later. On July 15, the 2/9th Battalion sent patrols towards Separi and along the Parehpareh River, aiming to cut the enemy's lines of communication. Concurrently, the 2/25th Battalion solidified its control over Cart, enabling them to dominate the highway from both the east and west. However, their position was soon contested as they faced a series of heavy Japanese counterattacks during the following nights, testing their resolve and defensive capabilities. By July 17, the 2/25th had moved to occupy Charm, situated prominently by the highway, while a company from the 2/33rd Battalion took over Cart, allowing both units to repel yet another strong night counterattack from Japanese forces. The next day, the 2/27th finally entered the unoccupied Sambodja area, while patrols began to probe westward toward the Milford Highway. On July 19, the 2/31st Battalion cleared the last remnants of Japanese presence from the highway, paving the way for uninterrupted Australian operations. The following day, the 2/25th destroyed a robust enemy pocket, allowing them to occupy Abide without further incident. On July 21, the remaining Japanese forces retreated from the Batuchampar area, prompting the Australians to push toward Pope's Track while extensively patrolling northward. By this time, the bulk of the 2/1st Pioneer Battalion had been landed at Djinabora, establishing a patrol base in the Tempadung area. A week later, following a naval bombardment, the Australians occupied Pamaluan and began probing operations to the east and north. This series of actions marked the conclusion of the Battle of Balikpapan. The Australians opted to halt any offensive operations at this point and instead focus on consolidating their positions through enhanced patrolling. During the course of the battle, Australian forces tragically suffered 229 killed and 634 wounded, while inflicting significant losses on the Japanese, with approximately 2,032 killed and 63 captured. Thus, Australian casualties for the broader Borneo Campaign totaled around 2,100, while Japanese losses were estimated at around 4,700. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. General George Stevens led brave troops against the entrenched Japanese forces aiming to capture the strategic town of Wewak. Despite fierce resistance and rugged terrain, they successfully advanced, featuring key victories after relentless battles. Australian artillery and infantry engaged in daring assaults, securing vital positions like the Kumbungua Ridge and establishing airfields. As the campaign progressed, Japanese forces dwindled, ultimately surrendering at Wewak.

australia english battle fall turning australian japanese kings army facing track empire calm large pope pacific feature newton utilizing coke flame emperor allies jenkins abide jap possession pressing cart charm swan officers captured manila kofi brigades allied scouts bale generals aerial cello cocoa armies battalion reconnaissance tau liaison regiment new guinea knoll concurrently wom rau blot saito passam opium wars pacific war yamil bougainville pacific theater nakano ulama naila moten mopping adachi lae battalions malba japanese army balikpapan hayfield captain smith winge cloncurry ulum craig watson sepik buin commando regiment yoshiwara

679. Said Karlsson om att guida till Tokyos höjdpunkter

Arkiv Samtal

Play Episode Listen Later Jul 11, 2025 66:10

Said Karlsson är fotograf och bosatt i Tokyo. Denna veckan guidar han till höjdpunkterna direkt från ett karaokebås i Nakano. Det finns ett bonusavsnitt på 34 minuter för dig som donerar valfri summa till den här podden på Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/arkivsamtalMin film Serietecknaren finns nu SF Anytime!https://www.sfanytime.com/sv/movie/serietecknarenJag har standupgig i Stockholm, Norrtälje, Malmö, Lund och Linköping bl.a. Biljetter till allt det här hittar ni på gardenfors.comSwish: 0760724728X: @gardenforsInstagram: @gardenforsFacebook: Arkiv Samtal - eftersnackgruppen Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

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Ikigai Musing With Rock Legend Sunplaza Nakano Kun

The Ikigai Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later May 28, 2025 64:19 Transcription Available

Ready to let ikigai rock your world?In this episode of the Ikigai Podcast, Nick speaks with Sunplaza Nakano Kun to explore how his music captures the spirit of ikigai and inspires his fans.Sunplaza Nakano Kun is a Japanese musician, writer, and singer for the band BAKUFU- SLUMP (爆風スランプ). Beyond his music career, he has also worked as a radio personality and author—a man of many talents.

WWE Releases, NJPW Dontaku, Tam Nakano Retires, Mayu Iwatani Joins Marigold | Grapsody 5/3/25

Fightful | MMA & Pro Wrestling Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later May 3, 2025 221:30

Phil Lindsey (@PhilDL616) and Righteous Reg (@RighteousReg) return for a new edition of Grapsody!This week, the guys will discuss a variety of topics.- WWE Releases - NJPW Dontaku,- Tam Nakano Retires- Mayu Iwatani Joins Marigold Ask a question or make a statement and get it read on the show! Donate a Superchat or HumperChat! To donate to Superchat, click the $ sign at the bottom of the chat box. If you would like to donate a Humperchat, go to Humperchat.com.The best way to support Fightful is by subscribing to Fightful Select! Fightful Select is the way to get all of our exclusive news first and delivered directly to you; plus, you get Q&As and 40+ additional monthly podcasts for just $5.99 per month!!Our Sponsors:* Check out Cigars International and use my code FIGHTFUL for a great deal: https://www.cigarsinternational.com* Check out Hims: https://hims.com/FIGHTFULSupport this podcast at — https://redcircle.com/fightful-pro-wrestling-and-mma-podcast/donationsAdvertising Inquiries: https://redcircle.com/brandsPrivacy & Opt-Out: https://redcircle.com/privacy

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STARDOM All Star Grand Queendom 2025 Review | Tam Nakano Career Is OVER! Mayu Iwatani Final Match!

Tru Heel Heat

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 29, 2025 113:04

Join SP3 and special guest Scott Edwards of Fightful & Five Star Media for our STARDOM All Star Grand Queendom 2025 Review breaking down the biggest Joshi wrestling event of the year ft. Saya Kamitani vs Tam Nakano in a Career vs Career Match for the World of Stardom Championship. Leave your thoughts on this PPV and review in the live chat and comments section. Like, share, superchat and subscribe to support! #STARDOM #TamNakano #SayaKamitani #Syuri #MayuIwatani #StarlightKid #AZM Welcome to the Tru Heel Heat Wrestling YouTube channel where we cover the sport of professional wrestling including all WWE TV shows (Raw, Smackdown, & NXT), AEW Dynamite/Dark, IMPACT Wrestling, NJPW, ROH, Dark Side of the Ring and more. Our weekly podcast hosted by SP3, Top Guy JJ & Miss Krssi Luv breaking down the weekly wrestling news and present unfiltered, honest thoughts and opinions for wrestling fans by wrestling fans, drops every Saturday. We also include PPV reviews, countdowns, and exclusive interviews with wrestlers from all promotions hosted by a wide range of personalities such as Romeo, Chris G, Ness, StatKing, Drunk Guy JJ, J-News and more. Subscribe and enable ALL notifications to stay posted for the latest wrestling WWE news, highlights, commentary, updates and more.Become a member of Tru Heels Facebook community: www.facebook.com/groups/1336177103130224/Subscribe to Tru Heel Heat on YouTube: www.youtube.com/channel/UC0AmFQmsRyQYPKyRm5hDwNgFollow Tru Heels on Twitter: twitter.com/truheelheatFollow Tru Heels on Instagram: www.instagram.com/truheelheat/Music composed by JPM

STARDOM All Star Grand Queendom 2025 Preview | Saya Kamitani vs Tam Nakano Career vs Career!

Tru Heel Heat

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 25, 2025 94:02

Join SP3 and special guest Scott E. Wrestling for our STARDOM All Star Grand Queendom 2025 Preview breaking down this Sunday's PPV ft. Saya Kamitani vs Tam Nakano in Career vs Career Match for the World of Stardom Championship. Leave your thoughts on this preview and give your predictions on this card in the live chat and comments section. Like, share, superchat and subscribe to support! #STARDOM #AllStarGrandQueendom #SayaKamitani #TamNakano #MayuIwatani #Syuri #AZM #StarlightKid Welcome to the Tru Heel Heat Wrestling YouTube channel where we cover the sport of professional wrestling including all WWE TV shows (Raw, Smackdown, & NXT), AEW Dynamite/Dark, IMPACT Wrestling, NJPW, ROH, Dark Side of the Ring and more. Our weekly podcast hosted by SP3, Top Guy JJ & Miss Krssi Luv breaking down the weekly wrestling news and present unfiltered, honest thoughts and opinions for wrestling fans by wrestling fans, drops every Saturday. We also include PPV reviews, countdowns, and exclusive interviews with wrestlers from all promotions hosted by a wide range of personalities such as Romeo, Chris G, Ness, StatKing, Drunk Guy JJ, J-News and more. Subscribe and enable ALL notifications to stay posted for the latest wrestling WWE news, highlights, commentary, updates and more.Become a member of Tru Heels Facebook community: www.facebook.com/groups/1336177103130224/Subscribe to Tru Heel Heat on YouTube: www.youtube.com/channel/UC0AmFQmsRyQYPKyRm5hDwNgFollow Tru Heels on Twitter: twitter.com/truheelheatFollow Tru Heels on Instagram: www.instagram.com/truheelheat/Music composed by JPM

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Episode 97 - Takahiro Morita

Beyond Boards

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 17, 2025 95:28

Episode 97 with Takahiro Morita, skateboarder and filmmaker from Tokyo, Japan, creative mind behind FESN (Far East Skate Network). Together we discussed his life and career, from picking up his first board in the early 90's to launching FESN in the mid 90's and creating some of the most iconic videos in skateboarding culture ever since, including the cult classic “Overground broadcasting” (2008), in recent years deciding to stop ollieing and transitioning into cruising, building custom cruiser boards at the FESN laboratory in Nakano and much more through surprise questions from friends of his.(00:13) – Intro (01:13) – Zach Chamberlain(02:37) – Simon Lockett(06:51) – Glen Fox(17:56) – Léo Valls(23:18) – Josh Stewart (29:33) – Silas Baxter Neal(33:21) – Cole Giordano(36:19) – Masafumi Kajitani(43:06) – Pete Talbot(45:43) – Gaston Francisco(48:58) – Colin Read(52:21) – Soy Panday(55:54) – Connor Kammerer(59:03) – Ken Goto(01:02:14) – Laurence Keefe(01:07:42) – Katsumi Minami(01:13:21) – Daisuke Takahashi(01:23:53) – Shigeta Iha(01:28:08) – Yutaka Hashiguchi(01:32:11) – Liu Puli(01:34:46) – ConclusionFor more information and resources: https://linktr.ee/beyondboardsHosted by Ausha. See ausha.co/privacy-policy for more information.

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Olivier JACQUE - Champion du monde Moto pour 14 millièmes de seconde...

Dans La Boîte à Gants

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 5, 2025 140:15

Olivier JACQUE alias la Jacque Attack ! Lui qui est devenu Champion du monde de moto de vitesse 250 cm³ avec Tech3 au cours de l'une des courses les plus légendaires. Imaginez un peu, il l'a remporté pour 14/1000e de secondes devant son coéquipier NAKANO.Vous allez découvrir au travers de cet épisode touchant l'histoire, les coulisses et les anecdotes de ce champion._________________________________________________________

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EXTRAIT - Olivier JACQUE - Devenu Champion du Monde moto pour 14 millièmes de seconde...

Dans La Boîte à Gants

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 4, 2025 11:20

Un avant-goût de l'épisode avec Olivier JACQUE aka la Jacque Attack ! Champion du Monde 250cm3 légendaire en moto de vitesse puisque de 14 millièmes devant son coéquipier NAKANO en 2000.Pour découvrir l'épisode en entier, tapez "Olivier JACQUE" sur votre plateforme d'écoute._________________________________________________________

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119: Nakano Broadway, the Hard Way! An Otaku Coffee Break!

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 13, 2024 25:27

In this episode of the PURE TOKYOSCOPE Podcast, authors Matt Alt (⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Pure Invention: How Japan Made the Modern World⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠) and Patrick Macias (⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Mondo Tokyo: Dispatches from a Secret Japan⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠) take a coffee break at otaku hotspot Nakano Broadway for a wide-ranging talk about the loss of pioneering anime personality Jan Scott-Frazier, the rising cost of vintage anime tees, and much more! ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠FULL EPISODE SHOW NOTES ON SUBSTACK!⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠FULL SHOW EARLY EPISODE DROPS AT OUR PATREON!⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ INFO ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Pure TokyoScope on Twitter ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Matt Alt on Bluesky⁠⁠ ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Patrick Macias on Bluesky⁠⁠ ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Pure TokyoScope on YouTube⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ The podcast is produced by ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠jaPRESS LLC⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠©, and engineered and edited by Patrick Macias Theme song by Marxy

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118: Manga Banned in the USA! New Gundam Anime! Pizza!

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Play Episode Listen Later Dec 6, 2024 39:16

In this episode of the PURE TOKYOSCOPE Podcast, authors Matt Alt (⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Pure Invention: How Japan Made the Modern World⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠) and Patrick Macias (⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Mondo Tokyo: Dispatches from a Secret Japan⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠) celebrate a birthday with a pizza party in Nakano and discuss a variety of topics including recent manga bans in the USA, a new Gundam anime, and more! ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠FULL EPISODE SHOW NOTES ON SUBSTACK!⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠FULL SHOW EARLY EPISODE DROPS AT OUR PATREON!⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ INFO ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Pure TokyoScope on Twitter ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Matt Alt on Bluesky⁠ ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Patrick Macias on Bluesky⁠ ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Pure TokyoScope on YouTube⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ The podcast is produced by ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠jaPRESS LLC⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠©, and engineered and edited by Patrick Macias Theme song by Marxy

Episode #161: Koki Nakano

Improv Exchange Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 18, 2024 28:41

Koki Nakano is a composer and a pianist, born in 1988 in Fukuoka, Japan. After graduating Music High School at Toho Gakuen School of Music in Tokyo, he enrolled at the composition department of Tokyo University of the Arts. He has performed recitals at the Louvre and the Théâtre du Châtelet (Paris), Cadogan Hall (London), Lincoln Center (New York). He released his first album Lift in 2016, in collaboration with French cellist Vincent Segal under the Paris-based label Nø Førmat!. In 2019, Koki took part in a research workshop at the Reborn Art Festival in the landscapes of Ishinomaki‘s bay. Accompanied by renowned visual artist Kohei Nawa, famous choreographer Damien Jalet, and few dancers, they explore different points of fusion between the human body and the landscape. His second album Pre-choreographed is released in April 2020. Koki mixed his classical pieces with electronic sounds and he developed this relationship between dance and music. In 2021, Koki composed the original music for Damien Jalet's piece ‘Brise-lames' and performed it live at Palais Garnier for Paris Opera's opening gala. His third album, Oceanic Feeling is released in 2022 as well as four musical videos gathering choreographers and dancers Tess Voelker and Nicolas Huchard, Marion Motin, Mourad Bouayad. Koki Nakano's new album Ululō is released in October 2024, in collaboration with singers Yaël Naim, Wayne Snow and Jordy.

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Nakano, Tokyo

The Dan Wilson in Tokyo Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 1, 2024 26:19

Every Thursday 21:00 Japan time. This week Dan does the podcast from Nakano, Tokyo. He explains the Japanese word for queef. Dan explores a part of Nakano while answering Patreon member's questions YouTube Video Podcast https://youtu.be/VYcd77NWi7U patreon.com/DanWilsonUSAJPN⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ Become a Patreon member for 5 bucks a months (that's like one tall boy) and Dan will give you a shoutout and read your questions on the podcast. Become a sponsor and support the Dan Wilson in Tokyo Podcast. Email: dan.yahola.wilson@gmail.com The Dan Wilson in Tokyo Podcast Your one-stop podcast for everything Japan and Japanese culture...kind of. Dan Wilson is an American living in Japan working in the entertainment industry in the comedy duo Badonkadonk | バドンカドンク Instagram & TikTok = @danielywilson

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中野サンプラザ再開発が費用高騰で着工できず…区は「再開発見直しを検討」建設費は倍の3539億円に

FNN.jpプライムオンライン

Play Episode Listen Later Sep 30, 2024 2:23

「中野サンプラザ再開発が費用高騰で着工できず…区は「再開発見直しを検討」建設費は倍の3539億円に」　東京・中野区のシンボルだった「中野サンプラザ」。その跡地の再開発計画を巡り波紋が広がっています。建設費用が当初の計画の2倍近くになる見通しだといいます。なぜこのような事態になったのでしょうか。中野サンプラザの跡地に建設が予定されているのは、複合施設「NAKANOサンプラザシティ（仮称）」。地上61階、高さ262メートルの高層ビルに商業施設や最大7000人規模の大ホール、ホテルやマンション、オフィスなどが入る複合施設で、2029年度中に完成する予定です。そして、地元の人からも期待の声が次々とありました。80代：中野にこういうのがあるんだなって、中野に人が集まってくる。活性化すると全然違う。20代：（中野サンプラザの閉館で）町の雰囲気が寂れてるじゃないけど、寂しいなと思う。あるだけで中野が盛り上がるのかな。1973年にオープンし、三角形のデザインが特徴的な中野サンプラザ。結婚式や成人式会場として利用されてきた他、コンサートホールでは数々のアーティストが公演。中野のランドマークとして、地元民ならず多くの人に愛されてきました。しかし老朽化などによって、2023年、惜しまれつつ閉館。50年の歴史に幕を下ろしたのです。その跡地や周辺に建設が予定されている「NAKANOサンプラザシティ」。当初の予定では9月中には着工が始まっていたはずですが、30日、現場に行ってみると、いまだ解体作業も始まっていません。その理由が、資材確保や人件費の高騰などによる度重なる建設費用の引き上げです。事業計画が提案された当初は1810億円でしたが、見直しが繰り返されるたびに増額。そして9月、施工主から中野区に工事費がさらに900億円以上増えると伝達があり、当初予算の2倍近くの3539億円になる可能性が出てきたのです。

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"Still, I Teach" With Kiyoko Nakano

The Transformed Teacher

Play Episode Listen Later Aug 6, 2024 19:37

Have you ever felt like walking away from your classroom? Veteran educator Kiyoko Nakano's new book, Still, I Teach illuminates the struggles of modern education and poses a vital question on many people's minds: Where do we go from here? In this interview, we chat about how Kiyoko came to write her book and what her challenges have taught her and can teach all of us! ⁠Follow Kiyoko on Instagram ⁠ Click HERE to order her latest book, Still, I Teach

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#148 Bonus Tracks with a Thanatologist and an Animal Doula – Kim Mooney and Kayla Nakano

Best Life Best Death

Play Episode Listen Later Jul 3, 2024 20:34

I'm pulling from the “old files” for this one! I spoke with Kim Mooney on BLBD podcast #71 and #72 and with Kayla Nagano on #74, and with this episode you can hear more from each of them! Kim = renowned thanatologist plus huge advocate for compassionate end-of-life options in Colorado and beyond. Kayla = podcaster and expert in all things animals and end of life. Enjoy this episode of "bonus tracks" from my past recordings with these two experts.

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Kitchen Skills: Keeping Your Knives Sharp | EP#218

Meal Prep Monday Podcast™

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 15, 2024 8:03

In episode 218, Prep Dish founder Allison Schaaf discusses basic kitchen skills in a month-long series and shares some of the best ways to keep your knives sharp. One of the number one items on Allison's list of kitchen equipment must-haves is a good quality knife, and she encourages meal preppers to upgrade their kitchen knives. Some brands Allison has in her kitchen include Wusthof, Shun, Nakano, and Eberhard Schaaf. Allison notes that the best way to find the right kitchen knife for you is to put it in your hand and see what feels most comfortable. Once you've got a high-quality kitchen knife, it's important to keep your tools in top shape on a regular basis, preferably sharpening them twice a year. Allison has used local sharpening services, door-to-door services, and most recently Kife Aid, which sharpens your kitchen knives by mail. Connect with Allison: PrepDish.com Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/prepdish/ Resources mentioned in this podcast: Get your free trial at prepdish.com/mpm for two weeks of free meal plans! Choosing Quality Kitchen Knives | Ep#160 https://prepdish.com/podcast-show-notes/ep160/ Three Must Have Knives for Your Kitchen https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=icilR3xb164 Knife Aid https://knifeaid.com/

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Farewell to Sting and AEW Revolution Recap | The Still Real to Us Show | Episode #734 – 3/7/24

THE STILL REAL TO US SHOW – Real Guy Radio

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 8, 2024 66:08

On this episode of The Still Real to Us Show:-- We recap & review "AEW Revolution!"-- Kazuchika Okada is All Elite...and shockingly aligns with "The Elite!"-- Paul Heyman and Bull Nakano are announced as the first inductees for the WWE Hall of Fame Class of 2024!-- And the latest WrestleMania 40 card round up!

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- 114 - Pacific War - Fall of Shaggy Ridge , January 23-30, 1944

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 23, 2024 40:17

Last time we spoke about the operations HA-GO, U-GO and the continued drive against Shaggy ridge. Lt General Mutaguchi Renya sought to invade India and was continuously scheming to drag the rest of the IJA on this rather insane endeavor. Yet the allies also tossed their own operations in the Burma theater greatly disrupting the Japanese planners and achieving numerous objectives. Over in New Guinea, Vasey launched an offensive against the Kankeiri saddle, designated operation cutthroat. Meanwhile General Nakano 's men were in a dire situation with the allied seizure of Sio and Saidor. Multiple Japanese units found themselves all doing the same thing, retreating further north. It seemed no matter what defensive lines they established, the allies kept their advance over land and periodically amphibious assaults their flanks and rear. The formidable defenses region of Shaggy ridge was not going to hold up against the allied advance much longer. This episode is The Fall of Shaggy Ridge Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. The Australian advance overland and Saidor operation had paid great dividends over and above the establishment of forward military base construction. The allies had formed a giant wedge between a significant residue of the Japanese fleeing the Finschhafen area. General Adachi commanding the 18th area army was facing a nightmare. Prior to the American landing, he had visited the 51st division HQ at Kiari and then traveled overland to the 20th Division over at Sio. He was fully aware of the hardships facing both forces. Meanwhile news of the Saidor landings hit Rabaul creating a massive debate. Senior officers sought to bring over all available troops to try and retake the town. Others sought to save as many troops as possible for a defense of Wewak, considering it the next main allies target. General Imamura favored bypassing Saidor altogether and withdrawing over inland trails. Thus Adachi appointed General Nakano to take charge of the withdrawal to Madang, and ordered 8 other companies to cross the Ramu valley to Bogadjim to harass the Americans at Saidor. These were purely defensive maneuvers. The Japanese also faced the daunting task of how to evacuate large numbers of troops from the 20th and 51st divisions from the impending allied trap. Nakano took the lead getting the 20th to retreat up the coast while the 51st worked their war over the inland trails. Nakano would soon be forced to abandon the plans and ordered both to pull into the interior to retreat towards Madang, nearly 200 miles away. This would mean the exhausted, starving and sick Japanese had to battle through the jungles, ridges, rivers and other horrors of the Finisterre range. Meanwhile Saidor was easily secured by the 32nd division, the Australian 7th division advanced through the Ramu Valley and came face to face with Shaggy Ridge. Shaggy ridge had been transformed into a heavy fortified position with numerous nasty features such as the Kankeiri saddle, Pimple, Intermediate snipers pimple, Green snipers pimple, Prothero 1 and 2 and so forth. During the first weeks of January the Australians made very little headway against the honeycombed Japanese defenses. Their air forces were called in numerous times to plaster the ridgelines in a 3 day assault designated Operation Cutthroat. On the 18th of January, B-25s from Nadzab and Port Moresby would drop 500 lb bombs all over the defenses. On the 21st P-40s strafed and bombed the area and this was met with some reorganizing of the ground forces. The 15th and 18th brigades relieved the exhausted 21st and 25th. Brigadier F. O Chilton began the new job by opening heavy artillery up on Prothero I. Captain T. L James with the 2/2 pioneer battalion described the attack on January 20th “At 1000 hours we met 2/12 Infantry Battalion at the appointed rendezvous, where I met their CO., Lt.-CoI. C. F. Bourne. We did not stay long at the rendezvous but formed up and commenced the long approach march. It was a gruelling day. The long single file moved silently up the deep ravines, scaling cliff-faces with the aid of ropes and lawyer vines. It took us the entire day to cover the four mile approach. In one spot that was almost impossible to traverse—a steep-sided cliff—they rigged lawyer vines between trees to act as a handrail and allow us to pull ourselves up." Despite the harsh conditions and fierce resistance, the Australians got atop Canning saddle and then forded the Mene river and drew near the village. Colonel Matsumoto's men were now trapped between the 2/9th battalion advancing from the Pimple and the 2/12th battalion from Prothero 1. To the east there was the 2/10th battalion about a mile away from the main Japanese defensive position along the Kankeiri saddle. On the 22nd, the 2/12th dispatched D company who advanced between Prothero1 and Prothero 2. At 10:40am they began to fire their artillery upon Prothero 2 and at 11:15am a platoon tried to progress but was held down by Japanese snipers and machine gun fire. A company came through D company to advance along Shaggy ridge until 3:30 pm once they took were held down by Japanese fire. Then a single australian section rushed forward led by Bren gunner Private Bugg. His team hit a Japanese machine gun crew from just 30 yards away. He seized a toehold quickly upon Prothero 2. After some bitter fighting Prothero 2 had fallen into allied hands. Meanwhile to the south the 2/9th sent a patrol out on the 22nd who found pill-boxes at McCaughey's knoll occupied with Japanese gunners. At 10:45am as allied artillery hit Prothero 2, Captain Taylor led a company of the 2/9th and assaulted McCaughers knoll. They were quickly pinned down, but by 1:15pm word reached them that Prothero 2 was captured and that the entire battalion was to push along Shaggy ridge. During that afternoon Taylor took his company to the western side of Shaggy ridge, getting ready for a new flanking maneuver against McCaughey's knoll. The men fought their way up the knoll cleaning up pillbox one after another, capturing McCaugheys knoll by nightfall. It would cost them 8 men wounded. More than 100 dead Japanese were found over the Prothero-Shaggry ridge area when mop up crews did their work. Meanwhile 2/10th kept up the pressure in the east. On the 22nd A Company led by Lt Gunn seized a foothold on Faria Ridge and, prompting the enemy by late in the afternoon, to abandon Cam's Hill, which was occupied by the 2/10th by 5.20 p.m. During the night and early morning of january 23rd, two counter attacks were launched by the Japanese. At 2.40 the forward troops of A Company on the ridge were attacked from the south but the attack was repulsed with no casualties. After this the Australians moved down the track towards Kankeiri. Captain Haupt's B Company of the 2/12th advanced down the track from Prothero 2. By 6pm they were atop the saddle around Crater Hill when they came across a Japanese gun position containing 150 rounds of 75mm ammunition. Half an hour later they ran into some resistance from slopes atop Crater Hill. They would pull back to the Kankeiri saddle to dig in for the night. The 2/10th then dispatch D company led by Captain Kumnick to advance along the Faria Ridge. They made it 1500 yards before running into a well entrenched position that held them down with machine gun fire. During the night however the Japanese abandoned their entrenchments for Cam Hill allowing the 2/10th to establish itself in a position roughy 1200 yards southeast of Crater Hill the next day. On the 24th, the 2/9th took over the responsibility for Shaggy Ridge up to Prothero 2 allowing the 2/12 to advance up Kankeiri. Small patrols from company B of the 2/12th reached the top of Crater Hill that day finding an enemy position on the southern slopes. On the 25th, the 2/12th and 2/10th probed enemy defenses on all sides of Crater Hill looking for decent approaches to attack. This led to several skirmishes, seeing both sides suffer casualties. One patrol led by Lt Coles of the 2/2nd pioneers, surveyed the Paipa mule track along the valley of the Mindjim, firing upon small bands of retreating Japanese. The Australians gradually converged to attack Crater Hill, but Matsumoto's defenders put up a valiant effort to repel the assaults. On the 26, Brigadier Chilton ordered Companies C and D of the 2/9th and Companies C and B of the 2/12th to assault Crater Hill. This saw companies C and D of the 2/9th perform a outflanking maneuver to the north tip of the Mindjim valley to hit the enemy's right flank, while Companies C and B of the 2/12th held the enemy down. Captain A. Marshall's C company led off at 10.35 a.m, passing from Shaggy Ridge through Kankirei Saddle and then to the north, with Captain Taylor's D company following to provide flank protection. By midday Marshall reported that he had advanced some 600 yards and passed through several old and abandoned positions finding no enemy. Cautiously he pushed on, at 5 p.m. he reached the summit of 4100. The main enemy position was to the south between Marshall and the 2/10th and 2/12th Battalions. Leaving Taylor to occupy the summit of 4100 Marshall advanced south towards Crater Hill in an attempt to surprise the enemy from the rear . He met them about 300 yards south-east from the summit just at dusk. The leading platoon attacked along the usual razor-back but withdrew because of heavy machine-gun fire. At 7 p.m. Marshall sent Lieutenant White's platoon round the right flank but approach from this flank was also very difficult and White was killed. By the nighttime, they had successfully surrounded Matsumoto's weakened defenders. Matsumoto's defenders had established extremely formidable positions and had a large number of automatic weapons at their disposal. Matsumoto was ready alongside his men to make a final stand. Basically a siege of Crater Hill began and would only end after 5 brutal days. The first two days saw Chilton order the 2/9th take responsibility for the southern slopes of 4100 and Kankeiri saddle, while the 2/12th held Protheros and Shaggy ridge, and the 2/10th maintained pressure on the south-eastern slopes of Crater Hill. Skirmishes borke out everywhere, as the artillery smashed Crater Hill. Captain Whyte of the 2/4th field regiment fired 2000 shells, shattering trees, which unfortunately created more timber obstacles for the advancing Australians. At 9.30 a.m. on the 29th, 19 Kittyhawks dive-bombed Crater Hill, followed by ten minutes of artillery fire. At 1.30 p.m. the artillery laid down a barrage and machine-gun fire covered an assault on Crater Hill from the west by Captain Daunt's company of the 2/9th . The leading platoon attempted to rush the enemy position up a very steep and open slope but the Japanese, entrenched on a razor-back, were too strong and drove them back. The Australians also had the bad luck to be shelled by their own artillery. Each time they performed an assault, the stubborn Japanese held firm. Finally on the 30th with the help of some heavy rain Matsumoto decided to evacuate during the night. Matsumoto and the remnants of his force withdrew towards Yokopi and Kubenau valley. After dawn on the 31st, Australian patrols found Crater Hill abandoned and it was a horror show. They found a ghastly mess. At least 14 dead were found and evidence of burials alongside them. The 2/9th and 2/10th advanced occupying the hill on February 1st. With that, Shaggy Ridge and the Kankeiri saddle had finally fallen. Chilton sent out patrols to pursue the retreating Japanese and perform mop up operations. By February 6th his forces managed to seize Paipa and Amuson. The Australians had suffered 46 deaths, 147 wounded while the Japanese figures were estimated at around 500 casualties. Meanwhile, Brigadier Hammer had also carried out two operations during this time period. The first was a diversionary attack against the Spendlove Spur held by elements of the 5th company, 80th regiment. This was carried out by Captain Kennedy company of the 24th battalion, whom managed to surprise the Japanese and quickly seized Cameron's Knoll. On January 30th, the 57/60th battalion led by Lt Colonel Robert Marston departed Ketoba and along another company led by Captain McIntosh assaulted Orgoruna, Kesa and Koba. The Australians would find Orgoruna and Kesa undefended.. Lt Marston ordered Major Barker 's 8 company to patrol Koba, and they would enter Koba on February 1st finding nothing, so they pushed on towards Mataloi 2 . There were signs of very recent occupation and, 200 yards along the track , they were ambushed. Barker brought heavy fire down upon the Japanese ambush position and managed to capture Koba that night. On the morning of the 3rd, about 400 yards east of Koba, Barker again struck a Japanese ambush position. They quickly outflanked the enemy who withdrew through Mataloi 2 towards Mataloi 1 . By the time Mataloi 2 was occupied at 6.30 p.m., there was not enough time to hit Mataloi 1 nor to allow adequate consolidation of Mataloi 2 before dark. At 9.30 p.m. the Japanese counter-attacked from the direction of Matalo 1, commencing the assault with a heavy mortar bombardment. As Mataloi 2 could be defended from three sides, Barker decided that he could hold the area best from high ground to the south which would also be out of range of the enemy mortars. Accordingly he ordered a withdrawal and departed with his headquarters and one platoon. Apparently the orders did not reach the other platoons who were encircled while the remainder of the company was withdrawing to Koba. Long-range enemy machine-gun fire was directed at Kesa at the same time as the counterattack developed at Mataloi 2. The 57th/60th pulled out concluding their little raid. Now Brigadier Hammer's 15th were getting ready to pursue Matsumoto's detachment who were fleeing to Kwato. But that is all we have for New Guinea, as were are moving back over to New Britain. Last time we were over in New Britain, the Americans had captured Hill 660, and were unleashing patrols to try and figure out where the Japanese were concentrating. Now they sought to secure the Borgan Bay-Itni river line. Meanwhile on the other side, General Matsuda's battered men had begun a retreat heading east via the Aisalmipua-Kakumo trail towards Kopopo. They also received reinforcements in the form of the fresh 51st reconnaissance regiment who took up the job of rearguard. The Japanese knew the terrain better than their American counterparts, thus held distinct advantages. They knew good grounds to put up defenses and how long they could hold out in such places until they should retreat. The Americans did not enjoy good maps, they had to painstakingly explore where they went. They relied on native reports on where to go, but in the end they were like explorers jumping into jungles, atop mountains and a hell of a lot of swampy terrain. The rainforests could be so dense, patrols could be moving yards from another and not know it, imagine trying to find hypothetical objectives in such places? Thus an enormous amount of vital patrolling was performed, beginning on January 19th with Captain Ronald Slay's men of L Company 1st marines. They advanced past Mt. Gulu, Langla volcano and Munlulu before heading down the saddle of Mt. Tangi. They managed to ambush a group of 20 Japanese being led by 8 armed natives, who fled east after 6 Japanese were killed. Slay took his men across the east-west government trail, only finding some Japanese telephone wire, which was severed. On the 22nd two patrols each consisting of a reinforced company departed the airdrome perimeter to converge from two directions along the trail junction Captain Slay's men discovered. The first was elements of the 1st battalion, 1st marines led by Captain Nikolai Stevenson, the other was led by Captain Preston Parish with elements of the 7th marines who took landing crafts to Sag Sag, the terminus of the east-west Government trail. Parishes men would bivouac around 1.5 miles inland near Aipati on the 24th while Stevensons men headed south of Mt Gulu. Both patrols found no Japanese, but Parish gained some valuable intelligence from a native village, who indicated there had been several Japanese parties around. On the 23rd, Stevenson and his men ran into a concealed machine gun crew 30 yards near Mt Langla. The Americans scrambled to fight back at an enemy they could not see. They did not lose any men, but had no idea if they hit any Japanese either. They continued their advance afterwards and would be ambushed again, this time 1500 yards south of Mt Munlulu. This time they seemed to be facing a force of platoon strength. By the 25th Stevenson and his men were pulling back to Mt Gulu and were relieved by another incoming patrol led by Captain George Hunts K Company, 1st marines. Meanwhile Parish's patrol continued east as the natives had indicated to them where the Japanese might be retreating through. On January 27th Hunts company ran into Parish's and both shared information and went in opposite directions hoping to hunt down nearby Japanese units. Hunt set off to the location where Parish's men had run into a Japanese ambush previously, expecting to find at least 50 Japanese. At 7am on the 28th, Hunt's men came across an outpost line and engaged it for hours, seeing 15 casualties. Hunt pulled his men back out of mortar range and the Japanese swarmed upon them forcing the Americans to perform some heated rearguard actions. Overall these patrols amongst others allowed the Americans to get a better picture of the terrain and concentration of the enemy. For two weeks the American patrols searched for the enemy headquarters running into countless skirmishes, mostly against the forces of Colonel Sato Jiro. By the 27th, Matsuda had reached Kokopo and received new orders from General Sakai that he was to take the men further on towards Iboki. Colonel Sato was to again provide the rearguard. This allowed the Americans to seize Nakarop, a placed their translators had mistranslated from Japanese documents as “Egaroppu”. It had been the nerve center of General Matsuda's operations. They found countless abandoned tents in bivouac areas, the village contained native and Japanese built structures. There was a huge sign saying "Matsuda Butai Army Command Principal Place." There were traces of elaborate radio installations recently removed containing an American-made telephone switchboard labeled "Glory Division." It would turn out Matsuda's personal quarters, however, were actually located off the main trail roughly midway between Magairapua and Nakarop, its approaches so skillfully concealed that patrols did not find it until several days later. Well camouflaged bivouac areas also infested this entire region. With the capture of Matsuda's former headquarters, all patrols were combined into the Gilnit Group led by the legendary Colonel Chesty Puller. Puller pointed his force in the direction of the Borgen Bay-Itni River to clear it out. They departed Agulupulla on January the 30th as the 5th Marines relieved the 2nd battalion, 1st marines to attack the Iboki area. Attempts were made at leapfrogging, using landing craft to hit places hoping to trap Japanese during the advance. The landing craft were operated by the Boat Battalion, 533d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, of the Army's 2d Engineer Special Brigade. They were made available to carry out the amphibious phase, and the division's little Cub artillery spotter planes for observation and liaison. Rough seas frustrated the first landing attempt at Namuramunga on February 4th, forcing two patrols from the 2nd battalion to proceed overland from Old Natamo via a coastal track. They got as far as Mambak killing a few stragglers and taking 3 prisoners. The next day another patrol landed at Aliado and advanced down the coastal track to the mouth of the Gurissa river through Kokopo and Gorissi. By the 10th of february they managed to kill 16 stragglers and grabbed 6 prisoners who they brought back to the Borgen Bay perimeter. Meanwhile the 3rd battalion advanced into Gorissi by boat on the 12th and setup a radar station. They then dispatched a patrol to the EI river on the 16, finding it impassable. Another patrol was sent to leapfrog around the Arimega Plantation on the 19th. It was seized quickly and now the Americans were very close to Iboki. Meanwhile Sato reached Kokopo, but did not linger long and continued on to Karai-ai by February 12th. That day the 3rd battalion, 5th marines, aware of the Japanese course, set up an advance base at Gorissi. Now 20 miles separated the Japanese rearguards from their pursuers. Sato and his men would reach Iboki by February 16th, while the Marines were fording the El river, 30 miles behind. It would take them 5 additional days to reach Karai-ai. To the south Puller's group had reached Gilnit and Nigol on the 10th, finding no enemy. These actions saw the Americans secure the western half of New Britain. 2 days later, Company B of the 1st Marines landed on Rooke Island where they set up a radar installation. They also had to patrol the islands to see if any Japanese remained upon it. They fanned out, running into native villages who offered them fresh fruit. They would come across machine gun emplacements, abandoned bivouac areas and some medical stations, but no Japanese. The enemy had clearly evacuated the island All the way back over at the Arawe area, Major Komori had received new radios on February 5th enabling him to resume communications with the 17th divisional HQ. He received a gloomy report “At present, the airfield is covered with grass 4 to 5 [feet] high. The airfield, 200 m [sic] in width 800 m in length, will be serviceable only for small airplanes. However, it will take quite some time to develop it. Consequently, I believe that it will not be of great value.” Knowing about Matsuda's withdrawal, he began casting envious eyes in the same direction. On February 8, he hinted more broadly to that effect: “As has been reported, the value of Merkus airfield is so insignificant that it seems the enemy has no intention of using it… Due to damage sustained by enemy bombardments and to the increased number of patients, it becomes more and more difficult to carry out the present mission… It is my opinion that as the days pass, replenishment of supplies will become more and more difficult and fighting strength will be further diminished; our new line will be cut off and consequently leave us with no alternative but self-destruction.” Divisional HQhowever was not pleased with this and sent a telegraphic response the following day ordering him curtly to continue his mission. Komori would write in his diary that day "Wondered what to do about the order all night long. Could not sleep last night… I felt dizzy all day today." Fortunately for Komori, on February 17th Sato was ordered to occupy key positions at the Aria river's mouth to help supply him by land. This allowed Komori to begin his retreat north on the 24th while Sato evacuated the Iboki stores to Upmadung. Komori's departure would be just in the nick of time as the Americans dispatched two tank platoons to clear out the airfield area on the 27th. They would find zero enemy resistance and this would put an end to the Arawe operation. And that will be all for today for New Britain as we are going to be covering some big allied planning. Over in the southwest and south Pacific Areas, General Douglas MacArthur continued his plan to drive back towards the Philippines. This would be done via amphibious operations along the north coast of New Guinea. His next main target was the Vogelkop Peninsula, then the Palau Islands, then the invasion of Mindanao. This would also see the Japanese lines of communications to the Dutch East Indies cut off. Yet before all of this he needed to capture the Hansa Bay area of northeastern New Guinea and then Hollandia in the Dutch part of New Guinea. This action would allow his forces to bypass the Japanese stronghold at Wewak. Meanwhile there were the ongoing efforts to reduce Rabaul, and to continue that he still had to capture the Admiralty Island and Kavieng, which would completely cut off Rabaul. The planners for the south, southwest and central Pacific Areas met at Pearl Harbor on January 28th. However the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to delay MacArthur's invasion of the Admiralties and Kavieng pushed it to April 1st. They had determined it was better to prioritize the invasion of the Marshall islands in the central pacific. This delay would further delay most of the southwest pacific operations along the New Guinea coast. Meanwhile Admiral Kusaka and General Imamura had sent the bulk of the 230th regiment and the recently arrived 1st independent mixed regiment to New Ireland. The 2nd battalion, 1st independent mixed regiment was sent to the Admiralties on January 25th, joining up with Colonel Ezaki Yoshio's 51st transport regiment. Then the 1st battalion, 229th regiment was sent to the Admiralties on february 2nd. These were last ditch efforts by the Japanese to secure a very desperate lifeline for Rabaul. No offensive could be mounted for at least 3 months, thus the Japanese were given ample time to reinforce and strengthen their defenses. Admiral Halsey also had plans to invade the St Matthias Islands as a preliminary for the attack upon Kavieng, and this like MacArthur's plans were thrown into disarray. In view of all of this MacArthur suggested to Halsey a new plan, codenamed Operation Squarepeg, to seize the Green Islands and establish a new PT boat and or air base there. With that in hand they could project air and naval power further against Rabaul and perhaps even as far as Truk. However many of the officers did not believe any of this would significantly isolate Kavieng and Rabaul. Furthermore, they believed it doubtful that fighters stationed at a base in the Green Islands would even be able to cover Kavieng. Admiral Wilkinson, with the backing of Admiral Fitch and General Geiger, suggested that the proposal be abandoned, and that plans be laid for a landing either at Borpop or Boang Island. On 28 December, however, after analyzing the situation, Colonel William E. Riley, Admiral Halsey's War Plans officer, made the following observation: “There is no doubt but that the occupation of this area [Borpop] and the utilization of air facilities thereat would assist materially in the neutralization of both Rabaul and Kavieng. However, the grave possibility that such an operation would result in the employment of approximately two divisions and additional naval support, not now available and will--in all probability--not be made available in time for this type intermediate operation, makes it necessary to eliminate Borpop as a possible intermediate operation… Though Green Island is not as far advanced as Boang Island, yet it is quite possible to provide fighter cover for strikes on Kavieng. In addition, dive bombers, based on Green Island, can operate most effectively against shipping at Kavieng.”Thus Halsey elected to go ahead with Operation Squarepeg anyway because a fighter umbrella could be tossed over the Green Islands during an amphibious invasion, something that would not be possible for Boang or Borbop. Halsey's staff went to work planning the amphibious landing. It would be carried out by elements of General Barrowclough's 3rd New Zealand Division. PT 176 and PT 178 of Lieutenant-Commander LeRoy Taylor's Torokina Squadron conducted hydrographic reconnaissance of the islands on January 10th and discovered the southern channels near Barahun island were the most suitable. 300 men of the 30th New Zealand battalion led by Lt Colonel Frederick Cornwall got aboard the APDs Talbot, Waters and Dickerson, covered by the destroyers Fullam, Bennet, Guest and Hudson led by Captain Ralph Earle. They landed on Nissan Island and performed a survey finding a promising airfield site. They also discovered there were no more than 100 Japanese at a relay station alongside 1200 native Melanesians. Pretty sure I said this before in the series, but I will repeat it. Melanesians are one of the predominant indigenous inhabitants of the Melanesian islands that are found in the area spanning New Guinea to the Fiji Islands. Something pretty neat about them, along with some indigenous Australians, they are the few groups of non-Europeans to have blond hair. The Melanesians were so friendly to the New Zealanders and so hostile to the Japanese that it was decided to omit the usual preliminary naval and aerial bombardment for the landings. Now over in the Central Pacific plans to invade the Marshall were underway, even before the successful liberation of the Gilberts. The operation was codenamed Operation Flintlock, and Admiral Nimitz assigned the 4th Marine division, reinforced with the 22nd marine regiment and Army's 7th division to train intensively for amphibious warfare. They were deemed Tactical Group 1, led by Brigadier General Thomas Watson. They would be backed up by a whopping 23 aircraft carriers, 15 battleships, 18 cruisers and 109 destroyers. Yet things had certainly changed since 1942, the American Navy was packing overwhelming heat. Admiral Spruance, now commander of the 5th fleet, would hold the highest operational command for Operation Flintlock. Admiral Turner would be commanding task force 51 and the Joint Expeditionary Fleet and General Holland Smith would be commanding all the expeditionary troops. General Smith's position in the chain of command in relation to Admiral Turner was made much clearer than it had been during the Gilberts operation. Simply put he was put in direct command of all landing forces and garrison forces once they were ashore. The troop commanders of each of the landing forces, the 7th and 4th Marine Divisions, were expressly placed under Smith until such time as Admiral Spruance should determine that the capture and occupation phase of the operation had been completed. However, Smith's authority as commander of expeditionary troops had one limitation. It was recognized that "the employment of troops, including the reserve troops engaged in the seizure of objectives, is subject to the capabilities of the surface units to land and support them," thus any directives issued by Smith as to major landings or as to major changes in tactical plans had to have the approval of Turner before they could be issued. To this extent, the expeditionary troops commander was still subordinate to Turner. They would also be supported by Rear Admiral Marc Mitscher's fast carrier force, task force 58 and Admiral Hoovers land based air forces, including the 7th air force and other Navy air forces. So yeah, America was coming in overkill. Nimitz's original plan was to advance into the Marshalls by simultaneously hitting Kwajalein, Maloelap and Wotje. Together these contained 65% of the aircraft facilities in the island group, leaving the 35% remainder on Jaluit and Mille. Jaluit and Mille could be neutralized and bypassed. Yet after facing the difficulties during the Gilberts operation, Nimitz decided to also bypass Maloelap and Wotje as well, so he could concentrate all his forces against Kwajalein. General Smith and Admirals Spruance and Turner opposed this, arguing that sailing into Kwajalein would be too exposed if Maloelap and Wotje were left unoccupied. Nimitz 'new plan would see General Corlett's 7th division hit the southern group of islands in the atoll, including Kwajalein island, while Major General Harry Schmidt's 4th marines would hit Roi-Namur and the other northern islands of the atoll. Task Force 52, would transport the 7th Division while Rear Admiral Richard Conollys task force 53 transported the 4th marines. After some meetings, Spruance managed to secure the invasion of Majuro, which would be carried out by Lt Colonel Frederick Sheldon's “Sundance” Landing Force. They consisted of the 5th amphibious corps reconnaissance company, the 2nd battalion, 106th regiment and the 1st defense battalion. Spruance wanted to make the atoll a fleet base, so airfields could be constructed to help cover the line of communications to Kwajalein. To support the main landings, Mitschers fast carrier force was going to smash the enemy aircraft and air facilities at Wotje, Maloelap, Roi-Namur and Kwajalein while his vessels simultaneously coordinated with Turners cruisers and Rear Admiral Ernest Small's Neutralization group task force 50.15 to naval bombard them as well. The main threat that needed to be neutralized quickly was Eniwetoks airfield. Meanwhile Hoover's land based aircraft would help neutralize Mille and Jaluit and help smash the other islands and shipping. Throughout November and December, two atolls would receive more attacks than the others. Mille closest to the Gilberts, thus much more accessible, earned the lionshare of attention. Maloelap with its large air facilities had to be kept under constant surveillance and attack, thus she came second. Beginning on December 23rd, aircraft based out of the Gilberts began increasing air strikes against the Marshalls. On Mille between November 24th to December 18th, 106 heavy bombers dropped 122 tons of bombs over the runways and facilities. The next week bombers and fighters began attacking Mille's fuel dumps, leveled all buildings, destroyed 11 grounded aircraft and another 13 in the air. Mille was neutralized and the Japanese would abandon its airfield by January. The damage dished out to Maloelap was extensive, but not as crippling. Her runways were not entirely put out of operation. From January 11th to the 25th, B-25's destroyed her ground installations, but still her airfield remained operational. On January 26, 9 B-25s, followed by 12 P-40s, flew into Taroa for a low-level attack. The B-25s destroyed 9 interceptors on the ground and 5 more after they were airborne. The control tower and two other buildings on the airfield were set afire and four tons of bombs were dropped in fuel dump and dispersal areas, starting large fires. As the B-25s left the target to return to Makin they were chased by about 15 Japanese fighters. 30 miles south of Maloelap the 12 P-40s met the bomber formation and immediately engaged the enemy fighters, destroying11 of them and severely damaging 2 more. The strike of January 26 was decisive. Practically all of the remaining enemy air strength at Maloelap had been destroyed, and the once formidable base was rendered almost powerless to defend itself against air strikes, thus neutralized. Jaluit was subjected to 15 attacks reduced to rubble and Wotje was hit 14 times suffering extensive damage. Meanwhile Admiral Pownalls task force 58.1 and 58.3 consisting of 6 fast carriers, 5 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers, 3 of the new class of anti aircraft cruisers, and 12 destroyers hit Kwajalein on December 5th. That day saw her attacked by over 246 aircraft. As a result 19 Japanese interceptors and 4 bombers were destroyed at Roi-Namur, 7 cargo ships were destroyed at Kwajalein and extensive damage was inflicted upon both bases. Simultaneously, 29 aircraft hit Wotje where they destroyed 5 grounded aircraft, set fire to hangers, machine ships and barracks. Japanese interceptors attacked Pownall's carriers, though they were unable to inflict serious damage. Following these attacks, Hoover's aircraft continued to smash Kwajalein, tossing 10 attacks, dropping nearly 210 tons of bombs on the atoll. Roi-Namurs airfield still remained operation by January 29th however, though she only had 35 aircraft on Roi-Namur; 10 reconnaissance planes on Kwajalein; 13 aircraft on Maloelap; 12 on Wotje and 15 on Eniwetok. The Japanese did not have any effective air force to defend the Marshalls any more. The feeling of the men on the islands, was doom. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Finally the Australians had taken the formidable position known as Shaggy Ridge. The Japanese continued the harrowing marches going north as their enemy would not let up. In the Marshalls the IJA and IJN personnel were inflicted the full might of American's wartime productivity, and they all knew Uncle Sam was coming to pay them a visit soon.

america american fall americans european green government australian japanese kings army new zealand navy hunt mt senior dutch philippines marine waters rough lt marines slay hq task force pearl harbor ei stevenson barker hoover parish shaggy burma uncle sam makin mille halsey generals bourne macarthur intermediate hunts new zealanders bennet dickerson joint chiefs canning cub aliado wondered pimples sato new guinea coi knoll marshalls chilton mene sio douglas macarthur matsumoto cautiously parishes opium wars nimitz mindanao pacific war turners new britain nakano finisterre koba puller port moresby matsuda company b dutch east indies skirmishes ramu battalions gilberts american navy truk prothero mccaughey central pacific vasey melanesian karai gulu fiji islands ijn green island infantry battalion neutralization hollandia rabaul komori craig watson majuro cam hill kwajalein paipa admiral nimitz admiral halsey

- 113 - Pacific War - The Battle for Shaggy Ridge , January 16-23, 1944

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 16, 2024 40:17

Last time we spoke about the landing at Saidor and continuation of advances upon New Guinea and New Britain. Operation Michaelmas was a huge success, isolating countless Japanese and threatening those trying to retreat further north. Taking advantage of the new front on New Guinea, the Australians began pushing more so upon the features across Shaggy Ridge and towards Sio. General Adachi frantically shifted units around in an effort to plug up the multiple advancing allied units, but in the end there was little to be done as the Japanese were pushed further and further north. Features were taken upon Shaggy Ridge and Sio fell nearly uncontested. Over in New Britain, General Rupertus triumphed over the Airdrome and his Marines were expanding their perimeters. Katayama made a bold attack against an enemy he overestimated at it certainly did not pan out for his men at suicide creek. This episode is The battle for Shaggy Ridge Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. A while back I covered the start of the Chinese-Indian offensive into the Hukawng Valley and Arakan regions. When I did so it was almost entirely from the allied viewpoint, but what of the IJA war planners? The Burma campaign has been arguably a complete disaster for the allies, the Japanese steamrolled all the way through, claiming vast amounts of territory and key cities and ports, so what really did they need to do but garrison it all? After Wingate unleashed operation Longcloth, the relatively idle Japanese raised the idea of potentially attacking India. Lt General Mutaguchi Renya, the victor of the Singapore campaign in 1942 was made a commander in Burma and wargamed the possibility of attacking India to try and earn support from his superiors at Tokyo General HQ. It was his belief, they could brush past the British in Assam and reach the gateway into India, and he expected the Indians to rise up and greet them with open arms. A lot of money and effort had been spent on Subhas Chandra Bose and his Indian National Army. The fall of India would be an absolutely devastating blow to the British Empire in Asia and in 1942 there was even the belief the Japanese could link up with their German allies in the middle east. But that was 1942, before Stalingrad and Kursk, 1944 was a very very different geopolitical situation. This however did not stop Mutaguchi from continuing his plans to invade India. Lt General Hanaya Tadashi, commanding the Arakan front was given the task of convincing the British that the counterattack in Arakan was the appearance of the main army earmarked to conquer India, thus leading General Slim to send up reserves from Imphal. The operation was codenamed HA-GO and it was intended to be a fent to mask the real attack upon Imphal designated Operation U-GO. Now let me dig a bit deeper into how this all came about. Until now, General Stilwell had been able to build much of the Ledo Road practically unmolested. Yet by early August, General Kawabe Mazakazu's Burma Area Army was preparing for a counter offensive. Kawabe actually did not trust Mutaguchi and suspected the man was harboring megalomaniac designs to invade India, which he was 100% right about. The “counter offensive” was really just the beginnings of Operation U-GO and it had been sold to Tokyo HQ as a pre-emptive strike to disable the 14th Army and make it unable to invade Burma. Thus General Mutaguchi's 15th Army was given the task of destroying any hostile elements in the Imphal region and to establish a strong defensive line. From December 22nd to the 26th, Mutaguchi held a conference pushing for the possibility of launching Operation U-GO and developed detailed missions for each division which would participate by means of a war game. At the same time Kawabe sold the operation HA-GO the diversionary attack in Arakan, with Lt General Hanaya Tadashi's 55th Division earmarked to pin down as many of the enemy's units as possible and to draw the British reserves away from the main offensive. When General Christisons offensive kicked off, this forced Kawabe to reinforce Hanaya with the 54th division, and this in turn established the 29th Army under the command of General Sakurai on January 6th. The 29th Army was under the overall command of the Burma Area Army, and its HQ was initially situated in Moulmein. It was assigned to defend the coastal region of Arakan and the lower Irrawaddy valley and consisted at first of the 55th Division in Arakan, the 54th Division in reserve in Prome, and various garrison units including the 24th Independent Mixed Brigade in Moulmein. It also controlled the 11th Shipping Detachment of Major-General Suzuki Gisaburo, consisting of the 11th Shipping Engineer Regiment and the 3rd Sea Transport Battalion. It had roughly 1,105 men, 85 large landing barges, 54 small landing barges, 47 motored sampans, two armored boats, 10 fishing boats, one messenger boat and one speed boat. The 11th Shipping Detachment was stationed at Taungup and its main supply depot was at Prome. Meanwhile after the capture of Maungdaw, the 5th Indian division of Major General Harold Briggs was ordered to attack the main Japanese defenses at Razabil. Razabil's defenses were quite formidable, it dominating the crossroads and road linking Maungdaw with the Tunnels and Buthidaung located 3 miles eastwards, forming the 15th Indian Corps immediate objective following Maungdaw's capture. It was dubbed by its Japanese commander “The Golden Fortress of the Mayu Range”. It was centered on the railway tunnels running through the Mayu Range and at Point 551 to the east with a further forward position at Point 1301. These powerful defenses, built carefully exploiting the rugged mountainous terrain, were tunneled deep into the hills and consisted of bunkers, trenches and other fire positions located amidst dense jungle and camouflaged with customary Japanese skill. The main outworks at Letwedet to the east and at Razabil to the west of the Mayu Range were major fortresses in their own right, requiring careful reduction before the main position could be tackled. With both bastions in direct line of sight from the Tunnels, accurate supporting artillery could be called down with ease, moreover, adding to the problems already facing troops assaulting trenches and bunkers dug into the hillsides invulnerable to all but direct hits by medium artillery. The offensive against Razabil was codenamed Operation Jonathan, but it would be delayed until the corps artillery became available. At the same time the 7th Indian division seized the initiative on January 18th and launched an attack against the 55th division's position between Letwedet and Htindaw. The 9th company, 143rd infantry regiment was defending a hill east of Htindaw and stood their ground against repeated attacks until January 24th. The Japanese strongpoints were well dug in on the tops of narrow ridges. On January 26th, Major General Briggs ordered the 161st brigade, with support in the form of Lee-Grant tanks, artillery and aerial bombardment to attack the Tortoise defended by 1st battalion, 143rd regiment in the Razabil area. The Tortoise was a horseshoe defensive position that dominated the highway. It was an elaborate system of bunkers, trenches and all the typical Japanese goodies. For the boys in Burma it would be the first time for most to face such a thing, as Slim wrote in his memories “This was the first time we had assaulted an elaborate, carefully prepared position that the Japanese meant to hold to the last." The attack opened up with 12 Vultee Vengeance dive bombers of the 3rd Tactical air force, 12 Mitchell medium bombers and 16 Liberator heavy bombers of the Strategic air force followed up by even more dive bombers. It was a visually spectacular event and to those observing from the ground looked devastating. However little to no damage was inflicted on the strongly constructed Japanese defenses burrowed so deeply into the hillsides. Similarly the mountain artillery regiment and batter from a field regiment did little damage with their bombardment as well. The Japanese had simply pulled back 1000 yards during the bombardments and by the time the allies surged forward came back to man their positions. When the Indians began their assault, the fire coming down the steep and jungle clad hillsides was absolutely devastating. The Lee-Grant tanks fired from the valley floor and managed to destroy all the identified bunkers, but the exposed Indian troops suffered massive casualties. It was virtually impossible to keep the defenders heads down long enough to advance even 50 yards towards the summit. Things got even worse when the men reached the defensive lines for the Lee-Grant tanks had to lift their fire lest they hit their own men. By the end of the day, only a toehold had been secured over the lower slopes of Razabil ridge. The assault carried on for 3 more days, with intense tank and artillery fire from different directions supporting the infantry as closely as possible. The only immediate effect of the bombardment and indirect fire by 25 pounders and 3.7 howitzers was to destroy the vegetation over the hillsides, thus exposing more and more of the Japanese defensive works. During the intense battle, the Lee-Grant medium tank proved itself a real solution in providing effective covering fire for infantry and soon new techniques were evolving. The Japanese defenses were mainly built over the summit of steep, thick, jungle covered hills and the Lee-Grants provided fire support from positions in the paddy fields below them. Their 75mm guns effectively destroyed or at the least neutralized bunker positions. A procedure was quickly developed for providing cover during the last stages of infantry assaults. Tanks would use high explosive shells to clear the vegetation, than delayed action high explosive shells to break up the front of visible bunkers, then armor piercing shells to enable the infantry to advance close behind the creeping barrage as shrapnel was not flying everywhere. All combined this showed the potential of armor vehicles in jungle warfare, when most claimed they had little practical use in such climats. Despite such developments, the casualties were mounting, little progress was being made. On January 28th, the 123rd brigade attacked Japanese positions on the secondary hill of Wrencat and its smaller neighbor hill Wrenkitten, probably the best hill names I have read on this podcast as of yet haha. These were located on the lower western foothills of the Mayu range. They were extremely steep, cone shaped features with fortified circular trenches around their heads, bunkers, and bamboo jungle. Firing from positions on the valley floor the Lee-Grants and 5.5 inch artillery were able to destroy the bunkers and switch to armor piercing rounds to perform creeping barrages for the infantry. Despite the tank and artillery support, the Japanese were throwing a ton of mortar, grenade and machine gun fire. An officer of the 123rd brigade involved in the fight had this to say 'It appears from our experience that consolidation on the objective which normally consists of a series of deeply constructed bunkers connected one with the other is extremely difficult in the very limited time that the enemy allow.' The failures against the Tortoise and Wrencat, prompted General Christison to call off the attack against Razabil by January30th. Christison regrouped his corps artillery and tanks to instead support the 7th divisions assault against Buthidaung and Letwedet. Meanwhile further to the north, General Tanaka had brought 6300 men of the 55th and 56th regiments to the Hukawng valley by early January. He wanted to counterattack in strength, but General Mutaguchi believed he could not spare additional motor transport units to give the necessary logistical support to the 18th division since preparations were already going on for operation U-GO. Thus, Tanaka ordered his men to perform a delaying action down the Hukawng valley with the primary objective of holding Kamaing, the ridge line separating Hukawng valley from Mogaung valley. Tanaka weighed his orders and the looming monsoon season that hit the area in May or June. Against Tanaka, Stilwell sought to continue his offensive after successfully taking Yupbang Ga. Stilwell now looked towards Taihpa Ga and convinced both General Wingate and Admiral Mountbatten to unleash the Galahad long penetration unit into the Hukawng valley. On January 4, 1944, Frank Merrill abruptly relieved a disappointed Brink. Despite having a background with cavalry, like Brink, Merrill understood the Japanese strength, but unlike Brink he respected the chain of command. General Sun met with Stilwell and and it was agreed the bulk of the 114th regiment should swing widely around Tanaka's left flank while the 113th regiment wheeled to the south to hit Tanaka's front along the Tanai Hka. Further north the 2nd battalion ,112th regiment would also advance east across the Tarung Hka to secure Warang Ga; the 65th regiment would continue their advance towards Taro, fording the Tanai river by January 9th; south of Kantau, the 3rd battalion, 114th regiment ran into two Japanese companies. The jungle made it difficult for the Chinese forces to organize themselves. The battalion split into 4 fragments and no two of them were in contact. The supporting 6th battery could not fire until fields of fire were cut and while that was being carried out, the Japanese companies performed infiltration maneuvers and quickly surrounded the battery. Fighting for their guns and lives between the 9th and 11th of January the Chinese cannoneers managed to save both. The battalion was nearly wiped out from these Japanese tactics, but thankfully on January 12th, the regimental HQ arrived and reformed the battalion to launch a concerted attack that managed to gradually push back the Japanese. 3 days later the 2nd battalion arrived allowing the 114th regiment to force a crossing of the Sanip Hka by January 16th. Meanwhile the 1st battalion, 113th regiment forded the Tarung river near Yupbang Ga and sent patrols north to occupy Tabawng GA on January 13th. From there they advanced southeast to Kaduja Ga then to Brangbram Hka where they formed a line extending to the junction with the Tanai bank by mid january. On January 21st, the Chinese broke through the Japanese lines north of Brangbram Hka and made it to Ningru Ha less than one mile downstream from Taihpa Ga. Simultaneously, the battered 112th regiment swung wide going north east to Warang Ga. By the end of January the 113th continued their advance upon Taihpa Ga where they would meet stronger Japanese resistance. They began fighting within 1,500 yards of Taihpa Ga. Artillery support, the 4th and 5th Batteries, was then brought up. The next 1,000 yards between the 113th regiment and Taihpa Ga took two days to cross; then they spent a week in what was called "preparations for attack." General Sun's men were now approaching the Japanese strongpoint in the area, and Japanese resistance was more freely offered, with heavy shelling by 75- and 150-mm. pieces. At Taihpa Ga, the Kamaing Road crossed the Tanai on a long gravel bar which bullock carts could use quite well. At this point was the village itself, a humble collection of bashas, long since burnt out. About 800 yards upstream was a ferry across a stretch of fairly deep water. The Japanese used this ferry to bring supplies across the Tanai, rather than the vulnerable and easily spotted gravel bar. Here they had their strongpoint, well prepared and stubbornly defended. Further to the west, the 65th regiment advance was much slower than expected for Stilwell. Upon reaching the Hukawng Valley, the 65th's commander, despite means more than ample for his mission, contracted the same lethargy that had hastened the demise of the 112th Regiment. Stilwell was greatly frustrated by the delay a few more weeks with Colonel Fu, so he ordered Colonel Liao to relieve him. Stilwell wrote in his diary "Told Liao this included division commanders unless they watched their step. Also that Fu really should be shot. Liao took it OK though it shook him up." On January 22, General Sun was told about this affair, but the news softened somewhat by the presentation of a silk banner for the victory at Yupbang Ga, a dramatic contrast of the respective awards for lethargy and vigor. Having made his point, and hoping that he had given the Chinese a healthy shock, Stilwell restored Fu to his command by January 26. Fu's later performance in combat was rated as excellent. The Chinese managed to encircle the passive 3rd battalion, 55th regiment on January 23rd, and by the 25th the last Japanese pockets were wiped out. On the 26th the Chinese reached Ahawk Hka and on the 28th crossed the Taro river and occupied Taro on the 30th. This effectively cut behind Tanaka's flank. The bulk of the 112th now was close enough to the 113th to aid them so Sun began an attack against Taihpa Ga on the 30th. The Japanese held on stubbornly for days and would quietly withdrew on the night of February 4th. Tanaka concluded the loss of the Taro plain meant "the failure of the whole division in its operations along the Tanai". Thus Tanaka decided there was no point in continuing the fighting there. Over at Sanip, Sun ordered the 3rd battalion, 114th regiment to rest. However Stilwell thought this was close to disobedience of his orders, because he wanted Sun to move quickly and cut behind the 18th Division. On January 13, he had spoken very bluntly to Sun, asking him what orders he gave the 114th Regiment and if there had been any word from Chongqing to slow the operation. Stilwell told Sun that if he could not exercise the commands that Peanut had given him, he would resign and report the whole affair to the US Government. "Regardless of what anyone else may say, I assure you that my report will be fully believed in Washington." General Sun was confronted with the prospect that Chinese lethargy in north Burma might mean withdrawal of all US help from China. Stilwell, Sun was told, had been alone in his fight to convince the United States that the Chinese Army was worth helping. "If I am double-crossed by the people I am trying to help I am through for good and I will recommend very radical measures." Stilwell closed by saying that he had done his part; would Sun reciprocate? But despite Stilwell's arguments and threats, General Sun did not meet Stilwell's ideas of how a dynamic field commander should conduct himself. Thus the 114th gradually began to dislodge the Japanese from their positions along the river bank, taking care to annihilate all pockets behind. Stilwell was satisfied with the progress of his offensive and established the northern combat area command on February 1st. This organization would be led by Brigadier General Haydon Boatner and would include American, British and Indian units entering North Burma. But that is all for the wild Burma front as we now need to travel over to New Guinea. Last time we were in New Guinea, Brigadier Chilton's 18th brigade had just completed their advance upon Shaggy Ridge and Brigadier Hammer's 15th brigade had just relieved the 25th brigade on January 7th. Thus two brigades were flown in and two were flown out, showcasing how far the allied New Guinea air forces had increased their efficiency during the war. The New Guinea force was now under the command of General Milford, though Vasey still retained his task of "contain hostile forces in the Bogadjim-Ramu area by vigorous action of fighting patrols against enemy posts”. The division's role was still to prevent enemy penetration into the Ramu-Markham valley from Madang and protect the Gusap airfield and the various radar installations the instruction added that the division would "create the impression of offensive operations against Bogadjim Road by vigorous local minor offensive action". This was to be done by holding in strength with two brigades a "line of localities" from Toms' Post on the right to the Mene River on the left, the boundary between the 18th on the right and the 15th on the left being a line from Bebei through Herald Hill to Kankirei Saddle. In addition the 18th Brigade would "by raids and harassing tactics ensure that no major Jap withdrawal takes place undetected and occupy the Mindjim-Faria divide and the high ground to the north and south of it as the administrative position permits". The 15th Brigade would hold the Yogia-Mene River area, delay any enemy advance up the Ramu from the Evapia River, patrol to the Solu River, and deny the 5800 and 5500 Features to the enemy. Despite this, Vasey was preparing to assault the Kankirei saddle with the fresh 18th brigade. Designated Operation Cutthroat, the seizure of the Kankieri saddle and ultimately that of Shaggy Ridge, Vasey planned to launch an attack against Mount Prothero which was being defended by the 6th company, 78th regiment. He would attack it from the south, preceded by a diversionary attack against Cam's saddle. Brigadier Chilton realized however, that frontal attacks along Shaggy Ridge would not be able to achieve surprise, so he instead wanted to attempt a wide encircling maneuver on the left flank via Canning's saddle to attack Prothero directly. The 18th brigade spent the early part of January patrolling to see if it was possible to advance through Canning's saddle to Prothero 1 while simultaneously and stealthily building a road to Canning's in preparation for the coming offensive. The possibility of occupying Prothero from Canning's Saddle had been suggested to Chilton by Lt-Colonel Lang of the 2/2nd Pioneers, after a patrol performed by Captain McInnes. Captain McInnes had found an approach along a steep, razor backed spur within a short distance of Prothero's summit where they could hear Japanese. Meanwhile the 2/9th battalion had sent a patrol that found a possible track from McGullough's ridge vie Geyton's Hill to the Mene River. Going up the river bed led one to Canning's saddle. Two companies of the 2/12th spent a few days constructing a track going to the Mene River and they took special precautions to prevent the enemy from finding out. Reconnaissance patrols in general were careful to avoid contact with the enemy and so was the case around Prothero. The jeep track was hurriedly pushed to Guy's Post, existing tracks were improved and shorter and better tracks constructed to improve the supply routes to Shaggy Ridge and Mainstream; reserves of supplies in forward areas were built up, thus enabling a concentration of as many natives as possible to carry for the attacking battalion on the left, and arrangements were made for a limited air dropping at Canning's Saddle at an appropriate time. To support the upcoming attack, 9 long and two short 25 pounders of the 2/4th field regiment were brought up along with 7000 shells. The guns had to be dragged forward to the Lakes-Guy's Post area. Lt Colonel Charles Bourne's 2/12th battalion was to head the attack. Chilton also planned to have Lt Colonel Charles Geard's 2/10th battalion perform a diversionary attack through Cam's saddle. After Protharo 1 was captured, the 2/10th were to exploit north to Kankieri and south to the Mainstream area; while Lt Colonel Clement Cummins 2/9th battalion attacked northwest along Shaggy Ridge to join up with the 2/12th. By January 18th, the 4000 yard track to Geyton's Hill was complete, allowing the 18th brigade to advance. On that same day, B-25 Mitchell bombers unleashed their cannons and bombed the enemy positions at the junction of Mainstream, the Faria and Shaggy ridge. They dropped 60 delayed action bombs over the Faria river valley and some modified Mitchells sporting 75mm cannons mounted on their chins fired upon the crest of ridges. This cannon, the same used by Sherman tanks, was quite a formidable weapon in the air. To enable its fire, the nose of the B-25G model had to be shortened and the cannon breech positioned behind the pilot from where it could be loaded by the navigator for firing. To fire it the pilot would press a button on his control wheel. The weapon would prove inefficient against shipping, but it would be a lot more successful at hitting ground targets. Over three successive days from 18 to 20 January the Mitchells flew 180 sorties against Shaggy Ridge, firing 135 rounds of 75 mm at the ridge as well as dropping around 200 tons of bombs. The aircraft also fired about 90,000 rounds of .50 caliber. The machine-gun salvos were particularly devastating. From his accompanying Boomerang, Alex Miller-Randle recalled ‘Mitchells strip the trees of Shaggy Ridge clean and shatter the limbs and trunks to matchsticks'. D-day was the 20th, seeing the 2/10th on the right and 2/12th on the left. Captain Kumnicks company of the 2/10th advanced to Grassy Patch and over on the left a party of the 2/12th led by Major Fraser took vanguard. All of the preliminary actions were completed back on the 19th when Captain Gunn's A company of the 2/10th advanced from Tom's Post for Sprogg's ridge via a Japanese mule track. Later Captain Humnicks D company would use the same track. On the left the 2/12th battalion and B and D company of the 2/2nd Pioneers advanced along the new line of communication to Geyton's. At 8:45am Captain Gunn's company advanced from Sprogg's ridge to attack Cam's Saddle, followed 30 minutes later by Captain Kumnick's company. Operation Cutthroat opened up with artillery and B-25 mitchell bombardments against the Protheros and Kankirei Saddle. By 11 a .m. Captain Gunn was 300 yards from an enemy position on Cam's Saddle while artillery shelled the position until 12.30 pm when the Australians found that the enemy had withdrawn. Farther on, Captain Gunn's men would be pinned down by Japanese defending the western end of the saddle as Japanese patrols ambushed a signal line party 500 yards behind. Gunn initially tried to outflank the enemy, but then withdrew 200 yards and dug in for the night astride the mule track. At the same time, the 2/12th battalion reached Canning's Saddle by 3:30pm. The next morning, the 2/12th began to silently creep along the razor back ridge towards Prothero 1 with Cameron's C Company taking the lead. At this point Fraser had Captain Cameron's C Company, Captain Geason's A Company and Captain Thomas's D company enveloping the ridge. They nearly achieved surprise, but the Japanese discovered their advance and rapidly turned their mountain gun upon them causing many casualties. Despite the mountain guns fire, Lt Braithwaites 8th Platoon charged the Japanese and captured the mountain gun upon Prothero 1. The action cost 11 Australian lives with another 44 wounded. The 2/12th had thus captured the key point in the Japanese defenses upon Shaggy Ridge. After the loss of the mountain gun position, Colonel Matsumoto ordered his men to pull back closer to Kankirei. In the process the 2/10th were able to capture Cam's Saddle. On that same day the 2/9th began their attack, sending A Company to envelope the Green Sniper's Pimple defended by a platoon of the 78th regiment. A Company managed to seize the position using stealth and would be met by failed counterattacks. By the end of the day the Japanese defenders were now sandwiched between the 2/9th to the south and the 2/12th to the north, while the 2/10th were advancing from the east. Way further to the east, General Nakano's men were in an even more dire situation. After the evacuation of Sio, the Japanese were forced to retreat day and night under heavy rainfall, hindered by rough terrain and allied aerial attacks. Lieutenant General Yoshihara Kane, Chief of Staff of the 18th Army, recalled this of the march: “The most wearing part was that with these ranges, when they climbed to the craggy summit they had to descend and then climb again, and the mountains seemed to continue indefinitely, until they were at the extreme of exhaustion. Especially when they trod the frost of Nokobo Peak they were overwhelmed by cold and hunger. At times they had to make ropes out of vines and rattan and adopt "rock-climbing" methods; or they crawled and slipped on the steep slopes; or on the waterless mountain roads they cut moss in their potatoes and steamed them. In this manner, for three months, looking down at the enemy beneath their feet, they continued their move. Another thing which made the journey difficult was the valley streams, which were not usually very dangerous. At times, however, there was a violent squall, for which the Finisterres are famous during the rainy season; then these valley streams for the time being flowed swiftly and became cataracts. Then there were many people drowned... General Shoge was swept away by one of these streams on one occasion but fortunately managed to grasp the branch of a tree which was near the bank and was able to save one of his nine lives.” The men were malnourished, fatigued, but kept going day by day anticipating an abundant food supply at Gali. When they reached Gali in late January they would find nothing there. This anguish was just the beginning. The base had been shelled by allied warships and bombed by allied aircraft. General Muroya was injured on January 17th during the bombardment. Luckily for the Japanese there was no offensive towards Gali. Since the Saidor landing, General Martin's men were busy expanding the perimeter with outposts extending towards Sel and Bilau. Martin was reinforced with the 1st and 3rd battalions of the 128th regiment on January 16th. Although Martin believed launching an eastern attack upon the withdrawing enemy would provide an excellent opportunity to destroy some of their divisions, General Kreuger refused to permit such a thing. This was because the 32nd division was required for an upcoming offensive in the Hansa Bay area. Meanwhile General Nakai had brought the bulk of his detachment over to the Mot River area and established a strong outpost on Gabumi. Nakai also sent the 3rd battalion 239th regiment to Bilau to try and contest the control of its outpost. On January 12, the Japanese attacked Biliau, forcing the Americans to retreat behind the river. 30 Americans then tried to retake the outpost the following day but were repelled by the Japanese. On January 15th, the Japanese withdrew, allowing the 1st Battalion, 128th Regiment to occupy it on January 20. Another Japanese attack on January 26 would force them to retreat; and two days later, the Americans were successfully ambushed when they tried to reoccupy the outpost. Nakano's men had thus successfully carried out a fighting withdrawal from Lae. They had suffered horribly for it, crossing unbelievable difficult terrain, with basically no supplies, apart from what meager amounts could be airdropped or brought over via submarine. Yet now they needed to break through towards Madang, and there were 3 possible options of doing so. Number 1, they could advance along the coast, but this one was disregarded immediately because they would have to break directly through the new American defenses. Number 2, codenamed A would be an advance inland through Cabutamon, Monara, Sibog and Bilau towards Mindiri. Option 3 codenamed B was an advance even further inland crossing over the foothills of the Finisterre, through Nokopo, Kwembum, Yugayuga, Gabumi and Singor towards Mindiri. Nakano elected to send the 20th division over plan A while his division would advance in 3 echelons over plan B. On January 23rd, the 51st division departed Gali along the B route while the 1st battalion, 115th regiment and General Katagiri's 20th division would advance along the A route. Katagiri's 80th regiment and 20th engineer regiment tried the best they could, but the march was only advancing a single kilometer per day. Katagiri's troops had to cut through dense jungle and were facing strong enemy patrols along their route. Facing greater difficulties than expected, Katagiri decided to follow Nakano's 51st division along the A route in the end. Yet unbeknownst to him, the 3rd battalion, 126th regiment had just established new outposts at Sibog and Paramusi on January 22nd. From there they were sending out patrols to Langani and Sindaman. The Americans still could not break through Nakai's defenses at Gabumi giving the Japanese some relief. The bulk of Nakano's forces were withdrawing smoothly, seeing just sporadic harassment from American patrols. On the 1st of February, the 1st battalion, 115th regiment finally made contact with Nakai's forces at Gabumi while the bulk of the 51st division advanced through Yugayuga. A week later, Nakano himself reached Gabumi and began advancing towards Madang. By the 16th of February, the 1st battalion, 115th regiment reached Madang and the 20th division had successfully pulled out of Gabumi. Late February would see 1667 men in total arrive at Madang, 5469 would reach Singor and 1235 would reach Gabumi. Thus 80% of Nakano's strength had effectively withdrawn. Nakai also managed to collect 500 patients that had been abandoned at Yugayuga and brought them over to Madang by March 1st. It seemed once again, Nakano's men had escaped doom. On the other side, Brigadier Cameron had begun his advance towards Saidor on January 25th. His 4th battalion led by Lt Colonel Percy Crosky, with a Papuan company reached Kiari on January 28th. Without taking a break they continued towards Singor the next day, then Malasanga and Crossingtown by the 31st. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Japanese were slowly but surely losing their hold over Shaggy Ridge. With the loss of the vital artillery position it was just a matter of time before the Australians took over the area, meanwhile Nakano's great retreat was a success, but one does not win a war moving backwards.

united states american china washington americans british chinese australian fighting german japanese kings army chief indian facing sun singapore strategic option mainstream marines batteries brink indians jap firing slim tactical sherman fraser hq saddle us government pioneers tanks peanut gunn brigades british empire boomerang tunnels sel shaggy burma tortoise generals faria battalion platoon reconnaissance canning mitchells tanaka liberator taro kursk pimples assam farther regiment stalingrad new guinea artillery gali chilton liao sio chongqing opium wars pacific war new britain nakano stilwell finisterre mayu galahad lee grant lae ramu prothero vasey nakai war the battle imphal papuan subhas chandra bose chinese army katayama c company irrawaddy craig watson katagiri arakan indian national army tanai

- 111 - Pacific War - Landing at Saidor , January 2-9, 1944

Unveiling Paradise: Your Go-To Destination Wedding Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 2, 2024 30:19

Last time we spoke about Operation Backhander, the landings at Cape Gloucester. General Douglas MacArthur unleashed another cog in the machine that was his drive back to the Philippines. The 1st Marines under General Rupertus were back in the action, spearheading the landings at Cape Gloucester. The landings were successful and multiple allied units began advancing towards the airdrome. Colonel Sumiya realized the futility of attempting a defense upon the open ground against American armor, so he pulled his units away towards Razorback Hill from which they could launch harassment maneuvers against the new American perimeter. Over on New Guinea the Australians continued their drive towards Sio, pushing the Japanese even further north in the process. The Japanese were being attacked in multiple places without the ability to contest them everywhere. What would the Japanese commanders do to establish a proper defense? This episode is Landing at Saidor Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. Last week we left off with General Nakai unleashing a counteroffensive against Kesawai. The counteroffensive was successful at pushing the Australian commando's out of the area to prevent them from encroaching upon Madang. These actions worried General Vasey who thought the Japanese might follow them up with an offensive against Dumpu. Vasey elected to carry out a punitive attack along Shaggy Ridge. Perhaps a refresher as I think I did once describe it, but Shaggy Ridge is located six miles north of Dumpu. The razorback ridge has one elevation of more than 5,000 feet, running roughly southeast to northwest. The highest point on the ridge is known as the Kankirei Saddle. There are also three high elevations along the ridge that the Australians named the Pimple, the Intermediate Snipers' Pimple, and the Green Sniper's Pimple. The Japanese had constructed four miles of defenses along the northern part of the ridge. These positions dominated the trail along which the Australians would eventually have to cross. The trail was narrow, only two to three feet wide, and there were drops on either side of 300 to 500 feet. The Japanese had also constructed a rough road on the coast side to a point between the Mindjim and Faria Rivers, making supply to the defenders much easier. The Pimples were the strong points, and the Japanese had built fortified posts with machine guns and deep trenches on each. Vasey's punitive force consisted of the 2/16th battalion under the temporary command of Major Garth Symington. Patrols had been sent to figure out decent approaches for an attack against the Pimple, but everything indicated there was only a narrow path to perform a frontal assault from. Thus Symington planned to assault the Pimple and exploit for about 400 yards along the ridge with Captain Christian's B Company while Captain Anderson's D Company maneuvered behind to consolidate the ground gained. Fortunately Symington would be receiving aerial support from the American 41st Squadron and Australian No. 4 Squadron, artillery support from the 8th battery and 54th battery and back up from the 2/27th battalion who would launch a diversionary attack against the Japanese along the Faria River and Mainstream area. During the morning of December 27th, the assault began with 16 Kittyhawks and two Boomerangs bombing the Pimple followed by artillery. Dive bombing, strafing and artillery fire was intense causing reverberation and roars that could be heard up and down the Ramu Valley. An hour later, B Company's leading platoon departed their startline under the foliage of the rainforest to scale the rock face leading to the pimple. Although the bombardment was stunning, the dazed Japanese defenders quickly responded to the invaders by tossing grenades from the well sited pillboxes atop the pimple. The Australians dashed forward and wiped out the forward pillbox, securing their toehold on the ridge. With the artillery firing further forward the Australians were soon able to capture the second pimple feature just 100 yards ahead, successfully clearing the Japanese from their entrenchments. However at this point, B company came across a strong rock bunker. They first allowed the artillery to smash it, then they tossed grenades while trying to outflank the defenders. A Japanese defender refusing to surrender, covered the entrance to his pillbox with a groundsheet and for about two hours flicked away the grenades thrown at him before they could explode. Eventually he was blasted out when a grenade was tied to the end of a bamboo pole which was poked into the pit, the pin being pulled out by a length of string. More than 100 grenades were thrown during the day at the rock bunker in front of the second pimple. As hard as they tried it was impossible to outflank as the sides of the razorback guarding the bunker were almost perpendicular. Christian was forced to pull B company back and dig in on the second pimple. Meanwhile, D company came up to relieve the exhausted men of B company. To deal with the bunker menace, Australian Pioneers chiseled a track along the cliff face towards it and designed a special bomb consisting of a grenade placed in a chemical and sealed in a field ration tin. During the morning of the 28th, D company advanced over their newly cut track and hurled the new bombs successfully blowing up the enemy bunker. While this was occurring, Lt Scott's 18th Platoon was advancing down the eastern slope of Shaggy Ridge attempting a encircling maneuver against the third pimple. At 10.50 a.m Scott reported being at the base of the third pimple and a quarter of an hour later the artillery and mortars began firing smoke to cover his Platoon's advance. At the foot of the objective Scott ordered his platoon sergeant, Longman, to take a small party of Owen gunners up the third pimple. Under heavy enemy machine-gun fire Longman and three men charged an enemy machine-gun post near the top. Two of his men were wounded but Longman and the other man continued to advance upon the enemy post and eventually silenced it with Owen-gun fire. To reach the enemy post they had to pull themselves up a steep slope with one hand and fire their Owens with the other. Still under heavy fire from other enemy posts the two men covered the evacuation of the two wounded and neutralized the fire of another enemy post 40 yards away which was opposing the advance of the rest of the platoon, led by the wounded Scott, up the cliff face. Nine minutes after Longman led the first assault, Scott was in possession of the third pimple and was covering the advance of Lieutenant McCaughey's 16 Platoon to the fourth and highest pimple, later named McCaughey's Knoll, farther along the ridge. The two platoons then dug in on the newly-won ground. During the afternoon, the battered Japanese attempted a counterattack but were easily repelled, suffering a total of 28 dead during the battle against Symington's three killed and eight wounded. After the pimples were captured, the fighting fell into a series of artillery duels and patrol skirmishes. With the Pimples in hand the Australians could observe Madang. Vasey at this time acquired further support from General MacArthur who relieved his exhausted brigades with the 18th and 15th brigades. Meanwhile General Adachi sensed key points in the Madang area were not defended well enough, so he ordered the bulk of the 41st division to advance from Wewak to Madang. In early december, the 2nd battalion, 237th regiment and 2nd mountain artillery battalion of the 41st group were deployed at Karkar island. However the movement of the rest of the division was sent to the Gogol area and was heavily delayed by storms that caused numerous rivers to overflow. But now we are shifting gears and heading over to the Huon Peninsula where a new allied landing was about to occur. In early December, General MacArthur finally decided to act upon a suggestion put forward by his assistant chief of staff Lt General Stephen Chamberlain. Chamberlain argued Saidor on the south side of the Huon Peninsula should be occupied in order to construct an advanced air and naval base. MacArthur waited until two days before the Arawe expedition, before giving orders to Krueger to prepare plans for a landing against Saidor. Because of limited landing craft the landings would need to be pushed until January 2nd. The operation was code named Michelmas and initially it was thought the 503rd parachute infantry could be airdropped over Saidor, but a limited number of aircraft killed this one in the crib. Thus the 32nd division who had been earmarked for the canceled Gasmata landings were chosen for the task. The general outline for the operation was discussed at a conference held on Goodenough island on December 20th attended to be Barbey, Major General William Gill, Whitehead commanding the 32nd division, Colonel Clarence Martin commanding the 126th regiment and other staff officers. Allied intelligence reports indicated the Japanese had few forces in the Saidor region. Nevertheless, the plans called for landings in force on three beaches codenamed Red, White and Blue on the west shore of Dekay's bay. If the Americans could successfully seize Saidor, this would cut the Japanese retreat from Finschhafen and therefore would trap another Japanese division at Sio. Krueger selected the 126th Regiment for the task after they were rebuilt following the Battle of Buna-Gona and retrained in amphibious warfare. Brigadier-General Clarence Martin would act as the commander of the new Michaelmas task force. MacArthur did not have much time to carry out ground reconnaissance, thus the 3 beaches selected were chosen primarily from aerial photograph data. They would prove to be quite narrow, rocky and exposed to heavy seas. Because the allied intelligence indicated few Japanese forces in the area, MacArthur elected not to perform a preliminary aerial bombardment. Admiral Barbey's amphibious force were now well experienced veterans with amphibious landings, so the last minute notice did not hinder them too much. On January the 1st, Martin's men were tossed onto 9 APD's, 17 LCI's and two LST's supported by 9 of Barbey's Destroyers and Admiral Crutchley's Cruiser force, hoping to intercept some IJN forces. Yet Crutchley would be disappointed as Admiral Koga had his hands full with something cooking up at Rabaul and Kavieng and could not afford to dispense units to Saidor. What could hinder the landings was air forces from the IJA at Wewak, though they were considerably weakened with just 39 fighters, 17 light bombers and 7 heavy bombers available after so many allied air strikes. The landings went off smoothly. The beaches were hit by more than 2000 shells within 20 minutes prior to the first LCV landings at around 7am. Two battalions of the 126th landed abreast without opposition and quickly established a perimeter. Soon a 3rd battalion passed through and extended the perimeter further left upon high ground, just southwest of an unserviceable airfield. Captain Meredith Muggins, who played a key role in the capture of Sanananda, recalled his impressions of this seemingly uneventful landing: “When we landed at Saidor it was an amazing sight. There were dozens of warships bombarding the coast. The sound was like a rolling thunder and the smoke hung along the ground. As we approached the beach, air attacks began. Heavy bombers dropped their load of high explosive from a few thousand feet. Then came in the B-25 strafers shooting everything in sight, clobbering positions. Behind them came fighters to give the Japs a final working over. There was very little opposition when we landed. We found a few wandering around in shell shock. What a contrast from the days at Buna and Sanananda, only a year before, when we were fighting with rifles, grenades, and rocks!” Thus 8000 troops were landed ashore by the end of the day. The only real resistance came in the form of some air raids from Wewak beginning at 4pm. 9 Japanese Nakajima Ki-49 (Helen) aircraft, escorted by up to 20 Zeros and Kawasaki Ki-61 (Tony) fighters bombed the beach area at 4:30pm. There were three more air raids during the night, and 49 over the course of the month, but most were quite small. Thus on Januaruy the 3rd MacArthur triumphantly stated “We have seized Saidor on the north coast of New Guinea. In a combined operation of ground, sea and air forces, elements of the Sixth Army landed at three beaches under cover of heavy air and naval bombardment. The enemy was surprised both strategically and tactically and the landings were accomplished without loss. The harbour and airfields are in our firm grasp. Enemy forces on the north coast between Sixth Army and the advancing Australians are trapped with no source of supply and face disintegration and destruction.” The Saidor area and her landing strip were in allied hands and further men and supplies would be brought over without enemy interference. Over on the Japanese side, General Adachi had the understrength and exhausted 51st division garrisoning Sio while the 20th division was retreating from the Finschhafen area. On December 30th, Adachi arrived to Kiari where he ordered the 51st to advance to Bogia, once the 20th had arrived at Sio. Since mid December, some units, such as the bulk of the 66th regiment had already made it to Bogia, where they could be rehabilitated, leaving just the 3rd composite battalion of the 66th regiment, the 3rd battalion HQ, the 10th company and one machine gun company to garrison Gali under the leadership of General Muroya. Just as Adachi was preparing to depart on January 2nd, he received word of the allied landing at Saidor which effectively opened up a new and important threat against his isolated forces. Adachi believed it was now useless to hold on to Sio and the Vitiaz Strait, since enemy troops were also landed on New Britain. Furthermore his main base at Madang was now vulnerable. Thus Adachi placed General Nakano in command of both divisions now designated the Nakano force and ordered him to advance the forces to Gali by submarine to try and secure the new key supply point while the Shoge detachment would delay the Australian advance to Sio. Nakano would therefore have to break through or bypass Saidor overland to arrive safely at Madang. Additionally the 41st division was ordered to depart Wewak immediately and advance overland towards Madang. General Nakai was given orders to advance his detachment towards Saidor to try and contain the American advance as long as possible and this would only leave the 2nd battalion, 78th regiment under Colonel Matsumoto Matsujiro on the Kankirei Saddle-Shaggy Ridge area. On January 3rd, Lt General Goro Mano was flown directly to Alexishafen to assume command of all units in the Madang region, including the Matsumoto detachment. Back over in Saidor, the Americans began to send patrols and an outpost was setup at Sel on January the 5th while the 3rd battalion, 126th regiment skirmished with other American patrols at Teterei and Biliau. General Muroya managed to secure Gali without much difficulty. Meanwhile, upon receiving the news of the Saidor landing, Brigadier Windeyer's 20th Brigade continued their advance, expecting the march to be a lot easier. After fording the Sanga River on January 3rd, the 2/17th battalion advanced to the Sazomu river while fighting off elements of Colonel Miyake's rearguard. At this point General Katagiri's forces were in a full retreat towards Kiari, only performing some rearguard against around Kelanoa. Thus the 2/17th advance went pretty much undisturbed as they reached the Dallman River on January 6th. Kelanoa offered more defensible positions, so Windeyer cautiously sent some patrols to scout the area out, trying to avoid unnecessary casualties. At 8 a.m. on the 8th the 2/17th resumed their advance and half an hour later their leading company was met with some fire from a track junction. There seemed to be about 40 determined Japanese with four machine-guns holding the area. The Australians killed 8 Japanese and lost 2 in the process with another 2 wounded. As the company could make no headway without further casualties they withdrew to a kunai patch south-east of the track junction so that artillery mortars and machine-guns could hit the Japanese. The position was hit with mortar heavily causing the Japanese to withdraw during the night. The next day at 9:30am the Australian battalion advanced through the position finding abandoned pill boxes, foxholes and several dead Japanese. Later during the day, a group of 30 heavily armed Japanese fire upon the battalion 1500 yards from the Buri River. The Australians unleashed artillery, mortars and machine guns upon them until 4pm when some tanks arrived forcing the Japanese to flee. Meanwhile the Japanese were able to repair 12 barges which were quickly used to evacuate wounded towards Gali. Unfortunately, allied PT boats were lurking in the area like sharks. The PT boats unsuccessfully attacked Adachi's submarine that was bringing him back over to Madang but managed to destroy one barge carrying 100 wounded near Herwath Point and damaged others. Most of the wounded would reach Gali by the 10th and 20th division advanced past Kiari on the 9th and were drawing closer to Gali. The 2/17th crossed the Buri River on the 10th and reached the Kapugara river the next day without opposition. General Nakano departed Kiari with his division heading for Gali. It was now only the Shoge detachment that stood in the path of the Australians. The Shoge detachment received orders on January 13th to withdraw towards Sio using an exhausting inland route going from Nambariwa to Nokopo. The Australians would soon enter the ruins of Nambariwa finding the Japanese had destroyed numerous large dumps. Nambariwa had been the principal Japanese supply base for the Finschhafen area, both banks of its river had been barge loading points. There were numerous facilities such as barge workshops, engineer store dumps, hospital areas and bivouac areas. By January 15th the Australian forces would occupy Sio uncontested. General Wootten's 9th division had completed its mission and it would be their last action in New Guinea. Wootten had received word in early January that the 8th Brigade led by Brigadier Claude Cameron was being brought over to Finschhafen to relieve the 24th Brigade. Now with the fall of Sio, General Berryman ordered the 5th division now under the command of Major General Alan Ramsay to take over the forward area. Mop up operations would continue for a week, until the 4th battalion, 8th brigade and 5th division officially took over Sio. The advance from Fortification Point to Sio saw the 20th Brigade suffer 3 deaths, 13 wounded and 958 sick from malaria, mosquitoes remaining a larger foe than the Japanese as usual. The 20th brigade had marched 50 miles in 24 days and counted a total of 303 dead Japanese and captured 22. Within the 4 months campaign going back to September 22nd, Wootten's 9th division had suffered 283 deaths and 744 wounded, but estimated they killed 3099 Japanese, captured 39 and inflicted around 4644 wounded. Now we are heading back to the boys on New Britain. With the airdrome secured and a strong defensive perimeter surrounding it, General Rupertus radioed the commander of the 6th Army “First Marine Division presents to you as an early New Year gift the complete airdome of Cape Gloucester. Situation well in hand due to fighting spirit of troops, the usual Marine luck and the help of God…” General Krueger expressed himself as "delighted." At his advance headquarters at Port Moresby General Douglas MacArthur, presented the airdrome to the people of the United States with his compliments and sent Rupertus the following dispatch: “I extend my heartiest congratulations to your officers and men. I am filled with pride and gratitude by their resourceful determination in capturing Cape Gloucester. Your gallant Division has maintained the immortal record of the Marine Corps and covered itself with glory.” General Rupertus raised the US flag on an improvised staff above the main strip with simple ceremonies on December 31. Soon American engineers were being brought over to repair the airfield as the Japanese sent nightly air raids to hamper these efforts. The Japanese still held several operational airfields within range, but their efforts to bomb the Americans positions were hampered by terrible weather. They also never massed air forces to attack in great strength, thus the damage was always minor and easily repairable. To the east, assistant commander of the 1st Marines, Brigadier General Lemuel Shepherd assumed command of the forces within the Yellow Beach perimeter. Due to the lack of Japanese resistance around the airdrome, the Marine commanders were convinced General Matsuda was retaining the bulk of his strength in the Borgen Bay area, thus leaving Colonel Sumiya out to dry. Shepherd elected to take his force and use them to clear up the Borgen Bay area. On January 1st he proposed to hold fast on the left and center of the Yellow Beach perimeter, while his right line consisting of the 3rd battalions of the 7th and 5th Marines would advance southeast. On the other side, Colonel Katayama had just arrived at Magairapua with his 2nd battalion on January 1st. It seems at this point Matsuda made an error. Perhaps its because he was essentially a transportation expert rather than a combat leader, perhaps it was due to his failed initial attacks, but he decided to place Katayama in command of all the forces in the Brogen Bay area. Now designated the Katayama detachment, these forces were the 2nd battalion, 53rd regiment and 2nd and 3rd battalions 141st regiment.There would also soon be Major Tatsumi Asaschichi's 3rd Battalion who were still en route from Nigol and Cape Bushing. Katayama first tackled his command by underestimating his enemy's strength. Katayama ordered an offensive in force against Target Hill to be led by Captain Mukai Toyoji's 2nd battalion, 141st regiment. Major Takabe Shinichi's 2nd Battalion, 53rd Regiment, would attack the center of the marine perimeter to confuse the Americans and prevent them from reinforcing the hill. At this time Target Hill was being defended by the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, more particularly their A Company . This unit was deployed with its 1st Platoon defending the area on the left between the beach and swamp, the 2nd Platoon holding a series of strong points on such dry ground as could be found in the swamp itself, and only the 3rd Platoon on the hill proper. Unbeknownst to Katayama, Shepherd had begun his offensive at 10:00am on the 2nd. The 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines, under the temporary command of Lieutenant-Colonel Lewis B. Puller and 3rd Battalion, 5th Marinesunder the command of Lieutenant-Colonel David S. MacDougal were advancing abreast southeast towards Suicide Creek. The terrain they were traversing was particularly brutal. The 3rd battalion had to hack their way through the jungle going some 300 yards where they would come across well prepared Japanese positions. The 5th battalion had a longer distance to travel, but would encounter less resistance at the early phase. The 5th battalion attempted an encircling movement from the west, the assault troops soon encountered the face of the same Japanese pocket that was holding up the 3rd battalion and were halted in turn. As a result, the attacking lines on the night of 2 January, and throughout 3 January, resembled a huge letter "U", with the enemy strong point contained on three sides. Recognizing Suicide Creek was a major obstacle, the Japanese had sited their positions skillfully to cover it. Time after time Marines attempted crossings, only to be fired upon from invisible positions. The Japanese had become experts at field fortifications. The jungle curtailed both their attackers' freedom of movement and enhanced their own concealment: Marines would need get within just a few feet of the emplacements in order to locate them, by which time few were left alive to spot them for others. Even their lack of fortification materials--cement and steel reinforcing--reacted in favor of the Japanese, for the earth-and-log bunkers which they improvised were too soft-surfaced to detonate bazooka rockets, the heaviest weapons the infantry was capable of bringing to the point of contact. To support these bunkers, they had dug deep foxholes between and under the flaring buttress roots of the giant trees characteristic of the region, camouflaging them with foliage and cutting cunningly interlocking fire lanes. Artillery and mortar shells and air bombs were all but useless in reaching these positions, owing to the fantastically high forest cover that usually caused tree bursts, to which the deeply dug-in enemy was virtually invulnerable. The marines gradually surrounded the well prepared positions of the 2nd battalion, 53rd regiment during the night, but they could do little else as each attack brought failure. Under the cover of darkness and Marine mortar fire, Katayama's assault troops and engineers hacked their way to the lower slopes of Target Hill. They did their best not to make any noise as they attempted scaling it, but the Marine defenders heard them. On January 3rd they launched their attack, unleashing artillery, mortar and 20mm machine cannon fire from below the hill. However most of the artillery missed the hill altogether, and the 20mm cannon fire was not causing much damage. Company D's mortars replied from their positions behind the hill, but the high angle of fire precluded effective damage to the advance enemy elements which had actually worked their way to positions about 20 feet from the Marines' front emplacements by then. Katayama's 5th company leading the assault fought bravely and with great determination, but against the steep terrain and inadequate support, against a very alert enemy proved too much for them. By dawn the attack had died down and the 5th company was virtually annihilated. Further to the west, the 53rd regiments secondary attack had achieved little more and suffered heavily for it. The Japanese were now trying to resist Shepherds attacks along the Suicide Creek while engineers of the 17th Marines were building a corduroy causeway across the coastal swamp to enable tanks to come into the action. By the morning of the 4th, following a 15 minute artillery bombardment, the first Sherman wallowed through the shallow water and mounted itself on the opposite bank. Soon the other Shermans followed and their 75mm guns began to absolutely devastate the Japanese emplacements from point blank range. Shepherd's assault battalions surged forward across their whole front, encountering no further opposition. Encouraged by the victory and the apparent death or withdrawal of all Japanese in contact to the immediate front, General Shepherd ordered the advance to continue, changing direction to south-southeast. Meanwhile, the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, pinched out by the successful sweep of its former front and the tying-in of 3rd battalion and 1st battalion on their left, executed a wide swing inland, made contact with the right of 3rd battalion, 5th marines extending the line westward. By the nightfall, Shepherd held a 4 battalion strong front against Katayama's positions at Aogiri Ridge and Hill 150. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Operation Michaelmas, the landings at Saidor were a great success, forcing General Adachi to shift numerous units around, scrambling to remedy the situation. Yet with so many Japanese units trapped, isolated and continuing to retreat north, would they ever be able to halt the allied advance?

Creating An Engaging Wedding Reception with Wes Nakano

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 20, 2023 32:03

FACT: The details of your wedding reception really can make or break your wedding. Do you have too many speeches? Are you trying too hard to play games that no one wants to play? Do you have grand ideas of smashing cake in your partner's face?? (HINT: DO NOT SMASH THE CAKE). In this episode, Wes Nakano, owner of From Above Entertainment, sits down with us as we break down each part of a reception and shares his thoughts on what works, and ways to make it even better. Reception details covered in this episode:Grand entrance (what if they don't want to do one)The Shoelywed Game (or any other game during a wedding)The garter toss (and what other fun options have you seen/done before)The bouquet toss (and what other fun options have you seen/done before)Smashing the wedding cake in someone's face (HARD NO IN TESSA'S OPINION)The first dance (and what if they're not dancers)Parent dances (and what if they don't have parents in attendance)Toasts/speeches - any advice to keep the crowd attentively listening? Money dance - yay or nay?Last dance - yay or nay?Find Wes Nakano here: https://www.fromaboveentertainment.com/ or on Instagram HERE.Support the showFind Us on Instagram:Unveiling Paradise @unveilingparadiseJoe @josephesserTessa @fredandkateeventsEmail us unveilingparadisepodcast@gmail.comWeb unveilingparadise.com

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- 100 - Pacific War - Defense of Finschhafen, October 17-24, 1943

A Tale of Two Hygienists Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 21, 2023 29:22

Last time we spoke about the ongoing operations around Finschhafen. The Japanese had technically lost Finschhafen in a rather quick fashion when the allies landed, but they had not given it up. General Katagiri was preparing a massive counter offensive against the allies while a large defensive effort was made at Sattelberg. Meanwhile the Australians and Americans had underestimated what it would take to secure the region and required time to reinforce themselves. Some ground was still gained and much patrolling was done, but the real battle for Finschhafen was just about to be let loose. We also spoke about the terrible situation in Bengal where a man made famine was not only hurting the people of Bengal but also bolstering the Free India Movement, led by Subhas Chandra Bose. Today we are going to continue these stories and more! This episode is the defense of Finschhafen Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. Episode 100, oh my god how time flies by! Just wanted to say a huge thanks from myself and KNG for continuing to listen to me ramble on, you guys are awesome. We are going back to Finschhafen, which was described by Australian Historian Garth Pratten "to be one of the largest bases in the Southwest Pacific Area". Its certainly a true statement, Finschhafen would act as an enormous staging camp with a divisional capacity, a wharf for LSTs, several airfields and fuel dumps. General Wootten's 9th division had finally arrived to help bolster Brigadier Windeyer's 20th Brigade, just in time to meet the increasing Japanese attacks. Simultaneously General Katagiri managed to bring the bulk of his 20th division to Sattelberg and was now ready to unleash his strong counteroffensive. Katagiri's officials orders read "After dusk on X Oct, the main strength of 79th Infantry Regiment will attack the enemy in Arndt Point area from the north side. The assault boat Butai will penetrate through the north coast of Arndt Point on the night of X-day. Instructions to this "Boat Penetration Tai" were that "ammunition dumps, artillery positions, tanks, enemy H.Q., moored boats, barracks, etc. should be selected as objectives". "X-day," will be decided on X-minus-1-day at 2200 hrs and a fire will be seen for 20 minutes on the Sattelberg heights. When the fire is seen answer back at a suitable spot (by fires)." Katagiri's plan was for the Yamada detachment to perform a surprise attack against Jivevaneng while the 79th regiment led by Colonel Hayashida Kaneki would attack in the direction of Katika with three companies of the 2nd battalion and another company of the 3rd battalion kept in reserve, while the rest attacked Scarlet beach in the northern part of Arndt Point. Additionally the 2nd battalion, 26th field artillery regiment and two companies of the 1st battalion, 79th regiment would perform a diversionary attack north of the Song river against Bonga, and the 10th company of the 79th regiment would join a detachment of engineers with explosive and demolition charges to make a seaborne attack against Scarlet Beach. This unit was called the "Boat Penetration Force", under Lieutenant Sugino, the commander of 10 Company. The counteroffensive was set to kick off on October 16th with the signal being a large fire lit at sattelberg. Now Wootten was aware there was something big coming, but he was unsure the direction of the offensive. Australian intelligence believed the enemy would counterattack towards Finschhafen airfield, Langemak bay or perhaps both. So Windeyer was ordered to coordinate the defense of Langemak Bay while Brigadier Evans would command the defenses of scarlet beach. On October 15th, a patrol of the 2/28th managed to capture a Japanese officer's satchel in the wareo-Gusika area, containing a copy of Katagiri's operation order for the offensive. The document was readily translated and reported back to Wootten. The Australian eyes were thus all turned west towards Sattelberg. Wootten instructed everyone "All units whose location permits will establish lookouts to report immediately… the lighting of any fires at night on Sattelberg heights and any answering fires.” Wotten believed that October 16th had to be X day and wondered why there was no sign yet of the diversion attack from the north. Wootten reaffirmed his orders to Evans to hold the site at Wareo at all costs as he believed the enemy would be advancing through there. Unbeknownst to Wootten, the bulk of the 79th regiment had already begun infiltrating the Katika track and the Yamada detachment were in position to hit Jivevaneng. Just before dawn on the 16th, the Japanese counteroffensive kicked off, as 3 companies of the 3rd battalion, 80th regiment launched their attack against the 2/17th battalions positions. The 2/17th were taken completely by surprise as many Japanese had crawled within 20 yards of their battalions HQ sitting on the eastern edge of Jivevaneng. Most of the attacks wre beaten back by components of Major Maclarns HQ company as well as the battalion HQ staff. For 2 hours after 7:30am the main track and positions occupied by a platoon of machine gunners and one mortar crew were subjected to sever shelling from a 70mm and 75 mm gun. The day would see 4 major attacks against the defensive positions, but all would be repulsed. At 3:15pm the battalion HQ was heavily damaged by mortar fire and grenades from cup dischargers. They suffered 19 casualties including 5 deaths. Yamada had also sent a small decoy unit of 150 men who raised cooking smoke in front of Kumawa trying to ruse the enemy over and prevent reinforcements going to Jivevaneng. Meanwhile the 79th regiment infiltrated the widely dispersed companies of the 2/3rd Pioneer battalion and the 155 man Boat Penetration force of Lt Sugino departed Nambariwa at dusk in four barges, successfully repulsing the interference of enemy PT boats on the way. General Adachu wrote of these actions in great detail "The above units, having received orders to prepare to attack the enemy's rear by boat in connection with the division's operations to annihilate the force which has landed north of Finschhafen, undertook intensive training for about 20 days under command of company commander 1st-Lieutenant Sugino at Nambariwa base. The men all awaited the appointed day firm in their belief of certain victory. On 16th October 1943, at the time of the attack by the division's main strength to annihilate the enemy north of Katika, the unit received orders to penetrate the shore south of the mouth of the Song River. After drinking the sake graciously presented to the divisional commander by the Emperor, the unit vowed anew its determination to do or die and departed from the base boldly at dusk on the same day. Repulsing the interference of enemy PT boats on the way, the unit arrived at the designated point at 0230 hours on the 17th.” As night time came, so did torrential rain. The Australians anxiously watched sattelberg for the signal fire to emerge. It seemed impossible for a large fire to be lit with such rain, but a company of the 22nd battalion over at Logaweng reported seeing a large fire emerge on Sattelberg's crest at around 8:30pm. Unfortunately this report failed to reach the divisional HQ. None the less the Australians expected a seaborne attack at any minute. At 3:15 am on October 17th a heavy Japanese bombing raid hit Heldsbach and Arndt point. 66 bombs were dropped over the course of two hours, producing little damage and few casualties. At 3:55am Australian coastwatcher Captain D. C Siekmann at Gusika reported seeing 4 Japanese barges heading south. Nearly an hour later another 3 barges hiding in rain squalls approached Scarlet beach. Evans prepared his 2/43rd and 2/28th battalions for battle. At 4:10am the barges were approaching the north end of Scarlet Beach as companies A and D of the 2/28th, Captain Harris's 10th light anti-aircraft battery, a detachment of the 2/28th anti-tank platoon and a detachment of the 532nd EBSR were sitting on Bofor guns, two pounders, 37mm and Browning .50 caliber waiting for them. When the barge were 50 yards from the shore the Bofors were the first to light them up followed by the rest. However the Bofors were aimed to high to effectively fire on the barges allowing 2 barges to hit the beach. The 37mm, small arms and .50 Brownings fired upon the Sugino's raiders. Meanwhile Private Nahan Van Noy withheld two flamethrower units to wait for the enemy to approach. The Japanese came surging out of their barges tossing grenades and as they closed in, Van Noys flamethrowers jumped up and fired upon them. The flamethrowers stopped the Japanese charge in its tracks as the Brownings cut them to pieces. Van Noy's legs were nearly blown off by multiple grenade hits. Sugino's raiders were pinned downed in the mayhem but they continued to lob grenades in the cover of darkness. The grenade onslaught destroyed 3 anti aircraft guns, 4 fields guns, two ammunition deports, two machine guns and two pom-pom automatic cannons and numerous small arms. As light began to emerge the Japanese were becoming more and more exposed so Sugino ordered the men to crawl north along the split across the Song. 40 Japanese dead littered the beaches out of an estimated 100 who landed. 60 managed to escape north, but 24 of them would be killed by hunters of the 2/43rd battalion later. The raiders had not been able to disable the allied guns, but much akin to how pilots exaggerate their kills, so to did the raiders. General Adachi wrote in his report “Defying fierce artillery crossfire, the troops landed from the boats immediately. Taking up positions indicated beforehand the three platoons advanced in columns in different directions. The infantry and engineers advanced as one body creeping through the jungle. They annihilated the panic-stricken enemy everywhere, and achieved glorious and distinguished success. They killed more than 430 of the enemy, destroyed seven AA guns, five machine-cannons and MG's and five ammunition and supply dumps. Moreover they blew up the enemy headquarters and bivouac tents, thus destroying the center of command [these were in fact the tents of the casualty clearing station]. Raiding the area at will and with raging fury, they surprised and overwhelmed the enemy. By disrupting his command organization they established the foundation for the victory of the division's main strength. With the company commander as the nucleus, the entire group put forth a united effort and demonstrated the unique and peerless spiritual superiority of the Imperial Army… All those who fell severely wounded committed suicide by using hand grenades, and, of the total of 186 men, all except 58 became guardian spirits of their country.” By the late morning, the Japanese had assembled around one mile west of Katika just behind the three Pioneer battalions, finally unleashing their attack directed at Lt Colonel Alfred Gallasch's HQ. The Australians fought like lions, repelling 3 consecutive attacks before the enemy managed to capture a steep hill overlooking their entire position by nightfall. In the end the Pioneers HQ laden with the bulk of reserve ammunition and rations had to withdraw back towards Katika proper, leaving its dispersed companies behind enemy lines without a secure supply route. But Gallasch's men's determined efforts had gained valuable time for Brigadier Evans to redispose his forces and for General Morshead to call in the urgent movement of the 26th brigade to Finschhafen. Evans was forced to abandon the Bonga area so he could reinforce the Song river mouths area. Meanwhile Admiral barbey provided 14 LCI's and 6 LST's to carry the urgent reinforcements. Colonel Norman's 2/28th were ordered to recapture the Pioneer HQ position in order to re-establish communications and a supply route to the now isolated companies. The next morning, the Australians prepared their counterattack, but they were met with an attack against Katika and around the Siki creek. The Australians managed to repel the initial assaults thanks to artillery of the 2/12th regiment which Katagiri had no answer for as the Sugino raiders were supposed to have taken them out. However the Japanese soon gained momentum as Evans tried to strengthen Scarlet Beachs defenses by arranged a semicircle of infantry companies between the Song and Siki. By midday an Australian platoon led by Lt Wedgewood gained a position north of the Katika track who reported killing 33 Japanese and suffering 11 casualties in the process. Norman ordered Wedgewood to get his men out of there, but the platoon commander asked permission hold the position which he thought was critical. It seems Wedgewood was correct in his assessment, as his platoons little position on the track caused Hayashida to pause his attack. Meanwhile Katagiri launched his diversionary attack north of the Song at 3:30pm. This effectively held up the 2/43rd battalion over at North Hill. Simultaneously Hayashia ordered some troops to advance south of Siki Creek to try and outflank the 2/28th's position and they remarkably made it all the way to Siki Cove doing so. This breakthrough threatened the entire Australian defensive position, effectively creating a wedge between the 24th and 20th brigades. Wootten ordered Evans to hold his lines at all cost, including at North Hill and between Scarlet beach to Siki Creek. The Japanese now threaten Scarlet beach from both the west and south, forcing Evans to order a withdrawal of the 2/28th from Katika. It was a controversial decision that would anger Wootten. Norman bitterly pulled out of his dominating position at Katika and likewise the gallant Wedgewood platoon were forced to depart their isolated forward position to maintain a tighter defensive perimeter around scarlet beach. Wootten then ordered half of the 2/13th to defend Heldsbach plantation and protect the supply area at Launch Jetty. To make sure to contain the threat, Wootten placed this unit directly under Windeyer and ordered him to move into the south bank of the Siki. Hayashida's men found Katika abandoned by dusk and proceeded south of it to hit Heldsbach and then Finschhafen. Yet just in the nick of time, Windeyeres troops arrived to prevent the 79th regiment from crossing the creek during the night. Meanwhile the 80th regiment continued their assault against Jivevaneng. The assault was that of a static fight along the Sattelberg road and Kumawa track. Some infantrymen who fought there wrote this in their diaries "I eat potatoes and live in a hole, and cannot speak in a loud voice. I live the life of a mud rat or some similar creature.” Another diary read “What shall I eat to live? What has happened to the general attack… the enemy patrol is always wandering around day and night." A third diary read "Heard that [79th Regiment] has forced the enemy in the sector of Arndt Point to retreat. This is the first good news I have heard since I left for the front." The 2/17th were completely surrounded, the 80th regiment had effectively raised a siege of Jivevaneng. On the 18th the 2/17th's diarist wrote this "this morning revealed that the enemy had cut the main Sattelberg Road to our east and was sitting astride the track". Japanese sniper rounds, mortars and grenades from cup discharges reigned hell upon the trapped defenders. With the enemy advancing along the Sattelberg road, Windeyer ordered the isolated Pioneer companies to hold the road in front of Zag. With so many allied units isolated behind enemy lines, emergency air drops of ammunition were flown by pilots of the No. 4 Squadron. On October 19th after repelling an enemy attack against Scarlet Beach, Colonel Norman moved in to hit back at Katika surprising the Japanese. aT 3:50pm Coppocks company of the 2/28th followed by two platoons charged Katika under artillery support. The Japanese defender were taken by complete surprise when the Australians hit them from the north, so quickly after losing the position. The battalion diaristwrote "Enemy… appear slightly peeved and evidently had not appreciated the possibility of our reoccupation of these positions.” The Japanese bitterly gave up the vital area and this was couple with a sudden unexpected Australian presence south of Siki. Hayashia in response had to reorganise his units. By nightfall Brigadier Whitehead's 26th brigade reinforce with a tank squadron landed at Langemak Bay by midnight thanks to admiral barbey. The next morning, Norman ordered a company to dislodge the Japanese at Siki cove. At 8:38 am on the 20th, two platoons charged the cove and were met with japanese fire from a razorback to the south. By 9:26am the platoons became pinned down. Lt Wedgewoods platoon attempted an encirclement maneuver but was also pinned down. The Australians took too many casualties forcing Norman to withdraw them. Although the assault on Siki cove was unsuccessful, the Japanese machine gun positions were now located, so at 2:30pm some Vickers were placed forward to hit the cove. The 2/28th diaries wrote "This caused considerable retaliation by the enemy, and terrific fire-fight ensued causing mild panic amongst beach defense personnel who thought enemy were breaking through." Eventually the Japanese machine-guns were silenced, mainly by 3-inch mortar fire. Throughout the rest of the day the Australians repulsed a number of attacks on Katika and the Sattelberg road. After days of resisting tooth and nail, the isolated Pioneer companies along the Katika Track were forced to pull back towards the beach. At 9:15am a Boomerang dropped a message on the Pioneers stating "You will rejoin main body North Hill, Scarlet Beach or Zag. Suggest route crossing Song River moving along it to North Hill." Nearly an hour later another plan dropped 3 canister of ammunition, though the men had hoped for rations. The men buried their surplus ammunition and began marching single file north. The Pioneers had borne the brunt of the main attack, and their mere presence had caused concern for the advancing enemy. The Japanese counter attack halted just when Wootten received his 3rd brigade. He therefor believed the time was ripe to steal the initiative and issued orders to Whitehead and Evans to drive the enemy from Siki Creek, while the entire 2/13th would advance up the Sattelberg road to support the 2/17th. On October 21st, Hayashida's battered forces prepared to abandon Siki cove retreating westwards. The 79th regiment had sustained huge losses, the men were exhausted, food was running low leaving many to live on a few potatoes. On the 22nd, reports came in that the Japanese could be seen withdrawing, prompting Norman to push further west of Katika while one of his other companies hit Siki Cove. During the afternoon, the Japanese launched a surprising counter attack against Katika, but were repulsed. Despite fighting them off, the Australians would be unable to advance further for the day. Katagiri then decided to reinforce Hayashia with two companies of the 1st battalion, 79th regiment trying to break the allies hold over Katika. On October 23rd, Evans men finally got some breathing space so they could reorganise the forces. The 2/43rd were ordered to hold the area from the coast through north Hill to the Song river while the 2/28th would hold the area from the Song going south 1000 yards and the 2/32nd would hold the Katika and Siki areas At this point the 79th regiment had suffered so many losses, Katagiri began to seriously consider calling off the counteroffensive. On the Katika front, the Australians reported numerous piles of Japanese dead, the 2/28th estimated 308 corpses were on the north side of the track alone. Hayashida continued his resolve and ordered attacks during the night, but none held any significant success. Morshead preparing to bring the 4th brigade over to Finschhafen and the American 808th engineer battalion would also land at Langemak bay. A constant stream of American units, vehicles and stores began to pour unto Dreger Harbour to construct new airfields. On the 24th, the Japanese would launch their last attacks west of Katika. While the Australians continue their advance. Wootten and Morshead visited the 24th brigade HQ and began lambasting Evans for his decision to abandon Katika. Evans was sure had had done the right thing pulling back to the perimeter around Scarlet Beach, but Wootten and Morsehead felt he had sacrifice vital ground for no reason. They argued the enemy had concentrated most of its attack on a continuous line which did not include Katika. Evans had neglected to keep up an adequate reserve, which could have been used to punch any Japanese force breaking through around Scarlet Beach. In the end it was Woottens prerogative as divisional commander to determine tactical objects and Evans duty to conform. It was not the first time Evans used his own judgement. For this Evans would be sacked by November 1st and replaced by Brigadier Selwyn Porter. Finally on October 25th, Katagiri ordered his battered men to concentrate at Sattelberg and reorganise for future counter offensive. For the next three days, the 24th and 26th brigades pushed forward their defensive perimeters, giving a depth of over 1200 yard inland from Scarlet beach and Katika. The Sattelberg road situation remained unchanged, with each side exerting pressure, but unable to shift the other. Katagiri's counteroffensive had failed. The Australians estimated 679 Japanese had died, with many more killed by artillery and mortar fire. Wootten's staff estimated the overall casualties for the Japanese to be around 1500. The Japanese would officially report 422 killed, 662 wounded. For the Australians they had 228 casualties of which 49 were dead. On October 28th, Wootten received the 4th brigade at Finschhafen and prepared a offensive against Sattelberg and Wareo yet again. This time Windeyers forces would regain full control over the Sattelberg road up to Jiveveaneng. The 2/13th advanced to Coconut Grove by October 29th in an effort to support the 2/17th as they attacked east of Jivevaneng. For the next few days the Australians pressed upon Jivevaneng with a series of assaults, but Yamada's men held on tenaciously. By the end of the month, the 2/17th were suffering from sniping attacks, sickness and a precarious supply line. The battalions diarist wrote this “The battalion at present is rather uncomfortable owing to the almost incessant rain over the past 48 hours. This afternoon mist obscured the whole area and seriously hampered vision. Everyone presents rather sorry spectacle as we are now reduced to one set of clothing. A relief will be welcome when it arrives. The main Sattelberg Road has been cut now for 13 days but it is hoped that this situation will be rectified in the very near future.” On November 1st, the 2/17th and 2/13th resumed their attacks against the Japanese pocket, but were repelled each time suffering terrible casualties. On November 2nd, pandemonium broke out when the 2/13th fired all of their weapons for 15 minutes in a grand diversionary demonstration as the 2/17th successfully launched an attack taking a position north of the road, around 150 yards from the 2/13th. The enemy was now firmly wedged between them. Also on November 2nd, it was expected the 20th and 26th brigades plus their tank squadron would relieve them. Wootten ordered WIndeyere to reopen the Sattelberg road so another fierce attack could occur. Just as this was about to happen, the Japanese were preparing to evacuate their pocket. Finally on November 3rd, after abandoning their positions, the road was opened and the vanguard of the 26th began to arrive and Windeyers battered men began to pull back. Meanwhile Whitehead assembled his forces along the Sattelberg road preparing for the new offensive. Wootten's intention was for the 26th brigade to capture the high ground of Sattelberg-Palanko and to subsequently advance to the Gusika-Wareo line. He had 18 tanks to toss up the Sattelberg road and he stressed to all his men to conceal them until the attack occurred. He also sent advance patrols who discovered a number of the enemy had posts west of Jivevaneng, such as a prominent feature called Steeple Tree Hill. Brigadier Porter's 24th brigade patrols would also find Japanese defending Bonga and Pino Hill. General Adachi visited the frontlines in late October where he found most of Katagiri's units had been reduced to below half strength and the division was suffering from supply difficulties. Despite this, Katagiri was confident his men could pull through and planned to gradually annihilate the enemy via a series of smaller limited attacks. Thus the 80th regiment would secure Sattelberg heights and the 79th would secure Nongora just in front of Wareo. Adachi also visited Kirai where the 51st division had just arrived. There he ordered Nakano to deploy his forces along the coast between Madang and Sio. The Japanese were going to make the road to sattelberg a road to hell. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Australian and Americans managed to thwart General Katagiri's large counteroffensive against Finschhafen. It was some brutal fighting that greatly hurt the Japanese, now they were again on the defensive and the road to sattelberg would soon be covered in more blood.

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Can My Dog Give Me Periodontal Disease? - Fast Facts: Perio Edition with Katrina Sanders, RDH

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 16, 2023 10:14

Dogs can experience a range of signs and symptoms for periodontitis just like humans. By the age 3, 50-75% of dogs are estimated to have perio disease. As we know, periodontal disease is infectious for susceptible people.. so can we get perio from our pets? Resources:More Fast Facts: https://www.ataleoftwohygienists.com/fast-facts/ Katrina Sanders Website: https://www.katrinasanders.com Katrina Sanders Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/thedentalwinegenist/ Yamasaki, Y., Nomura, R., Nakano, K., Naka, S., Matsumoto-Nakano, M., Asai, F., & Ooshima, T. (2012). Distribution of periodontopathic bacterial species in dogs and their owners. Archives of oral biology,57(9),1183-1188.

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- 97 - Pacific War - Drive to Finschhafen, September 26 - 3 October, 1943