Podcasts about liberators

Last time we spoke about the Liberation of Mindanao. In the spring of 1945, as the battle for Okinawa intensified, American forces relentlessly confronted entrenched Japanese troops. General Buckner's 10th Army faced fierce resistance amidst harsh weather and dwindling supplies. Despite these challenges, they captured the strategic Shuri Castle, marking a critical turning point as Japanese troops retreated. Simultaneously, the liberation of Mindanao was underway. American troops, under General Eichelberger, rapidly advanced, overcoming fortified Japanese defenses in mountainous terrain. With the 24th Division securing key locations like Digos and Davao, the 31st Division pushed northward against General Morozumi's forces. Despite stubborn resistance, American forces displayed tenacity and courage, leading to significant victories. By May 20, the Americans approached Malaybalay, where remnants of the 30th Field Artillery Regiment held their ground. As Japanese troops attempted to regroup, they faced relentless assaults from the advancing American divisions. Throughout the campaign, the Americans endured heavy casualties, but their determination led to more than 10,000 Japanese losses. This episode is the North Borneo Offensive Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As we continue our story, by June 9, General Buckner's forces had pushed through to the enemy's main defensive line on the Kiyamu Peninsula. It was there that General Ushijima was preparing to make his final stand. Meanwhile, General Shepherd's 6th Marine Division landed on the Oroku Peninsula, determined to dismantle a stubborn pocket held by Admiral Ota's naval units. On June 10, the pace of the assault quickened dramatically. Colonel Shapley's 4th Marines broke through enemy defenses, capturing the strategic Hills 58 and 55(2). At the same time, Colonel Roberts' 22nd Marines secured Hills 28 and 55(1). Although Colonel Whaling's 29th Marines made only limited progress, they effectively identified the last significant pocket of resistance in the high ground west of Oroku village. Looking south, General Del Valle's 1st Marine Division also reignited its offensive. Colonel Snedeker's 7th Marines successfully advanced into Itoman and Tera, while Colonel Mason's 1st Marines, supported by tanks, cleared the southern slopes of the key ridge between Tera and Yuza, capturing Yuza Hill in the process. To the east, General Bradley's 96th Division launched a renewed attack, bolstered by artillery and tank support. Colonel May's 383rd Regiment advanced approximately 700 yards toward the town of Yuza. Meanwhile, Colonel Halloran's 381st Regiment pushed into Yunagusuku and Tomui. However, they faced fierce resistance, quickly encountering heavy machine-gun fire originating from the heights of Yaeju Dake, which halted their advance. Meanwhile, General Arnold's 7th Division continued its relentless push toward Nakaza, employing the full might of their tanks and artillery. Colonel Finn's 32nd Regiment steadily advanced onto the eastern slopes of Hill 95, pressing toward Hanagusuku. At the same time, Colonel Pachler's 17th Regiment fought to solidify its precarious position on the southeast end of Yaeju Dake. Back at sea, a kamikaze attack tragically sank the destroyer William D. Porter. That same day, Admiral McCain's Task Force 38 unleashed a barrage of bombs and artillery on Minami Daito Island before retreating to Leyte-Samar after 89 consecutive days off the coast of Okinawa. This marked the conclusion of their role in Operation Iceberg. The following day, the sustained pressure from Arnold's offensive began to fracture General Suzuki's 44th Independent Mixed Brigade on both flanks.Seas of flame engulfed Hill 95 on 11 June as 1/32 slowly advanced toward the crest of the enemy position behind the jets of armored flame throwers. Flame fuel was pumped and sprayed from hoses over portions of the ridge inaccessible to tanks and then ignited. Infantrymen moved among the still hot and smoking rocks and drove back the surviving defenders. That night the battalion dug in just short of the Hill 95 peak. Although little forward progress was made by 2/32 or the 17th Infantry on 11 June, the enemy position was considerably weakened. Intensive fire from supporting weapons was concentrated against the slopes of Yaeju Dake, and strong patrols cleaned out enemy groups that held positions near the 7th Division front lines. The 32nd Regiment achieved a significant victory by capturing the peak of Hill 95, while the 17th Regiment struggled to make further headway To the west, advances in the 96th Division zone were minimal as Bradley's regiments focused on consolidating their newly-won positions amidst intense enemy fire. Simultaneously, at Yuza Hill, fierce counterattacks were thwarted, and Mason's 2nd Battalion accomplished the critical capture of Hill 69, just west of Ozato, despite heavy machine-gun fire coming from Yuza Dake. Further east, ahead of the 7th Marines, some 800 yards from the southern fringes of the two settlements, lay "the scene of the most frantic, bewildering, and costly close-in battle on the southern tip of Okinawa"Kunishi Ridge. This precipitous coral escarpment constituted the western-most anchor of the last heavily defended line on Okinawa. The ridge contained innumerable caves, emplacements, and tombs on both the forward and reverse slopes. The intervening area between this formidable fortress and the lines of the 7th Marines was a broad valley of grassy fields and rice paddies which offered no protection to advancing infantry. The supporting tanks were restricted to two approaches into the position: a road across the valley which cut through the center of the ridge and another along the coast line. Both of these routes were covered by anti-tank guns. Shortly after noon patrols from the 1st and 2nd Battalions moved out with armored support to probe the Japanese defenses. Intense frontal fire from Kunishi Ridge, enfilade fire from the enemy on Hill 69 opposing the attack of 2/1, and artillery concentrations directed at the tanks forced a withdrawal at 14:47. Because of the complete fire coverage of the open valley enjoyed by the Japanese, both from the heights and slopes of the ridge itself and from the Yuza Dake area, it was apparent that a daylight assault of the position would be a costly affair. Consequently, after Colonel Snedeker had made a personal reconnaissance of the objective from a light liaison plane, it was determined to attack at night. The commanding officers of the assault battalions were oriented on the general plan during the afternoon. The central road and a line of telephone poles was designated as the boundary between battalions upon which the assault units would guide. The scheme of maneuver contemplated a penetration of the ridge where the road passed through it, followed by an expansion of the initial foothold to the right and left flanks to secure the remainder of the objective in the regimental zone of action. Normal artillery would be placed alternately on Kunishi Ridge and Mezado Ridge (500-600 yards southwest of Kunishi) until H-Hour and thereafter on the latter. On June 11, General Shepherd launched a concerted attack. The 22nd Marines successfully secured the Tomigusuki area and Hill 53, while the 29th Marines faced stiff opposition, making only limited gains against the heavily fortified hills west of Oroku. Meanwhile, the 4th Marines worked to strengthen their line, completing the encirclement of Ota's naval forces. Nevertheless, the ramparts of the Oroku fortress were cracking, and Admiral Ota released his last dispatch to General Ushijima: “Enemy tank groups are now attacking our cave headquarters. The Naval Base Force is dying gloriously at this moment… We are grateful for your past kindnesses and pray for the success of the Army.” During the night, artillery units successfully targeted and either killed or dispersed a group of Japanese troops attempting to cross the Kokuba River. Meanwhile, 51 infiltrators were eliminated as they tried to breach the lines held by the 22nd Marines. The following day, the 4th and 29th Marines intensified their efforts to compress the enemy pocket west of Tomigusuki, breaking through to seize Easy Hill while the 22nd Marines consolidated their positions. The capture of this key terrain feature forced the enemy into the alluvial flats along the coast between Oroku and Hill 53. "In the late afternoon enemy troops began displaying flags of surrender. Language officers equipped with loud speaker systems were dispatched to the front line areas to assist in the surrender of those Japs who desired to. The attempt was partially successful, 86 enemy soldiers voluntarily laid down their arms." For several days General Buckner had been sending messages to the Japanese commander by radio broadcast and air drops pointing out the hopelessness of the enemy situation in an attempt to persuade General Ushijima to surrender. During the afternoon of 11 June, Tenth Army representatives were conducted to the 2d Battalion OP overlooking Itoman to await any enemy party that might desire to negotiate. At 1700 all fire was suspended in the 7th Marines' area pending the doubtful appearance of a white flag. About 15 Japanese wearing white headgear appeared in the 1/7 zone in front of Company A at 1740, but dispersed when hailed. Six of the enemy surrendered to Company C at 1802, but the situation returned to normal two minutes later when hostile mortar fire fell on the captors' position. Final orders for the resumption of the attack were issued by Colonel Snedeker about 2000 setting H-Hour at 0330, 12 June. Both 1/7 and 2/7 were to make the assault with one company each, and at 0225 Company C moved out to establish contact with Company F on the line of departure. The attack was launched on schedule at 0330 and at 0500 Companies B and G moved out in support of the assault companies. Concurrently, Company F reached the objective at a point 500 yards north of Mezado village, as Company C came up on its left to extend the line eastward. The enemy was completely surprised and several small groups were wiped out by Company C while they were engaged in preparing breakfast. At the same time, the 1st Battalion extended the line eastward toward Kunishi. However, the Japanese quickly regrouped, pinning down the attackers for the rest of the day, though the Marines managed to reinforce and consolidate their hard-won gains. By midnight the positions there could be considered reasonably secure. But as General del Valle put it, "The situation was one of those tactical oddities of this peculiar warfare. We were on the ridge. The Japs were in it, both on the forward and reverse slopes." Elsewhere, the 1st Marines focused on mopping up Hill 69, dispatching patrols south through Ozato and maintaining their defenses on Yazu Hill. To the east, another pre-dawn attack initiated by the 17th Regiment caught the defenders off guard.  Colonel Pachler had compelling reasons for favoring a night operation. The defenders held a significant advantage in observation, which had posed serious challenges when the 3rd Battalion of the 17th Infantry seized the southeast end of the escarpment. The coral wall of the escarpment was particularly high at this end, and the narrow routes leading to the high ground were easily controlled by Japanese fire. After days of holding positions at the base of the 170-foot cliff, the troops had grown familiar with the terrain and, as their commander, Major Maynard Weaver, noted, they were eager to reach the top and finally see something new. The night attack was primarily planned for the 1st Battalion, but Colonel Pachler decided to coordinate a move to expand the territory held by the 3rd Battalion as well. The final plan involved three assault companies: Company A would occupy a cluster of coral about a hundred yards beyond the edge of the escarpment, near the boundary between the 7th and 96th Divisions. Company B aimed for a similar objective located about 200 yards to the southeast, while Company L was assigned to capture a small hill situated between the 1st Battalion's targets and the positions held by the 3rd Battalion since June 11. Each company was given a separate route: Company A's path led straight up the cliff's face, Company B needed to head south to reach a break in the escarpment before turning right toward its goal, and Company L had an accessible objective near the edge of the escarpment. Movement was set to begin at 0400 on June 12. Since the attack relied on stealth, no artillery preparation was planned. However, two battalions of 105-mm artillery, one battery of 155-mm howitzers, and an 8-inch howitzer battalion were scheduled to deliver heavy harassing fire during the night. Additionally, 21 batteries registered their fire on the afternoon of June 11 and were ready to provide protective artillery support if needed once the objectives were reached. For added firepower, a section of heavy machine guns was assigned to each assault company. Colonel Pachler meticulously planned the attack, ensuring that every soldier involved understood the details of the operation. Reconnaissance patrols had scouted the trails leading to the high ground, and demolition teams had already prepared known cave positions at the cliff's face with satchel charges. Despite thorough preparations, there was a collective apprehension about potential confusion caused by the unknown conditions of darkness. This anxiety was amplified at 2000 on the night of June 11 when the 7th Division G-2 Section intercepted an enemy radio message indicating, "Prepare to support the attack at 2300." Soon after, another intercepted message stated, "If there are any volunteers for the suicide penetration, report them before the contact which is to be made one hour from now." Meanwhile, from dusk until almost 2300, the Japanese unleashed a heavy artillery barrage, leading front-line troops to anticipate a counterattack. That counterattack did come, aimed at the 1st Battalion of the 32nd Infantry, which had reached the summit of Hill 95 earlier that day, as well as against the 96th Division. However, there was no enemy activity observed in the 17th Infantry's sector. As night illumination and harassing fire ceased shortly before 0400, the attack proceeded according to plan. The companies moved out in single file. Remarkably, a heavy fog settled over southern Okinawa, creating the perfect conditions for concealment while allowing the troops to follow their paths without confusion. On the high ground, Company A encountered a few civilians wandering about, while the leading platoon of Company B unexpectedly came across three Japanese soldiers as they reached the shelf of the escarpment. The Americans chose to ignore them and continued silently on their way, with the enemy surprisingly not opening fire. By 0530, just minutes after dawn, Companies A and B were in position without firing a single shot. Company L also successfully reached its objective, and eager to capitalize on the fog and absence of enemy fire, its commander sent a support platoon to a small hill fifty yards beyond. This objective was secured quickly, but not without incident; two enemy soldiers were killed in the process. The platoon leader reported their progress but quickly called for mortar fire as about fifty Japanese troops approached in a column. The Americans opened fire with rifles and BARs, disrupting the formation and resulting in thirty-seven enemy soldiers killed, while the rest managed to escape. The men of the 1st Battalion celebrated the success of the night attack. Shortly after Company A took position, four enemy soldiers stumbled into view and were swiftly eliminated. A few moments later, another four followed suit, meeting the same fate. Company B remained undisturbed until around 0530 when Japanese soldiers attempted to emerge from several caves within the company's area. Although the cave entrances were heavily reinforced with concrete and couldn't be sealed with demolition charges, the Marines guarded the openings and shot at the Japanese as they appeared. Not long after daylight, Company C began clearing the caves at the base of the escarpment, eventually regrouping with the rest of the battalion on the high ground. By 0800, the situation had stabilized, and the 17th Infantry held strong positions on Yaeju Dake. During the night, the Japanese had withdrawn their front-line troops from Yaeju Dake to escape the punishing artillery fire, intending to reoccupy it before the anticipated 0700 attack. Fifteen hours after the 32nd Infantry fought their way to the top of Hill 95, the 17th Infantry had executed a masterful night attack to seize their portion of Yaeju Dake. Throughout the day, the 2nd Battalion of the 17th Infantry relieved Companies I and K, and with Company L attached and supported by medium and flame tanks, continued the offensive. The 1st Battalion maintained its position, firing at enemy soldiers who were slow to realize that their defensive terrain had been lost. Company B alone accounted for sixty-three Japanese soldiers killed throughout the day. Taking advantage of this breakthrough, the 381st Regiment advanced to occupy the slopes of Yaeju Dake, while the 383rd extended the division front and secured Yuza. As the situation unfolded, Japanese troops maintained control over Big Apple Peak, which towered about sixty feet above the surrounding plateau. However, by the evening of June 12, the 7th and 96th Divisions had succeeded in forcing the reconstituted 44th Independent Mixed Brigade from the southeastern end of the enemy's line. General Ushijima acted swiftly, given the limitations imposed by his damaged communication system and the chaos among his front-line units. With his artillery nearly silenced by enemy bombardments and his supplies dwindling faster than his manpower, Ushijima's only hope lay in sending more troops into the relentless shellfire and flames unleashed by American forces sweeping across the frontline. His urgent order read: “The enemy in the 44th IMB sector has finally penetrated our main line of resistance. The plan of the 44th IMB is to annihilate, with its main strength, the enemy penetrating the Yaeju-Dake sector. The Army will undertake to reoccupy and hold its Main Line of Resistance to the death. The 62nd Division will place two selected infantry battalions under the command of the CG, 44th IMB.” Unfortunately, the 64th Brigade, the part of the 62nd Division that had shifted from Shuri to reserve positions near Makabe, didn't receive this order until late on June 13, a full thirty hours after it became critical. This piecemeal commitment of reserve troops proved to be grossly inadequate. By June 13, the 44th Brigade was teetering on the brink of destruction. When reinforcements finally arrived, they found the remnants of the 44th Brigade overwhelmed and absorbed into the reinforcing battalions, with still not enough men to hold the line. In a last-ditch effort, the enemy committed the main strength of the 62nd Division, his final reserve, with a desperate plea for cooperation and orders to "reoccupy and secure the Main Line of Resistance." However, by the time the 62nd Division moved onto the line, they ran headlong into General Hodge's forces, who were advancing southward across the coral-studded plateau. The Americans pressed forward, shielded by the fire of machine guns and tanks, advancing over the bodies of Japanese defenders who had fought fiercely to hold their last stronghold "to the death." On June 13, General Arnold resumed his assault against the rapidly disintegrating 44th Independent Mixed Brigade. The 32nd Regiment successfully secured the Hill 95-Hanagusuku area, while the 17th Regiment expanded its control over the escarpment's summit. To the west, May's 3rd Battalion and Halloran's 2nd Battalion struggled to capture the top of the escarpment despite repeated attempts. However, they significantly diminished the defenders' strength with a relentless volume of covering fire. At the same time, May's 1st Battalion advanced through Yuza and swept southward to successfully secure Ozato. Meanwhile, General Del Valle prepared to commit the 1st Marines to the fight on Kunishi Ridge, as the isolated 7th Marines continued to be pinned down by heavy Japanese fire, relying on tanks for supplies and evacuation. Further north, the 29th Marines launched an attack southeast to eliminate the enemy pocket, while Shapley's 3rd Battalion moved swiftly toward the beach, progressively chasing the demoralized Japanese forces from the thick brush and marshy terrain along the waterfront. As they reached the sea wall, the assault turned into a rout. Some of the enemy threw down their arms and fled at the Marines' approach. Large numbers surrendered; but some fought back with hand grenades in desperate, individual last ditch stands, while many more used grenades to destroy themselves in despair. The sea wall was reached at noon, and the remainder of the day was spent running to earth small groups hiding in the cane fields and rice paddies. In the late afternoon General Shepherd notified General Geiger that all organized resistance on Oroku had ceased. In the early hours of June 14, Mason's 2nd Battalion advanced toward Kunishi Ridge, tenaciously fighting their way to positions east of the 7th Marines, which remained isolated. Simultaneously, Shepherd's reinforced Reconnaissance Company successfully landed on Senaga Island, completing the occupation of the Oroku Peninsula. Looking south once again, May's 1st Battalion completed the cleanup in Ozato but soon had to withdraw from its vulnerable position, while the rest of the 383rd Regiment pressed forward to the edge of the escarpment west of Yaeju Dake. To the east, despite heavy mortar and machine-gun fire, the 381st Regiment maintained constant pressure on the northern face of Yaeju Dake, finally reaching the top of the escarpment by nightfall. Their success allowed them to link up with the 7th Division, which dealt a crushing blow to the 13th Independent Battalion, advancing approximately 300 yards across the front. After a night of disorganized counterattacks and infiltration attempts, the 7th Division launched an assault toward Hills 115 and 153, advancing about 1,200 yards and reaching the outer slopes of the hill positions. To the west, the 381st Regiment and May's 3rd Battalion successfully secured the escarpment between Yuza and Yaeju Dake, although the remainder of the 383rd struggled to move forward due to heavy fire from Yuza Dake. On Kunishi Ridge, the pressure from the Japanese remained relentless, restricting the 7th Marines to only minor local gains. However, Mason's 2nd Battalion managed to inch its way along the ridge, successfully extending the line by about 200 yards to the east. Behind them, Colonel Griebel's 5th Marines began to relieve the weary 1st Marines, with Griebel's 2nd Battalion finally moving forward during the night to support Mason's isolated 2nd Battalion. On June 16, after an intense bombardment of artillery, mortars, and rockets, the 7th Marines finally broke through. Snedeker's 1st Battalion advanced along the northern slope of Kunishi Ridge, while the 2nd Battalion extended the line into the initial high ground of the Mezado hill mass. Concurrently, Griebel's 2nd Battalion advanced, making slow but steady progress until they secured a coral peak on the ridge that commanded their position. To the east, the 62nd Division, attempting to move from its reserve locations southwest of Makabe to support the faltering Japanese lines, faced devastating fire from artillery, ship guns, and aerial bombardments of rockets and napalm. Seizing the opportunity created by the relentless bombardment of enemy rear areas, Bradley launched his battalions through the Yuza Dake perimeter. Colonel Dill's 382nd Regiment pushed through the 383rd and advanced toward Ozato, aiming to gain control of the high ground southwest of Yuza, while May's 3rd Battalion successfully captured Yuza Dake. Additionally, the 381st Regiment gained approximately 600 yards along its front, reaching the saddle between Yuza Dake and Hill 153. Meanwhile, the 17th Regiment pressed onto the forward slopes of Hill 153, and the 32nd Regiment, driving down the coast, took Hill 115, effectively eliminating the 15th Independent Mixed Regiment. Back at sea, despite a significant depletion of Japanese air strength, a kamikaze attack succeeded in sinking the destroyer Twiggs.  But now, it's time to leave Okinawa and turn our attention to Borneo, where we continue covering the Australian offensive. As we last noted, by May 6, Brigadier Whitehead's 26th Australian Brigade had successfully landed on Tarakan, pushing the Japanese garrison into the island's rugged interior. By the evening of 6th May fairly copious information obtained from prisoners and Indonesians and from captured documents indicated that the enemy had about 390 naval troops in the Mount Api area, about 400 troops and civilians in the Fukukaku headquarters area (embracing Hills 105 and 102), 200 from Sesanip along Snags Track to Otway, 300 on Otway and in District VI, 300 in the Amal River area and 60 at Cape Juata. Having lost the airfield and the water-purifying plant and hospitals "the enemy at this time was displaying a decided disinclination to hold ground. In particular he was shunning any ground which could be subjected to heavy bombing, shelling, or attack by tanks; or against which large-scale attacks could be launched by our troops"; and he was directing his operations to delaying the attackers, particularly with mines, booby-traps, suicide raids, and isolated parties fighting to the death in tunnels and dugouts. The 4th Company of Tokoi Force (IJA) plus the 1st Company of the 2nd Naval Guard Force were on Hill 105, Margy and Janet; the 1st Company of Tokoi Force, and other troops were on Hill 102. In the north was a composite group. To secure the recently captured airfield from potential counterattacks, raids, or indirect fire, Brigadier Whitehead decided to deploy the 2/48th Battalion to gain the high ground north of the town, reaching up to Snags Track. The 2/4th Commando Squadron was tasked with advancing along Snags Track toward the Sesanip oilfields, while the 2/3rd Pioneers were assigned to sweep the high ground east of the town and move along John's Track to the mouth of the Ama River. Meanwhile, the Dutch company was to clear the unoccupied Cape Batu peninsula, a task that proved surprisingly straightforward. In the Mount Api area, however, the 2/23rd Battalion faced fierce resistance, particularly at Tiger and along Crazy Ridge, resulting in minimal progress until they were relieved by the 2/24th Battalion on May 9. Further to the right, the 2/48th Battalion seized Otway without opposition, and the commandos successfully cleared Snags Track up to Haigh's by May 8, though tanks could not advance any further. The pioneers, on the other hand, encountered heavy resistance along John's Track, which they couldn't overcome until May 9. That day, a long-distance patrol from the 2/24th Battalion also succeeded in driving the Japanese out of the Juata oilfields after a skirmish. On May 10, while the 2/48th and the commandos patrolled aggressively forward, the pioneers began their assault on the heavily defended Helen feature, which would successfully repel repeated Australian attacks for the next five days. Simultaneously, the 2/24th faced strong resistance in the Mount Api area but tenaciously pushed forward to Hill 105 on May 11, capturing Tiger the following night. They conducted patrols that probed about 1,000 yards southeast, cutting Snags Track at several points. On May 12, the 2/48th set out to cut King's Track and clear the heights from Sykes to Butch. The next morning, they successfully attacked and captured the knoll north of Snags Track. Meanwhile, following a highly effective air bombardment, the key Helen feature was found abandoned on May 15. This allowed the pioneers to clear John's Track and reach the coast at the mouth of the Amal River. Concurrently, the commandos secured the Agnes feature, followed by the 2/24th Battalion's capture of Elbow on May 16. The remaining positions on Hill 105 were then subjected to intensive bombing and bombardment, leading to an Australian assault on May 19. They finally captured the feature the following day. In the meantime, the 2/48th Battalion moved to Agnes to attack the Freda feature on May 14.  It was now evident that if the Freda hill was to be taken the attack must have heavier support. Therefore, on 22nd May, 12 Liberators and 12 Lightnings were sent out with bombs and napalm, but the cloud was so low that some of the heavy bombers did not find the objective. Then the artillery and mortars fired, and a two-company attack went in, the infantry moving very close behind the barrage. Gooden's company thrust from the east, and Captain Nicholas's advanced with one platoon pushing east along Snags Track towards Track Junction Knoll and another pressing north. The former platoon (Lieutenant Harvey), moving through very difficult country along a razor-back so narrow that only two men could be deployed on it, edged forward under heavy fire; after losing one killed and 4 wounded and finding the enemy becoming stronger Harvey manoeuvred out of this position. It was then found that a wounded man was not with them, so Harvey and three volunteers thrust back and engaged the enemy fiercely while the wounded man was carried out. During the day Gooden's company on the right had encountered two strongly-held knolls. Derrick's platoon succeeded in cutting the saddle between them and taking one knoll. Derrick's platoon and another launched “a most courageous attack up the steep slopes of Knoll 2 in the fading light. Here, in some of the heaviest and most bitter close-in fighting of the whole campaign these two platoons finally reached the top and secured the Knoll after inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy.... [Lance-Sergeant] Fennells time and again ... crawled ahead of the attacking troops, even to within five yards of the enemy, and gained vital information. On one occasion, when his section was forced to ground he had charged the Jap positions with his Owen gun blazing and had silenced the enemy post, killing the occupants. In a similar manner, Private W. R. How found the advance of the troops checked by a well-sited pill-box, raced forward with his Owen firing until within grenade range, and then, throwing grenades, moved in for the kill until he fell wounded. He had silenced the post and killed the machine-gunner, thus allowing the advance to continue.” At this stage 28 enemy dead had been counted; one Australian had been killed and 15 wounded.  Unfortunately, the Japanese counterattacked the following day, effectively recapturing the position. Following a devastating combination of air and artillery bombardment, the Australians managed to secure Freda and Track Junction Knoll on May 25. During this time, the 2/23rd Battalion remained in close contact with a resolute enemy at Janet and Margy but struggled to make significant progress. The 2/24th Battalion continued probing northward and captured the Droop feature on May 26. After another failed attack on May 29, a heavy air and artillery bombardment supported the 2/23rd as they finally captured Margy on May 31. Concurrently, the 2/24th successfully attacked and held the Poker Hills. On June 1, the 2/48th Battalion then attacked Hill 102, supported by aircraft and machine-gun fire. Lieutenant O'Rourke's platoon attacked, following an artillery barrage as closely as they could, and bringing with them three flame-throwers. They gained the forward slopes without being fired on and then saw five Japanese moving towards them, evidently to re-enter their positions after the bombing. These were fired on while the flame-throwers were brought into action. One operator sprayed the slope from side to side while another fired straight up it. “The result was devastating (said O'Rourke later). The hill was set completely ablaze to a depth of 50 yards, two of the five Japs were set on fire and the other three killed in their posts. The platoon was able to advance almost immediately through the flames, and with the help of the flame-throwers the feature was com-pletely captured within 15 minutes of the advance commencing. The flame which was fired up a slight rise hit the trees on the crest and also sprayed the reverse slope and had the effect of completely demoralising the enemy.“ While the Australians launched an unsuccessful assault on Wally, the 2/23rd Battalion was engaged in clearing out the remaining Japanese forces from Margy and its surrounding areas. On June 6, the Australians finally secured Wally, and the 2/24th Battalion also managed to capture Roger. In the early hours of June 10, the Japanese launched a counterattack toward Hill 105, but it was easily repelled. At the same time, the defenders began preparing for a withdrawal northeast into the island's interior, planning to split into independent groups to wage guerrilla warfare. Despite the looming withdrawal, Whitehead's battalions commenced attacks on Beech 2, Joyce, and Linda on June 11. However, progress was slow over the next three days, with the only notable achievement being the capture of Sandy on June 13. By nightfall that day, the Japanese finally began their withdrawal, leaving behind only rearguards to hold the crucial Essie Track. This allowed the Australians to capture the abandoned features of Linda, Joyce, Clarice, Hilda Paddy, Melon, and Aunty on June 14. The next day, the Australians took Nelly and Faith, but the Japanese rearguard on Essie Ridge managed to temporarily halt their pursuit. Eventually, however, Essie Ridge was overrun, and by June 16, Fukukaku was cleared. The 2/48th Battalion then pursued the Japanese as they fled eastward from Essie. On June 18, they caught a few but found that a large group had scattered into smaller parties. By June 19, patrols were radiating east, north, and west in pursuit, with Japanese forces standing firm at several points. Ultimately, the fall of Hill 90 on June 20 marked the end of organized resistance on Tarakan. Following this victory, Whitehead initiated a mop-up operation that would continue until the war's end. While the 26th Brigade was fighting to secure Tarakan, General Wootten's 9th Australian Division was preparing to launch the invasion of the Brunei Bay area of north Borneo, codenamed Operation Oboe VI. At the Manila conference in April General Morshead had learnt that OBOE I (Tarakan), OBOE VI (north Borneo) and OBOE II (Balikpapan) were to be carried out in that order. 34 LSTs would be allotted for OBOE VI but had to be released by 23 days after the landing. There were other fairly severe restrictions on the vessels available: the one boat battalion of the American Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment and the one amphibian tractor battalion allotted to OBOE VI had to be used for Balikpapan. Morshead and his staff arrived back at Morotai from Manila on April 21 and next day the Corps issued its staff study of the north Borneo operation, and the 9th Division's staff, which from April 4 to 17 had been planning an operation against Balikpapan, began preparing an outline plan for an attack on Brunei Bay instead. This was presented to Corps and approved on April 26; the final plan, which contained no major changes, was approved on May 16. Meanwhile a variety of problems had arisen at the Corps level and above. On May 1, 2200 troops and 1200 vehicles (including guns) of the 9th Division were still in the Cairns or Atherton areas awaiting shipment, and some of the stores and equipment were not scheduled to arrive at Morotai until May 25, two days after the proposed date of the landing. It also appeared that, on the day of the landing, the 24th Brigade would lack some unit stores and vehicles, and the 20th Brigade would possess only one battalion; there would be no field or anti-aircraft guns, a shortage of signal vehicles and equipment, no equipment for building wharves and bulk oil storage, and neither of the casualty clearing stations allotted would be present. Due to a series of issues at the Corps level and above, the invasion plan had been scaled down to a landing by a brigade on Labuan Island and just a battalion on Muara Island, with the operation further postponed to June 10. The strategy involved landing Brigadier Selwyn Porter's 24th Brigade on Victoria Harbor's Brown Beaches to capture the Labuan airfield and eliminate all hostile forces on the island. Simultaneously, Brigadier William Windeyer's 20th Brigade would put ashore the 2/15th Battalion on Muara Island's White Beach and the 2/17th Battalion on Brunei Bluff's Green Beach. These units were tasked with capturing Brooketon and securing the southern and western sides of Muara Island, setting the stage for an advance on Brunei Town. Upon capturing these objectives, the 9th Division was to occupy and defend the Brunei Bay-Beaufort area and take control of the Miri-Lutong-Seria regions. Once again, Admiral Barbey's Naval Attack Force, primarily comprising Admiral Royal's transports and Admiral Berkey's cruisers, was designated to facilitate the amphibious movement of troops to Brunei Bay. In preparation for the invasion, American and Australian air forces, under General Kenney's command, targeted airfields and other military installations, focusing particularly on destroying bridges on the railway to Jesselton to prevent the arrival of reinforcements to Labuan by rail. On June 4, Barbey's convoy finally departed Morotai, embarking on its 1,100-mile voyage to Brunei Bay. Air attacks intensified on June 5, successfully rendering the Papar River bridge unusable. Four days later, on June 9, the air campaign reached its peak: 54 Liberators and 24 Mitchells launched strikes against targets on Labuan, while 23 Liberators targeted the Brooketon area. In the meantime, minesweepers successfully cleared a channel into the bay, destroying 69 mines between June 7 and 9. Berkey's cruisers sailed ahead and shelled the Brown, White, and Green Beaches in the two days leading up to the landings. The convoy finally arrived at the main channel between Labuan Island and Brunei Bluff just before sunrise on June 10, fully prepared to execute the invasion. Opposing them, General Baba's 37th Army had assembled General Nozaki's depleted 56th Independent Mixed Brigade in the Brunei Bay sector. This included two battalions near Brunei, one at Beaufort, and one garrisoning Labuan. Additionally, the 553rd Independent Battalion was stationed in the Miri area; however, none of these units were equipped to make a stand at the beaches. At 08:15, Barbey's warships commenced a bombardment of the southern beaches as the troops were loading onto the landing vessels. Shortly after 09:05, the first waves began to advance, preceded by craft firing rockets and artillery. As anticipated, there was no opposition on the landing areas. The 2/15th Battalion successfully reached the shore at 09:15, followed by the 2/17th Battalion, which made landfall three minutes later, approximately 1,000 yards east of its intended location. By dusk, the 2/15th had scoured the swampy terrain of Muara Island and reported no Japanese presence. The 2/17th pushed forward a few miles along the road to Brunei, while the 2/13th Battalion landed and moved into reserve behind the 2/17th. Meanwhile, the 2/28th Battalion landed without incident at 09:15 and quickly secured Labuan town, with the 2/43rd Battalion following ashore at 09:20 to initiate the advance toward the airfield.  There was no opposition until 10:45, when the leading troops came under rifle fire just south of Flagstaff Hill. This post was quickly bypassed and taken, but the Australians continued to face strong resistance from the 371st Independent Battalion. Despite this, the defenders could not prevent the 2/43rd from capturing the airfield by nightfall. During the day, Porter also landed the 2/11th Commando Squadron on the unoccupied Hamilton Peninsula, with one troop initiating a move north along Charlie Track. On June 11, while the 2/43rd patrolled north and west, overcoming some opposition, the 2/28th slowly advanced toward the Able and Baker routes, where they encountered the bulk of enemy resistance. Meanwhile, after repelling an enemy patrol overnight, the 2/17th continued its advance to Brunei unopposed, with a company from the 2/15th moving up the Brunei River to land about four miles downstream from the town. The following day, the 2/17th reached and seized the airstrip, finally encountering defenses manned by the 366th Independent Battalion. On Labuan, the 2/43rd moved unopposed to Hamilton Road and successfully linked up with the commandos, leaving behind one company and three tanks to destroy a bypassed stronghold to the northwest. At the same time, the 2/28th probed the strongly held area astride MacArthur Road and to its west, making good progress to compress the resilient enemy into a pocket. On June 13, although the 2/43rd occupied an emergency airstrip at Timbalai, the primary objective remained to continue compressing the enemy into "the Pocket" and mop up the remainder of the island. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Australian troops, under Brigadier Whitehead, landed on Tarakan, swiftly overcoming Japanese strongholds. By May 20, they began the North Borneo Offensive, achieving significant territorial gains amid brutal combat. As Japanese forces faltered, some surrendered, signaling a turning tide. The campaign showcased immense courage and sacrifice, with heavy casualties on both sides, ultimately paving the way for Allied victories in the Pacific theater.

The Woven Fates continue into the Path of the Wing; Eldon resolute in his decision to learn more about the Liberators. Join our Patreon to get fun perks, including dice gifts and early access to the podcast/VODs: https://www.patreon.com/dicedragonsguildMusic by Monument Studios via Fantasy+ (https://www.fantasy-plus.com/). Check out their FULLY FUNDED KICKSTARTER HERE! (http://kck.st/4drxPDJ) Check out our ScrybeQuill.com recaps!We've got MERCH: https://tinyurl.com/ddgmerchMusic by Alexandre Miller - The Boy King of Idaho (https://open.spotify.com/artist/0WvWTz5TPYOuoZ77e2iIX8?si=bhT8sX2gS_e8huPQnWd81Q) Licensed under the Creative Commons 3.0: By Attribution license. Music & Ambient sounds by Michael Ghelfi. Please support him at his Patreon (https://www.patreon.com/MichaelGhelfi) and like and subscribe to his YouTube channel (   / @michaelghelfistudios  )Music by Kevin MacLeod (incompetech.com)Licensed under Creative Commons: By Attribution 4.0 Licensehttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/Sound Effects from ZapSplat.com (https://www.zapsplat.com)GM: IzziPlayers: Cuba as Ayla, Adam as Eldon, Amanda as Iolite, Patrick as Kai, and Julie as Kethra

Nouveau format court pour Land Rider ! Cette fois, on embarque pour les Royaumes Mortels pour passer en revue le récent kit des Liberators pour la gamme des Stormcast Eternals.

In this action-packed episode of Comix, we're diving into the latest and greatest from the world of comics and film! First up, we discuss Tom Hardy's desire to reprise his iconic role as Bane, and what that could mean for future *Batman* projects. Then, we have exciting casting news for the upcoming *Voltron* film that has fans buzzing with anticipation!Hold onto your controllers, because we'll also be breaking down the newly dropped trailer for *Sonic 3*, sharing our thoughts on what to expect from the blue blur's next adventure. Plus, we unveil the first photos of Charlie Hunnam as the notorious serial killer Ed Gein, exploring the chilling transformation and what it means for the upcoming project.And of course, we'll wrap up with our Rapid Fire News segment, where we'll cover a slew of other updates from the comic and entertainment universe. Join us for a thrilling episode filled with insights, laughs, and all the latest buzz!

Last time we spoke about the Victory at Leyte. In the Ormoc Valley, General Krueger's forces pushed the Japanese into a retreat toward Palompon. As the Americans advanced, they faced entrenched enemy positions and challenging terrain. On Christmas Day, the 77th Division successfully captured Palompon, cutting off the Japanese's main route. General Suzuki, forced to relocate his headquarters, prepared for a counteroffensive. Despite fierce resistance, American troops continued to push forward, eliminating remaining Japanese units and securing strategic positions along the coast as the year closed. As General Eichelberger's 8th Army took command of Leyte Island, the 77th Division relieved other units in preparation for future operations. Meanwhile, American forces faced fierce resistance while securing strategic positions on Samar and Mindoro. Despite enemy air assaults, they successfully disrupted Japanese plans, including a failed counter-landing. In Bougainville, Australian troops engaged in intense fighting, capturing Pearl Ridge after fierce battles. Their victory provided a crucial vantage point for future offensives, marking a significant moment in the campaign. This episode is the Aitape-Wewak Campaign Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As previously discussed, General Dunckel's task force successfully invaded Mindoro. Despite recent enemy efforts to reclaim control of the island, the Americans managed to establish airfields that enabled land-based aircraft to target specific locations on Luzon while also safeguarding the assault and resupply ships heading to Lingayen Gulf. This location was chosen because it had direct access to Luzon's key military objective, the Central Plains-Manila Bay region, and it featured the best and most extensive landing beaches on the island. With General Eichelberger's 8th Army taking charge of Leyte and Mindoro, General Krueger's 6th Army was assigned to capture and secure a beachhead at Lingayen Gulf and then advance south through the Central Plains to seize Manila and open Manila Bay. Furthermore, air and logistical bases would be established on Luzon to support future operations against Japan, and the legitimate government of the Philippine Commonwealth would be reinstated in its capital. For Operation Mike I, the reconquest of Luzon island, the Southwest Pacific's intelligence estimates concerning Japanese strengths, dispositions, capabilities, and intentions on Luzon were reasonably accurate from the start of planning. The abundance of information must be attributed in large measure to the efforts of guerrillas on Luzon, an island that was becoming a veritable hotbed of guerrilla resistance, both American-led and Filipino-led. Carefully nurtured by MacArthur's headquarters, especially after mid-1943, the guerrilla organizations had grown steadily in strength and effectiveness not only as sabotage units but also as valuable sources of information. The Leyte invasion in October 1944 gave great encouragement to the guerrillas, who redoubled their efforts in preparation for the invasion of Luzon, which they realized could not be too far off. Throughout 1944 supplies of all types had been sent to the guerrillas, first by submarine and later by airdrop and clandestine inter-island transportation. After the establishment of the Allied base on Leyte, the flow of supplies increased by leaps and bounds. The guerrillas themselves established a network of radio communications that soon came to be sustained and, to some extent, controlled by MacArthur's headquarters, which also sent into Luzon special intelligence parties to develop new sources of information and provide guerrilla efforts with more effective direction. In the end, one of the major difficulties Southwest Pacific intelligence agencies had was not obtaining information from Luzon but rather sifting the plethora of guerrilla reports, which attained every conceivable degree of accuracy and detail. Once sifted, the information had to be evaluated and correlated with that received from other sources such as radio intercepts, captured documents, and prisoner interrogations. MacArthur allocated the majority of his Army's ground combat and support forces, most of General Kenney's Allied Air Forces, and nearly all of Admiral Kinkaid's Allied Naval Forces ships and landing craft. He needed to ensure enough forces to defeat a strong Japanese garrison, secure a beachhead against potential fierce resistance, advance south through the Central Plains against expected strong defenses, defend the beachhead from anticipated counterattacks, and secure the Central Plains-Manila Bay area within four to six weeks. Krueger was assigned command of the 1st Corps, which included the 6th and 43rd Divisions, as well as the 14th Corps, comprising the 37th and 40th Divisions. In reserve were the 25th Division, the 11th Airborne Division, the 158th Regiment, the 13th Armored Group, and the separate 6th Ranger Battalion. Supporting these units were 13 nonorganic field artillery battalions of various calibers, two chemical mortar battalions, two additional tank battalions, the majority of five engineer boat and shore regiments, four amphibious tractor battalions, and 16 engineer aviation battalions, totaling approximately 203,000 personnel, of which 131,000 were classified as combat troops.  By the way, since I mentioned one, for those curious, a Chemical Mortar Battalion were US Army non-divisional units attached to infantry divisions during WW2. They were armed with 4.2-inch chemical mortars. Chemical shells were on standby during WW2, to be used in retaliation should the enemy employ chemical weapons first. Toxic agents such as phosgene or mustard gas could be used as well as white phosphorus. Additionally, Eichelberger's 8th Army was tasked with conducting a subsidiary landing on Luzon with the 11th Corps, which included the 32nd Division and the separate 112th Cavalry and 503rd Parachute Regiments. Furthermore, MacArthur designated the 33rd and 41st Divisions as General Headquarters Reserve and made plans to send the 33rd and 38th Divisions, along with the 1st Cavalry Division and the 19th and 34th Regiments, to Luzon within two months. Krueger's plan for the Lingayen assault, set for January 9, involved an amphibious attack on the southern beaches of the gulf, which were lightly defended but presented numerous obstacles that impeded maneuverability. Aiming for a swift landing with a robust force to achieve tactical surprise, Krueger opted for a broad front assault, with Major-General Innis Swift's 1st Corps landing on the eastern beaches near San Fabian and Major-General Oscar Griswold's 14th Corps on the western beaches facing Lingayen town. Each corps would land two divisions side by side, with one regiment from each division held in floating reserve. The initial missions of the two corps were the same: to capture the beachhead area within their designated zones, protect the flanks of the 6th Army, and maintain communication with one another. Both corps were also ready to advance quickly inland to secure a crossing over the Agno River, which would serve as the starting point for the final push south toward Manila and Manila Bay. Anticipating some congestion on the beaches, Krueger decided to keep the 25th Division, the 158th Regiment, and the 13th Armored Group afloat until January 11. On that date, the 158th would land on the extreme left of the 1st Corps to block the coastal corridor along the eastern shore of the gulf, preventing any Japanese counterattacks from the north. Similarly, the 25th Division and the 13th Armored Group were also ready to be deployed in Swift's area for both defensive and offensive operations. To facilitate the amphibious assault, Kinkaid took direct command of Task Force 77, which comprised the entire 7th Fleet, along with some Australian and Dutch vessels assigned to MacArthur, as well as warships borrowed from Admiral Nimitz's Pacific Ocean Areas. Kinkaid organized his Luzon Attack Force into several combat components, with Admiral Barbey's Task Force 78 tasked with landing the 1st Corps and Admiral Wilkinson's Task Force 79 responsible for the 14th Corps. Admiral Oldendorf once again led the Bombardment and Fire Support Group, which included six battleships and five heavy cruisers, while Admiral Berkey headed the Close Covering Group of four light cruisers. This time, Kinkaid's escort carriers were under the command of Rear-Admiral Calvin Durgin, who had a total of 17 escort carriers to provide convoy protection, conduct airstrikes on the target area alongside pre-assault minesweeping and bombardment, and offer close air support for ground operations until that responsibility was handed over to Kenney's land-based aircraft. Admiral Halsey's 3rd Fleet would once again play a crucial role in the operation by targeting enemy airfields, while also being ready to provide direct support if the Japanese gathered enough surface forces to initiate a significant naval confrontation. Meanwhile, Kenney's Allied Air Forces were tasked with safeguarding the convoy's sides and rear through overwater reconnaissance and attacks on enemy facilities in the southern Philippines and the Dutch East Indies, with General Whitehead's 5th Air Force responsible for carrying out most of these missions. Additionally, army aircraft were to protect convoys traversing central Philippine waters and offer air support for ground operations whenever possible. To complement Operation Mike I, a comprehensive deception strategy was in place, aimed at diverting the enemy's attention to a potential Allied threat against Formosa and southern Japan through naval activities in nearby waters. Consequently, Admiral McCain's Task Force 38 launched its initial strikes in support of the Lingayen operation on January 3 and 4. Although poor weather conditions hindered attacks on Formosa and the Ryukyu Islands, they still achieved moderate success. MacArthur also aimed to mislead the Japanese into believing that the primary focus of any Allied offensive on Luzon would be directed towards western Batangas or the Bicol Provinces. Therefore, on January 1, Company I of the 21st Regiment advanced on Bongabong along Mindoro's east coast, beginning the clearance of northeastern Mindoro. The next day, Company B of the 503rd Parachute Regiment started operations on the northwestern coast, moving towards Mamburao. On January 3, Company K of the 21st Regiment landed without opposition at Buenavista on the southwestern shore of Marinduque Island and established positions to set up radar installations. Meanwhile, other troops continued their advance toward Calapan, ultimately intercepting the recently landed enemy raiding unit at Pinamalayan on January 8, compelling it to retreat back to Calapan. Although some Japanese forces managed to reach Mansalay on the southeast coast of Mindoro and infiltrated overland toward San Jose, all attempts to raid enemy airfields were unsuccessful. Conversely, the 21st Regiment successfully captured Calapan on January 24, resulting in approximately 135 Japanese casualties, while the Americans incurred the loss of 1 soldier killed and 7 wounded. By the end of the month, Dunckel's forces had killed 170 Japanese and taken 15 prisoners, at a cost of 16 American soldiers killed, 71 wounded, and 4 missing, not including casualties from Japanese air attacks, which raised the Allied totals to 475 killed and 385 wounded. Looking back to Luzon, General Yamashita was also focused on finalizing plans and preparations to counter the impending enemy assault. During the latter part of December, battle preparations proceeded with discouraging slowness. Overburdened transport facilities, enemy strafing and bombing attacks, guerrilla interference and an acute shortage of automotive fuel impeded progress in every direction. On the other hand, there were numerous indications that General MacArthur was virtually ready to strike. In the Batangas area, enemy air reconnaissance was conspicuously frequent, while the dropping of dummy parachutists and the activity of small surface craft along the coast also caused grave alarm in the 8th Division. Other reports indicated that guerrilla forces were beginning to assemble in the mountains east of Manila, and that enemy submarines were delivering arms to guerrillas in the Lamon Bay area. Yamashita accurately predicted that the invasion would occur between January 10 and 20, targeting either the Batangas area or Lingayen Gulf. However, recognizing that he lacked sufficient forces for a decisive battle, particularly given the decimation of Japanese air power and the enemy's air superiority. As of the 1st of December the Japanese Army and Navy had probably had a combined air strength of some 500 planes in the Philippines, the bulk of them based on Luzon. This strength had been largely destroyed by Allied air strikes in support of the Mindoro operation and during Japanese air attacks against Mindoro-bound convoys and the Mindoro beachhead area. By the 20th of December, the Japanese Naval Air Service in the Philippines had no more than 30 planes, and the Japanese Army Air Force was down to approximately 100 first-line combat aircraft. About that date, some 50 naval planes flew to Luzon from Formosa to renew attacks against Mindoro, and shortly thereafter, it appears, a few Army aircraft also came down from Formosa or the home islands to reinforce Luzon. Many of these planes were lost during continued attacks against Mindoro until, by 31 December, the Japanese had probably no more than 150 operational aircraft left on Luzon, and about a third that many on other fields in the Philippine archipelago, for a total of about 200. Yamashita planned to execute a coordinated delaying strategy, launching local counteroffensives only when conditions were favorable. This approach aimed to deplete enemy resources and buy valuable time to reinforce Japanese defenses in Formosa and the Ryukyus. Consequently, on December 19, Yamashita finalized a new operational outline that established two forces: one to cover northern Luzon and the other for central and southern Luzon. The plans outlined an initial strategy for the forces defending coastal regions to inflict significant damage on the enemy during their landing. This would be followed by delaying actions aimed at hindering the capture of crucial inland communication hubs and airfields. The final phase would involve a sustained last stand in the three mountainous areas previously identified as zones of ultimate resistance. To delay further enemy operations against Formosa and the Ryukyus, Yamashita decided to strengthen the northern sector, as its mountainous terrain and limited access routes from the central Luzon plain offered the best tactical conditions for prolonged resistance. As a result, Southern Luzon would be nearly stripped of troops to reinforce the second-largest concentration of forces in the mountains east of Manila. Yamashita positioned the 103rd Division in the Aparri coastal area, with three battalions stationed on the northwest coast; the 23rd Division, along with the 58th Independent Mixed Brigade, near the eastern shore of Lingayen Gulf; the 10th Division in the San Jose, Umingan, and Natividad sectors, along with the 11th Independent Regiment at Baler and Dingalan Bays; the 2nd Tank Division as a mobile unit in the Cabanatuan-San Miguel area, with the 6th Tank Regiment in Manila; the Manila Defense Force responsible for Manila and the surrounding mountains, with a garrison on Corregidor and the 39th Regiment on the Bataan Peninsula; the 8th Division securing key communication points to the east and west of Lake Taal, as well as important coastal positions in Batangas; the majority of the 105th Division stationed in the critical area east of Manila, while the Noguchi Detachment continued to hold Bicol; and the 82nd Brigade occupying coastal positions in the Lamon Bay region. Upon its arrival on Luzon, the 19th Division was tasked with gathering its main forces south of San Leon, while also deploying units to secure critical locations around Tuguegarao and Echague. Additionally, the 2nd Mobile Regiment and the newly landed 2nd Glider Regiment were ordered to bolster defenses in the Clark Field area, which was primarily protected by ground air units. However, by the end of the month, due to the slower-than-anticipated withdrawal of the 105th Division, Yamashita instructed the 8th Division to relocate its main forces to the region east of Manila, leaving only the 17th Regiment stationed in Batangas Province. Lieutenant-General Yokoyama Shizuo then took command of the Shimbu Group, which encompassed all forces in the southern half of Luzon, below a line approximately extending from Manila to Lamon Bay. That is gonna be it for the Philippines today as we now need to head over to the Aitape-Wewak region.  In the coastal sector the 19th Brigade had moved forward in accordance with Stevens' orders of 26th November that it should relieve the 2/7th Commando Squadron, clear the enemy from the area west of the Danmap, and concentrate round Babiang and Suain in preparation for operations east of the river. A company of the 2/4th Battalion had therefore relieved the 2/7th Squadron at Suain and Babiang on the 29th and 30th November. In the next 16 days patrols clashed with small groups of Japanese on seven occasions, and killed 28 without loss to themselves. By 17th December the main body of the 2/4th Battalion was at Suain, with a company at Idakaibul and one at Babiang.  In the second week of December, the squadron expanded its control by establishing outposts at Yasile and Yambes, from which they successfully repelled several minor Japanese attacks. On 11th December an enemy patrol approached the perimeter held by Byrne's troop at Yambes. The Australians held their fire until the Japanese were 35 to 50 yards away, killed 6 and, during the day, 2 more. There were patrol clashes that day and on the 13th. At 1.30 a.m. on the 15th an enemy force of at least 35 attacked. This time the Australians let the leading Japanese come to within three yards of the perimeter then fired with automatic weapons and threw grenades. After pressing the attack for a while the enemy withdrew, dragging away their wounded and about 10 dead. By mid-December, the commandos had advanced along the coastal sector to the Danmap, over 40 miles from Aitape and approximately 20 miles into the Torricellis, without encountering significant enemy forces. The majority of Lieutenant-General Mano Goro's 41st Division was positioned south of the Danmap, with the reinforced 237th Regiment under Major-General Aotsu Kikutaro occupying forward positions between the Anumb and Danmap Rivers. Following the defeat at the Driniumor River, General Adachi's 18th Army implemented a strategy to minimize contact with the enemy. They positioned outpost forces for ambush and scattered their units across a broad area, especially in locations where they could cultivate food and regain their strength. Despite these measures, many soldiers faced hunger, malnutrition, and illness, and they often lacked essential modern military equipment. Meanwhile, on December 12, Stevens instructed the seasoned 17th Brigade, led by Brigadier Murray Moten, to relieve the 2/7th Squadron at Tong and conduct patrols south towards Mimbiok and Yanatong, southeast to establish a base at Musimbe, and east to set up a base at Musu. Subsequently, the 2/7th Squadron was to relocate to Makuir and scout a route through Chem to the Dandriwad River and Babiang, aiming to establish a forward base on the Danmap, about five miles east of Makuir. In line with this plan, Moten dispatched Major Ian McBride's Piper Force, consisting of two companies from the 2/5th Battalion, which arrived at Tong on December 20. That day Major Goode of the 2/7th Squadron reported that, except for foraging parties, the area which he had been ordered to patrol had been cleared of the enemy. The squadron had killed 26 Japanese and lost two killed and five wounded; two attached Papuan police had been wounded. The squadron's headquarters were now moved to Lambuain and it began its new task: to clear the Walum area. Walum village was occupied on 30th December after clashes in which several Japanese were killed. Documents captured by the squadron that day indicated that the main enemy line of communication from the coast to Balif was via Walum- Womisis-Womsak. At the same time, Piper Force occupied Musimbe and Musinau, coinciding with the arrival of the rest of the 2/5th Battalion in the Yambes area. Meanwhile, Stevens ordered the 19th Brigade to seize the Abau-Malin line and eliminate the enemy at the Danmap. On December 14, Martin sent the majority of the 2/4th Battalion to cross the river, with one company successfully fighting through Lazy Creek to reach Rocky Point. As the other companies assembled, the 2/8th Battalion began its advance into the foothills to establish a forward base at Idakaibul and move towards Malin. Patrolling from Lazy Creek the 2/11th had two sharp clashes with the enemy force west of Niap on 30th and 31st December, three Aus- tralians and 11 Japanese being killed. At Matapau village, early on 2nd January, from 30 to 35 Japanese attacked the perimeter of Captain Royce's company. Artillery fire was brought down and the Japanese with- drew leaving six dead. This was the beginning of five days of sharp fighting against Japanese who seemed determined to stop the advance along the Old German Road. As soon as the enemy's attack had been repulsed Royce's company pushed forward along the road to a spur whence the artillery observer, Captain Lovegrove, might direct fire. A platoon crossed the little Wakip River at 10.20 a.m. but came under fire from Japanese on the steep-sided spur. The infantry withdrew and accurate artillery fire was brought down. At 2.10 p.m. the spur was occupied and from it Lovegrove directed fire on a pocket of Japanese so close that he had "to almost whisper his orders into the phone". In the day 14 Japanese were killed, and two Australians killed and five wounded, of whom four remained on duty. Next day, and on the 4th and 5th, there was sharp fighting round the spur and towards Niap, and on the 6th, after a strike by 11 bombers and a bombardment by the artillery, a platoon attacked across the Wakip but was held by the resolute enemy pocket at Niap. On January 7, the Japanese defense was finally breached when three tanks broke through the beach and entered the town, followed by infantry. The next day, the leading company of the 2/8th Battalion entered Malin without facing any opposition. However, the 2/11th Battalion struggled to advance towards Doreto Bay, as the determined defenders repelled their attacks for another ten days. On January 18, a company executed a successful flanking maneuver through the foothills to Nimbum Creek and eventually positioned itself south of Abau, capturing the town two days later. Meanwhile, Lieutenant-Colonel Alfred Buttrose had sent one company to assault Perembil and secure the Musu area, while another advanced through Sumul towards Maharingi, and McBride's company at Musinau moved eastward to patrol deep into the south. On January 3, the Australians unexpectedly drove a strong force of the 238th Regiment from Perembil, though they had to fend off several counterattacks in the following days. Continuing their advance, Asiling fell on January 9, followed by Samisai two days later, and another company secured Maharingi by January 15. Now, it is time to return to the Marianas to prepare for the next missions of General Hansell's 21st Bomber Command.  The United States military took steps to improve Saipan's defenses after the damaging raids of November 27. In a frantic effort to detect future intruders, Admiral Hoover stationed two destroyers 100 miles northwest of Saipan to provide early radar warning, and an AN/TPS-3 radar was rushed to Saipan from Oahu by air. The destroyers in some instances gave ample warning, but on other occasions the enemy planes still managed to come in unannounced. Arnold became frustrated that the microwave early warning radar set still was not in use; and on December 3 Admiral Nimitz ordered that the highest priority be given to installing the radar. Despite this, it still was not ready until after the conclusion of the Japanese air campaign. Two B-24 Liberator bombers fitted with air-to-air radar sets were also dispatched to Saipan. This was the first use of airborne warning and control aircraft by the United States, but they were not used in combat. To maintain pressure on the enemy following the San Antonio strikes, he conducted a night radar mission with 30 Superfortresses on November 29, although it was unsuccessful. This mission was part of his preparations for a daylight attack on the Nakajima Aircraft Plant in Ota, scheduled for December 3. By D minus I weather reports were forbidding: at bombing altitudes over Ota, winds were reaching velocities of I 80 miles per hour or more. At 01:30 on the 3d it was decided that the only hope for the day was to go back to Musashino where visible bombing might be possible." Crews had already been briefed twice for the target; the 73d Wing hurriedly cut field orders and by 0945 eighty-six bombers were heading for Tokyo. Seventy-six got over the city to find clear weather but high winds; 59 planes bombed visually from a mean altitude of 28,700 feet with poor results. Out of this mission, six bombers were lost, and another six were damaged, resulting in just 26 bombs hitting the plant area, causing minimal damage to buildings and equipment. Once again, the strike was disappointing. Musashi's records indicate that twenty-six bombs fell in the plant area with some small damage to buildings and equipment and almost none to machinery; Japanese casualties were moderately high. Strike photos, the command's only source of information, seemed to show even less damage, and for these slight results the command had paid dearly, with six B-29's lost and six damaged. In response, on December 7, several Japanese aircraft, including two squadrons of Ki-67 bombers, launched a coordinated attack from both high and low altitudes, destroying three B-29s and damaging 23 others. This assault was observed by Lieutenant-General Millard Harmon, the commander of Army Air Forces in the Pacific, who had been sent by Nimitz to coordinate an extensive attack on Iwo Jima's installations using both air and surface forces. On December 8th, at 0945 twenty-eight P-38's swept over the island, followed at 1100 by the B-29's and at noon by the Liberators. Hoover's crusiers began seventy minutes of shelling at I 347. The bomb load carried by the planes forcefully illustrated the difference in performance between the heavy and very heavy bomber at 725 miles tactical radius: the 62 B-29's dropped 620 tons, 102 B-24's only 194 tons.” All told, enough metal was thrown to produce a good concentration on Iwo's eight square miles, but because the bombers had been forced to loose by radar, results, so far as they could be judged from photography-handicapped, like the bombing, by adverse weather-were much less decisive than had been expected. Eyen so, the enemy's raids on Saipan stopped until 25 December. Although the results were not as decisive as hoped, the enemy raids on Saipan were temporarily halted. On December 13, Hansell sent 90 Superfortresses to bomb the Mitsubishi Aircraft Engine Works in Nagoya.  The choice for primary visual target was the Mitsubishi Aircraft Engine Works at Nagoya, and the same company's aircraft works was named as radar target; strays, it was hoped, would spill into crowded Nagoya, Japan's second city and an industrial center of great importance. The engine works, still in top priority for 21st Bomber Command, lay in the northeast section of Nagoya, about two and a half miles from Nagoya Castle. The plant was considered by the JTG as a single target though it actually consisted of three separate but closely related units of the vast complex comprising the Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.: I) the No. 2 Engine Works, responsible for research, design, and manufacture of prototype engines; 2) the No. 4 Engine Works, which between 1939 and 1945 manufactured 44,004 engines, the most important model being the Ha-102, a 1,000-horsepower motor used on the Nick and Dinah 2; and 3) the No. 10 Engine Works, which furnished castings and forgings for all Mitsubishi engine plants. On the 13th, the 73d Wing was able to get ninety bombers up, most of them carrying ten 500-pound GP's but one squadron from each group loaded with incendiary clusters. As on previous missions, a number of planes failed to reach the primary target: sixteen B-29's aborted and three bombed targets of opportunity. Japanese resistance was lively and, in all, four B-29's were lost, thirty-one damaged. Despite significant losses, the recent bombing campaign demonstrated improvement, resulting in the destruction of an assembly shop and seven auxiliary buildings. Additionally, damage was inflicted on an assembly shop, a prototype engine-manufacturing facility, two other shops, and 11 buildings, leading to approximately 351 casualties. The bombing, if of less than pickle-barrel precision, showed improvement. Strike photos indicated that 16 per cent of the bombs dropped had fallen within 1,000 feet of the aiming point and that 17.8 per cent of the roofed area had been destroyed?' Although this in itself was encouraging, had intelligence officers been able to read from their photos the whole story, there would have been even more optimism on Saipan. At the No. 4 Engine Works an assembly shop and 7 auxiliary buildings were destroyed, and an assembly shop and 11 buildings were damaged; at the No. 2 Engine Works a prototype engine-manufacturing shop and 2 other shops were damaged; and personnel losses ran to 246 killed and 105 injured.  For the first time, the 21st Bomber Command made a noticeable impact on the aircraft industry, prompting the Japanese to start relocating equipment to underground facilities. Plant officials calculated that the attack reduced productive capacity from 1,600 to 1,200 engines per month; after December 13 parts were no longer machined at No. 4 Engine Works, and engine production was limited to assembling parts on hand and those received from other plants. Mitsubishi officials had been considering the advisability of dispersing the Nagoya facilities ever since the fall of Saipan. After the strike of December 13 the transfer of equipment to underground sites began, but even at the end of the war the movement had not progressed far enough to allow production in the new plants. Five days later, Hansell dispatched 89 B-29s to target the Mitsubishi Aircraft Works in Nagoya. The Mitsubishi Aircraft Works was the giant assembly plant which used most of the engines produced in the No. 4 Engine Works. Located on reclaimed land at the northeast corner of Nagoya harbor, it was, like the engine works, composed of three integrated plants: I) the No. I Airframe Works for research and experimental engineering; 2) the No. 3 Airframe Works, which built navy planes-Zeke and Jack fighters and Betty bombers; and 3) the No. 5 Airframe Works, which manufactured bombers and reconnaissance and transport planes for the army. Large, compact, and conspicuous, this complex offered an excellent visual target, and the proximity of the harbor's shore line made it suitable for radar strikes as well. On this 18 December attack many planes, as usual, failed to follow the flight plan so that only sixty-three planes bombed the primary target. Cloud cover was heavy and forty-four of these dropped by radar, to add considerably to the damage caused by an earthquake on 7 December. Though few bombs were plotted in the area, 17.8 percent of the roofed area appeared to have been destroyed. The No. 3 Works suffered extensive damage to the sheet-metal, heat-treatment, fuselage assembly, and final-assembly shops, and at No. 5, approximately 50 per cent of the total assembly area was damaged. Casualties, in dead and injured, amounted to 464.  On December 22, Hansell was compelled to alter his tactics and initiated a daylight incendiary mission. Unfortunately, only 48 B-29s targeted Mitsubishi's engine works due to poor weather, resulting in minimal damage. The Nagoya mission on the next day, though using only incendiaries, was not in fulfillment of Norstad's request; it involved only 78 bombers dispatched instead of IOO and it was planned as a daylight precision attack. The weather turned bad, however, and before the last formations were over Nagoya the target was covered by 10/10 cloud. Only forty-eight planes bombed the Mitsubishi plant and they had to drop by radar; strike photos were few and revealed little. Actually there was not much damage to reveal: 252 fire bombs fell in the area of the No. 4 Works, damaging a few buildings but hurting no machine tools and causing no loss to pruduction On Christmas night, the newly renamed 6th Air Army, led by Lieutenant-General Sugawara Michio, launched its final significant assault on the Marianas, deploying 25 aircraft to bomb from both high and low altitudes. This attack resulted in the destruction of one B-29, serious damage to three others, and minor damage to 11. Overall, the Japanese had deployed over eighty planes over Saipan and Tinian, losing around 37, while managing to destroy 11 B-29s, seriously damaging 8, and causing minor damage to 35. Finally, on December 27, Hansell's last mission involved a return trip to Nakajima, where only 39 out of 72 dispatched B-29s caused little damage to the Musashi plant, although an incendiary attack unfortunately set a hospital on fire. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In a fierce battle for control, forces devised a strategy to defend coastal regions and key locations in Luzon. As troops repositioned, Australian commandos clashed with Japanese units, achieving victories despite challenges. Meanwhile, U.S. bombers targeted Japanese industrial sites, inflicting damage but facing heavy losses, marking a pivotal struggle in the Pacific theater.

2024.11.07 Vrndavana EN

pWotD Episode 2682: Cleopatra Welcome to Popular Wiki of the Day, spotlighting Wikipedia's most visited pages, giving you a peek into what the world is curious about today.With 137,832 views on Wednesday, 4 September 2024 our article of the day is Cleopatra.Cleopatra VII Thea Philopator (Koinē Greek: Κλεοπάτρα Θεά Φιλοπάτωρ lit. 'Cleopatra father-loving goddess'; 70/69 BC – 10 August 30 BC) was Queen of the Ptolemaic Kingdom of Egypt from 51 to 30 BC, and its last active ruler. A member of the Ptolemaic dynasty, she was a descendant of its founder Ptolemy I Soter, a Macedonian Greek general and companion of Alexander the Great. Her first language was Koine Greek, and she is the only Ptolemaic ruler known to have learned the Egyptian language. After her death, Egypt became a province of the Roman Empire, marking the end of the last Hellenistic-period state in the Mediterranean, a period which had lasted since the reign of Alexander (336–323 BC).In 58 BC, Cleopatra presumably accompanied her father, Ptolemy XII Auletes, during his exile to Rome after a revolt in Egypt (a Roman client state) allowed his rival daughter Berenice IV to claim his throne. Berenice was killed in 55 BC when Ptolemy returned to Egypt with Roman military assistance. When he died in 51 BC, Cleopatra began reigning alongside her brother Ptolemy XIII, but a falling-out between them led to an open civil war. Roman statesman Pompey fled to Egypt after losing the 48 BC Battle of Pharsalus in Greece against his rival Julius Caesar (a Roman dictator and consul) in Caesar's civil war. Pompey had been a political ally of Ptolemy XII, but Ptolemy XIII, at the urging of his court eunuchs, had Pompey ambushed and killed before Caesar arrived and occupied Alexandria. Caesar then attempted to reconcile the rival Ptolemaic siblings, but Ptolemy's chief adviser, Potheinos, viewed Caesar's terms as favoring Cleopatra, so his forces besieged her and Caesar at the palace. Shortly after the siege was lifted by reinforcements, Ptolemy XIII died in the Battle of the Nile; Cleopatra's half-sister Arsinoe IV was eventually exiled to Ephesus for her role in carrying out the siege. Caesar declared Cleopatra and her brother Ptolemy XIV joint rulers but maintained a private affair with Cleopatra that produced a son, Caesarion. Cleopatra traveled to Rome as a client queen in 46 and 44 BC, where she stayed at Caesar's villa. After Caesar's assassination, followed shortly afterwards by that of Ptolemy XIV (on Cleopatra's orders), she named Caesarion co-ruler as Ptolemy XV.In the Liberators' civil war of 43–42 BC, Cleopatra sided with the Roman Second Triumvirate formed by Caesar's grandnephew and heir Octavian, Mark Antony, and Marcus Aemilius Lepidus. After their meeting at Tarsos in 41 BC, the queen had an affair with Antony which produced three children. He carried out the execution of Arsinoe at her request, and became increasingly reliant on Cleopatra for both funding and military aid during his invasions of the Parthian Empire and the Kingdom of Armenia. The Donations of Alexandria declared their children rulers over various erstwhile territories under Antony's triumviral authority. This event, their marriage, and Antony's divorce of Octavian's sister Octavia Minor led to the final war of the Roman Republic. Octavian engaged in a war of propaganda, forced Antony's allies in the Roman Senate to flee Rome in 32 BC, and declared war on Cleopatra. After defeating Antony and Cleopatra's naval fleet at the 31 BC Battle of Actium, Octavian's forces invaded Egypt in 30 BC and defeated Antony, leading to Antony's suicide. When Cleopatra learned that Octavian planned to bring her to his Roman triumphal procession, she killed herself by poisoning, contrary to the popular belief that she was bitten by an asp.Cleopatra's legacy survives in ancient and modern works of art. Roman historiography and Latin poetry produced a generally critical view of the queen that pervaded later Medieval and Renaissance literature. In the visual arts, her ancient depictions include Roman busts, paintings, and sculptures, cameo carvings and glass, Ptolemaic and Roman coinage, and reliefs. In Renaissance and Baroque art, she was the subject of many works including operas, paintings, poetry, sculptures, and theatrical dramas. She has become a pop culture icon of Egyptomania since the Victorian era, and in modern times, Cleopatra has appeared in the applied and fine arts, burlesque satire, Hollywood films, and brand images for commercial products.This recording reflects the Wikipedia text as of 02:14 UTC on Thursday, 5 September 2024.For the full current version of the article, see Cleopatra on Wikipedia.This podcast uses content from Wikipedia under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License.Visit our archives at wikioftheday.com and subscribe to stay updated on new episodes.Follow us on Mastodon at @wikioftheday@masto.ai.Also check out Curmudgeon's Corner, a current events podcast.Until next time, I'm neural Salli.

We discuss spiders, video games, and life.  In the story, the Liberators encounter their first taste of action, but something is slightly amiss about the foes they fight. That said, one wrong move can mean death to any trooper.    JARdon the Mess Socials Twitter: https://twitter.com/JARdontheMess Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/jardonthemess/   Randy's Socials:  Twitter: https://twitter.com/gosquee Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/randys_worldd/    Dalton's Socials: Twitter: https://twitter.com/_saltydalty_ Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/_saltydalty_/    Bert's Socials: Twitter: https://twitter.com/Ninjanomics101  Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/ninjanomics_101/

On this episode of The Vonu Podcast, I finally somewhat return to our old “TVP Interviews” series, wherein we host discussions with self-liberators to talk about their philosophy, liberated lifestyle(s), their location, & more. Today, I'm pleased to welcome Barend & Maarten to the show. Barend spent about a decade… The post TVP #216: A Conversation with Two European Self-Liberators, Maarten & Barend (Van Nomadism + Living on a Sailboat) appeared first on The Vonu Podcast.

What did commemoration of the dead look like in Medieval Livonia and how did memoria shape group identities in the region? Dr. Gustavs Strenga shares insights into his research and parallels with modern-day memory wars. Baltic Ways is a podcast brought to you by the Association for the Advancement of Baltic Studies, produced in partnership with the Baltic Initiative at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of AABS or FPRI.Read more:Remembering the Dead: Collective Memory and Commemoration in Late Medieval Livonia Transcript Indra Ekmanis: Hello, and welcome to Baltic Ways, a podcast bringing you interviews and insights from the world of Baltic studies.I'm your host Indra Ekmanis, and today we're speaking with Gustavs Strenga, senior researcher at the Institute of Arts and Cultural Studies at the Latvian Academy of Culture and recently a postdoctoral researcher at the University of In Germany. Today, he speaks with us about his recent book, Remembering the Dead: Collective Memory and Commemoration in Late Medieval Livonia, and what parallels that might have for us today in the modern Baltic states. Stay tuned.Dr. Gustavs Strenga, thank you so much for joining us on Baltic Ways. Perhaps we can start, you can tell us a little bit about your background and how you came into this field of study.Gustavs Strenga: First of all, thank you for inviting me. Well, my background is I'm Latvian. I was born in Riga and I began my studies in Riga, in Latvia, and I studied history at the University of Latvia. And since high school, I had an interest in the history of the Catholic Church, partially because I went to a Catholic school. And during my studies, when I began studying at the end of the last century, beginning of this century, I understood that I'm interested into medieval history. I wrote my bachelor thesis and also later my MA about Dominicans. It's a mendicant order founded in the 13th century and they also had their priories in the Baltics, like in Riga and Tallinn. I spent, during my studies, a year in Lublin at the Catholic University of Lublin. I had a wonderful Erasmus semester in Kiel, in Germany. And I really understood that I want to do medieval history. In Riga, I had really two good professors who were teaching medieval history, but I understood that it's not enough, so I went to Budapest, the Central European University now located in Vienna, and I studied medieval studies there.And later, I had a chance to study at the University of Queen Mary in London, and I was supervised by Mary Rubin. And there, my interest in medieval commemoration began.And during my studies in London — it was a wonderful time — but I had a problem. I didn't have funding. So I moved to Germany to the University of Freiburg where I was writing — continuing writing my doctoral thesis on medieval commemoration and memory in Livonia. And after that, I had a chance to work at the National Library of Latvia, and also very exciting and interesting postdoctoral projects at the universities of Tallinn and Greifswald.IE: Wonderful. So that's interesting that your early experience in a Catholic school has brought you all the way into studying commemoration in medieval Livonia. Thanks. Thank you for sharing that.So, as I mentioned, you are the author of Remembering the Dead: Collective Memory and Commemoration in Late Medieval Livonia, which came out in November of 2023 and was also awarded the Association for the Advancement of Baltic Studies book publication subvention.It's also one of two recent monographs by Latvian historians to really be published internationally. And our colleague Una Bergmane, who also recently spoke on this podcast, published, published the other. The book examines the practices of remembering, and how those practices have influenced or had their impact on medieval Livonia, now modern day Latvia and Estonia. But I wonder if you can tell us a little bit more about that book. I gather it comes from your doctoral research — tell us a little bit more about the research that informs that work.GS: Yes, so this book, as you said, is a transformed version of my doctoral dissertation, which had a bit different title, and which I defended in 2013. And, after I finished writing the thesis, I understood, yes, I want to transform it into a book, but maybe with a bit different structure, so it took me quite a lot of time to restructure it.Though medieval commemoration of the dead had, of course, religious aims — for example, to lessen the suffering of the deceased in purgatory — I wanted to pursue the idea that the medieval commemoration of the dead was both a form of collective memory and also a social practice. As a form of collective memory, it created group self awareness of the past and thus shaped their identities.As a social practice, it created bonds between individuals and groups, and also between living and dead. I can demonstrate that by saying, for example, if someone in the Middle Ages wanted to be commemorated, the person had to have resources.IE: Yeah.GS: And resources could have been donated to a particular institution, and this institution — for example, a friary, a monastery, or a nunnery, or even a parish Church — this institution would, for example, say to some priests, you have to pray or celebrate the service, and you have to pray for a certain person. So it's a, basically it's a kind of an economy of gift exchange.IE: Yeah.GS: You're giving resources to someone to commemorate you. In my book I was looking more on groups. I was interested not so much into commemoration of individuals, because lots of research has been done in the field. For example, if some of the listeners are interested, you can look up the books on medieval memorial culture. I — rather, I was interested in that, how through the commemoration of the dead, groups were remembering their past. And this is, this is something maybe a bit different, just, looking at medieval memorial culture.Thus, in my book, I'm featuring several such groups. For example, the Church of Riga, which means the Cathedral chapter and the bishops, later archbishops. The Livonian branch of the Teutonic Order, different urban guilds and brotherhoods in Livonian cities like Riga and Tallinn. And I also was interested in — how did the collective memory shape relationships between these groups, particularly I was interested in the conflicts.IE: Mm hmm.GS: And in the case of my research, it's definitely influenced by the surviving sources. For example, in the book, you cannot read anything about how peasants were remembering the past in the Middle Ages through the commemoration of the dead, because yes, you have, you have archaeological material, but you don't have other kinds of sources, which would give some kind of a background information.Also, medieval artisan groups are not much represented. So it's a bit of — I would say it's a collection of case studies. My colleague, Marek Tamm, also partially criticized me of that, but I was interested really in the cases of the research, less perhaps painting this large landscape picture of the medieval commemoration in medieval Livonia, because I thought that's difficult to do because not many sources survive.As we know Livonia later, after the Middle Ages was a battleground between several large regional powers and many archives had burned down. And also lots of the churches have been destroyed. Also during the Reformation, altars, murals, other things involved in the commemoration of the dead have been destroyed.So, yes, it's, let's say, it's a collection of case studies looking at certain groups and how they were remembering their past in the long term.IE: Yeah, I'd like to ask you to, to talk about, a case study or two, but I wonder if you can tell us a little bit more, especially for the non-historians or people who are not really looking always at material from, from the middle ages — how do you go about finding your source material? What does that look like?GS: Particularly this research in this study, I was using all kinds of sources. Written sources. For example, you have testaments, last wills. Then you have chronicles. I was also using some books of different brotherhoods and guilds where, like, they were keeping their records and also recording how they are commemorating their dead.You have documents written down. You have necrologies. These are like calendars where you're putting the names of the dead and you know when they should be commemorated. Liturgical manuscripts, for example, missals. And you also have other kinds of sources. You have material culture. You have chalices. You have altar pieces. You have objects, tokens given to the poor in order that they know that they, that they receive alms, that they should commemorate someone.So, I was trying to use all kinds of sources. Also, last but not least, for example, the grave slabs, which are, some of them are surviving in the churches of former Livonia. So you have all kinds of sources, and I think this is what makes the study of commemoration interesting, that you can combine them. You're not just using written material, but you're trying to look on memory as something that was kept not only in one kind of media, but in numerous kinds of media.IE: Yeah. Yeah. Thank you. Yeah. In the book, I think you go into a variety of different kind of contexts, looking at elites, non elites, as you mentioned, urban and rural sort of practices, liturgical, non liturgical. We'd love to hear your thoughts on one or two of those case studies.GS: Yes, I think this book has several interesting case studies. I would just introduce a few of them. In most cases, the groups in the Middle Ages were, in fact, interested a lot in remembering their beginnings. Into remembering their origins.As most of the listeners would know, medieval Livonia was Christianized quite late. The Christianization process began only in the late 12th, early 13th century, when the missionaries and crusaders from northern Germany and Scandinavia arrived in the eastern Baltic, which we now know today as Latvia and Estonia. And it is the time when the history of two, let's say, most important institutions in the region begin, and this is the history of the Riga Church, particularly the Cathedral chapter, and the history of the Livonian branch of the Teutonic Order, and these groups in the late Middle Ages were looking back at their beginnings, and these events which took place in the late 12th and early 13th century were important for them. And also not just events, but also the dead of that age.We can say the collective memory of the Riga Cathedral chapter and Riga bishops, was not just carried by the famous and very well known text the Livonian and Chronicle of Henry, which was written around 1227, but also by Riga Cathedral itself. Riga, as a city, was founded in 1201, and then in 1211,the founder of the city, Bishop Albert, began constructing the cathedral.What do I mean, the Cathedral and its choir was memory itself — the space was the commemorative space? Before the city of Riga was founded, Livonia already had two dead bishops. The first bishop, the first missionary, Meinhard, and the second bishop, Bertolt, who was killed in a battle in 1198, just three years before the foundation of Riga.For every community in the Middle Ages, the founders were very important for their memory. So around 1229 when Bishop Albert died, or 1230, the bodies of Meinhard and Bertol were transferred from Ikšķile or Üxküll where they were buried, to the new cathedral and buried in the choir. And so we could say that in the Middle Ages, they were not just reading a chronicle, this one, for example, the Chronicle of Henry, or commemorating bishops liturgically, but also they were in contact with the graves, with the places where the bishops were buried. So it was both. A phenomenon of memory that was recorded in the texts and performed during the liturgy. And also, we can say it was a physical experience, because still, though historians are arguing about that — whether in the Middle Ages, the three founding bishops of Rīga's Church were considered to be saints — we can say that they were seen as a holy man. Maybe, yes, we can still argue about their sainthood because they were never canonized in the Middle Ages, but they were seen also as important founding figures.In the case of the Teutonic Order, it is a bit different. Spaces — maybe if we are talking about this memory of the origins or memory of the beginning — spaces are maybe not so important. More, we have textual sources showing how the Teutonic Order's Livonian branch were commemorating their death. For example, the Livonian Rhymed Chronicle — text composed around 1290 — the text has numerous references to the brethren of the Teutonic Order who had been killed during the battles against the Baltic pagans during the 13th century. Later, it's very interesting, in 14th and 15th century, we can trace numerous necrologies of the Teutonic Order, not in Livonia, but nowadays Germany, Belgium, and Switzerland, where we can see the Teutonic Order were — that they were Commemorating those men, their own brethren, killed in distant Livonia.Sometimes they were misspelling the name of Livonia. Most likely those people who were recording these records in the necrologies or commemorating these dead brethren, they didn't know where Livonia is, but still, this experience of crusading was part of the Teutonic Order's collective memory.It's also interesting that in the later times, as I was saying about the commemorative culture of the Riga Cathedral, we have some evidence of the commemoration. For example, the Missal of Riga — the sole complete manuscript from the Middle Ages that gives us a glimpse into how liturgy in medieval Riga looked like. In this missile, we can also spot several instances where we can see the curation of the Riga archbishops. Their names have been recorded. And also, this is a time when there was a conflict between the Teutonic Order and the Cathedral Chapter of Riga. Because the Teutonic Order, during the late 15th century, wanted to take control over the Cathedral of Riga, and also over the cathedral chapter, and you can see the struggle also in the commemoration, because the records are telling us that these archbishops had died, during captivity into the Teutonic Order's prison, for example.IE: Well, yeah, thank you for sharing those, those glimpses into those case studies.And, you know, when I first thought about that topic of medieval Livonia, it wasn't totally clear to me how it drew to my own interest, but I was really drawn in, even by those first few paragraphs. You know, you talk about memoria as this form of collective memory and social practice that creates groups, that shapes identities, that helps remember the past, and creates those relationships.And I was thinking about, how does that translate a little bit into today's society? You know, collective memory group identity still plays such an important role in our world, and so, I wonder — do you have any insights as to what, what your work might tell us about the Baltic nations today?GS: It is indeed difficult to link medieval history with the contemporary world.IE: Yeah.GS: But, I would say that the commemoration of the dead is a phenomenon that shows that every group, in every historical period, is remembering their dead. So we can see the commemoration of the dead as a basic form of collective memory. And, if we look to the past, we can also see conflicts that have been created by different memories. And, today we are living into the age of memory wars in, in the Baltics.IE: Yeah.GS: Let's just remember, for example, the removal of the so-called Alyosha statue in Tallinn in 2007 and the riots which began afterwards and which were also supported by Russia in numerous ways, also by cyberattacks.IE: Right.GS: And also the removal of the monument to the Liberators of Soviet Latvia and from the German fascist invaders — now I'm just quoting the official name of that monument, which was removed in Riga in 2022. So these and also early examples show us that Baltics have experienced different practices of erasing memory.IE: Yeah.GS: Also, of trying to replace the memories. If we remember that during Soviet times in Latvia and also in Estonia, numerous monuments erected during the interwar period, for example, commemorating the independence wars against, against different forces, including Soviet Russia, those monuments were destroyed in the 1940s, 1950s in Latvia and Estonia. And afterwards, many of these monuments were restored by the movements.IE: Yeah.GS: So there we can see some kinds of parallels and this is quite similar to that, what I'm trying to show in my book, long term developments of commemoration and remembering.IE: Yeah. The long tail and how, how it is, perpetually moving that collective identity. Um, maybe we can talk a little bit about your current project on Saints and Heroes: From Christianization to Nationalism. Can you tell us a little bit about that work, as well?GS: Yes. In 2021, I had a chance, together with my colleague Cordelia Heß from the University of Greifswald to revisit the question of remembering in quite different settings. So, together with Cordelia Heß and also our partners from the State University of St. Petersburg in Russia, we created a project. It was a Russian-German co-project [financed by Deutsche Forschungs Gemeinschaft]. We were working on the medieval saints and medieval heroes in the Baltic Sea region and how they have been used and later abused after the medieval times.Yes, and I have to say that when Russia's full scale invasion in Ukraine began, our cooperation was discontinued, though we continue working on our part, let's say, on our German part of the project.IE: Yeah.GS: The idea behind was really to look at these long term developments in remembering medieval figures. I can assume that many listeners know medieval heroes, for example, Joan Arc, or Emperor Barbarossa, or Charlemagne, or Scottish and Welsh rebels, William Wallace and Owen Glyndwyr, or Russian Prince and Saint Alexander Nevsky, who nowadays is abused by Putin's regime. And in the case of these all figures, you can see different ways how people have been remembering them and also using them, for example, much later in the 19th and 20th century for nation building or for creation of smaller groups. We have lots of examples — for example, in Scandinavia, that medieval saints in late 19th and early 20th century, played very important role in creating identity of Catholic groups in these countries, because let's remember that Scandinavia became Protestant after the Reformation, and then when there was this Catholic revival, many Swedish intellectuals were choosing St. Bridget as their patron and also revisiting the materials of the canonization process of St. Bridget and also living this medieval religious life during the late 19th and early 20th century.Within the project, I was working on Baltic medieval heroes. That's, for example, the master of the Livonian branch of the Teutonic Order, Walter von Plettenberg, who was a Baltic German hero in the 19th century and also in the early 20th century. I was also working on Latvian medieval kings as heroes — for example, Viesturs and Namējs. As listeners would know, those were not real kings. During the 1920s and '30s in Latvia, they were called kings, but they were just leaders of the local ethnic groups. In the case of the Viesturs and Namējs, those were Semigallians. And I wrote an article, which has been recently published, on Liv warrior Imanta, who has been mentioned in medieval sources just once, in the Livonian Chronicle of Henry, in the scene where Imanta killed Bishop Bertold, who was mentioned in this podcast earlier.And, it is, in fact, fascinating to see that in the Baltic case, not so much history writing has been important for the revival of these medieval heroes, but literature, poetry, and also drama. Those have been the main tools — in the case of Imanta, also one of the main tools has been music, a song, which has been composed at the beginning of the 20th century, using lyrics of Latvian poet Andres Pumpurs. And the result that can be read in the case of the project is a book called Doing Memory: Medieval Saints and Heroes and Their Afterlives in the Baltic Sea Region (19th–20th centuries), that has been recently published by De Gruyter. And there we have 10 contributions about different medieval saints and heroes from Scandinavia, from Northern Germany, and also Latvia, Estonia, and Finland.IE: That is really interesting to see how arts, literature, music, theater come into play in rememberings, as well. We really appreciate you taking the time to speak with us and to share this glimpse into medieval history, medieval Livonia. The book grabbed me from the very beginning. So thank you so much, for your time and for sharing your thoughts with us.GS: Thank you. It was a pleasure.IE: Thank you for tuning in to Baltic Ways, a podcast from the Association for the Advancement of Baltic Studies produced in partnership with the Baltic Initiative at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. A note that the views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of AABS or FPRI. I'm your host, Indra Ekmanis. Subscribe to our newsletters@aabs-balticstudies.org and FPRI.org/baltic-initiative for more from the world of Baltic Studies. Thanks for listening and see you next time. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit fpribalticinitiative.substack.com

Last time we spoke about the fall of Mogaung. General Vinegar Joe's strategy against Myitkyina had turned into a brutal struggle. Stillwells forces were besieging the town while the Chindits battled for Mogaung, diverting Japanese reinforcements in the process. Despite heavy losses, the Chindits captured Naungkyaiktaw with the help of flamethrowers. Gradually Mogaung fell, but the credit was wrongly attributed to the Chinese while it should have gone to the Chindits. Mytikyina withstood endless attacks and at Biak the Americans repelled numerous Japanese assaults. The 2nd battalion, 162nd regiment tossed over to help, but this further complicated supply issues on the plateau. Progress was deeply hampered by water shortages, difficult jungle terrain and supply roads needing repairs. Lastly the battle for Lone Tree Hill saw absolute mayhem and horror, something the Americans and Japanese would never forget. This episode is the Invasion of Saipan Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    The use of US fleet and escort carriers during the landings on Hollandia and Aitape had convinced Admiral Toyoda's staff that the American naval force could be drawn into decisive naval battle off of New Guinea. On June 1st, however, a reconnaissance flight had discovered a major build up of enemy vessels at Majuro, suggesting that a new invasion was just days away. The Imperial General Staff reeled with shock in response to this, not knowing whether the Allied objective was Biak, Palau or Saipan. Aboard Toyoda's flagship Oyodo in Tokyo Bay, the naval staff debated, and the debate degenerated into argument. The truth was that no one had a “feel” for the American strategy except one lone staff intelligence officer, Commander Nakajima Chikataka. He said it had to be Saipan. But his fellow staff members scoffed at this. Even the Americans did not have such power that they could mount an operation the size of the three-pronged New Guinea strike as just a feint, they argued. They  further argued that an enemy airfield at Biak would allow the Allies to bomb the Philippines and Palau with their long-range B-24 Liberators. And the American carriers were in evidence off New Guinea, unlike at Majuro. Thinking that Nakajima must be seeing things, Toyoda thus decided that Biak had to be the place. The Japanese unleashed Operation KON, diverting an enormous sum of their naval and air resources to bolster Biak in response to the perceived allied advance.   However, in actuality, Admiral Spruance was gathering the largest Pacific force yet seen at Pearl Harbor, comprising approximately 535 ships, ranging from battleships to tugs, carrying a total of 127,500 personnel of Lt-General Holland Smith's 5th Amphibious Corps.  They were going to hit Saipan, Tinian and Guam. Designated “Operation Forager” it was to be the end game of Admiral Nimitz Central thurst into the Pacific. Taking these would see strategic airfields only 1400 miles away from Tokyo in the hands of the allies. From there the US Army Air Force could begin their long wished bombing campaign against the Japanese home islands. For the Japanese, Saipan in particular was considered a “home island”. Japan had seized Saipan during WW1 from the German Colonial Empire and she heavily invested in “Japanizing” the island. The Japanese government had encouraged southern Japanese and Okinawans to colonize Saipan, introducing Japanese language and culture to the indigenous peoples there. It was more than just another Imperial asset, in many ways Saipan had become a home island. Part of the new operation would include Admiral Mitscher commanding the Fast Carrier Task Force 58 stationed at the Marshalls, along with Vice-Admiral Charles Lockwood overseeing 19 submarines and Rear-Admiral Ralph Christie leading 9 submarines operating across the Pacific and Southeast Asia. Operation Forager entailed Admiral Turner's Task Force capturing Saipan and Tinian sequentially with the 2nd and 4th Marine Divisions, followed by the 3rd Marine Division and the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade attacking Guam. The 27th Division was reserved for Saipan and the 77th Division for Guam. The outcome on Saipan would determine subsequent operations, with the Southern Landing Forces also held in reserve for the Northern Landing Forces until June 25. Lieutenant-General Holland Smith's strategy for the Saipan invasion involved landing four assault regiments simultaneously on four beaches in the Charan Kanoa area. Following three days of continuous air and naval bombardments, Major-General Thomas Watson's 2nd Marine Division's 6th and 8th Marine Regiments were to land north of Afetna Point on the Red and Green Beaches, while Major-General Harry Schmidt's 4th Marine Division's 23rd and 25th Marine Regiments would land south of Afetna Point on the Blue and Yellow Beaches. Thomas Watson was then going to seize the Charan Kanoa Airstrip, afterwards he would sing northeast towards Mounts Tipo Pale and Tapotchau while Schmidt secured Charan Kanoa village, the Aslito Airfield and the islands southern end before moving north to take part in clearing the remainder of Saipan. Alongside this, Smith planned to dispatch the reserve 2nd and 24th Marine Regiments of Lt Colonel Walter Stuart and Lt Colonel Guy Tannyhill over to Scarlet and Black Beaches in the north to divert enemy attention. Two innovations would be tried for Forager. The 4th Marine Division had recently and optimistically accepted the proposal to employ amphibian tanks inland. This was a large part due to the unit's experiences on low and level Roi-Namur, during the Kwajalein assault. The 2nd Marine Division on the other hand, having fought on rugged Guadalcanal and experienced the limitations of LVTs during the Tarawa assault, were more pessimistic. General Watson convinced General Smith that he would only allow the amphibian tanks to advance inland far enough to clear the immediate beach area and that only the first troop-carrying LVT wave would follow them to discharge their troops beyond the beach. All subsequent waves would discharge troops on the beach and not proceed beyond the Tractor Control Line. The reason for this pessimism was that the Marines expected the terrain to be rougher than some predicted. They feared control would be lost over troops embarked in LVTs, concentrated groups of men would be exposed to fire, and that more amtracs would be lost to enemy fire inland. They were needed to return to the Transfer Control Line on the reef's lip where support troops boated aboard LCVPs would be picked up and run to shore in the amtracs. Furthermore, LVTs are not designed for cross-country movement. They have comparatively narrow tracks and low ground clearance, making it easy for them to "belly-out" on rough ground, rocks, and stumps. Amphibian tanks are poor substitutes for medium tanks for the same reasons, and in addition they have very thin armor and a high profile. The Marine divisions commenced training for Saipan in March, conducting a significant rehearsal between May 14 and 20 off Maui. With all arrangements in place, Admiral Turner's invasion fleet was poised to depart Hawaii by late May. The slower LSTs were scheduled to set sail for Eniwetok on May 25, followed by the troop transports departing Hawaii five days later. Turner's vessels were slated to gather at Eniwetok on June 6, coinciding with the departure of Admiral Mitscher's carriers from Majuro for the Marianas. Between June 8 and 10, Turner then embarked from Eniwetok in echelons, experiencing a relatively uneventful voyage towards Saipan. Meanwhile, the Japanese expedited the deployment of 31st Army units to the Central Pacific, successfully positioning most of their line units at designated locations by the end of May. Additionally, certain disparate units of the 31st Army underwent reorganization into seven independent mixed brigades and five independent mixed regiments to enhance chain of command and troop cohesion.   This, however, did not allow adequate time to prepare inland defenses in multiple lines, especially in the case of the Marianas. The larger elevated islands within the Marianas offered strategic advantages for establishing multi-layered defenses, creating strongholds on key terrain features, and positioning reserves centrally for potential counterattacks. However, the Japanese were unable to fully exploit these opportunities due to various factors. Insufficient troop deployments occurred until less than two months prior to the US assault, leaving limited time for comprehensive inland defense preparations. Many coastal defense and anti-aircraft guns were discovered still packed and alongside incomplete positions, due to a shortage of construction materials for fortified installations. Consequently, the high ground at the island's center remained unprepared for defense, and several beach defenses were unfinished. There was an overestimation of the natural ruggedness of the terrain to impede American advances. Despite this, some coastal defense guns were strategically placed within earlier reinforced concrete structures. While Saipan and Tinian lacked significant artificial underwater or beach obstacles, mines were sporadically utilized on their shores. The Japanese also suffered from a lack of anti-aircraft ammunition to counter the enemy air superiority. Over on Saipan, Lieutenant-General Saito Yoshitsugu commanded a significant military presence including the 43rd Division, the 47th Independent Mixed Brigade, the 9th Tank Regiment, the 1st Battalion of the 18th Regiment, and various support units totaling 25,500 personnel. Despite its apparent strength, a convoy carrying reinforcements for the 43rd Division was ambushed by two American submarines between June 4 and 6, resulting in the loss of five transports and nearly decimating the 118th Regiment. Saito, overseeing Saipan as commander of the Northern Marianas Army Group, was joined by Admiral Nagumo's Central Pacific Area Fleet headquarters, bolstering defense with an additional 6,200 naval personnel. Additionally, General Obata, stationed at Saipan's army headquarters, delegated authority to his chief of staff, Major-General Igeta Keiji, as he inspected defenses in Palau during the American landings. Saito organized Saipan's defense into five sectors, anticipating landings on the island's west and northwest coasts, Tanapag Harbor, and the north shore of Magicienne Bay. The Japanese strategy relied on tank-infantry counterattacks launched at night from designated positions to repel enemy landings. However, American bombardment of Saipan commenced before Saito's forces could fully fortify their positions. Large numbers of heavy weapons, ranging from 200mm mortars to 5-inch coastal defense guns and literally dozens of searchlights and antiaircraft guns still remained in naval depots or loaded on railroad cars or still packed in cosmoline near partially excavated gun positions. The high ground in the island's center had received little attention in the defensive preparations; and, indeed, beach defenses themselves were in many cases far from complete. In so far as training in defensive warfare is concerned, Japanese forces displayed a marked deficiency; there was little evidence of organization of the ground, the principal airfield (Aslito) was virtually undefended against ground troops, and their counterattack plans were poorly conceived. On the afternoon of June 11, Mitscher's Task Force 58, began a relentless three and a half day heavy bombardment against Saipan, Tinian, Guam, Rota, and Pagan. This onslaught, featuring a 225-plane fighter sweep, caught the Japanese off guard in the Marianas and resulted in the destruction of 150 enemy aircraft, securing air superiority for the rest of the campaign. On June 12th and 13th, 216 carrier bombers hit Guam, Saipan, and Tinian, while Admiral Hoover's B-24s started pounding the southern Marianas airfields. You might be raising your eyebrows, the B-24's belonged to Task Force 57, under Vice-Admiral John Hoover, which was currently formed by the 5th Air Force over on Cape Gloucester and New Guinea; the 7th Air Force and 4th Marine Aircraft Wing on the Marshall and Gilbert Islands; and the 13th Air Force on the Admiralty Islands. Concurrently, two Japanese convoys were intercepted, leading to the sinking of 16 enemy vessels. The first of these, was a formation of 20 ships, fleeing on a northerly course 125 miles west of Pagan Island. They were attacked on the afternoon of the 12th by planes of Rear Admiral William K. Harrill's Task Group 58.4. Further  south, 135 miles west of Guam, the other convoy of six ships became the target for a special attack mission sent by Rear Admiral Joseph J. Clark, commanding Task Group 58.1. Between the two attacks 12 cargo ships, three submarine chasers, and one patrol-torpedo boat were sunk. Additionally, on June 13th, Mitscher's fast battleships shelled Saipan, though with limited success. The following day, Turner's fire support ships joined Task Force 58 in bombarding Saipan's beaches and installations, effectively neutralizing most of the Japanese coastal defenses and anti-aircraft positions. Despite some damage inflicted on the destroyer Braine and battleship California, Saito's defenses were not completely destroyed, indicating that the preliminary bombardment was not entirely effective. Meanwhile, underwater demolition teams surveyed the landing beaches, clearing them of mines and obstacles and creating gaps in the reefs for the amphibious approach. Smith's reserves staged a demonstration off Tanapag to divert Japanese attention, while carrier groups were dispatched to prevent enemy aircraft staging through the Bonins, successfully attacking Iwo Jima, Chichi-jima, and Haha-jima. To deter the Japanese from utilizing the Bonins in the north as a staging area for aircraft, two task groups led by Clark's 58.1 and Harrill's 58.4 set sail from Saipan on June 14th for an offensive. This marked the furthest advance into Empire waters by a carrier striking force at that time. Task Groups 58.1 and 58.4 refueled on June 14th and were then dispatched that night toward Chichi and Iwo Jima. Airstrikes on Japanese airfields in those locations commenced the following afternoon despite challenging weather conditions. Despite facing strong resistance from the Japanese, American fighter sweeps and bombing runs resulted in the destruction of 28 out of 37 Zeros engaged, with an additional seven destroyed on the ground, while only two American aircraft were lost. Adverse weather hampered morning strikes on the 16th, but the afternoon sortie of 54 American aircraft encountered Japanese planes on the runway, claiming 63 destroyed, though this wasn't confirmed by Japanese sources. Only two American aircraft were lost due to anti-aircraft fire and operational issues. Despite airborne opposition and unfavorable flying conditions, the mission achieved its objectives, significantly diminishing the Bonins' effectiveness as an aircraft staging area. After the afternoon raid, the two task groups headed south as per Mitscher's orders to position themselves off Saipan by the 18th. This operation proved successful, as around 100 Japanese aircraft that could have intervened in the impending battle were eliminated. On the morning of June 15, while the landing craft were lowered and began the complex assembly process, the Americans carried the last air and naval preparations on Saipan. At 8:12am, Turner finally gave the landing signal and the amtracs began to approach their assigned beaches under the cover of the LCI gunboats' rockets. Enemy fire was light until the LVTs reached the coral reef's lip, at which time artillery, mortar, and machine-gun fire increased drastically. Some control craft had drifted slightly to the north and coupled with a stronger than expected current some 2nd Marine Division units landed north of their intended beaches. The UDTs had not experienced this as the sea conditions and tides were different when they went to work the day before. Once over the reef lip some 400yds from shore, the swell made stationkeeping even more problematic. The swell increased through the day, making unloading and transfer difficult as well as capsizing landing craft and LVTs. The 2nd Marine Division had 31 of its 68 amphibian tanks hit or mechanically disabled before reaching the Tractor Control Line ashore. Nonetheless, in 20 minutes, some 8000 assault troops were ashore despite the strong Japanese artillery fire, albeit suffering heavy casualties. On the Red Beaches, Colonel James Riseley's 2nd and 3rd Battalions encountered stiff resistance from Hill 500 but still managed to secure a shallow beachhead, subsequently repelling a savage counterattack as the reserve 1st Battalion was landing. To the south, as Colonel Clarence Wallace's 2nd and 3rd Battalions had both come ashore on Green Beach 1, the 2nd would be sent south to seize Afetna Point while the 3rd advanced inland. Afetna Point was important for another reason than just denying the Japanese excellent positions for enfilading the American landing craft. Possession of the point would make Beach Green 3 available for landing of the tanks of both divisions. Because of an open channel off Green 3, LCM's carrying tanks could proceed directly to the beach without crossing the troublesome reef that fenced all other beaches. Once through the channel the craft could either move straight into Green 3 or fan out to the north or south and put the tanks ashore, wherever it was desired. The same channel could also be used for logistical purposes after tanks were ashore. As a result, the 2nd met strong resistance, progressing slowly and costly against a determined foe while the 1st Battalion was being landed; yet the 3rd managed to push inland against weaker resistance, finally halting about 900 yards from the O-1 Line. In the afternoon, the reserve 1st Battalion, 29th Marines was also landed and employed to fill the gap between Wallace's battalions. It's also important to note that the 4th Company, 9th Tank Regiment conducted piecemeal counterattacks on either side of Charan Kanoa with 14 tanks, losing all but three. Meanwhile, along the Blue Beaches, the 23rd Marines led by Colonel Louis Jones made headway through Charan Kanoa, facing occasional gunfire, and successfully advanced to the O-1 Line. Despite encountering challenging terrain and harassment from Japanese riflemen, their amtracs managed to secure Mount Fina Susu, albeit with significant losses. Upon reaching the O-1 Line, heavy artillery fire pinned down the Americans. Because of the concentrated mortar and artillery fire which had struck his troops throughout the day, the commander of the 23rd Marines, Colonel Jones estimated that the light forces on the O-1 line would be incapable of holding there for the night without being virtually annihilated. In addition, the regimental commander felt that “pulling back would allow our artillery and air to bring fire on the Jap batteries a short distance inland, better contact could be obtained on the right, and the exposed left flank could be better protected.” Dillon's 2nd Battalion and Cosgrove's 3rd Battalion were therefore ordered to establish a defense line generally 800 yards west of O-1 for the night. This involved a withdrawal under cover of darkness of the meager forces on O-1.Concerned about the exposed left flank between the 2nd and 4th Divisions, Colonel Jones directed the reserve 1st Battalion to fill the dangerous gap. Further south, Colonel Merton Batchelder's 1st Battalion faced fierce resistance from Agingan Point, repelling enemy counterattacks with the aid of air and naval support. Reinforcement from 3rd Battalion units allowed partial clearance of Japanese positions. The 2nd Battalion to the left encountered enemy concentrations but benefited from the heroic actions of the LVTAs, enabling them to advance inland.  About half the assault Marines of this battalion were carried to a railroad embankment prior to debarkation from LVTs. Until it reached there, the battalion was subjected to frontal small-arms fire from Japanese behind the embankment. There the small arms fire ceased, but mortar and artillery fire continued. From the direction of Nafutan Point came shells which burst overhead, apparently from antiaircraft guns depressed to fire at ground targets. And, as if troubles to the front and flanks were not enough, two enemy mortars began firing on the Marines from positions 500 yards to the rear. Before a request for assistance could be made, friendly planes spotted the mortars, attacked, and silenced them. Much credit for the 2nd Battalion's success in pushing inland goes to the LVT(A)s of the Army's 708th Amphibian Tank Battalion, which, according to the Marine battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Hudson, took “more than their share of punishment diverted enemy attention from the amphibious tractors carrying troops ... I shall always re- member the excellent support given to my battalion by the Army LVT(A)'s”. Meanwhile, Marine tanks and artillery, under Turner's command, were successfully brought ashore, although some tanks and howitzers from the 4th Division were lost to fire and reef obstacles. By late afternoon, the bulk of the reserve 2nd and 24th Marines were landed, with the latter sustaining 400 casualties from accidents and artillery fire.  Lieutenant Colonel Alexander A. Vandergrift,  therefore, deployed his battalion and moved it on foot to an assembly area some 700 yards inland from Yellow 1, near a fork in the rail- road tracks. The men had no more than taken entrenching tools in hand when a barrage of well-directed Japanese artillery fire engulfed them. After the day's casualties were totalled, it was discovered that the unit had suffered heavily, though it had yet to enter the front line fighting: 25 killed, 72 wounded, 39 missing, mostly those lost on board the overturned LVTs. Other battalions had suffered more heavily, but the real significance of these figures lies in the fact that the 3rd Battalion did not arrive on the beach until 5:27pm. However, by nightfall, only the 25th Marines had reached the O-1 Line, constituting less than one-third of the planned beachhead, with casualties exceeding 2000 during the landings. After half an hour of the Saipan Invasion, Admiral Toyoda announced Operation A-Go proclaiming "The fate of the Empire rests upon this single battle. Every man is expected to do his utmost." The same Nelsonia words used by Admiral Togo at the legendary battle of Tsushima in 1905. He had created that statement taking Nelson's signal "England expects that every man will do his duty" at the Battle of Trafalgar. Toyoda planned to destroy the American fleet. Admiral Ugaki's battleships were to rendezvous with Admiral Ozawa's carriers in the Philippine Sea to attack the American fleet around Saipan. At 6:35pm on June 15th, the submarine Flying Fish reported that a force of Japanese battleships and at least three carriers had passed through the San Bernardino Strait. The submarines were under orders to report sightings before attempting to attack, so Flying Fish waited until nightfall, then surfaced to radio in its report. The sighting report from the submarine was monitored by the Japanese who knew they had been located. About one hour later, submarine Seahorse also sighted a Japanese force 200nm east-southeast of Surigao Strait. The exact composition of this force was unclear, but was thought to be Yamato and Musashi plus escorts. The submarine was not able to send a signal of its sighting until 4:00am on June 16th. Additionally, throughout the 15th, a growing body of signals intelligence indicated that a major IJN fleet action was underway.   Receiving this intelligence on the enemy's intentions, Admiral Spruance made the decision to halt the Guam landings, instructed for unloading at Saipan to continue until June 17th only, and tasked Turner with preparing for an imminent decisive battle. However, that's a podcast for next week. General Saito was on the verge of initiating his counterattack. Throughout the night, there were various probes and minor counterattacks that were swiftly repelled. Nonetheless, the 2nd Battalion, 6th Marines faced a major assault at 3am when a Japanese bugler 75 sounded a loud, clear call on the tense night air, and with a waving of flags, loud screams, and a brandishing of swords, the attack was launched. Added to the din were the shouts of the 6th Marines for “flares.” Illumination shells, fired by the three destroyers, Halsey Powell, Coghlan and Monssen of Task Unit 52.17.3 began to burst over the area, clearly revealing the Japanese attackers. Men of Companies F and I opened with accurate, devastating lire. California joined with a tornado of salvos in front of the Marine lines. The Japanese, stripped by the illumination of the advantage afforded by their superior knowledge of the terrain (so helpful in night lighting), dropped before the Marines' fusillade. As Japanese fell, others replaced them in the determined onslaught.  At one point in the fighting, it was feared that the enemy had effected a penetration of Company I, along the coastal road. To contain this Japanese prong, Colonel Riseley shifted one company of the 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marines, company L, into the area. The light of morning, however, revealed that no penetration had been made and that Company B had, in effect, formed a secondary line. By 5:45, the Japanese pressure reached a peak; two Marine 37mm guns near the beach were knocked out and their crews forced back. Although the main positions held, a false report reached the 6th Marines' command post to the effect that Company F's lines along the beach had been forced back about 50 yards. This erroneous report, probably fostered by the withdrawal of the two 37mm crews and the infiltration of small enemy groups to the regimental command post, had no basis in fact. Fortunately, five medium tanks arrived in the nick of time to halt the Japanese advance and thwart their assault. With the dawn of June 16th, the battlefield revealed approximately 700 enemy casualties strewn across the terrain. Meanwhile, as the 6th Marines consolidated their position and the remaining 2nd Marines landed, Colonel Wallace's 2nd Battalion resumed its offensive against Afetna Point, successfully eliminating enemy resistance and bridging the gap between Marine divisions. Further south, General Schmidt led his three regiments towards Fina Susu Ridge in a coordinated advance. Despite the 23rd Marines encountering formidable enemy opposition in the mountains and marshes, the 25th Marines managed to clear Agingan Point and extend beyond the beachhead, while Colonel Franklin Hart's 24th Marines in the center made significant progress towards the O-1 line despite facing fierce resistance. Meanwhile,  Spruance opted to withdraw the unnecessary transports in anticipation of the impending naval confrontation. General Smith made the decision to deploy the reserve 27th Division for landing. Consequently, Major-General Ralph Smith's units, excluding the 106th Regiment, commenced landing operations in the afternoon. However, during the night, Saito initiated his second significant counterattack. The Japanese 136th Infantry (two battalions) and 9th Tank Regiments were to counterattack the center of the 2nd Marine Division sector at 17.00hrs. Yokosuka 1st SNLF was to attack the north flank from the Garapan area and “cooperate with the tanks to annihilate the enemy's front line and advance towards Oreai (Charan Kanoa) Airfield.” Vice Admiral Nagumo, Commander Central Pacific Fleet and 5th Base Force, was ordered to command the attack personally. The units were still disorganized from the previous night's action and the attack was not launched until 03.30hrs. The objective of the Japanese attack was modest enough: the Saipan radio station, a short 400 yards behind the 6th Marines' lines. This objective, in itself, represented a revision in Saito's pre-D-Day policy to “destroy the enemy, during the night, at the water's edge." Seizure of the radio station area would still leave 500—600 yards distance to the water. This resulted in an estimated 44 tanks and 500 infantry attacking the positions of the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, and 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marines. The attack began at about 3:30, and the brunt struck Lieutenant Colonel Jones' 1st Battalion, 6th Marines,  and to a lesser extent the 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marines. The tanks advanced in groups of four or five with Japanese soldiers clinging to them. Poor and ineffective tactics reflected the inadequacy of Saito's order; some tanks cruised about in an aimless fashion, some bogged down in the swampy ground, some made an effort to break through the lines, still others stopped to let off their pugnacious passengers. The Japanese suffered heavy losses, including approximately 24 tanks and 300 men, while inflicting only 97 casualties. By the end of the initial two days, American forces had incurred roughly 3,500 casualties, approximately 20% of the total for the operation. Concurrently, General Obata had instructed the commanders of Guam, Truk, and Tinian to send reinforcements to Saipan via barge, although only two companies managed to land on Rota by June 22nd. On June 17th, the American offensive resumed, yielding significant progress, partly due to artillery support. General Watson expanded the beachhead area nearly twofold, with the 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marines, and 2nd Battalion, 6th Marines advancing northward to within 1000 yards of Garapan. Meanwhile, Colonel Riseley's remaining units secured the base of Mount Tipo Pale along the O-2 Line, and Colonel Wallace's Marines maneuvered around Lake Susupe to reach the O-1 Line.  To the south, the 25th Marines led by Colonel Batchelder advanced in a column formation, making headway towards Aslito Airfield by approximately 1500 yards. They managed to secure advantageous high ground along the O-2 Line on the northwest perimeter of the airfield. Simultaneously, Colonel Gerard Kelley's 165th Regiment also moved towards Aslito, making gains of around 1200 yards despite encountering light resistance. By 2:00pm, the 2nd Battalion had moved to the southwest edge of Aslito Airfield, while the 1st Battalion had become involved in a fight for a dominating ridge line extending from the airfield's southwest corner to the vicinity of Cape Obiam. Infantrymen of the 1st Battalion led by Major James H. Mahoney inched slowly up the steep and open slope, so that, by 5:00pm, a toehold had been gained at the crest. At this point, however, the Japanese launched a counterattack and drove the soldiers back off the hill. Reorganizing and reforming the lines at the base of the ridge, the battalion dug in for the night. Amid heavy artillery bombardment, the 24th Marines reached and secured the O-2 Line, consolidating their position on the ridge. In contrast, progress for the 23rd Marines to the south of Lake Susupe's swamps was minimal as they faced entrenched enemy forces. With the expansion of the beachhead, additional Corps units landed, including General Smith's command post, advance parties of the Corps artillery, and Colonel Leonard Bishop's 105th Regiment. During the night, Saito launched another counterattack, deploying the 1st Battalion of the 18th Regiment to stage a counterlanding on the Marine beachhead. However, the intervention of LCI gunboats and Marine artillery thwarted the attempt, driving the enemy back to Tanapag Harbor. Shifting focus to the Battle of Biak, General Fuller's forces had previously seized Mokmer but now found themselves encircled by Colonel Kuzume's formidable positions in the East and West Caves. Despite progress in repairing the airdrome, intense Japanese fire prevented its use until the enemy cave strongholds were neutralized. In contrast, the Japanese had attempted twice to reinforce Biak but failed both times. However, Operation KON drew the Allied forces away from the island, allowing barges to discreetly bring reinforcements from the southwest to Biak without naval protection. As a result, most of the 2nd Battalion, 221st Regiment was successfully transported to the island by June 12, and General Numata was evacuated during this period. Following this success, the 2nd Battalion, 219th Regiment was loaded onto barges in Sorong and transported to Biak via Noemfoor Island, arriving successfully by June 16. Meanwhile, as Colonel Newman's 186th Regiment secured its positions on June 8, Fuller decided to send the rest of Colonel Haney's 162nd Regiment to the recently secured Parai Jetty. With the Ibdi Pocket contained, Haney made significant progress toward Mokmer. The next day, Haney continued his advance, successfully connecting with his 2nd Battalion despite heavy mortar fire. Newman faced multiple night counterattacks and was unable to expand his beachhead. On June 10th the 1st Battalion, 186th Infantry, sent two companies to the point on the low ridge where Company B had been halted the previous afternoon. Despite artillery support, the two units could make little progress and were themselves pinned down about 10:30. Japanese rifle and mortar fire was silenced by the 1st Battalion's 60-mm. mortars, but the Japanese continued to pour machine gun fire from a number of bunkers and pillboxes which proved impervious to bazooka and 75-mm. tank fire. The units withdrew while more artillery fire was placed along the low ridge. On the east flank, enemy fire from the East Caves had died down, and the 2nd Battalion, 162nd Infantry, was able to move on eastward. On that same day, as Admiral Toyoda ordered a third attempt for Operation KON, Admiral Ugaki's battleships were directed to support Admiral Sakonju's convoy, assembling at Batjan Island on June 11th. The start of the Marianas bombardment on that day forced Toyoda to suspend the operation and prepare for A-Go, ordering the battleships to rejoin Admiral Ozawa's command and sending the 23rd Air Flotilla to Palau to reinforce Admiral Kakuta's 1st Air Fleet. With two regiments now stationed at Mokmer, Fuller decided to resume his offensive by advancing westward towards Borokoe and northward towards the low ridge. The 163rd Regiment was assigned to hold the Ibdi Pocket and the East Caves. On June 11, the assault battalions began moving to the starting point in front of Menoebaboe. Haney's forces faced strong resistance and only reached the starting point by afternoon. The Americans then crossed the starting line, encountering minimal resistance along the coast but significant opposition on the low ridge. As a result, three battalions reached the 1st Phase Line, while Haney's 3rd Battalion couldn't move beyond the starting line. This forced Newman to pause his advance temporarily until Haney cleared enemy positions on the ridge. On June 12, Haney's 2nd and 3rd Battalions advanced on the low ridge. The 3rd Battalion fought doggedly forward during the afternoon, discovering an ever increasing number of Japanese pillboxes, bunkers, and hasty automatic weapons and rifle emplacements of all kinds, manned by 1st Battalion and 5th Company, 222nd Regiment. Dusk found the unit still some 100 yards short of the line of departure and about 1,300 yards east of the 2nd Battalion. The 1st Battalion, taking no part in the action during the day, moved forward to Mokmer Drome from Parai. Due to heavy Japanese resistance, their progress was slow. The next day, the Americans continued their attacks against enemy positions, but they couldn't close the gap between Haney's 2nd and 3rd Battalions. Fuller concluded that his troops were fatigued and that the Japanese had likely received reinforcements, so he requested an additional infantry regiment. General Krueger planned to send the 34th Regiment from Hollandia, scheduled to arrive on June 18. In response to recent setbacks, General Doe ordered the 1st Battalions of the 162nd and 186th Regiments to support the 3rd Battalion on June 14. These battalions positioned themselves on the terrace above the low ridge, facing the main Japanese strongpoint directly. In response to the enemy's aggressive action, Colonel Kuzume initiated a tank-infantry counterattack with his remaining forces to push back the enemy battalions, inflicting heavy casualties and disrupting the American advance. Despite this, the Americans managed to regroup and establish a continuous line, while the Japanese sustained significant losses and were unable to execute any further major counterattacks for the rest of the battle. Generals Krueger and MacArthur were unhappy with the progress of operations in Biak, which led them to relieve Fuller of his duties as task force commander. Whether General Fuller's relief as commander of the HURRICANE Task Force was entirely justifiable is a question which cannot be answered categorically. At the time of his relief, the task force had seized Mokmer Drome. Patrols sent westward to Borokoe and Sorido Dromes had found no enemy at those two fields, and General Fuller knew they could be occupied with ease. But he had not sent more troops beyond Mokmer Drome because he believed it more important to secure an overland line of communications to that field and to clear the low ridge so that repair work could continue and at least one strip could be put in service. By June 14th it was only a question of time before the West Caves area and the low ridge would be secured. Indeed, General Eichelberger, who took 3.5 days to acquaint himself with the situation at Biak, drew up new attack plans according to which the 162nd and 186th Infantry Regiments were to be employed in the same area and in much the same manner as General Fuller had been using them. General Eichelberger realized, as had General Fuller, that Borokoe and Sorido Dromes would be no safer than Mokmer Drome as long as the Japanese held the low ridge and West Caves positions. But, in the last analysis, the mission of the HURRICANE Task Force, quick seizure and rehabilitation of the Biak fields, had not been accomplished by mid-June. General Eichelberger then took command of Operation Hurricane on June 15. Although the initial plan was to keep Fuller in charge of the 41st Division, he felt unjustly treated and requested to be relieved of this role as well. Consequently, Doe was promoted to command the 41st Division in Fuller's place. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The invasion of Saipan was seeing tremendous casualties for both the Japanese and Americans. By the end of the initial two days, American forces had incurred roughly 3,500 casualties, approximately 20% of the total for the operation. This island was not going to be a cake walk by any measure, it would be paid for in blood.  

What led Caesar to cross the Rubicon River? Why was it such a big deal? And was Pompey really that great? Trent Edwards and Steve Fait are joined by Lee Uniacke for an improvised history that follows Caesar and friends on their fateful journey, which may require a stop for snacks. Trent and Steve then interview history teacher Matt Roberto about what actually happened.   Links To Further Yer Book-Learnin'   Julius Caesar (Gaius Julius Caesar) c. 12 July 100 BC – 15 March 44 BC was one of the all-time great generals, empire-builders, and quote-givers while being murdered. Caesar crossed the Rubicon Jan. 10, 49 BCE.   Pompey the Great (Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus) c. 29 Sept. 106 – 28 Sept. 48 BC was a powerful Roman statesman and general.   The Battle of Philippi was the final battle in the Liberators' civil war between the forces of Mark Antony and Octavian (of the Second Triumvirate) and the leaders of Julius Caesar's assassination, Brutus and Cassius, in 42 BC, at Philippi in Macedonia.   Cicero (Marcus Tullius Cicero) c. 3 Jan. 106 BC – 7 Dec. 43 BC was a Roman statesman and gifted orator.   Marius (Gaius Marius) c. 157 BC – 13 January 86 BC was a Roman general and statesman who held the office of consul a record seven times.   Sulla (Lucius Cornelius Sulla Felix) c. 138–78 BC was the first man of the Roman Republic to seize power by force.   Crassus (Marcus Licinius Crassus) c. 115 – 53 BC is often referred to as "the richest man in Rome".   Savor the sweet history of cannoli.   Ireland gets potatoes in 1589.   Cleopatra (Cleopatra VII Thea Philopator) c. 70/69 BC – 10 Aug. 30 BC was Queen of the Ptolemaic Kingdom of Egypt from 51 to 30 BC, and a heckuva kisser.   The Battle of Pharsalus was the decisive battle of Caesar's Civil War fought on 9 August 48 BC near Pharsalus in Central Greece.   A Roman circus was one of the top choices for ancient entertainment.   P.T. Barnum (Phineas Taylor Barnum) c. July 5, 1810 – April 7, 1891 was  a showman and a scammer famous for co-founding the Ringling Bros and Barnum & Bailey Circus.

pWotD Episode 2552: Cleopatra Welcome to popular Wiki of the Day where we read the summary of a popular Wikipedia page every day.With 138,235 views on Saturday, 27 April 2024 our article of the day is Cleopatra.Cleopatra VII Thea Philopator (Koinē Greek: Κλεοπάτρα Θεά Φιλοπάτωρ lit. Cleopatra "father-loving goddess"; 70/69 BC – 10 August 30 BC) was Queen of the Ptolemaic Kingdom of Egypt from 51 to 30 BC, and its last active ruler. A member of the Ptolemaic dynasty, she was a descendant of its founder Ptolemy I Soter, a Macedonian Greek general and companion of Alexander the Great. After the death of Cleopatra, Egypt became a province of the Roman Empire, marking the end of the last Hellenistic-period state in the Mediterranean and of the age that had lasted since the reign of Alexander (336–323 BC). Her first language was Koine Greek, and she was the only known Ptolemaic ruler to learn the Egyptian language.In 58 BC, Cleopatra presumably accompanied her father, Ptolemy XII Auletes, during his exile to Rome after a revolt in Egypt (a Roman client state) allowed his rival daughter Berenice IV to claim his throne. Berenice was killed in 55 BC when Ptolemy returned to Egypt with Roman military assistance. When he died in 51 BC, the joint reign of Cleopatra and her brother Ptolemy XIII began, but a falling-out between them led to an open civil war. After losing the 48 BC Battle of Pharsalus in Greece against his rival Julius Caesar (a Roman dictator and consul) in Caesar's civil war, the Roman statesman Pompey fled to Egypt. Pompey had been a political ally of Ptolemy XII, but Ptolemy XIII, at the urging of his court eunuchs, had Pompey ambushed and killed before Caesar arrived and occupied Alexandria. Caesar then attempted to reconcile the rival Ptolemaic siblings, but Ptolemy's chief adviser, Potheinos, viewed Caesar's terms as favoring Cleopatra, so his forces besieged her and Caesar at the palace. Shortly after the siege was lifted by reinforcements, Ptolemy XIII died in the Battle of the Nile; Cleopatra's half-sister Arsinoe IV was eventually exiled to Ephesus for her role in carrying out the siege. Caesar declared Cleopatra and her brother Ptolemy XIV joint rulers but maintained a private affair with Cleopatra that produced a son, Caesarion. Cleopatra traveled to Rome as a client queen in 46 and 44 BC, where she stayed at Caesar's villa. After Caesar's assassination, followed shortly afterwards by that of Ptolemy XIV (on Cleopatra's orders), she named Caesarion co-ruler as Ptolemy XV.In the Liberators' civil war of 43–42 BC, Cleopatra sided with the Roman Second Triumvirate formed by Caesar's grandnephew and heir Octavian, Mark Antony, and Marcus Aemilius Lepidus. After their meeting at Tarsos in 41 BC, the queen had an affair with Antony which produced three children. He carried out the execution of Arsinoe at her request, and became increasingly reliant on Cleopatra for both funding and military aid during his invasions of the Parthian Empire and the Kingdom of Armenia. The Donations of Alexandria declared their children rulers over various erstwhile territories under Antony's triumviral authority. This event, their marriage, and Antony's divorce of Octavian's sister Octavia Minor led to the final war of the Roman Republic. Octavian engaged in a war of propaganda, forced Antony's allies in the Roman Senate to flee Rome in 32 BC, and declared war on Cleopatra. After defeating Antony and Cleopatra's naval fleet at the 31 BC Battle of Actium, Octavian's forces invaded Egypt in 30 BC and defeated Antony, leading to Antony's suicide. When Cleopatra learned that Octavian planned to bring her to his Roman triumphal procession, she killed herself by poisoning, contrary to the popular belief that she was bitten by an asp.Cleopatra's legacy survives in ancient and modern works of art. Roman historiography and Latin poetry produced a generally critical view of the queen that pervaded later Medieval and Renaissance literature. In the visual arts, her ancient depictions include Roman busts, paintings, and sculptures, cameo carvings and glass, Ptolemaic and Roman coinage, and reliefs. In Renaissance and Baroque art, she was the subject of many works including operas, paintings, poetry, sculptures, and theatrical dramas. She has become a pop culture icon of Egyptomania since the Victorian era, and in modern times, Cleopatra has appeared in the applied and fine arts, burlesque satire, Hollywood films, and brand images for commercial products.This recording reflects the Wikipedia text as of 01:39 UTC on Sunday, 28 April 2024.For the full current version of the article, see Cleopatra on Wikipedia.This podcast uses content from Wikipedia under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License.Visit our archives at wikioftheday.com and subscribe to stay updated on new episodes.Follow us on Mastodon at @wikioftheday@masto.ai.Also check out Curmudgeon's Corner, a current events podcast.Until next time, I'm Gregory Neural.

Last time we spoke about the defense of India. General Mutaguchi's megalomaniac dream of invading India was tossed into motion. Battles were raging over countless features and against formidable allied boxes such as the Lion Box. Yet Mutaguchi had relied far too heavily on seizing the allied supply depots while promising his subordinate commanders they would have ample supplies for their tasks. Those like General Sato became so angry with their superior they pretty much were acting insubordinate. The effort to take Kohima fully and thrust into India was falling apart battle by battle. Meanwhile within China, General Chennault's 14th air force was causing major problems for the Japanese, forcing them into action. Operation Ichi-Go was formed, a colossal offensive to neutralize airfields and perhaps end the China Problem once and for all. Meanwhile the Royal Navy received some breathing room in the mediterranean sea and were now moving into the Pacific Theater. This episode is Operation Ichi-Go Unleashed Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  The Imperial Japanese Army, largely because of the losses incurred by the Imperial Japanese Navy and logistical constraints, was virtually powerless to stop the allied advance in New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. Imperial HQ predicted further losses in early 1944 and General Douglas MacArthur was expecting to sweep up the northern New Guinea coast so he could retake the Philippines. New Guinea was thus seen as a holding operation to delay the allied advance. With its shorter supply line, the Philippines was now being regarded as a good location to block MacArthur's advance towards the home islands. Everyone of course was still waiting for the decisive naval battle. But back on the mainland, the IJA were not dependent on the IJN, their logistical constraints were not the same at all. Hence suddenly in 1944, the IJA decided to unleash incredibly large and bold offensives in Burma, Northern India and of course in China.  On New Years day of 1944, Chiang Kai-Shek cabled President FDR warning him that the strategy they and Stalin had agreed on at the Tehran Conference in November of 1943, fully emphasizing the European Front was leaving China open to a major attack. “Before long Japan will launch an all-out offensive against China.” Yet western intelligence disagreed with Chiang Kai-Shek's sentiment. While General Stilwell was completely focused on recapturing Burma, Chiang Kai-Sheks fears were about to be proven correct. In April of 1944, Operation Ichi-Go was launched. It was the largest military operation in Japanese history, it was also a last ditch effort to finally solve the so-called China Problem. It was obvious to the IJA, the IJN were losing the maritime war in the Pacific, thus they were determined to toss the dice in China. If they were successful, overland supply lines from Burma to Korea could be secured. In addition it would be a hell of a bargaining chip when negotiating with the Americans. If they could finally end Chiang Kai-Shek's Kuomintang government, America would be facing the extremely formidable task of having to invade and reconquer China. Of course the immediate war aims were to knock out General Chennault's air force some he would not be able to bomb Formosa or the home islands. Emperor Hirohito recalled in his Dokuhaku Roku, post-war testament “One shred of hope remained—to bash them at Yunnan in conjunction with operations in Burma. If we did that we could deal a telling blow to Britain and America …”  By early April General Hata had amassed 62,000 men, 52,000 Japanese and 10,000 collaborationist units alongside 800 tanks, 1550 artillery pieces, 250 aircraft, 15550 motorized vehicles and 100000 horses. This would turn into 150,000 troops, and believe it or not that was the advance guard of a campaign that would eventually involve 500,000 troops. They would be supplied with enough ammunition for two years. The IJA air force amassed 200 bombers with enough fuel for 8 months to support them. Over the next 9 months, battles would be fought over 3 regions, Henan in central China to the east of Nanjing; Hunan and Guangxi in south China east of Hong Kong and Guangdong province and south of the Yangtze River. While Ichi-Go was unleashed, Chiang Kai-Sheks crack troops, the Y-Force based out of Yunan province, alongside Merrill's marauders were busy fighting alongside Stilwell in northern Burma. In spite of the efforts to keep Ichi-Go secret, during early 1944, the Chinese began fortifying their defenses and redeployed troops on a large scale to strengthen their frontlines. Chiang Kai-Shek knew something was coming, but his commanders believed a large-scale Japanese offensive in China was impossible by this point of the war. The Japanese began carrying out a heavy bombardment campaign, targeting Henyang, Guilin, Chongqing and against the heavy concentration of Chinese troops advancing in the Yangtze river area. The aerial attacks greatly hampered the KMT's logistical lines. The Chinese reacted by unleashing their frontline artillery, destroying the Bawangcheng bridge on March 25th. The Japanese hastily went to work repairing the bridge as Lt General Uchiyama Eitaro's 12th army would need to cross as pertaining to Operation Kogo. Kogo was the first phase of the battle aimed at opening the Pinghan Railway that ran from Beijing to northern Wuhan. South of Beijing is the Yellow River, that runs southwest to east. Uchiyama's plan was initially to cross the Yellow River and secure the Zhengzhou area before driving south towards the Luohe area, where the Japanese would ultimately prepare for a drive towards Luoyang.  On the night of April 17th, the main part of the 37th division crossed the Yellow River and advanced towards Zhongmu. The Japanese rapidly penetrated the defenders positions, taking them by surprise. Three KM's in front of Zhongmu, they waited for the 7th independent Mixed Brigade to follow up behind them. The 7th Independent Mixed Brigade had crossed the Yellow River at the same time as the 37th Division, attacking the flank of the enemy facing the crossing point of the main body of the Brigade. Shortly after dawn the main body of the Brigade began crossing the river at a point near the left flank of the 37th Division. On the 19th, part of the 37th Division attacked Zhangzhou, completely routing the Chinese defenders while the bulk of the Division advanced towards Lihezhen.  Meanwhile the 110th Division advanced upon Bawangcheng with the 62nd Division and 9th Independent Brigade following behind them. The 62nd Division was accompanied by the 3rd Armored Division and 4th Cavalry Brigade, setting out for Luohe with their tank support. The 110th División continued their advance towards Micunzhen, capturing the town by the 24th. On that same day the 9th Independent Brigade seized Sishuizhen, but would be unable to break through the 177th Division's defenses. After a breakthrough was made at Zhengzhou, the 3rd armored division and 4th cavalry Brigades tanks advanced past the infantry to puncture the Chinese formations, forcing a quick rout. Meanwhile the 62nd Division, 37th Division and 7th Brigade reached the east-west line of Lihezhen and prepared for an assault on Xuchang. The Chinese simply were unable to respond to this. Chiang Kai-Shek and his commanders assumed this was a punitive expedition and that the Japanese would sooner or later turn back as they had always done in the past. As such, only the 15th and 29th Armies were sent to reinforce Xuchang to contain the Japanese offensive. Yet on the other hand, Uchiyama had also decided to divert his tanks and cavalry northwest, preparing for the future attack on Luoyang. On the 30th, Uchiyama's forces began attacking Xuchang, shattering the Chinese defenses at extreme speed and fully occupying the city by May 1st. The 62nd Division encountered the 15th and 29th Armies at Yingqiaozhen, battering them so heavily, the Chinese were unable to reinforce the vital railway. Two infantry battalions and one field artillery battalion of the 37th Division and the 27th Division departed Xuchang to continue marching south in order to re-open the Beijing-Hankou railway. The North China Area Army estimated that Tang Enbo would assemble his main force near Yehhsien, planning to advance to Yencheng and then wheel to the northwest in order to capture this force. However, the main force of the 31st Army Group of General Tang Enbo turned its advance to the north. The Area Army, therefore, changed its plan and decided to turn toward Loyang directly after the capture of xuchang, rather than to wait until Yencheng was captured. Yet we will have to wait until next week to find out what happens to General Tang Enbo's forces as we are now traveling over to Burma. Don't worry Operation Ichi-Go is just starting. After the capture of Walawbum in early March, General Stilwell ordered Merrill's Marauders to perform a wide envelopment, to cut the Kamaing Road behind General Tanaka's 18th Division while the 22nd Division with tank support drove down the Kamaing Road from the north. Two Marauder battalions led by Lt Colonel Charles Hunter set out on March 12th, reaching Janpan 4 days later. Once there they received new orders from Stilwell to head south through the hills along the Warong trail, then make their way to Kamaian to block the road at Inkangahtawng. Meanwhile Merrills 1st battalion and their Chinese allies were facing strong enemy resistance. From bivouac areas in the hills northeast of Shaduzup, on the Kamaing Road, the 1st Battalion of the 5307th, followed by the 113th Regiment, moved out on the morning of 13 March to put the northern clamp across the Kamaing Road just south of the Jambu Bum, in the vicinity of Shaduzup. I & R Platoons followed some fresh footprints into an enemy bivouac and stirred up a hornet's nest of Japanese. There was brisk skirmishing, and though the Americans managed to cross the Numpyek Hka just beyond, the Japanese had been alerted and proceeded to delay them expertly. Lieutenant-Colonel William Osborne, commander of the 1st Battalion, decided to cut a fresh trail around the Japanese. This was painfully slow business, and waiting for an airdrop took another day. On 22 March, when Colonel Hunter to the south was one day's march from his goal, aggressive patrolling by Red Combat Team revealed that the Japanese had blocked every trail in the area through which Osborne had to pass, so again Osborne elected to make his own trail, this time over ground so rough that the mules had to be unloaded. The maneuver succeeded, and no Japanese were seen on 23 or 24 March. Osborne's march would have been greatly aided had he known Tilly's Kachin Rangers were in the same general area. By March 22nd they reached Hpouchye. Additionally the 22nd Division and Colonel Browns tanks had been halling it through the Jambu Bum, making slow progress against heavy enemy resistance because of a lack of tank-infantry coordination. It was difficult to coordinate infantry and tank action, because the tankers found it hard to distinguish their countrymen from the Japanese. A few such cases of mistaken identity and the 22nd's men were understandably reluctant to get too close to the tanks. I remember a circumstance in WW1, when the IJA were laying siege to the German concession of Tsingtao. There was a small British force sent to aid the Japanese and so much friendly firing occurred, the IJA forced the Brits to wear their greatcoats to distinguish them from the Germans. So you know, it happens. By March 20th, Stilwell's forces crossed the ridge, reaching Hkawnglaw Hka, but yet again the lack of tank-infantry coordination led them to pull back. Once over the Jambu Bum, the 22nd found the road down to be mined and blocked with fallen trees. Two days were lost in clearing the road, and then three battalions made a frontal attack, guiding on the road. Next day they tried a co-ordinated tank-infantry attack and the leading tank platoon reached the Hkawnglaw Hka about four miles south of Jambu Bum, destroying a few machine guns and taking four antitank pieces. But the infantry would not follow the tanks and dug in two miles short of the stream. The tanks patrolled till dark, then fell back to their own lines. Over in the east, Hunter's men departed Janpan and reached Inkangahtawng on March 23rd, setting up two road blocks. Hunter sent out patrols and quickly discovered Kamaing was wide open, yet the delay of Stilwell's others units would force General Merril to deny any attempts to attack south. Tanaka's reaction to the roads blocks were pretty intense. Beginning on he 24th, vigorous Japanese counterattack followed on another. The Morita Unit, about two companies strong were a hastily assembled force drawn from a battalion gun platoon, an engineer company, a medical company, and division headquarters; they were given two 75-mm. guns, placed under command of the 18th Division's senior adjutant, and rushed south to Inkangahtawng. Tanaka also ordered the 2nd battalion, 114th Regiment over at Kamaing to attack north along the Kumon Range. The attacks were so intense, Hunter's men were forced to pull back to the Manpin Area by March 24th. Meanwhile, Merrill's 1st Battalion advanced to Chengun Hka, placing them really close to Tanaka's headquarters at Shaduzup. To the north, the 64th and 66th Regiments managed to link up, but the relentless Chinese assaults continued to fail against the tenacious defenders costing the attackers many tanks and lives. It was the 2nd battalion, 66th's turn to lead on 21 March. Again the tanks got well ahead of the infantry. A combination of ambush and counterattack by the Japanese cost five tanks, and then the Japanese came on up the road, almost overrunning the battalion headquarters, which was saved by the courage of two engineer platoons that had been clearing the road. That night the 1st battalion, 64th, which had been making the enveloping move, came in from the east and cut the Kamaing Road, right in the segment held by the Japanese. A tank attack on the 23rd found Japanese antitank guns just south of a small stream north of the Hkawnglaw Hka that prevented the tanks from outflanking the position. The guns knocked out the three lead tanks in quick succession, blocking the road. After heavy fighting at the stream crossing, the tanks finally had to withdraw, leaving the derelicts. In the afternoon the two flanking battalions made their way up the road and joined the 66th. Unfortunately, the meeting of the 64th and 66th Regiments did not signal the end of Japanese resistance. Japanese and Chinese positions on the road were thoroughly intermingled, making movement in the immediate area extremely hazardous. An attempt to break the deadlock with the tanks failed when the device chosen to identify the Chinese infantry backfired. Both the Chinese and the Japanese waved white cloths at the tanks. The armor moved blithely on into a nest of Japanese antitank men, who destroyed five tanks with magnetic mines, effectively blocking the road. General Liao, the 22nd Division's commander, now cut a bypass road for the tanks around his west right flank. A tank platoon tried it, could not cross a ravine improperly prepared for tank crossing, came under artillery fire, and had to be withdrawn. General Liao then committed his 65th Regiment to the main attack, applying immense  pressure, prompting Tanaka to order his frontline regiments to withdraw 10 kilometers.  On March 28th, Merrill's 1st Battalion established themselves along the Nam Kawng Chaung on the Japanese rear, from where they would be able to attack Tanaka's headquarters. Surprised, the Japanese chose to bypass the roadblock and evacuated their position via a track to the west. This resulted in Japanese resistance softening up, allowing the 65th Regiment to secure Shaduzup by March 29. At the same time, Hunter's encircled Marauders were fiercely resisting the enemy attacks at Nhpum Ga, with his 3rd Battalion subsequently taking up positions at the Hsamshingyang airstrip to the north. The men were extremely fatigued, facing constant marches, dysentery, malaria and malnutrition. They fought on for 5 days under constant attack, successfully pushing back the relentless Japanese assaults. On its hilltop the garrison, though suffering no shortage of food or ammunition, aside from the monotony of diet which was itself a hardship, suffered from an acute shortage of water. There were no plaster casts for the wounded, and they took their sulfadiazine dry. The pack animals could not be protected from the Japanese fire. When dead, their carcasses could not be buried, and the stench and the carrion flies added more miseries to the battle. Sergeant Matsumoto, who had played an important part at Walawbum, was a pillar of strength to the garrison, constantly scouting between the lines, overhearing Japanese conversations, and informing Colonel McGee accordingly. On one occasion, when Matsumoto learned of plans to surprise a small salient at dawn, the Americans drew back their lines, booby-trapping the abandoned foxholes. Punctually the Japanese attacked, straight into the massed fire of the waiting Americans. Throwing themselves into the foxholes for cover, they set off the booby traps. Matsumoto completed the debacle by screaming "Charge!" in Japanese, causing a supporting platoon to throw itself on the American guns. An ailing General Merrill would be evacuated to Ledo, leaving Colonel Hunter to assume formal command of the Galahad Unit. He then sent his 3rd Battalion to counterattack, unsuccessfully attempting to clear the trail as the Japanese repelled all his assaults. Finally on April 4th, Hunter got a breakthrough. The Japanese were believed to be moving ever more troops up the Tanai and it was believed that the 1st Battalion, which had been ordered to aid, would not arrive for four more days at least. Hunter's reaction was to attack on the 4th with everyone but the sick and the mule skinners, with his large patrols called in and Kachins used to replace them. A fake fight, using carbines, which sounded like the Arisaka rifle, was staged to deceive the Japanese, and the air support made three passes at them. The first two were genuine, the last a feint which made the Japanese take cover, only to come out and find the American infantry on them. Hunter's force gained that day and came within 1,000 yards of the besieged. About this same time Capt. John B. George and a small party, sent north by Hunter to find the Chinese regiment which Hunter understood would support him in this area, met the 1st battalion, 112th regiment at Tanaiyang, about eight miles northeast. After an interval, presumably used to obtain permission to do so, its commander moved toward Hsamshingyang. His first element arrived at the airfield on 4 April and was used to guard a trail junction. Despite this increasing pressure the Japanese made a very heavy attack on the Nhpum Ga garrison, actually reaching the foxholes at one point, and being driven out by two soldiers using hand grenades. Over the next few days, the Marauders were reinforced by the 112th regiment and Merrill's 1st battalion, allowing Hunters men to crawl closer and closer to Nhpum Ga. By Easter Sunday,  the Japanese vanished, leaving cooking fires and equipment. There was no pursuit, as Stilwell wanted no movement beyond Nhpum Ga as they were facing large supply issues at this time. The battalion of the 114th made its way to Myitkyina, where General Tanaka, anxious about the town, added it to the garrison. The 1st Battalion, 55th Regiment, however, withdrew towards the vicinity of Warong. The Marauders had suffered 59 deaths and 314 wounded during the Inkangahtawn roadblock engagement and the siege of Nhpum Ga. The Galahad Unit and 114th regiment suffered so heavily from exhaustion, the men would be very weakened for future engagements.  Further to the south, Stilwell was concerned about the recently offensives aimed at Imphal and Kohima, but he was relieved somewhat, when at the Jorhat conference of April 3, attended by Slim, Lentaigne, Stilwell and Mountbatten, he was told the situation was under control and for him to continue his northern offensive. During the conference, Slim also notified the others he had decided to divert the Chindits 14th and 111th Brigades, further south to help out his 4th Corps. However Brigadiers Fergusson and Calvert argued strongly against it, not wanting to get tangled up in the battle for Imphal. Calvert instead wanted to preserve White City and Broadway whilst Fergusson wanted another attempt at Indaw. The Chindits were still formally under the command of Stilwell in May and he wanted them to hold firm at Indaw to prevent the flow of Japanese reinforcements going north. It was estimated the Chindists could endure roughly 90 days of this action and would need to pull out my mid-June. This estimation did not sit well with Stilwell. General Lentaigne wanted to abandon the strongholds around Indaw and move north closer to Stilwell's forces. Therefore, Calvert's brigade would be prepared to open the drive to the town of Mogaung by attacking Mohnyin. Before this could occur, General Hayashi would initiated a general attack against White City on the night of April 6.  The attack began with a three hour artillery bombardment, then the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 4th Regiment; and 3rd battalion, 114th Regiment stormed Calvert's defenses. When the shelling died away, Hayashi's three infantry battalions attempting to punch a hole along the southeast perimeter of the stronghold, defended by the Lancashire Fusiliers, Gurkhas, and other West Africans of the 6th Nigerian Regiment. Secure behind a row of machine guns with a line of mortars behind them, the defenders opened fire. Bullets and projectiles whipped through the air, the bright flashes of tracers lending an ethereal air to the proceedings. Rounds poured into the attacking Japanese who began to suffer heavy casualties. Determined bands of Japanese brought up Bangalore torpedoes to destroy the wire, but all malfunctioned. The battle went on for most of the night. The Chindits fought like lions throughout the night and managed to toss back numerous enemy attacks. Then to their dismay 27 IJA medium bombers appeared,  blowing holes in the wire. The Bofors engaged them, shot down six and claimed six probables. Desperate efforts were made to repair the defenses before the next attack came in. White City received over 100,000 yards of barbed wire and 600 50ft coils of Dannert wire. The wire was 20 yards thick in places and festooned with mines and booby-traps. Dakotas continued to pour reinforcements into White City. The transport planes were relegated to flights during dawn and dusk times, but they kept coming, concentrating reinforcements at White City. Fresh companies of troops materialized to take up station, until in the words of Lt. Norman Durant of the South Staffords, the place was a “complete babel, for it contained  British troops, West Africans, Chinese, Burmans, a New Zealand RAF officer, Indians, and an American Neisei who acted as interpreter, or better said interrogator of prisoners. Large groups of West Africans from the 7th and 12th Nigerians landed, filling out the columns and battalions already at White City. As the planes continued to bring in reinforcements, Calvert managed to muster roughly seven battalions in and around “White City” against Hayashi.  Over the next few nights, Calvert's defenders continued to repel Hayashi's attacks, until he was finally relieved by Brigadier Abdy Rickett's 3rd West African Brigade on April 10th. This allowed Calvert to lead a strike force against Hayashi's HQ at Mawlu from the south. While the Japanese continued their onslaught of White City, Calvert's strike force advanced to Thayaung, before effortlessly seizing Sepein on the 13th. Then the 7th Nigerians fell upon Mawlu, prompting the HQ staff to flee south in a rout. With Mawlu now in their hands, the Nigerians soon found themselves under heavy fire, pinned down for the next four hours under relentless Japanese firing and dive-bombing by Japanese aircraft that put in a surprise appearance. Soon, the Gurkhas at Sepein also reported that they were under fire from the main Japanese positions at the edge of the village, hidden under mounds of flowering lantana scrubs. The sight was inordinately beautiful and lethal, concealing hordes of Japanese infantry, whose gunfire twinkled through the red, yellow, purple and green of the scrub. Three Gurkha ground attacks failed to dislodge the defenders and the men were becoming dispirited. Calvert decided to withdraw. As dusk settled at Mawlu, Vaughn began to pull his troops out of Mawlu and under the cover of a mortar barrage, taking with him a large collection of vital documents and an even larger trove of Japanese ceremonial swords and military equipment, which would serve as presents for Air Commando and RAF aircrews at White City. While this was going on, Brigadier Brodies 14th Brigade were advancing to the Wuntho-Indaw railway where they managed to successfully attack the main bridge close to the Bonchaung Station,  interdicting the 15th Division's lines of communication. To the northeast, Morris Force captured Myothit on April 9 and then continued to set up ambushes on the Bhamo-Lashio Road. Back at White City, Calvert decided to try and get behind the enemy from the flanks and hit them from the rear, pinning them against the stronghold's wire. On the night of April 16, the Nigerians prepared an ambush on the Mawlu-Henu road, subsequently killing 42 Japanese.  Yet realizing his strike force had trapped 2000 Japanese, Calvert ordered his men to infiltrate forward while the West Africans at White City launched an attack. This was met by a vicious and chaotic Japanese response as Hayashi's men tried to break free. During these actions its estimated the Japanese suffered 700 casualties while Calvert suffered 70 men dead with 150 wounded. The last Japanese attack against White City occurred on April 17th. After this Calvert felt he could hold White City indefinitely, but Lentaigne was concerned with the looming monsoon season, so he ordered White City and Broadway to be abandoned on May 3rd in favor of a new stronghold codenamed Blackpool. The site chosen for Blackpool originally codenamed “Clydeside” was a stretch of hilly ground by the railway, near the village of Namkwin, some 32 km southwest of Mogaung. There was water and suitable places to build an airstrip and deploy the 25-pdr artillery guns when they got them. Beyond a large tract of paddy was a hill, which the troops christened “Blackpool Hill” which curved like the sharp-spined back of a wild boar, with the head down, fore-arms and legs extended sideways. The Blackpool position effectively blocked the railway and main road at Hopin, drawing closer to Stilwells forces. The 11th Brigade had already been dispatched to the north to establish Blackpool. The now rested 16th Brigade managed to capture the Indaw West airfield by April 27th, facing no opposition. Ferguson noted, “This second approach to Indaw was an anti-climax, and for two reasons. First, just before we went in we were told that even if we captured the airfield of Indaw West, no troops, no divisions would be available from India for flying in: all hands and the cook, it seemed, were tied up in the great battle for Manipur. We were to capture the field for two or three days and then to abandon it…. Secondly, it was early apparent that the birds had flown. The Queen's got right on to the airfield without a shot being fired.” Lentaigne also decided to abandon the Aberdeen stronghold, evacuating Ferguson's men along with other units.  Meanwhile, by the end of April, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had also decided that capture of Myitkyina was of vital importance to increase the Hump tonnage. This of course was heavily influenced by the new opportunity for land-based bombers in Chinese airfields to bomb Formosa, the Ryukyu islands, the philippines and the eastern Chinese coast. Now to capture the Moguang-Myitkyina area, Stilwell would receive the Ramgarh-trained 30th Division,the 50th and 14th Divisions, all of which were airlifted over the Hump in April. Stilwell's plan was to drive down the Mogaung valley on Kamaing with such vigor as to persuade General Tanaka that this was the principal effort. The final directive on the 23rd, was for the 22nd Division to attack, rather than hold, and to swing the 64th and 65th Regiments around General Tanaka's left flank, while the 66th Regiment fought down the road. Once again the 112th was told to block off Kamaing from the south. The orders directed the "22nd and 38th to be in Pakhren and Lawa areas by April 27.  As Stillwell would remark in his diary “Now I've shot my wad,". Meanwhile the Marauder-Chinese force, now codenamed End Run would sneak east over the Kumon Range to attack Myitkyina directly. Tanaka's mission at this point was to hold Kamaing with all his strength until the rainy season while the 53rd Division, led by Lieutenant-General Kono Etsujiro moved to reinforce him. Elements of the 53rd Division began to sprinkle into the Indaw Area, but the Japanese HQ for northern Burma, from the newly activated 33rd Army led by Lt General Honda Masaki could not decide to commit them towards either Kamaiang or Myitkyina. Thus Tanaka's hopes for a counterattack were lost. Tanaka received two understrength regiments, the 146th and 4th in April and May, both of whom had suffered terrible losses against the Chindits the previous month. By mid-April General Sun's 38th Division was assembling in front of Tingring with the 114th regiment locked down in a fight with Tanaka's 55th regiment. After a visit to the Sun's command post on April 11th, Stilwell wrote in his diary: "At least it looks like a start! The piled-up inertia is terrible. . . ." On the next day the 114th Regiment relieved the 113th on the line of three villages all named Tingring. This move placed the 114th and 112th in line, the 112th to the east forming with its lines a small salient about Nhpum Ga. The 114th Regiment was operating in rugged terrain which was almost as much an obstacle as the delaying positions directly about Kamaing defended so skillfully by the Japanese. On at least one occasion the 114th lost its way and had to be located by aerial reconnaissance. The battle raged so heavily, it forced the 55th regiment to pull back, while the 114th regiment fought a Japanese rearguard from Hill 1725. By April 20th, they finally secured Tingring and quickly began a march south. On April 23, Stilwell ordered Liao to commence the drive south from Warazup, with the 22nd Division trying to make their way along Tanaka's extreme left flank. The Chinese forces were advancing slowly however, very apprehensive because Chiang Kai-Shek had ordered Generals Sun and Liao to be as cautious as possible. And that is all for today on the Burma front as we now need to jump over to New Guinea.  The last time we were talking about New Guinea, General Shoge's 239th regiment at Madang were getting ready to cover the continued Japanese retreat to Hansa and Wewak. On the other side, General Vasey's men were in hot pursuit. To the east, the 58th/59th battalion and Shoge's 3rd Battalion were patrolling extensively in the Bonggu-Melamu area, playing a sort of game of hide and seek. Several patrols just missed one another in the Wenga, Barum, Damun, Rereo and Redu areas. There were also several clashes. For instance, on March 26, reports from local natives and police boys indicated that the Japanese were again approaching Barum, which had become the main trouble area, from the direction of Damun just to the north. Both sides engaged one another with fire, particularly mortar bombs, but the brush was a cursory one with neither side gaining any advantage. Exchange of fire and a few sporadic attacks by the Japanese continued for about five hours from 5 p.m. While Corporal Tremellen, in the leading section, was moving among his weapon-pits, with a Bren gun in his left hand and two magazines in his right, he was attacked but, not being able to bring his Bren into action, he bashed the Japanese over the head with the Bren magazines. This Japanese thus had the distinction of probably being the only one to be killed by the Bren magazine rather than what was inside it. This would all last until April 11th, when the Japanese had finally withdrawn back to Madang. To the west, the 57/60th Battalion departed from Kwato on April 5 to rapidly secure Aiyau. From there they immediately sending patrols towards the Bogadjim Plantation. At this point, however, General Morshead had finally decided that it was time for Vasey's 7th Division to get some rest, so General Boase's 11th Division would assume responsibility for all units in the Ramu Valley and the Finisterres on April 8. Over at Atherton, General Herring had also retired in February, so General Savige had been appointed to command his 1st Corps. When recommending Savige's appointment Blarney had written to the Minister for the Army: “Two officers have been considered for this vacancy, Major-General S. G. Savige and Major-General G. A. Vasey. Both have been very successful in command in New Guinea operations, and I have some difficulty in determining the recommendations to be submitted, since each is capable and very worthy of advancement to higher responsibilities. Having regard to their respective careers, however, I recommend that Major-General S. G. Savige be appointed.” The significance of Blameys final sentence is a matter for speculation. It could hardly refer to past careers since Vasey's experience in command was wider than that of Berryman, a contemporary who had recently become a corps commander, and no less than Savige's. Alongside this Blamey also decided to do a changeover of corps HQ, seeing Savige take over 2nd Corps in the New Guinea front On April 10, the 57/60th then managed to break through the Japanese bridge positions to the high ground beyond at Bau-ak while patrols reconnoitered Bwai on the Gori River. The attack on the 10th on the enemy position at Bridge 6—two step heavily-timbered spurs running down from each side of the Ioworo River and making a defile was described by Hammer as "a textbook operation and in actual fact it developed perfectly " . One platoon advanced down the road to "fix" the enemy positions while the remainder of the company encircled the enemy position to come in from the high ground to the north . In the first encounter the leading platoon lost two men killed and two wounded. While it engaged the enemy with fire the rest of the company with Lieutenant Jackson's platoon in the lead clambered into position and , later in the day, clashed with the enemy in a garden area on one of the spurs. For a while the Japanese held on, but the pressure of the Australians and the accurate fire from Private Hillberg's Bren in an exposed position in the enemy's rear forced them to withdraw . Towards dusk an Australian patrol moved down a track towards the road where a small Japanese band was found to be still resisting with machine-gun fire . The Australians did not attack for they were sure that the enemy would disappear during the night. As expected there were no signs of the Japanese next morning at Bridge 6 only bloody bandages and bloodstains on the tracks to remind the Australians of yesterday's fight. McCall occupied the area and sent patrols forward to Bau-ak, the last high ground overlooking Bogadjim. Two days later, Brigadier Hammer sent strong patrols forward to Bogadjim and Erima, which found no enemy resistance in front and managed to secure both important hubs by April 15. At this point, while the 18th Brigade began to be evacuated back to Australia, Brigadier Hammer decided to withdraw the 58th/59th Battalion and the 2/2nd Commando Squadron, as the 57/60th would be the only one to continue the advance to Madang.    On April 17, however, General MacArthur instructed Savige that a brigade from General Ramsay's 5th Division should relieve the 32nd Division at Saidor in preparation for the Hollandia-Aitape operation's, so the 8th Brigade and portions of the 30th Battalion would be flown to Saidor five days later. Thus the 300 odd troops were carried over to Bogadjim as Savige ordered the 15th BRigade to rest up and for the 30th battalion to take Madang.  Hammer was anxious to get there first, so he had immediately dispatched patrols to Amele and Madang on April 20th. Shoge was able to fully evacuate Madang and join his comrades as they fled for Hansa. Amele was secured by the 24th, but the Australians would find it very difficult to cross the Gogol River afterwards. After this the 30th battalion and Hammer's patrols landed at Ort and resumed their advance. Both units cleared the Japanese from the Huon Peninsula, before entering an abandoned Madang. During the Australian advance an enemy mountain gun fired a dozen shells, and there was a sudden burst of machine-gun fire and a couple of grenade explosions from somewhere in the Wagol area. The machine-gun fire did not appear to be directed at the Australians and the shells from the gun landed out to sea. In all probability this was the final defiant gesture by the rearguard of the 18th Army as it left its great base of Madang which had been in Japanese hands since 1942. Madang had been heavily hit by Allied air attacks and possibly some demolitions had been carried out by the retreating Japanese. The airfield was cratered and temporarily unserviceable; the harbor was littered with wrecks, but although the two wharves were damaged they could be repaired and Liberty ships could enter the harbor. The Australian advance through the Markham, Ramu and Faria Valleys was a tremendous ordeal. The 7th division suffered between September 18, 1943 and April 8, 1944 204 killed and 464 wounded while it was estimated the Japanese suffered 800 killed, 400 wounded and 800 died from disease. The occupation of Madang ended the Huon Peninsula and Ramu Valley campaigns.  Meanwhile, the remainder of the 5th Division assembled at the Madang-Bogadjim area, fanning out patrols to the west and sending small detachment of the 30th Battalion to land on small islands off the coast, preparing a future advance against Alexishafen. Shoge's detachment rejoined its parent division, the the 41st Division over at the Hansa area, allowing General Katagiri's 20th Division to continue their advance to Wewak. The 51st Division who had already arrived at Wewak got to watch the allied airshow as Hansa and Wewak we bombed without mercy, seeing countless barges destroyed. This would hamper Katagiri's efforts to cross the Ramu and Sepik Rivers. Meanwhile General Nakai came across an alternative route in late April known as the Wangan-Garun–Uru-Kluk-Bien-Marienburg-Kaup route. This allowed the 20th Division to resume their march to Wewak. On April the 29th a barge carrying Katagiri was intercepted by a PT boat. General Katagiri was killed in the engagement, leaving Nakai to assume formal command of the Division. After May 1, the 41st Division then began to follow Nakai's route across the river, with all Japanese units leaving Hansa by May 15th and finally arriving at Wewak at the end of May after a 20-day movement.  Meanwhile General Adachi's plan for the coming weeks of April was for the 20th Division to immediately head towards Aitape, while the 51st Division would reinforce Hollandia once the 41st Division had reached Wewak. As such, a force was created around the 66th regiment led by Major-General Kawakubo. They were dispatched on April 19th, but would fail to arrive on time and would have to turn back to defend Wewak. Additionally, Adachi personally sent a part of his units under direct command to reinforce Hollandia.  Now after the neutralization of Hollandia and the Palaus, General Teramoto's remaining air units would have to move over to Manado and Genjem on April 15th, leaving only 25 serviceable aircraft from Major-General Inada Masazumi's 6th Air Division at Hollandia. After April 3rd, although plagued by bad weather, the 5th Air Force virtually owned the air over Hollandia. There would be only one resurgence of air opposition, on April 11th. The Japanese 14th Air Brigade staged a small fighter force to Wewak which, despite the loss of a Tony to the 8th Fighter Squadron, shot down three P-47s of the 311th Fighter Squadron, a new organization that had lately arrived from the United States and had only begun operations at Saidor on April 7. The enemy force perhaps had withdrawn to Hollandia by the next day, because some twenty enemy fighters pounced on a straggling B-24 there and shot it down. Aerial gunners of the 403rd Bombardment Squadron claimed destruction of one of the interceptors, and the 80th Fighter Squadron claimed eight others destroyed. In this action, Captain Richard I. Bong scored his twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh aerial victories, thus topping the score of twenty-six victories established by Rickenbacker in World War I. Promoted the same day to major, Bong was taken out of combat and returned to the United States on temporary duty at the suggestion of General Arnold, who feared adverse reaction among younger pilots if Bong were to be lost in combat after establishing such a record. Three were also small night attacks, combining 5th Air Force Liberators with Navy PB4Y's and Catalinas, made against Wakde Island during the early morning hours of 6, 13, and 16 April. These attacks seem to have been more profitable than similar missions against the Sentani airfields, probably because Wakde was only a small island easily identified by radar and so jammed with military objectives that a hit anywhere would be damaging. A captured Japanese diary recorded that the 6 April raid killed eleven men, destroyed a barracks, cratered the runway in five places, and destroyed or severely damaged ten planes. A daylight attack against Wakde by seven squadrons of Liberators was scheduled for 6 April, but weather forced its cancellation. The 24th and 41st Divisions were also carrying out their last rehearsals for Operation Reckless. Allied ground and amphibious forces had been engaged in final preparations and training for the coming assault and, on 8, 9, and 10 April, had undertaken last rehearsals. The 24th Division's rehearsal at Taupota Bay, on the coast of New Guinea south of Goodenough Island, was incomplete. Little unloading was attempted, and the area selected did not permit the employment of naval gunfire support. The 41st Division had a more satisfactory rehearsal, with realistic unloading and naval fire, near Lae, New Guinea. The Final loading began on April 10th, with the LCIs leaving their loading points six days later in order to allow the troops aboard to disembark at the Admiralty Islands for a day of exercising, resting, and eating. Ships carrying the Persecution Task Force, meanwhile, moved out of the Finschhafen area on April 18 and on the same day rendezvoused with the vessels bearing the 41st Division towards the Admiralties. All convoys under Admiral Barbey then moved north around the eastern side of the Admiralties and, at 7:00 on April 20th, the various troops assembled at a rendezvous point northwest of Manus Island. Thus, all seemed ready for the beginning of another amphibious assault.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Imperial Japanese Army tossed a final hail mary attempt to improve the war situation with the grand Ichi-Go offensive. If they could manage to seize their objectives, this would perhaps give them a better hand at the negotiating table. Because the allies certainly would not be keen on having to liberate most of China, it was a very bold strategy.

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Last time we spoke about Operation Thursday and the ferocious counteroffensive on Bougainville. The Chindits embarked on their second great raid, this time better equipped, better trained and more numerous than ever. With a literal armada of beasts of burden they marched through Burma, forded the Chindwin and began attacking and establishing strongholds. This was all done in coordination with Slim and Stilwell's forces, trying to break the Japanese and gradually seize back lost territory. Wingate had his work cut out for him as the Chindits were providing real results, yet unfortunately he would not have long to see them. Wingate was killed in a B-25 crash and it felt like the personality of the Chindits left with him. Over on Bougainville the Japanese tossed as much as they could to try and break through the Americans perimeter to hit the airfield, but it was all for naught.  This episode is the Bombing of Hollandia and Palau  Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Operation Brewer saw General MacArthur tossing cavalrymen against the eastern side of Los Negros. General Swift's 1st Cavalry Division successfully landed on Los Negros and managed to secure Seedler Harbor quickly. After this, General Chase's 1st Brigade was given the task of mopping up the island. By march 11th daily patrols had determined that the entire area from the Mokerang Peninsula to Southeast Point and as far west as Porlaka was generally free of the enemy. The 1st Squadron, 5th Cavalry pushed its perimeter at Momote west and south to the water barriers of Lemondrol Creek and Ihon Lagoon. The 12th Cavalry beachhead at Salami continuously patrolled into the interior and encountered so few Japanese that it was clear the enemy lacked sufficient numbers to harass the troops on the peninsula. West of Lemondrol Creek  was a completely different story. While the troops holding the beachheads from Lombrum to Papitalai waited for supply channels to be established, they probed to locate the center of enemy resistance. The 12th Cavalry was responsible for the beachheads at Papitalai Mission and Lombrum. The 2nd Squadron had captured Papitalai Mission and on the 11th the 1st Squadron took over Lombrum Point, relieving the 7th Cavalry so they could attack Manus Island. The 5th Cavalry held the Papitalai perimeter with Troop F. When that regiment extended its control over the area east of Lemondrol and Porharmenemen Creeks on the 11th, the 2nd Squadron moved into the Porlaka area while the 1st Squadron on the left flank was concentrated near Southeast Point. It was planned that the 12th Cavalry would do most of its fighting in the northern sector moving inland from the coastal positions to cut oil the Japanese hammered at by the 5th Cavalry as it pushed west on both sides of Lemondrol Creek. Since the 8th, every Troop F patrol from Papitalai had run into enemy resistance in the hilly country to the west. Although small patrols of squad size or slightly larger were held up day after day by resistance about 800 yards west of Papitalai, these first encounters did not reveal the full strength of the enemy pocket. When an attack by a platoon of Troop E, reinforced by two tanks, two bazookas, and flamethrowers, was repulsed on the 11th, the strength of the enemy strongpoint became clearer. The enemy was well dug in along the ridge, marked by a series of knobs, running west from Papitalai. The highest point, Hill 260, about 2,500 yards from Papitalai, not to be mistaken for Hill 260 on Bougainville by the way, this was probably the center of the enemies defense. However, on two knobs east of 260, well-defended outposts prevented any movement farther into the interior. The position 800 yards from Papitalai which had repulsed Troop E was defended by a platoon with knee mortars and at least 3 machine guns. The total enemy strength facing the 5th Cavalry was estimated at 150 to 200 Japanese.  Now that was the ongoings of Los Negros, but Brigadier General Verne Mudge's 2nd Brigade was now preparing to invade Manus island. American intelligence was unsure of the disposition of the enemy on Manus. A rough estimate was that 2700 Japanese were concentrated there and would most likely make a stand at Lorengau. The Americans expected the Japanese would put up a last losing fight. But because of the lack of knowledge of their numbers and disposition on the largest island of the Admiralties, this would require careful planning for the invasion. Fighting into the interior where the mountain range would provide defensive positions and through the swampy forests covering the rest of the island would not be easy. There were only 4 roads winding about the island and converging at Lorengau would be suitable for moving vehicles, and long stretches of these red-clay roads would be impassable in rainy weather. Surrounding jungle and swamps would confine any large-scale movement to the roads. Therefore, the plan was to pin the enemy to the coast where it was hoped he had concentrated his main strength. Mudge planned to land Troops A and C of the 8th cavalry regiment at the Yellow beaches of Lugos Mission. When the 8th Cavalry had secured a beachhead, including the Lugos Mission itself, each squadron would advance east, the 1st Squadron along the coast using the Number Three Road, and the 2nd along an inland road known as the Number One Road, to execute a wide sweep toward Lorengau. If a sizeable garrison was concentrated at fortified Lorengau, the inland arm of this attack would prevent the enemy from escaping along the only road leading west to the mountain areas. Prior to the assault, 3 patrols had been sent to Bear Point on Manus and on the islands of Butjo Luo and Hauwei. Mudge planned to deploy artillery at these places to aid in his assault. Bear Point was found to have no enemy, but unfortunately it was not a suitable place for artillery placement. The northern island of Butjo Luo was an excellent site for artillery and was found to be unoccupied. Hauwei would turn out to be another story. The American  patrol moved out from Salami on an LCV and a PT boat, landing without opposition on the western end of the island. Major Carter S. Vaden of the 99th Field Artillery Battalion, threw two grenades into a well camouflaged bunker about 10 yards from the beach and the party progressed inland. Immediately after the grenade explosions, a mortar shell landed on the beach in the rear of the party. From three sides, machine-gun, rifle, and mortar fire opened up. Fortunately, the grenades had evidently sprung a planned ambush prematurely and the party was not cut off from the rear. Using their submachine guns, the men of the patrol were able to hold back the enemy. They were aided by some supporting fire from the PT Boat and the .30-caliber machine gun of the LCV. After 2 and a half hours they managed to withdraw to the water's edge. The PT boat had returned to its tender after the commanding officer was wounded, and the coxswain of the LCV shouted and motioned for the cavalrymen to get on board, but only five of them reached the boat, as the others were engaged with the enemy on shore. The LCV had troubles of its own; enemy mortar and machine-gun fire found its range and wounded all on board except two. Then the LCV grounded on submerged coral and sank 200 yards offshore after receiving a direct hit from a mortar. The wounded men, put into lifejackets, floated about in the water. When the remaining members of the patrol on shore were wading out toward the LCV, 6 Japanese attempted to set up a machine gun on the beach. The men cut them down with their submachine guns. Still under fire, the cavalrymen swam out to the survivors of the LCV, making a group of 18 men out in the water. Failing to attract the notice of the destroyers nearby, the tired men had to stay in the water for 3 hours until a PT boat picked them up. At the same time a destroyer closed in to the island to draw hostile fire and bombard enemy positions on the western end. Hauwei was going to need extra help to be secured. The 2nd Squadron, 7th cavalry departed from Lombrum Point on the 11th and landed on Butjo Luo. The next day, Destroyer gunfire and rockets as well as 105-mm concentrations from the 61st Field Artillery Battalion at Mokerang point battered Hauwei. Then Kittyhawks of the 77th Pursuit Squadron at Momote airfield bombed and strafed the Hauwei. After all of this, the 2nd Squadron landed on Hauwei meeting slight resistance at the beach. They advanced 300 yards further inland where they became pinned down by heavy rifle, machine gun and mortar fire. The Japanese were firing upon them from some bunkers, prompting the 2nd Squadron to dig in and allow the artillery teams to hit them throughout the night. During the night the 61st Field Artillery Battalion from the north end of Mokerang Plantation fired 1,000 rounds to harass the enemy. This fire was directed so accurately and carefully that it was brought down on the enemy within 100 yards of the cavalrymen's positions without any casualties to our troops, and helped minimize enemy activity during the night.  At 10am on the 13th, with the support of a medium tank, the cavalrymen stormed the bunkers along the edges of the island. The Japanese put up a valiant fight, but they lacked anti-tank weaponry. By 12pm, the 2nd Squadron successfully mopped up the enemy, suffering 8 deaths and 46 wounded. They estimated they had killed 43 Japanese who were all naval personnel. Having secured the two islands, now one artillery battalion set up at Butjo Luo and two others upon Hauwei. The next day at 7:00am the 3 artillery battalions opened fire upon the Lorengau Township area. This target was chosen to divert the enemy's attention from the landing beaches around Lugos Mission. Meanwhile 4 destroyers bombarded Lorengau with their 5-inch guns. Then 18 B-25's from  Nadzab bombed and strafed the Lugos Mission and the beach areas until H - 5 minutes. Between 9:07 and 9:25, they dropped 81 500-pound bombs, strafed with more than 44,000 rounds of machine-gun fire, and cleared the target just as the troops were coming ashore.   The 8th cavalry departed Salami, heading for the Yellow Beaches covered by 3 rocket boats. The wave of buffaloes drew up to the beaches, and it appeared that they were going to make it without opposition until an enemy machine gun opened up from east of the landing beaches. Immediately the buffaloes responded with their own machine-gun fire, and two PT boats closed in to support. With 100 rounds from a flak boat added to this fire the machine gun was silenced. Two waves of landing craft followed the buffaloes to the shore in rapid succession and the narrow beaches, backed either by jungle or a high bluff, were soon congested with assault troops. On the eastern beach, Troop A began a vigorous drive toward Lugos Mission and the Number Three Road leading to the Lorengau airdrome. Captain Raymond J. Jennings, led the troops to storm the bluff where Lugos Mission was located and overran the mission before the few Japanese who had survived the bombardment could put up effective opposition. The men worked their way into the mission compound and cleared out the area with grenades. Troop A was soon on its way along Number Three Road leaving behind it, some 20 dead SNLF, without the loss of a single cavalryman. Meanwhile Troop C advanced west 800 yards to a ridge where they stopped and dug in, having accomplished their mission of establishing a defensive perimeter to protect the landing of successive elements. Other waves of the 1st and 2nd Squadrons began landing ashore as the 7th cavalry took up the beachhead. The 2nd squadron advanced over some ridges towards the Number One Road, while Troop A reduced enemy bunkers progressing roughly a mile from the beach. By 11:20am, they came across 3 mutually-supporting bunkers that halted their advance. It took Troop B's support alongside artillery and aerial bombardment to destroy the bunkers to they could advance. Meanwhile the 1st Squadron emerged out of the jungle into a clearing at 5pm, where they occupied a ridge overlooking the southern edge of the airdrome, where they would dig in. The 2nd Squadron reached Number One Road, where they ran into 3 bunkers. The following morning with tank support the squadron overran the bunkers and advanced northeast towards Lorengau. The cavalrymen would destroy 7 bunkers during their trek, before halting 100 yards before Lorengau. To the north, Troop A was clearing a coconut grove north of the airstrip, from which Japanese snipers were harassing them throughout the night. Troop C advanced along the southern edge near the airstip where they came across another pack of bunkers. Since the snipers north of the strip had been cleared out by noon, an attack could be made in the open. Troop B, supported by light tanks on their left advanced down the strip, followed by Troop D and the squadron HQ. Troop A advanced across the strip and then east along the north edge. By 1:00pm Troop C managed to destroy two bunkers using grenades, forcing the Japanese inhabitants to flee out into the open where they were cut down. Troop C then was about to dash across the airstrip when they suddenly became pinned down by friendly fire from Troop B who were trying to disengage the enemy before them. The 1st squadron suffered 9 deaths and 19 wounded during the action. Mudge then ordered them to relieve Troop C, who were holding some high ground south of the airstrip.  On the morning of the 17th after extensive naval and artillery bombardment, Mudge launched a coordinated attack with the 2nd Squadron advancing south of the airstrip and the 1st Squadron assaulting the bunkers that had held up the 8th cavalry's advance. The bombardments had nearly annihilated the bunkers, allowing the 1st squadron to face only slight resistance. They soon attacked a secondary Japanese position further east upon a ridge. This position was also met with artillery and mortar fire and would fall by 11:30am. After this the cavalrymen were able to obliterate the remaining pillboxes and advance across the pulverized airstrip. Meanwhile the 2nd Squadron of the 7th and 8th cavalry regiments linked up along the Number One Road near Lorengau. The 8th Cavalry had encountered little resistance on the road, destroying whatever bunkers were encountered with the aid of fire from medium tanks. The light tank accompanying the squadron had a track blown off by the first Japanese anti tank mine encountered in the operation. By 1pm, all the front-line troops around the airstrip to Number one Road linked up forming a general advance. By this point the backbone of the enemies resistance had been broken, leaving little to resistance them. For the next 1,500 yards to the river, it took them  2 hours because the Japanese had hurriedly put in large quantities of anti-tank and anti-personnel mines. They had been emplaced, however, with no prepared plan, and many were poorly camouflaged or left lying completely on the surface. The Japanese had also dug holes and refilled them without emplacing any mines. As the cavalrymen slowly made their way to the river, they suffered a few casualties from the mines. The 7th cavalry reached the Lorengau River by 3pm, from there they dispatched a reconnaissance platoon who quickly came under fire from bunkers atop some hills overlooking Lorengau. Lorengau was sheltered in a valley surrounded by jungle-covered hills rising to 400 feet. The Japanese believed an attack would come from the sea, thus many of their defenses were sited to cover the shoreline. The offshore approaches and the three roads entering the settlement from the east, south, and north were also covered by defensive positions. From the position held by the 2nd Brigade, the only approach to the town was over a sandbar at the mouth of the Lorengau River, a slow-moving stream 20 yards wide and 10 to 20 feet deep, except at the sandbar. The beach area, which the troops would then have to cross, was heavily protected. Naval demolition mines, containing 20 pounds of black powder and detonated by a master switch located in a control bunker up the hillside, covered the beach. About 100 yards inland from the beach a series of rifle pits and gun emplacements were constructed on the side of a dike which paralleled the shore. On the hills surrounding the harbor, beach, and town about a dozen heavy bunkers were used to reinforce the fires of beach defenses and to add depth to the position. As usual these bunkers were carefully camouflaged, although the concentration of naval and artillery fire as well as repeated bombings had disclosed the location of several. Mudge ordered the men to dig in for the night on the west bank of the river and establish a perimeter defense against some expected counterattacks that would not develop in the end. The next morning, after a mortar and artillery bombardment, the 2nd Squadron, 8th Cavalry advanced down from its ridge positions to the mouth of the broad river, with its Reconnaissance Platoon leading. Upon fording the river, the cavalrymen only faced a handful of machine-guns. Facing almost no opposition, the squadron was thus able to secure Lorengau, counting 87 dead Japanese in the remains of the town.  Colonel Ezaki seemed to have disappeared during the battle over Papitalai leaving his men leaderless. The Japanese naval troops in desperation began retreating towards Rossum, with American patrols hot on their trail. There would be a furious fight down the Rossum Road. 1st Lt. James M. Concannon captured an enemy map of the area during his patrol to which he exclaimed, "Well, here goes Concannon to get himself a Purple Heart!" Lt. Concannon's platoon had been ordered to go along Number Two Road which went to Rossum and from there to Kelaua Harbor, through the heart of the Japanese defenses indicated on the captured map. Hardly had the platoon crossed the outpost line still held by Troop E along Number Two Road when it came under fire from a pair of bunkers sited to cover the track. Lieutenant Concannon and one of his men were wounded. The platoon sergeant assumed command and attempted to flank the position. When the attempt was not successful, the sergeant decided to withdraw and report, as his mission was one of reconnaissance. Upon receiving the information that the enemy was in position not 200 yards from the outpost line, Colonel Bradley directed Major Shore to send Troop A back up the track to neutralize the enemy position. The troop was reinforced with machine guns and two 37-mm antitank guns.  Troop A of the 8th cavalry were ordered to deal with the newly discovered enemy bunkers. Corporal Peter J. Armstrong and Armando V. Valencia set their heavy machine-gun in position at a range of 30 yards from one of the bunkers. Having disclosed his position by laying a continuous burst of fire on the bunker, Corporal Armstrong was wounded by sniper fire. Armstrong continued firing until a grenade knocked him unconscious. Although the gun had been hit in several places and was leaking a steady stream from its water jacket, Corporal Valencia took over and continued firing at the bunker slits until the machine-gun froze; then he fired with his submachine-gun until it was knocked out of his hands by an enemy bullet. In the meantime the mortars had obtained four direct hits on the bunkers, and the anti-tank guns had made two. Corporals Armstrong and Valencia were later awarded the Distinguished Service Cross, and for its action during the day Troop A was given a unit citation.  After taking out the stubborn position, Troop A advanced along the road under heavy sniper fire, until they were relieved by Troop C. Troop C immediately was met with a heavy Japanese counterattack shortly after nightfall. The counterattack was launched by 8 Japanese using rifle grenades and small arms. Considering the size of the attacking force, the casualties of the troop were heavy: 2 killed and 10 wounded. All the Japanese were killed, largely due to a quick adjustment by the forward observer of the 61st Field Artillery Battalion followed by four volleys fired for effect. By this point the Americans had achieved all their objectives for the Admiralty Islands campaign, the only thing left to do was mop up the islands. The remaining IJA troops were now withdrawing across the Loniu Passage over to Manus. The 8th cavalry were soon given the task of clearing the eastern end of Manus, while the 7th cavalry would clear out the Rossum Road. Yet that is all for this campaign as we are now heading over to New Guinea. General MacArthur was planning his new Western New Guinea offensive. After the directives given on March 12th, Admiral Nimitz had been instructed to provide support for his Hollandia operation. The Japanese began their occupation of Hollandia  early in April of 1942 but paid little attention to the region for a year. Then  Allied air reconnaissance disclosed that the enemy was constructing airfields on the Lake Sentani Plain. This development progressed slowly until late 1943, by which time successive reverses in the air and on the ground in eastern New Guinea and the Bismarck Archipelago, together with increasing shipping losses in the same region, began to demonstrate to the Japanese the vulnerability of their air and supply bases east of Hollandia. In late 1943 and early 1944, the Japanese  built 3 airfields on the Lake Sentani Plain and started a fourth at Tami, on the seacoast east of Humboldt Bay. In addition, because of shipping losses east of Hollandia, the Japanese began to develop Humboldt Bay into a major supply base and transshipment point. Large ships would unload at Hollandia, whence cargo would be carried by barge to points southeast along the coast of New Guinea as far as Wewak over 215 miles away. Much of the cargo of the large ships remained at Hollandia to build up the base there. Admiral Nimitz decided to dispatch two fast carrier groups of Admiral Mitscher's Task Force 58 to conduct fighter sweeps against Hollandia and the Wakde-Sarmi area in order to keep their airfields neutralized. MacArthur south for the carries to support the troops for 8 days after the landings. But Nimitz believed this would put the carriers in risk, because the Japanese would be able to launch aircraft from all over the Dutch East Indies or even the Philippines. It was decided Task Force 58 would remain in the Hollandia region for only 3 days after the landings were made. As a result MacArthur opted to supplement using land-based aircraft against Hollandia. To obtain this he would need to capture an airfield in Northern New Guinea, just east of the main objective. He chose an Aitape, it was a lightly guarded area and already partially developed by the Japanese, such as the incomplete airfields around the Tadji Plantation. Once the men landed ashore at Aitape, allied forces could provide flank protection for Haollandia against any westward actions by the Japanese 18th Army. For the assault against Aitape, MacArthur planned to use the 8 escort carriers of Task Force 78 under the command of Rear Admiral Ralph E. Daviso. Now for the amphibious assault, Admiral Kinkaid gave the job to Admiral Barbey's task force 77 who were divided into 3 attack groups. They would bring over General Eichelberger's 1st corp who would perform the Hollandia operation, codenamed Operation Reckless. I think it is a pretty suitable name for a MacArthur operation. For the Hollandia part of the operation, the 19th and 21st regiments of Major General Frederick Irving's 24th division would land at Tanahmerah Bay; the 162nd and 186th regiments of General Fuller's 41st division would land at Humboldt Bay. For the operation against Aitape, codenamed Persecution, the 163rd regiment of the 41st division led by General Doe would perform the initial landings. To soften up the enemy, General Kenny's air forces began bombing Wewak and Hansa in mid March, then in early April they began neutralizing the airfields to try and deceive General Adachi into believing they were the next allied target. Additionally, MacArthur asked Admiral Spruance to perform a carrier raid against the Palau Islands, codenamed Operation Desecrate One, followed by strikes on Yap and Woleai in the eastern Carolines, in order to prevent the Japanese from reinforcing Western New Guinea. Admiral Mitscher's carriers departed Majuro on the 22nd of March and made their way around the Carolines, trying to sneak past Truk undetected. Despite their best efforts, Japanese search planes from Truk managed to spot them on their 3rd day at sea. This prompted Admiral Spruance to advance the day of the raid from April 1st to March 30th. Meanwhile after sighting the allied naval forces, Admiral Koga ordered an evacuation of Palau, seeing a large number of warships and merchant shipping flee the area for Tawi-Tawi. The US submarines Gar, Blackfish, Tang and Archerfish were stationed to operate against the withdrawing ships and as plane guards. On the 23rd, Tunny sank the Japanese submarine I-42 and damaged the 14,850-ton tanker Iro. To the north of Palau, during an attack on the 26th, Tullibee was hit and sunk by her own circling torpedo. Bashaw torpedoed a 4,317-ton freighter escorted by the destroyers Minazuki and Yuzuki. On the 29th, the super battleship Musashi departed Palau under cover of darkness to avoid an expected air raid, and encountered Tunny, which fired six torpedoes at the battleship; five of them missed, but the sixth blew a hole 5.8 meters in diameter near the bow, flooding her with 3000 tonnes of water. The torpedo hit killed 7 crewmen and wounded another 11. After temporary repairs, Musashi sailed for Japan later that night and arrived at Kure Naval Arsenal on April 3.  On the 30th, Task Force 58 reached its assembly point 90 miles south of the Palau Islands. The Task Force was met with a Japanese air strike consisting of mostly Betty's and Oscars who were easily swept aside. Then fast carriers Enterprise, Bunker Hill, Hornet, Yorktown and Lexington launched their first air strikes against Palaus. For the next day and a half, the Americans flew hundreds of sorties over these islands, striking the airfields and shooting down all planes they could find. The attacks saw 40 Japanese ships at Palau and Angaur sunk, another 4 were badly damaged. 93 aerial victories would be won over Palau and Avengers from Lexington, Bunker Hill and Hornet laid extensive mines around the channels and approaches to Palau. This was the first tactical aerial mining of the Pacific War performed by carrier aircraft. In response, Admiral Koga asked for help from neighboring islands. He received 9 B6N torpedo bombers from Yap who attempted a night attack against Task Force 58 on the 31st. Unfortunately for the Japanese, 4 Hellcats from Cabot managed to intercept them, successfully shooting all of them down. Koga certainly had a lot on his plate. Due to the recent attacks against Truk and now Palau, Koga decided to transfer his HQ from the Musashi to Davao on March 31st. Most of his senior staff and cryptographers boarded 3 H8K flying boats enroute to Mindanao from Palau. All 3 of the flying boats ran straight into a typhoon just off of Cebu, two of them got lost. These flying boats were carrying Admiral Koga and Vice Admiral Fukudome Shigeru, his chief of staff. Koga's plan would end up crashing enroute to Davao, killing all aboard. Thus another commander in chief of the IJN forces had met his end to a plane crash. The other plane carrying Fukudome crashed off the coast of Cebu. Fukudome had a harrowing experience, but escaped the aircraft and began swimming to the island. To make matters even worse, while swimming Fukudome was grabbed by Filipino guerillas who brought him over to Lt Colonel James Cushing. Cushing was a former engineer in the Philippines who helped organize a resistance movement. Now captured Fukudome was certainly a large prize, yet a even bigger one came on April 3rd. A Filipino shopkeeper named Pedro Gantuangoko spotted a box floating offshore on the 3rd and picked it up in his fishing boat. The box contained a red leather briefcase carrying the Z plan. Fukudome had assumed the box sank with the aircraft, but in a twist of fate it did not. Now while this was going on, Lt Colonel Seiiti Ohnisi had dispatched troops to search for survivors of the aircraft crash and for the box containing the Z plan. Ohnisi hundreds of Filipino villagers interrogated, tortured and killed, entire Filipino villages were burnt to the ground. Eventually Ohnisi cornered Cushing and they struck a deal. On April 10th, with Japanese forces on Cebu hot on the heels of the guerillas, the American commander, Lt-Colonel Cushing, arranged to return Fukudome and the other prisoners to the Japanese in return for a cessation of the massacre of Filipino civilians. Three days later, the Filipinos who had found the box containing Plan Z and the code book when it washed ashore, turned them over to Cushing. The codebook was recognized for what it was when the guerillas discovered the Japanese were offering a 50000 peso reward for its return. On April 27, Cushing arranged for the items to be picked up by the submarine Crevalle. Traveling mostly on the surface for speed, and diving only when needed, the submarine survived depth charging twice, finally arriving at Darwin on May 19. From there, the documents were flown to Brisbane later that day. Allied codebreakers looked forward with anticipation to the arrival of the codebook, since they had been stymied by changes to the IJN code since the summer of 1942 and had not “read the enemy's mail” in any detail since the week before the Battle of Midway. The documents outlined the new strategy for the defense of the inner perimeter islands around Japan with the intention of drawing the US fleet in for a decisive showdown. The documents were sent to Admiral Nimitz and would prove extremely valuable during the Battle of the Philippines Sea. The documents were so vital, the Americans performed a covert operation sending them back to the Philippines by submarine and placed near the wreckage of the flying boat by American divers. It was one of the greatest intelligence coups of WW2. Thus Admiral Koga was dead, the Z plan fell into allied hands and the IJN was now leaderless. Koga's death would not be announced until May and he was replaced by Admiral Toyoda Soemu. Koga was promoted to Marshal Admiral posthumously and granted a state funeral. According to pilot Nagatsuka Ryuji: “The death of Admiral Koga, successor to Admiral Yamamoto, had been another shock for the Japanese nation. These distressing circumstances had forced the naval and military Chiefs of Staff to resign. They had been replaced by General Tojo and Admiral Shimada.”  Now back to the invasion, on April 1st Rear-Admiral John Reeves' carriers launched  airstrikes against Yap and Ulithi, with the three task groups then attacking Woleai. 25 American aircraft were lost, with 26 out of 44 aircrews rescued thanks to submarine Harder. Meanwhile, the fleet's Hellcats win 111 aerial victories and destroy 46 grounded aircraft on the three atolls. With this, Task Force 58 successfully removed Palau as a threat to the Hollandia-Aitape operation. Alongside this South and Southwest Pacific land-based aircraft from bases in eastern New Guinea and the Admiralties, bombed islands in the eastern Carolines and undertook many long reconnaissance missions. Meanwhile Kenney's air forces were busy neutralizing enemy air bases in Western New Guinea and the eastern islands of the Dutch East Indies. Most of the strategic support missions flown to western New Guinea were undertaken by US 5th Air Force while the Royal Australian Air Forces Command took responsibility for the majority of the strikes against the islands in the eastern Dutch East Indies. The operations were intensified roughly 6 weeks before the landings at Hollandia and Aitape.    On March 30th, Kenney shifted the weight of his attacks from the Wewak area to Hollandia, where the Japanese 6th Air Division had recently retreated from Wewak and received strong reinforcements. The airforces also performed a full aerial reconnaissance taking photos of Hollandia's 3 airdromes on March. Added to this were radio intercepts and intelligence ereports, allowing the allies to estimate the Japanese had around 351 aircraft there. With this information at hand, Kenney launched Liberators armed with small 20 pound fragmentation bombs to perform a concentrated bombing against the enemy airfield. Since the Allies hoped to rehabilitate the Hollandia strips as quickly as possible, hits on the runways with heavy ordnance would be avoided. Fighter cover would be provided by long-range P-38's, which would escort the bombers over the target, and by shorter-range P-47's, which would meet the bombers near Aitape, beat off pursuing fighters, and shepherd them home. Medium and light bombers would continue attacks on the airfields at Wewak to prevent their use by Japanese fighters. The Liberators with their P-38 and P-47 escorts would smash the anti-aircraft defenses while the medium and light bombers would drench the area with bombs. On March 30th, 7 B-24's hit Hollandia dispersals as 75 Liberators of the 43rd bombardment group and 59 P-38s of the 80th, 431st and 432nd Fighter Squadrons swept over Hollandia's airstrips and dropped nearly 6000 bombs. To make matters worse for the Japanese, they suffered from insufficient radar warning, many of their aircraft would be on the ground refueling after some morning patrols. The 5th Air Force found countless enemy aircraft parked wing tip to wing tip along the runways, a lethargic anti-aircraft reaction. 25 or more fighters made "eager" passes against the 65th Bombardment Squadron, whose gunners claimed two destroyed. The 80th Fighter Squadron engaged a reported 35 to 40 hostile fighters, destroying 7 of them. The 431st Fighter Squadron claimed one Tony damaged, but the 432d encountered no enemy fighters. Japanese interception seemed badly disorganized. The planes milled about with little evident formation, and most of the pilots appeared to have little desire for a fight. Over 100 aircraft were destroyed as the Japanese were caught completely unprepared. Japanese prisoners-of-war and captured documents later revealed that the reason the bombing operation was so successful was because the Japanese high command erroneously transported too many airplanes to Hollandia from the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies but did not transport more pilots and maintenance crews with the airplanes. There was no way for them to build appropriate defensive shelters to protect all 400 aircraft and also there were not enough trained pilots who could fly all of those airplanes at the same time so many perfectly operational aircraft were left sitting there with no aircrew to maintain them. The morale at Hollandia airbase was very low during the bombing operation, with many Japanese soldiers and airmen hiding in bunkers instead of manning anti-aircraft artillery and getting airplanes into the air. Most of these Hollandia soldiers and airmen were rear-echelon and not combat-oriented at all because most of the combat-trained divisions from the 18th Army were recently sent further east towards Wewak in anticipation of amphibious landings that would never come thanks to the deception and feints carried out by General Kenney. The P-38s then withdrew to Nadzab as soon as the bombers cleared their targets; and the P-47s, meeting the Liberators near Aitape, convoyed them home without incident. So successful was this first raid that one squadron reported that “Hollandia had really been Wewaked”. The next day, Kenney launched a nearly identical mission, with 7 Liberators and 52 P-38s bombing the dispersal at Hollandia, Cyclops and Sentani airdromes. 153 tons of 100 pound demos, frags and incendiary bombs were dropped. The Japanese anti-aircraft fire was more accurate this time around and 56 Japanese fighters gave the allies a fight. However the pilots were inexperienced and unaggressive. The Americans estimated 14 aircraft were shot down while they suffered the loss of one P-38. After the air strike, the total number of destroyed aircraft on the ground reached 199. At this point the Japanese scrambled to withdraw their remaining serviceable aircraft out of Hollandia. On April 3, Kenney sent his heaviest air attack to date. 66 B-24s escorted by 21 P-38s dropped 492 1000-pound bombs on anti-aircraft defenses. An estimated 30 Japanese Tonys and Oscars attempted without success to break up the bomb runs, and B-24 gunners claimed 2 fighters destroyed, while the 21 escorting P-38's of the 80th Squadron claimed downing ten. Then, 96 A-20s escorted by 17 P-38s strafed and dropped 100-pound para-demolition bombs over grounded aircraft, stores, and other targets of opportunity. The 432nd Squadron, covering the A-20's with 17 P-38's, encountered about 20 Japanese fighters and claimed 12 definitely destroyed, against the loss of one P-38. Finally, 76 B-25s escorted by 36 P-38s swept the strips at noon, scattering parafrags and parademos and strafing everything in sight. Only 3 Japanese fighters were encountered in this last attack, which were all shot down. After the end of the raid, Hollandia was so badly mauled that it could no longer be considered a major air installation. A Japanese seaman after hearing of the Allied mission of April 3rd against Hollandia, although seemingly confused as to imperial folklore, correctly assessed the Allied victory: "Yesterday, the anniversary of the birthday of Emperor Meiji, we received from the enemy, greetings, which amount to the annihilation of our Army Air Force in New Guinea." After April 3rd, the 5th Air Force virtually owned the air over Hollandia. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Admiralty Islands campaign was coming to a swift close, seeing MacArthur secure the valuable islands like Los Negros and Manus. MacArthurs new campaign to hit Western New Guinea and the Dutch East Indies, certainly began with a bang as General Kenney's air forces had basically claimed air supremacy, the Japanese were in full panic mode. 

Tune in to a captivating episode of 'Echoes of Valor' featuring LTC Harry T. Stewart Jr., one of our nation's most distinguished veterans, and one of last two surviving Tuskegee Airman--brought to you in collaboration with The National Museum of the Mighty Eighth Air Force and The World War II Foundation. Your host, Colonel Tom Rendall, unpacks the gallantry, trials, and historical impact of the Tuskegee Airmen through the personal experiences of Colonel Stewart, a recipient of the Distinguished Flying Cross. Colonel Harry T. Stewart Jr. stands as one of the most honored members of the Tuskegee Airmen. Born on July 24, 1924, in Newport News, Virginia, his family relocated to Queens, New York, when he was two, near North Beach Airport. This proximity sparked his lifelong passion for aviation as he gazed at the planes flying above. At 17, sensing his forthcoming draft into World War II, he excelled in a military examination that singled out prospective pilots, which led to his enlistment in the US Army Air Corps as an aviation cadet. Stewart earned his pilot wings at Tuskegee Air Field, Alabama, and, still in his teens, received his commission as a second lieutenant. He underwent combat fighter training in the P-40 Warhawk and P-47 Thunderbolt, and in 1944 he was deployed to Italy with the all-black 332nd Fighter Group. Stewart completed 43 combat missions in the P-51 Mustang. His most notable combat success occurred on April 1, 1945, as then First Lieutenant Stewart and other P-51 pilots protected B-24 Liberators during a bombing mission. The engagement that followed saw Stewart down three FW-190s, securing him the Distinguished Flying Cross. The episode recorded on March 3rd explores Stewart's rigorous training, pivotal combat encounters, and his triumph in the inaugural Air Force "Top Gun" competition of 1949. Stewart, as one of the last Tuskegee Airmen, provides invaluable insight into their contribution to military aviation history. Midway, the episode features spotlights on the Mighty Eighth Air Force and The World War II Foundation, then resumes with a discussion on the timeless relevance of the Tuskegee Airmen's heritage in today's military and aviation realms. In the final segment, Colonel Stewart offers advice to young military and aviation hopefuls, contemplating the strides made and the distance yet to be covered. Seize the opportunity to engage with Colonel Stewart's profound legacy and the collective story of the Tuskegee Airmen. Immerse yourself in a significant slice of World War II history and gain a deeper perspective by reading “Soaring to Glory.” 'Echoes of Valor' continues to narrate tales of airborne bravery. Stay tuned for more stories that are bound to captivate and motivate. Photo Credit: Lydia Thompson (21st Century Fox)/(Robert Clark/National Geographic)  

David Johansson is the CEO, Co-Founder & Creative Director of BLOCKLORDS. David is also the CEO of Seascape Network & Metaking Studios, the creator of BLOCKLORDS. A passionate gamer and industry veteran, David has held numerous creative and production roles on some of the most successful products in their fields, including Crusader Kings, Liberators, and League of Angels, before turning his focus towards building out BLOCKLORDS in 2018 and never looked back.In this conversation, we discuss:- Introduction to BLOCKLORDS- AAA developers venturing into Web3 gaming- BLOCKLORDS whitepaper- Industry layoffs at Riot, Epic, Activision Blizzard- BLOCKLORDS Drops 300,000 $LRDS- Player-driven economies- The next generation of Web3 gaming- Player reward mechanisms- Blockchain integration in Web3 gaming- User acquisition- Fun conquers allBLOCKLORDSWebsite: blocklords.comX: @BLOCKLORDSTelegram: t.me/blocklordsgameDavid JohanssonX: @lordofblocksLinkedIn: David Johansson   ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------  This episode is brought to you by PrimeXBT.  PrimeXBT offers a robust trading system for both beginners and professional traders that demand highly reliable market data and performance. Traders of all experience levels can easily design and customize layouts and widgets to best fit their trading style. PrimeXBT is always offering innovative products and professional trading conditions to all customers.  PrimeXBT is running an exclusive promotion for listeners of the podcast. After making your first deposit, 50% of that first deposit will be credited to your account as a bonus that can be used as additional collateral to open positions.  Code: CRYPTONEWS50  This promotion is available for a month after activation. Click the link below:  PrimeXBT x CRYPTONEWS50 

David JohanssonCEO, Co-Founder & Creative DirectorDavid is the CEO of Seascape Network, Metaking Studios and the creator of BLOCKLORDS.A passionate gamer and industry veteran, David has held numerous creative and production roles on some of the most successful products in their fields, including Crusader Kings, Liberators, and League of Angels before turning his focus towards building out BLOCKLORDS in 2018 and never looked back. --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/crypto-hipster-podcast/support

Today we're talking about Manuela Sáenz, a political activist who helped to lead Simón Bolivar's vision of a Gran Columbia. She was notable for stopping multiple assassination attempts against him, becoming a spymaster of information, and also carrying a mustache around of her dead enemy?    Sources:  https://worldhistoryconnected.press.uillinois.edu/7.1/foote.html https://www.britannica.com/biography/Manuela-Saenz https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manuela_S%C3%A1enz https://www.rejectedprincesses.com/princesses/manuela-saenz      

Adam Shatz speaks with Kate Wolf and Eric Newman about his latest book, The Rebel's Clinic: The Revolutionary Lives of Frantz Fanon. The book is both a biography of Fanon— one of the most important thinkers on race and colonialism of the last century— as well as an intellectual history that looks closely at his most seminal texts. Shatz uncovers the events that led to the writing of books such as Black Skin, White Masks and the Wretched of the Earth by following Fanon from his birth in Martinique (then a French colony), to his time serving in World War II, his studies in Lyon, his innovative work as a psychiatrist in France and Algeria, as well as his pivotal decision to join in the fight for Algerian independence and become a part of the FLN. Though Fanon died at only 36, in 1961, Shatz also explores the many afterlives of his work, from his embrace by the Black Panthers and his influence on filmmakers such as Claude Lanzmann and Ousmane Sembene to echoes of his thought in the continued movements for Black liberation and decolonization today. Also, E. J. Koh, author of The Liberators, returns to recommend The Twilight Zone by Nona Fernandez, translated by Natasha Wimmer.

Adam Shatz speaks with Kate Wolf and Eric Newman about his latest book, The Rebel's Clinic: The Revolutionary Lives of Frantz Fanon. The book is both a biography of Fanon— one of the most important thinkers on race and colonialism of the last century— as well as an intellectual history that looks closely at his most seminal texts. Shatz uncovers the events that led to the writing of books such as Black Skin, White Masks and the Wretched of the Earth by following Fanon from his birth in Martinique (then a French colony), to his time serving in World War II, his studies in Lyon, his innovative work as a psychiatrist in France and Algeria, as well as his pivotal decision to join in the fight for Algerian independence and become a part of the FLN. Though Fanon died at only 36, in 1961, Shatz also explores the many afterlives of his work, from his embrace by the Black Panthers and his influence on filmmakers such as Claude Lanzmann and Ousmane Sembene to echoes of his thought in the continued movements for Black liberation and decolonization today. Also, E. J. Koh, author of The Liberators, returns to recommend The Twilight Zone by Nona Fernandez, translated by Natasha Wimmer.

Art Palmer is a child of the dust bowl and self-admitted "hobo" who joined the U.S. Army Air Corps and piloted B-24 Liberators during World War 2. Art's plane was shot down on his 50th mission and he spent the remainder of the war as a German prisoner.Now, at 104-year-young, Art shares his recollections with guest host Matt "Flounder" Arny, proving why his truly was the Greatest Generation.To read the book of stories and prisoner poems compiled by Art's late wife, visit our Patreon page.Support this podcast at — https://redcircle.com/the-fighter-pilot-podcast/donations

Medaya Ocher and Eric Newman are joined by E.J. Koh to discuss her debut novel, The Liberators, LARB Book Club's pick for Winter 2024. Widely acclaimed by critics, The Liberators tells the story of two families as they navigate love and survival from the Korean dictatorship of the early 1980s through the Sewol Ferry sinking of 2014. Between those bookending events lie a fraught terrain of marriage, birth, death, love, hope, and disappointment that unfurls itself across Korea and the United States. Moving from questions of form and diaspora to the relics that secure our belonging to places and people, the discussion explores how history both makes and unmakes us. Also, Lexi Freiman, author of The Book of Ayn, returns to recommend To The Friend Who Did Not Save My Life by Herve Guibert. The Liberators is the Winter 2024 selection for the LARB Book Club. The Book Club is one of many perks offered to our wonderful supporting members. To learn more about our membership program, check out lareviewofbooks.org/membership/

Medaya Ocher and Eric Newman are joined by E.J. Koh to discuss her debut novel, The Liberators, LARB Book Club's pick for Winter 2024. Widely acclaimed by critics, The Liberators tells the story of two families as they navigate love and survival from the Korean dictatorship of the early 1980s through the Sewol Ferry sinking of 2014. Between those bookending events lie a fraught terrain of marriage, birth, death, love, hope, and disappointment that unfurls itself across Korea and the United States. Moving from questions of form and diaspora to the relics that secure our belonging to places and people, the discussion explores how history both makes and unmakes us. Also, Lexi Freiman, author of The Book of Ayn, returns to recommend To The Friend Who Did Not Save My Life by Herve Guibert. The Liberators is the Winter 2024 selection for the LARB Book Club. The Book Club is one of many perks offered to our wonderful supporting members. To learn more about our membership program, check out https://lareviewofbooks.org/membership/

Last time we spoke about the landing at Saidor and the drive against Sio. The Australians were still advancing across Shaggy Ridge when General MacArthur unleashed an amphibious assault against Saidor to cut off the Japanese escape and isolate Sio. Numerous features were seized up the large ridge and the Americans successfully amphibiously assaulted Saidor and seized their airfield. General Adachi placed the 51st and 20th divisions under the command of General Nakano, who was tasked with advancing to Gali to try and secure a new supply point. Meanwhile efforts were made to try and contain the new threat in Saidor while simultaneously holding back the Australians in the south. Over on new britain the airdrome was seized as Colonel Katayama launched a failed counter attack against the Marines. The Marines tossed back the attack and began their own advance further inland. This episode is Ledo Road Offensive Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  The Americans had landed at Cape Gloucester, Saidor and were carrying out massive attacks against Rabaul. As we had seen previously, on November 5th, aided by bad weather, a surprise air raid was made by the USS Saratoga and Princeton, led by Rear-Admiral Frederick Sherman that inflicted heavy damage to 4 cruisers within the harbor; Maya's engine room was smashed by a bomb killing over 70 men; a 500 lb bomb hit Mogami; Takao took 2 500 lb bomb hits while 3 500 lb bombs narrowly missed Atago killing 23 seamen and caused severe damage to the ship's plating. 2 other cruisers and 3 destroyers also suffered light damage. Captain George Chandler flying a P-38 fighter pilot described how “There were B-24 bombers up high and B-25 bombers attacking right down on the deck dropping ‘frag' bombs on the airplanes along the runways … we did our best work at high altitude, but we also took part in combat a thousand feet off the ground.” The devastation caused Admiral Miniechi Koga to withdraw his forces to Truk, thus ending the IJN threat to Bougainville. A Japanese naval officer would later admit that they had given up on Bougainville mainly because of “the serious damage received by several Second Fleet cruisers at Rabaul by carrier attack …” The successful  raid against Rabaul left Halsey ecstatic. “It is real music to me and opens the stops for a funeral dirge for Tojo's Rabaul.” On November 8th, reinforcements led by Rear-admiral Alfred Montgomery task force 38, with the new fleet carriers USS Bunker Hill, Essex and Independence. With the added carrier strength on November 11th, a follow up air raid was made seeing the IJN cruiser Agano torpedoed and badly damaged, while 35 Japanese aircraft out of 120 launched in a counter attack against the carrier force were shot down. Montgomery would not lose a single ship. Admiral Koga's decision to send carrier pilots to bolster Rabaul had quite literally blown up in his face. Koga's air fleet had lost 43 of its 82 Zeros, 38 of its 34 Vals, 34 of its 40 Kates and 6 Judy spotter planes. Over 86 of his 192 experienced pilots and crew had perished, and he had only inflicted minimal damage to Nimitz fleet, it was a disaster. Yet the fantastical reports from Japanese pilots kept pouring in, claiming the air battles over Bougainville were infact won by the IJN air forces. Newspapers in Japan reported victories that added up to the destruction of 5 American battleships, 10 carriers, 19 cruisers and 7 destroyers. The reality was the destruction of 2 cruisers, the USS Birmingham and Denver. By mid november Vice Admiral Kusaka was finding it difficult to sustain attacks against allied convoys feeding supplies to Empress Augusta Bay. On November 12th, Rabaul only had 113 Zero's of which only 59 were operational. Crews were suffering from malaria and other diseases, no one was granted rest as they were limited in personnel and under constant attack. The quality of ground crews and pilots was deteriorating every week.  From November 12 through December 16, the daytime skies over the Gazelle Peninsula remained relatively quiet, as the US carrier forces had departed to support operations in the Central Pacific. AirSols received a new commander on the November 20th, Major General Ralph Mitchell who continued to support operations in Bougainville and General Kenney's Fifth Air Force was supporting preparations for the landings in western New Britain. The lull gave Admiral Kusaka a brief opportunity to recuperate as replacements began to arrive from the Marshalls and Truk. The Imperial Japanese Navy would take six months to replenish its carrier pilots with less well-trained and inexperienced replacements. In the meantime the carrier fleet itself, Japan's most expensive and precious strategic asset, was forced to remain idle in Truk as Nimitz began his island hop through the Central Pacific Meanwhile the Torokina airfield had become crude but operational. The Seabees had created a single 4750 foot by 200 foot strip. It lacked taxiways, hardstands and buildings, but by December 10th it could launch aircraft. Soon the Seabees would carve 2 additional landing trips in the jungle 3 miles further inland. The first would be a mile long, the second 8000 feet or so for bombers. Unlike the Japanese airfields on the Gazelle Peninsula which would take more than a year to complete, both of these American airfields took a month. You often hear, especially from marine veterans of the pacific, praise for the Seabees, such a colossal advantage in logistics paved the way to victory. A massive fighter sweep was launched on December 17 consisting of 32 Corsairs, 24 F6Fs, and 24 RNZAF Kittyhawks from airfields at New Georgia and Vella Lavella who rendezvoused at Torokina, topped off their fuel tanks, and hit  Rabaul. The strike was led by Major Greg “Pappy” Boyington, the commanding officer of Marine Fighter Squadron 214, better known by its nickname, the "Black Sheep Squadron". The three types of aircraft had different flying characteristics and different cruising speeds. The Kittyhawks, slowest of the bunch, took off first. The plan was for them to come in at 15,000ft, and lure out the Japanese. Next came the Hellcats, flying above the Kittyhawks. And the last were the Corsairs, who flew top cover. It was a long flight over open water, calculated to make the pilot of a single-engine aircraft nervous. If the engine failed it was a long swim home. They were intercepted by 35 Zeros, with the Kittyhawks getting the first jump on them. After the Kittyhawks made their first pass, shooting down a Japanese fighter, the advantage switched over to the more agile  Zeros. The Kittyhawk squadron leader's plane was fatally damaged and a second Kittyhawk went down after colliding with a Zero. Remarkably, both pilots survived. Meanwhile the Hellcats and Corsairs, at high altitudes, were coming up empty. The Corsairs circled Lakunai field finding no targets. Pilot Boyington exchanged insults with an English-speaking Japanese officer over the radio, but despite his challenges found no targets in the air. When all aircraft returned to base, the score was even. Two Kittyhawks and two Zeros were lost; one each due to the collision and one shot down by both sides. It was a rather disappointing fighter sweep, but would become just one of many against Rabual over the course of the next 3 weeks. The next raid came two days later seeing 48 B-24s launched, but 32 were forced turned back. The remaining 16 bombers escorted by 51 were intercepted by 94 Japanese fighters, yet they also suffered from the bad weather. Less than half made contact with the enemy. In the resulting fight, 5 Zeros were shot down and 10 allied aircraft were lost, but only two were shot down. The other eight were due to a mid-air collision and landing mishaps, all near home. The weather persisted to be so bad, it was only on the 23rd another sortie could be launched. B-24s escorted by Corsairs and Hellcats bombed Lakunai. Radar gave the Japanese some early warning and nearly 100 Zeros were scrambled. 60 made contact with the bombers after they hit Lakunai. No bombers were lost, but 2 Corsairs were shot down in the ensuing dogfights. Yet the Americans had a twist, they followed up the raid with a fighter sweep of 48 Corsairs. They arrived 15 minutes after the bombers left, surprising the airborne Japanese fighters, most of whom lacked radios. 6 Zeros were shot down, several others damaged and only 2 Corsairs lost.  2 days later, another fighter sweep preceded by bombers was launched claiming 18 aircraft kills, but it was probably closer to 5. In comparison the Japanese pilots would claim 55 kills, a number greater than the american force sent. On the 27 another sweep was launched against Cape Gloucester downing 7 Japanese aircraft for one American. 28 Corsairs returned the next day but this time the Japanese held the advantage, sandwiching the Marines between 2 large groups of Zeros. 3 Corsairs were shot down, but so were 3 Zeros, with 2 others badly damaged. On 30th 36 Liberators escorted by 20 Hellcats and 20 Corsairs, bombed Rabaul. 1 B-24 was lost on the raid, hit by antiaircraft fire. No air combat occurred. On New Years day 15 B-24s and 68 escorting fighters met heavy fighter opposition. 40 Zeros had been sent to Rabaul from Truk, manned by veteran pilots. 1 B-24 was shot down, and two others badly damaged. On January 2 48 US fighters raided and on the 3rd another 44. The two sweeps took out a handful of fighters. The last sweep was on the 5th seeing another 2 zeros downed. Meanwhile back on December 24th, Admiral Sherman's task force 37 raided Kavieng. The operation had two purposes, 1) was to distract attention from the landings at Cape Gloucester and 2) to interdict sea traffic between Truk and Rabaul. The 5000-ton naval transport Tenyru Maru was sunk and several other ships were damaged. After this task force 37 made several raids against Kavieng through January 4th. They managed to shoot down 10 Japanese fighters, damaged IJN cruiser Noshiro and destroyers Fumizuki and Satsuki. On Janaury 6th, the bomber strip at Piva became operational, thus Rabaul was now within range of allied light and medium bombers, basically it was pounding time.   On January 7th, 16 Avengers and 24 Dauntless raided Tobera airfield. From medium altitudes the Avengers dropped 2000lb pounds smashing the paved runways. The Japanese managed to shoot down 3 fighters and one dauntless, but Tobera was temporarily not operational. It was the first time any Rabaul airbase was neutralized from bomb damage. This would be followed up on the 11th by a low level attack against Vunakanau by B-25's, damaging 8 parked aircraft. Then on the 14th, Simpson Harbor was attacked by 16 Avengers , 36 Dauntless and fighter escorts. The Japanese tossed 84 fighters but the allies held such a tight formation it was difficult to get at the bombers. 2 bombers were lost before reaching Lakunai; 1 to a mid-air collision and 1 to antiaircraft fire. When the Allied aircraft finally arrived, clouds shielded Lakunai so the bombers switched to targeting the ships in Simpson Harbor. The Avengers carried 2,000lb bombs, limiting their effectiveness. Regardless, they landed hits on the 15,400-ton-displacement oiler Naruto, and thus ended its goal of becoming the Hokage. . . sorry folks could not resist that one. The destroyer Matsukaze was also damaged alongside 5 other vessels.    AirSols came back to hit simpson harbor and blanche bay 3 days later sinking  the Komaki Maru, Kosei Maru, Yamayuri Maru, Hakkai Maru and Iwate Maru. To take down the combined 30,000 tons of shipping AirSols lost 8 P-38s, 1 Hellcat, 1 F4U, 1 Avenger, and 1 Dauntless. The rest of January saw so many raids, sometimes 2-3 on the same day, thus I can't spend the entire podcast listing their actions, but the losses were brutal. For the Americans they would lose 23 aircraft between January 23rd-30th, for the Japanese it was around 37. By the end of the month, Rabaul was being bled dry of planes, thus the rest was withdrawn to Truk with around 40 pilots. To make up for the withdrawal, Admiral Koga brought over the air groups of carriers Junyo, Hiyo and Ryuho on the 25th adding 62 zeros, 18 vals and 18 kates to Admiral Kusakas dwindling forces. Does that not sound like performing the exact same action that saw such devastating losses in late december to early january? Yes, yes it does.    Moving over to New Britain, General Shepherd had just smashed the Japanese positions along Suicide Creek. While seizing Suicide Creek some Americans captured a Japanese dispatch saying “It is essential that we conceal the intention that we are maintaining positions on Aogiri Ridge. Concerning the occupation of this position, it is necessary that Aogiri Yama is maintained.” While making arrangements for the Japanese assault against Target Hill one, Lieutenant Abe had occasion sent field dispatches to Warrant Officer Kiyoshi Yamaguchi, one of his platoon leaders. The dispatch mentioned command post locations, hour of attack, and other orders. Yamaguchi, with that seemingly incredible indifference to basic security which the Japanese so often demonstrated, simply stuck the dispatch in his pocket and carried it with him to the assault. Marines found it on his body the following morning, thereby gaining their first inkling of the existence of a terrain feature which appeared as such on none of their maps but upon which the Japanese appeared to place great importance, for reasons not yet clear. Aoigiri Ridge was not in the American maps and it was currently held by the 2nd battalion, 53rd regiment and 2nd battalion, 141st regiment. Behind the ridge was a wide trail leading to Magairapua, connecting Matsuda's HQ with Borgen Bay. The trail was heavily used and concealed extremely well from American aircraft. Back over at the American lines, by January 5th, the 3rd battalion, 7th marines had pulled back into the reserve, allowing the weapons company, 7th marines to occupy the extreme left along the shore to prepare for Shepherds offensive against Hill 150. The new formation launched their attack at 11am on the 6th. Tanks surged forward to smash a roadblock held by the 2nd battalion, 141st regiment on the left trail. Artillery was deployed on a nearby hill hitting the Japanese lines as A company tried to break through but was quickly pinned down by the roadblock. The tanks eventually burst through the roadblock sending the Japanese packing.   The americans advanced through the increasingly swampy terrain, facing weaker resistance. B company crossed a small stream and stormed Hill 150 during the afternoon, securing it. Further right, C company and the 3rd battalion, 5th marines were surprised to be held up by extremely heavy fire from the until then unknown feature, Aogiri ridge. The men had no other choice than to pull back to a safe distance to dig in as they reported back the presence of the heavily fortified position. The Japanese would unleash carnage upon the men for 2 days whenever they tried to press forward. On the 7th the commanding officer of the 3rd battalion, 5th Marines, was wounded and replaced by Lt Colonel Lewis Walt. The next day, Walk's men were cautiously inching forward under heavy enemy fire through dense jungle, when they first encountered the ground rising in steepness. At this point Walt realized the feature had to be Aogiri Ridge.    On the 9th, the assault battalions resumed their attacks, this time with heavy artillery support against Aogiri ridge. Walt was reinforced with Companies K and L from the 7th marines, but the advance was extremely slow and painful. Two Japanese bunkers were knocked out with white phosphorus grenades, but that ended the limited gains. Walt personally began pushing a 37mm gun excruciating foot by foot up Aogiri ridge, firing a volley of canisters every few feet. Somehow he managed to get the gun up the steep slope into a decent position to sweep the ridge, allowing the gain of a foothold on the crest of Aogiri. The loss of the ridge was a huge threat to Matsuda and Katayama's positions, so the latter decided to throw his reserves in a desperate but ferocious counterattack.   At 1:15am on the 10th, Katayama sent his recently arrived 3rd battalion to attack the reverse slope. However the Marines held firm and would end up repelling 5 consecutive banzai charges with a fury and persistence unparalleled in the campaign. On the 4th try a Japanese major and two company officers succeeded in knifing through the Marine cordon almost to Colonel Walt's fox hole, 50 yards behind the front line. At that instant one of two short rounds in a 60-round artillery barrage burst in a tall tree almost directly overhead, and the major died there, sword in one hand and a pistol in the other. The 5th charge was blunted by artillery and the Japanese finally cut their losses and pulled back. The Japanese had suffered immense casualties, seeing all 3 of their battalions depleted, forcing Katayama to pull off Aogiri ridge that very night. The morning of the 10th saw Walk's men securing the feature and then discovering the vital Magairapua trail. The marines went to work mopping up the area until January 12th, whereupon Shepherd planned to seize Hill 660. The feature was guarded by the 6th company, 141st regiment supported by a number of guns of the 30th machine cannon company. The fresh 3rd battalion, 7th marines, led by lt colonel Henry Buse Jr were to perform the main assault, with the 1st battalion extending the perimeter behind them. To help the effort, the weapons company,7th marines of Captain Buckley would begin constructing a roadblock between the eastern base of Hill 660 to the shore of Borgen Bay, hoping to cut off the defenders escape route.   At 08:00am on the 13th, after artillery, mortars and the 5th Air Force performed a bombardment of the area, the last Marine offensive commenced. A intricate system of small arms and automatic weapon positions going up the summit unleashed fire upon the marines, quickly pinning down I company. L Company attempted swinging to the right, but were also pinned down. Engineers worked a light tank forward far enough to place fire across a gorge demolishing the more troublesome enemy weapons. By late afternoon, together with artillery supporting fire, the pinned-down companies were rescued and withdrawn for the night. Meanwhile the Weapons company worked with their bulldozer, by 1030 they had skirted the eastern base of the hill and set up an all-around perimeter. There they dug in clearing fields of fire for about 60 yards to both north and south, placing their half-tracks and tanks in supporting positions. The only opposition they encountered during the advance was by two Japanese machine guns and emplaced near the summit of the hill. With all said and done they successfully cut off the Japanese line of retreat.  On the morning of the 14th, the 3rd battalion resumed their assault, with their leading companies advancing to the right working their way up. One unit nearly got atop the crest before coming under fire from heavy machine guns. They got to a position where they could bring 60mm mortars to bear, and went to work neutralizing the machine gun positions before a final surge carried them across the summit. The Japanese fled down the crest heading east, coming straight into the line of fire of the Weapons company below. The result was a terrible rout, seeing many escape to the safety of the swamps to the hills southeast. By the end of the 14th, the marines had seized Hill 660 and were performing mop up operations through the following day. At 5:30am on the 16th, Katayama ordered the 6th and 11th companies, 141st regiment to counter attack Hill 660. Soon the marines were face to face with a large banzai charge, seeing the fighting getting up close and personal. But small arms, rifles, 60mm mortars and 81mm artillery broke the Japanese. Over 110 Japanese bodies would be found after the fight. This ended Shepherds offensive, as the remnants of Colonel Sumiya's forces began to arrive to the Borgen Bay area. Over the next few days, the exhausted 7th marines were relieved by the 5th marines and 2nd battalion, 1st marines who had recently been recalled after completing their mission at Green Beach.  After suffering the defeated in Borgen Bay, General Sakai decided to order the 1st battalion, 54th regiment to reinforce Talasea and for Matsuda to launch a last ditch effort, a suicidal one at that, to obliterate the enemy. But the men were in no condition for such an offensive, thus Katayama elected to postpone it for now. Since every man was needed for the defense of Borgen Bay, Colonel Sato took the remainder of his commander and departed Rooke Island to join the main body. Now that Hill 660 was secured, the Americans began a new method of patrolling; this time their patrols would specifically seek out and destroy what was presumed to be exhausted Japanese units, before the division would attack the defensive line at Borgen Bay-Itni river. Yet that is it for new Britian, as we are going to be traveling over to the CBI theater. Between November 22 to December the 1st, two conference were held between the Allied leaders. The first was the Cairo or “sextant” conference on November 22-26th, between President FDR, Sir Winston Churchill and Chiang Kai-shek. The second was held in Tehran on November 28-December 1st between FDR, Churchill and Joseph Stalin. You might be asking, why did they all not meet up together. The crux of it was the Soviet-Japanese neutrality Pact and to a lesser extent, though probably not in Chiang Kai-Shek's mind, Stalin was aiding the CCP. Because the Soviets had not declared war on the Japanese, it would not look to good if they met with the leader of China, likewise Chiang Kai-shek was not too forthcoming to meet with Stalin. The easy fix was to just have two different conferences. Overall the conferences did not really touch too much upon the Pacific war. But Stalin did promise to declare war on Japan within ninety days after the end of the European War. In return he demanded military and logistical concessions in Manchuria, maintenance of Outer Mongolia under Soviet control as well as sovereignty over the Kuril Islands that stretched from north of Japan to Russia's Kamchatka Peninsula. When Chiang Kai-shek heard about this he had suspicious and noted “The influence of this conference on China will be great. I hope Roosevelt isn't plotting with Churchill and Stalin against me.” Soon his suspicion would turn to anger when he discovered there were secret protocols relating to Manchuria.  Stalin had made some assurances to Mao Zedong that once the Soviets were in the war against Japan, they would have forces to bear down into China to help tip the scale for the CCP against the NRA. Yet after the war, it would seem promises made by Joseph Stalin were not always kept.  Another important aspect of the conferences was the British decision to cancel Operation Buccaneer, the invasion of the Andaman Islands, because Admiral Mountbatten's landing crafts were required for landings in southern france. The Joint chiefs of staff were livid at this, because it came at the same time the Japanese were reinforcing Burma. FDR overruled them and agreed to the British decision and this in turn greatly pissed off Chiang Kai-Shek. Yet at the same time, the Cairo declaration had lifted up the morale for the Chinese army and people to continue their war against the Japanese. The declarations made by the Tehran conference implied publicly that the CBI theater was all but abandoned to the mercy of Japan's air and land forces. Thus it would be no coincidence the Japanese thought it ripe to launch an all-out offensive against China.  In the meantime, the rather aggressive Admiral Mountbatten was trying to salvage what he could of the situation. To try and please Chiang Kai-Shek, he proposed Operation Pigstick. The operation was something Mountbatten had wargamed a bit, it was to be a landing on the southern Mayu peninsula aimed at hitting Akyab. He began assigning landing craft for the amphibious operation, only to be immediately slapped down by Alanbrooke and told to return 3 fast tank landing crafts that were direly needed for operations against Italy. Mountbatten hoped to retain 2 slower tank landing craft, but Cunningham requested them. Pigstick was to be 2 divisions plus 2 brigades who would be used in a southward advance down the peninsula and 1 division in an amphibious assault aimed at surrounding and destroying not less than 20,000 Japanese. An additional landing similar to PIGSTICK, could perhaps be launched in the Ramree-Cheduba area, could take staging areas that would put 15 Corps within reach of Rangoon. Speaking of Ramree, if any of you have heard this kind of myth about over 1000 Japanese being eaten by crocodiles on that island, over on my personal channel the pacific war channel I did a full investigation into the so called “ramree island massacre” story. A little sad about its performance not going to lie. Dramatically improved my lackluster animation skills for it, came out really well and I did a silly impersonation at the beginning, anyways check it out its a fun one! Alongside Pigstick, Mountbatten changed the Tarzan operation into Operation Gripfast, calling for an offensive on north and central Burma with an airborne landing at Indaw to sever the Japanese line of communications to Myitkyina. But now Chiang Kai-Shek was very wary of anything British, so he rejected the plans on December 19th. Alongside pissing off Chiang Kai-Shek, his estranged wife, Joseph Stilwell was also again angry with the British, particularly Mountbatten. At one point Mountbatten proposed moving certain American units into the Hukawng valley to help the offensive there and Stillwell burst out ‘I should like it placed on record that I am responsible for the training of all American forces in this theatre and I am the person to decide when they are adequately trained and can move forward.' Mountbatten replied: ‘I accept that in principle, but would remind you that these troops are being trained under British officers. I am responsible for operations and will decide when units move into the fighting lines. In other words, general, I should like to place on record that I am Supreme Commander out here and what I say goes.' Stilwell took it good-humouredly and laughed. ‘We none of us dispute that,'”. That day Stilwell wrote a letter to his wife, referring scathingly to Mountbatten as ‘the glamour boy. He doesn't wear well and I begin to wonder if he knows his stuff. Enormous staff, endless walla-walla but damn little fighting . . . And of course the Peanut is unchanged. The jungle is a refuge from them both.' The men would all share some screaming matches against another, until Stilwell would shock everyone by exclaiming “I am prepared to come under General Slim's operational control until I get to Kamaing.” It was a truly bizarre idea, Mountbatten asked how such a thing would work, and both Slim and Stilwell asked to discuss the matter amongst themselves. The two men would agree on tactical essentials such as getting more Chinese divisions for the Ledo force and to use the Chindits to assist in hitting Myitkyina. Slim and Stilwell shook hands and Stilwell said to him ‘I would fight under a corporal as long as he would let me fight.' Slim would later reflecte ‘In practice this illogical command set-up worked surprisingly well. My method with Stilwell was based on what I had learnt of him in the Retreat – to send him the minimum of written instructions, but, whenever I wanted anything, to fly over and discuss it with him, alone. Stilwell, talking things over quietly with no one else present, was a much easier and more likeable person than Vinegar Joe with an audience. Alone, I never found him unreasonable or obstructive. I think I told him to do something he did not approve of on only two or three occasions, and on each he conformed, I will not say willingly, but with good grace.' In the end Operation Pigstick never became a reality, because the landing crafts were needed for the Italian campaign and thus the hope of meeting Chiang Kai-sheks continued demand for an amphibious operation was gone. It was almost like the British never intended to go through with such a thing in the first place, woops that is just my opinion. Meanwhile the British-Indian command elected to start a new operation in Arakan. The brutal hard-won lessons of 1st Arakan battle had been absorbed in India Command, with senior British officers determined to avoid similar mistakes. The new operation was the subject of meticulous reconnaissance, planning, and rehearsals. A series of lectures, war games, models of the grounds and syndicate discussions were held for commanders, staff and regimental officers whom carefully considered countering Japanese offensive tactics and assaulting prepared defensive positions like those witnessed at Donbaik. A carefully planned programme of continuous, progressive and intensive training was put in hand for all corps and divisional fighting, support and administrative troops to practice necessary skills, including using brigade boxes, aerial resupply and the infiltration and envelop- ment of enemy positions. This comprehensive training programme culminated in intensive rehearsals and combined arms training with artillery, tanks and close support aircraft carried out near Lohardaga, over ground resembling Arakan, simulating attacks on mock Japanese defensive positions on jungle-clad hills. General Auchinleck assigned the 15th corps, reconstituted at Ranchi with the 3 best trained divisions available: Major-General Harold Briggs' 5th Indian Division; Major-General Frank Messervy's 7th Indian Division and Major-General Christopher Woolner's 81st West African Division.The 26th Indian Division formed the corps reserve. Command of the 15th corps would be given to Lt General Philip Christison. The plan called for the 5th and 7th Indian divisions to advance along the summit of the Mayu range towards Maungdaw and Buthidaung while the 5th and 6th west african brigades would provide flanking protection. On November 1st, the 2 Indian divisions began their advance and by mid november would make contact with a Japanese outpost.As the 7th Indian division advanced astride the Kalapanzin River they ran into stiff resistance. Efforts to dislodge Japanese defenders near Awlanbyin and Letwedet, showcased the formidable difficulties that attacking Japanese defensive bunker positions presented. Most were built on razor-back ridges, through which were burrowed fire positions, affording a limited approach, while the reverse slopes protected troops from view and bombardment. With the precipitous Goppe Pass initially only suitable for porters, pack transport and pack artillery, 7th Indian Division quickly devised other methods to overcome enemy defenses, since normal stereotyped, set-piece attacks stood little chance of success without supporting field artillery. Aircraft proved an ineffective substitute, moreover, with dive-bombing having only a transitory effect since the broken terrain and dense jungle absorbed blast leaving defenses and morale largely intact unless a lucky direct hit was made. The Indian forces began to infiltrate and bypass the well-entrenched Japanese defenses, giving the impression they would soon unleash a frontal attack upon them at any moment. General Messervy's would say of the action  “'We will undoubtedly have a Neapolitan sandwich of British - Japs - British, but it will be one made by ourselves, and with the initiative in our hands it will soon be transformed to British - British - Jap.” They were gaining ground and with it valuable combat experience. On the night of November 30th, the 15th Indian Corps commenced large-scale operations to drive in the Japanese outpost line astride the Mayu Range. A series of brisk skirmishes were fought by 33rd Indian Infantry Brigade on the jungle-cloaked ridges south of Awlanbyin quickly evicting small determined parties of Japanese infantry from carefully prepared platoon and company defensive localities. This was by no means an easy task since most heavily camouflaged positions were built atop steep hillsides overlooking paddy fields that provided an open field of five and difficult going for advancing troops. Earlier directions about infiltration paid off in practice. An attack on Awlanbyin west redoubt from the rear through thick jungle achieved complete surprise. Although a neighboring Japanese position initially held out, its garrison withdrew on 2nd December after being cut off. The 33rd Brigade columns  crossed the Ngakyedauk Chaung and occupied the area from Ngakyedauk village to the ridge about 1.5 miles north-west of Sinohbyin village. By December3rd, they extended the area of operation to the hills overlooking Maungyithaung and Sinohbyin. The 89th Brigade, meanwhile, pushed forward down Tatmin Chaung and established forward positions on the hills south of the chaung, one mile west of Tatmingyaungywa. By mid-month, 7th Indian Division had reached the main enemy positions covering the Tunnels and Buthidaung, and the opening of the Ngakyedauk Pass to wheeled traffic in late December considerably eased resupply and allowed the divisional artillery to join the formation. However, both the Indian divisions were under orders not to get engaged in serious fighting with the Japanese, so the advance stopped there. It is also important to note, in November 1943,  Spitfires were deployed in Bengal for the first time. The 615th and 617th squadrons were based in Chittagong to protect the vital port and also to cover the Arakan. Within one month, the Spitfires destroyed four Japanese photographic reconnaissance aircraft. Previously, the Dinah's range, speed and height had enabled them to fly with impunity over the Allied forward bases and the Hurricanes were unable to catch them. The Japanese reacted by sending out fighter sweeps in order to test the Spitfires and whittle down Spitfire strength. However, by the end of December, the Japanese lost 22 aircraft, another 33 were damaged, and the Allied loss was only 13 aircraft. The greatest air battle occurred on the last day of 1943. On that day, No. 136 Squadron destroyed 12 and damaged 11 when a mixed force of Japanese fighters and bombers attempted to attack the light naval force along the Arakan Coast. The Japanese carried out one strategic attack when on 5 December 1943, 60 bombers and fighters, including some naval aircraft, in two waves bombed Calcutta. The Japanese lost two aircraft and another five were damaged. The three and a half squadrons of Hurricane fighters, including half a squadron of night fighters which were defending the area lost five aircraft and another six were damaged.  To the west the 5th Indian Division had also encountered stiffening resistance from Japanese outposts as it advanced southwards along the coastal plain towards Maungdaw, through the foothills further north and along the spine of the jungle-clad Mayu Mountains. They soon discovered that overcoming Japanese bunker defenses presented particular difficulties. As the division would report "The great difficulty in attacking Jap "hill top" positions lies in the concealment of the actual bunker or weapon pit' one brigade commander later wrote, and in the practical impossibility of deploying attacking troops in thick jungle, particularly where the approach runs along the top of a razor backed ridge.' In each case, patrols infiltrated between these localities isolated them from supplies and reinforcements with the result that Japanese normally gave up ground without a contest. A newsletter prepared by the HQ of 5th Indian Division reported: 'The only way to deal with the Jap def positions is by INFILTRATION. Recent experience has shown that the Jap has produced nothing new in def tactics... It is almost physically impossible in hilly and thick country to have every post covered by another, the posts can be eliminated piece- meal by infiltration tactics.' After the outline of the main Japanese defenses became apparent this approach was also increasingly applied at brigade level. At the end of December 1943, the 5th Indian Division held the area from the sea to the crest of the Mayu Peninsula and the 7th Indian Division moved into the Kalapanzin Valley. By the end of the month they reached Maungdaw. The advancing 5th Indian Division discovered that frontal assaults could not be completely avoided, however, when Japanese troops were determined to stay put. During this advance, the 161st Brigade moved to the high ground to the northeast of Bakkagona about five miles to the north of Razabil. On 30th December, 161st Indian Infantry Brigade assaulted Point 124, but the 4/7th Rajputs were held up by dense jungle and heavy mortar and machine fire and suffered heavy casualties. For six days assaults continued with the forward infantry regularly reaching the Japanese defenses before being driven off by showers of hand grenades and supporting machine-gun from every other enemy defensive position within range. Only after a 'policy of strangulation, starvation, and attrition was adopted', did its defenders withdraw. The 5th Indian Division immediately began probing the main Razabil defenses, while its 123rd Indian Infantry Brigade patrolled the western foothills of the Mayu Range and northern side of Razabil, particularly two hill positions dubbed Wrencat and Wrenkitten. To do so an indirect approach was again advocated by Major-General Harold Briggs in note on tactical policy issued on 4th January, stressing the importance of patrolling to identify positions held by the Japanese and infiltration to seize vital ground in their flanks or rear that would either provoke Japanese counterattacks or force a withdrawal. Meanwhile Stilwell arrived to Shingbwiyang on December 21st and assumed command of the Chinese forces in India. To relive the trapped battalion of the 112th regiment at Yupbang Ga, Stilwell and General Sun planned to send the entire 114th regiment to break the Japanese center at Yupang Ga to rescue the 112th, then hook north to envelope the northern fragment of the Japanese defensive line. On December 24th, they unleashed artillery and launched the infantry into the Japanese lines. The 114th regiment managed to envelop the Japanese right flank by the afternoon and soon a breakthrough emerged allowing for them to make contact with the 112th. Sun's men then surrounded the Japanese pocket during the night and would wipe them out the next morning. And thus the Chinese had gained their first victory at Yupbang Ha, though the Japanese still held the river crossing, so Stilwell began plans for another assault set after Christmas. On December 28th, Sun ordered 3 battalions to attack the north, while the 1st battalion, 112th regiment would sweep to the right, getting behind the 3 Japanese outer strongpoints. The chinese forces rapidly broke the Japanese outer defenses creating a breach while the 1st battalion, 114th regiment broke through the river defensive line. The Japanese tossed a large counterattack, but it would be repelled by the night time. Now Yupbang Ga was in allied hands as the surviving Japanese companies split into smaller groups trying to hold out for many days. With the fall of Yupbang Ga, the Japanese were forced to withdraw from Sharaw Ga as well, so elements of the 2rd battalion, 113th Regiment were be able to seize it by December 30. In the meantime, as the 22nd Division's 65th Regiment had been sent towards the Taro Plain to try and secure the southern flank, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 114th Regiment had been sent south to cross the Tanai Hka at the Kantau ford in an effort to cut off the enemy withdrawal line. By the end of 1943, with the loss of 315 killed and 429 wounded, Sun's 38th Division had gained complete control of the Tarung Hka.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Things were deteriorating for the Japanese on New Britain as American Marines were seizing features and gradually pushing them into Borgan Bay. Within the CBI theater a ton of drama amongst the high commanders was surprisingly not resulting in disaster, as operations in Burma were kicking off with great results. Perhaps Burma could be saved.

Author E.J. Koh joins Daniel Ford on the final Friday Morning Coffee of 2023 to chat about her novel The Liberators.  Caitlin Malcuit also discusses the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, journalist casualties in the war, and E.J. Koh's handwritten love letter project. To learn more about E.J. Koh, visit her official website. Writer's Bone is proudly sponsored by The Bookshop: Lou's Literary Line, Libro.fm and Mark Cecil's upcoming novel Bunyan and Henry; Or, the Beautiful Destiny. 

E.J. Koh is the author of the debut novel The Liberators, available from Tin House. It is the official December pick of the Otherppl Book Club. Koh's other books include the memoirThe Magical Language of Others, which won a Washington State Book Award, Pacific Northwest Book Award, and Association for Asian American Studies Book Award, and was longlisted for the PEN Open Book Award. She is also the author of the poetry collection A Lesser Love, a Pleiades Press Editors Prize for Poetry winner. Her work has appeared in AGNI, the Atlantic, Boston Review, Los Angeles Review of Books, Poetry, Slate, World Literature Today, and elsewhere. Koh earned her MFA at Columbia University and her PhD at the University of Washington, and has received National Endowment for the Arts and MacDowell fellowships. She lives in Seattle, Washington. *** Otherppl with Brad Listi is a weekly literary podcast featuring in-depth interviews with today's leading writers. Available where podcasts are available: Apple Podcasts, Spotify, YouTube, etc. Subscribe to Brad Listi's email newsletter. Support the show on Patreon Merch Twitter Instagram  TikTok Bluesky Email the show: letters [at] otherppl [dot] com The podcast is a proud affiliate partner of Bookshop, working to support local, independent bookstores. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

  Last time we spoke about the invasion of the Treasury Islands. The time had come to begin operations against Bougainville, but in order to do so the allies had a few tricks up their sleeves. In order to make sure the landings at Cape Torokina at Empress Augusta Bay went safely, the allies would perform raids against Choiseul and the Treasury islands. It was hoped such actions would work as a diversion and confused the Japanese as to where the real operations were aimed. The landing on Mono saw some New Zealanders and Americans annihilate a 200 strong Japanese garrison. On Choiseul Paratroopers boldly raided a force 6 times larger than them. The raid was a success and thanks to John F Kennedy the Paratroopers were grabbed off the island before the Japanese could obliterate them. In the end the landings at Cape Torokina were a success and now a battle would be unleashed.  This episode is the battle of Empress Augusta Bay Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  So last time we covered the planning behind Operation Cherryblossom, the landings at Cape Torokina. As a means of confusing the enemy, the allies also chose to invade the Treasury islands and raided Choiseul. With Operation Cherryblossom in full swing, so begins the Bougainville campaign which we are going to be diving into now. At the end of October, after successfully invading the Treasury islands and the extremely bold attack upon Choiseul where the Paratroopers were outnumbered 6-1, combined with General Kenny's 5th air force and AirSols neutralizing Rabaul and nearly every airfield on Bougainville, the landings at Cape Torokina were finally launched. In a final act to aid operation cherryblossom, Admiral Sherman's Task force 38 departed Espiritu Santo on October 28th and Admiral Merrills Task Force did the same from Florida island on November 1st. They hoped to rendezvous near the Buka Passage three days later so they could prepare an attack against the Buka and Bonis airfields.  During the morning of November 1st, Admiral Merrill's cruisers arrived to their station and began firing upon the arifields. Then Sherman's carriers arrived off Buka passage to launch two separate air strikes. The first airstrike consisting of eighteen fighters, fifteen dive bombers, and eleven torpedo bombers hit Buka just after daylight. The second consisting of fourteen fighters, twenty-one dive bombers, and eleven torpedo bombers hit Buka again at midmorning. The airstrikes managed to shoot up a number of small ships within the harbor. Meanwhile after firing 2700 5 and 6 inch shells all over Buka and Bonis's airfields, Merrils task force 39 departed the Shortlands to bombard Poporang, Ballalo and Faisi.  On November 2nd, Sherman performed air strikes against Buka and Bonis's fields before departing south for Guadalcanal. Within those two days the Americans estimated they had destroyed around 30 aircraft and several small ships at the cost of 11 aircraft lost. The attacks had rendered the two Japanese airfields closest to Empress Augusta Bay basically unusable for when the landings would be made. The Japanese were now convinced that any invasion of Bougainville would have to be countered with all the aircraft and ships available within the southern theater. Yet they could not concentrate their entire naval and air forces against the Solomons, because the American and Australian forces on New Guinea would most likely be performing a landing on New Britain at any moment. Admiral Koga also expected the Americans to attempt a landing in the Gilbert or Marshalls. Thus the two pronged allied strategy was serving to freeze the Japanese army units within the New Guinea and Solomon areas.  Meanwhile Admiral Wilkinson's task force 31 were making final preparations for transport the 3rd Marine division. The amphibious assault would be facing a landing area defended by roughly 270 men. Once they overcame them, a defense perimeter would have to be hastily made because it was certain the Japanese commander on Bougainville would hammer them hard. General Vandergrift's plan was to land the 3rd and 9th marine regiments of Colonel George McHenry and Colonel Edward Craig and the 2nd raider battalion of Lt Colonel Joseph McCaffery abreast on 11 designated beaches covering a distance of 8000 or so yards. The 3rd raider battalion lt be Lt colonel Fred Beans would land at the same time on Puruata island to overcome an estimated 70 Japanese defenders there. Wilkinson wanted to land the forces abreast as quickly as possible and to have the transport unload the supplies off the bay by nightfall because he expected a rapid Japanese response, similar to what had occurred at Savo island.  On October 28th, General Turnage's men departed the New Hebrides in 20 combat transports and cargo ships commanded by Commodore Lawrence Reifsnider. The convoy proceeded using different routes, hoping to prevent the Japanese from discovering the size of their force, the three transport divisions would rendezvous with Wilkinsons destroyers by October 31st. Once linked up they would approach Bougainville under the cover of naval PBYs and Liberators. During the morning of November 1st, Minesweepers led by the destroyer Wadsworth were sent in to clear mines from the landing areas and to determine how dangerous the shoals were. The minesweepers found no mines, but did find plenty of uncharted shoals. Wadsworth radar confirmed that Cape Torokina's position within their naval charts was misplaced. Wadsworth had a number of tasks ahead of her. In addition to helping with the fire support at a range of around 3000 yards, she was to use her radar to confirm the actual location of Cape Torokina, Puruata island and the landing beaches. The coast of Bougainville had been chartered by the German Admiralty in 1890. The Germans had placed Cape Torokina and Mutupina Point around 9 miles southwest of their actual locations. Thankfully the submarine USS Guardfish reported that the air force and naval charts had misplaced Cape Torokina by around 7 miles and this is why Wadsworth was sent to investigate. Unsexy logistical stuff, but gravely important, as you don't want to waste any time during an amphibious landing searching for a lost beach. Wilkinson decided not the land the men until after daylight when it was possible to detect the offshore shoals. Shortly before sunrise, the minesweepers and destroyers began their bombardment. The Sigourney and Wadsworth fired at ranges of 13,000 yards upon Puruata Island, while the Terry bombarded closer to the shore of Cape Torokina. As each transport passed the cape, they fired 3 inch anti-aircraft guns hoping to hit Japanese positions or at least minimize their artillery. By 6:45am the transports began arriving off the beaches around 3000 yards from the shore. At 7:10am the LCVP's began taking men ashore. Simultaneously Wilkinsons destroyers began systematically bombarding the perimeter while 31 bombers from New Georgia bombed and strafed the landing areas. Within a few minutes around 7500 troops, roughly half of the total force were scrambling ashore and unloading with great speed and smoothness. The preliminary bombardment had failed however to smash the well concealed Japanese machine gun nests located on the southern beaches. These machine gun nests unleashed their lead upon the landing craft. The landing craft bearing a third of the force had immediately come under fire from Puruata island and some pillboxes on Cape Torokina. The 3rd raiders in particular were hit by machine gun fire from Puruata. Around 4 land craft were sunk from this, 10 others were badly damaged, over 70 men would be lost in the process.  The 9th marines landed themselves on 5 beaches to the north and were lucky to find little resistance from the Japanese. Once ashore they sorted themselves out quickly and began to move inland to discover the terrain was a nightmare. The beaches where they were led straight into some impassable swamp land. Nevertheless where there is a will there is a way, the marines began using fallen logs and debris to traverse the swamp until they came across some solid ground. By midmorning they would establish a narrow perimeter and began patrolling the greater area. They would establish a strong outpost on the Laruma River by 1pm. The boat crews were experienced a lot of issues with the high surf, combined with a lock of experience amongst them. Some of the LCVPS found themselves smashing into another, some dropped their men in deep water, some did not lower their ramps properly and the marines were forced to toss themselves over the sides into waist deep water. More than 30 landing craft were wrecked during the initial phase of the operation. Around 64 LCVPS and 22 LCMS were beached, many with damage beyond repair.  The 3rd marines and 2nd raiders would have a hell of a time landing. The 3rd marines landing south of the Koromokina river, they had no issues with shoals, nor the high surf, but they had landed directly in front of the main Japanese defenses. There was roughly 300 Japanese, but they did not have permanent defenses along the beaches of Yellow 2, Blue 2, and Blue 3. As the 3rd marines landed they began fighting with some Japanese killing many and sending them fleeing into the Jungle. Patrols were quickly organized who worked alongside the 2nd raiders patrols to fan out. The raiders upon landing found tougher resistance in the form of a reinforced platoon operating out of two bunkers and trenches located 30 yards inland. Once the raiders had blasted out the bunkers, the remaining Japanese began to retreat into the jungle. Like the 9th marines they would find swamp lands ahead of Yellow 1 making it difficult to advance. By midmorning the raiders reached the Buretoni Mission Trail. The main Japanese resistance hit the men who landed at Blue 1, just adjacent to Cape Torokina. There the Japanese had constructed 25 large and small log and earthen pillboxes around the perimeter of the cape. There were trenches connecting the pillboxes, some of the larger pillboxes measuring 6 feet by 6 feet, containing 75mm field guns. Each pillbox was covered by earth and camouflaged using jungle plants. Only 3 pillboxes had been hit by the naval and aerial bombardments prior to the landings. When the Americans hit the beaches in the area they immediately were forced to charge into the enemy bunkers. The Japanese 75 mm gun at Cape Torokina caused havoc upon the attackers. It was a well placed log and sand bunker and its approaches were protected by two smaller bunkers with a series of trenches manned by numerous Japanese. Sergeant Robert Owens of A company, 3rd marines grabbed 4 marines and charged the two small bunkers directly upon the mouths of some machine guns. The marines entered an emplacement through a fire port and drove the gun crew out. The surrounded trenches concentrated their fire on the brave marines, Sergeant Owns would be found later dead riddled with bullets. He was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for the action. Lt Colonel Joseph McCaffery was immediately mortally struck four times in the chest as he led the marines forward, he was replaced temporarily by Major Alan Shapley for the 2nd raiders. Despite the horrible losses the Americans cleared the Japanese positions and pushed further inland to pursue and kill the fleeing defenders. It is worthy to mention over 24 Doberman Pinschers, the official dog of the USMC between 1943-1945 from the 1st marine dog platoon proved invaluable during this point of the battle. The dogs were able to point out hidden snipers concealed in underbrushed. 549 War dogs would return from the war with only 4 not being able to return to civilian life, all very good boys. The 3rd raiders landing at Puruta had nearly all their boats shot at, but it was mostly small machine gun fire and did little to no damage. The Japanese had 3 or 4 deep well sandbagged emplacement on the seaward side where their machine guns nests fired upon the raiders. It took the raiders two hours upon landing to secure their beachhead around125 yards inland. Beans committed his reserves early in the afternoon, supported by some 75mm guns borrowed from the 9th marines, they moved halfway across the island, encountering sporadic Japanese sniper fire. The Japanese were outnumbered, by 3:30pm their resistance all but ended. The marines suffered 5 deaths and 32 wounded, around 29 dead Japanese would be found. They estimated another 70 Japanese escaped to Bougainville.  Soon after all the landing craft began to pull out, the Japanese began launching air strikes. For around two hours the transports and supply ships were zigzagging for their lives to evade dive bombers and fighters coming from Rabaul. The first air strike consisted of 9 Vals and 44 Zeros, they hit at around 7:35am almost immediately after the landings were made. General Twinning's 8 Kittyhawks and 8 P-38s managed to fight them off, downing 7 Japanese aircraft. The Wedsworth received a near miss during the battle. 10 minutes later, AirSols beat off another attack taking down another 8 Japanese aircraft. During the last attack, roughly 70 Japanese aircraft came in around 1pm and were met by 34 AirSols fighters. After all three attacked, the Japanese has used around 120 aircraft and lost 26, inflicting no serious damage to allied ships nor the marines ashore. But the air attacks did result in major delays for the unloading of supplies for some hours. To try and speed up the unloading process, Wilkinson stripped some men from the assault units to help unload cargo ashore. Additionally Wilkinson employed a method of light combat loading. It would take some days for the beaches to be fully sorted out, while the naval forces departed Empress Augusta Bay before nightfall to return to Guadalcanal. Thus 14,000 men and 6200 tons of supplies had been successfully placed ashore in 8 hours. By the end of the first day the marines had contested a ⅓ sector and reached their initial objectives, digging in uncomfortably for the night under torrential rain. The divisional perimeter was established by forward landing teams, who had very little to work with for maps. To the extreme left of the perimeter would be Company G of the 9th marines, who were in a vulnerable spot along the Lrauma river. Lucky for them the Japanese were quite disorganized and many were located southeast of Cape Torokina. At dusk there was only sporadic sniper fire directed at the ⅓ in the vicinity of the cape plantation and later an attack was made against the 2nd raiders at a roadblock they established along Mission Trail. General Turnage was now the official owner of a new lodgement on Bougainville. Generals Imamura and Hyakutake were quite slow to react to the landings. They sent the Iwasa detachment led by Major General Iwasa Shun, commanding the 6th infantry group. Backing him up would be the 1st and 3rd battalions of the 23rd regiment. Their first task was to hit the new enemy beachhead. As predicted by the allies, Admirals Kusaka and Samejima mustered every naval and aerial strength they had to try and smash the invaders. As part of Operation RO, Admiral Koga had sent over 250 aircraft from the 5 carriers of Admiral Ozawa's air fleet. Koga specifically stated the bulk of these were only going to be loaned for a short time, obviously they would have to return to the main fleet. Well the invasion of Bougainville certainly upset the plans, the planes would not be coming back on schedule. As Admiral Fukudome SHigeri, Koga's Chief of staff would later note “although the planes were not originally to be used in such offensive operations, we could not just stand by and not employ them." By midday on October the 31st, the Japanese had discovered the American task force that had departed Guadalcanal en route for Bougainville. The IJN were determined to interrupt the operation. Kusaka sent a cruiser-destroyer task force led by Vice admiral Omori Sentaro. Departing Rabual Omori had the two heavy cruisers, Myoko and Haguro; two light cruisers, Sendai and Nagara; and two destroyers. Now Omori was the commander of Cruiser division 5 of the Combined fleet, not of the 8th fleet. He just happened to be at Rabaul covering the movement of the 17th division at the time, he was given command of his division and the main strength of the 8th fleet. Omori sailed out at 3pm in the direction of the Shortland islands believing that to be the allied target. Poor weather hindered his force and his search planes failed to locate any allied ships. Thus by 9am on November the 1st he was on his way back to Rabaul. Yet right as his ships were turning around, suddenly they received reports that the Americans had hit the beaches of Cape Torokina. Omori was quickly reinforced with a destroyer squadron and a destroyer transport group consisting of the Amagiri, Fumizuki, Uzuki, Yunagi and Minazuki each carrying 200 troops of a 1000 special trained raider group of the 17th division. This was the 2nd mobile raiding units from the 2nd battalion, 54th regiment led by Major Miwa Mitsuhiro. They were going to perform a counter landing against the marines at Mutupino point near the village of Toroko, due south of the marine beachhead. Within 6 hours, Omoro departed once again to hit the enemy fleet, but he lacked a real battle plan. At 6:30pm Omori rendezvoused with the transports at the St. George channel and together they proceeded towards Bougainville. At 7:20 the convoy was spotted by an american bomber who dropped a bomb nearly hitting the Sendai. Based on this Omori knew the Americans knew he was coming so he concluded a counterlanding was far too dangerous. Instead he decided to send the slower destroyer transports back to Rabaul. Omori believed the enemy transports were still in Empress Augusta Bay, thus if he could sneak in and destroy them, the marines would be stuck on the island without much of their supplies and without hope of quick rescue.  Meanwhile Merrills task force 39 had retired to the vicinity of Vella Lavella, but soon received news of Omori's incoming convoy. Halsey had to order his only naval force in the area to go out once again to protect the beachhead and intercept the enemy. Merrills crews had been at it for more than 24 hours by this point and were quite exhausted. Now Merrill's force went in very cautiously, because they were aware the Japanese would be outgunning them and of course the IJN held the dreaded long lance torpedoes. Thus Merrill chose to detach his destroyers who would go out in front to see if they could intercept Omori's forces before the long lances could be put to use. He intended to take the fight to the west of Empress Augusta Bay where he could block the enemy from the beachhead. He had his leading destroyers 3 miles ahead and deployed his forces along a north-south axis with the cruisers in the center, maintaining a range of 19,000 yards or more from the deadly IJN destroyers and their feared long lances. His plan was to exploit the offensive capabilities of his destroyers by letting them unleash their attacks before he would have his cruisers unleash their 6 inch guns. He hoped his destroyers would be able to sneak into range and hit the Japanese destroyers before they could launch their torpedo salvos. Omori was at a disadvantage intelligence wise, he had no idea about Merrills forces whereabouts. Moreover he had to rely on spotter planes because he was forewarned their radar would give away their location to the enemy if used. As Omori would later tell interrogators  “We had some modified aircraft radar sets in action but they were unreliable. I do not know whether the sets or operators were poor, but I did not have confidence in them.” Thus he had no idea of the position or size of the American flotilla, still he believed the enemy transports were in the bay, though in reality they would be nearly 40 miles south. Omori still lacking any real battle plan arrayed his force in three columns with his two heavy cruisers Myoko and Haguro in the center; Ijuins screen of light cruiser Sendai; and destroyers Shiratsuyu, Samidare and Shigure to the left and rear admiral Osugi Morikazu's screen of light cruiser Agano; and destroyers Wakatsuki, Hatsukaze and Naganami. As the Japanese approached the area, task force 39 were sailing 20 miles west of the beachhead. Merrills flagship Montpelier was the first to make radar contact with the enemy at 2:30 on November 2nd. Omori's fleet was 35,900 yards out. Merrill's changed his course to head due north then reversed south with his cruisers to find a favorable position to try and cross Omori's T. Merrill sent Commander Bernard Austins destroyed out to hit the Japanese southern flank while Captain Burke was ordered to take an intercept course that would force the Japanese to be in a vulnerable position for the destroyers to launch torpedoes into their left flank. At 2:45am a Japanese aircraft finally spotted the Americans and began dropping flares over them to allowed the light cruiser Sendai to lead the northern column over. However by this point it was all but too late for the Japanese. Burke had closed in on their left flank and launched 25 torpedoes at Ijuin's column. After launching the torpedoes Burke had his ships separate and it would be an hour before they could all be gathered again to form a full circle and return to their firing positions. The battle would be very chaotic, the US destroyers experienced a hard time trying to maintain contact with each other and several times would fire upon each other by accident. All 25 torpedoes would miss, because Omori ordered his ships to make a hard right turn. At 2:50 the Samidare launched a full salvo of 8 torpedoes which missed their main targets but a single torpedo managed to hit the destroyer USS Foote blowing up a large part of her stern. Cruiser Cleveland and destroyer Spence would accidentally run into each other doing light damage trying to avoid the damaged Foote. Merrill could no longer wait for the results of the destroyer attacks and ordered his cruisers to open fire at 2:50am. Merrills cruisers would unleash a continuous fire using their 6 inch guns while maintaining a coordinated figure 8 pattern to confuse the enemy and avoid torpedoes. The tactic had been very well rehearsed and the commanders were perfectly in tune with another. James Fahey, a sailor aboard Merrill's flagship Montpelier, described the long night illuminated by lightning, flares, star shells, and muzzle flashes. “The big eight inch salvos, throwing up great geysers of water, were hitting very close to us. Our force fired star shells in front of the Jap warships so that our destroyers could attack with torpedoes. It was like putting a bright light in front of your eyes in the dark. It was impossible to see. The noise from our guns was deafening.” The Sendai was the first to be hit taking a 6 inch shell to her rudder before it exploded near her boiler rooms. Sendai experienced a series of explosions and quickly sank. The destroyers Samidare and Shiratsuyu behind the Sendai collided with another trying to evade the naval gunfire and would end up taking positions around the stricken Sendai already sinking by this point. Merrill then shifted the focus to the other two Japanese columns forcing Osugi's column to head west running across Omori's cruisers. The Hatsukaze tried to move between two heavy cruisers and collided with the Omori's flagship Myoko at 3:07. Hatsukaze was so crippled by the collision she was much easier to hit as a result was found by Burkes reformed 45th destroyer division by 5:30am and 5 of the destroyers proceeded to batter her with shells until she sank at 5:40am. The Myoko meanwhile was hit by 6 shells, but fortunately for her 4 of them were duds, not causing enough damage to slow down the flagship. Next the USS Spence and Thatcher ran into another, but were able to carry on the fight. Both sides were having trouble running into each other, Merrills cruisers performing the 8 pattern at high speed allowed them to evade most gunfire. At 3:20 Omori opened fire with his heavy armament, both torpedoes and naval gunfire from his cruisers. The torpedoes missed, but 3 dud shells hit Denver into her forward section, causing water to slow the ship down. The other cruisers were forced to slow their speed to match her. Light cruisers Columbia received a 8 inch shell hit, luckily it also failed to explode. The Japanese fire was becoming heavier and more accurate forcing Merrill to respond with a smoke screen in front of his cruisers. Merrill made sure to keep his distance from the Japanese. When their range closed in on 13,000 yards at 326 am he ordered a 180 degree turn to the north. The radical maneuvering by Merrills cruisers made it extremely difficult to accurately fire upon them, but also for Merrills cruisers to hit Omori's. At 3:30am Omori decided to retire in the mistaken belief that his Long Lances had sunk or heavily damaged Merrill's cruisers. Omori had received a false report claiming “one torpedo hit on leading US cruiser, two torpedo hits on second US cruiser, two torpedo hits on third US cruiser. Shell fire also reported on US Force.” In the meantime Burkes destroyers had re-entered the fray of battle and began firing upon the doomed Sendai. After they pursued the Shiratsuyu and Samidare but both destroyers got extremely lucky when Commander Austin confused Burke into believing that the ship he saw turning northwards was actually the Spence. By 4:00am the Sendai was sinking taking with her 185 crew. Ijuin and 311 other survivors would later be rescued on November 3rd by Submarine RO-104. The Hatsukaze would be the last to sink at 5:40am. As dawn was breaking, Merrill urgently called for all available fighters to come to his aid as he expected the Japanese to toss the kitchen sink of air forces at him. Just before 8am a formation of 80 Zeros and 18 dive bombers arrived and began attacking his cruisers desperately performing anti-aircraft maneuvers. The allied aircraft were delayed by bad weather resulting in only 8 Hellcats, 1 marine corsair, 3 P-38s and 4 New Zealander P40s showing up. The allied pilots would claim to down 16 Japanese aircraft, though in reality it would only be 8. Merrills forces performing a defensive circular cordon would claim to down 17 further Japanese aircraft. The Japanese managed two hits, one causing minor damage to the USS Montpelier. The Japanese had lost their chance to stop the invasion of Bougainville. Merrills handling of the battle, particularly his figure 8 maneuver, had negated the dreaded super weapon of the enemy, the Type 93 long lance torpedo. It was to be the last major surface engagement of the Solomons area. Halsey would later reflect on the Japanese attempt to hit the landing forces at Cape Torokina  “was the most desperate emergency that confronted me in my entire term as COMSOPAC (Commander South Pacific).” Commodore Reifsnider was ordered to bring his transports back to Cape Torokina to resume the unloading. The unloading of the cargo would be completed by 3pm. Vice admiral Omori's force withdrew back to Rabaul. It was soon joined by four more cruisers and a number of destroyers from Truk. The reluctant Admiral Koga according to Admiral Fukudome decided to commit some of the very best units from the undamaged 2nd fleet “to cooperate with the carrier-based planes which had been sent from Vice-Admiral Ozawa's fleet in order to check the [US] Bougainville operations.” 7 heavy cruisers, the Takao, Maya, Atago, Suzuya, Mogami, Chikuma, and Chokai; a light cruiser, the Noshiro; four destroyers; and a number of service ships would depart Truk on November 3. The once dominant IJN fleet so surely footed in the early days of the war now was hesitant and indecisive. Nevertheless, Koga would unleash another attack against Empress Augusta Bay. Koga placed the new naval force under Admiral Kurita who would attempt to intercept futher American forces enroute to Bougainville. On November 4th, Wilkinson would be bringing the 21st marines aboard 8 destroyer transports and 8 LSTs. 3548 men led by Colonel Evans Ames, alongside 5000 tons of supplies and equipment escorted by destroyers Waller, Saufley, Philip, Renshaw, Eaton and Sigourney.  Halsey received word of the new Japanese force and realized the situation was critical. If Halsey did not turn back the incoming threat, his forces on Bougainville would not receive their planned reinforcements. Halsey was thus ready to take a risk, he was going to send carriers. As Halsey would later write “perhaps the success of the South Pacific War, hung on it being stopped.”. Against conventional wisdom, that carriers should not be exposed to land-based aircraft attacks, he ordered Rear Admiral Sherman's task force built around the USS Saratoga and Princeton to face a force of possibly 200 Japanese aircraft. The risks for Hasley were personal as well as professional “I sincerely expected both air groups to be cut to pieces and both carriers stricken, if not lost. (I tried not to remember my son Bill was aboard one of them), but we could not let the men at Tokorina be wiped out while we stood by and wrung our hands.” Halsey's Chief of Staff, Admiral Carney, recalled that before making the decision to attack with his carriers, his commander “suddenly looked 150 years old.” Shermans task for now designated Task Group 50.4 consisted of carrier Saratoga; light carrier Princeton; and destroyers Stack, Sterett, Wilson, Izard, Conner, Bell, Charrette, Boyd, Bradford and Cowell. He would be supported by General Twinings AirSols in any way possible. Halsey also requested MacArthur allow Kenney's 5th air force to join in on the battle. On November 5th, aided by some bad weather, a surprise air raid was performed against Rabaul. Sherman's carrier force was 230 miles away from Rabaul near Cape Torokina when they began launching aircraft at 9am. The Saratoga launched 16 Avengers and 22 Dauntless. Princeton launched 7 Avengers. The carrier aircraft were escorted by 52 hellcats making a formation of 97 aircraft in all. This was their entire payload . The aircraft flew at a low level as they approached Rabaul anti-aircraft defenses by 10:20. They kept a tight formation, flying right through the flak which prevented the 70 Zeros from intercepting them properly. As we have seen during this series, the Japanese anti-aircraft guns were honestly pretty terrible. Added to this, the American aircraft enjoyed much better armor than their Japanese counterparts, particularly the Zero fighter. Commander Henry Caldwell led the bombers towards Blanche Bay where they peeled off at 14,500 feet. The Dauntless dive bombed the targets before them as the Avengers time their approaches to hit the same targets at the same time. Within just 30 minutes the attack absolutely devastated the Japanese plans. Heavy cruiser Maya was trying to leave the harbor during the attack but took a 500 lb bomb hit to her catapult area which set off a series of explosions, blowing up her engine rooms and causing heavy casualties. As Maya was left fully disabled, the Mogami managed to clear the harbor but took a torpedo hit. Her number 1 and 2 turrets were flooded, forcing her crews to scramble to put out fires.  The Atago suffered three very near misses, which damaged her hull, armament, and machinery.  The Takao took a bomb to her starboard side, damaging her hull and machinery. TheChikuma received only slight damage and was able to depart for Truk at 20:38. The Suzuya, which was just preparing for refueling, tried to evade and was only slightly damaged. Aside from this the other light cruisers and destroyers did not receive any damage. 70 sailors died aboard the Maya, 23  died aboard the Mogami, Takao and Atago. Captain George Chandler, a P-38 fighter pilot described how “There were B-24 bombers up high and B-25 bombers attacking right down on the deck dropping ‘frag' bombs on the airplanes along the runways … we did our best work at high altitude, but we also took part in combat a thousand feet off the ground.” Taking advantage of Hasleys daring attack, General Kenney sent 27 B-24's and 67 P-38s to bomb the warehouse area on the western side of the harbor. They were challenged by only 15 Zero's who would lose two in the process. The Japanese facilities were wrecked by the attack. The Americans lost 5 bombers and 5 fighters while taking down 11 Zeros. The cautious Admiral Mineichi Koga withdrew his forces back to Truk. The Japanese Naval threat to the invasion of Bougainville was ended. A Japanese naval officer later admitted that they had given up on Bougainville mainly because of “the serious damage received by several Second Fleet cruisers at Rabaul by carrier attack …” The success of the raid on Rabaul left Halsey ecstatic. “It is real music to me and opens the stops for a funeral dirge for Tojo's Rabaul.” Sherman grabbed all of his returning places expecting a Japanese counterstrike. A Japanese scout plane discovered Sherman's task force around midafternoon and Kusaka immediately dispatched eighteen torpedo bombers after the Americans. At around dusk the Japanese discovered what they believed to be the task force and attacked. Although they later claimed a great air victory, in reality they hit at an LCI and a PT boat escorting an LCT back from Cape Torokina. A torpedo lodged in the engine room of the LCI and killed one man. That was the extent of the damage to the "task force." In return, the Japanese lost one plane. It was hardly an even exchange, and no compensation at all for the havoc wreaked earlier upon the 2nd Fleet. Halsey yet again showed what a formidable and aggressive commander he could be, his gamble paid off greatly. The Americans had secured their naval superiority in the South Pacific and it would remain that way for the rest of the war. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Admiral Merrill performed an excellent battle against a larger IJN force. Admiral Hasley lived up to his reputation, he performed a bold gamble and it paid off big time. Now the Americans would dominate the South Pacific for the rest of the Pacific War.  

Last time we spoke about the Japanese counteroffensive against the Marine beachhead on Bougainville. Things were looking bad for the Japanese before they got even worse. The Japanese had underestimated the amount of Marines on Bougainville and sent Major Mitsuhiro with his special units to try and hit the marine left flank, later to join up with the Iwasa detachment. Mitsuhiro's men were in for a hell of a surprise when they attacked a larger force than expected. They took heavy losses before pulling back into the interior of the island to search for Iwasa. Meanwhile Iwasa also bit off more than he could chew with a counteroffensive targeting the Piva trail. In the end the marines not only repelled the attacks, but also greatly expanded their perimeter. We also spoke about the battle of Changde seeing the forces of Yokoyama crush multiple Chinese armies and unleash chemical and biological warfare in the area. This episode is the Battle of Sattelberg Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Vice Admiral John Henry Towers the commander of pacific air force circled a plan to recapture Wake island and use it as a springboard to latte assault the Marshalls that were around 500 miles south. Admiral Spruance favored opening a new campaign much father southeast, where the fleet could count on more land base air support in the south pacific. Spruance wanted to launch an offensive into the Gilbert Islands, some 600 miles southeast of the Marshalls. Admiral Nimitz was swapped by this and in turn twisted King's arm. And thus was born Operation Galvanic, the simultaneous capture of the Ellice islands, the Gilbert Islands and Nauru set for November 15th. Since his victorious return from the battle of Midway a year earlier, Admiral Raymond Spruance had privately longed for a major command at sea. But it was an admirals way to lobby for a job and he would not be surprised when Nimitz told him one morning in May of 1943  “There are going to be some changes in the high command of the fleet. I would like to let you go, but unfortunately for you I need you here” Spruance replied “Well, the war is an important thing. I personally would like to have another crack at the Japs, but if you need me here, this is where I should be.” The next day the two met again and Nimitz said “I have been thinking this over during the night. Spruance, you are lucky. I've decided that I am going to let you go, after all.” Nimitz reported to King the new assignment during their meeting in San Francisco a month later. On May 30th, Spruance received the rank of vice admiral and shortly after was detached from the CINCPAC staff and placed in command of the Central Pacific Force, later to be designated the 5th Fleet. It would be the largest seagoing command in the history of the US Navy.  Spruance would have little more than four months to plan the largest and most complex amphibious operation yet attempted. Naval forces and landing troops would be taken from far flung parts of the south pacific and USA mainland. His key commanders had not yet been identified. Spruance immediately recruited a chief of staff with a lot of experience and initiative, his old friend and shipmate, Captain Charles “Carl” Moore. Moore had been serving in Washington as a member of Admiral King's war planning staff. Spruance asked Moore to select other key staff officers, poaching many from naval HQ. Moore would arrive to Pearl Harbor on August 5th and took up a spare bedroom in Nimitz and Spruance house atop Makalapa Hill. Now Spruance was the type of manager that delegated everything possible, he once said “Looking at myself objectively, I think I am a good judge of men; and I know that I tend to be lazy about many things, so I do not try to do anything that I can pass down the line to someone more competent than I am to do it.” Moore was perfectly fine with this philosophy. Some would say Spruance was a bit lazy, the man did seem to bore rather easily and was a compulsive walker, often spent days just walking, grabbing staff with him. Moore wrote about such an instance once that occurred a few days after he arrived to Hawaii  “Raymond is up to his tricks already, and yesterday took me on an eight mile hike in the foothills. It was hot and a hard pull at times, and particularly so as we carried on a lively conversation all the way which kept me completely winded.” On this occasion Moore tried to talk to Spruance about operation Galvanic, but Spruance kept changing subjects. A few days later Moore would write to his wife “Yesterday Raymond stepped up the pace and the distance and we covered over 10 miles in three hours. My right leg caught up with my left and both were wrecked by the time I got back. . . . If he can get me burned to a crisp or crippled from walking he will be completely happy.” Spruance wanted Kelly Turner to command his amphibious fleet. Turner at that point held a year of hard experience in the South Pacific. He was the navy's preeminent amphibious specialist. Spruance knew the man well both at sea and at the Naval War College. Spruance told Nimitz in Juen“I would like to get Admiral Kelly Turner from Admiral Halsey, if I can steal him,” However with the northern Solomons campaign in high gear, Halsey was not too keen to release Turner. Nimitz sent a personal note to Hasley explaining that he had been ordered to wage a new offensive in the central Pacific: “This means I must have Turner report to me as soon as possible.” Unfortunately for Hasley, Turner also took some of their best staff officers with him. Major General Holland Smith would command the invasion troops, designated the 5th amphibious corps or ‘VAC”. Smith was one of the pioneers of amphibious warfare. He had persuaded the navy to adopt Andrew Higgen's shallow draft boats as landing craft and successfully trained several divisions in amphibious operations over at Camps Elliot and Pendleton in California. He fought hard to get combat command in the Pacific and was backed up by Secretary Knox and Admiral King. Nimitz did not know the man well, but Spruance had worked with him in the 1930's when they were both stationed in the Caribbean. Turner and Smith would make quite the combustible pair. Both men were aggressive, ambitious and quite overbearing. They were both used to running things without competition. Both were prone to fits of rage and this earned them the nicknames “terrible turner and Howlin'mad'smith”. At Guadalcanal Turner once offended General Vandegrift by infringing upon his command, this led Spruance to wonder “whether we could get the operation planned out before there was an explosion between them.” Smith had met Kelly Turner once in Washington and he found the admiral to be precise and courteous, describing him as “an exacting schoolmaster, affable in an academic manner. He could be plain ornery. He wasn't called ‘Terrible Turner' without reason.” For Operation Galvanic, Turner expected to be above Smith in the chain of command. This was consistent with how Operation Watchtower went about. But Smith wanted direct command of all amphibious troops throughout the operation, prior, during and after the landings, and he wanted to directly report to Spruance. Spruance wanted nothing to do with such arguments and because of his laissez-faire style this meant Moore would be acting as referee between Turner and Smith. Here is what Moore had to say of it “Holland Smith particularly complained about Kelly Turner. He was a whining, complaining type. He loved to complain. He loved to talk and loved to complain, and he would come and sit on my desk and growl about Turner. ‘All I want to do is kill some Japs. Just give me a rifle. I don't want to be a commanding general. Just give me a rifle, I'll go out there and shoot some Japs. . . . I'm not worried about anything else around here.' See, that kind of a line. I was trying to soothe him down, and Turner would come and complain about that blankety-blank Smith, couldn't get any cooperation out of him, and so forth.”Through these referee'd battles a compromise was met. Turner would be in command of the landing forces until the shore commander went ashore and assumed command of the troops. When turner was informed, all the troops ashore would fall under the command of the 5th amphibious corps and thus report to Smith. This model was accepted by both men and would remain in force throughout the Pacific War.  So at this point its important to note the US Navy had still not fully recovered from the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, and was still in the process of building the largest fleets the world had ever seen. You have probably heard this phrase many times: “World War Two would be won through British brains, American brawn, and Russian blood.” As said at the Tehran conference of December 1943 by Joseph Stalin. That brawn was simply incredible. From the start of the war until the end of 1943, the US would commission 7 aircraft carriers, the Essex, Lexington, Yorktown, Bunker Hill, Intrepid, Wasp and Hornet. Of the new Essex-class, 9 light carriers would be commissioned the Independence, Princeton, Belleau Wood, Cowpens, Monterey, Cabot, Langley, Bataan and San Jacinto. Of the new Independence class there would be 35 escort carriers, no worries not going to list them all haha. There would also be 6 new battleships the South Dakota, Indiana, Massachusetts, Alabama, Iowa and New Jersey; 4 new heavy cruisers, the  Baltimore, Boston, Canberra and Quincy; 16 light cruisers, 212 destroyers, 234 destroyer escorts and 92 submarines. To match this in the same period, Japanese commissioned two aircraft carriers the Junyo and Hiyo; one light aircraft carrier the Ryuho; 4 escort carriers the  Unyo, Chuyo, Kaiyo and Shinyo; 2 superbattleships the Yamato and Musashi; 4 light cruisers the Agano, Oyodo, Noshiro and Yahagi; 22 destroyers, 15 destroyer escorts and 61 submarines. Thus it was absolutely clear, the Americans had a significant advantage in naval production.  On September 4th, the 5th amphibious corps of Smith were officially established. Smith proceeded to train and control the units assigned to operation Galvanic which included Major General Julian Smith's 2nd Marine division and Major General Ralph Smith's 27th division, that's a lot of Smiths. As the 5th amphibious force and corps were still undergoing organization during the planning phase of the Gilberts operations, much of the burden for tacticaling planning fell initially onto the staffs of the two divisions involved. Julian Smith was informed in august his job was to capture the Tarawa and Apamama atolls. Ralph Smith was told he was to invade Nauru, but Holland Smith believed Nauru offered too many problems. Nauru was 390 miles west of the Gilberts and would place strain on available shipping. Simultaneous landings in the two places would further widen the dispersal of supporting fleet element, a dangerous division of forces in view of the presumed possibility of a Japanese naval counterattack. Finally, the terrain on Nauru would make an amphibious assault and the land fighting extremely costly to be warranted by the strategic advantages to be gained. Makin Atoll was considered no less suitable than Nauru as an air base for operations against the Marshalls and was thought to be considerably less well defended. Makin was also only about 105 miles north of Tarawa making it possible to concentrate the supporting fleet in one area and thus avoid the danger of excessive dispersion. So in early October, Spruance and Nimitz made the decision to invade Makin Atoll instead. Unfortunately the Americans did not have great intelligence on the Gilberts, so they had to do some photographic coverage of Tarawa and Makin between July and October 1943. The USS Nautilus contributed a lot to the intelligence effort by obtaining hydrographic and each conditions for both atolls, such as their surfs, reefs, beaches, lagoon entrance, current data, tidal data and so forth. The unsexy logistical stuff no one talks about. If you want to invade a beach, you have to know about said beach. During September and October a total of 16 former residents and travelers of the islands were attached to Turners staff to help out. Many of these were Australian, New Zealanders, Fijian naval reserve officers, officials of the Western pacific high commission, Australian army reserve officers and enlisted men and a few civilians. Another source of information was given by Lt Colonel James Roosevelt who had taken part in the raid upon Makin. For the landings at Makin, Turner's task for 54 and 53. He would have at his disposal 4 destroyer transports, one Cargoship, one LSD and 9 LSTS to transport the reinforced 165th regiment of Colonel Gardiner Conroy. He would be supported by the 7th army defense battalion, detachments of the 105th infantry regiment, 27th division, units of the 193rd tank battalion, 152nd engineer battalion, coastal artillery and anti-aircraft batteries of the 98th and 93rd Coastal artillery battalions, a platoon from the 5th Amphibious corps reconnaissance company, sundry medical, signal, ordnance, quartermaster and bomb disposal detachments. Their screening force would be 4 older battleships, 4 heavy cruisers, 13 destroyers and 3 escort carriers. The Tarawa force would be given one destroyer transport, 1 attack transport, 12 Destroyer transports, 3 AKA's, one LSD and 12 LST's under Rear Admiral Harry Hill, screened by 3 battleships, 3 heavy cruisers, 3 light cruisers, 21 destroyers and 5 escort carriers. Turner would also make a legendary decision. He appointed Colonel Eareckson, the veteran of the Aleutian Islands campaign to be commander of the support Aircraft, thus establishing a centralized system of ground control for support aircraft in amphibious operations. Eareckson became famous for his innovative tactics such as using radar equipped B-17's to guide P-38's to attack Kawanishi flying boats during the Aleutian islands campaign. He also pioneered low level bombing raids through the brutal aleutian weather. Aerial support, both at the tactical and strategic level would be provided by Rear admiral Charles Pownalls carrier task force 50 formed around 6 lage and 5 small carriers and by Rear admiral John Hoovers shore based aircraft; consisting of task groups 57.2/3/4. Both forces had to destroyer aircraft and air/harbor facilities at Tarawa, Mille, Jaluit, Makin and Nauru while simultaneously providing air support. Hoover also was responsible for conducting photographic reconnaissance over the Marshalls. After the air strikes and naval bombardment obliterated the Japanese defenses and installations, Turner planned to assault the beaches with the troops ferried using amphibian tractors, followed up by LCVPS and medium tanks in LCMS. For Tarawa, Ralph Smith's plan was a bit more elaborate and extreme, he was going to attempt something never done before. The amphibious assault of Tarawa had unique problems. There was no immediate means of achieving depth of deployment. The landing forces would initially be pinned down on a long narrow beach. The island offered basically no room for flank maneuvers and the aerial and naval bombardments would do little. Ralph assigned a major role to troops of a different regiment than the one that made up the main landing force. Detachments X and Y, of the 3rd Battalion, 105th Infantry and 193rd Tank Battalion,  led by Maj. Edward T. Bradt would be the first to land on the west coast of Butaritari, designated Red Beaches. This would be followed up quickly by the 1st and 3rd Battalions. On the right, the 3rd Battalion Landing Team would land on Red Beach 2 and seize the right half of the division beachhead to about 1,600 yards inland. Then they would move right to clear the area around Ukiangong Village and Ukiangong Point. Over on the left, the 1st Battalion Landing Team would land on Red Beach 1, seize the division beachhead in its zone of action and move left to capture the area from the north end of Red Beach to Flink Point. Meanwhile the reinforced 2nd Platoon of Company G, 165th Regiment, and 19 marines of the 4th Platoon of the 5th Amphibious Corps Reconnaissance Company were going to land on Kotabu island, lying just north of Flink point. This would secure the seward approaches into the lagoon. After two hours while the troops consolidated their beachhead the Z detachment of the 105th regiment led by Captain William Ferns would land on Yellow beach 2 on the north side of the island between On Chong's and King's Wharfs. The detachment would split into two groups, one heading east to clear Kings wharf the other west to clear On Chong's wharf. After this a wave of the 165th battalion would advance west. Comparing the two, Julian's plan was a lot more simple, it called for the landing at Betio of 3 battalions; the 2nd battalion, 8th marines, 2nd battalion and the  2nd and 3rd battalions 2nd marines. Colonel David Shoup and Colonel Elmer Hall would lead the 3 battalions.The 1st battalion, 2nd marines would be held in reserve. The corps reserve for Tarawa, Makin or Apamama would be Colonel Maurice Holmes 6th marines. Once the beachhead was secured, troops would advance across the island to the south, seizing the airfield and mopping up enemy positions along the major beaches To further prepare for Operation Galvanic, Admiral Pownall led three carriers, the Lexington, Princeton and Belleau Wood to strike the Gilberts on September 18th. Supported by 38 Liberators flying out of Canton, Funafuti and Guadalcanal, Pownall made 6 separate and unopposed air strikes against Tarawa. A ton of fuel and ammunition was destroyed, several buildings were wrecked and a small freighter was sunk. Attacks on Makin saw three flying boats lit on fire with some damage done to shore installations. What was more important than these strikes was the photographic coverage that accompanied them. Zero fighter interception was found at either, though two Japanese medium bombers were shot down northwest of Makin. According to the diary of a Japanese laborer, 28 laborers were killed during a strike on Makin, most likely from a direct bomb hit to a shelter. On Beito they hit a runway, though it would be quickly repaired. Pownall tried to keep the strikes going but now saw an interception from 18 zeros which shot down 5 of his aircraft.  To follow up the raid on the Gilberts, Admiral Montgomery hit Wake with one of the largest carrie strike forces to date. The Essex, Lexington, Yorktown, Cowpens, Independence and Belleau Wood with support from land based aircraft hit Wake on October 5th and 6th. Over 67 Japanese planes were reported to be destroyed in the air and on the ground. Shore installations were also battered heavily. Then beginning on november 13th, land-based bombers of Admiral Hoover made nightly raids against Tarawa, Makin, Nauru and some central Marshall islands. Meanwhile between November 13-17th, Major General Willis Hale's 7th air force's heavy bombers flew 141 bombing sorties against the Gilberts and Marshalls. They dropped over 173 tons of bombs, destroying at least 5 Japanese aircraft and inflicting heavy damage to their facilities and installations. Against the Americans, the Japanese forces in the area initially were that of Rear Admiral Abe Koso's 6th base force operating on Kwajalein. Koso commanded the 61st guard unit on Kwajalian, 62nd guard unit on Jaluit, 63rd guard unit on Taroa, 64th guard unit at Wotje,  65th guard unit at Wake, 43rd guard unit at Nauru, a detachment of the 63rd guard unit at Ocean island and another detachment of the 51st guard unit on Makin. For the Marshalls he had the 22nd air flotilla consisting of 46 Zeros, 40 kates, 3 vals, 5 flying boats and 11 reconnaissance aircraft. The raid of Makin back in 1942 alerted the Japanese to its significance so they sent the 6th Yokosuka SNLF to help occupy the Gilberts. During the spring of 1943, the IJN created the 3rd special base force of Rear-Admiral Shibazaki Keiji who would defend Tarawa, Makin, Apamama, Nauru and Ocean island. The Sasebo 7th SNLF would be sent to Tarawa, the 2nd Yokosuka SNLF to Nauru. The Japanese went to work on Makin and Tarawa constructing concrete and log emplacements for guns of all sizes. They used coconut tree logs to build tank barricade, tank pits, laid underwatch obstacles and dugouts for riflemen and machine gunners. On Makin the airbase was expanded and by july 1943 was able to take land based bombers. The Marshalls, Marianas and Carolines alongside other islands would be reinforced in preparation for expected American offensives. Four new south sea detachments were formed and tow mobile amphibious brigades that would be used for counterlandings. The Japanese were outmanned and outgunned, but they would make the Americans pay in blood for every inch of land, island by island. Now it is time for us to travel back to Green Hell as the allies were preparing to hit Sattelberg. By November 9th, the Australians knew the Japanese had two out posts west of Jivevaneng, at Green and Coconut ridges with another strong patrol base at Steeple Tree Hill. Whitehead decided to deploy the 2/24th battalion on the right to guard the enemy along the Palanko road; the 2/48th would take up the center advancing along the sattelberg road supported by the 1st tank battalion and the 2/23rd would take the left advancing along Sisi. Major General Frank Berryman would be appointed the new commander of the 2nd corps, as General Morshead was appointed commander of the New Guinea Force. The date for the new offensive was set for November 17th. A preliminary advance was made by a company along the sattelberg road to seize the enemy held Green Ridge. Under the support of heavy machine gun and artillery fire.    At 8:20am two batteries and the company of the 2/2nd machine gun battalion fired upon Green Ridge. Captain Isaksson's company of the 2/48th then moved up, but were unable to properly follow up the bombardment. The men advanced at a slow rate up the ridge because of thick bamboo. Both the nearby near and far features were strongly defended and would only be captured by 10 and 12:4-pm respectfully. The capture of the Far feature took the machine gunners 26,000 rounds to keep the enemy heads down for the infantry to storm their positions. Captain Brocksopp's company occupied Green Ridge, Isakssons took White Trunk Tree lying on the junction of Sattelberg road and the Sisi track by 1:40pm. 5 men were killed in the process, 18 Japanese died on Green Ridge. At first light on November 17th, four Matilda tanks led by Major Samuel Hordern led the way to the start line converted under the noise of a deadly rocket barrage. Beginning at 6:30am  rocket propelled bombs were fired from jeeps. These 30 pound bombs had a maximum range of 1200 yards. Several of them ended up being duds, but those that did explode had a very lethal effect, killing within a radius of 50 yards. On top of this came artillery and mortar bombardments, until Horderns tanks began smashing Coconut ridge with the infantry close behind them. A company of the 2/23rd would find Sisi unoccupied and continued north to help defend Green Ridge. Around 50 yards up the track the Australians found the first signs of opposition, a heavy machine gun post. The tanks fired blindly at the enemy defenses, mostly pillboxes and foxholes. Despite the terrifying attack, the Japanese held their ground and replied using machine guns, mortars and grenades, until the tanks blew them and their defenses to pieces. Halfway to Coconut ridge, the Matilada's had to halt to refill their ammunition. Within all of the excitement, the tank crews had run out of ammunition for their Besa guns. The Besa's had been firing bursts of around 50 rounds when they could have been firing 10s. Three deeps loaded with ammunition at Jivevaneng rushed forward as the tanks backed up some 60 yards to protect their approach. All of this was coordinated using walkie talkies, an absolutely crucial technology of the war. Meanwhile the 2/24th continued north to attack Japanese positions along the Palank road and to the south the 2/23rd met resistance halfway to Steeple Tree. At 10:20am, Horderns tanks were resuming their advance, eliminating pockets of resistance one by one. Upon reaching the Kunai Knoll on the southern Coconuts, two Matilda's became disabled. Upon seeing the halting tanks, the Japanese unleashed as much firepower as they could pinning down the infantry alongside their tanks. Lt Colonel Robert Ainslie ordered the men to advance on without the tanks. The men stormed the slopes of the Kunai Knoll, forced to crawl forward under heavy fire. It became a fierce battle, the Australians were unable to make much ground and forced to dig in for the night. Two companies dug in on the slopes of the Kunai Knoll while a third dug in near White Trunk Tree. Despite the terrifying tank attack, the Japanese did not flinch and fought throughout the day to halt the Australian advance. However during the night the Australians unleashed an artillery bombardment forcing the Japanese to abandon the ridge. The next morning, the Australians found the ridge abandoned and went to work repairing the two disabled tanks so they could continue the advance. Three more Matildas wielding 2 pounders and 3 inch Howitzers were brought up. The 2/2rd now advanced towards Mararuo, pushing the Japanese up a spur. The tanks advanced again, allowing the Australians to go another 250 yards until they were met again with heavy resistance. The Japanese held very strong positions upon the 2600 foot Steeple Tree Hill. Their system of defense was to have positions at every possible line of approach near bamboo obstacles. The Japanese would wait to fire until the infantry were just a few yards away to cause maximum damage. Armed with 37mm anti-tank guns the Japanese did all they could to neutralize the tank menace. By nightfall the attackers were forced to pull back to Coconut ridge and during the night the Japanese launched counter attacks using grenades and small arms.  The next morning at 8am the Australians resumed their advance. The tanks led the way, but they were met with extremely fast and well coordinated anti-tank measures. At around 100 yards from the start line, the advance was halted by an anti-tank ditch 6 feet wide and 4 feet deep. Major Moodie's engineers of the 2/13th field company were able to dislodge the tanks and soon the tanks were overrun an 81mm mortar position. The tanks ran havoc upon a Woodpecker and two light machine gun positions, then after another 150 yards ran into another tank ditch around 10am. Lt Farquhars platoon charged past the tanks to give the engineers room to dislodge them only to see the tanks hit another ditch when they came forward again. The men fashioned two fougasses out of 4 gallon drums filled with petrol to hit the defenders of one of the slopes later to be named Fougasse Corner. A fougasse by the way is a projectile weapon, typically using a 40 gallon drum with a flammable substance like petrol. They would be inclined and when triggered using an explosive charge, shot a flame going perhaps 10 feet up, 3 feet wide for about 30 yards. Picture a really big flamethrower burst. This was unleashed on the slope causing roughly 20 casualties. The Japanese would leave 46 of their dead abandoning the slope when the Australians charged into them. The Japanese then launched a counterattack against the Fougasse Corner leading to more casualties, but were repelled. To the north, the 2/24th launched an attack on a knoll near the summit of the 2200 Feature. After an artillery bombardment, Lt Caples platoon took the unoccupied knoll, but soon the Japanese began encircling them. They fought until 2:30pm when the Australians finally established a secure position on the knoll. Meanwhile, General Katagiri was preparing to send the 79th regiment to attack the mouth of the Song River. Katagiri was facing a dire supply situation. Although 2-3 barges came up daily to bring supplies to Kanimi and Lakona, once the supplies landed they had to be carried overland and that was the crux of the problem. The main roads, Kanimi to Ago to Lakona to Wario to Sattelberg and secondary roads leading to Zageheme and Merikeo were all steep and mountainous, taking 5 days to traverse. This led the supply line to the front lines to be inconsistent. From the Diary entry of an unknown Japanese infantry man at Sattelberg October 15th "I eat potatoes and live in a hole and cannot speak in a loud voice. I live the life of a mud rat or similar creature" At the same time the 2/15th battalion had sent a diversionary force led by Major Newcomb with orders to "in conjunction with the opening of the attack towards Sattelberg… you are to command a diversionary force, broaden the apparent front of the attack on Sattelberg by simulating a new threat towards Wareo" The 2/15th set out on November 17th and reached Garabow the next day. They began bombarding it to  cause the distraction. This was done to support Whiteheads offensive while in the east Brigadier Porter was going to cut the enemy's main supply line by attacking along the coast. Porter sent the 2/32nd battalion to take some high ground at Pabu. On November 19th, the 2/32nd were able to seize Pabu, avoiding any enemy, finding the hill unoccupied. The next morning the 2/32nd began patrolling and found large numbers of Japanese 500 yards to their west, and that said enemy then found them. Katagiri feared a possible attack upon Bonga so he decided to launch a secondary counteroffensive on November 21st. Meanwhile the 2/48th resumed their advance, this time without Horderns tanks who could not traverse past 250 yards because of bamboo obstacles. By 9:30am the tanks were able to bypass the obstacles and caught up to the infantry. At 10am, Whitehead gave the order “Go ahead as fast as possible” and 50 minutes later the skirmishing began upon the first enemy positions. The Australians pushed on slowly in a sluggish battle but were able to capture Steeple Tree by the late afternoon. At the same time the 2/23rd were trying to drive the enemy away from the southern approaches to Steeple Tree, gradually linking up with the 2/48th.  To the north the 2/24th once again found themselves halted. The Japanese had created strong bamboo obstacles along the slopes that were difficult to traverse. In an attempt to force the issue, Wootten committed another troop of tanks to assist the 2/24th, but it would take a lot of time before the Matildas could climb the 2200 Feature. But the Japanese were caught between two enemy forces and were forced to pull back to Sattelberg during the night. The next morning the 2/48th resumed their advance while the 2/23rd patrolled towards Mararuo. Meeting no opposition the troops moved ahead quickly. At 4:35pm the enemy unleashed machine gun fire at point blank range upon them. The 2/48th tossed mortars and their tank support who crushed the enemy defenses, rapidly overwhelming the enemy, sending them scattering. But on November 22nd, Katagiri finally launched his counterattack using the bulk of the 79th regiment against Porters positions along the Song. Katagiri also sent the Fujii detachment led by Lt Colonel Fujii to attack Pabu. It just so happened Davies Company  had left Pabu to search for the main Japanese supply road, and they came across Horace's Hoof in the afternoon. A company sized force of the Fujii detachment began their attack forcing Davies company back towards Pabu. But that is it for New Guinea as we now need to travel over to Bougainville. Generals Geiger and Turnage ordered a group of naval and marine engineers with construction personnel led by Civil Engineer corps officer Commander William Painter to construct airfields in the interior of the island. They were escorted by units of the 21st marines and used aerial photographs to find an area about 3 miles inland, roughly 1 mile beyond the defensive perimeter where suitable sites were located for two airstrips to be made. Unable to expand the perimeter properly because of the swamps around them, Turnage directed the 21st marines to establish a strong outpost at the junction of the East-West and Numa Numa trails to cover the new airfield sites. On November 13th, the inexperienced 2nd battalion, 21st marines of Lt Colonel Eustace Smoak set out with E company in the lead. Unbeknownst to them, Colonel Hamanoue had just realized the tactical value of said junction and sent a battalion to occupy Coconut Grove the previous day. The men had managed to establish a solid defensive perimeter.  At 11:05 Company E ran right into an ambush. The Japanese unleashed machine gun and mortar fire with sniper support from the treelines. E companies commander sent a report back to Colonel Smoak, one of many panicked and incoherent reports he would receive from said company. This was the first combat experience for the 2nd battalion, 21st marines. Smoak rushed forward and established his command post close to the action. He ordered F company to relieve E company who had suffered heavy casualties. F company however, advanced too far to the right and suffered a lot of casualties in a disorganized manner. Unable to get artillery support, Smoak ordered his units to begin digging in for the night. The next morning, 5 light tanks of the 1st battalion, 21st regiment came up to support Smoak. While Smoak organized his forces, a air strike hit the Coconut grove area at 9:05am consisting of around 20 Avengers carrying 100lb bombs using 1 second delay fuses. The marines then performed an artillery barrage before resuming their advance upon the grove. The Japanese fired upon the tanks, managing to disable two of them. At this point Smoak ordered the disorganized assault to halt and began regrouping his men to attack again. This time they were able to break the Japanese resistance and by late afternoon established a perimeter around the Coconut Grove. The marines found 40 dead Japanese, the baptism under fire for the 2nd battalions, 21st marines cost them 20 dead men and 39 wounded. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Operation Galvanic was being prepared and in the meanwhile, a large number of air raids were hitting numerous places in the central pacific. The advance to sattelberg was getting closer day by day, the boys on Bougainville were finding inhospitable Japanese around every corner. 

In this episode, James interviews Philip Martin, author of From Orphan to High Flyer. In this book, Philip tells the story of his late friend Denis Eliot. Denis rose from the horrors of a Victorian-style British orphanage and brutal foster parents to command and pilot American-built RAF B-24 Liberators against the Japanese in Asia, then to fly RAF aircraft into the late 1950s during the Cold War, and finally to live a fulfilling existence beyond his time in the military. In the RAF, he defied death many times and was privileged to see lands far from where he was raised in the UK. Join James and Philip as they discuss Denis' fascinating life and career.This show is part of the Spreaker Prime Network, if you are interested in advertising on this podcast, contact us at https://www.spreaker.com/show/4747725/advertisement

The debut novel by E.J. Koh is short in length, but extensive in time and place. The Liberators follows several generations of two Korean families, and encapsulates how different individuals reckon with the legacy of war, love and betrayal within their lineage. In today's episode, Koh speaks with NPR's Ari Shapiro about the importance of zooming into people's ordinary lives to understand the impact of historic geopolitical events, and why understanding her own family's history influenced how she wrote her characters.

November 8, 2023 - At the height of the military dictatorship in South Korea, Insuk and Sungho are arranged to be married. The couple soon moves to San Jose, California, with an infant and Sungho's overbearing mother-in-law. Adrift in a new country, Insuk grieves the loss of her past and her divided homeland, finding herself drawn into an illicit relationship that sets into motion a dramatic saga and echoes for generations to come. Extraordinarily beautiful and deeply moving, The Liberators by E. J. Koh is an elegantly wrought family saga of memory, trauma, and empathy, and a stunning testament to the consequences and fortunes of inheritance. From the Gwangju Massacre to the 1988 Olympics, flashbacks to Korean repatriation after Japanese surrender, and the Sewol ferry accident, Koh's exquisitely drawn portraits and symphonic testimony from guards, prisoners, perpetrators, and liberators spans continents and four generations of two Korean families forever changed by fateful past decisions made in love and war. In this conversation with Anton Hur, E. J. Koh discusses her debut novel. For more information, please visit the link below: https://www.koreasociety.org/arts-culture/item/1729-e-j-koh-the-liberators-with-anton-hur

This week, Liberty and Danika discuss Bookshops & Bonedust, Gorgeous Gruesome Faces, The Liberators, and more great books! Subscribe to All the Books! using RSS, Apple Podcasts, or Spotify and never miss a book. Sign up for the weekly New Books! newsletter for even more new book news. It's happening, readers — we're bringing paperbacks! Whether you hate carrying around bulky hardcovers, you're on a budget, you want a wider range of recommendations, or all of the above, you can now get a paperback subscription from TBR, curated just for you by one of our Bibliologists. You can also gift it (and the holidays, they are coming.) Get all the details at mytbr.co. This content contains affiliate links. When you buy through these links, we may earn an affiliate commission. Books Discussed On the Show: Bookshops & Bonedust (Legends & Lattes) by Travis Baldree Gorgeous Gruesome Faces by Linda Cheng The Liberators by E. J. Koh Hunt on Dark Waters by Katee Robert Hot Springs Drive by Lindsay Hunter  A Grandmother Begins the Story by Michelle Porter World Within a Song: Music That Changed My Life and Life That Changed My Music by Jeff Tweedy  The Queer Girl is Going to Be Okay by Dale Walls For a complete list of books discussed in this episode, visit our website. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

WARBIRD RADIO - Warbird Radio Downunder Hosts Dave and Grant speak with Matt Henderson, who with his wife Kaz moved to Tocumwal airport's airpark in New South Wales in 2017, and then in 2019 they set up the Tocumwal Aviation Museum there. Matt has researched the fascinating history of Tocumwal, which was one of he biggest aerodromes in the world when it was built by the Australian Government for the US Forces in WWII. By the time the construction was completed the war situation had changed, and the USAAF no longer required it. It was therefore handed over to the Royal Australian Air Force who made it into a massive repair and maintenance base for the RAAF Consolidated B-24 Liberators and other aircraft, as well as a paratroop training school, and more.As well as the museum, and the popular cafe, Matt and Kaz also run airshows at Tocumwal, their third such event having just taken place in September 2023.And they have just taken possession of a new addition to the museum, an ex-RAAF Macchi 326, A7-083, handed over by the Air Force on the 20th of October 2023. This episode was recorded two weeks earlier but was embargoed till the handover had happened. #warbirdradio #tocumwal #warbirds #aviation #airmuseums

Many of the WW2 generation faced hardship in their youth (they did spend their childhood in the Great Depression), but few had as bad of an early life as Denis Elliott, who became an RAF Flight Lieutenant. At age three he was placed in a brutal and abusive orphanage in London and was later subject to beatings by his first foster father. It wasn't until the Second World War that everything in Denis's life began to change — he finally overcame the lack of confidence and self-esteem that had plagued his childhood in Kent and went on to become a skilled, confident, brave pilot flying operations against Japanese forces in Burma, Malaya and Thailand.He spent two stints serving in the RAF, which saw him posted across Africa, the Middle East, the Far East and Europe, flyingearning to flying B-24 Liberators and Avro Lancasters.Today's guest is Phillip Martin, author of “From Orphan to High-Flyer.” We discuss these stories, along with those of Denis's personal growth, friendship and overcoming adversity.This show is part of the Spreaker Prime Network, if you are interested in advertising on this podcast, contact us at https://www.spreaker.com/show/3101278/advertisement

My Guest June Hersh began her food writing career in 2004.  Her mantra is Eat Well-Do Good, and to that end, she writes books with a charitable flavor. Her first was Recipes Remembered, a Celebration of Survival (Ruder Finn Press May 2011), written in association with and to benefit the Museum of Jewish Heritage - a Living memorial to the Holocaust.  The book is a collection of stories and recipes from June's interviews with over 100 Holocaust survivors. This November, a new edition of her first book will be released by The History Press under the title Food, Hope & Resilience: Authentic Recipes and Remarkable Stories from Holocaust Survivors. The esteemed chef Daniel Boulud penned the foreword. Proceeds will benefit Holocaust organizations. June has also written The Kosher Carnivore (St. Martin's Press November 2011), Still Here, Inspiration from Survivors and Liberators of the Holocaust (Brian Marcus, 2015), Yoghurt a Global History (Reaktion Books 2021 and Iconic New York Jewish Food, a History and Guide with Recipes (The History Press, February 2023).  Summary Jewish food is a vibrant and diverse cuisine with a rich history, especially in New York City. June Hersh's book, "Iconic New York Jewish Food," explores this culinary landscape, focusing on the bagel, a beloved New York icon. Hersh examines the history, craftsmanship, and cultural significance of the bagel, as well as its role in Jewish food culture and traditions.   Topics in this episode Food writing, Holocaust recipes, and Jewish food heritage. (4:40) Jewish food traditions and recipe preservation. (10:16) The history and cultural significance of bagels. (16:43) The history and culture of New York-style bagels. (20:49) The origins of bagels and lox in New York City. (28:44) Jewish food culture and traditions. (34:09) History, context, and food with June Hersh. (39:57) Food, history, and culture with a focus on Jewish cuisine. (42:48)   Social Media Links She invites you to email her at junehersh@gmail.com, follow her on Instagram and Facebook @junehersh, or visit her website www.junehersh.com

On the show this time Chris leads the show this week as the boys break down the news of Wrestling Cards from this last fortnight, we give our favourite Top 5 Belt Shot Cards, discuss the world of Custom Cards, Lloydy tallies up the Liberators and much more

In this truly wonderful and enlightening episode, E.J. Koh discusses her debut novel, the magic of dogs, familial relationships, how poetry helped her communicate, magnanimity, how imagination and creativity are essential aspects of apology, her hope for Korea, and more!  E. J. Koh is the author of the memoir The Magical Language of Others, which won a Washington State Book Award, Pacific Northwest Book Award, Association for Asian American Studies Book Award, and was longlisted for the PEN Open Book Award. Koh is also the author of the poetry collection A Lesser Love, a Pleiades Press Editors Prize for Poetry Winner. She earned her MFA at Columbia University in New York for Creative Writing and Literary Translation and her PhD at the University of Washington in English Language and Literature studying Korean American literature, history, and film. Koh has received National Endowment for the Arts, MacDowell, American Literary Translators Association, and Kundiman fellowships. She lives in Seattle, Washington. Her debut novel is The Liberators, out on Tin House November 7, 2023. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Many of the WW2 generation faced hardship in their youth (they did spend their childhood in the Great Depression), but few had as bad of an early life as Denis Elliott, who became an RAF Flight Lieutenant. At age three he was placed in a brutal and abusive orphanage in London and was later subject to beatings by his first foster father. It wasn't until the Second World War that everything in Denis's life began to change — he finally overcame the lack of confidence and self-esteem that had plagued his childhood in Kent and went on to become a skilled, confident, brave pilot flying operations against Japanese forces in Burma, Malaya and Thailand.He spent two stints serving in the RAF, which saw him posted across Africa, the Middle East, the Far East and Europe, flying B-24 Liberators and Avro Lancasters.Today's guest is Phillip Martin, author of “From Orphan to High-Flyer.” We discuss these stories, along with those of Denis's personal growth, friendship and overcoming adversity.This show is part of the Spreaker Prime Network, if you are interested in advertising on this podcast, contact us at https://www.spreaker.com/show/5351305/advertisement

IN THE NEWS Knowing the signs of a stroke can save your life How a Hallmark Movie's Take on Air Force Romance Got Cooperation from the Thunderbirds THIS WEEK'S GUEST Ivan Abbott Houston, who was a design engineer and test driver of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, MLRS and Humvee Military Vehicle, shares the story of his father, Ivan James Houston, a Buffalo Soldier who served with the 92nd Division in Italy during WWII, and wrote two books and a documentary film about his experiences during and after the war. RAPID FIRE Free career guidance for Veterans from America's top companies U.S. Army Mariners Rescue A Man Clinging To Plastic Lid In The Middle Of The Ocean VA recreation therapist leads Yak and Yarn group Special Guest: Ivan A. Houston.

Last time we spoke about the conclusion to the Lae-Salamaua campaign. Operation postern was unleashed with a bang. The Japanese were taken by complete surprise when the allies landed in the Lae Area. General Nakano frantically withdrew the forces from Salamaua over to Lae having been duped by the allied deception. Despite their fighting withdrawal, the Japanese not only lost Lae to the surprise attack, but ironically lost Salamaua at the same time. It was a race for the allied divisions to see who would seize both objectives. As the allies marched into Salamaua they realized it was so desolated, it probably would not be of use as a forward base, but Lae would prove extremely beneficial. Ultimately Nakano managed to get 8000 or more men out of the mayhem, now marching north for salvation, but the allies were not done yet. This episode is Huon Peninsula Offensive Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    Before we venture back to the boys on Green Hell, there had been some developments in the Solomons. On September 18th, Admiral Wilkinson brought over the first units of General Barrowcloughs 3rd division, the 35th and 37th battalions of the 14th brigade. They were brought over to Les Gill's plantation located at Joroveto north of Barakoma and they landed without any conflicts. Unbeknownst to them however, Admiral Sakamaki had launched an airstrike of 12 vals and 48 zeros. Luckily the allies tossed an interception in the form of 17 F4U Corsairs, 6 Hellcats and 4 P-40's which ran into them just over Baga island as Admiral Wilkinsons escorts force of 7 destroyers were making their escape. The air battle spread towards the east where the landing area was, but no shipping was damaged as the allies claimed to have knocked out 15 enemy aircraft at the cost of 3 Corsairs. Once he got ashore, Barrowclough assumed command of the Northern Landing force and set up his HQ on the eastern coast of Vella Lavella. In response, Wilkinson spread his fighter cover more thinly and scattered his LSTs away from Barakoma's anti-aircraft guns. On September 25th a large convoy carrying the 30th battalion, 14th brigade and some marines and Seabee units arrived at Ruravai. They began establishing an advance Marine base for an upcoming operation against Bougainville. This prompted Sakamaki to launch another air strike, this time of 8 vals and 40 zeros. Brigadier General James Moore had roughly 20 fighters to cover the convoy, but some of the vals managed to slip past them. At 11:13, 12 Hellcats intercepted the enemy, leading to dogfights with the Zeros, but two minutes later the Vals had come out from hiding in front of the sun. The vals were targeting the IMAC landing site at Ruravai where the 77th seabees had been clearing a beach area. The marines had some 40mm guns already set up when the Vals struck. Two bombs hit LST-167 forcing it vessel to beach itself while the rest of the bombs scattered across the beach killing 32 men and wounding 58. Sakamaki followed this up with another air strike on October 1st consisting of 8 vals and a dozen zeros again against Ruravai. The 1st marine parachute battalion was landing at the time, as Sakamaki's bombers successfully evaded allied rader and fighter patrols to hit the LSTs. LST-334 took a hit and near miss causing damage but no casualties. LST-448 was hit twice leaving her bursting into flames, killing 52 men with many more wounded. LAST-448 was hit again leading to her sinking while under tow. It was some pretty devastating air strikes, but it was also to be the last as the Japanese were in the midst of evacuating their troops from New Georgia and the 26th air flotilla was withdrawing from Buin. To the northwest, Fijina commandos ha discovered the Horaniu defense force were now scattered in an area between Tambala Bay and Marquana Bay. Barrowclough decided to order Bridagider Leslie Potter's 14th brigade to take out the enemy there. Potter planned to take the 35th battalion and his HQ up the western coast to Matu Soroto Bay while the 37th battalion would land at Doveli cover on the northern coast, hoping to trap the Japanese between both forces. On September 21st, Captain Tsuruya Yoshio had just arrived from Buin to take command of the rather disorganized Vella Lavella forces and began concentrating at Marquana Bay establishing a defensive perimeter. Potter's forces successfully landed at the designated points by september 24th and prepared their advance for the next day. Meanwhile Admiral Samejima and Kusaka were planning the evacuation of Kolombangara. To help them General Imamura was tossing over Major General Yoshimura Masayoshi's 2nd shipping detachment alongside 30 barges. Plans were quickly formed back in early september for Yoshimura to carrying out the evacuation in two stages beginning on September 28th and October 20th via the Choiseul route. Admiral Ijuin proposed using the 8th fleet destroyers for both transport and cover. Kusaka approved the plans and granted an additional 6 destroyers for Ijuins task, taken from the combined fleet, while also arranging some air cover from Sakamaki over Choiseul. The operation designated Se-gō, was mostly complete. Yoshimure assumed command over the Barges designated the 17th army sea battle unit, while under command of Samejima. He would have ultimately at his disposal 70 barges. Yoshimura had armed the barges usually with heavy machine guns and trained the crews to expect attacks from American destroyers and PT boats. He also outfitted them with repair tools. One of the largest problems he faced was how to move 70 barges and 9 small naval vedettes to the forward bases while keeping them hidden from enemy aircraft. The NGAF would confirm this problem on September 20th, when 8 Corsairs were patrolling and came across some barges. They managed to destroy 5 out of the 8 they found. Yoshimura recalled “it was an inauspicious start to the operation”. But he carried on none the less. Leaving buin on september 23rd, they arrived at Sumbe Head by the 25th where the 8th fleet sent a detachment of the Kure 7th to establish a base of operations. Kusaka flew into Vila to meet with General Sasaki and Admiral ota, landing in the midst of exploding shells. To prepare for the withdrawal Sakai had established 3 boarding points along Kolombangara; Jack harbor, Tuki point and Hambare harbor. At the same time he tried to conceal his intentions by increasing patrols and firing off the Yokosuka 7th guns against the enemy. Alongside this he had demolition teams blowing up all the airfield installations, which was mingling with General Barker's artillery. Construction units were beginning to cut trails to the boarding points. Against them was Admiral Halsey who held intelligence indicated the Japanese were planning to either reinforce or evacuate Kolombangara. Halsey send Admiral Merrills task force 39 to move up the Slot while Admiral Wilkinsons destroyers would swing south up Vella Gulf with the objective of catching the enemy between them. Halsey called it a “mouse trap”. On september 25th however, both the USS Columbia and Clevland reported sighting torpedo wakes, indicating a possible submarine force prompting Halsey to pull back the cruisers before the mousetrap was sprung, leaving only Wilkinsons destroyers to pounce on the evacuating Japanese. But thats all for the solomon's for now as we are jumping back to Green Hell. Salamaua and Lae had fallen. General Adachi was now determined to hold the Finisterre range, the Ramu Valley and the Huon Peninsula. He ordered Nakai detachment consisting of the 78th regiment less one company and a battalion of the 26th field artillery regiment led by Major General Nakai Masutaro to take up a position at Kaiapit. Masutaro's boys were to try and help halt the enemy pursuing General Nakano's fleeing 51st division. To make matters worse, although the original orders were for the fleeing men to carry their weapons, the Japanese progressively began to abandon their equipment as they fled. Rifle ammunition was the first to go, followed by helmets, then rifles. Kitamoto Masamichi ordered his engineers to gather as many of the abandoned rifles as they could and use their files to erase the chrysanthemum insignia off them. For those of you who don't know, the chrysanthemum is the symbol of the emperor, so they were going to literally waste time and resources to mitigate what they thought was a disgrace. Men also dropped rice, personal belongings, clothes, whatever they had to in order to survive. The logical thing to do is survive, not take time to file off the symbol of your emperor off the rifles. Major Shintani's 1st battalion of the 80th regiment apparently carried all their weapons across the Saruwaged, including 4 heavy machine guns. Shintani had told his men “the soldier who abandons his arms will be shot to death”. Shintani actually died during the crossing of the Saruwaged, but his men carried on his orders. Some of you might know already, but I am a Dad Carlin fanboy and he said it quite right in his piece on the pacific war about the Japanese. They did everything to the extreme. You just don't see the same radical behavior from the other belligerents of WW2. I find we often mock the Japanese naivety about believing their spirit would overcome the material difference, but by hell come high water they tried. They marched north via the Markham valley while General Katagiri's 20th division was sent to help defend Finschhafen. The Japanese had to shuffle their strategic plans at this point. Thus far they had not regarded the losses of Guadalcanal and Buna-Gona as irretrievable, always believing a decisive victory could be obtained allowing for their recapture. Now after losing Lae-Salamaua, the central solomons and the Aluetians, a brutal realization had dawned on them. With a new thrust into the central pacific, they now saw their perimeter was overextended and they needed to withdraw it. This created what became known as the absolute zone of national defense also called the absolute defense line. Tokyo drew the new perimeter line from western New Guinea through the Carolines to the Marianas, leaving most of the southeast area on the outpost line. The main goal was to build strong fortifications along the perimeter while General Imamura and Admiral Kusaka held the enemy at bay as long as possible.  General Imamura kept his 38th division to defend Rabaul and dispatched the 65th independent mixed brigade to Tuluvu. The 65th were ordered to develop a shipping point there and to maintain its airfield. Back on September 5th, Imamura sent Major General Matsuda Iwao to assume command of all the forces at Tuluvu which at that time consisted of the 65th brigade and the 4th shipping detachment, thus together they would be designated the Matsuda detachment. They were going to defend the coasts of western New Britain. Lt general Sakai Yasuchi's 17th division were dispatched from Shanghai to Rabaul to reinforce New Britain while Lt General Kanda Masatane's 6th division were sent to Bougainville to defend it at all dost. The 2nd battalion, 238th regiment would defend gasmata and the 51st transport regiment were deployed at Lorengau in the Admiralties. Now back over with the allies, when Lae was captured with such ease, this caused General Douglas MacArthur's HQ to revise the Cartwheel schedule. Originally it was planned to hit Finschhafen, the primary Japanese base for barge traffic. This was supposed to occur around 6 weeks after the fall of Lae. But like I said, because of Lae's quick capture, combined with some intelligence indicating the Japanese were heavily reinforcing Finschhafen and the Ramu Valley, MacArthur decided to order and immediate operation to secure the villages of Kaiaput and Dumpu in the Markham and Ramu valleys and to construct airfields for Kenney. Allied intelligence indicated the number of Japanese defending the immediate area of Finschhafen was roughly 350 men, providing MacArthur and his staff some optimism. It would be later discovered General Adachi had 5000 available men there. On September 17th MacArthur ordered Admiral Brabey to begin amphibious attack plans for Finschhafen to commence as soon as possible. The Markham and Ramu valleys were like a giant corridor some 115 miles long running from southeast and northwest, separating the Huon Peninsula from the rest of New Guinea. From end to end of the river corridor were large mountains rising on the north and south. The valley itself was flat kunai grass land, very suitable for airfields.  General Vasey's 7th division were earmarked to advance along the Markham and Ramu valleys as far as Dumpu. Dumpu would provide General Kenney with airfields required to isolate the Huon Peninsula. From there Kenney could hit Japanese supply convoys moving between Madang, Wewak and Hansa Bay. Meanwhile General Wootten's 9th division were given the task of amphibiously assaulting Finschhafen before exploiting along the coast to Sio and Saidor. Yet before any major operations could be unleashed there was still work to be done at Lae. General Milford's 5th division was given the task of cleaning up Lae so it could become a major forward base of operations. On September 22nd Milford moved his HQ to Lae. The western boundary between the new Lae Fortress and 7th division would be a line running north and south through Nadzab. The southern boundary would go as far as Nassau bay. Milford had the 15th, 29th and 4th brigade at his disposal. Milfords men immediately set to work clearing the interior approaches to the town of Lae against any possible Japanese counterattack while simultaneously aiding in the pursuit of the fleeing Japanese. The successful evacuation by the Japanese of Salamaua and then Lae had shocked the Australian commanders despite the fact they had been informed as early as May of intense Japanese patrol activities along the interior trails. A young Australian officer had earlier reported that the Japanese were surveying interior trails for a possible retreat across the mountains. On September 8th they acquired a order of evacuation document leaving no doubt how the Japanese were going to withdraw north. Mildfords HQ deduced the line of retreat was going to be from the Melambi river, Boana, Melasapipi, Iloka and Ulap. However this would prove to be deception on the part of General Nakano who changed the direction of the march to a steep trail along the east side of the Atzera range towards Sio.  Going back to the Quadrant Conference held in Quebec city between August 17th and August 24th, the allies had decided to make some major changes to Operation cartwheel. The main focus was now shifting to the Central Pacific and the Joint chiefs of staff planned to employ the 1st and 2nd marine divisions. For the southwest and south pacific areas this meant the central thrust was going to take a bunch of warships, transport ships and cargo ships. MacArthur was livid at the idea two marine divisions would basically prevent him from his objective of Rabaul. Thus in Quebec, it was decided to neutralize Rabaul rather than capture it. MacArthur also brought up the question of invading the southern philippines, but received no answer. He feared that even if the idea was approved, it might be handed over to Admiral Nimitz. Thus to bypass Rabaul, MacArthur's forces would seize Kavieng and the Admiralties. MacArthur would also have to neutralize Wewak and liberate the valuable Vogelkop Peninsula along New Guinea's northern coast.  Back over in New Guinea, General Nakano's men were continuing their withdrawal with the Australians in hot pursuit. On September 17th, th 2/14th battalion crossed the Atzera Range to capture Boana. The Japanese 30th independent engineer regiment and 51st engineer regiment were constructing a small bridge across the busu river using jungle wood. General Nakano had rejoined his HQ with the second echelon of men and he had such a rough time marched he had to be carried by four soldiers. On September 18th the 2/24th battalion reached Musom and Gawam. The Japanese defending Markham point had been completely cut off as of september 14th, receiving no supplies from Lae nor any information about the fact Lae and Salamaua had fallen into enemy hands. On the night of september 16th, 100 men of the 2nd battalion 328th regiment evacuated from Markham point, retreating towards to coast trying to get to Salamaua or Finschhafen. On the 18th, Captain Proctors company of the 15ht battalion were at Labu when they saw a group of 30 armed Japanese trying to escape in folding boats across the Labu lagoon. His company fired upon them forcing the Japanese to quickly row away and flee into the jungle. At 5:10am the next day the Japanese returned to attack Proctors company, trying to break out of what had become an encirclement. Three consecutive attacks were made, with the third reaching the edge of Proctors defensive perimeter when the fighting fell into hand to hand combat. The Japanese were driven off after they had 13 deaths, including their commanding officer. The rest of the Japanese would disperse into the jungle or die to future mop up operations. The next day Boana was taken and now the 2/14th were being held up by a Japanese rearguard on the upper reaches of the Busu. On September 20th, Nakano's first echelon finally crossed the Busu river and by the 22nd the other 3 echelons did likewise. In pursuit, a platoon of the 2/24th began to hit the Japanese at Kwapsanek, but Wootten's forces ultimately failed to catch the Japanese rearguard. In the end the Australians prepared to launch a new offensive against the Ramu valley and Finschhafen, the pursuit units were gradually called back allowing Naknao's men to reach the north coast almost unmolested. General Blamey predicted the remnants of the enemy would need “to escape the hardship of the mountain tracks”. I believe he was quite right on that one. The men of Colonel Watanabe's 14th field artillery regiment continued their march going up the range carrying their single mountain gun towards Lumbaip and then Kemen. Kane Yoshihara noted the officers and men “clung on to the rocks with truly formidable spirit”. General Nakano recalled “I was deeply stirred by their sense of responsibility but could not overlook their suffering”. Nakano ordered the last of the regiments guns to be abandoned. He recalled “the gunners with tears in their eyes, bade a formal farewell as they did so”. Colonel Watanabe would survive the trek alongside 280 of his men. There was a saying amongst the Japanese armed forces that “Java is heaven, Burma is Hell, but you never come back alive from New Guinea”. An American soldier once referred to New Guinea as ‘a green hell on earth”. The conditions were so horrible a veteran of the 32nd division went on the record to say “If I owned New Guinea and I owned hell, I would live in hell and rent out New Guinea”. Vasey and Blamey decided the next objective would be Kaiapit as they believed Naknao was retreating through the Markham and Ramy valleys. They earmarked Captain Gordon King's 2/6th independent company to quickly capture the village before the Japanese could get there. On september 17th, King's company flew over from Port Moresby landed at Sangan on the western bank of the Leron River. Two platoons from Captain John Chalf's Papuan infantry battalion company also reached the western bank of the leron that day coming overland from Chivasing. They would act as a screen ahead of King's men. Kings men began their march for Kaiapit and against them would be Major General Nakai Masutaro who had departed from Bogadjim with the 78th regiment on september 7th. He dispatched the 3rd battalion and Morisada company towards Kaiapit while the bulk of his forces advanced towards Nadzab where they planned to hit its airfield. The Takano Platoon, a reconnaissance unit were the only ones able to reach Kaiapit by September 19th just as the Australians were approaching. King have strict orders to the men that no movement was to be on the track to the village itself as it was believed the enemy would be covering such an approach. Instead the men came through kunai patches, bringing their 2 inch mortars close in to hit the enemy. The mortars began to smash the enemy forward positions sending Japanese fleeing or dying at their posts. The Australians then began to pin down the defenders using grenades and rushed their positions. Japanese treetop snipers unleashed hell, but soon the Australians began firing upon the treelines and village huts where they were hiding. The storming of the village was intense and fast seeing 30 dead Japanese and the rest fleeing. King lost 3 men dead with 7 wounded for the assault. The Australians quickly went to work creating a defensive perimeter placing booby traps everywhere they could. Vasey's decision to swiftly hit the village had paid off big time. The following morning, 300 men led by Major Yonekura Tsuneo arrived to Kaiapit, under the belief it was still in Japanese hands. Just before dawn of September 20th, the Australian commando's saw the incoming Japanese column and immediately opened fire upon them. The Japanese erupted into pure chaos as men of all ranks bunched up and milled about in confusion. Some of the men could be heard screaming in Japanese “we are Japanese let us through!”. Others soon realized Kaiapit was in Australian hands. Thousand of rounds were fired back at the Australians, but their positions were well concealed. King watched as the confused enemy did exactly what he taught his men not to do, shooting at shadows, wasting ammunition and firing high “In all that enormous activity of firing, nobody got hit nobody got hurt at all”. The situation came as a shock to King as well, because the sheer volume of return fire indicated it was a considerably large force. Some of  King's men wanted to advance, but he advised caution. Platoon leader Watson waited for King's signal for when he could advance and King recalled “each second seeming like a minute as the Japanese gathered in the half light. Watson was standing up there, looking back to me waiting”. When King dropped his arm, Watson blew his whistle and his men charged. Lt Bob Scott of section 7 recalled “we killed over a hundred Japanese in the first 100 yards”. Scotts group had cut down Yonekura and his command group in the first wave of Australian fire. Lt Bob Balderstone of section 9 sent his men into the right flank as Lt Jack Elsworthy's section 9 took up the left flank. The Australians had seized the moment and inflicted hellish pain on the Japanese. Watson's platoon lost 8 men killed, 14 wounded. King tossed another platoon through the right flank to grab Mission Hill which dominated the battlefield. As the men advanced, they drove off Japanese in their path and would seize the deserted hill. Once it was captured the Australians had a bird's eye view that allowed them to better direct their forces. Seeing the hill secured, Watson judged the time was ripe to continue the advance so he ordered Balderstone and Elsworthy's sections forward. Balderstone was hiding behind a coconut palm when a bullet nicked his right arm prompting him to scream out “who did that!”. It was not a serious wound, but he was fired up and he yelled to his men to surge forward. Balderstone personally tackled a Japanese machinegunner afterwards. After clearing some machinegun positions below mission hill, the enemy was becoming surrounded. The casualties had become so severe the Japanese began to rout in disorder towards Antiragen and Narawapum. It was an incredible victory for King, they buried 214 Japanese and believed many more were dying or wounded. General Vasey arrived around midday and walked over the corpse strewn battlefield to Mission hill stating ‘My God, my God, my God,'. The scale of the carnage and size of the force against a single Australian company was incredible. Gordon King was resting a wounded leg on a shady spot atop the hill when Vasey approached him. King struggled to get to his feet and Vasey said ‘No, no, sit down,' But King stood up to talk nonetheless. Vasey told him to get the first available aircraft out before adding, ‘Gordon, I promise that you'll never be left out on a limb like this again.' Vasey then returned to his plane, which headed back down the Markham Valley. Some months later, Vasey told King, ‘We were lucky, we were very lucky.' King replied, ‘Well, if you're inferring that what we did was luck, I don't agree with you, Sir. Because I think we weren't lucky, we were just bloody good.' For this victory King had lost 14 men dead, 23 wounded, it was something out of a Rambo film. Brigadier Dougherty's 21st brigade were beginning to land at Kaiapit on september 21st. Kings victory allowed Vasey to bring a fresh bridge into position to keep the advance going against Markham and Ramu valleys. The Yonekura battalion had nearly been wiped out to a man, thus General Nakai ordered the 1st battalion to rescue the battered force. Most of the Morisada company were unscathed as they did not engage in the battle at Kaiapit, alongside them were some stragglers left behind and around 40 men who managed to escape the carnage. Aided by the rescue battalion they managed to withdrew back towards Marawasa by September 24th. A volunteer unit was formed under Captain Morisada named the Saito unit, which consisted of around 80 men from the 10th company 78th regiment. They would work as a special infiltration unit who would begin raiding operations. Back over at Lae, Generals, Blamey, Herring and Wootten began to plan their offensive against Finschhafen. Towards midnight on the 17th, Herring arrived to Lae by PT boat for a meeting with Wootten. Wootten had warned Blamey and Herring that he might be required to carry out an attack on Finschhafen at short notice, leading Wooten to order Brigadier Windeyer to look at Finschhafen on the map because it might be of interest to him soon. Before Herrings arrival, plans were already being formed. At 9am of the 18th, Windeyer and his staff attended a 9th division conference at the HQ on the Bunga river. There Herring outlined a plan for the capture of the Finschhafen-Langemak Bay-dreger Harbor area with a quick swoop which would gain control over the eastern coast of the Huon peninsula and thereby Vitiaz strait. Windeyers 20th brigade would be join General Heavy's 532nd engineer boat and shore regiment and Admiral Brbey's landing craft armada to perform an amphibious assault against Scarlet Beach. Scarlet beach was on the southern part of the Song River just due north of Finschhafen where it was believed the Japanese would not be expecting a landing. From there it was possible they would be able to cut off the Japanese supply lines. Wootten and Blamey tossed up an additional brigade, but the available crafts: 4 destroyer transports, 15 LCI's and 3 LSTs were only capable of lifting a single brigade. In the end the decision was made that after the landings, the 22nd battalion would advance round the south coast of the Huon Peninsula to try and deceive the Japanese as to where the real direction of the threat was coming from. Windeyer planned to hit the beachhead with two battalions, the 2/17ths on the right and the 2/13th on the left. Once the beachhead was secured, the 2/15th would advance south along the main road towards Finschhafen. Additionally an expedition would be launched from G Beach on the night of September 21sst to also land at Scarlet Beach the following morning. To support the landings a large air armada of both American and Australian planes would protect the convoy during the daylight. General Kenney would be tossing air strikes against Cape Gloucester with Liberators, while the RAAF hit Gasmata with Kittyhawks and Bostons and Mitchells against Finschhafen. All of the key airfields and supply points between Wewak and Finschhafen would get smashed. Barbeys destroyers likewise would bombardment Finschhafen as well. To meet the boys coming to the beaches was Major General Yamada Eizo commanding the 1st shipping detachment, a naval force based around the 85th naval garrison. Around 1200 men were stationed at Finschhafen, many of them however were barge operators and mechanics. But there were some combat units; Major Shigeru Tashiros 2 battalion, 238th regiment had companies 7 and 8 at Finschhafen with company 5 at Tami islands. Additionally there was the bulk of the 80th regiment coming over from Madang via the coastal road that would arrive just in time to meet the Australian offensive. In the end Yamada's combat strength would be roughly 4000 men strong. On September 10th, after the allies landings at Lae and Nadzab, General Katagiri marched the rest of his forces from Madang to Finschhafen in a grueling advance along the coast. The first elements of his 79th regiment assembled at Gali by September 21st. Because of all of this, Madang was left pretty much undefended. The 239th regiment was chosen to reinforce the base, departing Wewak on October 3rd. Over in Finschhafen, Yamada began deploying the bulk of his forces at Logaweng; with 4 companies holding the Mongi river's mouth and two mixed companies of about 50 engineers and 300 naval personnel holding the Bumi river. To the north, Yamada could only deploy company 9th company of the 80th regiment towards the Song River to secure Sattelberg. Looking at it all on paper it seemed the Australians were set to face little resistance. On the afternoon of September 21st, Barbey's force of 8 LCM's and 15 LCV's departed Lae for Scarlet Beach.  Windeyer's landing plan called for two companies of th 2/17th battalion were going to land on the right beach while two companies from the 2/13th would land on the left. While the rest of the brigade landed, the right companies would hit North Hill and the left companies would hit Arndt Point. Barbey's convoy arrived off Scarlett Beach at 4:45am and the barges began to lower. After an 11 minute bombardment by destroyers Perkins, Drayton, Smith, Lamson and Flusser the barges began to speed over to the shore. However due to the darkness of the night, the whole wave landed a bit further south than intended and as a result the 4 assaulting companies were landed not only on the wrong beaches but also got mixed with other groups. This caused a fit of confusion as a platoon of the 2/13th drew fire from some machine gun nests near the mouth of the Song River. They quickly engaged the enemy with grenades and small arms, gradually silencing the two enemy posts. When the 2/17th battalion began to become organized in the area the platoon moved further south to rejoin its company. This all resulted in a failure to secure Scarlet Beach, forcing the second wave to veer further left and beach near Siki Cove under heavy enemy fire. But the LCI's of the 2nd and 3rd waves responded to the heavy fire with their 20 mm guns sending the Japanese fleeing. After that Scarlet beach was secured. Funny enough, if it was not for the misstep landing further south, the operation would have seen more casualties amongst the Australians, as the Japanese machine guns proved to be sited in a deadly position to hit Scarlet Beach. As the remaining waves disembarked, Lt Gibb's platoon of the 2/17th advanced inland and were soon met by some machine gun nests. Within half an hour of combat, the platoon killed 7 Japanese and sent the rest fleeing. Other platoons of the 2/17th began to advance up the Song River fighting only limited skirmishes. The 2/13th meanwhile were sending two companies towards Siki Cove where they had to clear a few pillboxes taking some Japanese prisoners. Windeyers forces then launched an attack against Katika. Makes me think of the show Vikings haha (do a Floki thing). A company led by Lt Pike passed through Katika at 6:45am, heading for some high ground beyond. There Pike's men ran into some strong resistance. Another platoon led by Lt Birmingham ran into a Japanese position who tossed a ton of well directed grenades their way killing 3 men and wounding 7. Pike's platoon stormed some huts seeing the Japanese begin a encirclement maneuver against him. Luckily the encirclement was thwarted with the help of another platoon led by Lt Cribb. Companies of the 2/17th and 2/13th were led by Pike and Cribb respectively and both found themselves close against one another. Cribb informed Pike he would launch a bombardment upon the enemy holding some high grounds allowing Pikes men to make a hook maneuver to hit the enemy. Under the cover of 15 3 inch mortars they hit the Japanese, ultimately taking the village at the cost of many men.  While Scarlet Beaches defensive perimeter was being consolidated, the 2/13th advanced south towards Heldsbac and Tareko as Barbey's destroyers were attacked by an air strike. 20 bombers, 10 torpedo bombs and 40 fighters had come over from Rabaul to hit the landing beach. Three American fighter squadrons were waiting to intercept them, successfully shooting down 10 bombers and 29 fighters, while losing 3 lightnings. Likewise the destroyers anti aircraft fire managed to take down 9 torpedo bombers, without receiving any significant hits back. Scarlet Beach was now in allied hands. 5300 troops, 180 vehicles, 32 guns and 180 tons of supplies had been landed successfully. The cost amounted to 20 dead australians, 65 wounded and 9 men missing. For the Americans 8 engineers were killed with 42 wounded. Yet again the rapid pace of the allies had caught the Japanese off guard upsetting their plans to reinforce Finschhafen. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The landing at Scarlet beach was a large success. The Japanese had planned to reinforce Finschhafen with 5000 troops, but now they had been caught completely off guard and would only have a fraction of the troops they wanted to support the area. In New Guinea, when it rains it pours.   

Last time we spoke about the mop up operations on New Georgia and the continued drive upon Salamaua and Lae. Munda had fallen, New Georgia was certainly a lost cause, but that did not mean there wasn't come cleaning up to do. The Americans were stuck mopping up places like Arundel and Baanga seeing fierce Japanese resistance. Sasaki ordered his men to fight as hard as they possibly could while others made their way to evacuation points. Over on Green Hell, the Australian and American forces had just taken Mubo and Lababia ridge, prompting General Nakano to create a last line of defense in front of Salamaua. Now the allies had to cross the francisco river and face multiple hills, ridges and knolls. Forward units forded the francisco river and grabbed a few knolls catching a glimpse finally of Salamaua, but a glimpse was all they were going to get as the Japanese fought tooth and nail to push them back. This episode is Operation Postern Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  The time has come at last. For months, we have seen the Australian and American forces fight for each hill, ridge and knoll, cross over ravines, rivers, swamps, a green hell of a landscape filled with more horror than just the Japanese. From the Jungles of Way to the rugged mountains of bobdubi and Komiatum, through the endless rain, mud and death. Operation Postern was to finally be unleashed, landings at Lae and Nadzab would commence. Now back in August, Admiral Barbey and General Wooten were forced to postpone D-day for September 4. For Lae the plan called for two battalions of Brigadir Victor Windeyer's 20th brigade to land on Red Beach; the 2/15th battalion would hit the eastern flank and the 2/17th to western flank closer to Lae. The 2/13th would hit Yellow beach; the 2/23rd battalion with a company of engineers, a field ambulance, a force of artillery and light anti-aircraft section would join the landing phase; the 26th brigade would follow up the initial landings and move right through the beachhead. The planners were concerned with possible Japanese naval action against their beachheads at night, as this had occurred at Guadalcanal and Milne Bay, so the defense of Red Beach would be coordinated with the 2/2nd machine gun battalion. Red Beach was selected as it was close to Lae, just a bit due east, but out of range of her large gun batteries. Yellow beach was further east and selected as an additional landing area to protect the eastern flank of the main beachhead that would be at red beach. The allies could not provide continuous air cover thus Brigadier Victor Windeyer's 20th brigade would have to land and unload quick as all hell. The initial plans called for a time of landing known as “h hour” to be between 3am and 4am in line with Wooten's request that it occur two hours during moonlight before dawn. They estimated they would need 9-10 hours for the unloading phase, the LST's would then retract at around 1pm. However, when the landing date was postponed for September 4th, this changed everything. Now there would be no morning moon, thus H hour could not be scheduled until after sunrise to allow time for the allied navy to identify the correct beach on a coast that was covered by a low-lying swampy jungle terrain, there was no prominent landmarks it would be difficult. This delayed the landing until 6:30am, resulting in the loss of around 3 hours of unloading time. Alongside that came the decision to retract the LST's by 11am as the allied air cover could not be guaranteed after 11am. This the unloading time was now reduced to 4.5 hours, that a hell of a lot less than they needed. It was also expected that the troops would take at least 1 to 1.5 hours to disembark leaving just 3 hours to unload supplies. Again logistics are not sexy, but this is the kind of problems needed to be overcome to win wars. So Brigadier David Whitehead's 26th brigade was going to follow up the initial landings, moving straight through the beachhead with the 2/2nd machine gun battalion who were earmarked to guard red beach. Furthermore General Heavy's brigade would dispatch some amphibian scouts with the 532nd engineer boat and shore regiment to go in on the first wave to establish red and yellow markers for the two beaches. To make things even more confusing, there was this enormous fringing reef along the thousand mile coastline with a few breaks. One break in the reef line near a village called Tauali was going to be marked Green beach as a back up landing area. The one and half mile of good narrow beach was to be Yellow beach 1, and yes there was a yellow beach 2, closer to Silimati. Admiral Barbey was going to employ every vessel he had; 4 Destroyer transports, the Gilmer, Humphreys, Brooks and Sands; 20 LCI's, 18 LCT's and 13 LSTs. From August 20-22nd Barbey had a full-scale landing rehearsal carried out at beaches on the south coast of Normanby island. The men learnt a few things from this experience. The first was that the surfacing of tracks with steel mesh was too slow to allow the vehicles to clear the beach. They decided that more stores would be loaded as bulk cargo and more labor would be provided to clear the landing crafts. Thus on August 29th, the 2/13th battalion was taken to Normanby island on destroyer transports were the men were disembarking from the LCVP's up to their necks in water. There were major differences as you can imagine for the conditions in Australia vs New Guinea. As Patrick Bourke remarked ‘the country fringing the beach was the worst we had been in. Almost impenetrable jungle grew in waist deep swamps, crisscrossed by much deeper creeks.' There was also a pre-emptive naval bombardment of Finschhafen as reports began to come in indicating enemy troops and supplies were being moved down the coast from Finschhafen by night. Vice Admiral Carpender ordered Captain Jesse Carter, commander of destroyer squadron 5 to sweep the Huan Gulf by night and hit Finschhafen. One of Carpenders staff noted  ‘It will be worthwhile to prove the Navy is willing to pitch in, even if we get nothing but coconuts,”. On August 22nd, destroyers Perkins, Smith, Conyngham and Mahan departed Milne bay enroute for the Huon Gulf. This was the furthest allied vessels larger than PT boats had ventured along the New Guinea coast since the beginning of the pacific war. Early on August 22rd, they opened fire on Finschhafen, firing 540 rounds of 5 inch shells within 10 minutes before hauling ass out of there. It was the first naval bombardment of Japanese forces in New Guinea. As for the battle for the skies, General Kenney was preparing to launch a series of air raids against Lae to support Operation postern. On the day before the landing, 21 allies bombers would hit Lae Airfield to try and knock out their aerial capabilities. Now all of that was just for the Lae landing, we got an entire other operation to hit Nadzab, designated as Z-day which because of the postponement was changed to September 5th. 96 C-47's, 82 carrying the regiments, 5 carrying artillery and 9 for supplies would be employed by Colonel Paul Prentiss's 54th troop carrier wing to transport Colonel Kenneth Kinsler's 503rd parachute regiment. Alongside this, Brigadier Eather's 25th brigade were earmarked to be the first flown in after the initial landings. On August 31st tossed 3 battalion commanders, their operations and communications officers with supplies using a Flying fortress at a very low altitude over the drop zone. They were acting as a sort of reconnaissance and they would uncover vital information to ensure safe location markers for accurate future drops. Hell they even performed meteorological analysis to figure out the wind conditions for jump areas. Meanwhile they keep saying everyday here in montreal its gonna be sunny and its rained for 5 days straight.  There would be rehearsals for the parachuting forces before September 3rd when the final plan was issued. Kinsler's 1st battalion led by Major John Britten would hit field B with the task of securing the Nadzab airfield site before establishing a defensive perimeter and beginning work on the airfield. Meanwhile the Australian 2/2nd pioneer battalion led by Lt Colonel J.T Lang would cross the Markham to help construct a new airfield. Alongside this Kinsler's 2nd battalion led by Lt Colonel George Jones was going to hit field A to capture the Gabsonkek area which would prevent the Japanese from advancing from the north or northwest. Kinsler's 3rd battalion led by Lt COlonel John Tolson would hit field c to capture Gabmatzung and prevent the Japanese from advancing from the east. Furthermore Prentiss would drop 22 dummy paratroopers in the forests south of Yalu right where Japanese forces occupying Heath's plantation would be able to see them. It was hoped this deception would delay advances towards Nadzab. By the way I took the time to educate myself a bit more on what is known as Paradummy's, because honestly until writing this episode I had no idea it was a thing. These were burlap cases filled with straw and plant waste, they kind of look like sackboy to be honest. As you can imagine from ground level looking fairly high up they do look like real paratroopers and they often were dropped alongside real paratroopers to give them a fighting chance against enemy bullets. The more you know.  After all the planning was done Barbey's little armada departed Milne Bay on the morning of September 3rd. Their journey was uneventful as they disembarked at Buna for a short break before re-embarking in the afternoon. After this point Heavy's Morobe base was hit by 9 Rabaul based Betty's with 27 Zeros for escort which tried to high altitude bomb them, doing little damage. Because of the deceptive campaign against Salamaua, termed the Salamaua magnet, very few IJA forces were left guarding Lae. At Lae were Companies 10 and 11 of the 115th regiment to the right bank of the Markham; Company 6 of the 238th regiment at Markham point; the 2 machine gun company of the 238th regiment were spread between the Bunga river and Bulu River; the 15th independent engineer regiment, 2nd company of the 5th battalion of heavy field artillery, the 25th, 29th and 30th machine cannon companies would all be at Lae proper. Aside from the few IJA troops, Rear Admiral Fujita Ruitaro had the 7th base force, formed around the 5th Yokosuka and 5th Sasebo SNLF and the 82nd naval garrisons anti-aircraft and coastal defense units. The Japanese were having a hell of a difficult time supplying their forces at Lae. To supply the near 10,000 or so men present within the Lae-Salamaua area each month required, 150 barges carrying 1500 cubic meters of supplies. Only large type barges could manage to get through the Dampier straits rather rough sea, smaller barges were too dangerous for the task. After each passing month, the naval ships used for transports were decreasing and by May the supplies were being carried by 6 submarines, cutting the volume in half the following month. After that supplies began to be carried overland from Wewak and Madang and a new barge route was established through Sio and Finschhafen. Regardless the Japanese were barely able to keep Lae and Salamaua supplied. This saw barely 300 fit men left to guard Lae with 2650 troops, malnourished, sick, wounded or suffering tropical ailments. The Japanese did have some big guns however, 28 75mm, 4 105mm and two 155mm for the coastal defenses, but their ammunition supply was quite limited. The 155mm's only had 30 shells a piece, while the 105mm had 50.  By late July, General Adachi decided to place Major General Shoge Ryoichi in command of the defenses at Lae, talk about a shitty promotion haha. Ryoichi's rd battalion, 238th regiment was sent first to Salamaua, then Company 6th and the 2nd machine gun company of the 238th regiment managed to reach Lae, but by the time things cooked up the rest would be stuck in Finschhafen. Therefore Rear Admiral Mori Kunizo was sent to grab command of the 7th base force in the meantime while Fujita would lead all the IJN and IJA units currently at Lae. By nightfall on September 3rd, the final voyage began. The allied vessels got to the assembly area unhindered and undetected and by 5:50am on the 4th identified the beach markers. The destroyer transports lowered the landing craft carrying the first wave while performing a 6 minute bombardment. The first landing craft hit the beach at 6:30am and at his guard post at the Japanese anti-aircraft positions overlooking the Lae airfield, private Wada Kiichi heard the sound and saw the flashes of a naval bombardment out in the Guon Gulf. He wrote this ‘Suddenly, there was a booming sound from the sea, and in a split second, I sighted red and yellow tracers come flying on a half moon ballistic arc. Where would the huge fleet land?‘Aren't they, in fact, landing right here in Lae?  ‘If I must die, I will fight with courage and die like an imperial navy man without shame.' Brigadier Windeyer's troops began to land at Red and Yellow beach, only meeting 30 members of the 2nd machine gun company of the 238th regiment who they brushed off around the Bulu plantation. General Kenney unleashed air raids against the Japanese airbases. At 7:45am 13 RAAF bombers, 10 Beauforts and 3 A-20 Bostons hit Gasmata; at 9am 24 Liberators hit Lae; at 9:30am 9 Mitchells hit Tuluvu on Cape Gloucester and 3 Bostons returned to hit Gasmata again in the afternoon. As the 22nd squadron War diary noted of the Gasmata raid “the strip is considered unserviceable”. The second wave approached the beach in the larger LCI's, managing to unload 6 companies without any opposition other than some very annoying reefs near the shore. Thus two waves hit the ground uncontested, but danger did lurk in the skies above. 6 Ki-43 Osca'rs and 3 Ki-51 Sonia's took off from Lae at 7am and 4 minutes later the Oscars began strafing 7 LCI's carrying the 2/23rd battalion and its division HQ while the Sonia's bombed two LCI's. One of the bombs crashed through the main deck of LCI 339 just forward of its pilot house setting the ship on fire before it began listing to port taking on water. The LCI ran ashore and was abandoned by the crew, 10 of which were wounded. Another bomb narrowly missed LCI 341 exploding near the bottom of the vessel, blowing a large hole amidships on her port side flooding two compartments. The list to port was corrected and the LCI managed to run ashore and would be salvaged later. 9 men were killed with 45 wounded during the attack. 8 Boomerangs and 2 Wirraways came over from Tsili Tsili to aid the next echelons as they began to unload units. The LSTs began clearing the landing area by 11am. The LCT's took a lot longer to unload than expected, they had arrived at 8am but only cleared the area over the course of 6 hours. Meanwhile, General Imamura frantically launched a strong air raid towards Law consisting of 12 Betty's, 8 Val's and 61 Zero's. The 81 aircraft strong party departed Rabaul, but was soon discovered by destroyer USS Reid lingering off Cape Cretin at around 1pm. Reid's report gave enough time for the allies to toss a counter air wave to intercept them consisting of 40 Lightnings and 20 Thunderbolts. A few vals tried to bomb Reid in the meantime, resulting in all misses. The interception saw the loss of 23 Japanese aircraft, mostly Zero's while only two lightnings were shutdown. However many Japanese aircraft continued towards Morobe where they descended upon the 6th echelons LSTs just off Cape Ward Hunt at around 2pm. These were carrying the Australian 2/4th independent company and the 2/2nd machine gun battalion, just 33 kms east of Morobe heading for Lae. 6 Vals managed to land two bomb hits on LST-473 and the Betty's one torpedo hit against LST-471. This killed 51, wounded 67 mostly from the 2/4th independent company. The Japanese lost an additional 4 Zeros and 3 betty's while 15 other aircraft were badly damaged. The remaining LSTs continued on towards Red beach, while some were ordered to divert course to assist the damaged LST's from the aerial attacks. Destroyer Humphrey's would grab the wounded and bring them back to Buna. Everything arrived on schedule by 23:00. Thus Admiral Barbey had managed to land 7800 personnel, of which 3780 were combat troops, alongside 3300 tons of supplies. After the landings, engineers at Red and Yellow beach got to work constructing roads while Windeyer's combat troops began to extend their perimeter. By nightfall the 2/17th battalion had crossed the Buso river and by 7:30am the 2/7th field company had built a single-girder bridge across it. To defend against further aerial raids upon the beachheads, a battery of the 2/4th light anti-aircraft regiment landed two detachments at Red and yellow beach. By mid afternoon the 2/13th had extended the yellow beach perimeter around 3000 meters inland and 2000 meters east to west. Lt Colonel Colvin's 2 companies of the 2/13th advanced inland towards the Bulu plantation sending the 30 Japanese who tried to contest them earlier further north towards some hills. Aside from them there were no signs of other enemy, by 2pm patrols of the 2/13th and 2/15th were forded the Suez river between Bulu river and Red beach. Colonel Grace's 2/15th battalion were given the task of protected the beachhead, while Lt Colonel Simpson's 2/17th began to advance towards the Buso river at 9am. Two companies of Major broadbent advanced northwest across the Buso going another 4 miles finding no enemy. Two companies of the 2/13th would also advance east along a track going towards Hopoi where opposition was expected. General Wootten wanted to speed up the advance towards Lae to prevent the Japanese from any time to organize a defense east of the Busu river. Wootten gave Brigadier Whiteheads 2/17th battalion the task of passing through the 20th brigade and continued the advance towards Buso river. Over on the other side Admiral Fujita began deploying his forces in a defensive perimeter between the Markham and Busu Rivers, with most of his naval units taking up positions on the right bank of the Busu while Companies 10 and 11 of the 115th regiment, around 127 men were sent to hold Singaua point. General Shoge rushed over as quickly as he could to take command at Lae, while General Nakano sent Major Mukai Masatake to assume command of the frontline actions. The next day the Australian advance going east and west continued still with no opposition. Simpson's men went west, advancing through some horrible wet and boggy terrain. To simpsons north was Broadbents men who got lost for a little while fording rivers until they made it to the Singaua plantation. Meanwhile the 2/23rd and 2/24th battalions followed behind them led by Lt Colonel Gillespie and Major McRae. They bivoucked south of Apo where Whitehead placed his HQ. During the morning hours, Brigadier Bernard Evan's 24th brigade embarked on 20 LCI's over at Buna and began to land at Red Beach by nightfall. As the Lae operation was moving along full swing, it was now time for Z-day. A B-24 liberator crashed on take-off after clipping a branch and rammed into 5 troop trucks full of soldiers waiting to debark. Its 4 500 lb bombs exploded tossing 2800 gallons of fuel in all directions killing 59 and wounding 92. It was a horrible disaster and a bad omen. The armada of C-47's were being escorted by 48 Lightnings, 12 Airacobras and 48 Thunderbolts a very intimidating force. Generals Kenney, Vasey and MacArthur accompanied the armada aboard some flying fortresses. Kenney said to MacArthur “They're my kids and I want to see them do their stuff”, apparently MacArthur hesitated for a moment before replying “you're right George We'll both go. They're my kids too”. Kenney worried about the consequences of both of them being killed by “some five dollar a month Jap aviator”. MacArthur only worried about becoming airsick and throwing up in front of his colleagues. General Vasey who had witnessed German paratroops in action over Crete back in 1941, watched the drop from above and would write to his wife “I wanted to see paratroops land from the top rather than the bottom as in Crete”. Over 302 aircraft crossed the Owen Stanley range. Heading the armada at 1000 feet were B-25 strafers carrying 8 .50 caliber gun in their noses and 60 frag bombs in their bomb bays. Behind that at about 500 feet were A-20's ready to lay smoke as frag bombs exploded. At around 2000 feet behind them were 96 C-47's carrying the paratroops, supplies and artillery. To all their sides were the fights sitting at around 7000 feet. Following this were B-17's loaded up with 300 lb parachute bombs to be drop ordered by paratroopers. Then even further behind that were B-24's and more B-17's who were going to hit Japanese defensive positions at Heath's plantation and other points between Nadzab and Lae. Air attacks against the defenses would be followed up with smokescreens. At 10:22am the C-47's began to drop their paratroopers over their target zones. Each C-47 dropped its men in less than 10 seconds and the whole regiment was unloaded in 4 and a half minutes. The whole of the Nadzab area was landed upon and taken uncontested. Watching it unfold Kenney was impressed going on the record to say “the operation really was a magnificent spectacle. I truly don't believe that another air force in the world could have put this over as perfectly as the 5th Air Force did.” By 2pm, the 2/2nd Pioneer battalion crossed Markham arriving at Nadzab during the night. The 2/2nd Pioneer battalion began hacking and burning kunai grass off the airstrip to clear it up before successfully extending it from 1500 feet to 3300 feet. This would allow the 871st airborne engineer battalion to land so they could construct two additional airstrips. On September 7th, Vasey's 7th division began to land at Nadzab, only facing some challenging weather. C Company of the 24th battalion led by Captain Arthur Duell departed Deep creek on the 4th to attack Markham point acting as a diversion. Lt Fred Child's 14th platoon performed the initial attack from the southwest followed up by Lt Maurie Yong's 13th platoon who advanced down a ridge near the river. Two other platoons covered them as they all blasted mortars over the Japanese camp and unleashed 2 vickers guns on Labu island. 100 men of the 6th company, 238th regiment were taken by surprise. They had dug in behind some barbed wire for several months astride a razorback ridge along the Markham river. Their surprise wore off quickly as they unleashed heavy fire killing 12 men and wounding 6. The allies were forced to pull back after killing 18 Japanese. Further to the south, General Nakano was facing some pressure from General Milford's 5th division. During late August the Japanese had been fighting tooth and nail to hold their last defensive line in front of Salamaua. The Japanese forward positions had been hit by heavy artillery for a long time, but their defenders were hunkering down. Brigadier Monaghan elected to send a company to cross the western slopes of Charlie Hill and occupy a position on its northern portion, thus isolating the Japanese. This was the same strategy that had been employed against Mount Tambu. However Milford instead elected to toss a frontal assault, believing his artillery support would win the day. Zero hour for the assault was to be 3:20pm, from 11:30am until then artillery smashed the Japanese positions with 2000 shells, 450 mortar bombs and 6000 rounds of machine gun fire. When zero hour hit, D company of the 42nd battalion began their climb. Lt Garland's 17th platoon led the way, immediately receiving enemy first after the first 100 yards. Two other platoons crossed around to the left and right only getting a few yards further. The approach to Charlie Hill from the west was a very steep thickly clad razorback. Garland's men had not even seen the enemy and 5 of them were hit. Two hours after the attack had begun, platoon leaders signaled down the slope that no progress could be made, it was simply too steep. Up above there were 4 well camouflaged machine gun nests unleashing havoc. The assault was canceled and the men withdrew. Over to the west, the 47th battalion launched two attacks against the Kunai spur. Captain Aubrey McWatter's A company began their attack at dusk on august 28th. Sergeant George Pitt's 9th platoon took the left as Barnett's 7th platoon to the right. The assault fell into hand to hand combat quickly, Barnett was twice wounded and his men were forced back. Pitt's platoon ran into heavy machine gun fire from a well dug in log bunker and were forced back having two deaths and two wounded. On the 30th, Major Idris Leach's C company made their attack but were forced back by heavy fire. Major Idris Leach and Sergeant Bill Eisenmenger lost their lives in that attack. On that same day, there was a request to increase artillery fire. 200 shells were lobbed upon the enemy the next day, then on september 1st after 5 hours of shelling, two platoons attacked again. They were supported by vickers guns as men scrambled to climb the ridge to its crest. The artillery softened up the enemy somewhat. Platoon leader Lt Ernest Anzac Walters died leading his men in the bloody carnage. They achieved the objective by the late afternoon sending many Japanese fleeing from their positions. Owen guns and grenades broke them. Around 60 dead Japanese were found on the Kunai spur, around 40 of them had been killed by artillery fire, some pillboxes took direct hits. The Kunai Spur was renamed Lewis Knoll after Captain Eric Lewis of B Company. To the east, after seizing Lokanu ridge, Milford ordered Lt Colonel Jack Amies 15th battalion to head right of the Americans and penetrate the Japanese defensive line at all cost without delay. At first light on the 31st, Lt Doug Matthew's 18th platoon of D company, reached a junction between Lokanu ridge and a razorback. The Japanese hit Matthew's men with mortar and machine gun fire. Despite the heavy fire, Matthew and his men crept up 75 yards, but at 12:50pm were met with a shower of grenades from enemies on a crest above them. Matthew decided to wait for reinforcements and artillery support before attacking up Scout ridge. Lt George Matthew's, brother Lt doug Matthews arrived with the 14th platoon after 1pm and organized a company attack, despite still not having artillery support nor mortars. Lt Doug led the 18th platoon forward, leading to 11 men becoming wounded, Doug likewise received a shot to the leg. George helped his brother get down the ridge and Doug told him before being carried off for care “About six weeks, I think”. George would later recall “I didn't worry too much about it. I thought on of the family has got out of it”. Lt Doug Matthew died the next day. The 15th battalion forces kept up the pressure sending C company, but they were repulsed likewise. On September 1st, Colonel Davidson sent B company around the west side of Charlie Hill intending to cut off the Japanese supply lines. Captain Frank Greer's B Company crossed a creek during the night and advanced 300 meters from the crest of Charlie Hill. They set up an ambush position, unknowingly 30 yards below the enemy perimeter on Charlie Hill. The Japanese tossed multiple counterattacks while A Company managed to establish their own ambush position nearby in some thick undergrowth on the eastern side of Charlie Hill. On September 4th, A Company joined up with B Company to the west, completely sealing off the enemy position. Meanwhile Captain Yates C company was advancing northwards from Lewis Knoll. Their patrols ran into Japanese losing many men in the process. At 7:15am the next morning they came across a razorback running towards a strongly held enemy position on Twin Smiths. Captain Yates led an attack upon the Twin Smiths, but the enemy fire was too much, forcing him to withdrew.  After the defeat at Arnold's Crest, Brigadier Hammer had resorted to harassing actions against the enemy. The 2/7th were hitting Arnold's Crest while Major Warfe's 58/59th and 2/3rd independent company were hitting rough hill. Hammer sent Lt Garland's men from C Platoon to infiltrate the Japanese rear and to carry out a diversionary ambush. On September 3rd, Lt Garland ordered Arnold's Crest to be shelled, so that the noise would cover his men as they began their infiltration. They departed at 9am, moving along the Buiris Creek between the Japanese positions. They ambushed a supply track at 11am, just when the shelling stopped. Garland recalled ‘My men made their way forward through the jungle canopy like deadly green ghosts. I never heard a sound as they moved forward and adopted their ambush positions.' Garland positioned his men on the southern side of the track with around ten meters between them, covering more than a thousand meters of track, watching while hiding; a difficult balance. Garland noted ‘You soon learn to look through the jungle, by slightly moving your head from side to side, whilst preserving your concealment.' After two hours of waiting, Garland's men killed 8 Japanese in an ambush, after this they pulled out. Finally, Scout Ridge was devastated with artillery and mortar bombardment, allowing Lt George Matthews men to gain its crest where his brother had died. On September 3rd, detachments of the 5th Sasebo and 2nd Maizuru SNLF marines counterattacked and forced the australians off. While this was occurring, Lt Tom Cavenagh's A company of the 15th battalion seized the unoccupied Lokanu knoll. They crept up the knoll under artillery support to find freshly dug trenches, weapon-pits and foxholes all recently abandoned. By nightfall the SNLF marines attempted to reoccupy the positions but were forced to dig in on the northern side of Lokanu Knoll. On the night of september 4th, General Adachi learnt of the Lae landings and immediately ordered General Nakano to withdrew from Salamaua and to assemble at Lae by september 20th. Japanese forces were going to withdrew towards Kaiapit or Sio through Salawaket. Adachi sent the main body of the 20th division to defend Finschhafen, resulting in the suspension of the construction of the Madang-Lae road. The Nakai detachment of Major General Nakai Masutaro currently at Bogadjim was ordered to defend Kaiapit and hold back the allied advance to help Nakano's withdrawal. Nakano ordered the 5th Sasebo and 2nd Maizuru SNLF to cover the movement by barge of the 3rd battalion 102nd regiment towards Law, departing on september 6th. Meanwhile the 51st division prepared a fighting withdrawal and at Lae, General Shoge and Major Mukai just arrived to grab command of the IJA forces. Shoge's attitude was considered to be the ideal representative of a commander. He often went a day or two without opening his mouth, he was a fighting man who did not display signs of joy or sorrow, nor pleasure or pain. Holding the enemy back to the east and west, even within close range, he remained cool. He never lost his composure and he was a large influence upon his officers and men. Shoge concentrated the whole strength of the Lae garrison to block the superior allied forces while Mukai personally led platoons and companies to direct the fighting at the frontlines. Meanwhile on september 6th, Wootten's men continued their advance. The 2/13th battalion reached the Buhem river and captured the overgrown Hopoi airfield. The 2/23rd battalion moved past the 2/17th arriving to the left bank of the Buiem river. From there they pushed back some Japanese to the Singaua plantation. By the late afternoon the Japanese were being hit from the east and north, forcing them to retreat. Ever since D-day, the Japanese had been tossing air raids against Red Beach, the Aluki track and the amphibian craft plying between the beaches, but they were unable to hinder the movement of men and supplies. At midnight on the 6th, 5 LCV's and 3 LCMS landed supplies from Red Beach to Apo village alleviating the severe ration and ammunition shortage for the forward troops and shortening supply lines. New plans were formed. On September 7th, the 24th brigade would takeover the costal advance while Whiteheads 26th brigade would advance further inland up the Burep River. The climax for the Lae-Salamaua campaign was nearly at hand. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Operation Postern finally kicked off and the amphibious invasion seems to be a resounding success. The Japanese were completely bamboozled and now frantically tried to get men in the Salamaua area over to defend Lae, but would they lose both as a result of it? 

— As they were finalizing their manuscript, Ronni's daughter sent them a screengrab of an Instagram post from “jabbieapp” that read: “Never underestimate a cycle breaker. Not only did they experience years of generational trauma but they stood in the face of the trauma and fought to say, “This ends with me.” This is brave. This is powerful. This comes at a significant cost. Never underestimate a cycle breaker. Ronni and Jennie read it, and cried. A few weeks later, Ronni found a post on Instagram from Xavier Dagba and sent it to Jennie: “All this time you thought you were nothing but the black sheep of your lineage, whereas you were being initiated to be their liberator. Healing looks good on you. Keep going. Jennie cried, and something in her shifted. These two amazing sisters started their journey with a sincere desire to spare their children the pain they had endured—to break the intergenerational cycle of abuse and addiction so that they could live beautiful lives. They also hoped that they could reparent themselves and live beautiful lives of their own. And they did, if imperfectly. Though they are still learning and growing, Ronni and Jennie have each created something well beyond what we could have imagined at the beginning of this ride. This means they are more than survivors. They are, indeed, rockstars!!! Valeria interviews Ronni Tichenor and Jennie Weaver — the author of “Healing Begins With Us: Breaking The Cycle Of Trauma And Abuse And Rebuilding The Sibling Bond” Ronni Tichenor has a PhD in sociology, specializing in family studies, from the University of Michigan, and Jennie Weaver, has received her degree from the Vanderbilt School of Nursing and is a board-certified family nurse practitioner with over 25 years of experience in family practice and mental health. Their book, Healing Begins with Us shares their inspiring and hopeful story of healing from their painful upbringing. To learn more about Ronni Tichenor and Jennie Weaver and their work, please visit: heartandsoulsisters.net         — This podcast is a quest for well-being, a quest for a meaningful life through the exploration of fundamental truths, enlightening ideas, insights on physical, mental, and spiritual health. The inspiration is Love. The aspiration is to awaken new ways of thinking that can lead us to a new way of being, being well. 

Last time we spoke about the beginning of mop up operations after the fall of Munda, the amphibious invasion of Vella Lavella and the fall of Kiska. New Georgia was a lost cause for the Japanese with the fall of Munda and now all efforts were being made to perform a withdrawal while buying time for forces to be brought over to places like Bougainville. Admiral Halsey ultimately choose to bypass Kolombangara and targeting Vella Lavella, which saw a successful amphibious invasion with a minor naval scuffle during the process. Then the Americans and Canadians invaded Kiska at long last. Although there were numerous reports that the island was abandoned it was decided to go forward with the invasion, at minimum it would be good training for the men. All they found were booby traps and some abandoned dogs as they ushered in the conclusion to the aleutian islands campaign.  This episode is Into the Central Pacific Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    So its been nearly a year since the start of the allied offensive in the Pacific. Way back when the Japanese were trying to recover from the Midway disaster, the Americans had no idea if they could manage a major land victory. For nearly a year, the allied campaigns in New Guinea and the Solomons showcased what both sides were capable of. But the US Navy wanted something else, they wanted a drive through the central pacific. Now to begin a thrust into the central pacific meant performing two parallel Pacific campaigns north and south of the equator. Admiral Nimitz did not yet possess the naval, specifically carrier forces required to wage a central pacific offensive, hell legions of troops required months of amphibious training, is was an enormous feat. Admiral Halsey likewise never ceased calling for reinforcements to carry his fight through the central and northern solomons.  Ever since the Casablanca Conference, Admirals King and Nimitz had been analyzing the idea of a central thrust in the pacific. They were looking specifically at a thrust in the direction of Truk-Guam and to hit the Marshall Islands. The victory over Guadalcanal had allowed the allies to secure lines of communication and supply to Australia and King presumed Rabaul would fall in 1943. On June 10th King began demanding hard deadlines for a central pacific campaign stating “In order that effective momentum of offensive operations can be attained and maintained, firm timing must be set up for all areas.” The joint chiefs of staff four days later told Nimitz to prepare an invasion of the Marshall Islands with a tentative sailing date of November 15th, 1943. As for the direct thrust, King declared  "establishing a base in the northwestern Marshalls and then proceeding to Truk and the Marianas." To pull this off MacArthur was expected to release the 1st marine division in time to participate in the operation with most of Halsey's naval and amphibious forces as well. As you can imagine MacArthur was outraged and objected the demands of his Cartwheel campaign to preclude any transfer of troops or ships from his theater to Nimitz. MacArthur wanted covering support from the Pacific Fleet's new fast carrier task forces to help raid Rabaul, Truk and other Japanese bases on a southern route. Halsey likewise was anxious about withdrawing aircraft from the south pacific area to support operations north of the equator. He warned Nimitz on June 25th that if airpower were diverted from the drive on Rabaul “it would seriously jeopardize our chances of success at what appears to be the most critical stage of the campaign.” Without borrowing forces from the south pacific, Nimitz could not realistically tackle the Marshalls until early 1944 and many members of the planning staff counseled patience. They argued to Nimitz, the new offensive should await the arrival of a large fleet of Essex carriers. By February or March of 1944, they predicted a much expanded 5th fleet could simply steam into the Marshalls and seize 4 or 5 of the largest Japanese bases simultaneously. If the combined fleet came out to fight, such an American force would willingly and confidently give them battle. But King simply wanted action in 1943, he insisted the northern line of attack be opened before the final assault on Rabaul. This would prevent the enemy from concentrating their defenses against either prong of the westward advance. Enemy territory simply had to be taken, somewhere in the central pacific by the end of the year.  There was a lot of arguing going about. The joint chiefs had clearly intimated that the Philippines were to be approached through the central pacific, but MacArthur concluded that a drive through the Marshalls and Carolines would have to occur without land-based air support, thus it would be slow and extremely costly to naval power and shipping. MacArthur argued the central pacific route was unwise and thought after Rabaul was captured it should be southwest pacific forces advancing along the north coast of New Guinea and onwards to the Philippines. This would require the neutralization of various islands like Palaus and others in the Banda and Arafura seas to protect their flanks. This long range plan that he prepared was designated RENO.  Now all of this of course was intended to cut Japan off from her vast riches in the Dutch East Indies, the thing keeping her war machine alive. The British also had their own desires who applied much pressure onto their American allies, prompting General Marshall to assure them that a Gilberts-Marshalls-Carolines campaign would be undertaken “with the resources available in the theater”. DuringQuadrant conference, the British chiefs had agreed to back King's demand for resources in the central Pacific in return for more forces against Nazi Germany. However during the Trident conference in May, which was not concerned so much with the Pacific strategy, the joint chiefs of staff submitted a plan titled “the strategic plan for the defeat of Japan” which called for a large, sustained air offensive against the home islands in preparation for an invasion. For this all to occur, China had to be maintained, and that meant the Americans and British would need to right their way into China finding a good secure port to move materials properly, most likely this would be Hong Kong. In the meantime the Americans, British and Chinese would work together to recapture Burma to try and drive through the strait of Malacca to Hong Kong via a series of amphibious operations. The Americans would also attempt a drive through the Celebes sea to Hong Kong from the central pacific aided by some subsidiary efforts from the south and southwest pacific areas, good luck getting a penny from MacArthur.  The Central Pacific was the most advantageous and logical route because it was shorter than the southern route, it would require less ships, less troops, less supplies and the bases in the Marshalls, Marianas and Carolines would isolate Japan from her overseas empire. The Japanese would only be able to mount limited air and ground forces on the islands in the central pacific, but nonetheless the American planners were forced to make twin drives along the central and southern axes. It has been argued, President FDR was swayed by Marshall's insistent demands for a southern push, because MacArthur held considerable political weight and could have been made a republican nominee for presidency in 1944. There were positives to running twin operations of course. For one thing it would prevent the Japanese from being able to guess the time and place of forthcoming advances keeping them off balance. It also allowed for opportunities for mutual support. Some of the operations would require a behemoth amount of resources, take for example the estimations they ran for the capture of the Bismarck Archipelago which was required to secure the line of communications to Australia and provide access to the Celebes sea. They estimated it would require 7 divisions, 5 of which needed to be amphibious units. If Rabaul fell or was neutralized, perhaps the division numbers would be less. The Marshall operation would require two reinforced amphibious divisions, 4 heavy bombardment and two fighter groups of land based aircraft. On top of that was the naval aspect, they estimated that they needed four battleships, three more auxiliary carriers, twelve cruisers, sixty-three destroyers, twenty-four attack transports, forty-four tank landing ships (LST's), plus landing craft. Garrison forces would include one reinforced division, 10 defense battalions, 545 planes, and 18 motor torpedo boats. For the Carolines, the Combined Chiefs estimated that they would require 3 reinforced amphibious divisions, 2 heavy bomber groups, 10 carriers of the Enterprise and Essex classes, 7 auxiliary carriers, 4 modern battleships, 9 old battleships, 31 cruisers, 108 destroyers, 20 submarines, 45 attack transports, 15 attack cargo ships, 6 LSD's , 3 headquarters ships, and miscellaneous auxiliaries. To garrison the islands would take two reinforced divisions and three defense battalions, plus aircraft. Talk about a shopping list. By the end of the year it was expected that one Marine and 3 Army divisions would be allocated to the Central Pacific while the South Pacific would gain 2 marines, 5 US Army and 1 New Zealand division and in the southwest pacific 4 US infantry, 1 US airborne, 1 US marine and 11 Australian divisions. So calculated all that, the Joint chiefs estimated 2 more divisions would be needed for the Marshalls, 2 more for the Carolines and 3 more for New Guinea. The strategic plan got the stamp of approval by the combined chiefs of staff on May 22nd. For the planned central pacific offensive, Nimitz decided his first objective would be the Marshall Islands. Their seizure was essential to extend the line of communication to the Celebes sea and to shorten the routes to Australia. From the Marshalls, land-based aircraft could support naval operations against the enemy's communication lines and there was always the possibility that by hitting the Marshalls, this would lure the combined fleet out for a fight. By July 20th, it was decided that instead of directly hitting the Marshalls, which would be extremely costly requiring a large force, they would instead capture Nauru and the Gilbert Islands as a preliminary springboard to invade the Marshalls. There had been two competing suggestions debated at CINCPAC HQ. Captain Forrest Sherman the chief of staff to Vice admiral John Henry Towers advocated to recapture Wake Islands and employ it as a springboard to invade the Marshalls. Wake was around 500 miles south of the Marshalls. Admiral Spruance favored opening a campaign south and east where the fleet could count on greater land-based air support from rear bases in the south pacific. He was the one advocating to invade the Gilberts, which were 600 miles southeast of the Marshalls. Spruance persuaded Nimitz who persuaded King thus, the Gilberts won the day. Code named Operation Galvanic, was the offensive to simultaneously invade the Ellice Islands, Gilbert Islands and Nauru by November 15th 1943. For Galvanic, Nimitz would have at his disposal all surface forces of the Pacific Fleet, the air forces of the pacific excluding those in the south and southwest pacific areas, elements of the 7th air force, the 2nd marine division of Major General Julian Smith over in New Zealand currently performing amphibious training, 3 aviation engineer or construction battalions, a port battalion and 3 marine defense battalions. The 7th air force led by Major General Willis Hale had already carried out some reconnaissance and bombing missions against Nauru and the Gilberts back in January, February and April. In spite of some heavy interception they managed to hit the runway on Nauru and a local phosphate plant as well as some installations on Tarawa. The 7th air force were utilizing air bases on Canton and Funafuti which were the only ones in range of the Gilberts. To seize the Ellice islands and build new airfields, Nimitz ordered the 5th and 7th defense battalions and 2nd airdrome battalion accompanied by the 16th naval construction battalion to conduct neutralization and reconnaissance. Nimitz sought to build new airfields at Nukufetau and Nanomea which were around 600 miles south and 350 miles east of Tarawa. On August the 18th an advance survey party landed at Nanomea determining it to hold no enemy presence thus the first elements of the 7th defense battalion began occupying it 10 days later. On August the 22nd an advance party of the 2nd Airdrome battalion landed at Nukufetau finding no enemy presenced allowing the remainder of the battalion to follow suit 5 days later. Transforming the atolls into air bases was rapid work. By September 7th a 5000 foot airstrip was operational on Nanomea, by the end of the month a full squadron of aircraft were operating from it. Over on Nukufetau work was slower, but its strip would be operation by October 9th. Back on August 11th, the 804th aviation engineer battalion was sent to develop Baker island, a already american held island 480 miles east of the Gilberts. They began their work on September 1st, taking a week to build a strip capable of supporting fighters. All of this gave Nimitz and Hale the bases they needed to prepare Operation Galvanic.   Now over in the southwest pacific, Generals MacArthur and Blamey were continuing their planned invasion of Lae codenamed Operation Postern. By early 1943, MacArthur had devised plans that made Blamey the commander of “allied land forces” only in name. As we have seen, the creation of the Alamo Force led by General Krueger was MacArthurs attempt at seizing overall command. This led Blamey to gradually realized his only functions would be that of the commander of Australian military forces. MacArthur would reconstitute the United States Army Forces in the Far East USAFFE, for his command in the Philippines with himself as its commander. Now the original date for operation Postern was August 1st and it was to have two stages: the first was an amphibious assault neat the Lae coast and the second was an air-ground operation against Nadzab airfield to its west, this would prevent the enemy from reinforcing Lae overland.    The Amphibious operation would be carried out by General Vasey's 7th division, who would depart Milne Bay and move north of Buna to land near Lae utilizing small landing craft. Admiral Barbey estimated it would require 65 LCVPS (landing craft, vehicle personnel or Higgins boats) and LCTs from the 2nd engineer special brigade. To train for the operation the 7th would be sent to trinity beach near Cairns. However continuous outbreaks of malaria led it being believed the unit could not be used without endangering the civilian population. Major General George Wooten's 9th division not yet exposed to the conditions on Green Hell and malaria free ended up taking the amphibious role. After two weeks of amphibious training with higgins boats. The 9th moved to Milne bay by August 12th and would be followed by General Heavy's units who would help further train them at Morobe.    Now I had mentioned the second part was an air-ground operation, originally it was to consist of the 2/503rd american parachute battalion to take the airfield. Then the 25th and 21st brigades of the 7th division were to cross the Markham river and assist the parachute battalion to occupy the area. But it would turn out, when they arrived to Markham, the Australians first had to advance through the Bulldog road to reach Wau, and although a ton of work had been done on it the Bulldog road had not reached Markham river yet. At first General Berryman boldly said to General Kenney that he would be him a bottle of whisky that a jeep could simply cover the gap to the road by august the 1st, he lost the bet. Thus it was decided transport aircraft would be required to take the 7th division directly from Port Moresby into the overgrown landing ground at Nadzab. The parachute battalion would not receive any support from Markham. MacArthur decided to instead employ the full 503rd parachute regiment led by COlonel Kenneth Kinsler to hit Nadzab on August 8th. Now thanks in a large part to cooperation between Generals Vasey, Herring, Whitehead and Kenney the planning for the operation went well. Extensive air and land reconnaissance of the area was the key to success. With all the preparation done, D-day for the 9th division's amphibious assault was scheduled for September 1st, Z day for the 7th divisions operation against Nadzab would be September 2nd. Like all good operations, a diversion was going to be implemented. General Savige's forces had been conducting a series of attacks in the Salamaua area for months. The “Salamaua magnet” had successfully convinced General Nakano the allies intended to hit Salamaua. Nakano also believed holding Salamaua would keep Lae safe. General Adachi would go on the record to state, orders given to him and other forces was to hold Salamaua as long as possible, probably until the last man if it came down to it. Adachi knew if Salamaua fell, Lae was pretty much a lost cause. The irony of course was this all led to troops being pulled away from Lae to bolster Salamaua, when Lae was in fact the target.  Air supremacy over the Huon Gulf was going to be a necessity for Operation Postern to succeed. Generals Berryman and Kenney needed to acquire new airfields that would be used to neutralize Wewak and Madang, two key Japanese air bases. The allies began building airfields at Benabena and Tsili Tsili which could act as advanced fighter bases and refueling points. Benabena already had a functioning airstrip, but Whitehead wanted to develop it further, Kenney was concerned as he knew the Japanese were aware of the site. Kenney wanted to divert the enemy's attention away from the airfield being built at Tsili Tsili which the Japanese did not know about yet. The Japanese were tossing wave after wave of air raids against Benabena, doing minimal damage. Meanwhile a military road was being constructed from Bogadjim on the northern coast up the valley of Mindjim river to Yaula and Yokopi and it was intended to extend past the Finisterre range into the Ramu Valley. On August 1st the New Guinea force HQ estimated the road would reach Ramu Valley within 8 weeks. THe development of the road and other activity in the Ramu valley was drawing attention from the Japanese, thus the 2/2nd independent company as sent to reinforce the 2/7th at Benabena. As this occurred, the secret construction work at Tsili Tsili raged on using some innovative ideas. The construction workers were using camouflage and careful timing of flights to hide the existence of Tsili Tsili's airfield, and managing to do this successfully for two months. An enormous amount of air transport and equipment was allocated for the task. The 871st airborne engineers battalion were sent in to hammer the job out and soon 3 dry weather runways were operational by september. Over on the Japanese side, they were reorganizing their air forces in New Guinea. After receiving alarming reports of enemy airfields being constructed at Mount Hagen and Benabena, knowing full well these would threaten their airfields at Wewak and Madang, it was decided the air strength of New Guinea would be bolstered by the 7th air division of Lt General Sudo Einosuke. From June 19th onwards, aircraft of the 7th division began arriving at Wewak from the Dutch East Indies. The 6th air division had moved its HQ from Rabual to Wewak on July 9th of 1943, 324 aircraft strong. The 7th air division brought another 156 aircraft, alongside this the 4th air army was brought over to Rabaul on August 6th placed under the command of General Imamura's 8th area army. Additionally to support the defense of Wewak and Madang, General Adachi was planning to toss 3000 soldiers under Lt General Katagiri Shigeru's 20th division against Benabena while Lt General Mano Goro's 41st division would occupy Mount Hagen. Such operations were scheduled to begin in early september. A detachment of the 30th independent engineer regiment of Lt Kitamoto Masamichi were sent over to Kaiapit alongside patrols further into the Ramu valley. They gradually occupied Dumpu and Wesa. But the increasing allied threat to Salamaua and Lae prompted Adachi to postpone the Benabena attack until August 1st and as a result Lae's airbase was being abandoned. Since early july, Lae was facing a substantial issue maintaining aviation fuel, it had been a point of refueling for aircraft going between Rabaul and other airfields like Madang and Wewak. Alongside this, Lae was within allied medium bomber range, and the threat prompted the Japanese to build 3 new airfields on the northwestern coast of New Guinea at But, Dagua and the Boram Plantation. It was the 20th and 41st divisions who ended up providing most of the labor to construct these airfields. On August 14th Tsili Tsili saw its first two squadrons of P-39 Airacobras of the 35th fighter group led by Lt Colonel Malcolm Moore. These arrived just in time to meet the beginning enemy attacks. Japanese aircraft had finally spotted the secret airfield during some reconnaissance flights on August 11th. On the morning of August 15th, 7 Ki-48 Lilly's escorted by 36 Ki-43 Oscars attacked Tsili Tsili. The bombers were intercepted immediately and all were shot down by 26 Airacobras and 3 Lightnings. However the Oscars managed to shoot down two C-47's of the 21st troop carrier squadron. The other C-47's scrambled to escape back to Port Moresby by flying at treetop level. The allied fighters then intercepted the Oscars lading to 3 Oscars being downed at the cost of 4 Airacobras. The following day saw another raid, but Thunderbolts and Lightnings intercepted the raiders downing some 15 Oscars. After receiving such a blow, the Japanese commanders at Wewak decided to conserve further air strength. Unbeknownst to them the situation was far more dire than they thought. You see the Japanese commanders did not believe the enemy fighters and medium bombers had the range to hit Wewak.  To geek out a bit, when such aircraft like Mitchells first arrived in Australia, they were equipped with a lower turret. Now when they began performing operations in New Guinea, it required low altitude flying and thus the turrets became useless, so they were removed and replaced with forward firing guns at the nose. General Kenney's air depot at Townsville working tireless to modify 172 Mitchells between July and September of 1943. The removal of the large turrets allowed for an additional square shaped 11,500 liter metal fuel tank to be installed, which was suspended by hooks from a bomb shackle. These fuel tanks gave the aircraft an extra two hours flying time, just enough to give them the range to hit Wewak. These tanks were very vulnerable to catching fire during combat or from crash landings so they were made dischargeable. A minor innovation, that made all the difference. On August 1th aerial photographs indicated the Japanese had 8 medium bombers, 31 light bombers, 69 fighters at Wewak and Boram plus 34 medium and 34 light bombs with 23 fighters at Dagua and But. Thus Kenney elected to hit them and he had at his disposal two heavy bomber groups the 43rd and 90th bomb groups with 64 bombers alongside two medium groups, the 3rd attack group and 38th bomb groups with 58 modified mitchells.  Kenney's plan was to toss 8 squadrons of heavy bombers for night raids against Wewaks 4 airfields followed up by 5 squadrons of Mitchells. Fighter could refuel at Tsili Tsili to help escort and boy would they, an unprecedented 99 fighter escorts would take part in the raids. On the night of August 16th the first raid occurred seeing 12 B-17 and 38 Liberators take off from Port Moresby, all but two reached Wewak by midnight. For 3 hours Colonels Harry Hawthorne and Aruther Rogers led the 43rd and 90th bombardment groups to pound the 4 airfields causing tremendous damage. Countless aircraft tried to take off the next day at Boram only to fail due to damage. The next morning, two squadrons of Mithcells of Lt COlonel Brian O'Neill's 38th bomb group left Port Moresby to hit Dagua and But while two squadrons of Colonel Donald Hall's 3rd attack group would hit Wewak and Boram. They would be employing some new toys, the first parachute retarded fragmentation bombs or also called Parafrags. They had been developed from standard 10 kg fragmentation bombs which were carried in a honeycomb rack in the bomb bay. A small parachute slowed and straightened out the course of the bomb allowing the bomber to get out of the blast range before it exploded. Further work was also going into the development of “daisy-cutter” bombs, which were bombs wrapping with wire to iron rods onto them to produce a ground level fragmentation effect when used with a ground proximity fuse. Nerd stuff.    The 3rd group bombers ended up catching some newly arrived Japanese aircraft perfectly lined up on each side of the runways. The Mitchells strafed them before dropping 786 10 kg paragraph bombs, annihilating 60 aircraft. Meanwhile the 38th group Mitchells faced some issues discharging their auxiliary fuel tanks, leading to only 3 bombers reaching Dagua and none to But. The 3 who reached Dagua strafed and low level bombed it with 105 ten kg parafrags destroying and damaged at least 17 aircraft and intercepting a single Oscar. Not a bad haul at all for just 3 Mitchells. The following day, Kenney tried to repeat the raids, but this time only half of the 49 heavy bombers reached their targets and the bombing was quite inaccurate. However, most of the 62 Mitchell's reached the target this time, but they would be pounced upon by Japanese fighters and anti-aircraft fire from an enemy that was waiting for them. A flight led by Major Ralph Cheli, commanding the 405th bomb squadron was jumped by nearly a dozen Oscars. Cheli's plane was badly hit, his right engine and wing catch fire. Yet despite this Cheli led his flight across Dagua airfield before crashing into the ocean. He was captured and sent to Rabaul where he would later be executed. For this brave action Cheli was awarded the Medal of Honor. In the end 15 Oscars were destroyed at the cost of 2 lightnings and 1 mitchell. Two additional raids were conducted on August 20th and 21st.   The 5th air force claimed to have destroyed 20 enemy aircraft on the 20th and 70th on the final day, half of which were shot down in air combat by the Lightnings. An estimated 174 Japanese aircraft were put out of action during these attacks, almost 90% of which came from Wewaks total air strength around 200 strong. Even before it had a chance to derail the battle for Lae, the 4th air army had been completely annihilated. Wewak was neutralized, the door was open to smash Lae. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. A ton of planning was raging on and now there was to finally be twin operations to thrust into the central pacific and south pacific. With some new toys, Kenney's airforces had all but smashed what the Japanese had created to defend Lae. Now the door was wide open for Lae to be assaulted.

Beijing has been brutally captured, with the Ming emperor committing suicide rather than face the bandit army of Li Zicheng. However, before he can get comfortable, the full might of the Qing are on their way to "liberate" the Chinese empire from, well, the Chinese. What follows is as chaotic as it is lightning swift, as the Manchu hordes, chase the fleeing remnants of the fallen Ming court south to what they pray will be a refuge: Nanjing. Time Period Covered: Apr. 1644- Nov. 1645 Major Historical Figures: Qing: The Shunzhi Emperor (Aisin Gyoro Fulin) [r. 1643-1661] Dorgon, Prince Ruizhong [1612-1650] Ajige, Prince Ying [1605-1651] Dodo, Prince Yu [1614-1649] Prime Minister Fan Wencheng [1597-1666] Ming: The Chongzhen Emperor [r. 1627-1644] General Wu Sangui [1612-1678] General Hong Chengchou [1593-1665] General Zuo Liangyu [1599-1645] General Shi Kefa [1601-1645] Bandit: Li Zicheng [d. 1644] Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Some people you just know you will connect with. That has always been my inclination about Founder and Executive Director of Hike Clerb, Evelynn Escobar. In our LIVE recording, Evelynn and I dive into prioritizing and recognizing life's theme and purpose, rebelling against a daily routine, and honoring her younger self by committing to the liberation of Black, brown, and indigenous women. Get comfortable and listen in, because talking to Evelynn is like meeting an old friend for the first time. Stay tuned until the end for an intimate "Ask A Cool Mom" segment.

Brian L. Slade has held command positions in the Army and the Air Force and received the Distinguished Flying Cross, Bronze Star, and fourteen combat air medals. He attended Utah State, where he earned a BA and was commissioned as an Army Aviation second lieutenant. He's also earned an MA in aviation instruction. Brian currently serves as a lieutenant colonel for Air Force Combat Search and Rescue. Author of None Braver and The Liberators, journalist Michael Hirsh earned his Combat Infantryman Badge as an army combat correspondent with the 25th Inf. Div. in Vietnam. He has produced numerous documentaries and is the recipient of the Peabody and Writers Guild Awards and the Vietnam Veterans of America Excellence in the Arts Award. Buy the book Cleared Hot Today and be the Victor of your Own Story Get Your Copy of Cleared Hot TODAY Brian Slade Linkedin Brian Slade FB Brian Slade Insta www.clearedhot.info

In this episode, Phillip Lanos and Jason Miller are joined by Brian Slade, Founder, and CEO of Cleared Hot. Brian Slade has held command positions in the Army and the Air Force and received the Distinguished Flying Cross, Bronze Star, and fourteen combat air medals. He attended Utah State, earning a BA, and was commissioned as an Army Aviation second lieutenant. He's also made an MA in aviation instruction. Brian currently serves as a lieutenant colonel for Air Force Combat Search and Rescue. Author of None Braver and The Liberators, journalist Michael Hirsh earned his Combat Infantryman Badge as an army combat correspondent with the 25th Inf. Div. in Vietnam. He's produced numerous documentaries and is the recipient of the Peabody and Writers Guild Awards and the Vietnam Veterans of America Excellence in the Arts Award...Tune in to learn more!For more go to: https://www.strategicadvisorboard.comConnect:Strategic Advisor Board: www.linkedin.com/company/strategic-advisor-boardJason Miller: www.linkedin.com/in/jasontmiller-sabPhillip Lanos: www.linkedin.com/in/philliplanosBrian SladeLinkedIn: www.linkedin.com/in/brian-slade-a6850223bWebsite: clearedhot.info

This episode of Hella Black is an audio recording of Jalil Muntaqim's recent talk at People's Programs which commemorated Black August. Tap in!!!