Podcasts about Central Pacific

The race is finally over as both railroads make it to Promontory Summit. On May 10, 1869, the Central Pacific and the Union Pacific meet in a massive celebration. But in the aftermath, Thomas Durant's financial scheme is revealed and creates a major scandal. Meanwhile, with the nation now linked together, people begin to settle the west in record numbers, and alter the country forever.  Thanks to our sponsor, HelloFresh! To get started, check out our plan: HelloFresh.com/legends10fm Join Black Barrel+ for ad-free episodes and bingeable seasons: blackbarrel.supportingcast.fm/join Apple users join Black Barrel+ for ad-free episodes, bingeable seasons and bonus episodes. Click the Black Barrel+ banner on Apple to get started with a 3-day free trial. For more details, visit our website www.blackbarrelmedia.com and check out our social media pages. We're @OldWestPodcast on Facebook, Instagram and Twitter. On YouTube, subscribe to LEGENDS+ for ad-free episodes and bingeable seasons: hit “Join” on the Legends YouTube homepage. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Cleo Paskal, non-resident senior fellow at FDD and author of Crossroads of Competition, joins the show to discuss China's campaign for influence and control at the scene of America's bloody island-hopping campaign in WW2. ▪️ Times      •      01:35 Introduction     •      04:03 Pacific desert        •      07:45 Control       •      13:48 Post 1945     •      22:43 Significance           •      24:31 Yap     •      29:43 Divisions           •      32:18 Diplomatic maintenance     •      35:54 Designs     •      41:30 Strategic concerns            Follow along on Instagram, X @schoolofwarpod, and YouTube @SchoolofWarPodcast Find a transcript of today's episode on our School of War Substack

The central Pacific hurricane season runs June 1 through Nov. 30, and it's important to be prepared to keep you and your ohana safe. In this episode, which was streamed live on June 9, Hawaii News Now chief meteorologist Jennifer Robbins and meteorologist Drew Davis discussed all things hurricane-related and answered your storm-related questions.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

The Central Pacific moves out of the Sierra Nevada Mountains and into the Nevada desert. No longer blasting through granite walls, the workers are able to make up for lost time as they battle scorching hot temperatures and cracked soil. But with the race in the back of his head, Big Four member Charles Crocker formulates a plan to set a record and make headlines. Thanks to our sponsor, HelloFresh! To get started, check out our plan: HelloFresh.com/legends10fm Join Black Barrel+ for ad-free episodes and bingeable seasons: blackbarrel.supportingcast.fm/join Apple users join Black Barrel+ for ad-free episodes, bingeable seasons and bonus episodes. Click the Black Barrel+ banner on Apple to get started with a 3-day free trial. For more details, visit our website www.blackbarrelmedia.com and check out our social media pages. We're @OldWestPodcast on Facebook, Instagram and Twitter. On YouTube, subscribe to LEGENDS+ for ad-free episodes and bingeable seasons: hit “Join” on the Legends YouTube homepage. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

As the Union Pacific begins construction across Nebraska, the Central Pacific faces an immediate obstacle: the Sierra Nevada Mountains. In order to bypass the formidable granite mountains, the Central Pacific calls upon Chinese immigrants to do some of the most dangerous tasks, including using nitroglycerin to blast tunnels through the mountains.  Thanks to our sponsor, HelloFresh! To get started, check out our plan: HelloFresh.com/legends10fm Join Black Barrel+ for ad-free episodes and bingeable seasons: blackbarrel.supportingcast.fm/join Apple users join Black Barrel+ for ad-free episodes, bingeable seasons and bonus episodes. Click the Black Barrel+ banner on Apple to get started with a 3-day free trial. For more details, visit our website www.blackbarrelmedia.com and check out our social media pages. We're @OldWestPodcast on Facebook, Instagram and Twitter. On YouTube, subscribe to LEGENDS+ for ad-free episodes and bingeable seasons: hit “Join” on the Legends YouTube homepage. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

For decades in the early 1800s, engineers and merchants attempt to convince the United States to build a railroad that could link the east to the west. But it isn't until the nation is thrown into Civil War that the government passes a bill to construct a transcontinental railroad. Two companies are formed: the Union Pacific and the Central Pacific. The Union Pacific begins building west from Omaha. But the man who oversees everything, Thomas Durant, uses the project to enrich himself.  Join Black Barrel+ for ad-free episodes and bingeable seasons: blackbarrel.supportingcast.fm/join Apple users join Black Barrel+ for ad-free episodes, bingeable seasons and bonus episodes. Click the Black Barrel+ banner on Apple to get started with a 3-day free trial. For more details, visit our website www.blackbarrelmedia.com and check out our social media pages. We're @OldWestPodcast on Facebook, Instagram and Twitter. On YouTube, subscribe to LEGENDS+ for ad-free episodes and bingeable seasons: hit “Join” on the Legends YouTube homepage. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Why you and your family should prepare now as NOAA forecasters share their predictions for this year's Central Pacific hurricane season. A Lahaina wildfire survivor accused of killing a fellow fire victim enters his plea in court. And federal funding cuts at the University of Hawaii are much deeper than expected.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

The Central Pacific hurricane season begins June 1 and today, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration released its forecast on how many tropical cyclones are possible. And a serial road rage driver accused of an attack in Kakaako is still in the hospital after he was beaten up while behind bars.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

In this first episode of a special two-part series, Waypoints heads to the heart of the Central Pacific to explore one of the most legendary destinations in saltwater fly fishing — Christmas Island. Host Jim Klug is joined by Bryant Dunn of Christmas Island Lodge for a deep dive into the rich history of the atoll, the evolution of its world-renowned fishery, and why this remote destination continues to captivate anglers from around the globe. Together, they unpack the fascinating backstory of Kiritimati — from its early Polynesian visitors and strategic wartime role to its emergence as a top-tier flyfishing hotspot.Listeners can expect an informative and detailed conversation that brings to life the story behind Christmas Island's rise as a must-visit destination. Bryant and Jim also share insights into the challenges and rewards of running an off-the-grid lodge operation, the role of fly fishing tourism for the local Kiribati economy, and what makes the Christmas Island experience truly unique. Whether you're planning your first trip to the famous atoll or simply dreaming of casting to bonefish and giant trevally on expansive Pacific flats, this episode sets the stage for an unforgettable look at one of fly fishing's most iconic locations (with  more to come in Part Two).Waypoints is brought to you by PatagoniaTo bring their gear to life, Patagonia is motivated by relentless curiosity and a passion for the wild. They evaluate hundreds of materials, build dozens of prototypes and spend seasons punishing them in the world's most extreme conditions. The work is the guide, and Patagonia never tires of exploring, learning and improving. Built with innovative materials, intuitive features and a refined fit, their Swiftcurrent® Waders are a better wader experience. Repatterned for bulk reduction, reduced seam stress, increased maneuverability and improved repairability, they move better in and out of the water, carry gear more efficiently and keep tools handy. They're made from recycled materials without intentionally added PFAS—toxic “forever chemicals.- Follow us on Instagram- Follow us on Facebook- Check out our YouTube Page- View the official Yellow Dog website ...

"Preview: Colleague Cleo Paskal of FDD outlines why the Central Pacific is vital to the defense of the US and allies right now. More later." 1900 PALAU

We just finished the brutal slog through the Solomons, and now we're following the Central Pacific drive straight into Tarawa. This wasn't jungle fighting, it was open beach and shallow reefs, turning a straightforward landing into a nightmare. Marines found themselves stranded, wading through chest-deep water under relentless fire. Communication fell apart, and every yard gained came at a heavy cost. Today, we're diving into the chaos and courage at Tarawa. ************* Visit HistoryoftheMarineCorps.com to subscribe to our newsletter, explore episode notes and images, and see our references. Follow us on social media for updates and bonus content: Facebook and Twitter (@marinehistory) and Instagram (@historyofthemarines). This episode is sponsored by Audible. Visit AudibleTrial.com/marinehistory for a free audiobook and a 30-day trial.

#OCEANIA: SECURING THE CENTRAL PACIFIC. CLEO PASKAL, FDD. @GORDONGCHANG, GATESTONE, NEWSWEEK, THE HILL 1899 AMOA WITH EUROPEAN WARSHIPS

This week's guest on the Black Rifle Coffee Podcast is Steve McCloud, author of “Black Dragon”, an in-depth account of the 2nd Battalion, 23rd Marines during the Pacific Campaign in WWII. Steve joins Logan Stark to talk about the incredible journey of these Marines, including the pivotal role they played at Iwo Jima, the incredible story of leadership and sacrifice, and the decade-long research journey Steve undertook to piece together this powerful narrative. Don't miss this fascinating look into history, leadership, and the enduring spirit of the Marine Corps.   Host: Find more about Logan Stark on socials @loganstark Guests: Steve McCloud: Founder of Trident Leadership, Author of Black Dragon   For information on PMEs, battlefield leadership experiences, or the 80th Anniversary Pacific Tour, visit TridentLeadership.com   Visit their website:  www.tridentleadership.com And check out their book: “Black Dragon: The Experience of a Marine Rifle Company in the Central Pacific”    https://www.amazon.com/Black-Dragon-Experience-Williams-Ford-University/dp/1648430171

Last time we spoke about the fall of Mandalay. Fierce battles raged over northern Luzon as General Clarkson's forces advanced, capturing key locations while Colonel Volckmann's guerrillas targeted enemy positions. The challenging terrain favored Japanese defenses, creating fierce resistance. Despite this, American troops steadily progressed, securing hills and towns. By mid-March, the 38th Division's relentless push led to significant Japanese losses. The brutal history of POW massacres fueled American resolve, leading to further victories in the region, American forces, led by Major-General Jens Doe were given the task of invading Palawan. Despite facing fortified defenses and rough terrain, the 41st Division advanced under artillery and air support. Meanwhile, in Burma, British-Indian forces clashed with the Japanese, capturing key positions and repelling assaults. As tensions rose in French Indochina, the Japanese executed a coup, disarming French forces and establishing puppet governments. The conflict intensified, reshaping the region's power dynamics. This episode is the Fall of Iwo Jima Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Today we are picking up on Iwo Jima. By March 10, General Schmidt's Marine forces had finally breached the determined enemy defenses to reach the northeastern shore of the island. However, there were still some Japanese strongholds to eliminate in the central and southern areas. One of these was Cushman's Pocket, named after the commander of the 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines, and located around a devastated ridge overlooking the sea, which housed the stubborn resistance southwest of Hill 362C. The other stronghold, held by General Senda's remaining troops, was established on March 11 after General Cates initiated his final push southeast toward the sea. Consequently, while Colonel Wensinger's 23rd Marines advanced quickly to the coast, Colonel Lanigan's 25th Marines struggled to make headway, as they were quickly halted by intense rocket, mortar, and small-arms fire from Senda's pocket. Unbeknownst to the Americans, Senda had committed suicide on March 8 following the failure of his banzai counterattack, leaving the disorganized Japanese forces in the pocket without leadership. Meanwhile, General Rockey's 5th Marine Division had advanced all the way to General Kuribayashi's last line of defense in northern Iwo Jima, where the battered defenders were prepared to make their final stand. Following a 50-minute preparation involving air, naval, and artillery support on March 11, Colonel Liversedge's 28th Marines launched their attack on the left with three battalions in line, while Colonel Wornham's 27th Marines attacked on the right with four battalions. However, fierce resistance soon forced the combat to close quarters, resulting in the Marines advancing only a few yards—up to 50 yards—across the front. To the right, while the 21st Marines advanced northward to connect with the 5th Division, Colonel Kenyon's 9th Marines resumed their assaults on Cushman's Pocket. The 1st and 3rd Battalions effectively eliminated all resistance in the eastern sector, completely sealing off the area controlled by the Japanese. On March 12, these battalions launched an attack westward toward Cushman's Pocket, with Colonel Withers' 3rd Battalion serving as a holding force on the opposite flank. However, the Marines faced strong opposition and could only advance slowly against the camouflaged enemy positions. To the north, Rocky's units continued to face intense resistance, with Liversedge making no progress and Wornham achieving only minor advances. An intelligence officer with the 5th Division estimated that a minimum of 1,000 Japanese troops were defending the northern end of the island, and stated ". . . there is no shortage of manpower, weapons, or ammunition in the area the Japanese have left to defend." The entire northern tip of the island seemed to be honeycombed with caves and passageways. When a 500-pound bomb landed in the mouth of a cave near Kitano Pint, a big puff of smoke blew out the side of a cliff over 400 yards away, and another bomb landing in a cave entrance in the same area caused a ring of smoke and dust to come up through the ground for a radius of 200 yards around the point of impact. Meanwhile, to the south, the 25th Marines pressed eastward while Colonel Jordan's 3rd Battalion contained the pocket from the north. Supported by tanks, flamethrowers, bazookas, anti-tank grenades, and 60mm mortars, Lanigan's troops engaged in fierce combat with the heavily fortified Japanese forces in the pocket for four days. During this time, Jordan's 2nd Battalion cleared the beach road, allowing the Shermans to move behind the pocket. On March 13, as Withers' 3rd Battalion returned to the 21st Marines, Kenyon's 1st and 3rd Battalions continued their offensive from the east, making significant gains that reduced Cushman's Pocket to 250 yards. Meanwhile, following a successful water-borne reconnaissance of Kama and Kangoku Rocks the previous afternoon, an armored amphibian company landed on these islets without encountering any resistance. At the same time, Rocky's weary Marines maintained pressure on the ridge above the gorge, achieving only slight gains on the right. Fortunately, by March 14, it seemed that the slow, arduous progress of the past three days had enabled the 27th Marines to push through the last strong enemy positions along the northeastern side of the island. As a result, Liversedge was instructed to hold position while the 26th and 27th Marines advanced north and northwest against lighter resistance, successfully gaining up to 1,000 yards by March 15.After armored dozers hacked paths forward, tanks were able to lend support. The flame tanks were particularly effective during this phase and provided "the one weapon that caused the Japanese to leave their caves and rock crevices and run." Army planes flew the last air support missions of the operation on 14 March when five P-51's dropped fire bombs (gasoline and diesel oil mixture) and strafed in front of 3/27 from 1030 to 1100. From then on, the narrow confines of the area of operations prevented use of those planes that had performed so well in supporting ground troops. Artillery and destroyers continued to furnish limited support, firing a preparation for RCT 26 on 15 March and performing night harassing and illumination missions. Meanwhile, operations against Cushman's Pocket entered their final phase on March 14, when Kenyon's 1st and 3rd Battalions finally breached the last enemy defenses by nightfall and completed the cleanup of the pocket two days later. On March 15, Lanigan redirected the main focus of the attack on Senda's pocket to the south, ordering the two battalions in the center to engage aggressively, resulting in a gain of approximately 200 yards and a deep penetration into the left flank of the Japanese's strongest positions. During the night, enemy forces attempted to infiltrate Marine lines from the south, but each attempt was detected and thwarted. Lanigan launched his final assault on March 16, facing only small, isolated pockets of resistance that were quickly eliminated as his battalions advanced toward the beach road. That day, with organized resistance in the 3rd Division's area of operations coming to an end, the 21st Marines were deployed to relieve the 27th Marines on the right flank to continue the northwest attack. With strong naval and artillery support, Withers' 1st Battalion encountered light resistance in its sector on the right, while the 2nd Battalion faced tougher opposition from scattered enemy positions. Nevertheless, both battalions reached the coastline at Kitano Point by the afternoon and began mopping up. To the left, Colonel Graham's 26th Marines also advanced cautiously northwest, with tanks effectively neutralizing enemy positions as the Marines gained about 400 yards. Despite the presence of 500 determined enemy troops still resisting in the western section of Kitano Point and the draw to the southwest, Iwo Jima was officially declared secured by the end of the day. However, on March 17, the battle for the gorge commenced as the 26th Marines advanced under moderate rifle fire, reaching the northern coast before shifting their focus southwestward to confront the gorge in front of the 28th Marines. The gorge in which the last resisting Japanese were now cornered was rocky and steep-sided, approximately 700 yards long and between 200 and 500 yards wide. Rock outcrops cut this ravine into other minor draws that constituted major obstacles to all types of movement. The entire area was ideally suited to the type of last ditch defense the Japanese had adopted. All routes into the main gorge were swept by heavy and accurate fire from machine guns and rifles concealed in cave positions in the cliffs and outcrops. The plan for attacking this strong point called for the 28th Marines, with attached elements of the 5th Pioneer Battalion and Division Reconnaissance Company, to hold the southern rim along the steep cliffs, while the reinforced 26th Marines worked in from the north and east. For the next nine days exhausted Marines carried out a battle of attrition against the thoroughly entrenched enemy. Advances into the east end of the ravine were measured in yards as each cave had to be sealed off before further progress could be made. Flame-thrower tanks, armored bulldozers, and infantry combined operations to provide the power and teamwork necessary to penetrate the last stronghold. As they gradually pushed down the ravine, resistance concentrated around a large concrete structure built into a knoll near the eastern end. After two days of assaults that silenced the supporting positions, engineers used bulldozers to seal a door on the north side and then demolished the structure with five charges totaling 8,500 pounds of explosives. Nevertheless, the battle of attrition persisted, and it wasn't until the end of March 24 that the pocket was reduced to an area of about 50 by 50 yards at the northwest end of the draw. The following morning, units of the 28th Marines, which had taken full responsibility for the pocket, reached the coastal cliffs to finally eliminate the last remnants of resistance in the gorge. On March 20, the 147th Regiment, set to take over the defense of Iwo Jima, arrived from New Caledonia, and by March 24, it had relieved the 21st Marines to establish night ambushes and patrols. The Japanese defenders fought tenaciously until the very end, choosing death over surrender. However, Kuribayashi had one final assault planned. In the pre-dawn darkness of March 26, the final act of the tragedy was performed. Between 200 and 300 Japanese troops from Death Valley and other scattered positions on the west coast silently crept through the ravines of the 5th Division sector headed for a tented area between Airfield No. 2 and the sea occupied by a mixture of Seabees, Air Force personnel, Shore Parties and AA Gunners. Most of them were sleeping, secure in the knowledge that the battle was virtually over. In a coordinated three-pronged attack against unsuspecting Marines and Air Force ground crews, aiming to create maximum chaos and destruction. Kuribayashi and his men stealthily cut through tents, bayoneted sleeping soldiers, and threw hand grenades, resulting in the deaths of around 44 Airmen and 9 Marines. The noise soon alerted troops from the surrounding area, and Marines from a nearby Pioneer Battalion, african american troops from a Shore Party, and soldiers from the 147th Infantry joined battle in a frenzy of shooting, punching, kicking and stabbing. Once the initial surprise wore off, the defenders retaliated, engaging in a chaotic hand-to-hand combat until the 5th Pioneer Battalion quickly organized a defensive line and halted the attack. Dawn revealed the full extent of the carnage in the ruined encampment: 44 Airman and 9 Marines lay dead with a further 119 wounded; of the attackers 262 were killed and 18 captured. Lt Harry Martin of the 5th Pioneers had hurriedly organized a defense line during the attack and single-handedly killed four enemy machine gunners before dying himself. He was to be Iwo Jima's final Medal of Honor hero, bringing the total to an incredible 27.  The circumstances of General Kuribayashi's death have always been shrouded in mystery. Over the years various sources have suggested that he died in the fighting around Death Valley or that he killed himself in his HQ. According to General Kuribayashi's son, Taro: “It seems that it was after sunset on March 25 to the dawn of the 26th that surviving Imperial Japanese forces were obliged to stand still under the US onslaught and showering shells. Under such circumstances, he had his sword in his left hand and ordered the chief staff officer, Colonel Takaishi, who was beside him, 'Send snipers to shoot'. Sargent Oyama heard the order. Oyama, who was seriously wounded in the last combat, fell unconscious, was hospitalized by the US and after having served as a POW came back and testified the dreadful account of the night to me. My father had believed it shameful to have his body discovered by the enemy even after death, so he had previously asked his two soldiers to come along with him, one in front and the other behind, with a shovel in hand. In case of his death he had wanted them to bury his body there and then. It seems that my father and the soldiers were killed by shells, and he was buried at the foot of a tree in Chidori Village, along the beach near Osaka Mountain. Afterwards General Smith spent a whole day looking for his body to pay respect accordingly and to perform a burial, but in vain.” Following the destruction of this final force, the capture and occupation phase of the Iwo Jima operation was declared complete. Over 34 days of combat, approximately 18,000 Japanese soldiers were killed, and 216 were taken prisoner, while the American side suffered heavy losses: 6,821 killed, 19,217 wounded, and 137 tanks destroyed. On April 4, the 147th Regiment took over full responsibility for the ground defense of Iwo Jima as the Marines were departing the island. Throughout April and May, aggressive patrols and ambushes by infantrymen resulted in an additional 867 prisoners and 1,602 Japanese killed, with the Americans losing 15 killed and 144 wounded. Meanwhile, General LeMay's 21st Bomber Command continued its firebombing campaign against Japan. After the successful Tokyo Great Air Raid and a less effective attack on Nagoya, LeMay decided to send 301 B-29s on the afternoon of March 13 to strike Osaka. Despite having to use radar bombing due to cloud cover, American bombardiers achieved a denser and more uniform bombing pattern than the impressionistic methods employed in Nagoya. This resulted in the destruction of 8.1 square miles in the city's core, including commercial and industrial areas, and caused 13,129 civilian casualties, with the loss of 2 bombers and 13 others damaged. Keeping up the intensity of the firebombing campaign, LeMay dispatched 307 B-29s to attack Kobe on the night of March 16. They faced 314 enemy interceptors, which proved ineffective against the Superfortresses unleashing fire over the port. Consequently, the fire on March 17 spiraled out of control, obliterating the eastern half of the business district and devastating a significant industrial zone to the southeast, including the Kawasaki shipyards. Japanese statistics show that the destruction was appalling. About 500 industrial buildings were destroyed, 162 damaged. The loss of 65,951 houses left 242,468 persons homeless. Police reported 2,669 dead or missing and 11,289 injured. Although the destruction was devastating for the Japanese, LeMay was disheartened to find that only 2.9 square miles of the city had burned. To complete his campaign, LeMay sent 313 bombers back to Nagoya on the night of March 19, utilizing radar techniques to cover a large portion of the city. This resulted in the burning of 3 square miles, including the Nagoya arsenal, freight yards, and Aichi's engine works. With an average of 380 aircraft, the 21st Bomber Command conducted 1,595 sorties over 10 days, dropping a total of 9,365 tons of bombs. The results far exceeded expectations, as the B-29s left a trail of destruction across four major cities, decimating 32 square miles and destroying numerous critical targets. Thus, LeMay's strategy proved successful, leading to incendiary area bombing becoming standard practice in the future. The focus now shifts from the Central Pacific to the South Pacific, where we need to address the ongoing Australian operations in New Britain. Following the capture of Milim and Ea Ea in January, General Ramsay's 5th Division aimed to continue its limited advances to the north. To secure crossings over the Ip River and patrol towards Henry Reid Bay, the entire 6th Brigade began moving to the Kiep-Milim area on January 26, completing this relocation by February 11. Concurrently, the 14th/32nd Battalion had advanced beyond the Ip and was conducting patrols towards Kalai Plantation, where they faced enemy resistance. The 36th Battalion also moved forward to Mavelo Plantation, leading to retaliatory actions against the new Australian outpost at Baia. In response, Ramsay dispatched stronger patrols to the Sai River throughout February, successfully establishing a new defensive line along the Mavelo River by the month's end. Returning to Wide Bay, after a series of aggressive patrols and nighttime ambushes, the 14th/32nd Battalion managed to reach Kamandran Mission by mid-February. The Australians continued to advance, and by the end of the month, the 19th Battalion, which had replaced the 14th/32nd at Gogbulu Creek, secured crossings over the Mevelo River and patrolled east toward the Wulwut River. On March 3, Ramsay ordered the 6th Brigade to cross the Wulwut and capture the Waitavalo Ridge. Two days later, the 19th Battalion initiated the assault but struggled to push more than one company across the river due to fierce enemy resistance. On March 6, following an artillery bombardment, another company successfully crossed and quickly seized Cake Hill. The next day, Lone Tree Hill was taken following another round of artillery bombardment. By March 10, Moose Hill, Young's Hill, and Perry's Knoll had also been captured. In the days that followed, Australian artillery began to suppress enemy mortars as infantry moved toward Kath's Hill. By mid-March, the 14th/32nd Battalion replaced the 19th Battalion, and on March 16, the Australians resumed their offensive, facing fierce resistance but successfully encircling Bacon Hill. The assault continued the next day as the 14th/32nd fought to reach the summit of the hill. On 18th March the mortar fire was intensified from the few remaining enemy positions, and it seemed that the Japanese were firing off their ammunition while they could. The attack was resumed. When Corporal Martin's section was halted on the steep spur by fire from three posts he jumped up shouting, "They can't do that to me", and went on alone, firing posts, killing five, before he himself was hit. The decisive attack was launched through this foothold. By 3 p.m. all the Japanese had been cleared from Bacon Hill; and a patrol from Kath's, under Lieutenant Lamshed,3 penetrated to a knoll 800 yards to the east and found no enemy there. No Japanese now remained in the Waitavalo-Tol area. In the five days from the 16th to the 20th 4 officers and 53 others had been killed or wounded.  In the following days, patrols ventured deep into enemy territory but found few stragglers. On March 21, the 19th Battalion took over again and advanced toward the Bulus and Moondei Rivers. On March 28, Ramsay ordered the 13th Brigade to relieve the 6th Brigade, a transition that was completed by April 12. Following the capture of Waitavalo Ridge, there were four months of infantry patrolling and routine maintenance by other troops, with the 16th Battalion patrolling forward to Jammer Bay in this area. Additionally, looking west, a company from the 36th Battalion successfully landed north of the Sai on March 30 but could not proceed to the Matalaili River due to heavy rains. However, Japanese positions there were heavily bombarded by aircraft and the sloop Swan, prompting the defenders to withdraw to the Toriu River in April. Meanwhile, Brigadier King's 16th Brigade advanced to the Ninahau River by March 12, while Brigadier Moten's 17th Brigade continued its westward push through the Torricelli Mountains, aiming to capture the Japanese base at Maprik. Throughout March, the 2/7th Battalion executed several successful ambushes from their new bases at Ilahop, Balangabadabil, and Bombeta, while Hayforce advanced through Sinahau to the north of Utumugu and eastward to Tatimba. By early March, Moten had cleverly led the enemy to believe that the primary offensive would be launched by the 2/10th Commando Squadron from the north via Ami. As a result, the Japanese bolstered their forces in that area, successfully driving back Australian patrols from Chaulak, Gwanginan, and Wambak. On March 13, the commando outpost at Milak came under attack, with the Japanese gradually encircling the position in the following days but failing to overcome the defenders' steadfast resistance. Fortunately, by March 17, patrols had restored communication lines, and two days later, the enemy pressure finally subsided. During this time, smaller Japanese forces also targeted the commando outposts at Murak and Aupik, but the defenders managed to repel these attacks as well. However, as the 2/10th was completely exhausted, the 2/6th Battalion was dispatched to relieve the commandos in late March amid a new wave of Japanese assaults. Meanwhile, the 2/7th Battalion was engaged in assaults on the fortified enemy positions at Ilaheta, which fell on March 20. The Australians then turned their attention to the Aupik villages, successfully focusing their efforts on the west bank of the Ninab River by the end of March, coinciding with Hayforce's crossing of the Amuk River. In the following three days, the 2/7th Battalion cleared all opposition along the eastern side of the Ninab in preparation for the final push toward Maprik. Consequently, General Miyake's 78th Regiment was ultimately compelled to retreat toward Jamei. Looking further north, King decided to initiate his advance towards But. By mid-March, a company from the 2/2nd Battalion had crossed the Ninahau on March 14 and quickly moved through Bai and Ultan. Although the Australian advance faced a strong enemy position that delayed progress for two days, the 2/2nd ultimately broke through Manib Creek, catching the defenders off guard and swiftly capturing the But airfield on March 17. Following this, the Australians patrolled the foothills and the Old German Road towards the Dagua airfield, encountering minimal resistance. Consequently, on March 21, the 2/2nd advanced rapidly again, successfully taking Dagua while the 2/1st Battalion moved in to secure But. At this stage, Japanese resistance along the coast was light, as General Adachi had focused on the Maprik district, which could produce more food. With the main enemy forces now concentrated in the hills to the south, King directed the 2/2nd to clear the foothills south of Dagua and eliminate the enemy in the Tokoku Pass, while the 2/3rd Battalion launched a flanking attack in the Mabam River-Hamsuk-Yalaminuni area. The 2/2nd then patrolled deep towards Magahen and Wonginara Mission, facing strong resistance at the 1410 Feature. On March 24, they finally captured the feature, while another patrol reached Wonginara without encountering enemy forces. However, in the final days of March, the Australians struggled to advance against the strong resistance of the Japanese defenders on the Wonginara Track, although one patrol successfully probed towards Kauremerak Hill. On April 2, following intense air and artillery bombardments, the 2/2nd Battalion finally managed to break through to Tokoku Pass, which was secured the next day. Meanwhile, another patrol advanced south from Dagua to the Autogi-Walanduum area and then to the coast near Kofi. The 2/3rd Battalion moved south from Feature 1410 towards the Mabam River and Wonginara Mission, successfully eliminating a series of Japanese ridge positions by April 6. The 2/1st Battalion patrolled deep into the hills south and west of But, completely clearing the area by April 1 while also pushing eastward to capture Saburuman. Concurrently, the 2/3rd Machine-Gun Battalion advanced to the upper Ninahau, effectively clearing the region up to a north-south line about two miles beyond Muguluwela by the end of March. In early April, the machine-gunners successfully cleared the Marabus area and connected with the 2/1st Battalion. Finally, it was time to shift focus to Bougainville to continue covering the Australian offensives on the island. As previously noted, Brigadier Stevenson's 11th Brigade had secured the Tsimba Ridge area, while Brigadier Field's 7th Brigade was advancing south towards the Puriata River. The swift capture of Mosigetta and the unexpected secondary landing at Toko had already compelled the Japanese to retreat behind the river amid a command crisis. The Japanese policy of resisting the southward advance more strongly even if it entailed heavier casualties failed to impose the hoped-for delay of the Australians. Nevertheless the Japanese leaders considered that the 13th Regiment's "swift damaging hit-and-run tactics" were well executed. However, Mosigetta was at length abandoned and a withdrawal south of the Puriata ordered. The landing at Toko was unexpected and caused an acceleration of this withdrawal. There now occurred a major crisis in the Japanese command. The young reserve officers were highly critical of the conduct of the campaign and blamed the policies of the older professional officers for the constant reverses. This criticism became so outspoken that, in February, a number of the younger officers were relieved of their commands; perhaps partly as an outcome of this crisis, General Hyakutake suffered a paralysis of his left side. General Kanda took command of the 17th Army and Lieutenant-General Akinaga Tsutomu, Chief of Staff of the Army, succeeded him in command of the 6th Division. "This change of command was regarded favourably by the younger officers, but it soon became apparent that Kanda intended to pursue the same policy as Hyakutake. Kanda was a shrewd, hard, fussy little professional soldier of long experience. He was steeped in tradition and a ruthless commander, but even his bitterest critics admitted his capabilities. Akinaga… was a dyed in the wool militarist and a strict disciplinarian. Unused to an active command he was plunged into a situation which was a little out of his depth. One of his staff stated that he spent too much time doing a corporal's job in his forward battalions to be a good divisional commander." In late February, General Bridgeford's forces advanced toward the Puriata, facing only minor rearguard positions. The 25th Battalion captured Barara on February 22 and a five-acre garden two days later, while the 61st Battalion took control of another garden measuring 600 by 400 yards near the river on March 1. Meanwhile, the 2/8th Commando Squadron was sent to secure the Makapeka area, successfully taking Commando Ridge and a ford across the Makapeka River by March 5. With General Savige aiming to reach the Hari River next, Bridgeford promptly ordered the 7th Brigade to move to the Hongorai River line. As a result, Field planned to initiate his main advance on March 11, utilizing the 25th Battalion and the 2/8th Commando Squadron, while the 61st Battalion pushed forward toward Horinu. In response, Kanda dispatched the 23rd Regiment to bolster the 13th at the front, preparing both units for a full-scale counterattack should the Australians cross the Puriata, aiming to delay the enemy long enough to finalize preparations for a decisive battle along the Silibai-Porror Rivers. By March 5, the 25th Battalion had already crossed the river and swiftly captured Slater's Knoll, which soon came under enemy mortar fire. Patrols were sent ahead and found that the 13th Regiment was poised to fiercely contest the Australian advance. Although the northern flank of the 25th Battalion would be effectively contained along the Buin Road on March 11, two Australian companies managed to maneuver through Tokinotu to the south, reaching Hiru Hiru by the end of the day. One of these companies moved along the eastern side of the Buin Road toward Slater's Knoll, but from March 15 to 17, they faced a heavy counterattack that ultimately forced them to withdraw. In response, Field initiated a strong offensive along the Buin Road on March 19, managing to push the Japanese back to some rear positions. Following a significant air and artillery bombardment, the attack resumed on March 22, successfully overcoming all enemy resistance. Meanwhile, the commandos advanced to Nihero, where they began extensive patrols southward towards Unanai, Hari, and the Buin Road. During one of these patrols, they captured detailed orders for a large-scale Japanese offensive planned for early April. As a result, Bridegeford decided to pause his offensive and send the 15th Brigade along with a tank squadron to Toko to reinforce his perimeter. On March 28 and 29, before Akinaga's main assault, the Japanese conducted a series of raids on the Australian lines of communication and rear areas, all of which were successfully repelled by vigilant defenders. On March 30, the 13th Regiment launched several strong attacks against the 25th Battalion, all of which were costly for the attackers and repelled, while the armored squadron advanced toward Tokinotu. Just as the tanks reached the front, the Japanese initiated another wave of fierce attacks against the 25th Battalion on March 31, which were thankfully repelled with the support of the armored units. Consequently, on April 1, two companies advanced again, establishing a perimeter 1,000 yards south of Slater's Knoll. That evening, and for the following three days, Akinaga launched a series of raids to facilitate the arrival of the 23rd Regiment for a renewed assault. In the early hours of April 5, the Japanese began infiltrating the Australian perimeter, launching a vigorous two-pronged assault on Slater's Knoll later that morning. The 23rd Regiment attacked about 1,000 yards to the right of the 13th and north-east of it. The attack failed, Kawano was killed and the regiment withdrew south to the rear of the 13th. The 13th Regiment with 600 men made the main attack from north and east.  Until 6.20 a.m. wave after wave charged forward and was brought low. Some Japanese fell within four yards of the weapon-pits. The artillery sent over accurate defensive fire, registered the previous day. At dawn the surviving Japanese were heard digging in on dead ground. As the light became clearer, the Australians saw that "enemy dead lay, literally, in heaps in front of the wire", and bodies could be seen scattered over an area some 200 yards square. It was gruesome evidence of the efficient siting of weapons and choice of fields of fire in preparation for expected attack. The attackers were ordered to dig in until darkness and make full use of grenades and mortars. However, in the afternoon, tanks and artillery fire drove the Japanese from the positions they had gained, and the Japanese commander accepted defeat. All three battalion commanders in the 13th were killed. After Akinaga had reported his failure Kanda said to his Chief of Staff, Colonel Yoshiyuki Ejima: "It would not have happened if I had been in command. The enemy right flank was wide open. I would have severed his life line and controlled Toko. We could have delayed the enemy for three months."  Concurrently, around 100 Japanese troops attacked the two forward companies along the Buin Road but were similarly repelled with ease. Following the unsuccessful counteroffensive by Akinaga, Slater's Knoll received reinforcements while the remaining Japanese forces were being dealt with, resulting in 620 Japanese fatalities since March 28, compared to 189 Australian casualties. However, Bridgeford could not capitalize on this victory due to the prolonged supply line, which temporarily halted his offensive. As a result, while the 2/8th Commando Squadron moved forward along the Commando Road, the 13th Brigade began to relieve the battered 7th Brigade under Field on April 13. Meanwhile, in the northern sector of the 11th Brigade area, the 26th Battalion launched a significant advance northward on February 21, successfully overrunning the Lalum-Downs' Ridge area by March 8. Two companies then advanced further north to secure the crossing of the Nagam River. On March 13, another company landed near the southern edge of Soraken Plantation and quickly pushed the enemy back behind the Nagam. Australian patrols harassed the Japanese forces at Horseshoe Knoll until March 20, when they finally withdrew. Simultaneously, the 26th Battalion eliminated the remaining enemy positions at the Compton River and secured the Soraken Peninsula, while the Taiof and Saposa Islands were also captured off the coast. The next battalion to take over the forward positions was the 31st/51st Battalion. Perhaps the outstanding patrol leader in the 31st/51st was Lieutenant Reiter, who led out 3 patrols which killed 10 out of the 78 Japanese killed by this battalion's forays. One of these patrols was named by the battalion "the raid on Reiter's Ridge". Reiter and 15 men were given the task of harassing the Japanese occupying a prominent ridge just east of Sisivie and discovering their strength. They departed from Keenan's Ridge at 17:30 on March 27, bivouacked at a former artillery observation post and moved on at 03:00 next morning for a dawn attack. At 06:00 “the patrol moved in, and throwing grenades and firing LMG occupied a small knoll (its report stated). 2 Japanese were killed and 1 pillbox containing LMG destroyed. Patrol raced down narrow neck to a wide clearing in which several huts were sighted. Phosphorus and HE grenades were thrown. In a matter of seconds 4 more Japanese killed (2 in slit trenches, 1 as he ran and another while abluting). 2 were wounded by phosphorus grenades. 3 huts were blazing and 1 (considered to be an ammunition dump) blew up. Enemy opened up with one LMG and 15 rifles and patrol pulled out with 1 man wounded.” Instead of hastening them away Reiter assembled his men nearby in concealment and watched the enemy. At length Japanese began to move about again, and soon they were washing clothes, chopping wood and performing other tasks. There were from 25 to 30 enemy in the post. The Australians watched throughout the morning and at 12:30 opened fire with all their weapons. 2 Japanese were killed and 4 more huts set on fire. The enemy fired back, and at 01:15 Reiter withdrew his men and returned to Keenan's Ridge leaving an ambush on the enemy's track. The ambush party returned later and reported that it had seen no movement.  On the 29th, the day after Reiter's return, a platoon of the 1st New Guinea Infantry Battalion under Lieutenant Martin set out for Buritsiotorara along the Wakunai River. There they found three huts and a large garden with seven Japanese moving about unarmed. Throwing grenades and firing from the hip the native soldiers attacked and killed all seven. Three more who emerged from a hut were chased and killed. Three of the dead men were found to be lieutenants; three machine-guns were cap-tured. Next day at Aviang, 1,200 yards away, seven more Japanese were seen, of whom three including another lieutenant were killed and the others fled. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The battle for Iwo Jima had come to a bitter end. The lessons learnt on Iwo Jima would become guidelines for the Battle of Okinawa in April and would influence allied plans for the invasion of the Japanese home islands. The war planners would later notably take into account that around a third of the troops committed to Iwo Jima, and later again at Okinawa, had been killed or wounded and that they could expect far more in Japan.

Back Home, One week later.By FinalStand. Listen to the Podcast at Explicit Novels.There is something worse than waking up and not knowing where you are: you could wake up and not know who you are.Note: World Events Stuff ~ aka Why things are happening in Cáel's lifeThe phone was from Iskender. His boss, Oyuun Tömörbaatar (OT), the former UN ambassador from Kazakhstan and now the informal and unrecognized UN representative and chief diplomat of the Khanate to the same august body, wanted to talk with me, immediately. OT wasn't being diplomatic at the moment, that would come later.{Now this is going to get convoluted}Any inquiries to the Khanate that didn't also include immediate official recognition of the Khanate currently were being steered my (and Hana's) way. For all the behind closed doors crap, he had me, his loyal ass-monkey mutton-head. I held faint hope that this latest meeting would work out to my benefit. For the meeting, I traveled light, only Naomi (the Amazon) and Chaz (British SRR) watched over me.Now fathers who know me, hide their daughters. I'd earned my 'scoundrel' reputation. T. Sarangerel, OT's daughter, was in the room when Iskender ushered me in. She gave me an uncertain look, I shrugged and she smiled. It took me 3 nano seconds to figure that out, OT was scoping me out as a potential son-in-law. I was in Temujin's Inner Circle and a man who he trusted (a rarity). Any union with me would strengthen OT's clan's standing in the new regime.The genetic footprint Temujin, and his immediate family collectively, had put down in the 13th and 14th centuries CE today was vast. He needed that to make his plans for the internal reorganization of the Khanate work. The old republics would go away, to be replaced by a system akin to the Byzantine 'themes, the re-organization of regions based on the recruitment of the Tumens.The Khanate was aiming for an 'Autocratic Republic' ~ a term invented in the 19th century. My use of this terminology was based on my gut instinct, Alal's host of memories involving every form of governance, and my experience with human nature. That clued me in to what Temujin was up to, his Greater Plan. He wasn't going to form a false-front government. He was going to retain the decision-making powers and do so openly, thus 'Autocratic'.He also planned to have a bicameral legislative branch. The Upper House would be based in Tumens and bureaucratic leadership, intellectual standing, religious sects, and tribal entities. This body would be based on merit, not primogeniture. The Lower, main chamber, would be a democratically-elected assembly (aka a democratic republic) that advised him on policy matters, thus 'Republic'.All the power would remain in the Great Khan's hands and would be exercised by his genetic descendants (which some geneticists estimated as being as high as 25% of the Central Asian population.) Marrying into that extended family would be easy, the 'family' itself would have a vested interesting in supporting a state that benefited them.Men and women could exercise power in the government through marriage alliances, identical to the manner Hana was working through me. Being surrounded by very populous countries in various states of belligerence, empowering women wouldn't be an issue since every willing mind and pair of hands mattered. Outsiders who shone through could be offered a spouse and brought into the ruling elite since polygamy was permissible.In the Khanate there would be universal compulsive suffrage (everyone 18+ was legally required to vote) to decide on the representatives in the new legislative body. Everyone was expected to fight, so everyone voted. It would be modeled on the Duma of early 20th century Imperial Russia. Unlike the ill-fated Tsar Nicholas II, Temujin would be much more attentive to the voice of the people, in the Information Age, he had to.Or so I hoped. I spewed forth my ideas to OT who didn't agree, or disagree with my vision. Perhaps Temujin and I did share a bond that went beyond obligation. OT then pulled a 'Pamela'."He told me he knew immediately you were his brother when you and I shared that vision," he commented out of nowhere."His words: You (Earth and Sky) are the old. He (meaning me) is the new. He (me again) will show us the way." My, that was nice, obtuse and not at all helpful. What did OT want? My good buddy, the Great Khan, wanted to cash in on Hana's and my sudden popularity. His most pressing need remained 'time'. He needed to have a cease-fire in the wings when his offensive resumed the next day.The Earth and Sky had moved, well, the Heaven and Earth to get the Tumens and their accompanying national armies up and running after only a two day respite. Thanks to me, Manchuria was a mess. The Russians had carried out my 'Operation: Funhouse' with mixed, mostly positive results.Dozens of smaller Chinese military police units along the border went, 'inactive' was the term most often used in the media. They didn't disarm, yet they didn't fight the Russians either. They sat back and let events unfold. The issue wasn't the Chinese's willingness to fight and die for their country. It was the schizophrenic government in Beijing.The PRC didn't want to wage a war with the Russian Federation at that moment. The Khanate was the priority. There were two fundamentally incompatible courses of action favored for dealing with the Russians:One large group advocated a passive Option A: let the Russians step in and shield the three remaining provinces making up Manchuria that were still in Chinese possession. Later, China would use military, economic and political means to edge the Russians out, once the Khanate was dealt with.A sizable faction favored a more aggressive Option B: play a game of chicken with Vladimir Putin. Tell the Bear not to come across the border while threatening him with a bloody and pointless (for him) guerilla war if he did intervene. Events on the ground were not providing a lot of support for that school of thought,However, this split at the highest levels of leadership left the local and regional commanders to try and muddle through as best they could. To the local commanders defending the Amur River side of the Chinese-Russian border, common sense dictated that they not oppose the Russian crossings, because the Russian 35th Army would kill them.All their military units had gone west to the Nen River line. With no heavy weapons and little air support, the People's Armed Police (PAP) (paramilitary) and the Public Security Bureau (regular police) units would be wiped out for little gain.Russia's GRU (Military Intelligence) sweetened the pot by allowing the police units to remain armed and in formation. It could be argued that they weren't even committing treason. At any time, they could throw themselves into the battle, or form the core of a resistance movement. 'Conserving your strength' had been a hallmark of the Communist Chinese struggle against the Imperial Japanese and Nationalists forces from the 1920's until 1945 and it had served them well.For the party officials, civil authorities and the People's Liberation Army (PLA), Army Air Force (PLAAF), and Army Navy (PLAN) who had gone with Option B, things weren't working out. In the north of Heilongjiang province at Morin Dawa/the Nen River line, the regional commander of the ad hoc forces facing the Khanate decided to duke it out with the Russian 36th Army as well. He was boned from the get-go.The PLAAF's overall command and control had been badly disrupted in the first few hours of The Unification War and had never fully recovered. Of the 22 air regiments that the PLAAF had started the war with in the Shenyang Military District (NE China), only 5 remained as effective formations flying, on average, a meager 20% of their original complement of advanced Shenyang J-16's, J-11's, Chengdu J-10's and Xian JH-7's aircraft.Replacing their aircraft losses meant sending up aged Shenyang J-8's (rolled out in 1980) and Nanchang Q-5's (in 1970) to fly and die in droves fighting their technologically superior Khanate foes. To add insult to injury, China's fleet of 97 Su-30MKK/MK2's (built in Russia) had suffered numerous suspicious mechanical and electronic failures, rendering them either flying coffins, or space holders in bomb-proof shelters.Furthermore, of the forces arrayed in the far north, only two of the five air regiments were responding. Two of the other three had begun displacing south into the Beijing Military District and preparing to defend the capital city. The fifth formation had another problem, North Korea (, more on that later.)In opposition to those two Chinese air regiments (roughly 60 aircraft of mixed types) stood seven complete and fresh Russian air regiments (over 400 front-line aircraft) and that didn't include the regiment and elements of the Far East Naval Aviation which was ALSO watching North Korea (, again more on that later.) The latter was of small comfort to the forces trying to hold the already compromised Nen River line.Behind those valiant troops, along the much more defensible Amur River line, the commander of the key city of Heihe sided with the Option A group and let the Russian 35th Army cross the river unopposed. By the time the PLA commanding general of the 'Nen Force' (the 69th Motorized Division and the subordinate 7th Reserve Division) figured that out, he was already in a shooting war with the Russians. So his supply lines weren't in danger, they were lost.The final indignity took place at Zalantun. The commander of the 3rd Reserve Div. had died during the attempt to recapture Zalantun. His replacement died when his helicopter was shot down as he was coming to assume command. In the absence of these officers, the divisional chief of staff told his men, including two hastily hustled forward mechanized brigades, to put down their arms. That meant 'Nen Force' was completely cut-off and surrounded.One battalion of the 36th Russian Motorized Brigade (yes, too many 36's running around) disarmed the Chinese troops while the rest, plus the 74th Independent Motorized Brigade raced for the prize, the city of Qiqihar. The last major mechanized formation of the 36th Rus. Army, the 39th MB was following them. However, instead of manning Qiqihar's defenses, the Chinese garrison in that city was waging war on its own populace.It wasn't only in Qiqihar; chaos reigned throughout Heilongjiang province. The Provincial Head of the Communist Party, Wang Xiankui, supported Option A. The Provincial Governor, Lu Hao, went with Option B. Both figures were rising stars in the PRC. Wang had ordered the still forming Reserve Divisions and the PAP units to disperse, thus avoiding any untimely confrontations with the Russians.Lu, without consulting Wang, ordered the same forces to launch a violent crackdown on all dissident forces, specifically all racial minorities. (It turned out that Lu was also a member of the Seven Pillars and his witch-hunt was aimed at getting the Earth and Sky organization operating in Heilongjiang).For the men and women on the other end of those phone conversations, there was no 'right' answer. Lest we forget, their organizations were already degraded by the Anthrax outbreak. Both men were powerful and represented China's future leadership, so if the person in charge at the ground level obeyed the wrong one, they could be assured of being roasted by the other.Some did try to do both, repress and disband at the same time. That meant that in the process of making mass arrests among an already war-fearful and plague-fearful populace, the law enforcement infrastructure began disintegrating.The problem with Lu's/7P's plan was that there was no 'revolutionary' organization to round up. That wasn't how the Earth and Sky operated in North-East China. They remained in tiny sabotage and reconnaissance cells. While they were scurrying for cover from the police crackdown, an opportunity presented itself.The afflicted minorities were getting furious with their treatment. These minorities saw themselves as loyal Chinese, yet they were being dragged out into the streets, put in detentions centers and (in a few cases) summarily executed. Being less than 10% of the overall population, resistance had never crossed their minds. It seemed all that those defenseless people could do was pray for Russian intervention forces to arrive.Within that mix of fear, betrayal and rage, the E and S discovered a way to start the dominos falling. The small, well-armed and well-trained E and S cells began ambushing police detachments. Weapons from those dead men and women were turned over to the pissed off locals before the cell went off to stalk the next police unit.Wash, rinse and repeat. It became a perverse and bloody case of wish fulfillment. Lu and the 7P's had been looking for an insurrection and they started one. Even though a miniscule portion of the population was involved, from the outside looking in, it reinforced the Putin Public Affairs initiative that portrayed Putin (and his army) as coming in to restore order to a collapsing civil system, which he was helping disrupt.From Moscow, the PRC's indecisiveness looked like Manna from Heaven. For the massive numbers of Russian soldiers riding through the Manchurian countryside, it felt like they were rolling into Arkham Asylum. Unlike the NATO countries' professional armies, Russia remained a largely conscript force whose normal term of service was only one year. These unseasoned troops could never tell if the local military, military police and police would attack until they rolled up on the Chinese units.At the start of that Day One of Operation: Funhouse, the Russian ROE (Rules of Engagement) was 'Ask and Verify'. It was tactically advantageous for the belligerent Chinese forces to lie about their intentions, then begin shooting at the Russians when they got close enough to hurt them. By Day Two, the standard front-line Russian soldier had adjusted that ROE to 'if they look at us wrong, light their asses up'. By Day Three, the officers had stopped trying to enforce Moscow's ROE orders.That was fine for the combat and rear echelon support troops because both the Chinese and Russian governments had another series of problems and they all centered around Pyongyang and Kim Jong-un's declaration that North Korea would intervene as well, without letting anyone know who he was 'intervening' against. To keep everyone guessing, the North Korean' People's Army was massing on all three borders, facing off with the PRC, Russia and South Korea. To prove his diplomatic intentions, Kim pledged to only mobilize half of his reserves, merely 4,250,000 extra men and women to go with his 950,000 strong standing army.It didn't take a military, or economic genius to realize the North Korean's chronically 'near death' economy was stampeding off a cliff. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) was in the middle of an oil crisis and Kim was increasing their fuel consumption by 400% while decreasing his workforce by 10%. To put it in perspective, the US unemployment was around 6%. Now imagine that in one week's time it would become 26%. One week, no severance packages. Would the population become unsettled?But wait, it gets better. The Secret War was colliding with the Real World in more places than Manchuria. Setting aside the assassination attempt (Grrr) of Hana Sulkanen, my fiancée, six Nipponese elders (two women and four men) appeared in the personal quarters of the Japanese Prime Minister on the first full night of 'Funhouse' and relayed their urgent requests.Those six were the Head of the Six (formerly Seven) Ninja Families and they were there at, my urging. Cause I'm an idiot and requiring the deaths of Romanians in my personal crusade obviously wasn't enough. Now I was asking the Japanese Defense Forces (JDF) to pony up as well. So take a deep breath and put on the hip-waders.You might be wondering why I would want the JDF, see, there was part of Operation: Funhouse that was hitting a predictable snag, namely the Korea People's Navy Force (KPNF) and the uncertain determination of the PLAN:The KPNF's vessels were rather old, small and crappy. They also had a love affair with anything that could launch a torpedo and they listed over 700 of these floating deathtraps (only 13 of which could be classified as surface warships) and the fanatical crews to take them into battle.The PLAN's numbers were far more realistic and the fleet generally more modern. Only their North (18 surface warships) and East Fleets (22 plus 5 'elsewhere') could play any role in an upcoming FUBAR, and both fleets were heading out to sea, mainly to avoid the sporadic, but increasingly effective Khanate air strikes.The FU to be BAR'ed was the Russian Far East Fleet (RFEF) (6 warships strong, ) that had seized on this crazy idea (per my suggestion) to sail south, around the Korean peninsula so they could land elements of the 55th Guards Red Banner Marine Brigade (the 165th Marine Regiment and the 180th Marine Tank Battalion).Theoretically they were going to be the 'Southern Shielding Force' that would interpose itself between the Khanate and Beijing. It should surprise no one that the RFEF's flotilla was unequal to the task of taking their destination, the port of Qinhuangdao, by amphibious assault. Fortunately for the Gods of War (which did not include me), there were five other navies involved.Meanwhile, South Korea was having kittens because their always crazy northern kin were slathering on the insanity. (In how many Buddhist countries do people flock to the temples and pray that their neighbor attacks someone, anyone else, but them? That wasn't a religious conundrum I wanted to deal with.) N.Korea mobilizing meant S.Korea had to mobilize, which sucked down on their GNP as well.Besides, N.Korean dams and coal-powered plants kept the lights on in Seoul. Erring on the side of caution, the S. Korea (aka Republic of Korea, ROK) Army suggested calling up only one million of their three million person reserve force in order to assure Cousin Kim that this was a purely defensive gesture. It didn't work. Kim Jong-un castigated the ROK for antagonizing him, despite his declaration that he 'might' feel like invading the South in the immediate future.Into the emerging crisis, the ROK Navy could sortie nineteen small surface ships. Japan's Navy wasn't up to its old imperial standards, but could still deploy 45 surface warships. The 800 lb. gorilla in the room was the core of the 7th Fleet stationed at Yokosuka, Japan, the USS carrier George Washington and her 14 escort vessels.If the George Washington was the gorilla, RIMPAC 2014 was King Kong. 22 nations, 50 ships, including the USS carrier Ronald Reagan were engaged in war games in the Central Pacific. With them were 5 vessels of the PLAN, had Kim Jong-un just kept his mouth shut, this wouldn't have been an issue. Hell, if the Khanate had not come into existence and launched its Unification War, but he had and they did,To show the US was taking this escalation seriously (without tipping their hand that they knew about Funhouse, Carrier Strike Group One (CSG 1) (the Carl Vinson +10) was rushing across the Pacific from San Diego. CSG 3 (the John C. Stennis +2) was being assembled hastily so that they could rendezvous with CSG 1 ASAP. So many brave souls running toward the danger, sometimes I hate myself.So now does it make sense that I found myself in a room with a US Senator tasked with riding herd on me?Anyway, there were the other three navies still unaccounted for, Taiwan / the Republic of China (ROC) (22 surface ships), Vietnam (7) and the Philippines (3). Taiwanese involvement was easy to explain, the PRC refused to acknowledge them as an independent country and probably never would.The Vietnam People's Navy was tiny in both numbers and tonnage. Five of the vessels were 1960's Soviet frigates. What Vietnam did have was a huge grudge against the PRC. The PLA invaded Vietnam in 1979 and devastated the northernmost provinces, killing as many as 100,000 civilians.The PLAN had walloped the VPN in 1974 (technically South Vietnam) and again in 1988. Out in the South China Sea were two island archipelagos; the Paracel (occupied by a small PLA garrison and claimed by the PRC, Vietnam and the ROC) and Spratlys Islands (disputed by Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, the PRC, the ROC, and Vietnam).The Philippines had a grand total of three frigates (all between 50 and 70 years old). 99% of the time, they faced a hopeless struggle enforcing Philippines' South China Sea claims, except they were now experiencing that 1% where the PRC found itself in a life and death struggle. Even then, the PLAN's South Sea Fleet was hands-down the biggest player with 26 surface warships centered on the Carrier Liaoning.Except (and there always seems to be an 'except') virtually all the PLAN's naval aviation had gone off to fight the Khanate and it wasn't coming back, ever. In the air, the Philippines was next to useless. What did they have of offer in the struggle for the South China Sea? Bases. The ROC and Vietnam had much more to bring to the table.The Vietnamese People's Liberation Air Force (VPLAR) had about 50 front-line aircraft and 175 nearly obsolete models ~ the same models the PLAAF was now piloting. The ROC Air Force could put up 325 almost-new fighters that were now superior to their opponents on the mainland. Why would I give a shit?Things cascade. The Khanate Air Force took a two-day long deep breath as Putin's 'Policeman that only looks like an invading army' started their intervention. Forty-eight hours later, the Khanate started the fourth stage (the first lunge, defeat the PLA's counter-attack then the second lunge) of the campaign.Their initial air power was still skating on thin ice where maintenance was concerned. They need more time to thoroughly rest their pilots and bring all their top-flight equipment to 100% working condition. Against them, in two days the PLAAF's assets increased by over 250 fighters.In turn, the Khanate had added their constituent state air forces plus nearly 80 new cutting edge air planes and 25 drones. Phase Four saw rolling airstrikes all along the forces massing in front of the northern and central Tumens. For a few hours, the PLA thought they knew what was going on.They were wrong and this was where my meeting with OT came in. Jab with the right, cut them down with the left. The left in my case was Tibet. Yeah, Tibet. Economic value = not nearly enough. From the very start of the war, a small number of seemingly inconsequential air strikes had seriously eroded the PLA and PLAAFs combat power in the Tibetan Plateau while leaving the roads, bridges and towns intact.Common military logic dictated that the Khanate had to punch their way further east into Qinghai (to the south) and Gansu (to the north) provinces. That was where the population and industry where. Farther east were even greater numbers of people and factories and the Khanate forces in the North hadn't been strong enough to threaten to cut off the Qinghai-Gansu front. Then the Russians showed up and the Khanate forces threatening that flank doubled overnight.The PLA hastily reinforced their northern flank, using troops from their strategic reserves. The move resulted in incredible attrition by airpower to the freshly equipped formations. The PLA was about to get flanked, but not from the north. Southwest of Qinghai was Tibet. A third of the Khanate's mobile forces now swept around in a huge left haymaker to the south.My job? I needed the 'Free Tibet' forces in the US and UK to provide public and moral support to the Khanate move. As Khanate Special Forces seized crucial bottlenecks in Tibet, they needed the locals to keep their 'liberators' informed of PLA presences and undermine any attempt to create a guerilla movement.The five Tumens dedicated to being the Schwerpunkt (point of maximum effort) of this flanking maneuver were going to be on a tight timetable if they were going to surround the PLA forces in Central China.My plan was to convince the Tibetans that the PRC's 55 years of occupation was coming to an end and the Great Khan wanted to sign a 'Treaty of Mutual Respect' (my invention). This would require both the Khanate and Tibet to recognize each other's right to exist the moment a cease-fire was reached. That was it. No 'armed presence', or 'mutual defense' agreements.The treaty would be formally signed in Lhasa, the Tibetan capital, when the city was safe ~ as determined by the Central Tibetan Administration (the Tibetan Government in Exile, CTA). Riki came up with an additional sweetener and proved she was quickly adjusting to our group's extra-governmental capabilities.

Last time we spoke about the Mandalay Offensive. In the midst of intense warfare, General Krueger positioned his troops strategically to bolster the assault at Rosario. As the American forces repelled counterattacks and advanced, they faced fierce Japanese resistance, particularly at Binalonan and Hill 600. Despite heavy casualties, the Americans gradually gained ground, clearing key areas and preparing for further offensives. Meanwhile, Japanese defenses were fortified but weakened by shortages. As battles raged, both sides braced for decisive confrontations in the ongoing struggle for control of Luzon. In a fierce battle across the hills of Luzon, the 103rd Regiment aimed to secure key positions but faced heavy resistance, capturing Hill 800 by nightfall. The 172nd Regiment achieved surprise at Hill 900, while other regiments advanced under relentless fire. Meanwhile, in Burma, the British-Indian forces captured Shwebo, pushing deeper against Japanese defenses. The Mars Task Force disrupted supply lines, leading to a Japanese retreat. Amidst the chaos, both sides suffered heavy losses, marking a pivotal moment in the campaign. This episode is the Return to Bataan Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  By the end of January, as previously noted on Luzon, the 43rd Division had secured most of the Rosario region and Route 3 from Pozorrubio to the crucial junction with Route 11. The 25th Division had successfully eliminated the Shigemi Detachment at San Manuel, while the 6th Division had cleared the Cabaruan Hills and established outposts between Balungao and Guimba. Meanwhile, the 14th Corps had advanced to Clark Field, where it was engaged in a fierce battle with the Kembu Group. By January 27, the 40th Division had breached General Tsukada's northern defensive line, and the 37th Division had fortified Mabalacat, Angeles, and Runway No. 1 in preparation for the final push toward Manila. On that same day, General Krueger received significant reinforcements, with the arrival of the 1st Cavalry Division, the 32nd Division, and the 112th Cavalry Regiment at Lingayen Gulf. He planned to gather the cavalry division at Guimba to launch a coordinated advance toward the capital along the eastern side of the Central Plains via Route 5. After returning the reserve 35th Regiment to General Mullins, Krueger intended to deploy the 32nd Division, minus the 126th Regiment in Army Reserve, to the San Manuel-Asingan area. This would allow the 25th and 6th Divisions to narrow their fronts and continue south and southeast toward the Licab-Lupao line with reduced risk of exposing the 1st Corps' flank. Additionally, this strategy would enable the 37th Division to resume its advance toward Manila. However, General Griswold wanted to push Tsukada's forces further into the Zambales Mountains first, directing General Beightler to assault the enemy's southern defensive line centered around Fort Stotsenburg, while only the 148th Regiment and the 37th Reconnaissance Troop moved south along Route 3 to San Fernando. On January 28, the attack commenced as planned, with the 129th Regiment advancing westward through Runway No. 2, but it was quickly halted by the formidable forward defenses of the Eguchi Detachment. Meanwhile, with the assistance of Filipino guerrillas, reconnaissance units from the 37th Division successfully secured the San Fernando bridges intact. To the north of the Bamban River, the 160th Regiment faced unexpectedly light resistance as it moved along its ridge line to capture open-crested Hill 620, although it would later encounter stronger opposition when it reached the main defenses of the Takaya Detachment. At the same time, General Patrick began gathering the 1st and 20th Regiments at Guimba and Victoria, while the 6th Reconnaissance Troop advanced toward Cabanatuan, where they identified a significant Japanese concentration. Further north, the 35th Regiment advanced unopposed to barrio Gonzales, while the 27th Regiment moved overland and successfully dislodged a Japanese outpost from barrio Pemienta. Meanwhile, MacArthur was planning a secondary landing on the Zambales coast of Luzon, assigning Major-General Charles Hall's 11th Corps, which included the 38th Division and the 34th Regiment, to land at San Antonio and quickly advance across the base of Bataan to prevent any significant Japanese retreat into the peninsula. He also aimed to divert the Kembu Group's attention to relieve some pressure on the 14th Corps. However, General Yamashita had no intention of retreating to Bataan and had only dispatched Colonel Nagayoshi Sanenobu's 39th Regiment to defend the peninsula and the Kembu Group's right flank. On January 26, Hall's 11th Corps had departed Leyte Island aboard vessels from Admiral Struble's Task Group 78.3, heading directly to Luzon for the San Antonio landing, codenamed Operation Mike 7. The convoy reached its destination on the morning of January 29. After receiving reports from Filipino guerrillas indicating that there were no Japanese forces in the landing area, Struble decided to cancel the planned pre-assault bombardment. Instead, he ordered Hall's four regiments to land simultaneously across a nearly six-mile stretch of coastline from San Antonio. Upon landing, the 151st Regiment secured San Felipe and San Antonio, while the 149th Regiment quickly moved inland to capture the San Marcelino Airstrip. However, they discovered that guerrillas led by Captain Ramon Magsaysay had already taken control of the airstrip three days prior. Before nightfall, the 34th Regiment and the 24th Reconnaissance Troop advanced south along Route 7 to the northern shore of Subic Bay. To the east, the 160th Regiment made significant progress, advancing nearly two miles southwest and breaching a stronghold at the center of the Takaya Detachment. The 129th Regiment also managed to penetrate enemy defenses into Fort Stotsenburg but was halted at barrio Tacondo by six tanks from the Yanagimoto Detachment. Despite this setback, the inability of the Japanese counterattacks to reclaim lost territory compelled Tsukada to order the Eguchi and Yanagimoto Detachments to retreat to their main line of resistance. Meanwhile, further north, units from the 1st and 20th Regiments successfully captured Licab and Talavera, cutting off the road between Cabanatuan and Muñoz. The 27th Regiment engaged a small tank-artillery force from the 2nd Tank Division that had become trapped along the highway between Gonzales and Pemienta.  With the rapid advances of the 6th and 25th Divisions, the 2nd Tank Division main strength in the Tayug-Triangle Hill area was in danger of being cut off from its sole remaining escape route into the northern bastion via San Jose and Highway 5. To meet the new situation, General Iwanaka was directed to pull back all remaining division strength from the Tayug-Umingan and Triangle Hill sectors with the exception of small outpost forces to be left at Gonzales and Umingan to delay an enemy advance from the northwest. The division was instead to concentrate the bulk of its forces in a triangular-shaped area bounded by Lupao, Muñoz and Rizal. These new dispositions had barely been effected when enemy elements swept around the outpost force at Gonzales and cut its withdrawal route to Umingan, forcing the detachment to withdraw through the hills after destroying most of its tanks and all of its mechanized artillery. From 20:00 on the 29th until 04:30 the next morning the force tried unsuccessfully to break through the Pemienta perimeter, against a sharp enemy. By the time the action had ended the 27th Regiment had killed 125 Japanese and had destroyed 8 tanks, 8 artillery prime movers, 4 tractors, 8 105-mm howitzers and 5 trucks, while only losing about 15 men killed and 45 wounded. Only four tanks succeeded in breaking through the enemy encirclement and escaped along the highway to Umingan. The next day, the 27th Regiment began positioning itself to attack Umingan from the north and northwest, while the 35th Regiment started preparations for a holding attack from the west and southwest. In an effort to avert the mass execution of prisoners of war at Cabanatuan, Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Mucci led a contingent of approximately 233 men, composed of Filipino guerrillas, soldiers from the Alamo Scouts, and Mucci's 6th Ranger Battalion. They traversed 30 miles cross-country between January 28 and 30 to liberate 522 weakened prisoners during the night. Most of the prisoners had vacated the camp by 2010 hours. Rangers and guerrillas had to carry most, piggy-backing them or making hasty litters from rifles and shirts. It was 2 miles to the Pampanga River, where carts waited to take them to Platero to be treated, fed, and organized. Many were still in shock and had not yet fully understood that they were free. At 2040 hours, Capt Prince was at the Pampanga River supervising the loading of stumbling prisoners into 25 carts as Rangers and prisoners trickled in. The rest of the Scouts established an ambush at the crossing site. At 2045 hours, one hour after the raid was launched, Prince fired the third red flare and departed for Balangkare. The loaded carabao carts were ordered on their way to Balangkare at 2145 hours.  Meanwhile Major Robert Lapham's guerrilla forces provided cover for their escape, successfully returning them to Allied lines on January 31. During this operation, around 270 Japanese soldiers were killed at the camp, with an additional 900 casualties along the Cabu River. Over 270 Japanese lay dead or dying in the smoldering camp; most of the wounded dying by dawn as no aid was forthcoming. Japanese bodies were literally stacked at the Cabu bridge and scores more littered the riverside woods. The 359th Battalion had ceased to exist. In the morning, battalion commander Capt Oyanu was still alive, but most of his officers were dead. Only 255 men of 1,200 survived and most were wounded.   In contrast, the Americans suffered only 2 fatalities and 7 wounded, along with 12 wounded Filipinos and 2 dead prisoners. Fortunately, the anticipated retaliation against the Filipino population did not occur, as the Japanese retreated from the area within a day of the raid, while the 20th Regiment secured the road junction barrio of Baloc and began advancing toward Muñoz. On January 30, Griswold continued his vigorous offensive against Clark Field; the 129th Regiment cleared the hills near Dolores and took control of the abandoned Fort Stotsenburg area, while the 160th Regiment made only 500 yards of progress against the determined Takaya Detachment. The 108th Regiment finally captured Hill 5 and Thrall Hill. Further south, patrols from the 37th Division reached within a mile of Calumpit and the Pampanga River, and on Bataan, the 34th Regiment took Olongapo after a fierce skirmish, while the 2nd Battalion of the 151st Regiment captured Grande Island at the entrance to Subic Bay. At the same time, MacArthur was strategizing another secondary landing on Luzon, this time utilizing General Swing's 11th Airborne Division to assault Nasugbu, located 45 miles southwest of Manila. With this operation, MacArthur aimed to initiate a southern advance toward Manila while simultaneously hindering Japanese forces in southern Luzon from moving north to challenge Krueger's main offensive. General Eichelberger intended to deploy the 187th and 188th Glider Regiments and advance them approximately twenty miles along Route 17 to Tagaytay Ridge. There, the 511th Parachute Regiment would conduct an airdrop to secure the ridge for the ground troops and capture adjacent sections of Route 17 before the Japanese could regroup to defend the highway. In opposition, General Yokoyama had assigned only the Fuji Force to defend the area south of Manila. This force, centered around Colonel Fujishige Masatoshi's reinforced 17th Regiment, had only deployed the 3rd Battalion of the 31st Regiment in the Tagaytay Ridge region, with a small outpost at Nasugbu and its main defenses positioned on Mounts Cariliao and Batulao. At this stage, Yokoyama was nearing completion of the organization of the diverse Shimbu Group forces east of Manila into a cohesive combat task force. To the north, near Ipo, he had stationed the Kawashima Force, which was composed of the 82nd Brigade and the 31st Regiment. To the south, the main contingent of the former Manila Defense Force had been relocated from the Philippine capital and renamed the Kobayashi Force, guarding the Wawa-Montalban area. However, the departure of General Tsuda's 105th Division to the northern stronghold had created a significant gap in the Shimbu Group's defenses. Although Yokoyama intended to address this vulnerability with the Noguchi Detachment, Major-General Noguchi Susumu's troops were still in the midst of a lengthy march from the Bicol Peninsula by the end of January. As a temporary solution, the Okita Detachment, a composite force consisting of five battalions centered around the 186th Independent Battalion, and the Kuromiya Detachment, a three-battalion unit based on the 181st Independent Battalion, were deployed in the Bosoboso-Antipolo region. Meanwhile, the Kogure Detachment, organized around the 1st Surface Raiding Base Force, was stationed at Lamon Bay. Manila was entrusted to Rear-Admiral Iwabuchi Sanji's Manila Naval Defense Force, which included approximately 13,700 naval personnel from the 31st Special Base Force responsible for defending the islands of Manila Bay and the capital, along with some Army reinforcements. On January 27, Swing's 11th Airborne Division departed from Leyte Island aboard ships from Admiral Fechteler's Task Group 78.2, heading directly to Nasugbu Bay to carry out Operation Mike 6. Following an uneventful journey and a brief preliminary bombardment on January 31, the 188th Glider Regiment successfully landed with minimal resistance and quickly advanced inland toward the Palico River, aiming for the section of Route 17 that leads to Tagaytay Ridge. Pleased with the initial landing, Swing subsequently deployed the 187th Glider Regiment and the division artillery, which began to relieve the rear elements of the 188th by midday. At the same time, the majority of the 188th secured the Palico bridge and crossed the river to reach Route 17. Further north, under pressure from MacArthur and Krueger, the 148th Regiment successfully crossed the Pampanga River and captured Calumpit, just as Beightler was dispatching the 145th Regiment along Route 3 to assist in the advance toward Manila. At Clark Field, the 108th Regiment was patrolling forward, while the 160th Regiment faced challenges in breaking through enemy defenses. Meanwhile, the 129th Regiment launched an attack on the main positions of the Eguchi Detachment at Top of the World hill, successfully securing its steep, grassy southern and southeastern slopes. On Bataan, General Jones sent the 152nd Regiment to travel through Olongapo and advance east along Route 7, while the 149th Regiment moved east toward Dinalupihan via a challenging trail located about 1,200 yards north of the highway. By the end of January, the 32nd Division had successfully taken control of the recently vacated Tayug area. The 6th and 25th Divisions reorganized in preparation for their final push towards San Jose, and the 1st Cavalry Division gathered at Guimba. The World War II brigade structure of Maj. Gen. Verne D. Mudge's dismounted 1st Cavalry Division differed greatly from that of the triangular infantry division of the period. Instead of three infantry regiments the 1st Cavalry Division had four cavalry regiments--the 5th and 12th in the 1st Cavalry Brigade, the 7th and 8th in the 2d Cavalry Brigade. Each regiment had two cavalry squadrons, each smaller than an infantry battalion, as opposed to the three battalions of an infantry regiment. Each cavalry regiment contained a weapons troop armed with 81-mm. mortars, .30-caliber and .50-caliber machine guns, and bazookas, but there was no heavy weapons troop within each squadron. The cavalry regiments lacked the antitank and cannon companies of an infantry regiment. 1st Cavalry Division Artillery was composed of one 75-mm. howitzer battalion, three 105-mm. howitzer battalions, and, for obvious reasons, an attached 155-mm. howitzer battalion. Reinforcing combat and service attachments brought the division's strength up to nearly 15,000 men, somewhat less than the strength of the reinforced 37th Division at the same time. On paper, each of the four cavalry regiments numbered 1,750 men--in contrast to the 3,000-odd of an infantry regiment--but none of the 1st Cavalry Division's regiments was up to strength. The division had received few replacements since entering combat on Leyte in October, and it had come to Luzon after very little rest from its arduous campaign through Leyte's mountains. The 1st Cavalry division was ready to advance towards Cabanatuan as General Mudge dispatched two reinforced motorized squadrons. On February 1, the Flying Columns, led by General Chase, crossed the Pampanga River and began their southern march with minimal resistance. As a result, Cabanatuan and Gapan were quickly captured, although some opposition was encountered south of the Peñaranda River. Meanwhile, the 188th Glider Regiment continued its advance towards Tagaytay Ridge, facing heavy enemy fire from Mount Cariliao but still managing to secure the important Mount Aiming. The 148th Regiment swiftly moved down Route 3 and captured Malolos with little resistance. However, the 152nd Regiment faced increasingly strong resistance at ZigZag Pass. While more rugged terrain than the ZigZag Pass area is to be found on Luzon, few pieces of ground combine to the same degree both roughness and dense jungle. Route 7 twists violently through the pass, following a line of least terrain resistance that wild pigs must originally have established. The jungle flora in the region is so thick that one can step 5 yards off the highway and not be able to see the road. The Japanese had honeycombed every hill and knoll at the ZigZag with foxholes linked by tunnels or trenches; at particularly advantageous points they had constructed strongpoints centered on log and dirt pillboxes. All the defenses were well camouflaged, for rich jungle foliage covered most positions, indicating that many had been prepared with great care and had been constructed well before Colonel Nagayoshi's 39th Regiment had reached the area in December. Colonel Nagayoshi had plenty of food and ammunition for a prolonged stand, and he also possessed numerous mortars and machine-guns. His artillery, however, was inadequate for the task at hand and he lacked certain types of medical supplies, especially malaria preventatives and cures. He had so scattered his mortars and artillery in order to protect them against American artillery and air strikes that his troops would often have difficulty massing their fires. Finally, his defensive line was scarcely 2000 yards wide northwest to southeast, thus rendering his whole position susceptible to vigorous outflanking maneuvers. On the other hand, he had good troops, well-prepared positions, and excellent defensive terrain. The 129th Regiment secured the summit of Top of the World hill, effectively ensuring Clark Field's protection from all but long-range artillery fire. The 20th Regiment launched its initial attack on Muñoz, which was thwarted by Colonel Ida Kumpei's tanks fortified as pillboxes. Additionally, the 27th Regiment attempted to advance towards Umingan but was unable to break through, while elements of the 35th Regiment bypassed this area and occupied barrio San Roque. February 2 mirrored the previous day in the San Jose sector, as the 20th and 27th Regiments continued their battle against the determined Japanese defenders. Meanwhile, Mullins dispatched the 35th Regiment in a two-pronged maneuver towards Umingan, successfully clearing most of the town by noon. In an effort to recover lost time, Mullins then directed the 35th toward Lupao in the afternoon, but its leading battalion was ultimately halted by intense Japanese artillery, mortar, and machine-gun fire. With their forward units stalled at Muñoz and Lupao, Patrick and Mullins resorted to flanking tactics. Accordingly, Patrick sent the 1st Regiment along the Talavera River to attack San Jose from the southeast, while the 63rd Regiment attempted to bypass Muñoz to the east and rejoin Route 5 north of the town. In turn, Mullins ordered the 161st Regiment to move cross-country to positions on Route 99 south of Lupao, then advance to Route 8 between San Isidro and San Jose while the 35th surrounded and cleared Lupao. However, on this day, the 105th Division successfully evacuated San Jose along with its stockpiled ammunition, regrouping north at Puncan and rendering the entire San Jose offensive ineffective. Simultaneously, Chase's Flying Columns passed through Gapan and entered Sabang, fording the Angat River to launch two simultaneous advances to the south and east. The 148th Regiment secured Plaridel after a brief but fierce skirmish, while the 152nd Regiment faced setbacks in the ZigZag Pass due to nighttime Japanese counterattacks and artillery fire. The 149th Regiment became disoriented and had to return to Olongapo, and the 188th Glider Regiment managed to break through to barrio Aga amidst heavy resistance, while the 1st Battalion of the 187th Glider Regiment moved forward to begin the assault toward Tagaytay. On February 3, Swing's glider infantry launched an assault on the western end of Tagaytay, while paratroopers from the 511th Parachute Regiment began to drop along the ridge in a rather scattered manner. The first echelon of the 511th, about 915 in all, had come to Tagaytay Ridge aboard 48 C-47 aircraft of the 317th Troop Carrier Group. The planes had flown north from Mindoro to approach Tagaytay Ridge from the northeast in order to avoid fire from Japanese anti-aircraft weapons west of the drop zone. The first 18 planes, carrying about 345 troops, dropped over the assigned area. At this juncture, planes from succeeding flights were nearly 6 miles and 3 minutes behind the lead aircraft. About 08:20 one of these later planes dumped out a couple of bundles of supplies. Taking this as a signal that they were over the proper drop zone, 'troopers of the succeeding 30 planes began jumping. Aircraft pilots, realizing they had not yet reached the proper point, attempted to halt the jumping, but the 511th's jump-masters continued sending the paratroopers out. Most of them landed almost 5 miles east-northeast of the assigned drop zone. A second group of 51 C-47s began approaching the drop area about 12:10. Some 80 men from the first 5 aircraft of this group landed in the proper place. The rest started out of their planes when they saw on the ground the collapsed chutes of the first misplaced jump. In the end, only 425 men landed on the assigned drop zone; the others, about 1325 in all, made scattered landings 4.5 to 6 miles to the east and northeast. The 11th Airborne Division, blaming the 317th Troop Carrier Group for the premature dropping, reported that the "true reason was the refusal of the Air Force to cooperate in a combined training program for Airborne and Air Force troops." In any event, it appears that some lack of jump discipline within the 511th contributed to the scattered, premature jumping. Fortunately for them, they encountered minimal resistance as they secured the unoccupied ridge. To the north, the 148th Regiment continued its advance southward, facing delays at several tidal streams that were unbridged and unfordable, but managed to reach a point two miles south of Marilao by day's end. At the same time, the 5th Cavalry's Flying Column destroyed a Japanese outpost at Angat and moved through the guerrilla-held Norzagaray before crossing the Santa Maria River to join the 8th Cavalry's Flying Column, which had already progressed to Talipapa and was nearing the outskirts of Manila. Meanwhile, the 27th Regiment successfully eliminated the remaining enemy pockets at Umingan; the 3rd Battalion of the 35th Regiment, advancing over elevated terrain northeast of Lupao, established a position on Route 8 approximately 1500 yards southeast of Lupao, while the rest of the regiment continued to launch unsuccessful frontal assaults on the town. The 20th Regiment managed to overrun a few Japanese strongholds at Muñoz but was unable to break through. On 3 February the 2d Battalion, 20th Infantry, moved in on the northwest, but could not reach Route 99 in its sector. The 3d Battalion pushed across that road at the southwest corner of Muñoz, but gained only half a block into the main section of the town. The 1st Battalion, on the south side of Muñoz, made negligible progress. By dusk, the 20th Infantry had overrun a few Japanese strongpoints, but in order to hold its gains had had to destroy completely and physically occupy every position it had reached so far. Muñoz, General Patrick had begun to realize, was going to be a costly, hard, and time-consuming nut to crack. The 20th Infantry had not yet closed with the main Japanese defenses, but had spent most of the last three days pinned down by Japanese artillery, tank, and machine gun fire. Only by hugging the ground and taking advantage of the little cover even shattered tree stumps afforded had the regiment kept its casualties down to 15 men killed and 90 wounded. Meanwhile the 63rd Regiment successfully bypassed Muñoz and advanced up Route 5 toward Caanawan; and the 1st Regiment similarly advanced along the San Jose-Rizal road, assembling at two points 1000 yards south and 1500 yards east of San Jose. Now, however, it is time to leave Luzon and head toward the Central Pacific. Following the successful capture of the Marianas and the establishment of B-29 Superfortress air bases on these islands, the Allies were finally able to conclude Operation Matterhorn and cease using bases in China and India for conducting raids on the Japanese mainland and other targets in East Asia. Between June 5, 1944, and January 17, 1945, General LeMay's 20th Bomber Command executed a total of 29 combat missions, inflicting significant damage on key military installations in southern Japan, Manchuria, Formosa, and Indochina, with a total loss of 73 B-29s. Meanwhile, General Hansell's 21st Bomber Command, reinforced by the 313th Bombardment Wing, struggled to achieve similar outcomes in both daylight precision bombing and area incendiary bombing, with the first three missions of January yielding the same disappointing results as those in December and November.  On January 3rd, Norstad's incendiary test mission was run on 3 January, when ninety-seven B-29's got off for Nagoya. Each plane carried a mixed load of bombs -14 x 350-pound M18 IB clusters fuzed to open at 8,000 feet and one 420-pound fragmentation cluster fuzed to open 1,000 feet below releasing altitude. What with aborts and planes straying from course, only fifty-seven bombed the urban area designated as primary target, most of them releasing visually though cloud cover was rated as 6/10. Some fires were started but there was no holocaust. Smoke rising to 20,000 feet combined with cloud to make observation of results impossible for the attackers. As a test, then, the mission was inconclusive. To the citizens of Nagoya, who were better informed than intelligence officers of 21st Bomber Command, the damage seemed slight. On January 9th, having satisfied Norstad's requirement, the command returned to its program of precision bombing against aircraft factories. Performance for the most part was of a piece with what had gone before. On 9 January 1945 seventy-two B-29's were sent against Musashino near Tokyo. High winds broke up the formations so that only eighteen planes were able to bomb the target; twenty-four bombs, widely scattered in the plant area, destroyed one warehouse and damaged two others-a slight return for the effort expended and the six B-29's lost. On January 14th, at the Mitsubishi Aircraft Works at Nagoya on the 14th, precision bombing was again less than precise. Seventy-three B-29's were airborne and forty bombed, getting four GP's-one ton-into the No. 5 Works area and damaging three buildings. Frustrated by this, Hansell increasingly blamed his crews for the unsatisfactory outcomes. Remarkably, he would only achieve his first fully successful B-29 attack on his final mission of the war. The target for the January 19 strike was virgin, a plant of the Kawasaki Aircraft Industries Company located 2 miles northwest of Akashi, a village on the Inland Sea some 12 miles west of Kobe. The Akashi works housed Kawasaki's general headquarters and one of the company's two large production units, which built the twin-engine fighters Nick and Randy and engines for Tony, Oscar and Frank fighters. Smaller than Nakajima and Mitsubishi, Kawasaki in 1944 delivered 17% of Japan's combat airframes and 12% of its combat engines. Against Akashi, Hansell sent 77 B-29s, plus 3 others in a diversionary strike. With good weather, 62 bulled it through to the Kawasaki factory, dumped 155 tons of GPs, and then returned with no losses. Interpreting strike photos, intelligence officers estimated that 38% of the roofed area showed major damage. This was an understatement. Every important building in both the engine and airframe branches had been hit and production was cut by 90%. Indeed, the Kawasaki Company liquidated the combined plant and dispersed the machine tools, which had suffered only slightly, to other sites. The Akashi shops were given temporary repairs at the cost of 226 tons of critical materials and over 9000000 yen, but the installation was used thereafter only for limited assembly jobs. It is a pity that the full results of this mission could not have been known to Hansell. His first completely successful B-29 attack, Akashi seemed to epitomize the doctrines of precision bombardment he had championed-and it was his last strike of the war. Unaware of this success, Hansell was replaced the following day as head of the 21st Bomber Command by the determined LeMay, who immediately suggested a shift to firebombing Japan's major cities at low altitude during nighttime, marking a stark departure from Hansell's previous strategies. However, the only obstacle in the flight path was Iwo Jima, which could alert the Japanese to an impending raid and still had operational airfields capable of launching intercepting fighters. These airfields had also been used for sporadic air assaults on the Marianas, although few attacks were actually carried out in January. Capturing Iwo Jima would resolve these issues, and Admiral Nimitz aimed to establish emergency landing facilities for B-29s based in Saipan, as well as a base for their fighter escorts targeting Japan. Consequently, he decided to proceed with the invasion, codenamed Operation Detachment. After this operation, Nimitz planned to invade Okinawa to secure and develop a robust air and naval base for the assault on the Japanese home islands, which we will discuss further later. For the Iwo Jima operation, Admiral Spruance was once again given overall command of the "big blue fleet," which was re-designated as the 5th Fleet. Under his command, Vice-Admiral Richmond Turner led Task Force 51, the Joint Expeditionary Force, responsible for landing Lieutenant-General Holland Smith's Expeditionary Troops. Turner was supported by Rear-Admiral William Blandy's Task Force 52, the Amphibious Support Force, which included ten escort carriers; Rear-Admiral Harry Hill's Task Force 53, comprising all transports and landing craft; Rear-Admiral Bertram Rodgers' Task Force 54, which had six battleships and five cruisers for shore bombardment; and Vice-Admiral Marc Mitscher's Task Force 58, the Fast Carrier Force. For the amphibious invasion, Major-General Harry Schmidt's 5th Amphibious Corps would deploy the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Marine Divisions, planning to land the 4th and 5th Divisions side by side with two regiments each along the two-mile stretch of beach between Mount Suribachi and the East Boat Basin on the island's southeast coast. Smith and Schmidt also decided to limit corps artillery to two battalions of 155mm howitzers, organized as the 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group, due to the limited space available for emplacements on the island. After landing, Major-General Clifton Cates' 4th Marine Division would take control of the Motoyama Plateau and its airfields, while also capturing the O-1 Line on the corps' right flank. Meanwhile, Major-General Keller Rockey's 5th Marine Division would secure the Mount Suribachi region before advancing northeast to capture the O-1 Line on the corps' left flank. They would then push forward across the island until Iwo Jima was fully secured. At the same time, Major-General Graves Erskine's 3rd Marine Division would remain in reserve, with only its 21st Marine Regiment deployed as the corps reserve. To aid in this effort, the 7th Air Force, under Generals Harmon and Hale, had been consistently targeting Iwo Jima's facilities since August 1944. Following intense attacks in December, which included bombardments by Rear-Admiral Allan Smith's 5th Cruiser Division against Iwo Jima, Haha Jima, and Chichi Jima were again struck on January 5, but the next bombardment wouldn't occur until January 25.  A fighter sweep by 28 P-38s opened the attack at 0945; 62 B-29s bombed at 1100 and 102 B-24s at noon; Crudiv 5 (Rear Admiral Allan E. Smith), comprising heavy cruisers Chester, Pensecola and Salt Lake City with six destroyers, arrived off Iwo at 1330 and opened bombardment at 1347. "Hoke" Smith approached the island from the west, rounded Mount Suribachi and then reversed track in a half-circle. Unfortunately the sky was so heavily overcast as to force the planes to bomb by radar and to hamper ships' spotting. Surface visibility was good enough to enable the island to be well covered by a naval bombardment, which lasted for 70 minutes and expended 1500 rounds of 8-inch and 5334 rounds of 5-inch shell. The bombers dropped 814 tons of bombs. Photographs, taken three days later, showed that both airfields on Iwo were wholly or in part operational, but no more enemy air raids hit the Marianas until Christmas Day. The job of keeping Iwo airfields neutralized was now turned over to B-24s of VII A.A.F. Between 8 December 1944 and 15 February 1945 they flew at least one strike daily over the island. The day before Christmas, Rear Admiral Smith's heavy cruisers, together with five destroyers, delivered a second bombardment, coordinated with a B-24 strike. This strike was slightly more eventful than the initial one in December, but even less effective. The bombardment, which expended 1500 rounds of 8-inch, provoked return fire from a 6-inch coast defense battery (designated "Kitty" on the target maps) in the northeast part of the island, but "Kitty's" claws managed to strike no closer than 200 yards. As proof of the slight damage inflicted by this bombardment, the Japanese were able to pay a vicious return visit to Saipan on Christmas Eve, a raid of 25 planes which destroyed one B-29 and damaged three more beyond repair. Crudiv 5 returned 27 December for a repeat performance, lighter than the others; and a fourth bombardment was set up for 5 January 1945. While fighter planes and B-24s hit Iwo Jima the same cruisers and six destroyers bombarded Chichi Jima, 145 northward, and the slightly nearer Haha Jima. Their hope was to catch a convoy bringing Japanese supplies to these islands, whence they were forwarded to Iwo by small craft at night. Destroyer Fanning, steaming ahead of the group as radar picket, encountered at 0206 a surface target, later identified as LSV-102, which she sank. At 0700 Admiral Smith's group opened a one hour and 49 minutes' bombardment of Chichi Jima. During it, destroyer David W. Taylor suffered an underwater explosion, probably from a mine, which flooded her forward magazine. The Haha Jima bombardment by Salt Lake City and two destroyers lasted for an hour. Crudiv 5 then pounded Iwo Jima for another hour and three quarters. The reply was negligible, and a few aircraft which made passes at the cruisers were easily driven off. Starting on the last day of January and continuing for two weeks, 7th Air Force aircraft bombed the island day and night, occasionally joined by LeMay's Superfortresses. For ten weeks, Iwo Jima faced near-daily bombardments from land-based aircraft, with nearly 6,800 tons of bombs dropped. Additionally, there were five naval bombardments that fired 203 rounds of 16-inch shells, 6,472 rounds of 8-inch shells, and 15,251 rounds of 5-inch shells. Under normal circumstances, such a heavy and sustained bombardment would have been more than enough to devastate an island of that size. However, the Japanese managed to restore the airfields on Iwo Jima just hours after each attack and continued to strengthen their defenses on the island. Following the fall of Saipan, the Japanese appointed Lieutenant-General Kuribayashi Tadamichi to oversee the defenses of the Bonin Islands, renaming the Ogasawara District Group as the 109th Division. Kuribayashi stationed Major-General Tachibana Yoshio's 1st Mixed Brigade and most of Colonel Iida Yusuke's 17th Independent Mixed Regiment on Chichi Jima, along with several other units across the islands. He accurately predicted that Iwo Jima would be the target for an Allied landing and took measures to make it virtually indestructible. To this end, he coordinated with Major-General Senda Sadasue's 2nd Mixed Brigade, Colonel Ikeda Masuo's 145th Regiment, and Lieutenant-Colonel Baron Nishi Takeishi's severely weakened 26th Tank Regiment, which had sustained heavy losses from American submarines at sea. Additionally, Major Fujiwara Tamachi's 3rd Battalion of the 17th Independent Mixed Regiment and a robust artillery unit led by Colonel Kaido Chosaku were included in the defense. Rear-Admiral Ichimaru Toshinosuke also provided a significant naval garrison on the island, centered around the 27th Air Flotilla, bringing Kuribayashi's total forces to approximately 21,060 men, far exceeding the American estimate of 13,000. Aware that the beaches would be vulnerable to enemy naval and air assaults, Kuribayashi opted to strengthen the Mount Suribachi and Motoyama Plateau areas. The Mount Suribachi area was made a semi-independent defense sector, its heavily fortified positions bristling with weapons of all types, ranging from casemated coast-defense guns and artillery to automatic weapons emplaced in mutually supporting pillboxes. The narrow isthmus connecting Suribachi to the rest of the island was lightly held by infantry, but heavily defended by enfilade fire from artillery, rockets, and mortars emplaced on both the high ground in the south (Suribachi area) and the northern portion of the island. The main defense line was a belt of mutually supporting positions organized in depth, running generally northwest-southeast across the island. It stretched from the cliffs north of the western beaches south to include Airfield Number 2; then, turning eastward through Minami, terminated at the rugged coast north of the eastern beaches. Pillboxes, blockhouses, bunkers, and dug-in tanks strengthened the defenses in the naturally formidable terrain everywhere throughout this belt. The second defense line generally bisected the remaining area in the northern portion of the island. It began several hundred yards below Kitano Point on the northwest coast, cut through Airfield Number 3 and the Motoyama area in the center, and terminated between Tachiiwa Point and the East Boat Basin on the eastern coast. Man-made emplacements were not as numerous in this second line, but natural caves and other covered positions afforded by the fantastically rugged terrain were skillfully organized for the defense. The beaches would be lightly defended but would receive fire support from the elevated positions. A substantial reserve force, including tanks, was also prepared to counterattack and push the Americans back into the sea if they managed to establish a foothold. In a shift from traditional Japanese defensive strategies, Kuribayashi moved away from full-scale counterattacks and suicidal banzai charges, instead instructing his troops to hold their mutually supportive positions to the last and to carry out small unit counterattacks at cutoff points. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Allied forces continued their advance through Luzon, battling Japanese defenses, liberating prisoners, and securing key locations, paving the way for a final push toward Manila. Meanwhile, on Iwo Jima, General Kuribayashi was preparing for a final stand, hoping beyond hope to make the Americans pay so dearly they might end the war.

Last time we spoke about the South China Sea Raid. In January, General Krueger reinforced the American beachhead at Lingayen Gulf while Admiral Halsey launched Operation Gratitude, targeting enemy ships based on faulty intelligence. Despite not finding the expected battleships, American forces decimated a Japanese convoy, sinking numerous vessels and claiming 113 enemy aircraft. Meanwhile, on Luzon, the 1st and 14th Corps advanced against Japanese defenses, capturing key positions despite fierce resistance. As both sides prepared for counteroffensives, the battle intensified, marking a pivotal moment in the Philippines campaign. On January 17, the 58th Brigade and supporting regiments launched a daring operation to destroy enemy positions. As American forces advanced, they faced fierce resistance, but some regiments achieved notable successes. Task Force 38 executed airstrikes on Formosa and Hong Kong, inflicting damage despite heavy losses. Meanwhile, Japanese forces struggled to regroup amid American pressure. General Suzuki devised a plan to fortify Leyte, but ongoing air raids hampered supply efforts. Tensions escalated as both sides prepared for decisive confrontations in the ongoing battle for control. This episode is the Mandalay Offensive Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  We last left off with, General Krueger strategically positioned General Mullins' 25th Division on the right flank of the 43rd Division to bolster the assault forces at the Rosario front. This maneuver was also intended to facilitate the continuation of the 14th Corps' advance to the south. Following the successful repulsion of General Nishiyama's local counterattack, General Wing ordered the 63rd, 158th, and 172nd Regiments, which had been stalled, to launch an offensive from the west along the Damortis-Rosario road. Simultaneously, the 103rd and 169th Regiments were tasked with advancing northward along Route 3, originating from Pozorrubio. In contrast, while the 58th Independent Mixed Brigade and the 23rd Division worked to contain General Swift's 1st Corps, General Yamashita was reinforcing the San Jose sector. He further instructed the Shigemi Detachment to maintain a defensive position in Binalonan. Although the 27th and 161st Regiments had successfully relieved the 103rd Regiment in the Binalonan area, Major-General Shigemi Isao ultimately opted to halt further troop movements. He decided to leave only a small garrison in Binalonan while the majority of his forces prepared for a decisive stand at San Manuel.   As the situation unfolded, the 3rd Battalion of the 161st Regiment encountered minimal resistance, allowing them to advance into the northern half of Binalonan by nightfall on January 17. In a parallel effort, General Patrick directed the 1st Regiment towards Urdaneta, where they successfully eliminated a small outpost belonging to the Shigemi Detachment. Additionally, he dispatched the 20th Regiment to the Cabaruan Hills, where they achieved their objective by reaching Lunec and securing the central area of the hills by the end of the day. On January 18, the offensive momentum of the 6th and 25th Divisions persisted. The 20th Regiment advanced to a low ridge approximately 2,500 yards west of Cabaruan, where American forces identified the primary defenses of the 2nd Battalion, 71st Regiment. Meanwhile, the 161st Regiment successfully cleared Binalonan, and the 27th Regiment moved forward to seize control of the Bactad area, further consolidating their gains in the region. Simultaneously, Wing's units were gearing up for a significant new offensive. In line with this strategy, the 2nd Battalion of the 169th Regiment advanced along Route 3, deftly circumventing the town of Sison, and finally reached a crucial road junction located to the northeast of the town. Meanwhile, to the north, the 172nd Regiment executed a successful nighttime ambush against a Japanese artillery battalion. Following this victory, they dispatched a company to seize control of a strategically important hill, rising 600 feet and situated approximately 1,000 yards north of Rosario. This position enabled American forces to exert control over a substantial portion of the surrounding area. By the conclusion of the day, the 158th and 63rd Regiments established contact through patrols about a mile south of Amlang, as they prepared for a coordinated assault that was set to launch on January 19. This offensive culminated in the collapse of the last Japanese defenses just two days later. Concurrently, the 172nd Regiment successfully established a patrol base on Hill 606. From this vantage point, patrols ventured into Rosario, discovering the town was heavily mined, riddled with booby traps, and defended by concealed machine-gunners and riflemen hiding amidst the rubble of the buildings. On January 19, the 103rd Regiment initiated an assault on Hill 600, located at the southern end of the ridge line east of Route 3. At the same time, the 2nd Battalion of the 169th Regiment faced several intense counterattacks from retreating Japanese forces that had been bypassed at Mount Alava and Sison. Despite the fierce resistance, the relentless pressure from Japanese troops and increasingly heavy artillery fire ultimately compelled the battalion to withdraw by noon. Nevertheless, the American operations succeeded in diminishing the Japanese presence in the region. Looking southward, the 161st Regiment cautiously advanced toward San Manuel, while the 27th Regiment effectively moved into Asingan, successfully cutting off Shigemi's escape route. Further south, the 1st Regiment rapidly progressed along Route 3 toward the Agno River, capturing the towns of Villasis, Carmen, and Rosales. Meanwhile, the 20th Regiment commenced an assault on the 2nd Battalion of the 71st Regiment stationed in the Cabaruan Hills. On the front commanded by General Griswold, the 14th Corps was in the process of mobilizing along the Camiling-Anao line, preparing to initiate an advance toward the Tarlac-Victoria line. The 160th Regiment began its march, covering seven miles southward from Camiling along Route 13, while the 129th Regiment took a strong position in Anao, establishing vital contact with other outposts of the 37th Division stationed at Paniqui. The advances made on January 20 were notably swift, with the 148th Regiment successfully capturing the towns of Gerona and Pura. Meanwhile, the 37th Reconnaissance Troop made significant progress by entering the guerrilla-occupied area of Victoria, and units from the 40th Division advanced to within four miles of Tarlac, signaling a promising push toward their objectives. In the area around Cabaruan, the Japanese forces had sustained heavy losses during the initial attack. In response, Colonel Patrick made the strategic decision to withdraw two battalions from the hills to reinforce the southern advance. Probing slowly through the roughest ground in the Cabaruan Hills on January 20 and 21, the 20th Regiment's reinforced battalion jumped off in the morning of the 22nd in what was expected to be the last attack, its way paved by an especially heavy artillery and air bombardment. But from the start, operations did not go as planned. The air strike, conducted by Fifth Air Force A-20s was four hours late, subjecting the infantry to "a nerve racking wait," and did not include requested napalm. Air and artillery concentrations were, however, well placed, and it seemed improbable to the waiting infantry that many Japanese could have lived through them. A combined tank-infantry assault began about 12:30 and proceeded slowly but steadily for almost two hours. Then the attackers were stopped cold by a tremendous burst of rifle, machine-gun, and light artillery fire from the very hillsides that had received the weight of the bombardments. Company E, in the lead, fell back; Company G's officers were all either killed or wounded, and the company was temporarily scattered; Company F was pinned in place; and two supporting tanks were knocked out. Casualties mounted quickly to 10 men killed and 35 wounded. As a consequence, Patrick found it necessary to redirect one battalion from the 1st Regiment to support the ongoing attack. Simultaneously, the remainder of the 20th Regiment pressed forward toward Cuyapo, while the bulk of the 1st Regiment continued its eastward movement toward the guerrilla-held Balungao. Additionally, the 6th Reconnaissance Troop reached Guimba, successfully establishing contact with patrols from the 14th Corps, which was crucial for coordinating their efforts. On another front, with Mount Alava now vulnerable, the 169th Regiment launched a vigorous assault on January 20, managing to secure the summit of the mountain by nightfall. In contrast, the 103rd Regiment continued to face heavy casualties during their frontal assaults against Hill 600, ultimately gaining only a precarious foothold on the exposed southern slopes. Meanwhile, in a significant naval development, Admiral Halsey's Task Force 38 exited the South China Sea through the Balintang Channel on January 20. The task force was poised to execute further strikes against Formosa, aiming to disrupt enemy operations and bolster the Allied offensive in the region. The following day, with significantly improved weather conditions, Admiral McCain's aircraft carriers launched a coordinated series of airstrikes targeting Formosa, the Pescadores Islands, and the southern Ryukyu Islands. These operations resulted in the destruction of 104 Japanese aircraft on the ground, the sinking of seven oil tankers, and the loss of seven transport ships, along with additional damage inflicted on another seven vessels.  For the first time since November 1944, TF 38 felt the sting of kamikazes. Operating just 100nm east of Formosa, TF 38 was not difficult to find. Just after noon, a single aircraft appeared to conduct a conventional bombing attack on TG 38.3's light carrier Langley. One bomb hit forward. Personnel casualties were light, but the carrier was conducting flight operations three hours later. Within minutes, another aircraft also evaded radar detection and the CAP to commence a suicide dive against Ticonderoga. The kamikaze struck the flight deck and penetrated where its bomb exploded. An impending strike was spotted and ready to launch; now these aircraft provided fuel for the fire which was quickly spreading. Just before 1300hrs, another group of eight kamikazes and five escorts resumed the attack on TG 38.3. Only two suicide aircraft survived the CAP to dive on the wounded Ticonderoga. One was sent spinning into the water by antiaircraft fire, but the final attacker crashed into the carrier's island. More fires were started. The crew succeeded in putting out the flames by 1415hrs and correcting a nine-degree list by 1800hrs. Though the ship was saved, the cost was high. Some 143 men were killed and 202, including her captain, were wounded. In addition, the air group lost 36 aircraft. As a final farewell, kamikazes attacked the two destroyers on picket duty just 65nm off Formosa at 1310hrs. A single Zero had joined a returning strike. Before it could be identified as enemy, it dove on destroyer Maddox, striking her amidships. This and the explosion of the bomb aboard created a fire that was quickly extinguished. After a final day of strikes on January 22 against the Ryukyus, during which eight ships were sunk, Task Force 38 set course for Ulithi. Upon arrival, Admiral Halsey transferred command of the Fast Carrier Force to Admiral Spruance, who would lead the final offensives in the Central Pacific.  Meanwhile, back on Luzon, on January 21, the 160th Regiment swiftly cleared the town of Tarlac and began its advance toward San Miguel. Simultaneously, the 145th and 148th Regiments moved unopposed toward La Paz. The speed of 14th Corps' advance had stretched Griswold's supply lines abnormally and had exposed his left from Cuyapo to La Paz, a distance of nearly 25 miles. He had no definite information about suspected Japanese concentrations in the vicinity of Cabanatuan, on Route 5 just 15 miles east of La Paz. His worries about the security of his flank were hardly put to rest by reports of new contacts with Japanese forces at Moncada, now 20 miles behind the front, and at La Paz. Elements of the 129th and 145th Regiments easily took care of the Japanese in the Moncada area; but during the night of January 21, a pitched battle developed at La Paz when a platoon of Japanese infantry, supported by one tank, attacked a 148th Regiment perimeter at a road junction a mile west of town. The Japanese finally withdrew after destroying a bridge that carried a secondary road across a river a mile east of La Paz; but because of this, Griswold reported to General Krueger that it would be impossible to extend 14th Corps' left any further south until he had more information about Japanese forces east of La Paz. To mitigate this risk, he decided to keep General Beightler's 37th Division positioned in reserve while General Brush's 40th Division continued its advance southward along Route 3 toward Bamban. As a result, elements of the 160th Regiment and the 40th Reconnaissance Troop reached Capas and conducted patrols toward Camp O'Donnell on January 22. Meanwhile, the 161st Regiment began probing the defenses established by Japanese forces under Shigemi. The 103rd Regiment faced severe losses during their assault on Hill 600, necessitating a withdrawal to reorganize. Concurrently, the 169th Regiment launched an attack on Hill 355, making slow and costly progress against fierce resistance on the steep, barren slopes. By January 24, most of Hill 355 had been cleared, allowing the 3rd Battalion of the 103rd Regiment to move in and conduct mop-up operations in the area. As the 158th Regiment looked northward and secured the area around Amlang, they initiated an eastward push towards the positions held by the 172nd Regiment. However, their advance was slow, with only a modest gain of 500 yards achieved. Over the next two days, the 158th faced a grueling battle, making painstaking progress as they advanced foot by foot across exposed hills and ridges, all while enduring relentless machine-gun, mortar, and artillery fire. It wasn't until January 26 that they successfully broke through to Cataguintingan, where they provided much-needed support to the 172nd Regiment's ongoing assaults into Rosario. Meanwhile, by the evening of January 23, the 161st Regiment had managed to secure the southern slopes of the barren ridge north of San Manuel. They established trail blocks in the Aboredo Valley, effectively controlling movement in the area. To the south, the 108th Regiment had taken control of the Capas region, while the 160th Regiment successfully captured Bamban. However, it became increasingly evident that the American forces were now confronting the well-fortified and organized defenses of the Kembu Group. The Kembu Group's strength lay in the terrain it held, in the depth of its defenses, and in the great number of automatic weapons (aircraft and anti-aircraft) it possessed. Its major weaknesses were its immobility; the inadequate training and armament of the bulk of its troops; shortages of food, ammunition, and field artillery; and the rudimentary state of many defensive installations, a state deriving from the late start in establishing the positions at and west of Clark Field. The health of the command was poor from the start, and medical supplies were short. Morale was not of the highest order, and many of the troops were easily disaffected Formosan, Okinawan, and Korean labor personnel. In brief, the Kembu Group was the poorest armed, prepared, and supplied of Yamashita's three defense commands. On the other hand, as the 40th Division was soon to learn, even poor service troops, whatever their state of training and armament, can put up stiff resistance in good defensive terrain.  In preparation for the defense of Clark Field, General Tsukada assembled a diverse array of forces, totaling approximately 30,000 troops, although the majority consisted of air and naval personnel. He strategically divided his Army units into four distinct detachments. The Takayama, Takaya, and Eguchi Detachments were positioned along the first and second lines of defense, facing eastward toward Highway 3. Their defensive line extended from the hills west of Bamban to the vicinity of Fort Stotsenburg. In contrast, the Yanagimoto Detachment maintained its mobile units at Angeles and Porac, ready to respond to any potential enemy paratrooper landings on the southern flank of the Clark Field defenses. Additionally, Rear-Admiral Sugimoto Ushie commanded naval units comprising about 15,000 men, tasked with defending positions behind the two forward lines. In light of this formidable opposition, General Griswold made the strategic decision to utilize January 24 for consolidation and regrouping. This involved preparing for further advances southward while also probing into the enemy defenses that had already been uncovered. The 160th Regiment was able to secure Lafe Hill, although they were unable to establish a foothold on Hill 500, highlighting the challenges that lay ahead. To the north, American forces initiated another offensive against the Cabaruan Hills. The units of the 1st Regiment made only modest progress, yet they managed to advance closer to the main defensive positions as night fell. Meanwhile, at San Manuel, the 161st Regiment launched its first assault against the Shigemi Detachment, which encountered unexpectedly fierce resistance. As a result, the Americans were only able to establish a fragile foothold in the northern section of the town. Further north, Wing directed the 103rd Regiment to set up a line of departure along Route 3, aiming to strike eastward at the northwestern slopes of Hill 600. At the same time, they were tasked with advancing up the southwestern slopes of the exposed Hill 700 to secure that strategic location, as well as Hill 800 to the northwest. The 169th Regiment, advancing to the left of the 103rd, was assigned to capture Question Mark Hill. Concurrently, the 63rd and 172nd Regiments were ordered to launch simultaneous assaults on Hills 900 and 1500, respectively, while the reserve 3rd Battalion of the 63rd Regiment was also committed to clear Benchmark Hill. This coordinated attack was scheduled for January 25. The initial phases of the assault showed promise, with the supporting forces making significant headway. However, the 103rd Regiment faced considerable difficulties, managing to secure Hill 800 only by nightfall. Notably, the 172nd Regiment achieved tactical surprise, successfully clearing most of Hill 900. Over the next two days, the 63rd Regiment regrouped around Hill 1500 in preparation for its own offensive. Simultaneously, the 161st Regiment continued its slow advance southward through San Manuel, facing intense opposition. Patrick's units on the Cabaruan Hills managed to gain a mere 300 yards against determined resistance. Meanwhile, Brush pressed his attack on Clark Field, with the 160th Regiment clearing Hill 500 and advancing nearly a mile along the ridge from Lafe Hill, while the 108th Regiment secured Hills E and G. The following day, the 40th Division continued its southward maneuver. Any movement by American troops along the generally open ridges west of Route 3 inevitably brought down Japanese machine-gun and mortar fire, often augmented by fire from the dismounted aircraft automatic weapons, anti-aircraft guns, and light artillery. Seeking cover and usually pinned in place, the American infantry would call for close-in mortar and artillery support, wait for the concentrations to be fired, and then drive forward a few yards, when the process had to be repeated. Each time, the Americans managed to overrun a few Japanese machine-gun or rifle strongpoints. There was little choice of routes of advance. Draws, providing some concealment in scrub growth or bamboo thickets, were usually covered by well-emplaced Japanese weapons both within the draws and on the ridges to each side. Possession of the high ground, as ever, was essential. Yet the troops had to employ draws whenever possible to outflank Japanese ridgeline strongpoints, and often draws and ravines proved to be the only routes by which tanks, tank destroyers, and cannon company self-propelled mounts could get to the front to fire against Japanese cave positions along the sides of the ridges. The capture of one Japanese-held cave served only to disclose another, and one machine-gun position was overrun only to provide access to the next. Dislodging the Kembu Group from such defenses in depth was to prove a slow, laborious, and costly process, demanding the closest teamwork between the infantry and its supporting arms. Casualties, as a rule, would not be heavy on any one day--progress would be too slow and the troops would spend too much of their time pinned down awaiting fire from supporting weapons. But a daily attrition rate of about 5 men killed and 15 wounded for each battalion engaged would soon begin to have its effect. Meanwhile the 160th Regiment swiftly captured Hills 636 and 600 in rapid succession. However, the 108th Regiment lost control of Hill G during the engagement. On January 26, Griswold committed the 37th Division to the fight, with the 145th Regiment successfully capturing Mabalacat and Mabalacat East Airfield. They then shifted westward across Route 3, overrunning Clark Field Runway Number 1. In the Cabaruan Hills, American forces gained only 150 yards at a considerable cost. In response, Patrick decided to deploy another battalion from the 1st Regiment to eliminate this pocket of resistance. The following day, this two-battalion assault proved successful, resulting in the destruction of an entire battalion of Japanese troops, with over 1,400 enemy soldiers killed. Further north, the 161st Regiment finally broke through the main defenses of Shigemi's forces. Before dawn most of the Japanese left in San Manuel scrambled across the draw on the east side of town and fled to join the 10th Reconnaissance Regiment north of San Nicolas, but not before launching a final counterattack to cover their escape. At 0930 the 161st Infantry's two battalions resumed the drive southward through the town, and by 1330 San Manuel was clear. In a heroic but tactically unimportant stand the Shigemi Detachment had virtually fulfilled its self-imposed desire for annihilation in place. The detachment had lost 750 men killed; all its tanks, artillery, trucks, machine guns, and mortars had been either captured or destroyed. Probably no more than 250 troops escaped, and many of them were unarmed and wounded. The 161st Infantry and attached units had lost approximately 60 men killed and 200 wounded; the 716th Tank Battalion lost 3 tanks. Meanwhile, Wing's offensive continued on January 27, with the 103rd Regiment successfully reaching the crest of Hill 700 and the northwestern slopes of Hill 600. Unfortunately, they lost both positions to a brutal Japanese counterattack amidst a violent tropical downpour. On January 28, the 172nd Regiment captured Rosario, while the 63rd secured the southern crest of Hill 1500. Both regiments completed the capture of this strategic feature by January 30, thereby finalizing the occupation of the crucial road junction area. Further south, on January 27, the 160th Regiment advanced only 500 to 800 yards to the west and southwest. The 108th Regiment made a more substantial advance of about 1,000 yards southwest from Hills E and G but failed to reach Hill 5. The 145th Regiment pushed south along Route 3 for an additional three miles, reaching Culayo and Dau before taking control of the guerrilla-occupied Angeles, which had recently been abandoned by the retreating Yanagimoto Detachment. In a similar vein, the 148th Regiment secured Magalang without encountering any resistance. As we shift our focus from Luzon, we turn our attention to Burma, where we will delve into the ongoing developments of Operation Capital. Picking up from our previous discussions, we find ourselves in Central Burma, where the 2nd British Division and the 19th Indian Division are making significant strides toward Shwebo. The 2nd British Division successfully captured Ye-u on January 2, followed by the establishment of a crucial bridgehead across the Mu River just three days later. Meanwhile, the 19th Indian Division also advanced, reaching the Shwebo area by January 5. On January 8, a coordinated assault was launched by units from both divisions, culminating in the capture of Shwebo after two days of intense and brutal combat. To the west, General Festing's 29th Brigade began probing the northern flank of the 15th Division at Twinnge. Concurrently, other elements of the 19th Division worked to solidify their positions by establishing additional bridgeheads over the Irrawaddy River at Thabeikkyin and Kyaukyaung. On January 10, the 20th Indian Division captured Budalin and subsequently pushed towards Monywa, where the 33rd Division had only left a small contingent to serve as a rearguard. However, the campaign faced unexpected challenges; heavy rainfall during the first week of January brought all transport operations of the 4th Corps to a standstill, significantly hampering the Lushai Brigade's planned assault on Gangaw. After enduring a heavy aerial bombardment, the attack on Gangaw finally commenced on January 10. The Lushai Brigade managed to overpower the limited defending forces, forcing them to retreat after a brief skirmish. With Gangaw now under their control, the Lushai Brigade refocused their efforts on reconnaissance, monitoring the flanks of the 7th Indian Division. Meanwhile, the 28th East African Brigade took the lead in the advance, successfully displacing a Japanese garrison at Tilin on January 22. By this time, the 114th Brigade had begun to follow in the wake of the East Africans, while the 89th Brigade executed a long maneuver to the left, advancing toward Pauk in parallel with the other offensives. Although General Kimura was aware of some movements on his southern flank, he perceived these as mere feints by minor forces intended to divert his attention southward. Following a relentless barrage of artillery and air strikes, the 20th Division launched its offensive against Monywa on January 20. This assault faced fierce resistance, and it took two days of intense and bloody combat before the division was able to secure control of the town. After capturing Monywa, the 80th Brigade advanced towards Myaung, while the 110th Brigade shifted its focus to Ayadaw before launching an attack on Myinmu. By January 25, they had successfully established a bridgehead in that area. Meanwhile, to the east, the 2nd Division commenced its assault on Sagaing on January 14. They made significant headway against the forward defenses of the 31st Division, with other units managing to secure a bridgehead at Ywathitgyi. General Katamura, concerned about the expanding bridgeheads established by the 19th Division across the Irrawaddy River, ordered the 15th and 53rd Divisions to neutralize these positions before they could become fortified. As a result, during the last week of January, the Japanese forces executed a series of coordinated night attacks on Kyaukmyaung. By this time, British-Indian troops had dug in deeply, supported by formidable artillery and machine-gun positions. The ensuing conflict was marked by brutal carnage, with the 15th Division suffering a staggering loss of one-third of its personnel, while the 53rd Division was compelled to withdraw to Kyaukse after incurring heavy casualties. In parallel, the 89th Brigade successfully occupied Pauk on January 28, as General Messervy's forces geared up for a decisive push towards Meiktila. Looking northward, General Sultan was also advancing his own offensive aimed at reopening the Burma Road to China. He ordered the 50th Chinese Division to move towards Lashio and deployed the Mars Task Force to Hosi. Additionally, he dispatched the 36th British Division towards Mongmit, although the British advance was expected to be slow until additional forces could be brought into alignment for a more coordinated effort. General Sun's newly established 1st Army initiated a delayed offensive against Namhkam, which resumed in early January. This resurgence was marked by the 90th Regiment's strategic capture of the hill that overlooks the southwestern entrance to the Shweli River valley. Concurrently, the 112th Regiment advanced through Loiwing, subsequently crossing the river to approach Namhkam from the northeast. Meanwhile, the 88th Regiment entered the valley via the main road, making a direct push across the small plain toward Namhkam. The 89th and 114th Regiments executed a broader maneuver around the southern end of the Shweli valley; the 89th crossed the river on January 7 and advanced northward toward Namhkam, while the 114th crossed three days later, navigating through the hills toward the Namhkam-Namhpakka trail. To the south, the 475th Regiment progressed through Mong Hkak and reached Mong Wi on January 6, preparing for another challenging march across the hilly terrain toward Hosi, with the 124th Cavalry Regiment following closely behind. So close is Tonkwa to the mountains that the 475th found the trail rising steeply on the 1st day's march east. Like a crazily twisted drill it bored its way farther east and ever higher. In some places it was 15 to 20 feet across; in others, just wide enough for a man and a mule. As they rounded the turns, the men would peer ahead and look out across the valleys to where lay row on row of hills. Trees were everywhere. In flat places carved by erosion, the Burmese had cut and farmed terraces, and little villages clung to the mountains like limpets to a rock. Because existing maps were unreliable, so that map reconnaissance could not locate water and bivouac areas, and because the sheer fatigue of climbing the steeper slopes was formidable, march schedules went down the mountain side, with quite a few steel helmets and an occasional mule. Halts were a matter of common sense leadership at platoon or company level. The march was tactical but no Japanese were encountered, though rumor of their nearness kept the men alert. The Chinese had passed that way before, while a screen of Kachin Rangers was preceding the American column. Speaking the local dialects and carrying radios and automatic weapons, the Kachins were an excellent screen which masked the MARS Task Force while reporting anything that might be suspicious. Despite the difficult march, crossing the 400-foot wide Shweli was not too hard. The bridge built by the Chinese some weeks before still stood, a triumph of Oriental ingenuity, with bundles of bamboo for pontons and vines for cable. The Shweli was beginning to tear it apart, but work parties from the 475th kept it operable.  Meanwhile, spurred into action by General Wedemeyer after a month of inactivity, General Wei's Y-Force finally resumed its offensive operations in late December. They promptly dispatched the 2nd, 6th, and 71st Armies to launch an assault on the forward positions of the 56th Division at Wanting. Simultaneously, the 53rd Army executed a wide flanking maneuver to the west, aiming to encircle and attack the Japanese forces from the rear. Faced with the intense pressure of this four-pronged offensive, General Matsuyama was compelled to withdraw the 148th Regiment to a position north of Mongyu. He also ordered the Yoshida Force to mount a counteroffensive toward Muse and committed the reserve 2nd Regiment to secure Namhpakka. On January 5, the 53rd Army reached the vicinity of Muse and began crossing the river; however, they were met with fierce resistance from Matsuyama's timely counterattack, which thwarted their advance. Ten days later, Sun's forces initiated a well-coordinated offensive against Namhkam, which ultimately succumbed on January 16 as the 55th Regiment retreated toward Khonung. With the Shweli Valley now firmly under Allied control, Matsuyama began to tighten his defensive perimeter in anticipation of a final withdrawal toward Hsenwi. On January 17, the Mars Task Force made significant progress by reaching the Hosi sector, where they immediately engaged Japanese outposts. The 475th Regiment successfully secured the advantageous high ground near Nawhkam village. Over the next two days, American forces clashed with the 4th Regiment, capturing the strategically important Loikang Ridge and the elevated terrain overlooking Namhpakka. On January 19, the Mars Task Force attempted to disrupt Japanese supply lines by blocking the Burma Road through demolition and artillery bombardment, coinciding with the arrival of the 55th Regiment, which was sent to bolster the defenders. In a parallel effort, the 114th Regiment managed to sever the Namhkam-Namhpakka trail at Loilawn on the same day. Faced with this escalating threat from the south and the intensifying Chinese assaults on Wanting, the 56th Division was compelled to further contract its defensive perimeter. As a result, Wanting fell on January 20. Fortunately for Matsuyama, General Wei received orders from the Generalissimo to conclude the Salween campaign immediately, which meant that the Chinese forces would remain in their positions until they could be relieved by Sultan's units. Over the course of nearly nine months of intense combat, Wei's Y-Force had successfully reoccupied an impressive 24,000 square miles of Chinese territory and had defeated one of the most elite divisions of the Japanese army, along with elements from two additional divisions. However, the fighting was far from over. Sun continued to dispatch the 112th and 113th Regiments toward Wanting and Mongyu, aiming to clear the final stretch of the road leading to China. Meanwhile, the 89th and 114th Regiments pressed eastward to cut off the Burma Road north of Namhpakka, further complicating the situation for the Japanese forces. In the southern region, from January 20 to January 24, the Mars Task Force continued its strategic operations, executing ambushes and demolition missions while successfully repelling several intense counterattacks from enemy forces. By late January, pressure by MARS Task Force and that of the Chinese forces in the north began to register on the Japanese. The soldiers of the 4th Regiment could see the aerial activity that kept MARS supplied. Not recognizing what they saw, they were so impressed by a big supply drop on the 24th that they sent a report to the 56th Division of a large airborne force being landed along the Burma Road. Accepting this report, General Matsuyama decided to destroy his ammunition and retreat south. His superiors on January 24 agreed to let him retreat, but only after he had evacuated casualties and ammunition. Forty vehicles with gasoline accompanied by a Major Kibino of the 33rd Army staff were sent north to support the 56th in its withdrawal. The Japanese truck convoy made its run north the night of January 24. The trucks were heard, and the Americans placed heavy fire on the road. Kibino had been making the trip in a tankette. Hit by a 4.2-inch mortar shell, it burst into flames clearly visible from the American lines. Kibino clambered out, jumped on a truck, and succeeded in getting his convoy through to the 56th Division. Next day the derelict tankette was credited to the 2nd Battalion, 475th Regiment. But  Encouraged by the additional supplies of gasoline and inspired by the heroic examples of Major Kibino and the personnel of the truck companies, the 56th Division renewed its efforts and, during the next four days effected the evacuation of over 1000 casualties and moved several tons of ammunition to Hsenwi.  Meanwhile, General Matsuyama began to systematically reposition his forces toward Namhpakka, a strategic maneuver that would enable Chinese troops to occupy Mongyu on January 27. In a broader context, by the end of January, the 36th and 50th Divisions were also engaged in crossing the Shweli River, preparing to advance their offensives further southward. In the Arakan region, Operation Romulus exceeded expectations. The 1st Battalion of the 111th Regiment had been defending Akyab. On December 31, as the rear guard of the Sakura Detachment crossed the Kaladan River and moved eastward the Battalion was ordered to withdraw to Ponnagyun. As intelligence suggested very few Japanese were left on Akyab island, a recce aeroplane reported the locals showing no anxiety and on January 2 messages were dropped in Urdu and Burmese asking them to sit on the ground if the island was still occupied or stand with their hands in the air if not. Captain Jimmy Jarrett of ‘C' Flight, 656 AOP Squadron, then landed to a rousing reception and found the Japanese had quit on December 31, although nobody believed him until a senior officer flew in to confirm it. This prompted General Christison to swiftly initiate an amphibious invasion. Notably, this operation was executed without the anticipated naval bombardment and without deploying the reserve 26th Indian Division. As a result, the 3rd Commando Brigade successfully captured Akyab on January 3, facing no resistance, and the 25th Indian Division soon followed, reinforcing the area. From Akyab, the 9th York and Lancasters were transported by boat to establish a strategic blockade along the Yo River at Ponnagyun. There, they encountered significant Japanese forces. After a fierce engagement, however, the Japanese defenders were compelled to retreat toward Myohaung by January 11. In response to the evolving situation, Admiral Mountbatten devised a plan to land the 3rd Commando Brigade and the 25th Division on the Myebon Peninsula. This operation aimed to sever the primary lines of communication for Japanese forces, while preparations were made for the 26th Division to conduct a landing on Ramree Island. In response to the urgent military situation, Operation Passport was swiftly conceived and executed on January 12. British-Indian forces successfully landed at the southern tip of the peninsula, supported by both air and naval operations. Once ashore, the commandos advanced inland, facing intense resistance from fortified hill positions. Their efforts culminated in the capture of Pagoda Hill and the village of Myebon. However, as they pushed forward, opposition intensified, making it increasingly difficult for the British-Indian troops to reach Hill 831. Simultaneously, the 82nd West African Division, now commanded by Major-General Hugh Stockwell, entered the Kaladan Valley to relieve the 81st Division, which had been engaged in combat for over a year. The West African forces began to apply pressure against the Matsu Detachment units stationed at Myohaung and Minbya, although these Japanese forces managed to maintain their positions despite the mounting assaults. Meanwhile, planning was underway for the deployment of the 3rd Commando Brigade and the 51st Indian Brigade to land at Kangaw, coinciding with General Lomax's invasion of Ramree Island.  Early on January 21 the naval bombardment group opened fire. Christison and the other Force Commanders were watching through field glasses from the bridge of HMS Queen Elizabeth in her first engagement since the Dardanelles in 1915. Christison later said: ‘Some shells fell on a marsh behind the Jap defences, and I saw a number of duck spring up. “Duck”, I shouted. “The Royal Navy never ducks”, said the Admiral.' With her second salvo Queen Elizabeth scored a direct hit on the Japanese ammunition depot, which facilitated the landing operations. The 71st Indian Brigade successfully captured Kyaukpyu with minimal resistance. This victory enabled them to advance toward Minbyin and Kyaupyauk, both of which fell into their hands by January 23. In the subsequent days, the brigade continued its advance toward the Yanbauk Chaung, where they encountered fierce Japanese defenses. At the same time, other elements of the division worked to secure Cheduba and Sagu Kyun Islands, further consolidating their strategic position in the region. On January 22, the commandos and the 51st Brigade successfully landed in the Kangaw area near the Min River. However, they faced violent and frequent counterattacks from Japanese forces, which hindered their ability to expand their beachhead. Despite these challenges, the intense pressure from the commandos ultimately forced the Japanese defenders at Hill 831, Myohaung, and Minbya to retreat toward Kani, marking a significant shift in the operational landscape. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. General Krueger's forces advanced against Japanese defenses, capturing key positions despite heavy resistance and casualties. Meanwhile, in Burma, British-Indian troops advanced, seizing key locations despite heavy resistance. Both fronts faced intense combat, leading to significant territorial gains against Japanese forces by the end of January.

Evan Mawdsley, Honorary Professorial Research Fellow at the University of Glasgow and author of Supremacy at Sea: Task Force 58 and the Central Pacific Victory, joins the show to discuss the successful 1944 U.S. naval campaign through the Central Pacific in World War II. ▪️ Times      •      01:36 Introduction     •      02:27 The Central Pacific      •      11:15 Carrier air power      •     14:31 Embracing the task force        •      20:00 Replenishment at sea      •      24:28 A campaign for airbases      •      27:56 Limiting loss       •      33:38 Spruance & Mitscher      •      38:36 Japanese defense doctrine      •      45:58 Parallels today     Follow along on Instagram or YouTube @SchoolofWarPodcast Find a transcript of today's episode on our School of War Substack

In this episode, Lt.Col. Brian Kerg joins me to talk about the Battle of Saipan in June/July 1944, and the leadership challenges that arose at the time, resulting in a Marine Corps Officer relieving an Army Officer. Links Commanding the Pacific: Marine Corps Generals in World War II by Stephen R. Taaffe (Amazon) Coral and Brass by Holland M. Smith (Amazon) Howlin Mad vs. The Army: Conflict in Command, Saipan 1944 by Harry Gailey (Amazon) New Guinea and the Marianas: March 1944 - August 1944 by Samuel Eliot Morison (Amazon) To the Marianas: War in the Central Pacific 1944 by Edwin Hoyt (Amazon) Mother of Tanks website (http://www.motheroftanks.com/podcast/)   Bonus Content (https://www.patreon.com/c/motheroftanks)

In January 1869, leaders of the Union Pacific and Central Pacific met in Washington, D.C. to discuss the final stretch of construction. For years, the two railroads had been advancing toward each other without a defined location for their tracks to meet. But now, their grading crews were working within sight of each other in Utah. In the frantic race to the finish, it became increasingly difficult to hide the fact that the tracks destined to unite the nation were built on a foundation of corruption.Order your copy of the new American History Tellers book, The Hidden History of the White House, for behind-the-scenes stories of some of the most dramatic events in American history—set right inside the house where it happened.Be the first to know about Wondery's newest podcasts, curated recommendations, and more! Sign up now at https://wondery.fm/wonderynewsletterListen to American History Tellers on the Wondery App or wherever you get your podcasts. Experience all episodes ad-free and be the first to binge the newest season. Unlock exclusive early access by joining Wondery+ in the Wondery App, Apple Podcasts or Spotify. Start your free trial today by visiting wondery.com/links/american-history-tellers/ now.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

In early 1866, Central Pacific workers were stalled in California, facing the monumental task of blasting 15 tunnels through solid granite in the Sierra Nevada mountains. Thousands of Chinese laborers would be pushed to their breaking point.One-thousand miles to the east, workers on the Union Pacific faced Plains Indians desperate to defend their ancestral homelands from the encroaching railroad.But the men in charge of the railroads knew that every mile of track meant money in their pockets, and they would stop at nothing to capture victory.Order your copy of the new American History Tellers book, The Hidden History of the White House, for behind-the-scenes stories of some of the most dramatic events in American history—set right inside the house where it happened.Be the first to know about Wondery's newest podcasts, curated recommendations, and more! Sign up now at https://wondery.fm/wonderynewsletterListen to American History Tellers on the Wondery App or wherever you get your podcasts. Experience all episodes ad-free and be the first to binge the newest season. Unlock exclusive early access by joining Wondery+ in the Wondery App, Apple Podcasts or Spotify. Start your free trial today by visiting wondery.com/links/american-history-tellers/ now.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

In the summer of 1863, an unscrupulous businessman named Thomas Durant gained control of the Union Pacific Railroad, the company chartered by Congress to build the transcontinental railroad westward from the Missouri River. Durant quickly used his new position to siphon money into his own pockets.2,000 miles to the west in California, on the other end of the rail line, the Central Pacific would turn to armies of immigrant workers to grade and lay track through unforgiving and dangerous terrain.Order your copy of the new American History Tellers book, The Hidden History of the White House, for behind-the-scenes stories of some of the most dramatic events in American history—set right inside the house where it happened.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Need any advice or information, message us.We talked to David Karr about real estate in the Central Pacific of Costa Rica (Jaco, Herradura, Playa Hermosa): what's selling, what's not, and where he sees the opportunity currently. We chatted about the lack of luxury products available and where he thinks there is opportunity in the luxury market in Costa Rica.Free 15 min consultation:  https://meetings.hubspot.com/jake806/crconsultContact us: info@investingcostarica.comGuest today:David Karr: davidkarrcostarica@gmail.com 

Last time we spoke about the conquest of Angaur and the Japanese Triumph in China. By October 18th, the remaining Japanese on Angaur were compressed into a small area, and by the 21st, resistance had ceased. The Americans suffered 264 killed and 1,355 wounded, while approximately 1,300 Japanese were killed. Over in China, Hara's forces suffered heavy losses during a delaying action at Momauk, with troops joining Bhamo's defense by November 16. The 113th Regiment maneuvered to encircle Bhamo from the south, while the 114th Regiment approached from the north, creating a loose encirclement. The 22nd Division's movement prompted concerns of severing key rail lines, leading Japanese forces to reposition defensively. Despite intense fighting, including a strong Chinese offensive on November 19, the Japanese withdrew from key positions, allowing Chinese forces to capture Mangshi and secure a strategic airfield for resupply, significantly impacting the campaign's dynamics. This episode is the Formosa Air Battle Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As we last saw on Peleliu, General Rupertus' 1st Marine Division, bolstered by Colonel Dark's 321st Regiment, successfully secured the island after approximately two weeks of intense fighting. However, Colonel Nakagawa's isolated and outnumbered garrison continued to resist in the Umurbrogol Pocket. As left by nature, the Umurbrogol Pocket was much like the Ibdi Pocket on Biak Island, but larger and rougher. Like Ibdi, the Umurbrogol originally had a thick cover of tropical trees and dense jungle undergrowth which, as the result of continued air, naval, and artillery bombardment (including extensive employment of aerial napalm strikes), was gradually knocked down or burned away. Again, as on Biak, the Japanese had improved upon nature. There were many artificial or semi-artificial caves which had been constructed to protect approaches to the inner sections of the pocket, and the Japanese had improved almost every natural cave. Where no caves were available or could be constructed, the defenders employed rock faults and crevices for defensive positions. Digging new entrances to existing caves or even cutting new levels within some caves, the Japanese were well prepared to execute a long and bloody holding action along the many ridges. These ridges, with the exception of the Five Sisters group at the southern side of the pocket, were generally parallel and oriented north-northeast to south-southwest. Steep-sided and fissured, many of them had razor-back summits upon which no cover could be found. The ridges were separated by deep draws, gullies, and wider valleys, the floors of which were strewn with coral boulders or coral outcroppings similar to stalagmites. Steep as they were, the sides of some ridges also were covered with such chunks and outcroppings. In late September, the exhausted infantrymen, who were tasked with containing the pocket while the Marines cleared northern Peleliu, made several heavy assaults. They only managed to reach the X-ray phase line, marking what was believed to be the northern edge of the core Japanese defenses, before being relieved by the 7th Marines. With Colonel Hanneken's 1st and 3rd Battalions now holding the X-ray line, Rupertus planned a strong attack southward while other Marine units maintained their positions on the western and southern sides of the pocket. On the morning of September 30, the attack was launched. However, fierce Japanese resistance, heavy rain, fog, and sickness hindered the 7th Marines' progress southward by October 2. On the following day, Hanneken's 2nd Battalion, supported by tanks, secured a foothold along the eastern side and top of Walt Ridge, while the 3rd Battalion finally captured the eastern slope of Boyd Ridge. By October 4, however, the 7th Marines had suffered such heavy losses and were so depleted that Rupertus was left with no choice but to relieve them as well. As a result, Colonel Harris's 5th Marines were once again thrust into action. On October 7, following an hour-long artillery and mortar barrage, the 3rd Battalion, along with six tanks, advanced into Mortimer Valley. However, Nakagawa's determined defenders continued to resist fiercely, successfully repelling two powerful tank-infantry assaults, causing heavy American casualties. Our old friend Eugene Sledge with K Company, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, wrote about fighting in this area, it is as follows  “Johnny led us on up through a jumble of rocks on Hill 140. Company K's line was emplaced along a rock rim, and we set up the mortars in a shallow depression about twenty yards behind it. The riflemen and machine gunners in front of us were in among rocks along the rim of Hill 140 facing east toward Walt Ridge and the northern end of the infamous Horseshoe. We had previously attacked that valley from its southern end. From the rim of Hill 140 the rock contours dropped away in a sheer cliff to a canyon below. No one could raise his head above the rim rock without immediately drawing heavy rifle and machine-gun fire. The fighting around the pocket was as deadly as ever, but of a different type from the early days of the campaign. The Japanese fired few artillery or mortar barrages, just a few rounds at a time when assured of inflicting maximum casualties. That they usually did, and then secured the guns to escape detection. Sometimes there was an eerie quiet. We knew they were everywhere in the caves and pillboxes. But there was no firing in our area, only the sound of firing elsewhere. The silence added an element of unreality to the valleys. If we moved past a certain point, the Japanese opened up suddenly with rifle, machine-gun, mortar, and artillery fire. It was like a sudden storm breaking. More often than not we had to pull back, and not a man in the company had seen a live enemy anywhere. They couldn't hope to drive us off by then or to be reinforced themselves. From that point onward, they killed solely for the sake of killing, without hope and without higher purpose. We were fighting in Peleliu's ridges and valleys, in terrain the likes of which most Americans could not even visualize, against an enemy unlike anything most Americans could imagine”. In response to this setback, Rupertus halted further offensive operations and ordered his forces to maintain pressure on the Japanese stronghold through sustained artillery fire and aerial bombardments. Over the next two days, this relentless bombardment cleared so much foliage and undergrowth that visibility across the ridges improved significantly. This allowed the attacks to resume on October 9, and although no ground was gained initially, Harris's 2nd Battalion succeeded in securing Wattie, Baldy, and 120 Ridges on October 10. They then pushed south to capture the tactically vital Hill 140. From this position, a Marine howitzer provided critical support to the 5th and 7th Marines as they cleared an area approximately 700 yards long and up to 200 yards east beyond the previous containment lines along West Road. However, on October 14, Dark's 321st Regiment began moving up to relieve the Marines, as General Geiger had decided to end Marine participation in the Battle of Peleliu.  Just before they were relieved, Eugene Sledge wrote a passage about moving through positions in October, finding numerous dead, stinking in the hot sun. One corpse he found made a significant impact on him, here is the passage. “As we moved past the defilade, my buddy groaned, “Jesus!” I took a quick glance into the depression and recoiled in revulsion and pity at what I saw. The bodies were badly decomposed and nearly blackened by exposure. This was to be expected of the dead in the tropics, but these Marines had been mutilated hideously by the enemy. One man had been decapitated. His head lay on his chest; his hands had been severed from his wrists and also lay on his chest near his chin. In disbelief I stared at the face as I realized that the Japanese had cut off the dead Marine's penis and stuffed it into his mouth. The corpse next to him had been treated similarly. The third had been butchered, chopped up like a carcass torn by some predatory animal. My emotions solidified into rage and a hatred for the Japanese beyond anything I ever had experienced. From that moment on I never felt the least pity or compassion for them no matter what the circumstances. My comrades would field-strip their packs and pockets for souvenirs and take gold teeth, but I never saw a Marine commit the kind of barbaric mutilation the Japanese committed if they had access to our dead. When we got back to the gun pit, my buddy said, “Sledgehammer, did you see what the Nips did to them bodies? Did you see what them poor guys had in their mouths?” I nodded as he continued, “Christ, I hate them slant-eyed bastards!” “Me too. They're mean as hell,” was all I could say.” About mid-October, a number of command changes occurred in the Palaus area. On the 12th, for instance, the 1st Marine Division was relieved of all responsibilities other than continuing the fight in the Umurbrogol Pocket. The 321st Infantry took over the defenses along the eastern arm, while the Island Garrison Force assumed responsibility for the area south of the pocket. On the morning of October 12, the command post of the 3rd Amphibious Corps moved ashore and General Geiger, the corps commander, declared that the assault and occupation phase of operations on Peleliu was ended. The exact meaning of this announcement is not clear, especially in relation to Admiral Fort's somewhat similar declaration of September 30, stating that Angaur, Peleliu, Ngesebus, and Kongauru had been captured and occupied. However, General Geiger's announcement seems to have been made in preparation for the 1st Marine Division's imminent departure from the Palaus. The statement also bears relation to the passing of control of operations in the Palaus from the 3rd Fleet and Admiral Halsey (as then represented by Admiral Fort's Western Attack Force headquarters) to the Headquarters, Forward Area Central Pacific (Task Force 57), under Admiral Hoover. On the 13th General Geiger issued orders alerting the 321st Regimental Combat Team to relieve the 1st Marine Division elements still at the Umurbrogol Pocket. The next day, control over all operations in the Palaus passed from Admiral Fort to Admiral Hoover's command. With the relief of the Marines at the Umurbrogol, the remainder of the battered 1st Marine Division then began preparations for leaving the Palaus. At the same time, the 1st Battalion, 323rd Regiment, fresh from operations at Ulithi Atoll, started preparations to relieve Marine units in the southwest corner of the pocket, with the rest of the regiment to follow. Consequently, the Marines prepared to depart from the Palaus, with Dark taking over responsibility for the reduction of Umurbrogol. Since September 29, the Marines had endured an additional 1,000 casualties, bringing their total to 1,252 killed and 5,274 wounded. In return, they estimated having killed between 850 and 1,000 Japanese soldiers, leaving roughly 1,000 defenders in the shrinking pocket as the 321st moved back in. After a failed local attempt to capture the northernmost peak of the Five Brothers Ridge on October 16, Dark launched a general attack the next day, which resulted in a modest gain of about 125 yards and the neutralization of some caves to the east. On the morning of October 18, the attack resumed, with Dark's 2nd Battalion successfully capturing three peaks of the Five Brothers, thanks to support from mortars, tanks, and LVT-mounted flamethrowers. However, undeterred by this overwhelming firepower, the Japanese immediately counterattacked and reclaimed the three peaks by nightfall. On the southwest side of the pocket, Nakagawa had also sent infiltrators through tunnels and connecting caves to raid the enemy lines, forcing Geiger to redirect elements of the 7th Marines and 323rd Regiment to address this new southern pocket. After much effort, most of the infiltrators were finally pushed north on October 23, though mopping up in the Southern Pocket wasn't completed until November 3. Meanwhile, on October 19, following a deadly napalm strike, Dark's 1st Battalion advanced up to 50 yards along the ridges west of Hill 140 with the help of howitzers and much-needed sandbags. The battalion's men, lying prone on the ground, inched their sandbags forward with rifle butts or sticks, laboriously expanding their hold and almost realizing the infantrymen's dream of portable foxholes. The next day, General Mueller formally assumed command of the Peleliu campaign. Following some reconnaissance and a napalm strike, the 321st resumed its assault on October 21, making significant progress by advancing over 100 yards and capturing the northernmost peak of the Five Brothers. On the subsequent day, Dark launched a coordinated attack with his 2nd Battalion securing the first three Brothers, the reinforced 1st Battalion struggling to breach Death Valley, and the 3rd Battalion sweeping through Mortimer Valley with tank support. After this achievement, while Colonel Watson was bringing the remaining 323rd Regiment to the Umurbrogol area, the only major progress was the capture of the fourth Brother on October 23. Two days later, the 323rd began relieving the weary 321st Regiment. By this time, Dark had lost 146 men killed and 469 wounded on Peleliu. As Watson took over, Nakagawa's forces had been reduced to about 700 effective troops, including those lightly wounded. The pocket's dimensions had also been compressed to an average north-south length of about 600 yards. Fortunately for the defenders, heavy rains, fog, and poor visibility significantly hampered Watson's operations in the Umurbrogol Pocket from October 26 to November 1. This period was used mainly for mortar barrages, napalm strikes, defense enhancements, and extending sandbag fortifications. Despite this pause, Nakagawa launched near-nightly counterattacks over the six days, primarily targeting the Five Brothers, which mostly resulted in further casualties for the defenders. To understand the eventual reduction of the Umurbrogol Pocket, we will need to shift our focus to the plans and preparations for General MacArthur's grand return to the Philippines. Previously, General MacArthur, along with Admirals Nimitz and Halsey, decided to abandon the preliminary operations for Mindanao and Yap in favor of a direct assault on Leyte. To be much more frank General MacArthur was having a turf war with Admiral Nimitz. After the Marianas campaign, the endgame of Nimitz island hoping across the Pacific forced the Joint Chiefs of staff to make a choice, to invade the Philippines, or leave it to wither on the vine and instead invade formosa. Admiral King, the joint chiefs of staff, Admiral Leahy and General Hap Arnold all favored the Formosa option. For quite awhile Nimitz got everyone onboard with this plan as Formosa was a logical choice being only 900 kms away from Japan and its seizure would cut off southeast asia from the home islands. With Formosa the Americans could even begin an invasion of southern CHina to aid their allies there and toss plenty of B-29s at the home islands from a much closer location. But then there was the force of nature that was Douglas MacArthur. MacArthur argued Formosa would be “a massive operation, extremely costly in men and shipping, logistically precarious and time consuming.” And he was willing to take his case straight to Washington. In July of 1944 he along with Nimitz went to Honolulu to meet with FDR. MacArthur bitterly protested the meeting, as he knew full well FDR was trying to get re-elected for a fourth term “humiliation of forcing me to leave my command to fly to Honolulu for a political picture taking junket.” So not to be outdone by FDR, MacArthur showboated, by landing early with. He went to a local shop in a limousine he borrowed, and had his staff place a 4 star general insignia upon. He wore khaki trousers a brown leather air force jacket and the cap of a Filipino Field Marshall, going out into public waving at crowds gathering to see the president. When he moved into a cabin to meet with FDR he refused to change into cooler attire stating to FDR , “you haven't been up there where I came from, and it's cold up there in the sky.” MacArthur then pretended Nimitz was not in the room and dominated the strategic discussions and attempted at every possible moment to impose his will on the rather ailing and sickly president, whose physical decline had become more apparent. During a private meeting between the two MacArthur said this to FDR “Mr. President, the country has forgiven you for what took place on Bataan. You hope to be re-elected president of the United States, but the nation will never forgive you if you approve a plan which leaves 17 million Christian American subjects to wither in the Philippines under the conqueror's heel until the peace treaty frees them. You might do it for reasons of strategy or tactics, but politically, it would ruin you” Rather ironic given it was his responsibility to defend those he was now blackmailing FDR to save. But the truth of the matter was, MacArthur had stolen the American press and American peoples hearts, his grand statement to return to the Philippines was a huge issue. There of course was the other issue, MacArthur could run on the Republican ticket against FDR. Some would allege FDR was bullied into an invasion of the Philippines because of this. To twist FDR's arm, MacArthur assured him the losses in retaking Luzon would be minimal “Mr. President, my losses would not be heavy, any more than they have been in the past … your good commanders do not turn in heavy losses.” Despite it being a slight against Nimitz, MacArthur's arguments did twist his wrist. That evening FDR spoke to his doctor Ross McIntire stating this “Give me an aspirin before I go to bed. In fact, give me another aspirin to take in the morning. In all my life nobody ever talked to me the way MacArthur did.” When leaving back on his plane, MacArthur turned to his aide and boasted, “We've sold it.” and when he returned to his South West Pacific Area Command HQ in Brisbane, MacArthur informed his staff, “the President has accepted my recommendations and approved the Philippines plan.” MacArthur was a bit too optimistic, although FDR agreed to invade the Philippines he did not do so without recommendations of his joint chiefs of staff. The Navy was to bear the brunt of furnishing air support in the early stages of the campaign. By arrangement with Admiral Nimitz, the Carrier Task Force from Admiral Halsey's 3rd Fleet was to strike northern Luzon and Okinawa or Formosa, or both, from A Day minus 10 to A minus 7. From A minus 4 through A Day, strikes were to be made on Luzon, the Cebu-Negros area, and the Leyte area in support of the landings. As soon as the Palau air base facilities would permit, shore-based air forces from the Central Pacific were to operate in the Bicol area. The Allied Naval Forces was to furnish carrier aircraft as protection for convoys and naval task forces and, supplemented by aircraft of the 3rd Fleet and the Allied Air Forces, to provide direct air support for the landings. In addition, it was to furnish protective air support and cover by carrier aircraft prior to A Day for the preliminary landings in Leyte Gulf and for the mine sweeping. On September 24, General Kenney issued his order for the Leyte operation and assigned missions to the Allied Air Forces. He designated General Whitehead's 5th Air Force as the Air Assault Force. It was to support the operation by intensified air activities against enemy installations, destroy hostile air and surface forces in the Celebes Sea and assigned areas in the Philippine Archipelago, and provide air defense for existing bases and forces in transit to Leyte within range of its capabilities. It was also to be prepared to establish, on order, land-based air forces on Leyte. The 13th Air Force was to support the missions of the 5th Air Force, while the Royal Australian Air Force Command was to destroy Japanese installations and sources of raw materials in the Netherlands Indies. Additionally, Halsey's 3rd Fleet was to be on standby to support the Leyte operation, with the objective of "destroying enemy naval and air forces in or threatening the Philippine Area." Submarines from both the Southwest and Central Pacific Areas would provide support through offensive reconnaissance of likely Japanese routes, maintaining observation and lifeguard services, and offering weather reports and strategic patrols. On the ground, General Krueger's 6th Army would lead the Leyte assault, taking over the operation after the disbandment of Alamo Force on September 25. With this force moving to the Philippines, General Eichelberger's 8th Army was assigned garrison duties in New Guinea, New Britain, the Admiralties, and Morotai. For King II, Krueger's forces included General Sibert's 10th Corps, consisting of the 1st Cavalry and 24th Infantry Divisions, totaling 53,000 men, and General Hodge's 24th Corps, comprising the 7th and 96th Divisions, totaling 51,500 men. The corps originally designated for the canceled Yap operation was reassigned to the 6th Army, replacing the 14th Corps, which was meant to carry out the initial Leyte landings after securing Mindanao. However, the 14th Corps was still in the process of being relieved at Bougainville. To further support the operation, Krueger kept the 32nd and 77th Divisions in reserve, totaling approximately 28,500 troops. Krueger's plan involved an advance team landing Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Mucci's 6th Ranger Battalion on the islands guarding the approaches to Leyte Gulf on October 17. As the Rangers took control of these small islands, Admiral Oldendorf's Fire Support Group would initiate a comprehensive bombardment campaign in preparation for the landings. Minesweepers and underwater demolition teams would also begin clearing natural and man-made obstacles from the gulf. On October 20, Admiral Barbey's Task Force 78 was to transport and land the 10th Corps, while Admiral Wilkinson's Task Force 79 was tasked with landing the 24th Corps. The reinforced 21st Regiment was scheduled to land at 09:30 near Panaon Strait, at the southeastern tip of Leyte, to secure control of the entrance to Sogod Bay. Further north, the 10th Corps was to land two divisions abreast in the Marasbaras and Palo areas at 10:00, while the 24th Corps would simultaneously land two divisions abreast in the Dulag area, about 15 miles to the south. Major-General Verne Mudge's 1st Cavalry Division was to capture Tacloban and its airfield and secure control of San Juanico Strait, while Major-General Frederick Irving's 24th Division seized Palo and advanced northwest through the Leyte Valley. The two divisions would then converge on Carigara at the northern end of the valley. Hodge's strategy involved Major-General James Bradley's 96th Division landing between Dulag and San Roque to secure a segment of Highway 1 within its operational zone, as well as Catmon Hill and the Dagami-Tanauan area. Since Bradley's task was relatively easier, the 381st Regiment was designated as Krueger's floating reserve. At the same time, Major-General Archibald Arnold's 7th Division was tasked with coming ashore in the Dulag area. One part of this division was to move south to capture the Highway 1 bridge and the Daguitan River crossings at Dao, while the main force advanced along the Dulag-Burauen road to take Burauen and then push on to Dagami. From there, Arnold's troops were expected to be ready to seize Abuyog and Baybay, eliminating enemy forces on the west coast and in southern Leyte. With the successful completion of these objectives, Krueger aimed to break the backbone of Japanese resistance. Consequently, with Leyte Valley and its airfields and base sites secured by the 6th Army, the 10th Corps would then advance south through the Ormoc Valley towards Ormoc, while the 24th Corps would move north from Baybay along the Ormoc Bay coast to link up with Sibert. Meanwhile, General Yamashita relied on General Suzuki's 35th Army, which consisted of four divisions and two independent mixed brigades dispersed across the central and southern Philippines. Specifically, Leyte was defended by Lieutenant-General Makino Shiro's 16th Division, experienced veterans of the initial Japanese invasion of the Philippines. Aside from minor forces left on Luzon and Samar, Makino commanded the full combat strength of the 16th Division, supplemented by 4th Air Division ground units, 35th Army service units in the area, and elements of the 36th Naval Guard Unit stationed at Ormoc and Tacloban. Anticipating that enemy landings would most likely occur in the Dulag-Tarragona-Abuyog sector, Makino strategically positioned the majority of his troops in fortified coastal positions between Abuyog in the south and Palo in the north, with the densest concentration around Dulag. By October, the 16th Division had completed three lines of trenches along the shoreline, but these defenses were weak and inadequately placed. The field positions were old-type long connecting trenches prepared in three echelons. These were difficult to defend and easily discovered from the air since camouflage was lacking. The only effective positions were the cave emplacements for artillery, which had been constructed on Catmon Hill. About 60% of the defenses constructed were completed by the time of the invasion. In the event of an enemy invasion, Suzuki kept the 30th Division and three battalions of the 102nd Division as a mobile reserve, ready to be deployed to destroy the enemy wherever they landed. This strategy was known as the Suzu Plan: if the enemy landed at Davao, the mobile reserve would reinforce the 100th Division; if they landed on Leyte, the main force of the 30th Division and three battalions of the 102nd Division were to land at Ormoc to support Makino's defenders. Meanwhile, back in September, Mitscher's fast carriers had conducted several strikes against the Philippines, leading to the near destruction of Japanese air forces and shipping in the region. To prevent air reinforcements to the Philippines, Halsey ordered Admiral Sherman's carrier-based aircraft to launch strikes against enemy aircraft staging areas in the Ryukyus, particularly Okinawa, on October 10. These strikes successfully destroyed an estimated 111 planes and sank or damaged 34 ships. Simultaneously, a cruiser force under Rear Admiral Allan Smith shelled Minami Torishima. The following day, the carriers under Admirals McCain and Davison carried out a feint attack on northern Luzon, sinking two more ships off Aparri. As the attack on the Ryukyus began, Admiral Toyoda was at Shinchiku in northern Formosa, returning to Tokyo after a command inspection in the Philippines intended to boost morale. Upon learning of the strikes, Toyoda believed that the American carriers in the northern Philippine Sea were vulnerable to his powerful land-based air forces. Over 1,800 aircraft were allocated for Sho in total, but they were widely dispersed across the four operation regions. About one third of them were not battle-ready due to casualties and a lack of parts or trained pilots. When the fighting began, Vice-Admiral Fukudome Shigeru (commander of the 2nd Air Fleet based in the Kyūshū-Okinawa-Formosa district) had approximately 700 planes ready in Formosa and Kyushu. 100 or so aircraft in the Seto Inland Sea was later added to his command. Over the next four days, an additional 690 or so planes flew in from bases in Japan and China. Toyoda saw this as a prime opportunity to deal a crippling blow to the enemy fleet and disrupt the Allied invasion timeline. Consequently, he decided to risk all available naval air power in a determined effort to destroy Mitscher's carrier forces, taking personal command of the battle operations in Formosa on October 10. As anticipated, Halsey planned to launch strong carrier-based strikes against Formosa on October 12 and 13. Mitscher's four task groups were assigned targets in southern, northern, and central Formosa, as well as the Takao area. Additionally, General LeMay's first two B-29 strikes of October were scheduled to support the attack, targeting the Okayama aircraft repair and assembly facility in Takao with 170 sorties. Originally set for October 11 and 14, these strikes were postponed to October 14 and 16 due to unfavorable weather forecasts. After a rapid overnight approach on October 11, Mitscher's carriers reached their positions off Formosa the next morning. All four task groups completed launch of predawn fighter sweeps by around 06:00 hours. Because the Japanese were on alert, Grumman F6F Hellcat fighters from all four groups were intercepted by enemy aircraft and moderate to intense anti-aircraft fire was universally reported. Air-to-air engagements were fiercest over northern and central Formosa, where aircraft from Rear Admiral Gerald F. Bogan's TG 38.2 and Rear Admiral Frederick C. Sherman's TG 38.3 operated. Sherman's USS Lexington and USS Essex claimed almost 50 enemy aircraft shot down between them. Bogan's task group contained three Essex-class carriers – USS Intrepid, USS Bunker Hill and USS Hancock. Intrepid and Bunker Hill claimed over 50 Japanese aircraft destroyed, making the combined claims for the two groups around 100. Many of Japan's more experienced pilots were killed during the first wave of American air raid. American carrier air groups had suffered minimal personnel losses with nine U.S. aircraft shot down with three pilots subsequently recovered by nearby ships or submarines. These lopsided results were in part due to a lack of experience among Japanese pilots. IJAAS fighters stationed to the north of the Philippines were still in training. The bulk of enemy fighter aircraft reported by U.S. aviators were Japanese Army types, primarily the Nakajima Ki-44 (Allied reporting name "Tojo"), Kawasaki Ki-61 ("Tony") and Nakajima Ki-43 ("Oscar") models. Even though there were some experienced Japanese naval aviators operating at this time, IJNAS Mitsubishi A6M Zero fighter units reconstituted after the Battle of the Philippine Sea were still learning to work together and did not execute the kind of section or division flying that yielded tactical advantage. By the third strike, the Hellcats had established air dominance over Formosa, with Admirals Bogan and Sherman each claiming over 50 Japanese aircraft destroyed at the cost of nine American planes shot down. This enabled the Americans to carry out four strikes during the day preceded by a fighter sweep. The Hellcats quickly gained air control over Formosa against the 230 Japanese fighters on the island. By the third strike of the day, the Americans faced no air opposition. A total of 1400 sorties were carried out on this day, sinking or damaging 24 vessels off the Pescadores and Takao.  This led Toyoda to order the activation of the air component of Operation Sho-Go at 10:30 on October 12. Although over 1,900 dispersed aircraft were assigned to Sho-Go, most did not arrive in the forward area for several days. Consequently, Vice-Admiral Fukudome Shigeru's 2nd Air Fleet began preparing up to 800 planes in southern Kyushu for an attack, supported by Admiral Ozawa's newly-reconstituted flying groups from the 3rd and 4th Carrier Divisions. Though the day's remaining carrier strikes by Hellcat fighters, Curtiss SB2C Helldiver dive bombers, and Grumman TBF Avenger torpedo bombers did significant damage to military installations on Formosa, they failed to completely neutralize Japanese air power based on the island. Lead aircraft on 14 October had made photos revealing Navy damage which included four buildings destroyed and nine damaged out of eighty at the assembly plant, and five hangars destroyed at the air base. Many surviving structures would be destroyed by B-29 raids during the later days of the battle, however.  The only Japanese attack that day involved about 45 torpedo bombers, which mistakenly reported two carriers as damaged. Meanwhile, the T Attack Force, a special unit for operations in adverse weather, conducted a strike within a sudden typhoon from 19:00 to 20:20 before landing on Formosan bases. Their efforts were largely ineffective as American ships used smoke screens and evasive maneuvers to avoid damage. Eight Japanese aircraft were shot down by ships' guns during the night, and three Mitsubishi G4M "Betty" bombers were claimed by night fighters from the USS Independence. USS Pritchett suffered damage from friendly fire, but no damage from enemy aircraft was incurred. On October 13, Mitscher's forces resumed strikes against Formosa and the Pescadores with up to 600 aircraft, encountering less opposition but achieving only minor damage due to poor weather. Despite this, Halsey reported the destruction of 520 Japanese aircraft, the sinking of 37 ships, and 74 probable sinkings over the two days. At dusk, the carriers came under attack from 32 planes of the T Attack Force. Despite Belleau Wood's combat air patrol shooting down 16 enemy aircraft, six G4M bombers managed to evade the interceptors and launched a series of determined attacks on Davison's carriers, releasing four torpedoes before all six were eventually downed by shipboard anti-aircraft guns. Fortunately, the torpedoes missed their targets. One torpedo ran just ahead of the USS Franklin, and another ran too deep and passed beneath the carrier. One of the Bettys attempted to crash into Franklin on its way down but glanced off the flight deck and slid over the starboard edge of the ship into the water. However, McCain's carriers faced more challenges as eight B6N2 bombers, evading radar by flying low, attacked the group. While six of the bombers were shot down by anti-aircraft fire, one successfully torpedoed the cruiser Canberra, killing 23 crew members and causing severe damage. The torpedo struck the cruiser in a vulnerable spot—under the main armor belt between both firerooms. The ship lost all power, laying just 90NM off Formosa. As a result, Halsey organized a unit to tow Canberra to safety, necessitating an additional day of protection for the damaged cruiser. On October 14, Mitscher launched early morning fighter sweeps to suppress enemy air power over Luzon and Formosa, while the newly-formed unit escorted Canberra. Japanese reports claimed two carriers were sunk and one was burning, leading Toyoda to believe the enemy retreating east had been severely damaged. Consequently, Fukudome ordered his full strength of 450 planes to launch from southern Kyushu, and Vice-Admiral Shima Kiyoshide's 2nd Striking Force was deployed to sweep the waters east of Formosa. However, before the Japanese could counterattack, 130 B-29s from Chengdu attacked Formosa in the afternoon, with 104 bombers successfully dropping about 650 tons of bombs on Okayama and 13 hitting secondary targets. A dozen planes made emergency landings at friendly fields in China, one crashed near Changteh whence its crew walked out, and one was listed as missing. This was a cheap price to pay for very severe damage done to Okayama installation. At 15:25, Fukudome's initial wave of 124 planes attacked Bogan's carriers. A formation of 25 Yokosuka D4Y "Judy" dive bombers, using cloud cover to evade detection, was intercepted by the group's combat air patrol. Only a few Japanese planes made it past the American fighters. The surviving bombers were able to put two bombs in the vicinity of the Hancock, and one hit the forward port side gun tube without detonating on impact. No serious damage was inflicted by this attack. At around 17:00 a large formation of enemies showed up on radar headed towards TG 38.3. As before, a great many of these were shot down by combat air patrol. The surviving enemy planes flew down to the water level to evade further radar detection. These planes – torpedo bombers and fighters – successfully ambushed the formation just minutes later. Evasive maneuvers, squall weather, and poor fighter cover on the part of the Japanese helped TG 38.3 escape without suffering any significant damage. The only bright spot for the Japanese was another twilight attack by the T Force by 52 aircraft against TG 38.1. Four Jills broke through to attack light cruiser Houston. Three were shot down, but the last succeeded in placing a torpedo in another vulnerable spot that flooded the engineering spaces and caused all power to be lost. As a result, Halsey was left needing to tow two cruisers to safety. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. By hook or by crook, General MacArthur bullied FDR into allowing an invasion of the Philippines. To soften up the new targets, strikes were unleashed against Luzon, Formosa and Okinawa. Despite a strong Japanese defense, American air superiority was achieved through aggressive carrier strikes, leading to the destruction of numerous Japanese aircraft and ships.

Last time we spoke about the invasion of Morotai. After capturing the Marianas and Sansapor, the Allies planned to invade the Palaus and Halmahera. The Japanese stationed the 14th Division at Palau and the 32nd Division at Halmahera. General Ishii, with 11,000 troops, defended Halmahera's nine airfields, while Major Kawashima led 500 Formosans on Morotai. Meanwhile Colonel Nakagawa commanded the forces at Peleliu with extensive defenses, emphasizing attrition tactics. The Allies planned Operation Stalemate for Peleliu and Angaur, with General Geiger's corps set to land on September 15. Aerial reconnaissance and submarine missions informed their strategy. At Morotai, Operation Tradewind was executed by General Krueger's 31st Division. Supported by air and naval bombardment, Allied troops swiftly secured key areas, encountering minimal Japanese resistance. These operations were part of broader Allied strategies involving coordinated air support and subsequent invasions in the region. This episode is the Invasion of the Palau Islands Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  In last weeks episode we talked about the plans and preparations for the invasion of Palau. General Rupertus' 1st Marine Division was assigned to assault Peleliu while General Mueller's 81st Division would conduct a dual-pronged landing on Angaur. Meanwhile, Admiral Hoover's land-based aircraft, General Kenney's Allied Air Forces, and Admiral Mitscher's carrier-based aircraft carried out an extensive neutralization program against Japanese airfields within range of Palau. When fighter planes of three fast carrier groups started sweeping over the Palaus on September 6, they found that the efforts of the Southwest Pacific's land-based bombers had succeeded in eliminating many ground targets. Nevertheless, fighters and bombers of the three groups started full-scale attacks on all the principal islands in the Palaus the next day. There was no air opposition, nor had there been any on the 6th. On the 8th, because observable targets were scarce, the weight of attack was reduced, and the carriers began preparing to move to Philippine waters. During their three days at the Palaus, the carrier-based planes flew about 1470 sorties, causing extensive damage to ammunition and supply dumps, barracks, warehouses, and a number of miscellaneous buildings. The groups claimed destruction of only four enemy aircraft, while losing eight of their own. Admiral Fort's slower-moving tractor groups, responsible for transporting both divisions to the islands, departed Guadalcanal with their respective screening forces on the morning of September 4. Four days later, fast transports and LSDs also set out to rendezvous with them in the early hours of September 15 after an uneventful voyage. In the interim, Admiral Davison's carrier group launched a final sweep over the Palaus on September 10. The next day, Rear Admiral Jesse Oldendorf's Western Fire Support Group and Rear Admiral Ralph Ofstie's escort carriers arrived to begin the naval gunfire bombardment. Over the following three days, approximately 2,200 tons of naval projectiles were successfully fired on Peleliu. While Japanese positions pinpointed by the fire support ships were generally destroyed, many hidden by natural or man-made camouflage remained intact, as did those in areas not accessible to naval gunfire. Minesweepers cleared the 670 mines laid by the Japanese in the Peleliu-Angaur region and at least 240 more in the Kossol Passage. Nearly 175 mines were destroyed in the four days leading up to the landings, with the remaining mines marked at the cost of one minesweeper. Underwater demolition teams also began clearing obstacles from the landing beaches on September 12, providing the Japanese with clues about the Allied landing plans, leading them to hastily lay many land mines in the last few days. By 05:15 on September 15, Fort's transports had finally gathered off the Palaus and taken their assigned positions in the transport areas, ready for the landings to begin. Under clear skies, the small craft and amphibian vehicles of the assault waves formed up without difficulty and moved toward the reefs in front of Peleliu's White and Orange Beaches. At 05:30, Oldendorf's cruisers and destroyers started the pre-landing bombardment of the beaches, which was scheduled to cease at 07:50 to allow the carriers to conduct a final sweep. Ten minutes later, the first assault wave began advancing, supported by an LCI rocket barrage and aerial strafing attacks. However, the pre-landing bombardment had been inefficient, leaving many Japanese positions intact. Artillery and mortar fire quickly targeted the American amtracs, with several LVTs taking direct hits. Approximately 26 were destroyed during the landings, their burning hulks cluttering the beaches. Despite the smoke from Japanese fire and burning amtracs, the first wave reached the shore at 08:32. Colonel Chesty Puller's 1st Marines landed on the left, Colonel Harold Harris' 5th Marines in the center, and Colonel Herman Hanneken's 7th Marines on the right. For those of you interested, a rather famous marine was with Harris's 5th marines this day. Serving with K Company, 3rd battalion, 5th Marines was Eugene Sledge, the author of “with the Old Breed” probably the most famous Pacific War book of all time. If you are a fan of the HBO series: the Pacific, it was based loosely off this book amongst others. I think overall with the Old Breed does an outstanding job, particularly for when it was written, to showcase the brutal reality of the war in the Pacific. Eugene Sledge did not sugar coat things or gloss over terrible things he saw his fellow marines do, such as ripping out gold teeth from dead or even alive Japanese as well as taking human trophies like skulls or hands. Here is a passage: We learned that our battalion would leave Peleliu as soon as a ship was available to transport us back to Pavuvu. By day we rested and swapped souvenirs, but we had to be on the alert at night for possible Japanese movement. To the south we could hear the constant rattle of machine guns and the thud of mortars and artillery as the 81st Infantry Division kept up the pressure around the Umurbrogol Pocket. “Have you gone Asiatic?” I gasped. “You know you can't keep that thing. Some officer'll put you on report sure as hell,” I remonstrated as I stared in horror at the shriveled human hand he had unwrapped. “Aw, Sledgehammer, nobody'll say anything. I've got to dry it in the sun a little more so it won't stink,” he said as he carefully laid it out on the rock in the hot sun. He explained that he thought a dried Japanese hand would be a more interesting souvenir than gold teeth. So when he found a corpse that was drying in the sun and not rotting, he simply took out his kabar and severed the hand from the corpse, and here it was, and what did I think? “I think you're nuts,” I said. “You know the CO will raise hell if he sees that.” “Hell no, Sledgehammer, nobody says anything about the guys collecting gold teeth, do they?” he argued. “Maybe so,” I said, “but it's just the idea of a human hand. Bury it.” He looked grimly at me, which was totally out of character for his amiable good nature. “How many Marines you reckon that hand pulled the trigger on?” he asked in an icy voice. I stared at the blackened, shriveled hand and wondered about what he said. I thought how I valued my own hands and what a miracle to do good or evil the human hand is. Although I didn't collect gold teeth, I had gotten used to the idea, but somehow a hand seemed to be going too far. The war had gotten to my friend; he had lost (briefly, I hoped) all his sensitivity. He was a twentiethcentury savage now, mild mannered though he still was. I shuddered to think that I might do the same thing if the war went on and on Its a gripping read, highly recommend it, especially for quote en quote normie friends you might want to get into the Pacific War. Back to the story.Rupertus' objectives for the first day were to push inland 300 yards to objective line O-1, then attack and capture O-2. Landing simultaneously with the fourth wave were the division's tanks (M-4 Shermans). Because of their excellent waterproofing for the operation, they successfully negotiated the reef, where the worst of the underwater obstacles had been removed by UDTs, and continued toward land in six parallel columns led by their respective LVT guides. The enemy fire, however, proved so intense that over half of 30 tanks organic to the division suffered from one to four hits during the 10 minutes necessary to cross the reef. In the 1st Marines' zone, for example, only one of the assigned tanks escaped being hit during the trip ashore. only three, however, were completely knocked out of action. "Thus within a half hour after the initial landing the infantry had full tank support--a record unsurpassed in any previous Marine landing in the Central Pacific, except for the Marshalls." To make matters worse, no sooner had the lead elements of 3/1 landed and advanced less than 100 yards inland, than they found themselves confronted by a most formidable natural obstacle, a rugged coral ridge, some 30ft high. This had not shown up on any maps. Worse, the face of this ridge (christened "The Point" by the Marines) was honeycombed with caves and firing positions which the Japanese had blasted into the coral and had turned into excellent defensive positions which resisted all initial assaults. Even after tanks arrived to support the assault troops attempting to storm the northern portion of the ridge, they stumbled into a wide, deep anti-tank ditch, dominated by the ridge itself. Here they came under severe and accurate enfilading fire and were pinned down for hours. The loss of much communication equipment further left Puller and Rupertus unaware of the situation on the left flank. A major effort was then launched to assault The Point from the rear.  It became apparent to the Marines that The Point was unassailable from the front and so eventually units fought inland and assaulted The Point from the rear. These units, commanded by Capt George P. Hunt, fought their way along The Point for nearly two hours, during which time they succeeded in neutralizing all of the enemy infantry protecting the major defensive blockhouses and pill boxes. The principal defense installation was a reinforced concrete casement built into the coral, mounting a 25mm automatic cannon, which had been raking the assault beaches all morning. This blockhouse was taken from above by Lieutenant William L. Willis, who dropped a smoke grenade outside the blockhouse's embrasure, to cover the approach of his men, and Corporal Anderson who launched a rifle grenade through the firing aperture. This disabled the gun and ignited the ammunition inside the blockhouse. After a huge explosion, the fleeing Japanese defenders were mown down by waiting Marine riflemen. Hunt's surviving 32 men remained isolated on The Point for the next 30 hours, constantly under attack from Japanese infiltrators. Meanwhile, Puller's 2nd Battalion pushed inland about 350 yards against moderate resistance. Despite this success, the 1st Marines' front was divided by two huge gaps. Puller's 1st Battalion was then committed to support the Marines on the left, successfully gaining a foothold on the southern area of The Point, but still unable to close the critical gaps. In the center, Harris' 1st Battalion advanced through coconut groves that provided ample cover, successfully reaching O-1 to link up with Puller's 2nd Battalion in front of the airfield by 09:30. On the right, however, Harris' 3rd Battalion and Hanneken's 3rd Battalion experienced a confused landing and made no progress, with only Harris' Company I reaching O-1 an hour after landing. At 10:30, the two battalions began pushing inland. Harris' Company K rapidly advanced deep into Peleliu's interior under the cover of fairly dense scrub, while the 7th Marines used a large anti-tank ditch to move forward in relative safety. Again I thought it give more flavor if I took a passage from this moment when K Company advanced from Sledge:  We started to move inland. We had gone only a few yards when an enemy machine gun opened up from a scrub thicket to our right. Japanese 81mm and 90mm mortars then opened up on us. Everyone hit the deck; I dove into a shallow crater. The company was completely pinned down. All movement ceased. The shells fell faster, until I couldn't make out individual explosions, just continuous, crashing rumbles with an occasional ripping sound of shrapnel tearing low through the air overhead amid the roar. The air was murky with smoke and dust. Every muscle in my body was as tight as a piano wire. I shuddered and shook as though I were having a mild convulsion. Sweat flowed profusely. I prayed, clenched my teeth, squeezed my carbine stock, and cursed the Japanese. Our lieutenant, a Cape Gloucester veteran who was nearby, seemed to be in about the same shape. From the meager protection of my shallow crater I pitied him, or anyone, out on that flat coral Hanneken soon faced strong opposition, leading him to pause his troops and request tank support in the afternoon. The requested tank support became somewhat confused by an unexpected coincidence: the flank battalions of the two assaulting regiments in the center and right were both the 3rd (3/5 and 3/7) with both containing Companies I, K, and L. The unfortunate tank commanders looking for 3/7 who had wandered into 3/5 area due to obstacles - in particular the large anti-tank ditch on Orange 3 - enquired of a body of troops they encountered "is this Company I, 3rd Battalion?" Hearing the right answer in the wrong place, they proceeded to operate with these troops, who were in fact Company I of 3/5 and not Company I of 3/7. Happily, this was one of those confusions of battle that helped more than it hindered. The confusion resulted in a gap between the two regiments as 3/7 paused to take stock of the situation, whereas 3/5 was actually pushing ahead. In an effort to re-establish contact with 3/5, Company L of the 7th Marines worked patrols further and further to the left until its foremost patrol emerged on the southern edge of the airfield. This was completely out of its regimental zone of action and several hundred yards to the rear of the units it was looking for. By this time, Harris' 2nd Battalion and Hanneken's 1st Battalion had landed, with Harris' battalion pushing vigorously northeast, while Hanneken's battalion dealt with fierce Japanese resistance and a dense swamp to the south as they advanced toward O-1. Concerned about the slow progress on the right and the heavy casualties suffered by Hanneken's forces, Rupertus decided to land the divisional reconnaissance company. However, the reserve 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines could not be disembarked until the next day.  One major Japanese counterattack occurred at around 16:50hrs on D-Day, consisting of a tank-infantry sortie in force across the northern portion of the airfield. This attack had been expected by the Marines, especially those of the 5th Marines facing open ground in front of the airfield, and accordingly the regimental commanders had brought up artillery and heavy machine guns as well as tanks to support that area. Increase in Japanese artillery and mortar fire in that area was the first indication that something was brewing. Soon after Japanese infantry was observed advancing across the airfield, not as a fanatical, drunken banzai charge but as a coolly disciplined advance of veteran infantrymen. A Navy air observer spotted Japanese tanks forming east of the ridges above the airfield with more infantry riding on them. These tanks moved forward, passing through the Japanese infantry advancing across the airfield and some 400 yards in front of the Marine lines. For a moment, but only for a moment, the Japanese counter-attack looked like a serious coordinated movement. Then the formation went to pieces. Inexplicably, the Japanese tank drivers opened their throttles wide and raced towards the Marine lines. Charging like the proverbial "Bats outa Hell," with the few infantry atop the tanks clinging on for dear life, they left their accompanying infantry foot support supp far behind. No positive account exists of what happened thereafter. The tanks involved in the charge numbered between 13 and 17 (insufficient pieces were left afterwards to give a definite count) and headed for the Marine lines, cutting diagonally across the front of 2/1, who subjected them to murderous flanking fire from all weapons, small arms, light and heavy machine guns, 37mm antitank guns and artillery. Two of the Japanese tanks veered off into the lines of 2/1, hurtling over a coral embankment and crashing into a swamp, the escaping crews were quickly disposed of by the Marines. Meantime, the remaining tanks came under heavy fire from the marines of 1/5, while the advancing Japanese infantry was subjected to fire and bombing from a passing Navy dive bomber. The tanks and their riding infantry were decimated as they passed right through the Marine lines which simply closed behind them. At 17:00, a heavy mortar barrage struck Harris' 3rd Battalion's command post, causing the Marine companies to lose cohesion, though they eventually formed a defensive line along the airfield's edge. Under this barrage Eugene Sledge had this to say: Under my first barrage since the fast-moving events of hitting the beach, I learned a new sensation: utter and absolute helplessness. The shelling lifted in about half an hour, although it seemed to me to have crashed on for hours. Time had no meaning to me. (This was particularly true when under a heavy shelling. I never could judge how long it lasted.) Orders then came to move out and I got up, covered by a layer of coral dust. I felt like jelly and couldn't believe any of us had survived that barrage. By the end of the day, despite 210 men killed and 901 wounded, the progress of the beach expansion was disappointing. Again Eugene Sledge has a passage about getting through the first heat of combat on D-day at Peleliu: We had to be alert constantly as we moved through the thick sniper-infested scrub. We received orders to halt in an open area as I came upon the first enemy dead I had ever seen, a dead Japanese medical corpsman and two riflemen. The medic apparently had been trying to administer aid when he was killed by one of our shells. His medical chest lay open beside him, and the various bandages and medicines were arranged neatly in compartments. The corpsman was on his back, his abdominal cavity laid bare. I stared in horror, shocked at the glistening viscera bespecked with fine coral dust. This can't have been a human being, I agonized. It looked more like the guts of one of the many rabbits or squirrels I had cleaned on hunting trips as a boy. I felt sick as I stared at the corpses. A sweating, dusty Company K veteran came up, looked first at the dead, and then at me. He slung his M1 rifle over his shoulder and leaned over the bodies. With the thumb and forefinger of one hand, he deftly plucked a pair of hornrimmed glasses from the face of the corpsman. This was done as casually as a guest plucking an hors d'oeuvre from a tray at a cocktail party. “Sledgehammer,” he said reproachfully, “don't stand there with your mouth open when there's all these good souvenirs laying around.” He held the glasses for me to see and added, “Look how thick that glass is. These sonsabitches must be half blind, but it don't seem to mess up their marksmanship any.” He then removed a Nambu pistol, slipped the belt off the corpse, and took the leather holster. He pulled off the steel helmet, reached inside, and took out a neatly folded Japanese flag covered with writing. The veteran pitched the helmet on the coral where it clanked and rattled, rolled the corpse over, and started pawing through the combat pack. The veteran's buddy came up and started stripping the other Japanese corpses. His take was a flag and other items. He then removed the bolts from the Japanese rifles and broke the stocks against the coral to render them useless to infiltrators. The first veteran said, “See you, Sledgehammer. Don't take any wooden nickels.” He and his buddy moved on. I hadn't budged an inch or said a word, just stood glued to the spot almost in a trance. The corpses were sprawled where the veterans had dragged them around to get into their packs and pockets. Would I become this casual and calloused about enemy dead? I wondered. Would the war dehumanize me so that I, too, could “field strip” enemy dead with such nonchalance? The time soon came when it didn't bother me a bit. During the night, coordinated local counterattacks were repelled with relative ease, thanks to the support from naval gunfire and the artillery of the 11th Marines. However, the enemy's resistance, which was not the frenzied banzai charges of previous encounters, began to suggest that the prolonged and organized opposition Rupertus had anticipated might indeed persist for a longer time. Meanwhile, with the 3rd Battalion, 15th Regiment cut off to the south, Nakagawa chose to withdraw most of his forces to the ridgelines and high ground north of the airfield, aiming to hold out as long as possible. The 1st Marine Division, enduring a night of harassment from Japanese mortar and artillery fire, faced heavy resistance from these ridgeline defenses on September 16. Despite this, after landing on Peleliu at 09:50, Rupertus made significant progress that day. His only adjustment was to order the reserve 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines to support Puller's beleaguered 1st Marines to "maintain momentum." On the right flank, the 7th Marines pressed their hold on the southern part of the island despite heavy resistance and thick scrub, capturing all but two small promontories at the southern tip, where isolated defenders established their final positions. In the center, the 5th Marines cleared most of the remaining airfield area and set up defenses at night in a hangar and shop area on the field's north side, while Puller's 2nd Battalion secured the northwestern section of the airfield, including several headquarters buildings and barracks. On the left flank, the 1st Marines struggled to advance against the determined and well-coordinated resistance from Nakagawa's main defenses, which were concentrated around the Umurbrogol Mountains. Only after intense fighting and with the help of tanks did the Marines manage to capture a 500-yard stretch of the ridge. By nightfall, at the cost of approximately 30 additional men killed and 115 wounded, the division had established a perimeter extending over 3,000 yards from north to south, and about 2,000 yards deep at its farthest point. Over the course of two days, the Americans suffered nearly 1,500 casualties, with more than 1,000 from Puller's 1st Marines alone. Despite these losses, the crucial objective—the Peleliu airfield area—had been secured. The Japanese defenses had been divided, with two small pockets in the south and the main stronghold in the central ridges. Feeling that operations were progressing well and possibly aiming to keep Peleliu an all-Marine endeavor, Rupertus decided not to request reinforcements from the 81st Division. Consequently, General Mueller's forces were set to proceed with landings on Angaur the next day. Rear-Admiral William Blandy, commanding the Angaur Attack Group, reported that based on air and naval bombardments, hydrographic surveys, and UDT activities, a successful landing on Angaur appeared achievable. Admiral Fort and General Geiger thus approved the decision. Meanwhile, Major Goto Ushio had stationed his 1,400 men from the reinforced 1st Battalion, 59th Regiment in four defensive sectors with a small reserve in the center. Expecting the Americans to land on the well-prepared Green Beaches to the southeast, he had fortified that area with his strongest coastal defenses. However, the Americans anticipated this and chose instead to land Colonel Benjamin Venable's 322nd Regiment on Red Beach to the north and Colonel Robert Dark's 321st Regiment on Blue Beach to the east. In the early hours of September 17, Blandy positioned his forces off Angaur and at 0530 the Angaur Fire Support Group started its bombardment, employing for the most part slow, methodical area fire rather than shooting at specific targets. The fire was characterized by the 81st Division as being "very satisfactory," and it accounted for about 40 percent of all naval shells thrown at Angaur from 12 through 17 September.  Due to a delay in the arrival of support aircraft, the shore bombardment continued past the scheduled time while General Mueller's assault troops boarded the landing craft and amphibian vehicles meant to take them ashore. By 08:00, the LVT assault waves began positioning themselves at the line of departure, while the 323rd Regiment executed a feint at Green Beach to distract the Japanese from the actual landing sites. Ten minutes later, the assault waves moved toward the shore, supported by LCI rocket fire, ongoing bombardments, and strafing planes that had also arrived late. Despite encountering only light mortar and small-arms fire, Dark's forces successfully landed on Blue Beach at 08:31, just one minute behind schedule. Venable's first wave, however, was delayed and arrived at Red Beach six minutes late. Subsequent waves landed throughout the day amid light resistance but faced challenges such as traffic congestion and limited beach space. By 16:45, all tanks of the 710th Tank Battalion were ashore, and the 316th and 906th Field Artillery Battalions had successfully landed at Red Beach by nightfall. The artillery for Blue Beach was landed the following day. Additionally, Venable's reserve 2nd Battalion landed by 11:30, and Dark's reserve 1st Battalion arrived by 13:00. After landing, Mueller's green regiments began advancing inland about 300 yards to their first phase line, quickly becoming entangled in dense scrub forests teeming with Japanese machine guns and snipers. On Blue Beach, Dark's troops proceeded cautiously at first, but by noon they had secured Rocky Point, Cape Ngariois, and established a beachhead approximately 1200 yards long and 350 yards deep. Meanwhile, Venable's 1st Battalion moved swiftly north and inland through less dense undergrowth to secure its designated beachhead area. The 3rd Battalion bypassed some enemy bunkers set in jagged coral and proceeded south and west, successfully linking up with the 1st Battalion but falling short of reaching Cape Ngatpokul. With two secure beachheads and a 700-yard gap along the first phase line between regiments, Mueller ordered the 322nd Regiment to extend its right flank onto the second phase line about 400 yards inland and to continue pushing south with its left flank towards the sister regiment. By 14:30, the advances resumed, with Venable's 1st Battalion pushing westward against light resistance into increasingly rough terrain along the coast and into a densely overgrown basin near the north end of Lake Aztec. Meanwhile, the 3rd Battalion engaged in patrol actions against isolated Japanese positions to secure the coastal area between the two landing beaches, though little progress was made. Dark's forces also struggled, hindered by difficult terrain and mounting Japanese resistance. Ignoring the gap between regiments, Mueller ordered Venable's 3rd Battalion to advance to the second phase line. The battalion moved along railroad beds without encountering opposition, reaching the objective by nightfall. Simultaneously, Dark attempted to advance to the second phase line but made little progress before having to dig in. Goto, on the other hand, chose not to launch an immediate mass counterattack, believing that the 81st Division might land at other beaches. Instead, he deployed a company-strength mobile reserve for a counterattack, but this effort was disrupted by air and naval gunfire before it could commence. By late afternoon, realizing that the Americans had firmly established themselves ashore, Goto began moving his units and withdrew the southern defense force to the northwest hills for a final stand. To cover this movement, he ordered a night counterattack by two companies. At 05:50 on September 18, enemy infantry emerged from cover below Rocky Point and attacked Dark's Company B, pushing the Americans back about 75 yards before being halted by a heavy concentration of fire. Meanwhile, small groups of Japanese forces repeatedly assaulted the defensive line south of Lake Aztec, near the boundary between the 1st and 3rd Battalions. Despite their efforts, they failed to exploit the gap between regiments and withdrew to the northwest hills shortly after dawn. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Thus the Marines were yet again storming new islands that would see them experience some of the worst horrors of WW2. A young enlisted man, Eugene Sledge would get his first experience of combat on Peleliu, and from there would begin to write a book that would captivate the minds of many in America, post WW2.

Last time we spoke about the end of Operation Dan. In Yunnan, by late July, General Wei's Y Force worked to eliminate Japanese garrisons at Tengchong, Mount Song, Pingda, and Longling. The 33rd Army prepared for Operation Dan, anticipating resistance from General Honda's garrisons until September. The fall of Myitkyina prompted Honda to expedite his plans. Reinforcements were expected in Mandalay by September. General Matsuyama's forces, cut off and surrounded, provided support only through radio messages. At Tengchong, Colonel Kurashige vowed to defend against relentless attacks. Chinese forces, after intense fighting and bombing raids, breached the city's defenses. Despite heavy casualties, the Japanese resisted fiercely. Major Kanemitsu's garrison defended Moung Song with dwindling supplies. The Chinese forces employed siege tactics and underground mines to break Japanese strongholds. The Chinese launched coordinated attacks, capturing key positions and ultimately compelling Japanese retreats.  This episode is the Invasion of Morotai Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  After the Marianas fell and Sansapor was captured, the Allies set their sights on their next objectives: the Palaus and Halmahera, slated for simultaneous invasion by mid-September. The Japanese had stationed the 14th Division at Palau and the 32nd Division at Halmahera as their primary defenses. The Halmahera-Morotai area had not assumed much importance to the Japanese until early 1944, when they began to develop Halmahera as a focal point for the defense of the southern approaches to the Philippines. In addition to the 32d Division, the Japanese had on Halmahera innumerable service organizations, and they completed or had under construction nine airfields on the island, most of them in northern Halmahera. On that island they concentrated nearly 30,000 men, including at least 11,000 combat troops.  On Halmahera, General Ishii commanded approximately 11,000 troops to safeguard nine airfields, despite having already lost most of their air power. Meanwhile, Morotai Island was defended by around 500 Formosans of the 2nd Raiding Unit, led by Major Kawashima Takenobu. General Ishii planned to counterattack from Halmahera if the Allies landed on Morotai, but soon realized Allied air and naval superiority would foil these efforts. Following their defeat in the Marianas, Tokyo reassigned the Bonin Area Group directly under its command and placed the Palau Area Group under the Southern Army, leaving General Mugikura's 31st Army to defend Truk and other isolated outposts. General Inoue fortified Palau with elaborate defenses along the coast and inland, manned by 21,000 Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) troops, 7,000 Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) personnel, and 10,000 laborers.  The IJN had by 1944 constructed numerous reinforced concrete blockhouses and bunkers plus dug an extensive tunnel system near the end of the northeast peninsula as well as taking full advantage of Peleliu's natural caves. This elaborate, multi-level tunnel system could shelter 1000 troops. These defenses, tunnels, the airfield, and the many support facilities were built by the 204th, 214th, and 235th Construction Battalions, mostly manned by Koreans and Okinawans. Detachments of the guard forces manned eight 120mm dual-purpose, and about three 200mm coast defense guns. There was no ammunition for the 200mm short guns nor did any ships report being fired on by coast defense guns. The 114th and 126th Anti-aircraft Units manned single and twin-barreled 25mm automatic guns (estimated at 30) and 13.2mm machine guns. A dozen 20mm cannons, removed from destroyed aircraft, were set up on makeshift mounts, mostly around the airfield. His strategy emphasized prolonged attrition over suicidal charges, aiming to exhaust the American forces. In preparation for the intense pre-landing bombardment, Inoue instructed his troops to utilize natural terrain features like coral caves and sinkholes, tactics that proved effective against the advancing Allies.Based in Koror, the Japanese commander stationed Colonel Nakagawa Kunio's 2nd Regiment on Peleliu, the reinforced 1st Battalion of the 59th Regiment on Angaur, and deployed the 15th and 59th Regiments across Babelthuap and other islands. Major-General Yamaguchi Takeo's 53rd Independent Mixed Brigade defended the central islands, complemented by 4,000 personnel from the Imperial Japanese Navy on Peleliu.  Prior to General Inoue's arrival in the Palaus, the defense of the Palaus had been under the command of Vice-Admiral Ito Yoshioka. Upon his arrival on Koror, where he established his headquarters, Inoue appointed Colonel Nakagawa Kunio as Peleliu's new commander, with his 2nd Regiment (Reinforced). Nakagawa was a most able commander, possibly one of Japan's finest defensive tacticians, in the same league as General Kuribayashi on Iwo Jima. Nakagawa would make full use of all his defenses and troops on Peleliu, making the Americans pay dearly for every inch, as he had been ordered to do. Although a very capable commander, the appointment of an Army colonel over a Navy vice-admiral caused a great rift between the Army and Navy on Peleliu, which deteriorated into farce. To resolve matters and calm the Navy down somewhat, Inoue sent Major-General Murai Kenjiro from his headquarters on Koror Island to Peleliu to provide the Army with sufficient rank to satisfy the vice-admiral's honor, although the defense of Peleliu seems, to practical purposes, to have remained in the hands of Nakagawa. It appears that Murai, after inspecting Nakagawa's defensive works and battle plans for the defense of Peleliu, was content to let Nakagawa continue without interference from himself, lending only the weight of his rank to acquire the required cooperation of the Navy elements on Peleliu. Nakagawa, divided the island into four defense sectors, each manned by an infantry battalion. His 1st Battalion, alongside the 14th Division Tank Unit and Engineer Company, served as a mobile reserve for counterattacks against potential landings. Meanwhile, Admirals Nimitz and Halsey had been planning Operation Stalemate, targeting Palau since May 29. Originally slated for September 8, General Geiger's 3rd Amphibious Corps would assault Peleliu and Angaur, with General Hodge's 24th Corps landing on Babelthuap.  Intelligence was gathered by aerial reconnaissance photographs. Also, in June 1944 the submarine USS Seawolf (SS-197) carried out photographic reconnaissance of the invasion landing beaches. A further reconnaissance was carried out by the submarine USS Burrfish (SS-312) on Peleliu and Yap beaches. An 11-man reconnaissance group of underwater demolition team (UDT) frogmen landed on the Peleliu beaches from the Burrfish for closer investigation relating to water depth, location of potholes and sandbars, and obstacles. With thousands of Japanese on the island they understandably did not reconnoiter inland, and the rugged terrain of the interior would come as an unpleasant surprise to the Marines. A similar operation was carried out on the Yap invasion beaches, but this time only two of a five-man reconnaissance team made it back to the pick-up point. After several unsuccessful attempts to locate their missing comrades the remaining two men returned to the Burrfish. After this incident, Admiral Nimitz banned any further missions of this type. Given delays in the Guam operation, Operation Stalemate was canceled on July 7, replaced by Stalemate II.  An unusual staff arrangement was established to plan Stalemate II. IIIAC was committed to take Guam under General Geiger. The IIIAC staff would thus be unable to plan the Palaus operation, which it was to execute. Consequently, Major General Julian Smith, designated to command the Expeditionary Troops, was tasked to plan the operation using his own small staff augmented by some IIIAC staff officers. This temporary planning staff was designated X-Ray Provisional Amphibious Corps. It would plan the operation and IIIAC would execute it – an awkward arrangement, but necessary in order to maintain the increasing tempo of operations. As Commander, Expeditionary Troops, Smith was also to be in control of all ground action in the western Carolines; a position roughly analogous to that of General Krueger of ALAMO Force in the Southwest Pacific. X-Ray was finally dissolved on August 15, 1944. This revised plan scheduled Geiger's forces to land on Peleliu with the 1st Marine Division and on Angaur with the 81st Division on September 15, while the 77th Division remained in floating reserve and the 5th Marine Division in area reserve. Then, on October 8th, the 24th Corps planned to launch an assault on the islands of Yap and Ulithi in the western Carolines. This was aimed at securing an additional airfield and fully neutralizing Truk and the remaining islands in the group. For this operation, Halsey divided his 3rd Fleet into two main echelons: his Task Force 30, which included covering forces such as Admiral Mitscher's Fast Carrier Task Force (now Task Force 38), and Admiral Wilkinson's Task Force 31, the Joint Expeditionary Force. At Peleliu, General Rupertus' 1st Marine Division was to land with five battalions advancing over the White and Orange Beaches on the southwest coast. The 1st Marines were to land on the left, pushing up the western shore to clear Japanese forces from ridges overlooking the airfield; the 5th Marines would land in the center to secure the airfield; and the 7th Marines on the right to capture the southern end of the island. Meanwhile, at Angaur, Major-General Paul Mueller's 81st Division planned a two-pronged amphibious assault. The 322nd Regiment was to land on Red Beach on the northeast coast, while the 321st Regiment would land on Blue Beach about 2000 yards to the southeast. Both forces would then push inland to secure a first phase line approximately 300 yards from the beaches, before continuing their advance west and south. The reserve 323rd Regiment was tasked with a feint landing at Beach Black on the northwest coast, with potential deployment to Ulithi if the Palau operations proved successful. Meanwhile, General MacArthur aimed to establish an airbase in the Halmahera area, strategically positioned between the Vogelkop and Mindanao. This location would provide crucial flank protection against Japanese forces in the Dutch East Indies and support land-based operations for the upcoming invasion of Mindanao. Optimistically, in mid-June, MacArthur had tentatively scheduled the invasion of Mindanao for October 25. Nimitz, however, believed that MacArthur's hope of reaching Mindanao by October 25 was too optimistic. During conferences at Pearl Harbor in July, called at the suggestion of Nimitz to coordinate Southwest and Central Pacific plans for the Morotai, Palau, and Mindanao operations, Southwest Pacific planners learned that less amphibious craft and assault shipping could be made available to them than had previously been anticipated. Moreover, restudy of range and weather factors made it appear somewhat risky to depend upon the ability of Morotai-based aircraft to provide air support for Southwest Pacific forces on Mindanao after carriers had to leave the latter area and before airdromes could be developed there. To obtain adequate land-based air support for the Mindanao invasion force, MacArthur returned to discarded plans to seize air-base sites on the Talaud Islands, about equidistant from Morotai and Sarangani Bay, Mindanao, where the first landings in the Philippines were then scheduled to take place. The employment of amphibious means for the Talaud operation would delay preparations for Mindanao, as would the development of airdromes on the Talauds. Finally, to have the invasion of Mindanao take place much before the middle of November would involve a conflict in timing with anticipated employment of assault shipping and carrier support by Admiral Nimitz for the occupation of Yap and Ulithi in the western Carolines, an operation scheduled for the first week in October. MacArthur therefore revised his program to call for the invasion of Morotai on September 15, the Talauds on October 15, and Mindanao on November 15. As Allied carriers were engaged in the Palau operation, MacArthur needed a target within range of fighters and medium bombers stationed at Sansapor. Thus, Morotai Island was chosen for Operation Tradewind due to its perceived light defenses and ample space for airfield and light naval base facilities. General Krueger selected the 31st Division and the 126th Regiment, totaling approximately 28,000 troops under the overall command of General Hall's 11th Corps, for this operation. Admiral Barbey's Task Force 77, comprising 12 destroyers, 2 APAs, 5 APDs, 1 LSD, 39 LCIs, 12 LSTs, and 12 LCTs, along with a covering force led by Admiral Berkey and an escort carrier force under Rear-Admiral Thomas Sprague, facilitated the amphibious movement. Additionally, Vice-Admiral John McCain's fast carrier group provided support. Anticipating minimal resistance, the landings were planned near prospective airfield sites on the Doroeba Plain in southwest Morotai. General Hall's strategy involved the 155th and 167th Regiments landing on Red Beach on the southwestern coast to swiftly capture the abandoned Pitoe Drome and secure the new Pitoe Airfield site. Meanwhile, the 124th Regiment landed at White Beach, about 1500 yards to the south, to secure the Gila Peninsula and the Wama Airfield site. The reserve 126th Regiment was scheduled to land the following day, with its 1st Battalion initially supporting the 124th Regiment's operations at the beachhead. Both the Palau and Morotai operations were supported by a coordinated strategic air support program. Admiral Hoover's land-based aircraft were tasked with neutralizing Japanese airfields at various islands including Yap, Woleai, Truk, Ponape, Pagan, Bonin, and Marcus Islands. Concurrently, General Kenney's Allied Air Forces reinforced these efforts and targeted enemy air centers in Palau, Mindanao, western Dutch New Guinea, Halmahera, the Talaud Islands, the Moluccas, the Celebes, and the Arafura Sea islands. Additionally, Mitscher's fast carriers embarked on an ambitious campaign, launching strikes from the Bonin and Volcano Islands to the Palaus and Mindanao between late August and the start of the invasions.  This strike had a twofold objective: the temporary neutralization of Japanese airfields on those island groups and, more important, the creation of a diversion on the north preceding stronger attacks against targets in the Philippines and western Carolines. Carrier action in the latter area was to begin on 6 September, with strikes on the Palaus, Yap, and Ulithi. The bulk of the carrier forces was to leave the western Carolines on the afternoon of the 8th to take up positions off Mindanao. Japanese airfields on Mindanao presented difficult targets because they were scattered over that large island, but it was believed that the cluster of airfields and associated installations in the Davao area would provide profitable targets for carrier-based aircraft attacks. The Davao and Sarangani Bay areas, as well as Japanese shipping routes from Davao to Zamboanga and thence north toward Manila, were also expected to provide profitable targets. Strikes against airdromes and shipping in the Mindanao area were to be carried out on 9 and 10 September, while on the 10th and 11th part of the carrier force was to hit the Palaus and Yap-Ulithi again. Rear-Admiral Ralph Davison's carrier-launched aircraft struck Chichi Jima and Iwo Jima from August 31 to September 2. The Fast Carrier Task Force continued with strikes on Yap and the Palaus from September 6 to 8, and on Mindanao from September 9 to 10. Enemy air resistance was surprisingly weak throughout these operations, prompting Halsey to redirect plans for a follow-up attack on Mindanao to the Central Philippines. While the Japanese forces in the Philippines hastened to complete preparations against anticipated Allied invasion, enemy carrier-borne aircraft served sudden warning on September 9 that the date of this invasion was fast drawing near. In the first large-scale air operation by the Allies against the Philippines, an estimated 400 carrier planes staged a devastating ten-hour offensive against southern Mindanao, concentrating their attacks on Davao, Sarangani, Cagayan and Digos. Since Japanese air patrols had failed to discover the enemy task force, the attacks achieved complete surprise and inflicted widespread and severe damage to ground installations, airfields, anchorages, and lines of communication. Reconnaissance units of the 1st Air Fleet immediately flew off search missions, which revealed that the attacks originated from three enemy naval task groups boldly maneuvering in the waters southeast of Mindanao. As per the Sho-Go directives, however, the 1st Air Fleet withheld retaliatory action pending further developments. Ground and naval units in the Davao area were nevertheless ordered on the alert to meet the possible contingency that an invasion attempt would follow the air strikes, and the Japanese armed forces throughout southern Mindanao became tense with expectancy. A feeling of nervousness gripped the weak local forces at Davao and rapidly spread to the large Japanese civilian colony. A wave of wild rumors swept the city. On September 10, a second series of heavy enemy raids aggravated this state of alarm. The city and harbor were reduced to a shambles and communications paralyzed. Panic and civil disorder broke out.  Less than 48 hours after the termination of the raids on Mindanao, the enemy struck again; this time in the central Philippines. On the morning of 12 September, a navy radar picket station on Suluan Island, in Leyte Gulf, broadcast over the general air-warning net that a vast formation of enemy carrier planes was heading westward toward the Visayas. Since the Suluan Island lookout was only about twenty minutes' flying time from Cebu, the air forces there could not be alerted quickly enough to put up an effective defense. By 0920 the enemy planes were already swarming over the Cebu airfields, where the main fighter strength of the First Air Fleet was based following its transfer from Davao. Although the attacks extended over the entire Visayan area and later took in Tawitawi, in the Sulu Archipelago, the Cebu fields appeared to be the principal objective. In the three days over which this air offensive continued, the First Air Fleet suffered damage to 50 Zero fighters on Cebu alone, while in other areas 30 additional aircraft of all types were rendered non-operational. Flight personnel suffered numerous casualties, and training was disrupted. Heavy damage was also sustained by Army air units. The 13th Air Brigade, made up of Type I fighters, was so hard hit that it had to be ordered back to Japan for regrouping, while the 45th Fighter­bomber Regiment was reduced to half strength. In addition, 11 transports totalling 27,000 gross tons and 13 naval combat vessels were sent to the bottom of Cebu harbor.The unexpected weakness in enemy air defenses led Nimitz to reconsider bypassing Yap and Mindanao, instead focusing forces on an early invasion of Leyte. McCain's group continued with attacks on Zamboanga, the Talauds, and Menado en route to Morotai. Meanwhile, between September 1 and 14, Kenney's aircraft conducted heavy raids on Japanese air bases within range of Morotai, effectively isolating the island. Targeted locations included Halmahera, the northern Celebes, Ceram, western New Guinea, and Mindanao. After rehearsals and preparations were completed, Barbey's convoy departed Aitape on September 9. Two days later, they rendezvoused at Maffin Bay with the majority of General Persons' 31st Division. The entire convoy departed the area on September 12, joined the next day by the covering force and escort carriers. The voyage proceeded smoothly, and Barbey successfully reached Morotai on the morning of September 15. Meanwhile, McCain's carrier aircraft conducted a bombing and strafing mission over Japanese air bases in the Manado area, destroying 28 enemy aircraft. Kenney's bombers also struck Japanese air installations on Batjan Island, while Berkey's cruisers and destroyers shelled enemy positions along Galela Bay. Barbey's surface warships conducted a bombardment of the landing area. During the naval and air bombardment, assault ships moved into their assigned positions west of the landing beaches efficiently and without confusion. The initial waves formed quickly and landed the 155th and 167th Regiments on Red Beach at 08:30, followed by the 124th Regiment on White Beach one minute later. Encountering no opposition, the troops swiftly reorganized on shore and advanced toward their objectives inland. By 13:00, the 167th Regiment had secured Pitoe Drome, and by 15:00, Colonel Starr's 1st Battalion had secured Gila Peninsula. Other units also advanced inland, establishing the 2000-yard beachhead line. Although there were some minor skirmishes, the Japanese could not mount significant resistance against the overwhelming Allied force and retreated into Morotai's rugged interior. The day's action resulted in seven wounded among the 124th Regiment and the loss of twelve Japanese soldiers, with one captured. Beach conditions, however, proved unexpectedly poor, severely hindering the unloading efforts. Consequently, starting on September 16, all the LSTs, along with numerous LCTs and LCMs, had to be unloaded at Blue Beach, a favorable landing spot on Pitoe Bay's shores. Simultaneously, as the reserve 126th Regiment was disembarking, Persons resumed advancing inland against minimal opposition. Swiftly, they secured a perimeter around the Pitoe Drome area, spanning over 7000 yards wide and approximately 5000 yards deep. Following this, American patrols were dispatched to eliminate small Japanese groups, radar stations and observation posts were established on various offshore islands and Morotai's coastline, and efforts were made to expand the perimeter to the Sabatai River to accommodate additional bivouacs and supply installations.  Leaving Morotai behind, attention shifts to Burma to explore the aftermath of Operation U-Go. Following the decisive victories at Imphal-Kohima, General Slim opted to pursue retreating Japanese forces toward the Chindwin River, despite the need for rest among his weary British-Indian divisions. Consequently, the 23rd Division spearheaded the pursuit to Tamu, at the head of the Kabaw Valley, where Major-General Charles Fowkes' 11th East African Division took over in early August. Meanwhile, to the south, General Evans' 5th Division pressed toward Tiddim, encountering stubborn resistance from General Tanaka's 33rd Division. Slim's strategy aimed for both divisions to eliminate remaining Japanese forces west of the Chindwin and converge at Kalemyo. Subsequently, the Tiddim road would be abandoned as a supply route in favor of the Kabaw Valley and aerial resupply drops. As a result, the 31st Division, now led by Lieutenant-General Kawata Tsuchitaro, successfully reached Sittaung. Their mission was to cover the withdrawal of other units in the region. Meanwhile, the 33rd Division faced challenges as it conducted delaying actions along the Tiddim road, with the added threat of East African forces potentially cutting off their withdrawal route towards Yazagyo. Japanese delaying tactics were always the same, and the means of dealing with them was also always the same. A crater would be found beyond which the lead infantry would come under fire and would have to be filled or covered using a Valentine bridgelayer, while air strikes would break up the blocking position to allow tanks from 3rd Carabiniers forward to support them. To disrupt Tanaka's communications south of the road, an ad hoc light unit, the Lushai Brigade, was deployed. By mid-August, General Mutaguchi ordered his forces to commence withdrawal towards the Zibyu Range. The 15th and 31st Divisions were directed to cross the Chindwin River by August 25, despite shortages of small boats. At the beginning of the crossing operation, a serious setback was experienced. It had been planned to bring small boats upstream to the crossing area with supplies for the Army and to utilize the same boats to evacuate casualties and heavy weapons south to Kalewa. Because of the enemy air activity over the Chindwin River, it was impossible to bring the boats to the crossing points. As a result, approximately 3000 sick and wounded were forced to cross the river and continue to the rear on foot with increasingly heavy death losses. By August 31, they were expected to reach the eastern bank of the Chindwin, with the 15th Division consolidating along the Pinbon-Pinlebu line by the end of September and the 31st Division reaching Shwebo by mid-October. By the end of August, key command changes occurred following the setbacks of Operation U-Go. Lieutenant-General Katamura Shihachi replaced General Mutaguchi as commander of the 15th Army, while Lieutenant-General Kimura Heitaro took over from General Kawabe as commander of the Burma Area Army. Kimura Heitaro, noted for his strategic flexibility and acumen, subsequently directed the 33rd Army to secure a defensive line from Lashio to Mandalay, safeguarding the right flank of the 15th Army. The 15th Army, in turn, was tasked with holding the Irrawaddy River from Mandalay to Pakkoku, while the 28th Army was assigned to defend the Yenangyaung oilfields, the Arakan coast, and the Rangoon delta. Meanwhile, on September 12, the 33rd Division crossed the Manipur River and proceeded with their retreat towards the Kabaw valley. They left the 215th Regiment to guard the rear at Tonzang, while units of the 5th Division infiltrated the area between Tonzang and Kalemyo to disrupt Tanaka's withdrawal and mount significant attacks against the 215th. By September 20, the Japanese forces were forced back to Tiddim, where the 214th Regiment covered the retreat of the rest of the division. Simultaneously, the 26th King's African Rifles moved east from Tamu to Sittang, crossing the Chindwin River on September 8 to assess enemy strength across the river and prepare bridgeheads for a broader crossing. Encountering unexpectedly strong resistance, they were compelled to retreat back across the river. Under persistent pressure, the Japanese evacuated Tiddim on the night of October 6. Tanaka consolidated his division in the Kalemyo-Kalewa area by the end of October, while pursuing forces captured Fort White and Kennedy Peak. On October 10, the 4th King's African Rifles launched an assault on Leik Ridge, suffering significant casualties but ultimately securing the main hill twelve days later. Meanwhile, after withdrawing from Mogaung, the 53rd Division regrouped at Mawhun by September 10, where they successfully defended against enemy units until the end of the month. They then retreated towards Pinwe and came under the command of the 15th Army on October 5. Following the Quebec conference in September, a strategic overview of Burma emerged: the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved two plans. The first, codenamed Dracula, proposed an amphibious assault on Rangoon with a target date of March 15, 1945. The second plan, Capital, aimed at the conquest of north and central Burma, with General Slim suggesting an overland capture of Rangoon as part of the operation. Initially skeptical, the Americans reluctantly agreed to Dracula, contingent on ensuring that northern Burma received adequate resources. However, due to Allied setbacks at Arnhem and during the Battle of the Bulge, it became clear that reinforcements from the European theater could not be spared for the Rangoon offensive. Consequently, it was announced that the operation would need to be postponed until after the 1945 monsoon season. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. After intense Allied operations in the Pacific, including the capture of the Marianas and Sansapor, attention turned to the Palaus and Halmahera. Japanese defenses were formidable, with significant troop concentrations and elaborate fortifications. Despite setbacks, Allied forces meticulously planned and executed operations, paving the way for further strategic advances in the region.

Hokulea's statewide sail has been postponed as the Polynesian Voyaging Society assesses weather conditions. Hokuea was expected to depart for Kauai on Thursday, but PVS said a potential tropical cyclone in the Central Pacific may disrupt plans.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Last time we spoke about the fall of Guam and actions in New Guinea. General Shepherd's Marines had secured the Orote Peninsula, while General Turnage's Marines pushed the Japanese northwards. General Bruce's 77th Division prepared for an eastward assault, and engineers attempted, but failed, to build a supply road to Yona. Geiger's offensive began on July 31, with Marines quickly capturing Agaña and advancing despite dense jungle and resistance. The 77th Division faced tough terrain but liberated 2,000 Guamanians. The push north continued, facing logistical challenges and mined roads. By August 7th, coordinated attacks cleared key areas, culminating in the defeat of remaining Japanese forces by August 11. Guam was back in American hands although scattered Japanese forces continued guerrilla warfare until the war's conclusion. Thus the Marianas campaign had finally come to a conclusion, and now the allies were adding more bass of operation to hit the Japanese home islands.  This episode is the Fall of Myitkyina Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  This week we are diving back over to the northern Burma front. Despite holding Myitkyina through a rainy, muddy summer-long siege, by late July, the Japanese had been gradually cornered into a small perimeter, cut off from all supply lines and running short on ammunition. The situation worsened due to a leadership crisis, between the two Japanese leaders was a matter of semantics. Colonel Maruyama of the 114th Regiment who was in charge of the defense of the city, interpreted his orders to “facilitate the future operations of 33rd Army ‘by securing the vital areas in the vicinity of Myitkyina',” as a call to defend the city street-by-street, house-by-house. When General Minakami of the 56th Division arrived, he pointed out that all Maruyama had to do to satisfy his orders was simply to continue to deny the Allies access to the Ledo-Kamaing road. Minakami thus found himself in a rather difficult position in regard to the command of the Myitkyina Garrison. Maruyama had conducted an excellent defense, was fully familiar with the situation and, because of his position as former commander, exercised considerable authority. Shortly after Minakami's assumption of command, General Honda asked how long Myitkyina could stand. Minakami replied that the garrison might be able to hold out for as long as two months. A few days later, Honda was surprised to receive a second message stating, "The Myitkyina Garrison finds it difficult to hold with the poor defense facilities and meager supplies of ammunition." The Army staff concluded that the first message was undoubtedly Minakami's personal opinion as it reflected his determined character and that the second message incorporated the views of Maruyama who was more cognizant of the actual situation. In order that there should be no doubt as to the importance of holding Myitkyina, Honda sent the following message, "Maj. Gen. Minakami will defend Myitkyina to the death” — a message sent with deep regret and sadness according to the staff officers who wrote and dispatched the order. Heavy casualties had reduced the Japanese forces from around 3,000 to fewer than 1,500, further weakening the garrison's defensive capabilities. This number included the heavily wounded and hospital patients, who could only be evacuated by drifting down the Irrawaddy River on rafts, often intercepted by the unforgiving Kachin Levies. On July 24, eight rafts and a boat laden with Japanese were attacked on the Irrawaddy by Kachins of the OSS Detachment 101. Twenty-four Japanese were killed, two captured, and then it was learned these were hospital patients fleeing Myitkyina. Three more Japanese seized by friendly Burmans revealed that hospital patients were being evacuated by the simple expedient of letting them drift down the river on rafts. As these fierce defenders began to falter, General Wessels felt ready to launch his final push. Reinforced by the 149th and 90th Regiments, the American-Chinese forces made daily gains of several hundred yards during the last days of July, though at a significant cost. As the Japanese-held area shrank, counterattacks became less dynamic, captured positions were less fortified, and many Japanese dead were found to be severely wounded men returned to the line. Unbeknownst to the Americans, the desperate defenders had requested a withdrawal to the east by the end of the month. Though Minakami had intended to fight to the last, he ultimately agreed to preserve his men's lives. On the night of August 1, the Japanese began their escape, crossing the Irrawaddy east of the town. Weighing the many evidences that control of the situation was rapidly passing into their hands, Wessels and his colleagues drafted a new plan of attack. It included an ingenious device, credited to General Pan Yu-kun of the 50th Division. A raiding party, formed into fifteen heavily armed sections, was organized and briefed on infiltrating Japanese lines facing the 50th Division. Having made its way through the Japanese lines in darkness, it was to remain hidden until 0430 when the 50th would assault while the raiders spread confusion behind the Japanese lines. Meanwhile, air reconnaissance revealed many rafts moored against the Irrawaddy within the Japanese lines. "At 0300 hours (3 August), when the moon went down and rain and thunder set in, the raiding party of the 50th Division moved out. The approach was detected only once and some shots were fired at the raiders, who hit the ground. The Chinese did not return fire however, and after laying low for a while, moved out again quietly and cautiously." While the raiders created confusion behind Japanese lines, the 50th Division launched a full attack, quickly overwhelming the remaining enemy positions and capturing 187 prisoners, thus securing Myitkyina for the Chinese. However, about 800 Japanese managed to escape eastward and later rejoined their allies. Minakami was not among them. As the 3rd of August meandered on in a haze of gunfire, blood and rain, Minakami went to sit with his back against a tree. There came the sound of a pistol shot. Japanese officers nearby sprinted to the scene. The general's orderly was in tears. They found Minakami's body erect against the tree trunk, facing northeast, towards Japan. The ten-week siege resulted in approximately 3,000 Japanese killed or captured; 972 Chinese killed, 3,184 wounded, and 188 evacuated due to illness; and 272 Americans killed, 955 wounded, and 980 evacuated sick. Overall, the total American-Chinese casualties in 1944 amounted to 13,618 Chinese and 1,327 American casualties. A week later, the Galahad Unit, reduced to only 130 combat-effective men from the original 2,997, was disbanded. The fall of Myitkyina was General Stilwell's greatest victory, earning him a promotion to full general on August 1, two days before the city fell. The attack was costly in terms of suffering and losses, but the Mogaung-Myitkyina area was a significant prize. It allowed Ledo Road builders and American transport planes to move to Myitkyina and enabled ground forces to link up with other Chinese forces in neighboring Yunnan. As the fighting moved further south down the Hukawng and Mogaung valleys, it became safer for transports to use the lower, more southerly routes to China. This, in turn, increased Hump deliveries to China from 13,686 tons in May to 18,235 tons in June and 25,454 tons in July.  While the Allies celebrated victories in northern Burma, the situation in China was dire as the Ichi-Go offensive resulted in many Chinese casualties. By August 1, General Yokoyama had amassed 110,000 troops around Hengyang, equipped with five heavy artillery pieces, fifty mountain artillery pieces, and 40,000 shells. Conversely, General Fang's resilient defenders had dwindled to 3,000 exhausted troops, with their defenses largely destroyed. General Xue Yue's reinforcements had failed to reach Hengyang, leaving the Chinese forces to rely on the 46th Army to launch an attack along the railway. On August 4, Yokoyama initiated his main offensive. The 68th and 116th Divisions launched a significant assault from the south and southwest, while the 58th Division quietly positioned itself near the enemy's northern defenses. Initially, progress was slow. However, by August 5, Yokoyama's forces had captured Yoping and School Hill. The next day, the 116th Division secured part of the city's defenses. On August 6, the 58th Division breached the city walls from the north, forcing Fang to redeploy troops to counter this new threat. Intense street fighting broke out on August 7 as the defenders valiantly tried to repel the Japanese attacks. By nightfall, the 68th Division had overrun the southern defenses and entered part of the Walled City. Gradually, enemy troops began to surrender, and before dawn on August 8, after 48 days of fierce resistance, Fang was compelled to surrender. Following the capture of Hengyang, Yokoyama declared the successful completion of the initial phase of Operation Togo and promptly began preparations for the subsequent offensive. In this phase, the Japanese reported casualties of over 3860 killed, 8327 wounded, and 7099 sick, with an estimated Chinese casualty count exceeding 100,000, including 8400 killed and 5000 captured in Hengyang alone. To spearhead the next stage of Operation Togo targeting Guilin and Liuzhou, General Okamura Yasuji's 6th Area Army was established on August 25, comprising the 11th, 23rd, and 34th Armies, along with the 27th, 40th, 64th, and 68th Divisions, alongside additional support units. This allowed General Hata to focus on countering potential American landings on the Chinese coast while Okamura directed the offensives in eastern China. Ahead of this operation, Lieutenant-General Tanaka Hisakazu of the 23rd Army initiated a preliminary offensive in late June, positioning the 23rd Independent Mixed Brigade in the northeastern sector of the Luichow Peninsula, advancing the 22nd Independent Mixed Brigade to the Tanjiang River, securing the Jiangmen area with the 22nd Division, and capturing the Qingyuan sector with the 104th Division. By late August, Yokoyama had deployed six divisions along the Shuangfeng-Leiyang line, poised to eliminate the enemy in the district west of Hengyang. On August 29, he launched the offensive, with over 100,000 troops advancing southwest amidst heavy artillery bombardment. Intense ground and aerial combat ensued, resulting in the loss of 10 Japanese planes and 15 enemy aircraft. Despite fierce resistance from Chinese defenders over three days, their entire line collapsed on September 1, prompting a retreat towards Shaoyang, Qiyang, and Jiahe. However, the Japanese advanced relentlessly, covering nearly 100 kilometers in the following days without pause. By September 5, both Qiyang and Huochangpingzhen had fallen, followed by the seizure of Lingling Airdrome on September 8 by the 3rd Division. Progressing along a north-south axis, Japanese forces secured Shaoyang and Changning, while the 58th Division captured Dongan on the same day. With initial objectives achieved, Yokoyama ordered further pursuit, with the 3rd and 54th Divisions converging in the Quanzhou area by September 14. Meanwhile, Tanaka prepared for his offensive, with the bulk of the 104th Division moving towards Taipingzhen, and a raiding unit conducting a wide envelopment maneuver along the Zhukeng-Huaiji road towards Wuzhou by September 6. Subsequently, the 23rd Brigade began its northward march from Suixi. However, Tanaka's offensive wouldn't commence for a couple of weeks. Turning to the broader context of the Pacific War, General Stilwell celebrated a major victory with the fall of Myitkyina, while General Slim's successful defense against Operation U-Go further bolstered Allied morale in the CBI Theater. In Thailand, Prime Minister Phibun's regime faced a significant crisis as Japan struggled to meet the country's essential import needs, leading to inflation, rationing, shortages, black markets, smuggling, corruption, and profiteering. The anti-Japanese Free Thai underground movement, spearheaded by Regent Pridi Banomyong, infiltrated the government, stoking public discontent against both the Japanese occupiers and Phibun's administration. As a result, following the downfall of the Tojo government, Phibun found himself compelled to step down in late July. For his part, Phibun also was thinking of ways, he claims, to prepare to turn against the Japanese. Part of these preparations included proposals to move the capital to remote Phetchabun, north of Bangkok, and construct a “Buddhist City,” a sort of center for world Buddhism, near Saraburi—both grandiose projects in typically extravagant Phibun style. Moving to the isolated, mountain-ringed Phetchabun, Phibun later argued, would facilitate a Thai uprising against the Japanese. Yet on July 18, the Tojo government in Japan resigned, and only six days later the Thai National Assembly turned down both government bills and forced the resignation of Phibun as prime minister. The deputies in the assembly voted against these plans motivated in part by the fall of Tojo, who was closely associated in their minds with Phibun, in part by their feeling that the war was turning against Japan, and in part by their feeling that Phibun was too closely identified with an authoritarian past that must now be buried for the sake of improving relations with the Allies.  Politician Khuang Aphaiwong then assumed his position as Prime Minister on August 1. Serving as a compromise candidate, he navigated between Phibun's supporters and the opposition while maintaining cooperation with the Japanese and safeguarding Free Thai members who had collaborated with the Allies. Meanwhile, in China, the success of Operation Ichi-Go led to another leadership crisis. Despite the initial rejection of Stilwell commanding troops in China in 1942, the effective Japanese offensive posed a threat of defeat to the Chinese Government, reigniting the debate over command authority. This was especially significant as Chinese troops under Stilwell's command were achieving significant victories in northern Burma. However, Stilwell's vocal criticism of Chiang Kai-Shek's corrupt regime and incompetent generals strained their relationship. Chiang favored General Chennault, who proposed that with a monthly allocation of 10,000 tons for operations in northern China, his 14th Air Force could halt the Japanese offensive. Despite his strained relationship with Chennault, Stilwell redirected Hump allocations to increase the 14th Air Force's allocation to 8,425 tons, although he couldn't secure an additional 1,500 tons from the Matterhorn allocation. Chennault's aircraft managed to disrupt the Japanese advance, but failed to halt it completely. In late June, Stilwell faced criticism when Vice-President Henry Wallace visited Chongqing. While Wallace persuaded Chiang to allow a small American observer mission into Communist territory, he also recommended Stilwell's recall due to his perceived lack of diplomacy and strained relations with the Chinese leadership. Nonetheless, Stilwell maintained the backing of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and President Roosevelt eventually nominated him to lead the China Theater, on the condition that he make every effort to avoid upsetting the Generalissimo. In July, the President attempted to persuade Chiang to accept this arrangement, but the Generalissimo employed various diplomatic maneuvers to reject the proposal, agreeing "in principle" only after an unspecified period for his forces to adjust. He also requested the presence of a presidential representative to facilitate smooth relations between himself and Stilwell. Major-General Patrick Hurley was appointed to this role and arrived in China in August. Concurrently, the Dixie Mission arrived in Yan'an, where over the following months, American observers assessed Communist society, military tactics, and guerrilla operations, issuing reports that commended them and suggested increased collaboration. Following the fall of Hengyang, tensions escalated in China, with rumors swirling about potential coup plans involving Marshall Li Zhongren and General Xue Yue against the Generalissimo. Meanwhile, Chennault urged Stilwell to divert Hump airlift capacity to supply ground forces in eastern China, a move opposed by Chiang, who feared supporting potential insurgents with lend-lease equipment. Stilwell, anticipating his imminent assumption of leadership in the China Theater, refrained from challenging Chiang's stance. With significant developments looming, the intensifying rift between Stilwell and Chiang foreshadowed the downfall of one of them. Elsewhere in the South Pacific, General MacArthur's troops had finished their final offensive in New Guinea and were preparing to return to the Philippines by way of an intermediate stop at Halmahera Island. To the east, Rabaul was completely surrounded, enduring heavy bombardment from Allied air forces. Meanwhile, on Bougainville, the remaining forces of the 17th Army had retreated to the island's southern region, unable to launch further counterattacks. The living conditions of the Japanese soldiers, never good under the best of circumstances, became increasingly desperate. Added to the dangers that forward troops always faced, such as contact with large American combat patrols, was the growing specter of starvation. Sealed off from regular supplies from New Ireland or New Britain, General Hyakutake's army had to depend entirely on its own laborers to acquire food. The normal rice ration of 750 grams of rice for each soldier was cut in April 1944 to 250 grams, and beginning in September there was no rice ration. A large portion of the available army and naval personnel had to be put to work growing food. Allied pilots took delight in dropping napalm on these garden plots whenever possible. The native workers who had been impressed into service were the first to defect, but soon many soldiers also just walked away from their units, taking the chance of surviving in the jungle on what could be gathered. After the failure of the March attack, morale in most units became deplorably low. There were instances, normally unimagined in the Japanese army, of open insubordination and even mutiny. Although General Hyakutake dreamed of a midsummer offensive, it became obvious that no operations as large as that smashed in March could be undertaken for months, if ever. Thus, almost as if by agreement, both sides adopted a defensive posture that minimized the conflict in the no-man's-land between them. In the Central Pacific, significant progress had been made over the past year, marked by the complete capture of the Gilbert, Marshall, and Mariana Islands, strengthening the Allied presence and providing a launching point for future offensives into the heart of the Japanese Empire. The next target for Admiral Nimitz was the Palaus, to be invaded concurrently with Halmahera. However, the architect of this southwestern advance was not Admiral Spruance, who had been overseeing operations with the 5th Fleet. Instead, it was Admiral Halsey's 3rd Fleet, known as the "Department of Dirty Tricks," that had been strategizing the next moves from Hawaii. Now, Admiral Halsey was set to assume command of the Pacific Fleet, leading the charge to the Palaus and the Philippines. This rotation in leadership between Halsey's 3rd Fleet and Spruance's 5th Fleet was orchestrated by Nimitz to maintain operational tempo and confuse the Japanese. The alternating command structure allowed for continuous planning of future operations while the active fleet conducted current ones. However, Tokyo was apprehensive about a potential invasion of the Philippines and sought to bolster its defenses. Following the surrender of the US Army Forces in the Philippines, the 14th Army, led by Lieutenant-General Tanaka Shizuichi, worked to establish military administration, secure cooperation from civilian institutions, and quell guerrilla groups across the countryside. Despite their endeavors, their control over certain regions, particularly in the Visayas and Mindanao, remained fragile. Allied submarines and aircraft from Australia and New Guinea also delivered supplies like signal equipment, weapons, explosives, propaganda materials, and counterfeit currency to support the guerrilla forces, further impeding Japanese efforts. Additionally, with the deteriorating situation in the South and Central Pacific, more troops were redirected from the Philippines' garrison to other areas, weakening the 14th Army, now commanded by Lieutenant-General Kuroda Shigenori since May 19, 1943. Undermanned and stretched thin, the Japanese halted their suppression operations in August, hoping that the imminent declaration of independence by the Second Philippine Republic would lead guerrillas to surrender. However, this strategy backfired, as the guerrillas only grew stronger during the pause. Consequently, Kuroda restarted intensive suppression operations in 1944, but guerrilla activities escalated in anticipation of the imminent liberation by American forces. As a result, the guerrillas gained strength in the following months, providing valuable intelligence to MacArthur's forces in preparation for their eventual return. Given this context, it was evident that the 14th Army would be ill-equipped to withstand an American invasion under the current circumstances. Due to its crucial strategic location bridging Japan and the southern region rich in natural resources, Japan couldn't risk losing the Philippines. It served as their primary rear base supporting the main defense perimeter. The Philippines were also to play the role of a rear base of operations–an assembly and staging area for troops and supplies and a concentration area for air reserves, to support operations at any threatened point on the main defense perimeter from the Marianas south to Western New Guinea and the Banda Sea area. To implement these plans, IGHQ in October 1943 directed the 14th Army to complete the establishment of the necessary base facilities by the spring of 1944. Major emphasis in this program was laid upon the construction of air bases. The Army alone planned to build or improve 30 fields in addition to 13 already in operational use or partially completed. The Navy projected 21 fields and seaplane bases to be ready for operational use by the end of 1944, expanding its total number of Philippine bases to 33. Line of communications and other rear­ area base installations were also to be expanded and improved. Of the 30 Army airfields projected in October 1943, six had been generally completed by May 1944, and 24 under construction. Of the 21 projected Navy fields, 15 were still incomplete by then. Consequently, in early 1944, the decision was made to strengthen the garrison in the Philippines. Initially, this involved reorganizing and expanding existing garrison units to establish four new independent mixed brigades. These brigades were primarily tasked with suppressing guerrilla activity, while infantry divisions were assigned to defend against potential enemy landings. However, despite the estimation that at least seven divisions were necessary for the defense of Luzon, the Visayas, and Mindanao, only the 16th Division was available. Additionally, it was deemed crucial to bolster air strength with at least two air divisions, anticipating Allied invasions in Halmahera and Palau before advancing to the Philippines. Plans were formulated in March to deploy reinforcements within eight months. In mid-May, General Terauchi relocated his headquarters to Manila to oversee operations more closely. Concurrently, efforts were made to transport the 30th Division to Mindanao and bring the 4th Air Army to Manila. Furthermore, the Philippines were reinforced with the 2nd and 4th Air Divisions, the latter being tasked with constructing 30 new airfields. In June, approximately 20,000 inexperienced replacements were transported to the Philippines to bolster the recently-formed independent mixed brigades, filling them up to division strength. Subsequently, in July, the 100th, 102nd, 103rd, and 105th Divisions were activated, along with the establishment of the 54th and 55th Independent Mixed Brigades. It's ironic that despite this reinforcement, the main Japanese forces were as inexperienced as the Philippine Army during MacArthur's defense. Nonetheless, Terauchi was resolute in further fortifying the Philippines to prevent its fall, unlike MacArthur's situation. By mid-July, the reinforced 58th Independent Mixed Brigade arrived at Lingayen. Later that month, the 14th Army underwent reorganization into the 14th Area Army, with units directly under its command tasked with defending the northern Philippines. Meanwhile, the 35th Army, led by Lieutenant-General Suzuki Sosaki, was established under the 14th Area Army to defend Mindanao and the Visayas. Additionally, Tokyo finalized plans for decisive battle operations, codenamed Sho-Go, covering the Philippines-Formosa-Ryukyus-Japan-Kuriles area. This determined the disposition of Army and Navy air forces across the Pacific, with the Philippines receiving the reorganized 1st and 2nd Air Fleets and the 4th Air Army. The Philippine garrison was strengthened to a total of nine divisions and four brigades, with the 1st Division at Shanghai and the 68th Independent Brigade at Formosa designated as general reserves. Defenses and fortifications were constructed at Luzon in preparation for the decisive battle there.  Known as the Combined Fleet Top Secret Operations Order No. 84,  issued on 1 August, this fixed the new tactical grouping of naval forces for the Sho-Go Operations. Almost the entire surface combat strength of the Fleet was included in a Task Force placed under the overall command of the First Mobile Fleet Commander, Vice­Adm. Ozawa Jisaburo. This force was broken down into three tactical groups: (1) the Task Force Main Body, directly commanded by Vice­Adm. Ozawa and consisting of most of the Third Fleet (carrier forces): (2) the First Striking Force, commanded by Vice Adm. Kurita Takeo and made up of the Second Fleet with part of the 10th Destroyer Squadron attached: (3) the Second Striking Force, commanded by Vice Adm. Shima Kiyohide and composed of the Fifth Fleet plus two destroyer divisions and the battleships Fuso and Yamashiro. The First Striking Force would be stationed at Lingga Anchorage, while the Task Force Main Body and the Second Striking Force would be stationed in the western part of the Inland Sea. However, if an enemy attack was expected, the First Striking Force would advance from Lingga Anchorage to Brunei, Coron or Guimaras while the Task Force Main Body and the Second Striking Force remained in the Inland Sea and prepared to attack the north flank of the enemy task force. During August, the Navy Section of Imperial General Headquarters also took action to give the Combined Fleet more unified operational control of naval forces in order to facilitate the execution of the Sho-Go plans. On 9 August the General Escort Command and units assigned to naval stations were placed under operational command of the Combined Fleet, and on 21 August the China Area Fleet was similarly placed under Combined Fleet command. On 10 August the 1st Carrier Division, reorganized around two newly-commissioned regular carriers, was added to the Task Force Main Body. Vice Adm. Ozawa, Task Force Commander, meanwhile set 15 October as the target date for completion of the reorganization and training of the 3d and 4th Carrier Division air groups. Concurrently with these preparations, steps were taken to strengthen the antiaircraft armament of combat units. Accordingly, the Japanese sought to deploy the 8th and 26th Divisions, the 2nd Tank Division, and the 61st Independent Mixed Brigade to the Luzon region for a decisive battle. However, enemy submarines posed a constant threat. Since February, they had been patrolling the South China Sea, targeting the Hi Convoys supplying Japanese territories in Southeast Asia and Japan itself. During these engagements, Admiral Ijuin was killed aboard the patrol boat Iki. Between August 18 and 25, Admiral Kajioka's Hi-71 convoy, carrying the 26th Division, was attacked by six American submarines. The escort carrier Taiyo, destroyers Yunagi and Asakaze, two oilers, four transports, and three kaibokans were sunk, with 7420 soldiers of the 26th Division lost. The submarine Harder was the only American vessel sunk in retaliation. Kajioka's Hi-72 convoy, returning from Luzon, was also attacked, resulting in the sinking of his flagship, the kaibokan Hirato, and the loss of the destroyer Shikinami, three transports, and one oiler. Despite these setbacks, advance units of the 8th Division, 2nd Tank Division, and 61st Independent Mixed Brigade successfully reached the Philippines in September. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. After months the siege of Myitkyina had finally ended. The Japanese had held out as long as they could, but lack of supplies and rather terrible leadership lost them the fight. Meanwhile, in China, Japanese offensives intensified, challenging Chinese defenses and leadership. It seemed war was coming to the Philippines, where the Japanese prepared to fight to the death.

Need any advice or information, message us.We get a market update on what is happening in the Central Pacific markets of Jaco, Herradura, and Playa Hermosa. We discuss the vast number of new properties hitting the market and the impact this will have on pricing and rental returns. Travis gives us his viewpoint on what shocks people when they first move to Costa Rica based on his first nine months living there.Free Consultation: https://meetings.hubspot.com/jake806/crconsultContact us: info@investingcostarica.comCurated and Analysed Investments: https://www.investingcostarica.com/invest/investments-opportunitiesGuest today:Travis Comstock: travis@remax-ocr.com

Last time we spoke about the fall of Mogaung. General Vinegar Joe's strategy against Myitkyina had turned into a brutal struggle. Stillwells forces were besieging the town while the Chindits battled for Mogaung, diverting Japanese reinforcements in the process. Despite heavy losses, the Chindits captured Naungkyaiktaw with the help of flamethrowers. Gradually Mogaung fell, but the credit was wrongly attributed to the Chinese while it should have gone to the Chindits. Mytikyina withstood endless attacks and at Biak the Americans repelled numerous Japanese assaults. The 2nd battalion, 162nd regiment tossed over to help, but this further complicated supply issues on the plateau. Progress was deeply hampered by water shortages, difficult jungle terrain and supply roads needing repairs. Lastly the battle for Lone Tree Hill saw absolute mayhem and horror, something the Americans and Japanese would never forget. This episode is the Invasion of Saipan Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    The use of US fleet and escort carriers during the landings on Hollandia and Aitape had convinced Admiral Toyoda's staff that the American naval force could be drawn into decisive naval battle off of New Guinea. On June 1st, however, a reconnaissance flight had discovered a major build up of enemy vessels at Majuro, suggesting that a new invasion was just days away. The Imperial General Staff reeled with shock in response to this, not knowing whether the Allied objective was Biak, Palau or Saipan. Aboard Toyoda's flagship Oyodo in Tokyo Bay, the naval staff debated, and the debate degenerated into argument. The truth was that no one had a “feel” for the American strategy except one lone staff intelligence officer, Commander Nakajima Chikataka. He said it had to be Saipan. But his fellow staff members scoffed at this. Even the Americans did not have such power that they could mount an operation the size of the three-pronged New Guinea strike as just a feint, they argued. They  further argued that an enemy airfield at Biak would allow the Allies to bomb the Philippines and Palau with their long-range B-24 Liberators. And the American carriers were in evidence off New Guinea, unlike at Majuro. Thinking that Nakajima must be seeing things, Toyoda thus decided that Biak had to be the place. The Japanese unleashed Operation KON, diverting an enormous sum of their naval and air resources to bolster Biak in response to the perceived allied advance.   However, in actuality, Admiral Spruance was gathering the largest Pacific force yet seen at Pearl Harbor, comprising approximately 535 ships, ranging from battleships to tugs, carrying a total of 127,500 personnel of Lt-General Holland Smith's 5th Amphibious Corps.  They were going to hit Saipan, Tinian and Guam. Designated “Operation Forager” it was to be the end game of Admiral Nimitz Central thurst into the Pacific. Taking these would see strategic airfields only 1400 miles away from Tokyo in the hands of the allies. From there the US Army Air Force could begin their long wished bombing campaign against the Japanese home islands. For the Japanese, Saipan in particular was considered a “home island”. Japan had seized Saipan during WW1 from the German Colonial Empire and she heavily invested in “Japanizing” the island. The Japanese government had encouraged southern Japanese and Okinawans to colonize Saipan, introducing Japanese language and culture to the indigenous peoples there. It was more than just another Imperial asset, in many ways Saipan had become a home island. Part of the new operation would include Admiral Mitscher commanding the Fast Carrier Task Force 58 stationed at the Marshalls, along with Vice-Admiral Charles Lockwood overseeing 19 submarines and Rear-Admiral Ralph Christie leading 9 submarines operating across the Pacific and Southeast Asia. Operation Forager entailed Admiral Turner's Task Force capturing Saipan and Tinian sequentially with the 2nd and 4th Marine Divisions, followed by the 3rd Marine Division and the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade attacking Guam. The 27th Division was reserved for Saipan and the 77th Division for Guam. The outcome on Saipan would determine subsequent operations, with the Southern Landing Forces also held in reserve for the Northern Landing Forces until June 25. Lieutenant-General Holland Smith's strategy for the Saipan invasion involved landing four assault regiments simultaneously on four beaches in the Charan Kanoa area. Following three days of continuous air and naval bombardments, Major-General Thomas Watson's 2nd Marine Division's 6th and 8th Marine Regiments were to land north of Afetna Point on the Red and Green Beaches, while Major-General Harry Schmidt's 4th Marine Division's 23rd and 25th Marine Regiments would land south of Afetna Point on the Blue and Yellow Beaches. Thomas Watson was then going to seize the Charan Kanoa Airstrip, afterwards he would sing northeast towards Mounts Tipo Pale and Tapotchau while Schmidt secured Charan Kanoa village, the Aslito Airfield and the islands southern end before moving north to take part in clearing the remainder of Saipan. Alongside this, Smith planned to dispatch the reserve 2nd and 24th Marine Regiments of Lt Colonel Walter Stuart and Lt Colonel Guy Tannyhill over to Scarlet and Black Beaches in the north to divert enemy attention. Two innovations would be tried for Forager. The 4th Marine Division had recently and optimistically accepted the proposal to employ amphibian tanks inland. This was a large part due to the unit's experiences on low and level Roi-Namur, during the Kwajalein assault. The 2nd Marine Division on the other hand, having fought on rugged Guadalcanal and experienced the limitations of LVTs during the Tarawa assault, were more pessimistic. General Watson convinced General Smith that he would only allow the amphibian tanks to advance inland far enough to clear the immediate beach area and that only the first troop-carrying LVT wave would follow them to discharge their troops beyond the beach. All subsequent waves would discharge troops on the beach and not proceed beyond the Tractor Control Line. The reason for this pessimism was that the Marines expected the terrain to be rougher than some predicted. They feared control would be lost over troops embarked in LVTs, concentrated groups of men would be exposed to fire, and that more amtracs would be lost to enemy fire inland. They were needed to return to the Transfer Control Line on the reef's lip where support troops boated aboard LCVPs would be picked up and run to shore in the amtracs. Furthermore, LVTs are not designed for cross-country movement. They have comparatively narrow tracks and low ground clearance, making it easy for them to "belly-out" on rough ground, rocks, and stumps. Amphibian tanks are poor substitutes for medium tanks for the same reasons, and in addition they have very thin armor and a high profile. The Marine divisions commenced training for Saipan in March, conducting a significant rehearsal between May 14 and 20 off Maui. With all arrangements in place, Admiral Turner's invasion fleet was poised to depart Hawaii by late May. The slower LSTs were scheduled to set sail for Eniwetok on May 25, followed by the troop transports departing Hawaii five days later. Turner's vessels were slated to gather at Eniwetok on June 6, coinciding with the departure of Admiral Mitscher's carriers from Majuro for the Marianas. Between June 8 and 10, Turner then embarked from Eniwetok in echelons, experiencing a relatively uneventful voyage towards Saipan. Meanwhile, the Japanese expedited the deployment of 31st Army units to the Central Pacific, successfully positioning most of their line units at designated locations by the end of May. Additionally, certain disparate units of the 31st Army underwent reorganization into seven independent mixed brigades and five independent mixed regiments to enhance chain of command and troop cohesion.   This, however, did not allow adequate time to prepare inland defenses in multiple lines, especially in the case of the Marianas. The larger elevated islands within the Marianas offered strategic advantages for establishing multi-layered defenses, creating strongholds on key terrain features, and positioning reserves centrally for potential counterattacks. However, the Japanese were unable to fully exploit these opportunities due to various factors. Insufficient troop deployments occurred until less than two months prior to the US assault, leaving limited time for comprehensive inland defense preparations. Many coastal defense and anti-aircraft guns were discovered still packed and alongside incomplete positions, due to a shortage of construction materials for fortified installations. Consequently, the high ground at the island's center remained unprepared for defense, and several beach defenses were unfinished. There was an overestimation of the natural ruggedness of the terrain to impede American advances. Despite this, some coastal defense guns were strategically placed within earlier reinforced concrete structures. While Saipan and Tinian lacked significant artificial underwater or beach obstacles, mines were sporadically utilized on their shores. The Japanese also suffered from a lack of anti-aircraft ammunition to counter the enemy air superiority. Over on Saipan, Lieutenant-General Saito Yoshitsugu commanded a significant military presence including the 43rd Division, the 47th Independent Mixed Brigade, the 9th Tank Regiment, the 1st Battalion of the 18th Regiment, and various support units totaling 25,500 personnel. Despite its apparent strength, a convoy carrying reinforcements for the 43rd Division was ambushed by two American submarines between June 4 and 6, resulting in the loss of five transports and nearly decimating the 118th Regiment. Saito, overseeing Saipan as commander of the Northern Marianas Army Group, was joined by Admiral Nagumo's Central Pacific Area Fleet headquarters, bolstering defense with an additional 6,200 naval personnel. Additionally, General Obata, stationed at Saipan's army headquarters, delegated authority to his chief of staff, Major-General Igeta Keiji, as he inspected defenses in Palau during the American landings. Saito organized Saipan's defense into five sectors, anticipating landings on the island's west and northwest coasts, Tanapag Harbor, and the north shore of Magicienne Bay. The Japanese strategy relied on tank-infantry counterattacks launched at night from designated positions to repel enemy landings. However, American bombardment of Saipan commenced before Saito's forces could fully fortify their positions. Large numbers of heavy weapons, ranging from 200mm mortars to 5-inch coastal defense guns and literally dozens of searchlights and antiaircraft guns still remained in naval depots or loaded on railroad cars or still packed in cosmoline near partially excavated gun positions. The high ground in the island's center had received little attention in the defensive preparations; and, indeed, beach defenses themselves were in many cases far from complete. In so far as training in defensive warfare is concerned, Japanese forces displayed a marked deficiency; there was little evidence of organization of the ground, the principal airfield (Aslito) was virtually undefended against ground troops, and their counterattack plans were poorly conceived. On the afternoon of June 11, Mitscher's Task Force 58, began a relentless three and a half day heavy bombardment against Saipan, Tinian, Guam, Rota, and Pagan. This onslaught, featuring a 225-plane fighter sweep, caught the Japanese off guard in the Marianas and resulted in the destruction of 150 enemy aircraft, securing air superiority for the rest of the campaign. On June 12th and 13th, 216 carrier bombers hit Guam, Saipan, and Tinian, while Admiral Hoover's B-24s started pounding the southern Marianas airfields. You might be raising your eyebrows, the B-24's belonged to Task Force 57, under Vice-Admiral John Hoover, which was currently formed by the 5th Air Force over on Cape Gloucester and New Guinea; the 7th Air Force and 4th Marine Aircraft Wing on the Marshall and Gilbert Islands; and the 13th Air Force on the Admiralty Islands. Concurrently, two Japanese convoys were intercepted, leading to the sinking of 16 enemy vessels. The first of these, was a formation of 20 ships, fleeing on a northerly course 125 miles west of Pagan Island. They were attacked on the afternoon of the 12th by planes of Rear Admiral William K. Harrill's Task Group 58.4. Further  south, 135 miles west of Guam, the other convoy of six ships became the target for a special attack mission sent by Rear Admiral Joseph J. Clark, commanding Task Group 58.1. Between the two attacks 12 cargo ships, three submarine chasers, and one patrol-torpedo boat were sunk. Additionally, on June 13th, Mitscher's fast battleships shelled Saipan, though with limited success. The following day, Turner's fire support ships joined Task Force 58 in bombarding Saipan's beaches and installations, effectively neutralizing most of the Japanese coastal defenses and anti-aircraft positions. Despite some damage inflicted on the destroyer Braine and battleship California, Saito's defenses were not completely destroyed, indicating that the preliminary bombardment was not entirely effective. Meanwhile, underwater demolition teams surveyed the landing beaches, clearing them of mines and obstacles and creating gaps in the reefs for the amphibious approach. Smith's reserves staged a demonstration off Tanapag to divert Japanese attention, while carrier groups were dispatched to prevent enemy aircraft staging through the Bonins, successfully attacking Iwo Jima, Chichi-jima, and Haha-jima. To deter the Japanese from utilizing the Bonins in the north as a staging area for aircraft, two task groups led by Clark's 58.1 and Harrill's 58.4 set sail from Saipan on June 14th for an offensive. This marked the furthest advance into Empire waters by a carrier striking force at that time. Task Groups 58.1 and 58.4 refueled on June 14th and were then dispatched that night toward Chichi and Iwo Jima. Airstrikes on Japanese airfields in those locations commenced the following afternoon despite challenging weather conditions. Despite facing strong resistance from the Japanese, American fighter sweeps and bombing runs resulted in the destruction of 28 out of 37 Zeros engaged, with an additional seven destroyed on the ground, while only two American aircraft were lost. Adverse weather hampered morning strikes on the 16th, but the afternoon sortie of 54 American aircraft encountered Japanese planes on the runway, claiming 63 destroyed, though this wasn't confirmed by Japanese sources. Only two American aircraft were lost due to anti-aircraft fire and operational issues. Despite airborne opposition and unfavorable flying conditions, the mission achieved its objectives, significantly diminishing the Bonins' effectiveness as an aircraft staging area. After the afternoon raid, the two task groups headed south as per Mitscher's orders to position themselves off Saipan by the 18th. This operation proved successful, as around 100 Japanese aircraft that could have intervened in the impending battle were eliminated. On the morning of June 15, while the landing craft were lowered and began the complex assembly process, the Americans carried the last air and naval preparations on Saipan. At 8:12am, Turner finally gave the landing signal and the amtracs began to approach their assigned beaches under the cover of the LCI gunboats' rockets. Enemy fire was light until the LVTs reached the coral reef's lip, at which time artillery, mortar, and machine-gun fire increased drastically. Some control craft had drifted slightly to the north and coupled with a stronger than expected current some 2nd Marine Division units landed north of their intended beaches. The UDTs had not experienced this as the sea conditions and tides were different when they went to work the day before. Once over the reef lip some 400yds from shore, the swell made stationkeeping even more problematic. The swell increased through the day, making unloading and transfer difficult as well as capsizing landing craft and LVTs. The 2nd Marine Division had 31 of its 68 amphibian tanks hit or mechanically disabled before reaching the Tractor Control Line ashore. Nonetheless, in 20 minutes, some 8000 assault troops were ashore despite the strong Japanese artillery fire, albeit suffering heavy casualties. On the Red Beaches, Colonel James Riseley's 2nd and 3rd Battalions encountered stiff resistance from Hill 500 but still managed to secure a shallow beachhead, subsequently repelling a savage counterattack as the reserve 1st Battalion was landing. To the south, as Colonel Clarence Wallace's 2nd and 3rd Battalions had both come ashore on Green Beach 1, the 2nd would be sent south to seize Afetna Point while the 3rd advanced inland. Afetna Point was important for another reason than just denying the Japanese excellent positions for enfilading the American landing craft. Possession of the point would make Beach Green 3 available for landing of the tanks of both divisions. Because of an open channel off Green 3, LCM's carrying tanks could proceed directly to the beach without crossing the troublesome reef that fenced all other beaches. Once through the channel the craft could either move straight into Green 3 or fan out to the north or south and put the tanks ashore, wherever it was desired. The same channel could also be used for logistical purposes after tanks were ashore. As a result, the 2nd met strong resistance, progressing slowly and costly against a determined foe while the 1st Battalion was being landed; yet the 3rd managed to push inland against weaker resistance, finally halting about 900 yards from the O-1 Line. In the afternoon, the reserve 1st Battalion, 29th Marines was also landed and employed to fill the gap between Wallace's battalions. It's also important to note that the 4th Company, 9th Tank Regiment conducted piecemeal counterattacks on either side of Charan Kanoa with 14 tanks, losing all but three. Meanwhile, along the Blue Beaches, the 23rd Marines led by Colonel Louis Jones made headway through Charan Kanoa, facing occasional gunfire, and successfully advanced to the O-1 Line. Despite encountering challenging terrain and harassment from Japanese riflemen, their amtracs managed to secure Mount Fina Susu, albeit with significant losses. Upon reaching the O-1 Line, heavy artillery fire pinned down the Americans. Because of the concentrated mortar and artillery fire which had struck his troops throughout the day, the commander of the 23rd Marines, Colonel Jones estimated that the light forces on the O-1 line would be incapable of holding there for the night without being virtually annihilated. In addition, the regimental commander felt that “pulling back would allow our artillery and air to bring fire on the Jap batteries a short distance inland, better contact could be obtained on the right, and the exposed left flank could be better protected.” Dillon's 2nd Battalion and Cosgrove's 3rd Battalion were therefore ordered to establish a defense line generally 800 yards west of O-1 for the night. This involved a withdrawal under cover of darkness of the meager forces on O-1.Concerned about the exposed left flank between the 2nd and 4th Divisions, Colonel Jones directed the reserve 1st Battalion to fill the dangerous gap. Further south, Colonel Merton Batchelder's 1st Battalion faced fierce resistance from Agingan Point, repelling enemy counterattacks with the aid of air and naval support. Reinforcement from 3rd Battalion units allowed partial clearance of Japanese positions. The 2nd Battalion to the left encountered enemy concentrations but benefited from the heroic actions of the LVTAs, enabling them to advance inland.  About half the assault Marines of this battalion were carried to a railroad embankment prior to debarkation from LVTs. Until it reached there, the battalion was subjected to frontal small-arms fire from Japanese behind the embankment. There the small arms fire ceased, but mortar and artillery fire continued. From the direction of Nafutan Point came shells which burst overhead, apparently from antiaircraft guns depressed to fire at ground targets. And, as if troubles to the front and flanks were not enough, two enemy mortars began firing on the Marines from positions 500 yards to the rear. Before a request for assistance could be made, friendly planes spotted the mortars, attacked, and silenced them. Much credit for the 2nd Battalion's success in pushing inland goes to the LVT(A)s of the Army's 708th Amphibian Tank Battalion, which, according to the Marine battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Hudson, took “more than their share of punishment diverted enemy attention from the amphibious tractors carrying troops ... I shall always re- member the excellent support given to my battalion by the Army LVT(A)'s”. Meanwhile, Marine tanks and artillery, under Turner's command, were successfully brought ashore, although some tanks and howitzers from the 4th Division were lost to fire and reef obstacles. By late afternoon, the bulk of the reserve 2nd and 24th Marines were landed, with the latter sustaining 400 casualties from accidents and artillery fire.  Lieutenant Colonel Alexander A. Vandergrift,  therefore, deployed his battalion and moved it on foot to an assembly area some 700 yards inland from Yellow 1, near a fork in the rail- road tracks. The men had no more than taken entrenching tools in hand when a barrage of well-directed Japanese artillery fire engulfed them. After the day's casualties were totalled, it was discovered that the unit had suffered heavily, though it had yet to enter the front line fighting: 25 killed, 72 wounded, 39 missing, mostly those lost on board the overturned LVTs. Other battalions had suffered more heavily, but the real significance of these figures lies in the fact that the 3rd Battalion did not arrive on the beach until 5:27pm. However, by nightfall, only the 25th Marines had reached the O-1 Line, constituting less than one-third of the planned beachhead, with casualties exceeding 2000 during the landings. After half an hour of the Saipan Invasion, Admiral Toyoda announced Operation A-Go proclaiming "The fate of the Empire rests upon this single battle. Every man is expected to do his utmost." The same Nelsonia words used by Admiral Togo at the legendary battle of Tsushima in 1905. He had created that statement taking Nelson's signal "England expects that every man will do his duty" at the Battle of Trafalgar. Toyoda planned to destroy the American fleet. Admiral Ugaki's battleships were to rendezvous with Admiral Ozawa's carriers in the Philippine Sea to attack the American fleet around Saipan. At 6:35pm on June 15th, the submarine Flying Fish reported that a force of Japanese battleships and at least three carriers had passed through the San Bernardino Strait. The submarines were under orders to report sightings before attempting to attack, so Flying Fish waited until nightfall, then surfaced to radio in its report. The sighting report from the submarine was monitored by the Japanese who knew they had been located. About one hour later, submarine Seahorse also sighted a Japanese force 200nm east-southeast of Surigao Strait. The exact composition of this force was unclear, but was thought to be Yamato and Musashi plus escorts. The submarine was not able to send a signal of its sighting until 4:00am on June 16th. Additionally, throughout the 15th, a growing body of signals intelligence indicated that a major IJN fleet action was underway.   Receiving this intelligence on the enemy's intentions, Admiral Spruance made the decision to halt the Guam landings, instructed for unloading at Saipan to continue until June 17th only, and tasked Turner with preparing for an imminent decisive battle. However, that's a podcast for next week. General Saito was on the verge of initiating his counterattack. Throughout the night, there were various probes and minor counterattacks that were swiftly repelled. Nonetheless, the 2nd Battalion, 6th Marines faced a major assault at 3am when a Japanese bugler 75 sounded a loud, clear call on the tense night air, and with a waving of flags, loud screams, and a brandishing of swords, the attack was launched. Added to the din were the shouts of the 6th Marines for “flares.” Illumination shells, fired by the three destroyers, Halsey Powell, Coghlan and Monssen of Task Unit 52.17.3 began to burst over the area, clearly revealing the Japanese attackers. Men of Companies F and I opened with accurate, devastating lire. California joined with a tornado of salvos in front of the Marine lines. The Japanese, stripped by the illumination of the advantage afforded by their superior knowledge of the terrain (so helpful in night lighting), dropped before the Marines' fusillade. As Japanese fell, others replaced them in the determined onslaught.  At one point in the fighting, it was feared that the enemy had effected a penetration of Company I, along the coastal road. To contain this Japanese prong, Colonel Riseley shifted one company of the 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marines, company L, into the area. The light of morning, however, revealed that no penetration had been made and that Company B had, in effect, formed a secondary line. By 5:45, the Japanese pressure reached a peak; two Marine 37mm guns near the beach were knocked out and their crews forced back. Although the main positions held, a false report reached the 6th Marines' command post to the effect that Company F's lines along the beach had been forced back about 50 yards. This erroneous report, probably fostered by the withdrawal of the two 37mm crews and the infiltration of small enemy groups to the regimental command post, had no basis in fact. Fortunately, five medium tanks arrived in the nick of time to halt the Japanese advance and thwart their assault. With the dawn of June 16th, the battlefield revealed approximately 700 enemy casualties strewn across the terrain. Meanwhile, as the 6th Marines consolidated their position and the remaining 2nd Marines landed, Colonel Wallace's 2nd Battalion resumed its offensive against Afetna Point, successfully eliminating enemy resistance and bridging the gap between Marine divisions. Further south, General Schmidt led his three regiments towards Fina Susu Ridge in a coordinated advance. Despite the 23rd Marines encountering formidable enemy opposition in the mountains and marshes, the 25th Marines managed to clear Agingan Point and extend beyond the beachhead, while Colonel Franklin Hart's 24th Marines in the center made significant progress towards the O-1 line despite facing fierce resistance. Meanwhile,  Spruance opted to withdraw the unnecessary transports in anticipation of the impending naval confrontation. General Smith made the decision to deploy the reserve 27th Division for landing. Consequently, Major-General Ralph Smith's units, excluding the 106th Regiment, commenced landing operations in the afternoon. However, during the night, Saito initiated his second significant counterattack. The Japanese 136th Infantry (two battalions) and 9th Tank Regiments were to counterattack the center of the 2nd Marine Division sector at 17.00hrs. Yokosuka 1st SNLF was to attack the north flank from the Garapan area and “cooperate with the tanks to annihilate the enemy's front line and advance towards Oreai (Charan Kanoa) Airfield.” Vice Admiral Nagumo, Commander Central Pacific Fleet and 5th Base Force, was ordered to command the attack personally. The units were still disorganized from the previous night's action and the attack was not launched until 03.30hrs. The objective of the Japanese attack was modest enough: the Saipan radio station, a short 400 yards behind the 6th Marines' lines. This objective, in itself, represented a revision in Saito's pre-D-Day policy to “destroy the enemy, during the night, at the water's edge." Seizure of the radio station area would still leave 500—600 yards distance to the water. This resulted in an estimated 44 tanks and 500 infantry attacking the positions of the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, and 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marines. The attack began at about 3:30, and the brunt struck Lieutenant Colonel Jones' 1st Battalion, 6th Marines,  and to a lesser extent the 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marines. The tanks advanced in groups of four or five with Japanese soldiers clinging to them. Poor and ineffective tactics reflected the inadequacy of Saito's order; some tanks cruised about in an aimless fashion, some bogged down in the swampy ground, some made an effort to break through the lines, still others stopped to let off their pugnacious passengers. The Japanese suffered heavy losses, including approximately 24 tanks and 300 men, while inflicting only 97 casualties. By the end of the initial two days, American forces had incurred roughly 3,500 casualties, approximately 20% of the total for the operation. Concurrently, General Obata had instructed the commanders of Guam, Truk, and Tinian to send reinforcements to Saipan via barge, although only two companies managed to land on Rota by June 22nd. On June 17th, the American offensive resumed, yielding significant progress, partly due to artillery support. General Watson expanded the beachhead area nearly twofold, with the 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marines, and 2nd Battalion, 6th Marines advancing northward to within 1000 yards of Garapan. Meanwhile, Colonel Riseley's remaining units secured the base of Mount Tipo Pale along the O-2 Line, and Colonel Wallace's Marines maneuvered around Lake Susupe to reach the O-1 Line.  To the south, the 25th Marines led by Colonel Batchelder advanced in a column formation, making headway towards Aslito Airfield by approximately 1500 yards. They managed to secure advantageous high ground along the O-2 Line on the northwest perimeter of the airfield. Simultaneously, Colonel Gerard Kelley's 165th Regiment also moved towards Aslito, making gains of around 1200 yards despite encountering light resistance. By 2:00pm, the 2nd Battalion had moved to the southwest edge of Aslito Airfield, while the 1st Battalion had become involved in a fight for a dominating ridge line extending from the airfield's southwest corner to the vicinity of Cape Obiam. Infantrymen of the 1st Battalion led by Major James H. Mahoney inched slowly up the steep and open slope, so that, by 5:00pm, a toehold had been gained at the crest. At this point, however, the Japanese launched a counterattack and drove the soldiers back off the hill. Reorganizing and reforming the lines at the base of the ridge, the battalion dug in for the night. Amid heavy artillery bombardment, the 24th Marines reached and secured the O-2 Line, consolidating their position on the ridge. In contrast, progress for the 23rd Marines to the south of Lake Susupe's swamps was minimal as they faced entrenched enemy forces. With the expansion of the beachhead, additional Corps units landed, including General Smith's command post, advance parties of the Corps artillery, and Colonel Leonard Bishop's 105th Regiment. During the night, Saito launched another counterattack, deploying the 1st Battalion of the 18th Regiment to stage a counterlanding on the Marine beachhead. However, the intervention of LCI gunboats and Marine artillery thwarted the attempt, driving the enemy back to Tanapag Harbor. Shifting focus to the Battle of Biak, General Fuller's forces had previously seized Mokmer but now found themselves encircled by Colonel Kuzume's formidable positions in the East and West Caves. Despite progress in repairing the airdrome, intense Japanese fire prevented its use until the enemy cave strongholds were neutralized. In contrast, the Japanese had attempted twice to reinforce Biak but failed both times. However, Operation KON drew the Allied forces away from the island, allowing barges to discreetly bring reinforcements from the southwest to Biak without naval protection. As a result, most of the 2nd Battalion, 221st Regiment was successfully transported to the island by June 12, and General Numata was evacuated during this period. Following this success, the 2nd Battalion, 219th Regiment was loaded onto barges in Sorong and transported to Biak via Noemfoor Island, arriving successfully by June 16. Meanwhile, as Colonel Newman's 186th Regiment secured its positions on June 8, Fuller decided to send the rest of Colonel Haney's 162nd Regiment to the recently secured Parai Jetty. With the Ibdi Pocket contained, Haney made significant progress toward Mokmer. The next day, Haney continued his advance, successfully connecting with his 2nd Battalion despite heavy mortar fire. Newman faced multiple night counterattacks and was unable to expand his beachhead. On June 10th the 1st Battalion, 186th Infantry, sent two companies to the point on the low ridge where Company B had been halted the previous afternoon. Despite artillery support, the two units could make little progress and were themselves pinned down about 10:30. Japanese rifle and mortar fire was silenced by the 1st Battalion's 60-mm. mortars, but the Japanese continued to pour machine gun fire from a number of bunkers and pillboxes which proved impervious to bazooka and 75-mm. tank fire. The units withdrew while more artillery fire was placed along the low ridge. On the east flank, enemy fire from the East Caves had died down, and the 2nd Battalion, 162nd Infantry, was able to move on eastward. On that same day, as Admiral Toyoda ordered a third attempt for Operation KON, Admiral Ugaki's battleships were directed to support Admiral Sakonju's convoy, assembling at Batjan Island on June 11th. The start of the Marianas bombardment on that day forced Toyoda to suspend the operation and prepare for A-Go, ordering the battleships to rejoin Admiral Ozawa's command and sending the 23rd Air Flotilla to Palau to reinforce Admiral Kakuta's 1st Air Fleet. With two regiments now stationed at Mokmer, Fuller decided to resume his offensive by advancing westward towards Borokoe and northward towards the low ridge. The 163rd Regiment was assigned to hold the Ibdi Pocket and the East Caves. On June 11, the assault battalions began moving to the starting point in front of Menoebaboe. Haney's forces faced strong resistance and only reached the starting point by afternoon. The Americans then crossed the starting line, encountering minimal resistance along the coast but significant opposition on the low ridge. As a result, three battalions reached the 1st Phase Line, while Haney's 3rd Battalion couldn't move beyond the starting line. This forced Newman to pause his advance temporarily until Haney cleared enemy positions on the ridge. On June 12, Haney's 2nd and 3rd Battalions advanced on the low ridge. The 3rd Battalion fought doggedly forward during the afternoon, discovering an ever increasing number of Japanese pillboxes, bunkers, and hasty automatic weapons and rifle emplacements of all kinds, manned by 1st Battalion and 5th Company, 222nd Regiment. Dusk found the unit still some 100 yards short of the line of departure and about 1,300 yards east of the 2nd Battalion. The 1st Battalion, taking no part in the action during the day, moved forward to Mokmer Drome from Parai. Due to heavy Japanese resistance, their progress was slow. The next day, the Americans continued their attacks against enemy positions, but they couldn't close the gap between Haney's 2nd and 3rd Battalions. Fuller concluded that his troops were fatigued and that the Japanese had likely received reinforcements, so he requested an additional infantry regiment. General Krueger planned to send the 34th Regiment from Hollandia, scheduled to arrive on June 18. In response to recent setbacks, General Doe ordered the 1st Battalions of the 162nd and 186th Regiments to support the 3rd Battalion on June 14. These battalions positioned themselves on the terrace above the low ridge, facing the main Japanese strongpoint directly. In response to the enemy's aggressive action, Colonel Kuzume initiated a tank-infantry counterattack with his remaining forces to push back the enemy battalions, inflicting heavy casualties and disrupting the American advance. Despite this, the Americans managed to regroup and establish a continuous line, while the Japanese sustained significant losses and were unable to execute any further major counterattacks for the rest of the battle. Generals Krueger and MacArthur were unhappy with the progress of operations in Biak, which led them to relieve Fuller of his duties as task force commander. Whether General Fuller's relief as commander of the HURRICANE Task Force was entirely justifiable is a question which cannot be answered categorically. At the time of his relief, the task force had seized Mokmer Drome. Patrols sent westward to Borokoe and Sorido Dromes had found no enemy at those two fields, and General Fuller knew they could be occupied with ease. But he had not sent more troops beyond Mokmer Drome because he believed it more important to secure an overland line of communications to that field and to clear the low ridge so that repair work could continue and at least one strip could be put in service. By June 14th it was only a question of time before the West Caves area and the low ridge would be secured. Indeed, General Eichelberger, who took 3.5 days to acquaint himself with the situation at Biak, drew up new attack plans according to which the 162nd and 186th Infantry Regiments were to be employed in the same area and in much the same manner as General Fuller had been using them. General Eichelberger realized, as had General Fuller, that Borokoe and Sorido Dromes would be no safer than Mokmer Drome as long as the Japanese held the low ridge and West Caves positions. But, in the last analysis, the mission of the HURRICANE Task Force, quick seizure and rehabilitation of the Biak fields, had not been accomplished by mid-June. General Eichelberger then took command of Operation Hurricane on June 15. Although the initial plan was to keep Fuller in charge of the 41st Division, he felt unjustly treated and requested to be relieved of this role as well. Consequently, Doe was promoted to command the 41st Division in Fuller's place. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The invasion of Saipan was seeing tremendous casualties for both the Japanese and Americans. By the end of the initial two days, American forces had incurred roughly 3,500 casualties, approximately 20% of the total for the operation. This island was not going to be a cake walk by any measure, it would be paid for in blood.  

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Last time we spoke about landings at Biak. General Fuller unleashed a amphibious assault against Biak that faced countless hurdles. The Hurricane Task force encountered a lot of terrain issues at Humboldt bay, leading to logistical headaches. Despite the disorganization, they shipped off and landed, forming a beachhead. Colonel Kuzume and his men were caught with their pants down, units were scattered all over the place. The first tank battle of the Southwest Pacific occurred, seeing American Shermans absolutely desolate Japanese Type 95's. General Fuller planned to consolidate his troops at Ibdi and Bosnek while reinforcements arrived, but the Japanese continuously lobbed surprise night attacks to horrible effect. Over in the Burma front, Mutaguchi's operation continued to unravel as his subordinate officers disregarded his orders and performed their own withdrawals. As Mutaguchi relieved men of command and replaced them, General Slim finally reopened the Imphal-Kohima road spelling doom for the Japanese. This episode is the Fall of Mogaung Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As General Vinegar Joe unleashed what he believed to be a masterstroke against Myitkyina, it soon turned out to be an absolute gruesome struggle. As we last saw, General Stilwell's men had begun a long and difficult siege of Myitkyina. The 22nd and 38th Chinese Divisions were now pinned down by General Tanaka's battered 18th Division south of Kamaing. To the south Brigadier Calvert's Chindits began a battle for Mogaung, which forced General Takeda's 53rd Division to suspend the relief of Myitkyina and rush back to reinforce the town. Though the Mogaung Garrison and the 1st Battalion, 128th Regiment to the north had been effectively destroyed by the Chindit and Chinese attacks, the Japanese had been able to maintain their hold on Mogaung by mid-June. To the east, General Wei's Y Force had opened a new offensive on Yunnan, gradually pushing Colonel Kurashige's 148th Regiment to Tengchong but failing to seize Longling against the tenacious resistance of General Matsuyama's forces. Along the Kamaing-Mogaung front, by late June, Tanaka had been able to assemble most of his depleted command at Lakatkawng, determined to keep the blockade on the Hukawng Valley. His main aim was to clear the Seton roadblock, which had been recently reinforced with General Sun's 113th Regiment; but once again, his attacks would fail to dislodge the tenacious Chinese defenders. Yet upon receiving orders from the 33rd Army commander to withdraw, General Tanaka reported that the 18th Division could continue to hold in the Kamaing area. This statement, inspired by Colonel Ohgoshi, the chief of staff, proved to be unwarranted optimism. The 18th had staged a desperate resistance in the vicinity of Kamaing for about a month and, for most of the period, had only 80 men for each mile of front. Supplies of ammunition and food were very low with only about 1400 rounds of rifle ammunition per day for the entire Division and 60 rounds per machine gun. The daily ration was about 2.5 ounces of rice per man. On receipt of the Army's message to withdraw, Colonel Ohgoshi had advised the Division commander that further resistance in the area was possible, but had not made it clear that this was his personal belief and did not reflect the opinions of the rest of the Division staff. Within a day or two the commander became aware of the fact that the other staff officers were convinced that further resistance in the Kamaing area was impossible. He therefore forwarded to the 33rd Army a revised report of the Division's actual situation. Upon receipt of the second message, on June 27 the Army directed the Division to retire to the Sahmaw sector. Tanaka believed he needed to stand his ground while the 53rd Division pushed aside the Seton Block and reopened his line of communications. Thus, he elected to continue to resist the attacks from the north while he himself attacked Seton for three more days; but failing to make any progress, he would finally comply with his orders to withdraw to the hills north of Sahmaw in early July.  While the 4th and 146th Regiments performed covering attacks, the remnants of the 55th and 56th Regiments destroyed their artillery and heavy equipment, and withdrew along an escape trail cut through the forest west of the Seton roadblock. On 2 July the 18th Division began its withdrawal, utilizing an obscure trail that ran directly south from Kamaing. Crossing the mountain range west of Seton, the Division completed its concentration near Sahmaw about 7 July. The Hukawng Operation was then considered concluded, ending a campaign that had been a miserable failure and had cost almost 8,000 casualties. By July 15th, the 18th Division would finally assemble in the Indaw area. Though only 3000 men from the elite 18th Division would survive the Hukawng Valley Campaign, Tanaka had effectively managed to keep intact the blockade to China for another year, something that would have profound repercussions later on in Chinese history. Further south, the 114th Regiment finally arrived at Gurkhaywa on June 16th, ready to reinforce the Chindits; yet Takeda had also brought most of his troops back to Mogaung, subsequently starting a deadly shelling of the Chindit positions. By when June 15th arrived, the Chinese still had not appeared, and Calvert pulled his troops back towards the bridge. At that moment, remarkable news arrived: The Japanese were abandoning their positions along the river. Calvert was exuberant. This meant he could move out of his bridgehead perhaps capture the town. Certainly, it meant a reduction of the shelling which was claiming at least 15 of his men a day. Yet, when the shelling did not die down and it quickly became apparent that Takeda was merely redeploying his troops along the railway, to get them out of flooding in low-lying areas. Chindit recce teams reported the area from the train station, in the heart of the town to the Mogaung Railway Bridge, further north, was heavily defended with eight bunkers dominating the landscape. Shelling from the village of Naungkyaiktaw, astride the road to Mogaung, set between fields of paddy, was persistent. Naungkyaiktaw had to be captured. Calvert estimated the village was held by a hundred Japanese. Because of this, on June 18th, Calvert ordered his forces to attack the apparent Japanese artillery encampment at Naungkyaiktaw after a heavy air and mortar bombardment. His troops outnumbered them, but unwilling to suffer needless casualties, Calvert directed the American fighter-bombers against the village, which was bombarded on the night of the 17th. Half an hour before dawn on the 18th, the Chindit mortars pummeled the place with 400 rounds for good measure. Calvert then sent in his assault force. Among the attackers was a company of 70 men from King's Liverpool led by Major Fred Reeman. This was a company that had stayed on with the 77th Brigade after the rest of the battalion had been transferred to the 111th Brigade. They were joined by 12 men of Blaine's Detachment, once evacuated to India but since returned, this time armed with about a dozen flamethrowers.  In the darkness, Blaine's Detachment was told to advance in front of the company of King's, and to “turn the fucking lights on.” As the detachment began to hurl flames far and wide, the Chindits behind them began cheering. The men had been told that the village had many bunkers, but never saw any at first. The scene soon turned fantastic. They went through the entire village “with twenty or thirty yards of flame shooting out in front.” They soon found the bunkers. The Japanese became crazed with fear especially after the British began yelling “put out the fucking lights,” and turning the flamethrowers their way. Many Japanese fled the bunkers, joined by those outside. They fled through the paddy fields, making for the railway station 400 yards away. Calvert's machine gunners had been waiting and blazed away, killing at least forty. Meanwhile, the rest of Fusiliers and the Kings walked up the paddy, picking off Japanese hiding or trying to crawl away in the ditches. Calvert, his mobile brigade-major Brash and his orderly Lance-Corporal Young decided to join the mop-up, shooting at Japanese while standing on chairs, as more Fusiliers began clearing the last of the bunkers, hurling grenades into them and blasting the insides with flamethrowers. As twilight set in that day, the most peculiar thing happened. The Fusiliers were cooking an evening meal in their newly-won positions, when a weary, seven-man patrol walked into their billet and began to take off their kit. The Fusiliers who looked up casually, noticed to their horror, that the new men were Japanese. The Japanese, for their part, had not noticed. The Fusiliers lunged for their weapons and opened fire. The Japanese patrol did not survive. In all, Calvert estimated that his troops had killed about 70 Japanese in the capture and holding of Naungkyaiktaw, while suffering 16 killed and 38 wounded. Major Reeman's King's company had become reduced to a platoon.  Calvert was considerably cheered on the evening of the 18th, when the much promised Chinese reinforcements finally arrived, guided over the river in motorized ranger boats by a towering Chindit officer, Captain Andrew. This was the 1st Battalion of the Chinese 114th Regiment led by Major P'ang, which quickly deployed in the positions pointed out by Calvert but left the Chindits a little flummoxed when they proclaimed that they were in no particular hurry to fight as they had been fighting for years. On the following day, another battalion of Chinese arrived under the personal command of the regimental leader, Colonel Li Hung, as did a battery of 75mm pack howitzers  the “6th Battery” under US Major Wayne Cook. The Chinese quickly assumed the defense of Mahaung, prompting an American liaison officer with the Chinese to send a press release that the Chinese had “captured” the village, which embarrassed Li. Cook's battery was deployed into position at Pinhmi village began operations on the 20th, hurling fire against the Japanese positions as the Chinese infantrymen consolidated their positions. Meantime, elements of the Chinese 113th Infantry, operating five miles north of Mogaung, surrounded a Japanese company, while Cook's guns hammered them. Fifty Japanese died from first blast alone. The Chinese finished off those who survived.The assault, was so ferocious that all the bunkers were overrun The reinforcements heartened Calvert for his own brigade was now a shell of its former self. The Lancashire Fusiliers and the King's Liverpool had only 110 men, the South Staffords had 180 and the Gurkha Rifles had 230. He planned a fresh advance, this time aiming for the hamlet of Natgyigon, on Mogaung's right flank, near the river. This area, Calvert believed, was the “key to Mogaung.” For the time, he chose the early hours of darkness on June 23rd a day which would go down in the annals of the 77th Brigade as the “stuff of legends.” The plan called for a mortar barrage of 1,000 bombs, in addition to shelling from the 75mm guns to cover the advance of the Chindits across the open ground towards Natgyigon. The Gurkhas were to move on the right, with the South Staffords on the left. Blaine's Detachment and the Lancashire Fusiliers were in reserve. The objective was to capture the entire stretch of ground from the Mogaung Bridge to the train station, the latter of which the Chinese were to secure. Once the area was in Allied hands, the troops were to dig in while the reserve troops mopped up. In addition, Allied aircraft were to bombard the area before the start of the assault, which itself was timed to launch at about 3.10 am. In the dark, section commanders could be heard telling their men: “We attack Mogaung tonight and once we've taken it the Brigadier says we are through!” Later, during the attack, Calvert discovered the Chinese infantry had not captured the all-important train station, even as their American liaison officer insisted that they had. Calvert angrily pointed out that no, the Chinese had not, because enemy fire from that direction continued to pick off his men at the railway embankment. The Gurkhas, moving along a wide right flank along the banks of the Mogaung River, headed for the railway bridge. Approaching the bridge, they came under heavy fire. Captain Allmand, by now suffering from trench foot as were most of the troops, moved forward to silence a machine gun firing on his men. He could barely run because of his affliction but advancing through the mud, he hurled grenades at the Japanese position. A burst of gunfire plunged into him. He fell, badly wounded. One of his Gurkhas, Sergeant. Tilbir Gurung pulled Allmand and another wounded NCO to safety. For this, Gurung was to get a Military Medal. Allmand's own valor was to be recognized by a Victoria Cross. The South Staffords swept into Mogaung town. Resistance was heavy. Lt Durant of the South Stafford deployed his machineguns to rake Japanese positions with fire. Meantime, the flamethrowers were brought up. As they moved up past Durant's positions, a shell burst exploded one, setting the man wielding it on fire. The man screamed and somehow shook off the flamethrowing unit from his back. Durant and some of his men rushed forward and rolled him into water in a nearby ditch. The Japanese had dug-in beneath the ruins of a brick house from where they were stubbornly holding the Staffords at bay. The rest of the flamethrowers moved in and sprayed the building. One Japanese, his clothes ablaze, leapt from his positions and tried to make a run for it. A scythe of gunfire cut him down. The rest valiantly held their positions and were burned to cinder. The Staffords, mopping up the, found the Japanese officer. He had shot himself with his revolver. The Japanese had entrenched themselves at a strategically important building known as the Red House, which was well-protected with machine-gun nests. The advancing Gurkhas consequently ran smack into this killing zone, getting caught in a murderous crossfire and suffering heavy casualties. In response, Calvert threw his reserves into the fray and the Chindits also began to pummel the Japanese positions with mortars and machine-guns, which allowed the infantry to reach the all-important train station. Inflicting some 120 casualties and losing 60 dead and over 100 wounded, the Chindits then successfully captured all their objectives by noon. For the rest of the day, heavy fighting would continue as the Chindits dug in on their gained positions; but during the night, the Japanese would finally pull out, leaving the town to the shattered remnants of the 77th Brigade. Mopping up then continued until June 27, when Mogaung was declared void of Japanese. Though this was the first major town to be recaptured in Burma, Calvert lost over 250 killed and 500 wounded at Mogaung, which was more than any Chindit formation was prepared to take. This was also a bittersweet victory for Calvert because Stilwell would claim that the town had been taken by his Chinese troops, even though the Chindits had done most of the fighting. Stilwill wrote in his diary on June 27th “Good news from Mogaung, We have it!” Then came a remarkable broadcast from Stilwell's headquarters via the BBC “The Chinese had captured Mogaung”. There was no mention of the Chindits. Calvert was incensed. Colonel Li was appalled and apologized profusely. “If anyone has taken Mogaung it is your Brigade and we all admire the bravery of your soldiers.” Calvert, his anger against Stilwell unmitigated, sent a message to US headquarters  “Chinese reported taking Mogaung. My Brigade now taking umbrage” this prompted Stilwell's staff to scour the maps for the location of Umbrage. Meantime, congratulations poured in from Lentaigne, from “Scottie” Scott, from John Masters, and the other brigade commanders. Among the lot, there was one, from Derek Tulloch, which struck Calvert's heart the most: “Wingate would have been proud of you.” After this defeat, and learning of the concurrent withdrawal of the 18th Division, Takeda's 53rd Division would withdraw to the Sahmaw River line in early July, where it was also reinforced with the recently-arrived 119th Regiment.  Meanwhile over at Myitkyina, General Boatner had to order a stop to the attacks after June 18th because of the heavy casualties. For the time being, tunneling would be used to close with the enemy. On June 25th, however, Boatner would have a severe recurrence of malaria that would force him to abandon the frontlines. This led General Stilwell to appoint Brigadier-General Theodore Wessels in command of the Myitkyina Task Force on June 26th. Luckily for Wessels the situation started to improve after the fall of Mogaung, as Chinese troops there could now move up the railroad to connect with Wessels' forces. This removed the recurrent menace of a Japanese drive from Mogaung, guaranteed reinforcements and the opening of a ground line of communications, and further eliminated one of General Minakami's two bases from which supplies had trickled into the Japanese perimeter. Despite this, the only gains in the week of June 25th were a few hundred yards taken by the 150th Regiment and the 236th Engineers. Alongside this, Stilwell ordered the 1st Battalion, 42nd Regiment to penetrate through the Japanese positions towards Sitapur on June 28. They would drive deep into the Japanese defense system, leading Stilwell to hope this was the turning point; on receiving Japanese fire, it halted and dug in. Air supply was necessary.In response, Wessels dispatched some Marauder reinforcements. F Company, unaware it had lost its way and under an inexperienced commander, proceeded with a small point almost directly ahead of the marching column. The company commander at the head of the point met a small group of Orientals whom he took to be Chinese and who greeted him affably. The strangers then suggested he and his party lay aside their guns. At this point the commander realized that he had been ambushed and gave the alarm. The Japanese machine guns opened on his trapped column, inflicting heavy casualties. Some of his men made their way back to the Allied lines, but the company was never reconstituted and was broken up and distributed among the rest of Galahad. For his constant gallantry during a stubborn eight-hour rear-guard action, which permitted the survivors to extricate themselves from ambush, Private first class. Anthony Firenze of New Galahad received the Distinguished Service Cross. Wessels then planning to launch a set-piece attack to capture a stretch of the Sumprabum Road.  Over in the Yunnan front, Colonel Matsui's 113th Regiment had successfully relieved the pressure from Longling by mid-June. General Matsuyama further ordered him to maintain the offensive while he continued to reorganize his forces. Though Matsui managed to seize the Tiechanghe pass on June 21st, most of his attacks would end up in nothing. In the north, the 20th Army Group launched simultaneous attacks against Qianshuang and Gudong on June 18th. This finally forcing the Japanese to retreat in disorder towards Tengchong by June 22nd. With the fall of Qianshuang, the Japanese had been forced to abandon the upper Shweli valley, and were now moving in some disorder toward Tengchong over three excellent trails. In Qianshuang, they left behind large quantities of ammunition and a few pieces of artillery, suggesting a disorganized withdrawal. 150 dead Japanese were found in Qianshuang itself; more than 300 Chinese gave their lives for the village. South of Qianshuang, the Japanese hastily destroyed their pontoon bridge to slow the Chinese pursuit. On reaching the Qianshuang-Baifen-Gudong line, the 20th Army Group had wrested 4000 square miles from Japanese control in forty days of fighting. The advance had been made over the precipitous ranges of the Kaolikung Mountains in an almost constant rain, a downpour sometimes heavy, sometimes light, rarely abating, and always turning to fog and sleet in the higher altitudes. More than 150 coolie supply porters fell to their deaths from the narrow, slippery trails that snaked precariously over the mountains. On June 25th General Wei received a personal order from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek to take Teng-chung. A few days later, th 20th Group Army, though delayed by the need to rebuild bridges over each of the swift mountain streams that crossed its advance, had pressed the Japanese rear guards back to the hills that surrounded Teng-chung at a distance of two to three miles from the formidable walled town itself. Meanwhile, the Fourteenth Air Force was trying to soften Teng-chung by daily attacks with bombs and machine-gun fire. The outer defenses of Teng-chung were pillboxes covering every avenue of approach, supported and covered by the 6,500-foot-high, fortified mountain peak of Lai-feng Shan, "The Place Where the Birds Come." Here were 600 or more Japanese with most of the garrison's artillery. Teng-chung itself was girdled by a massive wall of earth that in some places was forty feet high and sixty feet thick at the base, faced throughout with great slabs of stone. Chinese necromancers had carefully laid out the wall in a great square to cut the cardinal points of the compass. Each side had a gate, and each gate now had a Japanese command post, while Japanese machine guns and rifles swept the approaches to the wall, its face, and its parapets. Within the city were about 2,000 Japanese. In all, Colonel Kurashige, who had defended the Kaoli-kung mountains, had about 1,850 Japanese, a heavily reinforced battalion combat team built around the 2nd, 148th regiment. Kurashige's orders were to hold Teng-chung until the Chinese threat to Lung-ling passed Over at Longling, Matsui saw the arrival of some reinforcements on June 22nd that would allow him to continue his counteroffensive. Making repeated night and day attacks, the Japanese would be able to penetrate the enemy positions on June 24. Matsuyama then directed him to exploit towards Bengmiao and Huangcaobacum; yet a heavy raid by 24 B-25s and the arrival of the 1st Division would manage to halt the Japanese attempt to exploit their success, with Mitsui only securing the area northwest of Bengmiao by July 1st. The next day, Matsuyama then suspended the counteroffensive because of heavy casualties and he could see the enemy were strengthening their positions. In the meantime, Major Kanemitsu's Lameng Garrison was successfully holding off against a siege by three divisions since June 4th, though the Chinese would only launch unsuccessful attacks in regimental strength during this period; and to the southeast, the Pingda Garrison was also successfully repelling the small enemy attacks against them in spite of being cut off and disease-ridden. That is all for the Burma front today as we now need to head over to the Biak front. After the arrival of two battalions of the163rd Regiment for reinforcements, General Fuller planed a two-pronged attack against Mokmer Drome, with the 186th Regiment advancing west over the inland plateau while the 162nd Regiment resumed its attack west along the coast. On the morning of June 1, in preparation for the offensive, Colonel Newman's 3rd Battalion therefore left Bosnek and marched north over the coastal ridge, with the 2nd Battalion also moving from Opiaref to join them. By 11:00, both battalions successfully set up defensive perimeters; yet their preparations would be interrupted abruptly in the afternoon as Colonel Kuzume directed his 1st Battalion to attack the positions held by Company K. These Japanese, who were supported by machine guns and mortars emplaced northwest of the trail crossing, continued attacks until 5:00, when a platoon of Company K, by a flanking movement, forced their withdrawal northward. Company K and two platoons of the Antitank Company remained at the trail crossing for the night. Company I was moved forward to K's left and left rear, and Company L extended K's perimeter east along the main road toward the surveyed drome. Battalion headquarters and Company M stayed near the strip's western end. The 121st Field Artillery Battalion, the Cannon Company, the 2nd Battalion, regimental headquarters, the attached engineers, and the tanks remained near the center of the airfield.   Thankfully, the Americans would manage to repel the assaults and would ultimately force a Japanese withdrawal via a bold enveloping maneuver. But the Japanese would return after midnight. The first part of the night passed without incident, but at 3:30 the entire area held by the 3rd Battalion, 186th Infantry, flamed into action. About a company and a half of the 1st Battalion, 222nd Infantry, moved from the south against the semicircular perimeter held by Companies I, K, and L, having outflanked the 3rd Battalion on the west. Simultaneously, other elements of the 1st Battalion attacked from the northwest, attempting to drive a wedge between Companies L and K. Under the support of mortar and machine gun fire from both the northwest and southwest, the encircled Japanese desperately tried to fight their way north. Four hours of confused hand-to-hand fighting, marked by the use of bayonets, machetes, and grenades, ensued. At daylight a count revealed that 86 dead Japanese were within and around the 3rd Battalion's perimeter. The dead included the commander of the 1st Battalion, 222nd Infantry. Losses to the American unit were 3 men killed and 8 wounded.  After dealing with the threat, Newman resumed the westward advance at 9:00 on June 2nd. The 1st and 3rd Battalions, supported by five tanks and an antitank platoon, were to advance abreast, while the 2nd protected the right flank by patrolling north of the main road. The 121st Field Artillery Battalion was to provide continuous close support and was to displace forward with the infantry. Neither artillery nor air bombardment seems to have been provided for or delivered prior to the attack. However, both the 121st and 146th Field Artillery Battalions were registered on targets north and west of the 186th Infantry. Air support was available from Wakde Island upon call. The 1st Battalion, 186th Infantry broke camp at its beach defense area at 8:00 on June 2nd and moved north over the ridge to join the rest of the regiment. The 1st Battalion, 222nd Infantry, had made no serious attempt to stop the 186th Infantry's progress westward because the inland plateau was nearly indefensible and because the battalion would have been decimated in battle with the superior strength of the reinforced American regiment. The 1st Battalion was withdrawn from the surveyed drome area, initially in preparation for counterattack against the Bosnek beachhead. While no such counteroffensive was mounted, the withdrawal of the 1st Battalion at least had the advantage of keeping the unit intact. The American advance would thus be opposed by the 10th Company, 222nd Regiment; the 3rd Company, 36th Division Sea Transportation Unit and some other naval and engineer units.  The 1st and 3rd Battalions then advanced with two companies abreast against scattered but determined opposition from elements of the 1st Battalion, 222nd Infantry. Small enemy patrols aimed machine gun and rifle fire at the advancing American units and held their positions until killed or dispersed by tank or artillery fire. Most of the enemy parties were located on the north flank and apparently many of them had been driven westward out of the cave and garden area north of the surveyed drome by fire from the 121st Field Artillery Battalion, which destroyed Biak Detachment headquarters installations in that area. By nightfall the 186th Infantry had killed 96 Japanese and had itself lost 6 men killed and 10 wounded. The unit halted shortly after 1600 and began digging in at a point about 600 yards northeast of the day's objective. The advance had carried the regiment west until it was almost abreast and north of the 162nd Infantry, at the Ibdi Pocket. The latter had attempted to move west along the coast during the day, but it would be unable to dislodge the Japanese from the Ibdi Pocket, ultimately having to attach its 2nd Battalion to the 186th.  The addition of the 2nd Battalion, 162nd Regiment to the 186th Regiment helped to complicate the supply problems of the troops on the plateau. No water had yet been found inland. Heat and humidity were intense, and thick scrub growth, about 12 feet high, stopped any breezes. Despite the best efforts of Company B, 116th Engineers, the supply road could not be repaired fast enough to keep pace with the advancing infantrymen. Water had to be brought around from Bosnek via Opiaref to the forward units, and there were not enough water trailers nor 5-gallon cans available to supply all the water needed. At night each man received only one canteen of water for the next day, an inadequate amount under the conditions which prevailed inland. The water situation and the necessity for hauling all other supplies north through Opiaref did more to delay the 186th Regiment's progress westward than did the opposition of the 1st Battalion, 222nd Regiment. Meanwhile Kuzume's only support so far had been some air raids carried out by the depleted 23rd Air Flotilla and 7th Air Division. By late May, the 23rd Air Flotilla had only twelve fighters and six medium bombers at Sorong and the 7th Air Division had four large bombers, 20 medium bombers and three fighters. Both units threw what strength they could muster into attacks on the enemy landing force. On May 27th four Army heavy bombers and nine Navy fighters carried out a daylight attack against fierce air opposition, all but four fighters failing to return. Kuzume would need more than that to launch a determined attack that would succeed in pushing the enemy back into the sea. Consequently, on May 29th, General Numata and Admiral Senda had requested the immediate commitment of fleet and air strength into the Biak battle. They both relayed this message “The enemy apparently found the difficulty of rapid occupation of the airfield sector. The enemy will change, in all probability, its policy to occupy the whole island of Biak after the arrival of reinforcements, securing its present positions with landed units for a while. The officers and men on Biak Island are firm in their resolution to crush the enemy. However, our operations are severely restricted by the uncontested superiority of the enemy's feet and air units. The Biak Detachment, which is making every effort in destroying the confronting enemy, request for further support by the army and navy units concerned. We believe that the immediate commitment of our air forces and, if possible, some fleet units would give us a splendid opportunity to turn the tide of battle in the whole Pacific area in our favor.“ This finally convinced Admiral Toyoda to send reinforcements to the island.  To counter the Allied advance to Biak, the IJN dispatched from one third of its available naval land-based air strength from the Central Pacific to reinforce the 23rd Air Flotilla in western New Guinea. On May 28th 70 carrier-type fighters, 4 reconnaissance bombers, and 16 medium bombers were dispatched to western New Guinea. Another group of planes, comprising 48 fighters, 8 reconnaissance aircraft, and 20 bombers, were sent to western New Guinea and Halmahera from the Carolines on or about May 31st. On 29-30th May the flotilla carried out fresh attacks on the Biak landing force. On May 29th, sixteen medium bombers attacked the enemy fleet in the sea near BIAK Island before daybreak of that day, yet none of them returned. Furthermore, in a daylight attack on the same day, four Zero fighters strafed BIAK Island. None of them returned to the base either. On May 30th, the unit of the Zero fighters of the Navy again fired upon enemy ships in the sea off Mokmer. The damage on the enemy ships was not confirmed. However, the unit reported that they fought four P-38s and four B-25s of the enemy and shot down two B-25s above BIAK Island. Also as part of Operation KON, a huge task force under Admiral Sakonju, which included the battleship Fuso, four cruisers and eight destroyers, was to transport Major-General Tamada Yoshio's 2nd Amphibious Brigade towards Biak. Additionally, it was decided to move three infantry companies of the 35th Division from Sorong to Biak by barge. Sakonju's convoy finally left Davao on the night of June 2nd. In connection with KON Force's advance, the Japanese had planned heavy air strikes against Biak which were to be carried out by the recently reinforced 23rd Air Flotilla and the few army aircraft which remained at bases within range of Biak. Between 1645 and 1700 on 2 June, from eleven to fifteen Japanese planes bombed Allied positions on Biak, causing a few casualties and some light damage. Seven of these planes were shot down by shore-based anti-aircraft weapons, while guns aboard Seventh Fleet ships lying off Bosnek accounted for at least one more. Later during the same night, a few more enemy planes dropped some bombs harmlessly on and near Owi Island. Still more approached Biak during the night, causing many red alerts but not dropping any bombs. The next night, that of 3-4 June, no Japanese planes attacked Biak, although an unknown number bombed Owi Island without causing any damage or casualties. Again, however, enemy aircraft flew many reconnaissance flights around Biak, causing an almost continuous red alert until the early morning hours of 4 June. Early on the morning of June 3rd, at a point just east of the Talaud Islands, between Mindanao and Morotai, a 7th Fleet submarine sighted the Transport and 1st Screening Units and was in turn sighted by ships of the latter organization. Alongside this 7th Fleet PB4Y's, operating from Wakde Island, kept the Japanese vessels under surveillance the rest of the day, reporting that the course and speed of the enemy ships could bring them into range of Biak during the evening of June 4th. Their discovery by Allied aircraft so far from Biak apparently had not been anticipated by the Japanese, who later reported that they had not known Allied aircraft were capable of such long-range reconnaissance. Nevertheless, the three KON Force elements steamed on toward Biak, probably hoping that friendly aircraft might drive off the Allied reconnaissance planes and also protect the sea approaches to Biak. To further muddy the situation, Sakonju received false reports that a strong American carrier group was approaching the waters east of Biak. Admiral Kinkaid had indeed dispatched a special task force to deal with this threat, yet the warships could only arrive off Biak on the night of June 4th and didn't include any aircraft carrier. Nonetheless, knowing that he had been discovered and unwilling to risk so many ships under these circumstances, Sakonju would have to suspend the reinforcement run and turn back to Davao and Sorong.   When the Japanese called off KON on June 3rd, the Transport and the 1st and 2nd Screening Units were a little over 500 miles northwest of Biak and about 250 miles east-southeast of the Talaud Islands. At this point, the three forces were reorganized. The Transport Unit, accompanied by the three destroyers of the 1st Screening Unit, changed course for Sorong, while the 2nd Screening Unit and the two heavy cruisers of the 1st turned back toward Davao, which they probably reached late on June 5th. Of the ships moving to Sorong, the Fifth Air Force claimed to have sunk one destroyer and damaged at least two others. The Transport Unit and the 1st Screening Unit's three destroyers arrived safely at Sorong during the evening of June 4th. The Detached Unit, which had been moving toward Biak from Zamboanga on an independent course far to the west of the other three sections of KON Force, had also changed its direction during the night of 3-4 June, and reached Sorong sometime on the 4th. At Sorong the Transport Unit unloaded the 1,700 men of the 2nd Amphibious Brigade. The six destroyers of the Transport and 1st Screening Units then proceeded southwest to Ambon where they refueled. The Transport Unit's one heavy cruiser and one light cruiser sought shelter in Kaboei Bay, Waigeo Island, about 60 miles northwest of Sorong. On 6 June the heavy cruiser Aoba was attacked there by fifteen B-24's of the Fifth Air Force. First reports were that at least two hits were scored on the cruiser, but it was later learned that the ship suffered no damage. Instead, it was able to take part in a second KON Operation. Back over at Biak, Newman resumed the advance westward on the morning of June 3rd, making painfully slow progress because of the difficult terrain and lack of adequate supply lines. Meeting no opposition, they would finally dig in half a mile from the point at which the main ridge left the coast and turned inland near Mokmer. That day, however, Fuller learnt about the possible enemy naval attack, so he decided to halt any offensive actions for the moment. On June 4th, upon learning that no enemy carriers were in the Biak area, Sakonju was again ordered to prepare to run the American blockade, this time bringing the bulk of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 219th Regiment. There would be two naval groups, the first was the Transport Unit, containing three destroyers which had been part of the first KON Operation Transport Unit. The second section was the Screening Unit, also comprising three destroyers. For the second KON Operation there were two detached units, the 1st had one heavy and one light cruiser while the 2nd Detached Unit included the small craft and patrol boats which had put into Sorong at the end of the first KON. The three destroyers of the Transport Unit were each to embark 200 infantrymen at Sorong. In addition, the destroyers of either or both the Transport and Screening Units were each to tow to Biak one landing barge crammed with troops, probably 30 to 50 men to a barge. After two quiet nights, meanwhile, Newman decided to send three battalions forward toward the north-south section of the main ridge northwest of Mokmer on June 5th. Warned by the regimental commander that it was important to secure a foothold on the ridge before the Japanese could deny it to the 186th Infantry, the three assault battalions started westward about 8:00 on June 5th. Lack of water again slowed the advance. No water had been received in the forward area since the morning of the 4th, and Colonel Newman had ordered the troops westward against the advice of his staff and battalion commanders. About noon, however, a heavy rain fell. The regimental commander ordered all troops to halt, catch the rain in ponchos, and fill their canteens. "Had it not been for this lucky break, we would undoubtedly have had to halt in midafternoon." As events turned out, no Japanese opposition was encountered, and by 1500 the 3rd Battalion, 186th Infantry, was within 500 yards of the main ridge. Although Newman and General Doe then wanted to secure the dominating terrain north and northwest of the airfield, they would receive direct orders from Fuller to immediately seize Mokmer Drome and a beachhead on the coast directly south of that strip. Throughout the morning of June 6th the 186th Infantry directed most of its efforts to bringing supplies up to the forward units. Almost the entire 2nd Battalion was engaged in hand-carrying supplies to the 3rd Battalion atop the ridge, while the latter unit sent patrols toward Mokmer Drome seeking good routes of approach to that objective. About noon Colonel Newman reported to task force headquarters that no good route had been found and that supplies, especially the ever-needed water, had not been brought forward in sufficient quantities to allow a regimental attack to be launched that day, and he therefore recommended that the attack be postponed until June 7th. General Fuller approved this suggestion. The lack of supplies and water would delay the attack, however, though the 3rd Battalion would be able to move down the west side of the main ridge to take up positions along a line of departure for the next morning's attack. To support the infantry attack, on June 7th, a thirty-minute artillery concentration began at 7:00 that morning. The 146th, 205th, and 947th Field Artillery Battalions, from positions along the coast to the east, were registered on targets in the airfield area ready to support the advance, but most of the firing was undertaken by the 121st Field Artillery from its location behind the 186th Infantry. While the artillery fired on Mokmer Drome and along the low ridge between that field and the 186th Infantry, Fifth Air Force bombers attacked the Borokoe Drome area and also struck some targets along the low ridge. The airfield was only occupied by the 108th Airfield Construction Unit, which immediately fled the area because of the heavy bombardment. Newman's 1st and 3rd Battalions advanced south encountering no resistance as they crossed Mokmer Drome and reached the beach.  When, on 5 June, the 186th Infantry had reached the crest of the main coastal ridge, it had been on the left rear of the Japanese defenses on the low ridge and terraces above Mokmer Drome. Thus, the regiment had been in a favorable position to take these defenses from the rear. But in its move to the airfield, the 186th Infantry had bypassed the Biak Detachment's principal defensive positions. The bypassing had not been intentional. Colonel Newman had instructed both leading battalions to halt on the low ridge, reconnoiter along it in both directions, and report on Japanese defenses before moving on. According to Colonel Newman: "I received a negative report from both battalions, and ordered the movement to the airdrome. Evidently, the right battalion had failed in this patrolling effort." Instead, the 186th had captured its main objective, but now found itself surrounded by Kuzume's strongest defenses. The Japanese immediately began to pound the new American perimeter, with an artillery duel soon erupting. By nightfall, it had become impracticable to supply the 186th Regiment over the inland plateau road, which ended on the east side of the main ridge. From that point, all supplies would have to be hand-carried to Mokmer Drome and supply parties would be endangered by Japanese patrols, a few of which moved in behind the 186th as the regiment reached the beach, so the 3rd Battalion, 163rd Regiment would be dispatched to push over the inland plateau and protect the parties. Overwater supply was also attempted, yet as the first boats approached the shore they were greeted by machine gun and rifle fire from Japanese whom the 186th Infantry had not yet cleaned out of caves along the water line in front of Mokmer Drome. The small craft returned the fire, but were finally forced to withdraw. The 186th Infantry, according to Colonel Newman, was "glad to see them withdraw since they had our troops running for cover." At 2:00 another attempt was made to land supplies at Sboeria. The three LCM's managed to put their tanks ashore in the face of continuing Japanese fire, but accompanying LCT's were driven off by Japanese artillery. Two of the LCM's were so damaged by enemy fire that they could not fully retract their ramps and had to proceed the nine and a half miles back to Bosnek in reverse. Plans were made to effect all delivery of supplies and evacuation of casualties at night until the enemy fire on the Sboeria beachhead could be neutralized. The tanks which had been landed lumbered along the shore road fronting Mokmer Drome, destroying several small bunkers along the beach. Then they wheeled toward the low ridge north of the airfield, taking under fire a Japanese 75-mm. mountain gun and a 20-mm. piece which had opposed their landing. These two weapons were silenced. Moving cautiously northwestward from the field along a road which crossed the low ridge, the tanks destroyed two large pillboxes. Alongside this, Fuller sent two companies of Haney's 3rd Battalion to land on the Parai Jetty in order to outflank the Ibdi Pocket, which the 162nd had been unsuccessfully attempting to dislodge since the start of the month. But June 7th would also see the start of Operation KON's second attempt.  After rendezvousing off Misoöl Island that morning, Sakonju instructed his 8 destroyers to proceed to Biak. Air cover was to have been provided by planes of the 23rd Air Flotilla. But the cape area was being patrolled by Allied aircraft on June 8th and, about 1:30, the 23rd Air Flotilla cover of six planes was shot down or driven away by 5th Air Force P-38's.  Finding the air now free of enemy planes, American B-25's dived to the attack th convoy, reporting the convoy as 2 light cruisers and 4 destroyers. Initially, it was claimed that 1 destroyer was sunk, 2 were left sinking, and the fourth was damaged. A few days later, destruction was reassessed as 4 destroyers sunk and 2 light cruisers chased to the northwest. These claims were exaggerated. One destroyer, the Harusame, was holed by a near miss and sank rapidly, the bulk of its crew being saved. Another destroyer was damaged by a bomb and took some water; two others were slightly damaged by strafing. Neither speed nor navigation was impeded for any of the three. The two light cruisers reported by the Allied planes were, of course, the other two destroyers. These two might have taken some evasive action by heading northwest for a short time, but as soon as the Harusame crew had been rescued and the Allied planes had disappeared, the convoy reformed and continued on toward Biak. The convoy reformed and continued on toward Biak, undeterred by reports of strong enemy elements in the area. By nightfall, however, it was on a collision course with the cruisers of Admirals Crutchley and Berkey.  At about 6:00 on the 8th, the Transport and Screening Units received a report from a Japanese aircraft that an Allied naval force comprising 1 battleship, 4 cruisers, and 8 destroyers was moving west at high speed from an undesignated point east of Biak. This report was at least partially correct. The Allied task force which had been formed on June 3rd had again assembled on the 8th, having been alerted by reports of the air-sea battle off the Kaap de Goede Hoop. But the Japanese convoy commander apparently took this air reconnaissance report with at least one grain of salt--had not similar information received on June 3rd proved inaccurate? The Transport and Screening Units steamed on, despite the fact that the Kaap de Goede Hoop action had put the force behind schedule. At 11:30 the two enemy groups were approximately forty miles off the north coast of Soepiori Island, ready to turn southeast toward Korim Bay, on the northeast side of Biak. Minutes later a destroyer in the van sighted the Allied task force heading northwest around Biak. The convoy commander quickly realized that he was badly outnumbered and decided that discretion was called for. The Japanese convoy slipping towards the Mapia islands, seeing the allied destroyers failing to pursue them. Yet that is it for Biak for now as we now need to head over to the Wakde-Sarmi front.   General Sibert was preparing to resume the westward offensive. By June 14th, the 20th Regiment had relieved the 158th at the Tirfoam River; and although Sibert wanted to complete unloading of his remaining units before sending the 20th to push westward, General Krueger ordered him to start an immediate offensive on June 18th. Now, however, they were up against almost the full strength of General Tagami's 36th Division. Company B pushed on toward the village at the entrance to the defile between Lone Tree Hill and the eastern nose of Mt. Saksin. This advance was greeted by a hail of fire from Japanese automatic weapons emplaced in the defile--fire reminiscent of the opposition encountered by Company B, 158th Infantry, at the same place more than three weeks earlier. The 20th Infantry's Company B tried to outflank the enemy position to the south but was halted by intense Japanese machine gun fire. Tanks sent forward to aid the infantry were unable to reach the enemy guns because the terrain was impassable to tracked or wheeled vehicles, which could scarcely negotiate the rough road, let alone the thick jungle and rising ground to the south. Late in the afternoon Company A was sent forward to Company B's position, but both units encountered heavy fire and soon lost contact with the rest of the 1st Battalion. The two companies remained for the night in an isolated perimeter near the village and about 400 yards west of the main body. The 3rd Battalion had moved north off the coastal road during the morning, and late in the afternoon it had established a perimeter extending south 200 yards from the beach along the east bank of the Snaky River. The battalion had encountered little opposition during the day, but patrols which had crossed the Snaky before dark reported finding many Japanese defensive positions on the eastern slopes of Lone Tree Hill. A gap which existed between the 1st and 3rd Battalions was partially filled just before nightfall by elements of the 2nd Battalion, which were sent forward late in the afternoon. Casualties during the day were four killed and twenty-eight wounded. The 1st and 3rd Battalions, 1st Infantry, moved across the Tor River in the morning of June 20th and took over the positions in the vicinity of Maffin No. 1 vacated by the 20th Infantry. The 2nd Battalion, 1st Infantry, assumed responsibility for the protection of the bridgehead across the Tor.  The following morning, Sibert then directed his units to patrol extensively in order to locate enemy strong points on and around the hill. Thanks to the information gathered, the 3rd Battalion would attack towards Rocky Point in the afternoon. At the top of Lone Tree Hill was a stretch of rough but generally level ground lying mostly along the western part of the hill. This flat ground, about 700 yards long north to south, was shaped like a crude dumbbell. At its northern end, the level area was about 300 yards wide. It narrowed at the center of the hill to less than 100 yards but broadened again on the south to a width of about 250 yards. There were many coral outcroppings, potholes, and small crevices, while on the north the hill terminated in a very rugged prominence called Rocky Point. This terrain feature, which extended into Maffin Bay from the central mass of Lone Tree Hill, was about 300 yards wide east to west. Its northern face was not as heavily overgrown as the rest of Lone Tree Hill. Although Rocky Point's northeast slope was steep, foot troops could climb that face with more ease than they could approach the top of Lone Tree Hill from most other points. A deep ravine ran southwest into the central mass of Lone Tree Hill from a sandy beach on the east side of Rocky Point. The floor of the ravine varied from 20 to 30 yards in width and its nearly vertical western wall was 40 to 50 feet high. Both sides were honeycombed with natural or man-made tunnels, caverns, and small caves, most of which were connected with each other by underground or deeply defiladed passages. Some caves reached a width of 40 feet, a depth into the hillside of 50 feet, and a height of 20 feet. The ravine terminated on the eastern slope of Lone Tree Hill in a steep grade at the narrow central portion of the hilltop. At 1:45pm, after a fifteen-minute artillery and 4.2-inch mortar preparation, one company moved across the Snaky River, immediately finding the twenty-foot cliff along the eastern side of the shelf which lay between the Snaky River and the central mass of Lone Tree Hill. The morning patrols had not, apparently, reported the existence of this cliff, and naturally it was not known that Japanese defenses were established along it. Machine gun and rifle fire from the 1st Battalion, 224th Infantry, soon pinned down the 3rd Battalion's leading platoon. The company commander quickly sent part of his unit northward to find the Japanese left flank. Moving around the northeast end of the shelf, this group discovered the beach entrance to the deep ravine between the western side of the shelf and Rocky Point. Progress into or across the ravine was impossible in the face of the intense Japanese small arms fire which greeted the advancing American unit. Company B, 6th Engineers, then in the forward area to cut a road from the mouth of the Snaky River to Rocky Point, was brought up to the ravine to help clean out caves and crevices with flame throwers and demolitions, but could not reach the enemy positions through the continued machine gun, mortar, and rifle fire. Infantry bazooka squads also tried to blast the Japanese out of their caves but failed when their ammunition ran out. Since there was no time to bring additional rockets forward before dark, all elements of the 3rd Battalion and the engineer company were withdrawn to the east bank of the Snaky River for the night. The 20th Infantry was to continue the assault on the morrow with the 3rd Battalion moving against Lone Tree Hill from the northeast, the 2nd Battalion in reserve, and the 1st Battalion remaining in its holding position. On the morning of June 22, after a heavy air and artillery concentration on Rocky Point, the 3rd Battalion once again attacked northwest with Companies K and I, successfully driving the Japanese back into their caves to reach the top of Lone Tree Hill just south of Rocky Point. Meanwhile, another two companies had attacked southwest to force their way up the southeast slope of the hill; but subjected to heavy machine-gun fire, they would have to withdraw and march north to join Companies K and I. The 2nd Battalion also moved forward and took positions to the south of the 3rd Battalion. Worried about the American gains, Colonel Matsuyama personally led two companies in the afternoon to fall on the 3rd Battalion's perimeter with suicidal fury. Confused fighting, sometimes hand-to-hand, continued well into the night, with Matsuyama himself getting shot on the thigh. Yet this attack would successfully position the Japanese companies on the rear of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, thus cutting them off from regimental headquarters. Matsuyama also recalled his 2nd Battalion from the Maffin area, so he would employ these reinforcements to attack Sibert's 2nd Battalion on June 23. At dawn on the 23rd Japanese troops, some of whom were using American weapons and wearing parts of American uniforms, attacked the 2nd Battalion, 20th Infantry, from the deep ravine. The battalion initially held its fire, thinking that the enemy force might be a friendly patrol, and the Japanese were able to advance to within fifteen yards of the battalion lines before being recognized. It was an hour before the results of this error could be corrected--an hour during which both the 2nd Battalion and the Japanese suffered heavy losses. The hour ended with an enemy retreat. Isolated, the 2nd Battalion then decided to withdraw and march north towards the 3rd Battalion's perimeter at the top of the hill, getting harassed all the way by Matsuyama's forces. During the night, the Japanese launched a banzai charge against the perimeter, getting very close to retaking Lone Tree Hill but suffering heavy casualties in the end. Upon learning that his battalions were cut off, meanwhile, Sibert decided to outflank the hill by a shore-to-shore maneuver and then continue the attack from both west and east. Accordingly, Companies K and I of the 1st Regiment boarded ten LVTs on the morning of June 24th and moved to the beach just west of Rocky Point, under the protection of the 6th Reconnaissance Troop. Both companies would land successfully by midday against strong Japanese fire, though they would be rapidly pinned down on the narrow beach. Thankfully, Sibert also landed four tanks two hours later to secure the beachhead. This diversion would allow the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 20th Regiment to begin clearing the Japanese from the many caves and crevices on Rocky Point, the deep ravine east of the point, and the hilltop plateau, further securing the supply route up the hill.  By nightfall, no enemy counterattack developed, as Tagami had instead decided to withdraw the 224th Regiment to the Hill 255-Mount Saksin line while the 223rd Regiment retreated behind the Woske River. Thus Matsuyama's resistance in the area weakened and the Americans were finally able to clear Rocky Point. The next day the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 20th Infantry, continued clearing Rocky Point, the deep ravine, the northern part of the hilltop plateau, and the eastern shelf, where a few scattered Japanese still held positions along the twenty-foot-high cliff. Flame throwers, demolition charges, bazookas, and hand grenades all proved successful in eliminating Japanese resistance and sealing or clearing caves and crevices. The task was easier on the 25th, for the Japanese slowly gave up the fight and were killed or sealed off in their caves. Casualties continued to mount, the 2nd Battalion, 20th Infantry, had only about two hundred effectives by the end of the day but many of the losses were not due to Japanese action. Many men were evacuated over the now secured supply route to the top of the hill as they fell from exhaustion or became sick. On the beach west of Rocky Point Companies I and K, 1st Infantry, had little success in expanding their beachhead. The tanks proved useless in the area and were therefore withdrawn to Maffin No. 1. The two infantry companies, pinned down during the morning, kept up a continuous mortar barrage against Japanese positions in the swamp to the south, against the western cliff of Lone Tree Hill, and, when certain such fire would not endanger troops atop the hill, against the northwest corner of Rocky Point. This mortar fire, coupled with the operations on the plateau, began to have the desired effect during the afternoon, and Companies I and K were able to push their defenses beyond the narrow beachhead slightly southward and westward and toward the shore beneath Rocky Point. Once or twice during the afternoon, patrols were able to reach the top of Lone Tree Hill from the northwest corner of the point and established contact with 20th Infantry units. Late in the afternoon Company M, 1st Infantry, operating from the east side of the point, managed to push a patrol around the shore to establish contact with Company K. Though Companies I and K could find little tangible evidence of the results of their operations, they had actually wiped out the 223rd Infantry's defense force in the area just west of Lone Tree Hill. By dusk on the 25th, it had become obvious that the combined efforts of the 3rd Battalion, 1st Infantry, and the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 20th Infantry, had either cleared out the northern half of Lone Tree Hill or had forced the Japanese to withdraw. The latter conclusion was the more nearly correct. The 36th Division decided on 25 June to withdraw the bulk of the Center and Right Sector Forces west of the Woske River and establish new defensive positions, thereby keeping the 223rd Infantry, the bulk of which had not been committed to action in the Lone Tree Hill area, more or less intact. Only the remnants of the 224th Infantry were to remain east of the Woske, and they were to withdraw into rough terrain southwest of Mt. Saksin. At nightfall on the 25th, General Sibert estimated that his three forward battalions had lost approximately 140 men killed and 850 wounded and evacuated, including those who had to be sent back to the rear because of wounds, sickness, heat exhaustion, or psychoneurotic disorders. Known Japanese dead in the northern part of the hill numbered 344, but it could not be estimated how many more had been thrown over the west cliff, sealed in caves, or carried off by withdrawing remnants of the Japanese defense force. According to Japanese sources, the Japanese had lost about 500 men killed and another 300 wounded in the Lone Tree Hill-Hill 225-Mt. Saksin area.   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Chinese were accredited with the fall of Moguang despite the Chindits taking the lionshare of the fighting. Things were advancing very well for the allies in the new Biak front. As for the battle for Lone Tree Hill, it was a costly one, and not one the Americans or Japanese would soon forget.   

Jeremy Cox, Captain of the Lolita fishing team and co-founder of the Mongo Offshore Challenge, shares his fishing journey and the success of their recent fishing trip. The conversation covers topics such as Jeremy's fishing background, the Mongo Offshore Challenge, and their recent catch of a 704-pound blue marlin. They discuss the tournament format, the significance of the catch, and the importance of preserving and studying these fish. Jeremy also talks about the excitement of lure fishing and the thrill of anticipation. The conversation highlights the joy of fishing and the special moments shared with family and friends. The conversation revolves around the experience of catching marlin in the Gulf of Mexico and the importance of sustainable fishing practices. The guests discuss their recent catch of a 700-pound marlin and the challenges they faced during the fishing trip. They also touch on the significance of donating the meat from the catch to charities and zoos. The conversation highlights the love and passion marlin fishermen have for the species and their efforts to protect and conserve them. The guests also discuss the science and research that can be conducted using these rare event species. Additionally, they talk about the process of catching live bait in the Gulf of Mexico and the strategies they use to keep the bait fresh and alive. In this conversation, Jeremy from the Lolita Fishing Team discusses the evolution of live baiting in offshore fishing. He explains how the use of live bait tubes has become a common practice and how it has improved the ability to keep bait alive for longer periods. Jeremy also talks about the importance of fresh and frisky bait in attracting fish and shares tips on handling and caring for bait to keep it in optimal condition. He emphasizes the significance of structure, such as oil rigs, in creating fish aggregating devices (FADs) and attracting a variety of fish species. Jeremy also mentions the potential for future expansion of the Mongo Offshore Tournament to the East Coast and internationally.   Mongo Offshore Challenge East Coast Registration https://www.reeltimeapps.com/live/tournaments/2024-mongo-offshore-east-coast/register   Mongo App: Iphone: https://apps.apple.com/us/app/mongo-offshore-challenge/id1516755470 Android: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.reeltimeapps.mongo&pcampaignid=web_share   Keywords   fishing, blue marlin, tournament, Mongo Offshore Challenge, Gulf of Mexico, Lolita fishing team, catch, celebration, preservation, marlin, Gulf of Mexico, sustainable fishing, catch and release, fishing tournaments, conservation, live bait, tuna tubes, live baiting, offshore fishing, bait tubes, fresh bait, frisky bait, handling bait, oil rigs, fish aggregating devices, FADs, structure, Mongo Offshore Tournament   Takeaways   Jeremy Cox shares his fishing journey and the success of their recent fishing trip The Mongo Offshore Challenge is a season-long tournament that awards the biggest fish caught in various categories The Lolita fishing team caught a 704-pound blue marlin during the Hurricane Open tournament The catch was celebrated with family and friends, and the fish was donated to science for research purposes Lure fishing provides a unique thrill and anticipation for anglers Preserving and studying these fish is important for understanding their reproduction and population Marlin fishermen are passionate about the species and work towards their conservation and sustainability. Donating the meat from caught marlin to charities and zoos is a way to reduce waste and benefit the community. Catching live bait in the Gulf of Mexico can be challenging, especially during the day when the bait goes deep. Tuna tubes are used to keep live bait fresh and alive during fishing trips. The conversation highlights the importance of responsible fishing practices and the role of fishermen in scientific research and data collection. Live baiting has evolved over the years, with the use of live bait tubes becoming a common practice in offshore fishing. Fresh and frisky bait is essential in attracting fish, and there are techniques to handle and care for bait to keep it in optimal condition. Oil rigs serve as fish aggregating devices (FADs) by providing structure and attracting a variety of fish species. The Mongo Offshore Tournament is a popular fishing tournament that focuses on the Gulf of Mexico, but there are plans to expand to the East Coast and potentially internationally. Transcript: Katie (00:00.206) In today's episode, I'm sitting down with Captain Jeremy Cox as we dive into the Gulf of Mexico blue marlin fishery with big fish stories, tips on how to handle and maximize the health of your bait and why the oil rigs play such a valuable role in the Gulf of Mexico ecosystem. Katie (00:27.886) Welcome to the KDC Sawyer podcast. I'm your host Katie. And today I'm sitting with the captain of the Lolita fishing team. He's also the co -founder of the Mongo Offshore Challenge. Jeremy Cox, thank you so much for taking the time to sit with me today. No problem. Thank you so much for having us. It's my pleasure. Well, we've been talking about doing this for a long time and I'm really glad it worked out the way it did because you guys just had a heck of a fishing trip out of Grand Isle, Louisiana last week, which I really want to get into you guys. Spoiler alert. They caught a 704 pound blue Marlin, but Jeremy, tell us a little bit about you. Where are you from? What's your fishing experience and how did you get to where you are today? so, let's see. I'm, I was born in Maryland. Actually, my, my family's from Maryland. move my. family moved us to Pensacola, Florida back in the early 80s. And so I grew up in Florida. I was raised in Florida. I think I was two years old when we moved to Florida, Pensacola. And man, first fishing memory is like four years old. My brother, JD, which is also co -founder of the Mongo, he's my older brother by seven years. He took me fishing in a lake behind, you know, in our neighborhood behind our lake. caught a bass like the first trip and I was hooked. I was like man this is the thing now I probably pestered him every day after that can we go fishing can we go fishing you know we're going fishing and so that progressed into an addiction of fishing and my mom took me on a fishing charter when I was 10 years old out of Ocean City Maryland and I saw the mate you know back there with us and you know this guy driving the boat which was you know I learned was a captain and and we caught some tuna and I was like, these guys do this for a living? And my mom's like, yeah, this is what they do, you know? And I was like, man, I want to do that when I grow up. So my brother had a baseball scholarship. He went off to college and played baseball and moved to Birmingham, Alabama. And me and him always talked about owning our charter boat. So I got into the fishing industry. Like my first job was first fishing related jobs working at a place called Boaters World. They're out of business now, but. Katie (02:50.766) very like West Marine, it was around for years and it was a big box store for marine supplies and marine sales. So I worked there and figured that'd be a good opportunity to meet other fishermen. So long story short, met other captains and landed a mate job and started mating and me and my brother, that's what we were gonna pursue is our own charter boat career. And you know, I'm skipping a lot of stuff, but Hurricane Ivan hit in 2004 and sort of... hit us back to reality. It's like, man, we saw all these charter boats lose their whole livelihood with their boats getting wrecked and the whole season sort of thrown out the door, at least in our little town. And we're like, maybe that's not the smartest idea for us. We didn't have a lot of money anyway. We wanted to get in those charter boat things. I mean, so I had a lot of friends in the private industry. And we were charter fishing. We were mating and captain. By that time, JD moved down to Pensacola. And we were both mating on different boats. And I did some captain work. started in the private sector. So I was like, man, that's probably the better route, more secure, you know, and then it's, you know, you got somebody else paying for everything and you get paid to go fishing, paid to kick, you know, a lot more waxing and toilet fixing than fishing, but yeah, it's all part of the, all part of it. Yeah. So, but it's awesome. So, you know, that's, that's how I got into the captain, you know, and in that whole time, you know, I was doing sales, you know, I worked for a Long time I worked for a distributor. We sold fish and tackle to tackle stores. And then I was a tackle sales rep for a while. We represented a dial and play Jake and other other brands. And I did that for collectively for about 12 years while I was doing captain work on the side in the private world. I had an orange beach, Alabama and Pensacola, Florida, Destin, Florida. But now currently I run the Lolita to 72 foot Viking out of Destin, Florida. and been working for this family for this is the ninth summer. Great family. They're awesome. Yeah, we're like fam. They treat me to treat us like family and just a great, great time. And yeah, this weekend. So we, we called the art person. Yeah. no, no, no. I haven't interrupted you. Sorry guys. We're not there yet. We're not there yet. No, that's so cool. So are you out of Orange Beach now? Are you based out of Orange Beach now? I'm. Katie (05:15.47) We keep the boat Lolita, we keep it behind Bo Shamps and Destin. That's where we keep the boat year round. That's right, you just said that. No, yeah, we come to Orange Beach a lot. We're sort of a traveling boat in the summertime, so we're rarely home during the summer, but the wintertime's fall through spring, we're parked behind Bo Shamps. We spend a good amount of time in Grand Isle, Louisiana. The owners have a camp there in Grand Isle. Nice. Yeah, so we get to spend, well now it's about two months a year out of Grand Isle. a month in the spring. What two months is that? So we're just getting off of this month. So it's a March, you know, late March to well, actually this year it was early April through early May. You know, we're home in Orange Beach now for some work. So about a month, you know, in the late spring and then a month in a late summer, we used to go there late July and stay through late August. Yeah, it's really good fishing over there that time of year. Yeah. Are you, out of Grand Isle, are you... doing a lot of tuna fishing as well as blue marlin fishing. Correct. Yes, they love to catch tuna and blue marlin, that's pretty much it. That's all they would like to get. We do very little bottom fishing. It's primarily tuna and marlin fishing, which is... I mean, the fishing up there in the northern Gulf for those two species is incredible. And the fact that you've, I mean, you essentially grew up for the most part fishing the northern Gulf of Mexico, right? That's right. That's cool because I'm from Texas, right? That's where I claim as my hometown. But I, my Gulf of Mexico fishing experience is extremely limited. So, I have so many questions for you and I'm really excited to have a Gulf guy on the podcast. we've had South Florida, we've had Kona and now here we go into the Gulf and we're right in that tournament season. Now, do you want to tell me a little bit about the Mongo Offshore Challenge? It's a 153 day. regional challenge, right? That's right. So yeah, so me and my brother was involved in this private world of fishing and tournament fishing. I think our first tournament we fished together was in 2007 on a boat called the Sunset. I fished several tournaments in like 2004, 2005, but JD was able to move down from Birmingham, get out of, he was in natural disaster work as well. And anyway, he, Katie (07:34.382) He was able to fish with me in 2007, our first tournament together on a boat called Sunset. We fished Biloxi and we won it. First tournament we fished together. my gosh. What'd you win it with? 531 Blue Marlin. Yeah, and it caught on the first morning of the first hour of the first morning. is like totally spoiled. Like JD's like, I like this tournament fishing stuff. This is pretty awesome. Yeah. It's always, it doesn't always work out like that, but that was really special. We did it with our best friend and mentor, Matt Dunn, which he's not really in the, in the sport fishing game anymore. He switched over to yacht world and he's doing, you know, he works for, you know, runs a big yachty yacht now, but, Man, so we made a lot of memories fishing. We had a really good run there with him for about six or seven years. Did really well in the golf circuit. And that was right when live baiting was sort of getting really, really popular. We were primarily trollers on that boat, but yeah, that was cool. So. What do you mean primarily trawlers like lures? Yeah, lures. We were, we were lure fishing. We still actually are passionate. I don't know that I would have fell in love with blue marlin fishing if I would have started out just sitting soaking live baits. it's something about the anticipation of rigging the night before the days before. And you got your lures out and you're re -skirting and putting new hook sets on. You're like, maybe that's going to be this color. You know, you got, you know, we need more trawlers. We need more spiked lures. Yeah, you know, going to the tackle store and like, man, we got to buy this one. This is the one. man, look at the head. You know, it's just, I don't know, something about that anticipation and like, you know, the what if they eat this one? yeah, they should eat this one. It's this color. look, it's a dolphin color. We got to match the hatch. I mean, all that stuff is just like fun, you know, rather than feeding them what they eat all day long. Of course they're going to eat a tuna. Of course they're going to eat it. Yeah. It's like, you know, we do it and it works. Katie (09:36.782) We have to do it in time efficient up here. You have to live bait to be consistent. But it's, you know, you're not really tricking them anymore. You know, when you're lure fishing, it feels like, man, it's like bass fishing. I'd much rather bass fish with a spinner bait or a plastic worm than throwing a live shiner out there. They're going to eat a live shiner, but it's just something special about it. And so yeah, it's definitely progressed. We came in when it was... And the northern golf is mainly lure and, you know, in natural baits, you know, you're pulling islander, you know, about who combos is, you know, everybody still pulls and then they work 100%. They work. And that's just, I don't know, something special about, about that. And if we were started out live baiting, I don't know that I would have had the same excitement about it. Now we sort of mix it up a little bit. We do some trolling and we do a lot of live baiting. it's the primarily way we fish up here. We're very, very spoiled. with this Northern Gulf fishery with these old rigs. I mean, you have giant fads everywhere. So they hold fish. We're going to go a little off topic for a minute because I have a lot of questions for you. No, this is great. I love it. You're giving me great content. So in that tournament, so we won that tournament. I'll go back to the Mongo. Obviously, it's why you have us on here. But us tournament fishing, we saw the progress and we're on fast boats. And then we started running the Lolita. I started running that in 2016, and it was a slow Hatteras, a 23 knot Hatteras. And we also, when we first started fishing, there's a lot of express boats. In the early 2000s, in these big weekend tournaments in golf, there's a lot of smaller express boats. There's a lot of slower, you know, Bartrams and Hatteras. And everybody's competing. But as the fleet, you know, got more technologically advanced and bigger horsepower engines. It's a speed race now, so whoever has the fastest boat has more fishing time. And it's a huge, huge deal. We're running 150 to 250 miles one way. So if you're doing that, you know, and you're getting there two, three hours before everybody else, or at least before the slow boats, the slow boats don't really have a chance, you know, unless you get lucky and run over one. So we were like, man, it'd be awesome if there was a tournament that had like a, that would level the playing field that would give them. Katie (11:54.83) Same amount of time for everybody. Doesn't matter how fast you are, how slow you are. If you have a big giant Viking or a little center console, everybody's on a level playing field. And so that's how that progressed, that birth, that idea of like, man, all right, let's just have a season long event and put the lines in. Whenever you leave the dock, you're in the tournament from May 1st to September 30th. So if you can, and we're all about the big fish, Mongo meaning huge. So if you catch a giant fish. between May 1st and September 30th, you can win it. And we count your weights in tournaments, and we count your weights on fun fishing trips. We set up these weigh stations all over the Gulf, and you can go in anywhere. We have 20 weigh stations in the Gulf of Mexico from all the way in South Texas all the way to Naples, Florida. So you go in and weigh your fish, and if you have the biggest fish at the end of the season, you win the pot. Blue Marlin, Swordfish, Tuna, Dolphin, and Wahoo. So yeah, it's really, really fun. We started it five years ago. It had 66 teams that first year and this year. Wow. Yeah. Yeah. And COVID year too, which is crazy. That's a whole nother story. But yeah, our first year we had 66 teams. We have a bit of a network. We've been around, we know a lot of guys. So we were able to call up a lot of captains like, what do you think about this format? Would you fish it? And they're like, yeah, that's awesome. Heck yeah, man. Because you always catch your biggest fish on your fun trips anyway. Yeah. Yeah, typically. I mean, you're going out there for a million dollar tournament and you catch the big one the day before practicing, you know, so now we can celebrate that fish and reward, you know, whoever catches the bigger ones, all kinds of cool things for that format that makes it neat. But yeah, so so that's where it came from. And then now this year is our fifth year we've had a we have 150 teams and over half a million dollars in the pot. That's crazy in the Gulf of Mexico because you guys have branched out to other fisheries now, right? That's right. So we started the East Coast three years ago. This is our third season in the East Coast. We're trying to grow that East Coast. We don't have the network that we have in the Gulf because we grew up in the Gulf. We know everybody. So we're working on growing that network over there, getting some key individuals, key captains on board. But there's already, and registration is still open for the East Coast until June 30th. So teams. Katie (14:12.782) fishing from Cape Cod all the way down to Florida can register for the Mongo up until June 30th and pick which category you want to get in. You don't have to get in swordfish if you don't, if you're not a sword fisherman, just get into mahi or whatever you're fishing for. What's the registration fee? So it's alacarte. So each, each one's different. So the mahi and the wahoo are 500 a piece for the season. That's nothing. You know, we burn in that much an hour out of some of these boats and fuel. So, and then a swordfish is 15, excuse me. Swordfish is a thousand for the season, for the season. yellowfin and big eye are a thousand a piece for the season. And then blue marlin is 2 ,500 for the season. So you'll, if you want to get in all categories, like 6 ,500 bucks for the board. Yeah. And you're in from every time your boat leaves the dock, whether you're fishing two times a year or a hundred times a year, you're, you're in there. And what did the winner of the Gulf of Mexico last year make and what did they weigh on blue marlin? I think their payday was like 130 ,000 last year and it was a 727 pound blue marlin caught in the bluxy tournament. So he won two tournaments with one fish. I love it. I love that. Yeah. A boat called the salt shaker with Captain Dennis Bennett. And I remember that. Believe it or not, they also won the mahi. They caught the mahi in the ECBC tournament and won like another 50 grand with the mahi. So they really cashed in last year. That's so sick. And their mahi was 60 pounds, 59 .9 pounds, 60 pound mahi in the Gulf of Mexico. It was totally unheard of. I haven't seen a 60 pounder. That is massive. I haven't seen a 50 pounder in the Gulf in years. The only fish I've seen that big was in like Costa Rica, Central Pacific. Panama. That's, that's where I've seen the mahi get that even close to that big. But again, my golf experience is pretty limited. Sure. One thing is different, you know, Mongo, golf on that a minute, but we have very big minimums. So there's not a whole lot of fish weighed in the Mongo throughout the season. One, it's a winner take all. So once something huge is on the board, you're not going to weigh in anything smaller anymore. And then our limits are high. Like mahi has got to be 40 pounds to even qualify. Katie (16:31.278) Wahoo's 60 pounds, Yellowfin's 140 pounds. Blue Marlin's 118 inches. Which is like the federal, you guys, the federal minimum is 99 inches. And a lot of tournaments go 112 inches. So it's definitely progressed over the years. Typically last year was 110 for all the tournaments and this last weekend was 112 for this last weekend. Yeah, because people are going in figuring them out and they're starting to weigh in more and more and more. So they're trying to inch those links up to not take so many of them. And that's one reason we wanted to just pay one place. You know, one, we just wanted to award the biggest fish of the season. And then two, we didn't want to kill a bunch of extra ones. And then typically the blue morn... Actually, I'm trying to think, other than the first year in the Mongo... Every other blue marlin has been caught, or the winner was caught in another tournament. So the first year, the first year was a state record fish caught the day after the, the world cup on July 5th. They were out there for the world cup. They stayed out another day, caught this giant fish. If they would have called in the world cup, they would have won a whole lot more money. Obviously fly usually has, I don't know, well over a million dollars in that, in that world cup pot. But they ended up winning, I think they won like 90 grand or something like that extra. Yeah, that they were. I mean, how cool that you guys are giving that opportunity, you know, like I Drake when we were in Madeira, we saw a real big fish on July 3rd and didn't see it again. But it's just, you know, it's funny how they dance around that date. I feel like those sightings really, really go around the 4th of July. If you guys are wondering what we're talking about, the World Cup is a tournament that's around the world based on your specific time zone on the 4th of July. and we'll have Fly Navarro on for a podcast coming into that. So stay posted. But Jeremy, I guess natural integration. Tell us about your fish this last week. So this last week in the Lolita, the boat I worked for, my owners are gracious enough to get in. They know we put the tournament on. They're totally supportive and supporting of it. It's me, my brother JD and my best friend, Brian Johnson. We were the founders of the Mongo and we also all three work on the Lolita. Katie (18:56.366) So my brother's a mate and Brian comes on for tournaments and it's been just a great team. We all get along so well. And so they're always gracious enough to, hey, we'll get into, you know, we never twist our arm or nothing. They like the idea, they like the format. And so they've got in every year and we've never weighed in on qualifying fish during that time for the Mongo. But this year, our first, actually it's our second trip of the season, but our first tournament of the year. fishing the hurricane open out of Grand Isle, Louisiana this past weekend. And we catch a 704 pounder, which is a nice one. It's 122 inches. It's our biggest one yet. And man, we are so ecstatic. Congratulations. It was money or no money. It's actually sort of special for my owners and my owner's family because they've had a camp on Grand Isle, Louisiana for they call it a camp. It's a beach house and it's nice beach house now, but. It was camp since the 50s, late 50s. This family has had many traditions of going down there and spending time together every summer. And it's been, you know, it's something where everybody can go and be around each other. And it's, they're a really close knit family anyway. And they fish the tarpaulios and fish some other things over the years, but they've never weighed anything huge there in Grand Isle. So this has always been like a dream of theirs. And to do it in Grand Isle just makes it that much more special. We didn't. Like I said, we want some money, but it wasn't about the money. It was about that memory that they got to make with their family members. And they brought their 90 year old grandfather down here to celebrate with us. And he's, you know, yeah, his wife was Lolita. She passed away, but that's had to name the boat after. So he was able to come down and celebrate. And it was just so special. It was really, really cool. And we're able to, you know, not only celebrate that fish and won some money with that fish and. Now we're on the board with the Mongo, which, you know, extra special for me, JD and Brian. I mean, it's really, really cool to be able to do that. But, but you reached out to us and now we were able to donate that fish to science, which is awesome. And we also flayed up a bunch of the meat. Everybody's sharing the meat. We actually, my brother's smoking some up, making some fish dip out of it. Yes. Smoked blue marlin. That's the way to do it. Yep. We got some, some art being made from it. you know, some, the bill and the tail and some prints. And so it's. Katie (21:19.758) It's not a wasted fish, it's a celebrated fish. And now we got, we had kids down there taking pictures with it. It's just inspiring kids. I mean kids, the thing is, is like what a lot of people don't realize is when these fish are brought back to the dock, like the kids that see it, it's such a lasting impression. Because I mean, even for the adults that have never seen anything like that, like to see a creature from the ocean, a fish from the ocean of that size and magnitude and what it takes. to bring something like that in and what type of possibilities there are out there. It just opens so many doors. And I'm really, I was really stoked when I reached out to you, you were all on board about the donating. And next, you guys, the next podcast is gonna be Jeremy Higgs over at the University of Southern Mississippi. And that's exactly who these samples are going to. So Jeremy, I had you like. what we cut the head and we kept some of the innards and we're going to get to age that fish and, and learn a lot about the reproduction and the phases of the fish. So it's blue marlin are females when they're of that size and they're going to get to do reproductive histology on there and we're going to learn a lot about it. And I just think it's so cool that you guys were on board and just sharing that on this podcast is so important because you know, when these fish are brought in, there's so much more that can be done with them than even just. you know, taking the tournament win. Like you said, I love that you're showcasing the celebration of that life. Tell us a story about catching the fish. Like what did it eat? And, yeah, so, we fished some, a very popular area called, we call it the ghetto. it's just, some shallow, well, it's not shallow. It's, it's close to land rigs. I guess you could say it's a, it's a rig that are the floating rigs that are closest to the Alabama line. We're fishing out of Louisiana, but everybody knows the ghetto. If you fish in the northern Gulf Coast, you know it's the ghetto. It's the Rampowl and Petronas and Marlin Rig and Horn Mountain. It's these rigs that's been there for years and years and years. Probably some of the early rigs that were floaters are the ghetto. And they've added on to them. And we got hundreds of rigs that we could choose from. So, ghetto's in the shallower waters. It's about 3 ,000 feet and it's working its way up the bank. And, Katie (23:37.07) I saw some good current in there, like a good eddy being built. We use Hilton's to do our research before we go to figure out exactly what the current's doing, the temperature's doing, and all that. We saw this eddy being formed in there, and I was like, man, it's got some good water pushing in there. Also, Bluefin was still open, so if we accidentally happened to catch one, it wasn't closed yet. It's like, all right, if we get one, we could probably take her home if she ends up. Accidentally, you know eating one of our live baits that we use for blue marlin which they do typically this time of year And then there's huge tune in that area this time of year had some reports today before Several boats catching actually one boat called a 200 pounder another boat called 185 pounder all in this area. Yep And then several boats have caught blue marlin over the last couple days. So I was like, all right, let's go in there most of the fleet's gonna go to greens Canyon another area south of Louisiana and Maybe it won't be as so many boats over there. Anyway, we made the call. Go over there. And the bait's a little hard to catch, a little concern. As we get there, the bait's really, really deep. Typically in the daytime, we're trolling around the rigs, try to catch live bait first to fill up our tubes. At nighttime, you're jigging, using butterfly jigs and whatnot around the oil rigs. They all come to the lights and usually up shallower. And you can jig them all night, fill up your tubes. But in the daytime, you've got to be a little creative and catch them on the troll. There was a lot of different techniques guys used, but they were really deep, really hard to catch. So we were like, all right, at least to the rigs that we stopped at. So we switched over to trolling. That first day we're trolling, nothing. We got to watch another boat that was live baiting catch a couple of fish. So we're like, all right, well, there's fish around. We'll load the tubes tonight and we'll start in the morning and do some live baiting. So we did that. We filled up our tubes at night at a rig and then pulled over to our first stop. It was a drill ship and first bait in the water. It was a porpoise. Porpoise came up and ate our bait and they just, they're so smart. Yeah. They hated this fisherman. They're beautiful, awesome creatures, but they came up. Yeah. You're fishing. Yeah. You don't want when they're eating your bait. They're amazing how they eat it too. They missed the hook. They know where the hook is. They bite it right behind and they just like suck out everything. You just, all you have left on your, on your hook is the head of your bait. And they did that like first, first bait in. Katie (25:57.678) Corpus and I'm marking someone's sonar and like these all look like porpoise to me. So let's let's just go. So we went three miles away to the next rig and there's nobody there. There was like four boats or five boats fishing with us at that first one. So there's multiple reasons why I wanted to leave. So we lit we left one over there and there's only other one ended up being one other boat fishing with us there and marked a couple in the sonar. We hooked one fish, jumped them off within like two minutes. It was a hindsight it was a male. It was a smaller fish. And we found that over the years that that'll happen a whole lot. You'll catch them. You'll catch a small one and you go back and catch the big one or you'll catch the big one and you go back and catch a small one. It seems like they run together this time of year. It's typical to find a big fish with a small fish or multiple. I'm so curious to find out if your fish was spawning. Multiple small fish. A lot of times. So anyway, I marked one, we hooked that one, lost it, put the baits back out, and I saw another mark going over to the rig. So we were using Omniso Nars. Actually, I'm using an MAQ. I love it. It's awesome. So we go over to the rig, put the baits out, drag it over top of it, and I lose the mark. I can't find it. And a lot of times that means they're coming up about to eat your bait. You know, you're in your prop watch or whatnot. Nothing. About five minutes goes by, I mark something else. up ahead of me so we pulled the boat up about maybe a football field's length and there she is. She eats the bait immediately, starts dumping it. What you have like a blackfin or bonita? Yep, that morning all we could call it was blackfin. A little football size maybe about that big. And yeah, Aida immediately dumped a bunch of line. We're using 130 class reels with 130 pound line on there. We do have backing and she... My angler gets in there, Jordan Womack, he fights it for two hours straight. A hot, hard fight. Not a whole lot of jumping, but just a ton of dogging, ton of left and right and down sea, up sea. The fish was crazy. Really, really strong fish. We got one look at it, like two jumps. There's a video we just put up there on Instagram yesterday. You can see the only two jumps. That's the only two times she came out of the water. And she doesn't really look that big in that video. She's pretty far away. And, Katie (28:17.134) We see it's a solid fish, but we get the measurement stick out, like, all right, it might be 112, we'll see. And then two hours into the fight after, he's like, all right, this fish is super strong. It's big. And then she sounds. Sounds all the way down to the bottom, way back into the backing. We're probably a thousand feet out of line in our angler's life. You guys, sounding is when, and correct me if I'm wrong, Jeremy, but sounding is when that fish goes essentially straight up and down and it's deep. Like it's just deep. A lot of times when they do that, we try to, captains call a lot of big blue marlin that try to tag and release them. You're trying to keep them up on top because the worst thing you want is from the sound because they'll die. Typically when they sound that deep, they're stroking out, they're giving out. That's all. If you keep them up top, you can usually tag them really quick and release them and be done. So she sounded and we're like, man, we're in for the long haul now. We're already two hours in, which is a long time. Yeah, usually tagging these fish. If we're tagging the fish, even the big ones, you can get them in 30 minutes, 45 minutes an hour. But anyway, sort of all like defeated after that point. my goodness, we're two hours in, we haven't really saw her again. She's sounded and way back into the backing, our angler is just like totally gassed. He's puking, he's puking all over himself. He's pale in the face. He's like a bodybuilder guy. His arms are shaking, his legs are shaking. So we've got to get him dehydrated, get him cooled down, pouring water all over him. And then the family's just totally around him. The team's just around, like, you're not quitting. You're staying in this. You're going to get this fish. Just totally positive talking, because he's like, I don't know if I can get this thing anymore. Yeah. I mean, he's done his thing. Yeah. So in that. When they do that, and she's done fighting, like she sounds and then it's done, done taking more line. We go to full drag and at that process you got to plane them up. You got to, you know, you're pulling forward, getting a little bit of scope in the line where the line starts coming up a little bit and you're backing down really hard, reeling that slack and then doing it again. So basically what your rod was doing before, the boat's doing now. So the boat's pulling up and then you're reeling down. You're pulling up, reeling down about 40, 50 feet at a time. So it takes another three hours to get that fish. Katie (30:32.782) Hold on, I want to pause you real quick. I really like that you brought up the planing and how it's done because a handful of times when we've been fishing, it's just a really important skill for captains, crews, and anglers to know. A lot of times it can even potentially save a fish. If you have a fish that gets tail wrapped early on in a fight and you're not going to be able to get its head turned. So tail wrapped is when the line's wrapped around the tail of the fish. And if you can't get its head turned, a lot of times that fish is just gonna be swimming down. But if you recognize it early on, if the angler and the captain recognize it early on, you guys can start planing that fish up and get it up to the boat before it dies. Because if it's tail wrapped and it gets pulled backwards for too long, it's gonna asphyxiate because it can't breathe. moving backwards. So planing is a really, really important skill in the field of ethical angling. And then of course, in situations like these where, where you have a deep fish that's just gone. And I mean, also when they're that big, it's really interesting, Jeremy, because when they're that big, it's almost like they can't fight as long as the smaller ones. Like, do you think that that plays a key, like a role in it? And what about the like, how, how warm was the water? I'm just curious. 77. That's pretty cool actually for Northern Gulf. Yeah. It'll warm up. I'm surprised. Yeah. It's, it's, it's been cut off from the loop current that area. So if you go down in greens, it's probably 79 now, somewhere around there. the loop current is probably 80, but you know, this current is down there in greens is probably that, but up, up where we're fishing is still a little cooler because it's sort of been cut off. it's getting most of its water from out in the canyon out to the east of it. And that water is all 76, 77. Is that pretty regular with the seasons? Sometimes that loop current, you look on Hilton's and watch it come up. It'll come up from the Yucatan, make a hard ride over towards Tampa and loop back down. And then off of that northern part, you'll get eddies that'll curl up into that Louisiana, Alabama area. And those eddies are bringing in that nice fresh nutrients that you want. You want that counterclockwise eddy that brings up fish, brings up all the nutrients from the bottom. And you got to... Katie (32:50.926) Clockwise, it's pushing everything down. Altimeter's down and it seems like everything's deeper. But yeah, this time of year, it'll be all sort of weird and squirrely. We always like to fish after a really big storm, like a big south pushing storm. A lot of south wind, southeast wind. Sort of like the pocket and people are familiar with Chubb and down there. Anytime you've got something pushing everything into the shallow water, it seems to get better in there. And that near that shallower water just sort of stacks everything up. So we like doing that. but it was, you know, the, anyway, there's fish in there. There's fish everywhere. People caught fish this weekend all over the place. We were just sort of right place, right time. And then we're capitalized once we did get that fish on, everybody worked together as a good team. And, you know, we didn't make any mistakes. If we would have made a mistake, we would have lost that fish. Cause once we got that fish in the hook was hooked outside end, which is. already hard, you know, you lose them right at the beginning. It's probably when he chased that circle hook, when he was, when he was chasing that blackfin, that blackfin probably swirled around his head weird, got him somehow. And then that hook was hooked to the outside end. So when he came in, you could grab the hook and it just went, doop, it like barely came out. And then we had like two wraps, we had like two wraps around the tail that probably saved us, you know, saved that fish, you know, saved us getting that fish. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Yeah, because if it would have been hooked outside in and he sounded and we'd just been pulling him up like this, it would eventually just work this pulled it out because it just and then she would have died in vain. Yeah. And then it starts with ater and nobody got to celebrate. Yeah. All that. So yeah, it was really special the way it worked out. So many so many things worked in its way. It was a blessing for sure. Were y 'all surprised when she came? when y 'all got her up and she was 122 inches long? Yes, well, actually she popped up way far away. So, you know, we're playing in and once you get them up, you're playing in a dead fish up from that deep. Once you get up to like 200 feet above that thermocline, they'll just pop up and she popped up. Interesting. Yeah, she popped up probably 200 feet away. And so when she popped up tail first, we probably we knew that she was probably tail wrapped, but we didn't know it popped up tail wrap. Our hearts sort of sank. man, I hope she ain't like a 400 pounder, you know. Katie (35:07.438) come up tail up tail up. And then we, you know, now this is all sort of sucks, you know, we don't, we don't win nothing. And you know, we just killed a smaller fish. So she popped up tail up and we saw the tail sticking out of the water and we're getting back and down, back and down to the fish that JD can grab the leader, pull her over and the tail gets bigger and she gets longer. And we're like, okay, all right. And then JD gets her boat side and we're like, holy moly. Nobody says anything to each other until we, until we get her, you can watch that video. We're getting her in a boat. Brian and Ryan, the owner, start pulling her to boat and they get her in and then everybody's like, whoa. You know, we didn't want to say anything. Exhale. Yeah, exhale. And then we measured her. Yeah, we knew she was big and then we measured her and now she's a mongo. You know, now she's over one eighteen. We're like, yeah, we're high five. And it was so awesome. It was very, very special. We've killed it. We've killed a fish with these owners a few years ago, but it wasn't a mongo. It was like a five forty or five. 30 or something like that we caught in Blocsie. Which length was approximately? It was like 112, 113 I think was the length. Yeah you guys 118 is a really damn big fish. Yeah. Like it's a big fish. A special fish. In 122. Yes. Exactly. Exactly. And I, in the video, I mean it looked like you guys didn't even have a flying gaff out. Like you all just had your tuna gaff. Yeah we did have a flyer out. We decided we didn't need it once we got boat sided and we just stick it. regular stick gaff in there, straight gaff. And we did that and then we'd just get a new surround her, around her bill and then we were able to sort of guide her in that way. But yeah, it worked out really, really good that way. It was cool. It was very, very special fish. And then now it's like the dilemma of, all right, did we stay out here? The fishing's good. We ain't got a tuna yet. We came out here for a big tuna too. And we made the decision of going on in. So we... because we're in the Mongo. Because now we're gonna lose, we didn't want to lose any weight. And we wanted to explain how you lose weight. So a lot of times on the deck, they'll just lose weight. They're losing fluids the whole time, blood and other things. And we didn't have that many holes in her, but we had a couple of holes in her. A lot of times they'll just lose weight sitting on the deck. And it kept on going through our minds like, man, if she is a Mongo, she's still got, we got all season for 88 teams to try to beat her. Katie (37:30.414) But if we lose by like two or three pounds, we're going to be hitting ourselves in the face for not taking it. It's only three hours away to the weigh station. So it's a fast boat. So we go. And our plans are to come out either later that evening or that night and try to get a tuna. And we get in. We have a couple of mechanical issues I'm a little nervous about. So we decide not to go out. We just hung her up. We're 700 pounds. We're all having a great time. to see if somebody else can beat her. So nobody else beat her and we won that weekend tournament, which we're super excited about. And then, congratulations. See what happens in the market. Now it gives us a little bit later. You know, it was the 118 everybody was shooting for now it's a 700 pounder set by shooting for. So what is that? I don't know. It could be a 118, a really fat one, but typically probably, you know, that probably is going to save a few fish of being killed is in our thoughts, unless it's in a weekend tournament, you know, if it's on a fun trip, they're going to think twice about killing if it's. you know, 600 pound or something like that. So, yeah, that's cool. Which is really cool. Yeah. Question, what are some like when you're bringing a fish back to the dock and you want to make sure that it's not losing weight, like what are, what are ways that you can help mitigate that? Like, do you have any techniques that you or tips that you want to share? Yeah. So, at least knowledge that I've learned from, from other captains is, we haven't done it yet on. on length, but to keep length you want to keep them wet. Not necessarily cold, but wet to keep their length. So a lot of weekend tournaments, it might be 110 and you have 112 sitting on the deck. Two days later, that thing could be 110, you know, or 109. They could lose an inch or two pretty easily. And there's plenty of stories of guys catching a legal fish and getting back to dock and it's not legal anymore. So that's a bummer. So a lot of captains... found that you keep them wet with towels and that'll keep their length. Not sure about the way that is. Yeah. Is like their skin will shrink up. That skin is so it's very similar to Wahoo skin. Right. And even though the scales are different, very different, but it'll like it'll shrink up as it dries. So keeping them wet will keep them. There's like a lot of like. Katie (39:54.99) ends and outs of it, right? Like I just, okay. So just to clear the air here, I haven't been a really around fisheries that kill fish. you know, my blue Marlin, my predominant blue Marlin experience was in the fat fishery of Costa Rica, which is all catch and release because they're small fish. And then, we were fishing in Madeira for the big one, but we never saw her. So I've heard a lot of stories and like, of fish like coming back to the dock and people saying they were stretched, fish coming back to the dock, people saying that they, you know, put water in their bellies or whatever. what, like there's, there's definitely things you can and cannot do to keep these fish the way they should be as well as like the word mutilation. Can you, can you expand on that for me? Yeah. So in our tournament, in the Mongo, we def on a weekend tournaments. So say you catch your fish in a weekend, we defer to that tournament. So if it's dequeued in that weekend tournament, it's dequeued in the Mongo. If it counts, it counts. In our rules, we do Spirit of IGFA. So mutilated fish are not counted. Mutilation is something that impairs its ability to fight, its ability to swim. So if you back over it a little too hard and chop its tail off or chop something up with your propellers, it's not going to count. It's part of the game. It's shark bit. It's not going to count. We accept cookie cutter sharks because that could have been done months or years ago. Cookie cutter sharks will take like a little round bite out. You'll catch a swordfish and it'll have several of them in there a lot of times as cookie cutter sharks. So we'll accept those, but yeah, if it's a five tiger or something on the way up, then we don't count that. We count that as a mutilated fish. Unless that tournament that you're fishing in accepts it. then we'll count it because we defer to them. But yeah, I mean, you know, people have, yeah, we hear those stories too. I mean, same thing in the freshwater world, people putting leads in their stomachs and, you know, all kinds of stuff to try to win. So we, in the Mongo, we have some checks and balances in there. Sometimes we have the ability to cut that fish open at the dock and check its innards. And we have to have two witnesses that weren't on the boat to witness you weigh that fish. And... Katie (42:19.758) lie detector test for the winners. So we have some things built in to try to keep the confidence high that somebody isn't going to cheat. And a lot of it's peer enforced. If you're in this private industry of sport fishing and you're caught cheating, you go find another career. Yeah, you're not going to get another job. After your black eye, bloody nose heals, go find another job. you don't want to, nobody's going to accept you if you get caught cheating. So it's a lot of it is peer enforced, at least that fear of, you know, so hoping, you know, somebody that didn't want to go on their morals, there's some fear involved as well of getting caught cheating. So, you know, not saying people don't try, but we, we, we try to build some safe, some safe holds in there to keep people from doing it, at least thinking twice. Yeah, that's great. But yeah, and we like to keep them cold. You know, if they're big, big enough fish to weigh, the weigh in, we want to, try to donate that meat. So we like to keep them cold, wrap them up in a fish bag, put as much meat, much ice in there as you can, keep them wet as well. If you keep them bad and cold, he's going to stay long and you're going to get some meat and you can donate out of it. And people eat them in Hawaii all the time. They eat them in all these other islands all the time. I mean, it's not like the best table fare. It's not like we're going to, I'm, you know, let's go catch them all in a day so we can feed the family. But if you do catch them all in a day, she dies. It is edible. We have some especially smoked. Like we really like it. I've smoked Marlin on a bagel. Yeah. Yeah. I've had some smoked taco or some fish taco, Marlin tacos or they're fine. Yeah. You can dress it up and it's totally edible meat. but, we have some, some charities that we sit that we work with and the golf, golf coast, feeding the golf coast and different charities like that. that if a fish does come in the mongo and wait in one of our waste stations, we have outlet to get rid of that meat. A lot of times you'll have to flay that meat up and bag it up, but that's not a big deal. And then you just put those bags in the freezer or wherever and we'll have those cherries come up and pick it up. And they'll donate it to, if it's edible for human consumption, they'll donate it to some homeless shelters and whatnot, but also some zoos and things like that will take it for their tigers and their different. Burning sanctuaries. Yep, yep. So there, you know. Katie (44:38.158) alligator farm. How cool that you guys have like have thought all that yeah alligator farms for sure thought all of that out at your way stations like okay when we bring this fish back like I just love that you're obviously so sustainably minded. Yeah yeah yeah future conservation minded you know it's making choices you know make make your choice because if you want your kids to do this you know try to take some responsibility you know. Nobody loves Marlin more than Marlin fishermen. There's a bunch of fish huggers out there. Why in the world are you killing a fish? my goodness, neanderthals. Well, nobody loves them more than we do. I feel like we've hugged more Marlin. Yeah, we've hugged way more Marlin than y 'all have. And nobody raises more. Nobody raises more money to protect them, to research for them. We buy fishing licenses. That money goes to help all of it. So I love it when people... And the money we put into the communities. Yeah, I love it when people in all the comment sections, they all have an opinion and you go look them up and they're living in Iowa somewhere and never even seen a blue marlin. They have no idea what they're talking about. So nobody loves marlin more than marlin fishermen. We want them around. And yes, we try to take efforts to promote. people want them around more. We kill a few extra fish a year, but all under that minimum. We're allowed 250 per year. National Marine fisheries, white and blue marlin, and if there's an extra three or four killed in the mongo, and they're all huge fish, and they're all celebrated and all that, I think it's good. I don't think it's hurting anything. If anything, it's helping the industry, all the money that's raised from marlin fishermen, bringing new little junior anglers into it. Like you said, with... Like you said, with kids taking photos and stuff like that at Grand Isle this past weekend, there was a line of people, like literally after we took our photos, our team photos, there was like a line, like a single line of probably 15, 20 people waiting to take their picture with this fish that they only know who we are. They don't, you know, they're gonna take a picture with this fish so they can send it to their family members. I mean, very, very cool. Look at this. Yeah, so cool. Yeah, very cool. Did you even know this animal existed out there? Right. Yeah, and also like this, you know, Katie (46:54.286) Another way giving back to the fishery and the communities is the science. The science we're getting from it. These fish are known as rare event species and you and I can both testify to that. And they're really hard to get. They're very expensive to go after. And the scientists, the schools that are studying them to make sure that they are sustainably managed, that they are cared for correctly, that they are going to be in the lives of our children and our children's children in the future. they don't have the funding to be able to catch them themselves. And the fact that we have fishing teams that want to bring them back and take integrity and donate responsibility and donate these specimens to the science labs. I mean, USM was so stoked on y 'all's fish. Like it was, they were just so excited. USM, the Bill Fish Foundation, they were just really excited. So like you said, no one loves marlin more than marlin fishermen. It's just, it's a fact. exactly. And really cool fish. Yeah. And I've, I've even heard of people like, you know, we don't catch them as big as they, you know, y 'all are killing the stock. Well, think of all the records has been set in the last couple of years. All right. So last year, the biggest fish that's ever been recorded in the Gulf of Mexico was called in October, 1145 pounds. I see three years ago. Yeah. And days after he's one of our boys, he's one of our boys. He's, he's like one of the original supporters of the Mongo. Captain Chris Moat, he's an amazing fisherman loves blue morn fishing is really really good at it and Man, that would have been so special if it was caught two weeks prior to that. But yeah, so Yeah, so that's a golf record. I mean biggest one in the golf And then what what was Duffy's fish like four years ago the you know, 1 ,100 pounds caught in Maryland? All right, and then two years before that, Big Rock had the biggest ones ever caught in Big Rock. I mean, we're, the fish are still here. They're good. You know, we need to continue to take care of them and grow them, but they're not, we're not, we still have those old man in the sea photos. That's what the Mongo logo is about is staying inside that amazing fish. Well, there's proof that they're still out there. I mean, that just proved it. So yeah. That's so cool. I want to get into the live baiting. Katie (49:19.534) I want to get into why it's challenging to catch live bait in the Gulf of Mexico. So when we were in Costa Rica, I keep bringing this up, but we were bait and switch fishing predominantly, which you guys, that's teaser fishing. And if a fish shows up behind the teaser, we take the teaser away and then we present them with a dead bait with a circle hook in it. Right? And then we generally get a really active aggressive bite. It's a good feed, good hook set. That's all she wrote. But we were catching our bait out there. It was Bonita and they're prolific. They're just prolific. And I've heard that catching bait in the Gulf of Mexico is a very different experience. You've already touched on how the bait was real deep on this last trip and y 'all were struggling on catching bait. A lot of times you guys will have a little bit of an easier time catching bait at night, but then you're catching bait at night and losing some very valuable sleep. as well as, you know, those bait, they go deep during, during the day because the water can get so warm. So let, can you, can you give us a little bit of Intel into how you keep your tuna tubes, what tuna tubes are and how you keep them full and what your, your best care and strategy tips are? Yeah. So that's definitely progressed over the years. I remember live baiting in like 2005 and six, somewhere around there was my first time. was fishing on a boat with a really experienced captain that was really, really good at it. And they didn't even have tubes yet, but he live baited a lot. So he basically catches bait, put it right back out. Might even get a little creative and catch a bait and keep them close on a little leash in the water. Literally, that's your live bait tube, just keep them in the water on like a little leash with a little hook through his or a clip through his nose. Whatever, get creative to keep at least one in the quiver, to put one back out. But there's... caught a lot of fish by catching them and then hooking them up, putting them right back out and then doing well that way. But obviously if you can have a quiver of baits so when you get sharks or a barracuda eats it or a porpoise eats it, now you got to go catch more bait again. So now became the tuna tube. So it started out with boats getting two or three on there and now you'll have boats with 20 on there. We have 16 on our, so obviously the more tubes you have. Katie (51:46.094) The more bait you can have, the longer you can go without having to go try to catch bait again. So 16 tubes, man, that's been a whole progression as well of how do you keep 16 fish alive? So you have to have a lot of water flow. So there's a lot of techs and all kinds of science and mechanics and figuring out how much flow and how to get the best flow. And do you want bubbles and not bubbles? And where do you put your through hole? I mean, there's so much that goes into it. And every boat's different and all that. So anyway, over the last five or six years, it's very common to buy your boat. If you're building a brand new boat, say Vikings building your boat, and you can get your tubes installed at factory or right, you know, maybe you'll refit it when you get it down to South Florida. And there's a couple of guys that specialize in that and they'll refit your boat before you even go pick it up. You go pick up your boat and you got your sonar and your tubes. And those are primarily golf boats. Golf boats, we have tubes. If you don't have tubes, you're probably not fishing in the Gulf. So not competitively. Yes. And there's a lot of guy dredging now doing phenomenal. The guys that are really good at dredging still catch tons of fish, but a lot of that's on standups. Are you going to kill that? Those are your tag release guys. So the guys that are trying to catch the big one are live baiting primarily. And then you want them on a circle hook rather than have them on a J hook. because man, all the things didn't go wrong with a J hook. So, circle hook is a really good way of catching a big fish and being able to fight it through and land it. So, yeah, so typical day is, you know, if we're showing up, you know, tournaments leaving in the Gulf, you're leaving at like 10 a 11 a you're running out to your oil rig that you've picked, or you might stop on the way, some guys stop on the way at some bottom spots and pick up some bonito. A lot of times the bonito will hold up over a natural reef. or a shallow water oil rig and picking up some bonitas first. Bonitas are usually shallower where we live and as you get out you'll start getting to the black fin and the yellow fin and there's some skipjack and things like that. Yellowtail, or not yellowtail but rainbow runners. Things like that you can catch out there too. But you're trying to catch them trolling. Some people fish on the surface for them. The guys are figured out the getting deep, getting creative. Katie (54:07.502) how to get down deep with planers or downriggers or whatnot to get down deep to where they're at. And then all kinds of different things you can catch them on, little squid imitations or minnow limitations or spoons and all kinds of different ways. You're making them on daisy chains and figuring out a way to get those fish to eat, those little baits, and then you're bringing them up, putting them in your tubes. Once you get your tubes full, you go fishing. And then some guys, while they're fishing, they got a guy on the bow with these sea keepers. That's a whole nother thing. You got a guy, these sea keepers, if it's relatively calm, they're up there casting the popper, casting little plugs, little jigs to try to catch. You got one guy who's just a bait fisherman on your bow while everybody's fishing in the back. Try to continue. That's how important the bait is. You got to have that fresh bait. So yeah, you load your baits and then you're fishing, looking with sonars. Before sonars, we just all... stayed up on the up current side of the rig. A lot of times that up current side is where the marlins will be because the school of tuna typically swims around in circles on the up current side. My theory is it's easier for them to get back to safety. If they got to swim down sea to get back to safety, it's a lot easier than having to swim up sea to get back to safety. It's like a bass or anything. Yeah, it's like a minnow or anything else. or a reef fish, they're gonna swim back. So the upcurrent side will be the busy side. That's where most of your tunas are. That's where most of your predators are is upcurrent of them. So now it's easier for them to catch fish if they're swimming down sea versus having to swim into the current. That's how I figured it. So yeah, so that's the way we used to do before sonar, but now sonar's changing the game. Now it used to be, all right, and I'm gonna sit there with baits on the water while I'm sonar fishing, looking for something to troll over at two knots, my live bait's over to that mark. But now a lot of guys aren't even putting a bait in the water until they mark a fish because they've gotten so confident in their sonar abilities to find that fish. Don't even put a bait out until they're right on top of that fish. All right, deploy. Put your baits in the water. There he is. A lot of guys are getting really good at doing that. You can tell who's good at doing that. Wow. Just watch three tournaments. And if a guy's winning or placing in each one of those three or two of those three, Katie (56:16.27) that guy is a really good sonar fisherman because that's what he's doing. He's not waiting on chance and you know, just maybe official swim by this current side. He's, he's literally feeding that fish. It's almost like teasing that fish, but you know, you don't have to tease them. Just drop a bait on it and he'll come up and eat it. Cause I think the prop wash and all that makes them think that the feeding friends of the year, whatever, at least they're paying attention to what's going on with that prop wash up there. Yeah. So it's definitely progressing. It's, it's changed. It's like every five years something different and people are getting really good at that and then five years have changed and it's something people get really good at that. But that's the thing now, the successful captains that are, especially with numbers of fish are doing is not even putting a bait in the water until. So now you don't have to bait fish near as much because you're not killing so many baits. You're not wasting them whether tiring them out or you're getting shark aid or we get a lot of sharks, a lot of barracus, a lot of porpoise around them. these rigs too. So yeah, so daytime you're trolling for them, playing in whatever you got to do. At nighttime you're jigging and jigging is pretty easy. Once you find them, at nighttime you can load your tubes and usually 30, 45 minutes you'll have some bite, you know, you'll have some eating by sharks and whatnot. Sometimes it's frustrating, if it's really rough it's sort of hard to hold up sometimes. But yeah, loading them up and then you're ready to go and definitely lose some sleep. Some guys are bringing an extra guy, just like a night driver. You know, that way he's fresh, doesn't at least not run into the rig in the middle of the night, 3 a trying to hold

The National Weather Service is predicting “below normal” activity during the upcoming hurricane season in the Central Pacific. But officials warn it only takes one storm to leave behind a trail of damage.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

#OCEANIA: Security for the Central Pacific unfinished. Cleo Paskal, FDD . https://www.fdd.org/analysis/op_eds/2024/04/28/china-watches-as-the-u-s-fumbles-around-in-central-pacific/ 1944 OFF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS

Last time we spoke about Operation Reckless, Operation Persecution and the Japanese retreat in New Britain. General Douglas MacArthur unleashed his two amphibious assaults, opening up the Western New Guinea Campaign. Both Operation Reckless and Persecution achieved complete surprise upon the Japanese. Múltiple Japanese units already performing withdrawals were caught into a chaotic new flight when the allies landed and began seizing key territory such as Hollandia and Aitape. The Japanese commanders fell into disarray leaving some to seize command and order further withdrawals in the face of hopeless battles. Yet again, forces already used to retreating through rough terrain without adequate provisions, were hitting the jungle track. Morale was all but collapsing in New Guinea. Over on New Britain matters were similar as the Japanese continued to retreat under heavy pressure from American patrols. Competent commanders would lose their lives beside their men in another hopeless battle.  This episode is the Drive for Myitkyina Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Operation Reckless and Persecution were tremendous successes. There was very little opposition for the men advancing upon Hollandia, the Japanese simply did not even attempt to defend their well developed defenses there. The drive towards Hollandia's airfields was led by the 1st Battalion, 186th regiment. From Leimok Hill to Brinkman's Plantation, they did encounter opposition, but it was scattered and uncoordinated. Colonel Oliver Newman was very cautious, he believed thousands of Japanese were still around the airfields. Just before they came across the airfields, they found large, undefended Japanese supply dumps. This would be one of many Japanese supply dumps captured through the following days, as General Eichelberger recalled “There were more than six hundred supply dumps. There were clothing dumps as high as houses. There were ammunition dumps everywhere. There were pyramids of canned goods and tarpaulin-covered hills of rice which looked like Ohio haystacks. There were saki and beer. There were tons and tons of quinine and other medical supplies, which, as a result of our landing, never reached the Japanese troops at the front. I believe Hollandia was the richest prize—supply wise—taken during the Pacific War”. These types of discoveries indicated the Japanese were extremely desperate. By May 4th, Major General William Gill's 32nd Division had just arrived at Aitape to relieve the 163rd regiment, who were earmarked to take part in the next amphibious assault. The terrain, alongside the weather was dreadful at Hollandia, making it impossible to provide the needed airfields suitable for heavy bombers without some legendary engineer work. General MacArthur considered it necessary to seize and develop new heavy bomber airfields in the Wakde-Sarmi-Biak region in order to neutralize enemy bases in the western Caroline. To be honest given the track records of these amphibious assaults in causing absolute mayhem for Japanese commanders, forcing them to keep on running, it was a great idea to keep the pace up. With the knowledge General Tagami's 36th Division was still in the region and that the enemy might still seek to reinforce that said area before the allies could land there, MacArthur initially planned to send the full 41st Division against Wakde-Sarmi on May 15th, once the Hollandia fields were ready to support the amphibious assault. However supply congestion at Hollandia's beaches was thwarting such designs. Admiral Barbey proposed that D Day be postponed until May 21 and gave two reasons for the postponement. First, tides would be higher in the Wakde area on the 21st than on the 15th. Second, postponement would allow orderly and complete preparations to be made. Congestion was severe at the Hollandia beaches, where the bulk of the 41st Division was to stage. Lack of lighterage and beach space, combined with an inadequate road net, hampered unloading of equipment, supplies, and troops which were pouring into the Hollandia area. The arrival of such supplies and units, some of which had to be reloaded for Wakde-Sarmi, seriously interfered with mounting the 41st Division. As such, General Krueger decided that the operation could be started no earlier than the 16th but that unless important strategic considerations dictated otherwise, the 21st would be much preferable. Additionally, a number of engineer and air force organizations were scheduled to arrive at Hollandia on the 12th, either for employment there or to be staged for Wakde-Sarmi. The shipping bringing these units to Hollandia was needed to support the Wakde phase of the new operation, which could not begin until the vessels were reloaded. As beach congestion at Hollandia remained a major problem, this reloading could not be accomplished quickly. It was therefore proposed that the Wakde landings be postponed at least another day to the 17th. Although MacArthur initially approved the proposed delay, new aerial photography of the coastal area from Sarmi eastward to Wakde indicated the ground conditions of the region were not suited for heavy bomber airstrips. Thus MacArthur decided that the Sarmi portion of the operation should be axed and instead they would focus on Wakde Island slated for D-day May 17th. 10 days after the capture of Wakde, or as soon as the airfields were repaired, the allies would next hit Biak, where more suitable airstrip sites were known to exist. General Doe thus prepared the Wakde Landings, Codenamed Operation Tornado while General Fuller's remaining regiments were expected to seize the airdrome areas on Biak. Over on the other side, General Anami planned to send the 36th division over to perform an immediate counterattack against Hollandia, but was denied. General Adachi over to the east had more freedom to act. The 18th Army had found itself cut off from all provisions and supplies, thus deprived of every possibility of rejoining the 2nd Area Army west of Hollandia, for the crucial defense of Western New Guinea. Because of this Adachi reasoned the best move for his 55,000 troops was to perform some quick actions before their strength was sapped out. Thus on April 26th, Adachi ordered the 20th, 41st and 51st Divisions to prepare a counterattack against the enemy beachhead at Aitape. Adachi hoped such a bold action against his enemy's rear might force a major diversion of the enemy eastwards, in turn hampering their drive against Western New Guinea.  Now back in mid-February the Japanese were adjusting their forces in the Central Pacific. They had established the 31st Army in Saipan, formed around the 52nd and 29th Division, led by Lt General Obata Hideyoshi. The bulk of the 52nd division, led by Lt General Mugikura Shunzaburo had landed in Truk mid-February, Lt General Takashina Takesi's 29th Division meanwhile were still in the progress of traveling to the Marianas, escorted by the destroyers Kishinami, Asashimo and Okinami. The bulk of the division departed Busan on February 24; but the convoy would be torpedoed some 200 km south of Okidaitōjima by the submarine Trout on February 28. The 18th Regiment, led by Colonel Monma Kentaro suffered 1657 deaths, including its commanding officer, and 570 wounded. Because of this the 18th regiment was landed at Saipan to recover; 50th regiment was diverted to land at Tinian under the command of Colonel Ogata Keiji and the 38th regiment was sent to Guam on March 4th. Allied submarine interceptions of these troop movements was no mere coincidence. The submarine activities were frequently guided by 'Magic' intelligence relating to ship movements which was collected by intercepting and decrypting encoded radio transmissions. The IJN routinely broadcast the location and intended route of convoys under its protection, and decrypting these messages allowed Allied naval commanders to alert submarines in the vicinity of convoys. The submarine commanders were free to plan their interception and attack where conditions were most favorable. The IJN's faulty anti-submarine doctrine also contributed to Japan's shipping losses. The Navy had placed a low priority on protecting merchant shipping from submarine attack before and during the early years of the war and convoys were not routinely assembled until 1943. Vast swathes of Japanese shipping was being sunk in early 1944. There were two large reasons for this. Number 1) obviously the IJN was greatly diminished and thus allied submarines were operating further into enemy territory. Number 2) fixing the torpedo issue, yes those pesky Mark 14s/15s were now hitting hard and providing enormous results. In response to this emerging crisis, the Japanese established the Grand Escort Fleet Headquarters, under the overall command of Admiral Oikawa Koshiro, to coordinate convoys and implement a standard doctrine. The first order of business was to increase the average size of Japanese convoys from 5 ships to "large" convoys of 10 to 20 ship in order to assign more escort ships to protect against enemy submarine activity. To further reinforce the Central Pacific, the Japanese also created nine expeditionary units from the forces of the 1st and 7th Kwantung and 8th Korean Armies. They also decided to assign the 14th and 43rd Divisions of Lieutenant-Generals Inoue Sadae and Saito Yoshitsugu to General Obata's command, designated Truk Sector Group. To support them, the IJN decided to combine the 4th Fleet and the 14th Air Fleet on March 4th to form the Central Pacific Area Fleet, under Admiral Nagumo. Between March-April, the 31st Army was assigned the priority for shipping, so Nagumo would send a total of eleven large convoys collectively known as the Matsu Fleet to bring said reinforcements to the Central Pacific. Though the deadly American submarines would hunt relentlessly to prevent these reinforcements, they would only be able to sink the light cruiser Tatsuta, the destroyer Asanagi, six transports and one submarine chaser, so the Matsu Fleet was considered as largely successful.  By mid-April the success of the Matsu Fleet allowed the IJN to allocate more shipping to the 2nd Area Army. Thus the Take-Ichi convoy was formed to carry the 32nd division of Lieutenant-General Ishii Yoshio and the bulk of the 35th division to Western New Guinea. The large convoy consisting of 15 transports was escorted by an unusually strong force under Admiral Kajioka consisting of minelayer Shirataka; destroyers Asakaze, Shiratsuyu, Fujinami and Kuri; Mikura-class escort ship Kurahashi; Type D escort ships No. 20 and No. 22; gunboats Ataka and Uji; minesweepers No. 22 and No. 101; and submarine chasers No. 37, No. 38 and Tama Maru No. 7. They departed Shanghai on April 17th enroute for Manila. Unbeknownst to the Japanese allied code breakers were decrypting their radio signals and managed to figure out the convoys departure and arrival points. The Submarine Jack was given the coordinates and intercepted Kajioak's convoy around nightfall of April 26th. Jack fired 19 torpedoes from long range, managing to sink the 5425-ton freighter SS Yoshida Maru No. 1, which was carrying the entire 210th Regiment of the 32nd Division. 3000 soldiers and their commander Colonel Koike Yasumasa all drowned with the ship. Its moments like these I always find myself taking a step back. Thousands of men fighting on all these islands in the Pacific, absolute carnage in places like New Guinea, Guadalcanal, later on Peleliu….one submarine and woosh, a regiment gone. The allied submarine campaign during the Pacific War, did a lion's share of work, horrifying work. War is a horrible thing.  The remaining convoy ships continued to Manila, arriving there on April 29th. Upon reaching Manila, however, Lieutenant-General Ishii Yoshio learned that his 32nd Division was reassigned to the 2nd Army to further reinforce western New Guinea, so a new convoy of eight transports would resume the journey to New Guinea on May 1st, carrying the bulk of the 32nd and 35th Divisions. You can bet after hearing what happened to the 210th regiment on the Yoshida Maru, these men were dreading to sail again. They had every reason to feel that dread, as the American intelligence operators figured out the convoys departure and arrival information again. They pinpointed the convoys route, speed, daily noon positions, everything. This time the submarine Gurnard intercepted Kajioka's convoy in the Celebes Sea on May 6. Gurnard's captain, Commander Herb Andrew  submerged his boat and made a cautious approach to avoid detection by aircraft. He reached a firing position 4 hours later and fired 6 torpedoes at 2 transports. Only 1 of these torpedoes struck its mark, and a 2nd salvo missed its intended targets but hit another transport. Andrews then turned his boat and fired further torpedoes from Gurnard's stern torpedo tubes which hit a 3rd transport. One of the Japanese destroyers then counterattacked Gurnard and forced Andrews to break off his attack. The destroyer was traveling at too great a speed for its detection gear to function, however, and did not damage the submarine, despite dropping approximately 100 depth charges. Two hours later, Gurnard rose to periscope depth and found that a major effort to rescue troops and equipment from the torpedoed transports was under way. That night, the submarine also torpedoed one of the crippled transports which was still afloat. In the end, its attack successfully sank transports Aden Maru (5,825 tons) and Taijima Maru (6,995 tons) as well as the cargo ship Tenshinzan Maru (6,886 tons). Although the Japanese rescue effort was relatively successful, 1290 troops were killed, The 4th Independent Mountain Artillery Regiment was completely destroyed and much of their equipment was lost.   Due to these heavy losses, the Take-Ichi convoy finally docked at Halmahera on May 9th, where the remnants of the 32nd and 35th Divisions were ultimately unloaded. General Ikeda's 35th division, including the 219th regiment from Palau were shipped over to Sorong, with the 219th left to guard the St.Andrew Strait Islands. General Ishii's 32nd division, was retained at Halmahera to garrison the island. The terrible loss of the Take-Ichi convoy forced the Japanese leadership to acknowledge it was no longer possible to reinforce Western New Guinea, thus General Anami would have to fight with what he had on hand. Alongisde this, IJA General HQ decided to pull back the perimeter of the absolute defense zone in the southern area to a line extending from Sorong to Halmahera, with units at Geelvink Bay, Biak and Manokwari ordered to hold out as long as possible to delay the enemy advance. Anami did not like the orders one bit, as he belived the forward line should be aggressively defended to secure the valuable land holding air bases between Palau and Western New Guinea. What Anami was not aware of, was that the IJN combined fleet were preparing for the famed decisive naval battle in the area. This was part of Admiral Toyoda's Operation A-Go. Under the plans elaborated by the Combined Fleet, the First Mobile Fleet, and the First Air Fleet were assigned the principal roles in the projected battle. The former assembled its surface strength at Tawitawi in the Sulu Archipelago on May 16th, while the land-based units of the First Air Fleet continued to be widely deployed in the Marianas and Carolines to take advantage of any tactical opportunity that might arise. Tawitawi was chosen as the main staging point for the First Mobile Fleet because of its proximity to both the refueling facilities of Balikpapan and the sea area which the Navy High Command expected to be the scene of the decisive battle.  It was also safely beyond the range of enemy land-based air power and afforded greater security against Allied intelligence than other anchorages in the Philippines. Orders are orders, thus Anami ordered General Teshima to hold onto Geelvink Bay at all costs while also contuining to secure the Sarmi area as a lifeline for the 18th Army who were being cut off from east of Hollandia. While Admiral Ozawa's 1st Mobile Fleet assembled its at Tawi Tawi for Operation A-Go and Admiral Kakuta's 1st Air Fleet deployed its land-based units in the Marianas and Carolines, Admirals King, Nimitz and Spruance had also been planning their invasion of the Marianas, aiming to secure Saipan, Tinian and Guam as advance air and naval bases to allow striking of the Philippines, Formosa and Okinawa. After the landings at Hollandia and Aitape, Admiral Mitscher's Task Force 58 realized there was very little opposition and he still had plenty of strength to continue operating. Thus Nimitz decided to carry out a preventive strike against Truk, to ensure that the Japanese would not be able to build up their air power before the Marianas invasion scheduled for June.  Intelligence reports indicated that the Japanese had been rebuilding their strength at Truk. Indeed Truk's air garrison had grown enough to be a concern again. By late March, 30 flyable Zero fighters had been pieced together from aircraft destroyed during the February raids. Additionally, aircraft were being withdrawn from bypassed bases in the Marshalls and sent to Truk. By April, the Japanese had 104 flyable aircraft at Truk: 6 G4M twin-engine bombers, 12 D4Y1s dive bombers/reconnaissance bombers, 13 B5N or B6N torpedo bombers, 55 Zero fighters, 10 J1N1 night fighters, and 8 floatplanes used for observation and reconnaissance. Moen No. 1 airfield housed the G4Ms and 20 Zero, while Eten had the rest of the Zeros and all the night fighters. The single-engine bombers, the D4Y1s, B5Ns, and B6Ns, were all at Param, with the floatplanes at Dublon. There were another 63 unserviceable aircraft scattered throughout Truk's airfields. Admiral Spruance's 5th fleet would also conduct a bombardment of the Satawa and Ponape islands. On its return from Hollandia, Task Force 58 traveled to Truk, arriving shortly before dawn on April 30th and immediately tossed a fighter sweep consisting of 84 Hellcats. 5 Nakajima bombers from Param were aloft doing a dawn sweep, something that had become routine since February. Truk's radar detected the inbound US aircraft when they were 30 minutes out, shortly before the scout's interrupted radio report. The warning gave the Japanese ample time to launch air cover. Before the US fighters arrived, Moen No. 1 had scrambled 20 Zeros, Eten another 29, and Param its remaining eight Nakajima bombers. Yet the 57 Japanese aircraft were brushed aside, nearly 25 Zeros were shot down at the cost of 2 Hellcats. Just like we saw in February, Task Force 58 began staggering air strikes throughout the day. The carriers launched full deckloads seeing fighters, dive bombers and torpedo bombers continously over Truk for the entire day. Task Force 58 performed 2,200 bomber sorties, 467 of which were flown by fighters carrying bombs. In all, US Navy aircraft dropped 748 tons of bombs during the two-day operation. The Hino Maru No. 2, a 1,500-ton cargo ship and auxiliary gunboat, was hit and heavily damaged by a bomb by an Avenger from USS Cabot during the attack's first day. It sank four days later on May 4. The Sapporo Maru, a 600-ton auxiliary provision stores ship, was bombed on April 30 and sank north of Fefan. The 300-ton auxiliary minelayer Minsei Maru and 20 other craft were also destroyed in the harbor during the two days of raids. While a small haul when compared to February's results, these losses further reduced the number of vessels remaining in Truk Atoll. This increased the difficulty of moving supplies and personnel between the different islands in the lagoon, further decreasing Truk's usefulness as an outpost. Additionally, the Japanese submarine I-174 was detected 20 miles south of the atoll on May 1. Aircraft from the light carrier Monterey teamed up with the destroyers MacDonough and Stephen Potter to sink the submarine. Whether the submarine was fleeing Truk or heading back to it after a patrol is not known. Its loss contributed to the decision to abandon Truk as a submarine base later in 1944. The Japanese losing 23 auxiliary vessels and one submarine, but this time the American bombers also targeted Truk's shore facilities, giving special attention to the airfields on Moen and Eten, the Dublon naval headquarters and oil storage tanks, and Fefen's docks warehouses and ammo dumps.  On the morning of May 1st, the Japanese attempted several straggling strikes against the American carriers, but none managed to cause any damage. The largest attack against the US fleet contained 8 bombers, D4Y1 dive bombers, and Nakajima torpedo bombers which survived the first day's attack. They found Task Group 58.2 and Task Group 58.3 at 8:15am, making a series of attacks against aircraft carriers in both groups. Met by heavy antiaircraft fire, they were shot down, most before they could drop their torpedoes or bombs. Only one came close enough to drop a bomb, which fell near the Lexington but caused no damage. Task Force 58 contuined to pound Truk throughout the day before finally retiring towards Majuro during the night. Based on interpretation of post-strike aerial photography, US intelligence estimated 40 percent of the buildings on Dublon, 80 percent of those on Eten, 75 percent of those at Moen, 20 percent of the buildings on Fefan, 15 percent of those on Param, and 80 percent at Ulalu were destroyed during the airstrikes of April 30 and May 1. Roughly 423 buildings and six hangars were destroyed, 44 others were damaged, 59 Japanese aircraft were shot down, a further 60 were destroyed on the ground, 36 were left damaged, and only 12 were still flyable. All of this cost Mitscher 35 aircraft, with another 33 damaged. Furthermore, half the airmen shot down were rescued by planes or by submarines.  Thus the threat posed by Truk was yet again neutralized. After this, Admiral Montgomery's carrier group Task Force 58 was given orders to hit Minami Torishima and Wake Island for mid May. Leaving Majuro on May 15th, Montgomery assemled his forces about 420 miles southeast of Marcus Island on the17th. On the 19th, light carrier San Jacinto hunted for enemy picket boats north and west of Minami Torishima. At 7:28am a Avenger of VT-9 and a Hellcat of VF-9 found and attacked an enemy trawler 475 miles north of Marcus Island. They dropped their bombs and strafed it with machine gun fire. No direct bomb hits were obtained but the target was well covered with machine gun fire. The Japanese trawler was left dead in the water and down by the stern, with a 1/4 miles oil slick and debris behind it. No personnel were visible on the boat. Meanwhile fleet carriers Wasp and Essex launched a predawn fighter sweep. A flight of 4 night fighters launched at 5am from the Wasp on an intruder mission over Marcus Island, but the Essex had to cancel its flight of night fighters. At 11:15, another air attack commenced. Aircraft dove through antiaircraft bursts with bomb blasts occuring all over the island. At one time the entire island was completely smothered by smoke and dust, but the Anti-aircraft fire contuined undiminished. After the planes left, explosions and fires continued on Marcus Island for some time. They managed to inflict a moderate amount of damage to buildings, shot down one G4M and sunktwo small boats; ut the defenders' anti-aircraft fire was ferocious, successfully shooting down 4 American planes and damaging another 69. On May 21st, San Jacinto rejoined the group and also reported sinking one sampan. Montgomery's carriers then launched a series of composite carrier strikes against Wake on May 23, further damaging many installations there and sinking a slugger and three barges, at the cost of only one plane. But that is all for carrier actions today as we now need to jump oer to the Burma front. General Stilwell was contuining his offensive, with the 22nd division advancing south towards Inkangahtawng. General Lioa's 65th Regiment plus the 3rd Battalion, 66th regiment were advancing down the Kamaing road when they ran into Japanese resistance north and west of Inkangahtawng. The 64th regiment was kept behind to guard the Japanese flank until May 3rd, while the rest of the 22nd Division awaited better weather to perform a coordinated attack against the town. But this was Burma, and Burma is going to Burma. There was an outbreak of monsoons that quickly prevented the effective use of tanks and made supply movement over the Ledo Road a nightmare. By June about one inch of rain fell daily. Though supply convoys could still move from Ledo to Shingbwiyang, the combat trail from Shingbwiyang south was very difficult. The road was graded to Tingkawk Sakan known also as mile post 164 and metaled almost to Mile Post 138. However, rainfall had blocked the road over the flats north of Tingkawk Sakan. At the end of June the situation was unchanged. The Japanese stand at Kamaing and the heavy rains immobilized the survey party and the road trace. As the flood waters rose in the valley, they effectively barred armor from moving south to Mogaung or Myitkyina. Thus on May 3rd, the 64th avaned east across the Kamaing Road to try and cut the trail 500 yards south of the Hwelon Hka. The next day presented clearer skies, so the Chinese troops initiated their attack. Once Inkangahtawn fell, the 22nd Division would hold the area for several weeks while the first elements of Lt General Pen Yukun's 50th Division arrived to the front to reinforce them. To the east, General Sun's 114th regiment were engaging General Tanaka's 55th regiment along the Lahkraw Hka. To break the stalemate along the Lahkraw Hka, the Chinese 114th Regiment had to clear away the Japanese observation posts in the hills. The 1st battalion, 114th on the regiment's east flank cut around the flank of the 55th Regiment on April 28th, while the 2nd battalion, 114th pushed the same Japanese unit back a few hundred yards. This bending process continued during the next two days, and the 114th Regiment was well south of the enveloped Japanese flank and within half a mile of Wala. The 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 114th then began moving straight south, leaving behind them pockets of determined Japanese who held up the 3rd battalion, 114th. The Chinese managed to envelope the Japanese, pushing them all the way to Wala. The 113th Regiment also came back into line at the end of April to put frontal pressure on the Japanese positions along the Lahkraw Hka and Tigrawm Hka while the 112th Regiment held its salient without attempting to move. Though the Japanese managed to stabilize their lines on the creeks east and west of Wala, a company of the 114th would cross the Nawngmi Hka on May 6th, thus starting the advance southwards again. Two days later, the 114th's advance became general, while on the east, at Stilwell's order, the 112th began to gather its companies to take Warong.  On the 9th, the 114th Regiment finally took East Wala and Hlagyi and subsequently linked with the 112th Regiment pushing south towards Warong. The 114th's penetration, driving deeper into the Japanese lines, began to approach the 112th's outposts just north of Manpin. By the 12th the 114th and 112th Regiments were able to maintain communications, with very few Japanese between them. The 114th's penetration further weakened the position of the Japanese facing the 113th Regiment, which in turn began to roll up slowly from east to west as its 1st and 2nd Battalions pressed on to Wala and Maran. Between the 28-30th, Merrills End Run Force began the long grueling advance upon Ritpong. K Force moved out on 28 April; H Force, on 30 April. The so-called trail over the pass was more nearly a route used by the Kachins; in some places there was no path. Twenty pack animals slipped and fell off the narrow, muddy way. It was a grueling march for men who had already marched 500 miles and fought several battles, most of the time on K ration. Before End Rrun Force reached Ritpong, it had only one contact with the Japanese. A few of the enemy were flushed from cover by the 1/88th, but it was feared the Japanese held Ritpong in strength. On May 5th, the Japanese 2nd Battalion, 114th Infantry Regiment made contact with the K Force at Ritpong, 16 miles northwest of Nsopsup, and a four day battle ensued. The Battalion was forced to withdraw to Tingkrukawng, about eight miles to the southeast. There, after several skirmishes, contact with the enemy was lost for a period of five days. On the 5th, when the leading elements of K Force were a mile from Ritpong, Colonel Kinnison began an envelopment to hit the village from north and south. The 3rd Battalion managed to cut its way through the woods and place itself across the southern approaches to Ritpong on the 6th. Meanwhile, the 89th Regiment tried to take Ritpong from the north but failed. Next day an American reinforced company attacked Ritpong from the south but was stalled by a machine gun nest. Merrills Marauders would block the trail to the south, while the 80th Regiment contuined to hit their enemy positions. As the Chinese captured Ritpong on the 9th, M Force had had one skirmish with Japanese, routed them, and begun to cut its own paths. The march was fatiguing in the extreme; fully half the animals died of exhaustion or fell into the gorges. The men were farther harassed by fevers and dysentery, but they were only two days behind H and K Forces To the south, General Lentaigne's Chindits were contuining Operation Thursday. Yet under the overall direction of Stilwell, the Chindits were no longer a “special force”, now they were line infantry tasked with the traditional role of advancing and seizing well defended objectives, for which they did not have the training nor equipment to do effectively. Brigadiers Brodie and Ricketts men covered the general Chindit movement heading north. The plan called for closure of Aberdeen, Broadway and White City before the Monsoon broke. It was now the turn of 14 Brigade to play a major role. The new Block near Hopin would cut the road and rail link to the town of Mogaung. Meanwhile Major Masters' 111th Brigade began to establish the Blackpool Stronghold on May 5. The site was occupied on the night of May 5/6, and Masters spent the entirety of the following day setting up defenses. What he should have done was immediately attack the Japanese-held village of Namkwin just ahead of his positions. Instead, he busied himself with preparing the stronghold. It was a critical mistake, and says much about the lack of enterprise from the brigade. Blackpool Block was finally established on May 7th, with the King's Own's 46 Column the first to arrive at the site. They came under fire as they dug in. For the next 5 nights they would be attacked by a railway unit based out of Pinbaw. The railway unit was using 105mm guns firing from up the valley, while troops from Pinbaw attacked for the next five nights, held at bay by the rifles and machine guns of the King's own Rifles, and the mortars, which Masters had gathered from the battalions and wielded as single battery of eight. Despite the strong defense, in one section of the northern line nicknamed the “Deep”  which was the tip of the “boar's nose,” the Japanese were as close as 10 to 20 yards from the wire. Enemy snipers took shots at anything that moved while the King's own snipers and Bren gunners occupied hidden places among the shattered trees, firing whenever they saw the target, after which a cry would resound amid the quiet that followed: “got him!” The Japanese brought up a single 75mm artillery piece from Pinbaw, with which they shelled the camp, blasting the airstrip with impunity and setting the gliders and Dakotas on fire, until May 13 when Masters came into possession of three airlifted 25-pdr guns, allowing him to hit back. Overhead Cochran's Air Commandos mounted sortie after sortie against the Japanese positions but it was clear they could not maintain the ante. The dark clouds of the monsoon were gathering in strength. After the successful establishment of Blackpool, Brigadier Calvert's 77th brigade began advancing north towards Mogaung on the 8th. The night night, White City was abandoned as Brigadiers Broddie and Ricketts marched north to defend Blackpool. On May 11th, Lt General Takeda launched an attack against White City, but was surprised to find it abandoned. It then advanced to the then-abandoned Broadway and onwards to the Namkwin area, where the Blackpool stronghold was located. Having rushed through empty Broadway and White City, the 53rd Division thus tore into the zone in strength. Takeda Kaoru's 53rd Division began pursuing Broddie and Ricketts forces. For the next few days Master's troops continued to repel increasingly stronger and stronger Japanese attacks. Masters quote “Where in the name of God were the floater brigades? White City had been evacuated 13 days earlier and 14th Brigade was supposed to come straight up here. My brigade had marched 140 route miles in 14 days to establish this block. Surely those bloody nitwits could cover 120 route miles in 13 days? Where the hell were they? Where were the West Africans?… 20 bloody battalions, 40 flaming columns of Chindit bullshit sat on their arses and drank eat and wondered how we were getting on.” In mid-May, the 3rd Battalion, 114th Regiment and 2nd Battalion, 146th Regiment tried to break through towards Kamaing and Myitkyina to reinforce Tanaka's spent defenders and would join in on the attacks against Blackpool. The 2nd Battalion, 2nd Field Artillery Regiment would also support their attacks. The Japanese continued their efforts to quickly crush Blackpool Block. A Company-strength attack on May 14 was backed by artillery support. It was repulsed, the Japanese losing 60 killed. They returned the following morning, when another 50 were killed. Air strikes were called in to further punish the enemy. Then the monsoon took hold and air support and supply became more difficult – Lalaghat and Hailakandi were fair weather fields. The Japanese also retaliated through a single heavy mortar, firing 60lb bombs, note in comparison, Chindit's standard 81mm mortar fired a 10lb bombs. Delayed by the outbreak of the monsoons on May 15, the brigades of Brodie and Ricketts had managed to secure the vital Kyunsalai Pass, but they failed to get close enough to provide significant support for the stronghold. At the same time, the flooding of the Namyin river would leave Calvert's 77th Brigade unable to aid Masters in the defense of Blackpool; and Morris Force, which had successfully cut the Myitkyina road, was too far to the east to come into the stronghold's assistance. The monsoons had also hampered the airdrop of supplies, so the Chindits would have to make their five days' rations last up to 14 days. Meanwhile, proceeding from Ritpong, K Force feinted towards the Japanese supply point at Nsopzup in order to attract the Japanese attention while H Force advanced directly to Myitkyina.  On the 12th, Colonel Henry Kinnison's Marauders engaged the 2nd Battalion, 114th Regiment, near Tingkrukawng. The Japanese at Tingkrukawng were strong enough to pin both of K force's combat teams to the ground and then to halt the Chinese when they were committed. Attempts to envelop the Japanese failed. Since H Force was proceeding unmolested, Merrill told Kinnison to withdraw. K Force then picked up H's trail and followed it to Myitkyina. While K Force was fighting at Tingkrukawng, H Force kept on to a river just south of the village of Namkwi on the Mogaung-Myitkyina railroad and about two miles from the principal Myitkyina airstrip that lay almost due west of Myitkyina itself. Despite the several brushes with the Japanese, Kachin informants were sure that the Myitkyina garrison was not on the alert. To ensure surprise, before Colonel Hunter and his force bivouacked for the night of the 16th they rounded up the local Burmans and kept them under careful watch. Kinnison would reach Hkumchet by the 17th, where the Colonel had to be evacuated because he had contracted a deadly mite typhus, dying shortly after with shocking speed. In all, 149 men contracted this little-known scourge. While M Force was about to reach Arang, H Force began an attack of Pamati and the Myitkyina airstrip on the 17th. The 150th Regiment was ordered to take the airstrip, while GALAHAD personnel took the Irrawaddy ferry terminal at Pamati. The other airstrip, north of the town, was left alone for the present. The attack went like a service school demonstration, for though the Japanese knew Myitkyina was in danger, the actual assault was a complete surprise. Colonel Maruyama, the Japanese commander, had two understrength battalions of the 114th Regiment in the town of Myitkyina and in its little suburb of Sitapur. There were 100 more men of the 15th Airfield Battalion on the north and south airstrips, 318 men from labor and service units on various details in Myitkyina, and 320 patients in a military hospital. Perhaps 700 able-bodied Japanese were present when the battle began. They took the Japanese by complete surprise and subsequently securing both positions.  As soon as Hunter considered his hold on the major airstrip secure, he sent the prearranged code signal, “Merchant of Venice”, which meant the process of supply and reinforcement could begin. Consequently, some reinforcements began to be flown into the airstrip, though to the disappointment of General Merrill most of these were engineers and anti-aircraft instead of the needed infantry.  Back at his HQ, Stilwell was exultant. The brilliant seizure of the Myitkyina airstrip was the height of his career and the grand climax of the North Burma Campaign, as his forces had driven 500 miles into Burma and won engagements against seven Japanese regiments in the last six months. Stilwell's triumph also came right on time, as American planners in Washington were beginning to adopt the British position suggesting an end to offensive action in north Burma. Stilwell's bold stroke at Myitkyina would instead see the Americans issue a directive encouraging Admiral Mountbatten's command to exploit the opening of the Ledo Road and to secure enough of north Burma to protect the Allied hold on China's lifeline.   After the capture of the airstrip, Hunter immediately sent two battalions of the 150th Regiment to take Myitkyina. One battalion of the Chinese 89th Regiment, which had arrived from Ledo, would defend the air strip while two battalions of the 150th Regiment attacked Myitkyina. The other battalion of the 150th Regiment would be in reserve at the strip. They would encounter the 114th Regiment HQ and its 1st Battalion. As early as 1700 on 17 May Colonel Maruyama had also brought the 3rd Company, 148th Regiment, 56th Division, in across the Irrawaddy to reinforce Myitkyina. Following the wrong road, however, they went to Sitapur instead, where they were ambushed by the Japanese. On encountering Japanese rifle fire, they lost direction completely and engaged in fighting among themselves. Furthermore, some Marauders would continue toward Zigyun to secure the ferry crossing south of the city. On May 18, as more Chinese battalions were flown to reinforce the Chindits, the 150th again moved against Myitkyina; but repeating the mishap of the day before, the Chinese became confused, fought among themselves, and ultimately drove themselves right back out of the town. Nonetheless, the Siege of Myitkyina had just begun. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The invasion of Hollandia and Aitape was such quick successes it allowed the Americans to bombard further islands. The Take-Ichi convoy improved the transportation of troops, but it also came at a horrifying cost. The loss of such shipping was yet again the paint on the wall for the Empire of Japan. Despite this the IJN was fully committed to forcing a decisive naval victory. 

2/2: #OCEANIA: Remembering Empires of the Central Pacific & What is to be done. Cleo Paskal, FDD.  https://thediplomat.com/2024/04/the-importance-of-americas-pacific-family/ 1899 Yap in Micronesia

1/2: #OCEANIA: Remembering Empires of the Central Pacific & What is to be done. Cleo Paskal, FDD.  https://thediplomat.com/2024/04/the-importance-of-americas-pacific-family/ 1944 USS Minneapolis refueling off Marshalls

PREVIEW: #OCEANIA: Conversation with colleague Cleo Paskal of FDD re the succes of bipartidsanship in Congress to properly fund the Compact of Free Assosication's three sovereign island states in the Central Pacific, Pelau, Micronesia, Marshall Islands, in order to hold off China influence operations from establishing baseing to interrupt the ability of the US to deploy and resupply the Philippines and Taiwan in the event of war.  More detail later. 1837 Oceania

Last time we spoke about the beginning of the Japanese counteroffensive on Bougainville, action on the Burma front and New Guinea. General Hyakutake was under immense pressure to dislodge the Americal force from Bougainville. He unleashed a grand counter offensive trying to break the American defensive lines. Both the Japanese and Americans began suffering heavy casualties, yet neither side wavered in its resolve. Over in the Burma front, the Galahad unit, aka Merrills marauders joined their British, American and Chinese allies in pushing the Japanese back. There were some issues involving friendly fire, but overall the allies were making gains in a theater where the Japanese had dominated for years. Over in New Guinea, the Japanese were continuing to retreat to Madang. Things were going so terribly, units were now being deployed to defend the western part of New Guinea. Japan was simply not winning the war of attrition.  This episode is the Operation Thursday Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Things have really been heating up on the Burma front. General Mutaguchi basically tricked his own superiors into allowing him to invade India under the guise of Operations HA-GO and U-GO. This saw Japanese units advancing towards Imphal and Kohima. On the other side General Stilwell's forces were advancing upon Myitkyina in the north, as General Slim's 15th corp were clashing with the Japanese in the Arakan region. Americans, British, Indians, Chinese were all performing operations to halt Japanese attacks and push further into Burma, but on top of all of that, we now need to talk about our favorite child born from the onion eating madman Wingate, the Chindits.  All the way back in early February, Operation Thursday was in development. The operation was basically an extended version of the first Chindit raid, this time in two waves, with 3 brigades making long marches across the Chindwin. The first wave would go into the enemy territory, then 2-3 months later the second wave would come in to reinforce them. There were large issues with the operation, namely a lack of aircraft. Aircraft were being used for the Arakan campaign and flying supplies over the Hump. Chiang Kai-shek would not part with any aircraft set to go over the Hump and not even Mountbatten had the authority to touch the issue. Regardless Thursday would be authorized and its goals were as follows; to assist Stilwell's advance; to create favorable conditions for the Y-Force to gord the Salween and to inflict maximum damage to the Japanese in northern Burma. Their principles targets were the Shwebo-Myitkyina railway and the Myitkyina-Bhamo-Indaw road. There would be 4 strongholds to be designated, Piccadilly, Chowringhee, Broadway and Templecombe, the last one later renamed Aberdeen. The US 900th airborne engineer company would clear strips suitable for Dakotas to land. On February 4th Wingate and Stratemeyer, commander of the Eastern Air command issued the essential guidelines for Thursday, stressing this raid would require the wounded being flown out from the strongholds rather than to be abandoned as was the case with the first expedition. Stratemeyer added orders to bomb the stronghold areas prior to their establishment, though Wingate had instead favored diversionary bombings of Rangoon, Mandalay and Bangkok.  On February 5th of 1944, Fergussons 16th brigade kicked off first from Ledo and onlookers would remark they looked more like a mule train than a commando force. There were elephants, 250 bullocks, 547 horses and 31314 mules assigned to the operation. Fergusson's 4000 men took 500 mules, fully laden along with them. They avoided Japanese forces by traversing exceptionally difficult terrain. It would be a full month before all Brigade Battalions crossed the Chindwin river. The main target was Indaw, although two Columns were tasked to attack the town of Lonkin, in the Kachin Hills and 20 miles west of Kamaing. Two gliders, loaded with folding boats, outboard engines, and gasoline, were towed by air to the Chindwin River and softly set down on a sandbar. Not only were the necessities delivered to Fergusson, but also for reuse the pair of C-4As were plucked from the scene by a C-47. Wingate traveled with Fergusson and his men for the first the start of the grueling ascent up the Paktai. They faced mud slides, torrential rain, the usual Burma experiences. It would take them all of February to reach the Chindwin, after that it was another 200 miles to their target of Indaw. Wingate departed after the first few days, but would come back over by aircraft to observe the crossing of the Chindwin. Fergusson had been critical of Wingate in January, describing him as a liar, but he continued to believe in the man. “Wingate was sometimes wrong in small things but never in big.' When Wingate met Fergusson he showed up with an entourage of war correspondents, trying to publicize the Chindits activities. He began talking to them of a new fad he came across, turtle eggs which he declared provided singular nourishment. Like so many of Wingate's eccentric ideas, no one favored it. Turtles' eggs were found to be no more appetizing than those of any other reptile, and in fact many of the Chindits experienced stomach pains and other digestive problems after eating them. Then Fergusson had to tell Wingate they could not possibly reach Indaw earlier than March 20th. The expectation had been March 5th, thus Wingate was pissed. At the same time, the 1st air commando had performed aerial reconnaissance over the 3 selected locations suitable for bringing gliders, Broadway, Piccadilly and Chowringhee. Yet Wingate had issued strict orders banning any further overflights fearing it would give up their intentions to the Japanese. Despite the warning, Colonel Cochram dispatched a B-25 on March 5th to perform a final look over the sites, giving last minute reports that Broadway and Chowinghee were clear, but it looked like teak logs were sprawled over the Piccadilly site. Since the Piccadilly site seemed unsuitable, Brigadier Calvert persuaded Wingate to send the Gliders into Broadway. On the night of March 5th, the gliders carrying the second wave were flown in. The pathfinder gliders, first to touch down, set out flare pots to facilitate succeeding waves of gliders. However, the field proved far less accessible than expected. For many years, the local people had logged teak and during the wet season, slid the huge logs across the ground down to a river. Over time the technique gouged deep ruts that elephant grass covered, making the trenches invisible to aerial photographs or reconnaissance. Co-commander of the 1st air commando group John Richardson Alison recalled "They formed perfect glider traps, and there was no way to avoid them. The gliders arrived overhead in large numbers, and when a glider starts down there is no way to stop it. As each one hit the trenches the landing gears would come off and the gliders would go in a heap. We tried to arrange the lights to spread the gliders all over the field to avoid collisions, but this was impossible. They were coming in too fast to change directions, and glider after glider piled into each other while landing.” The next day the gliders landed successfully on Chowringhee and the airstrip was completed by nightfall. Meanwhile transports began to bring Calverts 77th brigade, followed by Brigadiers Lentaigne's 111th brigade. By the 11th, the fly in was complete, now 9250 Chindits were landed on Broadway and Chowringhee. The Chindits then began their advance east to hit the Lashio-Bahmo-Myitkyina motor supply line. Trekking from Chowringhee, Morris Force Columns headed north-east, to cut the Bhamo-Myitkyina road, as 111 Brigade's British Battalions marched south from Broadway to link up with other elements flown into Chowringhee. Their job was to stop Indaw being reinforced from the south. Thus, 111th Brigade set up ambushes and roadblocks south of Indaw although part of the brigade which landed at Chowringhee was delayed in crossing the Irrawaddy River, before moving west to Pinlebu. Broadway was held with a garrison that included field artillery, anti-aircraft guns and some six Spitfires that would successfully repel a Ki-43 attack on March 13.  Meanwhile Calvert's columns advanced over the railway towards Henu, where they would establish the White City stronghold, roughly 20 miles north of Indaw. Columns were directed to demolish bridges and railroads around the Kadu, Mawhun and Pinwe stations. It was a long and gruesome march over some very tough terrain. For example, it took Column 45, bringing up the Brigade's rear, nine days to cover the first 35 miles, to Hkalak Ga. They set out again on February 22nd. By this time, the men were tiring of K-rations, which gave calories but no bulk. Smoking was confined to lunch and evening bivouacs. The Leicesters were in the lead and reached the Chindwin on February 29th. Meanwhile, 45 Recce's columns, still in the rear, reached the Chindwin during the afternoon of Saturday March 4. It had taken them 21 days to cover some of the wildest, toughest country on earth. After successfully crossing the Chindwin, on March 12th Fergusson received orders to seize Indaw's airfield, destroy supply dumps in the area and establish a new Stronghold, to be known as Aberdeen. The Brigade continued south, moving parallel to and west of the railway. Meanwhile Calvert's 5 columns to 5 days to reach Henu. The South Staffords were the first to arrive and the Japanese reacted before they could dig in – they would have to fight for the Block. were on the alert to resist their incursion. In the afternoon of 16th, Calvert launched a bayonet charge up Pagoda Hill, with the Chindits soon engaging the Japanese engineers, who were charging down, in a vicious hand-to-hand combat. Eventually, with the assistance of the 1st Air Commando's close support, the Japanese were successfully pushed off the hill and the White City stronghold was established. For the loss of 23 dead and 64 wounded, Calvert's Chindits had killed 42 Japanese and had effectively cut the line of communications supporting the 18th Division far to the north. In the ensuing days, the stronghold would be developed into a fortress, with some airstrips becoming operational by March 21st. The time chosen to drop the Chindits near the 18th Division's line of communications was most embarrassing to General Tanaka. On January 10, Headquarters, 15th Army, had suspended movement of supplies to the 18th Division in order to accumulate stocks for the projected attack on Imphal. Shipment was to resume as soon as the Imphal operation was underway. Then the Chindits cut the rail line, and just when the supply movement was to have resumed, the 18th Division had to start living on what was at hand in north Burma. It was aided by the 56th Division, which shipped about ninety tons of vital supplies to Myitkyina via Bhamo, but Tanaka's supply position was fundamentally compromised by the Chindits fighting along the railway to north Burma. On the 18th Calvert's force took a large night drop, including wire and entrenching tools. They slaved away to turn the Block into a fortress. The parachutes festooned across the forest canopy gave the Block its popular name – White City – soon a maze of slit trenches and bunkers roofed with heavy timbers. White City, with its commanding position, became a powerful concentration of force, with Calvert's three Battalions steadily reinforced. The Block grew a heavily wired perimeter and a garrison strong enough to raise a substantial force for mobile action. Calvert regarded White City as “ideally situated around a series of hills about 30ft to 50ft high, with numerous small valleys in between, with water at the north and south. I brought the village of Henu into our defended area, so that we would have a good field of fire across the paddy to the south. I also brought into the perimeter what we called ‘OP Hill', a feature slightly higher than our own little hills, to give us good observation. Our perimeter was now about 1,000 yards long, mostly along the railway, and 800 yards deep.” Calvert now had 2,000 men inside the Block, with mobile “floater” columns operating to north and south, together with a sizeable force protecting Broadway. He called in air strikes to punish a Japanese force at nearby Mawlu. Meanwhile the 15th Army's staff were beginning to panic. Many of the officers were beginning to see the paint on the wall and were calling for the Imphal offensive to be abandoned. General Mutaguchi refused to give up and instead directed some troops to thwart the Chindits. To do this a reserve battalion was taken from the 15th, 18th, 33rd and 56th divisions and redirected to Indaw while Colonel Yanagisawa Hiroshi's 67th regiment moved over to Napin. Major General Hayashi Yoshihide's 24th independent mixed brigade was ordered to advance north along with some units of the 2nd division who would open a new HQ at Indaw by March 25th. Further behind the lines, the 53rd division led by Lieutenant-General Kono Etsujiro were directed to rush north to engage the enemy as fast as possible. All of this was still a diversion from the main effort against Imphal and it basically helped Stilwell's operations. To aid the war effort the IJA air force were also stepping up their game. On march 18th, a KI-43 raid managed to destroy some Spitfires grounded at broadway. William 'Babe' Whitamore and Alan M Peart managed to get airborne, with both shooting down one 'Oscar' each. Whitamore was shot down and killed but Peart survived for over half an hour, holding off over 20 enemy fighters. The remaining Spitfires were destroyed on the ground for the loss of another pilot, Lt Coulter. Peart flew back to Kangla the same day in his damaged Spitfire and reported the action.  The following day, Fergusson's footsore columns finally neared Manhton village and prepared to establish the Aberdeen Stronghold. After an appalling final leg of their terrible march into Burma, with progress reduced at some points to 100 yards per hour, the 16th Brigade elements finally reached Aberdeen clearing, some 60 miles west of Broadway Stronghold. The Aberdeen clearing was at Manhton, just east of the Meza River and 25 miles from the railway supplying the Japanese 18th Division, fighting Stilwell's Chinese troops, and the 56th Division, opposing the Yunnan Chinese. Aberdeen took in three villages: Manhton, Kalat and Naunghmi. Aberdeen's site had a lot of advantages. It was only two days' march from Indaw and 14 miles from the Indaw-Banmauk road. The dominant feature was a hill at the northern end, where the permanent garrison would be quartered. There were, however, some drawbacks – mainly the fact that, as Fergusson himself acknowledged, it was “highly accessible” to the enemy. The 16th brigade were exhausted and needed rest, the planned attack against Indaw would have to be delayed. To the south, on the 21st the Japanese launched a major night attack against White City. The battle was ferocious, Calvert's Chindits managed to successfully repel numerous attacks for over 8 hours until the Japanese finally pulled back. The Japanese suffered an estimated 300 deaths, the Chindits also suffered heavy losses. In the White City perimeter, men took solace from the companionship of the animals sharing their hardships. A pony gave birth to a foal during a Japanese attack and murderous mortar barrage. The foal was named “Minnie” after a nearby mortar post. In another attack, Minnie was kicked in the eye by a panic-stricken mule. They fought to save the eye and Brigadier Mike Calvert ordered regular reports of Minnie's progress to be circulated to all forward positions. When recovered, Minnie took to “doing the rounds” of the mortar positions, on the scrounge for tea – which she drank from a pint pot. Minnie survived White City and further battles and went on to enjoy a distinguished military career as the Lancashire Fusiliers' mascot. Minnie got out to India, traveled to Britain and subsequently joined the Regiment on a tour of duty in Egypt. On the 23rd, leading elements of Brigadier Thomas Brodies 14th brigade began to arrive to Aberdeen with the task of blocking the Indaw-Banmauk road.  At the same time, the 111th Brigade's columns were ordered to stop Japanese movements along the Pinlebu-Pinbon. The advance on Indaw may have been compromised inadvertently by the movements of 111 Brigade. One of its British Battalions, the Cameronian's, moved in a wide sweep west of Indaw, crossed the Banmauk road on the 22nd, with orders to cut the Indaw-Homalu road. They bumped into a Japanese patrol at night and their two wounded were flown out by light aircraft the next day. The men became hardened to the realities of jungle warfare against the Japanese, who fought to the death. Some columns were luckier than others regarding their supply drops. The King's Own columns had a reputation for being unlucky. During the 21-23, three successive attempts to re-supply them failed. Already, the columns were heavily reliant on food purchased in villages.  Wingate then visited Bernard Fergusson at Aberdeen. Fergusson wanted to rest 16 Brigade after its exhausting march in but Wingate told him to press on to Indaw before it could be reinforced. Unfortunately, however, the Japanese had already accomplished this. The 16th brigade departed Aberdeen on the 24th, heading south to Auktaw, drawing closer to the heavily-reinforced Indaw. Between them were strongpoints at Thetkegyin village. This part of the country was quite dry and the Japanese controlled all the water sources, thus the Chindits would be forced to fight to drink. Despite successfully blocking the Indaw-Banmauk road, most of Fergussons columns would get sucked into heavy fighting around Thetkegyin on the 26th. Only the 2nd Leicester's columns 17 and 71 made it to Indaw, holding a toehold grimly until they were ordered to pull back. After 5 intense days of fighting, Fergusson ordered his men to withdraw and regroup at Aberdeen.  Back on the 24th, Wingate flew down to Broadway and White City on a morale-boosting mission to 77 Brigade. After a side trip to Aberdeen, he flew back to Broadway and then on to Imphal. This would be the last time Calvert ever saw him. Wingate flew back to Imphal, landing at 6:23pm before taking off again at 8pm for Hailakandi airfield. Half an hour later the B-25 crashed into the Naga hills due west of Imphal near the village of Thilon. Cochran dispatched a special force to search for the crash and they found it the next day. Everyone inside the B-25 had died instantly. Investigators believed the crash could have occurred from freak weather, engine failure or pilot error. But since it was Wingate, there was an air of reluctance to accept it was just an accident. An official investigation concluded it had been the result of engine failure and that the pilot unsuccessfully tried to return to Imphal. Yet other theories emerged and were tested out. Sabotage was the first, but it was ruled out because the B-25 had been closely guarded at all times and nobody knew Wingates intentions or flight plans. Thunderstorms and turbulence were cited as plausible, but all pilots in the area confirmed no thunderstorms.  General Slim opted for extreme turbulence, even though the pilots' testimony also ruled that out. ‘The wreckage was eventually found on the reverse side of a ridge, so that it was unlikely that the aircraft had flown into the hill. The most probable explanation is that it had suddenly entered one of those local storms of extreme turbulence so frequent in the area. These were difficult to avoid at night, and once in them an aeroplane might be flung out of control, or even have its wings torn off.' Another theory had it that the B-25's cluster bombs had broke loose from the bay's rolled into the fuselage and detonated. Given, well how Wingate was, many in the Indian army rejoiced at his death, some quoted Shakepears Macbeth ‘Nothing in his life became him like the leaving it.' Mountbatten wrote to his wife Edwina ‘I cannot tell you how much I am going to miss Wingate. Not only had we become close personal friends but he was such a fire-eater, and it was such a help to me having a man with a burning desire to fight. He was a pain in the neck to the generals over him, but I loved his wild enthusiasm and it will be difficult for me to try to inculcate it from above.' General Slim had this to write on Wingate “With him, contact had too often been collision, for few could meet so stark a character without being violently attracted or repelled. To most he was either prophet or adventurer. Very few could regard him dispassionately; nor did he care to be so regarded. I once likened him to Peter the Hermit preaching his Crusade. I am sure that many of the knights and princes that Peter so fierily exhorted did not like him very  much – but they went crusading all the same. The trouble was, I think, that Wingate regarded himself as a prophet, and that always leads to a single-centredness that verges on fanaticism, with all his faults. Yet had he not done so, his leadership could not have been so dynamic, nor his personal magnetism so striking.” And so went Wingate, probably one of the most colorful characters of the Pacific War. In light of Wingates death, General Slim promoted Lentaigne to Major-General and appointed him the new commander of the 3rd Division. Slim, had loose operational control over Special Force, selected Brigadier Lentaigne to be Wingate's replacement after conferring with Brigadier Derek Tulloch, Wingate's Chief of Staff. Lentaigne was judged to be the most balanced and experienced commander in the force; he had been an instructor at the Staff College at Quetta, had led a Gurkha battalion with distinction during the grueling retreat from Burma in 1942 and had commanded a Chindit brigade in the field. As an officer of Gurkha troops, he had a similar outlook and background to Slim. The other Chindit brigade commanders were unknown quantities, mostly without staff qualifications, some of whom had never even commanded a battalion-sized unit in combat before 1944, and Wingate's staff officers lacked the necessary combat experience. The force's second-in-command, Major General George Symes, was bypassed by Slim and formally protested and asked to be relieved. In selecting Lentaigne, Slim did not take into account the tensions between those Chindit commanders and staff who were closely associated with Wingate, and Lentaigne, who had a classical "line" officer's background and had been critical of Wingate's methods and techniques. The loss of Wingate caused significant damage to the Chindits, it was as if they lost their persona. The month following Wingate's death, the 14th, 16th and 111th Brigades appeared to lack direction. They stayed around Indaw, ambushing the Japanese but with no major objective. As Slim, noted, "The immediate sense of loss that struck like a blow, even those who had differed most from him—and I was not one of these- was a measure of the impact he had made. He had stirred up everyone with whom he had come in contact. " At Broadway, for instance, after days of aerial attack, the 2nd Battalion, 146th Regiment stormed across the airstrip on March 27th and attacked its lightly defended western perimeter. Thankfully, the attack was repulsed, partly due to superior numbers. Three days of hard fighting at Broadway then ended with counterattacks and concentrated airstrikes finally dislodging the enemy. Though the Japanese regrouped, they were again pushed back by counterattacks supported by airstrikes in the end. Meanwhile, White City's defenses were strengthened. The Dakota brought over four 25 pounders, six Bofors anti-aircraft guns and four two-pounder anti-tank guns. This would allow Calvert to attack Mawlu on the 27th. As a result, the village was successfully taken and burnt out with flamethrowers, with the Chindits then reducing the remaining Japanese strongpoints. By the end of March, however, several major changes were made at the highest level. Much of the air support was diverted to the critical battles of Imphal and Kohima, where troops were cut off and could only be resupplied by air. The 23rd Brigade, yet to fly in, was also dispatched to Kohima. Finally, the Chindits were formally subordinated to General Stilwell, who ordered them to abandon their dispersed operations around Indaw and concentrate on interdicting the supply lines to the Japanese forces opposing his troops. In early April, while the 3rd West African Brigade and the remainder of Brodie's 14th Brigade were being brought in to Aberdeen, Lentaigne ordered the 111th Brigade led by Major John Masters to advance north and build the new Blackpool stronghold, which would block the railway and main road at Hopin. To Calvert's disgust, he was ordered to abandon White City and Broadway and move north to support the new stronghold, as Lentaigne insisted that the Chindit brigades were too far apart to support each other. But that is all for today in the Burma front as we now need to head over to Bougainville. The counterattack on Bougainville shifted on March 15th. General Kanda noticed Iwasa and Muda's Units were struggling to break through in their areas, so he changed the point of attack for the Magata Unit. He withdrew the bulk of the forces from Hills 700 and 260, sending them westward in preparation for a final attempt to break through towards the Piva airfields. The reserve 6th cavalry regiment was sent to reinforce Mugata's rear while the 2nd battalion, 4th South Seas Garrison was brought forward to try and contain the Americans at the Saua river mouth. Thus, there was a five-day break in the major action while the Japanese transferred the 13th and 23rd Regiments to reinforce what was left of Colonel Mugata's 45th Regiment. At this time the Japanese maintained patrols, which sometimes got into firefights with American patrols. A number of Japanese were taken prisoner during these patrol actions. From time to time the Japanese would lob mortar shells into the 129th's sector. During this lull in the fighting, the tired American riflemen and engineers were busy strengthening the defenses. Pillboxes were rebuilt, tactical wire reestablished, illuminating devices installed, communications improved, and the many Japanese dead buried. Information gained from prisoners and reconnaissance led General Beightler to conclude that the Japanese would launch a major assault on March 23rd. It was estimated that General Kanda had approximately 4850 men at his disposal to renew the attack on the 129th's front. Meanwhile the American artillery was smashing the South Knob who were now only being defended by a screening force. On the 18th, General McCulloch launched a final combined assault against the Knob. Companies A and B of the 132nd regiment performed a enveloping maneuver and enjoyed some initial success until they came upon heavy fire from Japanese bunkers. At 2:10pm the next day the attack resumed, this time successfully destroying several pillboxes, but the Americans were halted short of the crest. On the 20th, Company B was reinforced with a platoon from A and they circled the south end of the Knob, reaching the base of the trail going east. There they discovered the Japanese could pour down just as much fire, seeing another failed attack. Because of this failure it was decided to leave the reduction of Hill 260 to artillery and mortars. On the 23rd, the Iwasa and Muda units had completed their movement, now 4850 troops were concentrated on the northern sector ready to perform a major assault. Having been forewarned by the captured documents, the American forces were expecting the attack. The Americans unleashed a heavy artillery bombardment against Magata's assault forces as they were forming up, disrupting their initial advance and causing massive casualties. Late in the evening, Kanda launched his own assault, with General Iwara's 2nd battalion, 23rd regiment and 2nd battalion, 13th regiment through Cox Creek followed by Muda's men. Advancing under darkness, the Japanese surprised the Americans and managed to knock out 3 pillboxes under heavy fire. The area of attack was so narrow, artillery and air strikes could not be performed safely, so General Beightler ordered the 148th regiment to respond with a combined tank-infantry assault. With the support of Sherman's the Americans stormed the Japanese positions at 7:25am successfully reoccupying must of their lost territory within only 20 minutes. The Japanese tossed further attacked but were being gradually pushed from the narrow area by noon.  During the afternoon, General Kreber's corp and divisional artillery began concentrating their fire on a very narrow sector where the bulk of the surviving Japanese were dug in. An infantryman of the 129th recalled: “All these big guns opened fire into this area about 500 yards in front of us, and I remember what they called a million dollar barrage and it's something you never forget–the big guns shooting over your head. It was very frightening because you wondered whether one of these shells would not go far enough. It was all jungle out in front of us and when they got done it was all cleared out. They had knocked everything down. A lot of Japs were killed by this… I can remember the day after the big attack the bulldozers came in and dug these huge trenches and we had to go out and take the Japanese and drag them into these. Because of the warm weather they began to smell pretty bad. Many, many killed!” It was the heaviest artillery concentration seen as of yet during the Pacific War. It completely disrupted the Magata unit, causing tremendous casualties. The 2nd Battalion, 45th Regiment were completely disorganized; the 1st and 3rd Battalions were reduced to 20 men; the 1st Battalion, 81st Regiment were reduced to 40 men; and the 3rd Battalion, 53rd Regiment were down to 100 men. The massive losses forced the Japanese to withdraw. General Hyakutake now realized his counteroffensive was a failure and forced to call it off.  The Japanese were in full retreat by the 28th. The Magata force, with an estimated strength of over fifteen hundred men, utilized the Numa Numa Trail and withdrew toward the northern part of Bougainville. The remnants of the Iwasa and Muda forces, covered by reinforcements from the 4th South Seas Garrison unit and the 6th Cavalry Regiment, moved quickly along a number of trails to the relative safety of southern Bougainville. The units of the 17th Infantry Group returned to northern Bougainville and rejoined its parent unit. On the 28th, the 182nd regiment found the South Knob abandoned and finally secured Hill 260. The three-week battle for the rather insignificant knoll had cost the Americans 98 deaths and 581 wounded, counting 560 dead Japanese on the knob. Total casualties for the final Japanese counteroffensive on Bougainville would be 263 American dead and over 2489 Japanese bodies counted. In reality, Hyakutake's 17th Army lost a total of 3000 killed and 4000 wounded in their March operations, including 2398 killed and 3060 wounded from the 6th Division. General Beightler expressed the feelings of many in stating that the beating administered to the 6th Division was a partial repayment for its role in the rape of Nanking in 1937. Although the Japanese would plan another concentrated assault on Allied positions later down the line, they would never again launch a major attack. For all practical purposes, the battle for the Solomons was now over. Now we need to jump over to the Southwest Pacific.  As a result of the Admiralty Islands being invaded a month ahead of schedule. Yet General MacArthur kept his gaze on the development in the Central Pacific. He needed to pick up the pace if he wanted to win the race, so he planned to carry out the invasion of Kavieng, bypassing the Hansa Bay area with a direct jump to Holland before the end of April. General Sutherland gave the Joint Chiefs an outline calling for the Southwest Pacific forces to move into the Hollandia area with two divisions on April 15, supported by the Pacific Fleet. Air, naval, and logistic bases would be established at Hollandia to support subsequent Southwest Pacific advances northwest to the Geelvink Bay region of Dutch New Guinea. The Southwest Pacific forces would then move to Geelvink Bay about June. In the middle of the next month, according to General Sutherland's presentation, three Southwest Pacific divisions would be sent against the Arafura Sea islands, southwest of Dutch New Guinea. There, air bases would be established from which to cover later advances to the Vogelkop Peninsula and Halmahera, both scheduled for mid-September, when Central Pacific forces might be ready to move to the Palaus. If the Marianas were bypassed, however, the Palaus might then be invaded as early as mid-July. Land-based aircraft of the Southwest Pacific Area could support a July invasion of the Palaus from air bases in the Hollandia and Geelvink Bay regions. If air bases on the Vogelkop, Halmahera, and the Arafura Sea islands proved inadequate to provide left flank protection for the move into the Philippines, then airdrome sites on Ambon Island might also be seized in September or October. The entry into the Philippines would be effected at southeastern Mindanao on 15 November 1944. Yet for all of this, MacArthur needed something he did not have, the Pacific Fleet's aircraft carriers. After concluding the Marshall islands campaign, Admiral Nimitz argued that the next move would be to bypass Truk and invade the southern Marianas and the Palaus islands to further neutralize the Carolines. To seize the Philippines a good fleet base would be required in the western Pacific. Nimitz proposed seizing Ulithi atoll, around midway between the Marianas and Palaus. Nimitz also argued the case for Woleai in the Carolines, 400 miles south of the Marianas. By early March, the Joint Chiefs of Staff thus met at the Washington Planning Conferences with Nimitz and Lieutenant-General Richard Sutherland, to hear about their plans and discuss what the best course of action would be. In the end, on March 12th, they issued a new directive for operations in 1944.  The Joint Chiefs ordered MacArthur to cancel his Kavieng operation and instead to complete the neutralization of Rabaul and Kavieng with minimum forces necessary. The Southwest Pacific's forces were to jump from eastern New Guinea to Hollandia on April 15, thus bypassing Wewak and Hansa Bay, with the mission to develop an air center from which heavy bombers could start striking the Palaus and Japanese air bases in western New Guinea and Halmahera. Once Hollandia was secured, MacArthur was to conduct operations northwest along the northern New Guinea coast in preparation for the invasion of the Palaus and Mindanao.  The target date for the Southwest Pacific's landing on Mindanao in the Philippines was set for November 15. Admiral Nimitz, in turn, was ordered to cancel his Truk operation and to speed the aerial neutralization of Truk, Woleai, and other Japanese bases in the central and eastern Carolines. He was also directed to conduct heavy carrier strikes against the Marianas, the Carolines and the Palaus, and to provide carrier support and amphibious means for the Southwest Pacific's landings in the Hollandia area. The Marianas would be occupied by Central Pacific forces beginning in mid June and Palaus by mid September. The Joint Chiefs, were looking to extend Allied control over the eastern approaches to the Philippines and Formosa and to secure air and naval bases from which to support operations against Mindanao, Formosa, and the China coast. The invasion of the Admiralty and Green Islands led the Americans to seize full control over the South Pacific. This allowed the US Navy to begin sending destroyers to harass the Japanese at Rabaul and Kavieng. Admiral Halsey at Guadalcanal assembled an invasion force to hit Kavieng. When he heard about the decision to cancel the Kavieng invasion, he searched for another task for the boys he got together. He decided to capture the Emirau island, lying halfway between Kavieng and the Admiralties, thinking it could be the last link to strangle Rabaul. For what would be the last operation of Cartwheel, Admiral Wilkinson put Commodore Reifsneider in command of the amphibious operation and assigned Lieutenant-Colonel Alan Shapley's 4th Marines to carry out the landing. As a preliminary, Admiral Griffin's Task Force 36, formed around four battleships and two escort carriers, also bombarded Kavieng and its nearby airfields on March 20th. The bombardment gave Rear-Admiral Tamura Ryukichi the impression that the expected invasion by Allied forces was imminent and he gave the order to kill all the European prisoners in Kavieng. At least 25 of them were executed in the Kavieng Wharf Massacre, which later led to six of the perpetrators being sentenced for war crimes in 1947. Sentenced to death by hanging, Tamura was executed at Stanley Prison on March 16, 1948. Meanwhile Reifsneider's convoy  departed Guadalcanal in two echelons, successfully reached the unoccupied Emirau Island at 6:05am. The Marines of the two assault battalions, the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 4th Marines, traveled on nine high speed transports while the remainder of the force were on the dock landing ships, Epping Forest, Gunston Hall and Lindenwald, and the attack transport Callaway. One LSD carried the 66 LVTs for crossing Emirau's fringing reef, one carried three LCTs, two of them loaded with tanks, and the third carried three LCTs with radar sets and anti-aircraft guns. The LVTs were launched, and the assault troops transferred to the amphibious tractors using the APDs' boats, supplemented by those from Callaway while F4U Corsairs of VMF-218 flew overhead to make a last-minute check of the island for any signs of the Japanese. The assault waves touched down on schedule. The reserve 3rd Battalion's boats grounded on the reef soon afterwards, and its marines waded ashore through knee deep water. The only problem encountered was with launching the LCTs carrying the tanks. The LSD's flooding mechanism failed and the LCTs had to be dragged out by a fleet tug. While the detachment sent to occupy Elomusao Island was approaching the beach, some supposed opposition caused the amphibious tractors and then a destroyer to open fire, and a man was wounded by a shell fragment. After all of this…well the Marines were told by the natives the Japanese had left Emirau two months before and only a small detachment remained on Mussau Island. Thus 3727 troops and 844 tons of cargo were ashore by nightfall, when the ships sailed; and within a month, some 18,000 men and 44,000 tons of supplies had been landed and it had become a motor torpedo base that could keep watch on the north coast of New Ireland.  As for the Japanese Admiral Koga was planning to carry out a desperate program of reorganization, including the creation of the Mobile Fleet. Admiral Ozawa's 1st Mobile Fleet was formed by the 2nd and 3rd Fleets; consisting of most of the IJN's warships. This would leave the combined fleet as a mere administrative organization. Land-based forces in the Central Pacific were expanded, their main base was at Tinian; Saipan was fortified and it became the new fleet HQ. Fuel shortages and loss of tankers to submarine attacks had become so severe, Admiral Ozawa's new command would have to remain within the Singapore zone. They would operate close to the Dutch East Indies oilfield and within Japanese waters for training. Koga also prepared a new defensive plan, with the inner perimeter now extending from the Kuriles to the Nanpo Islands,  then the Marianas and the Carolines to the west end of New Guinea. He also drew up plans for the formation of a 3rd Aircraft Carrier Fleet, in three divisions, each composed of three carriers. It looked very impressive on paper, but the reality was that the 3rd division actually consisted of two converted tankers the Zuiho and Chitose and the converted naval auxiliary ship Chiyoda. Furthermore, the carriers lacked any experienced pilots, with most of them having been lost around Rabaul and in the Solomons and Marshalls. Thus, new pilots for the three carrier divisions would have to be trained. Finally, he developed Plan Z, a strike against the American fleet the moment it entered the Philippine Sea.  For this decisive battle, that in his eyes could allow the Japanese to win an “honorable peace”, Koga wanted to be prepared to use 500 planes on the carriers and another 500 on the islands, so he needed to increase the Japanese air force by about 50%, something that would be hard to achieve.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. And with that the South Pacific was liberated from the Japanese Empire. Operation Cartwheel was effectively done. The allies were squeezing the Japanese empire back to the home islands and honestly it was a good time to negotiate a peace on the side of the Japanese. But they would not do so, always on the search for the famed decisive victory. 

PREVIEW: #OCEANIA: Excerpt of a report by Cleo Paskal of FDD that the US Congress has fully funded the critical island states of Marshalls, Micronesia and Palau -- the stepping stones across the Central Pacific to reinforce Taiwan in the event of confict with the PRC.  More of this later. https://www.zawya.com/en/world/americas/pacific-leaders-welcome-signing-of-us-security-deal-u4l0nhc3 1883 Marshall Islands

#OCEANIA: Alarms the Central Pacific. Josh Rogin, Washington Post https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/02/29/congress-funding-marshall-islands-micronesia-palau-china-power/ 1855 Philippines

Last time we spoke about the invasion of Eniwetok and the end of Operation HA-GO in the Burma front. While Operation Hailstone was going on, the invasion of Eniwetok was greatly sped up as the Americans were simply too fast at conquering the Marshall islands. Codenamed operation Catchpole, Eniwetok was hit with the same kind of overwhelming force applied to Kwajalein and other islands. Aerial, naval and land base artillery smashed the defenders into submission before forces were landed. The Japanese launched so daring night time infiltration attacks, but were hopeless to stop the American seizure of the island. Within the Burma front the Japanese invaders were shocked at the performance of the newly improved Indian Army. Operation HA-GO was an utter disaster and worse it had weakened the Japanese to the point now the allies were going on the attack.  This episode is the invasion of the Admiralty Islands Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  The war for the South Pacific is reaching its climax. The allies are securing western New Britain, the Solomons and the Huon Peninsula. The Japanese are simply overwhelmed. The Japanese air forces have been utterly annihilated, their warships are being drained of fuel, are worn down by the war and are seemingly no longer ready for that decisive naval battle envisioned by Isoroku Yamamoto. The men are battle-weary, food is becoming more scarce, malnourishment is spreading. All those strung out at the furthest islands are basically being left to die. To end the misery for those in the South Pacific, the capture of the Admiralty Islands was one of the last steps in Operation Cartwheel and would seal off the Bismarck-Solomons area from supply and reinforcement, denying their use to the Japanese for effective air and naval operations, and left garrisons totaling over 100000 troops in isolated impotence In the South Pacific, the Admiralty Islands, that of Manus and Los Negros stood at the northeastern exist of the Bismarck Sea. They commanded the important strategic point some 600 miles from Rabaul, 820 miles from Truk and 1370 miles from Mindanao Island. The joint chiefs believed Seeadler Harbor had the potential to become a major naval anchorage for the Pacific Fleet and perhaps the springboard for the invasion of the Philippines. Back on April 7th, 1942 a Japanese destroyer and a merchant ship had landed invading forces at Lorengau, driving off the hundred or so Europeans who had been living there. At that time the only airstrip was at Lorengau, the administrative center for the group of islands. Apparently the Admiralties were not considered significant in the offensive phase of the Japanese conquest of the South Pacific area, for it was not until February 1943, that construction forces started to build a 5000-foot airstrip at Momote Plantation on Los Negros and to put the 3000-foot Lorengau airfield into operational use. After October 1943, the Momote field and the smaller Lorengau strip served as ferrying stops on the replacement routes to Wewak, Hollandia, and Rabaul, until Allied air attacks destroyed the effectiveness of the Admiralties' base. Seeadler Harbor was also being used for surface craft and possibly for seaplanes.  In late 1943, General MacArthur had assigned General Krueger's Alamo Force at that time based in Finschhafen to plan the seizure of the Seeadler Harbor area, with the aim of establishing an airdrome and light naval facilities for the support of subsequent operations along the north coast of New Guinea.  On February 13th however, MacArthur ordered Krueger to seize all of the Admiralty islands and to build air bases at Lorengau and Momote. This was to be Operation Brewer, beginning on April 1st. However one of Lt General Kenney's spotter planes noticed there was no sign of life on the Admiralty Islands and this prompted MacArthur to move up the time table, to the end of February. It would be quite a mistake. MacArthur's chief of intelligence, Colonel Willoughby, was convinced Kenney's intelligence was incorrect and information from ULTRA intercepts seemed to support his claims. It seemed Kenney had been fooled. The Japanese appeared to be absent on the islands, because Colonel Yoshio Ezaki had ordered his men not to move during the day, so as to conceal their work constructing two new airstrips and to conserve anti-aircraft ammunition. In spite of Kenney's arguments that the Japanese looked vulnerable, MacArthur's staff officers were not at all happy at the idea of taking such a high level risk assaulting them. Even Kenney would note “we had already outrun the capabilities of our supply system.” Ignoring the limitations, MacArthur was determined to take the islands, but would later reminisce “I felt that the situation presented an ideal opportunity for a coup de main which, if successful, could advance the Allied timetable in the Pacific by several months and save thousands of Allied lives.” This of course is MacArthur we are talking about and the capture of the Admiralty Islands would advance his timetable to retake the Philippines, so for him it was a no brainer. There was also the on going race. MacArthur was obviously taking notice of Admiral Nimitz's thrust into the Central Pacific, and what a thrust it was. The Gilberts and Marshalls were falling in extremely surprising speed. MacArthur, fully aware of the risks of forwarding Operation Brewer, nevertheless did so and would cover his tracks by describing the invasion as “a reconnaissance in force” The misgivings of this decision would be apparent when a covert reconnaissance mission led by Lt J.R McGowan and 5 other men of the 158th infantry reported on February 27th that the island were “lousy with Japs”, but by that point it was too late to pull back. For the operation, Krueger would assign Major-General Innis Swift's 1st Cavalry Division, which was training intensively in the Oro Bay area. Although the 1st Cavalry Division was dismounted for operations in the Pacific, it retained its organization as a cavalry unit with two brigades, each made up of two reinforced regiments. In addition to supporting units, each regiment comprised two squadrons of three rille troops and a heavy weapons troop. Air offensives against Rabaul and Wewak continued throughout February, seeing an enormous reduction in the Japanese ability for air action. On the 22nd and 23rd, Captain Burke's Destroyer Squadron 23, consisting of Destroyers Charles Ausburne, Stanly, Converse, Spence and Dyson made a daring sweep in the Admiralty island area. They managed to sink the 3800 ton Japanese tug Nagaura due east of Lorengau. 3 of his destroyers then sailed south of New Hanover where they sank a IJN minelayer and a cargo ship before turning around the coast of New Ireland. They encountered no shipping there, so they fired 1500 five-inch shells into Duke of York Island in order to damage the airfield under construction. Meanwhile the other 2 destroyers sailed north of New Hanover and bombarded the enemy base at Kavieng. At this point MacArthur realized the Japanese could not mount any significant air or naval support to defend the admiralties. He also believed Los Negros islands was lightly held and that they was a “coup de main” opportunity. As someone who speaks french as a second language, I gotta say its so weird how we anglophones use these random french phrases for things haha. Thus MacArthur decided to change his plans somewhat. In place of the scheduled assault set for April 1st, he now was tossing the “reconnaissance in force” I mentioned early against the Momote airstrip on Hyane Harbor and that it should be carried out no later than February 29th. The force performing this was to be known as the Brewer Reconnaissance Force; it consisted of 3 rifle troops and the heavy weapons troop of the 2nd Squadron, 5th Cavalry Regiment: 800 men with their complement of light and heavy machine guns, rocket launchers, and mortars. With them was a platoon from Battery B, 99th Field Artillery Battalion, carrying two 75-mm pack howitzers, four 50-caliber machine guns, and small arms. The 673rd Antiaircraft Machine Gun Battery, a unit of some 80 men, was equipped with twelve 50-caliber machine guns as well as individual weapons. Air and naval liaison officers and a shore fire control party were scheduled to land with the attacking force; Headquarters Troop, 1st Cavalry Brigade, would furnish a reconnaissance and a communications platoon. Arrangements had also been made for a detachment from the Australian New Guinea Administration Unit, usually called ANGAU; this group was to assist chiefly in gathering intelligence, patrolling, recruiting, and dealing with the native population as their villages were liberated.  If these men found Momote to be adequately defended, then they would establish a perimeter and await reinforcements, thus the reconnaissance turns into an invasion.With just 5 days to plan, General Kenney's 5th air force was given the task of bombing the objective area and northern Ireland. Meanwhile Admiral Barbey's destroyers were going to perform a heavy bombardment to cover the approach and landings. A patrol from the Alamo Scouts landed on the southeastern coast of Los Negros from a Catalina flying boat on the night of February 27th. They performed a reconnaissance, quickly discovering Colonel Ezaki Yoshio's forces were present. Yoshio's HQ was at Papitalai, the bulk of troops at Lorengau with garrison units were on Rambutyo, Peli, Pak, and Pityilu Islands and at the inland village of Kawaliap. One battalion was also at Papitalai covering HQ. The 2nd Battalion, 1st Independent Mixed Regiment at Salami and 1st Battalion, 229th Regiment at Hyane Harbor with its main elements south of Momote. It was obvious the enemy was still present in force. The Scouts discovered a large bivouac area on the southeast part of Los Negros and reported that the region between the Momote air strip and the south coast was as I mentioned earlier "lousy with Japs." This further allowed Admiral Barbey to make more specific bombardment plans. Three fire support areas had been established for the attack group, consisting of nine destroyers and the three destroyer-transports which were carrying the reconnaissance force. These areas covered the entire seaward side of Los Negros from the south coast to the northern end of Salami Plantation. In the final plans the attack group would bring the weight of its firepower against targets around Hyane Harbor and to the north. Additional fire to cover the southern part of the island would be furnished by another task group of two cruisers and four destroyers, which would meet the convoy at Cape Cretin. It was decided to split this latter group, giving one cruiser and two destroyers responsibility for the Japanese bivouac area, southwest of the Momote strip, which the Alamo Scouts had located. The other cruiser and two destroyers would fire on targets in the Lorengau-Seeadler Harbor region. In the 15-minute bombardment, scheduled from H-35 to H-20, 5-inch naval guns were each to expend approximately 350 rounds. Under the air force plan, two groups of heavy bombers would attack ground targets on Los Negros from H-28 to H-20. Two minutes later, four groups of medium bombers were to bomb and strafe the landing area until the first wave was ashore. Following H Hour a squadron of medium bombers and six smoke planes were to be on air alert for further missions.  The Japanese did not anticipate a landing would be made at Momote, thus only a few elements of the 1st battalion, 229th regiment were there while the bulk of their forces were concentrated at the beaches of Seeadler Harbor and on the other side of the island. Now despite the Alamo scouts best efforts, there was quite a lot of unknown variables. In light of that the landings would be done simplistically. 3 waves of 12 LCPRS would carry the troops to White Beach, lying near Jamandilai Point. From there the reconnaissance force led by Brigadier-General William Chase would advance and hold Momote airstrip. If this proved too difficult, the men would be loaded back up and return to Oro Bay. Now in the event of a successful landing, the remainder of the 5th cavalry regiment would come over 2 days later and the rest of the cavalry division, the main body of the Brewer force, would follow the reconnaissance and support forces as soon as shipping could be made available. On February 27, the 2nd Squadron, 5th Cavalry led by Lt. Colonel William E. Lobit loaded up at Oro Bay, and the following morning departed aboard 3 APDs and nine destroyers under the command of Rear-Admiral William Fechteler. They would rendezvous with Admiral Kinkaid's light cruisers at 13:26, around Cape Cretin, with General MacArthur onboard, and finally would arrive at a point about 10 miles south of Los Negros at 6:00 on February 29. While the troops climbed aboard their LCPRs, Fechteler's destroyers opened fire on their assigned targets. Unfortunately, when the LCPRs reached the line of departure, about 3700 yards from the beaches, the defenders responded with heavy machine-gun and battery fire.At H-28 minutes enemy machine-gun fire opened on the boats, whom began maneuvering radically as they could. Machine-gun fire was also directed against the destroyers and the Phoenix group to the south. Heavier shore batteries opened up; flashes could be seen from d gun near Southeast Point on the island, and what appeared to be 3- or 4-inch shells landed in the vicinity of the Flusser and the Mahan. In response the Phoenix and Mahan fired upon the batteries and 9 B-25's strafed and bombed the area. Their participation was limited by a heavy overcast and a low ceiling. Of the 40 B-24s scheduled to arrive during the naval bombardment, only 3 appeared before their appointed time to bomb the target area at H-47 minutes. The planned missions of four groups of B-25s fared little better, only nine appearing and these later than scheduled. No communications had been established with the B-25s nor could any of the planes be seen from the flagship, so the plan was called off for stopping naval gunfire at H-20 minutes to permit low-level bombing and strafing. The naval bombardment was continued for another 15 minutes. The order to cease fire was given at H-5 minutes and, although no aircraft were visible, starshells were fired as the attack signal for any strafers that might be in the vicinity. The first wave of LCPRs reached the shore at 8:17, meeting slight enemy fire. Troop G led by 1st-Lieutenant Marvin Henshaw rushed beyond the narrow beach to the edge of a coconut plantation, taking cover under fallen trees and kunai grass. Here they laid prone, forming a rough half-circle with a 50-yard radius. They saw scattered groups of the enemy fleeing inland, some as far away as the other side of the air strip. Lieutenant Henshaw killed one with a long distance shot, and members of his platoon killed another. Not one of the soldiers who landed in the first wave was a casualty. As the bombardment lifted, the defenders gradually came out of their dugouts and began subjecting the returning boats to cross-fire. As the second wave approached, the enemy fire became so heavy, the LCPR's were forced to turn back so the Mahan, Flusser and Drayton could further bombard them. At 08:23, the second wave finally landed, moving swiftly past the troops of the first wave to a point 100 yards inland. 22 minutes later, the third wave landed, rapidly fanning south and establishing a line 300 yards inland by 09:00. Meeting slight opposition, the cavalrymen managed to secure the Momote airstrip by 9:50 and completely unloaded by 12:50. 4 of the LCPRs had been left out of action during the landings, so the reconnaissance force could not be evacuated. From the positions held by the first waves, the troops then gradually moved forward to cover the whole dispersal area of the airdrome, sending patrols beyond the airdrome which identified evidence of concerning recent Japanese activity. As patrols sent out beyond the airdrome began to report back, the commanders could decide the next move. One patrol had scouted 1,000 yards west to Porlaka without contact, and another almost as far north as the skidway before meeting any enemy, there was plenty of evidence that the Japanese had recently been in the vicinity in some strength. One patrol that went about a mile south found the hastily vacated quarters of a high-ranking officer, as well as a bivouac area, and fired at a fleeing Japanese officer. Another found three big kitchens and a warehouse of food. Although the Japanese in the area had offered negligible resistance, our command expected a change in the near future. Captured documents revealed that 200 antiaircraft personnel had been encamped nearby.  Given this information, General Chase decided to pull back to a perimeter due east of the airstrip and had the cavalrymen dig in for the night. During the afternoon the reconnaissance force organized its defenses, which presented many difficulties. A good foxhole required back-breaking efforts, because the soil was heavy with coral. Since there was no barbed wire to put around the beachhead, men and weapons had to be spaced closely and every man available used for the perimeter defense. The 40 field artillery officers and men were assigned sectors for close-in defense, because their two pack howitzers could not cover the critical space in front of the defense line from such a shallow depth as the perimeter allowed. They took over these sectors after the howitzers had blasted away for a while at the Japanese known to be in the skidway area. For heavy weapons support, the twelve 50-caliber machine guns of the antiaircraft unit were moved into positions along the front line. Signalmen strung the perimeter with wire to make the necessary hook-ups for officers in the chain of command, and removed the radio sets for communication with Sixth Army Headquarters from an advanced position to a more sheltered bomb crater. Outposts were stationed beyond the strip on the far edges of the dispersal area. Meanwhile, MacArthur came ashore during the afternoon and decorated the first man to land, Lieutenant Henshaw, with a Distinguished Service Cross. He decided to stay, ordering Chase to hold his position until the follow-up force arrived. MacArthur then returned to the Phoenix, which got underway shortly afterwards at 5:29 for Cape Sudest, taking with it all the ships except two destroyers.  On the Japanese side, Colonel Ezaki immediately ordered the 1st Battalion, 229th Regiment to attack the beachhead during the night and annihilate the enemy or die trying. Suspicions that the Momote landing was a diversion, however, would prevent him from sending the rest of his troops to assist. Colonel Ezaki issued the following orders to the infantry battalion defending the Hyane Harbor sector: “Tonight the battalion under Captain Baba will annihilate the enemy who have landed. This is not a delaying action. Be resolute to sacrifice your life for the Emperor and commit suicide in case capture is imminent. We must carry out our mission with the present strength and annihilate the enemy on the spot. I am highly indignant about the enemy's arrogant attitude. Remember to kill or capture all ranking enemy officers for our intelligence purposes…” As ordered, 200 men with 3 mortars; 2 platoons of the 229th Infantry and 1 platoon of crept up to the Americans during the night. Yet by the time they reached the American line, their movement was no longer coordinated and they could only achieve some minor infiltrations. Groups of 7 to 15 Japanese edging in, flinging grenades at the weapons that fired. The only way the Japanese could be seen was by the light of grenade explosions or when the attackers got close enough so that a cavalryman crouched in a fox hole could see them silhouetted against the sky. Many of the Japanese were cut down by machine-gun and rifle fire, but some got through and succeeded in cutting all telephone lines. Although infiltrations occurred on all edges of the perimeter, the attack was heaviest near the shore on the southern side. Here some Japanese reached the shore in the rear of the main defense line by swimming in from the sea with life preservers. The vegetation bordering the beach provided protection for these infiltrators. One group found an opening in the left flank of Troop E, holding the south sector, next to the field artillery unit that held along the shore. The enemy penetrated Troop E's defense line, entirely isolating the 3d Platoon. Without communication with its troop, the unit had to fight it out alone against very heavy attacks. Come daylight, the majority of the Japanese survivors had disappeared back into the jungle, leaving 66 dead against 7 Americans killed and 15 wounded. However, those who had infiltrated and reoccupied some of their former pillboxes and fortifications in the perimeter had to be cleared out by the tired cavalrymen.  During the afternoon, patrols were also sent west and north to check how much strength the enemy had and the perimeter was further contracted and tightened. At 5:00, 2 companies of the 229th regiment made another coordinated effort against the perimeter, yet its intensity was lowered by the death of the battalion commander. The afternoon was free from enemy activity except for a patrol which was discovered inside the perimeter at about 4:00. The patrol's mission was evidently to kill or capture the American commanding officer. It was led by Captain Baba, the commander of the battalion who made the major attack on the preceding night. Although operating in broad daylight, the patrol came close to succeeding. The Americans were confident that the morning's mop-up had taken care of all the enemy within the perimeter. Secondary growth was thick in the area and the Japanese were unnoticed until they were within 35 yards of the task force command post. Once the group was sighted, a considerable amount of fire was placed on it. The Japanese lay concealed in the undergrowth and a single sniper pecked away with his rifle in the direction of the CP. Not knowing the size of the party, Major Chiaramonte set out with four men "to get the sniper." The task force commander and his executive officer directed the movement of the group either right or left according to movements in the underbrush, and the soldiers and Major Chiaramonte opened up whenever they detected any movements. As Major Chiaramonte and his party finally entered the area on which they had been firing, they heard a click followed by grenade explosions. Three of the Japanese had committed suicide. Another rolled over on his back and used his sword to commit hara-kiri. Fifteen dead officers and sergeants were counted, including Captain Baba. Thus, the attackers were kept beyond the perimeter until nightfall, when the attack finally stopped.  On March 2, after clearing Jamandilai Point by 10:45, 6 LSTs landed the 1st Squadron, 5th Cavalry plus artillery and Seabees. While the troops landed, Captain Emile Dechaineux's and will be honest very curious how Americans would pronounce that one, like i've said before there is no rhyme or reason as to how Americans pronounce french last names haha, well Dechaineux's destroyers bombarded Hauwei Island and Hyane Harbor. With reinforcements in hand, General Chase launched a new attack to extend his perimeter. At 2:15 B-25's, P- 38's, and P-47's bombed and strafed the area. The western half of the airfield and the dispersal area were softened up for the ground attack, and the skidway and Hyane coast beyond were also targets. Bombs were also dropped on the strip of land forming the northern arm of the harbor. After this at 3:00 the two cavalry squadrons advanced across the airstrip, rapidly taking the entire aerodrome against light opposition and finally digging along a new perimeter.  To block possible enemy landings from across Hyane Harbor, two anti-aircraft batteries and E Company of the 592nd Boat and Shore Regiment defended the shore. Seabees formed an inner defense line to the west and northwest of the brigade. Six rough trenches were dug out by a bulldozer and ten men stationed in each. The remainder of the 40th Construction Battalion elements remained in their trench on the right flank, which was now a secondary line behind the troopers. The critical north and northwest sectors were the 2nd Squadron's responsibility. They prepared their positions with careful attention to interlocking bands of machine-gun fire, while the 1st Squadron dug in on the left flank. The first night in the enlarged beachhead passed by without a crisis. An attack came at 9:00pm, but it was not as severe as expected. The chief enemy effort was to push machine-gun parties and infiltration groups through the 2nd Squadron's sector, and in particular through that held by Troop G. Communication lines were cut, radio equipment was slightly damaged, and a few Japanese penetrated as far as the field artillery positions. The artillery, prepared for interdiction fire, was not called on.  The following morning, a systematic search for enemy troops within the position was started and all Japanese within the perimeter were killed while the Seabees began work on the airstrip. At the same time, Krueger arranged with Barbey to expedite the movement of the rest of the cavalry division. The 2nd Squadron, 7th Cavalry Regiment was to arrive on March 4; the remaining units of the 1st Brigade would arrive by March 6; and the 2nd Brigade was to arrive on March 9. At this point Colonel Ezaki realized his situation was desperate, his 1st battalion, 229th regiment was being obliterated. He moved his HQ from Papitalai to Papitalai Mission and began concentrating his garrison units at Lorengau. He also ordered the 2nd battalion ,1st independent regiment at Salami to perform an assault from the north, coordinating with the 229th regiment. Their advance was slowed by constant naval and land artillery fire, but they got into position by the night of March 3rd. The Americans expected the attack, as prior, an enemy officer patrol had attempted to land on the shore of Hyane Harbor. The platoon leader of the shore company guarding the beach there allowed the boat to come in to land, then opened fire, killing all members of the patrol. Among the valuable documents discovered on the bodies was one which gave the information that a strong attack would be launched that night.  With this knowledge, the Americans fortified their front line defenses. Since infiltration was still the greatest danger for a small force holding a large perimeter in jungle and darkness, the front line positions were of prime importance. To offer as little space as possible for infiltration, each troop in the line would use all three of its rifle platoons. Automatic weapons covering front-line positions were basic in the fire plans; each of these weapons, in turn, was protected by two, three, or four dugouts on both flanks and rear manned by two or three riflemen. The approaches to these positions were strewn with mines, and trip signals were made of empty "C"-ration cans with lumps of coral inside for clappers, and hung on lengths of wire strung taut ten inches off the ground. In organizing defenses, good use was made of Japanese revetments, built to protect their airplanes in the dispersal bays on the airstrip. These revetments were steep banks of earth reaching some 15 feet high; usually a large one was at the end of a bay with two smaller embankments flanking it to form a pattern which, from the air, looked like cleats on the sole of a football shoe. Near the crest of some of these mounds, on the reverse slopes, cavalrymen dug foxholes. Two 30-caliber water-cooled machine guns were then placed on the flat ground alongside the bunker and mounted to fire across the front of the position.  All the 81-mm mortars were massed near the center of the perimeter, while all the 60-mm mortars were moved close to the front line. The water-cooled 50-caliber machine guns of the antiaircraft were returned to their units, except for those on the northern end of the air strip. This side of the perimeter faced the skidway, whence the chief attack was expected. Patrols had met the greatest opposition when working in this direction and toward Porlaka; enemy barges and troop concentrations had also been sighted on the northwestern shore of Hyane Harbor.  Nearby naval units would also coordinate by firing upon any Japanese concentration discovered. At 9pm the Japanese began their attack as a single Japanese bomber dropped 8 bombs.  As soon as the plane had departed, two yellow flares went up from the vicinity of Podaka, and a tracer, apparently 20-mm, was fired almost vertically from a position in front of the Troop B sector to the southwest. Almost immediately an attack supported by mortar fire was launched there as well as against the position held by Troops F and G to the northwest. The attack against the 1st Squadron on the southwest was relatively light, the enemy strength here being estimated later at two reinforced platoons. Since the 1st Squadron's sector was covered by a heavy growth of secondary jungle forest, infiltration was a great danger. The sited positions of our automatic weapons were of little value in the darkness, so the cavalrymen picked up the guns and fired them from the hip. The Japanese moved automatic weapons forward apparently with no other plan of action than to set them up in the open in front of our lines, depending on darkness to conceal their positions. The excited talking of the crews gave their positions away and they became easy targets for the defending riflemen. The attackers were blanketed by mortar fire accurately placed 20 to 50 yards in front of the perimeter. Nevertheless, many of the enemy did infiltrate, some as far as the south end of the air strip where they hid in heavy brush or climbed trees to begin sniper operations at dawn. Because of the relative weakness of the attacking force, there was never any real danger that the 1st Squadron's positions would be overrun.   The attack upon the 2nd Squadron's position on the northwest was a greater threat, with over a battalion, as later estimated, advancing on this sector from the direction of Pori aka and the skidway against the whole of Troop G's position and the right flank of Troop F. Apparently the enemy's intention was to drive our troops from their perimeter and occupy the north end of the air strip. The attacks against the sector held by Troops E and F were limited to infiltrations toward mortar positions and command posts. The rear installations were covered hy enemy mortar fire and machinegun fire while Japanese with grenades closed in on them and overran the positions. The Seabees, holding their secondary defense line behind the cavalry on the north side of the perimeter, also felt the effects of the furious attacks. Cavalrymen whose guns were knocked out, or who had run out of ammunition, carne back to the Seabees' trenches. When a weak place developed toward the left side of the Seabees' positions, their extra ammunition was at the other end of their line. First the men passed the ammunition to the front line by throwing the boxes from hole to hole, but when that seemed too slow they got out of their holes and ran with it, holding it low.  The Japanese advanced relentlessly, talking and singing though damaged and hampered by antipersonnel mines and booby traps, until they were cut down by the fierce machine-gun fire of the cavalrymen. Yet more and more kept coming behind them, marching over the bodies of the first. The Americans hunkered down in their holes and fired upon anything that moved,  continuing to inflict heavy casualties. The Japanese attempted a number of tricks and were occasionally successful. Somehow they learnt the names of platoon leaders. On one occasion a Japanese yelled, "Retreat, Thorne, the whole regiment's falling back to another line." This caused the mortar platoon commanded by 1st Lt. William D. Thorne to leave their positions. Not only did the platoon suffer three casualties, but it was unable to direct its mortar fire during the rest of the night. Another trick was to have individuals move about in front of the perimeter to draw the fire of machine guns. Then two or three snipers would fire tracers at any weapon that disclosed itself, enabling a mortar to open up on the position. Several cases of wiretapping of a 90-mm anti-aircraft battery took place between 10:30 and midnight, the wire-tapper claiming to be, on one occasion, a certain officer commanding a platoon, and on another, a sergeant. He reported in each case the disruption of our plans and the success of the enemy. Since his voice was not recognized, his messages were not heeded. However, a later message, although believed false, made the 211th Coast Artillery (AA) Battalion change its CP. At 11:30 a single enemy plane with landing lights on made several runs at a low altitude dropping flares. In spite of orders to hold their fire, the anti-aircraft battery opened up on the fourth run and drove the plane to the north, where it dropped bombs on Japanese positions.  Japanese using knives and grenades managed to get themselves into Troop G's defenses. A ferocious counterattack by the cavalrymen would shortly regain the positions just in time to face another strong frontal attack, in which more Japanese were cut down in front of the 2nd Squadron. By daylight, the infantry attacks were finally over, with the cavalrymen counting over 750 Japanese dead as they established a new outpost line on March 4. Against them, the Americans lost 61 killed and 244 wounded, 9 of the dead and 38 of the wounded were Seabees. That same day was met with another heavy bombardment of the Japanese positions, then the 2nd Squadron, 7th Cavalry landed against slight enemy resistance. The defensive perimeter was strengthened again and the damage of the previous night was repaired. Colonel Ezaki now believed that his troops had successfully pierced the American first line of defense and thus ordered to continue the attack that night; but upon learning the truth and how many casualties he had suffered, he decided to cancel the attack and ordered a general withdrawal towards Lorengau, leaving some units to hold Papitalai and delay the American advance. 600  men had been lost in the skidway area and in the attacks upon the perimeter. The remaining 200, with an additional 100 stragglers from other disorganized units, were ordered to retreat through Salami Beach and across Papitalai Harbor to Papitalai Mission. Natives on Mokerang Peninsula later told the Angau Party that the Japanese retreat developed into a rout. They were panic-stricken; some did not even wait to take paddles for the native canoes that they had appropriated for their escape to Papitalai Mission. Not more than 80 Japanese, frantic from fear and exhaustion, arrived at the mission to bolster the force already there. By the 5th, General Swift arrived to the secured  beachhead in the Admiralties, and with the arrival of the 12th Cavalry Regiment the following day, he was now ready to launch an offensive west towards Seeadler Harbor, the Lorengau airdrome and north against Salami Plantation. The same day, to clear the way for the 2nd Brigade's landing at Red Beach, General Swift ordered the 2nd Squadron, 7th Cavalry to move across the skidway to a point about 500 yards north. Despite a thorough artillery support, the advance did not go smoothly, with the Japanese immediately launching a strong attack from both Porlaka and the native skidway. Luckily the few Japanese who penetrated the position were killed, around 25 of them and the attack was broken up by mortar and artillery fire. At 4:30, the squadron finally began their offensive, moving with difficulty across a mined area and only gaining about 500 yards by nightfall.  The next morning, the squadron advanced, with the 12th Cavalry soon joining them. Despite the occasional pillboxes and the congested trail, the cavalrymen made ample progress towards the beaches of Seeadler Harbor and closed in on Salami by 4:30. To further secure the harbor, General Swift planned to clear the enemy presence at the Mokerang Peninsula, Papitalai Mission and Lombrum Point. That day, the 5th Cavalry had already begun the work of clearing the southern shore of Seeadler Harbor by pushing patrols west from the airstrip. Finding much more enemy corpses that opposition, Troop F would be able to establish a bridgehead at Porlaka. At 12:00 on the 7th, after an artillery bombardment, a reconnaissance patrol consisting of 40 volunteers from Troop B, led by Capt. William C. Cornelius advanced across Lemondrol Creek and successfully landed on Papitalai against an estimated 50 Japanese defenders. Captain Cornelius, leading the first wave, was reported to have single-handedly killed four of the enemy with rifle fire and grenades while operating 50 yards in advance of the troops. Yet severely wounded, he would die the next day; for his courage and leadership he was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.  The Japanese quickly withdrew. Simultaneously after a heavy air and artillery bombardment, the 2nd Squadron, 12th Cavalry departed Salami and advanced across Seeadler Harbor to land on Papitalai Mission, meeting heavy resistance.  By nightfall, Troop G had secured a beachhead, though it would have to break up three determined counterattacks during the night. This ultimately forced the Japanese to pull out from their beach defenses at Papitalai Mission and retreat towards Lorengau, allowing the cavalrymen to secure the beachhead the following morning. By 12:00 on the 8th, supplies for the 2nd Squadron, 7th Cavalry's attack on Lombrum Plantation also began arriving at Red Beach over the difficult road from Momote. Equipping the 12th Cavalry and the 2nd Squadron, 7th Cavalry, at Salami with enough supplies to carry on their overwater attacks was a difficult and hazardous operation. The single road from Momote to Salami was impassable for most vehicles during the days when the supplies were most urgently needed. Buffaloes got through by going overwater part of the way, but the rest of the essential supplies had to be dropped from airplanes or sent in LCMs from Momote around Mokerang Peninsula. The sending of LCMs into Seeadler Harbor was an operation which was possible only after continued naval efforts from D-Day on. Magnetic mines, dropped by American planes in May 1943, were presumably still in the harbor and had to be removed. To make entry into the harbor safe for their forces, destroyers also had to neutralize the Japanese harbor defense guns, which had already proved effective. The destroyers and minesweepers worked to accomplish these missions, but even by 7 March, when six LCMs loaded with supplies were to make their way around the point, it was not certain that enemy resistance on the islands guarding the harbor had completely disintegrated.  LCMs then successfully landed TROOP E, F and G on Lombrum two hours later against sporadic fire. The Americans extended their perimeter by 5:00, successfully completing the task of securing Seeadler Harbor while other units of the 12th Cavalry secured the Mokerang Peninsula to cover the north flank of the 2nd Brigade's landing. On the 9th, the 2nd Brigade successfully landed at Salami while destroyers pounded the main Japanese positions at Lorengau. This ended the first phase of Operation Brewer. The Americans had suffered a total of 116 killed and 434 wounded during their occupation of Los Negros while counting 1288 enemy dead by March 8. Their next objective would be Lorengau airdrome on Manus Island, but that it for the Admiralties as we now need to travel over to New Britain. Over on New Britain, General Rupertus was planning to invade the Willaumez Peninsula in order to cut off the Japanese retreat line there and take the Talasea airdrome. He assigned the 5th marines under Colonel Oliver Smith for the task. They were going land at a point about midway on the west coast of the Willaumez Peninsula north of Volupai, labeled Beach Red. The chosen zone of operations was about as good as the Marines could have found. It presented them with a short, comparatively flat route to their objective which might make possible utilization of tanks. A dirt track approximately four miles long connected Beach Red with Bitokara, and although it was not designed for motor transport, the Marines could hope. Beach Red contained about as much depth as Beaches Yellow 1 and Yellow 2 in the Gloucester landings, but was more confined on its flanks. Its 350 yards of sand nestled between a cliff on the right and a swamp on the left. The cliff constituted the northwestern slope of Little Mt. Worri, a mass rising 1360 feet above the beach and enfolding the native villages of Liapo to the south and Volupai on the west. Overlooking this smaller mountain from the south was Big Mt. Worri, higher by 300 feet and with a more encompassing base. Included in its ridge line was Mt. Schleuther, on the peninsula's eastern coast which dominated Bitokara, Talasea and the Waru villages from an altitude of 1130 feet. Volupai Plantation was 400 yards inland from Beach Red, containing a collection of small buildings and groves of coconut palms and cacao trees. Volupai track, linking Beach Red with Bitokara, skirted the northern bases of the several mountains. The country, except for the plantations and villages, was typical of New Britain: overgrown jungle and underbrush. Sea and air control in the New Britain area had passed so completely into Allied hands that it was decided to transport the assault forces from Iboki to Volupai in a convoy of 38 LCMs, 17 LCVPs and 5 LCTs, with only 5 PT boats as escorts. Furthermore, on March 3rd, an amphibious patrol landed on Cape Bastian and managed to contact friendly natives in order to learn that the enemy had a weak presence in the area. This was the reinforced 7th Company, 54th Regiment, which had been sent by General Sakai to defend Talasea while the bulk of the Matsuda and Komori Detachments retreated towards Malalia. Sakai was planning to engage the enemy in a decisive battle with the entire force of the 17th Division; but on February 23, General Imamura had ordered him to withdraw towards Rabaul. Thus Sakai assigned the 17th Provisional Battalion to secure Toriu; the 2nd Battalion, 53rd Regiment to hold Ulamona; the 39th Anti-Aircraft Battalion to remain at Malalia; the 17th Engineer Regiment to facilitate the crossing of the Kapuira River; and the 17th Transport Regiment to establish supply depots at Ubai, Butiolo and Sulu. He also ordered the bulk of the 54th Regiment to leave some naval units at Gasmata and begin to retreat towards Amio and then Ubai, where barges were to finally evacuate the detachment. Over in Bougainville, General Griswold's 14th Corps had just taken over the protection of the Cape Torokina base. As such, nearly 62000 men were stationed in the area, defenses were consolidated, and an impressive artillery complement under Brigadier-General Leo Kreber was directed to cover the perimeter. During this period of consolidation, the most important actions were the establishment of an important Fijian outpost at Ibu village. One of the most effective units operating under corps command was the 1st Battalion of the Fiji Infantry Regiment. This battalion, consisting of 777 enlisted men and 34 officers, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel J.B.K. Taylor of the New Zealand Army, whom arrived at Bougainville in late December. Taylor was wounded the first night ashore and was replaced as commander by Major Gregory Upton, who was in charge of the battalion during its long-range patrols in late December and January. The Fijian troops were well trained, proud of their uniforms and ability to march, and according to reports, loved to sing a wide variety of Fijian songs as well as the more modern American tunes. Almost immediately after their arrival, plans were under way to use their unique abilities as jungle fighters to establish a combat outpost far to the east of the mountain range, most of which was controlled by the Japanese. The managed to gain valuable information on Japanese movements before withdrawing in late February, and a successful expansion of the perimeter east of the mouth of the Torokina River. But the first real test of the Corps in Bougainville was approaching.  Under immense pressure from his superiors, General Hyakutake had been preparing to launch his main counterattack, codenamed Operation TA, since early January. He assembled over 15000 men from his total strength of nearly 40000 to take part in the operation. General Kanda the 6th Division commander was given command of the force and his mission was simple. 3 task forces, named after their commanders; the Iwasa unit of Major General Iwasa Shun consisting of the 23rd Infantry Regiment, the 2nd Battalion of the 13th Regiment, attached engineering troops, and two batteries of light field artillery and a mortar battalion–in all, approximately 4,150 men; the Magata Unit, commanded by Colonel Magata Isashi, consisting of most of the 45th Infantry Regiment (less 2nd Battalion), with artillery, mortar battalions, and engineers attached–a total of approximately 4,300 men; The smallest of the forces, the Muda Unit, commanded by Colonel Muda Toyohorei , consisted of the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 13th Regiment and an engineering company–a total of 1,350 men.  These 3 units would  attack strongpoints in the American perimeter. Thus, the Iwasa Unit was to strike towards Hill 700 on the right flank of the 37th Division line and then drive directly toward the two Piva airfields, which Hyakutake planned to capture by March 10; the Magata Unit was to take the low ground west of Hill 700 and then drive south to capture the Torokina airstrip by March 17; and the Muda Unit was to seize Hills 260 and 309 in the Americal sector and then capture the strategically-important Hill 608 by March 10. Bougainville was about to see some major action. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Despite the admiralty islands certainly holding significant enemy units, General MacArthur went ahead with his reconnaissance in force and turned it into a full blown invasion. Yet again MacArthur proved, he was willing to do whatever necessary to make sure the drive of the Pacific pointed in the direction of the Philippines.