Podcasts about Kinkaid

The Agents visit the crime scene and learn about the Kinkaid's. Be sure to get caught up with our archives via all the major podcast apps, YouTube, and our website! Find us on Apple Podcasts, Google Podcast, Spotify, Pandora, iHeart Radio, Amazon Podcasts, Audible, and more! Leave that 5 star rating and review! Don't forget to subscribe to our YouTube channel at Roll The Hard 20! And check out our Patreon! Find us on Apple Podcasts! https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/roll-the-hard-20-podcast/id1408365472 Subscribe to our YouTube channel at: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCOo3xgvuyt8p_u6HqysDATw/featured?view_as=subscriber YouTube Podcasts: Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/1kJ6KnJsQFsN4z86N6UjZo?si=6s15B9YuQPGksRzwZyVKLA Pandora https://pandora.app.link/WOmEP5Rf1Cb iHeart Radio: https://www.iheart.com/podcast/256-roll-the-hard-20-podcast-31128285/ Amazon Podcasts: https://www.amazon.com/ROLL-THE-HARD-20-PODCAST/dp/B08K585JWV/ref=sr_1_1?dchild=1&keywords=Roll+the+hard+20+podcast&qid=1618152633&s=audible&sr=1-1 We're on Audible! https://www.audible.com/pd?asin=B08K55QSGF&source_code=ASSORAP0511160006&share_location=podcast_show_detail Also on Podbean https://www.podbean.com/podcast-detail/vkker-a5316/ROLL-THE-HARD-20-PODCAST/page/6 Just one more venue we can be found! https://www.delta-green.com/topics/debriefing/ Want to be a Hard Slinger and get cool swag? Join us on our Patreon page! https://www.patreon.com/rollthehard20podcast Contact your Trusted D.M. Brian! Visit the website at: https://www.rollthehard20podcast.com/ Email us at: rollthehard20podcast@gmail.com Want to represent the podcast? Check out our awesome shirts! https://www.amazon.com/ROLL-THE-HARD-20-PODCAST/dp/B07HMMRMMN?keywords=roll+the+hard+20+podcast&qid=1537974976&sr=8-1-fkmrnull&ref=mp_s_a_1_fkmrnull_1 Follow our social media footprints at: https://m.facebook.com/groups/202767550592121 https://instagram.com/rollthehard20?igshid=gjlo7p4lay72 https://twitter.com/rollthehard20?s=11

Last time we spoke about the invasion of Luzon. As Operation Mike 1 commenced, General Swift's 1st Corps prepared to assault Lingayen Gulf while General Griswold's 14th Corps rehearsed at Huon Gulf. Despite successful diversionary strikes, Japanese forces anticipated an invasion. On January 2, enemy ships were spotted heading towards Luzon, confirming fears of a large-scale operation. Kamikaze attacks intensified, damaging Allied vessels, including the USS Long, which sank after being hit. Amidst bombardments, Filipino citizens demonstrated resilience despite the destruction, reflecting their loyalty and hope during the turmoil. As dawn broke on January 9, Kinkaid's amphibious convoys approached Lingayen Gulf, initiating a fierce assault. Preceded by heavy bombardments, American forces landed on the beaches, facing minimal resistance. The 14th Corps advanced toward key locations, while the 1st Corps secured strategic positions despite enduring sniper fire. By nightfall, they established a significant beachhead. Despite sporadic Japanese counterattacks, American troops pressed forward, and reinforcements were deployed to maintain momentum. The stage was set for a crucial campaign in Luzon. This episode is the South China Sea Raid Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As we last left off, the 1st and 14th Corps had just successfully established a beachhead on Lingayen Gulf. On January 11, General Krueger further reinforced his position by landing additional reserves, aiming to effectively confront the formidable enemy forces entrenched in the eastern hills. Concurrently, Admiral Halsey's 3rd Fleet units made their entrance into the South China Sea to execute an ambitious raid known as Operation Gratitude. This operation was prompted by misleading intelligence reports suggesting that the hybrid battleship-carriers Ise and Hyuga were stationed in Cam Ranh Bay. In response, Halsey ordered Admiral Bogan's Task Group 38.2 to launch an assault on these supposed targets. This task group was primarily composed of the battleships New Jersey and Wisconsin, which were directed to bombard the bay and eliminate any Japanese vessels that had sustained damage from prior airstrikes. To enhance their operational capabilities, Halsey established Task Group 38.5, specifically designed for night operations, which included the night-capable carriers Enterprise and Independence. On January 12, aircraft from these carriers were deployed for a predawn reconnaissance mission over Cam Ranh Bay and its adjacent waters in search of enemy targets. Despite their efforts, the search yielded no results, indicating that the earlier intelligence had been inaccurate. Nevertheless, all three carrier groups proceeded with their planned strikes at 07:30, while the surface action group advanced toward Cam Ranh. Halsey's strategic gamble proved to be remarkably successful. Although the Ise and Hyuga were not present in the bay, American aviators discovered a wealth of enemy shipping, including three significant Japanese convoys. Sherman's TG 38.3 encountered the most valuable target off Qui Nhon north of Cam Ranh. This was convoy Hi-86 with nine merchants and a heavy escort. The convoy had departed Cape St Jacques on January 9 and was headed north. The escort comprised light cruiser Kashii and five kaibokan. Late on January 11, it reached Qui Nhon Bay and anchored. After leaving Qui Nhon Bay, it was discovered by TG 38.3. In two large attacks, aircraft from Essex, Ticonderoga, Langley, and San Jacinto laid waste to the convoy. None of the nine merchant ships in the convoy survived this onslaught. Cargo ships Yoshu Maru and Eiman Maru (loaded with bauxite and raw rubber), along with tanker San Luis Maru, were sunk. The other six ships were damaged and forced to beach. Otsusan Maru (a cargo ship converted to tanker), passenger-cargo ship Tatebe Maru, cargo ship Kyokuun Maru, cargo ship Yusei Maru, ore carrier Tatsubato Maru, and cargo ship Banshu Maru No. 63 all became constructive total losses. The escort for this large convoy met a similar fate. Light cruiser Kashii was hit amidships by a torpedo in the early afternoon. This was followed by two bomb hits aft that detonated her depth-charge magazine. Kashii sank stern first with 621 members of her crew; only 19 survived. CD-23 was attacked north of Qui Nhon and sunk with her entire crew of 155 officers and men. CD-51 suffered the same fate. After she blew up and sank, her depth charges detonated with fatal consequences for any survivors; 159 men were lost. From the entire convoy, only kaibokans Daito and Ukuru, and corvette CD-27 survived, albeit in a damaged state. As a result, Admiral McCain's Task Force 38 conducted an impressive total of 984 strike missions throughout the day. This relentless assault led to the sinking of the light cruiser Kashii, two minesweepers, eight kaibokans, two subchasers, five transport ships, fourteen cargo vessels, and nine oilers. Additionally, four kaibokans, one subchaser, three transports, four cargo ships, and two oilers were damaged. This operation marked the highest number of ships sunk by airstrikes in a single day during the war, showcasing the effectiveness of the American air campaign and the critical role of intelligence in naval warfare. In addition to inflicting significant damage on Japanese shipping, the aviators under Admiral Halsey achieved remarkable success by claiming the destruction of 113 enemy aircraft, both in the air and on the ground, while sustaining the loss of 23 American aircraft. The impact of these operations extended beyond aerial engagements; critical infrastructure was also targeted. Airfields, docks, and oil storage facilities located between Tourane and Saigon suffered considerable damage. Notably, the railway station in Nha Trang and a vital bridge on the route connecting Saigon to Bien Hoa were also affected, disrupting transportation and supply lines.   Meanwhile, Bogan's surface strike group was unable to locate any Japanese vessels during their operations and instead focused their firepower on bombarding Cam Ranh Bay, further demonstrating the ongoing conflict's intensity. Turning to the situation in Luzon, the 1st and 14th Corps were poised to advance their offensives. To the west, the 185th Regiment and the 40th Reconnaissance Troop initiated a push toward the recently vacated Port Sual. The 160th Regiment maintained a watchful presence at Aguilar, while patrols from the 148th Regiment ventured into towns occupied by guerrilla forces, specifically Urbiztondo and Bayambang. In the eastern sector, the 6th Division was temporarily held back to prevent the creation of a potentially hazardous gap along the front of the 1st Corps. However, the reinforced 43rd Division continued its advance against the most formidable Japanese defenses encountered on Luzon to date. Along the coastline, the 158th Regiment dispatched patrols into Damortis, discovering the town largely deserted. The 172nd Regiment attempted an attack on Hill 580, which ultimately proved unsuccessful, while the 63rd Regiment was deployed to close the widening gap between the 158th and 172nd Regiments. The primary objective of these coordinated efforts was to defeat Major-General Sato Bunzo's 58th Independent Mixed Brigade and secure control of the Damortis-Rosario road. The Damortis-Rosario road, a 2-lane, concrete-paved section of Route 3, led east from the junction of Route 3 and the coast road at Damortis, about 8 miles north of San Fabian, to the junction of Routes 3 and 11, 8 miles inland and a mile east of Rosario. Seizure of the Damortis-Rosario stretch of Route 3 would present 1st Corps with an easy means of access to Route 11, in turn providing a 2-lane asphalt-paved axis of advance toward Baguio along the deep valley of the Bued River. Equally important, if the 1st Corps could quickly gain control over the Damortis-Rosario road and the Routes 3-11 junction, the corps could largely overcome the threat of counterattack against the 6th Army's beachhead from the north and northeast. The Damortis-Rosario road ran sometimes across wooded ravines and sometimes over ridge tops for 3/4 of the way to Rosario, and then continued across open farm land and through Rosario to a junction with Route 11. The road was dominated by broken ridges and steep-sided hills to both the north and the south for the first 5 miles inland. South of the road the hills and ridges were grass-covered; to the north many of the draws and ravines contained thick scrub growth. Bare, steep heights north, northeast, and east of Rosario controlled the Routes 3-11 junction. The 58th Independent Mixed Brigade, defending the Damortis-Rosario road, had all the advantages of observation, while the relatively soft rock and dirt mixture of the hills and ridges gave the brigade ample opportunity to indulge in what was soon to appear to the 1st Corps as the Japanese Army's favorite occupation--digging caves and tunnels. Achieving this would mitigate the threat of a counterattack against the 6th Army's beachhead from the north and northeast. With the security of its left flank assured, the 14th Corps could then accelerate its advance toward General Krueger's main objective: the Central Plains-Manila Bay region. This strategic maneuvering was crucial for consolidating American forces and ensuring a successful campaign in the Philippines. At the same time, the 169th Regiment faced ongoing challenges at Hill 318 and the southern part of the Japanese-held third ridgeline, while the 103rd Regiment made unsuccessful attempts to advance toward the Hill 200 complex, which was firmly defended by the 2nd Battalion, 64th Regiment. Meanwhile, General Tominaga executed his final large-scale kamikaze attack during the Philippines Campaign, successfully damaging two destroyer escorts, one destroyer transport, and five merchant ships. The final attacks were recorded on January 13. Only two suicide aircraft were dispatched, both IJA Ki-84 Franks. One surprised the crew of escort carrier Salamaua. Unengaged by antiaircraft fire, the Frank hit amidships. One of the aircraft's bombs exploded on the hangar deck and the second passed through the ship creating a hole near the waterline. The carrier was left without power while major fires took hold. Damage control was ultimately successful, but not before 15 were killed and 88 wounded. Salamaua was out of the war until April. Also on this day, attack transport Zeilin was hit by a probable IJN aircraft conducting an impromptu suicide attack. Ultimately, the 4th Air Army was scheduled to evacuate to Formosa on January 15, marking the end of the threat from Japanese air power in the Philippines, although the Allies were not yet aware of this. Since the initial kamikaze assault on the Mindoro-bound convoys on December 13, Japanese aircraft had sunk 24 vessels and damaged 67 others. Casualties from these air attacks aboard ships were approximately 1,230 men killed and 1,800 wounded, while the Allies estimated they had destroyed around 600 Japanese aircraft during the same timeframe. Back in Lingayen Gulf on January 13, the 172nd Regiment once again advanced up the grassy, steep slopes of Hill 580, successfully securing most of the area against fierce resistance. Simultaneously, the 63rd Regiment attacked north from Hill 247 and captured Hill 363, despite lacking artillery support. Artillery support was to have been provided by the 43rd Division's 155-mm. howitzer battalion, the 192nd Field Artillery Battalion, since the 63rd Regiment's own 105-mm. battalion had been sent south with the rest of the 6th Division. Unfortunately, the 192nd Field Artillery did not learn it was to support the 63rd until after dark on January 12, and could not start moving to good close support positions until daylight on the 13th, after the 63rd had started its attack. Unlike a 105-mm. battalion, the 192nd did not normally operate in direct support roles and lacked the forward observers and communications the lighter battalions possessed. The 192nd might therefore have been expected to take some time to prepare for its direct support mission, but the battalion reported it could have provided some support--with at least one battery--by noon on the 13th had not Colonel Ralph C. Holliday, commanding the 63rd Regiment, insisted that wire be laid for artillery liaison officers and forward observers, a job that was not completed for almost 36 hours. Colonel Holliday may have been influenced in his decision by the fact that the artillery's SCR-610 radio did not work efficiently in the broken terrain of the middle ridge line where the 63rd was attacking. It was not, indeed, until the 43rd Division had supplied the 192nd Field Artillery with infantry SCR-300 sets that the battalion was able to establish satisfactory radio communications. Then, on January 14, the first radio brought up to the battalion's forward observers was promptly destroyed by Japanese artillery, which also cut wire that had already been laid. Support was again delayed, so the entire battalion was not in position and ready to give the 63rd Regiment the support it needed until midafternoon on January 15. Meanwhile the 169th Regiment completed the clearing of the southern end of the ridgeline, while the 103rd Regiment continued its unsuccessful efforts to take Hill 200. To the west, the 6th Division established a fortified line extending from Malasiqui to Manaoag. They promptly dispatched reconnaissance units to the east and south to gather intelligence on enemy movements. The 185th Regiment achieved a significant victory by successfully assaulting Port Sual, while the 160th Regiment engaged in several skirmishes with the reinforced 23rd Reconnaissance Regiment, which had retreated from Port Sual at the onset of the conflict. Meanwhile, patrols from the 148th Regiment advanced into Wawa, strategically located between Bayambang and Urbiztondo. The following day, the 185th Regiment continued its momentum by capturing the crucial road junction town of Alaminos on the Bolinao Peninsula. Some of its elements also pushed northward toward Cabalitan Bay, where they discovered that Allied Naval Forces had already landed to establish a seaplane base, enhancing their operational capabilities in the region. Looking to the east, the 103rd Regiment made gradual but consistent progress along Hill 200, while the 169th Regiment executed a costly frontal assault to clear Hill 318, suffering significant casualties in the process. The 172nd Regiment advanced north along the third ridge, successfully seizing Hill 565 despite facing scattered resistance. The 63rd Regiment continued its slow advance northward, persistently harassed by Japanese artillery and mortar fire, which impeded their progress. Additionally, the 158th Regiment initiated an offensive toward Rosario but was quickly compelled to retreat due to intense Japanese artillery and machine-gun fire. In contrast, General Yamashita, while cautious about launching a major counteroffensive, recognized the necessity of limited offensive actions to regain the initiative. He believed that such actions would effectively disrupt the enemy's advance inland. Consequently, he ordered General Nishiyama's 23rd Division to conduct a robust raiding attack against the San Fabian-Alacan sector during the night of January 16. This strategic decision aimed to exploit the element of surprise and inflict damage on the enemy forces, thereby buying time for his troops to regroup and fortify their positions. In a strategic initiative aimed at maximizing the destruction of enemy weaponry, supplies, and critical base installations, the 58th Brigade, along with the 71st and 72nd Regiments, was instructed to assemble specialized "suicide" raiding units. These units comprised carefully selected soldiers, heavily armed with automatic firearms and supported by demolition teams trained for explosive operations. In addition, a fourth unit was to be formed from the Shigemi Detachment of the 2nd Armored Division, which had recently positioned itself on the southern flank of the 23rd Division. This unit would consist of a mobile infantry company and a medium tank company. The operational plan called for these units to breach the enemy's beachhead perimeter simultaneously at various locations on January 17. Their objective was to swiftly execute their missions and then withdraw to safety. As preparations for this limited counteroffensive unfolded, the American forces continued their own offensive operations, which had commenced on January 15. In this context, the 158th Regiment launched an eastward assault, successfully advancing approximately 1,000 yards. Meanwhile, the 63rd Regiment cautiously pushed forward over a mile and a half northward from Hill 363. The 172nd Regiment made a rapid advance to the Cataguintingan road junction, effectively establishing a battalion at the edge of Route 3, about a mile and a half west of Rosario. In contrast, the 169th Regiment encountered challenges during a two-pronged attack on Hill 355, leading General Wing to order the regiment to bypass the hill to the south and reposition overland to Route 3 at barrio Palacpalac. Conversely, the 103rd Regiment achieved significant success in their assault on the Hill 200 complex. Further to the west, patrols from the 185th Regiment advanced westward, successfully reaching Dasol Bay. Additionally, a battalion from the 129th Regiment crossed the Agno River at Wawa and continued south along a dusty gravel road toward Camiling. Other elements of the 160th Regiment also moved down from Aguilar to Camiling, consolidating their position in the area. After completing refueling operations over the previous days, Task Force 38 resumed its northern advance to launch an assault on Formosa on January 15. Despite Admiral McCain's recommendation to cancel the strike due to inclement weather conditions, Admiral Halsey opted to proceed with the operation. As a result, a series of airstrikes were executed against Formosa and the Pescadores Islands throughout the day. The 16 fighter sweeps conducted during this operation managed to destroy only 16 Japanese aircraft in the air and an additional 18 on the ground. However, the bombing missions targeting enemy shipping proved more effective, leading to the sinking of the destroyers Hatakaze and Tsuga, along with one transport vessel and two merchant ships, albeit at the cost of losing 12 American aircraft. Following these strikes, Task Force 38 redirected its course toward Hong Kong, which came under attack on January 16. Unfortunately, the American forces encountered severe weather conditions and faced intense anti-aircraft fire. This resulted in a limited success, with the Americans sinking just one transport ship, five oilers, one cargo vessel, and one guardboat. Additionally, they inflicted damage on the destroyer Hasu, three destroyer escorts, one corvette, one transport, and one oiler. The strikes also caused significant destruction to key infrastructure, including Kai Tak Airport, the Kowloon and Taikoo docks, the Aberdeen dockyard, the Kowloon-Canton railway, and the Macau Naval Aviation Center. In a broader campaign, the Americans executed secondary strikes against Canton and Hainan Island, as well as targeting several airfields along the Chinese coast, particularly between the Leizhou Peninsula and Swatow. However, this ambitious operation came at a steep cost, with Task Force 38 suffering a total loss of 49 aircraft—27 due to operational issues and 22 as a result of enemy action. With the South China Sea Raid concluded, Admiral Halsey directed his fleet toward the Luzon Strait, adhering to Admiral Nimitz's request. Ultimately, Halsey's aggressive campaign resulted in the destruction of approximately 300,000 tons of Japanese shipping and an estimated 615 Japanese aircraft, all at the expense of 201 American planes. Returning to the Lingayen Gulf, Wing's offensive operations persisted on January 16. The 63rd, 158th, and 172nd Regiments continued their assaults toward the town of Rosario. However, they encountered fierce resistance from the determined Japanese defenders, which significantly hampered their progress. In contrast, the 169th Regiment achieved a notable advancement by reaching Palacpalac, while the 103rd Regiment successfully captured the strategically important Hill 200 complex. From their newly secured positions, elements of the 103rd Regiment pursued the retreating Japanese forces toward Pozorrubio. Meanwhile, two reinforced companies advanced toward Potpot, and both towns ultimately fell into American hands on January 17. In a broader strategic context, General Krueger directed General Griswold to dispatch additional troops south of the Agno River in preparation for a decisive push toward Manila. By January 17, the 14th Corps had established outposts at key locations including Moncada, Nampicuan, Anao, and Paniqui, solidifying their control over the area. Simultaneously, Japanese General Nishiyama was preparing to initiate a local counteroffensive by nightfall on January 16. However, the 72nd Regiment's raiding unit was unable to participate due to enemy penetrations disrupting their plans. On the northern front, Sato's raiding unit conducted a minor raid against an artillery position held by the 158th Regiment, but this attack proved largely inconsequential. In contrast, the raiding unit from the 71st Regiment executed a more impactful maneuver by advancing down the Bued River valley. They successfully infiltrated the rear installations of the 172nd Regiment, where they ignited a gasoline dump, damaging several trucks in the process. This raid resulted in the deaths of two American soldiers and injuries to eight others. At Palacpalac, confusion reigned as the retreating 2nd Battalion of the 64th Regiment inadvertently engaged with the perimeter of the 1st Battalion of the 169th Regiment. This chaotic encounter cost the Japanese approximately 100 men before they retreated in disarray, further illustrating the tumultuous nature of the battlefield. In a dramatic turn of events, the tank raiding unit launched a surprise attack on the newly established outpost at Potpot. Initially, the first two tanks managed to breach the perimeter, unleashing a barrage of machine-gun fire in all directions as they sped away down the road toward Manaoag. However, the remaining tanks, along with their infantry support, encountered fierce resistance from determined defenders, leading to a sharp and intense fire fight that lasted two hours. Despite their initial success, the attackers were ultimately repelled. As dawn broke, the two tanks that had previously penetrated the defenses returned down the Manaoag road, but this time they met their demise, successfully destroyed by the defenders who had regrouped and fortified their positions. Since the onset of the invasion, the 1st Corps had suffered significant casualties, with approximately 220 men killed and 660 wounded. In stark contrast, Griswold's forces experienced far lighter losses, with only 30 killed and 90 wounded. With the enemy's counterattack thwarted, the 43rd Division managed to secure positions that effectively reduced the likelihood of another large-scale surprise offensive from the Japanese forces. However, to completely eliminate the remaining threats, Commander Wing recognized the necessity of securing control over the Rosario junction and establishing a solid hold on Route 3 to the south of this critical point. The challenge was considerable, as Japanese artillery, mortars, and machine guns positioned on the surrounding high ground commanded all approaches to Rosario. Consequently, Wing had no choice but to restrict the 172nd Regiment to a defensive holding action on its left flank while directing its right flank to seize the high ground immediately to the north and northwest of Rosario. In addition, the 63rd and 158th Regiments were tasked with neutralizing the enemy stronghold along the Rosario-Damortis road. To expedite the capture of the road junction, Wing also planned for the 103rd and 169th Regiments to launch an offensive drive north along Route 3. This coordinated effort aimed to strengthen their strategic position and diminish the Japanese threat in the region, ultimately paving the way for a more secure and stable front. In response to the evolving battlefield situation, General Krueger ultimately ordered General Mullins' 25th Division to secure the right flank previously held by Wing's forces. This strategic move prompted the 27th and 161st Regiments to begin the process of relieving the 103rd and 169th Regiments. By doing so, the 6th Division would be able to resume its advance, now directed towards Urdaneta and the Cabaruan Hills, critical areas for the ongoing campaign. To the west, Krueger aimed to maintain the 14th Corps along the Agno River line until General Swift's 1st Corps could effectively neutralize the enemy resistance stretching from Damortis to Urdaneta. This would enable Swift's forces to maneuver southward alongside Griswold's corps. However, General MacArthur was eager to initiate a southern advance toward Manila as soon as possible. Consequently, he instructed the 14th Corps to reposition its main forces back to their previous outpost line south of the Agno by January 20. Following this, the corps was to launch an offensive towards Tarlac and Victoria. Once they established a presence along the Tarlac-Victoria line, the corps would prepare to advance toward Clark Field, a vital objective necessary for the successful neutralization of Japanese strongholds at Iwo Jima and Okinawa. To bolster this offensive, MacArthur also planned to deploy the 11th Corps on the western coast of Luzon, just north of the Bataan Peninsula. This amphibious operation aimed to disrupt Japanese defensive strategies in the Clark Field area, thereby enhancing the overall effectiveness of the Allied campaign. In contrast, in reaction to the loss of the Hill 200 complex, Japanese General Yamashita ordered the 2nd Tank Division to advance immediately into the Tayug sector. There, Lieutenant-General Iwanaka Yoshiharu would take command of the 10th Division forces already stationed in the region. The armored units were tasked with positioning themselves along the trail north of San Nicolas and on both sides of the Ambayabang River, with the objective of containing any potential enemy advances to the east. Additionally, the Shigemi Detachment received orders to move its main forces from San Manuel to Binalonan, where they were to defend the town resolutely, prepared to hold their ground against any assault. In addition, General Okamoto was tasked with positioning his main forces to secure the immediate approaches to San Jose. Meanwhile, General Tsuda's 105th Division was instructed to advance northward through Cabanatuan as quickly as possible to establish defensive positions behind the 10th Division, specifically at Minuli and north of Carranglan. However, not all of these strategic plans could be effectively executed. By January 17, Yamashita discovered that the Villa Verde Trail was impassable for tanks and trucks, rendering it unusable for the planned armored movements. Furthermore, the terrain in the Tayug-San Nicolas area proved to be unsuitable for armored operations, complicating the situation further. On January 17 the 14th Area Army commander belatedly learned that the 10th Division had never concentrated at San Jose and that it had made no real effort to dispose itself along the entire Tayug-Umingan-Lupao-San Jose defense line for which it was responsible. General Okamoto, the division commander, had decided that he did not have sufficient strength to hold the relatively open ground assigned to him. Most of his 39th Regiment was with the Kembu Group; the bulk of the 10th Regiment, greatly understrength, was attached to the 103rd Division for the defense of northern Luzon; and, at least as late as of January 15, he had received no word as to when he might expect the attached Tsuda Detachment to arrive in the San Jose area from the east coast. He had therefore withdrawn most of his troops up Route 5 from San Jose and had started disposing them along the line Yamashita had intended the 105th Division to hold; leaving behind only a reinforced infantry company and two artillery battalions to secure the all-important railhead. Okamoto had directed the 10th Reconnaissance Regiment to remain in the San Nicolas area, and he stationed three or four rifle companies of his 63rd Regiment along the Tayug-Lupao line and in rising ground to the southwest. Confronted with these unexpected developments, Yamashita concluded that he had no choice but to accept the redeployment of the 10th Division as an established fact. Consequently, he ordered the 2nd Tank Division, which had already begun its movement toward Tayug, to concentrate its main forces southeast of Tayug to safeguard the immediate approaches to San Jose. Additionally, the 6th Tank Regiment was assigned to position itself in Muñoz to cover the southwestern approach to the area. To further bolster defenses, Tsuda was instructed to deploy two of his five advance battalions to San Jose. However, as these tactical adjustments were being made, it became necessary to shift focus away from Luzon and turn attention toward Leyte, where the final operations on the island were unfolding. It is important to note that the majority of General Suzuki's forces had successfully retreated to the Villaba-Mount Canguipot region, although some strong elements remained isolated further to the east. With General Eichelberger's 8th Army assuming control of the island, American forces commenced the final phase of operations to secure Leyte, methodically working to eliminate any remaining pockets of resistance. From January 1 to February 15, the 11th Airborne Division conducted patrols in the Burauen area, where they engaged and successfully eliminated a well-entrenched enemy force positioned on the southern slopes of Mount Majunag. Meanwhile, the 96th Division carried out extensive patrols in the eastern mountainous regions before taking over from the 11th Airborne Division. In the southern part of the island, the 7th Division launched numerous patrols and deployed a reinforced battalion that effectively neutralized all enemy forces in the Camotes Islands. Additionally, the 77th Division focused on clearing various pockets of enemy resistance located in northwestern Leyte. By late January, the Americal Division arrived to assist in the cleanup operations in Samar and Leyte, a mission that was successfully completed by February 24, with support from the 1st Filipino Regiment. However, during this time, Japanese General Suzuki was formulating his strategy for Operation Chi-Go. This operation involved the amphibious movement of several military units to different islands within the Visayas using large motorized landing barges. Suzuki's initial plan entailed deploying the majority of the 1st Division to establish a garrison on Cebu Island, while the headquarters of the 35th Army was to relocate to Davao. This strategic move would enable him to take direct command of military operations on Mindanao. Following this, he intended to dispatch the 41st and 77th Regiments to Mindanao, assign the 26th Division to the Bacolod area on Negros Island, and send the 5th Regiment along with units from the 102nd Division to Cebu. Furthermore, the 16th Division and the 68th Brigade, commanded by General Makino, were to remain in Leyte to engage in guerrilla warfare tactics.  The 102nd Division presented certain difficulties. There had been instances of 40 to 50 deserters fleeing to Cebu or Negros on boats they had built for themselves. Deserters that were apprehended were court-martialed. General Suzuki for some time had been out of touch with General Fukei, the commanding general of the 102nd Division, which was in the Mt. Pina area. By chance, one of Suzuki's officers learned that Fukei was planning to evacuate to Cebu. Suzuki was incensed since he and his staff felt that Fukei "was violating the military code in taking these steps without consent." He therefore ordered Fukei to remain at Leyte. Fukei did not answer but his chief of staff sent the following reply: "We appreciate the efforts of Army but at the present time we are very busy preparing for retreat. The division commander and chief of staff are unable to report to Army Headquarters." Suzuki was "entirely displeased" with the reaction of Fukei and sent his chief of staff, General Tomochika, to investigate the situation. When Tomochika arrived he found that Fukei, with his chief of staff and some headquarters personnel, had already left for Cebu. The sequel to these events was that Suzuki relieved Fukei of his command and ordered him to remain on Cebu until he received further orders. Upon the arrival of Suzuki in Cebu in the spring of 1945, Fukei was sentenced to confinement for thirty days. Suzuki asked IGHQ in Tokyo for authority to court-martial Fukei but no reply was forthcoming. In the end, Fukei was released and later returned to command of the 102nd Division. In the midst of ongoing military operations, Suzuki implemented measures to ensure that the forces stationed on Leyte could sustain themselves. He instructed his troops to make the most of local resources by utilizing available food and materials. This included directives to cultivate sweet potatoes and Indian corn, with the hope of sourcing all necessary provisions from the surrounding areas outside their operational base. However, the Japanese forces faced significant challenges due to relentless American air raids and mop-up operations, which severely hindered their ability to procure supplies. The hostile environment made it difficult for them to plant and harvest the crops they had intended to grow. Despite these obstacles, the Japanese managed to capitalize on the conclusion of the harvest season. They were able to secure substantial amounts of food that had been stored by local Filipinos, including a considerable quantity of coconuts and sweet potatoes. By early January, the 1st Division began its gradual movement toward Cebu, successfully transporting around 800 men to the island by mid-January. Unfortunately, the situation worsened as enemy PT boats established a stringent sea blockade, rendering maritime transportation impractical until mid-March. This blockade left approximately 2,000 men from the 1st Division, along with other units of the 35th Army, stranded on Leyte. Simultaneously, the Imahori Detachment, alongside the Mitsui Shipping Unit and the 77th Regiment, advanced to the southern Matag-ob area and subsequently moved toward Villaba, reaching their destination in early February. The majority of the 26th Division also made progress, arriving in the region north of Ormoc in mid-January before commencing a northwestward movement. By February, they successfully established contact with the rest of the 35th Army. Meanwhile, the remnants of the 16th Division could only reach the Valencia area in February, where they would remain until the end of the month. For the foreseeable future, the Japanese units left behind on Leyte faced the daunting task of defending against the advancing Americal Division and the 1st Filipino Regiment, which were steadily gaining ground.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Admiral Halsey launched Operation Gratitude, targeting Japanese shipping. Despite misleading intel, they decimated enemy convoys, showcasing the effectiveness of airstrikes and securing strategic advances in Luzon. American forces advanced through Luzon while Task Force 38 struck Formosa and Hong Kong. Despite fierce Japanese resistance and challenging weather, the Allies steadily gained ground, though both sides suffered significant losses in the campaign.

Last time we spoke about the Aitape-Wewak Campaign. General Dunckel's task force successfully invaded Mindoro, establishing airfields to support operations on Luzon. With General Eichelberger's 8th Army and General Krueger's 6th Army poised to capture Lingayen Gulf, guerrilla forces on Luzon provided crucial intelligence. As plans for the Luzon invasion solidified, General Yamashita prepared defenses, predicting an assault between January 10 and 20. Despite dwindling resources, he aimed to delay the enemy's advance. Meanwhile, Allied forces readied for a swift amphibious attack to secure Manila and restore the Philippine government. In December, Australian forces established outposts at Yasile and Yambes, successfully repelling Japanese attacks. After fierce clashes, they advanced 40 miles along the coast. Meanwhile, the U.S. military bolstered defenses in Saipan and launched bombing raids on Japanese facilities, achieving mixed results. Despite heavy losses, they began to impact Japanese production capabilities. As the month ended, the Japanese launched a final assault on the Marianas, but the Allies continued their strategic advances, setting the stage for future operations. This episode is the Invasion of Luzon Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  We last left off with the plans for Operation Mike 1 being finished. General Swift's 1st Corps was ready to land on the eastern beaches of Lingayen Gulf, while General Griswold's 14th Corps prepared to go ashore on the western beaches. Additionally, successful diversionary operations had been conducted on Mindoro, and Admiral McCain's Task Force 38 executed several moderately successful strikes against Formosa and the Ryukyu Islands in early January. Meanwhile, the 14th Corps elements staging at New Britain completed loading on 10 December; those mounting at Bougainville finished two days later. On the 17th all groups of the III Amphibious Force rendezvoused at Huon Gulf, eastern New Guinea, to rehearse the Lingayen assault. General Griswold felt that the 37th Division's rehearsal was satisfactory but had much fault to find with the 40th Division, remarking upon a "general failure to observe the spirit of the rehearsal." As a result, further training was conducted at Manus Island in the Admiralties, where the convoy reassembled on 22 December. On December 27, Admiral Wilkinson dispatched his LSTs and LSMs, followed by the remainder of Task Force 79 four days later. On the same day, Admiral Barbey's convoy, which included Major-General Leonard Wing's 43rd Division, loaded at Aitape before proceeding to Sansapor to load Major-General Edwin Patrick's 6th Division. Task Force 78 departed Sansapor on December 30, heading to a rendezvous point with other elements of Admiral Kinkaid's Luzon Attack Force. By January 4, all components of Task Force 77 had successfully gathered at Leyte Gulf, with MacArthur personally boarding the light cruiser Boise. Kinkaid's minesweepers, Admiral Oldendorf's Bombardment and Fire Support Group, and most of Admiral Durgin's escort carriers had already left the gulf on January 2 to conduct preliminary operations off Luzon. By January 6, the rest of the Luzon Attack Force began moving toward Lingayen Gulf, led by Admiral Berkey's light cruisers. As Mindoro-based aircraft significantly increased the intensity of their assaults during the last week of December—sinking seven transports and two escorts, and destroying over 140 aircraft. General Yamashita's tense and expectant forces were still racing against time to complete,their battle preparations when the first warnings came that the enemy was again on the move. At 1322 on 2 January, a naval lookout post on Surigao Strait reported that a long train of about 80 enemy ships, screened by destroyers, was moving through the strait into the Mindanao Sea. Other reports which followed immediately warned that large numbers of invasion craft were gathered in the Leyte, Palau and Marianas areas, and that enemy submarines had appeared in force off the west coast of Luzon. At first it was thought that the enemy convoy was merely a reinforcement and resupply group destined for Mindoro. On 3 January, however, developments began to point more conclusively toward a full-scale amphibious operation against Luzon. In the afternoon, just as the initially sighted enemy group passed into the Sulu Sea, a large enemy naval task force, including 12 escort carriers, four battleships and eight cruisers, was reported following in its wake through Surigao Strait. Another delayed report stated that an enemy transport convoy of 90 ships, under strong naval escort, had been spotted the previous day northwest of Palau, heading in the direction of Leyte Gulf. General Yamashita grew concerned that a large-scale amphibious operation against Luzon was imminent. Consequently, he decided to relocate his headquarters to Baguio. These concerns were validated in early January when Japanese lookouts spotted Kinkaid's warships and transports approaching the island. In response, General Tominaga ordered aggressive kamikaze attacks on the Allied vessels, with a major assault on January 4 causing severe damage to the escort carrier Ommaney Bay, which ultimately had to be scuttled. The following day, Japanese attacks persisted, damaging two escort carriers, two cruisers, and three destroyers, among other ships. In retaliation, Durgin's carrier aircraft launched strikes on Manila Bay, successfully sinking the destroyer Momi and damaging the Hinoki. On January 6, McCain's carriers joined the effort, with American pilots tasked with targeting air facilities at Manila and Clark Field. Despite adverse weather conditions limiting the effectiveness of the strike, they succeeded in sinking one transport and six oilers, as well as destroying 32 Japanese aircraft. Meanwhile, as Oldendorf's warships commenced their bombardment and minesweeping operations, kamikaze attacks continued. The destroyer minesweeper USS Long (DD-209/DMS-12) missed the attack on Pearl Harbor by about two days, but then immediately started anti-submarine patrols and escort missions. Its long trajectory in the Pacific War saw it make escort runs to Midway, Palmyra and Canton; participate in the invasions of Amchitka, Attu and Kiska in Alaskan waters; escort reinforcements to Roi and Namur in the Marshalls; participate in the invasions of the Admiralties, Hollandia, Saipan and Palau; and be one of the first vessels to enter into Leyte Gulf back in October. During the invasion of Lingayen Gulf, Long began mine sweeps on January 6, evading and firing upon Japanese aircraft as she carried out her intricate mission. Shortly after noon, beginning her second run, Long spotted two Zeros heading for her. Long went to 25 knots and opened fire, but a kamikaze crashed into her portside below the bridge about 1 foot above the waterline. With fires and explosions amidships, Long lost power and internal communications, and was unable to fight fires forward. Her commanding officer, Lieutenant Stanley Caplan, fearing an explosion in the forward magazine, gave permission for men trapped on the forecastle to leave the ship; but through a misunderstanding the crew abandoned ship. Later that afternoon a second plane attacked Long and exploded at the same spot, destroying the bridge and breaking the ship's back. Long finally capsized and sank the following morning. Alongside the Long, battleships California and New Mexico, along with the cruisers Columbia, Australia, and Louisville, five destroyers, another minesweeper, and one transport were damaged. Admiral Oldendorf was worried with good reason. Previously, kamikaze operations against his ships and those of other naval commands, though dangerous, had generally been executed by relatively untrained pilots who had taken few precautions to avoid detection and anti-aircraft fire and who often appeared to be flying partially damaged, lightly armored planes carrying little ordnance. In January the kamikazes had been operating in a far different manner. There was now a definite program of kamikaze operations, for the vast majority of the perhaps 100 Japanese aircraft that had attacked the forces under Admiral Oldendorf's command since January 2 had at least attempted kamikaze crashes. In addition, the pilots seemed to be more skilled. They took every advantage of radar-blanketing terrain, especially in the Lingayen Gulf area, and flew toward target ships at extremely low altitudes, thus helping to avoid both radar and visual detection. Flight tactics included radical maneuvering designed not only to avoid anti-aircraft fire and Allied planes but also to confuse observers as to which ship was the actual target. Finally, many of the kamikaze planes were heavily armored and armed. The Allies had expected great results from the relatively new proximity fuze for shipboard 5-inch antiaircraft weapons, but the Japanese planes usually appeared so suddenly and took such violent evasive action that 5-inch batteries could seldom track properly. The employment of the expensive special ammunition was, therefore, generally useless, and was sometimes even dangerous to friendly ships. Having missed approaching kamikazes by such distances that fuzes were not activated, shells sometimes sailed on to explode on or near Allied vessels, thereby causing some damage and many casualties.  Concerned about the effectiveness of the kamikaze attacks and recognizing that achieving air superiority did not prevent the enemy's suicide planes, Oldendorf opted for a psychological strategy. He ordered the minesweeper and bombardment groups to persist with their operations, even while sustaining damage, to convince the Japanese that their suicide missions were failing. Kinkaid shared these concerns and requested the cessation of all diversionary air operations to concentrate the main air offensive on Luzon. As a result, Admiral Halsey's carrier-based aircraft and General Kenney's ground forces were tasked with neutralizing all Japanese airfields in Luzon, supported by Durgin's escort carriers. On January 7, McCain's strikes on Luzon and Oldendorf's bombardment of the Lingayen beaches continued, while underwater demolition teams entered the gulf to undertake the dangerous mission of dismantling beach obstacles. Again contrary to expectations, no beach obstacles were found. The "frog men" encountered only a little rifle and machine gun fire, and the few beach defenses they observed appeared to be unoccupied. Their tasks and those of hydrographic ships were completed on the 8th. In retaliation, 20 to 25 kamikazes targeted various segments of the Luzon Attack Force, managing to sink two minesweepers and damage one LST. That night, Kinkaid's destroyers successfully sank the Hinoki off Manila Bay. However, on January 8, the 3rd Fleet units began advancing towards Formosa, as MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz suspected that the kamikazes were launching from there. Without Halsey's additional air support, the Japanese suicide planes once again attacked the Luzon Attack Force, this time damaging the cruiser Australia and the escort carriers Kitkun Bay and Kardashan Bay, as well as inflicting damage on an LSI, an LST, and an APA. Due to significant losses, by the end of the day, the 2nd Air Fleet and the 1st Combined Base Air Force headquarters were disbanded. The 1st Air Fleet received orders to withdraw to Formosa for reorganization, while the severely weakened units of the 4th Air Army were set to continue limited attack operations for a short time until a final evacuation could be carried out. Returning on the morning of the 8th to resume bombardment about 08:00, one section again hit the Lingayen area. About ten minutes later a destroyer standing close inshore and a spotting plane from a battleship reported that Filipinos were forming a parade, complete with United States and Philippine flags, in the town of Lingayen. The fire was shifted to more westerly targets while leaflets were quickly prepared instructing the Filipinos to clear the area. A spotting plane dropped the leaflets and the paraders dispersed. Bombardment started again as soon as the area seemed vacated. The reasons for resuming the bombardment of Lingayen and its environs in the face of this friendly demonstration ashore are unknown, especially since neither underwater demolition teams nor spotting planes had discovered any signs of Japanese activity in the area. The town, at least, seemed safely in the hands of the Filipinos. The most obvious explanation is that erroneous intelligence, having indicated that strong defenses would be encountered in the area, made it incumbent upon Admiral Oldendorf to continue the bombardment whether he wanted to or not. Too much was at stake to take a chance. The Filipinos in the Lingayen area could hardly have been pleased as they saw their homes and public buildings damaged or destroyed by what to them must have seemed an unnecessary bombardment. It seems a tribute both to the Filipinos and to the prewar administration of the United States in the islands--as well as a severe and obvious indictment of Japanese occupation policies--that the people of the Philippines took such adversities in their stride, not permitting personal resentments to overcome judgment and loyalty. Throughout the rest of 8 January, bombardment of the landing beach areas continued without incident. Practically no military installations or targets were found in the Lingayen town and airstrip area, and relatively few were discovered in the San Fabian region. The San Fabian bombardment vessels ran out of targets by 1530 and moved back up the gulf to strike the San Fernando area for another forty-five minutes, completing the task that the Japanese kamikazes had interrupted on the 6th. The Lingayen area ships had long since ceased their firing for the day. Thus ended preliminary bombardment operations. The heavy bombardment of the San Fernando sector on the 6th aroused great anxiety in General Yamashita's headquarters. An enemy landing in that sector would fall north of the main positions of the 58th Independent Mixed Brigade and create serious danger of a thrust toward Baguio over the Bauang-Naguilian Highway. The only means of meeting this potential threat was to change the planned employment of the 19th Division. The division was still in the San Fernando-Naguilian area due to postponement of its scheduled movement inland, and intense enemy air activity over the whole Lingayen area made it improbable that it could move in any case. Consequently, on 7 January, the Area Army ordered the division to assume responsibility for the defense of the sector north of a line running through Santiago, Magungunay, Mt. Bilbil, and Asin. Its main strength was to be concentrated between Naguilian and Baguio. With preliminary operations finished, Kinkaid's amphibious attack convoys arrived at the entrance to Lingayen Gulf around 04:00 on January 9. As the amphibious ships began landing operations, the fire support vessels of Admirals Barbey and Wilkinson positioned themselves for final pre-assault bombardment. In support of these efforts, McCain struck Formosa, destroying 47 Japanese aircraft, sinking seven ships, and damaging eleven others. Throughout the week, the fast carriers conducted a total of 3,030 offensive sorties, dropping approximately 700 tons of bombs at the cost of 86 aircraft. Pleased with the results of the anti-kamikaze operation, Nimitz finally permitted Halsey to launch a major raid into the South China Sea, codenamed Operation Gratitude. Meanwhile, back in Luzon, the pre-assault bombardment commenced at 07:00, gradually shifting fire from the landing beaches to the flanks of the assault area. At 09:00, the first amphibious vehicles began their approach from a departure line about 4,500 yards offshore, while rocket-armed landing craft and aircraft bombarded the beaches. The landing beaches of the 14th Corps were located across the middle of Lingayen Gulf's southern shores and centered on Lingayen airstrip and the nearby grounds of the capitol of Pangasinan Province. In peacetime one would have considered the shore line a beautiful swimming beach, a magnificent strand of firm sand stretching eastward almost 9 miles from the mouth of the Calmay River to the mouth of the Dagupan. The east bank of the Dagupan, which enters the gulf midway between Lingayen and San Fabian, delineated the boundary between the 14th and the 1st Corps, and bridges over the Dagupan were expected to provide the first easy means of contact between the two corps. Since there was a gap of over 6 miles between the 1st Corps' westernmost beaches and the 14th Corps' easternmost, it was imperative that the Dagupan crossings be seized without delay. Planners anticipated that inasmuch as 1st Corps troops would be a mile or so closer to the river at the moment of landing they would be the first to reach the bridges, but it was 14th Corps' responsibility to relieve 1st Corps at the crossings as soon as possible. The 37th Division was to drive toward the Dagupan, while the 40th Division would make a quick thrust west and northwest to Port Sual and Alaminos. Port Sual, located at the southwestern corner of Lingayen Gulf, and at the western extremity of the Army Beachhead Line, possessed some importance as the site of minor port facilities. Alaminos, about twelve miles northwest of Port Sual, lay inland on the Bolinao Peninsula. Early capture of road junctions at Alaminos would help forestall Japanese attempts to organize counterattacks against the 6th Army's right flank. In contrast, the beaches assigned to the 1st Corps were more widely spaced. The units of the 6th Division were scheduled to land on the Blue Beaches, located midway between the Dagupan River mouth and that of the Bued River. The 103rd Regiment was to land on White Beach 3 at San Fabian, while the 169th Regiment would land on White Beach 2, nearly two miles to the northeast. Additionally, the 2nd Battalion of the 172nd Regiment was set to land on the nearby White Beach 3. Fortunately for the American forces, they encountered minimal resistance as the initial waves approached the shore, facing only some challenges from the ebb tide. Shortly after 09:30, the 1st and 20th Regiments landed on the Blue Beaches, with the 1st Regiment quickly securing the mouth of the Bued River and advancing three miles inland to Mangaldan, while the 20th Regiment moved toward Dagupan. Meanwhile, Wing's regiments landed on their designated beaches to the northeast but faced harassment from snipers, artillery, and mortar fire from Lieutenant General Nishiyama Fukutaro's 23rd Division. However, the assault waves of the 14th Corps moved more slowly than expected, reaching the western beaches only by 09:40. The 185th Regiment captured Orange Beach, the 160th Regiment took Green Beach, the 148th Regiment secured Yellow Beach, and the 129th Regiment landed unopposed on Crimson Beach. After landing on the beaches, the 1st Battalion of the 185th Regiment marched to the Agno River's mouth. Meanwhile, the 40th Reconnaissance Troop established a roadblock on the main road, just three miles east of Port Sual. The 2nd Battalion of the 185th Regiment advanced directly inland through Lingayen, successfully crossing the Calmay River and an east-west segment of the Agno River. Similarly, the 160th Regiment crossed the Calmay and assembled nearly four miles inland. The reserve 2nd Battalion of the 108th Regiment landed at Lingayen, while the 148th Regiment moved straight inland, crossing both the Calmay and Dagupan Rivers toward San Carlos. The 129th Regiment entered Dagupan and crossed the Patan River to reach Calasiao, with its 3rd Battalion eventually extending the line to connect with the 148th. By the end of the day, Griswold had established a beachhead stretching northwestward from Calasiao for nearly twenty miles to the outpost near Port Sual. At the same time, Wing's units encountered the most significant resistance from three tiers of ridges that overlooked the 43rd Division's beaches from the north, northeast, and east.  The 43rd Division had the most hazardous and difficult S-day tasks. On the division's left low hills lay scarcely three-quarters of a mile inland from WHITE Beaches 1 and 2. Stretching northward, and coming still closer to Lingayen Gulfs eastern shore, a first line of low, grass-covered hills formed a somewhat broken ridge line, the seaward slopes of which grew steeper as the hills proceeded north along the coast. Beyond this first range, which averaged less than 250 feet in height, lay another, more irregular north-south ridge that rose to 350 feet. Still further east--a little over three miles inland--was yet a third steep-sided, grass-covered ridge line, this one averaging around 600 feet high. The three tiers of ridges overlooked the 43rd Division's beaches from the north, northeast, and east. They provided the Japanese with natural defensive terrain, excellent observation, good positions from which to deliver direct fire on the beaches, and cover behind which there was protection from the essentially flat trajectory of naval support fires. Moreover, the ridges were close to assembly areas further inland that could provide large Japanese forces with cover and concealment. In a single night the Japanese could move considerable strength from these assembly points into the tiers of hills to launch a counterattack against the 6th Army's left. While the 2nd Battalion of the 172nd Regiment advanced toward Hill 247, the 169th Regiment moved eastward, successfully reaching Binday and extending its lines north along the gentle slopes leading to Hill 470. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion of the 172nd Regiment quickly secured the barrios of Mabilao and Alacan, ultimately capturing Hill 247 despite scattered resistance. As small arms and mortar fire intensified, combat patrols advanced toward Hill 385, coinciding with the remainder of the 172nd coming ashore. Finally, the 103rd Regiment took control of San Fabian without facing any opposition and then advanced generally south and southeast toward Hill 200, halting just north of San Jacinto by the end of the day. While the assault units of the 1st Corps successfully landed by dusk on January 9, Swift's advance was not as deep as Griswold's, leaving several dangerous gaps between his units. Throughout the day, the Japanese launched sporadic kamikaze attacks on the Luzon Attack Force, causing significant damage to the battleship Mississippi, hitting the cruisers Columbia and Australia again, and damaging one destroyer escort. Meanwhile, friendly anti-aircraft fire resulted in numerous casualties aboard the battleship Colorado. In response to the enemy landings, Yamashita decided to deploy the 2nd Tank Division to the Agno River line near Tayug, where the armored units were to execute a counterattack from the northern flank if the enemy overextended. He also sent five battalions under Lieutenant-General Tsuda Yoshitake to secure the Cabanatuan area, ordered Lieutenant-General Okamoto Yasuyuki's 10th Division to position elements in the Triangle Hill and Tayug sectors to counter a potential enemy advance from Lingayen toward San Jose, stationed the majority of the 11th Independent Regiment at Bongabong, and directed the Noguchi Detachment to move from Bicol to the Manila area. During the night, the 12th Surface Raiding Regiment, based at Port Sual, attempted to disrupt further enemy landings with a full-scale suicide boat attack on ships near the beachhead. Taking advantage of the element of surprise, the small explosive-laden boats approached undetected but only succeeded in sinking one LCI and damaging eight other vessels. In other areas, increased guerrilla activities and Allied airstrikes in northern Luzon had nearly stopped the Japanese from collecting and transporting vital food supplies to the critical defense zones within the Baguio-Mankayan-Bambang triangle. This disruption would hinder the 14th Area Army's capacity to conduct a prolonged defensive campaign. Although plans for a desperate, full-scale counteroffensive were developed, Yamashita decisively rejected this strategy, instead ordering the 2nd Tank Division to cancel its intended counterattack and regroup at Lupao, approximately eight miles northwest of San Jose. Meanwhile, on January 10, Griswold's forces continued their advance inland: the 185th Regiment moved west toward Port Sual; the 160th Regiment progressed southward about eight miles; the 148th Regiment quickly advanced to San Carlos; and the 129th Regiment pushed forward to Malasiqui, where the 14th Corps faced enemy resistance for the first time since the landing. Additionally, the reserve 108th and 145th Regiments successfully landed on the Lingayen beaches. To the north, the 6th Division shifted generally south and southeast, covering about four miles across flat, dry, open farmland, and by nightfall, it secured a front of approximately seven miles from west to east. As they continued northeast, the 103rd Regiment expanded its front, with its 2nd Battalion advancing toward Manaoag while the other two battalions moved to the area northwest of Hill 200. Lastly, the 169th and 172nd Regiments encountered the most intense resistance thus far, providing an early glimpse of the challenges that would impede the 43rd Division for the upcoming month. The 1st Battalion, 169th Regiment, supported by close artillery and mortar fire, engaged in combat along the steep, grassy slopes of Hill 470, ultimately capturing the summit by nightfall. Meanwhile, the rest of the regiment advanced across the Bued River toward Hills 355 and 318, but halted near the river due to heavy artillery, mortar, and machine-gun fire. To the north, the 172nd Regiment cleared Hill 385 and then moved toward Hills 351 and 580, gradually advancing along the southern section of the third ridge line, which was located inland from the beaches. Additionally, its 1st Battalion progressed two miles along the graveled coastal road and conducted patrols along the ridge crest. By nightfall, Krueger had determined that the 6th Army Reserve should be deployed in the 1st Corps' area, as outlined in the pre-assault plans, due to the significant resistance faced by the 43rd Division. He suspected that the apparent lack of enemy resistance to the west was a trap, designed to lure the 6th Army into overextending its lines, making its flanks susceptible to a counterattack from the east. Fortunately for the Americans, Tominaga's kamikaze attacks began to diminish in the days following the landing, with an attack on January 10 resulting in damage only to the destroyer escort LeRay Wilson and one transport ship. The next day, the 43rd Division continued to face challenges in Luzon. The Japanese mortar and artillery fire along the 172nd's eastern front was so severe that Wing decided to shift the regiment's attack direction from east to north, resulting in minimal progress as they redeployed to strike toward Hills 351 and 580 from Hill 470. Additionally, the reserve 158th Regiment was landed to relieve the 1st Battalion, 172nd Regiment, on the coastal road. Looking southeast, the 169th Regiment nearly encircled Hill 318. However, despite receiving maximum support from Durgin's carrier aircraft, naval gunfire, and division artillery, they were unable to dislodge the Japanese forces, who had entrenched themselves in the hillside. Meanwhile, Griswold's advance inland to secure the Army Beachhead Line continued to progress well on January 11. On the 11th the 185th Infantry patrolled and consolidated its positions on the west flank, suffered no casualties, killed 5 Japanese, and captured another. Early in the morning a Chevrolet sedan of 1940 or 1941 vintage, occupied by two Japanese, came calmly down the coast road from the direction of Port Sual. Obviously unaware that Company C, 185th Infantry, maintained a roadblock on the highway, the Japanese practically ran into the American outpost before they realized their situation. Before they could recover from their surprise and consternation, both Japanese were dead, and Company C had acquired some luxurious transportation. Meanwhile the 160th Regiment reached Aguilar, a road junction already held by Filipino guerrillas. The 108th Regiment closely followed the 160th, and the 148th Regiment established a line from Dumpay westward for four miles to Bacnar, with patrols extending further south to Urbiztondo and Bayambang. By the end of the day, the 14th Corps had either occupied or outposted nearly all the territory within the Army Beachhead Line in its sector. However, with Swift's units unable to keep up with the advance southward, Griswold faced the risk of exposing his eastern flank if he continued to push forward. Therefore, the 1st Corps needed reinforcement to prevent widening the gap along the corps boundary. As a result, the reserve 63rd Regiment and the 13th Armored Group were deployed in the San Fabian area, while the 6th Ranger Battalion, which had landed at Blue Beaches the previous day, moved to the Dagupan area. Additionally, Major-General Charles Mullins' 25th Division began to assemble between the Agoi and Patalan Rivers. Despite these developments, casualties had been significantly lower than expected, with 55 men killed and around 185 wounded, primarily from the 43rd Division. Japanese casualties in ground operations were also relatively low, with American estimates suggesting between 150 and 200 Japanese killed. Meanwhile, Task Force 38 made its way into the South China Sea via the Luzon Strait on January 10, accompanied by the refueling group. Although poor weather conditions thwarted a scheduled refueling on that day, Task Force 38 was completely fueled by noon on January 11 and prepared to carry out Halsey's ambitious raid. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. As Allied forces prepared for a major assault on Luzon, kamikaze attacks intensified, leading to fierce battles and unexpected challenges, but Filipino resilience shone through despite devastation. On the shores of Lingayen Gulf, American forces launched a strategic landing, facing minimal resistance, but soon encountered fierce Japanese counterattacks as they advanced inland.

Last time we spoke about the Victory at Leyte. In the Ormoc Valley, General Krueger's forces pushed the Japanese into a retreat toward Palompon. As the Americans advanced, they faced entrenched enemy positions and challenging terrain. On Christmas Day, the 77th Division successfully captured Palompon, cutting off the Japanese's main route. General Suzuki, forced to relocate his headquarters, prepared for a counteroffensive. Despite fierce resistance, American troops continued to push forward, eliminating remaining Japanese units and securing strategic positions along the coast as the year closed. As General Eichelberger's 8th Army took command of Leyte Island, the 77th Division relieved other units in preparation for future operations. Meanwhile, American forces faced fierce resistance while securing strategic positions on Samar and Mindoro. Despite enemy air assaults, they successfully disrupted Japanese plans, including a failed counter-landing. In Bougainville, Australian troops engaged in intense fighting, capturing Pearl Ridge after fierce battles. Their victory provided a crucial vantage point for future offensives, marking a significant moment in the campaign. This episode is the Aitape-Wewak Campaign Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As previously discussed, General Dunckel's task force successfully invaded Mindoro. Despite recent enemy efforts to reclaim control of the island, the Americans managed to establish airfields that enabled land-based aircraft to target specific locations on Luzon while also safeguarding the assault and resupply ships heading to Lingayen Gulf. This location was chosen because it had direct access to Luzon's key military objective, the Central Plains-Manila Bay region, and it featured the best and most extensive landing beaches on the island. With General Eichelberger's 8th Army taking charge of Leyte and Mindoro, General Krueger's 6th Army was assigned to capture and secure a beachhead at Lingayen Gulf and then advance south through the Central Plains to seize Manila and open Manila Bay. Furthermore, air and logistical bases would be established on Luzon to support future operations against Japan, and the legitimate government of the Philippine Commonwealth would be reinstated in its capital. For Operation Mike I, the reconquest of Luzon island, the Southwest Pacific's intelligence estimates concerning Japanese strengths, dispositions, capabilities, and intentions on Luzon were reasonably accurate from the start of planning. The abundance of information must be attributed in large measure to the efforts of guerrillas on Luzon, an island that was becoming a veritable hotbed of guerrilla resistance, both American-led and Filipino-led. Carefully nurtured by MacArthur's headquarters, especially after mid-1943, the guerrilla organizations had grown steadily in strength and effectiveness not only as sabotage units but also as valuable sources of information. The Leyte invasion in October 1944 gave great encouragement to the guerrillas, who redoubled their efforts in preparation for the invasion of Luzon, which they realized could not be too far off. Throughout 1944 supplies of all types had been sent to the guerrillas, first by submarine and later by airdrop and clandestine inter-island transportation. After the establishment of the Allied base on Leyte, the flow of supplies increased by leaps and bounds. The guerrillas themselves established a network of radio communications that soon came to be sustained and, to some extent, controlled by MacArthur's headquarters, which also sent into Luzon special intelligence parties to develop new sources of information and provide guerrilla efforts with more effective direction. In the end, one of the major difficulties Southwest Pacific intelligence agencies had was not obtaining information from Luzon but rather sifting the plethora of guerrilla reports, which attained every conceivable degree of accuracy and detail. Once sifted, the information had to be evaluated and correlated with that received from other sources such as radio intercepts, captured documents, and prisoner interrogations. MacArthur allocated the majority of his Army's ground combat and support forces, most of General Kenney's Allied Air Forces, and nearly all of Admiral Kinkaid's Allied Naval Forces ships and landing craft. He needed to ensure enough forces to defeat a strong Japanese garrison, secure a beachhead against potential fierce resistance, advance south through the Central Plains against expected strong defenses, defend the beachhead from anticipated counterattacks, and secure the Central Plains-Manila Bay area within four to six weeks. Krueger was assigned command of the 1st Corps, which included the 6th and 43rd Divisions, as well as the 14th Corps, comprising the 37th and 40th Divisions. In reserve were the 25th Division, the 11th Airborne Division, the 158th Regiment, the 13th Armored Group, and the separate 6th Ranger Battalion. Supporting these units were 13 nonorganic field artillery battalions of various calibers, two chemical mortar battalions, two additional tank battalions, the majority of five engineer boat and shore regiments, four amphibious tractor battalions, and 16 engineer aviation battalions, totaling approximately 203,000 personnel, of which 131,000 were classified as combat troops.  By the way, since I mentioned one, for those curious, a Chemical Mortar Battalion were US Army non-divisional units attached to infantry divisions during WW2. They were armed with 4.2-inch chemical mortars. Chemical shells were on standby during WW2, to be used in retaliation should the enemy employ chemical weapons first. Toxic agents such as phosgene or mustard gas could be used as well as white phosphorus. Additionally, Eichelberger's 8th Army was tasked with conducting a subsidiary landing on Luzon with the 11th Corps, which included the 32nd Division and the separate 112th Cavalry and 503rd Parachute Regiments. Furthermore, MacArthur designated the 33rd and 41st Divisions as General Headquarters Reserve and made plans to send the 33rd and 38th Divisions, along with the 1st Cavalry Division and the 19th and 34th Regiments, to Luzon within two months. Krueger's plan for the Lingayen assault, set for January 9, involved an amphibious attack on the southern beaches of the gulf, which were lightly defended but presented numerous obstacles that impeded maneuverability. Aiming for a swift landing with a robust force to achieve tactical surprise, Krueger opted for a broad front assault, with Major-General Innis Swift's 1st Corps landing on the eastern beaches near San Fabian and Major-General Oscar Griswold's 14th Corps on the western beaches facing Lingayen town. Each corps would land two divisions side by side, with one regiment from each division held in floating reserve. The initial missions of the two corps were the same: to capture the beachhead area within their designated zones, protect the flanks of the 6th Army, and maintain communication with one another. Both corps were also ready to advance quickly inland to secure a crossing over the Agno River, which would serve as the starting point for the final push south toward Manila and Manila Bay. Anticipating some congestion on the beaches, Krueger decided to keep the 25th Division, the 158th Regiment, and the 13th Armored Group afloat until January 11. On that date, the 158th would land on the extreme left of the 1st Corps to block the coastal corridor along the eastern shore of the gulf, preventing any Japanese counterattacks from the north. Similarly, the 25th Division and the 13th Armored Group were also ready to be deployed in Swift's area for both defensive and offensive operations. To facilitate the amphibious assault, Kinkaid took direct command of Task Force 77, which comprised the entire 7th Fleet, along with some Australian and Dutch vessels assigned to MacArthur, as well as warships borrowed from Admiral Nimitz's Pacific Ocean Areas. Kinkaid organized his Luzon Attack Force into several combat components, with Admiral Barbey's Task Force 78 tasked with landing the 1st Corps and Admiral Wilkinson's Task Force 79 responsible for the 14th Corps. Admiral Oldendorf once again led the Bombardment and Fire Support Group, which included six battleships and five heavy cruisers, while Admiral Berkey headed the Close Covering Group of four light cruisers. This time, Kinkaid's escort carriers were under the command of Rear-Admiral Calvin Durgin, who had a total of 17 escort carriers to provide convoy protection, conduct airstrikes on the target area alongside pre-assault minesweeping and bombardment, and offer close air support for ground operations until that responsibility was handed over to Kenney's land-based aircraft. Admiral Halsey's 3rd Fleet would once again play a crucial role in the operation by targeting enemy airfields, while also being ready to provide direct support if the Japanese gathered enough surface forces to initiate a significant naval confrontation. Meanwhile, Kenney's Allied Air Forces were tasked with safeguarding the convoy's sides and rear through overwater reconnaissance and attacks on enemy facilities in the southern Philippines and the Dutch East Indies, with General Whitehead's 5th Air Force responsible for carrying out most of these missions. Additionally, army aircraft were to protect convoys traversing central Philippine waters and offer air support for ground operations whenever possible. To complement Operation Mike I, a comprehensive deception strategy was in place, aimed at diverting the enemy's attention to a potential Allied threat against Formosa and southern Japan through naval activities in nearby waters. Consequently, Admiral McCain's Task Force 38 launched its initial strikes in support of the Lingayen operation on January 3 and 4. Although poor weather conditions hindered attacks on Formosa and the Ryukyu Islands, they still achieved moderate success. MacArthur also aimed to mislead the Japanese into believing that the primary focus of any Allied offensive on Luzon would be directed towards western Batangas or the Bicol Provinces. Therefore, on January 1, Company I of the 21st Regiment advanced on Bongabong along Mindoro's east coast, beginning the clearance of northeastern Mindoro. The next day, Company B of the 503rd Parachute Regiment started operations on the northwestern coast, moving towards Mamburao. On January 3, Company K of the 21st Regiment landed without opposition at Buenavista on the southwestern shore of Marinduque Island and established positions to set up radar installations. Meanwhile, other troops continued their advance toward Calapan, ultimately intercepting the recently landed enemy raiding unit at Pinamalayan on January 8, compelling it to retreat back to Calapan. Although some Japanese forces managed to reach Mansalay on the southeast coast of Mindoro and infiltrated overland toward San Jose, all attempts to raid enemy airfields were unsuccessful. Conversely, the 21st Regiment successfully captured Calapan on January 24, resulting in approximately 135 Japanese casualties, while the Americans incurred the loss of 1 soldier killed and 7 wounded. By the end of the month, Dunckel's forces had killed 170 Japanese and taken 15 prisoners, at a cost of 16 American soldiers killed, 71 wounded, and 4 missing, not including casualties from Japanese air attacks, which raised the Allied totals to 475 killed and 385 wounded. Looking back to Luzon, General Yamashita was also focused on finalizing plans and preparations to counter the impending enemy assault. During the latter part of December, battle preparations proceeded with discouraging slowness. Overburdened transport facilities, enemy strafing and bombing attacks, guerrilla interference and an acute shortage of automotive fuel impeded progress in every direction. On the other hand, there were numerous indications that General MacArthur was virtually ready to strike. In the Batangas area, enemy air reconnaissance was conspicuously frequent, while the dropping of dummy parachutists and the activity of small surface craft along the coast also caused grave alarm in the 8th Division. Other reports indicated that guerrilla forces were beginning to assemble in the mountains east of Manila, and that enemy submarines were delivering arms to guerrillas in the Lamon Bay area. Yamashita accurately predicted that the invasion would occur between January 10 and 20, targeting either the Batangas area or Lingayen Gulf. However, recognizing that he lacked sufficient forces for a decisive battle, particularly given the decimation of Japanese air power and the enemy's air superiority. As of the 1st of December the Japanese Army and Navy had probably had a combined air strength of some 500 planes in the Philippines, the bulk of them based on Luzon. This strength had been largely destroyed by Allied air strikes in support of the Mindoro operation and during Japanese air attacks against Mindoro-bound convoys and the Mindoro beachhead area. By the 20th of December, the Japanese Naval Air Service in the Philippines had no more than 30 planes, and the Japanese Army Air Force was down to approximately 100 first-line combat aircraft. About that date, some 50 naval planes flew to Luzon from Formosa to renew attacks against Mindoro, and shortly thereafter, it appears, a few Army aircraft also came down from Formosa or the home islands to reinforce Luzon. Many of these planes were lost during continued attacks against Mindoro until, by 31 December, the Japanese had probably no more than 150 operational aircraft left on Luzon, and about a third that many on other fields in the Philippine archipelago, for a total of about 200. Yamashita planned to execute a coordinated delaying strategy, launching local counteroffensives only when conditions were favorable. This approach aimed to deplete enemy resources and buy valuable time to reinforce Japanese defenses in Formosa and the Ryukyus. Consequently, on December 19, Yamashita finalized a new operational outline that established two forces: one to cover northern Luzon and the other for central and southern Luzon. The plans outlined an initial strategy for the forces defending coastal regions to inflict significant damage on the enemy during their landing. This would be followed by delaying actions aimed at hindering the capture of crucial inland communication hubs and airfields. The final phase would involve a sustained last stand in the three mountainous areas previously identified as zones of ultimate resistance. To delay further enemy operations against Formosa and the Ryukyus, Yamashita decided to strengthen the northern sector, as its mountainous terrain and limited access routes from the central Luzon plain offered the best tactical conditions for prolonged resistance. As a result, Southern Luzon would be nearly stripped of troops to reinforce the second-largest concentration of forces in the mountains east of Manila. Yamashita positioned the 103rd Division in the Aparri coastal area, with three battalions stationed on the northwest coast; the 23rd Division, along with the 58th Independent Mixed Brigade, near the eastern shore of Lingayen Gulf; the 10th Division in the San Jose, Umingan, and Natividad sectors, along with the 11th Independent Regiment at Baler and Dingalan Bays; the 2nd Tank Division as a mobile unit in the Cabanatuan-San Miguel area, with the 6th Tank Regiment in Manila; the Manila Defense Force responsible for Manila and the surrounding mountains, with a garrison on Corregidor and the 39th Regiment on the Bataan Peninsula; the 8th Division securing key communication points to the east and west of Lake Taal, as well as important coastal positions in Batangas; the majority of the 105th Division stationed in the critical area east of Manila, while the Noguchi Detachment continued to hold Bicol; and the 82nd Brigade occupying coastal positions in the Lamon Bay region. Upon its arrival on Luzon, the 19th Division was tasked with gathering its main forces south of San Leon, while also deploying units to secure critical locations around Tuguegarao and Echague. Additionally, the 2nd Mobile Regiment and the newly landed 2nd Glider Regiment were ordered to bolster defenses in the Clark Field area, which was primarily protected by ground air units. However, by the end of the month, due to the slower-than-anticipated withdrawal of the 105th Division, Yamashita instructed the 8th Division to relocate its main forces to the region east of Manila, leaving only the 17th Regiment stationed in Batangas Province. Lieutenant-General Yokoyama Shizuo then took command of the Shimbu Group, which encompassed all forces in the southern half of Luzon, below a line approximately extending from Manila to Lamon Bay. That is gonna be it for the Philippines today as we now need to head over to the Aitape-Wewak region.  In the coastal sector the 19th Brigade had moved forward in accordance with Stevens' orders of 26th November that it should relieve the 2/7th Commando Squadron, clear the enemy from the area west of the Danmap, and concentrate round Babiang and Suain in preparation for operations east of the river. A company of the 2/4th Battalion had therefore relieved the 2/7th Squadron at Suain and Babiang on the 29th and 30th November. In the next 16 days patrols clashed with small groups of Japanese on seven occasions, and killed 28 without loss to themselves. By 17th December the main body of the 2/4th Battalion was at Suain, with a company at Idakaibul and one at Babiang.  In the second week of December, the squadron expanded its control by establishing outposts at Yasile and Yambes, from which they successfully repelled several minor Japanese attacks. On 11th December an enemy patrol approached the perimeter held by Byrne's troop at Yambes. The Australians held their fire until the Japanese were 35 to 50 yards away, killed 6 and, during the day, 2 more. There were patrol clashes that day and on the 13th. At 1.30 a.m. on the 15th an enemy force of at least 35 attacked. This time the Australians let the leading Japanese come to within three yards of the perimeter then fired with automatic weapons and threw grenades. After pressing the attack for a while the enemy withdrew, dragging away their wounded and about 10 dead. By mid-December, the commandos had advanced along the coastal sector to the Danmap, over 40 miles from Aitape and approximately 20 miles into the Torricellis, without encountering significant enemy forces. The majority of Lieutenant-General Mano Goro's 41st Division was positioned south of the Danmap, with the reinforced 237th Regiment under Major-General Aotsu Kikutaro occupying forward positions between the Anumb and Danmap Rivers. Following the defeat at the Driniumor River, General Adachi's 18th Army implemented a strategy to minimize contact with the enemy. They positioned outpost forces for ambush and scattered their units across a broad area, especially in locations where they could cultivate food and regain their strength. Despite these measures, many soldiers faced hunger, malnutrition, and illness, and they often lacked essential modern military equipment. Meanwhile, on December 12, Stevens instructed the seasoned 17th Brigade, led by Brigadier Murray Moten, to relieve the 2/7th Squadron at Tong and conduct patrols south towards Mimbiok and Yanatong, southeast to establish a base at Musimbe, and east to set up a base at Musu. Subsequently, the 2/7th Squadron was to relocate to Makuir and scout a route through Chem to the Dandriwad River and Babiang, aiming to establish a forward base on the Danmap, about five miles east of Makuir. In line with this plan, Moten dispatched Major Ian McBride's Piper Force, consisting of two companies from the 2/5th Battalion, which arrived at Tong on December 20. That day Major Goode of the 2/7th Squadron reported that, except for foraging parties, the area which he had been ordered to patrol had been cleared of the enemy. The squadron had killed 26 Japanese and lost two killed and five wounded; two attached Papuan police had been wounded. The squadron's headquarters were now moved to Lambuain and it began its new task: to clear the Walum area. Walum village was occupied on 30th December after clashes in which several Japanese were killed. Documents captured by the squadron that day indicated that the main enemy line of communication from the coast to Balif was via Walum- Womisis-Womsak. At the same time, Piper Force occupied Musimbe and Musinau, coinciding with the arrival of the rest of the 2/5th Battalion in the Yambes area. Meanwhile, Stevens ordered the 19th Brigade to seize the Abau-Malin line and eliminate the enemy at the Danmap. On December 14, Martin sent the majority of the 2/4th Battalion to cross the river, with one company successfully fighting through Lazy Creek to reach Rocky Point. As the other companies assembled, the 2/8th Battalion began its advance into the foothills to establish a forward base at Idakaibul and move towards Malin. Patrolling from Lazy Creek the 2/11th had two sharp clashes with the enemy force west of Niap on 30th and 31st December, three Aus- tralians and 11 Japanese being killed. At Matapau village, early on 2nd January, from 30 to 35 Japanese attacked the perimeter of Captain Royce's company. Artillery fire was brought down and the Japanese with- drew leaving six dead. This was the beginning of five days of sharp fighting against Japanese who seemed determined to stop the advance along the Old German Road. As soon as the enemy's attack had been repulsed Royce's company pushed forward along the road to a spur whence the artillery observer, Captain Lovegrove, might direct fire. A platoon crossed the little Wakip River at 10.20 a.m. but came under fire from Japanese on the steep-sided spur. The infantry withdrew and accurate artillery fire was brought down. At 2.10 p.m. the spur was occupied and from it Lovegrove directed fire on a pocket of Japanese so close that he had "to almost whisper his orders into the phone". In the day 14 Japanese were killed, and two Australians killed and five wounded, of whom four remained on duty. Next day, and on the 4th and 5th, there was sharp fighting round the spur and towards Niap, and on the 6th, after a strike by 11 bombers and a bombardment by the artillery, a platoon attacked across the Wakip but was held by the resolute enemy pocket at Niap. On January 7, the Japanese defense was finally breached when three tanks broke through the beach and entered the town, followed by infantry. The next day, the leading company of the 2/8th Battalion entered Malin without facing any opposition. However, the 2/11th Battalion struggled to advance towards Doreto Bay, as the determined defenders repelled their attacks for another ten days. On January 18, a company executed a successful flanking maneuver through the foothills to Nimbum Creek and eventually positioned itself south of Abau, capturing the town two days later. Meanwhile, Lieutenant-Colonel Alfred Buttrose had sent one company to assault Perembil and secure the Musu area, while another advanced through Sumul towards Maharingi, and McBride's company at Musinau moved eastward to patrol deep into the south. On January 3, the Australians unexpectedly drove a strong force of the 238th Regiment from Perembil, though they had to fend off several counterattacks in the following days. Continuing their advance, Asiling fell on January 9, followed by Samisai two days later, and another company secured Maharingi by January 15. Now, it is time to return to the Marianas to prepare for the next missions of General Hansell's 21st Bomber Command.  The United States military took steps to improve Saipan's defenses after the damaging raids of November 27. In a frantic effort to detect future intruders, Admiral Hoover stationed two destroyers 100 miles northwest of Saipan to provide early radar warning, and an AN/TPS-3 radar was rushed to Saipan from Oahu by air. The destroyers in some instances gave ample warning, but on other occasions the enemy planes still managed to come in unannounced. Arnold became frustrated that the microwave early warning radar set still was not in use; and on December 3 Admiral Nimitz ordered that the highest priority be given to installing the radar. Despite this, it still was not ready until after the conclusion of the Japanese air campaign. Two B-24 Liberator bombers fitted with air-to-air radar sets were also dispatched to Saipan. This was the first use of airborne warning and control aircraft by the United States, but they were not used in combat. To maintain pressure on the enemy following the San Antonio strikes, he conducted a night radar mission with 30 Superfortresses on November 29, although it was unsuccessful. This mission was part of his preparations for a daylight attack on the Nakajima Aircraft Plant in Ota, scheduled for December 3. By D minus I weather reports were forbidding: at bombing altitudes over Ota, winds were reaching velocities of I 80 miles per hour or more. At 01:30 on the 3d it was decided that the only hope for the day was to go back to Musashino where visible bombing might be possible." Crews had already been briefed twice for the target; the 73d Wing hurriedly cut field orders and by 0945 eighty-six bombers were heading for Tokyo. Seventy-six got over the city to find clear weather but high winds; 59 planes bombed visually from a mean altitude of 28,700 feet with poor results. Out of this mission, six bombers were lost, and another six were damaged, resulting in just 26 bombs hitting the plant area, causing minimal damage to buildings and equipment. Once again, the strike was disappointing. Musashi's records indicate that twenty-six bombs fell in the plant area with some small damage to buildings and equipment and almost none to machinery; Japanese casualties were moderately high. Strike photos, the command's only source of information, seemed to show even less damage, and for these slight results the command had paid dearly, with six B-29's lost and six damaged. In response, on December 7, several Japanese aircraft, including two squadrons of Ki-67 bombers, launched a coordinated attack from both high and low altitudes, destroying three B-29s and damaging 23 others. This assault was observed by Lieutenant-General Millard Harmon, the commander of Army Air Forces in the Pacific, who had been sent by Nimitz to coordinate an extensive attack on Iwo Jima's installations using both air and surface forces. On December 8th, at 0945 twenty-eight P-38's swept over the island, followed at 1100 by the B-29's and at noon by the Liberators. Hoover's crusiers began seventy minutes of shelling at I 347. The bomb load carried by the planes forcefully illustrated the difference in performance between the heavy and very heavy bomber at 725 miles tactical radius: the 62 B-29's dropped 620 tons, 102 B-24's only 194 tons.” All told, enough metal was thrown to produce a good concentration on Iwo's eight square miles, but because the bombers had been forced to loose by radar, results, so far as they could be judged from photography-handicapped, like the bombing, by adverse weather-were much less decisive than had been expected. Eyen so, the enemy's raids on Saipan stopped until 25 December. Although the results were not as decisive as hoped, the enemy raids on Saipan were temporarily halted. On December 13, Hansell sent 90 Superfortresses to bomb the Mitsubishi Aircraft Engine Works in Nagoya.  The choice for primary visual target was the Mitsubishi Aircraft Engine Works at Nagoya, and the same company's aircraft works was named as radar target; strays, it was hoped, would spill into crowded Nagoya, Japan's second city and an industrial center of great importance. The engine works, still in top priority for 21st Bomber Command, lay in the northeast section of Nagoya, about two and a half miles from Nagoya Castle. The plant was considered by the JTG as a single target though it actually consisted of three separate but closely related units of the vast complex comprising the Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.: I) the No. 2 Engine Works, responsible for research, design, and manufacture of prototype engines; 2) the No. 4 Engine Works, which between 1939 and 1945 manufactured 44,004 engines, the most important model being the Ha-102, a 1,000-horsepower motor used on the Nick and Dinah 2; and 3) the No. 10 Engine Works, which furnished castings and forgings for all Mitsubishi engine plants. On the 13th, the 73d Wing was able to get ninety bombers up, most of them carrying ten 500-pound GP's but one squadron from each group loaded with incendiary clusters. As on previous missions, a number of planes failed to reach the primary target: sixteen B-29's aborted and three bombed targets of opportunity. Japanese resistance was lively and, in all, four B-29's were lost, thirty-one damaged. Despite significant losses, the recent bombing campaign demonstrated improvement, resulting in the destruction of an assembly shop and seven auxiliary buildings. Additionally, damage was inflicted on an assembly shop, a prototype engine-manufacturing facility, two other shops, and 11 buildings, leading to approximately 351 casualties. The bombing, if of less than pickle-barrel precision, showed improvement. Strike photos indicated that 16 per cent of the bombs dropped had fallen within 1,000 feet of the aiming point and that 17.8 per cent of the roofed area had been destroyed?' Although this in itself was encouraging, had intelligence officers been able to read from their photos the whole story, there would have been even more optimism on Saipan. At the No. 4 Engine Works an assembly shop and 7 auxiliary buildings were destroyed, and an assembly shop and 11 buildings were damaged; at the No. 2 Engine Works a prototype engine-manufacturing shop and 2 other shops were damaged; and personnel losses ran to 246 killed and 105 injured.  For the first time, the 21st Bomber Command made a noticeable impact on the aircraft industry, prompting the Japanese to start relocating equipment to underground facilities. Plant officials calculated that the attack reduced productive capacity from 1,600 to 1,200 engines per month; after December 13 parts were no longer machined at No. 4 Engine Works, and engine production was limited to assembling parts on hand and those received from other plants. Mitsubishi officials had been considering the advisability of dispersing the Nagoya facilities ever since the fall of Saipan. After the strike of December 13 the transfer of equipment to underground sites began, but even at the end of the war the movement had not progressed far enough to allow production in the new plants. Five days later, Hansell dispatched 89 B-29s to target the Mitsubishi Aircraft Works in Nagoya. The Mitsubishi Aircraft Works was the giant assembly plant which used most of the engines produced in the No. 4 Engine Works. Located on reclaimed land at the northeast corner of Nagoya harbor, it was, like the engine works, composed of three integrated plants: I) the No. I Airframe Works for research and experimental engineering; 2) the No. 3 Airframe Works, which built navy planes-Zeke and Jack fighters and Betty bombers; and 3) the No. 5 Airframe Works, which manufactured bombers and reconnaissance and transport planes for the army. Large, compact, and conspicuous, this complex offered an excellent visual target, and the proximity of the harbor's shore line made it suitable for radar strikes as well. On this 18 December attack many planes, as usual, failed to follow the flight plan so that only sixty-three planes bombed the primary target. Cloud cover was heavy and forty-four of these dropped by radar, to add considerably to the damage caused by an earthquake on 7 December. Though few bombs were plotted in the area, 17.8 percent of the roofed area appeared to have been destroyed. The No. 3 Works suffered extensive damage to the sheet-metal, heat-treatment, fuselage assembly, and final-assembly shops, and at No. 5, approximately 50 per cent of the total assembly area was damaged. Casualties, in dead and injured, amounted to 464.  On December 22, Hansell was compelled to alter his tactics and initiated a daylight incendiary mission. Unfortunately, only 48 B-29s targeted Mitsubishi's engine works due to poor weather, resulting in minimal damage. The Nagoya mission on the next day, though using only incendiaries, was not in fulfillment of Norstad's request; it involved only 78 bombers dispatched instead of IOO and it was planned as a daylight precision attack. The weather turned bad, however, and before the last formations were over Nagoya the target was covered by 10/10 cloud. Only forty-eight planes bombed the Mitsubishi plant and they had to drop by radar; strike photos were few and revealed little. Actually there was not much damage to reveal: 252 fire bombs fell in the area of the No. 4 Works, damaging a few buildings but hurting no machine tools and causing no loss to pruduction On Christmas night, the newly renamed 6th Air Army, led by Lieutenant-General Sugawara Michio, launched its final significant assault on the Marianas, deploying 25 aircraft to bomb from both high and low altitudes. This attack resulted in the destruction of one B-29, serious damage to three others, and minor damage to 11. Overall, the Japanese had deployed over eighty planes over Saipan and Tinian, losing around 37, while managing to destroy 11 B-29s, seriously damaging 8, and causing minor damage to 35. Finally, on December 27, Hansell's last mission involved a return trip to Nakajima, where only 39 out of 72 dispatched B-29s caused little damage to the Musashi plant, although an incendiary attack unfortunately set a hospital on fire. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In a fierce battle for control, forces devised a strategy to defend coastal regions and key locations in Luzon. As troops repositioned, Australian commandos clashed with Japanese units, achieving victories despite challenges. Meanwhile, U.S. bombers targeted Japanese industrial sites, inflicting damage but facing heavy losses, marking a pivotal struggle in the Pacific theater.

Egypt is a country spanning the northeast corner of Africa and the Sinai Peninsula in the southwest corner of Asia. It is bordered by the Mediterranean Sea to the north, the Gaza Strip of Palestine and Israel to the northeast, the Red Sea to the east, Sudan to the south, and Libya to the west. At approximately 110 million inhabitants, Egypt is the 14th-most populated country in the world, and the third-most populated in Africa. But what if that country spanned the Americas as well? Jon from 21CD Podcast rolls with Joel on an incredible archeological ride as they unravel the mysteries of Egyptian culture that was lost in the "New World". They look into the lost civilization of King Solomon's Ophir and whether it was actually in North America. They look at the Egyptian "temples" in the Grand Canyon and artifacts from Kinkaid's Cave said to have been covered up by the Smithsonian. Lastly, they examine the idea of Joseph from Biblical texts, who was second in command of Egypt, building a massive second Egyptian settlement in the Americas to help during the seven years of famine told to him by God through Pharoah's dreams. Jon From The 21CD Podcast YouTube: @21CDpodcast Website: www.21cdstudios.com Buy Me A Coffee: Donate Website: https://linktr.ee/joelthomasmedia Follow: Instagram | X | Facebook Watch: YouTube | Rumble Music: YouTube | Spotify | Apple Music Films: merkelfilms.com Email: freetherabbitspodcast@gmail.com Distributed by: merkel.media Produced by: @jack_theproducer INTRO MUSIC Joel Thomas - Free The Rabbits YouTube | Apple Music | Spotify OUTRO MUSIC Joel Thomas - ShutUp N Drive YouTube | Apple Music | Spotify

Last time we spoke about the fall of Ormoc. The Japanese prepared their Wa offensive as General Arnold's troops advanced toward Ormoc. On December 5, American forces engaged in fierce fighting for Hills 918 and 380, facing entrenched enemy positions. By December 6, Japanese troops launched a surprise attack on American camps, but a swift counteroffensive from General Swift helped reclaim the Buri airfield. Despite initial gains, poor weather hindered Japanese reinforcements, allowing American forces to stabilize their positions and push back the enemy. Then the 148th battalion launched an attack on Buri. The advancing American troops faced fierce Japanese resistance, with intense battles over strategic locations like the San Pablo airstrip and Hill 380. Despite setbacks, forces rallied, utilizing effective tactics to outmaneuver the enemy. As reinforcements arrived, the Americans secured critical positions and engaged fiercely in Ormoc, leading to significant Japanese losses. The capture of Ormoc disrupted enemy supply lines, marking a pivotal victory that forced the Japanese to keep sending troops into a deteriorating situation. This episode is the Invasion of Mindoro Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Building on our discussion from last week, there were several other events occurring simultaneously with the fall of Ormoc on December 10. At Buri, following a half-hour of concentrated artillery fire, the 1st Battalion of the 149th Regiment launched a final assault that swiftly cleared the airstrip and eliminated the enemy paratrooper forces. Later that evening, the 3rd Battalion of the 13th Independent Regiment arrived in the area in a disorganized state after a challenging march, and with their last reserves of strength, they attacked Burauen town.  At 19:30 the Japanese launched their final concentrated attack against the airfields. They began to fire at the administration buildings of the Fifth Air Force, and some of the bullets went through the plywood walls of the house of Maj. Gen. Ennis C. Whitehead. "The General ducked a bullet, ordered someone to find out who the blankety-blank was responsible and that he'd blankety-blank better stop or think up a blankety-blank good reason." The air force personnel were pushed back until they reached the hospital, where they halted and held. They then counterattacked and drove the enemy away from the area. The Japanese left thirty of their dead behind them. This marked the retreat of the surviving Japanese forces, indicating the conclusion of the battle for the airstrips. Meanwhile, General Arnold's 7th Division continued its limited offensive through the challenging mountainous terrain, with the 17th and 184th Regiments reaching Malitbog by the end of the day. To the north, General Cunningham's 2nd Squadron, which had been engaged with the bulk of the 102nd Division, was finally relieved by the 2nd Squadron of the 7th Cavalry, initiating their westward movement to rejoin the rest of the regiment at the Leyte River. There, the 126th and 127th Regiments struggled to breach the defenses of the 1st Regiment, while the 5th and 12th Cavalry Regiments made slow progress through the mountains towards Mount Cabungaan, effectively bypassing the Mount Pina position.  In the process of reducing the Japanese-held area, it was estimated that an enemy force of 500 to 600 men had been wiped out. From 28 November to 9 December, the 12th Cavalry remained in the Mt. Badian and Hill 2348 sector, sent out westward patrols, and slowly moved westward. On 10 December, General Sibert decided to have elements of the 1st Cavalry Division debouch from the mountains onto Highway 2 south of the 32d Division and in the Lonoy area. This move was to be concurrent with the expected advance of the 32d Division down the highway. The 1st Squadron, 12th Cavalry, was in the vicinity of Mt. Cabungaan, and the 2d Squadron, on Hill 2348, was 2,000 yards northeast of the 1st Squadron. An enemy strong point existed to the north of the perimeter of the 1st Squadron. The 12th Cavalry spent 10 December in making preparations for a two-squadron assault against this enemy force. The plan was for the 1st Squadron to attack at 0830 while the 2d Squadron from Hill 2348 supported the attack by enveloping the left flank of the enemy. In furtherance of this plan Troop E of the 2d Squadron moved off Hill 2348 at 0800 toward the southwest and dug in for the night just north of Mt. Cabungaan. On the morning of 11 December, an intense mortar and artillery concentration was placed upon the enemy position in front of the 1st Squadron. The fire was so close that fragments frequently fell on the waiting assault troops. After this fire, the 1st Squadron with Troop A in the lead moved out at 0715. At the same time Troop E attacked from the northeast. The enemy defenses consisted of seven or eight pillboxes and many caves dug into the very rugged terrain. The men of Troop A, closely followed by Troop B, charged up the hill "throwing grenades and firing from the hip." The hill fell to the 1st Squadron at 1003 after very heavy hand-to-hand fighting. Troop E had been held up by the terrain and was unable to assist the 1st Squadron. After the capture of the Japanese position, patrols established contact with Troop E at 1200. The regimental reconnaissance platoon returned from the vicinity of Lonoy with the information that the Japanese had prepared strong defensive positions in that area. The platoon had gained a good observation point 900 yards east of Lonoy. The next several days were spent in sending out patrols and moving the 2d Squadron to the position of the 1st Squadron. Meanwhile, on December 9, Admiral Okawachi had launched what would turn out to be his final TA convoy. This convoy, consisting of three destroyers, two subchasers, and six transport ships carrying the Takahashi Detachment and the Ito Naval Landing Unit, departed from Manila on December 9. A day earlier, the Camotes Detachment had also been dispatched individually via landing barges. In light of the recent enemy landings at Deposito, three units were assigned to deploy in Ormoc and support General Tomochika's forces in defending the city. However, by December 11, Ormoc had already succumbed, and the convoy finally arrived in Leyte, where it was immediately targeted by American fighter planes. Near Palompon, two transports were struck and left immobilized, prompting an urgent order for the Takahashi Detachment to disembark there and assist the Camotes Detachment during its landing at Palompon. Meanwhile, two destroyers and two transports carrying the Ito Naval Landing Unit continued to Ormoc, where four American destroyers awaited them. This led to a chaotic battle, as artillery, mortars, tank destroyers, and the destroyer Coghlan opened fire on the transports as they unloaded the SNLF Marines northwest of Ormoc. Consequently, one transport was sunk, and another was damaged, necessitating an escort back to Palompon to offload its remaining cargo. Despite this, over 200 Marines managed to land by nightfall, although they could not connect with the Imahori Detachment situated north of Ormoc.  At 2330 on 11 December the 77th Division beach defense units observed a Japanese convoy, which was transporting the Special Naval Landing Force, steaming into Ormoc Bay with the apparent intention of landing at Ormoc. The Japanese evidently thought that Ormoc was still in their hands. The first craft noticed by the U.S. forces was a landing barge with about fifty men, heading directly for the Ormoc pier. By the time the barge came within range of the shore weapons, all shore units were alert and waited with guns trained upon it. They withheld their fire until the barge was within fifty yards of the pier and then all weapons converged their fires upon the craft. The first rounds squarely hit the barge, which immediately burst into flames. The Japanese clambered atop the gunwales and are reported to have screamed, "Don't shoot," under the mistaken notion that their forces still occupied Ormoc. The harbor was lit up by the burning barge and 60-mm. illuminating shells. During the night the Americans discovered that another enemy vessel, about the size of an LST, had pulled into shore northwest of the town under cover of darkness and was busily engaged in discharging troops and equipment. The tank destroyer guns of the 307th Infantry, emplaced along the beach within 1,000 yards of the vessel, opened fire on it while forward observers from the 902d Field Artillery Battalion directed artillery fire upon the landing area and inland. The enemy vessel attempted to pull out to sea, but after proceeding less than fifty yards it burst into flames and sank. About 150 men, two tanks, a number of rifles, mortars, and machine guns, and a quantity of ammunition had been unloaded before the vessel sank, but most of the supplies, including four ammunition trucks, had been destroyed by American fire while the vessel was unloading. The early dawn of 12 December revealed another ship of the same type farther west near Linao. The artillery, mortars, and tank destroyer guns opened up against this vessel as it fled along the shores of Ormoc Bay, and their fire followed until it was out of range. Before the fire ceased, heavy clouds of smoke billowed from the vessel as it moved at a snail's pace. During the night the American fire had to be closely coordinated, since American vessels, including a resupply convoy, were in the bay. Not a single U.S. craft was damaged. Troops of the Special Naval Landing Force who had disembarked got in touch with Colonel Imahori, who immediately ordered them to go to Highway 2 as the reserve unit of the 12th Independent Infantry Regiment. It was impossible for them to carry out the order, since the 77th Division had advanced north from Ormoc. They thereupon decided to join a naval airfield construction unit at Valencia, but again they failed. In the latter part of December, the men of the Special Naval Landing Force were in the eastern part of the Palompon area without having taken part in the battle for the Ormoc corridor. On the journey back to Manila, the Uzuki was sunk by two PT boats near Leyte on December 12. The rest of the convoy was also assaulted by 46 aircraft off Cebu, leading to the sinking of the Yuzuki and one transport. This incident marked the final TA convoy of the war, as the fall of Ormoc made the operation pointless. Similarly, plans for a counterlanding at Carigara Bay with the 39th Regiment were also scrapped. The nine TA convoys successfully transported an estimated 45,000 men and 10,000 tons of supplies and equipment to Leyte; however, this came at a significant cost. The Southwest Area Fleet incurred losses that included one light cruiser, nine destroyers, three submarines, three subchasers, two frigates, and 26 transports. Additionally, during enemy carrier strikes on Luzon and the Visayas, the fleet lost one heavy cruiser, two light cruisers, five destroyers, one submarine, three subchasers, three frigates, 19 transports, and four oilers. On December 11, General Bruce launched an aggressive defense of Ormoc, planning to advance his troops daily to establish new forts or blockhouses by nightfall until Valencia was secured. Consequently, the 307th Regiment and the 1st Battalion of the 306th Regiment attempted to cross the Antilao River but encountered intense fire and were quickly pinned down. Meanwhile, the 3rd Battalion of the 306th managed to advance despite facing increasing resistance from the Imahori Detachment at Cogon but was ultimately compelled to withdraw due to heavy enemy fire. At the same time, the bulk of the 305th Regiment repositioned to the right of the 307th, while the 17th and 184th Regiments completed their limited offensive, successfully crossing the Talisayan River without opposition and reaching the Binoljo area, with the 2nd Battalion of the 184th advancing to Ipil to establish contact with the 77th Division. At this stage, General Yamagata's units had retreated into the mountains, regrouping north of Talisanyan to initiate their final withdrawal to Ormoc. However, their escape route had been entirely cut off, and they were being pursued from the east by the bulk of General Swing's 11th Airborne Division. As General Gill's offensive progressed, his infantry began assaulting enemy artillery positions in the north. Simultaneously, the 2nd Squadron, 7th Cavalry launched an attack against the 102nd Division units; however, the defenders managed to hold the cavalrymen back at the hill's base. Meanwhile, General Suzuki was hastily retreating toward Huaton, where he was expected to arrive by December 13. His strategy involved waiting for the 5th and 77th Regiments to reach his position before executing a robust counterattack to reclaim Ormoc. The 68th Brigade was tasked with bolstering the beleaguered 1st Division, which had incurred over 3,000 casualties since the start of hostilities. Returning to the frontline developments, the previous day's intense fighting compelled Bruce to solidify his positions on December 12. He organized the delivery of supplies and supporting artillery to bombard enemy defenses while dispatching strong patrols for reconnaissance. At the same time, the 17th and 184th Regiments successfully gathered at the Panilahan River in preparation to reinforce the 77th Division. On the following day, after a significant artillery bombardment, a specialized attack force led by Colonel Paul Freeman, comprising two companies from the 305th Regiment, was dispatched to assault Colonel Imahori's primary blockhouse at Cogon. Meanwhile, the remainder of the regiment targeted other enemy positions along the ridge. While the infantry managed to advance to the ridge, Freeman's companies were unable to progress further, ultimately forcing the 305th to retreat. Simultaneously, the 307th Regiment advanced westward along the Ormoc-Linao road and successfully captured Linao. Although the 77th Division had pushed its western boundary forward by approximately 1,000 yards during the day, the central front lines remained largely unchanged since morning, necessitating General Bruce to launch another attack the following day. Meanwhile, Arnold sent the 32nd Regiment to connect with the 11th Airborne Division to aid in its withdrawal from the mountains.  On the morning of 13 December the 2d Battalion, 126th Infantry, with the assistance of its tanks and heavy mortars, pushed past the Japanese who had held up its advance. In the face of most determined opposition the battalion moved south, destroying the pockets of resistance which had been bypassed. At the end of the day the 2d Battalion had advanced 400 yards to a position 200 yards north of a roadblock set up by the 3d Battalion, 126th Infantry. The 3d Battalion, less Company L, which was to remain on the high ground overlooking the road, was to attack south on the east side of Highway 2 and come abreast of the 1st Battalion, 126th Infantry. At 1521 the 3d Battalion reported that six enemy tanks were coming up the highway. After heavy fighting, the Japanese tanks withdrew at nightfall and returned to the south. The 1st Battalion, 126th Infantry, the southernmost unit of the division, made plans to dislodge the enemy force between it and the 3d Battalion. The contested ground consisted of an open space 600 to 700 yards long and 200 to 300 yards wide, at the southern end of which were two knolls. The 1st Battalion had men on both knolls but did not control the northern end of the sector where the Japanese had dug in and were using machine guns, mortars, and rifles. The 1st Battalion charged against the Japanese and rooted them out with grenades and mortar fire. Except for this action, only slight gains were registered during the day. The men of the battalion were hungry, having been without food since the previous afternoon. The commanding officer of the battalion renewed a request for additional rations and ammunition, since the one-third ration that had been received the day before was insufficient. The 1st and 2d Battalions of the 127th Infantry received orders from the regimental commander to advance south with the 1st Battalion on the left, pinch out the 3d Battalion, 126th Infantry, and link up with the 1st Battalion, 126th Infantry. The 1st Battalion, 127th Infantry, moved out in a column of companies and had advanced 400 yards when it encountered forty to fifty Japanese on a ridge to its front, about 150 yards west of the road. The enemy threw blocks of TNT and grenades against the battalion, effectively pinning down the troops. A night perimeter was established. The 2d Battalion, 127th Infantry, moved abreast of the regiment's 1st Battalion throughout the day. Its advance was bitterly contested by the Japanese, who employed machine guns, mortars, and rifles against the battalion, which dug in for the night under fire. At 1630 the 11th Field Artillery Battalion fired upon fifteen Japanese who were walking along the road south of Lonoy and killed twelve of them. The night of 13-14 December was not quiet. At 2300 an enemy force from the 1st Infantry Regiment broke into the command post of the 126th Infantry. The Japanese set up a machine gun in the area and attacked with grenades and rifles. Bitter hand-to-hand fighting ensued but by 0325 the enemy force was evicted and the area had quieted down. At 0630, with the coming of dawn, the Headquarters Company got things in order and everyone was "happy to hear sound of comrade's voices." Six Japanese were killed and two Americans and two Filipinos wounded. On December 14, nearly all battalions of the 126th and 127th Regiments were actively advancing and maintaining physical contact with one another, successfully pushing over two miles south of Limon. At 0730 on the morning of 13 December, the 2d Squadron, 7th Cavalry, moved out and came under fire from two Japanese machine guns well emplaced on a cliff. The ridge narrowed to ten feet with sixty-degree slopes, making forward passage almost impossible. The troops were pinned down. In the meantime, Troop F of the squadron worked south in an attempt to envelop the rear of the enemy force but was unable to do so and returned. The 2d Squadron established night perimeters near the same positions it had held the previous night. On the following morning the 75-mm. and 105-mm. artillery and the 4.2-inch and 60-mm. mortars began to register heavy fire on the Japanese strong point. At 1200 Troop G of the 2d Squadron jumped off, attacking the enemy position frontally while Troop F moved in from the rear. Employing flame throwers, Troop G steadily pushed forward and by 1445 had knocked out four enemy bunkers and destroyed several machine guns. Of more importance, it was fifty yards beyond the enemy front lines. Troop F also continued to advance. By the end of the day the enemy force had been rooted off the high ground, and the 2d Squadron, 7th Cavalry, was in firm possession of the ridge. The unit captured a quantity of enemy ordnance, including 12 light and 3 heavy machine guns, 9 grenade launchers, and 73 rifles, together with considerable quantities of grenades and ammunition. Before the ridge was secured, "over 5000 rounds of artillery fire had been placed on [the] . . . position without appreciably affecting it." On 14 December, the 12th Cavalry was ordered to continue west to Highway 2 and assist the advance of the 32d Division, to establish a roadblock on the highway, and to attack the hostile forces to the north between it and the 32d Division. In furtherance of this order, the 1st Squadron, less A and C Troops, moved west on 15 December toward a previously reconnoitered area that was about 1,800 yards east of the barrio of Lonoy. This site, a banana plantation, was chosen for its observation facilities to the west and as an excellent dropping ground for supplies. The 1st Squadron, having encountered little opposition, closed on the area before dusk. Thereupon the rest of the regiment was ordered to close in on the area before nightfall on 17 December. At 0930 on 14 December Colonel Freeman prepared his special assault force to renew the attack. Before the jump-off, artillery and mortars laid their fire on the blockhouse and beyond. Under cover of artillery fire the troops cautiously moved out at 1030 with Company L on the right and by 1105 they had advanced 100 yards. Company L knocked out two pillboxes with flame throwers and a tank destroyer gun. Company E found every step of the way contested. The troops used hand grenades and bayonets and literally forced the enemy out of the foxholes in tough hand-to-hand fighting. Capt. Robert B. Nett, the commanding officer of Company E, although seriously wounded, refused to relinquish his command. He led his company forward and killed seven Japanese with his rifle and bayonet. Captain Nett was awarded the Medal of Honor. While Company E was so engaged, Company L on its right advanced through dense foliage and burnt the Japanese out of their foxholes and the bamboo thicket with flame throwers. The company was assisted by armored bulldozers from the 302d Engineers. For a hundred yards on all sides of the blockhouse, the enemy had dug many deep foxholes only a few yards apart. All the foxholes were covered, some with coconut logs and earth, and others with improvised lids of metal and earth. One was protected by an upturned bathtub. The armored bulldozer drove over the positions, its blades cutting off the tops of the foxholes, after which small arms fire into the holes killed the occupants. The crews of the tank destroyers not only fired point-blank at targets but opened the escape hatches and dropped grenades into the foxholes. At 1240 the blockhouse, or what remained of it, was secured. Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion, 305th Regiment executed a flanking maneuver around the blockhouse, subsequently shifting 1,000 yards to the east to intercept the enemy's communication lines along Highway 2. On December 15, the 77th Division consolidated its positions and dispatched small patrols, effectively securing the port of Ormoc. Since the initial landings, the 77th estimated that they had killed 3,046 Japanese soldiers and captured 9 prisoners at the expense of 103 soldiers killed, 318 wounded, and 26 missing. With the 184th Regiment taking over the defense of Ormoc, Bruce's troops were now able to prepare for their advance toward Valencia and beyond, aiming to connect with General Sibert's 10th Corps, which was still making its way southward. However, we must shift our focus from Leyte to address another significant development in the Philippines.  While Admiral Nimitz was strategizing his invasions of Iwo Jima and Okinawa—topics we will delve into further in the future—General MacArthur reluctantly postponed the Mindoro operation until December 15 to give Admiral Kinkaid time to assemble a robust escort carrier group to protect General Dunckel's Western Visayan Task Force during its landing on Mindoro. This group, composed of six escort carriers, three aging battleships, three cruisers, and 18 destroyers commanded by Rear-Admiral Theodore Ruddock, was tasked with safeguarding Admiral Struble's Task Group 78.3, now renamed the Mindoro Attack Group, alongside Admiral Berkey's Close Covering Group, which included three cruisers and seven destroyers. Additionally, Admiral McCain's Task Force 38 was ordered to assist Operation Love with a series of strikes against the main airbases on Luzon. Although the prime airfield locations on Mindoro were situated in the northeast, perilously close to Japanese air concentrations in Luzon, MacArthur chose to establish a beachhead and airfield sites near San Jose in the southwest corner. The 503rd Parachute Regiment was designated to land on the Green and Blue Beaches around the Bugsanga River, while the majority of the 19th Regiment would come ashore at the White Beach near Mangarin Bay. Meanwhile, General Yamashita had been convinced since early November that Leyte would fall, prompting him to strategize for the defense of Luzon. He thought the Americans would try to establish advance air bases in the western Visayas rather than on Mindoro, as the Japanese believed Mindoro had limited suitable locations for operational airfield construction. This belief hindered Yamashita's ability to reinforce either these positions or the already weakened defenses on Luzon, as Field Marshal Terauchi persistently pressured him to send all available reinforcements to Leyte. Realizing he could not engage in a decisive battle on Luzon without substantial reinforcements, Yamashita began planning a delaying defense strategy, where his existing forces would conduct operations aimed at exhausting enemy resources. In preparation for the worst-case scenario, the 14th Area Army started organizing positions for a prolonged defense in the mountainous regions around Baguio and north of San Jose, west of Tarlac, and east of Manila. At this stage, Yamashita had the 61st Independent Mixed Brigade stationed on the Batan and Babuyan Islands, the 103rd Division in northern Luzon, the 58th Independent Mixed Brigade in the Lingayen Gulf area, the 2nd Tank Division near San Miguel-Cabanatuan, the 8th Division in Batangas Province, the 11th Independent Regiment in the sectors around Baler and Dingalan Bay, the 82nd Brigade in the Lamon Bay region, the remainder of the 105th Division in the Legaspi and Naga areas, and most of the 23rd Division in the San Jose and Umingan sectors. In addition, the Manila Defense Force, established on November 1, comprised four provisional infantry battalions and five infantry companies, tasked with defending Manila and the Bataan Peninsula. Furthermore, the 8th Division was charged with the defense of Mindoro; however, the island was only protected by two provisional companies from the 359th Independent Battalion, which were deployed there to bolster the local naval garrisons and air personnel. On December 12, Struble's convoy finally set sail from Leyte Gulf towards Mindoro. Struble's forces steamed on through the Mindanao Sea unmolested until the afternoon of 13 December. Japanese Army and Navy planes had had the three groups under surveillance since 0900, but had not attacked pending receipt of information on the force's destination. In midafternoon ten Japanese Navy planes, including three designated as suicide bombers--the dread kamikazes--flew up from a field on Cebu and found the Allied force off the southeastern corner of Negros Island. Unobserved by lookouts and undetected by radar, which nearby land masses blanketed, one kamikaze flew in low over the water and crashed with a mighty roar on the light cruiser Nashville, Admiral Struble's flagship. Combined explosions from the plane's bomb and ship's ammunition wrecked the flag bridge, the communications office, and the combat information center. Over 130 men were killed outright, including General Dunckel's chief of staff, the 310th Bombardment Wing's commander, Admiral Struble's chief of staff, and Task Group 78.3's communications and medical officers. The wounded, numbering about 190, included Dunckel, who was painfully but not seriously injured and burned. Struble and Dunckel quickly transferred to the destroyer Dashiell, which also took aboard some of the members of both officers' staffs. The rest of the staffs and the wounded sailed back to Leyte on the Nashville, protected by the destroyer Stanly. Later that afternoon, another kamikaze struck the destroyer Haraden, which also had to return to Leyte, resulting in 15 fatalities and 25 injuries. Additionally, Admiral Shima's 2nd Striking Force was instructed to relocate from Lingga to Camranh Bay in anticipation of a potential sortie. Despite this, the Americans continued their advance, and fortunately for them, the Japanese were searching in the western Visayas, causing them to miss the opportunity to attack on December 14. Meanwhile, McCain's carriers launched a significant strike against Luzon, while Ruddock's carriers effectively diverted enemy attention with attacks on air concentrations in Panay and Negros Islands. By late afternoon of the 14th the location of the convoy in the southern waters of Mindoro Strait made it clear that the objective lay beyond the western Visayas. For the first time Fourteenth Area Army estimated that the landing would take place on Mindoro and ordered the 8th Division to alert its outposts there. It was also a serious possibility,, however, that the enemy might strike directly at Luzon. General Yamashita therefore issued a warning to Area Army forces throughout central Luzon. As a further precaution, the Nagayoshi Detachment, which was awaiting shipment to Leyte, and the 71st Infantry Regiment of the 23d Division, which had just reached Manila, were ordered to deploy immediately to Bataan Peninsula and Batangas, respectively, to meet potential enemy landings in those sectors. The Navy and air commands in Manila saw much greater probability of a landing on Luzon than on Mindoro. They therefore directed all subordinate units and installations to prepare for action against both enemy amphibious forces and possible airborne attack groups. Additionally, Army and Navy aircraft were quickly organized to target enemy shipping. Meanwhile, Struble's convoy anchored near San Jose and began preparations for the landings, which would catch the few defenders of Mindoro off guard. As troops transferred to the landing crafts and surface vessels commenced the pre-landing bombardment, McCain's carrier aircraft launched another assault on Luzon, inflicting substantial casualties. Assisted by Ruddock's carriers, they successfully shot down eight out of fifteen kamikaze attackers targeting the shipping off the island. For the loss of 35 aircraft, the Americans estimated they destroyed around 450 Japanese planes during this operation. Nevertheless, the Japanese continued their assault, damaging two LSTs that would later sink, as well as one LSM. In the heroic action, the destroyer USS Moale (DD-693), under the command of Commander Walter M. Foster, went alongside the burning LST-738 (which was loaded with aviation fuel and ordnance) to rescue crewmembers. Several explosions aboard LST-738 caused damage to Moale as she pulled away. Some pieces of shrapnel were two feet square and they put four holes in Moale's hull. Gunner's Mate Ed Marsh reported that a one-gallon jar of vaseline from the LST's cargo splattered on one barrel of his twin 40 mm Bofors AA gun, providing unwelcome lubrication. Moale suffered one fatality and thirteen wounded. In addition, Moale also rescued 88 survivors. Despite this damage, they were unable to prevent the successful landings of the 19th Regiment and the 503rd Parachute Regiment, which quickly unloaded and advanced seven miles inland to secure the objective beachhead line. Consequently, the few Japanese units present in the area were compelled to retreat inland toward Bulalacao. Meanwhile, engineers promptly began construction on the new Hill Drome, which would be completed by December 20. The second Ellmore Field was projected to be ready for limited use three days later and for continuous dry-weather operations by December 28, a week ahead of schedule. On the morning of December 16, a slow-moving tow convoy consisting of small tankers, barges, and LCTs, accompanied by destroyers, arrived off Mindoro after suffering the loss of a small Army tanker that was sunk and a destroyer that was damaged by kamikaze attacks during the journey. Concurrently, McCain carried out his final strike against Luzon, unfortunately resulting in the sinking of the hellship Oryoku Maru, which was carrying 1,620 prisoners of war, with over 200 lives lost. The burden of taking their fellow soldiers' lives would not be the only consequence for the Americans, as the fierce Typhoon Cobra soon battered Task Force 38, sinking the destroyer Spence and damaging nine additional warships. Despite these significant losses, the Mindoro operation was ultimately a complete success. Although MacArthur aimed to launch his amphibious invasion of Lingayen Gulf just 15 days after capturing Mindoro, considerations such as the lunar and tidal conditions at Lingayen Gulf, the necessity to rest and replenish the units of Kinkaid's 7th Fleet, and the ongoing slow progress in airfield construction on Leyte—required for establishing a much larger airbase at Mindoro—ultimately compelled him to delay Operation Mike I until January 9. Conversely, the invasion of Mindoro, signaling that the final advance on Luzon would soon take place, prompted Terauchi to recognize that Leyte was a lost cause. As a result, the decisive battle at Leyte was immediately halted, the 35th Army was instructed to hold the southern Philippines for as long as possible, and the 14th Area Army was ordered to expedite its defensive preparations on Luzon and quickly respond to the enemy landing on Mindoro. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Intense battles unfolded as American forces aggressively pushed back a chaotic Japanese retreat, marking a pivotal moment in the fight for Ormoc, while enemy convoys faced destruction and retreat marked the war's shifting tide. US forces battled fiercely on Leyte and Mindoro, overcoming Japanese resistance and kamikaze attacks to secure key positions for the Luzon invasion.

Last time we continued speaking about the Battle of Leyte Gulf. Admiral Toyoda's Operation Sho-Go aimed to eliminate American naval forces but faced setbacks with the loss of key ships. As Japanese forces advanced, miscommunications led to disorganized attacks. Rear-Admiral Clifton Sprague's Taffy groups used smoke and air assaults to delay the Japanese, ultimately leading to Kurita's retreat after sustaining heavy damage from American air strikes. On October 25, a series of intense naval engagements unfolded, featuring airstrikes and kamikaze attacks. U.S. forces launched multiple strikes against Japanese carriers, inflicting significant damage but facing challenges from anti-aircraft fire and pilot fatigue. The day ended with the sinking of several Japanese vessels, including Zuikaku and Chitose, resulting in substantial casualties. Admiral Halsey attempted to intercept Kurita's forces but was too late. Despite heavy losses, including the cruiser Abukuma and numerous aircraft, Kurita's forces managed to reach safety. The battle marked a significant defeat for the Japanese, severely weakening their naval capabilities, though Kamikaze attacks prolonged the war. This episode is the Advance to Ormoc Valley  Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Last we we covered the climax of the battle of Leyte Gulf seeing the IJN basically annihilated in the waters surrounding the philippines. As the confrontation drew to a close, General Krueger's offensive was ongoing at Leyte. By October 26, General Sibert's 10th Corps and General Hodge's 24th Corps had successfully established two beachhead areas, gradually expanding their perimeter inland and pushing General Makino's 16th Division further into the island's interior. Following the failure of his earlier repositioning after the loss of Hindang and Burauen, Makino acknowledged that he could not prevent the loss of the eastern coastal plain. He decided to retreat his units to rear positions in the mountains west of Dagami and Burauen. Concurrently, as part of Operation TA, Admiral Mikawa successfully delivered the first reinforcements to Ormoc. Consequently, General Suzuki promptly ordered Colonel Sumitani Takayoshi's 41st Regiment to move towards Carigara and then to Jaro, where the remnants of the 33rd Regiment had fallen back to maintain the division's left flank. After capturing Hills B and C, the 24th Division resumed its westward assault on October 26. With General Mudge's 1st Cavalry Division protecting General Irving's northern flank, the 34th Regiment advanced along Highway 2, reaching Santa Fe, while the 19th Regiment attempted to attack Pastrana but was halted short of its objective by heavy enemy fire. To the south, the 383rd Regiment patrolled towards San Vicente Hill amidst fierce resistance, as the 382nd Regiment attacked Tabontabon but was forced back to the Guinarona River by determined defenders. In addition, the reserve 3rd Battalion, 381st Regiment, embarked on a long march north along Highway 1 towards Tanauan but encountered enemy fire near Vigia Point. Further south, the 17th Regiment successfully advanced to a position about 600 yards south of Guinarona, while the 32nd Regiment fought persistently to reach the edge of the Buri airstrip. The following day, after fending off several light counterattacks, the 32nd finally secured the airstrip with minimal resistance. Additionally, the 17th pushed forward to a point approximately 2,200 yards south of Dagami, although they faced increased opposition from the retreating enemy. To the east, following an extensive artillery bombardment, the 382nd captured a majority of Tabontabon in a coordinated attack, with Colonel Dill's 1st and 3rd Battalions then moving northeast toward Kapahuan. Colonel Michael Halloran's 3rd Battalion pressed northward and ultimately took Tanauan without opposition before heading towards Kiling. Meanwhile, in the Catmon Hill area, after General Krueger released the remainder of the 381st Regiment to the control of the 24th Corps, General Bradley decided to deploy his reserve regiment to take control of the Labiranan Head position in preparation for an assault against Catmon hill. Catmon Hill had been under steady naval and artillery fire since A Day, October 20. The 96th Division artillery had constantly fired on targets of opportunity by day and harassed enemy positions in the area during the night. Starting at 21:00 on October 27, the 105-mm howitzers of the 361st Field Artillery Battalion, the 155-mm howitzers of the 198th Field Artillery Battalion, a battery of 155-mm howitzers from the 363d Field Artillery Battalion, and the 75-mm howitzers from the 780th Amphibian Tank Battalion were to deliver harassing fires on the hill until 10:30 the following day. At that time all of the artillery units were to commence firing successive concentrations beginning at the bottom of the hill and working to the top in 50-yard bounds. After the 381st Regiment, less the 3rd Battalion, attacked at 12:00 on October 28, the artillery was to fire concentrations in front of the troops as they advanced. In making his plans for the capture of Catmon Hill, Colonel Michael E. Halloran, commander of the 381st Regiment, decided to have the 1st Battalion make an enveloping movement from the northeast while the 2nd Battalion pushed west along the main ridge. The 1st Battalion, 383rd Regiment, from its position on Labiranan Head, would support the attack by fire. Further north, Irving's push westward continued as the 34th Regiment advanced unopposed to the Mudburon River, while the 19th Regiment captured Pastrana following another heavy artillery barrage. On that day, the 171st Independent Battalion arrived after a week-long voyage from Panay, preparing to join the 41st Regiment and its sister battalion towards Carigara and Jaro. On October 28, as the 41st Regiment passed through Carigara and approached Jaro, Mikawa launched his second Operation TA convoy, consisting of three echelons. The first echelon left Manila immediately without cover, transporting the 20th Antitank Battalion. Simultaneously, preparations were underway to send the 12th Independent Regiment and the recently arrived 1st Division to Leyte. Meanwhile, the 34th Regiment swiftly moved through Alangalang and advanced to the Mainit River, where they were ultimately halted by fierce Japanese resistance. Nevertheless, two companies successfully crossed the river unnoticed during a heavy rainstorm. After launching a surprise assault against the defenders, they captured a bridge over the river. At the same time, the 19th Regiment progressed to Tingib, where it established a patrol base. General Hoffman also directed his 2nd Cavalry Brigade to advance toward Carigara, with the 2nd Squadron, 8th Cavalry making an overland move to San Miguel, while Troop C of the 7th Cavalry conducted an amphibious landing at Barugo, later engaging in skirmishes with Japanese forces at Carigara. To the south, after successfully fending off a vigorous counterattack, Colonel Dill's 2nd Battalion secured the Tabontabon area, enabling it to move north toward Kiling. In spite of determined opposition, the Japanese supply center of Tabontabon had at last been taken and approximately 350 Japanese killed in the area. During the three days of fighting, the 2d Battalion had thirty-four men killed and eighty wounded. The remainder of the 382nd fought their way to Digahongan before turning towards Kiling, eventually halting at Kansamada. Meanwhile, while the 383rd conducted reconnaissance toward San Vicente and the 9th Regiment began its retreat to Dagami, the 381st Regiment finally launched its assault on Catmon Hill. However, Halloran's two battalions were met with heavy gunfire from the surrounding foothills. Lastly, as the 184th Regiment patrolled toward Santa Ana, the 17th Regiment attacked toward Dagami. Despite facing strong opposition and difficult swamp conditions, they managed to push 300 yards beyond the enemy stronghold by nightfall, rolling up the defenders' eastern flank. Since the 2d Battalion had borne the brunt of the fighting on 28 October and had suffered numerous casualties, the regimental commander decided to have the battalion drop back into reserve. Although the drive to Dagami was to continue, the north-south line of enemy pillboxes on the left flank of the regiment could not be ignored. At 0800 on 29 October the regimental lines were to be reorganized so that the 3d and 1st Battalions, less Company B, would pass through the 2d Battalion, which would become the regimental reserve. Company B with a platoon of M8's would attack the flank and rear of the enemy in the left line of pillboxes. At 0800, under cover of a heavy artillery concentration from the 49th Field Artillery Battalion, the 1st and 3d Battalions, 17th Infantry, passed through the 2d Battalion without incident. Company B, reinforced by the platoon from the Cannon Company, moved out to destroy the enemy force on the regiment's left flank. The company fought the Japanese from pillbox to pillbox, catching the enemy on his flanks and rear by rifle and machine gun fire, together with time-burst fire from the self-propelled howitzers. This completely demoralized the Japanese, some of whom threw down their arms and tried unsuccessfully to escape. More than 120 enemy dead were counted in the area. The 1st Battalion entered the southern part of Dagami without encountering serious resistance. It then came under artillery fire from the hills west of the town. The 3d Battalion proceeded east of the road in a column of companies in the order L, K, and I, and met no serious opposition until it reached a cemetery south of Dagami. Overgrown with weeds seven to ten feet high and containing stone crypts built off the ground, the cemetery was divided by a path running east to west. As Company L moved into the burial ground, Company I swung around the right (east) side to come into position for the night. The leading elements of Company L passed through the cemetery and Company I moved into position without incident, but as the 1st Platoon of Company L, the reserve platoon, crossed the path, a headstone tilted back and from the open grave four Japanese opened fire with an American Browning automatic rifle and other small arms. The small arms of the 1st Platoon had no effect and it became necessary to bring forward a flame thrower to burn the enemy out. At the same time the platoon received fire from other open graves, from which the Japanese had removed the bodies. By punching holes through the stone they used the crypts as individual foxholes. The platoon broke into small units and pushed through the cemetery, destroying the enemy forces wherever they could be located. Company K, which followed Company I, placed two platoons abreast behind Company L. As it came through the weeds past the cemetery path a Japanese officer charged on the right flank with his saber and wounded one man before he could be brought down. Since the platoons were also receiving heavy fire from the tombs, the commander of Company K drew his men back to the path where they reorganized. Preceded by a battery of six flame throwers, the men then marched shoulder to shoulder through the cemetery and burnt out the enemy. About 1900 the regiment completed the action and formed its night perimeter. During the fighting, the regimental operations officer, hearing the heavy fire and not being able to communicate with the 3d Battalion headquarters, called Company K direct to ascertain if the Japanese had broken through the American lines. "Hell no," was the reported reply, "we're breaking through theirs and fighting for our bivouac." During the night small infiltration parties of Japanese tried unsuccessfully to penetrate the regiment's defenses, and sporadic artillery fire was received from the hills west of Dagami. The following day, the 3rd and 1st Battalions advanced through the 2nd Battalion to continue their northern push, successfully entering Dagami without facing significant opposition. After securing the previous headquarters of the 16th Division, the 17th Battalion spent the next two days conducting mopping-up operations and patrolling the Dagami area, effectively establishing contact with the 19th Regiment across the Binahaan River and the 382nd Regiment to the east. Simultaneously, the 32nd Regiment dispatched its 2nd Battalion toward Abuyog, which was successfully captured by midday. By October 31, Company G had further taken control of Baybay, and the 1st Battalion had landed at Panaon to support the 21st Regiment stationed there. As a result, General Arnold's 7th Division accomplished its objective of capturing the Burauen airstrips and Dagami while linking up with the 96th Division and 10th Corps. This operation resulted in an estimated 4,211 Japanese casualties, with 19 soldiers taken prisoner, while the division incurred 322 killed, 1,064 wounded, and 21 missing. Meanwhile, on October 29, the 381st Regiment executed a tank-supported offensive and ultimately captured Catmon Hill, which would be thoroughly cleared in the following two days. At the same time, Halloran's 3rd Battalion stormed and secured Kiling, with Dill's 2nd Battalion arriving shortly thereafter. On the outskirts of the barrio the battalion met stubborn and determined resistance where the Japanese, with machine guns, mortars, and rifles, fought "to the last man." The resistance was overcome, and by 1500 the Americans occupied the town, which was honeycombed with emplacements and entrenchments. At 1600 the 3d Battalion, 381st Infantry, was relieved by the 2d Battalion, 382d Infantry, which had come up from Tabontabon by truck. At 1800 the 3d Battalion, 381st Infantry, returned by truck to the area north of San Roque. However, the remainder of the 382nd Battalion was unable to penetrate the retreating 9th Regiment towards Kiling, allowing some Japanese forces to evade complete destruction. Nevertheless, Bradley's 96th Division successfully took control of the Catmon Hill mass and the key towns of Tabontabon and Tanauan, resulting in an estimated 2,769 Japanese casualties and 6 prisoners captured, at the cost of 145 men killed, 564 wounded, and 90 missing. On October 29, Colonel Newman's 3rd Battalion advanced northward, leading the charge toward Jaro. They gradually battled through Galotan and quickly captured Jaro without much resistance. The American forces moved so swiftly that Suzuki was unable to implement his strategy of using Jaro as the gathering point for the reinforcements of the 35th Army, compelling him to designate Carigara as the new rendezvous site. Due to the evident Japanese strength in the region, Hoffman ordered his units to bolster defenses in Barugo, with the remaining units of the 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry arriving by nightfall, followed by the 2nd Squadron, 8th Cavalry on October 31, and the 2nd Squadron, 5th Cavalry on November 1.  At 08:00 on October 30 Colonel Newman ordered the 3rd Battalion of the 34th Regiment to start for Carigara down the highway. As the battalion left the outskirts of Jaro, with Company L in the lead, it came under fire from Japanese who were dug in under shacks along the road. Upon a call from the commanding officer of Company L, the tanks came up in a column, fired under the shacks, and then retired. The leading platoon was drawn back so that artillery fire might be placed on the Japanese, but the enemy could not be located precisely enough to use the artillery. Newman then ordered a cautious movement forward without artillery support, a squad placed on each side of the road and two tanks in the center. The squads had advanced only fifty yards when Japanese fire again pinned them down. When Newman came forward and discovered why the advance was held up he declared, "I'll get the men going okay." Upon hearing that the regimental commander was to lead them, the men started to move forward. The Japanese at once opened fire with artillery and mortars, and Colonel Newman was hit in the stomach. Although badly wounded he tried to devise some means of clearing the situation. After sending a runner back with orders to have the 3rd Battalion fire on the Japanese position, he said, "Leave me here and get mortar fire on that enemy position." As soon as possible Colonel Newman was put on a poncho and dragged back to safety. The following morning, while the 1st Battalion, 19th Regiment moved toward Jaro, the 34th Battalion launched another attack and managed to reach the Yapan River. Despite their fierce assault, the heavy Japanese artillery and flanking fire once again stalled the Americans on their journey to Carigara, allowing the 41st Regiment to withdraw. At this stage, the 5th Air Force had officially set up its forward units on Leyte, tasked with achieving air superiority and attacking Japanese convoys and troop concentrations. However, as the 13th Air Force focused its primary efforts on airfields in bypassed areas. Poor weather had taken its toll on General Krueger's advance. Rainy, monsoon-like conditions confounded his engineers, and airfield construction at Tacloban and Dulag floundered. Landing conditions were still poor. Naval carrier aircraft, from damaged escort carriers, headed to both airfields instead of ditching at sea. As the Navy pilots attempted to land on Leyte, 25 out of 72 planes ended up damaged. Without suitable land-based US air power, the Japanese could continue to launch air attacks. Limited American air power did contest the skies against the Japanese, but could still only provide a minimum of close air support to the American troops. While Japanese aircraft continued to reach targets throughout Leyte, Kinkaid and Halsey's forces had to depart the Leyte region to resupply, so Kenney had to take over with his limited forces. MacArthur did persuade Halsey to maintain Task Group 38.2 in the area when he withdrew most of his fleet on October 29. Kinkaid also left ten escort carriers only by redistributing fleet supplies, but he also had to refit. Nonetheless, Ground commanders criticized Kenney's continued failure to provide close air support. During the early invasion period, naval carrier aviators had delivered direct support. For example, out of the 121 troop support missions from October 20 to 25, pilots flew 33 sorties in direct support of soldiers. With Kinkaid and Halsey's forces departed, Kenney's focus was on air superiority. He had eliminated most close air support missions until later in the campaign. As a result, the infantry had to rely on artillery. The escort carriers of the 7th Fleet, significantly diminished following the Battle of Leyte Gulf, were unable to provide support. Although Admiral Mitscher's carriers did conduct numerous strikes against Japanese shipping in the Visayas and Manila Bay in the last days of October, Task Force 38 had mostly been withdrawn by the end of the month. During the final week of October, the 4th Air Army and the newly-formed 1st Combined Base Air Force maintained a persistent campaign to support ground operations, gradually redirecting their attacks from amphibious shipping and carriers to the enemy-occupied airfields at Tacloban and Dulag.  Though Kenney's airfields still had minimal capacity, he had 34 P-38s from the 49th Fighter Group based at Morotai deployed to Tacloban Airfield on October 27. Three days later, only 20 P-38s remained, as Japanese air attacks destroyed or damaged several of the twin-tailed aircraft. In response, Kenney deployed more P-38s from the 475th Fighter Group. He also assigned six P-61s from the 421st Night Fighter Squadron to counter night attacks. Kenney later replaced them with F6Fs from VMF (N)-541, which improved night patrol and interception missions to include strikes on Japanese night convoys. Thus, Kenney's pilots, led by the elite aces Richard Bong and Thomas McGuire, started to make a difference. Additionally, bombing attacks disrupted airfield construction and caused aircraft losses since they were parked close together due to space limitations. Still, Army engineers with Filipino labor made inroads towards rendering the airfields fully operational. Pilots could now use an expanded 5,000ft runway at Tacloban on October 31. With a growing 5th Air Force presence, the Americans improved their ability to intercept bombers; as a consequence, the Japanese relied more on night attacks. This shift inflicted substantial damage and compelled the Americans to reinforce their positions. Alongside the primary air offensive targeting enemy supply shipping and airfields, Kamikaze units executed suicide attacks against enemy carriers operating off the east coast of the Philippines. Pilots, as well as aircraft of various types, were drawn from the 153d, 601st and 761st Air Groups. The initial corps used only bomb-equipped fighters. However, after the reorganizations of the Kamikaze corps, all types of aircraft were used.  A kamikaze suicide aircraft hit Intrepid on one of her port side gun positions; ten men were killed and another six were wounded, but damage was minimal. The USS Franklin had just refueled and returned to the Leyte action on 27 October, her planes concentrating on a heavy cruiser and two destroyers south of Mindoro. She was under way about 100 miles (160 km) off Samar on 30 October, when enemy bombers appeared bent on a suicide mission. Navy fighters shot down most of the Japanese planes, but six broke through the combat air patrol into Franklin's task group of four carriers defensively surrounded by a circle of about twenty escorting cruisers and destroyers. Shipboard anti-aircraft guns shot down three of the four kamikazes independently diving toward each of the four carriers; but the one targeting Franklin hit the flight deck and crashed through to the gallery deck, killing 56 men and wounding 60. As the remaining two kamikazes attacked, one was shot down by anti-aircraft guns and the second missed Franklin with two bombs before flying into the stern of Belleau Wood. Franklin was able to extinguish fires and patch the flight deck so planes could be recovered 76 minutes after the kamikaze hit. Both carriers retired to Ulithi Atoll for temporary repairs, and then Franklin proceeded to the Puget Sound Navy Yard, arriving on 28 November 1944 for repairs of her battle damage.  Meanwhile, on October 30, the 20th Antitank Battalion was successfully landed at Ormoc. The following day, Mikawa dispatched his remaining two echelons: the second comprised three transports carrying the Imahori Detachment, primarily made up of Colonel Imahori Tetsusaku's 12th Independent Regiment. The third included four transports and four frigates carrying most of Lieutenant-General Kataoka Tadasu's 1st Division along with around 9,000 tons of supplies and ammunition, all under the protection of Rear-Admiral Kimura Masatomi's screen of six destroyers. This would be Mikawa's last convoy, as he would soon be replaced in command of the Southwest Area Fleet by Vice-Admiral Okawachi Denshichi due to his deteriorating health. Following a smooth journey, the Imahori Detachment was quickly disembarked at Ormoc on November 1, with the remainder of the convoy arriving later that night to commence the unloading for the 1st Division. During the day, one of the transports was sent to Cebu to pick up the 35th Army Headquarters, which landed the next morning alongside Kataoka's troops. By noon on November 2, a total of 13,000 soldiers had successfully arrived, culminating in the most effective reinforcement operation of the Leyte campaign, with just one transport lost and another slightly damaged. Turning to the primary action, on November 1, two companies from the 34th Regiment were ordered to execute a broad flanking maneuver and then attack Tunga from the northeast, facing no resistance. This enabled Newman's 1st and 2nd Battalions to advance swiftly down the highway to a point approximately 1,000 yards from Sagkanan. Concerned about the enemy's considerable presence at Carigara, Sibert planned for his two divisions to launch a coordinated assault on the town the following day; however, unbeknownst to him, the disorganized Japanese forces chose to abandon the town and retreat to the mountains southwest of Capoocan. Thus, following a heavy artillery bombardment, the Americans captured Carigara without opposition and promptly established a perimeter, while the 34th Regiment advanced further to Balud, where they encountered intense enemy fire. On that same day, the 382nd Regiment took control of Dagami, from which they would engage the positions of the 16th Division on Bloody Ridge over the coming days. The capture of Carigara marked the completion of the second phase of General Krueger's plan for liberating Leyte. Irving's 24th Division successfully achieved its objectives, resulting in the deaths of approximately 2,970 Japanese soldiers and the capture of 13 prisoners, with their own losses totaling 210 killed, 859 wounded, and 6 missing. Additionally, by October 27, Mudge's 1st Cavalry Division had killed an estimated 739 Japanese and taken 7 prisoners, incurring a loss of 40 men killed, 199 wounded, and 8 missing. The next phase of Krueger's strategy involved two offensives converging on Ormoc: one moving south through Ormoc Valley led by Sibert's 10th Corps and the other advancing north from Baybay under Hodge's 24th Corps. Initially, while certain units of the 24th Corps continued pushing west to bolster troops along Ormoc Bay and clean up in southern Leyte Valley, Sibert's forces aimed to secure control of the Carigara Bay coastline from Carigara to Pinamopoan. Simultaneously, Suzuki sent the experienced 1st Division to Carigara to launch an offensive toward Tacloban. The 1st Division, which had been activated in Tokyo, had served in Manchuria during the "China Incident" and had been transferred to Shanghai in August 1944. Though it had no combat experience, this division was considered by Major-General Tomochika Yoshiharu, deputy chief of staff of the 35th Army, to be the best equipped division of the Japanese Army. Under the command of Lieutenant-General Kataoka Tadasu, it had been held in reserve by Imperial General Headquarters for the decisive battle, and it was sent to Manila with great expectations. Meanwhile the Imahori Detachment moved to the northeastern base of the heights southwest of Jaro to facilitate the assembly of the 26th Division for an impending attack on Jaro. After securing Carigara, the 68th Brigade was set to land in the north as part of the 35th Army reserve, while the 30th Division would land at Albuera on Ormoc Bay and negotiate mountainous trails to Burauen to eliminate all enemy resistance in the Dulag region. As other units of the 102nd Division were moved forward using powered schooners, a reinforced company from the 364th Independent Battalion was also deployed to Albuera to secure the landing site for the 30th Division. On the morning of November 3, the 34th Regiment moved west once again and quickly seized Capoocan, just as Kataoka's vanguard was getting close. Suzuki immediately approved the emergency dispositions already taken and issued orders temporarily attaching the various reinforcement units to the 1st Division. It was impossible, however, to notify Lt. Gen. Kataoka immediately of the changed situation, and the division advance guard moved into the vicinity west of Capoocan at 0900 on 3 November to find itself unexpectedly engaged by the enemy. Badly surprised, the advance guard fell back toward Colasian with the enemy in pursuit. Meanwhile, at 1000, Lt. Gen. Kataoka reached the high ground south of Managasnas. Finding his advance guard engaged, he immediately ordered the 1st Reconnaissance Regiment and the 20th Antitank Battalion to check the enemy advance. At the same time he dispatch ed an order to the division main body to close up at forced march. Although the defenders were initially taken by surprise, they managed to halt the enemy's progress with fierce resistance, ultimately compelling them to withdraw. It was only after artillery bombardment of the ridge parallel to the road that the 34th finally dismantled the Japanese stronghold, establishing their position for the night. Additionally, earlier in the day, Company K had conducted a reconnaissance mission using amphibian tractors from Capoocan to a location just west of Pinamopoan. However, due to heavy enemy fire, the company withdrew and returned to Capoocan. Unbeknownst to the Americans, Kataoka mistakenly perceived this as a battalion-sized enemy assault, prompting him to retreat southwest and position his forces on the eastern end of a long ridge overlooking the coast, referred to as Breakneck Ridge.  Breakneck Ridge, over which Highway 2 corkscrewed its way between Pinamopoan and Limon for about 7200 yards, was actually a hill mass with many spurs branching off from an irregularly shaped crest line toward the shores of Carigara Bay to the north and the Levte River valley to the south. Shoulder-high cogon grass was thick on the low ground, and the pockets between the hills were heavily forested. The valleys were deep, with precipitous sides. The 1st Division had heavily fortified the area, taking advantage of the innumerable thickly wooded pockets that served as natural forts. The Japanese had also built an elaborate system of trenches and other defensive positions and had honeycombed the area with spider holes. Many of the latter were on reverse slopes some distance below the crests and were protected from direct fire. In front of each spider hole the enemy had cut fire lanes through the cogon grass, which was left so short that even a crawling soldier would be exposed to fire. The constant rainfall made the hills slippery and treacherous, and, more important, provided a protective curtain in the day and covered movements of the enemy at night. Following the Japanese withdrawal, the 34th quickly secured Colasian and captured Pinamopoan without opposition the next day. Newman's 3rd Battalion advanced through the town, continuing west along the highway for about 1,700 yards, stopping just short of the ridge. Anticipating a potential enemy amphibious assault via Carigara Bay, Krueger ordered Sibert to defend the Carigara area against any seaborne attack before proceeding southward. Meanwhile, as the divisions of the 10th Corps prepared defensive measures against a possible sea invasion, Colonel Miyauchi Yoshio's 57th Regiment was ordered to get ready to launch an attack from the ridge, as Kataoka believed that the enemy force could be easily cut off. As the newly-arrived 21st Regiment took over from the 34th at the Pinamopoan defenses, the Japanese forces launched an attack on a party of artillery forward observers conducting reconnaissance on OP Hill on November 5. With the artillerymen pinned down, Lieutenant-Colonel Frederick Weber's 3rd Battalion moved in to assist them by the afternoon, successfully securing the northern approaches to OP Hill and the undefended Corkscrew Ridge on the left. Although the Americans were able to fend off the enemy's counterattacks, intense mortar fire on November 6 ultimately compelled them to withdraw. Despite suffering heavy casualties during the battle for Breakneck Ridge, the 1st Division had nearly completed its concentration in the Cananga area and was ready to initiate a broad four-pronged assault. However, the Japanese advance through the mountainous terrain remained exceedingly slow, leaving the 57th Regiment to conduct the attack on its own. Concurrently, Irving attached the 3rd Battalion of the 19th Regiment to the 21st Regiment and ordered the combined force to advance towards Breakneck Ridge. Consequently, Weber's troops launched an assault on Miyauchi's positions, but were completely unsuccessful in breaking through. Dissatisfied with the 21st Regiment's progress and feeling that Weber was insufficiently aggressive, Sibert replaced him with Lieutenant-Colonel William Verbeck, a seasoned veteran of the Alaska Campaign. Verbeck then made an unsuccessful attempt at a wide flanking maneuver to the east but ultimately had to entrench at the edge of Breakneck Ridge by nightfall. On the same day, Colonel Chapman dispatched Company G to Hill 1525, but it lost its way and ended up considerably further east. Thats all we have for today on the Philippines front as we now need to shift over to New Britain. In October, a decision was made to deploy the 40th Division for combat in the Philippines, transferring control of the island to the Australians. This change aligned with the Australian government's intention to utilize their own troops to reclaim territory previously occupied by the Japanese during the war. As a result, General Ramsay's 5th Division began relocating to New Britain, tasked with containing and isolating the Japanese garrison on the Gazelle Peninsula. Ramsay was instructed to maintain pressure on the Japanese forces while avoiding large-scale deployments, permitted only to conduct patrols and minor raids as limited offensive actions. By late October, the 36th Battalion had assumed control at Cape Hoskins, with the remainder of the 6th Brigade slated to land at Jacquinot Bay in early November.  At this time the Japanese had posts at intervals along the south coast as far west as Awul near Cape Dampier. It was decided that the Australian southern guerilla force would be based at Lakiri, a village in the hills two days' march inland from Waterfall Bay, and in an area into which the enemy had not ventured. It possessed a good site for dropping stores from the air and, as a preliminary, some 25,000 pounds of supplies were dropped there. To give added security to the base the Australian-led native guerillas, commanded at this stage by Captain R. I. Skinner, overcame the enemy's coastwatching posts at Palmalmal and Baien, to the south-west and south-east, respectively, killing 23 and taking three prisoners. None survived at Palmalmal, but two escaped from Baien, and it was learnt later that they reached an enemy post at Milim bearing news of what had happened. The south coast group was now placed under the command of Captain Basil Fairfax-Ross, who counted with five officers, 10 Australian N.C.O's, about 140 native troops, and such native allies as could be maintained on an air delivery of 5,000 pounds of supplies a month. After the loss of Baien the Japanese reinforced their post at Milim at the south end of Wide Bay until it was 400 strong. Far to the west they retained posts at Massau and Awul and round Cape Beechey. Fairfax-Ross decided to move discreetly into the strongly-held Wide Bay area, advancing through the hills, concentrating first on winning over the natives , and using the air power available from Bougainville as his trump card . At the same time spies would be sent into the Gazelle Peninsula. In the western area also the first task was to gain information. On 5th June an American patrol from the west led by Lieutenant White of Angau attacked the Awul garrison, which withdrew inland. An Australian platoon under Lieutenant Black thereupon marched from Jacquinot Bay to Lau and Atu. In this area they found that native guerillas about 80 strong had killed 14 Japanese and 14 of their native allies. At Awul they met White and his party. It now seemed that the Japanese from the Atu-Awul area were retreating to the north coast. Guerillas were organized and at Kensina on 18th June, "after pretending to entertain a party of about 50 enemy" , the natives attacked and killed 28, losing 5 of their own men. Black's patrol, in pursuit, found the remainder of the enemy about Rang and i n an attack on 24th June killed nine, but had to withdraw after losing one native N.C.O . As they moved north and east through hostile territory other Japanese were killed. In the eastern section in this period Lieutenant Johnson was winning the support of influential natives in the mountains south-west of Wide Bay. A heavy air attack was made on the main Milim positions on the night of 17th-18th July and as a result the Japanese with- drew some men to a new position away to the west and some men right back to Lemingi in the Gazelle Peninsula. By early September the last of the Japanese stragglers on the south coast west of Wide Bay had been killed; the Japanese had heard many reports of a strong Australian base at Jacquinot Bay-reports circulated by the Australians to dissuade the enemy from advancing westward. This base, although non-existent as yet, was soon to become a reality, and from 5th to 7th September a reconnaissance party, including officers from New Guinea Force and the 5th Division, landed from the corvette Kiama and, guided by Black, examined the area. The two-platoon force reached Milim unnoticed on 12th August, and found the enemy about 150 strong. At dawn they opened an attack in three groups, one to fire on the houses in the Japanese camp, another to fire from the flank, and the third to intercept any reinforcements from the Yaret position 500 yards to the north. Unfortunately a native fired his rifle during the approach, the enemy manned his defenses, and, after a short exchange of fire, the attackers withdrew and placed ambushes across the tracks. The same day the Swan bombarded Milim. After three days of inaction on the part of the Japanese four native soldiers crawled into the enemy's position and killed three, whereafter the Japanese fired into the bush at intervals for 36 hours. This fire ceased on the 18th and soon afterwards the position was found to be abandoned; there was much booty including boats and numerous machine-guns. It was discovered that the enemy had withdrawn to Waitavalo. Fairfax-Ross now moved his forward base to the coast at the Mu River only 6 hours' march from Waitavalo. On 17th and 18th September Fairfax-Ross, Sampson and a platoon, reconnoitring Kamandran, became involved in a fight with a Japanese force about 100 strong. Anticipating that the enemy would retaliate in force the Australians prepared defensive positions and one platoon under Sergeant-Major Josep, an outstanding N.C.O. who had come from the New Guinea Constabulary, was placed on the hillside above Milim to give warning of an enemy advance. On the night of 28th September the Japanese did in fact advance on Milim and on towards the Australian defensive position at the Mu River. Here, however, largely because of Sergeant Ranken's cool handling of his Bren gun, they were repulsed, losing 17 killed. Next day about 200 Japanese reinforcements arrived and, in a firefight with Josep's men whose presence they had not discovered, 16 Japanese and a native ally were killed. The Australians now withdrew inland. Soon the Japanese, about 700 strong, were in their original positions round Milim, where they remained until heavy air attacks on 6th, 7th and 8th October forced them out again. By 10th October the guerilla force was again concentrated at Lakiri. Consequently, on November 4, a small convoy landed the reinforced 14th/32nd Battalion at Jacquinot Bay without  encountering any resistance. In the days following the landing, ground forces secured the Jacquinot Bay area, while a New Guinean company executed an amphibious operation to Pomio on November 6.  The 6th Brigade was gradually transferred to Cutarp, with the final units arriving on December 16. Due to shipping shortages and the low priority for reinforcing forces on New Britain, all components of the 5th Division would not advance to Jacquinot Bay until April 1945. The first echelon of the 13th Brigade arrived on November 26, while the remaining units followed by the end of December. Meanwhile, in the north, the 36th Battalion dispatched patrols to connect with Australian guerrillas at Ulamona, Ubili, and Ea Ea, aiding them in fending off an enemy advance on the Balima River by the end of November.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Americans were making tremendous progress in the Philippines, advancing through the Ormoc Valley. Despite the terrible odds, it seems the Japanese would not give up an inch of territory without a fight, digging their heels to the very end. Meanwhile the Australians were dealt mop up duty on New Britain and it was going equally as well.

Last time we spoke about the Battle of Leyte Gulf. General MacArthur's forces landed on Leyte, prompting a response from Admiral Toyoda. Kurita's 1st Striking Force was sent to attack Leyte Gulf, while Shima's force faced confusion and delays. Japanese naval forces were hit hard by American submarines, with significant losses including the sinking of the Atago and Maya. Despite efforts, Japanese counterattacks faltered. On October 24, American forces secured key positions, and MacArthur announced the re-establishment of the Philippine government amidst ongoing naval battles and air attacks. During the fierce Battle of Leyte Gulf, Musashi endured multiple torpedo and bomb hits from American aircraft but continued to fight as it took on severe flooding. Despite efforts from Kurita's fleet, Musashi was eventually abandoned and sank, marking the largest ship ever sunk by air attack. Nishimura's force faced relentless torpedo strikes and a decisive night battle, with the battleship Fuso and cruiser Mogami being heavily damaged or sunk. Ultimately, Nishimura's forces retreated, and the Americans achieved a significant victory. This episode is the Last Carrier Battle  Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Where we last left off during the Battle of Leyte Fulg, the 10th and 24th Corps had established successful beachheads at Palo-Tacloban and Dulag. In response, Admiral Toyoda launched Operation Sho-Go, mobilizing the full strength of the Imperial Japanese Navy to eliminate enemy warships and transports at sea. However, after losing three heavy cruisers to submarines, Admiral Kurita's 1st Striking Force faced severe damage from Admiral Mitscher's Task Force 38, culminating in the sinking of the battleship Musashi by the end of October 24. Shortly after the Sibuyan Sea engagement, Admiral Nishimura's Force C was annihilated by Admiral Kinkaid's 7th Fleet at the Surigao Strait. Despite these setbacks, Admiral Shima's 2nd Striking Force was approaching the area. Meanwhile, the Americans had identified Admiral Ozawa's decoy force by the end of the day. In response, the aggressive Admiral Halsey chose to leave San Bernardino Strait unguarded and pursue the depleted Japanese carrier force to the north, aiming to finish off the IJN. Unknown to him, Kurita, with four battleships, six heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and several destroyers, was advancing towards San Bernardino Strait to attack Kinkaid's transports and escort carriers from the rear. This set the stage for one of the final and largest naval battles of the Pacific War. To the north, as the Battle of Surigao Strait was in progress, radar-equipped aircraft from the Independence detected Admiral Matsuda's battleship carriers and later Ozawa's carriers in the early hours of October 25. However, due to a transmission error, the location of the Japanese forces was reported inaccurately. After the rendezvous of three of Halsey's four carrier task groups just before midnight on October 24, TF 38 headed north with every expectation of achieving a great victory. At 0100hrs on October 25, five radar-equipped aircraft flew off Independence to search out to a distance of 350NM. Contact was gained at 0205hrs on Force A and at 0235hrs on the Main Body. Because of a transmission error, the position of the Japanese forces was given incorrectly. The wrong position was plotted out some 120NM nearer to TF 38 than it actually was. In fact, TF 38 and Ozawa were actually about 210NM apart.  Despite this, Mitscher's carrier was readying for morning strikes while Admiral Lee's Task Force 34 was being reorganized. Meanwhile, Kurita's 1st Striking Force surprisingly navigated through San Bernardino Strait during the night without encountering resistance, proceeding towards Leyte Gulf and a confrontation with Rear-Admiral Thomas Sprague's escort carriers near Samar. However, the movement of Shima's force was not coordinated with Nishimura's. Shima designed his advance so he could attack separately from Nishimura's force. The gap between the forces was originally five hours, but Shima reduced this to two hours by the time his force began entering the strait. As he entered Surigao Strait on the night of October 24/25, Nishimura issued reports during the early part of his transit, which Shima received, but when he met serious resistance, the reports stopped. Shima was therefore unaware of the virtual annihilation of Nishimura's force. The only information available was gunfire flashes in the distance and snippets of radio traffic from Nishimura's ships under attack. Oldendorf was aware that a second force was moving to support Nishimura. The first firm indication of this was a contact report from the PT boats on Shima's force at 0038hrs. Oldendorf knew he was dealing with two widely spaced Japanese forces. Just as Nishimura was forced to deal with incessant PT boat attacks, now it was Shima's turn. These turned out to be more than a mere nuisance. Shima's introduction to combat came at about 0315hrs when PT-134 mounted an ineffective attack. One PT boat managed to hit the cruiser Abukuma with a torpedo at 03:25, causing a significant explosion and slowing her to 10 knots, forcing her to exit Shima's formation. As Shima advanced, he observed several ships ablaze and saw the destroyer Shigure retreat before detecting a radar contact 13,000 yards away. Without Shima's approval, his chief of staff ordered the two cruisers to maneuver for a torpedo strike against the distant and indistinct radar contacts. At 0422hrs Nachi and Ashigara each fired eight Type 93 torpedoes at the radar contacts. In fact, these were Oldendorf's flagship Louisville followed by Portland. Despite the element of surprise, the Japanese torpedo attack completely failed. Immediately after firing its torpedo broadside, Nachi faced disaster. The burning Mogami had loomed out of the darkness minutes before. Nachi's skipper failed to grasp that Mogami was underway, not stationary, and he failed to take proper measures to avoid the damaged cruiser. As Nachi was unable to pass forward of Mogami, the two ships side-swiped each other forward at 04:23. Frantic last-second maneuvers lessened the impact of the collision, but the result was still dramatic. Nachi took the worst of it, suffering a large gash in her bow at the waterline on her port side. Damage to the bow reduced her speed to 18 knots. Shima's four destroyers then continued north but failed to locate any targets. Fearing inevitable destruction, Shima decided to retreat south at 04:35. Although Oldendorf had dispatched his cruisers and destroyers to pursue the fleeing Japanese, his forces did not aggressively pursue, allowing Shima to escape. In the end, Oldendorf's pursuing cruisers only managed to catch the damaged Mogami and Asagumo, which they unsuccessfully attacked at 05:29. Despite sustaining additional hits, the Mogami continued to fight, escorted southwest by the destroyer Akebomo. The Asagumo, however, came under attack again at 07:02 and sank 19 minutes later. As Asagumo slipped under the waves, all that was left of Nishimura's force were hundreds of survivors in the water. Rescue efforts by at least four American destroyers resulted in only a handful being picked up. When one of Oldendorf's destroyer skippers asked at 07:35 what to do with the hundreds of men still in the water, Oldendorf simply replied, “Let them sink.” Japanese survivors who reached shore were, in many cases, killed by local inhabitants. While it seemed the Mogami might escape, Sprague's Taffy 1 group carriers launched their first strikes before 06:00. Four Avengers attacked the cruiser at 07:41 but failed to score any hits. Around 08:40, 21 aircraft also targeted Shima's force, but only inflicted minor strafing damage on the destroyer Shiranuhi. Before Sprague could continue his air attacks, new developments were occurring off Samar as Kurita's warships approached Rear-Admiral Clifton Sprague's Taffy 3 group. At 06:44, a lookout from the Yamato made visual contact, though he mistakenly identified the escorting destroyers as heavy cruisers and battleships.  Kurita's initial orders increased the confusion generated by the first contact at 06:44. He ordered “General Attack” at 07:03, meaning that each ship or division proceeded on its own against the Americans. This tactic abandoned any pretense of coordination between the various elements of the 1st Striking Force. Battleships Yamato and Nagato remained together, but Kongo and Haruna operated individually. For most of the engagement, the six heavy cruisers operated in three groups of two. The two destroyer flotillas, each led by a light cruiser, were kept to the rear by Kurita. He held his destroyers back to maintain their fuel reserves by not having them maneuver at high speeds, instead sending his heavy cruisers ahead to pursue at full speed. This precluded them from screening the heavy ships and kept them out of position to make a torpedo attack. The General Attack decision was a critical error. It resulted in a loss of control by Kurita and a melee for the next two hours. His rationale for ordering an immediate, but uncoordinated, attack was to close the range as quickly as possible and knock out the carriers' flight decks. Throughout the battle, Kurita maneuvered to keep the weather gauge; by so doing, he could prevent the carriers from turning into the wind to conduct flight operations. Meanwhile, an Avenger from Kadashan Bay sighted Kurita's force at 06:47 following radar contacts. Despite his surprise, Sprague immediately ordered Taffy 3 to head east, increased speed to 17.5 knots, directed every ship to lay smoke, and launched all available aircraft at 06:55. Realizing the gravity of the situation, Sprague began sending clear text messages at 07:01 to report his predicament and request assistance. Sprague's main objective was to delay the Japanese forces until reinforcements could arrive. To achieve this, he decided to use smoke screens and continuous air assaults, supported by Taffy 2's aircraft, to hinder Kurita's ships. As Kurita's cruisers advanced north, Sprague opted to maneuver southwest, moving closer to Leyte Gulf and the potential assistance from the 7th Fleet. Starting at 06:59, Kurita's battleships began firing from long range, with their salvos becoming more frequent and accurate. To mitigate this pressure, Sprague directed his forces into a rain squall from 07:06 to 07:15. Once clear of the squall, he changed course southward towards the approaching help from Leyte Gulf. Meanwhile, as Kurita's ships continued east before turning south, the range of Sprague's carriers was extended, and the rain and smoke impaired the accuracy of the Japanese gunners. Sprague also ordered his three destroyers to launch a torpedo counterattack to shield the escort carriers as they emerged from the squall. The Johnston, charging through enemy fire, engaged the cruiser Kumano with gunfire to close the distance for a torpedo attack. At 10,000 yards, the Johnston fired all ten of its torpedoes, scoring a critical hit that slowed the cruiser and forced it to retreat. It was inevitable that Evans would pay a price for approaching so close to a collection of enemy cruisers and battleships. This came at 0730hrs in the form of three large shells (possibly fired from Yamato) and a number of smaller shells that struck Johnston. The armor-piercing shells failed to explode, but damage was extensive. The aft machinery room was destroyed, which reduced speed to 17 knots. Most of the 5in./38 guns were knocked out, but after repairs were made during a providential 10-minute respite as a squall passed over, three were brought back online. The battleship evaded the torpedoes at 07:33 and retaliated with devastating gunfire against the Hoel. By 07:30, all operational aircraft were airborne, prompting Sprague to order the initial attacks on the heavy cruisers approaching his port quarter. Unrelenting American air attacks were the main reason for the Japanese defeat. Taffy aircrews were not highly trained for maritime attack, and torpedoes or armor-piercing bombs were in short supply. Most Avengers were launched with bombs instead of more effective torpedoes for two reasons. Torpedoes took more time and preparation to load, and the deck crews on Taffy 3 did not have the luxury of time. Also, once loaded with a heavy torpedo, the Avengers could only be launched if the escort carrier steamed into the wind. Moving downwind, like Taffy 3 was forced to do for most of the action, did not get enough wind across the flight deck. The first attacks by Taffy 3 aircraft were conducted in groups of two or three with aircraft not properly armed for attacking ships. Because Taffy 3 could not steam into the wind while being pursued by Kurita's force, recovering aircraft during the battle was impossible. When they ran out of ordnance or fuel, they had to land on Taffy 2 or fly 100NM to the newly opened airfield at Tacloban. Even when lightly armed or unevenly unarmed, the aircraft made unceasing strafing runs in the case of the Wildcats or dummy bombing runs in the case of the Avengers. These attacks were poorly coordinated, but the Japanese, on the receiving end of incessant attacks, saw it differently. After the battle, Kurita and others commented that the attacks were well coordinated, skillful, and aggressive. At 07:35, ten Avengers struck the cruiser Suzuya just as Vice-Admiral Shiraishi Kazutaka was boarding, scoring a near miss that reduced her speed to 20 knots and took her out of the battle. The damaged Hoel then attempted a second torpedo attack on the heavy cruiser Haguro at 07:50 but failed to hit the target. However, this attack forced the Superbattleship Yamato to open fire at 0659hrs. Her third salvo straddled White Plains, with one of the shells striking the carrier and causing some underwater damage. Around 0800hrs, to evade torpedoes fired from Hoel aimed at Haguro, Yamato turned due north. This evasive maneuver forced her to the north for almost ten minutes until the torpedo tracks disappeared, placing her at the rear of Kurita's formation and effectively removing her from the battle for a period. Nagato opened fire at 0701hrs at a carrier assessed to be 36,000 yards away. After the three salvos, the battleship stopped firing having hit nothing. At 07:54, the Heermann launched seven torpedoes at Haguro, but they missed. Destroyer escorts Samuel B. Roberts, Raymond, and Dennis also joined in the attack but also failed to score hits, though they managed to escape unharmed. The Heermann subsequently launched a second torpedo attack on the Haruna at 08:00, but once again, none of the torpedoes hit their mark. Despite using smoke and evading shell splashes, the Heermann avoided damage. The first ship to succumb to the barrage of Japanese shellfire was the crippled Hoel. After her run against Haguro, and only able to make 17 knots, she was trapped between Kongo on one side and four heavy cruisers on the other. Using every possible method to evade the storm of shells directed against his ship, Kintberger survived for well over an hour after the first hit was recorded. Hoel took as many as 23 hits, but the actual number will never be known since most passed through the ship without exploding. The final engine was knocked out at 0830hrs, bringing the ship to a halt. As the crew abandoned ship under continued fire, the Hoel finally rolled over at 08:55. Meanwhile, the Japanese cruisers continued to close in on the escort carriers. Under fire from the battleships, Sprague's initial course was to the eastsoutheast at full speed—17.5 knots. As the Japanese heavy cruisers began to pressure his formation's port quarter, Sprague was forced to alter course to the southwest. Kalinin Bay was at the rear of the formation. She took a battleship shell at 0750hrs (probably from Haruna) that went through the hangar deck and out of her unarmored hull. As many as 14 other hits followed, all probably from 8in. shells. Kalinin Bay retaliated against the cruisers at 18,000 yards with her aft 5in./38 gun. The smoke generated from all six carriers and from the destroyers and destroyer escorts on their starboard quarter succeeded in hiding the carriers from direct Japanese observation for much of the battle. The Japanese shot slowly and methodically with four-gun salvos, allowing the escort carriers to chase salvos. The smoke and evasive maneuvering kept damage to a minimum, but of the six escort carriers, four were eventually hit. Fanshaw Bay took six 8in. hits, all forward, that killed three and wounded 20. White Plains took a probable 6in. hit and suffered light damage. Kitkun Bay was not hit but suffered several personnel casualties from near misses. St. Lo suffered no damage during the battle. The Gambier Bay bore the brunt of enemy fire, with an initial shell igniting a fire at 08:10. Ten minutes later, a devastating hit reduced her speed to 11 knots and forced the carrier to lag behind the rest of the formation. At 08:22, Yamato reentered the fray, intensifying the assault on the carrier. Heermann closed on the carrier at 0841hrs to find her burning and listing 20°. Continued Japanese fire resulted in more hits, with most of the armor-piercing shells passing through the ship. Hit by as many as 26 shells from Yamato, Haruna, and several cruisers, Gambier Bay went dead in the water at 0845hrs; five minutes later, the captain gave the order to abandon ship. Gambier Bay capsized at 0907hrs, one of only two carriers sunk by gunfire during the entire war. Meanwhile, at 08:26, Sprague ordered the destroyer escorts on the starboard side of the formation to position themselves between the carriers and the Japanese heavy cruisers on their port side. As John C. Butler and Dennis engaged the enemy cruisers, the latter sustained minor damage from two hits. Samuel B. Roberts also was struck at 0850hrs. At 0900hrs, the destroyer escort was hit by two or three 14in. shells from Kongo. The large shells tore a huge hole in the side of the ship and knocked out all power. A total of six shells hit the ship. This prompted an order to abandon ship at 0910hrs for the crew of 178. Half (89 of them) did not survive. Samuel B. Roberts sank at 1005hrs. During this time, Rear-Admiral Kimura Masatomi instructed his destroyers to launch a torpedo attack at 08:45, targeting Kalinin Bay. Fortunately, Johnston detected the new threat and made a daring suicide charge through the smoke. Evans engaged Yahagi with gunfire at 7,000 yards, and several hits were gained. Then Evans engaged the next destroyer in column, again claiming several hits. Kimura ordered his torpedoes fired from about 10,500 yards—not an ideal range for even the formidable Type 93. Yahagi launched seven torpedoes at 0905hrs, followed by three destroyers beginning at 0915hrs, Urakaze fired four, Isokaze eight, and Yukikaze four. Evans may have been responsible for Kimura's premature torpedo attack, but now his ship was about to pay the ultimate price. The Japanese destroyers and Yahagi took Johnston under fire, joined by as many as three heavy cruisers. The hits began to pile up. By 0920hrs, Evans was reduced to conning the ship by yelling orders through an open hatch on the fantail to men below turning the rudder manually. At 0945hrs, Evans finally gave the order to abandon ship. The Japanese destroyers closed in and continued to pound the wreck. After an epic fight, Johnston rolled over and sank at 1010hrs. Most of the crew of 327 got into the water, but 186, including Evans, were lost. Meanwhile, Rear-Admiral Felix Stump's Taffy 2 group began their strikes against Kurita's fleet, with 15 Avengers and 20 Wildcats successfully hitting the Haguro with a bomb at 08:25. Five minutes later, six Avengers and 20 Wildcats from Taffy 3 joined forces with 16 Avengers and 8 Wildcats from Taffy 2 to launch a major assault on the enemy cruisers. At 08:50, the Chokai was attacked, and by 09:05, it had sustained severe damage from a bomb hit. The destroyer Fujinami arrived to assist at 10:18, but by then, the cruiser was immobilized. The destroyer evacuated the crew and sank the Chokai with torpedoes. At 08:54, four Avengers targeted the Chikuma, landing a critical torpedo hit that caused significant flooding. With American aircraft focusing on the Japanese warships, Kurita decided to withdraw at 09:11, planning to regroup and return to Leyte Gulf. Another attack against Suzuya was mounted at 1050hrs by as many as 30 aircraft. This time, a near miss amidships turned deadly. Shrapnel from the bomb ignited the torpedoes in the starboard forward mount, igniting a fire that caused other torpedoes to explode at 1100hrs. The explosion caused extensive damage to the secondary battery and the machinery, which left the ship unmaneuverable. For a second time in the morning, Vice Admiral Shiraishi had to transfer, this time to Tone. The fires reached the remaining torpedoes, with a large explosion resulting at 1200hrs. In turn, this caused the magazine of the secondary battery to explode, and soon the entire ship was an inferno. Surviving crewmen were taken off by destroyer Okinami after the order to abandon ship was given at 1300hrs, and at 1320hrs Suzuya sank. Twohundred forty-seven men were lost. The Tone suffered a bomb hit at 12:40, and three minutes later, Noshiro experienced minor damage from near misses. The destroyer Nowaki was tasked with rescuing Chikuma's crew and then scuttling the crippled cruiser, which was completed by 11:00. Due to these air attacks and fearing total destruction if the battle continued, Kurita signaled Toyoda at 12:36 to abandon the attack on Leyte Gulf and began his retreat north. During this withdrawal, Kurita's force faced attacks from 37 Avengers and 19 Wildcats at 12:45, resulting in only minor damage to Nagato and Tone. Subsequent strikes by Stump's carriers were also ineffective, but Sprague's carriers' total of 441 sorties that day was a notable accomplishment. At 13:15, 100 aircraft from Admiral McCain's carrier, which had been recalled on October 24 and were now arriving in the area, launched one of the longest carrier strikes of the war. Despite their efforts, they were unable to inflict additional damage. A follow-up strike at 15:00 with 52 planes also failed, allowing Kurita to escape. Tremendously outgunned, the commander of Taffy 3, Rear Admiral Clifton Sprague, began to plead for help minutes into the battle. As Kurita pressed his advantage, these pleas became more urgent. In response, Oldendorf recalled his advance guard at 0723hrs. Kinkaid ordered Oldendorf to bring his entire force north at 0847hrs to assist the escort carriers. He formed a task force of the battleships California, Tennessee, and Pennsylvania, because they had the most armor-piercing shells remaining. They were escorted by three heavy cruisers and 20 destroyers with 165 torpedoes. The next strike consisting of ten Avengers, each with two 500lb bombs instead of torpedoes, escorted by five Wildcats, all from Ommaney Bay, went after Mogami. The Avenger pilots claimed five hits on the cruiser; in fact, only two bombs struck the ship. By the time the attack concluded at 0910hrs, Mogami was dead in the water after the failure of her last turbine. New fires raged beyond control and the danger of the forward 8in. magazine exploding (the others had been flooded) put the entire crew in danger. After evacuating the remaining crew, the Akebono scuttled Mogami at 13:07, resulting in the loss of 191 men. Additionally, in the morning, Taffy 1 faced Admiral Onishi's first kamikaze attack. The first ship to be attacked was Santee. At 0740hrs, a kamikaze commenced its dive, gained complete surprise, and encountered no antiaircraft fire before hitting the ship forward on the flight deck. Fires from the resulting explosion were quickly put out, but not before 43 men had been killed or wounded. Within five minutes of the fires being extinguished, submarine I-56 slammed a torpedo into the ship. The converted tanker shook it off with no casualties and no loss of capability. The final aircraft also selected Petrof Bay but ended up going after Suwannee after it was damaged by antiaircraft fire. It struck the carrier on the flight deck forward of the aft aircraft elevator. The Zero's 551lb bomb exploded, creating a hole on the hangar deck. The fires were put out within minutes, and within two hours flight operations had resumed. The suicide pilots approached the remaining five escort carriers at low level before popping up to altitude a few miles from their target. At this point they were detected on radar, but no interception by defending Wildcats was possible. At 1049hrs, Kitkun Bay was attacked by a single Zero. The pilot failed to hit the carrier's bridge, but his aircraft hit the port-side catwalk before crashing into the sea. The ship incurred damage when the Zero's bomb exploded close alongside. Two more suicide aircraft were dispatched by antiaircraft fire. The last two Zeros selected White Plains for their attentions. One came in from astern but missed the ship after crashing into the water close aboard the port side. The other was deterred by antiaircraft fire and headed toward St. Lo. The last kamikaze was the most skillful. At 1053hrs, the Zero came in over the stern of St. Lo and dropped his bomb before performing a shallow dive into the flight deck amidships. The aircraft slid off the bow, leaving a trail of fire on the flight deck from its fuel. The fire was no problem to deal with, but the bomb penetrated the flight deck and exploded in the hangar deck, where six aircraft were being fueled and armed. The resulting explosion forced the ship to be abandoned, and 32 minutes after being struck, the ship sank with 114 crewmen after the fires reached its magazines. St. Lo was the first ship sunk by kamikaze attack. At 1110hrs, another four kamikazes appeared and selected Kalinin Bay for attack. Two were shot down by antiaircraft fire. The other pair both scored glancing hits. One Zero was hit by antiaircraft fire, remained in control, and then hit the flight deck at a shallow angle and slid overboard. The second hit the ship with a glancing blow aft. Looking north, despite losing contact with Ozawa's force overnight, Mitscher decided to launch an initial strike of 130 aircraft, led by Commander McCampbell, by 06:00. At the same time, he dispatched search aircraft, which reestablished contact with Ozawa's now reunited Main Body at 07:10. The American strike was then directed toward the enemy, and McCampbell's planes successfully located Ozawa's carriers at 08:10, beginning their assault. Despite encountering 13 Zeros on combat air patrol, the Helldivers struck first at 08:30, targeting the enemy carriers. They were followed by strafing Hellcats and torpedo-armed Avengers. The hour-long attack resulted in significant damage: Zuikaku was hit by three bombs and one torpedo, leading to fires, flooding, and a severe list; Zuiho sustained a single bomb hit causing fires on the hangar deck; Chitose was heavily damaged by three near misses that ruptured its unarmored hull, causing flooding and a severe list, and it sank at 09:37 with 904 casualties; the light cruiser Tama was torpedoed and had to make its way to Okinawa for repairs; the cruiser Oyodo suffered light damage from a bomb hit; and the destroyer Akizuki was hit amidships, caught fire, and broke apart before sinking following a major explosion. As this attack unfolded, Mitscher launched a second wave of 36 aircraft, which arrived at the target area around 09:45. Under McCampbell's coordination, these planes focused on the carrier Chiyoda, which was hit by one bomb and several damaging near misses that caused flooding and a list, ultimately bringing the carrier to a halt. Simultaneously, he deployed search aircraft, which reestablished contact with Ozawa's now reunited Main Body at 07:10. With the American strike directed towards this position, McCampbell's planes successfully located the enemy at 08:10 and began their assault on Ozawa's carriers. The Japanese were aware of the impending arrival of the initial strike, since radar aboard Zuikaku had detected the American aircraft at 08:04 about 110NM to the southwest. Four Zeros were already on CAP; these were joined by the last nine fighters on Zuikaku. Such a meager CAP meant that survival of Ozawa's ships depended on their ability to throw up accurate anti-aircraft fire and maneuver adeptly under dive-bombing and torpedo attack. According to American pilots, Japanese anti-aircraft fire was heavy and began with a display of multi-colored explosions at 15NM out as Ise and Hyuga fired sanshiki-dan incendiary shells from their 14in. main battery. The small Japanese CAP raced toward the approaching American formation, but the escorting Hellcats prevented them from reaching the Helldivers or Avengers. Essex Hellcats claimed nine Zeros, but one Hellcat was shot down and its pilot left in the water to witness the unfolding attack; he was rescued after the battle. The Helldivers launched the initial attack on the enemy carriers at 08:30, followed by strafing runs from Hellcats and then torpedo attacks from Avengers. Zuikaku came under attack from dive-bombers and torpedo bombers from Intrepid, and two light carriers. Five minutes into the attack, Zuikaku was hit by three bombs amidships, which created a fire on the lower and upper hangar decks. Just minutes later, a torpedo launched by an Avenger from either Intrepid or San Jacinto struck the ship on her port side. One of the engine rooms was flooded, and one of the shafts was damaged and had to be shut down. The ensuing flooding caused a severe list, but this was quickly corrected to a manageable 6°. The veteran carrier had an experienced and capable damage-control team. By 0850hrs, the fires were extinguished, and 23 knots were restored using the starboard shafts. However, steering was uneven, and the ship's transmitters were out of commission. Since she was no longer suitable as a flagship, plans were made to transfer Ozawa and his staff to cruiser Oyodo. Before this could happen, the second strike showed up.  Zuiho was caught out of formation launching aircraft when the first attack began. Enterprise's strike group targeted the veteran light carrier known to her crew as a lucky ship, since she had survived three earlier carrier battles. Reports from Enterprise air crew stated that the carrier was left dead in the water and on fire. In exchange, one Enterprise Avenger was seriously damaged by antiaircraft fire and was rolled over the side of the carrier when it landed back onboard. Another Enterprise Hellcat was lost to Zero attack. Intrepid Helldivers also selected Zuiho for attack and claimed hits. In fact, Zuiho suffered three near misses followed by a direct bomb hit at 0835hrs. The explosion caused fires on the hangar deck, but these were out by 0855hrs. After the dive-bombers did their work, torpedo bombers from Essex and Lexington attacked Zuiho, but no hits were gained. Light carrier Chitose was crippled early and was the first of Ozawa's carriers to sink. At 0835hrs, she was attacked by dive-bombers from Essex and Lexington. Helldivers from Essex reported dropping 12 bombs and claimed 8 hits, leaving the carrier burning and listing. In fact, Chitose suffered three near misses along her port side. This was enough to rupture the carrier's unarmored hull. The resulting flooding knocked out two boiler rooms and caused a severe 27° list. Damage-control efforts reduced the list and kept power, but steering was only accomplished by using the engines. At 0915hrs, progressive flooding knocked out the starboard engine room and speed fell below 14 knots. Ten minutes later, flooding caused all power to be lost and the list increased to a dangerous 30°. Hyuga was directed to tow the carrier, but her condition was beyond salvage. Chitose sank at 0937hrs with the loss of 904 officers and men; another 601 were saved. Light cruiser Tama was attacked by torpedo bombers from Belleau Wood and San Jacinto. One torpedo hit the ship in her boiler room. After emergency repairs, the cruiser was ordered to proceed independently to Okinawa at her best speed of 14 knots.  Oyodo was also subjected to attack and was slightly damaged. At 0848hrs, she was struck by a bomb and two rockets and recorded near misses from bombs. The cruiser's speed was unimpaired. Large destroyer Akizuki also came under attack from aircraft in the first strike. At 0842hrs the ship was struck amidships and set afire. The ship lost power and fell out of formation. Within minutes, a large explosion was noted amidships and at 0856hrs Akizuki broke in two and quickly sank. The cause was either a torpedo or a bomb hit that detonated torpedoes in the amidships torpedo mount. The commanding officer and 150 officers and men were pulled out of the water before more air attacks forced destroyer Maki to abandon rescue operations. Meanwhile, as this attack unfolded, Mitscher launched a second strike of 36 aircraft, which reached the target area around 09:45. Coordinated by McCampbell, these planes focused on the carrier Chiyoda, which was hit by one bomb and several near misses, resulting in flooding and a severe list, ultimately bringing the carrier to a halt. The climax of Halsey's battle of annihilation against the Main Body should have been an engagement by Task Force 34 with six of the world's most powerful battleships. But this was never to be. The plight of the escort carriers off Samar brought a flurry of urgent pleas to Halsey for assistance. These began at 07:07 with a plain text message from Kinkaid. In response, Halsey ordered Task Group 38.1 to steam west from Ulithi to support Kinkaid, but otherwise remained focused on crushing Ozawa with the rest of Task Force 38. This changed when Nimitz weighed in at 10:00 with an inquiry on the location of Admiral Lee's battleships, which finally prompted Halsey to order Task Force 34, supported by Task Group 38.2, south at 10:15. At this point, Task Force 34 was some 42NM away from Ozawa's remnants. This order was executed at 11:15 when the battleships turned south, yet the change of orders came too late. Even at their best speed, the battle line could not arrive off San Bernardino Strait until about 01:00 on October 26. At 13:45, Task Force 34 also slowed from 20 to 12 knots to fuel destroyers, something that took until 16:22.  By noon, as Ozawa transferred to the Oyodo, Mitscher launched his third strike. Launched between 1145hrs and1200hrs, the third strike was the largest and most effective of the day. It was active over the target area from about 1310hrs to 1400hrs with some 200 aircraft, 75 percent of which had taken part in the initial strike in the morning. The strike coordinator was Commander T. Hugh Winters from Lexington. By this point, the Main Body's formation was in a shambles. Two carriers were located to the north with a battleship and what was reported as two cruisers. Another carrier was located some 20NM to the south on fire and listing. A second battleship, a cruiser, and a destroyer were nearby the crippled carrier. Winters ordered TG 38.3's 98 aircraft from Essex, Lexington, and Langley, to go after the two operational carriers. Aircraft from Lexington focused on Zuikaku. By 1100hrs, Ozawa had departed his flagship and transferred to Oyodo. The nine surviving Zeros on CAP were forced to ditch around 1030hrs, so for the rest of the day the Americans faced no air opposition. Zuikaku worked up to 24 knots shortly after the third strike was spotted at 1308hrs. The attack by Helldivers and Avengers was well coordinated, with the Avengers coming in from both bows in an anvil attack. In less than ten minutes, Zuikaku was subjected to six torpedo hits—two on the starboard side and four on the port side. The first was a hit at 1315hrs that failed to detonate. The last of the six hit at 1323hrs. Within minutes of the last torpedo hit, the mighty carrier was listing to port by 14° and was dead in the water after all power was lost. In addition to the torpedoes, four bombs hit the ship, which resulted in renewed fires on the hangar decks. At 1327, with the list increasing to 21°, the crew was ordered up to the flight deck. The captain gave a final address and then the ensign was lowered. Finally, after this touch of the dramatic, the crew was ordered to abandon ship at 1358hrs. The ship rolled over at 1414hrs and took the captain, 48 other officers, and 794 enlisted men with her. Essex's strike focused on Zuiho. When aircraft from TG 38.4 arrived, including Enterprise's second strike of six Hellcats, ten Helldivers, and five Avengers, most were also directed at Zuiho at 1310hrs followed by more at 1330hrs. At 1317hrs, the carrier was hit by one torpedo on her starboard quarter. According to Japanese accounts, one small bomb hit the aft elevator, followed by seven very close near misses, and then 60 more near misses. Bomb fragments caused flooding in the starboard engine room and created a 13° list.  Mitscher's fourth strike, launched around 13:15 and reaching the target area by 14:45, involved 40 aircraft but only achieved ten near misses on the Zuiho and four near misses on the battleship Ise. Despite this, the Zuiho ultimately sank at 15:26, with 215 men lost. At 16:10, Mitscher launched his fifth strike, while a strong surface force under Rear-Admiral Laurance DuBose closed in on Chiyoda to finish her off. DuBose's force first encountered Chiyoda dead in the water with light cruiser Isuzu nearby preparing to rescue survivors. Isuzu quickly fled, leaving the heavy cruisers to open fire at Chiyoda at 1624hrs from some 20,000 yards. The carrier responded with her 5in. dual-purpose guns, but against a stationary target the American cruiser scored quickly and often and after 15 minutes the carrier was a mass of flames. A towering column of black smoke marked Chiyoda's final moments. At 1655hrs, the carrier rolled over—there were no survivors from her crew of 970 men.  Between 17:10 and 17:40, the fifth strike, consisting of 85 aircraft, targeted the Ise. However, due to pilot fatigue, only one bomb hit the battleship, with 34 near misses causing minor flooding. The sister ship, Hyuga, which was positioned south of the Main Body, experienced seven near misses but no direct hits. Mitscher then launched a final strike of 36 aircraft at 17:10, which reached the target area about an hour later but failed to cause further damage. Overall, Task Force 38 executed 527 sorties against Ozawa's force that day, marking the most intense effort by fast carriers against naval targets up to that point. Despite the lack of significant air opposition and heavy but largely ineffective anti-aircraft fire, the results were underwhelming. The limited damage can be attributed to heavy anti-aircraft fire, effective ship maneuvering, and pilot fatigue from previous attacks on the Sibuyan Sea. The Battle off Cape Engaño was not over yet. As DuBose's mop-up force continued north, they encountered three destroyers rescuing survivors from Zuikaku and Zuiho. At 18:52, DuBose's light cruisers engaged the Hatsuzuki, which tried to resist but was ultimately destroyed by the intense gunfire, sinking at 20:59. DuBose ceased his pursuit at 21:30. This decision was timely, as Hatsuzuki's distress calls led Ozawa to advance south with three battleships and one destroyer at 20:41. Finding no targets, Ozawa turned back at 23:30, bringing the battle to an end. On his retreat, two wolf packs were lying in wait. Although Ise avoided significant damage from a powerful torpedo attack at 18:44,  the Tama, already damaged, wasn't as fortunate. The cruiser was proceeding independently to Okinawa at 14 knots after taking a torpedo in the first air attack. Jallao's skipper fired three torpedoes from her bow tubes, but they all missed. He quickly lined up another shot with the four stern tubes. Three of the four hit, and two exploded. The damage was catastrophic, causing Tama to break in two and quickly sink. There were no survivors from the crew of some 450 men. Meanwhile, Halsey had dispatched the fastest ships from his battle line at 16:22 in a last-ditch effort to intercept Kurita's force before it could navigate the San Bernardino Strait. However, they arrived too late, as aircraft from Independence detected Kurita's force moving through the strait at 21:40. The only ship that did not make it was the destroyer Nowaki, which, overloaded with survivors from Chikuma, was attacked by the American forces at 00:54 on October 26 and was swiftly sunk by 01:32. During this time, General Krueger's offensive persisted with General Sibert's 10th Corps and General Hodge's 24th Corps making steady progress inland. To the north, cavalry units secured San Juanico Strait, while Colonel Newman's 3rd Battalion captured Hill C and Colonel Chapman's 2nd Battalion took Hill B despite heavy resistance. Additionally, Chapman's 1st Battalion secured Hill 85, and the majority of the 3rd Battalion advanced towards Castilla, 8000 yards southwest of Palo. Further south, a patrol from the 383rd Regiment reached the Binahaan River and linked up with Chapman's Company K; the 382nd Regiment pushed beyond Aslom and Kanmonhag; Colonel May's Company K attempted, but failed, to capture Tabontabon; the 17th and 184th Regiments consolidated their newly captured positions on Burauen while sending patrols towards Dagami; and the 32nd Regiment made some headway toward the Buri airstrip but was still unable to capture it. By October 26, Shima's two heavy cruisers and two destroyers had successfully evaded several PT boat attacks and made their escape. However, the damaged cruiser Abukuma, under the protection of destroyer Ushio, was struck by 43 B-24 heavy bombers in the Sulu Sea. Usually high-altitude attacks on ships were totally ineffective, so the bombers came in at an altitude of about 6,500ft. In the first attack, Abukuma took a direct hit in the area of her bridge at 1006hrs and another aft. The second group of bombers scored a damaging near miss forward, and then a direct hit aft that knocked out one of the shafts and the steering equipment. The resulting fires spread to the engine rooms and the torpedo mounts located aft. When the fires reached the torpedoes, four exploded at 1037hrs. A third attack at 1044hrs brought only near misses. Abukuma was mortally damaged but remained afloat long enough for 284 of the crew to leave the ship. The veteran cruiser, part of the force that attacked Pearl Harbor, sank at 1242hrs with the loss of 220 men (added to the loss of 37 from the torpedo hit from the PT boat). As they came in at a lower altitude, Abukuma and Ushio were able to account for three bombers in this action.  On the same day, kamikaze attacks resumed against Taffy 1. Three Zeros penetrated the CAP and attacked Suwannee, which had completed repairs from the prior day's suicide attack. One Zero hit the flight deck and smashed into a group of ten aircraft parked on the bow. The aircraft were quickly engulfed in flames that spread down into the hangar bay, where another ten fueled aircraft were preparing to be brought up to the flight deck. The resulting fires on the hangar deck were put out, followed two hours later by the fire on the flight deck. The crew paid a high price for saving their ship— 85 dead, 58 missing, and 102 wounded. Other kamikazes selected Sangamon and Petrof Bay for attack; both carriers reported being near-missed. The initial success of the kamikaze attacks, including one carrier sunk and five damaged, gave the Japanese hope that they had found a way to halt the American naval advance. This marked the beginning of the Kamikaze era in the Pacific War. As Kurita's force moved through the Sibuyan Sea, Admirals McCain and Bogan launched a strike at 06:00 with 257 aircraft. Despite this effort, the exhausted pilots managed only three bomb hits on Kumano, causing moderate damage. Aircraft from Wasp and Cowpens also found Kurita's main force. Noshiro was able to evade six torpedoes aimed at her, but at 0852hrs one struck with devastating effect. The ship lost all power and within minutes developed a 26° list to port. The next attack was conducted by aircraft from Hornet. A second torpedo hit the lightly protected cruiser at 1039hrs, and at 1113hrs she sank bow first. By this point, Kurita's destroyers were down to their last few tons of fuel, forcing them to reduce speed. Destroyers had to shift fuel among themselves to reach a tanker positioned at Coron Bay. Hayashimo was forced to temporarily anchor off Semirara Island south of Mindoro. She was attacked by Avengers from 1045hrs to 1050hrs, and had her bow blown off by a torpedo. As a result, she was grounded and sank in shallow water off Semirara Island. Kurita's remaining ships managed to reach Coron Bay or Brunei, except for the destroyers Fujinami and Shiranui, which were sunk by air attacks on October 27, resulting in the loss of their crews, including those from Chokai aboard Fujinami. By the end of the Battle of Leyte Gulf, the IJN had been effectively decimated. Despite suffering a severe defeat, Admiral Mikawa assessed that he still had enough resources to carry out Operation TA, which involved transporting reinforcements to Ormoc. On October 24, the cruiser Kinu and the destroyer Uranami escorted five transports through intense strafing fire to Cagayan. After boarding the 41st Regiment, Admiral Sakonju's convoy set sail the next morning and successfully landed the reinforcements at Ormoc early on October 26. Although they faced occasional enemy air attacks, they did not incur significant troop losses. Sakonju then sent three transports to Manila, but these were targeted by aircraft from Sprague's carriers. The attacks resulted in two bomb hits on Uranami and three on Kinu, leading to the sinking of both ships in the Visayan Sea. Another transport proceeded to Bohol, embarked the 169th Independent Battalion, and landed them at Ormoc on October 27. Although the Leyte beachheads were secured against sea-based attacks, the Americans could not control all surrounding waters, allowing Generals Yamashita and Suzuki to continue reinforcing the island. This marks the conclusion of the Battle of Leyte Gulf. In exchange for the loss of one light carrier, two escort carriers, two destroyers, one destroyer escort, one submarine, one PT boat, 255 aircraft, and about 2,000 men, the Americans had destroyed approximately 300 enemy planes and sunk 28 warships, including the carrier Zuikaku (the last survivor of the Pearl Harbor attack), three light carriers, three battleships, ten cruisers, and eleven destroyers, with a total of 12,000 Japanese casualties. Despite losing all his carriers, Ozawa fulfilled his expected role and managed to survive the battle with two battleships and two cruisers. After the war, he noted that the final three strikes were not damaging, and his chief of staff remarked that he was unimpressed with the American pilots' quality. In contrast, Halsey faced severe criticism for his controversial decision to leave San Bernardino Strait unguarded while moving his entire force north. If he had employed more strategic thinking and embraced decentralized decision-making, Mitscher's carriers could have engaged and defeated both Ozawa and Kurita. Nishimura also performed his duties effectively; despite losing his life and almost his entire force, he diverted the 7th Fleet's surface forces, leaving Kinkaid's transports and escort carriers vulnerable to Kurita's attack. The Shima force contributed nothing to the mission but survived largely intact. Kurita demonstrated bravery throughout the battle but was occasionally indecisive. Although he was not responsible for the losses at the Sibuyan Sea and was unlucky with his lookouts misidentifying cruisers and battleships among Sprague's escort carriers, he faced American tactics that he perceived as skillful. Sprague's desperate maneuvers to avoid annihilation were seen by the Japanese as tactical excellence. Kurita acknowledged the effective performance of American destroyers, which broke up his formation with torpedo attacks and utilized smoke screens effectively. Both Kurita and his chief of staff found the American air attacks to be relentless, aggressive, skillful, and well-coordinated, considering them the most proficient attacks encountered by the 1st Striking Force throughout the battle. In the end, Toyoda's Sho-Go plan was fundamentally flawed and destined for failure. Although it contained some clever elements that exploited weaknesses in the US Navy's command structure, it was ultimately incapable of success and served only as a means of the IJN's destruction. Even if Kurita had advanced into Leyte Gulf, it would have provided no significant military advantage for the Japanese and would likely have led to the complete destruction of Kurita's forces. The failure of Sho-Go left the Japanese without a fleet and with no realistic hope of defeating the Americans. However, the emergence of Kamikaze attacks allowed Japan to continue the war for a while longer. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Imperial Japanese Navy was virtually annihilated during the battle of Leyte Gulf. Few of her mighty warships remained and now she would cling to desperate measures to try and force the Americans to sue for an early peace to retain pieces of her empire. How long could Japan drag this war on?

On October 26, 2024, the MacArthur Memorial and the Hampton Roads Naval Museum commemorated the 80th anniversary of the Battle of Leyte Gulf with a series of presentations. Thomas Cutler, a retired USN officer and a preeminent naval historian, presented a lecture entitled The Naval Battle of Leyte Gulf. If you would like to see the slides he used, you can also find his presentation on the MacArthur Memorial's YouTube channel. Link: https://youtu.be/eFBjKmdlt_0 Have a comment about this episode? Send us a text message! (Note: we can only read the texts, we can't reply) Follow us on:Twitter: @MacArthur1880; @AEWilliamsClarkFacebook: @MacArthurMemorialwww.macarthurmemorial.org

Last time we spoke about the Return to the Philippines. Admiral Halsey, in preparation for the Leyte invasion, devised a strategic ploy to lure the Japanese forces by feigning vulnerability. Despite significant air engagements and the heavy damage to two cruisers, Halsey's forces maintained control. Meanwhile, a massive convoy approached Leyte, and the Japanese launched a desperate counterattack. The battle severely depleted Japan's air strength, leading to the birth of the Kamikaze Corps. As Davison's carrier aircraft attacked, Japanese forces struggled due to bad weather and underestimated the Americans. General Terauchi activated Sho-Go 1, targeting Leyte, despite disagreements with General Yamashita. Pre-landing operations saw U.S. Rangers secure islands, while heavy bombardments prepared Leyte for invasion. MacArthur's forces landed amidst fierce resistance, capturing key positions. Though logistics were disorganized, U.S. troops gained ground, marking the beginning of a decisive battle in the Philippines, with the Japanese struggling to counter. This episode is the Battle of Leyte Gulf Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As previously mentioned, General MacArthur's forces successfully landed on Leyte, with General Sibert's 10th Corps landing in the Palo-Tacloban sector and General Hodge's 24th Corps at Dulag. In response, Admiral Toyoda activated Operation Sho-Go, ordering Admiral Kurita's 1st Striking Force to move to Brunei Bay and destroy enemy warships and transports in Leyte Gulf. Meanwhile, Admiral Shima's 2nd Striking Force prepared to support counter-landings led by Vice-Admiral Mikawa Gunichi's Southwest Area Fleet. The planning for Admiral Shima's small force was emblematic of the shambolic state of the IJN organization for the battle. His force was originally assigned to Ozawa as part of the Main Body. Then it was detached to go down to Formosa to mop-up Halsey's Third Fleet in the aftermath of the Battle off Formosa. Then it was assigned to the Southwest Area Fleet based in Manila to spearhead an envisioned counter-landing on Leyte. The commander of the Southwest Area Fleet, Admiral Mikawa, determined that the Shima force was not required to accomplish the counter-landing mission. On October 19 Toyoda rejected this and instructed Mikawa to use the Shima force as part of the counter-landing force. In spite of this and after confirming that the counter-landing operation did not require Shima's force, Mikawa sent orders to Shima on the afternoon of the 19th that he was not required to stand by to support the counter-landing. Early in the afternoon on October 21, the Combined Fleet again ordered Shima to take part in the transport mission and ordered his force to Manila. At this point, two forces were assigned to the counter-landing operation with a total of five cruisers and eight destroyers. This was a very questionable use of the Combined Fleet's limited resources.  Kurita's 16th Cruiser Division was detached to reinforce the effort, and Admiral Ozawa's depleted Main Body was tasked with luring the enemy north, allowing Kurita to break through to the landing zone. Vice Adm. Ozawa's Task Force Main Body sortied from the Bungo Channel, at the southern entrance to the Inland Sea, on the afternoon of October 20, immediately after receiving the Combined Fleet battle order. To heighten its effectiveness as a lure, the Ozawa Force sortied with all of the 3d Carrier Division, made up of the regular carrier Zuikaku and the light carriers Zuiho, Chitose, and Chiyoda. The total number of aircraft available to put aboard these ships, however, was only 108. These belonged to the poorly trained air groups of the 1st Carrier Division and represented about half the normal complement. In addition to the half-empty carriers, the force comprised two battleships (Ise, Hyuga), three light cruisers(Oyodo, Tama, Isuzu) and eight destroyers (31st Destroyer Squadron). At around 06:00 on 21 October, Japanese aircraft attempted to bomb the Allied ships in Leyte Bay. An Aichi D3A dive-bomber dove for Shropshire, but broke away after heavy anti-aircraft fire was directed at it. The Aichi, damaged by Bofors fire, turned and flew at low level up the port side of the nearby Australia, before striking the cruiser's foremast with its wingroot. Although the bulk of the aircraft fell overboard, the bridge and forward superstructure were showered with debris and burning fuel. Seven officers (including Captain Dechaineux) and twenty-three sailors were killed by the collision, while another nine officers (including Commodore Collins), fifty-two sailors, and an AIF gunner were wounded. Observers aboard Australia and nearby Allied ships differed in their opinions of the collision; some thought that it was an accident, while the majority considered it to be a deliberate ramming aimed at the bridge. Following the attack, commander Harley C. Wright assumed temporary control of the ship. Since Kurita lacked air cover, Tominaga's forces were regrouping in the Philippines to bolster Japanese air strength for Operation Sho-Go, while Admiral Fukudome's 2nd Air Fleet was assembling in the Manila area. At the same time, with communication lost with General Makino's 16th Division.Because of the typhoon of October 17-18, signal communications were impossible. Roads were washed out and impassable. Bridges were down; and for about a week from the time the storm first hit the island, elements of the 16th Division were scattered and out of contact with one another. While trying to assemble its forces for operations, the Japanese were then hit by enemy bombardment, which further severely disrupted General Makino's radio-telegraphic communications. Additionally, the evacuation of Tacloban by the division rear echelon, which began early on October 20, necessitated the abandonment of permanent wireless installations and resulted in complete severance for 48 hours of all contact between the 16th Division and higher headquarters at Cebu and Manila. During this critical period, 14th Area Army and 35th Army were completely without knowledge of developments on Leyte. General Suzuki initiated the Suzu Plan, preparing the 41st Regiment and two battalions of the 102nd Division to move toward Ormoc. General Terauchi, having decided that the decisive battle would be fought at Leyte, directed General Yamashita to place the provisional Tempei Battalion and the 20th Antitank Battalion under Suzuki's command and ordered Lieutenant-General Yamagata Tsuyuo's 26th Division to prepare for early deployment to Leyte. Additionally, reinforcements from the 1st Division and the 68th Brigade, soon to arrive in the Philippines, were assigned to the 35th Army. The Japanese anticipated that the enemy would not move inland until the beachheads at Tacloban and Dulag were connected, so they aimed to gather reinforcements in the Carigara area before launching a major counteroffensive to crush the invading forces. In the meantime, Makino's 16th Division was tasked with holding off the enemy advance in eastern Leyte long enough to allow reinforcements to assemble. Reacting swiftly to the enemy landings, Makino sent the reserve 1st Battalion, 20th Regiment, and the 7th Independent Tank Company to strengthen the defenses at Palo and Dulag, respectively. General Krueger, however, intended to move quickly through Leyte Valley, aiming to secure key roads and airfields before the Japanese could regroup and mount a solid defense. The 1st Striking Force departed Lingga at 01:00 on October 18 and headed to Brunei Bay on the north coast of Borneo. At Brunei, Kurita's ships refuelled, and Kurita took the opportunity to confer with his officers. The details of Sho-1 reached Kurita's force during the day on October 18. This made for a dramatic conference and reflected the unease many felt about the plan. Many officers at the conference were appalled that the fleet was being risked attacking empty transports and doubted that they would ever get close to Leyte Gulf. Kurita probably had his own doubts about the plan, but after many of those present expressed their doubts, Kurita reminded them of the “glorious opportunity” they had been given. “Would it not be a shame to have the fleet remain intact while the nation perishes?” posed Kurita, and followed with the plea: “What man can say that there is no chance for our fleet to turn the tide of war in a decisive battle?” Whatever their doubts, the crews and ships of the 1st Striking Force departed Brunei at 08:00 on October 22 and headed northeast through the Palawan Passage. Kurita's 3rd Section—consisting of the old battleships Fuso and Yamashiro, heavy cruiser Mogami, and four destroyers—stayed behind. These ships departed at 15:00 and headed to the Balabac Strait and then into the Sulu Sea. If all went according to plan, they would storm Leyte Gulf through the Surigao Strait and meet Kurita's ships inside the gulf on the morning of October 25. To the north, General Mudge's 1st Cavalry Division continued advancing northwest along San Juanico Strait, with the 7th Cavalry liberating Tacloban with minimal resistance. The 5th and 12th Cavalry Regiments faced tougher opposition in the southwestern foothills, where Colonel Royce Drake was killed by enemy machine-gun fire, but they managed to secure Utap and Caibaan despite the swampy terrain. To the south, Colonel Aubrey Newman's 34th Regiment repelled a strong enemy counterattack, resulting in 600 Japanese casualties, before launching an assault on Hill 332. Although only the northern knoll was captured by nightfall, the 1st Battalion, 19th Regiment consolidated its position on Hill 522, while the 2nd and 3rd Battalions advanced towards Palo, with the 2nd successfully entering the town. Further south, Japanese artillery positioned on Catmon Hill targeted the beachhead area while General Bradley's 96th Division advanced. Colonel May's 1st Battalion attacked the Japanese positions at Labiranan Head, the remaining forces of the 383rd Regiment moved west to a point north of Tigbao, and Colonel Dill's 382nd Regiment made slow progress towards Tigbao. At the same time, General Arnold's 7th Division, after repelling two minor tank attacks, began advancing west toward the Burauen airstrips, with the 32nd and 184th Regiments moving side by side. The 184th faced minimal opposition as it captured the Dulag airstrip and continued moving forward about 1000 yards beyond the beachhead, whereas the 32nd had to overcome several bunkers and pillboxes to reach its objective. The next day, both regiments continued their westward advance, with the 184th stopping after 2800 yards due to increased enemy resistance, waiting for the 32nd to close the gap. To the north, May's 1st Battalion secured Labiranan Hill and San Roque, while the rest of the 383rd Regiment advanced to Anibung to surround Catmon Hill, and the 382nd Regiment pushed through Tigbao and Canmangui. In response to these developments, Makino decided to reorganize his southern forces to better defend Catmon Hill and Burauen, with the 20th Regiment largely disengaging and retreating towards Hindang. Simultaneously, the 34th Regiment captured Hill 332, while Lieutenant-Colonel George Chapman's 19th Regiment defended Palo from strong enemy counterattacks. The 3rd Battalion managed to reach the town, allowing the 2nd Battalion to launch an attack towards Hill B, though it was unable to capture its crest. Further north, while the 7th Cavalry secured the hills around Tacloban, Brigadier-General William Chase's 1st Cavalry Brigade continued to face challenges advancing up the western foothills. In the morning, Kurita set sail from Brunei and headed northeast through the Palawan Passage, leaving Vice-Admiral Nishimura Shoji's Force C behind to advance through the Surigao Strait into Leyte Gulf. Taking the direct route along the west coast of Palawan, the 1st Striking Force was detected by submarines Darter and Dace in the early hours of October 23. After reporting the enemy task force to Admirals Halsey and Kinkaid, the submarines executed a coordinated attack at 06:10. The first torpedoes struck Atago just as Kurita was having morning tea with his chief of staff. In total, four torpedoes hit the cruiser, dooming her instantly. Nineteen officers and 341 sailors went down with the ship. Kurita and his staff were thrown into the water and had to swim for their lives. The second salvo from Darter hit cruiser Takao, steaming behind Atago. Two torpedoes hit the cruiser, killing 32 crewmen and wounding another 30. Takao was not only out of the battle, but her heavy damage put her out of the war. After eventually reaching Singapore, she was deemed unrepairable.On Dace, Claggett observed Darter's devastating attack. Claggett identified a Kongo-class battleship for attack and began his approach. Six torpedoes were fired from a range of 1,800 yards toward the target, which was actually heavy cruiser Maya. The cruiser took four hits on her port side and sank in a mere eight minutes, taking with her 16 officers and 320 men. Kurita narrowly escaped the sinking of the Atago, later transferring to the battleship Yamato after sending two destroyers to escort the damaged Takao back to Brunei. The submarines then endured ineffective counterattacks from Japanese destroyers, although Darter ran aground on a reef while pursuing Takao. This successful submarine attack not only diminished Kurita's force by three powerful cruisers but also provided the Americans with the location of the 1st Striking Force. In response, Admiral Oldendorf's fire support group established a battle line across the mouth of Surigao Strait, and Halsey ordered his dispersed carrier groups to prepare for battle, recalling Task Group 38.4 immediately. Additionally, Vice-Admiral Sakonju Naomasa's 16th Cruiser Division, en route to Mindanao with the 41st Regiment for Ormoc, was tracked by submarine Bream near Manila Bay early on October 23. This led to a torpedo attack that critically damaged the heavy cruiser Aoba, forcing her to return to Japan, where she would never be operational again. Despite these challenges, the first reinforcement successfully arrived in Ormoc on the same day after an uneventful voyage. At the same time, the IJA and IJN air forces were rapidly assembling their resources in the Philippines in preparation for a coordinated air offensive set to begin on October 24, a day before the scheduled fleet attack. To the north, Ozawa's substantial but ineffective decoy force was positioned due east of Okinawa, moving south into the Philippine Sea, while Shima's 2nd Striking Force neared the Coron Islands. Back in Leyte, Krueger's offensive was advancing as well. In the north, the 8th Cavalry had moved through the 7th and successfully captured a bridge over the Diit River. On October 22, elements of the 5th Cavalry were sent to Tacloban to act as a guard of honor for General MacArthur. The guard of honor, consisting of 1st Lt. John Gregory and thirty enlisted men of the 5th Cavalry, arrived at Tacloban later on October 23. President Osmeña of the Philippine Commonwealth was also present, having come ashore for the occasion. A simple but impressive ceremony was held in front of the municipal building of Tacloban, though the interior of the edifice was a shambles of broken furniture and scattered papers. A guard of honor of "dirty and tired but efficient-looking soldiers" was drawn up in front of the government building. General MacArthur broadcasted an address announcing the establishment of the Philippine Civil Government with President Osmeña as its head. Lt. Gen. Richard K. Sutherland then read the official proclamation. President Osmeña spoke appreciatively of American support and of the determination of the Filipinos to expel the enemy. "To the Color" was sounded on the bugle, and the national flags of the United States and the Philippines were simultaneously hoisted on the sides of the building. Colonel Kangleon of the guerrilla forces was then decorated with the Distinguished Service Cross. Few Filipinos except representatives of the local government were present for the ceremony. Apparently the inhabitants had not heard of it, or did not know that they were permitted to attend. Information quickly spread, however, that the civil government had assumed control, and as General MacArthur and his party left town the civil population cheered them. The 1st Cavalry Brigade continued its slow advance through challenging terrain before being reassigned to support the overstretched 24th Division in its rear. Newman's 1st Battalion made an unsuccessful attempt to capture Hill Nan, and the 19th Regiment similarly failed to take Hill B. On the night of October 23 Col. Suzuki Tatsunosuke, the commanding officer of the 33rd Regiment, led a raiding detachment, armed with rifles, sabres, grenades, and mines, into Palo from the southwest. Using Filipino civilians in front of them, the men of the detachment tricked the guards at the outpost into believing that they were guerrillas. The Japanese were thus able to capture two machine guns and a 37-mm. gun. They penetrated to the town square and charged, throwing explosives into houses, trucks, and a tank, and broke into an evacuation hospital where they killed some wounded. They then moved toward the bridge and mounted the captured machine guns on it, firing until their ammunition was exhausted and then abandoning the guns. The American guards on the other side of the bridge, however, were able to fire upon the bridge and its approaches so effectively that they killed fifty Japanese, according to a count made the next morning. The raid was completely broken up, and sixty Japanese, including Colonel Suzuki, were killed. The American casualties were fourteen killed and twenty wounded. To the south, the 383rd Regiment secured the Guinarona River, while the 382nd conducted patrols. Even farther south, Arnold deployed the 17th Regiment, reinforced by the 2nd Battalion of the 184th Regiment and the 767th Tank Battalion, to push through his advance elements and continue the assault westward, with the other two regiments trailing 1000 yards behind. This "flying wedge" maneuver proved highly effective, with the infantry securing San Pablo airfield and the tanks advancing to the western edge of Burauen. They disrupted the disorganized enemy forces and killed Colonel Hokota Keijiro, commander of the 20th Regiment. Meanwhile, at sea, Kurita's intact warships advanced into Mindoro Strait by nightfall, while Nishimura's force was crossing the Sulu Sea. To the north, Ozawa's decoy force was deliberately broadcasting messages to draw enemy attention. Shima was also directed to penetrate Surigao Strait to support Nishimura's assault, as Mikawa had determined that the 2nd Striking Force was not needed for the counter-landing mission. On Leyte, the troops continued their engagement on October 24, unaware of the impending major naval battle. In the northern region, to secure San Juanico Strait and prevent Japanese reinforcements from Samar, the 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry landed successfully at Babatngon; Troop C of the 8th Cavalry did the same at La Paz; and the rest of the 1st Squadron advanced to Guintiguian. By nightfall, these cavalry units had to repel a strong counterattack from the 2nd Battalion, 9th Regiment, which was stationed in Samar. To the south, Newman's 1st Battalion secured Hills Nan and Mike; his 2nd Battalion fought its way to a small hill southeast of Hill C; Chapman's 2nd Battalion continued its unsuccessful assault on Hill B; and his Company K captured San Joaquin south of Palo. Further south, the 382nd Regiment pushed through Hindang, causing the 20th Regiment units to retreat, and also secured Anibung, while the 383rd Regiment began patrolling its area. Meanwhile, the 17th Regiment, supported by the 184th, advanced along the road to Burauen, fought through the town, and began preparing for a push north to Dagami. Additionally, the 32nd Regiment attacked toward the Buri airstrip but was eventually forced to withdraw. At dawn on October 24, the crucial air phase of the Sho-Go plan began, with 200 aircraft of the 1st and 2nd Air Fleets taking off from Clark Field to patrol the waters east of Luzon. At 08:20, Admiral Sherman's carriers were finally spotted, prompting the launch of three waves of Japanese aircraft for an attack. The first attack in the morning was intercepted by seven Hellcats from Essex led by Commander David McCampbell, the air group commander. The quality of the Japanese air crews was very low. McCampbell methodically proceeded to shoot down nine Japanese aircraft, for which he was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor, and his wingman claimed six more. After the record action, he managed to return and land in extremis on Langley because the Essex's deck was too busy to accommodate him although he had run short of fuel. Altogether, aviators from Essex were credited with 24 downed enemy aircraft, and fighters from Lexington 13. Despite the Hellcats' rough handling of the incoming Japanese strike, fleet air defense was never airtight. At 0938hrs, one Judy divebomber used clouds for cover and then made a skillful attack against light carrier Princeton. The aircraft's 551lb bomb hit in the middle of the flight deck some 75ft forward of the aft elevator. It penetrated several decks to the ship's bakery, where it exploded. The resulting blast reached into the hangar deck where it engulfed six fully armed and fully fueled Avengers. These aircraft caught fire and soon exploded with a blast so powerful both ship's elevators were thrown into the air. Water pressure was knocked out, which allowed the flames to spread quickly. All non-essential personnel were ordered off the ship at 1010hrs, followed by all but the fire-fighting personnel ten minutes later. In response, the cruiser Birmingham came to Princeton's aid but sustained severe damage from a major explosion and had to retreat to Ulithi, leading to Princeton being scuttled later in the afternoon. The subsequent two waves of Japanese aircraft were successfully intercepted, resulting in the loss of 67 Japanese planes by the end of the day. Meanwhile, Tominaga launched full-scale attacks on enemy invasion shipping in Leyte Gulf with minimal results. The failure to neutralize Halsey's carriers and Ozawa's undetected diversion mission allowed Admiral Mitscher to conduct a series of strikes against Kurita's force. That morning, American reconnaissance aircraft detected Kurita's 1st Striking Force south of Mindoro, prompting Admiral Bogan to dispatch 45 aircraft under Commander William Ellis to attack the battleships Yamato and Musashi as they neared the Sibuyan Sea. At approximately 10:30, aircraft from the Intrepid and Cabot began their attack. The lead group of Japanese ships included the huge Yamato and Musashi. Of these two, Musashi was nearest, so Commander Ellis selected her as the main target. He split the 12 Helldivers into two six-aircraft divisions to attack both battleships with their 1000lb bombs. The two nearest large ships were the subject of the Avengers' attack. Two were ordered to go after heavy cruiser Myoko and the other six were directed against Musashi. These were divided into two three-plane sections in order to execute an anvil attack. The four Avengers from Cabot were allocated against Yamato in the center of the formation. American pilots all remarked on the ferocity of the antiaircraft fire from the multi-colored 5in. bursts to the streams of tracers from the 25mm guns. The Japanese also used Type 3 incendiary shells from 18.1in. and 16in. main battery guns. Despite the spectacular appearances of this barrage, Japanese anti-aircraft fire was generally ineffective. The giant Type 3 shells proved totally ineffective, and Japanese records indicate that the battleships fired a relatively low number of 6in. and 5in. shells during each attack, indicating that the fire-control systems were taking too long to generate a targeting solution. These and the ubiquitous 25mm guns damaged many aircraft, but of the over 250 aircraft that attacked during the day, only 18 were shot down. Though the numbers confirm the ineffectiveness of IJN anti-aircraft fire, the American aviators displayed great courage pressing home their attacks through what was described as an impenetrable wall of flak. Musashi was hit with one torpedo, leading to flooding and listing, and another torpedo struck the cruiser Myoko, which had to return to Singapore. For most of the day, Musashi was the center of attention. Due to a fault in the design of her side belt, slow flooding entered the adjacent boiler room. The effect of some 3,000 tons of water was a 5.5° list, which was quickly reduced to a single degree by pumps in the affected boiler room and counterflooding on the opposite. Facing Musashi's intact antiaircraft batteries, one Avenger was shot down before it launched its torpedo and a second went down after deploying its weapon. The two Avengers that attacked Myoko were even more successful. At 1029hrs, one torpedo hit the heavy cruiser on her starboard side aft. Her propulsion system was damaged, and her top speed reduced to 15 knots. The cruiser fell astern of the formation. Kurita was forced to send her back to Singapore for repairs without destroyer escort. Since Myoko was the flagship of Sentai 5, at 1100hrs the commander transferred to cruiser Haguro. Myoko limped back to Singapore but was out of the war. Four of Kurita's heavy cruisers were out of the battle before they had a chance to engage an enemy ship. Cabot's small group of torpedo aircraft attacked Yamato, but the battleship dodged all torpedoes directed at her. Concurrently, Nishimura's fleet was located by an enhanced search operation from Admiral Davison's carriers. At 09:18, 16 Hellcats and 12 Avengers from the Enterprise attacked the Yamashiro and Fuso battleships, hitting the latter with two bombs, though the damage was minimal. Operating to the west of Nishimura was Shima's Second Striking Force and also in the area was Shima's detached Destroyer Division 21 with three ships, which was hurrying to rejoin Shima's main force after having completed a transport mission to Manila. Franklin's air group was assigned the northern sector of the Sulu Sea. It spotted the three ships of Shima's Destroyer Division 21 off Panay. Attacking high-speed destroyers was a challenge for any airman, but at 0813hrs Wakaba was hit by a bomb and several near misses. The damage proved fatal—45 minutes later, Wakaba sank with the loss of 30 men. Franklin launched a follow-up strike of 12 Hellcats and 11 bombers that reached the two remaining destroyers just before noon. Only one bomb hit was scored against Hatsushimo, which did little damage. The Japanese commander decided to head back to Manila with the survivors of Wakaba. Inexplicably, he failed to notify Shima of his decision. Destroyer Division 21 was out of the battle.  After this initial strike, Bogan sent a second wave of 42 aircraft, which targeted Musashi between 12:07 and 12:15. Again, Helldivers opened the attack. The 12 bombers scored at least two direct hits and five near misses. One 1,000lb hit forward and passed through Musashi's bow without exploding. The second hit just to the port side of the stack and penetrated two decks before exploding. The resulting damage forced the abandonment of the port-side inboard engine room, which reduced the ship to three shafts. A fire near one of the boiler rooms was quickly extinguished. Adding to the chaos, Musashi's steam siren was damaged, and it continued to sound off and on for the remainder of the action. Once again Intrepid's Avengers deployed to conduct an anvil attack. Of the nine aircraft, eight got their torpedoes in the water and headed toward the huge battleship. As was the case for the entire series of attacks, it is impossible to precisely trace the number of hits suffered by Musashi; American and Japanese records do not even coincide on the overall number of attacks during the day. It is probable that the second wave of Avengers put three torpedoes into Musashi's port side. One hit near the stack on the junction of the outboard port engine room and the port hydraulic machinery space; it caused slow flooding but little else. Another hit forward of the armored citadel and caused massive flooding into several large spaces. The last confirmed hit occurred abaft Turret No. 2. Despite these three additional hits, Musashi remained on an even keel, but was noticeably down by the bow. In exchange, Musashi antiaircraft gunners forced one Avenger to ditch some 15 miles away and shot down two Helldivers. During this attack, Japanese records indicate nine Type 3 shells were fired. American pilots were impressed that they were engaged at 25,000–30,000 yards, but no aircraft were damaged. This damage reduced Musashi's speed to 22 knots, prompting Kurita to slow his formation. Despite taking four torpedoes, Musashi's skilled damage-control teams managed to keep it afloat throughout the day. At 10:50, Sherman launched 58 aircraft from the Essex and Lexington, focusing on Musashi again at 13:30. With her speed reduced and unable to fully maneuver, she was a much easier target. Despite the heavy fire directed against them, the Helldivers performed their mission of preparing the way for the torpedo bombers. At least four 1,000lb bombs hit Musashi. Three hits caused minimal damage as they impacted near the forward 18in. turret and exploded in the unoccupied crew accommodation spaces below. Damage from the final hit that exploded on contact when it hit the starboard side of the stack was not serious, but the explosion devastated many nearby 25mm triple mounts and caused heavy casualties among the gun crews. While the Helldivers added to the topside carnage, damage from the Avengers was much more serious. Three more torpedo hits were confirmed in the third attack, bringing the total to seven. Two struck forward of the armored citadel on either side of the bow. The design flaw of having comparatively little compartmentation in the unarmored forward section of the ship led to massive flooding. In addition, the explosions forced the hull plating outward creating what looked like a huge plow throwing water up as the ship moved forward. Another torpedo struck the starboard side close to the previous starboard side hit. This increased flooding and forced the abandonment of the starboard hydraulic machinery room. A possible fourth hit was reported by some witnesses near the forward 6.1in. triple turret on the starboard side. This assault resulted in at least four bomb hits and three torpedo hits, causing severe flooding. Despite this, Musashi continued to fight, but with its speed reduced to 12 knots, Kurita ordered it to move west with destroyers Shimakaze and Kiyoshimo. Additionally, the cruiser Tone was struck by two bombs during this attack, sustaining only light damage. At 14:26, 12 Helldivers and 8 Hellcats from the Essex launched an assault on the Yamato and Nagato, delivering three bomb hits to the Yamato and two to the Nagato, though the damage was not severe. The fifth air attack of the day was the most intense, with 65 aircraft from the Enterprise and Franklin taking off at 13:15 to strike the heavily damaged Musashi at 15:10. The results against the near-defenseless battleship were devastating. Of the 18 Helldivers that dove on Musashi, 11 claimed hits. On this occasion, the aviators' claims were not inflated. Japanese sources agreed that within minutes, Musashi was pounded by ten 1,000lb bombs. This barrage can be detailed with some degree of certainty. One bomb hit forward of Turret No. 1 and added to the damage there from earlier bombs. Another bomb hit the roof of the same turret and failed to penetrate its thick roof armor. Another hit to the starboard side of the turret and penetrated two decks before exploding against the main armored deck. Two bombs hit together between the forward 6.1in. turret and the superstructure, exploded on contact, and did minimal damage. Another two hit just to port in the same general area, penetrated two decks, and exploded on the main armored deck without penetrating. The eighth bomb hit the port side of the massive superstructure and exploded on contact, causing devastation to nearby 25mm mounts and their crews. Another projectile hit the top of the superstructure and destroyed the main battery fire-control director and its rangefinder. The resulting explosion caused significant personnel casualties on the bridge and operations room totaling 78 killed and wounded. Among the wounded was the ship's captain. The final hit landed abaft the superstructure but caused only minor damage. Musashi was equally helpless against the Avengers. The eight Enterprise Avengers conducted an anvil attack, and all claimed hits. At this point in the action, the accounts of Musashi's surviving crewmembers are not reliable. It is certain that four more torpedoes hit the ship. The first was on the port side in the area of the magazine for Turret No. 1. Another hit on the port side was recorded abeam the superstructure, flooding one boiler room. The third hit to port was placed just aft of the stack. It was in the same area of an earlier hit, and it immediately flooded the outboard engine room. The only confirmed hit on the starboard side occurred in the area of Turret No. 2. On top of the four confirmed hits, some Japanese accounts mention as many as six more. Two of these struck amidships on the port side but did not explode. All attacking aircraft returned safely, confirming the ineffectiveness of Musashi's defenses at this point. At 15:21, Helldivers targeted the Haruna, but only managed five near misses. The increasing intensity of the air attacks throughout the day indicated that Japanese land-based air forces had failed to neutralize Halsey's carriers. Consequently, at 15:30, Kurita ordered his fleet to change course westward, away from the San Bernardino Strait, hoping that this maneuver would reduce the pressure from air attacks and allow Japanese air forces to achieve better results. Meanwhile, Bogan launched his third strike of the day at 15:50, with 31 aircraft under Ellis targeting the Musashi one final time. However, due to fatigue, the attack was ineffective. After this last air strike, Kurita decided to head back towards the San Bernardino Strait and instructed the sinking Musashi to beach itself on Sibuyan Island at 17:15. Before this could be executed, the battleship sank at 19:36, resulting in the loss of 1,023 lives. Thus, the Musashi became the largest ship ever sunk by air attack in what was the largest air-sea battle in history up to that point. Despite losing 18 aircraft, the Americans succeeded in sinking the Musashi, torpedoing the Myoko, and damaging three other battleships to varying extents. Nevertheless, the 1st Striking Force emerged in better condition than anticipated, with the Musashi absorbing much of the torpedo and bomb damage and allowing the other ships to weather the attack. Kurita planned to navigate San Bernardino Strait during the night, proceed down the east coast of Samar, and reach Leyte Gulf around 11:00. Meanwhile, Admiral Mitscher's search planes had located Ozawa's carriers at 16:40. By afternoon, Ozawa had launched most of his aircraft in an attack on Sherman, but the final assault by the once formidable IJN carrier force achieved only limited success, with 28 planes lost before retreating to the Philippines. Remaining undetected, Ozawa then dispatched two battleship carriers and four destroyers under Rear-Admiral Matsuda Chiaki southward, drawing American attention to his position.  In the aftermath of the Battle of the Philippine Sea, the Americans did not know that the IJN had no prospects of replacing its lost aviators. Because the majority of the carriers themselves survived the battle, and the Americans knew other carriers were being added to the force, the IJN's carrier force was still a threat. The intelligence Halsey received on the IJN's carrier force indicated that it was fully capable. In every other major battle of the war, the IJN carrier fleet was the main threat. The Pacific War had become a carrier war and surface forces had been firmly supplanted as the primary striking force. The Americans had no way of knowing that the Japanese had turned this thinking on its head in their planning for Leyte Gulf. Nimitz wanted to destroy the Combined Fleet and thus gain an increased measure of operational freedom for future operations. He was disappointed that this did not occur at Philippine Sea and thus had inserted the instruction to Halsey that the destruction of the Japanese fleet would be his primary objective if the opportunity was presented. Achieving this not only would eliminate the main threat to the invasion, but it would cripple the IJN's ability to interfere with future operations. As the assessment from the aviators was that Kurita's force no longer posed a threat, at 19:50 Halsey ordered his entire force north to crush what he assessed as the primary threat: Ozawa's carrier force. He decided to do so with the entirety of his force. By doing so, he decided to ignore the threat posed by the Kurita force, which was headed toward San Bernardino Strait. He kept his whole force together, because that was how TF 38 fought and because, as he stated after the war, he did not want to divide his force in the face of the enemy. A decisive victory was most likely if the carriers of TF 38 worked with the battleships of TF 34. This was USN doctrine and Halsey fully supported it.  At 20:22, Task Force 38 set course north, with the three carrier groups in the area meeting just before midnight. Earlier, at 20:05, a night reconnaissance aircraft from Independence had reported that Kurita's formidable surface force was heading back toward the San Bernardino Strait. This news raised concerns among several of Halsey's subordinates, including Bogan and Lee, but they were dismissed by the resolute Halsey. As a result, the 3rd Fleet's full strength continued northward toward Ozawa's decoy force, leaving the San Bernardino Strait completely unprotected. This left Kurita's battleships unopposed between themselves and the American landing vessels, except for Kinkaid's vulnerable escort carriers off Samar's coast. Meanwhile, the detection of Nishimura's force on October 24 gave Kinkaid enough time to prepare for a battle at Surigao Strait. Oldendorf set up his battle line under Rear-Admiral George Weyler near Hingatungan Point in the northern part of the strait, providing maximum sea space while still constraining Japanese movement. Eight cruisers in two groups were positioned south of this line, with 24 destroyers stationed to screen the battleships and cruisers and positioned on both flanks to launch torpedo attacks against the approaching Japanese. Additionally, 39 PT boats were deployed in the southern approaches to the strait and into the Mindanao Sea to provide early warning and execute torpedo attacks when possible. The main issue was that the battleships were primarily equipped with high-explosive shells and would only engage once the Japanese forces were about 20,000 yards away. Moreover, Kinkaid had intercepted an order from Halsey to assemble a powerful task force of fast battleships. Misinterpreting the order's unclear wording, Kinkaid mistakenly believed Task Force 34 was coming to defend San Bernardino Strait, allowing his forces to concentrate on Surigao Strait instead. Despite Kurita's delays, Nishimura pressed on to breach the strait, advancing with the heavy cruiser Mogami and three destroyers. Little is known about Nishimura's precise thinking as he approached the strait. He was planning on arriving off Tacloban at 0430hrs on October 25 in accordance with Toyoda's master plan that had Kurita's force arriving off Leyte a short time later. This schedule fell apart after Kurita's advance was thrown off schedule on the afternoon of October 24 when he temporarily turned around in the face of intensive air attack in the Sibuyan Sea. At 2013hrs Nishimura sent a message to Toyoda and Kurita that he planned to arrive off Dulag at 0400hrs the next morning, a half hour later than planned. This was only a minor change; much more important was the receipt at 2200hrs of Kurita's message that he would not be in the gulf until 1100hrs. This meant that Nishimura's force was on its own when it executed its attack into the gulf. However, Nishimura did not change his plan after learning of Kurita's revised intentions. He was determined to force the strait in darkness and in so doing draw forces away from Kurita's main attack. The battle began at 2236hrs when PT-131 gained radar contact on Nishimura's main force. The three boats of the section headed toward the contact to make a torpedo attack. Two of the boats were slightly damaged, but one was able to close within torpedo range. News of the contact did not reach Oldendorf until 0026hrs on October 25. Another section sighted the advance group built around Mogami at 2350hrs and two of the boats fired a torpedo at the cruiser. Neither hit its target. Demonstrating the confusion in any night battle, at about 0100hrs Mogami was hit by a 6in. shell from Fuso. Though a dud, it killed three men. About an hour later, PT134 closed to within 3,000 yards of Fuso and fired three torpedoes. Again, all missed. This running series of encounters continued up until 0213hrs. Of the 39 boats, 30 contacted the Japanese and launched 34 torpedoes. None of Nishimura's ships was hit. While Nishimura's force was successfully fighting its way up the strait in good order, he kept Kurita and Shima informed of his progress. At 0040hrs, the two parts of Nishimura's force reunited. First blood went to the Japanese, since ten PTs were hit, and one (PT-493) sank, with a total of three dead and 20 wounded. Though unable to exact any attrition on the Japanese, the PTs had provided an invaluable service informing Oldendorf of Nishimura's location and strength. Based on an earlier report from one of Mogami's scout aircraft on the location and numbers of USN ships in Leyte Gulf, Nishimura appeared to believe that the battle would occur inside Leyte Gulf and not in Surigao Strait. If he really believed that Oldendorf would not use favorable geography to his advantage, he was sorely mistaken. Having survived the PT boat attacks with no damage, Nishimura now faced a much more deadly threat. This came in the form of five Fletcher-class destroyers under the command of the aggressive Captain Coward. Two other destroyers from Coward's Destroyer Squadron 54 were left on picket duty and did not take part in the torpedo attack. The five destroyers assigned to the attack were arrayed to conduct an anvil attack (with torpedoes coming in from both bows of the enemy target), with McDermut and Monssen from the west and Remey, McGowan, and Melvin from the east. Approaching at 30 knots, Coward's ships would launch torpedoes guided by radar, and refrain from using their 5in. guns so as not to give their positions away. Once the torpedoes were on their way, the destroyers would break off and head north along the coast to clear the area and reduce the possibility of a friendly fire incident. What ensued was one of the most successful attacks of the entire war. Shortly after 03:00, Coward's three eastern destroyers launched 27 torpedoes from a range of 8200 to 9300 yards at the advancing Japanese ships. They scored two critical hits on the Fuso at 03:08, causing flooding and fires. The battleship, unaware of the severity of the damage, veered off course and headed south, ultimately sinking at about 03:45 with 1620 lives lost. The Americans claimed that the torpedoes had split the Fuso in two. Meanwhile, Coward's two western destroyers fired a full salvo of 20 torpedoes at 03:10. In response, Nishimura changed course, exposing his screen to danger. By 03:19, three torpedoes from McDermut struck the Yamagumo, which exploded and sank within two minutes; another torpedo hit the Michishio amidships, causing it to sink 15 minutes later after coming to a halt; and a final torpedo hit the Asagumo, damaging its bow and reducing its speed, forcing it to withdraw from the battle. McDermut's ten torpedoes were the most effective salvo of the war from any American destroyer. Monssen's torpedo attack resulted in a single hit on the battleship Yamashiro, causing some flooding and reducing her firepower by a third. Following Coward's devastating torpedo strike, six more destroyers, divided into two groups of three, approached Nishimura's force from the west along the coast of Leyte. The first group commenced their attack at 03:23, launching 14 torpedoes from a range of 6500 to 6800 yards, but only one torpedo struck the Yamashiro, temporarily slowing her to 5 knots. The second group of destroyers fired 15 torpedoes at 03:29, but none of their torpedoes hit their targets, and the gunfire from both sides proved ineffective. After this failed assault, nine destroyers in three sections of three approached Nishimura's weakened column from both flanks. The first two sections, attacking from either side, fired a half-salvo of five torpedoes from each destroyer, but none hit. Before the final section could launch its attack, a fierce gunnery battle was underway.  The gunnery battle began at 0351hrs when the first American cruiser opened up. Two minutes later, West Virginia commenced fire from 22,800 yards. All ships fired at the largest radar return of the three Japanese ships, which was Yamashiro. The American barrage grew as each battleship gained a fire control solution. The three ships with the most modern fire control systems did most of the work. California joined in at 0355hrs from 20,400 yards followed by Tennessee one minute later. The three battleships with the less capable Mk 3 fire control radar struggled to gain a firing solution. Maryland opened fire at 0359hrs by ranging her Mk 3 radar on the shell splashes from the other battleships. Mississippi took until 0412hrs when she fired a full salvo at Yamashiro from 19,790 yards. Pennsylvania never gained a good solution for her 14in. main battery and failed to fire a single salvo. Unbeknownst to Nishimura, the Americans had executed a "T" maneuver, leaving his ships able to fire only their forward guns while the enemy could unleash full broadsides. Concentrating their fire on the Yamashiro, Oldendorf's cruisers and battleships landed several hits during the 18-minute engagement. By 03:56, the Yamashiro was seen burning amidships, aft, and in the bridge area. Despite this, the battleship fought back fiercely, targeting the cruisers Phoenix, Columbia, Shropshire, and Denver, though no hits were achieved. The Mogami endured severe damage during this engagement, with the cruiser Portland focusing its fire on her and inflicting heavy harm. In the early phase of the battle, she took several 5in. hits from American destroyers. In the first minutes of the withering barrage from Oldendorf's cruisers and battleships, Mogami sustained more damage, including a hit on one of her 8in. turrets. After firing four Type 93 torpedoes at 0401hrs against the gun flashes from enemy ships to the north, she came under fire from heavy cruiser Portland. Two 8in. shells hit Mogami's bridge at 0402hrs, killing her commanding officer, and other shells disabled two engine rooms. The new commanding officer decided to break off the action and head south at slow speed. While headed south, she encountered the Second Diversion Attack Force.  As American gunfire pummeled Yamashiro's superstructure, the last destroyer group approached head-on, closing to within 6200 yards before launching 13 torpedoes. Before the torpedoes could reach their targets, the destroyers came under friendly fire and further assault from Yamashiro's guns, resulting in the Albert W. Grant taking 18 hits before being withdrawn. Observing the friendly fire, Oldendorf ordered a ceasefire at 04:09, allowing Nishimura to begin a retreat south. However, by 04:11, the Yamashiro had been hit by three torpedoes from the final destroyer salvo, causing a severe list and bringing the battleship to a halt. Yamashiro's valiant yet ultimately futile resistance ended at 04:19 when she capsized to port, taking Nishimura and 1625 others with her. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The largest naval battle in human history had only just begun. As many historians argue, given the fateful decision of Halsey to try and knock out the IJN combined fleet, the transports had been left completely open to an attack. Absolute carnage could unfold on an unprecedented scale…perhaps enough to cause America to rethink continuing the war?

Last time we spoke about the Formosa air battle. In mid-1944, General MacArthur and Admirals Nimitz and Halsey debated their next move in the Pacific. MacArthur, intent on a direct assault on the Philippines, clashed with Nimitz, who favored invading Formosa. MacArthur's persuasive tactics, political savvy and to be more blunt, threats during a rather dramatic visit to Honolulu, convinced President FDR to prioritize the Philippines. Despite MacArthur's grandstanding, FDR did not completely abandon the US Navy's plans, and MacArthur's plan would require significant Naval support, with carrier strikes planned to soften Japanese defenses. In October, Halsey's carriers launched devastating strikes against Formosa, leading to heavy Japanese losses and disrupting their air power. Despite some fierce counterattacks and damage to American ships, including the cruiser Canberra, the American forces achieved air supremacy. The successful air campaign set the stage for the invasion of Leyte, marking a pivotal shift in the Pacific War.  This episode is the Return to the Philippines Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  We last left off the week before the grand  return to the Philippines, Admiral Halsey had dispatched his carrier forces to neutralize enemy bases in Formosa in preparation for General MacArthur's Leyte invasion. However, Admiral Toyoda's response was unexpectedly strong, resulting in two cruisers being torpedoed, which forced Admiral Mitscher to order a retreat eastward under pressure from Japanese aviators. On October 15, while the cruisers Houston and Canberra were being towed under the protection of Admiral McCain's carriers, Halsey directed Admirals Bogan and Sherman's task groups to withdraw eastward out of sight. At the same time, Admiral Davison's forces carried out intermittent air raids on northern Luzon to keep enemy aircraft at bay. More significantly, Halsey decided to turn the situation into an opportunity. He instructed McCain's units to send out open messages, pleading for assistance. This tactic, which Halsey called the "Lure of the Streamlined Bait," was designed to mislead the Japanese into believing that this task group was all that remained of the fleet, enticing them to move in for the kill. Halsey's other task groups, which had withdrawn eastward, would then return to engage and destroy the enemy. On October 14, Japanese aviators claimed two carriers, one battleship and one heavy cruiser sunk, and one small carrier, one battleship and one light cruiser set afire. The exaggerated claims of the Japanese air force were accepted jubilantly on the home islands. The people felt that the American Navy had indeed been given a death blow, and the Finance Ministry distributed "celebration sake" to all households in the country to commemorate the event. The Tokyo radio made the unfounded claim that "a total of 57 enemy warships including 19 aircraft carriers and four battleships were sunk or heavily damaged by the Japanese forces… the enemy task forces lost the majority of their strength and were put to rout." It also predicted that the Allied losses would delay the invasion of the Philippine Islands by two months. Admiral Halsey's reaction was to report that "all 3rd Fleet Ships reported by radio Tokyo as sunk have now been salvaged and are retiring towards the enemy." The exaggerated claims of success made by Japanese pilots further convinced Toyoda to continue the assault, despite heavy aircraft losses. Meanwhile, Admiral Shima's strike force was already rushing south from the Inland Sea to support the air forces. However, Shima's force was not the only one speeding towards the battlefront. On October 13, Admiral Barbey's convoy, consisting of over 470 ships and carrying the 24th Division and the 6th Army Service Command, finally departed Hollandia, heading toward the designated "Far Shore," Leyte. The next day, the convoy crossed the equator without ceremony. By October 15, Task Force 78, which included the 1st Cavalry Division, joined the massive convoy. With General Sibert's full 10th Corps now en route to Leyte, the plan was to rendezvous with Admiral Wilkinson's Task Force 79. Over the course of about two weeks, General Hodge's 24th Corps had been transported from Hawaii to Eniwetok and then to Manus Island. On October 11, the LSTs carrying the assault battalions departed Manus, followed by Wilkinson's convoy of 267 ships, which left the Admiralties three days later. Their progress was steady, and by October 17, Wilkinson's tractor groups began joining the 7th Fleet. This combined fleet formed the largest convoy ever seen in the Pacific up to that point. Meanwhile, during the Formosa Air Battle, Japanese aviators launched multiple strikes against Task Groups 38.1 and 38.4 from dawn to dusk on October 15. Fortunately, the American carriers' reinforced combat air patrols effectively minimized damage, with only one glancing bomb hit on the Franklin. In retaliation, Admiral Mitscher's pilots claimed to have shot down more than 100 Japanese planes. Additionally, Admiral Davison's carriers attacked enemy air concentrations in Luzon, though they faced heavy resistance from Vice-Admiral Teraoka Kinpei's reorganized 1st Air Fleet. These engagements continued over the next two days, with American forces estimated to have destroyed 99 enemy aircraft on the ground and 95 in the air by October 19. On the morning of October 16, Mitscher's carriers conducted long-range searches to determine if the enemy had fallen for Halsey's trap. Meanwhile, Japanese morning reconnaissance flights over the western Philippine Sea spotted three enemy task groups with a combined total of 13 carriers in the vicinity, forcing Toyoda to reluctantly cancel Shima's planned attack. As a result, no surface engagement materialized from Halsey's "Lure of the Streamlined Bait." However, 247 naval aircraft were promptly dispatched from Okinawa, Formosa, and Luzon to locate the enemy groups. McCain continued to fend off persistent Japanese air assaults, which managed to land another torpedo hit on the Houston. Hellcats from light carriers Cabot and Cowpens did great execution against a Japanese formation of over 100 aircraft. However, three Jills penetrated the screen. One twin engine plane fought through the CAP and ships' anti-aircraft batteries, surviving just long enough to put a torpedo in the water before the plane itself crashed into the sea. The torpedo struck the after portion of the starboard side of the Houston, blowing 20 men overboard and spreading gasoline fires in the waters around the cruiser. The explosion set fire to the starboard tank that held fuel for the ship's reconnaissance floatplanes, causing a major fire in the aircraft hangar, though the remaining crew suppressed the blaze within fifteen minutes. Flooding from this hit degraded the ship's buoyancy and stability further. Another 300 men were evacuated afterward, leaving just 200 aboard to continue damage control efforts as the ships withdrew. Despite the cruiser suffering significant damage, the towing operation carried on, slowly guiding the task group towards Naval Base Ulithi, which they eventually reached on October 27. On October 17, the Japanese were still in pursuit of the retreating fleet, but contact was lost, and further attacks were aborted. Nevertheless, the Formosa Air Battle had one final chapter. After the successful strike on Okayama on October 14, General LeMay deemed the damage extensive enough that it wasn't necessary to send all available B-29s for mop-up operations. On October 16, only the 444th and 462nd Bombardment Groups were dispatched to hit Okayama, while the 468th targeted Heito, an airbase and staging field east of Takao. Of 49 planes airborne against Okayama, only 28 bombed there, but they were aided by five stragglers from the 468th Group. To even things up, a formation of 11 planes from the 444th flew calmly by its Okayama target and struck at Heito through an error by the lead bombardier. Other B-29s bombed alternate or chance targets at Takao, Toshien, Swatow, and Sintien harbors; at Hengyang; and at several airdromes, including Taichu on Formosa. This dual mission was less smooth than the October 14 raid, but no losses were reported. The next day, 23 B-29s from the 40th Bombardment Group attacked the Einansho Air Depot near Tainan to complete the Formosa campaign. Heavy cloud cover prevented 13 of the bombers from reaching the target, so they diverted to bomb Takao harbor instead. Despite these challenges, LeMay's bombers inflicted significant damage overall. By the end of the Formosa Air Battle, the Japanese had launched a total of 761 offensive sorties. Toyoda's pilots reported that nearly the entire 3rd Fleet had been sunk and the American carrier force was in ruins. For comedic effect why not go through the real list shall we: Japanese claims were finally listed as follows: Sunk: 11 carriers, 2 battleships, 3 cruisers, 1 destroyer (or light cruiser). Damaged: 8 carriers, 2 battleships, 4 cruisers, 1 destroyer (or light cruiser), 13 unidentified ships. In addition, at least 12 other ships set afire. These exaggerated claims were heavily promoted by newspapers, although figures like Toyoda within the IJN remained skeptical. In reality, the Japanese air forces were decisively beaten at Formosa, losing around 171 planes in the initial defense and another 321 during attacks on Mitscher's fleet—a total of approximately 492 aircraft.  The Second Air Fleet, comprising the main strength of the Navy's base air forces, had lost 50 per cent of its strength and was reduced to 230 operational aircraft. The First Air Fleet and Fourth Air Army in the Philippines were left with a combined operational strength of only a little over 100 aircraft. Of 143 carrier planes used to reinforce the Second Air Fleet, about one-third, with their flight crews, had been lost. Allied estimates, however, place Japanese losses as high as 655. In addition to these aircraft losses, Japan suffered significant casualties among air personnel, which severely weakened Admiral Ozawa's 3rd and 4th Carrier Divisions and left General Yamashita with limited air support for the defense of the Philippines. On the other hand, Halsey's forces lost only 89 aircraft, with two cruisers suffering serious damage. The radar-guided Hellcats easily repelled the fragmented Japanese attacks, causing no delays to the American operations and inflicting no serious damage on Task Force 38. This defeat significantly diminished Japan's ability to defend the Philippines, as their surface forces were now left without effective air cover. In the aftermath of the battle, the aggressive Vice-Admiral Onishi Takishiro assumed command of the 1st Air Fleet and initiated the creation of a suicide corps, recruiting volunteers to dive-bomb enemy vessels. Thus, the Kamikaze Special Attack Corps was born. Captain Motoharu Okamura, in charge of Tateyama base and the 341st Air Group Home is theorized to be the first officer to propose the use of kamikaze attack tactics. Commander Asaichi Tamai asked a group of 23 student pilots whom he had trained to volunteer for the first special kamikaze attack force, all of them did so willingly. The names of the four subunits within the Kamikaze Special Attack Force were Unit Shikishima, Unit Yamato, Unit Asahi and Unit Yamazakura. LeMay reported the destruction of 65 buildings and damage to 9 out of the 80 at Okayama's assembly plant, along with the destruction of 7 hangars and 16 buildings and damage to 9 others at the airbase. As a result, LeMay's intelligence team estimated it would take between four and six months to fully restore the Okayama plant to full operational capacity. His final strike of the month occurred on October 25, targeting the Omura Aircraft Factory, with 78 B-29 bombers successfully taking off. Over Omura, 59 planes dropped 156 tons of bombs, while 11 hit various other targets. Despite moderate resistance, one bomber was lost during the attack. Strike photos and subsequent reconnaissance showed significant damage, especially in the aluminum fabrication area. Over the following three months, Omura would become a primary target for Operation Matterhorn, though the 20th Bomber Command also conducted additional strikes to support Allied operations in Southeast Asia, China, and the Philippines. Meanwhile, minesweepers and other vessels had cleared the way for amphibious flotillas. In the early dawn of October 17 the minesweepers began their work on the channel approaches to Suluan Island. By 06:30 they had accomplished their task and then began to sweep the waters of the landing areas in Leyte Gulf until the storm forced them to suspend operations. At 12:59 they resumed sweeping with great difficulty. Until A Day, intensive area and tactical mine sweeping continued. The sweepers started at dawn each day and worked continuously until nightfall. By October 19 it was known that the Japanese had heavily mined the approaches to Leyte Gulf but that there were no mines within the gulf itself. However the northern part of the main channel into the gulf was not considered safe. By the same date sweeping had been completed in the southern half, 186 mines having been destroyed. At about 01:35 on October 19, the destroyer supporting the mine-sweeping units which were in the gulf struck a floating mine and while maneuvering away from the area struck another. The ship was disabled and retired from action. By A Day, a total of 227 mines had been destroyed and a passage approximately six miles wide had been cleared just north of Dinagat Island. All ships were therefore directed to enter Leyte Gulf through that portion of the strait. As the minesweepers came close to the land, boats containing Filipinos moved out to welcome the advance party of liberators. The reception they met was not enthusiastic. Admiral Oldendorf "suspected that some might have come seeking information so detained them aboard their respective ships… Directed no further patriots be taken aboard ship."With Halsey's forces still in the Formosa-Ryukyus region, these ships were under the air cover of General Whitehead's 5th Air Force and Admiral Kinkaid's escort carriers. While minesweepers and demolition teams worked to clear mines, remove transport barriers, and perform beach reconnaissance, Company D of the 6th Ranger Battalion prepared to land on Suluan Island on October 17. Supported by fire from the USS Denver and in heavy rain, the Rangers successfully landed on the beach at 08:05 without opposition. The men immediately filed south 500 yards on a trail along the coast and then headed east toward the lighthouse. On the way, four buildings, one of which contained a Japanese radio, were found and set ablaze. The company then continued along the trail. Suddenly the enemy fired from a concealed position, killing one man and wounding another. When Company D went into attack formation, the enemy force disappeared into the heavy jungle bordering the trail. The march was resumed and the company reached its objective without further incident. The lighthouse, which had been damaged by naval bombardment, and adjoining buildings were deserted. Unfortunately, a Japanese radio station successfully reported the enemy convoy's approach and the start of the Rangers' landings, revealing that Leyte was the Americans' ultimate target. In response, Toyoda swiftly initiated Operation Sho-Go, ordering Vice-Admiral Kurita Takeo's 1st Striking Force to move from Lingga anchorage to Brunei Bay, preparing to strike the enemy invasion fleet.  Just after midnight on October 18, Kurita's ships departed Lingga anchorage and began their trek to Leyte. Sentai (Division) 16—heavy cruiser Aoba, light cruiser Kinu, and destroyer Uranami—was ordered to detach from Kurita's command and head to Manila. These ships were all among the oldest in Kurita's fleet, but it was a mistake to detach them for a secondary transport mission when they would have been better used to augment the decisive attack planned for Kurita's force. Simultaneously, Shima's 2nd Striking Force, reinforced by Kurita's detached 16th Cruiser Division, was tasked with supporting counterlandings. The Second Striking Force, for this newly-assigned mission, was to be composed only of the Fifth Fleet (two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, seven destroyers) plus the 16th Cruiser Division (one heavy cruiser, one light cruiser, one destroyer) detached from the First Striking Force. Under this plan, the 16th Cruiser Division was ordered to proceed to Manila, while the Second Striking Force main body, then at Amami Oshima in the Ryukyus, was ordered to go first to Mako, refuel, and then proceed to the Philippines.   By noon, another order was issued to Ozawa's Main Body, despite its depleted air power, to coordinate a sortie from home waters in support of the attack planned for the morning of October 25 in Leyte Gulf. The mission of the Ozawa force was of vital importance to the success of the over-all plan. It was to act as a decoy to draw off the main strength of the enemy naval forces covering the invasion operations in Leyte Gulf, thus allowing the 1st Striking Force to penetrate to the landing point and smash the enemy's troop and supply ships. To heighten its effectiveness as a lure, the Ozawa Force sortied with all of the 3rd Carrier Division, made up of the regular carrier Zuikaku and the light carriers Zuiho, Chitose, and Chiyoda. The total number of aircraft available to put aboard these ships, however, was only 108. These belonged to the poorly trained air groups of the 1st Carrier Division and represented about half the normal complement. In addition to the half-empty carriers, the force comprised two battleships, three light cruisers and eight destroyers. Ozawa fully anticipated that his fleet would be completely wiped out, but this sacrifice was deemed essential to achieve the primary objective: destruction of the entire enemy invasion force. As a result of the transfer of the flying groups of the 3d and 4th Carrier Divisions to Second Air Fleet for the Formosa air battle, the Task Force Main Body had lost much of its planned striking power. The mission assigned to it was therefore less offensive than that assigned in the original Sho-Go battle plan. The original plan had called for a diversionary attack by the Ozawa Force against the enemy's main carrier task forces. Under the more general terms of the 18 October plan, however, Vice Adm. Ozawa was left discretion to choose an attack target more commensurate with the strength of his force. Meanwhile, Davison's carrier aircraft launched attacks on air bases around Manila and Legaspi, but neither the 1st Air Fleet nor the 4th Air Army could respond due to adverse weather. As these strikes were carried out in difficult conditions, General Terauchi concluded by nightfall that a significant enemy operation was underway. He then activated the Army component of Sho-Go, instructing Lieutenant-General Tominaga Kyoji to target enemy ships near Leyte. Should the enemy successfully land, General Suzuki's 35th Army was ordered to delay their advance until reinforcements arrived, with the goal of launching a counterattack to defeat the Americans by October 25. Given the recent actions on Suluan and the American naval presence in the Leyte Gulf, the Army and Navy IGHQ sections surprisingly coordinated their response, with the IJA staff approving the Southern Army's request to implement Sho-Go 1. It was determined that the coming decisive battle for Japan was the Philippines. One major difference was the battle's location. Terauchi, Yamashita, and other Southern Army officers believed it would be Luzon, not Leyte. With Sho-Go 1 focused on Leyte, the Japanese would have to fight in the central Philippines, without extensive defensive works or major airfields. Yamashita would also use his limited shipping to send reinforcements to Leyte. If the Japanese lost Leyte, there might not be sufficient strength to defeat decisively any American offensive on Luzon. Deploying the few IJA units to Leyte would make a Luzon defense harder to accomplish. Sho-Go 1 could hand the control of the Philippines to the Americans. Eventually, Terauchi agreed to the IGHQ position of making Leyte the primary location to fight the Americans. Believing that Halsey's fleet had been defeated off Formosa, Terauchi now thought the Americans could not sustain any major operations or contest reinforcement convoys, both poor assumptions that would later cause suffering for the IJA. Yamashita disagreed with Terauchi and the IGHQ about designating Leyte as the prime battle site; but on October 22, Terauchi finally ordered Yamashita and the Fourth Air Army to make Leyte the main point of attack. His opinion was: “The opportunity to annihilate the enemy is at hand.” However Yamashita was convinced that the Americans had greater strength than anticipated, given the continued American carrier aviation's presence. Meanwhile, by 12:30 on October 17, the Rangers had successfully landed on Dinagat Island, finding no Japanese forces there. On the morning of the 18th, the ship's address system clanged out general quarters. The men went below, put on their gear, and checked their weapons. At 0900 the troops were told to prepare to disembark. They bolted up the ladders and spilled out over the deck to the davits. The boats were lowered and the first wave started for the beach. At the same time the guns from the destroyer and frigate which had escorted the transport concentrated fire against the shore line for twelve minutes. Three minutes later, the boats grounded on a coral reef forty yards from the beach, and the men waded the remaining distance to shore. They encountered no resistance and at 1038 the company commander, Capt. Arthur D. Simons, notified the battalion commander, "Beachhead secured, supplies ashore. No resistance. No casualties." The company set up a channel light. They quickly set up a navigation light at Desolation Point to guide the main convoy. However, bad weather and tides delayed the landing on Homonhon Island. Colonel Mucci's Company B finally made it ashore the next morning without opposition and installed another navigation light. At the same time, Tominaga attempted to retaliate but was thwarted by a violent storm. In the afternoon, Kinkaid's forces, supported by Mitscher's carriers, conducted minesweeping and direct-fire missions on the Leyte beaches to protect the underwater demolition teams. Admiral Oldendorf's warships heavily bombarded the southern beaches, paving the way for transports to enter Leyte Gulf by the following evening. These pre-landing operations, which continued through October 19 on the northern landing beaches, alerted General Makino to a potential secondary landing closer to Tacloban. This maneuver would outflank the main strength of the 16th Division and directly threaten his headquarters. In response, Makino relocated his headquarters from Tacloban to Dagami and ordered the 33rd Regiment to reinforce the Palo-San Jose coastal sector, while the 2nd Battalion strengthened the southern defenses. Despite these last-minute efforts, Makino's forces were unprepared for the overwhelming assault. The heavy naval gunfire had destroyed many defensive positions and disabled most of the 22nd Field Artillery Regiment's guns. Furthermore, although the weather now favored Tominaga's counterstrikes, American carrier operations had been so effective that he was unable to challenge their air superiority. Despite the optimism of the High Command with regard to the prospects of gaining eventual air superiority in the battle area, it was already evident that the air phase of Sho-Go was not working out as intended. Those plans had envisaged mass air attacks against the invading enemy naval forces and troop convoys beginning prior to their arrival at the landing point. The enemy, however, had forestalled these plans by striking at Leyte before the planned concentration of Japanese air strength in the Philippines had been completed, and before the Navy's base air forces had time to recover from losses sustained in the Formosa Air Battle and earlier enemy carrier strikes on the Philippines. The 1st Air Fleet, already in the Philippines, had been reduced to an operational strength of less than 50 aircraft. The 2nd Air Fleet, which had lost half its strength in the Formosa Battle, had not yet begun its redeployment from Formosa to the Philippines. Although the 4th Air Army had sustained relatively lighter losses, its strength was widely dispersed. Before it could operate effectively in the Leyte area, it had to concentrate at forward bases in the central Philippines, an operation rendered both difficult and dangerous by enemy action, bad weather, and the virtually useless condition of many of the forward fields due to continuous rains. Under such unfavorable conditions, the concentration required a minimum of several days, and in the meanwhile the enemy was able to operate in Leyte Gulf against extremely light air opposition. On October 19, when weather conditions finally permitted an air attack against the enemy invasion fleet, no more than five naval and three Army aircraft could be mustered against the steadily increasing concentration of enemy shipping in Leyte Gulf. By the evening of October 19, the preliminary operations were nearly complete, with most of Kinkaid's fleet positioned outside the gulf. Since the minefield at the entrance hadn't been fully cleared, the ships entered slightly south of the entrance's center, avoiding the main channel and staying close to Dinagat's northern point. Meanwhile, Suzuki had already activated the Suzu Plan, with units from the 30th and 102nd Divisions preparing to move toward Ormoc. However, before they could depart, Oldendorf began October 20 with two simultaneous pre-landing bombardments, each involving three battleships. After two hours of battleship fire, cruisers and destroyers followed with high-explosive shells, causing significant damage. At the same time, Kinkaid's escort carriers launched bombing and strafing runs against suspected defensive positions and airfields, severely disrupting Makino's radio and telegraph communications. At 0800 the first anchor chains of the vessels had rattled out; LCVP's were quickly swung over the sides; boats circled mother ships and moved to their rendezvous areas. The LCI mortar and LCI rocket ships took their places at the head of the assault waves. It was now 0945, fifteen minutes before H Hour. The LCI's raced simultaneously to the shores of Leyte, raking the landing beaches with rocket and mortar fire. The bombardment grew heavier and more monotonous. Hundreds of small boats, flanked by rocket ships and destroyers, headed toward the beaches; thousands of rockets hit the beaches with the rumble of an earthquake. It was impossible to distinguish one explosion from another in the unbroken roar. By 09:30, the 21st Regiment successfully landed on Panaon Island without resistance, securing control of the entrance to Sogod Bay. Fifteen minutes later, the transports sped toward Leyte's shores, led by LCI gunboats, which pounded the beaches with rockets and mortar fire. At 10:00, Sibert's 10th Corps, covered by a heavy rocket barrage, landed on the White and Red Beaches, marking the Americans' return to the Philippines. Admiral Fechteler's transports delivered General Mudge's 1st Cavalry Division to White Beach, where the brigades landed side by side, with the 8th Cavalry Regiment held in floating reserve. Facing only small arms and machine gun fire, the 1st Squadron of the 7th Cavalry Regiment swiftly secured the Cataisan Peninsula and its airfield, while the 2nd Squadron captured San Jose and advanced across the Burayan River, reaching a point 3000 yards from the beach. The 5th and 12th Cavalry Regiments had to navigate a deep swamp to access Highway 1, then pushed westward until they encountered enemy resistance near the foothills of Caibaan. At 10:40, Mudge's reserve began to land, followed by the division artillery at 13:30. Meanwhile, to the south, Barbey's transports landed General Irving's 24th Division on the shallow Red Beach, with the 19th and 34th Regiments landing abreast in battalion columns. The Japanese permitted the first five waves to land, but when the remaining waves were about 2000 yards offshore, they unleashed heavy artillery and mortar fire, sinking several landing craft and causing significant casualties.  The first elements of the 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry, inadvertently landed 300 yards north of the assigned area and were immediately pinned down by heavy machine gun and rifle fire. The commanding officer of the regiment, Col. Aubrey S. Newman, arrived on the beach and, noting the situation, shouted to his men, "Get the hell off the beach. Get up and get moving. Follow me." Thus urgently prompted, the men followed him into the wooded area. To the south the 19th Infantry, with the 3d Battalion in the lead, had also struck heavy opposition on its sector of the beach. Through error the first waves of the regiment landed almost directly behind the 34th Infantry and 800 yards north of the proposed landing point. The later waves landed at the planned spot. Company K did not land on schedule, because its command boat broke down. Going in under heavy fire, the company had all its officers except one killed or wounded. One of its platoons was unable to make contact with the rest of the company until the following day. Upon landing, the first waves were immediately pinned down by intense machine-gun and rifle fire. Despite this, the Americans successfully stormed the initial defenses of the 33rd Regiment. By 12:15, the 34th Regiment had cleared the beach of enemy forces, and after a preparatory concentration, its 3rd Battalion advanced approximately 400 yards. The 2nd Battalion then moved through the 3rd, crossed Highway 1 at 15:50, and established positions for the night 100 yards west of the highway. To the south, the 3rd Battalion, 19th Regiment had reached Highway 1, while the battered 1st Battalion followed behind under heavy fire. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion landed and advanced cautiously, as the 1st Battalion pressed toward Hill 522 amidst fierce resistance. Hill 522, which rose directly from the river's edge north of Palo, overlooked the landing beaches and its upward trails were steep and winding. Hill 522 presented the most significant terrain feature which would have to be overcome before the American forces could push into the interior from Palo and it constituted one of the chief objectives for A Day. Three months earlier General Makino had started to fortify it, impressing nearly all of the male population of Palo for the work. By A Day they had constructed five well-camouflaged pillboxes of rocks, planking, and logs, covered with earth. Numerous tunnels honeycombed the hill; the communications trenches were seven feet deep. They eventually encircled enemy positions and began to make steady progress up the hill. By dusk, Companies B and C had captured the hill's crests and successfully repelled several enemy counterattacks. This achievement secured Hill 522, which commanded the route into the interior and overlooked Palo, the gateway to Leyte Valley. At 14:30, General Douglas MacArthur landed on Red Beach alongside President Sergio Osmeña, who had taken over from Manuel Quezon following his death on August 1. So if you go on Youtube you can see the footage of MacArthur et al wading ashore and to this day there is a monument to this iconic moment. MacArthur made a radio broadcast to the Filipino people, declaring, “People of the Philippines: I have returned. By the grace of Almighty God our forces stand again on Philippine soil—soil consecrated in the blood of our two peoples. We have come dedicated and committed to the task of destroying every vestige of enemy control over your daily lives, and of restoring upon a foundation of indestructible strength, the liberties of your people” He had finally fulfilled his promise to the Filipino people. Further south, Hodge's 24th Corps encountered more resistance as it landed on Orange, Blue, Violet, and Yellow Beaches at 10:00. Under the transport of Rear-Admiral Forrest Royal's ships and the protection of LCI gunboats, General Bradley's 96th Division landed with its regiments positioned between the Calbasag River and the town of San Jose. The 382nd Regiment successfully disembarked on the Blue Beaches at 09:50, followed by the 383rd Regiment on the Orange Beaches ten minutes later.As they advanced inland, both units faced intermittent mortar and artillery fire from the 9th Regiment positioned on Catmon Hill. Colonel Macey Dill's 3rd Battalion initially encountered obstacles such as tank barriers made of coconut logs, debris on the beach, and heavy bombardment from Hill 120. However, with mortar and naval gunfire support, the battalion eventually captured the hill and repelled several enemy counterattacks, though they were unable to continue the advance due to deep swamps. In contrast, Dill's 2nd Battalion managed to push about 2,500 yards inland despite the intense heat and swampy conditions. To the north, Colonel Edwin May's 1st and 2nd Battalions were similarly hindered by an unexpected swamp but still succeeded in securing San Jose and the head of the Labiranan River, advancing approximately 2,600 yards inland. By 18:00, Bradley's artillery had been landed, although the 381st Regiment remained in floating reserve. Further south, Admiral Conolly's transports landed General Arnold's 7th Division between the Calbasag and Daguitan Rivers, with regiments landing side by side. Companies L and K of the 3rd Battalion, 32nd Regiment landed abreast. Company L, on the left, ran into heavy fire from Japanese machine gunners who had waited until the leading elements of the company exposed themselves. The Japanese were entrenched in bunkers emplaced in hedgerows and banana groves. The pillboxes, which were mutually supporting, were located at the ends of the hedgerows and occasionally in the middle of an open field. Each pillbox had machine guns and anti-tank guns. Company L suffered a number of casualties and was pinned down. The enemy gunners then turned to Company K and stopped its forward movement. In the space of 15 minutes, 2 officers and 6 men of the 3rd Battalion were killed, and 1 officer and 18 men wounded. Of the medium tanks that had come ashore at 10:30, 3 were sent to support Company L and 2 to support Company K. The latter 2 were knocked out before they could adjust their fire on the pillboxes. The leading tank sent in support of Company L was knocked out by a direct hit from an antitank gun. With 2 tanks remaining, it was decided to hit the flanks of the entrenched pillboxes at 13:45. A platoon of Company K went to the right and another platoon from the company to the left. Simultaneously the remaining elements of the 2 companies, coordinating with the tanks, assaulted the pillboxes. The heavy volume of fire kept the enemy guns quiet until they could be finished off with grenades. The pillboxes were knocked out without further casualties. Paralleling the route of advance of Company L were several hedge fences, behind which were enemy machine guns and mortars. Although under heavy fire, the company was able to break through the first barriers with the aid of the tanks. At 16:30, since the enemy fire continued in volume, the 32nd Regiment withdrew and established a defensive position for the night. Meanwhile, the 184th Regiment landed its 3rd Battalion at Yellow Beach 2, directly in front of Dulag, and its 1st Battalion at Yellow Beach 1, which was farther south and separated by a swamp. Both beaches saw surprisingly little resistance, allowing the 184th to advance more quickly than expected, successfully capturing Dulag and reaching its airfield.Behind them, the reserve 2nd Battalion and the 3rd Battalion of the 17th Regiment landed after midday. The 3rd Battalion pushed west and south with minimal opposition, successfully securing the bridge over the Daguitan River at Dao. By the end of the day, both corps had fallen short of their beachhead objectives, with Hodge's 24th Corps achieving particularly modest results. Despite this, the Sixth Army had successfully landed assault forces along the entire eastern coast of Leyte and gained control of Panaon Strait, with casualties totaling 49 killed, 192 wounded, and 6 missing. Most of the 16th Division had retreated during the naval and air bombardment before the landing, which allowed the Americans to secure most coastal defenses before the enemy could regroup. Consequently, the only Japanese forces encountered were those left behind to delay the invasion. A more substantial enemy engagement was yet to come. Air opposition to the invasion was minimal, as Tominaga and the naval air forces continued to concentrate their strength in the Philippines in preparation for a major air offensive scheduled to begin on October 25. However, 37 Army and Navy planes attacked the invasion shipping off Leyte. At 1600, on 20 October an enemy torpedo plane was sighted as it aimed its torpedo at Honolulu. Despite the skillful maneuvering of Captain Thurber to evade, the torpedo found its mark on her port side. 64 men were killed and 35 were injured. Flooding caused a temporary severe list, but the ship was saved by efficient damage measures. But Honolulu was out of the fight. Honolulu sailed out the next day, arriving at Manus on 29 October for temporary repairs, and then steamed for Norfolk, Virginia, on 19 November, arriving on 20 December via Pearl Harbor, San Diego, California, and the Panama Canal. Unfortunately, not all went well with logistics. Although 107,450 tons of supplies had been landed on Leyte by the end of A-Day, it was a haphazard operation. The Navy was responsible for transporting the troops and supplies to the target area. Ships' companies unloaded the cargo from the cargo vessels and transported it in small craft to the beaches. Many of the ships had been improperly loaded for the journey to Leyte. The cargo should have been so loaded that articles first needed would be the last put on board; instead it had been stowed haphazardly, with little attention given to the problem of unloading. As a result of the faulty stowage of supplies on the ships, many badly needed items were at the bottoms of the holds, and articles that would not be needed until later in the operation were piled on top of them. The supplies were set ashore in random fashion and then were carelessly thrown on trucks and other vehicles. This sort of handling resulted in a loss of carrying capacity, in slow removal of the loads, and in a consequent delay in the return of vehicles to the landing beaches. Thus, officers complained about the disorganized effort to deliver, store, and distribute supplies. This was a precursor of future resupply problems. As the landings proceeded about as smoothly as could be hoped, Halsey would order Task Groups 38.1 and 38.4 to head to Ulithi on October 22, as he doubted that the Japanese would mount a major operation in response to the American invasion. And yet, the Japanese were about to come calling for another decisive battle.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. General Douglas MacArthur had finally done it, he had returned to the Philippines making good on his promise to the Filipino people. It was a colossal effort and thus far it was going very well all things considered. However little did the Americans know, but the IJN was about to toss the kitchen sink at them, literally, in an all or nothing battle to the death.

Long Island natives Marshall Warren and Keith Kinkaid join "The Double Chili Islanders Podcast" with Peter Schwartz. Warren is a defenseman from Laurel Hollow and is expected to start the season at Bridgeport. Kinkaid, a veteran NHL goalie who has played for multiple teams including the Devils and Rangers, is from Farmingville and is in camp on a PTO.  Peter caught up with both of them earlier this week at Islanders training camp at Northwell Health Ice Center. *****************************************Any Mission Anywhere is a proud sponsor of our podcast. Pick up your hockey apparel with Any Mission Anywhere. Any Mission Anywhere proudly supports veteran and first responder non-profit hockey organizations. https://anymissionanywhere.com*****************************************WORST COOKIE COMPANY AND SMOOTHIE CAFETHE DOUBLE CHILI ISLANDERS PODCAST IS SPONSORED BY THE WORST COOKIE COMPANY AND SMOOTHIE CAFÉ LOCATED AT 1896 WANTAGH AVENUE IN WANTAGH. IT'S A LOCALLY OWNED LONG ISLAND BUSINESS SERVING UNIQUE COOKIES, BAKED GOODS, SMOOTHIES AND PROTEIN SHAKES. MENTION THE DOUBLE CHILI ISLANDERS PODCAST AND RECEIVE 10 PERCENT OFF YOUR PURCHASE. VISIT THEM ON-LINE AT WWW.THEWORSTCOOKIECOMPANY.COM

Doug is joined by global speaker, author of Forensic Leadership: The Traces We Leave Behind, leadership coach, mentor and former elite British Army Commando Lieutenant Colonel Paul Kinkaid. Paul shares his journey from military service to developing the concept of "Forensic Leadership." Discover how Paul's unique experiences shaped his approach to leadership, goal-setting, and personal growth. KEY TAKEAWAYS Paul's concept of "Forensic Leadership" is based on the principle that every interaction leaves a trace, either positive (green) or negative (red). The three guiding principles of Forensic Leadership are care, notice, and transparency, which help maximise positive outcomes in interactions. Paul developed DactoApp, a software tool that measures leadership traits and predicts how "green" or "red" a leader is, allowing organisations to identify and address leadership issues. Transitioning from military to civilian life can be challenging, as it involves redefining one's identity and finding a new purpose. Setting ambitious goals, can provide direction and create good motivation. Planning for failure is crucial when setting goals, as it helps identify potential obstacles and create contingency plans. Paul's military background provided valuable lessons in leadership and goal achievement that he has then applied to business and his personal life. Developing emotional connections and demonstrating genuine care are essential aspects of effective leadership, regardless of the environment. BEST MOMENTS "Great leadership comes from a position of care and that comes from a couple of profound incidents that happened, and it's in the TED Talk as well that happened in my career that held a mirror up." "If you communicate effectively how the organisation is going to grow and develop and you communicate that intent, which is what I call it. Lots of people call it their why, their vision, their mission, their purpose. I call it intent." "If you're going to set goals in order to succeed, plan for failure. So too many people are too optimistic. You've got to understand where, how, and if it's going to go wrong." "When I left the army as Colonel Poole. I spent a long time working out who I was now, and it was my choice to take the uniform off, but it was hard, it was really hard, handing that uniform in." "We talk about big, hairy, audacious goals and, you know, Colonel in the Armed Forces, Big Hairy Audacious Goal. An app out into the world, Big Hairy Audacious Goal. Number one bestseller, Big Hairy Audacious Goal. What's next?" EPISODE RESOURCES www.paulkinkaid.comhttps://www.linkedin.com/in/paulkinkaid/https://www.facebook.com/paul.kinkaid/https://www.amazon.co.uk/Forensic-Leadership-Changing-Culture-Nation/dp/1468574361 VALUABLE RESOURCES Website: http://dougbennett.co.uk/ Email: doug@dougbennett.co.uk LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/financialdoug/ Twitter: https://twitter.com/FinancialDoug Facebook Wealth Tribe: https://join.dougbennett.co.uk/ Download Your "Ten-Step Guide To Financial Freedom" Here: https://bit.ly/Struggle-Success BOOKS: Goals Do Come True is now live and available to buy on Amazon: https://amzn.to/3phcy6Z Think Simple, Win Big is now live and available to buy on Amazon: https://www.amazon.co.uk/Think-Simple-Win-Big-Business/ Enjoy, and come back for the latest podcast each Wednesday. Thank you for listening.

In the 100th episode of The Texas Private School Podcast hosted by Walker Lott, Wes Tolleson, and Ryan Schroeder! Wes, Walker, and Ryan sit down and recap Week 2 and all of the games that happened! Parish vs Bellaire, All Saints vs Prestonwood, SBS vs FWC, Regents vs Kinkaid, Grace vs FBA, and more! If you want to follow the boys on social media you can find it below! https://twitter.com/TXPSMedia https://www.instagram.com/txpsmedia/ https://txpsmedia.com/ Walker Lott https://twitter.com/walker_lott​​​​​ https://www.instagram.com/_walkerlott/ Wes Tolleson https://twitter.com/tolleson_7​​​​​ https://www.instagram.com/tolleson.7/ Ryan Schroeder https://twitter.com/RyanSchroeder25​​​​​ https://www.instagram.com/ryan.schroeder_/

In the 99th episode of The Texas Private School Podcast hosted by Walker Lott, Wes Tolleson, and Ryan Schroeder! Wes, Walker, and Ryan sit down and preview Week 2 and all of the games that happened! Parish vs Bellaire, All Saints vs Prestonwood, SBS vs FWC, Regents vs Kinkaid, Grace vs FBA, and more! If you want to follow the boys on social media you can find it below! https://twitter.com/TXPSMedia https://www.instagram.com/txpsmedia/ https://txpsmedia.com/ Walker Lott https://twitter.com/walker_lott​​​​​ https://www.instagram.com/_walkerlott/ Wes Tolleson https://twitter.com/tolleson_7​​​​​ https://www.instagram.com/tolleson.7/ Ryan Schroeder https://twitter.com/RyanSchroeder25​​​​​ https://www.instagram.com/ryan.schroeder_/

In the 96th episode of The Texas Private School Podcast hosted by Walker Lott, Wes Tolleson, and Ryan Schroeder, we discuss SPC 4A/3A, is it Houston Christian's year? Bellaire vs Kinkaid...who wins? AND MORE! If you want to follow the boys on social media you can find it below! https://twitter.com/TXPSMedia https://www.instagram.com/txpsmedia/ https://txpsmedia.com/ Walker Lott https://twitter.com/walker_lott​​​​​ https://www.instagram.com/_walkerlott/ Wes Tolleson https://twitter.com/tolleson_7​​​​​ https://www.instagram.com/tolleson.7/ Ryan Schroeder https://twitter.com/RyanSchroeder25​​​​​ https://www.instagram.com/ryan.schroeder_/

Paul Kinkaid was a military commander. who is now a leadership expert, helping businesses address their leadership styles, language and relationship with their staff. https://paulkinkaid.com/https://www.linkedin.com/in/paulkinkaid/Get 15% off Timeless Gaming Convention tickets for the 14th August at Arcade club in Bury, with over 400 arcade machines, keynote talk from Ashens, and loads of panels, competitions, DJ Slopes and more! Use code Nuggets24 or click on the link below: https://timelessgaming.co.uk/discount/nuggets24 Theme music:Check out Katy on Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/artist/7g1bTthu5ETWFuq5igUMRm?si=dK72fUrHRX2kVp6Bt7SfwQCheck out Katy on Twitch https://www.twitch.tv/katyhmusic Support us on Patreonhttps://www.patreon.com/newtonsnuggetsWe also talk about our discord, which you can join here:https://discord.gg/Hz5Qjyefe7-------------------------------------------------------------------------- Buy the MentalTheft book from here in the UK:https://www.amazon.co.uk/MentalTheft-Your-mind-weakest-link/dp/1838254102 Anywhere else in the world, go to Amazon as usual and search MentalTheft (one word).Thanks as usual to Jesse for making the magic happen:https://www.jlawrence-photography.co.uk Check out Paul on: https://www.mentaltheft.co.uk#newtonsnuggets  Check out our Patreon on:https://www.patreon.com/newtonsnuggets

Dustin and Drew managed to see eight playoff games last week and are back with reports from all of them. Teams mentioned: Dripping Springs, Cedar Ridge, Buda Johnson, Round Rock, Smithson Valley, Rouse, Lake Travis, Westwood, St. John's, Houston Christian, Kinkaid, Episcopal, Walnut Grove, Frisco Wakeland, Rockwall-Heath, and  Rowlett.

Fusion Antibodies PLC CEO Adrian Kinkaid joined Proactive's Stephen Gunnion with more on the company that specialises in various stages of antibody development, excluding GMP production for clinical trials. He described Fusion Antibodies as a collaborative research organisation that engages deeply with clients to develop therapeutic antibodies, one of the most complex scientific endeavours. Its client base includes small VC-funded biotechs and has expanded to include large organisations like the National Cancer Institute. Fusion Antibodies also explores adjacent markets such as diagnostics, family medicine, and veterinary medicine. Recently, the company faced economic challenges, particularly a decrease in venture capital for biotechs, impacting its core business. However, it responded with strategic diversifications and cost management, leading to a 47% increase in fourth-quarter 2024 sales compared to the first quarter. The order pipeline at the year's end was significantly stronger at £750,000, promising a solid foundation for future growth. Kinkaid noted that Fusion Antibodies has secured various agreements, including a notable collaboration with the National Cancer Institute to employ their OptiMAL technology platform for discovering human antibodies. This platform could potentially lead to multiple licensing opportunities due to its vast diversity. Additionally, the company raised about £1.37 million, which will fund growth initiatives, including expanding its commercial team to better reach its primary market in the USA. #ProactiveInvestors #invest #investing #investment #investor #stockmarket #stocks #stock #stockmarketnews #FusionAntibodies #AntibodyDevelopment #Biotech #TherapeuticAntibodies #NationalCancerInstitute #OptiMALTechnology #HealthcareInnovation #Biopharma #VentureCapital #MedicalResearch #Diagnostics #FamilyMedicine #VeterinaryMedicine #BiotechFunding #ClinicalTrials #ResearchCollaboration #ScientificInnovation #Pharmaceuticals #Biotechnology #HealthcareTechnology

More Movies with Mark! Mark Van Buren and Chris continue the top Anthony Hopkins movies. Mark and Chris talk tourism Tufts University's Eden Kinkaid sounds off on Tucson's UNESCO City of Gastronomy designation. All the buzzwords come out for this pure psychobabble.

Scholars have recently coined the term “gastrodevelopment” to refer to the leveraging of food culture as a resource and strategy of economic development. Drawing on a case study of Tucson, Arizona – the United States' first UNESCO Creative City of Gastronomy – Kinkaid uses the lens of gastrodevelopment to examine how food culture is transformed into a form of symbolic capital that animates a broader project of urban development. Kinkaid shows how this transformation encodes differentials of value that are racialized and racializing and risk contributing to Tucson's uneven urban geographies. Kinkaid then turns to community visions of food-based development to imagine alternative trajectories for the project of gastrodevelopment. Dr. Eden Kinkaid (they/them) is a human geographer and social scientist whose work focuses on themes of sustainable and equitable food and agricultural systems, place, race, and development. They have researched these themes in north India and in the U.S. Southwest. In addition to this line of research, they publish on topics of feminist, queer, and trans geographies, geographic theory, creative geographies, and diversity, equity, and inclusion in academia. Their work has been published in Urban Geography, Progress in Human Geography, Transactions of the British Institute of Geographers, The Annals of the American Association of Geographers, Environment and Planning D, and various other journals and books. Eden has served as an editor at Gender, Place, and Culture, The Graduate Journal of Food Studies, and you are here: the journal of creative geography. You can learn more about their work on their website or by following them on social media @queergeog on Twitter, Instagram, and Bluesky. In addition to this audio, you can watch the video and read the full transcript of their conversation on Shareable.net – while you're there get caught up on past lectures. Cities@Tufts Lectures explores the impact of urban planning on our communities and the opportunities to design for greater equity and justice with professor Julian Agyeman.  Cities@Tufts Lectures is produced by Tufts University and Shareable.net with support from Barr Foundation and SHIFT Foundation. Lectures are moderated by Professor Julian Agyeman and organized in partnership with research assistants Deandra Boyle and Grant Perry. Paige Kelly is our co-producer and audio editor, the original portrait of Karin Bradley was illustrated by Anke Dregnet, and the series is co-produced and hosted by Tom Llewellyn.  “Light Without Dark” by Cultivate Beats is our theme song.

In 1909, G.E. Kinkaid found a cave in the Grand Canyon containing Egyptian and Asian artifacts. Jimmy Akin and Dom Bettinelli discuss the excavations that began at the time and then how the story vanished from the media. What is the truth of Kinkaid's cave and what did it really contain? The post Kinkaid's Cave (Egypt & the Grand Canyon) appeared first on StarQuest Media.

In 1909, G.E. Kinkaid found a cave in the Grand Canyon containing Egyptian and Asian artifacts. Jimmy Akin and Dom Bettinelli discuss the excavations that began at the time and then how the story vanished from the media. What is the truth of Kinkaid's cave and what did it really contain?

The New Jersey Devils made somewhat of a surprising move yesterday by reuniting with goalie Keith Kinkaid. They signed him to a one-year, two-way contract. Kinkaid had a good start during his first tenure with the Devils. However, his production progressively got worse as the years progressed. He might be looking to become the Devils' third-string goalie. Tomas Tatar recently signed a one-year deal with the Colorado Avalanche. There were a lot of questions surrounding his free agency period, but we finally received some clarity.Check out James' article: https://newjerseyhockeynow.com/2023/09/11/new-jersey-devils-free-agent-tomas-tatar-switches-agent-contemplating-offer/Follow & Subscribe on all Podcast platforms…

The New Jersey Devils made somewhat of a surprising move yesterday by reuniting with goalie Keith Kinkaid. They signed him to a one-year, two-way contract. Kinkaid had a good start during his first tenure with the Devils. However, his production progressively got worse as the years progressed. He might be looking to become the Devils' third-string goalie. Tomas Tatar recently signed a one-year deal with the Colorado Avalanche. There were a lot of questions surrounding his free agency period, but we finally received some clarity. Check out James' article: https://newjerseyhockeynow.com/2023/09/11/new-jersey-devils-free-agent-tomas-tatar-switches-agent-contemplating-offer/ Follow & Subscribe on all Podcast platforms…

https://jerrywills.com

Last time we spoke about the Komiatum Offensive in New Guinea. The drive to Lae and Salamaua was raging on New Guinea. Mount Tambu was assaulted and the allies received hellish casualties trying to take it. The legendary Bull Allen saved countless lives during this action, but Mount Tambu simply couldn't be captured. The allies chose to isolate and surround mount Tambu instead. The allies secured took the sugarcane knoll, the timbered knoll and then found a path heading to Komiatum. Nakano ordered his men to hold Komiatum ridge, but their situation became more and more desperate. Allied artillery and aerial bombardment alongside the enveloping maneuvers were taking a toll, the Japanese had suffered 900 casualties since July 23rd. With more men dying minute by minute, Nakano ordered a withdrawal from Komiatum still believing the primary target of the allies was Salamaua. This episode is the Fall of Kiska & Battle of Vella Lavella  Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  So before venturing back to the frigid northern aleutians, we have a lot of action to talk about in the south Pacific. On August 3rd, General Sasaki was forced to order a withdrawal from Munda. General Griswold sent a message over to Admiral Hasley declaring “Our ground forces today wrested Munda from the Japs and present it to you as sole owner”. Halsey in his typical fashion replied “keep ‘em dying”. Despite the blood, sweat and tears taking Munda, as a whole, operation cartwheel had fallen a month behind schedule. As Griswold noted “the months fighting had not been the Americans' finest hour in the Solomon islands campaign”. Halsey would add to it “the smoke of charred reputations still makes me cough”. Now just because Munda had fallen did not mean the work was all done, there was to be cleanup operations of course. General Sasaki ordered his forces to retreat northwards, most were enroute to the Kure 6th farm; the 13th regiment and Sasaki's HQ were going to Bairoko; the 3rd battalion, 23rd regiment and Yokosuka 7th guns were heading to Baanga island. The Americans would be in hot pursuit. General Griswold divided the cleanup operations, giving the 25th division the task of advancing across New Georgia to seize Bairoko Harbor and the Piru Plantation. General Hodge 's 43rd division was given the task of seizing the islands of Arundel and Baanga. General Collins would deploy the 1st battalion, 27th regiment and Colonel Dalton's 161st regiment to advance up the Bairoko trail; the rest of Colonel Douglas Sugg's 27th would advance along the Zieta Trail towards the Piru plantation. General Sasaki learnt on August 6th, the American navy had scored a small but conclusive victory when 6 US destroyers sunk 3 IJN destroyers, the Arashi, Kawakaze and Hagikaze during the Naval battle of Vella Gulf. This of course meant the Japanese reinforcement convoy had failed, thus Sasaki wasted no time ordered a general withdrawal to Kolombangara by the way of Baanga Island. Sasaki needed to give the men more time, so he reinforced the Yano battalion with the 12th company of the 3rd battalion, 23rd regiment who were left to defend the Kure 6th farm. Major Yano Keiji, a veteran of Guadalcanal, selected a rough terrain east and south of Zieta village and the Kure 6th farm to dig in. The Americans would later refer to it as “Zieta Garden”. The garden was to be Yano's first line of defense across the Zieta river. There was a bit of high ground due north of Zieta Village which would have been easier to defend, but he needed his men to protect the trail running to Lulu Channel and Baanga, his only line of communications. The 3rd battalion, 23rd regiment in the meantime were securing Baanga. General Sasaki radioed his plans to the 8th Fleet, but to his surprise was told to hold onto New Georgia until late September for “future operations”. Sasaki was bewildered by this, but understood Admiral Samejima then commanding the 8th fleet was trying to direct a land battle, and obviously he was not experienced in such things. What Sasaki did not know at the time was Samejima was being instructed by General headquarters to do this. On August 7th, the Army and Navy had agreed to pull out of the Central Solomons and would cooperate to bolster Bougainville's defenses. A revisión later on August 13th would instruct Koga, Kusaka and Imamura to hold onto as much of New Georgia as possible while Bougainville was being reinforced. Full evacuation of New Georgia was set for late September to early October, but the actual dates were dependent on the Bougainville progress. On August 8th Sugg's 2nd battalion advanced through a deep ravine going roughly 2 miles up the trail when his men were met with heavy machine gun fire. The Yano battalion was defending the barge supply route through the Lulu channel as their comrades and supplies made their way to Baanga. On August 9th, the 27th began their assault upon the Kure 6th Farm, employing a envelopment maneuver. The Yano battalion was holding them at bay, but gradually the allied forces were confining the Japanese into a smaller and smaller pocket. Meanwhile the 1st battalion was advancing north along the Munda-Bairoko trail where they joined Colonel Liversedge's men. On the 10th, Hodge ordered the 169th regiment to hit Baanga and on the 11th patrols from their 3rd battalion had located the Japanese strongpoint on its southwest tip. By nightfall, the American assault of the Kure 6th Farm forced Colonel Yano to withdraw back across the Zieta River to form a new defensive perimeter. His men performed a fighting withdrawal throughout the night seeing many Japanese scream and throw rocks at the Americans. The usual night time activities that kept the allied forces miserable.  On the 12th the Americans unleashed an artillery bombardment upon the Kure 6th Farm positions not realizing they had already been abandoned. The 89th had fired 2700 rounds, the heaviest concentration of the operation on completely empty positions. The Americans advanced over Yano's old positions, crossed the river and fell upon Yano's new defensive perimeter. On that day General Barker assumed command of the 43rd division as General Hodge returned to his command of the Americal Division. Barker began by sending L Company of the 169th regiment to occupy Baanga. L Company were met with unexpectedly heavy Japanese fire suffering 28 casualties before they were forced to pull back.    Meanwhile on August 13th, Sugg's 3rd battalion with E company managed to launch their main assault against the Yano battalion. They were attempting a envelopment maneuver against Yano's flanks, but heavy resistance saw Yano's right flank repel the attack. On the left there was a marshy plain that hindered the American advance forcing them to go too far left and thus failing to apply enough pressure. Although the assault failed, the unexpected left advance saw some gain. A patrol from H company stumbled across a heavily used trail leading to the Lulu channel. They established a roadblock that night allowing ambush efforts to hit the trail. The roadblock convinced Yano he was soon to be cut off, so he immediately prepared a withdrawal to Baanga.    In the meantime, Barker decided to use Vela Cela island as a launching point for an assault against Maanga. On August the 14th, the 3rd battalion, 169th regiment began occupying the small island before using it as a springboard to land at Baanga. However the Americans quickly found themselves surrounded by a mangrove swamp and the Japanese began tossing counter attacks until night fell.  Yano's forces repelled numerous American attacks from the 3rd battalion throughout the day, afternoon and night. The Japanese threw back one attack led by four marine tanks, which had crossed the river on a bridge engineers built. While doing this his men also began their retreat westwards. H Company met a brief exchange with Yano's men, but Yano decided not to seriously clash with them and withdrew his battalion to Baanga by the 15th.  The 27th occupied Zieta village, making contact with Schultz 3rd battalion, 148th infantry over on Zieta Hill to the north. After this the 27th would advance upon Piru plantation and Sunday Inlet, too which they also ran into mangrove swamps greatly hindering them. The fight for the Zieta area had cost them 168 casualties, the americans were seeing a continuous flow of fierce counterattacks at Baanga, prompting Barker to decided he would reinforce the beachhead with the 2nd battalion 169th regiment and the 1st and 3rd battalions of the 172nd regiment.   At this point General Griswold and Admirals Halsey and Wilkinson were trying to figure out what to do next. Halsey's original plan after the taking of Munda was to attack Kolombangara, but the recent performance of the Japanese defenders made the Americans quite skittish about performing an amphibious invasion. The battle for Munda point was one of the fiercest defenses the Japanese had put up. More than 30,000 troops had been brought over to face 5000 Japanese defenders within their network of entrenchments. As pointed out by the commander in chief of the US Navy planning memorandum “If we are going to require such overwhelming superiority at every point where we attack the Japanese, it is time for radical change in the estimate of the forces that will be required to defeat the Japanese now in the Southwest and Central Pacific.” Munda Point airfield would become a landmark victory because of the 6000 foot runway it would soon provide, alongside taxiways and its capacity as a base of operations. Halsey would later declare its airfield “to be the finest in the south pacific” and the Seabees would be awarded with a citation for their great efforts. Commander Doane would receive a special mention “by virtue of his planning, leadership, industry, and working ‘round the clock' to make serviceable the Munda Airfield on August 14th, 1943, a good four days ahead of the original schedule.” The seabees work was a testament not only to their morale and organization, but also the fact they held superior equipment. Admiral Nimitz would go on the record to state “one of the outstanding features of the war in both the North and South Pacific areas has been the ability of US forces to build and use airfields, on a terrain and with a speed which would have been considered fantastically impossible in our pre-war days.” Overall the Georgia campaign would go on the be an essential component in the strangulation of Rabaul, as pointed out by historian Eliot Morison “The Central Solomons ranks with Guadalcanal and Buna-Gona for intensity of human tribulation. We had Munda and we needed it for the next move, toward Rabaul; but we certainly took it the hard way. The strategy and tactics of the New Georgia campaign were among the least successful of any allied campaign in the Pacific”.   Allied intelligence indicated Kolombangara had roughly 10,000 Japanese defenders, thus Halsey was inclined to seek an alternative method rather than slugging it out. He thought perhaps they could bypass Kolombangara completely and instead land on Vella Lavella. If they managed to pull that off, it would cut off the Japanese supply line to Kolombangara which was basically surviving on fishing boats and barges based out of Buin. Halsey noted “Kolombangara was 35 miles nearer the Shortlands and Kahili. According to coast-watchers, its garrison numbered not more than 250, and its shoreline would offer at least one airstrip.” A reconnaissance carried out back on July 22nd reported very few enemy troops on the island and that it held a feasible airfield site at Barakoma which also had beaches capable for LST's to land at. Thus Halsey approved the plan and Griswold formed the Northern Landing Force, placed under the command of Brigadier General Robert McClure. The force consisted of the recently arrived 35th regiment of the 25th division attached to the 25th cavalry reconnaissance troops, all led by Colonel Everett Brown; the 4th defense battalion, the 58th naval construction battalion and the Naval base group.  To hit Vella Lavella they would require air supremacy and artillery planted upon Piru Plantation and the Enogai-Bairoko area. General Twinnings AirSols had 161 fighters back on July 31st, but by August 18th they would have 129 functioning. Twining had sufficient strength in bombers as the number of light and medium bombers had dropped by less than a dozen, at around 129. For heavy bombers his increased from 48 to 61. It was critical Munda airfields be fully operational by mid august, sothe Seabees of the 73rd and 24th naval construction battalions went to work. Admiral Fitch's plan for Munda airfield called for a 6000 long foot runway with a minimum 8 inch coral surface and taxiways and revetments ready for over 200 fighters by September 25th. Eventually this would also include 48 heavy bombers. The immediate job was the fighter strip as always, you prepare your defenses against air attacks before you bring in the heavy bombers. He had a week to make the field operational. Commander Doane of the 73rd Seabees had two critical assets. The first was Munda was by far the best airfield site in the Solomons. Beneath one to 3 feet of topsoil was solid coral and there was a plentiful supply of live coral which hardened like concrete, great for the surfacing. Second the 73rd was the best equipped battalion yet to arrive to the solomons with D-7 and D-8 bulldozers, ¾ yard power shovels, 8 yard carryalls and 7 ton rollers. Weather was good and the moon was bright for the week permitting night time work without lights. The immediate threat would have been a 12cm of the Yokosuka 7th SNLF at Baanga, but they never fired upon them. Again, wars are won by logistics and it can't be expressed enough what a colossal amount the Seabees did for the Pacific War. By August 14th, Mulcahy flew over to set up his HQ and the VMF-123 and VMF-124 flew into the base with a R4D carrying their gear and personnel. For the incoming invasion P-40s would be coming from Segi while Corsairs would be launched from Munda.  Admiral Kusaka had reformed his 1st Base air force thanks to the arrival of his long-sought reinforcements. In mid July reinforcements arrived to the Solomons in the form of the 201st Kokutai Aerial Bomb group and carrier Division 2's naval bombers from Ryujo. The overall strength of the 1st base air force was now at around 230 aircraft of various types. The land-based bombers would go to Rear Admiral Ueno Keizo's 25th air flotilla over in Rabaul. They were tasked with night bombing raids against Guadalcanal and New Georgia now. Naval fights and bombers would be merged into the 1st combined air attack force, later reformed into the 26th air flotilla led by Rear Admiral Sakamaki Munetake. There job was to destroy any enemy shipping in New Georgia and to conduct interceptions over the Munda-Buin areas. It was understood the Americans held numerical superiority, but the Japanese were willing to take them on hoping their fighting spirit would prevail. Meanwhile, back on the night of August 12th, Admiral Wilkinson deployed an advance party of 14 men led by Captain George Kriner to perform a reconnaissance of Vella Lavella. They would be reinforced by Companies E and G of the 103rd regiment when the scouts found 40 Japanese around Biloa and another 100 5 miles north of Barakoma. They had reached the island secretly using 4 PT boats, though Japanese floatplanes would made to bomb one of them. After the successful arrival of the advance party at Barakoma, F Company of the 103rd landed on August 14th to reinforce the beachhead.  The main invasión force designated Task Force 31 led by Admiral Wilkinson  would consist of 10 destroyers, 5 destroyer transports, 12 LCI's, 3 LST's and two subchasers. At 3:05am  the 1st transport group of the force departed consisting of the destroyer transports with 6 escort destroyers were carrying the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 35th regiment. Captain Ryan led the group aboard Nicholas while Wilkinson was aboard Cony. The second transport group made up of the smaller vessels carried the Seabees and support personally following an hour behind with 4 destroyer escorts led by Captain William Cooke. After the force departed Guadalcanal they were to approach the Gizo Strait around midnight, before beginning to unload in the early hours of august 15th, under the cover of fighters.  However Wilkinson would not be aware his force was spotted by a G3M Betty bomber which reported back to Admiral Samaki who immediately launched a strike force. By 8am, the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 35th regiment had landed. While the 3rd battalion began their unloading process enemy aircraft appeared. 48 Zeros and 6 Vals were intercepted by American fighters. By 9:15 all the troops were landed, now the equipment began to be unloaded. The Japanese launched two waves from Buin, the first appeared at 12:30, made up of 48 Zero's and 11 Vals. They were intercepted leading to no damage being done to the landing forces. 7 Zeros came in low to strafe the beach but were turned away by fire from 65 automatic weapons aboard the LST's. LST's in the past lacked adequate anti aircraft protection, thus 20 20mm guns were borrowed from Guadalcanal and set to use. At 5:30 32 Zero's and 8 Vals showed up but they too were intercepted. By 6pm the LSTs were beginning to retract. The strikes had amounted to 12 men killed on the beach and 40 wounded, it could have been much worse. The Japanese reported losing 9 Zeros and 8 Vals for the day while the Americans would claim to have lost a total of 5 fighters. Without any real land battle the amphibious invasion of Vella Lavella was a resounding success. After darkness settled in, Admiral Ueno's 5th air attack force over in Rabaul launched their final attempt against the American convoys. At 5:30pm, 3 Betty's that had launched out of Vunakanau were spotting the convoy and reporting their movements. They came across the LCI's southeast of Gatukai and the LSTs as they were approaching the Gizo strait. 23 Bettys in 3 Chutai's, one armed with torpedoes the other two with bombs approached. The torpedo armed Betty's attacked the LCI's while the bombers went for the LST's. The American destroyers tossed up a lot of anti aircraft fire as the torpedoes and bombs failed to hit targets. 4 Betty's would be damaged badly for their efforts. The Japanese reaction to the terrible results was to form an unrealistic plan to wipe out the American invasion by sending a single battalion to the island. When the landings became known, officers of the 8th fleet and 17th army formed a conference. They estimated, with accuracy surprisingly, that the landing force was around a brigade in strength. One officer proposed the idea to send a battalion to counterland. General Imamura's HQ calmly pointed out that sending a single battalion against a brigade would be like “pouring water on a hot stone”. The men were desperately more needed for the defense of Bougainville. The Japanese knew they were vastly outnumbered in the Solomons and that the fight for the central solomons was pretty much lost. They believed their only chance to successfully defend the rest of the solomons was to carry out a slow retreat in order to build up forces in Bougainville and Rabaul.  It was decided that two rifle companies of the Miktami battalion and a platoon from the Yokosuka 7th SNLF would be sent to Horaniu on the northeast corner of Vella Lavella. These forces would establish a barge staging base between Kolombangara and the Shortlands. Alongside this Rekata bay would be evacuated and its 7th Kure SNLF would set up a relay base at Choiseul. Imamura nad Kusaka planned to hold Horaniu for as long as possible, trying to establish a new supply route along the west coast of Choiseul.  For the Horaniu operation, Admiral Ijuins destroyer squadron of Sazanami, Shigure, Hamakaze and Isokaze were going to escort 22 barges, supported by 3 torpedo boats and two subchasers. The small armada departed Rabaul on August 17th, but Ijuin's destroyers were spotted quickly by an allied search plane 100 miles out of Rabaul. In fact, Wilkinson was anticipating the Japanese heading for Kolombangara or perhaps Barakoma. He sent 4 destroyers, the Nicholas, O'Bannon, Taylor and Chevalier under Captain Thomas Ryan. Ryan had been an ensign in Yokohama during the 1923 Great Kanto earthquake, where he saved the love of one Mrs. Slack from the burning Grand Hotel. This earned him the medal of honor making him 1 of 18 men to receive the medal of honor during the interwar period of 1920-1940. Ryans force departed Tulagi while the other American convoy, the 2nd echelon led by Cooke were landing equipment at Barakoma. By nightfall Ryans squadron were coming up the slot while the enemy convoy was being harassed by 4 Avengers. The Avengers failed to score hits, but the anti aircraft gunfire alerted Ryan, as the Japanese were reversing course heading in his direction. At 12:29am on August 18th O'Bannon made radar contact and a few minutes later the Americans could see the Japanese ships. At 12:32 the Japanese spotted Ryans force, prompting Ijuin to order a 45 degree turn northwest to try and lure the enemy away from the convoy. As his ruse succeeded there would be a pretty ineffective long range gun and torpedo duel seeing Hamakaze and Isokaze taking slight damage. Meanwhile the Japanese barges were racing to the coast. Ryan believed he had foiled the reinforcement when he engaged the destroyers . But because Chevalier was facing some mechanical failures and could not keep up speed to chase the Japanese destroyers, Ryan decided to turn back to engage the already landed reinforcements at Horaniu. However they managed to escape north too quickly, thus the Horaniu operation was quite a bit of success, with a lot of luck at play. Now we are shifting over to the frigid north waters of the Aleutians. The fall of Attu and Munda were pivotal moments of the Pacific war that completely changed the course of their respective campaigns. When Munda was taken, the Japanese realized the central solomons were a lost cause and began to move all resources and men they could to Bougainville. When Attu was taken, the Japanese realized the Aleutian islands campaign was a lost cause and decided to evacuate the forces on Kiska. The battle of the pips and miraculous evacuation of Kiska was completed by the end of July. Kiska was pummeled on July 26th and 27th under clear sunny weather. 104 tons of bombs hit Kiska's installation on the 26th in a large attack consisting of 32 B-24's, 24 P-38 lightnings and 38 P-40's. On the 27th it was hit with 22 tons of bombs. On August 1st Lt Bernard O'Donnel conducted the first reconnaissance sweep since the July 27th bombing and observed no Japanese fights, no anti aircraft fire and no ships at harbor. Meanwhile the blockade was being performed by Giffen and Griffen's task force who bombarded Kiska. Intelligence crews working on aerial photographs of the island and its installations noted a number of odd features. Practically all the buildings around 23 in all appeared destroyed, but with rubble patterns suggesting demolition rather than bombing. The Japanese also appeared to have done no repair work on the craters in the north head runway, which was very odd, it was around the clock kind of work for them. All the garrisons trucks seemed to be parked on the beach in clusters and it seemed they were not moving day to day. Some pilots reported a bit of activity, like narrowly missing flak and some vehicles and ships seen moving below, but Kinkaids HQ noted all these reports were coming from green pilots. Experienced fliers were not reporting such things. Radio traffic had vanished, some wondering if the bombing was so tremendous it destroyed all the radios. Generals Butler and DeWitt believed the Green pilots, but Generals Buckner and Holland Smith were very suspicious, pointing out that the Japanese had already carried out a secret massive evacuation at Guadalcanal. In fact Buckner and Smith kept asking Kinkaid to toss some Alaskan scouts ashore in rubber boats at night prior to an invasion to report if the island was abandoned or not. But Kinkaid had the last say in the matter and declined to do so. Kinkaid's decision was to go ahead with a full scale invasion of the island. In his words “if the enemy had evacuated the island, the troop landings would be a good training exercises, a super dress rehearsal, excellent for training purposes”.  On August 12th, Captain George Ruddel, leading a squadron of 4 fighters circled low over the anti aircraft gun positions on Kiska, received no flak so he landed on her North head runway dodging nearly 30 craters. The 3 other fighters followed suit and the pilots performed a tiny expedition for some time. They found no sign of people, just destroyed buildings and abandoned equipment. Nonetheless Ruddels report would not stop Kinkaid, only some scolding for doing something so dangerous. The invasion of Kiska, codenamed operation cottage, was set for August 15th. The invasion force was 30,000 Americans and 5300 Canadians under the overall command of Major General Charles Harrison Corlet. It consisted of Brigadier General Archibald Arnolds 7th division; Buckner's 4th regiment; Colonel Roy Victor Rickards 87th mountain infantry regiment, the 13th Canadian Brigade known as the Greenlight Force which consisted of the Canadian Fusiliers regiment, the 1st Battalion of Winnipeg Grenadiers, the Rocky Mountain Rangers regiment and Le Regiment de Hull led by Major General George Pearkers; there was also Colonel Robert Fredericks 1st Special Service force consisting of 2500 paratroops of elite American-Canadian commandos. Kiska marked the first time Canadian conscripts were sent to a combat zone in WW2. The men were equipped in Arctic gear, trained mostly at Adak, practicing amphibious landings using LCI's and LCT's. The naval forces were commanded by Admiral Rockwell were more than 100 warships strong, with Admiral Baker leading a group to bombard Kiska with over 60 tons on August 14th. The journey to the abandoned island was pretty uneventful. On August 15th, Admiral Rockwell dispatched the transports to gather off Kiska during a period of light fog. Major General Corlett's plan was to stage a diversionary landing using a detachment of Alaskan Scout led by Colonel Verbeck to hit Gertrude Cove which was assumed to be heavily fortified. While this occurred an advance force of the 1st, 2nd and provisional battalions of the 1st regiment, 1st special service force would secure the western side of the island, known as Quisling cove. The main force would land at a beach on the north near the Kiska volcano. Colonel Verbecks scouts and Colonel Robert Fredericks commands were the first to come ashore. They were met by empty machine gun nests as they climbed Lard Hill, Larry Hill and Lawson Hill, interesting names. They investigated caves and ravines only to find destroyed equipment. But perhaps the enemy was simply further up in the hills saving their ammunition to ambush them. During the morning the main force landed on Kiskas northern side whereupon they immediately began climbing some cliffs to reach objectives. In the process each battalion of the 87th mountain regiment captured Robber Hill, Riot Hill and Rose Hill. US Army Lt George Earle recalled this of the unique landscapes of Kiska “At one end was a perfectly shaped steaming volcano, cloudcushioned, well- wrapped […] all around were cliff-walled shores and, when visible, a bright green matting of waist-high tundra scrub and deep lush mosses – a great green sponge of slopes rising to a rocky knife-edge crest nearly eight hundred feet above the shore up in the fog, and zigzagging its ridge-line backbone toward the […] four-thousand foot cone of the volcano”. Lt Earle also noted the incessant rain and fog, Kiska saw roughly 250 days of rain per year on average and held a ton of clouds blotting out sunshine. On the day the allied force landed the island was blanketed with a thick fog. As the allied forces advanced they ran into a variety of booby traps the Japanese had taken a lot of time to leave behind, these included; typical land mines, improvised 155m shells with trigger wires, M-93 mine's laid upside down wired to blocks of TNT, timed bombs, candle bombs, and the classic grenades with trip wire. There was to be several casualties from booby traps. In the fog as timed bombs or other traps went off, allied forces opened fire towards noises believing the enemy was upon them. There was some friendly fire incidents amongst the Americans and Canadians, but not as much that has been perpetuated by quite a few videos on Youtube mind you. Its actually a myth thats been perpetuated in many books, in fact the main source I have been using for the Aleutian islands campaign is guilty of it sad to say. The friendly fire incidents on Kiska was not a large skirmish between American and Canadian forces that resulted in many deaths or wounded, no that was pretty much summed up to booby traps, a lot of them. If you want to know more about this, I did a podcast interview on my youtube channel, the Pacific War channel with Brad St.Croix, a historian focused on Canadian military history. The episode is titled the Canadian experience during the Pacific War, and Brad had a lot of, going to admit, vented anger about debunking this myth haha. Please go check it out, I have to admit of all my podcast episodes it has not received many views and I am sad at this because there's a lot of interesting stuff, like how Canada was going to be part of Operation Downfall. Anyways. The Americans and Canadians suspected the Japanese might be retreating into the interior or hiding in fight pits, so they were tense the entire time, after the stories from Attu who could blame them. The crack of a single rifle fire, would be met with more, but it always died down quickly. Corlett's forces continued to climb uphill towards Link Hill and Ranger Hill in the direction of the main enemy camp at Kiska harbor. They found all the fortifications they came across abandoned. The second wave of the main force were brought over consisted of the 1st regiment, 1st special service force who landed at Little Kiska Island unopposed. By August 18th Corlett was confident the enemy was not on Kiska, but he continued the search nonetheless, into the caves and ravine, until August 22nd. To quote Ian Toll's 2nd book of his pacific war trilogy  “Considering the expenditure of naval ordnance and aerial bombs on an island that had been vacated by the enemy, and the tremendous investment of shipping and troops in a bloodless invasion, the Kiska operation had been slightly farcical. In Pearl Harbor, the news was received in good humor. Nimitz liked to tell visitors how advance elements of the huge invasion force, creeping inland with weapons at the ready, were warmly greeted by a single affable dog that trotted out to beg for food” Indeed the capture of Kiska which ushered the end to the Aleutians campaign, was kind of a enormous blunder when you consider the amount of resources allocated to it. You always have to consider these resources could have been brought to the south pacific, but hindsight is hindsight. After the battle of Attu, the allies expected an absolute bloodbath on Kiska. For Corlett's men, the americans suffered 18 deaths, 170 wounded, the Canadians 4 killed and 4 wounded, 130 men also got trench foot. The destroyer Abner Read struck a Japanese mine on August 18th, suffering 70 dead and 47 wounded to bring the total casualties to 313. Generals Buckner and DeWitt sought an invasion of Paramushiro, but the joint chiefs of staff would gradually reject the idea because it was simply seen to be easier to drive through the central or south pacific to Japan. But I would like to point out, if the south and central pacific campaigns did not go well, the idea of hitting the Japanese home islands from the Aleutians could have been a very real thing. Kinkaid, Butler, Eareckson amongst many others would leave the north pacific to deploy in other theaters. It was only really Buckner who remained, DeWitt returned to the west coast, as did the majority of forces. Wanted a feel good end to this one. So the allied forces on Kiska found more than just booby traps, turns out the Japanese had abandoned a number of dogs on the island, so the allied troops adopted many of them and turned them into unit mascots and pets. Surviving photos of the soldiers and the dogs are abundant and cute. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The amphibious assault of Vella Lavella was a huge success, though now the battle for the small island was on. The farcical battle of Kiska had ushered in the end of the Aleutian islands campaign, birthing a long persisting myth to this very day of an incredible friendly fire battle. 

Access this entire 90 minute episode (and additional monthly bonus episodes, including the entire Miami Vice sidebar series) by becoming a Junk Filter patron! Over 30% of episodes are exclusively available to patrons of the show. https://www.patreon.com/posts/143-miami-vice-87557729 Friend of the show and Miami Vice head Matthew Kinkaid joins us from San Antonio, Texas for the sixth episode in our summer sidebar series. We discuss selected Vice episodes from Seasons 3 and 4; when Michael Mann departed from the production to work on Manhunter and Crime Story, Wolf took over as show runner and started to change the way Vice looked and felt, eschewing the pastel color scheme for harder neon lighting and a flatter visual look. The plots were now based on current events and tabloid fare, a new “ripped from the headlines” approach Wolf would soon bring to his next show Law & Order. Crockett wore a long mullet and Tubbs grew a beard. These changes, plus the newer earlier timeslot on Friday nights (up against Dallas) led to the slow decline of the popularity of the series. Matthew and I discuss three representative episodes of this period in the series, with Crockett and Tubbs up against a sleazy lawyer who is trafficking in stolen Colombian babies, crooked televangelists, and a scary porn director / artiste who may have made a snuff film, in a disturbing case that sets off the unravelling of Sonny Crockett throughout the rest of season 4. Currently most Miami Vice episodes are available for streaming in the US on Tubi. Episodes discussed on this show: Baby Blues - Season 3, Ep 9 Amen…Send Money - Season 4, Ep 2 Death and the Lady - Season 4, Ep 3 Follow Matthew Kinkaid on Twitter. Don Johnson and Philip Michael Thomas accepting the 1986 People's Choice Award for Miami Vice.

Last time we spoke about the allied drive to Munda and General Sasaki's major counter offensive. General Wing began the drive upon Munda Point, but General Sasaki predicted many of the routes the Americans would take and ordered his forces to create tedious roadblocks and defensive positions to foil their advances. The allied progress was brutally slow, despite having the enormous advantage in artillery, naval and aerial bombardment support. The Japanese pillboxes were proving to be devastating to the allied infantry, requiring tanks to be brought over to New Georgia. When things began to halt, suddenly General Sasaki performed a counter offensive seeing a daring attack directed at the headquarters of the 43rd division. The attack nearly broke the lines of communications, but luckily the Fijian commandos outperformed the japanese at their own game of night fighting. Lastly the IJN suffered terrible losses to allied aircraft collapsing their reinforcement efforts. This episode is the Mysterious Battle of the Pips Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  The battles in New Guinea and New Georgia were particularly bloody, in all honesty things had begun to really escalate when you look at it from a numerical point of view. Over on Green Hell, General Savige had just seized Mubo, the Pimple, Green Hill and Observation hill taking them out of Japanese hands. The Japanese had withdrawn to Komiatum while simultaneously trying to defend the Bobdubi ridge area against Brigadier Hammer's 15th brigade. General Savige, still unaware Salamaua was not the main target and in fact was being used as a deception to cover for Lae, continued his offensive, hoping to drive the enemy north of the Francisco River. Over on the other side, General Nakano's 1st battalion of the 80th regiment had managed to  push Companies B and A off their ambush position on the Bench Cut Track. They were forced to withdraw towards Gwaibolom by July 10th. Meanwhile to the south Major Warfe launched an attack along Goodview junction. Captain Wally Meares of C platoon marched up Stephens Track while Captain John Winterflood's B platoon took Walpoles track. Lt Hugh Egan created a blocking position using just 7 men around 800 meters south of Goodview Junction. The platoons went to work advancing down the steep ridges dislodging Japanese from outposts. Captain Meares platoon were continuing along the Stephens track when they suddenly encountered strong resistance from some Japanese who took a position along the Tambu Saddle which is at a junction between Stephens track and the Mule track. After engaging the Japanese, the platoon was forced to bypass them moving along the Mule track towards the Komiatum track where they ran into more Japanese. Meares men killed 13 Japanese on the Mule track before deciding to withdraw back to the Stephens track and dug in. The Japanese had surprised Warfe's men. The forces they were running into were mainly the 1st and 2nd companies of the 66th battalion along with Araki's HQ staff who had been on the run from Mubo to Komiatum. The Japanese tried to press on with a counter attack aimed at Winterflood's B platoon. The Japanese tossed mortar and machine gun fire, but received terrible losses to the commandos, forced to pull back up Walpole track. The next day Warfe ordered Winterflood's platoon to make a frontal assault, but quickly found themselves pinned down by machine gun fire and during the night received a heavy counter attack that forced them to dig in. The Japanese continued to block the way, covering their withdrawal further east, but all the mayhem prompted General Savige to relieve the commandos by tossing up companies C and B of the 2/5th who adopted the name Bennett force as they were led by Captain Cam Bennett. The rest of the 2/5th marched up the Buigap. Meanwhile General Herring was dealing with a supply issue for the 3rd Australian division. The 3rd division was too far from the coast and thus had been relying on supply via airdrops, which we have seen during this series to not be particularly accurate and quite inadequate. The supply problems mounted more when the decision was made to target Lae as such a campaign required building up reserve dumps. Warfe's men were critically low on supplies; the 58/59th had nearly used up all the supplies they received, being brought up via the Missim Track and from airdrops. Getting further and further away from the source of supplies and with declining carrier capacity, Warfe's men were reaching starvation point. Further back, Companies A and C of the 2/6th battalion got drafted the job of moving the supplies from Mubo to Buigap creek. General Herring considered it extremely difficult, but not impossible to maintain further units in the Salamaua area, if they were closer to the coasts. To solve the problem General Herring designated Tambu Bay as a new coastal base for supplies and it would also help as an artillery position. And thus, the 3rd battalion, 162nd regiment of Major Archibald Roosevelt landed at Nassau Bay back on July 12th commencing with their coastal advance. They were accompanied by Brigadier General Ralph Coane's artillery that had landed prior to them. Yet their advance would begin in an extremely confused and chaotic manner. The question of command was at the core of the issue, General Fuller had decided to separate units such as Archibald Roosevelts from the MacKechnie Force, and thus they were now placed under the command of the Coane Force. General Herring was forced to intervene, placing the Coane Force under General Savige. At the same time, Colonel MacKechnie was relieved of his command because Fuller felt that he had favored the Australians over the Americans. To dig depper into this mess, what occurred was General Savige and Colonel MacKechnie were both unaware that two-thirds of the 162nd regiment had been allocated to the Coane Force when General Herring sent the a confusing message to try and clarify things “all units MACK force are under operational control of 3 Aust Div”. Troubles began at Moten ordered Major Roosevelt to advance north, but Roosevelt had also been told by General Fuller that he was not under Australian command. Thus Roosevelt bluntly replied to Moten “For your information I obey no orders except those from my immediate superior”. Then MacKechnie tried to smooth things over with Moten when he was informed of Fuller's position. He apologized for Roosevelt's message, and tried to speak about how great all the Australian/American cooperation was going. Fuller and Herring then tried to clarify the situation by placing the Coane Force under General Savige, but Fuller also decided to dismiss MacKechnie, mostly because he had relinquished command of his men to the Australians and thus had failed to protect American interests. As I say on my personnel channel, often when talking about China's Warlords in the 1920's, this is some kindergarten bullshit. Back to the action at hand, the Coane Force was being aided by a Papuan company who were scouting ahead of the Americans. They managed to confirm that Tambu Bay and the Dot Inlet were occupied and fortified by the Japanese. A platoon of the 5th Sasebo SNLF and the 3rd battalion, 66th regiment were holding a position on Tambu Bay while the remnants of the 3rd battalion, 102nd regiment were on a ridge overlooking the bay, which would later be named Roosevelt Ridge. On July 18th, Roosevelt led the troops with Companies L and I taking the lead, guided by two Papuan platoons. L Company with a Papuan company advanced along an inland track while K Company likewise did so along the coast. K Companies's Papuan guides hit a Japanese outpost south of Boisi on July 18th. On the morning of the 20th, the Papuan platoon managed to kill four Japanese before K Company helped destroy the outpost. By the 20th they seized Boisi and Roosevelt with the others approached the Tambu bay. Roosevelt had Coane's artillery support, they brought up four 25 pounders of the 2/6th Australian field regiment originally placed at Nassau Bay along with 2 batteries of the 218th American field artillery battalion, 8 75mm guns from north Salus, a battery of the 205th American field artillery battalion and 4 105mm guns. Under the cover the artillery they attacked the enemy, but they were met with heavy mortar fire coming from Roosevelt Ridge. Roosevelt Ridge extended westwards from the sea for nearly 2000 yards, forming kind of bulwark that shielded the northern end of Tambu Bay. Thus Tambu Bay could not be secured unless the ridge was taken first. The Australian broadcasting commission correspondent, Peter Hemery described the ridge like this “a piece of old style razer blade jutting into the sea”. According to some Japanese sources they had this to say of it “The area around Boisi had a lay of land most suitable to the arrest of the enemy advancing northward along the coast” General Nakano had also decided to reinforce the ridge with 250 men of the 1st battalion, 115th regiment, but of course this came at the coast of Salamaua's defense. By this point the bulk of the 102nd regiment was at the Malolo-buang coastal area and the bulk of the 115th regiment, the 2nd Maizuru SNLF, two companies of the 5th Sasebo SNLF and the 14th field artillery regiment were at Salamaua, around 150 men in total. On the other side, after the fall of Mubo Brigadier Moten had the men advance north. The Bennet Force took over Goodview Junction; Companies A and D of the 2/5th advanced to Mount Tambu. Mount Tambu was the highest feature along the route between Mubo and Salamaua. It consisted of a series of razorback ridges covered in dense jungle, ideal for camouflage pillboxes. Its area was defended by roughly 700 Japanese from the 2nd and 3rd battalions of the 66th regiment led by Lt Colonel Fukuzo Kimura and Major Sakai Sugiyama. On July 16th, Captain Mick Walter led 60 men of Company A up the steep track leading to the south crest of Mount Tambu. Walter led the men to storm the two forward knolls, taking the Japanese by complete surprise. The two knolls were captured, but during the night the Japanese counterattacked in force. The Japanese crawled up the knolls through some heavy undergrowth before they unleashed mortars and mountain gun fire. Walters men however had captured some Japanese pillboxes upon the two knolls and thus the turn tables. 8 counterattacks were tossed at Walters men, each repulsed with heavy losses, around 39 casualties for the Australians and 350 for the Japanese. The following day, D company came up to help the Australian defenders, bringing much needed mortars. They dug in on a knoll around 300 yards back on the track. Alongside D company also came much needed supplies and an additional platoon to reinforce his men who he deployed on his western flank.  On July 18th, Walter ordered an advance going northwest in an attempt to secure the southern portion of Mount Tambu. The advance was spearheaded by Lance Corporal Jackson who alongside his comrades tossed grenades into a Japanese pillbox. Jackson then stormed inside killing 3 Japanese with this Tommy gun. Alongside Jackson, mortar and mountain gun fire aided Walters men to gain 80 additional yards, securing the southern portion of Mount Tambu. They could advance no further however as it became much more difficult from this position as the Japanese basically were encircling them upon razer back ridge to their north. Walter would write later on “we dug in on the new ground and shortened our perimeter to the narrowing plateau”. For this action the Australians paid with 6 lives, 13 wounded while the Japanese lost 82. At this point Walter had D company with one of his platoon holding the western flank; A company held the northern knoll and two platoons from D company held the eastern knolls. The Japanese had been devastated, losing hundreds of men and allied artillery was becoming a nightmare. Captain Newman's C Company of the 162nd battalion had come to a junction of the Buigap and Bui Eo. From there a reconnaissance patrol found suitable artillery positions northwest of the junction. With the help of native carriers and 80 men of the 2/6th battalion, two guns were hauled over the Buigap track and by July 17th another 4 guns of the American 218th battalion were hauled up from the southern arm of the Bitoi river to Green Hill. From these positions the allies could smash multiple Japanese defensive positions. General Nakano realized Mount Tambu was an essential component of General Muroya's defensive line so he sent the remainder of the 3rd battalion, 66th regiment to reinforce Colonel Araki's men. Then during the early hours of July 19th a large earth tremor startled the Australian defenders. It was the prelude to an assault led by Captain Kunizo Hatsugai's 9th company of the 66th regiment. They had crept up silently managing to get behind the southern knolls then suddenly charged up under the cover of darkness. But the defenders had their guard up and were not taken by surprise. A Bren gunner managed to knock out one of the Japanese raiders machine guns with a lucky hit in the dark. As the Japanese scrambled to try and recover it they were met with fire causing severe casualties. The Japanese surprise attack was a failure, forcing them to withdraw by first light, leaving 21 dead across the knoll. While this raid was occuring, Walters men were also repelling a series of attacks against the Northern Knoll. During these attacks, Walter was injured. Luckily for Walter and his company, they were relieved on the 19th by D Company. Another American unit, C Company of the 1st battalion, 162nd regiment led by Captain Delmar Newman also arrived to take up a position on the southern knolls. Until july 23rd, the Australians limited their actions to patrols. On the 20th, Bennet led a patrol making contact with a strong Japanese position on the Walpole track; Another company led by Morse found a Japanese position in the Goodview area dug within 100 yards of their own. Meanwhile the Japanese also limited their actions to a few patrols proding Mount Tambu for weaknesses.   On July 23rd Moten ordered the 2/5th battalion to attack the remaining Japanese positions on the Tambu Knoll, but it was the most heavily fortified yet. Basically it was like a castle keep, complete with a ravine for a moat, near vertical walls and deep tunnels going through the knoll. Mount Tambu's peak held  10 log reinforce bunkers connected by the tunnels which could shelter half a battalion or so. They also had a chain of weapon pits set up on lower ledges. Later on when investigating the entire system, the allies found weapon pits to be around 4 logs thick, interconnected by crawl trenches. Many of these weapon puts had been carefully sited within the roots of large trees, making them impervious to allied artillery fire. The tunnel entrances were dug into the side of the peak directly behind the defensive positions, allowing the defenders to storm out from their shelters underground within seconds. It was these kind of ingenious defensive works that would be built upon later on in the war to create absolute nightmares for the allies.   Moten had not carried out a thorough reconnaissance of the Japanese positions prior to ordering the attack and thus many of his subordinates elected to make a frontal assault instead of encircling them. D company took the center for the frontal attack while to the left were the 16th platoon led by Sergeant Alvin ‘Hungry' Williams and the 18th platoon led by Lt Bernard Leonads; and A company advanced along a Caffins track heading for the western flank of Mount Tambu to try and cut off the main Japanese supply route going back to Komiatum. 15 minutes before they charged, Australian and American artillery and mortars fired upon Mount Tambu. Two Australian mountain guns fired 90 rounds while the 4 75mm American guns fired 60 per gun from Green hill. D company began their attack around midday, trying to drive a wedge between two lines of pillboxes. Corporal John Smith laid cover fire as Captain Lin Cameron crept forward, getting within 15 yards of the pill boxes on the left side of the track. Cameron counted around 7 pill boxes in two lines of defense going across both sides of the track. The steep slopes on both sides gave little venues of approach, allowing around just a platoon at a time. There was also sharpened bamboo pickets on the left flank, leading Cameron to believe that an attack was expected there.   The Japanese knowingly let two platoons reach their line of forward pillboxes before unleashing hell upon them. The casualties were terrible. As Cameron recounted, “we were within 20 meters of the enemy bunkers before all hell let loose”. One of the men in the forward sections was killed outright, Cameron was wounded, his right elbow was shattered by a machine gun bullet. As he saw his men hesitate, he screamed out “forward! Get stuck into them!” With his right arm now useless and his eyesight dimming, Cameron handed command over to Lt Martin. Despite the horror, the Australians pressed on. Corporal Carey led his depleted platoon forward in a great dash and swept the outer ring of the Japanese pillboxes. On his left were Leonards men who stormed two pillboxes before heavy enfilade fire pinned them down. Then the 17th platoon led by Corporal John Smith charged up Mount Tambu from behind with their bayonets fixed. Smith screamed out “follow me!” as he charged. 3 other men out of the 11 managed to keep up with Smith, but soon Japanese grenades began to rain down on them. The grenades caught them just as they passed a third line of pillboxes. Smith was hit, but he kept charging and when he reached the peak of Mount Tambu with his back to the enemy he screamed “come on boys! come on boys!”. Without additional support and with no indication A company were making progress over on the left flank, the 4 men on the peak were forced to withdraw. The gallant Smith had to be dragged down and would die from severe wounds two days later. Smith was decorated for bravery in Syria in 1941, when he cleared out 3 machine gun nests at a roadblock and despite being wounded during the battle of Wau he still had gas left in the tank for some more.   Scouts had made their way towards the Tambu saddle track and spotted Japanese soldiers, around 125 of them a full company or so. The scouts quickly realized they were outnumbered, thus when the artillery began to open up and Walter's company moved in for the attack across the saddle, no sooner then they started the enemy halted them in their tracks. Walter had no choice but to withdraw around 500 yards south east as the Japanese were too strong. Walter's inability to make progress in the west ultimately ruined the entire attack. Despite the defeat, Companies A and D had done very well against such a heavily fortified position.   Meanwhile, Warfe and his men were marching when they discovered Ambush Knoll had come back under the hands of some Japanese from the 2nd battalion, 66th regiment. On July 15th, Warfes commandos launched an attack, with C Platoon performing a frontal assault along the narrow ridge top track. There were 16 men in the attack and they found themselves face to face with well dug in Japanese. The Japanese were behind a bamboo barricade with some pillboxes scattered about. The platoon got within 50 feet of the main barricade, but the Japanese fire was too much and casualties were mounting quickly. Meanwhile B Platoon was maneuvering around the Japanese eastern flank. At 5:30 B Platoon began attacking the eastern side of the knoll. The men got behind an enemy pillbox covering the track from Orodubi, but the Japanese quickly saw the Australians and began tossing grenades at them. Despite the resistance, B Platoon managed cut off the Japanese supply line to Ambush Knoll. With their supply lines cut the Japanese were forced to withdraw   With Ambush Knoll back under allied control, Brigadier Hammer ordered A company of the 58/59th battalion to depart Gwaibolom and attack Orodubi from its southern flank. Even with the help of the 58/59th company, the commando's yet again failed to dislodge the Japanese. On the night of July 19th, fresh troops of the 1st company, 80th battalion used the light of the full moon to come up the ridge. This became a staging point for them to attack Ambush Knoll, seeing artillery fire beginning in the morning to support their attack. Warfe's commandos were manning the trenches on Ambush Knoll, turning the tables on the Japanese and inflicting heavy casualties upon them. The Japanese were forced to retreat. The next day Warfe reinforced Ambush Knoll with two Vickers guns, which gave the Japanese a nasty surprise when they attacked again. On the 20th, the Japanese opened fire with mortars and artillery before charging the ridge. They managed to get as far as to cut the Australian lines of communication, but were ultimately repealed once again. Over 14 consecutive attacks would be made on the 20th, and even more on the 21st, but it all came to nothing, Warfe's commandos held their ground. Facing such pressure from the Japanese, Hammer still felt the greater weight of their attention was directed at Bobdubi and not towards Tambu, believing it to all be a consequence of Moton's lack of progress. General Savige decided to order Motens 2/6th battalion to take responsibility over Bobdubi ridge. The 2/6th then came across the Japanese rear near the slopes of Ambush Knoll and began harassing them. On the 22nd the Japanese tried yet again to attack Ambush Knoll, but were beaten back firmly, forcing them to finally withdraw to Sugarcane Ridge. By July 23rd, Warfes' exhausted commandos earned a relief by the 2/6th and were sent to relieve A company at Gwaibolom, while A company advanced north. The 2/6th likewise would advance north. But now we are moving away from the troubles of New Guinea and heading back up north to the frigid Aleutians. After the successful seizure of Attu, now Admiral Kinkaid and General Buckner needed to plan the invasion of Kiska. Kiska was the last Japanese bulwark in the Aleutians and held an incredible underground city. There were miles of tunnels, buried ammunition dumps, barracks,  3 hospitals, dental clinics, mess halls, machine shops, warehouses, photo labs, telephone rooms, all shoved and shored with wood. Ventilation pipes connected the maze of caves and tunnels, with Japanese troops wearing great fur lined coats busy at work. The Americans had experienced hell, on Attu, over 2872 Japanese had been killed or committed suicide, just 28 men were captured and it cost 549 american lives, 1148 wounded and nearly another 2000 ill or battered by harsh climate. The American leadership expected Kiska to be another hellscape and did not want to come at it lightly. The 7th division led by Brigadier General Archibald Arnolrd, Buckner's 4th regiment, the 87th Mountain infantry regiment, the 13th Canadian Brigade, consisting of the 6th Canadian division led by Major General George Pearkes, the Canadian Fusiliers regiment, the 1st battalion of Winnipeg grenadiers, the Rocky Mountain rangers regiment and e Regiment de Hull along with the 1st Special Service Force led by Colonel Robert Frederick were to be part of the invasion of Kiska, codenamed Operation Cottage. Unfortunately, the actual invasion will not be happening in this episode, you will actually have to wait  weeks for that one, but I just so happened to have recently done a podcast with a Canadian Military Historian named Brad St.Croix from the Youtube channel OTD Military History, the same gentleman who I interviewed for this series about the battle of Hong Kong. The podcast we recently did was on the Canadian experience of the Pacific War and the battle of Kiska is 1/3rd of it, so if you are, impatient and want to learn some neat stuff about how Canadians had to change their entire military organization and use American equipment for the battle of Kiska, check out my Youtube channel, the Pacific War channel for the full episode.  Now the last time we spoke about Kiska, the Japanese were forced to perform a bit of a miracle to evacuate their boys. After Attu had fallen, Rear Admiral Akiyama Monzo alongside 6000 men were ordered to evacuate Kiska. To try and do this, the Japanese began by sending 13 I-class submarines of the 1st submarine squadron of Rear Admiral Kouda Takeo. Despite these Type C submarines being enormous in size, they could only carry around 150 men per trip, thus it would have took 40 successful journey's to evacuate the entire Kiska garrison. With the US Navy fully decked out with sonar, this was not going to be a walk in the park. The efforts had begun on May 27th and by July, the submarines had managed to get 800 men safely back to Japan, but lost 300 due to american attacks.  Meanwhile Admiral Giffen had a considerable armada to work with consisting of a trio of older battleships; the Mississippi, Idaho and New Mexico, a quintet of cruisers; Louisville, Portland, San Francisco, Santa Fe and Wichita and 9 destroyers. He was ordered to bombard Kiska who already had been smashed with aerial attacks all throughout June and early July. On July 6th, Giffen steamed towards Kiska with 4 cruisers and 4 destroyers and bombarded the island for 22nd minutes causing a handful of casualties. It was not all that impressive, but it convinced Admiral Kawase that the Americans were about to invade Kiska at any moment.Admiral Kawase Shiro realized the futility of the submarine effort and was forced to come up with a new plan. Kawase came up with a bold plan, he was going to wait for a night when a thick fog was occurring and would take a surface fleet to sneak over into the Aleutians to assault enemy warships and evacuate all the remaining men on Kiska in a single go. To be blunt, it was a dumb idea. The American warships were equipped with radar that would pick up any surface ship with ease despite any type of fog, but what was about to occur can only be described as spectacular and bizarre.  Rear Admiral Kimura, the victor of the battle of the bismarck sea, would lead the force and he had at his disposal Destroyer Squadron 1: consisting of Yugumo, Kazagumo, Asagumo, Akigumo, Usugumo, Hibiki (one of my favorite whiskeys), Shimakaze, Samidare, Naganami, Wakaba, Hatsushimo and light cruisers Abukuma and Kiso. In close support of these there was also a covering force consisting of heavy cruisers Nachi, Maya, light cruiser Tama and destroyers Nokaze and Namikaze. The large convoy force departed from Paramushiro on July 7th with Takeo's 1st submarine squadron performing reconnaissance. The covering force departed Paramushiro on July 10th and by July 12th the fleet was around 500 miles south of Kiska. When they took up this assembly position, the sailors were in despair to see the fog was quite low. While it did not matter for warships with radar, Kimura knew full well what allied aircraft could do to his forces if they were not better concealed. Thus he elected to wait until the fog reappaered to cover his force. But the weather did not change, the skies remained clear forcing him to head back on July 15th. Meanwhile on Kiska, Rear Admiral Monzo was frantically ordering his troops to lay out a road from the underground base to the harbor piers to help facilitate the impending evacuation. All of the Japanese on Kiska felt an impending doom placed upon them. If the Americans landed first, it was all but over for them. Luckily, Japanese weather stations reported a dense fog would emerge over Kiska by July 25th, and unlike here in Montreal Canada, I guess these weather reporters are accurate. Kimura once again departed Paramushiro on July 22nd, accompanied by Admiral Kawase aboard cruiser Tama. Yet a few days prior, on July 19th, Admiral Kinkaid had ordered Admiral Giffen to bombard Kiska again. This time Giffen took a two pronged naval attack force consisting of battleships Mississippi and Idaho, cruisers Portland, Wichita, San Francisco, Louisville, Santa Fe and destroyers Abner Read, Farragut, Monaghan, Perry, Aylwin, Bache, Hughes, Morris and Mustin. Giffen's force reached Kiska on July 22nd and his ships smashed the island with 424000 lbs of high explosive shells. Just an hour later, a PBY suddenly detached with her radar 7 radar pips southwest of Attu. The PBY maintained contact for around 6 hours before low fuel forced her to return to base. These radar pips alarmed Admiral Kinkaid which was being reported in conjunction with a massive increase in Japanese radio activity on Kiska. Kinkaid believed a major Japanese fleet had just entered Aleutian waters, most likely a reinforcement convoy. Kinkaid immediately ordered Rear Admirals Giffen and Griffin to intercept the suspected enemy. However, by doing this he had also done something extremely favorable for the Japanese, he had left Kiska Harbor open and unguarded. Kinkaid dispatched a quartet of PT boats to try and provide a makeshift blockade, but the terrible weather forced the smaller vessels to return to port as trying to dash over to Kiska would probably see them all sunk. While this was occurring, Kimura's ships were traveling through the dense fog separately. The fog prevented the Americans from intercepting them initially, and having failed to make contact with the enemy, Kinkaid became nervous the Japanese might escape the blockade and ordered the force to return to Kiska at maximum speed on July 25th. The American ships dutifully turned back while Kinkaid sent the Oiler Pecos out to meet them for refueling. By dusk of the 25th, the American ships were around 90 miles from Kiska, when the fog had all but disappeared showing a cloudless sky. Kimura's vessels seeing their fog betray them, all reunited as a single force, now bearing 400 miles south of the American warships. At precisely 12:43am on July 26th the American warships picked up 7 strong radar pips around 15 miles northeast. It was Mississippi's SG radar that first picked them up, the American destroyers were actually unable to detect any pips on their radar due to the curvature of the ocean's surface at such a distance. The New Mexico, Portland, San Francisco and Wichita began picking up the same radar pips. The radar pips zigzagged across the sea surface, changing direction in much the same way ships attempting to evade detection might. The ships were being detected all at different angles, verifying to the Americans there were physical presences of some kind occupying definite points in space. On top of this, the immobile radar signature of Kiska's volcano at a range of 78 miles appeared clearly the entire time, verifying the validity of the pips moving with a fixed landmark. The radar pips converged 22,000 yards ahead of the Americans forcing them to spring into action. Admiral Giffen called for the entire fleet to turn left to intercept the pips on their southerly heading and in the hopes of foiling a possible torpedo attack. All of the American ships turned their guns to fire salvo's into the night. Great flame lances stabbed into the darkness as destroyers launched volleys of torpedoes and radar plotters frantically calculated salvo corrections. For 67 minutes the Americans tracked the 7 radar pips firing wildly at them. At 1:30am the Mississippi's log recorded zig-zags and a 20 degree course change, but not a single sailor saw an enemy ship. Cruisers San Francisco and Santa Fe registered shell splashes, but never an enemy target.  75 miles over on Kiska, the Japanese were watching a spectacle. From their point of view it was like a night-time light show over the horizon. By 2:22am the radar pips thinned, faded and vanished completely. During the morning surface ships and aircraft fanned out looking for wreckage, ships, floating papers, oil slick, anything to indicate something was even out there! The American warships reported no return fire, it was as if they faced ghosts. With a lack of fuel and ammunition, the US ships began refueling on the 28th and resumed their blockade of Kiska. What famously has become known as the battle of the Pips left the US Navy with a mystery that remains unsolved to this very day. The radar equipment was operating at times where there was a cloudless night with no fog, zero reasons for false radar echoes. An Aleutian crab fishing captain named Captain George Fulton may have solved the mystery in 1991 when he managed to duplicate the radar signatures observed during the battle by using his radar on a natural phenomenon common to the area. He presented his findings to the Alaska War Symposium in 1993 in a letter “I […] duplicated the Battle of the Pips using color radar. Sure enough there were blips on the tube and their density changed from red to orange to yellow and finally to black, providing an exact replication of the Battle of the Pips. What you described fits exactly the […] pattern of dense flocks of mutton birds or dusky shearwaters […] As mutton birds fly they veer left and right. This accounts for the zigzagging that was reported on the radar logs” Captain Fulton further went on to say how these huge flocks continue until they see large schools of fish, such as pollack. When the birds see them they begin landing on the sea surface then dive for their prey. This maneuver causes them to vanish from radar screens entirely. In the 1990s Aleutian fishing crews use this trait to locate large concentration of pollack, identifying the blips by their zigzagging motion and cast their nets accordingly. Were the Japanese saved by shearwater birds? Another answer came from the US Navy who officially stated that atmospheric echoes, a sort of phenomena caused the radar pips, that explanation has been highly contested. Its also been speculated that the American radar pips were 7 IJN submarines running reconnaissance. What we do know is Kimura made it to Kiska on the 28th undetected and unharmed while the US warships were enroute miles back. No American ships were anywhere near Kiska on the 28th. Admiral Kimura pulled the ships into Kiska anchorage and evacuated the entire remaining forces on the island, all 5183 men onto 8 vessels all within 55 minutes. The Japanese soldiers made sure to spend their last moments on the island setting up a plethora of booby traps. Four days later Kimura and Kawase were back in Paramushiro, successfully evacuating Kiska without firing a single shot. The Americans had no idea the evacuation occurred. In the words of one disgruntled American Colonel after the Kiska ordeal ““How I hate those bastards but I've got to give them credit for the most masterly evacuation by any army at any time and I'm not forgetting Dunkirk” I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The drive to Lae and Salamaua rages on New Guinea as the American Navy in the frigid northern seas fought perhaps a ghost ship army. Or perhaps some pesky birds looking for tasty pollock saved the entire Japanese garrison on the island of Kiska. 

Here it is! Grand Canyon pyramids! Take a trip on a river rapid retreat to reveal the reality of the Egyptian realm! In Arizona no less, they say they found a head dress, but Smithsonian contests A conspiracy rooted in myth from 1909, that withstood the test of time like a fine wine or a body in brine. Was this tale of Tutankhamen too far fetched for the people? Or did Kinkaid really find a triangular steeple? From the land of the pharaoh, you'll need a wheelbarrow and a map with an arrow to get to the marrow. Strap in for a fall down a great canyon wall and answer the call of a tale that's as long as it probably is tall They made it here fans, with cat worship plans, to a canyon that's grand and dug holes in the sand, tall enough for a man to stand on his hands and carve in the cliffs his own hieroglyphs. --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/ewing-house-studios/support

  /Last time we spoke about the fall of Attu. The Americans had to fight both the Japanese and a very cruel mother nature to claim the frigid island of Attu. The Americans gradually seized every hill, ridge and razer edge crest as the pushed the Japanese into Chichagof Harbor. Once the Japanese had their backs to the sea and nowhere left to withdraw, Colonel Yamasaki decided they would go out in ablaze of glory. Nearly 1000 screaming Japanese performed a suicidal Banzai charge towards the American artillery positions, hoping to unleash the enemies guns upon them. Yamasaki received an M1 Garand Bullet as the rest of his men killed themselves en masse clutching grenades to their chests. It was a horrifying conclusion fit to make the last Samurai Saigo Takamori proud. Now the Americans turned their gaze back east upon the isolated Kiska.  This episode is the Rice Bowl Campaign Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  We left off with the fall of Attu to the Americans. Colonel Yamasaki's doomed garrison made one last banzai charge into oblivion, leaving piles of their dead over the island. The Americans had suffered substantial casualties, making the battle of Attu the costliest ground battle as of now fought in the Pacific. In the words of General Bucker “[The Japanese proved to be a] tough fighter, with great physical endurance and fortitude. He was not afraid to die.”  A number of lessons were learnt from the battle, including new landing techniques, and the necessity for rubberized, thoroughly waterproofed boots. The men on Attu had been given expensive, thick and insulated leather hunting boots, but these became absolutely useless once soaked in water. After Attu, improved winter kits emerged, and cases of hypothermia, frostbite or trench foot would become very rare among American soldiers even during bitterly cold campaigns in Italy and France. The Americans also learnt how masterful the Japanese were at creating concealed defensive works and at infiltration tactics. The American forces got to see first hand how weather and terrain could pose the greatest threat to success. The Hourglass Division, owing to its initial desert training, was not prepared for Attu conditions, which demanded cold weather and mountain warfare expertise, clothing and equipment. In addition to being inadequately clothed, they failed to take care of themselves on the battlefield. The 7th Provisional Scout Battalion was only able to muster 40 men to walk after five days of action. In contrast, the 30-man detachment of Alaska Scouts, recruited because of their outdoors skills and experienced in Alaska conditions, lost one man killed in action, two wounded and one man with a slight case of trench foot. These type of lessons would prove very useful in future operations, to point out two, the future Italian and France campaigns which held some cold territories.  As the battle of Attu was coming to a close, Tokyo issued a directive on May 21st for the evacuation of Kiska's 6000 man garrison led by Rear-Admiral Akiyama Monzo. The evacuation was going to be done using 13 I-class submarines from the1st submarine squadron of Rear-Admiral Kouda Takeo. But by early June Takeo would already realize the danger of using his force for such a task as one of his submarines would be sunk at Attu. There was a call to use surface ships if the weather permitted it and continuous calls to rush over to evacuate the Attu garrison, but the American naval blockade put an end to that idea and worse now it seemed the Northern Kuriles were in danger. Now Tokyo sought the deployment of fighters and anti-aircraft units to provide air defense and shore batteries to thwart an amphibious invasion of the Kuriles. The Japanese had a daunting task laid before to them. In contrast to the relatively weak American naval forces deployed at the battle of the Komondorski islands, Admiral Kinkaids blockade and bombardment forces included the a trio of older battleships; the Mississippi, Idaho and New Mexico, a quintet of cruisers; Louisville, Portland, San Francisco, Santa Fe and Wichita and 9 destroyers. This powerful fleet showed up on July 19th under the joint command of Rear Admirals Robert C Giffen and Robert M Griffen, very close names there lol. Other destroyers and submarine chasers were operating in separate smaller commands within the region. Admiral Kawase Shiro took over IJN operations in the Aleutians and North Pacific following Hosogaya's removal from command and thus found himself stuck with rescuing Kiska's garrison from the teeth of a very powerful American blockade. Lacking the fleet strength to punch a hole in the blockade, thus Kawase had turned to submarines. The 12 submarines under Takeo were Type C's, heavily armed with torpedoes, deck guns and measured 358 feet long. Kawase's first plan was to try and slip submarines through the blockade, but despite being large, the submarines could barely carry 150 men each, thus it would require 40 successful journeys to remove the entire garrison. With most American warships now equipped with sonar, this represented a hell of a risk, forcing Kawase to look towards other options. While the submarines would make runs as soon as possible, Kawase had to plan a surface evacuation. The Japanese submarine evacuation of Kiska began on May 27th with the first submarine, the I-7 arriving at Kiska with food, ammunition and a radio beacon. She could only carry 60 passengers, which was reserved for the sick and wounded alongside 28 boxes of ashes for those who had died on the island and 4 tons of spent shell cartridges. A few more submarines managed to make the trek and evacuated a few hundred men from Kiska, but then the Japanese luck changed for the worse. The I-24 captained by Hanabusa Hiroshi, entered Kiska harbor in early June taking aboard 150 soldiers. On the night of the 10th, she was trying to slip away but as she was passing 40 miles north of Shemya Island, American sonar aboard the USS Larchmont, A pc-461 Class Submarine chaser pinged. Lt Wallace Cornell ordered is crew to depth charge the enemy submarine tossing 5 of them into the water. The Americans blasted the I-24 to the surface. Then Cornell ordered the Larchmont to put the pedal to the metal flooring the 450 ton sub chaser to ram the 2554 ton I-24. Larchmont rode up and over the submarine splashing into the sea on the far side. Upon seeing they failed to ram her, Cornell's men began pounding the vulnerable I-24 with shells, before turning around to try ramming her again. This time the Larchmouth smashing into the I-24's conning tower, fatally damaging the submarine. She sank stern-first into the black, frigid sea killing her 104 man crew and the 150 soldiers she was bearing. Three days later, the destroyer USS Frazier sank the I-31 taking down her entire crew and the 150 soldiers she was evacuating. Out of 800 total men the submarine forces got off the island, 300 of them died to American attacks. As the summer would continue, combat and operational losses would see the destruction of 8 out of the original 13 submarines, leaving Takeo with 5. Kawase recognized the futility of the submarine operation and was forced to turn to his surface plan which would unfold in late july. While all of this was going on, the Americans invaded the islands of Shemya and Agattu. Brigadier General John Copeland led elements of General Buckner's 4th regiment and Colonel Talley's 18th Engineers to land on Shemya during a tough storm. The Americans quickly surveyed the island to see if they could construct an airfield to accommodate a brand new experimental aircraft, the most iconic one of the Pacific War, the B-29 Superfortress heavy bomber. She had been in the works since 1938 and her objective would soon be long range bombing missions against the Japanese home islands. With their usual blinding speed, the American Engineers made the Attu air station operational by June 8th, then Shemya's two weeks later. Alongside this the 11th air force would be reinforced with squadrons of the new PV-1 Ventura bomber, equipped with the latest airborne radar, which was capable of giving a clear picture of topographical contours that would be extremely useful while flying through the arctic weather and at night. Admiral Kinkaid would likewise shuffle his ships around to improve the blockade and General Butler's airforce would spend most of June smashing Kiska with bombs. They would fly a total of 407 bombing sorties, though the Japanese arsenal of 70 anti-air batteries would give them a hell of a time doing so. Completely uncontested the Americans would make unopposed landings on Semisopochmoi and the Rat Islands, covered only by PT boats. With these newly acquired airfields such as Attu and Shemya and the new aircraft on hand, the Americans were in sufficient range to bomb Paramushiro, Japan's Gibraltar-like base guarded its northern approach. The first raid against Paramushiro would occur on July 10, with 6 B-24's launching from Attu, but suddenly getting redirected to hit 4 Japanese wooden transports trying to breakthrough the naval blockade for Kiska. Although the American pilots successfully sunk 2 of them, they would not have enough fuel to continue on to hit Paramushiro. Another attempt would be made on Jul 18th seeing 6 B-24's inflicting minimal damage upon Paramushiro, but it showed the Japanese their home soil was no longer safe from American bombers. Tokyo was forced to reinforce the Kuriles and Hokkaido taking up valuable resources in men, guns, ships, aircraft and such from other places they were needed like the Solomons. Because of their large success, Buckner and Kinkaid saw significant budget increases and now the Joint Chiefs were seriously thinking about invading the Japanese home islands from the Aleutians. They went as far as to create plans with 1945 designated as the year they would invade Japan. Now we are shifting away from the north pacific to dive back into the situation of the second sino-japanese war. The last time we were in China, the battle of West Hubei was raging on, with the 11th army of General Yokoyama invading south of the Yangtze River. Now Yokoyama would press on against the southwest portion of Yichang where the Chinese 11th division was defending Shipai Fortress; the 18th division was at Changyang and the 24th and 36th independent engineer battalions were at Yuyangkuan. The Chinese 11th division was led by General Hu Lien who held a considerably well defended fortress at Shipai, but also its approach which was the dangerous Xiling gorge. All combined, these defended the approach to Chongqing and Sichuan. Because of its vital importance, Commander Chen Cheng ordered Hu Lien to defend Shipai fortress to the death. By May 18th, the second phase of the IJA operation came to its conclusion, thus Yokoyama decided to concentrate his 13th division near Quanshuiwan, and his 3rd division backed by the Nozoe detachment near Shuangjingsi. This was in preparation for the third phase of the operation, a final drive against the Chinese defenses between Yichang and Yidu. The IJA 13th Division began to move north while the 3rd and Nozoe detachment advanced south of Yichang to cross the Qingjiang river. The Japanese found many Chinese defensive positions along the way, but by this point the Chinese had been so brutally battered over the past month, they were still dazed and confused, thus easily brushed aside. The 18th army would manage to hinder the Japanese advance, forcing Yokoyama to redirect 3 battalions of the 39th division to join the offensive. By May 22nd, the 39th forded the Yangtze and joined up with the 3rd and Nozoe detachment to assault Changyang. As the Japanese forces approached Shipai Fortress from three directions, Commander Chen Cheng and General Sun Lianzhong tossed the 94th and 32nd armies to try and stop the Japanese advance at Yuyangkuan. Chen Cheng's plan was to box in Yokoyama's forward units at Yuyuangkuan, but instead the Japanese began dispersing and clashing with the Chinese 18th army at Changyang alongside Yuyangkuan by May 23rd. The defenders still jarred from the offensives were routing left right and center. Fortunately the Chinese would manage to pull themselves together to reorganize a new defensive position to the right of the Shipai Fortress. Their last line of defense was to be at Muchiaochi, in front of Congqing and Sichuan, held by the 34th division. The Japanese were relentless as they continued their advance and by the end of May 26th they reached the defensive line. At this point Yokoyama had achieved his objectives as the vessels at Yichang could now advance towards Yueyang without facing resistance. He quickly ordered 53 steamers to navigate the river on the 27th, but then they were met with an expected enemy, the Major General Chennault's Flying Tigers. During May of 1943, as we have seen, the Japanese launched a ground offensive targeting areas like DongDongting Lake and the Yangtze River region. The objectives were clear to the allies, the Japanese were seizing the colloquially called “rice bowl” region, right during harvest season. As the ground fighting intensified it became clear that the CHinese land forces desperately needed aerial support. To counter the Japanese, the recently created 14th airforce as of march 10th 1943 led by Chennault and the Chinese 4th air group tossed P-40E's and P-43's to try and support the Chinese ground forces. On MAy 14th, Japanese reconnaissance covered Kweilin and Lingling, estimating the US order of battle was 24 P-40s, 8 B-24's, 3 B-25's, 1 P-38 and 1 P-43. It was also noted that the Chinese had advanced to Liangshan where their 4th air group was located.  The 4th air group went into action by May 19th with 8 P-40E's, 4 P-43's, alongside some A-29 Hudson bombers. The Chinese bombed the Japanese ground forces meeting some intense anti-aircraft gunfire back. Deputy group commander Xu Baoyun, flying a P-40E was shot down by Japanese anti-aircraft gunfire in the process. The next morning the Japanese bombed Liangshan by surprise giving the 4th air group no chance to retaliate. From May 19th-June 6th, the Chinese Air Forces would fly 336 fighter and 88 bomber sorties over the battle zone claiming to have shot down 31 Japanese aircraft. The 4th air group missing their chance to confront the Japanese on May 29th, when they fly from Liangshan to cover Chongqing due to a false alarm. While they were absent, 10 Japanese fighters strafed the field followed an hour later by 9 Japanese bombers with fighter escorts. On May 31st, 9 P-43's escorted 5 A-29s to attack the ferry crossing between Yichang and Yidu, but in doing so they would miss the most intense action of the campaign. On the same day Lt Colonel John Alison, an American ace alongside 2 USAAF wingmen led 7 P-40s from the 4th air group to escort 9 B-24 bombers over to Yichang. It was Alison's last mission in China and the ace hoped to add to his record of kills. The allied airforce bombed and strafed Japanese ground forces but also got into dogfights with Japanese air forces. Alison's aircraft was badly shot up by Captain Ohtsubo Yasuto the leader of the 1st Chutai squadron of the 33rd. Lt Tsang Hsu-Lan nicknamed “Bulldog” took his No.2304 P-40 to swing behind Ohtsubo as he was firing upon Alison and managed to shot his aircraft down, saving Alison's life. Tsang was awarded a American Silver Star and the highest medals China could offer. On June 6th the 14 K-43's and 8 light bombers attacked Liangshan. 13 Chinese P-40's led by COlonel Li Hsiang-Yang were returning from a mission to Liangshan and were landing as the Japanese approached. Captain Chow Chin-kai, commander of the 23rd squadron and a veteran of many years of combat, directed the ground crews to take defensive measures and then apparently climbed into a P-66 Vanguard. Without time to adjust his parachute, check his fuel nor even buckle his seatbelt he gunned the engine. While the Japanese strafed the field, Chow went directly for the bombers, claiming 3 destroyed. Chow received the Blue Sky White Sun award personally from Chiang Kai-shek for this action. Yet despite his heroism, 12 P-40's and a fleet trainer were destroyed on the grounds of Liangshan. What became known as the Rice Bowl Campaign took a heavy toll on the CAF. In addition to their loses in combat and on the ground suffered most by P-40's, many other aircraft suffered from operational damage. After the campaign the operational CAF aircrafts would number 6 out of 7 A -29s, 5 out of 10 SB-3s, 3 out of 5 P-40E's, 6 out of 9 P-43s and 39 out of 46 P-66's. The 14th airforce played a small role overall in the Rice Bowl campaign and thus their losses were quite minimal. Meanwhile at the Shipai Fortress, Hu Lien faced direct attacks from the IJA 68th regiment on May 28th. Told to fight to the death, the defenders managed to repel each enemy assault inflicting significant casualties upon the invaders. Hu Lien would personally led the troops at all times in their efforts to dig in and build fortifications. To the right flank the 3rd and 39th divisions charged against new positions manned by exhausted soldiers of the 18th army, who resisted as much as they could. However they were simply no match for the full might of two Japanese divisions and soon two Chinese companies were annihilated as the rest pulled back. General Luo Guangwen of the 18th Chinese division boldly decided to counterattack, launching a rain of grenade and mortar fire over the 3rd and 39ht divisions halting their advance. Although aided by artillery and aerial bombardment, the Japanese were still pressing hard against the defenders. The Chinese 94th and 32nd armies then arrived to the scene, and the 94th army went to work successfully blocking the advance of the 13th division near Dayanxiang. This forced the Japanese to cross the dangerous Tianzhu Mountain which would claim much of their equipment. Further down the road, the 13th division was also ambushed by concealed forces of the 32nd army, managing to inflict hundreds of casualties upon them. Because of the increased losses, Yokoyama ordered the Noji detachment at Yichang to cross the Yangtze to assault Shipai Fortress frontally in a last ditch effort to break Hu Lien's lines. On the 29th, the Noji detachment launched its attack, breaking through Hu Lien's line at Qiuqianping, inflicting sever casualties upon the 11th division which was forced to retreat towards the bay. By the end of the 29th, the 18th Army's other units were also withdrawing, leaving Hu Lien alone to face the brunt of the enemies advance. But by the point the Japanese had suffered tremendous losses and the steamers at Yichang had already arrived to Shishou, thus Yokoyama feared he was overstretched and that his forces might get trapped by Chinese units moving to Changyang. Thus not wanting to see things fall apart, Yokoyama ordered an end to the operation on the 29th and preparing his forces for a withdrawal. But the next day the 13th division decided to press an attack upon Muchiaochi, not knowing the 32nd Army had set up another ambush for them there. The Chinese unleashed artillery on the Japanese inflicting more casualties on the already battered division. Meanwhile the isolated 11th division was repealed the combined attacks of the 3rd and 39th divisions, repelling 10 consecutive attacks throughout the day, leaving the bay area full of dead Japanese. on the 31th the Japanese began their withdrawal as more and more Chinese reinforcements were arriving for a massive counterattack. While the 3rd and 39th divisions managed to avoid battles as they crossed the Yangtze at Yichang, the battered 13th division was heading towards Yidu and was trapped by the 32nd army at Changyang by June 3rd. The 13th division would manage to break free and flee towards Gongan, but the division which was earmarked to depart for the Pacific, lost so many men they would be forced to remain in China. Yokoyama was forced to send the 17th independent mixed brigade who had already managed to withdraw to Shishou to rescue the 13th division. They arrived to Gongan on June 5th, and fight a long series of battles to help the remnants of the 13th division to limp back to Shishou by June 8th. With the Japanese operation concluded, Commander Chen Cheng and General Sun Lianzhong would successfully recapture most of the lost territory and begin rebuilding defensive lines as they did. The Japanese claimed to have suffered 3500 casualties with 771 dead and 2746 wounded, though it should be noted other sources claim their losses were considerably higher, as the 13th division was practically destroyed, the 17th mixed brigade, 3rd and 39th divisions were also severely damaged indicating losses possibly in the tens of thousands. The losses were so grave, the Japanese would not be able to start another offensive in China until the end of the year. Thus the gateway to Chongqing and Sichuan were held, paraded as a grand victory by the Chinese. As I indicated in a previous episode however,  Historians such as Barbara W. Tuchman suggest "the Japanese withdrew without pursuit from what appeared to have been a training and foraging offensive to collect rice and river shipping." In other words, the Rice Bowl campaign as it became known, basically saw the Japanese stealing the bowl of rice for 1943.  Now we are not done just yet, there is some action going on in the Solomons. The Japanese had just conducted Operation I-Go and despite their pilots extremely overexaggerated claims, it truly was a lackluster offensive. Alongside this the legendary Admiral, Isoroku Yamamoto had been assassinated on April 18th, shattering Japanese morale. Nonetheless the show had to go on as they say and now Admiral Kusaka would need to reorganize, repair and reinforce his air forces in preparation for the next expected American offensive in the Solomons. Kusaka was reinforced with the 12th Air Fleet; consisting of the 24th and 27th Air Flotillas. The 11th Air Fleet meanwhile, would be reinforced with the 25th Air Flotilla  holding 60 Zeros, 10 J1N1s and 50 G4Ms. Kusaka's 26th Air Flotilla, who should have been relieved, would be forced to fight on for the duration of the campaign against Rabaul; but the 21st Air Flotilla would be sent to Saipan for rehabilitation. Now since the evacuation of Guadalcanal, the Japanese had created a new defensive line with Rekata bay being the hub for the Santa Isabel defense line and Munda the hub for New Georgia with its forward post at Wickham anchorage. This meant forward bases needed to be reinforced, so Santa Isabel received the 7th Combined Special Naval Landing Force of Rear-Admiral Katsuno Minoru, consisting of the Kure 7th SNLF and the 3rd Battalion, 23rd Regiment. New Georgia received the 2nd battalion, 229th regiment of Captain Iwabuchi Sanji, the 41st antiaircraft battalion, the 4th, 10th and 22nd construction units who went to Munda, the 1st battalion, 229th regiment and 1st machine-gun company who would go to Wickham anchorage. Kusaka envisioned the main defense force to be Rear Admiral Ota Minoru's 8th combined SNLF. This consisted of the Kure 6th and Yokosuka 7th who had recently been converted into heavy artillery units originally set to for hitting the Americans on Guadalcanal. Other support, rifle companies and heavy weapons compies made up the rest of the SNLF force. By late January Ota's force began its movement to New Georgia, arrived to Munda by the end of the month, though a large air strike rocked them on January 29th sinking 75 barge loads of valuable cargo. The Japanese sent various forces to occupy Vila and Rekata Bay in January where bases would be developed.  On February 27, Choiseul coast watchers spotted Kirikawa Maru carrying two 14cm guns, four 8cm dual-purpose guns, 600 tons of ammunition and supplies, and SNLF personnel as the ship and its two escorts cleared the Shortlands. A PBY and the coast watchers reported their course, and a COMAIRSOLS strike force of fourteen SBDs, with an escort of twenty-four fighters, caught them three miles off the northeast tip of Vella Lavella. The escort took on the thirteen Zeros and two F1Ms flying cover, and in the fight that followed each side lost two aircraft. The SBDs went about their business with deadly effect; a surviving Japanese medical officer later wrote that the bombs were exploding in the ship like a fireworks exhibition at Ryōgoku Bridge in Tokyo. This would force the Japanese to yet again rely on the good ol Tokyo express much to their dismay. Alongside that the battle of Blackett strait on March 6th forced the Japanese to avoid the Kula gulf and instead op for the Fergusson passage. Through march to May the Japanese would suffer only one loss, the sea truck Gisho Maru, thus the new route seemed to be successful. However with all of the shuffling by both sides it seemed evident, a new bloody campaign was about to be unleashed in the Solomons.   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Japanese struck hard into the heart of China's Rice Bowl Region. Both the Chinese and Japanese lost significant amounts of men to the bloody campaign, Chongqing and Sichuan were safe, but in the end the Japanese had secured their objectives.  

Last time we spoke about the battle for Attu. The allied commanders responsible for the frigid northern pacific theater finally unleashed a major campaign to kick the Japanese off American controlled soil. However the battle of Attu was to be by no means a cake walk, far from it. The men of the 7th and 35th divisions were about to receive a baptism under ice. As they stormed multiple beaches on Attu all was eerily quiet, there was no enemy to be seen. However upon marched a bit up the rugged hills and ridges they found extremely well concealed and well defended positions of the enemy. The Japanese rained pure hell upon the Americans causing a bloodbath. Despite the incredible numerical superiority, the Americans struggled to claim each hill, slope and ridge against a tenacious enemy. Today we are going to finish that story and jump back over to China for another bloody conflict. This episode is the West Hubei Offensive & Changjiao Massacre Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  We left off at Attu with Colonel Zimmerman taking command after Colonel Earle was killed by a Japanese sniper. The Southern force was pinned down at Massacre Valley just in front of Jarmin Pass. Colonel Culin's Northern force and Willoughby's Scouts were making gradual progress over in the Holtz Bay area, preparing to launch an all out offensive in 35 hours. The weather was terrible for the allies. The misty fog was concealing the Japanese positions upon the peaks, while the Japanese could fully see the allies down below. To make matters worse, casualties were mounting as a result of the brutality of mother nature. The clothing issued in San Francisco was  not nearly warm enough for fighting in Attu trenches. More than 100 Americans suffered death, injury, cripping frostbite and trench foot by May 14th alone, and the casualties were continuing to pile. The allied artillery were stuck in mud along the beaches. Supplies on the beaches sprawled in great clogged heaps which the men were forced to carry on their backs, causing them to sink further into the snow and mud. The transport ship Perida which was carrying vital supplies and beached herself after hitting a pinnacle rock. Landing crafts were running double time carrying supplies to the beaches and wounded men from them through crashing frigid waves. The air force were grounded because of the terrible weather, already 4 Wildcats had been smashed into mountainsides because of gusts of wind. Continuous radio pleas for supply drops were heard with men demanding sleeping bags and food.  General Brown decided to prod the enemy defenses with another assault on May 14th, tossing Zimmerman's 3rd battalion against the Jarmin Pass, this time with some support from the USS Nassau. Yet as usual the weather was brutal and 3 Wildcats would get caught in a williwaw in the early morning crashing them. The troops assault likewise was just as disastrous. 4 company commanders were put out of action, two killed and two wounded. The casualties were high and the battalion was forced to run right back to their trenches. Zimmerman was forced to relieve the battered unit by bringing up the 2nd battalion of the 32nd regiment. Further south, the newly arrived 1st battalion, 32nd regiment were clambering onto a very overcrowded beach. The transports were having a difficult time unloading unlike their counterparts at Beach Red who were managing to move the flow of supplies more smoothly to the front. General Brown was anxious to make progress and reluctantly requested that General Buckner's 4th regiment be brought over from Adak.  His message included this “Evidence of greater enemy strength than anticipated. Indication of lack of sufficient force to accomplish mission… Recent captured enemy documents show enemy strength considerably above than anticipated.” But Admirals Rockwell and Kinkaid had to refuse the request because the southern beach was congested, Kinkaid sent back this message,“Every effort must be made to expedite clearing of beach and unloading of transports in order that they may be withdrawn as soon as possible. Reinforcement by 4th Regiment not possible until completion of above.” Well that response certainly did not sit well with the Brown and the Army lads. Brown reacted bitterly, telling his staff officer he didn't believe the Navy cared at all about the Army's needs. As Major General Archibald Arnold put it  “Attu was the first Army-Navy operation for almost all of us. We had little understanding of successful cooperation. The Navy had no conception of the effect of terrain and weather on the combat efficiency of the troops on Attu. It had no conception of how ground troops fought, and therefore Admiral Kinkaid could not evaluate the prospects for the outcome.” To make matters worse, Rockwell's three old battleships had exhausted their bombardment ammunition, they needed to head back to Adak for more, leaving Brown and his men without that critical bombardment support. Admiral Kinkaid was really unhappy with the lack of progress on part of the Army and demanded Brown write a report of the situation. Unfortunately the PBY Catalina carrying that report accidentally dropped it into Massacre Bay. Admirals Kinkaid and Rockwell were not at all happy with what appeared to be utter silence from Brown. Meanwhile Culin's Northern force were firing from their trenches and withstanding Japanese mortar and artillery barrages. Both sides were causing significant casualties upon another. One of the Japanese Doctors at the scene, Dr. Paul Tatsuguchi wrote this in his diary  “Continuous flow of wounded in the field hospital. Took refuge in the trenches during daytime and took care of the patients during the bombardment. Enemy strength must be a division. Our desperate defense is holding up well.” Over in the mountains Willoughby's scouts had been fighting nonstop from May 14th to the 16th. Constant firefights and shootout with entrenched Japanese was taking a toll on them. The Japanese continuously were heard screaming “Damn American dogs, we massacre you!”. After the series of grim firefights in intense cold, the men went to their foxholes hungry as they had no rations. By the evenings nearly half his men were casualties. Willoughby would later describe his constant struggle to save his men, as many as possible from frostbite and gangrene. "The ones who suffered were the ones who didn't keep moving. I tried to keep everyone on the move, but I didn't catch some of them. They stayed in their holes with wet feet. They didn't rub their feet or change socks when they needed to". Willoughby had no choice but to push the men forward. They had no food and their boats had been casualties of friendly fire, their only salvation was to link up with the northern force, but to do so they would have to break through the enemy lines. On the 16th, Colonel Yamasaki decided to withdraw his forces to the Moore Ridge on the far side of Holtz Valley, it would be a miracle to Willoughby's men. Yamasaki's men had left behind large stores of ammunition and food. The rationale for the withdrawal was to thwart getting caught between the Northern FOrce and the Scout battalion. The Japanese had actually believed the Scout battalion to be a much larger force than it was because of the intensity of their fighting. Willoughby's battered men finally linked up with Culins force at Holtz Bay. Only 11 of Willoughbys scouts were dead, but out of his 420 men, now only 165 were effective. They had been crushed by wounds, frostbite, gangrene and other ailments.80 scouts were left to hold key positions in the mountains as the other 320 scouts would join the northern force's plight against the Jarmin Pass. Something had to be done to break the stalemate at Jarmin Pass which was causing unbelievable losses upon the allies. Culin ordered his battalions to march east during the night, hoping to push the Japanese off Moore ridge to the Chichagof Valley which would effectively cut off the Jarmin Pass defenders. Further south, Zimmerman led another front assault against Jarmins pass, but like the other times it failed. That noon, Rockwell decided to pull his warships out of Attu's waters within the next 24 hours as they had become sitting ducks. During this period, Brown was forced to physically come aboard Rockwell's Flagship to meet with the Admiral as communications had all but broken down. Brown had come to argue about transporting the 4th regiment, while Rockwell wanted to know what the hell was going on. Brown was able to convince Rockwell to send word to Kinkaid that they both wanted the 4th regiment to come over to Attu. Additionally they requested road-equipment to help the engineers build some roads to clear up the supply nightmare on the beach. Kinkaids response to Brown was made in haste with some poor choice of words “What did you expect to build there with such tremendous supplies—a stadium, or a city? You asked for supplies that you couldn't have used over a period of months.” Kinkaid basically read Brown's requests and came to the conclusion the General was expecting a battle to last 60 days, while the original battle plan was expecting 3 days. At this point when they were messaging another it had been 5 days of battle. Thus Kinkaid deduced Brown had shifted to a defensive stance rather than offensive. He was really pissed off by this and immediately met with General's Buckner and DeWitt. Buckner and DeWitt were not fans of Brown and would fan the flames blame upon him. As a result of terrible bad communications and some service rivalry, General Brown was relieved of his command. General Landrum was to relieve him and take command of the 7th division. Before Brown's  On may 16th, both Rockwell and Brown were relayed the message to their shock. Landrum was on his way, and in the meantime Brown retained command. Thus Brown ordered Zimmerman to launch an attack again against the Jarmin Pass and once again it failed. They had incurred so many losses from that attack the 2nd battalion of the 32nd regiment had to be relieved by the 3rd battalion of the 17th regiment. Do remember the 2nd battalion had been sent to relieve the previous one. To the north, Culins battalions had crossed the Holtz valley under the cover of night, applying pressure to the defenders on Moore Ridge. The allies were pinned to the valley floor while they rained hell upon Moore Ridge. Again we have a diary entry from Dr. Paul Tatsuguchi displaying the lengths the Japanese would go to, to hold their position. “If Shitigati Dai [Moore Ridge] is taken by the enemy the fate of East Arm is decided, so orders was given to destroy all the wounded soldiers by giving them shots in the arm and die painless. At the last minute there was an order from Headquarters Sector Unit to proceed to Chichagof Harbor by way of Umanose [Fish Hook Ridge].” Culin then sent some platoons out along the beach to his left to climb the seaside ends of the ridges. The men climbed from hump to hump and were forced to charge into several hand to hand fighting with the defenders, but they gradually earned a foothold upon the ridge by nightfall. Culin had thus managed to capture Holtz valley, finally a significant piece of good news. He sent word by radio to Brown. It was to be the only bit of good news Brown would hear as he responded “well done” to Culin. A few minutes later Brown heard General Landrum had just arrived at the harbor. Brown and Landrum met awkwardly. Brown gave a full report to Landrum who expressed astonishment. Landrum then made it clear he found no fault with Browns command and ordered his plans to continue exactly how they were. He judged Kinkaid's condemnation of Brown without even meeting with him in person to be a grave error. Brown took one last look at Attu, before he made his departure to the States. Without Browns knowledge, General DeWitt went on the record writing up a efficiency report of him, adding passages like this “Personality and temperament not conducive to command joint operations. Impulsive.” These sly remarks would block Brown's promotional chances later in his career.  Back at Moore Ridge, the Japanese defenders were down to a single meal a day, usually a single ball of cold rice. Many of them broke under the strain of cold and hunger. The psychological effect of waiting for ones death was too much for many. Many of the men would simply go off on their lonesome to attack the American positions in order to be shot and put out of their misery. Again Dr Paul Tatsuguchi wrote in his diary of the defenders plight “At night about 11:30 o'clock under cover of darkness I left the cave. Walked over muddy roads and steep hills of no-man's land. No matter how far or how much we went we did not get over the pass. Was rather irritated in the fog by the thought of getting lost. Sat down after 30-40 steps, would sleep, dream and wake up, same thing over again. We had few wounded and had to carry them on stretchers. They got frost-bitten feet, did not move after all the effort.”    Colonel Yamasaki decided to abandon Moore Ridge and the Holtz Bay area, withdrawing into the Prendergast and Fish Hook ridge during the night of May 16th. This left the Jarmin Pass defenders in an impossible position, so the 303rd independent battalion was likewise order to pull back and take up a position at the Clevesy pass. The Americans failed to realize this because of the thick fog, however with the lull in firing they gradually came to realize the brutal battle for the Massacre Valley which had caused 1100 casualties up to this point had ended. On may 17th, Culin launched a night attack to seize the rest of Moore ridge and the men anxious advanced for hours expecting carnage at any moment only to find out the Japanese had withdrawn. On Moore ridge they found large stocks of supplies, including artillery guns. While all of this was a great relief to the men, a few Nassau Wildcats coming in for a bombing-strafing run upon their position was not so great. Many of Culin's men were wounded by the aerial strike prompting word to be brought over to Kinkaid. Kinkaid sent Colonel Eareckson to Attu to better coordinate the air strikes with the ground operations. Meanwhile Willoughby sent out some patrols to link up with the Southern forces at Jarmin Pass to spread the good news. Prior to receiving that news, the fog had prevented Zimmerman's men from noticing the enemy had withdrawn. Zimmerman sent some patrols to the pass which found out the news for themselves and Zimmerman would begin occupying the pass by the end of the day. Zimmerman walked the crest of the pass and found the corpse of one Captain John Jarmin alongside the bodies of his platoon and the small clumps of dead Japanese horribly mangled by artillery shells. The pass, then named Massacre-Holtz Pass, was renamed after Jarmin who died on May 14th. Now we are going to take a leave of the frigid north pacific to talk about some American naval developments and a bloody offensive about to begin in China.  On February 7th of 1943, the submarine USS Wahoo entered Pearl Harbor carrying 8 rising sun flags on her signal halyards and a broom lashed to her periscope shears signifying a “clean sweep”. She had just come back from a long submarine cruise and one of the most remarkable ones for the war. She was hailed by a crowd of officers, personnel and even news reports. News reporters coming to see a submarine was indeed a rarity, thus adding to the nickname “the silent service”. The American submarines never promoted themselves and received basically no press coverage. But one person in the Pacific Fleet did decided to publicize the submarine war and much of the Wahoo's reports were given to him for public release. The captain of the Wahoo, Commander Dudley Walker Morton was nicknamed “a one-man wolfpack” and the submarine got an article published in Hawaii's Hawaiian Advertiser  titled “Wahoo running japs A'gunning”. Wahoo had sunk 5 ships totalling 32,000 tons on her third cruise. But what is more significant than the damage done was Morton's tactics. He had turned a new page and many submarine commanders would begin to study him. As Morton's executive officer, Richard O'Kane would say “cast aside unproven prewar concepts and bugaboos”. Morton was extremely aggressive and employed daring tactics like surfacing beside enemy ships to induce panic and deck gunning vulnerable ships. This often led to convoys scattering causing logistical nightmare for the Japanese.  However as triumphant as the Wahoo's ventures were, it could not sweep away the lingering frustration and disenchantment for the Pacific submarine force. Submarines had sunk 180 enemy ships totaling 725,000 tons in 1942, more aggregate tonnage than Japan could build that year, but it was felt the fleet was not reaching its full potential. Too many submarine crews clung to pre-war tactics. There was overwhelming evidence that the Mark 14 torpedo was a complete lemon, but the Navy's bureau of ordnance unanimously rallied against any critics and refused any suggestion that things needed reevaluation. In the later half of 1942, Admiral English had sent over 61 war patrols out of Pearl Harbor and 27 returned empty handed. Patrols off Truk had been far less productive than patrols within Japanese home waters. Glory hunting, ie: chasing capital ships was not producing results. The Japanese freighters and oil tankers, much slower and easier targets were a better investment. In the Atlantic Nazi Germany's Wolf packs were demonstrating how a relatively small number of Uboats could menace a vital economic and military lifeline. Japan like Britain was extremely vulnerable to a war of commerce and it was evident to all this was not being pursued heavily enough. But the Submarine leadership, admirals English, Fife, Lockwood and Withers were allowing their vessels to perform marginally important reconnaissance services or support various other campings in ill-conceived roles, ie pre-war doctrine stuff.  The active duty submarine officers were becoming increasingly resentful to their leadership and extremely annoyed at watching countless torpedoes explode prematurely, not explode at all or run in circles rather than speed towards a target. To these criticisms, Admiral English retorted “ SUBPAC has never had a premature explosion”. The Bureau of Ordnance instead of investigating, began to blame the sub crews for failures. According to Clay Blair a scholar of the Pacific submarine Campaign “The torpedo scandal of the U.S. submarine force in World War II was one of the worst in the history of any kind of warfare.” Ned Beach, a submarine commander who later became a historian and novelist remarked about the torpedo's “performed so poorly that had they been the subject of deliberate sabotage they hardly could have been worse”. It might have honestly been better if the torpedoes 100% all failed, because perhaps an investigation would have come sooner. The torpedo problem was gradually fixed over the period of two years, while the bureaucrats resisted bitterly and the submariner crews risked their lives carrying faulty weapons. The first problem to be solved was the Mark 14's tendency to run 10 feet deeper than set. Charlie Lockwood in Freemantle, Australia ran a series of tests and demonstrated the problem to the bureau of ordnance and got Admiral King involved who championed his cause. It was easily fixed by changing the depth setting. Next in August of 1942, while the torpedoes were certainly not going too deep anymore, the explosion rates were not improving. The magnetic influence exploder was faulty and causing premature explosions and through a lot of bickering amongst numerous commanders it was decided to deactivate it. This seemed to cure the mark 14's of premature explosions, but still more was wrong. So many submariner crews reporters dud hits, and when the magnetic influence exploder was deactivated the duds became even more apparent. It seemed the contact pistol was faulty. To solve this engineers adopted a ball switch and electric detonator rather than using a firing pin mechanism. Now the depth issue was solved, the premature explosion issue was solved and the dud issue was solved, but the torpedoes still tending to go in circles or simply ran erratically. Turned out to be an easy fix, they attached collars to the mark 14, which mark 15's had and this caused them to steer straight. To give an idea of how these minor engineer fixes changes the war lets go through some figures. By the start of the war, the Japanese had 6,384,000 tons of shipping. During the first year of the war, they lost 1,147,400 tons of shipping, but they also added 706,000 tons of shipping, for a total net loss of 441,400 tons, which left them with 5,942,600 tons of shipping by the start of 1943. It's important to mention that the Japanese leadership believed they needed to retain 3 million tons of shipping in order to meet the industrial and civilian needs of the economy, although this estimate was probably too low, as Japan's industrial capacity was proportional to her ability to import the needed material.  In 1943 Japan would lose 1.5 million tons of shipping, in 1944 this became 2.7 million. The Pacific Submariners were strangling the island nation to death. Now as a result of the increased american submarine attacks upon shipping, alongside Japan's increased demand for shipping to be used to transport men, supplies and raw materials for the war effort, well as you can imagine all of this required the homefront to produce more. As a result the shipping available for secondary theaters like the north pacific and even that of China forced Japan to seek out alternative means to secure the resources they needed.  For example at Yichang there was approximately 20000 tons of steamer tonnage for inland river navigation which could alleviate supply issues for the China theater. But Chinese control over the southern bank of the Yangtze river prevented the Japanese from moving the ships forward to Wuhan. Going all the way back to 1938, Chiang Kai-shek in absolute desperation to stop the Japanese advance had opened the levees that held back the Yellow River at Huayuankou in Henan province. This move had cost an estimated 500,000 Chinese lives. The fertile plains of Henan province were destroyed and its people drowned or starved. The Japanese army gradually moved south seizing the strategic city of Wuhan on the Yangtze river. The Nationalists still held control over unoccupied Henan provinces as the Japanese held around 1.5 million soldiers within China at the time and did not have the resource to push deeper. For most of the Pacific War, the Japanese were content simply controlling the Yangtze river from Wuhan, extending along the rich fertile delta that passed through Nanjing and Shanghai before exiting into the east china sea. A further 466 miles upstream to the west of Wuhan behind multiple barricades of mountains lay Chiang kai-shek's wartime capital of Chongqing.  In effect there began a stalemate between 3 sides in the conflict; the Japanese, the Nationalists and the CCP. Mao had brokered a secret deal with the Japanese not to fight another for awhile, some units of the NRA had similar pacts with the Japanese. This resulted in trade between both sides, and it might surprise you to hear, this even resulted in some lend lease materials that came over the hump being traded down the Yangtze river to the Japanese in Wuhan. Chiang Kai-shek did not have the resources to train and army even his core divisions let alone the local NRA forces led by provincial commanders. FDR promised Chiang kai-shek in 1943 to arm and modernize the NRA's core of 90 divisions, out of a theoretical 360, but in practice the hump could only provide enough materials to modernize 30 divisions, the X force and Y force. Stilwell was in charge of training these divisions which would in turn retake Burma to open up the land supply routes to CHongqing along the Ledo-Burma Road. Without resources to equip his armies on the eastern front, Chiang Kai-shek knew any head-on engagement with the Japanese would most likely end with defeat and destruction. This led the 2nd sino-japanese war conflict from 1942-1944 to see the majority of fighting limited at a local level, with struggles in agrarian regions ,village by village and between the NRA and CCP.  Now back to the offensive at hand, the Japanese sought to occupy the area between Yichang and Yueyang to increased their control over the Yangtze River and crush the Chinese fighting strength in the region. Now a bit further back in time there had been an offensive launched between february and march north of the Yangtze, performed by the 11th army of General Yokoyama. They managed to occupy the area between Jingzhou and Yueyang, thus acting as a preliminary for what would be called the west hubei offensive. Within the region was the 6th war area army under the command of General Sun Lianzhong, but overall command in the hands of the leader of the Chinese expeditionary force in the Burma theater, though at this point was still in Hubei, General Chen Cheng. The Chinese expeditionary force had 40,000 men that held defensive positions all over the region. General Yokoyama commenced the operation by ordering his 40th division to advance upon Shishou, then Huarong. The 40th division successfully captured the line running east and west of the towns by mid april. By early May, the 40th division sent its Koshiba detachment further west to prepare an assault upon the town of Nan while the 3rd division and 17t independent mixed brigade deployed at Shishou to prepare and assault upon the well defended base at Anxiang. Alongside this the 34th divisions Harigaya detachment performed a wide flanking maneuver to hit Nan and Anxiang from the south. This all consisted of the first phase of the operation, if it was successful, then the 3rd division would continue west to attack Zhijiang and Gongan, supported by the 58th divisions Nozoe detachment and the bulk of the 13th division. On May 5th, the west hubei offensive officially began with the 3rd division and 17th brigade crossing the Yangtze and smashing the NRA's 26th army defensive lines. Meanwhile the 40th division began to advance south and east securing the Yueyang area with the Toda detachment rapidly attacking NRA defensive lines around Yushanzhen. To the east, the Harigaya detachment crossed Dongdongting lake and defeated NRA forces around Hengling Hu, supported by the 44th air regiment. The Japanese advances were so powerful and quick, the defenders had no ability to stall them and rapidly began withdrawing south and west. By may the 8th, the 3rd division had defeated the NRA forces trying to escape towards Anxiang, successfully intercepting their escape route as the 17th brigade began occupying Anxiang. Further east, Nan was captured by the Koshiba detachment while NRA positions south of it were annihilated by the combined assaults performed by the Toda and Harigaya detachments. And it is at this point, one of the most horrible events unfolded during the 2nd sino-japanese war.  Most of you listeners and honestly many people in the world are aware of what is termed “the rape of Nanking”, but most of you in the west I imagine have never heard of the Changjiao Massacre. The town of Changjiao is around Dongdongting lake surrounded by water on three sides. As such the civilians were easily trapped within the town when the Japanese troops began to enter. The Japanese forces seized the waters ways and land routes coming out of the town quickly before anyone could escape. The Harigaya and Toda detachment alongside the 17th independent mixed brigade encircled Changjiao from all four sides while preparing for a river crossing to Changde's coastal area. The 73rd NRA army alongsides tens of thousands of civilians were besieged as a result.  In the early hours of May 9th, hundreds of Japanese forces landed in the Yonggu embankment in the central part of Changjiao. This was an area considered safe, thus thousands of local residents and refugees had gathered there. As the IJA forces landed they began massacring the civilian indiscriminately, forcing many to kneel down or be ties up in groups to be killed with knives and bayonet. On may 11th, the IJA forces forced hundreds of civilians to the Yongguyuan ditch port to salvage bullets dropped by NRA forces. Due to the cold weather and deep water in the port, the people were unwilling to cooperate. The IJA officers ordered machine gun crews to open fire upon them forcing countless into the waters. At this ditch port, more than 1000 people were stabbed to death by bayonet, gunned down, or even stoned to death. The survivors dug a bit to bury the victims and it is called “the thousands peoples pit” by locals.  In Changjiao is the Anhe river which is something like a deep mota blocking the east-west traffic, it was the only passage from Nanxian country to Hanshou and Changde county. On may 10th, the IJA indiscriminately massacred more than 6000 NRA POW's of the 73rd army and local civilians trapped there. In the early morning of the 10th the Japanese first bombed the area with aircraft, then the ground forces opened fire upon them. It is said the smell of decomposing corpses could be smelt miles away and was called “bloodwater river” by locals. In the Valienne dike, the Japanese performed 5 sweeps along the embankment killing more than 3000 people. In the Yucheng embankment of the factory cellar, the Japanese hacked to death 30 people with knives; within Quancheng village, 200 people were killed within 3 days by IJA forces. The Japanese forced 200 civilian to kneel on the ground before being gunned down by machine guns. Very few escaped the carnage. In many other local places pockets of civilians were killed in similar fashions. Sometimes the IJA would tie civilians to the back of motorboats and would drive at full speed to kill them.  It is estimated the Japanese raped more than 2000 women, from the young to the old, no one was spared. 3000 houses were burnt down alongside 2500 ships. The Japanese looted gold, silver, copper, iron and grain on a large scale.  The massacre was part of “the three alls policy, kill all, burn all, loot all”. In just 4 days, the Changjiao Massacre claimed the lives of 30,000 people. It was conducted under the command of Field Marshal Shunroku Hata ad the testimony of one Japanese Kempeitai officer named Uno Shintaro who participated in the event gives a chilling account. “I personally severed more than forty heads. Today, I no longer remember each of them well. It might sound extreme, but I can almost say that if more than two weeks went by without my taking a head, I didn't feel right. Physically, I needed to be refreshed.” A chinese civilian in Changjiao who survived named Guolu Ping give us this account. "Japanese soldiers slammed their feet into the pregnant bellies of women, laughing as they bloodily miscarried." Guolu Ping was bayoneted alongside his father and brothers: "The first blade barely pierced my thick coat... they stabbed me again in the back & abdomen."  After the horror, the first phase of the operation was a success. The 3rd division then advanced the Songzi river and assembled around Tuochuanbu while the 17th brigade moved towards Lixian and the 13th division advanced upon Zhijiang. On the 12th, the second phase kicked off, with the 13th division crossing the Yangtze to attack Zhijiang while the 3rd division trapped 50000 NRA forces of the 87th army at Gongan. The NRA were completely unprepared and utterly defeated as they fled towards Songzi. By the 18th the Songzi position collapsed and the defenders proceeded to flee further south suffering terrible casualties. Its important to note while this all looked like a large scale operation to annihilate and conquer, Historian Barbara Tuchman has this to say about the operation  "The Japanese withdrew without pursuit from what appeared to have been a training and foraging offensive to collect rice and river shipping." Forage for materials they did so at large scale, but also they annihilated large armies of NRA and performed unspeakable atrocities upon civilians. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The battle for Attu was a bloody affair, but soon the allies would seize the frigid north island and end Japan's toehold in the Americas. The Changjiao massacre is yet again another taste of the absolute horror that Japan unleashed upon the Chinese people. 

Last time we spoke about the drive towards Salamaua. New Guinea was about to see a large scale offensive launched at Salamaua, but in order for it to be pulled off, the allied high command decided to produce many feints to distract the Japanese. Codenamed Operation Postern, General Blamey directed his subordinate to launch offensives around Salamaua, but not to attack kit directly. Battles began to break out over the Pimple, Green Hill, observation hill and bobdubi ridge. It was costly warfare for both sides, but the strategy was working as the Japanese were beginning to believe the allies were targeting Salamaua, rather than the actual target which was Lae. We also talked about the tragic tale of the fate of the surviving doolittle POW's and the sinking of the hospital ship Centaur. The Japanese would perform many more war crimes during this war. But today we are venturing back to the frigid north pacific. This episode is the battle of Attu Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  It is May of 1943, almost a year has passed since the battle of Midway. The battle of Midway, though as you have heard me say probably a hundreds times by now, not the turning point of the pacific war, nonetheless has captivated people since it occurred. There is something about Midway that just makes it a great story, its full of everything, deception, foreshadowing, underdog victory, its on the level of Herodotus to be brutally honest with you. But while thats all good and fun it really overshadows other events in the Pacific War. One thing that gets really overshadowed is the Aleutian campaign, which ironically was born from the battle of Midway. As we have seen throughout this series, the Japanese invasion of the islands of Attu and Kiska were incredibly important aspects of the war, hell it was the first time American territory had been seized since the war of 1812, a war in which my nation of Canada defeated America, haha jokes jokes, trust me I know quite a lot about the war of 1812 and its by no means as simple as that and is honestly one of the most misunderstood wars in history. The invasions of Attu and Kiska were a large shock for the American public and their liberation was demanded from the offset.  Now to backtrack only a tiny bit for coherency's sake, last time we talked about Admiral Kinkaid's plan to attack Kiska. The plan became a major item debated at the Casablanca conference. The allied commanders liked the plan and sent it over the the Joint chiefs of staff to try and hammer out the details to form it into a real operation that got the codename Operation landcrab. When it was presented to General John DeWitt, he recommended using the 35th infantry division, but the War department decided to use the 7th motorized division instead. They had of course been trained for desert warfare in north africa, but General Rommel had just been defeated and thus the division's expertise in that area was no longer needed.  Vice Admiral Francis Rockwell received overall command of Operation Landcrab and when he looked over the plan, he quickly pointed out some major problems. Number one, they simply did not have enough naval assets to pull it off. Going back to the drawing board, Kinkaid suggested they switch their target for Attu, believing the island only held a garrison of around 500 Japanese. Attu would turn out to have closer to 3000 men. Regardless, Kinkaid argued bypassing Kiska for Attu might result in the Japanese abandoning Kiska.  The idea was approved and the 10,000 strong 7th division commanded by Major General Albert Brown would receive a crash course in amphibious landings and tundra warfare. The initial lands were set for May 7th, but the finer details of the plan were only finalized on April 1st at the San Diego military conference. As mentioned before, shipping was the most crippling issue facing the North Pacific as they really only received hand me downs so to say. Thus Operation Landcrab would be forced to use five terribly-overcrowded transports: the Harris, Heywood, Zeilin, Perida and Kane escorted by Task Force 51's Destroyers Dewey, Dale, Monaghan, Aylwin; minelayers Sicard, Pruitt and the Minesweeper group Perry, Elliot, Chandler and Long. They were to depart on April 24th.  Now to preserve secrecy for the operation, the 7th division who were training in California were told they were going to deploy in the Solomon Islands. Kind of a nasty surprise when you think about it, your training for a tropical climate only to be shipped off to one of the coldest and most miserable places in the world haha. A key element in the plan consisted of the provisional scout battalion, commanded by Captain William Willoughby. This unit was made up of the physically toughest men out of the 7th division and would prove to be the finest American fighting forces on Attu. Captain Willoughby would have 410 men who were given very little time to train. Willoughby secured massive firepower for his men, getting rid of half their rifles and all their submachine guns and replacing them with automatic rifles, machine guns and exchanging their soft lead ammunition for armor piercing rounds, which was a big necessity so they did not ricochet on the ice. He also filled his mens packs with grenades to the brim. The men left San Francisco on april 24th at 1pm, completely ignorant of their true destination. In the meantime the Americans wanted to keep their actual target a mystery from the Japanese and began a bombardment campaign against Kiska and Attu, tossing most of the bombs at Kiska. The bombardment campaign was heavily hampered by tremendous storms for the first half of april, seeing winds up to 115 mph and gusts over 127 mph. The Americans managed to better Kiska with 1175 sorties during April second half, then on May 1st they switched focus to Attu where their bombers hammered it with over 200,000 pounds of bombs. The pilots unfortunately were bombing blind as Attu was covered in a thick fog, thus there was no way to know the effectiveness of their campaign.  Of the entire invasion force, only Willoughby's provisional scout battalion would get training ashore in the Aleutians prior to deployment. While the rest of the 7th division came ashore at Cold Bay, they would be forced to stay aboard their ships as there were no accommodations ashore, a shivering and crammed mess to be sure. Only Captain Willoughby's men would carry on over to Dutch Harbor where they embarked on a week's last minute training in snow and muskeg. While the 7th division boys were shivering their asses off in Cold Bay, General Butler signaled the bombardment campaign to lay down the hammer of Attu, tossing Admiral McMorris force into the mix. McMorris led the Light cruisers Richmond, Detroit and Santa Fe; and destroyers Coghlan, Bancroft, Caldwell, Edwards, Frazier and Gansevoort to bombard Attu with naval gunfire. Over in Attu, Colonel Yamasaki Yasuyo who had been appointed to command the 2nd district force of the North Seas Garrison had arrived to the island in April and was given orders to hold Attu without any additional help until at least May. In May he was to receive reinforcements. Until then he had the 83rd and 103rd infantry battalion; the Aota battalion which was a provisional anti-aircraft battalion;  the 302nd Independent Engineer Company and 2nd Company of the 6th Ship Engineer Regiment; and  the 6th Independent Mountain Artillery Company. In all 2630 men, with just a few coastal guns, some flak guns and small arms to defend themselves. Yamasaki decided to keep the garrison at Chichagof Harbor, while at Holtz and Massacre Valleys he had the men abandon the low ground to instead dig pits, trenches and bunkers of the high, rugged ground overlooking the valleys. Rockwell and Brown spent May the 1st and 2nd discussing the landing plans against Attu. Characteristically the Aleutian weather was to be bleak, furious storms raged thus postponing the operation. D-day had to be pushed from may 7th to the 11th. Rockwell called for landing the entire 7th division at Sarana Bay as he didn't believe he could maintain full-scale supply of 2 different landing points. But Brown favored making 3 landings. One at Holtz bay by Colonel Frank Cuilin's northern force; the 1st battalion of the 17th regiment; another in Massacre Bay by Colonel Edward Earle's southern force consisting of the 2nd and 3rd battalions of the 17th regiment and the 2nd battalion of the 32nd regiment; and Captain Willoughby's  Scout battalion was to land at Beach Scarlet; lastly a reserve force consisting of the 1st and 3rd battalions of the 32nd regiment and the 1st battalion of the 4th regiment  ready to depart at any moment from Adak. The key to the plan was to have all three forces join up in the mountain pass  called Jarmin Pass which lay between Holtz and Massacre Valleys. Converging there would basically trap the Japanese at Chichagof Valley, leaving them open to naval bombardments and aerial bombing as the 7th division's advanced upon the high ground. Willoughby's scouts would have an extremely dangerous task having to land from two large submarines at night, the USS Narwhal and Nautilus. They would have to creep up in complete silence to achieve the element of surprise. This was easier said than done however. When jumping into their rubber boats, their equipment would clank and some of their heavy weapons would rip holes in the fragile boats. Thus Willoughby instead planned to come topside, inflate the rubber boats on the afterdecks and try to quietly crowed the boats while they were still high and dry. The submarines would submerge under them, so the boats would float without a ripple. Pretty smart stuff and very innovative for the day. Once a beachhead was established, the destroyer USS Kane would bring the remaining 165 men to Attu.  Admiral Kinkaids Task Force 16 would provide the naval support, consisting of two groups:  the Southern Covering Force of Admiral McMorris consisting of Light cruisers Richmond, Detroit and Santa Fe; and destroyers Coghlan, Bancroft, Caldwell, Frazier and Gansevoort; and the Northern Covering Force of Admiral Giffen  consisting of Heavy cruisers Louisville, San Francisco and Wichita; and destroyers Balch, Hughes, Morris and Mustin. They would have the task of naval bombarding the enemy positions and would receive the support from Admiral Rockwell's Task Force 51 consisting of the escort carrier Nassau, 3 old battleships the Nevada, Idaho and Pennsylvania; and destroyers Edwards, Meade, Ammen, Phelps, Hull, MacDonough, Aylwin and Monaghan, a Transport Group covered by three destroyers Dale, Dewey and Farragut and a Minesweeper Group of two minesweepers Chandler and Long.They were to be the largest American naval force assembled since the invasion of Guadalcanal and their guns would hammer the enemy on Attu to support the ground forces. On the 3rd of May, the assault force finally departed Cold Bay en route to Attu, despite the fact their intelligence indicated the Japanese knew they were coming. The convoy cut across the Chain at Amukta pass making a wide circle north of Kiska to avoid detection. By the 6th, they had reached their launch point, 100 miles north of Attu, but a storm began to smash them during the evening. The surf became too dangerous for landings, forcing Rockwell to postpone yet again. Rockwell took his transports and had them perform circles while his battleships headed west incase the Japanese tried to send reinforcements from the Kuriles. By the 11th, the storm had ended, leaving a soupy fog over the ocean. Because of the fog the destroyer USS Macdonough accidentally cut across the destroyer USS Sicard's course causing a collision. No one was injured, but the collision breached Macdonough's hull, forcing Sicard to tow her back to Adak. Sicard was one of the control ships for the landings, thus the landings would now be more difficult. Meanwhile, Colonel Yamasaki received warning of the incoming American invasion by May 4th and set to work ordering his men into combat alert positions. He kept the men on edge for a week, but by the 10th he had exhausted them and it looked like perhaps the weather and stopped the invasion from coming. Thus Yamasaki decided to leave the beaches unguarded, as his small force could not possibly guard every inch of them. His force was made up of, what we call the b-teamers, older men and raw recruits, primarily drawn from Hokkaido. The only advantage they enjoyed was the fact they were used to colder climates and knew the terrain and weather. Giving up the beaches to occupy the high ground was the only sensible defensive posture Yamasaki could hope for. Thus a major component of the defensive strategy would be to draw the enemy further in towards the mountains and away from their supplies on the shore. Yamasaki organized his forces into two sectors; the Chichagof harbor sector and the  Holtz Bay sector. Lt COlonel Yonegawa Isamu defended the Holtz Bay sector with his Yonegawa force of 420 men, 526 men of the Aota provisional anti-aircraft battalion led by Major Aota Seiji, 270 men of the 6th independent month artillery led by Captain Ono CHinozo, 270 men of the 6th ship engineers led by Captain Kobayashi and 183 men of the field hospital unit.  Chichagof Harbor sector was defended by Major Watanabe Tokuji who had 664 men of the 303rd independent infantry battalion. Willoughby and his scouts moved ashore first at 1am on May 11th, marking the start of a struggle that would carry on for 19 days. It was not going to be the 3 day adventures Admiral Kinkaid had promised them. Willoughby and 244 of his scouts clambered out of the large submarines Narwhal and Nautilus into their inflatable boats and made their way 3 miles to the western shore of Attu. They successfully landed on Beach Scarlet after two hours and immediately headed for an icy little creek that climbed up a ravine towards some ridges, there was no sign of the Japanese anywhere. Disaster struck immediately when some naval Wildcats swept in low over Scarlet Bay and began strafing their boats, narrowing missing 3 guards left behind with the boats. The Wildcats had come from the USS Nassau, there to support them, not destroy their escape vehicles. The friendly fire was certainly a bad omen to start their mission. With 36 hours worth of rations in their packs and no ability to retreat the scouts made their way climbing a snow covered mountain ridge. Willoughby and his soldiers spent the first night at the bitterly cold summit. A B-24 would be sent to drop additional ammunition and rations to them, but the powerful snow filled winds hurled the parachute supply crates deep in some crevasses. Over in the south, the old battleships delivered a bombardment of Chichagof harbor. After this the largest of the three assault bodies had arrived aboard their transports to Massacre Bay in the early morning. However the fog was so intense the allied aircraft couldn't see a glimpse of the ground from their altitude of 20,000 feet. In fact both the Japanese and allies bombers would be spending the majority of the battle grounded because of weather. The americans yet again had to postpone, this time until the afternoon. General Brown had had enough and ordered the southern force of Colonel Edward Earle to make the landings regardless. At 3:30 the first wave began to hit the Massacre beach unopposed. An hour later the second wave landed at 5pm. The soldiers came ashore to a eerily silent beach, greeted allegedly by a solitary raven, whose croaking echoed eerily off the foggy ridges until the bird flew away. Meanwhile the Northern force led by Colonel Frank Culin landed on Beach Red, meeting no immediate Japanese resistance as they formed their beachhead. Beach Red proved to be a narrow strip only a hundred yards long or so, surrounded by 250 feet heights. It was a highly unlikely landing area and thus the Japanese had never set up defenses there. Instead the Japanese set up positions, intending to hit the allies at Moore ridge using two 75mm mountain guns. By midafternoon, Culin had 1500 men ashore and climbing with no sign of the enemy. During this period however Culin succumbed to hypothermia forcing Lt Colonel Albert Hartl to take command. Hartl began his command by tossing out a screen of Aleut scouts, some who originally came from Attu, over the ravines and mountain ridges. By 6pm a US patrol encountered 4 Japanese, they killed one man, wounded and captured a second, but the other 2 managed to escape and raised the alarm. The Japanese began digging in on the high ground overlooking Holtz Valley. The days deep silence unnerved the men more than an outpouring of gunfire.  Lt H.D Long described the eerie silence followed by a sparrow that quote “ He sat on a bump above the beach and sang his lungs out, and an explosive gasp shushed out of hundreds of throats. The spell was broken, the world hadn't died around us. The first DSC from Attu should go to that bird. He saved lives that day. His song changed us from a tight, tense, hypnotized, unrelated group of human beings to a relaxed, laughing, cohesive fighting force” Back over in Massacre Valley, Colonel Early decided to toss one battalion up the valley floor and another up a parallel ridge. The two-pronged maneuver was slow going because of the muck of snow, mud and muskeg. They would soon come upon a chain of Japanese machine gun nests and mortar positions held by men of the 303rd infantry battalion. They were led by Lt Goto and Honna who told the men to wait silently for the enemy. Their position lay in some thick fog, but they could see the Americans clearly below them, struggling forward up the valley through a wet layer of snow and sucking mud. They had orders from the Northern Imperial Army headquarters at Paramushiro  “Destroy the enemy. We pray and hope for your successful battle.”   However the first shots of the battle would be fired at around 6pm by Brigadier General Archibald Arnolds 3 105mm field artillery. The pieces of artillery had been brought ashore with the southern force, but immediately got stuck in mud. A scouting force led by Lt James west had found a Japanese mortar positions and called its location down to the artillery men at the beach. Their first shell missed, but the Japanese mortar crew walked right into the next two shells which destroyed their guns and blasted the crews to pieces. They were the first casualties of the battle of Attu.   While those shells were being lobbed at the ridge-lines, Japanese snipers opened up fire taking long range shots at the US troops struggling up the valley throughout the day. By 7pm Earle led hundreds of men forward in an attack on the pass at Massacre Valley's inland end, soon to be dubbed Jarmin Pass. Japanese machine gun fire and mortar explosions caught the Americans on open ground. The men fell back, rallied, tried to again and were driven back once more.   The Japanese had prepared their battlefield expertly, choosing defensive positions that provided cover and concealment. Their snipers were positioned at right angles to cover the approaches from the enemy upon their machine gun nests. The grenade launchers covered depression where the Americans might take cover. A system of tunnels and trenches allowed them quick and easy movement. Telephone wires strung along the ground provided them communication. Caches of food and supplies were easily moved around throughout the combat. Low hanging fog along the ridges and mountain sides concealed their positions while also providing them good observation of the Americans huddling in their water filed foxholes down below. While the Japanese watched their enemy, the enemy could only see mist above them.   Earle tossed countless assaults, each bloodily repulsed. Sergeant Louis Adami of G company, 32nd infantry described one of the failed assaults. “The attack pushed off early in the morning at about 0630 and immediately the Japs opened up. The first casualties were being hit in the back by guns high on the mountain to our left. It was demoralizing because we couldn't spot them. […] They had machine guns all over the place, and knee mortars were systematically blasting holes in our advancing lines”. At nightfall, Earle would thus be forced to regroup behind a defensive perimeter, digging foxholes in the cold snow.    Further north, battleship Nevada was hammering the Japanese positions with her 14 inch guns as the Americans watching severed arms, legs and entire Japanese corpses pop out of their trenches, flopping grotesquely down the steep slopes after each salvo. The salvo's were chewing great chunks of mountain and inflicting heavy casualties. The Northern force meanwhile had reached high ground when the Japanese artillery had opened up on them, pounding Beach Red. By 10pm the americans were two miles inland and less than a mile from their first objective, designated Hill X. Hill X was a hilltop dominating Holtz Valley. The Americans would have to stop for the night as they could not see where they were going, unfortunately this gave the Japanese ample time to build up defensive positions on Hill X. At 4am, Willoughby got his half frozen men off their feet and they marched over the final ridges of Attu's western mountains and emerged to the rear of the Japanese positions on the high ground overlooking Holtz Bay and the Northern force. The scouts quickly took up positions sliding on their back down long snow slopes. The Japanese saw them and launched a preemptive attack. Willoughbys men, exhibiting professionalism, took cover and demolish the attack with machine gun and mortars. The scouts doctor, Captain David Kelin went to work setting up aid stations with extreme speed that would save the lives of 15 badly wounded men on the 12th and 13th. On the 13th the Americans pushed within 2 miles of the Jarmin Pass, fighting every step they took. Willoughby and his elite scouts fought so furiously, the Japanese defenders estimated their strength to be a full division worth instead of 410. On the 14th a trio of F4F wildcats tried to support them courageously fighting the bad weather, but incredible wind gusts smashed them against a mountainside killing all of the pilots. Willoughbys men carried on their costly struggle that was necessary to stop the enemy from turning their full might down upon the Northern force. At 9am, as the fog lifted, Colonel Earle ordered his 3rd battalion to assault the Jarmin pass, but yet again it failed. His men only made it a few yards before they were crawling back under heavy fire. Earle himself was visiting the front lines early that afternoon and was a victim of sniper fire. His death was a grave loss, prompting General Brown to send his chief of staff Colonel Wayne Zimmerman to take command of the southern force.  At the same time Colonel Culin's men were attacking the right flank of the Japanese defenders at Jarmin Pass, being met with machine gun fire, rifle fire and mortars. Pinned down one of Culin's companies would be unable to move forward or back and had to be rescued. After beach artillery, Phelps naval guns and Nassaus Wildcats made a bombardment, the Northern force was able to push forward and link with the isolated company. By the late afternoon, Hill X was captured by Culins men who had to overrun Japanese positions to do so. The Japanese soon regrouped and counterattacked causing heavy casualties, but did not manage to dislodge the Americans. At this point, casualties were shockingly high, General Brown pressed Rockwell to land two reserve battalions, but unbeknownst to him the Perida had suffered an accident. As she was edging towards Massacre Beach to land her reinforcements and supplies, the transport ran into a pinnacle rock. Water gushed into her forward hull destroying radio equipment needed ashore. Perida backed off, listing and staggered until she beached at the mouth of the bay and now was undergoing repairs. Rockwell only had 4 more vessels for shipping. On May 13th, Zimmerman picked up where Earle had left off tossing men at Jarmin Pass. The soldiers struggled uphill through snow and Japanese lead, managing to get within 200 yards of the summit before triple crossfire tossed them back. After this defeat, Brown pressed again for reinforcements and was told two battalions would arrive early in the afternoon. By midafternoon, the 1st battalion of the 32nd regiment successfully landed and immediately marched up hill to fill the front lines. The 3rd battalion of the 32nd regiment however were prevented by steady Japanese anti-aircraft guns from landing.  Brown asked Rockwell to get Nevada to fire upon the Holtz Bay area. As Nevada steamed back and forth firing her 14 inch guns against the Japanese anti-aircraft positions in Holtz Bay, suddenly an officer on the bridge alerted everyone an enemy submarine was in the area. Rockwell snapped “Screw the torpedoes, slow speed ahead”. The IJN submarine I-31 lined herself up with the Neveda and fired a torpedo, but the old battleship managed to dodge it narrowly and her destroyer escorts Edwards and Farragut began firing upon the submarine, managing to trap her and sinking her with naval gunfire. Nevada silenced the Japanese flak guns giving the boys on the ground a fighting chance. Willoughbys scouts who had not eaten for 2 days drove the Japanese from the high ground, securing the summit and settling in for the night. To the east of them, Culins 1st battalion managed to drive the Japanese from a hilltop with the assistance of Nassau's wildcats. Culin called up for reinforcements as his men dug in. For in 36 hours a full scale assault towards the mountain pass and enemy camp in Holtz Bay was going to begin.   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The fighting for Attu was turning into carnage. The frigid weather combined with flying lead in all forms would take a horrifying toll on the poor souls who had the unfortunate job of dying in a remote part of the world, few people ever venture.

Last time we spoke about Admiral Yamamoto's Operation I-Go. The empire of the rising sun had to do something about the allied advance up the solomons and New Guinea. Yamamoto devised a grand counter air offensive to hinder the allies airfield building in the regions. However, this was not 1941, it was 1943 and the Japanese aviation crews and pilots were not the same men they once were. The war was taking its toll on the effectiveness of Japan's airpower and it was showcased during Operation I-Go.  Despite the wild claims of the pilots who would have Japan's leadership believe they shutdown every allied aircraft in existence, the reality was they had only inflicted enough damage to set back the allied timetables for 10 days. Unbeknownst to the Japanese also was that allied cryptanalysts were continuing to break their codes and found out fateful information about the mastermind behind Operation I-Go. But today you need to grab your onions cause were are talking about Chindits. This episode is the return of the Chindits  Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  For a few weeks we have been covering what basically can be described as the major strategic shift during the Pacific War. I know I repeat it so often, but the battle of guadalcanal was the real turning point of the Pacific War. It led the allies to grab the initiative for the rest of the war and as a result the Japanese were forced to take a defensive stance. The taking of guadalcanal and the Buna-Gona-Sanananda areas led to a lot of shuffling for both sides. And with all that shuffling came heavy losses and resources being forcefully allocated to certain areas at the cost of others. Now up in the frigid northern waters of the north pacific, the 6 hour battle of the komandorski islands had nearly ended in an American debacle. If admiral Hosogaya had pressed his advantage, he would have most likely destroyed the Salt Lake City alongside several other warships. But as we saw, the high explosive shell fired by a single man had prompted Hosogay to falsely believe American airforces were attacking him and he pulled out. Hosogaya's conservative decision was condemned by his superiors and he was forced into retirement as a result. Admiral McMorris's force suffered damage to 3 ships and lost 7 men, but he walked away and the Japanese convoy failed its mission. It was to be Japan's last attempt to resupply the Attu and Kiska garrisons with surface ships, all future runs would be done via submarine. Thus the success of Admiral Kinkaids daring blockade had sealed the fate of the Japanese garrisons on the two islands. Yet before the Americans could begin invading these two islands they needed to perform basically the same strategy their colleagues were doing in the south pacific. They needed to secure advance bases and island hop their way west. One of the first major moves came when Admiral Kinkaid and General Buckner made the joint decision to move the Army, Navy and Air Force headquarters out to Adak. Adak was a thousand miles nearer to the enemy, but concentrating so much on the island created its own problems. A year prior, there had been only 5000 people in the Aleutians, now there were nearly 40,000. The bottleneck became so severe, Buckner's soldiers were being supplies with just 10 rounds of ammunition per weapon and food rations were very limited. The men were living off canned vegetables and the occasional shiploads of foul-smelling mutton from New Zealand. Mutton in general was notably not very loved amongst American forces. Australians took a notice of this as Americans began to complain in Australia that they were tired of eating it all the time there. Actually a hilarious rumor emerged amongst the Americans in Australia that General MacArthur owned a sheep ranch and was being enriched at their expense. Yes I managed to toss another punch at Dougey. Medical problems began to emerge in the Aleutians as many American bodies began to reject the environment, that is polite talk for Americans who can't handle a bit of cold. Lingering head colds became so bad, the men began to refer to it as “Aleutian malaria”. I mean I do get it, snow can suck, the cold sucks, waking up at 6am to record this podcast only to look out my window at what is becoming a hours shoveling of my driveway sucks, Canadian problems 101.  As for the US Navy, the north pacific submarine force had spent the first few months of Kinkaids command simply gathering strength, building up enough to make a final push, but nothing too exciting. A new PT boat squadron had been assembled employing the Higgens model. Now I don't know about all of you, but the idea of being on a tiny PT boat in the Aleutians sounds horrifying. If you might recall in January, 4 torpedo boats led by Lt CLinton McKeller had departed King cove to sail for Dutch Harbor. They sailed through a squall, coated with 4 inches of ice. The 4 boats made it to the nearest harbor, Dora Harbor on Unimak and were stuck there for nearly a week. There anchored they were bashed around by howling 80 knot winds, and Pt-27 smashed into some jagged rocks, Pt-28 went aground and sank, pt-22 crashed on a reef and sank, but McKellar was able to keep his crews intact. The two surviving boats had to be rescued some days later by the tender Virginia E.  The devastating experiences of the McKeller's men led to this new squadron of PT boats being outfitted with hot-air heaters. To compare to the PT boat crews miseries, the experience of the pilots in the Aleutians was not any better. Butler lost 11 planes due to bad weather in January alone. The weather improved in February allowing for some missions, but they were hampered terribly by a technological issue. The B-24 liberators constantly had their bomb-bay rack mechanisms freeze on them. Thus the bombing missions half the time went bust. Now Admiral Kinkaid suggested an attack on Kiska in January of 1943. The plan found its way to the Casablanca conference in north africa where president FDR, Sir Winston CHurhcill and the allied combined chiefs of staff hammered out the fine details. Kinkaid's plan to attack Kiska actually managed to become an item debated at the conference. The allied leaders approved it and sent it over to the US joint chiefs of staff to develop it into a real operation, which became code named Operation Landcrab. The task was handed over to General John DeWitt, who recommended using the 35th infantry division, but the war department decided instead to use the southwestern 7th motorized division. However this division was trained in desert warfare. The rationale for this was due to Rommel's recent defeat and the lack of need for desert trained troops in Europe.Well obviously the desert tactics nor the tanks, truck and other armored vehicles were of any use to the Aleutians, the entire division required training in arctic amphibious operations which would take over 3 months. Luckily amphibious assault specialists like Major General Holland “Howlin Mad” Smith, Colonels Castner, Eareckson, Alexander and Carl Jones were accustomed to the Aleutian theater and helped retrain the 7th division at Los Angeles. By February Washington had assigned an insufficient number of ships for the invasion of Kiska. This prompted Kinkaid to suggest instead of attacking Kiska to bypass her and hit Attu. Attu was believed to only have a garrison of 500 men and Kinkaid believed seizing Attu, just west of Kiska would prompt the Japanese to abandon Kiska. Thus operation Landcrab was greenlit and ready to go, and all the major commanders of the theater would meet at a conference in San Diego to hash out the final details. The San diego conference quickly deteriorated into a series of arguments between two new commanders, rear-admiral William Ward Smith and Vice admiral Francis Warren Rockwell and the experienced Alaskan leaders Buckner and DeWitt. They squabbled over reconnaissance issues, in truth the Americans did not have a good picture of the western Aleutians. Bucker pointed out that the Navy, Army and Airforce had 4 different sets of map coordinates and asked the issue be rectified. This led the Alaska Scout leader Colonel Castner to urge Major General Albert Eger Brown who would be commanding the 7th infantry division to perform a reconnaissance personally. Brown however did not do this. Furthermore Buckner requested they employ a battalion of his ground forces for the operation to improve their low morale. Rockwell argued his shipping capacity was overstretched, leading DeWitt to assign the commercial ship Perida to take Buckner's troops into the battle. Rockwell then complained the commercial ship would not be able to land his troops quickly enough to protect them it the enemy resisted the landings and Brown threw back at him the addition of these troops just disrupted the entire mission. So as you can see a lot of dick waving. In the end they reached a compromise, to hold Buckner's 4th regiment in reserve at Adak, ready to ship out in less than a day to hit Attu if needed. On April 18th, reconnaissance revealed there were at least 1600 Japanese on Attu, prompting Rockwell to commit the entire 7th division, 10,000 men in all and the extra 4th regiment for operation landcrab. Now before the men his the island Rockwell sent a small team of combat specialists to come up behind the Japanese to prevent them from falling back into the mountains where they could hold out for weeks or even months. Captain Willoughby's Scout battalion, 410 officers and men, trained vigorously in a short amount of time for the operation. They replaced all of their rifles and submarine guns with automatic rifles, machine guns and mortars and soft lead bullets for armor piercing bullets as those could penetrate ice without ricocheting. The mens packs were filled to the brim with grenades.  Meanwhile General Butler began a bombing campaign to soften up the island. A terrible storm prevented air raids during the first half of april seeing winds his 115 miles per hour and gusts over 127. Nonetheless over 1175 combat sorties would be made in april, with over 4000 pounds of bombs falling on Attu. Though it should be mentioned most of the bombers dropped their loads blind as Attu was covered in a thick fog. Finally on April 24th, the 7th division departed San Francisco at 1pm aboard 5 transports. The Aleutian campaign was soon coming to an end. But now we need to grab our onions and travel back to Burma to talk about good ol Wingate and the boys.  Back in Burma, Wingates forces were beginning the last phase of operation Longcloth, fleeing for their lives back to India. Now Fort Hertz and the new Ledo Road had been protectedAt his headquarters in Wuntho Wingate had to make a choice: retire back to India or press on and cross the Irrawaddy. Being Wingate he chose to press on with the Japanese hot on the Chindits trail. Now I do apologize I believe this will be the second time I am rehashing most of the Chindit story, I sort of am forced to do so as a result of how the week by week format laid out this story on the youtube channel. Think of it as a refresher to finish off the operation.  Major calvert's Column 3 and Fergussons column 5 headed towards the Gokteik Gorge to blow up its viaduct; Colonel Alexander's southern group was to rendezvous with the Kachin guerillas at Mongmit; and Wingate would personally lead columns 7 and 8 to hit Inywa one of the main based of the Burmese independence forces. Wingates northern force made its way to the Irrawaddy's principal northern tributary, the Shweli by March 17th. Here the river was so wide, their ropes and dinghies would not suffice, the crossing had to be made by boat. The approach to the stream was over open paddy fields, where they could easily be spotted and gundowned. Another major issue of course was the Burmese liberation Army. Wingate began by sending an envoy across the river to treat with the BLA and they promptly decamped. While this was going on Wingate discovered the local boats and their skilled native paddlers could help move his forces. They helped tow the Chindats RAF circular dinghies using 1500 lb net weights. Upon seeing how the locals managed Wingate wrote notes that in the future he should employ at least 40 men to each column who were skilled in handling boats and that 80 percent of his men needed to know how to swim. Yes many of these Chindits did not know how to swim. The mules as usual proved to be difficult to get across, leading 40 to be abandoned while the rest were tethered to boats and paddled across.  Fergusson's Column 5 crossed the Irrawaddy at Tigyaing with assistance of local villagers, missing the Japanese pursuers by a hair's breadth. Fergusson turned south, but then received orders from Wingate to abandon his mission to help Calvert and instead rejoin the rest of the brigade. Calvert completely unaware of these orders, faced a game of hide and seek with the Japanese, leaving them boody traps as they marched. At Tigyaing, Calverts group's rearguard were being hit by the Japanese as they crossed the river. Further south of him, the Southern group had crossed the river at Taguang on March 10th, continuing east. Wingate's men were making their own way eastwards, but the supply drops were becoming less and less frequent and the amount of wounded men was increasing. Wingate was forced to leave many men behind as the Japanese continued to pressure them. On march the 15th, the Southern group met up with Calvert's column 3 near Pegon where they exchanged information. Despite orders to head for Mongmit, Major dunlop and Colonel Alexander decided to advance to Namhkan, crossing the Shweliriver and making an escape for China. As the southern group continued they ran into Fergusson's column 5 on March 20th at Inbale Chaung. There they received orders to continue with the original plans, so they redirected themselves to Mongmit again. There they were supposed to meet with the Kachin guerrillas, but they were so late the Kachin had departed. Meanwhile Calvert and Fergusson were having a rough time as an entire Japanese battalion had arrived at Myitson and they were fanning out patrols to hunt them down. On March 23rd, Calvert found one of these patrols near the Nam Mit River and laid a trap killing 100 of them. In his words  ‘We let fly with everything we had and a lot of Japs could never have known what hit them. It was one of the most one-sided actions I have ever fought in.' He paid for the ambush with a dozen Gurkhas. Calvert's column made its way towards Gokteik, their glittering prize when disappointment was dealt to them. They received orders from Wingate to withdraw back to India. Wingate also took the care to tell his commanders not to call it a “retreat”, but instead to tell their men they were marching north to cooperate with parachute troops in an attack on Bhamo and Indaw. This was to deceive the enemy if men were captured and to simply boost morale. Calvert complied with the order, but in a bit of defiance decided he wanted to hit a railway on the retreat. Reading Calvert's mind Wingate sent an additional message to Calvert saying he needed to get out as fast as possible and not perform any additional strikes, he finished with this “we can get new equipment and wireless sets. But it will take 25 years to get another man. These men have done their job, their experience is at a premium”. Wingate at this point decided they needed a good supply drop and ordered one for March 24th in a paddy field near the village of Baw, which happened to be held by a Japanese company. This was the same location for the rendezvous with Fergussons column who were in bad need for supplies having been forced to butcher their own mules for meat and eat stews of monkeys, rats, locusts and cockroaches. Disaster struck. Wingate sent his forces to attack the Japanese company at Baw leading the RAF pilots seeing the confused battle to only drop one third of the supplies. Fergusson met up with Wingate on the 25th finding his superior to be a bit manic. Wingate was now claiming because of their actions, the Japanese commander would be hard pressed to annihilate them all to save face. Wingate faced a daunting issue, the Japanese would contest the passage of the Irrawaddy, how would they get through now? He decided to try a bluff, they would march back to Inywa and cross at the identical point they had taken to go east, thinking the Japanese would never expect it. To do this they would have to kill all their remaining mules and lighten their loads, perhaps we can take a moment of silence for these poor mules. Wingate told the men once they got across the river they were to break up into smaller groups, try to sabotage more railway installations and make their way back to Assam. The forces made a dreadful march back to Inywa, slaughtering their mules as they went, much to the grief of the muleteers. It became clear early the Japanese were following them. Colonel Tomotoki Koba had set up three defensive lines between the Chindits and the Indian border: 1 at the Irrawaddy, 1 along the Mu valley and 1 following the line of the Chindits. Koba's orders were pretty simply, to drive the Chindits into a trap as if they were wild beasts to hunt.  Wingate attempted feints and decoys, such as sending Fergusson's Column 5 towards the village of Hintha. This decoy worked great for everyone else of course, as Fergussons men suffered heavy casualties for their efforts. The feints and decoys worked as the bamboozled Japanese never fully caught up to the main body, failing to capture the Chindits in the Shweli loop as it was known. By 4pm on 28th, the main body reached Inywa where they lucked out greatly. It turned out the Japanese had neglected to commandeer the boats along the Shweli. Wingate was able to commander a number of local boats and his men began to cross the river. Column 7 went first followed by 2 and 8. But Column 8 as they made their way were fired upon by Japanese patrols. It was fortunate for the Chindits the Japanese patrols were small and lacked heavy machine guns. Even so, the mortar and rifle fire was enough for Wingate to call off the rest of the columns leaving column 7 on the other side of the river to make their own way home to India. Wingate took the rest of the forces to a secure bivouac 10 miles south east of Inywa where he ordered the men to disperse into 5 smaller groups. It was now every man for himself as they say. The first group to really suffer was Fergussons column 5. After the bitter fight at Hintha, he sent word to Wingate advised him where they should be rendezvousing for a supply drop. But when Fergusson got to the location, there was no drop and no Wingate. Fergusson's radio radio was destroyed at Hintha so he had to rely on runners and now knew he basically was on his own. Fergusson decided to take his column and head for the Kachin hills. When his men tried to cross the Shweli it turned into a disaster. Many men were swept away by a flood and most of their animals alone with them. 46 men had to be abandoned on a sandbank in the middle of the river and in Fergusson's words “‘the decision which fell on me there was as cruel as any which could fall on the shoulders of a junior commander'. His men staggered on half crazed with hunger and thirst. After 15 days they reached the Chindwin on April 24th and would limp over to Imphal 2 days later. Their column suffered horribly, 95 survivors out of an original 318. Major Ken Gilkes column 7 managed to get to China with 150 survivors and would fly back to India. Wingates dispersed groups would have a particularly horrible time on their way home. They had tales to tell of Japanese atrocities, the treachery of Burman villagers, the constant battle to stay awake, the agony of hunger and thirst and the feeling of being hunted down like beasts. Their menu more often the naught was python meat and nettles. There also began a rumor amongst the dispersed groups that Wingate had intentionally taken the easy way out for himself while using the rest of them as decoys.  As for Wingates group, his original thinking was that the trek would take 2 weeks but it took roughly 22 days. They spent 2 full days around the Irrawaddy trying to find a safe way across as the Japanese patrols attacked them. On April 13th, with the help of friendly locals who provided paddlers and bamboo rafts they got across. They planned to go across in three groups, and unfortunately for the last group who was acting rearguard they would be left behind. The starving survivors made their way to the Wuntho-Indaw railway then through the Mangin range. At this point all of the food ran out, making even the Python stews seem appetizing. They would make the mistake of trying to buy rice from a pro-Japanese village who began hitting gongs to summon the Japanese causing them to run. At another more neutral village they were able to buy some buffalo meat. As they continued through the Mangin range they nearly died of starvation if it was not for a stroke of luck when one of their Burmese interpreters contacted a local monastery who sold them chicken, tomatoes, rice bananas and 5 pigs. Refreshed they continued and by the 23ed of april could see the Chindwin river. Wingate recounted stating ‘Behold the Chindwin. It is a poor heart that never rejoices.' The 30 mile trek to the Chindwin was the hardest part of the journey. When finally facing the great river Wingate was forced to divide his men into those deemed strong enough to swim across and those who needed a boat. It took 5 men 7 hours to hack some elephant grass to make rafts. Wingate and others swam the Chindwin at a narrow point 500 yards or so wide. Even the strong swimmers were in danger of drowning, many forced to float on their backs. Wingate himself was pretty close to being swept away but managed to keep afloat using a pack for buoyancy. Everyone who got to the other side of the river were utterly exhausted. To their misery they soon heard the incoming Japanese on the other side of the river. As they hit the first village they came across they devoured the meals they could find. But they had left countless non swimming comrades on the other side and Wingate was desperate to send rescue parties. They found a post manned by some Gurkha rifles and obtained their help grabbing local boats and taking a flotilla back over the Chindwin to save the men they could find. In the end Wingates small group of 43 would see 34 survivors reach Assam. Meanwhile far to the south, Dunlop and Alexander's southern group were the furthest away from India. They decided to try and head back to Fort Hertz, but would be ambushed many times along the way. They crossed at the head of the Irrawaddy using stealth to avoid clashes with the Japanese. With the help of locals who gave them food and boats they made it across by April 20th, but after crossing were hit again by the Japanese suffering heavy casualties. Now down to 350 men, they continued towards the Mu River where they were ambushed yet again on the 28th. Colonel Alxander would be killed among others, as Dunlop recounted  "Clarke told me that the last mortar bomb had blown away most of the Colonel Alexander and officer De La Rue's legs. Edmonds and some orderlies had carried them away into the jungle, but that no one could now be found who knew of their whereabouts." Dunlop led the force of exhausted men to the Chindwin river fighting off multiple Japanese patrols. They would wander into early may and were saved by Karen guerilla forces a very lucky break. Lastly, Calverts column 3 made their way to the Shewli river by March 27th with Japanese patrols hot on their trail. Calvert decided the best course of action was to break up into 9 smaller groups. Out of the 360 men in Column 3, 205 eventually recrossed the Chindwin by mid April. Calvert personally would lead a group to detonate more explosives across the Burmese railway.  So ends operation longcloth. Two major things to note were Wingates character and behavior during the expedition. For the first, it is not surprising to see that extreme stress brought up the brittle personality of mr Wingate. It seems in his own mind, Wingate could never be at fault. Wingate clearly had not factored the importance of river crossings, which is unforgivable given Burma's riverine system. The crossings over the Irrawaddy showcased Wingates glory hunting nature. Wingate also was draconian in his punishment of the men. He told his men if any of them plundered villages or lost their own equipment he would have them shot. This went beyond normal army code. If sentries fell asleep and were caught, Wingate gave them 3 choices; be shot, make their own way back home or be flogged, not surprisingly everyone chose to be flogged. Wingate's behavior likewise kept switching from mania to depression given the circumstances.  The casualty figures of the operation were appalling. Out of 3000 men of the 77th brigade that Wingate took into Burma, 2182 returned; 450 were killed in action and the rest went missing. Out of the southern group 260 men out of the 1000 survived. What had been achieved to justify such losses? There are arguments made on both sides. General Slim said of the operation  “They had blown up bridges and cuttings on the Mandalay–Myitkyina railways that supplied the Japanese northern front, and attempted to reach across the Irrawaddy to cut the Mandalay–Lashio line. Exhaustion, difficulties of air supply, and the reaction of the Japanese, prevented this, and the columns breaking up into small parties made for the shelter of 4 Corps. About a thousand men, a third of the total force, failed to return. As a military operation the raid had been an expensive failure. It gave little tangible return for the losses it had suffered and the resources it had absorbed. The damage it did to Japanese communications was repaired in a few days, the casualties it inflicted were negligible, and it had no immediate effect on Japanese dispositions or plans.'” Even Wingates supporters admit the operation was a failure, some describing it “an engine without a train”. Fergusson would add it ‘What did we accomplish? Not much that was tangible. What there was became distorted in the glare of publicity soon after our return. We blew up bits of railway, which did not take long to repair; we gathered some useful intelligence; we distracted the Japanese from some minor operations, and possibly from some bigger ones; we killed a few hundreds of an enemy which numbers eighty millions; we proved that it was feasible to maintain a force by supply dropping alone.' Really in the end, Wingates exploits were used for propaganda purposes lifting the terrible morale amongst the British. The sacrifice of over 800 men for a rather pointless operation had to be glorified for if not it would have crushed morale further. Sit Winston Churchill would say of Longcloth on July 24th of 1943 ‘There is no doubt that in the welter of inefficiency and lassitude which has characterised our own operations on the Indian front, this man, his force and his achievements stand out; and no question of seniority must obstruct the advance of real personalities in their proper station in war.' Wingate performed a press conference on May 20th to spin the allied propaganda machine. Reuters called them “the british ghost army”, the daily mail hailed Wingate as “clive of Burma”. Wingate had performed the typical British habit of turning obvious defeats into glorious victories, it was very much his Dunkirk. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The mad onion man Wingate successfully, or unsuccessfully performed Operation Longcloth. His exploits became legendary, but perhaps one should look closer at the reality behind what occurred in the depths of Burma.

Last time we spoke about Wingate, the Chindits and Operation Longcloth. The onion eating madman Wingate certainly pushed his men to the limits as Operation Longcloth was in full swing. The Japanese had been alerted to the presence of the Chindits when they started blowing up railways and soon a game of cat and mouse was set loose. Some of the CHindit columns, especially those in the southern group were absolutely battered and had to flee for their lives back to India. Meanwhile Wingate and the main body were in a sticky situation and probably should have turned back from the offset, but Wingate pushed on regardless. His rather reckless attitude led the men to be hunted down more fiercely until orders from India forced Wingates hand to return home. In order to return home Wingate would have to sacrifice some and push others to the absolute limit. But today we are venturing back to the icy cold waters of the northern Pacific. This episode is the battle of Komandorski islands Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Raid, counterraid and a constant battle against the brutal power of mother natures frigid northern climate occupied both the Japanese and Americans in the Aleutians for much of 1942. Things did not really quick off much until the arrival of Rear Admiral THomas C. Kinkaid on january 3rd of 1943. Kinkaid quickly persuaded his chiefs to send both men and materials to Alaska to help expel the Japanese menace from their footholds on Kiska and Attu. Thus a naval force led by Rear Admiral Charles McMorris was sent. McMorris led Task force 8 which consisted of the heavy cruiser Indianapolis, light cruiser Richmond and the destroyers Gillespie, Coghlan, Bancroft and Caldwell. One of their early successes as we saw last time was the occupation of Amchitka. The race to take the island between the Japanese and Americans was a bit of a nail biter, but in the end it would fall securely into allied hands and a new airstrip was quickly built.  Kinkaid and McMorris began a blockade of the enemies approaches to Kiska and Attu trying to squeeze them out of the region. Submarine reconnaissance gave a report on February 18th claiming to have spotted several enemy warships harbored at Attu's Holtz Bay. McMorris decided to carry out an attack against Attu as a result. The submarine report however also made its way to Adak and the report prompted General Butler to order a bomber strike against Holtz Bay before McMorris could arrive to the scene. Unexpectedly the Americans were met with clear weather for once, which allowed McMorris to make it over to Attu in great time, so both the naval and aerial forces reached their target around the same time. This also however almost was met with disaster as a single B-17 flying around 10,000 feet mistook the american task force to be Japanese. The pilot attempted two bomb runs, but luck would have it, the bombs failed to release because of mechanical malfunctions. Meanwhile some anti-aircraft fire from the Americans forced the B-17 to withdraw. McMorris set to work ordering his task force to shell Chicagof village and Holtz Bay. They fired their salvo's using a checkerboard pattern, firing for 2 hours while some of his ships paraded back and forth. The bombardment managed to kill 23 Japanese, wounded one and demolished a building, but was not overly successful at neutralizing the airfields. After the bombardment, McMorris took the Indianapolis and destroyers Gillespie and Coghlan westward to bolster the blockade. This also allowed him to tease Japanese home waters a bit and potentially intercept some outbound convoys. The Japanese had actually launched a convoy back on February 13th. The convoy was transporting an infantry platoon, airfield construction materials and munitions, all escorted by the light cruiser KISo and destroyers Hatsushimo and Wakaba. Until this point the allies had never ventured to these waters and when they did, the Japanese were caught off guard and dispersed quickly leaving the 3100 ton Akagane Maru vulnerable. She was caught, fired upon and sunk while the other IJN vessels made way back to Paramushiro, not wanting to get caught up in the enemy's activity. The fact the allies were now prowling out in these waters indicated to the Japanese they were blockading Kiska and Attu. This left General Higuchi in quite a predicament; he had two options laid bare: to simply withdraw from the Aleutians or to continue reinforcing Attu and Kiska. The later of course would require more resources from the IJN, perhaps even sending naval assets to hit allied strongholds like Adak or the newly acquired Amchitka base. General Higuchi made a request for the later choice and this was vetoed down by Admiral Boshiro Hosogaya. As I have mentioned in some episodes, the IJN held an aggressive doctrine that held most actions to be directed at enemy warships. What I mean by this, take for example with the IJN submarine fleet, was that they viewed merchant raiding as dishonorable and instead favored using such assets in fleet engagements. It honestly goes far too unnoticed that during the Pacific War the other key actors, such as Nazi Germany, Britain and America employed considerable assets to hit their enemy's merchant fleets. The Nazi's devestated Britain with their U-boats, trying to strangle the island nation similarly to what the German empire did in WW1. Likewise the US employed its submarines in the Pacific almost exclusively against Japanese merchant shipping lanes and it was one of the major reasons for their victory. The American effort to eventually strange the Japanese home islands of their merchant fleet brought her literally to her knees, while the IJN submarine fleet only began significant efforts to do the same far too late into the war. On top of this, partly as a result of not having a doctrine to attack enemy merchant fleets, the IJN had basically no doctrine on how to defend their merchant fleets, and this proved disastrous from the early days of the war. Admiral Hosogaya had vetoed General Higuchi's call to perform some merchant attacks based on the grounds it was dishonorable, but when Higuchi requested then to simply abandon the Aleutians, he vetoed this as well on the grounds it would leave the Kuriles and northern Japan bare to attacks. It is rather interesting, if you pull out a map and look at the Aleutian island chain that extends over towards Japan, how likely this could have been. Though the weather conditions would have made it an absolute nightmare, a drive from the north could have had major potential. In the end Higuchi and his forces would be forced to make do, trying to build up their fortifications and airfields to combat the American campaigns to bombs them out. Higuchi had not a ton at his disposal. He had 8000 troops on Kiska and around 1000 at Attu, none of which were first rate soldiers, but it was to be expected given the nature of where they were and their roles. They had around 60 trucks, 20 motorcycles, some cars and small tractors. Anti aircraft guns were plentiful, but they had no artillery, not any significant mechanized strength.  They mined and barbed wired their sparsely defended beaches, hoping the war over the skies would keep the Americans at bay. But after the loss of Guadalcanal, the Japanese could ill afford to spare much in terms of aircraft to the North Pacific. By early march American bombing campaigns had crippled or sunk over 40 vessels and inflicted a total of 3477 casualties. Higuchi's men were running low on provisions, beginning to face the same fate as their comrades once did on Guadalcanal, albeit a very different type of climate. A resupply convoy slipped past the American blockade on March 9th, but it was to be the last. McMorris was stepping up the blockade game, finally forcing Admiral Hosogaya into a corner. Again Hosogaya was facing the dilemma, abandon the aleutians or commit significant assets to break the blockade. Hosogaya planned a major resupply mission using 2 large transports filled to the brim and 4 destroyers likewise carrying loads. He planned to blast his way through the American blockade, personally taking command of the 5th fleet “Northern Force” which consisted of heavy cruisers Nachi and Maya, light cruisers Tama and Abukuma and destroyers Wakabam, Hatsushimo, Ikazuchi, Inazuma and Usugumo. Hosogaya would be taking Nachi as his flagship for the operation set to depart on March 22nd. In keeping with the IJN's tradition of overly complicating operations, 3 groups of ships would converge on a rendezvous point 60 miles south of the Soviet owned Komondorski islands. Meanwhile Admiral Kinkaid had made some reforms to Task Force 8, forming it into the new Task Force 16 consisting of heavy cruisers Salt Lake City, light cruiser Richmond and destroyers Bailey, Coghlan, Dale and Monaghan. The Indianapolis had been switched out for the older Salt Lake City, which recently had been repaired after being damaged at the battle of Cape esperance. The same day Hosogayas 5th fleet departed, so did McMorris's from Dutch Harbor, heading to the west to enforce their blockade efforts. What is a bit interesting for this event, while dozens of carriers were being constructed, literally a 100 would be afloat by the end of the war, the war in the aleutians would see no more of these. In the remote fog-bound and storm lashed waters of the north, neither the Japanese nor Americans would field any carriers, after Yamamoto had withdrawn his during the Midway catastrophe. The battle for control over the Aleutian sea's would be quite the traditional one. Small task forces meeting and engaging another in furious exchanges of cannon fire at line of sight ranges. Hosogaya sailed his 5th fleet northern force to meet the transports, supply ships and escorts to shepherd them the rest of the way to Attu. His convoy sailed in two separate sections, the 2nd escort force consisting of Usugumo and transport Sanko maru and Convoy D led by Rear Admiral Mori Tomoichi comprising of Abukuma, Ikazuchi, Inazuma and the transports Sakita Maru and Asaka Maru. The second escort force left Kataoka naval base on the 22nd, while Convoy D departed on the 23rd. Hosogaya sailed south over the gray northern seas as the convoys went north. The Japanese did not realize it, but Joseph Rocherfort and his fellow cryptanalysts at Station Hypo were continuing to break Japanese naval codes, providing invaluable information on IJN movements. The Americans knew of the convoy sailing for Attu and Kinkaid was planning to intercept it. Now the IJN warships outmatched the Americans in terms of firepower, both in gun and significantly more so in torpedoes. The type 93 long lance oxygen torpedo boasted a 25 mile range against the Abysmal american Mark 15's which held a 7.4 mile range. The Long lances also held a 1080 lb warhead compared the Mark 15's 827 lb warhead. Regardless, the Americans had the distinct advantage of intelligence and the sailors were in high spirits despite knowing how outgunned they were. Joseph Candelaria, a water tender aboard the Monaghan said this prior to the battle “ I remember going up on the deck and across it going down to the fire room. We was going to attack some transports; going to be all over in a few minutes; duck soup”.  As the two fleets were edging closer to another in the northern sea, a terrible storm broke out. The battering winds and huge swells made the destroyers heave and thrash terrible and soon the light and heavy cruisers began to experience some minor damage. Hosogaya's force remained ignorant of the American threat stalking them through the inhospital weather. The weather issue caused problems for the Japanese at their rendezvous point. They were forced to cut speed by half on march 24th due to the violent weather and Hosogaya was only able to link up with Convoy D by 4pm on march 25th. The two other ships of 2nd escort force remained missing, thus Hosogaya's vessels began patrolling in a 60 mile line while awaiting their comrades. In the meantime the Americans had their own problems, the sea had grown so violent the crews feared sinking. Geoerge O'Connell aboard Salt Lake City recalled this  “the Salt Lake City would literally dive into the base of the next wave. Tons of water would come crashing down onto the forecastle, sweeping over Turrets I and II and... the open bridge. Shortly after our turn into the sea, and after only a few moments of that dangerous agony... Commander Bitler came to the bridge. Visibly disturbed, he said the ship patently could not take the punishment” By the early morning of march the 26th the storm finally died down making it safer for both sides. Damage to the American ships saw some smashed hull plates, bent stanchions, flooded storerooms, but nothing major.  The morning saw the furious ocean calmed to a near smoothness with almost no swell. Thick grey gloomy clouds hung over the expanse. McMorris had received a number of reports from PBY's stating they had seen the enemy ships appearing and disappearing in the west. McMorris was certain this had to be the large convoy and was anxious to intercept it, under the belief they would only have a few destroyers as escort. The leading destroyer Coghlan made a rader contact showing several unidentified ships around 10 miles north. McMorris took his force, then strung out in one mile intervals to close in around his flagship the Richmond and begin sailing towards the northeast to intercept the enemy. The mood amongst the Americans was exuberant, they believed the radar blips indicated a helpless line of transports with perhaps a destroyer or two in attendance, nothing to match their 6 vessel group. As one officer aboard Salt Lake City, Lt Howard Grahn put it “fox in the henhouse, the chickens had all turned to wolves and the door was locked”. As the forces came closer together, Japanese lookouts saw the Coghlan and Richmond and initially thought it was the second escort force, but quickly surmised their identity. Hosogaya ordered a message to be sent via signal lamp and this confirmed for the Americans to their horror that they were not facing a helpless convoy but rather 2 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers and 4 destroyers. McMorris had orders to avoid superior forces and could have dashed for safety, but with the Japanese force so close chances of that were quite slim. It was likely the Japanese would overtake them all and sink them regardless, thus he decided to engage the enemy. Hosogaya upon realizing what he was facing motioned the transports further back and got his warships between the foxes and his chickens. McMorris sent word to Kinkaid asking for air support. The two fleets set into a collision course with the Japanese destroyers swing to bear down on the port bow of Richmond. McMorris planned to draw the enemy cruisers away with a feint and then dash in behind them to attack the cargo ships. The Japanese cruisers were the first to fire with Nachi in the lead. At 8:40 cruiser Maya opened first at 20,000 yards upon Richmond which swung into a westward turn. Nachi suddenly received some electrical problems cutting power to her turrets for several minutes. As the range closed in more between the forces, the American ships began to open fire while the Japanese shifted their attention from Richmond to the larger and more threatening looking Salt Lake City. The Tama continued to fire upon Richmond scoring no hits, causing the surface around the American vessel to erupt in fountains of spray. Hosogaya ordered his destroyers to make torpedo runs, but none of them obeyed the order. Various captains would later make excuses such as not receiving the signal or being unable to reach the correct speed for proper maneuvers, but this was certainly a sharp contrast from IJN destroyers whose commanders and crews were famous for aggression. Meanwhile the American ships began “chasing salvos” to avoid taking hits, altering their course towards the last splash in order to foil enemy gunners. The IJN cruisers began launching their torpedoes, but all missed with one churning past dangerously close to Richmonds bow. The American guns put Nachi's main battery out of action forcing Hosogaya to change his course to get even closer to bring his other batteries into play. In response McMorris made a 40 degree turn to port to confuse the enemy's gunner. Captain Bertram Rodgers, soaked to the skin with ice cold water made gast guesswork as to where the next enemy salvos were aimed and expertly headed towards the point the last salvo had hit, assuming the enemy spotters would correct their aim each time. In this manner Rodgers chased salvoes with great skill exclaimed “fooled em again!”. At 10am, with almost no actual its having been achieved, Salt Lake City landing 3 hits on Nachi damaging her rudder and jamming her starboard. Her crew managed to free the rudder but it began functioning erratically. Noting the ships loss of maneuverability, and within 20,000 yards the crews all shifted their fire onto salt lake city. Hits were made from Richmond and Coghlan upon Nachi causing much smoke. McMorris then decided to disengage turning his force westwards. Upon seeing the Americans trying to flee, Hosogaya ordered Tama to cut across their arc and deployed Nachi, Maya, Hatsushimo and Wakaba to cut off the American escape route. Task force 16 was forced to flee for their lives going west and northwest. During this chase, both sides began frantically calling for aerial support, but both were informed no were coming. The Maya and Salt Lake City were the only ships dueling during this interval and Maya managed to hit Salt Lake City's amidships catapult taking out a floatplane and then hit her quarterdeck. Salt Lake City's own gunfire managed to damage her hydraulic steering system making her maneuvers more difficult. Over 200 shells fell around her until a dud hit and caused flooding to an engine room forcing her to slow down. In response to this McMorris ordered Coghlan and Bailey to drop back to the rear of the line and generate a smoke screen Hosogaya had the initiative now, the enemy was fleeing and they were far from Alaska, in fact they had managed to get themselves much closer to the Kuriles. The American crews believed their only chance of survival lay getting interned by the Russians, but Hosogaya squandered that chance by speeding up to block them. The Japanese were closing in and believing they were close to point blank range McMorris decided to make a wide turn south covered again by his destroyers smoke screen. The Japanese launched 16 torpedoes all at the same time but missed with all of them. At 10:59am the Nachi finally ranged in on the Salt Lake City, despite the smoke screen cover and landed a shell killing 2 men, one of which was Captain Rodgers second in command Lt Commander Windsor Gale. Then a 8 inch shell from Nachi hit her below the waterline at 11:03am destroying 2 fuel tanks, damaging propeller shafts and started flooding her engine room. Soon Salt Lake City was dead in the water as the Japanese concentrated their fire upon her. Her engineers struggled to restart her boilers and offset the flooding as McMorris ordered his destroyers to perform basically a suicidal torpedo run at the enemy in the hopes of saving Salt Late City time to repair herself. The 4 US destroyers began surging at the enemy as the Salt Lake City continued firing her guns back at Nachi. The Salt Lake City landed some hits on Nachi killing several men. Admiral Hosogaya himself was saved by a hairsbreadth as a shell had gone through the bridge killing 3 officers standing right next to him. By the time Salt Lake City had exhausted 80% of their armor piercing rounds, one Lt Benjamin Johnston made an amazing hit, largely by accident as he recalled “ I guess I probably would have asked permission to throw rocks had the Japs been close enough! […] In order to conserve armorpiercing ammo, I shifted to high capacitys [sic] with the hope that one shell at a time might just possibly cause the Japs to think a plane or two from Amchitka […] was dropping a few bombs. The high capacitys, not having shell dye, just might appear similar to bombs exploding on the water. They did, and the Japs fired off bursts into the overcast” After seeing the blue shell dye of the American armor piercing shots for hours, the Japanese believed Johnstons random HE shell was from an aircraft as the Nachi and Maya anti-aircraft guns suddenly began to fire into the clouds.  Meanwhile the American destroyers continued their charge forward with the Bailey in the lead. At 10,000 yards the Japanese concentrated fire upon Bailey and a shell through her killing 5 men. Captain Ralph Riggs of the Bailey ordered her to fire torpedoes at the extreme range of 9500 yards and just as the first fish was launched into the water suddenly the Japanese ships began steaming away. Hosogaya had ordered his fleet to retreat! Hosogaya had broke off the battle for a variety of reasons. His warships were dangerously low on ammunition and sailing back and forth in search of the second escort force had used up most of their fuel. The smoke screens had masked the state of Salt Lake City, Hosogaya believed she was still combat ready during the battle. Also the admiral had received reports about the Americans calling in for air support and alongside the odd HE shell incident he believed there might be American aircraft in the vicinity. There is also another factor no Japanese admiral would ever admit, fearing shame brought upon him. He saw 3 officers blown into chunks of flesh a few feet from himself and perhaps the commanders nerves were shot. Hosogaya's sudden departure was a miracle for the men aboard Salt Lake City. Admiral Kinkaid after investigating her damage declared “the Japanese could have sunk Salt Lake City with a baseball”. Likewise Ensign F.R Floyd wrote this on the ships log shortly after the battle ended “This day the hand of Divine Providence lay over the ship. Never before in her colorful history has death been so close for so long a time. The entire crew offered its thanks to Almighty God for His mercy and protection”. As indecisive as the battle was, it caused major changes. Hosogaya lost his command when the IJN staff analysis recognized correctly that more aggression would have resulted in Salt Lake City and perhaps more ships being sunk. In all 7 Americans and 14 Japanese were killed with 20 Americans and 26 Japanese wounded, no ships sunk. Most importantly the battle caused the Japanese to abandon efforts to resupply and reinforce Attu and Kiska. Now the IJN would rely on submarines to carry out the task, which could only manage so much. The battle of the Komandorski islands resulted in a tactical draw, but a strategic victory for America. It was also the last real slugout gunnery duel ever to take place between opposing surface fleets without the use of combat airplanes. Basically it was the last of the good old fashioned naval battles, those of you who play world of warships could probably make a “get rid of CV's joke”. McMorris received praise from Nimitz and Kinkaid for the unlikely victory. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The ice cold water in the north pacific saw a good old fashioned naval brawl the likes of which would not be seen again. It was a strategic victory for America and one that would advance her recapture of the Aleutians.

Last time we spoke about the first adventure of the Chindits. Eccentric and quite literally madman Wingate was championed by Wavell to create a guerrilla unit to perform operations in Burma. Wingate soon readjusted the group to be a long range penetration group known as the Chindits. Their purpose was to disrupt the Japanese behind their front lines. The eccentric Wingate proved to be capable of turning men into onion wearing jungle warriors and they marched into the jungle to sabotage railway lines to hinder the Japanese. Their first mission was met with tremendous disaster after disaster, but surprisingly by the end they had achieved their goal of blowing up some railway. We finished off by talking about a lesser known allied partner during the Pacific War, Free France. The Japanese had ignored them for a long time, but eventually enough was enough and they seized Guangzhouwan from Free France thus ending their position in China. But today we are venturing back to the Aleutians. This episode is Landing at Amchitka and Invasion of the Russels Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Now the last time we were in the Aleutians, the Americans had taken Adak back on August 30th of 1942. There they began building a new airfield from which they could continue to reclaim the Aleutian island chain. However the Japanese did not give up on their northern possessions and reoccupied Attu Island by late October. The Japanese acted so boldly because they believed the Amerians were not able to construct an airtstip yet on the neighboring island of Amchitka. Also during October, Kiska was reinforced by massive amounts of anti-aircraft weapons and an impressive underground network of bunkers. Now initially the plan for the Aleutians for the Japanese was simply a large feint that would see them gradually withdrawing to the northern Kuriles while bleeding the americans of lives and resources. However all the American activity in the north was surprising Japanese high command and they now were beginning to believe the Americans sought to hop along the Aleutian island chain all the way to the home islands to potentially invade Japan from the north, a rather insane war strategy to be sure. As a result, the Japanese high command decided not to abandon the Aleutians for the winter and on November 1st, the formulated a joint plan to strengthen the defenses of Kiska and Attu by February of 1943. They also sought to create a seaplane base at the unoccupied island of Shemya. Now on the other side, the US army planned to occupy Tanaga along with Atka after the Adak base was established, but for the time being this was not a pressing issue. What was a pressing issue was a concern that the Japanese might seize Amchitka, 60 miles east of Kiska. Admiral Nimitz directed Theobald to preempt any such occupation and for Colonel Talley to go with a party of Alaskan scouts to go to the island to see if it was possible to build an airfield there. The Alaskan scouts landed on the island having to hid, while Japanese reconnaissance aircraft flew overhead. They found test holes all over the island that had been made by Japanese patrols. Contrary to the Japanese reports, the Alaskan scouts determined Amchitka was long, narrow and flat, except of course for a volcano at one end, but this indicated it could operate an airfield. Given the viability of the island and the presence of the Japanese holes testing its viability likewise, the race was on. Thus Admiral Nimitz approved the invasion of Amchitka codenamed Operation Longview. General Marshall approved the plan to advance upon Amchitka and agreed to assign troops for an invasion. While planning for the Amchitka occupation was underway, major changes in command structure also were going on. On January 4th of 1943, Theobald was transferred out of his command assumed by Rear Admiral Thomas Kincaid. Likewise Theobalds second in command, rear admiral W.W Smith was also replaced by rear admiral Charles McMorris. Kincaid was a combat veteran who liked action and was more to Buckner's liking as he immediately went on the offensive, arranging for a task force to deliver the Army's Amchitka occupation forces of 2000 men led by Brigadier General Lloyd Jones. Beginning in early November upon discovering the Japanese reoccupation of Attu, General Butler sent missions against the island. Colonel William Eric Eareckson led the airforce to hit Attu, successfully destroying several beach installations, sank a cargo ship and took out 9 Zero fighters at Holtz Bay. During the first 6 months of 1943, Attu and Kiska would be attacked by the 11th air force who would hit the islands with over 3,000,000 pounds of bombs. In July Kiska alone would be hit by 900,000 pounds of bombs. Liberators, mitchells, dauntless, lightnings and warhawks took part in the aerial attacks making the islands untenable. This is quite a lesser known aspect of the Pacific War. The American airfield on Adak was little more than 200 miles away from the Japanese on Kiska and nearly twice that distance from Attu. Any day weather permitted it, American aircraft departed from Adak to strike at the Japanese, it was grueling work fighting the Japanese and mother nature.  Over on the Japanese side on November 23rd the first Shemya convoy departed from Paramushiro, carrying 1100 troops of the 303rd independent battalion escorted by the light cruisers Abukuma, Kiso, Tama and the destroyers Hacuoshimo, Wakaba and Usugumo led by Admiral Hosogaya. But before the convoy was able to get to the island, the Americans sent a wave of B-24's on November 27th which managed to sink the transport Cherrybourne Maru just off Attu waters. Hosogaya began receiving reports indicating a North Pacific task force was in the vicinity as well. This prompted Hosogaya to postpone the Shemya landings and return back to Paramushiro. Ironically there was no American task force in the north pacific as Admiral Theobald had literally taken the majority of warships with him for the invasion of North Africa.  Eareckson's constant aerial attacks forced Hosogaya to consolidate his vessels at all times and prompted him to take the entire convoy to Kiska landing the troops there on December 2nd. On December 18th, Earecksons aerial forces smashed Amchitka, destroying every building on the island. Mere hours after the report of the damage, General Buckner decided to send the Alaska scouts in. The Alaska Scouts, were also known as Castner's Cutthroats, led by Colonel Lawrence Castner. The scouting expedition showed further signs the Japanese had been on the island recently doing the same type of work as them. Thus operation longview's timetable had to be increased. The scouts reported a fighter strip could be built up in 2 to possibly 3 weeks and a main airfield in 3-4 months time. By the end of the year the 11th air force had managed to take down 50 enemy planes in combat and lost around a dozen in the combat. However, over 80 other aircraft had been lost to a multitude of other causes, such as good old mother nature. Operating in the far reaches of the north was extremely dangerous, and the weather seemed to be taking a heavier toll than the Japanese. In spite of mother nature, Eareckson's bombers continued their work using rather innovative means. Eareckson pioneering a low-level bombing technique to raid the enemy and thwart the effects of the unpredictable Aleutian weather. To overcome the shortness of the daylight cycle, he was forced to bomb at night and to do so he would use a single plane that preceded the main force by a minute to drop incendiary bombs to illuminate the area. It was a very Japanese type of strategy, perhaps he was learning from his enemy. As I had mentioned the 11th air force would literally drop more than a million pounds of bombs over Attu, Kiska and other islands under Earecksons command. Earecksons personally was in the air ever flyable day of the campaign excluding one brief October mission to the States. On January 4th, Admiral Kinkaid, an American admiral who had seen action in more big naval battles than anyone else, finally arrived at Kodiak to replace Theobald. The day after, Kinkaid ordered the full troop landings on Amchitka to be executed. Butler was very pleased to have a “fighting admiral”. Heavy cruiser Indianapolis, light cruisers Detroit, Raleigh and 7 destroyers led by Admiral McMorris were to do the job. Yet mother nature did not comply, the weather became severe forcing the americans to postpone the operation for a few days. Meanwhile Butler sent a reconnaissance over Amchitka and more air strikes against Attu and Kiska. These runs led to the sinking of the freighter Montreal Maru off the Komandorski islands, hey I am from Montreal and the Kotohiro Maru off Attu.  Because of the nonstop pressure from the 11th air fleet, the Japanese were only able to pull off 8 resupply runs for Kiska and 4 for Attu between December 17th to January 30th. Basically it was similar to the situation on Guadalcanal, trying to stop the Japanese from receiving provisions. By the night of January 11th the weather continued to look bad, but as the storms slacked just a bit, Admiral McMorris decided to depart with the 2100 Engineer and army troops led by Brigadier General Lloyd Jones. It was a risk to be sure, you could not trust any windows of decent weather to be open for very long. McMorris also ordered the destroyer Worden to take a detachment of Alaska Scouts led by Lt COlonel William Verback to hit Constantine harbor. The destroyer blasted through the surf at the harbor mouth shortly before dawn, successfully landing Verbeck's scouts. But as the Worden made her departure from the harbor mouth a brutal current smashed her onto a pinnacle rock, leaving her powerless. The destroyer Dewey was sent racing off to assist her, but the Worden would capsize and kill 14 of her crew before the rescue could be made. Like I said, mother nature was taking a heavier toll than the Japanese. Verbecks scouts did a full reconnaissance of the island finding no Japanese forces, so the rest of the convoy came in. They came ashore the same way they had come ashore at Adak, wading through icy surf. They were soaked with ice water and oil. It was miserable, but Amchitka was quickly secured. The American engineers went to work immediately to construct the new airfield. They would have 12 days before a Japanese aircraft emerged to the scene, it was a floatplane which reported their presence back to Kiska. The men made good use of the 12 days and it was the same story as what occurred on Adak before. Men toiling without rest in winter rain and wind, in the bitter cold surf of Constantine harbor, wading through black Aleutian mud, climbing over rocks and heavy tundra. They unloaded, carried ashore, stored and protected their arms, ammunition, food, fuel and other equipment, even the smallest of kindling. Her in the Aleutians, the soldiers bodily needs were more than that in a place like the south pacific, I can assure you I live in a place where we get the nasty combination of ice rain and snow, its not fun to be out in that. The Japanese commanders were shocked by the unexpected occupation of Amchitka which lay only 50 miles from their main base at Kiska. The Japanese began their own series of air strikes against Amchitka hoping to hinder the construction of the airfield. They knew if the American completed an airfield the already relentiles air attacks would increase. The Japanese air raids caused considerable damage over the course of the following days, but the american engineers performed miracles and managed to complete the Amchitka runway by the end of January, allowing a P-40 squadron to be landed on January 28th. After this the Japanese bombing missions became more sporadic until February 18th when they ceased. Just like the Americans, mother nature was just as cruel to the Japanese and they simply could not spare anymore aircraft bombing Amchitka, they had to have a reserve to defend themselves. Now additional air forces were joining the daily raids against Kiska using Amchitka as a launch pad. The Japanese were being whittled down slowly but surely in the north. Yet we need to leave the north and head back south to the Solomons. After the epic conclusion of the Guadalcanal campaign, culminating with the success of Operation KE, the Japanese Empire now had to switch to the defensive. During Operation KE, on February the 1st, the Americans received a cascade of sighting reports from coastwatchers and scouting aircraft. Some 20 Japanese destroyers had headed down the slot and a small Japanese infantry force was landed in the Russell Islands. Likewise allied flights over the Japanese held anchorage off Buin noted a sharp increase in the number of ships. Now the third run of Operation KE took place on the night of February 7th and lifted 1796 men off Guadalcanal and the Russell Islands. This prompted Admirals Nimitz and Halsey to commence their campaign to move up the solomons and thwart any Japanese incursions moving down them. In January they wanted to hit the Japanese base at Munda, but lacked the necessary forces for such an operation. One place in the solomons they could perform an operation against was the Russell Islands to the southeast. Admiral Halsey decided it would be advantageous to seize the Russell Islands and develop them while preventing their use to the Japanese. Thus operation Cleanslate was born. The idea behind it was simple, take the island away from Japanese use, further limited the Japanese operational capacity in the solomons and the Russell Islands could be used as a launching pad to hit other places like New Georgia. As Air Force historian Kramer Rohfleisch put it “for allied operations worked in such a way, that each fresh base became a successive cancer in the structure of the enemy's defense lines, sending out its tentacles and relentlessly destroying the equipment and personnel opposing it”. Operation Cleanslate was to be the first step in the conquest of the central and northern solomon islands, all to culminate with the final drive against the stronghold of Rabaul. By the end of January Halsey received permission from Nimitz to proceed with the invasion. The americans would dispatch an infantry battalion and anti-aircraft units from Guadalcanal into 2 destroyers to occupy the Russell Islands. Likewise the Japanese quickly beat them to the punch by landing around 400 troops as indicated by their aerial reconnaissance. As we know however, this was not a reinforcement of the island, but a part of Operation KE. The 17th army sought to use the Russell islands as a backup extraction point if the destroyers failed to get the men off Guadalcanal. Halsey was forced to postpone Operation Cleanslate, believing the Japanese were going to put up a large fight for the Russell Islands. In early february the Americans still were unaware the Japanese had evacuated Guadalcanal, but Hasley finally kicked off Operation Cleanslate regardless on the 7th. The 103rd and 169th regiments of Major General John Hester along with the 3rd marine raider battalion, anti aircraft units from the 10th and 11th marine defense battalions and ACORN 3: a naval engineering force of the 35th naval construction battalion.  Admiral Turner was given command of the operations with his task force 64 consisting of 8 destroyers, 5 minesweepers, 12 tank landing craft and a number of barges and torpedo boats. He was going to receive assistance from Admiral Fitch's land based aircraft to cover the transports and 2 other task forces. Task force 18 led by Admiral Giffen consisting of heavy cruisers Wichita, Louisville and 3 destroyers and Task force 68 led by Rear Admiral Aaron Merrill consisting of light cruisers Montpelier, Cleveland, Denver, Columbia and 4 destroyers. The other task forces would be in close proximity just in case things got dicey. Of course unbeknownst to the Americans the Japanese had evacuated the Russell Islands by the 10th closing off Operation KE. Australians and New Zealand coastwatcher alongside US army, marine and naval air reconnaissance saw a ton of abandoned equipment on the Russell Islands, which Halsey ignored as he was deadset to carry out Operation Cleanslate as planned, fearing the enemy might try to reinforce the islands still. On February the 20th the first echelon of the Russells Occupation force departed Guadalcanal under strict radio silence. It was an uneventful trip and the transports were divided into 3 groups to hit their landing sites. The 10rd regiment landed on Banika easily taking control over the island. The 3rd marine raider battalion did the same at Pavuvu. The landings went unopposed, but the Marines quickly found out that the 10 man rubber rafts used for their landings had motor issues. Alongside this the 169th field artillery battalion somehow managed to get lost and took over 19 hours to land instead of 2, but by the end of the day the islands were firmly in American hands. The men began digging themselves into defensive positions. As soon as reports came in that the islands were secure, Halsey began pouring Seabees into the islands and supplied their 2 new fighter strips with lavish amounts of ammunition and aviation fuel in anticipation of expanding the air operations in the central solomons. But the Russell Islands were at the absolute limit of Hasleys designated border, technically they were over that border. No more westward progress could occur without good old General MacArthurs blessing. So the men simply set to work, and by the end of hte month over 9000 soldiers were in the Russells and the construction of a new airbase was occurring in Banika and a torpedo boat base at Wernham Cove. Upon learning of the American seizure of the Russells, the Japanese launched a surprise air strike. 12 Vals and 25 zeros struck the unfinished airfield and torpedo boat base on March 6th without any warning. They caused little damage, but would just be the beginning of a 3 month long campaign of night air attacks. By late may the airfield at Banika alongside the torpedo boat base, a training center and staging area for the future operation against new georgia. Operation Cleanslate may have been lackluster when it came to combat, but acted as a great practice run for what was to be the future of island hoping warfare in the solomons. The landing craft tank veterans of operation cleanslate would help teach others, increasing Americans amphibious capabilities. The American also learned a very valuable lesson when it came to loading and landing operations. They had certainly come a long way from the earlier experience of operation Watchtower. Now back to the issue of Hasley's operation stepping on the toes of MacArthur's area. Upon taking the Russell Islands, Halsey had his eyes on Munda Point, where there was a new Japanese fighter strip in New Georgia, around 120 miles to the west. The terrain looked suitable for a large bomber field, something highly desired. But MacArthur stood in the way, so they were going to have to talk. A face to face summit was made in early april, forcing Halsey to cross the Coral sea to present himself to the general at the AMP building in Brisbane. There was no reason to believe this was going to be a warm meeting. Halsey to this point had certainly not appreciated MacArthur's credit snatching communiques. In fact one aide to Halsey had referred to General MacArthur as quote “a self-advertising son of a bitch”. MacArthur had also declined an invitation from Admiral Nimitz to attend a command conference in Noumea in September of 1942, a slight insult if you were. He instead sent Sutherland and Kenney in his place to which one of Nimitz staff officers remarked “MacArthur found himself unable to be present”. When Halsey met MacArthur face to face, believe or not they instantly took a liking to another. Within just 5 minutes Halsey wrote “I felt as if we were lifelong friends. I have seldom seen a man who makes a quicker, stronger, more favorable impression. He was then 63 years old, but he could have passed as 50. His hair was jet black; his eyes were clear; his carriage was erect. If he had been wearing civilian clothes, I still would have known at once that he was a soldier”. MacArthur was equally impressed writing about Halsey  “He was of the same aggressive type as John Paul Jones, David Farragut, and George Dewey. His one thought was to close with the enemy and fight him to the death. . . . I liked him from the moment we met, and my respect and admiration increased with time.” In the year that followed the admiral and general would effectively coordinate their operations in the south pacific. As Kenney and Kinkaid had learned, and as Halsey was in turn, MacArthur was accustomed to deference but did not bristle at well reasoned opposition. MacArthur could yield to sound arguments. Of course heated arguments occurred between the two men. Halsey's long term chief of staff, Robert Carney witnessed one in 1943 where he said “The admiral, with his “chin sticking out a foot,” told MacArthur that he was placing his “personal honor . . . before the security of the United States and the outcome of the war!” MacArthur responded “Bull, that's a terrible indictment. That's a terrible thing to say. But, I think in my preoccupation, I've forgotten some things. . . . You can go on back now. The commitment will be met.” Imagine that, MacArthur almost admitting a mistake, that goes to show the character of Halsey. What they were arguing about was Hasley proposing to attack New Georgia and it turned out to be inline with MacArthurs thinking. MacArthur approved the operation on the spot and it would intersect with his own plans for an offensive up the north coast of New Guinea.  Because of the seizure of the Russell Island's, D-Day for the invasion of New Georgia would be originally set for May 15th, but would get postponed to June 30th. However that is far into the future for us!   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Amchitka and the Russell Islands were taken unopposed and with relative ease. The Americans were being cautious in their actions, but little by little they were breaking down Japan's new defensive posture, a few islands down and many more to come.

The Boston Bruins going into Vancouver and beating the Canucks wasn't really a surprise. What made this one so special was Linus Ullmark scoring the rare goalie goal, and the subsequent celebration on the bench and with Jeremy Swayman. Earlier Saturday, Don Sweeney pulled off another sneakily savvy trade, acquiring forward prospect Shane Bowers from the Colorado Avalanche for goalie Keith Kinkaid. The Bruins are now in Edmonton to take on the Oilers, and you won't believe who poses the biggest threat to another Boston W! Support Us By Supporting Our Sponsors! Built Bar Built Bar is a protein bar that tastes like a candy bar. Go to builtbar.com and use promo code “LOCKEDON15,” and you'll get 15% off your next order. Athletic Greens To make it easy, Athletic Greens is going to give you a FREE 1 year supply of immune-supporting Vitamin D AND 5 FREE travel packs with your first purchase. All you have to do is visit athleticgreens.com/NHLNETWORK FanDuel Make Every Moment More.Place your first FIVE DOLLAR bet to get ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY DOLLARS in Free Bets – win or lose! Visit Fanduel.com/LockedOn today to get started FANDUEL DISCLAIMER: 21+ in select states. First online real money wager only. Bonus issued as nonwithdrawable free bets that expires in 14 days. Restrictions apply. See terms at sportsbook.fanduel.com. Gambling Problem? Call 1-800-GAMBLER or visit FanDuel.com/RG (CO, IA, MD, MI, NJ, PA, IL, VA, WV), 1-800-NEXT-STEP or text NEXTSTEP to 53342 (AZ), 1-888-789-7777 or visit ccpg.org/chat (CT), 1-800-9-WITH-IT (IN), 1-800-522-4700 (WY, KS) or visit ksgamblinghelp.com (KS), 1-877-770-STOP (LA), 1-877-8-HOPENY or text HOPENY (467369) (NY), TN REDLINE 1-800-889-9789 (TN) Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

The Boston Bruins going into Vancouver and beating the Canucks wasn't really a surprise. What made this one so special was Linus Ullmark scoring the rare goalie goal, and the subsequent celebration on the bench and with Jeremy Swayman.Earlier Saturday, Don Sweeney pulled off another sneakily savvy trade, acquiring forward prospect Shane Bowers from the Colorado Avalanche for goalie Keith Kinkaid.The Bruins are now in Edmonton to take on the Oilers, and you won't believe who poses the biggest threat to another Boston W!Support Us By Supporting Our Sponsors!Built BarBuilt Bar is a protein bar that tastes like a candy bar. Go to builtbar.com and use promo code “LOCKEDON15,” and you'll get 15% off your next order.Athletic GreensTo make it easy, Athletic Greens is going to give you a FREE 1 year supply of immune-supporting Vitamin D AND 5 FREE travel packs with your first purchase. All you have to do is visit athleticgreens.com/NHLNETWORKFanDuelMake Every Moment More.Place your first FIVE DOLLAR bet to get ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY DOLLARS in Free Bets – win or lose! Visit Fanduel.com/LockedOn today to get startedFANDUEL DISCLAIMER: 21+ in select states. First online real money wager only. Bonus issued as nonwithdrawable free bets that expires in 14 days. Restrictions apply. See terms at sportsbook.fanduel.com. Gambling Problem? Call 1-800-GAMBLER or visit FanDuel.com/RG (CO, IA, MD, MI, NJ, PA, IL, VA, WV), 1-800-NEXT-STEP or text NEXTSTEP to 53342 (AZ), 1-888-789-7777 or visit ccpg.org/chat (CT), 1-800-9-WITH-IT (IN), 1-800-522-4700 (WY, KS) or visit ksgamblinghelp.com (KS), 1-877-770-STOP (LA), 1-877-8-HOPENY or text HOPENY (467369) (NY), TN REDLINE 1-800-889-9789 (TN) Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

Budget Watchdog AF takes a field trip to the corn and soybean fields of northeastern Nebraska in search of common sense on the Farm Bill.  Taxpayers for Common Sense Senior Policy Analysts Sheila Korth and Josh Sewell introduce us to the current generations of the Kinkaid family farming this land since the 1940s.  Hit play and hear what these farmers think about farm subsidies.  It will suprise you. 

This week Bill and I have a special guest with us, he's been here before and we always love to have him, he's the one, the only, my good buddy, Jon Parshall.If you've been listening to the podcast as of late, you are well aware that we are making our way through the slug fest that was the Guadalcanal campaign.  While the fighting ashore has raged on and off between pitched engagements, the seas around the Canal have been anything but quiet.  Savo Island in August was a debacle for the US Navy, the carrier forces under Admiral fletcher landed some fairly significant blows on the Japanese carrier force at Eastern Solomons, and Admiral Norman Scott finally exacted some revenge for Savo at the Battle of Cape Esperance.  The US Navy has seen it's share of victories, as well as defeats in these bloody waters.  And while the fighting has been significant at sea…it ain't over.  Not even close.  The calendar now sits in October 1942, October 26 exactly.  And ashore, the Japanese have launched a massive offensive to finally push the Marines and Army off Guadalcanal.  The October offensive and the fighting that takes place ashore will be remembered as the Battle of Henderson Field.  The fighting at sea that takes place only a day later, all coinciding with the offensive ashore, will be called the Battle of Santa Cruz.Talking Points:Japanese Preparations and Plans Pre-Battle:The combined fleet sorties from Truk on October 11.  The force is very large, the largest Japanese force that has put to sea since Midway and consists of 4 CVs and 1 light CV3 Fleet CVs1 Light CV4 BBs8 CAs2 CLs24 DDsThe Japanese had planned that the naval force that was now at sea would not necessarily support the operation ashore, but would directly benefit from the success of the ground offensiveThat being said, once Hyakutake's infantry had captured Henderson, the Japanese combined fleet would then be free from any attack from land based air.The pre-sailing plans called for the Japanese so-called Support Force to make a high-speed run into the Guadalcanal area to intercept and destroy any American fleet units that would come to the rescue of the infantry following the Japanese land-based offensive's success.This is part of the reason why Kongo and Haruna blasted the shit out of Henderson on October 14-15.  Both to soften the defenses, destroy the airfield and also, hopefully draw the Americans out to fight.Japanese intel, which we have not talked about very much, had deduced via traffic patterns that at least 1 US CV was in the Canal area.Based on traffic patterns, the Japanese had seen a large flurry of messages go out to a “powerful unit” south of Guadalcanal that would receive the messages and maintain radio silence.This of course is CV8Again, based on traffic patterns, the Japanese had deduced that another major fleet unit had sailed from Pearl Harbor on or about Oct 15.This is the newly repaired CV6The Japanese estimated that this task force was headed south as well to join up with the other “ghost” forceJapanese. Intel also read US newspapers and listened to the news, as US officials ignorantly declared on October 20 that US Naval forces off Guadalcanal were preparing for a “sea clash”The Land influences the SeaDelays ashore from the Japanese 17th Army (future Henderson Field offensive force) caused Y-Day to be pushed from October 19 to the 22nd.  Incidentally, Hiyo suffers a fire in her engineering spaces that causes her to return to port and not take part in the planned upcoming action.17th Army again delays the offensive until the 24th further irritating the IJN.The delay by the Army forced the Navy to delay its attack which allowed CV6 to rejoin the American forces off Guadalcanal on October 24 and thus restoring some parity to any upcoming carrier battle.US Forces for battleUS forces are under the overall command of ADM Thomas Kinkaid TF 16 under Kinkaid has:CV61 CA1 CL 8 DDs 1 BB (SoDak)TF 17 under ADM George Murray has:CV82 CAs2 CLs 6 DDs Previous to CV6 returning from Pearl, CV8 was the only US CV in the area.CV8 was still, despite having been at Midway, an unexperienced CV.That being said, her aircrew was a mix of veterans and newbies.VS-8 skipper Gus Widhelm Veteran of Coral Sea and hit and run raids with VS-5Fantastic leaderVB-8 SBD pilot Clayton FisherVeteran of the Flight to Nowhere, June 4 afternoon raid and Mogami/Mikuma raid on June 6, but otherwise relatively fresh CV6 had just returned to the fleet after having been patched up after Eastern SolomonsCV6 still retained her well-trained deck crews, DC parties and the like.  Battle tested, CV6 would need all the help she could get in the upcoming fightWhile a veteran carrier, she deployed a brand-new air group, AG 10.Air Group 10, although new, is rife with veterans of different engagementsVF-10, better known as the Grim Reapers, is led by the legendary Jimmy Flatley and hosts names like:Jack LepplaDon Flash GordonWhitey Feightner and most importantly, Swede VejtasaBucky Lee led VS-10, not so much a veteran, but an incredible leader.  He had with him names that were both familiar and would become familiarBirney StrongMartin “Red” CarmodyAgain, technically a new air group, Air Group 10 would prove to be, arguably, the finest Air Group put to sea in 1942, and maybe the warThe Battle draws nearNight of October 24-25 the Japanese send out searches to find the suspected US CVs but do not find them.  They do detect ADM Willis Lee's BB56 but do not attack due to extreme rangeAround noon on October 25 US PBYs spot 2 Japanese CVsMonitoring the radio intercepts in Noumea, Halsey reads the sightings and messages Kinkaid “STRIKE! REPEAT STRIKE!”Amplifying reports allowed Kinkaid to launch at 1430 and again at 1520 his main strikeThe Japanese turned north, but radio silence does not allow Kinkaid to recall his strikers. This ends up, not so well, in that the majority of the strike gets lost and is, thankfully, shepherded back to CV6 by Swede Vejtasa who recalls that CV6 has an oil leak, spots the leak and follows it, at wave-top height, back to CV6 with the majority of the strike…at night.The Carrier Battle (Morning)Both sides readied search planes for a first light search patternDuring the night of 25-26, US PBYs spotted, and attacked, the Japanese including Zuikaku.  The PBYs missed, and their contact reports essentially went unheard.The Japanese got scouts off first, between 0415 and 0445.CV6 launched her own scouts around 0445 as well.  Kinkaid finally received the PBYs sighting report at 0512 but deemed the information old (which it was) and considered it to be inaccurate.One of CV6s scouts saw and approached one of Nagumo's Kate scout planes, only 85 miles away from CV6, confirming the presence of Japanese CVs in the area. First BloodBucky Lee, skipper of VS-10 spotted Nagumo's CVs at 0650 and climbed to attack altitude, but were driven off by CAPLee's scouting report alerted every SBD in the area, and drove them towards the Japanese like flies to honeyRadioman Clarence Garlow heard Lee's report, jotted it down and reported the contact to his pilot, Birney Strong.Birney and Eastern Solomons, pressure from Crommelin to attack and a bruise on his prideStrong diligently plotted the contact report, adjusted his fuel mixture for maximum distance and headed in the direction of the sighting.Showing off his supreme navigational skills, Strong found the enemy 20 minutes later as 2 of the 3 CVs in the area emerged from cloud cover.At the same time that Strong and his wingman Irvine approached, 2 other SBDs, one piloted by Red Carmody were being harassed by CAP Zeros, leaving Strong and Irvine wide open for a clear attack.Diving from 14,000 feet, at 0740, Strong popped in and out of clouds for the 30 seconds he dove.  At 1,500 feet the clouds parted and directly beneath him was the flight deck of Zuiho.Both Strong and Irvine planted their 500 pounders into the flight deck of Zuiho. The hits were not fatal, but did force her withdrawal.At 0658, Japanese scouts spot the HornetDespite the fact that the US spotted the Japanese first, it is the IJN that gets their strike off first (no surprise here)At 0725 Shokaku and Zuikaku launches their strikes, 62 aircraft led by MurataTalk about MurataComposition of the strikeAs the Japanese strike is on its way to Hornet, CV8 and a small CV6 strike passes them in the air.Let's talk about how the US strikes during this entire battle are very piecemeal, unorganized and generally unpreparedAs the Hornet strikers pass the Japanese, Zeros from Zuiho break off and attack the CV6 formationThe TBFs are hit hard as their fighter protection was in the process of making S turns to keep up with the slow TBFs and were on the outward leg of the turn during the attackAt 0850 Hornet's strike spotted Shokaku.  As the SBDs home in, they are hit again by Zuiho CAP, as well as Shokaku CAPGus Widhelm, strike leader, is shot down but later rescued.At the tail end of the formation is Clay FisherTalk about Clay's experienceHornet's strike, despite taking heavy casualties, is successful in hitting ShokakuJohn describe Shokaku damage 4-06 hits from 1000 poundersHornet Under AttackHornet receives word of the inbound strike from her outbound strikePoor coordination from CV6 and CV8 FDOs do not allow the CAP to engage in sufficient numbers to deter the incoming attack (Like Eastern Solomons)Japanese sight Hornet at 0855, but do not see CV6 as she dives into a rain squallHornet prepares for the attack, turns NE and dials up 31 knotsCAP engages at 15 miles but Vals break through and commence the attack at 0910First two Vals miss At 0912 Hornet is hit by three bombs within minutes1st bomb hits the flight deck and kills 60 men as it explodes 3 decks downMoments later another bomb struck the flight deck, this time exploding on the deck itself. The explosion blew an 11-foot hole in the deck, and the flying shrapnel killed another 30 of Hornet's crew. Still the rain of bombs came. Hornet suffered yet another hit when another 550-pound bomb penetrated three decks below and exploded there, causing severe damage but no loss of life. Seconds later, a damaged “Val” dive-bomber, hit by Hornet's own antiaircraft fire, plunged into the carrier's stack, glancing off of the port leading edge of the stack and smacking into the flight deck, the engine and propeller embedded firmly into the sea-blue stained Douglas fir flight deck. All of the hits suffered by Hornet thus far had occurred in a blinding fast span of just over two minutes. As Hornet reels from the Val attack, the Kates come into viewDescribe the Kate attack led by MurataHammer and anvil attack0915 Hornet is struck by 2 torpedoes starboard1 Val, having already dropped its load, swerves around Hornet from astern, passes the bridge and makes a wingtip vertical turn to crash into her port bowAt 0925 the attack is over and Hornet is dead in the water and listingFires were under control by 10, and she is being prepared for a two by NorthamptonThe Big E under attackJapanese Vals spot CV6 at 1000. They commence their attack at about 1015, led by SekiLT Keiichi Arima, who had hit the Big E at Eastern Solomons, again dives on CV6 and scores yet another hit on the ship.  Dead center near the bow.  The bomb flew through the flight deck and exploded in the water, showering CV6 with shrapnel and starting fires in the focsleMinutes later another bomb hits CV6, near the after portion of the forward elevator exploding in the hangar deck killing 40 menWilliam PinckneyAfrican American of slight build- carried wounded up the ladders to safety before he himself passed out, both wounded and with 3rd degree burns.  Navy CrossA third bomb was a tooth rattling near miss that opened hull plates and 2 empty fuel bunkersBy 1020, the attack was over.At 1035 the Kates arrived.  One of the CAP pilots to engage was Swede VejtasaDuring the attack on Hornet, Swede engaged and shot down one of the Vals that was about to dive on CV8, as well as one of the Vals that attacked CV6.Still aloft and with the majority of his ammunition still available, Swede switched off his two outboard weapons so as to conserve ammo, climbed above the Kate's altitude, dove into them and began picking them off one by one, dropping five of the bandits in about 15 seconds.His last target, another Kate, was riddled by Swede's guns, but flew on.  The aircraft piloted by Takei Kiyomi, dropped down, flew over SoDak and deliberately crashed into USS Smith.  The dead aircraft slid off the ship but the torpedo cooked off, setting the destroyer ablaze.Smith, under the command of LCDR Hunter Wood, steered directly into the boiling wake of SoDak.  The enormous wake thrown up by the battleship sliding along at 27 knots extinguished the flames, allowing the plucky little DD to resume station and resume firing.Vejtasa is credited with downing 7 Japanese aircraft in that one CAP mission, a record that still stands today. He would be recommended for the MOH, but instead would receive his 3rd (!) Navy CrossCV6 dodges a total of 9 Japanese torpedoes, throughout her ordeal USS South Dakota (BB-57) keeps station, a scant 1,000 yards astern, matching every move she makes so as to provide AAA support with her new 40mm bofors guns.SoDak claims 26 kills, an unlikely mark, but nevertheless, her guns and her adroit maneuvering certainly helped keep the Big E afloat.The returning Japanese (what few manage to return) get back to their CVs and speak of the tremendous amounts of American AA.  Some of those who returned were visibly shaken and could not speak due to shock.The Battle OverAt 1135 with CV8 out of action and CV6 heavily damaged, Kinkaid withdraws, leaving CV8 under tow by Northampton and a few screeners.At 1235 CV6 resumes landing ops and recovers the remaining aircraft aloft with only one operable elevator.  LSO Robin Lindsey, performs his legendary “virtuoso” He receives word from the bridge to stop landing aircraft as the deck is clogged.  Knowing that the majority of the remaining aircraft are SBDs, he elects to literally pull the plug from his headset, ignore orders and bring the boys down.  Lindsey landed so many planes that he was landing the last batch on the last arresting wire, unfazed. Last to land was Swede catching the #1 wire, with 56 other aircraft jammed ahead of him on the deck.At 1520, with the majority of US forces leaving the field of battle, Hornet is attacked again.  She is struck by 1 torpedo from Junyo. At this point, the remaining crew abandons ship and she is ordered to be scuttled.2 US DDs fire over 400 rounds into CV8 as well as torpedoes, but she refuses to sink.  (Harder than woodpecker lips)Knowing the IJN is closing, the DDs beat feet and get the hell out of the area, leaving CV8 to her enemy. 2 Japanese DDs finally finish Hornet off.Implications on the CampaignClearly Santa Cruz is a US defeat, although we claimed victory.  We leave the field of battle to the enemy and suffer more damage…clear defeat…in one way, a victory in another although unseen at that time.Japanese air losses have now reached a critical level.  Through attrition at Coral Sea, Midway, eastern Solomons, and especially Santa Cruz, more than half of the elite aviators who started the war are now dead.  Japanese pilot training and replacement systems problemsFinal Tally:US- 1 CV sunk, 1 DD sunk, 1 CV heavily damaged.  1 BB lightly damaged, 1 CL and 2 DDs damaged.81 aircraft lost266 men KIAJapanese- 1 CV heavily damaged, 1light CV damaged, 1 CA damaged, 1 DD damaged99 aircraft lost400-500 men KIA18% of Zero pilots killed 50% of Val crews killed31% of Kate crews killedHorrendous aircrew lossesUS AA, with the introduction of the 40mm account for roughly half of these losses!

Bruins go 3-0 on the week. Kinkaid is the story in Buffalo. Bruins investigating themselves. Marchand for the Hall. Plus Beauties and Benders and a mailbag!

The Boston Bruins recalled Keith Kinkaid on Wednesday, a sign that Jeremy Swayman could miss some time after suffering an injury the other night in Pittsburgh.Derek Forbort has also been placed on IR with what's believed to be a finger injury.The healthy Bruins are in New York to take on the Rangers tonight, and host Ian McLaren previews what should be a spirited affair.Plus, it's the weekly Cup check where Ian takes a look at where the Bruins stand in relation to the NHL's top 5 teams.Support Us By Supporting Our Sponsors!Built BarBuilt Bar is a protein bar that tastes like a candy bar. Go to builtbar.com and use promo code “LOCKEDON15,” and you'll get 15% off your next order.BetOnlineBetOnline.net has you covered this season with more props, odds and lines than ever before. BetOnline – Where The Game Starts!SimpliSafeWith Fast Protect™️ Technology, exclusively from SimpliSafe, 24/7 monitoring agents capture evidence to accurately verify a threat for faster police response. There's No Safe Like SimpliSafe. Visit SimpliSafe.com/LockedOnNHL to learn more. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

The Boston Bruins recalled Keith Kinkaid on Wednesday, a sign that Jeremy Swayman could miss some time after suffering an injury the other night in Pittsburgh. Derek Forbort has also been placed on IR with what's believed to be a finger injury. The healthy Bruins are in New York to take on the Rangers tonight, and host Ian McLaren previews what should be a spirited affair. Plus, it's the weekly Cup check where Ian takes a look at where the Bruins stand in relation to the NHL's top 5 teams. Support Us By Supporting Our Sponsors! Built Bar Built Bar is a protein bar that tastes like a candy bar. Go to builtbar.com and use promo code “LOCKEDON15,” and you'll get 15% off your next order. BetOnline BetOnline.net has you covered this season with more props, odds and lines than ever before. BetOnline – Where The Game Starts! SimpliSafe With Fast Protect™️ Technology, exclusively from SimpliSafe, 24/7 monitoring agents capture evidence to accurately verify a threat for faster police response. There's No Safe Like SimpliSafe. Visit SimpliSafe.com/LockedOnNHL to learn more. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

A Halloween tradition begins at Podzilla 1985! This is our brand-new seasonal scripted series, "The Hallow's Eve Tales," full of original horror stories written and voice-acted by PZ85 cast members (and some newcomers as well!), with new episodes coming every Monday in October. In episode one, local radio station KPDZ receives a very interesting guest on their spooky season call-in show. Summer camp can be such a magical time in a young person's life...if it lasts that long. "Delirium at Camp Kinkaid" was created by Tanner Calvert, written for stage by Hunter Hendricks, and performed in order of appearance by Seanán Young and Amber Dawn.

When a podiatry business grows, you end up with a team, and that team needs to be led, and how you lead them will leave both positive and negative traces, which are referred to as Green Traces (positive) and Red Traces (negative).  In this episode, I am joined by Paul Kinkaid, an Executive Leadership Coach and retired Commando-trained Lieutenant Colonel in the British Army, and we're discussing how private practice owners need to step into the leadership domain if they want to thrive.  We also discuss:  The difference between leadership and management. Self-awareness. The best leaders are always studying leadership. How you lead could be based on elements you've seen before, but did these examples of leadership leave positive traces (Green) or negative traces (Red) on you? Not asking questions results in the Law of Unintended Consequences. Difference between servant leadership and servile leadership A good leader will have a clear INTENT (Goal) and they need to paint this picture of the future for their team to follow. How a business benefits by creating leaders instead of followers. Followers will ask you constantly what they should do next, whereas leaders will tell you what they intend to do next and will keep moving forward. Creating leaders around you creates more space in your diary and mind, allowing you to be more strategic in your thinking. Managing processes is not leadership. Born leaders are doing leadership by default. This is also no good leadership.  Three guiding principles of forensic leaders: Lead from a position of care. Notice people and, where appropriate, give recognition or notice when they are struggling and lean in and help out. That's when the leader gets their hands dirty. They see patients when it's busy and when required, they get back on the tools. Be appropriately transparent and communicate your intent - your vision, your purpose, and your strategy in a compelling way so everyone understands their part in the plan and therefore they're going to get on board. Doing the right thing always leaves GREEN traces on people and doing the wrong thing will leave RED traces.  The standard you walk past is the standard you accept. You've got to sweat the small stuff; you've got to look at the details; they are that important. When you start leading poorly and leaving red traces on your team, the good people will leave because they back themselves to get another job, and the less than good people will stay. This is damaging for your business.   Forensic Leadership - pay attention to the guiding principles and traces. 4 Key Questions What will happen if I do it? What won't happen if I do it? What will happen if I don't do it? What won't happen if I don't do it? When you put the answers to all these questions through the forensic leadership filter, what green and red traces are going to be left and what is the impact on my people, then you know what the right decision is. Every successful podiatrist leaves clues, green traces, and every unsuccessful podiatrist also leaves clues, red traces.  If your employer says the wrong thing in a meeting, you can easily say that was a bit red, or if was very red, you could say that left a really big red trace. As an employer, you don't want to leave red traces. Habit stacking When you get up in the morning, what version of you has gotten up? Sometimes you're just grumpy, or maybe you get cut off on the road on the way to work. Be aware of how you feel, as this will influence your leadership ability that day.  Make leadership deliberate, conscious and intentional. Think about how you lead, the traces you leave on other people, and the traces that are left upon you, and you have to own those traces. Combine that with a compelling narrative that gives the intent in a clear and compelling way you will have a fantastic team. If you want to connect with Paul Kinkad, you can find him on Linkedin, or you can visit his website, Forensicoutcomes.com or send him an email at Paul@forensicoutcomes.com If you have any questions, please email me at tf@tysonfranklin.com  Business Coaching Are you looking for a podiatry business coach who coaches differently? If so, consider booking a FREE 30-Minute Discovery Call with me and let's see if we're a good fit.  YouTube Are you SUBSCRIBED to my YouTube Channel? This is where I upload all the UNCUT videos from my podcasts and other short educational business tips and ideas.  Podiatry Business Owners Club Please visit the Podiatry Business Owners Club on Facebook if you want to connect with like-minded podiatrists who enjoy business.