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The Pacific War - week by week
- 138 - Pacific War - The Battle of Noemfoor, July 9-16,1944

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Jul 9, 2024 46:02


Last time we spoke about the fall of Saipan. General Smith's coordinated attacks on June 27th led to significant progress, with the 4th Marine Division notably advancing. The 27th Division encountered resistance, and casualties rose. By early July, Americans gained ground, pushing toward Marpi Point. Japanese resistance remained fierce, but American forces steadily advanced, capturing strategic positions. The assault on Petosukara was swiftly countered, but intense action unfolded in the Makunsha region. The 3rd Battalion, 24th Marines faced a fierce enemy thrust, with over 200 attackers killed. Facing defeat, General Saito ordered a suicidal assault, resulting in a chaotic and desperate charge. Despite heavy losses, American forces repelled the onslaught. The battle lasted until midday on July 7, with sporadic skirmishes continuing. Efforts to persuade cave occupants to surrender intensified, yet many civilians chose mass suicide. Saipan was declared secured after extensive casualties on both sides.  This episode is the battle of Noemfoor  Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  General MacArthur unleashed a new offensive, seeing General Patrick's troops successfully landed on Noemfoor with little opposition, securing a beachhead. While the 3rd Battalion, 503rd Parachute Regiment was being airdropped on July 4, Colonel Sandlin's 3rd Battalion continued eastward through scattered minefields toward Kornasoren Drome, meeting no resistance. Simultaneously, the 1st Battalion crossed the Kamiri River and occupied Kamiri village without encountering any opposition. Moving out of Kamiri, the American forces followed a southeastern road to a sizable Japanese garden area, where they faced resistance on Hill 201.  The Japanese garden area was about 600 yards long, east and west, and 350 yards across, north to south. The ground was devoid of large trees except for a few atop Hill 201, but thick, secondary jungle growth covered the eastern and southern slopes of the hill, while the rest of the garden area was overgrown with partially cultivated papaya, taro, and cassava, all averaging about eight feet in height. The trail from Kamiri village passed over the southern slope of Hill 201, and 300 yards away, near the eastern edge of the gardens, joined the main road from Kamiri Drome to Namber Drome, located about six miles to the south. Another trail ran along the eastern side of the hill, branching to the north and northwest at the northeastern corner of the low terrain feature. To counter this, a double envelopment tactic was initiated, with Company C seizing Hill 180 to the north while Company B pushed the Japanese southeast over Mission Hill, a lower terrain feature situated southeast of Hill 201. By 15:15, the battalion secured the ground on both flanks of Hill 201 and consolidated around the hilltop for the night, establishing a tight defensive perimeter. At 05:20 on July 5, the Japanese launched an attack along the southern and southeastern sides of the perimeter with mortar support. The American forces responded with a deadly barrage of mortar and artillery fire, driving the enemy back and neutralizing their machine-gun positions. Some Japanese managed to get through the mortar and artillery barrages and continued up the sides of the trail from the south through fire from Company D's machine guns. The enemy found cover behind a low, 150-yard-long log fence which led from the southeast toward the center of the 1st Battalion's defenses. While the fence afforded some protection, the attacking infantrymen were silhouetted as they tried to clamber over the top. The main body of the attacking force therefore kept down behind the fence, trying to crawl along it to the top of the hill. Advancing cautiously, the attackers encountered sustained machine-gun and rifle fire from the defenders atop the hill, as the fence did not extend beyond the outer defenses of the 1st Battalion. The assault quickly deteriorated into a sequence of small suicide charges carried out by groups of three to six Japanese soldiers. The 1st Battalion now sent patrols out over the battlefield. From prisoners it was determined that the attacking force had consisted of 350 to 400 men--the 10th and 12th Companies, 219th Infantry, reinforced by approximately 150 armed Formosan laborers. During the morning over 200 dead Japanese were counted around the 1st Battalion's perimeter, and the number of enemy dead found or enemy wounded captured on subsequent days along trails leading south from the hill indicated that virtually the entire original attacking force had been annihilated.    By 06:30, the skirmish had concluded, with over 200 Japanese casualties tallied. Following this engagement, operations on Noemfoor transitioned into a series of patrol activities as Allied forces extended their dominance over the island and rapidly expanded the airfield facilities. On the morning of July 6, Sandlin's 2nd Battalion executed an amphibious landing on the deserted Namber Drome following a brief naval bombardment. By July 10, intensive patrolling had only encountered small Japanese groups, leading Patrick to conclude that no significant organized enemy presence remained on Noemfoor. To eradicate the remaining opposition, the 503rd Parachute Regiment was dispatched to the island's southern sector while the 158th addressed the northern half. By the end of August, Sandlin's efforts had resulted in the death of 611 Japanese soldiers, the capture of 179, the loss of 6 American lives with 41 wounded, and the liberation of 209 slave laborers.  The Japanese had never brought the Melanesians of Noemfoor entirely under their control, for the natives had either offered a passive resistance or had faded into the interior to live off the land. A few were impressed into service by the Japanese, while others who were captured but still refused to cooperate were executed. The natives greeted the Allied landings with great enthusiasm and came out of hideaways in the hills carrying Dutch flags which they had concealed from the Japanese. Under the direction of the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration, the natives were gradually resettled in their old villages. Late in July the village chiefs gathered in formal council and officially declared war on the Japanese. Thereafter, native cooperation increased. Up to August 31 the natives had captured and brought to Allied outposts more than 50 Japanese and had killed another 50. One tale of horror concerns the Javanese on Noemfoor. According to information gathered by the NICA Detachment, over 3000 Indonesians were shipped to Noemfoor in late 1943, mostly from Soerabaja and other large cities on Java. The shipment included many women and children. The Japanese, without regard to age or sex, put the Javanese to work constructing roads and airfields almost entirely by hand. Little or no clothing, shoes, bedding, or shelter was provided, and the Javanese had to supplement their very inadequate allowance of rations by shifting for themselves. Driven by hunger, many attempted to steal Japanese rations but for their pains were beheaded or hung by their hands or feet until dead. Starvation and disease took a steadily increasing toll. The dead were periodically collected for mass burial, and survivors alleged that many of the sick were buried alive. It was considered probable that not more than 10 or 15 Javanese were killed accidentally by Allied forces. Yet only 403 of the 3000-odd brought from Java were found alive on Noemfoor by August 31.  Meanwhile, Colonel Jones pursued the remnants of Colonel Shimizu's Noemfoor Detachment to Hill 670 in the south. From July 13 to 16, both sides engaged in fierce combat for control of the hill, with the Japanese ultimately managing to evade capture. Contact was reestablished on July 23 near Inasi, but Shimizu eluded capture once more. The primary Japanese force was finally located on August 10 near Hill 380, prompting Jones' 1st and 3rd Battalions to converge in an attempt to trap the enemy. However, on August 15, Shimizu once again evaded capture, slipping away towards Pakriki. Although the Japanese forces were either captured or eliminated by August 17, Shimizu evaded capture or death and remained at large by the operation's conclusion. Jones' forces endured 57 fatalities and 302 injuries, but managed to neutralize over 1100 Japanese soldiers and apprehend approximately 560 individuals, while liberating an additional 194 enslaved laborers. This brings the total casualties for the Battle of Noemfoor to 1730 Japanese casualties, with 740 taken prisoner, and 63 American fatalities, 343 wounded, and 3 missing, alongside the liberation of 403 slave laborers. Transitioning to the developments on the Aitape front post-Operation Persecution, significant changes occurred under General Gill's command starting May 4. The defensive setup in the Aitape region was revamped, and Colonel Howe's 127th Regiment bolstered its eastern positions, with the Nyaparake Force extending patrols to the Danmap River. However, General Nakai's advance forces arrived in early May. Shortly after 2:00am on 14 May, after a short preparation by grenades, light mortars, and light machine guns, 100 to 200 Japanese of the 78th Infantry, 20th Division, attacked from the east against the coastal sector of the perimeter. This assault was broken up by rifle and automatic weapons fire and by lobbing mortar shells to the rear of the advancing enemy group. The Japanese disappeared into the jungle south of the narrow beach. For the next hour Captain Fulmer's mortars placed harassing fire into suspected enemy assembly points east of the small stream. Meanwhile, the eight-man outpost reported that many small parties of Japanese were moving up the beach within 300 yards of the main perimeter and then slipping southward into the jungle. Such maneuvers seemed to presage another attack. The second assault came about 0330, this time against the eastern and southeastern third of the defenses. The Japanese were again beaten back by small arms and mortar fire, but at 5:00am they made a final effort which covered the entire eastern half of the perimeter. This last attack was quickly broken up and the Japanese quieted down. About 7:30am on the 14th, elements of Company A, 127th Infantry, began moving into the forward perimeter to reinforce Captain Fulmer's beleaguered units. The 1st Platoon of Company C and the 81-mm. mortar section also moved forward in preparation for continuing the advance. General Martin took charge of the East Sector on the same day, relocating all troops except the Nyaparake Force to the west bank of the Driniumor River. The East Sector forces were supplied by a variety of methods. Units along the coast were supported directly by small boat from BLUE Beach or by native ration trains moving along the coastal track. Supplies to the Afua area went south from the coast along the Anamo-Afua trail or, later, over the inland track from the Tadji fields through Chinapelli and Palauru. Wheeled transport was impracticable except along short stretches of the coastal track. In early June, when the Japanese ambushed many ration parties which attempted to reach Afua, experiments were made with air supply from the Tadji strips. Breakage and loss were heavy at first, but air supply rapidly became more successful as pilots gained experience and ground troops located good dropping grounds. A dropping ground cleared on the west bank of the Driniumor about 2200 yards north of Afua soon became the principal source of supply for troops in the Afua area. Communications during operations east of the Driniumor were carried out principally by radio, but between units along the river and from the stream back to higher headquarters telephone became the principal means of communication. Keeping the telephone lines in service was a task to which much time and effort had to be devoted. The Japanese continually cut the lines, or American troops and heavy equipment accidentally broke the wires. The enemy often stationed riflemen to cover breaks in the line, thus making repair work dangerous. Usually, it was found less time consuming and less hazardous to string new wire than to attempt to find and repair breaks. As a result, miles of telephone wire soon lined the ground along the trails or was strung along the trees in the Driniumor River area and back to the Tadji perimeter. Despite this adjustment, Nakai escalated pressure, advancing beyond Yakamul by month's end. In response, Gill replaced the Nyaparake Force with the 1st Battalion, 126th Regiment, which swiftly recaptured Yakamul and Parakovio. Despite initial success, Nakai's forces launched a heavy counterattack in early June, reclaiming Yakamul by June 5.   In the meantime, additional Japanese units had been conducting exploratory missions inland against Afua since the beginning of the month. However, Howe's 1st Battalion ultimately succeeded in repelling them. This allowed Martin's forces to establish an outer defensive line along the Driniumor River. From there, they continued forward patrols toward the Japanese lines. While the 41st and 51st Divisions struggled to move personnel and supplies to the forward assembly area, Nakai efficiently organized a counter-reconnaissance screen along Niumen Creek to prevent East Sector troops from gathering intelligence about deployments farther east. On June 20, due to the increasingly dire situation in Western New Guinea, the 18th Army was suddenly transferred from 2nd Area Army control to the direct command of the Southern Army. Although General Terauchi's directive was to execute a "delaying action at strategic positions," General Adachi opted to adhere to his original plans for a westward offensive. He was determined to maximize the effectiveness of his forces while they still possessed fighting capability, aiming to divert as much enemy strength as possible away from the Western New Guinea battlefront. Sensing an imminent heavy enemy assault, Generals Krueger and MacArthur decided to reinforce Aitape with General Cunningham's 112th Cavalry Regiment, arriving on June 27, and Colonel Edward “Ted” Starr's 124th Regiment, expected to arrive in early July. They also expedited the shipment of the 43rd Division from its New Zealand staging area to Aitape, necessitating the establishment of Major-General Charles Hall's 11th Corps. Upon assuming command of the task force on June 29, Hall reorganized his forces and implemented several troop redeployments in preparation for the looming enemy attack. By June 30th, Adachi had completed concentrating his forces in the assembly area. Consequently, he swiftly initiated preparations for launching an attack against the Driniumor River line on July 10th. His strategy involved Colonel Nara Masahiko's 237th Regiment crossing the river and launching an assault westward towards Koronal Creek, and northwest to clear Anamo and other Paup villages. Meanwhile, the 78th and 80th Regiments were tasked with clearing the Afua area and advancing all the way to Chinapelli. Success in this endeavor would pave the way for Japanese units to advance towards the Tadji airstrips. Furthermore, a Coastal Attack Force was designated to carry out a diversionary maneuver along the coast, aiming to engage the enemy and constrain them with artillery fire. In early July, as the Japanese finalized their preparations, Hall and Martin made the decision to dispatch robust patrols east of the Driniumor to the Harech River. However, these patrols were only able to advance as far as Yakamul, where they encountered only the enemy's forward units. Consequently, on July 10th, Hall and Martin ordered the 1st Battalion, 128th Regiment, and the 2nd Squadron, 112th Cavalry to conduct a reconnaissance mission across the Driniumor. Subsequently, the infantry faced significant resistance as they pushed towards Yakamul, while the cavalry's progress was limited to about a mile due to the dense jungle terrain. Despite these efforts yielding disappointing results, a captured Japanese soldier disclosed that their attack was imminent that night. However, this critical piece of information was mistakenly disregarded by the American command, leaving Adachi and Nakai poised to launch their counteroffensive. Around midnight, the assault commenced with the 1st Battalion, 78th Regiment charging across the Driniumor River, facing Company G of the 128th Regiment along a narrow front.  The Japanese attacked in two or three screaming waves, broadening the front after the first assault by throwing in the rest of the 78th Infantry and possibly elements of the 80th Infantry. Japanese reconnaissance had been good--the attackers knew the locations of company and battalion command posts all along the American defenses but not quite good enough. The enemy did not know that Company G had been reinforced during the afternoon of 10 July nor, apparently, had he discovered that the company's front was protected by low barbed wire. The attacks of the 78th Infantry were thrown back with heavy losses. Machine gun and mortar fire from the 2d Battalion, 128th Infantry, accounted for many Japanese, numbers of whom were caught as they tried to cross the barbed wire in front of Company G. According to Japanese sources, the results of American artillery fire were even more disastrous. As soon as the enemy attack had begun, the 120th and 129th Field Artillery Battalions had started firing previously prepared concentrations along the bed and east bank of the Driniumor. The Japanese units in or near the impact areas suffered heavy casualties. The 1st Battalion. 78th Infantry, was quickly reduced from 400 to 30 men, principally as a result of the American artillery fire, which also destroyed large numbers of artillery weapons, machine guns, and mortars. Despite this, the Americans, skillfully backed by artillery support, ultimately repelled them with significant casualties. Following this initial repulse, Martin concluded that a reconnaissance in force was unnecessary and ordered the units involved to retreat behind the Driniumor River. Confusion among many Japanese units, arriving late, had delayed the commencement of the 80th Regiment's attack, which was directed at Company E and was similarly pushed back. But a second wave of attackers, probably comprising the 237th Infantry and heretofore uncommitted elements of the Right Flank Unit, began pouring across the Driniumor toward Company E at approximately 0200. The new attackers overran the company command post and surrounded most of the unit's widely separated strong points. Fighting continued in the company sector for a little while, but the unit could not long withstand the overwhelming enemy pressure. Company organization and communications broke down. Worse still, the troops began to run out of ammunition. A general withdrawal commenced. By 03:00, the Japanese had breached a gap approximately 1300 yards wide in the American lines, physically occupying that territory. Fortunately, the following hours remained relatively calm as the 78th and 80th Regiments regrouped to the south to resume the offensive. This lull enabled Martin to dispatch the 1st Battalion, 128th Regiment to counterattack along the Anamo-Afua trail, aiming to reinforce the 2nd Battalion's positions. Initially encountering no resistance for the first 1500 yards, the Americans were eventually halted by intense enemy fire at 10:30, compelling them to retreat back to Tiver. This fierce opposition convinced Martin that the enemy could advance directly westward with minimal hindrance towards the Tadji strips unless he abandoned the Driniumor River line. He decided to reorganize his forces along the secondary delaying position at the X-ray River-Koronal Creek line, preparing for further counterattacks against the Japanese. Accordingly, while Company F maintained their position along the coast, the 128th Regiment began to fall back towards the creek. Further south, Cunningham opted to withdraw his cavalrymen in two stages, successfully reaching X-ray by midnight. However, communication issues delayed Howe's 3rd Battalion, with most of the unit arriving at the river the following day. A small contingent had to engage in combat with Japanese forces and couldn't reach X-ray until July 13. Despite this, Krueger and Hall disagreed with the decision to abandon the Driniumor, promptly deploying the 124th Regiment for a potential counterattack. Martin, who was instructed to hold his position, was replaced by Gill, assuming direct command of the divided covering force, now split into North and South Forces. However, before the American counterattack could commence, Nara's infantry launched an assault towards Tiver and Koronal Creek on July 12. The 128th Regiment successfully repelled them after a fierce confrontation. Meanwhile, Adachi dispatched the main body of the 41st Division and the reserve 66th Regiment towards the Driniumor, augmenting pressure on the Paup coast. To the south, Nakai's units gathered across the river near Afua and Kwamrgnirk, preparing for a final northward push. Finally, at 07:30 on July 13, the American counteroffensive commenced as the 1st Battalion, 128th Regiment swiftly moved from Tiver to Chakila, only to be ambushed by Japanese artillery. Nevertheless, precise artillery counterfire silenced most of the enemy artillery, enabling the Americans to advance eastward toward the mouth of the Driniumor. Meanwhile, the 124th Regiment under Starr's command advanced southward along the Anamo-Afua trail, facing strong opposition from the 237th Regiment. Despite encountering resistance, they managed to reach the river, although still positioned considerably north of their designated centerline. Cunningham's South Force began its eastward movement from the X-ray River at 10:00, successfully overcoming enemy positions along several stream crossings to reach the Driniumor near Afua. Consequently, all original crossing points on the Driniumor fell to the Allied forces, isolating the 20th Division and the 237th Regiment several miles west of the river's bank. By nightfall, Nara had regrouped his 237th Regiment for another assault on the 2nd Battalion, 128th Regiment. Company E demonstrated its combat effectiveness by holding firm and repelling the Japanese forces, with the rest of the battalion successfully defending against subsequent small-scale attacks, marking the conclusion of Nara's offensive actions. The following morning, Gill's forces consolidated their defensive positions along the reformed river line, albeit with a 1500-yard gap remaining in the center. Yet this all for today with Noemfoor as we now need to head over to the India-Burma theater. The final phase was coming for the Battle of Imphal. By the start of July, the reopening of the Imphal–Kohima Road facilitated the resupply of the 4th Corps, enabling them to launch an offensive against the fatigued and under-resourced troops under General Mutaguchi's command. Additionally, three brigades from General Stopford's 33rd Corps advanced from the north, swiftly joining General Gracey's 20th Division in an endeavor to reopen the Ukhrul Road. Under intense pressure, General Yamauchi's battered 15th Division units hastily abandoned Tongou and Sokpao, leading to the 80th Brigade occupying Lamu by July 2. The next day, the ailing general, who had long fallen out of favor with Mutaguchi, was carried from the battlefield on a stretcher and later died in a hospital at Maymyo. Lieutenant-General Shibata Uichi replaced him and promptly prepared the 51st and 67th Regiments to retreat. To cover their withdrawal, the newly arrived and utterly exhausted 60th Regiment was tasked with attacking towards Lamu, while General Miyazaki's troops assembled behind Ukhrul. However, the 60th Regiment was so weakened that its attacks were easily repelled, and the 67th Regiment retreated in disorder, leaving the 51st encircled. On July 8, Colonel Omoto's troops fiercely broke through the encirclement in three columns, allowing Stopford's brigades to finally overcome Japanese resistance at Ukhrul and capture the town. This forced Shibata to regroup his forces along a new line from Lungshong through Sangshak to Sakok, ultimately enabling the British-Indian forces to reopen the Ukhrul Road by July 10. With both supply roads reopened, the arrival of Stopford's brigades from the north, and the Japanese forces nearly routed, General Slim decided it was time to go on the offensive. Slim's plan involved the 33rd Corps taking over the Shenam Saddle and the Tamu–Palel Road while the 4th Corps cleared the Japanese from the Silchar Track and the Tiddim Road. On the other hand, Mutaguchi was still planning a combined attack on the Palel area involving the 15th Division, remnants of the 31st Division, and some units from the 33rd Division. Although he issued an attack order, the divisions were too battered to comply. The overall situation of the 15th Army went from bad to worse and the only hope remaining was to rally the 31st at Humine, give the troops a few days rest and then, after a reorganization, to dispatch them to the northern flank of the Yamamoto Detachment to capture Palel. In early July the 31st Division was concentrated in the area east of Myothit but discipline had disintegrated to the point that the Division could scarcely be termed a combat force. The Torikai Unit was organized with the 138th Infantry Regiment (less one battalion); the 2d Battalion, 124th Infantry Regiment and one artillery battalion to reinforce the Yamamoto Detachment. At the same time,the 15th Army ordered the 33rd Division to attack Palel from the south with the 214th Infantry Regiment. The newly formed Torikai' Unit, however, failed to join the Yamamoto Detachment and the order for the 33rd to attack Palel was never carried out. Consequently, on July 9, General Kawabe had no choice but to order preparations for a withdrawal to a line connecting the Zibyu Mountains, Mawlaik, Kalewa, and Gangaw. Mutaguchi intended to begin the retreat on July 16, directing the 15th Division towards Sittaung, the 31st Division to Thaungdut, and the 33rd Division to Tiddim, while the Yamamoto Detachment would hold the Shenam Saddle until July 24 and then retreat to the Kuntaung-Moreh line to cover the main Army's withdrawal from the Kabaw Valley.   On the southwest front, General Tanaka's forces had already started retreating from the Bishenpur area, leaving a small covering force at Ningthoukhong to prevent a pursuit by the 17th Division. As a result, General Cowan's brigades made limited progress against the stubborn rearguard, ultimately securing Ningthoukhong on July 16 after heavy bombardment, coinciding with Mutaguchi's general withdrawal. By the middle of July, Japanese resistance centered on Ningthoukhong Kha Khunou. A small hamlet about 300 meters wide and 500 meters long, it lay to the immediate south of Ningthoukhong. Despite probing attacks by the 48th Indian Brigade's infantry and artillery firing on their defenses, the Japanese held on. Finally, in the early hours of 16 July, this small space was subjected to what some describe as one of the heaviest artillery concentrations yet in the Burma Campaign; in the space of an hour, approximately 9,000 shells were fired on Ningthoukhong Kha Khunou. Fortunately for the Japanese, they had withdrawn from the village just before the shelling began. By the time it ended, the village had been completely flattened and was pockmarked with waterlogged craters. And so the last Japanese stronghold in the Imphal Valley was taken. The 63rd Indian Brigade also reached and occupied the Laimanai area around the same time. The 5th Indian Division, the other division in the reconstituted IV Corps, now took over and commenced the chase of the Japanese 33rd Division down the road towards Tiddim.  The 5th Division, now led by Major-General Geoffrey Evans, continued the pursuit while Stopford's brigades harassed the disordered retreat of the 15th and 31st Divisions. Despite their efforts, the 15th and 31st Divisions reached Thaungdut by early August, and the 33rd Division managed to assemble around Chikha by mid-August, under significant pressure and the serious threat of having their withdrawal route cut off. The 33rd Division distinguished itself by displaying almost superhuman fighting power and repeatedly launched counterattacks against the pursuing British-Indian 5th Division. The Yamamoto Detachment, however, had failed to cover the Yazagyo area and, in mid-August the 33rd Division found itself the vicinity of Chikha facing the serious threat of having its route of withdrawal cut by the enemy which was infiltrating into the Yazagyo area from Moreh and Shuganu through the Kabaw Valley. On the south-eastern approach to Imphal, the two armies continued to face each other on the Shenam Saddle. Yamamoto Force remained in place on these heights and the front line was still on Scraggy. It was in the second half of July that a final, concerted effort was made to evict Yamamoto Force and push it down the Tamu–Palel Road towards the India–Burma frontier. Led by the 23rd Indian Division , the operation involved five brigades in a three-pronged attack. The central thrust was by the 37th Indian Brigade on the Shenam Saddle, with the support of all available artillery and tanks; the 5th British Brigade was deployed behind it and readied to provide assistance. D-day was to be 24 July. The 1st Indian Brigade was sent through the hills on the right, to arrive behind the saddle. The two were to push the Japanese back on the road. It was hoped their withdrawal route would be cut by the 49th Indian Brigade, which would arrive on the road after looping in from the far left; the 268th Indian Brigade would be to its left, protecting its flank.    Before the Japanese could retreat, the 49th Brigade had cut off General Yamamoto's withdrawal route by looping in from the far left. However, Mutaguchi had sent Colonel Sato Genpachi's reserve 61st Regiment to Tamu, which quickly counterattacked and reopened the route. Consequently, Yamamoto withdrew to Moreh, allowing Roberts to swiftly capture Nippon Hill and Scraggy. Within two days, the 23rd Division advanced down the road, forcing the Yamamoto Detachment to retreat toward Mawlaik on July 30. This marked the end of the Battle of Imphal and Operation U-Go, the Japanese Army's largest land defeat. Estimates vary, but about 30,000 Japanese soldiers died and 23,000 were injured during the operation, including 6,000 killed at Kohima and 16,000 at Imphal. Additionally, the INA lost about 2,000 dead and 2,000 wounded. On the other hand, the British-Indians suffered 16,000 casualties, with over 12,000 at Imphal. Though Mutaguchi's plan was initially effective and nearly succeeded in capturing Imphal, he underestimated the enemy's ability to resist his troops and quickly bring reinforcements. Slim's overall strategy for Imphal succeeded, as the Japanese overextended themselves from the Chindwin River to the Imphal Valley, just as he had predicted. A crucial factor in the British-Indian success was the air support, which kept the 14th Army supplied despite the road to Kohima being cut off. Ultimately, in an attempt to thwart a potential British-Indian advance into Burma, Mutaguchi's 15th Army was utterly decimated by the failed attempt to capture Imphal. This failure allowed Slim to seize the moment and launch a rapid offensive into Burma, countering the Japanese U-Go plan. The Allies thus gained the upper hand, marking the beginning of the end for Japanese control over Burma. As a final note for this week by late July, Admiral Somerville executed Operation Crimson, a coordinated naval and air assault on Japanese airfields in Sabang, Lhoknga, and Kutaraja. Departing Trincomalee on July 22, Somerville's Task Force 62, comprising two carriers and four battleships, arrived off Sabang on the morning of July 25, ready to commence the bombardment. On 5th July 1944 the carriers Victorious and Indomitable arrived in Colombo. The former sailed with Illustrious on 22 July for Operation ‘Crimson', a bombardment of Sabang by the battleships over which the carrier-borne aircraft were to provide cover and take photographs of the damage. Illustrious embarked the same aircraft as before with Victorious for a total of thirty-nine Corsairs; together they comprised 47 Naval Fighter Wing commanded by Lieutenant Commander Turnbull. The force assembled for the operation was designated TF 62 and the carriers were supported by Queen Elizabeth, Valiant, Renown, Richelieu, Nigeria, Kenya, Gambia, Ceylon, Cumberland, Phoebe, Tromp, Relentless, Rotherham, Racehorse, Raider, Roebuck, Rocket, Rapid, Quilliam, Quality and Quickmatch. The submarines Templar and Tantalus were deployed to ASR positions. The carriers operated only thirty-five miles north of Sabang, not far from the battleships, which approached their bombardment positions at 06:40. The initial launch was planned for thirty-three minutes before sunrise but this proved to be too early as the morning was exceptionally dark and the launch was delayed for five minutes. Even then it was too early and the form-up was clumsy and slow, delaying departure. The fighters were briefed to attack Sabang, Lho Nga and Kotaraja airfields but 1838 NAS made a bad landfall since maps lacked detail and no photographs were available. When the target airfields were found it was still too dark for accurate strafing but the enemy was alert and opened fire as soon as aircraft came within range. To aircrew accustomed to the excellent intelligence material by then available in the Home Fleet, this caused concern and it had to be accepted that it was difficult to obtain good targets without losing the element of surprise. At very low level on a dark morning, flying at 400 knots with flashes from antiaircraft gunfire all around, camouflaged aircraft in revetments were inconspicuous and the strafing runs were not a success. One Corsair was shot down but the pilot was rescued. Concurrently, the battleships targeted harbor facilities and military barracks at Sabang, while cruisers and destroyers shelled radar and wireless stations and engaged enemy shore batteries. After the main bombardment, the destroyers Tromp, Quality, Quickmatch, and Quilliam entered Sabang harbor, attacking Japanese positions and launching torpedoes, sustaining light damage from return fire. On the return journey, two enemy reconnaissance aircraft were intercepted and shot down by fighters. Additionally, ten Zeros attacked Somerville's convoy but were intercepted by 13 Corsairs, leading to two Zeros being shot down and another two damageFollowing this engagement, British pilots noted that the Japanese airmen were not as proficient as they had been in 1942.  Although Operation Crimson's outcomes were not spectacular, Somerville's final offensive was still deemed successful enough. Due to health concerns, he was subsequently transferred to diplomatic duties at Admiral Mountbatten's request. Currently, Admiral Mountbatten was moving toward a complete rearrangement of the higher officers in SEAC. From the time of his arrival in the Far East, he had had trouble with his three commanders in chief. When the Imphal crisis arose, Mountbatten was dissatisfied with General Giffard's conduct of operations, and when he later found Giffard taking what Mountbatten considered a highly negative approach toward an aggressive conduct of operations he resolved to ask for Giffard's relief. Mountbatten's relations with Admiral Somerville had been equally difficult. Somerville had refused to treat him as a Supreme Commander and in Mountbatten's opinion tried to make him simply the chairman of a commanders-in-chief committee. As for the RAF commander, Air Chief Marshal Peirse, Mountbatten was not seeking his relief because he did not wish to change all of his principal subordinates simultaneously. After his relief, Somerville was placed in charge of the British naval delegation in Washington DC in October 1944 where he managed—to the surprise of almost everyone—to get on very well with the notoriously abrasive and anti-British Admiral Ernest King, the United States' Chief of Naval Operations. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Battle of Noemfoor was just getting started, seeing General Douglas MacArthur not giving the Japanese a moment to catch their breath. Meanwhile the battle for Imphal was finally coming to a bitter end as Mutaguchi's megalomaniac operation was clearly a disaster.

The Pacific War - week by week
- 120 - Pacific War - The battle of Imphal, March 5-12, 1944

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 12, 2024 39:21


Last time we spoke about the invasion of the Admiralty Islands and some action on New Britain and Bougainville. The last steps of operation Cartwheel would see the Bismarck-Solomon area sealed off with the capture of the admiralty islands. MacArthur was yet again trying to seize the initiative and force a drive upon the Philippines. A diversionary landing was made against Momote and Los Negros would cost 116 lives, 434 wounded by March 8th. On New Britain, General Rupertus began new amphibious assaults and other actions to cut off the retreat for the Japanese defenders. Then on Bougainville, under immense pressure from his superiors, General Hyakutake prepared to launch his main counterattack, codenamed Operation TA. He assembled 15,000 men who would hit the American defensive perimeter to dislodge the enemy from the island. Was this idea even feasible, or would it all end in a terrific disaster? This episode is the battle of Imphal Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  The war was not going well for the Japanese in 1944. They were on the cusp of being dislodged from the south pacific. Rabaul and Truk were effectively neutralized and the Americans were making enormous strides in the central pacific, seen in the Gilberts and Marshall campaigns. Even in Burma, a war front the Japanese had basically been winning every battle flawlessly, was now suffering defeats. The first defeats were found in the Hukawng Valley and Arakan region. In the face of these terrible defeats, the Japanese General Mutaguchi argued he had the answer.  Mutaguchi, a victor over the Singapore campaign, had wargamed the possibility of invading India and won support of some of his superiors in Tokyo. His reasoning had been to brush past the British in Assam, to storm the gateway into the subcontinent, where hopefully the Indians would rise up to greet the Japanese as liberators. With Subhas Chandra Bose and his Indian National Army, the Japanese could rally the Indians to turn against the British. The collapse of India would be a killing blow against Britain's influence in Asia. Initially it was also believed, such a move would allow the Japanese to link up with the Axis forces in Persia. Such fantastical ideas were farfetched even for 1942 standards, but in 1944 these were laughable. Stalingrad and Kursk had effectively turned the Eastern Front completely around, the Germans were fighting for their survival. Yet this all did not dissuade Mutaguchi.  Lt General Hanaya Tadashi was placed in charge of the Arakan region. Hanaya was tasked with deceiving the British into believing the counter attack in Arakan was an attempt to invade India, thus dragging units out of Imphal. The Operation was codenamed HA-GO, an intended feint, to mask another operation, U-GO to invade Imphal. To pull it off the assault in Arakan was made to be massive. Slim was forced to meet the enemy fiercely in Arakan, he had no choice but to pull his reserves out of Imphal. The Japanese were delivered a nasty surprise with the Admin Box tactic. For over 18 days the battle raged around the Admin Box, but the Japanese could not make a dent. The Japanese forces had expected once the British saw their lines of communications cut and were outflanked they would panic and flee. It was after all what had been occurring for years in Burma. The Japanese hoped to annihilate the 15th corp, but instead the British dug their heels in. Once again victory disease sprang its head force, the arrogant and overly confident Japanese, bit off more than they could chew. It was as if they were facing a brand new opponent. The Admin Box was hit by infantry and aerial attacks, the casualties were terrific, but the Admin Box never wavered. The Japanese had planned for a lighting battle, traveling light and seizing supplies on the go, but the British did not roll over. The Japanese began to run out of supplies, starvation loomed over the invaders. Casualties on both sides increased sharply, and Slim predicted the Japanese would not allow for defeat and instead would redouble their efforts. By February 13th, Slim was confident victory was in their hands as the 26th Indian division began to arrive to deliver a hammer blow with the Admin Box as the anvil. The Japanese fought desperately, but by the 24th they were withdrawing leaving 5000 dead. After defeating the Japanese Slim unleashed his own operation into the Arakan and while doing so his men captured some Japanese documents showcasing operation HA-GO in full. Slim now knew the Japanese were feinting him to draw resources away from Imphal Now Mutaguchi had sold Operation U-GO to his superiors in Tokyo as a pre-emptive strike to disable 14th Army, but in reality it was always to invade India. He also wanted to press the attack farther and take Dimapur, a major supply base through which ran the railway line to Ledo. Taking Dimapur would deal a major blow to the Allies and could potentially open the door to further operations deeper into India. Once they had broken through, the INA would rally local support, enabling them to extend the fight to the British in Assam, Bengal and beyond. For his Operation U-Go, Mutaguchi thought he could outsmart the British in terms of how he would approach Imphal. His plan called for the 33rd Division of Lt General Yanagida Motoso to begin an advance on March 8th attacking from the south. It was presumed the British would expect this and rush reinforcement when attacked. Meanwhile he planned to send the 15th division under Lt General Yamauchi Masafumi a week later to ford the Chindwin River and advance on Imphal from the north. Even further north the entire 31st division of Lt General Sato Kotoku would also ford the Chindwin between Homalin and Tamanthi, advancing northwest to block the main British supply route in the hills at Kohima.  To pull all of this off, Mutaguchi needed to ensure his forces captured Imphal before the monsoon rains made the jungle tracks impassable. He did not have much in terms of supplies to give to his 3 divisions. By 1943, the supply route into Rangoon by sea through the Bay of Bengal had become too dangerous because of attacks by Allied submarines, so the supplies had to rely on the railway being constructed by forced labor and POWs from Thailand. Mutaguchi was well aware of these issues. He knew, however, from personal experience in Malaya and Singapore, that taking logistical risks against the British could bring great rewards. This was because the British, who were usually immeasurably better supplied than the Japanese, frequently left behind large quantities of what the latter referred to as Chachiru kyuyo 'Churchill Rations' in their haste to flee the advancing Japanese. Accordingly, the capture of British supply dumps around Imphal formed a key assumption in his planning. The essence of Mutaguchi's plan was speed - totsusbin ‘swift onslaught' - for if these vast depots were not seized as a matter of priority, the whole offensive would literally run out of fuel. He thought it would take no more than three weeks for his forces to fall on the British supply dumps. Without the capture of these supplies success could not be guaranteed, but it seemed increasingly inconceivable to Mutaguchi that a decisive, overwhelming attack against Imphal would not bring with it rapid and substantial rewards. At no time was he concerned that he might not capture the vast British depots needed to fuel his advance. Imphal needed to be taken by April 10th or it would all be a disaster General Slim planned for his 14th Army to make a stand at Imphal, taking the hit on the chin as they say, before pushing the enemy back. He needed to draw the Japanese in the Imphal Valley, in a tight circle so he could launch an effective counteroffensive. Lt General Geoffrey Scoones 4th corps would deploy the 20th Indian division led by Major General Douglas Gracey around Tamu and the 17th Indian Light Division of Major General David Punch Cowan around Tiddim. Both divisions had been aggressively carrying out patrols in the valley and along the banks of the Chindwin River. The 23rd Indian Division of Major General Ouvry Roberts was held in reserve at Imphal, with his 49th brigade in the Ukhrul area to the northeast.  Once Mutaguchi's offensive kicked off, Slim planned for his two southern divisions to withdraw up the Tamu-Palel and Tiddim roads to go on the defensive around the Imphal Valley. The two divisions would have a short and more secure line of communications and supply behind them as they forced the Japanese to extend them self over the mountains. To counter losing the overland supply line from Kohima, Slim planned to use air supply to maintain his men during the long siege. Slim also expected Mutaguchi to send a single regiment to seize the defenseless Kohima, not an entire division that was further tasked with pouring down into the Brahmaputra valley. That last part would put his entire plan in jeopardy. On March 8th, Operation U-Go was kicked off with Lt General Yanagida Motoso's 33rd division beginning their advance in 4 columns. The left column was the 215th regiment led by Colonel Sasahara Masahiko who advanced south of Tiddim before swinging north towards the village of Singgel. They would come across the large supply deport between the milestones 109 and 110 around the Tiddim road. The central column consisted of the 214th regiment led by Colonel Sakuma Takayoshi, advancing up the Kabaw Valley to assault Tonzang. Following this column up was the Fort White Garrison unit led by Colonel Yagi Shigeru. Both columns would cut off the route of withdrawal of Major General David Cowan's 17th division and annihilate it. Lastly the right column consisting of the Yamamoto Force led by Major General Yamamoto Tsunoru. They would be advancing north up the Kabaw valley to assault Major General Douglas Gracey's 20th Division on the Tamu-Palel Road. There had been early reports from scouts that groups of Japanese soldiers were advancing west of the Tiddim road. This only sounded off the alarm bells for the 14th corps on March 12th, after a verified sighting report was made stating a large group of Japanese were just a few kilometers off the road at Milestone 109.  Consequently, Scoones ordered Cowan to withdraw, so the 17th would begin to move from Tiddim on March 14, after laying mines and booby traps. But it was too late, as the Japanese had already cut the Tiddim Road earlier that morning, so Cowan would have to fight its way out to Imphal. That day, Yamamoto Force had also started attacking Gracey's southern front-line positions, with a particular tank-on-tank battle developing between a troop of M3 Lee/Grant tanks of the 3rd Carabiniers and some six light tanks of the 14th Tank Regiment. The latter were trounced in the end, with four tanks destroyed and two captured. Meanwhile on the 15th, Lt General Yamauchi Masafumi's 15th division began fording the Chindwin river at Thaungdut and Sittaung and would descend upon Imphal from the north. Lt General Sato Kotoku's 31st division also forded the river further north at Homalin, Kawya nad Tamanthi and were rapidly advancing towards Kohima and Ukhrul.  Just as Mutaguchi had guessed, Scoones ordered his 37th and 49th brigades to advance to the Tiddim road to help Cowan's men. Cowan had sent his 63rd indian brigade to attack the 214th regiment at Tonang and Tiutum. Thai left Imphal and Ukhrul with little protection, so Scoones decided to dispatch the newly arrived 50th indian parachute brigade of Brigadier Maxwell Hope-Thomson to defend Ukhrul, but he did not expect them to find a real fight. Ukhrul would only have the lightest of garrisons and no real defenses. Forces in the area comprised two battalions of the newly raised and part-trained 50th Indian Parachute Brigade whose young and professional commander, 31-year-old Brigadier Maxwell 'Tim' Hope-Thomson had persuaded the powers that be in New Delhi to allow him to complete the training of his brigade in territory close to the enemy. At the start of March the brigade HQ and one battalion had arrived in Imphal, and began the leisurely process of shaking itself out in the safety of the hills north-east of the town. To the brigade was added the 4/5th Mahrattas under Lieutenant-Colonel Trim. Sent into the jungle almost to fend for themselves, it was not expected that they would have to fight, let alone be on the receiving end of an entire Japanese divisional attack. They had little equipment, no barbed wire and little or no experience or knowledge of the territory. On March 16th, Scoones ordered Gracey to withdraw, so the 20th Division could begin a controlled withdrawal up the Tamu-Palel Road, gradually moving into three defensive boxes.  The first was to be at Moreh, held by the 32nd Indian Brigade; the second in the Khongkhang–Sibong area, held by the 80th Indian Brigade; and the third was to be on the Shenam Saddle, held by the 100th Indian Brigade. Luckily for the allies, Yamamoto had dispatch two of his battalions in a useless wide flanking maneuver towards Mombi and the Tamu-Palel road. Thus Yamamoto would lack sufficient troops to launch a full attack against the retreating allied forces. Meanwhile Hawker Hurricanes and heavy artillery bombarded as the 63rd launched a direct assault against Tuitum saddle, managing to break through to the Manipur River, leaving a rearguard at the bridge. During the following days, the rearguard would repel a series of intense assaults upon the saddle by the 214th regiment and Yanagida's Fort White column. At the same time the 37th brigade was fighting against the bulk of the 215th regiment around milestone 100. The fighting became very confused as the Japanese units became sandwiched between the allied units who in turn were surrounded by other Japanese units. On March 18th, the 3rd battalion ,215th regiment managed to capture the supply depot between Milestones 109 and 110 facing minor resistance. Then they were forced to repel a number of counter attacks by the 48th Indian brigade. On the 19th, Hope-Thomson received some panicked reports that his battalions were seeing heavy columns of Japanese advancing on their undefended camp at Sheldon's Corner. It was the 31st infantry of Major General Miyazaki Shigesaburo from the 58th regiment. Hope-Thomson made a last minute call to assemble his dispersed forces at the deserted Naga Village of Sangshak. His brigade, when concentrated, consisted of 1850 men. However, as the troops dug in they discovered to their discomfort that they were atop an ancient volcano, and the rock was impervious to their picks. All they could dig were shallow trenches, which provided ineffective protection from Japanese artillery. Like all Naga villages that at Sangshak was perched on a hill, and had no water; anything the men required had to be brought up from the valley floor, through the rapidly tightening Japanese encirclement. Its unknown why Miyazaki diverted his men to hit Sangshak rather than continue towards Kohima. By nightfall of the 22nd, the Japanese infantry overwhelmed Indian defenses without performed a detailed reconnaissance and lacking artillery support. This would prove to be a fatal mistake. 400 Gurkhas of the 153rd parachute battalion began mowing down wave after wave of Japanese troops using machine gun fire. The Japanese 8th Company of 58th lost 90 out of 120 men in the space of just 15 minutes. Suffering tremendous casualties, seeing entire companies decimated, Miyazaki decided to regroup and began tossing numerous frantic efforts to break up the defenders positions.Under heavy mountain artillery fire and unable to be supplied by air, Hope-Thomson's troops grimly held a position that was not even ringed by barbed wire until March 26, when they finally received Scoones' order to pull out.  The Parachute brigade was being virtually destroyed in four battles at Sangshak, suffering 652 casualties. Yet in turn Miyazaki was served nearly 1000 casualties and his advance upon Kohima was held up for a week, severely delaying Sato's plans. Further to the south, Yamauchi's 60th regiment was also facing stubborn defenses at Sangshak. They actually had been waiting for the battle of Sangshak to conclude and only jumped in on the last day's assault. This prevented one of Yamauchi's columns from arriving in time north of Imphal, giving Scoones and Slim an extra few days to prepare Imphal's defenses. Meanwhile on March 23rd, the 48th brigade used their heavy guns and mortars to hit the Japanese positions and managed to force the 215th regiment to pull away from the valuable supply depot. To secure the depot however, they still needed to clear the road from the north. Gurkha's were sent in waves against the strongly defended Japanese bunkers, while the 37th brigade and Hawker Hurricanes hit the main defensive positions of the 215th regiment. At this point, General Yanagida, who had always felt that Allied capabilities were being underestimated, determined that his forces would not be able to hold on much longer and thus ordered them to pull back. Yanagida had received a signal from Colonel Sasahara about the critical situation his regiment was in. Sasahara, in turn, had been reacting to a signal from one of his battalion commanders, Major Sueki. Faced with rapidly depleting ammunition, mounting casualties and attacks on his position near Milestone 109, Sueki had signaled that he would not be able to hold on much longer. He indicated that he would destroy his codes and radio and fight to the end. Sasahara is said to have communicated this and the regiment's resolve to fight to the end to Yanagida. There is some mystery around this signal, some accounts suggesting the division commander received only the latter half of the message. Either way, Yanagida had had enough. All his reservations about the Imphal offensive came to the fore. He ordered the 215th Regiment to pull out and sent a signal to Mutaguchi about his decision. In this he noted the strength of their opponent, questioned the rationale of the operation and remarked on the impossibility of meeting the deadline. He is supposed to have gone so far as to suggest the suspension of the Imphal offensive. This all greatly pissed off Mutaguchi whose divisional commanders for the majority disagreed with his U-GO plan, and Motoso Yanagida openly derided him as an "imbecile". Irregardless, Mutaguchi sought to remove Yanagida from his command. Their relationship would not improve as more setbacks were on the way. With the Japanese dislodged, the 37th Brigade managed to reopen the Tiddim Road and the 48th Brigade finally secured the entire depot area around Milestone 109. Whatever supplies that could be recovered and transported back to Imphal were grabbed, while as many as possible that could be of potential value to the Japanese were destroyed. On the 26th, the 63rd Brigade's rearguard also withdrew, blowing up the Manipur River bridge behind them. Two days later, the 37th made first contact with Cowan's units near Milestone 102 and the 17th Division finally began their retreat towards Imphal. Their only obstacle would be a roadblock established by the 2nd Battalion, 213th Regiment around Khuadam. But that would be cleared out quite easily by Cowan's men who were able to reach Imphal by April 4th. In the meantime, Scoones had asked Gracey to send back one of his 100th indian brigade into the reserve on the 25th, leaving him with only two brigades to fend off the Japanese attacks. The next day, the 11th company, 213th regiment of the Yamamoto Force managed to advance past the main defenses at Moreh, defended by the 32nd indian brigade and captured Nippon Hill. Though they were not under heavy enemy pressure, the 32nd Indian Brigade finally withdrew from Moreh on April 1. It had set the dump on fire; by some estimates at least a million pounds' worth of supplies that had not yet been evacuated were destroyed. They arrived at the Shenam Saddle a few days later to join the 80th Indian Brigade in a fierce battle for Nippon Hill. Meanwhile, Slim had foreseen that reinforcements would be needed at Imphal and Kohima and had already requested them with great urgency.  Slim was granted  30 Dakotas to fly the 5th Division from Arakan back on the 18th. By the 27th, the 9th and 123rd Indian Brigades had arrived at Imphal and the 161st Indian Brigade was being flown to Dimapur to reinforce Kohima. In addition, Slim was promised the 2nd British Division and the 23rd Long Range Penetration Brigade, should it be necessary. General Giffard also decided that once the airlift of the 5th Division was complete, the 7th Division would then be airlifted to Manipur. Yet that is all for the India-Burma front as we need to move over to New Britain. On March 5th, Colonel Smith's 5th marines began loading for an overnight run to the Willaumez Peninsula, departing Iboki by nightfall. The following morning the small convoy assembled off Volupai, waiting for air support to soften up their landing area, but they never showed up. Apparently having reason to believe that the Marines would attempt to land at Beach Red, the defenders constructed an intricate communications net between Talasea and Volupai, placed some mines on the beach, constructed defenses of a sort, sighted in 90mm mortars–and then inexplicably did not attempt to defend the beach as they could have done very well under the circumstances. Realizing the longer they waited the better the enemy could prepare, Smith ordered the first assault wave to hit the beaches at 8:25. LCM-tank gunboats raked the beach with machine-gun fire, as Smith's 1st Battalion successfully landed meeting enemy sniper and mortar fire. Some sniper fire was observed and 90mm mortar shells began splashing in the water, but Companies A and B drove on shoreward and within 10 minutes after crossing the line of departure about 500 Marines had landed. The two assault companies then pushed forward to establish a beachhead line through which the 2nd Battalion could pass and continue the attack in the direction of Bitokara Mission. Company A accomplished this with relatively little difficulty on the right, but on the left there existed a virtually impassable swamp, running north and south and extending to the edge of the Volupai track. As a result, Company B had to pass through a slot between Little Mt. Worri and the swamp in order to accomplish its mission, encountering and eliminating an enemy pocket of resistance before establishing its lines 200 yards inland. Meanwhile the reinforced platoon patrol that had gone after the bunker on Little Mt. Worri had run into difficulty. The retreating enemy joined other of their fellows and hastily manned defensive positions which had been prepared in the Volupai coconut grove. The platoon accounted for about a dozen of the Emperor's troops, losing one Marine killed and another wounded in the process. Finding he could not advance against the Japanese all-around defensive positions, the patrol leader requested assistance but was instructed to hold what he had until the 2nd Battalion arrived on the scene. As the advancing elements pushed their way through the coconut trees, rear echelon personnel on Beach Red suffered heavier casualties than the assault units. All during the day the Japanese lobbed 90mm mortar shells onto the beach, shells landing capriciously and inevitably taking their toll in the crowded, constricted area. Among the early victims was Lieutenant Commander Richard M. Forsythe, regimental surgeon, who continued working with the wounded until he was evacuated. The heaviest casualties that day were recorded in the 11th Marines and among medical company personnel. Both groups had to remain on the beach, there being no other place to go. On top of that, coral reefs were delaying the LCM's from fully landing the 3nd battalion until the early afternoon. Once Company E came ashore, the advance guard rapidly moved forward and began moving through the 1st Battalion's lines astride the Volupai Plantation track at 11:00.  The Marines were brought to an abrupt halt 200 yards farther on where the Japanese had dug positions commanding the narrow trail. As Company E attempted to attack outside the plantation track, a medium tank commanded by Lieutenant John M. Scarborough moved up the trail to the company's assistance and knocked out a heavy machine-gun position. But suddenly two Japanese, one on each side of the trail and each armed with a magnetic mine, leaped out of the brush. The defending Marine infantry killed one before he could reach the tank, but the other succeeded in affixing the mine to the port side of the turret. The blast that followed killed the Japanese and the Marine who was trying to stop him, as well as jamming the turret so that it could not be operated and stunning the tank crew within. Simultaneously the rear of the turret was pierced by a missile, presumably an anti-tank grenade, which made a hole about three quarters of an inch in diameter. Supported by two more tanks and mortars, Company E finally began moving towards the coconut grove with increasing momentum during the afternoon, at the same time capturing a detailed map of Japanese positions in the Talasea-Bitokara-Waru area. As night approached, elements of the 2nd Battalion set up an all-around defense within the coconut grove while the 1st Battalion manned the beachhead. By the end of the first day, the Marines had penetrated approximately 2000 yards inland from the beach and killed 35 Japanese while suffering 13 killed and 71 wounded, most of them to the deadly mortar fire.  More than half of these were incurred on the beach, and the figures for the day represented more than half the total casualties the combat team would suffer between March 6th and its departure on April 25th. 9 of the fatalities and 29 of the wounded were in the 11th Marines alone.  At 2:00am on March 7th, a handful of Japanese attempted to infiltrate the lines of Company E, but the attack was so easily repelled that Smith considered that this wasn't even a counterattack. Actually, realizing that his forces were heavily outnumbered, General Sakai had ordered the defenders to leave a rearguard of about 100 men and withdraw at once towards Bola. During the morning, the 2nd Battalion advanced through the abandoned enemy positions without facing any opposition until they were stopped on Mt. Schleuther's northwest slope at 11:45. It became evident that the Japanese were attempting to turn the battalion's right flank. Luckily, Company F rushed forward and managed to extend the threatened flank and seize the high ground. At 3:00pm, the reserve 3rd Battalion was also landed at Volupai, thus relieving the 1st Battalion at the beachhead. The next morning, after a mortar barrage, the 2nd battalion soon discovered the Japanese had retreated past Bitokara. The Marines quickly captured Bitokara by 1:40pm. The Marines then dispatched scouts towards Mt. Schleuther and Talasea. The Mt. Schleuther scouting group reported that the Japanese were well dug in on a nearby peak, and at 3:00 a task force consisting of Company E and reinforcing elements began the ascent. A request for artillery fire on Scheuther brought several rounds dangerously close to the 2nd battalion, 5th Marines CP, and the battalion's 81mm mortars promptly took over the support missions. As the task force approached the enemy positions, however, it ran into concentrated fire from machine-guns and small arms, backed up by a 90mm mortar and a 75mm field piece. The Marines fought back for an hour and sustained 18 casualties before they were ordered withdrawn to the mission. The second scouting party had returned from Talasea, meanwhile, to report no indications of the enemy.    As no enemy presence was found on the latter, Company F advanced to the airdrome and in less than an hour reported it secured. Meanwhile the 1st Battalion advanced to Liapo and then began to push over rough terrain towards Waru, finally digging in for the night just a bit short of its objective. After some artillery and mortar dueling during the night, Companies G, B and C launched a coordinated assault at 8:00am on the 9th. Once again, they found abandoned positions, successfully clearing the Waru area by 1:00pm. Also a patrol was landed on Garua Island at 11:47, reporting it deserted as well.  By the afternoon, Smith moved his command post to Bitokara and informed the division that Talasea was secure and that his forces would now concentrate on mopping up and patrolling the Willaumez Peninsula. The 4 day campaign had cost the Marines 17 killed and 114 wounded, while estimating they had killed 150 Japanese. But now we need to jump over to Bougainville. The Japanese had begun earlier in the year to improve some trails, particularly the net leading from the Mosigetta-Mawaraka area. A rough road had been completed through the jungle to the jump-off positions for the infantry. Nevertheless, the movement of over fifteen thousand troops with all their equipment proved to be a major task that would have dampened the spirits of all but the most ardent warriors. Artillery units had a particularly difficult time pulling their heavy guns through the jungle to get them into position to support the attack. Their task was made even more difficult by the daily downpour that flooded the streams, washing away many of the makeshift bridges and making some trails veritable seas of mud. American intelligence by mid-February was aware of the large-scale movement toward the perimeter and Allied planes repeatedly attacked the trails. Despite all these difficulties, the Japanese soldiers displaying their tenacity and ability to overcome the most difficult obstacles, brought up the supplies and eventually had all the guns in place for the attack. All of this was done to support a major counteroffensive scheduled to begin on March 8th. On the 7th, the Iwasa unit has assembled behind Hill 1111; the Magata Unit behind Mount Nampei; the Muda Unit at Peko village on the East-West Trail, and the 17th Army Artillery Group, commanded by Colonel Saito Harumasa in place near Hill 600. Facing them, were the men of the 37th and Americal Divisions, who were on full alert in their foxholes and bunkers, waiting for the great Japanese counterattack. On the 8th General Hyakutake's counterattack began with a heavy albeit uncoordinated artillery bombardment. The Japanese artillery concentrated its fire on Piva Yoke instead of the forward areas of the perimeter, which would be the main initial point of attack. The artillery fire was delivered spasmodically and with poor coordination despite the high vantage points from which the Japanese surveyed the central segment of the American positions. The Japanese artillery did little damage. American corps and division artillery countered immediately, the 37th Division guns firing on the suspected hills to the northeast and the Americal howitzers concentrating on those to the east. The 6th Field Artillery Battalion and the 129th Infantry's cannon company were so situated that they could fire directly at the gun flashes. All other guns were directed by forward observers or spotter planes. Destroyers in Empress Augusta Bay also fired counterbattery missions. By midmorning marine dive and torpedo bombers were flying neutralization missions against Hills 250 and 600. Then in the afternoon 56 SBDs and 36 TBFs, guided by artillery smokeshells, struck the main concentrations on and around hill 1111. This all massively delayed the Japanese main assault. Only the 23rd Regiment would manage to assemble in place for the attack on Hill 700 by nightfall. Under drenching rainfall, the Japanese thus attacked the hill with some companies, yet their first assault was easily repelled by the experienced defenders.  At 2:30General Iwasa launched his main assault, sending his 2nd and 3rd battalions, 23rd division against the saddle. Despite the heavy fire from the 145th Regiment, the Japanese stormed the hill en masse, screaming and screaming threats in English and even singing American songs, presumably in attempts to unnerve the defenders of the hill. According to the historian of the 145th  "The enemy stormed the hill, clawing his way up the steep slope, yelling like a maniac, suicidally putting everything he had into a frontal attack designed to take the highest point on the hill. ... The 145th Infantry, defending the ridge, were somewhat taken aback by an enemy so unreasoning as to crawl up the 70-degree slope on all fours, rifles slung over their backs." Suffering severe losses, Iwasa's 2nd Battalion managed to blast their way through the protective wire and knock out one of the pillboxes. Through this gap, the Japanese moved onto the saddle and began to attack adjacent strongpoints, securing a penetration of the 145th's line 70 yards wide and 50 yards deep. Behind them, however, an effective artillery response would break up the attack of Iwasa's 3rd Battalion; yet the 2nd Battalion would continue to expand this perimeter until, by 12:00, they had captured seven pillboxes and had brought up machine-guns and mortars with which they could put McClelland Road, the only lateral supply road for the 145th, under direct fire. Supply of the forward troops became very difficult, since the three-quarter-ton trucks and half-tracks could not use the road. All supplies had to be hand carried. Evacuation of the wounded also became difficult and dangerous. Japanese machine guns on the crest of the hill were able to cover the ridge with accurate and deadly grazing fire. They had placed other machine guns in trees on the spur of the hill about a hundred yards to the rear of the ground-emplaced weapons, which could sweep the entire front. With the exception of a few scattered trees and shallow trenches, there was little cover for troops of the 145th who moved up the steep slopes attempting to retake the lost positions. All during the day the Japanese were also extending the trenches repairing the old pillboxes, and building new ones. In response to this breakthrough, General Beightler sent the 1st Battalion, 145th Regiment to counterattack. By noon, the Americans were attacking the newly-gained Japanese positions, successfully retaking five of the lost pillboxes against heavy fire and establishing a new line just south of the crest by nightfall. The first attempt to recapture Hill 700 was launched at noon on the 9th. Company C moved northward against the saddle in a direct frontal assault while two platoons of Company F attacked the saddle from the flanks. Company C was halted by devastating fire two-thirds of the way to its objective, and the men were forced to dig in and hold what they had gained. Meanwhile the riflemen of Company F had retaken five of the lost pillboxes, and the line, now reinforced, was solidly established by nightfall just south of the crest. Beightler had ordered two tanks forward late in the afternoon to take enemy targets under direct fire, particularly those that menaced McClelland Road, but the terrain proved too steep for them to be used effectively. Thankfully, Iwasa's breakthrough had been contained, with the 145th losing 23 killed and 128 wounded against an estimated 500 enemy dead.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Mutaguchi's insane Operation U-Go was not going the way he thought it would. General Slim was outsmarting his enemy and it seems the allies were going to make further gains in Burma. Meanwhile things were heating up on Bougainville as Iwasa continued his grand offensive. 

The Pacific War - week by week
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The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 20, 2024 42:15


Last time we spoke about Operation Hailstone, the continued drive upon Madang and the horrible massacre during the Indian Ocean Raid of 1944. Operation Hailstone saw what was once called the Gibraltar of the Pacific, Truk nearly annihilated. The demoralized and understrength Japanese could not hope to contest the air strikes and naval bombardment. Vice-Admiral Kobayashi Masami was held responsible for the defeat and was relieved of his command. Over on New Guinea the Australians were continuing their drive to Madang, killing and taking prisoner all the Japanese they could along the way. Then over in the Indian Ocean, Vice-Admiral Takasu Shiro unleashed a raid against allied shipping, a rarity for the Japanese. Unfortunately the raid devolved into a singular attack against the British steamer Behar. A needless and cruel massacre was performed aboard the Tone, killing 65 to a possible 100 people. Such actions would only see justice after the war. This episode is the battle of Eniwetok Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    Operation Flintlock was a huge success, Kwajalien was seized incredibly fast and the invasion of Majuro saw no Japanese even on the atoll. Because of this the allied war planners had to shuffle the schedule and thus was born Operation Hailstone and the invasion of Eniwetok. Eniwetok had been originally slabbed for May, but it seemed obvious the Japanese power in the Marshalls was crumbling a lot faster than anticipated. Consequently, Admiral Nimitz knew it would be necessary to capture the atoll to give shelter to all the ships he intended to deploy westward in the drive against the Japanese inner empire. Since it now seemed Brigadier-General Thomas Watson's 8000 reserve troops of the 22nd Marines and the 106th Regiment would no longer be required, Admirals Spruance and Hill began preparing them for the invasion of Eniwetok.  The operation was codenamed Catchpole and the war planners would only have 12 days to prepare. Moving up the invasion of Eniwetok required stripping the new garrisons of Kwajalein Island and Roi-Namur of manpower and supplies. The landing boat crews were greens, not trained with the troops. General Watson reported “the infantry, amphibian tractors, amphibian tanks, tanks, aircraft, supporting naval ships, and most of the staffs concerned had never worked together before.” Nevertheless, the forces available for the operation would be plentiful and well equipped. Having gone through the horribly bloody assault on Tarawa, Admiral Hill was relieved to have a large number of amtracs. The Army's 708th Provisional Amphibian Tractor Battalion would sail with 119 LVTs, most of which were the heavily armored newer models. As Hill would remark later “At Eniwetok, I felt like a millionaire, but at Tarawa, I was a pauper.” Admiral Hill would have at his disposal 5 attack transports, 1 transport, 2 attack cargo ships, 1 cargo ship, 1 LSD, 2 APDs, 6 LCIs and 9 LSTs to carry General Watson's Tactical Group 1, consisting of the 22nd marines and 106th regiment led by Colonel John Walker. Further support came in the form of 3 battleships, 3 heavy cruisers and 7 destroyers of Rear-Admiral Jesse Oldendorf's task force 51.17; 3 escort carriers and 3 destroyers of Rear-Admiral Van Ragsdale task group 53.6; and Rear-Admiral Samuel Ginder's carrier  task force 58.4. The plan was to first land two scout companies;  the Reconnaissance Company, V Amphibious Corps, against  Camellia and Canna Islands southeast of Engebi; and the scout company D, 4th Marine Tank Battalion against Zinnia Island northwest of Engebi to prevent any escape of the enemy from Engebi in that direction. The scout would secure Camellia and Canna allowing the 2nd Separate Pack Howitzer Battalion with their 75-mm pack howitzers to deploy on Camellia, and the 104th Field Artillery Battalion with their 105-mm. howitzers to deploy on Canna. The artillery would then be used to support the next day's attack against Engebi. The job of  hitting Engebi was given to the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 22nd Marines of Colonel John Walker. His 3rd Battalion would be kept in regimental reserve. The two battalions were to be supported by medium tanks of the 2nd Separate Tank Company, and a platoon from the Cannon Company, 106th Infantry, with two 105-mm, self-propelled guns. Lastly Colonel Russell Ayers' 106th Regiment would hit Eniwetok Island; and once it was captured, the infantry would take Parry Island along with the 22nd Marines.  Defending against them would by General Nishida's 1st amphibious brigade; organized from the 3rd Independent Garrison Unit. It had 3 1,036-man mobile battalions, a 76-man machine-cannon unit with 6 20mm guns, 66-man tank unit with 9 Type 95 light tanks, a 243-man engineer unit, a 139-man signal unit, and 190-man medical unit. The mobile battalions had a 103-man 1st Company while the other 2 had 197 men, plus a 155-man mortar company, a 121-man artillery company with 3 75mm mountain guns, 2 37mm anti-tank guns, and a 66-man engineer platoon. These units had recently been brought over alongside his HQ.  250 IJN personnel and 1115 troops were deployed on Parry, about 692 soldiers, 500 IJN personnel and 61 men of the 61st Guard Unit would Engebi;  and only 779 troops under Lieutenant-Colonel Hashida Masahiro, commander of the 1st Mobile Battalion  would defend Eniwetok. In the 6 weeks following the Kwajalein assault, the Japanese had been constructing defenses on the lagoon side based on reports they received from the Kwajalein attack, yet there was not enough time to make much progress. The 3 defended islands of Eniwetok Atoll had no naval-manned defenses, other than two 120mm coast defense guns and two 13.2mm twin machine-guns on Engebi's north corner. 3 75mm and 28 20mm anti-aircraft guns had been delivered, but were not even emplaced. The 1st Amphibious Brigade arrived less than a month and a half before the American would land with barely any time to dig in. While significant construction materials had been delivered, there was not nearly enough time to make much progress. Defenses would be mainly dugouts, trenches, and foxholes. The brigade deployed its infantry weapons more or less equally. Engebi was expected to be the most heavily defended, but instead the most troops were actually on Parry. On February 15th, Hill's scout group sailed out from Kwajalein lagoon while Operation Hailstorm smashed Truk. Meanwhile Ginder's carriers proceeded directly to Eniwetok and on February 16th launched a series of preliminary strikes. The strike completely destroyed all the buildings upon the atoll, neutralized her airfield and destroyed 14 aircraft on the ground. Naval bombardment of Engebi, Eniwetok, Parry and Japtan Islands began in the early morning hours of February 17, and was joined by more air strikes after dawn. Simultaneously, Hill's force arrived off Eniwetok's southeast coast. As the surface ship bombarded the islands, amtracs launched and landed by 1:30pm against Camellia and Canna. After securing Canna and Camellia by 2pm, the Reconnaissance Company landed, against no opposition, on the 3 islands northwest of Camellia and on 2 small unnamed islands west of Canna. These landings were made to offer security to the artillery units against possible Japanese infiltration during the night. Hill then landed his 2 artillery battalion to support the invasion of Engebi. Engebi's total weapon strength came to 2 flame throwers, 13 grenade dispatchers, 12 light machine guns, 4 heavy machine guns, 2 37-mm. guns, 1 50-mm. mortar, 11 81-mm. mortars, 1 20-mm. automatic gun, 2 20-mm. cannons, 2 mountain guns, 3 light tanks, and 2 12-cm. coast defense guns. Colonel Yano predicted that a heavy bombardment would precede the amphibious landings, he accordingly planned to concentrate his defensive system on the lagoon shore of this triangularly shaped island. The Japanese defenders were ordered to "...lure the enemy to the water's edge and then annihilate him with withering fire and continuous attacks." Most of the prepared defenses and over half of the brigade detachment were concentrated at the center of the lagoon shore. The approach to this strong point was flanked by the fire of 2 75-mm. mountain guns on the northwest corner and 2 20-mm. machine cannon in the southern part of the concentration itself, as well as 2 37-mm. guns emplaced on the southern tip. Frontal fire could be delivered by the 20-mm. automatic guns and the three tanks, each mounting 37-mm. guns. Hill deployed UDT-1 frogmen to first clear obstacles and mines while D Company , 4th Tank Battalion secured Zinnia and 4 other islets west of Engebi in the early morning of February 18. At 6:55 Colorado and Louisville began shelling the northern and eastern part of Enegbi. Tennessee and Pennsylvania moved at dawn to deliver close-range destructive fire against beach defenses from flanking positions on each side of the boat lanes. At 7:20 destroyers, Phelps and Hall, moved into position as direct support ships, but because of the smoke and dust rising from the island, Hall was unable to fire. Just before 8:00 the naval guns ceased fire to allow a half-hour air strike to take place. This was completed ahead of schedule and naval fire was resumed at 8:11 and increased steadily in intensity until just before the first troops landed. Shortly after the air strike was lifted, artillery on Canna and Camellia joined the naval guns and began to fire on the beaches at maximum rate until just after the first wave landed at 8:44, whereupon the artillery barrage was lifted inland to the center of the island for another five minutes. Thereafter, because of the smallness of the island, very few call missions were fired. All of the gunfire detonated the main ammunition dump on Engebi as Colonel Walker's amtracs made their way to the island covered by LCI gunboats. Many of the LCI rockets fell short forcing some amtracs off course, while quite a few would break down as they had been worn out by the attack on Kwajalein. Despite the technical difficulties, the first assault waves hit the beaches at 8:43. The 2nd Battalion hit Beach Blue 3 with G Company  on the left, F Company  in the center and e Company  on the right; and the 1st Battalion hit Beach White 1 with B Company  on the left, A Company  in the center and C Company  on the right. On the left, the 2nd Battalion pushed forward rapidly, bypassing isolated points of resistance and quickly overran the airfield by 10:30. F Company managed to swing towards Weasel Point on the west corner with remarkable speed. On the right, the 1st Battalion quickly split up with A Company  advancing north to New Point and C Company  towards Skunk Point on the southeast corner.  The Japanese put up a stiff fight against them, as their spider-hole defenses on the gap between the 2 companies were covered by the dense brush and palms. As a result, the 3rd Battalion would land at Beach White 1 at 09:55 and quickly advanced with tanks to clear the various tunnels and covered foxholes that resisted them. The Japanese were slowly forced northward along the island's eastern shore, eventually becoming isolated and cut down. By 1:10, Weasel and Newt Points had been cleared; and at 2:50, about 6 hours after the initial landing, General Watson declared the island secured. 6 minutes later, C Company captured Skunk Point; and by 6:30, the 1st Battalion secured their half of Engebi. The assault had been executed so fast that even the veteran IJA defenders were unable to offer any meaningful organized resistance. Bypassed Japanese troops and infiltrators did cause difficulties through the night, but mopping-up continued and Engebi was formally secured at 8:00 on February 19. American losses were 85 dead and missing and 521 wounded against the 1280 Japanese killed and 16 taken prisoner.   For the assault against Eniwetok, new intelligence indicated that the island was more heavily defended than expected, so Watson would reinforce the 106th Regiment with Walker's reserve 3rd Battalion and some Marine tanks. What they would be facing on Eniwetok was a total of 2 flame throwers, 13 grenade dischargers, 12 light machine guns, 2 heavy machine guns, 1 50-mm. mortar, 11 81-mm. mortars, 1 20-mm. automatic gun, 3 20-mm. cannons, and 3 light tanks. The Eniwetok garrison was divided into 5 forces, 3 on the lagoon shore, 1 placed so as to cut off the narrow eastern neck of the island, and 1 to be held in reserve. The 3 lagoon shore forces were to place their weapons so as to obtain interlocking bands of fire over the surface of the lagoon. The force in the east was to protect the rear of the 3 lagoon shore forces from any American units landing on the northern tip of the island. The reserve force was placed to the rear of the forces on the lagoon shore, near the western tip of the island. The defenses of the island consisted mostly of foxholes and trenches, which were better constructed and better camouflaged than those at Parry. After the capture of Kwajalein, the Japanese had begun construction of concrete pillboxes on the southwest tip of the island and had dug additional foxholes. Land mines were also found on Eniwetok. Colonel Ayers' new plan was to land his two battalions abreast. 1st Battalion would land on the right on Yellow Beach 2 and was charged with making the main effort to the west to clear the lower end of the island. The 3rd Battalion would land on Yellow Beach 1 and form a covering line just east of a road that bisected the island from the lagoon to the ocean shore. For the assault, the infantrymen lacked field artillery support; and although Eniwetok had also been subjected to naval bombardment on February 18, it had only received a fraction of the bombardment targeted against Engebi and Parry. A total of 1,179.7 tons of naval shells had been fired on Engebi, 944.4 tons were to be used on Parry, but Eniwetok received only 204.6 tons altogether. At 8:10am on the 19th, carrier planes began to bomb and strafe the beaches and LCI gunboats followed this up with a last-minute rocket attack against the landing areas. Meanwhile, although the arrival of the marine tanks was delayed by choppy seas and a 9-foot embankment just inland halted the amphibian tanks, but the Americans would manage to hit the Yellow beaches at 9:16. The 3rd Battalion landed on Beach Yellow 1 with L Company on the left, K Company on the right, and I Company following as reserve. Upon landing, L Company, followed by I Company pivoted east along the pier while K Company  pushed across the island to reach the opposite coast at 10:30. On the right, however, the 1st Battalion encountered dense spider-hole defenses as C and B Companies attempted to push across the island while A Company  attacked southwest along the coast. By noon,  the front line of the 1st Battalion was in the shape of an S, extending from the lagoon to the ocean.  The Japanese at this point made a bit of an unexpected move. As the Americans penetrated further inland, the Japanese began abandoning their positions and launched a 400 man counterattack. The Japanese managed to break through before getting completely cut down causing some havoc, but by 12:45 were beaten back. The American casualties were very high during the fight. Because of the strong resistance, Ayers ordered his 3rd battalion to attack east and for the reserves marines to land and relieve the left half of the 1st battalion's lion. The American attack to the west resumed with A Company  on the right wing making slow progress through the enemy positions near the lagoon, but the mingled elements of C and B Companies even after being reorganized and supported by 3 Cannon Company guns, could not push through the line taken up by the enemy at the end of his counterattack. Although it steadily reduced the Japanese positions, the attacking force was unable to move forward. By 2:25, the 3rd Battalion, 22nd Marines landed, passing through Ayers' 1st Battalion one hour later. Both battalions then launched a concerted attack towards the southwest end at 3:15, yet the Marines would soon lag behind, their advance delayed by the rugged terrain and the lack of adequate illumination and tank support. While the fight for Eniwetok was underway, the Amphibious Reconnaissance Company occupied Japtan by nightfall after first securing 10 unoccupied islets on the atoll's eastern rim while the scout tank battalion secured eight islets on Eniwetok's eastern rim, successfully subduing the enemy resistance on Rigilli. This would allow Watson to have some much-needed artillery support for the attack against Parry. On Parry the Japanese were able to construct very few installations and gun positions above ground in the short time that the brigade was there. With very few exceptions, the defenses consisted mostly of foxholes and trenches. These fell into two categories, the old and the new. The old foxholes and trenches were located on the ocean side, were well constructed, and often lined with rocks or coconut logs. Relying on their estimate of American amphibious tactics as demonstrated at Tarawa, the Japanese had recently undertaken heavier defenses on the lagoon side. These were freshly and hastily constructed, and therefore much inferior. All entrenchments were well camouflaged. A typical strong point consisted of a spider-web pattern of entrenchments. In the center of the web was a large personnel shelter lined and covered with coconut logs. Strips of corrugated iron and a thick layer of sand were placed over the log roof. The center was surrounded by a circle of foxholes ten to fifteen feet apart, mostly roofed over with corrugated iron. These holes were connected with one another by narrow trenches or tunnels. The trenches and tunnels on the outer edge of the web were in turn joined by radial trenches and tunnels to the shelter or control foxhole in the center of the position. The entire web was extremely well camouflaged and very difficult to locate. Parry was honeycombed with positions of this sort. Back to the action to deny the enemy an opportunity for the customary aggressive night tactics, Ayers ordered  a night attack at 6:50. At 3:33 on February 20, Ayers' 1st Battalion therefore managed to reach the western end of the island, though the Marines were still 100 yards to their left rear. The Japanese, meanwhile, attempted to probe and infiltrate through the night, finally counterattacking at 09:10. The 3rd Battalion, 22d Marines, found one of the main enemy defenses, manned by a strong and determined force, at the southwestern corner of the island in its zone. A combined force of light and medium tanks, 5 guns from the Cannon Company, 106th Infantry, and a supporting rifle company from the 1st Battalion, 106th Infantry, joined the Marines in destroying the enemy during the day. The 1st Battalion, 106th Infantry, mopped up its zone. The next day, after the withdrawal of the Marines, the battalion ran a line across the island from the pier and mopped up to the western end. A Company , at the right, finished first and returned to the battalion area near the landing beach. B Company , in the center, reached the end of the island a little later and then went for a swim. C Company , on the ocean side, found 22 of the enemy in hiding and destroyed them in a firefight that sent some bullets over the heads of B Companies swimmers. B Company  came out of the water, dressed, and rejoined the fight. The western end of Eniwetok Island was finally clear of Japanese. By 2:45, the stronghold was finally reduced and the western end of Eniwetok was at last secured. To the east, Ayers' 3rd Battalion also attempted to continue its attack during the night, but this proved futile as the troops lacked the confidence and experience for such a difficult task. As such, the battalion halted at 4:30, about a third of the way from the island's north end. They resumed their attack at 7:00 on the 21st, finally reached the north end at 4:30. The island was finally declared secure at 5:21, with the Americans losing 37 killed and 94 wounded against 800 Japanese killed and 23 taken prisoner. Because action had been bogged down at Eniwetok, the assault on Parry was delayed until the island was reduced and Walker's 3rd Battalion could re-embark as the regimental reserve. In the meantime, aerial, naval and artillery shells had pounded Parry for three days . Naval bombardment dropped on Parry totaled 944.4 tons, considerably more than the weight delivered on Eniwetok Island; the weight of artillery shells came to 245 tons, and aerial bombs added 99 tons more. Meanwhile while the rest of the 22nd Marines were brought from Engebi to southern Eniwetok. By this point the expedition was running low on ammunition and weapons. Naval and artillery shells were carefully apportioned. From all the ships, available grenades and demolition charges were gathered. To supplement them, 775 grenades and 1,500 percussion caps were flown in from Kwajalein while the attack was in progress. Other units surrendered BAR's and rifles to equip the 22nd Marines. In addition, the Marines had found the M1 carbine, with which many men had armed themselves, to be a less than effective combat weapon, and M1 rifles and Browning Automatic rifles were redistributed from 106th Infantry units to replace them. For the last assault of the operation Catchpole, Walker planned was to land two battalions abreast directly against the defenders' strongpoints; and after seizing the beachhead, tanks and infantry were to press forward to the ocean side of the island. Battleships Tennessee and Pennsylvania took positions only 1,500 yards north of the landing area and not only mauled it with their big guns but also hit it with their 40-mm. automatic weapons batteries. From the other side of the boat lanes, the heavy cruisers Indianapolis and Louisville and the destroyer Hailey also fired. Smoke and dust blew out over the lagoon without masking the target for the battleships but with serious consequences for the other three warships and for the landing craft that started ashore at 8:45. 3 LCI's that approached through the haze with the first wave to fire rockets were hit by 5-inch shells from Hailey, killing 13 and wounding 47. Some LVTs landed outside the designated beaches, thus widening the front and making necessary the suspension of artillery fire in their vicinity. Other tractors crisscrossed or fell behind, so that the landing teams had difficulty in reorganizing on the beaches. While the tractors made their 15-minute run from the line of departure, two formations of planes bombed Parry in the last of 219 sorties made during the 6 days of action at Eniwetok Atoll. This time they only bombed the island, omitting strafing runs because of the type of defense trench systems on Parry Island.At 09:00, Walker's 1st battalion landed at 09.00hrs on Green 1 just north of the island's central portion, with Companies B, C, and A in line left to right. It was 200yds too far south, only landing on the extreme south edge of its assigned beach. The 2nd Battalions landed at 9.00 on Green 2 near Parry's northwest corner, but 200yds farther south than intended, with part of the battalion landing on about two-thirds of Green 3 to the south. Mines were encountered on the beach, causing some casualties. In the line were, from left to right, companies G, F, and E. The first troops struck Green Beaches 2 and 3 at 9:00, with a wave of tractors and one of LCM's carrying medium tanks directly behind them. Heavy machine gun and mortar fire greeted the marines at the water's edge. As they tried to form an assault line, enfilading machine gun fire also struck them from a concealed position on the pier at the right. The machine guns were silenced by grenades and by shells from the amphibian tanks. Then the assault passed inland. Some of the enemy in trenches and foxholes in the dune line on the beach, men who had survived the bombardment, were overcome in hand-to-hand fighting. Thankfully, shells from the amphibian tanks managed to silence the Japanese guns, which allowed the Americans to move inland and to land their medium tanks behind the battalions. The defense plans for Parry outlined that about one half of the troops were disposed at the water's edge, where they were to be grouped into strong points about 140 feet apart. The defense of the beaches was to be supported by mountain guns, 20-mm. automatic guns, and other weapons. The mountain guns and 20-mm's were to fire first. Light and heavy machine guns were to fire on landing craft before and after they reached the underwater obstacles. Next, mortars and grenade throwers were to deliver concentrated fire against the enemy at the beaches and were to cover the sectors between fortified areas and strong points. To facilitate the employment of artillery and heavy weapons, the order called for fields of fire to be cleared through coconut groves. The order gave quite explicit instructions for measures against tanks: "Destroy enemy tanks when they are stopped by obstacles by means of hollow charge anti-tank rifle grenades, close-in attack, land mines, water mines, and Molotov cocktails. Especially at night, have a part of the force attack them." The order made it very clear that the brigade was not expected to survive an American assault once it had established a beachhead. Any troops remaining after the Americans had landed in force were to assemble in a central area. Then, the order continued, "...sick and wounded who cannot endure the battle will commit suicide. [Others]... will reorganize, return to battle as a unit, and die fighting.” 3 dug-in Japanese light tanks decided to attack, rather than earlier when the infantry were vulnerable. Yet the Shermans immediately destroyed them before they inflicted any damage, so Walker's battalions would be allowed to push forward against the retreating enemy. While Companies G and F swung left to reach the north end by 1:30, E Company  drove straight across to reach the ocean shore by 12:00. Then, as the Marines were consolidating, a group of 200 Japanese were discovered marching north and were wiped out within minutes. Over on the right, B Company reached the ocean coast at 11:55, while Companies C and A swung south and  successfully reached Valentine Pier by 1:30. Walker's reserve 3rd Battalion  landed at 10:00, immediately advancing south while clearing bypassed enemy pockets. After artillery bombardment, the attack south was launched at 1:30. Pressing through thick underbrush, both battalions achieved rapid progress as they overran a series of trench and foxhole defenses. The battalions were 450 yards from the island's southern tip when they halted for the night.Walker decided to declare the end of enemy resistance at 19:30, radioing Brigadier General Walker, "I present you with the island of Parry at 7.30." The Only slight enemy activity that existed anymore was occasional sniping, which would be swiftly cleared by 09:30 on February 23. For the capture of Parry, Marine casualties were 73 dead and missing and 261 wounded against 1300 Japanese killed, including General Nishida, and 66 captured. In total, American casualties during the Battle of Eniwetok came to 313 killed, 879 wounded and 77 missing. The Japanese had lost their entire garrison, with 3380 killed and 105 captured. Between March 7 and April 5, Walker would then conduct Operation Flintlock Jr., carrying 29 successful landings, securing 14 mostly unoccupied atolls and killing over 100 Japanese at the cost of two Marines killed. Other detachments would finally occupy the Erikub, Aur and Ujelang Atolls by the end of April, leaving only Mille, Maloelap, Jaluit and Wotje bypassed and unoccupied, in addition to the Japanese presence at Kosrae, Wake and Nauru.  Over on Jaluit Rear-Admiral Masuda Nisuke commanded the 13,000 personnel and beginning on March 4th, the 4th Marine Base Defense Aircraft Wing, headquartered on Majuro, and the 7th Air Force commenced a concerted campaign to neutralize the Japanese garrisons, which continued until the war's end. Navy Aviation and Army Air Forces had previously destroyed most Japanese aircraft on these islands. The 13,000 tons of aerial-delivered ordnance, coupled with frequent naval shelling, killed 2,564 Japanese and 4,876 died of disease and starvation; the Marines sprayed oil over the garrisons' gardens. Fighter-bomber units deploying to the Pacific would first serve in this role, perfecting their bombing techniques before moving forward to support other operations as new units replaced them. The Japanese survivors would finally surrender on September 2, 1945. As the American commander took stock of what they had achieved in the Marshalls, their confidence and self-assurance rose to new heights. In less than 3 months' time, the tragic and costly lessons of Tarawa had been refined and integrated into amphibious planning and doctrine, and the results had been tremendous. To the extent that further improvement was needed, it was in the details of execution rather than any deficiency in the plans themselves. Holland Smith concluded in his final report, “In the attack of coral atolls, very few recommendations can be made to improve upon the basic techniques previously recommended and utilized in Flintlock.” Over in Tokyo there was shock and incomprehension at the speed and ‘low cost' of the US victory over the Marshall Islands. The implications for Japan's future were dire. As Ichiro Koyose, the permanent Director of Japan's Imperial Rule Association said in an address, “The Marshall Islands are the frontporch entrance to Tokyo … The enemy is probably finally thinking of some such thing as bombing Tokyo in deadly earnest …” Yet that is it for today on the Marshall Island front as we are going to be diving back into Burma. The Japanese had launched their main offensive on the Arakan at the start of February, successfully infiltrating through the British positions to cut off their rear. By cutting the Indians' supply lines off, the Japanese expected to force them back into disarray; but these were not the same men they had been fighting for years. The Indian troops were better trained and ready to put up a real fight. This was seen when they faced Japanese attack after attack, using their all-round defensive brigade boxes, also referred to as "baby tortoise" or "beehive" tactics. This baffled Japanese,and soon they would leave the invaders effectively encircled and running out of supplies, as they themselves depended on what supplies could trickle to them over jungle trails. With increasing 'fanatical' desperation, the Japanese  began to press home attacks seeking to secure vitally needed stockpiled supplies of food, arms and ammunition upon which their offensive depended. In the Sinzweya area, the 112th Regiment made a night attack on the 9th, successfully breaking through the southwest corner of the enemy's perimeter defense in the Sinzweya Basin. Although the Regiment was successful in firing an ammunition dump and doing great damage, the enemy's employment of tanks forced it to draw back without further exploiting the breakthrough. On the morning of the 10th, Major General Sakurai met Colonel Tanabashi on Hill 315, due northeast of Sinzweya, and encouraged him to press the enemy more aggressively. The failure of the 112th to achieve a signal success appeared, however, to have so depressed morale that the Regiment was reluctant to repeat its attack. The 7th Indian Division, kept its morale high despite the intense fighting, rapidly mounting casualties and increasing exhaustion. They continued to fight on until the advanced Japanese units had exhausted their own food and ammunition. Whenever possible, the British-Indian troops also struck back against Japanese positions and harried their already tenuous supply lines. Furthermore, the massive firepower of the British mountain, field and medium artillery inflicted massive casualties on the attacking Japanese infantry. Firing from positions within each brigade box, carefully concerted artillery fire plans thus rained death upon Japanese troops scattered in the jungle throughout the divisional area. As such, the 71st Brigade would successfully recaptured Taung Bazaar on February 10, and was steadily advancing southwards towards the Ngakyedauk Pass. That same day, General Giffard realized that there was no possibility of 15th Corps being able to reach the Indin-Rathedaung line before the pre-monsoon swell made amphibious operations impossible, so he recommended canceling the Akyab assault. He placed the 36th Indian Division under the 14th Army, allotted the 50th Brigade to 4th Corps and ordered the 25th Indian Division towards Chittagong. General Slim, however, realized that the Japanese plans had miscarried, so he directed General Christison to resume the offensive against the Tunnels-Buthidaung position as soon as he had cleared the land communications to his forward divisions.    Consequently, as the 29th Brigade of the36th division was arriving at Bawli, Christison sent the bulk of the 26th Indian Division to destroy the enemy in the Kalapanzin valley behind the 7th Division. By the13th, patrols from both divisions successfully linked up near Taung Bazar; but at the same time, the Japanese were bringing reinforcements for their attacks at Sinzweya. The Japanese offensive reached its climax on February 14 when General Sakurai called for an all-out attack that evening. The attack was courageous and managed to achieve some initial gains, but it was also uncoordinated, suicidal and unsuccessful, ending with the Indians reinforcing the Admin Box the following day. Meanwhile elements of the 5th Indian Division, regrouped and battered away against a heavily fortified Japanese roadblock at the summit of the Ngakyedauk Pass. Thus, the Japanese tactical and administrative position quickly went from bad to worse around Sinzweya, as pressure steadily mounted against its vastly outnumbered troops. After a few days of bitter fighting the Japanese finally abandoedn their positions at Kyaukyit and Pyinshe Kala and began occupying areas covering the routes back to their main positions.  By the 20th, the strength of the Japanese striking force had  shrunk to 400 men increasingly-debilitated by lack of sleep and shortages of food. On the 23th, after a short but sharp fight, a battalion of 89th Brigade from the east and 123rd Brigade from the west linked up at Ngakyedauk Pass and by evening had firmly secured it. The following day, as soon as the 500 casualties from Sinzweya had been evacuated, the pass was opened to normal traffic and air supply of the 7th Division ceased. As Geoffrey Evans later wrote with obvious pride: “For eighteen days the British and Indian troops, most of them belonging to the administrative services, had withstood the determined attacks of trained Japanese infantry supported by guns and air. It spoke volumes for the war in which the junior leaders had carried out their task and the stout-heartedness of their men.” At this point, General Hanaya recognized the inevitable and ordered the Ha-Go offensive to be abandoned. The shattered remnants of Sakurai's command subsequently withdrawing in small parties. The last attack on Sinzweya, made on the 22nd, ended in failure. On the following night, acting on his own responsibility, Colonel Tanabashi withdrew his main force to Kreingyaung, leaving the 8th Company of the 112th Infantry at Ngakyedauk Pass and the 2nd Battalion of the 112th on a small hill south of Sinzweya. Upon receiving a report of Tanabashi's withdrawal, Major General Sakurai was really pissed off but realized that the move was undoubtedly inevitable, being forced by lack of food and supplies. At the suggestion of General Sakurai, the Division commander determined to suspend the offensive and ordered the Sakurai Unit to withdraw to the line of the Buthidaung-Maungdaw Road. Moving units into the line to cover the withdrawal, the movement south began on the night of 24 February and was completed by 1 March. The 1st Battalion of the 213th Infantry, which had been holding positions in the vicinity of the road between Ngangyaung and Maunghnama since 6 February, left its positions on the night of the 25th and, after breaking through the enemy lines, returned safely on 3 March. Many units were trapped, however, between units of the 26th and 36th Divisions advancing from the north and 5th Division from the east through the Ngakyedauk Pass upon the anvil of the boxes. In the end, the Battle of Ngakyedauk Pass cost 15th Corps 3506 casualties, but it also marked the turning point in the Burma Front. The Japanese lost 3106 killed and 2229 wounded, in what would be the first time that they met well trained British-Indian formations in battle and the first time that their enveloping tactics, aimed at cutting their opponents' line of communications, failed to produce the results they expected. Not only had operation HA-GO been an abysmal failure, but it materially undermined the Japanese ability to resist further British attacks. By March 5th, the 15th Corps had completely recovered and resumed its own offensive against the now disorganized and weakened Japanese forces in Arakan. Although the Japanese staged a remarkable recovery and still offered dogged resistance, the 5th Division would capture Razabil on March 12th and the 7th Division would seize Buthidaung and later mop up the Letwedet Fortress in late March.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The battle in the Marshalls absolutely shocked the Japanese in its speed, efficiency and low cost for the American forces. Now the Japanese feared the Americans would soon be in range to hit the home islands with their dreaded bombers. In the Burma Front, the former Japanese super soldiers were now realizing the Indian Army could no longer be pushed around.

Rotary Voices Podcast
Two years of war: The battle for Ukraine's identity

Rotary Voices Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 19, 2024 41:45


February 24, 2024 marks the two-year anniversary of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Russia still occupies 18 percent of the country. In light of this anniversary, we're bringing back an episode from this time last year where we analyzed the situation in Ukraine, explored the prospect of peace, and discussed the importance of civil society in Ukraine's postwar rebuilding.

Diversity in Fellowship
The Woke War: The Battle over Gender

Diversity in Fellowship

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 6, 2024 29:21


What does "woke" have to do with the current debates about gender? How should we respond to that as followers of Christ?

The Pacific War - week by week
- 113 - Pacific War - The Battle for Shaggy Ridge , January 16-23, 1944

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 16, 2024 40:17


Last time we spoke about the landing at Saidor and continuation of advances upon New Guinea and New Britain. Operation Michaelmas was a huge success, isolating countless Japanese and threatening those trying to retreat further north. Taking advantage of the new front on New Guinea, the Australians began pushing more so upon the features across Shaggy Ridge and towards Sio. General Adachi frantically shifted units around in an effort to plug up the multiple advancing allied units, but in the end there was little to be done as the Japanese were pushed further and further north. Features were taken upon Shaggy Ridge and Sio fell nearly uncontested. Over in New Britain, General Rupertus triumphed over the Airdrome and his Marines were expanding their perimeters. Katayama made a bold attack against an enemy he overestimated at it certainly did not pan out for his men at suicide creek. This episode is The battle for Shaggy Ridge Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    A while back I covered the start of the Chinese-Indian offensive into the Hukawng Valley and Arakan regions. When I did so it was almost entirely from the allied viewpoint, but what of the IJA war planners? The Burma campaign has been arguably a complete disaster for the allies, the Japanese steamrolled all the way through, claiming vast amounts of territory and key cities and ports, so what really did they need to do but garrison it all? After Wingate unleashed operation Longcloth, the relatively idle Japanese raised the idea of potentially attacking India. Lt General Mutaguchi Renya, the victor of the Singapore campaign in 1942 was made a commander in Burma and wargamed the possibility of attacking India to try and earn support from his superiors at Tokyo General HQ. It was his belief, they could brush past the British in Assam and reach the gateway into India, and he expected the Indians to rise up and greet them with open arms. A lot of money and effort had been spent on Subhas Chandra Bose and his Indian National Army. The fall of India would be an absolutely devastating blow to the British Empire in Asia and in 1942 there was even the belief the Japanese could link up with their German allies in the middle east. But that was 1942, before Stalingrad and Kursk, 1944 was a very very different geopolitical situation. This however did not stop Mutaguchi from continuing his plans to invade India. Lt General Hanaya Tadashi, commanding the Arakan front was given the task of convincing the British that the counterattack in Arakan was the appearance of the main army earmarked to conquer India, thus leading General Slim to send up reserves from Imphal. The operation was codenamed HA-GO and it was intended to be a fent to mask the real attack upon Imphal designated Operation U-GO. Now let me dig a bit deeper into how this all came about. Until now, General Stilwell had been able to build much of the Ledo Road practically unmolested. Yet by early August, General Kawabe Mazakazu's Burma Area Army was preparing for a counter offensive. Kawabe actually did not trust Mutaguchi and suspected the man was harboring megalomaniac designs to invade India, which he was 100% right about. The “counter offensive” was really just the beginnings of Operation U-GO and it had been sold to Tokyo HQ as a pre-emptive strike to disable the 14th Army and make it unable to invade Burma. Thus General Mutaguchi's 15th Army was given the task of destroying any hostile elements in the Imphal region and to establish a strong defensive line. From December 22nd to the 26th, Mutaguchi held a conference pushing for the possibility of launching Operation U-GO and developed detailed missions for each division which would participate by means of a war game. At the same time Kawabe sold the operation HA-GO the diversionary attack in Arakan, with Lt General Hanaya Tadashi's 55th Division earmarked to pin down as many of the enemy's units as possible and to draw the British reserves away from the main offensive.  When General Christisons offensive kicked off, this forced Kawabe to reinforce Hanaya with the 54th division, and this in turn established the 29th Army under the command of General Sakurai on January 6th. The 29th Army was under the overall command of the Burma Area Army, and its HQ was initially situated in Moulmein. It was assigned to defend the coastal region of Arakan and the lower Irrawaddy valley and consisted at first of the 55th Division in Arakan, the 54th Division in reserve in Prome, and various garrison units including the 24th Independent Mixed Brigade in Moulmein. It also controlled the 11th Shipping Detachment of Major-General Suzuki Gisaburo, consisting of the 11th Shipping Engineer Regiment and the 3rd Sea Transport Battalion. It had roughly 1,105 men, 85 large landing barges, 54 small landing barges, 47 motored sampans, two armored boats, 10 fishing boats, one messenger boat and one speed boat. The 11th Shipping Detachment was stationed at Taungup and its main supply depot was at Prome. Meanwhile after the capture of Maungdaw, the 5th Indian division of Major General Harold Briggs was ordered to attack the main Japanese defenses at Razabil. Razabil's defenses were quite formidable, it dominating the crossroads and road linking Maungdaw with the Tunnels and Buthidaung located 3 miles eastwards, forming the 15th Indian Corps immediate objective following Maungdaw's capture. It was dubbed by its Japanese commander “The Golden Fortress of the Mayu Range”. It was centered on the railway tunnels running through the Mayu Range and at Point 551 to the east with a further forward position at Point 1301. These powerful defenses, built carefully exploiting the rugged mountainous terrain, were tunneled deep into the hills and consisted of bunkers, trenches and other fire positions located amidst dense jungle and camouflaged with customary Japanese skill. The main outworks at Letwedet to the east and at Razabil to the west of the Mayu Range were major fortresses in their own right, requiring careful reduction before the main position could be tackled. With both bastions in direct line of sight from the Tunnels, accurate supporting artillery could be called down with ease, moreover, adding to the problems already facing troops assaulting trenches and bunkers dug into the hillsides invulnerable to all but direct hits by medium artillery. The offensive against Razabil was codenamed Operation Jonathan, but it would be delayed until the corps artillery became available. At the same time the 7th Indian division seized the initiative on January 18th and launched an attack against the 55th division's position between Letwedet and Htindaw. The 9th company, 143rd infantry regiment was defending a hill east of Htindaw and stood their ground against repeated attacks until January 24th. The Japanese strongpoints were well dug in on the tops of narrow ridges. On January 26th, Major General Briggs ordered the 161st brigade, with support in the form of Lee-Grant tanks, artillery and aerial bombardment to attack the Tortoise defended by 1st battalion, 143rd regiment in the Razabil area. The Tortoise was a horseshoe defensive position that dominated the highway. It was an elaborate system of bunkers, trenches and all the typical Japanese goodies. For the boys in Burma it would be the first time for most to face such a thing, as Slim wrote in his memories “This was the first time we had assaulted an elaborate, carefully prepared position that the Japanese meant to hold to the last."   The attack opened up with 12 Vultee Vengeance dive bombers of the 3rd Tactical air force, 12 Mitchell medium bombers and 16 Liberator heavy bombers of the Strategic air force followed up by even more dive bombers. It was a visually spectacular event and to those observing from the ground looked devastating. However little to no damage was inflicted on the strongly constructed Japanese defenses burrowed so deeply into the hillsides. Similarly the mountain artillery regiment and batter from a field regiment did little damage with their bombardment as well. The Japanese had simply pulled back 1000 yards during the bombardments and by the time the allies surged forward came back to man their positions. When the Indians began their assault, the fire coming down the steep and jungle clad hillsides was absolutely devastating. The Lee-Grant tanks fired from the valley floor and managed to destroy all the identified bunkers, but the exposed Indian troops suffered massive casualties. It was virtually impossible to keep the defenders heads down long enough to advance even 50 yards towards the summit. Things got even worse when the men reached the defensive lines for the Lee-Grant tanks had to lift their fire lest they hit their own men. By the end of the day, only a toehold had been secured over the lower slopes of Razabil ridge.  The assault carried on for 3 more days, with intense tank and artillery fire from different directions supporting the infantry as closely as possible. The only immediate effect of the bombardment and indirect fire by 25 pounders and 3.7 howitzers was to destroy the vegetation over the hillsides, thus exposing more and more of the Japanese defensive works. During the intense battle, the Lee-Grant medium tank proved itself a real solution in providing effective covering fire for infantry and soon new techniques were evolving. The Japanese defenses were mainly built over the summit of steep, thick, jungle covered hills and the Lee-Grants provided fire support from positions in the paddy fields below them. Their 75mm guns effectively destroyed or at the least neutralized bunker positions. A procedure was quickly developed for providing cover during the last stages of infantry assaults. Tanks would use high explosive shells to clear the vegetation, than delayed action high explosive shells to break up the front of visible bunkers, then armor piercing shells to enable the infantry to advance close behind the creeping barrage as shrapnel was not flying everywhere. All combined this showed the potential of armor vehicles in jungle warfare, when most claimed they had little practical use in such climats. Despite such developments, the casualties were mounting, little progress was being made. On January 28th, the 123rd brigade attacked Japanese positions on the secondary hill of Wrencat and its smaller neighbor hill Wrenkitten, probably the best hill names I have read on this podcast as of yet haha. These were located on the lower western foothills of the Mayu range. They were extremely steep, cone shaped features with fortified circular trenches around their heads, bunkers, and bamboo jungle. Firing from positions on the valley floor the Lee-Grants and 5.5 inch artillery were able to destroy the bunkers and switch to armor piercing rounds to perform creeping barrages for the infantry. Despite the tank and artillery support, the Japanese were throwing a ton of mortar, grenade and machine gun fire. An officer of the 123rd brigade involved in the fight had this to say 'It appears from our experience that consolidation on the objective which normally consists of a series of deeply constructed bunkers connected one with the other is extremely difficult in the very limited time that the enemy allow.' The failures against the Tortoise and Wrencat, prompted General Christison to call off the attack against Razabil by January30th. Christison regrouped his corps artillery and tanks to instead support the 7th divisions assault against Buthidaung and Letwedet.   Meanwhile further to the north, General Tanaka had brought 6300 men of the 55th and 56th regiments to the Hukawng valley by early January. He wanted to counterattack in strength, but General Mutaguchi believed he could not spare additional motor transport units to give the necessary logistical support to the 18th division since preparations were already going on for operation U-GO. Thus, Tanaka ordered his men to perform a delaying action down the Hukawng valley with the primary objective of holding Kamaing, the ridge line separating Hukawng valley from Mogaung valley. Tanaka weighed his orders and the looming monsoon season that hit the area in May or June. Against Tanaka, Stilwell sought to continue his offensive after successfully taking Yupbang Ga. Stilwell now looked towards Taihpa Ga and convinced both General Wingate and Admiral Mountbatten to unleash the Galahad long penetration unit into the Hukawng valley.   On January 4, 1944, Frank Merrill abruptly relieved a disappointed Brink. Despite having a background with cavalry, like Brink, Merrill understood the Japanese strength, but unlike Brink he respected the chain of command. General Sun met with Stilwell and and it was agreed the bulk of the 114th regiment should swing widely around Tanaka's left flank while the 113th regiment wheeled to the south to hit Tanaka's front along the Tanai Hka. Further north the 2nd battalion ,112th regiment would also advance east across the Tarung Hka to secure Warang Ga; the 65th regiment would continue their advance towards Taro, fording the Tanai river by January 9th; south of Kantau, the 3rd battalion, 114th regiment ran into two Japanese companies. The jungle made it difficult for the Chinese forces to organize themselves. The battalion split into 4 fragments and no two of them were in contact. The supporting 6th battery could not fire until fields of fire were cut and while that was being carried out, the Japanese companies performed infiltration maneuvers and quickly surrounded the battery. Fighting for their guns and lives between the 9th and 11th of January the Chinese cannoneers managed to save both. The battalion was nearly wiped out from these Japanese tactics, but thankfully on January 12th, the regimental HQ arrived and reformed the battalion to launch a concerted attack that managed to gradually push back the Japanese. 3 days later the 2nd battalion arrived allowing the 114th regiment to force a crossing of the Sanip Hka by January 16th.   Meanwhile the 1st battalion, 113th regiment forded the Tarung river near Yupbang Ga and sent patrols north to occupy Tabawng GA on January 13th. From there they advanced southeast to Kaduja Ga then to Brangbram Hka where they formed a line extending to the junction with the Tanai bank by mid january. On January 21st, the Chinese broke through the Japanese lines north of Brangbram Hka and made it to Ningru Ha less than one mile downstream from Taihpa Ga. Simultaneously, the battered 112th regiment swung wide going north east to Warang Ga. By the end of January the 113th continued their advance upon Taihpa Ga where they would meet stronger Japanese resistance. They began fighting within 1,500 yards of Taihpa Ga. Artillery support, the 4th and 5th Batteries, was then brought up. The next 1,000 yards between the 113th regiment and Taihpa Ga took two days to cross; then they spent a week in what was called "preparations for attack." General Sun's men were now approaching the Japanese strongpoint in the area, and Japanese resistance was more freely offered, with heavy shelling by 75- and 150-mm. pieces. At Taihpa Ga, the Kamaing Road crossed the Tanai on a long gravel bar which bullock carts could use quite well. At this point was the village itself, a humble collection of bashas, long since burnt out. About 800 yards upstream was a ferry across a stretch of fairly deep water. The Japanese used this ferry to bring supplies across the Tanai, rather than the vulnerable and easily spotted gravel bar. Here they had their strongpoint, well prepared and stubbornly defended.   Further to the west, the 65th regiment advance was much slower than expected for Stilwell.  Upon reaching the Hukawng Valley, the 65th's commander, despite means more than ample for his mission, contracted the same lethargy that had hastened the demise of the 112th Regiment. Stilwell was greatly frustrated by the delay a few more weeks with Colonel Fu, so he ordered Colonel Liao to relieve him. Stilwell wrote in his diary "Told Liao this included division commanders unless they watched their step. Also that Fu really should be shot. Liao took it OK though it shook him up." On January 22, General Sun was told about this affair, but the news softened somewhat by the presentation of a silk banner for the victory at Yupbang Ga, a dramatic contrast of the respective awards for lethargy and vigor. Having made his point, and hoping that he had given the Chinese a healthy shock, Stilwell restored Fu to his command by January 26. Fu's later performance in combat was rated as excellent.   The Chinese managed to encircle the passive 3rd battalion, 55th regiment on January 23rd, and by the 25th the last Japanese pockets were wiped out. On the 26th the Chinese reached Ahawk Hka and on the 28th crossed the Taro river and occupied Taro on the 30th. This effectively cut behind Tanaka's flank. The bulk of the 112th now was close enough to the 113th to aid them so Sun began an attack against Taihpa Ga on the 30th. The Japanese held on stubbornly for days and would quietly withdrew on the night of February 4th. Tanaka concluded the loss of the Taro plain meant "the failure of the whole division in its operations along the Tanai". Thus Tanaka decided there was no point in continuing the fighting there. Over at Sanip, Sun ordered the 3rd battalion, 114th regiment to rest. However Stilwell thought this was close to disobedience of his orders,  because he wanted Sun to move quickly and cut behind the 18th Division. On January 13, he had spoken very bluntly to Sun, asking him what orders he gave the 114th Regiment and if there had been any word from Chongqing to slow the operation. Stilwell told Sun that if he could not exercise the commands that Peanut had given him, he would resign and report the whole affair to the US Government. "Regardless of what anyone else may say, I assure you that my report will be fully believed in Washington." General Sun was confronted with the prospect that Chinese lethargy in north Burma might mean withdrawal of all US help from China. Stilwell, Sun was told, had been alone in his fight to convince the United States that the Chinese Army was worth helping. "If I am double-crossed by the people I am trying to help I am through for good and I will recommend very radical measures." Stilwell closed by saying that he had done his part; would Sun reciprocate? But despite Stilwell's arguments and threats, General Sun did not meet Stilwell's ideas of how a dynamic field commander should conduct himself. Thus the 114th gradually began to dislodge the Japanese from their positions along the river bank, taking care to annihilate all pockets behind. Stilwell was satisfied with the progress of his offensive and established the northern combat area command on February 1st. This organization would be led by Brigadier General Haydon Boatner and would include American, British and Indian units entering North Burma. But that is all for the wild Burma front as we now need to travel over to New Guinea.   Last time we were in New Guinea, Brigadier Chilton's 18th brigade had just completed their advance upon Shaggy Ridge and Brigadier Hammer's 15th brigade had just relieved the 25th brigade on January 7th. Thus two brigades were flown in and two were flown out, showcasing how far the allied New Guinea air forces had increased their efficiency during the war. The New Guinea force was now under the command of General Milford, though Vasey still retained his task of  "contain hostile forces in the Bogadjim-Ramu area by vigorous action of fighting patrols against enemy posts”. The division's role was still to prevent enemy penetration into the Ramu-Markham valley from Madang and protect the Gusap airfield and the various radar installations the instruction added that the division would "create the impression of offensive operations against Bogadjim Road by vigorous local minor offensive action". This was to be done by holding in strength with two brigades a "line of localities" from Toms' Post on the right to the Mene River on the left, the boundary between the 18th on the right and the 15th on the left being a line from Bebei through Herald Hill to Kankirei Saddle. In addition the 18th Brigade would "by raids and harassing tactics ensure that no major Jap withdrawal takes place undetected and occupy the Mindjim-Faria divide and the high ground to the north and south of it as the administrative position permits". The 15th Brigade would hold the Yogia-Mene River area, delay any enemy advance up the Ramu from the Evapia River, patrol to the Solu River, and deny the 5800 and 5500 Features to the enemy.    Despite this, Vasey was preparing to assault the Kankirei saddle with the fresh 18th brigade. Designated Operation Cutthroat, the seizure of the Kankieri saddle and ultimately that of Shaggy Ridge, Vasey planned to launch an attack against Mount Prothero which was being defended by the 6th company, 78th regiment. He would attack it from the south, preceded by a diversionary attack against Cam's saddle. Brigadier Chilton realized however, that frontal attacks along Shaggy Ridge would not be able to achieve surprise, so he instead wanted to attempt a wide encircling maneuver on the left flank via Canning's saddle to attack Prothero directly. The 18th brigade spent the early part of January patrolling to see if it was possible to advance through Canning's saddle to Prothero 1 while simultaneously and stealthily building a road to Canning's in preparation for the coming offensive.   The possibility of occupying Prothero from Canning's Saddle had been suggested to Chilton by Lt-Colonel Lang of the 2/2nd Pioneers, after a patrol performed by Captain McInnes. Captain McInnes had found an approach along a steep, razor backed spur within a short distance of Prothero's summit where they could hear Japanese. Meanwhile the 2/9th battalion had sent a patrol that found a possible track from McGullough's ridge vie Geyton's Hill to the Mene River. Going up the river bed led one to Canning's saddle. Two companies of the 2/12th spent a few days constructing a track going to the Mene River and they took special precautions to prevent the enemy from finding out. Reconnaissance patrols in general were careful to avoid contact with the enemy and so was the case around Prothero. The jeep track was hurriedly pushed to Guy's Post, existing tracks were improved and shorter and better tracks constructed to improve the supply routes to Shaggy Ridge and Mainstream; reserves of supplies in forward areas were built up, thus enabling a concentration of as many natives as possible to carry for the attacking battalion on the left, and arrangements were made for a limited air dropping at Canning's Saddle at an appropriate time.   To support the upcoming attack, 9 long and two short 25 pounders of the 2/4th field regiment were brought up along with 7000 shells. The guns had to be dragged forward to the Lakes-Guy's Post area. Lt Colonel Charles Bourne's 2/12th battalion was to head the attack. Chilton also planned to have Lt Colonel Charles Geard's 2/10th battalion perform a diversionary attack through Cam's saddle. After Protharo 1 was captured, the 2/10th were to exploit north to Kankieri and south to the Mainstream area; while Lt Colonel Clement Cummins 2/9th battalion attacked northwest along Shaggy Ridge to join up with the 2/12th. By January 18th, the 4000 yard track to Geyton's Hill was complete, allowing the 18th brigade to advance. On that same day, B-25 Mitchell bombers unleashed their cannons and bombed the enemy positions at the junction of Mainstream, the Faria and Shaggy ridge. They dropped 60 delayed action bombs over the Faria river valley and some modified Mitchells sporting 75mm cannons mounted on their chins fired upon the crest of ridges. This cannon, the same used by Sherman tanks, was quite a formidable weapon in the air. To enable its fire, the nose of the B-25G model had to be shortened and the cannon breech positioned behind the pilot from where it could be loaded by the navigator for firing. To fire it the pilot would press a button on his control wheel. The weapon would prove inefficient against shipping, but it would be a lot more successful at hitting ground targets. Over three successive days from 18 to 20 January the Mitchells flew 180 sorties against Shaggy Ridge, firing 135 rounds of 75 mm at the ridge as well as dropping around 200 tons of bombs. The aircraft also fired about 90,000 rounds of .50 caliber. The machine-gun salvos were particularly devastating. From his accompanying Boomerang, Alex Miller-Randle recalled ‘Mitchells strip the trees of Shaggy Ridge clean and shatter the limbs and trunks to matchsticks'.   D-day was the 20th, seeing the 2/10th on the right and 2/12th on the left. Captain Kumnicks company of the 2/10th advanced to Grassy Patch and over on the left a party of the 2/12th led by Major Fraser took vanguard. All of the preliminary actions were completed back on the 19th when Captain Gunn's A company of the 2/10th advanced from Tom's Post for Sprogg's ridge via a Japanese mule track. Later Captain Humnicks D company would use the same track. On the left the 2/12th battalion and B and D company of the 2/2nd Pioneers advanced along the new line of communication to Geyton's. At 8:45am Captain Gunn's company advanced from Sprogg's ridge to attack Cam's Saddle, followed 30 minutes later by Captain Kumnick's company. Operation Cutthroat opened up with artillery and B-25 mitchell bombardments against the Protheros and Kankirei Saddle. By 11 a .m. Captain Gunn was 300 yards from an enemy position on Cam's Saddle while artillery shelled the position until 12.30 pm when the Australians found that the enemy had withdrawn.   Farther on, Captain Gunn's men would be pinned down by Japanese defending the western end of the saddle as Japanese patrols ambushed a signal line party 500 yards behind. Gunn initially tried to outflank the enemy, but then withdrew 200 yards and dug in for the night astride the mule track. At the same time, the 2/12th battalion reached Canning's Saddle by 3:30pm. The next morning, the 2/12th began to silently creep along the razor back ridge towards Prothero 1 with Cameron's C Company taking the lead. At this point Fraser had Captain Cameron's C Company, Captain Geason's A Company  and Captain Thomas's D company enveloping the ridge. They nearly achieved surprise, but the Japanese discovered their advance and rapidly turned their mountain gun upon them causing many casualties. Despite the mountain guns fire, Lt Braithwaites 8th Platoon charged the Japanese and captured the mountain gun upon Prothero 1. The action cost 11 Australian lives with another 44 wounded. The 2/12th had thus captured the key point in the Japanese defenses upon Shaggy Ridge. After the loss of the mountain gun position, Colonel Matsumoto ordered his men to pull back closer to Kankirei. In the process the 2/10th were able to capture Cam's Saddle. On that same day the 2/9th began their attack, sending A Company to envelope the Green Sniper's Pimple defended by a platoon of the 78th regiment. A Company managed to seize the position using stealth and would be met by failed counterattacks. By the end of the day the Japanese defenders were now sandwiched between the 2/9th to the south and the 2/12th to the north, while the 2/10th were advancing from the east.   Way further to the east, General Nakano's men were in an even more dire situation. After the evacuation of Sio, the Japanese were forced to retreat day and night under heavy rainfall, hindered by rough terrain and allied aerial attacks. Lieutenant General Yoshihara Kane, Chief of Staff of the 18th Army, recalled this of the march: “The most wearing part was that with these ranges, when they climbed to the craggy summit they had to descend and then climb again, and the mountains seemed to continue indefinitely, until they were at the extreme of exhaustion. Especially when they trod the frost of Nokobo Peak they were overwhelmed by cold and hunger. At times they had to make ropes out of vines and rattan and adopt "rock-climbing" methods; or they crawled and slipped on the steep slopes; or on the waterless mountain roads they cut moss in their potatoes and steamed them. In this manner, for three months, looking down at the enemy beneath their feet, they continued their move. Another thing which made the journey difficult was the valley streams, which were not usually very dangerous. At times, however, there was a violent squall, for which the Finisterres are famous during the rainy season; then these valley streams for the time being flowed swiftly and became cataracts. Then there were many people drowned... General Shoge was swept away by one of these streams on one occasion but fortunately managed to grasp the branch of a tree which was near the bank and was able to save one of his nine lives.”   The men were malnourished, fatigued, but kept going day by day anticipating an abundant food supply at Gali. When they reached Gali in late January they would find nothing there. This anguish was just the beginning. The base had been shelled by allied warships and bombed by allied aircraft. General Muroya was injured on January 17th during the bombardment. Luckily for the Japanese there was no offensive towards Gali. Since the Saidor landing, General Martin's men were busy expanding the perimeter with outposts extending towards Sel and Bilau. Martin was reinforced with the 1st and 3rd battalions of the 128th regiment on January 16th. Although Martin believed launching an eastern attack upon the withdrawing enemy would provide an excellent opportunity to destroy some of their divisions, General Kreuger refused to permit such a thing. This was because the 32nd division was required for an upcoming offensive in the Hansa Bay area.   Meanwhile General Nakai had brought the bulk of his detachment over to the Mot River area and established a strong outpost on Gabumi. Nakai also sent the 3rd battalion 239th regiment to Bilau to try and contest the control of its outpost. On January 12, the Japanese attacked Biliau, forcing the Americans to retreat behind the river. 30 Americans then tried to retake the outpost the following day but were repelled by the Japanese. On January 15th, the Japanese withdrew, allowing the 1st Battalion, 128th Regiment to occupy it on January 20. Another Japanese attack on January 26 would force them to retreat; and two days later, the Americans were successfully ambushed when they tried to reoccupy the outpost. Nakano's men had thus successfully carried out a fighting withdrawal from Lae. They had suffered horribly for it, crossing unbelievable difficult terrain, with basically no supplies, apart from what meager amounts could be airdropped or brought over via submarine. Yet now they needed to break through towards Madang, and there were 3 possible options of doing so. Number 1, they could advance along the coast, but this one was disregarded immediately because they would have to break directly through the new American defenses. Number 2, codenamed A would be an advance inland through Cabutamon, Monara, Sibog and Bilau towards Mindiri. Option 3 codenamed B was an advance even further inland crossing over the foothills of the Finisterre, through Nokopo, Kwembum, Yugayuga, Gabumi and Singor towards Mindiri. Nakano elected to send the 20th division over plan A while his division would advance in 3 echelons over plan B.   On January 23rd, the 51st division departed Gali along the B route while the 1st battalion, 115th regiment and General Katagiri's 20th division would advance along the A route. Katagiri's 80th regiment and 20th engineer regiment tried the best they could, but the march was only advancing a single kilometer per day. Katagiri's troops had to cut through dense jungle and were facing strong enemy patrols along their route. Facing greater difficulties than expected, Katagiri decided to follow Nakano's 51st division along the A route in the end. Yet unbeknownst to him, the 3rd battalion, 126th regiment had just established new outposts at Sibog and Paramusi on January 22nd. From there they were sending out patrols to Langani and Sindaman. The Americans still could not break through Nakai's defenses at Gabumi giving the Japanese some relief. The bulk of Nakano's forces were withdrawing smoothly, seeing just sporadic harassment from American patrols. On the 1st of February, the 1st battalion, 115th regiment finally made contact with Nakai's forces at Gabumi while the bulk of the 51st division advanced through Yugayuga. A week later, Nakano himself reached Gabumi and began advancing towards Madang. By the 16th of February, the 1st battalion, 115th regiment reached Madang and the 20th division had successfully pulled out of Gabumi.   Late February would see 1667 men in total arrive at Madang, 5469 would reach Singor and 1235 would reach Gabumi. Thus 80% of Nakano's strength had effectively withdrawn. Nakai also managed to collect 500 patients that had been abandoned at Yugayuga and brought them over to Madang by March 1st. It seemed once again, Nakano's men had escaped doom. On the other side, Brigadier Cameron had begun his advance towards Saidor on January 25th. His 4th battalion led by Lt Colonel Percy Crosky, with a Papuan company reached Kiari on January 28th. Without taking a break they continued towards Singor the next day, then Malasanga and Crossingtown by the 31st.   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Japanese were slowly but surely losing their hold over Shaggy Ridge. With the loss of the vital artillery position it was just a matter of time before the Australians took over the area, meanwhile Nakano's great retreat was a success, but one does not win a war moving backwards. 

The Peter Zeihan Podcast Series
The Ukraine War & the Battle of Avdiivka || Peter Zeihan

The Peter Zeihan Podcast Series

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 5, 2024 6:46


Arguably the most brutal battle of the Ukraine War is now in its fourth month: the battle of Avdiivka. Let's take a deep look at its strategic importance for both sides. Full Newsletter: https://mailchi.mp/zeihan/the-ukraine-war-the-battle-of-avdiivka

Pastor Deborah’s Podcast – Agape Love Ministry
Agape Love’s War, The Battle of 2 Kingdoms- Rumble # 4, For We Wrestle Not Against Flesh & Blood

Pastor Deborah’s Podcast – Agape Love Ministry

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 18, 2023 31:06


Welcome to Episode # 4 of Agape Love's War, The Battle of 2 Kingdoms on Rumble's Social Media Podcasting Platform and here on YouTube. This is #4 entitled, We Wrestle Not Against Flesh & Blood. References 1. Zoom Pro 2. Pixabay.org, motion videos 3. The Authorized King James Bible 4. Rumble Show with Pastor Deborah at https://rumble.com/c/c-1837635 Each video is also placed on Agape Love, Love Is Here's web site at https://www.agapeloveishere.org Also each video is freely podcasted out to a free Podcast Show which all are accessible on the front page of the web site on the left hand side of the page. Also, each Podcast can be found on the following apps 1. Find Us On These Apps Available on PocketCasts Available on PodFriend Available on Overcast Here is a list of the Podcast Shows of Pastor Deborah and Agape Love, Love Is Here's Global Ministry of Spiritual Teachings 1. Agape Love Podcast Listen on Google Play Music Listen on Itunes Listen on TuneIn Listen on Stitcher Listen on iHeartRadio Listen on Amazon Music 2. Mental Health And The Forever Person Podcast Listen on Google Play Music Listen on Itunes Listen on TuneIn Listen on Stitcher Listen on iHeartRadio Listen on Amazon Music 3. Setting The Captives Free Podcast Listen on Google Play Music Listen on Itunes Listen on TuneIn Listen on Stitcher Listen on iHeartRadio Listen on Amazon Music 4. The King And The Kingdom Podcast Listen on Google Play Music Listen on Itunes Listen on TuneIn Listen on Stitcher Listen on iHeartRadio Listen on Amazon Music 5. International Spiritual Care University Podcast Listen on Google Play Music Listen on Itunes Listen on TuneIn Listen on Stitcher Listen on iHeartRadio Listen on Amazon Music 6. Story Time Podcast Listen on Google Play Music Listen on Itunes Listen on TuneIn Listen on Stitcher Listen on iHeartRadio Listen on Amazon Music 7. Tele-Ministry Podcast Listen on Google Play Music Listen on Itunes Listen on TuneIn Listen on Stitcher Listen on iHeartRadio Listen on Amazon Music 8. Audio Books Podcast Listen on Itunes Listen on TuneIn Listen on Stitcher Listen on iHeartRadio Listen on Amazon Music 9. School of Light Podcast Listen on Itunes Listen on TuneIn Listen on Stitcher Listen on iHeartRadio Listen on Amazon Music Also you can continue to follow Agape Love, Love Is Here and Pastor Deborah on it's Global Network of YouTube Channels at the following Channels 1. For Children of All Ages at / @forchildrenofallages3607 2. The Light of Love Channel at / @thelightoflove3730 You can also interact and following Pastor Deborah and Community of The Hidden Kingdoms at / @ucwx9kbenotphg7mpjquijlw / @thehiddenkingdoms 3. and on the Playlist called YouTube Shorts at • The Kingdom Within You - Part # 1, A... You can also following Pastor Deborah and Agape Love on Spreaker at https://www.spreaker.com/user/16790962 And also on Twitter at / agapeloveishere and on LinkedIn at / pastor-deborah-schleich-b54724177

Setting The Captives Free Podcast – Agape Love Ministry
Agape Love’s War, The Battle of 2 Kingdoms- Rumble # 4, For We Wrestle Not Against Flesh & Blood

Setting The Captives Free Podcast – Agape Love Ministry

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 18, 2023 31:06


Welcome to Episode # 4 of Agape Love's War, The Battle of 2 Kingdoms on Rumble's Social Media Podcasting Platform and here on YouTube. This is #4 entitled, We Wrestle Not Against Flesh & Blood. References 1. Zoom Pro 2. Pixabay.org, motion videos 3. The Authorized King James Bible 4. Rumble Show with Pastor Deborah at https://rumble.com/c/c-1837635 Each video is also placed on Agape Love, Love Is Here's web site at https://www.agapeloveishere.org Also each video is freely podcasted out to a free Podcast Show which all are accessible on the front page of the web site on the left hand side of the page. Also, each Podcast can be found on the following apps 1. Find Us On These Apps Available on PocketCasts Available on PodFriend Available on Overcast Here is a list of the Podcast Shows of Pastor Deborah and Agape Love, Love Is Here's Global Ministry of Spiritual Teachings 1. Agape Love Podcast Listen on Google Play Music Listen on Itunes Listen on TuneIn Listen on Stitcher Listen on iHeartRadio Listen on Amazon Music 2. Mental Health And The Forever Person Podcast Listen on Google Play Music Listen on Itunes Listen on TuneIn Listen on Stitcher Listen on iHeartRadio Listen on Amazon Music 3. Setting The Captives Free Podcast Listen on Google Play Music Listen on Itunes Listen on TuneIn Listen on Stitcher Listen on iHeartRadio Listen on Amazon Music 4. The King And The Kingdom Podcast Listen on Google Play Music Listen on Itunes Listen on TuneIn Listen on Stitcher Listen on iHeartRadio Listen on Amazon Music 5. International Spiritual Care University Podcast Listen on Google Play Music Listen on Itunes Listen on TuneIn Listen on Stitcher Listen on iHeartRadio Listen on Amazon Music 6. Story Time Podcast Listen on Google Play Music Listen on Itunes Listen on TuneIn Listen on Stitcher Listen on iHeartRadio Listen on Amazon Music 7. Tele-Ministry Podcast Listen on Google Play Music Listen on Itunes Listen on TuneIn Listen on Stitcher Listen on iHeartRadio Listen on Amazon Music 8. Audio Books Podcast Listen on Itunes Listen on TuneIn Listen on Stitcher Listen on iHeartRadio Listen on Amazon Music 9. School of Light Podcast Listen on Itunes Listen on TuneIn Listen on Stitcher Listen on iHeartRadio Listen on Amazon Music Also you can continue to follow Agape Love, Love Is Here and Pastor Deborah on it's Global Network of YouTube Channels at the following Channels 1. For Children of All Ages at / @forchildrenofallages3607 2. The Light of Love Channel at / @thelightoflove3730 You can also interact and following Pastor Deborah and Community of The Hidden Kingdoms at / @ucwx9kbenotphg7mpjquijlw / @thehiddenkingdoms 3. and on the Playlist called YouTube Shorts at • The Kingdom Within You - Part # 1, A... You can also following Pastor Deborah and Agape Love on Spreaker at https://www.spreaker.com/user/16790962 And also on Twitter at / agapeloveishere and on LinkedIn at / pastor-deborah-schleich-b54724177

Diversity in Fellowship
The Woke War: The Battle over the Environment

Diversity in Fellowship

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 5, 2023 32:04


Another area of battle for the woke wars is the environment. What does being "woke" have to do with that? How should we as Christians respond?

The Pacific War - week by week
- 106 - Pacific War - The Battle of Cape St George, November 28 - 5 December, 1943

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 29, 2023 38:18


Last time we spoke about operation Galvanic, the invasion of the Gilbert islands. The Americans finally assaulted Tarawa, Makin, Betio and the smaller islands of the Gilberts. Tarawa saw an estimated 4690 Japanese and Koreans killed, with 17 Japanese and 129 Koreans POWs captured. The Marines suffered 1009 deaths, 2101 wounded and 191 missing in action. Vandegrift would tell the New York Times on December 27th "Tarawa was an assault from beginning to end. We must steel ourselves now to pay that price". The heavy casualties would be met by an outraged american public who could not believe such losses were necessary to take such small and seemingly unimportant islands. Little did the American public know, the lessons of places like Tarawa, were just one of many more to come. Admiral Nimitz would spend considerable time reading furious letters from the letters of the dead boys on these islands. This episode is battle of Cape St George Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  The Gilberts, specifically Tarawa, provided the first “wake up call” to American about the ferocity of the war ahead of them. Correspondents were not present at Henderson Field during the Marine battle for Gaudalcanal where the Americans found themselves defenders and the Japanese attackers. 6 months of grueling battle would see casualties approximating those incurred after three days on Tarawa. Correspondent Richard Johnston was one of the first to write of the action for Time magazine “It has been a privilege to see the Marines from privates to colonels, every man a hero, go up against Japanese fire with complete disregard for their lives.“Last week some two to three thousand US Marines, most of them dead and wounded, gave the nation a name to stand beside those of Concord Bridge, the Bonhomme Richard, the Alamo, Little Big Horn and Belleau Wood. The name was Tarawa.”” Johnston was one of 25 war correspondents, 5 photographers and two artists embedded with the marines in the Gilberts. Never in history had a battle been so fully covered by the press. The amphibious landings drew immense casualty rates and during the active fighting, the mortality rate per 1000 soldiers per day was 1.78 compared to 0.36 in europe, thats nearly 5 times more. Overall casualty rates, including the wounded were 5.5 per thousand per day compared to 1.74 for europe. The war correspondents learnt a lot about the fighting qualities of their marines, but they also learnt a great deal about the enemy. The battles frequently saw hand-to-hand combat. The Americans were shocked to find the enemy were not in fact short, bucktoothed, bespectacled “Japs” as the propaganda cartoons had portrayed them. Private 1st class Robert Muhlbach recalled many of the enemy were over 6 feet tall and “They were good at defending themselves, and so we had to parry and thrust, and they were good! Those guys were so much bigger than the average Jap. They were naval landing forces [Rikusentai], like Japanese Marines, and they were larger. They were very accurate with their weapons, and good with their bayonets … They were good and we were pretty good, too. So it was two of probably the best military outfits in the war.” One Lt Thomas encountered some hand to hand fighting and said “ I had the field telephone in my hand when I was rushed by the biggest Jap I've ever seen. We grappled for a few seconds, and I managed to kick him off me and throw him to the ground. Then I picked up a 0.45 and finished him off.” General Holland Smith who commanded the marines had this to say about Tarawa “I don't see how they ever took Tarawa. It's the most completely defended island I ever saw … I passed boys who had lived yesterday a thousand times and looked older than their fathers. Dirty, unshaven, with gaunt sightless eyes, they had survived the ordeal, but it had chilled their souls. They found it hard to believe they were actually alive …” He was not to be the only high ranking commander stunned by what occurred on such a small island. Admiral Nimitz wrote to his wife  “I have never seen such a desolate spot as Tarawa. General Richardson, who saw battlefields in France last year, says it reminded him of the Ypres field, over which the battle raged back and forth for weeks. Not a coconut tree of thousands was left whole …” Nimitz would read countless letters beginning with “you killed my son on Tarawa”. The mothers of 1009 marines and 687 naval personnel would never see their sons again. The invasion of the gilberts had ushered in what is commonly known as the “island hoping campaign” vs what was called Leapfrogging in the south pacific. As told to us by General Douglas MacArthur “Although we've already seen many instances of American forces launching amphibious invasions against Japanese-held islands, particularly at the Solomons, there is one difference to be made. The strategy employed in the South Pacific is often referred to as leapfrogging, and the explanation comes from General MacArthur himself, who claimed to have invented this strategy despite it predating WW2 by many decades.    My strategic conception for the Pacific Theater, which I outlined after the Papuan Campaign and have since consistently advocated, contemplates massive strokes against only main strategic objectives, utilizing surprise and air-ground striking power supported and assisted by the fleet. This is the very opposite of what is termed island hopping which is the gradual pushing back of the enemy by direct frontal pressure with the consequent heavy casualties which will certainly be involved. Key points must of course be taken but a wise choice of such will obviate the need for storming the mass of islands now in enemy possession. Island hopping with extravagant losses and slow progress ... is not my idea of how to end the war as soon and as cheaply as possible. New conditions require for solution and new weapons require for maximum application of new and imaginative methods. Wars are never won in the past.””   With the capture of the Gilberts, now the allies had an assortment of new air bases for land based aircraft to be used against the Marshalls. The seabees and 7th air force engineers rapidly went to work on airfield construction at Tarawa and Makin. Yet there were many who questioned if it really was all worth it, amongst them was General Holland Smith "Was Tarawa worth it? My answer is unqualified: No." He questioned whether 1772 lives and an escort carrier was worth the additional air fields. The invasion taught a lot of bitter lessons, such as how to improve the preliminary naval bombardments and air strikes so they would be more successful; to improve the capability of naval fleets to move into a area and obtain control over it; for naval and aerial assets to remain in the area for the throughout the entire assault; the vital importance of maintaining good communications between land and sea and between the tanks and infantry which proved rather lackluster at Tarawa; the value of amphibian tractors when you had to face fortified beaches and most importantly Operation Galvanic proved to be a significant testing ground of established amphibious doctrine. The Americans had no illusions that the techniques, tactics and procedures set for in the basic US manuals for landing operations were workable under such difficult conditions. On the other side, the Japanese had prepared the Ko Brigade at Ponape consisting of the 3rd battalion, 107th regiment, 3rd battalion, 16th mountain artillery regiment, 2nd company, 52nd engineers and other units of the 1st south seas detachment to launch a counterlanding against the Gilberts, but this plan was quickly dropped. Instead the Japanese would focus their efforts on reinforcing other central pacific islands such as the Marshalls. Over on Bougainville, the Americans were enjoying a rather quiet week after the battle of the Coconut Grove and they used this time to expand their perimeter. However there was a hiccup on November 17th when convoy 31.6 bearing the 3rd battalion, 21st marines were set upon by Betty bombers. 185 marines were aboard the destroyer transport McKean and as she approached Empress Augusta Bay a Betty hit her with a torpedo off her starboard quarter. This exploded her after magazine and depth charge spaces. Flaming oil engulfed her, she lost power and communications. Her commanding officer Lt Ralph Ramey ordered abandon ship at 3:55am as she began to sink stern first by 4am. 64 crew and 52 troops died as a result of the attack. Meanwhile Colonel Hamanoue's men had been busy constructing defenses around the forks of the Piva River. By the 18th, American patrols discovered two new Japanese roadblocks on the Numa Numa and East-West trails. This led the 3rd battalion ,3rd marines to be tasked with knocking out the Numa Numa roadblock. The marines opened the following day up with an artillery barrage before rolling in with some light tanks flanking and rousing the defenders of the roadblock. 16 Japanese would be killed. With the Numa Numa position secured, the men advanced over to hit the East-West roadblock. That same morning the 2nd battalion, 3rd marines crossed the Piva and captured the roadblock at the forks area. During the afternoon, a reinforced platoon seized some high ground to the left of the East-West Trail. The platoon led by Lt Steve Cibek dug in on top of the feature that would provide excellent observation over the area. The Japanese would toss attacks at their hill for 3 days prompting reinforcements to be brought up to help Cibeks men. On the 21st, General Geiger decided to expand the perimeter again, this time to Inland Defense line “easy”. The 21st marines would now take up a position between the other two regiments. They would however run into some strong resistance from the bulk of Colonel Hamanoue's focus with their 3rd battalion getting pinned down after crossing the Piva by heavy mortar fire. Their 2nd battalion in the center ran head on into a Japanese defensive line astride the East-West trail. There were around 20 pillboxes and the 2nd battalion were forced to pull back. Unexpectedly the Japanese pursued them, trying to envelop the line held by the 1st battalion, but they failed and were cut down by machine gun fire. This allowed the 1st battalion to extend their lines north towards what was now being called Cibek's ridge. Geiger then halted the advances on November 22nd and shifted his units the following day to plug up some gaps in the line. He further planned to launch a new assault on the 24th. The 24th began with a heavy artillery bombardment as the 2nd and 3rd battalions, 3rd marine began advancing under the supporting first of the 1st battalion. At H-hour, 9:00am, a Japanese battery located on the forward slope of a coconut grove began to accurately smash the 1st battalions assembly locations. As one observer noted  “Shells poured into the first lines, into the attacking battalions' areas, the forward Regimental C.P. area, the rear C.P., the trail. The noise was much greater now-not only the deafening roar, but, added to it, the sharp terrifying sound of a shell exploding close by ... the agonizing moans of men shouting for corpsmen, for help, for relief from burning torture ... the maniacal screams and sobs of a man whose blood vessels in his head have burst from the blast concussions of high explosives devised by the clever brain of civilized man. The Third Battalion took it. The C.P. area took it to the tune of fourteen men killed and scores wounded in a period of five minutes." The 1st battalion quickly became pinned down. Fortunately Cibeks men were able to locate the battery and used 155mm howitzers to destroy it. At first the advance saw little resistance, as described by one historian of the 3rd marines "For the first hundred yards both battalions advanced abreast through a weird, stinking, plowed-up jungle of shattered trees and butchered Japs. Some hung out of trees, some lay crumpled and twisted beside their shattered weapons, some were covered by chunks of jagged logs and jungle earth, a blasted bunker, their self-made tomb. The Marines pressed forward on their destructive mission toward their clearly defined day's objective." Yet Japanese reserves were rushed to the scene and began engaging the 3rd marines. The 3rd marines were facing extremely accurate enemy artillery and mortar fire taking heavy casualties. The advancing americans would have to destroy a series of bunkers one by one while at the same time repelling the enemy's counterattacks. After already suffering 70 casualties going a quarter mile the Americans fired upon log bunker after log bunker one by one. The Japanese targeted American flamethrower units killing a number of them. Around every defense point Japanese snipers in trees and on elevated platforms fired upon them. Nambu machine guns were firing at all times. The terrain eventually dictated hand to hand and tree to tree combat. Though grueling, the Americans reached their first objective. The men reorganized their positions and unleashed a new artillery barrage with the two battalion advancing yet again against fierce resistance. It was not just the enemy they faced, the terrain in this area was dominated by swamps. General Geiger then postponed the attack to secure the terrain above the proposed airfield site so he could provide his men with a Thanksgiving meal. For thanksgiving the turkey meals were sent forward to the front with parties organized, braving Japanese sniper fire. One observer recalled “Some of the meat got there, some didn't. But it was a good stunt and a necessity; no one would have been forgiven if it had been left to rot down at the Division Commissary just because we had a battle! The men sat on logs eating their turkey. Nearby a Jap lay rotting in the swamp. Heads and arms of dead Japs floated in the near-by jungle streams. Not a very enjoyable setting, but these were tired, ravenously hungry men who had been fighting all day. And it was Thanksgiving. Those who were able to get it enjoyed their turkey.” By nightfall the resistance was crumbling and the Americans were grabbing a mile beyond the objective line before digging in. Mop up operations would be around the clock, but the battle of Piva forks had effectively come to an end, thus securing the site for a projected bomber field. The battle cost the Japanese dearly. Hamanoue's 23rd regiment ceased to exist as a well organized fighting unit. The marines counted 1107 dead Japanese, though it is likely the number was much higher. The 3rd marines suffered 115 casualties, thus earning some relief from the 9th marines for many days. On November 25th, the 1st battalion, 9th marines advanced past Cibeks ridge and unexpectedly ran into heavy machine gun fire from a small feature directly in front. They charged at the feature and tossed grenades, but the Japanese were able to repel their attack, thus the feature was named Grenade Hill.  Meanwhile General Hyakutake feared that the invasion of Cape Torokina was only a stepping stone for a large invasion against Buka. He persuaded Admiral Kusaka to further reinforce Buka. Previously Major General Kijima Kesao's 17t infantry group had been dispatched on 5 destroyers to protect Bougainvilles northern sector. No Captain Kagawa Kiyoto would perform a run to Buka on the 24th. Luckily for him his run went uncontested and he was able to unload 900 men of the 1st mobile raiding unit and a detachment of the 17th engineer regiment. At the same time he evacuated over 700 aviation personnel no longer required on Buka as her airfield was destroyed. Kiyoto's movement however was soon discovered by the Americans. Admiral Halsey, never one to let up a fight, immediately dispatched 5 destroyers, the Ausburne, Claxton, Dyson, Converse and Spence under Captain Burke to intercept them. Kiyoto had departed Buka shortly after midnight, while Burke lurked near them. American radar gave Burke an enormous advantage in first detection and he knew how to use it. At 1:41am after the initial radar contact was gained at 22,000 yards, Burke turned east to close in more. The Japanese were oblivious as Burkes force closed in at just 5500 yards when at 1:55am he ordered all his destroyers to fire 5 torpedoes each before the force made a hard turn to the south to avoid retaliation. Lookouts on the Japanese flagship Onami only spotted the American destroyers when it was too late. Kiyoto's force were absolutely shredded by the torpedo volley. Onami took several hits and sunk without a single survivor; Makinami took a single torpedo hit and managed to stay afloat, but greatly crippled. Burkes force pushed it to the limit going 33 knots to overtake the IJN vessels as they tried to flee while firing upon them using 5 inch guns. Yugiri turned to fire 3 torpedoes, but Burke foresaw the maneuver and executed a well timed evasion. The torpedoes exploded in the wake of Burkes flagship. It devolved into a running gun battle until 2:25 when the Japanese dispersed. 60 miles off Cape St George, Burke's three destroyers concentrated their 5 inch guns on Yugiri which received a critical hit at 3:05am crippling her speed. Yugiri was outgunned and outmaneuvered, so her captain turned her around to fire their remaining torpedoes and engage in a suicidal gun battle. At 3:15 Yugiri received another hit causing a tremendous explosion and would sink by 3:28. Meanwhile the crippled Makinami was finished off with torpedoes and gunfire. The two other Japanese destroyers managed to flee westwards, but Burke could not pursue as it was too close to Rabaul. The Japanese suffered terrible losses, aboard Onami all but 228 men died; aboard Makinami all but 28 out of 200 perished, from Yugiri there were 278 survivors out of 497 crew and troops. For the Americans, it was a brilliant victory and it demonstrated how far the IJN's super human night fighting ability had fallen to allied radar innovation. Burkes victory was described “as an almost perfect action” and he was awarded a Navy Cross. But now we have to head over to Green Hell where the battle for Sattelberg was raging. General Katagiri's counteroffensive that was launched back on November 22nd did not produce the results he was expecting. General Wootten predicted the 238th regiment would attack from the north while the bulk of the 79th regiment would hit from the northwest. Both of these forces had to cross the Song River to hit their main target, Brigadier Porters position at Scarlet Beach. The 2/43rd battalion took the lionshare of the assault with their B company under Captain Gorden successfully repelling the attempts by the 238th regiment to infiltrate. At around 8am, 15 Japanese tried to get between his right flank and the sea. By 9am some telephone lines to the HQ were cut, gradually the Japanese infiltrators were hunted and killed. Meanwhile the Fujii detachment had been created to take back Pabu hill. Unable to get past the Australian machine gun positions, Japanese mortars and 75 mm guns from Pino Hill began to bombard them. The Australians took heavy casualties but would not budge. Lt Colonel Thomas Scott sent small parties to harass the Japanese rear when they attempted an offensive. Fearing the 2/32nd battalion would soon be trapped, Porter sent his reserve D company over to reinforce them. However as D company crossed the Song river, Colonel Hayashida began to attack the Australian perimeter, applying considerable pressure on the positions held by the 2/43rd. Around noon, D company intercepted a Japanese thrust across the Surpine Valley. At 1pm D company saw the enemy force near some huts and began calling artillery strikes down upon them. As they attacked the Japanese it forces them into a more confined area near a creek. The Australians surrounded them, but the Japanese used captured anti-tank mines as booby traps. The Australians backed off somewhat trying to contain the Japanese into a pocket as they hit them with mortars. By 5:40 the Australians dug in and during the night the Japanese would withdraw after losing 43 men.  November 22nd saw the Japanese suffer 89 deaths while the Australians only had 1. With this Wooten felt the Japanese counteroffensive was most likely defeated and prepared to respond against what seemed to be Katagiri's last attempt to turn the tide of battle. For the Japanese, the attack of D company had completely disorganized their counteroffensive. They had estimated the Australians had sent 3 to 4 battalions instead of a single company to reinforce Pabu Hill and this action had the dual effect of cutting off the road between Wareo and Bonga. Colonel Hayashida had no choice but to redirect units of his regiment to defend the northern bank of the song and try to prevent the reinforcement of Pabu. Despite the actions of the Fujii detachment, the Australians stubbornly continued to resist and this led the Japanese to believe they were increasing in strength at Pabu Hill and enjoyed resupply via aircraft drops. Meanwhile the Japanese fighting power was decreasing due to their overfiring of guns and mortars from Pino Hill. Their rations were at a ⅓ standard amount, local supplies like potatoes were nearly all gone and casualties were high. The fighting around Scarlet Beach would continue until November 28th, when the Japanese withdrew towards Wareo. Katagiri's counteroffensive was unable to affect the 26th brigades advance upon Sattelberg and fell apart. Over at the Sattelberg front, Brigadier Whitehead resumed his advance on the 22nd, with the 2/48th, supported by Matilda tanks advancing up the Sattelberg road, while the 2/23rd advanced west to the Turn Off Corner position. The 2/23rd were attempting to go across a 3200 foot Feature to gain high ground over Sattelberg. The 2/48th reached a creek southwest of Sattelberg when suddenly they were halted by a landslide and four mines laid out by the Japanese. The 2/23rd after passing the corner, hit the enemy defending the 3200 feature by encircling and gradually annihilating them. Whitehead believed they held favorable terrain to dig in for the night, but would be met with strong artillery bombardment causing heavy casualties upon the 2/32nd and 2/48th. Further north the 2/24th were trying to break through towards Palanko but the 2nd battalion, 80th regiment managed to thwart their every effort at outflanking them. Both sides suffered heavy casualties of the course of a few days of battle.On the 23rd, the 2/48th spent the day trying to find a way through the rugged jungle grounds leading to Sattelberg, finally discovering an uncontested hairpin bend to the right that led to the Red Roof Hut Spur. By this point Katagiri was aware his forces on Sattelberg were not being supplied well and could not hope to resist for much longer. He began preparing to withdraw the 80th regiment over to Wareo as a result. On the 24th Whitehead sent two companies to creep up the approach of Sattelberg from the south while the Japanese continued hammering them using artillery and bombers. Meanwhile the 2/23rd launched a diversionary attack. The attack would employ what was colloquially called a “chinese attack”, ie; to make as much noise as possible. However the action quickly turned into a real firefight over the 3200 Feature. The Japanese made a surprising counter attack from the feature which inadvertently led to the Australians seizing the feature to their surprise. During the afternoon, the 2/48th reached Red Roof Hut where they found 20 Japanese deeply entrenched in two man pits with log covers. The Japanese opened fire upon them quickly pinning them down. The Japanese rolled grenades and fired machine guns at short range , as the Australians gradually surrounded them. Try as the might the Australians were unable to kill or dislodge the Japanese prompting White to signal at 5:50pm "Plan for tomorrow. 2/48 with tanks to go through Lyne 's company. 2/23 to hold firm." Just as the 2/48th were about to withdraw, Sergeant Tom Derrick made a daring attack against the right flank, rapidly advancing through Kunai grass before his men tossed their grenades into the Japanese entrenchments. By nightfall, Red Roof Hut was seized and the Australians dug in about 150 yards from Sattelberg itself. At the same time the 2/24th found the Japanese defenders who had halted them had abandoned their position. When they checked the area they found evidence the Japanese were eating ferns and the core of bamboo. The state of their corpses and the many documents and diaries they found indicated the Japanese supply situation was extremely dire. The men defending Sattelberg were being supplied from bases at Nambariwa which relied on fishing boats, submarines and airdrops, because their barges were too vulnerable to air and naval attacks. The supplies Australians saw airdropped to the Japanese were hardly enough. It was here the Australians found a diary entry from the 79th regiment I've read a few times  "Every day just living on potatoes. Divided the section into two groups, one group for fighting and the other to obtain potatoes. Unfortunately none were available. On the way back sighted a horse, killed it and roasted a portion of it… At present, our only wish is just to be able to see even a grain of rice." Another diarist of the 80th Regiment jubilantly wrote in mid-November: "Received rice ration for three days… It was like a gift from Heaven and everybody rejoiced. At night heard loud voices of the enemy. They are probably drinking whisky because they are a rich country and their trucks are able to bring up such desirable things—I certainly envy them." On the morning of the 25th, the 2/48th discovered the enemy positions in front of them also abandoned. Soon the Australians were entering the abandoned shell of Sattelberg. Meanwhile with the aid of tanks, the 2/24th were rapidly advancing towards Palanko, capturing it by nightfall. Further to the left, elements of the 2/23rd and 2/4th commando squadron found Mararuo abandoned. The 80th regiment was fleeing towards Wario as a broken force. With this the battle of Sattelberg had come to an end.  The battle for sattelberg cost the Japanese roughly 2000 casualties. Once the Australians entered Sattelberg a signal was sent to the 2/32nd on Pabu that “Torpy sits on Sat”. Torpy was a nickname for Brigadier Whitehead, based on the Whitehead Torpedo. Whitehead had also been one of the commanding officers of the 2/32nd battalion. Such nicknames were used in signals to disguise messages in case the enemy intercepted them. The capture of sattelberg was another turning point in the New Guinea campaign. General Adachi would note “Local resistance in small pockets continued in order to keep the Australian troops in action and prevent the 9th Division from being free to make an attack on Cape Gloucester and Marcus Point (east of Gasmata) should resistance cease altogether. While delaying action was being fought at Finschhafen the 17th Division was being moved by land and sea from Rabaul to Cape Gloucester to resist the anticipated attack in that area… The most advantageous position (Pabu) for the launching of a successful counter-attack was given up; also Pabu provided excellent observation for artillery fire, and after its capture the position of the Japanese forces was precarious. Even after the failure of the attack on Scarlet Beach we still retained some hopes of recapturing Finschhafen, but at this point the idea was abandoned.” The Japanese now believed that Finschhafen was completely lost and there was not much hope of halting the Australian advance. General Berryman now urged Wootten to begin a drive north along the coast to try and cut off the Japanese lines of retreat and secure the eastern coast before the expected American led invasion of New Britain. Thus Woottne next decided to clear the Wareo-Gusika ridge first, predicting the Japanese might launch a counterattack against his rear. On the 26th Wootten ordered the 24th brigade to seize the area from Gusika towards the Kalueng Lakes; for the 2-th brigade to seize Nongora and Christmas Hills; the 26th brigade to advance north from Sattelberg towards Wareo; and for the 4th brigade to guard the approach to Scarlet Beach and the Heldsbach area. Yet before the Australians could start their new offensive they had to first clear out Pino Hill and secure the road towards Pabu. Two companies of the 2/32nd with four matilda tanks led by Colonel Scott were given the job.  Meanwhile Colonel Hayashida launched a last ditch effort to take back Pabu. Reserve company 8 of the 2nd battalion, 78th regiment with the support of two 75 mm guns and mortars were given the task. As the bombardment raged over Pabu, the 30 Japanese attempted to infiltrate from the northwest and southwest. The Japanese ran into well dug positions, and the Australians caused them 20 casualties for their efforts. The Australian defenders had called in artillery support which bombarded the ring area around Pabu successfully foiling the attack. Meanwhile Pino Hill was hit with 2360 artillery shells, then by fire from four matilda tanks, before the Australian infantry stormed the feature to find it abandoned. On the 27th Wootten altered his offensive plan. Now he sought a three pronged assault against the Gusika-Wareo ridge. Berryman, Whitehead and Wootten were visiting Sattelberg on the 27th when they looked at the rugged country towards Wareo. They all knew it would be another logistical nightmare. Berryman stated it would be unwise to commit the 20th brigade through the center and that instead they should launch a two pronged attack using the 26th and 24th brigades against Wareo proper and the Gusika-Wareo ridge. Thus now the 26th and 24th brigades would hit the Gusika Wareo area and the 20th brigade would support the coastal thrust. On that same day, the 2/28th battalion advanced along the coast to take up a flanking position near the Gusika-Wareo ridge. The 2/28th made it just 500 yards south of Bonga when they were halted by strong Japanese resistance. It would take Matilda tank support to cross over a creek and begin reducing the Japanese positions. The Australians stormed over and a platoon seized a feature called “the exchange position” left undefended. The next day saw the relief of the 2/32nd battalion who advanced north while the 2/43rd took over their position on Pabu. The Pabu defenders had suffered 25 deaths and 51 wounded, but would count over 195 dead Japanese. On the 29th, the 2/43rd fanned out finding Japanese resistance west of Pabu. The Australians attempted to encircle and annihilate the Japanese positions, but were unable and gradually had to pull back to Pabu. To the east the 2/28th seized Bonga and sent patrols towards Gusika who found it abandoned so the entire battalion moved forward and took up a position at a former Japanese supply base along the coast. Meanwhile the 26th brigade were advancing north of the Song River and managed to seize Masangkoo and Fior. On the 30th, Wootten commenced the main offensive; the 2/28th crossed the Kaleung river and advanced to the Lagoon area; the 2/43rd seized the Horace and Horse mountain area; the 2/15th crossing the Song River and advanced towards Nongora and th 2/23rd crossing the Song River to cut off the main Kuanko track. Only the 2/28th would be met with strong resistance from the Japanese who were now panicking as the fall of Gusika had completely cut off their supply route towards Wareo. It was a very dire situation for the Japanese as they retreated. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The battle of Cape St George earned Captain Burke a incredible victory and yet again proved the IJN's night fighting abilities were no longer up to par. The battle for Sattelberg was finally over and with it any hope for the Japanese to take back the Finschhafen area, yet agian they fled north in New Guinea.  

The Pacific War - week by week
- 102 - Pacific War - The Battle of Empress Augusta Bay, October 31 - 7 November, 1943

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 29, 2023 39:48


  Last time we spoke about the invasion of the Treasury Islands. The time had come to begin operations against Bougainville, but in order to do so the allies had a few tricks up their sleeves. In order to make sure the landings at Cape Torokina at Empress Augusta Bay went safely, the allies would perform raids against Choiseul and the Treasury islands. It was hoped such actions would work as a diversion and confused the Japanese as to where the real operations were aimed. The landing on Mono saw some New Zealanders and Americans annihilate a 200 strong Japanese garrison. On Choiseul Paratroopers boldly raided a force 6 times larger than them. The raid was a success and thanks to John F Kennedy the Paratroopers were grabbed off the island before the Japanese could obliterate them. In the end the landings at Cape Torokina were a success and now a battle would be unleashed.  This episode is the battle of Empress Augusta Bay Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  So last time we covered the planning behind Operation Cherryblossom, the landings at Cape Torokina. As a means of confusing the enemy, the allies also chose to invade the Treasury islands and raided Choiseul. With Operation Cherryblossom in full swing, so begins the Bougainville campaign which we are going to be diving into now. At the end of October, after successfully invading the Treasury islands and the extremely bold attack upon Choiseul where the Paratroopers were outnumbered 6-1, combined with General Kenny's 5th air force and AirSols neutralizing Rabaul and nearly every airfield on Bougainville, the landings at Cape Torokina were finally launched. In a final act to aid operation cherryblossom, Admiral Sherman's Task force 38 departed Espiritu Santo on October 28th and Admiral Merrills Task Force did the same from Florida island on November 1st. They hoped to rendezvous near the Buka Passage three days later so they could prepare an attack against the Buka and Bonis airfields.  During the morning of November 1st, Admiral Merrill's cruisers arrived to their station and began firing upon the arifields. Then Sherman's carriers arrived off Buka passage to launch two separate air strikes. The first airstrike consisting of eighteen fighters, fifteen dive bombers, and eleven torpedo bombers hit Buka just after daylight. The second consisting of fourteen fighters, twenty-one dive bombers, and eleven torpedo bombers hit Buka again at midmorning. The airstrikes managed to shoot up a number of small ships within the harbor. Meanwhile after firing 2700 5 and 6 inch shells all over Buka and Bonis's airfields, Merrils task force 39 departed the Shortlands to bombard Poporang, Ballalo and Faisi.  On November 2nd, Sherman performed air strikes against Buka and Bonis's fields before departing south for Guadalcanal. Within those two days the Americans estimated they had destroyed around 30 aircraft and several small ships at the cost of 11 aircraft lost. The attacks had rendered the two Japanese airfields closest to Empress Augusta Bay basically unusable for when the landings would be made. The Japanese were now convinced that any invasion of Bougainville would have to be countered with all the aircraft and ships available within the southern theater. Yet they could not concentrate their entire naval and air forces against the Solomons, because the American and Australian forces on New Guinea would most likely be performing a landing on New Britain at any moment. Admiral Koga also expected the Americans to attempt a landing in the Gilbert or Marshalls. Thus the two pronged allied strategy was serving to freeze the Japanese army units within the New Guinea and Solomon areas.  Meanwhile Admiral Wilkinson's task force 31 were making final preparations for transport the 3rd Marine division. The amphibious assault would be facing a landing area defended by roughly 270 men. Once they overcame them, a defense perimeter would have to be hastily made because it was certain the Japanese commander on Bougainville would hammer them hard. General Vandergrift's plan was to land the 3rd and 9th marine regiments of Colonel George McHenry and Colonel Edward Craig and the 2nd raider battalion of Lt Colonel Joseph McCaffery abreast on 11 designated beaches covering a distance of 8000 or so yards. The 3rd raider battalion lt be Lt colonel Fred Beans would land at the same time on Puruata island to overcome an estimated 70 Japanese defenders there. Wilkinson wanted to land the forces abreast as quickly as possible and to have the transport unload the supplies off the bay by nightfall because he expected a rapid Japanese response, similar to what had occurred at Savo island.  On October 28th, General Turnage's men departed the New Hebrides in 20 combat transports and cargo ships commanded by Commodore Lawrence Reifsnider. The convoy proceeded using different routes, hoping to prevent the Japanese from discovering the size of their force, the three transport divisions would rendezvous with Wilkinsons destroyers by October 31st. Once linked up they would approach Bougainville under the cover of naval PBYs and Liberators. During the morning of November 1st, Minesweepers led by the destroyer Wadsworth were sent in to clear mines from the landing areas and to determine how dangerous the shoals were. The minesweepers found no mines, but did find plenty of uncharted shoals. Wadsworth radar confirmed that Cape Torokina's position within their naval charts was misplaced. Wadsworth had a number of tasks ahead of her. In addition to helping with the fire support at a range of around 3000 yards, she was to use her radar to confirm the actual location of Cape Torokina, Puruata island and the landing beaches. The coast of Bougainville had been chartered by the German Admiralty in 1890. The Germans had placed Cape Torokina and Mutupina Point around 9 miles southwest of their actual locations. Thankfully the submarine USS Guardfish reported that the air force and naval charts had misplaced Cape Torokina by around 7 miles and this is why Wadsworth was sent to investigate. Unsexy logistical stuff, but gravely important, as you don't want to waste any time during an amphibious landing searching for a lost beach. Wilkinson decided not the land the men until after daylight when it was possible to detect the offshore shoals. Shortly before sunrise, the minesweepers and destroyers began their bombardment. The Sigourney and Wadsworth fired at ranges of 13,000 yards upon Puruata Island, while the Terry bombarded closer to the shore of Cape Torokina. As each transport passed the cape, they fired 3 inch anti-aircraft guns hoping to hit Japanese positions or at least minimize their artillery. By 6:45am the transports began arriving off the beaches around 3000 yards from the shore. At 7:10am the LCVP's began taking men ashore. Simultaneously Wilkinsons destroyers began systematically bombarding the perimeter while 31 bombers from New Georgia bombed and strafed the landing areas. Within a few minutes around 7500 troops, roughly half of the total force were scrambling ashore and unloading with great speed and smoothness. The preliminary bombardment had failed however to smash the well concealed Japanese machine gun nests located on the southern beaches. These machine gun nests unleashed their lead upon the landing craft. The landing craft bearing a third of the force had immediately come under fire from Puruata island and some pillboxes on Cape Torokina. The 3rd raiders in particular were hit by machine gun fire from Puruata. Around 4 land craft were sunk from this, 10 others were badly damaged, over 70 men would be lost in the process.  The 9th marines landed themselves on 5 beaches to the north and were lucky to find little resistance from the Japanese. Once ashore they sorted themselves out quickly and began to move inland to discover the terrain was a nightmare. The beaches where they were led straight into some impassable swamp land. Nevertheless where there is a will there is a way, the marines began using fallen logs and debris to traverse the swamp until they came across some solid ground. By midmorning they would establish a narrow perimeter and began patrolling the greater area. They would establish a strong outpost on the Laruma River by 1pm. The boat crews were experienced a lot of issues with the high surf, combined with a lock of experience amongst them. Some of the LCVPS found themselves smashing into another, some dropped their men in deep water, some did not lower their ramps properly and the marines were forced to toss themselves over the sides into waist deep water. More than 30 landing craft were wrecked during the initial phase of the operation. Around 64 LCVPS and 22 LCMS were beached, many with damage beyond repair.  The 3rd marines and 2nd raiders would have a hell of a time landing. The 3rd marines landing south of the Koromokina river, they had no issues with shoals, nor the high surf, but they had landed directly in front of the main Japanese defenses. There was roughly 300 Japanese, but they did not have permanent defenses along the beaches of Yellow 2, Blue 2, and Blue 3. As the 3rd marines landed they began fighting with some Japanese killing many and sending them fleeing into the Jungle. Patrols were quickly organized who worked alongside the 2nd raiders patrols to fan out. The raiders upon landing found tougher resistance in the form of a reinforced platoon operating out of two bunkers and trenches located 30 yards inland. Once the raiders had blasted out the bunkers, the remaining Japanese began to retreat into the jungle. Like the 9th marines they would find swamp lands ahead of Yellow 1 making it difficult to advance. By midmorning the raiders reached the Buretoni Mission Trail. The main Japanese resistance hit the men who landed at Blue 1, just adjacent to Cape Torokina. There the Japanese had constructed 25 large and small log and earthen pillboxes around the perimeter of the cape. There were trenches connecting the pillboxes, some of the larger pillboxes measuring 6 feet by 6 feet, containing 75mm field guns. Each pillbox was covered by earth and camouflaged using jungle plants. Only 3 pillboxes had been hit by the naval and aerial bombardments prior to the landings. When the Americans hit the beaches in the area they immediately were forced to charge into the enemy bunkers. The Japanese 75 mm gun at Cape Torokina caused havoc upon the attackers. It was a well placed log and sand bunker and its approaches were protected by two smaller bunkers with a series of trenches manned by numerous Japanese. Sergeant Robert Owens of A company, 3rd marines grabbed 4 marines and charged the two small bunkers directly upon the mouths of some machine guns. The marines entered an emplacement through a fire port and drove the gun crew out. The surrounded trenches concentrated their fire on the brave marines, Sergeant Owns would be found later dead riddled with bullets. He was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for the action. Lt Colonel Joseph McCaffery was immediately mortally struck four times in the chest as he led the marines forward, he was replaced temporarily by Major Alan Shapley for the 2nd raiders. Despite the horrible losses the Americans cleared the Japanese positions and pushed further inland to pursue and kill the fleeing defenders. It is worthy to mention over 24 Doberman Pinschers, the official dog of the USMC between 1943-1945 from the 1st marine dog platoon proved invaluable during this point of the battle. The dogs were able to point out hidden snipers concealed in underbrushed. 549 War dogs would return from the war with only 4 not being able to return to civilian life, all very good boys. The 3rd raiders landing at Puruta had nearly all their boats shot at, but it was mostly small machine gun fire and did little to no damage. The Japanese had 3 or 4 deep well sandbagged emplacement on the seaward side where their machine guns nests fired upon the raiders. It took the raiders two hours upon landing to secure their beachhead around125 yards inland. Beans committed his reserves early in the afternoon, supported by some 75mm guns borrowed from the 9th marines, they moved halfway across the island, encountering sporadic Japanese sniper fire. The Japanese were outnumbered, by 3:30pm their resistance all but ended. The marines suffered 5 deaths and 32 wounded, around 29 dead Japanese would be found. They estimated another 70 Japanese escaped to Bougainville.  Soon after all the landing craft began to pull out, the Japanese began launching air strikes. For around two hours the transports and supply ships were zigzagging for their lives to evade dive bombers and fighters coming from Rabaul. The first air strike consisted of 9 Vals and 44 Zeros, they hit at around 7:35am almost immediately after the landings were made. General Twinning's 8 Kittyhawks and 8 P-38s managed to fight them off, downing 7 Japanese aircraft. The Wedsworth received a near miss during the battle. 10 minutes later, AirSols beat off another attack taking down another 8 Japanese aircraft. During the last attack, roughly 70 Japanese aircraft came in around 1pm and were met by 34 AirSols fighters. After all three attacked, the Japanese has used around 120 aircraft and lost 26, inflicting no serious damage to allied ships nor the marines ashore. But the air attacks did result in major delays for the unloading of supplies for some hours. To try and speed up the unloading process, Wilkinson stripped some men from the assault units to help unload cargo ashore. Additionally Wilkinson employed a method of light combat loading. It would take some days for the beaches to be fully sorted out, while the naval forces departed Empress Augusta Bay before nightfall to return to Guadalcanal. Thus 14,000 men and 6200 tons of supplies had been successfully placed ashore in 8 hours. By the end of the first day the marines had contested a ⅓ sector and reached their initial objectives, digging in uncomfortably for the night under torrential rain. The divisional perimeter was established by forward landing teams, who had very little to work with for maps. To the extreme left of the perimeter would be Company G of the 9th marines, who were in a vulnerable spot along the Lrauma river. Lucky for them the Japanese were quite disorganized and many were located southeast of Cape Torokina. At dusk there was only sporadic sniper fire directed at the ⅓ in the vicinity of the cape plantation and later an attack was made against the 2nd raiders at a roadblock they established along Mission Trail. General Turnage was now the official owner of a new lodgement on Bougainville. Generals Imamura and Hyakutake were quite slow to react to the landings. They sent the Iwasa detachment led by Major General Iwasa Shun, commanding the 6th infantry group. Backing him up would be the 1st and 3rd battalions of the 23rd regiment. Their first task was to hit the new enemy beachhead. As predicted by the allies, Admirals Kusaka and Samejima mustered every naval and aerial strength they had to try and smash the invaders. As part of Operation RO, Admiral Koga had sent over 250 aircraft from the 5 carriers of Admiral Ozawa's air fleet. Koga specifically stated the bulk of these were only going to be loaned for a short time, obviously they would have to return to the main fleet. Well the invasion of Bougainville certainly upset the plans, the planes would not be coming back on schedule. As Admiral Fukudome SHigeri, Koga's Chief of staff would later note “although the planes were not originally to be used in such offensive operations, we could not just stand by and not employ them." By midday on October the 31st, the Japanese had discovered the American task force that had departed Guadalcanal en route for Bougainville. The IJN were determined to interrupt the operation. Kusaka sent a cruiser-destroyer task force led by Vice admiral Omori Sentaro. Departing Rabual Omori had the two heavy cruisers, Myoko and Haguro; two light cruisers, Sendai and Nagara; and two destroyers. Now Omori was the commander of Cruiser division 5 of the Combined fleet, not of the 8th fleet. He just happened to be at Rabaul covering the movement of the 17th division at the time, he was given command of his division and the main strength of the 8th fleet. Omori sailed out at 3pm in the direction of the Shortland islands believing that to be the allied target. Poor weather hindered his force and his search planes failed to locate any allied ships. Thus by 9am on November the 1st he was on his way back to Rabaul. Yet right as his ships were turning around, suddenly they received reports that the Americans had hit the beaches of Cape Torokina. Omori was quickly reinforced with a destroyer squadron and a destroyer transport group consisting of the Amagiri, Fumizuki, Uzuki, Yunagi and Minazuki each carrying 200 troops of a 1000 special trained raider group of the 17th division. This was the 2nd mobile raiding units from the 2nd battalion, 54th regiment led by Major Miwa Mitsuhiro. They were going to perform a counter landing against the marines at Mutupino point near the village of Toroko, due south of the marine beachhead. Within 6 hours, Omoro departed once again to hit the enemy fleet, but he lacked a real battle plan. At 6:30pm Omori rendezvoused with the transports at the St. George channel and together they proceeded towards Bougainville. At 7:20 the convoy was spotted by an american bomber who dropped a bomb nearly hitting the Sendai. Based on this Omori knew the Americans knew he was coming so he concluded a counterlanding was far too dangerous. Instead he decided to send the slower destroyer transports back to Rabaul. Omori believed the enemy transports were still in Empress Augusta Bay, thus if he could sneak in and destroy them, the marines would be stuck on the island without much of their supplies and without hope of quick rescue.  Meanwhile Merrills task force 39 had retired to the vicinity of Vella Lavella, but soon received news of Omori's incoming convoy. Halsey had to order his only naval force in the area to go out once again to protect the beachhead and intercept the enemy. Merrills crews had been at it for more than 24 hours by this point and were quite exhausted. Now Merrill's force went in very cautiously, because they were aware the Japanese would be outgunning them and of course the IJN held the dreaded long lance torpedoes. Thus Merrill chose to detach his destroyers who would go out in front to see if they could intercept Omori's forces before the long lances could be put to use. He intended to take the fight to the west of Empress Augusta Bay where he could block the enemy from the beachhead. He had his leading destroyers 3 miles ahead and deployed his forces along a north-south axis with the cruisers in the center, maintaining a range of 19,000 yards or more from the deadly IJN destroyers and their feared long lances. His plan was to exploit the offensive capabilities of his destroyers by letting them unleash their attacks before he would have his cruisers unleash their 6 inch guns. He hoped his destroyers would be able to sneak into range and hit the Japanese destroyers before they could launch their torpedo salvos. Omori was at a disadvantage intelligence wise, he had no idea about Merrills forces whereabouts. Moreover he had to rely on spotter planes because he was forewarned their radar would give away their location to the enemy if used. As Omori would later tell interrogators  “We had some modified aircraft radar sets in action but they were unreliable. I do not know whether the sets or operators were poor, but I did not have confidence in them.” Thus he had no idea of the position or size of the American flotilla, still he believed the enemy transports were in the bay, though in reality they would be nearly 40 miles south. Omori still lacking any real battle plan arrayed his force in three columns with his two heavy cruisers Myoko and Haguro in the center; Ijuins screen of light cruiser Sendai; and destroyers Shiratsuyu, Samidare and Shigure to the left and rear admiral Osugi Morikazu's screen of light cruiser Agano; and destroyers Wakatsuki, Hatsukaze and Naganami. As the Japanese approached the area, task force 39 were sailing 20 miles west of the beachhead. Merrills flagship Montpelier was the first to make radar contact with the enemy at 2:30 on November 2nd. Omori's fleet was 35,900 yards out. Merrill's changed his course to head due north then reversed south with his cruisers to find a favorable position to try and cross Omori's T. Merrill sent Commander Bernard Austins destroyed out to hit the Japanese southern flank while Captain Burke was ordered to take an intercept course that would force the Japanese to be in a vulnerable position for the destroyers to launch torpedoes into their left flank. At 2:45am a Japanese aircraft finally spotted the Americans and began dropping flares over them to allowed the light cruiser Sendai to lead the northern column over. However by this point it was all but too late for the Japanese. Burke had closed in on their left flank and launched 25 torpedoes at Ijuin's column. After launching the torpedoes Burke had his ships separate and it would be an hour before they could all be gathered again to form a full circle and return to their firing positions. The battle would be very chaotic, the US destroyers experienced a hard time trying to maintain contact with each other and several times would fire upon each other by accident. All 25 torpedoes would miss, because Omori ordered his ships to make a hard right turn. At 2:50 the Samidare launched a full salvo of 8 torpedoes which missed their main targets but a single torpedo managed to hit the destroyer USS Foote blowing up a large part of her stern. Cruiser Cleveland and destroyer Spence would accidentally run into each other doing light damage trying to avoid the damaged Foote. Merrill could no longer wait for the results of the destroyer attacks and ordered his cruisers to open fire at 2:50am. Merrills cruisers would unleash a continuous fire using their 6 inch guns while maintaining a coordinated figure 8 pattern to confuse the enemy and avoid torpedoes. The tactic had been very well rehearsed and the commanders were perfectly in tune with another. James Fahey, a sailor aboard Merrill's flagship Montpelier, described the long night illuminated by lightning, flares, star shells, and muzzle flashes. “The big eight inch salvos, throwing up great geysers of water, were hitting very close to us. Our force fired star shells in front of the Jap warships so that our destroyers could attack with torpedoes. It was like putting a bright light in front of your eyes in the dark. It was impossible to see. The noise from our guns was deafening.” The Sendai was the first to be hit taking a 6 inch shell to her rudder before it exploded near her boiler rooms. Sendai experienced a series of explosions and quickly sank. The destroyers Samidare and Shiratsuyu behind the Sendai collided with another trying to evade the naval gunfire and would end up taking positions around the stricken Sendai already sinking by this point. Merrill then shifted the focus to the other two Japanese columns forcing Osugi's column to head west running across Omori's cruisers. The Hatsukaze tried to move between two heavy cruisers and collided with the Omori's flagship Myoko at 3:07. Hatsukaze was so crippled by the collision she was much easier to hit as a result was found by Burkes reformed 45th destroyer division by 5:30am and 5 of the destroyers proceeded to batter her with shells until she sank at 5:40am. The Myoko meanwhile was hit by 6 shells, but fortunately for her 4 of them were duds, not causing enough damage to slow down the flagship. Next the USS Spence and Thatcher ran into another, but were able to carry on the fight. Both sides were having trouble running into each other, Merrills cruisers performing the 8 pattern at high speed allowed them to evade most gunfire. At 3:20 Omori opened fire with his heavy armament, both torpedoes and naval gunfire from his cruisers. The torpedoes missed, but 3 dud shells hit Denver into her forward section, causing water to slow the ship down. The other cruisers were forced to slow their speed to match her. Light cruisers Columbia received a 8 inch shell hit, luckily it also failed to explode. The Japanese fire was becoming heavier and more accurate forcing Merrill to respond with a smoke screen in front of his cruisers. Merrill made sure to keep his distance from the Japanese. When their range closed in on 13,000 yards at 326 am he ordered a 180 degree turn to the north. The radical maneuvering by Merrills cruisers made it extremely difficult to accurately fire upon them, but also for Merrills cruisers to hit Omori's. At 3:30am Omori decided to retire in the mistaken belief that his Long Lances had sunk or heavily damaged Merrill's cruisers. Omori had received a false report claiming “one torpedo hit on leading US cruiser, two torpedo hits on second US cruiser, two torpedo hits on third US cruiser. Shell fire also reported on US Force.” In the meantime Burkes destroyers had re-entered the fray of battle and began firing upon the doomed Sendai. After they pursued the Shiratsuyu and Samidare but both destroyers got extremely lucky when Commander Austin confused Burke into believing that the ship he saw turning northwards was actually the Spence. By 4:00am the Sendai was sinking taking with her 185 crew. Ijuin and 311 other survivors would later be rescued on November 3rd by Submarine RO-104. The Hatsukaze would be the last to sink at 5:40am. As dawn was breaking, Merrill urgently called for all available fighters to come to his aid as he expected the Japanese to toss the kitchen sink of air forces at him. Just before 8am a formation of 80 Zeros and 18 dive bombers arrived and began attacking his cruisers desperately performing anti-aircraft maneuvers. The allied aircraft were delayed by bad weather resulting in only 8 Hellcats, 1 marine corsair, 3 P-38s and 4 New Zealander P40s showing up. The allied pilots would claim to down 16 Japanese aircraft, though in reality it would only be 8. Merrills forces performing a defensive circular cordon would claim to down 17 further Japanese aircraft. The Japanese managed two hits, one causing minor damage to the USS Montpelier. The Japanese had lost their chance to stop the invasion of Bougainville. Merrills handling of the battle, particularly his figure 8 maneuver, had negated the dreaded super weapon of the enemy, the Type 93 long lance torpedo. It was to be the last major surface engagement of the Solomons area. Halsey would later reflect on the Japanese attempt to hit the landing forces at Cape Torokina  “was the most desperate emergency that confronted me in my entire term as COMSOPAC (Commander South Pacific).” Commodore Reifsnider was ordered to bring his transports back to Cape Torokina to resume the unloading. The unloading of the cargo would be completed by 3pm. Vice admiral Omori's force withdrew back to Rabaul. It was soon joined by four more cruisers and a number of destroyers from Truk. The reluctant Admiral Koga according to Admiral Fukudome decided to commit some of the very best units from the undamaged 2nd fleet “to cooperate with the carrier-based planes which had been sent from Vice-Admiral Ozawa's fleet in order to check the [US] Bougainville operations.” 7 heavy cruisers, the Takao, Maya, Atago, Suzuya, Mogami, Chikuma, and Chokai; a light cruiser, the Noshiro; four destroyers; and a number of service ships would depart Truk on November 3. The once dominant IJN fleet so surely footed in the early days of the war now was hesitant and indecisive. Nevertheless, Koga would unleash another attack against Empress Augusta Bay. Koga placed the new naval force under Admiral Kurita who would attempt to intercept futher American forces enroute to Bougainville. On November 4th, Wilkinson would be bringing the 21st marines aboard 8 destroyer transports and 8 LSTs. 3548 men led by Colonel Evans Ames, alongside 5000 tons of supplies and equipment escorted by destroyers Waller, Saufley, Philip, Renshaw, Eaton and Sigourney.  Halsey received word of the new Japanese force and realized the situation was critical. If Halsey did not turn back the incoming threat, his forces on Bougainville would not receive their planned reinforcements. Halsey was thus ready to take a risk, he was going to send carriers. As Halsey would later write “perhaps the success of the South Pacific War, hung on it being stopped.”. Against conventional wisdom, that carriers should not be exposed to land-based aircraft attacks, he ordered Rear Admiral Sherman's task force built around the USS Saratoga and Princeton to face a force of possibly 200 Japanese aircraft. The risks for Hasley were personal as well as professional “I sincerely expected both air groups to be cut to pieces and both carriers stricken, if not lost. (I tried not to remember my son Bill was aboard one of them), but we could not let the men at Tokorina be wiped out while we stood by and wrung our hands.” Halsey's Chief of Staff, Admiral Carney, recalled that before making the decision to attack with his carriers, his commander “suddenly looked 150 years old.” Shermans task for now designated Task Group 50.4 consisted of carrier Saratoga; light carrier Princeton; and destroyers Stack, Sterett, Wilson, Izard, Conner, Bell, Charrette, Boyd, Bradford and Cowell. He would be supported by General Twinings AirSols in any way possible. Halsey also requested MacArthur allow Kenney's 5th air force to join in on the battle. On November 5th, aided by some bad weather, a surprise air raid was performed against Rabaul. Sherman's carrier force was 230 miles away from Rabaul near Cape Torokina when they began launching aircraft at 9am. The Saratoga launched 16 Avengers and 22 Dauntless. Princeton launched 7 Avengers. The carrier aircraft were escorted by 52 hellcats making a formation of 97 aircraft in all. This was their entire payload . The aircraft flew at a low level as they approached Rabaul anti-aircraft defenses by 10:20. They kept a tight formation, flying right through the flak which prevented the 70 Zeros from intercepting them properly. As we have seen during this series, the Japanese anti-aircraft guns were honestly pretty terrible. Added to this, the American aircraft enjoyed much better armor than their Japanese counterparts, particularly the Zero fighter. Commander Henry Caldwell led the bombers towards Blanche Bay where they peeled off at 14,500 feet. The Dauntless dive bombed the targets before them as the Avengers time their approaches to hit the same targets at the same time. Within just 30 minutes the attack absolutely devastated the Japanese plans. Heavy cruiser Maya was trying to leave the harbor during the attack but took a 500 lb bomb hit to her catapult area which set off a series of explosions, blowing up her engine rooms and causing heavy casualties. As Maya was left fully disabled, the Mogami managed to clear the harbor but took a torpedo hit. Her number 1 and 2 turrets were flooded, forcing her crews to scramble to put out fires.  The Atago suffered three very near misses, which damaged her hull, armament, and machinery.  The Takao took a bomb to her starboard side, damaging her hull and machinery. TheChikuma received only slight damage and was able to depart for Truk at 20:38. The Suzuya, which was just preparing for refueling, tried to evade and was only slightly damaged. Aside from this the other light cruisers and destroyers did not receive any damage. 70 sailors died aboard the Maya, 23  died aboard the Mogami, Takao and Atago. Captain George Chandler, a P-38 fighter pilot described how “There were B-24 bombers up high and B-25 bombers attacking right down on the deck dropping ‘frag' bombs on the airplanes along the runways … we did our best work at high altitude, but we also took part in combat a thousand feet off the ground.” Taking advantage of Hasleys daring attack, General Kenney sent 27 B-24's and 67 P-38s to bomb the warehouse area on the western side of the harbor. They were challenged by only 15 Zero's who would lose two in the process. The Japanese facilities were wrecked by the attack. The Americans lost 5 bombers and 5 fighters while taking down 11 Zeros. The cautious Admiral Mineichi Koga withdrew his forces back to Truk. The Japanese Naval threat to the invasion of Bougainville was ended. A Japanese naval officer later admitted that they had given up on Bougainville mainly because of “the serious damage received by several Second Fleet cruisers at Rabaul by carrier attack …” The success of the raid on Rabaul left Halsey ecstatic. “It is real music to me and opens the stops for a funeral dirge for Tojo's Rabaul.” Sherman grabbed all of his returning places expecting a Japanese counterstrike. A Japanese scout plane discovered Sherman's task force around midafternoon and Kusaka immediately dispatched eighteen torpedo bombers after the Americans. At around dusk the Japanese discovered what they believed to be the task force and attacked. Although they later claimed a great air victory, in reality they hit at an LCI and a PT boat escorting an LCT back from Cape Torokina. A torpedo lodged in the engine room of the LCI and killed one man. That was the extent of the damage to the "task force." In return, the Japanese lost one plane. It was hardly an even exchange, and no compensation at all for the havoc wreaked earlier upon the 2nd Fleet. Halsey yet again showed what a formidable and aggressive commander he could be, his gamble paid off greatly. The Americans had secured their naval superiority in the South Pacific and it would remain that way for the rest of the war. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Admiral Merrill performed an excellent battle against a larger IJN force. Admiral Hasley lived up to his reputation, he performed a bold gamble and it paid off big time. Now the Americans would dominate the South Pacific for the rest of the Pacific War.  

The Pacific War - week by week
- 104 - Pacific War - The Battle of Sattelberg, November 14-21, 1943

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 29, 2023 40:40


Last time we spoke about the Japanese counteroffensive against the Marine beachhead on Bougainville. Things were looking bad for the Japanese before they got even worse. The Japanese had underestimated the amount of Marines on Bougainville and sent Major Mitsuhiro with his special units to try and hit the marine left flank, later to join up with the Iwasa detachment. Mitsuhiro's men were in for a hell of a surprise when they attacked a larger force than expected. They took heavy losses before pulling back into the interior of the island to search for Iwasa. Meanwhile Iwasa also bit off more than he could chew with a counteroffensive targeting the Piva trail. In the end the marines not only repelled the attacks, but also greatly expanded their perimeter. We also spoke about the battle of Changde seeing the forces of Yokoyama crush multiple Chinese armies and unleash chemical and biological warfare in the area. This episode is the Battle of Sattelberg Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Vice Admiral John Henry Towers the commander of pacific air force circled a plan to recapture Wake island and use it as a springboard to latte assault the Marshalls that were around 500 miles south. Admiral Spruance favored opening a new campaign much father southeast, where the fleet could count on more land base air support in the south pacific. Spruance wanted to launch an offensive into the Gilbert Islands, some 600 miles southeast of the Marshalls. Admiral Nimitz was swapped by this and in turn twisted King's arm. And thus was born Operation Galvanic, the simultaneous capture of the Ellice islands, the Gilbert Islands and Nauru set for November 15th. Since his victorious return from the battle of Midway a year earlier, Admiral Raymond Spruance had privately longed for a major command at sea. But it was an admirals way to lobby for a job and he would not be surprised when Nimitz told him one morning in May of 1943  “There are going to be some changes in the high command of the fleet. I would like to let you go, but unfortunately for you I need you here” Spruance replied “Well, the war is an important thing. I personally would like to have another crack at the Japs, but if you need me here, this is where I should be.” The next day the two met again and Nimitz said “I have been thinking this over during the night. Spruance, you are lucky. I've decided that I am going to let you go, after all.” Nimitz reported to King the new assignment during their meeting in San Francisco a month later. On May 30th, Spruance received the rank of vice admiral and shortly after was detached from the CINCPAC staff and placed in command of the Central Pacific Force, later to be designated the 5th Fleet. It would be the largest seagoing command in the history of the US Navy.  Spruance would have little more than four months to plan the largest and most complex amphibious operation yet attempted. Naval forces and landing troops would be taken from far flung parts of the south pacific and USA mainland. His key commanders had not yet been identified. Spruance immediately recruited a chief of staff with a lot of experience and initiative, his old friend and shipmate, Captain Charles “Carl” Moore. Moore had been serving in Washington as a member of Admiral King's war planning staff. Spruance asked Moore to select other key staff officers, poaching many from naval HQ. Moore would arrive to Pearl Harbor on August 5th and took up a spare bedroom in Nimitz and Spruance house atop Makalapa Hill. Now Spruance was the type of manager that delegated everything possible, he once said “Looking at myself objectively, I think I am a good judge of men; and I know that I tend to be lazy about many things, so I do not try to do anything that I can pass down the line to someone more competent than I am to do it.” Moore was perfectly fine with this philosophy. Some would say Spruance was a bit lazy, the man did seem to bore rather easily and was a compulsive walker, often spent days just walking, grabbing staff with him. Moore wrote about such an instance once that occurred a few days after he arrived to Hawaii  “Raymond is up to his tricks already, and yesterday took me on an eight mile hike in the foothills. It was hot and a hard pull at times, and particularly so as we carried on a lively conversation all the way which kept me completely winded.” On this occasion Moore tried to talk to Spruance about operation Galvanic, but Spruance kept changing subjects. A few days later Moore would write to his wife “Yesterday Raymond stepped up the pace and the distance and we covered over 10 miles in three hours. My right leg caught up with my left and both were wrecked by the time I got back. . . . If he can get me burned to a crisp or crippled from walking he will be completely happy.” Spruance wanted Kelly Turner to command his amphibious fleet. Turner at that point held a year of hard experience in the South Pacific. He was the navy's preeminent amphibious specialist. Spruance knew the man well both at sea and at the Naval War College. Spruance told Nimitz in Juen“I would like to get Admiral Kelly Turner from Admiral Halsey, if I can steal him,” However with the northern Solomons campaign in high gear, Halsey was not too keen to release Turner. Nimitz sent a personal note to Hasley explaining that he had been ordered to wage a new offensive in the central Pacific: “This means I must have Turner report to me as soon as possible.” Unfortunately for Hasley, Turner also took some of their best staff officers with him. Major General Holland Smith would command the invasion troops, designated the 5th amphibious corps or ‘VAC”. Smith was one of the pioneers of amphibious warfare. He had persuaded the navy to adopt Andrew Higgen's shallow draft boats as landing craft and successfully trained several divisions in amphibious operations over at Camps Elliot and Pendleton in California. He fought hard to get combat command in the Pacific and was backed up by Secretary Knox and Admiral King. Nimitz did not know the man well, but Spruance had worked with him in the 1930's when they were both stationed in the Caribbean. Turner and Smith would make quite the combustible pair. Both men were aggressive, ambitious and quite overbearing. They were both used to running things without competition. Both were prone to fits of rage and this earned them the nicknames “terrible turner and Howlin'mad'smith”. At Guadalcanal Turner once offended General Vandegrift by infringing upon his command, this led Spruance to wonder “whether we could get the operation planned out before there was an explosion between them.” Smith had met Kelly Turner once in Washington and he found the admiral to be precise and courteous, describing him as “an exacting schoolmaster, affable in an academic manner. He could be plain ornery. He wasn't called ‘Terrible Turner' without reason.” For Operation Galvanic, Turner expected to be above Smith in the chain of command. This was consistent with how Operation Watchtower went about. But Smith wanted direct command of all amphibious troops throughout the operation, prior, during and after the landings, and he wanted to directly report to Spruance. Spruance wanted nothing to do with such arguments and because of his laissez-faire style this meant Moore would be acting as referee between Turner and Smith. Here is what Moore had to say of it “Holland Smith particularly complained about Kelly Turner. He was a whining, complaining type. He loved to complain. He loved to talk and loved to complain, and he would come and sit on my desk and growl about Turner. ‘All I want to do is kill some Japs. Just give me a rifle. I don't want to be a commanding general. Just give me a rifle, I'll go out there and shoot some Japs. . . . I'm not worried about anything else around here.' See, that kind of a line. I was trying to soothe him down, and Turner would come and complain about that blankety-blank Smith, couldn't get any cooperation out of him, and so forth.”Through these referee'd battles a compromise was met. Turner would be in command of the landing forces until the shore commander went ashore and assumed command of the troops. When turner was informed, all the troops ashore would fall under the command of the 5th amphibious corps and thus report to Smith. This model was accepted by both men and would remain in force throughout the Pacific War.  So at this point its important to note the US Navy had still not fully recovered from the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, and was still in the process of building the largest fleets the world had ever seen. You have probably heard this phrase many times: “World War Two would be won through British brains, American brawn, and Russian blood.” As said at the Tehran conference of December 1943 by Joseph Stalin. That brawn was simply incredible. From the start of the war until the end of 1943, the US would commission 7 aircraft carriers, the Essex, Lexington, Yorktown, Bunker Hill, Intrepid, Wasp and Hornet. Of the new Essex-class, 9 light carriers would be commissioned the Independence, Princeton, Belleau Wood, Cowpens, Monterey, Cabot, Langley, Bataan and San Jacinto. Of the new Independence class there would be 35 escort carriers, no worries not going to list them all haha. There would also be 6 new battleships the South Dakota, Indiana, Massachusetts, Alabama, Iowa and New Jersey; 4 new heavy cruisers, the  Baltimore, Boston, Canberra and Quincy; 16 light cruisers, 212 destroyers, 234 destroyer escorts and 92 submarines. To match this in the same period, Japanese commissioned two aircraft carriers the Junyo and Hiyo; one light aircraft carrier the Ryuho; 4 escort carriers the  Unyo, Chuyo, Kaiyo and Shinyo; 2 superbattleships the Yamato and Musashi; 4 light cruisers the Agano, Oyodo, Noshiro and Yahagi; 22 destroyers, 15 destroyer escorts and 61 submarines. Thus it was absolutely clear, the Americans had a significant advantage in naval production.  On September 4th, the 5th amphibious corps of Smith were officially established. Smith proceeded to train and control the units assigned to operation Galvanic which included Major General Julian Smith's 2nd Marine division and Major General Ralph Smith's 27th division, that's a lot of Smiths. As the 5th amphibious force and corps were still undergoing organization during the planning phase of the Gilberts operations, much of the burden for tacticaling planning fell initially onto the staffs of the two divisions involved. Julian Smith was informed in august his job was to capture the Tarawa and Apamama atolls. Ralph Smith was told he was to invade Nauru, but Holland Smith believed Nauru offered too many problems. Nauru was 390 miles west of the Gilberts and would place strain on available shipping. Simultaneous landings in the two places would further widen the dispersal of supporting fleet element, a dangerous division of forces in view of the presumed possibility of a Japanese naval counterattack. Finally, the terrain on Nauru would make an amphibious assault and the land fighting extremely costly to be warranted by the strategic advantages to be gained. Makin Atoll was considered no less suitable than Nauru as an air base for operations against the Marshalls and was thought to be considerably less well defended. Makin was also only about 105 miles north of Tarawa making it possible to concentrate the supporting fleet in one area and thus avoid the danger of excessive dispersion. So in early October, Spruance and Nimitz made the decision to invade Makin Atoll instead. Unfortunately the Americans did not have great intelligence on the Gilberts, so they had to do some photographic coverage of Tarawa and Makin between July and October 1943. The USS Nautilus contributed a lot to the intelligence effort by obtaining hydrographic and each conditions for both atolls, such as their surfs, reefs, beaches, lagoon entrance, current data, tidal data and so forth. The unsexy logistical stuff no one talks about. If you want to invade a beach, you have to know about said beach. During September and October a total of 16 former residents and travelers of the islands were attached to Turners staff to help out. Many of these were Australian, New Zealanders, Fijian naval reserve officers, officials of the Western pacific high commission, Australian army reserve officers and enlisted men and a few civilians. Another source of information was given by Lt Colonel James Roosevelt who had taken part in the raid upon Makin. For the landings at Makin, Turner's task for 54 and 53. He would have at his disposal 4 destroyer transports, one Cargoship, one LSD and 9 LSTS to transport the reinforced 165th regiment of Colonel Gardiner Conroy. He would be supported by the 7th army defense battalion, detachments of the 105th infantry regiment, 27th division, units of the 193rd tank battalion, 152nd engineer battalion, coastal artillery and anti-aircraft batteries of the 98th and 93rd Coastal artillery battalions, a platoon from the 5th Amphibious corps reconnaissance company, sundry medical, signal, ordnance, quartermaster and bomb disposal detachments. Their screening force would be 4 older battleships, 4 heavy cruisers, 13 destroyers and 3 escort carriers. The Tarawa force would be given one destroyer transport, 1 attack transport, 12 Destroyer transports, 3 AKA's, one LSD and 12 LST's under Rear Admiral Harry Hill, screened by 3 battleships, 3 heavy cruisers, 3 light cruisers, 21 destroyers and 5 escort carriers. Turner would also make a legendary decision. He appointed Colonel Eareckson, the veteran of the Aleutian Islands campaign to be commander of the support Aircraft, thus establishing a centralized system of ground control for support aircraft in amphibious operations. Eareckson became famous for his innovative tactics such as using radar equipped B-17's to guide P-38's to attack Kawanishi flying boats during the Aleutian islands campaign. He also pioneered low level bombing raids through the brutal aleutian weather. Aerial support, both at the tactical and strategic level would be provided by Rear admiral Charles Pownalls carrier task force 50 formed around 6 lage and 5 small carriers and by Rear admiral John Hoovers shore based aircraft; consisting of task groups 57.2/3/4. Both forces had to destroyer aircraft and air/harbor facilities at Tarawa, Mille, Jaluit, Makin and Nauru while simultaneously providing air support. Hoover also was responsible for conducting photographic reconnaissance over the Marshalls. After the air strikes and naval bombardment obliterated the Japanese defenses and installations, Turner planned to assault the beaches with the troops ferried using amphibian tractors, followed up by LCVPS and medium tanks in LCMS. For Tarawa, Ralph Smith's plan was a bit more elaborate and extreme, he was going to attempt something never done before. The amphibious assault of Tarawa had unique problems. There was no immediate means of achieving depth of deployment. The landing forces would initially be pinned down on a long narrow beach. The island offered basically no room for flank maneuvers and the aerial and naval bombardments would do little. Ralph assigned a major role to troops of a different regiment than the one that made up the main landing force. Detachments X and Y, of the 3rd Battalion, 105th Infantry and 193rd Tank Battalion,  led by Maj. Edward T. Bradt would be the first to land on the west coast of Butaritari, designated Red Beaches. This would be followed up quickly by the 1st and 3rd Battalions. On the right, the 3rd Battalion Landing Team would land on Red Beach 2 and seize the right half of the division beachhead to about 1,600 yards inland. Then they would move right to clear the area around Ukiangong Village and Ukiangong Point. Over on the left, the 1st Battalion Landing Team would land on Red Beach 1, seize the division beachhead in its zone of action and move left to capture the area from the north end of Red Beach to Flink Point. Meanwhile the reinforced 2nd Platoon of Company G, 165th Regiment, and 19 marines of the 4th Platoon of the 5th Amphibious Corps Reconnaissance Company were going to land on Kotabu island, lying just north of Flink point. This would secure the seward approaches into the lagoon. After two hours while the troops consolidated their beachhead the Z detachment of the 105th regiment led by Captain William Ferns would land on Yellow beach 2 on the north side of the island between On Chong's and King's Wharfs. The detachment would split into two groups, one heading east to clear Kings wharf the other west to clear On Chong's wharf. After this a wave of the 165th battalion would advance west. Comparing the two, Julian's plan was a lot more simple, it called for the landing at Betio of 3 battalions; the 2nd battalion, 8th marines, 2nd battalion and the  2nd and 3rd battalions 2nd marines. Colonel David Shoup and Colonel Elmer Hall would lead the 3 battalions.The 1st battalion, 2nd marines would be held in reserve. The corps reserve for Tarawa, Makin or Apamama would be Colonel Maurice Holmes 6th marines. Once the beachhead was secured, troops would advance across the island to the south, seizing the airfield and mopping up enemy positions along the major beaches To further prepare for Operation Galvanic, Admiral Pownall led three carriers, the Lexington, Princeton and Belleau Wood to strike the Gilberts on September 18th. Supported by 38 Liberators flying out of Canton, Funafuti and Guadalcanal, Pownall made 6 separate and unopposed air strikes against Tarawa. A ton of fuel and ammunition was destroyed, several buildings were wrecked and a small freighter was sunk. Attacks on Makin saw three flying boats lit on fire with some damage done to shore installations. What was more important than these strikes was the photographic coverage that accompanied them. Zero fighter interception was found at either, though two Japanese medium bombers were shot down northwest of Makin. According to the diary of a Japanese laborer, 28 laborers were killed during a strike on Makin, most likely from a direct bomb hit to a shelter. On Beito they hit a runway, though it would be quickly repaired. Pownall tried to keep the strikes going but now saw an interception from 18 zeros which shot down 5 of his aircraft.  To follow up the raid on the Gilberts, Admiral Montgomery hit Wake with one of the largest carrie strike forces to date. The Essex, Lexington, Yorktown, Cowpens, Independence and Belleau Wood with support from land based aircraft hit Wake on October 5th and 6th. Over 67 Japanese planes were reported to be destroyed in the air and on the ground. Shore installations were also battered heavily. Then beginning on november 13th, land-based bombers of Admiral Hoover made nightly raids against Tarawa, Makin, Nauru and some central Marshall islands. Meanwhile between November 13-17th, Major General Willis Hale's 7th air force's heavy bombers flew 141 bombing sorties against the Gilberts and Marshalls. They dropped over 173 tons of bombs, destroying at least 5 Japanese aircraft and inflicting heavy damage to their facilities and installations. Against the Americans, the Japanese forces in the area initially were that of Rear Admiral Abe Koso's 6th base force operating on Kwajalein. Koso commanded the 61st guard unit on Kwajalian, 62nd guard unit on Jaluit, 63rd guard unit on Taroa, 64th guard unit at Wotje,  65th guard unit at Wake, 43rd guard unit at Nauru, a detachment of the 63rd guard unit at Ocean island and another detachment of the 51st guard unit on Makin. For the Marshalls he had the 22nd air flotilla consisting of 46 Zeros, 40 kates, 3 vals, 5 flying boats and 11 reconnaissance aircraft. The raid of Makin back in 1942 alerted the Japanese to its significance so they sent the 6th Yokosuka SNLF to help occupy the Gilberts. During the spring of 1943, the IJN created the 3rd special base force of Rear-Admiral Shibazaki Keiji who would defend Tarawa, Makin, Apamama, Nauru and Ocean island. The Sasebo 7th SNLF would be sent to Tarawa, the 2nd Yokosuka SNLF to Nauru. The Japanese went to work on Makin and Tarawa constructing concrete and log emplacements for guns of all sizes. They used coconut tree logs to build tank barricade, tank pits, laid underwatch obstacles and dugouts for riflemen and machine gunners. On Makin the airbase was expanded and by july 1943 was able to take land based bombers. The Marshalls, Marianas and Carolines alongside other islands would be reinforced in preparation for expected American offensives. Four new south sea detachments were formed and tow mobile amphibious brigades that would be used for counterlandings. The Japanese were outmanned and outgunned, but they would make the Americans pay in blood for every inch of land, island by island. Now it is time for us to travel back to Green Hell as the allies were preparing to hit Sattelberg. By November 9th, the Australians knew the Japanese had two out posts west of Jivevaneng, at Green and Coconut ridges with another strong patrol base at Steeple Tree Hill. Whitehead decided to deploy the 2/24th battalion on the right to guard the enemy along the Palanko road; the 2/48th would take up the center advancing along the sattelberg road supported by the 1st tank battalion and the 2/23rd would take the left advancing along Sisi. Major General Frank Berryman would be appointed the new commander of the 2nd corps, as General Morshead was appointed commander of the New Guinea Force. The date for the new offensive was set for November 17th. A preliminary advance was made by a company along the sattelberg road to seize the enemy held Green Ridge. Under the support of heavy machine gun and artillery fire.    At 8:20am two batteries and the company of the 2/2nd machine gun battalion fired upon Green Ridge. Captain Isaksson's company of the 2/48th then moved up, but were unable to properly follow up the bombardment. The men advanced at a slow rate up the ridge because of thick bamboo. Both the nearby near and far features were strongly defended and would only be captured by 10 and 12:4-pm respectfully. The capture of the Far feature took the machine gunners 26,000 rounds to keep the enemy heads down for the infantry to storm their positions. Captain Brocksopp's company occupied Green Ridge, Isakssons took White Trunk Tree lying on the junction of Sattelberg road and the Sisi track by 1:40pm. 5 men were killed in the process, 18 Japanese died on Green Ridge. At first light on November 17th, four Matilda tanks led by Major Samuel Hordern led the way to the start line converted under the noise of a deadly rocket barrage. Beginning at 6:30am  rocket propelled bombs were fired from jeeps. These 30 pound bombs had a maximum range of 1200 yards. Several of them ended up being duds, but those that did explode had a very lethal effect, killing within a radius of 50 yards. On top of this came artillery and mortar bombardments, until Horderns tanks began smashing Coconut ridge with the infantry close behind them. A company of the 2/23rd would find Sisi unoccupied and continued north to help defend Green Ridge. Around 50 yards up the track the Australians found the first signs of opposition, a heavy machine gun post. The tanks fired blindly at the enemy defenses, mostly pillboxes and foxholes. Despite the terrifying attack, the Japanese held their ground and replied using machine guns, mortars and grenades, until the tanks blew them and their defenses to pieces. Halfway to Coconut ridge, the Matilada's had to halt to refill their ammunition. Within all of the excitement, the tank crews had run out of ammunition for their Besa guns. The Besa's had been firing bursts of around 50 rounds when they could have been firing 10s. Three deeps loaded with ammunition at Jivevaneng rushed forward as the tanks backed up some 60 yards to protect their approach. All of this was coordinated using walkie talkies, an absolutely crucial technology of the war. Meanwhile the 2/24th continued north to attack Japanese positions along the Palank road and to the south the 2/23rd met resistance halfway to Steeple Tree. At 10:20am, Horderns tanks were resuming their advance, eliminating pockets of resistance one by one. Upon reaching the Kunai Knoll on the southern Coconuts, two Matilda's became disabled. Upon seeing the halting tanks, the Japanese unleashed as much firepower as they could pinning down the infantry alongside their tanks. Lt Colonel Robert Ainslie ordered the men to advance on without the tanks. The men stormed the slopes of the Kunai Knoll, forced to crawl forward under heavy fire. It became a fierce battle, the Australians were unable to make much ground and forced to dig in for the night. Two companies dug in on the slopes of the Kunai Knoll while a third dug in near White Trunk Tree. Despite the terrifying tank attack, the Japanese did not flinch and fought throughout the day to halt the Australian advance. However during the night the Australians unleashed an artillery bombardment forcing the Japanese to abandon the ridge. The next morning, the Australians found the ridge abandoned and went to work repairing the two disabled tanks so they could continue the advance. Three more Matildas wielding 2 pounders and 3 inch Howitzers were brought up. The 2/2rd now advanced towards Mararuo, pushing the Japanese up a spur. The tanks advanced again, allowing the Australians to go another 250 yards until they were met again with heavy resistance. The Japanese held very strong positions upon the 2600 foot Steeple Tree Hill. Their system of defense was to have positions at every possible line of approach near bamboo obstacles. The Japanese would wait to fire until the infantry were just a few yards away to cause maximum damage. Armed with 37mm anti-tank guns the Japanese did all they could to neutralize the tank menace. By nightfall the attackers were forced to pull back to Coconut ridge and during the night the Japanese launched counter attacks using grenades and small arms.  The next morning at 8am the Australians resumed their advance. The tanks led the way, but they were met with extremely fast and well coordinated anti-tank measures. At around 100 yards from the start line, the advance was halted by an anti-tank ditch 6 feet wide and 4 feet deep. Major Moodie's engineers of the 2/13th field company were able to dislodge the tanks and soon the tanks were overrun an 81mm mortar position. The tanks ran havoc upon a Woodpecker and two light machine gun positions, then after another 150 yards ran into another tank ditch around 10am. Lt Farquhars platoon charged past the tanks to give the engineers room to dislodge them only to see the tanks hit another ditch when they came forward again. The men fashioned two fougasses out of 4 gallon drums filled with petrol to hit the defenders of one of the slopes later to be named Fougasse Corner. A fougasse by the way is a projectile weapon, typically using a 40 gallon drum with a flammable substance like petrol. They would be inclined and when triggered using an explosive charge, shot a flame going perhaps 10 feet up, 3 feet wide for about 30 yards. Picture a really big flamethrower burst. This was unleashed on the slope causing roughly 20 casualties. The Japanese would leave 46 of their dead abandoning the slope when the Australians charged into them. The Japanese then launched a counterattack against the Fougasse Corner leading to more casualties, but were repelled. To the north, the 2/24th launched an attack on a knoll near the summit of the 2200 Feature. After an artillery bombardment, Lt Caples platoon took the unoccupied knoll, but soon the Japanese began encircling them. They fought until 2:30pm when the Australians finally established a secure position on the knoll. Meanwhile, General Katagiri was preparing to send the 79th regiment to attack the mouth of the Song River. Katagiri was facing a dire supply situation. Although 2-3 barges came up daily to bring supplies to Kanimi and Lakona, once the supplies landed they had to be carried overland and that was the crux of the problem. The main roads, Kanimi to Ago to Lakona to Wario to Sattelberg and secondary roads leading to Zageheme and Merikeo were all steep and mountainous, taking 5 days to traverse. This led the supply line to the front lines to be inconsistent. From the Diary entry of an unknown Japanese infantry man at Sattelberg October 15th "I eat potatoes and live in a hole and cannot speak in a loud voice. I live the life of a mud rat or similar creature" At the same time the 2/15th battalion had sent a diversionary force led by Major Newcomb with orders to "in conjunction with the opening of the attack towards Sattelberg… you are to command a diversionary force, broaden the apparent front of the attack on Sattelberg by simulating a new threat towards Wareo" The 2/15th set out on November 17th and reached Garabow the next day. They began bombarding it to  cause the distraction. This was done to support Whiteheads offensive while in the east Brigadier Porter was going to cut the enemy's main supply line by attacking along the coast. Porter sent the 2/32nd battalion to take some high ground at Pabu. On November 19th, the 2/32nd were able to seize Pabu, avoiding any enemy, finding the hill unoccupied. The next morning the 2/32nd began patrolling and found large numbers of Japanese 500 yards to their west, and that said enemy then found them. Katagiri feared a possible attack upon Bonga so he decided to launch a secondary counteroffensive on November 21st. Meanwhile the 2/48th resumed their advance, this time without Horderns tanks who could not traverse past 250 yards because of bamboo obstacles. By 9:30am the tanks were able to bypass the obstacles and caught up to the infantry. At 10am, Whitehead gave the order “Go ahead as fast as possible” and 50 minutes later the skirmishing began upon the first enemy positions. The Australians pushed on slowly in a sluggish battle but were able to capture Steeple Tree by the late afternoon. At the same time the 2/23rd were trying to drive the enemy away from the southern approaches to Steeple Tree, gradually linking up with the 2/48th.  To the north the 2/24th once again found themselves halted. The Japanese had created strong bamboo obstacles along the slopes that were difficult to traverse. In an attempt to force the issue, Wootten committed another troop of tanks to assist the 2/24th, but it would take a lot of time before the Matildas could climb the 2200 Feature. But the Japanese were caught between two enemy forces and were forced to pull back to Sattelberg during the night. The next morning the 2/48th resumed their advance while the 2/23rd patrolled towards Mararuo. Meeting no opposition the troops moved ahead quickly. At 4:35pm the enemy unleashed machine gun fire at point blank range upon them. The 2/48th tossed mortars and their tank support who crushed the enemy defenses, rapidly overwhelming the enemy, sending them scattering. But on November 22nd, Katagiri finally launched his counterattack using the bulk of the 79th regiment against Porters positions along the Song. Katagiri also sent the Fujii detachment led by Lt Colonel Fujii to attack Pabu. It just so happened Davies Company  had left Pabu to search for the main Japanese supply road, and they came across Horace's Hoof in the afternoon. A company sized force of the Fujii detachment began their attack forcing Davies company back towards Pabu. But that is it for New Guinea as we now need to travel over to Bougainville. Generals Geiger and Turnage ordered a group of naval and marine engineers with construction personnel led by Civil Engineer corps officer Commander William Painter to construct airfields in the interior of the island. They were escorted by units of the 21st marines and used aerial photographs to find an area about 3 miles inland, roughly 1 mile beyond the defensive perimeter where suitable sites were located for two airstrips to be made. Unable to expand the perimeter properly because of the swamps around them, Turnage directed the 21st marines to establish a strong outpost at the junction of the East-West and Numa Numa trails to cover the new airfield sites. On November 13th, the inexperienced 2nd battalion, 21st marines of Lt Colonel Eustace Smoak set out with E company in the lead. Unbeknownst to them, Colonel Hamanoue had just realized the tactical value of said junction and sent a battalion to occupy Coconut Grove the previous day. The men had managed to establish a solid defensive perimeter.  At 11:05 Company E ran right into an ambush. The Japanese unleashed machine gun and mortar fire with sniper support from the treelines. E companies commander sent a report back to Colonel Smoak, one of many panicked and incoherent reports he would receive from said company. This was the first combat experience for the 2nd battalion, 21st marines. Smoak rushed forward and established his command post close to the action. He ordered F company to relieve E company who had suffered heavy casualties. F company however, advanced too far to the right and suffered a lot of casualties in a disorganized manner. Unable to get artillery support, Smoak ordered his units to begin digging in for the night. The next morning, 5 light tanks of the 1st battalion, 21st regiment came up to support Smoak. While Smoak organized his forces, a air strike hit the Coconut grove area at 9:05am consisting of around 20 Avengers carrying 100lb bombs using 1 second delay fuses. The marines then performed an artillery barrage before resuming their advance upon the grove. The Japanese fired upon the tanks, managing to disable two of them. At this point Smoak ordered the disorganized assault to halt and began regrouping his men to attack again. This time they were able to break the Japanese resistance and by late afternoon established a perimeter around the Coconut Grove. The marines found 40 dead Japanese, the baptism under fire for the 2nd battalions, 21st marines cost them 20 dead men and 39 wounded. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Operation Galvanic was being prepared and in the meanwhile, a large number of air raids were hitting numerous places in the central pacific. The advance to sattelberg was getting closer day by day, the boys on Bougainville were finding inhospitable Japanese around every corner. 

The Jordan Harbinger Show
919: Chris Miller | Chip War: The Battle for Semiconductor Supremacy

The Jordan Harbinger Show

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 9, 2023 69:37 Transcription Available


How high are the geopolitical and technological stakes in the international struggle for semiconductor supremacy? Chip War author Chris Miller chimes in! What We Discuss with Chris Miller: Semiconductors, commonly known as semis or chips, are essential components in thousands of products such as computers, smartphones, appliances, gaming hardware, medical equipment, and military technology. How superconductors evolved to become so crucial to our modern infrastructure. The intricacies of semiconductor manufacturing -- from their complex operation to the resources required to create them -- mean the countries that can produce the most advanced chips have a strategic advantage on the world stage. Taiwan is currently the leader in this field. Why China, despite investing heavily in semiconductor technology, is always playing catch-up with the rapid pace of Western-influenced technological advancement -- and what underhanded steps it might take to slow this pace to its advantage. What the recently passed CHIPS and Science Act will likely mean for semiconductor research and manufacturing jobs in the United States. And much more... Full show notes and resources can be found here: jordanharbinger.com/919 This Episode Is Brought To You By Our Fine Sponsors: jordanharbinger.com/deals Sign up for Six-Minute Networking — our free networking and relationship development mini course — at jordanharbinger.com/course! Like this show? Please leave us a review here — even one sentence helps! Consider including your Twitter handle so we can thank you personally!

Diversity in Fellowship
The Woke War: The Battle for Our Image

Diversity in Fellowship

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 31, 2023 31:09


How do we view America? How do we talk about the image of our country? How should we view and talk about it as Christians?

Diversity in Fellowship
The Woke War: The Battle over DEI

Diversity in Fellowship

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 17, 2023 33:18


What is DEI and how does it impact our jobs and universities? How is the concept of woke being used in this battleground?

Diversity in Fellowship
The Woke War: The Battle for Education

Diversity in Fellowship

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 10, 2023 33:36


How has the "woke" idea impacted education? How can we think through this battle as Christians?

Diversity in Fellowship
The Woke War: The Battle Begins

Diversity in Fellowship

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 3, 2023 31:51


What is the woke war? How did we get to this point? Why should we be concerned about this as Christians?

Adventure Church Podcast
Encourage: The Soils of War – The Battle for Your Heart

Adventure Church Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Sep 17, 2023 45:37


Continuing our new series “Encourage” today, Pastor Kuulei teaches on the Parable of the Sower which causes us to look at the condition of our heart, and makes a case for the spiritual battle we face daily to keep our hearts toward God!Key Scripture Passages:Mat 13:1-13,19-23, 1 Pet 5:8-9, Jam 4:7, Psa 119:34, Mat 5:10-12, Rom 5:3-5, Pro 23:5, 1 Tim 6:10,17-18, Mat 6:24, Rom 12:2, 2 Tim 3:16-17, Col 2:6-7, Psa 86:11, Eph 6:10-17

That Wilbur Smith Show
11. Courtney's War - The Battle of Stalingrad

That Wilbur Smith Show

Play Episode Listen Later Aug 18, 2023 45:47


Tom and Diana discuss Wilbur's book Courtney's War with its vivid depiction of the horrors of the Battle of Stalingrad, a conflict with disturbing similarities to today's war in Ukraine. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

The Pacific War - week by week
- 85 - Pacific War - The battle of Kula Gulf, July 4-11, 1943

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Jul 13, 2023 31:33


Last time we spoke about the amphibious assaults for Operations Chronicle and Toenails. General Douglas MacArthur finally performed his landings at Nassau Bay, Woodlark and Kiriwina islands. Woodlark and Kiriwina proved to be cake walks, while Nassau Bay proved a tougher nut to crack. Then over in the Solomons, Admiral Halsey unleashed his landings at Wickham Anchorage, Segi Point, Viru Harbor and Rendova. Now the Japanese were more alert to the invasions and offered some resistance, although ultimately Sasaki would order many forces to simply withdraw from the invaders. Admiral Kusaka tossed a ton of airpower at the incoming allies only to lose a disastrous quarter of his air fleet, forcing him to ask his Army colleague Immamura for additional support. However with all of these landings came a large amount of allied warships to bring them, and such actions could only bring about one conclusion, another naval battle for the pacific war. This episode is the Battle of Kula Gulf  Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    Before we jump into the naval battle of Kula Gulf a lot was occurring in New Guinea and the Solomons. Over in the Bobdubi front, the Australian 15th brigade under the temporary command of Colonel Guinn were preparing for the main offensive, hoping to trap the Japanese defending Mubo. To support the Nassau Bay landing, Colonel Guinn ordered the untested 58/59th battalion to advance upon the Japanese high ground position at the Old Vicker's, Coconuts and Bobdubi area. They would be marching from Orodubi to the Coconuts while Major Warfe's commandos would raid Malolo and Kela. Company A and C of the 58/59th would make the initial attack seeing A attacking Gwaibolom and C the Old Vicker's position. Following close behind them was B company who were to advance across the ridge to gain control over the Bench Cut Track. D Company were to be held in reserve at the Kunda-vine. On June 26th, A company set off from Missim heading towards their forming up point at Namling. On the 28th, the other remaining companies made departed Meares Camp heading for the New Bobdubi kunda bridge. The next day 17 of Warfe's commandos were ambushed by 30 Japanese. They managed to escape, but were forced to abandon a Bren gun. By the night of June 29th, the 58th/59th crossed the Francisco River and began preparations for the launch of the main attack which would occur the next morning. The next morning saw lackluster allied air strikes against Gwaibolom, Salamua, Old Vickers and the Coconut area. Companies B and C left their start up point of Uliap Creek, seeing C attack Buggert village, just a bit south of the Old Vickers position being held at this time by a company of the 115th regiment led by Lt Ogawa Takeshi. They successfully outlanked the Japanese and captured the village, suffering only 2 casualties for their efforts. From there the Australians assaulted the Old Vickers position, but the Japanese defenders repealed them right back to Buggert village. The Japanese defenders had well established positions, hiding in dugouts 40 feet down from the top. The failure to seize the Old Vickers position, prevented B Company from reaching their objective, the Bench Cut Track and now they were being met with Mortar fire as they crossed the ridge. Meanwhile A Company began their assault on Orodubi, but anticipating booby-traps the men had left on the Bench Cut Track around 70 yards south of Orodubi, they chose to climb a 40 foot kunai slope to join the main track just 10 yards within the enemy. Around 80 men of Company 10 led by Lt Gunji Toshio saw the Australians doing this and promptly began tossing grenades at close range and fired down upon them. The Australians were forced to flee back to Namling as a result. The next day it was decided they would use a platoon to contain Orodubi while the others bypassed it to go onwards and capture Gwaibolom and Erskine Creek, which they managed to do by July 2nd. While this was occurring, B Company was trying to find another way across the ridge, but were failing to do so. So on July 2nd, they were ordered to move across the ridge via the newly established positions at Gwaibolom and Erskine Creek, and would reach the Komiatum Track / bench track junction where they would prepare an ambush by the 3rd. At around 5pm on the 3rd, B company managed to ambush a party of 20 Japanese trying to move towards Old Vickers and this quickly fell into hand to hand combat killing half the Japanese and one of their officers. Meanwhile Colonel MacKechnie's men were fighting to keep their beachhead alive at Nassau Bay. AA and C Companies had fought through the night against Japanese until their 300 yard perimeter was secured. At dawn on June 30th, C company began advancing south to find the Papuan infantry battalion who were around Cape Dinga. C Company made their way to a place just due west of Cape Dinga, following the Tabali River, while A Company was patrolling north and south of an arm of the Bitoi river where they ran into the 3rd battalion, 102nd regiment. A Company backed by some other units attempted to hit the Japanese western flank, but they were overwhelmed and forced to turn back. It would actually be Amphibian engineers who would save the day, who came in at the last minute to help A company out just as the Japanese tossed a banzai charge at them. Upon receiving word of the Japanese attacks, C company rushed over to join A by 3pm. Yet unbeknownst to them, the Japanese were not actually trying to break through, they were trying to withdraw by crossing the Tabali river. General Nakano had ordered them to withdraw to a new position at Lake Salus when he heard word over 1000 men had landed at Nassau Bay. Nakano also had ordered the 3rd battalion of the 66th regiment to send 150 men to march south from Salamua to help out in the Nassau Bay area. These men were tasked with carrying out only limited attacks against the allied forces around Nassau Bay, such as delaying actions to help the Nassau Bay garrison withdraw towards Lake Salus. Nakano was also coordinating with Colonel Araki who was now operating out of an HQ in Mubo, he had likewise brought forces over to Mubo from Salamua.  As for the Papuan infantry, they were marching north and they ran into the 3rd battalion, 102nd regiment around Cape Dinga as well. They managed to attack their rear killing at least 26 Japanese who were holding out in a bunker. After this they continued their march to the Nassau Bay beachhead. At around 4:30pm C company began sending reports that they were seeing some Japanese crossing over the Tabali River just south of their position. They were ordered to return to the beachhead perimeter to take the southern flank, but before they were able the Japanese attacked their rear taking 5 men and a platoon commander. Around the beachhead a hastily prepared defensive line was established by an ad hoc force of Engineers, Australian infantry and Headquarters personnel. As the night fell on, C company reached the southern part of the perimeter, quickly taking up positions. The Japanese began a series of attacks throughout the entire night from all sides using machine guns, grenades, mortar and rifle fire. Smaller parties of Japanese were trying to infiltrate positions. It was a terrifying experience for the defenders who would dub it “guy fawkes night”. Many of the men had itchy fingers which led to tragic accidental casualties throughout the night. It was a pitch black night and the noises of the jungle and Japanese screaming stuff in english unnerved the allied forces. The Japanese had tossed a ton of stuff into the perimeter trying to get the allies to use up their own munitions in response. As a result the allied forces had 18 deaths and 27 wounded several of which were the result of friendly fire. The Japanese it seems to have around 50 deaths during the night. Back over in the north, on June 30th, Captain Dexter was leading forward a number of patrols in preparation for an assault upon Duali. However as they advanced they ran into a Japanese ambush along the Bitoi track, thus canceling their planned assault. The next day, Brigadier Moten ordered Dexter's exhausted men to move forward regardless. With some support of Beaufighters strafing the Japanese positions, the Australians charged straight through the enemy positions, and to their shock they found them abandoned. As Dexter recalled ‘We advanced through the Japanese position with fixed bayonets and searched the scrub on each side. Everywhere was evidence of a hasty evacuation, dropped equipment and personal rice bags, and evidence of extensive bomb damage. But of the Japs, no sign.' Thus Dexter and his men captured the mouth of the Bitoi by early afternoon. Shortly after the capture, Dexter made contact with MacKechnie who was busy expanding his perimeter northwards. By nightfall, PT boats led by Lt Commander Barry Atkins covered the landing of 11 landing craft full of reinforcements. The PT boats staffed nearby villages to cause a lot of ruckus, hoping to dissuade nearby Japanese from firing on the vulnerable landing craft. The reinforcements were mostly from B company who had failed to land during the third wave. On July 2nd, Moten began to pressure MacKechnie, stating he had to get his troops moving inland at once. Thus MacKechnie decided to leave C company to defend the perimeter while Lt Colonel Harold Taylor would lead the rest of the men towards Napier. Luckily for the men, 4 75mm pack howitzer m1 artillery guns had been unloaded that night with the reinforcements giving them ample firepower. The gun were positioned on the beach and immediately went to work shelling targets at the mouth of the Tabali River, Cape Dinga and the area between Duali and the Bito River's southern arm. On July the 3rd, the men now designated the Taylor Force accompanied by Dexter's company were marching for Napier, but their march was a slow one as the jungles were thick and they were carrying heavy equipment. While this was occurring the 3rd battalions of the 102nd and 66th regiments were consolidating around Lake Salus looking to create a defensive position. The coastal area however proved to be too difficult to fortify, so they moved over the Tambu where they joined a SNLF platoon of the 5th Sasebo to make a position there. At this point General Savige decided to send the Papuans north along the coast to keep pressuring the enemy's retreat. By the 4th, Taylor Force had taken a position at Napier and were now under the direct command of Moten's 17th brigade. Back over on the beaches at Nassau Bay a total of 1477 troops had been landed, thus securing the beachhead. Dexters company marched back over to Guadagasal taking a coastal route, getting themselves ready for a future assault against Mubo slated for July 7th. MacKechnie believed the loss of some of his landing craft had greatly delayed the entire operation, perhaps up to 3 weeks. He did not think he would be able to move artillery or large quantities of supplies further inland. He also did not think it was tactically sound to leave his base, as the Japanese proved to be quite a nuisance in the area. Orders from the top were demanding a artillery road be built, but his troops at the assembly area would probably run out of rations in a day or two and he had no native carriers on hand. In his words "To be very frank we have been in a very precarious position down here for several days and my sending the rifle troops inland was contrary to my own best judgment. Troops had gone inland stripped to the bone. Without heavy weapons and mortar and machine-gun ammunition. "Therefore, these troops who are up there now are in no position to embark upon an offensive mission until we are able to get food, ammunition and additional weapons up to them." In response to the situation, on July 6th, Moten ordered 1000 rations and 100 boy loads of ammunition…god you have to love the australians, boy-loads haha. Anyways this was to be dropped over Napier. Moving over to the Solomons, Admiral Halsey had successfully occupied Rendova, Segi point, Viru Harbor and Wickham anchorage forcing the smaller number of Japanese to withdraw to their main base at Munda. Admiral Kusaka tossed a series of air strikes against the invaders, suffering horrible losses whereupon he had to request General Immamura reinforce him with the 21st air flotilla at Saipan and from the 6th air division. For the battle of Munda, Admiral Halsey had assembled the largest air force ever assembled in the Solomon islands campaign. It was a force that was needed as the Japanese in Rabaul tossed every bomber that was available to try and thwart the US amphibious invasion. The June air battles had greatly depleted the Japanese air power, but they were not done. On July 1st the Japanese hit Kahili using 6 Vals and 34 Zeros. They were trying to knock out the 3rd battalion, 103rd infantry who were unloading at Poko plantation on the west coast of Rendova. However they were met by 20 P-40's and F4Fs that ripped them to pieces taking down 3 Vals, 5 Zeros and losing 5 P-40's in the process. Although the allies were scoring massively high success against the Japanese in ratios, by this point it reached 7 to 1, they were still unable to sustain round the clock 32 fighter or more CAP. To do this required a total of 96 operational aircraft and after 10 days of fighting in the skies over New Georgia the pilots were also becoming increasingly exhausted. Colonel Merrill Twining requested more P-38 Lightnings, the aircraft that had become the most comfortable fighter to those in the south pacific by this point. But Hap's Arnold over in Washington was heavily committing forces for General Patton and Montgomery's invasion of Sicily at the time so he had to deny this request. As Arnold stated back “every trained unit must be thrown against the German until he is beaten”.  Regardless, with Rendova secured, General Hester was landing the bulk of his forces for the final push against Munda. The unloading process had been heavily hampered by poor planning and a failure to allocate adequate personnel for beach control and unloading duties however. To clear the new beachhead and distribute the combat stores, infantrymen were detailed to carry out the work. When transports carrying the next echelon arrived, many of the boats grounded offshore and had to be unloaded manually by troops wading ashore. On July 2nd, Admiral Kusaka coordinating with General Itahana formed a combined strike led by Major Endo Misao consisting of 18 Ki-21 bombers, 23 Ki-43's and Ki-61s with 29 Zero escort. Unfortunately for the allies, Admiral Mitscher had recalled the Rendova patrol due to bad weather, so a total of 18 Ki-21 bombers came to the scene unmolested and hit the congested area around the harbor. The strike caused 200 or so casualties, mostly upon the 2nd battalion, 172nd, the 24th seabees, the 9th defense battalion and staff officers of various headquarters. The strike also knocked out a lot of equipment and supplies. With the failure of the June air battles to hold back the allied invasion, Admiral Koga turned to the Navy for the task of providing new supplies to the defenders at Munda Point. The Tokyo Express was back in business, a convoy of 10 destroyers were sent to New Gerogia led by Rear Teruo Akiyama aboard his flagship Niizuki. His force was ordered to attack Rendova and he had with him the old Yubari, Yunagi, Mikazuki who would operate south of the Treasuries as a diversion, while Niizuki, Amagiri, Hatsuyuki, Nagatsuki, Satsuki, Mikazuki and Mochizuki would hit the allied shipping and shell the harbor. The Japanese destroyers were spotted right away, but bad weather prevented 3 American strike forces consisting of PBY's and B-25's from hitting the incoming enemy. In the meantime, Akiyama closed in on the southern tip of Rendova. She circled the island and opened fire on a point due west of the harbor. The bombardment was quite ineffective, but some allied PT boats rushed in to attack her which caused a wild 10 minute mini battle seeing 2 of them running aground. On the ground, General Hester ordered the 1st battalion, 172nd regiment and A company of the 169th regiment now designated Southern Landing Group to land at Zanana beach. Led by General Wing on the afternoon of the 2nd they made a crossing over Blanche Channel using 16 landing crafts. With the support of Brigadier General Harold Barkers artillery they successfully formed a perimeter. Now the Japanese air and naval attacks were worrying Halsey. He expected the Japanese to launch a major counterlanding with substantial forces perhaps on the 3rd. Therefore he ordered Admiral Ainsworth to lay in wait off the west coast of Rendova for the enemy. However July the 3rd would not bring an enemy, this was because General Imamura and Admiral Kusaka agreed with the lack of air and naval forces on hand at this time they could not perform such a feat, to the disgust of General Sasaki who had assumed command over the defense for Munda on the 2nd. Sasaki was so adamant about landing reinforcements at around midnight on July 3rd he proposed violating orders to simply make a counter landing using the 13th regiment and Ota's barges. He had a crazy idea to simply bring the vessels in and mix them with the American landing craft who were making rountrips to the mainland through the Honiavasa passage. He thought even if half his forces perished, the attack would be worth it. Ota objected to this on the grounds the barges would be needed for other transports scheduled for July 4th and 5th, apparently this made Sasaki visibly upset, who adjourned the meeting and left the room. Ota pushed Sasaki to write his plans down and submit them to Rabaul, which he did, and Rabaul squashed it immediately.  On July 3rd the Japanese performed an unsuccessful fighter sweep over Rendova and the next day reconnaissance reported the island was secured by the Americans who had heavily reinforced it with anti aircraft guns and radar. They also reported landings on Zanana and that it looked like Rice Anchorage would be next, thus cutting off Japanese reinforcements from coming down the Munda trail from Bairoko. Imamura and Kusaka had to wait for an accumulation of forces to bring reinforcements to New Georgia; they had no intention of losing it like Guadalcanal. 4000 soldiers of the 13th and 45th regiments were earmarked for departure. Kusaka ordered Itahana to launch another combined strike, this time aimed at Roviana island. However the Japanese were intercepted by 32 F4F's causing the loss of 6 Ki-21s, 3 Ki-43's and a zero without a single loss for the Americans. This would be the fateful end of the joint air operations as Itahana needed to take his forces to help the Salamaua area. Luckily for Kusaka he received reinforcements in the form of the 201st Kokutai from the 25th flotilla which would allow him to gradually rebuild his air strength by mid july. Meanwhile Admiral Turner had assigned 7 destroyer transports, 2 fast minesweepers and 4 Destroyers to carry the 1st raider battalion, the 3rd battalion, 145th infantry regiment and the 3rd battalion, 148th infantry regiment of the 37th division led by Colonel Liversedge into the Kula Gulf. Their escort cover was Ainsworth task group 36.1 consisting of the Cruisers Honolulu, St Louis, Helena and destroyers Nicholas, O'Bannon, Strong and Chevalier. They were also tasked with bombarding Vila and Bairoko. On July 4th, Ainsworth led the group up the slot while the Rear Admiral Teruo Akiyama's Tokyo Express were on their way to Vila carrying 1300 troops of the 13th regiment towards Vila. At around midnight Ainsworth entered Kula Gulf carefully avoiding the mindfield laid back in May. His force proceeded to shell Vila, but they failed to detect the Japanese who were heading south. The Japanese detected the Americans at 12:15 thanks to their brand new radar system; the 1-shiki 2-go radar which was outfitted on the Niizuki. The IJN were eager to test out the radar so they fastened it to the flagship of Destroyer squadron 3. Oh how the turn tables as they say. The radar indicated they were heavily outnumbered, so Akiyama decided to abort the mission, but before doing so he ordered 14 torpedoes to be launched at a range of 10 miles. The type 93 long lance torpedo remained the best weapons of the kind in the Pacific theater and one his destroyer Strong at 12:43 practically cutting her in two. Can't stress it enough what an immense advantage Japan had over the Americans in terms of torpedo power during the first half of the war, hell if any of you play World of Warships, you know Japanese DD is base as hell.  When the torpedo hit, the Japanese were already heading back up the Slot and Ainsworth thought he was being attacked by IJN submarines. Thus while Liversedge's men were landing on the southside of the Pundokono River, Ainsworth dispatched destroyers O'Bannon and Chevalier to rescue the survivors of Strong. The Strong was settling fast off the Enogai inlet. When Chevalier and O'Bannon came to the scene picking up survivors a gun duel emerged between them and some batteries on Enogai. By 1:22am Chevalier had 239 men come aboard before her commander said it was time to go. His ship was getting battered by the batteries and he unfortunately was forced to ram the Strong to keep it from capsizing which ripped a 10 foot fash in Chevaliers bow. A near miss from one of Enogai's guns had opened her seams aft and another shell knocked out her NO 3 gun mount. When Chevalier was pulling away from the Strong, breaking her in two in the process, 3 of Strong's depth charges went off under Chevalier lifted the entire boat out of the water causing her to flood in forward sections, talk about bad luck. Over in Rice Anchorage, despite the terrible stormy weather and some gunfire from Enogai, Turner ordered the transport group to clear the Gulf by 7am so they could quickly unload their cargo. 300 men of the 148th regiment landed further north at Kobukobu inlet because of the terrible weather. It would take them until July 7th to meet up with the main body. Though the USS Strong had been sunk, the Tokyo Express failed her run, thus Akiyama elected to bring the bulk of his shipment to Vila the following night, but this time he brought 10 destroyers; Niizuki, Suzukaze, Tanikaze, Mocizuki, Mikazuki, Hamakaze, Amagiri, Hacujuki, Nagacuki and Sacuki. Halsey got advance word of this and ordered Ainsworth to return to Kula Gulf to wait for the Japanese to show up. Halsey also reinforced him with destroyers Jenkins and Radford. Ainsworth went into this with a simple but ultimately flawed plan. He overestimated the capabilities of radar guided 6 inch guns against fast moving targets. On top of that he seemed to be totally ignorant of the IJN's Type 93 Long Lance torpedo's capabilities. His plan was to wait passively until radar detected the enemy than he would toss his cruisers at the enemy using their 6 inch guns, hoping to fire over 8,000 yards or so. He believed that was the effective Japanese torpedo range, why he believed this I do not know. For his destroyers, they would launch torpedoes at the enemy.   Akiyama's Tokyo Express departed Buin after sundown divided into a covering force of 3 destroyers in the front and the main bulk behind them. Around midnight on July 6th, Ainsworth's force were just northwest off New Georgia, entering the mouth of the Kula Gulf. The Japanese were also arriving to the Kula Gulf whereupon they detached the first transport unit to land 1600 troops. By 1:06am, Niizuki's radar detected Ainsworth's force, but this time Akiyama was prepared for a fight. Akiyama detached his second transport unit at 1:43am and 7 minutes later American radar picked up the Japanese. Ainsworth took his force in closer until the enemy was 7000 yards away. Then at 1:56am at around a range of 6800 yards the Americans Cruisers began to open fire. Akiyama quickly recalled the second transport unit before he engaged the enemy. Unluckily for Akiyama the Americans concentrated their fire upon the Niizuki which was pulverized quickly. She became a burning wreck before she was sunk by 6 inch shell fire taking Rear Admiral Akiyama's life alongside 300 sailors. Within 20 minutes the Americans would fire 612 shells, 6 of which smashed the Niizuki.   Despite the loss of of their commander, the well drilled torpedo crews pulled off a salvo of 16 torpedoes at the American gun flashes. Ainsworth ignorant of the long lance range could do little to avoid it. The light cruiser USS Helena was the first to be struck, her bow was blown off virtually up to the number 2 turret, nearly cracking her in two as she sank taking 190 of her 1177 crew with her. St Louis was hit by a torpedo that fortunately did not detonate and another nearly missed Honolulu. The Japanese fled as fast as they could for Buin as Ainsworth directed his two remaining cruisers to shell the second transport unit. Of the four destroyers in this group, Amagiri escaped with minor damage, while Hatsuyuki was hit by 2 6inch shells, but luckily for her they were duds and she limped away. Nagatsuki was hit by a single 6 inch shell to her rear ship which would force her to run aground near Bambari Harbor. The next morning she would be destroyed by American aircraft. At 3:30am, Ainsworth ordered his forces to return to Tulagi as he dispatched the Radford and O'Bannon to pick up survivors while Nicholas chased the fleeing Japanese. The Japanese dispatched Amagiri to pick up their survivors and she would be intercepted by Nicholas taking 4 hits before she made her retreat. While this was going on the First transport unit completed unloading its 1600 troops and bolted through the Blackett Strait and Kula Gulf. The Japanese had managed to land their reinforcements and sunk the USS Strong and Helena, so they considered it a tactical victory, though the loss of the Niizuki and her commander was terrible. The battle for New Georgia was nowhere near done. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The landings and early offensives were well on their way on New Georgia and the drive upon Lae was closing in. The Battle of Kula Gulf gave the Americans a bloody nose and now the Japanese had more forces at their disposal to try and dislodge the Americans from New Georgia.

Bridgewater Church
I Declare War: The Battle Belongs to God | Pastor Drew Wilkerson

Bridgewater Church

Play Episode Listen Later May 7, 2023 36:05


I declare war! Let's look at the book of James together and declare war on the things in our lives that are not from God. - Stay connected all week long on Facebook (@bwchoh) and IG (@bridgewaterchurch). - Support the ministry of BWC at http://bwch.org/give !

CherriesWriter - Vietnam War website
Vietnam War – The Battle of Hue

CherriesWriter - Vietnam War website

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 18, 2023 6:11


This episode is also available as a blog post: http://cherrieswriter.com/2023/03/18/vietnam-war-the-battle-of-hue/

Crisis Twink
"Tear the Community Apart 100: Civil War: The Battle of Scherzinger's Gulch" w/ Forda Boyz & Michael Eichner

Crisis Twink

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 22, 2023 86:40


100 episodes. 3 people. And 1 song. The 100th episode of Crisis Twink is here, and to commemorate the occasion, Drew and some extra special guests are going through a March Madness-style bracket of Tear the Community Apart winners to determine the greatest song of all time. For part three of five, Drew is joined by drag queen extraordinaire Forda Boyz and hunty maximus Sweet Michael Eichner to discuss "Buttons" as a Final Destination-esque mayhem machine, serving under duress, "Break My Soul"'s potential midness, and more. There's a new episode every day this week, so tune in! Don't miss out freak. Follow Crisis Twink on Twitter and Instagram. Follow Drew on Twitter and Instagram. Follow Forda on Twitter and Instagram. Follow Michael on Twitter and Instagram. --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/crisis-twink/message

The Dangerous Man Podcast
LIFE IS WAR | The battle between good and evil

The Dangerous Man Podcast

Play Episode Play 22 sec Highlight Listen Later Jan 26, 2023 55:36


You can feel it, you can sense it, its all around you! There is a war being waged and the battle is not white vs. black or left vs. right... this is a war between good and evil!Support the show Follow us on X for more shenanigans https://twitter.com/TDMPodcast603 Follow us on Instagram for extra shenanigans https://www.instagram.com/thedangerousmanpodcast/ Connect with Matt Fortin & Rory Lawrence Email us at: thedangerousmanpodcast@gmail.com And Remember men... Stop trying & start training! Top 3 Masculinity Podcast... https://podcasts.feedspot.com/masculinity_podcasts/ Top 20 Men's Podcast for 2024... https://podcasts.feedspot.com/mens_podcasts/

Down to Earth But Heavenly Minded
We are at War, The Battle is all Around Us

Down to Earth But Heavenly Minded

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 27, 2022 17:22


A Look at the Book of Ephesians, Chapters 2 and 6 on the Podcast, "Down to Earth, But Heavenly Minded. Your host is Irv Risch.

Frikkity Frak, We Do Talk Back
The Gospel According to Bleach: Thousand-Year Blood War "The Battle"

Frikkity Frak, We Do Talk Back

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 16, 2022 16:52


In this edition of Frikkity Frak, We Do Talk Back, we discuss the episode "The Battle" of Bleach TYBW and connect it to 2nd Kings 2:9. Please rate, subscribe, and review this podcast, tell your friends, and if you have any questions, please contact us at frikkityfraktalkback@gmail.com or any of our social media accounts with any questions about this episode or any and all spiritual, nerdy, or general questions. @FrikkityF on Twitter @FrikkityFrak on Instagram @FrikkityFrak on Facebook --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/frikkityfrak/message

Pastor Deborah’s Podcast – Agape Love Ministry
Rumble Channel Introduction Video # 1, Agape Love’s War, The Battle of 2 Kingdoms

Pastor Deborah’s Podcast – Agape Love Ministry

Play Episode Listen Later Sep 1, 2022 19:08


Welcome to the Introduction Video for Agape Love's War, a new Playlist here on The Hidden Kingdoms. This is Episode # 1. References 1. Zoom Pro 2. Pixabay.org 3. Rumble, Social Media 4. LinkedIn 5. The Hidden Kingdoms All videos are placed on Agape Love, Love Is Here's global web site at https://www.agapeloveishere.org Also each Video's Audio is Audio Podcasted Out to a Podcast Show which are all accessible on the front page of the web site on the left hand side of the page. You can also follow the other 2 YouTube Channel's of 1. For Children of All Ages 2. The Light of Love You can also continue to follow Agape Love, Love Is Here's Global Spiritual Teaching Ministry and It's Global Network of Channels and Pastor Deborah on Twitter and LinkedIn. Love Pastor Deborah

Setting The Captives Free Podcast – Agape Love Ministry
Rumble Channel Introduction Video # 1, Agape Love’s War, The Battle of 2 Kingdoms

Setting The Captives Free Podcast – Agape Love Ministry

Play Episode Listen Later Sep 1, 2022 19:08


Welcome to the Introduction Video for Agape Love's War, a new Playlist here on The Hidden Kingdoms. This is Episode # 1. References 1. Zoom Pro 2. Pixabay.org 3. Rumble, Social Media 4. LinkedIn 5. The Hidden Kingdoms All videos are placed on Agape Love, Love Is Here's global web site at https://www.agapeloveishere.org Also each Video's Audio is Audio Podcasted Out to a Podcast Show which are all accessible on the front page of the web site on the left hand side of the page. You can also follow the other 2 YouTube Channel's of 1. For Children of All Ages 2. The Light of Love You can also continue to follow Agape Love, Love Is Here's Global Spiritual Teaching Ministry and It's Global Network of Channels and Pastor Deborah on Twitter and LinkedIn. Love Pastor Deborah

Setting The Captives Free Podcast – Agape Love Ministry
Rumble Channel Introduction Video # 1, Agape Love’s War, The Battle of 2 Kingdoms

Setting The Captives Free Podcast – Agape Love Ministry

Play Episode Listen Later Sep 1, 2022 19:08


Welcome to the Introduction Video for Agape Love's War, a new Playlist here on The Hidden Kingdoms. This is Episode # 1. References 1. Zoom Pro 2. Pixabay.org 3. Rumble, Social Media 4. LinkedIn 5. The Hidden Kingdoms All videos are placed on Agape Love, Love Is Here's global web site at https://www.agapeloveishere.org Also each Video's Audio is Audio Podcasted Out to a Podcast Show which are all accessible on the front page of the web site on the left hand side of the page. You can also follow the other 2 YouTube Channel's of 1. For Children of All Ages 2. The Light of Love You can also continue to follow Agape Love, Love Is Here's Global Spiritual Teaching Ministry and It's Global Network of Channels and Pastor Deborah on Twitter and LinkedIn. Love Pastor Deborah

Pastor Deborah’s Podcast – Agape Love Ministry
Rumble Channel Introduction Video # 1, Agape Love’s War, The Battle of 2 Kingdoms

Pastor Deborah’s Podcast – Agape Love Ministry

Play Episode Listen Later Sep 1, 2022 19:08


Welcome to the Introduction Video for Agape Love's War, a new Playlist here on The Hidden Kingdoms. This is Episode # 1. References 1. Zoom Pro 2. Pixabay.org 3. Rumble, Social Media 4. LinkedIn 5. The Hidden Kingdoms All videos are placed on Agape Love, Love Is Here's global web site at https://www.agapeloveishere.org Also each Video's Audio is Audio Podcasted Out to a Podcast Show which are all accessible on the front page of the web site on the left hand side of the page. You can also follow the other 2 YouTube Channel's of 1. For Children of All Ages 2. The Light of Love You can also continue to follow Agape Love, Love Is Here's Global Spiritual Teaching Ministry and It's Global Network of Channels and Pastor Deborah on Twitter and LinkedIn. Love Pastor Deborah

The Pacific War - week by week
- 36 - Pacific War - The battle of Kokoda, July 19-August 2, 1942

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Jul 26, 2022 32:08


In the last couple of weeks, we have covered both the American and Japanese general plans for the future, delving into the minds of important figures like General MacArthur, Admiral King, General Hyakutake or Admiral Yamamoto. Although the American plans haven't quite gotten in motion yet, the Japanese had started their Kokoda Track campaign in the last episode; and today, we are going to cover the continuation of the Japanese advance on Kokoda, as well as the resistance offered by the Maroubra Force and the plans that were brewing in Burma for future operations in the region.

Engelsberg Ideas Podcast
84: Worldview: Reflections on War — The battle for energy resources

Engelsberg Ideas Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Jul 13, 2022 49:47


In this episode of Worldview, Adam Boulton is joined by Professor Helen Thompson, Tim Marshall and Dr Daniel Yergin to discuss the global energy market.  The fallout of Putin's invasion of Ukraine has overthrown energy norms in Europe. However, over the past decade the energy market has been far from stable. With concerns surrounding climate change and the discovery of new resources, we are on the brink of an energy revolution which will overhaul the geopolitical map as we know it. 

The Hellenistic Age Podcast
072: The Fourth Syrian War - The Battle of Raphia

The Hellenistic Age Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later May 21, 2022 49:11


Only a few short years after his coronation, Antiochus III would invade the kingdom of Ptolemy IV in 219 B.C., intent on reclaiming the lands of Coele Syria as part of his birthright. To stem the tide, the Ptolemaic government tries to rejuvenate the now-rusty Egyptian army by ordering a massive recruitment drive and issuing reforms, and the two kings would come to blows at Raphia, where over 140,000 men would take part in one of the largest battles of the ancient world. Episode 072 Notes: (https://hellenisticagepodcast.wordpress.com/2022/05/21/072-the-fourth-syrian-war-the-battle-of-raphia/) Episode 072 Transcript: (https://hellenisticagepodcast.files.wordpress.com/2022/05/072-the-fourth-syrian-war-the-battle-of-raphia-transcript.pdf) Intelligent Speech Conference 2022 Website (https://www.intelligentspeechconference.com/) Twitter (https://twitter.com/Intellspeechcon) Promo Code: AGE Social Media: Twitter (https://twitter.com/HellenisticPod) Facebook (www.facebook.com/hellenisticagepodcast/) Instagram (https://www.instagram.com/hellenistic_age_podcast/) Twitch (https://www.twitch.tv/hellenisticagepodcast) Show Merchandise: Etsy (https://www.etsy.com/shop/HellenisticAgePod) Redbubble (https://www.redbubble.com/people/HellenisticPod/shop?asc=u) Donations: Ko-Fi (https://ko-fi.com/hellenisticagepodcast) Amazon Book Wish List (https://tinyurl.com/vfw6ask)

Sky News Daily
Ukraine war: The Battle for Donbas

Sky News Daily

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 21, 2022 15:02


Russian forces have launched their latest offensive in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine – where fighting between pro-Russia separatists and the Ukrainian army has been ongoing since 2014. The Kremlin has declared that capturing the region is now its main goal. But will they be successful? On the Sky News Daily podcast with Leah Boleto, our security and defence editor Deborah Haynes joins us in Kyiv, and our correspondent Mark Stone is currently in Dnipro, but has just been in the Donbas region. Producer: Soila Apparicio Digital producer: Emma Rae Woodhouse Editor: Philly Beaumont

Warfare
Winston Churchill: From Failures to Finest Hour

Warfare

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 30, 2022 29:37


Whilst Churchill is best remembered for his achievements during the dark days of the Second World War, much of the rest of his career had much more to do with failure than success. Geoffrey Wheatcroft, journalist and author of 'Churchill's Shadow: An Astonishing Life and a Dangerous Legacy', joins Dan for this episode from the archive. They discuss Geoffrey's radical reappraisal of Churchill's life and work and the myth that continues to shape our view of one of the most complex figures of the 20th Century.For more about the Second World War, check out History Hit's new original 'The Traces of War: The Battle for France' which includes Warfare's own James Rogers.For more Warfare content, subscribe to our Warfare newsletter here.If you'd like to learn even more, we have hundreds of history documentaries, ad free podcasts and audiobooks at History Hit - subscribe today!To download, go to Android or Apple store. See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

Subject to Change
The Korean War - the battle of the Chosin Reservoir

Subject to Change

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 22, 2022 60:27


In October 1950 the Americans are racing to the Yalu river, trying to bring the war in Korea to a decisive close. Unknown to them a huge Chinese army has been sent to oppose them and the forces meet at the Chosin Reservoir.  Both sides have to fight not only each other but the appalling cold as the Chinese try to surround and annihilate the Americans.Hampton Sides' book On Desperate Ground is an absolutely gripping account of the battle and I'm unsurprised to see it has 5 stars on Amazon. In today's podcast he talks about some of the key moments. 

The Redcoat History Podcast
The Peninsular War: The Battle of the Pyrenees 1813 (Ep. 45)

The Redcoat History Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 1, 2022 32:19


In the late Summer of 1813 the French are fighting back in the Peninsular. Marshal Soult is back in command, and the soldiers' morale is high. Can Wellington's advance towards France be derailed? In today's episode we learn about the battles of Roncesvalles. Maya and Sorauren - collectively known as the Battle of the Pyrenees. Included today is the story of the 92nd Highlanders at Maya - a fight that is described as one of the greatest feats in military history. Nick's fantastic Atlas of the Peninsular War can be purchased here: https://amzn.to/3G9Xdxh Marcus's book on his distant relative Marshal Beresford can be found here: https://amzn.to/332kRNB  If you are interested in the Zulu War, then please sign up for my mailing list to receive my free book on the subject: www.redcoathistory.com If you are very generous, you can also buy me a coffee and help support the channel via https://ko-fi.com/redcoathistory 

Liberty Weekly - Libertarian, Ancap, & Voluntaryist Legal Theory from a Rothbardian Perspective

For western observers of the conflict in Ukraine, Orthodox Christianity is almost as foreign of a concept as the world of Islam was in the early 2000s. No understanding of the conflict in Ukraine is complete without a firm grasp of the underlying religious rivalry between Ukraine and Russia, which goes back 800 years. In 2018, this rivalry reached a boiling point when the Orthodox Church of Ukraine split from the Russian Orthodox Church. This split has been described as the biggest fissure in Orthodox Christianity in centuries. Did this split precipitate Russia's 2022 attack? Is Putin waging a holy war for the soul of Russia? We explore in this week's episode. Episode 205 of the Liberty Weekly Podcast is Brought to you by: Join Liberty Weekly and tons of your favorite creators on Rokfin for one low subscription fee! Liberty Weekly Subscribestar Rakuten Cash Back Referral Link Liberty Weekly Substack The Liberty Weekly Patreon Page: help support the show and gain access to tons of bonus content! Become a patron today! Liberty Weekly on Flote. Patreon Bonuses for Crypto! Show Notes: Next Year in Kyiv? - by Diana Butler Bass - The Cottage (substack.com) Vladimir I of Kiev - New World Encyclopedia North Korea Conducts Missile Test After Declaring ‘New Situation' With China | The Libertarian Institute Disclose.tv on Twitter: "JUST IN - Head of the Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Kirill, calls Putin's opponents in Ukraine "evil forces," and believes "we must not allow dark and hostile external forces to laugh at us." (Interfax) https://t.co/GrXIW2Asbq" / Twitter Патриарх Кирилл призвал молиться о мире на "русской земле" - Москва || Интерфакс Россия (interfax-russia.ru) What is the Eastern Orthodox Church? Its History & Beliefs - (christianity.com) What is Pentecost? Meaning of Pentecost Sunday 2022 (christianity.com) Putin and the Patriarchs: how geopolitics tore apart the Orthodox church | Financial Times (ft.com) Putin Awards Patriarch Kirill With the Highest Russian Decoration - FSSPX.Actualités / FSSPX.News No, Patriarch Kirill of Moscow is Not Calling for Peace — In Fact, He's Putin's Accomplice | Religion Dispatches Patriarch Kirill and Vladimir Putin's Two Wars - Public Orthodoxy Antiwar.com Plans of Moscow Patriarchate against Ecumenical Patriarch's visit to Ukraine | Orthodox Times (en) Putin is after more than land — he wants the religious soul of Ukraine (religionnews.com) COI #239: NATO Aggression and Putin's War | The Libertarian Institute

The Libertarian Institute - All Podcasts
Holy War? The Battle Over Orthodoxy in Ukraine Ep. 205

The Libertarian Institute - All Podcasts

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 28, 2022 86:24


https://youtu.be/P2gpAjBXjnk For western observers of the conflict in Ukraine, Orthodox Christianity is almost as foreign of a concept as the world of Islam was in the early 2000s. No understanding of the conflict in Ukraine is complete without a firm grasp of the underlying religious rivalry between Ukraine and Russia, which goes back 800 years. In 2018, this rivalry reached a boiling point when the Orthodox Church of Ukraine split from the Russian Orthodox Church. This split has been described as the biggest fissure in Orthodox Christianity in centuries. Did this split precipitate Russia's 2022 attack? Is Putin waging a holy war for the soul of Russia? We explore in this week's episode. Episode 205 of the Liberty Weekly Podcast is Brought to you by: Join Liberty Weekly and tons of your favorite creators on Rokfin for one low subscription fee! Liberty Weekly Subscribestar Rakuten Cash Back Referral Link Liberty Weekly Substack The Liberty Weekly Patreon Page: help support the show and gain access to tons of bonus content! Become a patron today! Liberty Weekly on Flote. Patreon Bonuses for Crypto! Show Notes: Next Year in Kyiv? - by Diana Butler Bass - The Cottage (substack.com) Vladimir I of Kiev - New World Encyclopedia North Korea Conducts Missile Test After Declaring ‘New Situation' With China | The Libertarian Institute Disclose.tv on Twitter: "JUST IN - Head of the Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Kirill, calls Putin's opponents in Ukraine "evil forces," and believes "we must not allow dark and hostile external forces to laugh at us." (Interfax) https://t.co/GrXIW2Asbq" / Twitter Патриарх Кирилл призвал молиться о мире на "русской земле" - Москва || Интерфакс Россия (interfax-russia.ru) What is the Eastern Orthodox Church? Its History & Beliefs - (christianity.com) What is Pentecost? Meaning of Pentecost Sunday 2022 (christianity.com) Putin and the Patriarchs: how geopolitics tore apart the Orthodox church | Financial Times (ft.com) Putin Awards Patriarch Kirill With the Highest Russian Decoration - FSSPX.Actualités / FSSPX.News No, Patriarch Kirill of Moscow is Not Calling for Peace — In Fact, He's Putin's Accomplice | Religion Dispatches Patriarch Kirill and Vladimir Putin's Two Wars - Public Orthodoxy Antiwar.com Plans of Moscow Patriarchate against Ecumenical Patriarch's visit to Ukraine | Orthodox Times (en) Putin is after more than land — he wants the religious soul of Ukraine (religionnews.com) COI #239: NATO Aggression and Putin's War | The Libertarian Institute

This Day in Weather History
December 15 - Weather and War: "The Battle of Fredericksburg"

This Day in Weather History

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 15, 2021 6:54


We have covered a couple of Civil War stories on this podcast already.  How the weather plays into war settings is incredibly intriguing; it isn't enough that all sides are told that they want to kill each other but now they have to face a foe they have no control over.  And in the case of theatres like the American civil war, they had no way of knowing what was coming. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Southland Christian Church
WAR | The Battle for Simplicity

Southland Christian Church

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 8, 2021 30:00


We've all said things and done things without thinking. Whether it's buying something we don't need, eating something we know isn't good for us, dating someone who isn't healthy, or speaking up when we should probably stay quiet, impulsive behavior is a threat to our spiritual growth. In this message, we will learn how to replace impulsive appetites with self-control.

Southland Christian Church
WAR | The Battle for Simplicity

Southland Christian Church

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 8, 2021 30:00


We've all said things and done things without thinking. Whether it's buying something we don't need, eating something we know isn't good for us, dating someone who isn't healthy, or speaking up when we should probably stay quiet, impulsive behavior is a threat to our spiritual growth. In this message, we will learn how to replace impulsive appetites with self-control.

Southland Christian Church
WAR | The Battle for Rest

Southland Christian Church

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 1, 2021 31:59


Worry can drain the human heart of stability and cause us to live in a constant state of fear. From political instability to economic downturns to global pandemics, the news offers a steady stream of nail-biting topics. In this message, we will learn how to filter what we hear through the promises of God.

Southland Christian Church
WAR | The Battle for Rest

Southland Christian Church

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 1, 2021 31:59


Worry can drain the human heart of stability and cause us to live in a constant state of fear. From political instability to economic downturns to global pandemics, the news offers a steady stream of nail-biting topics. In this message, we will learn how to filter what we hear through the promises of God.

Southland Christian Church
WAR | The Battle for Peace

Southland Christian Church

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 25, 2021 29:21


All of us struggle with sadness from time to time in life. But not all of us wake up everyday thinking the sun will never shine again. Depression is exhausting and it's leading millions of people to believe there is no hope for them and that ending their lives would be better than facing another day. In this message, we will talk about the reality of suicide and how God wants to help the hopeless.

Southland Christian Church
WAR | The Battle for Peace

Southland Christian Church

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 25, 2021 29:21


All of us struggle with sadness from time to time in life. But not all of us wake up everyday thinking the sun will never shine again. Depression is exhausting and it's leading millions of people to believe there is no hope for them and that ending their lives would be better than facing another day. In this message, we will talk about the reality of suicide and how God wants to help the hopeless.

Southland Christian Church
WAR | The Battle for Wholeness

Southland Christian Church

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 18, 2021 32:08


Addiction seems like a losing battle in our society. From food to heroin to pornography, everywhere we turn we are dangerously led towards appetites that threaten to destroy us. In this message, we will learn how to take the first step towards freedom from the captivity of addiction.

Southland Christian Church
WAR | The Battle for Wholeness

Southland Christian Church

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 18, 2021 32:08


Addiction seems like a losing battle in our society. From food to heroin to pornography, everywhere we turn we are dangerously led towards appetites that threaten to destroy us. In this message, we will learn how to take the first step towards freedom from the captivity of addiction.

The Best of The 'X' Zone Radio/TV Show with Rob McConnell
Rob McConnell Interviews - Margaret Doner - Past Life Regression Therapist, Angelic Channel, and Healer

The Best of The 'X' Zone Radio/TV Show with Rob McConnell

Play Episode Listen Later Sep 18, 2021 60:01


Margaret Doner, past life regression therapist, angelic channel, and healer, has assisted clients for twenty-five years to help them remember, and integrate, the wisdom of their souls. Doner's books include: The Path of the Human-Incarnated Angel and Starseed, Archangels Speak, Merlin's Handbook for Seekers and Starseeds, and Merlin's War: The Battle between the Family of Light and the Family of Dark. Her newest book, scheduled for release in February is entitled: Merlin's Guide to the Apocalypse. Her goal is to assist the Starseed community in their awakening by sharing her own journey, and the journey of her clients and friends, with a wider audience. Website: margaretdoner.comTo listen to all our XZBN shows, with our compliments go to: https://www.spreaker.com/user/xzoneradiotv*** AND NOW ***The ‘X' Zone TV Channel on SimulTV - www.simultv.comThe ‘X' Chronicles Newspaper - www.xchroniclesnewpaper.com

The 'X' Zone Radio Show
Rob McConnell Interviews - Margaret Doner - Past Life Regression Therapist, Angelic Channel, and Healer

The 'X' Zone Radio Show

Play Episode Listen Later Sep 18, 2021 60:01


Margaret Doner, past life regression therapist, angelic channel, and healer, has assisted clients for twenty-five years to help them remember, and integrate, the wisdom of their souls. Doner's books include: The Path of the Human-Incarnated Angel and Starseed, Archangels Speak, Merlin's Handbook for Seekers and Starseeds, and Merlin's War: The Battle between the Family of Light and the Family of Dark. Her newest book, scheduled for release in February is entitled: Merlin's Guide to the Apocalypse. Her goal is to assist the Starseed community in their awakening by sharing her own journey, and the journey of her clients and friends, with a wider audience. Website: margaretdoner.comTo listen to all our XZBN shows, with our compliments go to: https://www.spreaker.com/user/xzoneradiotv*** AND NOW ***The ‘X' Zone TV Channel on SimulTV - www.simultv.comThe ‘X' Chronicles Newspaper - www.xchroniclesnewpaper.com

The River
gods at War - The Battle Within

The River

Play Episode Listen Later Sep 5, 2021 42:25


SBS Hebrew - אס בי אס בעברית
“This is literally a war" The battle of Australia against Covid-19 (a special report in Hebrew)

SBS Hebrew - אס בי אס בעברית

Play Episode Listen Later Aug 15, 2021 9:43


אוסטרליה הכריזה אתמול מלחמה על קוביד-19“This is literally a war" The battle of Australia against Covid-19 (a special report in Hebrew)...History of Covid-19 in Australia from March 2020 until August 2021 with Nitza Lowenstein

Purveyer of Truth
Gods War. (The battle belongs to the Lord; Knowing your place)?

Purveyer of Truth

Play Episode Listen Later Aug 1, 2021 103:00


Numbers 21:14; exodus 15:3, 1 Corinthians 14:8, Isa. 6:1-8, 31:4, 42,13, Amos 9:11-13, Acts 6:19, Rev. 3:7, Isaiah 22:22 Further reading (2 Chronicles 18:3-34)

The 'X' Zone Broadcast Network
Rob McConnell Interviews - Margaret Doner - Past Life Regression Therapist, Angelic Channel, and Healer

The 'X' Zone Broadcast Network

Play Episode Listen Later Jun 19, 2021 60:00


Margaret Doner, past life regression therapist, angelic channel, and healer, has assisted clients for twenty-five years to help them remember, and integrate, the wisdom of their souls. Doner's books include: The Path of the Human-Incarnated Angel and Starseed, Archangels Speak, Merlin's Handbook for Seekers and Starseeds, and Merlin's War: The Battle between the Family of Light and the Family of Dark. Her newest book, scheduled for release in February is entitled: Merlin's Guide to the Apocalypse. Her goal is to assist the Starseed community in their awakening by sharing her own journey, and the journey of her clients and friends, with a wider audience. Website: margaretdoner.com Our radio shows archives and programming include: A Different Perspective with Kevin Randle; Alien Cosmic Expo Lecture Series; Alien Worlds Radio Show; Connecting with Coincidence with Dr. Bernard Beitman, MD; Dick Tracy; Dimension X; Exploring Tomorrow Radio Show; Flash Gordon; Jet Jungle Radio Show; Journey Into Space; Know the Name with Sharon Lynn Wyeth; Lux Radio Theatre - Classic Old Time Radio; Mission Evolution with Gwilda Wiyaka; Paranormal StakeOut with Larry Lawson; Ray Bradbury - Tales Of The Bizarre; Sci Fi Radio Show; Seek Reality with Roberta Grimes; Space Patrol; Stairway to Heaven with Gwilda Wiyaka; The 'X' Zone Radio Show with Rob McConnell; and many other! That's The ‘X' Zone Broadcast Network Shows and Archives - https://www.spreaker.com/user/xzoneradiotv *** AND NOW *** The ‘X' Zone TV Channel on SimulTV - www.simultv.com The ‘X' Chronicles Newspaper - www.xchroniclesnewspaper.com

The Redcoat History Podcast
The Peninsular War: The Battle of Fuentes De Oñoro, May 3-5th 1811 (Ep.27)

The Redcoat History Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 14, 2021 36:22


The latest Redcoat History Podcast...Today's episode on one of the key battles of the Peninsular War is a belter. . .A bitter hand-to-hand fight along alleyways and inside houses, an inexperienced allied division cut off and in danger of annihilation. A troop of horse artillery surrounded and forced to slash their way through the French cavalry. Today's episode of the Redcoat History Podcast is packed with drama – put your pack down, sip some captured French grog and lend me your ears as we are transported to May 1811 and find Wellington and the allied army with their backs to the wall once more at the village of Fuentes de Oñoro on the Spanish-Portuguese border. Visit www.redcoathistory.com/newsletter to sign up for my monthly despatch.

The Best of The 'X' Zone Radio/TV Show with Rob McConnell
XZRS: Margaret Doner - Past Life Regression Therapist, Angelic Channel, and Healer

The Best of The 'X' Zone Radio/TV Show with Rob McConnell

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 21, 2021 60:01


Margaret Doner, past life regression therapist, angelic channel, and healer, has assisted clients for twenty-five years to help them remember, and integrate, the wisdom of their souls. Doner's books include: The Path of the Human-Incarnated Angel and Starseed, Archangels Speak, Merlin's Handbook for Seekers and Starseeds, and Merlin's War: The Battle between the Family of Light and the Family of Dark. Her newest book, scheduled for release in February is entitled: Merlin's Guide to the Apocalypse. Her goal is to assist the Starseed community in their awakening by sharing her own journey, and the journey of her clients and friends, with a wider audience. Website: margaretdoner.com

The Redcoat History Podcast
The Peninsular War: The Battle of Bussaco, September 1810 (Ep.22)

The Redcoat History Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 13, 2021 33:46


In the latest episode of Season 3 of The Redcoat History Podcast, we examine the Battle of Busacco...fought in Portugal on the 27th September 1810. The battle is important for many reasons - not least of which as it marked the coming of age of the newly reorganized and re-equipped Portuguese army which would achieve so much throughout the rest of the Peninsular war. March in the ranks and sit alongside Wellington as he decides when and how to try and stop the third French invasion of Portugal - will he be successful or will Marshal Massena's army of veterans brush the Redcoats aside and advance to Lisbon? If you are on Instagram and like looking at photos of the world's battlefields then check me out - https://www.instagram.com/redcoathistory/ I am also on Twitter - https://twitter.com/redcoathistory And I have a website - https://redcoathistory.com/ 

Women on War
Women on War: The Battle of the Oaken Bucket

Women on War

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 6, 2021 22:47


The place - Italy. The year - 1325. The item that caused a war.....an oaken bucket? In this episode, Alyssa and Jillian discuss all things medieval and just exactly what caused this war to take place. So join us as we sip wine and get to the bottom of the barrel...we mean bucket.  Like our podcast? Email us at info.womenonwar@gmail.com and leave us a review! 

Well That Aged Well
Episode 7: The Asian Pacific War: The Battle Of The Philipines With Minter Dial

Well That Aged Well

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 28, 2020 46:00


The Japanese Empire. Ruled 1/5th Of the World during World War 2. The Asian pacific War is mostly known for The Battle of Midway and Pearl Harbor. But today we go in debt on the Battle in Philipines. What was it like during the Japanese ocupation? Find out this and more during the epic story of the Battle of The Philipines, on "Well That Aged Well" With "Erlend Hedegart"Minter Dials documentary can be found on Youtube and it is called: The Last Ring Home https://youtu.be/o4o1DPHrfF8. Minter Dials website http://www.minterdial.com/ Here you can buy his book on Amazon https://www.amazon.com/Minter-Dial/e/B0753G7NCF/ Support this show http://supporter.acast.com/well-that-aged-well. Support this show http://supporter.acast.com/well-that-aged-well. Our GDPR privacy policy was updated on August 8, 2022. Visit acast.com/privacy for more information.

Alpha Dog Mindset
WAGE WAR|| THE BATTLE OF HABITS

Alpha Dog Mindset

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 15, 2020 4:37


We are a collection of the action we choose to take or not take. And these form our habits and habits form success or the lack of. We must aggressively approach and identify our allies and enemies. What habits serve us and what habits limit us. Your best Life is in your best habits...stay strong men

While We're Young
Tug of War - The Battle with Sin

While We're Young

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 9, 2020 30:49


Ever since the fall of man, we have struggled daily with our sin. Even after salvation, we find ourselves struggling back and forth with the same temptations. Why is that? Why can't we ever seem to get it right? In "Tug of War," Tyler looks to Roman 7 to answer this complex question. Links: https://lnk.bio/wwypodcast --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/tylersmith12/support

Warden Full Gospel Assembly
I Declare War, The Battle Ground, Part III

Warden Full Gospel Assembly

Play Episode Listen Later Aug 3, 2020 30:08


Pastor Connie Jefford The post I Declare War, The Battle Ground, Part III appeared first on Warden Full Gospel Assembly.

Bleeding Daylight
Jacob Hill - Winning the Battle of Addiction

Bleeding Daylight

Play Episode Listen Later Jun 7, 2020 39:40


How does a young boy with a promising future become a thief and a junkie and how does he turn his life around? That's today's episode of Bleeding Daylight.Jacob Hill was a straight A student with a dream of winning Olympic gold, but his life took a number of unexpected turns, including crime, drug addiction and coming very close to death. Some would say it's a miracle that Jacob is alive today. How did such a talented young man fall so far and how did he turn his life turn around? Today he's a husband, father, author and pastor. Jacob is my guest for this episode of Bleeding Daylight.   Jacobs's Book - Kids at War: The Battle of AddictionJacob's Website - http://JacobHill.org Jacob on Facebook - https://www.facebook.com/jacobhillofficialpage TRANSCRIPTEmily Olsen Wherever there shadows there are people ready to kick at the darkness until it bleeds daylight. This is bleeding daylight with your host Rodney Olsen. Rodney Olsen  0:19 How does a young boy with a promising future become a thief and a junkie and how does he turn his life around? That's today's episode of Bleeding Daylight. Jacob Hill was a straight A student with a dream of winning Olympic gold, but his life took a number of unexpected turns, including crime, drug addiction and coming very close to death. Some would say it's a miracle that Jacob is alive today. How did such a talented young man fall so far and how did he turn his life turn around? Today he's a husband, father, author and pastor. Jacob is my guest for this episode of Bleeding Daylight.  Welcome. Jacob Hill  1:07 Thanks so much for having me, Rodney. Rodney Olsen  1:08 I want to get to know the eager young boy who had such an amazing life stretched out ahead of him. Tell me about those early years. Jacob Hill  1:16  Oh gosh. Probably my biggest memory of the sort of the overarching sort of feeling like I carry from my childhood is like you said eager. Like I was just I loved life and life was was good. My parents were amazing and I was taught that I could do anything and the results I was producing was showing it and I just had such a confidence that whatever I put my hand to was gonna succeed at, and so yeah, I just had this is so excited for life and so excited for the future. Rodney Olsen  1:52 So you studies were going well, and you're also excelling at sport. Jacob Hill  1:56 So it didn't start out good in school like I look back, it's probably like ADD or dyslexia or something. I remember like every single recess I'd be kept into the finish work off and homework was nightmare but then at some point it sort of clicked and I ended up finishing primary school with straight As pretty much and then High School on a sports scholarship. I was like champion of athletics right through school, I was captain and more school hockey team and the factions and all of that, and the icing on the cake was we went away to high school and hockey scholarship, and we're training at the Commonwealth hockey stadium the big stadium here in Perth four times a week, twice with school, twice with my club playing there on the weekends and sometimes during the week, we'd actually have the Australian hockey team on the other end of the pitch and that was crazy. Like literally seeing my dream like my dream was to play hockey for Australia and literally get to shake hands with like my dream. it was in my mind, it was very, very done. Rodney Olsen  2:53 So when it came to hockey, what was your biggest dream? Jacob Hill  2:56 A gold medal. That was that was it. The Australia Kookaburras at that point had won a silver medal. One of the guys played for my club and putting his silver medal on one time, wearing around my neck thinking, wow, this is so good, but I'm gonna go one better. That literally was everything. Rodney Olsen  3:11 And there was really no doubt in your mind at that stage that that was going to happen. Jacob Hill  3:16 Not not a fraction of doubt. Rodney Olsen  3:17 So how could all of that come crashing down? You're in high school, your grades are good, you're rising through the ranks at a rather elite level of playing hockey, how did all that begin to unwind? Jacob Hill  3:30 So all about the same time, my parents separated, and I developed a disease in my knees. So within a couple of months, the rug was pulled out from under me and I just did not know where I was, who I was, where I belonged. Everything I dreamed about was just gone, and I didn't have a backup plan. My identity was really busted up from my dad leaving because I just sort of thought if he really loved us, he wouldn't have left us and then I sort of you know, just a little kid, 13, really just got the message I wasn't worth loving and then all of the other stuff I'd gotten validation for from my whole life that was gone as well. Because I was never like a real social kid I was always I had plenty of friends and stuff but that was mostly I think because of sport because I was a little bit socially awkward and as much as I tried to put on a confident front I was pretty shy and I totally lost man like just totally lost. Rodney Olsen  4:26 So in the middle of this your family starting to fall apart and you've lost your dream of representing your country and winning Olympic gold. That also means that hockey team mates that had become your closest friends are all gone as well. Everything's falling away beneath you. Jacob Hill  4:41 My mates were all guys I trained with and played with. All of a sudden, I couldn't play and I could barely walk for a while, like I could like remember just the pain trying to get upstairs and stuff because I had this growing disease in my knees. Really I felt very, very alone and found myself trying to work out where did I fit in who you know. Like with my dad, sort of, I was always felt like someone's looking at for me, someone sort of keeping me in line a bit someone's believing in me and then with my mates always, you know, felt that camaraderie that real team spirit sort of thing. You get the validation that you get playing sport team sport. And I just like lost both sides of I guess the people that gave me a lot of my identity and and I just really started to look for that I was like. And I wouldn't have been able to tell you that as a 13 year old kid like, but looking back retrospectively that's what I can really see that's what I was doing. That's why I actually settled hanging out with people who were really living a risky lifestyle that I did not agree with. I just wanted to belong like my brother was hanging out with these guys that started smoking pot. They were doing graffiti and petty crime like break and enters and stuff like that. Man, I just wanted to belong I  think .Yeah and I was pretty prepared to do anything to fit in. Rodney Olsen  6:03 Tell us about your family. Did you know that things weren't great between your parents? Was there any inkling that the marriage was breaking down? And you've mentioned your older brother? Were they just the two siblings? Jacob Hill  6:14 No at that time, there was my parents, my older brother, who's just a year older than me, and a younger brother who's three years younger. So all around that time, I'm just starting school, high school, sorry. So I'm sort of the end of first year second year. And my brother's in the same school. He was in the same hokey program. My parents had been, I knew that they were separating. So all around that time, we were sort of we were blindsided one time with the conversation, but that was first before the knees. But before that, like my dad was amazing. He'd take us camping all the time, fishing every weekend, he was was at every single game of mine, take me to practice, you know, take us skateboarding and surfing and make sure we do our homework and it just, you know, it could could barely fault the guy on that side of things. And so and I really felt blocked, betrayed by him going, the only reason he could have possibly left, the only rationale I could dig up in my sort of 13 year old mind is that he really didn't care about us. It really rocked the foundation of what I believed about everything in life, who I was, who we were as a family, my Christian faith, because I was brought up in church. It really just scuttled me, Rodney Olsen  7:32 You mentioned that your older brother had already started mixing with the wrong crowd, and it was around that time that you started dabbling in drugs yourself. Your brother's only a year older than you so you're still both very young. How did the connections into that kind of world begin? Jacob Hill  7:48 So I atually don't really know how he started to get involved. Whether that was around the time my parents separated, looking back, actually, I'd say that's what's happened. And so he started hanging out with these guys. So he would have been 13, 14 at that point, and then I've sort of joined in with them when I was 13. So he would have been 14 by then. Put a lot of it down to definitely down to the people were hanging out with their peer group but also, had a lot to do with the music we were listening to. We listened to a lot of hip hop. Drugs were glorified. So much of it was talking about how drugs are cool, how they're a way of making money, a way of basically dominating your circumstances. And it also spoke a lot about violence and how violence is you know, the way you get respect and the way you hold respect. You know, we just really identified with that music and with that subculture, trying to emulate these guys. I'd never bothered that I wasn't smoking weed like I never wanted to do it. I didn't have any attract there's just nothing there for me. But I was listening to a song that the there's a line in the song said when you smoke, talking about marijuana, when you smoke like I smoke then you're high like every day and I remember just listening to that song one time, and then just like the penny dropped and I was just like, I'm not one of the guys. Like I'm not like these people and I felt like a real try hard. I just thought you know what today, I'm going to try marijuana because at the bus stop every afternoon the boys would sit in a circle and pass the bong around and I thought today when it gets passed to me, I'm not just going to pass it by I'm actually going to try it. And that afternoon I did that I tried it an interesting side note to is the guy whose pot it was that day, he was a guy I grew up with, and his family is actually the family that got us into playing hockey. He was a really good friend and a really like a huge influence on me growing up, and he actually died of a heroin overdose at the age of 20. So so this is the guy who's you know, it's his pot. I've tried it for the very first time, and this is something where I think young people need to be told about drugs. People don't just go and throw their life away like for no reason. Typically, these drugs have a really solid, immediate payoff, like in the terms of actually getting high like you feel really good. And that first time I got stoned man, it was like all my problems were gone. The pain of my dad leaving just gone. The disappointment of losing my Olympic dream was just gone. I really felt like I fitted in with the guys. And I actually had the thought that very first time I remember like so clearly it was looking back it's almost like it was a thought placed into my head from the outside but it was so clear in my mind, it was like, if I can just keep feeling like this. Everything will be okay. And I was literally addicted to marijuana the very first time I tried it, which some people say that marijuana is not addictive. I tell you I've no idea what they're talking about. But then I had another thought at that same sort of that same day was if this is how good pot is, I wonder how good all the other drugs are. And basically, I went on a quest to, you know, try all these other drugs. Rodney Olsen  11:07 How do 13, 14, 15 year old boys get their hands on the the sort of money that it takes to buy these drugs? Jacob Hill  11:15 When I was 13, I started selling for the boys that were older than me to the kids in my year, and I'd sell a certain amount of pot and I'd get a certain amount for free. And when that wasn't working for different reasons, like supply issues, you'd go and do break and enters and, you know, steal from different things and different people and shops and all of that. Rodney Olsen  11:36 It was really the start of a, I guess, a life of crime at that point. Jacob Hill  11:40 Yeah, it was it was totally and, you know, when you look at prisons, they're full of the're full, a majority of the people that are in there because of drugs. You wouldn't say it's easy money, but you don't have to be disciplined to make enough money to get by. So whereas if you've got a job, you've got to wake up at a certain time do what the boss says that you know in all of this, when you just do it that life you wake up when you want to go out and do it. For someone who's already emotionally crippled to the point where they're, you know, self medicating which and that's all that drug addiction is is you've got people that are in such bad shape they're self medicating to escape from this situation emotionally. Rodney Olsen  12:20 You've mentioned that you were on a quest to try a variety of drugs. The Verve had a song some years ago titled The Drugs Don't Work. Did that ever become your experience? Jacob Hill  12:31 Yeah, they stopped soon enough. You get a tolerance built up. The problem with it is is that well, there's a lot multiple problems but the first sort of problem is is when the drug stopped working and and by that I mean they they effectively they stop covering the pain is really I think, the simplest way of putting it. That is you can imagine you're in even medicine will tell you this, you you're taking painkillers for pain and you take them a long  time enough and your tolerance keeps building up, you need to take more and more of them to deal with that pain. If you keep doing it long enough that will stop dealing with the pain and that's what happened to me like the marijuana stopped making me feel good and the alcohol stopped making me feel good and the pills I was popping and acid and everything was it wasn't making me feel good anymore. But at the same time, I couldn't not use them because not using them made me feel even worse. So it was almost like now you've got no payoff for using drugs, except that you don't get the really horrible withdrawals or the really horrible problem of being straight. And basically what happened from there was, I think I was 16 and I made a decision. I was like, I felt so stuck. I was like, I need to get high. All of these drugs aren't doing it. I'm going to try heroin. And I knew what that meant. I knew that heroin was super addictive, I knew that it's super expensive, super dangerous. 'Cause I was a smart enough little kid as well, like, actually weighed it up and thought, you know, the pros and the cons. And I knew that there was no upside to this. But I still did not feel like I had another choice because I didn't realize that I could stop using drugs. That That wasn't in my in the equation. So it was just like, well, the only solution I could say was to go harder, even though I knew it was going to cost me everything. So I did it. I started using heroin. The very first time I shot heroin, I was 16 and I had that same feeling not the same high, but that same sort of thought that if I could just keep feeling like this, everything will be okay. It made me feel great for a little while, but you know, sure enough that that stopped working as well. You know, after a period of after a period of time, Rodney Olsen  14:54 I believe that during these times you even tried taking your own life a couple of times. Jacob Hill  14:59 Oh it cooks your head. Like, I mean you're dealing with people like in my situation you're dealing with a young guy who already was massively insecure. Any drive I had was gone. I saw no hope for the future. I'd ruined so many opportunities. I dropped out of school. You just look at some of the logical stuff. You've got someone who's going to be pretty low emotionally, then you chuck in all of those psychedelic chemicals and in such strong you know, drugs you're putting into a developing mind. I mean, being a kid's hard enough. You know, you know, being 16, 17 is hard enough when you're doing everything right. But yeah, you mix those those chemicals in with some real lifestyle challenges, on top of the you know, the the insecurities and on top of all the I was like flat out suicidal. First time I tried to end my life I was 17. I remember just sort of just not seeing a way out. My mates are starting to go to jail. They're starting to die of overdoses. People are starting to get hepatitis C. Getting kicked out of home. Like I literally could see no way out like way before when I could see no way out or there's like there was heroin, at least I could use heroin to make me feel okay. Now at this point where I was on heroin, and it wasn't doing it for me. I just, I could say nothing. Well, I might as well end my life. What's the point of sticking around here for to, you know, to live like this. And yeah, I made a genuine attempted suicide and praise God, it didn't work, but I was put in great lengths mental institution, I was there for a while. I came out of there, and just nothing like yours just went right back to it. Rodney Olsen  16:45 So even after having to spend time in a mental Institute, you didn't have reason to think well, this isn't working? I need to stop this kind of self destructive life? Were you still thinking there was no way out? Jacob Hill  16:57 Yeah, well, to be really honest and I have to be pretty honest with myself in saying this, as much as you want to get off because we you need to because you know, just just plain logic tells you that part of it was is actually didn't want to get out. Because partially because that's all I had known from quite a young age like from 13 my whole group of friends were in that lifestyle. I would I didn't know this at the time, but I've just, you know, from conversations I've had with guys trying to help them step off drugs, we actually get really scared of like, what will life be like without drugs? Can I handle this? Can I How can I function like in my own mind? And so you've got this medley of reasons, why quitting doesn't seem to be a viable choice. And yeah, and literally I've left there and nothing changed. Rodney Olsen  17:52 In your book, Kids at War, the Battle of Addiction, you describe an overdose that nearly took your life. I believe it was one person's actions that was the difference between life and death for you. Jacob Hill  18:04 Yeah, I overdosed after a party one night and I was y'know rushed to hospital. I was dead by the time the paramedics got to this guy's house. So what's happened is I was at this party. We've gone back to my mate's house. I was asleep on the couch, and someone's woken up my friend whose house it was and I said, can you come and wake up Jacob? He's snoring too loud. I can't sleep. I can't wake him up. Can you come and sort him out. So they're basically just wanted my friend to wake me up not out of concern for my health, but because that was keeping them awake. But he's come and he's heard this noise that they've complained about that was snoring. And he knows this sound, because the year before he was at a mate's house kicking it, watching a movie, doing some drugs. This guy falls asleep, and my my friend thinks nothing of it. And then this guy starts to what he thinks is snore, and he thinks nothing of it. But after a while he realizes something's seriously wrong and he tries to wake him up, he won't wake up. He rings the ambulance. By the time the ambulance gets there this blokes dead, 18 years of age. So when he's come out and he's heard the noise that they thought was snoring, and so he knows straightaway that this guy's not snoring, he's drowning. So what happens is you're unconscious you're laying on your back, you start to regurgitate, and then you breathe that in, you're literally drowning in your own vomit. And he knew straight away so he's jumped straight on the phone, rang the ambulance. By the time the ambulance has got to his place, I'm dead. They've had to revive me. I died a few more times. My mom is called. They said there's no chance I'm going to survive. Had I been dead for too long, basically, the oxygen I bought my body, my brain and my organs had been without oxygen. Mostly my brain had been without oxygen for too long. And there was just no way I was going to survive and they've put a piece of paper in front of her, which is they're asking her to sign a permission waiver from them to give away my organs. She didn't, which I'm pretty grateful for. But so I've pulled through about I was in a coma for a week but I've pulled through, and I've woken up. I had to learn how to walk again to learn how to breathe again. But the day I could walk, I walked straight out of the hospital and went right back to it. Yes, it was like not a lesson was learned. And even when I was in that hospital, I remember there was a lady come to me, counselor, and she's said, you need help, you know, and I said, what do I need help for? And she's like for your drug problem. And I said, lady, I don't have a drug problem. I like using drugs. Leave me alone. Rodney Olsen  20:38 So you've been committed to a mental institution and gone straight back to using drugs. You've overdosed, been in a coma for a week connected to machines and gone straight back to using drugs, Seen others that you know, lose their lives by doing the same sorts of things that you're doing, yet you're still taking drugs. Nothing so far has shaken you hard enough to change. What would finally shake you to the point of saying, enough's enough, something needs to be done. Jacob Hill  21:06 This is actually my mom. I needed some money one time and I'd ask her went and asked her for it, which I hadn't asked her for money since I was a kid since I was living at home in school, but now I was 21. I've been out of home since I was 17. And for some reason, I've gone and asked her for the money. She's told me that she doesn't want to talk to me again until I'm in rehab. And I thought, well, rehab doesn't work. Once a junkie, always a junkie, but for her, I'll give it a go. And to be really fair, I wasn't actually giving it a go to try to get off them. I was actually giving it a go, so it was way would have proved to me my theory that I was I was a lost cause basically. And I was really just thinking, this is just going to validate everything. I've thought. I'm going to do this thing go there for a few weeks. It's not going to work, and I'm just gonna come out and I'm gonna go as hard as I can till I'm dead basically. That was my my plan. Sure for you all go, but don't expect it to work. Rodney Olsen  22:05 Your book talks about the moment that you were given a decision about which rehab to go to and the strange decision that you made at the time. Jacob Hill  22:12 Yeah, the whole rehabs, like structure and system was pretty crazy in my mind, who knows? I was probably the crazy one but I was struggling to work all this thing. My normal counselor lady was she saying I couldn't get into rehab because I was using too much drugs. Like you need to go to a detox clinic, but I was using too much drugs to get into the detox clinic. So I need to use less drugs. So I could get into the detox clinic so they could detox me to get me into a rehab. And I'm thinking if I could use less drugs, or wouldn't he people. One of the weeks I go to the clinic was a different lady there. And she I'm sort of thinking, ah, if I lie to this lady, about how much drugs I'm using, she might put me straight into the detox centre or straight into the rehab or something. So when she's asked me how much I'm doing and everything I'm telling her just what I think she wants to hear. But then she says, I think Teen Challenge would be good for you. Now I'd heard about Teen Challenge a few years earlier, where I heard someone saying that they had gotten off heroin at Teen Challenge. And I remember at the time, just thinking what a pile of rubbish, but I do remember them saying that they met God at Teen Challenge, and God helped them get off heroin. And I remember just bad mouthing them in public. You know what, while they were saying it, but this lady said Teen Challenge, and I instantly remembered this. And then I'm like, are you a Christian? Are you trying to push God on me? She's like, No, no, no, we'll find you somewhere else. But it was like that little split microsecond between are you trying to push God on me and her saying, No, no, it was in that little, that little moment. I remember so clearly, just like everything slowed down and got quiet for a minute. I had a little conversation inside my head with God and it was just like, Man, this chick had talked about a miracle, like about God helping her get off heroin. And if that happened, that was a miracle. And I was thinking, the only way this is gonna happen is a miracle because I didn't even want to stop using. As much as I hated the life that I was. It was just, it was all I knew. And I remember that little split second to saying to God as a God, if you're real, you can make me stop wanting to use drugs. And I said, if you do that I'll serve you for the rest of my life. She's like, no, no we'll find you somewhere else. I'm like, No, no, give me give me the God place and she's like, no, no, no, we'll find it somewhere else and lady, give me the God place. And I don't remember much from there to, but it was a couple of months later ended up down at Teen Challenge and then the fun really started. Rodney Olsen  24:43 I understand you were picked up by a young guy who you thought fitted all the Christian stereotypes. Jacob Hill  24:48 Good Christian boy. Yeah. So like, I know this is a Christian place. I'm like, prepared for a bit of God stuff. And this little Vietnamese guy. He's the one that collects me from, it's a 10 hour bus ride, Rodney. So he comes he collects me from from the bus. He was so clean cut. Look, he just was like a church boy looking kid and I'm just like, oh my goodness, I remember just feeling so hopeless at that point. I was like, this guy looks like he's never even had panadol and just thinking, how can he help me? But then I got talking with him and he'd had the same, he was into the same stuff I'd been into. He'd been through the gangs and dealing heroin and you know, all sorts of nasty business. It's like to talk to him, you would never in a million years think he had a habit. Like he was just like, whoa, this guy's the real deal. And I remember it was this on the literally on the drive out there where I made we're actually had the thoughts like, wow, this is possible. I can do this. Like if it happened for him, it can happen for me. Rodney Olsen  25:47 All this time you've thought that there is no hope for people like you who are addicted to a life of drugs yet he's living proof of that change being possible. Jacob Hill  25:56 Yeah, right in front of me and saying he'll walk alongside me through it too. Rodney Olsen  26:00 So you're talking about having to detox from everything you'd been pumping into your body and you'd lied to get there because you understated what drugs you are taking. So they don't even know what they're dealing with when you walk through the front door. Jacob Hill  26:13 Oh man I was sick. So I taken a bunch of drugs that day. I've slept fine that night. But man after that, I did not sleep well. So the first morning was probably the start of the wake up call. So someone's knocked on my door at seven o'clock in the morning. And I'd be like, the only time I'd ever be up at seven o'clock because if I hadn't made a bed yet. So I'm like, this guy's knocked my door seven o'clock saying it's time to wake up and I just sort of went off my brain at him. I just like get out of, this is like one of the staff members, like get out of my bleeping room or I'll cut your bleeping throat. Anyway, he left, I didn't see him again for the day, but for that morning, and they let me sleep it off. And I mean, that was the last time I slept for so long. And I remember for that first couple of weeks just so so sick Rodney like, man, like there'll be times where I literally fall to the ground, my muscles or my body and my body just totally seizes up cramping to the point where I'm actually curled into a little ball. Like not my choice and shaking and feeling like I was being electrocuted and stuff. And like I just be every chance I got I'll just find a piece of sun to go and lay in just because like I was sick man about I wasn't sleeping either. I remember like every night used to be like looking forward to going to bed because I was so tired. But then not sleeping. Like the amount of times I watched the sun come up. It was months before I could sleep again. It was horrific. Rodney Olsen  27:45 You said that you believed only a miracle could turn your life around. This supposed cure is sounding pretty horrific. So when did the miracle come? Jacob Hill  27:54 I reckon it came when I met that guy at the bus stop because the night before I left, I'd popped my shoulder out in a fight so I dislocated my shoulder and I've gone to the, you know, which didn't help the sleeping situation, and so they've taken me to the doctors and I have the you know the option for some something to help with the pain and sleeping. I'm like now I don't want any of that stuff but I don't want anything to help me sleep. I don't want anything to help with the pain. I just want to be have nothing to do with with drugs even the prescribed stuff that they get I don't want anything and so it was like literally that straightaway I just said look no taste for it at all. Even though I had to go through the detox the physical side of it. Emotionally I was done with it like I was I was through it. Yeah, I mean, like not learning how to live like a healthy life or anything but the as far as wanting drugs, I was done like day one. Rodney Olsen  28:51 So after the the horror of the detox, it was then a matter of learning how to live a healthy life. What did that mean for you? Jacob Hill  28:59 Well, I talked about That detox and it's like it sounds pretty bad and go I'm looking back it was terrible. But that was the easy bit. But you can make your body do stuff you know you just got to watch a marathon and you see some people doing some pretty incredible things and but the the real hard thing for me was the emotional stuff because you got to remember that it was the emotional stuff is why I got onto drugs in the first place. And it was the emotional stuff is why I kept going harder and kept using more and more. I'll tell you the biggest the biggest key to the whole thing was learning that I was made on purpose by a God who loved me and had a plan for my life. That was the the biggest key and I really struggled to believe it though that are you know, on heaps of levels. But having that nugget is what got me through like that is still today is was what gets me through. Rodney Olsen  29:58 What age are you at this point? Jacob Hill  30:00 I went in there at 21. And it took me 14 months to finish the program. So I finished it and I just turned 23 Rodney Olsen  30:10 Here you are at that point of learning the basics of how to live a normal, healthy life. You're a 21 year old man having to deal with the emotional baggage of a 12 or 13 year old that had never been dealt with. Jacob Hill  30:23 Yeah, flat out like, basically once you start checking out with drugs, you don't mature past that point to a degree because that's how we learn. Like we have a problem. We work our way through it, and we've grown it's called maturing and yeah, and I just did not do that process. So it's one of the things you see about Teen Challenge is it doesn't matter what age the bloke gets down there, they've actually just changed the name of it to Adult and Teen Challenge because they're just finding more and more grown men going in there. To a large extent they've all got the psychology of a you know of someone in their mid teens because of exactly what you said like that not growing past emotionally, Rodney Olsen  31:03 It's an interesting journey that you've been on and as I said, you thought only a miracle could make you change. You've mentioned that you had to come to an understanding that you were created on purpose and that there was a God that loved you. So, how did that finally settle for you? When did all of that begin to make some kind of sense? Jacob Hill  31:22 Gosh, good question. So take it back before I went to Teen Challenge, and you're talking about, you know, all these crazy things that happened and you know, like the hospitals the mental institutions and the overdoses and all of that stuff and people look like a you know, say well you know, these surely that was your rock bottom moment. Now, surely that was a rock bottom moment, like my lowest point in life, was driving down the along the freeway with one of my mates and the song came on the radio, Grinspoon, and the lyric went something like this. It's like were you born to be a star? Were you born to be more than you are? And I remember listening to that song and knowing beyond a shadow of a doubt that i and this is someone who flat out drug addict on our way to score, some heroin, breaking every speed, like every law on the road to get to this place quicker and at that point, I remember like just knowing that I was meant I was made for something special. I was made for something more. I was made to do something important. And I could see no way of getting there. I had this drug problem, I had no education. I had no drive. It was just like, that was my lowest point, realizing I was meant for something and not having any awareness of how I could get there. Rodney Olsen  32:43 I know that you had a little bit of a picture of what you were meant for. Tell us about that picture that you carried with you in your mind. Jacob Hill  32:50 I had this picture of like, what I would actually like for a life. I saw a girl who would love me for me. That was just that was like that desire in my heart. I wanted a family. Wanted my own kids like two boys was actually what I just this image I saw. My own house where I couldn't get kicked out of anymore. A job that I didn't hate, not even one that I liked. That wasn't that wasn't even the dream. It was just a job I didn't hate. And I remember that, seeing that picture. And that was so far from possible in my mind that I attempted suicide. But as I've started to get my life back on track at Teen Challenge like that, there was a sniff of it, you know, like it was like, well, God's got a good plan for my life and he can get me there as well as starting to wake up that those feelings like now I can be doing I can do something significant with my life. My life can make it like be called to make a difference in the lives of a lot of people. Rodney Olsen  33:44 So you've had this picture of a wife or a couple of sons a job that you don't hate. You've now been through all the detox, you've been through the rehab. we fast forward quite a number of years to the current day. What does life look like for you now? Jacob Hill  33:59 It looks remarkably similar to that picture. But it was about five or six years ago, I remember that picture came to mind and I was just like, Whoa, this is my life now. Happily married, built our own home, our two little boys and it was literally like that dream that was impossible was now not just, a potential, it was like I was living it. So and it was just like, far out. The Impossible is real. Like, I'm literally living this impossible dream and it's now tangible and I live in the house, and I tuck those boys into bed every night. And it was a dog in the picture as well. And I got a really cool dog. But that was just like, Whoa, I was just like, it's time to dream again. And I went back to the drawing board. It was just like, open up my heart as like, right. Like, I know that I wasn't just created to have my 2.4 kids and my own little piece of Australia. I was like, I am created to do amazing things. And I went back to the drawing board and at that time, I was pastoring a church, the church where I'm still pastoring now, but as a young guy that was literally my dream job. Forget about a job I didn't hate it was like my dream job. And I've, you know, just dreamt again and put some a few more things on paper and then God sort of added some surprises to it. We had a beautiful little girl. And now, I still pastor the church, but I'm off staff at the church, I'm not staff anymore. And I run my own company, Purpose and Destiny, which, you know, the goal of it is, is to help people discover their purpose in life and empower them to fulfill their destiny through some of the keys that I've learned, you know, bunch of facets, like through drug education in schools to sharing my story, as well as, you know, speaking at church and it but on top of that, doing this stuff that I was doing before that was great. It's not like got rid of stuff, doing new stuff. It's just like adding to my life. Rodney Olsen  35:46 Someone listening right now might think, well, that's great for you, but can it work for anyone else? I mean, let's admit it, you had seen maybe one or two people who had been able to kick heroin but you didn't really believe that that was possible, especially for you. So someone listening might be thinking, well for me that's just not possible. Someone else listening might be thinking there's someone that I love who's addicted. Is it possible for them really possible? What would you say? Jacob Hill  36:12 Well, I'd seen zero people that have gotten off. That one girl who I saw her but I didn't actually believe it for I know now and yes, it worked. So to really understand it, my both of my brothers went down the same road I went down and my my little brother he started using. The first time he was busted selling drugs, he was like nine or 10 years old. They both ended up heroin addicts as well. Today, my both of my brothers have been through Teen Challenge are off drugs. Got, you know, beautiful families, own their own homes, like just just doing well in life. My friend who rang the ambulance for me, he's off drugs. He actually goes to church with us. And a real kicker was I just realized the other day. That guy that I was driving in the car with when I say that song came on and you know where I had that where were you born to be a star that guy he's been through Teen Challenge as well. He's off heroin too now and he's married happily married and man, God is it if He's done it for one person, he'll do it for anybody. But to take it one step further my wife Melissa, her story basically reflects mine perfectly. Change a few names a few dates, a few details her life is is exactly the same as mine she, and then she's going through Teen Challenge, encountered God, kicked drugs and alcohol addiction and really had a radical transformation and now she you know, she's so she's another one. So there's definitely is good for me, but I'm not alone. Rodney Olsen  37:46 It's good to know that there is hope available for people who have thought that things are hopeless. If someone is wanting to perhaps get in touch with you and talk through some of the things that you've experienced that would help them on their way or even get a hold of your books? How would they do that? Jacob Hill  38:03 Probably the easiest way would be, maybe jump on my website, which is JacobHill.org and there's a connect page there. Or, you know, if they look me up on Facebook, and I'm pretty good at responding to the messages and stuff. Rodney Olsen  38:17 Jacob, your life has certainly had many ups and quite a few downs and I'm sure that it's still not a perfect life, but it's in a very different place to where it was. You say that really, it came down to a miracle and that miracle is still happening every day. Jacob Hill  38:32 Man, I get to see it every day. I've got friends that are still in the scene and I you know, I still pray for them and I still hope and believe that they'll come through it and I watch them over the years. I watch them just one at a time just coming through it. Rodney Olsen  38:47 Jacob, thank you so much for your time today. As I mentioned, you've written your story down into a book that people can grab hold of if they want to read through and get some of the stories in a bit more detail. It's called Kids at War, the Battle of Addiction and It's it's a great read. We look forward to seeing where this miracle will take you next. It's been an absolute delight to chat with you. Jacob Hill  39:07 Thanks heaps for having me, Rodney. Emily Olsen  39:10 Thank you for listening to bleeding daylight. Please help us to shine more light into the darkness by sharing this episode with others. For further details and more episodes, please visit BleedingDaylight.net Transcribed by https://otter.ai

Silver Club Golfing Society Podcast
Brett Cyrgalis, Author, "Golf's Holy War; The Battle For the Soul of a Game In An Age of Science"

Silver Club Golfing Society Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later May 5, 2020 61:28


Is the game of golf an art or a science?  This SCGS Podcast searches for that answer with Brett Cyrgalis, NY Post writer and author of a highly touted book, "Golf's Holy War" debuting today, May 5.  Cyrgalis, an excellent player in his own right, tries to make sense in both sides of the argument of how golf has transformed over the years through technology.

River City Church
I Declare War - The Battle Begins in the Mind

River City Church

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 7, 2020


We all have internal battles we fight every day, from temptation to negativity and anxiety. This four-week series based off the book I Declare War by Pastor Levi Lusko will address spiritual warfare and help us understand how what happens in the mind matters and how to wage and win the battles we wage against ourselves. Attenders will learn to identify the inward tendencies that have been keeping them from spiritual and personal success, as well as practical ways to fight those struggles from a stance of victory.

Point Community Church Podcast
January, 06 2019 - "This Means War: The Battle of Your Life - Pastor Thomas Wong"

Point Community Church Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 6, 2019


http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/PointCommunityChurchPodcast/~3/hRx9-C2cY_Y/january-06-2019-this-means-war-battle.htmlinfo@pointcommunitychurch.orgnoinfo@pointcommunitychurch.orgPoint,Community,Church,Thomas,Wong,Tim,Nussbaumer,Church,Jesus,Sermon,Bible,Point,Community,Churchhttps://podcastpointcommunitychurch.blogspot.com/2019

The Abracast
The Vietnam War: The Battle of Khe Sanh pt 2

The Abracast

Play Episode Listen Later Jul 18, 2018 57:02


This episode starts with a look back to the events that started and escalated the Vietnam War and then continues with the harrowing tale of the Marines in Khe Sanh. The true story of the Tet Offensive is revealed and finally the end of the battle. Featured Book:A Patriots History of the United States: From Columbus's Great Discovery to the War of Terror – Larry Schweikart and Michael Patrick AllenThe Battle For Khe Sanh - Captain Moyers S. Shore II, USMC Featured Song: Fuck and Fight – Soda JerkTheme Song “Red Horse Rising” by X-Proph3t: http://www.reverbnation.com/xproph3tStigmata Studios Comic Books and Graphic Novels: www.stigmatastudios.comSign up for the newsletter for exclusive content! http://eepurl.com/YIbLf Additional Production by Daniel Foytik and Nelson Pyles· Incidental Music by Kevin MacLeod (incompetech.com) Licensed under Creative Commons: By Attribution 3.0 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/· Incidental Music (royalty free) by Ross BugdenEmail Jon: Towers113@gmail.com Visit: www.stigmatastudios.comFind Jon on Twitter: @jonnyaxx https://twitter.com/JonnyAxx Find Jon on Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/#!/stigmatastudiosFind Jon On Instagram: http://instagram.com/stigmatastudios

The Abracast
The Vietnam War: The Battle of Khe Sanh pt 1

The Abracast

Play Episode Listen Later Jul 15, 2018 54:36


1968, In the northwest corner of south Vietnam, among the mountainous jungle in a valley called Khe Sanh about 7,000 United States Marines are about to take on over 35,000 North Vietnamese Army soldiers. We look at the disaster of Dien Bien Phu that took place ten years before and we will examine the importance of Logistics and the supply train to this mission. Featured Book:The Battle For Khe Sanh - Captain Moyers S. Shore II, USMC Featured Song: Fuck and Fight – Soda JerkTheme Song “Red Horse Rising” by X-Proph3t: http://www.reverbnation.com/xproph3tStigmata Studios Comic Books and Graphic Novels: www.stigmatastudios.comSign up for the newsletter for exclusive content! http://eepurl.com/YIbLf Additional Production by Daniel Foytik and Nelson Pyles· Incidental Music by Kevin MacLeod (incompetech.com) Licensed under Creative Commons: By Attribution 3.0 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/· Incidental Music (royalty free) by Ross BugdenEmail Jon: Towers113@gmail.com Visit: www.stigmatastudios.comFind Jon on Twitter: @jonnyaxx https://twitter.com/JonnyAxx Find Jon on Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/#!/stigmatastudiosFind Jon On Instagram: http://instagram.com/stigmatastudios

New Books in Irish Studies
Steve R. Dunn, “Bayly's War: The Battle for the Western Approaches in the First World War” (Naval Institute Press, 2018)

New Books in Irish Studies

Play Episode Listen Later Jul 9, 2018 39:34


Though Great Britain's warships ruled the waves throughout the First World War, their greatest challenge came from just underneath them. Nowhere was this better demonstrated in the Western Approaches, where, as Steve R. Dunn details in his book Bayly's War: The Battle for the Western Approaches in the First World War (Naval Institute Press, 2018), the Royal Navy found themselves hard pressed even to secure the trade routes just off their western shores from the threat posed by Germany U-boats. At the start of the war, the command covering the region, the Coast of Ireland station, was something of a backwater, one not anticipated to be a major area of the war. The U-boat campaign against British trade soon changed this, as sinkings such as those of the liner Lusitania demonstrated the vulnerability of shipping in the region. In response the Admiralty nominated the dynamic Lewis Bayly to take over as commander. Setting a focused, no-nonsense tone from the start, Bayly soon moved to protect merchant shipping and hunt down U-boats by every means possible. Bayly's greatest success, though, came with the entry of the United States into the war in 1917, as he presided over the successful integration of American naval vessels into his command, where they provided the necessary protection for the ships transporting American soldiers to the battlefields of the Western Front. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

New Books Network
Steve R. Dunn, “Bayly’s War: The Battle for the Western Approaches in the First World War” (Naval Institute Press, 2018)

New Books Network

Play Episode Listen Later Jul 9, 2018 39:22


Though Great Britain’s warships ruled the waves throughout the First World War, their greatest challenge came from just underneath them. Nowhere was this better demonstrated in the Western Approaches, where, as Steve R. Dunn details in his book Bayly’s War: The Battle for the Western Approaches in the First World War (Naval Institute Press, 2018), the Royal Navy found themselves hard pressed even to secure the trade routes just off their western shores from the threat posed by Germany U-boats. At the start of the war, the command covering the region, the Coast of Ireland station, was something of a backwater, one not anticipated to be a major area of the war. The U-boat campaign against British trade soon changed this, as sinkings such as those of the liner Lusitania demonstrated the vulnerability of shipping in the region. In response the Admiralty nominated the dynamic Lewis Bayly to take over as commander. Setting a focused, no-nonsense tone from the start, Bayly soon moved to protect merchant shipping and hunt down U-boats by every means possible. Bayly’s greatest success, though, came with the entry of the United States into the war in 1917, as he presided over the successful integration of American naval vessels into his command, where they provided the necessary protection for the ships transporting American soldiers to the battlefields of the Western Front. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

New Books in Military History
Steve R. Dunn, “Bayly’s War: The Battle for the Western Approaches in the First World War” (Naval Institute Press, 2018)

New Books in Military History

Play Episode Listen Later Jul 9, 2018 39:22


Though Great Britain’s warships ruled the waves throughout the First World War, their greatest challenge came from just underneath them. Nowhere was this better demonstrated in the Western Approaches, where, as Steve R. Dunn details in his book Bayly’s War: The Battle for the Western Approaches in the First World War (Naval Institute Press, 2018), the Royal Navy found themselves hard pressed even to secure the trade routes just off their western shores from the threat posed by Germany U-boats. At the start of the war, the command covering the region, the Coast of Ireland station, was something of a backwater, one not anticipated to be a major area of the war. The U-boat campaign against British trade soon changed this, as sinkings such as those of the liner Lusitania demonstrated the vulnerability of shipping in the region. In response the Admiralty nominated the dynamic Lewis Bayly to take over as commander. Setting a focused, no-nonsense tone from the start, Bayly soon moved to protect merchant shipping and hunt down U-boats by every means possible. Bayly’s greatest success, though, came with the entry of the United States into the war in 1917, as he presided over the successful integration of American naval vessels into his command, where they provided the necessary protection for the ships transporting American soldiers to the battlefields of the Western Front. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

New Books in History
Steve R. Dunn, “Bayly’s War: The Battle for the Western Approaches in the First World War” (Naval Institute Press, 2018)

New Books in History

Play Episode Listen Later Jul 9, 2018 39:34


Though Great Britain’s warships ruled the waves throughout the First World War, their greatest challenge came from just underneath them. Nowhere was this better demonstrated in the Western Approaches, where, as Steve R. Dunn details in his book Bayly’s War: The Battle for the Western Approaches in the First World War (Naval Institute Press, 2018), the Royal Navy found themselves hard pressed even to secure the trade routes just off their western shores from the threat posed by Germany U-boats. At the start of the war, the command covering the region, the Coast of Ireland station, was something of a backwater, one not anticipated to be a major area of the war. The U-boat campaign against British trade soon changed this, as sinkings such as those of the liner Lusitania demonstrated the vulnerability of shipping in the region. In response the Admiralty nominated the dynamic Lewis Bayly to take over as commander. Setting a focused, no-nonsense tone from the start, Bayly soon moved to protect merchant shipping and hunt down U-boats by every means possible. Bayly’s greatest success, though, came with the entry of the United States into the war in 1917, as he presided over the successful integration of American naval vessels into his command, where they provided the necessary protection for the ships transporting American soldiers to the battlefields of the Western Front. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

New Books in British Studies
Steve R. Dunn, “Bayly’s War: The Battle for the Western Approaches in the First World War” (Naval Institute Press, 2018)

New Books in British Studies

Play Episode Listen Later Jul 9, 2018 39:22


Though Great Britain’s warships ruled the waves throughout the First World War, their greatest challenge came from just underneath them. Nowhere was this better demonstrated in the Western Approaches, where, as Steve R. Dunn details in his book Bayly’s War: The Battle for the Western Approaches in the First World War (Naval Institute Press, 2018), the Royal Navy found themselves hard pressed even to secure the trade routes just off their western shores from the threat posed by Germany U-boats. At the start of the war, the command covering the region, the Coast of Ireland station, was something of a backwater, one not anticipated to be a major area of the war. The U-boat campaign against British trade soon changed this, as sinkings such as those of the liner Lusitania demonstrated the vulnerability of shipping in the region. In response the Admiralty nominated the dynamic Lewis Bayly to take over as commander. Setting a focused, no-nonsense tone from the start, Bayly soon moved to protect merchant shipping and hunt down U-boats by every means possible. Bayly’s greatest success, though, came with the entry of the United States into the war in 1917, as he presided over the successful integration of American naval vessels into his command, where they provided the necessary protection for the ships transporting American soldiers to the battlefields of the Western Front. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Witness History
Vietnam War: The Battle for Hue

Witness History

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 6, 2018 9:26


Communist forces overran the key southern city of Hue triggering one of the biggest battles of the war. The attack was part of the Tet Offensive in 1968, when North Vietnam launched surprise assaults on towns and cities across South Vietnam, with the support of its southern based guerrilla force, the Viet Cong. Alex Last spoke to Nguyen Dac Xuan, a former member of the Viet Cong which fought against American and South Vietnamese forces in Hue. Photo: American troops watch as a US plane bombs Communist positions in the city of Hue, February 1968 (BBC)

Bethany Baptist Church
A Time for War: A Battle for Your Body

Bethany Baptist Church

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 14, 2018


A Time for War“The Battle for the Body”   1st Corinthians 6:9-20   A Word of Encouragement Good morning, it is my hope and my joy to know that the battle for our time has begun in Christ. Though you may have made little steps in the past week to win the battle it is […] The post A Time for War: A Battle for Your Body appeared first on Bethany Baptist Church.

Burlington Christian Church
This Means War - The Battle Is The Lord's

Burlington Christian Church

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 12, 2017 35:32


Presented by John Nappo at Burlington Christian Church on November 12th, 2017.

Cloverdale Baptist Church Sermons
This Means War: The Battle Plan

Cloverdale Baptist Church Sermons

Play Episode Listen Later May 28, 2017 30:00


May 28, 2017 Dr Rob Godard This Means War: The Battle Plan Ephesians 6:10-20

Cloverdale Baptist Church Sermons
This Means War: The Battle Plan

Cloverdale Baptist Church Sermons

Play Episode Listen Later May 28, 2017 30:00


May 28, 2017 Dr Rob Godard This Means War: The Battle Plan Ephesians 6:10-20

Cool Canadian History
S2E1 The Strangest Tale of the Second World War: The Battle for Castle Itter

Cool Canadian History

Play Episode Listen Later Sep 11, 2016


In the closing days of the Second World War, American, German, Austrian and a smattering of multi-national prisoners of war (plus a special Canadian thrown in there for good measure) defend Castle Itter against SS soldiers bent on destruction

National Library of Australia
On War: The Battle of Pozières

National Library of Australia

Play Episode Listen Later Aug 3, 2016 46:33


Dr Meleah Hampton, Australian War Memorial historian, explores the allied efforts to capture the OG (Old German) trench line near Pozières, France, in 1916. This was among the most costly battles for Australians during the First World War. In association with the Canberra Great War Study Group, the Estaminet

bohemican
Czechs in the Great War: The Battle of Dukla 1914-15

bohemican

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 16, 2016 38:53


The Austria-Hungarian Empire had their hands full against the Russians in the fall of 1914 outside of Warsaw, Poland. By the winter of 1915, the defense of the Fortress Przemyśl took its toll as harsh winter conditions set in. The embedded Czech soldiers fought off the Russian siege, frostbite, starvation, and disease while deep in the Carpathian Mountains. The Battle of Dukla was the prelude to the utter devastation and horrors that would become common place on World War One battlefronts. Disillusionment of Czech forces under poor Austria-Hungarian leadership would lead to mass desertion and defection to Entente armies.A show by podcastnik.com — visit the site for all projects and news. Visit bohemican.com for more on this project and the Czech Republic.Check out our new show, Past Access! (YouTube Link)Twitter @bohemican | @Travis J Dow | @Podcastnik — Facebook Podcastnik Page — Instagram @podcastnikPodcastnik YouTube | Podcastnik Audio Podcast Support: PayPal | Patreon | Podcastnik Shop | Pete Collman Photography Our GDPR privacy policy was updated on August 8, 2022. Visit acast.com/privacy for more information.

Cornerstone Presbyterian Church Franklin
Holy War: The Battle Underneath Every Battle

Cornerstone Presbyterian Church Franklin

Play Episode Listen Later Sep 12, 2015 43:26


Holy War: The Battle Underneath Every Battle by Cornerstone Presbyterian Church Franklin

The Community Podcast
09/07/14- gods at War: The Battle For Our Hearts

The Community Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Sep 14, 2014 41:25


Listen to pastor Bruce Jarman and other guests with this weekly podcast. Community Bible Church, Montevideo MN.

The Road to the Great War
The Road to War: The Battle of the Marne

The Road to the Great War

Play Episode Listen Later Sep 8, 2014 17:06


The Battle of Marne halts the German Advance towards Paris

Simple Church
Gods At War: The Battle for Your Heart

Simple Church

Play Episode Listen Later Aug 4, 2013 35:57


Pastor Aaron DeLong discusses the battleground of the gods - your heart - in week 2 of the series Gods At War.

K2 The Church (Red)
The Battle for Marriage

K2 The Church (Red)

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 6, 2011 40:36


All's Not Fair in Love and War: The Battle for Marriage

K2 The Church (South)
The Battle for Marriage

K2 The Church (South)

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 6, 2011 45:32


All's Not Fair in Love and War: The Battle for Marriage