Podcasts about gilberts

Chain of sixteen atolls and coral islands in the Pacific Ocean

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Best podcasts about gilberts

Latest podcast episodes about gilberts

Mi-Fit Podcast
12,500 Days of Motivation: Dr. Rob Gilberts Success Hotline Journey

Mi-Fit Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Jun 24, 2025 61:12


Dr. Rob Gilbert is a legendary sports psychologist, professor, and performance coach who has been inspiring athletes, coaches, and leaders for over four decades. He is best known as the voice behind the iconic Success Hotline, where he has delivered a motivational message every single day—without missing a beat—for over 12,500 consecutive days. A professor at Montclair State University and a highly sought-after speaker, Dr. Gilbert has helped shape the mindset of champions around the world. His storytelling, humor, and heart have made him one of the most impactful voices in the world of mental performance.Reflection questions1. Energy and Self-Awareness:Dr. Gilbert emphasizes that 'energy is your edge' and talks about being aware of your energy levels throughout the day. Reflect on your typical day - when do you feel most energized and alive, and what specific activities, people, or environments contribute to those peak energy moments? How might you intentionally design more of these energy-giving experiences into your daily routine?"2. The Strategy vs. Talent Paradigm:Dr. Gilbert believes 'life is not a talent game, it's a strategy game.' Think about an area of your life where you've been relying on natural ability or hoping things will just work out. What specific strategies could you develop or implement to take more intentional control of that situation? How might shifting from a talent mindset to a strategy mindset change your approach?3. Untapped Potential - Your Personal 'Acres of Diamonds'The 'Acres of Diamonds' story suggests we often overlook the treasures right in front of us. What skills, opportunities, relationships, or resources do you currently have access to that you might be taking for granted or not fully utilizing? How could you begin to 'mine' these existing assets more effectively?4. Daily Consistency and Compound Impact:Dr. Gilbert has delivered over 12,500 daily motivational messages since 1992, demonstrating the power of small, consistent actions. What is one small but meaningful action you could commit to doing daily that would compound over time to create significant positive change in your life? What has prevented you from maintaining this type of consistency in the past, and how might you overcome those obstacles?5. Reframing Challenges as Opportunities:Throughout the conversation, Dr. Gilbert emphasizes finding the positive in difficult situations. Think about a current challenge or setback you're facing. How might this situation actually be preparing you for something greater, teaching you a valuable lesson, or opening doors you hadn't previously considered? What would it look like to approach this challenge with curiosity rather than resistance?Download my FREE Coaching Beyond the Scoreboard E-book www.djhillier.com/coach Download my FREE 60 minute Mindset Masterclass at www.djhillier.com/masterclassDownload my FREE top 40 book list written by Mindset Advantage guests: www.djhillier.com/40booksSubscribe to our NEW YouTube channel: https://www.youtube.com/@MindsetAdvantagePurchase a copy of my book: https://a.co/d/bGok9UdFollow me on Instagram: @deejayhillierConnect with me on my website: www.djhillier.com

The Jim Bakker Show
Unraveling Revelation 2 - Derek & Sharon Gilbert Day 2

The Jim Bakker Show

Play Episode Listen Later Jun 19, 2025 28:30


Today is Day 2 with Derek & Sharon Gilbert! They are authors, teachers, researchers and co-hosts of Unraveling Revelation! The Gilberts and the panel discuss their new book, The Gates of Hell: Unlocking the Ganymede Code of the Demonic Portals of Mount Hermon and the U. S. Capitol. Other topics include cloning today and in ancient days, why God deliberately does not reveal His plan for rapture, the significance of the location of Jesus' baptism, and an explanation of the Gates of Hell.

The Jim Bakker Show
Unraveling Revelation 1 - Derek & Sharon Gilbert Day 1

The Jim Bakker Show

Play Episode Listen Later Jun 18, 2025 28:30


Derek & Sharon Gilbert join the Jim Bakker Show today. Derek & Sharon are authors, teachers, researchers and co-hosts of Unraveling Revelation! The Gilberts and the panel discuss their new book, The Gates of Hell: Unlocking the Ganymede Code of the Demonic Portals of Mount Hermon and the U. S. Capitol. Hear them explain the current geopolitical world through a theopolitical standpoint, explain what the principalities and powers behind the scenes are trying to accomplish, the significance of the B.I.S., and much more!

A View from the Bunker
Iron and Myth 40: Rings of Revelation

A View from the Bunker

Play Episode Listen Later May 12, 2025 98:25


THE BOOK OF REVELATION is cryptic and complex. Supernaturally so. Critics who write off Revelation as a hallucination have obviously not looked at the literary structure of the book. The Iron and Myth crew discusses a book by regular IaM panelist Doug Van Dorn (DouglasVanDorn.com), Rings of Revelation, that shows a level of complexity to the work of the apostle John that is beyond human. Brian Godawa (Godawa.com) and Dr. Judd Burton (BurtonBeyond.net) join us to explore Revelation's literary structure, thematic elements, and the interplay between supernatural and earthly realms. Doug presents a unique perspective on Revelation as a literary masterpiece, emphasizing its cyclical nature and chiastic structure.  The discussion also touches on the use of popular culture, such as Star Wars, in understanding biblical texts, and the implications of astral theology within the context of divine council. We also congratulate Doug for presenting a new take on end times prophecy in a non-contentious way, recognizing that God may have made prophecy hard to understand by design so that the fallen realm isn't able to fabricate a convincing lie. Join Doug Van Dorn's Reformed Fringe at www.ReformedFringe.com! The Gilberts' new book The Gates of Hell is now available in paperback, Kindle, and as an audiobook at Audible! Derek's new book Destination: Earth, co-authored with Donna Howell and Allie Anderson, is now available in paperback, Kindle, and as an audiobook at Audible! Follow us! X: @viewfrombunker | @sharonkgilbert | @derekgilbertTelegram: t.me/gilberthouseSubstack: gilberthouse.substack.comYouTube: @GilbertHouse | @UnravelingRevelationFacebook.com/viewfromthebunker Thank you for making our Build Barn Better project a reality! The building has HVAC, a new floor, windows, insulation, ceiling fans, and an upgraded electrical system! We truly appreciate your support. If you are so led, you can help out at www.GilbertHouse.org/donate. —— Download our free app! This brings all of our content directly to your smartphone or tablet. Best of all, we'll never get canceled from our own app! Links to the app stores for iOS, iPadOS, Android, and Amazon Kindle Fire devices are at www.GilbertHouse.org/app. Please join us each Sunday for the Gilbert House Fellowship, our weekly Bible study podcast. Log on to www.GilbertHouse.org for more details. Check out our weekly video program Unraveling Revelation (unravelingrevelation.tv), and subscribe to the YouTube channel: YouTube.com/UnravelingRevelation. —— Special offers on our books and DVDs: www.gilberthouse.org/store. —— JOIN US AND SPECIAL GUEST CARL TEICHRIB IN ISRAEL! Our next tour of Israel is October 19–30, 2025 with an optional three-day extension to Jordan. For the latest information, log on to GilbertHouse.org/travel. Discuss these topics at the VFTB Facebook page (facebook.com/viewfromthebunker) and check out the great podcasters at the Fringe Radio Network (Spreaker.com/show/fringe-radio-network)!

Thrive Radio | Entrepreneurship | Entrepreneur Advice
How AI Saved My Life | Chronic Illness | Gilberts Syndrome

Thrive Radio | Entrepreneurship | Entrepreneur Advice

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 26, 2025 16:44


In this episode of Thrive Radio, host Aimee Montgomery shares her personal journey of overcoming chronic illness with the help of AI. After years of misdiagnosis and ineffective treatments, Aimee discovered how to leverage ChatGPT to analyze her medical history and provide tailored health solutions. This transformative experience not only improved her health but also empowered her to advocate for herself in the medical field. Aimee encourages others facing similar struggles to explore AI as a potential resource for healing and support.

Dupont & Lafitt
Rute 107 1

Dupont & Lafitt

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 24, 2025 75:03


I sommeren 1221 bliver detektiven Anton Dupont opslugt af en artikel om Den Store Detektivmesse i Asit Dur – et tilløbsstykke for opdagere og teknikentusiaster. Hans makker, Gilbert Lafitt, er dog skeptisk over for både messen og rejsen. Redningen kommer, da Gilberts kæreste, Iris, opdager en konkurrence på en boblevask-æske, hvor man kan vinde en luksusrejse med første klasse på Rute 107. Anton deltager – og vinder. De to detektiver rejser afsted med luftskib og oplever messens fortryllende opfindelser. Vinteren er ved at tage fat, og sneen er begyndt at falde, da de står på hovedbanegården i Asit Dur, klar til at begynde den komfortable hjemrejse med Rute 107.Her finder du mere information om LEF: Website: www.lefnet.dk Facebook: www.facebook.com/groups/lefrollespil YouTube: www.youtube.com/channel/UCE86Gfh0jeGfWXwPDF-fI7A Patreon: www.patreon.com/bePatron?u=64413595 Bluesky: https://bsky.app/profile/lef-podcast.bsky.social

The Clinician's Corner
#47: Exploring Hormone Metabolism and Beta Glucuronidase with Dr. Betty Murray

The Clinician's Corner

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 15, 2025 63:25 Transcription Available


In this episode of the RWS Clinician's Corner, Margaret Floyd Barry has an enlightening discussion featuring Dr. Betty Murray, a leading expert in women's health and hormone metabolism. Dr. Betty dives deep into the intricate role of the enzyme beta glucuronidase and how it impacts everything from detoxification processes to hormone balance, particularly in women over 40. We also unpack the symbiotic relationship between hormones and the microbiome, and how this understanding can transform clinical practices.   In this interview, we discuss:    -What beta glucuronidase is and the relationship between hormones and the microbiome   -How microbiome changes with age and hormones - and its potential benefits   -The approach to testing for beta glucuronidase in conjunction with other tests   -The role of diet and supplements in managing microbiome and enzyme levels   -The concept of creating a healthier biome environment rather than targeting individual strains The Clinician's Corner is brought to you by Restorative Wellness Solutions.  Follow us: https://www.instagram.com/restorativewellnesssolutions/   Connect with Dr. Betty Murray: Websites: https://bettymurray.com; https://livingwelldallas.com; ​​and https://getmenrva.com YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/@drbettymurray and https://www.youtube.com/@MenopauseMasteryShow Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/drbettymurray/ Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/drbettymurray LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/bettymurray/   Resources from Dr. Betty:  Assessing the Microbiome in Clinical Practice Presentation from the Archives: https://youtu.be/nvbAE3oVec0   A Girl's Guide to Estrogen Dominance: https://ed.hormoneshelp.com/   Timestamps: 00:00 From Christian Science to Functional Medicine 10:13 Rethinking Beta Glucuronidase's Role 11:42 Menopause, Microbiome, and Hormones 17:20 Hormones' Impact on IBS Severity 25:02 Hormone Metabolism Insights in Telemedicine 28:42 Researching Age-Specific Functional Medicine 37:37 Clinician's Corner: Gut Healing Training 43:21 Dietary Impact on Microbiome Change 48:44 Postbiotic Innovations in Microbiome Therapy 51:45 Understanding Overgrowth Causes 55:51 Constant Relearning and Pattern Recognition 01:02:44 "The Clinician's Corner: Join Us" Speaker bio: Dr. Betty Murray is a women's health advocate, nutrition expert, PhD researcher, certified functional medicine practitioner, author, and speaker. Betty helps women over 40 harness their hormones to lose weight, optimize sleep, restore energy, and thrive. During her research for her Ph.D., Betty made several key discoveries that lead to hormone & metabolic imbalances that plague women over 40. Restoring balance to these key metabolic and hormone pathways is the basis of her Menopause Mastery Program.    Dr. Betty is the founder and CEO of Living Well Dallas Functional Medicine Center and Menrva, a national women's telemedicine company providing bioidentical hormone treatment, nutrition, diet, and lifestyle guidance to feel like perimenopause and menopause never happened. She is the host of the Menopause Mastery Podcast, author, and featured writer for Brainz Magazine. As a professional speaker, she has shared the stage with Lisa Nichols, Dr. Mark Hyman, JJ Virgin, Dr. Steven Gundry, Codie Sanchez, Dr. Shrini Pallay, and many others, and she is a frequently featured nutrition expert on Fox News Broadcasting, CW33, NBC, and CBS.  Keywords: Beta glucuronidase, estrogen metabolism, hormone imbalance, detoxification, functional medicine, gut health, microbiome, perimenopause, menopause, probiotics, pathogenic species, PCR technology, breast cancer, constipation dominant IBS, hormone metabolites, dietary changes, biofilms, fermented foods, resistant starches, calcium D-glucarate, postbiotics, metagenomics, neurotransmitters, inflammation, histamine, polyphenol-rich foods, nutraceuticals, chemotherapy toxicity, lipopolysaccharide, Gilberts syndrome   Disclaimer: The views expressed in the RWS Clinician's Corner series are those of the individual speakers and interviewees, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Restorative Wellness Solutions, LLC. Restorative Wellness Solutions, LLC does not specifically endorse or approve of any of the information or opinions expressed in the RWS Clinician's Corner series. The information and opinions expressed in the RWS Clinician's Corner series are for educational purposes only and should not be construed as medical advice. If you have any medical concerns, please consult with a qualified healthcare professional. Restorative Wellness Solutions, LLC is not liable for any damages or injuries that may result from the use of the information or opinions expressed in the RWS Clinician's Corner series. By viewing or listening to this information, you agree to hold Restorative Wellness Solutions, LLC harmless from any and all claims, demands, and causes of action arising out of or in connection with your participation. Thank you for your understanding.  

A View from the Bunker
Iron and Myth 39: Against the Gods of Greece

A View from the Bunker

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 14, 2025 76:18


THE SO-CALLED silent centuries between the Book of Malachi and the Gospel of Matthew weren't as quiet as we've been taught. This month, the Iron and Myth crew discusses a fictionalized account of Judea's struggle for independence in the second century BC from the rule (and gods) of their Greek overlords by Iron and Myth regular and best-selling author Brian Godawa (Godawa.com), Judah Maccabee Part 1: Abomination of Desolation and Judah Maccabee Part 2: Against the Gods of Greece.  Doug Van Dorn (DouglasVanDorn.com) and Dr. Judd Burton (BurtonBeyond.net) join Brian to discuss the historical and theological significance of the centuries between the Old and New Testaments, focusing on the story of Hanukkah and the Maccabees. We analyze the role of Antiochus Epiphanes, the Maccabean revolt, and the implications of these events on Jewish history and theology.  Our conversation also explores the nature of historical fiction and how it can be approached from a truth perspective, emphasizing the importance of understanding divine authorities and principalities in the context of these narratives. Brian shares how he balances myth and history in biblical narratives, emphasizing the concept of ‘mytho-history' as a blend of mythological and historical storytelling. He explores the role of fiction in understanding scripture, the importance of cultural context, and how integrating non-biblical stories can enhance biblical narratives. The Gilberts' new book The Gates of Hell is now available in paperback, Kindle, and as an audiobook at Audible! Derek's new book Destination: Earth, co-authored with Donna Howell and Allie Anderson, is now available in paperback, Kindle, and as an audiobook at Audible! Follow us! X: @viewfrombunker | @sharonkgilbert | @derekgilbertTelegram: t.me/gilberthouseSubstack: gilberthouse.substack.comYouTube: @GilbertHouse | @UnravelingRevelationFacebook.com/viewfromthebunker Sharon's novels Winds of Evil and The Armageddon Strain are available now in paperback, ebook (Kindle), and audiobook (Audible) formats! Get signed copies of the first two books of The Laodicea Chronicles now at GilbertHouse.org/store! Thank you for making our Build Barn Better project a reality! The building has HVAC, a new floor, windows, insulation, ceiling fans, and an upgraded electrical system! We truly appreciate your support. If you are so led, you can help out at www.GilbertHouse.org/donate. —— Download our free app! This brings all of our content directly to your smartphone or tablet. Best of all, we'll never get canceled from our own app! Links to the app stores for iOS, iPadOS, Android, and Amazon Kindle Fire devices are at www.GilbertHouse.org/app. Please join us each Sunday for the Gilbert House Fellowship, our weekly Bible study podcast. Log on to www.GilbertHouse.org for more details. Check out our weekly video program Unraveling Revelation (unravelingrevelation.tv), and subscribe to the YouTube channel: YouTube.com/UnravelingRevelation. —— Special offers on our books and DVDs: www.gilberthouse.org/store. —— JOIN US AND SPECIAL GUEST CARL TEICHRIB IN ISRAEL! Our next tour of Israel is October 19–30, 2025 with an optional three-day extension to Jordan. For the latest information, log on to GilbertHouse.org/travel. Discuss these topics at the VFTB Facebook page (facebook.com/viewfromthebunker) and check out the great podcasters at the Fringe Radio Network (Spreaker.com/show/fringe-radio-network)!

A View from the Bunker
Pagans Go Mainstream

A View from the Bunker

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 7, 2025 69:01


IT'S BECOMING more acceptable for pagans to proclaim their faith openly in America. Carl Teichrib (GameOfGods.ca), author of Game of Gods: The Temple of Man in the Age of Re-enchantment, shares his experiences at the 2025 Paganicon in Minneapolis. Carl tells us that many of the Neo-pagans there, who now follow gods of the Greek, Roman, Mesopotamian, and Norse pantheons, came out of Christian churches. We discuss the reasons these modern-day pagans abandoned Jesus and the responsibility we Christians share for failing to serve as effective ambassadors for our King. Follow Carl on X (@CarlTeichrib) and take advantage of his research at ForcingChange.org. The Gilberts' new book The Gates of Hell is now available in paperback, Kindle, and as an audiobook at Audible! Derek's new book Destination: Earth, co-authored with Donna Howell and Allie Anderson, is now available in paperback, Kindle, and as an audiobook at Audible! Follow us! X: @viewfrombunker | @sharonkgilbert | @derekgilbertTelegram: t.me/gilberthouseSubstack: gilberthouse.substack.comYouTube: @GilbertHouse | @UnravelingRevelationFacebook.com/viewfromthebunker Sharon's novels Winds of Evil and The Armageddon Strain are available now in paperback, ebook (Kindle), and audiobook (Audible) formats! Get signed copies of the first two books of The Laodicea Chronicles now at GilbertHouse.org/store! Thank you for making our Build Barn Better project a reality! The building has HVAC, a new floor, windows, insulation, ceiling fans, and an upgraded electrical system! We truly appreciate your support. If you are so led, you can help out at www.GilbertHouse.org/donate. —— Download our free app! This brings all of our content directly to your smartphone or tablet. Best of all, we'll never get canceled from our own app! Links to the app stores for iOS, iPadOS, Android, and Amazon Kindle Fire devices are at www.GilbertHouse.org/app. Please join us each Sunday for the Gilbert House Fellowship, our weekly Bible study podcast. Log on to www.GilbertHouse.org for more details. Check out our weekly video program Unraveling Revelation (unravelingrevelation.tv), and subscribe to the YouTube channel: YouTube.com/UnravelingRevelation. —— Special offers on our books and DVDs: www.gilberthouse.org/store. —— JOIN US AND SPECIAL GUEST CARL TEICHRIB IN ISRAEL! Our next tour of Israel is October 19–30, 2025 with an optional three-day extension to Jordan. For the latest information, log on to GilbertHouse.org/travel. Discuss these topics at the VFTB Facebook page (facebook.com/viewfromthebunker) and check out the great podcasters at the Fringe Radio Network (Spreaker.com/show/fringe-radio-network)!

The Jim Bakker Show
Demons & Deception - Derek Gilbert

The Jim Bakker Show

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 10, 2025 58:30


Today we welcome author, researcher, teacher, and tv and podcast host, Derek Gilbert to the show!The panel discusses religious division in Turkey, the spirit realm as UFO activity, drugs as a gateway to the demonic, and a painting in our nation's Capitol Building. You'll also get a peek into the Gilberts' new book: The Gates of Hell: Unlocking the Ganymede Code and the Demonic Portals of Mount Hermon and the United States Capitol.

Gott Snack med Fredrik Söderholm
1002. DEL 2: Gilberts gravplundrings våg & SL-uttåg

Gott Snack med Fredrik Söderholm

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 31, 2025 34:54


I Studion: David Thulin, Sofia Kappel, Daniel Gilbert, Sanna Dollan, August Bohlin, Theodore Jansson Fredag!David tar över rollen som programledare för dagen.Sanna mina ord OM självÖMKAN och nya KÄRLEKENDaniel Gilbert om världens undergång och varför det är MUSKS fel (Bland andra)Lokets bortgång live under sändning! Vila i frid!David har gnäll & idag riktas det mot honom självSofia Kappels ny uppmaning från klubbarna: Sluta häng i taketSTORT grepp på förhudDessutom gräver vi i flygplanskraschen i USADavid BUSRINGER SL där Gilbert slängs under bussenEFTERSNACKMER FÖRHUD!Trevlig FREDAG vänner!Stötta oss på patreon.com/gottsnackSupport till showen http://supporter.acast.com/gott-snack-med-fredrik-soderholm. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

LiverHealthPOD
A Touch of Yellow - Could you have Gilberts Syndrome?

LiverHealthPOD

Play Episode Listen Later Jul 22, 2024 28:27


Not all genetic mutation are bad. Some may actually be good. In this episode Will, John and Paul talk about the fascinating topic of Gilberts Syndrome and why it might actually be good for you.

The Jim Bakker Show
A Solidarity Mission - Derek & Sharon Gilbert - Day 1

The Jim Bakker Show

Play Episode Listen Later Jun 11, 2024 58:30


Researchers, teachers, authors and hosts of Unraveling Revelation, Derek & Sharon Gilbert join The Jim Bakker Show today! Having recently returned from a trip to Israel, the Gilberts share their experiences during their solidarity mission. Hear about visiting the site of the NOVA Festival, the welcome by the locals, and their volunteer work. The panel discusses AI and last days deception, UFO's as interdimensional beings, and demonic possession and oppression.

Behind The Book Podcast
Behind The Book Sports Betting Podcast: Game 7 Recaps For The Avs and Nuggets, Denver Nuggets Dynasty & Continued Playoff Predictions!

Behind The Book Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later May 25, 2024 45:52


This week the hosts continue to poke at Gilberts emotions while Ryley enjoys every minute of it. Discussion on whether the Denver Nuggets can be a  dynasty or not and can they continue to compete with such a competitive Western Conference?  With Boston being large favorites on the East, can the Pacers steal one or possibly make it a close series? NHL East and West, who takes the series all the way to the Stanley Cup Finals? As always the hosts give their 3 best bets for the week!Follow Ameristar Black Hawk:Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/Ameristar.Casino.BHInstagram: https://www.instagram.com/ameristarbh/Twitter: https://twitter.com/AmeristarBHTikTok: https://www.tiktok.com/@ameristarbh Follow the Podcast:Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/behindthebookpod/

P.I.D. Radio
"They Wouldn't Just Eat Any White Men That Fell From the Sky"

P.I.D. Radio

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 20, 2024 69:03


THOSE IMMORTAL WORDS were spoken by Michael Kabuni, a political science lecturer at the University of Papua New Guinea, responding to a false claim by President Biden that his uncle had been eaten by cannibals after being shot down in WWII. Biden told the story twice Wednesday, in Scranton and then again in Pittsburgh. As it happens, his uncle, Ambrose J. Finnegan, was not a pilot and hadn't been shot down; the plane on which he was flying lost power in both engines and ditched in the ocean with only the flight engineer surviving the crash. Needless to say, the people of Papua New Guinea are not thrilled about being characterized as cannibals. We also discuss the tense situation in the Middle East. Since last week's program, Iran hit Israel with a wave of drones and cruise missiles, nearly all of which were intercepted. There was only one reported casualty, a 7-year-old Bedouin girl. In response, Israel on Friday reportedly destroyed the radar unit that protects Iran's Natanz nuclear plant. Then, Friday night, reports from Iraq indicate that somebody struck a base south of Baghdad used by Iran-backed Shia militias. Israel and the US have denied responsibility, but the Shias in Iraq blame Israel nonetheless. We discuss who may have attacked the Shias there and why. Also: Bluetooth LE has created a mesh network independent of the Internet, ready for AI to transform into the real-world equivalent of Skynet, and car wash turns Tesla Cybertruck into a Cyberbrick. Here's the link to the video for “Watchers,” the new song by the Caspar McCloud Band, featuring the Gilberts, Pastor Paul Begley, and Col. David Giammona. Thank you for making our Build Barn Better project a reality! Our 1,200 square foot pole barn has a new HVAC system, epoxy floor, 100-amp electric service, new windows, insulation, lights, and ceiling fans! If you are so led, you can help out by clicking here: gilberthouse.org/donate. Get our free app! It connects you to this podcast, our weekly Bible studies, and our weekly video programs Unraveling Revelation and A View from the Bunker. The app is available for iOS, Android, Roku, and Apple TV. Links to the app stores are at pidradio.com/app. Video on demand of our best teachings! Stream presentations and teachings based on our research at our new video on demand site: gilberthouse.org/video! Check out our online store! GilbertHouse.org/store is a virtual book table with books and DVDs related to our weekly Bible study. Take advantage of our monthly specials!——————SOLIDARITY MISSION TO ISRAEL! We're planning a one-week trip to Israel May 6–13, 2024 to bear witness to what's happened there since the war with Hamas began. We plan to visit Hostage Square in Tel Aviv, Sderot, the site of the Nova Music Festival, and more. For details, go to www.gilberthouse.org/travel. NEW DATES FOR OUR NEXT TOUR OF ISRAEL! Our 2025 tour features special guests Dr. Judd Burton and Doug Van Dorn! We will tour the Holy Land March 25–April 3, 2025, with an optional three-day extension in Jordan. For more information, log on to www.GilbertsInIsrael.com.——————Gilbert House runs on coffee! We are proud to partner with Kevlar Joe's Coffee (KevlarJoe.com) to bring you three blends: Snarling Dachshund, a Sumatran medium roast; Amazing Grace, a cookies and cream flavored coffee; and Derek's Bunker Buster, a dark roasted Colombian that's sure to get you moving. Find out more at GilbertHouse.org/store/.——————Subscribe to our YouTube channels:• Unraveling Revelation: www.YouTube.com/UnravelingRevelation• These weekly studies and Derek's podcast: www.YouTube.com/GilbertHouse

SkyWatchTV Podcast
Five in Ten 4/17/24: NSA Close to Turning Internet into Surveillance Tool

SkyWatchTV Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 17, 2024 17:00


A change in definitions in Section 702 of the bill to extend the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act could give the NSA power to compel any business that offers free WiFi to customers to hand over user data. 5) House Speaker Mike Johnson to advance separate aid bills for Israel, Ukraine, and Taiwan; 4) Roads blocked “for Palestine” by group calling itself A15 Action; 3) Congress close to giving NSA power to spy on huge swath of Internet; 2) Controversy over men's conference in Springfield, Missouri; 1) UK spending money to fund research into “trans archaeology.” For information on the Gilberts' Solidarity Mission to Israel May 6–13, 2024, go to www.gilberthouse.org/travel/. FOLLOW US! X: @Five_In_Ten and @WatchSkyWatchTV YouTube: @SkyWatchTVnow @SimplyHIS @FiveInTen Rumble: @SkyWatchTV Facebook: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHIS @EdensEssentials Instagram: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHisShow @EdensEssentialsUSA TikTok: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHisShow @EdensEssentials SkyWatchTV.com | SkyWatchTVStore.com | EdensEssentials.com | WhisperingPoniesRanch.com

SkyWatchTV Podcast
Five in Ten 4/16/24: Israel Will Respond—But How?

SkyWatchTV Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 16, 2024 17:00


A spokesman for the IDF said Monday that Israel will respond to Iran's attack, but was intentionally vague as to what that response might be. 5) Lapid criticizes Netanyahu, suggesting he may now have Biden's backing; 4) Democrats suddenly (and probably temporarily) support Israel after Iran attack; 3) Iran trying to destabilize Jordan; 2) Gender sanity; 1) Trillions of cicadas prepare to emerge in American Midwest and Southeast.. For information on the Gilberts' Solidarity Mission to Israel May 6–13, 2024, go to www.gilberthouse.org/travel/. FOLLOW US! X: @Five_In_Ten and @WatchSkyWatchTV YouTube: @SkyWatchTVnow @SimplyHIS @FiveInTen Rumble: @SkyWatchTV Facebook: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHIS @EdensEssentials Instagram: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHisShow @EdensEssentialsUSA TikTok: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHisShow @EdensEssentials SkyWatchTV.com | SkyWatchTVStore.com | EdensEssentials.com | WhisperingPoniesRanch.com

SkyWatchTV Podcast
Five in Ten 4/15/24: Iran's Attack on Israel—Theater or Failure?

SkyWatchTV Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 15, 2024 15:00


Iran launched its first direct attack on Israel early Sunday. 99% of the 350 drones and missiles were reportedly shot down by Israeli air defenses and allies. The question is whether this attack was designed to fail. 5) Iran attacks Israel; 4) Israel pauses before launching counterattack; 3) Biden administration tells Israel to “take the win”; 2) Sunni Arab states appear to be quietly siding with Israel against Iran; 1) Illegal immigrant fails to rob Ohio bank because he doesn't speak English and tellers couldn't understand his demands. For information on the Gilberts' Solidarity Mission to Israel May 6–13, 2024, go to www.gilberthouse.org/travel/. FOLLOW US! X: @Five_In_Ten and @WatchSkyWatchTV YouTube: @SkyWatchTVnow @SimplyHIS @FiveInTen Rumble: @SkyWatchTV Facebook: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHIS @EdensEssentials Instagram: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHisShow @EdensEssentialsUSA TikTok: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHisShow @EdensEssentials SkyWatchTV.com | SkyWatchTVStore.com | EdensEssentials.com | WhisperingPoniesRanch.com

SkyWatchTV Podcast
Five in Ten 4/12/24: The Friday Five - Losing Control of the Border

SkyWatchTV Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 12, 2024 16:00


A Fox News reporter was told by Border Patrol agents in New Mexico that Mt. Cristo Rey is “no longer ours”—meaning that it's under the control of Mexican drug cartels running illegal migrants into the country. 5) US intelligence warns Israel that Iranian missile attack could come within days; 4) Pastor interviewed by Tucker Carlson organizes anti-Israel Christ at the Checkpoint conferences; 3) Border Patrol in New Mexico admits that US territory is controlled by Mexican cartels; 2) General Mills, other food producers backing social media “anti-diet” trends; 1) Harvard “honesty researcher” fudged data and plagiarized sections of her published research. For information on the Gilberts' Solidarity Mission to Israel May 6–13, 2024, go to www.gilberthouse.org/travel/. FOLLOW US! X: @Five_In_Ten and @WatchSkyWatchTV YouTube: @SkyWatchTVnow @SimplyHIS @FiveInTen Rumble: @SkyWatchTV Facebook: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHIS @EdensEssentials Instagram: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHisShow @EdensEssentialsUSA TikTok: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHisShow @EdensEssentials SkyWatchTV.com | SkyWatchTVStore.com | EdensEssentials.com | WhisperingPoniesRanch.com

SkyWatchTV Podcast
Five in Ten 4/11/24: Iran's Balancing Act with Israel

SkyWatchTV Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 11, 2024 27:00


Iran has threatened a devastating response to Israel's airstrike on the Iranian embassy in Damascus. But a direct strike on an Israeli facility may not be easy for Ayatollah Khameini. Ali Siadatan (thinkagainproductions.com), born in Iran before the Shia revolution of 1979, joins us to explain why Khomeini may not be as eager to hit back at Israel as some of his supporters, preferring instead to come up with an asymmetrical approach involving his proxies in Gaza, Syria, Lebanon, and maybe even a plot to overthrown King Abdullah of Jordan. For information on the Gilberts' Solidarity Mission to Israel May 6–13, 2024, go to www.gilberthouse.org/travel/. FOLLOW US! X: @Five_In_Ten and @WatchSkyWatchTV YouTube: @SkyWatchTVnow @SimplyHIS @FiveInTen Rumble: @SkyWatchTV Facebook: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHIS @EdensEssentials Instagram: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHisShow @EdensEssentialsUSA TikTok: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHisShow @EdensEssentials SkyWatchTV.com | SkyWatchTVStore.com | EdensEssentials.com | WhisperingPoniesRanch.com

SkyWatchTV Podcast
Five in Ten 4/10/24: Tucker Carlson Has Lost the Plot

SkyWatchTV Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 10, 2024 17:00


Tucker Carlson aired an interview with an Arab pastor in Bethlehem in which Carlson said Christians who aren't critical of the destruction in Gaza have “lost the plot.” This is why Hamas hides behind civilians—to ratchet up world pressure on Israel. 5) Tucker Carlson criticizes Christians over Israel-Hamas war; 4) Pentagon sends seized Iranian weapons to Ukraine; 3) Trump criticized from left and right over policy statement on abortion; 2) AI pioneer warns that AI-powered weapons could lead to “nasty” consequences; 1) Mayo Clinic researchers find that puberty blockers appear to have irreversible and potentially dangerous side effects. For information on the Gilberts' Solidarity Mission to Israel May 6–13, 2024, go to www.gilberthouse.org/travel/. FOLLOW US! X: @Five_In_Ten and @WatchSkyWatchTV YouTube: @SkyWatchTVnow @SimplyHIS @FiveInTen Rumble: @SkyWatchTV Facebook: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHIS @EdensEssentials Instagram: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHisShow @EdensEssentialsUSA TikTok: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHisShow @EdensEssentials SkyWatchTV.com | SkyWatchTVStore.com | EdensEssentials.com | WhisperingPoniesRanch.com

SkyWatchTV Podcast
Five in Ten 4/9/24: Hamas May Have Baited IDF Into Strike That Killed Aid Worker

SkyWatchTV Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 9, 2024 17:00


A report by the IDF on the deadly strike that killed seven aid workers in Gaza suggests that Hamas may have tricked Israeli troops into thinking that the World Central Kitchens convoy was a group of Hamas vehicles. 5) Total eclipse is past and we're still here; 4) Hamas may have baited IDF into strike against aid workers; 3) Vatican releases official statement defending human dignity from conception to natural death; 2) Secretive experiment to spray particulates into air over San Francisco to save us from climate change; 1) Botswana is being overrun by elephants. For information on the Gilberts' Solidarity Mission to Israel May 6–13, 2024, go to www.gilberthouse.org/travel/. FOLLOW US! X: @Five_In_Ten and @WatchSkyWatchTV YouTube: @SkyWatchTVnow @SimplyHIS @FiveInTen Rumble: @SkyWatchTV Facebook: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHIS @EdensEssentials Instagram: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHisShow @EdensEssentialsUSA TikTok: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHisShow @EdensEssentials SkyWatchTV.com | SkyWatchTVStore.com | EdensEssentials.com | WhisperingPoniesRanch.com

SkyWatchTV Podcast
Prophetic Signs in the Heavens

SkyWatchTV Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 8, 2024 12:00


Israel, Ukraine, Russia, China, Iran: As the total eclipse crosses the United States today, Col. David Giammona, co-author with Troy Anderson of The Military Guide to Armageddon, joins us to discuss the world's geopolitical hot zones and their prophetic implications. For information on the Gilberts' Solidarity Mission to Israel May 6–13, 2024, go to www.gilberthouse.org/travel/. FOLLOW US! X: @Five_In_Ten and @WatchSkyWatchTV YouTube: @SkyWatchTVnow @SimplyHIS @FiveInTen Rumble: @SkyWatchTV Facebook: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHIS @EdensEssentials Instagram: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHisShow @EdensEssentialsUSA TikTok: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHisShow @EdensEssentials SkyWatchTV.com | SkyWatchTVStore.com | EdensEssentials.com | WhisperingPoniesRanch.com

SkyWatchTV Podcast
Five in Ten 4/8/24: Prophetic Signs in the Heavens

SkyWatchTV Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 8, 2024 12:00


Israel, Ukraine, Russia, China, Iran: As the total eclipse crosses the United States today, Col. David Giammona, co-author with Troy Anderson of The Military Guide to Armageddon, joins us to discuss the world's geopolitical hot zones and their prophetic implications. For information on the Gilberts' Solidarity Mission to Israel May 6–13, 2024, go to www.gilberthouse.org/travel/. FOLLOW US! X: @Five_In_Ten and @WatchSkyWatchTV YouTube: @SkyWatchTVnow @SimplyHIS @FiveInTen Rumble: @SkyWatchTV Facebook: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHIS @EdensEssentials Instagram: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHisShow @EdensEssentialsUSA TikTok: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHisShow @EdensEssentials SkyWatchTV.com | SkyWatchTVStore.com | EdensEssentials.com | WhisperingPoniesRanch.com

SkyWatchTV Podcast
Five in Ten 4/4/24: Biden Admin Trying to Take Down Netanyahu

SkyWatchTV Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 4, 2024 17:00


A left-wing agitator in Israel reportedly told colleagues on Zoom and WhatsApp that the White House is backing his riots after opposition leader Benny Gantz failed to bring down the government as promised. 5) Powerful earthquake rocks Taiwan; 4) Biden's handlers trying to install left-wing government in Israel; 3) Bird flu turning up in US dairy cattle; 2) $20 minimum wage in California forcing fast food chains to lay off thousands of workers; 1) Adidas to redesign German soccer team's numeral font after it's pointed out that the “44” looked a lot like the SS logo from WW2. For information on the Gilberts' Solidarity Mission to Israel May 6–13, 2024, go to www.gilberthouse.org/travel/. FOLLOW US! X: @Five_In_Ten and @WatchSkyWatchTV YouTube: @SkyWatchTVnow @SimplyHIS @FiveInTen Rumble: @SkyWatchTV Facebook: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHIS @EdensEssentials Instagram: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHisShow @EdensEssentialsUSA TikTok: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHisShow @EdensEssentials SkyWatchTV.com | SkyWatchTVStore.com | EdensEssentials.com | WhisperingPoniesRanch.com

SkyWatchTV Podcast
Five in Ten 4/3/24: Biden Doesn't Know What His Handlers are Doing

SkyWatchTV Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 3, 2024 16:00


President Biden told reporters that he did not proclaim Easter Sunday Transgender Day of Visibility, even though the proclamation is posted at the White House website. Either Biden didn't know or he didn't remember what he did the day before. 5) Biden denied declaring Easter Sunday “Trans Day of Visibility”; 4) Mexico's President Obrador issues blackmail demands to US to stop illegal migrants; 3) Iran-backed militia in Iraq hits southern Israel with drone; 2) Amazon launches online signup for biometric payment system; 1) Princeton engineering student complains that introductory STEM classes should be easier. For information on the Gilberts' Solidarity Mission to Israel May 6–13, 2024, go to www.gilberthouse.org/travel/. FOLLOW US! X: @Five_In_Ten and @WatchSkyWatchTV YouTube: @SkyWatchTVnow @SimplyHIS @FiveInTen Rumble: @SkyWatchTV Facebook: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHIS @EdensEssentials Instagram: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHisShow @EdensEssentialsUSA TikTok: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHisShow @EdensEssentials SkyWatchTV.com | SkyWatchTVStore.com | EdensEssentials.com | WhisperingPoniesRanch.com

SkyWatchTV Podcast
Five in Ten 4/2/24: Israel Strikes Iranian Consulate in Damascus

SkyWatchTV Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 2, 2024 16:00


A senior commander of Iran's Revolutionary Guards Corps was reportedly among the six people killed Monday in an Israeli airstrike on the Iranian consulate in Damascus. 5) Kremlin denies report that Russian military intelligence may be behind mysterious “Havana syndrome”; 4) Israel strikes Damascus days after airstrike near Aleppo; 3) Denver begs migrants to go to other “sanctuary cities”; 2) Within 25 years, more than 2/3 of countries' populations will be dropping; 1) White House press corps asked to please stop stealing things from Air Force One. For information on the Gilberts' Solidarity Mission to Israel May 6–13, 2024, go to www.gilberthouse.org/travel/. FOLLOW US! X: @Five_In_Ten and @WatchSkyWatchTV YouTube: @SkyWatchTVnow @SimplyHIS @FiveInTen Rumble: @SkyWatchTV Facebook: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHIS @EdensEssentials Instagram: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHisShow @EdensEssentialsUSA TikTok: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHisShow @EdensEssentials   SkyWatchTV.com | SkyWatchTVStore.com | EdensEssentials.com | WhisperingPoniesRanch.com

SkyWatchTV Podcast
Five in Ten 4/1/24: White House Recognizes 'Transgender Day of Visibility'

SkyWatchTV Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 1, 2024 15:00


The White House triggered a storm of controversy by choosing Good Friday to announce that Joe Biden would be the first president to recognize Transgender Visibility Day, which this year fell on Easter Sunday. 5) White House declares Easter “Transgender Visibility Day“; 4) Cargo ship that hit Key Bridge at Baltimore may be on top of high-pressure underwater gas line; 3) Red heifers at Shiloh given names; 2) More than 70 million AT&T customers have information leaked on dark web; 1) Mystery in Florida Keys: fish swimming in circles until they die. For information on the Gilberts' Solidarity Mission to Israel May 6–13, 2024, go to www.gilberthouse.org/travel/. FOLLOW US! X: @Five_In_Ten and @WatchSkyWatchTV YouTube: @SkyWatchTVnow @SimplyHIS @FiveInTen Rumble: @SkyWatchTV Facebook: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHIS @EdensEssentials Instagram: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHisShow @EdensEssentialsUSA TikTok: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHisShow @EdensEssentials SkyWatchTV.com | SkyWatchTVStore.com | EdensEssentials.com | WhisperingPoniesRanch.com

SkyWatchTV Podcast
Five in Ten 3/29/24: Russia Blames West for Moscow Terror Attack

SkyWatchTV Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 29, 2024 18:00


A spokesperson for Russia's Foreign Ministry doubled down on comments earlier in the week by President Vladimir Putin, blaming Ukraine and its Western allies—specifically the US and UK—for last Friday's deadly terror attack in Moscow. 5) Russia blames US, UK for Moscow terror attack; 4) Major disruption to trade, traffic from Baltimore bridge collapse; 3)  Biden vs. Bibi; 2) Democratic National Committee working to keep all challengers to Biden off ballots; 1) “Squatter hunter” using crazy “squatter's rights” laws to recover homes being illegally occupied for owners. For information on the Gilberts' Solidarity Mission to Israel May 6–13, 2024, go to www.gilberthouse.org/travel/. FOLLOW US! X: @Five_In_Ten and @WatchSkyWatchTV YouTube: @SkyWatchTVnow @SimplyHIS @FiveInTen Rumble: @SkyWatchTV Facebook: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHIS @EdensEssentials Instagram: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHisShow @EdensEssentialsUSA TikTok: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHisShow @EdensEssentials SkyWatchTV.com | SkyWatchTVStore.com | EdensEssentials.com | WhisperingPoniesRanch.com

SkyWatchTV Podcast
Five in Ten 3/28/24: Was Baltimore Bridge Collapse a Cyberattack?

SkyWatchTV Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 28, 2024 17:00


Journalist Lara Logan, citing several intelligence sources, claimed Wednesday that the collapse of the Key Bridge at Baltimore was a specifically targeted cyberattack aimed at cutting important sea and highway transportation on the East Coast. 5) Journalist claims Baltimore bridge collapse a cyberattack; 4) Congress hears testimony that China is profiting from selling organs of political prisoners; 3) Company that runs mall above major subway hub in New York City wants to break lease due to crime in area; 2) Court documents show how predators embedded themselves inside staff at Nickelodeon; 1) Professor claims traditional marriage is evil plot by white heteronormative patriarchy. For information on the Gilberts' Solidarity Mission to Israel May 6–13, 2024, go to www.gilberthouse.org/travel/. FOLLOW US! X: @Five_In_Ten and @WatchSkyWatchTV YouTube: @SkyWatchTVnow @SimplyHIS @FiveInTen Rumble: @SkyWatchTV Facebook: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHIS @EdensEssentials Instagram: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHisShow @EdensEssentialsUSA TikTok: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHisShow @EdensEssentials SkyWatchTV.com | SkyWatchTVStore.com | EdensEssentials.com | WhisperingPoniesRanch.com

SkyWatchTV Podcast
Five in Ten 3/27/24: Baltimore Ports Paralyzed by Bridge Collapse

SkyWatchTV Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 27, 2024 15:00


A cargo ship caused a key bridge to collapse, blocking the ports of Baltimore, a key shipping point for autos, light trucks, imported sugar and gypsum, and exported coal. 5) Baltimore bridge collapse; 4) Biden asks Ukraine to stop bombing Russian refineries because it could drive up the price of oil ahead of election; 3) DOJ launches federal “red flag law” database; 2) Church of England archdeacon calls for “anti-whiteness”; 1) Evangelical Christian Publishers Association offers DEI certification program for its members. For information on the Gilberts' Solidarity Mission to Israel May 6–13, 2024, go to www.gilberthouse.org/travel/. FOLLOW US! X: @Five_In_Ten and @WatchSkyWatchTV YouTube: @SkyWatchTVnow @SimplyHIS @FiveInTen Rumble: @SkyWatchTV Facebook: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHIS @EdensEssentials Instagram: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHisShow @EdensEssentialsUSA TikTok: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHisShow @EdensEssentials SkyWatchTV.com | SkyWatchTVStore.com | EdensEssentials.com | WhisperingPoniesRanch.com

SkyWatchTV Podcast
Five in Ten 3/26/24: US Washes Hands of Israel in UN Security Council

SkyWatchTV Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 26, 2024 17:00


Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu canceled plans to send a delegation to Washington, DC after the US decided not to veto a UN Security Council resolution calling for a ceasefire in Gaza. 5) IDF kills, captures hundreds of terrorists at hospital in Gaza City; 4) Egypt faces social unrest over death sentences for leaders of Muslim Brotherhood; 3) China funding road project in Panama that would ; 2) California man arrested after being spotted with severed human leg; 1) Federal employees at Department of Labor show up at the office to protest being required to come to the office to work. For information on the Gilberts' Solidarity Mission to Israel May 6–13, 2024, go to www.gilberthouse.org/travel/. FOLLOW US! X: @Five_In_Ten and @WatchSkyWatchTV YouTube: @SkyWatchTVnow @SimplyHIS @FiveInTen Rumble: @SkyWatchTV Facebook: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHIS @EdensEssentials Instagram: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHisShow @EdensEssentialsUSA TikTok: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHisShow @EdensEssentials SkyWatchTV.com | SkyWatchTVStore.com | EdensEssentials.com | WhisperingPoniesRanch.com

SkyWatchTV Podcast
Five in Ten 3/25/24: Moscow Terror Attack

SkyWatchTV Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 25, 2024 16:00


At least 140 were killed in a terror attack on a mall and concert hall in Moscow Friday night. A branch of ISIS has claimed responsibility, but the Russian government alleges Ukraine's involvement in the attack. 5) Deadly attack in Moscow; 4) Houthis in Yemen hit Chinese-owned tanker with missile despite reported safe passage agreement; 3) White House responds to shocking El Paso border crossing video by banning media from border; 2) California man arrested after being spotted with severed human leg; 1) Federal employees at Department of Labor show up at the office to protest being required to come to the office to work. For information on the Gilberts' Solidarity Mission to Israel May 6–13, 2024, go to www.gilberthouse.org/travel/. FOLLOW US! X: @Five_In_Ten and @WatchSkyWatchTV YouTube: @SkyWatchTVnow @SimplyHIS @FiveInTen Rumble: @SkyWatchTV Facebook: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHIS @EdensEssentials Instagram: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHisShow @EdensEssentialsUSA TikTok: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHisShow @EdensEssentials SkyWatchTV.com | SkyWatchTVStore.com | EdensEssentials.com | WhisperingPoniesRanch.com

SkyWatchTV Podcast
Five in Ten 3/22/24: US Troops Deployed Just Off China's Coast

SkyWatchTV Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 22, 2024 17:00


Taiwan's defense minister apparently admitted that US Green Berets are training his troops on an island just three miles from the coast of China, a shocking escalation of tensions in the region. 5) US, UK, Canada appear to be withdrawing support for Israel; 4) US troops now reportedly on island just three miles from China; 3) New York City posed to become Migrant Central; 2) State Department working to evacuate Americans from Haiti; 1) Pentagon may have had secret UFO tracking program after all. For information on the Gilberts' Solidarity Mission to Israel May 6–13, 2024, go to www.gilberthouse.org/travel/. FOLLOW US! X: @Five_In_Ten and @WatchSkyWatchTV YouTube: @SkyWatchTVnow @SimplyHIS @FiveInTen Rumble: @SkyWatchTV Facebook: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHIS @EdensEssentials Instagram: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHisShow @EdensEssentialsUSA TikTok: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHisShow @EdensEssentials SkyWatchTV.com | SkyWatchTVStore.com | EdensEssentials.com | WhisperingPoniesRanch.com

SkyWatchTV Podcast
Five in Ten 3/21/24: Court Blocks Texas Immigration Law

SkyWatchTV Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 21, 2024 17:00


A US appeals court has blocked Texas from enforcing a new law giving the state power to arrest and deport illegal migrants. 5) Mexico says it will not accept illegal migrants deported from Texas; 4) Boeing whistleblower told family friend not to believe his death was suicide; 3) New “anti-racist” policy puts people waiting for kidney transplant at risk; 2) Police in Scotland told to target actors and comedians under new hate crime law; 1) New study finds liberals and people with “woke views” less happy and mentally healthy than conservatives. For information on the Gilberts' Solidarity Mission to Israel May 6–13, 2024, go to www.gilberthouse.org/travel/. FOLLOW US! X: @Five_In_Ten and @WatchSkyWatchTV YouTube: @SkyWatchTVnow @SimplyHIS @FiveInTen Rumble: @SkyWatchTV Facebook: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHIS @EdensEssentials Instagram: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHisShow @EdensEssentialsUSA TikTok: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHisShow @EdensEssentials SkyWatchTV.com | SkyWatchTVStore.com | EdensEssentials.com | WhisperingPoniesRanch.com

SkyWatchTV Podcast
Five in Ten 3/20/24: Putin's Reelection Means More Global Instability

SkyWatchTV Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 20, 2024 21:00


Lt. Col. Robert Maginnis (US Army–Ret.), author of Alliance of Evil and Kings of the East, explains why Vladimir Putin's reelection, combined with feckless Western leaders, means trouble for the world. For information on the Gilberts' Solidarity Mission to Israel May 6–13, 2024, go to www.gilberthouse.org/travel/. FOLLOW US! X: @SkyWatch_TV YouTube: @SkyWatchTVnow @SimplyHIS @FiveInTen Rumble: @SkyWatchTV Facebook: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHIS @EdensEssentials Instagram: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHisShow @EdensEssentialsUSA TikTok: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHisShow @EdensEssentials SkyWatchTV.com | SkyWatchTVStore.com | EdensEssentials.com | WhisperingPoniesRanch.com

SkyWatchTV Podcast
Five in Ten 3/19/24: 'Tik-Tok Ban' Gives President Power to Censor Internet

SkyWatchTV Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 19, 2024 18:00


The so-called Tik-Tok ban overwhelmingly passed by the House last week would actually give the president power to censor anything online he deems a threat to national security.  5) Tik-Tok ban a poison pill hiding inside word salad; 4) Netanyahu gives go-ahead for Rafah operation; 3) Theft ring of Chilean migrants burglarizing wealthy homes from coast to coast; 2) US State Department trying to evacuate US missionaries trapped by violence in Haiti; 1) Stoner rats in New Orleans eating marijuana stored in dilapidated police evidence room. For information on the Gilberts' Solidarity Mission to Israel May 6–13, 2024, go to www.gilberthouse.org/travel/. FOLLOW US! X: @SkyWatch_TV YouTube: @SkyWatchTVnow @SimplyHIS @FiveInTen Rumble: @SkyWatchTV Facebook: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHIS @EdensEssentials Instagram: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHisShow @EdensEssentialsUSA TikTok: @SkyWatchTV @SimplyHisShow @EdensEssentials SkyWatchTV.com | SkyWatchTVStore.com | EdensEssentials.com | WhisperingPoniesRanch.com

The Pacific War - week by week
- 120 - Pacific War - The battle of Imphal, March 5-12, 1944

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 12, 2024 39:21


Last time we spoke about the invasion of the Admiralty Islands and some action on New Britain and Bougainville. The last steps of operation Cartwheel would see the Bismarck-Solomon area sealed off with the capture of the admiralty islands. MacArthur was yet again trying to seize the initiative and force a drive upon the Philippines. A diversionary landing was made against Momote and Los Negros would cost 116 lives, 434 wounded by March 8th. On New Britain, General Rupertus began new amphibious assaults and other actions to cut off the retreat for the Japanese defenders. Then on Bougainville, under immense pressure from his superiors, General Hyakutake prepared to launch his main counterattack, codenamed Operation TA. He assembled 15,000 men who would hit the American defensive perimeter to dislodge the enemy from the island. Was this idea even feasible, or would it all end in a terrific disaster? This episode is the battle of Imphal Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  The war was not going well for the Japanese in 1944. They were on the cusp of being dislodged from the south pacific. Rabaul and Truk were effectively neutralized and the Americans were making enormous strides in the central pacific, seen in the Gilberts and Marshall campaigns. Even in Burma, a war front the Japanese had basically been winning every battle flawlessly, was now suffering defeats. The first defeats were found in the Hukawng Valley and Arakan region. In the face of these terrible defeats, the Japanese General Mutaguchi argued he had the answer.  Mutaguchi, a victor over the Singapore campaign, had wargamed the possibility of invading India and won support of some of his superiors in Tokyo. His reasoning had been to brush past the British in Assam, to storm the gateway into the subcontinent, where hopefully the Indians would rise up to greet the Japanese as liberators. With Subhas Chandra Bose and his Indian National Army, the Japanese could rally the Indians to turn against the British. The collapse of India would be a killing blow against Britain's influence in Asia. Initially it was also believed, such a move would allow the Japanese to link up with the Axis forces in Persia. Such fantastical ideas were farfetched even for 1942 standards, but in 1944 these were laughable. Stalingrad and Kursk had effectively turned the Eastern Front completely around, the Germans were fighting for their survival. Yet this all did not dissuade Mutaguchi.  Lt General Hanaya Tadashi was placed in charge of the Arakan region. Hanaya was tasked with deceiving the British into believing the counter attack in Arakan was an attempt to invade India, thus dragging units out of Imphal. The Operation was codenamed HA-GO, an intended feint, to mask another operation, U-GO to invade Imphal. To pull it off the assault in Arakan was made to be massive. Slim was forced to meet the enemy fiercely in Arakan, he had no choice but to pull his reserves out of Imphal. The Japanese were delivered a nasty surprise with the Admin Box tactic. For over 18 days the battle raged around the Admin Box, but the Japanese could not make a dent. The Japanese forces had expected once the British saw their lines of communications cut and were outflanked they would panic and flee. It was after all what had been occurring for years in Burma. The Japanese hoped to annihilate the 15th corp, but instead the British dug their heels in. Once again victory disease sprang its head force, the arrogant and overly confident Japanese, bit off more than they could chew. It was as if they were facing a brand new opponent. The Admin Box was hit by infantry and aerial attacks, the casualties were terrific, but the Admin Box never wavered. The Japanese had planned for a lighting battle, traveling light and seizing supplies on the go, but the British did not roll over. The Japanese began to run out of supplies, starvation loomed over the invaders. Casualties on both sides increased sharply, and Slim predicted the Japanese would not allow for defeat and instead would redouble their efforts. By February 13th, Slim was confident victory was in their hands as the 26th Indian division began to arrive to deliver a hammer blow with the Admin Box as the anvil. The Japanese fought desperately, but by the 24th they were withdrawing leaving 5000 dead. After defeating the Japanese Slim unleashed his own operation into the Arakan and while doing so his men captured some Japanese documents showcasing operation HA-GO in full. Slim now knew the Japanese were feinting him to draw resources away from Imphal Now Mutaguchi had sold Operation U-GO to his superiors in Tokyo as a pre-emptive strike to disable 14th Army, but in reality it was always to invade India. He also wanted to press the attack farther and take Dimapur, a major supply base through which ran the railway line to Ledo. Taking Dimapur would deal a major blow to the Allies and could potentially open the door to further operations deeper into India. Once they had broken through, the INA would rally local support, enabling them to extend the fight to the British in Assam, Bengal and beyond. For his Operation U-Go, Mutaguchi thought he could outsmart the British in terms of how he would approach Imphal. His plan called for the 33rd Division of Lt General Yanagida Motoso to begin an advance on March 8th attacking from the south. It was presumed the British would expect this and rush reinforcement when attacked. Meanwhile he planned to send the 15th division under Lt General Yamauchi Masafumi a week later to ford the Chindwin River and advance on Imphal from the north. Even further north the entire 31st division of Lt General Sato Kotoku would also ford the Chindwin between Homalin and Tamanthi, advancing northwest to block the main British supply route in the hills at Kohima.  To pull all of this off, Mutaguchi needed to ensure his forces captured Imphal before the monsoon rains made the jungle tracks impassable. He did not have much in terms of supplies to give to his 3 divisions. By 1943, the supply route into Rangoon by sea through the Bay of Bengal had become too dangerous because of attacks by Allied submarines, so the supplies had to rely on the railway being constructed by forced labor and POWs from Thailand. Mutaguchi was well aware of these issues. He knew, however, from personal experience in Malaya and Singapore, that taking logistical risks against the British could bring great rewards. This was because the British, who were usually immeasurably better supplied than the Japanese, frequently left behind large quantities of what the latter referred to as Chachiru kyuyo 'Churchill Rations' in their haste to flee the advancing Japanese. Accordingly, the capture of British supply dumps around Imphal formed a key assumption in his planning. The essence of Mutaguchi's plan was speed - totsusbin ‘swift onslaught' - for if these vast depots were not seized as a matter of priority, the whole offensive would literally run out of fuel. He thought it would take no more than three weeks for his forces to fall on the British supply dumps. Without the capture of these supplies success could not be guaranteed, but it seemed increasingly inconceivable to Mutaguchi that a decisive, overwhelming attack against Imphal would not bring with it rapid and substantial rewards. At no time was he concerned that he might not capture the vast British depots needed to fuel his advance. Imphal needed to be taken by April 10th or it would all be a disaster General Slim planned for his 14th Army to make a stand at Imphal, taking the hit on the chin as they say, before pushing the enemy back. He needed to draw the Japanese in the Imphal Valley, in a tight circle so he could launch an effective counteroffensive. Lt General Geoffrey Scoones 4th corps would deploy the 20th Indian division led by Major General Douglas Gracey around Tamu and the 17th Indian Light Division of Major General David Punch Cowan around Tiddim. Both divisions had been aggressively carrying out patrols in the valley and along the banks of the Chindwin River. The 23rd Indian Division of Major General Ouvry Roberts was held in reserve at Imphal, with his 49th brigade in the Ukhrul area to the northeast.  Once Mutaguchi's offensive kicked off, Slim planned for his two southern divisions to withdraw up the Tamu-Palel and Tiddim roads to go on the defensive around the Imphal Valley. The two divisions would have a short and more secure line of communications and supply behind them as they forced the Japanese to extend them self over the mountains. To counter losing the overland supply line from Kohima, Slim planned to use air supply to maintain his men during the long siege. Slim also expected Mutaguchi to send a single regiment to seize the defenseless Kohima, not an entire division that was further tasked with pouring down into the Brahmaputra valley. That last part would put his entire plan in jeopardy. On March 8th, Operation U-Go was kicked off with Lt General Yanagida Motoso's 33rd division beginning their advance in 4 columns. The left column was the 215th regiment led by Colonel Sasahara Masahiko who advanced south of Tiddim before swinging north towards the village of Singgel. They would come across the large supply deport between the milestones 109 and 110 around the Tiddim road. The central column consisted of the 214th regiment led by Colonel Sakuma Takayoshi, advancing up the Kabaw Valley to assault Tonzang. Following this column up was the Fort White Garrison unit led by Colonel Yagi Shigeru. Both columns would cut off the route of withdrawal of Major General David Cowan's 17th division and annihilate it. Lastly the right column consisting of the Yamamoto Force led by Major General Yamamoto Tsunoru. They would be advancing north up the Kabaw valley to assault Major General Douglas Gracey's 20th Division on the Tamu-Palel Road. There had been early reports from scouts that groups of Japanese soldiers were advancing west of the Tiddim road. This only sounded off the alarm bells for the 14th corps on March 12th, after a verified sighting report was made stating a large group of Japanese were just a few kilometers off the road at Milestone 109.  Consequently, Scoones ordered Cowan to withdraw, so the 17th would begin to move from Tiddim on March 14, after laying mines and booby traps. But it was too late, as the Japanese had already cut the Tiddim Road earlier that morning, so Cowan would have to fight its way out to Imphal. That day, Yamamoto Force had also started attacking Gracey's southern front-line positions, with a particular tank-on-tank battle developing between a troop of M3 Lee/Grant tanks of the 3rd Carabiniers and some six light tanks of the 14th Tank Regiment. The latter were trounced in the end, with four tanks destroyed and two captured. Meanwhile on the 15th, Lt General Yamauchi Masafumi's 15th division began fording the Chindwin river at Thaungdut and Sittaung and would descend upon Imphal from the north. Lt General Sato Kotoku's 31st division also forded the river further north at Homalin, Kawya nad Tamanthi and were rapidly advancing towards Kohima and Ukhrul.  Just as Mutaguchi had guessed, Scoones ordered his 37th and 49th brigades to advance to the Tiddim road to help Cowan's men. Cowan had sent his 63rd indian brigade to attack the 214th regiment at Tonang and Tiutum. Thai left Imphal and Ukhrul with little protection, so Scoones decided to dispatch the newly arrived 50th indian parachute brigade of Brigadier Maxwell Hope-Thomson to defend Ukhrul, but he did not expect them to find a real fight. Ukhrul would only have the lightest of garrisons and no real defenses. Forces in the area comprised two battalions of the newly raised and part-trained 50th Indian Parachute Brigade whose young and professional commander, 31-year-old Brigadier Maxwell 'Tim' Hope-Thomson had persuaded the powers that be in New Delhi to allow him to complete the training of his brigade in territory close to the enemy. At the start of March the brigade HQ and one battalion had arrived in Imphal, and began the leisurely process of shaking itself out in the safety of the hills north-east of the town. To the brigade was added the 4/5th Mahrattas under Lieutenant-Colonel Trim. Sent into the jungle almost to fend for themselves, it was not expected that they would have to fight, let alone be on the receiving end of an entire Japanese divisional attack. They had little equipment, no barbed wire and little or no experience or knowledge of the territory. On March 16th, Scoones ordered Gracey to withdraw, so the 20th Division could begin a controlled withdrawal up the Tamu-Palel Road, gradually moving into three defensive boxes.  The first was to be at Moreh, held by the 32nd Indian Brigade; the second in the Khongkhang–Sibong area, held by the 80th Indian Brigade; and the third was to be on the Shenam Saddle, held by the 100th Indian Brigade. Luckily for the allies, Yamamoto had dispatch two of his battalions in a useless wide flanking maneuver towards Mombi and the Tamu-Palel road. Thus Yamamoto would lack sufficient troops to launch a full attack against the retreating allied forces. Meanwhile Hawker Hurricanes and heavy artillery bombarded as the 63rd launched a direct assault against Tuitum saddle, managing to break through to the Manipur River, leaving a rearguard at the bridge. During the following days, the rearguard would repel a series of intense assaults upon the saddle by the 214th regiment and Yanagida's Fort White column. At the same time the 37th brigade was fighting against the bulk of the 215th regiment around milestone 100. The fighting became very confused as the Japanese units became sandwiched between the allied units who in turn were surrounded by other Japanese units. On March 18th, the 3rd battalion ,215th regiment managed to capture the supply depot between Milestones 109 and 110 facing minor resistance. Then they were forced to repel a number of counter attacks by the 48th Indian brigade. On the 19th, Hope-Thomson received some panicked reports that his battalions were seeing heavy columns of Japanese advancing on their undefended camp at Sheldon's Corner. It was the 31st infantry of Major General Miyazaki Shigesaburo from the 58th regiment. Hope-Thomson made a last minute call to assemble his dispersed forces at the deserted Naga Village of Sangshak. His brigade, when concentrated, consisted of 1850 men. However, as the troops dug in they discovered to their discomfort that they were atop an ancient volcano, and the rock was impervious to their picks. All they could dig were shallow trenches, which provided ineffective protection from Japanese artillery. Like all Naga villages that at Sangshak was perched on a hill, and had no water; anything the men required had to be brought up from the valley floor, through the rapidly tightening Japanese encirclement. Its unknown why Miyazaki diverted his men to hit Sangshak rather than continue towards Kohima. By nightfall of the 22nd, the Japanese infantry overwhelmed Indian defenses without performed a detailed reconnaissance and lacking artillery support. This would prove to be a fatal mistake. 400 Gurkhas of the 153rd parachute battalion began mowing down wave after wave of Japanese troops using machine gun fire. The Japanese 8th Company of 58th lost 90 out of 120 men in the space of just 15 minutes. Suffering tremendous casualties, seeing entire companies decimated, Miyazaki decided to regroup and began tossing numerous frantic efforts to break up the defenders positions.Under heavy mountain artillery fire and unable to be supplied by air, Hope-Thomson's troops grimly held a position that was not even ringed by barbed wire until March 26, when they finally received Scoones' order to pull out.  The Parachute brigade was being virtually destroyed in four battles at Sangshak, suffering 652 casualties. Yet in turn Miyazaki was served nearly 1000 casualties and his advance upon Kohima was held up for a week, severely delaying Sato's plans. Further to the south, Yamauchi's 60th regiment was also facing stubborn defenses at Sangshak. They actually had been waiting for the battle of Sangshak to conclude and only jumped in on the last day's assault. This prevented one of Yamauchi's columns from arriving in time north of Imphal, giving Scoones and Slim an extra few days to prepare Imphal's defenses. Meanwhile on March 23rd, the 48th brigade used their heavy guns and mortars to hit the Japanese positions and managed to force the 215th regiment to pull away from the valuable supply depot. To secure the depot however, they still needed to clear the road from the north. Gurkha's were sent in waves against the strongly defended Japanese bunkers, while the 37th brigade and Hawker Hurricanes hit the main defensive positions of the 215th regiment. At this point, General Yanagida, who had always felt that Allied capabilities were being underestimated, determined that his forces would not be able to hold on much longer and thus ordered them to pull back. Yanagida had received a signal from Colonel Sasahara about the critical situation his regiment was in. Sasahara, in turn, had been reacting to a signal from one of his battalion commanders, Major Sueki. Faced with rapidly depleting ammunition, mounting casualties and attacks on his position near Milestone 109, Sueki had signaled that he would not be able to hold on much longer. He indicated that he would destroy his codes and radio and fight to the end. Sasahara is said to have communicated this and the regiment's resolve to fight to the end to Yanagida. There is some mystery around this signal, some accounts suggesting the division commander received only the latter half of the message. Either way, Yanagida had had enough. All his reservations about the Imphal offensive came to the fore. He ordered the 215th Regiment to pull out and sent a signal to Mutaguchi about his decision. In this he noted the strength of their opponent, questioned the rationale of the operation and remarked on the impossibility of meeting the deadline. He is supposed to have gone so far as to suggest the suspension of the Imphal offensive. This all greatly pissed off Mutaguchi whose divisional commanders for the majority disagreed with his U-GO plan, and Motoso Yanagida openly derided him as an "imbecile". Irregardless, Mutaguchi sought to remove Yanagida from his command. Their relationship would not improve as more setbacks were on the way. With the Japanese dislodged, the 37th Brigade managed to reopen the Tiddim Road and the 48th Brigade finally secured the entire depot area around Milestone 109. Whatever supplies that could be recovered and transported back to Imphal were grabbed, while as many as possible that could be of potential value to the Japanese were destroyed. On the 26th, the 63rd Brigade's rearguard also withdrew, blowing up the Manipur River bridge behind them. Two days later, the 37th made first contact with Cowan's units near Milestone 102 and the 17th Division finally began their retreat towards Imphal. Their only obstacle would be a roadblock established by the 2nd Battalion, 213th Regiment around Khuadam. But that would be cleared out quite easily by Cowan's men who were able to reach Imphal by April 4th. In the meantime, Scoones had asked Gracey to send back one of his 100th indian brigade into the reserve on the 25th, leaving him with only two brigades to fend off the Japanese attacks. The next day, the 11th company, 213th regiment of the Yamamoto Force managed to advance past the main defenses at Moreh, defended by the 32nd indian brigade and captured Nippon Hill. Though they were not under heavy enemy pressure, the 32nd Indian Brigade finally withdrew from Moreh on April 1. It had set the dump on fire; by some estimates at least a million pounds' worth of supplies that had not yet been evacuated were destroyed. They arrived at the Shenam Saddle a few days later to join the 80th Indian Brigade in a fierce battle for Nippon Hill. Meanwhile, Slim had foreseen that reinforcements would be needed at Imphal and Kohima and had already requested them with great urgency.  Slim was granted  30 Dakotas to fly the 5th Division from Arakan back on the 18th. By the 27th, the 9th and 123rd Indian Brigades had arrived at Imphal and the 161st Indian Brigade was being flown to Dimapur to reinforce Kohima. In addition, Slim was promised the 2nd British Division and the 23rd Long Range Penetration Brigade, should it be necessary. General Giffard also decided that once the airlift of the 5th Division was complete, the 7th Division would then be airlifted to Manipur. Yet that is all for the India-Burma front as we need to move over to New Britain. On March 5th, Colonel Smith's 5th marines began loading for an overnight run to the Willaumez Peninsula, departing Iboki by nightfall. The following morning the small convoy assembled off Volupai, waiting for air support to soften up their landing area, but they never showed up. Apparently having reason to believe that the Marines would attempt to land at Beach Red, the defenders constructed an intricate communications net between Talasea and Volupai, placed some mines on the beach, constructed defenses of a sort, sighted in 90mm mortars–and then inexplicably did not attempt to defend the beach as they could have done very well under the circumstances. Realizing the longer they waited the better the enemy could prepare, Smith ordered the first assault wave to hit the beaches at 8:25. LCM-tank gunboats raked the beach with machine-gun fire, as Smith's 1st Battalion successfully landed meeting enemy sniper and mortar fire. Some sniper fire was observed and 90mm mortar shells began splashing in the water, but Companies A and B drove on shoreward and within 10 minutes after crossing the line of departure about 500 Marines had landed. The two assault companies then pushed forward to establish a beachhead line through which the 2nd Battalion could pass and continue the attack in the direction of Bitokara Mission. Company A accomplished this with relatively little difficulty on the right, but on the left there existed a virtually impassable swamp, running north and south and extending to the edge of the Volupai track. As a result, Company B had to pass through a slot between Little Mt. Worri and the swamp in order to accomplish its mission, encountering and eliminating an enemy pocket of resistance before establishing its lines 200 yards inland. Meanwhile the reinforced platoon patrol that had gone after the bunker on Little Mt. Worri had run into difficulty. The retreating enemy joined other of their fellows and hastily manned defensive positions which had been prepared in the Volupai coconut grove. The platoon accounted for about a dozen of the Emperor's troops, losing one Marine killed and another wounded in the process. Finding he could not advance against the Japanese all-around defensive positions, the patrol leader requested assistance but was instructed to hold what he had until the 2nd Battalion arrived on the scene. As the advancing elements pushed their way through the coconut trees, rear echelon personnel on Beach Red suffered heavier casualties than the assault units. All during the day the Japanese lobbed 90mm mortar shells onto the beach, shells landing capriciously and inevitably taking their toll in the crowded, constricted area. Among the early victims was Lieutenant Commander Richard M. Forsythe, regimental surgeon, who continued working with the wounded until he was evacuated. The heaviest casualties that day were recorded in the 11th Marines and among medical company personnel. Both groups had to remain on the beach, there being no other place to go. On top of that, coral reefs were delaying the LCM's from fully landing the 3nd battalion until the early afternoon. Once Company E came ashore, the advance guard rapidly moved forward and began moving through the 1st Battalion's lines astride the Volupai Plantation track at 11:00.  The Marines were brought to an abrupt halt 200 yards farther on where the Japanese had dug positions commanding the narrow trail. As Company E attempted to attack outside the plantation track, a medium tank commanded by Lieutenant John M. Scarborough moved up the trail to the company's assistance and knocked out a heavy machine-gun position. But suddenly two Japanese, one on each side of the trail and each armed with a magnetic mine, leaped out of the brush. The defending Marine infantry killed one before he could reach the tank, but the other succeeded in affixing the mine to the port side of the turret. The blast that followed killed the Japanese and the Marine who was trying to stop him, as well as jamming the turret so that it could not be operated and stunning the tank crew within. Simultaneously the rear of the turret was pierced by a missile, presumably an anti-tank grenade, which made a hole about three quarters of an inch in diameter. Supported by two more tanks and mortars, Company E finally began moving towards the coconut grove with increasing momentum during the afternoon, at the same time capturing a detailed map of Japanese positions in the Talasea-Bitokara-Waru area. As night approached, elements of the 2nd Battalion set up an all-around defense within the coconut grove while the 1st Battalion manned the beachhead. By the end of the first day, the Marines had penetrated approximately 2000 yards inland from the beach and killed 35 Japanese while suffering 13 killed and 71 wounded, most of them to the deadly mortar fire.  More than half of these were incurred on the beach, and the figures for the day represented more than half the total casualties the combat team would suffer between March 6th and its departure on April 25th. 9 of the fatalities and 29 of the wounded were in the 11th Marines alone.  At 2:00am on March 7th, a handful of Japanese attempted to infiltrate the lines of Company E, but the attack was so easily repelled that Smith considered that this wasn't even a counterattack. Actually, realizing that his forces were heavily outnumbered, General Sakai had ordered the defenders to leave a rearguard of about 100 men and withdraw at once towards Bola. During the morning, the 2nd Battalion advanced through the abandoned enemy positions without facing any opposition until they were stopped on Mt. Schleuther's northwest slope at 11:45. It became evident that the Japanese were attempting to turn the battalion's right flank. Luckily, Company F rushed forward and managed to extend the threatened flank and seize the high ground. At 3:00pm, the reserve 3rd Battalion was also landed at Volupai, thus relieving the 1st Battalion at the beachhead. The next morning, after a mortar barrage, the 2nd battalion soon discovered the Japanese had retreated past Bitokara. The Marines quickly captured Bitokara by 1:40pm. The Marines then dispatched scouts towards Mt. Schleuther and Talasea. The Mt. Schleuther scouting group reported that the Japanese were well dug in on a nearby peak, and at 3:00 a task force consisting of Company E and reinforcing elements began the ascent. A request for artillery fire on Scheuther brought several rounds dangerously close to the 2nd battalion, 5th Marines CP, and the battalion's 81mm mortars promptly took over the support missions. As the task force approached the enemy positions, however, it ran into concentrated fire from machine-guns and small arms, backed up by a 90mm mortar and a 75mm field piece. The Marines fought back for an hour and sustained 18 casualties before they were ordered withdrawn to the mission. The second scouting party had returned from Talasea, meanwhile, to report no indications of the enemy.    As no enemy presence was found on the latter, Company F advanced to the airdrome and in less than an hour reported it secured. Meanwhile the 1st Battalion advanced to Liapo and then began to push over rough terrain towards Waru, finally digging in for the night just a bit short of its objective. After some artillery and mortar dueling during the night, Companies G, B and C launched a coordinated assault at 8:00am on the 9th. Once again, they found abandoned positions, successfully clearing the Waru area by 1:00pm. Also a patrol was landed on Garua Island at 11:47, reporting it deserted as well.  By the afternoon, Smith moved his command post to Bitokara and informed the division that Talasea was secure and that his forces would now concentrate on mopping up and patrolling the Willaumez Peninsula. The 4 day campaign had cost the Marines 17 killed and 114 wounded, while estimating they had killed 150 Japanese. But now we need to jump over to Bougainville. The Japanese had begun earlier in the year to improve some trails, particularly the net leading from the Mosigetta-Mawaraka area. A rough road had been completed through the jungle to the jump-off positions for the infantry. Nevertheless, the movement of over fifteen thousand troops with all their equipment proved to be a major task that would have dampened the spirits of all but the most ardent warriors. Artillery units had a particularly difficult time pulling their heavy guns through the jungle to get them into position to support the attack. Their task was made even more difficult by the daily downpour that flooded the streams, washing away many of the makeshift bridges and making some trails veritable seas of mud. American intelligence by mid-February was aware of the large-scale movement toward the perimeter and Allied planes repeatedly attacked the trails. Despite all these difficulties, the Japanese soldiers displaying their tenacity and ability to overcome the most difficult obstacles, brought up the supplies and eventually had all the guns in place for the attack. All of this was done to support a major counteroffensive scheduled to begin on March 8th. On the 7th, the Iwasa unit has assembled behind Hill 1111; the Magata Unit behind Mount Nampei; the Muda Unit at Peko village on the East-West Trail, and the 17th Army Artillery Group, commanded by Colonel Saito Harumasa in place near Hill 600. Facing them, were the men of the 37th and Americal Divisions, who were on full alert in their foxholes and bunkers, waiting for the great Japanese counterattack. On the 8th General Hyakutake's counterattack began with a heavy albeit uncoordinated artillery bombardment. The Japanese artillery concentrated its fire on Piva Yoke instead of the forward areas of the perimeter, which would be the main initial point of attack. The artillery fire was delivered spasmodically and with poor coordination despite the high vantage points from which the Japanese surveyed the central segment of the American positions. The Japanese artillery did little damage. American corps and division artillery countered immediately, the 37th Division guns firing on the suspected hills to the northeast and the Americal howitzers concentrating on those to the east. The 6th Field Artillery Battalion and the 129th Infantry's cannon company were so situated that they could fire directly at the gun flashes. All other guns were directed by forward observers or spotter planes. Destroyers in Empress Augusta Bay also fired counterbattery missions. By midmorning marine dive and torpedo bombers were flying neutralization missions against Hills 250 and 600. Then in the afternoon 56 SBDs and 36 TBFs, guided by artillery smokeshells, struck the main concentrations on and around hill 1111. This all massively delayed the Japanese main assault. Only the 23rd Regiment would manage to assemble in place for the attack on Hill 700 by nightfall. Under drenching rainfall, the Japanese thus attacked the hill with some companies, yet their first assault was easily repelled by the experienced defenders.  At 2:30General Iwasa launched his main assault, sending his 2nd and 3rd battalions, 23rd division against the saddle. Despite the heavy fire from the 145th Regiment, the Japanese stormed the hill en masse, screaming and screaming threats in English and even singing American songs, presumably in attempts to unnerve the defenders of the hill. According to the historian of the 145th  "The enemy stormed the hill, clawing his way up the steep slope, yelling like a maniac, suicidally putting everything he had into a frontal attack designed to take the highest point on the hill. ... The 145th Infantry, defending the ridge, were somewhat taken aback by an enemy so unreasoning as to crawl up the 70-degree slope on all fours, rifles slung over their backs." Suffering severe losses, Iwasa's 2nd Battalion managed to blast their way through the protective wire and knock out one of the pillboxes. Through this gap, the Japanese moved onto the saddle and began to attack adjacent strongpoints, securing a penetration of the 145th's line 70 yards wide and 50 yards deep. Behind them, however, an effective artillery response would break up the attack of Iwasa's 3rd Battalion; yet the 2nd Battalion would continue to expand this perimeter until, by 12:00, they had captured seven pillboxes and had brought up machine-guns and mortars with which they could put McClelland Road, the only lateral supply road for the 145th, under direct fire. Supply of the forward troops became very difficult, since the three-quarter-ton trucks and half-tracks could not use the road. All supplies had to be hand carried. Evacuation of the wounded also became difficult and dangerous. Japanese machine guns on the crest of the hill were able to cover the ridge with accurate and deadly grazing fire. They had placed other machine guns in trees on the spur of the hill about a hundred yards to the rear of the ground-emplaced weapons, which could sweep the entire front. With the exception of a few scattered trees and shallow trenches, there was little cover for troops of the 145th who moved up the steep slopes attempting to retake the lost positions. All during the day the Japanese were also extending the trenches repairing the old pillboxes, and building new ones. In response to this breakthrough, General Beightler sent the 1st Battalion, 145th Regiment to counterattack. By noon, the Americans were attacking the newly-gained Japanese positions, successfully retaking five of the lost pillboxes against heavy fire and establishing a new line just south of the crest by nightfall. The first attempt to recapture Hill 700 was launched at noon on the 9th. Company C moved northward against the saddle in a direct frontal assault while two platoons of Company F attacked the saddle from the flanks. Company C was halted by devastating fire two-thirds of the way to its objective, and the men were forced to dig in and hold what they had gained. Meanwhile the riflemen of Company F had retaken five of the lost pillboxes, and the line, now reinforced, was solidly established by nightfall just south of the crest. Beightler had ordered two tanks forward late in the afternoon to take enemy targets under direct fire, particularly those that menaced McClelland Road, but the terrain proved too steep for them to be used effectively. Thankfully, Iwasa's breakthrough had been contained, with the 145th losing 23 killed and 128 wounded against an estimated 500 enemy dead.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Mutaguchi's insane Operation U-Go was not going the way he thought it would. General Slim was outsmarting his enemy and it seems the allies were going to make further gains in Burma. Meanwhile things were heating up on Bougainville as Iwasa continued his grand offensive. 

The Pacific War - week by week
- 121 - Pacific War - Bougainville Counteroffensive, March 12-19, 1944

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 12, 2024 47:19


Last time we spoke about Operation HA-GO, U-GO and some action brewing up on New Britain and Bougainville. Mutaguchi basically tricked his superiors at Tokyo into allowing him to attempt an invasion of India. Operations HA-GO and U-GO were simultaneously unleashed, the only problem was the allies were very ready to meet them. General Slim's men captured documents indicating the true nature of the operations and he acted accordingly. The new box defense systems were employed as the allies lured the Japanese into major traps thwarting their designs against Imphal. The Japanese were fighting tenaciously, but time and supplies would not be on their side. Over on New Britain the allies advanced and managed to seize Talasea. Meanwhile on Bougainville the Japanese were preparing a large counteroffensive, attempting to breach the American defensive perimeter. The operation had just kicked off last episode and today we will continue the story. This episode is the Bougainville Counteroffensive  Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  The Marines departed Bougainville and were relieved by the Americal Division by the end of January 1944. Sporadic fighting emerged and through it Major General Griswold obtained intelligence indicating the Japanese would launch a major counter attack, most likely slated for early March. At the time Lt General Hyakutake was under extreme pressure to reduce the bombing against Rabaul. Rabaul as we know was smashed daily, suffering heavy losses. Admiral Koga had responded by taking away air units from Truk, but all this achieved was even more losses. Rabaul was neutralized, and Truk became vulnerable. The Americans had pummeled both so much, they were able to unleash a dramatic thrust into the central pacific aimed at the Gilberts, Marshalls and later the Carolines. Now it seems Hyakutake had been operating under some very bad intelligence, indicating to him the Americans were defending their perimeter with just a single division around the airfield. With the objective of destroying said airfield, Hyakutake did not know the actual number of defenders and would not enjoy movement by sea. The Americans had full control of the sea lanes, thus any IJN destroyers trying to move troops would run a risky gauntlet. By the first quarter of 1944, Rabaul had tossed meager attacks against the Americans, for example on January 23rd two bombers scored a direct hit over the living quarters of Brigadier General John Hodge and his senior staff officers.  What Hyakutake had to work with was 4300 men of the 45th regiment led by Colonel Isashi Magata. These men were considered the crack troops on Bougainville and they included artillery, mortar and engineering battalions. They were further supported by 4125 men of the 23rd regiment led by Major General Shun Iwara and 1350 men of the 13th regiment led by Colonel Toyo Horei Muda. All three units would be led by Major General Masatane Kanda. The 3 units made an arduous trek through the jungles to reach their jump off points by the evening of March 7th. Hyakutake then sent them a resounding message “time has come to manifest our knighthood with the pure brilliance of the sword. It is our duty to erase the mortification of our brothers at Guadalcanal. Attack! Assault! Destroy everything! Cut, slash, and mow them down. May the color of the red emblem of our arms be deepened with the blood of American rascals.” Major General Kanda also added his own message  “The cry of our victory at Torokina Bay shall resound to the shores of our beloved Nippon. We are invincible.” All of these troops received a large morale boost from such message, but on top of that there was something else incentivising them all. They had adequate food to last them until April 1st, they literally needed to overrun the Americans to steal their provisions. Such was the reality of the Japanese island hopping campaigns. Hyakutakes forces proved themselves far from invincible. Their artillery bombarded on the morning of the 8th, targeting the airfield at Piva Yoke. Their bombardment destroyed a bomber, 3 fighters, killed a single man, and forced a temporary evacuation of aircraft to New Georgia. It was now exactly the greatest of results. Artilleryman Stan Coleman vividly described the Japanese artillery attack “All of a sudden we heard a very different kind of ‘whoosh.' It was made by a shell at the end of its flight, not the beginning. It was ‘incoming mail.' All hell broke loose. In the rear some fuel dumps went up. Every American artillery piece in the perimeter went into action.” The American artillery counter-attack proved far more effective. The Japanese artillery units were forced to move positions constantly and then they were met by a new type of weapon.  As Coleman recalled “Four blue Marine Corsairs came in with rockets. Rockets were a new ground-support weapon and I had never seen them … The rockets in flight made a fearful display. There was a tremendous concussion when they struck their target.” That same night the Iwasa Unit attacked Hill 700 during a heavy downpour. Yet by 2:30am the first attacks were beaten off. It seems the experience persuaded the Japanese not to attempt another night attack on March 9th. Instead, they used occasional machine gun and mortar fire to disrupt the fitful sleep of the Americans. Then at 6:45am on the 10th, Iwasa launched another attack in coordination with Colonel Muda's assault against Hill 260. Iwasa's men clambered up the steep 70 degree slopes screaming maniacally. They would shout confused threats in English. A prolific slaughter occurred against one group of Japanese soldiers who seized out a pillbox and set up a machine gun post on the saddle of the hill. It was dearly bought. General Griswold had brought up more reinforcements for the 145th that same morning. Engineers put together a bangalore torpedo 72 feet long by connecting sticks of dynamite like a long pipe. The object was to climb the hill and then snake the charge down the opposite side into one of the pillboxes. Unfortunately the Japanese spotted them and fired a knee mortar, hitting the torpedo and killing the engineers. Another ruse was attempted shortly after noon with the object of getting the Japanese on the saddle to surrender. A public address system was set up with speakers aimed at Hill 700, and one of the division's Japanese interpreters spoke to the defenders. He informed them of the odds against their success and told them that they could not be reinforced. If they surrendered, it would be considered honorable. To die needlessly was foolish. For the short time he spoke all was quiet, but seconds after he had finished the Japanese directed a mortar barrage on the section of the hill from whence he was broadcasting. The day ended in victory for the riflemen of the 37th Division. At 11:15 an air strike by 26 planes and continuous artillery fire had devastated the Japanese. The day's assault cost the lives of some 500 or more Japanese soldiers.  Meanwhile further south, the 1st battalion, 13th regiment was knocked out by heavy artillery fire. Colonel Muda sent his 3rd battalion, 13th regiment to attack the southern positions of the 182nd regiment around Hill 260. Hill 260, a twin-peaked rise close to the west bank of the Torokina River approximately four miles north of its mouth, was covered with heavy vegetation. The hill itself measured only 850 yards along its north-south axis and at its widest a mere 450 yards, and it was shaped roughly like an hourglass, with the highest elevations to the north and south connected by a narrow saddle. The eastern slope of the hill was precipitous, steepest along the South Knob, where it was almost perpendicular. The South Knob, which was considered the most important part of Hill 260, had been occupied by men of 2nd battalion, 182th regiment since early January, and vigorous patrolling had also been carried on regularly along the saddle and on the unoccupied North Knob. The hill was about half a mile east of the 182nd's main line of resistance. Between Hill 260 and the main line of the Americal was a small stream named Eagle Creek, which provided a natural defensive barrier. There was but a single trail leading from the main perimeter to South Knob. A small bridge over the creek could take vehicular traffic. The last hundred yards to the top of South Knob was a steep stairway cut into the sides of the hill. Possession of this portion of the hill was important for both sides. The Americans had built a platform near the top of a 150-foot banyan tree from which forward observers could see any enemy-activity along the Torokina River or along the highlands to the northeast. Conversely, if the Japanese could seize the hill they could have good observation of the American-held Hills 608 and 309 and the area behind them. Under the cover of intense machine-gun and mortar fire, the Japanese managed to climb the steep slope of the South Knob and then burst in among the outnumbered Americans. The position was held by a reinforced platoon of Company G of the 182nd and a forward observer team of the 246th Field Artillery Battalion. The Americans were rapidly wiped out and dispersed as Muda's men established a defensive perimeter over the crest of South Knob. Hearing the dire news, General Griswold ordered General Hodge to hold Hill 260 at all costs, an order that surprised many of the Americal's staff since they had not expected to try to hold the hill in the face of a concerted Japanese attack. Companies E and F immediately advanced to occupy the North Knob and then attempted an encircling maneuver to counterattack the newly-established Japanese perimeter. Company E at 8:45 attacked South Knob from the southwest while Company F moved south. The company began its attack at 10:45 but halted after the troops had advanced a few yards into the cleared zone. The men took whatever cover was available and waited for flame throwers before trying to advance farther. At approximately 2:45 the commander, Lieutenant Colonel Dexter Lowry, ordered the attack resumed; Company E split and attempted an envelopment. The northern prong of the envelopment was halted but the infantrymen of the southern prong, using grenades and flame throwers, managed to gain a lodgment within earshot of the men of Company G who were still holding out in the pillbox.  Meanwhile, the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 145th Regiment had been reorganized and launched a counterattack against Hill 700 at 5:00. The Japanese unleashed intense mortar and artillery ied, but gradually were dislodge from the crest of the hill, leaving just 4 pillboxes remaining under their control. After the reestablishment of the original resistance line, Iwasa prepared his men to storm Pat's Nose during the night. The Japanese had lost heavily during these attacks, which also cost the 145th three dead and 121 wounded. During the night, after a failed bayonet charge, the Japanese would reinforce their position on Hill 260. They then struck at Company E early in the morning of March 11th and although this attack was beaten off, the American situation in the lodgment had become desperate. Thus, after another Japanese flanking attack, the defenders would have to pull back towards North Knob.  Company G was sent to relieve the beleaguered Company E but was halted by yet another Japanese flanking attack on Company E. General Hodge, fearful of reducing his main defense line, felt that he could send no more reserves to the hill and therefore decided to break off the action and pull Company G and what was left of Company E off South Knob. They retired, unimpeded by the Japanese, behind Eagle Creek. There they joined Company B and then proceeded to cut a new trail up to the crest of North Knob. At daybreak on 11 March, Iwasa launched another attack against the promontory called ‘Pat's Nose,' some 150 yards to the west of ‘Hill 700.' Flanking 37 mm guns cut the Japanese charge to shreds. Iwasa's rear echelons kept advancing over the dead bodies of those who had been leading the charge and eventually managed to break through the barbed wire, though they too were ultimately destroyed. After an hour of suicidal attack Iwasa's troops receded leaving some 84 dead behind them. The 37th Division's historian described this attack: "Brandishing their prized sabers, screeching 'Chusuto' (Damn them!), the Jap officers climbed up the slope and rushed forward in an admirable display of blind courage. The men screamed in reply 'Yaruzo' (Let's do it!) and then 'Yarimosu' (We will do it!). As they closed with the American doughboys, the leaders cried' San nen Kire!' (Cut a thousand men!). General Beightler, concerned over the inability of the 145th to reduce the Japanese positions on Hill 700, decided to send the 2nd Battalion, 148th Regiment to finally wipe out the enemy opposition. After a heavy mortar and artillery bombardment, two platoons of Company E advanced east from Pat's Nose trying to flank the saddle while a third attacked west from Hill 700. Thirteen men were killed before the momentum of the attack waned and the battalion dug in on the ground it had gained. Meanwhile, Companies F and B, now under the command of Brigadier-General William McCulloch, began a  two-pronged attempt to drive the Japanese off South Knob. Supported by flamethrowers units from the 132nd, men of Company B got across the saddle and onto the knob, but were ultimately pulled because of the enemy's numerical superiority. Meanwhile, Colonel Magata Isashi's 45th Regiment had limited its actions to heavy patrol activity while the Iwasa Unit was attacking Hill 700. The terrain fronting the 129th Regiment, which was holding the center of the 37th Division line, was much more favorable for the Japanese than that encountered by either the Iwasa or Muda forces. The land was relatively flat, although cut by many gullies. The 129th's line, defended by two battalions, extended over two miles, curving slightly from just east of the Numa Numa Trail southwest to the right flank of the 148th Regiment. The Japanese had easy access to the 37th's lines, first via the Numa Numa Trail and then following the lowlands and gullies adjacent to the creeks. Colonel John Frederick, the regimental commander of the 129th, had recognized the potential vulnerability of this position and had organized a defense in depth during the two months prior to the attack. The position was anchored by a large number of mutually supporting earthen and log pillboxes and protected by a double apron of barbed wire, in front of which antipersonnel mines had been laid. Machine-guns had been sited to provide interlocking fire and additional barbed wire had been placed to channel potential attackers into the main machine-gun fire lanes. The 129th's cannon company of 75-mm pack howitzers, and its mortar sections had been augmented by 37-mm and 40-mm anti-tank guns, which could fire canisters in flat-trajectory direct fire. Thus although Colonel Magata's men did not have to climb up steep cliffs to get at the American positions, they would find the 129th's defenses near impregnable to relatively lightly supported infantry attacks, no matter how fanatically delivered. While patrolling, some documents were taken from dead Japanese bodies detailing Magata's plan, so Colonel John Frederick's 129th Regiment was expecting his thrust. On the 11th, the contact between Japanese and American patrols increased, as did the amount of incoming mortar fire, so the American supporting artillery was directed to fire intermittently into the areas where the Japanese were located.Colonel Frederick at 4:00pm ordered all his outposts back into the main perimeter and division artillery fired a ten-minute concentration along the 2nd Battalion front. At dusk, a heavy firefight then broke out as the Japanese opened up with machine-guns and mortars on Company G's area. During the exchange of fire, which lasted until 7:20pm, men in the pillboxes did not fire their machine guns, since they did not want to reveal their positions. The firing died down to only a few exchanges during the night, generally directed at Japanese infiltrators, who were attempting to cut through the barbed wire. Finally, at dawn on the 12th, Magata sent his 1st and 3rd battalions in column to strike Company G. Although the attacking Japanese suffered very heavy casualties from machine-gun fire, they penetrated the first line of defense by sheer weight of numbers. Moving up the streambed running into the sector, they captured one pillbox after another until they held a total of seven. Frederick then sent his reserve 1st Battalion to support Company G, while also launching a counterattack that managed to contain the enemy expansion and that also retook two pillboxes by late afternoon. Meanwhile, Companies E and F of the 148th were converging against Iwasa's remaining strongpoints. Using grenades, rifles, and flamethrowers, they finally reduced the pillboxes one by one, leaving the Japanese in possession of only one pillbox by 1:00pm. An historian of the 145th Regiment described the fight for this last strongpoint: “On the second day, the last held enemy pillbox was subjected to everything an infantryman has at his command. Hand grenades by the dozen were thrown at the emplacement. Still there was responding fire. Flamethrowers scorched the hidden Nip into silence. The searching parties entered the charred remains of the emplacement only to hear the click of a Japanese grenade being detonated. In the far corner they made out the dim outline of a Jap, eyes bloodshot, mouth bleeding, face seared, clothing burned. His clenched fist held a grenade. Even as the men dove for cover outside the pillbox, the Jap threw the grenade at them as in a dying gesture.” Despite a heroic resistance, this was cleared in the afternoon at last, thus completely restoring the original 145th's line.  While this was going on, after a heavy artillery bombardment, McCulloch sent Companies B and F once again to storm the South Knob. Company B in a column of platoons with six flamethrowers attempted to storm the height from the northwest. The leading platoon was halted by machine gun fire from pillboxes dug in on the west slope. Once these were spotted a concentration of mortar and machine gun fire was directed against these Japanese positions, enabling the following platoon to reach the top of the knob. There, it was pinned down by heavy fire from machine guns sited east of the observation post banyan tree. American mortar fire, together with the work of the flamethrower operators, who were covered by BAR men of the 3rd Platoon, soon negated these positions. Although it appeared that the South Knob would soon be in American hands, ammunition for the attacking platoons was running low, there had been numerous casualties, there were no more reserves, and it was already late in the day.  Despite this, Hodge sent Company A of the 132nd Regiment to reinforce the gained position. Company A of the 132nd tried to scale the height from the southwest to join Company B of the 182nd on the crest. A burst of machine gun fire killed the company commander, however, and disorganized the attack so much that under the best of conditions the men could not reach the top before dark. Hodge then reluctantly recalled his forces and, sensing the futility of further attacks, he requested permission to pull off South Knob. Yet Griswold refused the request and a new attack was ordered for the next day using two companies of the 1st Battalion, 132nd Regiment. After another heavy artillery bombardment, Company A attacked southward along the narrow saddle while Company B attacked up the southwest slope. Surprisingly, the two companies of the 182nd that had led the attack the day before had not been kept in immediate reserve but had been pulled back within the perimeter. Therefore there were no reserve troops available to help exploit the minor gains made during the afternoon. As night fell, Major Raymond Daehler, the battalion commander, reluctantly pulled his men off the knob and retreated to safer ground. Despite repeated attacks from 12 -16th, Magata had made no headway and finally withdrew his forces. After Iwasa's retreat, the men of the 145th had the dubious honor of policing the slopes of Hill 700 and burying the corpses left behind. In an area roughly 50 yards square, corpses that could be identified were counted. This count included only those within the barbed wire lines in front of the pillboxes. As one observer noted, the carnage was a sight to turn even the most cast-iron stomach: “Enemy dead were strewn in piles of mutilated bodies, so badly dismembered in most cases that a physical count was impossible. Here and there was a leg or an arm or a blown-off hand, all to show for the vanished and vanquished enemy. At one point, Japanese bodies formed a human stairway over the barbed wire. Five enemy were piled one on top of the other, as each had successively approached the location to use a predecessor as a barricade and then fall on top of him as he in turn was killed. Farther out from the perimeter, where a little stream wound its way parallel to it, Japs killed by the concussion of thousands of mortar shells lay with their heads, ostrich fashion, stuck under the least protection they could find”. What was left of Iwasa's shattered command to the relative safety of the Blue Ridge, Approximately two miles east of the American perimeter. During the day, as the Japanese were retreating, American planes dropped 123 tons of bombs on the intermediate areas, and destroyers off shore lobbed their five-inch shells into the high ground to the north and east of the perimeter. Further east, Magata launched a night attack at 4:00am, managing to gain another pillbox, so Griswold would decide to reinforce Frederick with a tank platoon. General Griswold agreed to send the 1st Platoon of Company C, tank battalion, forward, with the stipulation that they be used only to augment the infantry as they took back the lost pillboxes. 4 tanks supported a midmorning assault, which successfully retook two pillboxes. Another tank-infantry attack began at 1:15pm but was halted since the tanks were low on fuel and ammunition. They were replaced by tanks of another platoon, which assisted the infantry of the 129th in destroying all the other pillboxes held by the Japanese and in restoring the front line roughly to the positions held before the Japanese attack of the previous day. Alongside this, Griswold ordered the reconnaissance troop forward to occupy the right sector of the threatened area, with the 131st Engineer Regiment taking over the extreme left. General Hodge requested to be reinforced with tanks; but as they could not cross Eagle Creek, McCulloch and him reluctantly decided to cease any further attempt to drive the Japanese off South Knob. He thought that the three-day action against the Muda Unit had obviously so weakened it that it no longer posed a danger to the perimeter proper. Thus, it could be contained and continually harassed by combat patrols and neutralization fire.  On the 14th, the fighting fell into just intermittent small-arms and mortar fire from the Japanese as Colonel Magata shifted some of his troops to more favorable positions and as he brought his reserve 2nd Battalion, 45th Regiment and 2nd Battalion, 13th Regiment to reinforce further attacks. Magata also received the 1st Battalion, 81st Regiment and the 3rd Battalion, 53rd Regiment from the north, tossing them into his new reserve. At 4:00am on 15th, the Japanese launched a heavy local attack against the right of Company F. By dawn, they had captured one pillbox and penetrated approximately 100 yards into the perimeter, where they were ultimately checked. A coordinated counterattack by Companies F and C in conjunction with a 36-plane strike against the Japanese positions, managed to retake the pillbox. Further tank-infantry attacks finally drove the entrenched Japanese out of the salient and successfully restored the line. Losses for the day were 10 dead and 53 wounded, while 190 Japanese were counted dead. The Japanese then repeated the attack the next morning at 4:00am on the high ground east of Cox Creek with a larger force of elements from three battalions. They penetrated approximately 75 yards before their momentum was halted. Then, Company B, supported by a platoon of tanks, counterattacked and restored the original line by midmorning. Finally, shortly after noon, the tanks moved beyond the wire and shelled the draws and ravines in front of Company F until their ammunition was exhausted. Once again the Japanese had paid heavily for no gain. 194 dead were counted and 1 prisoner taken, while the Americans only lost 2 dead and 63 wounded. Though the counter offensive is nowhere near done, that is all for this week as we now have to jump over to the CBI theater. General Merrill's Marauders had been given the task of cutting the Japanese supply line over the Kamaing road. At Merrill's disposal were the three battalions of GALAHAD, each in turn broken down into two combat teams. The teams bore the code names Red and White for the 1st Battalion; Blue and Green for the 2nd Battalion and Khaki and Orange for the 3rd Battalion. Each team included a rifle company, heavy weapons platoon, pioneer and demolition platoon, reconnaissance platoon, and medical detachment, with a combined strength of sixteen officers and 456 enlisted men. The marauders had been recruited from units in the south-west pacific and from Trinidad in the Caribbean. Many of the volunteers were notably seen as pure psychopaths. Their training in India was quite painful, a lot so for the military police nearby. 10 percent of the Marauders went AWOL, many of them amused themselves by shooting at catte, chickens and other birds, apparently even at the feet of locals to make them dance. One incident apparently had some of them aboard a train to Ledo firing out of the windows. They were seen as arrogant, psychopathic, gung-ho and they had many colorful catchphrases such as ‘My pack is on my back, my gun is oiled and loaded, and as I walk in the shadow of death I fear no sonofabitch.'  The baptism of the Marauders did not impress their commander who was obsessed with speed and efficiency. The Galahad unit had departed on February 24th and on receiving orders to move to his forward assembly area, Merrill sent his three intelligence and reconnaissance (I & R) platoons to check trails as far as the Tawang Hka, the first of the three considerable streams that crossed the line of march. At 6:00am on the 24th, the 5307th moved out, screened by the I & R platoons. Next day two of them clashed with Japanese patrols and the point of one platoon, Pvt. Robert W. Landis of Youngstown, Ohio, was killed. Luckily radio communication between the 2nd Battalion, 56th Regiment and the 18th Division's headquarters broke down at this time, so General Tanaka was unaware that a semi-detached American unit was operating off to his flank.  Stilwell fretted at the time it took them to cross the 130 miles over the Naga range to the battlefront. Part of the problem was that 5307th Composite was mule-based and had to bring 700 animals with them but none of them knew anything about muleteering. Whatever misgivings Stilwell had when he saw his reinforcements, he kept them to himself and addressed them simply and quietly, explaining that their new mission was to hit Walawbum. On the afternoon of the 28th, Merill received the new orders, calling for cutting the road on either side of Walawbum, the 2nd Battalion led by Colonel McGee to the west, the 3rd Battalion led by Colonel Beach to the south, and the 1st Battalion led by Colonel Osborne to patrol along the Nambyu Hka north of the Kamaing Road. Positions near Walawbum would be held until the 38th Division relieved the 5307th. Unfortunately the freak rains already experienced by Stilwell and his men continued, so that the Marauders' eight-day, 60-mile trek to Walawbum turned into something of a nightmare. On March 2nd, the Marauders crossed the Tanai Hka and arrived at their assembly area. With the last elements at hand, General Stillwell initiated his offensive. On the 3rd, Colonel Brown's tankers, with the support of a battalion from the 65th regiment advanced against Maingkwan. Facing light opposition, they managed to advance 5000 yards northeast of Maingkwan by 3pm when they were halted by heavy Japanese fire. Meanwhile, Merrill's marauders were clashing with Japanese at various places throughout the day. The 3rd Battalion had a sharp fight at Lagang Ga, killing 30 Japanese and seized the area needed for the building of a drop field. One of the battalion's two combat teams, Khaki, stayed at Lagang Ga to build and protect the dropping zone. Orange Combat Team kept on to the high ground east of Walawbum and dug in, its heavy weapons commanding the Kamaing Road. This saw them securing high ground east of Walawbum. The 22d Division, was also moving ahead, and so far was in step with the tanks and GALAHAD. On  the 3rd, the 64th Regiment was near Ngam Ga, east of the Kamaing Road. The 66th to the west was in contact with the third regiment, the 65th, as it emerged from the Taro Plain. Tanaka's intelligence indicated the Americans were at Walawbum. The Chinese 22nd and 38th divisions were advancing slowly, so he believed his rearguard could hold them back so he could take the bulk of his strength to attack the americans. On the 3rd, the 55th and 56th regiment began retreating in order to launch an enveloping maneuver against Merrill's marauders. The next day, Brown found the enemy gone and his men were able to advance 3 miles southeast, getting his tanks in line with Maingkwan. Over at Walawbum, Merrills 3rd battalion were resisting against ferocious attacks from the Japanese. The drop field at Lagang Ga was attacked at dawn on the 4th but the garrison held. Orange Combat Team opened the battle in its sector with mortar fire on Walawbum, drawing mortar and 75-mm. fire in return from the 56th Infantry Regiment, which had been Tanaka's left flank, as it assembled for attack. When it moved, the 56th tried to cross the river and work around the Americans' flanks, where it met booby traps and ambushes thoughtfully prepared for just such a contingency. Some Japanese did cross to the east, but this failed to affect the course of the action, and 75 dead Japanese were counted, as against one American dead and seven wounded. These latter were evacuated by air the same evening. The 2nd battalion managed to get across the Kamaing road west of Wesu Ga where they established a roadblock. Finding out about the roadblock, Tanaka dispatched his forces to clear them out. On the 5th the Japanese appeared to be forming for an attack, but mortar fire seemed to be successful in breaking up such attempts. To the south, Allied aircraft could be seen bombing and machine-gunning what Orange Combat Team took to be Japanese reinforcements. One indication that the Japanese were increasing their strength in the immediate area lay in their being able to force Orange Combat Team's I & R Platoon back across the river about noon. Simultaneously, the 66th regiment liberated the abandoned Maingkwan and began advancing south over the Kamaing road. Brown's reconnaissance had found a good trail running south from Tsamat Ga, and on the morning of the 5th the tanks moved out through the jungle. After the engineers had prepared a small stream for crossing, the tanks broke into a freshly evacuated Japanese bivouac area. Jungle vines looping across the trail from either side, and connecting masses of vegetation and trees, made effective obstacles as they slowed down the tanks by catching their turrets; not until late afternoon did the armor break out on the trail running east and west between Maingkwan and Wesu Ga. Almost immediately the tanks encountered what seemed to be a company of Japanese defending a small but marshy stream. The stream did not seem fordable, so Brown attacked by fire alone. Unknown to him, his tanks were firing on Tanaka's division headquarters, and now lay squarely between the 18th's headquarters and its 56th Regiment. This understandably threw Tanaka's plan into chaos, as his forces who were unsuccessfully attacking Merrills marauders were becoming encircled. Tanaka decided to swing his force around the American roadblock, using a Japanese built trail that the Americans did not know about.The bypass road over which the 18th was to withdraw had been built by the Japanese engineers some days before and quote “The Engineer Regiment commander, Colonel Fukayama, had considered the possibility of reversals in our position and, in order to facilitate the withdrawal of the division, he had previously cleared a secret jungle trail about 20 kilometers long leading from the vicinity of Lalawng Ga to Jambu Hkintang on his own initiative. This trail was used in the withdrawal of the main body of the division.” By nightfall, Merrill's 2nd battalion had pulled out to Wesu Ga and were trying to link up with the 3rd battalion south of Walawbum. On the 6th after heavy artillery bombardment, at 5:15pm an estimated two companies of Japanese in line of skirmishers, with heavy supporting fire, crossed the river. The American mortars continued their work; the automatic weapons held back until the Japanese were within fifty yards. Two heavy machine guns, which had a clear field of fire along the river bank, were especially effective. The Japanese failed, leaving many dead on the open ground east of the river and on the river banks. Orange Combat Team found its ammunition low, and so sent a request for more to Khaki Combat Team, which was about one hundred yards downstream. This was however just a diversionary attack, as most of the 18th division were escaping unmolested. Meanwhile elements of the 113th regiment were beginning to arrive to Lagang Ga and unfortunately an incident of friendly fire would occur. The remainder of the 38th Division and an American patrol met near Walawbum on March 7th. The recognition signal had been arranged as three bursts of three rounds each. This necessarily meant there would be firing when the Chinese and Americans met. When the tops of the American helmets, which looked not unlike the Japanese pot helmet when their brims were invisible, appeared through and over the brush, there was a brief exchange of fire in which three Chinese were wounded before identity was established. Such is the nature of coordinating multiple nations' armies during actions. General Sun and Merrill's marauders made a withdrawal beginning on the 7th in order to circle south and cut the Kamaing road again, this time even further south than before. Brown in the meantime had advanced to Ninghku Ga where he secured support from a battalion of the 64th regiment and launched a coordinated tank-infantry attack against Kumnyen. At around 3pm, the tanks and infantry assembled across the Kamaing road in two places, establishing a roadblock while the tanks moved out aggressively along the road to east and west. On the 8th, Brown's tanks then moved along the Kamaing Road and onto a trail that showed signs of heavy traffic. This allowed them to discover Tanaka's evacuation route, finally occupying Walawbum by the end of the day. Brown later recalled, "swarming with people from the 64th Infantry and the 113th Infantry who, to the tankers' great disgust, disputed the latter's claim to have taken Walawbum”. Though the 18th division had managed to escape Stilwells traps, the American-Chinese forces had still scored a well-earned victory. The road to Myitkyina was not open.  The cost for this first series of victories in the North Burma Campaign were 802 Chinese dead and 1479 wounded, plus 530 undifferentiated casualties from the fall of 1943 to March 18, 1944. But the temporary American-Chinese collaboration did not presage a wider Sino-American synergy, and the Marauders found operating with their allies a major problem. One issue was that of disease: the Americans caught dysentery in large numbers and attributed this to the insanitary habits of the Chinese, especially their refusal to boil their water, or to wash their hands after using the latrines. The American K-rations also proved unsatisfactory and unsuitable for jungle warfare, as the Chindits soon discovered. Yet that is all for burma as we now have to jump over to New Guinea. The advance and pursuit upon Madang resumed on March 12th as the 2/12th Battalion found Ward's Village unoccupied while the 57th/60th Battalion secured the abandoned Saipa 2. The 57th/60th Battalion advanced swiftly by night and finally concentrated at Yokopi two days later. On the 16th, Brigadier Hammer then received a rather ambiguous order. Chilton had redefined the division's role "in the light of the present situation". While the 18th Brigade was to watch the 15th Brigade's immediate left flank from the high ground between the lower Evapia and Mene Rivers, and the commando troop at Faita the far left flank, the 15th Brigade would garrison Kankiryo Saddle, keep contact with the enemy along the Bogadjim Road and patrol along the Kabenau River towards Astrolabe Bay to join the Americans. Finally, the 15th Brigade would "provide a firm base for patrolling, by employing at the discretion of the commander, a force not exceeding one battalion forward of Kankiryo up to and inclusive of Yokopi". The order was ambiguous as far as the local commanders were concerned, and managed to overcome the ban placed by higher authority on any advance across the Finisterres to the coast: Hammer could not go beyond Yokopi but, at the same time, he was to maintain contact with the enemy along the Bogadjim Road—and they were already farther back than Yokopi. At this point Hammer decided that the supply route from the Saddle to the 57th/60th had to be developed. While the battalion patrolled and the enemy positions were bombarded, Saipa, Yokopi and Daumoina were built into staging areas. In the meantime, patrols from the 2/2nd Commando Squadron were harrying the Japanese from the left flank, successfully establishing a new patrol base at Jappa by March 17th. From there, the Commandos patrolled towards Aminik, Oromuge and Mataloi, which they finally found abandoned. Further east, the 58th/59th Battalion patrolled from the Nangapo and Yangalum areas towards Arawum and Kul 2 as they searched for the Americans at the Kabenau and Kambara Rivers. An accidental meeting had already taken place between the patrols of the two Allies. An American reconnaissance patrol was being towed in a rubber boat by a PT boat with the object of landing at Male and seeing if the Japanese were at Bogadjim. Off Garagassi Point, the tow rope broke and the Americans rowed to shore in their rubber boat which they deflated and hid in the bush near Melamu. Moving inland for about a mile they turned west and nearing the Kaliko Track met Lieutenant Norrie's patrol of the 58th/59th Battalion and accompanied the Australians to Barum, where the Americans were given supplies and a guide; moving via Wenga, they reached Jamjam on the 18th and found no signs of the enemy. On this day at noon about 30 Japanese with three machine-guns and a mortar attacked Norrie's position at Barum. The situation would have been serious had it not been for Sergeant Matheson and his two men who had remained behind at Kaliko and managed to bear the first brunt of the attack and warn those at Barum. The Americans moved on the 20th to Yangalum and next day set out for Kul 2, along almost exactly the same route as that taken by Brewster, who had departed on March 20. Brewster reached Kul 2 on March 21, where he joined the Americans from Saidor and remained with them until the 26th. In this period he went to Saidor where he met General Gill, giving him information about the area east of the Kabenau River and learning of the American intentions and dispositions. Brewster then returned to Yangalum having carried out an important and lengthy linking patrol—35 miles each way. On the other side, General Adachi ordered his 51st division to continue withdrawing towards Wewak and for the 20th division towards Hansa. There he sought for them to reorganize and receive around 5000 replacements from Palau each. By the 9th, both divisions had reached Bogia and the 20th division had established a new defense of the Hansa area. By mid March the 51st reached Wewak and would be able to assemble at Hansa. On March 20th, the bulk of the 41st division was ordered to withdraw towards Hansa as well. As a result of the invasion of the Admiralty Islands, the 18th army and 4th air army were now cut off from Rabaul. Thus they were reassigned to the 2nd Area Army under the command of General Anami Korechika with his HQ at Ambon. They would be responsible for the defense of the eastern part of the Dutch East Indies and the western portion of New Guinea. General Teramoto would also have to move his command from Wewak to Hollandia.  Back at Yokopi, Hammer anticipated that the constant patrolling and bombardment had forced the Japanese to withdraw from their positions. On March 28th, patrols of the 57th/60th moved past Daumoina and effectively found the enemy gone. The reality, however, was that General Nakai and Colonel Matsumoto had been ordered to pull back and follow its parent unit towards Hansa. The remainder of the 41st Division were following suit over the next few days. Only a 5000-men detachment, deemed the Madang detachment formed around the 239th Regiment, under the command of General Shoge, was left behind to hold Madang and cover the Japanese withdrawal. Hammer ordered the 57th/60th to move forward with speed towards Yaula, yet the Australians would be stopped at the Kofebi River on March 30. In response, a company would be sent in an enveloping maneuver across the river, successfully getting through to Mabelebu although they would be unable to draw away the defenders. During the night, the surrounded company would then have to resist a number of enemy counterattacks, though these weren't really counterattacks but the Japanese trying to retreat towards Madang. The following day, with the enemy gone, the Australian patrols would rapidly set out north towards Yaula. Meanwhile, the 2/2nd Squadron's patrols, after securing Mataloi 1, were also advancing towards Yaula with speed. Finally, the commandos would successfully enter Yaula on April 4, with the 57th/60th's vanguard arriving soon after and then occupying Kwato by nightfall.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Bougainville counteroffensive proved the Japanese could still unleash brutal offensives and meet some success. However the level of success was not going to win the war let alone the fight over Bougainville. Within Burma the mixed national armies of the allies were finding some difficult working together, but they were gradually pushing the Japanese back.  

Ireland Crimes and Mysteries
Behind Closed Doors: Jean Gilberts Story

Ireland Crimes and Mysteries

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 3, 2024 33:58


In the serene suburbs of Castleknock, Dublin, the tragic murder of Jean Gilbert by her husband, David Bourke, in August 2007, shocked a community and captured the attention of a nation. "Behind Closed Doors" delves deeply into this devastating event, exploring the complexity of relationships marred by control,betrayal and the ultimate act of violence within a family.This meticulously researched series goes beyond the surface of the crime to explore the life of Jean Gilbert—a beloved mother, accomplished professional, and vibrant member of her community, we aim to understand the intricate dynamics of Jean and David's marriage, what led to such a tragic conclusion, and the legal aftermath that ensued.We seek to honor the memory of Jean while also navigating the legal, psychological, and societal questions that arise from domestic violence and murder. In doing so, we strive to understand the warning signs that lead to issues of domestic instability, and the role of community awareness in preventing such tragedies."Behind Closed Doors" Jean Gilberts Story" invites listeners into a narrative that challenges us to reflect on complex emotional and social issues, the nature of love and betrayal, and the paths toward healing and understanding in the aftermath of unimaginable loss.Join us as we give voice to Jean's story, aiming not only to tell a tale of tragedy but also to contribute to a broader conversation about preventing violence and protecting those in vulnerable situations.Become a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/ireland-crimes-and-mysteries--5973961/support.

Truth Church of Denison
Technology and Christianity

Truth Church of Denison

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 3, 2024


The Gilberts | 03.03.2024

The Pacific War - week by week
- 119 - Pacific War - The invasion of the Admiralty Islands, February 27 - March 5, 1944

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 27, 2024 49:33


Last time we spoke about the invasion of Eniwetok and the end of Operation HA-GO in the Burma front. While Operation Hailstone was going on, the invasion of Eniwetok was greatly sped up as the Americans were simply too fast at conquering the Marshall islands. Codenamed operation Catchpole, Eniwetok was hit with the same kind of overwhelming force applied to Kwajalein and other islands. Aerial, naval and land base artillery smashed the defenders into submission before forces were landed. The Japanese launched so daring night time infiltration attacks, but were hopeless to stop the American seizure of the island. Within the Burma front the Japanese invaders were shocked at the performance of the newly improved Indian Army. Operation HA-GO was an utter disaster and worse it had weakened the Japanese to the point now the allies were going on the attack.  This episode is the invasion of the Admiralty Islands Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  The war for the South Pacific is reaching its climax. The allies are securing western New Britain, the Solomons and the Huon Peninsula. The Japanese are simply overwhelmed. The Japanese air forces have been utterly annihilated, their warships are being drained of fuel, are worn down by the war and are seemingly no longer ready for that decisive naval battle envisioned by Isoroku Yamamoto. The men are battle-weary, food is becoming more scarce, malnourishment is spreading. All those strung out at the furthest islands are basically being left to die. To end the misery for those in the South Pacific, the capture of the Admiralty Islands was one of the last steps in Operation Cartwheel and would seal off the Bismarck-Solomons area from supply and reinforcement, denying their use to the Japanese for effective air and naval operations, and left garrisons totaling over 100000 troops in isolated impotence In the South Pacific, the Admiralty Islands, that of Manus and Los Negros stood at the northeastern exist of the Bismarck Sea. They commanded the important strategic point some 600 miles from Rabaul, 820 miles from Truk and 1370 miles from Mindanao Island. The joint chiefs believed Seeadler Harbor had the potential to become a major naval anchorage for the Pacific Fleet and perhaps the springboard for the invasion of the Philippines. Back on April 7th, 1942 a Japanese destroyer and a merchant ship had landed invading forces at Lorengau, driving off the hundred or so Europeans who had been living there. At that time the only airstrip was at Lorengau, the administrative center for the group of islands. Apparently the Admiralties were not considered significant in the offensive phase of the Japanese conquest of the South Pacific area, for it was not until February 1943, that construction forces started to build a 5000-foot airstrip at Momote Plantation on Los Negros and to put the 3000-foot Lorengau airfield into operational use. After October 1943, the Momote field and the smaller Lorengau strip served as ferrying stops on the replacement routes to Wewak, Hollandia, and Rabaul, until Allied air attacks destroyed the effectiveness of the Admiralties' base. Seeadler Harbor was also being used for surface craft and possibly for seaplanes.  In late 1943, General MacArthur had assigned General Krueger's Alamo Force at that time based in Finschhafen to plan the seizure of the Seeadler Harbor area, with the aim of establishing an airdrome and light naval facilities for the support of subsequent operations along the north coast of New Guinea.  On February 13th however, MacArthur ordered Krueger to seize all of the Admiralty islands and to build air bases at Lorengau and Momote. This was to be Operation Brewer, beginning on April 1st. However one of Lt General Kenney's spotter planes noticed there was no sign of life on the Admiralty Islands and this prompted MacArthur to move up the time table, to the end of February. It would be quite a mistake. MacArthur's chief of intelligence, Colonel Willoughby, was convinced Kenney's intelligence was incorrect and information from ULTRA intercepts seemed to support his claims. It seemed Kenney had been fooled. The Japanese appeared to be absent on the islands, because Colonel Yoshio Ezaki had ordered his men not to move during the day, so as to conceal their work constructing two new airstrips and to conserve anti-aircraft ammunition. In spite of Kenney's arguments that the Japanese looked vulnerable, MacArthur's staff officers were not at all happy at the idea of taking such a high level risk assaulting them. Even Kenney would note “we had already outrun the capabilities of our supply system.” Ignoring the limitations, MacArthur was determined to take the islands, but would later reminisce “I felt that the situation presented an ideal opportunity for a coup de main which, if successful, could advance the Allied timetable in the Pacific by several months and save thousands of Allied lives.” This of course is MacArthur we are talking about and the capture of the Admiralty Islands would advance his timetable to retake the Philippines, so for him it was a no brainer. There was also the on going race. MacArthur was obviously taking notice of Admiral Nimitz's thrust into the Central Pacific, and what a thrust it was. The Gilberts and Marshalls were falling in extremely surprising speed. MacArthur, fully aware of the risks of forwarding Operation Brewer, nevertheless did so and would cover his tracks by describing the invasion as “a reconnaissance in force” The misgivings of this decision would be apparent when a covert reconnaissance mission led by Lt J.R McGowan and 5 other men of the 158th infantry reported on February 27th that the island were “lousy with Japs”, but by that point it was too late to pull back. For the operation, Krueger would assign Major-General Innis Swift's 1st Cavalry Division, which was training intensively in the Oro Bay area. Although the 1st Cavalry Division was dismounted for operations in the Pacific, it retained its organization as a cavalry unit with two brigades, each made up of two reinforced regiments. In addition to supporting units, each regiment comprised two squadrons of three rille troops and a heavy weapons troop. Air offensives against Rabaul and Wewak continued throughout February, seeing an enormous reduction in the Japanese ability for air action. On the 22nd and 23rd, Captain Burke's Destroyer Squadron 23, consisting of Destroyers Charles Ausburne, Stanly, Converse, Spence and Dyson made a daring sweep in the Admiralty island area. They managed to sink the 3800 ton Japanese tug Nagaura due east of Lorengau. 3 of his destroyers then sailed south of New Hanover where they sank a IJN minelayer and a cargo ship before turning around the coast of New Ireland. They encountered no shipping there, so they fired 1500 five-inch shells into Duke of York Island in order to damage the airfield under construction. Meanwhile the other 2 destroyers sailed north of New Hanover and bombarded the enemy base at Kavieng. At this point MacArthur realized the Japanese could not mount any significant air or naval support to defend the admiralties. He also believed Los Negros islands was lightly held and that they was a “coup de main” opportunity. As someone who speaks french as a second language, I gotta say its so weird how we anglophones use these random french phrases for things haha. Thus MacArthur decided to change his plans somewhat. In place of the scheduled assault set for April 1st, he now was tossing the “reconnaissance in force” I mentioned early against the Momote airstrip on Hyane Harbor and that it should be carried out no later than February 29th. The force performing this was to be known as the Brewer Reconnaissance Force; it consisted of 3 rifle troops and the heavy weapons troop of the 2nd Squadron, 5th Cavalry Regiment: 800 men with their complement of light and heavy machine guns, rocket launchers, and mortars. With them was a platoon from Battery B, 99th Field Artillery Battalion, carrying two 75-mm pack howitzers, four 50-caliber machine guns, and small arms. The 673rd Antiaircraft Machine Gun Battery, a unit of some 80 men, was equipped with twelve 50-caliber machine guns as well as individual weapons. Air and naval liaison officers and a shore fire control party were scheduled to land with the attacking force; Headquarters Troop, 1st Cavalry Brigade, would furnish a reconnaissance and a communications platoon. Arrangements had also been made for a detachment from the Australian New Guinea Administration Unit, usually called ANGAU; this group was to assist chiefly in gathering intelligence, patrolling, recruiting, and dealing with the native population as their villages were liberated.  If these men found Momote to be adequately defended, then they would establish a perimeter and await reinforcements, thus the reconnaissance turns into an invasion.With just 5 days to plan, General Kenney's 5th air force was given the task of bombing the objective area and northern Ireland. Meanwhile Admiral Barbey's destroyers were going to perform a heavy bombardment to cover the approach and landings. A patrol from the Alamo Scouts landed on the southeastern coast of Los Negros from a Catalina flying boat on the night of February 27th. They performed a reconnaissance, quickly discovering Colonel Ezaki Yoshio's forces were present. Yoshio's HQ was at Papitalai, the bulk of troops at Lorengau with garrison units were on Rambutyo, Peli, Pak, and Pityilu Islands and at the inland village of Kawaliap. One battalion was also at Papitalai covering HQ. The 2nd Battalion, 1st Independent Mixed Regiment at Salami and 1st Battalion, 229th Regiment at Hyane Harbor with its main elements south of Momote. It was obvious the enemy was still present in force. The Scouts discovered a large bivouac area on the southeast part of Los Negros and reported that the region between the Momote air strip and the south coast was as I mentioned earlier "lousy with Japs." This further allowed Admiral Barbey to make more specific bombardment plans. Three fire support areas had been established for the attack group, consisting of nine destroyers and the three destroyer-transports which were carrying the reconnaissance force. These areas covered the entire seaward side of Los Negros from the south coast to the northern end of Salami Plantation. In the final plans the attack group would bring the weight of its firepower against targets around Hyane Harbor and to the north. Additional fire to cover the southern part of the island would be furnished by another task group of two cruisers and four destroyers, which would meet the convoy at Cape Cretin. It was decided to split this latter group, giving one cruiser and two destroyers responsibility for the Japanese bivouac area, southwest of the Momote strip, which the Alamo Scouts had located. The other cruiser and two destroyers would fire on targets in the Lorengau-Seeadler Harbor region. In the 15-minute bombardment, scheduled from H-35 to H-20, 5-inch naval guns were each to expend approximately 350 rounds. Under the air force plan, two groups of heavy bombers would attack ground targets on Los Negros from H-28 to H-20. Two minutes later, four groups of medium bombers were to bomb and strafe the landing area until the first wave was ashore. Following H Hour a squadron of medium bombers and six smoke planes were to be on air alert for further missions.  The Japanese did not anticipate a landing would be made at Momote, thus only a few elements of the 1st battalion, 229th regiment were there while the bulk of their forces were concentrated at the beaches of Seeadler Harbor and on the other side of the island. Now despite the Alamo scouts best efforts, there was quite a lot of unknown variables. In light of that the landings would be done simplistically. 3 waves of 12 LCPRS would carry the troops to White Beach, lying near Jamandilai Point. From there the reconnaissance force led by Brigadier-General William Chase would advance and hold Momote airstrip. If this proved too difficult, the men would be loaded back up and return to Oro Bay. Now in the event of a successful landing, the remainder of the 5th cavalry regiment would come over 2 days later and the rest of the cavalry division, the main body of the Brewer force, would follow the reconnaissance and support forces as soon as shipping could be made available. On February 27, the 2nd Squadron, 5th Cavalry led by Lt. Colonel William E. Lobit loaded up at Oro Bay, and the following morning departed aboard 3 APDs and nine destroyers under the command of Rear-Admiral William Fechteler. They would rendezvous with Admiral Kinkaid's light cruisers at 13:26, around Cape Cretin, with General MacArthur onboard, and finally would arrive at a point about 10 miles south of Los Negros at 6:00 on February 29. While the troops climbed aboard their LCPRs, Fechteler's destroyers opened fire on their assigned targets. Unfortunately, when the LCPRs reached the line of departure, about 3700 yards from the beaches, the defenders responded with heavy machine-gun and battery fire.At H-28 minutes enemy machine-gun fire opened on the boats, whom began maneuvering radically as they could. Machine-gun fire was also directed against the destroyers and the Phoenix group to the south. Heavier shore batteries opened up; flashes could be seen from d gun near Southeast Point on the island, and what appeared to be 3- or 4-inch shells landed in the vicinity of the Flusser and the Mahan. In response the Phoenix and Mahan fired upon the batteries and 9 B-25's strafed and bombed the area. Their participation was limited by a heavy overcast and a low ceiling. Of the 40 B-24s scheduled to arrive during the naval bombardment, only 3 appeared before their appointed time to bomb the target area at H-47 minutes. The planned missions of four groups of B-25s fared little better, only nine appearing and these later than scheduled. No communications had been established with the B-25s nor could any of the planes be seen from the flagship, so the plan was called off for stopping naval gunfire at H-20 minutes to permit low-level bombing and strafing. The naval bombardment was continued for another 15 minutes. The order to cease fire was given at H-5 minutes and, although no aircraft were visible, starshells were fired as the attack signal for any strafers that might be in the vicinity. The first wave of LCPRs reached the shore at 8:17, meeting slight enemy fire. Troop G led by 1st-Lieutenant Marvin Henshaw rushed beyond the narrow beach to the edge of a coconut plantation, taking cover under fallen trees and kunai grass. Here they laid prone, forming a rough half-circle with a 50-yard radius. They saw scattered groups of the enemy fleeing inland, some as far away as the other side of the air strip. Lieutenant Henshaw killed one with a long distance shot, and members of his platoon killed another. Not one of the soldiers who landed in the first wave was a casualty. As the bombardment lifted, the defenders gradually came out of their dugouts and began subjecting the returning boats to cross-fire. As the second wave approached, the enemy fire became so heavy, the LCPR's were forced to turn back so the Mahan, Flusser and Drayton could further bombard them. At 08:23, the second wave finally landed, moving swiftly past the troops of the first wave to a point 100 yards inland. 22 minutes later, the third wave landed, rapidly fanning south and establishing a line 300 yards inland by 09:00. Meeting slight opposition, the cavalrymen managed to secure the Momote airstrip by 9:50 and completely unloaded by 12:50. 4 of the LCPRs had been left out of action during the landings, so the reconnaissance force could not be evacuated. From the positions held by the first waves, the troops then gradually moved forward to cover the whole dispersal area of the airdrome, sending patrols beyond the airdrome which identified evidence of concerning recent Japanese activity. As patrols sent out beyond the airdrome began to report back, the commanders could decide the next move. One patrol had scouted 1,000 yards west to Porlaka without contact, and another almost as far north as the skidway before meeting any enemy, there was plenty of evidence that the Japanese had recently been in the vicinity in some strength. One patrol that went about a mile south found the hastily vacated quarters of a high-ranking officer, as well as a bivouac area, and fired at a fleeing Japanese officer. Another found three big kitchens and a warehouse of food. Although the Japanese in the area had offered negligible resistance, our command expected a change in the near future. Captured documents revealed that 200 antiaircraft personnel had been encamped nearby.  Given this information, General Chase decided to pull back to a perimeter due east of the airstrip and had the cavalrymen dig in for the night. During the afternoon the reconnaissance force organized its defenses, which presented many difficulties. A good foxhole required back-breaking efforts, because the soil was heavy with coral. Since there was no barbed wire to put around the beachhead, men and weapons had to be spaced closely and every man available used for the perimeter defense. The 40 field artillery officers and men were assigned sectors for close-in defense, because their two pack howitzers could not cover the critical space in front of the defense line from such a shallow depth as the perimeter allowed. They took over these sectors after the howitzers had blasted away for a while at the Japanese known to be in the skidway area. For heavy weapons support, the twelve 50-caliber machine guns of the antiaircraft unit were moved into positions along the front line. Signalmen strung the perimeter with wire to make the necessary hook-ups for officers in the chain of command, and removed the radio sets for communication with Sixth Army Headquarters from an advanced position to a more sheltered bomb crater. Outposts were stationed beyond the strip on the far edges of the dispersal area. Meanwhile, MacArthur came ashore during the afternoon and decorated the first man to land, Lieutenant Henshaw, with a Distinguished Service Cross. He decided to stay, ordering Chase to hold his position until the follow-up force arrived. MacArthur then returned to the Phoenix, which got underway shortly afterwards at 5:29 for Cape Sudest, taking with it all the ships except two destroyers.  On the Japanese side, Colonel Ezaki immediately ordered the 1st Battalion, 229th Regiment to attack the beachhead during the night and annihilate the enemy or die trying. Suspicions that the Momote landing was a diversion, however, would prevent him from sending the rest of his troops to assist. Colonel Ezaki issued the following orders to the infantry battalion defending the Hyane Harbor sector: “Tonight the battalion under Captain Baba will annihilate the enemy who have landed. This is not a delaying action. Be resolute to sacrifice your life for the Emperor and commit suicide in case capture is imminent. We must carry out our mission with the present strength and annihilate the enemy on the spot. I am highly indignant about the enemy's arrogant attitude. Remember to kill or capture all ranking enemy officers for our intelligence purposes…” As ordered, 200 men with 3 mortars; 2 platoons of the 229th Infantry and 1 platoon of crept up to the Americans during the night. Yet by the time they reached the American line, their movement was no longer coordinated and they could only achieve some minor infiltrations. Groups of 7 to 15 Japanese edging in, flinging grenades at the weapons that fired. The only way the Japanese could be seen was by the light of grenade explosions or when the attackers got close enough so that a cavalryman crouched in a fox hole could see them silhouetted against the sky. Many of the Japanese were cut down by machine-gun and rifle fire, but some got through and succeeded in cutting all telephone lines. Although infiltrations occurred on all edges of the perimeter, the attack was heaviest near the shore on the southern side. Here some Japanese reached the shore in the rear of the main defense line by swimming in from the sea with life preservers. The vegetation bordering the beach provided protection for these infiltrators. One group found an opening in the left flank of Troop E, holding the south sector, next to the field artillery unit that held along the shore. The enemy penetrated Troop E's defense line, entirely isolating the 3d Platoon. Without communication with its troop, the unit had to fight it out alone against very heavy attacks. Come daylight, the majority of the Japanese survivors had disappeared back into the jungle, leaving 66 dead against 7 Americans killed and 15 wounded. However, those who had infiltrated and reoccupied some of their former pillboxes and fortifications in the perimeter had to be cleared out by the tired cavalrymen.  During the afternoon, patrols were also sent west and north to check how much strength the enemy had and the perimeter was further contracted and tightened. At 5:00, 2 companies of the 229th regiment made another coordinated effort against the perimeter, yet its intensity was lowered by the death of the battalion commander. The afternoon was free from enemy activity except for a patrol which was discovered inside the perimeter at about 4:00. The patrol's mission was evidently to kill or capture the American commanding officer. It was led by Captain Baba, the commander of the battalion who made the major attack on the preceding night. Although operating in broad daylight, the patrol came close to succeeding. The Americans were confident that the morning's mop-up had taken care of all the enemy within the perimeter. Secondary growth was thick in the area and the Japanese were unnoticed until they were within 35 yards of the task force command post. Once the group was sighted, a considerable amount of fire was placed on it. The Japanese lay concealed in the undergrowth and a single sniper pecked away with his rifle in the direction of the CP. Not knowing the size of the party, Major Chiaramonte set out with four men "to get the sniper." The task force commander and his executive officer directed the movement of the group either right or left according to movements in the underbrush, and the soldiers and Major Chiaramonte opened up whenever they detected any movements. As Major Chiaramonte and his party finally entered the area on which they had been firing, they heard a click followed by grenade explosions. Three of the Japanese had committed suicide. Another rolled over on his back and used his sword to commit hara-kiri. Fifteen dead officers and sergeants were counted, including Captain Baba. Thus, the attackers were kept beyond the perimeter until nightfall, when the attack finally stopped.  On March 2, after clearing Jamandilai Point by 10:45, 6 LSTs landed the 1st Squadron, 5th Cavalry plus artillery and Seabees. While the troops landed, Captain Emile Dechaineux's and will be honest very curious how Americans would pronounce that one, like i've said before there is no rhyme or reason as to how Americans pronounce french last names haha, well Dechaineux's destroyers bombarded Hauwei Island and Hyane Harbor. With reinforcements in hand, General Chase launched a new attack to extend his perimeter. At 2:15 B-25's, P- 38's, and P-47's bombed and strafed the area. The western half of the airfield and the dispersal area were softened up for the ground attack, and the skidway and Hyane coast beyond were also targets. Bombs were also dropped on the strip of land forming the northern arm of the harbor. After this at 3:00 the two cavalry squadrons advanced across the airstrip, rapidly taking the entire aerodrome against light opposition and finally digging along a new perimeter.  To block possible enemy landings from across Hyane Harbor, two anti-aircraft batteries and E Company of the 592nd Boat and Shore Regiment defended the shore. Seabees formed an inner defense line to the west and northwest of the brigade. Six rough trenches were dug out by a bulldozer and ten men stationed in each. The remainder of the 40th Construction Battalion elements remained in their trench on the right flank, which was now a secondary line behind the troopers. The critical north and northwest sectors were the 2nd Squadron's responsibility. They prepared their positions with careful attention to interlocking bands of machine-gun fire, while the 1st Squadron dug in on the left flank. The first night in the enlarged beachhead passed by without a crisis. An attack came at 9:00pm, but it was not as severe as expected. The chief enemy effort was to push machine-gun parties and infiltration groups through the 2nd Squadron's sector, and in particular through that held by Troop G. Communication lines were cut, radio equipment was slightly damaged, and a few Japanese penetrated as far as the field artillery positions. The artillery, prepared for interdiction fire, was not called on.  The following morning, a systematic search for enemy troops within the position was started and all Japanese within the perimeter were killed while the Seabees began work on the airstrip. At the same time, Krueger arranged with Barbey to expedite the movement of the rest of the cavalry division. The 2nd Squadron, 7th Cavalry Regiment was to arrive on March 4; the remaining units of the 1st Brigade would arrive by March 6; and the 2nd Brigade was to arrive on March 9. At this point Colonel Ezaki realized his situation was desperate, his 1st battalion, 229th regiment was being obliterated. He moved his HQ from Papitalai to Papitalai Mission and began concentrating his garrison units at Lorengau. He also ordered the 2nd battalion ,1st independent regiment at Salami to perform an assault from the north, coordinating with the 229th regiment. Their advance was slowed by constant naval and land artillery fire, but they got into position by the night of March 3rd. The Americans expected the attack, as prior, an enemy officer patrol had attempted to land on the shore of Hyane Harbor. The platoon leader of the shore company guarding the beach there allowed the boat to come in to land, then opened fire, killing all members of the patrol. Among the valuable documents discovered on the bodies was one which gave the information that a strong attack would be launched that night.  With this knowledge, the Americans fortified their front line defenses. Since infiltration was still the greatest danger for a small force holding a large perimeter in jungle and darkness, the front line positions were of prime importance. To offer as little space as possible for infiltration, each troop in the line would use all three of its rifle platoons. Automatic weapons covering front-line positions were basic in the fire plans; each of these weapons, in turn, was protected by two, three, or four dugouts on both flanks and rear manned by two or three riflemen. The approaches to these positions were strewn with mines, and trip signals were made of empty "C"-ration cans with lumps of coral inside for clappers, and hung on lengths of wire strung taut ten inches off the ground. In organizing defenses, good use was made of Japanese revetments, built to protect their airplanes in the dispersal bays on the airstrip. These revetments were steep banks of earth reaching some 15 feet high; usually a large one was at the end of a bay with two smaller embankments flanking it to form a pattern which, from the air, looked like cleats on the sole of a football shoe. Near the crest of some of these mounds, on the reverse slopes, cavalrymen dug foxholes. Two 30-caliber water-cooled machine guns were then placed on the flat ground alongside the bunker and mounted to fire across the front of the position.  All the 81-mm mortars were massed near the center of the perimeter, while all the 60-mm mortars were moved close to the front line. The water-cooled 50-caliber machine guns of the antiaircraft were returned to their units, except for those on the northern end of the air strip. This side of the perimeter faced the skidway, whence the chief attack was expected. Patrols had met the greatest opposition when working in this direction and toward Porlaka; enemy barges and troop concentrations had also been sighted on the northwestern shore of Hyane Harbor.  Nearby naval units would also coordinate by firing upon any Japanese concentration discovered. At 9pm the Japanese began their attack as a single Japanese bomber dropped 8 bombs.  As soon as the plane had departed, two yellow flares went up from the vicinity of Podaka, and a tracer, apparently 20-mm, was fired almost vertically from a position in front of the Troop B sector to the southwest. Almost immediately an attack supported by mortar fire was launched there as well as against the position held by Troops F and G to the northwest. The attack against the 1st Squadron on the southwest was relatively light, the enemy strength here being estimated later at two reinforced platoons. Since the 1st Squadron's sector was covered by a heavy growth of secondary jungle forest, infiltration was a great danger. The sited positions of our automatic weapons were of little value in the darkness, so the cavalrymen picked up the guns and fired them from the hip. The Japanese moved automatic weapons forward apparently with no other plan of action than to set them up in the open in front of our lines, depending on darkness to conceal their positions. The excited talking of the crews gave their positions away and they became easy targets for the defending riflemen. The attackers were blanketed by mortar fire accurately placed 20 to 50 yards in front of the perimeter. Nevertheless, many of the enemy did infiltrate, some as far as the south end of the air strip where they hid in heavy brush or climbed trees to begin sniper operations at dawn. Because of the relative weakness of the attacking force, there was never any real danger that the 1st Squadron's positions would be overrun.   The attack upon the 2nd Squadron's position on the northwest was a greater threat, with over a battalion, as later estimated, advancing on this sector from the direction of Pori aka and the skidway against the whole of Troop G's position and the right flank of Troop F. Apparently the enemy's intention was to drive our troops from their perimeter and occupy the north end of the air strip. The attacks against the sector held by Troops E and F were limited to infiltrations toward mortar positions and command posts. The rear installations were covered hy enemy mortar fire and machinegun fire while Japanese with grenades closed in on them and overran the positions. The Seabees, holding their secondary defense line behind the cavalry on the north side of the perimeter, also felt the effects of the furious attacks. Cavalrymen whose guns were knocked out, or who had run out of ammunition, carne back to the Seabees' trenches. When a weak place developed toward the left side of the Seabees' positions, their extra ammunition was at the other end of their line. First the men passed the ammunition to the front line by throwing the boxes from hole to hole, but when that seemed too slow they got out of their holes and ran with it, holding it low.  The Japanese advanced relentlessly, talking and singing though damaged and hampered by antipersonnel mines and booby traps, until they were cut down by the fierce machine-gun fire of the cavalrymen. Yet more and more kept coming behind them, marching over the bodies of the first. The Americans hunkered down in their holes and fired upon anything that moved,  continuing to inflict heavy casualties. The Japanese attempted a number of tricks and were occasionally successful. Somehow they learnt the names of platoon leaders. On one occasion a Japanese yelled, "Retreat, Thorne, the whole regiment's falling back to another line." This caused the mortar platoon commanded by 1st Lt. William D. Thorne to leave their positions. Not only did the platoon suffer three casualties, but it was unable to direct its mortar fire during the rest of the night. Another trick was to have individuals move about in front of the perimeter to draw the fire of machine guns. Then two or three snipers would fire tracers at any weapon that disclosed itself, enabling a mortar to open up on the position. Several cases of wiretapping of a 90-mm anti-aircraft battery took place between 10:30 and midnight, the wire-tapper claiming to be, on one occasion, a certain officer commanding a platoon, and on another, a sergeant. He reported in each case the disruption of our plans and the success of the enemy. Since his voice was not recognized, his messages were not heeded. However, a later message, although believed false, made the 211th Coast Artillery (AA) Battalion change its CP. At 11:30 a single enemy plane with landing lights on made several runs at a low altitude dropping flares. In spite of orders to hold their fire, the anti-aircraft battery opened up on the fourth run and drove the plane to the north, where it dropped bombs on Japanese positions.  Japanese using knives and grenades managed to get themselves into Troop G's defenses. A ferocious counterattack by the cavalrymen would shortly regain the positions just in time to face another strong frontal attack, in which more Japanese were cut down in front of the 2nd Squadron. By daylight, the infantry attacks were finally over, with the cavalrymen counting over 750 Japanese dead as they established a new outpost line on March 4. Against them, the Americans lost 61 killed and 244 wounded, 9 of the dead and 38 of the wounded were Seabees. That same day was met with another heavy bombardment of the Japanese positions, then the 2nd Squadron, 7th Cavalry landed against slight enemy resistance. The defensive perimeter was strengthened again and the damage of the previous night was repaired. Colonel Ezaki now believed that his troops had successfully pierced the American first line of defense and thus ordered to continue the attack that night; but upon learning the truth and how many casualties he had suffered, he decided to cancel the attack and ordered a general withdrawal towards Lorengau, leaving some units to hold Papitalai and delay the American advance. 600  men had been lost in the skidway area and in the attacks upon the perimeter. The remaining 200, with an additional 100 stragglers from other disorganized units, were ordered to retreat through Salami Beach and across Papitalai Harbor to Papitalai Mission. Natives on Mokerang Peninsula later told the Angau Party that the Japanese retreat developed into a rout. They were panic-stricken; some did not even wait to take paddles for the native canoes that they had appropriated for their escape to Papitalai Mission. Not more than 80 Japanese, frantic from fear and exhaustion, arrived at the mission to bolster the force already there. By the 5th, General Swift arrived to the secured  beachhead in the Admiralties, and with the arrival of the 12th Cavalry Regiment the following day, he was now ready to launch an offensive west towards Seeadler Harbor, the Lorengau airdrome and north against Salami Plantation. The same day, to clear the way for the 2nd Brigade's landing at Red Beach, General Swift ordered the 2nd Squadron, 7th Cavalry to move across the skidway to a point about 500 yards north. Despite a thorough artillery support, the advance did not go smoothly, with the Japanese immediately launching a strong attack from both Porlaka and the native skidway. Luckily the few Japanese who penetrated the position were killed, around 25 of them and the attack was broken up by mortar and artillery fire. At 4:30, the squadron finally began their offensive, moving with difficulty across a mined area and only gaining about 500 yards by nightfall.  The next morning, the squadron advanced, with the 12th Cavalry soon joining them. Despite the occasional pillboxes and the congested trail, the cavalrymen made ample progress towards the beaches of Seeadler Harbor and closed in on Salami by 4:30. To further secure the harbor, General Swift planned to clear the enemy presence at the Mokerang Peninsula, Papitalai Mission and Lombrum Point. That day, the 5th Cavalry had already begun the work of clearing the southern shore of Seeadler Harbor by pushing patrols west from the airstrip. Finding much more enemy corpses that opposition, Troop F would be able to establish a bridgehead at Porlaka. At 12:00 on the 7th, after an artillery bombardment, a reconnaissance patrol consisting of 40 volunteers from Troop B, led by Capt. William C. Cornelius advanced across Lemondrol Creek and successfully landed on Papitalai against an estimated 50 Japanese defenders. Captain Cornelius, leading the first wave, was reported to have single-handedly killed four of the enemy with rifle fire and grenades while operating 50 yards in advance of the troops. Yet severely wounded, he would die the next day; for his courage and leadership he was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.  The Japanese quickly withdrew. Simultaneously after a heavy air and artillery bombardment, the 2nd Squadron, 12th Cavalry departed Salami and advanced across Seeadler Harbor to land on Papitalai Mission, meeting heavy resistance.  By nightfall, Troop G had secured a beachhead, though it would have to break up three determined counterattacks during the night. This ultimately forced the Japanese to pull out from their beach defenses at Papitalai Mission and retreat towards Lorengau, allowing the cavalrymen to secure the beachhead the following morning. By 12:00 on the 8th, supplies for the 2nd Squadron, 7th Cavalry's attack on Lombrum Plantation also began arriving at Red Beach over the difficult road from Momote. Equipping the 12th Cavalry and the 2nd Squadron, 7th Cavalry, at Salami with enough supplies to carry on their overwater attacks was a difficult and hazardous operation. The single road from Momote to Salami was impassable for most vehicles during the days when the supplies were most urgently needed. Buffaloes got through by going overwater part of the way, but the rest of the essential supplies had to be dropped from airplanes or sent in LCMs from Momote around Mokerang Peninsula. The sending of LCMs into Seeadler Harbor was an operation which was possible only after continued naval efforts from D-Day on. Magnetic mines, dropped by American planes in May 1943, were presumably still in the harbor and had to be removed. To make entry into the harbor safe for their forces, destroyers also had to neutralize the Japanese harbor defense guns, which had already proved effective. The destroyers and minesweepers worked to accomplish these missions, but even by 7 March, when six LCMs loaded with supplies were to make their way around the point, it was not certain that enemy resistance on the islands guarding the harbor had completely disintegrated.  LCMs then successfully landed TROOP E, F and G on Lombrum two hours later against sporadic fire. The Americans extended their perimeter by 5:00, successfully completing the task of securing Seeadler Harbor while other units of the 12th Cavalry secured the Mokerang Peninsula to cover the north flank of the 2nd Brigade's landing. On the 9th, the 2nd Brigade successfully landed at Salami while destroyers pounded the main Japanese positions at Lorengau. This ended the first phase of Operation Brewer. The Americans had suffered a total of 116 killed and 434 wounded during their occupation of Los Negros while counting 1288 enemy dead by March 8. Their next objective would be Lorengau airdrome on Manus Island, but that it for the Admiralties as we now need to travel over to New Britain. Over on New Britain, General Rupertus was planning to invade the Willaumez Peninsula in order to cut off the Japanese retreat line there and take the Talasea airdrome. He assigned the 5th marines under Colonel Oliver Smith for the task. They were going land at a point about midway on the west coast of the Willaumez Peninsula north of Volupai, labeled Beach Red. The chosen zone of operations was about as good as the Marines could have found. It presented them with a short, comparatively flat route to their objective which might make possible utilization of tanks. A dirt track approximately four miles long connected Beach Red with Bitokara, and although it was not designed for motor transport, the Marines could hope. Beach Red contained about as much depth as Beaches Yellow 1 and Yellow 2 in the Gloucester landings, but was more confined on its flanks. Its 350 yards of sand nestled between a cliff on the right and a swamp on the left. The cliff constituted the northwestern slope of Little Mt. Worri, a mass rising 1360 feet above the beach and enfolding the native villages of Liapo to the south and Volupai on the west. Overlooking this smaller mountain from the south was Big Mt. Worri, higher by 300 feet and with a more encompassing base. Included in its ridge line was Mt. Schleuther, on the peninsula's eastern coast which dominated Bitokara, Talasea and the Waru villages from an altitude of 1130 feet. Volupai Plantation was 400 yards inland from Beach Red, containing a collection of small buildings and groves of coconut palms and cacao trees. Volupai track, linking Beach Red with Bitokara, skirted the northern bases of the several mountains. The country, except for the plantations and villages, was typical of New Britain: overgrown jungle and underbrush. Sea and air control in the New Britain area had passed so completely into Allied hands that it was decided to transport the assault forces from Iboki to Volupai in a convoy of 38 LCMs, 17 LCVPs and 5 LCTs, with only 5 PT boats as escorts. Furthermore, on March 3rd, an amphibious patrol landed on Cape Bastian and managed to contact friendly natives in order to learn that the enemy had a weak presence in the area. This was the reinforced 7th Company, 54th Regiment, which had been sent by General Sakai to defend Talasea while the bulk of the Matsuda and Komori Detachments retreated towards Malalia. Sakai was planning to engage the enemy in a decisive battle with the entire force of the 17th Division; but on February 23, General Imamura had ordered him to withdraw towards Rabaul. Thus Sakai assigned the 17th Provisional Battalion to secure Toriu; the 2nd Battalion, 53rd Regiment to hold Ulamona; the 39th Anti-Aircraft Battalion to remain at Malalia; the 17th Engineer Regiment to facilitate the crossing of the Kapuira River; and the 17th Transport Regiment to establish supply depots at Ubai, Butiolo and Sulu. He also ordered the bulk of the 54th Regiment to leave some naval units at Gasmata and begin to retreat towards Amio and then Ubai, where barges were to finally evacuate the detachment. Over in Bougainville, General Griswold's 14th Corps had just taken over the protection of the Cape Torokina base. As such, nearly 62000 men were stationed in the area, defenses were consolidated, and an impressive artillery complement under Brigadier-General Leo Kreber was directed to cover the perimeter. During this period of consolidation, the most important actions were the establishment of an important Fijian outpost at Ibu village. One of the most effective units operating under corps command was the 1st Battalion of the Fiji Infantry Regiment. This battalion, consisting of 777 enlisted men and 34 officers, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel J.B.K. Taylor of the New Zealand Army, whom arrived at Bougainville in late December. Taylor was wounded the first night ashore and was replaced as commander by Major Gregory Upton, who was in charge of the battalion during its long-range patrols in late December and January. The Fijian troops were well trained, proud of their uniforms and ability to march, and according to reports, loved to sing a wide variety of Fijian songs as well as the more modern American tunes. Almost immediately after their arrival, plans were under way to use their unique abilities as jungle fighters to establish a combat outpost far to the east of the mountain range, most of which was controlled by the Japanese. The managed to gain valuable information on Japanese movements before withdrawing in late February, and a successful expansion of the perimeter east of the mouth of the Torokina River. But the first real test of the Corps in Bougainville was approaching.  Under immense pressure from his superiors, General Hyakutake had been preparing to launch his main counterattack, codenamed Operation TA, since early January. He assembled over 15000 men from his total strength of nearly 40000 to take part in the operation. General Kanda the 6th Division commander was given command of the force and his mission was simple. 3 task forces, named after their commanders; the Iwasa unit of Major General Iwasa Shun consisting of the 23rd Infantry Regiment, the 2nd Battalion of the 13th Regiment, attached engineering troops, and two batteries of light field artillery and a mortar battalion–in all, approximately 4,150 men; the Magata Unit, commanded by Colonel Magata Isashi, consisting of most of the 45th Infantry Regiment (less 2nd Battalion), with artillery, mortar battalions, and engineers attached–a total of approximately 4,300 men; The smallest of the forces, the Muda Unit, commanded by Colonel Muda Toyohorei , consisted of the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 13th Regiment and an engineering company–a total of 1,350 men.  These 3 units would  attack strongpoints in the American perimeter. Thus, the Iwasa Unit was to strike towards Hill 700 on the right flank of the 37th Division line and then drive directly toward the two Piva airfields, which Hyakutake planned to capture by March 10; the Magata Unit was to take the low ground west of Hill 700 and then drive south to capture the Torokina airstrip by March 17; and the Muda Unit was to seize Hills 260 and 309 in the Americal sector and then capture the strategically-important Hill 608 by March 10. Bougainville was about to see some major action. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Despite the admiralty islands certainly holding significant enemy units, General MacArthur went ahead with his reconnaissance in force and turned it into a full blown invasion. Yet again MacArthur proved, he was willing to do whatever necessary to make sure the drive of the Pacific pointed in the direction of the Philippines.

Why We Fight ~ 1944
Operation Flintlock: Battle of Kwajalein - JAN-FEB 1944

Why We Fight ~ 1944

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 26, 2024 89:40


In this episode, Lt.Col. Brian Kerg tells the story of the Battle of Kwajalein, part of Operation Flintlock. The Battle of Kwajalein began on 31 JAN 1944 and continued for several days into February. At this time we see the US Army and US Marine Corps commanders applying the lessons learned just a couple of months earlier at Tarawa, as well as some comparisons to what the Americans and Allies are experiencing in Italy around the same time. Links Coral and Brass by Holland M. Smith (https://www.amazon.com/Coral-Brass-Holland-M-Smith/dp/1548048631) Eastern Mandates: The US Army Campaigns in World War II (https://history.army.mil/html/books/072/72-23/CMH_Pub_72-23.pdf) The Eastern Mandates Campaign: A Staff Ride Guide for Operation FLINTLOCK - The Seizure of Kwajalein Atoll (https://www.smdc.army.mil/Portals/38/Documents/Publications/History/Staff%20Ride/CompleteBook.pdf) The United States Army in World War II - The War in the Pacific: Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls (https://history.army.mil/html/books/005/5-6-1/CMH_Pub_5-6-1.pdf) Marines in World War II - Commemorative Series Breaking the Outer Ring: Marine Landings in the Marshall Islands (https://www.usmcu.edu/Portals/218/Breaking%20the%20Outer%20Ring-Marine%20Landing%20in%20the%20Marshall%20Islands%20PCN%2019000312400.pdf?ver=2018-10-30-102929-470) Why We Fight Bonus Content (https://www.patreon.com/motheroftanks) --- Send in a voice message: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/mother-of-tanks/message

The Pacific War - week by week
- 117 - Pacific War - Operation Hailstone: the Smashing of Truk , February 13-20, 1944

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 13, 2024 47:24


Last time we spoke about Operation Flintlock, the invasion of Kwajalein. The Americans had unleashed an incredible amount of air, sea and land forces against the Marshall Islands. The amphibious invasion of most of the islands saw little resistance, but on Kwajalein they would meet a determined enemy. The Americans achieved strategic surprise; artillery preparation, naval gunfire, and aerial bombardment had successfully softened up the target in a fashion unexcelled at any other time in the Pacific War; the ship-to-shore movement had been conducted expeditiously and without too many hiccups; supplies flowed ashore and to the front lines relatively smoothly and without interruption; the infantry-engineer teams assisted by tanks moved steadily clearing the enemy from shelters and pillboxes; and American casualties had been fairly light. Altogether, the battle for Kwajalein represented the ideal for all military operations. Then we covered a bit of the Burma front where the allies unleashing an offensive, while the Japanese unleashed Operation HA-GO. This episode is Operation Hailstone: the Smashing of Truk Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  For those who came rushing over to see the scene at Kwajalein descriptions given were comically noted as “a hell of a Spruance Haircut, with some Mitscher shampoo”. Looking down at Roi and Namur a F6F pilot recalled “ it looked like “the moon,” or “plowed ground.” The beach and roads were strewn with the charred and misshapen remains of equipment, tanks, and armored vehicles. I don't think there was a stick of anything standing. It looked just completely beaten up.” A sailor who visited one of the captured atolls had observed “palms were shredded where shells and bomb fragments had made direct hits, leaving stumps that looked like old-fashioned shaving brushes stuck, bristles up, in the sand”. Holland Smith was greatly annoyed by the number of sightseers who came to Kwajalein stating. a “regular tourist haunt. . . . The big army and navy brass from Pearl Harbor descended on us like flies. The photographers had a gala day snapping pictures against the background of shelled buildings, while visiting brass hunted for samurai swords and other souvenirs.”  Meanwhile a single battalion was assigned to capture Majuro, and their battle would consist of walking up some beaches completely unopposed. The Japanese garrison had pulled out a week earlier. Admiral Hill declared the atoll secure only 2 hours after landings were made. Its huge anchorage would accommodate all the mobile floating logistical assets of Service Squadron 10 and for the time being became the principal advance base for the 5th fleet. Jaluit, Mille, Wotje and Maloelap, which had sizable Japanese garrisons, would not be invaded by the Allied forces. Since the Japanese were cut off from outside assistance, the garrisons were doing no harm to the Allied effort, so they would be left alone, thus saving many American and Japanese lives by not forcing the issue.  But Eniwetok Atoll would not be bypassed, because she held the second largest lagoon in the Marshall Islands. As Admiral Nimitz and his commanders considered the repercussions of their surprising quick and low cost victory, they soon elected to accelerate the schedule of future operations in the region. Eniwetok had been originally slabbed for May, but it seemed obvious the Japanese power in the Marshalls was crumbling a lot faster than anticipated. Consequently, Admiral Nimitz knew it would be necessary to capture the atoll to give shelter to all the ships he intended to deploy westward in the drive against the Japanese inner empire. Since it now seemed Brigadier-General Thomas Watson's 8000 reserve troops of the 22nd Marines and the 106th Regiment would no longer be required, Admirals Spruance and Hill began preparing them for the invasion of Eniwetok. However Eniwetok was within Truk's air combat radius, thus to hit Eniwetok, they would first have to neutralize what was called the Gibraltar of the Pacific, Truk. Prior to WW2, Truk was neither well developed nor well defended. Although the US feared the Japanese had been fortifying Truk for nearly two decades; in truth, the Japanese largely ignored Truk after capturing it during WW1. When the Pacific War started on December 7, 1941, only a few coastal batteries and naval minefields added since November 1939 covered the passes into Truk Lagoon. Few other defenses, including inadequate anti-aircraft artillery, protected it. To the US Navy, Truk appeared impregnable and sailors spoke the name in awe‑struck tones. This was because Truk needed few artificial defenses to make it virtually impregnable to surface invasion. Truk was a naturally sheltered and easily defended anchorage, large enough to accommodate the entire IJN and out of range of enemy naval guns. Their defense, however, depended on the air garrison, one of the strongest in Japan's Southeast Pacific theater. Dangerous long‑range reconnaissance flights flown by B‑24s from bases in the Gilberts in December 1943 managed to bring back photos that allowed intelligence officers to map out the air bases and the various anchorages in the lagoon. Analysts thus began to realize there was not as much there as expected. And thus Operations Catchpole and Hailstone were born. Catchpole would be the invasion of Eniwetok while Hailstone would be the neutralization of Truk and as a secondary objective, to discern if Truk could be bypassed similarly as Rabaul or Maloelap  was. Operation Hailstone would be bigger than December's raid against Kwajalein. Vice-Admiral Raymond Spruance's 5th fleet would deploy Task Group 50.9 and three of Task Force 58's four fast carrier task groups. Task Force 50 was under Spruance himself while Admiral Mitscher had command over the carrier task force. Spruance would also had overall command over the operation. Fleet carriers Enterprise, Yorktown, Essex, Intrepid, and Bunker Hill and light carriers, Belleau Wood, Cabot, and Monterey would be launched aircraft in the operation. Admiral Lea would control a fast striking force consisting of light carrier Cowpens, and battleships Iowa, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Alabama, South Dakota and North Carolina. 10 submarines would be lurking like sharks around Truk independently seeing if they could possibly intercept some IJN forces or rescue down US pilots during the attack. To prepare for the operation, on February 4th a lone PB4Y Liberator launched off Torokina's airfield to carry out reconnaissance of Truk. The photos indicated that Truk Lagoon held a battleship, two aircraft carriers, six heavy cruisers and four light cruisers, 20 destroyers, and 12 submarines. The PB4Y was spotted and fired on by warships in the harbor and several fighters were launched to intercept, but only one, a floatplane fighter, came close enough to open fire. The pilot managed to high tail it out of there safely.  The American reconnaissance flight alerted Admiral Koga that they could expect a heavy raid at any moment, so he ordered all his warships to depart the lagoon before February 21st, the date they predicted the Americans would hit. The departure was extremely hasty. 2 auxiliary aircraft carriers had just arrived at Truk the previous month. When the departure order came, they haphazardly unloaded their aircraft in order to leave quickly. The aircraft were left parked nose-to-tail on airport aprons and taxiways. Cargo ships equally hastily unloaded stores so they could leave. Fuel barges were drained to top off the tanks of the Combined Fleet's major units. They had to be tediously refilled from tankers, a task made difficult by choppy seas kicked up by rough weather between February 13 and 15. On February 12, most of the Combined Fleet's major units left Truk for Palau. The light cruiser Agano, previously damaged and under repair, could not depart until February 16. Its departure was so late that it would be caught and sunk by the newly arrived US submarine screen. Other ships were still preparing to leave, their departure delayed by bad weather and slow refueling. Of those ships trapped still at Truk were the 4th fleet of Vice-Admiral Kobayashi Masami, consisting of light cruiser Naka; destroyers Maikaze and Oite, alongside some units of the 8th Fleet and several transports. There were also various auxiliary, destroyer, repair ships, transports and the 6th Fleet of Vice-Admiral Takagi Takeo headquarters. On February 5th, Admiral Hill learnt he would be commanding the Eniwetok expeditionary forces and have less than two weeks to prepare them. Moving up the invasion of Eniwetok required stripping the new garrisons of Kwajalein and Roi-Namur of manpower and supplies. The landing boat crews were green and had no real training with the troops. As recalled by General Watson “the infantry, amphibian tractors, amphibian tanks, tanks, aircraft, supporting naval ships, and most of the staffs concerned had never worked together before.” Yet we will be talking about Eniwetok in the next episode so we will be diving straight into Hailstone. Operation Hailstone had been long on American drawing board. On December 26, 1943, Admiral Nimitz had informed King that he thought the operation would become feasible by the following April, but he pledged to do it earlier if circumstances allowed: “Much depends on extent of damage inflicted on enemy in all areas in next 2 months.” Located 669 miles southwest of Eniwetok, Truk was a colossal atoll, it held a cluster of around a dozen islands near the center of its lagoon. Around 2000 Micronesian natives lived on the islands, mostly in thatch huts on grassy plains and beaches. There was a sense of dread amongst the aviators and crewmen of the task forces assigned to the operation. They were to attack the “mystery base”, Truk had acquired a reputation as an unassailable fortress. It was thought to be a major hub of Japanese airpower, defended by hundreds of crack pilots in Zeros. The task forces sortied westward on February 12th and no Japanese would bother their approach. The carriers got to their assembly point 90 miles northeast of Dublon before sunrise on February 17th. AT 4:43am the operation kicked off when 5 fleet carriers launched 72 Hellcats to go knock out the enemy air power prior to sending in the bombers. This was a new technique Admiral Mitscher had concocted himself. The Japanese were caught completely unprepared, no Japanese aircraft were in the air when radar picked up the incoming aircraft. The IJN's 22nd and 26th Air Flotilla's were on shore leave and their radar had difficulty detecting low flying aircraft, a weakness allied intelligence exploited. Despite this, the Japanese tossed 90 aircraft, half of which attempted to intercept the US fighters without coordination.  Within minutes of combat, 30 Japanese fighters were shot down, by the end of the engagement a total of 55 would fall. The Americans lost 4 Hellcats, and at least one according to VF-6 pilot Alex Vraciu was a victim of friendly fire. “There were dog fights all over the place. I even saw one of our Hellcats shoot another Hellcat down. It was a great deflection shot but . . . one of our guys just shot first before being sure and this other poor pilot was forced to parachute out. In the course of the action, I saw a number of Japanese parachutes in the air.” The American pilots had expected to be facing 200 Japanese aircraft. According to estimates given in postwar interrogations, the Japanese had 68 operational airplanes on the Moen field; 27 on the Dublon field; 20 on Eten and 46 on Param, for a total of 161. Parked on the big field at Eten were some 180 aircraft that were damaged, most grounded for lack of spare parts, or immobilized for lack of aircrews. Most of these would be destroyed on the ground. Although Admiral Koga anticipated the American move against Truk, air and naval forces were not on the alert when the American planes suddenly appeared overhead. According to Masataka Chihaya, a staff officer with the 4 Fleet, the pilots, ground personnel, and ships' crews had been kept in 24hr readiness since the overflight of the 2 marine PB4Ys two weeks earlier, and had reached a state of collective exhaustion. Another factor to the catastrophe was that of morale and even discipline had eroded since the withdrawal of the heavy warships. Pilots had refused to climb into their cockpits when ordered, many had gone absent without leave. The atoll's commander, Vice Admiral Masami Kobayashi, had apparently concluded that the American fleet was still engaged in the Marshalls, and authorized a downgrade in the alert level. On February 16, many pilots and other personnel had left their barracks for R&R. The morning of the American raid found a large proportion of Truk's aviators asleep in the atoll's largest town, on the island of Dublon, having partied pretty hard into the night at local drinking establishments. Their only means of returning to their airfield on the island of Eten was by ferry, and the ferry could not accommodate all of them at once. Many aircraft, both on Eten and on the airfields of Moen and Param islands, had also been disarmed and drained of fuel. Kobayashi's ignominious failure to keep his forces on alert put an end to his naval career; he was relieved of command and then forced to retire from active service. Having swept the skies of opposition by 6:00am, the Hellcats began strafing the seaplane base at Dublon and the airfields on Moen, Eten, and Param, successfully destroying another 40 aircraft on the ground. As the fighter sweep was ending, 18 Avengers emerged dropping their payloads onto the airfields,  neutralizing Truks air power. As such, the living hell created by strafing and bombs saw a total of 125 operational aircraft and 110 air arsenal aircraft get destroyed or seriously damaged on the ground. With Truk's air power neutralized, the next American objective was to hit the shipping in the lagoon, so the carriers then began launching full deckload strikes, staggering the launches so that there were aircraft over Truk virtually continuously for the rest of the day. James D. Ramage, flying a VB-10 Dauntless, noted that several Zeros flew by him without offering combat. He assumed that they were dispirited by the one-sided results of the air fight and were determined to survive it. It was a syndrome that had become increasingly common during the later stages of the South Pacific air campaign.  Due to the lack of air cover or warning, many merchant ships were caught at anchor with only the islands' anti-aircraft guns for defense. At 07:30, the first shipping began to be attacked. Yorktown's bombers rapidly sinking the cargo ship Fujikawa Maru and then bombing the submarine tender Rio de Janeiro Maru was hit by 1,000lb bombs dropped by Yorktown SBD Dauntlesses east of Uman. It stayed afloat, but sank the next day. Another submarine tender, the Heian Maru, headquarters of Vice-Admiral Takagi Takeo was hit twice , but the ship would successfully survive the relentless American attacks, then offloading Takagi on Dublon after sunset. By 9:23am, Lee's battleships, heavy cruisers and destroyers came in to try and catch escaping ships. Some Japanese vessels attempted to flee via the atoll's North Pass; but were bottled up by the aerial attack and by Lee's warships, most of them would be successfully sunk by 13:00.  The famed marine fighter ace Major Gregory “Pappy” Boyington, of the Black Sheep squadron VMF-214, had been shot down and captured off Rabaul a week before Hailstone. Alongside other POW's he was flown into Truk while the raid was developing. As the Betty bomber carrying them rolled to a stop, Pappy and his fellow prisoners were thrown out onto the airstrip. They looked up and were shocked to see an F6F Hellcat flying low over the airfield, walking .50-caliber fire across  parked planes. The bomber from which they had just been ejected went up in a sheet of flame. The Americans were shoved into a pit by the side of the airfield, and watched the action overhead and cheered for the attackers. Pappy recalled this “There was so much excitement I couldn't do any differently. I just had to see those Nip planes, some of the light planes like the Zeros, jump off the ground from the explosion of our bombs and come down “cl-l-l-lang,” just like a sack of bolts and nuts. The planes caught on fire and the ammunition in them began going off. There were 20-mm cannon shells and 7.7's bouncing and ricocheting all around this pit. Some of these hot pieces we tossed back out of the pit with our hands”. Enterprise dive-bombers dropped 1,000-pound armor-piercing bombs on targets chosen from the aerial photos taken earlier. The planes hurtled down through flak bursts and smashed the stationary ships. A bomb hit the stern of the 13,000-ton Hoyo Maru. The 7,000-ton aviation stores ship Kiyozumi Maru and lit her up. A VT-6 Avenger flew low over the ammunition ship, the Aikoku Maru, and landed a bomb dead-center amidships. The target went up in a huge, rolling ball of flame that engulfed the plane and destroyed it. The shockwave was powerful enough to rock Lieutenant Ramage's aircraft, more than 2,000 feet overhead. “It was, I think, the biggest explosion I've ever seen, other than the atomic bombs. It was just an enormous blast.” 5 ships managed to escape the carnage within the lagoon. The light cruiser Katori, auxiliary cruiser Akagi Maru, destroyers Maikaze and Nowaki, and the small trawler, Shonan Maru. Unfortunately for them they ran directly into Lee's force at 1:30pm. Only the destroyer Nowaki managed to outrun the Americans as she fired a spread of torpedoes trying to keep the Americans at a distance. Spruance was ultimately the one who ordered the surface ships to come into the combat area and this resulted in close calls for friendly fire. Mitscher would continuously order pilots to hold back their payloads against fleeing ships and wait for identification first. Many of the aviators would accuse Spruance of seeking to have “the big guns” get their taste of the blood. But the big guns would basically only finish off some crippled ships. Minneapolis and New Orleans sank two immobilized ships with 3-4 salvos. Meanwhile the USS New Jersey nearly took two torpedo hits from a sinking IJN destroyer. American ships came to the ailing IJN vessel trying to pick up survivors, but almost all the Japanese sailors took their own lives. The Iowa would take a bomb hit from a Japanese aircraft, but suffered little damage. If one or more of the American surface ships were hit by torpedoes, it may have very well cost Spruance his command. The ordinarily conservative fleet commander had behaved with impulsive bravado, and it seems for no better reason than a blackshoe's inborn desire to claim a piece of the action for the big guns. Admiral Sherman's tactful conclusion was that “this expedition accomplished little and only complicated the attacks by the carrier planes.” Lieutenant Ramage was less gentle: “So the big battleships finally drew blood against a cruiser that was almost dead in the water. It must have been a great victory.” The death toll for the first day of Hailstone was more than 20 Japanese ships sunk, but the fun was not over. 6-7 Radar-equipped B5Ns capable of tracking ships at night launched perhaps from Rabaul or Saipan, hunting for the US carriers. They were spotted on radar as they approached the US ships. Night fighters attempted to intercept them, but were unable to find them in the darkness. The task force maneuvered to avoid the incoming bombers, which would have worked if the Japanese were using aircraft blindly flying a standard search pattern. However, the radar-equipped Nakajimas detected the course change and continued to home in on the carriers. Between 7:00 and 10:00, the aircraft made several approaches to the US ships, but were kept at a distance by heavy radar-directed anti-aircraft fire. The Yorktown launched a night fighter F4U Corsair at 9:20 to intercept a particularly persistent Nakajima, vectoring the fighter towards the torpedo bomber. But for once, the Japanese used radar to better advantage than the US, so the Corsair never made contact with the Nakajima. The Nakajima was then able to press its attack, launching a torpedo at the USS Intrepid. It struck near the starboard quarter, jamming the rudder, killing 11 aboard, and wounding 17. The B5N that dropped the torpedo apparently escaped unharmed. Intrepid was in no danger of sinking, but made her way to Majuro to be safe. The Americans then launched their own night attack on Japanese shipping in Truk Atoll. At 2:00 am, the USS Enterprise launched a flight of 12 radar-equipped Avengers to attack the surviving Japanese ships in Truk Lagoon. Each aircraft was armed with 4 500-pound bombs. The concept of performing a low-altitude night attack, with the planes guided to the targets by radar alone, had been studied and discussed but never attempted before. It required the pilots to navigate to Truk on instruments alone. Once over the lagoon, they circled over the anchorages until radar echoes provided an image of the targets. The mission would be a tactical breakthrough, unprecedented in the annals of aviation or naval history. Lieutenant Commander William I. Martin, who trained the airmen, recalled “Radar displays at that time required an operator to do a great deal of interpreting. It was like learning a new language. Instead of it being a polar plot, looking down on it like a map, the cathode ray tube just gave indications that there was an object out there. After considerable practice, a radar operator could determine that there was a ship there and its approximate size. You related the blip on the radar scope to the image of the ship”. In about 30 minutes, the Avengers made 25 passes over Dublon and Eten, scoring 13 direct hits on ships, two on rocky islets mistaken for ships and seven near misses. As a result, around 12 vessels were sunk during the attack, including the Heian Maru. It was a remarkable performance by a dozen aircraft in the US Navy's first carrier-launched night attack.  The following dawn, Mitscher sent another fighter sweep, though it would not be very effective as the Japanese had basically no surviving aircraft in the area. 200 aircraft met negligible air opposition over the atoll as they worked over the remaining targets at their leisure. Hundreds of incendiaries were dropped on smoking airfields, parking areas, and hangars. The bombers paid special attention to the fuel tank farms, which had been spared on the first day in order to prevent smoke from obscuring visibility. By noon, Japanese resistance was almost non-existent and there were no more worthwhile targets, so Spruance and Mitscher decided to call a halt to the attacks, as it was considered that Truk no longer posed a threat to the Eniwetok invasion.  Hailstone cost the Americans 12 fighters, 7 torpedo bombers, 6 dive bombers and 2 floatplanes. 29 aircrew died; and 28 sailors died aboard the Intrepid. The operation had been one of the most smashing carrier raids of the Pacific war. Though most of Japan's heavy naval units had fled the lagoon, the Americans had sunk three light cruisers, four destroyers, three auxiliary or training cruisers, and six other naval auxiliaries. In addition, around 30 merchant ships were sent to the bottom of the lagoon, including 5 precious oil tankers. The total shipping losses approached 200,000 tons and many of those vessels had been laden with munitions and other supplies that could not be recovered. 17,000 tons of fuel went up in the attack, at a time when fuel was running very short for the Japanese. The Japanese lost 249 aircraft, most on the ground. As Rear Admiral Samuel Eliot Morison would later write, “Courage and determination the Navy had shown from the first, but in the Marshalls it demonstrated mastery of the art of amphibious warfare; of combining air, surface, submarine and ground forces to project fighting power irresistibly across the seas. The strike on Truk demonstrated a virtual revolution in naval warfare; the aircraft carrier emerged as the capital ship of the future, with unlimited potentialities.” The IJN Combined Fleet would never return to Truk; the 4th Fleet headquarters remained at Truk, but its warships left; and the transports carrying the 52nd Division to Truk, some of which had arrived on February 19, hastily unloaded and quickly departed. Vice-Admiral Kobayashi Masami was held responsible for the defeat and would consequently be relieved of his command, never to return to active duty. But that's it for the Marshall Islands campaign for now as we are shifting over to the south pacific.  In preparation for the invasion of the Admiralty Islands, the allies first would need to seize the Green islands, situated 117 miles southeast of Rabaul. Admiral Halsey had been tasked with landing General Barrowclough's 3rd New Zealand Division consisting of the 14th Brigade; Special Army Tank Squadron; 17th Field Regiment; 29th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment; 144th Independent Battery; 53rd Anti-Tank Battery; 967th Coast Artillery Battalion; Naval Base Unit No. 11 and other supporting units. Halsey assigned Admiral Wilkinson to command the operations. He would transport the men in 3 echelons using a plethora of Destroyers, Destroyer Transports and countless landing crafts. AirSols would be providing coverage alongside Admiral Merrill's Task force 39 consisting of light cruisers Cleveland, Columbia and Montpelier; and destroyers Charles Ausburne, Dyson, Stanly, Spence and Converse. There would also be Admiral Ainsworths Task force 38. Wilkinsons echelons departed Vella Lavella and the Treasury islands On February 12th and 13th. They met near Bougainville and together advanced towards the departure line off Barahun Island. The Americans expected Rabaul's airforce to be greatly depleted by this point, but the convoy was still harassed by 15 Vals and 17 Zeros during the night of February 14th. 10 vals managed to score a hit and 3 near misses against cruiser St Louis, killing 23 men and causing moderate damage. The bombers also tried attacking the landing craft, but apart from a near miss on LST-446, the landing would proceed quickly and smoothly. The landing craft began taking off on the morning of February 15th as AirSols fighters gained air supremacy over the skies of Nissan Island. 32 fighters form Squadron 14, RNZAF, commanded by Squadron Leader S. G. Quill, and Squadrons 1 and 18, commanded by Squadron Leader J. A. Oldfield, both kept 18 aircraft continuously over the island until dusk, flying sorties from the airfields at Empress Augusta Bay.  12 Japanese bombers would be reported shot down. This was the last air opposition encountered during Operation Squarepeg. With such a numerous  fleet sending thousands of troops ashore with impunity only 115 miles from Rabaul proved AirSols was a force to be reckoned with. Ferried ashore in LCIs and LCVPs, into the lagoon in southern Barahun Island, the troops would disembark at several landing beaches around the Pokonian and Tangalan Plantations.  Within just 2 hours, about 5800 New Zealanders were ashore. Patrols were then sent out, and carrying parties began moving stores off the beaches further inland. As the beachhead was established, there was only a brief resistance from several Japanese barges around Sirot Island, before a perimeter was established. By nightfall, in addition to the aforementioned troops, Wilkinson had also landed 58 jeeps, 67 trucks, 44 guns, 8 Valentine tanks, 426 tons of petrol in drums, 2000 gallons of fresh water in tins, and 267 tons of rations. The following day, as the Kiwis fanned out along Nissan Island, about 21 Japanese were encountered on Sirot. Late that afternoon, natives reported that an unspecified number of Japanese had taken refuge on the densely wooded island of Sirot, and the task of clearing the island was assigned to B Company, led by Captain D. Dalton. The Japanese were swiftly dealt with, but the Kiwi's would suffer 5 deaths and 3 wounded in the firefight. On February 18, patrols from the 37th Battalion reached the northern tip of Nissan Island and reported it clear while the 30th and 35th Battalions dealt with a large group of Japanese at the south point of the island. The Kiwis accidentally came upon the remaining Japanese garrison on 20 February, in an area previously declared clear by patrols. It was along the coast near a few deserted native huts passing as the village of Tanaheran on the map. On February 19, the remaining 100-man Japanese garrison signed off on their radio ‘We are charging the enemy and beginning radio silence'.The Kiwi's suffered 3 deaths and 11 wounded. The Japanese had been overwhelmed and annihilated. The next day the second echelon of Admiral Fort arrived. Organized resistance had ceased. In total, 120 Japanese had been killed against the 13 killed and 24 wounded of the Allied forces.  With the Green Islands under their control, the Allied forces now needed to do something about the 1200 friendly native Melanesians whose taro gardens and coconut groves were about to be turned into airfields. The answer was a temporary evacuation to Guadalcanal. This was explained to the natives' head men, and, as the Melanesians are born rovers, the prospect of a boat ride to the Solomons and free food there was highly pleasing. Accordingly, "Grandpa" Roger Cutler's LSTs of the Second Echelon took on the function, new even for Love-Sugar-Tares, of evacuating natives; and so well was this done that by the time the flotilla of Melanesian Mayflowers reached Guadalcanal the 1147 embarked had increased to 1148. The Green Islands would prove to be a very useful link in the strangling of Rabaul, with a PT base immediately opening on February 17 and with a new fighter strip being completed by March 4, which for the first time put Kavieng within range of AirSols fighters and bombers. But now we have to shift over to the boys in New Guinea. The last time we were in New Guinea, the Australians were in hot pursuit of General Nakano's men. On February 3rd, the 30th battalion of Lieutenant-Colonel William Parry-Okeden had set off from Singor to take over for the 4th battalion at Crossington. The next day, the Australians reached Nemau and the day after that established a new supply beach at Butubutu. On that same day orders came in stating all commanders must make every endeavor to capture prisoners. This prompted Cameron to call off the Papuans from leading the advance and sent the leading Papuan platoon to reconnoiter the inland trails while the infantry led the advance on the right. The men advanced sluggishly as a result of the mixture of muddy tracks and enemy corpses. They reached Roinji 1 on the 6th then Roinji 2 on the 7th. During the afternoon the Papuans reached Gali 1 where they managed to kill 24 Japanese stragglers and captured 3 prisoners. Each day the Papuans killed on average 10-15 Japanese, but it was not until the 8th when they encountered a real Japanese rearguard at Weber Point. The Papuans performed a frontal assault killing 53 Japanese and captured another 4 prisoners. By the night on February 9, the leading company was 2000 yards west of Malalamai and 3500 yards from the American's most forward outpost at Yagomai when they fought another larger group of Japanese. 61 Japanese were killed and 9 prisoners taken in the day; and on February 10, the 30th Battalion at last reached Yagomai. Here they finally linked with the American force at Saidor. It was decided that the 5th Division would not operate west of the Yaut, so Brigadier Cameron was instructed to mop up the Tapen and Nokopo areas. Meanwhile, the 35th Battalion advanced towards Bwana, where they killed 31 Japanese. On the 18th, the Australians killed 40 Japanese at Gabutamon and another 142 in the Tapen area; 3 days later, they attacked Wandiluk, where they killed 57 Japanese. After the 22nd, the pursuit was largely carried on by the Papuans towards Nokopo. During this time until March 1st, the 8th Brigade reported killing 734 Japanese, found 1793 dead and took 48 prisoners. The Australians and Papuan had suffered 3 deaths and 5 wounded. Despite his losses, General Nakano and his men had yet again cheated death. In a letter on 21st March Lt General Frank Berryman wrote: "About 8,000 semi-starved, ill equipped and dispirited Japanese bypassed Saidor. It was disappointing that the fruits of victory were not fully reaped, and that once again the remnants of 51st Division escaped our clutches." Meanwhile General Morshead had been planning to relieve the 7th division with the fresh 11th division Major-General Allan Boase. But General Vasey convinced him instead to let him take over the drive on Madang by the end of January. Now the 58th/59th Battalion relieved the 2/10th in the right-hand sector from 4100 through Crater Hill and Kankirei Saddle to Cam's Hill, with the task of patrolling the area east of Cam's Hill, the headwaters of the Mosa River, and forward along the upper Mindjim River Valley to Paipa 2. The 57th/60th relieved the 2/9th on the left with positions on the 4100 Feature, the Protheros and Shaggy Ridge, and the task of patrolling forward from Canning's Saddle along the high ground west of the Mindjim. The 24th Battalion relieved the 2/12th in reserve.  Now Brigadier Hammer had the task of patrolling forward from the Kankirei Saddle. As typical for New Guinea, the terrain facing them would be formidable. Hammer had this to say in a report "The country in the Finisterre Ranges is rugged, steep, precipitous and covered with dense rain forest. It rains heavily almost every day thus making living conditions uncomfortable. By day it is hot, by night three blankets are necessary. There is, therefore, a constant battle with mud, slush, rain and cold. To allow freedom of movement over this mud it was necessary to corduroy every track in the area." By late February Hammer dispatched a number of small patrols towards Amuson and Saipa 2. On the right flank Lt Brewster with a patrol from the 58th/59th investigated the valley of the Mosa River as far as Amuson, and returned after 4 days reporting the area was clear. In the central area a patrol from the 57th/60th brushed with an enemy patrol near Saipa 2, with some support from the guns of the 4th Field Regiment. On the 28th a patrol from the 57th/60th, led by Lt Besier, attacked Saipa 2 three times with supporting artillery fire, but all attempts to enter the village were repulsed. On February 26, the 58th/59th Battalion was instructed to establish a company patrol base on Amuson and send out a platoon reconnaissance patrol to the coast in the Mindjim-Melamu area, which managed to establish some observation posts overlooking Astrolabe Bay in early March. Hammer also sent the 57th/60th Battalion to the Paipa area in preparation for an attack on Saipa 2.  Meanwhile, after the conclusion of Operation Dexterity on February 10th General Krueger handed command to Major-General William Gill over the Saidor area and he began to bring the remaining elements of his 32nd division.  Gill then began plans for a secondary landing at the Yalau Plantation, around 30 miles west of Saidor. He hoped to establish a new forward base there and possibly intercept enemy stragglers trying to bypass the Saidor area.The 2nd battalion, 126th regiment led by Lt Colonel Oliver O. Dixon successfully landed on March 5th. 54 landing crafts unloaded 1348 within 9 waves, seeing little to no opposition. As men patrolled east and west from Yalau, they encountered and killed a few Japanese and found many already dead. They would reach Bau Plantation on March 9th, where they ran into a detachment of General Nakai's 3rd battalion, 239th regiment. But yet again we must not shift our attention somewhere we have not been in quite some time, the Indian Ocean.  The Commander in Chief, Southwest Area Fleet, Vice-Admiral Takasu Shiro had decided to dispatch heavy cruisers Aoba, Chikuma, and Tone, under the command of Rear-Admiral Sakonju Naomasa, to raid Allied shipping on the main route between Aden and Fremantle. Departing the Lingga Islands on February 27, the heavy cruisers were escorted by light cruisers Kinu and Ōi and 3 destroyers through the Sunda Strait. The raiders were also supported by 10 medium bombers and 3-4 seaplanes based in Sumatra and west Java which conducted patrols in the direction of Ceylon. 3-4 submarines from the 8th Flotilla also monitored Allied shipping movements near Ceylon, the Maldive Islands and Chagos Archipelago. On March 6th the allies detected the force near the Lombok Strait. Fearing a possible attack, Western Australia was reinforced and the British Eastern Fleet was diverted. On the morning of March 9th, Sakonju's cruiser came across the 6200 ton British steamer Behar between Fremantle and Colombo. Upon sighting the Japanese ships, Behar's Captain Maurice Symons, ordered that his radio operator transmit the "RRR" code in order to notify other ships and Allied bases that the merchant ship was being attacked by surface raiders. Tone's signals room picked up the message,. The Tone then began signaling repeatedly to the Behar to surrender, but the Behar continued to flee, prompting the cruiser to open fire. Behar was hit a few times to her prow and stern, killing 3 crewmembers. Within 5 minutes Behar's crew and passengers began abandoning ship as she sank. 104-108 survivors were rescued by the Tone. Following the attack, Sakonju believed it was too dangerous to continue raiding as Behar had sent out a distress signal. So he turned back, reaching Tanjung Priok on March 15th.  Shortly after the Behar survivors were rescued, Sakonju sent a radio message to Tone's commanding officer, Captain Mayuzumi Haruo, reprimanding him for taking non-essential personnel prisoner and not capturing the merchant ship. In this message Sakonju ordered that the survivors be killed. Mayuzumi was unwilling to do so, however, as he felt that this would violate his Christian religious beliefs. His executive officer, Commander Mii Junsuke, also opposed killing the prisoners deeming it dishonorable. Mayuzumi radioed a request to Sakonju that the prisoners be put ashore, but this was rejected. The captain then visited Aoba to argue his case, but Sakonju remained unmoved and told Mayuzumi to "obey my orders". Despite his misgivings, Mayuzumi ultimately decided to kill the prisoners. On the night of March 18, all the prisoners on board Tone were beheaded by several of the cruiser's officers. Mayuzumi watched the killings from the ship's bridge but Mii refused to take part. The number of the crew to be executed was between 65 and at least 100. Following the massacre 15-36 survivors were transferred to Aoba. The party sent to Aoba included Symonds, the Behar's chief officer and several of the senior officers as well as both of the ship's female passengers. All of this group were later landed at Tanjung Priok. After the war, the Allies prosecuted the officers responsible for the murders on board the Tone. Vice Admiral Takasu died from disease in September 1944, but Sakonju was tried by the British in 1947 at Hong Kong and sentenced to death and executed 21 January 1948. Mayuzumi was convicted for his role in the killings and sentenced to 7 years imprisonment. Sakonju stated in his affidavit that he was 'retaliating against the execution and inhuman treatment of Japanese prisoners by the allies in Guadalcanal'. Mayuzumi stated in his defense that he was following Sakonju's orders. Mayuzumi received a light sentence due to his repeated requests for clemency for the prisoner's lives. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Operation Hailstone saw what was once called the Gibraltar of the Pacific, Truk nearly annihilated. She could no longer be counted upon to thwart allied sea and air units in the region. The Australians on New Guinea were not letting up on the retreating Japanese and a terrible and needless massacre took place in the Indian Ocean.  

The Pacific War - week by week
- 115 - Pacific War - Invasion of Marshalls , January 30 - February 6, 1944

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 30, 2024 43:45


Last time we spoke about the fall of Shaggy Ridge, some hardcore patrolling on New Britain and major planning for the invasion of the Marshalls. The Australians seized the Kankeiri saddle, the Prothero's, Crater Hill and countless other features until finally at last the Japanese had been dislodged from the area. Meanwhile over on New Britain, the Americans were expanding their perimeter and unleashing wave after wave of patrols, trying to figure out where the Japanese were concentrating. It was tireless work, without any good maps in a horribly difficult climate with menacing terrain. The commanders of the central, south and southwest pacific all met to finalize big plans, that would now involved the invasion of the Marshall islands. It seems Dougey boy MacArthur was delivered some setbacks for his grand advance to the Philippines, as the Central Pacific was stealing the drivers seat.  This episode is Operation Flintlock: The Invasion of the Marshalls  Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  In spite of General Douglas MacArthur's attempted hijacking of the strategic control over the Pacific campaign, by trying to have the US Navy's Central Pacific campaign pretty much aborted, it did not pan out. MacArthur had made multiple arguments against their Central plans, stating Nimitz choice of route was “time consuming and expensive in our naval power and shipping” which was really a self-serving argument flying in the face of actual evidence. MacArthur pointed out all the problems faced during the invasion of Tarawa, such as the high casualty rates. The Marines had jumped 2500 miles from New Zealand to hit Tarawa at the cost of 4 days of fighting. Yet Australian soldiers and American GI's would take nearly a year and a half, through nearly continuously fighting to make the 300 mile journey from Port Moresby to Madang. Operation Cartwheel proved to be extremely laborious, time consuming and costly in terms of materials and men. But from MacArthur's point of view the lives lost were largely Australian and perhaps as some Historians might point out “were politically expendable to a person like MacArthur”. Kind of a hit point to make, that one came from Francis Pike's Hirohito's War, go after him not me folks. It was also self evident the supply lines of ships from the west coast of the US to Nimitz Pacific fleet and their Marines, some 5000 or so miles from San Diego to Kwajalein atoll, was shorter than the long route going from the US west coast to Australia then to New Guinea, a colossal 9108 mile trip. By mid 1943 the supply line to MacArthur was nearly double that of Nimitz in distance with increased dangers of IJN submarines prowling about, though as I have said numerous times, the IJN only really figured out the capability of merchant hitting in the late years of the war.  Well in spite of all of that MacArthur gave Brigadier-General Frederick Osborn and MacArthurs trusty lackey Sutherland going to Washington to fight on his behalf against the Joint Chiefs of Staff, they elected to commit themselves to the Central Pacific thrust. It had been a strategic decision based on logistical and strategy…well logic? The 1943 Cairo conference ended just as Tarawa was captured, thus driving the nail in the coffin so to say. The next target on the way to the Marianas was thus the Marshall islands, way back in the old days they were property of the German empire, that Japan had stolen with ease. Ever since 1938, the Japanese banned any non Japanese ships from the region, thus US intelligence was pretty lax on them. MAGIC intercepts began to give clues as to how the Japanese deployed their troops on the Marshall islands however. This led the allied war planners to leave some “to wither on the vine” like Wotje. It was decided the main target would be Kwajalein. The 380 mile lagoon made it one of the largest in the world, quite beautiful also. Some like Rear Admiral Turner, questioned the risks of going straight into the heart of the Marshall islands, calling the move “too aggressive and dangerous and reckless!” But Nimitz and Spruance were adamant, well this was before Tarawa. The bitter lessons learnt on Tarawa prompted Spruance to determine that “Kwajalein would be struck with violent, overwhelming force and swiftly applied”. For the invasion of the Marshalls, codenamed Operation Flintlock, the first phase was to be the capture of Kwajalein, earmarked by General Corlett's 7th division against the southern group of islands in the atoll that included Kawjalein. General Schmidt's 4th marine division would capture Roi-Namur and the northern islands in the atoll. Furthermore prior to these attacks, Colonel Sheldon's Sundance Landing Force would hit Majuro Atoll. Because of the experiences gained during the invasion of the Gilberts, a far greater quantity and variety of amphibious equipment had been made available to the Central Pacific forces. Now the attack force commanders would not have to rely on the faulty communications systems of battleships to maintain proper radio liaison between ship and shore and ship and air. Two newly constructed headquarters ships, each equipped with the latest developments in radio and radar gear and unburdened by gunfire support duties, were provided for the operation. Several improvements were also made in the techniques of softening up the enemy defenses before the first troops touched shore. The US Navy changed their bombardment tactics based on the experience at Tarawa and now used armor piercing shells and fired from closer ranges. These all added would increase the quantity and accuracy of firepower to be delivered before the invasion. To provide a last-minute saturation of the beaches, two new, or rather modified, forms of older types of amphibious equipment were also introduced. The first of these was the amphibian tank LVT-A, which was just the standard amphibian tractor equipped with extra armor plating and mounting a 37-mm gun housed in a turret. The second was the LCI gunboat, an LCI converted into a gunboat by the addition of three 40-mm guns and banks of 4.5-inch rocket launchers.  Admiral Turner's plan called for extensive pre-landing bombardment both from surface ships and from aircraft. Most of the Marshall's airfields had been successfully neutralized by Admiral Hoover's aircraft over the prior months. To complete preliminary operations, Admiral Mitschers Fast Carrier force launched a heavy strike on January 29 and 30th. On the 30th, eight of Mitschers battleships, accompanied by about a dozen destroyers, were to deliver a dawn bombardment against Kwajalein Island and Roi-Namur. The object was to destroy aircraft, coast defense guns, and personnel, and to render the airfields temporarily useless. At the same time, two advance units of cruisers and destroyers from Turner's task force were to bombard the airfields at Wotje and Maloelap. These dawn bombardments were to be followed by air strikes against each of the objectives. After the strikes were completed the surface ships would again take up the bombardment and maintain a steady fire until about noon. Then on the 31st, initial landings would begin against Carlson (Enubuj), lying  northwest of Kwajalein Island; Ivan (Mellu) and Jacob (Ennuebing) Islands, lying southwest of Roi-Namur. For southern Kwajalein, three other small islands in addition to Carlson were to be captured during the preparatory phase of the operation. These were Carlos (Ennylabegan), Carter (Gea), and Cecil (Ninni) Islands, all lying north of Carlson. On some of these islands artillery could be emplaced for the main assault. On February 1st, battleships, cruisers and destroyers would conduct a monster bombardment in support of the main landings and air strikes would begin 45 minutes before the men hit the beaches. There would be a cease to the carnage 25 minutes before to allow the smaller islands to deploy their artillery to help support the main assault. With this tremendous bombardment by aircraft, surface ships, and artillery, all to be executed before the first troops hit the shore line, it was hoped that the bitter experience of Tarawa would not be repeated. For the attack on Kwajalein Island, Corlett decided to land on a narrow front on the beaches at the western extremity, as the reef and surf conditions were more favorable there. He had at his disposal 79 amphibian tanks and 95 amphibian tractors that would transport the first 4 waves to hit the southern beaches. The first with great secrecy would be a pre-dawn landing against Carter and Cecil islands, by one platoon of the 7th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop. The reconnaissance troop was embarked on two high-speed transports (APD's), along with two platoons of Company B, 111th Infantry. After this the 17th regiment led by Col. Wayne C. Zimmerman would land on Carlos and Carlson islands. The 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry, would hit Carlos while the 2nd Battalion, 17th Infantry, hit Carlson. The 3rd Battalion, 17th Infantry was to be held in reserve, ready to go to the aid of either landing team. While the capture of Carlson Island was in progress, the division artillery, loaded for the most part on amphibious trucks, was to debark and proceed to a rendezvous area offshore. Upon a signal from the commander of the Carlson landing force, the guns were to be moved ashore and into position. This was all done to secure General Arnold's artillery, whom on the night of the D-day along the 145th field artillery battalions would deliver interdictory fire from Carlson on all the principal fortified areas of Kwajalein Island and place counter-battery fire on any enemy artillery that might be emplaced on Burton. They were also to fire general support missions for the infantry. Finally, the 184th on the left and 32nd Regiment on the right would land abreast and advance up the axis of the island. If things looked like they were going well enough and the reserve 17th regiment would not be necessary, they would instead capture the remaining islands of Beverly (South Gugegwe), Berlin (North Gugegwe), Benson, and Bennett (Bigej) Islands in the eastern chain. There was a hell of a lot of fire power they would face as well. On Kwajalein, 4 12.7-cm, dual-purpose twin-mount guns were divided into batteries of 2, one located at each end of the island. Each battery was protected by 7.7-mm. and 13-mm. machine guns along the nearby beaches. Near each gun were 2 150-cm. searchlights. In addition, the northern end of the island was guarded by a twin-mount dual-purpose 13-mm machine gun on the lagoon shore. Several 7.7-mm. machine guns were in position on the western end and other heavy machine guns were scattered about the center of the island, some mounted on wooden sleds for easy movement to critical points. On the ocean shore were 6 8-cm. dual-purpose guns, divided into 2 batteries of 3 guns each. One battery was east of the tank ditch and the other was opposite the center of the airfield. The first had a 360-degree traverse and could fire either to seaward or landward. The other formed the nucleus of a strongpoint composed of a semicircle of rifle pits facing the beach supported by one heavy and one 13-mm. machine gun, and also included an observation tower, a range finder, and a 110-cm. searchlight. 2 other 8-cm. guns were in position on the lagoon shore, and the blockhouse on the main pier (Nob Pier), which jutted out into the lagoon near the northern tip of the island, had a 13-mm. dual-purpose gun on its roof and firing ports on the ground floor allowing machine guns to fire in all directions. For the attack on Roi-Namur, Schmidt's 1st phase was to capture the 5 islets near Roi-Namur. The Ivan Landing Group was commanded by Brig. General James L. Underhill, consisting of the 25th Marines under Col. Samuel C. Cumming; the 14th Marines Artillery and Company D of the 4th Tank Battalion. They would seize Jacon and Ivan islands to allow the 3rd and 4th Battalions of the 14th Marine Regiment artillery to deploy. Then they would hit Albert, Allen and Abraham islands where the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 14th Marine Regiment artillery would deploy. For the main landings Schmidt chose to perform a orthodox amphibious maneuver, simply landing two regiments abreast on a broad front over the lagoon shore. The 23rd marines would hit Roi's red beach 2 and 3 and the 24th marines would hit Namur's Green beaches 1 and 2. The 3rd and final phase would see the capture of the remaining islands in the northern Kwajaleins.  Now that was all for the Americans, but what about the defenders? Admiral Akiyama had recently been reinforced with a number of IJA units such as the 3rd South Sea Garrison from Wake; the 1st South Seas detachment from Mille and Jaluit and the 1st Amphibious mobile brigade from Eniwetok. The reinforcements were deployed mostly on the periphery, as Kwajalien, Jaluit, Maloelap and Wotje had sizable naval garrisons already. The hub of the Japanese military in the Marshalls was at Kwajalein and its main air base at Roi. If you pull out a map, which I do hope many of you do during this entire podcast series haha, especially for Burma it gets really confusing, trust me I know your pain. You can see Kwajalein lies far to the west, with Jaluit, Mille, Maloelap and Wotje kind of acting as buffers. If you were a Japanese commander you would most likely assume any invasion attempt would hit outer islands first and leave Kwajalein as the last one. A quote from one commander, Chikataka Nakajima makes this point "There was divided opinion as to whether you would land at Jaluit or Mille. Some thought you would land on Wotje but there were few who thought you would go right to the heart of the Marshalls and take Kwajalein.” The three most heavily defended islands were Roi-Namur, Kwajalein and Burton in that order of strength. The defenses of Roi-Namur were organized around a series of seven strong points, 4 on Roi and 3 on Namur, all on the ocean side. Starting from the southwest tip of Roi, the first was located along the southern shore of the west coast. The second and third were to the south and north of the northwest taxi circle. The fourth was on both sides of the wire and stone barriers next to the northeast taxi circle. The fifth, sixth, and seventh were on the northwest, north, and east tips of Namur, respectively. From the lagoon side the approaches were covered mostly by nothing heavier than 7.7-mm. machine guns. Wire entanglements were found at two points—on the beach around the northeast taxi circle on Roi, and on the narrow bit of land connecting Roi with Namur. The beach around the northeast taxi circle also boasted a tank obstacle in the form of large rocks jutting out of a rock wall. Anti-tank ditches had been dug throughout the two islands. On Kwajalein, there was a concrete sea wall along most of the ocean shore and around the northern and western ends of the island. The section at the northern end had posts set into it, probably to act as a tank barricade. East of the area cleared for the airfield was a tank ditch extending halfway across the island, and three smaller tank ditches ran between the ocean shore and the road in the vicinity of the airfield. The lagoon shore was protected by a two-strand barbed-wire fence at the water's edge. The large tank ditch was supported by trenches, rifle pits, and machine guns. At this point in the war, the Japanese tactical doctrine still stressed beach-line defense that would hinder a proper defense in depth. The Japanese doctrine to fortify beaches would gradually change as a result of the Gilbert-Marshall campaign. IJA General HQ research groups abandoned beach defenses for internal defenses to thwart naval and aerial bombardments, but also to favor concealed positions to thwart flamethrower and grenade attacks. Actually to side track just a bit, there is a book I rather like “The Battle for Okinawa” by Colonel Hiromichi Yahara. If you are interested in how some of the Japanese commanders decided to change to defense in depth, Colonel Yahara was a good case study and the book is interesting. Akiyama had roughly 5000 men on Kwajalein. 930 of these were IJA units, the 1st Company, 3rd Mobile Battalion, plus 2nd and 4th Companies of the 2nd Mobile Battalion of the 1st Amphibious Mobile Brigade. The IJA forces were led by Colonel Asu Tarokichi, commander of the 2nd Mobile Battalion. There also was 250 SNLF of the Yokosuka 4th; 1150 naval troops from the 61st Guard Unit and Akiyama's headquarters. The rest were not considered combat effective, mostly comprising laborers and logistical units. Most of these units were at Kwajalein itself, with some 345 troops and over 2000 air personnel of the 24th Air Flotilla at Roi-Namur. Three lookout stations were also established on Bennett, Carter and Carlos Islands while an air unit of the 952nd and 160 men defended Burton. By January 20th, all the preparations were complete in the Hawaiian islands for the grand invasion of the Marshalls. 2 days later, the task forces departed. At dawn on the 29th, the 4 task groups of Task Force 58 and the Neutralization Group arrived to their first assembly positions Aircraft carriers Enterprise, Yorktown, and Belleau Wood successfully neutralized Taroa while while Essex, Intrepid, and Cabot bombed and strafed Roi-Namur. Aircraft from Essex, Intrepid, and Cabot bucked northeasterly winds to bomb and strafe once more the important airfield at that base. Ninety-two enemy planes were based on Roi airfield when the attack developed. Command of the air was seized by American planes at the outset and after 8am, no enemy planes were seen airborne over Roi-Namur. Numerous hits were made on runways, hangars, fuel dumps, and gun positions. Additionally, carriers Saratoga, Princeton, and Langley sent multiple strikes against Wotje, managing to neutralize its airfield. Finally Admiral Sherman's carriers Cowpens, Monterey, and Bunker Hill launched strikes against Kwajalein. Her airfield and buildings were bombed on the first strike, then she was subjected to strafing and bombing. During the evening Admiral Sherman's group moved northwestward toward Eniwetok to be in position to launch an attack at dawn of D minus 1. It was not just the navy that smashed the Marshalls, the Army also got a taste. At Kwajalein one flight of seven B-24s dropped fifteen tons of bombs on Roi-Namur and three more tons on Kwajalein Island during the morning and early afternoon. As the carrier planes retired at dusk another seven heavy bombers arrived for a night attack, dropping twenty tons of bombs on Kwajalein Island. At Wotje, flying through heavy overcast, one flight of three B-24s dropped seven tons of bombs, causing fires and damaging the runways. A few hours later a flight of nine B-25s dropped three tons of bombs on the island in a low-level attack and strafed and sank a small cargo vessel in the lagoon. During this late attack carrier planes from the task force mistakenly intercepted the B-25s and shot down two before it was realized they were American planes. Maloelap, Jaluit, and Mille also received land-based attacks during the day. At Taroa, two and a half tons of bombs were dropped by B-25s, which then joined carrier planes in strafing the island. At Jaluit, attack bombers and fighters dropped seven tons of bombs and afterwards strafed the island. Mille was covered all day by twenty fighters, flying in flights of four. Planes that had been scheduled to strike these targets but that were unable to get through because of weather or mechanical difficulty flew over Mille on the way back to American bases in the Gilberts and dropped their bomb loads on the islands of that atoll.The Neutralization group shelled Wotje and Maloelap, leaving the last operational airfield on Eniwetok. Sherman's fighters and bombers hit the atoll during the morning of the 30th, destroying nearly all its buildings and runways, though a few aircraft managed to escape. The rest of the day would see more carrier strikes and surface bombardments against the Marshalls' atolls while the landing forces made their final approach towards Kwajalein. Meanwhile, Admiral Hill's attack group detached from the main task force, heading for Majuro Atoll. At 11pm 1st Lt. Harvey C. Weeks led a recon platoon on rubber boats to Calalin island, becoming the first Americans to land on any territory the Japanese had possessed prior to WW2. The rest of the recon company led by Captain James Jones landed on Dalap, Uliga and Darrit Islands. Finally, Majuro Island itself. They would find the Japanese had abandoned the atoll perhaps over a year earlier. At the same time Sheldon's landing force occupied Darrit and Dalop without any opposition and the 1st defense battalion soon arrived to take up garrison duties. To the northwest, the Destroyer transports Overton carrying Troop A and Manley carrying Troop B raced past Turners task force to hit Carter and Cecil islands. Troop B successfully landed on Carter at 6:20am, rapidly securing the island after killing her 20 defenders. Troop A accidently landed on Chauncey Islet at 5:45am and upon realizing they had landed on the wrong island, they left a detachment of 61 infantrymen and then re-embarked at 9:29am. Finally, Troop A landed on Cecil at 12:35pm, finding zero opposition there. On Chauncey, however, the Americans discovered a force of over 100 Japanese hidden in the islet's center. Half of the enemy force was killed but the Americans would eventually have to withdraw after losing two men. The desperate Japanese would continue to resist until eventually being annihilated a few days later. With the lagoon's entrance secured, Colonel Zimmerman transferred his two assault battalions to amphibious tractors and sent them towards Carlos and Carlson Islands.  While Kwajalein, Burton and everly islands were under heavy bombardment, the 1st battalion, 17th regiment landed on Carlos unopposed at 9:10am. From there they quickly attacked the 25 man garrison. To their south, the 2nd battalion landed on the northeastern end of Carlson at 9:12am under some heavy artillery fire coming out of Kwajalein that was quickly suppressed by air and naval bombardment. The men expected fierce resistance, but the Japanese fled, leaving 21 Koreans to be taken prisoner. Honestly pretty good outcome for those poor Koreans. Then General Arnold landed his 5 artillery battalions who got their guns ready by nightfall. Further north, Brigadier Generals James Underhill began operations against Ivan and Jacob islands to secure even more artillery positions. After the preparatory bombardment the marines got aboard their amtracs with a lot of difficulty. Before the operation, landing team commanders had estimated that their debarkation interval would be about sixty minutes, but this did not pan out. Once the troops were loaded in their assigned landing craft they had to make their way through choppy seas to the LST area for transfer to amphibian tractors. At this juncture all semblance of control broke down. Landing craft were about two hours late in reaching the LST area. Choppy seas and a headwind were partly responsible for the delays. Boat control officers left the tractors in frantic search for the landing craft and failed to return in time to lead the LVTs to the line of departure. Tractors were damaged or swamped while milling around their mother LSTs waiting for the troops to show up. Radios in LVTs were drowned out. One LST weighed anchor and shifted position before completing the disembarkation of all its tractors. The elevator on another broke down so that those LVTs loaded on the topside deck could not be disembarked on time. In short, almost every conceivable mishap occurred to delay and foul up what, under even the best of circumstances, was a complicated maneuver. Despite the issues, by 9:17 the amtracs were surging forward while LCI gunboats fired rocket barrages. B Company of the 25th marines hit Jacobs at 9:52, easily overrunning the island within 15 minutes. Ivan island had a much rougher surf alongside bad reef conditions that slowed down the amtracs. Company D, 4th light tank battalion managed to land at 9:55am, with Company C of the 25th marines landing on the opposite side of the shore at 10:15am followed by Company A. They linked up and began advancing inland, rapidly destroying a token defense force and securing the entire island by 11:45. During the early afternoon, the 3rd battalion, 14th marines landed at Jacob Island aboard LVT's, while the 4th battalion landed on Ivan aboard LCMs. At this point the lagoon entrance was secured, so the 2nd and 3rd battalions, 25th marines re-embarked to land on Albert and Allen. Rough seas delayed them, but the marines were once again on the move. LCI gunboats performed rocket barrages as the 3rd battalion landed on Albert at 3:12, while the 2nd battalion hit Allen 3 minutes later. Both islets were quickly cleared, while G Company landed on the unoccupied Andrew island. The 3rd battalion then assaulted Abraham island at 6:24, securing it by 7:15. With that, the Americans had secured a chain surrounding Roi-Namur and the first phase of the operation was done. Now the Americans would perform the main landings. Late during the night, Arnolds artillery and Turner's warships bombarded Kwajalein and Burton while 3 destroyers kept up a barrage upon Roi-Namur. Under the cover of darkness, frogmen of Underwater Demolition Team 1 scouted Roi-Namur and UDT 2 scouted Kwajalein's beaches. These men made sure there were no obstacles or mines in the way of their landing objectives. This was the first use of UDT's during the Pacific War. Early on February 1st Kwajalein was hit with an unprecedented bombardment. During one period two shells per second were hitting specific targets or areas in the path of the assault troops. The 14-inch naval shells of the battleships were most effective in piercing and destroying reinforced concrete structures. From the cruisers and destroyers, 8-inch and 5-inch shells ploughed into bunkers and tore up the thick growth of pandanus and palm trees. All together that day, nearly 7,000 14-inch, 8-inch, and 5-inch shells were fired by supporting naval vessels at Kwajalein Island alone, and the bulk of these were expended against the main beaches before the landing. The field artillery on Carlson also joined in the preparatory fire. Its total ammunition expenditure against Kwajalein was about 29,000 rounds. The results of all this expenditure of explosives were devastating. The damage was so intensive that it is impossible to determine the relative effectiveness of the three types of bombardment. The area inland of Red Beaches was reduced almost completely to rubble. Concrete emplacements were shattered, coconut trees smashed and flattened, the ground pock-marked with large craters, coral ripped to splinters. From the carriers Enterprise, Yorktown, Belleau Wood, Manila Bay, Corregidor, and Coral Sea eighteen dive bombers and fifteen torpedo bombers struck the western part of Kwajalein Island while as many fighters strafed the area with machine guns and rockets. All together ninety-six sorties were flown from the carriers in support of the troop landing on Kwajalein Island. As one observer reported, "The entire island looked as if it had been picked up to 20,000 feet and then dropped.” After 36000 rounds of naval gunfire and artillery, along with sizable air attacks, pummeled the island, LCI gunboats were on the move, tossing rockets into the mix. At 9am, Turner unleashing his landing force. Colonel Curtis O'Sullivans 184th regiment headed towards Beach Red 1, while Colonel Marc Logie's 32nd regiment hit Beach Red 2. Each beach was covered by a strongpoint, though these were mostly obliterated, with only a few pillboxes surviving. Both regiments landed at 9:30am, finding weak opposition, allowing their artillery support to start smashing 200 yards ahead of their positions. The americans were met with light mortars and automatic fire from some surviving pillboxes, but many were able to take shelter behind the wrecked ruins of a seawall. Meanwhile as more Amtracs pulled up they were hampered by wreckage and debris, causing a congestion. The reefs also hindered where they could approach, but by 11:22 the first four waves of both battalions were ashore, all with 15 minutes. They then began to advance inland against light resistance. Logie's 1st battalion managed to reach the western edge of the west area by 11:30. Meanwhile O'Sullivan's 3rd Battalion came face to face with a network of several pillboxes still containing live Japanese in spite of the heavy preliminary bombardment. These were silenced in short order in a series of almost simultaneous actions in which many varieties of weapons were used. Two infantrymen of Company K, Pvt. Parvee Rasberry and Pfc. Paul Roper had landed near the left of Red Beach 1 and had run about 25 yards inland when they came under fire from one of the pillboxes in the area. Quickly taking shelter in a shell hole, they started lobbing grenades at the enemy position about fifteen yards ahead. The Japanese merely threw the grenades back and the volley kept up until a flame thrower was brought forward. That, too, proved ineffective; the flames only hit the box and bounced back. Finally, Private Rasberry got out of his foxhole, crawled to within about five yards of the pillbox and threw in a white phosphorus smoke grenade. This flushed several Japanese from their cover into open positions where they could be taken under rifle fire. Those who weren't hit ran back to the pillbox. Rasberry threw white phosphorous grenades until he had none left, by which time about eight of the enemy had been killed. At this juncture, T. Sgt. Graydon Kickul of Company L was able to crawl up to the pillbox and on top of it. He emptied his M1 rifle into it, killing the remainder of the Japanese inside. To make doubly certain that the job was done, an amphibian tank was then brought forward to fire both its flame thrower and its 37-mm. gun into the aperture. Meanwhile Logie's 1st battalion got within 250 yards of Wilma road by 12:20. An hour later they fell upon a network of pillboxes. To the north O'Sullivan's 3rd battalion ran into tough resistance again, but managed to link up with Logie's men at Wilma Road by 2:50pm. Behind the battalions were follow up battalions who mopped up the area and the reserves secured the beachheads. Logie and O'Sullivans men then fought their way to Kwajaleins airfield. Lucky for them the Japanese had not established a defensive line across the width of the island, instead the bulk of them retired eastward, for their commander Admiral Akiyama had run into an early tragedy. Akiyama had left his bunker to observe the front line and was killed by an artillery shell. At 3:25, the 1st battalion was relieved by the 2nd battalion who began attack against the strongpoint at Canary Some of these positions, which extended along each side of Wallace Road, were defended by Japanese who ducked and crawled through rubble heaps and bunkers in such a way that Lt. John L. Young, commanding Company E, became convinced that they were using connecting tunnels. For an hour the fighting persisted, but not more than ten enemy dead could be counted above ground. Company E continued through a litter of small works, moving so slowly that it was necessary to commit Company F, which undertook a flanking movement at the left. The maneuver was intended to cut the strong point off, but the company promptly ran into fire that slowed its advance to about fifty yards in thirty minutes. It then became clear that the whole movement had been stopped. The attack was consequently broken off at 1800 and defensive positions were organized for the night. To the north, O'Sullivan's 3rd Battalion ran into large underground shelters and defenses. Their advance was temporarily blocked by a fuel dump ignited by artillery fire, but they eventually pushed on another 500 yards before halting at 18:00 for the night.  Meanwhile Logie's 2nd battalion broke off their attack halfway up the length of an unfinished runway and dug in for the night.  By the end of February 1st, approximately 450 of the dead Japanese were counted  in the zone of the 184th, and this regiment also was responsible for the capture of ten of the eleven prisoners taken. A large share of the enemy casualties was attributed to the heavy bombardment from ships and aircraft and from artillery based on Carlson. Estimates made by assault troops and by others, including doctors following the assault, indicated that the preparatory bombardment caused from 50 to 75 percent of all Japanese casualties on Kwajalein Island. It truly was a colossal bombardment. The Americans suffered 21 deaths and 87 wounded. Over on Roi-Namur, Admiral Conolly's LSTs entered the lagoon at first light to provide the amtracs an easier ride. Naval ships, artillery and aircraft began smashing the island. The marines saw some delays, but Colonel Colonel Louis Jones' 23rd Marines began their run to Roi at 11:50. Covering them, amphibian tanks sought hull defilade positions and concentrated their 37mm fire on the Wendy Point blockhouse, which could deliver flanking fire on the assault waves. The 1st and 2nd Battalions hit the beaches at 11:57 landed and immediately began to push 300 yards inland. Meanwhile Colonel Franklin Hart's 24th Marines bound for Namur were assigned the tractors of the 10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion that had participated in the preceding day's actions. The troubles that had beset the 10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion on D-Day were titanic. They had been launched too far from the line of departure in the first place. They had to buck adverse winds and unexpectedly choppy seas. Radio failures had tremendously complicated the problem of control, causing still further delay and much unnecessary travel through the water. All of this spelled excessive fuel consumption and many of the tractors ran out of gas before the day was over. For an LVT to run out of fuel in a choppy sea was usually disastrous. This model, the LVT-2, shipped water easily and its bilge pumps could not be manually operated. Thus, when the gasoline supply was gone the vehicle could not be pumped out and usually sank. In addition, many of the tractors of the 10th Battalion had not been released from their duties on D-Day until after dark, were unable to get back to their mother LSTs for refueling, and had spent the night on various outlying islands. Thus, as the hour for descending on Namur approached, the 24th Marines could muster only 62 of the 110 tractors that had been assigned to them and a hurried call was sent out for LCVPs to make up the difference. After some scrambling, the 2nd and 3rd battalions were reorganized and on their way to Namur. Hart's 2nd battalion hit Beach Green 2 at 11:55. They faced anti-tank ditches across the narrow beach, causing a large congestion. Hart's 3rd battalion made it to Green 1 at 12 and his K and I companies immediately advanced north. Meanwhile Jone's battalions secured Wendy Point facing no opposition. Encourage by the lack of resistance, the Marines began a rather disordered dash across the island. The stormed across the runway without orders and all guns blazing. Tanks and infantry hastily charged in the disorder, successfully driving the surviving and terrified Japanese north. Jones managed to gain control over his units and brought them back to assembly points to coordinate further attacks. The “re-assault” of Roi kicked off at 3:30 against a dazed enemy still trying to recover from the first attack. The 2nd battalion pushed north towards Estelle point while the 3rd battalion hit Nancy point. Enemy resistance was being rapidly annihilated, Estelle point was secure by 5pm, while Nancy Point would be taken by 6pm. After Nancy point was secured, Jones declared Roi secure. Meanwhile Harts F company unknowingly breached a torpedo warhead bunker and began throwing satchel charges into the hole. The structure was obliterated by a massive explosion that would detonate two other ammunition bunkers nearby. Blocks of concrete, palm trees, wood, torpedo warheads, and other debris rained down over the island, covering most of the island with smoke and dust. 20 Marines were killed and 100 were wounded. The enormous explosion disrupted the 2nd battalions assault, causing a delay. Hart's 3rd battalion enjoyed more success, but heavier resistance as the Japanese defenders took advantage of all the rubble and dense brush tossed around to hide behind. By 7:30pm, Hart ordered his men to dig in and during the night the Japanese began their classic infiltration tactics. The green troops amongst the men began indiscriminately firing throughout the night. The next morning, light tanks broke a Japanese counter attack, as the Marines advanced 50 yards. Hart then launched his main attack at 9am,with the 3rd Battalion rapidly securing Nora Point by 11:00am. Tank support for the 2nd Battalion arrived an hour late, but they still managed to push towards Natalie Point by 12:15, where the two battalions linked up. Mop up operations continued in the rear, but the island was declared secure at 2:18. For their first operation, Schmidt's 4th Marine Division suffered 206 killed, 617 wounded and 181 missing. 3472 Japanese would be found dead, with 51 captured and 40 Korean laborers surrendered.  To the south, after aerial, artillery and naval bombardment, Corlett launched a tank supported attack at 7:15am. O'Sullivans 2nd battalion advanced north against weak resistance while Logie's 2nd Battalion continued to fight through the Canary strongpoint. Advancing through destroyed pillboxes with tanks at the forefront, O'Sullivans men were able to reach Carl Road on the eastern end of the airfield by 10:40am. Meanwhile Logie's men reduced the Canary and advanced rapidly until they reached the deadly Cat strongpoint. Here they faced tiers of well-concealed defensive works, taking many lives until they also reached Carl Road at 10:40. The Americans were now facing the main defensive system of the island. In front of it lay a deep tank trap, connected to long rifle trenches. Beyond this was anti-tank ditches and an elaborate organized set of defensive positions called Corn strongpoint. They were in for a hell of a time. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Operation Flintlock went off with a terrifying bang seeing the combined firepower of land, air and sea tossed against the Marshall islands. The Americans had made easy and quick work of the smaller islands, but now we're face to face with a truly formidable defensive position that was sure to cause them real headaches. 

The Pacific War - week by week
- 114 - Pacific War - Fall of Shaggy Ridge , January 23-30, 1944

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 23, 2024 40:17


Last time we spoke about the operations HA-GO, U-GO and the continued drive against Shaggy ridge. Lt General Mutaguchi Renya sought to invade India and was continuously scheming to drag the rest of the IJA on this rather insane endeavor. Yet the allies also tossed their own operations in the Burma theater greatly disrupting the Japanese planners and achieving numerous objectives. Over in New Guinea, Vasey launched an offensive against the Kankeiri saddle, designated operation cutthroat. Meanwhile General Nakano 's men were in a dire situation with the allied seizure of Sio and Saidor. Multiple Japanese units found themselves all doing the same thing, retreating further north. It seemed no matter what defensive lines they established, the allies kept their advance over land and periodically amphibious assaults their flanks and rear. The formidable defenses region of Shaggy ridge was not going to hold up against the allied advance much longer.  This episode is The Fall of Shaggy Ridge Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  The Australian advance overland and Saidor operation had paid great dividends over and above the establishment of forward military base construction. The allies had formed a giant wedge between a significant residue of the Japanese fleeing the Finschhafen area. General Adachi commanding the 18th area army was facing a nightmare. Prior to the American landing, he had visited the 51st division HQ at Kiari and then traveled overland to the 20th Division over at Sio. He was fully aware of the hardships facing both forces. Meanwhile news of the Saidor landings hit Rabaul creating a massive debate. Senior officers sought to bring over all available troops to try and retake the town. Others sought to save as many troops as possible for a defense of Wewak, considering it the next main allies target. General Imamura favored bypassing Saidor altogether and withdrawing over inland trails. Thus Adachi appointed General Nakano to take charge of the withdrawal to Madang, and ordered 8 other companies to cross the Ramu valley to Bogadjim to harass the Americans at Saidor. These were purely defensive maneuvers. The Japanese also faced the daunting task of how to evacuate large numbers of troops from the 20th and 51st divisions from the impending allied trap. Nakano took the lead getting the 20th to retreat up the coast while the 51st worked their war over the inland trails. Nakano would soon be forced to abandon the plans and ordered both to pull into the interior to retreat towards Madang, nearly 200 miles away. This would mean the exhausted, starving and sick Japanese had to battle through the jungles, ridges, rivers and other horrors of the Finisterre range.  Meanwhile Saidor was easily secured by the 32nd division, the Australian 7th division advanced through the Ramu Valley and came face to face with Shaggy Ridge. Shaggy ridge had been transformed into a heavy fortified position with numerous nasty features such as the Kankeiri saddle, Pimple, Intermediate snipers pimple, Green snipers pimple, Prothero 1 and 2 and so forth. During the first weeks of January the Australians made very little headway against the honeycombed Japanese defenses. Their air forces were called in numerous times to plaster the ridgelines in a 3 day assault designated Operation Cutthroat. On the 18th of January, B-25s from Nadzab and Port Moresby would drop 500 lb bombs all over the defenses. On the 21st P-40s strafed and bombed the area and this was met with some reorganizing of the ground forces. The 15th and 18th brigades relieved the exhausted 21st and 25th. Brigadier F. O Chilton began the new job by opening heavy artillery up on Prothero I. Captain T. L James with the 2/2 pioneer battalion described the attack on January 20th “At 1000 hours we met 2/12 Infantry Battalion at the appointed rendezvous, where I met their CO., Lt.-CoI. C. F. Bourne. We did not stay long at the rendezvous but formed up and commenced the long approach march. It was a gruelling day. The long single file moved silently up the deep ravines, scaling cliff-faces with the aid of ropes and lawyer vines. It took us the entire day to cover the four mile approach. In one spot that was almost impossible to traverse—a steep-sided cliff—they rigged lawyer vines between trees to act as a handrail and allow us to pull ourselves up." Despite the harsh conditions and fierce resistance, the Australians got atop Canning saddle and then forded the Mene river and drew near the village. Colonel Matsumoto's men were now trapped between the 2/9th battalion advancing from the Pimple and the 2/12th battalion from Prothero 1. To the east there was the 2/10th battalion about a mile away from the main Japanese defensive position along the Kankeiri saddle. On the 22nd, the 2/12th dispatched D company who advanced between Prothero1 and Prothero 2. At 10:40am they began to fire their artillery upon Prothero 2 and at 11:15am a platoon tried to progress but was held down by Japanese snipers and machine gun fire. A company came through D company to advance along Shaggy ridge until 3:30 pm once they took were held down by Japanese fire. Then a single australian section rushed forward led by Bren gunner Private Bugg. His team hit a Japanese machine gun crew from just 30 yards away. He seized a toehold quickly upon Prothero 2. After some bitter fighting Prothero 2 had fallen into allied hands. Meanwhile to the south the 2/9th sent a patrol out on the 22nd who found pill-boxes at McCaughey's knoll occupied with Japanese gunners. At 10:45am as allied artillery hit Prothero 2, Captain Taylor led a company of the 2/9th and assaulted McCaughers knoll. They were quickly pinned down, but by 1:15pm word reached them that Prothero 2 was captured and that the entire battalion was to push along Shaggy ridge. During that afternoon Taylor took his company to the western side of Shaggy ridge, getting ready for a new flanking maneuver against McCaughey's knoll. The men fought their way up the knoll cleaning up pillbox one after another, capturing McCaugheys knoll by nightfall. It would cost them 8 men wounded. More than 100 dead Japanese were found over the Prothero-Shaggry ridge area when mop up crews did their work. Meanwhile 2/10th kept up the pressure in the east. On the 22nd A Company led by Lt Gunn seized a foothold on Faria Ridge and, prompting the enemy by late in the afternoon, to abandon Cam's Hill, which was occupied by the 2/10th by 5.20 p.m. During the night and early morning of january 23rd, two counter attacks were launched by the Japanese.  At 2.40 the forward troops of A Company on the ridge were attacked from the south but the attack was repulsed with no casualties. After this the Australians moved down the track towards Kankeiri. Captain Haupt's B Company of the 2/12th advanced down the track from Prothero 2. By 6pm they were atop the saddle around Crater Hill when they came across a Japanese gun position containing 150 rounds of 75mm ammunition. Half an hour later they ran into some resistance from slopes atop Crater Hill. They would pull back to the Kankeiri saddle to dig in for the night.  The 2/10th then dispatch D company led by Captain Kumnick to advance along the Faria Ridge. They made it 1500 yards before running into a well entrenched position that held them down with machine gun fire. During the night however the Japanese abandoned their entrenchments for Cam Hill allowing the 2/10th to establish itself in a position roughy 1200 yards southeast of Crater Hill the next day. On the 24th, the 2/9th took over the responsibility for Shaggy Ridge up to Prothero 2 allowing the 2/12 to advance up Kankeiri.  Small patrols from company B of the 2/12th reached the top of Crater Hill that day finding an enemy position on the southern slopes. On the 25th, the 2/12th and 2/10th probed enemy defenses on all sides of Crater Hill looking for decent approaches to attack. This led to several skirmishes, seeing both sides suffer casualties. One patrol led by Lt Coles of the 2/2nd pioneers, surveyed the Paipa mule track along the valley of the Mindjim, firing upon small bands of retreating Japanese. The Australians gradually converged to attack Crater Hill, but Matsumoto's defenders put up a valiant effort to repel the assaults. On the 26, Brigadier Chilton ordered Companies C and D of the 2/9th and Companies C and B of the 2/12th to assault Crater Hill. This saw companies C and D of the 2/9th perform a outflanking maneuver to the north tip of the Mindjim valley to hit the enemy's right flank, while Companies C and B of the 2/12th held the enemy down. Captain A. Marshall's C company led off at 10.35 a.m, passing from Shaggy Ridge through Kankirei Saddle and then to the north, with Captain Taylor's D company following to provide flank protection. By midday Marshall reported that he had advanced some 600 yards and passed through several old and abandoned positions finding no enemy. Cautiously he pushed on, at 5 p.m. he reached the summit of 4100. The main enemy position was to the south between Marshall and the 2/10th and 2/12th Battalions. Leaving Taylor to occupy the summit of 4100 Marshall advanced south towards Crater Hill in an attempt to surprise the enemy from the rear . He met them about 300 yards south-east from the summit just at dusk. The leading platoon attacked along the usual razor-back but withdrew because of heavy machine-gun fire. At 7 p.m. Marshall sent Lieutenant White's platoon round the right flank but approach from this flank was also very difficult and White was killed. By the nighttime, they had successfully surrounded Matsumoto's weakened defenders. Matsumoto's defenders had established extremely formidable positions and had a large number of automatic weapons at their disposal. Matsumoto was ready alongside his men to make a final stand. Basically a siege of Crater Hill began and would only end after 5 brutal days. The first two days saw Chilton order the 2/9th take responsibility for the southern slopes of 4100 and Kankeiri saddle, while the 2/12th held Protheros and Shaggy ridge, and the 2/10th maintained pressure on the south-eastern slopes of Crater Hill. Skirmishes borke out everywhere, as the artillery smashed Crater Hill. Captain Whyte of the 2/4th field regiment fired 2000 shells, shattering trees, which unfortunately created more timber obstacles for the advancing Australians. At 9.30 a.m. on the 29th, 19 Kittyhawks dive-bombed Crater Hill, followed by ten minutes of artillery fire. At 1.30 p.m. the artillery laid down a barrage and machine-gun fire covered an assault on Crater Hill from the west by Captain Daunt's company of the 2/9th . The leading platoon attempted to rush the enemy position up a very steep and open slope but the Japanese, entrenched on a razor-back, were too strong and drove them back. The Australians also had the bad luck to be shelled by their own artillery. Each time they performed an assault, the stubborn Japanese held firm. Finally on the 30th with the help of some heavy rain Matsumoto decided to evacuate during the night. Matsumoto and the remnants of his force withdrew towards Yokopi and Kubenau valley. After dawn on the 31st, Australian patrols found Crater Hill abandoned and it was a horror show. They found a ghastly mess. At least 14 dead were found and evidence of burials alongside them. The 2/9th and 2/10th advanced occupying the hill on February 1st. With that, Shaggy Ridge and the Kankeiri saddle had finally fallen. Chilton sent out patrols to pursue the retreating Japanese and perform mop up operations. By February 6th his forces managed to seize Paipa and Amuson. The Australians had suffered 46 deaths, 147 wounded while the Japanese figures were estimated at around 500 casualties. Meanwhile, Brigadier Hammer had also carried out two operations during this time period. The first was a diversionary attack against the Spendlove Spur held by elements of the 5th company, 80th regiment. This was carried out by Captain Kennedy company of the 24th battalion, whom managed to surprise the Japanese and quickly seized Cameron's Knoll. On January 30th, the 57/60th battalion led by Lt Colonel Robert Marston departed Ketoba and along another company led by Captain McIntosh assaulted Orgoruna, Kesa and Koba. The Australians would find Orgoruna and Kesa undefended.. Lt Marston ordered Major Barker 's 8 company to patrol Koba, and they would enter Koba on  February 1st finding nothing, so they  pushed on towards Mataloi 2 . There were signs of very recent occupation and, 200 yards along the track , they were ambushed. Barker brought heavy fire down upon the Japanese ambush position and managed to capture Koba that night. On the morning of the 3rd, about 400 yards east of Koba, Barker again struck a Japanese ambush position. They quickly outflanked the enemy who withdrew through Mataloi 2 towards Mataloi 1 . By the time Mataloi 2 was occupied at 6.30 p.m., there was not enough time to hit Mataloi 1 nor to allow adequate consolidation of Mataloi 2 before dark. At 9.30 p.m. the Japanese counter-attacked from the direction of Matalo 1, commencing the assault with a heavy mortar bombardment. As Mataloi 2 could be defended from three sides, Barker decided that he could hold the area best from high ground to the south which would also be out of range of the enemy mortars. Accordingly he ordered a withdrawal and departed with his headquarters and one platoon. Apparently the orders did not reach the other platoons who were encircled while the remainder of the company was withdrawing to Koba. Long-range enemy machine-gun fire was directed at Kesa at the same time as the counterattack developed at Mataloi 2. The 57th/60th pulled out concluding their little raid. Now Brigadier Hammer's 15th were getting ready to pursue Matsumoto's detachment who were fleeing to Kwato. But that is all we have for New Guinea, as were are moving back over to New Britain. Last time we were over in New Britain, the Americans had captured Hill 660, and were unleashing patrols to try and figure out where the Japanese were concentrating. Now they sought to secure the Borgan Bay-Itni river line. Meanwhile on the other side, General Matsuda's battered men had begun a retreat heading east via the Aisalmipua-Kakumo trail towards Kopopo. They also received reinforcements in the form of the fresh 51st reconnaissance regiment who took up the job of rearguard. The Japanese knew the terrain better than their American counterparts, thus held distinct advantages. They knew good grounds to put up defenses and how long they could hold out in such places until they should retreat. The Americans did not enjoy good maps, they had to painstakingly explore where they went. They relied on native reports on where to go, but in the end they were like explorers jumping into jungles, atop mountains and a hell of a lot of swampy terrain. The rainforests could be so dense, patrols could be moving yards from another and not know it, imagine trying to find hypothetical objectives in such places?   Thus an enormous amount of vital patrolling was performed, beginning on January 19th with Captain Ronald Slay's men of L Company 1st marines. They advanced past Mt. Gulu, Langla volcano and Munlulu before heading down the saddle of Mt. Tangi. They managed to ambush a group of 20 Japanese being led by 8 armed natives, who fled east after 6 Japanese were killed. Slay took his men across the east-west government trail, only finding some Japanese telephone wire, which was severed. On the 22nd two patrols each consisting of a reinforced company departed the airdrome perimeter to converge from two directions along the trail junction Captain Slay's men discovered. The first was elements of the 1st battalion, 1st marines led by Captain Nikolai Stevenson, the other was led by Captain Preston Parish with elements of the 7th marines who took landing crafts to Sag Sag, the terminus of the east-west Government trail. Parishes men would bivouac around 1.5 miles inland near Aipati on the 24th while Stevensons men headed south of Mt Gulu. Both patrols found no Japanese, but Parish gained some valuable intelligence from a native village, who indicated there had been several Japanese parties around. On the 23rd, Stevenson and his men ran into a concealed machine gun crew 30 yards near Mt Langla. The Americans scrambled to fight back at an enemy they could not see. They did not lose any men, but had no idea if they hit any Japanese either. They continued their advance afterwards and would be ambushed again, this time 1500 yards south of Mt Munlulu. This time they seemed to be facing a force of platoon strength. By the 25th Stevenson and his men were pulling back to Mt Gulu and were relieved by another incoming patrol led by Captain George Hunts K Company, 1st marines. Meanwhile Parish's patrol continued east as the natives had indicated to them where the Japanese might be retreating through. On January 27th Hunts company ran into Parish's and both shared information and went in opposite directions hoping to hunt down nearby Japanese units. Hunt set off to the location where Parish's men had run into a Japanese ambush previously, expecting to find at least 50 Japanese. At 7am on the 28th, Hunt's men came across an outpost line and engaged it for hours, seeing 15 casualties. Hunt pulled his men back out of mortar range and the Japanese swarmed upon them forcing the Americans to perform some heated rearguard actions. Overall these patrols amongst others allowed the Americans to get a better picture of the terrain and concentration of the enemy. For two weeks the American patrols searched for the enemy headquarters running into countless skirmishes, mostly against the forces of Colonel Sato Jiro. By the 27th, Matsuda had reached Kokopo and received new orders from General Sakai that he was to take the men further on towards Iboki. Colonel Sato was to again provide the rearguard. This allowed the Americans to seize Nakarop, a placed their translators had mistranslated from Japanese documents as “Egaroppu”. It had been the nerve center of General Matsuda's operations. They found countless abandoned tents in bivouac areas, the village contained native and Japanese built structures. There was a huge sign saying "Matsuda Butai Army Command Principal Place." There were traces of elaborate radio installations recently removed containing an American-made telephone switchboard labeled "Glory Division." It would turn out Matsuda's personal quarters, however, were actually located off the main trail roughly midway between Magairapua and Nakarop, its approaches so skillfully concealed that patrols did not find it until several days later. Well camouflaged bivouac areas also infested this entire region. With the capture of Matsuda's former headquarters, all patrols were combined into the Gilnit Group led by the legendary Colonel Chesty Puller. Puller pointed his force in the direction of the Borgen Bay-Itni River to clear it out. They departed Agulupulla on January the 30th as the 5th Marines relieved the 2nd battalion, 1st marines to attack the Iboki area. Attempts were made at leapfrogging, using landing craft to hit places hoping to trap Japanese during the advance. The landing craft were operated by the Boat Battalion, 533d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, of the Army's 2d Engineer Special Brigade. They were made available to carry out the amphibious phase, and the division's little Cub artillery spotter planes for observation and liaison. Rough seas frustrated the first landing attempt at Namuramunga on February 4th, forcing two patrols from the 2nd battalion to proceed overland from Old Natamo via a coastal track. They got as far as Mambak killing a few stragglers and taking 3 prisoners. The next day another patrol landed at Aliado and advanced down the coastal track to the mouth of the Gurissa river through Kokopo and Gorissi. By the 10th of february they managed to kill 16 stragglers and grabbed 6 prisoners who they brought back to the Borgen Bay perimeter. Meanwhile the 3rd battalion advanced into Gorissi by boat on the 12th and setup a radar station. They then dispatched a patrol to the EI river on the 16, finding it impassable. Another patrol was sent to leapfrog around the Arimega Plantation on the 19th. It was seized quickly and now the Americans were very close to Iboki.   Meanwhile Sato reached Kokopo, but did not linger long and continued on to Karai-ai by February 12th. That day the 3rd battalion, 5th marines, aware of the Japanese course, set up an advance base at Gorissi. Now 20 miles separated the Japanese rearguards from their pursuers. Sato and his men would reach Iboki by February 16th, while the Marines were fording the El river, 30 miles behind. It would take them 5 additional days to reach Karai-ai. To the south Puller's group had reached Gilnit and Nigol on the 10th, finding no enemy. These actions saw the Americans secure the western half of New Britain. 2 days later, Company B of the 1st Marines landed on Rooke Island where they set up a radar installation. They also had to patrol the islands to see if any Japanese remained upon it. They fanned out, running into native villages who offered them fresh fruit. They would come across machine gun emplacements, abandoned bivouac areas and some medical stations, but no Japanese. The enemy had clearly evacuated the island   All the way back over at the Arawe area, Major Komori had received new radios on February 5th enabling him to resume communications with the 17th divisional HQ. He received a gloomy report  “At present, the airfield is covered with grass 4 to 5 [feet] high. The airfield, 200 m [sic] in width 800 m in length, will be serviceable only for small airplanes. However, it will take quite some time to develop it. Consequently, I believe that it will not be of great value.” Knowing about Matsuda's withdrawal, he began casting envious eyes in the same direction. On February 8, he hinted more broadly to that effect: “As has been reported, the value of Merkus airfield is so insignificant that it seems the enemy has no intention of using it… Due to damage sustained by enemy bombardments and to the increased number of patients, it becomes more and more difficult to carry out the present mission… It is my opinion that as the days pass, replenishment of supplies will become more and more difficult and fighting strength will be further diminished; our new line will be cut off and consequently leave us with no alternative but self-destruction.” Divisional HQhowever was not pleased with this and sent a telegraphic response the following day ordering him curtly to continue his mission. Komori would write in his diary that day "Wondered what to do about the order all night long. Could not sleep last night… I felt dizzy all day today." Fortunately for Komori, on February 17th Sato was ordered to occupy key positions at the Aria river's mouth to help supply him by land. This allowed Komori to begin his retreat north on the 24th while Sato evacuated the Iboki stores to Upmadung. Komori's departure would be just in the nick of time as the Americans dispatched two tank platoons to clear out the airfield area on the 27th. They would find zero enemy resistance and this would put an end to the Arawe operation. And that will be all for today for New Britain as we are going to be covering some big allied planning.    Over in the southwest and south Pacific Areas, General Douglas MacArthur continued his plan to drive back towards the Philippines. This would be done via amphibious operations along the north coast of New Guinea. His next main target was the Vogelkop Peninsula, then the Palau Islands, then the invasion of Mindanao. This would also see the Japanese lines of communications to the Dutch East Indies cut off. Yet before all of this he needed to capture the Hansa Bay area of northeastern New Guinea and then Hollandia in the Dutch part of New Guinea. This action would allow his forces to bypass the Japanese stronghold at Wewak. Meanwhile there were the ongoing efforts to reduce Rabaul, and to continue that he still had to capture the Admiralty Island and Kavieng, which would completely cut off Rabaul. The planners for the south, southwest and central Pacific Areas met at Pearl Harbor on January 28th. However the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to delay MacArthur's invasion of the Admiralties and Kavieng pushed it to April 1st. They had determined it was better to prioritize the invasion of the Marshall islands in the central pacific. This delay would further delay most of the southwest pacific operations along the New Guinea coast. Meanwhile Admiral Kusaka and General Imamura had sent the bulk of the 230th regiment and the recently arrived 1st independent mixed regiment to New Ireland. The 2nd battalion, 1st independent mixed regiment was sent to the Admiralties on January 25th, joining up with Colonel Ezaki Yoshio's 51st transport regiment. Then the 1st battalion, 229th regiment was sent to the Admiralties on february 2nd. These were last ditch efforts by the Japanese to secure a very desperate lifeline for Rabaul. No offensive could be mounted for at least 3 months, thus the Japanese were given ample time to reinforce and strengthen their defenses. Admiral Halsey also had plans to invade the St Matthias Islands as a preliminary for the attack upon Kavieng, and this like MacArthur's plans were thrown into disarray. In view of all of this MacArthur suggested to Halsey a new plan, codenamed Operation Squarepeg, to seize the Green Islands and establish a new PT boat and or air base there. With that in hand they could project air and naval power further against Rabaul and perhaps even as far as Truk. However many of the officers did not believe any of this would significantly isolate Kavieng and Rabaul. Furthermore, they believed it doubtful that fighters stationed at a base in the Green Islands would even be able to cover Kavieng. Admiral Wilkinson, with the backing of Admiral Fitch and General Geiger, suggested that the proposal be abandoned, and that plans be laid for a landing either at Borpop or Boang Island. On 28 December, however, after analyzing the situation, Colonel William E. Riley, Admiral Halsey's War Plans officer, made the following observation: “There is no doubt but that the occupation of this area [Borpop] and the utilization of air facilities thereat would assist materially in the neutralization of both Rabaul and Kavieng. However, the grave possibility that such an operation would result in the employment of approximately two divisions and additional naval support, not now available and will--in all probability--not be made available in time for this type intermediate operation, makes it necessary to eliminate Borpop as a possible intermediate operation… Though Green Island is not as far advanced as Boang Island, yet it is quite possible to provide fighter cover for strikes on Kavieng. In addition, dive bombers, based on Green Island, can operate most effectively against shipping at Kavieng.”Thus Halsey elected to go ahead with Operation Squarepeg anyway because a fighter umbrella could be tossed over the Green Islands during an amphibious invasion, something that would not be possible for Boang or Borbop. Halsey's staff went to work planning the amphibious landing. It would be carried out by elements of General Barrowclough's 3rd New Zealand Division. PT 176 and PT 178 of Lieutenant-Commander LeRoy Taylor's Torokina Squadron conducted hydrographic reconnaissance of the islands on January 10th and discovered the southern channels near Barahun island were the most suitable. 300 men of the 30th New Zealand battalion led by Lt Colonel Frederick Cornwall got aboard the APDs Talbot, Waters and Dickerson, covered by the destroyers Fullam, Bennet, Guest and Hudson led by Captain Ralph Earle. They landed on Nissan Island and performed a survey finding a promising airfield site. They also discovered there were no more than 100 Japanese at a relay station alongside 1200 native Melanesians. Pretty sure I said this before in the series, but I will repeat it. Melanesians are one of the predominant indigenous inhabitants of the Melanesian islands that are found in the area spanning New Guinea to the Fiji Islands. Something pretty neat about them, along with some indigenous Australians, they are the few groups of non-Europeans to have blond hair. The Melanesians were so friendly to the New Zealanders and so hostile to the Japanese that it was decided to omit the usual preliminary naval and aerial bombardment for the landings.  Now over in the Central Pacific plans to invade the Marshall were underway, even before the successful liberation of the Gilberts. The operation was codenamed Operation Flintlock, and Admiral Nimitz assigned the 4th Marine division, reinforced with the 22nd marine regiment and Army's 7th division to train intensively for amphibious warfare. They were deemed Tactical Group 1, led by Brigadier General Thomas Watson. They would be backed up by a whopping 23 aircraft carriers, 15 battleships, 18 cruisers and 109 destroyers. Yet things had certainly changed since 1942, the American Navy was packing overwhelming heat. Admiral Spruance, now commander of the 5th fleet, would hold the highest operational command for Operation Flintlock. Admiral Turner would be commanding task force 51 and the Joint Expeditionary Fleet and General Holland Smith would be commanding all the expeditionary troops. General Smith's position in the chain of command in relation to Admiral Turner was made much clearer than it had been during the Gilberts operation. Simply put he was put in direct command of all landing forces and garrison forces once they were ashore. The troop commanders of each of the landing forces, the 7th and 4th Marine Divisions, were expressly placed under Smith until such time as Admiral Spruance should determine that the capture and occupation phase of the operation had been completed. However, Smith's authority as commander of expeditionary troops had one limitation. It was recognized that "the employment of troops, including the reserve troops engaged in the seizure of objectives, is subject to the capabilities of the surface units to land and support them," thus any directives issued by Smith as to major landings or as to major changes in tactical plans had to have the approval of Turner before they could be issued. To this extent, the expeditionary troops commander was still subordinate to Turner. They would also be supported by Rear Admiral Marc Mitscher's fast carrier force, task force 58 and Admiral Hoovers land based air forces, including the 7th air force and other Navy air forces. So yeah, America was coming in overkill. Nimitz's original plan was to advance into the Marshalls by simultaneously hitting Kwajalein, Maloelap and Wotje. Together these contained 65% of the aircraft facilities in the island group, leaving the 35% remainder on Jaluit and Mille. Jaluit and Mille could be neutralized and bypassed. Yet after facing the difficulties during the Gilberts operation, Nimitz decided to also bypass Maloelap and Wotje as well, so he could concentrate all his forces against Kwajalein. General Smith and Admirals Spruance and Turner opposed this, arguing that sailing into Kwajalein would be too exposed if Maloelap and Wotje were left unoccupied.  Nimitz 'new plan would see General Corlett's 7th division hit the southern group of islands in the atoll, including Kwajalein island, while Major General Harry Schmidt's 4th marines would hit Roi-Namur and the other northern islands of the atoll. Task Force 52, would transport the 7th Division while Rear Admiral Richard Conollys task force 53 transported the 4th marines. After some meetings, Spruance managed to secure the invasion of Majuro, which would be carried out by Lt Colonel Frederick Sheldon's “Sundance” Landing Force. They consisted of the 5th amphibious corps reconnaissance company, the 2nd battalion, 106th regiment and the 1st defense battalion. Spruance wanted to make the atoll a fleet base, so airfields could be constructed to help cover the line of communications to Kwajalein. To support the main landings, Mitschers fast carrier force was going to smash the enemy aircraft and air facilities at Wotje, Maloelap, Roi-Namur and Kwajalein while his vessels simultaneously coordinated with Turners cruisers and Rear Admiral Ernest Small's Neutralization group task force 50.15 to naval bombard them as well. The main threat that needed to be neutralized quickly was Eniwetoks airfield. Meanwhile Hoover's land based aircraft would help neutralize Mille and Jaluit and help smash the other islands and shipping. Throughout November and December, two atolls would receive more attacks than the others. Mille closest to the Gilberts, thus much more accessible, earned the lionshare of attention. Maloelap with its large air facilities had to be kept under constant surveillance and attack, thus she came second. Beginning on December 23rd, aircraft based out of the Gilberts began increasing air strikes against the Marshalls.  On Mille between November 24th to December 18th, 106 heavy bombers dropped 122 tons of bombs over the runways and facilities. The next week bombers and fighters began attacking Mille's fuel dumps, leveled all buildings, destroyed 11 grounded aircraft and another 13 in the air. Mille was neutralized and the Japanese would abandon its airfield by January. The damage dished out to Maloelap was extensive, but not as crippling. Her runways were not entirely put out of operation. From January 11th to the 25th, B-25's destroyed her ground installations, but still her airfield remained operational. On January 26, 9 B-25s, followed by 12 P-40s, flew into Taroa for a low-level attack. The B-25s destroyed 9 interceptors on the ground and 5 more after they were airborne. The control tower and two other buildings on the airfield were set afire and four tons of bombs were dropped in fuel dump and dispersal areas, starting large fires. As the B-25s left the target to return to Makin they were chased by about 15 Japanese fighters. 30 miles south of Maloelap the 12 P-40s met the bomber formation and immediately engaged the enemy fighters, destroying11 of them and severely damaging 2 more. The strike of January 26 was decisive. Practically all of the remaining enemy air strength at Maloelap had been destroyed, and the once formidable base was rendered almost powerless to defend itself against air strikes,  thus neutralized. Jaluit was subjected to 15 attacks reduced to rubble and Wotje was hit 14 times suffering extensive damage. Meanwhile Admiral Pownalls task force 58.1 and 58.3 consisting of 6 fast carriers, 5 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers, 3 of the new class of anti aircraft cruisers, and 12 destroyers hit Kwajalein on December 5th. That day saw her attacked by over 246 aircraft. As a result 19 Japanese interceptors and 4 bombers were destroyed at Roi-Namur, 7 cargo ships were destroyed at Kwajalein and extensive damage was inflicted upon both bases. Simultaneously, 29 aircraft hit Wotje where they destroyed 5 grounded aircraft, set fire to hangers, machine ships and barracks. Japanese interceptors attacked Pownall's carriers, though they were unable to inflict serious damage. Following these attacks, Hoover's aircraft continued to smash Kwajalein, tossing 10 attacks, dropping nearly 210 tons of bombs on the atoll. Roi-Namurs airfield still remained operation by January 29th however, though she only had 35 aircraft on Roi-Namur; 10 reconnaissance planes on Kwajalein; 13 aircraft on Maloelap; 12 on Wotje and 15 on Eniwetok. The Japanese did not have any effective air force to defend the Marshalls any more. The feeling of the men on the islands, was doom.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Finally the Australians had taken the formidable position known as Shaggy Ridge. The Japanese continued the harrowing marches going north as their enemy would not let up. In the Marshalls the IJA and IJN personnel were inflicted the full might of American's wartime productivity, and they all knew Uncle Sam was coming to pay them a visit soon. 

Why We Fight ~ 1944
Tanks & Alligators at Tarawa

Why We Fight ~ 1944

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 15, 2024 61:59


In this episode, Jon Bernstein, the Arms & Armor Curator at the National Museum of the United States Marine Corps, joins me to talk about USMC Sherman Tanks and Alligators used at Tarawa, including the first "hot tank on tank action" involving Marine Shermans in the Pacific Theater. Links Tanks in Hell: A Marine Corps Tank Company on Tarawa (https://www.amazon.com/Tanks-Hell-Marine-Company-Tarawa/dp/1612003036) Coral and Brass (https://www.amazon.com/Coral-Brass-Holland-M-Smith/dp/1548048631/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1H7OR5B9SMY3T&keywords=coral+and+brass+holland+smith&qid=1705250898&s=books&sprefix=coral+and+bra%2Cstripbooks%2C181&sr=1-1) History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Volume 7: Aleutians, Gilberts, and Marshalls, June 1941 - April 1944 (https://www.usni.org/press/books/aleutians-gilberts-and-marshalls-june-1941-april-1944) Galvanic: Beyond the Reef - Tarawa and the Gilberts, November 1943 (https://www.history.navy.mil/content/dam/nhhc/research/publications/publication-508-pdf/Galvanic-booklet-508%20A.pdf) "With the Marines at Tarawa" (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JolhiCbU_u8) "Fight Now" performed by the III Marine Expeditionary Force Band (https://www.dvidshub.net/video/817588/fight-now-iii-marine-expeditionary-force-band) --- Send in a voice message: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/mother-of-tanks/message

Why We Fight ~ 1944
With the Marines at Tarawa: "The Price We Had to Pay for a War We Didn't Want..."

Why We Fight ~ 1944

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 14, 2024 84:10


In his final episode for the 1943 series, Lt. Col. Brian Kerg returns to tell the story of the Marines at Tarawa in November 1943 and the lessons we learned and can still learn from this costly battle. Links Tanks in Hell: A Marine Corps Tank Company on Tarawa (https://www.amazon.com/Tanks-Hell-Marine-Company-Tarawa/dp/1612003036) Coral and Brass (https://www.amazon.com/Coral-Brass-Holland-M-Smith/dp/1548048631/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1H7OR5B9SMY3T&keywords=coral+and+brass+holland+smith&qid=1705250898&s=books&sprefix=coral+and+bra%2Cstripbooks%2C181&sr=1-1) History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Volume 7: Aleutians, Gilberts, and Marshalls, June 1941 - April 1944 (https://www.usni.org/press/books/aleutians-gilberts-and-marshalls-june-1941-april-1944) Galvanic: Beyond the Reef - Tarawa and the Gilberts, November 1943 (https://www.history.navy.mil/content/dam/nhhc/research/publications/publication-508-pdf/Galvanic-booklet-508%20A.pdf) "With the Marines at Tarawa" (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JolhiCbU_u8) "Fight Now" performed by the III Marine Expeditionary Force Band (https://www.dvidshub.net/video/817588/fight-now-iii-marine-expeditionary-force-band) --- Send in a voice message: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/mother-of-tanks/message

The Pacific War - week by week
- 103 - Pacific War - The Counterattack on Bougainville, November 7 - 14, 1943

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 29, 2023 30:21


Last time we spoke about the naval battle of Empress Augusta Bay. Operation Cherry Blossom kicked off taking the Japanese by complete surprise. All of the diversionary actions had managed to confused the Japanese into thinking the Shortland Islands were the real target. Wilkinsons flotilla managed to land 14,000 men and 6200 tons of supplies at Cape Torokina. When the Japanese finally received news of the landings they tossed massive air attacks and prepared a counter landing force. The air attacks were not nearly enough to put a dent on the unloading process. Vice admiral Omori set out to intercept the Americans, but was caught off guard by Admiral Merrills figure 8 maneuver that saw two Japanese warships sunk, many heavily damaged and hundreds of Japanese killed. The Japanese tried a second time to hit the Americans, but Admiral Halsey unleashed his carriers to quell the action. This episode is the Counterattack on Bougainville  Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Things were looking bad for the Japanese at the start of the Bougainville campaign. Many Japanese lay dead on the island from the futile attempt to counter the landings. In the depths of Empress Augusta bay lay other bodies and warships. Rabaul was being pulverized systematically. The Japanese needed to dislodge the enemy from the island lest it become another Guadalcanal. General Turnage's marines had successfully made their landings and now they would expand their perimeter. The naval battle of Empress Augusta Bay combined with Admiral Sherman's carrier raid against Rabaul's harbor had delivered a crippling blow the IJN's power in the region. Admiral Kusaka's air force at Rabaul had been reduced to 270 aircraft including the last minute 100 aircraft he was loaned from the IJN carriers. To make matters worse, on November the 5th, Admiral Halsey received a new task group led by Rear Admiral Alfred Montgomery. Task Group 50.3 consisted of carriers Essex and Bunker Hill; light carrier Independence and destroyers Edwards, Murray, McKee, Kidd, Chauncey and Bullard. On November 8, the destroyers Stack, Sterett and Wilson were also given to this group, though they would be withdrawn by November 14. These new carriers were packing heat. Essex carried 36 Hellcats, 36 SBDs and 19 TBFs; Bunker Hill 24 Hellcats, 33 SB2C Helldivers and 18 TBFs, plus 24 Corsairs ran CAP for her from Ondoanga and Segi Point; Light Carrier Independence carried 24 Hellcats and 9 TBFs, plus  12 Hellcats (CAP from Ondoanga and Segi Point). With all of that Halsey had an additional 45 torpedo bombers, 69 dive bombers and 120 fighters to continue putting the hurt on Rabaul. The only catch for all of this was Halsey lacked an adequate destroyer screen to protect these super weapons, thus he would be unable to fully utilize them until a bit later on.Halsey was also reinforced with Rear-Admiral Laurance DuBose's Cruiser Division 13 consisting of light cruisers Santa Fe, Birmingham, Mobile and Biloxi; and destroyers Harrison, John Rodgers, McKee and Murray. Admiral Merrill's exhausted task force was given some much needed R&R beginning on November 7th.  Back over at the beachhead, General Vandegrift was so certain the operation was 100% successful he handed the keys to the car to Turnage and returned with Admiral Wilkinson to Guadalcanal, of course he was about to receive a promotion and would soon be on his way to Washington. Turnage now sought to expand the beachhead further inland to give the marines more defense in depth, as it was expected the Japanese would launch major attacks to dislodge them. He shifted the 3rd Marines, whose units had suffered the most casualties thus far to the left sector of the beachhead. He then moved the more fresh 9th marines to the right where he believed was the most likely area the Japanese would hit the hardest. Still meeting no enemy resistance, these shuffling actions were accomplished by November 4th. Simultaneously many units also extended the perimeter. By the end of November 3rd, the 2nd raider battalion extended their part of the perimeter 1500 yards or so. The only real action anyone saw for awhile was patrol skirmishes and some fighting over roadblocks. The 2nd Raiders were under the temporary command of Major Alan Shapley who took responsibility for a few roadblocks; companies rotated out of their positions every couple of days. The key roadblock positions were found along the Piva and Mission trails. The 3rd raiders were working out ways to lure out a small group of Japanese holding out on Torokina island. On November 3rd, 3rd defense battalion and a 105 mm battery of the 12th marines fired upon the small island for 15 minutes. The 3rd raiders followed this up to storm the suspected Japanese position to find nothing but corpses. An outpost was established by M company of the 9th marines far to the left of the main perimeter which was hoped to guard against surprise attacks coming over the Laruma river. Turnages patrols at this point became a daily chore for all units on Bougainville. These patrols would go on for 20 grueling months. The thick undergrowth and lack of well defined trails made it extremely easy for the Japanese to set up ambushes at their leisure. Thus to combat this, the marines had to turn to some very good boys, K9 companies. The war dogs used their superior senses to hunt and track down the enemy during patrols. During the early stages of the Bougainville campaign the dogs were able to locate a number of small groups of Japanese. The Bougainville campaign despite being a warzone would not see as brutal fighting as say places like Peleliu. On Peleliu many of the war dogs literally were driven mad, but for Bougainville the dogs had a less intensive time. The patrols scouted as far north as Laruma and south to the Torokina River finding no meaningful resistance. By the 5th of November, the perimeter was extended inland a further 3 miles. Now 5 battalions were manning a 10,000 yard front, with the bulk of the raider battalions located on Puruata island and at cape Torokina in the reserves. Wilkinson's convoy would bring over another 3548 troops of the 21st marines and 5080 tons of supplies on November 6th. Because the beaches were already so cluttered up with supplies everything and they still lacked developed facilities, the incoming LST's had to land their cargo on Puruata island where there was open beaches. There was still no shore party to organize the unloading and a supply jam would hit the smaller island just like it was on Bougainville. Turnage now had nearly 20,000 men to man a pretty small beachhead. On the other side, the Japanese were under the belief, no more than 5000 Americans hand landed on Bougainville, getting those guadalcanal vibes aren't we? Admiral Kusaka still sought to send over the specially trained amphibious 2nd mobile raiding unit of Major Miwa Mitsuhiro, 1000 men strong. He hoped to perform a counter landing north of the American beachhead. If the special unit could disrupt the marines enough perhaps the Iwasa detachment could march overland to join up and together they would dislodge the Americans. On the 6th the destroyers Amagiri, Uzuki Yunagi and Fumizuki departed Rabual carrying 475 of the special unit with 375 support troops. The small convoy was escorted by Admiral Osugi's destroyer squadron consisting of Urakaze, Kazagumo, Wakatsuki, Makinami, Naganami, Onami and Hayanami. Fortunately for them, the naval force managed to sneak past a PT Boat guard force of 8 PT boats operating out of Puruata Island. On November 7th and 4am the IJN destroyers doubled back and unloaded the troops onto 21 landing barges to make a run for the beach. The 8 PT boats operating patrols in the area had established a new base on Puruata island, but not a single one of the discovered the Japanese landing force. Sailors aboard one of the PT boats reported seeing a strange craft, which might have been one of the barges and consequently a PT boat did check out the report. Yet before it arrived the Japanese were already landed ashore and about to charge into the left flank of the perimeter. The landing craft was seen by a Marine anti-tank platoon along the beach, but they did not fire upon it, thinking it to be American. Thus in the end the amphibious assault was a complete surprise to the Americans. The small Japanese force had landed on the beaches between the Laruma and Koromokina rivers. Not only were the Americans surprised, the Japanese were also surprised to find out the American perimeter extended further west than expected, as a result they would be unable to assemble into a unitary force before a firefight broke out. The Japanese had landed so close to the marine beachhead, the 5th company, 54th regiment were cut off from the Laruma outpost at 6am and were forced to attack the left flank of the perimeter. The Japanese raiders came ashore scattered along two miles of beach on either side of the Laruma River. Major Miwa Mitsuhiro gathered the men he could and sought to take advantage of the element of surprise they held. At 6:30am a skirmish broke out against Company K's 3rd platoon. The platoon had been out patrolling inland towards the Laruma river right at the same time as the landing. The platoon ran right into the force killing some japanese before the platoon leader disengaged realizing the size of the enemy. He took his men into the swamps going eastward, it would turn into a 30 hour grueling adventure. Company K of the 9th marines then were attacked by company 5 of the 54th regiment in a 5 hour long firefight. The guns of the 12th marines and the 90 mm anti-aircraft weapons of the 3rd defense battalion managed to fire upon the invaders who were forced to pull back to some captured foxholes. Company K then launched a counterattack. They found the Japanese dug in 150 yards west of the Laruma river. Fierce fighting broke out, but Company K could not dislodge them. At 1:15pm companies B and C of the 1st battalion, 3rd Marines came in to relieve the exhausted defenders and launched an attack through Company K's position. Major John Brady's men attacked the Japanese in the entrenchments. Company C hit the right flank as B hit the left. Both ran into heavy machine gun fire. The men requested tank support and soon the tanks 37mm were firing upon the Japanese at point blank range causing tremendous casualties. Meanwhile the 1st battalion of the 21st marine led by Lt Colonel Ernest Fry had just landed on Puruata island and they were given orders to spearhead a new assault upon the Japanese. Two LCPRS were sent to evacuate the Laruma outpost and by the night time the marines and Japanese were having shouting matches as they fired upon another. The Japanese yelled "Moline you die" and the Marines made earthy references to Premier Tojo's diet. Marine Captain Gordon Warner was fluent in Japanese, so he could quickly reply to the Japanese, apparently he even yelled believable orders prompting a bayonet charge. He would receive the Navy Cross for destroying machine gun nests with a helmet full of hand grenades, but lost a leg in the battle. Sergeant Herbert Thomas, would give his life near the Koromokina. His platoon was forced prone by machine-gun fire, and Thomas threw a grenade to silence the weapon. The grenade rebounded from jungle vines and the young West Virginian smothered it with his body. He posthumously was awarded the Medal of Honor. The attack would come to a halt, to allow a strong bombardment to hit the Japanese positions provided by the 12th marines. The following morning saw another bombardment by 5 batteries of the 12th marines before Lt Colonel Fry led two companies through the 3rd marines position to attack. They crashed into a concentrated area around 300 yards wide and 600 deep. Light tanks supported the attack. However they would only find slight resistance alongside over 250 dead Japanese. Major Miwa had pulled the men out heading further inland to try and join up with Major General Iwasa Shun's soon to be counteroffensive. The battle cost the marines 17 dead and 30 wounded, but took a hell of a toll on the Japanese. After this action the defensive line behind the Koromokina Lagoon was strengthened. On november 9th, allied dive bombers hit the area to clear it of possible Japanese infiltrators. Patrols in the area would find more Japanese dead and the Marines would ultimately claim over 377 dead Japanese. Over on the Japanese side, the Iwasa Detachment were marching towards the Mission and Numa Numa Trails. These two positions would allow them to thwart a lot of the possible American advance, which they still believed were smaller than they actually were.  Back on November 5th the E company of the 2nd raiders had skirmished with some Japanese at the Piva Trail roadblock. The actions alerted Colonel Edward Craig and he ordered most of the raiders to head north to support the position. On November 7th, Colonel Hamanoue Toshiaki led the 1st battalion to hit part of the roadblock managed by H company. This would be occurring simultaneously with the amphibious assault on the Koromokina. H company supported by some mortars from the 9th marines were able to beat off the attack, giving Major Alan Shapley's G company enough time to come and reinforce the position. By the afternoon, the raiders were forcing the Japanese to retreat over to Piva village where they dug in. Hamanoues men then began to use their new position to fire mortars and artillery into the marine perimeter. The next day, General Iwasa ordered two battalions to attack the position supported by a mortar barrage. However the swamp land on either side of the trail prevented proper flanking maneuvers so the Japanese were forced into a frontal attack. Companies E and F easily repelled the attack receiving aid from the 3rd raiders. The Americans formed a horseshoe defensive formation connecting the roadblock to the main perimeter. The new position was reinforced with mortars from the 9th marines and some light tanks of the 3rd tank battalion. The Japanese suffered heavy casualties for their efforts. E and F company then attempted flanking maneuvers through the treacherous swamps and did manage to hit the Japanese. The heavy fighting eventually resulted in a stalemate and both sides pulled back. The marines had 8 deaths and 27 wounded while it is estimated the Japanese had 125 deaths. On November 9th Major General Roy Geiger arrived at Bougainville to take command of the 1st Marine amphibious corps. Turnage now turned his attention to clearing the Piva Trail as it could threaten the building of the planned airstrips. He ordered the 2nd battalion, 9th marines led by Lt Colonel Roert Cushman into a support position and two raider battalions to clear the trail. Beginning at 7:30am on the 9th, artillery of the 12th marines began to pound the area as the Raiders advanced forward through the narrow trail between the two swamps. Some Japanese had survived the artillery bombardment and began moving 25 yards within the marines position. The raiders ran directly into them beginning a firefight. The action saw a series of thrusts and counter thrusts at point blank range. The Japanese were trying to breakthrough the marine defenses just as the raiders were coming up to smash them. It was fierce fighting and Private 1st Class Henry Gurke of the 3rd raiders was maning one of the tow man foxholes in the forefront that met the attack. To protect his partner Private 1st class Donald Probst firing with a BAR, Gurke pushed Prost aside and tossed himself over a grenade that was thrown into their foxhole. Gurke was killed, saving his friend. Probst would receive a Silver Star Medal and Gurke posthumously received the Medal of Honor. As the brawl raged on Colonel Craig sent in his reserves to check a flanking maneuver right of the roadblock. The marines gradually overcome Iwasa's men causing them to pull back again to Piva village. By midafternoon, the Marines reached the junction of the Piva and Numa Numa trails and would dig in for the night. The marines suffered 12 dead and 30 wounded, while patrols would counter over 140 dead Japanese bodies. If accurate this meant the Japanese had suffered 500 casualties during this four-day combined counteroffensive. To strengthen their new position, bombers from Munda began bombing the 50 yard area on either side of the Piva trail going as far north as Piva village. Afterwards the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 9th marines settled into new defensive position along the Numa-Numa trail and began tossing patrols forward. Meanwhile Turnage and Geiger were seeing the arrival of the first echelon of General Beightlers 37th division. Wilkinsons transports landed the 148th regiment, 5715 troops and 3160 tons of supplies. In response Kusaka tossed 15 Kates and 60 zeros to try and hit the transports during the afternoon. They managed to land a hit on the transport Fuller, killing 5 men and wounding 20, but ultimately it did nothing much. The beach situation had improved a bit, so the 129th and 145th regiments, some 10,277 men were beginning to land alongside 8500 tons of supplies between november 11th and 12th. Im sure by hearing these numbers for the landings you are already realizing how dramatically things had shifted for the allies in the Pacific. There was no way for Japan to challenge such landings at this point, the Americans were simply out producing them in every imaginable way.  Admiral Halsey now sought to smash Rabaul again on the 11th. He planned to launch a three pronged air raid. Sherman's and Montgomery's carriers from the south and General Kenney's bombers from New Guinea. Yet terrible weather hit New Guinea as it typically dose, preventing Kenney's aircraft from participating. Thus the carriers would go it alone. Sherman launched his aircraft in the vicinity of Green island 225 miles from Rabaul. Shermans aircraft ran into 68 Zeros over the harbor. The bombers tried to hit the already damaged heavy cruisers Chokai and Maya, but missed. However within the inner harbor was the light cruisers Agano, and single torpedo landed a critical hit, blowing off a large portion of her stern, flooding her engine room. Montgomery launched his aircraft 160 miles southeast of Rabaul. Essex and Bunker Hill tossed 80 aircraft each, Independence tossed 25 and 24 additional Corsairs came to provide CAP. Lt Commander James Vose led 33 Curtiss SB2C Helldivers, the new dive bomber replacing the Dauntless throughout the fleet. The Naganami was hit by a torpedo and forced to be towed into the harbor. The Suzunami was hit by a dive bomb attack and would sink near the entrance to Rabauls harbor. Strafing from the fighters and bombers inflicted additional damage against light cruiser Yubari; and destroyers Urakaze and Umikaze. 6 zeros were also shot down. While Shermans pilots had managed to withdraw from their raid using rain squalls, Montgomery's group would not be so lucky. Admiral Kusaka responded to the raids by launching one of the largest anti-carrier strikes of the War. The wave consisted of 11 G4M bombers, 27 D3A dive bombers, 14 B5N torpedo bombers and 67 Zeros. Despite radar alerts of the incoming air strike, Montgomery decided to get his aircraft aloft and perhaps carry out another strike. Montgomery was confident in his CAP and his task force was operating a new carrier formation. The carriers were grouped together rather than separated, forming a triangle in a 2000 yard circle with 9 destroyers spaced around evenly around 4000 yards. They would also be utilizing new anti-aircraft fuses. The Japanese pounced on the task force in a battle that would last 45 minutes. The CAP engaged the zeros while the Japanese bombers tried to hit the carriers. Bunker Hill suffered 5 near misses, one one puncturing the hull of the Essec in a number of places. Independence received 4 near misses. It was minor damage and it came at the cost of 2 zeros, 14 kates and 24 vals, absolutely terrible for the Japanese. The action did however stop Montgomery from launching a second strike. In just a week Kusaka had lost 43 zeros out of 82; 38 vals out of 45; 34 kates out of 40; 6 D4Y Susui “comets” out of 6 and 86 pilots out of 192. Such losses were absolutely crushing. Admiral Koga would be forced into a terrible situation later with the invasion of the Gilberts due to a shortage of aircraft. Koga was forced to pull out his surviving carrier planes from Rabaul and replace them with inferior planes and pilots from the Marshalls. But that's it for Bougainville for we are now traveling back to the China theater.  At dusk on November 2nd, General Yokoyam began his offensive into the Changde area. His 39th division advanced southwest of Yidu, followed by the 13th division headed to Nanmu; the 3rd division with the Sasaki detachment headed for Wanjiachangzhen; and the 68th and 116th divisions plus the Toda Detachment attacked the Anxiang. After routing some smaller forces out of the way, the 13th and 3rd divisions attacked the 79th army along the Nanmu-Wangjiachangzhen line on november 5th, while the 116th and 68th divisions hit the 44th army near Anxiang. Commander of the 10th army group, Lt General Wang Jingjiu assembled the 66th army at Niajiahezhen and ordered Major General Wang Jiaben to resist the enemy at all costs. The Chinese were absolutely crushed by the two Japanese divisions and were forced to retreat towards Moshi with the Japanese in hot pursuit.  Meanwhile the 116th and 68th divisions hit both flanks of Anxiang breaking General Wang Zuanxu's lines held by the 29th army. Zuanxu had to order a withdrawal and from that point the 116th pursued the 44th army towards Jinshi where they annihilated a small part of the unit. To the north on November the 9th the Miyawaki Detachment was advancing to Nanmu and the Sasaki detachment to Xinguanzhen, white the 3rd and 13th divisions were catching up to the 79th army in the Moshi area. The 13th division attacked Moshi while the 3rd division attacked Xinmin. During this battle the 79th army was effectively destroyed as a fighting force. After this, Yokoyama ordered the 3rd division and Sasaki detachment to attack Shimen where the 73rd army was defending. Yokoyama also ordered the 116th division to attack Chongyang and for the 68th division to advance by river towards Hanshou. This was all done in preparation for the upcoming attack against Changde, being defended by Major General Wang Yaowu's 74th and 100th armies. On November 14th, the Japanese offensive hit Shiman, seeing the defeat of the 73rd army in just two days. On the 19th, the second phase of the offensive began with the 3rd division joining up with the 116th to attack Chongyang. Simultaneously, the 13th division and Sasaki detachment began an occupation of Tzuli. On the 21st the assault of Chongyang began seeing the 51st and 58th divisions of the 74th army crushed. From Chongyang the Japanese forces immediately began an advance towards Changde. The 13th division met tough resistance from the remnants of the 29th army group led by Wang Zuangxu. The Chinese were able to utilize the mountainous terrain to their benefit hitting the Japanese with artillery. The 68th division defeated the 100th army at Hanshou and then annihilated its remaining survivors around Junshanpuzhen. This left only Major General Yu Chengwan's 57th division defending Changde.  Unbeknownst to Yokoyama, General Xue Yue had dispatched reinforcements led by Lt Generals Li Yutang and Ou Zhen to try and halt the Japanese offensive. By November 23rd, Yokoyama's assault on Changde began. The 3rd, 68th and 116th divisions surrounded the city. Two days later the 30,000 Japanese began attacking Yu Chengwan's brave 8300 defenders. The defenders were hit with artillery and aerial bombardment. With each attack the Chinese were pushed back little by little until they only held 300 meters around their main command post. Yu Chengwan's only hope was to hold on until the reinforcements arrived to try and make a breakthrough, but by December the 1st the 3rd and 68th divisions performed a pincer attack defeating them. On December 2nd, Yu Chengwan was forced to evacuate the city. Changde fell on the 3rd of December and Yokoyama celebrated the success by ordering chemical and biological units to attack cities in the region. Whenever the Japanese found too much resistance they had Unit 516 deploy chemical weapons in liquid or gas forms including mustard gas, lewisite, cyanic acid gas and phosgene. Some of the weaponry was still in experimental stages. Artillery was used to launch shells filled with the gas into cities inflicting massive civilian casualties. Most of the artillery shells contained mustard gas and lewisite. The effect of the chemical weapons caused massive panic to both humans and livestock. Its alleged bubonic plague was also deployed and spread within a 36 km radius of Changde city. It is estimated 300,000 civilians would be killed in Changde alone, alongside 50,000 soldiers. The Japanese began to withdraw on December 9th, but by this time Ou Zhen launched a counteroffensive and managed to reclaim the city. By December 24th, the 11th Army returned to their original positions, for the Japanese it was another hit and run offensive, aimed to cause massive death. The Japanese suffered 1274 deaths and 2977 wounded, though these are their claims and they most likely lost more. The Chinese estimated 14,000 had died with 10,000 being captured.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Japanese counteroffensive against the Marine beachhead on Bougainville was not going according to plan. Admiral Halsey gave Rabaul another crushing air raid and now the Japanese air power in the pacific was dwindling dangerously. Within China the horror of Japan and their chemical and biological units continued. 

The Pacific War - week by week
- 106 - Pacific War - The Battle of Cape St George, November 28 - 5 December, 1943

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 29, 2023 38:18


Last time we spoke about operation Galvanic, the invasion of the Gilbert islands. The Americans finally assaulted Tarawa, Makin, Betio and the smaller islands of the Gilberts. Tarawa saw an estimated 4690 Japanese and Koreans killed, with 17 Japanese and 129 Koreans POWs captured. The Marines suffered 1009 deaths, 2101 wounded and 191 missing in action. Vandegrift would tell the New York Times on December 27th "Tarawa was an assault from beginning to end. We must steel ourselves now to pay that price". The heavy casualties would be met by an outraged american public who could not believe such losses were necessary to take such small and seemingly unimportant islands. Little did the American public know, the lessons of places like Tarawa, were just one of many more to come. Admiral Nimitz would spend considerable time reading furious letters from the letters of the dead boys on these islands. This episode is battle of Cape St George Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  The Gilberts, specifically Tarawa, provided the first “wake up call” to American about the ferocity of the war ahead of them. Correspondents were not present at Henderson Field during the Marine battle for Gaudalcanal where the Americans found themselves defenders and the Japanese attackers. 6 months of grueling battle would see casualties approximating those incurred after three days on Tarawa. Correspondent Richard Johnston was one of the first to write of the action for Time magazine “It has been a privilege to see the Marines from privates to colonels, every man a hero, go up against Japanese fire with complete disregard for their lives.“Last week some two to three thousand US Marines, most of them dead and wounded, gave the nation a name to stand beside those of Concord Bridge, the Bonhomme Richard, the Alamo, Little Big Horn and Belleau Wood. The name was Tarawa.”” Johnston was one of 25 war correspondents, 5 photographers and two artists embedded with the marines in the Gilberts. Never in history had a battle been so fully covered by the press. The amphibious landings drew immense casualty rates and during the active fighting, the mortality rate per 1000 soldiers per day was 1.78 compared to 0.36 in europe, thats nearly 5 times more. Overall casualty rates, including the wounded were 5.5 per thousand per day compared to 1.74 for europe. The war correspondents learnt a lot about the fighting qualities of their marines, but they also learnt a great deal about the enemy. The battles frequently saw hand-to-hand combat. The Americans were shocked to find the enemy were not in fact short, bucktoothed, bespectacled “Japs” as the propaganda cartoons had portrayed them. Private 1st class Robert Muhlbach recalled many of the enemy were over 6 feet tall and “They were good at defending themselves, and so we had to parry and thrust, and they were good! Those guys were so much bigger than the average Jap. They were naval landing forces [Rikusentai], like Japanese Marines, and they were larger. They were very accurate with their weapons, and good with their bayonets … They were good and we were pretty good, too. So it was two of probably the best military outfits in the war.” One Lt Thomas encountered some hand to hand fighting and said “ I had the field telephone in my hand when I was rushed by the biggest Jap I've ever seen. We grappled for a few seconds, and I managed to kick him off me and throw him to the ground. Then I picked up a 0.45 and finished him off.” General Holland Smith who commanded the marines had this to say about Tarawa “I don't see how they ever took Tarawa. It's the most completely defended island I ever saw … I passed boys who had lived yesterday a thousand times and looked older than their fathers. Dirty, unshaven, with gaunt sightless eyes, they had survived the ordeal, but it had chilled their souls. They found it hard to believe they were actually alive …” He was not to be the only high ranking commander stunned by what occurred on such a small island. Admiral Nimitz wrote to his wife  “I have never seen such a desolate spot as Tarawa. General Richardson, who saw battlefields in France last year, says it reminded him of the Ypres field, over which the battle raged back and forth for weeks. Not a coconut tree of thousands was left whole …” Nimitz would read countless letters beginning with “you killed my son on Tarawa”. The mothers of 1009 marines and 687 naval personnel would never see their sons again. The invasion of the gilberts had ushered in what is commonly known as the “island hoping campaign” vs what was called Leapfrogging in the south pacific. As told to us by General Douglas MacArthur “Although we've already seen many instances of American forces launching amphibious invasions against Japanese-held islands, particularly at the Solomons, there is one difference to be made. The strategy employed in the South Pacific is often referred to as leapfrogging, and the explanation comes from General MacArthur himself, who claimed to have invented this strategy despite it predating WW2 by many decades.    My strategic conception for the Pacific Theater, which I outlined after the Papuan Campaign and have since consistently advocated, contemplates massive strokes against only main strategic objectives, utilizing surprise and air-ground striking power supported and assisted by the fleet. This is the very opposite of what is termed island hopping which is the gradual pushing back of the enemy by direct frontal pressure with the consequent heavy casualties which will certainly be involved. Key points must of course be taken but a wise choice of such will obviate the need for storming the mass of islands now in enemy possession. Island hopping with extravagant losses and slow progress ... is not my idea of how to end the war as soon and as cheaply as possible. New conditions require for solution and new weapons require for maximum application of new and imaginative methods. Wars are never won in the past.””   With the capture of the Gilberts, now the allies had an assortment of new air bases for land based aircraft to be used against the Marshalls. The seabees and 7th air force engineers rapidly went to work on airfield construction at Tarawa and Makin. Yet there were many who questioned if it really was all worth it, amongst them was General Holland Smith "Was Tarawa worth it? My answer is unqualified: No." He questioned whether 1772 lives and an escort carrier was worth the additional air fields. The invasion taught a lot of bitter lessons, such as how to improve the preliminary naval bombardments and air strikes so they would be more successful; to improve the capability of naval fleets to move into a area and obtain control over it; for naval and aerial assets to remain in the area for the throughout the entire assault; the vital importance of maintaining good communications between land and sea and between the tanks and infantry which proved rather lackluster at Tarawa; the value of amphibian tractors when you had to face fortified beaches and most importantly Operation Galvanic proved to be a significant testing ground of established amphibious doctrine. The Americans had no illusions that the techniques, tactics and procedures set for in the basic US manuals for landing operations were workable under such difficult conditions. On the other side, the Japanese had prepared the Ko Brigade at Ponape consisting of the 3rd battalion, 107th regiment, 3rd battalion, 16th mountain artillery regiment, 2nd company, 52nd engineers and other units of the 1st south seas detachment to launch a counterlanding against the Gilberts, but this plan was quickly dropped. Instead the Japanese would focus their efforts on reinforcing other central pacific islands such as the Marshalls. Over on Bougainville, the Americans were enjoying a rather quiet week after the battle of the Coconut Grove and they used this time to expand their perimeter. However there was a hiccup on November 17th when convoy 31.6 bearing the 3rd battalion, 21st marines were set upon by Betty bombers. 185 marines were aboard the destroyer transport McKean and as she approached Empress Augusta Bay a Betty hit her with a torpedo off her starboard quarter. This exploded her after magazine and depth charge spaces. Flaming oil engulfed her, she lost power and communications. Her commanding officer Lt Ralph Ramey ordered abandon ship at 3:55am as she began to sink stern first by 4am. 64 crew and 52 troops died as a result of the attack. Meanwhile Colonel Hamanoue's men had been busy constructing defenses around the forks of the Piva River. By the 18th, American patrols discovered two new Japanese roadblocks on the Numa Numa and East-West trails. This led the 3rd battalion ,3rd marines to be tasked with knocking out the Numa Numa roadblock. The marines opened the following day up with an artillery barrage before rolling in with some light tanks flanking and rousing the defenders of the roadblock. 16 Japanese would be killed. With the Numa Numa position secured, the men advanced over to hit the East-West roadblock. That same morning the 2nd battalion, 3rd marines crossed the Piva and captured the roadblock at the forks area. During the afternoon, a reinforced platoon seized some high ground to the left of the East-West Trail. The platoon led by Lt Steve Cibek dug in on top of the feature that would provide excellent observation over the area. The Japanese would toss attacks at their hill for 3 days prompting reinforcements to be brought up to help Cibeks men. On the 21st, General Geiger decided to expand the perimeter again, this time to Inland Defense line “easy”. The 21st marines would now take up a position between the other two regiments. They would however run into some strong resistance from the bulk of Colonel Hamanoue's focus with their 3rd battalion getting pinned down after crossing the Piva by heavy mortar fire. Their 2nd battalion in the center ran head on into a Japanese defensive line astride the East-West trail. There were around 20 pillboxes and the 2nd battalion were forced to pull back. Unexpectedly the Japanese pursued them, trying to envelop the line held by the 1st battalion, but they failed and were cut down by machine gun fire. This allowed the 1st battalion to extend their lines north towards what was now being called Cibek's ridge. Geiger then halted the advances on November 22nd and shifted his units the following day to plug up some gaps in the line. He further planned to launch a new assault on the 24th. The 24th began with a heavy artillery bombardment as the 2nd and 3rd battalions, 3rd marine began advancing under the supporting first of the 1st battalion. At H-hour, 9:00am, a Japanese battery located on the forward slope of a coconut grove began to accurately smash the 1st battalions assembly locations. As one observer noted  “Shells poured into the first lines, into the attacking battalions' areas, the forward Regimental C.P. area, the rear C.P., the trail. The noise was much greater now-not only the deafening roar, but, added to it, the sharp terrifying sound of a shell exploding close by ... the agonizing moans of men shouting for corpsmen, for help, for relief from burning torture ... the maniacal screams and sobs of a man whose blood vessels in his head have burst from the blast concussions of high explosives devised by the clever brain of civilized man. The Third Battalion took it. The C.P. area took it to the tune of fourteen men killed and scores wounded in a period of five minutes." The 1st battalion quickly became pinned down. Fortunately Cibeks men were able to locate the battery and used 155mm howitzers to destroy it. At first the advance saw little resistance, as described by one historian of the 3rd marines "For the first hundred yards both battalions advanced abreast through a weird, stinking, plowed-up jungle of shattered trees and butchered Japs. Some hung out of trees, some lay crumpled and twisted beside their shattered weapons, some were covered by chunks of jagged logs and jungle earth, a blasted bunker, their self-made tomb. The Marines pressed forward on their destructive mission toward their clearly defined day's objective." Yet Japanese reserves were rushed to the scene and began engaging the 3rd marines. The 3rd marines were facing extremely accurate enemy artillery and mortar fire taking heavy casualties. The advancing americans would have to destroy a series of bunkers one by one while at the same time repelling the enemy's counterattacks. After already suffering 70 casualties going a quarter mile the Americans fired upon log bunker after log bunker one by one. The Japanese targeted American flamethrower units killing a number of them. Around every defense point Japanese snipers in trees and on elevated platforms fired upon them. Nambu machine guns were firing at all times. The terrain eventually dictated hand to hand and tree to tree combat. Though grueling, the Americans reached their first objective. The men reorganized their positions and unleashed a new artillery barrage with the two battalion advancing yet again against fierce resistance. It was not just the enemy they faced, the terrain in this area was dominated by swamps. General Geiger then postponed the attack to secure the terrain above the proposed airfield site so he could provide his men with a Thanksgiving meal. For thanksgiving the turkey meals were sent forward to the front with parties organized, braving Japanese sniper fire. One observer recalled “Some of the meat got there, some didn't. But it was a good stunt and a necessity; no one would have been forgiven if it had been left to rot down at the Division Commissary just because we had a battle! The men sat on logs eating their turkey. Nearby a Jap lay rotting in the swamp. Heads and arms of dead Japs floated in the near-by jungle streams. Not a very enjoyable setting, but these were tired, ravenously hungry men who had been fighting all day. And it was Thanksgiving. Those who were able to get it enjoyed their turkey.” By nightfall the resistance was crumbling and the Americans were grabbing a mile beyond the objective line before digging in. Mop up operations would be around the clock, but the battle of Piva forks had effectively come to an end, thus securing the site for a projected bomber field. The battle cost the Japanese dearly. Hamanoue's 23rd regiment ceased to exist as a well organized fighting unit. The marines counted 1107 dead Japanese, though it is likely the number was much higher. The 3rd marines suffered 115 casualties, thus earning some relief from the 9th marines for many days. On November 25th, the 1st battalion, 9th marines advanced past Cibeks ridge and unexpectedly ran into heavy machine gun fire from a small feature directly in front. They charged at the feature and tossed grenades, but the Japanese were able to repel their attack, thus the feature was named Grenade Hill.  Meanwhile General Hyakutake feared that the invasion of Cape Torokina was only a stepping stone for a large invasion against Buka. He persuaded Admiral Kusaka to further reinforce Buka. Previously Major General Kijima Kesao's 17t infantry group had been dispatched on 5 destroyers to protect Bougainvilles northern sector. No Captain Kagawa Kiyoto would perform a run to Buka on the 24th. Luckily for him his run went uncontested and he was able to unload 900 men of the 1st mobile raiding unit and a detachment of the 17th engineer regiment. At the same time he evacuated over 700 aviation personnel no longer required on Buka as her airfield was destroyed. Kiyoto's movement however was soon discovered by the Americans. Admiral Halsey, never one to let up a fight, immediately dispatched 5 destroyers, the Ausburne, Claxton, Dyson, Converse and Spence under Captain Burke to intercept them. Kiyoto had departed Buka shortly after midnight, while Burke lurked near them. American radar gave Burke an enormous advantage in first detection and he knew how to use it. At 1:41am after the initial radar contact was gained at 22,000 yards, Burke turned east to close in more. The Japanese were oblivious as Burkes force closed in at just 5500 yards when at 1:55am he ordered all his destroyers to fire 5 torpedoes each before the force made a hard turn to the south to avoid retaliation. Lookouts on the Japanese flagship Onami only spotted the American destroyers when it was too late. Kiyoto's force were absolutely shredded by the torpedo volley. Onami took several hits and sunk without a single survivor; Makinami took a single torpedo hit and managed to stay afloat, but greatly crippled. Burkes force pushed it to the limit going 33 knots to overtake the IJN vessels as they tried to flee while firing upon them using 5 inch guns. Yugiri turned to fire 3 torpedoes, but Burke foresaw the maneuver and executed a well timed evasion. The torpedoes exploded in the wake of Burkes flagship. It devolved into a running gun battle until 2:25 when the Japanese dispersed. 60 miles off Cape St George, Burke's three destroyers concentrated their 5 inch guns on Yugiri which received a critical hit at 3:05am crippling her speed. Yugiri was outgunned and outmaneuvered, so her captain turned her around to fire their remaining torpedoes and engage in a suicidal gun battle. At 3:15 Yugiri received another hit causing a tremendous explosion and would sink by 3:28. Meanwhile the crippled Makinami was finished off with torpedoes and gunfire. The two other Japanese destroyers managed to flee westwards, but Burke could not pursue as it was too close to Rabaul. The Japanese suffered terrible losses, aboard Onami all but 228 men died; aboard Makinami all but 28 out of 200 perished, from Yugiri there were 278 survivors out of 497 crew and troops. For the Americans, it was a brilliant victory and it demonstrated how far the IJN's super human night fighting ability had fallen to allied radar innovation. Burkes victory was described “as an almost perfect action” and he was awarded a Navy Cross. But now we have to head over to Green Hell where the battle for Sattelberg was raging. General Katagiri's counteroffensive that was launched back on November 22nd did not produce the results he was expecting. General Wootten predicted the 238th regiment would attack from the north while the bulk of the 79th regiment would hit from the northwest. Both of these forces had to cross the Song River to hit their main target, Brigadier Porters position at Scarlet Beach. The 2/43rd battalion took the lionshare of the assault with their B company under Captain Gorden successfully repelling the attempts by the 238th regiment to infiltrate. At around 8am, 15 Japanese tried to get between his right flank and the sea. By 9am some telephone lines to the HQ were cut, gradually the Japanese infiltrators were hunted and killed. Meanwhile the Fujii detachment had been created to take back Pabu hill. Unable to get past the Australian machine gun positions, Japanese mortars and 75 mm guns from Pino Hill began to bombard them. The Australians took heavy casualties but would not budge. Lt Colonel Thomas Scott sent small parties to harass the Japanese rear when they attempted an offensive. Fearing the 2/32nd battalion would soon be trapped, Porter sent his reserve D company over to reinforce them. However as D company crossed the Song river, Colonel Hayashida began to attack the Australian perimeter, applying considerable pressure on the positions held by the 2/43rd. Around noon, D company intercepted a Japanese thrust across the Surpine Valley. At 1pm D company saw the enemy force near some huts and began calling artillery strikes down upon them. As they attacked the Japanese it forces them into a more confined area near a creek. The Australians surrounded them, but the Japanese used captured anti-tank mines as booby traps. The Australians backed off somewhat trying to contain the Japanese into a pocket as they hit them with mortars. By 5:40 the Australians dug in and during the night the Japanese would withdraw after losing 43 men.  November 22nd saw the Japanese suffer 89 deaths while the Australians only had 1. With this Wooten felt the Japanese counteroffensive was most likely defeated and prepared to respond against what seemed to be Katagiri's last attempt to turn the tide of battle. For the Japanese, the attack of D company had completely disorganized their counteroffensive. They had estimated the Australians had sent 3 to 4 battalions instead of a single company to reinforce Pabu Hill and this action had the dual effect of cutting off the road between Wareo and Bonga. Colonel Hayashida had no choice but to redirect units of his regiment to defend the northern bank of the song and try to prevent the reinforcement of Pabu. Despite the actions of the Fujii detachment, the Australians stubbornly continued to resist and this led the Japanese to believe they were increasing in strength at Pabu Hill and enjoyed resupply via aircraft drops. Meanwhile the Japanese fighting power was decreasing due to their overfiring of guns and mortars from Pino Hill. Their rations were at a ⅓ standard amount, local supplies like potatoes were nearly all gone and casualties were high. The fighting around Scarlet Beach would continue until November 28th, when the Japanese withdrew towards Wareo. Katagiri's counteroffensive was unable to affect the 26th brigades advance upon Sattelberg and fell apart. Over at the Sattelberg front, Brigadier Whitehead resumed his advance on the 22nd, with the 2/48th, supported by Matilda tanks advancing up the Sattelberg road, while the 2/23rd advanced west to the Turn Off Corner position. The 2/23rd were attempting to go across a 3200 foot Feature to gain high ground over Sattelberg. The 2/48th reached a creek southwest of Sattelberg when suddenly they were halted by a landslide and four mines laid out by the Japanese. The 2/23rd after passing the corner, hit the enemy defending the 3200 feature by encircling and gradually annihilating them. Whitehead believed they held favorable terrain to dig in for the night, but would be met with strong artillery bombardment causing heavy casualties upon the 2/32nd and 2/48th. Further north the 2/24th were trying to break through towards Palanko but the 2nd battalion, 80th regiment managed to thwart their every effort at outflanking them. Both sides suffered heavy casualties of the course of a few days of battle.On the 23rd, the 2/48th spent the day trying to find a way through the rugged jungle grounds leading to Sattelberg, finally discovering an uncontested hairpin bend to the right that led to the Red Roof Hut Spur. By this point Katagiri was aware his forces on Sattelberg were not being supplied well and could not hope to resist for much longer. He began preparing to withdraw the 80th regiment over to Wareo as a result. On the 24th Whitehead sent two companies to creep up the approach of Sattelberg from the south while the Japanese continued hammering them using artillery and bombers. Meanwhile the 2/23rd launched a diversionary attack. The attack would employ what was colloquially called a “chinese attack”, ie; to make as much noise as possible. However the action quickly turned into a real firefight over the 3200 Feature. The Japanese made a surprising counter attack from the feature which inadvertently led to the Australians seizing the feature to their surprise. During the afternoon, the 2/48th reached Red Roof Hut where they found 20 Japanese deeply entrenched in two man pits with log covers. The Japanese opened fire upon them quickly pinning them down. The Japanese rolled grenades and fired machine guns at short range , as the Australians gradually surrounded them. Try as the might the Australians were unable to kill or dislodge the Japanese prompting White to signal at 5:50pm "Plan for tomorrow. 2/48 with tanks to go through Lyne 's company. 2/23 to hold firm." Just as the 2/48th were about to withdraw, Sergeant Tom Derrick made a daring attack against the right flank, rapidly advancing through Kunai grass before his men tossed their grenades into the Japanese entrenchments. By nightfall, Red Roof Hut was seized and the Australians dug in about 150 yards from Sattelberg itself. At the same time the 2/24th found the Japanese defenders who had halted them had abandoned their position. When they checked the area they found evidence the Japanese were eating ferns and the core of bamboo. The state of their corpses and the many documents and diaries they found indicated the Japanese supply situation was extremely dire. The men defending Sattelberg were being supplied from bases at Nambariwa which relied on fishing boats, submarines and airdrops, because their barges were too vulnerable to air and naval attacks. The supplies Australians saw airdropped to the Japanese were hardly enough. It was here the Australians found a diary entry from the 79th regiment I've read a few times  "Every day just living on potatoes. Divided the section into two groups, one group for fighting and the other to obtain potatoes. Unfortunately none were available. On the way back sighted a horse, killed it and roasted a portion of it… At present, our only wish is just to be able to see even a grain of rice." Another diarist of the 80th Regiment jubilantly wrote in mid-November: "Received rice ration for three days… It was like a gift from Heaven and everybody rejoiced. At night heard loud voices of the enemy. They are probably drinking whisky because they are a rich country and their trucks are able to bring up such desirable things—I certainly envy them." On the morning of the 25th, the 2/48th discovered the enemy positions in front of them also abandoned. Soon the Australians were entering the abandoned shell of Sattelberg. Meanwhile with the aid of tanks, the 2/24th were rapidly advancing towards Palanko, capturing it by nightfall. Further to the left, elements of the 2/23rd and 2/4th commando squadron found Mararuo abandoned. The 80th regiment was fleeing towards Wario as a broken force. With this the battle of Sattelberg had come to an end.  The battle for sattelberg cost the Japanese roughly 2000 casualties. Once the Australians entered Sattelberg a signal was sent to the 2/32nd on Pabu that “Torpy sits on Sat”. Torpy was a nickname for Brigadier Whitehead, based on the Whitehead Torpedo. Whitehead had also been one of the commanding officers of the 2/32nd battalion. Such nicknames were used in signals to disguise messages in case the enemy intercepted them. The capture of sattelberg was another turning point in the New Guinea campaign. General Adachi would note “Local resistance in small pockets continued in order to keep the Australian troops in action and prevent the 9th Division from being free to make an attack on Cape Gloucester and Marcus Point (east of Gasmata) should resistance cease altogether. While delaying action was being fought at Finschhafen the 17th Division was being moved by land and sea from Rabaul to Cape Gloucester to resist the anticipated attack in that area… The most advantageous position (Pabu) for the launching of a successful counter-attack was given up; also Pabu provided excellent observation for artillery fire, and after its capture the position of the Japanese forces was precarious. Even after the failure of the attack on Scarlet Beach we still retained some hopes of recapturing Finschhafen, but at this point the idea was abandoned.” The Japanese now believed that Finschhafen was completely lost and there was not much hope of halting the Australian advance. General Berryman now urged Wootten to begin a drive north along the coast to try and cut off the Japanese lines of retreat and secure the eastern coast before the expected American led invasion of New Britain. Thus Woottne next decided to clear the Wareo-Gusika ridge first, predicting the Japanese might launch a counterattack against his rear. On the 26th Wootten ordered the 24th brigade to seize the area from Gusika towards the Kalueng Lakes; for the 2-th brigade to seize Nongora and Christmas Hills; the 26th brigade to advance north from Sattelberg towards Wareo; and for the 4th brigade to guard the approach to Scarlet Beach and the Heldsbach area. Yet before the Australians could start their new offensive they had to first clear out Pino Hill and secure the road towards Pabu. Two companies of the 2/32nd with four matilda tanks led by Colonel Scott were given the job.  Meanwhile Colonel Hayashida launched a last ditch effort to take back Pabu. Reserve company 8 of the 2nd battalion, 78th regiment with the support of two 75 mm guns and mortars were given the task. As the bombardment raged over Pabu, the 30 Japanese attempted to infiltrate from the northwest and southwest. The Japanese ran into well dug positions, and the Australians caused them 20 casualties for their efforts. The Australian defenders had called in artillery support which bombarded the ring area around Pabu successfully foiling the attack. Meanwhile Pino Hill was hit with 2360 artillery shells, then by fire from four matilda tanks, before the Australian infantry stormed the feature to find it abandoned. On the 27th Wootten altered his offensive plan. Now he sought a three pronged assault against the Gusika-Wareo ridge. Berryman, Whitehead and Wootten were visiting Sattelberg on the 27th when they looked at the rugged country towards Wareo. They all knew it would be another logistical nightmare. Berryman stated it would be unwise to commit the 20th brigade through the center and that instead they should launch a two pronged attack using the 26th and 24th brigades against Wareo proper and the Gusika-Wareo ridge. Thus now the 26th and 24th brigades would hit the Gusika Wareo area and the 20th brigade would support the coastal thrust. On that same day, the 2/28th battalion advanced along the coast to take up a flanking position near the Gusika-Wareo ridge. The 2/28th made it just 500 yards south of Bonga when they were halted by strong Japanese resistance. It would take Matilda tank support to cross over a creek and begin reducing the Japanese positions. The Australians stormed over and a platoon seized a feature called “the exchange position” left undefended. The next day saw the relief of the 2/32nd battalion who advanced north while the 2/43rd took over their position on Pabu. The Pabu defenders had suffered 25 deaths and 51 wounded, but would count over 195 dead Japanese. On the 29th, the 2/43rd fanned out finding Japanese resistance west of Pabu. The Australians attempted to encircle and annihilate the Japanese positions, but were unable and gradually had to pull back to Pabu. To the east the 2/28th seized Bonga and sent patrols towards Gusika who found it abandoned so the entire battalion moved forward and took up a position at a former Japanese supply base along the coast. Meanwhile the 26th brigade were advancing north of the Song River and managed to seize Masangkoo and Fior. On the 30th, Wootten commenced the main offensive; the 2/28th crossed the Kaleung river and advanced to the Lagoon area; the 2/43rd seized the Horace and Horse mountain area; the 2/15th crossing the Song River and advanced towards Nongora and th 2/23rd crossing the Song River to cut off the main Kuanko track. Only the 2/28th would be met with strong resistance from the Japanese who were now panicking as the fall of Gusika had completely cut off their supply route towards Wareo. It was a very dire situation for the Japanese as they retreated. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The battle of Cape St George earned Captain Burke a incredible victory and yet again proved the IJN's night fighting abilities were no longer up to par. The battle for Sattelberg was finally over and with it any hope for the Japanese to take back the Finschhafen area, yet agian they fled north in New Guinea.