Podcasts about LST

For most of his life, comedian W. Kamau Bell assumed his single mom never had sex after she made him. Today, he gets the real story. ⭐️ This episode originally aired on July 12, 2016 and is a favorite from the LST archives. It's also part of our ongoing Sex & Parenthood series. We'll be airing a few episodes from the series over the next few weeks, while we gear up for our next batch of new episodes. You can find the full series here. … Join LST+ for community and access to You Know What, another show in the Longest Shortest universe! Follow us on Instagram Website: longestshortesttime.com Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Bitcoin remains an untapped source of net-new liquidity that could be injected into DeFi. This would completely reshape Bitcoin's utilization from a mere store of value to a liquid asset that can be ported cross-chain and traded like a liquid staking derivative. Lombard's LBTC builds upon Babylon's Bitcoin staking primitive and aims to unlock new yield sources for the industry's leading asset by increasing its DeFi utilization.Topics covered in this episode:Jacob's backgroundLessons gathered from PolychainFocusing on BitcoinWhy Bitcoin staking is crucial for BTC DeFiBuilding on top of BabylonLBTC mintingSources of BTC yieldPoS inflation and native token incentivesBTC as a trading pair in DeFiLombard chainFuture challenges to overcomeBitcoin L2sLombard milestonesEpisode links:Jacob Phillips on XLombard on XBabylon on XSponsors:Gnosis: Gnosis builds decentralized infrastructure for the Ethereum ecosystem, since 2015. This year marks the launch of Gnosis Pay— the world's first Decentralized Payment Network. Get started today at - gnosis.ioChorus One: one of the largest node operators worldwide, trusted by 175,000+ accounts across more than 60 networks, Chorus One combines institutional-grade security with the highest yields at - chorus.oneThis episode is hosted by Brian Fabian Crain.

When Sara Reardon's friends discovered she had answers for all their (and their moms') weird vagina questions, they called her “The Vagina Whisperer.” Sara embraced the nickname and, like a true superhero, put on her cape (ahem, vulva costume) and went on a mission to save leaky, dry, painful, and aging vaginas around the world with her pelvic floor physical therapy practice and fun, educational videos. Tune in for Sara's tips — and answers to YOUR questions — about keeping things healthy down there. … Recommendations from the archive • #49 Healing After Childbirth • All episodes from our ongoing Sex & Parenthood Series (we will be airing a few of these in the coming weeks as we gear up for our next batch of new episodes) … Upcoming live pelvic floor AMA! Join Hillary and her very own pelvic floor PT, Debra Goldman, for a live AMA on Wednesday, June 18th 1-2pm ET. This event is available for LST+ members, and we are currently offering 10% off annual membership with code VAGINA. We did this once before and it was super fun, so don't miss it! There is truly no such thing as TMI here, so come prepared with questions! … Episode resources *Purchasing with our affiliate links helps support the show! • Vagina Survival Kit, curated for LST by Sara • Sara's book: FLOORED: A Woman's Guide to Pelvic Floor Health at Every Age and Stage • Sara's website • The Vagina Whisperer on Instagram … Join LST+ for community and access to You Know What, another show in the Longest Shortest universe! Follow us on Instagram Website: longestshortesttime.com Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Apart from incentivising market participants to secure the network through inflationary rewards, many consider staking as an equivalent of stock dividend yield. As a result, although Bitcoin is regarded as digital gold, protocols are looking for ways to increase its utilisation in DeFi and, ultimately, generate yield. Nowadays, while newer networks are struggling to attract investors and sustain a healthy, decentralised validator set, more established blockchains capture the lion's share of PoS actors. However, in a constant race for profit basis points, centralised consolidation of stakers seems inevitable. Join us for a fascinating discussion on the staking landscape and the challenges it may present to decentralisation.Topics covered in this episode:Increasing BTC utilization through BTC yieldLooping yield productsThe maturation of the staking marketChorus One staking portfolioHow to prevent staking consolidationRetail vs. institutional-grade operatorsSymbiotic, Eigenlayer & restaking yieldEpisode links:Mirko Schmiedl on XTobias Jung on XStaking Rewards on XSponsors:Gnosis: Gnosis builds decentralized infrastructure for the Ethereum ecosystem, since 2015. This year marks the launch of Gnosis Pay— the world's first Decentralized Payment Network. Get started today at - gnosis.ioChorus One: one of the largest node operators worldwide, trusted by 175,000+ accounts across more than 60 networks, Chorus One combines institutional-grade security with the highest yields at - chorus.oneThis episode is hosted by Brian Fabian Crain & Sebastien Couture.

On this week's episode: James and Jamie dive into the deep end of the bathtub as Sydney Sweeney sells her bathwater, review of Lilo & Stitch, reaction to the season 2 finale of The Last of Us, Ariana Grande joins the Meet the Parents franchise, and King of the Hill returns!The Hub on Hollywood, hosted by Jamie and James, delves into the thriving film industry in New England. The podcast explores the production of various projects, including commercials, television shows, and full-length feature films.The podcast insights into New England's growing film industry, as well as entertainment news and reviews. Subscribers can access the podcast on the iHeartRadio app and follow the hosts on Instagram and TikTok for updates.

Last time we spoke about the battle of Malacca strait. In the intense Battle of the Malacca Strait, Japanese forces undertook a desperate evacuation amidst relentless attacks by the Allies. After suffering heavy casualties from previous confrontations, the Japanese regrouped and attempted to maintain their defensive positions. However, under the pressure of determined Allied assaults and strategic maneuvers, they faced increasingly fierce resistance. As the Allies advanced, they successfully overwhelmed Japanese defenses, leading to significant losses for the opposing forces. The battle transformed into a pivotal moment in the Pacific War as Japanese resistance crumbled, ultimately shifting the tide toward Allied victory. This clash not only showcased the harsh realities of war but also underscored the relentless determination of both sides as they fought for dominance in the region, marking a crucial step towards the conclusion of the conflict. This episode is the Breakthrough on Okinawa Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As of mid-May, General Buckner's forces had made steady, albeit slow, progress against the determined Japanese defenders on the Shuri defensive line. On May 16, the offensive continued. Colonel Schneider's 22nd Marines and Colonel Whaling's 29th Marines launched yet another unsuccessful assault on Sugar Loaf Hill, while Colonel Snedeker's 7th Marines exhausted their strength in a failed attempt to seize Wana Ridge. To the east, Colonel Coolidge's 305th Regiment advanced 200 yards closer to Shuri. Colonel Hamilton's 307th Regiment nearly captured Flattop and Chocolate Drop Hill but was ultimately pushed back. Colonel Dill's 382nd Regiment successfully cleared Dick Hill but came under intense fire from Oboe Hill. Meanwhile, Colonel May's 383rd Regiment made only minor gains on the southeastern slopes of Conical Hill and Love Hill, even as tanks broke through toward Yonabaru for the first time. The following day, the 383rd Regiment maintained pressure on Conical and Love Hills, prompting General Bradley to commit part of Colonel Halloran's 381st Regiment to the attack. To the west, the 382nd Regiment staged a hard-fought advance of 200 yards but was unable to capture Oboe Hill.  Slowly the 77th Division forces between Flattop and Route 5 were reducing enemy positions bearing on the area in front of the 307th Infantry. By 17 May this progress began to show in the advances of the foot troops around Chocolate Drop. Covered by company heavy weapons out on both flanks, infantrymen worked around both sides of the hill to the huge caves on the reverse slope. Inside were 4 antitank guns, 1 field piece, 4 machine guns, 4 heavy mortars, and a American 60-mm. mortars. By nightfall the caves had been partially sealed off. During the night an enemy force launched a counterattack against the American positions around the hill but was repulsed with the loss of twenty-five Japanese killed. On the 17th another bitter struggle raged on Flattop. The struggle swayed back and forth across the narrow crest of the hill. Company K, the assaulting unit, had been reduced to fourteen infantrymen by the end of the day; finally it was forced back off the top. Tanks tried to go through the road cut between Flattop and Dick Hill, but two of them were disabled by mines, leaving the cut blocked. The road cut was later blown along its entire length by seven tons of bangalore torpedoes to remove the mines. Company E continued to push toward Ishimmi Ridge, where they faced a series of heavy Japanese counterattacks. Coolidge's 3rd Battalion and the rest of Hamilton's 2nd Battalion dug in just a few hundred yards north of Shuri and Ishimmi in the highway valley. Meanwhile, Coolidge's 1st Battalion was halted by heavy fire from 110 Meter Hill and the extensive fortress houses in Shuri's suburbs. The intense fighting had nearly depleted the 22nd Regiment, prompting General Amamiya to direct the 32nd Regiment to take over the defense of Shuri along a line extending from Ishimmi to Oboe. Meanwhile, on Wana, the 7th Marines launched a renewed attack but were once again repelled. However, the 5th Marines succeeded in advancing to Hill 55. Further west, the bulk of the 29th Marines attacked toward Half Moon Hill, successfully reaching its forward slopes but later having to withdraw to more defensive positions overnight. Whaling's 2nd Battalion also mounted relentless assaults on Sugar Loaf, each time suffering heavy losses in repelled attacks. As dusk fell, Japanese planes targeted American shipping, successfully damaging the destroyer Douglas H. Fox. On May 18, tanks played a crucial role in a successful assault on Sugar Loaf, executing a double envelopment while securing the top of the hill. The 2nd Battalion then advanced to Horseshoe Hill, while the remainder of the 29th Marines managed to secure the forward slopes of Half Moon.After a night of sporadic bombardment from enemy artillery and mortars, 3/7 again attempted to gain a foothold on Wana Ridge. During the morning supporting weapons concentrated their fire on the forward slopes and crest of the objective and at noon Company I, followed by a platoon of Company L, jumped off and fought its way to the ridge. The assault troops' gains "were measured in yards won, lost, and then won again." Finally, mounting casualties inflicted by enemy grenade and mortar fire forced Lieutenant Colonel Hurst to pull back his forward elements and consolidate his lines on positions held the previous night. On the right flank of the division front the isolated platoon from Company E of 2/5 was unsuccessful in exploiting its hold on the western slopes of Hill 55. The men were driven to cover by intense enemy fire, and tanks again had to be called upon to supply ammunition and rations to the outpost. During the morning operations the 5th Marines laid protective fire with tanks and assault guns along Wana Ridge to support 3/7's advance. At noon, under cover of this fire, Company F sent one rifle platoon and an attached platoon of engineers into Wana village to use flame throwers and demolitions against the enemy firing positions in the ruins. Numbers of grenade dischargers, machine guns, and rifles were found in Wana and the tombs behind it and destroyed. Further advance into the draw was not feasible until the 7th Marines could occupy the high ground on the eastern end of the ridge and furnish direct supporting fire to troops advancing in the draw below. At 1700 the troops were ordered to return to their lines for the night. n the center, General Bruce pressed his attack deeper into the Shuri defenses, with Coolidge's 3rd Battalion gaining 150 yards along the Ginowan-Shuri highway and Hamilton's 2nd Battalion advancing up to 300 yards toward Ishimmi, although attacks against 110 Meter Hill and Flattop failed to gain ground. On the morning of 18 May, orders were given to stay at all costs. Lieutenant Bell said firmly, "We stay." The men resigned themselves to a last-ditch stand. Their grenades exhausted and their machine guns and mortars destroyed, the remaining men salvaged every clip of ammunition from the bandoleers of the dead. Spare workable rifles were loaded and bayonets laid alongside. Enemy pressure increased steadily during the day. Some Americans were shot at close range as they darted from hole to hole to escape grenades. At one time eight knee mortars were pounding the ridge, firing in pairs. Friendly artillery could to some extent keep off the charging Japanese but seemed unable to ferret out the enemy mortars, which were well protected. The moans of wounded men, many of whom were in pitiful condition from lack of water and of medical aid, added to the strain. All canteens had been emptied the previous night. Nevertheless, battle discipline remained excellent. The worst problem concerned the replacements, who were courageous but inexperienced. Thrust suddenly into a desperate situation, some of them failed at crucial moments. One man saw two Japanese attacking a sergeant thirty feet away, but his finger froze on the trigger. Another shouted wildly for a comrade to shoot some Japanese while his own rifle lay in his hands. Another saw an enemy soldier a few yards from his hole, pulled the trigger, and discovered that he had forgotten to reload. By the end of the ordeal, however, the replacements who survived were battle-hardened veterans. During the afternoon the 307th attempted to reinforce the small group. Elements of Company C tried to cross the open ground north of Ishimmi Ridge. Only the commander and five men reached Company E. The men scrambled safely into foxholes, but the commander, shot through the head while racing toward the command post, fell dead on the parapet of the command post foxhole. Spirits rose considerably when word came later in the afternoon that a litter-bearing unit of eighty men would try to get through in the evening. Enemy fire slackened after dark, and the first of the litter bearers arrived at about 2200. They immediately started back carrying casualties. Walking wounded accompanied them. The litter bearers moved swiftly and managed to avoid being seen in the light of flares. Through splendid discipline and good luck eighteen men were carried out in two and a half hours, and others walked out. The litter teams had brought some water and ammunition and the troops drank for the first time since the day before. The second sleepless night on the ridge passed. The 382nd Regiment continued to face heavy resistance from Oboe Hill but managed to secure the road cut between Flattop and Dick Hill. Meanwhile, Halloran's 3rd Battalion could only push about 400 yards south due to the relentless mortar and small-arms fire coming from Hogback Ridge. At sea, a low-flying kamikaze aircraft struck LST-808 off Iejima, resulting in the deaths of 17 men. The following day, while the 382nd and 383rd Regiments focused on neutralizing the cave positions and gun emplacements in the uneven terrain between Conical and Dick Hills, Halloran's 3rd Battalion launched an attack to the south and west toward Sugar Hill but made little progress due to the heavy defensive fire. In the center, the 307th Regiment systematically worked to eliminate enemy firing positions on the high ground in front of them, employing every available weapon for the task. Colonel Smith's rehabilitated 306th Regiment began moving up to replace the battered 305th, with its 3rd Battalion relieving Coolidge's 3rd Battalion and portions of Hamilton's 2nd Battalion along the low ground bordering the highway to Shuri, including the isolated men at Ishimmi Ridge.  On 19 May the enemy seemed to intensify his efforts to recapture Ishimmi Ridge. The besieged troops wondered whether his supply of men and ammunition was inexhaustible. The Japanese launched several attacks which were repulsed with great difficulty. Only the support of artillery and mortars, together with self-propelled mounts firing with precision on both flanks of Ishimmi Ridge, prevented the enemy from making an attack in strength which would have overrun the American positions. One enemy attack of platoon strength was dispersed by mortar and machine-gun fire and by a four-battalion time-on-target artillery concentration. Japanese mortar fire continued to fall on Ishimmi, however, and took its toll during the day. A message arrived during the morning that Company E would be relieved that evening. By noon the radio had become so weak that further communication with the company was impossible. The day wore slowly on. By 2100 there was still no sign of the relief. Shortly afterward, however, rifle fire intensified to the rear, a sign of activity there. At 2200 Company L, 3d Battalion, 306th Infantry, arrived. The relief was carried out in pitch darkness; each member of Company E left as soon as a replacement reached his position. As the haggard survivors were about to descend the ridge at 0300, a bursting shell hit two of the newcomers; one of them had to be evacuated on a poncho. Carrying its own wounded, Company E followed a white tape to the rear and arrived safely. Of the 204 officers and men of the reinforced company that had made the night attack on Ishimmi, 156 had been killed or wounded. There were 28 privates, 1 noncommissioned officer, and 2 officers left of the original 129 members of Company E. The platoon sent in relief by Company C had gone out with 58 effectives and returned with 13. Of the 17 men in the heavy weapons section only 4 came back. Company E had spearheaded a several-hundred-yard advance toward Shuri, however, and with the help of supporting weapons had killed hundreds of Japanese around Ishimmi. The 7th Marines launched one last unsuccessful assault on Wana Ridge before being relieved by Colonel Mason's rested 1st Marines. Meanwhile, after repelling a strong night counterattack, the exhausted 29th Marines were also relieved by Colonel Shapley's reserve 4th Marines, which made additional advances alongside the 22nd Marines, now under Colonel Harold Roberts. Four new regiments had been committed over the past few days to revitalize the offensive. On May 20, Shapley's assault battalions gained more ground on Horseshoe Hill but were still unable to reach the crest of Half Moon, though they successfully repelled another strong night counterattack. To the east, Mason's 2nd Battalion advanced rapidly to the base of 110 Meter Hill and captured part of Wana Ridge, while his 3rd Battalion secured a firm hold on the northern slope. Concurrently, the 5th Marines attacked southwest along the Naha-Shuri Road and successfully captured the high ground. Meanwhile, in coordination with the 1st Marines, Coolidge's 1st Battalion and Smith's 3rd Battalion made a slow, grinding advance of about 150 yards, positioning themselves within 200 yards of the outskirts of Shuri in the highway valley. At the same time, the 382nd Regiment expanded its hold on the reverse slope of Dick Hill but remained unable to penetrate Oboe Hill. The 307th Regiment consolidated and expanded its positions around Chocolate Drop, finally seizing Flattop. Reducing the tiny hill continued to be ticklish work because enemy positions to the south still overlooked the area. The fighting was still so confused that three wounded Americans lay south of Chocolate Drop for two days before relief arrived. By that time two had died and the third was so delirious that he thought he was still fighting Japanese and had to be forcibly subdued. By 20 May the caves were completely sealed off. The enemy made a final attempt to retake Chocolate Drop, attacking in company strength, but was repelled with the loss of half his force. On the same day the 3d Battalion, using tanks, flame throwers, and demolition teams, finally secured the crest of Flattop. The final American attack started with a saturation shower of grenades. A chain of men extending from the base of Flattop passed hand grenades to the troops lined up along the crest, who threw the missiles as fast as they could pull out the pins. Having seized the advantage, the infantry moved down the reverse slope blasting caves with satchel charges and flame throwers. Tanks along the road cut accounted for many of the Japanese. BY 1545 Flattop had fallen. More than 250 enemy bodies lay on the crest and reverse slope of the hill. Further east, Halloran's 3rd Battalion made a slow but steady advance down the eastern slopes of Hogback, reaching the foot of Sugar Hill despite constant grenade duels with an enemy fighting desperately to hold every inch of ground. Additionally, the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 383rd Regiment fought their way to jump-off positions within 300 yards of Love Hill, destroying enemy strongpoints that had obstructed their advance for a week. Meanwhile, back at sea, Japanese aircraft managed to damage two destroyers and three transports. The following day, the 383rd again attacked Love Hill but was ultimately forced to withdraw from its base due to fierce defensive fire. Despite this setback, May's 2nd Battalion successfully supported the 381st Regiment in clearing Hogback and pushing to the top of Sugar Hill. To the west, the 382nd advanced quickly against moderate opposition toward Oboe Hill and Hen Hill, encountering retreating enemy units moving toward the high ground at Shuri. Concurrently, the 307th pushed 350 yards south of Flattop before being halted by enemy forces at the Three Sisters, while the 306th completed the relief of the 305th, with its 3rd Battalion advancing 200 yards unopposed to the eastern slopes of 110 Meter Hill. Meanwhile, the 1st Marines continued their assault along Wana Ridge, making only limited gains at the Draw, where the 5th Marines held out and aggressively patrolled forward. The 4th Marines began their push toward the Asato River, achieving a costly advance of about 200 yards on Horseshoe. By nightfall, heavy rains began to fall, significantly impeding efforts to resupply assault troops and replenish forward ammunition dumps. Amidst this torrential downpour on May 22, Shapley's 1st and 3rd Battalions slogged through the "gooey slick mud" to reach the bank of the rain-swollen river. This prompted the Japanese to evacuate Naha and establish new defensive positions on the Kokuba Hills. To the east, the continuous rain flooded Wana Draw with mud and water, transforming it into a makeshift lake. For the next few days, General Del Valle's Marines were forced to attack without support, leading to aggressive patrolling rather than organized assaults. The prospects of success for the infantry alone, slogging through the mud without the support of other arms, were not encouraging. Tanks bogged down, helplessly mired. Amphibian tractors were unable to negotiate the morass, and front-line units, which had depended on these vehicles for carrying supplies forward in bad weather, now had to resort to hand carrying of supplies and of the wounded. These were back breaking tasks and were performed over areas swept by enemy fire. Mortar and artillery smoke was used as far as possible to give concealment for all movement. Litter cases were carried back through knee-deep mud. Living conditions of front-line troops were indescribably bad. Foxholes dug into the clay slopes caved in from the constant soaking, and, even when the sides held, the holes had to be bailed out repeatedly. Clothes and equipment and the men's bodies were wet for days. The bodies of Japanese killed at night lay outside the foxholes, decomposing under swarms of flies. Sanitation measures broke down. The troops were often hungry. Sleep was almost impossible. The strain began to take a mounting toll of men. Under these conditions the Marine attack against Wana Ridge was soon at a standstill. The action degenerated into what was called in official reports "aggressive patrolling." Despite inactivity, enemy mortar and artillery fire continued to play against the American front lines, especially at dusk and at night. In the center, Bruce's 77th Division faced similar challenges, with the 306th Regiment stalled and the 307th Regiment again unsuccessfully attacking the Three Sisters. There, Company A became isolated at the base of the forward slope of Jane Hill, nearly cut off by intense enemy mortar and machine-gun fire. For the following week, the 382nd Regiment struggled to make headway on Hen and Oboe Hills, where fierce hand-to-hand combat erupted. Similarly, all attempts by the 383rd Regiment to breach the defenses of Love Hill on the western side of Conical failed, as the 381st was also unable to make any progress against Cutaway. General Hodge had also moved General Arnold's rehabilitated 7th Division to assembly areas just north of Conical Hill to spearhead the advance toward Yonabaru and the high ground south of the village. Strengthened by 1,691 replacements and 546 men returned to duty from hospitals since it left the lines on 9 May, the 7th Division moved up to forward assembly areas just north of Conical Hill and prepared to make the dash through the corridor. At 1900 on 21 May the 184th Infantry, chosen by General Arnold to lead the way, was in place at Gaja Ridge, at the northern base of Conical. The initial move of the envelopment was to be made in the dead of the night and in stealth. General Buckner felt that "if the 7th can swing round, running the gauntlet, it may be the kill." As part of this operation, the 2nd Battalion of the 184th Regiment moved out from Gaja Ridge during the night, swiftly and silently passing through Yonabaru in the early morning hours to capture Spruce Hill and Chestnut Hill in a surprise attack. Colonel Green's 3rd Battalion then followed the 2nd Battalion through Yonabaru, but their assault on Juniper and Bamboo Hills was unsuccessful as the surprised defenders regrouped. The following day, Green's two battalions continued to push toward these initial objectives, ultimately securing a solid line that stretched from the coastline across the southern slopes of Chestnut, and then over to Juniper and Bamboo by day's end. This success allowed Colonel Finn's 32nd Regiment to pass through Yonabaru and advance westward along the Naha-Yonabaru valley to assault the enemy's western hill defenses focused around Oak Hill.On the west coast, after a successful night reconnaissance of the Asato River, the 4th Marines rapidly crossed the river under cover of smoke, beginning their advance toward a low ridge 500 yards south of the Asato. However, as previously noted, the torrential rain had turned every draw and gully into a sticky morass of knee- and thigh-deep mud in the center. The steep slopes of the hills and ridges, treacherous under the best of conditions, became virtually unassailable. Consequently, full-scale coordinated attacks had to be canceled, and only localized gains could be achieved. Despite the breakthrough in the center, the Japanese command remained concerned about the threat posed to the flanks of the Shuri bastion by American advances along both coasts. While they believed the Naha breakthrough could be contained, every available soldier was deployed to establish a defensive line stretching from the southwest slopes of Conical Hill through Yonawa to the road junction village of Chan, aiming to eliminate Arnold's spearhead that had penetrated into the Naha-Yonabaru valley. General Ushijima feared that his forces were being gradually encircled in the Shuri fortress, where they would become “easy prey” to overwhelming American firepower. In light of this situation, Ushijima began planning a withdrawal to the Chinen Peninsula or the southernmost part of the island, the Kiyamu Peninsula. This decision was met with resistance from General Fujioka, who expressed concern that thousands of severely wounded men would have to be abandoned during the retreat.  Although the holding of the heights surrounding the city had been the keystone of the Japanese preferred plan, several factors now militated against its retention. There were an estimated 50000 surviving officers and men to be crammed into a final defense zone less than a mile in diameter. Once these troops were surrounded, the Japanese believed that they would be rendered ineffectual and become "easy prey" to overwhelming American fire superiority. In addition, Japanese long-range artillery pieces, many of which were still intact, could not be effectively utilized within the limited space that would be available. The best chance of prolonging the battle for Okinawa seemed to rest in defending the Kiyamu Peninsula region which was dominated by the Yaeju Dake-Yuza Dake Escarpment. Natural and artificial caves, sufficient to accommodate the whole of the surviving army, abounded in the area. The 24th Division, which had organized the terrain, had left a considerable amount of ammunition and weapons there when it moved north to the Shuri lines. The principal roads in southern Okinawa led directly to the proposed position, thus facilitating the movement of large bodies of men in the shortest possible time. These roads also gave American tanks an excellent route of advance, but only to the outposts of the defensive zone where cliffs, hills, and precipitous ridges barred the way. To add weight to his argument, General Amamiya indicated that his 24th Transport Regiment had preserved enough trucks to move the Shuri munitions reserve to the new position within five nights if weather conditions permitted. General Ushijima, after considering the respective positions of his staff and commanders, decided to order the move to Kiyamu.  Although General Suzuki preferred the Chinen Peninsula, which his brigade had fortified, most officials supported a move to the Kiyamu Peninsula, where Amamiya's 24th Division had previously established defenses in the natural and artificial caves of the Yaeju Dake-Yuza Dake Escarpment. Thus, transportation of wounded personnel and munitions reserves to the south commenced at midnight on May 23, with the bulk of the 32nd Army scheduled to begin their withdrawal six days later.  On the night of 25 May, the remnants of the 62d Division were to pull out of the Shuri line and move through Tsukasan to counterattack the Americans. The relatively strong 22d Independent Infantry Battalion, which had been in reserve throughout most of the fighting in April and May, was directed to hold the Shuri front in place of the division. The orders to General Fujioka were "to annihilate the enemy rushing from the Yonabaru area." Failing this, the division was at least to stop the American advance long enough to allow the main body of the Thirty-second Army to retire. In order to gain time to organize the new positions, the holding force left on the Shuri front was to fight on until 31 May. Withdrawing units were to leave behind strong rearguards which would defend a line along the Kokuba Gawa to the hills north of Tsukasan and Chan and then south through Karadera to the east coast until the night of 2 June. Then a second line centered on Tomusu, approximately 2,000 yards farther south, would be held until the night of 4 June. By that time the Thirty-second Army would be firmly set up within its Itoman-Yunagusuku-Gushichan outpost zone. Admiral Ota's naval force was directed to hold the west flank of the withdrawal corridor and begin its own retreat when ordered by 32nd Army. During the night, Admiral Ugaki initiated his seventh mass Kikisui attack, launching 165 kamikaze aircraft that inflicted only light damage on landing craft. On May 24, while engineers constructed a bridge over the Asato River to facilitate vehicle movement, the 4th Marines suffered heavy casualties as they attempted to advance through the muddy, flooded valley and low clay hills. Simultaneously, Shepherd's Reconnaissance Company crossed the lower Asato and roamed the streets of northwestern Naha without encountering any resistance. To the east, Dill's 1st Battalion faced a brutal counterattack that inflicted significant casualties and nearly drove the Americans from Oboe Hill. Following Ushijima's directives, the 32nd and 184th Regiments began to encounter increasing resistance as they sought to expand their control over the valley and the high ground to the south. This culminated in a series of aggressive nighttime counterattacks that ultimately slowed and halted the western advance of the 7th Division. During the night, Japanese forces conducted heavy raids on American airfields at Kadena, Yontan, and Iejima. However, these attacks were merely a diversion for Operation Gi-Gou, a suicide raid against Kadena and Yontan. In this operation, twelve Ki-21 heavy bombers, carrying Giretsu Kuteitai special airborne assault troops, aimed to crash land on the airfields to deploy commandos tasked with destroying aircraft stationed there.  After the start of B-29 attacks on Tokyo from bases in the Mariana Islands, the 1st Raiding Brigade of the Teishin Shudan was ordered to form a commando unit for a "special operations" mission to attack and destroy the bombers on the Aslito Airfield on Saipan. Captain Okuyama Michiro, commander of the brigade's engineering company and trained in sabotage and demolition was selected as mission leader. He selected an additional 126 men from his own team, the 4th Company of the 1st Raiding Regiment, to form the first Giretsu Airborne Unit. It was initially organized with a command section and five platoons and one independent squad, based at the Imperial Japanese Army's air academy at Saitama. The group unit also included eight intelligence officers and two radio men from the Nakano School. Giretsu operations were to be undertaken at night, beginning with air strikes by bombers. After this, commando units would be inserted onto the target airfield by crash landing their transports. The fact that there was no provision for extraction of the strike force, along with the rejection of surrender in Japanese military doctrine at the time, meant that the Giretsu ground operations were effectively suicide attacks. Though the Saipan attack was eventually cancelled, the 6th Air Army ultimately requested the deployment of the Giretsu Special Forces to neutralize the Okinawa airfields. The 6th Air Army accordingly began preparations for the attack in early May. Led by Captain Okuyama, the raid force moved from Nishitsukuba to Kumamoto as it continued to prepare for the assault, codenamed Operation Gi-Gou. Aircraft for the raid came from the 3rd Independent Air Unit based in the vicinity of Hamamatsu. The raid force consisted of 120 commandos broken up into a headquarters section and five flights, each containing twenty men. They were to be transported by twelve Mitsubishi Ki-21s stripped of their guns and with additional forward and rear exits added to assist raiders with exiting. The timing of the raid was also meant to coincide with the withdrawal of the 32nd Army from the Shuri Line in southern Okinawa. Of the twelve bombers dispatched, four encountered engine trouble and returned to base, while three were intercepted by American night fighters en route to Okinawa. The remaining five Ki-21 bombers approached Yontan Airfield at low altitude and engaged Marine anti-aircraft gunners from the 1st Provisional Anti-aircraft Artillery Group. As a result, four of the bombers were shot down or crash-landed; however, a small number of Giretsu commandos survived this wave and commenced their mission to attack aircraft on the airfield. The fifth bomber, however, successfully evaded anti-aircraft fire and belly-landed approximately 100 meters from the control tower. About 10 commandos disembarked and attacked aircraft and air personnel with grenades. In the ensuing chaos, the Japanese commandos killed two Americans, wounded 18, destroyed nine aircraft, damaged 29 more, and set a fuel dump ablaze, destroying 70,000 gallons of aviation gasoline. After twelve hours of mayhem, however, American troops hunted down the commandos and exterminated them to a man. Despite this partial success, the Japanese operation occurred against a backdrop of heavy losses, with American fighters and anti-aircraft fire claiming a total of 150 Japanese planes on May 24. During the course of three days, Ugaki committed a total of 387 Navy planes and 174 Army planes to his kamikaze attacks, which continued through May 25. These attacks successfully sank the destroyer Bates, one transport, and one landing craft, while further damaging two destroyers, one destroyer minesweeper, one minesweeper, one transport, and one Liberty ship. On the same day, Admiral Rawlings' Task Force 57 launched its final strikes in the Okinawa area before retiring late on May 25, having completed the Royal Navy's Iceberg mission. On land, while Shepherd's Reconnaissance Company occupied the deserted ruins of Naha, the 4th Marines fought to seize Machisi Ridge and continued pushing into the eastern outskirts of Naha. However, across the remainder of the 10th Army front, assault units struggled to make progress due to the havoc wreaked by the rain and the stiffened Japanese resistance. That night, in accordance with the withdrawal plan, the 62nd Division began moving its remaining 3,000 men to counter the advance of the 7th Division, hoping to delay the American advance long enough for the main body of the 32nd Army to retreat. The arrival of additional forces on the Ozato-Mura front had little significant impact, primarily serving to strengthen the covering and holding force. On May 26, the 184th Regiment successfully cleared the Hemlock-Locust Hill Escarpment. Meanwhile, the 32nd Regiment was brought nearly to a standstill in front of the Japanese defensive line across the Yonabaru valley. Looking west, Del Valle's Marines observed large numbers of enemy troops withdrawing from Shuri and were able to pinpoint their location for naval guns, artillery, and aircraft to bombard. However, despite penetrating the Shuri defensive line on both flanks, the day yielded minimal progress. At sea, further kamikaze attacks caused damage to one destroyer, one destroyer minesweeper, and a subchaser. In total, Ugaki's raids over the past three days resulted in the deaths of 103 sailors.  Believing the fast carriers' continued value off Okinawa had become dubious, back on May 18 Mitscher had requested that TF 58 be relieved from its Okinawa station. Spruance regretfully declined. A week later an increasingly weary Mitscher reported: “For two and a half months [Task Force 58] operated daily in a 60nm square area East of Okinawa, less than 350nm from Kyushu. This was necessitated by the restricted area available and the necessity for being able to cover [the] Amami Gunto airfields, intercept air raids before they could reach Okinawa, and still furnish air support to ground forces. There was no other location from which all these things could be done.” Reflecting on the months of unrelenting stress, tedium, and fatigue, TG 58.1's screen commander, Captain Tom Hederman, signaled Rear Admiral J.J. Jocko Clark: “See Hebrews 13, verse 8.” Consulting his Bible aboard Hornet, Clark read: “Jesus Christ the same yesterday, and today, and forever.” Amused, Clark forwarded the verse to his entire Task Group, adding, “No disrespect intended.” Clark then signaled Mitscher, “What the hell are we doing out here, anyway?” Mitscher's response: “We are a highspeed stationary target for the Japanese air force.” Indeed, TF 58 had already suffered over 2,000 Iceberg fatalities. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The brutal Battle of Okinawa was reaching a critical point as General Buckner's forces pressed against fierce Japanese defenses. Struggles unfolded over Sugar Loaf Hill and Wana Ridge, with Marines suffering heavy casualties but slowly gaining ground. By late May, the dire situation prompted Japanese commanders to plan a retreat to more defensible positions as American forces closed in. Despite challenging conditions, the Allies pushed forward, marking a decisive breakthrough in the Pacific War.

This week, we're bringing you something special: an episode from Add to Cart, a show we love hosted by Kulap Vilaysack and SuChin Pak. You might remember Kulap when she was a guest on our show back in 2018, where she bravely unpacked her childhood trauma and shared how it led to her documentary film. Add to Cart is a witty, subversive take on consumerism. Each week, Kulap and SuChin have candid (and often TMI) conversations about what they're adding to or removing from their carts—whether it's products, people, trends, or philosophies. Together, they explore what we're buying into and what it reveals about who we are.  In this episode, they're joined by author and journalist Vicky Nguyen for the very first Auntie Book Club of the year, diving into her powerful memoir Boat Baby. Vicky talks about going from boat refugee to national TV and why the R is for refuse in her household. To hear more episodes of Add to Cart, follow the show wherever you get your podcasts or head to: https://lemonada.lnk.to/atcfd … Kulap's LST episode #204 Breaking Cycles (and Chairs!) with Kulap Vilaysack … Join LST+ for community and access to You Know What, another show in the Longest Shortest universe! Follow us on Instagram Website: longestshortesttime.com Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

On June 6, 1944, a teenager from Michigan helped steer a flat-bottomed Navy vessel toward the shores of Normandy. His name was Myles Isbell. His ship: LST-540. He was 17. In this special episode of Front to the Films, we tell the extraordinary story of Myles Isbell—Gunner's Mate Third Class, World War II veteran, and eyewitness to some of the most pivotal naval operations of the 20th century. To bring Myles' story to life in full, we've seamlessly interwoven his final recorded interview—conducted just three months before his death—with archival audio from an earlier oral history he gave to the Library of Congress' Veterans History Project.

Omnia is the CoFounder of Kinetiq.In this episode, we cover the native liquid staking protocol for Hyperliquid, with the upcoming launch of its LST for HYPE, called kHYPE. We dive into how kHYPE can unlock new utility and yield opportunities across Hyperliquid DeFi, the architecture behind its staking design, and the early institutional demand for exposure to HYPE through Kinetiq's platform.------

Last time we spoke about the Visayas Offensive. In March 1945, the Pacific War raged on. On Iwo Jima, the US Marines, after intense fighting and heavy casualties, declared the island secured. Meanwhile, in northern Luzon, General Clarkson's division advanced towards Baguio, facing fierce Japanese resistance, while General Mullins pushed through Balete Pass. The Japanese army, grappling with severe supply shortages, was forced to evacuate Baguio. In the Visayas, General Eichelberger's forces targeted the Sulu Archipelago and Central Visayan Islands, securing key airfields. The 40th Division landed on Panay, capturing Iloilo, and launched an assault on northern Negros. On Cebu, the Americal Division landed near Talisay, encountering mines but minimal resistance, and secured Cebu City. By April, Allied forces had made strategic advances across the Philippines, overcoming Japanese resistance and establishing crucial airfields. This episode is the Invasion of okinawa Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  We have come to the grand final battlefield at last, that of Okinawa. Of course battles are raging in all sorts of other theaters like New Guinea, China, Burma, etc. However as you might imagine its becoming impossible given the week by week format to cover all of this in single episodes. So we are going to hardcore focus on Okinawa for awhile, we will circle back to the other theaters to catch up. Seriously it was the only logical way to do this and honestly in retrospect I wish the entire podcast was campaign by campaign instead of week by week. But I am a mere podcaster following the youtube series of this. But if you want to hear a campaign by campaign series, over at Echoes of War me and my cohost Gaurav are beginning to roll them out. The first series will be the entire Malayan Campaign, and I think after that I might try to do the Philippines. Regardless lets jump into the invasion of Okinawa. As previously noted, the directive issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on October 3 designated Okinawa as the final target for invasion, following the establishment of air and naval bases in Luzon and Iwo Jima. Capturing this crucial island would bring the conflict to Japan's doorstep, disrupt the enemy's air communications through the Ryukyu Islands, and flank their maritime routes to the south. Consequently, from these newly established air and naval bases in the Ryukyus, American forces would be able to launch attacks on Japan's main islands and implement a more rigorous sea and air blockade, isolating them from Japanese territories to the south. This made it imperative for the Japanese Empire to maintain control over Okinawa and the Ryukyus. To this end, the 32nd Army, led by Lieutenant-General Watanabe Masao, was formed there by late March 1944. Initially, it comprised four companies and one artillery regiment stationed at Amami Oshima; five companies and one artillery regiment at Nakagusuku Bay; four companies and one artillery regiment at Iriomote Island; along with various garrison units from the 19th Air District in Okinawa.  Under Operation Tei-Go, the Ryukyus and Formosa were to form a long zone of interprotective air bases. These bases were expected to defeat any American sea or air forces sent into the region. To avoid destruction from the air, each base was to consist of a cluster of airfields, such that if one were damaged others could be used immediately. Military and civilian crews were promptly set to work building the numerous fields. 13 base clusters had to be created, stretching in a line from Tachiarai in the northern Ryukyus to Pingting on Formosa in the south. The only remaining tasks for ground forces were the defense of these facilities and their support anchorages and the unenviable work of building the fields. Much of the energy of 32nd Army would be absorbed building these air facilities. This was more difficult since 32nd Army had only two bulldozers and one earth roller. Japan had produced dozers in small numbers at its Komatsu plant since 1943, but few had reached the front. Since soldiers were thus obliged to use shovels, hoes, straw baskets, and horse-drawn wagons, construction was slow. Moreover, because of enemy submarine raiders, it was impossible for the Japanese to deliver the large quantities of fuel, ammunition, and anti-aircraft guns needed to operate the bases. Even more seriously, the planes themselves were not available. Between April and June, the 32nd Army received reinforcements, including the 44th and 45th Independent Mixed Brigades, the 21st Independent Mixed Regiment, and the 27th Independent Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion, among other air garrison units. From these forces, Watanabe chose to send the 45th Brigade to establish bases on Miyako Island and Ishigaki Island, while the 21st Regiment was tasked with setting up a base on Tokunoshima. On June 27, the 1st and 2nd Infantry Corps (approx. 4100 men) boarded the Toyama Maru and began the voyage to Okinawa. The 44th Brigade HQ, Artillery and Engineer Units meanwhile boarded other vessels of the Taka-412 convoy. Two days later, while the convoy was sailing east of Tokunoshima, the submarine Sturgeon successfully sank the Toyama Maru with two torpedoes, therefore inflicting the loss of 3724 men and much heavy equipment. Because of this, the 1st Corps had to be deactivated.  Following the fall of Saipan, the Japanese Empire rapidly deployed significant ground forces to the 32nd Army, including the 9th, 24th, 28th, and 62nd Divisions, as well as the 59th, 60th, and 64th Independent Mixed Brigades, and the 27th Tank Regiment. Additionally, the 15th Independent Mixed Regiment was airlifted to bolster the beleaguered 44th Brigade, which was reorganizing its 2nd Corps with local recruits. The 32nd Army Staff wished to use as much of the indigenous population as it could in direct support of the war effort, so on January 1 1945 it ordered total mobilization. All Okinawan males aged 18 to 45 were obliged to enter the Japanese service. 39000 were drafted, of whom 15000 were used as nonuniformed laborers and 24000 as rear-echelon troops called the Home Guard (Boeitai). Many of the Boeitai replaced sea based battalions and rear-area supply units that had been reorganized and equipped for frontline duty. In addition to these, 1500 of the senior boys of the middle schools on Okinawa were organized into Iron and Blood Volunteer Units and assigned to frontline duty. Some of these students had been tried out in the signal service in the autumn of 1944 with good results, so the program was expanded. Since the fall of 1944, 600 senior students of the girls' middle schools also had been given training in the medical service. While most of these troops were sent to strengthen the main defenses at Okinawa, a large portion of the 28th Division was actually assigned to reinforce the garrisons on the Miyako and Yaeyama Islands. The 36th Regiment was dispatched to support the Daito Islands, the entire 45th Brigade was moved to garrison Ishigaki and the rest of the Yaeyamas, the 59th Brigade was tasked with defending Irabu Island, the 60th Brigade was sent to reinforce Miyako Island, and the 64th Brigade was deployed to the Amami Islands. On August 9, Lieutenant-General Ushijima Mitsuru took command of the 32nd Army. His initial strategy was to occupy all of Okinawa with a strong force and eliminate any invading troops at their landing sites. As fierce fighting began at Leyte, intensive training for the troops commenced, including divisional maneuvers at potential American landing points, artillery bombardments of beachheads, and nighttime assaults on bridges. However, on November 13, Tokyo decided to send the elite 9th Division to Formosa to prepare for a movement to the Philippines that ultimately did not occur. The unexpected withdrawal of the 32nd Army's best division disrupted Ushijima's operational plans. Ironically, this situation improved combat efficiency, as it compelled the army to achieve more with fewer resources. Ushijima chose to concentrate most of his forces in the mountainous and easily defensible Shimajiri area, located in the southern part of the island. This strategic location allowed the Japanese to maintain control over Naha port and target the northern airfields with artillery. Similar to the situation in Iwo Jima, this decision marked a departure from the previously favored strategy of a "decisive battle," opting instead for a war of attrition that had proven effective at Peleliu and Iwo Jima. As a result, Ushijima positioned Lieutenant-General Amamiya Tatsumi's reinforced 24th Division at the southern end of the island, Lieutenant-General Hongo Yoshio's reinforced 62nd Division along the central isthmus, Major-General Suzuki Shigeji's reinforced 44th Independent Mixed Brigade on the Hagushi plain, and Colonel Udo Takehiko's Kunigami Detachment, consisting of two battalions from the 2nd Corps, in northern Okinawa. These troop placements were successfully implemented in December; however, concerns arose that the 32nd Army was spread too thin to effectively counter the anticipated enemy invasion. Consequently, on January 15, Ushijima decided to move the 44th Brigade from the Hagushi plain southward to overlap with the 62nd Division's area on the east, significantly shortening the Japanese front. Additionally, one battalion from the Kunigami Detachment was sent to defend Iejima and its crucial airbase, which necessitated the rest of the unit to consolidate its positions and strengthen defenses on Yaedake Mountain in the Motobu Peninsula. Ushijima also had the support of the brigade-sized 5th Artillery Group, led by Lieutenant-General Wada Kosuke; the 21st Field Anti-Aircraft Artillery Corps; the 11th Shipping Group, which included several shipping engineer regiments and sea-raiding battalions; the 19th Air District overseeing various aviation service units; and Rear-Admiral Ota Minoru's Okinawa Naval Base Force, which comprised nearly 9,000 personnel stationed at the Oroku Naval Air Base near Naha. Ushijima had nearly 100,000 troops at his command, with 29,000 assigned to specialized units for anti-aircraft, sea-raiding, and airfield operations. Anticipating the nature of the impending conflict, these well-staffed service units were reorganized for ground combat. The 19th Air District transformed into the 1st Specially Established Regiment, responsible for defending the Yontan and Kadena airfields it had recently constructed and maintained. Most of the service personnel were integrated into the new 1st Specially Established Brigade in the Naha-Yonabaru area, while the sea-raiding base battalions became independent infantry units. Additionally, the remainder of the 11th Shipping Group was restructured into the 2nd Specially Established Brigade on the southwestern part of Okinawa. This reorganization, completed on March 21, bolstered ground combat strength by 14,000 men, leaving only 10,500 of the 67,000 Army personnel in specialized roles. To protect themselves, the Japanese began constructing robust fortifications, tunnels, and cave systems to shield against anticipated enemy bombardments.  Work on the caves was begun with great vigor. "Confidence in victory will be born from strong fortifications" was the soldiers' slogan. The caves meant personal shelter from the fierce bombardments that were sure to come, and they also offered a shimmering hope of victory. The combination was irresistible, and units began to work passionately on their own caves. Enthusiasm was essential because of the great toil it took to create the caves. Just as 32nd Army had only two bulldozers to make airfields, it had no mechanized tunneling equipment at all. Besides lacking cutting equipment, 32nd Army also lacked construction materials. It had no cement, no ironware, and no dynamite. The units had to rely entirely on wooden beams that they obtained themselves to shore up their shafts. This was not necessarily easy because there were no forests in the south of the island where the troops were now stationed. Pine forests were abundant in the mountainous north, however, so each unit was assigned its own lumbering district in the north. Several hundred men from each division were detailed as its lumbering squad. The problem remained, however, of how to move the several million logs that were needed over the 40 or so miles from the forests to the forts. With no railroads and the use of trucks limited by a shortage of gasoline, the solution was for each unit to cut its own logs, then transport them in small native boats called sabenis. The divisions acquired 70 of these, which then plied the waters steadily from north to south. In January 1945, however, the Leyte-based B-24s that began flying over daily for reconnaissance also began strafing the boats. So the waterborne delivery of logs had to be switched from day to night, greatly lowering efficiency. Ushijima aimed to prolong the fight from these positions and decided to destroy the indefensible Yontan and Kadena airfields to prevent their use by the enemy, effectively ending the ineffective air defense strategy initially devised by Tokyo. Meanwhile, Admirals Nimitz and Spruance were preparing for Operation Iceberg, the invasion of Okinawa. Given the expectation that the capture of Iwo Jima and recent air assaults on Japan would concentrate enemy air power around the Empire's core, which would respond aggressively to any attacks on Okinawa, the Americans needed to first neutralize or eliminate enemy air facilities in the Ryukyus, Kyushu, and Formosa to achieve air superiority over their objective. As a result, all available carrier-based and land-based air forces were tasked with this operation, including Admiral Mitscher's Task Force 58, General Kenney's Far East Air Forces, Admiral Hoover's Central Pacific Forward Area, and General Arnold's 20th Air Force. From the 20th Air Force, General LeMay's 21st Bomber Command was assigned to attack Okinawa before moving on to Kyushu and other vulnerable locations in the home islands. Meanwhile, Brigadier-General Roger Ramey's 20th Bomber Command, supported by General Chennault's 14th Air Force, focused on neutralizing Formosa. Aircraft from the Southwest Pacific Area were also set to conduct searches and continuous strikes against Formosa as soon as conditions on Luzon allowed. Additionally, the British carriers of Vice-Admiral Bernard Rawlings' Task Force 57 were tasked with neutralizing air installations on the Sakishima Group in the ten days leading up to the landings. Once air superiority was achieved, Spruance's 5th Fleet was to land Lieutenant-General Simon Buckner's 10th Army, which included Major-General John Hodge's 24th Corps and Major-General Roy Geiger's 3rd Amphibious Corps. The 24th Corps comprised the 7th and 96th Divisions, while the 3rd Amphibious Corps included the 1st and 6th Marine Divisions. As the Commanding General of Expeditionary Troops, Buckner also oversaw the 27th and 77th Divisions and the 2nd Marine Division for special operations and reserve purposes. Furthermore, the 81st Division was held in area reserve. In total, Buckner commanded a force of 183,000 troops, with 116,000 designated for the initial landings. The plan called for Major-General Andrew Bruce's 77th Division to first secure amphibious bases in the Kerama Islands on March 26, with one battalion further securing Keisejima five days later to establish a field artillery group there. On April 1, following a demonstration by the 2nd Marine Division in southern Okinawa, the main landings were set to take place. The 24th Corps and the 3rd Amphibious Corps would land simultaneously on the west coast beaches north and south of Hagushi. After landing, both corps were to quickly advance across the island, capturing the airfields in their designated areas before securing all of southern and central Okinawa. Subsequently, Buckner's forces were to invade and secure Iejima and northern Okinawa. Once this was achieved, there were tentative plans to launch an invasion of Kikaijima with the 1st Marine Division and Miyako Island with the 5th Amphibious Corps. For the invasion, Spruance relied on a Covering Force under his command, along with Admiral Turner's Joint Expeditionary Force. This force included Admiral Blandy's Amphibious Support Force, which comprised minesweepers, UDTs, and escort carriers; Rear-Admiral Morton Deyo's Gunfire and Covering Force, consisting of ten battleships and eight heavy cruisers; Rear-Admiral Lawrence Reifsnider's Northern Attack Force, responsible for landing the 3rd Amphibious Corps; and Rear-Admiral John Hall's Southern Attack Force, tasked with landing the 24th Corps. Similar to Iwo Jima, Okinawa had endured multiple air attacks since October 1944 as part of the preliminary operations for the landings on Leyte, Luzon, and Iwo Jima that we previously discussed. These operations also included air strikes aimed at neutralizing Japanese air power on Formosa. Throughout February and March, Mitscher's carriers and LeMay's B-29s brought the conflict back to the Japanese home islands with a series of strikes that caused significant damage and instilled fear in the population. On March 1, Task Force 58 launched the first strike of the month against the Ryukyus, targeting Amami, Minami, Kume, Tokuno, and Okino, as well as Okinawa. This operation resulted in the destruction of 41 planes, the sinking of eleven vessels, damage to five others, and significant harm to island facilities. In between the main assaults on Japan, the superfortresses frequently targeted key sites in the Ryukyus, leading the beleaguered Japanese forces to refer to these missions as the "regular run." Throughout March, aircraft from the Southwest Pacific and the Marianas conducted nearly daily operations over the Ryukyus and surrounding waters, searching for Japanese shipping and contributing to the isolation of Okinawa by sinking cargo ships, luggers, and other vessels, while American submarines intensified the blockade around the Ryukyus. Meanwhile, after completing extensive training and rehearsals, Task Forces 51 and 55 gathered at Leyte, Task Force 53 assembled in the Guadalcanal-Russells area, and the rest of the 5th Fleet convened at Ulithi. On March 12, Reifsneider's convoy, carrying the 3rd Amphibious Corps, was the first to depart, successfully reaching Ulithi nine days later. On March 18, the tractor group transporting the 77th Division began its journey from Leyte to the Kerama Islands. On the same day, Mitscher's carriers targeted 45 airfields in Kyushu, claiming the destruction of 102 Japanese planes, damaging or destroying 275 on the ground, sinking six vessels, and damaging three more. In response, Admiral Ugaki's 5th Air Fleet launched a counterattack against the carriers Enterprise, Intrepid, and Yorktown, inflicting minor damage while losing 33 aircraft. The next morning, after locating the majority of the Combined Fleet at Kure, Mitscher dispatched 436 aircraft to target naval installations and shore facilities in the Inland Sea. At 06:50 three C6N Saiun “Myrt” recon planes discovered Task Force 58, and by 07:00 Captain Genda Minoru's elite, handpicked 343rd Kokutai had scrambled 63 advanced Kawasaki N1K2-J “George” Shiden-Kai fighters from Shikoku to intercept the Americans. Minutes later, Genda's powerful Shiden-Kais “waded into the Hellcats and Corsairs as if the clock had been turned back to 1942.” Soon the 343rd Kokutai was engaged in a wild maelstrom with 80 US fighters, including VF-17 and VBF-17 Hellcats from Hornet and VMF-112 Corsairs from Bennington. For once the Japanese broke about even, losing 24 fighters and one scout plane to the Americans' 14 fighters and 11 bombers. Nevertheless, Genda's expert but outnumbered 343rd Kokutai proved unable to blunt the American onslaught. Despite facing a formidable intercepting force, they managed to inflict damage on 18 Japanese warships, including the battleships Yamato, Ise, Hyuga, and Haruna, as well as six aircraft carriers. Additionally, one incomplete submarine was destroyed, 97 enemy planes were shot down, and 225 were either destroyed or damaged at Japanese airfields. In response, Ugaki launched a kamikaze counterattack that successfully struck the carriers Wasp and Franklin, causing significant damage and forcing Franklin to head to Pearl Harbor immediately. As Task Force 58 slowly withdrew the afternoon of March 20, a damaged Zero crashed destroyer Halsey Powell, killing 12 and wounding 29. Shortly afterwards friendly anti-aircraft fire started fires aboard Enterprise. At 23:00 eight Japanese torpedo planes unsuccessfully attacked the carriers, while three overnight snoopers were splashed by anti-aircraft fire. Between March 17 and March 20 Ugaki had committed 193 aircraft to battle and lost 161. On March 21 Ugaki dispatched a 48-plane strike, including 16 G4M “Betty” bombers, carrying the very first Ohka (“Cherry Blossom”) suicide missiles. However the combat air patrol (CAP) of 150 Hellcats and Corsairs repulsed them. Franklin, Wasp, and Enterprise, all damaged, steamed to Ulithi as a reorganized Task Group 58.2. Except for April 8–17, when Task Group-58.2 was briefly reestablished, Task Force 58 strength would remain at three Task Groups throughout Iceberg's duration. Ugaki's 5th Air Fleet was meanwhile effectively incapacitated for several weeks, but Ugaki nevertheless reported five carriers, two battleships, and three cruisers sunk, which IGHQ found scarcely credible. Meanwhile, the Mine Flotilla departed Ulithi on March 19, followed two days later by the rest of Task Force 52 and Task Force 54 to support the Kerama operation. On March 23, to prepare for the imminent minesweeping operations of Iceberg, Task Force 58 conducted extensive bombing raids on all known installations in Okinawa, resulting in significant damage and the sinking of 24 vessels and damage to three others over the following five days. Furthermore, Admiral Lee's battleships traversed the cleared area and opened fire on Okinawa, sinking an additional two vessels. With this naval and air support, Blandy's minesweepers and UDTs successfully cleared the route for Rear-Admiral Ingolf Kiland's Western Islands Attack Group by nightfall on March 25. Their primary opposition in the following two days consisted of a series of kamikaze attacks, which caused damage to the battleship Nevada, light cruiser Biloxi, four destroyers, two destroyer minelayers, one minesweeper, and two transports, while the destroyer Halligan was sunk by mines. The next morning, supported by naval gunfire and carrier aircraft, Bruce initiated his first landings. The 3rd Battalion, 305th Regiment landed on the southern beaches of Aka Island, facing sporadic resistance. Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion, 306th Regiment landed unopposed on Geruma Island, which was quickly secured. The 2nd Battalion, 306th Regiment achieved even faster success at Hokaji Island, while the 1st Battalion, 305th Regiment invaded Zamami Island with light resistance. The 2nd Battalion, 307th Regiment encountered minor opposition as it took Yakabi Island. The Fleet Marine Force Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion scouted Keisejima and found no enemy presence. After encountering some resistance, the units on Aka and Zamami pushed back the enemy garrisons, securing two-thirds of Aka by nightfall and successfully repelling a strong counterattack on Zamami that night. Simultaneously, Deyo's warships and Blandy's carriers began bombarding the demonstration beaches, while minesweepers cleared progressively larger areas around Okinawa, although the minesweeper Skylark was sunk by mines. By March 27, the remaining enemy forces on Aka and Zamami were finally eliminated, and a company took Amuro Island without opposition. Additionally, a company from the 307th moved to Kuba Island, which was quickly secured. At the same time, Bruce continued his main landings, with the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 306th Regiment landing on the west coast of Tokashiki Island, facing minimal opposition. As the two battalions advanced north along narrow trails toward Tokashiki town, the 3rd Battalion landed to secure the southern part of the island. On March 28, they reached the town, clearing the entire island and concluding the Kerama operation.  In Kerama, "Island Chain between Happiness and Good," the Japanese tradition of self-destruction emerged horribly in the last acts of soldiers and civilians trapped in the hills. Camping for the night of March 28 a mile from the north tip of Tokashiki, troops of the 306th heard explosions and screams of pain in the distance. In the morning they found a small valley littered with more than 150 dead and dying Japanese, most of them civilians. Fathers had systematically throttled each member of their families and then disemboweled themselves with knives or hand grenades. Under one blanket lay a father, two small children, a grandfather, and a grandmother, all strangled by cloth ropes. Soldiers and medics did what they could. The natives, who had been told that the invading "barbarians" would kill and rape, watched with amazement as the Americans provided food and medical care; an old man who had killed his daughter wept in bitter remorse. Only a minority of the Japanese, however, were suicides. Most civilians straggled into American positions, worn and dirty. In all, the 77th took 1,195 civilian and 121 military prisoners. This operation resulted in the deaths of 530 Japanese soldiers, 121 captured, and the neutralization of over 350 suicide boats, with American losses totaling 31 killed and 81 wounded. While this initial operation was underway, the tractor groups of the Southern and Northern Attack Forces left their staging areas in Luzon and Ulithi on March 25, followed by the rest of Spruance's fleet two days later. On March 26 and 27, Rawlings' Task Force 57 conducted a series of strikes on the Sakishima Islands, primarily targeting Miyako. Meanwhile, after a 250-plane raid on the Mitsubishi plant in Nagoya on March 24, LeMay sent 165 B-29s from the 73rd and 314th Bombardment Wings to attack the Kyushu airfields on March 27, facing minimal resistance as they caused significant damage to the Tachiarai Army Airfield, the Oita Naval Airfield, and the Omura aircraft plant. Other bombers from the 313th Bombardment Wing laid aerial mines in the Shimonoseki Strait. The Japanese responded with a raid on Spruance's naval units using aircraft and suicide boats on the night of March 28, resulting in one LCM being destroyed and one cargo ship damaged. On March 29, Mitscher launched another strike against Kyushu, but poor weather conditions led to only minor damage, with 12 vessels sunk and one damaged. By this point, the “largest assault sweep operation ever executed” had cleared the Hagushi beach approaches in 75 sweeps, with minesweepers clearing 3,000 square miles of coastal waters. The following morning, as Task Force 58 once again targeted Okinawa, Deyo's ten battleships and eleven cruisers advanced to bombard Okinawa's defenses and demolish coastal seawalls with increased intensity. At the same time, the 314th sent 12 planes to attack the Mitsubishi engine works in Nagoya overnight. The next day, LeMay dispatched 152 B-29s for his second assault on Kyushu, completely destroying the Tachiarai machine works and heavily damaging the Omura airstrip. On March 31, back in Okinawa, the final underwater demolition operation off the Hagushi beaches was underway while the 420th Field Artillery Group was successfully positioned on Keisejima, prompting a strong reaction from Ushijima's artillery. That morning, a Ki-43 fighter crashed into Admiral Spruance's flagship, the Indianapolis, resulting in the deaths of nine crew members and severely damaging a shaft, which ultimately compelled Spruance to transfer his flag to the battleship New Mexico. Meanwhile, the frogmen completed their last demolition operations at Hagushi, and the final preliminary bombardment of Okinawa and the Sakishima Islands was executed successfully. By the end of the month, over 13,000 large-caliber shells had been fired in the shore bombardment, and approximately 3,095 sorties had been conducted against the Ryukyus. However, effective Japanese concealment prevented significant damage to Ushijima's defenses. As night fell, a vast fleet of transports, cargo ships, landing craft, and warships navigated the final miles of their long journey, successfully meeting off the Hagushi beaches in the East China Sea before dawn on April 1. While Turner's forces prepared for the landing, a fire support group consisting of 10 battleships, 9 cruisers, 23 destroyers, and 177 gunboats began the pre-landing bombardment of the beaches at 05:30, firing a total of 44,825 rounds of shells, 33,000 rockets, and 22,500 mortar shells. In response, the Japanese launched some scattered kamikaze attacks on the convoys, successfully hitting the transport Hinsdale and LST 884. At 07:45, carrier planes from Task Force 58 and Blandy's carriers targeted the beaches and nearby trenches with napalm. Fifteen minutes later, the first wave of amphibious tanks advanced toward the shore at four knots, followed closely by five to seven waves of assault troops in amphibious tractors. Alongside the primary landings, Major-General Thomas Watson's 2nd Marine Division staged a feigned landing on the southeast coast of Okinawa, near Minatoga, aiming to distract the enemy's reserves in that region. Meanwhile, on the main front, supported by rocket fire from LCI gunboats and artillery fire from Keisejima, a nearly continuous line of landing craft advanced toward the beaches at 08:20. Encountering no resistance, the first waves began to land on their designated beaches at 08:30, with additional troops following closely behind. Within an hour, Geiger's 3rd Amphibious Corps had successfully landed the assault elements of the 6th and 1st Marine Divisions north of the Bishi River, while Hodge's 24th Corps disembarked the 7th and 96th Divisions to the south of the river. The lack of significant opposition, coupled with the rapid disintegration of the untrained 5473 airfield service troops of the 1st Specially Established Regiment under heavy air and artillery bombardment, created a sense of foreboding among the men, prompting them to scout the area cautiously. As before, the enemy's primary response consisted of kamikaze attacks on naval units, resulting in damage to the battleships West Virginia and Tennessee, the British carrier Indefatigable, destroyers Prichett and Vammen, the British destroyer Ulster, the destroyer minelayer Adams, and four other vessels. Returning to Okinawa, after ensuring they were not walking into a trap, the troops began advancing inland while tanks and other support units were brought to the beaches. In the north, Major-General Lemuel Shepherd's 6th Marine Division deployed Colonel Merlin Schneider's 22nd Marines on the isolated Green Beaches and Colonel Alan Shapley's 4th Marines on the Red Beaches near Yontan Airfield. The 4th Marines advanced toward Yontan, encountering only scattered resistance, and quickly secured the objective east of the airfield by 13:00. Meanwhile, Schneider's 3rd Battalion moved through Hanza without opposition, but the 2nd Battalion's progress was hindered as it needed to protect its exposed flank, prompting the 22nd Marines to quickly commit its reserve battalion to maintain their momentum. To the south, Major-General Pedro Del Valle's 1st Marine Division landed Colonel Edward Snedeker's 7th Marines on the Blue Beaches and Colonel John Griebel's 5th Marines on the Yellow Beaches just north of the Bishi River. By 09:45, the 7th Marines on the left had advanced through the village of Sobe, their primary objective, while the 5th Marines were positioned 1,000 yards inland. At this point, it was decided to land the reserve battalions of both regiments, along with Colonel Kenneth Chappell's 1st Marines. With forces arranged in depth and reserves positioned to the right and left, Del Valle's units continued to advance steadily over the rolling terrain as the 11th and 15th Marines artillery units were also being landed. At 13:30, the 4th Marines resumed their advance, facing light resistance on the left but becoming overextended on the right while trying to maintain contact with the 7th Marines. As a result, Shapley landed his reserve battalion to fill this gap, while Shepherd also deployed his reserve 1st Battalion, 29th Marines, to secure the critical northern flank, allowing the 22nd Marines to keep advancing eastward. Meanwhile, further south, Major-General Archibald Arnold's 7th Division disembarked Colonel Frank Pachler's 17th Regiment on the Purple Beaches just south of the Bishi River and Colonel John Finn's 32nd Regiment on the Orange Beaches in front of Kadena Airfield. Both regiments quickly ascended the gentle hills at the landing sites and began advancing eastward. By 10:00, the 27th Regiment had patrols at Kadena Airfield, which was discovered to be empty; by 10:30, the front line was crossing the airstrip. Moments later, it advanced 200 yards beyond, heading towards Cholon. Simultaneously, the 32nd Regiment secured the southwestern edge of Kadena and continued along the road to Kozo. To the south, Major-General James Bradley's 96th Division landed Colonel Michael Halloran's 381st Regiment on the White Beaches in front of Sunabe and Colonel Edwin May's 383rd Regiment on the Brown Beaches at the extreme southern flank. Both regiments moved eastward with the same ease as the other units that day, making significant progress towards Momobaru in the north and successfully capturing Chatan in the south. Additionally, all divisional artillery of the 24th Corps landed early; Hodge's reserve regiments and battalions were successfully brought ashore, and by nightfall, direct-support battalions were in position. By the end of the day, over 60,000 men had landed, suffering only 28 dead, 27 missing, and 104 wounded, thereby establishing a beachhead 15,000 yards long and up to 5,000 yards deep in some areas. Shepherd's Marines paused for the night along a line stretching from Irammiya to the division boundary south of Makibaru, which the 1st Marine Division extended further south to Kadena. Meanwhile, the 7th Division advanced nearly three miles inland, destroying several pillboxes but losing three tanks to mines. The 96th Division secured positions along the river south of Chatan, on the elevated ground northwest of Futema, in the outskirts of Momobaru, and in the hills to the northwest and southwest of Shido. Although there were gaps in the lines in several areas, they were filled by reserve units or weaponry before nightfall. Thus, the Battle of Okinawa, seen by most as the final climactic battle of the Pacific War has only just begun. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. As Gandalf the White once said “The board is set, the pieces are moving. We come to it at last, the great battle of our time.” The battle of Okinawa will become the bloodiest campaign America has ever fought. The soul crushing journey has just begun as the Americans end the last stand of the Japanese in the Pacific War.

patreon.com/eidolonplaytest xXx[FinDom]xXx wrote (3:26a LST): lmao "stereotypical"? is this the very first fictional story you've ever seen? has your previous experience with entertainment been banging two rocks together? guys like john deere are the fucking background radiation of the whole genre. they're always gonna be there, so you just have to write around them. kia soul isn't the lead of the show because, unfortunately, showbiz isn't a meritocracy. if it was and we lived in a just and righteous universe, subaru outback would've won best actress for her performance in "bound 2: re/bound," but we're in worst timeline. but i guess that's how you like it, isn't it? i mean, there's no way someone like you would ever have made it as far as you did in eidolon corp if you were actually expected be good at your job instead of shitting up this thread on the company laptop. since you apparently don't like to do things in private, i assume you won't mind me showing everyone who the corporate stooge behind the screenname actually is. [Attachment: booktok_profile.jpg] : ) CREDITS: Zoe Tunnell as Genevieve St. Cloud and Genevieve The Cloud Crystal Zaslavchik as Leila Marino Tyberius Wilson as Bridgerton Larch Iris Christianson as Trace Vector Luke Varner as The GM Additional Voices by Molly Rhinebeck and Fabby Garza MUSIC BY MAX KNIGHTLEY EDITED BY CRYSTAL ZASLAVCHIK CONTENT WARNING: This episode features mind control and lethal violence. Buy our book at bit.ly/eidolon2e!

In this week's Cannabis Grow Guides, we dive into the techniques and strategies for growing massive cannabis plants. Whether you're cultivating indoors or outdoors, optimizing plant size can lead to higher yields and stronger, healthier plants. We cover: What factors influence how big a cannabis plant can grow? Which strains are best for growing large cannabis plants? How does pot size affect plant size? What training techniques encourage bigger plants? (Topping, LST, Supercropping, etc.) How does light intensity and duration impact plant growth? What are the best nutrients and feeding schedules for maximizing size? If you want massive, high-yielding cannabis plants, this episode is packed with tips, tricks, and advice to help you achieve your biggest grow yet! If you have any questions you'd like us to answer in next week's episode, reach out to us through your favourite social network, join our Discord server, or visit Percy's Grow Room for more. Links are available on our website—don't miss out! Website: https://highonhomegrown.com Discord: https://discord.gg/sqYGkF4xyQ Youtube: https://www.youtube.com/highonhomegrown Thank you for downloading and listening to our cannabis podcast! I hope you have enjoyed this episode.

This episode of "Thermal Lens" features Dr. Claire Bulgin, a Senior Research Scientist in Earth Observation at the University of Reading.Claire takes us into the often-overlooked world of uncertainties in land surface temperature (LST) measurements and elaborates on the differences between error and uncertainty, the roles of accuracy, precision, and bias, and the challenges of calculating and communicating uncertainties. Claire breaks down how current satellite missions address these issues, the common sources of uncertainty, and what goes into building reliable uncertainty budgets.We also discuss her recommendations for both satellite data providers and users on how to better provide, interpret, and apply uncertainty information. Whether you're working in climate services, agriculture, or environmental monitoring, this conversation is packed with insights into how uncertainty shapes our understanding of the Earth's surface.This episode is hosted by Jennifer Susan Adams, a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Zurich and Rachana Mamidi, a Space Engineer & Podcaster based in Berlin.Links to resources mentioned in the episode: The LST CCI project webpage - https://climate.esa.int/en/projects/land-surface-temperature/LST CCI product user guide - https://admin.climate.esa.int/media/documents/LST-CCI-D4.3-PUG_-_i2r0_-_Product_User_Guide.pdfUncertainty budget document  - https://admin.climate.esa.int/media/documents/LST-CCI-D2.3-E3UB_-_i3r0_-_End-to-End_ECV_Uncertainty_Budget.pdfFor users with a strong mathematical background, the entire document will be accessible. For those less comfortable with mathematics, attention should be directed to the last three pages,  where the key examples are presented.LST CCI Climate Assessment Report - https://admin.climate.esa.int/media/documents/LST_cci-D5.1-CAR_-_i3r0_-_Phase2_Climate_Assessment_Report.pdfChapters:(00:00) - Intro (01:07) - Episode Summary (02:09) - Diving into Uncertainty and Error (05:22) - Importance of Uncertainty in Data (08:12) - Calculating Uncertainty Budgets (12:59) - Lifecycle of Uncertainty in Satellite Data (24:55) - Challenges in Computing Uncertainties (28:18) - Educating Users on Uncertainty (30:14) - European Space Agency's LST_CCI Project (37:34) - Resources for Learning About Uncertainty (39:21) - Conclusion and Final Thoughts

Are you a beginner looking to start growing cannabis indoors? This video is your ultimate guide! We take you through a detailed week-by-week indoor cannabis grow calendar, covering every stage from seed germination to harvesting and curing your own buds. Learn how to set up the perfect indoor grow space, manage light cycles, control temperature and humidity for optimal growth, and choose the right nutrients for each stage.Discover advanced techniques like topping, super cropping, and low-stress training (LST) to maximize your yields. We also provide essential tips on preventing pests and diseases, ensuring your plants stay healthy throughout their lifecycle. Plus, find out the best practices for drying and curing your cannabis to achieve the best flavor and potency. As a special bonus, watch our exclusive interview with cannabis expert  @TheCannabisCutie  - recorded live from MJ Biz Con, where she shares her insights on cannabis. Whether you're just starting out or looking to improve your growing skills, this video has everything you need. Don't forget to like, comment, subscribe, and follow @natehammer420 on Instagram for more valuable content!Disclaimer: This video is for educational purposes only. Growing cannabis may be illegal in your jurisdiction. Always comply with local laws and regulations.

Delmar Beard grew up near Ft. Bragg, North Carolina. But when it was time to join the military during World War II, he chose the Navy. Serving as a gunner aboard an LST, Beard made multiple landings during the battles of Iwo Jima and Okinawa. Later, he did join the Army, and served for 22 years. He rose to the rank of command sergeant major and was deployed to both Korea and Vietnam.In this edition of Veterans Chronicles, Beard takes us from training to landing at Iwo Jima. He describes unloading the ship while Japanese bullets were whizzing around him and even fatally striking the sailor right next to him. He also tells us what he saw on the beach and in the hills and mountains above.From there, Beard tells us about operating the 40mm double-barreled anti-aircraft guns during the relentless Japanese air raids and kamikaze missions against the U.S. fleet. Finally, he takes us to Vietnam. Beard explains his command over a series of gun batteries stretching from Quin Yon to the DMZ and some of the most difficult moments of his time there.

Brandon Goh is Co-Founder & CEO of Treehouse. Focused on building the fixed income layer for digital assets, Treehouse introduces innovative fixed income products and primitives.  Why you should listen Treehouse Finance is carving out a niche in the decentralized finance (DeFi) space by focusing on fixed income solutions for digital assets. Treehouse introduces Treehouse Assets (tAssets) and Decentralized Offered Rates (DOR), aiming to establish robust benchmark rates essential for fixed income markets. This framework is designed to enable users to earn enhanced yields while contributing to a new era of fixed income products within the digital asset ecosystem. One of Treehouse's flagship offerings is tETH, which allows users to engage in interest rate arbitrage strategies. By staking native tokens or Liquid Staking Tokens (LSTs), participants can earn yields that combine LST annual percentage yields (APY) with Market Efficiency Yield (MEY). This approach seeks to align fragmented rates of native chain assets with their risk-free rates, optimizing returns for users. Security and transparency are paramount for Treehouse. The platform undergoes regular security audits and maintains a bug bounty program to ensure the integrity of its protocols. Treehouse has established an insurance fund to further protect users' assets, reinforcing its commitment to building a secure and reliable DeFi environment. Treehouse Finance is pioneering the integration of fixed income products into the DeFi landscape, offering institutions and individuals innovative tools to maximize yields while maintaining security and transparency. Supporting links Stabull Finance Treehouse Finance Andy on Twitter  Brave New Coin on Twitter Brave New Coin If you enjoyed the show please subscribe to the Crypto Conversation and give us a 5-star rating and a positive review in whatever podcast app you are using.

patreon.com/eidolonplaytest Private message from xXx[FinDom]xXx to Heartbreaker2196 (2:40a LST): both to preserve the ideals of free speech on this forum and in the vain hope that you and the rest of your clique might one day develop a modicum of media literacy, i have consistently chosen to debate you in full view of the rest of thread's participants. however, that shit you said about Kia Soul in your last post went way too far. if you want to be wrong about Starelia then fine, go for it. if loving a ship that's the literary equivalent of a soylent cube makes you happy, who am i to tell you to seek out something more exciting and emotionally complex. but you do not insult Aurelia's actress. she has fewer lines compared to the other major characters because the writers and directors know she's actually capable of using body language and tone of voice to show instead of tell. she has subtlety and range. she's done stageplays. she is quite simply objectively better at her job than anyone else. you know what John Deere was doing before he got the role for Rembrandt? "starring" in commercials for hot pockets where they recorded slow-mo footage of a microwave being shot with an anti-materiel rifle. he wasn't even firing the rifle. he just said "whoa" a lot. i'll expect your apology and correction in the thread shortly. CREDITS: Iris Christianson as Trace Vector Tyberius Wilson as Bridgerton Larch Crystal Zaslavchik as Leila Marino Zoe Tunnell as Genevieves St. Cloud Luke Varner as The GM Additional Voices by Fabby Garza, Molly Rhinebeck, Lexi Waltner, and Mike Painter MUSIC BY MAXIE KNIGHTLEY EDITED BY LUKE VARNER CONTENT WARNING: This episode contains discussions of animal cruelty and gender dysphoria, as well as depictions of existential horror, unethical therapeutic treatment, and toxic sexual dynamics. Buy our book at bit.ly/eidolon2e!

patreon.com/eidolonplaytest xXx[FinDom]xXx wrote (02:19a LST): oh wow what a surprise that this board's queen of comphet would think starcadia's argument held any fucking water. "but the solar empire has been safeguarding that star system for centuries!" says the dumbass who apparently doesn't know what refugees are. this shit is why no one likes humanity. you can't even fucking stand being around each other! bunch of apes have their dna take a wrong turn and become tool-moded land-cucks who make up nonsense words like "de jure" to dress up their insatiable bloodlust. fucking evolutionary dead-end is what you are. it's a shame Aurelia's attempts to assassinate rembrandt in the first season didn't work. mark my words, she's gonna return in an episode or two to commit even worse atrocities against the crown. it'll be so funny. CREDITS: Zoe Tunnell as Genevieve St. Cloud Tyberius Wilson as Bridgerton Larch Iris Christianson as Trace Vector Crystal Zaslavchik as Leila Marino Luke Varner as The GM MUSIC BY MAX KNIGHTLEY EDITED BY CRYSTAL ZASLAVCHIK CONTENT WARNING: This episode depicts bloody violence, drug overdose, a heart attack, and existential horror. Buy our book at bit.ly/eidolon2e!

We went to LST 2025...then we left a little early. Listen to all the details.

Frank is at Brians house and they went on a cruise in the Tacoma. We are headed to LST and it is going to be a cold one.

Ep. 381 - Title Sponsor: Scrapin the Coast Our Lifestyle Podcast YouTube Channel  ODB covers key items related to Lone Star Throwdown (LST) 2025 Note: episode 381 artwork created by Jason "ODB" Ballard using images from LST and more. RIP Mark “Papa Smurf” Ballard! We miss you Dad.  Stay On Da Rise! 

Last time we spoke about the liberation of Bataan and Corregidor. The Shimbu Group's commander launched a coordinated raid on northern Manila, aiming to weaken enemy defenses. Despite heavy casualties, the Allies captured key locations, including Nichols Field. Meanwhile, General Chase's 38th Division overcame strong Japanese defenses at ZigZag Pass, while General Hall's forces secured Bataan. Plans for an airborne assault on Corregidor were set for February 16, leveraging surprise against the outnumbered Japanese garrison. American forces launched the strategic attack on Corregidor, dropping paratroopers from the 503rd Regiment. Despite facing sporadic fire, they secured key positions. The following days saw intense skirmishes as the 3rd Battalion, 34th Regiment landed and established a foothold. Over eight days, they repelled numerous Japanese counterattacks, inflicting heavy casualties. By February 26, organized resistance crumbled, leading to the island's capture. Meanwhile, in Manila, American troops advanced, clearing buildings and securing the city, inching closer to victory in the Philippines. This episode is the Invasion of Iwo Jima Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    A few weeks ago we spoke about Operation Detachment. Admirals Nimitz and Spruance were planning an invasion of Iwo Jima with General Schmidt's 5th Amphibious Corps. During a thorough campaign of preliminary air and naval bombardment against the Volcano Islands, the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions, along with other Corps units, were loading at Hawaii between December 25 and January 25. Once training and loading were complete, Admiral Turner's Task Force 51 and Admiral Hill's Task Force 53 left Pearl Harbor on January 27, initially heading toward Saipan. By February 12, Admiral Spruance's 5th Fleet had gathered in the Marianas and was prepared to sail for Iwo Jima. Additionally, Admiral Mitscher's Task Force 58 had departed Ulithi to conduct a series of supporting air strikes over and around Tokyo, known as Operation Jamboree. Task Force 58 sortied from Ulithi 10 February and shaped a course eastward of the Marianas and Bonins. On the 12th, the air groups rehearsed with the 3rd Marine Division on Tinian. Two days later the task force fueled at sea from one of Admiral Beary's replenishment groups. Everything possible was done to guard against detection. Measures included radio deception, scouting by Pacific Fleet submarines to dispose of any picket vessels there might be en route, scouting by B-29s and Navy Liberators from the Marianas to clear the air. On the 15th a scouting line of five destroyers ranged ahead of the carriers, and antisubmarine air patrol was set up. At 1900 a high-speed run-in began towards launching positions, where the carriers arrived at dawn 16 February. Thanks to these precautions, and to thick weather most of the way, they arrived undetected. General LeMay's 21st Bomber Command, which was being reinforced by the 313th and 314th Bombardment Wings, would also assist Detachment with several strikes against Japan. Following some unremarkable high-altitude daytime missions in late January, 129 B-29s from the 73rd and 313th Bombardment Wings targeted Kobe on February 3, using a mix of incendiaries and fragmentation bombs. This attack caused significant damage to the urban area and local war production, resulting in the loss of 2 bombers and damage to 35 others. Subsequently, on February 10, a precision strike was launched against Ota's Nakajima aircraft factory, with 84 out of 118 dispatched B-29s successfully bombing the site. However, only 14% of the bombs hit the target, leading to the loss of 12 bombers and damage to 29. Nearly one-third of the factory buildings sustained damage, primarily from the incendiaries combined with high-explosive bombs. Five days later, LeMay dispatched 117 B-29 bombers to target Mitsubishi's engine works in Nagoya. However, an unexpected cold front resulted in only 33 bombers reaching the target area, yielding lackluster results. Meanwhile, after conducting some assault rehearsals, Spruance's amphibious support forces and tractor groups set sail for Iwo Jima on February 14, followed two days later by Turner's main assault convoy. At the same time, the reserve 3rd Marine Division continued loading at Guam, with its 21st Marines departing for Iwo Jima on February 16, followed by the main body of the division the next day. On the morning of February 16, Admiral Blandy's Amphibious Support Force arrived off Iwo Jima and promptly commenced the final preliminary bombardment and minesweeping operations, although inclement weather hindered these efforts. However, the next day, Task Force 52 successfully carried out these missions; beach reconnaissance by UDTs faced heavy mortar fire, resulting in the sinking of one LCI gunboat, damage to eleven others, and casualties of 44 killed and 152 wounded. Despite this, the frogmen encountered no obstacles on the beaches and managed to create accurate maps of the approaches. Meanwhile, by February 16, Mitscher's carriers had quietly moved to a position 60 miles off the coast of Honshu, launching extensive fighter sweeps against airfields in Tokyo Bay and bombing raids on aircraft frame and engine plants in the Tokyo area.  About 100 Japanese fighters attacked Admiral Davison's planes as they crossed the coast and about 40 of them were shot down. American pilots found the Japanese on the whole reluctant to engage; Admiral Mitscher had correctly told his pilots, "He is probably more afraid of you than you are of him". In fact the IJAAF 10th Hiko Shidan immediately ordered an IJAAF night-fighter group and all “second-class” personnel to take cover, while all aircraft not intercepting were ordered to be dispersed, fuel tanks drained, and ammunition unloaded. In contrast, American pilots reported Tokyo antiaircraft fire “the most accurate and intense yet encountered.” By nightfall, Rear-Admiral Matthias Gardner's night-flying carrier group conducted a sweep of night fighters to cover the enemy airfields at dusk. This operation was repeated the following morning, but poor weather ultimately forced the carriers to retreat toward Iwo Jima. Despite this, significant damage was inflicted on aircraft frame and engine facilities, with 10 vessels sunk, including the unfinished escort carrier Yamashio Maru. A total of 531 aircraft were reported destroyed, at the expense of losing 88 planes and damaging two destroyers. On February 18, after the enemy battery camouflage had been obliterated during the previous two days of bombardment. This revealed batteries not previously known to exist, the island's defenses were for the first time properly revealed; and formidable they were indeed. Fortunately for the Americans, the support of UDTs with LCI gunboats had convinced General Kuribayashi that the main landing had started, and to repel it he unmasked batteries that would have caused very heavy casualties on D-day had they not been discovered two days before. This was the only serious mistake made by the Japanese general in his defensive tactics, which won the rueful admiration of his enemies. Blandy opted to focus on the immediate area and flanks of the eastern beaches. Heavy ships moved closer to 2,500 yards to deliver concentrated direct fire on all targets. Consequently, bombardment ships provided continuous direct fire throughout the day, effectively dismantling enemy defenses. However, during the night, the Japanese launched a minor raid that caused significant damage to the destroyer minesweeper Gamble and the destroyer escort Blessman. At 06:00 on February 19, Turner's main force arrived off Iwo Jima and began maneuvering into final positions. Simultaneously, Admiral Rodgers' warships executed the last pre-landing bombardment, coordinated with air strikes from Mitscher's carriers. Between 08:25 and 08:55, as the first wave crossed the line of departure and advanced toward the shore under the protective rocket fire of gunboats, shells fell heavily on Iwo Jima, marking the most intense pre-landing bombardment of World War II. At 08:57, as the leading armored amtracs approached their targets, naval gunfire shifted inland and to the flanks. The LVTs of the first wave touched down on Iwo Jima at 09:02 and began moving forward through the high terraces of soft black volcanic ash, engaging inland targets from the water to support subsequent landings. Three minutes later, the Marines of the 4th and 5th Divisions started landing side by side on the Green, Red, Yellow, and Blue beaches. The assault infantry battalions of the Landing Force received assistance throughout D-Day from all the supporting arms available to the Amphibious Support Force. Carrier pilots of Task Force 58 and the escort carriers of Task Force 52 flew missions all day as airborne observers and spotters maintained constant vigilance over the target. Including pre-H-Hour strikes, 606 support aircraft flew 26 missions on February 19 and dropped 274500 pounds of bombs. These planes also fired 2254 rockets into the island defenses and dropped over a hundred napalm bombs. Air and naval gunfire liaison teams remained in communication with both air and sea supporting units through the hectic hours that followed the beach assault. Naval rifles from 5- to 16-inch caliber pounded enemy positions in response to Marine requests. Gunfire support vessels engaged enemy artillery that covered landing areas from high ground to the north, and concentrated on concealed Japanese mortars that shelled landing areas with deadly effect. The units quickly reorganized and began their advance inland, facing only light resistance, although their progress was hampered by the sandy terrain. General Kuribayashi's forces, however, had been waiting in well-fortified underground positions as planned, emerging only after the bombardment ceased to unleash a barrage of machine-gun, rifle, and mortar fire on the advancing troops. As the initial waves of Marines struggled to advance, congestion along the shore became increasingly critical, while the full force of the Japanese defenders was unleashed shortly after 10:00. By 10:30, elements from all eight assault battalions had landed on the island, successfully bringing ashore about 6,000 men and bulldozers that were clearing paths for tank deployment. On the far left flank, Colonel Harry Liversedge's 28th Marines, having landed on Green Beach, initiated a rapid advance across the half-mile isthmus below Mount Suribachi to isolate this crucial position. The attack unfolded in such a way that some units were delayed while others managed to break through and continue westward despite suffering heavy casualties, ultimately crossing the island while the bypassed enemy was being dealt with. By midday, the reserve 3rd Battalion and tanks landed under heavy fire to join the afternoon assault on Suribachi, but intense enemy fire hindered their progress to the assault positions. Consequently, the 2nd Battalion launched an attack on its own, gaining only 150 yards before retreating to regroup with the 3rd Battalion for the night. At the same time, Colonel Thomas Wornham's 27th Marines had landed on the Red Beaches, making swift progress inland despite increasing casualties and bypassing numerous enemy positions. By 11:30, Company A was moving across the southern end of Airfield No. 1, establishing a presence along the western edge while other units continued to advance past the airfield. The 1st Battalion launched an attack on the airfield with tank support but faced strong enemy resistance, resulting in minimal gains. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion pushed westward and reached the cliffs overlooking the western coast. Additionally, the reserve 3rd Battalion landed and began clearing bypassed positions, while the artillery units from the 13th Marines and General Rockey's reserve 26th Marines also arrived in the afternoon as the 27th and 28th Marines solidified their positions. By nightfall, although the 5th Marine Division was still a considerable distance from the O-1 Line, it had established a firm foothold on the island, with Mount Suribachi isolated and portions of the airfield under their control. To the east, General Cates' 4th Marine Division also landed successfully, with Colonel Walter Wensinger's 23rd Marines coming ashore at the Yellow Beaches and Colonel John Lanigan's 25th Marines landing on Blue Beach 1 and the southern part of Blue Beach 2. The two regiments began their advance inland, hindered by intense enemy fire but managing to gain between 400 and 600 yards by midday. As tanks were being deployed, the 3rd Battalion of the 25th Marines moved to the right to clear the remaining area of Beach Blue 2 and encircle the threatening quarry zone. At this stage, as the assault battalions continued their advance, Wensinger and Lanigan deployed their reserve battalions to cover the gaps in their attack lines. With the support of tanks that had finally reached the front, the 23rd Marines advanced towards Airfield No. 1 and successfully captured its outskirts. Meanwhile, the 25th Marines initiated a coordinated assault, with the 3rd Battalion advancing about 200 yards along the beach to secure the problematic quarry, while the other two battalions moved north to seize the high ground to the northwest of the quarry. By the end of the day, Cates had also landed half of the artillery from the 14th Marines, along with his reserve 24th Marines, which began to relieve some of the frontline units from both assault regiments. Although the penetration by the 4th Marine Division was not as extensive as intended, by nightfall, the front lines included the eastern edge of the airfield and extended sufficiently inland from the Blue Beaches to ensure the beachhead could be held successfully. The Marines, forced to advance across open terrain while enduring intense fire from well-concealed positions that were difficult to target, fell significantly short of the O-1 objective. Nonetheless, by the end of the day, six Marine regiments, an equal number of artillery battalions, and two tank battalions had landed and were positioned to defend the narrow beachhead against a potential night counterattack.  Throughout this first day, the situation on the beaches prevented landing of any but the highest priority "hot cargo." This consisted of ammunition, rations, water, and signal equipment brought to the beach in LCVPs and LCMs. Shore party teams, working under extremely adverse conditions without sufficient trucks and other heavy equipment, could do little more than stack the supplies on the beach above the high water mark. LVTs and weasels made trips from the beach dumps inland carrying these supplies to the troops and returned bearing wounded men. The busy amtracs also made nonstop trips from LSTs, ferrying critically needed items direct to Marines on the front lines. Most of the transports and other vessels of the task force retired from the island at nightfall, but some command ships, preloaded LSTs, and hospital LSTs remained behind. Emergency items, especially 81mm mortar ammunition, were brought in during the night, but actually very little unloading was accomplished and many of the wounded spent this night on the beach because they could not be evacuated. Some progress was made cutting exits through the terrace and clearing mines, but enemy fire and the shortage of equipment limited this activity. Despite this, the Japanese did not launch any large-scale assaults, although their mortars and artillery relentlessly bombarded Marine lines along the front throughout the night. Consequently, Allied casualties on this first day totaled 548 killed and 1,755 wounded. On February 20, the goal was for the 28th Marines to take Mount Suribachi while other units advanced north to capture the two airfields. Initially, in the south, after a coordinated air and naval bombardment, Liversedge launched another assault on the volcano but managed to gain only 75 yards by midday. During the forenoon, Marines gained only 50-70 yards. Aircraft and ships pounded Japanese positions and the 3d Battalion, 13th Marines fired mission after mission, but stiff enemy resistance continued, particularly from well-camouflaged pillboxes hidden in the brush to the front of the Marine lines. These emplacements, too close to friendly troops to be engaged by heavy support weapons, could only be silenced by coordinated attacks of assault demolition teams using flamethrowers and explosive charges. Tanks then moved in to provide support, allowing the attack to progress from pillbox to pillbox; however, by the end of the day, the Marines had only advanced 200 difficult yards. Meanwhile, Schmidt's other regiments initiated a coordinated offensive to the north following extensive artillery, naval gunfire, and air support. Despite facing heavy resistance, the 23rd Marines successfully overran most of Airfield No. 1 by noon. Wensinger continued to push his units in the afternoon, but progress was limited as tanks were hindered by minefields and rough terrain. Wornham's 27th Marines pressed their attack on the left flank, overcoming enemy mortar and artillery fire to gain about 800 yards along the coast. In contrast, Lanigan's 25th Marines, affected by friendly fire, made only minimal advances against enemy crossfire from concealed positions. At 1600, friendly planes misdirected their fire to the 25th Marine's area, adding terror to the situation. An air strike consisting of .50-caliber machine-gun strafing, rockets, and bombs fell on troops of Company B of the 24th Marines, which was positioned on top of the quarry some 400 yards inland from the eastern shore. This strike was made without a preliminary "dry-run", and despite the fact that yellow front line panels were displayed prior to and during the aerial attack. The 1st Battalion, 24th Marines suffered five killed and six wounded as a result of this misguided effort. Shortly after the planes left the area, this battalion reported that friendly artillery and naval gunfire was being registered on its lines. Due to the slow progress, Schmidt attempted to land his reserve 21st Marines, but high seas and congested beaches ultimately thwarted these efforts. Nevertheless, the remaining 14th Marines were landed, albeit with significant casualties, and elements of the corps artillery began to come ashore. During the night, there were no counterattacks on Mount Suribachi, but the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions had to fend off some small counterattacks on their front lines. On February 21, following a strike involving 40 aircraft, Liversedge's 28th Marines launched another assault on the volcano. The 1st Battalion on the right swiftly advanced along the west beach to the base of Suribachi, while the 3rd Battalion in the center pushed nearly to the foot of the mountain despite facing heavy resistance. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion on the left moved cautiously along the east beach toward the volcano's base, with Company F heading toward Tobiishi Point. At the same time, other regiments continued their offensive towards O-1 after a bombardment from air, artillery, rockets, and naval gunfire. Rockey's units made significant progress, advancing over 1,000 yards, while the 23rd Marines achieved similar gains on the left flank, where slightly sheltered areas allowed for local and limited encirclement, but only advanced 100 yards in the right and center. The 25th Marines maintained steady pressure against the strong enemy defenses, gaining between 50 and 300 yards across the front. Colonel Hartnoll Withers' 21st Marines successfully landed this time; due to heavy casualties in the center, they were assigned to relieve the exhausted 23rd Marines. By nightfall, the Marines had to fend off several local counterattacks and infiltration attempts.  During the night, 50 kamikaze planes targeted Blandy's Task Force 52. They were picked up by the radar of the USS Saratoga, a veteran carrier of the Pacific War, and six fighters were sent to intercept. They shot down two Zeros but the remaining Zeros plowed on through the low lying cloud, two of them trailing smoke, and slammed into the side of the carrier turning the hangers into an inferno. Another solitary attacker smashed into the flight deck leaving a gaping hole 100 yards from the bow. Damage control teams worked wonders and within one hour the fires were under control and the Saratoga was able to recover a few of her planes. Another aircraft, a "Betty" twin engined bomber, tore into the escort carrier USS Bismarck Sea. The decks were full of aircraft and the ensuing explosion caused uncontrollable fires. Abandon ship was sounded and 800 men went over the side. Within a few minutes a huge explosion ripped off the entire stern of the carrier and she rolled 38 over and sank. Three other ships were also damaged: the escort carrier USS Lunga Point was showered with flaming debris as four aircraft were blasted out of the sky; the minesweeper Keokuk was damaged when a "Jill" dive bomber hit her deck; and LST 477 loaded with Sherman tanks received a glancing blow. The Saratoga, with destroyer escort, returned to Pearl Harbor, but by the time the damage was repaired the war was over. The kamikazes had done their work well: 358 men killed, one carrier sunk, and another severely damaged. It was a grim preview of the mayhem they would later cause during the invasion of Okinawa in April. On February 22, amidst a dreary cold rain, Liversedge renewed his assault on Suribachi, where only half of the original garrison remained to oppose the Marine advance. There was no let-up in the weather on Wednesday as Marines of the 28th Regiment, drenched to the skin and bent by the wind, prepared to renew the attack on Suribachi. Fresh supplies of ammunition had been brought to the front during the night, but the Shermans were mired in mud and the Navy declined to supply air support in the appalling weather. It was to be up to the foot soldier with rifle, flamethrower, grenade, and demolition charge to win the day. Colonel Atsuchi still had 800-900 men left and they had no intention of allowing the Americans an easy victory. Major Youamata announced: "We are surrounded by enemy craft of all sizes, shapes and descriptions, enemy shells have smashed at our installations and defenses, their planes bomb and strafe yet we remain strong and defiant. The Americans are beginning to climb the first terraces towards our defenses. Now they shall taste our steel and lead." Throughout the day, the 28th Marines engaged Japanese positions on the lower slopes of the mountain, with the 3rd Battalion making the final push to the base of Suribachi while the other two battalions cleared the coastline to completely encircle the volcano. Simultaneously, Schmidt's northern sweep continued, with the 21st Marines replacing Wensinger's troops, and Colonel Chester Graham's 26th Marines taking over on the 5th Division front. The 26th Marines advanced approximately 400 yards in the center but ultimately had to withdraw as the flanking units could not progress; the 21st Marines began their assault on the formidable defenses of Colonel Ikeda's 145th Regiment in front of Airfield No. 2, managing to advance only about 250 yards on the right; and the 25th Marines were unable to launch an attack on the left due to Withers' lack of significant gains and had to fend off several local Japanese counterattacks. Marine "Howlin' Mad" Smith aboard the USS Auburn was counting the cost. Three days of battle and the Regimental Returns listed 2,517 casualties for the 4th Division and 2,057 for the 5th: 4,574 dead and wounded and the O-1 line had just been reached. Little did he know that as his Marines approached the hills, ravines, canyons, gullies, and cliffs of the north the worst was yet to come. Additionally, as the 4th Division remained stalled, Cates ordered Colonel Walter Jordan's 24th Marines to relieve the weary troops of Lanigan on the right. During the night, most of Task Force 58 departed the area for a second air strike against Tokyo, which significantly limited the availability of aircraft for direct support of ground forces on Iwo Jima. On February 23, the 28th Marines under Liversedge launched their final assault on Suribachi. The 2nd Battalion was tasked with scaling the volcano's heights, while the 1st Battalion advanced south around the mountain's western side. To their surprise, they encountered no enemy fire, and small patrols reached the crater's edge by 09:40. 1st Lieutenant Harold G. Schrier, executive officer of Company E, and a 40-man detachment set out to follow the patrols and occupy the highest point of land on Iwo Jima. The number of live Japanese lurking in caves along this north face was unknown, so flankers were sent out to guard against ambush as Schrier's men clawed their way warily upward. Still there was a mysterious lack of enemy activity, and the only Japanese encountered were the harmless dead. Positions along the rim of the crater were reached at about 10:15, and as Marines scrambled over the lip, the tenseness was eased by action. A small defending force challenged the patrol and a short, hot fight developed. Even while this skirmish was in progress, some of the men located a length of Japanese iron pipe, secured a small American flag to one end, and raised the Stars and Stripes at 10:20. It was an inspiring sight for thousands of Americans on Iwo as the flag waved bravely from the summit. Shortly after the mounting of this flag that measured only 54 inches by 28 inches, an unidentified Marine went aboard LST 779, beached near the base of the volcano, to obtain a larger set of colors. As this second and larger (8 feet by 4 feet 8 inches) flag was being carried up the slopes of Suribachi, photographer Joe Rosenthal, who covered the Iwo operation for the Associated Press, noticed it and instantly started in close pursuit. His efforts that morning resulted in the now famous picture of the second flag raising. Also since it's one of my favorite movies, I wanted to add this passage from the book “Flags of our Fathers” by James Bradley The Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal, had decided the previous night that he wanted to go ashore and witness the final stage of the fight for the mountain. Now, under a stern commitment to take orders from General Holland "Howlin' Mad" Smith, the secretary was churning ashore in the company of the blunt, earthy general. Their boat touched the beach just after the flag went up, and the mood among the high command turned jubilant. Gazing upward, at the red, white, and blue speck, Forrestal remarked to Smith: "Holland, the raising of that flag on Suribachi means a Marine Corps for the next five hundred years". Forrestal was so taken with fervor of the moment that he decided he wanted the Second Battalion's flag flying on Mt. Suribachi as a souvenir. The news of this wish did not sit well with 2nd Battalion Commander Chandler Johnson, whose temperament was every bit as fiery as Howlin Mad's. "To hell with that!" the colonel spat when the message reached him. The flag belonged to the battalion, as far as Johnson was concerned. He decided to secure it as soon as possible, and dispatched his assistant operations officer, Lieutenant Ted Tuttle, to the beach to obtain a replacement flag. As an afterthought, Johnson called after Tuttle: "And make it a bigger one." Following this, the 28th Marines conducted mopping-up operations to eliminate remaining enemy positions and seal off caves at the base of Suribachi. All accessible outer and inner slopes were covered as the Marines annihilated enemy snipers and blasted shut the many cave entrances, sealing in an uncounted number of Japanese. Much observation equipment was found, emphasizing the fact that this had been an excellent point of vantage from which hostile observers directed murderous fire against the entire beachhead. Marine artillerymen, ready and eager to seize this advantage, hastened to move flash-ranging equipment into position. By nightfall, approximately 122 Japanese soldiers were killed while attempting to infiltrate American lines. Over the five-day period, the 28th Marines suffered 895 casualties, while nearly 2,000 Japanese were either killed or trapped in over 1,000 caves in the area. Kuribayashi had not anticipated the loss of this strategically significant location so early in the battle, and the survivors who managed to breach American lines faced severe reprimands upon their return to the north. For the remainder of the month, the 28th Marines focused on clearing out stubborn Japanese forces, reorganizing, and reequipping. Meanwhile, fighting in the north persisted as the three assault regiments advanced toward the O-2 Line. The 26th and 21st Marines faced heavy fire and struggled to make progress, while the 24th Marines advanced along their entire front, gaining up to 300 yards in some areas. On this day, the situation on the beach steadily improved as clearance efforts, construction of exits, and unloading continued, facilitating the arrival of essential ammunition and an additional 25 tanks. On February 24, following extensive air, naval, and artillery preparations, the offensive resumed. However, the initial failure of tanks to join the assault due to minefields and heavy anti-tank fire forced the Marines to advance slowly under intense fire from various sources. In the center, the 3rd Battalion, 21st Marines advanced 800 yards, reaching the north side of the east-west runway of Airfield No. 2, while the 2nd Battalion gradually moved northward around the end of the runway by noon. In the afternoon, as tank support began to arrive, Withers' 3rd Battalion captured the hill north of the airstrip after a fierce hand-to-hand battle. Simultaneously, his 2nd Battalion coordinated with the 26th Marines to seize the elevation beyond the airfield. Graham's troops easily secured the ground in front but had to pause their advance when they found themselves about 400 yards ahead of the 21st Marines. On the right flank, the 24th Marines initially made significant progress alongside Withers' men toward the airfield but were ultimately halted by the strong defenses on Charlie-Dog Ridge.  Running along the southeast edge of the east-west runway of Airfield Number 2 was a ridge known only as "Charlie-Dog Ridge." In prolongation of this ridge, on a lower level to the southeast, was a semicircular rise of ground that formed the "Amphitheater." In this area, Japanese engineers had constructed some of the most formidable defenses on the island. From the south, the approach traversed bare flat ground swept by guns on the ridge. To the east, the route led across a weird series of volcanic outcroppings and draws. It was against these positions that the 24th Marines moved out on D-plus-5. Assault squads then had to methodically clear the ridge, moving from one strongpoint to another, using fire and explosives until Charlie-Dog was secured. While the overall gains for the day were notable by Iwo Jima standards, the casualty figures were also high, with the Marines suffering 1,034 killed and 3,741 wounded during the five-day push to the second airfield. Additionally, the remainder of General Erskine's 3rd Marine Division began landing that day to officially take control of the central area. On February 25, a decision was made to hold back the 26th Marines to allow the 3rd Division to align with them. After another intense bombardment, Colonel Howard Kenyon's 9th Marines advanced through the 21st to continue the assault, but the two-battalion attack only managed to gain a meager 100 yards against Ikeda's determined defenders. Kenyon then deployed his reserve 3rd Battalion in the center, but it also failed to break through. To the east, the 23rd and 24th Marines launched simultaneous attacks, but only the 23rd made significant progress, overrunning the eastern end of the strip and establishing a foothold on the high ground to the north. Meanwhile, in the morning, Mitscher's carriers conducted a second strike on Tokyo. The Japanese sighted 600 US carrier aircraft on February 25, but Rear Admiral “Ted” Sherman reported, “The enemy opposition was only halfhearted and Japanese planes which were not shot down seemed glad to withdraw from the scene … as swiftly and unceremoniously as possible. Even here, over their own capital, the enemy were notably inferior to our naval aviators in aggressiveness, tactics, and determination.” TF-58 aircraft hit the Ota and Koizumi aircraft plants, but increasingly snowy, stormy weather meant Mitscher canceled further Tokyo strikes at 1215hrs. Spruance and Mitscher decided to hit Nagoya instead. En route to Nagoya that night destroyers USS Hazelwood and Murray sank three small Japanese craft. Eventually Mitscher realized TF-58 would not reach launching position on time, and at 0530hrs Spruance and Mitscher canceled the Nagoya strikes and headed south to refuel. TF-58 claimed 47 Japanese planes shot down and 111 destroyed on the ground for a total of 158 Japanese planes destroyed on February 25. Two hangars, one radar station, and two trains were destroyed. About 75 percent of the Ota engine plant's buildings were destroyed and an additional 15 percent heavily damaged. The Koizuma plant had also been heavily hit, and five coastal vessels and several smaller craft sunk, with another 14 vessels damaged. Total US losses were nine aircraft to antiaircraft fire and four to operational causes; four pilots were lost.. After TF-58 aircraft had plastered the Nakajima Ota airframe plant with 45 tons of bombs, February 25 photoreconnaissance revealed Ota to be 60 percent destroyed and 30 percent heavily damaged, although half of this was believed due to B-29s. After the photos TF-58 aircraft dropped another 13 tons on the plant. The Nakajima Koizuma plant was attacked on February 25 with 35 to 40 tons of bombs, with hits concentrated in the center of the plant. Reconnaissance showed 20 percent of the Koizuma roof damaged. The Hitachi–Tachikawa aircraft engine plant was attacked by one Task Group strike, with US airmen reporting “excellent results.” Photographs showed many bomb hits, but smoke made precise damage assessments difficult. Slight damage was also inflicted on the Tachikawa airframe plant. TF-58 planes struck the B-29s' nemesis, the Musashino-Tama aircraft engine plant, with 40 tons of bombs in the center of the Tama complex.  On that day, LeMay also dispatched 231 B-29s to attack Tokyo with incendiaries, with 172 successfully dropping 453.7 tons of bombs, incinerating a square mile of the city. This operation served as the "conclusive" test of the incendiary bombs that the 20th Air Force had requested, with valuable lessons to be learned for future use. The next day, the 26th Marines resumed their attack despite the high ground on the left remaining unclaimed, successfully advancing over 300 yards in the right and center. In the center, the 9th Marines continued their assault with the 1st and 2nd Battalions side by side, but they made no notable gains. On the right flank, the 23rd Marines launched another assault towards Hill 382, facing heavy resistance and managing to advance only about 200 yards. Concurrently, Lanigan's 25th Marines moved through the battered 24th Marines, achieving an advance of approximately 100 yards before encountering intense machine-gun fire from the Amphitheater and Turkey Knob. On February 27, Wonrham's 27th Marines took over from the exhausted 26th and continued to push northward despite rising casualties, successfully overrunning several strongpoints and gaining about 500 yards across the front. In the center, the 9th Marines finally breached the enemy's main defenses towards Hill 199-O and captured Hill Peter, securing Airfield No. 2. Meanwhile, on the right, the 4th Division pressed on against the heavily fortified Japanese positions at the Meatgrinder, advancing only 150 to 200 yards on each flank while struggling to make headway against the Amphitheater and Turkey Knob. In the final attack of the month, the 27th Marines advanced towards Hill 362A, reaching its base but were forced to retreat nearly 100 yards due to Japanese counterattacks and loss of communication. In the center, Withers' 21st Marines moved past the 9th Marines and rapidly advanced north of Airfield No. 2, making significant progress on the right as they swept through Motoyama village and captured the high ground overlooking Airfield No. 3. To the east, Cates continued to send troops into the Meatgrinder, with the 23rd Marines gaining over 200 yards and launching an attack on Hill 382, while the 25th Marines struggled to make any headway against the Amphitheater and Turkey Knob, achieving only minor gains along the coast. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. And thus we have begun one of the most brutal battles of WW2, let alone the Pacific War. It was a controversial decision to invade Iwo Jima and the Americans could never have predicted how the Japanese would change their tactics to turn the entire ordeal into one giant meat grinder.

xXx[FinDom]xXx wrote (5:34a LST): once again i find myself enjoying an episode for entirely different reasons than most, because i am burdened to be one of the few who knows what subtext is. yeah, sure, your boy got his kiss. but here's the thing: for a genre that's usually notorious for dragging out the will-they-won't-they until the heat death of the universe, Courtship sure is pushing rembrandt really hard, huh? almost like it wants you to think that's what's "supposed" to happen, which is the same opinion held by Starcadia's parents? Aurelia's glance wasn't just generically "meaningful," it was asking Star a question: is this what you want? it clearly points to Starelia being endgame. rembrandt is just a pit stop along the way. also, goddammit, why is it always elves? "my unique and mysterious alien race looks exactly like if we put some modeling putty on a human's ear." wow how exciting i'm so intrigued. i bet they're gonna really strain the budget two episodes from now when we meet a new alien who's got nose ridges or some shit CREDITS: Iris Christianson as Trace Vector Tyberius Wilson as Bridgerton Larch Zoe Tunnell as Genevieve St. Cloud Crystal Zaslavchik as Leila Marino, Lietunant of Mare Cognitum Luke Varner as The GM Additional Voices by Max Knightley MUSIC BY MAX KNIGHTLEY EDITED BY LUKE VARNER CONTENT WARNING: This episode contains knife violence and body horror.

On this weeks Grow Guides: Episode 27: What are some common terms growers use to describe cannabis quality, like "dank" or "brick weed"? | What do terms like "veg," "flowering," and "stretch" mean in the cannabis growth cycle? | Can you explain slang related to training techniques like LST, topping, and scrogging? | What do growers mean when they talk about "nutes," "pH," or "flushing"? | What are common pest and disease terms, like "PM," "hermie," or "bud rot"? | What does "curing" mean, and why do growers emphasize its importance? | What is the significance of terms like "trichomes," "terps," and "sticky"? | How do growers measure success with terms like "GPW" or "PPM"? | What are some fun or unique slang terms, like "couch lock" or "420"? |  If you have any questions you'd like us to answer in next week's episode, reach out to us through your favourite social network, join our Discord server, or visit Percy's Grow Room for more. Links are available on our website—don't miss out! Website: https://highonhomegrown.com Discord: https://discord.gg/sqYGkF4xyQ Youtube: https://www.youtube.com/highonhomegrown Thank you for downloading and listening to our cannabis podcast! I hope you have enjoyed this episode.

Throughout the years, there were many attempts of tapping into Bitcoin's liquidity and security, but almost all of them came with different caveats. Most notably, wrapped BTC (wBTC) depended on the wrapper contract security. However, the recent surge in research and development for native solutions has led to breakthroughs previously thought impossible. Babylon launched native BTC staking and plans to further expand this to secure other blockchains, in a model similar to that of mesh security. This would not only help secure other networks, but it would also unlock liquidity from the mother chain through liquid staking derivatives.Topics covered in this episode:David's backgroundThe evolution of BabylonThe Bitcoin RenaissanceTechnical challenges of implementing Bitcoin stakingThe OP_CAT upgradeBabylon's Bitcoin staking & Bitcoin-secured networksBridging liquidity & LSTsSecuring multiple chains and slashingBabylon chain - aggregating Bitcoin-secured networksCould Bitcoin become a POS chain?Babylon upgradeabilityEpisode links:David Tse on XBabylon on XSponsors:Gnosis: Gnosis builds decentralized infrastructure for the Ethereum ecosystem, since 2015. This year marks the launch of Gnosis Pay— the world's first Decentralized Payment Network. Get started today at - gnosis.ioChorus1: Chorus1 is one of the largest node operators worldwide, supporting more than 100,000 delegators, across 45 networks. The recently launched OPUS allows staking up to 8,000 ETH in a single transaction. Enjoy the highest yields and institutional grade security at - chorus.oneThis episode is hosted by Brian Fabian Crain & Sebastien Couture.

The DeFi landscape has significantly evolved since 2018 when Chainlink was launched. Recent developments such as L2 rollups, liquid staking, restaking and the rise of BTC DeFi have created huge demand for more customizable, modular oracles that would be able to provide accurate data for countless use cases, crosschain. RedStone set out to do exactly that and are now securing over $6.6 bn worth of assets (1000+ assets), across more than 60 chains, without a single mispricing event.Topics covered in this episode:Marcin's backgroundEarly oracle landscapeRedStone's technical architectureNetwork incentivesData aggregation moduleNode operator modulePush vs. Pull oraclesRedStone's business modelThe role of RedStone tokenPyth vs. RedStoneRestakingOracle extractable valueSynergies between oracles and institutional investorsEpisode links:Marcin Kazmierczak on XRedStone on XSponsors:Gnosis: Gnosis builds decentralized infrastructure for the Ethereum ecosystem, since 2015. This year marks the launch of Gnosis Pay— the world's first Decentralized Payment Network. Get started today at - gnosis.ioChorus1: Chorus1 is one of the largest node operators worldwide, supporting more than 100,000 delegators, across 45 networks. The recently launched OPUS allows staking up to 8,000 ETH in a single transaction. Enjoy the highest yields and institutional grade security at - chorus.oneThis episode is hosted by Brian Fabian Crain.

Last time we spoke about the Aitape-Wewak Campaign. General Dunckel's task force successfully invaded Mindoro, establishing airfields to support operations on Luzon. With General Eichelberger's 8th Army and General Krueger's 6th Army poised to capture Lingayen Gulf, guerrilla forces on Luzon provided crucial intelligence. As plans for the Luzon invasion solidified, General Yamashita prepared defenses, predicting an assault between January 10 and 20. Despite dwindling resources, he aimed to delay the enemy's advance. Meanwhile, Allied forces readied for a swift amphibious attack to secure Manila and restore the Philippine government. In December, Australian forces established outposts at Yasile and Yambes, successfully repelling Japanese attacks. After fierce clashes, they advanced 40 miles along the coast. Meanwhile, the U.S. military bolstered defenses in Saipan and launched bombing raids on Japanese facilities, achieving mixed results. Despite heavy losses, they began to impact Japanese production capabilities. As the month ended, the Japanese launched a final assault on the Marianas, but the Allies continued their strategic advances, setting the stage for future operations. This episode is the Invasion of Luzon Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  We last left off with the plans for Operation Mike 1 being finished. General Swift's 1st Corps was ready to land on the eastern beaches of Lingayen Gulf, while General Griswold's 14th Corps prepared to go ashore on the western beaches. Additionally, successful diversionary operations had been conducted on Mindoro, and Admiral McCain's Task Force 38 executed several moderately successful strikes against Formosa and the Ryukyu Islands in early January. Meanwhile, the 14th Corps elements staging at New Britain completed loading on 10 December; those mounting at Bougainville finished two days later. On the 17th all groups of the III Amphibious Force rendezvoused at Huon Gulf, eastern New Guinea, to rehearse the Lingayen assault. General Griswold felt that the 37th Division's rehearsal was satisfactory but had much fault to find with the 40th Division, remarking upon a "general failure to observe the spirit of the rehearsal." As a result, further training was conducted at Manus Island in the Admiralties, where the convoy reassembled on 22 December. On December 27, Admiral Wilkinson dispatched his LSTs and LSMs, followed by the remainder of Task Force 79 four days later. On the same day, Admiral Barbey's convoy, which included Major-General Leonard Wing's 43rd Division, loaded at Aitape before proceeding to Sansapor to load Major-General Edwin Patrick's 6th Division. Task Force 78 departed Sansapor on December 30, heading to a rendezvous point with other elements of Admiral Kinkaid's Luzon Attack Force. By January 4, all components of Task Force 77 had successfully gathered at Leyte Gulf, with MacArthur personally boarding the light cruiser Boise. Kinkaid's minesweepers, Admiral Oldendorf's Bombardment and Fire Support Group, and most of Admiral Durgin's escort carriers had already left the gulf on January 2 to conduct preliminary operations off Luzon. By January 6, the rest of the Luzon Attack Force began moving toward Lingayen Gulf, led by Admiral Berkey's light cruisers. As Mindoro-based aircraft significantly increased the intensity of their assaults during the last week of December—sinking seven transports and two escorts, and destroying over 140 aircraft. General Yamashita's tense and expectant forces were still racing against time to complete,their battle preparations when the first warnings came that the enemy was again on the move. At 1322 on 2 January, a naval lookout post on Surigao Strait reported that a long train of about 80 enemy ships, screened by destroyers, was moving through the strait into the Mindanao Sea. Other reports which followed immediately warned that large numbers of invasion craft were gathered in the Leyte, Palau and Marianas areas, and that enemy submarines had appeared in force off the west coast of Luzon. At first it was thought that the enemy convoy was merely a reinforcement and resupply group destined for Mindoro. On 3 January, however, developments began to point more conclusively toward a full-scale amphibious operation against Luzon. In the afternoon, just as the initially sighted enemy group passed into the Sulu Sea, a large enemy naval task force, including 12 escort carriers, four battleships and eight cruisers, was reported following in its wake through Surigao Strait. Another delayed report stated that an enemy transport convoy of 90 ships, under strong naval escort, had been spotted the previous day northwest of Palau, heading in the direction of Leyte Gulf. General Yamashita grew concerned that a large-scale amphibious operation against Luzon was imminent. Consequently, he decided to relocate his headquarters to Baguio. These concerns were validated in early January when Japanese lookouts spotted Kinkaid's warships and transports approaching the island. In response, General Tominaga ordered aggressive kamikaze attacks on the Allied vessels, with a major assault on January 4 causing severe damage to the escort carrier Ommaney Bay, which ultimately had to be scuttled. The following day, Japanese attacks persisted, damaging two escort carriers, two cruisers, and three destroyers, among other ships. In retaliation, Durgin's carrier aircraft launched strikes on Manila Bay, successfully sinking the destroyer Momi and damaging the Hinoki. On January 6, McCain's carriers joined the effort, with American pilots tasked with targeting air facilities at Manila and Clark Field. Despite adverse weather conditions limiting the effectiveness of the strike, they succeeded in sinking one transport and six oilers, as well as destroying 32 Japanese aircraft. Meanwhile, as Oldendorf's warships commenced their bombardment and minesweeping operations, kamikaze attacks continued. The destroyer minesweeper USS Long (DD-209/DMS-12) missed the attack on Pearl Harbor by about two days, but then immediately started anti-submarine patrols and escort missions. Its long trajectory in the Pacific War saw it make escort runs to Midway, Palmyra and Canton; participate in the invasions of Amchitka, Attu and Kiska in Alaskan waters; escort reinforcements to Roi and Namur in the Marshalls; participate in the invasions of the Admiralties, Hollandia, Saipan and Palau; and be one of the first vessels to enter into Leyte Gulf back in October. During the invasion of Lingayen Gulf, Long began mine sweeps on January 6, evading and firing upon Japanese aircraft as she carried out her intricate mission. Shortly after noon, beginning her second run, Long spotted two Zeros heading for her. Long went to 25 knots and opened fire, but a kamikaze crashed into her portside below the bridge about 1 foot above the waterline. With fires and explosions amidships, Long lost power and internal communications, and was unable to fight fires forward. Her commanding officer, Lieutenant Stanley Caplan, fearing an explosion in the forward magazine, gave permission for men trapped on the forecastle to leave the ship; but through a misunderstanding the crew abandoned ship. Later that afternoon a second plane attacked Long and exploded at the same spot, destroying the bridge and breaking the ship's back. Long finally capsized and sank the following morning. Alongside the Long, battleships California and New Mexico, along with the cruisers Columbia, Australia, and Louisville, five destroyers, another minesweeper, and one transport were damaged. Admiral Oldendorf was worried with good reason. Previously, kamikaze operations against his ships and those of other naval commands, though dangerous, had generally been executed by relatively untrained pilots who had taken few precautions to avoid detection and anti-aircraft fire and who often appeared to be flying partially damaged, lightly armored planes carrying little ordnance. In January the kamikazes had been operating in a far different manner. There was now a definite program of kamikaze operations, for the vast majority of the perhaps 100 Japanese aircraft that had attacked the forces under Admiral Oldendorf's command since January 2 had at least attempted kamikaze crashes. In addition, the pilots seemed to be more skilled. They took every advantage of radar-blanketing terrain, especially in the Lingayen Gulf area, and flew toward target ships at extremely low altitudes, thus helping to avoid both radar and visual detection. Flight tactics included radical maneuvering designed not only to avoid anti-aircraft fire and Allied planes but also to confuse observers as to which ship was the actual target. Finally, many of the kamikaze planes were heavily armored and armed. The Allies had expected great results from the relatively new proximity fuze for shipboard 5-inch antiaircraft weapons, but the Japanese planes usually appeared so suddenly and took such violent evasive action that 5-inch batteries could seldom track properly. The employment of the expensive special ammunition was, therefore, generally useless, and was sometimes even dangerous to friendly ships. Having missed approaching kamikazes by such distances that fuzes were not activated, shells sometimes sailed on to explode on or near Allied vessels, thereby causing some damage and many casualties.  Concerned about the effectiveness of the kamikaze attacks and recognizing that achieving air superiority did not prevent the enemy's suicide planes, Oldendorf opted for a psychological strategy. He ordered the minesweeper and bombardment groups to persist with their operations, even while sustaining damage, to convince the Japanese that their suicide missions were failing. Kinkaid shared these concerns and requested the cessation of all diversionary air operations to concentrate the main air offensive on Luzon. As a result, Admiral Halsey's carrier-based aircraft and General Kenney's ground forces were tasked with neutralizing all Japanese airfields in Luzon, supported by Durgin's escort carriers. On January 7, McCain's strikes on Luzon and Oldendorf's bombardment of the Lingayen beaches continued, while underwater demolition teams entered the gulf to undertake the dangerous mission of dismantling beach obstacles. Again contrary to expectations, no beach obstacles were found. The "frog men" encountered only a little rifle and machine gun fire, and the few beach defenses they observed appeared to be unoccupied. Their tasks and those of hydrographic ships were completed on the 8th. In retaliation, 20 to 25 kamikazes targeted various segments of the Luzon Attack Force, managing to sink two minesweepers and damage one LST. That night, Kinkaid's destroyers successfully sank the Hinoki off Manila Bay. However, on January 8, the 3rd Fleet units began advancing towards Formosa, as MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz suspected that the kamikazes were launching from there. Without Halsey's additional air support, the Japanese suicide planes once again attacked the Luzon Attack Force, this time damaging the cruiser Australia and the escort carriers Kitkun Bay and Kardashan Bay, as well as inflicting damage on an LSI, an LST, and an APA. Due to significant losses, by the end of the day, the 2nd Air Fleet and the 1st Combined Base Air Force headquarters were disbanded. The 1st Air Fleet received orders to withdraw to Formosa for reorganization, while the severely weakened units of the 4th Air Army were set to continue limited attack operations for a short time until a final evacuation could be carried out. Returning on the morning of the 8th to resume bombardment about 08:00, one section again hit the Lingayen area. About ten minutes later a destroyer standing close inshore and a spotting plane from a battleship reported that Filipinos were forming a parade, complete with United States and Philippine flags, in the town of Lingayen. The fire was shifted to more westerly targets while leaflets were quickly prepared instructing the Filipinos to clear the area. A spotting plane dropped the leaflets and the paraders dispersed. Bombardment started again as soon as the area seemed vacated. The reasons for resuming the bombardment of Lingayen and its environs in the face of this friendly demonstration ashore are unknown, especially since neither underwater demolition teams nor spotting planes had discovered any signs of Japanese activity in the area. The town, at least, seemed safely in the hands of the Filipinos. The most obvious explanation is that erroneous intelligence, having indicated that strong defenses would be encountered in the area, made it incumbent upon Admiral Oldendorf to continue the bombardment whether he wanted to or not. Too much was at stake to take a chance. The Filipinos in the Lingayen area could hardly have been pleased as they saw their homes and public buildings damaged or destroyed by what to them must have seemed an unnecessary bombardment. It seems a tribute both to the Filipinos and to the prewar administration of the United States in the islands--as well as a severe and obvious indictment of Japanese occupation policies--that the people of the Philippines took such adversities in their stride, not permitting personal resentments to overcome judgment and loyalty. Throughout the rest of 8 January, bombardment of the landing beach areas continued without incident. Practically no military installations or targets were found in the Lingayen town and airstrip area, and relatively few were discovered in the San Fabian region. The San Fabian bombardment vessels ran out of targets by 1530 and moved back up the gulf to strike the San Fernando area for another forty-five minutes, completing the task that the Japanese kamikazes had interrupted on the 6th. The Lingayen area ships had long since ceased their firing for the day. Thus ended preliminary bombardment operations. The heavy bombardment of the San Fernando sector on the 6th aroused great anxiety in General Yamashita's headquarters. An enemy landing in that sector would fall north of the main positions of the 58th Independent Mixed Brigade and create serious danger of a thrust toward Baguio over the Bauang-Naguilian Highway. The only means of meeting this potential threat was to change the planned employment of the 19th Division. The division was still in the San Fernando-Naguilian area due to postponement of its scheduled movement inland, and intense enemy air activity over the whole Lingayen area made it improbable that it could move in any case. Consequently, on 7 January, the Area Army ordered the division to assume responsibility for the defense of the sector north of a line running through Santiago, Magungunay, Mt. Bilbil, and Asin. Its main strength was to be concentrated between Naguilian and Baguio. With preliminary operations finished, Kinkaid's amphibious attack convoys arrived at the entrance to Lingayen Gulf around 04:00 on January 9. As the amphibious ships began landing operations, the fire support vessels of Admirals Barbey and Wilkinson positioned themselves for final pre-assault bombardment. In support of these efforts, McCain struck Formosa, destroying 47 Japanese aircraft, sinking seven ships, and damaging eleven others. Throughout the week, the fast carriers conducted a total of 3,030 offensive sorties, dropping approximately 700 tons of bombs at the cost of 86 aircraft. Pleased with the results of the anti-kamikaze operation, Nimitz finally permitted Halsey to launch a major raid into the South China Sea, codenamed Operation Gratitude. Meanwhile, back in Luzon, the pre-assault bombardment commenced at 07:00, gradually shifting fire from the landing beaches to the flanks of the assault area. At 09:00, the first amphibious vehicles began their approach from a departure line about 4,500 yards offshore, while rocket-armed landing craft and aircraft bombarded the beaches. The landing beaches of the 14th Corps were located across the middle of Lingayen Gulf's southern shores and centered on Lingayen airstrip and the nearby grounds of the capitol of Pangasinan Province. In peacetime one would have considered the shore line a beautiful swimming beach, a magnificent strand of firm sand stretching eastward almost 9 miles from the mouth of the Calmay River to the mouth of the Dagupan. The east bank of the Dagupan, which enters the gulf midway between Lingayen and San Fabian, delineated the boundary between the 14th and the 1st Corps, and bridges over the Dagupan were expected to provide the first easy means of contact between the two corps. Since there was a gap of over 6 miles between the 1st Corps' westernmost beaches and the 14th Corps' easternmost, it was imperative that the Dagupan crossings be seized without delay. Planners anticipated that inasmuch as 1st Corps troops would be a mile or so closer to the river at the moment of landing they would be the first to reach the bridges, but it was 14th Corps' responsibility to relieve 1st Corps at the crossings as soon as possible. The 37th Division was to drive toward the Dagupan, while the 40th Division would make a quick thrust west and northwest to Port Sual and Alaminos. Port Sual, located at the southwestern corner of Lingayen Gulf, and at the western extremity of the Army Beachhead Line, possessed some importance as the site of minor port facilities. Alaminos, about twelve miles northwest of Port Sual, lay inland on the Bolinao Peninsula. Early capture of road junctions at Alaminos would help forestall Japanese attempts to organize counterattacks against the 6th Army's right flank. In contrast, the beaches assigned to the 1st Corps were more widely spaced. The units of the 6th Division were scheduled to land on the Blue Beaches, located midway between the Dagupan River mouth and that of the Bued River. The 103rd Regiment was to land on White Beach 3 at San Fabian, while the 169th Regiment would land on White Beach 2, nearly two miles to the northeast. Additionally, the 2nd Battalion of the 172nd Regiment was set to land on the nearby White Beach 3. Fortunately for the American forces, they encountered minimal resistance as the initial waves approached the shore, facing only some challenges from the ebb tide. Shortly after 09:30, the 1st and 20th Regiments landed on the Blue Beaches, with the 1st Regiment quickly securing the mouth of the Bued River and advancing three miles inland to Mangaldan, while the 20th Regiment moved toward Dagupan. Meanwhile, Wing's regiments landed on their designated beaches to the northeast but faced harassment from snipers, artillery, and mortar fire from Lieutenant General Nishiyama Fukutaro's 23rd Division. However, the assault waves of the 14th Corps moved more slowly than expected, reaching the western beaches only by 09:40. The 185th Regiment captured Orange Beach, the 160th Regiment took Green Beach, the 148th Regiment secured Yellow Beach, and the 129th Regiment landed unopposed on Crimson Beach. After landing on the beaches, the 1st Battalion of the 185th Regiment marched to the Agno River's mouth. Meanwhile, the 40th Reconnaissance Troop established a roadblock on the main road, just three miles east of Port Sual. The 2nd Battalion of the 185th Regiment advanced directly inland through Lingayen, successfully crossing the Calmay River and an east-west segment of the Agno River. Similarly, the 160th Regiment crossed the Calmay and assembled nearly four miles inland. The reserve 2nd Battalion of the 108th Regiment landed at Lingayen, while the 148th Regiment moved straight inland, crossing both the Calmay and Dagupan Rivers toward San Carlos. The 129th Regiment entered Dagupan and crossed the Patan River to reach Calasiao, with its 3rd Battalion eventually extending the line to connect with the 148th. By the end of the day, Griswold had established a beachhead stretching northwestward from Calasiao for nearly twenty miles to the outpost near Port Sual. At the same time, Wing's units encountered the most significant resistance from three tiers of ridges that overlooked the 43rd Division's beaches from the north, northeast, and east.  The 43rd Division had the most hazardous and difficult S-day tasks. On the division's left low hills lay scarcely three-quarters of a mile inland from WHITE Beaches 1 and 2. Stretching northward, and coming still closer to Lingayen Gulfs eastern shore, a first line of low, grass-covered hills formed a somewhat broken ridge line, the seaward slopes of which grew steeper as the hills proceeded north along the coast. Beyond this first range, which averaged less than 250 feet in height, lay another, more irregular north-south ridge that rose to 350 feet. Still further east--a little over three miles inland--was yet a third steep-sided, grass-covered ridge line, this one averaging around 600 feet high. The three tiers of ridges overlooked the 43rd Division's beaches from the north, northeast, and east. They provided the Japanese with natural defensive terrain, excellent observation, good positions from which to deliver direct fire on the beaches, and cover behind which there was protection from the essentially flat trajectory of naval support fires. Moreover, the ridges were close to assembly areas further inland that could provide large Japanese forces with cover and concealment. In a single night the Japanese could move considerable strength from these assembly points into the tiers of hills to launch a counterattack against the 6th Army's left. While the 2nd Battalion of the 172nd Regiment advanced toward Hill 247, the 169th Regiment moved eastward, successfully reaching Binday and extending its lines north along the gentle slopes leading to Hill 470. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion of the 172nd Regiment quickly secured the barrios of Mabilao and Alacan, ultimately capturing Hill 247 despite scattered resistance. As small arms and mortar fire intensified, combat patrols advanced toward Hill 385, coinciding with the remainder of the 172nd coming ashore. Finally, the 103rd Regiment took control of San Fabian without facing any opposition and then advanced generally south and southeast toward Hill 200, halting just north of San Jacinto by the end of the day. While the assault units of the 1st Corps successfully landed by dusk on January 9, Swift's advance was not as deep as Griswold's, leaving several dangerous gaps between his units. Throughout the day, the Japanese launched sporadic kamikaze attacks on the Luzon Attack Force, causing significant damage to the battleship Mississippi, hitting the cruisers Columbia and Australia again, and damaging one destroyer escort. Meanwhile, friendly anti-aircraft fire resulted in numerous casualties aboard the battleship Colorado. In response to the enemy landings, Yamashita decided to deploy the 2nd Tank Division to the Agno River line near Tayug, where the armored units were to execute a counterattack from the northern flank if the enemy overextended. He also sent five battalions under Lieutenant-General Tsuda Yoshitake to secure the Cabanatuan area, ordered Lieutenant-General Okamoto Yasuyuki's 10th Division to position elements in the Triangle Hill and Tayug sectors to counter a potential enemy advance from Lingayen toward San Jose, stationed the majority of the 11th Independent Regiment at Bongabong, and directed the Noguchi Detachment to move from Bicol to the Manila area. During the night, the 12th Surface Raiding Regiment, based at Port Sual, attempted to disrupt further enemy landings with a full-scale suicide boat attack on ships near the beachhead. Taking advantage of the element of surprise, the small explosive-laden boats approached undetected but only succeeded in sinking one LCI and damaging eight other vessels. In other areas, increased guerrilla activities and Allied airstrikes in northern Luzon had nearly stopped the Japanese from collecting and transporting vital food supplies to the critical defense zones within the Baguio-Mankayan-Bambang triangle. This disruption would hinder the 14th Area Army's capacity to conduct a prolonged defensive campaign. Although plans for a desperate, full-scale counteroffensive were developed, Yamashita decisively rejected this strategy, instead ordering the 2nd Tank Division to cancel its intended counterattack and regroup at Lupao, approximately eight miles northwest of San Jose. Meanwhile, on January 10, Griswold's forces continued their advance inland: the 185th Regiment moved west toward Port Sual; the 160th Regiment progressed southward about eight miles; the 148th Regiment quickly advanced to San Carlos; and the 129th Regiment pushed forward to Malasiqui, where the 14th Corps faced enemy resistance for the first time since the landing. Additionally, the reserve 108th and 145th Regiments successfully landed on the Lingayen beaches. To the north, the 6th Division shifted generally south and southeast, covering about four miles across flat, dry, open farmland, and by nightfall, it secured a front of approximately seven miles from west to east. As they continued northeast, the 103rd Regiment expanded its front, with its 2nd Battalion advancing toward Manaoag while the other two battalions moved to the area northwest of Hill 200. Lastly, the 169th and 172nd Regiments encountered the most intense resistance thus far, providing an early glimpse of the challenges that would impede the 43rd Division for the upcoming month. The 1st Battalion, 169th Regiment, supported by close artillery and mortar fire, engaged in combat along the steep, grassy slopes of Hill 470, ultimately capturing the summit by nightfall. Meanwhile, the rest of the regiment advanced across the Bued River toward Hills 355 and 318, but halted near the river due to heavy artillery, mortar, and machine-gun fire. To the north, the 172nd Regiment cleared Hill 385 and then moved toward Hills 351 and 580, gradually advancing along the southern section of the third ridge line, which was located inland from the beaches. Additionally, its 1st Battalion progressed two miles along the graveled coastal road and conducted patrols along the ridge crest. By nightfall, Krueger had determined that the 6th Army Reserve should be deployed in the 1st Corps' area, as outlined in the pre-assault plans, due to the significant resistance faced by the 43rd Division. He suspected that the apparent lack of enemy resistance to the west was a trap, designed to lure the 6th Army into overextending its lines, making its flanks susceptible to a counterattack from the east. Fortunately for the Americans, Tominaga's kamikaze attacks began to diminish in the days following the landing, with an attack on January 10 resulting in damage only to the destroyer escort LeRay Wilson and one transport ship. The next day, the 43rd Division continued to face challenges in Luzon. The Japanese mortar and artillery fire along the 172nd's eastern front was so severe that Wing decided to shift the regiment's attack direction from east to north, resulting in minimal progress as they redeployed to strike toward Hills 351 and 580 from Hill 470. Additionally, the reserve 158th Regiment was landed to relieve the 1st Battalion, 172nd Regiment, on the coastal road. Looking southeast, the 169th Regiment nearly encircled Hill 318. However, despite receiving maximum support from Durgin's carrier aircraft, naval gunfire, and division artillery, they were unable to dislodge the Japanese forces, who had entrenched themselves in the hillside. Meanwhile, Griswold's advance inland to secure the Army Beachhead Line continued to progress well on January 11. On the 11th the 185th Infantry patrolled and consolidated its positions on the west flank, suffered no casualties, killed 5 Japanese, and captured another. Early in the morning a Chevrolet sedan of 1940 or 1941 vintage, occupied by two Japanese, came calmly down the coast road from the direction of Port Sual. Obviously unaware that Company C, 185th Infantry, maintained a roadblock on the highway, the Japanese practically ran into the American outpost before they realized their situation. Before they could recover from their surprise and consternation, both Japanese were dead, and Company C had acquired some luxurious transportation. Meanwhile the 160th Regiment reached Aguilar, a road junction already held by Filipino guerrillas. The 108th Regiment closely followed the 160th, and the 148th Regiment established a line from Dumpay westward for four miles to Bacnar, with patrols extending further south to Urbiztondo and Bayambang. By the end of the day, the 14th Corps had either occupied or outposted nearly all the territory within the Army Beachhead Line in its sector. However, with Swift's units unable to keep up with the advance southward, Griswold faced the risk of exposing his eastern flank if he continued to push forward. Therefore, the 1st Corps needed reinforcement to prevent widening the gap along the corps boundary. As a result, the reserve 63rd Regiment and the 13th Armored Group were deployed in the San Fabian area, while the 6th Ranger Battalion, which had landed at Blue Beaches the previous day, moved to the Dagupan area. Additionally, Major-General Charles Mullins' 25th Division began to assemble between the Agoi and Patalan Rivers. Despite these developments, casualties had been significantly lower than expected, with 55 men killed and around 185 wounded, primarily from the 43rd Division. Japanese casualties in ground operations were also relatively low, with American estimates suggesting between 150 and 200 Japanese killed. Meanwhile, Task Force 38 made its way into the South China Sea via the Luzon Strait on January 10, accompanied by the refueling group. Although poor weather conditions thwarted a scheduled refueling on that day, Task Force 38 was completely fueled by noon on January 11 and prepared to carry out Halsey's ambitious raid. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. As Allied forces prepared for a major assault on Luzon, kamikaze attacks intensified, leading to fierce battles and unexpected challenges, but Filipino resilience shone through despite devastation. On the shores of Lingayen Gulf, American forces launched a strategic landing, facing minimal resistance, but soon encountered fierce Japanese counterattacks as they advanced inland.

Last time we spoke about the third arakan campaign. In December, General Bruce's forces advanced through Leyte, securing Ormoc and preparing for a decisive push toward Valencia.. The 305th and 306th Regiments steadily overcame enemy positions, while the 307th secured the airstrip. As Japanese forces began to retreat, the 12th Cavalry captured Kananga, opening Highway 2. Meanwhile, in Burma, General Slim devised Operation Extended Capital, aiming to outmaneuver the Japanese and cut off their supply lines, setting the stage for a crucial battle. As Admiral Mountbatten pivoted from Operation Dracula to launch Operation Romulus in Arakan, General Christison devised a three-pronged assault on Akyab. Facing fierce Japanese resistance, Private Kweku Pong displayed extraordinary bravery amidst chaos, earning recognition for his valor. Meanwhile, the 28th Army struggled to defend its positions, ultimately retreating under pressure. Amidst strategic deceptions, the Allies advanced through challenging terrain, culminating in significant victories that shifted the tide in Burma, showcasing courage and tactical ingenuity in the face of adversity. This episode is the Victory at Leyte  Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As we last left off, General Krueger's forces had effectively secured the Ormoc Valley, prompting many Japanese units to begin a challenging retreat toward Palompon. From that point, the best General Suzuki's troops could manage was to hold their positions for as long as possible. The Japanese had pockmarked Matagob and the area surrounding it with foxholes and emplacements and had dug spider holes under the houses. South of Matagob, where the road climbed into the hills, the enemy had utilized natural caves, gullies, and ridges on both sides of the road and dug many deep defensive positions. Some of these were eight feet deep, two feet in diameter at the top, and widened to six feet at the bottom. The Japanese had emplaced machine guns in culverts and had constructed several well-camouflaged coconut log pillboxes on the forward slopes of the ridges. An excellent, almost invisible installation, which served as an observation post, was dug in on the forward slope of a ridge about three miles north of San Miguel. It had a concealed entrance on the reverse slope. From this post eight miles of the road to the north and east could be observed.  Meanwhile, eager to deliver a decisive blow, Krueger organized his forces for a four-division assault along a wide front toward the west coast. General Bruce's 77th Division was tasked with advancing west along the Palompon road, while the three divisions of General Sibert's 10th Corps embarked on a difficult trek across the mountains to reach the northwest coast. The northwestern mountains of Leyte west of Ormoc Bay provided a difficult barrier to any movement toward the northwest coast. The area was the last one available to the Japanese either for escaping from Leyte or for staging defensive actions. In general, the terrain was rough, increasing in altitude from broken ground and low hills in the north to steep rocky ridges and high hills in the south. The northern part was either under cultivation or covered with cogon grass. Toward the south, the cultivated fields and grasslands were gradually supplanted by dense forests. Palompon had been extensively used by the Japanese as an auxiliary port of entry to Leyte. The town was the western terminus of the road that ran north and eastward across the northwestern hills to join Highway 2 near Libongao. It was this road junction that the 10th and 24th Corps had seized. The Palompon road, as it was called, followed the lower slopes of the hills until the flat interior valley floor was reached. The confining hills were steep-sided with many knife-edged crests. Such was the area into which the forces of the 6th Army had driven remnants of the Japanese 35th Army. To facilitate the capture of Palompon, Bruce planned to land the 1st Battalion, 305th Regiment near the port, while the other two battalions advanced westward on the Palompon road. To support this operation, Admiral Kinkaid would provide amphibious vehicles, LCMs, and a PT escort. However, while preparations for the amphibious assault were underway, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 305th Regiment departed from Valencia on December 22, quickly crossing the Togbong and Pagsangahan Rivers without encountering any opposition, and eventually halting just beyond the Humaybunay barrio.  The 302nd Engineer Battalion, which followed behind the assault battalions, fought the "battle of bridges." The engineers worked around the clock, frequently without any infantry protection, to restore the bridges as soon as possible. The bridges were to be sufficiently strengthened initially to support 2.5-ton truck traffic for infantry supply, then they were to be reinforced to carry 20 tons in order to bring M8's forward, and eventually to 36-ton capacity to carry the M10's. General Bruce had hoped that sufficient Bailey bridges could be made available for important crossings to carry traffic while engineers built wooden bridges under the Bailey bridges. Only a limited number of Bailey bridges were furnished, however, and engineer progress to the west was slowed down. At the same time, patrols from the 128th Regiment successfully eliminated the last enemy strongholds in the Limon area, while the 127th Regiment advanced to Lonoy, where the 1st Cavalry Division was gearing up for its westward push. Finally, the 24th Division, now under Major General Roscoe Woodruff, dispatched the 34th Regiment to launch an attack toward Tuktuk. On December 23, as aircraft bombed Palompon, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 305th Regiment resumed their advance. The Americans steadily progressed along the road, successfully forcing the Takahashi Detachment to retreat to the mountains northwest of Matag-ob, where they had to fend off a series of strong night counterattacks. That same morning, the assault units of the 1st Cavalry Division moved out from the highway, facing no resistance as they advanced west through the mountains. This initial day of marching established the pattern for the following days, with the cavalry regiments continuing to push forward through challenging terrain, encountering only sporadic resistance. Additionally, from December 23 to 26, the 34th Regiment conducted extensive patrols along the west coast of the Leyte peninsula. Meanwhile, the advance echelon of the 1st Division successfully linked up with the 68th Brigade, reaching the Bagacay sector the next day. However, the main body of the division had to carve its way through dense jungle on its way to Bagacay. The 102nd Division was also advancing toward the area south of Matag-ob, but after failing to make contact with the 35th Army or the Takahashi Detachment, its units began to retreat to Villaba in the following days. On December 24, while the 1st Battalion was boarding at Ormoc, the remainder of the 305th Regiment launched another offensive. At 1000 on 24 December the assault troops jumped off. The Japanese resistance was light and intermittent, but American progress was slow because of the rough, irregular hills in which the enemy had established positions in foxholes, spider holes, and caves. Since it was not possible to bypass these positions, the regiment had to clear each one before the advance could continue. The force received some artillery fire but a mortar platoon from Company A, 88th Chemical Weapons Battalion, silenced the enemy guns. At 1500 the battalions set up their night perimeter 500 yards short of the road bend. During the night a Japanese force of twenty men, which tried to penetrate the defenses of the 3d Battalion, was killed. Both the 127th and 128th Infantry Regiments sent out patrols on December 23 to reconnoiter the terrain. At 08:00 on December 24 the two regiments started for the west coast. Throughout the march to the sea, they encountered only small parties of the enemy, who put up no effective resistance, but heavy rains, dense, almost impassable forests, and steep craggy hills slowed the advance. The commanding officer of the 127th Infantry said of the hills encountered on December 24: “The morning was spent in climbing to the top of a mountain ridge. The climbing was difficult but as we later found out, the descent was much worse. The trail led almost perpendicular down the side. After reaching the bottom, another ridge was encountered, this almost straight up, everyone had to use hand holds to pull themselves up. All in all there were seven ridges from the bottom of the first descent to the first possible bivouac area.” The hills were less rugged from then on. Throughout the march both regiments also received supplies by airdrop, which was not completely satisfactory since none of the drops was made at the requested time and frequently there was a wide scattering of supplies. On December 25, the 1st Battalion of the former unexpectedly came across the remnants of the 1st and 57th Regiments. The Japanese forces suffered significant casualties and were compelled to disperse, but they eventually managed to reach Bacacay later that night. Meanwhile, the 305th Regiment made slow progress along the Palompon road against a well-entrenched enemy. However, the crucial development was that its 1st Battalion successfully landed at Buaya without facing any opposition.  A light fast armored column moved north to clear the road and to forestall any Japanese counterattack from that direction as the rest of the task force went rapidly south through the barrio of Look to Palompon, which fell at 1206. This closed the last main port of entrance on the island to the Japanese. Within four hours after hitting the beaches the battalion had secured the barrios of Buaya and Look as well as Palompon, and had strong patrols operating to the northeast and south. The troops met no opposition at any point. It was doubtless with great satisfaction that General Bruce sent the following message to the Commanding General, 14th Corps: "The 77th Infantry Division's Christmas contribution to the Leyte Campaign is the capture of Palompon, the last main port of the enemy. We are all grateful to the Almighty on this birthday of the Son and on the Season of the Feast of Lights." The 1st Battalion occupied a defensive position in the vicinity of Look on 25 December, and rested on 26 December, which was Christmas Day back home. It spent the next five days sending out patrols and awaiting the arrival through the mountains of the rest of the 305th Infantry. Once again, Suzuki's plans were thoroughly disrupted. Palompon was to have been used as the rear center of the line of communications and the army headquarters was to have been established at Kompisao, but the seizure of Palompon on 25 December by the 77th Division forced Suzuki to change the location of his army headquarters. He then selected as a base of operations an area in the vicinity of Ginabuyan that overlooked Silad Bay and was about three kilometers north of Villaba. The new area was a plateau with an elevation of about 1,200 feet, heavily forested and having rocky eastern and western slopes that made it "a natural fortress." From it one could command a view of Ormoc Valley to the east and the Camotes Sea and Cebu to the west. There were a few Filipino huts, and cultivated fields and coconut groves, interspersed with salt beds, lay along the beach. The area "was admirably suited for an extended period of defensive action." General Suzuki ordered the units of the 35th Army that were retreating westward to repair to the vicinity of the new base of operations.  He sent orders for his retreating units to gather there instead of in Palompon. Although Suzuki anticipated being able to support 15,000 men in this self-sufficient area, an assessment of the available resources revealed that they would only last for two weeks. Consequently, the Japanese began preparations for Operation Chi-Go, which involved the amphibious movement of several units, including the 35th Army headquarters and the majority of the 1st Division, to other islands in the Visayas. At the same time, on December 26, the 34th Regiment received orders to capture San Isidro. The next day, its 1st Battalion left Calubian and moved to the high ground overlooking the port, while Companies F and G conducted amphibious landings at Gigantangan Island and Taglawigan before securing Daha. The reinforced Company G then re-embarked on the landing craft and proceeded toward the San Isidro Bay area, where they encountered heavier resistance than anticipated and were ultimately forced to retreat. At the same time that the 2nd Battalion, 305th Regiment was being withdrawn for an overwater movement to Palompon, the 3rd Battalion continued its advance along the road, successfully covering over 1,000 yards by December 28. That day the foremost elements of the 5th and 12th Cavalry Regiments broke out of the mountains and reached the barrio of Tibur on the west coast, about 2,800 yards north of Abijao. By nightfall on the following day, the 7th Cavalry was also on the west coast but farther north. In its advance it had encountered and destroyed many small, scattered groups of the enemy, most of whom showed little desire to fight. The regiment arrived at Villaba, two and one-half miles north of Tibur, at dusk, and in securing the town killed thirty-five Japanese. Additionally, the 34th Regiment launched a coordinated assault on San Isidro, successfully overcoming all enemy resistance and capturing the port. In the following days, the troops moved south along the coast, eliminating small, poorly equipped Japanese units. Looking south on December 29, the 128th Regiment reached the high ground overlooking Tabango and Campopo Bays, while the 127th Regiment secured the high ground overlooking Antipole Point, completing the advance of the 32nd Division. Further south, the 3rd Battalion, 305th Regiment continued its push along the Palompon road despite strong resistance, while Company B secured the barrio of San Miguel. At 0930 on 30 December the 305th Infantry struck along the Palompon road, the 3d Battalion driving west, and the Provisional Mountain Force attacking east. The Mountain Force encountered only scattered resistance until 0930, when the Japanese, from well-entrenched positions in the precipitous sides of the road at a point about four miles east of Palompon, directed strong machine gun fire along the road. The Mountain Force dug in for the night on high ground overlooking the point at which its advance had been halted. The 3d Battalion succeeded in overcoming the opposition which had halted it the previous day, and pushed forward to a point about 1,000 yards southwest of Tipolo. The Japanese had emplaced artillery on curves in the road and could fire directly on the advancing American troops. Although the 305th Infantry lost one tank to enemy artillery fire, it was able to destroy three 75-mm. guns and capture two others intact. Meanwhile, Company C conducted a reconnaissance in force and executed an amphibious landing at Abijao, advancing 1,300 yards north to establish contact with elements of the 1st Cavalry Division near Villaba. By this time, most of the Japanese forces had successfully regrouped in the Villaba-Mount Canguipot area. Consequently, on December 31, Suzuki launched four strong counterattacks against the forces at Villaba; however, enemy artillery disrupted most of these assaults before elements of the 77th Division arrived to relieve the cavalrymen. With the westward advance to the coast complete, General Eichelberger's 8th Army officially took command of all units on Leyte Island, following MacArthur's announcement that organized resistance had ceased. As a result, on January 1, the 77th Division was instructed to relieve the 32nd and 24th Divisions, while the divisions of the 10th Corps moved to staging areas in preparation for upcoming operations. The 8th Army also assumed control of operations on Samar Island, which had similarly been secured against enemy forces. Units from the 1st Cavalry Division had pushed through heavy resistance to reach the strategic Taft-Wright Highway that runs through central Samar. On December 8, the cavalry successfully captured Wright, the western end of the highway, and then moved east to connect with friendly guerrilla forces advancing from Taft on the opposite coast, thereby securing control of the highway. Meanwhile, following the successful invasion of Mindoro, American forces continued their efforts on Hill Drome and Ellmore Field, with General Dunckel's troops conducting extensive patrols to locate enemy stragglers while awaiting the arrival of the 21st Regiment. The only opposition faced came from the persistent assaults of the 4th Air Army and the 1st Combined Base Force. On December 21 and 22, the 1st Resupply Echelon was attacked by enemy aircraft. About twenty kamikazes attacked the convoy, so damaging two LST's that they later had to be abandoned, and inflicting lesser damage on two destroyers and a Liberty ship. The 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry, en route to Mindoro in this convoy lost 6 men killed and 32 wounded; U.S. Navy losses were about 70 men killed or wounded; the Japanese lost 7 planes in kamikaze attacks and 3 others to shipboard antiaircraft fire. Then, from December 28 to December 30, Task Unit 18.3.15 was also attacked by kamikazes. Meanwhile, Admiral Okawachi was getting Admiral Shima's 2nd Striking Force ready for a hit-and-run surface attack on enemy invasion ships near San Jose, known as Operation Rei-Go. However, a proposed counter-landing on Mindoro, which was supported by Marshal Terauchi, Admiral Fukudome, and General Tominaga, faced strong opposition from General Yamashita and his 14th Area Army. The Area Army staff adamantly maintained that it would be impossible to move any sizeable forces to Mindoro but agreed to dispatch a small raiding unit to hamper enemy development of airfields in the San Jose area. On or about 24 December, an order was issued to the 8th Division to organize a task unit for this mission as soon as possible. Ultimately, a reluctant compromise was reached, allowing a small raiding unit from the 8th Division to be sent to disrupt enemy airfield development in the San Jose region. The raiding detachment was a specially organized provisional unit which included a small number that originally belonged to the Gi-Go Airborne Raiding Unit. It assembled at Batangas and prepared to embark for Mindoro. While this unit was being organized, Shima's warships left Camranh Bay on December 24. However, as they approached Mindoro on December 26, a lone PBY reconnaissance plane spotted them. In response, 105 aircraft were sent to conduct low-level attacks on the Japanese force.  At 19:40 the first wave of planes found the vessels just offshore. Before the wild engagement was over, the full wing strength had attacked every ship at least once. "When I saw a solid sheet of flame," reported one pilot in describing the AA, "I knew I was over the vessel." While wheeling away from the target, each pilot flashed on his running lights to avoid collision. Some planes landing in the Mindoro blackout for rearming, made as many as three strikes against the enemy vessels. Although PT boats, lurking close to shore, fired torpedoes at the silhouetted Japanese targets, only the destroyer Kiyoshimo went down, and the fleet persisted toward the beachhead, where at 22:40 it fired star shells which began an ineffective 40-minute bombardment. Only one Liberty ship, which had not sought refuge behind Ilin Island as directed, was sunk. Naval gunfire and simultaneous Japanese air attacks caused little damage at Hill, but made it difficult for the airmen aloft to land. With gasoline running short, most of the pilots made as many attacks as possible and then headed through the night and bad weather for Leyte, a flight more dangerous than the Japanese AA had been. When a full count was made, losses during the engagement totaled 26 aircraft. For the force engaged this was a heavy loss, but it was not in vain, for several Japanese survivors attributed the amazingly poor bombardment by their fleet to the aerial clawing which had demolished main batteries and killed a majority of the gun crews. Dunckel thought that without a doubt the airmen had saved the beachhead from serious losses: "The action of our Air Units on that night," he wrote, "will stand forever… as one of the most gallant deeds to be established in the traditions of American fighting men." On 26 December 1944, then with the San Jose bombardment force, Kiyoshimo was crippled by two direct bomb hits in attacks by U.S. Army bombers during the approach to Mindoro, Philippines. The ship was then finished off by a torpedo from U.S. PT-223, 145 miles south of Manila ; 82 were killed and 74 injured. The destroyer Asashimo rescued 169 survivors, including ComDesDiv 2, Captain Shiraishi Nagayoshi, and Lieutenant Commander Kajimoto; U.S. PT boats rescued five others.Despite this, Shima pressed on toward his target, entering the anchorage area at 23:00 to commence bombardment of San Jose. After approximately forty minutes of shelling, during which one auxiliary vessel and a PT boat were sunk, the Japanese ships withdrew northwest at high speed, still under fire from enemy planes. Although Shima's force ultimately managed to escape, the air attacks resulted in the sinking of the Kiyoshimo and damage to the Ashigara, the light cruiser Oyodo, and three destroyers, with a loss of 26 aircraft. The bombardment prevented landings at the Mindoro strips and many pilots, finding their planes running low on fuel, headed through the darkness and heavy weather toward Leyte fields only to crash on the way. Following this unsuccessful operation, on December 31, the raiding unit from the 8th Division finally crossed the Verde Island Passage by landing craft to reach Calapan in northeastern Mindoro, and then proceeded to Pinamalayan, arriving there on January 5. We must now depart from the Philippines and proceed to Bougainville to report on the preparations for a new Australian offensive.  Previously, we observed that General Savige's 2nd Corps had successfully relieved the American troops stationed at the Cape Torokina perimeter.  The Australians had now reached the conclusion that the Japanese had disbanded depleted units to reinforce others and were maintaining a well- disciplined and efficient force. They decided that, at the end of November, the force included the 38th Independent Mixed Brigade, built round the 81st Regiment, and the 6th Division with three depleted infantry regiments -13th, 23rd and 45th. Of these the 38th Brigade was believed to be chiefly concentrated at Numa Numa, with part of the 81st Regiment forward on the trail; most of the 13th Regiment was believed to be round the Jaba River-Gazelle Harbour area, with the 23rd farther south, and the 45th round Kieta on the east coast. The Allied Intelligence estimates of the whereabouts of the main Japanese forma- tions on Bougainville proved accurate. The main shortcoming was that the strength of the naval troops was underestimated. At the time of the arrival of the Aus- tralians there were about 11,000 naval men, including 3,500 civilian workers, on the island; the 87th Garrison Force, about 4,000 strong, was in the Buka area, and in the south were two strong forces of marines: the 6th Sasebo Special Naval Landing Force (about 2,000) and the 7th Kure Special Naval Landing Force (about 1,500). Indeed the naval forces were about as strong in fighting men as the 6th Division. The successful attack on Little George by the 9th Battalion on 29th November, six weeks before it was expected, surprised the enemy commanders and convinced them that the Australians were determined to open an offensive. Reinforcements numbering 450 were hurried into the central area (there were 2,000 troops deployed in or forward of Numa Numa) and Colonel Kaneko Atsushi of the 81st Regiment took command. A further 1,000 troops were sent from Kieta and the north to Numa Numa. Hyakutake was convinced that the attack on the Numa Numa trail would be accompanied by a landing at its eastern end with the object of severing his force. The quantity of artillery used in the attack on Little George and later Arty Hill convinced the Japanese that a determined thrust was being made. Arty Hill was defended by men of the 5th and 11th Companies of the 81st Regiment. Meanwhile the 13th Regiment was attacked on the Jaba River. Lieut-General Kanda of the 6th Division did not propose to contest the south bank of the river, considering that the crossing was merely a feint and the principal offensive would be made by sea; the main body of the defending force-1,500 men-was retained in the Mosigetta area. By January Kanda estimated that one Australian division, its name yet unknown, was south of the Jaba, with 25 guns. From 23rd to 26th November the 9th Battalion, with the 12th Field Battery and other detachments under command, took over this sector. The 9th Battalion's first task was actively to reconnoitre the Sisivie area with a view to attacking it later; and to secure ground from which such an attack could be launched. It had been believed that the main supply route from Numa Numa passed through Sisivie, but captured docu- ments and interrogation of prisoners revealed that Sisivie was merely an outpost and that the Piaterapaia area was the terminus of the enemy's line of communication; consequently the battalion's efforts were con- centrated in that direction. At 1.50 p.m. on the 24th one rifle shot was fired from Little George into the battalion's area the first shot in the Australian operations on Bougainville. On the 25th a small patrol moved stealthily to the rear of Little George and was fired on, two men being wounded. On the morning of the 29th the battery in the Doiabi Valley fired high-explosive and smoke shells on to Arty Hill, mortars fired smoke bombs on to Little George, and into the smoke a single platoon attacked. At the run the men reached the top of Little George before the Japanese emerged from shelter, opened fire with machine-guns and threw grenades. The attackers did not falter but worked their way forward in pairs, one man firing on a post while the other moved close and threw in grenades. Lieutenant Deacon, the commander, was 3 wounded but carried on. In about half an hour the position was gained. Two Australians had been killed and six wounded, of whom three remained on duty. Twenty Japanese dead lay on the hill, in- cluding a lieutenant and a sergeant. The expected enemy counter-attack was made in the evening by about 40 Japanese. It was a frontal thrust and gained no ground. Until dawn the enemy tried in vain to infiltrate. While these operations were in progress on the Numa Numa trail, the 2/8th Commando, next on the right, had taken over responsibility for the tangled mountain area rising to an altitude of 4,000 feet south and south-east of Mount Bagana, and known as the Hanemo sector. When the commando squadron took over from a company of the 164th American Regiment there had been no contact with the enemy for several weeks, and it was believed that only a handful of Japanese were in the neighbourhood. For five weeks from 24th November, when the relief was completed, a commando troop patrolled but met Japanese only twice, killing two and capturing another. By 27th December, when the 61st Battalion relieved the troop, it was considered that the area was clear and the flank of a force advancing down the coast would be safe. Additionally, Brigadier Raymond Monaghan's 29th Brigade was deployed to the southwestern edge of the perimeter, and a company from New Guinea was assigned to scout the Jaba River area. On December 3, Matthews sent a platoon to Sisivie, but the defenders were able to pin down the Australians with intense fire. After successfully repelling a strong enemy counterattack, the 9th Battalion advanced on Bawabu Ridge toward Pearl Ridge, with Matthews' C Company ordered to capture Arty Hill on December 18.  Matthews planned an attack on Arty Hill by a full company. At 7 a.m. on 18th December Major Blanch's C Company formed up on the sheltered side of George and Little George, on top of which men of a supporting company were walk- ing about nonchalantly to mislead the enemy into thinking that it was to be another uneventful day. Twelve New Zealand Corsairs at- tacked the Japanese positions; the battery of the 4th Field Regiment opened fire from its positions in the Laruma River Valley; medium machine-guns fired from Mount Deacon and Bawabu Ridge that is, from each flank-on to the reverse slope of Arty Hill at ranges up to 1,000 yards. After thirteen minutes of bombardment, the attackers advanced through the smoke along the razor-back ridge which was the only means of approach to the bare hill. Months of intermittent shelling had destroyed the bush and so loosened the soil on the steep slopes that the men had difficulty in scrambling up them. By 8.10 the leading troops were near the crest of Banyan Knoll and were meeting sharp small arms fire from Japanese in covered weapon-pits. Grenades were hurled down on them. They pressed on. Sergeant Allan, commanding the right platoon, led the way to the top of Banyan Knoll, shot a Japanese machine-gunner and himself fell dead. His men carried on up the slopes of Arty Hill. As at Little George, the attackers worked in pairs, one man covering an enemy post with fire while the other attacked from a flank with grenades. After more than an hour of close fighting the position was won and the defenders were digging in and setting up wire in preparation for the probable counter-attack. There was none: a prisoner said that there were not enough men left to attack. Five Australians were killed and 12 wounded of whom 4 remained on duty. Twenty-five Japanese dead were counted, 2 Japanese were taken prisoner, and from 10 to 20 recently-buried bodies were found. Two days later, Lieutenant-Colonel John McKinna's 25th Battalion began to relieve the exhausted 9th Battalion and was immediately tasked with taking Pearl Ridge, although its initial probing attacks were met with fierce resistance from the determined defenders. Meanwhile, Monaghan had deployed Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert McDonald's 15th Battalion to the Jaba River area, where they effectively cleared out enemy outposts. By the fourth week of December, the unofficial ceasefire on Bougainville had collapsed. Intense fighting erupted in two of the three main sectors, resulting in the deaths of over 100 Japanese soldiers, with their forward positions in each area being captured. The Australians were also bringing in additional reinforcements to sustain their offensive. According to Savige's strategy, Brigadier John Field's 7th Brigade was to be replaced by elements of Brigadier John Stevenson's 11th Brigade in the central sector, with orders to move south and join the rest of Major-General William Bridgeford's 3rd Division for an assault toward the Puriata River. Additionally, a strong contingent from the 11th Brigade was set to advance along the northwest coast of the island toward Soraken Harbour, aiming to push the northern enemy forces into the confined Bonis Peninsula. However, before these plans could be executed, McKinna was intent on capturing Pearl Ridge and aimed to launch one final attack with all his companies by the end of the month. Unbeknownst to the Australians, the few defenders in the area had recently received reinforcements in the form of a battalion under the direct command of Major-General Kijima Kesao, which significantly strengthened the ridge. Nevertheless, on the morning of December 30, aircraft bombarded the Japanese positions for about 40 minutes. At 08:00, the infantry advanced under the cover of artillery and machine-gun fire, with A Company facing heavy resistance just in front of Pear Hill that they could not overcome. Due to this setback on the right flank, McKinna ordered D Company to undertake a challenging climb along Pear Hill instead of the narrow spur where the attack had failed. Meanwhile, C Company made slow progress through dense brush but eventually managed to cut the enemy's track to the west. After repelling several enemy counterattacks during the night, the four companies renewed their assault on December 31. Although the march over Arty Hill and through thick underbrush was physically demanding, D Company managed to approach Pear Hill undetected. With A Company drawing enemy fire, D Company launched a powerful attack following an artillery bombardment that successfully pushed back the Japanese defenders. Meanwhile, B Company captured Baker's Brow to the west, and C Company held its position along the western track. However, by nightfall, Kijima's troops began testing the defenses established by C Company. In the early morning, the Japanese launched a fierce counterattack from the south and southeast, managing to penetrate two forward Australian positions. After an hour of intense hand-to-hand combat, the assault was ultimately repelled with the help of artillery support, and Australian patrols later found that Pearl Ridge had been abandoned by the enemy. Throughout the morning and into the early afternoon, the Australians conducted mopping-up operations until the ridge was completely cleared. With control of Pearl Ridge secured, the Australians gained a strategic vantage point that allowed them to observe from one side of Bougainville to the other, aiding future operations. During the battle, the Australians suffered 10 killed and 25 wounded, while the Japanese lost 34 killed and 1 captured. Shortly after taking Pearl Ridge, the 11th Brigade assumed control of the central sector as per Savige's orders, while the rest of the 7th Brigade began moving south. In conclusion, Major-General Percy Clarkson's 33rd Division began its deployment to Morotai in late December, with Colonel Ray Cavenee's 136th Regiment landing on the island's west coast on December 22. Four days later, the regiment advanced into Japanese-controlled territory to engage Colonel Kisou's 211th Regiment, receiving support from elements of the 130th Regiment moving overland from the Doroeba Plain and the 3rd Battalion of the 137th Regiment marching from Morotai's southern coast into the interior. This coordinated effort aimed to prevent the Japanese from dispersing into smaller groups in the island's mountainous regions. On January 3, the 136th Regiment located and attacked the 211th Regiment at Hill 40, with the 1st and 2nd Battalions advancing from the southwest while the 3rd Battalion approached from the north. After two days of intense combat, the Americans successfully captured Hill 40, inflicting significant casualties on the enemy, and then began pursuing the retreating Japanese forces to the north. Two thousand yards to the north, the 3d Battalion was settling down for the night. Its march from Radja had started badly. From the beginning the battalion had been harried by the enemy. On the nights of December 26-27 and 27-28, its perimeter had been attacked viciously by an estimated enemy battalion. (The 3d Battalion of the Jap 211th Infantry. It had been detached from the 211th for a special mission to Radja to await and guide reinforcements from Halmahera. The five reinforcing barges were ambushed after slipping through the Navy PT screen, and were destroyed along with fifty tons of food and supplies.) The battalion had experienced the hardest march of its history. The jungle was more difficult than that encountered by the Pilowo column. Moreover, to join the Hill 40 battle it had to abandon trails for cross-country movements. Although the battalion had marched and fought its way forward for ten days it was still in fighting trim. The number of Japs killed and found buried along the trail indicated terrible losses for the Japs. The battalion commander, Major Ralph Pate, attributed the lack of enemy resistance during the past two days to the withdrawal of the enemy. Actually, as he learned later, the 3d Battalion, Jap 211th Infantry Regiment, had been destroyed as a military force. By January 14, when the 136th Regiment was finally withdrawn to the main perimeter, the Americans reported having killed 870 Japanese soldiers and captured 10, suffering 46 men killed and 127 wounded in the process. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. General Krueger's forces captured Palompon, disrupting Japanese plans, while American troops advanced through challenging terrain, overcoming resistance and securing key locations. Japanese forces planned a counter-landing on Mindoro, but faced fierce opposition. Meanwhile, Australians advanced on Bougainville, capturing strategic positions amid heavy fighting.

Last time we spoke about the fall of Ormoc. The Japanese prepared their Wa offensive as General Arnold's troops advanced toward Ormoc. On December 5, American forces engaged in fierce fighting for Hills 918 and 380, facing entrenched enemy positions. By December 6, Japanese troops launched a surprise attack on American camps, but a swift counteroffensive from General Swift helped reclaim the Buri airfield. Despite initial gains, poor weather hindered Japanese reinforcements, allowing American forces to stabilize their positions and push back the enemy. Then the 148th battalion launched an attack on Buri. The advancing American troops faced fierce Japanese resistance, with intense battles over strategic locations like the San Pablo airstrip and Hill 380. Despite setbacks, forces rallied, utilizing effective tactics to outmaneuver the enemy. As reinforcements arrived, the Americans secured critical positions and engaged fiercely in Ormoc, leading to significant Japanese losses. The capture of Ormoc disrupted enemy supply lines, marking a pivotal victory that forced the Japanese to keep sending troops into a deteriorating situation. This episode is the Invasion of Mindoro Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Building on our discussion from last week, there were several other events occurring simultaneously with the fall of Ormoc on December 10. At Buri, following a half-hour of concentrated artillery fire, the 1st Battalion of the 149th Regiment launched a final assault that swiftly cleared the airstrip and eliminated the enemy paratrooper forces. Later that evening, the 3rd Battalion of the 13th Independent Regiment arrived in the area in a disorganized state after a challenging march, and with their last reserves of strength, they attacked Burauen town.  At 19:30 the Japanese launched their final concentrated attack against the airfields. They began to fire at the administration buildings of the Fifth Air Force, and some of the bullets went through the plywood walls of the house of Maj. Gen. Ennis C. Whitehead. "The General ducked a bullet, ordered someone to find out who the blankety-blank was responsible and that he'd blankety-blank better stop or think up a blankety-blank good reason." The air force personnel were pushed back until they reached the hospital, where they halted and held. They then counterattacked and drove the enemy away from the area. The Japanese left thirty of their dead behind them. This marked the retreat of the surviving Japanese forces, indicating the conclusion of the battle for the airstrips. Meanwhile, General Arnold's 7th Division continued its limited offensive through the challenging mountainous terrain, with the 17th and 184th Regiments reaching Malitbog by the end of the day. To the north, General Cunningham's 2nd Squadron, which had been engaged with the bulk of the 102nd Division, was finally relieved by the 2nd Squadron of the 7th Cavalry, initiating their westward movement to rejoin the rest of the regiment at the Leyte River. There, the 126th and 127th Regiments struggled to breach the defenses of the 1st Regiment, while the 5th and 12th Cavalry Regiments made slow progress through the mountains towards Mount Cabungaan, effectively bypassing the Mount Pina position.  In the process of reducing the Japanese-held area, it was estimated that an enemy force of 500 to 600 men had been wiped out. From 28 November to 9 December, the 12th Cavalry remained in the Mt. Badian and Hill 2348 sector, sent out westward patrols, and slowly moved westward. On 10 December, General Sibert decided to have elements of the 1st Cavalry Division debouch from the mountains onto Highway 2 south of the 32d Division and in the Lonoy area. This move was to be concurrent with the expected advance of the 32d Division down the highway. The 1st Squadron, 12th Cavalry, was in the vicinity of Mt. Cabungaan, and the 2d Squadron, on Hill 2348, was 2,000 yards northeast of the 1st Squadron. An enemy strong point existed to the north of the perimeter of the 1st Squadron. The 12th Cavalry spent 10 December in making preparations for a two-squadron assault against this enemy force. The plan was for the 1st Squadron to attack at 0830 while the 2d Squadron from Hill 2348 supported the attack by enveloping the left flank of the enemy. In furtherance of this plan Troop E of the 2d Squadron moved off Hill 2348 at 0800 toward the southwest and dug in for the night just north of Mt. Cabungaan. On the morning of 11 December, an intense mortar and artillery concentration was placed upon the enemy position in front of the 1st Squadron. The fire was so close that fragments frequently fell on the waiting assault troops. After this fire, the 1st Squadron with Troop A in the lead moved out at 0715. At the same time Troop E attacked from the northeast. The enemy defenses consisted of seven or eight pillboxes and many caves dug into the very rugged terrain. The men of Troop A, closely followed by Troop B, charged up the hill "throwing grenades and firing from the hip." The hill fell to the 1st Squadron at 1003 after very heavy hand-to-hand fighting. Troop E had been held up by the terrain and was unable to assist the 1st Squadron. After the capture of the Japanese position, patrols established contact with Troop E at 1200. The regimental reconnaissance platoon returned from the vicinity of Lonoy with the information that the Japanese had prepared strong defensive positions in that area. The platoon had gained a good observation point 900 yards east of Lonoy. The next several days were spent in sending out patrols and moving the 2d Squadron to the position of the 1st Squadron. Meanwhile, on December 9, Admiral Okawachi had launched what would turn out to be his final TA convoy. This convoy, consisting of three destroyers, two subchasers, and six transport ships carrying the Takahashi Detachment and the Ito Naval Landing Unit, departed from Manila on December 9. A day earlier, the Camotes Detachment had also been dispatched individually via landing barges. In light of the recent enemy landings at Deposito, three units were assigned to deploy in Ormoc and support General Tomochika's forces in defending the city. However, by December 11, Ormoc had already succumbed, and the convoy finally arrived in Leyte, where it was immediately targeted by American fighter planes. Near Palompon, two transports were struck and left immobilized, prompting an urgent order for the Takahashi Detachment to disembark there and assist the Camotes Detachment during its landing at Palompon. Meanwhile, two destroyers and two transports carrying the Ito Naval Landing Unit continued to Ormoc, where four American destroyers awaited them. This led to a chaotic battle, as artillery, mortars, tank destroyers, and the destroyer Coghlan opened fire on the transports as they unloaded the SNLF Marines northwest of Ormoc. Consequently, one transport was sunk, and another was damaged, necessitating an escort back to Palompon to offload its remaining cargo. Despite this, over 200 Marines managed to land by nightfall, although they could not connect with the Imahori Detachment situated north of Ormoc.  At 2330 on 11 December the 77th Division beach defense units observed a Japanese convoy, which was transporting the Special Naval Landing Force, steaming into Ormoc Bay with the apparent intention of landing at Ormoc. The Japanese evidently thought that Ormoc was still in their hands. The first craft noticed by the U.S. forces was a landing barge with about fifty men, heading directly for the Ormoc pier. By the time the barge came within range of the shore weapons, all shore units were alert and waited with guns trained upon it. They withheld their fire until the barge was within fifty yards of the pier and then all weapons converged their fires upon the craft. The first rounds squarely hit the barge, which immediately burst into flames. The Japanese clambered atop the gunwales and are reported to have screamed, "Don't shoot," under the mistaken notion that their forces still occupied Ormoc. The harbor was lit up by the burning barge and 60-mm. illuminating shells. During the night the Americans discovered that another enemy vessel, about the size of an LST, had pulled into shore northwest of the town under cover of darkness and was busily engaged in discharging troops and equipment. The tank destroyer guns of the 307th Infantry, emplaced along the beach within 1,000 yards of the vessel, opened fire on it while forward observers from the 902d Field Artillery Battalion directed artillery fire upon the landing area and inland. The enemy vessel attempted to pull out to sea, but after proceeding less than fifty yards it burst into flames and sank. About 150 men, two tanks, a number of rifles, mortars, and machine guns, and a quantity of ammunition had been unloaded before the vessel sank, but most of the supplies, including four ammunition trucks, had been destroyed by American fire while the vessel was unloading. The early dawn of 12 December revealed another ship of the same type farther west near Linao. The artillery, mortars, and tank destroyer guns opened up against this vessel as it fled along the shores of Ormoc Bay, and their fire followed until it was out of range. Before the fire ceased, heavy clouds of smoke billowed from the vessel as it moved at a snail's pace. During the night the American fire had to be closely coordinated, since American vessels, including a resupply convoy, were in the bay. Not a single U.S. craft was damaged. Troops of the Special Naval Landing Force who had disembarked got in touch with Colonel Imahori, who immediately ordered them to go to Highway 2 as the reserve unit of the 12th Independent Infantry Regiment. It was impossible for them to carry out the order, since the 77th Division had advanced north from Ormoc. They thereupon decided to join a naval airfield construction unit at Valencia, but again they failed. In the latter part of December, the men of the Special Naval Landing Force were in the eastern part of the Palompon area without having taken part in the battle for the Ormoc corridor. On the journey back to Manila, the Uzuki was sunk by two PT boats near Leyte on December 12. The rest of the convoy was also assaulted by 46 aircraft off Cebu, leading to the sinking of the Yuzuki and one transport. This incident marked the final TA convoy of the war, as the fall of Ormoc made the operation pointless. Similarly, plans for a counterlanding at Carigara Bay with the 39th Regiment were also scrapped. The nine TA convoys successfully transported an estimated 45,000 men and 10,000 tons of supplies and equipment to Leyte; however, this came at a significant cost. The Southwest Area Fleet incurred losses that included one light cruiser, nine destroyers, three submarines, three subchasers, two frigates, and 26 transports. Additionally, during enemy carrier strikes on Luzon and the Visayas, the fleet lost one heavy cruiser, two light cruisers, five destroyers, one submarine, three subchasers, three frigates, 19 transports, and four oilers. On December 11, General Bruce launched an aggressive defense of Ormoc, planning to advance his troops daily to establish new forts or blockhouses by nightfall until Valencia was secured. Consequently, the 307th Regiment and the 1st Battalion of the 306th Regiment attempted to cross the Antilao River but encountered intense fire and were quickly pinned down. Meanwhile, the 3rd Battalion of the 306th managed to advance despite facing increasing resistance from the Imahori Detachment at Cogon but was ultimately compelled to withdraw due to heavy enemy fire. At the same time, the bulk of the 305th Regiment repositioned to the right of the 307th, while the 17th and 184th Regiments completed their limited offensive, successfully crossing the Talisayan River without opposition and reaching the Binoljo area, with the 2nd Battalion of the 184th advancing to Ipil to establish contact with the 77th Division. At this stage, General Yamagata's units had retreated into the mountains, regrouping north of Talisanyan to initiate their final withdrawal to Ormoc. However, their escape route had been entirely cut off, and they were being pursued from the east by the bulk of General Swing's 11th Airborne Division. As General Gill's offensive progressed, his infantry began assaulting enemy artillery positions in the north. Simultaneously, the 2nd Squadron, 7th Cavalry launched an attack against the 102nd Division units; however, the defenders managed to hold the cavalrymen back at the hill's base. Meanwhile, General Suzuki was hastily retreating toward Huaton, where he was expected to arrive by December 13. His strategy involved waiting for the 5th and 77th Regiments to reach his position before executing a robust counterattack to reclaim Ormoc. The 68th Brigade was tasked with bolstering the beleaguered 1st Division, which had incurred over 3,000 casualties since the start of hostilities. Returning to the frontline developments, the previous day's intense fighting compelled Bruce to solidify his positions on December 12. He organized the delivery of supplies and supporting artillery to bombard enemy defenses while dispatching strong patrols for reconnaissance. At the same time, the 17th and 184th Regiments successfully gathered at the Panilahan River in preparation to reinforce the 77th Division. On the following day, after a significant artillery bombardment, a specialized attack force led by Colonel Paul Freeman, comprising two companies from the 305th Regiment, was dispatched to assault Colonel Imahori's primary blockhouse at Cogon. Meanwhile, the remainder of the regiment targeted other enemy positions along the ridge. While the infantry managed to advance to the ridge, Freeman's companies were unable to progress further, ultimately forcing the 305th to retreat. Simultaneously, the 307th Regiment advanced westward along the Ormoc-Linao road and successfully captured Linao. Although the 77th Division had pushed its western boundary forward by approximately 1,000 yards during the day, the central front lines remained largely unchanged since morning, necessitating General Bruce to launch another attack the following day. Meanwhile, Arnold sent the 32nd Regiment to connect with the 11th Airborne Division to aid in its withdrawal from the mountains.  On the morning of 13 December the 2d Battalion, 126th Infantry, with the assistance of its tanks and heavy mortars, pushed past the Japanese who had held up its advance. In the face of most determined opposition the battalion moved south, destroying the pockets of resistance which had been bypassed. At the end of the day the 2d Battalion had advanced 400 yards to a position 200 yards north of a roadblock set up by the 3d Battalion, 126th Infantry. The 3d Battalion, less Company L, which was to remain on the high ground overlooking the road, was to attack south on the east side of Highway 2 and come abreast of the 1st Battalion, 126th Infantry. At 1521 the 3d Battalion reported that six enemy tanks were coming up the highway. After heavy fighting, the Japanese tanks withdrew at nightfall and returned to the south. The 1st Battalion, 126th Infantry, the southernmost unit of the division, made plans to dislodge the enemy force between it and the 3d Battalion. The contested ground consisted of an open space 600 to 700 yards long and 200 to 300 yards wide, at the southern end of which were two knolls. The 1st Battalion had men on both knolls but did not control the northern end of the sector where the Japanese had dug in and were using machine guns, mortars, and rifles. The 1st Battalion charged against the Japanese and rooted them out with grenades and mortar fire. Except for this action, only slight gains were registered during the day. The men of the battalion were hungry, having been without food since the previous afternoon. The commanding officer of the battalion renewed a request for additional rations and ammunition, since the one-third ration that had been received the day before was insufficient. The 1st and 2d Battalions of the 127th Infantry received orders from the regimental commander to advance south with the 1st Battalion on the left, pinch out the 3d Battalion, 126th Infantry, and link up with the 1st Battalion, 126th Infantry. The 1st Battalion, 127th Infantry, moved out in a column of companies and had advanced 400 yards when it encountered forty to fifty Japanese on a ridge to its front, about 150 yards west of the road. The enemy threw blocks of TNT and grenades against the battalion, effectively pinning down the troops. A night perimeter was established. The 2d Battalion, 127th Infantry, moved abreast of the regiment's 1st Battalion throughout the day. Its advance was bitterly contested by the Japanese, who employed machine guns, mortars, and rifles against the battalion, which dug in for the night under fire. At 1630 the 11th Field Artillery Battalion fired upon fifteen Japanese who were walking along the road south of Lonoy and killed twelve of them. The night of 13-14 December was not quiet. At 2300 an enemy force from the 1st Infantry Regiment broke into the command post of the 126th Infantry. The Japanese set up a machine gun in the area and attacked with grenades and rifles. Bitter hand-to-hand fighting ensued but by 0325 the enemy force was evicted and the area had quieted down. At 0630, with the coming of dawn, the Headquarters Company got things in order and everyone was "happy to hear sound of comrade's voices." Six Japanese were killed and two Americans and two Filipinos wounded. On December 14, nearly all battalions of the 126th and 127th Regiments were actively advancing and maintaining physical contact with one another, successfully pushing over two miles south of Limon. At 0730 on the morning of 13 December, the 2d Squadron, 7th Cavalry, moved out and came under fire from two Japanese machine guns well emplaced on a cliff. The ridge narrowed to ten feet with sixty-degree slopes, making forward passage almost impossible. The troops were pinned down. In the meantime, Troop F of the squadron worked south in an attempt to envelop the rear of the enemy force but was unable to do so and returned. The 2d Squadron established night perimeters near the same positions it had held the previous night. On the following morning the 75-mm. and 105-mm. artillery and the 4.2-inch and 60-mm. mortars began to register heavy fire on the Japanese strong point. At 1200 Troop G of the 2d Squadron jumped off, attacking the enemy position frontally while Troop F moved in from the rear. Employing flame throwers, Troop G steadily pushed forward and by 1445 had knocked out four enemy bunkers and destroyed several machine guns. Of more importance, it was fifty yards beyond the enemy front lines. Troop F also continued to advance. By the end of the day the enemy force had been rooted off the high ground, and the 2d Squadron, 7th Cavalry, was in firm possession of the ridge. The unit captured a quantity of enemy ordnance, including 12 light and 3 heavy machine guns, 9 grenade launchers, and 73 rifles, together with considerable quantities of grenades and ammunition. Before the ridge was secured, "over 5000 rounds of artillery fire had been placed on [the] . . . position without appreciably affecting it." On 14 December, the 12th Cavalry was ordered to continue west to Highway 2 and assist the advance of the 32d Division, to establish a roadblock on the highway, and to attack the hostile forces to the north between it and the 32d Division. In furtherance of this order, the 1st Squadron, less A and C Troops, moved west on 15 December toward a previously reconnoitered area that was about 1,800 yards east of the barrio of Lonoy. This site, a banana plantation, was chosen for its observation facilities to the west and as an excellent dropping ground for supplies. The 1st Squadron, having encountered little opposition, closed on the area before dusk. Thereupon the rest of the regiment was ordered to close in on the area before nightfall on 17 December. At 0930 on 14 December Colonel Freeman prepared his special assault force to renew the attack. Before the jump-off, artillery and mortars laid their fire on the blockhouse and beyond. Under cover of artillery fire the troops cautiously moved out at 1030 with Company L on the right and by 1105 they had advanced 100 yards. Company L knocked out two pillboxes with flame throwers and a tank destroyer gun. Company E found every step of the way contested. The troops used hand grenades and bayonets and literally forced the enemy out of the foxholes in tough hand-to-hand fighting. Capt. Robert B. Nett, the commanding officer of Company E, although seriously wounded, refused to relinquish his command. He led his company forward and killed seven Japanese with his rifle and bayonet. Captain Nett was awarded the Medal of Honor. While Company E was so engaged, Company L on its right advanced through dense foliage and burnt the Japanese out of their foxholes and the bamboo thicket with flame throwers. The company was assisted by armored bulldozers from the 302d Engineers. For a hundred yards on all sides of the blockhouse, the enemy had dug many deep foxholes only a few yards apart. All the foxholes were covered, some with coconut logs and earth, and others with improvised lids of metal and earth. One was protected by an upturned bathtub. The armored bulldozer drove over the positions, its blades cutting off the tops of the foxholes, after which small arms fire into the holes killed the occupants. The crews of the tank destroyers not only fired point-blank at targets but opened the escape hatches and dropped grenades into the foxholes. At 1240 the blockhouse, or what remained of it, was secured. Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion, 305th Regiment executed a flanking maneuver around the blockhouse, subsequently shifting 1,000 yards to the east to intercept the enemy's communication lines along Highway 2. On December 15, the 77th Division consolidated its positions and dispatched small patrols, effectively securing the port of Ormoc. Since the initial landings, the 77th estimated that they had killed 3,046 Japanese soldiers and captured 9 prisoners at the expense of 103 soldiers killed, 318 wounded, and 26 missing. With the 184th Regiment taking over the defense of Ormoc, Bruce's troops were now able to prepare for their advance toward Valencia and beyond, aiming to connect with General Sibert's 10th Corps, which was still making its way southward. However, we must shift our focus from Leyte to address another significant development in the Philippines.  While Admiral Nimitz was strategizing his invasions of Iwo Jima and Okinawa—topics we will delve into further in the future—General MacArthur reluctantly postponed the Mindoro operation until December 15 to give Admiral Kinkaid time to assemble a robust escort carrier group to protect General Dunckel's Western Visayan Task Force during its landing on Mindoro. This group, composed of six escort carriers, three aging battleships, three cruisers, and 18 destroyers commanded by Rear-Admiral Theodore Ruddock, was tasked with safeguarding Admiral Struble's Task Group 78.3, now renamed the Mindoro Attack Group, alongside Admiral Berkey's Close Covering Group, which included three cruisers and seven destroyers. Additionally, Admiral McCain's Task Force 38 was ordered to assist Operation Love with a series of strikes against the main airbases on Luzon. Although the prime airfield locations on Mindoro were situated in the northeast, perilously close to Japanese air concentrations in Luzon, MacArthur chose to establish a beachhead and airfield sites near San Jose in the southwest corner. The 503rd Parachute Regiment was designated to land on the Green and Blue Beaches around the Bugsanga River, while the majority of the 19th Regiment would come ashore at the White Beach near Mangarin Bay. Meanwhile, General Yamashita had been convinced since early November that Leyte would fall, prompting him to strategize for the defense of Luzon. He thought the Americans would try to establish advance air bases in the western Visayas rather than on Mindoro, as the Japanese believed Mindoro had limited suitable locations for operational airfield construction. This belief hindered Yamashita's ability to reinforce either these positions or the already weakened defenses on Luzon, as Field Marshal Terauchi persistently pressured him to send all available reinforcements to Leyte. Realizing he could not engage in a decisive battle on Luzon without substantial reinforcements, Yamashita began planning a delaying defense strategy, where his existing forces would conduct operations aimed at exhausting enemy resources. In preparation for the worst-case scenario, the 14th Area Army started organizing positions for a prolonged defense in the mountainous regions around Baguio and north of San Jose, west of Tarlac, and east of Manila. At this stage, Yamashita had the 61st Independent Mixed Brigade stationed on the Batan and Babuyan Islands, the 103rd Division in northern Luzon, the 58th Independent Mixed Brigade in the Lingayen Gulf area, the 2nd Tank Division near San Miguel-Cabanatuan, the 8th Division in Batangas Province, the 11th Independent Regiment in the sectors around Baler and Dingalan Bay, the 82nd Brigade in the Lamon Bay region, the remainder of the 105th Division in the Legaspi and Naga areas, and most of the 23rd Division in the San Jose and Umingan sectors. In addition, the Manila Defense Force, established on November 1, comprised four provisional infantry battalions and five infantry companies, tasked with defending Manila and the Bataan Peninsula. Furthermore, the 8th Division was charged with the defense of Mindoro; however, the island was only protected by two provisional companies from the 359th Independent Battalion, which were deployed there to bolster the local naval garrisons and air personnel. On December 12, Struble's convoy finally set sail from Leyte Gulf towards Mindoro. Struble's forces steamed on through the Mindanao Sea unmolested until the afternoon of 13 December. Japanese Army and Navy planes had had the three groups under surveillance since 0900, but had not attacked pending receipt of information on the force's destination. In midafternoon ten Japanese Navy planes, including three designated as suicide bombers--the dread kamikazes--flew up from a field on Cebu and found the Allied force off the southeastern corner of Negros Island. Unobserved by lookouts and undetected by radar, which nearby land masses blanketed, one kamikaze flew in low over the water and crashed with a mighty roar on the light cruiser Nashville, Admiral Struble's flagship. Combined explosions from the plane's bomb and ship's ammunition wrecked the flag bridge, the communications office, and the combat information center. Over 130 men were killed outright, including General Dunckel's chief of staff, the 310th Bombardment Wing's commander, Admiral Struble's chief of staff, and Task Group 78.3's communications and medical officers. The wounded, numbering about 190, included Dunckel, who was painfully but not seriously injured and burned. Struble and Dunckel quickly transferred to the destroyer Dashiell, which also took aboard some of the members of both officers' staffs. The rest of the staffs and the wounded sailed back to Leyte on the Nashville, protected by the destroyer Stanly. Later that afternoon, another kamikaze struck the destroyer Haraden, which also had to return to Leyte, resulting in 15 fatalities and 25 injuries. Additionally, Admiral Shima's 2nd Striking Force was instructed to relocate from Lingga to Camranh Bay in anticipation of a potential sortie. Despite this, the Americans continued their advance, and fortunately for them, the Japanese were searching in the western Visayas, causing them to miss the opportunity to attack on December 14. Meanwhile, McCain's carriers launched a significant strike against Luzon, while Ruddock's carriers effectively diverted enemy attention with attacks on air concentrations in Panay and Negros Islands. By late afternoon of the 14th the location of the convoy in the southern waters of Mindoro Strait made it clear that the objective lay beyond the western Visayas. For the first time Fourteenth Area Army estimated that the landing would take place on Mindoro and ordered the 8th Division to alert its outposts there. It was also a serious possibility,, however, that the enemy might strike directly at Luzon. General Yamashita therefore issued a warning to Area Army forces throughout central Luzon. As a further precaution, the Nagayoshi Detachment, which was awaiting shipment to Leyte, and the 71st Infantry Regiment of the 23d Division, which had just reached Manila, were ordered to deploy immediately to Bataan Peninsula and Batangas, respectively, to meet potential enemy landings in those sectors. The Navy and air commands in Manila saw much greater probability of a landing on Luzon than on Mindoro. They therefore directed all subordinate units and installations to prepare for action against both enemy amphibious forces and possible airborne attack groups. Additionally, Army and Navy aircraft were quickly organized to target enemy shipping. Meanwhile, Struble's convoy anchored near San Jose and began preparations for the landings, which would catch the few defenders of Mindoro off guard. As troops transferred to the landing crafts and surface vessels commenced the pre-landing bombardment, McCain's carrier aircraft launched another assault on Luzon, inflicting substantial casualties. Assisted by Ruddock's carriers, they successfully shot down eight out of fifteen kamikaze attackers targeting the shipping off the island. For the loss of 35 aircraft, the Americans estimated they destroyed around 450 Japanese planes during this operation. Nevertheless, the Japanese continued their assault, damaging two LSTs that would later sink, as well as one LSM. In the heroic action, the destroyer USS Moale (DD-693), under the command of Commander Walter M. Foster, went alongside the burning LST-738 (which was loaded with aviation fuel and ordnance) to rescue crewmembers. Several explosions aboard LST-738 caused damage to Moale as she pulled away. Some pieces of shrapnel were two feet square and they put four holes in Moale's hull. Gunner's Mate Ed Marsh reported that a one-gallon jar of vaseline from the LST's cargo splattered on one barrel of his twin 40 mm Bofors AA gun, providing unwelcome lubrication. Moale suffered one fatality and thirteen wounded. In addition, Moale also rescued 88 survivors. Despite this damage, they were unable to prevent the successful landings of the 19th Regiment and the 503rd Parachute Regiment, which quickly unloaded and advanced seven miles inland to secure the objective beachhead line. Consequently, the few Japanese units present in the area were compelled to retreat inland toward Bulalacao. Meanwhile, engineers promptly began construction on the new Hill Drome, which would be completed by December 20. The second Ellmore Field was projected to be ready for limited use three days later and for continuous dry-weather operations by December 28, a week ahead of schedule. On the morning of December 16, a slow-moving tow convoy consisting of small tankers, barges, and LCTs, accompanied by destroyers, arrived off Mindoro after suffering the loss of a small Army tanker that was sunk and a destroyer that was damaged by kamikaze attacks during the journey. Concurrently, McCain carried out his final strike against Luzon, unfortunately resulting in the sinking of the hellship Oryoku Maru, which was carrying 1,620 prisoners of war, with over 200 lives lost. The burden of taking their fellow soldiers' lives would not be the only consequence for the Americans, as the fierce Typhoon Cobra soon battered Task Force 38, sinking the destroyer Spence and damaging nine additional warships. Despite these significant losses, the Mindoro operation was ultimately a complete success. Although MacArthur aimed to launch his amphibious invasion of Lingayen Gulf just 15 days after capturing Mindoro, considerations such as the lunar and tidal conditions at Lingayen Gulf, the necessity to rest and replenish the units of Kinkaid's 7th Fleet, and the ongoing slow progress in airfield construction on Leyte—required for establishing a much larger airbase at Mindoro—ultimately compelled him to delay Operation Mike I until January 9. Conversely, the invasion of Mindoro, signaling that the final advance on Luzon would soon take place, prompted Terauchi to recognize that Leyte was a lost cause. As a result, the decisive battle at Leyte was immediately halted, the 35th Army was instructed to hold the southern Philippines for as long as possible, and the 14th Area Army was ordered to expedite its defensive preparations on Luzon and quickly respond to the enemy landing on Mindoro. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Intense battles unfolded as American forces aggressively pushed back a chaotic Japanese retreat, marking a pivotal moment in the fight for Ormoc, while enemy convoys faced destruction and retreat marked the war's shifting tide. US forces battled fiercely on Leyte and Mindoro, overcoming Japanese resistance and kamikaze attacks to secure key positions for the Luzon invasion.

Bob Brennan Introduces a New AI-Powered Focus for the Podcast This episode marks a major milestone for the Local SEO Tactics podcast. Bob Brennan announces an important transition as he takes sole ownership of the show and unveils an exciting new direction. Learn how the podcast will blend SEO expertise with cutting-edge AI tools to revolutionize your digital marketing strategy. Explore upcoming topics, including AI-powered SEO, chatbots, content creation, and more. Join us as we embrace the future of marketing and help you take your business to new heights. Don't miss this exciting new chapter—subscribe today and prepare to transform your marketing with AI! https://www.localseotactics.com/  

After a 5-year hiatus, The Longest Shortest Time is coming back! We're gonna talk about all things reproductive health: periods, birth control, consent, bodily autonomy, pregnancy, menopause, and so much more — but we can only create a sustainable show with your help. Please join our club, where you'll get to participate in our community AND hear a whole extra show in the LST universe. Listen to this trailer for more info and to hear what Hillary's daughter sounds like now, as a teen (!) ... Follow us on Instagram Website: longestshortesttime.com Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

A daily update on what's happening in the Rocket Pool community on Discord, Twitter, Reddit, and the DAO forum. #RocketPool #rpl #Ethereum #eth #crypto #cryptocurrency #staking #news Podcast RSS: https://anchor.fm/s/cd29a3d8/podcast/rss Anchor.fm: https://anchor.fm/rocket-fuel Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/0Mvta9d2MsKq2u62w8RSoo Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/rocket-fuel/id1655014529 0:00 - Welcome Rocket Pool news 0:38 - Community call with NodeSet and NS chat https://discord.com/channels/968587363536220252/1287508898261241957/1295783514502987807 https://discord.com/channels/968587363536220252/968589754264346664/1295831169514078290 https://discord.com/channels/968587363536220252/968608014116466698/1295898580699189289 https://discord.com/channels/968587363536220252/1164433179092983869/1295905976620159037 https://discord.com/channels/405159462932971535/894377118828486666/1295906759097192541 https://discord.com/channels/968587363536220252/1164433179092983869/1295905976620159037 https://discord.com/channels/405159462932971535/405163713063288832/1296020176063696987 https://discord.com/channels/987570376303341568/987903538334138428/1296043406270664758 https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1-euxJOqFwzbQ7npYfvm2sUZnxbb6G3HgbBnsaePkbV0/edit?gid=66661233#gid=66661233 https://discord.com/channels/968587363536220252/1153574664174579842/1296128737930117120 16:01 - Dev funding vote needs to hit quorum https://vote.rocketpool.net/#/proposal/0x2c1cf6c335ee8f07cc955133b6e0c5f7e6bc3fd0676c4d06d32f678c06ab3a0e 17:16 - Saturn 0 thoughts https://discord.com/channels/405159462932971535/405163713063288832/1295796569857069108 19:43 - 1.13.10 broke Grafana for some https://discord.com/channels/405159462932971535/468923220607762485/1295778880543657984 21:13 - Deposits coming https://discord.com/channels/405159462932971535/405163713063288832/1296125395740917803 24:22 - Hanniabu working on LST dashboard https://discord.com/channels/405159462932971535/1295848930776715357 28:00 - Team prep for Bangkok https://discord.com/channels/405159462932971535/1040445327360139284/1295805190246760449 29:24 - Client update https://github.com/NethermindEth/nethermind/releases/tag/1.29.1 Staking news 31:21 - Nectar announcement https://x.com/nektarnetwork/status/1846210269334175881 In other news 33:15 - Major Firefox bug https://x.com/optimizoor/status/1846328252379566472

In this special Constellation focused episode of Rocket Fuel, Rhett tells us about xrETH, rRPL, what their plans are for the tokens, and the launch date of Constellation. He explains how xrETH will be the best LST on the market, its DeFi integrations, and incentives to mint it. He also explains how xRPL will provide yield for those who do not stake RPL.

Stephen Novenstern, the founder of Kintsu joins the show. In this episode we discuss: Stephen's path to the cryptocurrency industry and the vision for Kintsu, a liquid staking project in the Monad ecosystem. The history of DeFi and the LST category. Why Monad and views on the net new primitives that are enabled by this new layer one blockchain. The future of layer one blockchains. Central limit orderbooks in decentralized finance. To learn more about Kintsu visit their website and follow the project on X.  

Gm! In this episode, Dan Smith from Blockworks Research joined us to discuss L2 MEV extraction, Blockworks Research's Solana Dashboard, and Total Economic Value on Solana! Additionally, we discussed how validators earn revenue from MEV, and supporting small validators. Finally, we unpacked Sanctum's recent LST partnerships, and speculated on whether or not NFTs will ever make a comeback. Enjoy! Resources Blockworks Research Solana Dashboard: https://solana.blockworksresearch.com/ Dan Checks the Chain Part 1: https://x.com/smyyguy/status/1831761080252539182 Dan Checks the Chain Part 2: https://x.com/smyyguy/status/1831803935549747563 -- Follow Dan: https://x.com/smyyguy Follow Jack: https://x.com/whosknave Follow Lightspeed: https://twitter.com/Lightspeedpodhq Subscribe to the Lightspeed Newsletter: https://blockworks.co/newsletter/lightspeed -- Access is the new way to support and consume content from your favorite creators. Over 140 subscriptions to select from, spanning from large crypto media to a long tail of talented independent researchers and artists. No paying for subscriptions. Simply stake, consume, and get rewarded. Claim your free subscription through this link. But be quick there is a limited number available! https://tiplink.io/f/2195-aOAlZYc4ARht#Lhr8-0rBdVrxL94ZjOHwVtwxI2OSal2xw6Sz51lYuzU – Step into MyPrize—the online multiplayer crypto casino that lets you battle your friends and play alongside creators. On MyPrize, you're invited to get rowdy and share every victory and defeat with your pals. Because we know the only thing more fun than beating the house is beating your friends. Get started now with a 150% deposit or purchase bonus: https://myprize.com/invite/Lightspeed -- Subscribe on YouTube: https://bit.ly/43o3Syk Subscribe on Apple: https://apple.co/3OhiXgV Subscribe on Spotify: https://spoti.fi/3OkF7PD Get top market insights and the latest in crypto news. Subscribe to Blockworks Daily Newsletter: https://blockworks.co/newsletter/ -- (00:00) Introduction (03:23) Is MEV Being Extracted on L2s? (15:57) Diving Into the Blockworks Solana Dashboard (24:34) Access Protocol Ad (25:16) MyPrize Ad (25:46) How Do Validators Earn Revenue From MEV? (28:57) Where Should TEV Be Going? (33:44) Supporting Small Validators (42:40) Are Stakers Entitled to a Large Share of TEV? (48:08) Sanctum's LST Partnerships (55:39) Are NFTs Coming Back? -- Disclaimers: Lightspeed was kickstarted by a grant from the Solana Foundation. Nothing said on Lightspeed is a recommendation to buy or sell securities or tokens. This podcast is for informational purposes only, and any views expressed by anyone on the show are solely our opinions, not financial advice. Mert, Jack, and our guests may hold positions in the companies, funds, or projects discussed.

For episode 23 of Crypto Market Wizards, we have Arthur0x from DeFiance Capital to discuss his bull case for DeFi. Both Arthur and I have been calling for a "DeFi Renaissance," but that doesn't mean we are bullish on all of DeFi. We discuss the major coins in each DeFi sector such as lending, spot & perp DEXes, LST/LRT's, and stablecoin projects. I hope you enjoy the episode. This was recorded on August 28th. Crypto Market Wizards is an ad-free and sponsor-free podcast. Guest's Twitter: https://x.com/Arthur_0x Taiki's AAVE thesis: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wmVZPGO1t0c Join the Humble Farmer Army: https://whop.com/humble-farmer-army Free Newsletter: https://hfaresearch.substack.com/ Free Telegram: https://t.me/+3LgpNxIgJ4IzY2Fh Taiki's Twitter: https://twitter.com/TaikiMaeda2 Humble Farmer Army Twitter: https://twitter.com/HFAresearch Taiki's AAVE thesis: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wmVZPGO1t0c PODCASTS: Crypto Market Wizards: https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL6bwqqJO_txgGQySGK5-HSuTPp0LjeGqA Steady Lads: https://www.youtube.com/@0xSteadyLads Taiki is the founder of Humble Farmer Army, a community-driven research company founded in 2021 with a mission to create high-quality, digestible content that helps separate signal from noise for DeFi enthusiasts. Timestamps: 0:00 Why we are bullish DeFi 7:16 Money Markets (AAVE vs Competitors) 11:43 "DeFi coins don't pump" Argument 16:30 LST and LRT's (LDO & LRT's) 25:58 Spot DEXes (Uniswap vs Competitors) 35:28 "Decentralized" Stablecoins (MKR vs Others) 41:18 Rate Cuts and Effects on DeFi 43:26 Perp DEXes (Hyperliquid vs others) 50:29 Vitalik's Stance on DeFi 54:27 Solana DeFi (Jupiter, JTO) 1:00:32 Final Questions & Summary MY VALUES: QUALITY OVER QUANTITY A lot of content creators are incentivized to pump out content for ad revenue. Taiki has never run YouTube ads on his channel because he believes in creating quality content, not monetizing your eyeballs via ads. On top of not running any YouTube ads, Taiki has never participated in a paid promotion, a channel sponsorship, or even a DEX/CEX ref-link. PREMIUM RESEARCH HFAResearch offers a Premium subscription. This is not meant to be a "copy trading" service or a “pump and dump” signal group. Taiki publishes two premium videos and an AMA livestream every week. Think of Taiki as your personal research analyst that keeps you on top of the markets so you can focus on what you do best. You also gain access to a private discord with the largest premium DeFi community. There, Taiki also gives frequent updates as well as real-time analysis on current events in crypto.

Fresh off a very busy last 7 days of racecars in the Northeast, we talk Thompson last week, Bobby and Charlie went to Lee for Ollie Silva night, while Brad went to Stafford. We also talk some Thunder Road happenings, as well as Wiscasset and LST races before we talk this coming weekends Oxford 250 where Bobby and Charlie will both be racing and Charlie will be on the call Friday night and Sunday for SLM competition. Support the Show.

Last time we spoke about invasion of Guam and Tinian. Japanese forces, led by General Obata on Guam and Colonel Ogata on Tinian, prepared defenses with trenches, pillboxes, and artillery. The Americans bombarded these defenses extensively. Despite resistance, they successfully landed on Guam and Tinian, securing beachheads. Intense fighting ensued, with Marines facing heavy casualties. Despite Japanese counterattacks, American forces gradually expanded their footholds, leading to the eventual containment of the Japanese on Orote Peninsula. The Japanese launched a fierce assault against Marine positions on Guam, engaging in close combat with heavy casualties on both sides. Despite initial success, the Japanese offensive was repelled by intense artillery and machine-gun fire, leaving the remaining enemy forces to defend Orote Peninsula. On Tinian, after extensive naval bombardment, Marines landed successfully, repelling Japanese counterattacks and establishing a beachhead. Despite heavy Japanese casualties, the Marines suffered relatively few losses, ultimately breaking the enemy's resistance. This episode is the Battle of Sansapor Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Following the successful capture of Noemfoor and Biak, the Allies possessed ample air and supply bases to advance to the Vogelkop Peninsula, fulfilling General MacArthur's aim of establishing a vital airbase supporting further operations northwestward, potentially towards Mindanao or via Halmahera. Initially considering Manokwari as a non-critical objective, MacArthur's plan centered on seizing Sorong and Waigeo Island for crucial supply and air bases in New Guinea. However, the rapid pace of Pacific theater operations raised doubts about the feasibility of bringing the Klamono oilfields into production before the war's end, prompting the cancellation of exploitation plans by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  The Joint Chiefs assumed responsibility for the direction and coordination of oil rehabilitation projects in the Dutch East Indies and undertook necessary liaison with British and Dutch agencies. By mid-February 1943 they had decided that military units would at least start all oil rehabilitation and exploitation projects in the Indies, although the final development of the oil resources might be left to civilian agencies. MacArthur was instructed to plan the location and timing details of oil rehabilitation projects in the Indies, and, subject to the Joint Chiefs' approval, execute those plans. At the same time, the Joint Chiefs directed that the organization of special military petroleum production and refining units begin. The requisite troops, most of them US Army engineers and many especially recruited from civilian pursuits, soon began to assemble and train in California. Orders were also placed with manufacturers for the special production and refining equipment, which was sent to California as it was obtained. While these steps were being taken to coordinate oil rehabilitation projects, it had become obvious that in accordance with MacArthur's plans the first significant oil producing region that could be recaptured in the Netherlands East Indies would be the Klamono district on the Vogelkop Peninsula. The Klamono oil was especially valuable in that it could be used as fuel for naval vessels without refining beyond a little "topping" to remove excess naphtha. With limited effort, the wells could be expected to bring in some 16000 barrels of crude oil per day; with additional development, about 25000 barrels. Such production would presumably save the Allies considerable shipping space and time, for, instead of the long haul from United States ports, navy bunker fuel could be produced and topped as necessary much nearer to the scene of combat. With the oilfields no longer a priority and aerial surveys indicating unsuitable conditions for airstrips on Waigeo, MacArthur opted for ground reconnaissance of the Mar-Sansapor area. This exploration revealed promising landing beaches and potential airfield sites, albeit requiring significant effort to develop. Consequently, MacArthur directed Alamo Force to secure the lightly-defended Sansapor-Mar area instead of Sorong-Waigeo, scheduling a landing for July 30. General Krueger tasked General Sibert's 6th Division with Operation Typhoon, designating the 20th Regiment at Wakde-Sarmi as reserve and arranging relief by Major-General John Persons' 31st Division. Admiral Fechteler's Task Force 77 had devised a strategy: to deploy Colonel Forbie Privett's 1st Regiment, consisting of the 1st and 2nd Battalions, onto the Red Beaches northeast of Mar. Concurrently, Sibert's 6th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop was tasked with securing Middleburg Island. Following the landings, airfields were to be constructed at these sites. The subsequent phase involved Privett's 3rd Battalion executing a shore-to-shore movement to establish a PT base on Sansapor's Green Beach, scheduled for the day after the initial landings. To set this plan in motion, the 31st Division commenced unloading operations at Maffin Bay on July 14 and successfully relieved Sibert's units four days later. The two regimental combat teams of the 31st Division, the 155th and the 167th, which operated at Wakde-Sarmi had no previous combat experience but received much valuable training in a series of patrol actions, company-sized scouting missions, and battalion reconnaissances in force. General Persons wanted to mount an offensive to drive the Japanese from a main line of resistance which they had established in the low hills between Metimedan Creek and Sarmi, but the demands for labor at the Maffin Bay staging area and the necessity for committing many troops to the defense of that area made it impossible to assemble sufficient strength for such an attack. Then, by the time the 6th Division's requirements had been met, the 31st Division itself had to begin preparations for another operation. The 31st Division therefore had to confine itself principally to its patrolling missions, both west and east of the perimeter. Patrols east of the perimeter were sent out to hunt down stragglers from the Japanese Hollandia garrison, and most of them, comprising armed natives of the Wakde-Sarmi area, were led by a Dutch officer, 1st Lt. C.J. Sneeuwjagt. Meanwhile, work went on at the Maffin Bay staging area; and during the period July 18-August 31 a daily average of 2,500 tons of various supplies was unloaded at the bay. During the same period the 31st Division lost 39 men killed, 195 wounded, 34 injured, and 3 missing. The division in turn killed 294 Japanese, found 497 dead, and captured 14 others. However, the deployment of the 6th Division faced delays due to heavy congestion in the Wakde-Sarmi area. It wasn't until July 27 that Sibert's combat units began departing from Maffin Bay towards Sansapor. Maintaining the element of surprise was paramount to General Krueger, hence no preliminary naval or air bombardment was conducted in the Sansapor-Mar area. Instead, General Kenney's aircraft targeted Japanese bases at Manokwari, Sorong, and the Halmahera-Ceram-Ambon region. To further deceive the Japanese, Fechteler's convoy took a circuitous route to approach Sansapor, apparently arriving undetected around 05:00 on July 30. As anticipated, no opposition was encountered, and the first wave successfully landed at 07:01. While Privett's troops swiftly unloaded on the mainland, one LST proceeded toward Middleburg Island. By 07:30, it began deploying the amtracs carrying the reinforced 6th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, which safely landed by 08:00. Encountering no resistance, the island was promptly secured, and the troop regrouped before setting sail for nearby Amsterdam Island, which was also secured unopposed by 11:30. Upon returning to the mainland, following the incident where three unarmed Japanese were killed, Privett's 2nd Battalion proceeded inland and eastward. They successfully established defenses along low hills roughly 800 yards from the shore. Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion encountered challenges navigating through dense jungle undergrowth. At 07:40, the 3rd Battalion landed and moved west along the beach to the Wewe River mouth, preparing for the next day's advance to Sansapor. By nightfall, all units were ashore, securing the desired beachhead perimeter. The following day, Privett's 3rd Battalion embarked for Green Beach at Cape Sansapor, meeting no resistance upon landing at 08:44. They then proceeded south along the beach to secure Sansapor Plantation and Village by 10:00. While Cape Sansapor proved unsuitable for the planned PT boat base due to reef-bound shorelines and poor beaches, Amsterdam Island emerged as a promising alternative location. Subsequent operations in the Sansapor-Mar area involved patrolling to eliminate scattered Japanese groups, expanding the beachhead, and safeguarding airfield installations. A significant event occurred on August 3 when 92 sick or wounded Japanese and Formosan troops were captured at a Japanese hospital near Cape Opmarai. Concurrently, General Anami acknowledged the untenable positions on the northeastern Vogelkop and General Ikeda's 35th Division abandoned Manokwari on July 16, embarking on a challenging overland march towards Sorong with limited supplies. Around the same time, General Teshima's headquarters at Manokwari and other small garrisons in the region commenced an overland journey to Windehsi. By August 15, as units of the 35th Division approached the Kor River, the 63rd Regiment moved into the vicinity, engaging in skirmishes with retreating Japanese forces. In these encounters, they eliminated 17 enemy combatants and captured 4. By August 31, the 63rd Regiment had further success, neutralizing 155 Japanese soldiers and capturing an additional 42, with minimal losses on their own side: 3 soldiers killed and 4 wounded. Similarly, patrols from the 1st Regiment on the western flank encountered retreating Japanese forces, resulting in the elimination of 197 enemies and the capture of 154, with only 4 soldiers wounded by the end of August. The total casualties for the Typhoon Task Force amounted to 14 killed, 35 wounded, and 9 injured, while they managed to account for 385 Japanese and Formosans killed and 215 captured. Ikeda's division remnants reached Sorong on August 25 after enduring a grueling 40-day march. Additionally, construction of the Middleburg strip was successfully completed by August 14, and the Mar Drome was slated to be operational by September 3 to accommodate Kenney's fighters and medium bombers. Transitioning to Tinian, following the successful landing on July 24 and the subsequent destruction of the Japanese counterattacking force, General Schmidt's primary objectives for July 25 included landing the 2nd Marine Division and expanding the beachhead. While General Watson's Marines disembarked swiftly, General Cates' 4th Marine Division initiated their advance at 10:00. Colonel Jones' 23rd Marines navigated through dense canefields and underbrush along the coast beyond the O-1 Line. Colonel Batchelder's 25th Marines executed an enveloping maneuver against Mount Maga, securing its summit after intense combat supported by mortars and tanks. Colonel Hart's 24th Marines swiftly moved south and eastward, reaching the O-2 Line. Upon arrival, Colonel Wallace's 8th Marines assumed control of the far left flank and proceeded slowly through the rugged coastal terrain and dense undergrowth toward Ushi Point. Following the successful capture of a Japanese stronghold, the Marines advanced unopposed, advancing 200 yards past O-2 swiftly. However, the day brought hardship for the 14th Marines, facing heavy counter-battery fire resulting in the loss of 13 soldiers killed and 22 wounded. Admiral Mitscher's Task Force 58 conducted a reconnaissance-in-force of the western Carolines and launched a third raid on the Volcano-Bonin Islands to thwart enemy bomber interference, resulting in the destruction of five ships, damage to others, and the loss of 13 enemy planes for only 16 aircraft lost. The next day, Schmidt's undermanned divisions, later reinforced with 1782 replacements to fill Saipan-related gaps, commenced the advance to the O-3 Line. While the 23rd Marines steadily advanced with minimal resistance towards the vicinity of the O-4 Line, the bolstered 25th Marines cleared Mount Maga and, securing the summit of Mount Lasso, advanced into the O-4A Line virtually unchallenged. Meanwhile, the 8th Marines rapidly secured the Ushi Point flats and its airfield, Colonel Stuart's 2nd Marines swiftly advanced eastward, securing Asiga Point upon reaching the east coast by 12:30, and Colonel Riseley's 6th Marines, after landing, pushed southward to establish a line abreast of the 2nd Marines. On July 27 and 28, encountering minimal opposition, the Marines advanced southward in a concerted effort, with riflemen in formation and skirmishers leading the way. The NTLF G-2 Lieutenant Colonel Thomas R. Yancey came to a conservative conclusion on July 27 that summarized not only that day's enemy situation but the entire operation's enemy situation as well: “Without saying so, he seemed to indicate the importance of all units conducting aggressive patrolling far to the front: To date there have been no indications that our front line units have encountered the 50th Infantry Regiment in force [since the first night's counterattacks]. It is believed that this unit is largely intact and it is known that they are well equipped and seasoned troops. They are capable of intervention at any time and may be expected to offer a strong opposition when encountered.” In the same report, Yancey noted that the "most likely enemy capability" was: "To fight a delaying action, withdrawing to, and organizing further defenses in, the high ground in the southeastern end of the island." Faced with this enigmatic enemy situation, General Schmidt formulated his scheme of maneuver and assigned his objectives on July 27 and 28 to facilitate an irregular "elbowing" advance. From the front lines held on the morning of July 27, Objective O-4 was near for the 4th Division, far for the 2nd Division; once Objective O-4 had been reached, the emphasis would shift--Objective O-5 would be near for the 2nd Division, far for the 4th Division. The Corps' attack on these two days, then, would find the 2nd Division carrying the ball on July 27, the 4th Division on the 28th. On the first day the 2nd Division would push forward at 07:30, the 4th Division at 10:00; on the second day the 4th Division would attack at 07:00, the 2nd Division at 10:00. Variations in these attack hours were consistent with plans to punch first with the left, then with the right. Principal advantage of this arrangement was that the bulk of the supporting fires could be allotted first to one division, then to the other. Not only did the 14th Corps Artillery mass its fires to support the main effort, but two 105mm howitzer battalions of the division executing the secondary attack were also made available to support the principal thrust in each case.    Despite the gradual progress made by Cates' Marines as they secured key positions on higher terrain, they successfully reached the O-4 Line by the end of the first day. Simultaneously, Watson's Marines made significant strides on more favorable terrain, aided by tanks, covering a distance of 4000 yards to also reach the O-4 Line. The following day, amidst worsening weather conditions, the 2nd and 6th Marines quickly moved forward to secure the O-5 Line. The weather at Tinian had been unpleasant. Nearly every day featured rain squalls, gusty winds, and ominous clouds. And yet, for Jig-Day and three days following, the seas remained calm enough for reasonably convenient shore activities. The "three days of good weather" that Admiral Hill had considered vital had already expired. On the afternoon of 28 July the weather got worse--much worse. This condition resulted from the effects of a typhoon that built up west of the Marianas and sent its swells and winds against Tinian's west coast. The seas surrounding Tinian changed to a dirty gray-blue as the winds mounted and the waves boiled over one another and grew into larger, uglier masses. Surf roaring against the tiny WHITE Beaches and their rocky flanking shelves forced temporary suspension, at 1800 on 28 July, of all unloading over the beaches. On the left flank, after intense artillery bombardment, Cates' Marines swiftly advanced to the O-5 Line, then, supported by naval forces, resumed their march to secure Gurguan Point and its airfield, advancing to the intermediate O-6A Line, with Jones' 23rd Marines covering a total distance of 7300 yards. On July 29, with half of the island under control, Schmidt directed his forces to push beyond the O-6 Line. Accordingly, the 24th and 25th Marines advanced with minimal resistance and reached the O-6 Line. Although Watson's Marines faced initially light opposition, resistance intensified as they crossed the O-6 Line. The 6th Marines managed to secure advantageous positions just shy of the intermediate O-7A Line, while the 2nd Marines encountered opposition around the Masalog Point hill, halting their progress. The next day, Cates' Marines resumed their southward advance, encountering resistance from Japanese machine-gunners and riflemen entrenched in coastal caves. While tanks engaged the enemy, the 24th and 25th Marines surged forward, effectively securing Tinian Town and its airfield, and eventually reaching the O-7 Line. On the right flank, Watson's Marines also pressed southward, with the 2nd Marines swiftly securing Masalog Hill and advancing along the coast despite heavy machine-gun fire, reaching O-7, while the 6th Marines advanced against sporadic resistance, also reaching O-7. Additionally, the 8th Marines took position at the center of the corps' line. With the capture of four-fifths of the island and over 3000 Japanese either killed or captured, Schmidt's Marines successfully pushed the remaining Japanese forces under Colonel Ogata's command into an unnamed ridge between Lalo and Marpo Points at Tinian's southern end. On July 31, following a massive artillery, air, and naval barrage, the Marines launched another assault to the south. The 24th Marines made significant progress along the coast and on less steep cliffs, securing the road to the ridge top. The 23rd Marines faced stiffer resistance but advanced with remarkable discipline, aided by tanks, gaining high ground. On the right flank, the 2nd and 6th Marines advanced against light machine-gun and mortar fire, reaching the intermediate O-8A Line. In the center, the 8th Marines encountered stronger resistance but managed to establish a foothold on the zigzag road to the top. By nightfall, a 600-yard gap emerged between the 8th and 23rd Marines, which the Japanese could exploit. At 23:00, a banzai charge was repelled; however, at 01:00 on August 1, a 150-man force blocked Wallace's rear road and launched an attack. A counterattack force was quickly organized, driving back the enemy. Ogata's final banzai charge at 05:15 was directed at the left of Company E but failed to breach Marine defenses. Both Colonel Wallace and the enemy commander probably still Colonel Ogata had realized the tactical implications of the cliff-line penetration. Both knew that it provided a route over which thousands of Marines could move into the Japanese rear. The two commanders' reactions were classic. As soon as one of his battalions grasped a toe hold, Wallace exploited the success by committing his reserve there. The enemy commander, as soon as he received word of the penetration, ordered a counterattack to throw the Marines off the cliff and restore the position. Each selected a tactically sound course of action. Only one could be successful. At dawn, as the Japanese began to withdraw, Cates' Marines continued the attack southward, with the 24th Marines reaching the O-8 Line at Lalo Point, and the 23rd Marines, after encountering a sheer cliff, retracing their steps to reach the cliffline in front of O-8. On the right flank, the 8th Marines swiftly advanced to O-8A and moved alongside the 6th Marines toward the cliffs overlooking the water. Finally, the 2nd Marines secured the high ground to prevent enemy escape along the east coast. Despite not reaching Marpo Point, organized resistance crumbled, leading Schmidt to declare Tinian secure at 18:55.  Organized resistance had ceased. But on the early morning of August 2, an enemy force–estimated variously from 100 to 250–struck headlong into the command post of the 3rd Battalion, 6th Marines. Headquarters personnel, armed for the most part with carbines and pistols (although two automatic rifles were also used), considered the enemy group very well "organized." Initially, personnel of the aid station bore the brunt, but soon everyone in the headquarters group–clerks, communicators, corpsmen, assault engineers, mortarmen, and staff personnel–rallied behind their commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Easley, to defend themselves. The Japanese, carrying rifles, grenades, and machine guns, hurled themselves at the Marines with characteristic violence. As soon as one fell, another took his place. In search of substantial assistance, Captain John R. Steinstra, Headquarters Company commander, dashed to the nearby Company F, 6th Marines, acquired a medium tank and a rifle platoon, and led them back to the fight. Here was welcome reinforcement to the 3rd Battalion Headquarters Group, which had fought the enemy at close quarters for over two hours. The machine barged into the battle with guns blazing, and the tide turned. The battalion executive officer later stated that he considered the tank's appearance "vitally important" to the outcome. Those enemy soldiers who remained on their feet hastily departed the area. Daylight made results of the enemy effort visible: 119 Japanese bodies lay almost side by side in and around the 3rd Battalion command post. But the Marines had also taken casualties, one of the dead being Colonel Easley. Nearly 400 Japanese perished in the week following the island's capture. From August 7 onward, the 8th Marines conducted cleanup operations on Tinian until January 1, 1945, eliminating an additional 542 Japanese at the cost of 38 killed and 125 wounded. Throughout the Battle of Tinian, a total of 5,745 Japanese were killed and 404 captured, while American losses amounted to 389 killed and 1,816 wounded. Similar to Saipan, around 4,000 civilians either took their own lives or were killed, but unlike Saipan, the majority—approximately 13,000 civilians—were interned.  On April 15, 1944, there were 16,029 civilians residing on Tinian, out of which 1,658, primarily consisting of women, children, and the elderly, were relocated to Japan prior to the American invasion. Approximately 2,610 civilians lost their lives during the conflict. Journalist Robert Sherrod observed that most casualties occurred due to direct combat, as the Americans heavily utilized artillery, aerial bombardment, and naval attacks, often forcing civilians to seek refuge alongside soldiers. Some perished from diseases, thirst, or hunger. Tragically, some were also victims of atrocities committed by Japanese soldiers, such as being tied together and attacked with grenades. Instances of mass suicide occurred, notably at the "Suicide Cliff," where parents threw their children off the 120-foot precipice, and some civilians were pushed by Japanese soldiers. According to a captured Japanese soldier, a large group willingly perished in caves at the military's behest. By August 1, only 2,468 civilians had been documented, but within three days, this number surged to 8,491. The 2nd Marine Division established a camp for civilians at Ushi Point Airfield, while the 4th Marine Division set up another at the ruins of Churo village, which became a permanent settlement for all displaced civilians. By October 15, Camp Churo housed 10,926 civilians, comprising mainly Japanese and Korean nationals, with nearly half being children under 15 years old. The military administration struggled to provide adequate care due to shortages of relief supplies. Seabees oversaw the construction of temporary shelters initially, which were later replaced by more durable structures using salvaged materials. The internees also supplemented their provisions by salvaging food and cultivating gardens, with Seabees stepping in to provide improvised diesel stoves as firewood became scarce. In late 1945, Admiral Spruance, who succeeded Nimitz as CINCPOA, ordered the repatriation of all Japanese and Korean civilians, a process completed by late 1946. Shifting focus to Guam, by July 25, General Geiger's Marines had secured two beachhead areas, with General Turnage's 3rd Marine Division advancing on the Fonte Plateau and General Shepherd's brigade sealing off the Orote Peninsula. Despite a fierce enemy counterattack on both fronts, Japanese resistance was effectively shattered. On July 26, while mop-up operations continued in General Turnage's sector, General Shepherd's Marines prepared to assault Orote. Following coordinated air, naval, and artillery bombardment, the 4th Marines launched their attack at 07:00, making swift progress. However, the 22nd Marines faced delays due to enemy artillery fire, necessitating the 4th Marines to extend their line to cover the exposed flank. Although the mangrove swamp hindered Colonel Schneider's Marines, they successfully cleared the area by afternoon, establishing contact with Colonel Shapley's forces at RJ 15, albeit with a slight eastern bend in their line. Meanwhile, Shepherd's units encountered mines, pillboxes, and bunkers, halting their advance by nightfall. On the morning of July 27th, the offensive recommenced, yet the 4th Marines encountered difficulties in penetrating the robust enemy defenses without tank support. However, once the mines were cleared, the Shermans neutralized enemy positions, enabling the Marines to take control of the ridge ahead, although they couldn't advance further through the coconut grove. Meanwhile, the 22nd Marines, moving alongside Shapley's 3rd Battalion along the inland road, faced delays due to the swamp. They encountered numerous obstacles including pillboxes, trenches, dugouts, and mines near the old Marine Barracks. Remarkably, the determined enemy abandoned their fortified line around 5:00 PM after a substantial bombardment, allowing Schneider's Marines to swiftly advance ahead of the 4th Marines and seize strategic terrain by nightfall. Following another intense bombardment, Shepherd's forces prepared to attack on July 28th. Despite Japanese resistance, Schneider's tank-supported advance reached the O-4 Line by 10:05 AM, creating a significant gap between Marine regiments. Nonetheless, the 22nd Marines persisted, fighting through the Marine Barracks and halting just 100 yards east of Sumay. Meanwhile, the 4th Marines faced slow progress and fierce opposition, stopping within 150 yards of the airfield. On June 29th, Shepherd launched a final assault after yet another heavy barrage, with both regiments successfully advancing the entire length of the airstrip against minimal resistance, establishing a defensive line 150 yards beyond the strip by 2:00 PM. As the 22nd Marines redirected their efforts to clean up the devastated Sumay area, effectively eliminating the last remaining enemy stronghold the next day, the 4th Marines continued their advance northward, with a combined tank and infantry patrol reaching the tip of the peninsula. With the peninsula now under control, the American flag was once again raised over the ruins of the Marine Barracks.General Shepherd proclaimed “On this hallowed ground, you officers and men of the 1st Marine Brigade have avenged the loss of our comrades who were overcome by the numerically superior enemy three days after Pearl Harbor.” Orote saw over 2500 Japanese casualties, while Marine losses amounted to 115 killed, 721 wounded, and 38 missing. Moving northward, following a failed Japanese counterattack, Takashina's forces were preparing to retreat further into the island's interior, but the Americans were relentless in their pursuit. After regrouping and subjecting the enemy to heavy bombardment, battalions from Turnage's regiments launched an assault towards the Fonte Plateau on July 27, albeit encountering stubborn resistance from the still-active enemy. Meanwhile, Colonel Butler's 3rd Battalion successfully advanced to the D-2 Line on the same day. Following successful defense against several small-scale enemy counterattacks overnight, Turnage initiated the main push towards the objective beachhead line on the morning of July 28. The depleted 3rd Marines, with Colonel Craig's 2nd Battalion attached, launched another assault, encountering minimal resistance and securing the D-3 Line by afternoon, thereby completely controlling the abandoned Fonte area. Further bolstered by the 3rd Battalion, 307th Regiment, the 9th Marines made progress in their attack towards the strategic Chachao-Alutom-Tenjo ridgeline, marking a significant initial victory. Simultaneously, the 2nd Battalion, 307th Regiment, supported by units from the 305th Regiment, advanced towards Mount Tenjo from the south. Under the protective cover of artillery neutralization fire, Craig's 3rd Battalion effectively demolished a concrete emplacement at the center of Mount Chachao's summit and swiftly secured the beachhead line adjacent to Mount Alutom. Simultaneously, General Bruce's infantry units swiftly captured Mount Tenjo, with Craig's 1st Battalion joining them by day's end. The 21st Marines faced minimal resistance, eliminating remaining enemy pockets around the radio towers and reaching the designated beachhead line. Thus, Turnage's attack objectives were achieved, extending the beachhead line across the entire front. Additionally, the 21st Marines overran the 29th Division command post near the Fonte River, resulting in Takashina's demise as he supervised his retreating units. Consequently, General Obata assumed direct command of the remaining forces, adhering to Takashina's plan for a strategic withdrawal to Mount Santa Rosa, with delaying positions established at Finegayan and Mount Barrigada. The Japanese launched eleven localized counterattacks against Turnage's beachhead line on July 29, all of which were successfully repelled, inflicting 800 casualties on the attackers. The 3rd Marine Division then focused on consolidation and reorganization for the remainder of the day while rear areas were cleared of enemy presence. In the meantime, as the 306th Regiment secured the unoccupied Mounts Alifan and Taene, Bruce had also dispatched several patrols to the southern end of the island since July 27, successfully discovering by the end of July that the sector had been completely abandoned.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The allies chose to focus on the Vogelkop Peninsula over the Klamono oilfields, as MacArthur's focus shifted to the Mar-Sansapor region for airfield development. The Marines faced a horror show in Tinian but managed to secure her while progress was made on Guam. The Americans were clawing ever closer to the Japanese home islands.

Last time we spoke about beginning of the bombing campaign against Japan. The Japanese 11th Army faced setbacks at Hengyang due to resilient Chinese defenses and supply shortages. Reinforced by General Xue Yue, Chinese forces launched effective counterattacks, regaining some territories before being pushed back. By July 20, the Japanese resumed their offensive but faced heavy resistance and were paused. American air raids on Japan and Manchuria intensified under General Arnold's orders, despite logistical challenges. In Burma, Allied forces under General Stilwell made slow but steady advances, capturing strategic positions and repelling Japanese counterattacks. The Chindits, severely depleted, were eventually evacuated. In Yunnan, Chinese forces encircled and assaulted Japanese positions, achieving significant gains despite heavy resistance and logistical issues.  This episode is the Invasion of Guam and Tinian Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Today our week begins with the ongoings of Operation Forager. By late July, American plans for the invasions of Guam and Tinian were finalized. General Cates' 4th Marine Division was assigned to land on Tinian's White Beaches, while General Geiger's 3rd Amphibious Corps planned two amphibious landings nearly seven miles apart to trap the Japanese in a double envelopment. General Obata, who had relocated his headquarters to Guam, commanded several troops on these islands. On Tinian, Colonel Ogata Keiji's forces included the 50th Regiment, the 1st Battalion of the 135th Regiment, the tank company of the 18th Regiment, and the 56th Naval Guard Unit, totaling 8,039 men. Similar to Saipan, he divided Tinian into three sectors, with most troops defending Tinian Town and Asiga Bay. The 1st Battalion of the 135th Regiment, supported by Ogata's artillery, formed the Mobile Counterattack Force, ready to respond swiftly to landings. This left only Ogata's 3rd Company to defend the northwest coast where the Americans planned to land. Meanwhile, General Takashina's 29th Division was assigned to Guam and reinforced by Major-General Shigematsu Kiyoshi's 48th Independent Mixed Brigade and Colonel Kataoka Ichiro's 10th Independent Mixed Regiment. Takashina's units fortified the landward neck of the Orote Peninsula and established strong positions on the beaches of Agat, Asan, Tumon, and Agaña Bays. The main fortified area ran along the west coast from Tumon Bay to Facpi Point and included, of course, Orote Peninsula. Other fortified beaches, on the south and east coasts from Merizo to Pago Bay, had been abandoned before W Day, their defenders having moved to the north. Outside the main fortified area, the airfields were provided local defense by anti-aircraft and dual-purpose guns. The most notable and certainly the most effective fortifications on the island were constructed across the neck of Orote Peninsula, which contained a fairly elaborate system of trenches and foxholes arranged in depth, together with large numbers of pillboxes and heavy-caliber weapons. Outside of Orote, the prepared defenses were generally hastily constructed and often incomplete. The typical beach defense was arranged, from the seaward side, in four parallel lines: first were obstacles and mines on the fringing reef offshore; second came beach obstacles and tank traps; third were trenches, machine-gun positions, pillboxes, heavy weapons, artillery, and coast defense guns on the beaches or immediately inland; and, finally, came the machine-guns, heavy weapons, and artillery emplaced on the high ground inland. Insufficient advantage was taken of the high ground, and except on Orote little provision was made for defense in depth. Even as late as the five-week period of pre-invasion bombardment, the Japanese continued to work frantically on improving offshore obstacles and beach defenses, to the neglect of positions in the rear.They also had three tank companies in reserve to strike the beachhead alongside the infantry. Additionally, the 54th Naval Guard Unit, equipped with coastal defense and anti-aircraft guns, secured many positions with reinforced concrete. The Japanese set up specific defense sectors on this island. Shigematsu's brigade and Colonel Ohashi Hikoshiro's 18th Regiment held the Asan Beaches and the Agaña and Tumon Bays. Colonel Suenaga Tsunetaro's 38th Regiment defended the Agat Beaches, while Kataoka's forces manned the southern defenses. Additionally, Takashina had a mobile reserve behind the Fonte Plateau, which included five infantry companies, one naval unit, and one tank company. Only Ohashi's 2nd Battalion was positioned at Guam's northern end, while Kataoka's 1st Battalion was deployed to Rota Island. The Americans conducted the longest preliminary air and sea bombardment of the war against Guam, beginning on June 16 after the invasion of Saipan. This bombardment intensified after July 8, when American warships launched the greatest single naval bombardment program of the war, coordinated with Admiral Mitscher's carrier aircraft. Over the next 13 days, a total of 836 rounds of 16-inch, 5422 of 14-inch, 3862 of 8-inch, 2430 of 6-inch, and 16214 of 5-inch shells were fired at Guam's main defenses.  At the invasion of Roi-Namur Admiral Conolly had earned the sobriquet "Close-in Conolly" for his insistence that warships cruise close to shore when firing at land targets. At Guam, he reaffirmed his right to the title, but more important was the systematic procedure he introduced for coordinating naval gunfire and aerial bombardment and checking the results of each. A target board of six officers, representing the air, gunnery, and intelligence sections of the staff, was set up to assign primary missions for air strikes and naval gunfire and assess the damages daily before designating the next day's targets. Aerial photographs were taken each morning and on the basis of these damage was assessed and new targets were assigned. In these operations, the admiral's staff was aided by the presence aboard Appalachian of General Geiger who, as commanding general of the landing force, naturally had the greatest personal concern about the accuracy both of the bombardment and of the damage reports submitted afterward. In the final three days before the landing, Mitscher's planes conducted 1430 bombing sorties and 614 strafing attacks, dropping a total of 1131 tons of bombs, depth charges, and rockets, while losing only 16 aircraft. Despite the extensive bombardment, positions reinforced with coral and concrete remained in good condition. Anti-aircraft artillery and harbor installations suffered minimal damage, power installations in caves were unharmed, and communications were not interrupted. The intensity of the attacks on the western defenses suggested a likely amphibious landing there, prompting Takashina to abandon the ineffective southern and northern defenses. Meanwhile, Conolly's vessels, carrying Geiger's Southern Landing Forces, departed Eniwetok for Guam between July 11 and 18, arriving successfully by July 21. Between July 14 and 17, three underwater demolition teams scouted the landing beaches, and under the protection of LCI gunboats, they removed 640 obstacles from the Northern Beaches and 300 from the Southern Beaches. On the morning of July 21, in excellent weather conditions, the Americans began a preliminary bombardment. Admirals Conolly and Reifsneider directed the shelling of Asan and Agat beaches, respectively, while Admiral Mitscher's carrier aircraft bombed and strafed the fourteen miles of coastline from Agaña to Bangi Point. At 07:40, the assault waves crossed their departure lines under the cover of rocket fire from LCI gunboats. Eight minutes before landing, when the vehicles were 1200 yards from shore, Conolly's warships launched a final massive bombardment, and Mitscher's fighters provided covering strafing attacks. These attacks were to be shifted inland as the troops approached the shore. Despite the intense bombardment from ships and aircraft, the Japanese managed to target the assault waves, destroying nine amtracs from the 3rd Marine Division. Nevertheless, the waves of vehicles advanced, and at 08:28, the first LVTs landed, two minutes ahead of schedule. Further south, shore fire was even heavier, hitting one LCI gunboat and destroying 13 amtracs. However, the landing formation held, and the troops landed on schedule. Despite numerous concrete pillboxes still manned by the Japanese, both assault regiments advanced rapidly. Colonel Merlin Schneider's 22nd Marines successfully captured Agat amid strong resistance but were eventually halted at a hill position northwest of the town. Meanwhile, Lieutenant-Colonel Alan Shapley's 4th Marines cleared Bangi Point and Hill 40, setting up a roadblock supported by five tanks on Harmon Road. By the end of the day, General Shepherd had established a beachhead approximately 1300 to 2300 yards deep, at the cost of around 350 casualties and 24 lost LVTs. At 08:30, the infantrymen of Lt. Col. Robert D. Adair's 2nd Battalion were climbing down cargo nets from their transports into the bobbing landing craft that were to carry them to the edge of the reef. By 10:30 all boats were in position near the line of departure waiting for the signal to go in. For three and a half hours they circled impatiently. At last, at 14:05, came the message to proceed to the beach and assemble in an area 300 yards inland from Gaan Point. Unfortunately, no amphibian tractors were on hand to transport Adair's men over the reef and onto the shore line, and of course their LCVPs were too deep-drafted to negotiate either the reef or the shallow waters inland of it. Over the sides of their boats the men climbed, and waded the rest of the way in water at least waist deep. Some lucky few were able to pick up rides in Marine LVTs on the landward side of the reef, but most stumbled in over the rough coral bottom, cutting their shoes en route and occasionally falling into deep potholes. Luckily, no enemy fire impeded their progress, and except for the dousing they got and the exhaustion they suffered the troops of the 2nd Battalion, 305th Regiment completed their ship-to-shore movement without injury.To the north, Colonel Edward Craig's 9th Marines advanced steadily against fairly heavy machine-gun and rifle fire, securing a beachhead about 1500 yards deep. Colonel Arthur Butler's 21st Marines, facing only moderate opposition but difficult terrain, cleared Asan Town and gained a foothold on the face of the Fonte Plateau. On the left flank, Colonel William Hall's 3rd Marines encountered the heaviest resistance from two complex cave defense systems on Chonito Cliff and Bundschu Ridge. Hall's men cleared Chonito Cliff and Adelup Point after several costly assaults and heavy casualties, but progress against Bundschu Ridge was limited, resulting in a 200-yard-wide gap between the 3rd and 21st Marines. Nevertheless, General Turnage secured a beachhead approximately 1600 by 4000 yards and had landed all division infantry, artillery, and support units, at the cost of 105 killed, 536 wounded, and 56 missing. Upon receiving the alert of enemy landings, Takashina promptly mobilized his reserve units to the Fonte Plateau in an attempt to contain Turnage's Marines within their limited beachhead. Throughout the night, he initiated several fragmented counterattacks, all of which were easily thwarted, resulting in significant Japanese casualties. In the southern sector, the 4th and 22nd Marines heroically fended off numerous well-coordinated counterattacks, managing to destroy four enemy tanks and eliminate Colonel Suenaga along with his 38th Regiment. By July 22, Geiger's forces began to expand their footholds on the beaches. In the northern front, Hall's assault on the Bundschu Ridge faced formidable resistance. Despite some Marines reaching the ridge with support from 20mm and 40mm fire, they were compelled to withdraw due to intense mortar shelling. Unbeknownst to them, their relentless attack forced the Japanese to abandon the position, albeit at a significant cost to the 3rd Marines, which suffered up to 615 casualties and was unable to sustain the advance. Meanwhile, Butler's 21st Marines encountered difficulty clearing the ravine separating them from the 3rd Marines, necessitating the deployment of their reserve 1st Battalion to support the depleted 2nd Battalion. On the right flank, Craig's 9th Marines encountered minimal resistance as they swiftly secured the Piti Navy Yard, followed by the landing of the 3rd Battalion on Cabras Island after extensive naval and aerial bombardment. The only significant engagement during the night was a Japanese bayonet charge backed by mortar fire, which Butler's 1st Battalion successfully repelled, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy. To the south, following the night landings, the 305th Regiment underwent reorganization while Tanzola's 2nd Battalion relieved Shapley's 2nd Battalion. Schneider's 22nd Marines encountered moderate resistance as they moved northward after crossing the Ajuya River. Despite lacking tank support, they advanced until halting approximately 250 yards north of RJ 5. Simultaneously, Shapley's 4th Marines launched an assault towards Mount Alifan's steep slopes, successfully neutralizing entrenched enemy positions using demolitions and grenades, though hindered by rugged terrain. Eventually, a platoon reached the summit, finding no enemy presence. Tanzola's 1st and 3rd Battalions then advanced along Harmon Road towards the Maanot Pass, navigating eroded hills and dense vegetation to secure the O-a high ground line.  The 306th Infantry Regiment's landing on the White Beaches required the entire day because of communications problems and landing craft shortages. It was not until the next day that the 4th Marines was fully replaced by the 306th. 3rd Amphibious Corps Artillery was landing over White 1 at this same time, as was the 77th Division Artillery, leading to a great deal of congestion, especially when coupled with the landing of smaller units, supplies, and ammunition. Most artillery battalions were in-place by nightfall as was the 9th Defense Battalion deployed along the beaches. The defense battalions, besides providing air defense and direct fire support on ground targets, were positioned to engage any Japanese counter-landing attempts on the beachhead. The 77th Division, with the 305th on the right (center of the beachhead) and the 306th on the left, would secure the southern portion allowing the 4th Marines to move north with the 22nd Marines to seal off the neck of Orote Peninsula. They continued their advance beyond Harmon Road and Maanot Pass, securing commanding positions overlooking Orote Peninsula. Meanwhile, Schneider's 22nd Marines, initially advancing rapidly against scattered resistance, encountered intense enfilade fire from hills surrounded by rice paddies while attempting to maneuver across the neck of Orote Peninsula. This compelled them to withdraw approximately 400 yards to a line of hills south of Old Agat Road. Further to the north, Hall's 3rd Marines eventually discovered that the Bundschu Ridge had been deserted. However, following their clean-up operations, they were not in a condition to advance any further. Craig's 3rd Battalion successfully secured Cabras Island and then relieved the 2nd Battalion on the mainland. Meanwhile, Butler's 21st Marines faced challenges in bridging the gap with the 3rd Marines and encountered limited progress against well-fortified enemy pillboxes on the plateau's slopes. Turnage initiated the first contact attempt with Shepherd's brigade on July 24th, but the 30-man patrol was forced to retreat due to enemy fire. Despite Butler's 2nd Battalion's efforts to close the gap by attacking up the ravine, they were repeatedly hindered by heavy machine-gun fire from caves on the cliff sides. Although both the 3rd and 9th Marines managed to enhance their positions, Turnage's casualties rose to 2034 since the initial landing. Further south, Shepherd, in response to the formidable defense on the neck of the Orote Peninsula, instructed Schneider to advance the 1st and 3rd Battalions in company columns along the Agat-Sumay Road. The objective was to penetrate the enemy lines and seize the O-2 Line from the coast to Apra Harbor, while the 2nd Battalion shifted to occupy strategic high ground near Atantano from its position on the Old Agat Road. This maneuver not only flanked the Japanese strongholds guarding the rice paddies but also established a barrier across the neck of Orote, securing the beachhead line in front of the brigade. Following an extensive air, artillery, and naval bombardment, Schneider's primary thrust along the Agat-Sumay Road encountered determined resistance but successfully advanced to the R-2 Line. The 1st Battalion then spread out to the right, while the 3rd Battalion veered further east across the hills, swiftly capturing the fortified positions around the rice paddies that had posed significant challenges the previous day. By nightfall, the 1st Battalion had reached the O-2 Line, but the 3rd Battalion halted 400 yards short of its target, prompting Shapley's 2nd Battalion to fill the breach between them. After repulsing a vigorous counterattack, the 2nd Battalion pushed forward with minimal opposition and secured Atantano. Consequently, by the end of July 24, Shepherd had firmly established his beachhead and contained the enemy on the Orote Peninsula, albeit with casualties totaling 200 killed, 748 wounded, and 97 missing. General Bruce, with the remainder of the 77th Division, assumed control of most of the beachhead perimeter, while Shepherd's Marines readied for the capture of Orote. Subsequently, after repelling several tank-led counterattacks resulting in the destruction of 12 Japanese tanks, they sealed off the peninsula entirely on July 25. By afternoon, approximately 2500 troops under Commander Tamai Asaichi were confined to the eight square miles of Orote Peninsula. Meanwhile, Turnage pressed his forces to secure the objective beachhead definitively. Accordingly, the 9th Marines progressed southward along the Apra Harbor shoreline towards the Aguada River, reaching the midpoint before being compelled to retreat to the Laguas River due to Craig's stretched lines. Meanwhile, the 21st Marines faced formidable defenses at the Mount Chachao-Aluton-Tenjo complex, managing to establish defensive positions just shy of Mount Tenjo Road after slow progress. Simultaneously, the beleaguered 3rd Marines, with reinforcements from Craig's 2nd Battalion, launched a determined assault, overcoming moderate resistance and mortar fire to seize Mount Tenjo Road and gain a vantage point. Despite the extended frontline, troops stationed on the newly captured high ground could finally survey the terrain ahead by nightfall. As Takashina consolidated his forces on the plateau, he prepared for a coordinated counterattack aimed at dividing and conquering the enemy. The 48th Independent Mixed Brigade planned to strike Turnage's left flank before pivoting northeast to target Hall's rear. Meanwhile, the 18th Regiment aimed to assault Butler's positions and advance toward the coast to establish a new defensive line, targeting the enemy's headquarters, artillery, and supply units. Additionally, elements of the 10th Independent Mixed Regiment were tasked with exploiting an 800-yard gap between the 9th and 21st Marines, protected only by the 3rd Reconnaissance Company. In a desperate move following a failed attempt to evacuate by barge, Tamai opted for a nighttime banzai charge with his trapped 2500-strong force, seeking to break free from the Orote Peninsula and join Takashina's troops at Fonte. After dusk, the intermittent showers that had been falling all day became more frequent. A heavy downpour hampered organization of the brigade's defense for the night. On the other hand, the pitch blackness and the unpleasant weather aided the Japanese in making preparations for their supreme effort. Marines in the front lines could hear screaming, yelling, laughter, and the breaking of bottles as the Japanese made final arrangements. At times so much clamor could be heard that reports reached the command post that the assault had started. Afterwards someone aptly said that the confusion "sounded like New Year's Eve in the Zoo." While the enemy made ready and drank, Marine artillerymen laid down normal barrages along the swamp's edge and at all other points of possible penetration. Shortly before midnight the Japanese commanders felt that their men had reached the proper emotional state, and the assault began. Sake-crazed attackers swarmed from the cover of the mangroves in front of the 3rd Battalion, 22nd Marines. Led by flag-waving, sword-swinging officers, the enlisted men stumbled forward, carrying everything conceivable. Unsteady hands clutched pitchforks, sticks, ballbats, and pieces of broken bottles, together with the normal infantry weapons. The assault faced formidable resistance from Marine forces, particularly Shapley's 1st Battalion, which alone accounted for 256 enemy casualties.  When the surging Japanese mass came within range, Marine forward observers and company commanders gave the order to commence firing. Brigade, 77th Division, and corps artillery, 37mm guns, 81mm and 60mm mortars, machine guns, rifles, and grenades saturated the entire area. At one time officers brought the fire of the Pack Howitzer Battalion, 22d Marines, to within 35 yards of 3/22's front lines in an at tempt to stop the swarming horde. One weapons company lieutenant reported: "Arms and legs flew like snowflakes. Japs ran amuck. They screamed in terror until they died." But in a powerful attack it is inevitable that some men will seep through the blocking fire. Company L, 3/22, received the brunt of the subsiding attack and repulsed it before too much damage could be done. Those Japanese who survived fled to the momentary safety of the swamp. But observers shifted the artillery fire and between midnight and 0200 some 26,000 shells took a heavy toll of the remaining peninsular defenders. On the right flank of the 22d Marines a second counterattack hit. The Island War describes the action quite vividly: “. . . At its height, flares revealed an out-of-this-world picture of Nipponese drunks reeling about in our forward positions, falling into foxholes, tossing aimless grenades here and there, yelling such English phrases as they had managed to pick up, and laughing crazily, to be exterminated in savage close-in fighting. Succeeding waves were caught in a deadly cross-fire. Not until dawn did this attack finally dwindle out, at which time more than four hundred bodies were counted in front of the position.” In contrast to the frenzied close quarter action in the 3/22 zone, the platoon from Company A (1/4) that filled the gap between the two regiments participated in a shooting gallery affair with the Japanese. Enemy troops made no attempt at a concerted attack, and the platoon plus artillery, without the loss of a single Marine, killed 256 Imperial soldiers. This fantastic figure was verified by officers from regiment the following morning. Despite the intense machine-gun and artillery fire, some Japanese managed to infiltrate Marine positions, engaging in fierce hand-to-hand combat. However, by dawn, the Japanese offensive had been halted, with most remaining enemy forces eliminated, leaving Tamai with no option but to defend Orote Peninsula to the end. Meanwhile, Takashina's main assault, launched on July 26 at 04:00, faced initial success in overrunning Company B positions but was ultimately contained by the relentless machine-gun fire of the 1st Battalion.  Major Maruyama's men (2/18) advanced noisily, shouting, "Wake up American and die." The initial impetus of the assault passed completely over Company B in the center, previously reduced to about 50 men, and streamed through the gap down a draw toward the cliff. Despite the breakthrough, companies held the shoulders of the penetration and Lieutenant Colonel Williams ordered the units to refuse their flanks to the cliff. Company A on the left, commanded by Captain William G. Shoemaker, rallied in the face of the withering fire and overwhelming numbers. Shoemaker pulled back his right platoon to deny his flank to the enemy and to permit regrouping for a local counterattack. Company C (Captain Henry M. Helgren, Jr.) also successfully refused its flank to protect the position and immediately began firing into the onrushing Japanese. Tanks parked in the rear of the Marine positions took a great toll as the intruders surged through the widening gap. One report described the rush on the tanks as resembling a horde of ants. It went on to say of the Nipponese: “Savagely they swarmed upon the mechanized vehicles, oblivious of the vicious machine-gun fire, and frantically pounded, kicked, and beat against the turrets in an attempt to get the crew within. When this seemed futile they leaped to the ground and continued their wild rush down the draw to the rear areas. . .” Demolition charges were forgotten in the mad scramble to reach deeper into Marine-held territory. Machine gunners of 1/21 had a field day. Never had they seen such lucrative targets, but grenades and bayonets soon silenced the Marines as enemy soldiers overran the gun positions. Many of the Japanese were killed as they moved through the lines and into the ravine. Although some of the infiltrating Japanese got down the cliff to attack the battalion command post and Butler's mortar platoons, killing most of the mortarmen before being repelled by service troops, To the left, Craig's tenacious 2nd Battalion, in its exposed position, received the brunt of Shigematsu's attack, yet it managed to defeat seven determined counterattacks without losing any ground. Nonetheless, though they killed 950 Japanese, they suffered 50% casualties as well. Looking right, Ohashi's 3rd Battalion hit Butler's 3rd; and although two machine-guns were initially captured, their attack ended up being rapidly repelled. Consequently, the Japanese slid along the front and attacked down the vulnerable 800-yard gap, successfully defeating a strong roadblock to set up a dangerous line on the high ground behind Butler's 3rd Battalion.  The lack of a swiftly organized regimental reserve line led to approximately 70 Japanese infiltrating into the Division Hospital area, where they were eventually repelled by a pioneer force. The first warning came about 6:30 when corpsmen reported that a number of enemy soldiers could be seen on the high ground to the right of the hospital. Division headquarters immediately ordered Lieutenant Colonel George O. Van Orden (Division Infantry Training Officer) to take command of two companies of pioneers standing by for just such an eventuality and clear the enemy from the hard-pressed area. At the hospital, doctors ordered patients to evacuate the tents and go to the beach. Onlookers saw a pathetic sight as half-clothed, bandaged men hobbled down the coast road helping the more seriously wounded to safety. 41 of the patients grabbed rifles, carbines, hand grenades, and whatever else they could find and joined the battle. The hospital doctors, corpsmen, and pajama-clad patients presented a rare sight as they formed a defensive line around the tents. It was a solid line, however, and one that held until the recently organized reinforcements arrived. Only one patient was wounded during the fighting, but one medical officer and one corpsman later died of wounds. The casualty list also included one medical officer, one dental officer, one Navy warrant officer, 12 corpsmen, and 16 Marines from the medical companies wounded in action. This does not include those casualties suffered by Van Orden's force. After cleaning out the assigned area, Van Orden proceeded up the Nidual River Valley in pursuit of the fleeing Japanese. The attack had pushed the enemy back to the hill at the head of the ravine by 11:00, but a request to send a Marine patrol to the ridge to determine the hostile strength was denied. Other plans had already been made for the assault of this dominating terrain. It was from this high ground that Major Yukioka's men paralyzed the operation of 3/21's CP and threatened the flank of both the 9th and 21st Marines. While this action was taking place, the 12th Marines CP and several of its battalions were engaged in stopping the suicide squad attacks. In order to have these parties in position to make their foray in conjunction with the all-out offensive, enemy commanders had ordered the groups to infiltrate behind Marine lines on the night of 24-25 July. With typical Japanese patience, the raiders lay hidden in caves all day. As soon as darkness came on the night of 25-26 July they started firing random shots into the headquarters of the 12th Marines and began to move in small groups down the Asan Valley. A hand grenade duel went on during the early hours of darkness, but some of the intruders sought the safer confines of a cave not 20 feet from the headquarter's fire direction center. The artillerymen's perimeter defense held, and only one of the enemy succeeded in getting through to the guns. He was killed in the 3d Battalion's area before he could do any damage. In the five-hour long fighting around the regimental headquarters, 17 explosive-laden Japanese died. Most of them carried packs containing about 20 pounds of TNT with ready detonators, while others carried magnetic mines. With the coming of daylight, patrols went out to clean up any troops that might cause trouble later in the day. Men of the 12th Marines killed approximately 50-60 more enemy soldiers and drove the remainder into other areas where they were liquidated one by one. Despite the initial success of Takashina's well-coordinated counterattack, by noon, his forces had suffered defeat, marking the breaking of the backbone of Japanese resistance on Guam. Marine casualties were significant, with around 166 killed, 645 wounded, and 34 missing between July 25 and 27. Consequently, the 9th Marines retreated approximately 1500 yards to establish better defensive positions, and a battalion of Colonel Stephen Hamilton's 307th Regiment was deployed near Piti Navy Yard. However, the focus now shifted to covering the invasion of Tinian. While naval guns had intermittently harassed Tinian since June 11, the preliminary bombardment of Saipan's sister island commenced on June 20, with the first Army artillery battery targeting northern Tinian. By July 9, the 531st Field Artillery Battalion had fired a total of 7571 rounds. Following the fall of Saipan, the remaining 24th Corps Artillery and Marine howitzers intensified the bombardment, maintaining a continuous round-the-clock schedule and expending a total of 24,536 rounds on northern Tinian. For the most part, 14th Corps Artillery confined its efforts to the area north of the line between Gurguan Point and Masalog Point, while aircraft restricted their efforts to the southern half of the island. Naval ships were assigned any targets on Tinian deemed unsuitable to either of the other two arms. Coordination of the three supporting arms was assigned to the corps artillery representative attached to General Schmidt's staff. In one instance, an artillery air observer discovered three 140-mm. coastal defense guns on Masalog Point that were within easy firing range of White Beaches 1 and 2, but were masked from field artillery. The battleship Colorado was called in and, with its main batteries adjusted by an airborne artillery observer, succeeded in neutralizing or destroying the enemy weapons. Because the spotting plane was not in direct radio contact with the ship, it was necessary for the plane to submit its spotting data to the artillery post by radio, whence they were relayed by telephone to General Schmidt's headquarters, and in turn by radio on another frequency to the firing ship. In spite of this somewhat complicated system of communications, the time lag was so slight as to be insignificant. Meanwhile, starting from June 22, the P-47s belonging to the 318th Fighter Group maintained a relentless barrage on the airfields at Ushi, Gurguan Point, and just east of Tinian Town through constant strafing and bombing, further devastating the town to ruins. Beginning on July 15, naval gunfire operations were reinstated, with Admiral Hill's cruisers and destroyers delivering destructive bombardment daily against Tinian's harbor defenses. Then, on July 22, two P-47s dropped the first napalm bombs used in the Pacific war on Tinian, proving highly effective in incinerating canefields, underbrush, and enemy personnel located in open trenches and dugouts. The following day, Hill intensified preparatory fire with a formidable naval force comprising three battleships, two heavy cruisers, three light cruisers, and sixteen destroyers, positioned strategically to shell Tinian from all directions. However, there was no attempt to focus on the White Beaches to mislead the Japanese about the actual landing point. Throughout the rainy night, destroyers and cruisers maintained control over crucial road junctions while an UDT conducted a last-minute underwater reconnaissance, albeit unsuccessfully attempting to detonate recently discovered mines due to adverse weather conditions. At dawn on July 24, Hill's transports carrying the 2nd and 4th Marine Divisions finally departed from Tanapag Harbor for the short journey to Tinian, successfully reaching their designated areas by 06:00. Simultaneously, the onslaught of artillery, air raids, and naval bombardment persisted over the Japanese defenses, intensifying into a full-scale onslaught by 07:00, with particular focus on the White Beaches. Additionally, efforts were made to neutralize mines on White 2, although these attempts proved futile. As the assault waves took shape, General Watson's Marines effectively executed the demonstration near Tinian Town without suffering any casualties. This demonstration effectively held the defenders in place, preventing them from deploying northward. However, a cleverly concealed Japanese battery managed to inflict significant damage on the battleship Colorado and the destroyer Norman Scott, resulting in the loss of 62 lives and 245 wounded before being neutralized. At 07:17, the initial landing wave crossed the designated line and began the 3000-yard journey to the beach, supported by intense pre-landing bombardment and rocket fire from LCI gunboats.  At about the same moment small-caliber fire--estimated variously as 50-caliber, 20mm and 40mm--began falling around the LST's. Its source could not be located because of the pall of smoke and dust that cloaked the island. Regarding this incident the logistics officer of the 2d Battalion, 23d Marines, aboard one of the LST's in the area, recalled: “The fire . . . wounded two or more Navy enlisted men of the crew of the vessel, and possibly a couple of Marines belonging to the landing team. . . . My recollection concerning the Marines who were wounded is hazy . . . the incident created a stir and speculation concerning the source of the fire, but everyone soon settled down to the business at hand.” Despite encountering the sporadic small-caliber fire, the LVTs successfully reached the narrow beaches by 07:50. Upon landing, Company E of the 24th Marines swiftly engaged and eliminated a small beach-defense unit on White 1, while the remainder of the battalion made landfall. On White 2, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 25th Marines landed simultaneously but faced a delay in advancing due to the need for engineers to clear 100 horned mines that had destroyed three LVTs. Subsequently, Colonel Batchelder's Companies G and I circumvented two enemy blockhouses and initiated an inland attack, while other units subdued strongpoints. However, the presence of additional mines and staunch resistance from caves and ravines prevented them from reaching their objective at the O-1 Line and Mount Maga. Meanwhile, Colonel Hart's 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 24th Marines successfully advanced to the O-1 Line amid minimal opposition. Later in the day, reserve and artillery battalions were landed, along with Colonel Jones' 23rd Marines, although their landing was delayed due to communication issues. This delay proved beneficial due to heavy congestion on White 2 at the time. By nightfall, Colonel Wallace's 1st Battalion, along with the 2nd and 4th Tank Battalions, under Hill's command, successfully disembarked 15614 men ashore. General Cates, anticipating Japanese counterattacks, directed his troops to halt at 16:30 to fortify defenses, achieving a beachhead spanning about 7000 yards. This came at a cost of 15 Marines killed and 225 wounded. Ogata, as expected by Cates, immediately ordered counterattacks with the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 50th Regiment and mobilized the Mobile Counterattack Force. While Japanese probes commenced at 22:30, the major assaults, marked by fierce banzai charges, began after midnight.  The attack on the left came first and lasted longest. At 2:00, men of the 1st Battalion, 24th Marines, straining their eyes through the black moonless night, suddenly saw a compact group of Japanese a short 100 yards away. The Marines opened fire. The compact group became a screaming mass of attackers as the first Marine bullets and shells found targets. Now the shadows were alive with about 600 leaping Japanese naval troops, loaded with aggressive spirit, requiring no instructions to make their screaming charge. Marines called flares into action; the battlefield became light. Marines needed no orders either: the 37mm guns sprayed canister; machine guns cut into the enemy area with grazing fire; rifles pounded out at sighted or suspected targets; mortars crunched into the defilade areas; artillery crashed steadily behind the Japanese to shatter and destroy any reinforcement group. The tightly packed foe was a choice target for all these weapons, and hundreds of shells lashed his ranks. At no time did the enemy penetrate the 1st Battalion; but extremely heavy pressure against Company A, the unit that bore the brunt, caused the battalion commander to reinforce it with engineers, corpsmen, communicators, naval gunfire liaison and shore party personnel. The fight continued hot and heavy until about 0545, when dawn and the vigor of the enemy effort broke simultaneously. Medium tanks from Company B, 4th Tank Battalion, entered the fray at this time and stopped all further thrusts at the Marines' lines. Many Japanese, convinced that all was lost, committed suicide with grenades. While armored amphibians afloat fired on enemy groups hiding along the coast, Marines of the 1st Battalion, 24th Marines, mopped up the area to their front, an activity completed by 0700. They counted 476 Japanese bodies, most of them within 100 yards of Company A's lines. Although no figures are available for Marine casualties in this action, the battalion commander estimated that ". . . Company A was reduced to about 30 men with usable weapons before the enemy was repulsed." Ogata's infantrymen struck Cates' center thirty minutes later, yet their efforts were thwarted by intense small-arms, mortar, and 37mm fire. Despite briefly breaching the line through weak points, they were ultimately defeated by rear elements after prolonged and heavy fighting.  This time, though many of the attackers fell forward of the lines, others penetrated a weak spot at the boundary between the two Marine regiments. About 200 Japanese poured through this spot before the flow could be stopped. After pausing in a swamp behind the lines, the enemy force speared out in two prongs: one straight into the beachhead toward U. S. artillery positions, the other turning west into the 25th Marines' rear areas. The latter group of Japanese attained first contact when they met a well-prepared support platoon from the 3d Battalion, 25th Marines. Positioned to contain just such a penetration as had occurred, the Marines quickly eliminated this Japanese threat, killing 91 in a brief, violent skirmish. The other prong pushed deep into the rear of the beachhead, finally reached the 75mm howitzer firing positions of the 2d Battalion, 14th Marines. Battery D, firing a mission for the 24th Marines, suddenly found itself beset from the front by many determined Japanese. Marines not actively engaged in servicing the howitzers rallied to the defense of their positions with small arms, while the remainder continued firing an artillery mission for the 24th Regiment. Later, as pressure mounted, all hands turned to the task of stopping the Japanese close at hand. At this juncture the .50-caliber machine guns of the other two batteries (E and F) of the battalion levelled a heavy volume of enfilading fire into the area forward of besieged Battery D. This fire, in the words of the battalion executive officer, "literally tore the Japanese . . . to pieces." To reinforce Battery D in its bitter fight, Company C, 8th Marines, arrived at 0445. But by then the situation was well in hand; the Japanese had faltered and stopped before the deluge of small-arms fire. Morning revealed about 100 dead Japanese in the area, while the artillerymen had lost but two of their number--both killed manning a .50-caliber machine gun with Battery D. The only Japanese penetration of the night had shattered itself against a prepared rear area. Up at the front, meanwhile, Marines of the 25th Regiment and the right (2d) battalion of the 24th Regiment, fought off a series of frontal rushes upon their positions. In each case the Japanese were stopped at the barbed wire forward of the Marines' lines. The all-night firing had taken a heavy toll of the Marines' ammunition stocks, however, and by shortly before daylight there was concern along the lines that another heavy attack might exhaust supplies. Dawn came first. Attached tanks moved up at once to range the area forward of the lines. They blasted points of resistance with their 75mm guns, killing or chasing such few Japanese as had survived the night melee. Nearly 500 Japanese were killed in the attacks against the center of the beachhead and in the skirmishes behind the lines following the penetration. The third and last major enemy effort struck the extreme right (south) flank of the beachhead at 3:30. The 2d Battalion, 23d Marines, in position along the coast, bore the brunt of this thrust, although the 2d Battalion, 25th Marines, also figured prominently in the action. Moving north along the coastal road, the enemy force consisted of five or six light tanks (about half of those available to the Japanese at Tinian) with infantrymen riding and following on foot. First warning of the enemy move came when Marine listening posts stationed along the road a short distance forward of the lines reported enemy tanks rumbling in from the south. With the tanks an estimated 400 yards in front of the lines, Marine artillery opened up. The tanks came on. Ready for just this situation, U. S. ships began firing illuminating shells over the area, virtually turning night into day. Bazookas, 75mm half-tracks, and 37mm guns attached to three battalions now went into action. One of the 37mm platoons, positioned astride the coral road, leveled point-blank fires into the enemy armor. Even so, one fast-moving tank weathered a 37mm hit and drove through the front lines into rear areas before a Marine bazookaman finished it off. An officer present on the scene described the action as he saw it: “The three lead tanks broke through our wall of fire. One began to glow blood-red, turned crazily on its tracks, and careened into a ditch. A second, mortally wounded, turned its machine guns on its tormentors, firing into the ditches in a last desperate effort to fight its way free. One hundred yards more and it stopped dead in its tracks. The third tried frantically to turn and then retreat, but our men closed in, literally blasting it apart. . . . Bazookas knocked out the fourth tank with a direct hit which killed the driver. The rest of the crew piled out of the turret, screaming. The fifth tank, completely surrounded, attempted to flee. Bazookas made short work of it. Another hit set it afire, and its crew was cremated.” Thus, five tanks stood immobile on the field of battle. If a sixth accompanied this incursion, it escaped, since there was no trace of it the following morning when Marines moved through the area. Despite the fact that their armor was gone, enemy foot soldiers from the 1st and 2d Battalions, 50th Infantry, and the 1st Battalion, 135th Infantry, pressed toward the Marines. The fighting that ensued was close-in and savage, but the Japanese never cracked the tight defense. The few who seeped through the lines met a quick end at the hands of the 23d Marines' reserve (1st Battalion), positioned to provide depth in this precise area. The operations officer of the 2d Battalion, 23d Marines, described the weird termination of the Japanese activities: “. . . as it began to get light, Jap bodies began to fly ten to fifteen feet in the air in the area in front of our lines. . . . We knew that hand grenades did not have the power to blow a man's body that high and could not figure out what was happening. [Later] we moved out to mop up. . . . It turned out that about fifty percent of the dead Japs carried magnetic mines and had obviously been ordered to break through our lines and destroy the tanks in the rear of us. . . . The Japs who were wounded and unable to flee were placing the tank mines under their bodies and tapping the detonators.” Daylight revealed that the enemy had expended 267 men and five tanks (of 12 on the island) against the right flank of the beachhead with no success. By the end of the night's counterattacks, 1241 Japanese bodies lay scattered along Cates' front, with the 1st Battalion, 135th Regiment virtually decimated, while Marine casualties numbered less than 100. Reflecting on the engagement, they later concluded: "It was there and then that [we] broke the Jap's back in the battle for Tinian". This assessment proved accurate, as Ogata's forces began retreating towards the southern end of the island. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Similar to the experience invading Saipan, Guam and Tinian proved to be literal horror shows. The savagery of the Island hoping campaign had increased ten-fold. The Japanese hoped by inflicted as much pain as possible, the Americans might simply come to the peace table, but was there any real chance of that?

Caylee joins us from Canada sharing her experience with two VBACs after a twin Cesarean birth. She also shares what it was like having cholestasis in all three pregnancies. Cholestasis is a liver condition that slows or stalls the flow of bile. Meagan and Caylee discuss in greater detail what cholestasis means during pregnancy, what symptoms can look like, and how it is diagnosed. One of Caylee's most intense symptoms was incessant itching. She talks about how it affected her not only physically but mentally as well. While all three of her pregnancies were preterm births and her two VBACs were medically necessary inductions, Caylee advocated throughout her entire labors and was able to stay the course to achieve the vaginal births she knew she was capable of. Cleveland Clinic Article: Cholestasis of PregnancyAmerican Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology Article: Risk of Stillbirth in U.S. Patients with CholestasisHow to VBAC: The Ultimate Prep Course for ParentsFull Transcript under Episode Details Meagan: Hello, everybody. Welcome to the show. We have our friend, Caylee, with us and her little wee, tiny little newborn. Caylee: Hi everyone. Meagan: Oh my gosh. Welcome to the show. How old is your baby? Caylee: He just turned 3 months. He was born a month early though. Meagan: Okay, 3 months and a month early. We are going to talk about why he was born a month early. You guys, today we are going to be sharing some stores and talking a little bit about cholestasis. This is something that we actually don't have a lot about on the show. When you were listening, Caylee, did you? Caylee: I don't think I've heard a single episode, yeah. Meagan: Did you hear about it in general on other platforms? Was it talked about?Caylee: Not really, no. I found it online on Facebook. I'm in the ICP Care Facebook group and that's super helpful. They are amazing in there and super knowledgeable, but yeah. It's not very common. It's quite rare. I think it's 1 in 1000 women who end up getting it. Meagan: Yeah. Caylee: So yeah. It's not very well known about and even with providers, providers don't know about it very well either. Meagan: Yeah. I think that can be part of the problem, right? Because we've got providers who don't know a lot about it and then it can cause a little bit of a panic and then a lot of the times, it can cause Cesareans or lead, I should say, to Cesarean. We're going to be talking about that today and sharing her stories. Review of the WeekMeagan: But I do have a Review of the Week so I'm going to get into that and then turn the time over to cute Caylee. This is from Cori and it doesn't say where it's from. Somewhere in the universe, it is from. It says, “The VBAC Link is gold.” It says, “Of all of the things I did to prepare in pursuing for a VBAC after two C-sections, I think is one of the most important is that I was listening to this podcast. Hearing these stories and information from Meagan and Julie made the dive into learning about VBAC and birth in general so much easier. I was blessed with my VBA2C” so VBAC after two C-sections “with my sweet Brynne Lynn and I sincerely believe I wouldn't have gotten to that point without this resource and the community. Thank you guys for all that you do.” Oh, that just makes me smile so much because this community– oh my gosh. I mean, Caylee and I were kind of just talking about this. Yes, Julie and I are here, but there is this community, this absolutely incredible community and all of the people coming forth to share their stories. And Caylee, you just said it yourself when you were like,  it's like all of these people who came and shared these stories impacted you. Caylee: Yeah, totally. Meagan: Yeah, they are the reason. You are the reason right here. Caylee, you are the reason why what Cori said in this review is possible by sharing your stories, by coming in the community on Facebook and on Instagram and having these conversations and learning and also being vulnerable. There are so many times where I see posts where it's the most vulnerable, genuine post and I can't explain to you the outpouring of love that I see come in for this person from this community. The VBAC Link Community, just the VBAC community in general, oh my gosh. You are all amazing. Thank you so much and yes, if you want to join that community, check us out on Facebook at The VBAC Link Community. It is a private group. You do have to answer the questions to get in so just keep that in mind. If you are not answering questions, you might not be allowed in. And on Instagram, and of course, if you want to have a review that I could share for the Review of the Week, please do so. We would love that.  Symptoms of Cholestasis Meagan: Okay, Caylee. Are you ready? I'm so ready. Caylee: I am ready, yes. Meagan: Awesome, I would love to turn over the time. Caylee: I don't know where to start. Should we start by talking a little bit about cholestasis so that they understand the risks? Meagan: Yeah, I think that– well yeah, the risks, the symptoms, and then also how it can be missed and then how it can sometimes– well it kind of goes with the risk, but there are other things that can come in I should say from cholestasis and I actually even had a client myself, a VBAC client after two C-sections. She had cholestasis, preeclampsia, VBAC after two Cesareans, and was induced. Caylee: Wow, good for her. Meagan: Yeah, but preeclampsia, right? Okay, let's talk about the things. So what are the symptoms that you one, may be experiencing, and two, that there may be that someone might not experience? Caylee: Yeah, so for me, it was intense itching mainly on the bottom of my feet and on the palm of my hands but I had it everywhere. I have scars on my ankles, up my arms, on my belly just from scratching. Meagan: From scratching? Caylee: Yes, incessantly. It's an itch that you can't really scratch. It's in your blood that is making you so itchy so you can scratch all you want and it's temporary relief but as soon as you stop, it's like, oh. I broke down in tears so many times and had ice packs on my feet and on my hands while I was trying to sleep. Another symptom is darker urine output and some upper right quadrant pain. Meagan: Yes. Yeah. Caylee: Those are very common and some people also experience jaundice. Meagan: I was going to say yellowing, jaundice. Decreased appetite. Caylee: Yeah. You're more likely to get preeclampsia and gestational diabetes. Yeah. Meagan: Mhmm, yeah. So nausea, feeling unwell, dark urine, lack of urine output which a lot of the time, dark urine is the beginning of that. Your kidneys are warning you and then you stop. Yeah. I had a client, not the one I was telling you about, but another client. She said that her bowels like her poop smelled really weird, like abnormal. Caylee: Yeah, I've heard that before too. Meagan: Yeah. That's the first time when she was like– that was actually one of her first symptoms that she noticed. Thinking back, she was like, “Yeah, I guess I was kind of itchy, but I wasn't itchy-itchy until later.” But that was one of the things where she was like, “I just thought I ate something weird.” Caylee: Yeah. Meagan: A decreased appetite. Pain in your belly and your quadrants, jaundice, and of course, itching. Those are the main signs. Caylee: Itching. And the severity of the itching can vary greatly between cases so the first time, it was quite mild and then it progressively got worse throughout my pregnancies. That's different for everyone who experiences that so if you have any itching, you should ask for LST's and bile acid tests from your provider. Itching can also precede the bile acids rising and the elevated bile acids is what's dangerous for the baby. It increases the risks in the baby where they might pass meconium before birth and also stillbirth risk goes up a lot if the bile acids are above 40. Meagan: Too high, yeah. So when you are pregnant, if you are having symptoms, definitely go in and get checked like she said. Get these tests. Then if you have cholestasis, if you test positive and things are looking like you have it, it is something that may increase extra testing and extra visits because you do want to keep a close eye on this. Again, like she said in the beginning, it's really rare. Even right here, it shows on this link that I'm going to put in the show notes, it's from the Cleveland Clinic, but it shows 1-2 in 1000 people during pregnancy will experience this. It's pretty low, but it can be a serious thing. Also, I was going to ask you because I know my clients have in the past. They've been given some things to try and control, to minimize, to control, to lower things to try and continue pregnancy to a good, safe term stage. Were you given anything like that? Caylee: Yeah. I was put on a medication called Ursodiol. It helps lower bile acids to make it a little bit safer for the baby so you can continue. With my last pregnancy, they were very severe levels. They were over 100 so it was kind of touch and go there whether we could get him to 36 weeks or not. They were talking about inducing me at 34 weeks. We ended up opting for non-stress tests and biophysical profile ultrasounds just to keep an eye on him. Meagan: And he did well? Caylee: He was doing well. He had already passed meconium sometime before I was induced though at 36 weeks. It was time for him to come out. He was already in distress so it was good that we did end up taking him out at 36 weeks, but he did great. Really great. Meagan: Good. Good. That's another thing I would like to drop in and note that if you do have cholestasis, it may be something that brings you to something like an induction that is earlier than expected. Obviously here, we're going to share this story in just a second about VBAC and induction. It's possible and totally doable, but that is a thing. Cause of CholestasisMeagan: She's mentioning bile. It is in the liver, right? Am I correct? It's in the liver. Caylee: Yeah. Meagan: We don't really know why. I don't know why. Do we know exactly why it happens?Caylee: They don't. They think it's something to do with pregnancy hormones and the placenta, but they don't know for sure. It's some sort of genetic factor as well, but no woman in my family who I know has had it. So I think it's just something that can happen sometimes. Meagan: Yeah. I have heard the hormones like estrogen and progesterone can be too much in the body. So just to circle back around again, if you have had any of these symptoms or if you are having any of these symptoms, it's okay. Don't hesitate and go in and get checked out. Caylee: And if you go in and get a negative result and still have symptoms, ask your provider to keep testing you. Meagan: Yes. Go back and check again. Okay, so baby number one? First pregnancy: TwinsCaylee: Twins. Meagan: Twins! Caylee: Baby one and two, my first pregnancy. Meagan: So twins. You had symptoms? Caylee: I did, yes. I got it pretty early on and they tested me and it was negative. They just put me on Ursodiol before anything came back positive. They didn't do anymore testing or anything. I didn't have any itching. The medication must have made it go away somewhat. Yeah. I was only 21 when I was pregnant with the twins so I was pretty young. I didn't know much of anything. I knew I wanted a vaginal birth. I had actually switched providers in my third trimester to somebody who was comfortable with vaginal birth with twins and they ended up being breech when they decided they needed to take them out. Preterm Cesarean at 36 weeks due to breech presentation and IUGRIt wasn't due to cholestasis, but I did have them at 36 weeks because one of the twins had stopped growing so they took them out. Meagan: IUGR? Caylee: Yeah. Yeah. He was quite significantly smaller than his brother. Meagan: Okay. That can happen with twins too, I know. Caylee: Yeah, totally. Yeah. My twin A was 6 pounds, 7 ounces, and twin B was 4 pounds, 4 so it was quite a big difference. Meagan: Mhmm. Caylee: Yeah, so it was a C-section with them. We were in the NICU for two weeks. Second pregnancyCaylee: I ended up getting pregnant again when the twins were 16 or 17 months old. I knew I did not want to do that again, having a C-section so I found supportive midwives and got on with them. Unfortunately, I don't know if it's in Canada, but they don't allow home birth for your first VBAC for some reason. Maybe it was just those midwives, I don't know, but I really wanted a home birth and they were like, “No, let's do hospital. It's safer.” I was like, “Okay, as long as I can still have my VBAC. I'll just do that.” The pregnancy went well. I thought I wasn't going to get it again. No itching, then I hit 34 weeks and the dreaded itching started again. I kind of had a feeling that I had it during my first pregnancy too from my own research. I had mentioned it to my midwives beforehand so we were looking for it seeing if it would happen. They sent me for testing right away at 34 weeks. It came back negative so they ended up testing me again weekly and then at 36 weeks, they tested me and my liver function tests were very high. My liver was basically failing and they didn't even wait for the bile acids to come back. They just brought me in for an induction. Meagan: What week again? Caylee: I was 36 weeks and 2 days when they started my induction.Meagan: Okay, so technically preterm. Caylee: Yes, yes. InductionCaylee: When I went in, they started with a Foley balloon to help dilate my cervix and that was awful. It's like a torture device, I swear. But it was effective I guess. It dilated me and then it fell out and I don't know if they didn't have a nurse for me or something, but I was waiting 8 hours for them to continue my induction. The OB came in and he wanted to break my water. I said, “No. Let's start low Pitocin.” He was like, “Well, it's not really going to do anything if you're not going to break your water too.” I said, “Okay, let's see how it goes.” Meagan: Yes. Caylee: We did that. Labor was going smoothly. I loved being in the shower. It was amazing. Then they made me get out because his heart rate was dipping really high so they wanted to get me out and be able to monitor him a little bit better. That's when things got really intense and I felt like I wasn't able to cope as well after I got out of the shower. I think in the back of my mind, I was still pretty young with him too for my first VBAC. I was only 24 and I know that uterine rupture risk is very low, but for some reason, I just couldn't get that out of my mind and every contraction I'd have, I'd just feel like I was being ripped open and was so scared that I was having a uterine rupture. I ended up– it was 32 hours into my induction and I still was at 4 centimeters just because I wasn't letting my body relax and do the work. I was tensing and fighting every contractions because I was terrified. I ended up getting an epidural at 1:00 AM and 5 hours later, I woke up and was fully dilated and pushed for 15 minutes and he came out. Meagan: 15?! 1-5? Caylee: Yeah, 1-5. Meagan: Oh my goodness. Caylee: As he was coming out, I pulled him up to my chest and it was just this amazing feeling like, Oh my god, I did it. The high that comes with that is unbelievable. Meagan: Yeah. Caylee: I just kept looking at everyone saying, “I did it. I did it.” Meagan: Absolutely. Caylee: It's an amazing feeling. Meagan: It really is. Caylee: I fought with the OB who was on call a little bit, the one who wanted to break my water. He kept saying, “Does she want to do this? Let's just go for a C-section.” I'm like, “Yeah, I can do this all night long and he can stay out of my room until I'm pushing. My midwives have got this, thanks.”Unfortunately, because I had to be induced, I had to be overseen by an OB so my midwife ran the show and was able to be with me and do everything, but he had to be there in case anything went wrong I guess. Meagan: That's kind of normal. A lot of the times, when there is a hospital midwife, there are OBs who oversee them. Caylee: Yeah. Yeah. So yeah, that was my first VBAC, first induced VBAC. Second Induced VBACCaylee: I just recently had another induced VBAC. With this one, my levels went up high. I think it was 28 weeks that I tested positive so it was sooner. Meagan: Significantly sooner. Caylee: Yeah. They went from 0 to 100 within a matter of days. They put me on Ursodiol immediately as soon as it came back positive. I was being monitored weekly with NSTs, non-stress tests, and they were sending me for biophysical profiles as well weekly which is an ultrasound to check on the baby's well-being. He was doing well so they just were keeping going with that and unfortunately, the Ursodiol did not help my itching this time around. It was so severe. I was in tears pretty much daily from the severity of the itching. Yeah. It was really bad this time. The mental health aspect of having that incessant itching I don't think is talked about a lot either. It really gets to you. It's depressing. Meagan: Oh, I would not do well with that. I would find myself getting very anxious probably and out of control. Caylee: Even now, if I get an itch, I get PTSD. It's like, Oh my god. It's not going to stop. I freak myself out and work myself up. I remember that after my second pregnancy as well. It was like I'd get a bug bite and I'd just have to itch and itch and itch until it was bleeding. Oh, it was just bad. I don't know how to leave itching alone now. His levels were very severe, or my levels I guess. My liver function tests were some of the worst that my OB had ever seen. Meagan: Interesting. Caylee: So yeah, it was just really bad. Caylee: I had actually applied for midwives. We had just moved from Alberta for BC pretty much as soon as we found out we were pregnant with Henley here. I applied pretty much as soon as I found out I was pregnant for the midwives here. I ended up hearing back from the midwives in Edmonton which is an hour and a half away that they could see me up there but once I got the itching and cholestasis, I was like, “Just transfer me to an OB where I live. It's just easier for me then all of my appointments will be out here and I don't have to drive 1.5-2 hours to appointments in the middle of winter.” Yeah, so they scheduled my induction for exactly 36 weeks because of the high levels. They didn't want me going past that because with levels over 100 bile acids, the stillbirth risk goes up very high after 37 weeks. Meagan: Did they give you a percentage or anything like that? Caylee: Yeah, I think it's upwards of 15% with very severe levels. Meagan: Oh wow. Caylee: If levels stay under 40, your risk of stillbirth is around the same as anyone else's. They go up 3% over 40 and over 100, it's even more. So it was a bit touch and go there. They were talking about inducing at 34 weeks and we were able to get to 36. Still preterm, but a higher likelihood that he wouldn't need additional support. InductionCaylee: I was induced at exactly 36 weeks. I actually had influenza B when I had to be induced. Meagan: That's miserable. Caylee: As if labor isn't hard enough alone, I had to have influenza B. It was great. Meagan: Miserable. Yes. Caylee: Yeah, one perk though was that we got a private room right away. I didn't have to labor in triage until I was far enough along to get my delivery room or whatever. They put me right in there. I was able to get set up and feel like it was my space and get more comfortable. So yeah, they started with the Foley balloon again to open the cervix. They can't do Cervadil or a few of the other cervical ripening– Meagan: Cytotec. Caylee: Yeah, because it really does increase the risk of uterine rupture with induction, but the Foley balloon is a safer option and it works. Within an hour and a half this time, my cervix was 4 centimeters. Meagan: Wow. Caylee: From barely a 1. It was kind of funny. I was standing there talking to my husband and I took a step toward the bathroom and it just flopped out and there was this line of blood up and down the floor. It was like a total bloody show. Meagan: Mucus. Caylee: In a perfect line. Meagan: Oh my gosh. Caylee: Because they attach the tube to your leg. They tape it to your leg so when it falls out, it makes a long, smooth line. My husband pulled the nurse call button and she's laughing. She ended up cleaning me up. Things picked up pretty quickly from there this time. I felt it was much more manageable though. I don't know if the nurses were nicer this time and they were doing the Pitocin a bit slower because I remember with my first VBAC, the contractions just felt back to back like I wasn't getting a break at all and it was really mentally wearing me out after 32 hours. I hadn't slept. I ended up getting the epidural but this time, it felt like more of a natural progression. I don't know. I've never had natural labor, but for me, I was able to handle it a lot better. Maybe that's because I knew what to expect this time so it wasn't as scary. Meagan: It could be. Caylee: Yeah, I don't know. Or I've heard too that with cholestasis that the bile acids or something make Pitocin more effective so maybe I didn't need as much of it this time because my levels were higher. I don't know but it was much more peaceful this time and I knew what to expect even though I was sick. I labored in the shower for a little bit with the mobile monitor because with inductions, they want to be able to monitor the baby constantly which I know is talked about a lot on here as something that is not ideal. Meagan: Yeah. Even if no induction with VBAC, it's really, really common if not 100% that your hospital is going to want that monitoring. Caylee: Yeah. And having that mobile monitor though is so helpful if your hospital has one of those. Definitely ask because oh my gosh, it's so nice to be able to get up and walk around and move and shower. Unfortunately, because of the flu, we were battling a fever. I had a fever so as soon as my Tylenol would wear off, my fever would spike and then his heart rate would go up. I had an anterior placenta so it was kind of in the way of the monitoring and it was hard to get him constantly so they ended up wanting to do the electrode. Meagan: The IUPC and the FSC? Caylee: Yeah, I think so. It's the one that they put on the scalp. Meagan: Okay, that's an FSC, fetal scalp electrode. Caylee: Yeah, that unfortunately didn't work very well. I was bed-bound but I was so sick that I didn't even really care. I was just switching sides laboring through, using the gas. I loved the gas this time.Yeah. I ended up getting to an 8, 8 centimeters and the OB unfortunately was not the OB who I had through my pregnancy. She had gone on vacation for my induction, unfortunately. I was really sad about that, but the OB on call came in and he was like, “You know, this is taking pretty long. I think it's time that we start thinking about a C-section. I'm getting worried about your scar.” I'm like, “I've done this before and it took longer last time. I am not having a C-section.” Meagan: Good for you. Caylee: I don't think he really liked that though because he was like, “Well, then you're getting an epidural because at least if you have the epidural and something happens, we can rush you in and open you up faster,” and blah, blah, blah. I'm like, “It has to be at least 24 hours and it's only been maybe 12 hours of hard, active labor here. My C-section scar is strong. It's been over 7 years since my first C-section. We are both doing well. Yes, I'm sick. Yes, his heart rate keeps going up when we have a fever but when the Tylenol kicks in, his heart is going back down and his tracing is normal. Why would I have a C-section?” Meagan: The fact that you're having a fever is more likely to the fact that you are sick versus that you have an infection.Caylee: Yeah, exactly. They tested me when I got there and they knew that I had influenza B and I tested for Group B strep so I was just having to fight with another OB again which is really frustrating, but yeah. He ended up leaving the room and my doula and my nurse were both like, “Wow, you're amazing. I'm actually so impressed with you saying no to him.” I guess a lot of people just go with what the doctor says. Meagan: Well, I guess. Caylee: That is why there are so many unneeded C-sections. Meagan: Well, we've talked about it on the show where it's like, I didn't go to years and years of medical school, so okay, I guess. Same thing with me, I was like, Okay, and went down and had a C-section when I completely did not need a C-section. Caylee: You hope that doctors are saying that when it is actually medically necessary and not when it's convenient for them. I think he was getting like, It's been 24 hours. I'm almost off-shift. I don't know, but I was not having it. It was actually funny. When he texted me, he was like, Oh, you're 8 centimeters, but he's -2 position and not coming down. He was like, It's probably time to do a C-section. I was like, “No, it's not actually.” Meagan: Oh my gosh. He really wanted to do a C-section. Caylee: Yeah, so I was like, “No, I'm not having a C-section.” He ended up leaving the room and pretty much immediately, I had a super strong contraction. I jumped off the bed trying to get away from it because apparently, that can help. I kind of grabbed my nurse's shoulders, the poor thing. She is this tiny, little 20-something nurse. I grabbed her shoulders and my body was pushing. I was farting and things were moving down there. Meagan: I bet that baby was coming down quickly too. Caylee: Yeah, that quick movement. Popping up just brought him down and she was like, “Are you pushing?” My doula was like, “Well, that's a good sign.” I was like, “I don't think so.” But my body was just doing it and then I barely made it back on the bed before his head was out. Meagan: Oh my gosh. So was the provider even in there? Caylee: No. Nope, he was just leaving the room telling me that I needed a C-section because I wasn't progressing. Meagan: I know that he had left but I didn't know if she was beeping him back in like, “Come back in!”Caylee: I guess he was down the hallway at that point and his head was out. I made it back onto the bed thankfully. My nurse was down there taking the fetal electrode out of his scalp panicking a little bit being a nurse. She was like, “You need to keep pushing.” I'm like thinking in my mind, No, I need to rest for a second. His head's out. He's fine. I knew in my soul that he was okay. I took half of a second to rest and then my body was pushing again and he was out. Meagan: Oh my gosh. Caylee: He had the umbilical cord wrapped around his neck and his armpit. I thought that maybe was why he wasn't coming down. Meagan: It could be. Caylee: Maybe he was tangled up in there a little bit and couldn't come down fully but maybe that quick movement that I did to pop out of bed was just enough to let him come down. It was so quick. I was looking around. My doula ended up riding out into the hallway to call my OB back and my nurse was frantic. She was like, “This was my first baby I caught!”Meagan: Aw, and it was a VBAC. Caylee: Yeah, yeah. I'm looking around the room like, “Whoa. What just happened?” I went from 5 minutes ago being told it was time for a C-section to my baby on my chest. Meagan: Yes. Oh, that is amazing. You know, maybe that person needed to leave to also relieve some stress so baby could come down. That's another thought I had. Caylee: Yeah, I think that was it and maybe my baby was like, Yeah, we're not going for surgery, mom. Let's show this OB what's up. Meagan: Yeah, seriously. It reminds me– is it the tiger or the lion? I can't remember the thing, but when you are being chased or when you are in a hostile environment, you either tense up or you run or whatever. We've got all of these senses and you could have been like, Nope. I am not having this baby with you in this room. I've had enough of your C-section talk. So cool. So after, with all of the babies, but especially with this one because your levels were so bad, were there any complications? Caylee: I guess I did touch on this a little bit before. I forgot though during my birth story there, when they broke my water, because I did allow it earlier this time because I felt with my first VBAC that that actually helped speed things up a little bit. I did allow them to break my water and start Pitocin at the same time this time. When they broke my water, it was full of meconium. They weren't too worried about it. Thankfully, that OB seemed pretty C-section happy and he was still like, “Oh, no big deal. We'll just monitor him. It's okay. There is a risk there for aspiration, but it's not a total risk that that will happen.” So they were just monitoring that. When he came out, he was fine for being 36 weeks. He was breathing good. They wiped his face because there was the meconium on his face, but no. He was great. It was more me that I was worried. I was like, “Is he okay?” They were like, “He's fine.” Meagan: Good. That's so good to know. I was just curious because he was early, high levels, induction, fevers, all the things so that's so good to hear that he was really great. Caylee: Mhmm, yeah. Even my twins were 36 weeks, 2 days when I had my C-section. They were in the NICU for 2 weeks and that was just for feeding and growing. They didn't know how to suck and then with my now 5-year-old, he was totally healthy when he came out too. He was 36+4 at the time he was born because my induction took so long with him, but yeah. He was healthy. He did have jaundice quite badly though so he needed the bilirubin lights and then with my baby now, he also had jaundice but he was able to stay off of the lights. He was just under that level for needing phototherapy. That's pretty common with early babies anyway. I don't know if that had anything to do with cholestasis in general or if that was just them being early that it was more likely to happen.Meagan: Yeah, that makes sense. Oh, well thank you so much for sharing your story and talking more about cholestasis with us. Like you said, there is not a lot out there. It is not very common so it makes sense that it is not talked about that often. However, uterine rupture isn't very common but it is talked about all the time. Caylee: Yeah. Meagan: So you know, but it's good. It's good to be aware. It's good to understand the symptoms and what's going on and why so I'm so grateful that you shared your stories. I'm so grateful that everyone is healthy and happy and wonderful and you are smiling and have some good birth experiences and maybe some healing birth experiences. Caylee: Yeah, totally. Meagan: You showed yourself that you could stand up to pressuring doctors. Caylee: Yes. I honestly thank my doula for being there for my last birth because I don't know if I would have had the confidence to be that firm with such a pushy, “this is what's going to happen” doctor. We had talked about it previously that she can't say anything for me but that she will be there to support and give me the power to advocate for myself. I totally felt that power from her. She was amazing. I'd like to shout her out to Little Loves Doula in Red Deer. She was amazing. Stephanie, she's great. If anyone is in Red Deer, Alberta, definitely contact Stephanie from Little Loves. Meagan: Well, you know that we love doulas here and always encourage checking out a doula. We do have VBAC Link-certified doulas. She's got her doula. Yeah. Caylee: I think she was also VBAC Link certified. Meagan: Was she or is she? Caylee: Yeah. Meagan: That's so awesome. You can check out The VBAC Link doulas at vbaclink.com/findadoula. Let me tell you, it's so fun to see all of the doulas in all of the different states. We are growing within the States. And if you have a doula in mind who is not on the VBAC list, send them the link. We would love to have them and have them support our VBAC clients and our VBAC community. Thank you so much again. Caylee: Thank you. ClosingWould you like to be a guest on the podcast? Tell us about your experience at thevbaclink.com/share. For more information on all things VBAC including online and in-person VBAC classes, The VBAC Link blog, and Meagan's bio, head over to thevbaclink.com. Congratulations on starting your journey of learning and discovery with The VBAC Link.Support this podcast at — https://redcircle.com/the-vbac-link/donationsAdvertising Inquiries: https://redcircle.com/brands

Last time we spoke about the Invasion of Saipan, Tinian and Guam. The Japanese mistakenly believed that the Americans were preparing for a decisive battle near New Guinea, not realizing the real target was Saipan. The US assembled a large fleet for Operation Forager, aiming to capture Saipan, Tinian, and Guam, advancing the US strategy to establish strategic airfields to hit  Tokyo. Japanese defenses were ill-prepared, with shortages of ammunition and inadequate inland defenses. The Americans hit Saipan with extensive air and naval bombardments, neutralizing Japanese positions, and faced stiff resistance during landings but ultimately secured a beachhead. The 23rd Marines of Colonel Louis Jones, advanced through Charan Kanoa and secured Mount Fina Susu despite significant losses. Heavy artillery pinned them down at the O-1 Line, leading Jones to reposition his forces. Casualties mounted on both sides as American forces fought to secure the beachhead and push inland. This episode is the the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Before his death Admiral Yamamoto instilled a sort of mind virus into the Imperial Japanese Navy. To be honest, the virus was a pre war doctrine, laying around ever since perhaps the First-Sino Japanese War of 1894-1895, but Yamamoto certainly focused attention more so upon it. The infamous decisive naval battle. The event that could turn the tide of the war, to bolster Japan's poker hand for peace negotiations. If Japan could simply knock out a enormous sum if not the entire strength the American Pacific fleet, something extremely unrealistic by this point of the war, but if they could, would America not reconsider settling this all up at the peace table? It had been the strategy of not just the IJN but for the Japanese military as a whole. Japan would never be able to win a war of attrition with the US, but they could make them pay so dearly, perhaps the Americans would just sue for peace. This idea consumed Yamamoto, leading to the disaster at the Battle of Midway. After the Guadalcanal Campaign, Japan lost the initiative, they retreated behind an inner perimeter. Henceforth the IJN scoured over the actions of the American navy, looking for any opportunity to unleash their full might down upon a significant American naval force. So many times the American navy eluded them, but here, with the invasion of Saipan, the IJN felt the decisive naval battle had finally come.  Admiral Turner and General Smith's American forces had just successfully invaded Saipan, establishing a beachhead with some challenges by June 17. This incited a strong Japanese response, as Admiral Toyoda initiated Operation A-Go, the IJN's strategy for a decisive battle that could potentially win them the war. Following Admiral Koga's Plan Z, Toyoda's A-Go involved Admiral Kakuta's land-based aircraft providing early warning and reconnaissance, aiming to neutralize one third of the enemy carriers before Admiral Ozawa's carriers completed the destruction of the enemy fleet with large-scale daytime air attacks, operating beyond the enemy's aircraft range. Additionally, Toyoda planned a nighttime surface engagement where enemy screening forces would be targeted by massed torpedo attacks. On June 16, at 9:00, the First Mobile Fleet departed the Guimaras and headed to the northeast. At 5:30pm, the Japanese fleet entered the Philippine Sea through the San Bernardino Strait. Admiral Ugaki's battleships Yamato and Musashi were not with the main body, but were proceeding independently through the Philippine Sea with two heavy cruisers, a light cruiser and five destroyers to join with Ozawa. Once into the Philippine Sea, Ozawa headed southeasterly. At about 5:00 on the 16th, Yamato and Musashi joined with the First Mobile Fleet. The Japanese began to refuel which was not completed until 10:00 on the 17th.  In response, Admiral Spruance directed Admiral Mitscher's Task Force 58, strengthened by Admiral Lee's battleships and Turner's cruisers and destroyers, to remain positioned west of the Marianas, prepared to counter any IJN attack. On June 16, Mitscher continued strikes against Guam and Tinian. Several Japanese aircraft were destroyed on the ground and in the air, but their airfields remained usable. The following day saw an increase in Japanese air activity. A small strike flown from Truk, five torpedo bombers and one J1N1-S night fighter attacked a transport group east of Saipan at 5:50pm. Three Japanese aircraft were claimed as destroyed, but a torpedo hit the small landing craft LCI-468 that later sank. On June 18th, the Japanese mounted a larger raid, this time from Yap Island. This operation featured 31 Zeros, 17 Judys and two P1Y twin-engined bombers. Combat Air Patrol did not intercept this group before it attacked shipping off the landing beach at Saipan that resulted in damage to an LST. The attack group then encountered the American escort carrier groups and attacked them at dusk. Two escort carriers were nearmissed and Fanshaw Bay was hit by a bomb which penetrated to the hangar deck. The carrier was forced to retire for repairs. As usual, Japanese aviators over-claimed, stating that three or four carriers from Task Force 58 had been hit.Furthermore, Admirals Lockwood and Christie's submarines were tasked with reconnaissance of IJN fleet movements, launching attacks when possible, and rescuing downed aircrews. Since Ozawa's fleet maintained radio silence and operated beyond the reach of American search planes, the only way to track his movements was through submarines, leaving the Americans mostly uninformed until the battle began. Unknown to Ozawa and Toyoda, Mitscher's carrier aircraft had already disabled Kakuta's land-based air power in the area, which significantly weakened a major part of A-Go. Additionally, the Americans, who had acquired Plan Z on April 3, were prepared for the critical carrier battle, although they were hesitant to engage in nighttime combat. Meanwhile, on June 18, the 2nd and 4th Marine Divisions began their attacks at 10:00 a.m. The 4th Marine Division attacked toward the east coast with three regiments abreast: 25th Marines on the right, 24th Marines in the center, and 23rd Marines on the left. The 3rd Battalion, 24th Marines, remained attached to the 23rd Regiment. Good progress was made by the 24th and 25th Marines, although the former sustained an attack at 10:15 by two Japanese tanks which surged to within 350 yards of the front lines. The situation for a while was alarming: American tanks had departed for rear areas to refuel and rearm so that only bazookas were immediately available for anti-tank defense. Though the 24th Marines' Weapons Company was immediately alerted, it arrived too late to participate in the fight. The enemy tanks were finally chased by bazookas and artillery, but not before they had sprayed the area, causing 15 casualties with machine-gun and small cannon fire. A portion of the O-3 line was reached by the 24th and 25th Marines during the day, placing the latter along the coast of Magicienne Bay. This healthy gain severed the island's southern portion, including Nafutan Point, from the remainder of the island. To maintain the momentum of the attack and avoid the long delay of a mopping-up process, the 24th Marines by-passed the southern extremity of a heavily defended cliff line running north and south through its zone of action. However, since the direction of attack for the division would soon Swing north through the by-passed area, it was necessary to secure the cliff line. This mission was assigned to the division reserve, 1st Battalion, 25th Marines. This, the unit's first experience with cleaning cave positions, proved a sIow, unpleasant and dangerous task. Rather than a coordinated move, the task took the form of a series of small, separated actions, each employing groups of four or five men. At 7:30, the 3rd Battalion, 24th Marines, relieved Haas' 1st Battalion on the division's left wing and commenced the move on O-2, which would serve as the line of departure. As will be seen, however, events of the day prevented the regiment from reaching this line. Organizational readjustments within the 23rd Marines included the attachment of the 3rd Battalion's rifle companies and 81mm mortar platoon to Dillon's 2nd Battalion and formation of a composite battalion from the 1st Battalion and the 3rd Battalion Headquarters. The latter unit would support the attack of the other two battalions from positions on Mt. Fina Susu. Machine-gun fire stopped the 23rd Marines' left elements after an advance of 200 to 250 yards. Most of this fire came from a clump of trees to their front, but a definite location of enemy weapons was impossible. Frequent barrages of Japanese mortar fire hampered efforts to spot the enemy, and the attack faltered. At this juncture, Cosgrove's composite battalion was committed on the left of the 3rd Battalion. 24th Marines, in an attempt to retain the impetus, and the attack again moved forward. But the advance was slow. By 5:15, the 23rd Marines had moved to a line about 400 yards short of O-2. Prior to darkness, 23rd Marines' patrols were dispatched to the east. On the right, these patrols reached O-2, but on the left machinegun fire denied movement as far as O-2. Colonel Jones, the 23rd Marines' commander, requested permission from General Schmidt to withdraw to more favorable ground for the night. General Schmidt approved, and the 23rd pulled back to a position about 400 yards east of Lake Susupe, breaking contact with the 2nd Division. The 23rd Marines emerged from the swamps, the 24th Marines reached the base of Hill 500, and the 25th Marines progressed to Magicienne Bay, effectively dividing the island. General Smith's soldiers also captured the Aslito Airfield, with the 165th and 105th Regiments securing Cape Obiam and the area south of the field. This isolated numerous Japanese forces in the north at Nafutan Point. Concurrently, General Saito was shifting his remaining troops to the Garapan-Mount Tapotchau area, facing relentless artillery, naval, and air attacks that left the Japanese in a dire situation.  The chief of staff of the 31st Army, General Igeta, drafted a message on the morning of June 18th to the commanding general at Yap Island and the chief of staff in Tokyo. In it he summarized the situation as he saw it and, in the process, revealed how very little he knew of what was taking place. Not that the general was caught in the bog of apathy, nor was he too frightened or lazy to find out what was going on; it was simply impossible for him to penetrate the shroud of obscurity resulting from ruptured communications in the vast area over which the action was taking place. As such, he erroneously reported that the 43rd Division HQ “underwent an enemy attack this morning and the division CO died along with his staff officers.” In another dispatch later in the day, Igeta corrected his error in regard to the division commander's death, reporting that General Saito was “all right, but that his staff officers were wounded.” He also added that “the secret documents in custody of the 31st Army Headquarters… were completely burned at 1830 of 18 June…” Recognizing the desperate circumstances, Prime Minister Tojo sent a fatalistic message to the garrison, despite reinforcements en route. “Have received your honorable Imperial words. By becoming the bulwark of the Pacific with 10000 deaths; we hope to acquire Imperial favor.” Reports indicated that Ozawa's mobile fleet was approaching the Marianas and expected to arrive on June 19. When Spruance finally received the spotting report from Cavalla, this prompted a decision that turned out to be the most important of the battle. Assuming that the report from Cavalla was Ozawa's main force, and assuming it would continue at a speed of 19 knots to the east, Spruance's staff calculated that the Japanese would still be about 500nm from TF 58 at 5:30 on the 18th. This placed the Japanese well out of range of American searches or strikes. The only way to alter this situation was to steam TF 58 to the southwest toward the contact and plan to locate and engage the Japanese during the afternoon of the 18th. Mitscher advised the aggressive option of steaming to the southwest to close the range on Ozawa's force. He wanted to launch afternoon strikes to locate and possibly attack Ozawa and even advocated a nighttime surface engagement. While this offered the possibility of opening the battle on terms set by the Americans, there were several problems with it in Spruance's calculating mind. The first was that TF 58 was not yet concentrated; TGs 58.1 and 58.4 were not due to link up with the other two task groups operating west of Saipan until 1200 on the 18th. If he allowed Mitscher to take off to the west, it would only be with two task groups. Since the Japanese possessed longer-range strike aircraft, this offered Ozawa the chance to attack TF 58 and defeat it piecemeal. As for the prospects of a night engagement, both Spruance and Lee declined that possibility.  In response, Spruance adopted a cautious approach, instructing Mitscher to gather his carrier groups and redirect them toward Saipan. In a last effort to change Spruance's mind, Mitscher sent him a message at about 11:30pm and proposed a course change to the west at 1:30am in order to position TF 58 to launch a strike against the Japanese carrier force at 5:00am. At 12:38am on the 19th, Spruance sent a message rejecting the proposal. The die was finally cast for a defensive battle on June 19.Spruance's priority was to safeguard the invasion force rather than eliminate the Japanese fleet. At 6:00am on the 18th, Japanese search floatplanes from the First Mobile Fleet spotted six carriers from TF 58. In the afternoon, seven aircraft from Carrier Division 1 flying out to 420nm spotted TF 58 after its 1200 rendezvous. The first report was issued at 3:14pm and included detection of an American task group with two carriers. A second aircraft sighted a task group with an “unknown number of carriers” at 4:00 and later issued another report at 1710 which identified two task groups, each with two carriers. These were within strike range, but Ozawa elected not to launch an immediate strike since his pilots were so inexperienced in night flying. Nonetheless, Rear-Admiral Obayashi Sueo of the 3rd Carrier Division boldly ordered the launch of 67 aircraft from the carriers Zuiho, Chitose, and Chiyoda, hoping to surprise the Americans. However, when he learned of Ozawa's decision, Obayashi reluctantly called off his strike. Ozawa had correctly assessed that the enemy would hold its position near Saipan, allowing him to maintain his own position without fearing an American attack. With this understanding, he changed course southwest to maintain the distance, while Admiral Kurita's Vanguard Force moved east, and Forces A and B shifted south. At 03:00 on June 19, all three forces turned northeast and increased their speed to 20 knots. Ozawa executed his plan flawlessly, positioning himself to launch significant attacks against the unsuspecting Americans the next morning. His only misstep was breaking radio silence at 20:20 to coordinate the decisive operation with Kakuta, who consistently misrepresented the true condition of his air forces while giving overly optimistic reports of successes by his aviators. As a result, an American station intercepted the transmission and geo-located it accurately. Once the mobile fleet reached strike positions, the Japanese began launching search aircraft, sending 16 floatplanes at 04:45 and another 14 planes about 30 minutes later. Although they lost seven scouts, the Japanese were able to spot the northern elements of Task Force 58 and the picket destroyers deployed ahead by 7:00. Starting at 05:30, Mitscher's combat air patrol engaged Japanese aircraft from Guam, which were unsuccessful in bombing destroyers. At 6:30am, American radar detected Japanese air activity over Guam and four Hellcats were sent to investigate. At 7:20am, these arrived and found themselves in the middle of many Japanese aircraft taking off. More Hellcats rushed in and, beginning at 8:07am for the next hour, there was constant combat over and near Guam. Up to 33 American fighters were involved, and they claimed 30 fighters and five bombers. The Americans claimed to have destroyed 30 aircraft, successfully hindering Kakuta's support for Ozawa's decisive battle. However, with the return of Japanese floatplanes, Ozawa was preparing to launch his first strike, deploying 69 aircraft: 16 Zero fighters, 45 Zeros with bombs and eight Jills with torpedoes at 08:30 under Obayashi's command. Fortunately for the Americans, radar warnings enabled Mitscher to dispatch every available Hellcat for interception. At 10:23am, launching of every available Hellcat from TF 58 began as the force headed east into the wind. The American carriers cleared their decks and all airborne bombers on search and patrol missions were instructed to clear the area. This allowed the fighters to return as necessary to rearm and refuel. The goal was to keep as many fighters in the air as possible to intercept incoming threats. The Hellcats had reached their interception altitudes of between 17,000 and 23,000ft when at 10:35am they spotted the incoming Japanese aircraft identified as two groups of strike aircraft with escorting Zeros on each flank. The first American fighters on the scene were Hellcats from Essex. Lieutenant Commander C. Brewer of Fighter Squadron 15 VF-15 led them.  The escorting Japanese fighters did not protect the bombers and the bombers scattered making them easy to pick off. Brewer claimed four aircraft, and his wingman claimed another four. In all, VF-15 pilots claimed 20 Japanese aircraft. Joining the Hellcats from Essex were others from Hornet and Bunker Hill as well as from five light carriers for a total of 50 Hellcats. Altogether, some 25 out of the 69 Japanese aircraft in this raid were accounted for by this initial interception. In return, three Hellcats were lost in combat and a Bunker Hill Hellcat was lost when it ditched on its way back to its carrier. The remaining Japanese aircraft continued their approach but were intercepted by Bunker Hill's Hellcats, which claimed another 16. Only around 28 Japanese planes remained and made minor attacks on Admiral Lee's group. Two targeted battleship South Dakota, with one scoring a direct bomb hit at 10:49, though causing minimal damage. Another narrowly missed heavy cruiser Minneapolis, while another almost missed cruiser Wichita. The Japanese reported  losing 42 aircraft:  eight fighters, 32 fighter-bombers, and two torpedo bombers. Most had been destroyed by Hellcats, with anti-aircraft gunnery from TG 58.7 accounting for the rest. Meanwhile, Ozawa launched his main strike at 08:56, composed of the 1st Division's best-trained pilots from three fleet carriers. This was a large strike designated Raid II from the three fleet carriers of Carrier Division 1 with the best-trained aviators in the First Mobile Fleet. The raid consisted of 128 aircraft – 48 Zero fighters, 53 Judy dive-bombers and 27 Jills with torpedoes. Launching began at 08:56 but was disrupted when at 09:09 Taiho came under attack by American submarine Albacore. The submarine fired six torpedoes at the fast-moving carrier. A last-second glitch in the boat's fire-control computer made it necessary to fire the six torpedoes by eye. One of Taiho's aircraft saw the torpedoes headed for the ship and dove into one in an effort to save the ship. In spite of this, one of the torpedoes hit the carrier abreast the forward elevator and created a hole which resulted in flooding. The ship's forward elevator, which was raised for the launch, was knocked out of alignment and fell several feet. Within 30 minutes, the elevator space was planked over by damage-control personnel and the launch continued. In addition to the aircraft lost from Taiho, eight other aircraft developed engine trouble and were forced to return. More trouble soon followed. When the attack group flew over the Vanguard Force deployed about 100nm in front of the main carrier force, it was engaged by the Japanese ships. This fire was effective enough to shoot down two more aircraft and damage another eight that were forced to return.  This attack and some friendly fire reduced the Japanese force to just 109 aircraft for the largest strike of the day, which was detected by radar. In a swirling action that began at 11:39am, the Hellcats again tore through the Japanese formation. McCampbell claimed three Judys and his wingman two. Other Hellcats joined the fray resulting in about 70 Japanese aircraft being shot down. VF-16 from Lexington claimed 22 Japanese aircraft without a loss; 12 Bunker Hill Hellcats were unable to gain a solid intercept but still claimed five kills, and Hellcats from light carriers Bataan, Monterey and Cabot claimed ten, seven and five, respectively. VF-1 from Yorktown also scored heavily. This still left a number of Japanese aircraft headed for TF 58. Twenty were reported in three groups at 11:45. Most of these made the mistake of attacking the picket destroyers deployed in advance of TG 58.7 or Lee's battleship force itself. Destroyer Stockham reported being under attack for 20 minutes, but again the ship suffered no damage. Around noon, TG 58.7 came under attack. Two torpedo bombers attacked South Dakota with no success, and two more selected Indiana in the center of TG 58.7's formation as their target. One crashed into the waterline of the heavily armored ship but caused little damage. Another Jill went after Iowa, but again missed. Alabama was undamaged by two bombs aimed at her. Potentially more serious was a group of six Judy dive-bombers that escaped the Hellcats and proceeded south until running across TG 58.2. Of this group, four selected carrier Wasp for attack. None scored a hit, but one of the bombs detonated overhead which rained down shrapnel that killed one and wounded 12 crewmen. The other two selected TG 58.2's other fleet carrier, Bunker Hill, for attack at 12:03. They scored two near misses that caused minor fires and other damage, in addition to killing three and wounding 73. Both carriers continued in action. Four of the aircraft were shot down by antiaircraft fire, with the other two landing on Rota and Guam. Finally, six B6N bombers attacked Admiral Reeves' carriers, but their attacks began at 11:57 and were also ineffective, failing to hit any targets. One missed Enterprise, and another three attacked light carrier Princeton, but all three were destroyed by antiaircraft fire.Thus, Ozawa's second strike resulted in a significant loss for the Japanese, with 97 of the 128 aircraft not returning to their carriers. His losses totaled 32 fighters, 42 dive-bombers and 23 Jills. At 5:30, the third group of Japanese scout aircraft took off. This comprised 11 Judys from Shokaku and two Jakes from heavy cruiser Mogami. The aircraft flew 560nm to the east. Two contacts were radioed back to Ozawa. The first, at 9:45, was reported at a position well to the south of TF 58's actual position. The problem resulted from an uncorrected compass deviation on the search aircraft. This contact was designated “15 Ri” by the Japanese. The second contact, designated “3 Ri”, was reported at 10:00. It was of a task force of three carriers and escorts to the north of TF 58's actual position, but may have been of TG 58.4.This third Japanese strike designated Raid III by the Americans was mounted by Carrier Division 2. This effort, from Junyo, Hiyo and Ryuho, comprised 47 aircraft including 15 fighters, 25 Zeros with bombs, and seven Jills with torpedoes. The remaining 20 aircraft saw what they believed to be two battleships but chose to keep searching for carriers. After a failed search, the group eventually attacked the battleships they initially spotted at 12:55 but were intercepted by Hellcats and lost seven aircraft. Nonetheless, the group pressed on and attacked Rear-Admiral William Harrill's carriers at 13:20. The effort was ineffective with one aircraft dropping a bomb 600 yards from Essex. Ozawa's third strike had accomplished nothing, but at least 40 of its 47 aircraft survived to return to their carriers. At 11:00, Ozawa launched his final attack of the day, consisting of 82 aircraft from the carriers Junyo, Hiyo, Ryuho, and Zuikaku of Carrier Division 1. It comprised 30 Zero fighters, ten Zeros with bombs, 27 Vals and nine Judys and six Jills. The planes set off for the new, incorrect southern target and found nothing, causing them to divide into three groups. The largest group of 49 planes headed toward Guam, where the Americans had been periodically discarding their ordnance to neutralize Kakuta's airfields.  As Ozawa sent his series of strikes against TF 58, Spruance directed Mitscher to keep a number of Hellcats active over Guam to disrupt any Japanese attempt to mount attacks from there. This reflected Spruance's fear that the Japanese would use Guam as a base for “shuttle bombing” using aircraft from the 1st Mobile Fleet. Before the first Japanese carrier raid, Hellcats encountered airborne Japanese aircraft over Guam. This action continued throughout the day and periodically intensified when TF 58 dive-bombers and Avengers, ordered to the east to steer clear of the air battle, dumped their ordnance on Guam. Before noon, 15 Yorktown and 17 Hornet Helldivers bombed Orote Field on Guam. Another attack was mounted at 13:30 by Dauntlesses from Lexington and Enterprise, nine Avengers from Enterprise and ten Hellcats for escort. The armor-piercing bombs carried by the dive-bombers did little damage, but the Avengers succeeded in cratering the runway. Other attacks continued throughout the afternoon including Hellcats from Bunker Hill strafing Japanese aircraft on the ground and 11 Helldivers from Essex just before 14:00. The price to keep Guam suppressed during the day was steep – six Hellcats and one Helldiver – but the Base Air Force did not support Ozawa's main attack. Back over at the carrier action, Ozawa's first group approaching Guam were picked up by TF 58 radar at 1449hrs. Before long, 27 Hellcats were on the scene. Among these were 12 from light carrier Cowpens, seven from Essex again led by McCampbell, and eight from Hornet. The Hellcats did great execution, shooting down 30 of the 49 Japanese trying to land on Guam. The remaining 19 planes landed but were damaged on the ground and could no longer fly.Another 15 aircraft headed for Rota but changed course to attack Montgomery's group when they sighted it en route. Six aircraft approached Wasp unmolested until 2:23 when they were engaged by antiaircraft fire just as they were dropping their bombs. Adept maneuvering by Wasp thwarted the aircraft, identified as Judys. Another group of divebombers appeared and split up; two went after Bunker Hill, and one after Wasp. All missed, and of the nine attackers, only one escaped. The final 18 aircraft of Raid IV, including the eight from Zuikaku and ten Zeros with bombs, were returning to their carriers when they encountered two American scout groups consisting of Hellcats and Avengers some 200nm west of Guam.This encounter cost the Japanese six aircraft, but they did gain a measure of revenge when at 3:30 the same group of returning Japanese aircraft encountered and shot down two Bunker Hill aircraft on a search mission. Despite these efforts, none of the American ships were hit during this fourth attack, while Ozawa suffered a significant loss of 73 aircraft. The situation worsened when the submarine Cavalla spotted Shokaku recovering aircraft at 11:52 and launched six torpedoes. Three torpedoes hit the carrier's starboard side at 12:22, sparking fires in the hangar and causing the ship to list. Soon, the ship came to a halt and was left behind when Carrier Division 1 moved north. At 1310, the fires on the hangar set off a bomb that set off fumes from the cracked forward fuel tank. Large explosions ensued and it was obvious the carrier was doomed. Shokaku sank at 15:01, resulting in the deaths of 1,272 crew members. The light cruiser Yahagi and destroyers Urakaze, Wakatsuki, and Hatsuzuki rescued Captain Matsubara and 570 men. Additionally, a torpedo hit Taiho, cracking the forward aviation fuel tank and turning the IJN's newest and most heavily protected carrier into a floating bomb. At 3:32pm, a massive explosion hit Taiho, lifting her flight deck and causing damage to her hull that led to the ship sinking. Despite Ozawa's initial desire to stay with the carrier, he and his team were eventually evacuated by a destroyer. However, 660 members of Taiho's crew perished as the ship sank. The transfer to the Haguro, added to the confusion for Ozawa was the fact that he and his staff were jammed into inadequate facilities aboard heavy cruiser Haguro after they were forced to depart from Taiho. Communications were grossly inadequate; Ozawa admitted later that he should have turned over command to Kurita until he could have moved to a ship with adequate command and control facilities. After the final strike aircraft returned, the Japanese turned northwest at 18:08, preparing to refuel the following day before continuing their attack. In their four strikes, the Japanese had launched 373 aircraft; of these 243 were lost. Added to these losses were another 50 from Guam, nine when Shokaku went down, and another 13 from Taiho to bring the total to 315. Some 296 Hellcats had been engaged during the day in combat, and only 14 were lost in combat with another six recorded as operational losses. The lack of sufficient training and experience among Japanese aircrews was evident, as seasoned American pilots compared the battle to “an old-time turkey shoot down home.” As a result of the significant losses inflicted on Japanese aircraft by American forces, the aerial portion of the Battle of the Philippine Sea was known as the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot. In the war upon the land, after an uneventful night, the 2nd Marine Division conducted patrols as Generals Schmidt and Smith focused on securing the rest of southern Saipan. Although the 4th Marine Division's assault was postponed due to their need to disperse a sizable Japanese group near Tsutsuran village, the 27th Division pressed forward in the morning with the 165th Regiment swiftly reaching Magicienne Bay. In contrast, the 105th advanced more slowly through challenging terrain, resulting in a gap between the two regiments and requiring the 165th to extend its lines to maintain contact. Further north, Colonel Jones' 23rd Marines succeeded in advancing close to Hill 500 after intense artillery bombardment, but were compelled to withdraw about 400 yards to protect their vulnerable flank. At this stage, Brigadier-General Arthur Harper's Corps artillery had arrived on the island, offering essential reinforcement to the division's artillery units. By the end of the day, Schmidt's division realigned its regiments and shifted north. The most vicious action of the night occurred in the sector occupied by the 2nd Battalion, 24th Marines. Starting at about 3:50am and lasting until daylight, an enemy force of approximately 75 attacked the Marines with grenades and bayonets. In the close-in fighting that ensued, 11 Marines were wounded, but, in the process, the enemy attack was broken. By daylight, many of the attackers were sprawled forward of the Marines' foxholes, the rest had taken to their heels. Meanwhile, Admiral Mitscher, having retrieved all his aircraft, set a westerly course and increased speed to 23 knots in an attempt to catch up with the enemy. However, on June 20, his usual morning search found no results. The Japanese also maintained radio silence during the day, with no new intelligence obtained by American submarines or PBM flying boats based in Saipan. In the afternoon, a successful search finally established contact, prompting Mitscher to prepare for a bold night strike against an enemy fleet beyond the maximum strike range. Meanwhile, the plan to refuel the 1st Mobile Fleet on June 20 fell through amid confusion, prompting Ozawa to abandon the attempt after noon. He transferred to the Zuikaku and restored communications, discovering the extent of his aircraft losses. Ozawa's hope that he could continue strikes was buoyed by reports from Kakuta that some of Ozawa's aircraft had landed on Guam and the prospects that additional land-based aircraft reinforcements would flow into the area. The only concession he made was to move his next attack until the 21st. However, at 16:45, Ozawa's reconnaissance revealed he had been spotted, so he decided to retreat northwest at 24 knots. Thirty minutes later, when his scout aircraft located Task Force 58, Ozawa opted to initiate a night attack with seven B5Ns and three radar-equipped B6Ns. Meanwhile, Mitscher launched a full deckload from 11 carriers, including 85 Hellcats, 77 dive-bombers, and 54 Avengers. The First Mobile Fleet was not well positioned to meet the attack. The Van Force with most of the heavy escorts and the best antiaircraft capabilities was not the closest formation to the incoming American strike. Each of Ozawa's three groups was headed northwesterly with the Van Force to the south, Carrier Division 2 in the center and Zuikaku to the north. Astern of the carrier groups were the two supply groups composed of six oilers with their escorts, making this the closest group to the Americans. After an uneventful flight, the American aircraft found the 1st Mobile Fleet at 18:40, at the edge of their fuel range after nearly 300 miles. Lacking time for a coordinated attack, the American aircraft easily bypassed the 40 fighters and 28 bombers sent to intercept them and individually targeted the enemy carriers. The veteran carrier Zuikaku was defended by 17 fighters and put up a good fight with heavy antiaircraft fire and adept maneuvering. She avoided the four torpedoes aimed at her from the Hornet Avengers and took only a single direct hit by a 500- pound bomb aft of the island. After departing, the Americans reported the big carrier with heavy fires onboard. However, the damage was not as great as it appeared. The single bomb hit penetrated to the upper hanger deck where a fire started among the remaining aircraft. These were not fueled, so after a few tense moments and an order to abandon ship that was quickly rescinded, the fire was extinguished. Six near misses were recorded, but overall damage was light. Zuikaku, the last surviving carrier from the Pearl Harbor attack force, lived to fight again. Aircraft from Bunker Hill, Monterey, and Cabot attacked the Chiyoda group, which evaded five torpedoes and sustained one bomb hit, surviving to fight another day. The Japanese were organized into three groups, each centered on a light carrier with several escorting battleships or heavy cruisers. The Zuiho and Chitose groups were not attacked, but the Chiyoda group was. The light carrier was the target of over 20 Helldivers and Avengers with bombs, but only a single bomb hit Chiyoda on the flight deck resulting in 20 dead, 30 wounded and two aircraft destroyed. The Avengers from Monterey probably scored the single hit, which caused a fire that was quickly extinguished. Chiyoda successfully dodged five torpedoes from Bunker Hill Avengers and lived to fight another day. Escorting battleship Haruna was hit by a 500-pound bomb that penetrated her stern and flooded the steering compartment. The ship's speed was reduced, and 15 crewmen were killed and 19 wounded. Cruiser Maya endured a near miss that caused flooding. The strike group from Lexington, with support from the Avengers from Enterprise, Yorktown, and Belleau Wood, and the bomb-carrying Hellcats from Hornet and Yorktown, attacked Admiral Jojima's carriers. They inflicted minor damage on Junyo and Ryuho. Most of Lexington's Dauntless dive-bombers selected Junyo for attention. At 7:04, one or two bombs hit the carrier's island, and several near misses created minor flooding. Casualties included 53 dead, but overall damage was light. Light carrier Ryuho was attacked by the five Avengers from Enterprise with bombs at 7;10; eight hits were claimed, but only slight damage was caused by near misses. The carrier also survived attacks from Enterprise Dauntlesses, Avengers from Yorktown five with torpedoes and probably Hellcats from Hornet. Hiyo suffered the most successful attack of the evening. The carrier left the formation to launch two Jills to lay a smoke screen and was caught behind the main body when the American strike arrived. In the opening attack by Dauntlesses from Lexington, one bomb hit the foremast and exploded above the bridge resulting in heavy casualties to bridge personnel. The Japanese reported that another bomb hit the flight deck. However, the group of four Belleau Wood Avengers with torpedoes caused fatal damage. Three conducted an anvil attack, and one torpedo hit the carrier's starboard engine room. This was followed by a dive-bomb attack from six Enterprise Dauntlesses. The single torpedo hit, the only one scored by Avengers during the entire attack, proved fatal to the largely unprotected carrier. Within minutes, the damage created a list. The ship proceeded for a time on its port engine, but then went dead in the water. Just before sunset, at 1917, there was a large explosion amidships that caused a loss of power. The Japanese were convinced that this was the result of a submarine-launched torpedo, but there were no submarines in the area. A fuel-fed conflagration ensued, causing multiple explosions. The fire was beyond being contained, and the order to abandon ship was given. Hiyo sank at 20:32, claiming 247 crew members. The final American counterattack came from Wasp's aircraft, targeting Ozawa's Supply Group to disrupt the withdrawal of the 1st Mobile Fleet by damaging the oilers. Three oilers were damaged, and two were later scuttled. In this series of uncoordinated attacks, the Americans lost 20 aircraft and destroyed 80 Japanese planes; although the results were underwhelming, with only one carrier sunk, they fared better than Ozawa's combined strikes the previous day. At 20:45, American aircraft began returning to their carriers. The distance from the targets to TF 58 was between 240 and 300 miles, so fuel exhaustion was a real danger for many pilots. On a dark night, the returning aircraft began to return to their carriers at 8:45. Mitscher decided to ignore the potential Japanese air and submarine threats and ordered his ships to use extra illumination beyond the normal landing lights on each carrier deck to guide his appreciative aviators home. Any pretense of order was quickly lost and soon aircraft were ordered to land on any deck in sight. Almost half of the returning aircraft landed on the wrong carrier. This hectic scene took over two hours to play out. When the final accounting was complete, aircraft losses were expectedly heavy. The Americans would end up losing a total of 100 pilots and 109 crew members. Meanwhile, Admiral Toyoda ordered Ozawa to disengage from the decisive battle and retreat northwest, with the Japanese fleet successfully evading Mitscher's slow pursuit and reaching Okinawa on the afternoon of June 22. Once more, the Japanese sought a decisive battle but were decisively defeated. By the end, they had lost three carriers sunk, two carriers damaged, 395 carrier aircraft, about 200 land-based aircraft, two oilers, and four other damaged ships, with around 3,000 Japanese fatalities. In contrast, the Americans lost 130 aircraft and 76 aviators, with none of their damaged ships rendered out of service. The Battle of the Philippine Sea, the last carrier-versus-carrier battle of the war, stood out because the most conservative and defensive-minded side emerged victorious. In terms of scale the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot dwarfed the four carrier battles that preceded it. At the Battle of the Coral Sea, the Battle of Midway, the Battle of the Eastern Solomons, and the Battle of Santa Cruz Islands, the largest carrier engagement involved 7 carriers at Midway; by comparison there were 24 carriers at the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot. It was, by a factor of almost 350 percent, the biggest carrier battle in history. Though Mitscher's Combat Air Patrol was not flawless, the combination of inadequate Japanese aircrew training and American radar-directed fighter interception rendered a significant Japanese strike ineffective. Ozawa conducted an intelligent battle, accurately assessing American intentions to launch carrier air strikes that would have been catastrophic to a carrier task force by 1942 standards. Nevertheless, his tools failed him. Despite Ozawa's skilled fleet handling, he lacked the airpower to inflict serious damage on Task Force 58. Admiral Spruance has faced criticism for his cautious approach, which exposed his carriers to attack without a strong chance of striking back at the enemy. Only the significant difference in skill between American and Japanese aviators and some good luck prevented this strategy from failing.  Now back over on Saipin, General Watson continued to focus mainly on patrolling, while the 8th Marines worked to secure Hill 500. Colonel Wallace's 2nd Battalion encountered minimal resistance, enabling them to quickly advance to the O-4 Line. Around 09:00, the 25th Marines moved towards Hill 500, subjecting the Japanese to a severe, thundering beating administered by the 4.5-inch rockets. As the Marines charged up the hill through the thinning smoke, artillery shells walked ahead in sturdy escort. Shortly before noon the hill was seized, and mopping up of the cave network began. Compartments at different levels and angles made it possible for the Japanese occupants to retreat from one cave-room to another, and the cleaning out process was a slow one. The price for Hill 500 was not light. Chambers' battalion suffered 49 casualties, nine of whom were killed. Counted Japanese dead numbered 44. Upon examination, it was found that Hill 500 had been well organized for defense but that the positions were not strongly manned. As darkness approached, the Marines dug in to defend their newly won possession. Meanwhile, the 24th Marines also reached the O-4 Line near Tsutsuran, but the 27th Division struggled to push the Japanese forces onto the challenging terrain at Nafutan Point. Additionally, the 106th Regiment arrived on June 20, and Aslito Airfield became operational, putting the security of the Japanese home islands in jeopardy. The following day involved reorganizing, resupplying, mopping-up, and patrolling to prepare for the next day's attack into central Saipan. General Smith's infantry continued their offensive south toward Nafutan Point, making incremental progress through each cave and ravine.  At 12:15, while engaged in the Nafutan Point attack, the 27th Division received a change of mission and disposition. NTLF Operation Order 9 dictated less one battalion and one light tank platoon, to assemble northwest of Aslito Airfield in NTLF reserve. Control of the division artillery would pass to the 23rd Corps Artillery. The designated infantry battalion was ordered to “operate in the Garrison Area and mop up remaining enemy detachments, maintain anti-sniper patrols within the Garrison Area and along the coast line to protect installations within its zone of action with particular attention to Aslito Airfield.” At 5:00, after consideration of the NTLForder, Ralph Smith telephoned Holland Smith and urged that a complete regiment be used to clean up Nafutan Point, rather than one battalion. He said that he planned to use the 105th Infantry for the job and that he believed they could finish in a couple of days. Holland Smith agreed to this but specified that one battalion of the 105th must be retained in reserve for possible use elsewhere. For this task, the 2nd Battalion would be selected. This modification was later confirmed in a mailbrief from NTLF which arrived at the 27th Division command post at 8;30, 22 June. Ralph Smith then issued an order to his division, the 105th will hold the present front line facing Nafutan Point, with two battalions on the line and one battalion in regimental reserve. It would relieve elements of 165th now on the front line by . Reorganization of the present front line to be effected not later than 11:00, 22 June and offensive operations against the enemy continued. Reserve battalion will maintain anti-sniper patrols in the vicinity of Aslito Airfield.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Battle of the Philippines  was the last hurrah of the once proud IJN carrier fleet that had humbled the American two and a half years earlier. Admiral Spruance's strategic patience led to a decisive American victory. Japan's carrier threat, which had driven its early wartime expansion, was annihilated in the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot.

A daily update on what's happening in the Rocket Pool community on Discord, Twitter, Reddit, and the DAO forum. 0:00 - Welcome Rocket Pool news 0:47 - RPL collateral limit reduced https://discord.com/channels/405159462932971535/405163979141545995/1255039338320760905 Staking news 2:35 - Gravita and NodeSet's LST https://docs.gravitaprotocol.com/gravita-docs/how-does-gravita-work/graveth 6:40 - Updated staking guide from stakesaurus https://x.com/stakesaurus/status/1805451688998060419 Ethereum news 8:23 - ETH ETF news! https://x.com/ericbalchunas/status/1805596193977761954?s=46 https://x.com/matthew_sigel/status/1805624888821989576?s=46 11:09 - Arb staking plans https://x.com/defiignas/status/1805551397292699889?s=46 In other news 13:13 - Assange freed https://www.reuters.com/world/us/wikileaks-assange-expected-plead-guilty-us-espionage-charge-document-says-2024-06-24/ 14:24 - No rate cuts for 2024? https://twitter.com/deitaone/status/1805567662925181416? https://x.com/deitaone/status/1805222592900419926? 16:17 - Big UX development for Solana https://x.com/solana/status/1805587979723063440 https://x.com/ryanberckmans/status/1805608066982858895 https://x.com/eawosikaa/status/1805610182757453975

A daily update on what's happening in the Rocket Pool community on Discord, Twitter, Reddit, and the DAO forum. 0:00 - Welcome Rocket Pool news 0:34 - Biweekly and community call https://discord.com/channels/405159462932971535/405163979141545995/1254780462593736775 5:10 - Node operator delegation https://discord.com/channels/405159462932971535/405163979141545995/1253581789071675495 https://discord.com/channels/405159462932971535/922648971351056475/1253589993776222209 11:01 - Tokenomics questions https://discord.com/channels/405159462932971535/1254837555090817114/1254837646115733556 https://x.com/waqwaqattack/status/1805280890634879040 https://www.reddit.com/r/ethfinance/comments/1dn5jyx/comment/la2lhfn/ 12:55 - 1kx tokenomics proposal https://dao.rocketpool.net/t/1kxs-thoughts-and-feedback-on-the-2024-tokenomics-rework/3073 18:40 - Sno and Halooo get married https://discord.com/channels/405159462932971535/405163713063288832/1254212460144230481 20:45 - lovepoints wants to get married https://discord.com/channels/405159462932971535/405163713063288832/1254795737334681601 22:05 - Cheapest minipool ever? https://discord.com/channels/405159462932971535/894377118828486666/1254224540096135280 23:10 - Client updates https://github.com/NethermindEth/nethermind/releases/tag/1.27.0 https://www.reddit.com/r/ethfinance/comments/1dmej84/comment/l9xp9bf/ https://github.com/ConsenSys/teku/releases https://github.com/status-im/nimbus-eth2/releases/tag/v24.6.0 26:44 - New York Rocket Pool party https://discord.com/channels/405159462932971535/405163713063288832/1254788713309933589 Staking news 28:24 - NodeSet vault deposits coming in https://app.stakewise.io/vault/mainnet/0xe2aeecc76839692aea35a8d119181b14ebf411c9 https://discord.com/channels/968587363536220252/1153574664174579842/1254838383059009606 29:44 - LST income https://x.com/0xgeeb/status/1804897747381727550?s=46 https://x.com/tokenterminal/status/1804489930795626515?s=46 https://x.com/llamaonthebrink/status/1804981280074850458?s=46 Ethereum news 31:31 - ETH ETF round up https://x.com/ericbalchunas/status/1804254007202103379?s=46 https://x.com/BitwiseInvest/status/1805239486554480909

Last time we spoke about the Siege of Myitkyina. General Vinegar Joe made huge gains in northern Burma. Myitkyina's airstrip was taken, now the main town was under siege. The Japanese resistance around Kamaing was greatly reduced. However setbacks were also seen, such as the Chindits abandonment of the Blackpool stronghold, prompting Stiwell to toss a new attack at Mogaung. Likewise American officers embedded with the Chinese units were sending reports of how the Chinese were suffering very heavy casualties and utilizing far too much ammunition for their objectives. Regardless, it seemed the Ledo Road to China was going to pan out. Calvert chose a new stronghold location, this time at Lakum, where his Chindits faced heavy resistance. Over on New Guinea, the allies were advancing west of their new beachheads to assault Lone Tree Hill. Soon assaults against Arare and Biak would also be made. This episode is the Landing against Biak Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  In the last episode, plans were made for an amphibious assault against Biak, yet there were some hiccups. The Hurricane Task Force staged at Humboldt Bay, were facing issues with terrain. Terrain considerations forced most of the task force to assemble on the southern of the two sand spits dividing Humboldt and Jautefa Bays. On this spit the beach had a steep slope which made it impossible for more than a very few LST's to be held against the shore line long enough to load bulk stores. The LST's had to beach on the northern spit, where clearing and salvage after the fires and explosions which had ravaged that beach during the early phases of the Hollandia operation had not been completed. In addition, the northern spit was being used to unload supplies destined to be used at Hollandia, to load supplies being sent to the Tornado Task Force at Wakde-Sarmi, and to unload cargo for the Hurricane Task Force. No road connected the northern and southern sandspits. Consequently, most of the supplies and equipment, as well as many of the troops, had to be transported by water from the southern to the northern loading area. There were only a few LCT's available for this work and only by working twenty-four hours a day, were all the troops and supplies transported to the loading beach in time for departure on the 25th.  Finally, General Fuller's task force would depart the bay on the evening of May 25th, covered by Admiral Fectheler's cruisers and destroyers. Taking the most direct route, the convoy would be able to arrive off Biak on the morning of May 27th. At the time, Biak was held by the Biak Detachment, under Colonel Kuzume Naoyoki. It consisted of the 222nd Regiment; the 19th Guard Unit; and some rear echelon, service, and construction units. There were 10000 IJA personnel, 4000 were combat troops in total and 2000 IJN personnel, 125 were combat troops in total. In view of the intense enemy concentration on the Sorido-Mokmer airfield sector, Colonel Kuzume decided on May 22nd to shift the operational center of gravity of the detachment to the west. The 1st Battalion, 222nd Infantry, was relieved of its mission in the sector east of Opiaref and sent to replace the naval garrison unit in the Bosnek sector. The naval troops were, in turn, shifted westward into the Sorido airfield sector, while the tank company was brought over from Arfak Saba and assembled in the area northwest of Mokmer airfield. Although most of the Japanese efforts had been directed to the construction of airfields, Kuzume had ably managed to build a system of strong cave positions.  In this amphitheater-like terrain and along the low ridge, both of which were covered with thick growth, the Biak Detachment emplaced many field artillery and antiaircraft weapons. There were also many automatic weapons and a few mortars. All these weapons were located within range of Mokmer Drome and most of them could also fire on Borokoe Drome. The key to Colonel Kuzume's defenses in this area was the West Caves area, located about 50 yards north of the low ridge and about 1200 yards north of the western end of Mokmer Drome. The West Caves were actually three large sumps, or depressions in the ground, which were connected by underground tunnels and caverns. The caves were ringed with pillboxes, bunkers, and foxholes, and an extensive system of coral and log emplacements was built along the spur ridge above Mokmer Drome. Biak naval headquarters was originally located in the West Caves, which could shelter 1000 men, and Colonel Kuzume planned to move Biak Detachment headquarters to the caves for the final defense of the airdromes. As long as the West Caves and the positions along the low ridge were occupied by the Japanese, Allied planes could not safely use the airfields. Chief of Staff of 2nd Area Army, Lieutenant-General Numata Takazo and Rear-Admiral Senda Sadatoshi, Commander of the 28th Special Base Force, with HQ at Manokwari had come to visit the garrison just as the Allies were preparing to invade, with Numata choosing to stay on the island to direct the battle alongside the resourceful Kuzume. Yet all of the Japanese at Biak were about to be caught with their pants down as many of their troops were scattered about the island. The Biak Detachment would not be in their defensive positions on Z Day but were apparently being held mobile. Detachment headquarters, the 1st Battalion of the 222nd Infantry about half of the 19th Naval Guard Unit, and miscellaneous service organizations were all located in a cave and garden area on the inland plateau about 3,000 yards north-northwest of Bosnek. Outposts at Saba and Opiaref were held by the 1st Company, 222nd Infantry, and a platoon of the 2nd Company was stationed along the main ridge behind Bosnek. The bulk of the 2nd Battalion, the rest of the naval guard unit, and some naval antiaircraft organizations were located at the East Caves. Naval headquarters, various naval service units, and the 6th Company, 222nd Infantry, were at the West Caves. Most of the army service units were at Mokmer Drome or disposed along the low ridge north of that field. The bulk of the 3rd Battalion was posted at the west end of the same airfield. One platoon of the 10th Company was at Sorido, guarding the southern terminus of a trail which led north across the island to Korim Bay. The tanks had not yet moved to Saba but were assembled on the terrace north of the eastern end of Mokmer Drome. On the morning of May 27, Fechteler carried out his naval fire support as planned and General Kenney's bombers also launched their air bombardment, receiving little answering fire from the surprised Japanese shore installations. Yet there was a westerly current off Biak that would push the transports over 3000 yards to the west, which would complicate the landings. A rocket-equipped LCI, which began firing on the beaches about H minus 4 minutes, led the first LVT wave toward the shore. The LCI fire, consisting of rockets and fire from automatic weapons, continued until H plus 2 minutes, when it was lifted because it began to endanger the troops who were unloading and pushing inland. The first waves of LVTs then formed rapidly and crossed the line of departure; but because of the westerly current and the smoke and dust raised by the preliminary bombardment, they would end up landing on a mangrove swamp almost 3000 yards west of Green Beach 4. Nevertheless, by 7:30, the 2nd Battalion, 186th Regiment had successfully landed and was pushing beyond the swamps to the main coastal road connecting Bosnek and the airfields. Five minutes later, Companies I and K of Colonel Newman's 186th Regiment also landed about 700 yards east of the 2nd Battalion. Realizing about the westerly current, Fechteler then started to turn succeeding waves eastward to the proper beaches, with the troops coming ashore in disorder for the next thirty minutes.  With more than half of his regiment already far west of the proper landing beaches, and knowing that the landing had become disorganized and that the rest of the boat waves were being delayed, Colonel Newman asked the task force commander if the 186th Regiment should continue with its original mission or whether it might be feasible to switch missions with the 162nd Regiment and start moving west toward the airfields. General Fuller, the Task Force commander, ordered the 186th Regiment to continue with its original mission. As events turned out, it might have been better had the regiment continued west, and it is possible that a great deal of time might have been saved if the missions had been switched. In the first place, the maps with which the task force was supplied were so inaccurate that both regiments soon came upon terrain features that threw much planning out of gear. Secondly, most of the 186th Regiment had landed so far west that both it and the 162nd consumed much valuable time getting to their proper locations. Finally, an exchange of missions might have been executed without much difficulty, for, in amphibious training, the 41st Division had learned to switch missions when such mistakes were made. Luckily, the landings would face no opposition, though the confusion would give Kuzume time to prepare his defense. By 8:00, the rest of Newman's 3rd Battalion had landed to secure the jetties; and by 10:30, Companies I and K arrived to take their position west of Old Jetty. Entangled with the landed artillery and tanks, the 2nd Battalion would only be able to reach the area east of New Jetty by noon, then sending patrols to the north and east to secure the Bosnek perimeter. The face of the coral ridge behind Bosnek was found to be rough and honeycombed with small caves. Companies F and G, aided by elements of the Support Battery, 542nd Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, sent patrols along the steep slope and to the top of the ridge to investigate many of the caves, most of which proved to be unoccupied, though three Japanese were killed near caves directly north of New Jetty. The companies moved over the first slope to a second ridge line which was parallel to and about seventy-five yards north of the first. Company G started looking for a trail which was thought to lead over the ridges to the plateau north of Bosnek, but it was Company E which, shortly after noon, found the ill-defined track. A few Japanese from the 2nd Company, 222nd Regiment in a pillbox temporarily prevented the two companies from securing the trail, which was not cleared until 2:00 hours, after the pillbox had been destroyed. During the late afternoon, patrols were sent north of the ridges to the area which the Japanese had surveyed for an airdrome. A few Japanese , most of whom fled upon being sighted, were found at the airdrome site, but there were no signs of large organized enemy groups north, northeast, or east of Bosnek insofar as the 186th Infantry could ascertain. The only enemy action during this day would be an air attack by four Japanese bombers.  A few enemy planes which flew over Biak around noon fled before anti-aircraft guns from ship or shore could be brought to bear. But all anti-aircraft crews were on the alert to expect further Japanese air action late in the afternoon. Because of the difference in time of sunset at the closest Allied and Japanese bases, Japanese aircraft could remain in the Biak area about half an hour after Allied planes had to leave. The expected attacks developed shortly after 4:00, when four Japanese two-engined bombers, accompanied by three or four fighters, approached the beachhead from the north, flying low over the ridge behind Bosnek and thus escaping radar detection. Some excellent targets were ready for the Japanese. Admiral Fechteler had permitted four LST's to tie up side by side at one of the jetties. Although he knew this move to be tactically unsound, he considered it justified because of the importance of the cargo aboard the LST's and because the jetty provided the only good spot for LST beaching. The Japanese bombing was accurate, but the LST's were lucky. None of the Japanese bombs exploded! Though the Japanese planes also bombed and strafed the beaches, none of the bombs dropped ashore exploded, while the strafing runs killed only one man and wounded two others. All four bombers were shot down by ground or ship-based antiaircraft, and the Japanese fighters were driven off by some Allied fighter planes which had remained late in the area. One Japanese bomber crashed into the water, sideswiping an SC which was standing offshore. Two of the ship's crew were killed and nine wounded. The SC had to be towed away for repairs, and a few other naval vessels suffered minor damage from strafing. There was negligible damage to supplies and equipment ashore. Total Allied losses as a result of the air raid were three killed and fourteen wounded, most of them naval personnel. Unloading also progressed satisfactorily, with 12000 men, 12 medium tanks, 29 artillery pieces, about 500 vehicles, and an estimated 3000 tons of bulk cargo being landed by 5:15. Meanwhile, Colonel Haney's 162nd Regiment had begun landing shortly after 9:00 and immediately started moving west along the main coastal road towards Biak's three airdromes. Moving with speed, the 3rd Battalion passed through Ibdi village at 10:30 and then began to traverse the difficult Parai Defile. At 11:15, the regimental Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon discovered an enemy position on the face of the cliff west of Ibdi, that the 162nd Infantry first learned of the existence of the Parai Defile. At 1:00 the 3rd Battalion, with six tanks of the 603rd Tank Company leading the advance, arrived at the eastern entrance to the defile. There was no large Japanese force stationed along the cliff, but the few Japanese had such a tactical advantage over troops moving along the coastal road that they were able to delay the 162nd Infantry's advance for some time. Meanwhile Company E, which had been attempting to advance along the ridge north of the rest of the regiment, had found that the terrain and thick vegetation made progress along that route next to impossible. Since the company was lagging far behind the rest of the advance and since strong enemy opposition had not yet been encountered either inland or on the coastal route, it withdrew to join the rest of the 2nd Battalion on the beach, and by the time that battalion had reached Parai, Company E was back in place.  By 3:00, the 3rd Battalion had successfully pushed through the defile and had secured Parai and a large jetty at that village. Progress west of the Parai Defile was without noteworthy incident during the rest of the afternoon, so Haney's 2nd and 3rd Battalion would be able to dig in at Parai by nightfall. On the other side, Kuzume was surprised by the landings, but he was expecting the enemy to land exactly there, where the extreme narrowness of the beach and the few entrances inland would make deployment difficult. Deciding to seize this momentary advantage, he thus ordered his 1st and 3rd Battalions to carry out an attack all along the Bosnek beachhead during the night. On the 3rd Battalion front, after an unsuccessful raid against two batteries near Ibdi. Then the 3rd Battalion, 222nd Infantry , renewed the attack with grenades and rifle fire, some circling to the north around Battery C and a few others moving against Battery B, located 200 yards to the east. Attacks on Battery C continued until daylight, when the last Japanese withdrew. The action cost Battery C 4 men killed and 8 wounded, while a near-by antiaircraft detachment lost 1 man killed and 1 wounded. Over 15 of the enemy had been killed during the night and an unknown number wounded. The 1st Battalion also raided the beachhead, suffering many casualties as a result.  On the morning of May 28th, the 162nd then resumed its westward advance, with its 3rd Battalion rapidly proceeding through Mokmer village without opposition. By 9:30, however, the Americans began to face stiff resistance at a road junction nearly 1500 yards west of Mokmer. Supported by artillery, Company K would be able to push to within 200 yards of Mokmer Drome; yet Kuzume would rapidly counterattack them with his 2nd Battalion. Charging repeatedly, the Japanese would eventually force the Americans to pull back by noon, with Lieutenant Yokoyama Hideo dying heroically during these attacks. Emboldened by this success, Kuzume then launched an all out assault from the East Caves area. On the main ridge north of Mokmer the Japanese had another strongpoint east of the West Caves, which was called by the Japanese the East Caves. Behind Mokmer the ridge rose to a height of 240 feet. It was not so steep a cliff as the Parai Defile barricade, but it could not be climbed without the use of hands. About three quarters of the way to the top was a flat ledge from which two large caverns, similar to those in the West Caves area, could be entered. The Japanese constructed pillboxes on the ridge both below and above the ledge, and in the caverns they emplaced mortars, 20-mm. guns, and heavy machine guns. Observation posts were also set up at the East Caves, from which an unobstructed view of the coast from Parai to the west end of Mokmer Drome could be obtained. The Biak Detachment used the East Caves principally as living quarters, supply dumps, and as a connecting link between the Ibdi Pocket and the West Caves. Continued Japanese occupation of the East Caves would endanger Allied troop and supply movements along the coastal road from Parai to Mokmer Drome. The enemy threw more troops into the battle from the East Caves area until the attackers were coming not only from the west but also from the northwest and north. The Japanese split the 3rd Battalion by driving a wedge along the cliff between the troops on the shore and those on the terrace. Companies L and M were cut off. The 2nd Battalion, attempting to get on the terrace to the north of the 3rd Battalion, was pinned down by Japanese fire from the East Caves and was unable to advance. Company G, on the terrace north of the main road and between the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, was also cut off. In response to the attacks, Haney ordered the 1st Battalion to move north from Parai onto the main coastal ridge to outflank the enemy positions, but efforts to do so were halted by enemy fire from the East Caves. Two companies patrolled in the broken terrain along the main ridge but were unable to move westward. Most of Company L and the Company M detachment which was also on the coral terrace managed to find a covered route back to the rest of the 3rd Battalion on the shore, but one platoon, initially surrounded, had to fight its way eastward into the lines of the 2nd Battalion, north of Mokmer village. Company G, on the terrace north of the main road and between the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, was also cut off and withdrew to the 2nd Battalion only with difficulty, and after it had suffered many casualties from Japanese fire. During the afternoon the 3rd Battalion stood off two more concerted enemy counterattacks, one at 12:00 and another shortly after 2:00, and suffered more casualties from the enemy mortar and artillery fire. During the latter attack, the Japanese began moving some light tanks forward from the Mokmer Drome area. The 3rd Platoon, 603rd Tank Company, engaged these tanks at a range of 1,200 yards and, with the aid of fire from destroyers lying offshore, drove the enemy tanks back into defilade positions. Three tanks of the 603rd were damaged by Japanese artillery fire and three men of the same organization were wounded during the action. Meanwhile, General Fuller had decided to reinforce the 3rd Battalion, 162nd Infantry. The 1st Platoon, 603rd Tank Company, moved west along the coastal road. At the same time small boats manned by the 542nd Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment were also sent forward with ammunition and medical supplies, both dangerously low. The small craft moved along the shore out of range of Japanese mortar and artillery fire until opposite the 3rd Battalion's position and then shot inshore at full speed, one by one. Supplies were replenished and the worst casualties evacuated despite continued shelling of the 3rd Battalion's position by the Japanese. The 1st and 2nd Battalions continued their efforts to clear the Japanese from the terrace behind the 3rd but met with little success. By late afternoon, just as the 3rd Battalion's position was becoming untenable, Fuller gave up plans for further attempts at reinforcement and ordered Haney to withdraw his 3rd Battalion. The withdrawal started slowly because communications difficulties still prevented concentration of supporting fires. However, at 5:00 the regimental commander finally ordered the 3rd Battalion to start moving back along the coastal road. Tanks were to act as point, and rear guard and close-in artillery fire was substituted for a disengaging force. The battalion was to continue eastward until it had passed through the 2nd, which was setting up a new defensive position east of Mokmer village. The men of the 3rd Battalion moved in small parties along the beach and main road, which was intermittently swept by Japanese mortar, machine gun, and rifle fire. Many troops were unable to use the main road, but had to drop down to the beach below the overhanging cliff. Four tanks brought up the rear and protected the north flank. Between 1830 and 1900 all elements of the 3rd Battalion reached safety beyond the 2nd Battalion's lines and began digging in for the night east of the latter unit. Casualties for the day, almost all of them suffered by the 3rd Battalion, were 16 killed and 87 wounded. Facing strong resistance, he also decided to commit his tank company to the attack. At around 8:00, new waves of Japanese infantry, now supported by four tanks, appeared west and north of the 2nd Battalion, thus beginning the first tank battle of the war in the Southwest Pacific Area. The 2nd Battalion, 162nd Infantry, with the 1st Platoon, 603rd Tank Company, in support, was astride the main coastal road 1,000 yards east of Mokmer. The battalion's left flank was on the beach while its right was against the coastal cliff and less than forty yards inland. Between the beach and the cliff was a coconut grove. The main coastal road crossed the rise of the cliff at a point about 475 yards west of the 2nd Battalion's lines. Shortly after 8:00 the Japanese tanks, followed by an infantry column, advanced down the incline where the main road crossed the cliff and deployed in echelon left formation in the coconut grove. The Japanese vehicles were light tanks, Type 95, weighing about nine tons, carrying a crew of three men, and armed with one 37-mm. cannon and two 7.7-mm. machine guns. They were opposed by two General Sherman M4A1 medium tanks, the heaviest armament on which was the 75-mm. Each Japanese tank was stopped by one round of 75-mm. armor-piercing ammunition, while the enemy infantry was literally mowed down by the machine guns and mortars of the 2nd Battalion, 162nd Infantry. Armor-piercing 75-mm. shells passed right through the Japanese light tanks, and the Shermans followed with a few rounds of 75-mm. high explosive, which tore holes in the Japanese vehicles and blew loose their turrets. During this action several hits scored on the Shermans by the Japanese 37-mm. guns caused no damage. About thirty minutes after the first attack the Japanese sent in a second wave of three tanks, which used the same route of approach and the same formation in the coconut grove. These three were quickly destroyed by three Shermans. One enemy 37-mm. shell locked the 75-mm. gun of one Sherman in place, but the American tank backed part way into a shell hole to obtain elevation for its weapon and, despite the damage, managed to destroy one of the enemy tanks. The Japanese tanks having been stopped and the leading elements of the second infantry wave killed, the attack disintegrated and the enemy withdrew. For an hour or so the Japanese were quiet, but late in the morning, under the cover of machine gun fire and mortar barrages, they began to circle north of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 162nd Infantry. New infantry attacks began about 12:00. The enemy was unable to dislodge the 162nd Infantry, but his mortar fire caused many casualties within the regimental perimeter and the Japanese managed to cut the coast road east of a large T-jetty at Parai. Company B and the Cannon Company counterattacked the Japanese roadblock behind close-in mortar support and succeeded in dislodging the enemy by fire and movement. During the afternoon of May 29, the 162nd thus moved back to Parai, where the 2nd Battalion and two companies boarded some amphibious craft back to Bosnek while the rest of the regiment moved overland through the Parai Defile and took up positions at Ibdi The 162nd Infantry's casualties during the day were 16 killed, 96 wounded, and 3 injured. The regiment estimated that it had killed over 500 Japanese during the day. Though Kuzume's forces had suffered massive casualties, they had heroically managed to stop the enemy advance and would subsequently push troops forward to Parai and into the cliffs along the Parai Defile. They would however also lose most of their armor during these attacks. Only five tanks survived and were withdrawn to the West Caves. Pending the arrival of reinforcements, General Fuller planned to use his available troops to hold the west flank at Ibdi and expand the beachhead at Bosnek. The 162nd Infantry was to establish a semicircular perimeter beginning on the beach west of Ibdi, reaching north to the main ridge, and returning to the beach at the village. The 1st Battalion, 186th Infantry, would maintain a perimeter around Mandom, where the Hurrican Task Force HQ was located, while the 3rd Battalion moved over the ridge behind Bosnek to set up defenses on the inland plateau. The 2nd Battalion, with part of the 3rd attached, would remain at the Bosnek beachhead. During this period, the 800 well-armed men of the 3rd Battalion, 222nd Infantry in the Ibdi Pocket, made only harassing attacks with small groups against the positions of the 162nd Infantry. On 30th and 31st of May the 162nd Infantry patrolled around the main ridge near Ibdi for a route over which large bodies of troops might move north to the inland plateau in preparation for the second attack westward. During the course of this patrolling, it was discovered that the main ridge from Bosnek to the Parai Defile actually comprised a series of seven sharp coral ridges, the crests of which were 50-75 yards apart and separated by gullies 50-100 feet deep. These separate ridges were honeycombed with small natural caves, potholes, and crevices. There was little soil on most of the coral, yet the area maintained a cover of dense rain forest containing trees 8-20 inches thick and 100-150 feet high. The 162nd Infantry discovered two native trails over the ridges. The most easterly of these, designated "Old Man's Trail," began on the beach road about 1,200 yards west of Mandom. It was a fairly well defined track which swung north over the seven ridges along a comparatively easy route. Another track began 1,200 yards to the west, near Ibdi. Called "Young Man's Trail," the latter followed a very difficult route over the ridges to the inland plateau. Both of these trails ran through the outer defenses of the Ibdi Pocket, into which the Biak Detachment, on 30 May, moved the 3rd Battalion, 222nd Infantry. On 30 and 31 May the 162nd Infantry's patrols along the ridges north of Ibdi and Mandom were harassed by the Japanese in the Ibdi Pocket, which had not yet been recognized as a major enemy strong point. On 30 May the 162nd Infantry located a water hole near the beach terminal of Old Man's Trail. A regimental water point established there was constantly harassed by Japanese rifle fire from the Ibdi Pocket area or by small enemy parties which moved down out of the ridges north of Ibdi and Mandom. The Cannon Company, 162nd Infantry, was therefore assigned the missions of clearing the enemy from the water point area and protecting that important installation from Japanese attacks. Halfway through the Parai Defile, a little over a mile west of the 162nd Infantry's main perimeter, an underground stream ran from the base of the cliff into Soanggarai Bay. At the point where the main road crossed the stream, the 162nd Infantry set up an ambush to prevent Japanese infiltration from the west along the beach. The ambush site was also used as a patrol base from which small parties reconnoitered along the cliffs of the Parai Defile to discover enemy dispositions in the area. Patrolling on 30th and 31st of May cost the 162nd Infantry 6 men killed, 17 wounded, and 4 injured. On the main coastal ridge between the village of Ibdi and the Parai Defile the Biak Detachment developed another center of resistance which came to be known as the Ibdi Pocket. The terrain in the area was a series of knifelike east-west ridges separated by depressions and crevices up to fifty feet deep. These ridges were connected in places by cross-ridges, and the entire area was covered with thick rain forest and dense jungle undergrowth which had found a foothold in the coral. Pillboxes of coral and logs, hasty emplacements of the same materials, small caves and crevices, and foxholes at the bases of large trees were all utilized by the enemy to defend the area. Back to the Wakde-Sarmi area, General Patrick was preparing to launch another assault on Lone Tree Hill. On the morning of May 27th at 7:00 two destroyers, firing on Lone Tree Hill and the Maffin Strip area, started scheduled fire support for the day's advance. Artillery and infantry action on this morning was much more closely coordinated than on the previous day. The destroyer fire lasted until 7:45, at which time the field artillery and all the 81-mm. mortars of the 158th Infantry laid concentrations on suspected and known enemy positions in the defile, on Lone Tree Hill, and on Hill 225. After this Colonel Herndon sent his 1st Battalion against the defile between Lone Tree Hill and the eastern nose of Mount Saksin and his 2nd Battalion against Hill 225. At 8:30 Company F, moving around Company E on the south flank, started its attack. Behind close artillery support, apparently controlled by artillery liaison planes for the most part, Company F pushed up a terrain feature initially believed to be Hill 225. It was not discovered until late the next day that F Company was actually on the eastern nose of Mt. Saksin and about 700 yards east of its reported location. Since artillery fire had knocked out two enemy machine gun nests which had been delaying the advance, patrols of Company F were able to reach the top of the eastern ridge. The rest of the company moved up the hill at 10:00; encountering scattered rifle fire from enemy positions to the southwest. Company E, just before noon, arrived atop the same hill on F's right. Company E had orders to secure the southern slopes of the defile between Hill 225 and Lone Tree Hill. Company B, still at the eastern entrance to the defile, was again unable to make any progress and during the morning was held up by machine gun and mortar fire from concealed enemy positions on the southern and southwestern slopes of Lone Tree Hill. No sooner had some of these positions been eliminated by American artillery and mortar fire than Company B was subjected to enemy machine gun and mortar fire originating from the northeast side of Hill 225, the reported location of Companies E and F. Actually, the artillery fire had not been entirely effective, because it had not reached into deep draws or caves in which many of the Japanese weapons were emplaced. Company E, attempting to move down the northern slopes of the eastern ridge to Company B's aid, was soon forced back by enemy rifle fire and infantry counterattacks from the west. At the same time small parties of Japanese, under cover of their own machine guns, started a series of minor counterattacks against Company B. Company F did not become engaged in this action. Instead, the company dug in on the ridge it was holding and sent patrols to the south and west to probe Japanese defenses. It was soon discovered that the combination of rugged terrain and Japanese machine gun and rifle fire limited patrolling to a very small area. North of Company B, Company A patrolled along the west bank of the Snaky River and on the eastern slope of Lone Tree Hill during the morning and early afternoon. About 4:30 the company moved in force up Lone Tree, finding the eastern slope of the hill to be unoccupied. Most of the fire that had harassed the company during the morning had apparently originated on the beach below the northern face of Lone Tree Hill. For the night the unit dug in at the crest of the hill. Again, little ground had been gained, although the eastern nose of Mr. Saksin and Lone Tree Hill had been at least partially occupied. At the same time, Patrick was informed that two battalions of the 163rd Regiment would be shipped to Biak to reinforce Fuller on June 1st, with General Krueger also preparing the 6th Division led by Major General Franklin Silbert  to be dispatched to Wakde to replace the 163rd. Yet before this could occur, Colonel Matsuyama crossed the Tementoe River and launched a surprise night attack against Toem. During pitch-black night at 8:30, an estimated 100 Japs struck 1st Battalion's area. Divided into small groups, but in two major commands, they carried grappling hooks, knives, grenades, knee-mortars, and rifles. Their grappling hooks had two prongs, like anchors and were attached to long ropes by which they could pull to explode booby traps harmlessly. A knee mortar barrage began the attack. While their mortars drove the men to ground, their grappling hooks caught booby trap wires and exploded attached grenades. They struck from southeast and southwest, two different commands about 150 yards apart. First command shouted wildly and threw grenades. They fired a light machine gun down A Company's street and holed up their tents. But this command's howling rush with grenades was just a feint to cause confusion. The second command, around 35-40,  made the main drive. Easily they broke through 1st Battalion's far-spread perimeter holes. An estimated 25 made the serious penetration. They were trying to reach the Regimental command post to kill the top officers. Some of the staff officers were actually cut off outside their holes in a tent and actually unarmed. Ten Japanese almost reached the command post before they were cut down. Such was the official report, but 163rd men said that they tried to blow up the motor poo, nearly 100 of them. From a slit trench, four blazing M-1s stopped them, from the motor pool chief Staff Sergeant Burton, Staff Sergeant Engbretson, T/4 Switzer, and T/5 Donakowski. They piled up 13 dead Japanese, the last just 20 feet away. On a whistle signal, all Matsuyama's men withdrew. The wild attack prompted Patrick to not to ship the 163rd towards Biak. The following morning, after another well-timed preliminary artillery bombardment, Herndon once again threw his forces against the Ilier Mountains, yet the result was the same as before. Nonetheless, his troops would be able to cover the amphibious arrival of two tanks to aid in further attacks; but with the situation soon becoming untenable because of strong Japanese counterattacks, all his companies ultimately had to withdraw to the Snaky River line. On May 29th, Krueger finally notified Patrick that the two battalions of the 163rd would have to leave for Biak the next day, so this would force Patrick to cease offensive action and withdraw the 1st Battalion, 158th Regiment back to Arare. Yet further Japanese counterattacks also forced Herndon to withdraw his remaining forces to the Maffin area as well, where he would form a new defensive line.  Patrick ultimately disagreed with Herndon's decision to retreat, judging the withdrawal to be unwarranted and would relieve Herndon of his command, replacing him with Colonel Earle Sandlin. Colonel Herndon's fears of attack along his line of communications had been well taken, for the Right Sector Force had begun flanking movements designed to recapture the entire Maffin Bay area. However, the combat engineers quickly proved their versatility by driving off the enemy force with rifle, carbine, and machine gun fire. Five of the engineers were killed. Enemy casualties could not be estimated since the Japanese removed their dead and wounded during the night. The remainder of the night was more quiet, and the next morning the defenses along the Tirfoam were improved. There were a couple of minor attacks during the afternoon and desultory rifle and 70-mm. or 75-mm. artillery fire was directed against all American units still west of the Tor. The 147th Field Artillery Battalion, withdrawing to the east bank of the Tor late in the afternoon, was struck by some of this enemy artillery fire and lost one man killed. A new defensive line along the Tirfoam was being developed on May 30th as the bulk of the 163rd Regiment would depart for Biak. This left Patrick's forces spread out over almost twelve miles of coastline, just as Colonel Yoshino was about to launch his night attack. After the difficult river crossing, the 223rd Regiment had spent three days moving into the jungle southwest of Arara, from where they launched a series of simultaneous attacks against some anti-aircraft positions along the beach.  A 6:05 on June 30th, a guard at B Battery's Position No 6 challenged two men in the jungle across the beach road. Other Japanese were moving west down the road. When they did not answer his challenge, he fired, and hit the ground. Instantly, Japanese machine guns, rifles, mortars, and even grenades hit the B-6 position. The anti-aircraft men killed 10 Japs, but one heavy machine gun jammed. The second gun became overheated and had to cease fire. The Japanese were hard to hit in the dark. They were heavily camouflaged with leaves and nets down to their hips. After one American was killed, the anti-aircraft men left their emplacement and fled 500 yards east on the beach road to Battery A's Position 7. Joined with the men of A-7 - they had already stopped one attack - the B-6 men helped fight about 15-25 Japanese. From 6:40 to 4:30 next day, the Japanese struck intermittently, but rifle and machine guns fire repelled them. About 500 yards west of the B-6 position where the first attack had occurred, Battery A-6 also endured harassment from Japanese mortar, rifle, and machine gun fire. At least twice, the gunners repulsed attacks. A fourth position, Battery B-8, which was 400 yards west of A-6, was assailed about 6:30 also. The anti-aircraft men's .50 multiple heavy machine gun became overheated and jammed. Rifle ammo was running out. Scurrying from the gun-pit, they took cover in the shore brush until the Japanese left at 4:30. All attacks began about the same time, about 8:30, and some men glimpsed a Jap officer with his saber who was giving orders. All Japanese dead had rolls of white gauze in their mouths, and the Japanese officer had completely covered his lower face. The Americans thought that they used these means to prevent them from shouting or screaming when they were wounded. While they attacked the anti-aircraft batteries, Yoshino's men also tried to storm 1st Battalion 158 Infantry protecting Task Force Headquarters and the supply dumps. About 7:00, rifle and machine gun fire began impacting 1st Battalion positions. A captured heavy machine gun fired also. At 10:00 came a furious suicidal attack against B Company - beaten off with rifles, grenades, bayonets, pistols, and even knives. They failed to fire the supply dumps with demolition charges and Molotov cocktails. In the end, the Americans miraculously only lost 12 killed and 10 wounded while inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy. But fearing more enemy attacks, Patrick would decide to reduce the number of separate perimeters along the beach, from 21 to only 8.  The bulk of the 158th had to withdraw behind the Tor, leaving only its 2nd Battalion west of the river to secure the bridgehead. Facing little resistance, the Japanese recaptured Maffin, though they would be unable to push Sandlin's troops behind the river. Yoshino and Matsuyama were unable to coordinate their efforts however, allowing the Americans to continue to strengthen their defenses for the next few days, with the Japanese only able to launch nightly raiding attacks that were easily repelled. On June 5, the first units of Major-General Franklin Sibert's 6th Division then began to arrive, freeing up the 158th to continue with its offensive.  Sandlin then launched an attack with his 1st and 2nd Battalions supported by tanks crossing the Tor to attack Maffin on June 8, meeting increasingly strong enemy resistance from a line of hastily-repaired bunkers and pillboxes. The tanks were able to reduce the Japanese defenses due to their strong firepower, but not before the Americans had to dig in by nightfall.  The night passed without incident and early on June 9th patrols began to probe westward toward the Tirfoam. Scouts reported that the Japanese were holding another defense line, including reoccupied bunkers, on a slight rise at the west bank of the river. About 10:00, tank-infantry teams began to destroy the Japanese-held positions along the new line. While tank 75-mm fire was destroying bunkers or forcing the Japanese to seek cover, infantrymen crept forward to toss grenades into bunker gun ports or shoot down Japanese who tried to escape from the area. While these tank-infantry team operations were taking place, the rest of the two infantry battalions rested. Japanese 75-mm. fire, from a weapon emplaced on the beach between the Snaky River and Lone Tree Hill, harassed the 1st Battalion for a while, but this fire was summarily stopped when a 155-mm howitzer of the 218th Field Artillery Battalion scored a direct hit on the enemy piece. By 11:30 the enemy defensive positions had been cleaned out and the 1st and 2nd Battalions resumed the advance westward. Aided by fire from the 147th Field Artillery, which had supplanted the 167th in the close support role, the two infantry units probed cautiously forward, and it was not until 3:30 that both reached the east bank of the Tirfoam. Opposition was scattered, but the American units lost 6 men killed and 6 wounded. It was estimated that 50 of the enemy had been killed and one was captured. At this point, the 158th would have to stop its advance because they received new orders from Krueger, who planned to employ the regiment for an assault on Noemfoor Island, 300 miles northwest of Sarmi, in late June or early July. As such, advances west of the Tirfoam would be postponed until a second combat team of the 6th Division could arrive in the area to relieve the 158th in mid-June.  General Sibert assumed command of the Tornado Task Force on June 12th. On 10 and 11th June the 158th Infantry limited its activities to patrolling, consolidating defensive positions, and driving Japanese outposts westward. One outpost, lying southeast of the 2nd Battalion, was manned by about a hundred Japanese and had to be cleared by tank fire and infantry assault. The Japanese, who were members of a 223rd Infantry company assigned to the Right Sector Force, fled toward Mr. Saksin, leaving behind 4 heavy machine guns, 1 light machine gun, 2 70-mm. howitzers, and 1 37-mm. antitank gun. On 14 June the 20th Infantry, 6th Division, relieved the 158th Infantry at the Tirfoam. The 158th recrossed the Tor and went into a defensive perimeter on the west bank of Tementoe Creek. Patrols sent south and east during the next week encountered a few stragglers from the Japanese garrison at Hollandia or from the Matsuyama Force. On the 22nd the entire regimental combat team was relieved of all combat responsibility in the Wakde-Sarmi area and began final preparations for the Noemfoor Island operation. During its operations in the Wakde-Sarmi area the 158th Regimental Combat Team lost 70 men killed, 257 wounded, and 4 missing. The unit took 11 Japanese prisoners and estimated that it killed 920 of the enemy. With their supply line compromised, Yoshino and Matsuyama would also decide to withdraw from their present positions about this time, which would allow the 36th Division to establish better defensive positions in the Ilier Mountains line. Yet that is all for Operation Tornado and Hurricane for now, as we now need to head over to the Imphal-Kohima front. By June, the situation at Manipur saw General Slim's 14th Army losing all of their advantages. Despite the extreme odds, with a slim chance of success, General Mutaguchi continued his wild attacks against Imphal. As it was, the two armies had been battling it out in difficult terrain and conditions. There were the steep and often jungle-covered hills, the heat for men not accustomed to it, the risk of tropical diseases like malaria and the leeches – not to mention the weeks and months of both physical and psychological strain from fighting a formidable enemy. The monsoon rains that began later in May only made matters worse. As the days passed by, the low-lying areas in the Imphal Valley would flood because of the downpours, while the streams and small rivers everywhere would become raging torrents. The water level of Loktak Lake would also rise, making it especially uncomfortable for the units of both sides dug in at some of the lakeside villages on the Tiddim Road. Dysentery and diarrhea became an ever-greater concern. Foot rot would start to set in for men in their flooded positions. The slopes in the hills became slippery and that much more treacherous to navigate. The incessant rains would dissolve stretches of ‘fairweather' roads and ‘jeepable' tracks into mud and slush everywhere, while triggering landslides in the hills. For the units on higher altitudes like the Shenam Saddle, Point 5846 and the Ukhrul area, the nights would become shockingly cold and damp, adding to their misery. Yet things were undoubtedly harder for the Japanese, who had carried few supplies and didn't expect to be strung out fighting for so long.  To the north, General Sato's 31st Division were withdrawing from Kohima towards Ukhrul, defying Mutaguchi's orders, with General Miyazaki providing rearguard at Viswema, whileGeneral Grover's 2nd Division pursued them. Miyazaki's men held out at Visweman until June 12th, before withdrawing to Maosongsang. Then they held out at Maosongsang until June 16, before retreating to the last holding position at Maram. Over to the south, General Brigg's 5th Division was engaging Colonel Matsumura's 60th Regiment, fighting brutally for control over the Imphal-Kohima road. The battered Japanese defenders were fighting tooth and nail to prevent the opening of this vital supply line.  The 9th and 123rd Brigades pushed on, they would only be able to capture the Zebra hill on June 7. The following day, the 3/14th Punjabis made a wide hook and arrived on the road behind Japanese lines by nightfall, where they would repel three heavy counterattacks. This would allow the 123rd to clear the hill positions near Modbung and link up with the Punjabis on June 11th. The 9th Brigade made great progress during these days, pushing on to Satarmaina by June 13th. General Gracey's 20th Division was also attacking towards the Ukhrul Road during this period, with the 80th Brigade advancing northwards from Kameng up the Iril River Valley on a wide encircling move towards Litan while the 100th Brigade attacked up the road towards Kasom. Though the 80th faced little resistance, the 100th would struggle to progress against the fierce counterattacks of the recently-arrived 67th Regiment. By mid-June, the 51st Regiment was also ordered to abandon its positions and support the 67th on the Ukhrul Road.  Over in the southwest front, the arrival of reinforcements in the form of the 2nd Battalion, under the command of Colonel Yanagisawa Kanji at the end of May, gave General Tanaka a gleam of hope that he could launch another offensive in early June. On June 6th, four battalions under Colonel Sasahara attacked the 63rd Brigade's hill positions, applying such great pressure, General Cowan was forced to withdraw his brigade to Bishenpur the following day. On June 7th, Tanaka ordered his recently-arrived reinforcements to clear Ningthoukhong and retake Potsangbam, yet their first coordinated attack would end in failure. The attack was almost single-handedly held by Sergeant Hanson Victor Turner of the 1st West Yorks. Defending his platoon's position on the perimeter, Turner grabbed some grenades and charged forward, throwing them at the Japanese. He did this five times, going back to gather grenades each time and returning to the attack in the face of Japanese grenade and small-arms fire. He was killed on the sixth occasion while throwing a grenade. For his bravery, Turner was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross. The Japanese eventually captured some ground in North Ningthoukhong, but withdrew after being struck from the air and shelled. In the meantime, after the Japanese defeat at the Gibraltar Box, the Yamamoto Detachment would continue to harass the British-Indian positions from Nippon and Scraggy Hills in early June. On the evening of June 9, the Japanese put in their last major attack on Scraggy, starting with a heavy artillery bombardment. Artillery concentrations were directed at the Japanese and an airstrike was made on their part of Scraggy and Lynch. The Gurkhas followed up with an advance. Although some ground was recovered, the Japanese maintained their grip on Scraggy's crest. Having suffered many casualties and feeling that the Gurkhas' new position was sufficiently strong, General Roberts then decided to halt the counterattacks, thus leaving General Yamamoto in control of Scraggy up until the end of July. Concurrently, as a last hope to break through towards Imphal, Mutaguchi was planning to conduct a desperate offensive on Palel with some reinforcements that would fail to arrive in time. Due to these delays, he would end up sending some of Yamamoto's exhausted troops to recover Langgol and advance to the hill northeast of Palel. The Japanese managed to get beyond Langgol and attack some positions in the foothills near Palel Airfield, but were soon rebuffed. They finally sent in a commando raid on the airfield in early July, which succeeded in blowing up eight planes. Over in Ningthoukhong, Tanaka launched another heavy assault on June 12th. Though a salient on the other side was initially captured, a ferocious counterattack would ultimately evict them. This action was performed by units of the 48th Brigade, including reinforcements sent from Potsangbam.  Rifleman Ganju Lama of the 1/7th Gurkha Rifles who earned a Victoria Cross in this action. To the west, Tanaka ordered the newly-arrived 151st Regiment of Colonel Hashimoto Kumakoro to attack the British picquets overlooking the Silchar Track. After a wave of assaults, Water Picquet would fall on June 21; yet the 32nd Brigade would respond immediately with a series of counterattacks that developed into confused fighting as positions were won and lost by both sides.  On the night of 25 June, no less than a company of Japanese began attacking Mortar Bluff, a picquet position bereft of cover and a short distance away from Water Picquet. It was held by a small garrison of some 40-odd men of the 2/5th Royal Gurkha Rifles who had replaced the 7/10th Baluchis. In pouring rain, the Japanese first bombarded the position with mortars and guns at point-blank range. For the next few hours, the infantry repeatedly attacked the surrounded and dwindling garrison. Subedar Netra Bahadur Thapa defended the besieged position almost through the night, organizing counter-attacks with whatever ammunition and grenades his unit had left. The Japanese finally overran Mortar Bluff the next morning, with Netra Bahadur Thapa fighting to his death. He was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross. A few hours later, a company of the same unit formed for a counterattack on Mortar Bluff. In the face of heavy fire, Naik Agan Singh Rai led his section in charging a Japanese machine-gun post and killing its crew. It then recaptured Mortar Bluff and neutralized a 37mm gun position and crew. Rai now advanced on a Japanese bunker and killed its occupants, after which his company also recovered Water Picquet. For his actions that day, Rai won the Victoria Cross, the second for the 2/5th Royal Gurkha Rifles the same day. Faced with such counter-attacks and intense artillery fire from Gun Box, the last throw of the Japanese 33rd Division around the Silchar Track ended in failure. This left Hashimoto and Tanaka empty-handed for all the losses they had suffered. Tanaka was forced to withdraw units before they were annihilated. On July 2st the 214th Infantry, with only 400 effectives remaining, completed its withdrawal to the area south of Nouyangtek and the 151st was directed to move back to Laimanai. Having been decimated by sickness and straggling en route to the front, the strength of the entire 151st Infantry Regiment was, at that time, less than 100 men. Back in the north, Briggs' units continued to struggle for control of the Satarmaina area. The struggle over the next week centered on the main feature east of the road, the hill named Liver. The 3/9th Jats attacked repeatedly to try to dislodge the Japanese from this feature. One such attempt was made on June 15th, when Hurribombers strafed the hill, followed by heavy artillery concentrations from 25-pdrs, 3.7in  howitzers and 3in  mortars. A Jat company climbed the hill, but had to withdraw some 100 meters from its objective because of heavy machine-gun fire. At the same time, the 1/17th Dogras were sent off on a wide hook left of the road and the 3/14th Punjabis were able to secure the Octopus position by June 20.  North of them, Grover's troops would also be able to break through Maram and continue south down the road on June 20, finally meeting the Dogras two days later. Beaten, Miyazaki had nonetheless fulfilled his task and could now withdraw east towards Ukhrul. Sato's rearguard fought determinedly. Often a few men with an artillery piece, grenades and a machine-gun would take up positions on the high ground above tracks, ambushing the British advance guards before melting away to repeat the performance a few km further back or, as was often the case, remaining obstinately in their positions until they were killed. Few were free from disease and fatigue, but surrender played no part in these men's vocabulary; they fought on till overtaken by a British bullet or bayonet or, more often, by starvation and exhaustion. But the 31st Division had literally fought itself to death. Exhausted men lay in pits unable to defend themselves, suicide squads with anti-tank mines tottered towards the advancing Lee Grants and Stuarts to be mown down by accompanying infantry, or obliterated by shellfire Although the battered 31st Division would manage to survive the Kohima disaster, General Sato would be relieved of his command as he had refused to carry Mutaguchi's orders numerous times. As a result, Miyazaki was promoted to Lt-General and given temporary command of the division by the end of June. Meanwhile, though his men had resisted like demons, Matsumura now had no choice but to abandon the road and retreat east towards Ukhrul with what remained of his command due to this new threat to the north. On June 21, the Liver position would fall at last. Again, the Japanese positions were bombed and strafed from the air, this time by three squadrons of Hurribombers for half an hour. The 4th and 28th Field Regiments, as well as a troop of the 8th Medium Regiment, fired a concentration on Liver that covered it in dust and smoke. Three companies of the Jats now went in, and yet this attack was also held by the Japanese on and around Liver. They had had enough, however, and by the next morning were found to have withdrawn from the feature. The Jats suffered around 150 casualties that week, including 33 killed. The 15th Division would adopt new defensive positions at Ukhrul to cover the withdrawal of Miyazaki and Matsumura. The main force of the 15th Division then went into defense positions in a line extending generally from Ukhrul through Tongou, Shongphel and Aishan to the 3524 Pass in order to be in position to cover and pick up the Right Assault Unit and the Miyazaki Detachment as they withdrew to the east. In order to hold the new defense positions, all available men, including all those in the rear service units, were thrown into the line. Finally the Imphal-Kohima road was reopened. Slim knew while the battle was not yet over, it had already been won. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The landings at Biak was another allied success. The first tank battle of the war in the Southwest Pacific Area saw the American Sherman's absolutely devastate Japanese Type-95's. Within the Burma front, General Slim had finally reopened the Imphal-Kohima road spelling doom for Mutaguchi's failed offensive.  

Bankless Friday Weekly Rollup First Week of April, 2024  Major thanks to Anthony Sassano for filling in for Ryan as he takes some time off to update his firmware. https://x.com/sassal0x  ------

Matt and Nic are back for another week of ATHs. In this episode: ETH's Dencun upgrade goes live Is ETH stuck between two different stakeholder groups? Is Traeger going to hold Bitcoin? Saylor is still buying Bitcoin Nigeria holds two Binance executives for a $10b ransom A UK judge in the COPA case has determined that Craig Wright is not Satoshi Why the COPA v CSW case matters Blackrock will buy Bitcoin ETFs in their global allocation fund Greyscale filed for a low-fee spinoff of GBTC, ticker BTC John Griffin of Griffin and Shams is back with another terrible paper A new paper alleges that crypto finances slavery Sponsor notes: Market Dynamics & Risks of Liquid Staking Tokens  In Coin Metrics State of the Network Issue 250, we explore the market dynamics and risks of liquid staking tokens (LST's)

Title Sponsor: Scrapin the Coast Our Lifestyle Podcast YouTube Channel  ODB intros episode 353 covering scene updates & MORE ODB wraps-up Lone Star Throwdown 2024 & MORE Travel to/from the show The actual show itself The fate of LST '24 going forward per Lone Star Throwdown + so much more!  Note: episode 353 artwork created by Jason "ODB" Ballard using various images he took + some from the LST fam RIP Mark “Papa Smurf” Ballard! We miss you Dad.  Stay On Da Rise! 

Lonnie, Radar, and Jarred join Ronnie to talk about the issues with LST and the Aftermath of the 2024 show and the potential for a 2025 shutdown!  You can see the interview on C10 Talk, Instagram and the Truck Talk Media, YouTube channel as well. 

#492 Davinadroid - Richard has been frightened by a weeing Samurai and an apparently dead audience member, but he's back for more RHLSTP, back a the LST and with a guest who is too good for this rubbish, the glorious Davina McCall. They discuss how she (eventually) beat a comedian to host God's Gift, Street Mate on skis, how Davina is ultimately to blame for the destruction of the world, why Richard was one of the first to know about an historic moment in Big Brother, why sitcom was not for McCall, overcoming addiction to chase her dream, beating Salman Rushdie to book of the year, the best professional to be in a relationship with and a never before revealed royal secret.See RHLSTP on tour- http://richardherring.com/rhlstpSee Rich's stand-up tour Can I Have My Ball Back - https://richardherring.com/ballback/SUPPORT THE SHOW!Watch our TWITCH CHANNELSee extra content at our WEBSITE Become a member at https://plus.acast.com/s/rhlstp. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Title Sponsor: Scrapin the Coast Our Lifestyle Podcast YouTube Channel  ODB intros episode 352 covering scene updates & MORE ODB provides key updates on Lone Star Throwdown 2024 & MORE How long has LST been going strong FAQs Look out for scams + so much more!  Note: episode 353 artwork created by Jason "ODB" Ballard using various images he took + some from the LST fam RIP Mark “Papa Smurf” Ballard! We miss you Dad.  Stay On Da Rise!