Podcasts about il app

Follow Dan on LinkedIn at linkedin.com/in/cotterdan Follow Pat on LinkedIn athttps://www.linkedin.com/in/donald-patrick-eckler-610290824/ Predictions Sure To Go Wrong: Smolucha: Affirm Jordan: Reverse Harris: Punt Illinois Supreme Court: https://www.illinoiscourts.gov/courts/supreme-court/oral-argument-audio-and-video/ IL App: https://www.illinoiscourts.gov/courts/appellate-court/oral-argument-audio/

Follow Dan on LinkedIn at linkedin.com/in/cotterdan Follow Pat on LinkedIn athttps://www.linkedin.com/in/donald-patrick-eckler-610290824/ Predictions Sure To Go Wrong: Piasa: Reverse Blanquart: Affirm Mazurkiewicz: Reverse Illinois Supreme Court, Piasa: https://www.illinoiscourts.gov/courts/supreme-court/oral-argument-audio-and-video/ IL App: https://www.illinoiscourts.gov/courts/appellate-court/oral-argument-audio/

fWotD Episode 2572: City of Champaign v. Madigan Welcome to featured Wiki of the Day where we read the summary of the featured Wikipedia article every day.The featured article for Monday, 20 May 2024 is City of Champaign v. Madigan.City of Champaign v. Madigan, 2013 IL App (4th) 120662, 992 N. E.2d 629 (2013), is a case decided by the Illinois Appellate Court in 2013 concerning the state's Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The court ruled that messages sent and received by elected officials during a city council meeting and pertaining to public business are public records subject to disclosure, even when those communications are stored on personal electronic devices. It was the first court ruling in Illinois to hold that private messages were subject to public disclosure under FOIA.The case addressed a public records request from a reporter for The News-Gazette in Champaign, Illinois, who observed Champaign city council members and the mayor using their personal electronic devices to send messages during a city council meeting. City officials denied the reporter's request for disclosure of the private messages. The case eventually reached the Appellate Court, which held that public officials have to disclose their records, even if they are stored on a personal electronic device or account, but only when acting as a public body. The court found that members of a city council do not constitute a public body when acting individually. However, because the city council members in question had convened a public meeting, they were acting collectively as a public body, and their messages were therefore subject to disclosure under FOIA.This recording reflects the Wikipedia text as of 01:03 UTC on Monday, 20 May 2024.For the full current version of the article, see City of Champaign v. Madigan on Wikipedia.This podcast uses content from Wikipedia under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License.Visit our archives at wikioftheday.com and subscribe to stay updated on new episodes.Follow us on Mastodon at @wikioftheday@masto.ai.Also check out Curmudgeon's Corner, a current events podcast.Until next time, I'm Olivia Neural.

George L. Schoenbeck join us this episode to talk about issues that commonly come up during modern Postmortem Estate Planning. Our conversation touches on the fiduciary duties of trustees and executors, attorney liability and professional responsibility Issues, and the importance of an attorney/client engagement letter. George is a Partner at Sosin, Arnold & Schoenbeck, Ltd., in Orland Park, where he represents clients in matters concerning estate planning, estate administration, business succession planning, business general counsel, and commercial transactions. He is licensed to practice in Illinois and Florida. He has written extensively on the topics of business succession planning, estate planning, and estate administration, including articles in the Illinois Bar Journal and the Trusts and Estates Newsletter of the Illinois State Bar Association. In 2017, he was awarded the Illinois State Bar Association's Board of Governors Award for his distinguished service to the legal profession. In October 2022, he was recognized by the Third District Court of Appeal of the State of Florida in Miami for receiving one of the highest scores in the July 2022 administration of the Florida Bar Examination. He received his B.S. in Accountancy with Highest Honors from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and his J.D. from the Chicago-Kent College of Law. He is also the author of Ch. 1, Overview of the Postmortem Estate Planning Process, on IICLE's Postmortem Estate Planning handbook. Listeners can use the discount code INREPUBS-PSTMRTM20 to get 20% off IICLE'S Postmortem Estate Planning handbook through March 15, 2024. Cases discussed in this episode: In re Estate of Halas, 209 Ill.App.3d 333, 568 N.E.2d 170, 154 Ill.Dec. 170 (1st Dist. 1991)In re Estate of Godinez, 2018 IL App (2d) 161009-U Estate of Hudson v. Tibble, 2018 IL App (1st) 162469, ¶23, 99 N.E.3d 105, 421 Ill.Dec. 105Gagliardo v. Caffrey, 344 Ill.App.3d 219, 800 N.E.2d 489, 497, 279 Ill.Dec. 421 (1st Dist. 2003)Pelham v. Griesheimer, 92 Ill.2d 13, 440 N.E.2d 96, 64 Ill.Dec. 544 (1982) Music: Fearless First Kevin MacLeod (incompetech.com) Licensed under Creative Commons: By Attribution 3.0 License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/.

Appraisal Required to Establish Amount of Loss The plaintiff, Shelter Mutual Insurance Company (Shelter), appealed the circuit court of Coles County's March 28, 2023, oral pronouncement denying its motion for judgment on the pleadings and ordering the parties to proceed forward with the appraisal process as outlined in the at-issue insurance policy, and the circuit court's written March 30, 2023, order memorializing the same. In Shelter Mutual Insurance Company v. Tim Morrow and Jodie Morrow, 2023 IL App (5th) 230249-U, No. 5-23-0249, Court of Appeals of Illinois, Fifth District (August 24, 2023) was asked to determine if appraisal could be compelled. BACKGROUND Shelter issued a homeowners insurance policy to the Morrows (the Policy). The Policy was in effect from April 7, 2021, to April 7, 2022. The policy provided: Appraisal If you and we fail to agree on the market value, total restoration cost, actual cash value, or amount of loss, as may be required in the applicable policy provision, either party may make written demand for an appraisal. ... The appraisers shall then appraise the loss, stating separately the market value, total restoration cost, actual cash value, or loss to each item as may be required in the applicable policy provision....  On December 10, 2021, a hail and windstorm occurred affecting the Morrows' property. The Morrows submitted a claim to Shelter for damage allegedly sustained because of the storm. Shelter inspected the claimed property damage and determined that the damage added up to less than the Morrows' deductible of $1000. In response, the Morrows obtained their own report and estimate from a public adjuster, the Accuval Group LLC, dated December 21, 2021. That report indicated that a complete tear-off and replacement of the residence roof and garage roof, as well as removal and replacement of the fencing would be necessary at a total cost of $38,198.15, less the $1000 deductible. Following this report, Shelter obtained a second assessment, this time from Donan Engineering, dated February 2, 2022. That report concluded that some of the damage claimed was attributed to the storm, but other damage claimed was not. That report found that much of the damage was attributable to installation errors, inadvertent man-made damage, and sealant strip failure. On February 8, 2022, Shelter sent a letter informing the Morrows that it continued to view the loss as not exceeding their deductible. The Morrows answered the complaint and filed counterclaims asserting breach of contract and bad faith, specifically alleging bad faith for Shelter's refusal to submit to the appraisal process as outlined in the Policy and as previously invoked by the Morrows on May 5, 2022. The circuit court denied the motion for judgment on the pleadings and ordered the parties to proceed with the appraisal process as previously invoked by the Morrows and as outlined in the Policy. ANALYSIS An appraisal clause is analogous to an arbitration clause. The Court of Appeals held that an order denying a motion to dismiss was tantamount to an order denying arbitration. Shelter's assessment acknowledged that a tornado touched down approximately 1.8 miles northwest of the Morrows' property on the date of the storm. The report acknowledged  that "higher wind speeds affected [the Morrows'] property." Based upon these facts alone, it is evident that the question at issue is not whether a covered loss occurred because a covered loss was found by Shelter's own adjuster in its report. Therefore, the true dispute of the parties is the amount of that covered loss. This case involves a determination of the "amount of loss," which is expressly stated within the appraisal clause as an appropriate issue for determination under that process The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's oral pronouncement. --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/barry-zalma/support

Immediate Notice Requirement Defeats Claim IHC Construction Companies, LLC ("IHC") and MA Rebar Services, Inc. ("MA Rebar"), appealed a final summary judgment entered in favor of Westfield Insurance Company ("Westfield") in Westfield's declaratory judgment action against IHC, MA Rebar, and Wayne McClure.   In  Westfield Insurance Company v. MA Rebar Services, Inc., IHC Construction Companies, LLC, and Wayne Kelly McClure, No. 1-23-0161, 2023 IL App (1st) 230161-U, Court of Appeals of Illinois, First District, Fourth Division (July 27, 2023) the Court of Appeals resolved the dispute. FACTS In 2016 IHC was the general contractor for a municipal construction project ("the Project") and that IHC had hired MA Rebar as a subcontractor on the Project. As a condition of its subcontract, MA Rebar was required to obtain liability insurance. In accordance with the subcontract, MA Rebar obtained the required insurance from Westfield and provided IHC with a certificate of insurance confirming such compliance. Wayne McClure filed a complaint against IHC alleging that he was injured as a result of IHC's negligence while working on the Project as an employee of MA Rebar. IHC promptly notified its insurance carrier, Hartford Insurance Company, of the suit, but it did not provide any notice to Westfield at that time. In July 2018, IHC filed a motion to dismiss McClure's complaint. After the circuit court denied the motion in October 2018, IHC filed a third-party complaint against MA Rebar seeking indemnification and contribution. Approximately three months later MA Rebar notified Westfield of IHC's third-party complaint against it. Westfield then sued for declaratory judgment  seeking declarations (1) that it has no duty to defend and indemnify MA Rebar and (2) that it owed no coverage obligation to IHC due to the six-month delay between the time that IHC learned of the McClure lawsuit and the time that Westfield received notice of the suit. The circuit court issued a final order granting Westfield's motion for summary judgment and denying IHC and MA Rebar's cross-motion. The circuit court below determined that IHC's notice to Westfield was untimely because IHC had not provided a justifiable excuse for its three- to six-month delay in notifying Westfield of McClure's claim. IHC failed to provide Westfield with notice of the suit for six months after it received service of the complaint. IHC's only justification for the delay in providing notice is that it was attempting to negate the need for insurance coverage by seeking dismissal of the case, but that does not justify the delay. Westfield was entitled to be informed of the suit "immediately," precisely to allow it to participate in defense actions like motions to dismiss.  IHC denied Westfield that contractual right by withholding notice while pursuing the motion to dismiss. The court concluded that the Insured failed to comply with the terms of an insurance policy notice provision requiring "immediate" notice of any claims when the insurer did not receive notice of a lawsuit against the insured until six months after service of the complaint on the insured. ZALMA OPINION The insured tried to reduce its premium, by moving to dismiss without reporting a claim, found itself to be its own worst enemy. Its scheme to save future premium increases resulted only to eliminate its insurance for McClure's claimed injury and lost over $10 million in available coverage and the unlimited defense costs. Ignorance can be cured but stupid attempts to save insurance premiums is not curable. (c) 2023 Barry Zalma & ClaimSchool, Inc. Please tell your friends and colleagues abo --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/barry-zalma/support

Condo Association are Birthplaces of Litigation Plaintiff, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company (Nationwide), brought a declaratory judgment action against insureds, Beverly Glen Homeowners' Association (Association) and members of the board of directors asking the court to declare that Nationwide had no duty to defend or indemnify defendants against claims made by the Association residents in a derivative suit. The trial court granted Nationwide's motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that res judicata and collateral estoppel barred defendants from seeking a defense in the derivative suit where judgment rendered in a prior case determined that Nationwide had no duty to defend. In Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v. Beverly Glen Homeowners' Association, et al, No. 3-22-0089, 2023 IL App (3d) 220089-U, Court of Appeals of Illinois, Third District (July 7, 2023) BACKGROUND This lawsuit arises out of an ongoing dispute between defendants and Teresa and Katarzyna Jagiello, two Association residents. On April 14, 2020, the trial court granted Nationwide's motion. It held that "There are no material issues of fact in dispute and it is clear, as a matter of law, that the lack of cooperation on the part of the insured and its counsel has relieved Nationwide of its duties under its policy .... Nationwide's insured failed to cooperate with Nationwide, relieving Nationwide of its duties under the policy, and Nationwide owes nothing to its insured...  for any legal services. As such, Nationwide owes neither a duty to defend nor indemnify its insured in this matter." ANALYSIS Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel The doctrine of res judicata serves to bar actions in which: (1) there was a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) there is an identity of cause of action; and (3) there is an identity of parties or their privies in both actions. Res judicata prevents the relitigation of issues that could have been decided in the first action along with those issues that were actually decided. The directors of a Condo Association act as the arms of the Association and for all intents and purposes are one and the same. In other words, there exists a legal relationship in which the directors, acting within their corporate authority, bind the Association. --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/barry-zalma/support

Anti-Stacking Provision Clear & Unambiguous Plaintiffs, Mark and Karen Kuhn (the Kuhns) sued seeking a declaratory judgment of the available liability insurance covering an accident between a semitruck owned by Jason Farrell and a school bus driven by Mark. In Mark Kuhn and Karen Kuhn v. Owners Insurance Company; et al, No. 4-22-0827, 2023 IL App (4th) 220827, Court of Appeals of Illinois, Fourth District (June 28, 2023) the semitruck was insured under a policy issued by Owners Insurance Company (Owners), and that policy also insured six other vehicles-two other semitrucks and four trailers- that were not involved in the accident. Each vehicle had a limit of $1 million per accident. The Kuhns sought a declaration that the coverage limits for all of the covered vehicles should be aggregated, or "stacked," resulting in a total of available liability insurance of $7 million for the accident. The trial court entered a written judgment in favor of the Kuhns, concluding that (1) the policy was ambiguous; (2) because the ambiguity should be construed against Owners, stacking of the policy's coverage limits was permitted; and (3) the aggregate limit of insurance for liability coverage under the policy was $7 million. Accordingly, the court granted the Kuhns' motion for summary judgment and entered judgment against Owners. Owners appealed BACKGROUND "Stacking” ordinarily involves combining or aggregating the policy limits applicable to more than one vehicle where the other vehicles are not involved in the accident. The Insurance Policy at Issue The policy provided "Combined Liability" coverage on each of the seven vehicles of up to "$1 Million each accident." The Kuhns argued that the wording of the policy and accompanying declarations were ambiguous pursuant to Illinois case law because the coverages and premiums set forth in the declarations were repeated for each insured vehicle. Owners argued that the policy declarations were consistent with each other and not ambiguous. In particular, subsection 5 explicitly stated that the limits for the same or similar coverage applying to other vehicles could not be added to determine the amount of coverage for an accident. ANALYSIS In general, antistacking provisions in insurance policies are not contrary to public policy. In Illlinois, an unambiguous antistacking clause will be given effect by a reviewing court. The coverages varied based on the vehicle insured; for example, the premiums for vehicle 1 and vehicle 2 (both semitrucks) were identical for liability, UIM/UM coverage, and medical payments, but only vehicle 1 had comprehensive and collision coverage. The Antistacking Clause Even if some ambiguity existed, the policy's antistacking clause cleared up any possible confusion. Instead of applying the Policy's clear anti-stacking provision, the trial court engaged in the very sort of tortured and strained reading of the Policy to find an ambiguity that this Court and the Illinois Supreme Court have repeatedly rejected. This was error, the trial court's order was reversed and the case remanded with directions to enter summary judgment in favor of Owners. ZALMA OPINION It should be axiomatic that a trial court should never engage in tortured or strained reading of a policy to find an ambiguity that did not exist. A clear and unambiguous policy wording that refuses to allow stacking of coverages that apply to more than one vehicle insured when only one vehicle is involved in an accident, should be enforced as written. The Illinois Court of Appeals read the entire policy and found no ambiguity and insisted on enforcing the contract of insurance as written. --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/barry-zalma/support

For our second episode of the new season, Title Nerds co-hosts Mike O'Donnell and Bethany Abele interviewed Steve Gottheim, General Counsel of the American Land Title Association (“ALTA”).  Steve discussed some of the primary issues of concern to ALTA and its members, including housing recession possibilities, public policy issues around increased access to affordable housing and, generating the most conversation, real estate and wire fraud.  Steve noted that ALTA is deeply involved in providing education and assistance to title insurance and real estate professionals to help avoid scams and to identify money laundering scenarios.  In addition, ALTA provides a host of educational materials about avoiding wire fraud for consumers and real estate agents.  Steve also touched on the proliferation of title monitoring services, and the need for home buyers to consider enhanced homeowners policies with title insurance fraud protection. Bethany then interviewed Riker Danzig associate Jim Mazewski about the complex title insurance coverage matter Findlay v Chicago Title Ins. Co., 2022 IL App (1st) 210889 (2022).  Therein, the Illinois Appellate Court, First Division, adopted the reasoning of other outside jurisdictions and held that title insurance claims were exempt from Illinois' “complete defense rule,” which requires that an insurer provide a defense on all claims raised against an insured even if only one of the claims is covered. In this matter, landlocked homeowners were able for years to easily access the Lake Michigan beach via  a beach easement across a portion of a neighboring lot, Lot 5.  However, when Lot 5 was purchased by a new owner, the new owner objected to neighbors cutting across his property and filed a lawsuit to prevent them from doing so.  The landlocked homeowners sought a declaratory judgment, implying that an ingress-egress easement existed on Lot 5.  The new owner of Lot 5 won that suit, and then sued Chicago Title, which had received claims from both parties to the first lawsuit as they were both insured by Chicago Title.  The plaintiff's suit against Chicago Title alleged conflict of interest, failing to provide coverage for all counts of the earlier litigation, and failing to approve of the plaintiff's retention of a new attorney. Failing at trial on all claims, the plaintiff appealed. In a decision in line with a growing body of caselaw, the appellate court found title insurance companies are not subject to the “complete defense rule.”  The Court also found that Chicago Title had the right to select counsel of its choosing, not the insured's.   Tune in to the podcast for an in-depth discussion of the Appellate Court's consideration of the plaintiff's claims leading to the decision.

There Must be an Actual Change in the Appearance, Shape, Color, Or Other Material Aspect Of The Property for Coverage to Apply Plaintiff MTDB Corporation d/b/a Striker Lanes (MTDB) sued seeking declaratory judgment action against defendant, American Auto Insurance Company (AAIC), seeking a declaration that AAIC owed it coverage for alleged business losses and property damage due to the COVID-19 pandemic. In MTDB Corporation D/B/A Striker Lanes v. American Auto Insurance Company, 2022 IL App (1st) 210979-U, No. 1-21-0979, Court of Appeals of Illinois, First District, Sixth Division (December 30, 2022) the Illinois Court of Appeal followed the Illinois Supreme Court requiring actual physical damage to property and refused coverage to the plaintiff. BACKGROUND MTDB sought coverage under the property coverage and the civil authority endorsement provisions of the policy. The policy at issue provided property, general liability, and automobile coverages for the policy period of August 19, 2019, to August 19, 20202. The relevant portions of the policy and Section A of the business income coverage form states that: "[w]e will pay for the actual loss of business income you sustain due to the necessary suspension of your operations during the period of restoration. The suspension must be caused by direct physical loss of or damage to property at the premises described in the Declarations, including personal property in the open (or in a vehicle) within 100 feet, caused by or resulting from any Covered Cause of Loss." --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/barry-zalma/support

Court Refuses to Strain to Find Ambiguity That Did Not Exist In ERIE INSURANCE EXCHANGE v. DRAGANA PETROVIC, No. 1-21-0628, 2022 IL App (1st) 210628-U, Court of Appeals of Illinois, First District, Second Division (November 15, 2022) the circuit court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the insurer declaring that it had no duty to indemnify or defend the insureds because the underlying accident occurred while the insured was operating his personal vehicle during the scope of employment, triggering the "auto exclusion" provision of the policy. Erie Insurance Exchange (Erie) sued the defendants, Aral Construction Company (Aral) and Arunas Alasevicius (Alasevicius) and Dragana Petrovic (Petrovic), seeking a declaration that Erie was not obligated to defend or indemnify Aral or Alasevicius in the underlying negligence claim brought by Petrovic. --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/barry-zalma/support

When Insurer Let's Insured Unilaterally Choose Additional Insureds it has no Standing to Complain An insurer, by drafting an open-ended additional insured endorsement that allowed its insured, by entering into contracts under which the insurer would be obligated to provide a defense to people unknown to the insurer and which did not require that its insured to obtain the insurer's approval of the contracts or require its insured to disclose the identities of the third parties or require that named insured name those parties as additional insureds. The insurer assumed the responsibility of providing defenses for certain unknown and unnamed third-party beneficiaries. In Westfield Insurance Company v. Walsh/K-Five Jv (I-14-4208); Walsh/K-Five Jv (I-14-4209); Walsh Construction Company Ii, Llc/K-Five Construction Company Jv, a Joint Venture; Walsh Construction Company Ii, Llc; K-Five Construction Corporation; Arch Insurance Company; and Royce Brown, Defendants, Walsh/K-Five JV (I-14-4208), Walsh/K-Five JV (I-14-4209), Walsh Construction Company II, LLC/K-Five Construction Company JV, a Joint Venture, Walsh Construction Company II, LLC, and K-Five Construction Corporation, 2022 IL App (1st) 210802-U, No. 1-21-0802, Court of Appeals of Illinois, First District, Third Division (August 17, 2022) compelled the insurer to live up to its agreements. FACTS Westfield Insurance Company (Westfield) filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a determination that it owed no duty to defend or indemnify defendants in an underlying personal injury lawsuit that occurred at a construction site at which Walsh and K-Five were operating a joint venture. In the underlying lawsuit, Royce Brown (Brown), an employee of VMR Contractors, Inc. (VMR), a subcontractor at the construction site, injured himself carrying rebar. Coverage under the Policy That's what occurred in this case. Because the plain language of the Contractors Endorsement mandates that the endorsement does not apply to "any person or organization covered as an additional insured on any other endorsement now or hereafter attached," the joint venture exclusion therein did not negate coverage for Walsh, K-Five or the Joint Venture, as additional insureds under the Additional Insured Endorsement. The Court of Appeal affirmed the circuit court's rulings that granted defendant Walsh Construction Company II, LLC's motion for a partial judgment on the pleadings, granted defendants Walsh/K-Five JV (I-14-4208), Walsh/K-Five JV (I-14-4209), Walsh Construction Company II, LLC/K-Five Construction Company JV and K-Five Construction Corporation's motions for partial summary judgment and denied plaintiff Westfield Insurance Company's motions for summary judgment where plaintiff had a duty to defend defendants. ZALMA OPINION Insurers who give away their underwriting pen to others have learned its decision was expensive. In this case the insurer gave the insured the right to make anyone with whom it contracted additional insureds. By so doing Westfield gave away its right to underwrite its obligation to insure and found it was insuring multiple people it had no idea, when it issued the policy, it insured. Cases like this one should cause insurers to reconsider whether it has sufficient premium to cover the risk it is letting its named insured to impose on it by entering into a contract with others. (c) 2022 Barry Zalma & ClaimSchool, Inc. --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/barry-zalma/support

Why do litigators feel comfortable dismembering emails, and showing deponents only fragments of the actual conversation? More importantly, why do they think it's okay? In this episode, Jim Garrity discusses "rule of completeness" objections, and why you need to make them. As always, be sure to check out the show notes, which contain the authorities on which each episode is based. The show notes below for this episode contain nine references to authorities. If you can't see them all wherever you download your podcasts, be sure to click through to our episode and podcast homepage, where the complete list is always displayed. Thanks for listening!Cases that begin with a double asterisk (**) were added after the episode was first aired.SHOW NOTES**House, et al v. Players' Dugout, et al., 2021 WL 4898071, No. 3:16-CV-00594-RGJ, 2021 WL 4898071, at *9 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 20, 2021) (stressing crucial nature of making of objections at deposition where error is curable, failing which objection is deemed waived)Fakes v. Eloy, 2014 IL App (4th) 121100, ¶ 88, 8 N.E.3d 93, 110 (“Indeed, the rule of completeness is not limited to discovery depositions but also applies to the following broad range of evidence: “Oral conversations, parts of written or recorded statements or in the nature of addenda thereto, and written or recorded statements neither part of the previously introduced written or recorded statement nor in the nature of addenda thereto may be introduced by an opposing party on his or her next examination of the same witness, whether cross or redirect, provided such evidence tends to explain, qualify, or otherwise shed light on the meaning of the evidence already received”)Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Theiss, 354 Md. 234, 253, 729 A.2d 965, 975 (1999) (to preserve a deposition objection to any error or irregularity that might be cured if a timely objection had been made at deposition, the objecting party must state the ground for the objection before the conclusion of the deposition, so that the opposing party will have a chance to cure or obviate the error or irregularity)Walker v. Spina, No. CIV 17-0991 JBSCY, 2019 WL 538458, at *18 (D.N.M. Feb. 11, 2019) (“By allowing the other party to present the remainder of the writing or recorded statement immediately rather than later on cross-examination, this rule avoids the situation where a statement taken out of context “creates such prejudice that it is impossible to repair by a subsequent presentation of additional material”)Walker v. Spina, No. CIV 17-0991 JBSCY, 2019 WL 538458, at *19 (D.N.M. Feb. 11, 2019) (nothing that courts have provided guidance on when the rule of completeness applies. See, e.g., United States v. Velasco, 953 F.2d 1467, 1475 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Castro-Cabrera, 534 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1160 (C.D. Cal. 2008)(Pregerson, J.). The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has applied a four-part test to determine whether to allow evidence under rule 106: “(1) does [the evidence] explain the admitted evidence, (2) does it place the admitted evidence in context, (3) will admitting it avoid misleading the trier of fact, and (4) will admitting it insure a fair and impartial understanding of all of the evidence.” Velasco)State v. Johnstone, 486 S.W.3d 424, 432–33 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016) (“This ‘rule' holds that a *433 party may introduce evidence of the circumstances of a writing, statement, conversation, or deposition so the jury can have a complete picture of the contested evidence introduced by the adversary.” State ex rel. Kemper v. Vincent, 191 S.W.3d 45, 49–50 (Mo. banc 2006) (emphasis added). “This rule seeks to ensure that an exhibit is not admitted out of context.” State v. Jackson, 313 S.W.3d 206, 211 (Mo.App.E.D.2010) (emphasis added). “The adverse party is entitled to introduce or to inquire into other parts of the whole exhibit in order to explain or rebut adverse inferences which might arise from the fragmentary or incomplete character of the evidence introduced”)Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(c)(1) (“The examination and cross-examination of a deponent proceed as they would at trial under the Federal Rules of Evidence, except Rules 103 and 615”)Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(6) (“If a party offers in evidence only part of a deposition, an adverse party may require the offeror to introduce other parts that in fairness should be considered with the part introduced, and any party may itself introduce any other parts”)Fed. R. Evid. 106. Remainder of or Related Writings or Recorded Statements (“If a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded statement, an adverse party may require the introduction, at that time, of any other part — or any other writing or recorded statement — that in fairness ought to be considered at the same time”)Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(c)(1) (“The examination and cross-examination of a deponent proceed as they would at trial under the Federal Rules of Evidence, except Rules 103 and 615. After putting the deponent under oath or affirmation, the officer must record the testimony by the method designated under Rule 30(b)(3)(A)” )

Explaining the Hazards of Failing to Reside in the Dwelling the Risk of Loss of Which Was Insured https://zalma.com/blog Insurance companies often see disputes relating to the terms “domicile” and “residence” when dealing with a homeowners policy. It is important, therefore, that everyone in the business of insurance must understand the meaning, and application, of the terms to insurance claims and how they relate to individuals and corporations that are insured or insurers. Although a person may have more than one residence, he or she may only have one domicile at any one time. [Nat'l Artists Mgmt. Co. v. Weaving, 769 F. Supp. 1224, 1227 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)]. The controlling factor in determining residency, on the other hand, is intent, as evidenced primarily by the acts, of the person whose residence is questioned. [Farmers Auto Insurance Ass'n v. Williams, 213 Ill. App. 3d 310, 314 (2001), Direct Auto Ins. Co. v. Grigsby, 2020 IL App (1st) 182642-U (Ill. App. 2020).] In the context of automobile insurance exclusions, residence is determined on a case-by-case basis using factors such as intent and relative permanence. [Potter v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 996 P.2d 781, 783 (Colo. App. 2000); Grippin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 409 P.3d 529 (Colo. App. 2016)] In Holland v Trinity Health Care Corp, 287 Mich App 524, 527-528; 791 NW2d 724 (2010) the Court defined the verb “reside” as to dwell permanently or for a considerable time, to live. In doing so, the Court expressly explained that the definition of "reside" is not synonymous with the legal definition of "domicile," which may have a more technical meaning than intended in the home insurance context under the policy language at issue. The term “reside” requires that the insured actually live at the property. The homeowners policy language unambiguously requires that the property at issue be the insured's "residence premises" for coverage to apply. It does not require that the property be the Insured's domicile. The "insured location" was defined in relevant part to mean "the residence premises," and the "residence premises" was defined to mean the dwelling where the insureds "reside and which is shown as the 'residence premises' in the Declarations." Faced with such clear and unambiguous language, a court is required to enforce the exact language of the policy that unambiguously required the insured to reside at the insured premises at the time of the loss. If the insured resided in a different location there could be no coverage. © 2021 – Barry Zalma --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/barry-zalma/support

Facts vs Perception On Race In Policing USA Today Article CUPES Study The Cases: Lawsuit Filed Challenging Mandatory Vaccination Of Corrections Employees, Legaretta v. Macias, 2021 WL 833390 (D.N.M. 2021). City Can Be Liable For ADA Violations Of Third-Party Evaluators, Gibbs v. City of Pittsburgh, 2021 WL 800255 (3rd Cir. 2021). Mandatory Retirement Not ‘Involuntary,’ Prospect Heights FPD v. Department of Employment Security, 2021 IL App (1st) 182525 (2021). Chief’s Questions About And Statements During Union Meetings Amount To Illegal ‘Direct Dealing,’ City of Paterson, 47 NJPER ¶ 70 (NJ PERC 2021). The post First Thursday, April 2021 appeared first on Labor Relations Information System.

This podcast with defense attorney James Doerr provides a discussion of the 2019 Illinois Supreme Court decision of People v. Patel involving discovery issues in DUI cases.

This podcast with defense attorney James Doerr will provide a discussion of the recent Illinois Supreme Court decision of People v. White. James will discuss the 4th Amendment, Search and Seizure, Motion to Suppress Evidence, and other legal issues of this case.

This podcast will provide a discussion of the recent appellate case of People v. Milan, 2020 IL App (1st) 172181. Join defense attorney James Doerr, as he discusses this recent appellate court decision. 

People v. Lampert, 2019 IL App (5th) 180248 (May). Episode 640 (Duration 16:08) Defendant crashes on the bridge from Illinois to Kentucky fun jurisdictional SNAFU ensues. Subscribe: Apple | Google | Spotify | Android | RSS | Direct Download APPLE PODCASTS GOOGLE PODCASTS SPOTIFY ANDROID RSS DIRECT DOWNLOAD Gist Kentucky police handled an Illinois DUI. The Illinois – Kentucky Border In Illinois v. […] The post DUI On A Bridge Causes Huge Jurisdiction Problem first appeared on IllinoisCaseLaw.com.

People v. Clifton, 2019 IL App (1st) 151967 (April). Episode 632 (Duration 8:20) Unduly suggestive ID, you make the call photos provided here. ** This opinion has photos. Subscribe: Apple | Google | Spotify | Android | RSS | Direct Download APPLE PODCASTS GOOGLE PODCASTS SPOTIFY ANDROID RSS DIRECT DOWNLOAD Charges & Sentence Defendant was found guilty of armed robbery and sentenced to 35 […] The post When A Perpetrator Description Can Be So Detailed And So Good It Damages The Photo Lineup (Photos Enclosed) first appeared on IllinoisCaseLaw.com.

People v. Bailey, 2019 IL App (3d) 180396 (May). Episode 631 (Duration 15:01) Food in your beard is not particularly indicative of anything. Subscribe: Apple | Google | Spotify | Android | RSS | Direct Download APPLE PODCASTS GOOGLE PODCASTS SPOTIFY ANDROID RSS DIRECT DOWNLOAD Charges The State charged defendant with two counts of DUI (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(1), (a)(2)), as well as other traffic […] The post DUI Probable Cause And Chicken Wing Hot Sauce In Your Beard first appeared on IllinoisCaseLaw.com.

People v. Campbell, 2019 IL App (1st) 161640 (April). Episode 630 (Duration 11:07) Court is not insensitive to claims of “dropsy” testimony and “testilying.” Subscribe: Apple | Google | Spotify | Android | RSS | Direct Download APPLE PODCASTS GOOGLE PODCASTS SPOTIFY ANDROID RSS DIRECT DOWNLOAD Charges Campbell was charged with nine counts of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1), […] The post Dropsy, Smells-Me, Front Seating, and Other Testilying Testimony Has To Be Weighed On It’s Own Merit first appeared on IllinoisCaseLaw.com.

People v. Rice, 2019 IL App (3d) 170134 (April). Episode 623 (Duration 7:36) A strong indication from the 3rd district on what the smell of weed means for a car search. Subscribe: Apple | Google | Spotify | Android | RSS | Direct Download APPLE PODCASTS GOOGLE PODCASTS SPOTIFY ANDROID RSS DIRECT DOWNLOAD Charges Defendant Jeremiah Paige Rice was charged with one […] The post 3 Districts All Have Said The Smell Of Weed Still Justifies A Car Search first appeared on IllinoisCaseLaw.com.

People v. Brandt, 2019 IL App (4th) 180219 (April). Episode 621 (Duration 17:08) Police use their own sense of smell to go get a warrant for a house. Subscribe: Apple | Google | Spotify | Android | RSS | Direct Download APPLE PODCASTS GOOGLE PODCASTS SPOTIFY ANDROID RSS DIRECT DOWNLOAD Charges Defendant was charged by information with unlawful possession with intent to deliver […] The post Forget The Dog Police Can Rely On Their Own Nose To Detect Cannabis first appeared on IllinoisCaseLaw.com.

People v. Patel, 2019 IL App (2d) 170766 (March). Episode 603 (Duration 19:01) State failed to produce discover for the SSS Hearing, they subsequently blew Trainor. Subscribe: Apple | Google | Spotify | Android | RSS | Direct Download APPLE PODCASTS GOOGLE PODCASTS SPOTIFY ANDROID RSS DIRECT DOWNLOAD Charges Defendant was charged with two counts of driving while under the influence of alcohol […] The post Court Is Taking The Discovery Rules Seriously In Summary Suspension Hearings first appeared on IllinoisCaseLaw.com.

People v. Spicer, 2019 IL App (3d) 170814 (March). Episode 602 (Duration 11:56) Can the prosecution compel you to give up your phone password? Subscribe: Apple | Google | Spotify | Android | RSS | Direct Download APPLE PODCASTS GOOGLE PODCASTS SPOTIFY ANDROID RSS DIRECT DOWNLOAD Charges Defendant was arrested for unlawful possession of a controlled substance and later also charged with knowingly […] The post Can The State Compel You To Give Up Your Phone Passcode? first appeared on IllinoisCaseLaw.com.

People v. Holmes, 2019 IL App (1st) 160987 (March). Episode 601 (Duration 9:33) An essentially anonymous tip was treated as wholly unreliable resulting in an outright reversal of this gun conviction. Subscribe: Apple | Google | Spotify | Android | RSS | Direct Download APPLE PODCASTS GOOGLE PODCASTS SPOTIFY ANDROID RSS DIRECT DOWNLOAD Gist Police approach a man with a gun and […] The post When Easily Identifiable Informants Are Treated As Anonymous Tipsters first appeared on IllinoisCaseLaw.com.

In re K.M., 2019 IL App (1st) 172322 (February). Episode 595 (Duration 13:05) Police entered onto private property without a warrant to retrieve stolen property, the fallout is widespread. Subscribe: Apple | Google | Spotify | Android | RSS | Direct Download APPLE PODCASTS GOOGLE PODCASTS SPOTIFY ANDROID RSS DIRECT DOWNLOAD Anonymous Call Sauk Village Police Department received an anonymous call on, around […] The post Police Search This Property Without A Warrant State Concedes Some Illegality first appeared on IllinoisCaseLaw.com.

People v. Day, 2019 IL App (4th) 160217 (January). Episode 588 (Duration 16:46) He wasn’t behind the wheel but state still proved he was driving. Subscribe: Apple | Google | Spotify | Android | RSS | Direct Download APPLE PODCASTS GOOGLE PODCASTS SPOTIFY ANDROID RSS DIRECT DOWNLOAD See also the subsequent opinion: People v. Day, 2019 IL App (4th) 160217-B  (September). Issue According to […] The post Defendant Says This Was A DUI With No Proof Of Driving first appeared on IllinoisCaseLaw.com.

This month’s cases: Firefighters, Facial Hair, The ‘Empty Vessel’ Of Light Duty, And The ‘Driving Calculus of Bureaucracy,’ Bey v. City of New York, 2020 WL 467507 (E.D.N.Y. 2020). Promise Of No Discipline? No Weingarten Rights, Fraternal Order of Transit Police, 51 PPER ¶ 51 (Penn. LRB ALJ 2020) Another Officer Loses A Brady Lawsuit Against A Prosecutor, Latty v. Polk County Sheriff’s Office, 2020 WL 485526 (D. Ore. 2020). Union Lawyer Not Liable To Member For Malpractice Claim, Zander v. Carlson, 2019 IL App (1st) 181868 (Ill. App. 2019) Prison Prep Time Compensable Under FLSA, Aguilar v. Management and... The post First Thursday, March 2020 appeared first on Labor Relations Information System.

After Illinois passed the Cannabis Regulation and Tax Act which became effective in 2020, can police still search a car when they smell cannabis? The Old “Smell Of Weed Rule” In Illinois Before Decriminalization Of 2020 The warrantless search of a car is authorized “where a trained and experienced police officer detects the odor of cannabis emanating from a defendant’s vehicle.” People v. Stout, 106 Ill.2d 77, 88 (1985) The question today, is if this rule survived the cannabis law change in 2020. In This Episode… “The officer would probably be better suited to try and find more information, more probable cause, to layer that probable cause.” — John “Jack” Duggan Attorney John Duggan Jack’s father is a retired Chicago Police Officer. Jack followed in his father’s footsteps and became a Police Officer for the Village of Oak Park. While working as a Police Officer, Jack decided to continue his studies and attended The John Marshall Law School.  Jack focuses his practice in the areas of Real Estate, Family Law, Estate Planning, and selected criminal matters. Jack Duggan’s Contact Information 782 Busse Highway Park Ridge, IL 60068 john@johnmdugganlaw.com http://www.johnmdugganlaw.com/ Attorney Jeff Hall “I basically call it the ‘sniff and search’ statute.” — Jeff Hall “I basically call it the ‘sniff and search’ statute.” – Jeff Hall Jeffrey R. Hall has practiced law since 2004, concentrating in the area of Criminal Law, DUI, Traffic Law, Driver’s License & FOID Card Reinstatement’s.  He began his legal career as an Assistant State’s Attorney in Tazewell County, IL. Jeff Hall helped draft SB228 (passed on July 29, 2016), the popular Cannabis Decriminalization Bill and was an integral part of the legislative process, changing Illinois law from a “Zero Tolerance” state for cannabis related DUIs, to a more reasonable law that focused more on impaired driving. Jeff Hall’s Contact Information 316 SW Washington Street, Suite 1A Peoria, IL 61602 jhall@hallrustomfritz.com http://www.centralillinoislawyers.com/ Links & Resources Cannabis Regulation and Tax Act Cannabis Control Act Illinois Vehicle Code The Sniff & Search Law – 625 ILCS 5/11-502.15 What The Illinois Cannabis Regulation And Tax Act Says About Lawful Limits? 410 ILCS 705/10-10. Possession Limit. “(a) Except if otherwise authorized by this Act, for a person who is 21 years of age or older and a resident of this State, the possession limit is as follows: (1) 30 grams of cannabis flower; (2) no more than 500 milligrams of THC contained in cannabis-infused product; (3) 5 grams of cannabis concentrate; and (4) for registered qualifying patients…” Strict Prohibition of Cannabis Possession For Those Under 21 410 ILCS 705/10-15. Persons under 21 years of age. “(b) Notwithstanding any other provisions of law authorizing the possession of medical cannabis, nothing in this Act authorizes a person who is under 21 years of age to possess cannabis. A person under 21 years of age with cannabis in his or her possession is guilty of a civil law violation as outlined in paragraph (a) of Section 4 of the Cannabis Control Act. (c) If the person under the age of 21 was in a motor vehicle at the time of the offense, the Secretary of State may suspend or revoke the driving privileges of any person for a violation of this Section under Section 6-206 of the Illinois Vehicle Code and the rules adopted under it.” Further Limitations And Prohibition Of Cannabis In Certain Places 410 ILCS 705/1-35. Limitations and penalties. “a) This Act does not permit any person to engage in, and does not prevent the imposition of any civil, criminal, or other penalties for engaging in, any of the following conduct… (2) possessing cannabis: (D) in a vehicle not open to the public unless the cannabis is in a reasonably secured sealed, container and reasonably inaccessible while the vehicle is moving; or… (3) using cannabis: (D) in any motor vehicle; (F)…in any public place; or (G) knowingly in close physical proximity to anyone under 21 years of age who is not a registered medical cannabis patient under the Compassionate Use of Medical Cannabis Program Act… 4) smoking cannabis in any place where smoking is prohibited under the Smoke Free Illinois Act;” The Cannabis Control Act Still Criminalizes Possession Of The Following Amounts Of Cannabis… 720 ILCS 550/4. Cannabis Control Act. “Except as otherwise provided in the Cannabis Regulation and Tax Act and the Industrial Hemp Act, it is unlawful for any person knowingly to possess cannabis. Any person who violates this Section with respect to: (c) more than 30 grams but not more than 100 grams of any substance containing cannabis is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor; provided, that if any offense under this subsection (c) is a subsequent offense, the offender shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony; (d) more than 100 grams but not more than 500 grams of any substance containing cannabis is guilty of a Class 4 felony; provided that if any offense under this subsection (d) is a subsequent offense, the offender shall be guilty of a Class 3 felony; (e) more than 500 grams but not more than 2,000 grams of any substance containing cannabis is guilty of a Class 3 felony; (f) more than 2,000 grams but not more than 5,000 grams of any substance containing cannabis is guilty of a Class 2 felony; (g) more than 5,000 grams of any substance containing cannabis is guilty of a Class 1 felony.” Delivery And Possession With Intent To Deliver Cannabis Remains Illegal 720 ILCS 550/5. Cannabis Control Act. “Except as otherwise provided in the Cannabis Regulation and Tax Act and the Industrial Hemp Act, it is unlawful for any person knowingly to manufacture, deliver, or possess with intent to deliver, or manufacture, cannabis. Any person who violates this Section with respect to: (a) not more than 2.5 grams of any substance containing cannabis is guilty of a Class B misdemeanor; (b) more than 2.5 grams but not more than 10 grams of any substance containing cannabis is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor; (c) more than 10 grams but not more than 30 grams of any substance containing cannabis is guilty of a Class 4 felony; (d) more than 30 grams but not more than 500 grams of any substance containing cannabis is guilty of a Class 3 felony for which a fine not to exceed $50,000 may be imposed; (e) more than 500 grams but not more than 2,000 grams of any substance containing cannabis is guilty of a Class 2 felony for which a fine not to exceed $100,000 may be imposed; (f) more than 2,000 grams but not more than 5,000 grams of any substance containing cannabis is guilty of a Class 1 felony for which a fine not to exceed $150,000 may be imposed; The Illinois Vehicle Code Still Criminalizes Cannabis Related DUI’s 625 ILCS 11-501. Driving while under the influence of alcohol, other drug or drugs, intoxicating compound or compounds or any combination thereof. “(a) A person shall not drive or be in actual physical control of any vehicle within this State while: (4) under the influence of any other drug or combination of drugs to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely driving; (7) the person has, within 2 hours of driving or being in actual physical control of a vehicle, a tetrahydrocannabinol concentration in the person’s whole blood or other bodily substance as defined in paragraph 6 of subsection (a) of Section 11-501.2 of this Code. Subject to all other requirements and provisions under this Section, this paragraph (7) does not apply to the lawful consumption of cannabis by a qualifying patient licensed under the Compassionate Use of Medical Cannabis Program Act who is in possession of a valid registry card issued under that Act, unless that person is impaired by the use of cannabis.” The “Sniff & Search” Law – 625 ILCS 5/11-501.15 625 ILCS 5/11-502.15. Possession of adult use cannabis in a motor vehicle. “(a) No driver may use cannabis within the passenger area of any motor vehicle upon a highway in this State. (b) No driver may possess cannabis within any area of any motor vehicle upon a highway in this State except in a sealed, odor-proof, child-resistant cannabis container. (c) No passenger may possess cannabis within any passenger area of any motor vehicle upon a highway in this State except in a sealed, odor-proof, child-resistant cannabis container. (d) Any person who knowingly violates subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this Section commits a Class A misdemeanor. “Can’t Miss” Moments From Episode 745 ✓ An officer who encounters the odor of cannabis in a car might have to start running through a mental checklist. What are the things they should be checking-off? (Go to 4:46) ✓ Legitimate law enforcement objectives are implicated by the smell of weed. After Illinois has decriminalized marijuana what legitimate law enforcement concerns remain on the table? (Go to 5:42) ✓ There is at least one situation where a car reeking of cannabis is going to get searched by the police. Jump to this spot to find out what that situation is. (Go to 7:50) ✓ What does a positive drug dog sniff mean now that some cannabis can be possessed legally? (Go to 11:50) ✓ How does the plain view doctrine affect this question? What have other legalized states done with this question of allowing officers to search car based on the smell of cannabis? (Go to 22:01) ✓ How a “sealed, odor-proof, child-resistant cannabis container” can be the difference between wide spread car searches in Illinois and/or very limited ones. (Go to 24:50) ✓ Urban Dictionary defines “hotboxing” as, “n. The practice of smoking marijuana in an enclosed space (e.g. a car or a small room) in order to maximize the narcotic effect.” (Go to 34:20) See Also You may also want to check out… People v. Rice, 2019 IL App (3d) 170134 (April). Episode 623 (Duration 7:36) (odor of cannabis indicative of criminal activity) Episode 556 – Interview With Charles Schierer | The Best Reason To Change The “Smell Of Cannabis” Rule Episode 509 – In re O.S., 2018 IL App (1st) 171765 (June) (1st District also says smell of weed rule is still valid)  Episode 584 – People v. Hill, 2019 IL App (4th) 180041 (January) (4th District says the same thing adding burnt or raw cannabis doesn’t matter that car is getting searched)  Episode 621 – People v. Brandt, 2019 IL App (4th) 180219 (April) (officer smelled cannabis and that justified the warrant)  Episode 340 – Kim Bilbrey on The Magic Words That Instantly Allow An Officer To Search A Car Without A Warrant Episode 558 – People v. Williams, 2018 IL App (2d) 160683 (October)(odor of alcohol alone means nothing) Episode 015 – People v. Abdur-Rhamim, 2014 IL App (3d) 130558 (August) (Police Can Search A Car In Illinois If The Smell Marijuana, So What Went Wrong Here For The Police?) Episode 276 – You Just Can’t Ignore The Stench Of Weed In An Auto Accident Episode 207 – With Ken Wang – Give Us 24 Minutes And You’ll Get a Comprehensive Debriefing on The New Illinois Marijuana Law Episode 251 – With Jeffrey Hall –  On The Latest Developments And Problems With The Illinois Cannabis Decriminalization Law Episode 196 – Dog Sniff Alert To Drugs Will Lead To Car Search

People v. Monroy-Jaimes, 2019 IL App (2d) 160426 (January). Episode 586 (Duration 9:38) Interesting use of an informant, how much of it was legal? Subscribe: Apple | Google | Spotify | Android | RSS | Direct Download APPLE PODCASTS GOOGLE PODCASTS SPOTIFY ANDROID RSS DIRECT DOWNLOAD Confidential Informant Police had an individual who was in custody for having possessed drugs with the […] The post When Is A Criminal Informant Considered A Witness Who Has To Testify? first appeared on IllinoisCaseLaw.com.

People v. Hill, 2019 IL App (4th) 180041 (January). Episode 584 (Duration 16:08) Officer sees passenger riding low in the seat and thinks it may be a guy wanted on warrant, turns out it wasn’t him. Subscribe: Apple | Google | Spotify | Android | RSS | Direct Download APPLE PODCASTS GOOGLE PODCASTS SPOTIFY ANDROID RSS DIRECT DOWNLOAD Issue Defendant filed a motion […] The post Traffic Stop Based On Mistaken Identity Leads To An Odor Of Cannabis first appeared on IllinoisCaseLaw.com.

People v. Relwani, 2019 IL 123385 (January). Episode 582 (Duration 10:18) You Can’t Be Suspended On Private Property: How To Prove A Private Property Recession of Suspension. Here’s the lower court opinion. People v. Relwani, 2018 IL App (3d) 170201 (February). Episode 471 (Duration 7:01) Subscribe: Apple | Google | Spotify | Android | RSS | Direct Download APPLE PODCASTS GOOGLE PODCASTS SPOTIFY ANDROID […] The post DUI License Suspension On Private Property first appeared on IllinoisCaseLaw.com.

Episode 724 (Duration 33:57). Chicago defense attorney Peter Lewis explains what a litigant can do when their criminal discovery is missing the police body cam video. In This Case... The State's Attorney's position is if they didn't get it from the police then it doesn't exist. Attorney Peter Lewis Am I Entitled To Have The Police Body Cam In My Case? Yes. Generally, speaking a criminal defendant is going to be entitled to possess a copy of the police body cam or cams involved in his or her case. The interesting question is what to do when you don't get it. Attorney Peter Lewis Peter Lewis has been an Illinois attorney since 2004. He currently has an extensive criminal law practice. He handles cases throughout Cook County and the collar counties. Contact Information 5508 West Lawrence Ave Chicago, IL 60630 773-853-0223 http://pwlewislaw.com/ Main Areas Of Law  In Chicago what are the three main areas of law that govern the police use of body cameras? United States Department of Justice & Chicago Police Department Consent Decree Illinois Law Enforcement Officer-Worn Body Camera Act Chicago Police Department Special Order S03-14 on Body Worn Cameras What Does The Consent Decree Say About Body Cam? What does the Justice Department's Chicago Police Department Consent Decree say about the use of police body cams? On page 6 of the report it says, ...that the Justice Department supports the City’s decision to accelerate its plan to ensure that all CPD officers have body cameras. In the "Recommendations" section of the report, it says that CPD should "adopt use of force practices that minimize the use of fore." Subsection (i) states, Equip all patrol officers and supervisors, and officers who regularly interact with the public, including tactical officers, with body cameras, and develop a body camera policy delineating officers’ responsibilities regarding the consistent and appropriate use of body cameras and the retention and review of body camera footage. Consent Decree Important Details From The Illinois Body Cam Act ✓ The Illinois Law Enforcement Officer-Worn Body Camera Act does not require that police departments employ body cams. The act merely provides guideline for departments that wish to use them. The act also includes minimal feature and procedures that must be followed if a department chooses to use body cams. (Go to 4:04) ✓ "No officer may hinder or prohibit any person, not a law enforcement officer, from recording a law enforcement officer in the performance of his or her duties in a pubic place or when the officer has no reasonable expectation of privacy." 50 ILCS 706/10-20(11) ✓ Generally, body cam videos ARE NOT subject to FOIA requests unless you have been arrested, are a victim, or a witness. See 50 ILCS 706/10-20(b) Did You Know? ✓ As of right now every single Chicago Police Department patrol officer is suppose to be using a fully functioning and operable body cam device. (Go to 2:59) What You Need To Know About The Chicago Police Department Body Cam Special Order The policy says in clear unmistakable terms that, All sworn members and their immediate supervisors assigned to a Bureau of Patrol district normally assigned to field duties and any other member at the discretion of the district commander will be assigned and utilize a BWC. CPD Special Order S03-14 This is one of the most important things listed in Special Order S03-14, it's under the "Operational Procedures" section. (Go to 6:20) An attorney trying to hunt down body cam footage may want to know the following to help facilitate the search (Go to 10:08): Name of person arrested Date of arrest RD number Incident number Name of officers involved Badge number of officers involved Beat Number ✓ CPD currently has 8,200 video cams issued to officers. This should be enough to cover the entire patrol division. (Go to 14:50) "Can't Miss" Moments: ✓ In video recordings you often see an officer stop and do this with his equipment right before he engages with a subject. (Go to 7:01) ✓ Body cam equipment involves more than a camera. The devices includes a camera and hard drive that can hold at least 10 hour of video. At the end of a shift all the recordings go into one master super data base. (Go to 8:04) ✓ Peter says CPD should not be allowed to do this one critical thing in regards to this body cam issue. A third independent body should involved and do this when there is an arrest. (Go to 9:16) ✓ You ever hear of a beat number and RD number? You may want to know what these are if you're hunting down body cam recordings. Peter Lewis explains this, just (Go to 9:16). ✓ This one fact provides the state with zero motivation to hunt and search for something that might exist but is buried somewhere. (Go to 12:25) ✓ The question then is what do we do when you know a video exists but for some reason it was not tendered to you during discovery? (Go to 14:16) ✓ These particular police units come into a lot of contact with the public. You could say they're in the thick of it. Oddly, these units don't wear body cams. What's that all about? (Go to 14:50) What Do You Do When You Don't Get Police Body Cam In Your Discovery? ✓ The question then is what do we do when you know a video exists but for some reason it was not tendered to you during discovery? (Go to 14:16) ✓ A Kladis motion is often filed when there has been a violation of discovery. This remedy is rare, but it can lead to the suppression of evidence. (Go to 18:30) ✓ Peter's discovery violation motion is titled, "Motion To Exclude Testimony of State's Witnesses And For Other Relief Or Sanction The Court Deems Appropriate". It incorporates parts of the state statute and the CPD special order. (Go to 19:00) If a court or other finder of fact finds by a preponderance of the evidence that a recording was intentionally not captured, destroyed, altered, or intermittently captured in violation of this Act, then the court or other finder of fact shall consider or be instructed to consider that violation in weighing the evidence, unless the State provides a reasonable justification. 50 ILCS 706/10-30 ✓ The State statute is kind of soft. It doesn't exactly say that evidence can be barred or excluded. (Go to 22:36) ✓ This is a last ditch effort thing to do when you see that a judge is not going to give you sanctions for missing body cam video. Do this when you got no other cards to play. (Go to 25:50) Links & Resources United States Department of Justice & Chicago Police Department Consent Decree More About The CPD Consent Decree 50 ILCS 706/10-1 et seq. - Illinois Law Enforcement Officer-Worn Body Camera Act Chicago Police Department Special Order S03-14 on Body Worn Cameras People v. Kladis, 2011 IL 110920 How Often Do Chicago Police Officers Fail To Activate Their Body Cameras? It’s Hard To Know - CBS Chicago Key Body Camera Footage Missing After Chicago Police Officers Raid Wrong Homes, Point Guns At Children - CBS Chicago See Also You may also want to check out... People v. Montgomery, 2018 IL App (2d) 160541 (October). Episode 555 (Duration 14:02) (What To Do, What To Do About Lost, Destroyed, or Missing Video?) People v. Cunningham, 2018 IL App (1st) 153367 (June). Episode 517 (Duration 12:37) (Significance Of The Evidence And Bad Faith Drive Discovery Violation And Destruction Of Evidence Issues) People v. Moravec, 2015 IL App (1st) 133869 (November 2015). Episode 105 (Duration 8:00) (Defendant wins sanctions to exclude all evidence after CPD ignores repeated requests for the POD video.) Episode 320 (Duration 52:38) (Behind The Scenes Of The Curtis Lovelace Trial | Attorney Evan Parke Discloses How The Defense Team Made Use Of FOIA)

People v. Rowell, 229 Ill. 2nd 82 (May 2008). Episode 686 (Duration 31:58) What's the best way to handle legally insufficient criminal charges? In this episode you get a feel for what it's like working in the criminal law. Subscribe: Apple Podcasts | Google Podcasts | Spotify | Android | RSS | Direct Download APPLE PODCASTS GOOGLE PODCASTS SPOTIFY ANDROID RSS DIRECT DOWNLOAD Illinois attorney Alan Downen walks us through the detailed intricacies of just one issue in criminal litigation: In This Episode... "There's an old saying about losing your 'tall'. 'Tall' is your favorite marble." -- Alan Downen. Illinois Attorney Alan Downen Alan Downen has been a member of the Illinois bar since 1974. He's a solo practitioner concentrating his practice in the areas of criminal, DUI, traffic law. His office is in McLeansboro, Illinois. "Can't Miss" Moments: ✓ Here's an example of the kind of fatally flawed or legally insufficient charging document we are talking about: A defendant charged with aggravated domestic battery is charged by information. However, the information is missing the mental state. It doesn't state if defendant acted "knowingly" or "intentionally". It also omits the type of battery the defendant is alleged to have done. It doesn't say if he caused bodily harm or committed insulting or provoking contact. (Go to 3:35) ✓ What's the law now? What does a court do when it's confronted with a legally insufficient complaint? Well it depends. There are two legal standards. If a motion to dismiss is filed pretrial the court will adopt a "strict construction" policy and automatically dismiss the charges without prejudice. That means the state is free to refile. If the motion to dismiss if filed on appeal or after the trial is over then a defendant must show prejudice to get the charges dismissed. (Go to 5:07) ✓ Some defense attorneys say they don't the prosecution a darn thing. There's nothing wrong with lying in the weeds and springing the issue on the state when the time is right. (Go to 6:40) ✓ Why some judges really hate a motion to dismiss, and why they'll accuse you of "sandbagging" and other dastardly legal things.  (Go to 7:16) & (Go to 15:40) ✓ "Like any attorney, if the judge asks you a question and you answer like this, 'Yea - I'm ready to go' when you know that there's a problem. That's kinda troublesome to me as an attorney...But that's kinda the scenario." (Go to 8:42) ✓ The problem with informing the state they have a bad charge. (Go to 9:20) ✓ Why it better to save your motion to dismiss until after the trial has started. Sure, you have to show prejudice but a few cases demonstrate that can be done.  (Go to 9:51) ✓ The thing about the Rowell case is that it really highlights how a defense attorney can go about demonstrating the prejudice that results to an accused with a fatally flawed charging document is filed against them.  This is the "bible" on insufficient charging instruments. (Go to 11:49) ✓ Talk about getting caught in court with your pants down. This might be every prosecutor's worst nightmare.  (Go to 11:20) ✓ The number one lesson for prosecutors about this discussion is this. Some of them will do it. Many more won't and that's exactly why criminal defense can be so fun sometimes.  (Go to 13:55) ✓ Why defense attorneys sometimes win by filing "the wrong" motion against all precedent and contrary to clearly applicable laws, and why judges are quick to grant you these "meritless" motions. (Go to 17:49) ✓ "You have a duty to the court as a lawyer to be honest and forthright. But you also have a duty to your client. Sometimes, as you say, the lines are just real clear." (Go to 22:29) ✓ What an older attorney told Alan about the practice of law. Why sometimes it's best to do nothing even when you know something can be done. (Go to 24:25) Links & Resources 725 ILCS 5/11-3(a)(3) states that In Illinois "a charge shall be in writing and allege the commission of an offense by: Setting forth the nature and elements of the offense charged;" People v. Rowell, 229 Ill. 2nd 82 (May 2008) (Illinois Supreme Court finds prejudice to the defense from a fatally flawed charging document.) People v. Pendleton, 2017 IL App (3d) 140814-U (March) (trial court erred in denying defendant’s midtrial motion to dismiss because defendant was prejudiced by the insufficient charges) See Also You may also want to check out... Episode 419 - People v. Sheley, 2017 IL App (3d) 140659 (October) (concurring opinions discussing "sandbagging" and why it's a disfavored practice) Episode 399 - People v. Frazier, 2107 IL App(5th) 140493 (July) (defense attorney accused of being ineffective for filing the motion to dismiss after the trial had started) Episode 249 - People v. Swift, 2016 IL App (3d) 140604 (October) (because defendant waited until the trial to begin he had to show prejudice to win a dismissal)

People v. Kruckenberg, 2019 IL App (3d) 170505-U. Episode 628 (Duration 31:43). Matthew Paulson and Larry Vandersnick describe a drug interdiction traffic stop and analyze where it went wrong for the prosecution. Subscribe: Apple | Google | Spotify | Android | RSS | Direct Download APPLE PODCASTS GOOGLE PODCASTS SPOTIFY ANDROID RSS DIRECT DOWNLOAD In This Episode… “The appellate court is […] The post How Defense Attorneys Convince A Judge That A Traffic Stop Is Bad first appeared on IllinoisCaseLaw.com.

People v. Caraballo, 2019 IL App (1st) 171993 (March). Episode 613 (Duration 12:55) (Officer was not certified at the time of the breathalyzer, but was he substantially certified?) This is a DUI stop with an arrest. Subscribe: Apple | Google | Spotify | Android | RSS | Direct Download APPLE PODCASTS GOOGLE PODCASTS SPOTIFY ANDROID RSS DIRECT DOWNLOAD Gist The jury found defendant […] The post Police Officer’s Breathalyzer Certification Was Expired Becomes A Big Problem In This DUI first appeared on IllinoisCaseLaw.com.

People v. Rebollar-Vergara, 2019 IL App (2d) 140871 (March). Episode 616 (Duration 15:29) Defendant gets into an argument with a guy and his buddy ups and shoots him, then sloppy questioning happens in the grand jury room. Subscribe: Apple | Google | Spotify | Android | RSS | Direct Download APPLE PODCASTS GOOGLE PODCASTS SPOTIFY ANDROID RSS DIRECT DOWNLOAD Facts Defendant and his buddy […] The post Officers Have To Be Very Careful About How They Answer Questions In The Grand Jury Room first appeared on IllinoisCaseLaw.com.

People v. Cunningham, 2019 IL App (1st) 160709 (March). Episode 611 (Duration 9:18) Defendant gets 3 years for shooting himself in the leg in a housing project; this UUW version is constitutional. Subscribe: Apple | Google | Spotify | Android | RSS | Direct Download APPLE PODCASTS GOOGLE PODCASTS SPOTIFY ANDROID RSS DIRECT DOWNLOAD See Also These Prior Constitutionality Cases Episode 610 – […] The post It’s Completely Legal To Ban Guns From Public Housing first appeared on IllinoisCaseLaw.com.

People v. Thomas, 2019 IL App (1st) 170474 (March). Episode 609 (Duration 11:51) Police see a defendant hand a gun to another person and then try to run and hide. Subscribe: Apple | Google | Spotify | Android | RSS | Direct Download APPLE PODCASTS GOOGLE PODCASTS SPOTIFY ANDROID RSS DIRECT DOWNLOAD First See Episode 552 – People v. Bonilla, 2018 IL 122484 (October) (Supreme Court […] The post Police Chase Some Men, See A Gun And Arrest Them – Is That Legal? first appeared on IllinoisCaseLaw.com.

People v. Bowden, 2019 IL App (3d) 170654 (February). Episode 591 (Duration 11:29) Another example of evidence that was admitted to demonstrate the course of the police investigation. Subscribe: Apple | Google | Spotify | Android | RSS | Direct Download APPLE PODCASTS GOOGLE PODCASTS SPOTIFY ANDROID RSS DIRECT DOWNLOAD Facts The officer was following defendant’s vehicle, in Carthage, Illinois, in the westbound […] The post Downstate Police Department Takes Advantage Of This Weird Traffic Line To Stop Cars first appeared on IllinoisCaseLaw.com.

Episode 579 (Duration 16:25) What is happening in Illinois with the mistake of law doctrine? Here is a round up of recent mistake of law cases. In Re Maurice J. In re Maurice J., 2018 IL App (1st) 172123 (June). Episode 506 (Duration 8:18) Officer not knowing the traffic law he says he was enforcing is not the same as […] The post What Happens When Police Are Wrong About The Traffic Law – The Barney Fife Traffic Stop first appeared on IllinoisCaseLaw.com.

People v. Pratt, 2018 IL App (5th) 170427 (December). Episode 574 (Duration 6:41) Warrantless blood draw after an accident deemed unconstitutional blood results excluded. Gist The Ford Expedition he was driving struck a tractor trailer, causing extensive damage to the defendant’s vehicle. Daniel Tutor, a passenger in the defendant’s vehicle, died at the scene. The defendant sustained […] The post Police Have To Be Reminded To Go Get A Warrant Before They Draw Dude’s Blood first appeared on IllinoisCaseLaw.com.

People v. Mueller, 2018 IL App (2d) 170863 (December). Episode 572 (Duration 8:47) Jeep touches the traffic lines 3 times and gets stopped, reasonable? Charges Defendant was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(1), (a)(2)) and improper lane usage (ILU) (625 ILCS 5/11-709(a)). Innocent Left Turn Defendant’s Jeep was stopped in the […] The post What If You Just Touch The Line But Don’t Cross It Can You Be Stopped? first appeared on IllinoisCaseLaw.com.

People v. Quigley, 2018 IL App (1st) 172560 (November). Episode 565 (Duration 9:50) He was plastered and sends his car air born on the expressway, nonetheless, he says his hospital blood can’t be considered in a civil suspension hearing. Gist Defendant was involved in a multi-car collision and was transported from the scene by ambulance to […] The post Defendant Argued His Hospital Blood Could Not Be Used Against Him In A Civil Suspension Hearing first appeared on IllinoisCaseLaw.com.

People v. Sadeq, 2018 IL App (4th) 160105 (November). Episode 563 (Duration 15:18) Steigmann says the delay to have the drug dog come out was justified because defendant was, in part, extremely nervous. Gist Traffic stop leads to a dog sniff and a car search. Stolen cigarettes destined for resale were discovered in the car. The Trooper […] The post Driver’s Nervousness Justified The Delay For The Drug Dog To Come Out first appeared on IllinoisCaseLaw.com.

People v. Williams, 2018 IL App (2d) 160683 (October). Episode 558b (Duration 11:25) Challenging this DUI traffic stop gave us a reason to review exactly what it takes for police to find probable cause for a DUI arrest in Illinois. Subscribe: Apple | Google | Spotify | Android | RSS | Direct Download APPLE PODCASTS GOOGLE PODCASTS SPOTIFY ANDROID RSS DIRECT DOWNLOAD The Stop […] The post DUI Arrest, What Is The Minimum Amount Of Evidence Required? first appeared on IllinoisCaseLaw.com.

People v. Montgomery, 2018 IL App (2d) 160541 (October). Episode 555 (Duration 14:02) It’s unclear if the video ever existed, regardless, it was not tendered to defense counsel, and it’s unclear what’s the best remedy. Gist Defendant was cited for DUI involving alcohol, DUI involving drugs, and various traffic offenses. Before trial, the state was ordered […] The post What To Do, What To Do About Lost, Destroyed, or Missing Video? first appeared on IllinoisCaseLaw.com.

People v. Lopez, 2018 IL App (1st) 153331 (October). Episode 549 (Duration 12:56) Is the identity of a driver subject to suppression after an illegal traffic stop? Gist On appeal, defendant contends that the court erred in denying his motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. Specifically, he argues that the anonymous tip relied upon by […] The post Anonymous Tip On A DUI Has Got To Be Specific Plus Identity Information Is Suppressible first appeared on IllinoisCaseLaw.com.