Podcast appearances and mentions of jamil anderlini

President Biden entered office with ambitious foreign policy goals and is leaving a complicated legacy. Though he navigated the global COVID-19 pandemic, rallied allies to support Ukraine, and implemented policies to address climate change, challenges such as the chaotic Afghanistan withdrawal, record illegal border crossings, the war in Gaza, and high inflation marred his term. The Gaza cease-fire that looks eminent mirrors a Biden proposal, yet Donald Trump has claimed credit for the deal. Will Biden's presidency be remembered as an interlude between two Trump terms? Jamil Anderlini, Anton La Guardia, and Carla Anne Robbins join Ivo Daalder on this week's World Review to evaluate Biden's foreign policy record and what he leaves behind for Trump, including the Gaza cease-fire deal that Israel's cabinet still needs to ratify and waning public support for continuing to aid to Ukraine.  

US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan visited Beijing this week for high-level talks with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, laying the groundwork for another Xi-Biden summit. Meanwhile, clashes between the Philippines and China in the South China Sea have sparked fears of a wider conflict. Then, the arrest of Telegram CEO Pavel Durov in France has ignited controversy over free speech, encryption, and digital rights. Yasmeen Abutaleb, Jamil Anderlini, and Peter Spiegel join World Review with Ivo Daalder to discuss the potential significance of the CEO's arrest, plus Russia's hybrid attacks on NATO countries.

The World Central Kitchen has suspended operations in Gaza after an Israeli airstrike killed 7 aid workers. Another Israeli airstrike in Damascus is igniting fears of retaliatory strikes from Iran. Meanwhile, Turkey's nationwide local elections dealt Turkish President Erdogan's ruling AK Party a major electoral defeat, signaling a change in Turkey's political landscape, as the main opposition group claimed victory in major cities. Plus, the United States and United Kingdom signed an agreement on AI safety testing. Deborah Amos, Jamil Anderlini, and Ryan Heath join the Council's Ivo Daalder to discuss these issues.

Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelensky makes a plea to Congress for more U.S. aid to fight Russia, though chances of passing a deal hang in the balance. The divide between President Joe Biden and Israel Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu widens after Biden warns that Israel is losing international support for its war against Hamas. And Poland elects a new Prime Minister, ending eight years of conservative rule. Deborah Amos, Jamil Anderlini, and Peter Spiegel join the Council's Ivo Daalder on this week's World Review to discuss these issues.

The disappearance of China's defense minister General Li and former foreign minister Qun Gang raises questions about a potential purge in Xi's government. Global leaders gathered for the annual meeting at the U.N. General Assembly to discuss their highest priorities. Plus, how did the U.S. and Iran reach a $6 billion prisoner swap deal? The Council's Ivo Daalder unpacks these issues with Jamil Anderlini, Bobby Ghosh, and Susan Glasser on World Review. 

Anti-French rhetoric fuels the coup in Niger as West African countries meet to discuss the crisis. Then, Saudi Arabia hosts senior officials from over 40 countries to discuss ending the war in Ukraine—without Russia at the table. Plus, China's economy falls into deflation and the foreign minister remains missing. The Council's Ivo Daalder dives in with Jamil Anderlini, Catherine Philp, and Peter Spiegel on World Review.

Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen heads to China as part of the Biden administration's continuing effort to normalize relations with the PRC. Israel's recent raid on the West Bank's Jenin Camp raises fresh concerns for human rights and the Palestinian peace process. And finally, Ukraine tops the agenda at NATO's Vilnius summit, but what commitments does it want and what will it realistically get? Council CEO Ivo Daalder dives in with Jamil Anderlini, Bobby Ghosh, and Susan Glasser on World Review.

The U.S. dollar's status as the global reserve currency is diminishing, which reduces the power that U.S. leaders have over the global economic system. In this episode, hear highlights from recent Congressional testimony during which financial elites examine the current status of the global financial system and what Congress is being told to do to address perceived threats to it (and to their own power). Please Support Congressional Dish – Quick Links Contribute monthly or a lump sum via PayPal Support Congressional Dish via Patreon (donations per episode) Send Zelle payments to: Donation@congressionaldish.com Send Venmo payments to: @Jennifer-Briney Send Cash App payments to: $CongressionalDish or Donation@congressionaldish.com Use your bank's online bill pay function to mail contributions to: 5753 Hwy 85 North, Number 4576, Crestview, FL 32536. Please make checks payable to Congressional Dish Thank you for supporting truly independent media! View the show notes on our website at https://congressionaldish.com/cd276-the-demise-of-dollar-dominance Background Sources Recommended Congressional Dish Episodes CD269: NDAA 2023/Plan Ecuador CD230: Pacific Deterrence Initiative CD195: Yemen CD187: Combating China CD102: The World Trade Organization: COOL? International Monetary Fund “IMF Financial Activities List 2023.” Updated June 21, 2023. International Monetary Fund. “Weekly Report on Key Financial Statistics.” June 9, 2023. International Monetary Fund. “IMF Lending.” Updated December 2022. International Monetary Fund. Argentina “Argentina: Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, and Technical Memorandum of Understanding” October 17, 2018. International Monetary Fund. “Argentina Policy Memorandum.” January 11, 1999. International Monetary Fund. Ecuador “Ecuador—Supplementary Letter of Intent.” March 13, 2003. International Monetary Fund. Smaller Banks within the World Trade System International Finance Corporation China “Members and Observers.” World Trade Organization. “ China and the WTO.” World Trade Organization. “From ‘China Shock' to deglobalisation shock: China's WTO accession and US economic engagement 20 years on.” Stephen Kirchner. January 24, 2022. United States Studies Centre. “The China Reckoning: How Beijing Defied American Expectations.” Kurt M. Campbell and Ely Ratner. February 13, 2018. Foreign Affairs. The World Bank “Who can borrow from the World Bank?” December 10, 2020. Bretton Woods Observer. “Domination of the United States on the World Bank.” Eric Toussaint. April 2, 2020. Committee for the Abolition of Illegitimate Debt. “Why Is the World Bank Still Lending to China?” Yukon Huang. January 15, 2020. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Congressional Stock Trade Tracking Quiver Quantitative Unusual Whales US Abuse of Sanctions “The Other Counteroffensive to Save Ukraine.” Lawrence Summers et. al. June 15, 2023. Foreign Affairs. Allies Pivoting “Europe must resist pressure to become ‘America's followers,' says Macron.” Jamil Anderlini and Clea Caulcutt. April 9, 2023. Politico. “US State Dept backs latest raft of Saudi, UAE, Jordan arms sales.” February 2, 2022. Al Jazeera. Witnesses Mark Rosen on Linkedin Daniel F. Runde on Linkedin “Membership Roster.” Accessed June 24, 2023. Council on Foreign Relations. Tyler Goodspeed on Linkedin Carla Norrlof - “Board of Directors.” Atlantic Council. Daniel McDowell bio Marshall Billingslea on Linkedin Audio Sources Dollar Dominance: Preserving the U.S. Dollar's Status as the Global Reserve Currency June 7, 2023 House Financial Services Committee Watch on YouTube Witnesses: Dr. Tyler Goodspeed, Kleinheinz Fellow, Hoover Institution at Stanford University Dr. Michael Faulkender, Dean's Professor of Finance, Robert H. Smith School of Business at University of Maryland Dr. Daniel McDowell, Associate Professor, Maxwell School of Citizenship & Public Affairs at Syracuse University Marshall Billingslea, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute Dr. Carla Norrlöf, Senior Fellow, The Atlantic Council and Professor, University of Toronto Clips 34:05 Dr. Tyler Goodspeed: In 2022, as the Ranking Member highlighted, 88% of all foreign exchange transactions by value involved the United States Dollar, a figure that has been roughly constant since 1989, which is testament to the substantial path dependence in international currency usage due to large positive network externalities. As the Ranking Member also highlighted, 59% of all official foreign exchange reserves were held in US dollars, which is down from a figure of 71.5% in 2001. By comparison 31% of all foreign exchange transactions by value involve the Euro, which is the second most commonly transacted currency, which accounted for 20% of official foreign exchange reserves. 34:50 Dr. Tyler Goodspeed: The fact that 90% of all foreign exchange transactions continue to involve the United States dollar, and that global central banks continue to hold almost 60% of their foreign exchange reserves in US dollars confers net economic benefits on the United States economy. First, foreign demand for reserves of US dollars raises demand for dollar denominated securities, in particular United States Treasury's. This effectively lowers the cost of borrowing for US households, US companies, and federal, state and local governments. It also means that on average, the United States earns more on its investments in foreign assets than we have to pay on foreign investments in the United States, which allows the United States to import more goods and services than we export. Second, foreign demand for large reserves of US dollars and dollar denominated assets raises the value of the dollar and a stronger dollar benefits us consumers and businesses that are net importers of goods and services from abroad. Third, large reserve holdings of US currency abroad in effect constitutes an interest free loan to the United States worth about $10 to $20 billion per year. Fourth, the denomination of the majority of international transactions in US dollars likely modestly lowers the exchange rate risks faced by US companies. Fifth, the given the volume of foreign US dollar holdings and dollar denominated debt, monetary policy actions by foreign central banks generally have a smaller impact on financial conditions in the United States than actions by the United States Central Bank have on financial conditions in other countries. 36:40 Dr. Tyler Goodspeed: However, the benefits of the US dollar's global reserve status are not without costs. The lower interest rates in the United States benefit US borrowers, especially the federal government. They also lower returns to US savers. In addition, though a stronger dollar benefits US consumers and businesses that net import goods and services from abroad, it does also disadvantage US firms that export goods and services abroad as well as firms that compete against imported goods and services. Furthermore, the perception of the US dollar as a safe haven asset means that demand for the dollar tends to increase in response to adverse macroeconomic events that are global in nature. As a result, the competitiveness of US exporters and US firms that compete against imported goods and services are likely to face an increased competitive disadvantage at times of elevated global macroeconomic stress. 37:35 Dr. Tyler Goodspeed: However, despite these costs, studies generally find that the economic benefits of the dollar's prominent global status outweigh the costs, providing a modest net benefit to the United States economy. This does not include the substantial benefit to which the chairman referred of the United States dollar's centrality in global transactions, allowing the United States to utilize financial sanction tools when appropriate in support of national security objectives. 44:50 Dr. Daniel McDowell: With little more than the stroke of the President's pen or through an Act of Congress, the US government can use financial sanctions to impose enormous economic costs on targeted foreign actors, be they individuals, firms, or state institutions, by freezing their dollar assets or cutting them off from access to the banks through which those dollars flow. The consequences for individual targets, known as specially designated nationals or SDNs, are severe, significantly impairing targets capacity to participate in international trade, investment, debt repayment, and depriving them of access to their wealth. Over the last two decades, the United States has used the tool of financial sanctions with increasing frequency. For example, in the year 2000, just four foreign governments were directly targeted under a US Treasury Country Program overseen by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). Today that number is greater than 20, and if we include penalties from secondary sanctions the list gets even longer. The more that the United States has reached for financial sanctions, the more it has made adversaries and foreign capitals aware of the strategic vulnerability that stems from dependence on the dollar. Some governments have responded by implementing anti-dollar policies measures that are designed to reduce an economy's reliance on the US currency for investment in cross-border transactions. But these measures sometimes fail to achieve their goals. Others have produced modest levels of de-dollarization. Notable examples here include Russian steps to cut its dollar reserves and reduce the use of the dollar and trade settlement in the years leading up to its full scale invasion of Ukraine, or China's ongoing efforts to build its own international payments network based on the Yuan, efforts that have taken on a new sense of urgency as Beijing has become more aware of its own strategic vulnerabilities from Dollar dependence. 47:05 Dr. Daniel McDowell: The United States should reconsider the use of so-called symbolic financial sanctions. That is, if the main objective of a tranche of sanctions is to signal to the world or to a domestic audience that Washington disapproves of a foreign government's policy choices, other measures that can send a similar signal but do not politicize the dollar system ought to be considered first. Second, the use of financial sanctions against issuers of potential rival currencies in particular, China and its Yuan should face a higher bar of scrutiny. Even a small targeted sanctions program provides information to our adversaries about their vulnerabilities, and gives them time to prepare for a future event when a broad US sanctions program may be called upon as part of a major security crisis, when such measures will be most needed. Finally, whenever possible, US financial sanctions should be coordinated with our allies in Europe and Asia, who should feel as if they are key stakeholders in the dollar system and not vassals to it. Such coordinated efforts will prevent our friends from seeking to conduct business with U.S. adversaries outside of the dollar system and send a message to the whole world that moving activities into secondary currencies, like the Euro or the Yen, is not a safe haven. 48:35 Marshall Billingslea: I'll say at the outset that I agree with you and others that to paraphrase Mark Twain, reports of the dollar's demise have been greatly exaggerated. That said, we need to remind ourselves that in the 16th century the Spanish silver dollar was the dominant currency, in the 17th century it was Dutch florins, in the 18th century it was the pound sterling. The link between a nation's currency and its role as the relatively dominant political actor on the world stage is pretty clear. And that is why people like Lula from Brazil, Putin and Xi all aspire to undercut the role of the dollar as the global reserve currency. 50:00 Marshall Billingslea: If we look at what Russia did in the run-up to its further invasion of Ukraine, they began dumping ownership of treasury bonds in 2018. In that year, they plummeted from $96 billion and holdings down to $15 billion and they also started buying large amounts of gold. China is now, as the Ranking Member has observed, embarking on its own its own gold buying spree. I haven't seen the data for May, but April marked the sixth straight month of Chinese expansion in its gold holdings, and I'm not sure I believe the official figures. We have to recall that China is the dominant gold mining player around the world and half of those gold mining companies are state-owned. So the actual size of China's war chest when it comes to gold reserves may be far higher. In fact, I suspect inevitably far higher than official numbers suggest. Last year China also started dumping its treasuries. 2022 marked the largest or second largest decrease on record, with a drop of about $174 billion, and China stood at the lowest level since 2010. In terms of its holdings, though, this past March they did reverse course. This bears close watching because a sell-off may be a strong indicator of planned aggression. 51:20 Marshall Billingslea: The sheer size of the Chinese economy dwarfs what we've been contending with in the form of Iran, Russia, and so on. And one of the first things that the Biden administration did in the wake of Russia's attack was start sanctioning Russian banks and de-SWIFTing them. That's one thing when you're going after an economy smaller than the size of Texas; it's quite another when you consider that out of the 100 largest banks in the world, China has 20, and all four of the top four are Chinese banks. And that is why many within the Treasury contended when I was there, and they will contend to this day, that these Chinese banks are simply too big to sanction. I don't agree that we can allow that to stand but I do believe we have to start taking very swift action to put us in a situation where we could take punitive measures on these banks if necessary. 54:10 Dr. Carla Norrlöf: I will note that the Dollar's dominance is not quite as strong amongst private actors and private markets as it is with governments. In private transactions, it averages about 45% of the world's total. That includes FX transactions, but also things like issuance of international debt, securities, and cross-border banking. 54:55 Dr. Carla Norrlöf: The Chinese Yuan poses no immediate threat to dollar dominance. It accounts for roughly 3% of overall reserves. So far China has been successful in promoting the Yuan with its trade partners, but the Yuan is scarcely used by countries outside trade with China. China is a potential long term challenger due to its active pursuit of trade and investment relationships. If the Yuan is increasingly used by third countries, it will pose a greater threat to the dollar. 55:30 Dr. Carla Norrlöf: And in addition to these external threats, there is also a domestic threat. Flirting with the possibility of a voluntary default puts dollar dominance at risk. What should the US do to maintain dominance, to curb the domestic threat? Congress should consider creating an alternative mechanism for resolving political differences on government spending and its consequences. 56:00 Dr. Carla Norrlöf: To rein in external threats the United States should, whenever possible, implement multilateral sanctions in support of broadly endorsed goals to shore up the liberal international order. This is likely to limit dollar backlash. 59:40 Marshall Billingslea: The thing I do worry -- I come back to this fact that they've been buying a lot of gold -- that one of the things that they could do, which would be very concerning, if they wind up having larger reserves of gold than we believe, is they could start issuing Yuan or gold denominated, gold-backed Yuan contracts and that would further their ambition for introducing the Yuan onto the world stage. 1:05:00 Marshall Billingslea: China considers the actual composition of its foreign exchange reserves to be a state secret. So they don't publish and they they view it as a criminal offense to try to obtain that information in terms of the balance of how much is gold, how much Dollar or Euro denominated. But the numbers I've seen suggest that still at this moment, about 50% to 60% of their Foreign Exchange reserves are still in Dollars or Euros, which means that they are at high risk of sanctions; we can affect them. The problem is that that war chest that they've built up is enormous. It's more than $3 trillion that they have in Foreign Exchange reserves. Compare that with what Russia had at the onset of its assault, which was around $680 billion, of which we managed to freeze overseas half of it, but Russia is still keeping its economy going despite the Biden administration sanctions. So imagine how they're going to be able to continue with that sizable war kitty in Beijing if they do decide to go after the Taiwanese. 1:09:00 Dr. Tyler Goodspeed: Short term I think the risk is that we continue to see diversification away from the dollar, PRC continuing to push other countries to use trade inverse invoicing and Renminbi, that they continue to promote the offshore Renminbi market, that they continue to promote or force bilateral clearing. Longer term, I think the bigger risk is that foreign investors no longer perceive the United States federal government debt to be as safe and risk free as it is today perceived. 1:41:20 Dr. Daniel McDowell: The demonstration of US control over the actual flow of dollars, of communication, absolutely provides information to adversaries to prepare for events where they may face similar circumstances. And so I think what we're seeing is China, we're seeing Russia, we're seeing other countries try to create alternative payments networks. Russia has its own SPFS payment messaging system. It's quite small. It was launched in 2014, not coincidentally, after the initial round of sanctions targeting Russia. In terms of CIPS, China's cross border payments network, Belarus announced it was having banks join immediately following the 2022 sanctions. So what I'm saying is there's a pattern between when the United States mobilizes control over the pipes and the messaging of cross-border payments and adversaries looking for alternatives. It doesn't mean they're using them, but they're getting plugged into the system as at least sort of a rainy day option in the event of a future targeting. 1:45:35 Dr. Daniel McDowell: I look at China not just as a typical country, because I think they're an alternative service provider. Most countries fall into alternative service users; they're looking for an alternative to the dollar. China, you could perhaps put Europe in this as well, are the only two sort of economic BLOCs capable, I think, of constructing an attractive enough cross-border payments network that could attract those alternative service users that are looking for that network. And so that's why I think again, with China, there should be a higher bar of scrutiny. 2:02:20 Dr. Tyler Goodspeed: As deficits mount and as the debt burden rises above 100%, I think the Congressional Budget Office has it ending the budget window at about 119% of our economy, then we will probably observe an acceleration of diversification away from the dollar as a hedge. Again, I don't see another single currency displacing the dollar as the major international currency or as the major reserve currency, but continued diversification. International Financial Institutions in an Era of Great Power Competition May 25, 2023 House Financial Services Committee Watch on YouTube Witnesses: Jesse M. Schreger, Associate Professor of Business, Columbia Business School Mark Rosen, Partner, Advection Growth Capital and former Acting Executive Director, International Monetary Fund (IMF) Daniel F. Runde, Senior Vice President, Center for Strategic & International Studies(CSIS) Rich Powell, Chief Executive Officer, ClearPath & ClearPath Action Daouda Sembene, Distinguished Nonresident Fellow, CGD and CEO, AfriCatalyst Clips 39:55 Mark Rosen: The IMF is the global lender of last resort to countries that are in economic distress. IMF borrowers usually have a balance of payments problem, are running out of foreign exchange reserves, and so cannot meet their obligations. The IMF negotiates a set of economic policies with the borrower in government to alleviate the crisis, and, conditional on the government implementing the agreed policies, provides a loan in tranches, normally over a three year period. 41:00 Mark Rosen: The biggest challenge the IMF faces today is China which, as we've heard, has lent vast sums to emerging market and low income countries in a non-transparent and irresponsible manner. Many IMF members are now struggling to repay China. 42:05 Mark Rosen: The United States is the largest shareholder in the IMF and has veto power over certain key decisions and it's critical that the US continues to maintain its ownership of more than 15% which enables it to have this veto power. 42:20 Mark Rosen: China for some time, has been pressing for an increased quota share at the IMF. However, given its irresponsible lending, and then willingness to provide debt relief to developing countries, this is not the time to reward China with increased ownership at the Fund. Two other issues I'd like to focus on are anti-corruption and the catalytic role of the private sector in the work of the IMF. Corruption is a severe problem for many emerging market countries, which do not have strong institutions that can confront and root out corruption. The IMF is certainly doing a much better job than it did historically on anti-corruption, but I believe it's critical that it continues to make anti corruption laws and policies front and center in the conditions of its lending programs, as well as a focus of its technical assistance. Only by reducing corruption will many of these countries be able to attract the vast amount of private sector investment which is potentially available and remains the ultimate key to reducing poverty. Establishing a rule of law, including laws to protect private property is key to unlocking this investment. And it should be a focus of the IMF and World Bank to encourage these countries to improve the rule of law and to fight corruption. If they do that, emerging market countries can attract private capital and grow rapidly as many countries that have followed that path have already done so successfully. 44:45 Daniel Runde: Multilateral development banks, MDBs, under US and Western leadership are one way that we can respond with something. The United States built and strengthened the MDB system. MDBs provide money, advice, data and convening power to help developing countries solve problems. If the US exerts its influence over these institutions, they are forced multipliers of a US-led global system. If we disregard our leadership role, then other actors, including China, can exert influence over them. The World Bank Group is a series of institutions: it lends money to national governments, it has a private sector arm, and has an insurance arm. There are a series of other regional development bank's including the InterAmerican Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank -- Taiwan is a member of the Asian Development Bank -- the African Development Bank and the EBRD, the European Bank for Reconstruction Development Bank, focused mainly on countries that used to be behind the Iron Curtain. The United States has been instrumental in creating the majority of these institutions and remains the largest, or one of the largest, shareholders of every afformentioned MDB. Since the founding of these institutions, the US has used its shareholding power to shape the policies and activities of MDBs in indirect support of American foreign policy. 47:10 Daniel Runde: What role does China play in the MDBs? They're a shareholder. China continues to borrow from the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. That is crazy. That needs to stop. China is a shareholder. Also, Chinese firms can bid on MDB projects. China wins a lot of in terms of dollar value, a lot of the dollar value of World Bank contracts. Something to take a look at. 47:35 Daniel Runde: How does the Belt and Road figure into the MDBs? You all have heard of the Belt and Road. Infrastructure is now a strategic issue. China's Belt and Road Initiative is a combination of construction and financing projects for roads, airports, and energy around the world. Unfortunately for us, BRI is an ambitious project that speaks to the hopes of China's friends and potential friends. To counter the BRI, the US needs a positive alternative that says more than, "Don't work with China." Right? That's not a strategy. We've got to have an alternative. 1:12:50 Rep. Andy Barr (R-KY): How do we end China's eligibility to borrow from the World Bank? Daniel Runde: The Asian Development Bank has said they're going to end their eligibility by 2025. We should absolutely hold them to that. There is a temptation for the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank to continue to loan for a couple of reasons. One is they say, "Well, this is a window into how we can understand China better." There's lots of other ways to understand China better. And or this is a way for us to -- for a bunch of lending reasons that they do it. You all have the power of the purse, you have an ability, I think you should have blunted conversations with the administration about this. I suspect it's an open door, but it's going to require, I think, some pushing from Congress. I would encourage this committee to push the administration on ending lending to China. 1:14:30 Jesse Schreger: So fundamentally right now, the Renminbi is not yet positioned to compete with the US dollar for a number of reasons. First and foremost, the reason that the dollar plays the role it does in the international financial system is it provides the global safe asset. You're confident, except for the upcoming debt ceiling, that you will always be paid back if you own US dollars. That's fundamentally what you know. When you contemplate investing in China and holding Chinese Renminbi as reserves, you're not necessarily sure that you're gonna be able to turn that piece of paper into the goods and services that you need or intervening in FX markets. 1:21:15 Jesse Schreger: First and foremost, what China is trying to do is essentially convince countries around the world that the Renminbi is an alternative asset to invoice your trade and to invest in. And so on the investment side, they've been working very hard to actually allow in foreign capital, encouraging foreign central banks to hold Renminbi denominated bonds as their reserves. And on the trade side, they're encouraging firms to invoice, basically price their goods, in Renminbi. There's a few areas in which they've had challenges there. So first, we actually don't know who are holding most of these Renminbi denominated assets. What you can see is after the US sanctioned Russia back in 2014, it was the Russian Central Bank that effectively announced they were moving out of US dollar denominated assets and into Renminbi, so they did that publicly. And so China has effectively been trying to attract foreign capital of that form and a lot of the reasons for that is that China finds itself vulnerable in the dollar-based financial system. And so what I would say the fundamental area in which the United States can assure the dominance of the dollar is making everyone understand that US Treasuries are the world's safe asset that there is no state of the world in which the United States can or will default. 2:03:25 Jesse Schreger: I think the real way in which people start being able to issue and borrow in Renminbi is when people start thinking in terms of the goods that they need to buy and consume are in Renminbi. Fundamentally, most countries around the world, if they issue a bond in Renminbi, the calculation they have to do is then "okay, I'm going to take my renminbi and convert it into US dollars to buy the thing in which I need." And so while actions in the US financial system are certainly going to affect other countries decisions to borrow in Renminbi, the kind of underlying challenges in Chinese financial markets and fundamentally the lack of goods priced and sold in Renminbi are going to continue to hold back kind of a growth of this market for a while. And in particular, the fact that many countries are reluctant to try to raise money inside of China's liquid onshore capital markets for, effectively, fear of capital controls. If you've raised renminbi in China, you can't get that out and to your projects the way you can if you raise money in the US in dollars. 2:14:55 Daniel Runde: The business model of the World Bank is they lend money to richer countries with a pretty good credit rating and then they cross subsidize that by lending to poor countries with a poor credit rating. My view is, China can finance its own development, we should stop this practice. I think the Asian Development Bank has sort of gotten the memo, but the World Bank has not fully gotten the memo and they'll give you kind of World Bank-y answers to this sort of thing. We got to stop it. Rep. Zach Nunn (R-IA): Mr. Runde, I could not agree with you more. And you highlighted earlier, you know, by 2025, China should graduate from this program. I'd offer that 25 is two years too late. We can start funneling them off that now. Daniel Runde: I agree, sir. Rep. Zach Nunn (R-IA): I think you're in the right spot. Thank you. Music Tired of Being Lied To by David Ippolito (found on Music Alley by mevio) Editing Pro Podcast Solutions Production Assistance Clare Kuntz Balcer Cover photo Eric Prouzet on Unsplash

Beijing brokers a deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran, with big implications for the civil war in Yemen. Plus, the AUKUS crew unveils plans for nuclear-powered Australian submarines. What does this mean for the future of US-China tensions and the potential repercussions in the Indo-Pacific? Council President Ivo Daalder dives in with Deborah Amos, Jamil Anderlini, and Peter Spiegel on World Review.

President Xi Jinping has introduced a series of policy shifts to turn the narrative around as the fallout from zero-COVID further strains China's economy. Will this smooth relations with the West, and is this new push authentic? Plus, what does the latest US-EU clash over clean energy subsidies mean for the future of climate change and global trade? And finally, Germany and the United States agree to send tanks to Ukraine. Ivo Daalder discusses with Jamil Anderlini, Elise Labott, and Peter Spiegel on World Review.

For the final episode of the year, host Jack Blanchard looks ahead to the biggest political stories coming down the track in 2023. Guests include Paul Johnson of the Institute for Fiscal Studies; former U.K. Defense Secretary Michael Fallon; Katy Balls of the Spectator; Stephen Bush of the Financial Times; Ipsos pollster Keiran Pedley; Tory peer and elections expert Robert Hayward; Jill Rutter and Giles Wilkes of the Institute for Government; and POLITICO's own Jamil Anderlini and Cristina Gallardo. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Continued protests after Mahsa Amini's death have sparked government reprisals in Iran. Europe realigns against China in the wake of myriad economic, political, and human rights concern. And Putin's mobilization faces a chaotic start with administrative errors, street demonstrations, and a mass exodus of draft-eligible Russians. Council President Ivo Daalder examines the long term implications for the world at large with Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, Jamil Anderlini, and Bobby Ghosh. 

Jamil Anderlini, Carla Robbins, and Peter Spiegel join Ivo Daalder to discuss the South Pacific and why it's the next US-China contest. Then, President Biden's Summit of the Americas is off to a rocky start as Mexico's President Andrés Manuel López Obrador declines to attend. What does this mean for US policy towards Latin America? Plus, the latest on the war in Ukraine.  Like this episode? Leave us a review wherever you get your podcasts.

Jamil Anderlini, Bobby Ghosh, and Giles Whittell join Ivo to cover the latest news from Ukraine: more weapons, more sanctions, and more evidence that Russia is willing to escalate the conflict in new ways. Then, COVID-19 lockdowns in China prompt Chinese criticisms of Xi Jinping's zero-COVID policy, whether the French election is Macron's to lose, and how Boris Johnson is staying in charge...for now. Prefer to watch instead? https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/events/world-review-apr-22 Don't forget to leave us a review! 

As crushing Western sanctions take their toll on Russia and the global economy, Jamil Anderlini, Stefan Kornelius, and Nahal Toosi join World Review with Ivo Daalder to cover the latest headlines. They unpack public pressure to increase support for Ukraine, Germany's stark foreign policy shifts, what China's learning from Russia, and why we could be watching the end of globalization as we've known it in our lifetimes. Prefer to watch the show instead? Visit www.thechicagocouncil.org/ Like this episode? Leave us a review! 

In this episode, host Mark Leonard is joined by POLITICO Europe's Editor-in-Chief Jamil Anderlini to discuss his plans for POLITICO. They talk about life in Brussels, breaking news in Asia, how to find a good story and what makes good reporting. Also, many of the big impetuses that have changed Europe in the past came from the outside, and likely in the future, mainly from Asia: what does Anderlini think about China's rise and security issues coming from Asia think? This podcast was recorded on 10 December 2021. Further reading • “Measured response: How to design a European instrument against economic coercion” by Jonathan Hackenbroich & Pawel Zerka: https://buff.ly/3zTgkZo Bookshelf • “The guns of August” by Barbara W. Tuchman • “Red Roulette: An insider's story of wealth, power, corruption, and vengeance in today's China” by Desmond Shum

Ahead of the 31st anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre, China’s plan to implement a restrictive new national security law in Hong Kong prompted the United States to end decades of a special relationship with the city. Jamil Anderlini, the Financial Times’ Asia editor, and Ambassador Kurt Tong, former US Consul General in Hong Kong, join Deep Dish to examine what this means for the US-China rivalry.

Could Coronavirus actually be a boost for the Chinese government? Is it better to be spied on by China or the United States? Is Russia really serious about its pivot to Asia? Carnegie's Alex Gabuev and The Financial Times' Asia editor Jamil Anderlini discuss the impact of Coronavirus on the Russian economy, how the virus is influencing the ongoing US-China trade war, and how events in Asia affect the choices European countries are making.

Could Coronavirus actually be a boost for the Chinese government? Is it better to be spied on by China or the United States? Is Russia really serious about its pivot to Asia? Carnegie’s Alex Gabuev and The Financial Times’ Asia editor Jamil Anderlini discuss the impact of Coronavirus on the Russian economy, how the virus is influencing the ongoing US-China trade war, and how events in Asia affect the choices European countries are making.

   Today I want to look at internal controls for third parties. One of the questions that GSK faced during the bribery and corruption investigation of its Chinese operations is how an allegedly massive bribery and corruption scheme occurred? The dollars paid out went upwards of $500MM, which coincidentally was the amount of the fine levied by the Chinese court on GSK. It is not as if the Chinese medical market is not well known for its propensity towards corruption, as prosecutions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) are littered with the names of US companies which came to corruption grief in China. GSK itself seemed to be aware of the corruption risks in China. In a Reuters article, entitled “How GlaxoSmithKline missed red flags in China”, Ben Hirschler reported that the company had “more compliance officers in China than in any country bar the United States”. Further, the company conducted “up to 20 internal audits in China a year, including an extensive 4-month probe earlier in 2013.” GSK even had PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) as its outside auditor in China. Nevertheless, he noted, “GSK bosses were blindsided by police allegations of massive corruption involving travel agencies used to funnel bribes to doctors and officials.” Where were the appropriate internal controls? You might think that a company as large as GSK and one that had gone through the ringer of a prior Department of Justice (DOJ) investigation resulting in charges for off-label marketing and an attendant Corporate Integrity Agreement (CIA) might have such controls in place. It was not as if the types of bribery schemes in China were not well known. In an article in the Financial Times (FT), entitled “Bribery built into the fabric of Chinese healthcare system”, reporters Jamil Anderlini and Tom Mitchell wrote about the ‘nuts and bolts’ of how bribery occurs in the health care industry in China. The authors quoted Shaun Rein, a Shanghai-based consultant and author of “The End of Cheap China”, for the following “This is a systemic problem and foreign pharmaceutical companies are in a conundrum. If they want to grow in China they must give bribes. It’s not a choice because officials in health ministry, hospital administrators and doctors demand it.” Their article discussed the two primary methods of paying bribes in China: the direct incentives and indirect incentives method. Anderlini and Mitchell reported, “The 2012 annual reports of half a dozen listed Chinese pharmaceutical companies reveal the companies paid out enormous sums in “sales expenses”, including travel costs and fees for sales meetings, marketing “business development” and “other expenses”. Most of the largest expenses were “travel costs or meeting fees and the expenses of the companies’ sales teams were, in every case, several multiples of the net profits each company earned last year.”” It would be reasonable to expect that internal controls over gifts would be designed to ensure that all gifts satisfy the required criteria, as defined and interpreted in Company policies. It should fall to a Compliance Officer to finalize and approve a definition of permissible and non-permissible gifts, travel and entertainment and internal controls will follow from such definition or criteria set by the company. These criteria would include the amount of the spend, localized down into increased risk such the higher risk recognized in China. Within this context, there are four general internal controls to consider. (1) Is the correct level of person approving the payment / reimbursement? (2) Are there specific controls (and signoffs) that the gift had proper business purpose? (3) Are the controls regarding gifts sufficiently preventative, rather than relying on detect controls? (4) If controls are not followed, is that failure detected? Below are 10 specific inquires you can make regarding your compliance internal controls specific to third parties. 1: Prior to entering the relationship, did management: confirm alignment with business strategy; analyze strategic risk; perform risk/reward analysis; and review its ability to provide adequate oversight and management on an ongoing basis? 2: Can the third-party’s activities be viewed as predatory, discriminatory or abusive? 3: Does your compliance regime include: policies and procedures to help manage third-party relationships; proper internal controls; training; monitoring; and auditing procedures to ensure consistent and ongoing compliance? 4: Was adequate due diligence conducted that included a review of all available information about the third-party (e.g. financial condition, reputation, knowledge of laws, complaints, operations and controls, internal controls and marketing materials? 5: Are expectations and obligations of both the company and the third-party outlined in a written contract prior to entering the relationship? 6: Does the board of director’s review and approve any material third-party relationships? 7: Does the contract outline fees to be paid, management information reports, audit rights, limit use of consumer information, exclusivity language, complaint management process, specifies circumstances that constitute default, dispute resolution process, and provides indemnification provisions? 8: Did the board initially approve the third-party relationship and does it review each significant third-party relationship on at least an annual basis? 9: Is there a process to verify the third-party’s operations are consistent with the written agreement and that risks are being controlled? 10: Does management allocate sufficient qualified staff to monitor significant third-party relationships and provide necessary oversight (and are these activities reported to the board of directors or designated committee)? What is the frequency of exceptions and how are they analyzed/documented/reported to management? When applicable, are you comparing and analyzing the third-party’s sales patterns? Obviously, the use of third-parties can be a powerful and effective way for a business to achieve its strategic goals. This may be one of the key reasons why third-parties are still one of the leading indicia of bribery and corruption. Every compliance program should regularly review its third-party service providers and evaluate internal policies and procedures to ensure compliance. Three Key Takeaways GSK in China continues to be an example of the lack of internal controls for an effective compliance program. General areas of review for compliance internal controls. Third parties are still the highest risk of corruption related issues. For more information on how to improve your internal controls management process, visit this month’s sponsor Workiva at workiva.com.   Learn more about your ad choices. 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After embracing market reforms in 1979, the world's largest communist country blindsided the world with three decades of consistent double-digit GDP growth. It was dubbed the "China Miracle." But now, the country's growth is rapidly slowing and a raft of grave concerns about demographics, the middle-income trap, capital flight, and debt are emerging in its economy. So does this mean economic catastrophe, or can it be managed? In this episode we hear from a range of economists, investors, and journalists to unpack what’s going on in China’s economy, and what a stumble might mean for the world.

President Xi Jinping's state visit to the UK has featured all the pomp and circumstance the UK can muster. Has it cemented the UK's place as a prosperous best friend to China in the West or has Britain bowed too deeply to an authoritarian regime? Joshua Chaffin puts the question to Jamil Anderlini and Demetri Sevastopulo. See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

Facing an economic slowdown with its old tools to stimulate growth losing their power, Beijing finally turned to a weapon it had avoided using for more than two decades. Jamil Anderlini investigates why China’s leaders resorted to devaluation of the renminbi, and the risk of a currency war See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

A shrinking labour force is driving huge economic change in China. James Kynge talks to Jamil Anderlini about the human cost of China's mass migration from rural areas to the cities and why it is now beginning to slow. See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

What are the prospects for some form of detente between Japan and China? Ahead of next week's Apec summit, where leaders of the two countries are expected to meet, Ben Hall discusses the reasons for the strained relations between the two countries with Beijing bureau chief Jamil Anderlini and David Pilling, Asia editor. See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

Patrick Jenkins is joined on the line by Jamil Anderlini, Beijing bureau chief, for news of the Chinese shadow banking sector, marking the start of a week-long FT series on shadow banking across the globe. Daniel Schäfer looks at credit default swaps, which have dropped in price and are proving more attractive than pricier government bonds. Finally, Martin Arnold has news from the UK payday lending sector, where Wonga's founder-chairman is departing and high street banks are considering entering the market See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

Aerial posturing over disputed territories in the East China Sea has caused concern among the international community. After China declared an air identification zone over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, the US despatched two B-52 bombers in an apparent show of defiance, but has instructed its civilian airlines to respect the zone. In this week’s podcast, Gideon Rachman is joined by Jamil Anderlini, Beijing bureau chief, and Geoff Dyer, US foreign policy correspondent to shed light on the situation See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

In the last two weeks, tension on the Korean peninsula has risen dramatically, as North Korea has threatened to target US territories in the Pacific and blocked South Korean workers from entering a joint industrial complex in the North. In this week’s podcast, John Aglionby is joined by Geoff Dyer, diplomatic correspondent and Jamil Anderlini, Beijing bureau chief, to discuss whether Kim Jong-eun’s escalating rhetoric is purely sabre-rattling or if we should be worried about his threats See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

China has just completed its carefully-scripted, once-in-a-decade leadership transition. The Politburo was cut from nine to seven members and incoming general secretary and president Xi Jinping will also become head of the military. With these remaining uncertainties settled, Jamil Anderlini, Beijing bureau chief; James Blitz, diplomatic editor, and David Pilling, Asia editor, join John Aglionby to discuss how the new leadership will cope with an increasingly demanding population and whether the world will engage with Beijing any differently See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

A Party Congress next month is expected to confirm the once-in-a-generation leadership change atop the Chinese Communist Party. But things are not going to plan: the transition is occurring against a backdrop of a slowdown in the Chinese economy and now the mysterious disappearance from public view of Xi Jinping, just weeks before his expected elevation to lead the party. Jamil Anderlini in Beijing, Geoff Dyer in Washington and Tom Mitchell in London join Shawn Donnan to discuss the uncertainty in China. See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

The eurozone has dominated headlines for months, but what of the other key poles of the world economy, China and the United States? Growth has been slowing in China for months, and the US is also struggling. James Politi in Washington and Jamil Anderlini in Beijing join Gideon Rachman to discuss the prospects of the world's two largest economies. See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

Jamil Anderlini joins Gideon Rachman to explain how the dismissal of Bo Xilai fits into the ongoing power struggle at the apex of the Chinese Communist Party. In Washington, where President Obama and British prime minister David Cameron are meeting this week, there is growing anxiety about Afghanistan, Geoff Dyer reports. Meanwhile, in Afghanistan itself, there is concern about what will happen to women’s rights once Nato leaves the country, Matthew Green reports from Kabul. See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

This week Gideon Rachman discusses with Peter Spiegel, FT's Brussels bureau chief, whether time really has run out for Greece. He also talks to Jamil Anderlini, FT's Beijing bureau chief, about Bo Xilai, the Chinese princeling who recently suffered a severe blow to his chances of becoming a member of the Communist party leadership. Produced by Amie Tsang and Serena Tarling See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

In this week’s show: As Europe looks to China and other Bric nations to buy up its debt – we ask, is the global economy at a tipping point? Back in the Eurozone – rumours are flying again about the possibility of a Greek default and Germany’s chancellor, Angela Merkel is under pressure; and Palestinian leaders prepare to present their case to the UN for statehood. Presented by Shawn Donnan with Joe Leahy in Sao Paulo, Jamil Anderlini in Beijing, Guy Dinmore in Rome, Gerrit Wiesmann in Berlin and Roula Khalaf and Ben Hall in the studio in London. Produced by LJ Filotrani and Serena Tarling See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

In this week's podcast: Have European leaders done enough to save Greece and the eurozone? UK prime minister David Cameron struggles to keep a lid on the News of the World phone hacking scandal; And, has Obama’s meeting with the Dalai Lama endangered US/China relations? Presented by Gideon Rachman with Peter Spiegel in the studio in London, Elizabeth Rigby in Westminster and Jamil Anderlini in Beijing - interviewed by Serena Tarling. Produced by LJ Filotrani See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

Mure Dickie reports from Tokyo on the devastating earthquake. In the studio, James Blitz examines the options for intervention in Libya, and Richard Milne looks at eurozone debt - are defaults on the cards? We also hear from Jamil Anderlini in Beijing on the Dalai Lama retiring from politics. Presented by Gideon Rachman. See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.