Podcast appearances and mentions of Bo Xilai

#ADV Approfitta della promozione NordVPN riservata a te che ascolti Ultimi Attimi: https://nordvpn.com/ultimiattimi Fino a 34 mesi al prezzo di 24! --- Supporta Ultimi Attimi, unisciti al Patreon! CLICCA QUI --> Contenuti esclusivi di questa puntata! Tutti i link della community: linktr.ee/ultimiattimi ---- I Patreon che producono questa puntata (livello "Equipaggio" o superiore): Mattia Zambon (CAPITANO) Simona Sbardella Fal06 CPT_Koenig Ilag78 --- È il 7 maggio 2002, quando un MD-82 della China Northern Airlines decolla da Pechino, diretto a Dalian. A bordo, 103 passeggeri e 9 membri dell'equipaggio. Ma a circa metà del volo, il destino dell'aereo cambia drammaticamente: un incendio a bordo scatena il panico, rendendo impossibile il controllo del velivolo. L'aereo precipita nel Mare di Bohai, senza lasciare superstiti. Cosa ha provocato l'incendio? Un guasto tecnico o un gesto deliberato? Seguendo le tracce di Zhang Pilin, ricostruiamo gli eventi che portarono a una delle tragedie più inquietanti dell'aviazione civile cinese. Un disastro che cambiò per sempre le norme di sicurezza nei cieli. ATTENZIONE: Questo episodio contiene riferimenti a temi sensibili come la salute mentale e il suicidio. Se tu o qualcuno che conosci sta attraversando un momento difficile, non esitare a cercare aiuto. In Italia puoi contattare Telefono Amico al numero 02 2327 2327. LISTA PERSONAGGI: Liu Jiqing – Operaio portuale di Dalian Zhang Pilin – Imprenditore Yun – Moglie di Zhang Pilin Mingming – Fratello minore di Zhang Pilin Wang Yongxian – Comandante del volo 6136, esperto pilota dell'MD-82. Chen Xiuming – Primo ufficiale del volo 6136 Li Yanfeng – Moglie di Han Xiaoguang, passeggera del volo e critica del politico Bo Xilai. Han Xiaoguang – Imprenditore alberghiero detenuto, presunto oppositore politico. Bo Xilai – Potente politico cinese e sindaco di Dalian all'epoca dell'incidente. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

身份 shēn fèn - identity 特殊 tè shū - special 薄瓜瓜 bó guā guā - name of a person, the son of Bo Xilai 共產黨 gòng chǎn dǎng - Communist Party 政治世家 zhèng zhì shì jiā - political family 薄一波 bó yī bō - Bo Yibo, a Chinese political figure 中共 zhōng gòng - Chinese Communist Party 八老之一 bā lǎo zhī yī - one of the "eight immortals" of the Chinese Communist Party 創黨 chuàng dǎng - founding the party 元老 yuán lǎo - elder or veteran of the Communist Party 薄熙來 bó xī lái - Bo Xilai, a former Chinese politician 政治局 zhèng zhì jú - Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China 委員 wěi yuán - committee member 衝突 chōng tú - conflict 被關進了 bèi guān jìn le - was imprisoned 監獄 jiān yù - prison 谷開來 gǔ kāi lái - Gu Kailai, Bo Xilai's wife 涉及 shè jí - involved in 一樁 yī zhuāng - a case or incident 謀殺案 móu shā àn - murder case 家庭背景 jiā tíng bèi jǐng - family background 文革 wén gé - Cultural Revolution 具有 jù yǒu - to possess or have 政治色彩 zhèng zhì sè cǎi - political connotation 掌權人 zhǎng quán rén - person in power 變故 biàn gù - change or misfortune 求學 qiú xué - to pursue studies 因素 yīn sù - factor 牛津大學 niú jīn dà xué - Oxford University 哈佛大學 hā fú dà xué - Harvard University 哥倫比亞法學院 gē lún bǐ yà fǎ xué yuàn - Columbia Law School 深造 shēn zào - further studies 學歷 xué lì - academic qualifications 擔任 dān rèn - to hold (a position) 分析師 fēn xī shī - analyst 低調 dī diào - low-key 引起 yǐn qǐ - to cause or provoke 熱議 rè yì - heated discussion 跨越 kuà yuè - to cross over 婚事 hūn shì - marriage affairs 引人注目 yǐn rén zhù mù - eye-catching 登記 dēng jì - to register 騷擾 sāo rǎo - to harass 除此之外 chū cǐ zhī wài - apart from this If you've been learning Chinese or preparing for the TOCFL exams but feel stuck or frustrated with your progress, book a one-on-one trial lesson with me

Welcome to China Compass on the Fight Laugh Feast Network! I'm your China travel guide, Missionary Ben. You can follow me on X (@chinaadventures) where I post daily reminders to pray for China (PrayforChina.us). You can also email me with any questions or comments @ bfwesten at gmail dot com. You can also find easy links to everything we are involved in @ PrayGiveGo.us! Summary In today’s podcast, I begin by discussing the recent US-China Prisoner Swap (5:10) and its potential implications for casual visits to China. Then I talk all about Chongqing (17:39), which turns out to have a fascinating history. Finally, we look at the fascinating life of China missionary and explorer, James Cameron (35:31), whose earthly journey ended in Chongqing in the late 1800s. (Bonus: I threw in an unplanned story near the end (49:43) about a former teammate who was nearly stabbed to death by Tibetan Assassins hired by Buddhist Monks.) In the News: China-US Prisoner Swap https://www.politico.com/news/2024/11/27/state-dept-china-travel-warning-downgraded-00191942 https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/27/world/asia/us-china-prisoner-swap.html Pray for China Province of the Week: Chongqing Chongqing Municipality in central China is matched up with southeast Texas (Greater Houston) for prayer. See which Chinese province your state is praying for @ PrayforChina.us! Chongqing is located in the subtropics, in the transitional area between the Tibetan Plateau and the middle and lower reaches of the Yangtze. Its climate features frequent monsoon conditions, often raining at night in late spring and early summer. The city's "night rain in the Ba Mountains", features in poems throughout Chinese history, including "Written on a Rainy Night" by Li Shangyin. Its territory is 470 km (290 mi) from east to west at its longest, and 450 km (280 mi) from north to south at its widest. It borders Hubei and Hunan to the east, Sichuan and Shaanxi to the north, and Guizhou to the south. Asia Harvest overview: https://www.asiaharvest.org/china-resources/chongqing Wikipedia profile: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chongqing Chongqing Spicy Chicken: Lazi Ji Crazy Tall Escalator: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Huangguan_Escalator The Rise and Fall of Bo Xilai: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bo_Xilai James Cameron Missionary Explorer and Tibet Trailblazer (1845-1892): https://chinacall.substack.com/p/james-cameron https://www.asiaharvest.org/china-resources/tibet/1880s-tibetan-work https://omf.org/mrt-james-cameron-the-livingstone-of-china/ Resource of the Day: UNBEATEN: Arrested, Interrogated, and Deported from China www.Unbeaten.vip

Welcome to China Compass on the Fight Laugh Feast Network! I'm your China travel guide, Missionary Ben. You can follow me on X (@chinaadventures) where I post daily reminders to pray for China (PrayforChina.us). You can also email me with any questions or comments @ bfwesten at gmail dot com. You can also find easy links to everything we are involved in @ PrayGiveGo.us! Summary In today’s podcast, I begin by discussing the recent US-China Prisoner Swap (5:10) and its potential implications for casual visits to China. Then I talk all about Chongqing (17:39), which turns out to have a fascinating history. Finally, we look at the fascinating life of China missionary and explorer, James Cameron (35:31), whose earthly journey ended in Chongqing in the late 1800s. (Bonus: I threw in an unplanned story near the end (49:43) about a former teammate who was nearly stabbed to death by Tibetan Assassins hired by Buddhist Monks.) In the News: China-US Prisoner Swap https://www.politico.com/news/2024/11/27/state-dept-china-travel-warning-downgraded-00191942 https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/27/world/asia/us-china-prisoner-swap.html Pray for China Province of the Week: Chongqing Chongqing Municipality in central China is matched up with southeast Texas (Greater Houston) for prayer. See which Chinese province your state is praying for @ PrayforChina.us! Chongqing is located in the subtropics, in the transitional area between the Tibetan Plateau and the middle and lower reaches of the Yangtze. Its climate features frequent monsoon conditions, often raining at night in late spring and early summer. The city's "night rain in the Ba Mountains", features in poems throughout Chinese history, including "Written on a Rainy Night" by Li Shangyin. Its territory is 470 km (290 mi) from east to west at its longest, and 450 km (280 mi) from north to south at its widest. It borders Hubei and Hunan to the east, Sichuan and Shaanxi to the north, and Guizhou to the south. Asia Harvest overview: https://www.asiaharvest.org/china-resources/chongqing Wikipedia profile: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chongqing Chongqing Spicy Chicken: Lazi Ji Crazy Tall Escalator: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Huangguan_Escalator The Rise and Fall of Bo Xilai: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bo_Xilai James Cameron Missionary Explorer and Tibet Trailblazer (1845-1892): https://chinacall.substack.com/p/james-cameron https://www.asiaharvest.org/china-resources/tibet/1880s-tibetan-work https://omf.org/mrt-james-cameron-the-livingstone-of-china/ Resource of the Day: UNBEATEN: Arrested, Interrogated, and Deported from China www.Unbeaten.vip

Photo: 1935 Beijing. No known restrictions on publication. @Batchelorshow ##PRC: The curse of the Red Guards: Xi Jinping and Bo Xilai.

Photo: 1920 Gum Tree. South Australia. No known restrictions on publication. @Batchelorshow TONIGHT: The show travels from Niamey, Niger to Mscow, Russia, from the Straits of Hormuz to Bo Xilai's prison.  Attention to the Fitch ratings downgrade of US long-term debt and to the multi-cloud environment of the new Federal Government.

We're back with a new recording of one of the first cases we covered on Criminal Records. Bo Xilai was one of the rising stars of China's Communist Party, but his political dreams came crashing down when a close business partner was found dead in mysterious circumstances. Sources and shownotes at this link Support the show and listen to bonus episodes on Patreon

Guanxi is the oil the greases the engine of life in China. But when things go wrong, it all comes tumbling down, and fast. This is the story of Bo Xilai and Gu Kailai. And then, back to the school.

This week on Sinica, Kaiser and Jeremy were live in London with a very special guest: Carrie Gracie, whose career with the BBC spanned three decades as a China-based correspondent, news presenter, and China editor. She talks about her podcast series on the Bo Xilai scandal, her longitudinal documentary series on White Horse Village, and her struggle with the BBC to win equal pay for women.6:02 – Murder in the Lucky Holiday Hotel and Carrie's coverage of the Bo Xilai scandal and Chinese elite politics in 201211:38 – Overview of the main characters: Bo Xilai, Gu Kuilai, Neil Heywood, and Wang Lijun 35:18 – How the 2012 power struggle shaped Xi Jinping's leadership style41:42 – Carrie's key takeaways from following the Bo Xilai case44:33 – White Horse Village: documenting life of farmers across a decade in rural China50:56 – Changing conditions for foreign journalists in China56:52 – Advice to reporters starting in China1:01:05 – Assessing media organizations' progress on dismantling the gender pay gapA transcript of this episode is available at TheChinaProject.com.Recommendations: Jeremy: Yellowstone, a drama series about a family-owned ranch in Montana Carrie: Everything Everywhere All at Once; the Disney animated film MulanKaiser: the UK progressive rock band Porcupine Tree's current Continuation/Closure tour — Europe datesSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

This year marks ten years since Wang Lijun's fateful flight to the US Embassy in Chengdu, a decision which set in motion a chain of events that ultimately brought down one of China's most powerful politicians, Xi's most credible rival for power in 2012, Bo Xilai. The former mayor of Chongqing remains in prison to this day for bribery, embezzlement and abuse of office, along with his wife Gu Kailai, who is serving life imprisonment for the murder of a British businessman. But a decade later, how much of an impact does Bo's story have in the halls of power? New York Times reporter Chris Buckley joins the show this episode to discuss Bo's legacy and share anecdotes about his encounters with him prior to his arrest, along with formerly Chongqing-based author Xujun Eberlein. Former ChinaTalk producer Alex Boyd co-hosts. We discuss Bo's rise to power in Dalian and his move to Chongqing How Chongqing's man-on-the-street viewed Bo during his tenure - and after The similarities and differences between Bo and Xi Jinping Where is Bo now? I HAVE A NEWSLETTER! Check it out! https://www.chinatalk.media/ Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

This year marks ten years since Wang Lijun's fateful flight to the US Embassy in Chengdu, a decision which set in motion a chain of events that ultimately brought down one of China's most powerful politicians, Xi's most credible rival for power in 2012, Bo Xilai. The former mayor of Chongqing remains in prison to this day for bribery, embezzlement and abuse of office, along with his wife Gu Kailai, who is serving life imprisonment for the murder of a British businessman. But a decade later, how much of an impact does Bo's story have in the halls of power? New York Times reporter Chris Buckley joins the show this episode to discuss Bo's legacy and share anecdotes about his encounters with him prior to his arrest, along with formerly Chongqing-based author Xujun Eberlein. Former ChinaTalk producer Alex Boyd co-hosts. We discuss Bo's rise to power in Dalian and his move to Chongqing How Chongqing's man-on-the-street viewed Bo during his tenure - and after The similarities and differences between Bo and Xi Jinping Where is Bo now? I HAVE A NEWSLETTER! Check it out! https://www.chinatalk.media/ Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

In 2011, Neil Heywood was murdered in China. The fallout from the ensuing investigation resulted in one of the biggest scandals in China's recent history. Bogu Kailai was the daughter of a Communist Party general and was married to a high-profile Chinese politician named Bo Xilai. Bogu's murder of Neil Heywood rocked the Chinese government.Join Mike and Gibby as they discuss the murder of Neil Heywood by Bogu Kailai. This case made headlines all over the world because it involved family secrets, murder, politics, and a police coverup. Many different levels of the government got swept up in this case. But, some questions still remain, including the true motive for Neil Heywood's murder.You can help support the show at patreon.com/truecrimeallthetimeVisit the show's website at truecrimeallthetime.com for contact, merchandise, and donation informationAn Emash Digital productionSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Partihöjdaren Bo Xilai ville nå den politiska toppen i Kina men hans fall blev skandalomsusat och används än idag som skräckexempel av partiet. Berättelsen om Bo Xilais uppgång och fall är nästan för dramatisk för att vara sann. Sex, korruption, avlyssning och ett giftmord. Men trots att både Bo Xilai och hans fru Gu Kailai idag sitter fängslade, används de fortfarande som varnande exempel av det kinesiska kommunistpartiet.Skandaler som politiskt verktygI veckans avsnitt av Kinapodden tittar vi närmare på hur farlig kinesisk toppolitik är. Fallet Bo Xilai är kanske det tydligaste exemplet på hur snabbt en politisk stjärna kan falna och hur snabbt andra aktörer kan dra nytta av situationen. För i samma veva som Bo Xilai försvann från scenen gjorde Xi Jinping entré.

O caso de hoje aconteceu na China, e envolve uma âncora de um jornal de lá, Zhang Weijie, que desapareceu quando estava grávida de 8 meses, o prefeito da cidade e a primeira dama, Bo Xilai e Gu Kailai, e um anatomista alemão, Gunther von Hagens, com o museu dele. www.margotmattosmeiners.com

Episode Notes:Today, we're going to talk about US-China relations, the upcoming Sixth Plenum , Xi Jinping, and what we might expect for the next year heading into the 2022 20th Party Congress among other topics. I'm really pleased that our first guest for the Sinocism Podcast is Chris Johnson, CEO of Consultancy China strategies Group, senior fellow at the Center for Strategic International Studies and former senior China analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency. 4:45 on US-China relations - I think their assessment is that it's working. In other words, by maintaining that sort of very strict line, they've gotten Madam Meng of Huawei fame home. They've gotten the trade discussions going again. They've got the US saying, "Well, we might lengthen the timeline for you to implement phase one." In other words, it's working from their perspective.13:30 on the 6th Plenum - The first I think is that, it would represent, I think the net evolution in what I call Xi Jinping's further development of his leadership supremacy. And, I use those terms very deliberately because often times, the shorthand we see in describing this as references to Xi's consolidation of power. Well, in my mind that took place very early on in his tenure. 30:00 on the economy and heading towards the 2022 20th Party Congress - Equally important in my mind is how little the leadership and the economic technocrats seem to be rattled by that fact. In other words, we're not seeing the stimulus wave. We're not seeing monetary policy adjustments in a significant way. There's a lot of study as she goes. And, that could change. We've got the central economic work conference, obviously in December, which will give us a sense of how they're thinking about next year. But like so many other things, I think we as watchers and the investment community and others, we're slow to sometimes break with old narratives. One of which is you must welcome a party Congress with very high growth. And every signal coming out of the leadership is that, they're not playing that game anymore. I think that's fairly strong.37:00 On US-China relations - I think if you're a senior US policymaker, your working assumption has to be that China's more likely to get it right than to get it wrong, even if they only get it 30% right or 40%, something like that…Chris Johnson:Xi is here and will be here for the foreseeable future. And therefore there won't be any change in the policies largely that he's articulated.Links: More about Chris Johnson and his China Strategies Group here.Transcript:Bill Bishop:Today, we're going to talk about US-China relations, the upcoming Sixth Plenum , Xi Jinping, and what we might expect for the next year heading into the 2022 20th Party Congress among other topics. I'm really pleased that our first guest for the Sinocism Podcast is Chris Johnson, CEO of Consultancy, China strategies Group, senior fellow at the center for strategic international studies and former senior China analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency. Welcome, Chris.Chris Johnson:Great to be here, Bill.Bill Bishop:Chris, welcome. I think today, what I really like to start out with is just an overview where you see the state of US-China relations and how the new administration, I mean it's 10 months now or thereabouts, but how the new administration is doing and how the Xi Jinping administration is reacting.Chris Johnson:Great. Yeah. Well, it's obviously a unique time in US-China relations. I guess, if I had to characterize it in a phrase, I would say, things are a bit of a mess. I think, if we start, it's useful to start at a sort of high order level and then work our way down in terms of thinking about the relationship. So I think at the highest order, one of the things that strikes me is that arguably for the first time, since normalization of relations, really, we're in this strange position where I think both countries, both leaders and perhaps increasingly, even both peoples, aren't overly keen to engage with one another.Chris Johnson:I think, we've had times in the past during the last several decades where maybe one side or the other was feeling that way, but not both. And the sense that I get in terms of the leader to leader view is, both Xi Jinping and President Biden are kind of looking at each other and saying, "I've got a lot going on at home. I'm very focused on what's happening domestically. I know the other guys out there and I need to pay attention to what he's doing, and right now it's all just his. But, if I can kind of keep him at arm's length, that's okay with me." And I think we're kind of seeing that really on both sides of the fence.Chris Johnson:I think for Xi Jinping, it's a little more intense in that it's hard to see where the good outcomes are for him and trying to lean in toward the relationship and so on, because he's kind of getting what he wants to some degree without doing. So, as to your question about how the administration is doing, I think to be fair, I think we have to say probably about as well as they could given both the domestic constraints, what we might call China's own attitudes and approach toward the relationship right now.Chris Johnson:On the domestic side, by constraints, I mean, the administration from my perspective seems to have an almost neurologically fearful stance of being seen as weak on China. Obviously that comes out of four years of the Trump administration and its approach toward China, stories and tales and recreations of history about how engagement was a failure and how the Obama administration was somehow a main sort of group that failed to understand the reality of the relationship and therefore blew it and a lot of those people are back now. And I think that contributes to this fear. And I think the practical impact of that is that, it's inhibited the administration from doing what I think they need to do, which is to have sort of an objective racking and stacking of what they believe China's global ambitions actually are. And then I think critically beyond that, which of those ambitions the US can live with, because in my assessment, we're going to have to live with at least some of them.Chris Johnson:And then to be fair to the administration, I think that same needed exercise has been hamstrung by China's own approach, which at least so far, I think we could probably characterize as an unflinching resistance that the US must adjust it's as they like to call it hostile attitude, if progress is going to be made. And, it's my sense that there's really little chance of progress of China's unwilling to move off of that stance. But at the same time, I think their assessment is that it's working. In other words, by maintaining that sort of very strict line, they've gotten Madam Meng of Huawei fame home. They've gotten the trade discussions going again. They've got the US saying, "Well, we might lengthen the timeline for you to implement phase one." In other words, it's working from their perspective.Bill Bishop:And, they presented two lists to Deputy Secretary of State Sherman. And, it certainly seems like there are some of the things on that list that are being worked through. To follow up though, what do you think the administration is doing around Taiwan? Because it seems like over the last couple of weeks, we've had quite a push from Secretary of State Lincoln and others on Taiwan and sort of whether or not it's giving them, returning them to the UN or in a seat or at least giving them more participation in UN bodies. What do you think is driving that and what do you think realistically, the administration believes the outcome's going to be because it certainly seems to be touching the most sensitive point on the Chinese side?Chris Johnson:Yeah. Well, my sense of it is that, regardless of the administration's intention, and I'm not entirely sure what the intention is, the results in Beijing are the same, which is to say that there would be a perception there that the US is unilaterally making a change to what they see as the cornerstone of the bilateral relationship, which is the US adherence to the One China Policy. And, if you're sitting in Beijing's shoes and you're hearing, you're seeing things in the press, you're hearing the president himself say, "Well, we will defend Taiwan." Oops. We didn't mean to say that, but it wasn't, but I didn't misspeak, and these sort of things, and a lot of that has to do with the domestic. Look, the Chinese have never doubted that the US would probably mount some kind of a defense. So, it's not really that issue if the Chinese were to attack. It's the accumulation of what they see as salami slicing erosion of the US commitment to the One China Policy.Chris Johnson:And so in my mind, the only relevant element here is not really the motivations, but what's going on in Xi Jinping's mind. Can he see all of this activity and basically respond by making the appropriate judgment about this erosion in the One China Policy and then quietly taking the appropriate adjustments on war planning and on other things? Or does he feel that with the accumulation of these things, whether it's the debate over whether or not to break with strategic ambiguity, changing the name of Taiwan's defacto embassy in Washington, all these sort things, does he feel that he needs to do something demonstrative now to kind of reset the balance, which was really the motivation behind their military exercises in 1995, '96, for example, when [inaudible 00:07:53] came to the United States?Bill Bishop:And of course back then, they had far less capability as they do now. I mean, certainly, I've heard different things and looked at different reports, but it does sound like the PLA has advanced quite rapidly around in areas that they would be able to bring to bear, to deal with Taiwan from their perspective. And that the US, I think is ... One of the things I worry about is just that there's certainly in some quarters in DC, it seems like there's a belief in the US military power that may not be fully rooted in the new realities of the sort of PLA modernization campaign that really has, I think, dramatically accelerated and did much more efficient under Xi Jinping.Chris Johnson:Yeah, definitely. And primarily to the degree, there's been a chief innovation under Xi's leadership. They've finally taken the steps to address what we might call the software issues. In other words, the technology, the hardware, the shiny kit has been being developed since that '95, '96 period. And they've got some very interesting and capable systems now. But the software, the ability to actually conduct joint operations, these sort of things was always a fall down point for them. And then massive restructuring of the PLAs force structure, much along the lines of sort of Goldwater-Nichols that Xi launched early in his tenure is now bearing a lot of fruit and making them more capable from that sort of software side of things as well.Bill Bishop:And that restructuring, that was something that the PLA or that they talked about doing before but had never, no other leader had been able to push it through.Chris Johnson:Correct.Chris Johnson:Even Deng Xiaoping, who himself tried to do sort of a similar restructuring in the aftermath of Tiananmen and in the aftermath of the Yang period.Bill Bishop:That's interesting. I remember we talked when she convened the second Gutian meeting with all the generals that look clearly in retrospect was the kickoff to I think, a massive corruption crackdown inside the PLA.Chris Johnson:No. I call it political shock and awe which was the twin aspect of force restructuring and the anti-corruption campaign in the military, which basically the back of the PLAs political power in the system from my perspective.Bill Bishop:Interesting. So, well now moving on to politics, we have the Sixth Plenum. That starts in on the 8th of November, I believe. Can you talk a bit about why those plenums are important and what might be especially interesting about this one? Because, one of the things that we keep hearing about, and certainly there are rumors, but there's also, I think, some certainly the way they describe the agenda for the plenum in the official Xinhua release a couple weeks ago. It sure sounds like they're going to push through a third historical resolution.Chris Johnson:Yeah. No, my sense is that's a forgotten conclusion pretty much at this point. To your first question about why plenums are important. In my mind, I think they're employing both mechanically and substantively. Mechanically, having one once a year, since the reform and opening period started really, and really per the requirement in the party's constitution, that happened once a year. That has been fundamental, I think, to signaling both domestic audiences and international audiences that things in China are relatively stable. So, just look at the brouhaha that that occurred, for example, in this current central committee cycle that we're in the 19th central committee where Xi Jinping snuck in effectively an extra plenum early in the process in early 2018 to get the changes to the constitution about term limits put out there, which then meant they had to advance the third plenum from its normal position in that fall, after a party Congress to the usual second plenum, which manages the national people's Congress changes, personnel changes and so on.Chris Johnson:And then, a perception that the fourth plenum therefore had been delayed because it was more than a year before it actually took place. And you'll recall as well. And we talked a about it at the time, all the speculation. Oh, this means Xi Jinping's in trouble and so on and so forth, non-sense from my point of view. So, that's the mechanical aspect.Chris Johnson:Substantively, obviously I think they're important because outside of the political work report that the sitting party general secretary delivers at the five yearly party congresses, the decision documents as they're usually called that come out of the plenums really reflect the most authoritative venue for the party leadership to signal their priorities, their preoccupations and the policies, of course. And of course, there have been some very important plenums in the party's history, most notably the third plenum of the 11th central committee, which at least the official version is that's when reform and opening was launched. There's a lot of debate about whether that's true or not.Chris Johnson:But, turning to the upcoming six plenum, I think they have made it, as I said, a moment ago, pretty clear that there will be a history resolution. Obviously, there's only been two previous ones in the history of the party. One in 1945 and the other by Mao Zedong and the other in 1981 from Deng Xiaoping, largely closing the book on the mount period, and the culture revolution and so on. So from my perspective, if they do do it this time and I think they will, it it's important for several reasons. The first I think is that, it would represent, I think the net evolution in what I call Xi Jinping's further development of his leadership supremacy. And, I use those terms very deliberately because often times, the shorthand we see in describing this as references to Xi's consolidation of power. Well, in my mind that took place very early on in his tenure.Chris Johnson:I think, he's been there for a good long while. And so, this is just about further articulating his leadership supremacy. And indeed I think, his genius really from the beginning was to frame the party's history in these three distinct eras, each roughly 30 years from the founding of the PRC to Mao's death, Deng's reform, an opening period, and now Xi Jinping's so-called new era. And in fact, I think his signature political achievement, among many political achievements that he's had, has been to canonize that framing these three epics under the banner of Xi Jinping thought with on Chinese characteristics for the new era, so long I can never remember. Let's just call it Xi Thought for shorthand. Yes. And I think, he used it to both effectively erase his two immediate predecessors Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao from history, which is important and also simultaneously to vault past Deng Xiaoping in the pantheon of ideology by getting the autonomous thought. And of course, the next iteration will be to truncate Xi Jinping thought for horribly long name.Bill Bishop:Well, and there are multiple variants. There's thought on diplomacy. There's thought on economics. There's thought on law. Chris Johnson:All of that. And I think, the other thing is this ideological crowning, obviously, the significance of it lies in the codification and probably the legitimization then of the sum of all of his actions and pronouncements since he came to power and the equating of those developments and those statements with the party's line. And as you and I have discussed many times, to criticize Xi now then is not just to attack the man, but to attack the party itself. That's very dangerous. And if you're going to do it, you better get it right.Bill Bishop:To that point, isn't that part of his political genius, because he must have, that must have been by design, right?Chris Johnson:Oh, absolutely. It was completely by design and there was a reason I think why Xi, amongst recent leaders, was the one who, if you spoke to people for example, in the party, the central committee department for party history research, they would say when he was vice president leader in training, he actually cared about party history. Jiang and Hu didn't really care, or at least it wasn't a priority for them. It was very meaningful for Xi Jinping, I think for those reasons. And so, this new history resolution, I think, is important in helping him continue this process toward the next revolution, which is to truncate Xi Jinping thought.Chris Johnson:I think, in terms of the substance of a new resolution, it's my sense that there's a tension, not just in Xi's mind, but perhaps in the leadership circles of the people who are working on this thing, between a desire to make that document, only celebratory and forward looking, in other words, why the new era is so amazing versus a desire to tidy up, if you will, some of the bits from history that he doesn't like with criticism, which of course in a very similar fashion to say, Deng Xiaoping 1981 when criticizing the excesses of the cultural revolution. So in my mind, there's two aspects where that criticism could come to the fore, which are very valuable. The first is, will he do in effect to Deng what Deng did to Mao, which is to criticize the excesses of Deng Xiaoping's reform and opening policies.Bill Bishop:Which would be including criticizing then at least indirectly Hu and Jiang who are still alive.Chris Johnson:Well, we'll come back to that in a minute because I think it's a separate animal, but on the reform and opening piece, it very much relates obviously to common prosperity, to the new development concept. I'm seeing right over the last several months, but I think there's a separate aspect from that kind of economic excesses. There is this line. It was a very fascinating. You never want to put too much emphasis on one piece of propaganda, but I believe it was the 24th of September, People's Daily had their latest iteration in the Xi Jinping thought question and answer series. And, it was about kind of party leadership and so on and so forth. And there was a fascinating line in there in my mind, which was the quote was especially after the 18th party Congress in view of quote, the neglect dilution and weakening of the party's leadership for a period of time.Chris Johnson:Now, what period of time is he talking about? He's talking about the tenures of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. So once again, further re-raising them from history, boosting his own stature and creating a justification for him to certainly rule for a third term. And, who knows beyond that?Bill Bishop:And, having a historical resolution, the third one then really does create the third era, right?Chris Johnson:No. It formalizes the kickoff, if you will, of that new era. Yeah.Bill Bishop:And that's why, I struggle with sort of lots of the rumors. Xi's weak. Xi's up or he's down or there's the latest one is he won't travel abroad because he is worried about a coup. "Hey, it's Chinese politics." Maybe it's true, but it seems a little bit of a stretch to me. But, I look at, again, back to his ... You hear lots of things. And certainly, when I was in Beijing and sort of the, probably not now but back then, the Beijing chattering class. He was never the smart guy. He was always kind of slow. And yet, here we are. And here he is. And so I think, he may not be the best educated of Chinese leaders in some formal perspective, but he certainly seems to be as politically savvy as Deng or Mao.Bill Bishop:I mean, he certainly seems to have surpassed Jiang and Hu, but I think one of the things too, back to this question of, is he weak or will he be around? What's going to happen to the 20th plenum? One of the things I go back to is, when he got, Xi Jinping fought and appended, whatever you want behind it, it's a 19 party congress. Doesn't that basically mean though, that as long as Xi's alive, he's kind of the man? [crosstalk 00:20:16] Even, if someone else has the job title, unless the party changes his line and gets rid of Xi's thought, which seems like it would be extremely difficult for a whole bunch of reasons, ultimately as long as he's breathing, isn't he caught up kind of running the show.Chris Johnson:Yes.Bill Bishop:Or, is that too simplistic?Chris Johnson:Very much the case. And in fact, again, his interest in not just Chinese communist party history, but the communist movements history, you can have no Khruschev secret speech. If you do these sort of things, at least while he's alive, to your point. And I think, that's a very important aspect of what he's trying to do here. He's creating the conditions for him to be able to engage in, to steal Barry Naughton’s term for the economy, grand steer edge of the entire system, and I think, that's a very, very important aspect. And just to your point on the intellectual stuff, because I think it's important, there's a difference between book smarts and political street fighting skills. And probably, his education was disrupted. So probably, he may not be God's gift to intellect, but there's no question in my mind that from a political acumen point of view, he's a genius, a tactical genius.Bill Bishop:And, if you think about what his primary book education was when he was in his most formative years, it was Mao thought.Chris Johnson:Yeah. No, definitely. And, I just want to come back to that too, because I think it's so important on what could be the meaning, if you will, of this new history resolution, which is that Xi Jinping clearly has a problem with the period of the nineties and what I actually like to call the early naughties in both of their-Bill Bishop:Otherwise known as the Go-Go Years..Chris Johnson:and being naughty. Yeah. The wild west days. And I think, he feels also that the period in the run up to when he took power ahead of the party Congress in 2012, he in many ways saw that as the period of maximum danger for the party. And so, this will be criticized. There's no way in my mind there won’t be some mention of our friends Bo Xilai,and the characters that were purged at that time, maybe not specifically, but in the sideline propaganda and so on, I'm sure will come up.Bill Bishop:So, because one thing when you talked about the resolution, I mean, and what will be in it and sort of how do you balance the sort of criticism or judgment on the past 30 years with forward looking, I found it interesting in yesterday's People's Daily. I had it in the newsletter yesterday, was that very long piece by the sort of the pen name for the People's Daily theory department on Chinese style modernization, which was very forward looking, but also very global looking in terms of talking about how China has created this new style modernization and how it can be a sort of applicable to other countries. And so, tying that back a little bit to your earlier comment about sort of trying to understand, as you said, the administration's rack and stack, how do we sort of go through what we think they're global, the PRCs global ambitions are and what can we live with what we can, what do you think their global ambitions are?Chris Johnson:Well, there are a series of them in their region, certainly, and we can talk. There's endless debate about whether it extends globally and if so, on what timeline, but they certainly want to be seen as a major superpower. No question. I often like to say that their goal in the region certainly, and I think increasingly globally, is that they want countries when a country is thinking of doing something significant in terms of its policies, the leadership and Xi Jinping himself would like that country's leadership to think about how Xi Jinping's going to react to this in the same moment that they think about how will the US react to this? That's what they're after.Chris Johnson:And in my mind, as to whether it is a desire to subvert the rules based global international order and so on, I'm much more skeptical, I think, than a lot of our colleagues on that in part, because implicit in that is this notion of them sitting around in the Politburo meetings, stroking long beards and looking 50 years into the future. They have an inbox too, and they're not infallible nor are they press the end all the time. And, I just think that, it's too much of a teleological view, from my point of view, but that's certainly one of them.Chris Johnson:And I think, this ties to the history resolution bill, because, Xi, in my mind, needs or wants kind of three things from that. The first is, he too needs to create a justification for staying in power. The reality is, no one can stop what he's trying to do next year, or at least that's my opinion, but what they can do is build leverage for the horse trading for all the other positions that will be in play. If he can be criticized, as someone I spoke to about this situation put it to me, even Mao had to launch the cultural revolution to take control over the party again. In other words, even someone of his stature had to do that.Chris Johnson:Second, and it touches on what we were just discussing is his obsession with China breaking through the middle income trap to further prove the legitimacy of the country. And that means breaking from the old economic model. And third, also relevant to our comments just now is, he sees all of this as intimately bound to what we might call the global narrative competition with the US. In other words, if he can be seen as breaking through the middle income trap, doing a better job than the west on income and equality and so on, he sees that paying tremendous dividends for elevating China system.Bill Bishop:At least so for on dealing with COVID. It's paid dividends.Chris Johnson:Absolutely. Yeah. And, indeed further legitimizing the notion that they have found some third way between capitalism and socialism that not just works for them, but increasingly could be exportable.Bill Bishop:Right. So, it's not like everyone has to become a Marxist, Leninist exactly country, or people's dictatorship, but we have this China, this China solution, I think they call it. And certainly, one thing that's interesting too, I think is, and it hasn't gotten a lot of attention yet in more mainstream media, is this global development initiative that she announced at his speech to the UN in September, which now he is regularly bringing up in his calls with developing countries.Bill Bishop:And, it looks to me like it's effectively taking, it's a way of packaging up their lessons from the poverty alleviation campaign that they declared victory in early this year, and trying to take that global. And quite honestly, the world needs more positive development and if China's offering something that's reasonably attractive in the US or Europe isn't, then how can the US criticize these countries for signing onto it?Chris Johnson:No. I'm mean, increasingly, we always want to say, "Well, nobody wants to sign on to their model" or "It doesn't work in other places", but increasingly, what's the narrative that they're touting? One of it is, "Hey, we brought X hundred million people out of poverty." That's very attractive to some other countries. We have a system that works. We have a system that is tolerant of various and sundry approaches, doesn't insist that you change your governance structure or that you support human rights or avoid graft, and things like this. It's very attractive. But the global development initiative, I think in my mind, increasingly, it's sort of an agglomeration of the BRI aspects. And then, there's been so much attention of recent weeks about, particularly Wang Huning's dream weaving of cultural hegemony and all of these sort of//.Bill Bishop:I think people are a bit overindexing a bit on Wang Huning. [crosstalk 00:28:22] important.Chris Johnson:I know they are. I mean, the line I like to use is they're confusing the musician with the conductor.Bill Bishop:Okay. Oh, so you must be up to date on Xi Jinping thought on music. That's good.Chris Johnson:Exactly. Eventually.Bill Bishop:So, I mean, back to the plenum, moving forward from the next year to the 20th party Congress. I mean, normally, the year before a party Congress is a very, very politically sensitive and difficult year where you have the entire system is geared towards the party Congress and basically one not screwing up. And two, anticipating where the people or persons making the decisions on promotions want you to go in terms of policies. And so, in some way, usually it kind of freezes the system. Is there some risk of a fairly difficult year with China? Because, you've got clearly the economy is, I don't want to say struggling, but it's clearly not doing as well as they hoped.Bill Bishop:They seem to continue to be pushed pretty hard on the third tough battle of reducing financial risks. And specifically, I think evergrande is the poster child of that right now. But, what do you think she believes needs to happen over the next year? And what do you think that means for sort of the stuff, a lot of investors feel worried about around real estate, common prosperity? I mean, it just feels like for the first time in a while, things on the economic side at least look a little bit rickety right now.Chris Johnson:No. I agree with that general assessment. Equally important in my mind is how little the leadership and the economic technocrats seem to be rattled by that fact. In other words, we're not seeing the stimulus wave. We're not seeing monetary policy adjustments in a significant way. There's a lot of study as she goes. And, that could change. We've got the central economic work conference, obviously in December, which will give us a sense of how they're thinking about next year. But like so many other things, I think we as watchers and the investment community and others, we're slow to sometimes break with old narratives. One of which is you must welcome a party Congress with very high growth. And every signal coming out of the leadership is that, they're not playing that game anymore. I think that's fairly strong.Chris Johnson:This also comes back to the issue though of what I mentioned earlier about the politics. It's been quite striking to me given what a momentous occasion is happening next year, how little in the analysis of the crackdowns, the tech lash, these sort of things, property sector, how little attention's being paid to the political dimension. So for example, if you look at sort of this issue that I raised a moment ago of the danger for Xi is not someone's going to stop him or unseat him, but this issue of ... I think, my sense is he views the model of the changeover next year as being the ninth party Congress where I believe there was something like 80% turnover in the central committee.Bill Bishop:This was the 1969 during the middle of the cultural revolution.Chris Johnson:Yeah, in the midst of cultural revolution.Bill Bishop:And, the eighth party Congress was not five years before it was. There was quite a gap.Chris Johnson:Yeah. Huge gap. Yeah. And so, if he would like to sweep away that kind of level of changeover, that means getting rid of a lot of the dead wood of the other constituent groups, let's call them. And I think, his ability to do that is closely tied to whether they can criticize and what are the KPIs that he has put out for himself for this current term, and you just raised them. It's poverty alleviation, environmental improvement, and "guarding against financial risk". I think, we can say on the first two, he's done very well. On the third, it's a bit of a disaster.Chris Johnson:So the message, and I'm told that this was sort of some of the discussion on the margins of Beidaihe this year was that, you've got a year or arguably eight months because of the way the system does these things to get that grade on financial risk from a C-, D+ to an A, and poor Liu He in the role of having to figure out how to make that happen operationally. And I think to your point, oftentimes, we do get that paralysis as everybody's kind of looking over their shoulder. But if anything, I think these guys are more inclined to show they're overfulfilling the plan, if you will, in terms of representation and implementation. So, the risk in my mind is not that the various crackdowns will calm down or smooth out, it's that in their zeal to look like they're doing what the boss wants them to do to hopefully be promoted, they might badly over correct. And that I think, has applications for how they handle Evergrande and many of the other associated crackdowns.Bill Bishop:That's an interesting point. And, one of the things I wonder about because it just seems like she has been quite skillful at finding opportunity and what looks like messes. And, if we're looking at an evaluation in the last 30 years, sort of the historical resolution idea, certainly there's a lot to criticize about the economic model. I mean, they criticize it on a regular basis in terms of trying to transition the new development concept. It's an effectively saying the old model doesn't work anymore. And, one of the biggest problems we created was this massive debt problem for China. Is there a cynical way of looking at it and saying, "Okay, if we have this, we being sort of see the top of the party, we have a fair amount of confidence because we've done a lot, so much work on hardening the system and the stability maintenance system that we can tolerate more stress than people think"?Bill Bishop:And, by letting these things get really stressed, does that help remove some of the dead wood in terms of sort of surfacing officials who might be promotable to actually look like they were somehow culpable for some of the decisions that led to things like ever grand or some of these other messes, and then that clears the way for other personnel moves?Chris Johnson:I think, that's certainly part of it. I think, that might be adopting to sort of micro of a frame on it. I think where it's important is, from the perspective of, again, this is Xi's political genius, from my perspective, is the layering of these narratives in the buildup toward a major change or a major development. So, why in the depths of the trade war? Did you start talking about a new long march? And hardship and sacrifice and all of these things, they're preparing the ground. In some reason, why are they maintaining a COVID zero approach? There's lots of reasons. But one of the reasons in my mind is if indeed you feel you must fundamentally break with that old, dirty economic model, which was largely export led, and you want dual circulation to work and you want these things, why not keep the border closed and force the system to transition because it must?Chris Johnson:So, there's a number of these things where I think, again, I don't like to claim that it's all some master plan, but I think there's a lot of thought that's gone into some of these things.Bill Bishop:But clearly, things like the energy crisis, I mean, they clearly have ... There are a lot of moving parts that can blow up pretty quickly. And so I think, to your earlier point, the politics are always in command in China. I think they're more in command now, but it does just feel like the risks or the downside risks on the economy are greater than they've been in a while.Chris Johnson:Yeah. I mean, my sense is, again, what do the officials and particularly the economic technocrats see as the greatest risk? I think they think the great as risk is overdoing it, not underdoing it at this stage.Bill Bishop:Interesting. So, well, thanks. Anything else you want to talk about?Chris Johnson:No, I think I kind of covered the waterfront. I mean, I guess in summation, I would just say and it maybe kind of comes back nicely to US-China relationship and so on. Discussing what we've just been discussing, I think if you're a senior US policymaker, your working assumption has to be that China's more likely to get it right than to get it wrong, even if they only get it 30% right or 40%, something like that.Chris Johnson:Xi is here and will be here for the foreseeable future. And therefore there won't be any change in the policies largely that he's articulated. And if we have those as our working assumptions, I think we will find ourselves framing a better policy. And I guess, if it doesn't go that way, you could be "pleasantly surprised" or whatever you want to say. But is it really a pleasant surprise if you have a leadership crisis in China?Chris Johnson:I mean, this is another thing I think just in conclusion that I find very striking in the absence of information. And I think, one of the challenges for us as watchers, when a collective leadership system like we had before goes away, each one of those collective, all seven or nine, depending on the timeframe of the standing committee members, they all had coteries under them and so on and so forth. In other words, there was a lot of places to tap in to get insight and compare notes. And so, with Xi Jinping, it's a very small circle, clearly. Even Kurt Campbell and other US officials have discussed their frustration with not being able to get in the inner circle.Chris Johnson:And therefore, people just find themselves going to these memes such as, well, they're will inevitably be a succession crisis when Xi Jinping leaves the scene. In my mind, the biggest opportunity for a massive succession crisis in the history of the PRC was Mao's death. And yet, they managed to find a way largely through Deng Xiaoping. But I think in general, because there was a collective understanding that this whole thing's going to unravel if we don't get it together, China's not so worried about that, nor am I worried about an imminent invasion of Taiwan, but that's probably another podcast.Bill Bishop:That was a whole different podcast. And so ... No. Well, look, thank you so much. It's really great as always to talk to you. And, I do hope I can get you back on as a guest at some point.Chris Johnson:Always glad to do so. Anytime, Bill. And, your newsletter in my mind is the best thing out there in terms of keeping me up to speed and subsequently informed every day.Bill Bishop:Thank you. I didn't pay him to say that just to be clear. But, great. Thank you, Chris. Get full access to Sinocism at sinocism.com/subscribe

Episode Notes:Today's guest is Chen Long, co-founder and partner of Plenum, a research firm covering Chinese economy and politics. Prior to that, he was a China economist at Gavekal Dragonomics. Chen Long is a Beijinger, and graduated from Peking University. Welcome to the podcast. It's great to have you.2:20 - I think the economy is a little bit like ice and fire, for now. There are certain areas certainly doing pretty poorly. Of course, everyone always talking about the property market, Evergrande, and basically every couple weeks we see a property developer default… 6:00 on the power generation problems - usually December is a peak of Chinese electricity consumption. I'm not sure the current supply of coal is not ... I mean, it's better than a month ago, but they probably have to do a little bit more. So I think it's still too early to say that we have totally overcome the end of the shortage.13:07 on whether this time is different with the real estate market - a year after Beijing and many local governments introduced restrictive policies, finally, we had three months in a row of property sales volume falling by double digits, on a year on year basis. But this is just three months, right? If you look at the previous cycles, especially 2015, 16, we could have the down cycle for 15 months. But this is just three, right? So Beijing has not blinked yet, because it's only three months.16:30 on Evergrande - I think there was a little bit of overreaction, especially when you see headlines linking Evergrande to Lehman Brothers, and this sort of thing. And I have to say that this is at least the third time I hear a Chinese Lehman moment in the last ten years.35:50 on the 6th Plenum and likely historical resolution - The previous ones were all about resolutions on certain questions of the party's history. Right? And this one is not uncertain questions. There is no question. It is resolution on the party's accomplishments over the last 100 years, and the lessons. So I guess it's a big, big summary about what he has done. And, of course, this one I think will cement him as the core, right? And we have to follow whatever he thinks we should do soLinks: The Plenum website. Transcript:Bill:Hi everyone. Today's guest is Chen Long, co-founder and partner of Plenum, a research firm covering Chinese economy and politics. Prior to that, he was a China economist at Gavekal Dragonomics. Chen Long is a Beijinger, and graduated from Peking University. Welcome to the podcast. It's great to have you.Chen:Thank you, Bill. It's my honor to be your third guest.Bill:Oh, well, third time is the charm, I hope. And I hope things are well. And I hope things are well in Beijing. I have to say, I very much miss this time of year in Beijing. There is something really special about autumn in Beijing.Bill:So, to kick off, today, I think we want to talk about the state of economy, and various themes related to that, including common prosperity, and real estate, the sixth plenum that's coming up. But, to start out, could you just give a brief intro about yourself, and more specifically what Plenum does?Bill:Just for listeners, it's a high end research service. The website is at Plenum.ai. And it's really terrific. It's one of my top most favorite research services on China now. They're really sharp on economy and politics.Chen:Yeah. Thank you, Bill. I think, Bill, you have done basically all the marketing I need to do. So we are a pretty young firm. I mean, we were founded two years ago, almost exactly two years ago. And that's when we first started to publish reports. And we write on Chinese economy, policies, politics, geopolitics, other stuff. And we serve institutional clients. Some are financial institutions, some are non-financial corporations.Chen:And I think where we are a little bit different from others, is the team is basically entirely Chinese nationals. But, of course, we'll come from different backgrounds. A lot of people work in the US for many years. And, right now, I'm based in Beijing. Yeah.Bill:And I first came across your work, I think, because you were working with Arthur Kroger, over at Gavekal DragonomicsChen:Yes. I was at Gavekal for almost six years. Yeah.Bill:Right. And I think that's where I first started reading your work. So, anyway, it's great to have you. I've always been a big fan. So-Chen:Yeah. Thank you, Bill.Bill:From a top level, could you just give us your view on what's going on in the economy in China, and where things are?Chen:Yeah. I think the economy is a little bit like ice and fire, for now. There are certain areas certainly doing pretty poorly. Of course, everyone always talking about the property market, Evergrande, and basically every couple weeks we see a property developer default.Chen:But, on the other hand, you also see this energy crunch, which actually was because energy demand was really strong, right? And industrial demand was strong. And then the grid and then the power plants could not meet up with that demand. So you basically have one big sector of economy, and actually several big sectors, apart from the real estate, you have the automobile market actually shrinking this year, general consumption were pretty mediocre, right? Because whenever there's a COVID cluster, you have local governments will restrict travel, or implement some sort of lockdown for two or four weeks. So consumption will be affected.Chen:But, on the other hand, the export is really strong, right? We're probably seeing the best export performance since 2011. That's the best we have in a decade. And there's no sign that this is putting off. A lot of people have said, "No, this is just temporary. Not going to be sustainable." I've been hearing that argument since a year ago. And, right now, it's still really hot. So that's why you have certain sectors ... So that's a little bit special, I think, compared with any time in the last decade. Yeah.Bill:And, certainly, specifically around the energy challenges, you said it was really because demand was so high. How quickly do you think that the ... There have been a whole flurry of measures from the NDRC, and other government bodies, about making sure that the coal supply increases, and cracking down on price speculation.Bill:And, I mean, how quickly do you think that these regulatory actions are going to solve the problem? And, the reforming or the changing in the price mechanism, is that enough to make the power generators actually make money now, so they're more willing to produce energy? Or are we still going to be looking at probably fits and starts over the next few months?Chen:Yeah. I think a lot of the power plants may not be losing money at this point. The government basically did several things at the same time. One, they told all the coal miners just to increase supply as much as you can. And, two, they told the coal miners also to restrict the prices. Basically, they set a cap. And there's a debate on what exactly is the cap, because there are several different versions of the cap.Chen:But whatever version you believe in, there's a cap. And the cap is a lot lower than the market price we had two weeks ago. That's why we had this Zhengzhou thermal coal future price, basically halve in two weeks. And they also allow the power plants to raise the electricity prices by up to 20%, and more if the users are high energy intensity sectors.Chen:So there are flurry of changes happen just over the last months or so. And I think the coal supply has probably improved quite a bit. And we are hearing a lot less stories on companies running ... They face blackouts, or they were just told in very short notice that they have to cut production. We hear a lot less that sort of story. But that still exists, it's just a lot less than a month ago, or at the end of September.Chen:But with this winter heating season coming again, usually December is a peak of Chinese electricity consumption. I'm not sure the current supply of coal is not ... I mean, it's better than a month ago, but they probably have to do a little bit more. So I think it's still too early to say that we have totally overcome the end of the shortage.Bill:Thanks. I mean, it is interesting how it really seemed to have caught a lot of people by surprise. I think both policy makers, but also investors. It's just interesting how that happened, and how so many people seemed to not understand what was going on, including myself.Chen:Yeah. Because, for 20 years maybe, people talk about China has over capacity in IPP, this is actually the power plants. China invested too much in some coal power plants. And I think, at one point, like 2015 or 2016, when over capacity got really serious. And then that was one of the sectors that local and others had to work very hard to cut capacity.Chen:So we never really thought for a second that China would have electricity shortage, because there's always huge supply, maybe oversupply. But I think a lot of things changed since the beginning of the pandemic. The services sector used to be growing a lot faster. But, so far, it's underperforming, while the industrial sector, which were slowing for many years, has suddenly started to outperform.Chen:So, basically, since the second quarter of last year, we have a Chinese economy moving further away from a service driven economy, to a more industrial driven economy. So that's a completely reversal of the trend since 2010, or even 2005.Bill:That's also a reversal of what a lot of economists have recommended China do, right?Chen:Yeah. I mean, people say, "No, yeah, China should become more service driven, and less industrial driven. And also, of course, more consumption driven, less investment driven." But I would say this whole rebalancing theme has somewhat reversed over the last year or so.Chen:And this just, again, has to do with this fire and ice, as I mentioned earlier. So this is just one sector doing really well, it's industrials. And the manufacturing facilities are just all pretty at fully capacity, demand from the rest of the world is really strong. And while the domestic consumption is very mediocre. And service sector, of course, the people just go out a little bit less than they were, in 2019 or earlier.Chen:So basically the economy itself is consuming much more electricity than it used to be, that means two years ago. So, suddenly, we have this issue.Bill:Interesting. And just on that stronger industrial, weaker consumption service sector, is that by design? Is that something that the policy makers want? Or is this just more of an outgrowth of the pandemic changing global dynamics, potentially consumer spending dropping because of concerns about consumer debt, for example? I mean, what's driving that?Chen:I don't think it's intended or planned, or even foreseen by Beijing, by the leadership, I think when China started to get out of the pandemic, in April or May 2020, I mean, there was a real fear, because the rest of the world is experiencing the worst of the pandemic. So the worry, at the time, was China is going to face a demand collapse from the rest of the world. So you got a double whammy economic crisis. So just get out from the domestic demand collapse, you're going to see an external demand collapse.Chen:But somehow that external demand collapse didn't really happen, or just basically happened for one month or so. And turned out to be that the export was really strong. And people in Beijing could hardly believe that. And people say, "Oh, this is just temporary. Because this supply chain was disrupted. But maybe when the things get better next year, the demand will go away. And somebody might has to do with this stimulus checks, given by US government, European governments. Once that effect expires, the demand will go away."Chen:But, so far, it still hasn't gone away. And with Southeast Asia, and Eastern Europe, Latin America, lot of developing manufacture hubs in trouble, China basically became the only manufacture hub that can still maintain enough supplies. So I think that really caught a lot of people, including the Chinese government, by a big surprise.Bill:No, it is. It is really interesting. And so as you talk about the economy, I think you called it fire and ice, I mean, one area that seems a bit icy is real estate. And, obviously, Evergrande's been in the news. But there are plenty of real estate developers that have violated the three red lines, or seem to be in various states of default or near default on some of their debt.Bill:One thing that's been interesting is we've seen real estate stresses that are over the last 15 years or so. Every few years, it seems like there's a cycle, and it's usually policy driven. Because the policy makers want to crack down on real estate speculation and unproductive investment. But then when things start getting bad, and stressed, and companies start having problems, and prices maybe start looking like they're going to drop in some places, the policy makers always blink and pull back, and basically find ways to loosen things up, and let the market return.Bill:It seems like, this time, they've been much more disciplined, I think surprising a lot of people, in terms of being willing to ride out a lot more pain around the real estate sector. Is that a fair assessment? And, if it is, why is that? And if it's not, how do you see what's going on?Chen:Yeah. I tend to believe that this time is not that much different from previous episodes. I mean, I know there's the argument there, saying, "Xi really wants to reduce the share of the real estate in the economy, and wants to curb housing prices." But I don't think this is new. We have this episode, like you just mentioned, multiple times in the last 15 years. Basically every three years, we have a property cycle, from trough to peak to trough. Right? And the Chinese government, in both central and local, that will change policies very, very quickly.Chen:And this time is no different, right? Because you talk about the three red lines, the three red lines really were just introduced a year ago, last August. Right? And, well, the background of that was the PBOC, along with other policy makers, the property market recovered too quickly, and think they're doing too well. And housing prices in cities, especially big cities like Shenzhen or Shanghai, were rising too fast. And that was a little bit unanticipated. So they said, "No, we have to restrict the area, this kind of bull run."Chen:And now a year after Beijing and many local governments introduced restrictive policies, finally, we had three months in a row of property sales volume falling by double digits, on a year on year basis. But this is just three months, right? If you look at the previous cycles, especially 2015, 16, we could have the down cycle for 15 months. But this is just three, right? So Beijing has not blinked yet, because it's only three months. Right?Chen:And we are seeing a little bit some early signs, like PBOC two weeks ago said, "Oh, some banks misunderstood our intention, when we told them to restrict the lending. And some of the normal projects would not be restricted," blah, blah, blah. And then I think today, or yesterday, one of the state-owned media, Economic Daily again published article about these housing regulations. So I think we're seeing some signs that those things are easing a little bit. So it's not like they are just letting the market die.Bill:Right. Well, and I mean, there are real risks. I mean, there are real risks around ... I mean, I owned property in China for a while, and certainly had lots of friends, including some real estate developers, and people with lots of ... I mean, there was just this sense that, in these previous cycles, they would go until prices started dropping, and there was a risk of people getting really pissed off because they were losing money again.Bill:And so is that one of the things ... I mean, again, it doesn't seem like the prices have dropped that much yet in most places. Is that one of the things to look for, where if we start seeing housing prices actually go negative, is that one of the triggers that makes the government maybe start loosening faster, just because they're worried about how ... I mean, they have their constituency, and people who own property. They do care what they think, right?Chen:Yeah. That's certainly one thing they care about. And I think another thing they care about is the impact on economy, like the GDP, right? The housing and the real sector as a whole, if you found all the upstream industries all together, it'd account for probably one third of Chinese economy. Right? So if you kill the real estate sector, basically you kill the economy. And they can't do that. That's suicide.Bill:No. It's still a quarter of the economy. Right? So somewhere around there, if you add up all the various-Chen:Yeah. Depending on how you estimate, anywhere between 20% to a third, that's kind of the estimation. Yeah.Bill:So, Evergrande, there was a massive freak out over Evergrande. And I think it's maybe even a month ago, or a little longer. Did people overreact to what's going on at Evergrande. And what is going on there? And how do you think it gets resolved?Chen:Yeah. I think it has a little bit of sense that people were a little bit overreacting. I got called by Al Jazeera twice in two days, saying, "We need you to comment on Evergrande." I was like, "Come on, guys. You guys, yeah, are very respectful media TV, but you don't need to tell your audience in Qatar what's going on in Evergrande, in two days in a row. And one of that is a Sunday."Chen:So I was like, "Oh, this is really everywhere. Right? It's not just Bloomberg or Wall Street Journal. This has gone to non-financial media as well." And that was basically the main theme in the last week, or last two weeks of September. Right? So I think there was a little bit of overreaction, especially when you see headlines linking Evergrande to Lehman Brothers, and this sort of thing. And I have to say that this is at least the third time I hear a Chinese Lehman moment in the last ten years.Bill:I was just going to say, is the default analogy when ... Oh my God, China's Lehman moment. And we saw it. I remember it was, I think, 2013, when the interbank market basically went crazy, the end of Q2, early Q3. And I forget the other one. But, no, every time I see someone say, "China's Lehman market," basically, just to be honest, I just tune it out. Because it doesn't fit. And it never has. And if China has a big problem like Lehman Brothers, it won't be like Lehman brothers. It'll be something else, is my view.Chen:Yes, totally. And I don't know that even if Lehman Brothers exist today. I mean, if the same thing happens today, with the current federal reserve, with the current Fed chairman, that this will not have happened. Because they would just do QE.Bill:So what does happen with Evergrande? I mean, how does this thing get resolved?Chen:Evergrande, on the surface, just a very large company, over leveraged, and had a liquidity problem, maybe has solvency problem. We don't really know how much of its assets is real, or how much liability is real. Maybe its liability is a lot more than is stated. It says it has 2 trillion RMB liability, but if it has 2.5 trillion, then the company is insolvent, right? So we don't really know.Chen:And the thing is, we just start to see that this company started to have funding problem, since PBOC introduced the three red lines, because it failed in all the three. Banks were afraid of giving it money, and couldn't refinance in the bank market either. And the trust company, and the trust world that everyone saw, started to have problems. So, basically, with leverage at that size, you have to keep borrowing. To Evergrande, they're reducing the debt. And once that snowball stops moving, then basically you collapse, right? So I guess that's basically what it faced.Chen:And how we're going to resolve it, I think, in the best case scenario, that a lot of the estate projects will just ... First, they have to get it finished. And some of the land, or some other projects be sold to other developers. And Evergrande will downsize to a much smaller developer, and then will start to exist.Chen:And that's quite similar to what Wanda did. Wanda was a much bigger property developer five years ago. But then since has sold a lot of the projects, both in China and overseas. And, basically, right now, it's like a property management company, and doesn't have a lot of power assets. So that's what Wang Jianlin did to save himself, basically, and his company.Chen:So maybe, on Evergrande, if you're rational, you think that's a good scenario. But I think Hui Ka Yan doesn't want to give up. I think that he is betting on another big easing from Beijing. Right? Because he has been in this, I would say, in the live or die moment, at least twice in the last 15 years. Right? The first time I heard about Evergrande was 2007, right? I saw news that Hui Ka Yen was having drinks with the Hong Kong tycoons, and playing mahjong together. And, finally, he received a lot of money from the Hong Kong tycoons. And then that saved him in 2008, when the company was on the edge of collapse.Chen:And the second time was 2015. The company was again on the edge of collapse. And then it bet on a big easing from Beijing, and then property market turned around. It became much bigger. And I think, this time, Hui Ka Yen doesn't want give up. But he did say two weeks ago that he wants to move further from property developing, wants to become electricity car company. God knows whether he can succeed or not, but he's not going to just give up.Bill:Right. Right. No, he's the kind of ... I mean, that's why he's been so successful, and why he's been able to pull this off, right? I mean, he's just going to go until he can't go anymore. And it will be-Chen:Yeah, yeah. I think that the government ... Yeah. Sorry.Bill:No, go ahead. Go ahead, please.Chen:Yeah. I think from the government's perspective, the government would just want Evergrande to downsize, finish the existing projects, pay off your debt. It becomes a smaller company. And then your risk also is a lot smaller. But I'm not sure that's something that Hui Ka Yen has decided to do. Because then he will become a much less relevant person. Right?Bill:Right. And the government does also seem concerned now about the risks of defaults in the overseas debt markets. Right? I mean, it seems like this is the constant tension, right? They want introduce some discipline, and they want to avoid moral hazard, but they can't have a bunch of offshore bonds default in a short period of time. Right? Because then that potentially really screws up the market for them for a while, doesn't it?Chen:Yeah. That's actually an interesting point. Because when people ask me about Evergrande like a month and a half ago, and I was basically saying, "I think the dollar bond market matters the least for Beijing." Right? Because you have a different kind of creditors of Evergrande, right? You have the home buyers, who've paid, but they haven't received the houses. And then you have the construction firms and their workers. And you have the domestic banks, the domestic WMP holders, domestic trust companies. And they all matter a great deal for the Chinese financial system. And the last one is a hedge fund or someone who bought a bond in Hong Kong. But all of a sudden, they had a meeting a week ago, saying, "Hey, guys, we have to have a little bit discipline. Don't just run away. And you have to also take care of your offshore debt." I still haven't figured out why, what changed in their thinking. Maybe this is just a way to calm down the Wall Street. But why did they suddenly feel they have to calm down the Wall Street, six weeks after the crisis happened? I haven't figured out.Chen:My hypothesis is maybe some Wall Street bosses put some pressure on Chinese leadership. I did notice that a lot of the big bankers, and the big American company, and the senior executives had a video conference with Wang Qishan two or three weeks ago, in the name of the Xinhua advisory board.Bill:Right. Right, right, right. That's interesting. And I have to say, I find it very, very strange that the US Secretary of State, Blinken, brought up Evergrande a couple weeks ago, which he made some comment about hoping the Chinese manage ... I forget exactly, but it just-Chen:Well, he was asked by CNN, or someone. Yeah, he was asked.Bill:Oh, was it a response? He was asked? Okay. It just seemed like it was very out of his lane, in terms of what the Secretary of State would talk about. So-Chen:Yeah. He basically said, "People have to act responsibly."Bill:Interesting. I mean, I think it is interesting though. It definitely does seem to be a shift. So, speaking of shifts, I know we only have a few more minutes, but I'd love to get your thoughts on ... Again, this is something lots of people ... Outside of China, I know we're scratching their heads, but certainly folks I've talked to inside China too, are trying to really get their hands around, what does common prosperity mean? And, really, what changes, what policy direction are we really going to see around common prosperity? And there was that strange WeChat post that was from a very sort of Neo-Maoist-Chen:Li GuangmanBill:Yeah, yeah, the very Neo-Maoist blogger, that was picked up over the weekend by the online properties of Xinhua big state media properties, which caused a lot of consternation outside China, but I think inside China as well. And so it seems like the messaging is a little bit mixed, and there's obviously a lot of politics involved. But what do you see, or what's your guys' view, the point of view on what common prosperity means going forward?Chen:Well, we tend to think that common prosperity is next step after President Xi completed the poverty alleviation campaign, right? So after poverty alleviation, in theory, China should have no absolutely poorer people, right? Nobody's living in poverty anymore. And then what's the next step, right? That's not the end. Right? You get out of poverty, but you should get richer, and you have a better life.Chen:So I think that's something that he came up with after that, that we want everyone to have a more decent lifestyle. And, of course, he chose Zhejiang province, a province he spent five years as party secretary to be this pilot program, or pilot area for common prosperity. And the thing about Zhejiang was ... The thing Zhejiang published was rather, I would say, a standard, right? It basically said, "No, we want to increase the household time by one percentage point, or increase the GDP by certain percentage point. And then the equality among different cities should be restricted within a ratio, and people should be able to find the jobs very easily," blah, blah. So a lot like that.Chen:So it's still very pro growth, the Zhejiang plan. But we all know the common prosperity is not only about growth, it's also about redistribution, which is something Zhejiang did not mention very much in his own report, which is understandable. Because that requires tax policy changes that Zhejiang has no say. So Beijing has to decide what kind of tax, what you have to introduce, right? People talk about this property tax, and more pilot programs for property taxes. And then we talk about the consumption taxes. So this kind of stuff, Zhejiang has no say, right? So Beijing has to decide what exactly they're going to do with all these taxes.Chen:So there's certainly an element also about redistribution, restricting certain super rich, and especially those who got rich without behaving, how to say, legally, or you operate in gray area. For many years, there was no law or no regulation. You got rich, but maybe you broke the law. Right? So if you got rich through that channel, then maybe you have to rethink a little bit. Yeah. Or at least you have to change your model completely, because that's no longer tolerated. Right? Because the President did say, "We encourage everyone to work very hard to get rich. And that's great. But we also want to restrict people from getting rich using dodgy channels."Bill:Right. And I think that's what has certainly freaked out a fair number of people. Right? Because it's always unclear what the definition of dodgy or not legal actually is, and how far back they might go. And, that, I think also ties a bit into ... I know you guys have written a fair amount about all these various regulatory actions, and specifically around anti-monopoly policies and regulatory decisions, and also the changing approach to internet platform regulation.Bill:Are we in a new normal, when it comes to regulation? I talk to some people who think this is all passed, and it's going to get better again. But, to my perspective, it really feels like we're in a new era of this kind of stuff. And so, the big internet companies, their businesses are still good, but they're never going to be the same. And it feels like, their costs, they're going to have a lot higher cost base, because they're not going to be able to exploit workers and customers, like the way they used to be able to.Chen:Yeah. I think the compliance cost will certainly be a lot higher than before. And these regulations have passed. And they will stay here. They'll not go away. They'll not be rolled back. So I don't think there's anything like the end of the regulation, or the end of the regulatory competitor. There will be no end.Chen:But I do think maybe the peak is behind us. Think about the largest internet companies in China, Alibaba and Meituan were already punished for antitrust. And the Tencent was not directly affected by the trust, but the gaming thing was also mentioned, and a lot of other guys also name checked, like ByteDance, or Pinduoduo, they were also a little bit worried. So it is hard to say who will be bigger than Alibaba, who will be a bigger victim than Alibaba, it's very hard to ... Unless Tencent suddenly runs into a big trouble. But nobody else is bigger than Alibaba in the Chinese internet domain.Chen:So I guess, after these campaigns, maybe since we settled down a little bit, it will not be over, but we're likely to suddenly see another company find 18 billion RB immediately, or another large fintech company saying, "You have to dissolve, or you have to be separated into different arms." Nobody else is really as big as Ant Right? So I guess maybe we have passed a peak.Chen:And especially, this year, again, I think there's something different about this year, is since the very beginning, Xi made it very clear that this is a year that we don't have to worry very much about economic growth, because it's very easy. Right? They said the growth is targeted at 6% intentionally, which is a target they're going to reach anyway. Right? So, basically, they can do a lot of other things, like structural reforms, and some things they wanted to do in the past, but didn't have the time or the capacity. But, finally, this year, you can spend all your efforts in these things.Chen:But next year will be different again. But next year, actually, we'll go back to the normal China, that you have to be worried about growth target, right? Where is Beijing going to set the growth target? People are debating. I think it's still being something like five and a half percent. And I definitely don't think it'll be lower than 5%. And given the current trajectory, they have to change policy quite a bit to reach either target, especially…Bill:So you're saying, if they decide the target for next year is 5%, they'd have to ease up on some things for next year?Chen:Yeah. I think, five, there is a little bit. And if five and a half, they have to ease quite a lot. And that means you have to be a little bit nicer to companies in general. Right? So, last year in 2020, Xi had several symposiums with various people, and at least two with large companies, right? One, there was a foreign company, the other was all Chinese private firms.Chen:But, this year, at least on the record, I haven't seen any of these kind of symposiums with companies. Right? So he only does that when he's worried about the corporate sector. And, this year, he's not worried, apparently. But, next year, if he's worried again, he could come up, and then they'll have a conversation with these guys in person. And if he does that, then the crackdowns will be a lot softer, at least. Right?Bill:Interesting. So last question, I know you got to go, is what do you think we're going to see out of the sixth plenum, that investors and others should really be paying attention to, that starts ... I guess it starts on Monday and runs through, I think, Thursday next week, right?Chen:Yeah. Yeah. Well, the sixth plenum is all about one thing, right? It's this resolution about the accomplishments of the party in the last one, two years. Right? And I think the previous two resolutions, we had one in 1945, another in 1981, right? Maybe the 1981 one is more relevant, because of course that's more recent, and that was done by Deng Xiaoping. And, without the second, we wouldn't have known there would be another resolution. Right?Chen:But I think this time it's quite different. Because both in the first resolution, basically written by and approved by Chairman Mao, and the second one basically drafted and finally approved by Deng and Chen Yun and other old comrades. But they had to fight with a different ideology. Right?Chen:So in the first resolution, Chairman Mao was basically saying that the party made a lot of mistakes in the 1930s. Right? And ended up then with the Long March. And then we had the Zunyi conference. And then I had to be this poor core. And then the party was saved. Right? So there was a real fight between Mao and a lot of other guys, from Wang Ming and others. So he used that resolution to cement what happened in the party over the past 20 years or so, which was right and which was wrong. So that was basically that resolution was all about.Chen:And the 1981 resolution was similar. Right? So this old comrades had to ... They felt they had to come with something to summarize what happened since 1949, what was right, what was wrong? Where did chairman Mao did right? And where did he did wrong? And what we should do next? Right? So there was a lot of that. And also of course Hua Guofeng at the time was still relevant. Right? So he had to make sure that this 两个凡是, that whatever Mao said, we had to follow. Right? This is...Bill:Yeah, the two whateversChen:Yes. Yeah. So he had to crack that. So, in both occasions, there were clear things they had to correct. But, this time, I really don't think there's a clear thing that President Xi has to correct. Because no one is really arguing something else. And I think they usually talk about their mistakes, or some problems the party had since 1981. Maybe the biggest thing was what happened in the late '80s. Right?Chen:But since 1992, when Deng did this sudden speech, and everything was basically all about the reform, and open up, blah, blah. Of course, we had a little bit of chaos during the 18th party Congress, Bo Xilai and all these guys. But that, I think, was so minor, if you compare all the other accidents the party had over the last 100 years, right? Maybe it's only relevant in the last 40 years. So I think this all ...Chen:And also the name was a little bit different, right? The previous ones were all about resolutions on certain questions of the party's history. Right? And this one is not uncertain questions. There is no question. It is resolution on the party's accomplishments over the last 100 years, and the lessons. So I guess it's a big, big summary about what he has done. And, of course, this one I think will cement him as the core, right? And we have to follow whatever he thinks we should do so, and that's something definitely right.Bill:That's an interesting point, about if it's not actually about certain questions. And probably, certainly, if people want to ahead of this, I think reading that document ... I think it came out in August. It was basically a long piece about the party's accomplishments. I'm guessing that there'll be a lot in this resolution that is very similar to that language.Chen:Yeah, yeah.Bill:Right? I mean, it seems like it's a draft almost. And, really, like you said, it's not about settling a fight that's been going on, so much as more forward working. But so what does that mean? I mean, I assume this will tie into common prosperity. And I guess, this plenum, it really is going to be about this. There's probably nothing from a policy perspective that's going to affect the economy, or how investors should look at China in the near term, right?Chen:Yeah. I guess not that much in the near term. Well, of course, this one will set a stage for next year, where the big thing will happen. So the 20th party Congress, will get them to say, "No, we're going to follow this revolution, and then do whatever we should do in the next few years." Right.Bill:Great. Well, hey, I really appreciate your time. I think really want to thank you for being one of the first guest of Cynicism. And I will put a link to the Plenum website in the show notes. And I highly recommend anyone who is a financial market professional in China, you should go sign up for trial. Like I said, these guys, Chen Long and his team, and the Plenum research product is really quite terrific. So thanks again for your time. And I hope everything stays safe in Beijing. We see lots of headlines about COVID in Beijing right now. But I-Chen:Yeah, it is absolutely safe. If I go out, I may not be able to come back. So it's absolutely safe to stay here.Bill:Right. So you're probably not leaving Beijing until February, right? I mean, is it possible that you really can't leave before the Olympics?Chen:I think I can. I think, after next week, things may be a little bit relaxed. I think it's just partly because of next week, the sixth plenum.Bill:The plenum.Chen:And partly because the COVID clusters are still on the rise. But I think after next week, I might be able to travel a little bit.Bill:Great. Well, anyway, thanks again for your time. And I hope to talk to you soon.Chen:Yeah. Thank you, Bill. Yep. Get full access to Sinocism at sinocism.com/subscribe

Photo: No known restrictions on publication. CBS Eye on the World with John Batchelor CBS Audio Network @Batchelorshow #100Years: Succession Unknown. The challenge by Bo Xilai. James Miles @TheEconomist. https://www.economist.com/leaders/2021/06/26/chinas-communist-party-at-100-the-secret-of-its-longevity?utm_medium=pr&utm_source=us-e

Photo: No known restrictions on publication. CBS Eye on the World with John Batchelor CBS Audio Network @Batchelorshow #100Years: The challenge by Bo Xilai. James Miles @TheEconomist. https://www.economist.com/leaders/2021/06/26/chinas-communist-party-at-100-the-secret-of-its-longevity?utm_medium=pr&utm_source=us-e

In der ersten Folge unseres Podcasts „China ungeschminkt“ geht es um einen der größten Politkrimis in der Geschichte Chinas: den sog. Bo Xilai-Skandal. Dieser hatte sich rund um die Amtsübernahme des gegenwärtigen chinesischen Staatspräsidenten Xi Jinping zugetragen. Bo Xilai war eine der schillerndsten und charismatischsten Persönlichkeiten in der Kommunistischen Partei Chinas, der auf der Karriereleiter fast ganz oben angekommen war - bis er im Jahr 2012 all seiner politischen Ämter enthoben, aus der KPCh ausgeschlossen und im Jahr 2013 schließlich zu lebenslanger Haft verurteilt wurde. In der Geschichte geht es um einen erbitternden Machtkampf, Korruption und sogar um Mord. Der Fall wirkt bis heute nach, denn obwohl Bo Xilai von der Bildfläche verschwunden ist, hat sein Wirken in den Jahren vor dem Gerichtsverfahren die politische Agenda der Xi-Administration nachhaltig geprägt. Link zum Lied: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OjNpRbNdR7E&ab_channel=MeheandusRevolution Feedback und Anregungen an: china-ungeschminkt@zu.de

Photo: Slogan for the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China in Tianxin District of Changsha, Hunan, China.  湖南省长沙市天心区万家丽南路的中国共产党成立100周年标语。 Permissions: see below. CBS Eye on the World with John Batchelor CBS Audio Network @Batchelorshow 100 years of Communist China rule leads to Bo Xilai vs Xi Jinping. @GordonGChang, Gatestone, Newsweek, The Hill https://thediplomat.com/2012/01/the-case-for-bo-xilai/ .. Slogan for the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China in Tianxin District of Changsha, Hunan, China. 中文（简体）: 湖南省长沙市天心区万家丽南路的中国共产党成立100周年标语。 Date 11 June 2021, 16:21:31 Source Own work Author Huangdan2060 Camera location 28° 04′ 09.6″ N, 113° 01′ 05.51″ E Kartographer map based on OpenStreetMap. The reproduction of this artistic, architectural, or applied artwork, is covered under the Copyright Law of the People's Republic of China, which allows reproduction of works in public place if the author and the name of the original work is attributed.Copyright Law of the People's Republic of China, Article 24: In the following cases, a work may be used without permission from, and without payment of remuneration to, the copyright owner, provided that the name of the author and the title of the work shall be indicated, the normal use of the work shall not be affected, and the legitimate rights and interests of the copyright owner shall not be infringed unreasonably:(10) copying, drawing, photographing, or video recording of an artistic work located or on display in a public place;

What was the Chongqing Model and why does it still matter? Yueran Zhang, a PhD student in sociology at the University of California, Berkeley, discusses. We talk about how Bo Xilai utilized mass mobilization against his enemies in the central government and China's labor movements, and the significance of the 2018 Jasic protests. Zhang's two recent articles for Made In China journal, “The Chongqing Model One Decade On” and “Leninists in a Chinese Factory: Reflections on the Jasic Labour Organizing Strategy,” serve as the basis for today's episode. Outtro music: some pro-Bo Xilai song written in 2009 to commemorate him taking on gangs (full story here: https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E8%96%84%E7%86%99%E6%9D%A5%E4%B9%8B%E6%AD%8C) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ND6fOAR4MWA  While this song is hilarious, I couldn't find a good recording and didn't want to you have to listen to the whole thing. Also thought it would be funny to pair this with folks who idolize gangsters... Outtro music #2: GOSH Music 2020 cypher (the biggest Chongqing hip hop collective) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6M0axMxBSWg The views expressed in this podcast do not reflect those of the Rhodium Group. Please consider supporting ChinaTalk at https://glow.fm/chinatalk/ Get bonus content on Patreon See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

What was the Chongqing Model and why does it still matter? Yueran Zhang, a PhD student in sociology at the University of California, Berkeley, discusses. We talk about how Bo Xilai utilized mass mobilization against his enemies in the central government and China’s labor movements, and the significance of the 2018 Jasic protests. Zhang’s two recent articles for Made In China journal, “The Chongqing Model One Decade On” and “Leninists in a Chinese Factory: Reflections on the Jasic Labour Organizing Strategy,” serve as the basis for today’s episode. Outtro music: some pro-Bo Xilai song written in 2009 to commemorate him taking on gangs (full story here: https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E8%96%84%E7%86%99%E6%9D%A5%E4%B9%8B%E6%AD%8C) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ND6fOAR4MWA  While this song is hilarious, I couldn't find a good recording and didn't want to you have to listen to the whole thing. Also thought it would be funny to pair this with folks who idolize gangsters... Outtro music #2: GOSH Music 2020 cypher (the biggest Chongqing hip hop collective) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6M0axMxBSWg The views expressed in this podcast do not reflect those of the Rhodium Group. Please consider supporting ChinaTalk at https://glow.fm/chinatalk/

Qui était Bo Xilai? Un truand sans scrupule, pour la vie des gens comme pour les biens des autres? Un administrateur surdoué, génie du développement des territoires et des opportunités pour amener à son pays la prospérité? Un vieux garde rouge ne s'étant jamais remis de son adolescence sous la Révolution culturelle? Ou le rival malheureux de Xi Jinping 10 ans en arrière, dans la guerre sans pitié pour la succession de Hu Jintao à la tête de la république populaire de Chine? Sans doute lui correspondent toutes ces facettes à la fois, et c'est ce que je vous raconte dans ce dixième épisode des chroniques d'Eric -un épisode au rythme haletant,  bien conforme à la nature décoiffante du personnage (décoiffante en particulier pour son chef de la police, et je me comprends) ! 

The illegitimate daughter of Bo Xilai appeared in Biden's email in hard drive

You can’t get far doing serious business in China without having friends in powerful places. So when her husband’s company, Jardine Matheson (which once upon a time had sold opium into the country), was invited back into a liberalising China in the 1990s, Tessa Keswick had rare access to the country’s top leadership. On the podcast, she recounts seeing Bo Xilai, the disgraced Chongqing party secretary, days before he was arrested by Xi Jinping; the prank that Zhu Rongji, the then Prime Minister, played on Henry Keswick; and what it was like inside Zhongnanhai, the secretive Beijing compound that China’s leaders work from. Tessa Keswick's book, The Colour of the Sky after Rain, is out now and she is pictured above with Cai Qi, Party Secretary of Beijing.

You can’t get far doing serious business in China without having friends in powerful places. So when her husband’s company, Jardine Matheson (which once upon a time had smuggled opium into the country), was invited back into a liberalising China in the 1990s, Tessa Keswick had rare access to the country’s top leadership. On the podcast, she recounts seeing Bo Xilai, the disgraced Chongqing party secretary, days before he was arrested by Xi Jinping; the prank that Zhu Rongji, the then Prime Minister, played on Henry Keswick; and what it was like inside Zhongnanhai, the secretive Beijing compound that China’s leaders work from. Tessa Keswick's book, The Colour of the Sky after Rain, is out now and she is pictured above with Cai Qi, Party Secretary of Beijing. Chinese Whispers is a fortnightly podcast on the latest in Chinese politics, society, and more. Presented by Cindy Yu. Listen to past episodes here (https://www.spectator.co.uk/podcasts/chinese-whispers) .

In this podcast interview with NCUSCR President Stephen Orlins, Jude D. Blanchette discusses his new book China’s New Red Guards: The Return of Radicalism and the Rebirth of Mao Zedong. Mr. Blanchette shares his inspiration for choosing a topic not focused on in Western literature, and relates his personal experiences conducting research in China. Mr. Blanchette surveys the potential for a resurgence of Neo-Maoism as an active movement, examines the role previously played by Bo Xilai, former Party-Secretary of Chongqing. Mr. Blanchette then transitions to a broader meditation on President Xi Jinping’s consolidation of power, of which Bo Xilai was an infamous casualty. While recognizing an increasingly constricted political and ideological environment, Mr. Blanchette emphasizes the continued survival of intellectual debate and diverse political thought within China. On October 18, 2019, Jude Blanchette presented his book at a National Committee event in New York City. Join us at an upcoming event, or watch videos of past events: ncuscr.news/events Jude D. Blanchette is the Freeman Chair of China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. He is also a senior advisor at Crumpton Group, a geo-political risk advisory in Arlington, VA. He serves as an adjunct fellow of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security, and is a National Committee on U.S.-China Relations Public Intellectuals Program fellow. Read Full Bio: ncuscr.news/jude

SupChina.direct — China consultants, on demand. Submit your project needs, and we will match you with qualified China consultants. This week, Kaiser sits down with Jude Blanchette in the Sinica South Studio in Durham, North Carolina, to talk about Jude's new book, China's New Red Guards: The Return of Radicalism and the Rebirth of Mao Zedong, which just came out on June 3. Jude explains the origins of the neo-Maoists and others on the left opposition, and how overlooking the conservative reaction to reform and opening impoverishes our understanding of China and its politics. What to listen for on this week’s Sinica Podcast: 9:33: The show begins with a discussion on Diāo Wěimíng 刁伟铭, an editor of the prominent neo-Maoist website Utopia (乌有之乡 wūyǒu zhī xiāng), and his untimely death in a vehicle collision while leading a group of Chinese tourists in North Korea visiting the grave of Mao Zedong’s grandson. Jude states: “Not only is his story fascinating and the story of why the heck they were in North Korea, but also [because] the news of the bus crash was originally suppressed.” The sensitivity of information about neo-Maoists reflects how their relationship with the Communist Party is “fraught” and “complex,” Jude says, who adds that this relationship “has been evolving for decades and continues to evolve now.” 18:48: Are there online platforms that lend themselves to radicalization in China? Jude explains how individuals find these communities organically, and moments around the turn of the millennium that prompted galvanization, the 1999 NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade among them. “Several key print publications were shut down by Jiang Zemin in 2002 and 2003, and these were old, established, thick theoretical journals that essentially had been the only remaining outlets for the conservative intellectuals…and after those publications were shut down, they really cast about to see what to do next, and I think had there been no internet, it would have been quite difficult to reconstitute a movement. But they saw this fledgling piece of information technology…this provided a public square, so to speak, where people could come together.” 27:34: What is neo-authoritarianism? What are the linkages between this ideology, the neo-Maoists, and the increasing prominence of technology? Jude tells the story of this theory in China and of the early progenitors, one of whom now sits on the Politburo Standing Committee. 31:21: How does the radical left in China view the protests at Tiananmen Square in 1989? Jude notes: “You would think given what we know about the current political program of neo-Maoism that they would either minimize or deny that there was any sort of massacre on June 4th, but in fact that’s actually not the case…there’s actually a much more nuanced position on things like the Cultural Revolution and June 4th than you would originally think.” 57:32: During Wen Jiabao’s tenure in office, Jude claims there is a reason why he pointed to the Cultural Revolution — to warn against the increase in radical leftist political views: “I do think there is a reason Wen Jiabao chose to invoke the spirit of the cultural revolution when essentially he wanted to warn about the neo-Maoists and Bo Xilai. That there is this thread of radical politics, which is always a threat to the Communist Party. And the most powerful fuel for this radical style of politics is not this sort of Liu Xiaobo, Ai Weiwei [style of] constitutional democracy. That’s not what the Party is really afraid of. It’s more afraid of people who outflank it from the left.” Recommendations: Jude: Behind the Curve, a film investigation into the “Flat Earth” community.   Kaiser: How to Hide an Empire: A History of the Greater United States, by Daniel Immerwahr, a story of the United States beyond the lower 48 states.  

Is the ongoing anti-corruption drive a sincere effort to root out official wrongdoing? Or is it a political purge of the enemies of Xí Jìnpíng 习近平? These questions have been hotly debated since the outset of the campaign in 2013. Now Peter Lorentzen of the University of San Francisco and Xi Lu of the National University of Singapore have harnessed data to examine the anti-corruption drive in the hopes of settling the question. Kaiser sat down with Peter on the sidelines of the recent Association for Asian Studies Conference to talk about the findings in their paper, “Personal Ties, Meritocracy, and China’s Anti-Corruption Campaign.” What to listen for on this week’s Sinica Podcast:  22:57: Of the many officials that have been purged since 2012, “three big tigers” in particular stand out: Sū Róng 苏荣, Líng Jìhuà 令计划, and Zhōu Yǒngkāng 周永康. Of the provinces Xi Lu and Peter analyzed, economic performance was a large contributing factor for official promotion except for Jiangxi, Shanxi, and Sichuan. Here, Peter provides background on these three officials, their downfall, and the “tiger territories” they previously oversaw.   30:34: In 2012, Bó Xīlái 薄熙来 was considered one of the main contenders to challenge Xi Jinping’s ascent to power. His association with the murder of a British businessman, Neil Heywood, reportedly ordered by his wife, brought a swift end to his political success. However, Peter was surprised by what he found regarding his political network in the aftermath: “If you rank people using the Google PageRank algorithm, you find Bo Xilai was below 20th. What that means, in practice, is that in our data there were not many people reported as being his cronies who were subordinate to him compared to a lot of other people.” 32:42: What does the inability of Politburo Standing Committee members to protect their personal networks say about the current political climate in China? Peter: “Even when you clump all other six Politburo [Standing Committee] members together, we didn’t see a sort of protective effect. Their associates, people we believed to be connected with them, were just as likely to go down as anyone else. So the question is: Why were they not able to protect their people?... This is not something we can observe directly in our data, but my sense is that it does show the demise of the collective leadership, first-among-equals approach.” 39:26: How many people have been subject to the corruption crackdown? Peter studied those who were investigated, whose names were published in reports by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection by 2015. “We’re looking at the first wave of the crackdown, but that was just a thousand people [whose names we could get]. I was looking at some estimates last night, and I think people are saying that the total number as of the end of last year was 20,000 to 30,000 people overall. And you know, they’re not all people who looked wrong at Xi Jinping some day. So it’s pretty clear that he’s got to have some other way of deciding who goes down.” Recommendations: Peter: Two sitcoms, Speechless (available on ABC) and Kim’s Convenience (available on Netflix). Kaiser: Two playlists on Spotify, “Instrumental Madness” and “Got Djent?”

This week, we cover the fall from grace of Bo Xilai and Gu Kailai. From rising stars of the communist party to convicted murderers, what does their story tell us about the workings of the modern Chinese Communist Party?

Raquel Vaz Pinto é uma das maiores especialistas em Portugal em política externa e estratégia da China.  O mote para este episódio era a política externa chinesa, mas acabámos por falar de muito mais do que isso. A política externa chinesa, que era muito discreta durante as primeiras décadas de desenvolvimento, tem-se tornado cada vez mais conspícua, de tal forma que a rivalidade entre a China e os EUA é, provavelmente, o grande tema das Relações Internacionais para as próximas décadas. Apoie o podcast a partir de 2€! https://www.patreon.com/quarentaecincograus Inquérito de feedback dos ouvintes: https://pt.surveymonkey.com/r/GNWLB97 Agradecimentos a patronos do podcast: Gustavo Pimenta; João Vítor Baltazar; Salvador Cunha; Ana Mateus; Ricardo Santos; Nelson Teodoro e Paulo Ferreira João Gil; Vasco Sá Pinto; “Falcão Milenar”; David; Pedro Vaz; Luís Ferreira; Helena Teixeira; André Gamito, Rui Baldaia Links: Houve contacto entre o Império Romano e a China Antiga? https://www.quora.com/Did-Rome-Empire-ever-contact-with-China Pessoas e episódios referidos: O Homem e o Tanque na praça de TianAnMen: https://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2018/jun/05/tank-man-what-happened-at-tiananmen-square-video-explainer Liu XiaoBo: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liu_Xiaobo Deng Xiaoping e o chapéu de cowboy: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/09/25/how-a-10-gallon-hat-helped-heal-relations-between-china-and-america/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.d8c62a862b88 Bo XiLai: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bo_Xilai Quando a Guerra Nuclear quase começou: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1983_Soviet_nuclear_false_alarm_incident Livro recomendado: https://www.wook.pt/livro/as-rotas-das-seda-peter-frankopan/21418695 Outros livros referidos: Gideon Rachman “Easternization”: https://www.amazon.com/Easternization-Asias-Americas-Decline-Beyond/dp/1590518519 Graham T. Allison “Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap?”: https://www.amazon.com/Destined-War-America-Escape-Thucydidess/dp/0544935276 John J. Mearsheimer “Can China Rise Peacefully?”: https://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204 Tim Marshall “Prisioneiros da Geografia”: https://www.wook.pt/livro/prisioneiros-da-geografia-tim-marshall/19597654 Robert Kaplan “A Vingança da Geografia”: https://www.fnac.pt/mp8589109/A-Vinganca-Da-Geografia Tucidides “História da Guerra do Peloponeso” (pp. 315-320) : https://www.wook.pt/livro/historia-da-guerra-do-peloponeso-tucidides/10644477 Bio: Raquel Vaz-Pinto é Investigadora do Instituto Português de Relações Internacionais da Universidade Nova de Lisboa. Foi Presidente da Associação Portuguesa de Ciência Política de 2012 a 2016. Os seus artigos têm sido publicados no Brazilian Journal of International Politics e The American Interest online, entre outros. É autora de «A Grande Muralha e o Legado de Tiananmen, a China e os Direitos Humanos» (Tinta-da-china, 2010), «Os Portugueses e o Mundo» (Fundação Francisco Manuel dos Santos, 2014) e editou em 2016 pela Tinta-da-china «Administração Hillary» (com Bernardo Pires de Lima) e «Para Lá do Relvado, o que podemos aprender com o futebol». Os seus interesses de investigação são política externa e estratégia chinesa; grande estratégia EUA e a Ásia-Pacífico; religião em relações internacionais; os portugueses e o mundo; e o futebol e as relações internacionais. Actualmente, lecciona a disciplina de Estudos Asiáticos na Faculdade de Ciências Sociais e Humanas da Universidade Nova de Lisboa.

In this episode of the Sinica Podcast, taped live at the US-China Strong Foundation’s China Careers Summit in Washington, D.C., on May 31, Kaiser talks to former assistant secretary of state for East Asia and Pacific affairs Kurt Campbell about his career, his critique of engagement, and the fascinating events that happened on his watch — including the extrication of blind activist lawyer Chen Guangcheng and the attempted defection of Bo Xilai’s former police chief in Chongqing, Wang Lijun. Recommendations: Kurt: Darkest Hour, a movie about Winston Churchill in the early 1940s that shows what is possible even in our darkest moments. Additionally, Kurt recommends The Narrow Road to the Deep North, a book by Richard Flanagan about an Australian POW’s experiences during World War II. Kaiser: Road to Unfreedom, a book by Timothy Snyder about the developments in Putin’s Russia and their implications for democracy and law across Europe, the United States, and other regions.

Welcome to the 35th installment of the Caixin-Sinica Business Brief, a weekly podcast that brings you the most important business stories of the week from China's top source for business and financial news. Produced by Kaiser Kuo of our Sinica Podcast, it features a business news roundup, plus conversations with Caixin reporters and editors. This week, we look at China's new economic data, which suggests that the 2017 rate of the country's economic growth was around 6.9 percent, marking the first acceleration in seven years. We learn that an ambitious deal between Dalian Wanda and IBM to join forces in China's booming cloud-computing market appears to be in serious jeopardy. We discuss global hotel giant Marriott International's apology following online anger toward its description of Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, and Tibet as “countries” in a recent customer survey. We hear about a burning oil tanker that exploded on a ship in the East China Sea on January 6. We explore the story of Yao Ning 幺宁, a controversial prosecutor who rose to fame under disgraced Party heavyweight Bo Xilai 薄熙来 and has recently come under public scrutiny after posting a statement about her handling of a 2009 case linked to a veteran Beijing lawyer, Li Zhuang 李庄. We note the latest move by leading shared-car services provider Didi Chuxing to drive into China's shared-bike business. In addition, we talk with Caixin Global senior editor Aries Poon about China's New Third Board and what it's doing to boost liquidity and attract a better class of companies. We also converse with Caixin Global editor Michael Bellart about efforts made by the central bank of China to try to improve security for QR-code-based payment. We'd love to hear your feedback on this product. Please send any comments and suggestions to sinica@supchina.com.  

Gillian Wong has been reporting from China since 2008 and is now the news director for Greater China at the Associated Press. High-profile stories Gillian has covered include the 2012 Tibetan self-immolations and the downfall of Bo Xilai 薄熙来. Her husband, Josh Chin, works as a foreign correspondent for the Wall Street Journal, where he has covered China since 2007. Prior to the Journal, Josh was a research fellow at the Asia Society’s Center on U.S.-China Relations, where he helped produce the China Boom Project. Between the two of them, Gillian and Josh have covered a host of China-related topics, ranging from cybersecurity to Xinjiang. They talk to Kaiser and Jeremy about their paths to becoming journalists, their experience of the changing working conditions for journalists in China, and their efforts to create diverse and representative narratives — complicated, and sometimes aided, by the fact that they are both at least part ethnically Chinese. Recommendations: Jeremy: Memphis, Tennessee, an American cultural destination and the musical hometown of B.B. King and Elvis Presley. Kaiser: Matt Sheehan’s piece on California’s transformation into an epicenter for U.S.-China relations, “Welcome to Chinafornia: The Future of U.S.-China Relations.” As a second recommendation, The Polish Officer, by Alan Furst, which does an incredible job of re-creating an old-world style of language and immersing the reader in its respective time and space. Gillian: The audiobook reading by Tom Perkins of John Pomfret’s The Beautiful Country and the Middle Kingdom. (Listen to John Pomfret discuss his book on Sinica.) Josh: The Paulson Institute’s MacroPolo initiative, which uses the latest research to decode China’s economy, urbanization, and development. A lot of great data all in one accessible, punny place. Also check out Gillian and Josh’s coauthored front-page piece, “China’s new tool for social control: A credit rating for everything.”  

Li Xin 李昕 is the managing director of Caixin Global, the English-language arm of China’s most authoritative financial news source, Caixin. For over 10 years, she has worked closely with the editor-in-chief of Caixin, Hu Shuli 胡舒立, whose famously fearless pursuit of investigative reporting has shaped the business landscape and pushed the boundaries of business reporting in a country known for its tight control of media. Kaiser sat down with Xin on March 22, at the 2017 CoreNet Global Summit in Shanghai, and asked for her insights into how investigative reporting happens in China, what makes Caixin different from other publications, and how and why China-based media is different than foreign media. They also discussed what one might call the “new normal” of issues keeping China’s leaders up at night, including risk in the real estate market, corporate debt, environmental contamination, and, of course, Trump. Originally from the megacity of Chongqing, Xin graduated from the prestigious Tsinghua University in Beijing, and received a master’s degree in journalism from the University of Missouri. Outside of her work at Caixin, she is known for a recent stint as managing editor of the Wall Street Journal’s Chinese edition. Disclosure: SupChina partners with Caixin on the Caixin-Sinica Business Brief podcast. Recommendations: Xin: The work of Haizi 海子, a famous poet of the 1980s who tragically committed suicide at the age of 25. Kaiser: Murder in the Lucky Holiday Hotel, a brief series about the murder of Neil Heywood by the wife of jailed politician Bo Xilai, written by BBC reporter Carrie Gracie.

Edward Wong became a reporter for The New York Times in 1999. He covered the Iraq war from Baghdad from 2003 to 2007, and then moved to Beijing in 2008. He has written about a wide range of subjects in China for the Times, and became its Beijing bureau chief in 2014. For more on Ed’s background and samples of his reporting, find our Sinica backgrounder here. Ed is a regular guest on the Sinica Podcast, with many appearances going back to August 2011, when he joined the show to discuss his profile of documentary filmmaker Zhao Liang and self-censorship in the arts scene at that time. Since then, he has appeared on many Sinica episodes, including a discussion of the “trial of the century” (which resulted in the conviction of senior Communist Party leader Bo Xilai for bribery, abuse of power and embezzlement) and what it meant for media transparency, and an episode in which Ed drew on his years as a war correspondent in Iraq to comment on China’s view of the Middle East in the age of the Islamic State. In this week’s episode, Kaiser and Jeremy talk to Ed about the state of foreign correspondence in China: the differences in today’s reporting environment compared with a decade ago, and how media companies deal with censorship and hostility from the Chinese government. Recommendations: Jeremy: Little North Road: Africa in China, photography of Africans in Guangzhou, China, by Daniel Traub and others. Also check out the accompanying website, Xiaobeilu. Ed: Two documentaries by Zhao Liang. One is Crime and Punishment, which is distributed in the U.S. through dGenerate Films. The other is Petition. Both films are available on Amazon. Kaiser: “Can Xi pivot from China’s disrupter-in-chief to reformer-in-chief?,” by Damien Ma.

Members of the Politburo are rarely praised for their dancing skills, but consider Xi Jinping's almost flawless execution of a political two-step: first casting himself as the voice of liberal moderation in the face of Bo Xilai's mass propaganda, and then draping himself in the mantle of Maoist China and the Communist Revolution once his position was secure. The changes are enough to prompt anyone to ask: How exactly did this happen and does it even make sense? Today on Sinica we take a look at the political movement that some academics are calling neo-Maoism, a group composed of the traditionally conservative politicians and Communist Party members whose influence began eroding with market reforms in the 1980s but who have arguably witnessed a comeback in the last two years. In a conversation with Jude Blanchette, the former assistant director of the 21st Century China Program at the University of California San Diego and currently the associate engagement director at The Conference Board’s China Center for Economics and Business in Beijing, Kaiser Kuo and Jeremy Goldkorn take a look at the history of the movement, its major players and how it is treated in the Chinese media.

Meg Rithmire talked with me about her new book, Land Bargains and Chinese Capitalism: The Politics of Property Rights under Reform. If land prices and fiscal reforms aren’t enough to hold your interest, be on the lookout for the Bo Xilai anecdotes.

Heute mit dem Spiegel, Bodo Ramelow, Bo Xilai, Herrn Hundt, Flüchtlingen und Spielkonsolen. Ohne Toby ginge es nicht. Hier sein Klingelbeutel. Shownotes vom mathepauker und @vale.

On 26 September 2013 the Lowy Institute for International Policy announced the winner of the inaugural Lowy Institute Media Award. Fairfax's John Garnaut has won the inaugural Lowy Institute Media Award. John was nominated for his in-depth work on the leadership transition in China, his reporting on the Bo Xilai case, and coverage of tensions in the South China Sea. The keynote address at the award ceremony was given by ASIS Director-General Nick Warner, who spoke about his late father, war correspondent Denis Warner. An extended version of Nick Warner's speech, as well as more information about the award, is available on our website: http://lowyinstitute.org

Godmorgon, världen! om attacken i Kenya, tyska valet, inslag om sakrala riter i profant land, samtal om domen mot Bo Xilai, krönikör Ulf Wickbom, panelen om skatter, politik och religion. I vår andra timme om hemlig diplomatisk kemvapenplan, syrienkrigets nya fas, politisk satir, FN:s klimatrapport, israel-TV om araber och kåseri om hundar och Heidegger av Pamela Jaskoviak.

Correspondents tell their stories: Mark Mardell in Washington on difficult decisions for President Obama: Charles Haviland, off for dinner with the departing president of Pakistan, ponders over the milk pudding on the legacy Asif Ali Zardari leaves behind; a different perspective on the state of Chinese justice comes from John Sudworth, who was covering the trial in Jinan of ousted politician Bo Xilai; as immigration tops the election headlines in Australia, Jon Donnison tells the story of a refugee who made it from the civil war in Syria to the offices of a women's magazine in Sydney and Nick Thorpe's unearthed the reason why, somewhere in the dry Hungarian soil, the heart of Suleiman the Magnificent is beating a little faster. From Our Own Correspondent is produced by Tony Grant.

The spectacular trial of Bo Xilai seized the media's attention last week as the fallen politburo member — still widely admired in Chongqing and Dalian and heavily connected among the Party elite — defended himself with unexpected vigor against charges of corruption, and hardly paused to implicate his wife and subordinates in murder, mutual poisoning and financial skullduggery. This week on Sinica, Kaiser and Jeremy host two guests: Ed Wong from The New York Times and James Miles of The Economist for a closer look at what some Chinese commentators are calling China's "trial of the century." Join us for an in-depth discussion of the trial which looks at not only what this means for media transparency in China, but also makes historical comparisons with previous political purges, including the famous case against Jiang Qing and the Gang of Four following the Cultural Revolution. Recommendations: Jeremy The twitter feed of Jorge Guajardo https://twitter.com/jorge_guajardo James The Rise and Fall of the House of Bo: How A Murder Exposed The Cracks In China's Leadership, by John Garnaut http://www.amazon.com/Rise-House-Penguin-Specials-ebook/dp/B00A3Q9ER6 Ed A Death in the Lucky Holiday Hotel: Murder, Money, and an Epic Power Struggle in China, by Pin Ho and Wenguang Huang http://www.amazon.com/Death-Lucky-Holiday-Hotel-Struggle/dp/1610392736 Kaiser Blocked on Weibo: What Gets Suppressed on China's Version of Twitter (And Why), by Jason Q. Ng http://www.amazon.com/Blocked-Weibo-Suppressed-Version-Twitter/dp/159558871X

China's new leadership team is due be unveiled at the Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, which begins next week in Beijing.The transition takes place against a troubled background. The economy is slowing and tensions are rising in a territorial dispute with Japan. Bo Xilai, who once expected to promoted in the reshuffle, is instead about to go on trial, and the outgoing premier, Wen Jiabao, has just been accused in the New York Times of using his position to accumulate huge wealth for his family. James Kynge, editor of FT China Confidential, and David Pilling, Asia editor, join Gideon Rachman to discuss the state of China at this crucial juncture. See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

As crisis grows more dangerous by the day, nobody yet knows what the Obama Administration is doing to help Syrian rebels against the al-Assad regime. We'll have reports from inside the country and ask if it's time for the US to become more directly involved—whatever the risks might be. Also, Bo Xilai's Wife Reportedly Confesses to Murder Charges and we take a look at who gets what in public tragedies.

Det er så og si umulig for den vanlige kineser å følge en av Kinas mest kontroversielle drapssaker, som ble gjennomført i dag. Oppmerksomheten mot ekteparet "Gu Kailai," "Bo Xilai" er så stor at kinesiske myndigheter hindrer folk å søke på deres navn på internett. Rettssaken er også flyttet til et annet distrikt for å unngå folkesnakk. Inger Bentzrud, journalist og kommentator i Dagbladet - hva er det som egentlig skjer i Kina knyttet til denne rettssaken?

Today on To The Point, we'll get some previews and take a look at how much the Olympic Games really mean to different countries around the world. Also, a look at guns and the presidential campaign, and China's dramatic political upheaval as the wife of Bo Xilai faces murder charges.

In the wake of the Bo Xilai scandal, Ian Johnson, Roderick MacFarquhar and Orville Schell assess China's recent political upheavals and its upcoming change of leadership in a program introduced by Hugh Eakin of the New York Review of Books. (1 hr., 21 min.)

Jamil Anderlini joins Gideon Rachman to explain how the dismissal of Bo Xilai fits into the ongoing power struggle at the apex of the Chinese Communist Party. In Washington, where President Obama and British prime minister David Cameron are meeting this week, there is growing anxiety about Afghanistan, Geoff Dyer reports. Meanwhile, in Afghanistan itself, there is concern about what will happen to women’s rights once Nato leaves the country, Matthew Green reports from Kabul. See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

This week Gideon Rachman discusses with Peter Spiegel, FT's Brussels bureau chief, whether time really has run out for Greece. He also talks to Jamil Anderlini, FT's Beijing bureau chief, about Bo Xilai, the Chinese princeling who recently suffered a severe blow to his chances of becoming a member of the Communist party leadership. Produced by Amie Tsang and Serena Tarling See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.