Podcasts about metaethics

Today's show sponsored by: Goldco — 10% Instant Match in BONUS SILVER, for qualified JLP Show listeners Learn more at https://www.JesseLovesGold.com or call 855-644-GOLD Punchie's coffee ☕ — https://jesseleepeterson.shop/

What in the world is intrinsically good — good in itself even if it has no other effects? Over the millennia, people have offered many answers: joy, justice, equality, accomplishment, loving god, wisdom, and plenty more.The question is a classic that makes for great dorm-room philosophy discussion. But it's hardly just of academic interest. The issue of what (if anything) is intrinsically valuable bears on every action we take, whether we're looking to improve our own lives, or to help others. The wrong answer might lead us to the wrong project and render our efforts to improve the world entirely ineffective.Today's guest, Sharon Hewitt Rawlette — philosopher and author of The Feeling of Value: Moral Realism Grounded in Phenomenal Consciousness — wants to resuscitate an answer to this question that is as old as philosophy itself.Rebroadcast: this episode was originally released in September 2022.Links to learn more, highlights, and full transcript.That idea, in a nutshell, is that there is only one thing of true intrinsic value: positive feelings and sensations. And similarly, there is only one thing that is intrinsically of negative value: suffering, pain, and other unpleasant sensations.Lots of other things are valuable too: friendship, fairness, loyalty, integrity, wealth, patience, houses, and so on. But they are only instrumentally valuable — that is to say, they're valuable as means to the end of ensuring that all conscious beings experience more pleasure and other positive sensations, and less suffering.As Sharon notes, from Athens in 400 BC to Britain in 1850, the idea that only subjective experiences can be good or bad in themselves — a position known as ‘philosophical hedonism' — has been one of the most enduringly popular ideas in ethics.And few will be taken aback by the notion that, all else equal, more pleasure is good and less suffering is bad. But can they really be the only intrinsically valuable things?Over the 20th century, philosophical hedonism became increasingly controversial in the face of some seemingly very counterintuitive implications. For this reason the famous philosopher of mind Thomas Nagel called The Feeling of Value “a radical and important philosophical contribution.”So what convinces Sharon that philosophical hedonism deserves another go? In today's interview with host Rob Wiblin, Sharon explains the case for a theory of value grounded in subjective experiences, and why she believes these counterarguments are misguided. A philosophical hedonist shouldn't get in an experience machine, nor override an individual's autonomy, except in situations so different from the classic thought experiments that it no longer seems strange they would do so.Chapters:Cold open (00:00:00)Rob's intro (00:00:41)The interview begins (00:04:27)Metaethics (00:05:58)Anti-realism (00:12:21)Sharon's theory of moral realism (00:17:59)The history of hedonism (00:24:53)Intrinsic value vs instrumental value (00:30:31)Egoistic hedonism (00:38:12)Single axis of value (00:44:01)Key objections to Sharon's brand of hedonism (00:58:00)The experience machine (01:07:50)Robot spouses (01:24:11)Most common misunderstanding of Sharon's view (01:28:52)How might a hedonist actually live (01:39:28)The organ transplant case (01:55:16)Counterintuitive implications of hedonistic utilitarianism (02:05:22)How could we discover moral facts? (02:19:47)Rob's outro (02:24:44)Producer: Keiran HarrisAudio mastering: Ryan KesslerTranscriptions: Katy Moore

How should we think biblically about morality in today's culture? What do we way to the skeptic who insists that morality is nothing more than a matter of one's opinion? What is the moral argument for God's existence? Why is God critical for a coherent view of morality? We'll answer these questions and more with our guest, our colleague Dr Dave Horner around his new book with JP Moreland, (don't let the title throw you) Metaethics—or how to think about morality and ethics. Dr. Dave Horner is Professor of Theology and Philosophy at Talbot.  He has a D.Phil. from Oxford and is the author of several books, including Mind Your Faith: A Student's Guide for Thinking and Living Well, and numerous journal articles, book chapters, blog posts and conference presentations.  He's a specialist in Aristotle and Aquinas in addition to ancient and medieval philosophy. ==========Think Biblically: Conversations on Faith and Culture is a podcast from Talbot School of Theology at Biola University, which offers degrees both online and on campus in Southern California. Find all episodes of Think Biblically at: https://www.biola.edu/think-biblically. Watch video episodes at: https://bit.ly/think-biblically-video. To submit comments, ask questions, or make suggestions on issues you'd like us to cover or guests you'd like us to have on the podcast, email us at thinkbiblically@biola.edu.

Dnešná epizóda otvára našu podcastovú sezónu na rok 2024-25 a až do letných prázdnin vás pozývame 2x mesačne zamýšľaš sa s nami nad veľkými a zveochtivími otázkami z obastí a na priesečníku filozofie, vedy, náboženstva či dejín. A dnešnou témou bude metaetika.  Súvisiace dávky: PD#4: Morálny kompas, http://bit.ly/davka4  PD#18: Emotivizmus, http://bit.ly/davka18  PD#44: David Hume a spor rozumu a vášní, http://bit.ly/davka44  Použitá a odporúčaná literatúra: Geoff, "Metaethics", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2023) DeLapp, "Metaethics", Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy *** Baví ťa s nami rozmýšľať? Podpor našu tvorbu priamo na SK1283605207004206791985 alebo cez Patreon (https://bit.ly/PDtreon), kde Ťa odmeníme aj my.

fWotD Episode 2702: Ethics Welcome to Featured Wiki of the Day, your daily dose of knowledge from Wikipedia’s finest articles.The featured article for Friday, 27 September 2024 is Ethics.Ethics is the philosophical study of moral phenomena. Also called moral philosophy, it investigates normative questions about what people ought to do or which behavior is morally right. Its main branches include normative ethics, applied ethics, and metaethics.Normative ethics aims to find general principles that govern how people should act. Applied ethics examines concrete ethical problems in real-life situations, such as abortion, treatment of animals, and business practices. Metaethics explores the underlying assumptions and concepts of ethics. It asks whether there are objective moral facts, how moral knowledge is possible, and how moral judgments motivate people. Influential normative theories are consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics. According to consequentialists, an act is right if it leads to the best consequences. Deontologists focus on acts themselves, saying that they must adhere to duties, like telling the truth and keeping promises. Virtue ethics sees the manifestation of virtues, like courage and compassion, as the fundamental principle of morality.Ethics is closely connected to value theory, which studies the nature and types of value, like the contrast between intrinsic and instrumental value. Moral psychology is a related empirical field and investigates psychological processes involved in morality, such as reasoning and the formation of character. Descriptive ethics describes the dominant moral codes and beliefs in different societies and considers their historical dimension.The history of ethics started in the ancient period with the development of ethical principles and theories in ancient Egypt, India, China, and Greece. This period saw the emergence of ethical teachings associated with Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism, Daoism, and contributions of philosophers like Socrates and Aristotle. During the medieval period, ethical thought was strongly influenced by religious teachings. In the modern period, this focus shifted to a more secular approach concerned with moral experience, reasons for acting, and the consequences of actions. An influential development in the 20th century was the emergence of metaethics.This recording reflects the Wikipedia text as of 00:30 UTC on Friday, 27 September 2024.For the full current version of the article, see Ethics on Wikipedia.This podcast uses content from Wikipedia under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License.Visit our archives at wikioftheday.com and subscribe to stay updated on new episodes.Follow us on Mastodon at @wikioftheday@masto.ai.Also check out Curmudgeon's Corner, a current events podcast.Until next time, I'm neural Aria.

Bhakti Ethics, Emotions, and Love in Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava Metaethics (Lexington Books, 2024) explores the broader implications of understanding bhakti, “devotional love to the divine,” as an ethical theory based on a “realist” account of emotions, where emotions are sensory perceptions of the real ethical qualities of classes of actions. The work discusses how emotions are understood metaphysically as extra-mental, objectively real qualities, what Cogen Bohanec refers to as “affective realism.” This follows from a cosmogenic model where the universe emanates from the loving relationship between the divine feminine, Rādhā, and her intense loving relationship with her masculine counterpart, Kṛṣṇa. Since the origin of all of reality emanates from the ultimacy of an affective relationship, then the fabric of reality can be described as having objectively real affective qualities and that is the basis for grounding this ethical system. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

Bhakti Ethics, Emotions, and Love in Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava Metaethics (Lexington Books, 2024) explores the broader implications of understanding bhakti, “devotional love to the divine,” as an ethical theory based on a “realist” account of emotions, where emotions are sensory perceptions of the real ethical qualities of classes of actions. The work discusses how emotions are understood metaphysically as extra-mental, objectively real qualities, what Cogen Bohanec refers to as “affective realism.” This follows from a cosmogenic model where the universe emanates from the loving relationship between the divine feminine, Rādhā, and her intense loving relationship with her masculine counterpart, Kṛṣṇa. Since the origin of all of reality emanates from the ultimacy of an affective relationship, then the fabric of reality can be described as having objectively real affective qualities and that is the basis for grounding this ethical system. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/south-asian-studies

Bhakti Ethics, Emotions, and Love in Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava Metaethics (Lexington Books, 2024) explores the broader implications of understanding bhakti, “devotional love to the divine,” as an ethical theory based on a “realist” account of emotions, where emotions are sensory perceptions of the real ethical qualities of classes of actions. The work discusses how emotions are understood metaphysically as extra-mental, objectively real qualities, what Cogen Bohanec refers to as “affective realism.” This follows from a cosmogenic model where the universe emanates from the loving relationship between the divine feminine, Rādhā, and her intense loving relationship with her masculine counterpart, Kṛṣṇa. Since the origin of all of reality emanates from the ultimacy of an affective relationship, then the fabric of reality can be described as having objectively real affective qualities and that is the basis for grounding this ethical system. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/indian-religions

Bhakti Ethics, Emotions, and Love in Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava Metaethics (Lexington Books, 2024) explores the broader implications of understanding bhakti, “devotional love to the divine,” as an ethical theory based on a “realist” account of emotions, where emotions are sensory perceptions of the real ethical qualities of classes of actions. The work discusses how emotions are understood metaphysically as extra-mental, objectively real qualities, what Cogen Bohanec refers to as “affective realism.” This follows from a cosmogenic model where the universe emanates from the loving relationship between the divine feminine, Rādhā, and her intense loving relationship with her masculine counterpart, Kṛṣṇa. Since the origin of all of reality emanates from the ultimacy of an affective relationship, then the fabric of reality can be described as having objectively real affective qualities and that is the basis for grounding this ethical system. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/religion

An Ethics Course (Taught at Ashland Seminary) Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

An Ethics Course (Taught at Ashland Seminary) Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

In this special episode celebrating the Oxford Quartet Miles is joined by Lesley Brown (Somerville College, Oxford) and John Hacker-Wright (University of Guelph, Canada) to discuss the life and work of Philippa Foot, as well as her connections to Anscombe, Midgley and Murdoch. Lesley Brown is Centenary Fellow in Philosophy at Somerville and expert on Ancient Philosophy. She was taught by both Foot and Elizabeth Anscombe and is Foot's literary executor. https://www.some.ox.ac.uk/our-people/lesley-brown/ John Hacker-Wright is a world-leading expert on Foot's work having published 'Philippa Foot's Moral Thought' (Bloomsbury, 2013),Philipp Foot on Goodness and Virtue (Palgrave, 2018) and 'Philippa Foot's Metaethics' (CUP,2021). You can find details of all his work here: https://www.uoguelph.ca/arts/philosophy/people/john-hacker-wright

Charles Nussbaum | Philosophy, University of Texas, Austin"Why Normative Ethics Is Natural and Metaethics Is and Is Not" Morality prescribes privileged standards for action and character. Ethics is the philosophy of morality. Normative ethics codifies the prescriptive principles of morality that justify considered judgments of cases. Metaethics is the second-order study of ethics. It investigates the truth conditions of moral judgments and principles, the ontological commitments of moral principles, and the justification of these principles, as well as related metaphysical issues such as moral property supervenience, reductionism, and eliminativism, among other matters. Normative ethics, I argue, is maturationally natural, practiced natural, and reflectively natural. Metaethical positions, by contrast, range from the strongly natural to the strongly non-natural. Hence, metaethics is both natural and non-natural.

Can we trust our emotions as a guide to right and wrong?This week's guest James Hutton is a philosopher at the University of Delft who argues that emotions provide a way of testing our moral beliefs — similar to the way observations are used in natural sciences as evidence for or against theories.This is not to say that emotions are infallible, nor that they are not themselves influenced by our moral beliefs, but that they do have a place in our moral inventory. In particular, the destabilizing power they can have — their capability to clash with our beliefs — is an important counterpoint to the entrenchment of poorly justified beliefs.I found myself revising my own views throughout this discussion. It feels right that emotions play a role in our decision-making. Perhaps that feeling is justified. James' academic website Multiverses websiteOutline(00:00) Intro(2:28) Start of conversation: Metathical frameworks(4:45) Reason alone cannot provide moral premises(6:30) Are moral principles self-evident? Or do we have a moral sense?(11:00) Is emotion antithetical to reason?(12:00) Emotional senses:Amia Srinivasan's example of Nour, an example where emotions are trustworthy(23:00) Antonio Damasio & Descartes' Error: the importance of emotion as a motivating force(29:30) … But should it be a motivating force?(30:30) Tolstoy's emotional reaction to an exection and how it disrupted his moral theory of progress(34:50) Emotions can cause us to revise our moral beliefs(37:25) This does not mean emotion is infallible as a guide to morality(40:25) The tension between reasoning from principles and emotional reaction creates a useful instability(42:00) The analogy between science and moral reasoning: sometimes observations (and emotions) should be ignored, but sometimes we should pay attention to them(46:00) Is it possible to have a no-holds-barred ethics incorporating principles and emotions? (Not really!)(49:40) Observations and theories are perennially in conflict, sometimes we reject the observation(50:40) Utilitarianism: elegant but easy to find cases where it clashes with our intuitions(51:50) Harvesting organs — where the greatest good for the number does not feel right(53:20) Ethics and Inuition — Peter Singer: we shouldn't trust our emotions(54:20) But why trust the utilitarian principle over our intuitions?(57:45) Situations in which we need to be wary of our emotions: burn a teddy vs releasing tonnes of CO2(1:03:00) Emotional blind spots: abstract, global, probabilistic, outgroup vs ingroup(1:08:00) Partiality: should we treat everyone equally, or do we have special obligations to friends and family?(1:10:28) Heckled by a doorbell(1:11:50) Partiality is a litmus case for utilitarian principles vs intuition(1:15:30) Given emotions are fallible how do we make good use of them?(1:17:30) Unreliable emotions and ethical knowledge: blood sugar, mood &c. cause emotional noise(1:19:30) How do we deal with noisy information in other areas — the analogy with testimony(1:23:50) Defeaters — cues that give us pause to double check our emotional responses(1:25:40) Negative meta-emotions: e.g. shame at being angry(1:26:25) Should we expand our emotional repertoire?(1:30:20) Flight shame as an example of a new emotional response(1:34:25) Should we expect evolution to have created morally fitting emotional responses?(1:38:15) The problems with evolutionary debunking arguments(1:46:43) This is work in progress — google James Hutton Delft to get in touch

Can we have objective morality without metaphysics?Looking for a link we mentioned? It's here: https://linktr.ee/philosophyforourtimesJoin Simon Blackburn, renowned philosopher at Cambridge University, as he discusses navigating heated moral discussions, the play of perspective on moral dilemmas, and his notable disagreements with Richard Rorty. From understanding contentious topics to gaining insights into meta-ethics, Blackburn takes us on an enlightening journey into the depths of truth and its implications in the modern world.Simon Blackburn is an academic philosopher known for his work on meta-ethics and his attempts to popularise philosophy to a wider audience. He has published over a dozen books on various philosophical issues both for public and academic audiences, and has appeared on shows such as Radio 4's The Moral Maze and PBS's Closer to Truth. He is known for proposing a meta-ethical view called 'quasi-realism' which proposes that ethical statements are projections of emotional attitudes as if they were real features of the world. His latest book, On Truth (2018), examines various philosophical approaches to the concept of truth, in order to interrogate what it is, how we should think about it, and why it matters.There are thousands of big ideas to discover at IAI.tv – videos, articles, and courses waiting for you to explore. Find out more: https://iai.tv/podcast-offers?utm_source=podcast&utm_medium=shownotes&utm_campaign=how-i-changed-my-mind-about-truth-simon-blackburnSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

W tej serii poznajemy podstawy metaetyki – dziedziny filozofii, której celem jest wyjaśnienie podstaw moralności. Podczas gdy etyka stara się odpowiedzieć na pytanie CO jest moralne, metaetyka stara się odpowiedzieć na pytanie DLACZEGO (I CZY) coś w ogóle może być moralne. W cz. 3 omówimy teorie obiektywistyczne i uniwersalistyczne (zakładające istnienie obiektywnej lub uniwersalnej moralności): intuicjonizm metaetyczny, naturalizm metaetyczny, teorię Bożego rozkazu, oraz subiektywizm idealnego obserwatora. ---> DIAGRAM: https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1e8rFNgn8KFkWp6IKPFtY8u2ZXldDU7GB 
---> Podcast możesz wesprzeć na: Patronite – https://patronite.pl/filozofiapoprostu/description Buy Coffee – https://buycoffee.to/filozofiapoprostu To niezwykle pomocne i motywujące – dziękuję! :) Zapraszam też na sociale :) ---> Instagram: @filozofia_po_prostu https://www.instagram.com/filozofia_po_prostu/?hl=en ---> Facebook: Filozofia Po Prostu https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100068611986622 ---> kontakt: filozofia.po.prostu.podcast@gmail.com Podcast powstaje dzięki niesamowitym Patronom i Patronkom: Bartłomiej Wachacz, Anna Limanowska, Pola Weryszko, Adrian Sokołowski, Patryk Neumann, Michał Semczyszyn, Magda Juraszewska, Przemek Łukasiński, Anita Włosek, Ewa Kamińska, Sebastian Cychowski, Michał Bukała, Michał Kruszewicz, Kuba Dziadosz, Alicja Zielińska, Magdalena Rutkowska, Agnieszka Myszkowska, Ewa Glu, Michał Klatka, Beata Kupczyńska, Karol Ciba, Paweł Jastrzębski, Piotr Juszczyński, Stefan Basista, Barbara Skobiej, Ela Petruk, Katarzyna Ergang, Kinga Kasińska, Michał Grązka, Piotr Romanowski, Rob Ak, Marcin Kweczlich, Nicolina Majewska, Marcin Maśkiewicz, Szymon Zawierucha, Małgośka Radkiewicz, Maciej Ruciński, Hania Ślęk, Michał Wojciak, Michał Śliwiński, Rafał Myrcik, Katarzyna Kwietniewska, Cezary Spustek, Mikołaj Gala, Bartosz Szarowar, Aleksandra Franczyk, Natalia Pietrzak, Kamil Gucwa, Michał Felerski, Brądzylians Fąfalny, Witold Barycki, Karol Głowacki, Elo Mordo, Dawid Dziedzic, Maciej Foremski, Ewa Dąbrowska, Maja Smolarz, Andrzej Manoryk, Dorota Uniewska, Bartlomiej Mej, Marek Paszkowski, Marcin Gryszko, Antoni Kania, Piotr Żmudziński, Bartosz Kolasa, Paweł Doligalski, Werka G, Maria Matyka, oraz Patroni i Patronki anonimowi. Dziękuję!

Dr. Lennox, emeritus professor at University of Pittsburgh, is a renowned expert in the history and philosophy of biology, publishing extensively in the field. His books include Aristotle's Philosophy of Biology: Studies in the Origins of Life Science, and, most recently, Aristotle on Inquiry. His other primary research focus is Charles Darwin. Dr. Lennox has also contributed to scholarly books on Rand's philosophy, including A Companion to Ayn Rand, Concepts and Their Role in Knowledge: Reflections on Objectivist Epistemology, and Metaethics, Egoism, and Virtue: Studies in Ayn Rand's Normative Theory (he was also co-editor, with Allan Gottelf, of the latter two). https://www.hps.pitt.edu/people/james...https://jglennox.com/Show is Sponsored by https://www.expressvpn.com/yaron & https://www.fountainheadcasts.comJoin this channel to get access to perks: https://www.youtube.com/@YaronBrook/joinLike what you hear? Like, share, and subscribe to stay updated on new videos and help promote the Yaron Brook Show: https://bit.ly/3ztPxTxSupport the Show and become a sponsor: https://www.patreon.com/YaronBrookShow or https://yaronbrookshow.com/membershipOr make a one-time donation: https://bit.ly/2RZOyJJContinue the discussion by following Yaron on Twitter (https://bit.ly/3iMGl6z) and Facebook (https://bit.ly/3vvWDDC )Want to learn more about Ayn Rand and Objectivism? Visit the Ayn Rand Institute: https://bit.ly/35qoEC3#philosophy #stoicism #Morality ​ ​#Objectivism​ #AynRand #politicsThis show is part of the Spreaker Prime Network, if you are interested in advertising on this podcast, contact us at https://www.spreaker.com/show/3276901/advertisement

W tej serii poznajemy podstawy metaetyki – dziedziny filozofii, której celem jest wyjaśnienie podstaw moralności. Podczas gdy etyka stara się odpowiedzieć na pytanie CO jest moralne, metaetyka stara się odpowiedzieć na pytanie DLACZEGO (I CZY) coś w ogóle może być moralne. W cz. 2 omawiamy teorie anty-obiektywistyczne (odmawiające istnienia obiektywnej moralności): emotywizm, preskryptywizm, teorię błędu, relatywizm mówiącego, relatywizm jednostki, relatywizm kulturowy - a także przy okazji takie zagadnienia jak ewolucjonizm metaetyczny i quasi-realism. ---> DIAGRAM: https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1e8rFNgn8KFkWp6IKPFtY8u2ZXldDU7GB ---> Podcast możesz wesprzeć na: Patronite – https://patronite.pl/filozofiapoprostu/description Buy Coffee – https://buycoffee.to/filozofiapoprostu To niezwykle pomocne i motywujące – dziękuję! :) Zapraszam też na sociale: ---> Instagram: @filozofia_po_prostu https://www.instagram.com/filozofia_po_prostu/?hl=en ---> Facebook: Filozofia Po Prostu https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100068611986622 ---> kontakt: filozofia.po.prostu.podcast@gmail.com Podcast powstaje dzięki niesamowitym Patronom i Patronkom: Bartłomiej Wachacz, Anna Limanowska, Pola Weryszko, Adrian Sokołowski, Patryk Neumann, Michał Semczyszyn, Magda Juraszewska, Przemek Łukasiński, Anita Włosek, Ewa Kamińska, Sebastian Cychowski, Michał Bukała, Michał Kruszewicz, Kuba Dziadosz, Alicja Zielińska, Magdalena Rutkowska, Agnieszka Myszkowska, Ewa Glu, Michał Klatka, Beata Kupczyńska, Karol Ciba, Paweł Jastrzębski, Piotr Juszczyński, Stefan Basista, Barbara Skobiej, Ela Petruk, Katarzyna Ergang, Kinga Kasińska, Michał Grązka, Piotr Romanowski, Rob Ak, Marcin Kweczlich, Nicolina Majewska, Marcin Maśkiewicz, Szymon Zawierucha, Małgośka Radkiewicz, Maciej Ruciński, Hania Ślęk, Michał Wojciak, Michał Śliwiński, Rafał Myrcik, Katarzyna Kwietniewska, Cezary Spustek, Mikołaj Gala, Bartosz Szarowar, Aleksandra Franczyk, Natalia Pietrzak, Kamil Gucwa, Michał Felerski, Brądzylians Fąfalny, Witold Barycki, Karol Głowacki, Elo Mordo, Dawid Dziedzic, Maciej Foremski, Ewa Dąbrowska, Maja Smolarz, Andrzej Manoryk, Dorota Uniewska, Bartlomiej Mej, Marek Paszkowski, Marcin Gryszko, Antoni Kania, Piotr Żmudziński, Bartosz Kolasa, Paweł Doligalski, oraz Patroni i Patronki anonimowi. Dziękuję! OPRACOWANIA: Fisher, A. 2014. Metaethics: an introduction. Routledge. Miller, A. 2014. Contemporary metaethics: an introduction. John Wiley & Sons. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, online 2023: https://plato.stanford.edu/, hasła z dziedziny metaetyki. WYBRANE TEKSTY ŹRÓDŁOWE: Ayer, A. J., 1946. “A Critique of Ethics”, in Language, Truth and Logic, London: Gollanz, 102–114. Blackburn, S., 1993. Essays in Quasi-Realism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Blackburn, S., 1998. Ruling Passions, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Boyd, R., 1988. “How to Be a Moral Realist,” in Essays on Moral Realism, G. Sayre-McCord (ed.), 181–228. Firth, R., 1952, “Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 12: 317–345. Foot, P., 1958, “Moral Beliefs”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 59: 83–104. Hare, R. M., 1952. The Language of Morals, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hume, D., 1739. Treatise Concerning Human Nature, L.A. Selby-Bigge (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1888. Joyce, R., 2001. The Myth of Morality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mackie, J. L., 1977. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, London: Penguin Books. Moore, G. E., 1903. Principia Ethica, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rawls, J. 2001. Justice as fairness: A restatement. Harvard University Press. Rorty, R. 2013. Pragmatism, relativism, and irrationalism. The American Philosophical Association Centennial Series, 653-666. Singer, P. 1981. The expanding circle. Oxford: Clarendon Press. ​​Stevenson, C., 1937. “The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms”, Mind, 46: 14–31.

W tym odcinku poznajemy podstawy metaetyki –dziedziny filozofii, której celem jest wyjaśnienie podstaw moralności. Podczas gdy etyka stara się odpowiedzieć na pytanie CO jest moralne, metaetyka stara się odpowiedzieć na pytanie DLACZEGO (I CZY) coś w ogóle może być moralne. Odcinek ten jest publikowany w częściach: w cz. 1. omawiamy podstawowe problemy i terminy dotyczące podstaw moralności (wstęp do teorii ;). ---> Podcast możesz wesprzeć na Patronite – o tutaj: https://patronite.pl/filozofiapoprostu/description To niezwykle pomocne i motywujące – dziękuję! :) Zapraszam też na sociale: ---> Instagram: @filozofia_po_prostu https://www.instagram.com/filozofia_po_prostu/?hl=en ---> Facebook: Filozofia Po Prostu https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100068611986622 ---> kontakt: filozofia.po.prostu.podcast@gmail.com Podcast powstaje dzięki niesamowitym Patronom i Patronkom: Bartłomiej Wachacz, Anna Limanowska, Pola Weryszko, Adrian Sokołowski, Patryk Neumann, Michał Semczyszyn, Magda Juraszewska, Przemek Łukasiński, Anita Włosek, Ewa Kamińska, Sebastian Cychowski, Michał Bukała, Michał Kruszewicz, Kuba Dziadosz, Alicja Zielińska, Magdalena Rutkowska, Agnieszka Myszkowska, Ewa Glu, Michał Klatka, Beata Kupczyńska, Karol Ciba, Paweł Jastrzębski, Piotr Juszczyński, Stefan Basista, Barbara Skobiej, Ela Petruk, Katarzyna Ergang, Kinga Kasińska, Michał Grązka, Piotr Romanowski, Rob Ak, Marcin Kweczlich, Nicolina Majewska, Marcin Maśkiewicz, Szymon Zawierucha, Małgośka Radkiewicz, Maciej Ruciński, Hania Ślęk, Michał Wojciak, Michał Śliwiński, Rafał Myrcik, Katarzyna Kwietniewska, Cezary Spustek, Mikołaj Gala, Bartosz Szarowar, Aleksandra Franczyk, Natalia Pietrzak, Kamil Gucwa, Michał Felerski, Brądzylians Fąfalny, Witold Barycki, Karol Głowacki, Elo Mordo, Dawid Dziedzic, Maciej Foremski, Ewa Dąbrowska, Maja Smolarz, Andrzej Manoryk, Dorota Uniewska, Bartlomiej Mej, Marek Paszkowski, Marcin Gryszko, Antoni Kania, oraz Patroni i Patronki anonimowi. Dziękuję!

Perspective Philosophy and I speak about metaethics, intervening in wild animal suffering, veganism, the toll of working in a slaughterhouse, ethical intuition, moral disagreement, and a few metaphysical questions about contingency and necessity.  Full interview here Linktree

------------------Support the channel------------ Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/thedissenter PayPal: paypal.me/thedissenter PayPal Subscription 3 Dollars: https://tinyurl.com/ybn6bg9l PayPal Subscription 5 Dollars: https://tinyurl.com/ycmr9gpz PayPal Subscription 10 Dollars: https://tinyurl.com/y9r3fc9m PayPal Subscription 20 Dollars: https://tinyurl.com/y95uvkao This show is sponsored by Enlites, Learning & Development done differently. Check the website here: http://enlites.com/ Dr. Krister Bykvist is Professor in Practical Philosophy at the Department of Philosophy at Stockholm University and Research Fellow at the Institute for Future Studies. He has been a visiting researcher at the Department of Philosophy, Canada, and at SCAS, Uppsala. His research concerns questions about our responsibility for future generations, the foundations of consequentialism, evaluative uncertainty, and the relationship between preferences, value, and welfare. He is the author of Moral Uncertainty. In this episode, we talk about metaethics. We start by discussing what the most basic questions in metaethics are, how ethics can be objective, and the metaphysical status of moral facts. We talk about the relationship between preferences, values, and wellbeing. We get into population ethics, and discuss questions related to future demographics, climate change, and social security. Finally, we discuss antinatalism, if life is worth starting, and if we can determine objectively the amount of good and bad in human life. -- A HUGE THANK YOU TO MY PATRONS/SUPPORTERS: PER HELGE LARSEN, JERRY MULLER, HANS FREDRIK SUNDE, BERNARDO SEIXAS, OLAF ALEX, JONATHAN VISSER, ADAM KESSEL, MATTHEW WHITINGBIRD, ARNAUD WOLFF, TIM HOLLOSY, HENRIK AHLENIUS, JOHN CONNORS, FILIP FORS CONNOLLY, DAN DEMETRIOU, ROBERT WINDHAGER, RUI INACIO, ZOOP, MARCO NEVES, COLIN HOLBROOK, SIMON COLUMBUS, PHIL KAVANAGH, MIKKEL STORMYR, SAMUEL ANDREEFF, FRANCIS FORDE, TIAGO NUNES, ALEXANDER DANNBAUER, FERGAL CUSSEN, HAL HERZOG, NUNO MACHADO, JONATHAN LEIBRANT, JOÃO LINHARES, STANTON T, SAMUEL CORREA, ERIK HAINES, MARK SMITH, JOÃO EIRA, TOM HUMMEL, SARDUS FRANCE, DAVID SLOAN WILSON, YACILA DEZA-ARAUJO, ROMAIN ROCH, DIEGO LONDOÑO CORREA, YANICK PUNTER, ADANER USMANI, CHARLOTTE BLEASE, NICOLE BARBARO, ADAM HUNT, PAWEL OSTASZEWSKI, NELLEKE BAK, GUY MADISON, GARY G HELLMANN, SAIMA AFZAL, ADRIAN JAEGGI, NICK GOLDEN, PAULO TOLENTINO, JOÃO BARBOSA, JULIAN PRICE, EDWARD HALL, HEDIN BRØNNER, DOUGLAS FRY, FRANCA BORTOLOTTI, GABRIEL PONS CORTÈS, URSULA LITZCKE, SCOTT, ZACHARY FISH, TIM DUFFY, SUNNY SMITH, JON WISMAN, MORTEN EIKELAND, DR BYRD, DANIEL FRIEDMAN, WILLIAM BUCKNER, PAUL-GEORGE ARNAUD, LUKE GLOWACKI, GEORGIOS THEOPHANOUS, CHRIS WILLIAMSON, PETER WOLOSZYN, DAVID WILLIAMS, ROOFTOWEL, DIOGO COSTA, ANTON ERIKSSON, CHARLES MOREY, ALEX CHAU, AMAURI MARTÍNEZ, CORALIE CHEVALLIER, PEDRO BONILLA, BANGALORE ATHEISTS, LARRY D. LEE JR., OLD HERRINGBONE, STARRY, MICHAEL BAILEY, DAN SPERBER, ROBERT GRESSIS, TOM ROTH, THERPMD, IGOR N, JEFF MCMAHAN, JAKE ZUEHL, BARNABAS RADICS, MARK CAMPBELL, RICHARD BOWEN, TOMAS DAUBNER, LUKE NISSEN, CHRIS STORY, AND MANUEL OLIVEIRA! A SPECIAL THANKS TO MY PRODUCERS, YZAR WEHBE, JIM FRANK, ŁUKASZ STAFINIAK, TOM VANEGDOM, BERNARD HUGUENEY, CURTIS DIXON, BENEDIKT MUELLER, VEGA GIDEY, THOMAS TRUMBLE, KATHRINE AND PATRICK TOBIN, JONCARLO MONTENEGRO, ROBERT LEWIS, AND AL NICK ORTIZ! AND TO MY EXECUTIVE PRODUCERS, MATTHEW LAVENDER, SERGIU CODREANU, AND BOGDAN KANIVETS!

This episode, Matt and Joseph sit down with Andrew Sepielli (University of Toronto) to talk about metaethical quietism. His new book on the topic, Pragmatist Quietism, is out now from Oxford University Press. Click here to listen to episode 145 of Elucidations.Metaethical quietism is the view that ethical statements—or anyway, a large portion of the ethical statements we're usually interested in—can't be justified or disproved by statements from outside of ethics. There's something autonomous about the topic of ethics (or rather, about a lot of ethics). Consider the question: in the scenario where a trolley is barreling down the track, on its way to clobber five people, and you have the ability to divert it to the other track where it will only clobber one, should you do so? According to quietists such as our guest, you can't answer this question by asking metaphysicians or logicians for help. It won't do to investigate whether moral facts are part of the furniture of the universe, or to study the grammar of words like ought. The only way you can answer a question like that is, well, whatever we usually do to answer ethical questions.Why are philosophers often tempted to think we can turn to metaphysics, logic, or the philosophy of language to help answer ethical questions? Andrew Sepielli thinks it's because we conflate two different kinds of ethical statements: the statements he calls deep and the statements he calls superficial. A deep statement is one such that, if you believe it, that belief can impact your mental picture of how things are laid out in the world and guide your action. The fancy word for this mental picture of how the world is laid out is non-conceptual representation. A superficial statement is one belief in which does not influence your non-conpceptual representation of the world. The questions that moral philosophers often write about—such as whether one should divert the trolley, or whether utilitarianism is true—are superficial, which is part of why you can only answer them from within ethics. But there are also deep moral questions, such as: will the party we're thinking of going to be attended by a bunch of jackasses? When you ask that question, you're deploying moral language—jackass, specifically, so it is definitely a moral question—but you're also trying to find out which individuals are going to be at the party. And which individuals happen to be at the party is part of the information in your non-conceptual mental map.In this episode, Sepielli argues that keeping track of when we're having a superficial debate vs. when we're having a deep debate can make it seem less mysterious how ethics could be its own autonomous area of inquiry. Tune in to see why he thinks this is the case! Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

What is metaethics? Is moral objectivism the same thing as moral realism? When philosophers examine sentences like "Murder is wrong", are they generally more interested in (1) the role that the language is playing in a social interaction (e.g., that it's an imperative or that it expresses an emotion) or (2) the concepts themselves and their relations? Could it be the case that all moral statements are false? What do we know about how people actually use moral language in everyday life? Or do people even have any idea what they're doing when they use moral language? We're familiar with the idea that cultures vary in how they emphasize and value moral concepts; but are there cultures that have radically different moral concepts than our own (i.e., cultures that might not even have the concepts of modesty or honor in the first place, or that might have moral concepts that have never occurred to us)? Are there cultures that have have no moral concepts at all? What does it really mean to say that someone "should" do something? What is the use of intuition in philosophy? Where is philosophy going wrong today?Lance S. Bush is a PhD student in social psychology at Cornell University. Most of his research focuses on moral psychology, metaethics, and methodological issues in experimental philosophy. He is also interested in psychological factors relevant to effective altruism and existential risk, particularly cognitive biases, reputational concerns, and other psychological phenomena that inhibit altruism and concern for the distant future. Email him at lancesbush@gmail.com or learn more about him at LanceSBush.com.

What is metaethics? Is moral objectivism the same thing as moral realism? When philosophers examine sentences like "Murder is wrong", are they generally more interested in (1) the role that the language is playing in a social interaction (e.g., that it's an imperative or that it expresses an emotion) or (2) the concepts themselves and their relations? Could it be the case that all moral statements are false? What do we know about how people actually use moral language in everyday life? Or do people even have any idea what they're doing when they use moral language? We're familiar with the idea that cultures vary in how they emphasize and value moral concepts; but are there cultures that have radically different moral concepts than our own (i.e., cultures that might not even have the concepts of modesty or honor in the first place, or that might have moral concepts that have never occurred to us)? Are there cultures that have have no moral concepts at all? What does it really mean to say that someone "should" do something? What is the use of intuition in philosophy? Where is philosophy going wrong today?Lance S. Bush is a PhD student in social psychology at Cornell University. Most of his research focuses on moral psychology, metaethics, and methodological issues in experimental philosophy. He is also interested in psychological factors relevant to effective altruism and existential risk, particularly cognitive biases, reputational concerns, and other psychological phenomena that inhibit altruism and concern for the distant future. Email him at lancesbush@gmail.com or learn more about him at LanceSBush.com.Further reading:Meta-Ethical Positions diagram and explanation blog post by Tommy Crow

Read the full transcript here. What is metaethics? Is moral objectivism the same thing as moral realism? When philosophers examine sentences like "Murder is wrong", are they generally more interested in (1) the role that the language is playing in a social interaction (e.g., that it's an imperative or that it expresses an emotion) or (2) the concepts themselves and their relations? Could it be the case that all moral statements are false? What do we know about how people actually use moral language in everyday life? Or do people even have any idea what they're doing when they use moral language? We're familiar with the idea that cultures vary in how they emphasize and value moral concepts; but are there cultures that have radically different moral concepts than our own (i.e., cultures that might not even have the concepts of modesty or honor in the first place, or that might have moral concepts that have never occurred to us)? Are there cultures that have have no moral concepts at all? What does it really mean to say that someone "should" do something? What is the use of intuition in philosophy? Where is philosophy going wrong today?Lance S. Bush is a PhD student in social psychology at Cornell University. Most of his research focuses on moral psychology, metaethics, and methodological issues in experimental philosophy. He is also interested in psychological factors relevant to effective altruism and existential risk, particularly cognitive biases, reputational concerns, and other psychological phenomena that inhibit altruism and concern for the distant future. Email him at lancesbush@gmail.com or learn more about him at LanceSBush.com.Further reading:Meta-Ethical Positions diagram and explanation blog post by Tommy Crow [Read more]

------------------Support the channel------------ Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/thedissenter PayPal: paypal.me/thedissenter PayPal Subscription 1 Dollar: https://tinyurl.com/yb3acuuy PayPal Subscription 3 Dollars: https://tinyurl.com/ybn6bg9l PayPal Subscription 5 Dollars: https://tinyurl.com/ycmr9gpz PayPal Subscription 10 Dollars: https://tinyurl.com/y9r3fc9m PayPal Subscription 20 Dollars: https://tinyurl.com/y95uvkao ------------------Follow me on--------------------- Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/thedissenteryt/ Twitter: https://twitter.com/TheDissenterYT Anchor (podcast): https://anchor.fm/thedissenter This show is sponsored by Enlites, Learning & Development done differently. Check the website here: http://enlites.com/ Dr. Bart Streumer is Professor and Vice-Dean at the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Groningen. His expertise is in metaethics and ethics. He is the author of Unbelievable Errors: An Error Theory About All Normative Judgements. In this episode, we talk about metaethics. Topics include: the questions metaethics deals with; moral concepts, moral truths, and moral facts; challenges to moral realism; Dr. Streumer's metaethical stance, based on error theory; and what moral anti-realists get wrong. -- A HUGE THANK YOU TO MY PATRONS/SUPPORTERS: KARIN LIETZCKE, ANN BLANCHETTE, PER HELGE LARSEN, LAU GUERREIRO, JERRY MULLER, HANS FREDRIK SUNDE, BERNARDO SEIXAS, HERBERT GINTIS, RUTGER VOS, RICARDO VLADIMIRO, CRAIG HEALY, OLAF ALEX, PHILIP KURIAN, JONATHAN VISSER, JAKOB KLINKBY, ADAM KESSEL, MATTHEW WHITINGBIRD, ARNAUD WOLFF, TIM HOLLOSY, HENRIK AHLENIUS, JOHN CONNORS, PAULINA BARREN, FILIP FORS CONNOLLY, DAN DEMETRIOU, ROBERT WINDHAGER, RUI INACIO, ARTHUR KOH, ZOOP, MARCO NEVES, COLIN HOLBROOK, SUSAN PINKER, PABLO SANTURBANO, SIMON COLUMBUS, PHIL KAVANAGH, JORGE ESPINHA, CORY CLARK, MARK BLYTH, ROBERTO INGUANZO, MIKKEL STORMYR, ERIC NEURMANN, SAMUEL ANDREEFF, FRANCIS FORDE, TIAGO NUNES, BERNARD HUGUENEY, ALEXANDER DANNBAUER, FERGAL CUSSEN, YEVHEN BODRENKO, HAL HERZOG, NUNO MACHADO, DON ROSS, JONATHAN LEIBRANT, JOÃO LINHARES, OZLEM BULUT, NATHAN NGUYEN, STANTON T, SAMUEL CORREA, ERIK HAINES, MARK SMITH, J.W., JOÃO EIRA, TOM HUMMEL, SARDUS FRANCE, DAVID SLOAN WILSON, YACILA DEZA-ARAUJO, IDAN SOLON, ROMAIN ROCH, DMITRY GRIGORYEV, TOM ROTH, DIEGO LONDOÑO CORREA, YANICK PUNTER, ADANER USMANI, CHARLOTTE BLEASE, NICOLE BARBARO, ADAM HUNT, PAWEL OSTASZEWSKI, AL ORTIZ, NELLEKE BAK, KATHRINE AND PATRICK TOBIN, GUY MADISON, GARY G HELLMANN, SAIMA AFZAL, ADRIAN JAEGGI, NICK GOLDEN, PAULO TOLENTINO, JOÃO BARBOSA, JULIAN PRICE, EDWARD HALL, HEDIN BRØNNER, DOUGLAS P. FRY, FRANCA BORTOLOTTI, GABRIEL PONS CORTÈS, URSULA LITZCKE, DENISE COOK, SCOTT, ZACHARY FISH, TIM DUFFY, TRADERINNYC, SUNNY SMITH, JON WISMAN, MORTEN EIKELAND, AND DR BYRD! A SPECIAL THANKS TO MY PRODUCERS, YZAR WEHBE, JIM FRANK, ŁUKASZ STAFINIAK, IAN GILLIGAN, LUIS CAYETANO, TOM VANEGDOM, CURTIS DIXON, BENEDIKT MUELLER, VEGA GIDEY, THOMAS TRUMBLE, AND NUNO ELDER! AND TO MY EXECUTIVE PRODUCERS, MICHAL RUSIECKI, JAMES PRATT, MATTHEW LAVENDER, SERGIU CODREANU, AND BOGDAN KANIVETS!

One of the major questions in Natural Moral Law is how one can determine what are the goods. In this video, we discuss a few of the different frameworks that one can use to establish what are the goods and how we can find them. Thanks to Dr. Richard Playford for coming onto the channel for the discussion. For the full video, please check here:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-HPGSZ8RAZESupport the show-------------------------- Where else to find Josh Yen: Philosophy: https://bit.ly/philforall Gaming: https://bit.ly/zarathustragames Education: https://bit.ly/joshyen Football: https://bit.ly/footballopinions Buisness: https://bit.ly/logosedu -------------------------- If you would want to support the channel and what I am doing, please follow me on Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/philosophyforall

In this episode, I am joined by Dr. Russ Shafer-Landau to talk about on moral philosophy and the landscape of metaethicsMeet Dr. Shafer-LandauRuss Shafer-Landau serves as a professor of philosophy at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He is the author of Moral Realism: A Defence, Whatever Happened to Good and Evil?, The Fundamentals of Ethics, and Living Ethics). He is the editor of Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Shafer-Landau served as President of the American Philosophical Association (Central Division) in 2021. He is currently working on a large collaborative project with John Bengson and Terence Cuneo that seeks to offer a new vindication of non-naturalist moral realism, entitled The Moral Universe (Oxford 2023) focusing on the metaphysical and normative dimensions of morality.Resources:Whatever Happened to Good and Evil? by Russ Shafer-LandauFoundations of Ethics: An Anthology by Russ Shafer-Landau and Terence CuneoMetaethics: A Contemporary Introduction by Mark van RoojenMoral Discourse and Practice: Some Philosophical Approaches by Stephen Darwall, Allan Gibbard, and Peter RailtonThe Digital Public Square is a production of the Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission and is produced and hosted by Jason Thacker.Production assistance is provided by Kadin Christian. Technical production provided by Owens Productions. It is edited and mixed by Mark Owens.

How do you really know what is ethical? Is there such a thing as objective ethical fact? Metaethics is a branch of philosophy that grapples with these issues. Everybody wants to believe that they are doing moral good, and that they are running their business ethically. But is there some absolute ethical truth that applies to all businesses?  In this episode, we introduce metaethics then dig into ethical anti-realism and views like nihilism, subjectivism, and non-cognitivism. Listen in so we can help you build an ethical framework that you can apply when you are making tough decisions in the course of business.

Dr. Michael Huemer joins me to discuss moral realism vs. antirealism, ethical intuitionism, phenomenal conservatism, moral disagreement, and much else in moral philosophy. (This aired originally on YouTube and Walden Pod.) Ethical Intuitionism Knowledge, Reality, and Value: A Mostly Common Sense Guide to Philosophy William Lane Craig vs. Erik Wielenberg Linktree   / The Five … Continue reading Metaethics & Moral Realism w/ Michael Huemer →

Dr. Michael Huemer joins me to discuss moral realism vs. antirealism, ethical intuitionism, phenomenal conservatism, moral disagreement, and much else in moral philosophy.  Ethical Intuitionism  Knowledge, Reality, and Value: A Mostly Common Sense Guide to Philosophy  William Lane Craig vs. Erik Wielenberg  Linktree / The Five Metaethical Positions /  Noncognitivism/expressivism: Moral statements are neither true nor false. Evaluative predicates do not even purportedly refer to any sort of property, nor do evaluative statements assert propositions. Error theory/nihilism: Moral statements (that imply that something has an evaluative property) are all false. Subjectivism: Some moral statements are true, but not objectively. For a thing to be good is for some individual or group to (be disposed to) take some attitude towards it. Moral Naturalism: There are objective moral properties, but they are reducible. Evaluative truths are reducible to descriptive truths. Additionally, moral statements can be justified empirically. Moral Non-Naturalism/Intuitionism: There are objective moral properties, and they are irreducible. Evaluative truths are not reducible to descriptive truths. Additionally, at least some moral truths are known intuitively. / Timestamps / 00:00 Introduction 01:05 Objective vs. Subjective 06:45 Five Metaethical Views 36:45 Fictionalism 50:40 Phenomenal Conservatism, Scientism, Skepticism 1:15:00 Moral Disagreement 1:25:00 Theism and Moral Realism 1:41:00 Companions in Innocence 1:46:30 Evolutionary Debunking Arguments 2:00:00 Huemer's soul is not in Colorado nor is it in Michigan

Justin Clarke-Doane is a professor of philosophy at Columbia University, where he works on the philosophy of mathematics, physics, and metaethics. He and Robinson discuss ice cream and Justin's fantastic hair, along with less important topics, like philosophy and mathematics. Instagram: @robinsonerhardt --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/robinson-erhardt/support

Metaethics and Moral Anti-realism.   Part 1 (Intro to metaethics.  Intro to anti-realism, key terms such as cognitivism and noncognitivism).  Part 2 (23min53sec - error theory and John Mackie).  Part 3 (1hr03min15sec - noncognitivism - Ayer, Hare - evaluation of anti-realism).  Paul Moore-Bridger, and Ben Jones chat with Simon Kirchin (Kent).  Also - check out Part ONE on moral realism and our metaethics short summary episode.  [Music by Alex Grohl] 

Simon Kirchin (Kent) summarizes the area of metaethics talking through moral realism and anti-realism.  Also - check out the two in-depth episodes on metaethics.  Part ONE is on realism, part TWO is on anti-realism.  [Music by Alex Grohl]

------------------Support the channel------------ Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/thedissenter PayPal: paypal.me/thedissenter PayPal Subscription 1 Dollar: https://tinyurl.com/yb3acuuy PayPal Subscription 3 Dollars: https://tinyurl.com/ybn6bg9l PayPal Subscription 5 Dollars: https://tinyurl.com/ycmr9gpz PayPal Subscription 10 Dollars: https://tinyurl.com/y9r3fc9m PayPal Subscription 20 Dollars: https://tinyurl.com/y95uvkao ------------------Follow me on--------------------- Twitter: https://twitter.com/TheDissenterYT This show is sponsored by Enlites, Learning & Development done differently. Check the website here: http://enlites.com/ Dr. Russ Shafer-Landau is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. His primary interest is in ethics. He is the author of Moral Realism: A Defence (Oxford 2003), Whatever Happened to Good and Evil? (Oxford 2004), and The Fundamentals of Ethics (Oxford 2010). He is the editor of Oxford Studies in Metaethics, and is the founder and organizer of the annual Madison Metaethics Workshop (MadMeta). He is also the director of the Marc Sanders Prize in Metaethics. In this episode, we talk about metaethics, and moral realism. We ask what is metaethics, and define moral realism. We go through several challenges to moral realism, like evolutionary debunking arguments, apparent moral variation across cultures, moral foundations theory, and arguments from disagreement. We discuss if and how we can know that an epistemological approach is the best one out there. Finally, we talk about where moral beliefs come from, and the implications that might have for how moral philosophers do their work. -- A HUGE THANK YOU TO MY PATRONS/SUPPORTERS: KARIN LIETZCKE, ANN BLANCHETTE, PER HELGE LARSEN, LAU GUERREIRO, JERRY MULLER, HANS FREDRIK SUNDE, BERNARDO SEIXAS, HERBERT GINTIS, RUTGER VOS, RICARDO VLADIMIRO, CRAIG HEALY, OLAF ALEX, PHILIP KURIAN, JONATHAN VISSER, JAKOB KLINKBY, ADAM KESSEL, MATTHEW WHITINGBIRD, ARNAUD WOLFF, TIM HOLLOSY, HENRIK AHLENIUS, JOHN CONNORS, PAULINA BARREN, FILIP FORS CONNOLLY, DAN DEMETRIOU, ROBERT WINDHAGER, RUI INACIO, ARTHUR KOH, ZOOP, MARCO NEVES, COLIN HOLBROOK, SUSAN PINKER, PABLO SANTURBANO, SIMON COLUMBUS, PHIL KAVANAGH, JORGE ESPINHA, CORY CLARK, MARK BLYTH, ROBERTO INGUANZO, MIKKEL STORMYR, ERIC NEURMANN, SAMUEL ANDREEFF, FRANCIS FORDE, TIAGO NUNES, BERNARD HUGUENEY, ALEXANDER DANNBAUER, FERGAL CUSSEN, YEVHEN BODRENKO, HAL HERZOG, NUNO MACHADO, DON ROSS, JONATHAN LEIBRANT, JOÃO LINHARES, OZLEM BULUT, NATHAN NGUYEN, STANTON T, SAMUEL CORREA, ERIK HAINES, MARK SMITH, J.W., JOÃO EIRA, TOM HUMMEL, SARDUS FRANCE, DAVID SLOAN WILSON, YACILA DEZA-ARAUJO, IDAN SOLON, ROMAIN ROCH, DMITRY GRIGORYEV, TOM ROTH, DIEGO LONDOÑO CORREA, YANICK PUNTER, ADANER USMANI, CHARLOTTE BLEASE, NICOLE BARBARO, ADAM HUNT, PAWEL OSTASZEWSKI, AL ORTIZ, NELLEKE BAK, KATHRINE AND PATRICK TOBIN, GUY MADISON, GARY G HELLMANN, SAIMA AFZAL, ADRIAN JAEGGI, NICK GOLDEN, PAULO TOLENTINO, JOÃO BARBOSA, JULIAN PRICE, EDWARD HALL, HEDIN BRØNNER, DOUGLAS P. FRY, FRANCA BORTOLOTTI, GABRIEL PONS CORTÈS, URSULA LITZCKE, DENISE COOK, SCOTT, ZACHARY FISH, TIM DUFFY, TRADERINNYC, AND MAX BEILBY! A SPECIAL THANKS TO MY PRODUCERS, YZAR WEHBE, JIM FRANK, ŁUKASZ STAFINIAK, IAN GILLIGAN, LUIS CAYETANO, TOM VANEGDOM, CURTIS DIXON, BENEDIKT MUELLER, VEGA GIDEY, THOMAS TRUMBLE, AND NUNO ELDER! AND TO MY EXECUTIVE PRODUCERS, MICHAL RUSIECKI, ROSEY, JAMES PRATT, MATTHEW LAVENDER, SERGIU CODREANU, AND BOGDAN KANIVETS!

Metaethics and Moral Realism.  Part 1 (Intro to metaethics and moral realism)  Part 2 (25min30sec- moral naturalism, Moore's Open Question Argument).  Part 3 (54mins25sec - moral nonnaturalism, and problems with the OQA, summary).  Paul Moore-Bridger and Ben Jones chat with Simon Kirchin (Kent).  Also - check out our other two episodes: Part TWO on moral anti-realism, and the metaethics short summary. [Music by Alex Grohl]

Today we're joined by Riana Popat, a PhD student at the University of Nottingham. We'll be talking about her experiences in teaching and particularly in outreach, her research on the relationship between metaethics and mental health, and her thoughts on the value of philosophy. If, after listening, you'd like to get in touch with Riana, you can email her at riana.popat@nottingham.ac.uk. We also have a transcript available here if you want to read along. Find out more at http://www.philosophersnest.com

Kant is one of the leading philosophers in the rationalism v empiricism debate. In this video/ lecture, we cover his philosophy on perception, covering various important themes which must not be overlooked. --------------------------To check out more about my content feel free to go to my YouTube Channel Philosophy for All to access clips and extra discussions

'Are there any actions that are right or wrong?'Metaethics is the study of moral judgment's nature, scope, and meaning. It is one of the three branches of ethics generally studied by philosophers. And as you know, our residential philosopher Kedric loves to spend his limited free time exploring the rabbit holes of philosophy. In today's episode, alongside Dr. Terence Cuneo, we look to explore the essence of morals. Through the lens of a philosopher, what does it mean to have moral concepts indeed, the nature of morality, and do we truly have one true morality? 

Are you interested in learning about Ayn Rand's Objectivism? Check out this FREE ebook:

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This isNo-Nonsense Metaethics, Part 1: Heading Toward: No-Nonsense Metaethics, published by lukeprog. Part of the sequence: No-Nonsense Metaethics A few months ago, I predicted that we could solve metaethics in 15 years. To most people, that was outrageously optimistic. But I've updated since then. I think much of metaethics can be solved now (depending on where you draw the boundary around the term 'metaethics'.) My upcoming sequence 'No-Nonsense Metaethics' will solve the part that can be solved, and make headway on the parts of metaethics that aren't yet solved. Solving the easier problems of metaethics will give us a clear and stable platform from which to solve the hard questions of morality. Metaethics has been my target for a while now, but first I had to explain the neuroscience of pleasure and desire, and how to use intuitions for philosophy. Luckily, Eliezer laid most of the groundwork when he explained couldness, terminal and instrumental values, the complexity of human desire and happiness, how to dissolve philosophical problems, how to taboo words and replace them with their substance, how to avoid definitional disputes, how to carve reality at its joints with our words, how an algorithm feels from the inside, the mind projection fallacy, how probability is in the mind, reductionism, determinism, free will, evolutionary psychology, how to grasp slippery things, and what you would do without morality. Of course, Eliezer wrote his own metaethics sequence. Eliezer and I seem to have similar views on morality, but I'll be approaching the subject from a different angle, I'll be phrasing my solution differently, and I'll be covering a different spread of topics. Why do I think much of metaethics can be solved now? We have enormous resources not available just a few years ago. The neuroscience of pleasure and desire didn't exist two decades ago. (Well, we thought dopamine was 'the pleasure chemical', but we were wrong.) Detailed models of reductionistic meta-ethics weren't developed until the 1980s and 90s (by Peter Railton and Frank Jackson). Reductionism has been around for a while, but there are few philosophers who relentlessly play Rationalist's Taboo. Eliezer didn't write How an Algorithm Feels from the Inside until 2008. Our methods will be familiar ones, already used to dissolve problems ranging from free will to disease. We will play Taboo with our terms, reducing philosophical questions into scientific ones. Then we will examine the cognitive algorithms that make it feel like open questions remain. Along the way, we will solve or dissolve the traditional problems of metaethics: moral epistemology, the role of moral intuition, the is-ought gap, matters of moral psychology, the open question argument, moral realism vs. moral anti-realism, moral cognitivism vs. non-cognitivism, and more. You might respond, "Sure, Luke, we can do the reduce-to-algorithm thing with free will or disease, but morality is different. Morality is fundamentally normative. You can't just dissolve moral questions with Taboo-playing and reductionism and cognitive science." Well, we're going to examine the cognitive algorithms that generate that intuition, too. And at the end, we will see what this all means for the problem of Friendly AI. I must note that I didn't exactly invent the position I'll be defending. After sharing my views on metaethics with many scientifically-minded people in private conversation, many have said something like "Yeah, that's basically what I think about metaethics, I've just never thought it through in so much detail and cited so much of the relevant science [e.g. recent work in neuroeconomics and the science of intuition]." But for convenience I do need to invent a name for my theory of metaethics. I call it pluralistic moral reductionism. Next post: What is Met...

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is No-Nonsense Metaethics, Part 2: What is Metaethics?, published by lukeprog. When I say I think I can solve (some of) metaethics, what exactly is it that I think I can solve? First, we must distinguish the study of ethics or morality from the anthropology of moral belief and practice. The first one asks: "What is right?" The second one asks: "What do people think is right?" Of course, one can inform the other, but it's important not to confuse the two. One can correctly say that different cultures have different 'morals' in that they have different moral beliefs and practices, but this may not answer the question of whether or not they are behaving in morally right ways. My focus is metaethics, so I'll discuss the anthropology of moral belief and practice only when it is relevant for making points about metaethics. So what is metaethics? Many people break the field of ethics into three sub-fields: applied ethics, normative ethics, and metaethics. Applied ethics: Is abortion morally right? How should we treat animals? What political and economic systems are most moral? What are the moral responsibilities of businesses? How should doctors respond to complex and uncertain situations? When is lying acceptable? What kinds of sex are right or wrong? Is euthanasia acceptable? Normative ethics: What moral principles should we use in order to decide how to treat animals, when lying is acceptable, and so on? Is morality decided by what produces the greatest good for the greatest number? Is it decided by a list of unbreakable rules? Is it decided by a list of character virtues? Is it decided by a hypothetical social contract drafted under ideal circumstances? Metaethics: What does moral language mean? Do moral facts exist? If so, what are they like, and are they reducible to natural facts? How can we know whether moral judgments are true or false? Is there a connection between making a moral judgment and being motivated to abide by it? Are moral judgments objective or subjective, relative or absolute? Does it make sense to talk about moral progress? Others prefer to combine applied ethics and normative ethics so that the breakdown becomes: normative ethics vs. metaethics, or 'first order' moral questions (normative ethics) vs. 'second order' questions (metaethics). Mainstream views in metaethics To illustrate how people can give different answers to the questions of metaethics, let me summarize some of the mainstream philosophical positions in metaethics. Cognitivism vs. non-cognitivism: This is a debate about what is happening when people engage in moral discourse. When someone says "Murder is wrong," are they trying to state a fact about murder, that it has the property of being wrong? Or are they merely expressing a negative emotion toward murder, as if they had gasped aloud and said "Murder!" with a disapproving tone? Another way of saying this is that cognitivists think moral discourse is 'truth-apt' - that is, moral statements are the kinds of things that can be true or false. Some cognitivists think that all moral claims are in fact false (error theory), just as the atheist thinks that claims about gods are usually meant to be fact-stating but in fact are all false because gods don't exist.1 Other cognitivists think that at least some moral claims are true. Naturalism holds that moral judgments are true or false because of natural facts,2 while non-naturalism holds that moral judgments are true or false because of non-natural facts.3 Weak cognitivism holds that moral judgments can be true or false not because they agree with certain (natural or non-natural) opinion-independent facts, but because our considered opinions determine the moral facts.4 Non-cognitivists, in contrast, tend to think that moral discourse is not truth-apt. Ayer (1936) held that moral sentences expres...

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This isNo-Nonsense Metaethics, Part 3: Conceptual Analysis and Moral Theory, published by lukeprog. Part of the sequence: No-Nonsense Metaethics. Also see: A Human's Guide to Words. If a tree falls in the forest, and no one hears it, does it make a sound? Albert: "Of course it does. What kind of silly question is that? Every time I've listened to a tree fall, it made a sound, so I'll guess that other trees falling also make sounds. I don't believe the world changes around when I'm not looking." Barry: "Wait a minute. If no one hears it, how can it be a sound?" Albert and Barry are not arguing about facts, but about definitions: ...the first person is speaking as if 'sound' means acoustic vibrations in the air; the second person is speaking as if 'sound' means an auditory experience in a brain. If you ask "Are there acoustic vibrations?" or "Are there auditory experiences?", the answer is at once obvious. And so the argument is really about the definition of the word 'sound'. Of course, Albert and Barry could argue back and forth about which definition best fits their intuitions about the meaning of the word. Albert could offer this argument in favor of using his definition of sound: My computer's microphone can record a sound without anyone being around to hear it, store it as a file, and it's called a 'sound file'. And what's stored in the file is the pattern of vibrations in air, not the pattern of neural firings in anyone's brain. 'Sound' means a pattern of vibrations. Barry might retort: Imagine some aliens on a distant planet. They haven't evolved any organ that translates vibrations into neural signals, but they still hear sounds inside their own head (as an evolutionary biproduct of some other evolved cognitive mechanism). If these creatures seem metaphysically possible to you, then this shows that our concept of 'sound' is not dependent on patterns of vibrations. If their debate seems silly to you, I have sad news. A large chunk of moral philosophy looks like this. What Albert and Barry are doing is what philosophers call conceptual analysis.1 The trouble with conceptual analysis I won't argue that everything that has ever been called 'conceptual analysis' is misguided.2 Instead, I'll give examples of common kinds of conceptual analysis that corrupt discussions of morality and other subjects. The following paragraph explains succinctly what is wrong with much conceptual analysis: Analysis [had] one of two reputations. On the one hand, there was sterile cataloging of pointless folk wisdom - such as articles analyzing the concept VEHICLE, wondering whether something could be a vehicle without wheels. This seemed like trivial lexicography. On the other hand, there was metaphysically loaded analysis, in which ontological conclusions were established by holding fixed pieces of folk wisdom - such as attempts to refute general relativity by holding fixed allegedly conceptual truths, such as the idea that motion is intrinsic to moving things, or that there is an objective present.3 Consider even the 'naturalistic' kind of conceptual analysis practiced by Timothy Schroeder in Three Faces of Desire. In private correspondance, I tried to clarify Schroeder's project: As I see it, [your book] seeks the cleanest reduction of the folk psychological term 'desire' to a natural kind, ala the reduction of the folk chemical term 'water' to H2O. To do this, you employ a naturalism-flavored method of conceptual analysis according to which the best theory of desire is one that is logically consistent, fits the empirical facts, and captures how we use the term and our intuitions about its meaning. Schroeder confirmed this, and it's not hard to see the motivation for his project. We have this concept 'desire', and we might like to know: "Is there anything in the world similar to what we mean ...

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This isNo-Nonsense Metaethics, Part 4: Pluralistic Moral Reductionism, published by lukeprog. Part of the sequence: No-Nonsense Metaethics Disputes over the definition of morality... are disputes over words which raise no really significant issues. [Of course,] lack of clarity about the meaning of words is an important source of error. My complaint is that what should be regarded as something to be got out of the way in the introduction to a work of moral philosophy has become the subject matter of almost the whole of moral philosophy... Peter Singer If a tree falls in the forest, and no one hears it, does it make a sound? If by 'sound' you mean 'acoustic vibrations in the air', the answer is 'Yes.' But if by 'sound' you mean an auditory experience in the brain, the answer is 'No.' We might call this straightforward solution pluralistic sound reductionism. If people use the word 'sound' to mean different things, and people have different intuitions about the meaning of the word 'sound', then we needn't endlessly debate which definition is 'correct'.1 We can be pluralists about the meanings of 'sound'. To facilitate communication, we can taboo and reduce: we can replace the symbol with the substance and talk about facts and anticipations, not definitions. We can avoid using the word 'sound' and instead talk about 'acoustic vibrations' or 'auditory brain experiences.' Still, some definitions can be wrong: Alex: If a tree falls in the forest, and no one hears it, does it make a sound? Austere MetaAcousticist: Tell me what you mean by 'sound', and I will tell you the answer. Alex: By 'sound' I mean 'acoustic messenger fairies flying through the ether'. Austere MetaAcousticist: There's no such thing. Now, if you had asked me about this other definition of 'sound'... There are other ways for words to be wrong, too. But once we admit to multiple potentially useful reductions of 'sound', it is not hard to see how we could admit to multiple useful reductions of moral terms. Many Moral Reductionisms Moral terms are used in a greater variety of ways than sound terms are. There is little hope of arriving at the One True Theory of Morality by analyzing common usage or by triangulating from the platitudes of folk moral discourse. But we can use stipulation, and we can taboo and reduce. We can use pluralistic moral reductionism2 (for austere metaethics, not for empathic metaethics). Example #1: Neuroscientist Sam Harris: Which is better? Religious totalitarianism or the Northern European welfare state? Austere Metaethicist: What do you mean by 'better'? Harris: By 'better' I mean 'that which tends to maximize the well-being of conscious creatures'. Austere Metaethicist: Assuming we have similar reductions of 'well-being' and 'conscious creatures' in mind, the evidence I know of suggests that the Northern European welfare state is more likely to maximize the well-being of conscious creatures than religious totalitarianism. Example #2: Philosopher Peter Railton: Is capitalism the best economic system? Austere Metaethicist: What do you mean by 'best'? Railton: By 'best' I mean 'would be approved of by an ideally instrumentally rational and fully informed agent considering the question ‘How best to maximize the amount of non-moral goodness?' from a social point of view in which the interests of all potentially affected individuals are counted equally. Austere Metaethicist: Assuming we agree on the meaning of 'ideally instrumentally rational' and 'fully informed' and 'agent' and 'non-moral goodness' and a few other things, the evidence I know of suggests that capitalism would not be approved of by an ideally instrumentally rational and fully informed agent considering the question ‘How best to maximize the amount of non-moral goodness?' from a social point of view in which the interests of all p...

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This isNo-Nonsense Metaethics, Part 5: Quick thoughts on empathic metaethics, published by lukeprog. Years ago, I wrote an unfinished sequence of posts called "No-Nonsense Metaethics." My last post, Pluralistic Moral Reductionism, said I would next explore "empathic metaethics," but I never got around to writing those posts. Recently, I wrote a high-level summary of some initial thoughts on "empathic metaethics" in section 6.1.2 of a report prepared for my employer, the Open Philanthropy Project. With my employer's permission, I've adapted that section for publication here, so that it can serve as the long-overdue concluding post in my sequence on metaethics. In my previous post, I distinguished "austere metaethics" and "empathic metaethics," where austere metaethics confronts moral questions roughly like this: Tell me what you mean by 'right', and I will tell you what is the right thing to do. If by 'right' you mean X, then Y is the right thing to do. If by 'right' you mean P, then Z is the right thing to do. But if you can't tell me what you mean by 'right', then you have failed to ask a coherent question, and no one can answer an incoherent question. Meanwhile, empathic metaethics says instead: You may not know what you mean by 'right.' But let's not stop there. Here, let me come alongside you and help decode the cognitive algorithms that generated your question in the first place, and then we'll be able to answer your question. Then we can tell you what the right thing to do is. Below, I provide a high-level summary of some of my initial thoughts on what one approach to "empathic metaethics" could look like. Given my metaethical approach, when I make a “moral judgment” about something (e.g. about which kinds of beings are moral patients), I don't conceive of myself as perceiving an objective moral truth, or coming to know an objective moral truth via a series of arguments. Nor do I conceive of myself as merely expressing my moral feelings as they stand today. Rather, I conceive of myself as making a conditional forecast about what my values would be if I underwent a certain “idealization” or “extrapolation” procedure (coming to know more true facts, having more time to consider moral arguments, etc.).[1] Thus, in a (hypothetical) "extreme effort" attempt to engage in empathic metaethics (for thinking about my own moral judgments), I would do something like the following: I would try to make the scenario I'm aiming to forecast as concrete as possible, so that my brain is able to treat it as a genuine forecasting challenge, akin to participating in a prediction market or forecasting tournament, rather than as a fantasy about which my brain feels "allowed" to make up whatever story feels nice, or signals my values to others, or achieves something else that isn't forecasting accuracy.[2] In my case, I concretize the extrapolation procedure as one involving a large population of copies of me who learn many true facts, consider many moral arguments, and undergo various other experiences, and then collectively advise me about what I should value and why.[3] However, I would also try to make forecasts I can actually check for accuracy, e.g. about what my moral judgment about various cases will be 2 months in the future. When making these forecasts, I would try to draw on the best research I've seen concerning how to make accurate estimates and forecasts. For example I would try to "think like a fox, not like a hedgehog," and I've already done several hours of probability calibration training, and some amount of forecasting training.[4] Clearly, my current moral intuitions would serve as one important source of evidence about what my extrapolated values might be. However, recent findings in moral psychology and related fields lead me to assign more evidential weight to some moral ...

Link to original articleWelcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This isNo-Nonsense Metaethics, Part 1: Heading Toward: No-Nonsense Metaethics, published by lukeprog. Part of the sequence: No-Nonsense Metaethics A few months ago, I predicted that we could solve metaethics in 15 years. To most people, that was outrageously optimistic. But I've updated since then. I think much of metaethics can be solved now (depending on where you draw the boundary around the term 'metaethics'.) My upcoming sequence 'No-Nonsense Metaethics' will solve the part that can be solved, and make headway on the parts of metaethics that aren't yet solved. Solving the easier problems of metaethics will give us a clear and stable platform from which to solve the hard questions of morality. Metaethics has been my target for a while now, but first I had to explain the neuroscience of pleasure and desire, and how to use intuitions for philosophy. Luckily, Eliezer laid most of the groundwork when he explained couldness, terminal and instrumental values, the complexity of human desire and happiness, how to dissolve philosophical problems, how to taboo words and replace them with their substance, how to avoid definitional disputes, how to carve reality at its joints with our words, how an algorithm feels from the inside, the mind projection fallacy, how probability is in the mind, reductionism, determinism, free will, evolutionary psychology, how to grasp slippery things, and what you would do without morality. Of course, Eliezer wrote his own metaethics sequence. Eliezer and I seem to have similar views on morality, but I'll be approaching the subject from a different angle, I'll be phrasing my solution differently, and I'll be covering a different spread of topics. Why do I think much of metaethics can be solved now? We have enormous resources not available just a few years ago. The neuroscience of pleasure and desire didn't exist two decades ago. (Well, we thought dopamine was 'the pleasure chemical', but we were wrong.) Detailed models of reductionistic meta-ethics weren't developed until the 1980s and 90s (by Peter Railton and Frank Jackson). Reductionism has been around for a while, but there are few philosophers who relentlessly play Rationalist's Taboo. Eliezer didn't write How an Algorithm Feels from the Inside until 2008. Our methods will be familiar ones, already used to dissolve problems ranging from free will to disease. We will play Taboo with our terms, reducing philosophical questions into scientific ones. Then we will examine the cognitive algorithms that make it feel like open questions remain. Along the way, we will solve or dissolve the traditional problems of metaethics: moral epistemology, the role of moral intuition, the is-ought gap, matters of moral psychology, the open question argument, moral realism vs. moral anti-realism, moral cognitivism vs. non-cognitivism, and more. You might respond, "Sure, Luke, we can do the reduce-to-algorithm thing with free will or disease, but morality is different. Morality is fundamentally normative. You can't just dissolve moral questions with Taboo-playing and reductionism and cognitive science." Well, we're going to examine the cognitive algorithms that generate that intuition, too. And at the end, we will see what this all means for the problem of Friendly AI. I must note that I didn't exactly invent the position I'll be defending. After sharing my views on metaethics with many scientifically-minded people in private conversation, many have said something like "Yeah, that's basically what I think about metaethics, I've just never thought it through in so much detail and cited so much of the relevant science [e.g. recent work in neuroeconomics and the science of intuition]." But for convenience I do need to invent a name for my theory of metaethics. I call it pluralistic moral reductionism. Next post: What is Met...

Professor Shafer-Landau's primary interest is in ethics. He is the author of Moral Realism: A Defence (Oxford 2003), Whatever Happened to Good and Evil? (Oxford 2004), and The Fundamentals of Ethics (Oxford 2010). He is the editor of Oxford Studies in Metaethics, and is the founder and organizer of the annual Madison Metaethics Workshop (MadMeta). He is also the director of the Marc Sanders Prize in Metaethics. Shafer-Landau is currently working on a large collaborative project with UW colleague John Bengson and Terence Cuneo (Vermont) that seeks to offer a new vindication of nonnaturalist moral realism. Russ Schafer-Landau: ◼ https://sites.google.com/site/shaferlandau/home Brute Facts: ◼ Special thanks to Oz with “TANG” and Pasta Mike with "Normalizing Atheism" for inspiration and encouragement. ◼ Patreon https://www.patreon.com/brutefactspodcast ◼ Website https://www.brutefacts.com/ ◼ Store https://www.brutefacts.com//shop ◼ Youtube https://www.youtube.com/c/BruteFactsPodcast ◼ Linktree https://linktr.ee/Brute_Facts_Podcast ◼ Discord https://discord.gg/RveCZ5dz

On today's episode, we continue our discussion of metaethics, explaining some of the traditional philosophical problems in metaethics, which have led  some philosophers to think that anti-realist or relativist views of morality might actually be right.Toby Napoletano, Michael Hughes

Is there something about the world which makes our actions good or bad? Moral realism is the position that moral propositions can be true or false and that morality is a feature of the world rather than (say) just the way we subjectively feel. In this episode I talk to Prof. Russ Shafer Landau, the founder and editor of the periodical Oxford Studies in Metaethics, about what reasons there might be for being a moral realist.