Podcast appearances and mentions of Vienna Convention

The Lowest Moral Denominator.By FinalStand. Listen to the Podcast at Explicit Novels.Those who declare war are willing to kill as many as it takes to reach their goal.(The Lowest Moral Denominator)My first week at Havenstone, I'd biked to work alone on most days and I'd enjoyed that. I'd have treasure it more if I had glimpsed my future. I loved people, not crowds. I knew about violence, yet I had no affection for it. I was a confirmed bachelor. Now I was staring down both barrels of marriage. I had had also become a walking arsenal with a lethal omnipresent entourage.This situation was so fucked up that I had to stop by Caitlin's place just to see Aya. My favorite sprite gave me a hug and reminded me that I had to do what I could, not worry about what I couldn't do. She was my 9 year old Svengali. She was my little Valkyrie. In truth, she was the only woman knew I loved and that was the love of a father for his daughter.On the elevator ride up to the penthouse suite of the Midtown Hilton, I thought about Dad. What would Ferko Nyilas do in my shoes? It would be easy for someone who didn't know him to imagine my dad getting up on his high moral horse and telling me to just do the right thing, except that wasn't him. What he'd tell me was to not pass the buck. I had to deal with this, unless I knew someone else who could and would do it better.It wasn't about 'being a man'; it was being a member of the Human Race. We all pitched in and got the job done, or it didn't get done, and millions died because we refused to accept any responsibility for what was going on. That was my Dad, 'do what you can' and 'never be afraid to ask for help if you need it'. After the age of ten, he never told me I had to do anything. He'd tell me what needed to be done and leave it at that.So I wouldn't forget the pictures I knew I'd be seeing before too long, the innocent dead. If the sorrow broke me, it broke me. Until it did, I could not turn away. I had to 'do what I could'. That put me heading to a meeting at three o'clock in the afternoon in the penthouse suite.After my non-breakfast with Iskender, we had driven straight to Havenstone, where I demanded an immediate, private meeting with Katrina. This wasn't an info-dump and then out the door. No, I was part of the process now, one of those fools who were responsible for the lives of others. Katrina and I had argued about compartmentalizing my terrifying news.Her reasoning was clear. We were at war with the Seven Pillars. The basis of the 7P strength was China, so anything bad that happened to China was good for the Amazon Host. I nixed that. It was Katrina's job to think about our security. It was mine to juggle how we related to the rest of the planet. Absent the Golden Mare's opposition, Katrina couldn't stop me from doing my job as I saw fit.The Golden Mare was out of immediate contact, so we moved forward on my proposal. Katrina called Javiera, validated Vincent's call, and then suggested she bring in someone from the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) at Ft. Detrick. Katrina wouldn't tell her why.I dispatched Delilah to talk to her MI-6 guy while I made my way to Nicole Lawless's law offices. I need to talk to my Aunts. An hour later, I dismissed a somewhat piqued Nicole from the room, then laid out the upcoming crisis to my Mom's clones. I hesitated a minute before dropping the other bomb, Grandpa Cáel was back.Was I sure? I countered with, "Do you know who Shammuramat was?"Why, yes they did; Grandpa had a bust of her in his main office."Well, she's back, in the flesh and that spells all kinds of problems".The six aunts present agreed. They invited me to fly to Europe with five of them. Much to their surprise and joy, I agreed. I told them I would be a party of twelve with plenty of firepower. They were less pleased about that.I exited that scene, only to engage in another, somewhat unrelated, bit of diplomacy. I met with Brooke and Libra for lunch. They brought Casper, who was seeing a specialist in New York and had expressed an interest in seeing me again. Into that volatile mix, I placed my request: 'Could Brooke put up a friend for a couple of weeks while I made other arrangements?'Yes, this was a 'bizarre' friend. Yes, this was a violently bizarre friend. Yes, she walked around with enough weaponry to scare a seasoned SWAT officer. And yes, she was a mass murderer. Cool,, if I agreed to stop by and see how this 'friend' was doing, and gave Libra advance notice too, then they were fine with it.Thus Shammuramat, Sakuniyas, Saku became Brooke's roommate. Insane? Not really. Putting Saku inside Havenstone on a regular basis was going to result in a blood bath. Saku was abrasive and she was a criminal in the minds of her 'sisters'. This gave her an 'out', some space and time with a civilized person who she couldn't emotionally bowl over.If Saku got physical with Brooke, we both understood that House Ishara was going to cancel her return performance. Amazons could defend themselves, so we were fair game for her rude behavior. Brooke couldn't, so she was hopefully out of bounds. Saku had agreed to the arrangement without comment.She'd already figured out that no other Amazons wanted her around and there simply wasn't room at my place. With that chore done, I was able to see Miyako off before her flight to Tokyo by way of Seattle. Selena was with her, but not going. Miyako did have three Amazons in case things got rough.The Marda House guard woman looked mature and humorless. Her age wasn't a problem. She was a grandmother, yet if she thought she couldn't keep up, she'd have taken herself to the cliffs before now. It turned out she had been in Executive Services before returning to House Marda. My diplomat, I didn't know her, but she seemed eager enough. The member of House Ishara was a brand new recruit named Jenna.She was from Acquisitions and spoke seven Asian languages, including Japanese. She looked absolutely thrilled to be heading off into danger. I instructed the younger two to obey the Mardan. In private, I 'advised' the Mardan that our main mission was to be of aid to the ninja. Information gathering would be secondary. More Amazons were on the way. She gave me a nod.For this critical mid-afternoon meeting at the Midtown Hilton, Wiesława lead the way off the elevator. Buffy went next, then me and finally Saku. Delilah and Vincent had already arrived with their appropriate factions. Katrina took a separate elevator, with Elsa and Desiree. Pamela was, somewhere. After she'd pointed out a half-dozen people from four different agencies in the lobby, she told me to not wait while she went to the bathroom.At the door of the Penthouse were two familiar faces from the NYPD, Nikita Kutuzov and her partner, Skylar Montero. When Javiera's investigation followed me to New York, they had been drafted into the taskforce."Hey ladies," I smiled. My last meeting with Nikita hadn't gone well."Cáel," Nikita smiled back. "How have you been?""More trouble than normal," I shook her hand."We can tell," Skylar relaxed somewhat. As Nikita's partner, she had to know that our relationship had soured when she started investigating me. Katrina's group came up."I think you are the last to arrive," Nikita informed us. This time, Desiree was the first one through the door. I could hear the conversation trail off. Wiesława went next, then Katrina, me, Buffy, Saku and finally Elsa. I decided to toss 'civilized' behavior out the window seconds after entering. Virginia Maddox of the FBI, the initiator of the Amazon children's airlift, was here.I hugged her and after a moment, she hugged me back."Priya says hey and," she blushed slightly, "she's counting the days, all forty-five of them.""Don't forget, I owe you," I grinned then patted her shoulder. Javiera was next."Cáel," she headed my familiarity off. She was a Federal Prosecutor after all."This is the head of this taskforce, Jonas Baker (deep breath) Associate Deputy Undersecretary of Analysis for Homeland Security {ADUAHS} (deep breath)." I extended my hand, so he shook it. He looked somewhat annoyed by this whole encounter. Javiera was duly nervous because of his poor initial attitude. The introductions went around.Half way through it, Pamela showed up, from where, I didn't know. Delilah, her MI-6 boss and the British professional killer Chaz were there, much to the chagrin of the Americans. Vincent was there with Javiera. Cresky was representing the CIA plus there was ATF, ICE, Riki Martin (?) from the State Department and a man in a civil servant's salary suit and a military demeanor, Captain Moe Mistriano."Fine," Mr. Baker began. "I hope you aren't wasting our time." His gaze flicked between Katrina and me."May the Blessed Isis bring understanding to our meeting," I intoned, in old Egyptian."What was that?" Baker turned on me."Praying for guidance," I replied. Isis wasn't in the Amazon pantheon, but I could sure use her help at this point. Baker was going from put-out to pissed-off. If that is how they wanted to play it, their choice. "Are you the specialist from Ft. Detrick?" I asked the Captain."Yes, I am and I hope this is worth my time as well," he gave me a steady gaze. Oh, I really needed that."Anthrax, China," I stated and weighed his response. Oh yeah, I had his attention now, which meant his bio-warfare unit had some idea about what was happening in China."Care to enlighten me?" Baker inquired. He had gauged his medical expert's reactions as well and he didn't like what the biological warfare specialist was not saying."Mr. Baker," the Captain decided to go first. "Roughly fifty-five hours ago, we got wind that there was a massive Anthrax outbreak in Western China. Xinjiang, Qinghai, Gansu, Ningxia and Nei Mongol administrative regions have all reported outbreaks."Holy Shit!" Riki Martin gasped. Her dark, whip-like, Hispanic features noticeably paled."That sounds suspiciously like bio-terrorism," Jonas Baker turned on me."You'd be right about that," I refused to evade. "It is and it is about to get a whole lot worse.""The PRC has a robust vaccine program," the Captain stated. "That is why they aren't making a public stink about it. They have the problem well under control.""Damn, " I closed my eyes and lowered my head. In some deep section of my mind, I had fanned the feeble flames of hope that somehow, the Earth  and  Sky program had derailed. "That is the 'whole lot worse' I was talking about. The terrorists aren't terrorists. They, ""What do you mean they are not terrorists," Baker snapped. "They, ""Shut up and let the man speak," Katrina said calmly."Who are you again?" he glared at Katrina. "If you aren't part of the solution, you are part of the problem and I'm here to make sure this problem is dealt with. I am not here to play footsie with you. I am going to be asking some tough questions and you had better answer them.""I'm Cáel's boss," Katrina smiled. "Since we came here to help you and you don't want to let us speak, we are leaving. Cáel."The Amazons didn't turn and leave. No, we backed up toward the door."You can't start talking about an ongoing terrorist threat and then walk out the door," Baker argued."Javiera, I apologize," I looked her way. "Mr. Baker, Javiera's a smart cookie. I'm sure she's given you every bit of information that has come across her desk. That means you know we consider ourselves an independent nation-state without borders. You can't intimidate us. We feel no obligation to obey your legal system and we operate internationally," I kept going."Now, as we are trying to repay Javiera's kindness in our time of need, you are treating us like criminals currying favors. Blow it out your ass, you pompous bureaucrat" I concluded. "We aren't the problem here.""If that's the way you want it," he shrugged. "Javiera, arrest them." Pause."Sir, you do realize that if I give that order, there is a good likelihood they will resist with force?" Javiera replied calmly. Baker looked around the room."We outnumber them and these are law enforcement officers," he insisted. "Now, ""I wouldn't count on that 'outnumbered' thing," Delilah chimed in.Chaz and MI-6 dude didn't seem to be onboard with his plan. "I have reason to believe Cáel has information on a highly virulent weaponized Anthrax program. If our US allies aren't interested, Her Majesty's government certainly will be." That did interest the MI-6 senior officer."That is all the more reason to put these people into federal custody," Baker stated."Then what, Mr. Associate Deputy?" Chaz said. "Are you going to torture them for time sensitive data? In my military service, I've met some truly hard characters. Some people you can put a gun to their child's head and they'll tell you what you want to know. Not this group. They'll memorize your face and wait for a chance to make you pay, whether you kill the kid, or not.""That's my read on them as well," Agent Vincent Loire added."Mr. Baker, I worked under you when we were both in Counter-terrorism," Virginia spoke up. "I think you are mishandling this. Invoke the Patriot Act and all we get is a roomful of statues. I've fought beside these, Amazons and I'm reaffirming my report to Ms. Castello (Javiera), they do not believe their behavior is wrong.At some point in their fifties, they commit ritual suicide. They make their twelve year old daughters fight for their lives. They murder their male infants. Sir, they are an alien society, indoctrinated at birth to believe they are spiritual inheritors of the ancient Amazons mentioned by Homer during the time of the Iliad.They fanatically believe in a pantheon of goddesses and possess very little inclination for integration. They think they are superior to everyone in this room, except for Cáel, he's an oddity," Virginia pleaded."That legion of crimes is yet another reason to arrest them," Baker just wouldn't give up."What you have described, Agent Maddox is a right wing nut cult, like the Branch-Davidians at Waco. Arrest them.""What are the charges?" Javiera's face blanked out."Conspiracy to commit terrorist acts; aiding and abetting an international terrorist organization," Baker snapped."Everyone, put down your firearms and blades," Katrina ordered. I didn't have the status to give that order except to my own. For that matter,"Team, disarm," Elsa commanded her Security Detail people. Technically, Katrina couldn't order those girls to forego their primary mission, defend the Host. Out came the guns.The group of us went over to one wall, put our backs to it and sat down. Pro forma, Virginia, Vincent and the ATF guy drew their firearms. By this time, both Riki and the Captain looked ready to explode."Tell us what you know about this terrorist conspiracy and, " Baker said."We invoke our Right to Council," I raised my hand."You are being charged under the Patriot Act, smart-ass," Baker sneered. "We can hold you indefinitely if we can show a risk to National Security, such as a terrorist attack in China.""I apologize for dragging you into this," I turned to Katrina. "You too, Saku." Saku shrugged."I told you there is no benefit in helping 'these people'," Katrina comforted me. She meant non-Amazons and it was rather sad that it was looking like she was right and I was wrong."Unless you want to grow old and grey in Guantanamo, I suggest you start talking now," Baker threatened.There was no bravado on our part. We didn't zone out, or ignore him. We looked at him the same way we would a yappy dog while continuing to scan the room. Being disarmed didn't make us defenseless. It merely limited our options."Sir," Riki tapped Baker."If the People's Republic of China finds out we withheld details of a terrorist attack on their soil, that would be BAD, with a capital 'B'.""I have to call this in," the Captain shook his head."Wait until we have active intelligence," Baker said. The Captain completed his call."I don't work for you, Sir. I work for the Department of Defense and that man," the Captain pointed at me, "strung two words together he shouldn't have. Now, I don't know any of you people. I was told to come here, so here I am. I do know, Sir, that you are ignoring the advice from your experts about the expected results of standard interrogation techniques.You are acting on two assumptions which I find to be fictitious," the Captain was clearly furious. "First, you seem to think this won't get out, and you are wrong. Why? We have no idea who these people have talked with. We can only believe that any person outside of their organization can use that revelation for their own ends. Secondly, you haven't grasped the extent of the emergency.Chinese citizens are already starting to drop dead as we speak. This variant of Anthrax is highly contagious, fast-acting, and appears to be incredibly fatal. No nation on Earth has enough Anthrax vaccine on hand to protect their entire population, and that still implies that the vaccines we currently have will work on this new bacteria. Need I go on?"Then Captain Mistriano went back to talking softly with his companions back at Ft. Detrick. The MI-6 chief made his own call. This was his job after all. Before Baker could even start to threaten the Brit, Delilah and Chaz had their guns out, though pointed down. The US law enforcement operatives were far more leery of challenging agents of a friendly foreign power."I will make sure to tack on charges for all those deaths you are facilitating," Baker piled it on. "The US government might find it necessary to send you to the People's Republic of China to face charges there. After all, you claim to not be US citizens." None of us responded verbally. We looked at him. We certainly heard him speak, but his '

It's time for a news roundup which kicks off with a bit of a correction from our Digital ID episode which saw the cookers get one right. Kinda. Well sort of. A bit. But they did. Big thanks to Michael for letting us know!Then we jump straight into politics - Biden struggled in the debate and the UK was set to go to the polls. The results are in and Labor pissed it in, but we knew that so it's doesn't really matter. In cooker update we laugh at MGG, Guru and Dave Oneegs who are all making dicks of themselves as usual. In sovcits we have a particularly nasty character who relied on the Vienna Convention for reasons we don't know and....Pete's an influencer! Well, according to the daily mail. Enjoy!

This Day in Legal History: LaGrand ICJ CaseOn June 27, 2001, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) made a landmark ruling in the LaGrand case, Germany v. United States, affirming that foreign nationals must be informed of their right to contact their home country's embassy following an arrest. This case revolved around brothers Karl and Walter LaGrand, German nationals who were arrested in Arizona in 1982 for murder and armed robbery. Arizona authorities failed to inform the brothers of their right to consular assistance as stipulated by the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.Despite a 1999 U.S. Supreme Court decision upholding their convictions, Germany brought the case to the ICJ, which issued a provisional order to stay the executions. Nonetheless, Arizona proceeded with the executions that same year. The ICJ's 2001 ruling declared that the U.S. had violated both the Vienna Convention and the ICJ's provisional order.This decision underscored the importance of consular notification and reinforced international legal standards for the treatment of foreign nationals. It also highlighted the binding nature of ICJ provisional measures and the obligation of states to comply with international treaty obligations.Of course, having said all of that, the brothers LaGrand were still executed in contravention of both the ICJ and the Vienna Convention–so the degree to which decisions by either are truly binding is at least a matter of debate. The families of victims murdered by a Chiquita-funded paramilitary group will receive around $1,300 per victim, while their lawyer, Paul Wolf, is set to earn over $4 million in fees from the settlement. This payout is significantly lower than a recent verdict awarding millions per plaintiff. Colombian President Gustavo Petro criticized the settlement, arguing that it devalues Colombian lives.The settlement, affecting about 2,500 victims' families, came after a landmark jury verdict awarded $38.3 million to 16 victims' families. Chiquita, accused of paying paramilitary groups to quell regional unrest, claimed these payments were made under duress, but the jury rejected this defense. Salvatore Mancuso, a former paramilitary leader, confirmed Chiquita's payments in an interview.The lowest award from the recent verdict was $2 million, much higher than the settlement amount, which must be shared among family members. Wolf will collect over $4 million from the settlement, whether or not his clients accept the deal.This settlement has sparked additional legal actions and court filings in Florida, where other lawyers aim to secure more funds for victims. Senior District Judge Kenneth A. Marra must decide if there will be a cap on payments to families. Chiquita argued that Colombian law limits damages to about $52,000 per victim, while other plaintiff lawyers disputed this, citing a Colombian court ruling against such caps.Wolf defended the settlement, stating it was better to secure something for his clients than risk getting nothing. The settlement agreement has complicated efforts to reach a global deal for all victims' families, but other plaintiffs' attorneys remain committed to pursuing more substantial compensation.‘Life of a Colombian' Insulted by Chiquita's $1,300 PayoutOn June 26, 2024, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of former Portage, Indiana mayor James Snyder, overturning his federal corruption conviction for accepting $13,000 from a truck company awarded city contracts. The 6-3 decision, authored by Justice Brett Kavanaugh, determined that federal law does not criminalize state and local officials accepting gratuities, such as gift cards or lunches, given as tokens of appreciation after official acts. The ruling, supported by the court's conservative justices and opposed by the liberal justices, emphasized that regulating such gratuities should be left to state and local governments, not federal prosecutors.Snyder was initially convicted and sentenced to nearly two years in prison for soliciting a payment in connection with government contracts, which he claimed was a consulting fee. The Chicago-based 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals had upheld his conviction, leading to his appeal to the Supreme Court. In dissent, Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson argued that the decision weakens federal efforts to combat public corruption and leaves the prosecution of serious corrupt practices in doubt.This ruling follows the court's trend of narrowing the scope of federal corruption laws, similar to its decision last year to overturn the bribery conviction of an ex-aide to former New York Governor Andrew Cuomo.US Supreme Court narrows reach of federal corruption law | ReutersThe National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has sanctioned Boeing for releasing confidential details about the ongoing investigation into a 737 MAX mid-air emergency. Boeing is accused of violating investigative regulations by disclosing non-public information and speculating on potential causes of the January 5 Alaska Airlines door plug blowout during a media briefing. As a result, Boeing will retain its status as a party to the investigation but will lose access to information produced during the probe and will not be allowed to ask questions at the upcoming investigative hearing in August.The NTSB's action has heightened tensions between Boeing and government agencies, especially as the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) considers criminal charges against Boeing for violating a 2021 settlement agreement related to previous 737 MAX crashes. The NTSB will coordinate with the DOJ's Fraud Division regarding Boeing's unauthorized information releases.In February, the NTSB noted the door panel in the Alaska Airlines incident was missing four key bolts. The unauthorized release revealed that Boeing provided unverified information and opinions to the media, which the NTSB had not approved. This incident adds to a series of conflicts between Boeing and the NTSB, including a recent delay in providing employee names involved in the 737 MAX door team, and criticism of Boeing's portrayal of the investigation.The NTSB emphasized that its investigation aims to determine the probable cause of the accident rather than assign individual blame. This latest sanction underscores ongoing scrutiny and legal challenges facing Boeing as it navigates compliance and safety issues.NTSB sanctions Boeing over release of 737 MAX investigation details, flags to DOJ | Reuters This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.minimumcomp.com/subscribe

Roberto Diaz @RRomanen &@dieresis_u on X, reports about the break of international relations between Mexico and Ecuador, and the effect it had in the Latin American region and internal politics struggles in both countries.    #LatinAmerica #Mexico #Ecuador #LatinAmerican #Democracy #DanielNoboa #AMLO #America #Geopolitics   Recorded April 27th 2024.Duration 7:19    On the night of Friday, April 5th, the Mexican embassy in Quito was raided by the Ecuadorian police, after Mexico granted political asylum to former Ecuadorian vice-president Jorge Glas. This action by the Mexican embassy was made after the Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa declared Mexican ambassador Raquel Serur persona non-grata, Ecuador's government urged her to leave the country in the quickest time possible. The Mexican embassy was left under control of chief of mission Roberto Canseco, who was physically subdued by Ecuadorian police forces during the raid. Consequently, Mexican President Andrés Manuel Lopez Obrador ordered the formal rupture of relations with the South American nation.   In response to this event, several countries came out in support of Mexico and condemned President Noboa's actions, which openly violated the Vienna Convention, where diplomatic missions of any country are declared as extensions of the respective countries and are granted immunity from the host country laws. The list of supporting nations includes Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Cuba, Honduras, Panama, and Peru; the latter had already severed diplomatic relations with Mexico in 2023. Additionally, there was a formal rupture of diplomatic relations with Nicaragua and Venezuela. In the northern hemisphere, the United States and Canada also spoke out against the raid on the Mexican embassy, as did the European Union, the United Kingdom, Norway, and Russia.   What reason did President Noboa have for raiding the embassy? The protocol for international political asylum, as outlined in Article 3, states that the granting country cannot provide asylum to an individual who is being prosecuted for common crimes in the requesting country. —That would be the legal justification for the raid. —However, the same article states that the evaluation of charges against the asylum seeker is the exclusive responsibility of the granting state. Therefore, the raid could not be justified, and on April 11th, the Mexican government formally filed a lawsuit against the Ecuadorian government in the International Court of Justice.   Meanwhile, in Ecuador, the majority party in parliament, the RC party Citizen Revolution distanced itself from agreements with the ruling coalition regarding security matters, following the attacks by criminal gangs in Quito, where criminals seized a television station and the University of Quito. As a result, Noboa's government lost its majority in the National Assembly.   The arrest has sparked speculation on social media and among various analysts, suggesting that the event was used as a political maneuver to sway the outcome of the referendum held on Sunday, April 22nd. Voter turnout reached 73% of the population, with a 60% approval rating for security reforms; 9 out of the 11 reforms proposed. Reforms regarding arbitration and hourly hiring were rejected by the population.   In 2025, Ecuador will have a new electoral process, where President Daniel Noboa will seek his reelection. He was elected only to cover the remaining term of his predecessor Guillermo Lasso's, after Lasso dissolved the congress and called for extraordinary elections. In a movement called as “Muerte Cruzada”   In Mexico, on the other hand, Ecuador's blow against Mexican diplomacy was favorably received by the Mexican opposition, such as Senator Lilly Tellez from the PAN party, who posted a statement on X, expressing her standing on Ecuador's side. Also was opposed by Mexican politicians such as Gerardo Fernandez Noroña, who filed a complaint with the Attorney General's Office against Daniel Noboa for the crime of kidnapping.   President Lopez Obrador also stated in his daily press conference that no charges would be brought against Ecuador 's Minister of Government, Mónica Palencia, who holds Mexican nationality, for the crime of treason.   Although the economic impact is minimal for Ecuador and Mexico, the influx of thousands of Ecuadorians into Mexican territory paints a bleak picture for migrants who may not have access to consular representation or defense in Mexico until bilateral relations are restored once again, further complicating the passage of migrants through Mexican territory.

An American soldier is being held by Russian authorities on charges of criminal misconduct, Army officials confirmed Monday. The Associated Press cited U.S. officials who said the soldier, Staff Sgt. Gordon Black, 34, was stationed in South Korea and was in the process of returning home to Fort Cavazos in Texas. Instead, officials said Black, who is married, traveled to Russia to see a longtime girlfriend and was accused of theft. The officials spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss personnel details, according to The Associated Press. In a statement, Army spokeswoman Cynthia Smith said the service member was arrested on May 2 by Russian authorities in Vladivostok. She did not provide any information about the soldier's identity or reasons for being in Russia. “The Russian Federation notified the U.S. Department of State of the criminal detention in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,” she said. “The Army notified his family and the U.S. Department of State is providing appropriate consular support to the soldier in Russia.” The Associated Press reported the Russian woman had lived in South Korea, and last fall she and Black got into some type of domestic dispute or altercation, according to officials. After that, she left South Korea. It isn't clear if she was forced to leave or what, if any, role Korean authorities had in the matter.You can find every episode of this show on Apple Podcasts, Spotify or YouTube. Prime Members can listen ad-free on Amazon Music. For more, visit barstool.link/ZeroBlog30

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This week we talk about diplomatic immunity, Trump's court cases, and the Supreme Court.We also discuss Nixon, Clinton, and the US Constitution.Recommended Book: My upcoming book, How To Turn 39 (https://books2read.com/htt39), which is available for pre-order today :)TranscriptThere's a concept in international law—diplomatic immunity—that says, in essence, certain government officials should be immune from the laws of foreign countries, including those within which they're operating.This is a very old concept, based on similar rights that were granted to envoys and messengers back in the oldest documented periods of human civilizations.The idea is that if different cultures, whether organized into tribes or kingdoms or nation states, are going to be able to deal with each other, they need to maintain open and reliable means of communication. Thus, the folks tasked with carrying messages between leaders of these different groups would need to be fairly confident that they wouldn't be hassled or attacked or prosecuted by the people they were bringing those messages to, and whose messages they were bringing back to their own leaders.Such representatives have at times been imprisoned or killed by their hosts, but this is relatively rare, because any governing body that treated ambassadors from other cultures in this way would have trouble dealing with anyone outside their current legal sway, and that would in turn mean less trade, less reliable peace, and less opportunity to generally cross-pollinate with cultures they might benefit from cross-pollinating with.As a general rule, at least in the modern iteration of diplomatic immunity, folks operating under the auspices of this policy can still be punished for their misdeeds, it's just that they'll generally be declared persona non grata, expelled from the country where they did something wrong, rather than punished under that country's laws.In some rare instances a country hosting a misbehaving or criminal ambassador or other diplomat might ask that person's home country to waive their immunity, basically saying, look, this person killed someone or got drunk and drove recklessly through our capitol city's downtown, we'd like to try them in our courts, and it may be that the government running that misbehaving person's home country says, okay, yeah, that's messed up, you go ahead; but usually—even if that person has done something truly reprehensible—they'll instead say, no, sorry, we'll pull them back and they won't be allowed to return to your country or serve as an ambassador anywhere else, because they've shown themselves to be unreliable, and we might even try them in a court here, in their home country, but we can't allow our people, no matter what they do, to fall under the legal jurisdiction of some other nation, because that would set a bad precedent, and it may make people wary of working for us in this capacity in the future—surely you understand.There are tiers of diplomatic immunity, depending on the seniority of the diplomat or other representative in question, and the Congress of Vienna of the early 1800s charted out the basis for how these things work, in much detail, formalizing a lot of what was already in the ether back then, and creating an outline that was then further formalized in 1961's Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which has been almost universally ratified and respected, though of course there's been a lot of grey area in terms of what harassment of a representative, which is a no-no according to this convention, entails, and to what degree it can be proven, and thus punished, if violated.We saw a lot of grey area utility during the height of the Cold War in particular, in part because many diplomats were moonlighting as spies, which is still true today, though it was even more overt and worrisome to their host countries, back then, so harassment, kidnappings, even assassinations of diplomats were more common then, than today, though they were still almost universally done covertly so that no one seemed to be violating these nearly universally accepted terms.What I'd like to talk about today is another type of legal immunity—in this case, Presidential Immunity in the US—and why this type of immunity is at the center of former US President Trump's ongoing legal cases.—In the United States, many politicians and high-level appointees enjoy some of the immunity-related privileges in their own country that diplomats of various stripes have traditionally enjoyed elsewhere.Most of these figures are only protected by this immunity under very specific circumstances, though, not universally.Judges, while doing court-related, judge-work, for instance, have absolute civil immunity—so a judge who falls afoul of the law in the course of their duty as a judge, doing judge-things, will tend to get away with whatever it is they did wrong, though this won't generally apply to non-judge things they do during that same periodSo a judge would have trouble arguing that they should get off with a warning for murdering someone because they happened to kill that person while they were on their lunch break, but they would likely be okay if they accidentally ruled in a way that exceeded their jurisdiction, even if their having done so caused all sorts of secondary problems.Similarly, and also within the US court system, a prosecutor can't be sued for withholding evidence, even if their having done so leads to a wrongful conviction, which would be a bad thing that happened as a result of their actions, but because they acted while performing their protected duty, they'll almost certainly be okay from a legal standpoint, even if not always a moral one.These are not rules novel to the US system of governance; most of them were borrowed from earlier forms of the same, and a lot of the US's version of these immunity rules are derived from those that exist within the British parliamentary system, where parliamentarians can't be prosecuted for things they say while in Parliament, and the same is true for politicians while engaged in their work on the floor of the US House of Senate.Interestingly though, while the US Constitution provides that kind of legislative immunity to Congresspeople, it doesn't grant the same, or anything similar, to the President; and this was apparently a hotly debated topic back in the Constitution-writing days, as those who set up the rules of the land were aware that it might be beneficial to allow folks at the top some legal leeway, so they don't make executive decisions based on whether or not they might be sued or otherwise punished for those decisions, but at the same time they really didn't want another king, or similarly authoritarian ruler to step into office and then get away with murder—perhaps literally.So the constitution doesn't give the President of the United States the same immunity as other members of government, but a slew of cases in the 19th and 20th centuries found, in general, that if the president or members of the president's cabinet take actions that are "more or less" within the scope of their duties, they should be granted absolute immunity, protecting them from lawsuits and legal punishments.A court case against President Nixon in the 1970s made that previously somewhat vague and general legal trend more formal, at first triggering a bunch of lawsuits against him and his people, but then a 1982 Supreme Court decisions said, in essence, that former or current presidents are immune from lawsuits related to anything that falls within the "outer perimeter" of their duties, due to the president's "unique status under the Constitution."This legal precedent was tested in the mid-1990s when then-President Bill Clinton was sued for sexual harassment during his governor of Arkansas days, and a lower court, then the Supreme Court, both affirmed that presidential immunity doesn't protect the president from things they did before taking that highest government office.As a result of all that, today we have a legal context in which the President is kind of granted some immunity for some things they do while in office, but the delineation between protected and not-protected is fuzzy, and there's a whole lot of theory on this matter, but less in the way of actual court precedent that establishes confident footing for anyone stepping into this corner of the legal world.All of which is newly relevant in 2024 because former President Trump is currently being prosecuted for all sorts of things in several different jurisdictions. And part of his legal strategy is based on a sort of Hail Mary play that's made its way to the Supreme Court, and which is premised on the concept of Presidential Immunity.But before we get to that case, let's talk real quick about the other cases that are currently in progress, all of which that bigger Supreme Court case may influence, depending on how it turns out.Beginning this week, as of the day this episode goes live, the week of April 15, 2024, Trump is scheduled to be in court four days a week for the next six to eight weeks, facing 34 criminal charges related to falsifying business records in order to get payoff money to Stormy Daniels, allegedly to cover up an affair they had, which he didn't want becoming public while he was running for his first term in office.Tentatively beginning in late-May of 2024, Trump will face 40 criminal charges in Florida for allegedly mishandling sensitive documents, and his alleged conspiracy to keep those documents even after the government demanded them back.A federal case in which Trump faces four criminal charges related to his alleged effort to overturn the 2020 presidential election results was originally meant to begin the first half of this year, but it's looking increasingly likely it won't occur until after the November presidential election, as the judge overseeing the case has postponed it until after the Supreme Court makes their decision about presidential immunity, though there's a chance it could start as early as August, despite that delay.And Trump faces 10 criminal charges for the same general collection of alleged efforts to overturn the 2020 election in Georgia, alongside 18 alleged co-conspirators; that trial has a proposed start date of August 5, but that would be tricky, as it would mean the trial could run through Election Day, which would be awkward and would likely complicate things further.Trump has also dealt with a flurry of recent civil, so non-criminal, no jail time possible, just fines, lawsuits, including one related to sexual assault and his defamation of the person he sexually assaulted, which led to a big payout recently, and another in New York related to his misrepresentation of the value of his real estate holdings in the state, which led to an even bigger fine, but which is currently being appealed.There's another federal civil case that's ongoing, Thompson v. Trump, which is related to the attack on the US Capitol by Trump's fans on January 6, 2021, and that's especially relevant here because, already, the judge in that case, ruled that Trump's presidential immunity does not shield him from this lawsuit, and an appeals judge ruled the same.There's now a Supreme Court case, which I mentioned earlier, that consolidates three separate civil lawsuits into one, Trump v. United States, and this case asks, in essence, whether Trump should be protected from these lawsuits by presidential immunity; that same immunity that was upheld in many cases in recent memory, though in different contexts.The reason this Supreme Court case is so fundamental here is that it could impact many or all of those other cases, plus others that might arise related to Trump's actions in the future, as it would give him a sort of legal whammy on just about anything he could argue was done within the perview of his role as President.Thus, he could argue he wasn't trying to overturn the 2020 election that he lost, he was looking into what he considered to be legitimate election irregularities as part of his duty as President. And if some other things happened as a result of that effort, like his supporters breaking into the Capitol building, he should be protected from that under the auspices of this immunity.Those two DC court judges that earlier ruled Trump wasn't protected by presidential immunity said that it's in the public interest to hold presidents accountable for their actions, because not doing so would leave anyone who holds that office "unbounded authority to commit crimes."They determined that it was worth the possibility that a president might make some executive decisions from a perspective of worrying about later lawsuits if it would prevent the creation of a political office from which someone could legally get away with any crime they chose to commit, including but not limited to, theoretically at least, assassinating their political rivals.The big question now is how the Supreme Court will decide on this matter; some people are predicting that the heavily slanted toward conservative justices court will be more likely to find in Trump's favor, though they've defied those expectations several times in recent years, in some cases seeming to take advantage of their current 5 or 6, depending on how you measure, versus 3, conservative to liberal composition in order to get a bunch of Republican priorities accomplished, like overturning Roe v. Wade, which protected the right to an abortion at the federal level, but in other cases they've made what seem to be more objective rulings, defying assumptions made based on those ideological leanings—so there's no way to know one way or the other on this, right now. We'll likely find out, though, sometime in May or June, as the court will begin considering these claims on April 25 of this year, and it's expected they'll have their ruling sometime in those subsequent two months.Until then, though, some of these other cases are a bit up in the air, as the granting of enhanced immunity could make Trump's current and potential future cases a slam-dunk for his defense team, while a ruling in favor of the contemporary, fuzzy standard, or one that weakens that standard, at least for his specific context, would deny him that potentiality.That said, Trump's defense team seems to have also been making use of the abundant delay tactics that are available within the US justice system, and there's a chance that if he delays long enough and then wins another term as president in November, that would allow him, when he steps back into office early next year, to either pardon himself or order someone in his government to get rid of the charges against him.Which is part of why the prosecutors working opposite him have been politely but firmly asking the judges in charge of these cases to pick up the pace, because there's a looming possibility that even if the courts decide against Trump in some key cases, he could still get off Scott free, because of that other apparent loophole in the system that would allow a sitting President to get away with just about anything, though in this case because of a different, in practice immunity-granting mechanism.Show Noteshttps://www.washingtonpost.com/news/opinions/wp/2014/01/30/7th-circuit-pokes-a-hole-in-prosecutorial-immunity/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trial_of_Donald_Trumphttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indictments_against_Donald_Trumphttps://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/us/trump-investigations-charges-indictments.htmlhttps://www.nytimes.com/article/trump-investigations-civil-criminal.htmlhttps://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/trumps-2024-trials-where-they-stand-and-what-to-expecthttps://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/interactive/2023/trump-investigations-indictments/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-68577638https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-61084161https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2024/03/donald-trump-legal-cases-charges/675531/https://archive.ph/JFsIBhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indictments_against_Donald_Trumphttps://apnews.com/article/trump-jury-selection-hush-money-trial-manhattan-56d540406cd174ab143fe12469e9adefhttps://apnews.com/article/donald-trump-michael-cohen-stormy-daniels-e40532d3bce7768e296fdaf9591ef05bhttps://www.wsj.com/us-news/law/trump-criminal-hush-money-trial-begins-2a1bdd15https://www.reuters.com/world/us/fallout-trumps-bid-overturn-election-loss-heads-supreme-court-2024-04-14/https://www.reuters.com/legal/special-counsel-urges-us-supreme-court-reject-trump-immunity-bid-2024-04-09/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trump_v._United_States_(2024)https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Presidential_immunity_in_the_United_Stateshttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Absolute_immunityhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parliamentary_immunityhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diplomatic_immunityhttps://www.britannica.com/topic/diplomatic-immunityhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vienna_Convention_on_Diplomatic_Relations This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit letsknowthings.substack.com/subscribe

Ralph welcomes Columbia University Professor Jeffrey Sachs to discuss what's motivating anti-Palestinian extremism in Israel, how the U.S. has been complicit in Israel's theft of Palestinian territory and genocide against the Palestinian people, and what the United Nations can do to help achieve a lasting peace. Plus, we share Ralph's recent column: "Israeli Leaders' Objective All Along Has Been the Expulsion of Occupied Palestinians and Seizure of Their Remaining Land."Jeffrrey Sachs is the Director of the Center for Sustainable Development at Columbia University, where he holds the rank of University Professor (the university's highest academic rank) and he served as Director of the Earth Institute at Columbia University from 2002 to 2016. Mr. Sachs has also served in numerous positions at the United Nations, including as President of the UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network.The reason that diplomacy is not happening is perfectly obvious. Which is that the core of this government does not want diplomacy, even if it were to deliver security. Their aim is not security through diplomacy. Their aim is “Greater Israel.”Jeffrey SachsI have lived through…watching the U.S. government abandon so many projects, from Southeast Asia through the Americas—these have been terrible projects often—but the U.S. loses interest, it moves on. And Israel needs to actually live in its neighborhood if it's going to survive. And counting on military might to do that is a profound mistake. It's eating away at its own fundamental capacity to act as a society—the idea that you can stand alone in the world community and have no one support you. This is a huge mistake. So I've tried to say to my counterparts in Israel…that this path is not only wrong and immoral, but doomed to fail as well.Jeffrey SachsThe Palestinians have one of the highest literacy rates—97 % — in the world. Under dire conditions, they have accomplished farmers, physicians, scientists, engineers, poets, musicians, novelists, artists, and a deep entrepreneurial tradition carried on by the Palestinian diaspora around the world. It is no accident that Israeli bombers directly target Palestinian cultural and educational institutions in their recurrent assaults on Gaza. Israeli militarists have to degrade all Palestinians… to expel them from their ancestral lands.Ralph NaderIn Case You Haven't Heard with Francesco DeSantisNews 4/10/241. An unsettling story in Business Insider recounts how the Israeli military uses an AI system – chillingly called “Where's Daddy?” – to track Hamas militants to their homes. As one IDF officer put it, “We[‘re] not interested in killing [Hamas] operatives only when they…[are] engaged in a military activity…On the contrary, the IDF bomb[s] them in homes without hesitation, as a first option. It's much easier to bomb a family's home.” This policy of bombing family homes “as a first option” is a major factor in why so many Palestinian families have lost unimaginable numbers of relatives in Israeli strikes. IDF officers added “human input in the target identification process…[is] essentially [to] ‘rubber stamp' the machine's picks after little more than ‘20 seconds' of consideration — which was largely to double-check the target is male.”2. As we know from the recent polling on the issue, only 22.5% of Democrats now support military aid to Israel, while 83% want a permanent ceasefire. More surprising is that only 41% of Republicans want  the U.S. to send military aid to Israel, and 58% want a permanent ceasefire. This poll is now joined by a similar poll from the United Kingdom, showing 56% of the British public – including 74% of Labour Party voters – support their government refusing to sell more weapons to Israel, with only 17% in support of continuing such sales. Pressing on this issue, progressive members of Congress Mark Pocan and Jan Schakowsky have penned a letter to President Biden and Secretary of State Blinken “strongly urg[ing them]…to reconsider [their] recent decision to authorize the transfer of a new arms package to Israel and to withhold this and any future offensive arms transfers until a full investigation into the [World Central Kitchen] airstrike is completed…to continue withholding these transfers until those responsible are held accountable [under U.S. or international law and]…to withhold these transfers if Israel fails to sufficiently mitigate harm to innocent civilians in Gaza, including aid workers, and if it fails to facilitate – or arbitrarily denies or restricts – the transport and delivery of humanitarian aid into Gaza.” This letter was signed by 37 additional Democratic members of Congress – mostly the typical progressives, though with one extremely notable addition: Nancy Pelosi, signifying how mainstream this position has become.3. In yet another sign of the shifting political winds, Delaware Senator Chris Coons – a consummate moderate and perhaps President Biden's closest ally in the Senate – has come out in favor of conditioning military aid to Israel, Axios reports. Coons added “I've never said that before, I've never been here before.”4. Yet even as the Democratic Party shifts., Biden has continued his blind support for Israel – resulting in continued success for the “Uncommitted” electoral protest movement. In Wisconsin, the “uninstructed delegation” option won nearly 50,000 votes statewide – over 8% of the vote – and over 30% of votes in the precincts representing the University of Wisconsin-Madison. And it hasn't stopped with Wisconsin. In Connecticut, “uncommitted” won over 11%; in New York, blank ballots accounted for 12%; and in Rhode Island, “uncommitted” won a whopping 14.5% of primary voters statewide. John Nichols at the Nation tabulates that as of now, over half a million Democratic primary voters have given Biden a clear message: “Save Gaza!”5. The controversy surrounding Oscar-winning Zone of Interest Director Jonathan Glazer's acceptance speech continues to drag on. This week, over 150 major Jewish creatives signed an open letter supporting Glazer, per Variety. These signatories include many household names, such as Joaquin Phoenix, Elliott Gould, Joel Coen, David Cross, Amy Berg, Boots Reilly, Hari Nef, Ilana Glzazer, Wallace Shawn, and many, many more. This letter states “We are Jewish artists, filmmakers, writers and creative professionals who support Jonathan Glazer's statement from the 2024 Oscars. We were alarmed to see some of our colleagues in the industry mischaracterize and denounce his remarks…Their attacks on Glazer are a dangerous distraction from Israel's escalating military campaign which has already killed over 32,000 Palestinians in Gaza and brought hundreds of thousands to the brink of starvation. We grieve for all those who have been killed in Palestine and Israel over too many decades...We honor the Holocaust by saying: Never again for anyone.”6. In some positive news, the National Labor Relations Board reports union election petitions are up 35% in the first half of Fiscal Year 2024, with unfair labor practice charges up 7%. The NLRB is quick to note that this increased caseload coincides with a long-term funding crunch that has seen their offices shrink by 50% over the past 20 years. NLRB General Counsel Jennifer Abruzzo writes “Congress needs to fully fund the NLRB to effectively and efficiently comply with our Congressional mandate when providing quality service to the public in conducting hearings and elections, investigating charges, settling and litigating meritorious cases, and obtaining full and prompt remedies for workers whose rights are violated.”7. In Ecuador, a diplomatic crisis is unfolding with Mexico after Ecuadorian forces stormed the Mexican embassy to arrest former Ecuadorian Vice President Jorge Glas, who had sought – and been granted – asylum at the Mexican embassy. Mexican President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, or AMLO, decried this as a “flagrant violation of international law and the sovereignty of Mexico.”  CNN reports this provocation prompted AMLO to suspend diplomatic relations with Ecuador and pursue a case against Ecuador at the International Court of Justice. For its part, the U.S. State Department issued a statement saying “The United States condemns any violation of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, and takes very seriously the obligation of host countries under international law to respect the inviolability of diplomatic missions.”8. NBC4 Washington is out with a blockbuster report on gun running within the D.C. Metro police department. Put simply, “For at least seven months in 2020 and 2021, the D.C. area's largest police department was…the only place D.C. residents could legally get a handgun.” Incredible as that may seem, that much was already public knowledge. Now, federal documents have been uncovered showing that a remarkable number of these guns ended up at crime scenes. In fact, “So many guns [were] recovered at crime scenes, in such a brief period, that the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives placed D.C. police into a program designed to give extra scrutiny to dealers with higher levels of so-called crime guns.” In other words, D.C. cops, far from getting guns off the street, were in fact releasing so many guns on to the street that federal firearms regulators had to step in. So much for police improving safety.9. According to CNBC, “Brazilian Supreme Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes initiated an investigation into tech magnate Elon Musk on Sunday…concern[ing] possible obstruction of justice by Musk, who said over the weekend that he would defy the court's orders to restrict or suspend some popular accounts on its platform.” This comes as part of a larger investigation into “so-called digital militias, a term applied to people accused of spreading misinformation online to attack democratic institutions in Brazil.” While the list of accounts flagged by the Brazilian government is not public, Wired reports this list includes “the fugitive far-right influencer Allan dos Santos, a supporter of president Jair Bolsonaro. (Dos Santos fled the country in 2020 to avoid investigation for disseminating disinformation.)… [and] right-wing YouTuber Bruno Aiub, known as Monark, who has over 1 million followers on X and has argued that Brazil should recognize the Nazi party, and Brazilian billionaire and Bolsonaro-supporter Luciano Hang.”10.  Finally, you might have heard that Amazon is shutting down the “Just Walk Out” technology at its grocery stores. This technology supposedly relied on an entirely automated system of cameras and sensors to track what people picked up at the stores and charge that to their Amazon accounts. Yet, Gizmodo reports “Though it seemed completely automated, Just Walk Out relied on more than 1,000 people in India watching and labeling videos to ensure accurate checkouts. The cashiers were simply moved off-site, and they watched you as you shopped.” This genre of story has become all too common – companies trumpeting ‘automation' when in fact all they're doing is outsourcing with extra steps. Just another reminder to remain skeptical of claims by big corporations. Often flashy new tech is just a smokescreen for regular old labor exploitation.This has been Francesco DeSantis, with In Case You Haven't Heard. Get full access to Ralph Nader Radio Hour at www.ralphnaderradiohour.com/subscribe

Episode 1022 Courts in Arizona and Florida have both ended abortion rights in very different (but both terrible) ways this month. Did Arizona actually resurrect a 160-year law passed decades before it was even a state? And how weird can it get when you go full originalist on a law that is younger than most people in Florida? Before we get there, Matt opens by sharing his experience with the OJ Simpson trial at the age of 14 and how it shaped his understanding of US criminal law. We then make sure to pay appropriate respects to the violent domestic abuser who (do we even have to say "allegedly" anymore?) brutally murdered Nicole Brown and Ronald Goldman on June 12, 1994. Also, two different countries have committed extreme and unprecedented violations of international law involving embassies in the past week. How does the Vienna Convention protect diplomatic posts, and what actually happens when these international agreements are broken? The first of the Trump trials will finally begin in New York in one business day! How does jury selection even work in a case where everyone on the planet has an opinion about the defendant? 1) Planned Parenthood v Florida (4/1/24) 2) In Re: TW, 551 So. 2d 1186 (1989) 3) Planned Parenthood of AZ v. Mayes (4/9/24) 3) The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961) 4) Judge Merchan's letter to the parties in NY v. Trump outlining jury selection process If you'd like to support the show (and lose the ads!), please pledge at patreon.com/law!

Today, Jamil, Jess, Les, and Morgan discuss Ecuador's recent decision to send police officers into the Mexican Embassy in Quito to arrest former Ecuadorian Vice President Jorge Glas, who has been convicted on corruption and bribery charges. The raid has been with met international condemnation and Mexico has severed diplomatic ties with Ecuador.Why did Mexico grant political asylum to Jorge Glas? Are there any long-term implications for Ecuador's violation of the Vienna Convention? Was Ecuador in the right to raid the embassy? Check out the answers to these questions and more in this episode of Fault Lines.Check out the sources that helped shape our expert's discussion!https://www.eurasiareview.com/08042024-biden-administration-should-demand-ecuador-immediately-release-political-opponent-illegally-kidnapped-from-mexicos-embassy-oped/https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/07/world/americas/ecuador-mexico-embassy-noboa.htmlhttps://apnews.com/article/7276b35e8d5944e7b5ca280ab0390b26https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/04/07/ecuador-mexico-embassy-raid-glas-noboa-diplomacy/eb838672-f50c-11ee-9506-c8544e5c9d86_story.htmlhttps://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/04/05/mexico-ecuador-crisis-diplomatica/a9d8ba10-f3c9-11ee-a4c9-88e569a98b58_story.htmlhttps://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/apr/07/latin-american-governments-condemn-ecuador-after-police-raid-mexican-embassy Follow our experts on Twitter: @jamil_n_jaffer@NotTVJessJones@lestermunson@morganlroachLike what we're doing here? Be sure to rate, review, and subscribe. And don't forget to follow @masonnatsec on Twitter!We are also on YouTube, and watch today's episode here: https://youtu.be/zI8rRImFEy0 Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Canada has accused India of violating international law & Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations in its push for parity, which has resulted in withdrawal of 41 Canadian diplomats.

Top News of The Day: No violation of Vienna Convention in asking Canada to withdraw diplomats: India's counter, Mahua Moitra's lawyer recuses from defamation case after Delhi HC rap on Dehadrai 'coercion' bid, Expect overall delays in visa': Canada tells India after cutting down staff, Italian PM Georgia Meloni announces separation from long-time journalist partner, RRTS launch Updates: ‘New form of railways filling me with joy', says PM Modi

A spokesman for the Chinese Consulate General in San Francisco called the alleged ramming of the building Monday afternoon by a driver "extremely egregious".中国驻旧金山总领馆发言人称，10月9日下午不明身份人员驾车冲闯领事馆大楼的行为“极其恶劣”。A suspect crashed his blue Honda sedan into the consulate building and was shot by police, according to authorities and local news reports. The identity of the driver was not released.据总领馆和当地新闻报道，一名嫌疑犯驾驶一辆蓝色本田汽车闯入领事馆大楼，随后被警方枪击。驾驶人的身份尚未公布。A man covered in blood was taken away on a stretcher outside the consulate building and rushed into an ambulance, according to a witness surnamed Liu.一位姓刘的目击者说，一名浑身血迹的男子被抬上领事馆大楼外的担架，迅速送进了救护车。"The incident has posed a serious threat to the lives of the staff and the people at the scene, causing serious damage to the facilities and our property," the consulate spokesman said.领事馆发言人表示：“这起事件对工作人员及现场民众生命安全构成了严重威胁，对我馆设施与财产造成了严重破坏。”The San Francisco Standard, citing unnamed sources, said police shot the driver, believing that the person was armed. The Standard reported that the building was evacuated.旧金山标准报匿名消息称，警方认为驾驶人持有武器并将其枪击。标准报消息，大楼已完成疏散。"Our consulate strongly condemns this violent attack and reserves the right to hold those relevant to this incident accountable," the spokesman said. "Our consulate has made solemn request to the United States for truth to be quickly ascertained, and the US side handle the case seriously in accordance with the law.发言人表示，“我馆严厉谴责这起暴力袭击事件，保留追究事件相关责任的权利。我馆也已郑重要求美方尽快查明真相，并依法严处此案。”"We also urge the United States to take all necessary measures to ensure the safety of the San Francisco Consulate General of China and its premises, in line with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and the Sino-US Consular Treaty," he said.“同时，我方敦促美国依照《维也纳外交关系公约》《维也纳领事关系公约》及中美领事条约，采取一切必要措施确保中国驻旧金山总领馆及其场所设施的安全。”San Francisco police and fire crews rushed to the scene and shut down Geary Boulevard near Laguna Street for further investigation.旧金山警方及消防人员迅速赶到现场，封锁了吉尔里街及附近的拉古纳街以便进一步调查。The visa office at the consulate was open for business at the time of the incident, and security guards were present.目前，领事馆签证办公室正常开放，安保人员正常到岗。Chinese Consulate General in San Franciscon.中国驻旧金山总领馆Sino-US Consular Treatyn.中美领事条约

1. 1958 – The United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) is an office of the U.N. Secretariat that promotes and facilitates peaceful international cooperation in outer space. It is part of the UN that was established in the year 1945. If aliens actually visit the Earth, this will be the competent organization to deal with the same. Visionary approach of United Nations.   2. 1960 – Establishment of Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) by the Treaty of Montevideo. This treaty provided for new foreign investment rules and restrictions on operations of foreign firms in Latin American countries. It was later transformed into Latin American Integration Association. Currently, it has 13 member states.   3. 1967 – Establishment of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) initially as a security association since at that point of time, entire Southeast Asia was beset with conflicts. It is currently a political and economic union of 10 member states including Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines and Singapore.   4. 1967 – Signing of the Outer Space Treaty or the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. Currently, there are 113 parties to this convention. Key provisions of the Outer Space Treaty include prohibiting nuclear weapons in space; limiting the use of the Moon and all other celestial bodies to peaceful purposes; establishing that space shall be freely explored and used by all nations; and precluding any country from claiming sovereignty over outer space or any celestial body. 5. 1969 – Adoption of Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) that introduced the concept of ‘jus cogens' in International Law. VCLT is one of the most important treaties in International Law. Currently, there are 116 parties to this convention.   6. 1972 – United Nations Conference on the Human Environment at Stockholm, Sweden. The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) was created as a result of this conference. Around 122 countries attended it. Its success lies in the fact that in 1972, environmental governance was not seen as an international priority and still it was able to bring on board so many countries.   7. 1979 – Signing of the Moon Treaty or the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. Currently, 18 states are parties to the treaty. Its primary objective of is to provide the necessary legal principles for governing the behavior of states, international organizations, and individuals who explore celestial bodies other than Earth, as well as administration of the resources that exploration may yield.   8. 1985 – Establishment of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). It is a regional intergovernmental organization and geopolitical union of states in South Asia aiming to accelerate the process of economic and social development in its member states through increased intra-regional cooperation. Its member states are Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.   9. 1991 – Birth of Mercosur, a South American trade bloc established by the Treaty of Asunción. Mercosur's purpose is to promote free trade and the fluid movement of goods, people, and currency. Its members are Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. 10. 1995 – Birth of World Trade Organization (WTO) through the Marrakesh Agreement. It replaced the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that was established in 1948. It is an intergovernmental organization that regulates and facilitates international trade. Currently, it has 164 member states.   11. 1996 – Formation of Shanghai Five that later on succeeded as Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in the year 2001. It is a political, economic and security organization. Its member states are China, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. 12. 1998 – The International Criminal Court (ICC) is established under the Rome Statute, adopted by 120 States on 17 July 1998 during the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court in Rome and enters into force on 1 July 2002. 

We tackle the topic of delays in the justice system from a different angle. There is evidence that the problem is more than inadequate funding. John grants this may be true and, citing Canadian health care as an example, observes that fixing large government systems can take a very long time. Then we look beyond the Charter in the Jost case. Several rights violations are cited in this challenge to the invocation of the Emergency Act. Some are from documents other than the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, like international treaties and the 1960 Bill of Rights. How do these protect us?Michael Lesage in Canadian Lawyer, Mar 17, 2023: The Ontario Superior Court is attempting to hide poor performance behind a privacy excuseDepartment of Justice Canada, (modified) Jul 21, 2021: Video and Photo Gallery--Court delaysSupreme Court of Canada, Cases in Brief: R. v. K.G.K.Ontario Courts (PDF): Justice David Brown, Court of Appeal for Ontario, 14th Annual Straight From The Bench ConferenceCBC, Apr 12, 2016: Alberta's judge shortage at 'crisis' level but feds have no timeline for resolutionCanadian Senate, Aug 12, 2016: Delaying Justice is Denying Justice: Report SummaryToronto Sun, Jun 14, 2017: Justice delayed is justice deniedNoel Semple in Slaw, Dec 14, 2022: Justice Denied: Constitutional Remedies for Systemic DelayJustice Centre, Dec 1, 2022: Jost et al. v. CanadaThe Canadian Encyclopedia: Constitution Act, 1867 (passed 29 March 1867)Gov of Canada Justice Law: Canadian Bill of Rights (Assented to 1960-08-10)United Nations Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted Dec 16, 1966)United Nations Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner: International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted Dec 16, 1966)legal.un.org: Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969Theme Music "Carpay Diem" by Dave StevensSupport the show

Lecture summary: It is alleged that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) embodied the victory of Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice's preference to interpret treaties based on the “ordinary meaning of the words” over Sir Hersh Lauterpacht's view that one instead should seek to ascertain the treaty parties' “actual intentions.” But is that so? If, as VCLT Article 31(1) provides, the focus is to be on “the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose,” and if that “ordinary meaning” is not, as per Article 32, “ambiguous,” “obscure,” “manifestly absurd or unreasonable,” then why should resort to “Supplementary Means of Interpretation” be appropriate at all “in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31”? If, as many believe, the VCLT is hierarchical, shouldn't interpretation be complete when an “ordinary meaning” is established that is “unambiguous,” not “obscure,” and “neither manifestly absurd or unreasonable”? Did those preferring to determine the treaty parties “actual intentions” in fact sneak into the VLCT's text that provision for supplementary “confirmation” of a clear “ordinary meaning”? Is to that extent the VCLT in fact, as is said of treaties generally, “an agreement to disagree”? In reality, given the sequential submissions in international arbitrations, as well as before international courts and tribunals, each party, beginning with the Applicant's or Claimant's Memorial, followed by Respondent's Counter-Memorial, the Reply Memorial etc., from the start places before the adjudicator all of its arguments under Section 3. of the VCLT (Articles 31-33).The fact that Article 31's “General Rule Of Interpretation” and Article 32's “Supplementary Means Of Interpretation” are presented to the adjudicator as a unit, and not seriatim, has resulted in some arbitral tribunals not treating those two articles of the VCLT as being hierarchical, and instead applying what has become known as the “crucible approach,” i.e., stirring the two in the pot of deliberations as though they were a regulatory potpourri rather than distinct rules, the later to be applied only if the first did not produce an unchallengable “ordinary meaning.” Thus separate approaches to the VCLT have arisen that have raised the question posed by former ICJ President Schwebel: “May Preparatory Work Be Used to Correct Rather Than Confirm the ‘Clear' Meaning of a Treaty Provision?”Judge Charles N Brower's career has been divided between private law practice, first with White & Case LLP in New York City and Washington, D.C., since 2001 as an Arbitrator Member of Twenty Essex Chambers in London, and public service, first with the Office of The Legal Adviser of the U.S. Department of State (1969-73)(successively as Assistant Legal Adviser for European Affairs, Deputy Legal Adviser and Acting Legal Adviser), as Judge of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (1983-present), as sub-Cabinet rank Deputy Special Counsellor to the President of the United States dealing with the Iran-Contra affair (1987), as Judge ad hoc of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (1999-2002)(appointed by Bolivia), and the most -appointed of the only five Americans ever to be appointed Judge ad hoc of the International Court of Justice (2014-2022) (appointed by Colombia (1 case) and the United States (2 cases)).Judge Brower's book: 'Judging Iran: A Memoir of The Hague, The White House, and Life on the Front Line of International Justice' is available now to pre-order and will be released on 11 April 2023.

Lecture summary: It is alleged that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) embodied the victory of Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice’s preference to interpret treaties based on the “ordinary meaning of the words” over Sir Hersh Lauterpacht’s view that one instead should seek to ascertain the treaty parties’ “actual intentions.” But is that so? If, as VCLT Article 31(1) provides, the focus is to be on “the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose,” and if that “ordinary meaning” is not, as per Article 32, “ambiguous,” “obscure,” “manifestly absurd or unreasonable,” then why should resort to “Supplementary Means of Interpretation” be appropriate at all “in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31”? If, as many believe, the VCLT is hierarchical, shouldn’t interpretation be complete when an “ordinary meaning” is established that is “unambiguous,” not “obscure,” and “neither manifestly absurd or unreasonable”? Did those preferring to determine the treaty parties “actual intentions” in fact sneak into the VLCT’s text that provision for supplementary “confirmation” of a clear “ordinary meaning”? Is to that extent the VCLT in fact, as is said of treaties generally, “an agreement to disagree”? In reality, given the sequential submissions in international arbitrations, as well as before international courts and tribunals, each party, beginning with the Applicant’s or Claimant’s Memorial, followed by Respondent’s Counter-Memorial, the Reply Memorial etc., from the start places before the adjudicator all of its arguments under Section 3. of the VCLT (Articles 31-33). The fact that Article 31’s “General Rule Of Interpretation” and Article 32’s “Supplementary Means Of Interpretation” are presented to the adjudicator as a unit, and not seriatim, has resulted in some arbitral tribunals not treating those two articles of the VCLT as being hierarchical, and instead applying what has become known as the “crucible approach,” i.e., stirring the two in the pot of deliberations as though they were a regulatory potpourri rather than distinct rules, the later to be applied only if the first did not produce an unchallengable “ordinary meaning.” Thus separate approaches to the VCLT have arisen that have raised the question posed by former ICJ President Schwebel: “May Preparatory Work Be Used to Correct Rather Than Confirm the ‘Clear’ Meaning of a Treaty Provision?” Judge Charles N Brower’s career has been divided between private law practice, first with White & Case LLP in New York City and Washington, D.C., since 2001 as an Arbitrator Member of Twenty Essex Chambers in London, and public service, first with the Office of The Legal Adviser of the U.S. Department of State (1969-73)(successively as Assistant Legal Adviser for European Affairs, Deputy Legal Adviser and Acting Legal Adviser), as Judge of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (1983-present), as sub-Cabinet rank Deputy Special Counsellor to the President of the United States dealing with the Iran-Contra affair (1987), as Judge ad hoc of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (1999-2002)(appointed by Bolivia), and the most -appointed of the only five Americans ever to be appointed Judge ad hoc of the International Court of Justice (2014-2022) (appointed by Colombia (1 case) and the United States (2 cases)). Judge Brower's book: 'Judging Iran: A Memoir of The Hague, The White House, and Life on the Front Line of International Justice' is available now to pre-order and will be released on 11 April 2023.

California Democratic Governor Gavin Newsom handily won re-election and now has 4 more years to work towards his goal of achieving carbon neutrality in the state by 2045. Mr. Newsom and other Governors have billions of dollars in climate funding at their disposal that was allocated by the U.S. Congress this summer. These state governments will play a crucial role in helping cities, universities, and the private sector make the most of it.  Also, emissions of chemicals that tear holes in the protective atmospheric ozone layer have fallen dramatically, thanks to the Vienna Convention launched in 1985 and its related Montreal and Kigali protocols. NOAA recently reported that midlatitude atmospheric concentrations of ozone depleting chemicals have declined about 50% compared to peak historic levels. And wildlife populations have declined by nearly 70% since 1970 due to habitat loss, over harvest, and pollution. The climate crisis will put even more pressure on wildlife, but there are also signs of improvement and hope. -- Support for Living on Earth comes from maude. Get 15% off your first order using the code LIVINGEARTH. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

In this episode, we follow Napoleon's abdication, first exile in Elba, and his return to France during the Vienna Convention and a very unpopular Bourbon Restoration.

In the third episode of ‘Reckonings with Europe: Pasts and Present', James Lowry and Meredith Terretta take up the object of archives: how law conceptualizes the archives of states; the ‘displaced', ‘disputed' or ‘migrated' archives left when empires and states are reconstituted; and what state archives can and cannot tell us. Works mentioned, in order of mention: James Lowry (ed), https://www.routledge.com/Displaced-Archives/Lowry/p/book/9780367193072 (Displaced Archives) (Routledge, 2017)  James Lowry (ed), Disputed Archival Heritage (forthcoming), esp chapter by J J Ghaddar, ‘Provenance in Place: Crafting the Vienna Convention for Global Decolonization and Archival Repatriation'. Meredith Terretta, Claimants, Advocates and Disrupters in Africa's Internationally Supervised Territories (forthcoming; for a sense of work to date on anticolonial advocate lawyering see ‘Claiming Land, Claiming Rights in Africa's Internationally Supervised Territories' in Steven L.B. Jensen and Charles Walton (eds), Social Rights and the Politics of Obligation in History (CUP, 2022) 264-286 https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fdoi.org%2F10.1017%2F9781009008686.014&data=04%7C01%7Cmegan.donaldson%40ucl.ac.uk%7Cd08f48f47ab142e2558808da0b402901%7C1faf88fea9984c5b93c9210a11d9a5c2%7C0%7C0%7C637834667590835461%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&sdata=nVLmKsq92Zor4kI3%2Frm3ahXFbdeOuMpsYzrPYdmkGwQ%3D&reserved=0 (https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009008686.014); ‘http://muse.jhu.edu/article/680533 (Anti-Colonial Lawyering, Postwar Human Rights, and Decolonization across Imperial Boundaries in Africa)'. Canadian Journal of History 52(3), 448-478 (2017)). James Lowry, ‘Radical empathy, the imaginary and affect in (post)colonial records: how to break out of international stalemates on displaced archives'. Archival Science 19, 185–203 (2019). https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fdoi.org%2F10.1007%2Fs10502-019-09305-z&data=04%7C01%7Cmegan.donaldson%40ucl.ac.uk%7C80fc6a077ad14fe02f3408da0b3e44ab%7C1faf88fea9984c5b93c9210a11d9a5c2%7C0%7C0%7C637834659614052115%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&sdata=vvZ7GROQyACafWpAR8%2FqDcPR1mrUI2sEIQs0ngJf0ws%3D&reserved=0 (https://doi.org/10.1007/s10502-019-09305-z) (For concise background on the ‘migrated archives', see James Lowry & Mandy Banton / Association of Commonwealth Archivists and Records Managers https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Facarmblog.files.wordpress.com%2F2018%2F10%2Facarm-position-paper-migrated-archives-adopted-20171125.pdf&data=04%7C01%7Cmegan.donaldson%40ucl.ac.uk%7C80fc6a077ad14fe02f3408da0b3e44ab%7C1faf88fea9984c5b93c9210a11d9a5c2%7C0%7C0%7C637834659614052115%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&sdata=IdqALVM%2FFVL8RWEHfTiQgV7D74ep0H%2FojnGrD2FeH9Q%3D&reserved=0 (position paper)). Umut Özsu, ‘Determining New Selves: Mohammed Bedjaoui on Algeria, Western Sahara, and Post-Classical International Law' in Jochen von Bernstorff and Philipp Dann (eds), The Battle for International Law: South–North Perspectives on the Decolonization Era (OUP, 2019) https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780198849636.001.0001/oso-9780198849636-chapter-16 (DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198849636.003.0016). Stanley H Griffin (with Jeannette A Bastian & John A Aarons) (eds), https://litwinbooks.com/books/decolonizing-the-caribbean-record-an-archives-reader/ (Decolonizing the Caribbean Record: An Archives Reader) (Litwin, 2018) (and forthcoming work in Displaced Archives, above).  

Can Mr. Donald Trump be trialed as “Persona Non Grata”? Some stripped of their Executive Privileges and Diplomatic Immunity, From the American Government and denied American Citizenship; For no American President in Modern Day History has committed such crimes against humanity that it officiated World War III, under the Vienna Convention of 1961 on International Diplomatic Relations and Peace. The reason Mr. Trump is acting insane lately is he plans on pleading the 5th or insanity to escape a much deserved sentence. I urge no court to fall for it. A.I.I.A Eligibility: release thy Criminal Records. --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/taf-international-2019/message Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/taf-international-2019/support

Tensions between Turkey and many of its NATO allies ensued after ambassadors from 10 countries called for the release of Osman Kavala who has been jailed for his alleged role in the 2013 Gezi protests and the 2016 failed coup. Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan ordered the ambassadors to be expelled for interfering in the country's internal affairs in violation of article 41 of the Vienna Convention. The embassies involved have since reiterated their commitment to the protocol. Although tensions have defused, Ankara says it will not refrain from taking further action in defence of the country's sovereignty. Guests: Murat Aslan Researcher at SETA Klaus Jurgens Political Analyst

*) Several killed during violent military coup in Sudan Several people were killed during a violent military coup in Sudan while demanding the release of civilian leaders, including the prime minister. Hundreds were also injured as soldiers opened fire on citizens who took to the streets to try and stop the takeover. Sudan's top general declared a state of emergency and also dissolved the government. A move that sparked swift local outrage and international condemnation. *) ASEAN summit gets under way without Myanmar A summit of Southeast Asian leaders got underway without a Myanmar representative, after its junta leader was excluded for failure to follow a regional peace deal. Neither ASEAN's chair Brunei, nor the bloc's secretary-general made a mention of the no-show in opening remarks at the virtual meeting. The ASEAN summit on October 15 excluded the junta chief who ousted a civilian government in February this year. *) Joint statement by 10 Western countries avert crisis with Turkey A diplomatic crisis has been averted after the US and nine other Western countries, including France and Germany, backed down from their joint statement a week ago, demanding the release of a Turkish prisoner. Turkey's President Erdogan cautiously welcomed the move when the US Embassy in Ankara said "it maintains compliance with Article 41 of the Vienna Convention.” Erdogan warned that those who do not respect Turkey's sensitivities and its independence, cannot live in the country. *) Over a dozen worshippers shot dead in Nigeria mosque At least 18 worshippers have been killed by gunmen who attacked a mosque in northern Nigeria during early morning prayers. The attackers, believed to be ethnic Fulani nomadic herders, were able to escape. Nigerian police said the attack was linked to a conflict between villagers and Fulani herders. And finally… *) Japan's Princess gives up her royal title Japanese Princess Mako has given up her royal title by marrying her university sweetheart. The couple wed in a low-key ceremony in Tokyo, following years of controversy over their relationship. The couple are expected to move to the US in the coming weeks to start their new life.

In 2018 Jersey was approached to join the Vienna Convention for Road Traffic, and in 2019 work began to implement it.Since then, the Government has been working to bring in MOT-style ‘Periodic Technical Inspections' - this week, they announced that they will building the centre for the tests themselves, due for 2024.However, they are still making the decision about whether they will be running the centre themselves, or whether it will be privately run by a franchise, either off-island or on-island.With expressions of interest currently being sought, DVS Head, Gordon Forrest, discusses how the inspections will be carried out, why the decision was made not to hand tests over to the island's garage industry, and how they will be making sure not to take away from the industry's already small pool of mechanics.

#TheSoundOfMusic "I'm glad to go, I cannot tell a lie" Last week it was a sad one. Why? Many countries withdrew from different treaties and courts - important ones. Let's begin with Turkey. A Presidencial decree, from last Saturday, published that Turkey was leaving - ironically - the Istanbul Convention. Turkey is withdrawing from their own treaty? Kind of. The Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence, aka the Istanbul Convention because it was signed in 2011, in Istanbul, Turkey. In fact, Turkey was the first to ratify it. This is weird! It's like Austria leaving the Vienna Convention or France withdrawing from the Paris Agreement. Why is this a problem? For many reasons. Other cases: Turkey left the Istanbul Convention; Brazilian Steakhouse labor lawsuit; Japanese Court denied reactivating the Tokai second nuclear power plant; Spain legalised euthanasia; We like to keep you updated: - The EU and UK conflict with the Northern Ireland Protocol, - Uber London workers situation and - The Apache Tribe's situation update. Don't forget to submit your suggestions, questions and cases you would like us to talk further about. Just head to fariadeoliveira.com/news.

Lecture summary: The current (and intensely fought) dispute over the ICC's jurisdiction in Palestine raises some interesting doctrinal and theoretical issues in international law, such as how Palestine can be considered a State for purposes of the Rome Statute while having not attained full independence or external self-determination.Once one places the ICC properly within the broader universe of international legal order, and applies the treaty interpretation principles of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, objections to jurisdiction that seem at first glance powerful, such as that Palestine is not really a State, are revealed to be on quite shaky ground. Professor Robert Howse is the Lloyd C. Nelson Professor of International Law at NYU School of Law. Professor Howse received his B.A. in philosophy and political science with high distinction, as well as an LL.B., with honours, from the University of Toronto, where he was co-editor in chief of the Faculty of Law Review. He also holds an LL.M. from the Harvard Law School. He has been a visiting fellow at the London School of Economics and visiting professor at Harvard Law School, Tel Aviv University, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, the University of Paris 1 (Pantheon-Sorbonne), Tsinghua University, and Osgoode Hall Law School in Canada and taught in the Academy of European Law, European University Institute, Florence.

Lecture summary: The current (and intensely fought) dispute over the ICC's jurisdiction in Palestine raises some interesting doctrinal and theoretical issues in international law, such as how Palestine can be considered a State for purposes of the Rome Statute while having not attained full independence or external self-determination.Once one places the ICC properly within the broader universe of international legal order, and applies the treaty interpretation principles of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, objections to jurisdiction that seem at first glance powerful, such as that Palestine is not really a State, are revealed to be on quite shaky ground. Professor Robert Howse is the Lloyd C. Nelson Professor of International Law at NYU School of Law. Professor Howse received his B.A. in philosophy and political science with high distinction, as well as an LL.B., with honours, from the University of Toronto, where he was co-editor in chief of the Faculty of Law Review. He also holds an LL.M. from the Harvard Law School. He has been a visiting fellow at the London School of Economics and visiting professor at Harvard Law School, Tel Aviv University, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, the University of Paris 1 (Pantheon-Sorbonne), Tsinghua University, and Osgoode Hall Law School in Canada and taught in the Academy of European Law, European University Institute, Florence.

News Item #1 On 11th December, the International Court of Justice, will deliver its Judgment in the case concerning Immunities and Criminal Proceedings (Equatorial Guinea v. France). The case concerns the request of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea for the ICJ to hold that the French Republic, by entering a building used as the diplomatic mission of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea in Paris, by searching, attaching and confiscating the said building, its furnishings and other property, has acted in violation of its obligations under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. News Item #2 An expert panel of international and environmental lawyers has been assembled to work on a legal definition of the “international crime of ecocide, similar to definitions of the international crimes of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.” The panel, co-chaired by Professor Philippe Sands and Judge Florence Mumba was set up by the Stop Ecocide Foundation at the request of Swedish parliamentarians. News Item #3 Trial Chamber IX of the International Criminal Court (ICC) has postponed the delivery of the judgment in The Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen to 4 February 2021. The trial in this case opened on 6 December 2016. Dominic Ongwen is accused of 70 counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity allegedly committed in northern Uganda. News Item #4 The Grand chamber of the European Court of Human Rights has made a judgement in the case of Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson v. Iceland. The case concerned the applicant's allegation that the new Icelandic Court of Appeal (Landsréttur) which had upheld his conviction for road traffic offences was not “a tribunal established by law”, on account of irregularities in the appointment of one of the judges who heard his case. The Court held that there had been a violation of the right to a tribunal established by law. News Item #5 The American Society of International Law is now accepting applications for the Francis Lieber Prize which is awarded to the authors of publications that are considered outstanding in the field of law and armed conflict. The deadline for the application, including a letter or message of nomination, must be received by 10 January 2021.

In this episode we discuss how COVID-19 continues to drive market risk.There has been a pick-up in new Covid-19 cases across Europe - and with it, the prospect of another round of national lockdowns. This poses a major risk to markets, but it is not the only potential source of volatility. The Brexit deadline is looming, with just a few weeks to reach a Free Trade Agreement ahead of the European Council meeting. If an agreement is not forthcoming, it could lead to significant turmoil in financial and currency markets.Then there is the US election, which has been more contentious than most. Biden is still ahead in the polls, but Donald Trump has made it clear he won’t go quietly. History suggests that a disputed election may upset stockmarkets.[0.28] We’ve seen a pick up in new Covid-19 cases across Europe - and with it, the prospect of another round of national lockdowns. Is this a major risk to markets – and are there any other risks we should be thinking about?Yes, we see the risk of more lockdowns as the major risk to markets today, but we also see a number of other tail risks looming this autumnsome of these issues could include a no-deal Brexit, a disputed US election and a sell-off in technology stocks, each of which has the potential to put material downward pressure on equities (at home and abroad). [1.05] OK – let's look at some of those risks in more detail. The Brexit deadline is looming, what’s your reading of the situation?The UK has already left the EU, however, by effectively reopening-up the legislated Withdrawal Agreement, PM Boris Johnson has raised the possibility that the UK may not get even a very basic Free Trade Agreement on goods with the EU when the transition period expires at year endthe British government is changing the Withdrawal Agreement text on fears that in the event of no Free Trade Agreement, the EU could restrict trade between Great Britain and Northern Ireland and undermine the integrity of the UK the government is also concerned that the Northern Ireland Protocol (NIP) in the Withdrawal Agreement could potentially give the EU powers over UK state aid in perpetuity. The UK could make a case for reneging on some commitments made in the revised NIP in October 2019 around the government needing to play a larger role in helping the economy recover from the pandemiccertainly, article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties enables parties to discharge their legal obligations when there has been a “fundamental change in circumstances” since the treaty was signed.  [2.27] And they’re arguing that the Covid-19 outbreak is just this kind of ‘change in circumstances?Exactly, and certainly this has been the biggest economic shock in modern historynevertheless, the EU is unimpressed that the UK is willing to make changes to commitments made less than a year agoBoris Johnson has given the EU a deadline of 15 October to reach a Free Trade Agreement at the European Council meetingif an agreement is not forthcoming, it could lead to volatility in financial and currency markets. [2.59] OK, let’s turn to the US. There’s a lot of noise generated by the election, but what do you see as important? Since the coronavirus crisis hit the media headlines at the start of this year, Joe Biden’s strategy has been to make the November US election an effective referendum on President Trump’s handling of the pandemicin opinion polls President Trump’s job approval rating slipped from 47% at the start of April to a low of 41% at the end of July(1)as lockdown has ended it has steadily recovered to 45% currently(2)for comparison, job approval rating data from Gallup show that in June of an election year, previous incumbents, like George H.W. Bush in 1992 on 37%, Jimmy Carter on 32% in 1980 and Gerald Ford on 45% in 1976, all lost office after one term on such low stats(3)the exception was Harry Truman, who was re-elected in 1948on just 40%(4)it is possible that the race for the keys of the White House is influenced by whether a COVID-19 vaccine is approved for distribution ahead of the electionopinion polls could narrow further and potentially lead to a wafer-thin win for either Joe Biden or Donald Trumpconsidering the partisanship between Democrats and Republicans, a tight election result would be hotly disputed, as it was when Republican George Bush was initially shown to have beaten Democrat Al Gore on 7 November 2000 by a slender margin in Floridagiven the closeness of the result, the Democrats demanded recounts, the S&P 500 fell over 8% during this period of political uncertainty until the Supreme Court ordered recounting to stop after 34 days.(5) [4.46] So mail-in voting could be the big area of contention?Yes. Lingering concerns over COVID-19 are likely to boost voting by mail. This opens a whole can of risks, ranging from allegations of fraud, lost, uncounted or rejected ballots from voters unfamiliar to verification requirementsgiven the time it will take to count voting by mail, the election result may not be known on the daythe election is on 3 November, but the deadline for all states to certify voting results is 8 Decemberultimately, unless there is a clear win for either side, the result could be disputed and that could undermine financial markets performance.  [5.28] There’s finally been some sell-off among the big tech stocks. What do you believe is happening there?The so-called FAAMG (Facebook, Apple, Amazon, Microsoft and Google) basket of technology stocks have sold off in aggregate by 16% from peak to trough so far in September(6)the biggest correction seen since the market downturn in Marchinvestors may be simply taking profits after such a strong run or getting apprehensive about increasingly demanding valuationsas the economy opens up again competitors will be able to recover at least some market share thus slowing FAAMG growth rates and reducing their relative attractivenessthe risk to equities is the size of the FAAMGs, which collectively account for around a quarter of S&P 500 market cap and around 8% of global GDP(7)a larger correction in the FAAMGs stocks could lead to a broader equity market correctionhowever, it is encouraging to see that the recent correction in the FAAMGs has had less of an impact on global equities in September than in late February and March. [6.37] What do you believe might happen if a vaccine is found and what is your outlook for markets?Even if an effective COVID-19 vaccine is found and used by the bulk of the population, related markets risks are likely to linger so we expect volatility to continuenonetheless, when viewed from a longer-term perspective, we believe the sheer scale of the unprecedented global financial stimulus and indeed hope of some medical progress against the virus leave sufficient room for some guarded optimismmoreover, the opening-up of the global economy is unleashing pent-up demandone example of where this is happening is in the important US residential sector, which reported its fastest pace of existing home sales in August for 14 years(8)confidence is returning to the US economy, as furloughed workers returns to jobs; the unemployment rate has now fallen to 8.4% currently from a peak of 14.7% back in April. This improving macro backdrop has broadened to the global economy and company earnings(9)the consensus now expects global forward Earnings Per Share growth of +15% expected over the next 12 months, a dramatic improvement from -2% just 6 months ago. As such, we see this fundamental pick-up in company earnings to support equity prices and so, we remain positive.(10)References:1-4 Real Clear Politics, data as at 24 September 20205, 8-10 Refinitiv Datastream6-7 Refinitiv Datastream, calculations by Smith & Williamson data as at 24 September 2020This episode was recorded on 30/09/2020Capital at risk. Please remember the value of investments and the income from them can fall as well as rise and investors may not receive back the original amount invested. Past performance is not a guide to future performance. This S&W The Pulse podcast is of a general nature and is not a substitute for professional advice. No responsibility can be accepted for the consequences of any action taken or refrained from as a result of what is said. The views expressed are not necessarily those of the presenter or of Smith & Williamson or any of its affiliates. No reproduction of this podcast may be made in whole or in part for professional or recreational purposes. No action should be taken based on this podcast and we accept no liability if we change your views on any of the subjects mentioned. Smith & Williamson Investment Management LLPAuthorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority. Registered No 580531 

I talk about my week, and Diplomatic Immunity. Enjoy! Hey, welcome to another podcast where I sit down from time to time with some of my family, friends, and other people I look up to or some people I don’t know. My name’s Rob Banks and welcome to Banks Heist.

Malgosia Fitzmaurice on The Legal Nature of Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties

With the beginning of early caucusing in Nevada and the formal caucuses days away, "campaign officials and Democratic activists are increasingly alarmed that they might prove a debacle as damaging as the vote in Iowa," the Washington Post reported Sunday. Politico reported that same day, "Anxiety is rising over the possibility of another tech-induced meltdown at the Nevada Democratic caucuses on Saturday." Folks, all I can say to this one is, really, come on.CBS News has jumped on the bandwagon and aired a story attacking Radio Sputnik. The print version of the story opens by saying, “As the FBI and other federal agencies look high and low for signs of Russian interference in the 2020 election, Russian propaganda is being transmitted on America's airwaves in Kansas City, Missouri.” Last week we discussed the New York Times piece entitled, "Playing on Kansas City Radio: Russian Propaganda," part of which states, "In January, Radio Sputnik, a propaganda arm of the Russian government, started broadcasting on three Kansas City-area radio stations during prime drive times. ... In the United States, talk radio on Sputnik covers the political spectrum from right to left, but the constant backbeat is that America is damaged goods." So, what are we to make of all of this?Four US peace activists - Adrienne Pine, David Paul, Margaret Flowers and Kevin Zeese, aka the Embassy Protectors - "were arrested on May 16 after staying in the Venezuelan embassy in Washington, DC, for 37 days to prevent it from being handed over to right-wing Venezuelan coup-leaders in violation of the Vienna Convention. ... The activists face federal charges punishable by up to a year in prison, a $100,000 fine each and restitution to the government for police time and damages," Popular Resistance reported in December. According to a Friday article in The Grayzone by Code Pink's Leonardo Flores, "The Trump administration's case against Venezuelan embassy protectors was severely biased, but ended up with a hung jury. The mistrial is a victory for sovereignty and democracy, and another failure in the coup attempt." How daunting of a reality is it when you are faced with going up against your own government in court, and you know that you are right?GUESTS:Dr. Clarence Lusane — African-American author, activist, lecturer and chair of the political science department at Howard University. Garland Nixon — Co-host of Fault Lines on Sputnik News Radio. Kevin Zeese — Co-editor for Popular Resistance.

It's Friday, so that means it's panel time.A Thursday New York Times piece that seeks to discredit Sputnik News states, "In January, Radio Sputnik, a propaganda arm of the Russian government, started broadcasting on three Kansas City-area radio stations during prime drive times … In the United States, talk radio on Sputnik covers the political spectrum from right to left, but the constant backbeat is that America is damaged goods." In addition, The Hill reported Thursday, "A group of House Democrats criticized the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) on Thursday for not taking action to curb Russian propaganda aired on U. radio stations, and urged the agency to take steps to remedy this ahead of the 2020 elections." These are Democrats, who are supposed to be the liberal side of the political aisle. We'll lay out the truth and the fallacies and point out the hidden message.Four US peace activists - Adrienne Pine, David Paul, Margaret Flowers and Kevin Zeese, aka the Embassy Protectors - "were arrested on May 16 after staying in the Venezuelan embassy in Washington, DC, for 37 days to prevent it from being handed over to right-wing Venezuelan coup-leaders in violation of the Vienna Convention. ... The activists face federal charges punishable by up to a year in prison, a $100,000 fine each and restitution to the government for police time and damages," Popular Resistance reported in December. They are on trial right now, but the proceedings are getting very little coverage. "On December 13, the chief judge of the US District Court for Washington, DC, Beryl A. Howell, denied discovery motions requested by the defendants," Popular Resistance noted. This means that "the jury will not be allowed to consider the contentious legality of the Trump administration's recognition of the leadership of the coup in Venezuela, and thus the legal basis of the charges the defenders are facing. ... The Embassy Protectors had permission from the internationally recognized, elected Venezuelan government to be in the embassy."The US Senate passed a resolution with a bipartisan vote Thursday limiting US President Donald Trump's ability to order future strikes against Iran without first seeking Congress' explicit approval. What does this mean going forward? The measure is being described as a pointed rebuke of the Trump administration's resistance to involving the legislature in foreign policy decisions. Many believe that the administration's inconsistent messages and irresponsible actions could lead to an all-out war. "Eight Republicans joined all Democrats in voting 55 to 45 for the measure from Sen. Tim Kaine (D-VA), which invokes the War Powers Act to block Trump from engaging in hostilities without consulting Congress except in cases where self-defense is required against a clear, imminent attack," the Washington Post reported Thursday.Iowa Democratic Party Chairman Troy Price resigned Wednesday after the state's Democratic presidential caucuses became embroiled in confusion last week. In his resignation letter, he said the following, "The fact is that Democrats deserved better than what happened on caucus night. As chair of this party, I am deeply sorry for what happened and bear the responsibility for any failures on behalf of the Iowa Democratic Party." Now that we know, based upon the reporting of Max Blumenthal at The Grayzone, about Shadow Inc., ACRONYM and hedge-fund billionaires like Seth Klarman, is Troy Price the scapegoat?GUESTS:Caleb Maupin — Journalist and political analyst who focuses his coverage on US foreign policy and the global system of monopoly capitalism and imperialism. Jim Kavanagh — Political analyst and commentator and editor of The Polemicist.Daniel Lazare — Journalist and author of three books: "The Frozen Republic," "The Velvet Coup" and "America's Undeclared War."Dr. Linwood Tauheed — Associate professor of economics at the University of Missouri-Kansas City.

Lecture summary: An analogy between States and international organizations has characterised the development of the law that applies to intergovernmental institutions on the international plane. That is best illustrated by the work of the International Law Commission on the treaties and responsibility of international organizations, where the Commission for the most part extended to organizations rules that had been originally devised for States in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and 2001 Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. The talk, based on a recently published research monograph, will reflect on the foundations of the assumption that the two main categories of international legal subjects are analogous for certain purposes, and discuss the elusive position that international organizations occupy in the international legal system. Dr Fernando Lusa Bordin is a University Lecturer in International Law at the University of Cambridge and is a Fellow of the Lauterpacht Centre.

Hosts Rania Khalek and Kevin Gosztola welcome journalist Max Blumenthal back to the "Unauthorized Disclosure" weekly podcast. Max is the editor of The Grayzone and co-host of the "Moderate Rebels" podcast. In the first part of the interview, Max recounts how he was arrested by D.C. police essentially out of the blue. He was shackled and in jail for around two days before he was arraigned. He faces a charge of "simple assault" stemming from a baseless allegation from around five months ago when the Venezuela embassy in D.C. besieged by Venezuela opposition supporters. Max talks about what unfolded in May of this year, as Code Pink and various other antiwar activists attempted to protect the embassy from being taken over by supporters of Juan Guaido, who mounted a coup attempt in Venezuela. He also describes the political cases that four embassy protectors face. They were arrested in a raid against a diplomatic building that violated the Vienna Convention. Later in the show, Max and Rania talk about the familiar faction of people who enjoy seeing them attacked for engaging in journalism. They mention their recent trip to Syria and dissect the culture among reporters, who work for establishment media.

Legally Speaking with Michael MulliganDiplomatic Immunity – The wife of a US diplomat killed a British teenager in a car accident but was able to avoid prosecution and leave the UK as a result of diplomatic immunity. Topics discussed include the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and how this is implemented in Canada.Other related issued include diplomats not having to pay parking tickets, how diplomats suspected of impaired driving are dealt with in Canada, and immunity from having to pay for parking in Victoria, BC for a list of people including vehicles bearing the flag or insignia of the Lieutenant Governor of British Columbia or the Senior Officer commanding the Canadian Armed Forces on Vancouver Island. Interestingly, as section 71 (11) of the City of Victoria Streets and Traffic Bylaw is drafted, the immunity from having to pay for parking doesn’t seem to be restricted to the actual Lieutenant Governor of British Columbia or the Senior Officer commanding the Canadian Armed Forces on Vancouver Island, but rather appears to apply to any vehicle bearing one of their flags or insignias. Also discussed is a recent agreement between the Government of BC, and the Association of Legal Aid Lawyers to modestly increase what legal aid lawyers are paid. The increase in pay is still much less than what the government pays lawyers doing prosecution, or other government work.While the Government of BC will still be diverting more than half the funds raised every year from a special tax that was intended to fund legal aid, the recognition of the Association of Legal Aid Lawyers as a bargaining agent for lawyers doing this work may result in future improvements for a long underfunded system. Legally Speaking is live on CFAX 1070 every Thursday at 10:30am. Follow this link for a transcript of the show.

On May 16, 2019, DC police stormed the Venezuelan embassy, arresting the last remaining members of the Embassy Protection Collective. The collective was charged by the Venezuelan government with ensuring the embassy’s safety after diplomatic relations between Venezuela and the United States broke down. Over the course of a month, Guaido’s most militant, right-wing supporters in DC besieged the embassy on behalf of his appointed so-called ambassador, Carlos Vecchio. Among the ranks were employees of the World Bank, the NATO-backed pro-regime change think tank Center for Strategic & International Studies, and weapons manufacturer Raytheon. The Guaido supporters shouted homophobic and racist insults at the Embassy Protection Collective, while threatening to kill and rape journalists and collective members. They stole food from peace activists, engaged in violence against those trying to deliver the food, flashed strobe lights into the Embassy, and blasted air horns inches from the ears of the collective. They attempted to break into the building on several occasions. During the siege, the police, Trump’s Secret Service, and later the U.S. Marshals intervened to give Guaido’s supporters the strategic advantage. When a month of siege warfare failed to break the collective’s resolve, the police illegally entered the building, violating key articles of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The excerpts you just heard were from the heavily protested press release by Guaido’s appointees, one day after the seizure of the embassy, as recorded by Anya Parampil of the Grayzone Project. They wasted no time in heartily thanking Donald Trump, the State Department, and the U.S. forces of regime change for their so-called victory. Because the Guaido puppet regime does not control any territory or government position in Venezuela, the embassy building under the control of Vecchio will not be able to fulfill any of the diplomatic functions that an embassy is tasked to carry out. This is a hollow victory for Guaido and Trump. The fallout from this violation of international law has consequences far beyond the U.S. war on Venezuela. It puts U.S. embassies across the world at risk of similar seizure if diplomatic relations were to break down.On this two-part episode of Empire Supernova, we speak with organizers who were on the ground during the siege of the embassy. First we hear from Claire Cook, an organizer with the ANSWER Coalition. Later, we speak with Kevin Zeese, a political activist and the co-director of Popular Resistance. Kevin was part of the collective that legally maintained the embassy from the beginning of the siege until the police raid on May 16. We talked to Claire only two days before the seizure of the Embassy, so the interview reflects the urgency of the situation. The process of resistance to this U.S. seizure exposed the farce that is the U.S. propping up of Guaido’s claim to the presidency of Venezuela.

Guest: Jeb Sprague. We discuss the hybrid war being waged on Venezuela with an end goal of regime change. We also talk about recent events at the Venezuelan embassy under siege in Washington and the Venezuelan opposition figures who operated outside to help with a seizure in violation of the Vienna Convention. Jeb Sprague lectures at the University of Virginia and formerly taught at the University of California, Santa Barbara. He is the author of Globalizing the Caribbean: Political Economy, Social Change, and the Transnational Capitalist Class (Temple University Press, 2019) and Paramilitarism and the Assault on Democracy in Haiti (Monthly Review Press, 2012). In addition, he has authored and co-authored a number of scholarly articles, and is the editor of Globalization and Transnational Capitalism in Asia and Oceania (Routledge, 2016). He is a founding member of the Network for Critical Studies of Global Capitalism (NCSGC) and has taught sociology in the Caribbean, East Asia, and North America. Find his articles at The Grayzone, MintPress News, The Canary and at his website jebsprague.blogspot.com. FOLLOW Jeb Sprague @JebSprague and find his writing at The Grayzone, MintPress News, The Canary and at his website jebsprague.blogspot.com. Visit him at Jeb Sprague CV. Around the Empire is listener supported, independent media. Pitch in if you can at Patreon: patreon.com/aroundtheempire or paypal.me/aroundtheempirepod. Website: aroundtheempire.com. SUBSCRIBE on YouTube. FOLLOW @aroundtheempire and @joanneleon. SUBSCRIBE/FOLLOW on iTunes, iHeart, Spotify, Google Play, Facebook or on your preferred podcast app. Recorded on May 21, 2019. Music by Fluorescent Grey. Reference Links: Who’s Behind the Pro-Guaidó Crowd Besieging Venezuela’s D.C. Embassy?, Jeb Sprague, Alex Rubinstein, Mint Press News Washington’s hybrid war on Venezuela – a very 21st-century attempt at regime change, Jeb Sprague, The Canary

For 37 days, from April 10 to May 16, activists calling themselves the Embassy Protection Collective stayed at the Venezuelan Embassy in Washington, DC 24/7 to prevent the United States from perpetuating its coup attempt and violating the Vienna Convention by turning the embassy over to the US-supported coup leader, Juan Guaido. The activists, including the show hosts, were there with the permission and support of the elected government of Venezuela. The United States government used everything it could to force the activists out, including cutting off access to food, electricity and water and surrounding the embassy with violent fascists. Adrienne Pine, a professor of anthropology who has studied the coup in Honduras and who was an Embassy Protector until the end, joins us to discuss what happened, what it was like and what comes next. Subscribe to Clearing the FOG on Patreon and receive our bonus show, Thinking it Through, plus Clearing the FOG totes, water bottles and T shirts. Visit Patreon.com/ClearingtheFOG. And visit the new Popular Resistance Podcast Network at www.PopularResistance.org/prpn/

On this episode of The Critical Hour, Dr. Wilmer Leon is joined by Ivan Eland, senior fellow at the Independent Institute and director of the institute's Center on Peace & Liberty; and Whitney Webb, staff writer at MintPress News.The Trump administration has been on high alert in response to what military and intelligence officials have deemed specific and credible threats from Iran against US personnel in the Middle East. But US President Donald Trump is frustrated with some of his top advisers, who he thinks could rush the United States into a military confrontation with Iran and shatter his long-standing pledge to withdraw from costly foreign wars, according to several US officials. Trump prefers a diplomatic approach to resolving tensions and wants to speak directly with Iran's leaders. All of this while my first guest warns that with the beat of Washington's war drums continuing to grow, particularly following the Monday reports of a government plan to send as many as 120,000 troops to counter Iran, the threat of an “accidental” provocation or a “false flag” is also becoming increasingly likely.Four activists who had been protesting in the Venezuelan Embassy in Washington, DC, for more than a month were arrested Thursday and forcibly removed from the building. Medea Benjamin, co-founder of anti-war organization Code Pink, told the Associated Press that police entered the building early in the morning to arrest the protestors. The US Secret Service confirmed officers had helped agents from State Department's Diplomatic Security Service execute arrest warrants against people inside the embassy: Kevin Zeese, Margaret Flowers, Adrienne Pine and David Paul.Carlos Ron, deputy foreign minister for Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro's government, tweeted Thursday that US officials entering the building “is an unlawful breach of the Vienna Convention,” an international treaty that created a legal framework for diplomacy between countries. All of this action is taking place in Washington, DC, while it is reported that the Venezuelan government and opposition are preparing to negotiate. After months of protests and a failed opposition attempt to overthrow Maduro, government and opposition representatives are meeting in Norway for talks, Venezuela's ambassador to the United Nations said Thursday. It was unclear whether the sides would meet directly to explore resolutions for the political crisis in the South American nation or if Norwegian officials would serve as intermediaries.US President Donald Trump announced a new immigration plan in a speech Thursday afternoon, the latest attempt by the administration to follow through on a campaign promise to overhaul America's immigration system. "We are proposing an immigration plan that puts the jobs, wages and safety of American workers first," Trump said. "Our proposal is pro-America, pro-immigrant and pro-worker. It's just common sense." What are we to make of the president's description?GUESTS:Carlos Castaneda — Attorney at Garcia & Garcia. Lilly Tajaddini — Iran Campaign coordinator for Code Pink.Ricardo Vaz — Writer and editor at Venezuelanalysis.com.Ivan Eland — Senior fellow at the Independent Institute and director of the Independent Institute's Center on Peace & Liberty.Whitney Webb — Staff Writer at MintPress News.

Tuesday, 30 April 2019 - 9.00am Location: Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, Finley Library All-day workshop: 09:00 - 17:00 hrs Conveners: Eyal Benvenisti, Harold Hongju Koh, and Tomohiro Mikanagi In 2019 three major treaty withdrawals will reach important watersheds. Sometime in spring, the United Kingdom is scheduled to withdraw from the European Union under the withdrawal notice it gave under Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon. On November 4, 2019, the United States (under the administration of Donald Trump) is set to give notice that it will withdraw from the Paris Climate Change Accord one year later. In November 2019 the dispute resolution mechanism of the WTO will terminate effectively unless the US agrees to re-appoint a judge of the Appellate Body. These events may be seen as signaling a decline in leading states’ commitment to multilateralism and a growing preference to bilateralism. The Trump administration has clearly asserted its preference for bilateral deals while dismissing international organisations as taking advantage of US generosity. China also seems to prefer alternative groupings outside existing multilateral organisations. In October 2007, during its ascent to global power, China declared FTAs to be its basic international economic strategy. America’s disengagement from multilateralism did not prompt China to fill the void by reinforcing existing multilateral bodies with global reach. Instead, its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its regional security arrangements are modelled on the “hub and spokes” pattern, an architecture that allows it to tightly control its numerous partners and limit the application of existing standards and mechanisms. Famously, it ignored the UNCLOS arbitral award on the South China Sea in 2016. Perhaps to confront the risk of two superpowers busy dividing and ruling the rest, other countries have sought to preserve the minilateral institutions (eg the CPTPP) and utilise existing multilateral mechanisms (WTO reforms, UNCLOS conciliation and arbitration, OPCW attribution mechanism, etc.). In this workshop we wish to address the uncertain future of multilateralism in light of the prospective withdrawals and resurgence of bilateralism. We wish to discuss motivations, prospects, and implications for domestic and international law. This one day workshop seeks to reflect on the questions. In particular we wish to address the following questions: Panel I: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord and Revising the WTO Since 2017, the Trump Administration has announced its withdrawal from a host of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, including the Paris Climate Agreement; the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or Iran Nuclear Deal); the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; the Global Compact on Migration; the U.N. Human Rights Council; the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Relations with Iran; the 1961 Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention for Diplomatic Relations on Dispute Settlement; the Universal Postal Union Treaty; and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is the Trump Administration aberrational, or are we witnessing the culmination of a long-term trend of U.S. withdrawal from multilateralist institutions? To what extent has the Trump Administration applied tactics first adopted by prior administrations: e.g., blocking reappointment of members of the WTO Appellate Body? What constraints do U.S. and international law place upon blanket unilateral presidential withdrawal from all disfavored organizations? Panel II: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding China’s “Hub and Spoke” Strategy This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is China accepting the existing multilateral legal rules and mechanisms in economic and non-economic areas? Is China deviating from international standards (including with respect to ISDS) in its various legal arrangements under BRI? Is China deviating from UNCLOS in the South China Sea, including through bilateral COC negotiation? Panel III: The Future of Rule-Based Global Governance through International Institutions: Limits and Potential What are the prospects for international institutions to reclaim multilateralism through concerted action, or through insistence on multilaterally binding norms? To what extent can the UN Security Council, the International Court of Justice, or other international organisations and tribunals can contribute to maintaining and developing further globally-binding norms? To what extent can international process enhance the rule-based global governance through the clarification of law and facts? The UK and the Changing Legal Landscape: The Way Forward from Here

Tuesday, 30 April 2019 - 9.00am Location: Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, Finley Library All-day workshop: 09:00 - 17:00 hrs Conveners: Eyal Benvenisti, Harold Hongju Koh, and Tomohiro Mikanagi In 2019 three major treaty withdrawals will reach important watersheds. Sometime in spring, the United Kingdom is scheduled to withdraw from the European Union under the withdrawal notice it gave under Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon. On November 4, 2019, the United States (under the administration of Donald Trump) is set to give notice that it will withdraw from the Paris Climate Change Accord one year later. In November 2019 the dispute resolution mechanism of the WTO will terminate effectively unless the US agrees to re-appoint a judge of the Appellate Body. These events may be seen as signaling a decline in leading states’ commitment to multilateralism and a growing preference to bilateralism. The Trump administration has clearly asserted its preference for bilateral deals while dismissing international organisations as taking advantage of US generosity. China also seems to prefer alternative groupings outside existing multilateral organisations. In October 2007, during its ascent to global power, China declared FTAs to be its basic international economic strategy. America’s disengagement from multilateralism did not prompt China to fill the void by reinforcing existing multilateral bodies with global reach. Instead, its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its regional security arrangements are modelled on the “hub and spokes” pattern, an architecture that allows it to tightly control its numerous partners and limit the application of existing standards and mechanisms. Famously, it ignored the UNCLOS arbitral award on the South China Sea in 2016. Perhaps to confront the risk of two superpowers busy dividing and ruling the rest, other countries have sought to preserve the minilateral institutions (eg the CPTPP) and utilise existing multilateral mechanisms (WTO reforms, UNCLOS conciliation and arbitration, OPCW attribution mechanism, etc.). In this workshop we wish to address the uncertain future of multilateralism in light of the prospective withdrawals and resurgence of bilateralism. We wish to discuss motivations, prospects, and implications for domestic and international law. This one day workshop seeks to reflect on the questions. In particular we wish to address the following questions: Panel I: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord and Revising the WTO Since 2017, the Trump Administration has announced its withdrawal from a host of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, including the Paris Climate Agreement; the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or Iran Nuclear Deal); the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; the Global Compact on Migration; the U.N. Human Rights Council; the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Relations with Iran; the 1961 Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention for Diplomatic Relations on Dispute Settlement; the Universal Postal Union Treaty; and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is the Trump Administration aberrational, or are we witnessing the culmination of a long-term trend of U.S. withdrawal from multilateralist institutions? To what extent has the Trump Administration applied tactics first adopted by prior administrations: e.g., blocking reappointment of members of the WTO Appellate Body? What constraints do U.S. and international law place upon blanket unilateral presidential withdrawal from all disfavored organizations? Panel II: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding China’s “Hub and Spoke” Strategy This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is China accepting the existing multilateral legal rules and mechanisms in economic and non-economic areas? Is China deviating from international standards (including with respect to ISDS) in its various legal arrangements under BRI? Is China deviating from UNCLOS in the South China Sea, including through bilateral COC negotiation? Panel III: The Future of Rule-Based Global Governance through International Institutions: Limits and Potential What are the prospects for international institutions to reclaim multilateralism through concerted action, or through insistence on multilaterally binding norms? To what extent can the UN Security Council, the International Court of Justice, or other international organisations and tribunals can contribute to maintaining and developing further globally-binding norms? To what extent can international process enhance the rule-based global governance through the clarification of law and facts? The UK and the Changing Legal Landscape: The Way Forward from Here

Tuesday, 30 April 2019 - 9.00am Location: Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, Finley Library All-day workshop: 09:00 - 17:00 hrs Conveners: Eyal Benvenisti, Harold Hongju Koh, and Tomohiro Mikanagi In 2019 three major treaty withdrawals will reach important watersheds. Sometime in spring, the United Kingdom is scheduled to withdraw from the European Union under the withdrawal notice it gave under Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon. On November 4, 2019, the United States (under the administration of Donald Trump) is set to give notice that it will withdraw from the Paris Climate Change Accord one year later. In November 2019 the dispute resolution mechanism of the WTO will terminate effectively unless the US agrees to re-appoint a judge of the Appellate Body. These events may be seen as signaling a decline in leading states’ commitment to multilateralism and a growing preference to bilateralism. The Trump administration has clearly asserted its preference for bilateral deals while dismissing international organisations as taking advantage of US generosity. China also seems to prefer alternative groupings outside existing multilateral organisations. In October 2007, during its ascent to global power, China declared FTAs to be its basic international economic strategy. America’s disengagement from multilateralism did not prompt China to fill the void by reinforcing existing multilateral bodies with global reach. Instead, its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its regional security arrangements are modelled on the “hub and spokes” pattern, an architecture that allows it to tightly control its numerous partners and limit the application of existing standards and mechanisms. Famously, it ignored the UNCLOS arbitral award on the South China Sea in 2016. Perhaps to confront the risk of two superpowers busy dividing and ruling the rest, other countries have sought to preserve the minilateral institutions (eg the CPTPP) and utilise existing multilateral mechanisms (WTO reforms, UNCLOS conciliation and arbitration, OPCW attribution mechanism, etc.). In this workshop we wish to address the uncertain future of multilateralism in light of the prospective withdrawals and resurgence of bilateralism. We wish to discuss motivations, prospects, and implications for domestic and international law. This one day workshop seeks to reflect on the questions. In particular we wish to address the following questions: Panel I: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord and Revising the WTO Since 2017, the Trump Administration has announced its withdrawal from a host of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, including the Paris Climate Agreement; the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or Iran Nuclear Deal); the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; the Global Compact on Migration; the U.N. Human Rights Council; the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Relations with Iran; the 1961 Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention for Diplomatic Relations on Dispute Settlement; the Universal Postal Union Treaty; and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is the Trump Administration aberrational, or are we witnessing the culmination of a long-term trend of U.S. withdrawal from multilateralist institutions? To what extent has the Trump Administration applied tactics first adopted by prior administrations: e.g., blocking reappointment of members of the WTO Appellate Body? What constraints do U.S. and international law place upon blanket unilateral presidential withdrawal from all disfavored organizations? Panel II: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding China’s “Hub and Spoke” Strategy This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is China accepting the existing multilateral legal rules and mechanisms in economic and non-economic areas? Is China deviating from international standards (including with respect to ISDS) in its various legal arrangements under BRI? Is China deviating from UNCLOS in the South China Sea, including through bilateral COC negotiation? Panel III: The Future of Rule-Based Global Governance through International Institutions: Limits and Potential What are the prospects for international institutions to reclaim multilateralism through concerted action, or through insistence on multilaterally binding norms? To what extent can the UN Security Council, the International Court of Justice, or other international organisations and tribunals can contribute to maintaining and developing further globally-binding norms? To what extent can international process enhance the rule-based global governance through the clarification of law and facts? The UK and the Changing Legal Landscape: The Way Forward from Here

Tuesday, 30 April 2019 - 9.00am Location: Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, Finley Library All-day workshop: 09:00 - 17:00 hrs Conveners: Eyal Benvenisti, Harold Hongju Koh, and Tomohiro Mikanagi In 2019 three major treaty withdrawals will reach important watersheds. Sometime in spring, the United Kingdom is scheduled to withdraw from the European Union under the withdrawal notice it gave under Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon. On November 4, 2019, the United States (under the administration of Donald Trump) is set to give notice that it will withdraw from the Paris Climate Change Accord one year later. In November 2019 the dispute resolution mechanism of the WTO will terminate effectively unless the US agrees to re-appoint a judge of the Appellate Body. These events may be seen as signaling a decline in leading states’ commitment to multilateralism and a growing preference to bilateralism. The Trump administration has clearly asserted its preference for bilateral deals while dismissing international organisations as taking advantage of US generosity. China also seems to prefer alternative groupings outside existing multilateral organisations. In October 2007, during its ascent to global power, China declared FTAs to be its basic international economic strategy. America’s disengagement from multilateralism did not prompt China to fill the void by reinforcing existing multilateral bodies with global reach. Instead, its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its regional security arrangements are modelled on the “hub and spokes” pattern, an architecture that allows it to tightly control its numerous partners and limit the application of existing standards and mechanisms. Famously, it ignored the UNCLOS arbitral award on the South China Sea in 2016. Perhaps to confront the risk of two superpowers busy dividing and ruling the rest, other countries have sought to preserve the minilateral institutions (eg the CPTPP) and utilise existing multilateral mechanisms (WTO reforms, UNCLOS conciliation and arbitration, OPCW attribution mechanism, etc.). In this workshop we wish to address the uncertain future of multilateralism in light of the prospective withdrawals and resurgence of bilateralism. We wish to discuss motivations, prospects, and implications for domestic and international law. This one day workshop seeks to reflect on the questions. In particular we wish to address the following questions: Panel I: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord and Revising the WTO Since 2017, the Trump Administration has announced its withdrawal from a host of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, including the Paris Climate Agreement; the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or Iran Nuclear Deal); the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; the Global Compact on Migration; the U.N. Human Rights Council; the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Relations with Iran; the 1961 Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention for Diplomatic Relations on Dispute Settlement; the Universal Postal Union Treaty; and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is the Trump Administration aberrational, or are we witnessing the culmination of a long-term trend of U.S. withdrawal from multilateralist institutions? To what extent has the Trump Administration applied tactics first adopted by prior administrations: e.g., blocking reappointment of members of the WTO Appellate Body? What constraints do U.S. and international law place upon blanket unilateral presidential withdrawal from all disfavored organizations? Panel II: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding China’s “Hub and Spoke” Strategy This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is China accepting the existing multilateral legal rules and mechanisms in economic and non-economic areas? Is China deviating from international standards (including with respect to ISDS) in its various legal arrangements under BRI? Is China deviating from UNCLOS in the South China Sea, including through bilateral COC negotiation? Panel III: The Future of Rule-Based Global Governance through International Institutions: Limits and Potential What are the prospects for international institutions to reclaim multilateralism through concerted action, or through insistence on multilaterally binding norms? To what extent can the UN Security Council, the International Court of Justice, or other international organisations and tribunals can contribute to maintaining and developing further globally-binding norms? To what extent can international process enhance the rule-based global governance through the clarification of law and facts? The UK and the Changing Legal Landscape: The Way Forward from Here

Tuesday, 30 April 2019 - 9.00am Location: Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, Finley Library All-day workshop: 09:00 - 17:00 hrs Conveners: Eyal Benvenisti, Harold Hongju Koh, and Tomohiro Mikanagi In 2019 three major treaty withdrawals will reach important watersheds. Sometime in spring, the United Kingdom is scheduled to withdraw from the European Union under the withdrawal notice it gave under Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon. On November 4, 2019, the United States (under the administration of Donald Trump) is set to give notice that it will withdraw from the Paris Climate Change Accord one year later. In November 2019 the dispute resolution mechanism of the WTO will terminate effectively unless the US agrees to re-appoint a judge of the Appellate Body. These events may be seen as signaling a decline in leading states’ commitment to multilateralism and a growing preference to bilateralism. The Trump administration has clearly asserted its preference for bilateral deals while dismissing international organisations as taking advantage of US generosity. China also seems to prefer alternative groupings outside existing multilateral organisations. In October 2007, during its ascent to global power, China declared FTAs to be its basic international economic strategy. America’s disengagement from multilateralism did not prompt China to fill the void by reinforcing existing multilateral bodies with global reach. Instead, its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its regional security arrangements are modelled on the “hub and spokes” pattern, an architecture that allows it to tightly control its numerous partners and limit the application of existing standards and mechanisms. Famously, it ignored the UNCLOS arbitral award on the South China Sea in 2016. Perhaps to confront the risk of two superpowers busy dividing and ruling the rest, other countries have sought to preserve the minilateral institutions (eg the CPTPP) and utilise existing multilateral mechanisms (WTO reforms, UNCLOS conciliation and arbitration, OPCW attribution mechanism, etc.). In this workshop we wish to address the uncertain future of multilateralism in light of the prospective withdrawals and resurgence of bilateralism. We wish to discuss motivations, prospects, and implications for domestic and international law. This one day workshop seeks to reflect on the questions. In particular we wish to address the following questions: Panel I: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord and Revising the WTO Since 2017, the Trump Administration has announced its withdrawal from a host of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, including the Paris Climate Agreement; the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or Iran Nuclear Deal); the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; the Global Compact on Migration; the U.N. Human Rights Council; the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Relations with Iran; the 1961 Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention for Diplomatic Relations on Dispute Settlement; the Universal Postal Union Treaty; and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is the Trump Administration aberrational, or are we witnessing the culmination of a long-term trend of U.S. withdrawal from multilateralist institutions? To what extent has the Trump Administration applied tactics first adopted by prior administrations: e.g., blocking reappointment of members of the WTO Appellate Body? What constraints do U.S. and international law place upon blanket unilateral presidential withdrawal from all disfavored organizations? Panel II: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding China’s “Hub and Spoke” Strategy This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is China accepting the existing multilateral legal rules and mechanisms in economic and non-economic areas? Is China deviating from international standards (including with respect to ISDS) in its various legal arrangements under BRI? Is China deviating from UNCLOS in the South China Sea, including through bilateral COC negotiation? Panel III: The Future of Rule-Based Global Governance through International Institutions: Limits and Potential What are the prospects for international institutions to reclaim multilateralism through concerted action, or through insistence on multilaterally binding norms? To what extent can the UN Security Council, the International Court of Justice, or other international organisations and tribunals can contribute to maintaining and developing further globally-binding norms? To what extent can international process enhance the rule-based global governance through the clarification of law and facts? The UK and the Changing Legal Landscape: The Way Forward from Here

Tuesday, 30 April 2019 - 9.00am Location: Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, Finley Library All-day workshop: 09:00 - 17:00 hrs Conveners: Eyal Benvenisti, Harold Hongju Koh, and Tomohiro Mikanagi In 2019 three major treaty withdrawals will reach important watersheds. Sometime in spring, the United Kingdom is scheduled to withdraw from the European Union under the withdrawal notice it gave under Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon. On November 4, 2019, the United States (under the administration of Donald Trump) is set to give notice that it will withdraw from the Paris Climate Change Accord one year later. In November 2019 the dispute resolution mechanism of the WTO will terminate effectively unless the US agrees to re-appoint a judge of the Appellate Body. These events may be seen as signaling a decline in leading states’ commitment to multilateralism and a growing preference to bilateralism. The Trump administration has clearly asserted its preference for bilateral deals while dismissing international organisations as taking advantage of US generosity. China also seems to prefer alternative groupings outside existing multilateral organisations. In October 2007, during its ascent to global power, China declared FTAs to be its basic international economic strategy. America’s disengagement from multilateralism did not prompt China to fill the void by reinforcing existing multilateral bodies with global reach. Instead, its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its regional security arrangements are modelled on the “hub and spokes” pattern, an architecture that allows it to tightly control its numerous partners and limit the application of existing standards and mechanisms. Famously, it ignored the UNCLOS arbitral award on the South China Sea in 2016. Perhaps to confront the risk of two superpowers busy dividing and ruling the rest, other countries have sought to preserve the minilateral institutions (eg the CPTPP) and utilise existing multilateral mechanisms (WTO reforms, UNCLOS conciliation and arbitration, OPCW attribution mechanism, etc.). In this workshop we wish to address the uncertain future of multilateralism in light of the prospective withdrawals and resurgence of bilateralism. We wish to discuss motivations, prospects, and implications for domestic and international law. This one day workshop seeks to reflect on the questions. In particular we wish to address the following questions: Panel I: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord and Revising the WTO Since 2017, the Trump Administration has announced its withdrawal from a host of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, including the Paris Climate Agreement; the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or Iran Nuclear Deal); the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; the Global Compact on Migration; the U.N. Human Rights Council; the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Relations with Iran; the 1961 Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention for Diplomatic Relations on Dispute Settlement; the Universal Postal Union Treaty; and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is the Trump Administration aberrational, or are we witnessing the culmination of a long-term trend of U.S. withdrawal from multilateralist institutions? To what extent has the Trump Administration applied tactics first adopted by prior administrations: e.g., blocking reappointment of members of the WTO Appellate Body? What constraints do U.S. and international law place upon blanket unilateral presidential withdrawal from all disfavored organizations? Panel II: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding China’s “Hub and Spoke” Strategy This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is China accepting the existing multilateral legal rules and mechanisms in economic and non-economic areas? Is China deviating from international standards (including with respect to ISDS) in its various legal arrangements under BRI? Is China deviating from UNCLOS in the South China Sea, including through bilateral COC negotiation? Panel III: The Future of Rule-Based Global Governance through International Institutions: Limits and Potential What are the prospects for international institutions to reclaim multilateralism through concerted action, or through insistence on multilaterally binding norms? To what extent can the UN Security Council, the International Court of Justice, or other international organisations and tribunals can contribute to maintaining and developing further globally-binding norms? To what extent can international process enhance the rule-based global governance through the clarification of law and facts? The UK and the Changing Legal Landscape: The Way Forward from Here

Tuesday, 30 April 2019 - 9.00am Location: Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, Finley Library All-day workshop: 09:00 - 17:00 hrs Conveners: Eyal Benvenisti, Harold Hongju Koh, and Tomohiro Mikanagi In 2019 three major treaty withdrawals will reach important watersheds. Sometime in spring, the United Kingdom is scheduled to withdraw from the European Union under the withdrawal notice it gave under Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon. On November 4, 2019, the United States (under the administration of Donald Trump) is set to give notice that it will withdraw from the Paris Climate Change Accord one year later. In November 2019 the dispute resolution mechanism of the WTO will terminate effectively unless the US agrees to re-appoint a judge of the Appellate Body. These events may be seen as signaling a decline in leading states’ commitment to multilateralism and a growing preference to bilateralism. The Trump administration has clearly asserted its preference for bilateral deals while dismissing international organisations as taking advantage of US generosity. China also seems to prefer alternative groupings outside existing multilateral organisations. In October 2007, during its ascent to global power, China declared FTAs to be its basic international economic strategy. America’s disengagement from multilateralism did not prompt China to fill the void by reinforcing existing multilateral bodies with global reach. Instead, its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its regional security arrangements are modelled on the “hub and spokes” pattern, an architecture that allows it to tightly control its numerous partners and limit the application of existing standards and mechanisms. Famously, it ignored the UNCLOS arbitral award on the South China Sea in 2016. Perhaps to confront the risk of two superpowers busy dividing and ruling the rest, other countries have sought to preserve the minilateral institutions (eg the CPTPP) and utilise existing multilateral mechanisms (WTO reforms, UNCLOS conciliation and arbitration, OPCW attribution mechanism, etc.). In this workshop we wish to address the uncertain future of multilateralism in light of the prospective withdrawals and resurgence of bilateralism. We wish to discuss motivations, prospects, and implications for domestic and international law. This one day workshop seeks to reflect on the questions. In particular we wish to address the following questions: Panel I: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord and Revising the WTO Since 2017, the Trump Administration has announced its withdrawal from a host of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, including the Paris Climate Agreement; the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or Iran Nuclear Deal); the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; the Global Compact on Migration; the U.N. Human Rights Council; the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Relations with Iran; the 1961 Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention for Diplomatic Relations on Dispute Settlement; the Universal Postal Union Treaty; and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is the Trump Administration aberrational, or are we witnessing the culmination of a long-term trend of U.S. withdrawal from multilateralist institutions? To what extent has the Trump Administration applied tactics first adopted by prior administrations: e.g., blocking reappointment of members of the WTO Appellate Body? What constraints do U.S. and international law place upon blanket unilateral presidential withdrawal from all disfavored organizations? Panel II: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding China’s “Hub and Spoke” Strategy This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is China accepting the existing multilateral legal rules and mechanisms in economic and non-economic areas? Is China deviating from international standards (including with respect to ISDS) in its various legal arrangements under BRI? Is China deviating from UNCLOS in the South China Sea, including through bilateral COC negotiation? Panel III: The Future of Rule-Based Global Governance through International Institutions: Limits and Potential What are the prospects for international institutions to reclaim multilateralism through concerted action, or through insistence on multilaterally binding norms? To what extent can the UN Security Council, the International Court of Justice, or other international organisations and tribunals can contribute to maintaining and developing further globally-binding norms? To what extent can international process enhance the rule-based global governance through the clarification of law and facts? The UK and the Changing Legal Landscape: The Way Forward from Here

Tuesday, 30 April 2019 - 9.00am Location: Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, Finley Library All-day workshop: 09:00 - 17:00 hrs Conveners: Eyal Benvenisti, Harold Hongju Koh, and Tomohiro Mikanagi In 2019 three major treaty withdrawals will reach important watersheds. Sometime in spring, the United Kingdom is scheduled to withdraw from the European Union under the withdrawal notice it gave under Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon. On November 4, 2019, the United States (under the administration of Donald Trump) is set to give notice that it will withdraw from the Paris Climate Change Accord one year later. In November 2019 the dispute resolution mechanism of the WTO will terminate effectively unless the US agrees to re-appoint a judge of the Appellate Body. These events may be seen as signaling a decline in leading states’ commitment to multilateralism and a growing preference to bilateralism. The Trump administration has clearly asserted its preference for bilateral deals while dismissing international organisations as taking advantage of US generosity. China also seems to prefer alternative groupings outside existing multilateral organisations. In October 2007, during its ascent to global power, China declared FTAs to be its basic international economic strategy. America’s disengagement from multilateralism did not prompt China to fill the void by reinforcing existing multilateral bodies with global reach. Instead, its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its regional security arrangements are modelled on the “hub and spokes” pattern, an architecture that allows it to tightly control its numerous partners and limit the application of existing standards and mechanisms. Famously, it ignored the UNCLOS arbitral award on the South China Sea in 2016. Perhaps to confront the risk of two superpowers busy dividing and ruling the rest, other countries have sought to preserve the minilateral institutions (eg the CPTPP) and utilise existing multilateral mechanisms (WTO reforms, UNCLOS conciliation and arbitration, OPCW attribution mechanism, etc.). In this workshop we wish to address the uncertain future of multilateralism in light of the prospective withdrawals and resurgence of bilateralism. We wish to discuss motivations, prospects, and implications for domestic and international law. This one day workshop seeks to reflect on the questions. In particular we wish to address the following questions: Panel I: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord and Revising the WTO Since 2017, the Trump Administration has announced its withdrawal from a host of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, including the Paris Climate Agreement; the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or Iran Nuclear Deal); the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; the Global Compact on Migration; the U.N. Human Rights Council; the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Relations with Iran; the 1961 Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention for Diplomatic Relations on Dispute Settlement; the Universal Postal Union Treaty; and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is the Trump Administration aberrational, or are we witnessing the culmination of a long-term trend of U.S. withdrawal from multilateralist institutions? To what extent has the Trump Administration applied tactics first adopted by prior administrations: e.g., blocking reappointment of members of the WTO Appellate Body? What constraints do U.S. and international law place upon blanket unilateral presidential withdrawal from all disfavored organizations? Panel II: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding China’s “Hub and Spoke” Strategy This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is China accepting the existing multilateral legal rules and mechanisms in economic and non-economic areas? Is China deviating from international standards (including with respect to ISDS) in its various legal arrangements under BRI? Is China deviating from UNCLOS in the South China Sea, including through bilateral COC negotiation? Panel III: The Future of Rule-Based Global Governance through International Institutions: Limits and Potential What are the prospects for international institutions to reclaim multilateralism through concerted action, or through insistence on multilaterally binding norms? To what extent can the UN Security Council, the International Court of Justice, or other international organisations and tribunals can contribute to maintaining and developing further globally-binding norms? To what extent can international process enhance the rule-based global governance through the clarification of law and facts? The UK and the Changing Legal Landscape: The Way Forward from Here

Tuesday, 30 April 2019 - 9.00am Location: Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, Finley Library All-day workshop: 09:00 - 17:00 hrs Conveners: Eyal Benvenisti, Harold Hongju Koh, and Tomohiro Mikanagi In 2019 three major treaty withdrawals will reach important watersheds. Sometime in spring, the United Kingdom is scheduled to withdraw from the European Union under the withdrawal notice it gave under Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon. On November 4, 2019, the United States (under the administration of Donald Trump) is set to give notice that it will withdraw from the Paris Climate Change Accord one year later. In November 2019 the dispute resolution mechanism of the WTO will terminate effectively unless the US agrees to re-appoint a judge of the Appellate Body. These events may be seen as signaling a decline in leading states’ commitment to multilateralism and a growing preference to bilateralism. The Trump administration has clearly asserted its preference for bilateral deals while dismissing international organisations as taking advantage of US generosity. China also seems to prefer alternative groupings outside existing multilateral organisations. In October 2007, during its ascent to global power, China declared FTAs to be its basic international economic strategy. America’s disengagement from multilateralism did not prompt China to fill the void by reinforcing existing multilateral bodies with global reach. Instead, its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its regional security arrangements are modelled on the “hub and spokes” pattern, an architecture that allows it to tightly control its numerous partners and limit the application of existing standards and mechanisms. Famously, it ignored the UNCLOS arbitral award on the South China Sea in 2016. Perhaps to confront the risk of two superpowers busy dividing and ruling the rest, other countries have sought to preserve the minilateral institutions (eg the CPTPP) and utilise existing multilateral mechanisms (WTO reforms, UNCLOS conciliation and arbitration, OPCW attribution mechanism, etc.). In this workshop we wish to address the uncertain future of multilateralism in light of the prospective withdrawals and resurgence of bilateralism. We wish to discuss motivations, prospects, and implications for domestic and international law. This one day workshop seeks to reflect on the questions. In particular we wish to address the following questions: Panel I: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord and Revising the WTO Since 2017, the Trump Administration has announced its withdrawal from a host of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, including the Paris Climate Agreement; the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or Iran Nuclear Deal); the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; the Global Compact on Migration; the U.N. Human Rights Council; the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Relations with Iran; the 1961 Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention for Diplomatic Relations on Dispute Settlement; the Universal Postal Union Treaty; and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is the Trump Administration aberrational, or are we witnessing the culmination of a long-term trend of U.S. withdrawal from multilateralist institutions? To what extent has the Trump Administration applied tactics first adopted by prior administrations: e.g., blocking reappointment of members of the WTO Appellate Body? What constraints do U.S. and international law place upon blanket unilateral presidential withdrawal from all disfavored organizations? Panel II: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding China’s “Hub and Spoke” Strategy This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is China accepting the existing multilateral legal rules and mechanisms in economic and non-economic areas? Is China deviating from international standards (including with respect to ISDS) in its various legal arrangements under BRI? Is China deviating from UNCLOS in the South China Sea, including through bilateral COC negotiation? Panel III: The Future of Rule-Based Global Governance through International Institutions: Limits and Potential What are the prospects for international institutions to reclaim multilateralism through concerted action, or through insistence on multilaterally binding norms? To what extent can the UN Security Council, the International Court of Justice, or other international organisations and tribunals can contribute to maintaining and developing further globally-binding norms? To what extent can international process enhance the rule-based global governance through the clarification of law and facts? The UK and the Changing Legal Landscape: The Way Forward from Here

Tuesday, 30 April 2019 - 9.00am Location: Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, Finley Library All-day workshop: 09:00 - 17:00 hrs Conveners: Eyal Benvenisti, Harold Hongju Koh, and Tomohiro Mikanagi In 2019 three major treaty withdrawals will reach important watersheds. Sometime in spring, the United Kingdom is scheduled to withdraw from the European Union under the withdrawal notice it gave under Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon. On November 4, 2019, the United States (under the administration of Donald Trump) is set to give notice that it will withdraw from the Paris Climate Change Accord one year later. In November 2019 the dispute resolution mechanism of the WTO will terminate effectively unless the US agrees to re-appoint a judge of the Appellate Body. These events may be seen as signaling a decline in leading states’ commitment to multilateralism and a growing preference to bilateralism. The Trump administration has clearly asserted its preference for bilateral deals while dismissing international organisations as taking advantage of US generosity. China also seems to prefer alternative groupings outside existing multilateral organisations. In October 2007, during its ascent to global power, China declared FTAs to be its basic international economic strategy. America’s disengagement from multilateralism did not prompt China to fill the void by reinforcing existing multilateral bodies with global reach. Instead, its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its regional security arrangements are modelled on the “hub and spokes” pattern, an architecture that allows it to tightly control its numerous partners and limit the application of existing standards and mechanisms. Famously, it ignored the UNCLOS arbitral award on the South China Sea in 2016. Perhaps to confront the risk of two superpowers busy dividing and ruling the rest, other countries have sought to preserve the minilateral institutions (eg the CPTPP) and utilise existing multilateral mechanisms (WTO reforms, UNCLOS conciliation and arbitration, OPCW attribution mechanism, etc.). In this workshop we wish to address the uncertain future of multilateralism in light of the prospective withdrawals and resurgence of bilateralism. We wish to discuss motivations, prospects, and implications for domestic and international law. This one day workshop seeks to reflect on the questions. In particular we wish to address the following questions: Panel I: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord and Revising the WTO Since 2017, the Trump Administration has announced its withdrawal from a host of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, including the Paris Climate Agreement; the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or Iran Nuclear Deal); the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; the Global Compact on Migration; the U.N. Human Rights Council; the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Relations with Iran; the 1961 Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention for Diplomatic Relations on Dispute Settlement; the Universal Postal Union Treaty; and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is the Trump Administration aberrational, or are we witnessing the culmination of a long-term trend of U.S. withdrawal from multilateralist institutions? To what extent has the Trump Administration applied tactics first adopted by prior administrations: e.g., blocking reappointment of members of the WTO Appellate Body? What constraints do U.S. and international law place upon blanket unilateral presidential withdrawal from all disfavored organizations? Panel II: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding China’s “Hub and Spoke” Strategy This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is China accepting the existing multilateral legal rules and mechanisms in economic and non-economic areas? Is China deviating from international standards (including with respect to ISDS) in its various legal arrangements under BRI? Is China deviating from UNCLOS in the South China Sea, including through bilateral COC negotiation? Panel III: The Future of Rule-Based Global Governance through International Institutions: Limits and Potential What are the prospects for international institutions to reclaim multilateralism through concerted action, or through insistence on multilaterally binding norms? To what extent can the UN Security Council, the International Court of Justice, or other international organisations and tribunals can contribute to maintaining and developing further globally-binding norms? To what extent can international process enhance the rule-based global governance through the clarification of law and facts? The UK and the Changing Legal Landscape: The Way Forward from Here

Tuesday, 30 April 2019 - 9.00am Location: Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, Finley Library All-day workshop: 09:00 - 17:00 hrs Conveners: Eyal Benvenisti, Harold Hongju Koh, and Tomohiro Mikanagi In 2019 three major treaty withdrawals will reach important watersheds. Sometime in spring, the United Kingdom is scheduled to withdraw from the European Union under the withdrawal notice it gave under Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon. On November 4, 2019, the United States (under the administration of Donald Trump) is set to give notice that it will withdraw from the Paris Climate Change Accord one year later. In November 2019 the dispute resolution mechanism of the WTO will terminate effectively unless the US agrees to re-appoint a judge of the Appellate Body. These events may be seen as signaling a decline in leading states’ commitment to multilateralism and a growing preference to bilateralism. The Trump administration has clearly asserted its preference for bilateral deals while dismissing international organisations as taking advantage of US generosity. China also seems to prefer alternative groupings outside existing multilateral organisations. In October 2007, during its ascent to global power, China declared FTAs to be its basic international economic strategy. America’s disengagement from multilateralism did not prompt China to fill the void by reinforcing existing multilateral bodies with global reach. Instead, its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its regional security arrangements are modelled on the “hub and spokes” pattern, an architecture that allows it to tightly control its numerous partners and limit the application of existing standards and mechanisms. Famously, it ignored the UNCLOS arbitral award on the South China Sea in 2016. Perhaps to confront the risk of two superpowers busy dividing and ruling the rest, other countries have sought to preserve the minilateral institutions (eg the CPTPP) and utilise existing multilateral mechanisms (WTO reforms, UNCLOS conciliation and arbitration, OPCW attribution mechanism, etc.). In this workshop we wish to address the uncertain future of multilateralism in light of the prospective withdrawals and resurgence of bilateralism. We wish to discuss motivations, prospects, and implications for domestic and international law. This one day workshop seeks to reflect on the questions. In particular we wish to address the following questions: Panel I: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord and Revising the WTO Since 2017, the Trump Administration has announced its withdrawal from a host of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, including the Paris Climate Agreement; the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or Iran Nuclear Deal); the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; the Global Compact on Migration; the U.N. Human Rights Council; the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Relations with Iran; the 1961 Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention for Diplomatic Relations on Dispute Settlement; the Universal Postal Union Treaty; and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is the Trump Administration aberrational, or are we witnessing the culmination of a long-term trend of U.S. withdrawal from multilateralist institutions? To what extent has the Trump Administration applied tactics first adopted by prior administrations: e.g., blocking reappointment of members of the WTO Appellate Body? What constraints do U.S. and international law place upon blanket unilateral presidential withdrawal from all disfavored organizations? Panel II: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding China’s “Hub and Spoke” Strategy This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is China accepting the existing multilateral legal rules and mechanisms in economic and non-economic areas? Is China deviating from international standards (including with respect to ISDS) in its various legal arrangements under BRI? Is China deviating from UNCLOS in the South China Sea, including through bilateral COC negotiation? Panel III: The Future of Rule-Based Global Governance through International Institutions: Limits and Potential What are the prospects for international institutions to reclaim multilateralism through concerted action, or through insistence on multilaterally binding norms? To what extent can the UN Security Council, the International Court of Justice, or other international organisations and tribunals can contribute to maintaining and developing further globally-binding norms? To what extent can international process enhance the rule-based global governance through the clarification of law and facts? The UK and the Changing Legal Landscape: The Way Forward from Here

Tuesday, 30 April 2019 - 9.00am Location: Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, Finley Library All-day workshop: 09:00 - 17:00 hrs Conveners: Eyal Benvenisti, Harold Hongju Koh, and Tomohiro Mikanagi In 2019 three major treaty withdrawals will reach important watersheds. Sometime in spring, the United Kingdom is scheduled to withdraw from the European Union under the withdrawal notice it gave under Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon. On November 4, 2019, the United States (under the administration of Donald Trump) is set to give notice that it will withdraw from the Paris Climate Change Accord one year later. In November 2019 the dispute resolution mechanism of the WTO will terminate effectively unless the US agrees to re-appoint a judge of the Appellate Body. These events may be seen as signaling a decline in leading states’ commitment to multilateralism and a growing preference to bilateralism. The Trump administration has clearly asserted its preference for bilateral deals while dismissing international organisations as taking advantage of US generosity. China also seems to prefer alternative groupings outside existing multilateral organisations. In October 2007, during its ascent to global power, China declared FTAs to be its basic international economic strategy. America’s disengagement from multilateralism did not prompt China to fill the void by reinforcing existing multilateral bodies with global reach. Instead, its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its regional security arrangements are modelled on the “hub and spokes” pattern, an architecture that allows it to tightly control its numerous partners and limit the application of existing standards and mechanisms. Famously, it ignored the UNCLOS arbitral award on the South China Sea in 2016. Perhaps to confront the risk of two superpowers busy dividing and ruling the rest, other countries have sought to preserve the minilateral institutions (eg the CPTPP) and utilise existing multilateral mechanisms (WTO reforms, UNCLOS conciliation and arbitration, OPCW attribution mechanism, etc.). In this workshop we wish to address the uncertain future of multilateralism in light of the prospective withdrawals and resurgence of bilateralism. We wish to discuss motivations, prospects, and implications for domestic and international law. This one day workshop seeks to reflect on the questions. In particular we wish to address the following questions: Panel I: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord and Revising the WTO Since 2017, the Trump Administration has announced its withdrawal from a host of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, including the Paris Climate Agreement; the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or Iran Nuclear Deal); the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; the Global Compact on Migration; the U.N. Human Rights Council; the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Relations with Iran; the 1961 Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention for Diplomatic Relations on Dispute Settlement; the Universal Postal Union Treaty; and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is the Trump Administration aberrational, or are we witnessing the culmination of a long-term trend of U.S. withdrawal from multilateralist institutions? To what extent has the Trump Administration applied tactics first adopted by prior administrations: e.g., blocking reappointment of members of the WTO Appellate Body? What constraints do U.S. and international law place upon blanket unilateral presidential withdrawal from all disfavored organizations? Panel II: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding China’s “Hub and Spoke” Strategy This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is China accepting the existing multilateral legal rules and mechanisms in economic and non-economic areas? Is China deviating from international standards (including with respect to ISDS) in its various legal arrangements under BRI? Is China deviating from UNCLOS in the South China Sea, including through bilateral COC negotiation? Panel III: The Future of Rule-Based Global Governance through International Institutions: Limits and Potential What are the prospects for international institutions to reclaim multilateralism through concerted action, or through insistence on multilaterally binding norms? To what extent can the UN Security Council, the International Court of Justice, or other international organisations and tribunals can contribute to maintaining and developing further globally-binding norms? To what extent can international process enhance the rule-based global governance through the clarification of law and facts? The UK and the Changing Legal Landscape: The Way Forward from Here

Tuesday, 30 April 2019 - 9.00am Location: Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, Finley Library All-day workshop: 09:00 - 17:00 hrs Conveners: Eyal Benvenisti, Harold Hongju Koh, and Tomohiro Mikanagi In 2019 three major treaty withdrawals will reach important watersheds. Sometime in spring, the United Kingdom is scheduled to withdraw from the European Union under the withdrawal notice it gave under Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon. On November 4, 2019, the United States (under the administration of Donald Trump) is set to give notice that it will withdraw from the Paris Climate Change Accord one year later. In November 2019 the dispute resolution mechanism of the WTO will terminate effectively unless the US agrees to re-appoint a judge of the Appellate Body. These events may be seen as signaling a decline in leading states’ commitment to multilateralism and a growing preference to bilateralism. The Trump administration has clearly asserted its preference for bilateral deals while dismissing international organisations as taking advantage of US generosity. China also seems to prefer alternative groupings outside existing multilateral organisations. In October 2007, during its ascent to global power, China declared FTAs to be its basic international economic strategy. America’s disengagement from multilateralism did not prompt China to fill the void by reinforcing existing multilateral bodies with global reach. Instead, its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its regional security arrangements are modelled on the “hub and spokes” pattern, an architecture that allows it to tightly control its numerous partners and limit the application of existing standards and mechanisms. Famously, it ignored the UNCLOS arbitral award on the South China Sea in 2016. Perhaps to confront the risk of two superpowers busy dividing and ruling the rest, other countries have sought to preserve the minilateral institutions (eg the CPTPP) and utilise existing multilateral mechanisms (WTO reforms, UNCLOS conciliation and arbitration, OPCW attribution mechanism, etc.). In this workshop we wish to address the uncertain future of multilateralism in light of the prospective withdrawals and resurgence of bilateralism. We wish to discuss motivations, prospects, and implications for domestic and international law. This one day workshop seeks to reflect on the questions. In particular we wish to address the following questions: Panel I: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord and Revising the WTO Since 2017, the Trump Administration has announced its withdrawal from a host of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, including the Paris Climate Agreement; the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or Iran Nuclear Deal); the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; the Global Compact on Migration; the U.N. Human Rights Council; the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Relations with Iran; the 1961 Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention for Diplomatic Relations on Dispute Settlement; the Universal Postal Union Treaty; and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is the Trump Administration aberrational, or are we witnessing the culmination of a long-term trend of U.S. withdrawal from multilateralist institutions? To what extent has the Trump Administration applied tactics first adopted by prior administrations: e.g., blocking reappointment of members of the WTO Appellate Body? What constraints do U.S. and international law place upon blanket unilateral presidential withdrawal from all disfavored organizations? Panel II: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding China’s “Hub and Spoke” Strategy This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is China accepting the existing multilateral legal rules and mechanisms in economic and non-economic areas? Is China deviating from international standards (including with respect to ISDS) in its various legal arrangements under BRI? Is China deviating from UNCLOS in the South China Sea, including through bilateral COC negotiation? Panel III: The Future of Rule-Based Global Governance through International Institutions: Limits and Potential What are the prospects for international institutions to reclaim multilateralism through concerted action, or through insistence on multilaterally binding norms? To what extent can the UN Security Council, the International Court of Justice, or other international organisations and tribunals can contribute to maintaining and developing further globally-binding norms? To what extent can international process enhance the rule-based global governance through the clarification of law and facts? The UK and the Changing Legal Landscape: The Way Forward from Here

Tuesday, 30 April 2019 - 9.00am Location: Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, Finley Library All-day workshop: 09:00 - 17:00 hrs Conveners: Eyal Benvenisti, Harold Hongju Koh, and Tomohiro Mikanagi In 2019 three major treaty withdrawals will reach important watersheds. Sometime in spring, the United Kingdom is scheduled to withdraw from the European Union under the withdrawal notice it gave under Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon. On November 4, 2019, the United States (under the administration of Donald Trump) is set to give notice that it will withdraw from the Paris Climate Change Accord one year later. In November 2019 the dispute resolution mechanism of the WTO will terminate effectively unless the US agrees to re-appoint a judge of the Appellate Body. These events may be seen as signaling a decline in leading states’ commitment to multilateralism and a growing preference to bilateralism. The Trump administration has clearly asserted its preference for bilateral deals while dismissing international organisations as taking advantage of US generosity. China also seems to prefer alternative groupings outside existing multilateral organisations. In October 2007, during its ascent to global power, China declared FTAs to be its basic international economic strategy. America’s disengagement from multilateralism did not prompt China to fill the void by reinforcing existing multilateral bodies with global reach. Instead, its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its regional security arrangements are modelled on the “hub and spokes” pattern, an architecture that allows it to tightly control its numerous partners and limit the application of existing standards and mechanisms. Famously, it ignored the UNCLOS arbitral award on the South China Sea in 2016. Perhaps to confront the risk of two superpowers busy dividing and ruling the rest, other countries have sought to preserve the minilateral institutions (eg the CPTPP) and utilise existing multilateral mechanisms (WTO reforms, UNCLOS conciliation and arbitration, OPCW attribution mechanism, etc.). In this workshop we wish to address the uncertain future of multilateralism in light of the prospective withdrawals and resurgence of bilateralism. We wish to discuss motivations, prospects, and implications for domestic and international law. This one day workshop seeks to reflect on the questions. In particular we wish to address the following questions: Panel I: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord and Revising the WTO Since 2017, the Trump Administration has announced its withdrawal from a host of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, including the Paris Climate Agreement; the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or Iran Nuclear Deal); the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; the Global Compact on Migration; the U.N. Human Rights Council; the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Relations with Iran; the 1961 Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention for Diplomatic Relations on Dispute Settlement; the Universal Postal Union Treaty; and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is the Trump Administration aberrational, or are we witnessing the culmination of a long-term trend of U.S. withdrawal from multilateralist institutions? To what extent has the Trump Administration applied tactics first adopted by prior administrations: e.g., blocking reappointment of members of the WTO Appellate Body? What constraints do U.S. and international law place upon blanket unilateral presidential withdrawal from all disfavored organizations? Panel II: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding China’s “Hub and Spoke” Strategy This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is China accepting the existing multilateral legal rules and mechanisms in economic and non-economic areas? Is China deviating from international standards (including with respect to ISDS) in its various legal arrangements under BRI? Is China deviating from UNCLOS in the South China Sea, including through bilateral COC negotiation? Panel III: The Future of Rule-Based Global Governance through International Institutions: Limits and Potential What are the prospects for international institutions to reclaim multilateralism through concerted action, or through insistence on multilaterally binding norms? To what extent can the UN Security Council, the International Court of Justice, or other international organisations and tribunals can contribute to maintaining and developing further globally-binding norms? To what extent can international process enhance the rule-based global governance through the clarification of law and facts? The UK and the Changing Legal Landscape: The Way Forward from Here

Tuesday, 30 April 2019 - 9.00am Location: Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, Finley Library All-day workshop: 09:00 - 17:00 hrs Conveners: Eyal Benvenisti, Harold Hongju Koh, and Tomohiro Mikanagi In 2019 three major treaty withdrawals will reach important watersheds. Sometime in spring, the United Kingdom is scheduled to withdraw from the European Union under the withdrawal notice it gave under Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon. On November 4, 2019, the United States (under the administration of Donald Trump) is set to give notice that it will withdraw from the Paris Climate Change Accord one year later. In November 2019 the dispute resolution mechanism of the WTO will terminate effectively unless the US agrees to re-appoint a judge of the Appellate Body. These events may be seen as signaling a decline in leading states’ commitment to multilateralism and a growing preference to bilateralism. The Trump administration has clearly asserted its preference for bilateral deals while dismissing international organisations as taking advantage of US generosity. China also seems to prefer alternative groupings outside existing multilateral organisations. In October 2007, during its ascent to global power, China declared FTAs to be its basic international economic strategy. America’s disengagement from multilateralism did not prompt China to fill the void by reinforcing existing multilateral bodies with global reach. Instead, its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its regional security arrangements are modelled on the “hub and spokes” pattern, an architecture that allows it to tightly control its numerous partners and limit the application of existing standards and mechanisms. Famously, it ignored the UNCLOS arbitral award on the South China Sea in 2016. Perhaps to confront the risk of two superpowers busy dividing and ruling the rest, other countries have sought to preserve the minilateral institutions (eg the CPTPP) and utilise existing multilateral mechanisms (WTO reforms, UNCLOS conciliation and arbitration, OPCW attribution mechanism, etc.). In this workshop we wish to address the uncertain future of multilateralism in light of the prospective withdrawals and resurgence of bilateralism. We wish to discuss motivations, prospects, and implications for domestic and international law. This one day workshop seeks to reflect on the questions. In particular we wish to address the following questions: Panel I: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord and Revising the WTO Since 2017, the Trump Administration has announced its withdrawal from a host of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, including the Paris Climate Agreement; the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or Iran Nuclear Deal); the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; the Global Compact on Migration; the U.N. Human Rights Council; the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Relations with Iran; the 1961 Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention for Diplomatic Relations on Dispute Settlement; the Universal Postal Union Treaty; and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is the Trump Administration aberrational, or are we witnessing the culmination of a long-term trend of U.S. withdrawal from multilateralist institutions? To what extent has the Trump Administration applied tactics first adopted by prior administrations: e.g., blocking reappointment of members of the WTO Appellate Body? What constraints do U.S. and international law place upon blanket unilateral presidential withdrawal from all disfavored organizations? Panel II: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding China’s “Hub and Spoke” Strategy This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is China accepting the existing multilateral legal rules and mechanisms in economic and non-economic areas? Is China deviating from international standards (including with respect to ISDS) in its various legal arrangements under BRI? Is China deviating from UNCLOS in the South China Sea, including through bilateral COC negotiation? Panel III: The Future of Rule-Based Global Governance through International Institutions: Limits and Potential What are the prospects for international institutions to reclaim multilateralism through concerted action, or through insistence on multilaterally binding norms? To what extent can the UN Security Council, the International Court of Justice, or other international organisations and tribunals can contribute to maintaining and developing further globally-binding norms? To what extent can international process enhance the rule-based global governance through the clarification of law and facts? The UK and the Changing Legal Landscape: The Way Forward from Here

Tuesday, 30 April 2019 - 9.00am Location: Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, Finley Library All-day workshop: 09:00 - 17:00 hrs Conveners: Eyal Benvenisti, Harold Hongju Koh, and Tomohiro Mikanagi In 2019 three major treaty withdrawals will reach important watersheds. Sometime in spring, the United Kingdom is scheduled to withdraw from the European Union under the withdrawal notice it gave under Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon. On November 4, 2019, the United States (under the administration of Donald Trump) is set to give notice that it will withdraw from the Paris Climate Change Accord one year later. In November 2019 the dispute resolution mechanism of the WTO will terminate effectively unless the US agrees to re-appoint a judge of the Appellate Body. These events may be seen as signaling a decline in leading states’ commitment to multilateralism and a growing preference to bilateralism. The Trump administration has clearly asserted its preference for bilateral deals while dismissing international organisations as taking advantage of US generosity. China also seems to prefer alternative groupings outside existing multilateral organisations. In October 2007, during its ascent to global power, China declared FTAs to be its basic international economic strategy. America’s disengagement from multilateralism did not prompt China to fill the void by reinforcing existing multilateral bodies with global reach. Instead, its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its regional security arrangements are modelled on the “hub and spokes” pattern, an architecture that allows it to tightly control its numerous partners and limit the application of existing standards and mechanisms. Famously, it ignored the UNCLOS arbitral award on the South China Sea in 2016. Perhaps to confront the risk of two superpowers busy dividing and ruling the rest, other countries have sought to preserve the minilateral institutions (eg the CPTPP) and utilise existing multilateral mechanisms (WTO reforms, UNCLOS conciliation and arbitration, OPCW attribution mechanism, etc.). In this workshop we wish to address the uncertain future of multilateralism in light of the prospective withdrawals and resurgence of bilateralism. We wish to discuss motivations, prospects, and implications for domestic and international law. This one day workshop seeks to reflect on the questions. In particular we wish to address the following questions: Panel I: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord and Revising the WTO Since 2017, the Trump Administration has announced its withdrawal from a host of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, including the Paris Climate Agreement; the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or Iran Nuclear Deal); the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; the Global Compact on Migration; the U.N. Human Rights Council; the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Relations with Iran; the 1961 Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention for Diplomatic Relations on Dispute Settlement; the Universal Postal Union Treaty; and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is the Trump Administration aberrational, or are we witnessing the culmination of a long-term trend of U.S. withdrawal from multilateralist institutions? To what extent has the Trump Administration applied tactics first adopted by prior administrations: e.g., blocking reappointment of members of the WTO Appellate Body? What constraints do U.S. and international law place upon blanket unilateral presidential withdrawal from all disfavored organizations? Panel II: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding China’s “Hub and Spoke” Strategy This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is China accepting the existing multilateral legal rules and mechanisms in economic and non-economic areas? Is China deviating from international standards (including with respect to ISDS) in its various legal arrangements under BRI? Is China deviating from UNCLOS in the South China Sea, including through bilateral COC negotiation? Panel III: The Future of Rule-Based Global Governance through International Institutions: Limits and Potential What are the prospects for international institutions to reclaim multilateralism through concerted action, or through insistence on multilaterally binding norms? To what extent can the UN Security Council, the International Court of Justice, or other international organisations and tribunals can contribute to maintaining and developing further globally-binding norms? To what extent can international process enhance the rule-based global governance through the clarification of law and facts? The UK and the Changing Legal Landscape: The Way Forward from Here