Podcasts about ftas

The Prime Minister ponders the GDT Auction, falling livestock numbers, carbon farming loopholes, the windfall from FTAs, and whether Trump won the Canadian and Australian elections for the left. See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Tyler Goss, from Tampa has two critical sales questions: 1) How do we achieve those "crazy" prospecting numbers I talk about in my books? 2) When should a lead become a pipeline opportunity? In this podcast I break down these answers in plain English. When to Create a Deal: Finding the Sweet Spot There's no shortage of opinions on when to create a deal in your CRM. Some sales leaders will tell you to create a deal before you even make the first call (ridiculous). Others won't let you create one until the contract is practically signed (equally absurd). Here's my take: Both extremes are problematic. You need a pipeline that gives you meaningful data. Here's how we handle this at Sales Gravy: For Inbound Leads: We categorize inbound leads into three distinct groups: 1. List Leads These are people who sign up for our newsletter or download basic resources where we only ask for a name and email address. They're joining our community, and while some may become customers down the road, they're not pipeline opportunities yet. 2. MQLs (Marketing Qualified Leads) These folks have given us more detailed information through webinars or content downloads. They've provided their phone number, email address, company, role, etc. There's an implicit understanding that we might reach out, but they haven't expressed a direct interest in buying. I don't want these in my pipeline yet. 3. Hot Leads These people come to us with their hands up, saying things like: "We've got a team of nine and want to do sales training" or "Our SKO is in February, and we want to hire Jeb. How much does he cost?" These leads have an open buying window and go straight into the pipeline. We'll close 95% of these because they've already self-identified as buyers. For Outbound Prospecting: When prospecting outbound we only put opportunities into the pipeline after the prospect has agreed to a first time appointment (FTA). Here's why: First-time appointments are your Money Ball metric – they indicate the health of your prospecting efforts. When an FTA is in your pipeline, you can measure critical data points like: Show/no-show rates by rep Advancement rates from FTA to next stages Conversion rates from FTA to closed business If I have a rep setting tons of FTAs with only a 10% show rate, I need to diagnose that problem. If another rep is advancing 50% of their FTAs to the next stage, that tells me something completely different. The qualification point is simple: both parties have agreed to step into the sales process. That's when it becomes a pipeline opportunity. Some organizations resist this approach because they only want "fully qualified" opportunities in their pipeline. I get it – but you're missing valuable data if you wait too long. Consider this example: If you work in an industry where everyone's under contract, and you know contract expiration dates, you might be tempted to automatically add prospects to your pipeline as their contract end dates approach. I wouldn't do that. Wait until you've had a conversation where they agree to meet with you to discuss options. That agreement to step into the process is your trigger. If you're putting everything into your pipeline, you're diluting your data. If you're waiting until deals are practically closed, why even have a pipeline? The sweet spot is somewhere in between – and for most B2B sales organizations, it's at the first-time appointment stage. Maximizing Prospecting Efficiency: How We Make So Many Calls Tyler also asked about those "crazy" prospecting numbers I mention in my books. How do my teams make hundreds of calls during designated call blocks? The answer boils down to three key principles: 1. Separate List Building from Prospecting Research and building lists is NOT prospecting. When we're prospecting, we're just chopping wood. We have our lists ready in advance, and when it's time to prospect, that's all we do.

EDITORIAL: Make better use of FTAs | Apr. 17, 2025Subscribe to The Manila Times Channel - https://tmt.ph/YTSubscribe Visit our website at https://www.manilatimes.net Follow us: Facebook - https://tmt.ph/facebook Instagram - https://tmt.ph/instagram Twitter - https://tmt.ph/twitter DailyMotion - https://tmt.ph/dailymotion Subscribe to our Digital Edition - https://tmt.ph/digital Check out our Podcasts: Spotify - https://tmt.ph/spotify Apple Podcasts - https://tmt.ph/applepodcasts Amazon Music - https://tmt.ph/amazonmusic Deezer: https://tmt.ph/deezer Stitcher: https://tmt.ph/stitcherTune In: https://tmt.ph/tunein #TheManilaTimes#VoiceOfTheTimes Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

It's Tuesday, March 18th, 2025. This is Nelson John, let's get started.  India's Solar Growth Faces Execution Challenges Despite crossing 200 GW in renewable capacity, India's solar energy adoption remains slow, contributing under 10% to its electricity mix. While solar capacity surged from 3.7 GW in 2015 to over 100 GW, issues like weak transmission infrastructure, land acquisition delays, and hesitant power distributors persist. Moreover, the US SEC is probing Adani Green and Azure Power over alleged bribery in solar contracts. Experts suggest grid modernization, better state-Centre coordination, and rooftop solar expansion as key solutions to achieve the 500 GW renewables target by 2030. ABD Bets on Premium Liquor Amid Market Slowdown With India's liquor market cooling, Allied Blenders and Distillers (ABD) is focusing on premiumization. The maker of Officer's Choice aims to raise its “prestige-and-above” segment share from 42% to 50% and launch two to three brands next fiscal. Managing Director Alok Gupta sees macroeconomic headwinds but remains bullish on high-end spirits like gin brand Zoya and single malt Arthaus. ABD is also expanding production and partnering with Ranveer Singh to drive brand growth, targeting double-digit value gains. India Braces for US Tariff Impact, Eyes Trade Diversification India's exports to the US may dip 3-3.5% if Washington enforces reciprocal tariffs in April. With a $35.3 billion trade surplus, India is under scrutiny as the US targets nations with higher import duties. However, India's FTAs and diversification into global supply chains could soften the impact. The US's 25% tariff on steel and aluminum imports might even benefit India by easing competition. As US economic growth slows, India must prioritize value-added exports and alternative trade routes via West Asia. UNO Minda's EV Expansion Faces Market Realities India's auto industry grew 7% YoY in Q3FY25, but weak passenger and commercial vehicle sales weighed on momentum. EV registrations jumped 37%, boosting component maker UNO Minda, whose stock initially soared 60% on its EV push. However, with EVs contributing under 6% to revenue, shares corrected 30%. Minda continues investing in high-voltage powertrain components and expanding in Indonesia. While rising costs and debt pose challenges, rural two-wheeler demand and operational efficiencies could aid long-term growth. Meta Battles CCI Over WhatsApp Data Sharing Meta is challenging a Competition Commission of India (CCI) order banning WhatsApp from sharing user data with Facebook and Instagram, along with a ₹213 crore fine. The National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) will decide on May 13 whether to hear Meta's appeal before or after India's new digital data protection rules take effect. Meta argues that the forthcoming framework makes the CCI's ruling redundant, but regulators insist the case should proceed now. If NCLAT delays proceedings, it would mark a legal win for Meta. However, with India tightening data laws, Big Tech's data dominance remains under scrutiny.

Prime Minister Christopher Luxon is heading to India, taking with him one of the largest delegations a New Zealand PM has ever travelled with. And, the fanfare makes sense, given we currently export $718 million worth of goods to India annually, but we don’t have a formal free trade agreement. With the world’s largest population and on track to become the world’s third largest economy by 2030 – starting negotiations on that deal has been a priority for Luxon, above the other deals he’s focused on so far this term. Luxon even promised in the 2023 election campaign to finalise a deal within his first term of Government – but how likely is that, and what would a deal actually mean for New Zealand? Newstalk ZB political editor Jason Walls is with us to explain what all these agreements, memorandums, and FTAs actually mean. Then Bharat Chawla, chair India New Zealand Business Council, joins us to delve into New Zealand’s relationship with India. Follow The Front Page on iHeartRadio, Apple Podcasts, Spotify or wherever you get your podcasts. You can read more about this and other stories in the New Zealand Herald, online at nzherald.co.nz, or tune in to news bulletins across the NZME network. Host: Chelsea DanielsSound Engineer/Producer: Richard MartinProducer: Ethan SillsSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

The Australian livestock industries now produce high quality product, that is full tracebale, quality assured, with real time market information coming from a sophisticate supply chain that sells into high quality markets with preferential access including 16 FTAs. This has transitioned from an absolute commodity industry with only one free trade agreement, no traceability, national ID system, limited market information and a disconnected supply chain just 30 odd years ago. Today we are joined Jason Strong, a long time advocate and leader in the Australian livestock industries including as the former Managing director of Meat and livestock Australia and former CEO of the AACo, Australia's largest integrated cattle and beef producer, and is the oldest continuously operating company in Australia.Jason sees the greatest opportunity is making progress in areas that are efficiency productivity driven but has other knock on benefits, including the reduction of enteric emissions with the methane emissions from the base cow herd being the greatest challenge and poor reproductive performance being crucial to improving emissions intensity from these cows. Trust is the most critical thing to capitalism on these opportunities.  Send us a text

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The seafood industry isn't making the most of free trade deals.  FTAs with the UK, European Union, and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership eliminated tariffs on some seafood.  However, at the recent Seafood Conference, it was revealed a large part of the industry is still paying.  Seafood New Zealand Chief Executive Lisa Futschek told Mike Hosking they're working to figure out what's causing this problem.  She says it appears to be at the importer end where the paperwork is not being filled in correctly.  LISTEN ABOVE See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

The Ministry of Commerce says China will strive to ensure its network of free trade areas contribute to about 40 percent of total foreign trade by 2030.

Investors in Asia are still processing the news of the sudden passing of Vietnam's long-serving leader, Communist Party Secretary General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong in mid-July. Trong was one of the country's most powerful leaders in decades and had overseen the explosive growth of the Vietnamese economy – during which GDP more than doubled, Vietnam signed several significant foreign trade agreements (FTAs) and became a primary destination for investors' China +1 strategies. He is also behind Vietnam's aggressive anti-corruption campaign, known as the “blazing furnace”, which has taken down several very senior leaders and more recently had been a cause of real concern for foreign investors. His passing marks the end of an era in Vietnamese politics and has many watching closely to see how Vietnam's leadership will be structured. Angela Mancini, Partner, sits down with Steve Wilford, Partner, to discuss what the passing of Trong means for Vietnam and its business environment. Visit www.controlrisks.com/vietnam to contact our experts for an in-depth briefing. If you are looking for more analysis across South East Asia, please visit our South East Asia hub. 

Malaysia is looking to restart negotiations with the European Union on a free trade agreement, 12 years after talks stalled. Is the environment more ripe for an agreement to be reached this time around? We discuss the opportunities and challenges posed by FTAs with former deputy minister of international trade Ong Kian Ming.Image Credit: Shutterstock.com

BUSINESS: DTI to boost exports with partnerships, FTAs | April 18, 2024Subscribe to The Manila Times Channel - https://tmt.ph/YTSubscribe Visit our website at https://www.manilatimes.net Follow us: Facebook - https://tmt.ph/facebook Instagram - https://tmt.ph/instagram Twitter - https://tmt.ph/twitter DailyMotion - https://tmt.ph/dailymotion Subscribe to our Digital Edition - https://tmt.ph/digital Check out our Podcasts: Spotify - https://tmt.ph/spotify Apple Podcasts - https://tmt.ph/applepodcasts Amazon Music - https://tmt.ph/amazonmusic Deezer: https://tmt.ph/deezer Stitcher: https://tmt.ph/stitcherTune In: https://tmt.ph/tunein #TheManilaTimes Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

The chairman of the Australian Cattlemen's Association is in New Zealand looking at Marlborough oysters. We talk about the Rugby World Cup, Eddie Jones, Zanda McDonald Award finalists and FTAs with India and the EU.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Landry Signé, senior fellow in the global economy and development program and the Africa Growth Initiative at the Brookings Institution and executive director and professor of the Thunderbird School of Global Management at Arizona State University, leads the conversation about Africa on the global stage. FASKIANOS: Thank you and welcome to today's session of the Fall 2023 CFR Academic Webinar series. I'm Irina Faskianos, vice president of the National Program and Outreach here at CFR. Today's discussion is on the record and the video and transcript will be available on our website, CFR.org/academic. And, as always, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy. We're delighted to have Landry Signé with us to discuss Africa on the global stage. Dr. Signé is a senior fellow in the global economy and development program and the Africa Growth Initiative at Brookings Institution. He's also a professor, executive director, and the founding codirector of The Globalization 4.0 and Fourth Industrial Revolution Initiative at Arizona State University's Thunderbird School of Global Management, and distinguished fellow at Stanford University's Center for African Studies. He serves as chairman of the Global Network for Africa's Prosperity and is also the author of numerous scholarly publications and several books. His most recent is entitled, Africa's Fourth Industrial Revolution. And it was published by Cambridge University Press this summer. So, Dr. Signé, thank you very much for being with us today. I'm going to throw you a very big question, and you can take us in the direction you would like, by talking about the important challenges and opportunities facing countries across Africa. SIGNÉ: Hello, everyone. And thank you so much, Dr. Irina, for so kind an introduction. It's a pleasure to be with all of you today. So when it comes to Africa, I want to highlight a few key trends why Africa is playing such an important role in the global sphere. So the first thing that I want to share to everyone is Africa's transformation is more substantial than what most people will think. And this is for many reasons. One is that, especially pre-pandemic, trade and in and with the rest of the world have grown for about 300 percent, which exceeds the global average of a little bit less than 200 percent. So that is a key dimension to highlight. And this is also driven by the competition between emerging countries, such as, of course, Russia, Indonesia, Brazil, China, and more established and industrialized nations such as the United States, France, and others. So that is one of the key trends that I want to highlight. So Africa is richer and is transforming much more than what most people will be thinking. So the second trend that I also want to highlight, why Africa is so important in the global sphere, is that by the end of this century Africa could reach about 40 percent of the global population. Listen, I said 40 percent. So this is incredible, especially as the continent represent now only about 17 percent of the global population. So that is a key dimension to take into consideration when speaking about Africa, how Africa engages with the rest of the world. A third trend that I also want to highlight is really the rise of global partnerships and the competition, as I highlighted, between emerging and established powers. So, as a matter of fact, between 2006 and 2016, for example, China trades with Africa surge with imports increasing by 233 percent, and exports increasing by about 53 percent. This is a substantial growth in engagement. And if we compare—so with Russia, for example, it was about 142 percent of change in imports from Africa and about 168 percent change in exports with Africa. So in comparison, and with the rest of the world was only about 56 percent for change in imports and 18 percent for change in export. So this is another key trend. And a country like the United States still needs to expand and to do much more in terms of those engagement. This also apply with—to the countries in the European Union in general. So another trend that I want to highlight is really the, let's say, fast urbanization that we see on the continent. So the continent will be growing from about five cities—will reach about five cities of more than ten million inhabitants, in comparison of only three in 2015. And will exceed fifteen cities of more than five million inhabitants, in comparison of about five to six in the recent year. So another point, when people speak about Africa, I want to speak about industrialization in Africa. Of course, we have to acknowledge the diversity of the continent. Some would say fifty-four member states, because we have about—those other ones recognized by the United Nations. But don't be surprised if you also hear people mentioning instead fifty-five countries, because the Western Sahara is also consider as a member of the African Union. So when speaking about industrialization, people may—some people may consider Africa as deindustrializing. But that is because they're not looking at one of the things that we call at the Brookings Institution industries without smokestacks. Those industries are important because they have similar characteristic when they compare to traditional manufacturing. And those similar characteristics include, for example, the tradability, they are labor intensive, and the store—they absorb a high quantity of moderately skilled workers. But they are also—they also have a high level of productivity. Irina, you mentioned my book on the Fourth Industrial Revolution. I want to connect, because when people speak about digitalization, innovation, they will mostly think about the Silicon Valley. They will think about some of the emerging nations—Israel, India—in addition to the U.S., of course. A key dimension to highlight is that in the 1990s New York City had more mobile phone subscribers than the entire continent of Africa, where now the continent has hundreds of millions of mobile phone subscribers. So in addition, we have disruptive innovations such as mobile banking, with M-PESA, for example, which is a digital application allow—which allow to provide banking services, digital banking services, to African citizens. This is another illustration of the important dynamics with Africa. Let me finish with about two or three additional points, and I'm looking very much forward to the conversation. I will highlight the critical importance of regional integration. We have, for example, the African Continental Free Trade Area, which was adopted in 2018, ratified by a sufficient number of country in 2019, and was officially launched in January 2021. And that is an incredible speed from the signing to the coming into force of the second-largest trade organization in the world, or let's say trade area in the world, after the World Trade Organization, of course, in terms of number of countries. So this is a key dimension. And another trend to highlight, despite some of the challenges that we see in many African countries in terms of democratic retreat. The overall trend is that African citizens want democracy. So they want accountability. But they also want democracy to deliver. And let me finish with a trend related to business. The combined consumer and business spending in Africa will reach or exceed $16 trillion U.S. dollars by 2050, and about $6.7 trillion U.S. dollars by 2030. So Africa really is a place with phenomenal opportunities, despite the challenges that we see. Climate change affects Africa more than other regions, for example. Some of the most vulnerable countries in terms of state fragility. We have, as I also mentioned, some democratic recession. But despite those challenges, the continent is really growing and is really transforming at a very important pace. And I enthusiastically look forward to engaging, to answering your many questions. Thank you so much. FASKIANOS: Thank you very much. That was a great overview. Obviously, this is such a big topic. So now we're going to go to all of you for your questions. (Gives queuing instructions.) Alright, so the first question we're going to take is from Pearl Robinson. Pearl over to you. Q: Hello. Very pleased to meet you. I have a question, something I'm going to ask you to do. I'm at Tufts University. FASKIANOS: Thanks, Pearl. Q: Can you use this wonderful, optimistic introduction, and connect it with a discussion of the wave of coups in the West African Sahel? Because I find myself having to talk about both. And I thought that you began with the last decade's narrative of Africa's growth and opportunities. And today, everybody is talking about democratic decline and all of these coups in the context of everything. So I'd like you to put your talk onto an introduction for me to talk about the coup situation. SIGNÉ: Absolutely. Thank you so much for the question. So I have studied the—also the democratic situation in Africa from the—from the independence to the last decade. And one of the reasons, of course, when you have democratic interruption, there are serious reasons to be concerned. And this is mostly related to the ability of democratic governance to deliver. Typically when democracy is promoted with many of the Africans, one of the key argument which was chose is that democracy allows citizens to have a better standard of living, deliver economic outcomes, education, health, security, good governance, less corruption, among others. And many of the countries which have faced a coup are countries—when you think about Mali, we think about Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, among others—there are countries where citizen are facing serious economic—a serious economic situation, deteriorated by the pandemic, of course. They are not the only country but deteriorated by the pandemic. You also have a question—the security question in the Sahel especially, with violent extremism. But I want to put things in perspective because democratic development is a slow-moving process. And although it is very unfortunate some of the development that you are seeing in terms of coups, when you look at Africa in the long-term perspective, when I was looking, for example, in the 1980s, almost the entire continent was red. Red, meaning authoritarian. But now the majority of African countries have elections. More than half of those country have free, fair, and transparent, meaningful elections. They are able to choose their government. And this so I'd just highlight those point, to say I classify those countries—I had them in four categories. So one was the uninterrupted democracy. So the countries which once they become democracies, they remain uninterrupted democratic. And those countries are outperforming overall, economically speaking and with many of the other benefits of democracy that I've mentioned. But the countries which are interrupted are mostly the countries where democracy is not necessarily delivering wealth. But will that change the broader trend on the continent? I don't think so. So I think, yes, we have to acknowledge those challenges. We have to act vigorously to address them to reduce the negative impact. But those are not necessarily—I don't think that that makes Africa a hopeless continent, as depicted by the Economist in the early 2000s, as discussed before. I'll pause there. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take a written question from Tanisha Fazal's student Jack Drouin, and they're at the University of Minnesota: Will Africa as a whole ever compete at the same level as the United States and China in international trade and production? SIGNÉ: So the idea behind the African continental trade area is to make Africa stronger internationally when dealing with the rest of the world, while unlocking also the potential of trade within Africa. For example, when African countries trade with one another, more than 40 percent of products exported are manufactured products. Which mean that they create jobs and opportunities for young people, for women, for the economy. They accelerate industrialization. And when African countries trade with the rest of the world, about only 17 percent of those countries—of those—of the products exported are manufactured products. So the idea really behind the African Continental Free Trade Area is not just to grow African trade with—and improve countries' trading with one another. But it is also really to make Africa stronger when engaging with other countries. As a matter of fact, Africa still represents less than 3 percent of global exports. So this the reason why when I engage with some leaders, some are wondering if whether the AfCFTA was really needed. There is no doubt that the African Continental Free Trade Area was needed, because partnering and coming together to engage with them makes the continent stronger. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I've never seen so many questions. So I'm going to go next to Fordham IPED. They have their raised hand. It's the International Political Economy and Development Program at Fordham. Q: Hi. My name is Julisha. I'm a student here at Fordham in the IPED Program. And thank you for your presentation, Landry, if I may call you that—I'm sorry, Professor. My question is—and I come from the continent. My question to you is, you seem very optimistic about Africa, as we call it. But why exactly? What gives you this optimism, given the fact that different countries have varying problems, and also we've got different levels of infrastructure and productive capacities? And then also, we haven't had that much success in relation to the regional FTAs. So why optimistic specifically about this one? Should we focus more on maybe building stronger regional bodies and then come together as one consortium? SIGNÉ: Thank you so much for your question. I don't think that it is either/or. And you have to put in perspective also, again, when—I like to look at things from a historical perspective, putting things in context. And when we put things in context—again, I mentioned, for example, before, in less than a couple of decades Africa went from being a continent almost full of authoritarianism, to a continent where in perhaps the past six, seven years you have had an incredibly important number of countries which where the incumbent lost the election or was changed through an electoral process. So those are important gains not to overlook. When we also speak about poverty, for example, so we are also seeing positive—although, and I published an article at Brookings about it—why, despite the fast economic growth just before the pandemic, the continent had an important number of poverty. The key dimension here was poverty in terms of percentage of the population went down, but the continent is also growing at a fast rate, the population of the continent. So which means that even if you're in relative number you have a reduction of poverty, in absolute number we can still have an important number of poor. But if you also put that further in context, by removing—of course, you could not remove them—but by considering Nigeria and Democratic Republic of Congo, which are countries with the highest concentration—not the highest, but an important number of poor, the picture related to poverty on the continent will be very different. Another reason of my lucid optimism is that Africa—more than 50 percent of the African—close to 60 percent of the African population is below the age of twenty-five. So what this means, that everything is possible in an incredibly short duration. You probably know what we have named the Cheetah—what George Ayittey has named the Cheetah Generation. So the generation of young Africans who are dynamic, they are innovative, in opposition to the elephant who are moving slowly. So this is also another characteristic. When you look at innovation and you look at entrepreneurship, the general entrepreneurship survey globally, when you compare Africa to the rest of the world, the percentage of optimism, of interest in innovation, in entrepreneurship, of willingness and of respect for the field is also higher in general. So, again, I understand why most people will be focusing on challenges versus opportunity. But you also know, like me, that when in 2000 the Economist wrote that article about a hopeless Africa, in 2011 they wrote another issue about Africa rising, apologizing about their previous assessment. Because six to seven of the world's ten fastest-growing economies in the first decade—the first fifteen years of the twenty-first century, were located in Africa. So yes, we have numerous challenges. But most countries, which were at the level of development of many of the African countries, have also had challenges. So. yes, we have to address those challenges. And that is also part of what my work does with the Brookings Institution—identifying how to bridge the gap between the policy intentions and the implementation outcome. And a part of doing that is also to shift the mindset from looking exclusively at the challenges that Africa is facing, to also think about what are the opportunities? How can we identify those opportunities? How can we transform those opportunities into reality, into positive outcomes? Because the young generation in Africa deserve it. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next written question from Dayanara Miranda, who's an undergraduate student at Lewis University: My question is, besides agricultural and mineral resources, what other markets can African countries enter to grow their economies? SIGNÉ: So, that is another extremely important question. And let me say, overall Africa—so, it depends as to whether we are speaking about the consumer spending, household consumptions, or whether we are speaking about business spending. In terms of household consumption, by 2030 the continent will receive about $2.5 trillion U.S. dollars of household consumption or consumer spending. And some of the largest sector include food and beverage because people need to eat, but also include housing, healthcare, financial services, transportation, and education. So to put things in perspective, African countries will be growing faster in some of those sectors compared to the growth of other developing economies. Now, if I also think now about the business-to-business spending, so the continent will be home of about—of more than $4 trillion U.S. dollars by 2030. Of course, the largest area for that spending will include agriculture and agri-processing. But we will also have manufacturing, construction, utilities, transportation, wholesalers, and retailers in terms of resources. So, yes, a place—Africa is an important business destination for people who are, again, open to identify opportunities and to manage the risk. Of course, have risk, but those risks also exist in Latin America, exist in the Middle East. exist in the broader—in the broader Asia, and also in the—in some of the advanced economies. So, again, I think, like, a change of mindset is important. One of the reasons why China become the first trade partner of Africa, the first investor in infrastructure amount order, is because while other countries were looking at the challenges that Africa is facing, China and other emerging countries were looking at opportunity and how to manage their risk amount order. Of course, that is not to say that the Chinese model of engagement is necessarily the right one, but it's just to say that the difference of mindset may explain why some country may be identifying more opportunities than other. But I'm also very happy to highlight the fact that recently, the U.S. administration has also been very much active—much more active in terms of engaging with Africa from an economic perspective, from an opportunity business perspective, including the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act. Thank you. FASKIANOS: Thank you. Thank you. I'm going to take the next question from Dorian Brown Crosby. Q: Yes. Hello. Thank you, Professor Signé, for this discussion. I'm from Spelman College. And I do have a question regarding remittances. Can you speak to the current impact of remittances that those in the diaspora are sending to African countries? And how is that affecting Africa's economic trajectory? Or even speak to a specific country. Thank you. SIGNÉ: Absolutely. Thank you very much for the questions. Remittances are playing a key role in Africa. In some of the countries they are exceeding even, let's say, the official development assistance. So that is a key point to highlight. Perhaps the nuance that I want to bring is that most of the remittances are sent for consumption, for family consumptions, among others. A shift that we may want to see happen is to turn—(inaudible)—to increase perhaps those remittances, and especially the category of remittances, shifting only from consumption, for productive use, for economic use, for entrepreneurial activities, as well on the continent. But, yes, remittances are key for development. They are extremely important. They are making a difference. And I connect with that question with the notion of diaspora. The rising role of the diaspora is also one of the key trends. Of course, I didn't—I wanted to be brief in my preliminary comments, but diaspora are really playing a key role in fostering the relations between Africa and the rest of the world. They play the role of investor. You have also the remittances, as you have just mentioned. They are diplomat. In addition of the higher representation that we are also seeing of people of African origin in international organizations, whether we speak about the World Trade Organization, the World Health Organization, the International Finance Corporation, among other. So there's really a trend where the diaspora playing a key role, both financially to remittances and have an increased demand, also for investment. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to combine two questions, two written questions, because they are along the same lines. One from Thomas at Oklahoma State University and Kihoa from Adelphi University, and it has to do with China: China's trade with—China's aid to Africa, is it purely altruistic? Should African states be receiving Chinese aid? And should Africa be giving aid to historically authoritarian regimes? And then the second question is to have you talk a little bit about the Belt and Road Initiative, and how that initiative is influencing trading partners with other Western countries. SIGNÉ: Absolutely. Thank you for the important question. So let me—to further speak about China in Africa, some key trends to highlight is that, first, you have an exponential growth of exports to Africa, increase imports from Africa, substantial lending to African countries. So China is already one of those, the major lending on transport, power, and mining, the Ex-Im Bank is really leading the way in terms of loans. I do prefer to speak about development versus assistance, development finance instead of developing assistance, or on the longer term, a growing trend in terms of FDI. So China is dominating also the important investment on the continent. You have an important presence of Chinese workers, and forgot—not to forget the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, which remains critical to an action of the multiplication of the of the Confucius Institutes on the continent. Despite that important presence, a key element you mentioned is that per Afrobarometer survey, African citizen still prefer the U.S. model of development to the Chinese one. So this is an important dimension that I want to highlight. And whether China is altruistic, it's important to mention when we speak about the commitment, they are not necessarily—China is a country with its own national interests. Perhaps the way of doing business is different, but they are not acting toward Africa, from my perspective, from an altruistic perspective. They're really looking to achieve interest, whether from a geopolitical dimension, economic interest to secure especially energy, power, mining, oceans, agricultural lands for food security in China, among others. And many of the other countries in the world are doing the same. So I'm not—so, of course, we are speaking more about China, but most of the countries when they're acting globally they are acting in alignment of their interests. And probably Jentleson, for example, has mentioned when we speak about the U.S. foreign policy as some of their drivers, which include what are the—of course, we have power, we have peace, we have prosperity, and we have principles. So foreign policy decisions are usually, let's say, the result of a tradeoff between either power consideration, peace consideration, or security consideration, economic consideration, and principle consideration, which could include democratic development, and, of course, humanitarian intervention, and so on. So it depends on which country we are talking about. And to just connect it to the broader Belt and Road Initiative, I think that, of course, it is part from my perspective of China ambition to become the next global power. And in my conversation with many of the African leaders, their main concern—including head of states and head of governments—so their main concern is given the gap, the infrastructure gap that we have on the content, financing gap that you have on the continent, China is providing an alternative and China is acting quickly. However, many of the leaders with whom I'm engaging will prefer to deal instead with, for example, the United States. The United States is probably acting slower than some of the other players. But this is also because of the democratic process and the compliance mechanism, among others. But despite that, I think that there are still tools which can allow to be compliant, to respect the democratic principle, but also act faster, with more agility. And we are having conversations. I testified before the Senate on some of those questions, before the House of Representatives, before the U.S. International Trade Commission, sharing perspective on how the U.S. can further leverage its strength and the alignment to advance U.S.-Africa prosperity. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next oral question from John O'Toole. Q: Well, thank you, because my question directly kind of follows off of that. So that's very fortunate. FASKIANOS: Fantastic. Q: So my question was related to, like, Africa on, like, the global security scale. So, like you said, like, Russia and China are investing heavily, are—and becoming, like, major players, some might argue, in an attempt to be, like, first to market, in a way, in terms of being, like, colleagues with Africa. And you can't really pick and choose who your partners are, especially if the people you want to work with, like the United States or the EU, aren't moving as fast. But is there a concern that growing relationships with China and Russia could morph into a global security conflict? And that some African leaders might be afraid of becoming perhaps the next Lumumba where they're characterized as, you know, perhaps a communist pawn, or something? Is that part of the thought process? SIGNÉ: Thank you for the important question. So it's important to highlight a few considerations here. Typically, when many of the more established powers, whether you're speaking about France, the United States, UK, when they are engaging with many of the African countries they take into consideration the principles that I mentioned before, whether we speak about democratic principles, human rights consideration, humanitarian consideration, among other. So those are really key dimensions that are taken into consideration with more traditional African partners, although it is not uniform. So you will also have the same country which will be trading both with some of the authoritarian countries. But when doing so, they will often bring the question of democratic governance, of human rights in the conversation. And the difference there with countries such as China or Russia, is they are decoupling trade, investment, and principle quotient of democracy—democratic quotients, human rights quotients. For obvious reason, when you look also at your level of democratic development, or at the situation of human rights in your—in your countries. So now, what are the potential risk for the continent? I think that the—many of the—we have seen the presence, whether in an official capacity or in an unofficial capacity of foreign forces in Africa, including from Russia. So to what extent are they influencing the political sphere? To what extent are they fueling or contributing to fuel some of the insecurity and conflict that we have, as we say, in the Sahel? Or to what extent are they helping those country to address some of the challenges faced? I think the growing support that we have seen for Russia, or China, or for some of the emerging countries is related to a narrative, which may not always be founded, but a more appeasing and more respectful narrative that they have when engaging with some of the African countries. But that doesn't mean that they are acting in a way which better advance the interests of those countries. And African leaders are often in a complex situation where they don't necessarily—some of them, of course, will be very clear in terms of their preferences for Western countries. And others, in between, where they want to be certain that they will not be dropped, if I can use the terms. And this is because historically, even some of the best partners of the West—and we look at the case of Niger, when the military coup happened, so despite some political discourses the West was not able to do much. So those are elements which create also a certain level of insecurity on the continent. So yeah, your question is extremely important. And I think that there are risks which are associated with the—with the growing involvement of those emerging powers, like China, especially as it is shifting or has shifted from the economic quotient to a more security, military quotient and cooperation. But some of the countries with which they are cooperating, or perhaps even most of those countries in terms of military engagement, are not necessarily countries with their reputation or leaders with the reputation of—or with the best record in terms of democratic progress or in terms of human rights. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next question from Zachary Billot, a student at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas: How will increased environmental challenges related to climate change impact institution and governmental efficacy in Africa? Can Africa be expected to transition to green energy if there isn't substantial foreign investment? SIGNÉ: Absolutely. It is extremely important. Thank you for the question. It's extremely important to highlight the consequences of climate change on the continent, especially in the fragile countries, in the fragile regions, especially also when combined with governance challenges. So many of the conflicts in the Sahel—and I publish a—I co-published a report with Brookings on the question on how—on the nexus—on the climate change-security-development nexus. So many—if climate change doesn't necessarily—the relation between climate change and conflict is not necessarily causal, but there is a strong correlation at least when it comes to exacerbating initial conditions in regions where you have poverty and where governance is already quite weak. So the question is, yes, climate change is increasing the likelihood of conflict, especially in an area where we already have bad governance, or poor performance. And how to address some of those questions? Of course, we have involved also in drafting the human development—the Sahel Human Development Report, where the topic is on using energy to unlock Africa potential to contribute to sustainable development, how we can leverage in a sustainable way. And, yes, I do believe that the continent has a path. So of course, I will not necessarily disclose the findings, because they will have to be officially launched by the United Nations Development Program later this year, early the next one. But there is a clear path for Africa to achieve a greener future, especially as the continent has, I would say, the luxury of learning from what has been done on the negative experiences of some of the advanced economies. But also on capitalizing on technology to achieve those goals. Now, you mentioned about investment. Yes, that is an area where global partners who have committed, including the United States, France, Canada, among others, to support a greener revolution, economic revolution, energy transition, industrial development on the continent also have to play their part. Of course the global community, the World Bank, the International Finance Corporation, among others. So Africa has the potential to achieve it, but not alone. With the collaboration of global partners, including some of the biggest polluters. FASKIANOS: Great, thank you. I'm going to go next to Alicia Hoffman. Q: Hello. How are you? I have a question regarding some previous legal agreements that were put forth between the ACP countries and the European Union. So my question is, I would like for you to highlight and discuss the role of the comprehensive legal agreements such as the Rome Agreement, that is now defunct, the Lomé Agreement, the Cotonou Agreement and now the post-Cotonou Agreement, which was just finalized last month, and get some of your opinions or your thoughts about the post-Cotonou Agreement in fostering the economic development of African countries. And also mitigating the issues dealing with migration and even human trafficking that kind of were not really addressed clearly in those earlier agreements, such as the Rome, and Lomé, and the Cotonou. SIGNÉ: Thank you so much for the extremely important question. So I think that to put things in context, as you mentioned, the Lomé Agreement, the Cotonou Agreement, and other agreement, when we look—again, I like to look from an historical perspective. So we clearly see that if a single agreement was almost having the impact of a magic stick, Africa will be in a different position now. So all those agreements, of course, and some of those agreements are benefiting, at least per the perspective of some of the African countries, they are benefiting more the European Union countries and France than perhaps, per se, in the absolute term, the African countries. Because many of the key players in those countries in industrial development, among others, are foreign corporations, which are originating from those countries. But let me instead speak in a in a broader perspective. I think that the responsibility for Africa's development really lie primarily with African leaders and citizens. So it's a notion that I think we should really come back to. Of course, when we discuss then the relation within Africa and the rest of the world, Africa has been historically in a situation where it was abused—from slavery, to colonization, and so on. But as you have seen in in my permanent record, I'm also part—most of my work consists not only at looking at those structural asymmetries that we can see on the continent, but at giving back the responsibility, accountability of the African leaders, despite the asymmetrical relation they may be having with some of the other part of the world, still have the power and the responsibility to better deliver for their citizens. So, yes, I think that the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), as I mentioned, also represents an opportunity to address some of those challenges. But, of course, some countries will—we also have the political economy of the AfCFTA, in the sense that some country—and the ones which are the most advanced, economically speaking—the most enthusiastic about accelerating the implementation. But the beauty of the AfCFTA is that they also acknowledge some of the country we may potentially be left behind and have specific growth or special and differential treatments allowing the countries with more challenges to be—to be developed. So, again, I think that, yes, it's extremely important for Africa when engaging with the European Union to really find a configuration which would unlock the industrial development of the continent, and not necessarily just rely on the primary goods, among others. FASKIANOS: So, thank you. I'm you're going next to Charlotte Langeveld, who's a lecturer at Ocean County College: To which identity do the young African people prefer to be associated with, ethnic or national identity? While national identity is superficial and ethnic is real, it has consequences for the future of the continent. SIGNÉ: So yeah, so that is probably a specific survey should be developed and in a systematic way to provide a definitive response to that question. But we have different, again, multiple belonging. Like some African citizens, especially young people, will want to be presented as African, even beyond your nation, or as global citizens. But it is clear that ethnic—the ethnicity continues to play a role on the continent, because although younger Africans speak less than the previous generation local dialects and languages, so it is important to also highlight that it is part of a broader cultural system. So I don't think that it is either/or. So if you think also about citizens of the Africa—of the European Union, are French people considering more French than European, or more European than French? I would say it probably depends, but that multiple belonging remain valid. And although the comparison is slightly different, are Californians believing that they are more Californian than American or are more American than Californian? So, but understanding also the potential implication of the question is that it is extremely important to keep—in nation-building to go beyond the questions or the notions which are dividing, to focus on the common values, and systems. So I don't think that's a problem for young people to have multiple belongings or ideas of belonging. What is—what could be a bad thing is to use those differences for discrimination, for poor governance, among others. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to go next to Kimberly Pace. Q: Hello, Landry. It's nice to see you. I have—my question is—hi, University of Alaska, Anchorage. My question is regarding women and girls. My question is, you know, given the role that violent extremism has had in Africa, what is the effect—what do you think is the effect on the economic and political opportunities for girls and women across African countries? Would love to hear your response. SIGNÉ: Absolutely. Hello, Kimberly. And so great to see you. And so I'm looking forward to following up after this session. So this is an extremely important question. There is no future of Africa without a full acknowledgement of the critical importance of women and girls, and not just economically speaking, politically speaking, in all the spheres of society. Just speaking economically, the gross domestic product of the content in some country could be increased by more than 50 percent with the full—or, about 50 percent—increase from 2 to 48, 49 percent with the full integration of women in society, in the economy, among other. So, and it is incredibly painful to see how in some countries, especially in situations of conflict, some of the first victim—the main victims, are girls, are women, or young people in as well, in general. So it is therefore extremely important, I think, to further empower women. But when you speak about empowering women, most people will think about empowering them politically, in particular. But for my conversation with many heads of state—former head of states, including President Banda or President Gurib-Fakim, so in our conversation it appear clearly that one of the best way to empower women politically is first to empower them also economically. Because when you're empowered economically you can organize a campaign, you can be a fully contributing member, and you can be independent. So, yes, addressing conflict, human rights challenges, will be a way to further protect women, because when you have war, when you have civil conflict, they are typically the most vulnerable people and they are often the one who are the most abused by a protagonist. So yeah. So I fully concur to the fact that we have to act in a more vigorous way to protect women, to create opportunities for women, and to empower women. And some of my best models, not to say most, are women. And starting with my mother, my sisters, and yeah. So I couldn't agree more with you. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next question from William Decourt, who's at Hamilton Lugar School at Indiana University: You mentioned surveys indicating widespread support for democracy across the continent. How have you seen public opinion in Africa responding to or shaping norms of liberal governance on the continent? And has it been affected by other challenges, such as the recent coups, influence from Russian mercenaries, and perhaps from increased Chinese investment too? SIGNÉ: So, just to be certain that I understand, and thank you so much for the important questions, is also about some of the trends on the continent related to democratic support, and the overall political situations. One of the reasons, and please, Irina, feel free to engage and follow up as needed. So one of the reasons why we have seen coups, of course, some—you have to put things in context. I mentioned that before. Many of the African citizens really want democracy to deliver. And not just democracy to deliver—if you live in rural contexts. At the origin of modern states is the social contract, which require that while a citizen will be giving up some of your fundamental—some of your rights, you will receive in exchange from states basic public services and goods, including security, economic opportunities, among others. But when those are not delivered, whether in a democracy or in a nondemocratic regime, that is when you have more challenges. Which could lead in some cases to a military coup, as we have seen, because then coup leaders may justify that—may justified their action by the imperative of restoring security or bringing about economic opportunities. So I think that is a point that I first want to highlight, to insist on the fact that, yeah, so the—those surveys show that on one hand, Africans want democracy. On the other hand, they want those democracies to deliver. And sometime even in democratic countries, some leaders are not necessarily governing in the way which is aligned with accountability. And those are the reasons why some coup leaders will also be supported by some citizens as an alternative, not to restore a long-term authoritarian system, but perhaps organize a transition. But from my perspective, it's one of the reasons why I think that—for many reasons. But one of the key reasons why I think coups even in a very contested context are extremely bad is one of the best predictors of a coup is a previous coup. So once military got involved in politics, even after a successful short-term transition and return to power to the civilians, the likelihood of having another coup is high. So that is one of the reasons why I think it's very important to invest in citizen, and invest in democratic development, and also invest in making democratic countries, African democracies, African democratic countries, deliver better for their citizens. FASKIANOS: Well, Landry, we are unfortunately out of time. And I apologize to all of you who had wonderful questions, we could not possibly get to them all, and raised hands. So we will just have to continue the conversation, and organize another conversation around these important issues. But, Landry Signé, thank you very much for being with us today. We really appreciate your comments and your analysis. And you can follow Landry on X, the app formerly known as Twitter, at @LandrySigne. It's spelled S-I-G-N-E. And our next Academic Webinar will be on Wednesday, October 25, at 1:00 p.m. (EDT) with Stephen Biddle, who's an adjunct senior fellow here at CFR and professor at Columbia University, to talk about military strategy in the contemporary world. And in the meantime, I'd encourage you to learn about CFR paid internships for students and fellowships for professors at CFR.org/Careers. Please visit CFR.org, ForeignAffairs.com, and ThinkGlobalHealth.org. We have been posting a lot of content there in light of the Israeli-Hamas conflict. So there are a lot of resources on our homepage that I commend to all of you. And again, Landry Signé, thank you very much for being with us today. SIGNÉ: Thank you so much, Irina. And thank you so much for the wonderful questions, conversation, and to the incredible team which has put everything together. FASKIANOS: Thank you. (END)

The Lakers are looking much more like a good bet to finish in the West's top 10, a big change from a month ago when the Lakers were staring down the barrel of weeks without LeBron James available to play. But they went 8-5 in his absence, managed to stay right in the thick of things in a Western Conference that just refuses prosperity, and actually still could finish as high as sixth if things break the right way and the Lakers run, or mostly run, the table.LeBron said himself after Sunday's loss that he was certainly inspired to crank up the rehab to 11 in order to try and get back on the floor, given how well the team was hanging in. It had an impact. And had the Lakers lost their first six or so games after his injury, that calculus would have (rightly) changed.So with all that in mind, should he have communicated a little better with the team about his recovery? They seemed to sort of know he was on the mend (they know he's working out, for example), knew enough to upgrade him to doubtful on Saturday (which is actually a big needle move, indicating there's a chance he could play) then questionable on Sunday morning. So was the seemingly rocky game plan a result of the Lakers being caught with their proverbial pants down? Should they have had a plan in place for whatever game in which James returned? Multiple plans for multiple scenarios?And what about Anthony Davis. Eight shots against the Bulls, part of a pattern where in too many games, Davis simply doesn't get enough shots up. And when the FGAs go down, so do the FTAs. Not a good formula for a team that needs as much offense as it can generate.And Pat Bev did Pat Bev stuff, and for the day at least, got to relish in it. But what's the deal with the toilet paper thing?HOSTS: Andy and Brian KamenetzkySEGMENT 1: The Lakers really do have a chance to make a little noise, and that influenced LeBron's rehab.SEGMENT 2: Why isn't AD consistently getting 20 shots a night?SEGMENT 3: Pat Bev, trolling even when he's not technically trolling.Support Us By Supporting Our Sponsors!Built BarBuilt Bar is a protein bar that tastes like a candy bar. Go to builtbar.com and use promo code “LOCKEDON15,” and you'll get 15% off your next order.Ultimate Pro Basketball GMTo download the game just visit probasketballgm.com or look it up on the app stores. Our listeners get a 100% free boost to their franchise when using the promo LOCKEDON (ALL CAPS) in the game store.PrizePicksFirst time users can receive a 100% instant deposit match up to $100 with promo code LOCKEDON. That's PrizePicks.com – promo code; LOCKEDONFanDuelMake Every Moment More. Don't miss the chance to get your No Sweat First Bet up to ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS in Bonus Bets when you go FanDuel.com/LOCKEDON.FANDUEL DISCLAIMER: 21+ in select states. First online real money wager only. Bonus issued as nonwithdrawable free bets that expires in 14 days. Restrictions apply. See terms at sportsbook.fanduel.com. Gambling Problem? Call 1-800-GAMBLER or visit FanDuel.com/RG (CO, IA, MD, MI, NJ, PA, IL, VA, WV), 1-800-NEXT-STEP or text NEXTSTEP to 53342 (AZ), 1-888-789-7777 or visit ccpg.org/chat (CT), 1-800-9-WITH-IT (IN), 1-800-522-4700 (WY, KS) or visit ksgamblinghelp.com (KS), 1-877-770-STOP (LA), 1-877-8-HOPENY or text HOPENY (467369) (NY), TN REDLINE 1-800-889-9789 (TN) Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

The Lakers are looking much more like a good bet to finish in the West's top 10, a big change from a month ago when the Lakers were staring down the barrel of weeks without LeBron James available to play. But they went 8-5 in his absence, managed to stay right in the thick of things in a Western Conference that just refuses prosperity, and actually still could finish as high as sixth if things break the right way and the Lakers run, or mostly run, the table. LeBron said himself after Sunday's loss that he was certainly inspired to crank up the rehab to 11 in order to try and get back on the floor, given how well the team was hanging in. It had an impact. And had the Lakers lost their first six or so games after his injury, that calculus would have (rightly) changed. So with all that in mind, should he have communicated a little better with the team about his recovery? They seemed to sort of know he was on the mend (they know he's working out, for example), knew enough to upgrade him to doubtful on Saturday (which is actually a big needle move, indicating there's a chance he could play) then questionable on Sunday morning. So was the seemingly rocky game plan a result of the Lakers being caught with their proverbial pants down? Should they have had a plan in place for whatever game in which James returned? Multiple plans for multiple scenarios? And what about Anthony Davis. Eight shots against the Bulls, part of a pattern where in too many games, Davis simply doesn't get enough shots up. And when the FGAs go down, so do the FTAs. Not a good formula for a team that needs as much offense as it can generate. And Pat Bev did Pat Bev stuff, and for the day at least, got to relish in it. But what's the deal with the toilet paper thing? HOSTS: Andy and Brian Kamenetzky SEGMENT 1: The Lakers really do have a chance to make a little noise, and that influenced LeBron's rehab. SEGMENT 2: Why isn't AD consistently getting 20 shots a night? SEGMENT 3: Pat Bev, trolling even when he's not technically trolling. Support Us By Supporting Our Sponsors! Built Bar Built Bar is a protein bar that tastes like a candy bar. Go to builtbar.com and use promo code “LOCKEDON15,” and you'll get 15% off your next order. Ultimate Pro Basketball GM To download the game just visit probasketballgm.com or look it up on the app stores. Our listeners get a 100% free boost to their franchise when using the promo LOCKEDON (ALL CAPS) in the game store. PrizePicks First time users can receive a 100% instant deposit match up to $100 with promo code LOCKEDON. That's PrizePicks.com – promo code; LOCKEDON FanDuel Make Every Moment More. Don't miss the chance to get your No Sweat First Bet up to ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS in Bonus Bets when you go FanDuel.com/LOCKEDON. FANDUEL DISCLAIMER: 21+ in select states. First online real money wager only. Bonus issued as nonwithdrawable free bets that expires in 14 days. Restrictions apply. See terms at sportsbook.fanduel.com. Gambling Problem? Call 1-800-GAMBLER or visit FanDuel.com/RG (CO, IA, MD, MI, NJ, PA, IL, VA, WV), 1-800-NEXT-STEP or text NEXTSTEP to 53342 (AZ), 1-888-789-7777 or visit ccpg.org/chat (CT), 1-800-9-WITH-IT (IN), 1-800-522-4700 (WY, KS) or visit ksgamblinghelp.com (KS), 1-877-770-STOP (LA), 1-877-8-HOPENY or text HOPENY (467369) (NY), TN REDLINE 1-800-889-9789 (TN) Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

Vietnamese authorities are expediting negotiations over new free trade agreements (FTAs) with markets that the country has yet to tap.

In this episode, we talked about 1. Migration centric development (1:14) 2. Foreign universities, India campus (26:34) 3. Realignment towards FTAs (40:47) Made with love by Shubham Vyas, Siddharath Sigroha and Raj Krishna.. Thanks for tuning it

Over the years, Vietnam has emerged as a promising country for many international investors thank to its strong annual economic growth and key factors that contribute to this success – namely a stable political system, a young and dynamic workforce, a low wage economy and a growing middle class. While there are still concerns about the investment environment in Vietnam, the Vietnamese mergers and acquisitions (M&A) market has seen an increasing number of financial and strategic investments, leading to a sharp rise in the total transaction value. How it works and what are the opinions of the German experts from legal and investment perspectives? In our podcast episode, Mr. Martin Seybold - Attorney-at-Law, Luther LLP to have a conversation with our Host, Mr. Marko Walde – Chief Representative of AHK Vietnam, sharing about their perspectives on various aspects of M&A in Vietnam, including commercial issues, legal frameworks and impacts of FTAs. We will have an overview of the M&A transactions in Vietnam, understand the pros and cons of Due Diligence and what are the opportunities and the challenges of EVFTA. ❗❗❗Download and Enjoy Listening!

Aashish Chandorkar is a Public Policy Commentator, Entrepreneur, and Management Consultant who has been published in leading media publications like BBC, Times of India, Economic Times, Swarajya, and more. Aashish has a deep interest on trade, geopolitics, and industrial policy. Join this channel to get access to perks:https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCfBf... 0:00 - Sneak peek1:07 - Introductions1:50 - Why is trade important for economy?4:31 - Post-COVID trade and how India can improve exports9:06 - Role of old trade linkages in the modern world21:03 - India in comparision to growth of other Asian countries24:10 - Import substitution explained25:47 - The role of global trade organizations29:26 - Constraints that international trade organizations have to handle37:20 - Companies that have benefited from joining international trade organizations38:19 - India's position in global trade today40:10 - Significance of FTAs for international trade41:51 - Optimism for India's trade growth45:35 - Closing comments47:15 - Conclusion

Pricing is all about value. The more you give, the more you win. This is a very simple concept, yet it is not as easy as it sounds. In today's digital age, it can be easy to fall into the trap of trying to be everything to everybody. It's important to remember that by setting boundaries and charging accordingly, can help you create a stronger brand and a stronger business. This Sales on the Rocks episode is here to tell you why you don't need a million and one offers to reach your revenue goals, how scarcity works in sales and why it is so damn effective as well as how to properly execute the scarcity tactic with your business and the first few things you should be tracking and monitoring after hiring a salesperson.What's in JJ's glass: Parker's Heritage Collection | Heaven Hill DistilleryThis Cast Covers: JJ went on a wine-tasting tour that used a reverse psychology scarcity tactic on them (03:28)Is this scarcity tactic something that you can also spin in B2B sales or more for D2C only? (06:01)Joey exposes Bugatti for incorporating the scarcity tactic really well in their sales (07:27)Stuff we said we'd never do but are now doing (12:19) The most advantageous way to package your services and why less is more is always the way to go (17:05)A problem JJ keeps noticing with the clients they work with wherein they can't or won't execute the sales management training we've given them (21:54)Why founders and business owners either overlook the sales accountability tools we give them despite training and coaching them on how to use them (23:24)A solution Joey proposes that's honestly the most basic and non-negotiable activity you need to do if you want to fix this issue (24:17)Joey and JJ workshop through how to train salespeople using a phased on-ramp and what trainers should be looking for from one phase to the next (26:17)Activities Joey would love to see sales reps doing in the first couple of weeks of their training (27:40)Why it's important to not only track activities but also focus on measuring the outcomes of those activities, such as the number of FTAs booked (28:54)This same kind of measuring and tracking activities and outcomes of sales reps can also be used in our timeline with clients (31:33)Defining the win at different stages in the engagement is a mappable application (31:53)Joey and JJ go into a semi-deliberation between two candidates who are gunning for the closer role at SDA (36:23) If we both had to make a decision today, who would we pick from the two (45:46)Why JJ actually liked trying to sell the role to the candidate because it feels like the candidate has the upper hand (47:04)Joey puts JJ on the spot with this question: What's it like making as much money as you're making now? (50:27)Generosity is a great metric of mastery over money (20:59)Joey's core focuses or thoughts around generosity (23:10)Having a purpose for your money (25:41)Additional Resources:The Sales Driven AgencyThe Best Damn Agency Mastermind

How is ESG impacting global trade relations? Moderator: Rem Korteweg, Senior Research Fellow, Clingendael Institute Panellists: Emily Rees, Senior Fellow at ECIPE and Managing Director at Trade Strategies Marie Kasperek, Executive Director of the Institute of International Economic Law (IIEL) at Georgetown University Law Vasuki Shastry, Associate Fellow, Asia-Pacific Programme, Chatham House This podcast episode was recorded on 17 June 2022 The 2022 edition of the AIG Global Trade Series explores the competition and connectedness that characterise the current trade landscape. In this podcast, Rem Korteweg (Senior Research Fellow, Clingendael Institute) is joined by Emily Rees (Senior Fellow at ECIPE and Managing Director at Trade Strategies); Marie Kasperek (Executive Director of the Institute of International Economic Law (IIEL) at Georgetown University Law; and Vasuki Shastry (Associate Fellow, Asia-Pacific Programme, Chatham House). Listen as they discuss the normative side of trade: Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), Values and Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) criteria. ESG plays an increasingly important role in bilateral and multilateral trade agreements. As geopolitics continues to impact the global trade landscape, there is an increasing US and EU focus on developing a values-based trade agenda. How is the introduction of ESG criteria impacting global trade relations? And what role do values play in shaping contemporary trade ties? Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this podcast series are those of the speakers and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of American International Group, Inc. or its subsidiaries or affiliates (“AIG”). Any content provided by our speakers are of their opinion and are not intended to malign any religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual or anyone or anything. AIG makes no representations as to accuracy, completeness, correctness, or validity of any information provided during this podcast series and will not be liable for any errors, omissions, or delays in this information or any losses injuries, or damages arising from its use.

There is a new acronym in the alphabet soup of legislation acronyms in Congress: the SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP Act. The bill seeks Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) to be paired with approval of the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program in hopes to pass new Free Trade agreements (FTAs) as soon as possible (ASAP)

Stephanie Honey is a trade policy consultant and former New Zealand trade negotiator. She focuses on digital trade and services, Asia-Pacific regional economic integration, the WTO, agriculture, and inclusion in trade. Stephanie serves as Deputy Executive Director of the APEC Business Advisory Council, Associate Director of the New Zealand International Business Forum, and is the co-founder of Global Trade Insights, a business offering executive education in trade policy. Today, she discusses digital trade, the latest developments in digital trade in FTAs, and the WTO e-commerce negotiations. --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/tradeexperettes/message

Q1: The govt has deferred the plan to privatise public sector banks, as the legal amendments have not been made yet. Do you think privatisation of PSBs is an idea whose time has come? Do you think the RBI should relax criterion to allow corporates, especially those with experience in finance business to participate in the privatisation process? Ans: >India needs a larger, stronger, Atmanirbhar financial services sector >It is for the regulators to decide the right way to achieve a strong financial services sector  >Good-quality corporate players should be allowed to enter the financial services industry >RBI should build a discussion around what the future of lending looks like   Q2: There have been hiccups in the current privatisations of PSUs that have been announced recently, like Central Electronics Ltd and Pawan Hans. Do you think that process should be strengthened and rigorus criteria should be in place to screen bidders for other PSUs as well that have been put on block?  Ans: >Need a transparent, clear well-thought-out consistent process for privatisation >The intent of the government is, it should not be in business >There are sensitivities involved. So, some of these things take time     Q3: Post FDI hike in insurance, do you think more needs to be to attract foreign capital in the sector? Ans: >Don't have a domestic financial sector that is strong enough to support India's growth opportunity >India can become the manufacturing hub of the world, because of the changing nature of geopolitics >Foreign capital finds the best risk-reward geography over a period of time >Capital must help create a strong domestic financial services industry, led by banking, asset management, insurance and pension     Q4: What more financial sector reforms need to be undertaken in India? Ans: >Expand banking to increase financial inclusion >Need to take banking closer to people, and digital tools can make a significant benefit >Need to provide capital to small and medium scale enterprises and explore export opportunities >With the government signing FTAs, we need to ensure capital is easily available to companies >India needs few large banks to strategically help large companies that have built necessary capabilities and are looking to build new capacities overseas >Insurance sector has gathered a large amount of assets, which need to be put to productive use >Move assets from govt securities to fund startups, infrastructure projects and create a viable corporate bond market in India     Q5: Mr Bajaj, CII has given a range of GDP estimates for FY23 based on three oil price scenarios. In this scenario of 7.4-8.2 per cent growth rate, do you think growth may be closer to the upper end or lower end? Ans: >If oil price stays around $100 level (per barrel), then I think closer to 8% is what we can look at >Rise in the interest rate and how often it happens will depend on the prevailing inflation >Inflation is partly dependent on fuel prices >Govt should cut taxes on fuel in a collaborative manner between the centre and the states >A normal monsoon is expected this year, which can arrest inflation   Q6: What sort of a magnitude of impact of inflation are you seeing India Inc going face on its margin? And: >Impact of inflation on margins will differ from sector to sector >Corporate margins have got compressed partly, in the last two quarters, because of rising input cost >That's why some amount of price rise is passed on to the customers

Free trade agreements are the cornerstone of any strong economy. With India's policymaking and foreign policy shifting toward becoming the next manufacturing hub, FTAs are integral for our growth into the next global superpower. Today, we have our guests Rahul Bajoria and Nirav Kanodra. Rahul is the Chief Economist at Barclays, focusing on Asia–Pacific, with a special emphasis on India's macroeconomy and policy making. Nirav is an investment banker based out of Singapore with extensive experience in sales and trading. He is also considered a prominent voice when it comes to macroeconomic issues. In this episode, they speak about topics such as the significance of FTAs and their use as a strategic tool, how FTAs can ensure optimal economic growth, Indo-Australia agreement, future FTAs that India might sign, and more.

The former NZ Special Agricultural Trade Envoy and former Beef + Lamb chair is a Hawke's Bay sheep and beef farmer and an "ethical carbon farmer" these days. Today we talk carbon farming and FTAs and why Australia has 26 to our 16? See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Not(PolicyWTF): Trade Deals Are GoodThis section looks at policies that are surprisingly sane.- RSJWe signed a trade deal with Australia yesterday. For over a decade now, we have been trying to get this going. The deal falls just short of a free trade agreement (FTA) but that’s a minor quibble that should get sorted in future. Australia’s desire to reduce its dependence on China as the primary trading partner and India’s willingness to have a stronger link with the Quad on economic matters seem to have brought the deal to fruition. There is a small matter of upcoming national elections in Australia too where the economy will play a key role in setting the agenda. The deal is significant in what it signals about the Indian government’s view on global trade. For the past few years, we have gone on and on about atmanirbhar Bharat whose primary manifestation was an increase in import duties across a range of goods taking us back to the pre-liberalisation era. We have lamented about this wrong turn. As Pranay argues we must focus on atmashakti instead of atmanirbharta. So, reading the key terms of the deal warms my heart. As Reuters reports:“The deal with India removes tariffs on more than 85% of Australian goods exports to India, worth A$12.6 billion, rising to almost 91% over 10 years. Tariffs will be scrapped on sheep meat, wool, copper, coal, alumina, fresh Australian rock lobster, and some critical minerals and non-ferrous metals to India.It will see 96% of Indian goods imports enter Australia duty-free.”That’s good. What’s better was the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) that India signed last month with the UAE. There were the usual agreements on tariffs and duties which is in line with the agreement with Australia. From Mint:“The CEPA between India and the UAE covers almost all the tariff lines dealt in by India (11,908 tariff lines) and the UAE (7581 tariff lines) respectively. India will benefit from preferential market access provided by the UAE on over 97% of its tariff lines which account for 99% of Indian exports to the UAE in value terms, especially for all labour-intensive sectors such as Gems and Jewellery, Textiles, leather, footwear, sports goods, plastics, furniture, agricultural and wood products, engineering products, medical devices, and Automobiles. India will also be offering preferential access to the UAE on over 90% of its tariff lines, including lines of export interest to the UAE.As regards trade in services, India has offered market access to the UAE in around 100 sub-sectors, while Indian service providers will have access to around 111 sub-sectors from the 11 broad service sectors.”But the eye-popping section in this agreement was on government procurement where the UAE based companies will be treated on par with domestic companies. This is a first and quite remarkable when you consider India hasn’t even signed the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) as a member of WTO. UAE companies will now have the ability to bid for government contracts of value greater than Rs. 200 Crs while being seen as an equivalent to a domestic company. The unwillingness to agree on government procurement has stalled other FTAs between India and the EU, UK, and Japan. So, the UAE agreement appears like a watershed moment.There has been the usual noise in some quarters about how this will impact the domestic producers, but that swadeshi lobby has been having it good for the last few years. So, maybe they will have to lump it this time. Having sat out of the RCEP much to my disappointment and raising the protectionist rhetoric in the past few years, these two agreements signal a shift in the government’s thinking. This is for the good. Indian manufacturers must see the world as their market. They must learn to compete with the best in domestic markets, improve the quality of their products and use the existing factor cost advantage to win in global markets. Also, opening up government procurement to suppliers from other countries will help improve the quality of government projects. The shoddiness we have come to associate with such projects owes its origins to colonial-era L1 (lowest cost) guidelines that are being dismantled, and to the jugaad mindset that’s prevalent among the suppliers to the government. Things can only get better if there is a global competition for such projects with best-in-class project management and governance practices. And like we have often argued here, voluntary trade doesn’t happen between countries. People transact with one another. And all voluntary trade is a win-win as has been demonstrated over and over again. The Indian consumer will eventually benefit.There is also a geostrategic element to these trade deals. Closer integration with Australia on the eastern Quad and stronger relations with Israel and UAE on the so-called ‘western’ QUAD are good measures to build a counter to China on trade. They also provide these countries with access to India and the Indian subcontinent markets. Lastly, stronger trade integration is the best counterweight to bigotry in domestic politics. There is no credible domestic political force that’s left that can stem the tide on this. We need global markets and trade deals for growth. And closer economic cooperation with other nations will mean a responsibility to behave well on the domestic front. It may sound optimistic at this stage. But in the long run, global trade and the broader trend of decentralisation are the key countervailing forces to a fast-narrowing domestic polity.But…—Pranay KotasthaneThe trade agreements with the UAE and Australia deserve praise. However, my worry stems from inadequate state capacity. A multilateral trade agreement is useful also because it can override points of bilateral contention. Moreover, multilateral agreements also make it easier for a government to convince its domestic stakeholders (recall Putnam’s paper Diplomacy and Domestic Politics). India seems to have opted for a bilateral approach instead where it will fine-tune the deal specifics with countries. Such an approach will be protracted. It will face opposition from domestic lobbies, who will want to keep their products out of deals with states having competing suppliers. Finally, this approach would require immense and sustained political, intellectual, and administrative capacity. Without building this capacity, the Commerce and External Affairs ministries are likely to satisfice rather than maximise. So, I remain sceptical of the outcomes. India Policy Watch: The Paradoxes of India’s Westernophobia Insights on burning policy issues in India- Pranay KotasthaneOnce again, the Russia-Ukraine war has brought India's geopolitical stance into focus. The last two weeks witnessed visits by delegations from the US, UK, European Union, Japan, Russia, and China. High profile visits by the Russian and Chinese foreign ministers, in particular, have led to heated debates about India's position. Some commentators in the West see these visits as further proof of India's Westernophobia. In contrast, some Indian commentators interpret that the Russia-India-China (RIC) grouping is not dead after all.I think Westernophobia is self-defeating and RIC is good riddance. What K Subrahmanyam said with characteristic incisiveness in a Pragati interview fourteen years ago still remains a sound principle for guiding India’s foreign policy:“India has to leverage this situation and change the US-EU-China triangle into a rectangle. Until then it is in our interest to help America to sustain its pre-eminence. After all, in a three-person game, If America is at Number One, China is at Number Two and we are lower down, it is in our best interest to ensure that it is America that remains Number One.”With intense US-China contestation in play, the convergence of interests and values between the West and India is at an all-time high. A deeper collaboration with the West is critical for improving India’s economic, technological, and security futures. China and the East Asian countries benefited massively from a deeper relationship with the West over the last forty years. India now has the opportunity to play the same game. Nevertheless, it does seem that a streak of Westernophobia, particularly its subset anti-Americanism, still exists in India. Why so? Let’s explore. In my view, we should begin the analysis of India-US relationship using a tri-axis framework: state-to-state relations, state-to-people relations, and people-to-people relations.As far as state-to-state relations are concerned, I’m less worried. India’s foreign policy establishment of India adroitly shifted its weight behind the Quad 2.0 as the China threat increased. With Pakistan having moved itself out of the equation, the job of the US and Indian officials has become far easier than it was in the past. The sensible statements made by the US spokespersons in response to India’s stance on Russia in the UN are indicative of the mutual understanding and trust between the two sides. On the people-to-people relationship, there was never any doubt in the first place. On this front, ties between the West and India are absolutely no match for the ties between India and Russia or India and China. Indian elites’ reference network for everything from music to education is American. There is a robust movement of ideas, people, goods and services that has outpaced the state-to-state relationship for nearly three decades. This twitter thread by Brookings Senior Fellow Tanvi Madan gives a good idea of the deep connections.It’s the state-to-people axis which is problematic. Many Indians still seem to harbour a deep frustration with the American state. Charges of unreliability (hint: the 1971 War) or hypocrisy (hint: Afghanistan) always make an appearance in casual discussions on India-US relations. The lesson people derive from such arguments is that if India were to throw its weight behind the US, it would get sucked into fighting America’s wars all over the world, only to be ditched by the US in one fell swoop soon after.Here on, let’s focus on this third axis—the state-people relationship. Without going into the psychoanalytical reasons for why we think this way, there are three paradoxes implicit in this anti-American strand that I want to emphasise. Paradox 1: Vishwaguru and VictimThe flurry of official diplomatic visits over the last two weeks has filled some Indians with pride. Notwithstanding India’s poor and declining economic potential over the last decade, many seriously believe that India’s concurrence is indispensable for any future global order. And that all sides desperately need the vishwaguru on their side. The paradox is that the same people also hold the view that India is a victim of circumstances at the global stage. Hence, it should neither call out Russia’s invasion and revisionism for fear of losing cover in the UN or military supplies, nor should it ally with the US lest it becomes a mere pawn in the global machinations of an unreliable superpower.Clearly, only one of these conceptions can be true. Either way, the conclusion remains the same: India need not stick to its old stance of non-alignment. If India truly is a swing power, it has enough leverage to go against its partners without necessarily facing the worst consequences. It can partner with the US without necessarily committing itself to all the global wars that America indulges itself in. It can also call out the Russian invasion for what it is, without the fear of a proportional retaliation from Russia. On the other hand, if the dominant conception is that India is a victim of global machinations, gaining economic and military power in the shortest possible time remains the only way out. This approach again needs collaboration with richer and more powerful countries with which we have no major divergence on interests and values i.e. the West.Paradox 2: Three is Better than TwoMany Indians seriously believe that a closer India-Russia partnership can wean Russia away from China. Hence, they argue that the answer to India’s current problems lies not in collaborating with the West, but by reinvigorating the Russia-India-China grouping. This argument is often couched under multipolarity mumbo-jumbo that I fail to grasp.It is a paradox for two reasons. First, India’s ability to influence the Russia-China collaboration is exaggerated. India’s GDP per capita is a fifth of both Russia and China. The Russia-India partnership is a single-tracked one, relying on one way movement of defence goods. Contrast that with Russia’s China dependence, which is set to rise further due to the economic sanctions. There’s no scenario in which India would be able to drive a wedge between Russia and China on its own accord. Second, the notion that Russia and China would create a world order that is in India’s interests is truly fantastical. With RIC, the successor to the West’s unipolarity will not be multipolarity, but a Sinocentric world order. Paradox 3: Silent Majority vs the Vocal MinorityThe Westernophobia seen on India Twitter might not be a true representation of the state-to-people axis. I say this based on the first edition of the Global Outlook Survey conducted by my colleagues at Takshashila. To a question ‘Which of these bilateral relationships is the most important for India to achieve its strategic objectives?’, 64 per cent of the non-expert survey takers answered India-US. Russia came a distant second at 10 per cent. Notably, the survey sample is skewed towards the young (63 per cent of recipients) and towards South and West India (57 per cent of recipients). To another question ‘What sort of international order best serves India’s interests?’, 84 per cent of the non-expert respondents opted for ‘a multipolar order with an expanded UNSC’. These two data points highlight an interesting dynamic. While many Indians consider the India-US partnership as supremely important, they also believe that the current world order is inimical to India’s interests. Therein lies an opportunity for the US. Backing India’s inclusion in UNSC, reducing barriers for technology transfer to India, and deeper technology alliance might make the vocal minority irrelevant. In any case, resolving these three paradoxes on the state-to-people axis is a key policy challenge for India.I want to end this essay with a question for all of you: what event, decision, or circumstance would make you reverse your current thinking on the India-Russia relationship? India Policy Watch: Nehru-Jinnah DebatesInsights on burning policy issues in India- RSJI was reading Nehru: The Debates That Defined India by Adeel Hussain and Tripurdaman Singh this week. The book has Nehru debating four of his contemporaries with whom he had differences about the fundamental question of the idea of India. Two things struck me. One, the civility of exchanges that were otherwise marked by huge differences in views. Two, how the fundamental questions of that era (1930-50) remain relevant today. In many ways, they have come back to bite us. I will touch upon some of the debates in other editions. The book is a must-read.Today, I will reproduce extracts from the book on the Nehru-Jinnah debate about the question of Muslim representation in a democratic India. I have touched upon this in a previous edition. Quoting from the book:“In Nehru’s view, the Hindu-Muslim problem or communalism was at its core a problem of ‘upper middle-class people’ who only made up a small fraction of the Indian population. If the ‘mass elements take part in the election of the constituent assembly’, communal issues would ‘recede into the background’. Broadly secular in his political outlook, Nehru never warmed to the idea that religion deserved a place in progressive politics. ‘The so-called Hindu-Muslim problem,’ Nehru disclosed his position in usual frankness, ‘is not a genuine problem concerning the masses, but it is the creation of self-seekers, job-hunters, and timid people, who believe in British rule in India till eternity.’For Nehru, therefore, it was telling that Muslim politicians preferred to discuss the communal question from a numerical perspective and connect it to reserved seats in the legislature or the colonial administration. Nehru openly raged against the Communal Award of 1932, the chief institution that the British had established to ensure the retention of separate electorates for Indian Muslims. At its core, Nehru saw reservations opposed to the egalitarian principles of nationalism.‘It is absurd to consider this question [of communalism] from the point of view of numbers,’ Nehru declared in the presence of Jinnah. ‘If there was a question of numbers we thirty five crores [350 million] of people would not have become a slave country being dominated by a small number of people in Britain.’Against the Nehru Report (on Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms), Jinnah proposed his Fourteen Points, which sought, among other things, a federal constitutional make-up of India with residual power vested in the provinces, a fixed Muslim representation in the Central legislature and the upholding of separate electorates. However, Jinnah signalled that he was willing to consider joint electorates if the Congress met his other demands. Clothed into concrete modifications to the Nehru Report during an ‘All Parties Conference’ in Calcutta, Jinnah pressed the committee members who were deciding on the merits of the Nehru Report that at least ‘one-third of the elected representatives of both the Houses of the Central Legislature should be Musalamans’.In a moving speech on the fifth day of the convention, Jinnah clarified that his desire was not to overwhelm the Congress with demands that would make it look soft on Muslims in front of the Hindu Mahasabha. Instead, Jinnah’s demands were guided solely by dry constitutional observations from other countries. According to Jinnah, by the 1920s, it had become conventional wisdom that ‘majorities are apt to be oppressive and tyrannical and minorities always dread and fear that their interests and rights, unless clearly and definitely safeguarded by statutory provisions, would suffer […].’Jinnah reasoned that because the Nehru Report predicted that a third of the legislature would consist of Muslim delegates anyway, there would be no harm in implementing this figure as a formal constitutional safeguard. Such a written anchor would also allow Indian Muslims to distribute those seats more evenly and distribute the excess seats that they would receive in the Muslim-majority provinces of Bengal and Punjab to regions where Muslims were numerically weaker.The delegates roundly rejected Jinnah’s proposal. Dissent to his suggestions even emerged from within the ranks of the Muslim League. Other parties rejoiced over the open split in the Muslim League. M.R. Jayakar of the Hindu Mahasabha, for instance, poked right into this wound. In his response to Jinnah’s speech, Jayakar cautioned the audience to ‘bear in mind that the demands, as set forth by Mr Jinnah, do not proceed on behalf of the entire Muslim Community, not even a large bulk of it’. With some justification, Jayakar reiterated that the position Jinnah voiced reflected the desires of ‘a small minority of Muhammadans’.This speech left a mark on Jinnah. Responding to Jayakar, he moved away from his otherwise carefully measured statements that tended to evoke constitutional principles as an acid test for minority protections. Now Jinnah asserted that lasting harmony between communities could not be established in ‘a Court of Law’ or through a constitution ‘however perfect from a theoretical point of view it may seem’. Instead, it could only turn into a reality through ‘the highest order of statesmanship and political wisdom’ and the recognition that ‘there is no progress for India until the Musalmans and Hindus are united’. The alternative Jinnah presciently predicted was ‘a revolution and civil war’.When Jinnah re-emerged on the political scene in 1934, after an extended hiatus to heal from the humiliation in the aftermath of the Nehru Report, he began to filter politics more squarely through the lens of war and peace….Moving from contractual obligations to honour was reflective of Jinnah’s changed perspective. Earlier, he had viewed Indian Muslims primarily as a minority community, constantly vying to petition for rights from the British crown or the Congress party. Now he saw Indian Muslims as a distinct and separate nation capable of ensuring their rights through force. This view clashed severely with the secularist outlook of Jawaharlal Nehru, who could only interpret Jinnah’s religious posturing as a profound symptom of political alienation: a desperate attempt to plaster over existential anxieties that ranged from colonial oppression to unemployment and food scarcity. With constitutional reforms bringing more and more Indians into the realm of electoral politics, Jinnah and Nehru’s contradictory ideas of India clashed soon after their joint appearance in Lucknow.In the 1937 provincial elections, the Indian National Congress secured a resounding victory. At the polls of India’s first large-scale election campaign that departed from the established system of dyarchy and increased the vote to thirty-six million Indians, including some women, the Indian National Congress secured more than 750 of some 1,500 seats. This sweeping success did more than underline the Congress’s claim of being a national party. It altogether transformed the Congress from a mass movement to a political party. Congress members now occupied ministries in five provinces outright and constituted coalition governments in another two.Jinnah suffered a crushing defeat. His All-India Muslim League secured less than 5 per cent of the Muslim vote, although this slim vote share amounted to some 108 seats from 485 reserved for Muslims under the Communal Award….In full awareness that the Congress did not require the League to rule, Nehru conducted this communication from a position of strength. Jinnah refused to acknowledge that the election result was an adequate measure of the political value of the Muslim League. To him, the communal question remained the most critical issue to determine India’s future. Jinnah’s cold responses were his way to shake Nehru out of this false sense of security that the Hindu-Muslim issue had receded into the background and given way to lofty ideas around socialism and constitutional democracy. Perhaps for this reason, Jinnah refused to lay the Muslim case to Nehru anew.”Advertisement: If you enjoy the themes we discuss in this newsletter, consider taking up the Graduate Certificate in Public Policy course. Intake for the next cohort is open. 12-weeks, fully online, designed with working professionals in mind, and most importantly, guaranteed fun and learning. Do not miss.HomeWorkReading and listening recommendations on public policy matters[Article] Check out our take on Hypocrisy in International Relations in edition #52.[Article] This post by Yiqin Fu has some cool insights on the consequences of a mobile-first internet with Chinese characteristics. [Podcast] On Puliyabaazi, we discussed organic farming troubles in Sri Lanka. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit publicpolicy.substack.com

The Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement or CEPA between India and the United Arab Emirates, which aims at increasing the bilateral non-oil trade to $100 billion in five years from $45 billion now, has many firsts. These include chapters on digital trade and intellectual property rights. But India seems to be effecting a significant change in its trade policy stance by opening its central government procurement market to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) after keeping the subject out of free trade agreements so far. This will give national treatment status to UAE companies while bidding for central tenders, which means such companies will be treated on par with Indian companies for procurement. Public procurement as a percentage of GDP is estimated to be about 20%. For a $3 trillion economy, this amounts to public procurement to the tune of $600 billion annually. Central public sector enterprises are a major contributor to the public procurement of works, goods and services. In June 2020, the government barred global tenders from government procurement up to Rs 200 crore. Even for tenders above this threshold, the government can choose not to invite foreign suppliers. The government won't enjoy this discretion with UAE anymore. The clause however comes with its own limitations to safeguard the domestic industry. Public procurement of goods and services, including construction services above Rs 200 crore by 34 designated central government ministries, will be opened up. However, procurements by all central public sector enterprises, autonomous bodies, and regulators are not covered under the deal. Procurements related to construction projects or any infrastructure projects, procurements relating to the health care sector, procurements of agricultural products for food aid programmes are also not covered under the deal. Recognising the important contribution that MSMEs can make to economic growth and employment, the agreement allows both parties to apply a preferential procurement policy for their MSMEs. What are the larger implications of India's move? Known for its cautious approach toward FTAs, India is currently in negotiations with the UK, Canada, Australia and the Gulf Cooperation Council. The government procurement clause in the deal with UAE could very well set a precedent and open the floodgates for similar demands from other nations in ongoing talks. India's existing free trade partners could also demand a review of the agreements. The move also sends confusing signals to local suppliers just as India is in the midst of the Atmanirbharta initiative to strengthen domestic manufacturing.    

In this online conversation, Jacki Davis talks to Filip Geerts, the Director-General of CECIMO, the European Association of the Machine Tool Industries and related Manufacturing Technologies. This IP-intensive sector was among those examined in the recent ECIPE study:  “The Benefits of...

Lecture summary: In December 2020, the UK and five partners signed the 'Agile Nations Charter', reflecting its participants commitment to 'a more agile approach to rule-making ... to unlock the potential of innovation.' Around the same time, the World Economic Forum published a toolkit on 'Agile Regulation for the Fourth Industrial Revolution'. The aspiration for regulatory agility is everywhere. This lecture charts the ways in which the 'agility agenda' has emerged across a range of spaces of governance, including the OECD, new generation FTAs, and regulator-to-regulator agreements, and asks how this agenda is reshaping regulatory governance at the global level. What is meant by 'agility', and how is it produced? What international legal forms and techniques are amenable to agility? What questions should we be asking, to guide research into, and thinking about, regulatory agility at the global level? Professor Andrew Lang joined the Edinburgh School of Law in 2017 as the Chair in International Law and Global Governance. Prior to that, he was Professor of Law at the London School of Economics. He is an expert in Public International Law, with a specialty in International Economic Law and the Law of the World Trade Organization. He has a combined BA/LLB from the University of Sydney, where he was a double University Medallist, and his PhD is from the University of Cambridge.

Lecture summary: In December 2020, the UK and five partners signed the 'Agile Nations Charter', reflecting its participants commitment to 'a more agile approach to rule-making ... to unlock the potential of innovation.' Around the same time, the World Economic Forum published a toolkit on 'Agile Regulation for the Fourth Industrial Revolution'. The aspiration for regulatory agility is everywhere. This lecture charts the ways in which the 'agility agenda' has emerged across a range of spaces of governance, including the OECD, new generation FTAs, and regulator-to-regulator agreements, and asks how this agenda is reshaping regulatory governance at the global level. What is meant by 'agility', and how is it produced? What international legal forms and techniques are amenable to agility? What questions should we be asking, to guide research into, and thinking about, regulatory agility at the global level? Professor Andrew Lang joined the Edinburgh School of Law in 2017 as the Chair in International Law and Global Governance. Prior to that, he was Professor of Law at the London School of Economics. He is an expert in Public International Law, with a specialty in International Economic Law and the Law of the World Trade Organization. He has a combined BA/LLB from the University of Sydney, where he was a double University Medallist, and his PhD is from the University of Cambridge.

On February 18th, India and the United Arab Emirates signed the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement or CEPA, which is the first free trade agreement finalised by the Narendra Modi-led government since it came to power in 2014. (VO 1) The deal was negotiated in a record 88 days and will come into force from May. It aims at increasing the non-oil trade between the two countries to $100 billion in five years from $45 billion 2021.  The UAE is currently India's third-largest trading partner and the second-largest export destination, after the US. While India is the UAE's second-largest trading partner and the largest in terms of exports.  The trade pact is expected to benefit around $26 billion worth of Indian products that are subject to 5% import duty by the UAE. The UAE will remove customs tariffs on nearly 80% of the goods, which account for 90% of India's exports to the Gulf nation by value. India expects CEPA to generate 10 lakh jobs across labour-intensive sectors such as textiles, gems & jewellery, leather, footwear, pharma, agriculture products, medical devices, sports goods and automobiles. Not just goods, CEPA also covers 11 service sectors and over 100 sub-sectors, which include business services, telecommunications, construction, education, tourism, nursing, finance among many others. The agreement is wide in its scope and includes areas like government procurement, digital trade and intellectual property rights.  To protect the interests of domestic producers, India has kept items such as dairy, fruit, cereals, vegetables, tea, coffee, tobacco, dyes, soaps, footwear, petroleum, tyres, toys, aluminium scrap, copper, processed marble, among others, out of the trade pact. The trade deal has also provided a permanent safeguard mechanism, which will protect exporters and businesses from both countries from any unwarranted surge in volumes of any particular product. But the deal comes with stringent rules of origin conditions. At least 40% value addition has been mandated for most goods to avoid routing of products manufactured in third countries to India via UAE. For the first time in a trade agreement, the CEPA provides for automatic registration and marketing authorisation of Indian generic medicines in 90 days, once they are approved in any of the developed countries. India has given duty concessions on gold imported from the UAE, while Indian exporters will get zero duty access to the UAE market for jewellery.  This assumes significance as the two countries account for over 16% of the global trade in diamonds, gold, and jewellery. India is looking to enter into a similar agreement with the Gulf Cooperation Council during this this year itself  Amitendu Palit spells out the larger importance of the deal beyond the trade aspects and explains how it marks a change in India's approach towards international trade policy India had pulled out of Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, the world's biggest free trade deal signed by 15 Asia-Pacific economies in November 2020 over worries that cheap Chinese imports would flood the Indian market harming domestic producers. It also faced opposition from farmers, especially the dairy industry. India's manufacturing sector is less competitive in several categories when compared to many other Asian countries. India also wanted stricter rules of origin in RCEP.   India's concerns are not misplaced. Analysis by a national daily showed that between FY11 and FY21, exports to nine countries and two trading blocs, with which India has trade agreements, grew 36% to $62 billion while imports from these countries grew 44% to nearly $75 billion, doubling the trade deficit to $11.8 billion from $5.8 billion in a decade. India is rushing to finalise mutually-beneficial early harvest deals with the countries it is negotiating FTAs that would exclude sensitive issues until a full-fledged FTA is finalised. While CEPA is a good

It's episode 50 (!) of ConsEUmer! This week:

Continuing the series on the US - KE FTA, this episode brings you key insights on public participation in trade agreements put into context by the recent confusion surrounding the UK - Kenya EPA. What can be learnt from this? How can effective and meaningful public participation be carried out for FTAs? This episode answers these questions by highlighting the legal framework for public participation in Kenya, what happened with the UK - Kenya EPA, and what this may mean if the US - KE FTA negotiations result in an FTA. Joined by Joanna Kahumbu and Peace Kioko, Dr. Melissa Omino hosts this episode and leaves us with a lot to think about on what meaningful public participation should look like. 

Susan K. Sell is Professor at the School of Regulation and Global Governance (REGNET) at the Australian National University. Susan has been at the forefront of critical international political economy (IPE) scholarship for over two decades. An admirer of earlier critical IPE voices, like Susan Strange, Susan has forged a career shining a light on the dark side of global governance in a world of hyper-globalisation and acquisitive transnational private power. For Susan, it has always been about who wins and who loses within the often opaque workings of the global economy. Her research has applied this lens to powerful effect, particularly in the area of global health. Although critical IPE is experiencing a resurgence of interest, that was not always the case. In a wide-ranging conversation, Susan reflects on being an often lone critical voice during the triumphalist 1990s liberal moment, navigating a discipline which, until recently, was overwhelmingly male, as well as the potential for COVID-19 to serve as a “horrendous opportunity”, and what the future of global private power might look like. Susan can be found on the ANU website. Selection of publications: What COVID-19 Reveals About Twenty-first Century Capitalism: Adversity and Opportunity, 2020 Health under capitalism: a global political economy of structural pathogenesis, 2019 (with Owain D. Williams) Who Governs The Globe? 2010 (with Deborah Avant and Martha Finnemore) TRIPS was never enough: vertical forum shifting, FTAs, ACTA, and TPP, 2011 Private Power, Public Law: The Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights, 2003

In this third episode of the US Kenya FTA Series hosted by Dr Melissa Omino, we are joined by Dr. Isaac Rutenberg the Director of CIPIT, and Lori Wallach, Head Director and Founder of Global Trade Watch, a division of Public Citizen. (link to: https://www.citizen.org/article/lori-wallach-director-public-citizens-global-trade-watch/) It is a great privilege to have Lori as a guest on this episode as she is a recognised expert in the field of International Trade with experience in this area for over 25 years, including testifying at Congress on NAFTA, WTO and other international trade agreements and their effects on global citizens.This is a first part of the conversation, where Lori takes us through what her thoughts are on the proposed agreement between the US and Kenya, what questions Kenya should consider with comparison to other FTAs that the US has finalised in the last decade, and what these ongoing negotiations should consider.Lori definitely leaves us with a lot to think about with regard to why we are going forward with the FTA as Kenya.

Tuesday, 30 April 2019 - 9.00am Location: Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, Finley Library All-day workshop: 09:00 - 17:00 hrs Conveners: Eyal Benvenisti, Harold Hongju Koh, and Tomohiro Mikanagi In 2019 three major treaty withdrawals will reach important watersheds. Sometime in spring, the United Kingdom is scheduled to withdraw from the European Union under the withdrawal notice it gave under Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon. On November 4, 2019, the United States (under the administration of Donald Trump) is set to give notice that it will withdraw from the Paris Climate Change Accord one year later. In November 2019 the dispute resolution mechanism of the WTO will terminate effectively unless the US agrees to re-appoint a judge of the Appellate Body. These events may be seen as signaling a decline in leading states’ commitment to multilateralism and a growing preference to bilateralism. The Trump administration has clearly asserted its preference for bilateral deals while dismissing international organisations as taking advantage of US generosity. China also seems to prefer alternative groupings outside existing multilateral organisations. In October 2007, during its ascent to global power, China declared FTAs to be its basic international economic strategy. America’s disengagement from multilateralism did not prompt China to fill the void by reinforcing existing multilateral bodies with global reach. Instead, its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its regional security arrangements are modelled on the “hub and spokes” pattern, an architecture that allows it to tightly control its numerous partners and limit the application of existing standards and mechanisms. Famously, it ignored the UNCLOS arbitral award on the South China Sea in 2016. Perhaps to confront the risk of two superpowers busy dividing and ruling the rest, other countries have sought to preserve the minilateral institutions (eg the CPTPP) and utilise existing multilateral mechanisms (WTO reforms, UNCLOS conciliation and arbitration, OPCW attribution mechanism, etc.). In this workshop we wish to address the uncertain future of multilateralism in light of the prospective withdrawals and resurgence of bilateralism. We wish to discuss motivations, prospects, and implications for domestic and international law. This one day workshop seeks to reflect on the questions. In particular we wish to address the following questions: Panel I: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord and Revising the WTO Since 2017, the Trump Administration has announced its withdrawal from a host of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, including the Paris Climate Agreement; the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or Iran Nuclear Deal); the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; the Global Compact on Migration; the U.N. Human Rights Council; the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Relations with Iran; the 1961 Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention for Diplomatic Relations on Dispute Settlement; the Universal Postal Union Treaty; and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is the Trump Administration aberrational, or are we witnessing the culmination of a long-term trend of U.S. withdrawal from multilateralist institutions? To what extent has the Trump Administration applied tactics first adopted by prior administrations: e.g., blocking reappointment of members of the WTO Appellate Body? What constraints do U.S. and international law place upon blanket unilateral presidential withdrawal from all disfavored organizations? Panel II: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding China’s “Hub and Spoke” Strategy This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is China accepting the existing multilateral legal rules and mechanisms in economic and non-economic areas? Is China deviating from international standards (including with respect to ISDS) in its various legal arrangements under BRI? Is China deviating from UNCLOS in the South China Sea, including through bilateral COC negotiation? Panel III: The Future of Rule-Based Global Governance through International Institutions: Limits and Potential What are the prospects for international institutions to reclaim multilateralism through concerted action, or through insistence on multilaterally binding norms? To what extent can the UN Security Council, the International Court of Justice, or other international organisations and tribunals can contribute to maintaining and developing further globally-binding norms? To what extent can international process enhance the rule-based global governance through the clarification of law and facts? The UK and the Changing Legal Landscape: The Way Forward from Here

Tuesday, 30 April 2019 - 9.00am Location: Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, Finley Library All-day workshop: 09:00 - 17:00 hrs Conveners: Eyal Benvenisti, Harold Hongju Koh, and Tomohiro Mikanagi In 2019 three major treaty withdrawals will reach important watersheds. Sometime in spring, the United Kingdom is scheduled to withdraw from the European Union under the withdrawal notice it gave under Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon. On November 4, 2019, the United States (under the administration of Donald Trump) is set to give notice that it will withdraw from the Paris Climate Change Accord one year later. In November 2019 the dispute resolution mechanism of the WTO will terminate effectively unless the US agrees to re-appoint a judge of the Appellate Body. These events may be seen as signaling a decline in leading states’ commitment to multilateralism and a growing preference to bilateralism. The Trump administration has clearly asserted its preference for bilateral deals while dismissing international organisations as taking advantage of US generosity. China also seems to prefer alternative groupings outside existing multilateral organisations. In October 2007, during its ascent to global power, China declared FTAs to be its basic international economic strategy. America’s disengagement from multilateralism did not prompt China to fill the void by reinforcing existing multilateral bodies with global reach. Instead, its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its regional security arrangements are modelled on the “hub and spokes” pattern, an architecture that allows it to tightly control its numerous partners and limit the application of existing standards and mechanisms. Famously, it ignored the UNCLOS arbitral award on the South China Sea in 2016. Perhaps to confront the risk of two superpowers busy dividing and ruling the rest, other countries have sought to preserve the minilateral institutions (eg the CPTPP) and utilise existing multilateral mechanisms (WTO reforms, UNCLOS conciliation and arbitration, OPCW attribution mechanism, etc.). In this workshop we wish to address the uncertain future of multilateralism in light of the prospective withdrawals and resurgence of bilateralism. We wish to discuss motivations, prospects, and implications for domestic and international law. This one day workshop seeks to reflect on the questions. In particular we wish to address the following questions: Panel I: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord and Revising the WTO Since 2017, the Trump Administration has announced its withdrawal from a host of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, including the Paris Climate Agreement; the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or Iran Nuclear Deal); the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; the Global Compact on Migration; the U.N. Human Rights Council; the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Relations with Iran; the 1961 Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention for Diplomatic Relations on Dispute Settlement; the Universal Postal Union Treaty; and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is the Trump Administration aberrational, or are we witnessing the culmination of a long-term trend of U.S. withdrawal from multilateralist institutions? To what extent has the Trump Administration applied tactics first adopted by prior administrations: e.g., blocking reappointment of members of the WTO Appellate Body? What constraints do U.S. and international law place upon blanket unilateral presidential withdrawal from all disfavored organizations? Panel II: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding China’s “Hub and Spoke” Strategy This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is China accepting the existing multilateral legal rules and mechanisms in economic and non-economic areas? Is China deviating from international standards (including with respect to ISDS) in its various legal arrangements under BRI? Is China deviating from UNCLOS in the South China Sea, including through bilateral COC negotiation? Panel III: The Future of Rule-Based Global Governance through International Institutions: Limits and Potential What are the prospects for international institutions to reclaim multilateralism through concerted action, or through insistence on multilaterally binding norms? To what extent can the UN Security Council, the International Court of Justice, or other international organisations and tribunals can contribute to maintaining and developing further globally-binding norms? To what extent can international process enhance the rule-based global governance through the clarification of law and facts? The UK and the Changing Legal Landscape: The Way Forward from Here

Tuesday, 30 April 2019 - 9.00am Location: Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, Finley Library All-day workshop: 09:00 - 17:00 hrs Conveners: Eyal Benvenisti, Harold Hongju Koh, and Tomohiro Mikanagi In 2019 three major treaty withdrawals will reach important watersheds. Sometime in spring, the United Kingdom is scheduled to withdraw from the European Union under the withdrawal notice it gave under Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon. On November 4, 2019, the United States (under the administration of Donald Trump) is set to give notice that it will withdraw from the Paris Climate Change Accord one year later. In November 2019 the dispute resolution mechanism of the WTO will terminate effectively unless the US agrees to re-appoint a judge of the Appellate Body. These events may be seen as signaling a decline in leading states’ commitment to multilateralism and a growing preference to bilateralism. The Trump administration has clearly asserted its preference for bilateral deals while dismissing international organisations as taking advantage of US generosity. China also seems to prefer alternative groupings outside existing multilateral organisations. In October 2007, during its ascent to global power, China declared FTAs to be its basic international economic strategy. America’s disengagement from multilateralism did not prompt China to fill the void by reinforcing existing multilateral bodies with global reach. Instead, its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its regional security arrangements are modelled on the “hub and spokes” pattern, an architecture that allows it to tightly control its numerous partners and limit the application of existing standards and mechanisms. Famously, it ignored the UNCLOS arbitral award on the South China Sea in 2016. Perhaps to confront the risk of two superpowers busy dividing and ruling the rest, other countries have sought to preserve the minilateral institutions (eg the CPTPP) and utilise existing multilateral mechanisms (WTO reforms, UNCLOS conciliation and arbitration, OPCW attribution mechanism, etc.). In this workshop we wish to address the uncertain future of multilateralism in light of the prospective withdrawals and resurgence of bilateralism. We wish to discuss motivations, prospects, and implications for domestic and international law. This one day workshop seeks to reflect on the questions. In particular we wish to address the following questions: Panel I: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord and Revising the WTO Since 2017, the Trump Administration has announced its withdrawal from a host of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, including the Paris Climate Agreement; the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or Iran Nuclear Deal); the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; the Global Compact on Migration; the U.N. Human Rights Council; the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Relations with Iran; the 1961 Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention for Diplomatic Relations on Dispute Settlement; the Universal Postal Union Treaty; and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is the Trump Administration aberrational, or are we witnessing the culmination of a long-term trend of U.S. withdrawal from multilateralist institutions? To what extent has the Trump Administration applied tactics first adopted by prior administrations: e.g., blocking reappointment of members of the WTO Appellate Body? What constraints do U.S. and international law place upon blanket unilateral presidential withdrawal from all disfavored organizations? Panel II: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding China’s “Hub and Spoke” Strategy This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is China accepting the existing multilateral legal rules and mechanisms in economic and non-economic areas? Is China deviating from international standards (including with respect to ISDS) in its various legal arrangements under BRI? Is China deviating from UNCLOS in the South China Sea, including through bilateral COC negotiation? Panel III: The Future of Rule-Based Global Governance through International Institutions: Limits and Potential What are the prospects for international institutions to reclaim multilateralism through concerted action, or through insistence on multilaterally binding norms? To what extent can the UN Security Council, the International Court of Justice, or other international organisations and tribunals can contribute to maintaining and developing further globally-binding norms? To what extent can international process enhance the rule-based global governance through the clarification of law and facts? The UK and the Changing Legal Landscape: The Way Forward from Here

Tuesday, 30 April 2019 - 9.00am Location: Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, Finley Library All-day workshop: 09:00 - 17:00 hrs Conveners: Eyal Benvenisti, Harold Hongju Koh, and Tomohiro Mikanagi In 2019 three major treaty withdrawals will reach important watersheds. Sometime in spring, the United Kingdom is scheduled to withdraw from the European Union under the withdrawal notice it gave under Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon. On November 4, 2019, the United States (under the administration of Donald Trump) is set to give notice that it will withdraw from the Paris Climate Change Accord one year later. In November 2019 the dispute resolution mechanism of the WTO will terminate effectively unless the US agrees to re-appoint a judge of the Appellate Body. These events may be seen as signaling a decline in leading states’ commitment to multilateralism and a growing preference to bilateralism. The Trump administration has clearly asserted its preference for bilateral deals while dismissing international organisations as taking advantage of US generosity. China also seems to prefer alternative groupings outside existing multilateral organisations. In October 2007, during its ascent to global power, China declared FTAs to be its basic international economic strategy. America’s disengagement from multilateralism did not prompt China to fill the void by reinforcing existing multilateral bodies with global reach. Instead, its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its regional security arrangements are modelled on the “hub and spokes” pattern, an architecture that allows it to tightly control its numerous partners and limit the application of existing standards and mechanisms. Famously, it ignored the UNCLOS arbitral award on the South China Sea in 2016. Perhaps to confront the risk of two superpowers busy dividing and ruling the rest, other countries have sought to preserve the minilateral institutions (eg the CPTPP) and utilise existing multilateral mechanisms (WTO reforms, UNCLOS conciliation and arbitration, OPCW attribution mechanism, etc.). In this workshop we wish to address the uncertain future of multilateralism in light of the prospective withdrawals and resurgence of bilateralism. We wish to discuss motivations, prospects, and implications for domestic and international law. This one day workshop seeks to reflect on the questions. In particular we wish to address the following questions: Panel I: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord and Revising the WTO Since 2017, the Trump Administration has announced its withdrawal from a host of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, including the Paris Climate Agreement; the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or Iran Nuclear Deal); the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; the Global Compact on Migration; the U.N. Human Rights Council; the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Relations with Iran; the 1961 Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention for Diplomatic Relations on Dispute Settlement; the Universal Postal Union Treaty; and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is the Trump Administration aberrational, or are we witnessing the culmination of a long-term trend of U.S. withdrawal from multilateralist institutions? To what extent has the Trump Administration applied tactics first adopted by prior administrations: e.g., blocking reappointment of members of the WTO Appellate Body? What constraints do U.S. and international law place upon blanket unilateral presidential withdrawal from all disfavored organizations? Panel II: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding China’s “Hub and Spoke” Strategy This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is China accepting the existing multilateral legal rules and mechanisms in economic and non-economic areas? Is China deviating from international standards (including with respect to ISDS) in its various legal arrangements under BRI? Is China deviating from UNCLOS in the South China Sea, including through bilateral COC negotiation? Panel III: The Future of Rule-Based Global Governance through International Institutions: Limits and Potential What are the prospects for international institutions to reclaim multilateralism through concerted action, or through insistence on multilaterally binding norms? To what extent can the UN Security Council, the International Court of Justice, or other international organisations and tribunals can contribute to maintaining and developing further globally-binding norms? To what extent can international process enhance the rule-based global governance through the clarification of law and facts? The UK and the Changing Legal Landscape: The Way Forward from Here

Tuesday, 30 April 2019 - 9.00am Location: Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, Finley Library All-day workshop: 09:00 - 17:00 hrs Conveners: Eyal Benvenisti, Harold Hongju Koh, and Tomohiro Mikanagi In 2019 three major treaty withdrawals will reach important watersheds. Sometime in spring, the United Kingdom is scheduled to withdraw from the European Union under the withdrawal notice it gave under Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon. On November 4, 2019, the United States (under the administration of Donald Trump) is set to give notice that it will withdraw from the Paris Climate Change Accord one year later. In November 2019 the dispute resolution mechanism of the WTO will terminate effectively unless the US agrees to re-appoint a judge of the Appellate Body. These events may be seen as signaling a decline in leading states’ commitment to multilateralism and a growing preference to bilateralism. The Trump administration has clearly asserted its preference for bilateral deals while dismissing international organisations as taking advantage of US generosity. China also seems to prefer alternative groupings outside existing multilateral organisations. In October 2007, during its ascent to global power, China declared FTAs to be its basic international economic strategy. America’s disengagement from multilateralism did not prompt China to fill the void by reinforcing existing multilateral bodies with global reach. Instead, its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its regional security arrangements are modelled on the “hub and spokes” pattern, an architecture that allows it to tightly control its numerous partners and limit the application of existing standards and mechanisms. Famously, it ignored the UNCLOS arbitral award on the South China Sea in 2016. Perhaps to confront the risk of two superpowers busy dividing and ruling the rest, other countries have sought to preserve the minilateral institutions (eg the CPTPP) and utilise existing multilateral mechanisms (WTO reforms, UNCLOS conciliation and arbitration, OPCW attribution mechanism, etc.). In this workshop we wish to address the uncertain future of multilateralism in light of the prospective withdrawals and resurgence of bilateralism. We wish to discuss motivations, prospects, and implications for domestic and international law. This one day workshop seeks to reflect on the questions. In particular we wish to address the following questions: Panel I: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord and Revising the WTO Since 2017, the Trump Administration has announced its withdrawal from a host of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, including the Paris Climate Agreement; the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or Iran Nuclear Deal); the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; the Global Compact on Migration; the U.N. Human Rights Council; the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Relations with Iran; the 1961 Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention for Diplomatic Relations on Dispute Settlement; the Universal Postal Union Treaty; and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is the Trump Administration aberrational, or are we witnessing the culmination of a long-term trend of U.S. withdrawal from multilateralist institutions? To what extent has the Trump Administration applied tactics first adopted by prior administrations: e.g., blocking reappointment of members of the WTO Appellate Body? What constraints do U.S. and international law place upon blanket unilateral presidential withdrawal from all disfavored organizations? Panel II: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding China’s “Hub and Spoke” Strategy This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is China accepting the existing multilateral legal rules and mechanisms in economic and non-economic areas? Is China deviating from international standards (including with respect to ISDS) in its various legal arrangements under BRI? Is China deviating from UNCLOS in the South China Sea, including through bilateral COC negotiation? Panel III: The Future of Rule-Based Global Governance through International Institutions: Limits and Potential What are the prospects for international institutions to reclaim multilateralism through concerted action, or through insistence on multilaterally binding norms? To what extent can the UN Security Council, the International Court of Justice, or other international organisations and tribunals can contribute to maintaining and developing further globally-binding norms? To what extent can international process enhance the rule-based global governance through the clarification of law and facts? The UK and the Changing Legal Landscape: The Way Forward from Here

Tuesday, 30 April 2019 - 9.00am Location: Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, Finley Library All-day workshop: 09:00 - 17:00 hrs Conveners: Eyal Benvenisti, Harold Hongju Koh, and Tomohiro Mikanagi In 2019 three major treaty withdrawals will reach important watersheds. Sometime in spring, the United Kingdom is scheduled to withdraw from the European Union under the withdrawal notice it gave under Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon. On November 4, 2019, the United States (under the administration of Donald Trump) is set to give notice that it will withdraw from the Paris Climate Change Accord one year later. In November 2019 the dispute resolution mechanism of the WTO will terminate effectively unless the US agrees to re-appoint a judge of the Appellate Body. These events may be seen as signaling a decline in leading states’ commitment to multilateralism and a growing preference to bilateralism. The Trump administration has clearly asserted its preference for bilateral deals while dismissing international organisations as taking advantage of US generosity. China also seems to prefer alternative groupings outside existing multilateral organisations. In October 2007, during its ascent to global power, China declared FTAs to be its basic international economic strategy. America’s disengagement from multilateralism did not prompt China to fill the void by reinforcing existing multilateral bodies with global reach. Instead, its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its regional security arrangements are modelled on the “hub and spokes” pattern, an architecture that allows it to tightly control its numerous partners and limit the application of existing standards and mechanisms. Famously, it ignored the UNCLOS arbitral award on the South China Sea in 2016. Perhaps to confront the risk of two superpowers busy dividing and ruling the rest, other countries have sought to preserve the minilateral institutions (eg the CPTPP) and utilise existing multilateral mechanisms (WTO reforms, UNCLOS conciliation and arbitration, OPCW attribution mechanism, etc.). In this workshop we wish to address the uncertain future of multilateralism in light of the prospective withdrawals and resurgence of bilateralism. We wish to discuss motivations, prospects, and implications for domestic and international law. This one day workshop seeks to reflect on the questions. In particular we wish to address the following questions: Panel I: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord and Revising the WTO Since 2017, the Trump Administration has announced its withdrawal from a host of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, including the Paris Climate Agreement; the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or Iran Nuclear Deal); the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; the Global Compact on Migration; the U.N. Human Rights Council; the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Relations with Iran; the 1961 Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention for Diplomatic Relations on Dispute Settlement; the Universal Postal Union Treaty; and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is the Trump Administration aberrational, or are we witnessing the culmination of a long-term trend of U.S. withdrawal from multilateralist institutions? To what extent has the Trump Administration applied tactics first adopted by prior administrations: e.g., blocking reappointment of members of the WTO Appellate Body? What constraints do U.S. and international law place upon blanket unilateral presidential withdrawal from all disfavored organizations? Panel II: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding China’s “Hub and Spoke” Strategy This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is China accepting the existing multilateral legal rules and mechanisms in economic and non-economic areas? Is China deviating from international standards (including with respect to ISDS) in its various legal arrangements under BRI? Is China deviating from UNCLOS in the South China Sea, including through bilateral COC negotiation? Panel III: The Future of Rule-Based Global Governance through International Institutions: Limits and Potential What are the prospects for international institutions to reclaim multilateralism through concerted action, or through insistence on multilaterally binding norms? To what extent can the UN Security Council, the International Court of Justice, or other international organisations and tribunals can contribute to maintaining and developing further globally-binding norms? To what extent can international process enhance the rule-based global governance through the clarification of law and facts? The UK and the Changing Legal Landscape: The Way Forward from Here

Tuesday, 30 April 2019 - 9.00am Location: Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, Finley Library All-day workshop: 09:00 - 17:00 hrs Conveners: Eyal Benvenisti, Harold Hongju Koh, and Tomohiro Mikanagi In 2019 three major treaty withdrawals will reach important watersheds. Sometime in spring, the United Kingdom is scheduled to withdraw from the European Union under the withdrawal notice it gave under Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon. On November 4, 2019, the United States (under the administration of Donald Trump) is set to give notice that it will withdraw from the Paris Climate Change Accord one year later. In November 2019 the dispute resolution mechanism of the WTO will terminate effectively unless the US agrees to re-appoint a judge of the Appellate Body. These events may be seen as signaling a decline in leading states’ commitment to multilateralism and a growing preference to bilateralism. The Trump administration has clearly asserted its preference for bilateral deals while dismissing international organisations as taking advantage of US generosity. China also seems to prefer alternative groupings outside existing multilateral organisations. In October 2007, during its ascent to global power, China declared FTAs to be its basic international economic strategy. America’s disengagement from multilateralism did not prompt China to fill the void by reinforcing existing multilateral bodies with global reach. Instead, its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its regional security arrangements are modelled on the “hub and spokes” pattern, an architecture that allows it to tightly control its numerous partners and limit the application of existing standards and mechanisms. Famously, it ignored the UNCLOS arbitral award on the South China Sea in 2016. Perhaps to confront the risk of two superpowers busy dividing and ruling the rest, other countries have sought to preserve the minilateral institutions (eg the CPTPP) and utilise existing multilateral mechanisms (WTO reforms, UNCLOS conciliation and arbitration, OPCW attribution mechanism, etc.). In this workshop we wish to address the uncertain future of multilateralism in light of the prospective withdrawals and resurgence of bilateralism. We wish to discuss motivations, prospects, and implications for domestic and international law. This one day workshop seeks to reflect on the questions. In particular we wish to address the following questions: Panel I: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord and Revising the WTO Since 2017, the Trump Administration has announced its withdrawal from a host of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, including the Paris Climate Agreement; the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or Iran Nuclear Deal); the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; the Global Compact on Migration; the U.N. Human Rights Council; the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Relations with Iran; the 1961 Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention for Diplomatic Relations on Dispute Settlement; the Universal Postal Union Treaty; and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is the Trump Administration aberrational, or are we witnessing the culmination of a long-term trend of U.S. withdrawal from multilateralist institutions? To what extent has the Trump Administration applied tactics first adopted by prior administrations: e.g., blocking reappointment of members of the WTO Appellate Body? What constraints do U.S. and international law place upon blanket unilateral presidential withdrawal from all disfavored organizations? Panel II: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding China’s “Hub and Spoke” Strategy This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is China accepting the existing multilateral legal rules and mechanisms in economic and non-economic areas? Is China deviating from international standards (including with respect to ISDS) in its various legal arrangements under BRI? Is China deviating from UNCLOS in the South China Sea, including through bilateral COC negotiation? Panel III: The Future of Rule-Based Global Governance through International Institutions: Limits and Potential What are the prospects for international institutions to reclaim multilateralism through concerted action, or through insistence on multilaterally binding norms? To what extent can the UN Security Council, the International Court of Justice, or other international organisations and tribunals can contribute to maintaining and developing further globally-binding norms? To what extent can international process enhance the rule-based global governance through the clarification of law and facts? The UK and the Changing Legal Landscape: The Way Forward from Here

Tuesday, 30 April 2019 - 9.00am Location: Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, Finley Library All-day workshop: 09:00 - 17:00 hrs Conveners: Eyal Benvenisti, Harold Hongju Koh, and Tomohiro Mikanagi In 2019 three major treaty withdrawals will reach important watersheds. Sometime in spring, the United Kingdom is scheduled to withdraw from the European Union under the withdrawal notice it gave under Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon. On November 4, 2019, the United States (under the administration of Donald Trump) is set to give notice that it will withdraw from the Paris Climate Change Accord one year later. In November 2019 the dispute resolution mechanism of the WTO will terminate effectively unless the US agrees to re-appoint a judge of the Appellate Body. These events may be seen as signaling a decline in leading states’ commitment to multilateralism and a growing preference to bilateralism. The Trump administration has clearly asserted its preference for bilateral deals while dismissing international organisations as taking advantage of US generosity. China also seems to prefer alternative groupings outside existing multilateral organisations. In October 2007, during its ascent to global power, China declared FTAs to be its basic international economic strategy. America’s disengagement from multilateralism did not prompt China to fill the void by reinforcing existing multilateral bodies with global reach. Instead, its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its regional security arrangements are modelled on the “hub and spokes” pattern, an architecture that allows it to tightly control its numerous partners and limit the application of existing standards and mechanisms. Famously, it ignored the UNCLOS arbitral award on the South China Sea in 2016. Perhaps to confront the risk of two superpowers busy dividing and ruling the rest, other countries have sought to preserve the minilateral institutions (eg the CPTPP) and utilise existing multilateral mechanisms (WTO reforms, UNCLOS conciliation and arbitration, OPCW attribution mechanism, etc.). In this workshop we wish to address the uncertain future of multilateralism in light of the prospective withdrawals and resurgence of bilateralism. We wish to discuss motivations, prospects, and implications for domestic and international law. This one day workshop seeks to reflect on the questions. In particular we wish to address the following questions: Panel I: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord and Revising the WTO Since 2017, the Trump Administration has announced its withdrawal from a host of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, including the Paris Climate Agreement; the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or Iran Nuclear Deal); the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; the Global Compact on Migration; the U.N. Human Rights Council; the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Relations with Iran; the 1961 Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention for Diplomatic Relations on Dispute Settlement; the Universal Postal Union Treaty; and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is the Trump Administration aberrational, or are we witnessing the culmination of a long-term trend of U.S. withdrawal from multilateralist institutions? To what extent has the Trump Administration applied tactics first adopted by prior administrations: e.g., blocking reappointment of members of the WTO Appellate Body? What constraints do U.S. and international law place upon blanket unilateral presidential withdrawal from all disfavored organizations? Panel II: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding China’s “Hub and Spoke” Strategy This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is China accepting the existing multilateral legal rules and mechanisms in economic and non-economic areas? Is China deviating from international standards (including with respect to ISDS) in its various legal arrangements under BRI? Is China deviating from UNCLOS in the South China Sea, including through bilateral COC negotiation? Panel III: The Future of Rule-Based Global Governance through International Institutions: Limits and Potential What are the prospects for international institutions to reclaim multilateralism through concerted action, or through insistence on multilaterally binding norms? To what extent can the UN Security Council, the International Court of Justice, or other international organisations and tribunals can contribute to maintaining and developing further globally-binding norms? To what extent can international process enhance the rule-based global governance through the clarification of law and facts? The UK and the Changing Legal Landscape: The Way Forward from Here

Tuesday, 30 April 2019 - 9.00am Location: Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, Finley Library All-day workshop: 09:00 - 17:00 hrs Conveners: Eyal Benvenisti, Harold Hongju Koh, and Tomohiro Mikanagi In 2019 three major treaty withdrawals will reach important watersheds. Sometime in spring, the United Kingdom is scheduled to withdraw from the European Union under the withdrawal notice it gave under Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon. On November 4, 2019, the United States (under the administration of Donald Trump) is set to give notice that it will withdraw from the Paris Climate Change Accord one year later. In November 2019 the dispute resolution mechanism of the WTO will terminate effectively unless the US agrees to re-appoint a judge of the Appellate Body. These events may be seen as signaling a decline in leading states’ commitment to multilateralism and a growing preference to bilateralism. The Trump administration has clearly asserted its preference for bilateral deals while dismissing international organisations as taking advantage of US generosity. China also seems to prefer alternative groupings outside existing multilateral organisations. In October 2007, during its ascent to global power, China declared FTAs to be its basic international economic strategy. America’s disengagement from multilateralism did not prompt China to fill the void by reinforcing existing multilateral bodies with global reach. Instead, its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its regional security arrangements are modelled on the “hub and spokes” pattern, an architecture that allows it to tightly control its numerous partners and limit the application of existing standards and mechanisms. Famously, it ignored the UNCLOS arbitral award on the South China Sea in 2016. Perhaps to confront the risk of two superpowers busy dividing and ruling the rest, other countries have sought to preserve the minilateral institutions (eg the CPTPP) and utilise existing multilateral mechanisms (WTO reforms, UNCLOS conciliation and arbitration, OPCW attribution mechanism, etc.). In this workshop we wish to address the uncertain future of multilateralism in light of the prospective withdrawals and resurgence of bilateralism. We wish to discuss motivations, prospects, and implications for domestic and international law. This one day workshop seeks to reflect on the questions. In particular we wish to address the following questions: Panel I: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord and Revising the WTO Since 2017, the Trump Administration has announced its withdrawal from a host of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, including the Paris Climate Agreement; the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or Iran Nuclear Deal); the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; the Global Compact on Migration; the U.N. Human Rights Council; the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Relations with Iran; the 1961 Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention for Diplomatic Relations on Dispute Settlement; the Universal Postal Union Treaty; and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is the Trump Administration aberrational, or are we witnessing the culmination of a long-term trend of U.S. withdrawal from multilateralist institutions? To what extent has the Trump Administration applied tactics first adopted by prior administrations: e.g., blocking reappointment of members of the WTO Appellate Body? What constraints do U.S. and international law place upon blanket unilateral presidential withdrawal from all disfavored organizations? Panel II: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding China’s “Hub and Spoke” Strategy This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is China accepting the existing multilateral legal rules and mechanisms in economic and non-economic areas? Is China deviating from international standards (including with respect to ISDS) in its various legal arrangements under BRI? Is China deviating from UNCLOS in the South China Sea, including through bilateral COC negotiation? Panel III: The Future of Rule-Based Global Governance through International Institutions: Limits and Potential What are the prospects for international institutions to reclaim multilateralism through concerted action, or through insistence on multilaterally binding norms? To what extent can the UN Security Council, the International Court of Justice, or other international organisations and tribunals can contribute to maintaining and developing further globally-binding norms? To what extent can international process enhance the rule-based global governance through the clarification of law and facts? The UK and the Changing Legal Landscape: The Way Forward from Here

Tuesday, 30 April 2019 - 9.00am Location: Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, Finley Library All-day workshop: 09:00 - 17:00 hrs Conveners: Eyal Benvenisti, Harold Hongju Koh, and Tomohiro Mikanagi In 2019 three major treaty withdrawals will reach important watersheds. Sometime in spring, the United Kingdom is scheduled to withdraw from the European Union under the withdrawal notice it gave under Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon. On November 4, 2019, the United States (under the administration of Donald Trump) is set to give notice that it will withdraw from the Paris Climate Change Accord one year later. In November 2019 the dispute resolution mechanism of the WTO will terminate effectively unless the US agrees to re-appoint a judge of the Appellate Body. These events may be seen as signaling a decline in leading states’ commitment to multilateralism and a growing preference to bilateralism. The Trump administration has clearly asserted its preference for bilateral deals while dismissing international organisations as taking advantage of US generosity. China also seems to prefer alternative groupings outside existing multilateral organisations. In October 2007, during its ascent to global power, China declared FTAs to be its basic international economic strategy. America’s disengagement from multilateralism did not prompt China to fill the void by reinforcing existing multilateral bodies with global reach. Instead, its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its regional security arrangements are modelled on the “hub and spokes” pattern, an architecture that allows it to tightly control its numerous partners and limit the application of existing standards and mechanisms. Famously, it ignored the UNCLOS arbitral award on the South China Sea in 2016. Perhaps to confront the risk of two superpowers busy dividing and ruling the rest, other countries have sought to preserve the minilateral institutions (eg the CPTPP) and utilise existing multilateral mechanisms (WTO reforms, UNCLOS conciliation and arbitration, OPCW attribution mechanism, etc.). In this workshop we wish to address the uncertain future of multilateralism in light of the prospective withdrawals and resurgence of bilateralism. We wish to discuss motivations, prospects, and implications for domestic and international law. This one day workshop seeks to reflect on the questions. In particular we wish to address the following questions: Panel I: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord and Revising the WTO Since 2017, the Trump Administration has announced its withdrawal from a host of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, including the Paris Climate Agreement; the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or Iran Nuclear Deal); the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; the Global Compact on Migration; the U.N. Human Rights Council; the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Relations with Iran; the 1961 Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention for Diplomatic Relations on Dispute Settlement; the Universal Postal Union Treaty; and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is the Trump Administration aberrational, or are we witnessing the culmination of a long-term trend of U.S. withdrawal from multilateralist institutions? To what extent has the Trump Administration applied tactics first adopted by prior administrations: e.g., blocking reappointment of members of the WTO Appellate Body? What constraints do U.S. and international law place upon blanket unilateral presidential withdrawal from all disfavored organizations? Panel II: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding China’s “Hub and Spoke” Strategy This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is China accepting the existing multilateral legal rules and mechanisms in economic and non-economic areas? Is China deviating from international standards (including with respect to ISDS) in its various legal arrangements under BRI? Is China deviating from UNCLOS in the South China Sea, including through bilateral COC negotiation? Panel III: The Future of Rule-Based Global Governance through International Institutions: Limits and Potential What are the prospects for international institutions to reclaim multilateralism through concerted action, or through insistence on multilaterally binding norms? To what extent can the UN Security Council, the International Court of Justice, or other international organisations and tribunals can contribute to maintaining and developing further globally-binding norms? To what extent can international process enhance the rule-based global governance through the clarification of law and facts? The UK and the Changing Legal Landscape: The Way Forward from Here

Tuesday, 30 April 2019 - 9.00am Location: Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, Finley Library All-day workshop: 09:00 - 17:00 hrs Conveners: Eyal Benvenisti, Harold Hongju Koh, and Tomohiro Mikanagi In 2019 three major treaty withdrawals will reach important watersheds. Sometime in spring, the United Kingdom is scheduled to withdraw from the European Union under the withdrawal notice it gave under Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon. On November 4, 2019, the United States (under the administration of Donald Trump) is set to give notice that it will withdraw from the Paris Climate Change Accord one year later. In November 2019 the dispute resolution mechanism of the WTO will terminate effectively unless the US agrees to re-appoint a judge of the Appellate Body. These events may be seen as signaling a decline in leading states’ commitment to multilateralism and a growing preference to bilateralism. The Trump administration has clearly asserted its preference for bilateral deals while dismissing international organisations as taking advantage of US generosity. China also seems to prefer alternative groupings outside existing multilateral organisations. In October 2007, during its ascent to global power, China declared FTAs to be its basic international economic strategy. America’s disengagement from multilateralism did not prompt China to fill the void by reinforcing existing multilateral bodies with global reach. Instead, its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its regional security arrangements are modelled on the “hub and spokes” pattern, an architecture that allows it to tightly control its numerous partners and limit the application of existing standards and mechanisms. Famously, it ignored the UNCLOS arbitral award on the South China Sea in 2016. Perhaps to confront the risk of two superpowers busy dividing and ruling the rest, other countries have sought to preserve the minilateral institutions (eg the CPTPP) and utilise existing multilateral mechanisms (WTO reforms, UNCLOS conciliation and arbitration, OPCW attribution mechanism, etc.). In this workshop we wish to address the uncertain future of multilateralism in light of the prospective withdrawals and resurgence of bilateralism. We wish to discuss motivations, prospects, and implications for domestic and international law. This one day workshop seeks to reflect on the questions. In particular we wish to address the following questions: Panel I: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord and Revising the WTO Since 2017, the Trump Administration has announced its withdrawal from a host of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, including the Paris Climate Agreement; the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or Iran Nuclear Deal); the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; the Global Compact on Migration; the U.N. Human Rights Council; the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Relations with Iran; the 1961 Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention for Diplomatic Relations on Dispute Settlement; the Universal Postal Union Treaty; and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is the Trump Administration aberrational, or are we witnessing the culmination of a long-term trend of U.S. withdrawal from multilateralist institutions? To what extent has the Trump Administration applied tactics first adopted by prior administrations: e.g., blocking reappointment of members of the WTO Appellate Body? What constraints do U.S. and international law place upon blanket unilateral presidential withdrawal from all disfavored organizations? Panel II: The Domestic and International Legal Issues Surrounding China’s “Hub and Spoke” Strategy This panel will address the following questions, among others – Is China accepting the existing multilateral legal rules and mechanisms in economic and non-economic areas? Is China deviating from international standards (including with respect to ISDS) in its various legal arrangements under BRI? Is China deviating from UNCLOS in the South China Sea, including through bilateral COC negotiation? Panel III: The Future of Rule-Based Global Governance through International Institutions: Limits and Potential What are the prospects for international institutions to reclaim multilateralism through concerted action, or through insistence on multilaterally binding norms? To what extent can the UN Security Council, the International Court of Justice, or other international organisations and tribunals can contribute to maintaining and developing further globally-binding norms? To what extent can international process enhance the rule-based global governance through the clarification of law and facts? The UK and the Changing Legal Landscape: The Way Forward from Here

PIIE Senior Fellow Chad P. Bown and Soumaya Keynes of The Economist discuss the challenges facing the UK government as it seeks negotiations separate from the Brexit talks to maintain existing market access through the...

PIIE Senior Fellow Chad P. Bown and Soumaya Keynes of The Economist discuss the challenges facing the UK government as it seeks negotiations separate from the Brexit talks to maintain existing market access through the...