Podcasts about Kokoda Track

In this episode, we’re going to take a deeper dive into the terrain, geography, and physical demands of the Kokoda Track—arguably one of the most formidable battlegrounds in Australian military history. For anyone preparing to walk this track today, or simply seeking to understand what our soldiers endured in 1942, this episode will give you a real sense of what they were up against. It’s one thing to read about it, another to stand in the mud yourself. But for now, I want to take you there through story and description.ADVENTURE WITH US KOKODA FIT PROGRAM TREK THE KOKODA TRACKSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Hey Everyone, I finally got to take my partner, and PNG national, Mili Saul to Kokoda. This is her experience. KOKODA FITNESS ADVENTURE PROFESSIONALSSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

It's easy to think if the Kokoda Campaign as a chapter in a history book. But when you walk the track - when you feel the mud under your boots and the weight of history in the air - you realise this story is alive. It lives in every ridge, every village, every monument. It lives in the people. DO KOKODA WITH GLENN FITNESS FOR KOKODA ADVENTURE WITH GLENNSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

For years this show has been built on interviews from the track. That's not changing - but now we're going deeper. Deeper into the history. Deeper into the battles. Deeper into the country, the people and the lessons Kokoda teaches us. Whether you're preparing to trek the Track or simply want to understand why this place matters, this podcast is now your definitive resource. ADVENTURE WITH GLENN FITNESS FOR KOKODA JOIN GLENN ON THE KOKODA TRACKSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

1RPH's Jenelle Provost interviews Eric Thauvette of Hartley Lifecare in advance of their fundraising walk along the Kokoda Track.

A passionate Mark Levy didn’t hold back, calling on Prime Minister Anthony Albanese to solve the funding drama engulfing Concord’s Kokoda Track Memorial Walkway. See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Charley welcomes his friend Stephan Lorenz back to the show with more adventures from the infamous Kokoda Track in PNG.Here's the company that Stephan used for his logistics:https://kokodacrossing.com/Here's a short video about Stephan's trip:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TUazWhNghIo&t=550sWhite-eyed Robin recording courtesy of Stephan Lorenz.Please check out the website of our sponsor Tropical Birding: https://www.tropicalbirding.com/If you wish to support this podcast, please visit our Patreon page: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://www.patreon.com/naturallyadventurous?fan_landing=true⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Feel free to contact us at: cfchesse@gmail.com &/or ken.behrens@gmail.com Naturally Adventurous Podcast Nature - Travel - Adventure

What medical treatment was avaiable for the soldiers fighting on the Kokoda Track.  How were ill and injured soldiers cared for and what were the difficulties in providing surgical and medical care in the austere conditions of the Jungles of Kokoda? This episode continues our Kokoda Campaign Podcast series.  Check out the  show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.

Heidi and Glenn are back with even more answers to the most common FAQ's around the Kokoda Track. :-) See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

This week Heidi and myself answer some FAQ's which will hopefully help you in your Kokoda prep. See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

I have a quick announcement for the upcoming ANZAC Kokoda period. See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

This week I am sitting down with Adventure Professionals trek leader Heidi and we're chatting all things Kokoda, preparation for a double crossing, ANZAC and everything in between.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

We are back for the 2025 season of The Kokoda Track Podcast. See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

At Aleda, we know there are consistent dimensions of what great leadership looks like, and we are exploring the great power of each of them during our Summer Series “Success Leaves Clues”. On every Empowering Leaders episode we hear from people at the top of their industries. They soar in the areas of sports, business, social venture, education, the arts and more. When it comes to the dimension of successfully creating and sharing a VISION, we have hand-selected the phenomenal group of people you’re about to hear and learn from. Creating and sharing a VISION that gets traction and has impact is a valuable skill, but as the following group of guests reveal, it’s a skill within reach for anyone who puts their mind to it. Featuring:[02:05] NIC NAITANUI - whose legacy as an Australian rules footballer is as significant as anyone in the modern era. The overall number two draft pick in 2008 - of Fijian heritage - went on to be a three time all Australian, two time West Coast Eagles best and fairest and played with athleticism and power, the likes of which the game hadn't seen before.[05:00] ANDY FRIEND - one of the most respected coaches in world rugby, former head coach of the Brumbies, Australian Men's Rugby Sevens. Andy recently launched Performance Friend, a consultancy business, supporting highly scrutinised leaders across many fields.[07:05] KURT FEARNLEY - the incredible Australian wheelchair racer & Paralympic gold medalist who famously crawled the treacherous Kokoda Track without his wheelchair.[10:45] VANESSA FORD - chief operating officer of Kukua, a Kenyan based education entertainment company that has a primarily female executive team - AND the executive producer of the first African animated superhero series, Super SEMA, where the main character SEMA is an African superhero whose superpower is using her mind and science and technology. [16:34] BELINDA STOWELL - the Olympic gold medal winner from the Sydney Olympics who now leads other athletes to Olympic and world championship glory. [17:45] The Honourable WILL ALSTERGREN - Chief Justice of the Family Court of Australia and the Federal Circuit Court, which puts him at the coalface of family and gender based violence in Australia, an issue he tirelessly campaigns against in and out of the courtroom. A huge thank you to all the guests featured in this episode and if you want to hear more from any of them follow the link to the full length, in depth conversations they each had with Luke in 2024. On our next Success Leaves Clues episode: Curiosity is a leadership dimension that shapes our learning and development. We're excited to explore its transformative impact on the journeys of some exceptional guests and to learn just how they harnessed it. If you enjoy listening to the Empowering Leaders podcast, be sure to subscribe and please, if you have a moment, leave a review for us so we can reach more listeners and empower more leaders. Learn. Lead. Collaborate. Start your leadership journey today. Head to Aleda Collective to find out more about our signature, cross industry collaboration program, Aleda Connect. Curated and facilitated by experts, running for 8 fortnightly sessions, Aleda Connect is the learning experience of a life-time.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

In this episode of Diving Deep, Sam Fricker sits down with Damien Thomlinson, a former Australian Commando whose life took a dramatic turn in April 2009 during a night patrol in Southern Afghanistan. After his unit drove over an improvised explosive device, Damien sustained severe injuries leading to the amputation of both his legs. Demonstrating remarkable resilience, he not only learned to walk again with prosthetic limbs but also pursued a career as a motivational speaker, inspiring audiences with his story of overcoming adversity. Damien's journey didn't stop there; he authored the best-selling autobiography Without Warning, participated in the TARGA Tasmania classic car rally, walked the demanding Kokoda Track, and competed in the 2014 and 2016 Invictus Games. Transitioning into acting, he was cast in the 2016 film Hacksaw Ridge, which received multiple Academy Award nominations. In 2019, Damien shifted his focus to golf, aiming to represent Australia on the international circuit. He won his first professional tournament in 2020, the Victorian All Inclusive Championship, and is now ranked among the top three multi-amputee golfers globally. Join us as we delve into Damien's extraordinary journey, exploring his unwavering determination and the lessons he's learned along the way. This is an episode you won't want to miss!

In the final episode of our harvest binge series, we delve into an inspiring adventure as we chat with Tanja about her April 2024 trek along the Kokoda track. Covering the physical challenges, resilience, and camaraderie she experienced, this discussion shares observations on similarities to Mallee farming life. Join us as we wrap up with reflections on seeking new opportunities and pursuing goals beyond farming. 00:00 Introduction to the Final Episode 00:15 Reflecting on the Kokoda Trek 00:23 Interview with Nick Paltridge 00:35 Lessons from the Kokoda Experience 01:53 Insights for Farmers 03:41 The Importance of Teamwork 05:25 Challenges and Humor on the Trek 05:32 Returning Home and New Perspectives 06:46 Weather and Terrain on the Kokoda Track 08:07 Anzac Day and Historical Reflections 09:59 Physical and Mental Challenges 11:16 Conclusion and Future Plans A heartfelt thanks to everyone who’s tuned in, shared, and supported the MSF FarmTalk podcast. We’re signing off for 2024 but will return in 2025 with new and exciting episodes to inspire and inform.Support the show: https://msfp.org.au/about/membership/See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

This episode is the first of a two part interview with retired LTCOL Gary McKay, who was a Platoon Commander in Vietnam, in D Coy, 4 RAR.  He fought in Op Ivanhoe at the battle of Nui Le, where he was wounded.  For his awarded the Military Cross for his performance during the battle.  He was later the Commanding Officer of 8/9 RAR between 1988 and 1990. This episode continues our Kokoda Campaign Podcast series. It specifically looks at how Australian soldiers were prepared for combat in the jungle and also looks at what makes jungle combat one of the most difficult types of terrain to fight in. As you are listening to Gary's story, compare that with the soldiers from the Second World War fighting the early jungle battles.  The legacy of those hard won lessons on the Kokoda Track can clearly be heard in Gary's story. Check out the  show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.

An update on the current closure along the Kokoda Track in PNG and thoughts on whether or not it will reopen for 2025. See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

*Kokoda Track shuts down. *Joe Hockey on US election. *Best 'one hit wonders' of all timeSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

*Kokoda Track shuts down. *Joe Hockey on US election. *Best 'one hit wonders' of all timeSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

*Kokoda Track shuts down. *Joe Hockey on US election. *Best 'one hit wonders' of all timeSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

How did air power influence the Kokoda Campaign?  We review the employment of air power and compare it with the Milne Bay operation, where Air Power's effect was described as 'decisive' by both MAJGEN Clowes and LTGEN Rowell. The episode picks up the story with the elevation of Les Jackson to CO of No 75 Squadron after the death of his brother, John.  We discuss the importance of training pilots for the responsibilities for Squadron Command and the requirement for a panel of potential candidates, before looking at the Battle of Milne Bay. This is Part 18 of our series looking at the Kokoda Campaign, focusing on the combat performance of battalions on the Kokoda Track and the fourth and final episode as we look at Air Power, RAAF Leadership and doctrine development during the Kokoda Campaign.  Check out the  show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.

Episode 80: David Armstrong - Living Free David is businessman, adventure specialist, and co-founder of the Living Free Movement. David has run businesses in the sports medicine, sports performance and education sectors. He has sailed to Antarctica, climbed to Everest Base Camp, and navigated the Kokoda Track. But perhaps his biggest challenge came in 2020 when he was diagnosed with cancer. In this podcast, David joins me to talk about his cancer journey and why he chose to take a completely different approach to help heal his body. We also talk about how he and a group of passionate colleagues created the Living Free Movement, which aims to support freedom in health, lifestyle, clean food and lawful processes and to provide education on how to move from the public to the private. Visit the Living Free Movement's Website here: https://www.livingfreemovement.org Follow Humanley on Telegram: t.me/humanley New Book Out Now - Can You Catch A Cold?: Untold History & Human Experiments Disclaimer: This podcast is for general information purposes only. It does not constitute as health advice and does not take the place of consulting with your primary health care practitioner. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guest speaker and do not necessarily reflect those of Humanley, the presenter or any other entities or third parties associated with Humanley or the presenter. The right to freedom of opinion is the right to hold opinions without interference, and cannot be subject to any exception or restriction. We encourage the audience to use their critical judgement and use due diligence when interpreting the information and topics discussed in this podcast.

This week I chat with Trek Leader and Human Performance Specialist Sami Dunk, about the changes in her mindset and body when preparing for Kokoda now that she has had children and the hormonal changes that come with that. Plenty in this episode for the ladies and even for the men out there. I trust you'll enjoy this one. :-) ADVENTURE PROFESSIONALS WEBSITE GET KOKODA FITSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

This week I had a chat with David Kelly who did Kokoda back in 2019 and then again in 2024, but this time added in the Northern Beaches. We chatted about the differences between the two trips, five years apart and what he did differently this time to prepare. ADVENTURE WITH US KOKODA WITH USSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

What was RAAF Leadership like in No. 75 Squadron at Port Moresby.  We look at the career and Leadership of Squadron Leader John Jackson, a great RAAF pilot who lead from the front.  We look at the tactics that he developed to fight the more agile Japanese Zeroes and what was it that caused him to ignore his own tactics on the day that he was shot down and killed. This is Part 17 of our series looking at the Kokoda Campaign, focusing on the combat performance of battalions on the Kokoda Track and how the militia were prepared for combat at the tactical, operational and strategic level. This episode looks at the combat leadership of John Jackson. Check out the  show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.

Today I spoke with Todd who served in the Army with me and his wife Kate, about their Kokoda experience DO KOKODA WITH USSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

 Today I am sharing some interviews with myself, Aiden Taylor and Bill James from the 4BC radio station in Brisbane. I really hope you enjoy these because there are some really valuable conversations here. See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Another podcast and another chat with a good mate of mine who trekked Kokoda with me this year. Tuffy kept good notes on his training so I thought it would be good to share those with you. I get asked about training a lot. ADVENTURE PROFESSIONALS  KOKODA TRACKSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Damien Thomlinson is someone who has seen his fair share of adversity.Damien is an Australian Afghanistan war veteran, inspires globally who lost both his legs to a Taliban bomb in Afghanistan.He undertook intense rehabilitation, learned to walk with prosthetics and from there he kept going.He authored his best-selling autobiography "Without Warning.", took on various challenges like the TARGA Tasmania rally, Kokoda Track, snowboarding and the Invictus Games.He acted in "Hacksaw Ridge," and appeared on "Australian Survivor."He's now even ranked among the top 3 Multi-Amputee golfers worldwide.But it is the challenges of being a special forces soldier and the PTSD that he battles with after that part of his life that he has chosen to share with us today.In this episode shares:- The special show he has produced and will be touring the country with- What the special forces means to him- What the process to get in was like- How he made connections despite not being able to tell people what he did- How his relationships outside of the military struggled while he was in it- How his PTSD presents for him- The first time he felt good after his PTSD- How he handles his PTSD and his weaknesses nowKey Quotes “Everything shuts down. My voice gets broken into a monotone that I don't even know if I could do if I was trying to act.”“I'd much rather get it wrong and get it right the second time.”More about DamienYou can find out more about Damien, including the production he is touring here at his website: https://www.damienthomlinson.com/You can get involved with the podcast online To try out our resilience course: https://www.challengesthatchangeus.com/surviving-2-thriving-course1On facebook in our community: https://www.facebook.com/groups/challengesthatchangeusOr on Instagram: @challengesthatchangeusIf you want to contact the podcast, email us here: support@challengesthatchangeus.comOr check out our website: www.Challengesthatchangeus.com If you want to find out more about what Ali does, check out her business via the website:http://www.trialtitudeperformance.com.au For her other business you can find it through the websites:www.altitudefitnessarmidale.com.au@trialtitudeperformance Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

ADVENTURE PROFESSIONALS   KOKODA TRACK INFORMATIONSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

FULL SHOW | Rejoice, Marty is back! He chats Kokoda Track treks with Lehmo, and we ask listeners: how'd you burn your bits?   Tune into Triple M weekdays LIVE from 6-9am and call 1 333 53 to play The Marty Sheargold Show's $10K Spin it DJ. For more Marty Shear-GOLD, head to Youtube.  And for a laugh-fuelled feed, follow us on TikTok and Instagram. Remember to like and share!See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Today I chat Kokoda with Aiden who just completed the ANZAC Kokoda Trek.ADVENTURE PROFESSIONALS WEBSITE KOKODA TRACKSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

How did the P-40E compare against the Japanese Zero?  We look at how Australia was prepared for the war in the air over Port Moresby.  How well were the pilots prepared and how well was the squadron bought up to operational standard?  This is Part 16 of our series looking at the Kokoda Campaign, focusing on the combat performance of battalions on the Kokoda Track and how the militia were prepared for combat at the tactical, operational and strategic level. This episode looks at the first combats fought over the skies of Port Moresby and how the Squadron Leader of No 75 Squadron, John Jackson, took the fight to the Japanese. Check out the  show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.

It was 900 days from the declaration of war against Germany in 1939 to the bombing of Darwin.  When Darwin was bombed, there were no RAAF fighters to defend, and it was three weeks before Darwin was had fighter coverage (and they were US fighters).  We look at how the RAAF was prepared for war, prepared for war for Japan and prepared to defend Australia. This is Part 15 of our series looking at the Kokoda Campaign, focusing on the combat performance of battalions on the Kokoda Track and how the militia were prepared for combat at the tactical, operational and strategic level. This episode looks at how No 75 Squadron contributed to the Joint Battle during the Kokoda Campaign.  We focus on how the RAAF looked to mobilise and scale up.  We discuss EATS, Check out the  show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.

SBS's Pablo Vinales talks to Australia's Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and PNG's Prime Minister James Marape while the two men follow the challenging 16 kilometre Kokoda track to the Isurava Memorial site, for the Anzac Day dawn service. The Kokoda Track is a symbol of the courage, sacrifice, and resilience of both Australian and Papua New Guinean soldiers who defended against the Japanese advance. Stretching through rugged mountain terrain and dense jungle in Papua New Guinea, the trail was a crucial lifeline during the Pacific campaign. Its challenging terrain, coupled with sometimes harsh weather conditions, tests the endurance of all who traverse it.

Last time we spoke about the beginning of Operation Ichi-Go, the war in the Burma front and the war in New Guinea. Hundreds of thousands of IJA troops stormed countless areas in China. Chiang Kai-Shek was caught somewhat with his pants down, his best men were in Burma, there was little his defenders could do against such raw power. Xuchang fell and soon the Japanese were marching upon Luoyang. Over in Burma the British, Indian, American and Chinese alliance was continuing to both attack and defend. In the north Stilwell led the offensive, while Slim led the defensive in the south. The Chindits fought like lions to defend White City, but ultimately would give up strongholds to seek out new ones. Over in New Guinea the Japanese continued their frantic retreat under heavy pressure from the Australians. As bad as the situation was, the Japanese were in for another nasty surprise in Green Hell. This episode is the invasion of Western New Guinea Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Last week we saw the effective conclusion of the Eastern New Guinea Campaign. It was a colossal campaign beginning with the Australian defense along the Kokoda Track, then the blood battle of Buna-Gona, the drive upon Lae-Salamaua, the march north upon the Huon Peninsula and Finisterres, and after taking Madang it was finally over. Yet while the book was closing upon Eastern New Guinea, the book on Western New Guinea was just about to be opened.  The pace of the offensive against the Japanese in New Guinea accelerated greatly in the first half of 1944. This was primarily because General MacArthur feared unless he made quick progress he would lose the reins over where the allies would drive upon the Japanese home islands. MacArthur of course sought to advance upon the Philippines, while the Joint Chiefs favored the Navy's central thrust more so. Despite MacArthur's continuous war against his colleagues and superiors and his continuous complaining he lacked support, he had been provided the means to carry out numerous amphibious assaults that could lead to his ultimate goal. MacArthur's operations against New Britain, Saidor, Los Negros and Manus clearly indicated allied superiority over the Japanese in terms of men, ships and airpower. By April of 1944, MacArthur had nearly 750,000 men under his command. His major components were 6 US infantry divisions, one cavalry division, 3 separate regiment combat teams and 3 special brigades. The Australians were gradually being relegated into a secondary role, but could still provide 5 additional divisions and enough separate brigades to form another 2 divisions. General Kenney's air force had grown so large, they could now mount 200 aircraft raids against a variety of targets with little fear of Japanese retaliation. What MacArthur needed was more and more forward airfields so he could hurl fighters and bombers deeper into the Japanese inner perimeter. In a lot of respects, the Japanese position in New Guinea was all but hopeless. Although they still had more than 350,000 troops in the Southwest Pacific area, many were isolated with little chance of receiving reinforcements or supplies. There was also an enormous amount of confusion amongst the various commands, made difficult by enormous distance and the lack of effective naval power. Overall command of Japanese forces as far as Wewak was technically under Lt General Fusataro Tshima, whose HQ was at Manokwari on the Vogelkop Peninsula. It was Tshima who ordered General Adachi to withdraw his 18th Army over to the Hollandia area. Fortunately for MacArthur, Adachi procrastinated heavily, believing a landing would be made at Hansa Bay. All of the heavy bombing by the 5th air force against the coast near Wewak supported his beliefs. Not too long ago we spoke about Operations Reckless and Persecution, the invasion of Hollandia and Aitape. Admiral Barbey had already departed the staging points and rendezvous northwest of Manus Island by April 20th. The large convoys sailed west from the Admiralty Islands until dusk, whence they turned southwest towards Hollandia. Admiral Mitscher's Task Force 58 was providing escort while also launching strikes against Wakde, Sarmi and Sentani airfields on April 21st. Over the next three days the carrier aircraft neutralized the remaining airpower in the Wakde-Sarmi area. Early on the 22nd, the two task forces separated, with the Persecution Task Force heading southeast towards Aitape and the rest, designated Reckless Task Force, proceeded to a point 20 miles offshore between Humboldt and Tanahmerah Bay. Now the allied troops were ready to hit the beaches, but awaiting them was a large concentration of Japanese…however it was mostly a concentration of Japanese personnel rather than combat troops. While initial attention was focussed on the Geelvink Bay area, the 2nd Area Army command was also concerned over the weak condition of the defenses of Hollandia, which lay just east of the 140th meridian in the 8th Area Army zone of responsibility. An order to dispatch an element of the 36th Division to that sector was issued but was quickly revoked on the ground that it would weaken the defenses of Geelvink Bay without appreciably strengthening Hollandia. A large section of the New Guinea coast between Wewak and Sarmi thus remained practically undefended. General Anami promptly dispatched a staff mission to 8th Area Army headquarters at Rabaul to press for reinforcement of the Hollandia area, and a similar recommendation was communicated to Imperial General Headquarters during December. Two battalions of the 6th South Seas Detachment, temporarily stationed on Palau, were dispatched by the High Command. This force arrived in Hollandia on March 4, but numbered only 240 men, since approximately 1000 men, including the detachment commander, had been lost en route to submarine attacks. No other action was taken, however, since both 8th Area Army and 18th Army, after the loss of Finschhafen, were more immediately concerned with checking further enemy penetration of the Dampier Strait region. Thus roughly 10,000 IJA and 1000 IJN personnel were at Hollandia, most support units led by Major-General Kitazono Toyozo and aviation units from General Inada's 6th air division. When Tsihima ordered Adachi over to the Hollandia area and he procrastinated, this prompted the leader of the 2nd Area Army, General Korechika Anami over at Davao to become concerned. Anami sent his chief of staff over to Wewak to convince Adachi to pull out, but when Adachi finally began withdrawing, he only had two regiment on the trail by the time of the American landings against Hollandia and Aitape. Major General Toyozo Kitazono only arrived in the area 10 days before the invasion and for an unexplained reason never officially took command. This is why Tshima's appointed air officers, Inada ended up being thrown the command. Inada only really had 500 effective combat troops, mostly from the 6th South Seas Detachment. These units belonged to General Anami Korechika's 2nd Area Army, which had been transferred recently from Manchuria to oversee the defense of the eastern Dutch East Indies and western New Guinea, and for the projected and later canceled invasion of northern Australia. Random note, I recently made a Youtube short mocking that canceled australian invasion on my youtube channel, it was a wild idea. Thus Anami's command was now formally around the 2nd, 18th and 19th armies. Lt General Kitano Kenzo's 19th Army had been garrisoning Timor, the Lesser Sunda Islands, Sumbawa, the Banda Sea Islands and some key points in Northwestern New Guinea with their HQ located at Ambon. Lt General Tshima Fusutaro's 2nd Army as I had mentioned was assigned overall defense of Western New Guinea, with Lt General Tagami Hachiro's 36th Division landing at Sarmi and Biak in early March and Lt General Ikeda Shunkichi's 35th Division preparing to come to Manokwari. The 14th Division originally part of the 2nd Army was diverted to defender Palau. Furthermore, to further support  the 2nd Area Army was Vice-Admiral Endo Yoshikazu's 9th Fleet, three southern expeditionary fleets, and the 7th Air Division of Lt General Sudo Einosuke. At Hollandia, the headquarters of Admiral Endo and Generals Kitazono and Inada had arrived at the same time by mid April. Though General Adachi had placed Kitazono in formal command of all units there, the transport commander had no time, as to develop a comprehensive defense plan for Hollandia, thus as I previously mentioned, command really fell onto Inada and Endo. The Japanese would be woefully unprepared for what was to come.  Over at Aitape, meanwhile, there were only a handful of replacements from the 20th Division, along with some naval and support personnel, so the situation looked even wrose for the 1000-man garrison. Preceding the amphibious assaults, Admiral Crutchley's surface fleet was going shell the Tanahmerah Bay area while Admiral Mitscher's carrier planes bombed the waters off the Tanahmerah beaches to explode possible mines, also finishing off the Hollandia airstrips and the remaining aircraft there.  Crutchley's warships picked up their landmarks through the mist as best they could, and at 6sm the roar of 8-inch guns from the heavy cruisers HMAS Australia and HMAS Shropshire shattered the silence of the steaming tropical morning. To this din was added the sharper crack of 5-inch and 4.7-inch weapons from American and Australian destroyers. The fire continued until 6:45, by which time 600 rounds of 8-inch and 1,500 rounds of 5-inch and 4.7-inch ammunition had been expended. As for the aerial strikes, despite the unfavorable weather, Task Force 58 managed to maintain planes on air alert over the Hollandia area since dawn. No enemy aircraft flew up from the Hollandia fields, and the few apparently operational planes sighted on those strips were strafed. In general there were no indications that Japanese defenses or defenders existed in the Tanahmerah Bay area. Task Force 58's scheduled bombing and strafing missions for that region were therefore canceled. Meeting little opposition, LCVP's carrying the first wave of the 19th and 21st Regiment approached Red Beach 2. As the leading wave of LCVP's, approached RED Beach 2, which was obscured by smoke from the naval bombardment, a rocket barrage was laid on the landing area by one Seventh Fleet LCI and two landing craft,, of the 542nd Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment. Machine guns mounted aboard the leading LCVP's kept up a steady fire against the beach. There was no answer from the Japanese, and the only opposition to the landing was scattered small arms and light automatic weapons fire from points far on the flanks of the beach and from a small island in Tanahmerah Bay. This fire was so quickly silenced by supporting destroyers that the assault waves suffered no casualties before reaching shore. Thus tactical surprise was achieved in Tanahmerah Bay, as the Japanese had only a few lookouts in the sector. General Irving's 24th Division successfully landed and the 3rd Battalion, 19th Infantry, quickly secured the northern portion of the beachhead and immediately dispatched patrols east and north to probe suspected enemy positions. The 1st Battalion, following the 3rd ashore, went into an assembly area to act as local reserve and to make ready to aid in unloading supplies at the water's edge if that proved necessary. The 2nd Battalion, 21st Infantry, took the southern half of Red Beach 2 with similar ease. The 3rd Battalion of that regiment quickly followed the 2nd ashore and sent Company I south to look for the trail expected to connect with Red Beach 1 at Dépapré. Simultaneously, LVT's carrying Lt Colonel Thomas Cliffords 1st battalion, 21st Regiment crossed coral barrier reefs on their way to Red Beach 1. Cliffords men landed completely unopposed and would spend an hour trying to locate the road leading to Lake Sentani and her airfields. Clifford left A Company at the beach while the rest trekked it over the  Dépapré-Lake Sentani trail at 8:37am, still encountering no enemy opposition whatsoever.Moving through fire lanes down which no bullets flew and past pillboxes in early stages of construction, the battalion column reached the village of Mariboe at 1047 hours. Only a few scattered enemy rifle shots had been encountered during this march and the village was secured without opposition. Over three miles by trail inland from Dépapré, Mariboe was the 24th Division's first inland objective. It was evident from scattered Japanese equipment in and around Mariboe that the Japanese had recently evacuated the village not long before the 1st Battalion's arrival. Colonel Clifford  halted his men. Since radio communication with the division command post on Red Beach 2 had been lost, he sent messengers back over the tortuous trail to report progress to General Irving. At the same time patrols were sent toward Kantomé, nearly two miles southeast of Mariboe. They reported few signs of enemy activity along the trail beyond Mariboe. Colonel Clifford apparently did not wait to re-establish contact with higher headquarters but, acting on his patrols' reports, ordered the battalion to push on. Encountering little opposition along the main trail, the unit reached Kantomé about noon. When Irving arrived to Red Beach 2 at 9;30am, he found a major logistical problem had formed at his main beachhead. Behind the narrow beach, a wide, impassable swamp was discover, it covered most of the area that the men had planned to use for the bivouac and supply dump area. Thus supplies soon began to pile up on the beach. This was an especially serious circumstance, for the landing plans had called for moving almost all troops and supplies overland from Red Beach 2 to the road inland. Construction of a road between the two beaches was soon found impracticable and when, after a day and a half of hard work, engineers had succeeded in driving a few yards of road into the hills south toward Red Beach 1, the project was discontinued. The small completed stretch did serve some useful purpose. On D-Day two batteries of 105-mm. howitzers were dragged along the road as far as possible to a cramped position on a little ridge immediately south of Red Beach 2. From this site the howitzers could deliver some fire support for troops advancing inland from Red Beach 1, but the direction of this fire was limited by a number of hills nearby. The same stretch of road also provided dispersal space for a few of the many vehicles which had been unloaded at Red Beach 2 on D-Day. Additionally, a limited dispersal area, rendered inaccessible by a small stream and by an arm of the swamp, was discovered at the northern edge of the beach, and ultimately the 542nd Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment constructed a road into this space. Artillery, ashore within an hour after the initial landing, was emplaced there to deliver fire on inland targets. But the fill used to build this road stopped the flow of the little stream which had drained the swamp into Tanahmerah Bay. To prevent a rise in the swamp's water level, a drainage canal was cut directly through the center of the beach. This procedure speeded the outward flow of swamp water, lowered the water level a little, and created a small additional dry area behind the beach, but it did not provide sufficient dry land for dispersal of all the troops and supplies scheduled to land on Red Beach 2. Eventually Irvings men found some dry flat dispersal areas behind the beach, allowing the supply shuttles to continue their work uncongested. Colonel Cliffords battalion would make the main thrust for the division while the remainder of Colonel Charles Lyman's 21st Regiment moved over to Red Beach 1. Colonel Clifford possessed little or no knowledge of the situation to the rear other than the difficulties presented by terrain. Ahead, 10,000 Japanese were thought to be concentrated around the airfields. Jangkena was on flat, swampy ground and was not an easily defensible position. Should the 1st Battalion push on to Dazai, also on flat ground, Japanese troops might outflank the unit, cut its line of communications to Dépapré, and destroy it at leisure. If the Japanese bypassed the battalion they could cut off the advance of the rest of the 21st Infantry at any one of the many defiles over the first two or three miles of the trail inland from Dépapré. Colonel Clifford therefore decided to pull his men back to Kantomé for the night, leaving only outposts along the trail east of that village. Kantomé was located near the foot of the Takari Hills, which he thought would present a serious obstacle to any Japanese flanking maneuvers. It was a fortunate decision, as around midnight elements of the 22nd Airfield Battalion had advanced overland around his 1st battalions outposts, striking at their left flank. Meanwhile, General Heavey's landing craft carrying the leading waves of the 162nd and 186th Regiments, supported by rocket fire and by Rear-Admiral Russell Berkey's cruisers, likewise met no Japanese resistance as they landed General Fuller's troops on the White Beaches. Company A of Colonel Harold Haney's 162nd Regiment rapidly secured Cape Pie while Company I of Colonel Oliver Newman's 186th Regiment secured Cape Tjeweri. With Jautefa Bay in hand, Newman's 3rd Battalion was then landed on White Beach 4 in preparation for an advance towards Leimok Hill and Pim. The first objective, Leimok Hill, lay 1,800 yards northwest of Pim. Part of the battalion secured the hill by 1000, and other elements advanced southward toward Pim. That village and its usable jetty were secured, against light opposition, by 1645, while Suikerbrood Hill, on Jautefa Bay south of Pim, was cleared by 1800. The danger that enemy troops atop dominating heights near Pim might make White Beach 4 untenable was over. The 3rd Battalion then established a night perimeter at Pim, extending its defenses along a trail leading west from that village to the point at which the Pim-Hollandia track joined the main road inland to Lake Sentani, thus securing the roadhead from which movements to inland objectives had to begin. Over at White Beach 1, Haney's 3rd Battalion advanced quickly to take Pancake Hill at around 8am, only meeting sporadic rifle fire. After taking the hill, they began pushing up the shores of Humboldt Bay, encountering no resistance as they advanced upon Jarremoh Hill. It seemed clear to the Americans, the Japanese had been taken by complete surprise, not expecting an amphibious assault against Hollandia so quickly, so they had pulled back to the Sentani Lake Airfield sector. Now further south, Haney's 2nd Battalion were advancing to a track that connected Hollandia with Pim, trying to make contact with the 3rd Battalion over at Jarremoh Hill. Meanwhile Newman's 1st Batallion was advancing upon Leimok Hill. Though the men wanted to keep pushing towards Hollandia during the late afternoon, Fuller decided to dig in for the night while warships and artillery softened up the city. When General Anami over at his HQ in Manado heard of the invasion he immediately ordered the 23rd Air Flotilla of Rear-Admiral Ito Yoshiaki to toss whatever he could against the allied surface ships and force along the beaches. He also ordered the 18th army to break through Aitape to rush over and help the Hollandia garrison and for General Tshima to dispatch a regiment force as well to Hollandia. Thus General Tagami got his 224th regiment together for the advance to Hollandia, expecting to get there for early May, while General Nakai's 20th Division continued to close in on Aitape. Anami also wanted to send the main part of the 36th Division to perform a counterattack in Hollandia's direction as he thought it vitally important to delay the enemy as much as possible so a better defense of Western New Guinea could be organized. Yet General Terauchi Hisaichi of the Southern Army declined his request to do so on the basis a counteroffensive would simply denude the already weakened defenses of Western New Guinea. Meanwhile General Doe's Persecution Task Force was carrying out their landing against Aitape. The landings would be preceded by naval gunfire from Captain Albert Noble's Destroyer force, aerial bombardment from escort carriers of Rear Admiral Ralph Davisons Task Force 78 and from General Kenney's air force. Meeting zero resistance and under the cover of a rocket barrage, the LCPR's landed the men of Colonel Francis Mason's 163rd Regiment by 6:45. Despite the lack of resistance, an immense amount of smoke and poor visibility prevented the troops from landing at Beach Blue, and instead they came ashore at Wapil. Just like at Hollandia, they had achieved tactical surprise at Aitape as the Japanese fled in a panic under naval gunfire. Mason's got his 2nd Battalion to swing west and quickly seize the Waitanan Creek while the 1st battalion was being landed. Then the 2nd Battalion formed a defensive position at the Pro Mission while the 3rd Battalion sent patrols east to establish an outpost near the mouth of the Nigia River. Back over at the beaches, General Doe landed some Australian engineers who began repairing the Tadji Fighter airstrip. The No. 62 Works Wing, Royal Australian Air Force, had come ashore at Blue Beach during the morning and had been able to start work on Tadji Fighter Strip at 1:00pm. Repairs continued throughout the night under floodlights, the lack of Japanese opposition and the urgency of the task prompting General Doe to push the work. Although it had been hoped that the strip would be ready for use on D+1, terrain conditions were such that necessary repairs were not completed on schedule. Thus it was 9:00 on April 24th before the Australian engineers, who had worked without break for almost forty-eight hours, could announce that the airstrip was ready. At 4:30pm, 25 P-40s of No. 78 Wing, RAAF, landed on the field, and the balance of the wing arrived the next day. The ground on which the fighter strip was located was so poorly drained that it was not until April 28th, after steel matting had been placed on the field, that it could be used continuously. The works wing then moved to Tadji Bomber Strip to aid the 872nd and 875th Engineer Aviation Battalions. The latter two units passed to the operational control of Wing Commander William A. C. Dale of the RAAF, who, besides commanding the works wing, was Persecution Task Force Engineer. Extensive repairs were necessary at the bomber strip and that field was not ready for use by fighter and transport planes until May 27th and for bombers until early July. While the engineers worked, Colonel Merle Howe's 127th Regiment also landed, while Mason's man expanded the perimeter further west, securing the incomplete Tadji west airstrip and the mouth of the Raihu River by the end of the day. Simultaneously, Colonel Cliffords men continued their advance from Kantomé to Sabron, whereupon, Fuller finally decided to launch his assault on Hollandia, with Colonel Haney's 2nd and 3rd Battalions rapidly moving down the ridge to seize the abandoned town by 11:15am. To the south, Colonel Newman had his 1st Battalion pursue the fleeing enemy, and in the process rapidly secured Brinkman's Plantation and then repelled a very uncoordinated Japanese counterattackby the 6th South Seas Detachment and General Kitazono's 42nd independent motor car battalion. At 8:00am on the23rd the 1st Battalion left its night positions on Leimok Hill and started out over the main track, passing through the 3rd Battalion. The movement was supported by the 205th and 218th Field Artillery Battalions, set up near Cape Pie, and by aircraft from the carriers of Task Force 58. By 9am the 1st Battalion had reached Brinkman's Plantation, about 2,200 yards by trail southwest of Pim. So far, there had been no opposition. Now Companies A and C parted from the main body to patrol northwest up the Borgonjie River. Proceeding to a fork about 2,000 yards upstream, the two companies repulsed a series of unco-ordinated attacks which were launched against the right flank of the 186th Infantry during the afternoon by a Japanese force estimated at 150. The two companies remained at the stream-branching during the night of 23-24 of April, and on the latter day they moved overland southwest to rejoin the main force on the Pim-Lake Sentani trail. Meanwhile General Inada's aviation personnel already at the Sentani airfield alongside those currently retreating there were cut off from their ration and ammunition supplies which happened to be stored near the coast. Facing the hopeless situation of having to conduct a proper defense of the airfields with less than a week's worth of rations, little small arms and machine gun ammunition, no artillery at all and with two different enemy forces converging upon them, General Inada seized full command and led the weak garrison to retreat towards Genjem. Their rear guard was proved by General Kitazono's troops. During that same afternoon, two platoons of Cliffords Company B, leading the advance from Sabron, safely crossed a small stream but soon found themselves in the middle of a well-concealed Japanese ambush on the east bank. Rifle and heavy machine gun fire made the stream's steep banks untenable, and the forward platoons hurriedly withdrew to the west, leaving four dead men behind. In response to this, Irvings artillery and Admiral Mitscher's carrier aircraft began to bomb and strafe the area, but Cliffords B Company was nonetheless unable to break through. An artillery duel emerged during the night keeping the men of the 1st Battalion wide awake. They were also being supplies with great difficulty via hand-carry over the Dépapré-Lake Sentani trail. Fortunately the 24th Division's plans for the Hollandia operation had taken into consideration many of the potential logistic problems that might be encountered in the Tanahmerah Bay area. The division G-4 Section had made a detailed study which had shown that a full infantry regiment could be supplied by hand-carry from Red Beach 2 over the Dépapré-Lake Sentani trail inland as far as Jangkena. When no road connecting Red Beach 2 with Red Beach 1 had been found, the division moved the main supply point to Dépapré, from which the advance inland would be supported. With this change in plans, the G-4 Section undertook new computations and calculated that the hand-carry distance could be extended to Dazai. This conclusion was based on the assumption that adverse weather conditions would not make the Dépapré-Lake Sentani road nearly impassable. On 23 April heavy rains started to turn the road into a quagmire through which struggling men could scarcely carry their own equipment and food, to say nothing of extra supplies for the leading battalion. By evening on that day logistic support of the 21st Regiment had therefore become a major problem. There was no question but that the regiment would have to be supported by hand-carry, for it was estimated that at least two weeks' hard work by engineers would be required before the road from Dépapré as far as Mariboe could be made passable even for jeeps. But the 1st Battalion had already advanced east of Dazai, beyond which point, according to the G-4 estimates, support by hand-carry would be next to impossible. Because of the logistical issues, General Eichelberger decided to make the Humboldt Bay area the principal task force landing site, allowing the 41st division to drive further inland. On the 24th, Newman's 3rd Battalion passed through the 1st and seized the Koejaboe area, only stopping there until the 2nd battalion came over to reinforce the continued advance. During this action however, most of the Japanese continued their retreat towards Genjem unmolested. Over in the west, Irving ordered Clifford to consolidate his forward positions around Sabron and Dazai as he now realized the continued rapid advance inland was no long possible as a result of their hand-carry logistics scheme and the weather was taking quite a turn for the worse hampering air drops. Back over at Aitape, Mason's troops crossed the Raihu and by midday the 2nd Battalion secured the town. However General Doe was dissatisfied with the pace of the westward advance, and he therefore suggested to Alamo Force that the 163rd's commander, Mason be relieved. This step was approved by General Krueger, although the regimental commander remained in control of his unit until 9 May, only two days before the 163rd Infantry began loading for another operation. For the next few days, the 163rd patrolled further inland and would fall into a heavy engagement at Kamti on the 29th. At the Kapoam villages, about twelve miles up the Raihu, elements of the 3rd Battalion encountered the only signs of organized Japanese resistance found in the Aitape area to 4 May. At one of these villages, Kamti, some outpost troops of the 3rd Battalion were surrounded by an estimated 200 Japanese who made a number of harassing attacks on 28 and 29th. These skirmishes cost the battalion 3 men killed and 2 wounded, while it was estimated that the Japanese lost about 90 killed. On the 25th, Colonel Lymann's two forward battalion resumed their march, heading through some dense jungle being met by sporadic enemy small arm fire. They eventually dug in around the vicinity of Julianadorp. Meanwhile Colonel Newman had his 3rd battalion advancing west along the main road to Nefaar while some LVT's transported his 1st battalion over Lake Sentani to a point on the western shore of Nefaar. Neither force faced much opposition and together would perform some patrolling of the Cyclops Drome during the afternoon. Back over at Aitape, Colonel Howe's 127th Regiment finished their occupation of Tumleo, Seleo and the Ali Islands and now were beginning to send patrols east towards Afua. On the 26th, Colonel Newman had his 1st Battalion seize the Cyclops Drome while his 2nd Battalion took some LVTS to capture the Sentani Drome. Shortly after midday both Battalions rapidly secured the airdromes under light enemy resistance. Despite a serious supply situation, Lyman's 1st and 3rd Battalion resumed the advance, only encountering one enemy bunker at Ebeli Plantation. It had been impossible to drop supplies from the air on April 25 and even hand-carrying had been stopped late in the afternoon by heavy rains which had flooded many small streams. Parts of the Dépapré-Lake Sentani trail were now knee deep in water. The two forward battalions were low on ammunition, and they would have to go on half-rations if the supply situation were not quickly improved. But General Irving was again optimistic about the weather, believing that air supply would be successful on the 26th. Furthermore, he had received information which indicated that the Japanese were evacuating the airfield area. For these reasons he considered that a continuation of the advance would not be unduly hazardous. In ordering the advance, the division commander was knowingly pushing his men far beyond the limit at which they could be supplied by hand-carry. If the airdrop should again fail or if track conditions should not improve, one of the two forward battalions would probably have to be echeloned back along the trail to augment the carrying parties, and the advance would probably have to be halted. Should enemy opposition prove stubborn, the forward battalions might have to withdraw, perhaps as far as Dazai, to replenish their meager supplies of rations and ammunition. General Irving was taking a calculated risk which assumed the success of the airdrop and an absence of determined Japanese opposition. By the afternoon of the 26th, the Hollandia Drome was secured after a successful airdrop at Dazai. After this the objectives of Reckless had been achieved. Mop up operation would continue up until June 6th, as Fuller's 41st Division cleared out Cape Soedja and the Cyclops Mountain. They would end up flushing out Japanese on Hill 1000 and Irving's 24th Division sent out patrols west towards Marneda, Demta Bay and Gemjem. By 6 June the they had all killed 405 Japanese and had taken 64 prisoners in the Genjem-Demta region. Many more Japanese were found dead of starvation or disease along the trails in the same area. During the same time period, Eichelberger's task force would develop Hollandia into a major base from which future operations would be support. In the end casualties for Operation Reckless amounted to 124 deaths, 1057 wounded and 28 missing for the Americans. The Japanese suffered 3300 deaths, 661 captured. On April 30th, 7220 Japanese from Hollandia's garrison would assemble at Genjem where General Inada began a gradual withdrawal in 11 echelons towards Sarmi. By May 7th, all echelons departed Genjem for a very long march through some of the worst terrain in New Guinea. Two-thirds of the garrison reached the Tor River by June. It's estimated 93% of their strength would succumb to the deadly jungles, lack of provisions and rampant cases of malaria. Meanwhile to secure the Tadji airstrips against Japanese attacks from the direction of Wewak, Colonel Howe sent Company C by boat to Nyaparake on April 28th where they set up outposts further inland around Charov and Jalup. By May 4th, further patrolling by the 127th regiment had discovered no trace of organized enemy units, thus Operation Persecution was successfully completed. During the operation 525 Japanese were killed, 25 were captured while the Americans suffered 19 deaths and 40 wounded. That is all for the New Guinea front as we are now traveling over to New Britain. After the Battle of Talasea and the area was secured, Colonel Smith reached the conclusion that the enemy was withdrawing as rapidly as possible to Cape Hoskins. He decided to send patrols to Numundo Plantation. A reconnaissance patrol on March 10th found enemy positions at Bola and Santa Monica Plantation evacuated, but came upon entrenched enemy at Garilli. On 11th Captain Andrew Haldane's Company K left Bitokara with orders to proceed to Numundo on a three-day patrol, a time estimate that was to prove too optimistic. Company K reached Garilli to find it empty of the enemy, but just north of Patanga encountered Japanese small-arms, automatic-weapons and mortar fire. For four days the Marine patrol made slow progress, fighting an enemy who made a stand in the heavy vegetation approximately every 200 yards and then withdrew effectively before the advance guard flankers could close in. On the evening of the 16th the company entered Kilu where the Japanese made their final stand. While the two forces battled, a Marine landing craft appeared offshore and as it approached the beach the enemy diverted what apparently was a 75mm field gun from the ground action to the "naval force". In the boat was Lieutenant Colonel Deakin who had obtained permission from Colonel Smith to transport a section of 81mm mortars to Captain Haldane's assistance. Although the Japanese bracketed the craft, they failed to hit it and the weapons were landed without casualties. Shortly after the heavy mortars began lobbing shells toward the enemy, the Japanese broke contact and the Marines reached Numundo 48 hours later without finding the Terunuma Detachment again. The 1st Battalion also set up an ambush at Garu which was productive of enemy dead and prisoners for awhile. Company I replaced Company K at Numundo and in turn was replaced on 25 March by the 2nd Battalion. Inasmuch as the enemy continued to straggle eastward singly and in small groups with little or no communications, patrols were kept busy returning over and over again to the same villages and plantations in hopes of catching unwary Japanese. Such hopes frequently paid off. On the 30th the 2nd Battalion moved southeast from Numundo to San Remo Plantation, described by one Marine as "a very pleasant place." From that point patrols probed westward to the Kulu River and eastward into the Cape Hoskins area as far as Buluma. Overall the patrols saw 3 men killed with 8 wounded while accounting for 151 Japanese killed and 68 taken prisoner. Meanwhile, Matsuda, Komori and Terunuma;s Detachments all were performing withdrawals. Komori dispatched his force to the rendezvous point in successive echelons. He himself left Didmop with the rear guard, back on February 28th, reaching Augitni via Vakan on March 1st. The following morning he started his hospital patients along the evacuation route and sent a detail of 250 men to Bulawatni to help transport provisions. Yet the Marines at Iboki were becoming increasingly troublesome, though quite unaware that they faced anything more than starving stragglers. When Company A, 1st Marines entered Talawaga on the 5th, Colonel Sato felt the hot breath of pursuit on his neck and moved to the trail fork where he assumed command of the combined force. The next morning the Komori Group resumed its withdrawal in a northwesterly direction along the right prong of the trail fork, while Sato prepared to follow with his command on the 7th. At this point the ways of these two officers parted, and thenceforth each pursued his individual course toward the destiny that awaited him. On the 6th the Komori Group, with Major Tobuse's 1st Battalion, 141st Infantry in the lead, covered 16 km's on the trail running northeast from the fork toward the coast to reach what the Japanese called the "North Road." After the first day on the trail, Komori's progress becomes difficult to follow, owing to his use of place names occurring in no other reports or maps. It was slow and difficult at best, because of rain and mud, and the necessity for wide detours to find fords through deep streams and safe passages through or around extensive swamps. His immediate force numbered about 200, and on March 8th he recorded the Tobuse Battalion a half-day's march ahead. He sighted occasional enemy reconnaissance planes, and on the 12th U.S. landing craft fired upon his men as they attempted to cross the Kuhu River, obliging them to take to the jungle and swamps. The broad Via River stopped his force on the 14th. When improvised rafts refused to float, the major and 15 others swam across. The rest, through weakness or timidity, declined to follow this excellent example, and it took two days and a wide detour inland to get the whole group to the right bank. Then, on the 17th, provisions ran out. Thus the weakening men came by painful stages to Kometto (Eleanora Bay) and the welcome coconuts of Linga Linga Plantation on the 21st. But the wide Kapuluk River posed a formidable obstacle to further progress. They tried first to swim the Kapuluk near its mouth, but 18 men of the 2nd Company were swept away and 12 of them drowned, only the captain reaching the far bank safely. A patrol far upstream failed to find any fording point, so the troops spent the rest of the day building rafts. These managed to stay afloat, but broke apart so frequently that another two days were required for the passage. Then came the real heartbreaker on the 24th: they reached Kou only to find the provisioning post evacuated. On the 25th an officer patrol encountered a U.S. patrol, and once more the group had to detour. On the 26th Komori hired a native to guide him to Numundo Plantation, at the eastern base of the Willaumez Peninsula. But evidently the man had a change of heart, for the major recorded next day that, lacking a guide, "we advanced using a compass." They now entered a region of extensive swamps, intersected by another major obstacle: the two-pronged Kulu river. The column got across this stream on the 27th, but lost five more men in the swift current. The survivors emerged from the swamps on the 29th and followed the river southward. On the 31st Komori made his final diary entry, eloquent in its stark simplicity: "We are very tired and without food." Apparently at this point malaria laid the major low. Ordering his men to continue toward Cape Hoskins, he took refuge in a native village, accompanied only by his executive officer, his orderly and a corporal attached to his headquarters. For lack of further diary entries, obscurity shrouds the last week of his life. Most of the Japanese forces reached Malalia by the end of March, but Marine patrols were becoming increasingly troublesome. On the 11th, elements of the 1st Marines landed at Linga Linga, patrolling further inland. Company E landed at the Kulu River mouth at the base of Willaumez Peninsula. There the Marines encountered 4 enemy stragglers, killing three and taking one prisoner. Then they moved westward to Kandoka, where they were joined by two platoons of Company F, brought over by boat. There they established a roadblock, just in time to catch Sato's rear echelon. Second Lieutenant Richard B. Watkins was in command of the trail block. At 9am Watkins led his group inland from the village over some faint trails which he hoped the Japanese main body might be using. The Marines had proceeded about a mile and a half and were about to cross a stream in a sparsely wooded area when they sighted two Japanese standing with slung rifles, apparently resting. Watkins had about decided to dispose of these when they moved off in a northeasterly direction, followed almost immediately by a large body of their compatriots. Lying where the Japanese could easily have spotted them, the Marines counted the 73 enemy soldiers and noted the equipment cited above. Conspicuous among them was a tall, burly officer being carried on a litter. The Japanese were cutting fresh trail through the jungle, and fortunately were too intent on their work to discover the patrol. They made excruciatingly slow progress, however, and Watkins did not dare to move until the last man had disappeared. He then returned with all speed to Kandoka, sending a runner ahead with his report. At the village he met Major Brush who had come over from Yaluiai with one squad on what he had intended as merely a routine inspection. He promptly radioed his command post to send a rifle platoon and a 60mm mortar section to the scene and ordered Watkins to hold the trail block with one rifle squad, one machine-gun squad and two mortar squads while he himself set off with the rest of the troops available in an effort to overtake the Japanese from the rear. Before his own departure that morning, Watkins had sent a six-man patrol under Sergeant Frank Chliek to an inland village some two miles south of Kandoka, right where the Japanese appeared to be heading. The lieutenant promptly dispatched a native messenger there with a warning; then, when firing broke out in that direction, he surmised, correctly, that Chliek had become engaged and took the remaining rifle squad and hurried to his assistance. He arrived to find the sergeant and his men crouched on high ground by the east-west trail with dead Japanese all around them. The volume of fire was intense, the pattern not at all clear. As it turned out, Chliek had stumbled upon the column somewhere near its head and, taking advantage of his superior position, immediately opened fire. Major Brush's force, which had been closing rapidly, was on the opposite side of the valley at this time; hence, at sound of the first shots, had hastened to the scene and struck the Japanese column's other flank. In order to avoid becoming involved in a fire fight with that group, Watkins ordered Chliek's patrol back to Kandoka and followed with his own squad at a slower pace. Brush caught up with him shortly, whereat a counting of heads showed that, miraculously, the Marines had not sustained a single casualty. Here is the aftermath as Watkins recalls it: “On the following morning I took a 20 man patrol through the battle area. We counted 55 dead including 3 officers. It was quite easy to believe that perhaps 20 more died in scattered positions throughout the dense underbrush. The dead were all within a 100 yard stretch of trail. We encountered 2 more Japanese who had evidently just come upon the scene who were sitting side by side staring dazedly at the destruction and did not even turn their heads when we approached.” The burly officer previously observed on a litter proved to be Colonel Sato. Evidently Sergeant Chliek's patrol had struck the enemy column at precisely the point where he was being carried, for the colonel had only had time to leap to his feet and draw his sword to fight back before the Marines' fire riddled him. Seeing their leader fall, those Japanese farther forward took off in mad flight, while those behind were cut off by the converging of the two patrols. Thus perished one of the few Japanese to deserve much credit for the performance of the 65th Brigade on New Britain. Although the rear echelon attacked by the two patrols comprised less than half of Sato's total force, the group, as such, ceased to exist with the death of the leader who alone had held it together. Units split into components, these into smaller parties, straggling eastward over a variety of trails, often hacking their own way by compass azimuth.  Throughout April, the 17th Division continued their retreat towards Rabaul, managed to repel multiple marine patrol attacks around Cape Hoskins. General Sakai's survivors finally got to Rabaul between April 16th and May 15th, erecting the last bulwark of defense for the South Pacific. On April 6th, the journey of another Japanese commander came to an end. The body of the already deceased Major Komori was captured at the San Remo Plantation by the 2nd Battalion, 5th marines. They came upon the outpost, suddenly face to face with a group of four bedraggled Japanese. It was one of those abrupt encounters that allow little time for reflection or deliberation. The flurry of fire that followed killed three of the enemy and wounded the fourth, who promptly surrendered. Komori had apparently died of malaria along the way.  For the 5th Marines, too, was nearing its journey's end, so far as New Britain was concerned. With promotion of the regimental commander, Lieutenant Colonel Buse took over on an acting basis, and General Smith returned to Cape Gloucester to relieve General Shepherd as Assistant Division Commander. Units attached to the regiment followed, and representatives of the Army's 185th Infantry arrived to inspect positions preparatory to replacing the 5th, just as other 40th Infantry Division elements were doing in the Cape Gloucester area with a view toward relieving the entire 1st Marine Division. Last clash of the campaign occurred onthe 22nd of April, when a 2/5 patrol intercepted a party of Japanese, killing 20, including two officers, and suffering the regiment's last fatality on New Britain. Three days later the whole 185th RCT moved into Talasea and San Remo, and at 1530 command of the area formally passed to the Army. LCM's carrying the 1st and 3rd Battalions back to Borgen Bay cleared Talasea at 1630, followed by those carrying 2/5 from San Remo at 2000. The movement was reported complete at 1930 on the 26th, and men of the 5th learned that the 1st Marines had departed this island of evil memory the previous day and that they would follow as ships became available. Soon they would be relieved by Major-General Isaac Rapp Brush's 40th Division, which took responsibility for Cape Gloucester, Arawe and Talasea by the end of April.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Thus Operation Reckless and Persecution were both successful. Now MacArthur had a strong foothold in Western New Guinea seeing the Japanese continued their frantic retreat wherever allied forces seemed to pop up. Over in New Britain, the Japanese were losing formidable commanders as they too were on the retreat, things were simply disastrous for the empire of the rising sun. 

The prime minister has paid tribute to the Australian soldiers who became part of military history along the Kokoda Track as he prepares to walk "in the footsteps of giants"...etc - アンソニー・アルバニージー首相はパプアニューギニアで戦死したオーストラリアの第二次世界大戦の兵士を追悼しました。他

Waziri Mkuu amewasifu wanajeshi wa Australia walio kuwa sehemu ya historia ya jeshi, katika eneo la Kokoda Track anapo jiandaa kutembea katika nyayo zamagwiji.

The Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and his Papua New Guinean counterpart James Marape have set off together on a two-day hike of the historic Kokoda Track.

This is Part 14 of our series looking at the Kokoda Campaign, focusing on the combat performance of battalions on the Kokoda Track and how the militia were prepared for combat at the tactical, operational and strategic level. This episode looks at how the Australians and the Japanese generated combined arms on the Kokoda Track. Check out the  show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.

This is Part 13 of our series looking at the Kokoda Campaign, focusing on the combat performance of the 53rd Battalion and how the militia were prepared for combat at the tactical, operational and strategic level. This episode looks at the tragic friendly fire incident that occured during the Battle of Isurava, where the 2/14th C Company attacked into the Battalion Headquarters.  What were the factors in this and how could it have been avoided? Check out the  show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.

This is Part 12 of our series looking at the Kokoda Campaign, focusing on the combat performance of the 53rd Battalion and how the militia were prepared for combat at the tactical, operational and strategic level. The Kokoda Campaign for the Japanese is a manifestation of the effects of the manourvrist approach. We then discuss MAJGEN Basil Morris - at the time he took over command of the 8th Military District he was a substantive Colonel.  We look at the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operating Environment for the Kokoda Campaign.  What was the decisive terrain in the Morris' plan and how did he use his available resources?  We discuss the 49th Battalion and how they were employed. Check out the  show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.

This is Part 11 of our series looking at the Kokoda Campaign, focusing on the combat performance of the 53rd Battalion and how the militia were prepared for combat at the tactical, operational and strategic level. This episode commences our assessment of the operational level, but before we start, we will look at the psychiatric cost of training and fighting in the jungle.  David Woolley has done an excellent job in documenting issues on the Kokoda Track and suggests some solutions to increasing resilience for troops. We look at what the operational level of war is along with the events within MAJGEN Basil Morris' Area of Operations during the Kokoda Campaign. Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.

This is Part 10 of our series looking at the Kokoda Campaign, looking at the combat performance of the 39th Battalion. The 39th Battalion was one of Australia's best Battalions.  Formed in Victoria, it's story is similar to that of the 53rd Battalion- but with some key differences.  We look at those differences with Dr David Cameron, an expert on the Battles of the Kokoda campaign. Have a listed Dr David Cameron, an expert on the Kookoda Campaign as he discusses the history and performance of the 39th Battalion.  Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.   Dr David Cameron's Biography David Cameron received first class Honours in Prehistory, University of Sydney and a PhD in Palaeoanthropology, Australian National University. He has written over twenty books covering Australian Military History, Colonial History, and Evolutionary Science with over 70 internationally peer reviewed papers published in various journals and book chapters. He is a former Australian Research Council Post Doctoral Fellow, School of Archaeology, Australian National University; and an Australian Research Council QEII Fellow in the Department of Anatomy and Histology, University of Sydney. He has conducted and led several international fieldwork projects in Europe (Hungary), Asia (Vietnam, India, and Japan), and the Middle East (Turkey, Jordan, Israel, and the United Arab Emirates) and conducted extensive museum studies and conferences (United States, Europe, and Asia). Before retiring in 2023, he was a senior analyst in the Australian Intelligence Community.   Books on the Papua Campaign by Dr Cameron:   Cameron, D.W. (in preparation – December 2024.) The Battle for Milne Bay, Big Sky Publishing Cameron, D.W. (in preparation – August 2024) Sanananda, Bastard of a Place: The Battle for the Beachhead, 1942-43, Big Sky Publishing Cameron, D.W. (in press – November 2023) Bloody Buna: The Battle for the Beachhead, 1942-43, Big Sky Publishing Cameron, D.W. (2023) Gona's Gone: The Battle for the Beachhead 1942, Big Sky Publishing Cameron, D.W. (2022) Retaking Kokoda: The Australian Advance Across the Owen Stanleys, Big Sky Publishing Cameron, D.W. (2022) Saving Port Moresby: Fighting at the End of the Kokoda Track, Big Sky Publishing Cameron, D.W. (2022) The Battle for Isurava: Fighting on the Kokoda Track in the heart of the Owen Stanleys, Big Sky Publishing Cameron, D.W.  (2020) The Battles for Kokoda Plateau: Three Weeks of Hell Defending the Gateway to the Owen Stanleys, Allen & Unwin Australia

In 1942 amidst the rugged terrain of Papua New Guinea, the battle to save the Australian mainland unfolded in treacherous conditions, dense jungles, and steep mountain ranges, shadowed by the constant threat of tropical diseases.The Kokoda Track, a narrow and challenging pathway, became the epicenter of a battle where outnumbered Australian forces, primarily composed of reservists, aided by local Papuan allies, valiantly defended the strategically crucial Port Moresby. Enduring severe hardships, shortages of supplies, and fierce battles, they succeeded in compelling the Japanese to retreat.Join us as we explore their unwavering determination and sacrifice, which defined this critical victory for the Allies in the Pacific while facing incredible difficulties, and helped to solidify just what it means to be an ANZAC.Clips used from Slim Dusty, "Kokoda Track" and Stan Bissett - https://australiansatwarfilmarchive.unsw.edu.au/archive/1223

In 1942 amidst the rugged terrain of Papua New Guinea, the battle to save the Australian mainland unfolded in treacherous conditions, dense jungles, and steep mountain ranges, shadowed by the constant threat of tropical diseases.The Kokoda Track, a narrow and challenging pathway, became the epicenter of a battle where outnumbered Australian forces, primarily composed of reservists, aided by local Papuan allies, valiantly defended the strategically crucial Port Moresby. Enduring severe hardships, shortages of supplies, and fierce battles, they succeeded in compelling the Japanese to retreat.Join us as we explore their unwavering determination and sacrifice, which defined this critical victory for the Allies in the Pacific while facing incredible difficulties, and helped to solidify just what it means to be an ANZAC.

This is Part 9 of our series looking at the Kokoda Campaign, looking at the combat performance of the 39th Battalion. This episode discusses the formation of the 39th Battalion, it's preparation for combat and how it performed on the Kokoda Trail.  The 39th Battalion is one of the Australian Army's most famous Battalion, a militia battalion that bore the brunt of the Japanese attacks down the Kokoda track.  What enabled it to fight so well? Have a listed Dr David Cameron, an expert on the Kookoda Campaign as he discusses the history and performance of the 39th Battalion.  Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast. Dr David Cameron Biography David Cameron received first class Honours in Prehistory, University of Sydney and a PhD in Palaeoanthropology, Australian National University. He has written over twenty books covering Australian Military History, Colonial History, and Evolutionary Science with over 70 internationally peer reviewed papers published in various journals and book chapters. He is a former Australian Research Council Post Doctoral Fellow, School of Archaeology, Australian National University; and an Australian Research Council QEII Fellow in the Department of Anatomy and Histology, University of Sydney. He has conducted and led several international fieldwork projects in Europe (Hungary), Asia (Vietnam, India, and Japan), and the Middle East (Turkey, Jordan, Israel, and the United Arab Emirates) and conducted extensive museum studies and conferences (United States, Europe, and Asia). Before retiring in 2023, he was a senior analyst in the Australian Intelligence Community.   Books on the Papua Campaign by Dr Cameron:   Cameron, D.W. (in preparation – December 2024.) The Battle for Milne Bay, Big Sky Publishing Cameron, D.W. (in preparation – August 2024) Sanananda, Bastard of a Place: The Battle for the Beachhead, 1942-43, Big Sky Publishing Cameron, D.W. (in press – November 2023) Bloody Buna: The Battle for the Beachhead, 1942-43, Big Sky Publishing Cameron, D.W. (2023) Gona's Gone: The Battle for the Beachhead 1942, Big Sky Publishing Cameron, D.W. (2022) Retaking Kokoda: The Australian Advance Across the Owen Stanleys, Big Sky Publishing Cameron, D.W. (2022) Saving Port Moresby: Fighting at the End of the Kokoda Track, Big Sky Publishing Cameron, D.W. (2022) The Battle for Isurava: Fighting on the Kokoda Track in the heart of the Owen Stanleys, Big Sky Publishing Cameron, D.W.  (2020) The Battles for Kokoda Plateau: Three Weeks of Hell Defending the Gateway to the Owen Stanleys, Allen & Unwin Australia

This is the sixth episode in our Kokoda Track series looking at the performance of the 53rd Battalion.  The 53rd, a militia Battalion, had some incredibly brave men.  Virtually untrained, poorly equipped and with inexperienced leaders, they fought a battle-hardened enemy in some of the worst terrain in the world.  This episode looks at the mistakes in mobilisation that we made that sowed the seeds for the performance of the Battalion on the Kokoda Track at the Battle of Isurava. What are the similiarities between the formation of the 53rd Battalion and the mobilisation of Russian Reserves for the war in Ukraine? How was the Battalion formed? What was the Shanghai incident? How did they get to Port Moresby? Why were so many of the troops surprised on the Aquatania after it left port? What lessons are their we can learn from the 53rd Battalion if Australia was required to mobilise rapidly for war in the future? Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.

This is the fifth episode in our Kokoda Track series looking at the performance of the 53rd Battalion. The 53rd, a militia Battalion, had some incredibly brave men. Virtually untrained, poorly equipped, with inexperienced leaders, they fought a battle-hardened enemy in some of the worst terrain in the world. This episode looks at the fall of Isurava. Japanese troops in increasing numbers, with increasing persistence and increasing ferocity forced Australian troops to withdraw. Australian efforts to retake Kokoda will need to wait for another day. Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.