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Last time we spoke about the battle of Malacca strait. In the intense Battle of the Malacca Strait, Japanese forces undertook a desperate evacuation amidst relentless attacks by the Allies. After suffering heavy casualties from previous confrontations, the Japanese regrouped and attempted to maintain their defensive positions. However, under the pressure of determined Allied assaults and strategic maneuvers, they faced increasingly fierce resistance. As the Allies advanced, they successfully overwhelmed Japanese defenses, leading to significant losses for the opposing forces. The battle transformed into a pivotal moment in the Pacific War as Japanese resistance crumbled, ultimately shifting the tide toward Allied victory. This clash not only showcased the harsh realities of war but also underscored the relentless determination of both sides as they fought for dominance in the region, marking a crucial step towards the conclusion of the conflict. This episode is the Breakthrough on Okinawa Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. As of mid-May, General Buckner's forces had made steady, albeit slow, progress against the determined Japanese defenders on the Shuri defensive line. On May 16, the offensive continued. Colonel Schneider's 22nd Marines and Colonel Whaling's 29th Marines launched yet another unsuccessful assault on Sugar Loaf Hill, while Colonel Snedeker's 7th Marines exhausted their strength in a failed attempt to seize Wana Ridge. To the east, Colonel Coolidge's 305th Regiment advanced 200 yards closer to Shuri. Colonel Hamilton's 307th Regiment nearly captured Flattop and Chocolate Drop Hill but was ultimately pushed back. Colonel Dill's 382nd Regiment successfully cleared Dick Hill but came under intense fire from Oboe Hill. Meanwhile, Colonel May's 383rd Regiment made only minor gains on the southeastern slopes of Conical Hill and Love Hill, even as tanks broke through toward Yonabaru for the first time. The following day, the 383rd Regiment maintained pressure on Conical and Love Hills, prompting General Bradley to commit part of Colonel Halloran's 381st Regiment to the attack. To the west, the 382nd Regiment staged a hard-fought advance of 200 yards but was unable to capture Oboe Hill. Slowly the 77th Division forces between Flattop and Route 5 were reducing enemy positions bearing on the area in front of the 307th Infantry. By 17 May this progress began to show in the advances of the foot troops around Chocolate Drop. Covered by company heavy weapons out on both flanks, infantrymen worked around both sides of the hill to the huge caves on the reverse slope. Inside were 4 antitank guns, 1 field piece, 4 machine guns, 4 heavy mortars, and a American 60-mm. mortars. By nightfall the caves had been partially sealed off. During the night an enemy force launched a counterattack against the American positions around the hill but was repulsed with the loss of twenty-five Japanese killed. On the 17th another bitter struggle raged on Flattop. The struggle swayed back and forth across the narrow crest of the hill. Company K, the assaulting unit, had been reduced to fourteen infantrymen by the end of the day; finally it was forced back off the top. Tanks tried to go through the road cut between Flattop and Dick Hill, but two of them were disabled by mines, leaving the cut blocked. The road cut was later blown along its entire length by seven tons of bangalore torpedoes to remove the mines. Company E continued to push toward Ishimmi Ridge, where they faced a series of heavy Japanese counterattacks. Coolidge's 3rd Battalion and the rest of Hamilton's 2nd Battalion dug in just a few hundred yards north of Shuri and Ishimmi in the highway valley. Meanwhile, Coolidge's 1st Battalion was halted by heavy fire from 110 Meter Hill and the extensive fortress houses in Shuri's suburbs. The intense fighting had nearly depleted the 22nd Regiment, prompting General Amamiya to direct the 32nd Regiment to take over the defense of Shuri along a line extending from Ishimmi to Oboe. Meanwhile, on Wana, the 7th Marines launched a renewed attack but were once again repelled. However, the 5th Marines succeeded in advancing to Hill 55. Further west, the bulk of the 29th Marines attacked toward Half Moon Hill, successfully reaching its forward slopes but later having to withdraw to more defensive positions overnight. Whaling's 2nd Battalion also mounted relentless assaults on Sugar Loaf, each time suffering heavy losses in repelled attacks. As dusk fell, Japanese planes targeted American shipping, successfully damaging the destroyer Douglas H. Fox. On May 18, tanks played a crucial role in a successful assault on Sugar Loaf, executing a double envelopment while securing the top of the hill. The 2nd Battalion then advanced to Horseshoe Hill, while the remainder of the 29th Marines managed to secure the forward slopes of Half Moon.After a night of sporadic bombardment from enemy artillery and mortars, 3/7 again attempted to gain a foothold on Wana Ridge. During the morning supporting weapons concentrated their fire on the forward slopes and crest of the objective and at noon Company I, followed by a platoon of Company L, jumped off and fought its way to the ridge. The assault troops' gains "were measured in yards won, lost, and then won again." Finally, mounting casualties inflicted by enemy grenade and mortar fire forced Lieutenant Colonel Hurst to pull back his forward elements and consolidate his lines on positions held the previous night. On the right flank of the division front the isolated platoon from Company E of 2/5 was unsuccessful in exploiting its hold on the western slopes of Hill 55. The men were driven to cover by intense enemy fire, and tanks again had to be called upon to supply ammunition and rations to the outpost. During the morning operations the 5th Marines laid protective fire with tanks and assault guns along Wana Ridge to support 3/7's advance. At noon, under cover of this fire, Company F sent one rifle platoon and an attached platoon of engineers into Wana village to use flame throwers and demolitions against the enemy firing positions in the ruins. Numbers of grenade dischargers, machine guns, and rifles were found in Wana and the tombs behind it and destroyed. Further advance into the draw was not feasible until the 7th Marines could occupy the high ground on the eastern end of the ridge and furnish direct supporting fire to troops advancing in the draw below. At 1700 the troops were ordered to return to their lines for the night. n the center, General Bruce pressed his attack deeper into the Shuri defenses, with Coolidge's 3rd Battalion gaining 150 yards along the Ginowan-Shuri highway and Hamilton's 2nd Battalion advancing up to 300 yards toward Ishimmi, although attacks against 110 Meter Hill and Flattop failed to gain ground. On the morning of 18 May, orders were given to stay at all costs. Lieutenant Bell said firmly, "We stay." The men resigned themselves to a last-ditch stand. Their grenades exhausted and their machine guns and mortars destroyed, the remaining men salvaged every clip of ammunition from the bandoleers of the dead. Spare workable rifles were loaded and bayonets laid alongside. Enemy pressure increased steadily during the day. Some Americans were shot at close range as they darted from hole to hole to escape grenades. At one time eight knee mortars were pounding the ridge, firing in pairs. Friendly artillery could to some extent keep off the charging Japanese but seemed unable to ferret out the enemy mortars, which were well protected. The moans of wounded men, many of whom were in pitiful condition from lack of water and of medical aid, added to the strain. All canteens had been emptied the previous night. Nevertheless, battle discipline remained excellent. The worst problem concerned the replacements, who were courageous but inexperienced. Thrust suddenly into a desperate situation, some of them failed at crucial moments. One man saw two Japanese attacking a sergeant thirty feet away, but his finger froze on the trigger. Another shouted wildly for a comrade to shoot some Japanese while his own rifle lay in his hands. Another saw an enemy soldier a few yards from his hole, pulled the trigger, and discovered that he had forgotten to reload. By the end of the ordeal, however, the replacements who survived were battle-hardened veterans. During the afternoon the 307th attempted to reinforce the small group. Elements of Company C tried to cross the open ground north of Ishimmi Ridge. Only the commander and five men reached Company E. The men scrambled safely into foxholes, but the commander, shot through the head while racing toward the command post, fell dead on the parapet of the command post foxhole. Spirits rose considerably when word came later in the afternoon that a litter-bearing unit of eighty men would try to get through in the evening. Enemy fire slackened after dark, and the first of the litter bearers arrived at about 2200. They immediately started back carrying casualties. Walking wounded accompanied them. The litter bearers moved swiftly and managed to avoid being seen in the light of flares. Through splendid discipline and good luck eighteen men were carried out in two and a half hours, and others walked out. The litter teams had brought some water and ammunition and the troops drank for the first time since the day before. The second sleepless night on the ridge passed. The 382nd Regiment continued to face heavy resistance from Oboe Hill but managed to secure the road cut between Flattop and Dick Hill. Meanwhile, Halloran's 3rd Battalion could only push about 400 yards south due to the relentless mortar and small-arms fire coming from Hogback Ridge. At sea, a low-flying kamikaze aircraft struck LST-808 off Iejima, resulting in the deaths of 17 men. The following day, while the 382nd and 383rd Regiments focused on neutralizing the cave positions and gun emplacements in the uneven terrain between Conical and Dick Hills, Halloran's 3rd Battalion launched an attack to the south and west toward Sugar Hill but made little progress due to the heavy defensive fire. In the center, the 307th Regiment systematically worked to eliminate enemy firing positions on the high ground in front of them, employing every available weapon for the task. Colonel Smith's rehabilitated 306th Regiment began moving up to replace the battered 305th, with its 3rd Battalion relieving Coolidge's 3rd Battalion and portions of Hamilton's 2nd Battalion along the low ground bordering the highway to Shuri, including the isolated men at Ishimmi Ridge. On 19 May the enemy seemed to intensify his efforts to recapture Ishimmi Ridge. The besieged troops wondered whether his supply of men and ammunition was inexhaustible. The Japanese launched several attacks which were repulsed with great difficulty. Only the support of artillery and mortars, together with self-propelled mounts firing with precision on both flanks of Ishimmi Ridge, prevented the enemy from making an attack in strength which would have overrun the American positions. One enemy attack of platoon strength was dispersed by mortar and machine-gun fire and by a four-battalion time-on-target artillery concentration. Japanese mortar fire continued to fall on Ishimmi, however, and took its toll during the day. A message arrived during the morning that Company E would be relieved that evening. By noon the radio had become so weak that further communication with the company was impossible. The day wore slowly on. By 2100 there was still no sign of the relief. Shortly afterward, however, rifle fire intensified to the rear, a sign of activity there. At 2200 Company L, 3d Battalion, 306th Infantry, arrived. The relief was carried out in pitch darkness; each member of Company E left as soon as a replacement reached his position. As the haggard survivors were about to descend the ridge at 0300, a bursting shell hit two of the newcomers; one of them had to be evacuated on a poncho. Carrying its own wounded, Company E followed a white tape to the rear and arrived safely. Of the 204 officers and men of the reinforced company that had made the night attack on Ishimmi, 156 had been killed or wounded. There were 28 privates, 1 noncommissioned officer, and 2 officers left of the original 129 members of Company E. The platoon sent in relief by Company C had gone out with 58 effectives and returned with 13. Of the 17 men in the heavy weapons section only 4 came back. Company E had spearheaded a several-hundred-yard advance toward Shuri, however, and with the help of supporting weapons had killed hundreds of Japanese around Ishimmi. The 7th Marines launched one last unsuccessful assault on Wana Ridge before being relieved by Colonel Mason's rested 1st Marines. Meanwhile, after repelling a strong night counterattack, the exhausted 29th Marines were also relieved by Colonel Shapley's reserve 4th Marines, which made additional advances alongside the 22nd Marines, now under Colonel Harold Roberts. Four new regiments had been committed over the past few days to revitalize the offensive. On May 20, Shapley's assault battalions gained more ground on Horseshoe Hill but were still unable to reach the crest of Half Moon, though they successfully repelled another strong night counterattack. To the east, Mason's 2nd Battalion advanced rapidly to the base of 110 Meter Hill and captured part of Wana Ridge, while his 3rd Battalion secured a firm hold on the northern slope. Concurrently, the 5th Marines attacked southwest along the Naha-Shuri Road and successfully captured the high ground. Meanwhile, in coordination with the 1st Marines, Coolidge's 1st Battalion and Smith's 3rd Battalion made a slow, grinding advance of about 150 yards, positioning themselves within 200 yards of the outskirts of Shuri in the highway valley. At the same time, the 382nd Regiment expanded its hold on the reverse slope of Dick Hill but remained unable to penetrate Oboe Hill. The 307th Regiment consolidated and expanded its positions around Chocolate Drop, finally seizing Flattop. Reducing the tiny hill continued to be ticklish work because enemy positions to the south still overlooked the area. The fighting was still so confused that three wounded Americans lay south of Chocolate Drop for two days before relief arrived. By that time two had died and the third was so delirious that he thought he was still fighting Japanese and had to be forcibly subdued. By 20 May the caves were completely sealed off. The enemy made a final attempt to retake Chocolate Drop, attacking in company strength, but was repelled with the loss of half his force. On the same day the 3d Battalion, using tanks, flame throwers, and demolition teams, finally secured the crest of Flattop. The final American attack started with a saturation shower of grenades. A chain of men extending from the base of Flattop passed hand grenades to the troops lined up along the crest, who threw the missiles as fast as they could pull out the pins. Having seized the advantage, the infantry moved down the reverse slope blasting caves with satchel charges and flame throwers. Tanks along the road cut accounted for many of the Japanese. BY 1545 Flattop had fallen. More than 250 enemy bodies lay on the crest and reverse slope of the hill. Further east, Halloran's 3rd Battalion made a slow but steady advance down the eastern slopes of Hogback, reaching the foot of Sugar Hill despite constant grenade duels with an enemy fighting desperately to hold every inch of ground. Additionally, the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 383rd Regiment fought their way to jump-off positions within 300 yards of Love Hill, destroying enemy strongpoints that had obstructed their advance for a week. Meanwhile, back at sea, Japanese aircraft managed to damage two destroyers and three transports. The following day, the 383rd again attacked Love Hill but was ultimately forced to withdraw from its base due to fierce defensive fire. Despite this setback, May's 2nd Battalion successfully supported the 381st Regiment in clearing Hogback and pushing to the top of Sugar Hill. To the west, the 382nd advanced quickly against moderate opposition toward Oboe Hill and Hen Hill, encountering retreating enemy units moving toward the high ground at Shuri. Concurrently, the 307th pushed 350 yards south of Flattop before being halted by enemy forces at the Three Sisters, while the 306th completed the relief of the 305th, with its 3rd Battalion advancing 200 yards unopposed to the eastern slopes of 110 Meter Hill. Meanwhile, the 1st Marines continued their assault along Wana Ridge, making only limited gains at the Draw, where the 5th Marines held out and aggressively patrolled forward. The 4th Marines began their push toward the Asato River, achieving a costly advance of about 200 yards on Horseshoe. By nightfall, heavy rains began to fall, significantly impeding efforts to resupply assault troops and replenish forward ammunition dumps. Amidst this torrential downpour on May 22, Shapley's 1st and 3rd Battalions slogged through the "gooey slick mud" to reach the bank of the rain-swollen river. This prompted the Japanese to evacuate Naha and establish new defensive positions on the Kokuba Hills. To the east, the continuous rain flooded Wana Draw with mud and water, transforming it into a makeshift lake. For the next few days, General Del Valle's Marines were forced to attack without support, leading to aggressive patrolling rather than organized assaults. The prospects of success for the infantry alone, slogging through the mud without the support of other arms, were not encouraging. Tanks bogged down, helplessly mired. Amphibian tractors were unable to negotiate the morass, and front-line units, which had depended on these vehicles for carrying supplies forward in bad weather, now had to resort to hand carrying of supplies and of the wounded. These were back breaking tasks and were performed over areas swept by enemy fire. Mortar and artillery smoke was used as far as possible to give concealment for all movement. Litter cases were carried back through knee-deep mud. Living conditions of front-line troops were indescribably bad. Foxholes dug into the clay slopes caved in from the constant soaking, and, even when the sides held, the holes had to be bailed out repeatedly. Clothes and equipment and the men's bodies were wet for days. The bodies of Japanese killed at night lay outside the foxholes, decomposing under swarms of flies. Sanitation measures broke down. The troops were often hungry. Sleep was almost impossible. The strain began to take a mounting toll of men. Under these conditions the Marine attack against Wana Ridge was soon at a standstill. The action degenerated into what was called in official reports "aggressive patrolling." Despite inactivity, enemy mortar and artillery fire continued to play against the American front lines, especially at dusk and at night. In the center, Bruce's 77th Division faced similar challenges, with the 306th Regiment stalled and the 307th Regiment again unsuccessfully attacking the Three Sisters. There, Company A became isolated at the base of the forward slope of Jane Hill, nearly cut off by intense enemy mortar and machine-gun fire. For the following week, the 382nd Regiment struggled to make headway on Hen and Oboe Hills, where fierce hand-to-hand combat erupted. Similarly, all attempts by the 383rd Regiment to breach the defenses of Love Hill on the western side of Conical failed, as the 381st was also unable to make any progress against Cutaway. General Hodge had also moved General Arnold's rehabilitated 7th Division to assembly areas just north of Conical Hill to spearhead the advance toward Yonabaru and the high ground south of the village. Strengthened by 1,691 replacements and 546 men returned to duty from hospitals since it left the lines on 9 May, the 7th Division moved up to forward assembly areas just north of Conical Hill and prepared to make the dash through the corridor. At 1900 on 21 May the 184th Infantry, chosen by General Arnold to lead the way, was in place at Gaja Ridge, at the northern base of Conical. The initial move of the envelopment was to be made in the dead of the night and in stealth. General Buckner felt that "if the 7th can swing round, running the gauntlet, it may be the kill." As part of this operation, the 2nd Battalion of the 184th Regiment moved out from Gaja Ridge during the night, swiftly and silently passing through Yonabaru in the early morning hours to capture Spruce Hill and Chestnut Hill in a surprise attack. Colonel Green's 3rd Battalion then followed the 2nd Battalion through Yonabaru, but their assault on Juniper and Bamboo Hills was unsuccessful as the surprised defenders regrouped. The following day, Green's two battalions continued to push toward these initial objectives, ultimately securing a solid line that stretched from the coastline across the southern slopes of Chestnut, and then over to Juniper and Bamboo by day's end. This success allowed Colonel Finn's 32nd Regiment to pass through Yonabaru and advance westward along the Naha-Yonabaru valley to assault the enemy's western hill defenses focused around Oak Hill.On the west coast, after a successful night reconnaissance of the Asato River, the 4th Marines rapidly crossed the river under cover of smoke, beginning their advance toward a low ridge 500 yards south of the Asato. However, as previously noted, the torrential rain had turned every draw and gully into a sticky morass of knee- and thigh-deep mud in the center. The steep slopes of the hills and ridges, treacherous under the best of conditions, became virtually unassailable. Consequently, full-scale coordinated attacks had to be canceled, and only localized gains could be achieved. Despite the breakthrough in the center, the Japanese command remained concerned about the threat posed to the flanks of the Shuri bastion by American advances along both coasts. While they believed the Naha breakthrough could be contained, every available soldier was deployed to establish a defensive line stretching from the southwest slopes of Conical Hill through Yonawa to the road junction village of Chan, aiming to eliminate Arnold's spearhead that had penetrated into the Naha-Yonabaru valley. General Ushijima feared that his forces were being gradually encircled in the Shuri fortress, where they would become “easy prey” to overwhelming American firepower. In light of this situation, Ushijima began planning a withdrawal to the Chinen Peninsula or the southernmost part of the island, the Kiyamu Peninsula. This decision was met with resistance from General Fujioka, who expressed concern that thousands of severely wounded men would have to be abandoned during the retreat. Although the holding of the heights surrounding the city had been the keystone of the Japanese preferred plan, several factors now militated against its retention. There were an estimated 50000 surviving officers and men to be crammed into a final defense zone less than a mile in diameter. Once these troops were surrounded, the Japanese believed that they would be rendered ineffectual and become "easy prey" to overwhelming American fire superiority. In addition, Japanese long-range artillery pieces, many of which were still intact, could not be effectively utilized within the limited space that would be available. The best chance of prolonging the battle for Okinawa seemed to rest in defending the Kiyamu Peninsula region which was dominated by the Yaeju Dake-Yuza Dake Escarpment. Natural and artificial caves, sufficient to accommodate the whole of the surviving army, abounded in the area. The 24th Division, which had organized the terrain, had left a considerable amount of ammunition and weapons there when it moved north to the Shuri lines. The principal roads in southern Okinawa led directly to the proposed position, thus facilitating the movement of large bodies of men in the shortest possible time. These roads also gave American tanks an excellent route of advance, but only to the outposts of the defensive zone where cliffs, hills, and precipitous ridges barred the way. To add weight to his argument, General Amamiya indicated that his 24th Transport Regiment had preserved enough trucks to move the Shuri munitions reserve to the new position within five nights if weather conditions permitted. General Ushijima, after considering the respective positions of his staff and commanders, decided to order the move to Kiyamu. Although General Suzuki preferred the Chinen Peninsula, which his brigade had fortified, most officials supported a move to the Kiyamu Peninsula, where Amamiya's 24th Division had previously established defenses in the natural and artificial caves of the Yaeju Dake-Yuza Dake Escarpment. Thus, transportation of wounded personnel and munitions reserves to the south commenced at midnight on May 23, with the bulk of the 32nd Army scheduled to begin their withdrawal six days later. On the night of 25 May, the remnants of the 62d Division were to pull out of the Shuri line and move through Tsukasan to counterattack the Americans. The relatively strong 22d Independent Infantry Battalion, which had been in reserve throughout most of the fighting in April and May, was directed to hold the Shuri front in place of the division. The orders to General Fujioka were "to annihilate the enemy rushing from the Yonabaru area." Failing this, the division was at least to stop the American advance long enough to allow the main body of the Thirty-second Army to retire. In order to gain time to organize the new positions, the holding force left on the Shuri front was to fight on until 31 May. Withdrawing units were to leave behind strong rearguards which would defend a line along the Kokuba Gawa to the hills north of Tsukasan and Chan and then south through Karadera to the east coast until the night of 2 June. Then a second line centered on Tomusu, approximately 2,000 yards farther south, would be held until the night of 4 June. By that time the Thirty-second Army would be firmly set up within its Itoman-Yunagusuku-Gushichan outpost zone. Admiral Ota's naval force was directed to hold the west flank of the withdrawal corridor and begin its own retreat when ordered by 32nd Army. During the night, Admiral Ugaki initiated his seventh mass Kikisui attack, launching 165 kamikaze aircraft that inflicted only light damage on landing craft. On May 24, while engineers constructed a bridge over the Asato River to facilitate vehicle movement, the 4th Marines suffered heavy casualties as they attempted to advance through the muddy, flooded valley and low clay hills. Simultaneously, Shepherd's Reconnaissance Company crossed the lower Asato and roamed the streets of northwestern Naha without encountering any resistance. To the east, Dill's 1st Battalion faced a brutal counterattack that inflicted significant casualties and nearly drove the Americans from Oboe Hill. Following Ushijima's directives, the 32nd and 184th Regiments began to encounter increasing resistance as they sought to expand their control over the valley and the high ground to the south. This culminated in a series of aggressive nighttime counterattacks that ultimately slowed and halted the western advance of the 7th Division. During the night, Japanese forces conducted heavy raids on American airfields at Kadena, Yontan, and Iejima. However, these attacks were merely a diversion for Operation Gi-Gou, a suicide raid against Kadena and Yontan. In this operation, twelve Ki-21 heavy bombers, carrying Giretsu Kuteitai special airborne assault troops, aimed to crash land on the airfields to deploy commandos tasked with destroying aircraft stationed there. After the start of B-29 attacks on Tokyo from bases in the Mariana Islands, the 1st Raiding Brigade of the Teishin Shudan was ordered to form a commando unit for a "special operations" mission to attack and destroy the bombers on the Aslito Airfield on Saipan. Captain Okuyama Michiro, commander of the brigade's engineering company and trained in sabotage and demolition was selected as mission leader. He selected an additional 126 men from his own team, the 4th Company of the 1st Raiding Regiment, to form the first Giretsu Airborne Unit. It was initially organized with a command section and five platoons and one independent squad, based at the Imperial Japanese Army's air academy at Saitama. The group unit also included eight intelligence officers and two radio men from the Nakano School. Giretsu operations were to be undertaken at night, beginning with air strikes by bombers. After this, commando units would be inserted onto the target airfield by crash landing their transports. The fact that there was no provision for extraction of the strike force, along with the rejection of surrender in Japanese military doctrine at the time, meant that the Giretsu ground operations were effectively suicide attacks. Though the Saipan attack was eventually cancelled, the 6th Air Army ultimately requested the deployment of the Giretsu Special Forces to neutralize the Okinawa airfields. The 6th Air Army accordingly began preparations for the attack in early May. Led by Captain Okuyama, the raid force moved from Nishitsukuba to Kumamoto as it continued to prepare for the assault, codenamed Operation Gi-Gou. Aircraft for the raid came from the 3rd Independent Air Unit based in the vicinity of Hamamatsu. The raid force consisted of 120 commandos broken up into a headquarters section and five flights, each containing twenty men. They were to be transported by twelve Mitsubishi Ki-21s stripped of their guns and with additional forward and rear exits added to assist raiders with exiting. The timing of the raid was also meant to coincide with the withdrawal of the 32nd Army from the Shuri Line in southern Okinawa. Of the twelve bombers dispatched, four encountered engine trouble and returned to base, while three were intercepted by American night fighters en route to Okinawa. The remaining five Ki-21 bombers approached Yontan Airfield at low altitude and engaged Marine anti-aircraft gunners from the 1st Provisional Anti-aircraft Artillery Group. As a result, four of the bombers were shot down or crash-landed; however, a small number of Giretsu commandos survived this wave and commenced their mission to attack aircraft on the airfield. The fifth bomber, however, successfully evaded anti-aircraft fire and belly-landed approximately 100 meters from the control tower. About 10 commandos disembarked and attacked aircraft and air personnel with grenades. In the ensuing chaos, the Japanese commandos killed two Americans, wounded 18, destroyed nine aircraft, damaged 29 more, and set a fuel dump ablaze, destroying 70,000 gallons of aviation gasoline. After twelve hours of mayhem, however, American troops hunted down the commandos and exterminated them to a man. Despite this partial success, the Japanese operation occurred against a backdrop of heavy losses, with American fighters and anti-aircraft fire claiming a total of 150 Japanese planes on May 24. During the course of three days, Ugaki committed a total of 387 Navy planes and 174 Army planes to his kamikaze attacks, which continued through May 25. These attacks successfully sank the destroyer Bates, one transport, and one landing craft, while further damaging two destroyers, one destroyer minesweeper, one minesweeper, one transport, and one Liberty ship. On the same day, Admiral Rawlings' Task Force 57 launched its final strikes in the Okinawa area before retiring late on May 25, having completed the Royal Navy's Iceberg mission. On land, while Shepherd's Reconnaissance Company occupied the deserted ruins of Naha, the 4th Marines fought to seize Machisi Ridge and continued pushing into the eastern outskirts of Naha. However, across the remainder of the 10th Army front, assault units struggled to make progress due to the havoc wreaked by the rain and the stiffened Japanese resistance. That night, in accordance with the withdrawal plan, the 62nd Division began moving its remaining 3,000 men to counter the advance of the 7th Division, hoping to delay the American advance long enough for the main body of the 32nd Army to retreat. The arrival of additional forces on the Ozato-Mura front had little significant impact, primarily serving to strengthen the covering and holding force. On May 26, the 184th Regiment successfully cleared the Hemlock-Locust Hill Escarpment. Meanwhile, the 32nd Regiment was brought nearly to a standstill in front of the Japanese defensive line across the Yonabaru valley. Looking west, Del Valle's Marines observed large numbers of enemy troops withdrawing from Shuri and were able to pinpoint their location for naval guns, artillery, and aircraft to bombard. However, despite penetrating the Shuri defensive line on both flanks, the day yielded minimal progress. At sea, further kamikaze attacks caused damage to one destroyer, one destroyer minesweeper, and a subchaser. In total, Ugaki's raids over the past three days resulted in the deaths of 103 sailors. Believing the fast carriers' continued value off Okinawa had become dubious, back on May 18 Mitscher had requested that TF 58 be relieved from its Okinawa station. Spruance regretfully declined. A week later an increasingly weary Mitscher reported: “For two and a half months [Task Force 58] operated daily in a 60nm square area East of Okinawa, less than 350nm from Kyushu. This was necessitated by the restricted area available and the necessity for being able to cover [the] Amami Gunto airfields, intercept air raids before they could reach Okinawa, and still furnish air support to ground forces. There was no other location from which all these things could be done.” Reflecting on the months of unrelenting stress, tedium, and fatigue, TG 58.1's screen commander, Captain Tom Hederman, signaled Rear Admiral J.J. Jocko Clark: “See Hebrews 13, verse 8.” Consulting his Bible aboard Hornet, Clark read: “Jesus Christ the same yesterday, and today, and forever.” Amused, Clark forwarded the verse to his entire Task Group, adding, “No disrespect intended.” Clark then signaled Mitscher, “What the hell are we doing out here, anyway?” Mitscher's response: “We are a highspeed stationary target for the Japanese air force.” Indeed, TF 58 had already suffered over 2,000 Iceberg fatalities. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The brutal Battle of Okinawa was reaching a critical point as General Buckner's forces pressed against fierce Japanese defenses. Struggles unfolded over Sugar Loaf Hill and Wana Ridge, with Marines suffering heavy casualties but slowly gaining ground. By late May, the dire situation prompted Japanese commanders to plan a retreat to more defensible positions as American forces closed in. Despite challenging conditions, the Allies pushed forward, marking a decisive breakthrough in the Pacific War.
Last time we spoke about the Allied invasion of Borneo. The Allies initiated the invasion of Borneo, commanded by General Morshead. The operation, known as Operation Oboe, aimed to reclaim vital oilfields from the demoralized Japanese forces. Despite their fierce resistance, American troops swiftly captured strategic locations on the island. The Japanese, already struggling with low morale and supply shortages, were unable to mount an effective defense. Amid the intense fighting, Air Commodore Cobby's forces conducted air assaults on key targets, weakening Japanese positions. As American troops landed on Tarakan Island on May 1, they faced heavy fire but managed to gain significant territory by nightfall. By early May, despite the loss of ground, Japanese forces continued to resist fiercely. This victory in Borneo marked a turning point in the Pacific campaign, ultimately foreshadowing the decline of Japanese influence in the region and paving the way for further Allied advances. This episode is the Second Okinawa Offensive Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. Last we left off, by April 24, General Ushijima's 32nd Army had chosen to abandon the first line of Shuri defenses, with the exception of the extreme right in the Item Pocket area. However, the weary Japanese troops merely withdrew to the next line of prepared positions within the Shuri defense zone, ready to make the American invaders pay for every inch of territory gained. Observing this, General Hodge promptly ordered the 7th, 27th, and 96th Divisions to regroup and enhance their positions through aggressive maneuvers, seizing strategic ground in front of them and pushing back enemy outposts. His forces were also heavily depleted and exhausted, prompting him to plan a final offensive on April 26 before rotating in the relatively fresh 77th Division and the 1st Marine Division for support. Unbeknownst to him, the 62nd Division had suffered significant losses, nearly losing half of its original strength on the left flank. In response, Ushijima decided to move the 24th Division and the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade north to reinforce the Shuri defense zone, establishing a fallback position for retreating forces.This shift also meant that the southern areas were defended only by a hastily assembled Shimajiri Security Force of 5,500 men, drawn from rear-area supply units tasked with delaying any American advances from the south until the main infantry units could return. The question of a second landing in southern Okinawa was considered by 10th Army most seriously before April 22. General Bruce, commander of the 77th Division, knew that his division would be committed in the Okinawa fighting as soon as lejima was secured. At Leyte the amphibious landing of the 77th Division behind the Japanese line at Ormoc had been spectacularly successful. General Bruce and his staff wished to repeat the move on Okinawa and urged it on the 10th Army command even before the division sailed from Leyte. As the Iejima fighting drew to a close, General Bruce pressed his recommendation to land his division on the southeast coast of Okinawa on the beaches just north of Minatoga. He believed that it would be necessary to effect a juncture with American forces then north of Shuri within ten days if the venture was to be successful. His plan was either to drive inland on Iwa, a road and communications center at the southern end of the island, or to push north against Yonabaru. General Buckner rejected the idea. His assistant chief of staff, G-4, stated that he could supply food but not ammunition for such a project at that time. The Minatoga beaches had been thoroughly considered in the planning for the initial landings and had been rejected because of the impossibility of furnishing adequate logistical support for even one division. The reefs were dangerous, the beaches inadequate, and the area exposed to strong enemy attack. Although beach outlets existed, they were commanded both by the escarpment to the west and by the plateau of the Chinen Peninsula. The 10th Army intelligence officer reported that the Japanese still had their reserves stationed in the south. Both the 24th Division and the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade were still in the area and could move quickly to oppose any landings. Artillery positions on the heights overlooking the beaches were fully manned. The 77th Division would be landing so far south that it would not have the support of the troops engaged to the north or of 24th Corps artillery. The steep terrain near the beaches favored the defense, and any unit there would be isolated. It might be more like Anzio than Leyte, Buckner suggested. Besides that, the three divisions on the line needed to be relieved, and Buckner's three unused divisions would all be needed there. On April 25, the main focus of action shifted to the Item Pocket, where Captain Bernard Ryan's Company F of the 165th Regiment surged forward following a 20-minute artillery bombardment to seize the summit of Ryan Ridge. Captain Ryan looked out over the rugged expanse of Ryan Ridge, where the Japanese forces entrenched at the top presented a formidable challenge. They controlled the crucial territory between Ryan and Fox Ridges, creating a dangerous stronghold that threatened his position. For Ryan, the solution lay in artillery fire. He understood that since the supporting fire would fall perpendicular to his attack route, the risk of overshooting or undershooting would be minimal, just a lateral deviation of fifteen yards. With this confidence, he ordered a twenty-minute artillery barrage on the slopes of the ridge.As dawn broke on the morning of the 25th, Ryan gathered his men from Company F. He stressed the importance of a swift ground assault to capitalize on the artillery support. However, this was no easy task; his company was tired, undermanned, and severely low on food and ammunition. Despite these challenges, the two assault platoons sprang into action the moment the first shells began to fall. They charged forward, propelled by the roar of mortars, machine guns, and antitank guns that kept enemy forces at bay.But as they sprinted towards the ridge, the enemy struck back fiercely. Enemy fire and natural obstacles thinned their ranks, yet thirty-one determined soldiers reached the summit. They found themselves standing on a jagged ridge, strewn with rocks and scarred vegetation, a treacherous landscape that added to their struggle. Just as the artillery fire began to fade, the Japanese emerged from their hidden positions: “spider holes,” pillboxes, and tunnels. The Americans stood ready, and for the next twenty minutes, a brutal fight erupted. They engaged in fierce hand-to-hand combat, reminiscent of earlier battles on Item Pocket ridge tops. The outcome was grim; thirty-five Japanese soldiers fell, and many more fled in panic. However, the Americans also paid a price, five were killed, and two wounded. Now, the real challenge began: consolidating their hard-won position. Captain Ryan knew that previous units had ascended these ridges only to be pushed back by the enemy. By late afternoon, only twenty-four effective soldiers remained atop the ridge, with each man averaging a mere six rounds of rifle ammunition. Medical supplies had run dry, and all the aid men had become casualties. Communication was severed, and Ryan could sense the tightening noose as the Japanese regrouped for an assault. Understanding the gravitas of their situation, Ryan devised a bold plan. He arranged for Company I to maneuver around to his right flank, hoping to replicate the success of the morning. At 4:05 PM, just fifteen minutes after artillery support resumed, Ryan and his company made their ascent once more, enduring five additional casualties along the route. Unfortunately, Company I struggled to reach the top, cut off by heavy enemy fire on the slopes. In a moment of desperation, Ryan and two men ventured out into the dark to seek reinforcement, a risky endeavor that could easily end in disaster. Although Company I was still bogged down, Captain Betts from Company K recognized the urgency of the situation and quickly mobilized his men. By midnight, all of Company K had reached the ridge, bolstering Ryan's weary but determined troops. As these events unfolded at Ryan Ridge, other companies from the 165th were locked in a brutal struggle at Gusukuma, located southwest of the ridge. Fierce fighting erupted as soldiers moved from wall to wall, tree to tree, fighting for every inch in the rubble of Gusukuma. Company A faced an unrelenting barrage, enduring fire from eight machine guns and a 47-mm antitank gun, much of which came from the yet-untamed eastern slope of Ryan Ridge. Amidst this chaos, Private First Class Richard King from Company A became a beacon of valor. In a remarkable display of courage, he climbed a tree to eliminate a Japanese soldier perched above and, from his vantage point, went on to kill ten more enemies before night fell. The day had been marked by sacrifice and bravery, with Captain Ryan and his men fighting heroically for every inch of ground gained on Ryan Ridge. As the sun set, they prepared for the challenges that lay ahead, their resolve unwavering amid the turmoil of war. Meanwhile, other companies of the 165th Regiment engaged fiercely in assaults against Gusukuma, gradually gaining ground at a high cost to both sides. At the same time, the 96th Division consolidated its position in front of Maeda and Kochi, while Colonel Pachler's 1st Battalion advanced 600 yards with minimal resistance to occupy the slope of Horseshoe Ridge. The following day, April 26, the general offensive resumed, with the bulk of the 165th Regiment continuing its costly advance into the heart of the Item Pocket, successfully clearing Gusukuma as Company F pushed along the crest of Ryan Ridge toward the northern end of the Machinato airstrip. To the east, the 105th Regiment advanced to the southern edge of Nakama, while the 106th Regiment extended the front line toward Yafusu. In the center, Colonel Halloran's 2nd Battalion launched an assault on the Maeda Escarpment but was quickly repulsed by a brutal barrage of Japanese fire across the front. However, elements of the 383rd Regiment managed to reach the crests of Hills 150 and 152, securing a strategic position to inflict heavy casualties on the enemy below, as tanks and armored flamethrowers moved to the outskirts of Maeda to wreak havoc. At 4 pm in the afternoon General Ushijima issued a terse order: “The enemy with troops following tanks has been advancing into the southern and eastern sectors of Maeda since about 1 pm. The 62d Division will dispatch local units . . . attack the enemy advancing in the Maeda sector and expect to repulse him decisively.” At the same time, adjacent 24th Division units were ordered to cooperate in this effort regardless of division boundary. Two hours later the Japanese commanding general issued another order: "The army will crush the enemy which has broken through near Maeda. The 24th Division will put its main strength northeast of Shuri this evening." Lastly, Pachler's 1st Battalion attempted to advance along the western flank of Kochi Ridge, while the 2nd Battalion moved along the eastern flank. Both battalions were immediately repelled by a barrage of enemy fire. The following day, efforts to establish physical contact between the two units proved costly and futile. Meanwhile, Halloran's 1st Battalion, along with elements of the 383rd Regiment, maneuvered through the saddle between Hills 150 and 152, receiving support from tanks and armored flamethrowers. Although tanks and infantry managed to penetrate to the southern edge of Maeda, the advance was halted by intense enemy fire. Atop the escarpment, an all-out effort was made to reduce a heavily fortified underground pillbox that separated Companies F and G; however, this attempt also failed. Concurrently, as the 105th Regiment organized a defensive line at Nakama, Colonel Stebbins' 2nd Battalion engaged in fierce combat around Yafusu in an effort to straighten their front lines. Meanwhile, the disorganized 165th Regiment continued clearing the Item Pocket, which was finally declared secure, although many Japanese troops remained hidden in deep caves and tunnels. Due to this disorganization and the sluggish progress in securing the pocket, General Griner ultimately decided to relieve Colonel Kelley of his command of the 165th. The regiment would then spend the remaining days of the month patrolling the Kuwan Inlet south of Machinato airfield. Griner's overextended and battered division would not undertake any further offensive actions until being relieved at the end of April. At sea, a Japanese suicide boat successfully dropped a depth charge near the destroyer Hutchins, which had to withdraw due to heavy damage. Additionally, Japanese aircraft reemerged during the night, with a kamikaze crashing into and sinking the ammunition ship Canada Victory, while other planes damaged two destroyers and a transport ship. Random factoid by the way, the SS Canada Victory was among the 531 Victory ships constructed during World War II as part of the Emergency Shipbuilding program. Launched by the Oregon Shipbuilding Corporation on January 12, 1944, she was completed on February 28, 1944. The ship was designated VC2-S-AP3 by the United States Maritime Commission, with hull number 93 (1009). Following her completion, the Maritime Commission transferred her to the civilian operator Alaska SS Company. This was merely a prelude to Admiral Ugaki's fourth mass Kikisui attack, which launched 115 kamikazes on April 28. While interceptor fighters destroyed most of these aircraft, seven managed to slip past the combat air patrol and crashed into destroyers Daly and Twiggs, the destroyer minesweeper Butler, the evacuation transport Pickney, and the hospital ship Comfort. On the ground, Halloran's Company K attempted to weaken resistance at the escarpment by moving through the 27th Division zone to the west and advancing southeast towards the Apartment House barracks, where they were met with heavy losses and forced to retreat. Meanwhile, on the western side of Kochi Ridge, Pachler's 3rd Battalion relieved the 1st Battalion and launched an attack into the gap between the ridge and Zebra Hill. They successfully led Company K through Kochi and into the cut, while Company L moved southward along the western slope. However, upon reaching the cut, both companies were met with a barrage of machine-gun fire, ultimately compelling them to withdraw. To the east, the 32nd Regiment faced delays in initiating their attack due to setbacks around Kochi, despite the successful raids by armored flamethrowers into the heart of Kuhazu. The following day, more kamikaze assaults inflicted additional damage on destroyers Hazelwood and Haggard. By the end of April, American pilots reported 1,216 air-to-air kills, while Japanese sources acknowledged losses exceeding 1,000 aircraft, including 820 destroyed in the first four Kikisui attacks. This left Admiral Ugaki with approximately 370 operational aircraft for future operations. It is also important to note that the Japanese pilots inflicted significant casualties, resulting in Admiral Spruance's 5th Fleet suffering the loss of 1,853 sailors killed or missing and 2,650 wounded, averaging one and a half ships hit per day. As April expired, a concerned Nimitz personally visited Okinawa, where Buckner reminded Nimitz that as a land battle, 10th Army operations fell under Army command. “Yes,” Nimitz replied, “but ground though it may be, I'm losing a ship and a half a day. So if this line isn't moving within five days, we'll get someone here to move it so we can all get out from under these stupid air attacks.” Nevertheless, by May, 10th Army had thoroughly bogged down into costly, unimaginative frontal assaults against southern Okinawa's heavily fortified Shuri line. Numerous 10th Army generals urged Buckner to “play the amphib card” and land the reserve 2nd Marine Division in southeastern Okinawa, behind Japanese lines. Buckner ultimately refused, claiming insufficient logistics. Nimitz concurred with Buckner, at least publicly, but few others did. Spruance, Turner, and Mitscher were themselves growing increasingly bitter at 10th Army's lack of progress, as well as USAAF lethargy constructing fighter airfields ashore that could finally relieve the battered carriers. Touring the developing Okinawa airstrips, a 5th Fleet staff officer discovered that General “Hap” Arnold had secretly been writing Okinawa's lead USAAF engineer, urging him to divert assigned fighter strip resources into building B-29 bomber airfields instead. An incredulous Spruance went ashore to investigate and discovered the allegation was true. Stunned, Spruance “turned that situation around in about 15 minutes.” On land, following an unsuccessful tank assault toward Onaga, the 32nd Regiment intensified pressure on enemy positions to the southeast to support operations against Kochi Ridge. However, the 17th Regiment's attacks were still stalled. Meanwhile, after fending off two strong counterattacks that resulted in approximately 265 Japanese casualties, the 383rd Regiment advanced to capture the crest of Hill 318 in fierce close combat. This critical victory finally enabled American forces to direct fire onto Shuri itself. On April 29, the 307th Regiment took over the Maeda Escarpment section of the line from the 381st, and the next morning, the 306th Regiment relieved the 383rd on the left flank of the 96th Division. Simultaneously, the 1st Marines relieved the 165th on the west coast, while the 5th Marines took over the line held by the 105th and 106th Regiments on May 1. Despite ongoing efforts, attacks against Kochi Ridge on April 30 once again failed. However, the 1st Battalion of the 32nd Regiment successfully established Company C on “Chimney Crag” and Company A on the “Roulette Wheel,” located on the ridge southwest of Kuhazu. During the night, large numbers of Japanese infiltrated behind these companies, disrupting the planned relief of the 32nd by the 184th Regiment. This relief, intended to be completed before dawn on May 1, was delayed until late in the afternoon. Despite this setback, Colonel Green's Company L managed to reach Gaja Ridge, positioned just in front of Conical Hill during the night. Concurrently, Colonel Hamilton's Company A attempted to mount ladders at the eastern end of the Maeda Escarpment but was quickly repelled by fierce defenders. On the western front, however, Company B successfully captured the edge of the escarpment using cargo nets by nightfall, although they were ultimately forced to withdraw due to heavy counterattacks later that night. Additionally, Hamilton's 3rd Battalion moved behind the escarpment to Nakama village, launching an attack eastward toward the Apartment House barracks area. Meanwhile, on the west coast, the 1st Marines had been attempting to advance south for two days but were repelled each time, suffering significant casualties. However, they did succeed in clearing an enemy pocket at Miyagusuku. On May 2, the 5th Marines finally joined the offensive but encountered stubborn resistance, while the 1st Marines continued to struggle to cross the draw south of Nakanishi village in their effort to reach the Jichaku ridge mass. To the east, Hamilton's Companies A and B positioned troops on the edge of the Maeda Escarpment but made no significant gains due to the enemy's intense machine-gun fire. The 17th Regiment eventually mopped up Onaga village, with the 1st Battalion taking control of the area, although they failed to capture Kochi during their renewed efforts. On May 3, after a dawn artillery preparation, the 1st Battalion on the east and the 3rd Battalion on the west advanced in a coordinated attack, which included a movement by Company C against How Hill on the eastern flank of Kochi Ridge. However, this entire effort was thwarted as heavy enemy artillery and machine-gun fire halted all progress. During 3 May the 1st Battalion, 307th Infantry, fought a desperate grenade battle to win the top of part of the escarpment. The Japanese showered the top with grenades and knee mortars from the reverse slope and with 81-mm. mortar fire from a distance. Men came back across the narrow top of the escarpment to the north side, swearing and crying, saying they would not go back into the fight. "Yet," observed one platoon leader, "in five minutes' time those men would go back there tossing grenades as fast as they could pull the pins."Finally, while the 1st Marines made only limited gains as they pushed toward the Asa River, the 5th Marines successfully cleared the Awacha Pocket and advanced between 300 and 600 yards in their zone. Unbeknownst to the Americans, their slow, incremental advances and the looming threat of a costly, protracted campaign were far from their only concerns. By the 29th General Cho had argued that in the present state of affairs, the Americans had the upper hand. If the status quo continued, the 32nd Army eventually would be wiped out. At this meeting, only Colonel Yahara spoke for continuing the war of attrition and avoiding an offensive. Yahara pointed out that in modern warfare a superiority of 3 to 1 was usually needed for successful attack. "To take the offensive with inferior forces… is reckless and would lead to certain defeat," he said. Second, the high ground around Minami-Uebaru had already fallen into American hands, giving them a major advantage in defensive terrain. Third, Yahara argued, a hasty offensive would fail, with thousands needlessly lost. Then, 32nd Army's reduced forces would be unable to hold Okinawa for a long period and unable to delay the invasion of Japan. A hasty attack would cause 32nd Army to fail in its duty. And yet, the other young staff members were silent. Cho then declared again that he hoped for an attack to snatch life from the midst of death. At this, Yahara left the room. All the other staff members then agreed to launch an offensive. Cho then tried to manage Yahara by sheer emotional force. At dawn on April 30, before Yahara "had time to splash water on his face," Cho appeared at his quarters. Cho squeezed Yahara's hand and said with genuine enthusiasm that there had been nothing but trouble between them in the past and that they would probably both die together on Okinawa. Cho then asked if Yahara, on this one occasion, would go along with the offensive. As Cho spoke, his tears fell abundantly. Yahara was deeply moved, despite his aloof reputation, and before long he was weeping too. He was overcome by Cho's sudden display of emotion and said, "I consent." Again I have to say, in the “battle of Okinawa” by Yahara, basically his memoirs, in which he notably lies a bunch to cover himself, but I digress, this moment amongst others are really interesting, I highly recommend reading the book. Cho's plan outlined that General Amamiya's 24th Division would lead the main effort on May 4, executing a two-pronged attack on the right half of the line. They intended to sweep past the Tanabaru Escarpment toward Minami-Uebaru hill, ultimately reaching the Futema-Atsuta line. Meanwhile, General Suzuki's 44th Independent Mixed Brigade was to shift from its reserve position behind the 62nd Division to a location northeast of Shuri and move northwest toward the coastal town of Oyama, effectively cutting off the 1st Marine Division's retreat. In conjunction with this, General Fujioka's battered 62nd Division would hold its position on the left flank and mount an offensive once the attacking units on its right had breached enemy lines. Additionally, the 23rd and 26th Shipping Engineer Regiments were tasked with conducting counterlandings in the American rear on the east and west coasts, respectively. The Japanese reasoned that success depended on the extent to which they could support their frontline troops with artillery, tanks, supplies, and communications. Their plans specified in detail the role that each of the support units was to play in the projected operations. Artillery units were ordered to regroup in preparation for the attack. Guns and howitzers were pulled out of cave positions and set up farther south in more open emplacements for greater flexibility. They were to open fire thirty minutes before the attack. When the infantry had driven through the American front lines, artillerymen were to move their weapons forward. The 27th Tank Regiment, hitherto uncommitted, was ordered to move from its position near Yonabaru during the night over several routes and support the attack in the Maeda area. To support this comprehensive offensive, Ugaki was alerted to prepare for the fifth mass Kikisui attack directed against the enemy's naval forces. Once the plans were finalized and preparations well underway, Ushijima and Cho celebrated with a pre-victory banquet in their chambers at headquarters. Even as Ushijima's banquet was underway, offensive operations had commenced. Japanese troops infiltrated behind American lines during the night while the shipping engineers prepared for their counterlandings. The 26th and 23d Shipping Engineer Regiments set out up the west and east coasts. On beaches south of Naha and Yonabaru, men of the shipping engineer regiments piled into barges and assault boats. Also, small groups of soldiers with light machine guns infiltrated behind U.S. lines on the night of 3 May to attack Americans as they became visible at dawn. Small units of three or four men, variously designated as "reconnaissance raiding" and "rear harassing" teams, proceeded toward the American lines to attack command posts, heavy weapons, communications, and depots and to send back information by means of smoke signals. The 27th Tank Regiment rumbled up to Ishimmi, several of its tanks being severely damaged by American artillery fire en route. Ugaki's fifth Kikisui attack began on the afternoon of May 3, when at least 19 kamikazes sortied from Formosa, stealthily approaching the American convoys. They successfully sank the destroyer Little and one landing craft, while severely damaging two destroyer-minelayers and another landing craft. Additionally, Japanese aircraft targeted shore installations, focusing their efforts on Yontan airfield. In Nakagusuku Bay, a suicide boat further damaged a cargo ship. At 02:00 on May 4, most of the boats from the 26th Shipping Engineer Regiment were spotted approaching the heavily defended area of Kuwan. Armed with antitank guns, heavy machine guns, light arms, and thousands of satchel charges, several hundred men of the 26th Shipping Engineer Regiment headed under overcast skies for landing places below Yontan and Kadena airfields. They miscalculated their position and turned, into the shore at a point where it was heavily defended. At 0200 riflemen of the 1st Marine Division on the sea wall near Kuwan caught sight of ten barges and opened up with concentrated fire. Naval flares lighted up the area. One company fired 1,100 rounds from 60-mm. mortars. Several enemy barges burst into flames. One platoon of marines used fifty boxes of ammunition and burned out six machine-gun barrels as it sprayed the Japanese trying to cross the reef. Although many of the engineers managed to reach the shore, some fled back to the Japanese lines, while others were trapped in Kuwan, where they were mopped up by the Marines at their leisure. A smaller group of Japanese forces advanced almost as far as Chatan, ultimately landing at Isa, where they were contained without much difficulty and destroyed the following day. The amphibious assault was even less successful on the east coast of Okinawa, as the 25th Shipping Engineer Regiment attempted to land near Ouki. Most of these troops were killed by fire from ships in Buckner Bay or by the 7th Division Reconnaissance Troop on land. As a result, the Japanese suffered losses of 500 to 800 men and nearly all their landing craft during these amphibious assaults. At 05:00, Ugaki initiated his main mass attack, launching 125 kamikazes and 103 escorting fighters from Kyushu to target Admiral Rawlings' Task Force 57, which was currently striking the Miyako and Ishigaki airfields. Taking advantage of the weakened anti-aircraft defenses, the kamikazes managed to score hits on the carriers Formidable and Indomitable, though both vessels ultimately survived. They also targeted American shipping, successfully sinking destroyers Morrison and Luce, along with three landing craft. Additionally, they inflicted further damage on the light cruiser Birmingham, the escort carrier Sangamon, the destroyer Ingraham, and two destroyer-minelayers, resulting in a total of 589 sailors killed. On land, following a heavy artillery bombardment during the night, the 24th Division commenced its main assault. In the pitch darkness Japanese troops made their way toward the American front lines. At 0500 two red flares ordered them to attack. As the artillery fire became heavy, a guard of Company A, 17th Infantry, on a hill just north of Onaga, dropped back below the crest for cover. He thought that the enemy would not attack through his own artillery, but the enemy did just that. A few Japanese appeared on the crest and set up a light machine gun. Pfc. Tillman H. Black, a BAR man, killed the gunner, and as more of the enemy came over the crest he killed four Japanese who tried to man the machine gun. The enemy advanced over the crest in ragged groups, enabling Black to hold his own. Soon the whole company was in action and drove the enemy off the crest. The Japanese abandoned three light machine guns, four mortars, and much ammunition. At another point a surprise attack nearly succeeded. On high ground 1,000 yards east of Onaga a group of Japanese crept up the hill in front of Company I, 184th, commanded by Capt. James Parker. In the sudden onslaught that followed, two heavy machine gun crews abandoned their positions. One of them left its weapon intact, and the Japanese promptly took it over and swung it around on the company. Parker, watching the attack from the ridge, had anticipated the move. The Japanese managed to fire one burst; then Parker destroyed the usurped weapon with his remaining heavy machine gun. For an hour or two longer the Japanese clung to the forward slopes, firing their rifles amid shrill screams, but they made no further progress. By dawn the general pattern of the Japanese attack on the left (east) of the 14th Corps line was becoming clear. In the 184th's sector the enemy's 89th Regiment, following instructions to "close in on the enemy by taking advantage of cover,"had advanced around the east slopes of Conical Hill, crept across the flats, and assembled in force around the "Y ridges" east of Onaga. They had outflanked three companies of the 184th on Chimney Crag and the Roulette Wheel north of Kuhazu, and had also managed to evade the forward battalions of the 17th around Kochi. Another Japanese element had attacked 7th Division lines on the high ground north of Unaha. At dawn 1st Lt. Richard S. McCracken, commanding Company A, 184th, observed 2,000 Japanese soldiers in the open area east and north of Kuhazu. They were perfect "artillery meat." Unable to get through to his artillery support, McCracken called his battalion commander, Colonel Maybury, and described the lucrative targets. Maybury was equally pleased. McCracken suggested, however, that the Colonel should not be too happy--a group of Japanese at that moment was within 100 yards of Maybury's observation post. There was indeed a party of Japanese busily unlimbering two 75-mm, howitzers just below Maybury. But Company C, 17th Infantry, had spotted this activity, and within a few minutes maneuvered tanks into position and scattered the enemy group. Artillery eliminated the Japanese caught in the open. A mortar duel ensued, sometimes at ranges of 250 yards. The 3d Battalion, 32d, also poured fire on the enemy there. After the impetus of the attack was lost, a Japanese officer stood out on open ground and waved his saber to assemble his men for an attack. American mortarmen waited for a worth-while target to develop, then put mortar fire on it. Four times the officer assembled a group, only to have his men killed or scattered, before he was finally killed. While the 7th Division was repelling the Japanese attack in the eastern sector of the 14th Corps line, the 77th Division was blunting the other enemy "spearhead" in the center. Here the Japanese 32d Regiment, supported by tanks and engineers, attacked behind intense artillery fire. This sector was the critical point of attack, for a break-through here would enable the supporting 44th Independent Mixed Brigade to cut west and isolate the 1st Marine Division. Transportation difficulties beset the 32d Regiment almost from the start. During the night light tanks drove out of Shuri up the Ginowan road (Route 5), but American artillery interdicting the road prevented medium tanks from following. The mediums had to take a long detour, which was in such poor condition that only two of the tanks could enter into the attack. Trucks and artillery also were slowed down. Even foot troops had trouble in moving. One Japanese infantryman recorded that his column was shelled on the way and that everyone except himself and one other was wounded. Another wrote of encountering "terrific bombardment" on the way to Kochi. These difficulties severely handicapped the 32d Regiment in ensuing operations. Supported by nine light tanks, the 3d Battalion led the assault of the 32d Regiment against the 306th Infantry, 77th Division, before dawn on 4 May. The enemy mounted his assault from southeast of Hill 187 and hit the 77th where Route 5 curled around the east end of Urasoe-Mura Escarpment. The Japanese drove into the front lines of the 1st Battalion, 306th, near Maeda. Shortly before daylight, when the Japanese infantry had failed to take its initial objectives east of Hill 187, Colonel Murakami, commanding the 27th Tank Regiment, became impatient and recklessly committed his own infantry company, a standard element of a Japanese tank regiment. American artillery fire destroyed one platoon, disrupting the attack, and daylight found the surviving troops in a precarious position across from the American lines. Colonel Murakami ordered the company to withdraw, but artillery fire prevented a retreat during the day. When the Japanese used smoke for concealment, the Americans simply blanketed the obscured area with shell fire. The survivors straggled back to their front lines after nightfall. All the light tanks that had supported the attack were lost. By 07:30, the 306th Regiment had effectively repelled the enemy. The Japanese, broken up into small groups, attempted to withdraw across terrain subjected to heavy artillery and mortar fire, but few made it through. By 08:00, the 89th Regiment had also been pushed beyond grenade range along the entire front of the 7th Division. Instead of retreating or pressing the assault, however, Kanayama's troops made the critical mistake of milling about in the exposed flatlands, rendering them easy targets for American heavy weaponry. As a result, the 89th Regiment suffered severe losses from concentrated land, naval, and air bombardment, losing half its strength. Colonel Yoshida's 22nd Regiment in the center fared no better; its advance was delayed by the necessity of laying smoke, and it encountered significant hardships when the smoke unexpectedly cleared. In the center of the line the Japanese 22d Regiment was never able to fulfill its role of following up the "successful" advance of flank units, and the regiment spent the day locked in a violent fire fight with men of 3/306, 3/17, and 1/17 holding the Kochi-Onaga area. The Japanese reported the 22d "was not able attain results worth mentioning." Unbeknownst to the Americans, elements of the 1st Battalion of the 22nd Regiment had penetrated more than 1,000 yards behind American lines near Kochi, identifying a significant weak point before pulling back to the regimental line. Nevertheless, due to the overall failure of the 24th Division, the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade was not even committed to the attack. On the fronts at Maeda and the west coast, American forces made some gains. Hamilton's 1st Battalion successfully executed a complex demolition assault on the extensive cave-tunnel-pillbox network located about 200 feet west of the eastern end of the escarpment, effectively repulsing several subsequent counterattacks and inflicting approximately 600 casualties on the Japanese. The 5th Marines also advanced up to 400 yards through hotly contested terrain during the day. Although pinned down in the coastal area, Colonel Chappell's 1st Battalion managed to break through a defile east of Jichaku, while the 3rd Battalion secured a ridge approximately 400 yards ahead of its position. Despite the apparent failure of the Japanese attack, Amamiya refused to abandon the offensive, ordering a renewed effort during the night. Kitago's uncommitted 1st Battalion, along with the attached 26th Independent Battalion, was directed to penetrate the enemy lines northwest of Kochi in a night attack, aiming to replicate the breakthrough achieved by elements of the 1st Battalion of the 22nd Regiment. Following another artillery bombardment, the Japanese launched their assault against the 306th Regiment at 02:00 on May 5. However, this attack was quickly disrupted by American artillery. Three hours later, the Japanese struck again, this time supported by tanks. They pressed through artillery and mortar fire to engage the 306th in close combat. Fierce firefights erupted along the regiment's entire line, resulting in the Japanese suffering 248 dead during the fighting. Amid the chaos, a significant portion of Kitago's 1st Battalion successfully infiltrated behind American lines, breaching the defenses at a point between Route 5 and Kochi. While approximately 90 of the infiltrators were quickly killed while assaulting the command post of the 306th Regiment, around 450 Japanese troops crossed the divisional boundary and managed to reoccupy the town of Tanabaru and the Tanabaru Escarpment, effectively cutting off the supply road for the 17th Regiment. In response, Pachler sent Company E to eliminate the infiltrators, but they underestimated the enemy's strength and were repelled with heavy losses. With Company E stalled on the eastern slope of the escarpment, Company F, supported by tanks, attempted a broad flanking maneuver. They successfully pushed through Tanabaru, spending the day destroying the enemy's hastily established defenses. Company E then took over the assault, and by nightfall, they had reached the top of the Tanabaru Escarpment following a mortar preparation. The relentless battle for the Tanabaru Escarpment continued for the next two days, resulting in the Japanese losing 462 killed behind American lines. Only a few men managed to escape the Tanabaru death trap and return to the Shuri lines. Made even more desperate by the failure of Amamiya's grand attack, the ragtag battalions of the 62nd Division fought to the death to defend the vital western approaches to Shuri, ensuring that every yard gained came at a steep price in Marine lives. Each pillbox, cave, and tomb became a stronghold that unleashed a torrent of fire against the attacking Marines from all directions. Despite this fierce resistance, Del Valle's units made significant progress on May 5. The 5th Marines advanced their lines by an average of 300 yards, while the 1st Marines seized the high ground along the Asa River. At the Maeda Escarpment, the reverse slope was slowly captured as caves were blasted and sealed off. By midnight, it became clear to Ushijima that the counteroffensive had failed, with the Japanese suffering approximately 6,227 dead and losing 59 artillery pieces. In turn, the 7th and 77th Divisions, which had absorbed the brunt of the enemy counterattack, sustained 714 losses. Despite these heavy casualties, the 1st Marine Division, which continued its push to the south, incurred corresponding losses of 649 men. This indicated that the Americans experienced greater losses due to the Japanese defensive tactics of attrition. However, the morale of the 32nd Army had been shattered, as the Japanese abandoned all hope for a successful outcome from the operation. Nevertheless, the 24th Division and 5th Artillery Command were ordered to reorganize and shift to a holding action. This strategy aimed to bleed American strength by forcing the 10th Army to maintain its slow, deadly, yard-by-yard advance into the fire of prepared positions. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In the fierce Second Okinawa Counteroffensive, weary American troops pressed into determined Japanese defenses. Captain Ryan's valor led to hard-won territory despite heavy casualties. As chaos unfolded, Japanese morale waned, marking a turning point. The relentless battle showcased unparalleled sacrifice, foreshadowing the Allies' gradual victory in the Pacific.
Last time we spoke about the invasion of Mindanao. In April 1945, the US launched the invasion of Mindanao under General Eichelberger, focusing on Illana Bay. Initial assaults were swift, and American forces quickly captured vital areas due to the disarray among Japanese troops, who were struggling with low morale and supply shortages. The Japanese were under significant pressure, with commanders ill-prepared to mount a robust defense as American troops advanced toward Davao. Fierce battles unfolded, including attempts to seize key positions, but Japanese forces, that included remnants from earlier campaigns, faced overwhelming and relentless assaults. Despite stiff resistance in some areas, the Americans ultimately made considerable territorial gains, significantly weakening Japanese positions. This successful operation in Mindanao laid crucial groundwork for further advances in the Pacific theater, marking a decisive phase in the war as the tide turned heavily in favor of the Allies. As this chapter closed, it was evident that the end of Japanese resistance in the region was drawing near. This episode is the Allied Invasion of Borneo Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. A long time ago, in a galaxy far away we talked about the Japanese invasion of the Dutch East Indies. Now it is time to talk about how the Dutch strikes back. . . well not exactly, but I wanted to finish the star wars reference. For an extended period, the Australian forces that had valiantly fought on the island of New Guinea during a crucial phase of the Allied war effort had been assigned to garrison duties in remote areas, conducting minor offensives against a desperate enemy more concerned with obtaining food than engaging in battle. At the same time, General MacArthur deemed it politically unwise for Australians to take a prominent role in reclaiming the Philippines, an American territory, and he also found it politically unfavorable for American troops to participate in restoring Dutch and British authority in the Indies. Recognizing the urgent need to secure the oilfields of British and Dutch Borneo to supply accessible oil for the push toward Japan, Lieutenant-General Leslie Morshead's 1st Australian Corps was designated for the operation to retake Borneo, known as Operation Oboe. Should note that after a period of illness, suffering from malaria and a skin condition, the fighting General George Alan Vasey had finally recovered by February 1945. General Blamey, who still had doubts about his physical fitness despite Vasey being given an A by an Army medical board, reluctantly appointed him to command the 6th Division, then in action in the Aitape-Wewak campaign. Vasey then flew north to take up his new command. The aircraft Vasey was travelling in, RAAF Lockheed Hudson A16-118, took off from RAAF Station Archerfield on the afternoon of March 5, 1945. Due to a cyclone that was ravaging the Queensland coast at the time, the aircraft crashed into the sea about 400 metres out from Machans Beach, just north of the mouth of the Barron River, 2 kilometres short of the Cairns Airport. Vasey was killed in the crash along with all those on board. His body was recovered from the crash site and was buried with full military honours in Cairns cemetery along with those of Major-General Rupert Downes and Lieutenant-Colonel G. A. Bertram. Vasey's concern for his men outlived him. The men called him 'Bloody George', not after his casualties, but after his favourite adjective, and Vasey's personable style of command attracted immense loyalty from them. "Vasey owns the 7th," wrote a Melbourne journalist, "but every man in the division believes he owns Vasey." Thus now it fell to General Steven to retain command of the 6th Division at that time already engaged in combat at Aitape-Wewak, the initial plan was to land Brigadier David Whitehead's 26th Brigade at Tarakan on April 23 to establish an airstrip for supporting aircraft for subsequent operations, specifically an assault on Balikpapan by the remaining forces of Major-General George Wootten's 9th Division on May 18. Following that, ten days later, a brigade was set to land at Bandjarmasin to secure air support for the planned invasion of Java by the entire corps on June 27. Ultimately, the operations at Bandjarmasin and Java were cancelled; the Tarakan landing was postponed to May 1; the Balikpapan invasion would instead be conducted by Major-General Edward Milford's 7th Division on July 1; and the 9th Division was tasked with the invasion of Brunei Bay on June 10. Consequently, by the end of March, Morshead's headquarters and the entire 9th Division had relocated to Morotai, where they would prepare and rehearse for the impending invasion. In March 1944, General Doihara Kenji organized the 7th Area Army to establish a new defensive line across Malaya, Singapore, Sumatra, Java, and Borneo. Yes you heard that right, General Doihara Kenji. For those of you who listen to my Fall and Rise of China podcast, this guy is that infamous intelligence officer who worked on nearly all the significant false flag operations during the second sino-Japanese war. Working as an intelligence officer he played a key role in the orchestration of the Huanggutun Incident, Mukden Incident, kidnapping of Emperor Puyi and Marco Polo Bridge Incident, amongst countless other “incidents”. He was a bonafide mastermind behind numerous false flag operations and the Manchurian drug trade earning the moniker Lawrence of Manchuria. Now, anticipating an impending enemy invasion, Lieutenant-General Yamawaki Masataka reorganized the Borneo Defence Army into the 37th Army in September, placing it directly under General Terauchi's Southern Army. This force gradually received reinforcements from the 56th and 71st Independent Mixed Brigades, the 25th Independent Mixed Regiment, and several smaller units. Despite this, the command was understrength and poorly equipped, as most of the available equipment and experienced troops were reassigned to more critical locations in the Southwest Pacific. By the end of the year, under the leadership of Lieutenant-General Baba Masao, the 37th Army had stationed the majority of Major-General Nozaki Seiji's 56th Independent Mixed Brigade at Tawau, Major-General Yamamura Hyoe's understrength 71st Independent Mixed Brigade at Kuching, most of Colonel Iemura Shinichi's 25th Independent Mixed Regiment on Tawi-Tawi Island, Rear-Admiral Kamada Michiaki's 22nd Naval Special Base Force at Balikpapan, along with three battalions in Sandakan, two battalions and a naval unit in Tarakan, and one battalion each in Kudat, Beaufort, and Miri. However, in 1945, both Baba and Terauchi recognized that the enemy was likely to first target strategic locations on the east coast before establishing a strong presence in western Borneo to prepare for an invasion of Malaya. Consequently, they decided that the majority of the 37th Army should be concentrated around Brunei Bay, leading to orders for the 56th Independent Mixed Brigade to march overland toward northern Borneo. The 370th Independent Battalion remained in Tawau, while the 369th Independent Battalion was sent to garrison Bandjarmasin. Additionally, half of the 454th Independent Battalion was dispatched to Balikpapan, and the other half to Bandjarmasin. This left only the 455th Independent Battalion and part of the 2nd Guard Unit at Tarakan. Early in April the strength of the Japanese force on Tarakan was estimated at about 4000 of whom 2500 were base troops. On the eve of the attack, however, largely because of information indicating that a battalion had been moved from Tarakan to Balikpapan, it was estimated that only 1500 to 2000 troops remained on the island. Aerial photographs showed five gun positions on the south-eastern tip of the island covering the channel along which ships normally entered Tarakan. Round Lingkas and Tarakan there seemed to be 15 anti-aircraft guns, and 9 medium and 5 light anti-aircraft guns seemed to be round the airfield. The whole of Lingkas beach was protected by parallel rows of posts, rails and pipes driven into the mud and extending into the sea to a distance of 125 yards from high-water mark; and between the beach and the road was an anti-tank ditch about 25 feet wide. A group of oil tanks was near the beach and, as it was possible that the Japanese might try to impede an attacker by flooding the oil over the sea and the swamp near the Pamusian River and setting it alight, the air force had taken pains to destroy these tanks. Field works could be seen; there were concrete pill-boxes built by the Dutch; and it was suspected that, here as elsewhere, tunnels had been dug into the hills. Units stationed at Sandakan were also ordered to move toward Brunei, leaving the 554th Independent Battalion behind. Furthermore, due to the challenges in supplying Tawi-Tawi, the 25th Independent Mixed Regiment was withdrawn to Borneo in February and instructed to march toward Jesselton, where it was expected to arrive in May. During this time, little was done to enhance the island's defenses, and the overland marches took a significant toll on the soldiers' stamina. Meanwhile, enemy air raids intensified, severely disrupting communications. Between April 11 and 29, Air Commodore Arthur Harry Cobby's Australian 1st Tactical Air Force, along with Major-General Paul Wurtsmith's 13th Air Force, conducted several air assaults on Tarakan and Tawau, targeting oil storage tanks, artillery positions, radar stations, defenses, and various buildings. On April 27, Rear-Admiral Forrest Royal's Task Group 78.1 departed Morotai, carrying Whitehead's 26th Brigade, protected by Admiral Berkey's cruisers and destroyers. Over the next two days, this force executed a naval bombardment on shore targets while a minesweeping unit cleared and marked the approach route within 800 yards of the beach and Sadau Island. Early on April 30, the 2/4th Commando Squadron landed unopposed on Sadau, where they established an artillery battery to support the engineers in clearing obstacles from the invasion beaches. After successfully completing the task with just a few sniper and mortar attacks, the main convoy reached the southwest coast of Tarakan Island an hour before sunrise on May 1. Following a heavy air and naval bombardment prior to landing, Whitehead's assault waves began their approach to the shore, supported by rocket fire from the LCI gunboats. Around 08:00, the 2/23rd and 2/48th Battalions landed on Green Beach and Red Beach, respectively, without facing any opposition. However, once they moved inland, they encountered intense fire from Lingkas Hill and Roach. The 2/23rd Battalion launched an attack and captured both locations while the 2/48th took the Finch and Parks positions as they advanced to secure the Collins Highway ridge. Throughout the day, the remaining units of the 26th Brigade landed despite poor beach conditions and overcrowding, with the 2/24th Battalion held in reserve along Anzac Highway. By nightfall, the brigade managed to hold an area 2,800 yards wide at the base and up to 2,000 yards deep. Early on May 2, the 2/23rd seized Milko with minimal resistance, advancing further north to the Pages feature and Hospital Spur. Simultaneously, the 2/48th quickly secured Lyons and the junction with Burke Highway, while the 2/24th effectively attacked the Wills, Sturt, and Frank positions with support from aircraft and artillery. In the late afternoon, as one company moved up Anzac Highway toward the airfield, Lieutenant-Colonel George Warfe's other companies converged on the Essex feature, which was captured without opposition during the night. The next morning, the 2/24th attacked the airfield from the south and east; although they successfully took the airfield ridge at a high cost, their late assault on the Rippon position to the north was repelled by determined enemy defenders. At the same time, the 2/48th conducted reconnaissance towards the Peter and Sykes features, while the 2/23rd managed to secure the area between Gleneleg Highway and Pamusian. However, their assaults on Hospital Spur and Tarakan Hill were unsuccessful. Fortunately, Burke Ridge was found abandoned on May 4. By then, Whitehead had already instructed the 2/23rd to advance east and join the 2/24th in their attacks on the airfield, with the 2/3rd Pioneer Battalion and the 2/4th Commando Squadron taking over their positions in the west. The commandos then launched an attack on Tarakan Hill. Despite being initially held down by fierce enemy fire, they eventually forced the defenders off the high ground through sustained pressure, tank support, and a sweeping maneuver to the right. Simultaneously, the 2/48th advanced and successfully took control of the Evans feature, while a company from the 2/24th attacked the Peningkibaru stronghold after an intense artillery barrage, managing to secure the position just in time to fend off the Japanese who had retreated during the bombardment. Additionally, Warfe planned another assault on Rippon, but heavy Japanese shelling ultimately compelled him to call it off. On May 5, as the commandos and pioneers continued to diminish the remaining strongholds on Tarakan Hill, the 2/48th successfully cleared the road north to Otway, although they faced greater resistance near Sykes. Rippon was also discovered to be abandoned and was swiftly captured, though the Japanese still controlled the high ground to the north. Finally, on May 6, the 2/48th launched another attack on Sykes and successfully cleared the hill this time. While capturing the airfield and town accomplished Whitehead's primary objective, the Japanese continued to hold the rugged interior of Tarakan, indicating that much fighting lay ahead until the garrison was completely defeated. By the evening of 6th May fairly copious information obtained from prisoners and Indonesians and from captured documents indicated that the enemy had about 390 naval troops in the Mount Api area, about 400 troops and civilians in the Fukukaku headquarters area, 200 from Sesanip along Snags Track to Otway, 300 on Otway and in District 6, 300 in the Amal River area and 60 at Cape Juata. Having lost the airfield and the water-purifying plant and hospitals "the enemy at this time was displaying a decided disinclination to hold ground. In particular he was shunning any ground which could be subjected to heavy bombing, shelling, or attack by tanks; or against which large-scale attacks could be launched by our troops".The enemy was now directing his operations to delaying the attackers, particularly with mines, booby-traps, suicide raids, and isolated parties fighting to the death in tunnels and dugouts. After the unsuccessful general attack on April 19, which yielded minimal gains, Generals Hodge and Buckner were preparing to push the offensive southward, fully aware that breaching the first Shuri defense ring would be a slow and costly endeavor. On the western front, the primary enemy positions on Kakazu Ridge had been entirely circumvented, with General Griner directing his troops to advance and focus on cleanup later. Consequently, on April 20, the majority of the 165th Regiment secured the coastal region before launching a southern attack that encountered immediate and fierce resistance in the rugged terrain north of Gusukuma, particularly around Item Pocket. The center of the Japanese resistance lay in the I section of Target Area 7777, which came to be called "Item Pocket", in military terminology I is called Item. Actually, the pocket was the hub of the enemy position; from it, like spokes of a giant wheel, extended four low ridges, separated from each other by ravines and rice paddies. Potter's Ridge ran north from the hub, Charlie Ridge to the northeast, Gusukuma Ridge to the southeast, and Ryan Ridge to the southwest. Lying between Gusukuma and Charlie Ridges and sloping to the east was a cone-shaped hill called by Americans "Brewer's Hill." A gulch ran along each side of the hill Anderson's Gulch on the north and Dead Horse Gulch on the south. Both ran in an easterly direction, crossing Route 1 at small bridges just north of Gusukuma. The ground was superbly suited for active defense. Typical Japanese positions were connected by tunnels along the sides and under the crests of the ridges; Ryan Ridge, in particular, was honeycombed with such defenses. From Item Pocket the enemy had excellent command both of the coastal areas to the north and west and of the open land to the east where Route 1 ran north-south. The Japanese had long been aware of the defensive value of this position against either a beach landing on the northwest or an attack from the north. Months before the Americans landed, Japanese troops and Okinawan laborers were boring tunnels and establishing elaborate living quarters and aid stations. The area was held by two companies of the 21st Independent Infantry Battalion of the 64th Brigade, 62nd Division, supported by an antitank company, a machine gun company, and elements of antiaircraft, artillery, and mortar units. At least 600 Japanese occupied the Pocket, reinforced by several hundred Okinawans. Only through persistent effort was the 1st Battalion able to reach a position east of Gusukuma by nightfall, while the 2nd Battalion successfully took control of Potter's Ridge and Fox Ridge but failed in its attempts against Ryan Ridge and Item Pocket itself. The leading platoon was well up on the slope of Ryan when Japanese on top opened up with mortars, machine guns, and artillery, cutting off the rest of Company E. While the company commander, his clothes torn by bullets, and the rest of the company straggled back to Fox Ridge, the leading platoon continued doggedly ahead. Its leader, T/Sgt. Earnest L. Schoeff, managed to reach the top with eight of his men despite almost constant fire. He was ordered by radio to hold until relief came. The men hugged the ground as darkness slowly descended. Then from three directions from fifty to sixty heavily armed Japanese set upon the Americans. In wild hand-to-hand fighting the nine men beat off the attack. Pfc. Paul R. Cook fired four cases of ammunition into the enemy, shooting down at least ten before he was killed. With grenades, rifle butts, and the enemy's own weapons, Schoeff and his men killed another dozen before the Japanese withdrew. With two of his men killed, another missing, and two wounded, Schoeff led the survivors back to his company during the night. To the east, the 106th and 105th Regiments tried to advance south towards the village of Iso and the Pinnacles but were hindered by heavy enemy gunfire. In response, Colonel Winn dispatched his 2nd Battalion to maneuver around the East Pinnacle to reach the village of Natama, where Companies F and G were ultimately repelled by a strong Japanese counterattack. As they retreated in chaos, they faced an ambush from Japanese infiltrators, resulting in significant casualties. Despite these challenges, the 106th Regiment and Winn's 3rd Battalion managed to bypass the West Pinnacle and advance with relative ease, halting 200 yards southwest of Iso. Additionally, Winn's 1st Battalion fought its way to the western edge of Kakazu village and nearly cleared Kakazu Ridge to its eastern point before being ordered back to the escarpment to support the 2nd Battalion and halt any enemy breakthroughs. At the same time, General Bradley ordered the 381st and 382nd Regiments to advance toward Nishibaru Ridge and the Tanabaru Escarpment. In response, Colonel Dill's 3rd Battalion moved along Tombstone Ridge, clearing out the enemy from caves and tombs, and reached the southern end just in time to join Colonel Halloran's 1st Battalion for a surprise offensive against Nishibaru. They quickly captured the crest but were ultimately driven back by the determined defenders. However, this partial victory prompted Halloran to deploy the 2nd Battalion in the afternoon for another assault to the south. By day's end, the 381st was entrenched along the northern slope of Nishibaru Ridge, though at a significant cost. Further west, Dill's 2nd Battalion also pushed forward despite persistent fire from the Rocky Crags, where attempts by the 184th and 17th Regiments to attack were unsuccessful. They could not catch up with the 3rd Battalion. Meanwhile, General Arnold targeted Ouki Hill, but his initial assault was quickly halted by enemy mortar and machine-gun fire. Two armored flamethrowers successfully advanced 400 yards ahead of the infantry, neutralizing an enemy mortar position on Ouki Hill's west slope. Consequently, the Americans concentrated their mortars and smoke to cover the enemy positions, allowing a composite company to launch a surprise attack that secured the crest of Ouki Hill, although the isolated troops would soon have to fend off a series of fierce counterattacks. The next morning, the 32nd Regiment launched an attack down Skyline Ridge with two companies. However, they were quickly halted by mortar fire at a deep road cut in the middle of the ridge. Despite this setback, the troops persevered, largely due to Sergeant Theodore MacDonnell's efforts, and eventually gained control of the entire forward face of the ridge. When, east of the road cut, a man in the stalled third platoon, Company E, was killed, Sgt. Theodore R. MacDonnell, a gist Chemical Mortar Company observer, was impelled to drastic action. MacDonnell had frequently joined men on the line and shown qualities of a determined infantryman. Now, infuriated, he gathered up a handful of grenades and ran in the face of the machine-gun fire along the slope to a point underneath the spot where he believed the enemy gun to be located, and then started up the 20-foot embankment. When he looked over the crest he failed to spot the gun, but he did see three enemy soldiers and grenaded them. He made two trips to the bottom of the embankment for fresh supplies of grenades, but it was not until his third trip to the crest that he located the machine gun. MacDonnell then slid back to the bottom, grabbed a BAR, and mounted the embankment with it, only to have the weapon jam after the first shot. He skidded to the bottom, seized a carbine, and went back up for the fifth time. On reaching the crest he stood up and fired point-blank into the machine-gun position, killing the gunner and two covering riflemen. MacDonnell then hurled the machine gun down the slope behind him. A mortar that he found in the position was also sent crashing down the hillside. Sergeant MacDonnell was later awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his heroism on this occasion. Lt. Fred Capp, commanding Company E, sent troops to reinforce MacDonnell immediately, and the position was consolidated. Then Company F, on orders given as a result of this sudden development, pressed the attack down Skyline Ridge, and by 18:00 the entire forward face of the ridge was occupied and only a knob at the lower tip was causing trouble. To the west, while Colonel Pachler's Company B attempted another attack on Rocky Crags, Dill's 3rd Battalion reorganized and encircled to reach Nishibaru Ridge via the 381st Regiment, launching an eastward assault that made good headway until they were met with fierce enemy counterattacks that forced them to halt. Simultaneously, Halloran coordinated an attack on Nishibaru, which was successfully repelled by the defenders. Colonel May's 3rd Battalion was then deployed to fill the gap at the gorge. Overnight, a large number of Japanese troops had moved from the Urasoe-Mura Escarpment to set up mortars and machine guns in the Kakazu Pocket, prompting the 27th Reconnaissance Troop to advance toward Kakazu, where they became pinned down at the village's edge. As a result, Colonel Stebbins' 3rd Battalion was ordered to position itself on Kakazu West. Looking west, the majority of the 105th and 106th Regiments were tasked with neutralizing the Pinnacles, but with little success. They did manage to clear the road to the escarpment's summit of mines and obstructions to facilitate tank movements. Finally, Colonel Kelley's 2nd Battalion launched another unsuccessful attack across the mouth of Item Pocket, while Company F attempted to advance along the coast using amphibious tractors but was likewise repelled by intense fire from Ryan Ridge. The 1st Battalion also pushed southwest into Gusukuma, but without armor support, they made minimal progress against the machine guns in the village and fire from Item Pocket attacking from the right rear. The enemy's defense was very effective on the east. Here the 1st Battalion had a major supply problem on its hands. Two blown bridges along Route 1 east of the Item Pocket were holding up vehicles of support units. During the previous night, fire from the Pocket had driven off an engineer platoon working at the site and killed the platoon leader. Early on the 21st Lieutenant Golden, the Bailey bridge expert, came up with ten truckloads of material. His engineers worked for an hour but had to stop in the face of almost ceaseless fire from the Pocket. Colonel Kelley then ordered scouts to find another stream crossing. A bulldozer cut a bypass around Anderson's Gulch near the railroad, but when, about 10:00, the operator nosed his machine out in the open, he was shot in the ear. General Griner, in Colonel Kelley's observation post at the time, ordered Lt. Col. Walter F. Anderson, commander of the 193rd Tank Battalion, to push the bypass through. Anderson himself climbed into his battalion's sole remaining "tank-dozer" and completed the bypass. A 47-mm. anti-tank gun, hitherto silent, scored a direct hit on Anderson's tank, killing him and a guide. The bypass was now blocked and had to be abandoned. This break-down in supply over Route 1 seriously affected operations east of Gusukuma. Colonel Mahoney's 1st Battalion attacked southwest early on the 21st into Gusukuma, but without tanks or cannon the troops made little ground against machine guns in the village and fire from Item Pocket on the right rear. Mahoney's left company did reach a point 400 yards north of the village of Yafusu, the farthest advance yet registered by 24th Corps since April 19, but here the troops were stopped by a network of enemy positions. Concerned about the significant vertical separation between his battalions, Kelley decided to deploy his 3rd Battalion in an effort to fill the gap and simultaneously penetrate Item Pocket. Consequently, the American forces advanced through Dead Horse Gulch, with Company K fighting nearly to the center of the pocket. However, they were ultimately compelled to retreat due to heavy losses and intense counterattacks. On April 22, Kelley opted to hold and enhance his current positions while conducting extensive patrols. Looking to the east, as the 105th Regiment regrouped following a night counterattack from Kakazu, Stebbins' 1st Battalion systematically located and neutralized enemy positions behind them along the escarpment. Brigadier-General William Bradford also took command in the Kakazu area, bolstered by the 3rd Battalion, 17th Regiment, and most of the 2nd Battalion, 165th Regiment, successfully containing the pocket. Further west, the 383rd Regiment replaced the weakened 382nd, while the 2nd Battalion advanced down Nishibaru Ridge to capture the village and higher ground facing Hill 143 to the south. Meanwhile, the 3rd Battalion made minimal progress toward the Gate of the Tanabaru Escarpment. Additionally, Pachler's Company B initiated another attack on the west side of the Rocky Crags, supported by howitzers, tanks, and armored flamethrowers. However, once again, they faced hand grenades and knee mortar shells raining down from above, resulting in heavy casualties and the need to retreat. Finally, the 32nd Regiment maintained control of the forward face of Skyline Ridge but made no attempt to advance, while patrols scoured extensive sections of the southern slope to reach the abandoned eastern face of Hill 178. That night, artillery provided cover to the beleaguered defenders as Colonel Yoshida's 22nd Regiment took over along Skyline Ridge. Following several days of inactivity, 41 kamikaze planes were once again launched on April 22. They successfully sank the minesweeper Swallow and one LCS, while also damaging two destroyers and another minesweeper, resulting in the loss of 25 aircraft. The next day, the 32nd Regiment remained stationed on the north slope of Skyline Ridge, except when conducting patrols or securing caves. This allowed the Japanese defenders to withdraw overnight from their remaining positions around Hill 178. With Company B worn out, the rest of the 1st Battalion, 17th Regiment joined the assault on the Rocky Crags, which fell with little resistance. To the west, medium tanks and armored flamethrowers finally launched a direct attack on Nishibaru Ridge and the Tanabaru Escarpment, successfully destroying most of the enemy positions, although few territorial gains were made. Further west, Winn's 1st Battalion executed a surprise attack on the East Pinnacle, managing to capture the position after fierce hand-to-hand combat. At the same time, the remaining defenders at West Pinnacle initiated a desperate banzai charge towards Iso, where they were ultimately overwhelmed. Kelley then ordered Company I to conduct a probing assault on Ryan Ridge and Item Pocket, while Company C ascended Brewer's Hill but was unable to descend the steep side to join the fight. On April 24, no new attacks were launched due to a confusing mix-up of orders, but preparations were made for an assault the following day. After an artillery barrage, Bradford's task force finally attacked the Kakazu Pocket with four battalions; however, they faced no enemy resistance, as the Japanese had abandoned their positions overnight. To the east, the beleaguered defenders in front of the 96th Division had also retreated, leading to the fall of the Tanabaru Escarpment, its village, Hill 143, and the rest of Nishibaru Ridge without opposition. In a similar manner, the 17th Regiment ascended Hill 178 with only a few scattered artillery rounds landing nearby. The Japanese forces had resisted fiercely for five days, but with the first ring of Shuri defenses breached at multiple points, they chose to withdraw under the cover of heavy mist and light fog the night before. Even so, this advancement was minimal, and it was clear that reaching Shuri would take considerable time given the rate of progress over the first three and a half weeks of the operation. Nonetheless, Buckner believed that any significant landing on the Minatoga beaches or between Machinato airfield and Naha could not be logistically supported and would be vulnerable to strong enemy counterattacks. Therefore, he dismissed proposals to deploy the 77th Division or the 1st Marine Division for these efforts. Instead, it was decided to move the 3rd Marine Corps and the 77th Division from northern Okinawa and Iejima to replace the 24th Corps in the Shuri area. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In April 1945, the Allies launched the invasion of Borneo, led by General Morshead. Swift assaults secured strategic areas against demoralized Japanese troops. Despite fierce resistance, American forces gained ground, crippling Japanese defenses. This victory marked a pivotal moment in the Pacific War, signaling the end of Japanese influence in the region.
Last time we spoke about the fall of Iwo Jima. General Schmidt pushed through Japanese defenses, facing strongholds like Cushman's Pocket and General Senda's positions, with intense fighting and heavy casualties on both sides. Despite stubborn resistance, the Marines gradually advanced, employing tanks and artillery support. The Japanese, under General Kuribayashi, fought tenaciously, culminating in a final assault on March 26. After brutal combat, Iwo Jima was declared secured, but at great cost: 18,000 Japanese and over 6,800 American lives lost. Meanwhile, in New Britain, Australian forces continued their offensive, capturing strategic positions despite fierce enemy resistance. In the midst of a fierce conflict, Australian battalions advanced into enemy territory, capturing strategic positions while facing heavy resistance. Notable victories included the successful ambushes by the 2/7th Battalion and the capture of key locations like the But airfield. Despite facing fierce counterattacks from the Japanese, particularly at Slater's Knoll, the Australians maintained their momentum. As the Japanese command faced internal crises, the Australians continued their relentless push, ultimately leading to significant territorial gains and weakening enemy forces. This episode is the Visayas Offensive Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. Within northern Luzon, by mid-March, General Clarkson's 33rd Division was exploring the western routes to Baguio. Colonel Volckmann's guerrilla unit had taken control of San Fernando and was engaged in combat around Cervantes. Meanwhile, General Mullins' 25th Division had advanced to Putlan, and General Gill's 32nd Division was involved in a fierce battle at Salacsac Pass. Following the capture of Putlan, General Swift instructed Mullins to push through Balete Pass to secure the vital Santa Fe region. On March 12, the 27th and 161st Regiments began advancing north and northwest, successfully clearing the Minuli area and establishing a foothold on Norton Ridge by March 15. At the same time, the 35th Regiment initiated a broad maneuver around Balete Pass via the Old Spanish Road, but this was soon hindered by intense artillery and mortar fire from the positions of the 11th Independent Regiment. The road also required significant engineering efforts to support the outflanking force, leading Mullins to ultimately halt the 35th's assault. However, General Konuma was unaware of this; fearing an outflanking maneuver from Carranglan, he had no choice but to keep around 3,000 of his best troops in this seemingly secure area. On March 15, Mullins ordered the reinforced 161st Regiment to launch a holding attack to the north while the majority of the 27th Regiment executed a flanking maneuver over Myoko Ridge, Mount Myoko, and Lone Tree Hill to encircle Balete Pass from the east. After regrouping at Putlan, the 35th was also tasked with capturing Mount Kabuto to subsequently advance northwest along Balete Ridge and connect with the 27th at Myoko. Mullins launched a renewed offensive on March 16, facing stubborn resistance from the 161st as it gradually advanced toward Norton's Knob, which was successfully captured by the end of the month. On March 22, the 27th began its flanking maneuver, with the 1st Battalion moving east into the elevated terrain south of Kapintalan by March 28, while the 2nd Battalion advanced nearly 3,750 yards up the wooded Myoko Ridge to the east. Meanwhile, the 35th's attempt to encircle the enemy via Kabuto started off well, reaching the northern slope of Balete Ridge on March 22. However, Konuma's recently arrived reinforcements launched a series of strong counterattacks and harassment raids, forcing the 35th to withdraw by March 28. With the other two regiments stretched thin and unable to penetrate the enemy's main defenses, Mullins ordered the 35th to position itself between the 27th and 161st Regiments to assault Highley Ridge from the east. By the end of March, the 161st was advancing northeast along Highley Ridge toward Crump Hill, which finally fell on April 8, bringing the advance to a halt. The 35th supported this effort with an attack on Kapintalan, which was ultimately captured by April 21. Meanwhile, the 27th continued to struggle through the challenging terrain of Myoko Ridge against fierce opposition, not reaching Woody Hill until April 12. This slow progress allowed Konuma to reinforce the Myoko sector with four understrength infantry battalions. Nevertheless, the brave soldiers of the 27th Regiment persevered, securing the Pimple on April 15 and advancing an additional 350 yards northeast by April 21. Looking west, Clarkson aimed to advance battalion combat teams toward Baguio via Route 11, the Galiano road, and the Tuba Trail. However, Swift declined to approve such ambitious plans, limiting the 33rd Division to a more restrained offensive. Although dissatisfied, Clarkson continued the attack along Route 11, managing to reach Camp 3 by the end of March. In the central area, patrols faced no opposition as they approached within a mile of Galiano, but other patrols discovered increasing signs that the Japanese were preparing to defend the Tuba Trail vigorously. Eventually, a robust reconnaissance force secured Bauang on March 19, with patrols then moving east to occupy Naguilan four days later and Burgos by the month's end. Meanwhile, at Salacsac Pass, the 127th Regiment fought from Hill 502 to Hill 504 against fierce resistance, while Gill sent the 2nd Battalion, 128th Regiment up the trail from Valdez toward Imugan, where they were ultimately halted by vigilant Japanese forces. By March 23, the 1st Battalion of the 127th Regiment reached the crest of Hill 504; the 2nd Battalion advanced past it to Hill 505; and the 3rd Battalion managed to position one company at the base of Hill 507D. However, with its forces stretched thin and dwindling, the 127th was unable to capitalize on its seemingly advantageous position, allowing General Iwanaka to launch a strong counterattack on Hill 507D that successfully repelled the 3rd Battalion. As a result, Gill decided to withdraw that unit and the stalled 2nd Battalion, 128th Regiment, while the majority of the 128th relieved the 127th in the Hill 502 sector. Beginning on March 25, the 128th Regiment advanced aggressively eastward, successfully capturing the previously overlooked Hill 503, fully securing Hill 504, and expanding its control over Hill 505 by the month's end. However, on the night of March 31, Iwanaka launched a daring counterattack, reclaiming Hill 504 and nearly taking all the territory east of Hill 502. By April 4, both the 127th and 128th Regiments had sustained significant casualties and could no longer continue the offensive. Consequently, Swift had to order the 33rd Division to relieve the beleaguered 126th Regiment in the Ambayabang and Arboredo River valleys, allowing this unit to reposition north of the Villa Verde Trail to execute a flanking maneuver along the Miliwit River valley. Fortunately for Clarkson, General Krueger persuaded MacArthur to free the 129th Regiment from its duties in Manila, sending it to bolster the now overstretched 33rd Division. Once the rest of the 37th Division arrived at the Baguio front, which Krueger anticipated would happen in early April, Swift could initiate a two-division assault on Baguio. In the meantime, Clarkson promptly dispatched the 129th to Burgos, and by April 1, it had advanced to Salat. The Japanese opposing the reinforced 33d Division were no longer in the shape they had been at the end of February. The 58th IMB and the 23d Division had both suffered heavy losses during March, losses that probably stemmed largely from lack of food and medical supplies rather than from combat action. By mid-March Japanese supply problems on the Baguio front had progressed from bad through worse to impossible. First, supplies had moved westward over the new Baguio-Aritao supply road far more slowly than anticipated, a development attributable in large measure to Allied Air Forces strikes on that road and along Route 5 north and south of Aritao. Second, operations of the 66th Infantry, along Route 11 north from Baguio, and the activities of the 11th Infantry, , in the Cagayan Valley, had made it virtually impossible for the Japanese to bring any food into the Baguio area from the north. Third, the Japanese tried to do too much with the limited amount of supplies available on the Baguio front. They were attempting to supply 23d Division and 58th IMB troops along the MLR; send certain military supplies north up Route 11 for the 19th Division; feed 14th Area Army headquarters and a large civilian population in Baguio; and establish supply dumps north and east of the city against the time of eventual withdrawal. Almost inevitably the principal sufferers were the front-line troops. By mid-March the best-fed Japanese combat troops on the Baguio front were getting less than half a pound of rice per day as opposed to a minimum daily requirement of nearly two and a half pounds. Before the end of the month the troops on the MLR were down to less than a quarter of a pound of rice a day. Starvation and diet-associated diseases filled hospitals and sapped the strength of the combat units. Generally, effective frontline strength was far lower than reported ration strength indicated. Medical supplies were consumed rapidly, and by the end of March, for example, there was virtually no malaria phophylaxis left in Baguio area hospitals. Looking upon the situation on the Baguio front with frank pessimism, Yamashita in mid-March directed inspection of terrain north, northeast, and east of the city with a view toward preparing a new defense line. His attitude became even plainer when, on or about 30 March, he ordered Japanese civilians and the Filipino puppet government to evacuate Baguio. Indeed, the future on the Baguio front was so bleak by the end of March that almost any other army would have withdrawn to new defenses forthwith, thereby saving troops for future battle. But not so the Japanese. Yamashita decided that the existing MLR would be held until the situation became hopeless. At the end of March that portion of the MLR held by the 23d Division was still intact, and the 58th IMB was busy deploying additional strength along its section of the line. One independent infantry battalion was on high ground north of Route 9 at Sablan; and another held defenses at Sablan. A reinforced company was at Burgos and, less that company, another independent infantry battalion held reserve positions at Calot, a mile and a half southeast of Sablan. One understrength battalion was responsible for defending the rough terrain from Sablan six miles south to Mt. Apni, where a tie-in was made with the right flank of the 23d Division. Maj. Gen. Bunzo Sato, commanding the 58th IMB, expected that the emphasis of any Allied drive in his sector would come along Route 9, but he did not neglect the other approach in his area, the Galiano road. Since the understrength battalion stationed astride the road was not strong enough to withstand a concerted attack, he directed his main reserve force, the 1st Battalion of the 75th Infantry, 19th Division, to move west out of Baguio to defenses at Asin. This step left in Baguio a reserve force of roughly three provisional infantry "battalions," which together probably could not muster over 750 effectives. In the Salacsac area, as casualties in the western pass were rapidly increasing and Allied air and artillery strikes made it nearly impossible for the 2nd Tank Division to transport supplies, Iwanaka concluded that his forward positions were nearly untenable. He began planning to redeploy forces to defend the eastern pass. Consequently, when the 126th Regiment launched its new offensive on April 5, it faced unexpectedly light resistance, quickly capturing Hills 518 and 519 within two days and cutting off a Japanese supply route leading north from Hill 504 across the eastern slopes of Hill 519 and up Mount Imugan. However, Iwanaka swiftly recognized the emerging threats and sent reinforcements to intercept the 126th's advance, delaying the capture of Hills 511 and 512 until March 13 and effectively halting further progress. At the same time, the reorganized 128th Regiment resumed its assault eastward on April 7, successfully retaking the Hill 504-505 sector and capturing Hill 506 by April 10. The following week, the 128th fought tenaciously to secure this elevated ground against fierce resistance, managing to push all the way to Hills 506B, 507C, and 507D with their remaining strength, nearly securing the western pass by April 17. Meanwhile, after the fall of San Fernando, General Krueger instructed Volckmann to advance inland along Route 4 toward Bontoc. However, the Provisional Battalion established at Cervantes could only withstand the relentless enemy pressure until April 4, when it was ultimately forced to retreat into the hills northwest of the town. Consequently, Volckmann had to quickly deploy the 121st Regiment to barrio Butac in preparation for an eastward push along Route 4. After a week of intense back-and-forth combat, this elite guerrilla unit succeeded in establishing footholds along the northern parts of Lamagan and Yubo Ridges. Over the next few days, the 121st made slow and arduous progress, ultimately gaining control of Route 4 nearly to the southeastern edge of Bessang Pass by mid-April. Further south, by mid-March, General Wing's 43rd Division had effectively secured the Antipolo sector, while General Hurdis' 6th Division was advancing well toward Mount Baytangan. At this point, General Hall's 11th Corps assumed responsibility for operations against the Shimbu Group, now rebranded as the 41st Army. However, he quickly decided to maintain the offensive against General Yokoyama's left flank, with the 20th and 1st Regiments focusing on an eastward push alongside the 43rd Division. Meanwhile, General Noguchi had completed his withdrawal to the Sugarloaf Hill-Mount Tanauan line, where he would receive reinforcements from elements of the Kogure Detachment. Simultaneously, General Kobayashi was struggling to stabilize his left flank, bolstered by one reserve battalion. On the morning of March 15, the American offensive resumed, with the 103rd Regiment continuing its assaults on Benchmark 7 Hill to secure Route 60-A, while the 172nd Regiment launched its initial attacks toward Sugarloaf Hill, facing fierce resistance. On March 17, the 1st Regiment renewed its advance toward Baytangan, initially making good progress and digging in about a mile west-southwest of the mountain's summit. However, during the night, a barrage of mortar fire followed by an infantry counterattack forced the Americans to retreat in disarray. As a result of this setback, the 1st Division began to advance eastward more cautiously, facing determined resistance and heavy mortar fire. By March 22, it was only slightly closer to Baytangan's crest than it had been five days earlier. The 20th Regiment on the left also encountered strong resistance, managing to reach a point a mile and a half west of Baytangan by March 22. At the same time, a company maneuvering to the north established a foothold on a wooded ridge overlooking the Bosoboso Valley. Meanwhile the 103d Infantry finally overran the defenses on Benchmark 7 on 18 March, killing about 250 Japanese in the process. The Japanese battalion there had delayed the 103d's attack toward Mt. Tanauan until the morning of 18 March, but by evening of that day the regiment's troops had begun swarming up the bare, rocky, southern and southwestern slopes of the mountain. Over the next three days, American forces slowly advanced through a complex of caves and bunkers until they secured the mountain's summit, while other units captured Benchmark 23 Hill and patrolled northward into the southeastern part of the Bosoboso Valley. By March 19, the 172nd Division was halted, containing Sugarloaf to the west. They bypassed it to the north and east, initiating new assaults toward Mounts Yabang and Caymayuman, making significant progress to the east but less so to the north by March 22. Despite concerns that Hall's four exhausted regiments might lack the strength to turn the 41st Army's left flank, the ongoing pressure and the failure of previous counterattacks ultimately compelled Yokoyama to order his threatened units to withdraw to new positions east of the Bosoboso River. Therefore, when the 6th and 43rd Divisions resumed their attacks on the morning of March 23, the withdrawal was already in full progress. Over the next three days, the 1st and 20th Regiments faced only scattered and disorganized resistance, allowing them to establish positions over a mile north and south of Baytangan along the ridgeline that overlooks the Bosoboso Valley. Meanwhile, the 172nd Regiment successfully captured Mount Yabang and most of Mount Caymayuman, while the 103rd Regiment advanced quickly northward, taking barrio New Bosoboso, Mount Balidbiran, and Benchmark 21 Hill. On March 27, the 1st Regiment secured the crest of Baytangan, and the 172nd Regiment eliminated the last organized opposition at Sugarloaf Hill. With Yokoyama's left flank collapsing, Hall could focus on capturing Wawa Dam and destroying the remaining elements of the Kobayashi Force west of the Bosoboso River, a mission assigned to the 6th Division. During this initial offensive, approximately 7,000 Japanese soldiers were killed since February 20, while American casualties included 435 killed and 1,425 wounded. Hurdis' initial strategy for capturing Wawa Dam involved the 1st and 20th Regiments advancing northward to clear Woodpecker Ridge and Mount Mataba, while the 63rd Regiment conducted diversionary attacks on the western slopes of Mataba. This new offensive began on March 28 but quickly faced intense small arms, machine-gun, and mortar fire, leading to a back-and-forth struggle against fierce enemy resistance. By April 3, the 20th Regiment had advanced less than half a mile toward Mataba, and the 1st Regiment had gained only 250 yards to the north. General Hurdis had hoped his attack, directed against the Kobayashi Force southern flank, would be far more successful, but the Kobayashi Force, rapidly and efficiently, had reoriented its defenses, which it had laid out primarily to face an attack from the west. The force's two remaining provisional infantry regiments, the Central and Right Sector Units, were still relatively intact, and the Central Sector Unit, bearing the brunt of the 6th Division's offensive, had recently been reinforced by remnants of the Left Sector Unit and elements of the Shimbu Group Reserve. Other factors bearing on the 6th Division's slow progress were the declining strength and deteriorating combat efficiency of its infantry regiments. The 20th Infantry could muster only 2,085 effectives on 3 April; some of its rifle companies were reduced to the combat strength of platoons. The situation within the 1st Infantry, with an effective strength of 2,150, was little better. As of 3 April the commanders of both regiments rated their units' combat efficiency only as "fair," the lowest ranking of three terms each had employed since the Lingayen Gulf assault.To bolster protection for Hurdis' right flank, the 103rd Regiment also captured Hill 1200 on the east bank of the Bosoboso River by the end of the month. Due to the slow progress of Hurdis' offensive, on April 5, Hall assigned General Cunningham's Baldy Force, which consisted of the 112th Cavalry Regiment and the recently arrived 169th Regiment, to take control of the area north of Mount Oro. This move would free up most of the 63rd Regiment to support the 20th Regiment and continue the assault north toward Mataba, while the 1st Regiment maintained its position along Woodpecker Ridge. From April 6 to 9, the 63rd made only limited progress to the east; however, on April 10, it shifted its focus to an offensive on the western slopes of Mataba, quickly securing the southwestern quarter of the mountain with minimal resistance. In response, Kobayashi promptly redirected his forces back to Mataba from the north-south ridge to prevent the 63rd from reaching the mountain's summit until April 17. At the same time, the 1st Regiment resumed its advance along Woodpecker Ridge but again faced strong enemy opposition, resulting in only limited gains. Looking further south, by March 23, the 187th Glider Regiment and the 511th Parachute Regiment had advanced to Santo Tomas and Tanauan but were unable to completely clear these areas. Meanwhile, the 158th Regiment secured Balayan, Batangas, and the Calumpan Peninsula, pushing toward Mount Macolod, where they were ultimately halted by significant forces from the Fuji Force. At this stage, as Krueger planned to launch an offensive into the Bicol Peninsula using the 158th, he needed to relieve the 11th Airborne Division with the barely rested 1st Cavalry Division. This division quickly took control of the Santo Tomas-Tanauan area, while General Swing's units maneuvered around the west side of Lake Taal to relieve the 158th at Macolod. As a result, General Griswold renewed his offensive on March 24. The 187th attempted to attack Macolod but was unsuccessful. A task force composed of units from Swing's other two regiments advanced quickly north toward Lipa, only to be halted at the hills southeast of the town. The 8th Cavalry captured Santo Tomas after a fierce battle and took Tanauan two days later. The 7th Cavalry advanced about five miles east into the corridor between Mounts Maquiling and Malepunyo, while the 12th Cavalry pushed along Route 21, moving about four miles beyond Los Baños. On March 27, Swing's task force finally overcame the enemy defenses southeast of Lipa, but it was the 8th Cavalry that ultimately secured this strategic town two days later. Griswold's successful offensive also forced around 2,000 troops from the Fuji Force to retreat along Route 21 and through the Santa Maria Valley to join Yokoyama's forces in the mountains east of Manila. In response, Krueger devised a plan to prevent the potential influx of Japanese reinforcements around the eastern and northern shores of Laguna de Bay. He instructed Hall to clear the northern shore of the lake, block the Santa Maria Valley, and secure Route 21. While the 187th continued its assault on Macolod, Griswold ordered his other units to push eastward to secure Laguna de Bay and Tayabas Bay. Accordingly, on March 30, the 103rd Regiment advanced in small increments along the northern shore of Laguna de Bay, reaching Siniloan by April 4. The 12th Cavalry moved to Calauan and then south along a secondary road toward San Pablo, encountering strong enemy positions that wouldn't be overcome until April 5. The 5th and 7th Cavalry Regiments fought through the Maquiling-Malepunyo corridor against determined but disorganized Japanese resistance, successfully occupying San Pablo by April 2. Additionally, elements of the 188th Glider Regiment pushed east through the mountain corridors, reaching Tiaong on April 3 and Lucena three days later. By April 6, the 5th Cavalry and the 103rd Regiment had established contact at Pagsanjan, effectively isolating the 41st Army. The next day, patrols from the 11th Airborne Division headed north from Lucena, while 1st Cavalry Division patrols departed from Pagsanjan heading south. They successfully linked up at Lucban by April 10 and then advanced eastward to Mauban. At the same time, a company from the 188th traveled along Route 1 across the Bondoc Isthmus, reaching Atimonan on April 11. Griswold's patrols also moved towards Mount Malepunyo, where the Fuji Force was preparing for its final stand. By April 16, preliminary assaults had concentrated enemy resistance around Mount Mataasna-Bundoc. Meanwhile, after a week of intense aerial bombardment, Brigadier-General Hanford MacNider's 158th Regiment successfully landed at Legaspi Port with minimal opposition on April 1. They quickly secured the port and the nearby airfield, then advanced to Daraga before moving south along Route 1 to occupy the Sorsogon Peninsula, where they encountered machine-gun fire from the Mount Bariway-Busay Ridge. The following morning, the troops had to retreat east of Daraga, and in the coming days, the 158th faced tough fighting in the challenging, jungle terrain to overcome resistance in the Daraga area. Concerned about delays in occupying the Sorsogon Peninsula, MacNider landed his anti-tank company at Bacon on April 6, which occupied Sorsogon without opposition. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion continued its overland advance, reaching Bulan by April 12, where they targeted a significant Japanese concentration. Simultaneously, MacNider's other two battalions attacked Camalig on April 11 and began their unsuccessful assault on enemy positions in the Cituinan Hills. By April 1, the 188th had successfully eliminated the last organized resistance in the rugged hills south of Ternate. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion of the 151st Regiment launched an assault on Caballo Island on March 27 but could not fully dismantle the entrenched enemy positions until April 13. The Japanese in the pits and tunnels created an almost insoluble problem for the 2d Battalion, 151st Infantry. The Japanese had so emplaced their weapons, which included machine guns and mortars, that they controlled all approaches to the mortar pits but could not be reached by American artillery or mortar fire. When the 151st Infantry concentrated its mortar fire against the pits' entrances, the Japanese simply withdrew into the tunnels. When the American fire ceased--at the last possible moment before an infantry assault--the Japanese rushed out of the tunnels to man their weapons. Tanks were of no help to the American troops. From positions near the rim of the pits the tanks were unable to depress their guns sufficiently to do much damage to the Japanese. If the tanks tried to approach from above, they started sliding down Hill 2's slopes into the pits. No combination of tank, artillery, and infantry action proved of any avail, and the 151st Infantry had to give up its attempts to take the Japanese positions by assault. On 31 March engineers tried to pour diesel oil into one of the tunnels connecting the mortar pits, employing for this purpose a single ventilator shaft that was accessible to the 151st Infantry. Nothing came of the effort since it was impossible to get enough oil up the steep slopes of the hill to create a conflagration of significant proportions within the tunnels. Nevertheless, burning the Japanese out seemed to promise the only method of attack that would not risk the unduly heavy casualties of a direct infantry assault. No one, of course, wanted to throw away the lives of experienced troops on such an insignificant objective. Finally, the commander of the 113th Engineers, 38th Division, suggested pumping oil up the hill from the beach through a pipeline from a ship or landing craft anchored at the shore line. The Allied Naval Forces happily fell in with this idea and supplied the 151st Infantry with two oil-filled ponton cubes; the Allied Air Forces provided a 110-horsepower pump and necessary lengths of pipeline and flexible hosing; and the 592d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment came through with an LCM to carry the pump and the ponton cubes. On 5 April over 2,500 gallons of diesel fuel were pumped into the pits and tunnels through the ventilator and were then ignited by white phosphorus mortar shells. "Results," the 38th Division reported, "were most gratifying." A huge flash fire ensued, followed by a general conflagration and several explosions. The engineers repeated the process on 6 and 7 April, and on the latter day carefully lowered two large demolition charges through the ventilator shaft and placed another at an accessible tunnel entrance. Set off simultaneously, the three charges caused an enormous volume of flames and several terrific explosions. For the next few days the 2d Battalion, 151st Infantry, tried to persuade a few Japanese who had lived through the holocausts to surrender and also executed a few infantry probing attacks. On 13 April a patrol entered the pits and tunnels, killed the lone surviving Japanese, and reported the positions cleared and secured. Following this, El Fraile was targeted, with Company F of the 151st and the 113th Engineers effectively neutralizing Fort Drum using gasoline and explosives. On April 16, troops from the 1st Battalion of the 151st Regiment attacked Carabao Island, facing no opposition. Looking towards the Visayas, after capturing Palawan and Zamboanga, General Eichelberger set his sights on the Sulu Archipelago, where new airfields were to be established. On March 16, a reinforced company from the 162nd Regiment landed unopposed on Basilan Island and spent the next two days searching Basilan and nearby islets, finding no signs of Japanese forces. On April 2, the reinforced 2nd Battalion of the 163rd Regiment landed on Sanga Sanga Island, successfully clearing the Tawi Tawi Group by April 6. The remainder of the regiment made an unopposed landing near Jolo Town on April 9. Over the next two days, the Americans drove approximately 2,400 men of the 55th Independent Mixed Brigade from the heights immediately south and southeast of the town to secure a nearby airstrip. However, the Japanese retreated to more fortified hill masses further inland, where they had long prepared their defenses and began to resist fiercely. After initial attacks by Colonel Alejandro Suarez's guerrillas failed to breach the Japanese positions, the 1st Battalion of the 163rd Regiment joined the fight and managed to overrun the enemy defenses by April 22. On April 25, the 3rd Battalion launched an assault on Lieutenant-General Suzuki Tetsuzo's final positions at Mount Tumatangus, which were ultimately subdued by May 2. However, the remaining Japanese forces continued to engage in guerrilla warfare. By this time, airfields in Zamboanga and Sanga Sanga had become operational to support the forthcoming invasion of Borneo.The first field at Zamboanga was a dry-weather strip 5000 feet long, completed on March 15 and immediately put to use by Marine Corps planes. The field, named Calarian Drome, could not answer the need for an all-weather strip 6000 feet long. Accordingly, engineers constructed a new strip, which the Marine aviators based there called Moret Field, about a mile to the east, and had it ready for all-weather operations by May 16. Used primarily by Marine Air Groups 12, 24, and 32, Moret Field was also employed by a 13th Air Force night-fighter squadron, an emergency rescue squadron, and 13th Air Force B-24s and P-38s staging through for strikes against Borneo. Marine Corps planes on March 16 executed the first support mission flown from a field in the Zamboanga area, covering the landing on Basilan Island. Later, Marine Corps planes from Zamboanga flew support for the Tawi Tawi and Jolo operations and undertook pre-assault bombardment and cover for the invasion of eastern Mindanao. While 13th Air Force planes executed most of the support for the invasion of Borneo, Marine Corps B-25s from Zamboanga also flew some missions. At Sanga Sanga Island there was a Japanese coral-surfaced strip about 2800 feet long. Engineers repaired and extended this strip to a length of 5000 feet by May 2, when fighters of the 13th Air Force began moving to Sanga Sanga from Palawan to provide close support for the initial landings on Borneo. These US Army planes were replaced in mid-May by units of the Royal Australian Air Force, which employed the all-weather Sanga Sanga field during later operations on Borneo. Finally, a Japanese field 3800 feet long on Jolo Island was repaired and used for aerial supply and evacuation operations in support of ground troops throughout the Sulu Archipelago. Eichelberger's next target was the Central Visayan Islands. For the Panay-Guimaras-northern Negros operation, codenamed Victor I, he assigned General Brush's 40th Division, excluding the 108th Regiment, which had recently been assigned to Leyte. The 40th Division departed Lingayen Gulf on March 15 aboard ships from Admiral Struble's Task Group 78.3. After a brief stop at Mindoro, they arrived at Panay before dawn on March 18. Following a short bombardment by destroyers, the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 185th Regiment landed unopposed about twelve miles west of Iloilo, where they were joined by Colonel Macario Peralta's guerrillas, who already controlled much of the island. The 185th quickly expanded its beachhead against light, scattered resistance and began advancing along the coastal road toward Iloilo in the afternoon, forcing the 170th Independent Battalion to retreat to the mountainous interior. With Iloilo secured by March 20, G Company of the 185th Regiment successfully captured Inampulugan Island on March 22, while other elements of the regiment cleared the unoccupied Guimaras Island by March 23. Additionally, Brush decided to assign the 2nd Battalion of the 160th Regiment to garrison Panay alongside Peralta's guerrillas. No pursuit of the 170th Independent Battalion was made, allowing the Japanese to continue their guerrilla activities until the end of the war. Meanwhile, for the operation against northern Negros, Brush planned to launch an assault with the 185th Regiment on March 29, followed by the majority of the 160th Regiment the next day, while keeping the 503rd Parachute Regiment in reserve for potential airdrops. Opposing him, Lieutenant-General Kono Takeshi's 77th Brigade had a total of 15,000 troops but was prepared to retreat into the mountains of north-central Negros for a prolonged defense, leaving only token forces in the coastal plain to delay American advances. On March 29, the 185th Regiment landed unopposed near Pulupandan and quickly secured a bridge over the Bago River. The 185th then spread north and east, with the 160th Regiment following, successfully securing nearly the entire coastal plain of northwestern Negros by noon on April 2. As they closed in on Kono's inner fortress, the Americans overran the main Japanese outposts while the 511th was landed to bolster the assault. On April 9, Brush launched his general offensive, with his three regiments advancing slowly into rugged terrain where the Japanese held significant defensive advantages. On June 4 General Kono, realizing that his remaining forces were incapable of further sustained effort, directed a general withdrawal deep into the mountains behind his broken defensive lines. The surviving Japanese dispersed into small groups seeking food and hideouts and trying to avoid contact with Colonel Abcede's guerrillas who, under the direction of the 503rd Parachute Regiment, took over responsibility for the pursuit of Kono's men. On June 9 the 503rd then relieved all elements of the 40th Division in northern Negros. By that date the Japanese had lost over 4000 men killed. Kono lost another 3350 troops, mainly from starvation and disease, before the end of the war. After the general surrender in August 1945, over 6150 Japanese came down from the mountains to turn themselves in, joining about 350 others who had been captured earlier. In all, about 7100 Japanese lost their lives in northern Negros, pinning down the equivalent of an American infantry division for over two months. The 40th Division's casualties for the operation, including those of the attached 503rd Parachute, totaled approximately 370 men killed and 1035 wounded. Meanwhile, Eichelberger's final objective in the Central Visayas was Cebu, assigned to Major-General William Arnold's Americal Division. For Operation Victor II, Captain Albert Sprague's Task Group 78.2 was set to land the bulk of the division at Cebu City while Colonel James Cushing's guerrillas secured the water sources. Opposing them were Rear-Admiral Harada Kaku's 33rd Naval Special Base Force and Major-General Manjome Takeo's 78th Brigade, which together comprised approximately 14,500 troops, including the 173rd Independent Battalion and the 36th Naval Guard Unit stationed at Cebu City. Additionally, around 750 soldiers from General Kataoka's 1st Division were positioned in northern Cebu. Although the command situation on the island was chaotic, General Suzuki's 35th Army headquarters in Leyte had been evacuated by two large motorized landing barges between March 17 and 25. Taking control of all forces on Cebu, Suzuki appointed Manjome as the de jure commander in the Cebu City area while leaving Kataoka in charge of northern Cebu, as he prepared to retreat to Mindanao. General Manjome designed his defenses so as to control--not hold--the coastal plains around Cebu City, and for this purpose set up defenses in depth north and northwest of the city. A forward line, constituting an outpost line of resistance, stretched across the first rising ground behind the city hills 2.5 to 4 miles inland. A stronger and shorter second line, the main line of resistance, lay about a mile farther inland and generally 350 feet higher into the hills. Back of this MLR were Manjome's last-stand defenses, centering in rough, broken hills 5 miles or so north of the city. Anticipating that American forces would attempt to mount wide envelopments of his defensive lines, Manjome set up one flank protective strongpoint in rugged, bare hills about 3.5 miles north of barrio Talisay, on the coast about 6 miles southwest of Cebu City, to block the valley of the Mananga River, a natural axis of advance for forces enveloping from the south and west. Similarly, he established strongpoints on his left to block the valley of the Butuanoan River, roughly 4 miles northeast of Cebu City. Against the eventuality that the American invading forces might land north of Cebu City and strike into the Butuanoan Valley, Manjome set up another flank protective position in low hills overlooking the beach at Liloan, 10 miles northeast of Cebu City. Manjome did not intend to hold the beaches, but at both Talisay and Liloan, the best landing points in the Cebu City region, he thoroughly mined all logical landing areas. The Japanese also constructed tank barriers along the shore line and planted tank traps and minefields along all roads leading inland and toward Cebu City. The inner defense lines were a system of mutually supporting machine-gun positions in caves, pillboxes, and bunkers. Many of these positions had been completed for months and had acquired natural camouflage. Manjome's troops had an ample supply of machine guns and machine cannon and, like the Japanese on Negros, employed remounted aircraft and anti-aircraft weapons. Manjome had some light and heavy mortars, but only a few pieces of light artillery. For the rest, however, Manjome's forces were far better supplied than Kono's troops in northern Negros. After an uneventful journey, Task Group 78.2 and the Americal Division arrived off Cebu in the early hours of March 26. Following an hour of bombardment by three light cruisers and six destroyers from Admiral Berkey's Task Force 74, the leading waves of the 132nd and 182nd Regiments landed unopposed on beaches just north of Talisay at 08:30. However, the landing was chaotic, as Japanese mines just a few yards beyond the surf line disabled ten of the first fifteen LVTs. Fortunately for the Americans, Manjome had chosen to withdraw from the beaches to establish inland defenses, resulting in minimal casualties. Once they cleared the beach minefields by 10:00, Arnold's leading units cautiously advanced through abandoned defenses toward the main highway to Cebu City, ultimately stopping for the night about a mile and a half south of their objective. The following day, the infantry secured Cebu City without opposition and on March 28 proceeded to clear Lahug Airfield and Hill 30 to the north. The Americans began their assault on Go Chan Hill on March 29, during which Company A of the 182nd Regiment was completely annihilated by the explosion of an ammunition dump located in caves along the hill's eastern spur. Fueled by a desire for revenge, nearly the entire 182nd returned to the attack on March 30 and successfully captured Go Chan Hill. Meanwhile, the 132nd Regiment cleared the coastal plains area north to the Butuanoan River, further securing the city's water supply sources by April 2. Unopposed, troops from the 132nd also successfully landed on Mactan Island, quickly securing an airstrip. In the meantime, as guerrillas had already taken control of much of Masbate, the 2nd Battalion of the 108th Regiment successfully landed on the island by April 7. Facing minimal opposition, the Americans pursued the scattered Japanese remnants through the hills and jungles of Masbate, killing approximately 120 Japanese soldiers by May 4. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. On March 29th, the Americans attacked Go Chan Hill, suffering heavy losses. Seeking revenge, they captured it the next day, securing water supplies and defeating Japanese forces in Masbate. Then in April, Allied forces advanced strategically, overcoming fierce Japanese resistance, securing key positions, and establishing airfields, culminating in significant victories across the Philippines.
Last time we spoke about the liberation of Bataan and Corregidor. The Shimbu Group's commander launched a coordinated raid on northern Manila, aiming to weaken enemy defenses. Despite heavy casualties, the Allies captured key locations, including Nichols Field. Meanwhile, General Chase's 38th Division overcame strong Japanese defenses at ZigZag Pass, while General Hall's forces secured Bataan. Plans for an airborne assault on Corregidor were set for February 16, leveraging surprise against the outnumbered Japanese garrison. American forces launched the strategic attack on Corregidor, dropping paratroopers from the 503rd Regiment. Despite facing sporadic fire, they secured key positions. The following days saw intense skirmishes as the 3rd Battalion, 34th Regiment landed and established a foothold. Over eight days, they repelled numerous Japanese counterattacks, inflicting heavy casualties. By February 26, organized resistance crumbled, leading to the island's capture. Meanwhile, in Manila, American troops advanced, clearing buildings and securing the city, inching closer to victory in the Philippines. This episode is the Invasion of Iwo Jima Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. A few weeks ago we spoke about Operation Detachment. Admirals Nimitz and Spruance were planning an invasion of Iwo Jima with General Schmidt's 5th Amphibious Corps. During a thorough campaign of preliminary air and naval bombardment against the Volcano Islands, the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions, along with other Corps units, were loading at Hawaii between December 25 and January 25. Once training and loading were complete, Admiral Turner's Task Force 51 and Admiral Hill's Task Force 53 left Pearl Harbor on January 27, initially heading toward Saipan. By February 12, Admiral Spruance's 5th Fleet had gathered in the Marianas and was prepared to sail for Iwo Jima. Additionally, Admiral Mitscher's Task Force 58 had departed Ulithi to conduct a series of supporting air strikes over and around Tokyo, known as Operation Jamboree. Task Force 58 sortied from Ulithi 10 February and shaped a course eastward of the Marianas and Bonins. On the 12th, the air groups rehearsed with the 3rd Marine Division on Tinian. Two days later the task force fueled at sea from one of Admiral Beary's replenishment groups. Everything possible was done to guard against detection. Measures included radio deception, scouting by Pacific Fleet submarines to dispose of any picket vessels there might be en route, scouting by B-29s and Navy Liberators from the Marianas to clear the air. On the 15th a scouting line of five destroyers ranged ahead of the carriers, and antisubmarine air patrol was set up. At 1900 a high-speed run-in began towards launching positions, where the carriers arrived at dawn 16 February. Thanks to these precautions, and to thick weather most of the way, they arrived undetected. General LeMay's 21st Bomber Command, which was being reinforced by the 313th and 314th Bombardment Wings, would also assist Detachment with several strikes against Japan. Following some unremarkable high-altitude daytime missions in late January, 129 B-29s from the 73rd and 313th Bombardment Wings targeted Kobe on February 3, using a mix of incendiaries and fragmentation bombs. This attack caused significant damage to the urban area and local war production, resulting in the loss of 2 bombers and damage to 35 others. Subsequently, on February 10, a precision strike was launched against Ota's Nakajima aircraft factory, with 84 out of 118 dispatched B-29s successfully bombing the site. However, only 14% of the bombs hit the target, leading to the loss of 12 bombers and damage to 29. Nearly one-third of the factory buildings sustained damage, primarily from the incendiaries combined with high-explosive bombs. Five days later, LeMay dispatched 117 B-29 bombers to target Mitsubishi's engine works in Nagoya. However, an unexpected cold front resulted in only 33 bombers reaching the target area, yielding lackluster results. Meanwhile, after conducting some assault rehearsals, Spruance's amphibious support forces and tractor groups set sail for Iwo Jima on February 14, followed two days later by Turner's main assault convoy. At the same time, the reserve 3rd Marine Division continued loading at Guam, with its 21st Marines departing for Iwo Jima on February 16, followed by the main body of the division the next day. On the morning of February 16, Admiral Blandy's Amphibious Support Force arrived off Iwo Jima and promptly commenced the final preliminary bombardment and minesweeping operations, although inclement weather hindered these efforts. However, the next day, Task Force 52 successfully carried out these missions; beach reconnaissance by UDTs faced heavy mortar fire, resulting in the sinking of one LCI gunboat, damage to eleven others, and casualties of 44 killed and 152 wounded. Despite this, the frogmen encountered no obstacles on the beaches and managed to create accurate maps of the approaches. Meanwhile, by February 16, Mitscher's carriers had quietly moved to a position 60 miles off the coast of Honshu, launching extensive fighter sweeps against airfields in Tokyo Bay and bombing raids on aircraft frame and engine plants in the Tokyo area. About 100 Japanese fighters attacked Admiral Davison's planes as they crossed the coast and about 40 of them were shot down. American pilots found the Japanese on the whole reluctant to engage; Admiral Mitscher had correctly told his pilots, "He is probably more afraid of you than you are of him". In fact the IJAAF 10th Hiko Shidan immediately ordered an IJAAF night-fighter group and all “second-class” personnel to take cover, while all aircraft not intercepting were ordered to be dispersed, fuel tanks drained, and ammunition unloaded. In contrast, American pilots reported Tokyo antiaircraft fire “the most accurate and intense yet encountered.” By nightfall, Rear-Admiral Matthias Gardner's night-flying carrier group conducted a sweep of night fighters to cover the enemy airfields at dusk. This operation was repeated the following morning, but poor weather ultimately forced the carriers to retreat toward Iwo Jima. Despite this, significant damage was inflicted on aircraft frame and engine facilities, with 10 vessels sunk, including the unfinished escort carrier Yamashio Maru. A total of 531 aircraft were reported destroyed, at the expense of losing 88 planes and damaging two destroyers. On February 18, after the enemy battery camouflage had been obliterated during the previous two days of bombardment. This revealed batteries not previously known to exist, the island's defenses were for the first time properly revealed; and formidable they were indeed. Fortunately for the Americans, the support of UDTs with LCI gunboats had convinced General Kuribayashi that the main landing had started, and to repel it he unmasked batteries that would have caused very heavy casualties on D-day had they not been discovered two days before. This was the only serious mistake made by the Japanese general in his defensive tactics, which won the rueful admiration of his enemies. Blandy opted to focus on the immediate area and flanks of the eastern beaches. Heavy ships moved closer to 2,500 yards to deliver concentrated direct fire on all targets. Consequently, bombardment ships provided continuous direct fire throughout the day, effectively dismantling enemy defenses. However, during the night, the Japanese launched a minor raid that caused significant damage to the destroyer minesweeper Gamble and the destroyer escort Blessman. At 06:00 on February 19, Turner's main force arrived off Iwo Jima and began maneuvering into final positions. Simultaneously, Admiral Rodgers' warships executed the last pre-landing bombardment, coordinated with air strikes from Mitscher's carriers. Between 08:25 and 08:55, as the first wave crossed the line of departure and advanced toward the shore under the protective rocket fire of gunboats, shells fell heavily on Iwo Jima, marking the most intense pre-landing bombardment of World War II. At 08:57, as the leading armored amtracs approached their targets, naval gunfire shifted inland and to the flanks. The LVTs of the first wave touched down on Iwo Jima at 09:02 and began moving forward through the high terraces of soft black volcanic ash, engaging inland targets from the water to support subsequent landings. Three minutes later, the Marines of the 4th and 5th Divisions started landing side by side on the Green, Red, Yellow, and Blue beaches. The assault infantry battalions of the Landing Force received assistance throughout D-Day from all the supporting arms available to the Amphibious Support Force. Carrier pilots of Task Force 58 and the escort carriers of Task Force 52 flew missions all day as airborne observers and spotters maintained constant vigilance over the target. Including pre-H-Hour strikes, 606 support aircraft flew 26 missions on February 19 and dropped 274500 pounds of bombs. These planes also fired 2254 rockets into the island defenses and dropped over a hundred napalm bombs. Air and naval gunfire liaison teams remained in communication with both air and sea supporting units through the hectic hours that followed the beach assault. Naval rifles from 5- to 16-inch caliber pounded enemy positions in response to Marine requests. Gunfire support vessels engaged enemy artillery that covered landing areas from high ground to the north, and concentrated on concealed Japanese mortars that shelled landing areas with deadly effect. The units quickly reorganized and began their advance inland, facing only light resistance, although their progress was hampered by the sandy terrain. General Kuribayashi's forces, however, had been waiting in well-fortified underground positions as planned, emerging only after the bombardment ceased to unleash a barrage of machine-gun, rifle, and mortar fire on the advancing troops. As the initial waves of Marines struggled to advance, congestion along the shore became increasingly critical, while the full force of the Japanese defenders was unleashed shortly after 10:00. By 10:30, elements from all eight assault battalions had landed on the island, successfully bringing ashore about 6,000 men and bulldozers that were clearing paths for tank deployment. On the far left flank, Colonel Harry Liversedge's 28th Marines, having landed on Green Beach, initiated a rapid advance across the half-mile isthmus below Mount Suribachi to isolate this crucial position. The attack unfolded in such a way that some units were delayed while others managed to break through and continue westward despite suffering heavy casualties, ultimately crossing the island while the bypassed enemy was being dealt with. By midday, the reserve 3rd Battalion and tanks landed under heavy fire to join the afternoon assault on Suribachi, but intense enemy fire hindered their progress to the assault positions. Consequently, the 2nd Battalion launched an attack on its own, gaining only 150 yards before retreating to regroup with the 3rd Battalion for the night. At the same time, Colonel Thomas Wornham's 27th Marines had landed on the Red Beaches, making swift progress inland despite increasing casualties and bypassing numerous enemy positions. By 11:30, Company A was moving across the southern end of Airfield No. 1, establishing a presence along the western edge while other units continued to advance past the airfield. The 1st Battalion launched an attack on the airfield with tank support but faced strong enemy resistance, resulting in minimal gains. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion pushed westward and reached the cliffs overlooking the western coast. Additionally, the reserve 3rd Battalion landed and began clearing bypassed positions, while the artillery units from the 13th Marines and General Rockey's reserve 26th Marines also arrived in the afternoon as the 27th and 28th Marines solidified their positions. By nightfall, although the 5th Marine Division was still a considerable distance from the O-1 Line, it had established a firm foothold on the island, with Mount Suribachi isolated and portions of the airfield under their control. To the east, General Cates' 4th Marine Division also landed successfully, with Colonel Walter Wensinger's 23rd Marines coming ashore at the Yellow Beaches and Colonel John Lanigan's 25th Marines landing on Blue Beach 1 and the southern part of Blue Beach 2. The two regiments began their advance inland, hindered by intense enemy fire but managing to gain between 400 and 600 yards by midday. As tanks were being deployed, the 3rd Battalion of the 25th Marines moved to the right to clear the remaining area of Beach Blue 2 and encircle the threatening quarry zone. At this stage, as the assault battalions continued their advance, Wensinger and Lanigan deployed their reserve battalions to cover the gaps in their attack lines. With the support of tanks that had finally reached the front, the 23rd Marines advanced towards Airfield No. 1 and successfully captured its outskirts. Meanwhile, the 25th Marines initiated a coordinated assault, with the 3rd Battalion advancing about 200 yards along the beach to secure the problematic quarry, while the other two battalions moved north to seize the high ground to the northwest of the quarry. By the end of the day, Cates had also landed half of the artillery from the 14th Marines, along with his reserve 24th Marines, which began to relieve some of the frontline units from both assault regiments. Although the penetration by the 4th Marine Division was not as extensive as intended, by nightfall, the front lines included the eastern edge of the airfield and extended sufficiently inland from the Blue Beaches to ensure the beachhead could be held successfully. The Marines, forced to advance across open terrain while enduring intense fire from well-concealed positions that were difficult to target, fell significantly short of the O-1 objective. Nonetheless, by the end of the day, six Marine regiments, an equal number of artillery battalions, and two tank battalions had landed and were positioned to defend the narrow beachhead against a potential night counterattack. Throughout this first day, the situation on the beaches prevented landing of any but the highest priority "hot cargo." This consisted of ammunition, rations, water, and signal equipment brought to the beach in LCVPs and LCMs. Shore party teams, working under extremely adverse conditions without sufficient trucks and other heavy equipment, could do little more than stack the supplies on the beach above the high water mark. LVTs and weasels made trips from the beach dumps inland carrying these supplies to the troops and returned bearing wounded men. The busy amtracs also made nonstop trips from LSTs, ferrying critically needed items direct to Marines on the front lines. Most of the transports and other vessels of the task force retired from the island at nightfall, but some command ships, preloaded LSTs, and hospital LSTs remained behind. Emergency items, especially 81mm mortar ammunition, were brought in during the night, but actually very little unloading was accomplished and many of the wounded spent this night on the beach because they could not be evacuated. Some progress was made cutting exits through the terrace and clearing mines, but enemy fire and the shortage of equipment limited this activity. Despite this, the Japanese did not launch any large-scale assaults, although their mortars and artillery relentlessly bombarded Marine lines along the front throughout the night. Consequently, Allied casualties on this first day totaled 548 killed and 1,755 wounded. On February 20, the goal was for the 28th Marines to take Mount Suribachi while other units advanced north to capture the two airfields. Initially, in the south, after a coordinated air and naval bombardment, Liversedge launched another assault on the volcano but managed to gain only 75 yards by midday. During the forenoon, Marines gained only 50-70 yards. Aircraft and ships pounded Japanese positions and the 3d Battalion, 13th Marines fired mission after mission, but stiff enemy resistance continued, particularly from well-camouflaged pillboxes hidden in the brush to the front of the Marine lines. These emplacements, too close to friendly troops to be engaged by heavy support weapons, could only be silenced by coordinated attacks of assault demolition teams using flamethrowers and explosive charges. Tanks then moved in to provide support, allowing the attack to progress from pillbox to pillbox; however, by the end of the day, the Marines had only advanced 200 difficult yards. Meanwhile, Schmidt's other regiments initiated a coordinated offensive to the north following extensive artillery, naval gunfire, and air support. Despite facing heavy resistance, the 23rd Marines successfully overran most of Airfield No. 1 by noon. Wensinger continued to push his units in the afternoon, but progress was limited as tanks were hindered by minefields and rough terrain. Wornham's 27th Marines pressed their attack on the left flank, overcoming enemy mortar and artillery fire to gain about 800 yards along the coast. In contrast, Lanigan's 25th Marines, affected by friendly fire, made only minimal advances against enemy crossfire from concealed positions. At 1600, friendly planes misdirected their fire to the 25th Marine's area, adding terror to the situation. An air strike consisting of .50-caliber machine-gun strafing, rockets, and bombs fell on troops of Company B of the 24th Marines, which was positioned on top of the quarry some 400 yards inland from the eastern shore. This strike was made without a preliminary "dry-run", and despite the fact that yellow front line panels were displayed prior to and during the aerial attack. The 1st Battalion, 24th Marines suffered five killed and six wounded as a result of this misguided effort. Shortly after the planes left the area, this battalion reported that friendly artillery and naval gunfire was being registered on its lines. Due to the slow progress, Schmidt attempted to land his reserve 21st Marines, but high seas and congested beaches ultimately thwarted these efforts. Nevertheless, the remaining 14th Marines were landed, albeit with significant casualties, and elements of the corps artillery began to come ashore. During the night, there were no counterattacks on Mount Suribachi, but the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions had to fend off some small counterattacks on their front lines. On February 21, following a strike involving 40 aircraft, Liversedge's 28th Marines launched another assault on the volcano. The 1st Battalion on the right swiftly advanced along the west beach to the base of Suribachi, while the 3rd Battalion in the center pushed nearly to the foot of the mountain despite facing heavy resistance. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion on the left moved cautiously along the east beach toward the volcano's base, with Company F heading toward Tobiishi Point. At the same time, other regiments continued their offensive towards O-1 after a bombardment from air, artillery, rockets, and naval gunfire. Rockey's units made significant progress, advancing over 1,000 yards, while the 23rd Marines achieved similar gains on the left flank, where slightly sheltered areas allowed for local and limited encirclement, but only advanced 100 yards in the right and center. The 25th Marines maintained steady pressure against the strong enemy defenses, gaining between 50 and 300 yards across the front. Colonel Hartnoll Withers' 21st Marines successfully landed this time; due to heavy casualties in the center, they were assigned to relieve the exhausted 23rd Marines. By nightfall, the Marines had to fend off several local counterattacks and infiltration attempts. During the night, 50 kamikaze planes targeted Blandy's Task Force 52. They were picked up by the radar of the USS Saratoga, a veteran carrier of the Pacific War, and six fighters were sent to intercept. They shot down two Zeros but the remaining Zeros plowed on through the low lying cloud, two of them trailing smoke, and slammed into the side of the carrier turning the hangers into an inferno. Another solitary attacker smashed into the flight deck leaving a gaping hole 100 yards from the bow. Damage control teams worked wonders and within one hour the fires were under control and the Saratoga was able to recover a few of her planes. Another aircraft, a "Betty" twin engined bomber, tore into the escort carrier USS Bismarck Sea. The decks were full of aircraft and the ensuing explosion caused uncontrollable fires. Abandon ship was sounded and 800 men went over the side. Within a few minutes a huge explosion ripped off the entire stern of the carrier and she rolled 38 over and sank. Three other ships were also damaged: the escort carrier USS Lunga Point was showered with flaming debris as four aircraft were blasted out of the sky; the minesweeper Keokuk was damaged when a "Jill" dive bomber hit her deck; and LST 477 loaded with Sherman tanks received a glancing blow. The Saratoga, with destroyer escort, returned to Pearl Harbor, but by the time the damage was repaired the war was over. The kamikazes had done their work well: 358 men killed, one carrier sunk, and another severely damaged. It was a grim preview of the mayhem they would later cause during the invasion of Okinawa in April. On February 22, amidst a dreary cold rain, Liversedge renewed his assault on Suribachi, where only half of the original garrison remained to oppose the Marine advance. There was no let-up in the weather on Wednesday as Marines of the 28th Regiment, drenched to the skin and bent by the wind, prepared to renew the attack on Suribachi. Fresh supplies of ammunition had been brought to the front during the night, but the Shermans were mired in mud and the Navy declined to supply air support in the appalling weather. It was to be up to the foot soldier with rifle, flamethrower, grenade, and demolition charge to win the day. Colonel Atsuchi still had 800-900 men left and they had no intention of allowing the Americans an easy victory. Major Youamata announced: "We are surrounded by enemy craft of all sizes, shapes and descriptions, enemy shells have smashed at our installations and defenses, their planes bomb and strafe yet we remain strong and defiant. The Americans are beginning to climb the first terraces towards our defenses. Now they shall taste our steel and lead." Throughout the day, the 28th Marines engaged Japanese positions on the lower slopes of the mountain, with the 3rd Battalion making the final push to the base of Suribachi while the other two battalions cleared the coastline to completely encircle the volcano. Simultaneously, Schmidt's northern sweep continued, with the 21st Marines replacing Wensinger's troops, and Colonel Chester Graham's 26th Marines taking over on the 5th Division front. The 26th Marines advanced approximately 400 yards in the center but ultimately had to withdraw as the flanking units could not progress; the 21st Marines began their assault on the formidable defenses of Colonel Ikeda's 145th Regiment in front of Airfield No. 2, managing to advance only about 250 yards on the right; and the 25th Marines were unable to launch an attack on the left due to Withers' lack of significant gains and had to fend off several local Japanese counterattacks. Marine "Howlin' Mad" Smith aboard the USS Auburn was counting the cost. Three days of battle and the Regimental Returns listed 2,517 casualties for the 4th Division and 2,057 for the 5th: 4,574 dead and wounded and the O-1 line had just been reached. Little did he know that as his Marines approached the hills, ravines, canyons, gullies, and cliffs of the north the worst was yet to come. Additionally, as the 4th Division remained stalled, Cates ordered Colonel Walter Jordan's 24th Marines to relieve the weary troops of Lanigan on the right. During the night, most of Task Force 58 departed the area for a second air strike against Tokyo, which significantly limited the availability of aircraft for direct support of ground forces on Iwo Jima. On February 23, the 28th Marines under Liversedge launched their final assault on Suribachi. The 2nd Battalion was tasked with scaling the volcano's heights, while the 1st Battalion advanced south around the mountain's western side. To their surprise, they encountered no enemy fire, and small patrols reached the crater's edge by 09:40. 1st Lieutenant Harold G. Schrier, executive officer of Company E, and a 40-man detachment set out to follow the patrols and occupy the highest point of land on Iwo Jima. The number of live Japanese lurking in caves along this north face was unknown, so flankers were sent out to guard against ambush as Schrier's men clawed their way warily upward. Still there was a mysterious lack of enemy activity, and the only Japanese encountered were the harmless dead. Positions along the rim of the crater were reached at about 10:15, and as Marines scrambled over the lip, the tenseness was eased by action. A small defending force challenged the patrol and a short, hot fight developed. Even while this skirmish was in progress, some of the men located a length of Japanese iron pipe, secured a small American flag to one end, and raised the Stars and Stripes at 10:20. It was an inspiring sight for thousands of Americans on Iwo as the flag waved bravely from the summit. Shortly after the mounting of this flag that measured only 54 inches by 28 inches, an unidentified Marine went aboard LST 779, beached near the base of the volcano, to obtain a larger set of colors. As this second and larger (8 feet by 4 feet 8 inches) flag was being carried up the slopes of Suribachi, photographer Joe Rosenthal, who covered the Iwo operation for the Associated Press, noticed it and instantly started in close pursuit. His efforts that morning resulted in the now famous picture of the second flag raising. Also since it's one of my favorite movies, I wanted to add this passage from the book “Flags of our Fathers” by James Bradley The Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal, had decided the previous night that he wanted to go ashore and witness the final stage of the fight for the mountain. Now, under a stern commitment to take orders from General Holland "Howlin' Mad" Smith, the secretary was churning ashore in the company of the blunt, earthy general. Their boat touched the beach just after the flag went up, and the mood among the high command turned jubilant. Gazing upward, at the red, white, and blue speck, Forrestal remarked to Smith: "Holland, the raising of that flag on Suribachi means a Marine Corps for the next five hundred years". Forrestal was so taken with fervor of the moment that he decided he wanted the Second Battalion's flag flying on Mt. Suribachi as a souvenir. The news of this wish did not sit well with 2nd Battalion Commander Chandler Johnson, whose temperament was every bit as fiery as Howlin Mad's. "To hell with that!" the colonel spat when the message reached him. The flag belonged to the battalion, as far as Johnson was concerned. He decided to secure it as soon as possible, and dispatched his assistant operations officer, Lieutenant Ted Tuttle, to the beach to obtain a replacement flag. As an afterthought, Johnson called after Tuttle: "And make it a bigger one." Following this, the 28th Marines conducted mopping-up operations to eliminate remaining enemy positions and seal off caves at the base of Suribachi. All accessible outer and inner slopes were covered as the Marines annihilated enemy snipers and blasted shut the many cave entrances, sealing in an uncounted number of Japanese. Much observation equipment was found, emphasizing the fact that this had been an excellent point of vantage from which hostile observers directed murderous fire against the entire beachhead. Marine artillerymen, ready and eager to seize this advantage, hastened to move flash-ranging equipment into position. By nightfall, approximately 122 Japanese soldiers were killed while attempting to infiltrate American lines. Over the five-day period, the 28th Marines suffered 895 casualties, while nearly 2,000 Japanese were either killed or trapped in over 1,000 caves in the area. Kuribayashi had not anticipated the loss of this strategically significant location so early in the battle, and the survivors who managed to breach American lines faced severe reprimands upon their return to the north. For the remainder of the month, the 28th Marines focused on clearing out stubborn Japanese forces, reorganizing, and reequipping. Meanwhile, fighting in the north persisted as the three assault regiments advanced toward the O-2 Line. The 26th and 21st Marines faced heavy fire and struggled to make progress, while the 24th Marines advanced along their entire front, gaining up to 300 yards in some areas. On this day, the situation on the beach steadily improved as clearance efforts, construction of exits, and unloading continued, facilitating the arrival of essential ammunition and an additional 25 tanks. On February 24, following extensive air, naval, and artillery preparations, the offensive resumed. However, the initial failure of tanks to join the assault due to minefields and heavy anti-tank fire forced the Marines to advance slowly under intense fire from various sources. In the center, the 3rd Battalion, 21st Marines advanced 800 yards, reaching the north side of the east-west runway of Airfield No. 2, while the 2nd Battalion gradually moved northward around the end of the runway by noon. In the afternoon, as tank support began to arrive, Withers' 3rd Battalion captured the hill north of the airstrip after a fierce hand-to-hand battle. Simultaneously, his 2nd Battalion coordinated with the 26th Marines to seize the elevation beyond the airfield. Graham's troops easily secured the ground in front but had to pause their advance when they found themselves about 400 yards ahead of the 21st Marines. On the right flank, the 24th Marines initially made significant progress alongside Withers' men toward the airfield but were ultimately halted by the strong defenses on Charlie-Dog Ridge. Running along the southeast edge of the east-west runway of Airfield Number 2 was a ridge known only as "Charlie-Dog Ridge." In prolongation of this ridge, on a lower level to the southeast, was a semicircular rise of ground that formed the "Amphitheater." In this area, Japanese engineers had constructed some of the most formidable defenses on the island. From the south, the approach traversed bare flat ground swept by guns on the ridge. To the east, the route led across a weird series of volcanic outcroppings and draws. It was against these positions that the 24th Marines moved out on D-plus-5. Assault squads then had to methodically clear the ridge, moving from one strongpoint to another, using fire and explosives until Charlie-Dog was secured. While the overall gains for the day were notable by Iwo Jima standards, the casualty figures were also high, with the Marines suffering 1,034 killed and 3,741 wounded during the five-day push to the second airfield. Additionally, the remainder of General Erskine's 3rd Marine Division began landing that day to officially take control of the central area. On February 25, a decision was made to hold back the 26th Marines to allow the 3rd Division to align with them. After another intense bombardment, Colonel Howard Kenyon's 9th Marines advanced through the 21st to continue the assault, but the two-battalion attack only managed to gain a meager 100 yards against Ikeda's determined defenders. Kenyon then deployed his reserve 3rd Battalion in the center, but it also failed to break through. To the east, the 23rd and 24th Marines launched simultaneous attacks, but only the 23rd made significant progress, overrunning the eastern end of the strip and establishing a foothold on the high ground to the north. Meanwhile, in the morning, Mitscher's carriers conducted a second strike on Tokyo. The Japanese sighted 600 US carrier aircraft on February 25, but Rear Admiral “Ted” Sherman reported, “The enemy opposition was only halfhearted and Japanese planes which were not shot down seemed glad to withdraw from the scene … as swiftly and unceremoniously as possible. Even here, over their own capital, the enemy were notably inferior to our naval aviators in aggressiveness, tactics, and determination.” TF-58 aircraft hit the Ota and Koizumi aircraft plants, but increasingly snowy, stormy weather meant Mitscher canceled further Tokyo strikes at 1215hrs. Spruance and Mitscher decided to hit Nagoya instead. En route to Nagoya that night destroyers USS Hazelwood and Murray sank three small Japanese craft. Eventually Mitscher realized TF-58 would not reach launching position on time, and at 0530hrs Spruance and Mitscher canceled the Nagoya strikes and headed south to refuel. TF-58 claimed 47 Japanese planes shot down and 111 destroyed on the ground for a total of 158 Japanese planes destroyed on February 25. Two hangars, one radar station, and two trains were destroyed. About 75 percent of the Ota engine plant's buildings were destroyed and an additional 15 percent heavily damaged. The Koizuma plant had also been heavily hit, and five coastal vessels and several smaller craft sunk, with another 14 vessels damaged. Total US losses were nine aircraft to antiaircraft fire and four to operational causes; four pilots were lost.. After TF-58 aircraft had plastered the Nakajima Ota airframe plant with 45 tons of bombs, February 25 photoreconnaissance revealed Ota to be 60 percent destroyed and 30 percent heavily damaged, although half of this was believed due to B-29s. After the photos TF-58 aircraft dropped another 13 tons on the plant. The Nakajima Koizuma plant was attacked on February 25 with 35 to 40 tons of bombs, with hits concentrated in the center of the plant. Reconnaissance showed 20 percent of the Koizuma roof damaged. The Hitachi–Tachikawa aircraft engine plant was attacked by one Task Group strike, with US airmen reporting “excellent results.” Photographs showed many bomb hits, but smoke made precise damage assessments difficult. Slight damage was also inflicted on the Tachikawa airframe plant. TF-58 planes struck the B-29s' nemesis, the Musashino-Tama aircraft engine plant, with 40 tons of bombs in the center of the Tama complex. On that day, LeMay also dispatched 231 B-29s to attack Tokyo with incendiaries, with 172 successfully dropping 453.7 tons of bombs, incinerating a square mile of the city. This operation served as the "conclusive" test of the incendiary bombs that the 20th Air Force had requested, with valuable lessons to be learned for future use. The next day, the 26th Marines resumed their attack despite the high ground on the left remaining unclaimed, successfully advancing over 300 yards in the right and center. In the center, the 9th Marines continued their assault with the 1st and 2nd Battalions side by side, but they made no notable gains. On the right flank, the 23rd Marines launched another assault towards Hill 382, facing heavy resistance and managing to advance only about 200 yards. Concurrently, Lanigan's 25th Marines moved through the battered 24th Marines, achieving an advance of approximately 100 yards before encountering intense machine-gun fire from the Amphitheater and Turkey Knob. On February 27, Wonrham's 27th Marines took over from the exhausted 26th and continued to push northward despite rising casualties, successfully overrunning several strongpoints and gaining about 500 yards across the front. In the center, the 9th Marines finally breached the enemy's main defenses towards Hill 199-O and captured Hill Peter, securing Airfield No. 2. Meanwhile, on the right, the 4th Division pressed on against the heavily fortified Japanese positions at the Meatgrinder, advancing only 150 to 200 yards on each flank while struggling to make headway against the Amphitheater and Turkey Knob. In the final attack of the month, the 27th Marines advanced towards Hill 362A, reaching its base but were forced to retreat nearly 100 yards due to Japanese counterattacks and loss of communication. In the center, Withers' 21st Marines moved past the 9th Marines and rapidly advanced north of Airfield No. 2, making significant progress on the right as they swept through Motoyama village and captured the high ground overlooking Airfield No. 3. To the east, Cates continued to send troops into the Meatgrinder, with the 23rd Marines gaining over 200 yards and launching an attack on Hill 382, while the 25th Marines struggled to make any headway against the Amphitheater and Turkey Knob, achieving only minor gains along the coast. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. And thus we have begun one of the most brutal battles of WW2, let alone the Pacific War. It was a controversial decision to invade Iwo Jima and the Americans could never have predicted how the Japanese would change their tactics to turn the entire ordeal into one giant meat grinder.
Last time we spoke about the South China Sea Raid. In January, General Krueger reinforced the American beachhead at Lingayen Gulf while Admiral Halsey launched Operation Gratitude, targeting enemy ships based on faulty intelligence. Despite not finding the expected battleships, American forces decimated a Japanese convoy, sinking numerous vessels and claiming 113 enemy aircraft. Meanwhile, on Luzon, the 1st and 14th Corps advanced against Japanese defenses, capturing key positions despite fierce resistance. As both sides prepared for counteroffensives, the battle intensified, marking a pivotal moment in the Philippines campaign. On January 17, the 58th Brigade and supporting regiments launched a daring operation to destroy enemy positions. As American forces advanced, they faced fierce resistance, but some regiments achieved notable successes. Task Force 38 executed airstrikes on Formosa and Hong Kong, inflicting damage despite heavy losses. Meanwhile, Japanese forces struggled to regroup amid American pressure. General Suzuki devised a plan to fortify Leyte, but ongoing air raids hampered supply efforts. Tensions escalated as both sides prepared for decisive confrontations in the ongoing battle for control. This episode is the Mandalay Offensive Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. We last left off with, General Krueger strategically positioned General Mullins' 25th Division on the right flank of the 43rd Division to bolster the assault forces at the Rosario front. This maneuver was also intended to facilitate the continuation of the 14th Corps' advance to the south. Following the successful repulsion of General Nishiyama's local counterattack, General Wing ordered the 63rd, 158th, and 172nd Regiments, which had been stalled, to launch an offensive from the west along the Damortis-Rosario road. Simultaneously, the 103rd and 169th Regiments were tasked with advancing northward along Route 3, originating from Pozorrubio. In contrast, while the 58th Independent Mixed Brigade and the 23rd Division worked to contain General Swift's 1st Corps, General Yamashita was reinforcing the San Jose sector. He further instructed the Shigemi Detachment to maintain a defensive position in Binalonan. Although the 27th and 161st Regiments had successfully relieved the 103rd Regiment in the Binalonan area, Major-General Shigemi Isao ultimately opted to halt further troop movements. He decided to leave only a small garrison in Binalonan while the majority of his forces prepared for a decisive stand at San Manuel. As the situation unfolded, the 3rd Battalion of the 161st Regiment encountered minimal resistance, allowing them to advance into the northern half of Binalonan by nightfall on January 17. In a parallel effort, General Patrick directed the 1st Regiment towards Urdaneta, where they successfully eliminated a small outpost belonging to the Shigemi Detachment. Additionally, he dispatched the 20th Regiment to the Cabaruan Hills, where they achieved their objective by reaching Lunec and securing the central area of the hills by the end of the day. On January 18, the offensive momentum of the 6th and 25th Divisions persisted. The 20th Regiment advanced to a low ridge approximately 2,500 yards west of Cabaruan, where American forces identified the primary defenses of the 2nd Battalion, 71st Regiment. Meanwhile, the 161st Regiment successfully cleared Binalonan, and the 27th Regiment moved forward to seize control of the Bactad area, further consolidating their gains in the region. Simultaneously, Wing's units were gearing up for a significant new offensive. In line with this strategy, the 2nd Battalion of the 169th Regiment advanced along Route 3, deftly circumventing the town of Sison, and finally reached a crucial road junction located to the northeast of the town. Meanwhile, to the north, the 172nd Regiment executed a successful nighttime ambush against a Japanese artillery battalion. Following this victory, they dispatched a company to seize control of a strategically important hill, rising 600 feet and situated approximately 1,000 yards north of Rosario. This position enabled American forces to exert control over a substantial portion of the surrounding area. By the conclusion of the day, the 158th and 63rd Regiments established contact through patrols about a mile south of Amlang, as they prepared for a coordinated assault that was set to launch on January 19. This offensive culminated in the collapse of the last Japanese defenses just two days later. Concurrently, the 172nd Regiment successfully established a patrol base on Hill 606. From this vantage point, patrols ventured into Rosario, discovering the town was heavily mined, riddled with booby traps, and defended by concealed machine-gunners and riflemen hiding amidst the rubble of the buildings. On January 19, the 103rd Regiment initiated an assault on Hill 600, located at the southern end of the ridge line east of Route 3. At the same time, the 2nd Battalion of the 169th Regiment faced several intense counterattacks from retreating Japanese forces that had been bypassed at Mount Alava and Sison. Despite the fierce resistance, the relentless pressure from Japanese troops and increasingly heavy artillery fire ultimately compelled the battalion to withdraw by noon. Nevertheless, the American operations succeeded in diminishing the Japanese presence in the region. Looking southward, the 161st Regiment cautiously advanced toward San Manuel, while the 27th Regiment effectively moved into Asingan, successfully cutting off Shigemi's escape route. Further south, the 1st Regiment rapidly progressed along Route 3 toward the Agno River, capturing the towns of Villasis, Carmen, and Rosales. Meanwhile, the 20th Regiment commenced an assault on the 2nd Battalion of the 71st Regiment stationed in the Cabaruan Hills. On the front commanded by General Griswold, the 14th Corps was in the process of mobilizing along the Camiling-Anao line, preparing to initiate an advance toward the Tarlac-Victoria line. The 160th Regiment began its march, covering seven miles southward from Camiling along Route 13, while the 129th Regiment took a strong position in Anao, establishing vital contact with other outposts of the 37th Division stationed at Paniqui. The advances made on January 20 were notably swift, with the 148th Regiment successfully capturing the towns of Gerona and Pura. Meanwhile, the 37th Reconnaissance Troop made significant progress by entering the guerrilla-occupied area of Victoria, and units from the 40th Division advanced to within four miles of Tarlac, signaling a promising push toward their objectives. In the area around Cabaruan, the Japanese forces had sustained heavy losses during the initial attack. In response, Colonel Patrick made the strategic decision to withdraw two battalions from the hills to reinforce the southern advance. Probing slowly through the roughest ground in the Cabaruan Hills on January 20 and 21, the 20th Regiment's reinforced battalion jumped off in the morning of the 22nd in what was expected to be the last attack, its way paved by an especially heavy artillery and air bombardment. But from the start, operations did not go as planned. The air strike, conducted by Fifth Air Force A-20s was four hours late, subjecting the infantry to "a nerve racking wait," and did not include requested napalm. Air and artillery concentrations were, however, well placed, and it seemed improbable to the waiting infantry that many Japanese could have lived through them. A combined tank-infantry assault began about 12:30 and proceeded slowly but steadily for almost two hours. Then the attackers were stopped cold by a tremendous burst of rifle, machine-gun, and light artillery fire from the very hillsides that had received the weight of the bombardments. Company E, in the lead, fell back; Company G's officers were all either killed or wounded, and the company was temporarily scattered; Company F was pinned in place; and two supporting tanks were knocked out. Casualties mounted quickly to 10 men killed and 35 wounded. As a consequence, Patrick found it necessary to redirect one battalion from the 1st Regiment to support the ongoing attack. Simultaneously, the remainder of the 20th Regiment pressed forward toward Cuyapo, while the bulk of the 1st Regiment continued its eastward movement toward the guerrilla-held Balungao. Additionally, the 6th Reconnaissance Troop reached Guimba, successfully establishing contact with patrols from the 14th Corps, which was crucial for coordinating their efforts. On another front, with Mount Alava now vulnerable, the 169th Regiment launched a vigorous assault on January 20, managing to secure the summit of the mountain by nightfall. In contrast, the 103rd Regiment continued to face heavy casualties during their frontal assaults against Hill 600, ultimately gaining only a precarious foothold on the exposed southern slopes. Meanwhile, in a significant naval development, Admiral Halsey's Task Force 38 exited the South China Sea through the Balintang Channel on January 20. The task force was poised to execute further strikes against Formosa, aiming to disrupt enemy operations and bolster the Allied offensive in the region. The following day, with significantly improved weather conditions, Admiral McCain's aircraft carriers launched a coordinated series of airstrikes targeting Formosa, the Pescadores Islands, and the southern Ryukyu Islands. These operations resulted in the destruction of 104 Japanese aircraft on the ground, the sinking of seven oil tankers, and the loss of seven transport ships, along with additional damage inflicted on another seven vessels. For the first time since November 1944, TF 38 felt the sting of kamikazes. Operating just 100nm east of Formosa, TF 38 was not difficult to find. Just after noon, a single aircraft appeared to conduct a conventional bombing attack on TG 38.3's light carrier Langley. One bomb hit forward. Personnel casualties were light, but the carrier was conducting flight operations three hours later. Within minutes, another aircraft also evaded radar detection and the CAP to commence a suicide dive against Ticonderoga. The kamikaze struck the flight deck and penetrated where its bomb exploded. An impending strike was spotted and ready to launch; now these aircraft provided fuel for the fire which was quickly spreading. Just before 1300hrs, another group of eight kamikazes and five escorts resumed the attack on TG 38.3. Only two suicide aircraft survived the CAP to dive on the wounded Ticonderoga. One was sent spinning into the water by antiaircraft fire, but the final attacker crashed into the carrier's island. More fires were started. The crew succeeded in putting out the flames by 1415hrs and correcting a nine-degree list by 1800hrs. Though the ship was saved, the cost was high. Some 143 men were killed and 202, including her captain, were wounded. In addition, the air group lost 36 aircraft. As a final farewell, kamikazes attacked the two destroyers on picket duty just 65nm off Formosa at 1310hrs. A single Zero had joined a returning strike. Before it could be identified as enemy, it dove on destroyer Maddox, striking her amidships. This and the explosion of the bomb aboard created a fire that was quickly extinguished. After a final day of strikes on January 22 against the Ryukyus, during which eight ships were sunk, Task Force 38 set course for Ulithi. Upon arrival, Admiral Halsey transferred command of the Fast Carrier Force to Admiral Spruance, who would lead the final offensives in the Central Pacific. Meanwhile, back on Luzon, on January 21, the 160th Regiment swiftly cleared the town of Tarlac and began its advance toward San Miguel. Simultaneously, the 145th and 148th Regiments moved unopposed toward La Paz. The speed of 14th Corps' advance had stretched Griswold's supply lines abnormally and had exposed his left from Cuyapo to La Paz, a distance of nearly 25 miles. He had no definite information about suspected Japanese concentrations in the vicinity of Cabanatuan, on Route 5 just 15 miles east of La Paz. His worries about the security of his flank were hardly put to rest by reports of new contacts with Japanese forces at Moncada, now 20 miles behind the front, and at La Paz. Elements of the 129th and 145th Regiments easily took care of the Japanese in the Moncada area; but during the night of January 21, a pitched battle developed at La Paz when a platoon of Japanese infantry, supported by one tank, attacked a 148th Regiment perimeter at a road junction a mile west of town. The Japanese finally withdrew after destroying a bridge that carried a secondary road across a river a mile east of La Paz; but because of this, Griswold reported to General Krueger that it would be impossible to extend 14th Corps' left any further south until he had more information about Japanese forces east of La Paz. To mitigate this risk, he decided to keep General Beightler's 37th Division positioned in reserve while General Brush's 40th Division continued its advance southward along Route 3 toward Bamban. As a result, elements of the 160th Regiment and the 40th Reconnaissance Troop reached Capas and conducted patrols toward Camp O'Donnell on January 22. Meanwhile, the 161st Regiment began probing the defenses established by Japanese forces under Shigemi. The 103rd Regiment faced severe losses during their assault on Hill 600, necessitating a withdrawal to reorganize. Concurrently, the 169th Regiment launched an attack on Hill 355, making slow and costly progress against fierce resistance on the steep, barren slopes. By January 24, most of Hill 355 had been cleared, allowing the 3rd Battalion of the 103rd Regiment to move in and conduct mop-up operations in the area. As the 158th Regiment looked northward and secured the area around Amlang, they initiated an eastward push towards the positions held by the 172nd Regiment. However, their advance was slow, with only a modest gain of 500 yards achieved. Over the next two days, the 158th faced a grueling battle, making painstaking progress as they advanced foot by foot across exposed hills and ridges, all while enduring relentless machine-gun, mortar, and artillery fire. It wasn't until January 26 that they successfully broke through to Cataguintingan, where they provided much-needed support to the 172nd Regiment's ongoing assaults into Rosario. Meanwhile, by the evening of January 23, the 161st Regiment had managed to secure the southern slopes of the barren ridge north of San Manuel. They established trail blocks in the Aboredo Valley, effectively controlling movement in the area. To the south, the 108th Regiment had taken control of the Capas region, while the 160th Regiment successfully captured Bamban. However, it became increasingly evident that the American forces were now confronting the well-fortified and organized defenses of the Kembu Group. The Kembu Group's strength lay in the terrain it held, in the depth of its defenses, and in the great number of automatic weapons (aircraft and anti-aircraft) it possessed. Its major weaknesses were its immobility; the inadequate training and armament of the bulk of its troops; shortages of food, ammunition, and field artillery; and the rudimentary state of many defensive installations, a state deriving from the late start in establishing the positions at and west of Clark Field. The health of the command was poor from the start, and medical supplies were short. Morale was not of the highest order, and many of the troops were easily disaffected Formosan, Okinawan, and Korean labor personnel. In brief, the Kembu Group was the poorest armed, prepared, and supplied of Yamashita's three defense commands. On the other hand, as the 40th Division was soon to learn, even poor service troops, whatever their state of training and armament, can put up stiff resistance in good defensive terrain. In preparation for the defense of Clark Field, General Tsukada assembled a diverse array of forces, totaling approximately 30,000 troops, although the majority consisted of air and naval personnel. He strategically divided his Army units into four distinct detachments. The Takayama, Takaya, and Eguchi Detachments were positioned along the first and second lines of defense, facing eastward toward Highway 3. Their defensive line extended from the hills west of Bamban to the vicinity of Fort Stotsenburg. In contrast, the Yanagimoto Detachment maintained its mobile units at Angeles and Porac, ready to respond to any potential enemy paratrooper landings on the southern flank of the Clark Field defenses. Additionally, Rear-Admiral Sugimoto Ushie commanded naval units comprising about 15,000 men, tasked with defending positions behind the two forward lines. In light of this formidable opposition, General Griswold made the strategic decision to utilize January 24 for consolidation and regrouping. This involved preparing for further advances southward while also probing into the enemy defenses that had already been uncovered. The 160th Regiment was able to secure Lafe Hill, although they were unable to establish a foothold on Hill 500, highlighting the challenges that lay ahead. To the north, American forces initiated another offensive against the Cabaruan Hills. The units of the 1st Regiment made only modest progress, yet they managed to advance closer to the main defensive positions as night fell. Meanwhile, at San Manuel, the 161st Regiment launched its first assault against the Shigemi Detachment, which encountered unexpectedly fierce resistance. As a result, the Americans were only able to establish a fragile foothold in the northern section of the town. Further north, Wing directed the 103rd Regiment to set up a line of departure along Route 3, aiming to strike eastward at the northwestern slopes of Hill 600. At the same time, they were tasked with advancing up the southwestern slopes of the exposed Hill 700 to secure that strategic location, as well as Hill 800 to the northwest. The 169th Regiment, advancing to the left of the 103rd, was assigned to capture Question Mark Hill. Concurrently, the 63rd and 172nd Regiments were ordered to launch simultaneous assaults on Hills 900 and 1500, respectively, while the reserve 3rd Battalion of the 63rd Regiment was also committed to clear Benchmark Hill. This coordinated attack was scheduled for January 25. The initial phases of the assault showed promise, with the supporting forces making significant headway. However, the 103rd Regiment faced considerable difficulties, managing to secure Hill 800 only by nightfall. Notably, the 172nd Regiment achieved tactical surprise, successfully clearing most of Hill 900. Over the next two days, the 63rd Regiment regrouped around Hill 1500 in preparation for its own offensive. Simultaneously, the 161st Regiment continued its slow advance southward through San Manuel, facing intense opposition. Patrick's units on the Cabaruan Hills managed to gain a mere 300 yards against determined resistance. Meanwhile, Brush pressed his attack on Clark Field, with the 160th Regiment clearing Hill 500 and advancing nearly a mile along the ridge from Lafe Hill, while the 108th Regiment secured Hills E and G. The following day, the 40th Division continued its southward maneuver. Any movement by American troops along the generally open ridges west of Route 3 inevitably brought down Japanese machine-gun and mortar fire, often augmented by fire from the dismounted aircraft automatic weapons, anti-aircraft guns, and light artillery. Seeking cover and usually pinned in place, the American infantry would call for close-in mortar and artillery support, wait for the concentrations to be fired, and then drive forward a few yards, when the process had to be repeated. Each time, the Americans managed to overrun a few Japanese machine-gun or rifle strongpoints. There was little choice of routes of advance. Draws, providing some concealment in scrub growth or bamboo thickets, were usually covered by well-emplaced Japanese weapons both within the draws and on the ridges to each side. Possession of the high ground, as ever, was essential. Yet the troops had to employ draws whenever possible to outflank Japanese ridgeline strongpoints, and often draws and ravines proved to be the only routes by which tanks, tank destroyers, and cannon company self-propelled mounts could get to the front to fire against Japanese cave positions along the sides of the ridges. The capture of one Japanese-held cave served only to disclose another, and one machine-gun position was overrun only to provide access to the next. Dislodging the Kembu Group from such defenses in depth was to prove a slow, laborious, and costly process, demanding the closest teamwork between the infantry and its supporting arms. Casualties, as a rule, would not be heavy on any one day--progress would be too slow and the troops would spend too much of their time pinned down awaiting fire from supporting weapons. But a daily attrition rate of about 5 men killed and 15 wounded for each battalion engaged would soon begin to have its effect. Meanwhile the 160th Regiment swiftly captured Hills 636 and 600 in rapid succession. However, the 108th Regiment lost control of Hill G during the engagement. On January 26, Griswold committed the 37th Division to the fight, with the 145th Regiment successfully capturing Mabalacat and Mabalacat East Airfield. They then shifted westward across Route 3, overrunning Clark Field Runway Number 1. In the Cabaruan Hills, American forces gained only 150 yards at a considerable cost. In response, Patrick decided to deploy another battalion from the 1st Regiment to eliminate this pocket of resistance. The following day, this two-battalion assault proved successful, resulting in the destruction of an entire battalion of Japanese troops, with over 1,400 enemy soldiers killed. Further north, the 161st Regiment finally broke through the main defenses of Shigemi's forces. Before dawn most of the Japanese left in San Manuel scrambled across the draw on the east side of town and fled to join the 10th Reconnaissance Regiment north of San Nicolas, but not before launching a final counterattack to cover their escape. At 0930 the 161st Infantry's two battalions resumed the drive southward through the town, and by 1330 San Manuel was clear. In a heroic but tactically unimportant stand the Shigemi Detachment had virtually fulfilled its self-imposed desire for annihilation in place. The detachment had lost 750 men killed; all its tanks, artillery, trucks, machine guns, and mortars had been either captured or destroyed. Probably no more than 250 troops escaped, and many of them were unarmed and wounded. The 161st Infantry and attached units had lost approximately 60 men killed and 200 wounded; the 716th Tank Battalion lost 3 tanks. Meanwhile, Wing's offensive continued on January 27, with the 103rd Regiment successfully reaching the crest of Hill 700 and the northwestern slopes of Hill 600. Unfortunately, they lost both positions to a brutal Japanese counterattack amidst a violent tropical downpour. On January 28, the 172nd Regiment captured Rosario, while the 63rd secured the southern crest of Hill 1500. Both regiments completed the capture of this strategic feature by January 30, thereby finalizing the occupation of the crucial road junction area. Further south, on January 27, the 160th Regiment advanced only 500 to 800 yards to the west and southwest. The 108th Regiment made a more substantial advance of about 1,000 yards southwest from Hills E and G but failed to reach Hill 5. The 145th Regiment pushed south along Route 3 for an additional three miles, reaching Culayo and Dau before taking control of the guerrilla-occupied Angeles, which had recently been abandoned by the retreating Yanagimoto Detachment. In a similar vein, the 148th Regiment secured Magalang without encountering any resistance. As we shift our focus from Luzon, we turn our attention to Burma, where we will delve into the ongoing developments of Operation Capital. Picking up from our previous discussions, we find ourselves in Central Burma, where the 2nd British Division and the 19th Indian Division are making significant strides toward Shwebo. The 2nd British Division successfully captured Ye-u on January 2, followed by the establishment of a crucial bridgehead across the Mu River just three days later. Meanwhile, the 19th Indian Division also advanced, reaching the Shwebo area by January 5. On January 8, a coordinated assault was launched by units from both divisions, culminating in the capture of Shwebo after two days of intense and brutal combat. To the west, General Festing's 29th Brigade began probing the northern flank of the 15th Division at Twinnge. Concurrently, other elements of the 19th Division worked to solidify their positions by establishing additional bridgeheads over the Irrawaddy River at Thabeikkyin and Kyaukyaung. On January 10, the 20th Indian Division captured Budalin and subsequently pushed towards Monywa, where the 33rd Division had only left a small contingent to serve as a rearguard. However, the campaign faced unexpected challenges; heavy rainfall during the first week of January brought all transport operations of the 4th Corps to a standstill, significantly hampering the Lushai Brigade's planned assault on Gangaw. After enduring a heavy aerial bombardment, the attack on Gangaw finally commenced on January 10. The Lushai Brigade managed to overpower the limited defending forces, forcing them to retreat after a brief skirmish. With Gangaw now under their control, the Lushai Brigade refocused their efforts on reconnaissance, monitoring the flanks of the 7th Indian Division. Meanwhile, the 28th East African Brigade took the lead in the advance, successfully displacing a Japanese garrison at Tilin on January 22. By this time, the 114th Brigade had begun to follow in the wake of the East Africans, while the 89th Brigade executed a long maneuver to the left, advancing toward Pauk in parallel with the other offensives. Although General Kimura was aware of some movements on his southern flank, he perceived these as mere feints by minor forces intended to divert his attention southward. Following a relentless barrage of artillery and air strikes, the 20th Division launched its offensive against Monywa on January 20. This assault faced fierce resistance, and it took two days of intense and bloody combat before the division was able to secure control of the town. After capturing Monywa, the 80th Brigade advanced towards Myaung, while the 110th Brigade shifted its focus to Ayadaw before launching an attack on Myinmu. By January 25, they had successfully established a bridgehead in that area. Meanwhile, to the east, the 2nd Division commenced its assault on Sagaing on January 14. They made significant headway against the forward defenses of the 31st Division, with other units managing to secure a bridgehead at Ywathitgyi. General Katamura, concerned about the expanding bridgeheads established by the 19th Division across the Irrawaddy River, ordered the 15th and 53rd Divisions to neutralize these positions before they could become fortified. As a result, during the last week of January, the Japanese forces executed a series of coordinated night attacks on Kyaukmyaung. By this time, British-Indian troops had dug in deeply, supported by formidable artillery and machine-gun positions. The ensuing conflict was marked by brutal carnage, with the 15th Division suffering a staggering loss of one-third of its personnel, while the 53rd Division was compelled to withdraw to Kyaukse after incurring heavy casualties. In parallel, the 89th Brigade successfully occupied Pauk on January 28, as General Messervy's forces geared up for a decisive push towards Meiktila. Looking northward, General Sultan was also advancing his own offensive aimed at reopening the Burma Road to China. He ordered the 50th Chinese Division to move towards Lashio and deployed the Mars Task Force to Hosi. Additionally, he dispatched the 36th British Division towards Mongmit, although the British advance was expected to be slow until additional forces could be brought into alignment for a more coordinated effort. General Sun's newly established 1st Army initiated a delayed offensive against Namhkam, which resumed in early January. This resurgence was marked by the 90th Regiment's strategic capture of the hill that overlooks the southwestern entrance to the Shweli River valley. Concurrently, the 112th Regiment advanced through Loiwing, subsequently crossing the river to approach Namhkam from the northeast. Meanwhile, the 88th Regiment entered the valley via the main road, making a direct push across the small plain toward Namhkam. The 89th and 114th Regiments executed a broader maneuver around the southern end of the Shweli valley; the 89th crossed the river on January 7 and advanced northward toward Namhkam, while the 114th crossed three days later, navigating through the hills toward the Namhkam-Namhpakka trail. To the south, the 475th Regiment progressed through Mong Hkak and reached Mong Wi on January 6, preparing for another challenging march across the hilly terrain toward Hosi, with the 124th Cavalry Regiment following closely behind. So close is Tonkwa to the mountains that the 475th found the trail rising steeply on the 1st day's march east. Like a crazily twisted drill it bored its way farther east and ever higher. In some places it was 15 to 20 feet across; in others, just wide enough for a man and a mule. As they rounded the turns, the men would peer ahead and look out across the valleys to where lay row on row of hills. Trees were everywhere. In flat places carved by erosion, the Burmese had cut and farmed terraces, and little villages clung to the mountains like limpets to a rock. Because existing maps were unreliable, so that map reconnaissance could not locate water and bivouac areas, and because the sheer fatigue of climbing the steeper slopes was formidable, march schedules went down the mountain side, with quite a few steel helmets and an occasional mule. Halts were a matter of common sense leadership at platoon or company level. The march was tactical but no Japanese were encountered, though rumor of their nearness kept the men alert. The Chinese had passed that way before, while a screen of Kachin Rangers was preceding the American column. Speaking the local dialects and carrying radios and automatic weapons, the Kachins were an excellent screen which masked the MARS Task Force while reporting anything that might be suspicious. Despite the difficult march, crossing the 400-foot wide Shweli was not too hard. The bridge built by the Chinese some weeks before still stood, a triumph of Oriental ingenuity, with bundles of bamboo for pontons and vines for cable. The Shweli was beginning to tear it apart, but work parties from the 475th kept it operable. Meanwhile, spurred into action by General Wedemeyer after a month of inactivity, General Wei's Y-Force finally resumed its offensive operations in late December. They promptly dispatched the 2nd, 6th, and 71st Armies to launch an assault on the forward positions of the 56th Division at Wanting. Simultaneously, the 53rd Army executed a wide flanking maneuver to the west, aiming to encircle and attack the Japanese forces from the rear. Faced with the intense pressure of this four-pronged offensive, General Matsuyama was compelled to withdraw the 148th Regiment to a position north of Mongyu. He also ordered the Yoshida Force to mount a counteroffensive toward Muse and committed the reserve 2nd Regiment to secure Namhpakka. On January 5, the 53rd Army reached the vicinity of Muse and began crossing the river; however, they were met with fierce resistance from Matsuyama's timely counterattack, which thwarted their advance. Ten days later, Sun's forces initiated a well-coordinated offensive against Namhkam, which ultimately succumbed on January 16 as the 55th Regiment retreated toward Khonung. With the Shweli Valley now firmly under Allied control, Matsuyama began to tighten his defensive perimeter in anticipation of a final withdrawal toward Hsenwi. On January 17, the Mars Task Force made significant progress by reaching the Hosi sector, where they immediately engaged Japanese outposts. The 475th Regiment successfully secured the advantageous high ground near Nawhkam village. Over the next two days, American forces clashed with the 4th Regiment, capturing the strategically important Loikang Ridge and the elevated terrain overlooking Namhpakka. On January 19, the Mars Task Force attempted to disrupt Japanese supply lines by blocking the Burma Road through demolition and artillery bombardment, coinciding with the arrival of the 55th Regiment, which was sent to bolster the defenders. In a parallel effort, the 114th Regiment managed to sever the Namhkam-Namhpakka trail at Loilawn on the same day. Faced with this escalating threat from the south and the intensifying Chinese assaults on Wanting, the 56th Division was compelled to further contract its defensive perimeter. As a result, Wanting fell on January 20. Fortunately for Matsuyama, General Wei received orders from the Generalissimo to conclude the Salween campaign immediately, which meant that the Chinese forces would remain in their positions until they could be relieved by Sultan's units. Over the course of nearly nine months of intense combat, Wei's Y-Force had successfully reoccupied an impressive 24,000 square miles of Chinese territory and had defeated one of the most elite divisions of the Japanese army, along with elements from two additional divisions. However, the fighting was far from over. Sun continued to dispatch the 112th and 113th Regiments toward Wanting and Mongyu, aiming to clear the final stretch of the road leading to China. Meanwhile, the 89th and 114th Regiments pressed eastward to cut off the Burma Road north of Namhpakka, further complicating the situation for the Japanese forces. In the southern region, from January 20 to January 24, the Mars Task Force continued its strategic operations, executing ambushes and demolition missions while successfully repelling several intense counterattacks from enemy forces. By late January, pressure by MARS Task Force and that of the Chinese forces in the north began to register on the Japanese. The soldiers of the 4th Regiment could see the aerial activity that kept MARS supplied. Not recognizing what they saw, they were so impressed by a big supply drop on the 24th that they sent a report to the 56th Division of a large airborne force being landed along the Burma Road. Accepting this report, General Matsuyama decided to destroy his ammunition and retreat south. His superiors on January 24 agreed to let him retreat, but only after he had evacuated casualties and ammunition. Forty vehicles with gasoline accompanied by a Major Kibino of the 33rd Army staff were sent north to support the 56th in its withdrawal. The Japanese truck convoy made its run north the night of January 24. The trucks were heard, and the Americans placed heavy fire on the road. Kibino had been making the trip in a tankette. Hit by a 4.2-inch mortar shell, it burst into flames clearly visible from the American lines. Kibino clambered out, jumped on a truck, and succeeded in getting his convoy through to the 56th Division. Next day the derelict tankette was credited to the 2nd Battalion, 475th Regiment. But Encouraged by the additional supplies of gasoline and inspired by the heroic examples of Major Kibino and the personnel of the truck companies, the 56th Division renewed its efforts and, during the next four days effected the evacuation of over 1000 casualties and moved several tons of ammunition to Hsenwi. Meanwhile, General Matsuyama began to systematically reposition his forces toward Namhpakka, a strategic maneuver that would enable Chinese troops to occupy Mongyu on January 27. In a broader context, by the end of January, the 36th and 50th Divisions were also engaged in crossing the Shweli River, preparing to advance their offensives further southward. In the Arakan region, Operation Romulus exceeded expectations. The 1st Battalion of the 111th Regiment had been defending Akyab. On December 31, as the rear guard of the Sakura Detachment crossed the Kaladan River and moved eastward the Battalion was ordered to withdraw to Ponnagyun. As intelligence suggested very few Japanese were left on Akyab island, a recce aeroplane reported the locals showing no anxiety and on January 2 messages were dropped in Urdu and Burmese asking them to sit on the ground if the island was still occupied or stand with their hands in the air if not. Captain Jimmy Jarrett of ‘C' Flight, 656 AOP Squadron, then landed to a rousing reception and found the Japanese had quit on December 31, although nobody believed him until a senior officer flew in to confirm it. This prompted General Christison to swiftly initiate an amphibious invasion. Notably, this operation was executed without the anticipated naval bombardment and without deploying the reserve 26th Indian Division. As a result, the 3rd Commando Brigade successfully captured Akyab on January 3, facing no resistance, and the 25th Indian Division soon followed, reinforcing the area. From Akyab, the 9th York and Lancasters were transported by boat to establish a strategic blockade along the Yo River at Ponnagyun. There, they encountered significant Japanese forces. After a fierce engagement, however, the Japanese defenders were compelled to retreat toward Myohaung by January 11. In response to the evolving situation, Admiral Mountbatten devised a plan to land the 3rd Commando Brigade and the 25th Division on the Myebon Peninsula. This operation aimed to sever the primary lines of communication for Japanese forces, while preparations were made for the 26th Division to conduct a landing on Ramree Island. In response to the urgent military situation, Operation Passport was swiftly conceived and executed on January 12. British-Indian forces successfully landed at the southern tip of the peninsula, supported by both air and naval operations. Once ashore, the commandos advanced inland, facing intense resistance from fortified hill positions. Their efforts culminated in the capture of Pagoda Hill and the village of Myebon. However, as they pushed forward, opposition intensified, making it increasingly difficult for the British-Indian troops to reach Hill 831. Simultaneously, the 82nd West African Division, now commanded by Major-General Hugh Stockwell, entered the Kaladan Valley to relieve the 81st Division, which had been engaged in combat for over a year. The West African forces began to apply pressure against the Matsu Detachment units stationed at Myohaung and Minbya, although these Japanese forces managed to maintain their positions despite the mounting assaults. Meanwhile, planning was underway for the deployment of the 3rd Commando Brigade and the 51st Indian Brigade to land at Kangaw, coinciding with General Lomax's invasion of Ramree Island. Early on January 21 the naval bombardment group opened fire. Christison and the other Force Commanders were watching through field glasses from the bridge of HMS Queen Elizabeth in her first engagement since the Dardanelles in 1915. Christison later said: ‘Some shells fell on a marsh behind the Jap defences, and I saw a number of duck spring up. “Duck”, I shouted. “The Royal Navy never ducks”, said the Admiral.' With her second salvo Queen Elizabeth scored a direct hit on the Japanese ammunition depot, which facilitated the landing operations. The 71st Indian Brigade successfully captured Kyaukpyu with minimal resistance. This victory enabled them to advance toward Minbyin and Kyaupyauk, both of which fell into their hands by January 23. In the subsequent days, the brigade continued its advance toward the Yanbauk Chaung, where they encountered fierce Japanese defenses. At the same time, other elements of the division worked to secure Cheduba and Sagu Kyun Islands, further consolidating their strategic position in the region. On January 22, the commandos and the 51st Brigade successfully landed in the Kangaw area near the Min River. However, they faced violent and frequent counterattacks from Japanese forces, which hindered their ability to expand their beachhead. Despite these challenges, the intense pressure from the commandos ultimately forced the Japanese defenders at Hill 831, Myohaung, and Minbya to retreat toward Kani, marking a significant shift in the operational landscape. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. General Krueger's forces advanced against Japanese defenses, capturing key positions despite heavy resistance and casualties. Meanwhile, in Burma, British-Indian troops advanced, seizing key locations despite heavy resistance. Both fronts faced intense combat, leading to significant territorial gains against Japanese forces by the end of January.
Last time we spoke about Operation Capital. In late November, General Gill's 32nd Division secured Limon and aimed for Ormoc, while General Arnold's 7th Division prepared to flank Japanese forces. Intense fighting marked the attack on Kilay Ridge, resulting in a costly victory for the Americans. Meanwhile, Japanese operations faltered as supplies dwindled. By December, Allied plans for Luzon's invasion were set, but delays in securing air support complicated the Mindoro operation. Across the seas, naval battles raged, revealing the fierce struggle for control in the Pacific. In December, the Chinese launched renewed attacks on fortified Japanese positions in Bhamo, but faced fierce resistance. While the 113th Regiment struggled, the 114th found early success aided by coordinated artillery and air support. As casualties mounted, General Honda ordered reinforcements for Hara's garrison, leading to a desperate counterattack. Despite heavy losses, Japanese forces managed to retreat to safety. Amid ongoing skirmishes, the Allies realized their strategies would need revision to face the shifting tide of battle effectively. This episode is the Fall of Ormoc Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. Last we left off, the Japanese were preparing to initiate their Wa offensive, General Arnold's troops had successfully taken control of Shoestring Ridge and were poised to launch a fresh attack aimed at Ormoc. By December 4, the tanks of the 776th Amphibian Tank Battalion were positioned near Balogo, ready to strike the enemy positions ahead of the main assault. The next morning, these tanks targeted the weakened Japanese defenses at Balogo and Tabgas before subsequently withdrawing.There were numerous finger ridges inland which were cut by deep ravines and gorges that came to within a few hundred yards of the coast line. The entrenched Japanese, using reverse slope tactics, were able to deliver deadly fire on the advancing infantry. In many cases the reverse slopes were so steep that effective artillery fire could not be placed upon them. The 2d Battalion, 184th Infantry, moved forward slowly toward a small hill which faced the Palanas River, and at 0858 it encountered enemy small arms fire from the western slope of the hill. Using grenades, the battalion pushed forward, but at 0938 the Japanese opened up with three light machine guns. The supporting weapons of the 2d Battalion fired on the enemy positions to the front. At 1037, as the battalion reached the military crest of the hill, the Japanese launched a small counterattack on the left flank of Company E. This attack was repulsed, but the companies continued to receive small arms and machine gun fire. At 1325 the 1st Battalion renewed its advance and proceeded without incident, finding the situation "very quiet" to its front. At 1435 the battalion dug in for the night approximately 300 yards south of Balogo. The 3d Battalion moved through the gap between the 1st and 2d Battalions and across the front of the 2d Battalion on the right toward Hill 380, which consisted of a series of ridges. As the 3d Battalion advanced toward the hill, it came under machine gun fire on each flank. With artillery support, the troops reached the top of the second ridge of Hill 380 and dug in, nine of the men having been wounded. At 1635 the battalions of the 184th Infantry received orders to set up night defense positions in depth and to hold the "positions at all costs." Colonel O'Sullivan decided that the 3d Battalion was to bear the brunt of the advance of the 184th Infantry on 6 December and push on to Hill 380. On the right of the 184th the 17th Infantry had had a busy day in working toward its objective, Hill 918. At 0800 on 5 December the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 17th Infantry, with the 1st Battalion on the left, had moved through the 32d Infantry. At 0906 the advance elements of the 1st Battalion secured a ridge south of the main ridge leading from Hill 918, and at 1000 the entire battalion closed on this ridge. In the face of sporadic rifle and machine gun fire, the leading platoons pushed forward to secure a ridge that led west from Hill 918. As the advance platoons neared the crest of this ridge, they received intense rifle, machine gun, and mortar fire to the front and on both flanks from the 2d Battalion, 12th Independent Infantry Regiment. At the same time the rest of the battalion, in attempting to reach a forward ridge and support the leading platoons, also encountered cross fire that came down the intervening draw. As enemy gunfire pinned down the troops, the 1st Battalion lost contact with Company G, 2d Battalion, and a gap developed between the 1st and 2d Battalions. At the end of 5 December the 17th Infantry had secured the ridge west of Hill 918 and the 184th Infantry had secured a line extending from the beach 300 yards south of Balogo east to the high ground southeast of the Palanas River. Company K, 32d Infantry, had filled a gap that had existed between the 17th and 184th Infantry Regiments, while the 3d Battalion, 184th Infantry, had crossed the Palanas River and, advancing up the southwest slope of Hill 380, reached the top of the first ridge. The next day the 2d Battalion had driven forward with Company E on the right and Company G on the left. Company E went east along the Bucan River for approximately 1,000 yards and then turned northeast to ascend Hill 918. At first, however, the company had to secure a small ridge southwest of Hill 918 on which was a small but dense banana grove. Company E encountered and destroyed a small enemy force on this ridge, after which the company reorganized and at approximately 1300 began to ascend Hill 918 itself. When Company E reached the military crest of the hill, the Japanese began heavy firing with grenade launchers and at least three machine guns. The enemy fire swept the crest of the hill and prevented any movement over the lip of the ridge. Meanwhile, Company G went to the left of Company E and secured a small ridge about 1,200 yards from the line of departure and west of Hill 918. The advance platoon of Company G then received fire from automatic weapons that were emplaced in a draw to the left front of the platoon. The rest of the company attempted to move around to the right of the ridge but also encountered automatic weapons fire coming from another draw. Since high cogon grass covered the area, observation was limited to a matter of inches. At about 1300, elements of the 13th Independent Infantry Regiment counterattacked through a gap between Company G and Company A of the 1st Battalion. A machine gun platoon, which was thrown in to plug the gap, succeeded in stopping the attempted Japanese advance. Company G, however, continued to be pinned down by the enemy fire directed at its front. Company F, the reserve company, was then committed to take a position between G and E Companies. Its mission was to come abreast of Company E, take Hill 918, and then turn west and wipe out the resistance in front of Company G. At 1415 Company F moved up Hill 918 and reached Company E without opposition. Three spurs led down from Hill 918. The one occupied by Company E ran southwest, that occupied by Company F ran west, and the third ran northwest. As the two commanders started to launch a coordinated assault from their respective spurs, their companies received a concentration of about fifty rounds of mortar fire but pushed through this fire and secured the crests of both spurs. They immediately came under automatic weapons and rifle fire from the northwest ridge. Since the left flank of Company F was in the tall cogon grass, it was practically impossible for the company to observe the enemy. On the other hand, Company E was on bare and open ground which exposed it to machine gun and mortar fire from Hill 918. Both companies also came under long-range machine gun fire from the vicinity of Kang Dagit, northeast of Hill 918. It was impractical to attempt an envelopment to the right, since the flank of Company E rested on a deep ravine which ran to the bed of the Bagan River. An envelopment to the left would have necessitated going down the hill, circling behind Company G, and attacking east from the positions of the 1st Battalion. Because of these unfavorable conditions, Companies E and F with their wounded withdrew to make a line with Company G. Meanwhile, the Japanese continued their preparations for Operation Wa, which was already set to fail from the outset. General Makino's 16th Division could only advance a composite battalion of 500 men, which incurred 200 casualties en route. Additionally, General Yamagata's 26th Division was still mobilizing to reach the assembly area, with only one forward battalion prepared for action. Consequently, feeling inadequately prepared, General Suzuki requested a delay in the attack, and General Yamashita effectively rescheduled it to the night of December 6. From his new headquarters in Lubi, Suzuki communicated this update to the 16th and 26th Divisions, but due to radio issues, Makino was never informed. Meanwhile, General Bruce's 77th Division was organizing a risky amphibious invasion of Ormoc. As per General Hodge's strategy, Rear-Admiral Arthur Struble's Task Group 78.3, consisting of around a dozen destroyers, was assigned the task of transporting and landing the 77th Division, along with its supplies and equipment, at the barrio of Desposito located southeast of Ormoc. Upon landing, Bruce's forces were to advance northward, capture Ormoc, and then proceed up the Ormoc corridor to connect with units from General Sibert's 10th Corps. To facilitate this operation, the 5th Air Force would provide continuous air support—both day and night—for the assault convoy en route to the target, during the landings, and for the return trip. In addition, General Gill's 32nd Division was set to initiate an offensive southward along Highway 2 towards Ormoc while the 7th Division pressed northward to seize the elevated terrain south of the Panilahan River. Consequently, on December 5, the 127th Regiment commenced its advance past Colonel Hettinger's 3rd Battalion, facing staunch resistance from General Kataoka's 1st Division, which was well-entrenched on the high ground 1,000 yards south of the Leyte River bridge. The well-camouflaged enemy defenses consisted of numerous foxholes and ten-foot-deep spider holes, many of which were connected by interlacing communication trenches. The terrain that the troops traversed was adapted to defensive fighting, and the 1st Division took full advantage of this fact. There were deep ravines and steep hills where the enemy had dug in on both the forward and reverse slopes. The entire area was covered by heavy rain forest with dense underbrush. The nearly constant rainfall made observation difficult and the maps for the area were very inaccurate. The 77th Division continued to assemble its troops on Tarragona Beach, on the east coast of Leyte, and during the night of December 5 the loading of supplies and equipment on the landing ships began. The loading was slowed by frequent air alerts. The division had previously been told that the convoy would be unable to stay in the landing area more than two hours and consequently there was no attempt to bulk load supplies, since they would take too long to unload. All supplies and equipment to support the initial assault had to be mobile-loaded, that is, loaded on the vehicles taken with the division so that the supplies could be brought ashore in the vehicles upon debarkation. There were only 289 vehicles in the initial convoy, including tanks, M8s, and M10s that could not carry supplies. The LVTs were filled with supplies rather than troops in order that they could be discharged from the landing ships into the water and go ashore fully loaded. Furthermore, since the supplies were mobile they could be moved either by water or inland by motor. The 77th Division gave the highest priority to ammunition, water, and rations. Makino also initiated his segment of the Wa offensive, with around 150 Japanese troops stealthily advancing towards the Buri airstrip. At that time, Major-General Joseph Swing's 11th Airborne Division was tasked with securing the Burauen area, although most of the division was engaged in combat for the mountain passes leading to Albuera. Additionally, Major-General Henry Jones' 38th Division had been deployed at Leyte to prepare for future operations but could also reinforce Swing, along with portions of General Bradley's 96th Division, if needed. At 06:00 on December 6, the 287th Field Artillery Observation Battalion, located northwest of Burauen, spotted Makino's troops crossing the main road south of their position and moving east toward the Buri field. While the artillery team communicated this information to the 24th Corps, the Japanese forces advanced into the swamp near the airfield prior to initiating their assault. At 06:30 the 16th Division launched its surprise attack. Led by a Filipino, the Japanese broke into the American bivouac area while the men were still asleep. Some were bayoneted while in their blankets, or before they could seize their weapons. Others held the Japanese off until they could retreat, shoeless and in their shorts and undershirts, either up the bluff to the headquarters of the 5th Bomber Command, or to the road, where an infantry company had come up in support. The service troops were "firing at everything that moves and… probably inflicting casualties among our troops." Swift promptly responded by deploying the 1st Battalion of the 187th Glider Regiment to counterattack toward Buri, while Hodge assigned the 1st Battalion of the 382nd Regiment to Swift's command. The battalion was to proceed immediately to the aid of the two companies of the 11th Airborne Division in the Buri airfield area. General Hodge emphasized that the area was "critical" and "must be kept closed." It would be "dangerous" to let the enemy "get into the service troops along the road and around airfields." One reinforced company of the 1st Battalion was already in the area and the rest of the battalion made ready to follow. This reinforcement allowed one bolstered company to quickly support the service troops, effectively holding back the enemy while the glider units took position near the airfield. When the Americans launched a coordinated counteroffensive, they succeeded in driving the Japanese from the Buri airfield by nightfall, though some resistance remained at the edges of the airstrip. Meanwhile, Arnold maintained his offensive, with the 184th Regiment advancing through Hill 380 to secure Balogo, while the 17th Regiment captured the abandoned enemy positions on Hill 918 and moved up Hill 380 to join the 184th. By midday, the loading of the 77th Division was complete, and the convoy gathered off Dulag to await the arrival of Struble's escorting destroyers. At 13:30, Struble's main convoy set sail, having been preceded by four slower LSTs under the protection of two destroyers. While American transports and destroyers navigated silently toward Ormoc Bay, General Tominaga activated the airborne segment of Operation Wa. He planned to deploy an initial wave of 40 Mitsubishi Ki-57 transports, carrying 409 paratroopers, primarily targeting the Buri, San Pablo, and Bayug airstrips to capture them. In a related secondary attack, two pairs of transports would drop smaller groups of paratroopers over the Dulag and Tacloban airstrips to destroy as many American aircraft and facilities as possible. The transports would have Ki-43 fighters as escorts, and 21 medium bombers were dispatched to bomb and strafe the Buri, San Pablo, and Bayug airstrips shortly before the paratroopers' descent. Two additional waves were scheduled, the first five hours after the initial assault, comprising 270 troops in 21 aircraft, followed by a third wave of 80 soldiers six hours later. These follow-up operations were intended to assist in eliminating any remaining resistance, after which a defense would be established at the captured airfield. The primary goal of this operation was to incapacitate the enemy airstrips to ensure the safe arrival of the last TA convoys with critical reinforcements to Leyte. The attack was synchronized with Admiral Okawachi's eighth convoy, which included three destroyers, two subchasers, and five transport ships carrying Major-General Kurisu Takeo's 68th Brigade, having departed from Manila on December 5 and expected to reach Albuera two days later. After taking off at 15:30, Tominaga's first echelon headed towards the Burauen area. Just before dark, thirty-nine Japanese transports with supporting bombers and fighters roared over the Burauen airfields. Several incendiary bombs fell on the San Pablo strip, setting a gasoline dump afire and burning a liaison plane. Despite American fighters destroying 18 planes, they managed to deploy over 300 paratroopers by 19:00 following preparatory bombing and the deployment of a smoke screen. However, the intense anti-aircraft fire caused some confusion, leading pilots to drop soldiers at incorrect locations. Still, approximately 60 paratroopers descended on Buri, while more than 250 landed at San Pablo. Meanwhile the secondary attacks on the Dulag and Tacloban strips completely miscarried. Two transports flew over the former installation; one dropped about five paratroopers and then crashed, while the other crashed about 4,500 yards northeast of the field. Over Tacloban two medium bombers converted to transports lowered their flaps and wheels preparatory to landing, but one was shot down, and the other crashed. Nonetheless, upon landing, the paratroopers quickly advanced along both the north and south sides of the San Pablo strip. They talked in loud tones and allegedly called out in English, "Hello--where are your machine guns?" Most of the enemy forces assembled on the north side of the airstrip. They burned three or four more liaison planes, a jeep, several tents, and another gasoline dump, throwing ammunition on the latter. Fortunately for the Americans, inclement weather combined with significant Japanese transport losses prevented the subsequent waves of reinforcements from being dispatched. On the night of 6-7 December, the Air Corps service personnel had abruptly quitted the Buri airfield, leaving behind carbines, rifles, grenades, small arms ammunition, and machine guns. 2d Lt. Rudolph Mamula of the 767th Tank Battalion had been ordered to take charge of the situation, co-ordinate the action of forces on the airstrip, and recover abandoned armament and ammunition. Apparently he was unsuccessful, because later in the day the Japanese made "the best use" of the same arms and ammunition. By the middle of the morning, on 7 December, the enemy had completely occupied the Buri airstrip. In response, Swift quickly ordered the 674th Glider Field Artillery Battalion to abandon their artillery and support the 127th Airborne Engineer Battalion, which was near San Pablo preparing to reclaim the airstrip. General Krueger also reacted swiftly, allocating two battalions from the 148th Regiment to Hodge's command, who dispatched them toward San Pablo. However, before their arrival, Swift's forces had already initiated their counteroffensive at dawn on December 7, successfully driving the paratroopers back to the northwest until they ran out of ammunition. Fortunately, the Japanese chose to retreat towards Buri rather than continue the battle at San Pablo. At 14:00, upon the arrival of the 148th battalions, Swift promptly ordered them to launch an attack towards Buri. The 1st and 2d Battalions of the 149th Infantry, 38th Division, were alerted at 0200 on 7 December for movement to the San Pablo airstrip. The advance elements of the 1st Battalion were greeted at the San Pablo airstrip by General Swing, who is reported to have said: "Glad to see you. I am General Swing of the 11th Airborne Division. We've been having a hell of a time here. Last night approximately seventy-five Jap paratroopers dropped on us of which we have accounted for about fifty. Fifteen hundred yards from here on an azimuth of 273° is another airstrip just like this one. Between here and there are about twenty-five Jap troopers. It is now 1400. I want that strip secure by nightfall." The commanding officer of the 1st Battalion decided to attack with Companies A and C abreast, Company A on the right, with approximately a 200-yard frontage for each company. A section of heavy machine guns was attached to each unit, and a platoon of 81-mm. mortars from Company D was to support the attack from positions on the San Pablo airstrip. The 1st Battalion set out at 14:30, moving the first 400 yards without any issues, but eventually encountered a rain-swollen swamp that impeded their progress, resulting in the companies losing contact with one another. By nightfall, only Companies A and C had reached the airstrip but were unable to initiate their attack due to the late hour. Simultaneously, the 1st Battalion of the 187th Glider Regiment and the 1st Battalion of the 382nd Regiment advanced towards Buri and successfully joined the 1st Battalion of the 149th Regiment at the western end of the airstrip by the end of the day. In the meantime, Arnold continued his limited offensive on December 7, with the 184th Regiment facing little resistance as it ascended the high ground overlooking the Tabgas River. At dawn the 17th Infantry sent out patrols. The one from the 1st Battalion located an enemy heavy machine gun, two light machine guns, and a mortar, emplaced 150 yards from the battalion's lines. When the patrol returned, mortar fire was placed on the position and it was wiped out. The 1st Battalion moved out at approximately 0900. Though long-range fire fell on the troops and small arms fire hit the left flank of Company C, the men continued to push forward. The battalion found several ridges leading up Hill 380--a knifelike ridge in front of Company C and a double ridge in the form of a horseshoe, with its closed end toward the hill, in front of Company B. Company B moved across the double ridge while Company C forced its passage through machine gun and rifle fire across the closed part of the horseshoe. At 1600 the two companies re-established contact on the northernmost ridge leading to Hill 380. At 1630 the Japanese with machine guns launched a counterattack against the right flank of the 3d Battalion, 184th Infantry, and the left flank of the 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry. The 3d Battalion, 184th, was pinned down but did not yield any ground. The troops on the front lines of the 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry, at first were forced back slightly but in a few minutes regained the lost ground. They dug in for the night on the crest of the ridge. After its dawn patrols had reported on 7 December, the 2d Battalion, 17th Infantry, jumped off to the attack. Company E secured the first of the three spurs leading from Hill 380, and continued forward to the middle spur in the face of light fire that came from in front of the company in the area the 17th Infantry wished to secure. Presently the fire grew to considerable intensity and the company's section of light machine guns and two platoons of heavy machine guns moved onto the middle spur, where they neutralized the enemy position. While this action was going on, Companies G and F moved to the first spur. Company G received orders from the battalion commander to make a wide envelopment of Hill 380 and then assault the hill from the east. At 0930 the company dropped below the military crest of the southern slope of Hill 380 unobserved and made its way very slowly over the steep terrain and through the thick cogon grass. At 1200 the 49th Field Artillery Battalion laid a five-minute preparatory fire in front of the battalion. The American troops then routed the surprised Japanese defenders and killed the majority of them as the others fled into the mountains northeast of the hill. Apparently realizing that Hill 380 was the key to defense of the Tabgas River valley and Hill 606, troops of the 26th Division poured long-range machine gun fire from Hill 606 into Company G and at the same time halted the company with small arms fire from the immediate left along the ridge. At 1355, after a heavy mortar barrage, about fifty men from the 26th Division counterattacked the positions of Company G, but the company held firm and mowed down the attackers with fire from its rifles and automatic weapons. The position on the hill was maintained. Although Company G occupied the top of Hill 380, it was not in a position to aid the advance of Company E. The Japanese troops were dug in on the reverse slopes and could only be rooted out by close-in fighting. The commanding officer of the 2d Battalion committed Company F down the main spur from the east, supported by Companies E and G and the machine guns from Company H. As soon as Company F started down the ridge, the enemy concentrated fire upon it both from the north and the west. In a matter of minutes Company F was reduced to a point where the number of its riflemen hardly equaled one platoon. The company commander secured an additional platoon from Company G and renewed the assault behind a concentration of 100 rounds of 60-mm. mortar fire and 80 rounds of 81-mm. mortar fire. The attack succeeded, and the enemy force was overrun and annihilated. Company E thereupon moved to the main ridge and helped mop up the area. At 0700 the 3d Battalion, 17th Infantry, moved out, reaching the source of the Palanas River at 1400. An enemy force of about fifty men was observed in a natural bowl to its immediate front. The battalion placed long-range rifle and machine gun fire on the group as two platoons from Company K attacked from the flank. They destroyed the entire Japanese force without any casualties to the American troops. The 3d Battalion then crossed the Palanas River and went into night perimeter at Kang Cainto. At 1907 eight rounds of artillery fire fell into the area, killing seven men and wounding eighteen others. At the end of the day the 184th Infantry was on the banks of the Tabgas River and the 17th Infantry had secured Hill 380, which commanded the Tabgas River valley. Arnold's offensive had become so precarious that Yamagata was forced to halt his division's advance towards Burauen and instead redirect them to defend Albuera, only sending his advance battalion to participate in the Wa offensive. The situation was about to worsen for Yamagata as Struble's convoy finally arrived off Deposito just before dawn. At 06:34, an enemy shore battery opened fire, and at 06:40, the destroyers responded by targeting their assigned locations. As the Japanese communicated this information to higher command, Okawachi received orders to land the 68th Brigade at San Isidro. Additionally, the 1st Combined Base Air Force and the 4th Air Army were directed to unleash all their resources against the landing forces. With Suzuki absent, Major-General Tomochika Yoshiharu took charge of the defense of Ormoc, promptly instructing the Mitsui Shipping Unit to secure defensive positions on Red Roof Hill. Meanwhile, the Imahori Detachment was ordered to advance south through Ormoc to confront the enemy. Elements of the 77th Regiment, which had just arrived by barge at Ipil, were also tasked with reinforcing the defense of Ormoc. Furthermore, Suzuki commanded the 16th and 26th Divisions to halt the Wa offensive and retreat immediately towards Ormoc. In Manila, Okawachi and Yamashita were preparing to send two provisional companies from the 58th Independent Mixed Brigade to garrison the Camotes Islands to counter the arrival of enemy reinforcements and suppress guerrilla activity in the region. Meanwhile, after Okawachi's latest convoy was detected, 57 P-47s were dispatched to strike the Japanese vessels while the 68th Brigade was being disembarked. In one of the fiercest aerial battles of the Leyte Campaign, the fighters strafed the vessels and dropped 94 1000-pound and six 500-pound bombs on enemy shipping, successfully destroying all five transports and damaging two destroyers. However, the 68th Brigade landed, albeit lacking most of its equipment, supplies, and heavy weaponry. Back at Ormoc Bay, General Bruce's first wave, composed of the leading battalions from the 305th and 307th Regiments, successfully landed on the White Beaches without encountering opposition at 07:07, and the troops quickly moved inland. The subsequent four waves of troops, including two battalions from the 306th Regiment, came ashore without incident. At 08:20, around 138 Japanese aircraft launched an assault on Struble's convoy. Despite the 5th Air Force executing a commendable interception of the attackers, some determined enemy planes managed to breach the anti-aircraft defenses and strike the American ships. On the morning of December 7, three years to the day after she fired the opening shot of the Pearl Harbor attack, the destroyer Ward came under attack by several Japanese kamikazes while patrolling off the invasion area. One bomber hit her hull amidships, bringing her to a dead stop. When the resulting fires could not be controlled, Ward's crew was ordered to abandon ship, and she was sunk by gunfire from O'Brien, whose commanding officer, William W. Outerbridge, had been in command of Ward during her action in Hawaii three years before. Nevertheless, their attempt to thwart this crucial invasion once again ended in failure. By 11:00, approximately 10,000 troops and most of the supplies had been landed, but under relentless air attack, Struble ultimately decided to withdraw and return to San Pedro Bay. Meanwhile, Bruce's forces were expanding their initial beachhead inland, with the 305th Regiment capturing crossings over the Bagonbon River and the 307th Regiment securing a bridge over the Baod River. Due to a lack of organized resistance, Bruce chose to continue advancing north along the highway to extend the division's foothold to Ipil. Consequently, the 307th began its northward advance around 10:45, gradually facing stiffer opposition as it approached its goal. By 14:55, they reached the outskirts of Ipil and commenced an assault on the defenses of two companies from the 77th Regiment, successfully killing 66 Japanese soldiers as they cleared the barrio and established a night perimeter on the northern edge by 17:40. With Bruce's forces having secured a two-mile beachhead, Yamagata's 26th Division found itself caught between two robust American divisions, leaving the route to Ormoc largely open for the 77th Division. On December 8, as the first two companies of the 12th Independent Regiment arrived to bolster the Mitsui Shipping Unit, the 307th Regiment resumed its advance northward, swiftly reaching the Panalian River where they began meeting stronger resistance. Successfully repelling enemy counterattacks, the 307th continued to push forward and achieved a total gain of 2,000 yards by day's end. At the same time, since half of the 2nd Raiding Brigade could not be airdropped during the now-halted Wa offensive, the Japanese decided to land them at the Valencia airstrip over the coming days to reinforce the defenders in Ormoc. Furthermore, Okawachi and Yamashita designated the Takahashi Detachment, organized around the 5th Regiment, as an emergency reinforcement to depart for Leyte immediately alongside the Ito Naval Landing Unit of SNLF Marines. Additionally, the 39th Regiment of the 10th Division was assigned to prepare for a counter-landing in the Carigara Bay region. Meanwhile, as the 26th Division began to withdraw along the coast to retreat through the ridges towards Ormoc, the 184th and 17th Regiments captured the Hill 606 positions and moved forward to the Sibugay River. During the night of 7-8 December, the Japanese brought forward two machine guns and emplaced them directly in front of Company A of the 1st Battalion, 382d Infantry. At dawn the machine guns opened up. Their low, grazing fire pinned down the company, but Pfc. Warren G. Perkins, in the face of enemy bullets, located the guns and called mortar fire upon the site. The mortar concentration, falling within fifty yards of Perkins, silenced the machine guns and startled the Japanese. Pvt. Ova A. Kelley took advantage of the confusion and charged with his M1 rifle and a carbine. Kelley killed eight of the enemy before he himself was slain. The rest of Company A followed Kelley and secured the edge of the airstrip where it set up a perimeter. During 8 December the Americans consolidated their positions. The following day, the 1st Battalion of the 149th Regiment launched an assault to the north, successfully crossing the airstrip and eliminating approximately 50 paratroopers before being halted by enemy fire. By nightfall, the 1st Battalion of the 382nd Regiment repelled another determined counterattack, killing an additional 50 Japanese soldiers and leaving around 100 paratroopers trapped on the airstrip. Concurrently, the 17th and 184th Regiments advanced through Albuera without opposition, continuing their movement through challenging terrain towards Gungab. In the early hours of December 9, Struble's initial resupply convoy reached Deposito, delivering the remainder of the 306th Regiment. As a result, its 1st Battalion was assigned to the 307th Regiment and promptly engaged in the northward attack. Progressing gradually through the formidable enemy ridge defenses, the 307th ultimately captured Camp Downes, while the 305th Regiment secured the northeastern area. During this advance, the rest of the 77th Regiment also arrived by barge at Palompon, where they were immediately deployed to bolster the defenders in Ormoc. Ormoc, the largest and most important commercial center in western Leyte, possessed a concrete and pile pier at which a vessel with a sixteen-foot draft, and two smaller vessels, could anchor at the same time. On the route to Ormoc and in the town itself, the Japanese dug strong defensive positions. The favored sites were in bamboo thickets, on reverse slopes, along creek beds, and under buildings. Individual spider holes about six feet deep were covered with logs and earth and "beautifully camouflaged." Against such positions, artillery and mortar fire did little more than daze the defenders. Each position had to be searched out and destroyed. The next day, for the final assault on Ormoc, Bruce planned to deploy the 307th Regiment to attack along the highway, while the 306th Regiment would move northeast to encircle the opposing enemy forces. After a significant artillery barrage, Bruce first dispatched Company A of the 776th Amphibian Tank Battalion, supported by the rocket fire from LCMs and LCVs, to launch an assault on the city's strong enemy defenses. Following this, the 306th and 307th Regiments advanced, with the latter encountering minimal resistance until approaching the outskirts of Ormoc. Despite facing fierce opposition, the Mitsui Unit was effectively driven back, allowing the 307th to enter the city while the 306th advanced northeast with little resistance. The two regiments then pressured the enemy like squeezing a tube of toothpaste, ultimately forcing the determined defenders to retreat to the hills north of Ormoc, where the Imahori Detachment was gathering. However, some defenders remained behind, valiantly fighting to delay the American advance. Positioned in spider holes beneath the buildings, they resisted until overwhelmed. At the same time that the 77th Division was entering Ormoc, the 32nd Division was pushing southward toward Ormoc Valley, the 11th Airborne Division was working westward over the mountains toward the town, and the 7th Division was pushing northward along the eastern coast of Ormoc Bay in an attempt to make a juncture with the 77th Division. General Bruce advised General Hodge: "Have rolled two sevens in Ormoc. Come seven come eleven." As his troops were reducing Ormoc, General Bruce also made a report on the status of the attack and referred to a promise that had been made by the commanding general of the 5th Air Force: "Where is the case of Scotch that was promised by General Whitehead for the capture of Ormoc. I don't drink but I have an assistant division commander and regimental commanders who do…" In its advance to the north, the 77th Division reportedly killed around 1,506 Japanese soldiers and captured 7 prisoners, at a cost of 123 men killed, 329 wounded, and 13 missing. The capture of Ormoc had significant consequences: it split the Japanese forces and isolated the remaining elements of the 26th Division; it diverted and eliminated previously uncommitted enemy reserves, easing the pressure on other fronts; it expedited the connection between the 10th Corps and the 24th Corps; and it prevented the Japanese from using Ormoc as a port, through which many reinforcements and supplies had been funneled into the campaign. Consequently, the Japanese had faced a clear defeat on Leyte Island; nevertheless, they were determined to continue fighting to the death, senselessly sending more troops into battle, which unnecessarily extended the campaign by several additional months. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Japanese forces prepared Operation Wa while U.S. troops engaged in intense battles for strategic positions like Hill 918 and Balogo amid challenging terrain and strong defenses. Despite initial setbacks, American forces regrouped, successfully counterattacking Japanese positions and securing strategic areas, while Japanese reinforcements struggled amid heavy losses and unfavorable weather conditions.
Last time we spoke about the advance to Ormoc Valley. As October 1944 unfolded in the Leyte campaign, American forces steadily pushed Japanese troops inland. Despite fierce resistance, they captured key positions, like Dagami, Catmon Hill, and multiple airstrips. While the Japanese reinforced areas like Ormoc, American regiments advanced through challenging conditions, relying on artillery amid minimal air support due to weather and resource constraints. By month's end, American forces had inflicted heavy casualties on the Japanese, securing vital beachheads and pushing closer to full control of Leyte. After suffering losses at Leyte Gulf, the 7th Fleet withdrew, leaving Kenney's P-38s to defend Tacloban airfields amid Japanese air raids. As kamikaze attacks grew, USS Franklin sustained heavy casualties, while the Americans pressed forward, capturing Carigara on Leyte. Meanwhile, Australian forces began reclaiming New Britain, pushing Japanese forces back through guerilla warfare. Facing tough jungle conditions, Australian and native troops gradually secured strategic positions by December, reinforcing the Allied grip in the Pacific. This episode is the Battle of Ormoc Bay Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. As we have seen over the past few weeks, the Battle of Leyte Gulf saw Generals MacArthur's forces land and successfully defeat the 16th Division of Leyte Island as well as seized Carigara and Pinamopoan over the northern coast. The 24th Division also engaged the enemy's reinforcements, centred around the elite 1st Division during the battle for the northern entrance into the Ormoc Valley. Meanwhile Admiral Okawachi and General Yamashita aimed to bring more reinforcements to Leyte which would lead to another air-naval battle. The previous week, Colonel Verbeck's 21st Regiment was engaged in a mission to capture Breakneck Ridge, fiercely defended by Colonel Miyauchi's 57th Regiment. Simultaneously, General Kataoka mobilized his remaining two regiments to initiate a broad, four-pronged assault on the Pinamopoan perimeter. However, the rugged terrain slowed their movement toward assembly areas. On the morning of November 8 a typhoon, moving in from the west, swept over the entire island of Leyte. Jan Valtin, a member of the 24th Division, graphically describes it: "From the angry immensity of the heavens floods raced in almost horizontal sheets. Palms bent low under the storm, their fronds flattened like streamers of wet silk. Trees crashed to earth. In the expanse of… [cogon] grass the howling of the wind was like a thousand-fold plaint of the unburied dead. The trickle of supplies was at a standstill. On Carigara Bay the obscured headlands moaned under the onslaught of the… seas. Planes were grounded and ships became haunted things looking for refuge. Massed artillery… barrages to the summit of Breakneck Ridge sounded dim and hollow in the tempest. Trails were obliterated by the rain. The sky was black." In the midst of the storm, the 21st's infantry attacked. As the typhoon swept across the island, Verbeck's forces launched a three-pronged assault on Breakneck Ridge and Hill 1525, facing staunch resistance from Miyauchi's defenders but making considerable progress toward Hill 1525. Notably, plans for General Suzuki's offensive were found on a deceased Japanese officer, enabling General Krueger to redeploy his forces effectively. On 10 November General Mudge sent elements of the 1st Cavalry Division to patrol the area of the mountains of central Leyte extensively. From 5 November through 2 December, elements of the 1st Cavalry Division extensively patrolled the central mountain area and had many encounters with small forces of the enemy. At all times the supply situation was precarious. The 12th Cavalry established high in the foothills, at the entrance to the passes through the mountains, a supply base that was also a native camp, a hospital, and a rest camp. About 300 Filipino carriers were kept here under the protection of the guerrillas. The carriers had been hired for six days at a time and were not allowed to leave without a pass from their Filipino leader. This precaution was necessary, since the ration-carrying assignment was extremely arduous. The cavalrymen would frequently skirmish with the 41st Regiment and the 169th and 171st Independent Battalions during this period. Brigadier-General Julian Cunningham's 112th Cavalry Regiment, expected by November 14, was tasked with relieving General Mudge's 1st Cavalry Division in the Carigara-Barugo area to enable a southwest advance from the central mountains and ease pressure on General Irving's 24th Division. General Bradley's 96th Division was directed to capture the high ground between Jaro and Dagami, with the 382nd Regiment remaining at Dagami to inflict significant losses on the 16th Division while securing Bloody Ridge. By November 4, the 382nd Regiment had made some progress into Bloody Ridge. The night of 4-5 November was not quiet. The Japanese delivered harassing fire on the 1st Battalion, and at 2205 elements of the 16th Division launched a heavy assault against the perimeter of the 2d Battalion. An artillery concentration immediately stopped the attack, and the Japanese fled, leaving 254 dead and wounded behind them. The following morning, after the artillery had fired a preparation in front of the 1st and 2d Battalions, the two battalions renewed the attack at 0900 and two companies from the 3d Battalion protected the regimental left (south) flank. The battalions advanced about 1,000 yards before they encountered any strong resistance. The defenses of the 16th Division consisted of a great many concrete emplacements, concealed spider holes, and connecting trenches. By nightfall, at 1700, the two battalions, assisted by the tanks from Company A, 763d Tank Battalion, successfully reduced the enemy to their front and captured the ridge. Each battalion formed its own perimeter and made plans to renew the attack on 6 November. At 0830 the 1st Battalion, with light tanks in support, moved out in the attack westward against a strong enemy force that was well entrenched in foxholes and pillboxes. Each of these defensive positions had to be reduced before the advance could continue. At 1300 the 2d Battalion moved to the high ground on the right flank of the 1st. The 1st Battalion encountered a strong concrete enemy pillbox which was believed to be a command post, since there were no firing apertures. As grenades had no effect it became necessary finally to neutralize the pillbox by pouring gasoline down the ventilation pipes and setting it afire. Two officers and nineteen enlisted men of the enemy were killed in the pillbox. The Japanese continued to fight tenaciously. There was no withdrawal, but by the end of the day only isolated pockets of enemy resistance remained. The Japanese 16th Division was taking a bad beating. Its supply of provisions had run out. All the battalion commanders, most of the company commanders, and half the artillery battalion and battery commanders had been killed. On the night of 6 November the 16th Division contracted its battle lines and on the following day took up a new position in the Dagami area. The new position ranged from a hill about four and a half miles northwest of Dagami to a point about three and three-fourths miles northwest of Burauen. On 7 November all three battalions of the 382d Infantry engaged the enemy and maintained constant pressure against his positions. The 1st and 3d Battalions advanced west, while the 2d Battalion drove north and west. The 3d Battalion encountered -the more determined resistance. Advancing, preceded by tanks, it met heavy enemy machine gun and rifle fire. A large enemy force assaulted the troops at close quarters and tried to destroy the tanks, but when the 382d Infantry introduced flamethrowers and supporting machine guns, the attackers fell back in disorder. The regiment overran the Japanese defensive positions and killed an estimated 474 of the enemy. Company E of the 2d Battalion had remained in the Patok area, engaged in patrolling and wiping out isolated pockets of enemy resistance. On 8 November strong patrols from the 1st and 2d Battalions probed west into the hills. They encountered the left flank of the enemy supporting position at a point about 2,600 yards west of Patok. A very heavy rainfall on the night of 8-9 November made an assault against the position impossible on 9 November. After all-night artillery fire, the 1st and 3d Battalions moved out at 0900 on 10 November. They met no resistance, but progress was slow because of the swamps. By 1225 the two battalions, supported by a platoon of light tanks, occupied the ridge formerly held by elements of the 16th Division. The 1st Battalion had advanced 2,500 yards. The 382d Infantry had destroyed all organized enemy resistance in its sector and removed the threat to Dagami. Meanwhile, General Arnold's 7th Division stationed at the Burauen-Abuyog area began sending patrols from Baybay toward Ormoc to prepare for a larger advance, while the 2nd Battalion, 32nd Regiment moved to Baybay, successfully ambushing the Japanese unit advancing to Abuyog. Concurrently, Okawachi sent his fourth convoy from Manila, consisting of three transports, four frigates, and six destroyers under Admiral Kimura. This convoy carried the bulk of General Yamagata's 26th Division and approximately 3,500 tons of supplies, followed by another echelon of three transports with the remainder of the 1st Division. The echelon reached Ormoc the next day, unloaded successfully, and departed without issue. However, the main convoy encountered air attacks as it approached Ormoc Bay, beginning its debarkation by nightfall. On 10 November the 38th Bomb Group, based on Morotai, sent 32 B-25 Mitchells escorted by 37 P-47 Thunderbolts to attack TA-4 near Ponson Island. Reaching the convoy just before noon, the B-25s attacked at minimum altitude in pairs, sinking the two largest transports, Takatsu Maru and Kashii Maru, disabling a third, and sinking two of the patrol craft escorts at a cost of seven bombers, for which the group was awarded the Distinguished Unit Citation. Although Yamagata's troops were finally ashore by November 10, most of the supplies couldn't be unloaded due to ongoing enemy air attacks. Shortly after leaving Ormoc, American planes intercepted the convoy, destroying two transports and one frigate, while further damaging another frigate and a destroyer. Meanwhile, Okawachi dispatched a third convoy, consisting of five transports, a submarine chaser, and five destroyers under Rear Admiral Hayakawa Mikio, transporting special troops and heavy equipment of the 26th Division. When one transport ran aground on Luzon's Bondoc Peninsula, Kimura sent two frigates and three destroyers to transfer its cargo to Ormoc. As a result, Hayakawa's convoy arrived at Ormoc Bay on November 11 and began unloading. However, ULTRA intercepts had detected the enemy convoy departing Manila, prompting Admiral Halsey to redeploy Task Force 38 under Admiral McCain. While under repair at Manila on 29 October, Nachi and Kumano were attacked by aircraft from USN Task Force 38. Nachi was hit by a single bomb to her aircraft deck, and this, as well as strafing attacks, killed 53 crewmen and further delayed repairs. On 5 November, again in Manila Bay, Nachi was attacked by three waves of U.S. planes from the aircraft carriers USS Lexington and Ticonderoga. She escaped the first wave undamaged, but was hit by five bombs and two or three torpedoes in the second wave while attempting to get underway. During the third wave, Nachi was hit by five torpedoes in her port side, which severed her bow and stern, and by an additional 20 bombs and 16 rockets. Nachi's flag commander, Vice Admiral Kiyohide Shima, was ashore for a conference at the time of the attack, but arrived at dockside in time to see his flagship blown apart. The central portion of the vessel sank in 102 feet (31 m) of water about 12 nautical miles (22 km) northeast of Corregidor. McCain launched an attack on Kimura's convoy. Just as unloading began, 347 planes struck, sinking all four transports and four destroyers, including the flagship Shimakaze, on which Hayakawa lost his life. This costly reinforcement operation thus ended in partial failure, with most equipment lost and over 1,500 casualties. Nevertheless, elements of the 1st Division moved immediately toward the Limon area, while Yamagata's units, though short on weaponry, were ordered to assemble at Dolores to prepare for joining the Imahori Detachment at Daro. At the same time, noticing the rapid advance of the enemy into the Carigara area, Yamashita concluded that Suzuki's proposed offensive toward Tacloban was destined for failure. He ordered the main force of the 35th Army to join the 16th Division in the advantageous mountainous positions of the Burauen-Dagami area to regain control of the recently captured airstrips, thereby limiting operations in the Carigara area to a holding action. Concurrently, as this adjustment to the tactical plan was made, Yamashita communicated his growing belief that the overall situation offered little hope for victory on Leyte and unsuccessfully tried to persuade General Terauchi to shift the decisive battle to Luzon. As a result of Terauchi's decision, the 68th Brigade was still to be sent to Leyte; the 23rd Division was scheduled to go to Manila in mid-November before returning to Leyte; and the 10th and 19th Divisions were planned for movement to the island by the end of the year. With the plans finalized for continuing the decisive battle on Leyte, Terauchi's headquarters departed Manila for Saigon on November 17. Back on Leyte, on November 9, the weary, mud-stained troops of the 21st Regiment launched another attack, with the 3rd Battalion assaulting the center of Breakneck Ridge and the 2nd Battalion targeting OP Hill, though they made only minor gains. Additionally, Verbeck's 1st Battalion attacked Limon but was repelled by heavy enemy fire, and fresh Japanese troops subsequently counterattacked the Hill 1525 position, forcing the Americans to retreat. Finally, Colonel Chapman's 2nd Battalion reached the western slopes of Hill 1525 in the afternoon, but it was too late for them to take part in the battle. On November 10, Verbeck continued his assault, successfully capturing OP Hill and making significant headway in the area. At the same time, Chapman's 2nd Battalion began advancing westward to establish a roadblock on Highway 2, approximately 2000 yards south of Limon. Meanwhile, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Clifford's 1st Battalion of the 34th Regiment landed on the western shore of Carigara Bay and initiated a wide envelopment around the western flank of the 57th Regiment to secure the high ground known as Kilay Ridge. Additionally, Mudge's cavalrymen pressed forward toward Mount Minoro. On this day, Yamashita's adjustments to the tactical plan finally reached Suzuki's headquarters. As a result, Suzuki abandoned his initial strategy and directed Yamagata to move his troops quickly to Albuera to prepare for an offensive eastward, dubbed Operation Wa. To replace the 26th Division in upcoming operations on the Jaro front, Suzuki decided to deploy the 30th Division, which had not yet departed Mindanao, instructing them to land at Ipil and prepare to support the Imahori Detachment, already skirmishing with Bradley's patrols. On November 11, following a heavy artillery barrage, Verbeck resumed his assault, although the 2nd Battalion quickly found itself pinned down, while the 1st Battalion successfully secured a ridge 300 yards southwest of OP Hill. The next morning, the 1st and 3rd Battalions advanced against the crest of Breakneck Ridge, successfully capturing the objective before being halted by Japanese artillery fire. At the same time, Chapman's 2nd Battalion reached Highway 2, and Clifford's 1st Battalion, supported by elements of the guerrilla 96th Regiment, arrived in the Cabiranan area. By November 13, Verbeck's 1st and 2nd Battalions advanced 600 and 400 yards, respectively, without encountering opposition. Breakneck Ridge was secured, although the Japanese maintained control over several nearby spurs, particularly Corkscrew Ridge. Nonetheless, the 21st Regiment reported approximately 1,779 Japanese soldiers killed, suffering 630 casualties in the process. Additionally, Clifford's 1st Battalion successfully reached Kilay Ridge undetected and quickly established defensive positions. At 0855 on 13 November a column of Filipino men, women, and children entered the perimeter and brought approximately thirty-five boxes of rations from Consuegra. The battalion left the area at 0930 and reached the ridge without opposition. Trenches and prepared gun positions without a man in them honeycombed the ridge from one end to the other. It was evident that elements of the 1st Division had intended to occupy the area in the latter stages of the battle for Limon. On 14 November Colonel Clifford ordered his battalion to entrench itself along the ridge in positions that would afford the best tactical advantage. The battalion established strong points and observation posts on the knolls, placed blocks on the trails leading through the area, and sent out reconnaissance patrols to locate enemy positions. Colonel Clifford made arrangements to utilize the Filipinos as carriers. These men were to use a trail on the north end of the ridge and bring supplies to the battalion from a supply dump at Consuegra. The first human pack train arrived in the area at 1010 with twenty-eight cases of rations and a supply of batteries for the radios. At 1125 enemy artillery shelled the southern end of the ridge and twenty minutes later shifted its fire to the Limon area. The battalion did not succeed in establishing physical contact with the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry, which was operating east of the road, but it was able to make radio contact. Throughout the day, patrols of the battalion were active in searching out enemy positions. Meanwhile the 112th Cavalry was landed at Carigara and attached to the 1st Cavalry Division to strengthen the assault on the central Leyte mountains. Meanwhile, the reserve 32nd Division, led by Major-General William Gill, was also dispatched to the island to relieve the fatigued 24th Division. This newly arrived division was assigned the mission of capturing Limon and advancing down the Ormoc Valley toward Ormoc. On the Japanese side, after receiving the rest of his division, Kataoka chose to move the 1st Regiment to the left flank to assist the 57th, which had also been bolstered by two fresh battalions. This combined force aimed to launch an attack along the main road toward Pinamopoan while the 49th Regiment and the 171st Independent Battalion sought to envelop the enemy's left flank toward Colasian. By mid-November, the headquarters of the 102nd Division and most of the 364th Independent Battalion had also arrived in Ormoc, with Lieutenant-General Fukei Shinpei taking command of the 41st Regiment and his other battalions on the island as they advanced toward Mount Pina. Furthermore, despite significant losses to enemy aircraft, five air regiments had reinforced the 4th Air Army, enabling General Tominaga to make the 4th Air Division fully operational, a unit that had previously focused solely on base activities and anti-submarine patrols. The replenishment of naval air strength was progressing well, with replacement aircraft for the 1st Combined Base Air Force outnumbering losses by 26% in November. On November 15, the Combined Fleet opted to cease training carrier air groups and instead focus on expanding the base air forces. The 3rd Air Fleet, stationed in the homeland, was tasked with training replacement units for deployment to the Philippines. Due to the successful reinforcement of Japanese air forces in the Philippines and General Kenney's ongoing inability to provide close air support, Halsey once again directed Task Force 38 to attack enemy airbases on Luzon. On November 13 and 14, McCain's carriers conducted several strikes against Japanese airfields in Luzon, resulting in a significant decrease in enemy air operations over Leyte. On 13 November 1944, on the threat of American carrier strikes on Luzon, Kiso was ordered to return to Brunei that evening carrying Vice Admiral Kiyohide Shima. Before she could leave for Brunei, she was attacked on 13 November while underway in Manila Bay by more than 350 carrier planes of Task Force 38's carrier task groups 38.1's Hornet, Monterey and Cowpens, TG 38.3's Essex, Ticonderoga and Langley and TG 38.4's Enterprise and San Jacinto. Three bombs hit Kiso to starboard - one in the bow, one near her boiler rooms and one near her aft gun mounts. Kiso sank in shallow water 13 kilometres (7.0 nmi; 8.1 mi) west of Cavite. Captain Ryonosuke Imamura and 103 of her crew survived, but 175 crewmen went down with the ship. Akebono, while alongside destroyer Akishimo at Cavite pier near Manila, was attacked in a USAAF air raid. A direct bomb hit set both ships ablaze, and the following day a large explosion on Akishimo blew a hole in Akebono, which sank upright in shallow water, with 48 crewmen killed and 43 wounded. After returning to Manila, Hatsuharu was caught in an air raid in Manila Bay. A series of near misses buckled plates and set fires, causing the ship to sink in shallow water. The attack killed 12 crewmen and injured 60 more, but 218 survived. Several other vessels were also sunk. Meanwhile, on November 14, the Hi-81 convoy, comprising the escort carriers Shinyo and Akitsu Maru, destroyer Kashi, seaplane tender Kiyokawa Maru, submarine chaser No. 156, seven escort ships, five oilers, and three transports, left Imari Bay under Rear-Admiral Sato Tsutomu. The convoy carried most of Lieutenant-General Nishiyama Fukutaro's 23rd Division and headed into the Yellow Sea, wary of enemy submarines. After stopping for the night in Ukishima Channel near the Gotō Islands, Sato's convoy resumed its journey on November 15 but was soon ambushed by two submarine wolfpacks. Commander Charles Loughlin's submarines were the first to strike, successfully hitting the Akitsu Maru with two torpedoes, which later sank, resulting in the loss of 2,046 lives, including most of the 64th Regiment. After the attack, Sato withdrew to Strange Island, located off the coast of Korea, to take refuge for the day. On the morning of November 17, the convoy resumed its journey but was soon detected by a B-29 Superfortress as it made its way toward the Shushan Islands. By late afternoon, Commander Gordon Underwood's submarines launched an assault on the Japanese ships, successfully striking the transport vessel Mayasan Maru, which sank quickly, resulting in the loss of 3,437 men, including most of the 72nd Regiment. Almost twelve hours later 200 kilometers off Saishu Island, Spadefish surfaced and attacked the Shinyo with six torpedoes. Four struck the carrier on the starboard at 11:03 pm, and it caught fire. At least 1,130 Japanese sailors went down with their ship; only about seventy survived, including Ishii. Kashi immediately dropped several depth charges where the Spadefish was thought to be. An oil slick and other debris eventually made the Japanese believe they had sunk Spadefish so the Kashi broke off the engagement, but Spadefish had escaped apparently without serious damage. Only minor cracks were reported to have appeared on the submarine after the alleged "sinking" by Kashi. Underwood's final strike was against the submarine chaser No. 156, which sustained three torpedo hits and sank rapidly. Following some rescue efforts, Sato continued his advance on November 21, eventually arriving in Kaohsiung five days later. Half of the convoy then proceeded to San Fernando, where the remaining members of the 23rd Division disembarked on December 2. Yet thats it for today for the Philippines as we now need to shift over to Morotai.With Japanese reinforcements pushed back into the interior of the secured island, General Persons directed the 31st Division to capture several islands off New Guinea that served as observation points for Japanese outposts monitoring Allied movements. On November 15, the 2nd Battalion of the 167th Regiment landed on Pegun Island, followed by a successful attack on Bras Island the next day. By November 18, with the Mapia Islands secured, Company F of the 124th Regiment was sent to occupy the unguarded Asia Islands on November 19. In the Aitape region, Major-General Jack Stevens' 6th Australian Division was assigned to relieve American forces, similar to the Australian efforts on New Britain and Bougainville, in order to free up troops for the Philippines Campaign. By late October, a base had been successfully set up, allowing the 19th Brigade to arrive by mid-November, with the 17th Brigade scheduled for early December, and the 16th by year-end. Under General Blamey's orders, the new Australian garrisons were to adopt a more active approach than the American units had, so Stevens planned not only to secure the airfield and radar installations in the Aitape-Tadji area, but also to carry out extensive patrols in support of intelligence and guerrilla operations aimed at weakening the enemy in Wewak. One of General Stevens' tasks was to give maximum help to AIB. and Angau units in the area in their tasks of gaining Intelligence, establishing patrol bases and protecting the native population. These AIB. and Angau units had been active in the Sepik-Aitape triangle since the time of the landing of American forces at Aitape in April 1944, and the 6th Division came into an area where, from the outset, practically all the deep patrolling had been done by groups of Australians. In the Aitape area, prior to the arrival of the Division (said the report of the 6th Division), Angau long-range patrols operated without troop support and, for their own protection, inaugurated a type of guerilla warfare. Selected village natives called "sentries" were taught to use grenades and Japanese rifles. The sentries, besides furnishing Intelligence, accounted for large numbers of enemy. This system was continued. As each area was freed the sentries were rewarded and returned to their villages. By early November, the 2/10th Commando Squadron had established a patrol base at Babiang, conducting numerous patrols throughout the month. Intelligence gathered suggested the Japanese forces were weakened, poorly nourished, and mainly focused on sourcing food. In response, Stevens planned two significant December operations: to sever the enemy's communication line along the Malin-Walum-Womisis-Amam axis and to neutralize enemy positions east of the Danmap River. By November 25, the seasoned 2/7th Commando Squadron had arrived at Babiang, and by month-end, the 19th Brigade took over the area. The commandos then advanced southward, setting up a base at Tong on December 4 and establishing an outpost at Kumbum three days later. Now to finish this week's episode let's explore the B-29 Superfortress operations during this time. After the Formosa Air Battle and the Omura raid on October 25, General LeMay's 20th Bomber Command conducted four missions in November. Three of these supported Southeast Asia operations as part of “PAC-AID,” while the fourth targeted the Omura Aircraft Factory, a key focus for the command. On November 3, 44 B-29s from India effectively bombed the Malegon Railway Yards at Rangoon. Two days later, 53 bombers hit Singapore's King George VI Graving Dock, the largest of several dry docks at Singapore and one of the world's best. The first of 53 Superforts attacking was over target at 0644, and the bombardier, Lt. Frank McKinney, put a I,ooo-pound bomb into the target within 50 feet of the aiming point, the caisson gate; Lt. Bolish McIntyre, 2 planes back, laid another alongside. This was the sort of pickle-barrel bombing the Air Corps had talked about before the war. Strike photos showed a rush of water into the dock, presumptive evidence that the gate had been strained, and subsequent reconnaissance photos indicated that the dock was out of use (A-2's estimate of three months of unserviceability was to prove quite accurate). There were other hits on the dock, on a 465-foot freighter in it, and on adjacent shops. For “baksheesh,” as the boys had learned to say in India, seven B-29's bombed the secondary target, Pangkalanbrandan refinery in Sumatra, and reported direct hits on the cracking plant. The Japanese, evidently relying on the inaccessibility of Singapore, put up a feeble defense, but the long trip took a toll of two planes and twelve crewmen, including Col. Ted L. Faulkner, commander of the 468th Group. On November 11, 96 B-29s launched from China to strike Omura under difficult weather; only 29 reached the aircraft factory unsuccessfully, while 24 more bombed Nanking with limited results. The month's final mission on November 27 saw 55 B-29s severely damage the Bang Soe marshaling yards in Bangkok. Meanwhile, in the Marianas, General Hansell's 21st Bomber Command prepared for strikes on the Japanese Home Islands. In order to properly plan missions to Japan, up-to-date reconnaissance photos of the proposed targets were needed. Other than information which was used during the Doolittle Raid in 1942, there was scant information about the locations of Japanese industry, especially the aircraft industry. On November 1, two days after arriving on Saipan, a 3rd Photographic Reconnaissance Squadron F-13A Superfortress (photo reconnaissance-configured B-29) took off bound for Tokyo. The aircraft flew over Tokyo at 32000 feet for 35 minutes taking picture after picture. A few fighters made it up to the camera plane's altitude but did not attack. These photos, along with other intelligence, gave the 21st Bomber Command the locations of the Japanese aircraft manufacturing plants and enabled mission planners to plan missions for the combat crews to attack. In honor of his mission, the aircraft was named "Tokyo Rose". In response, about ten G4Ms launched from Iwo Jima attacked Isley Field on Saipan the next day, scoring five bomb hits but losing three bombers. Hansell responded with a practice strike on Iwo Jima on November 5, though results were again limited. On November 7, the Japanese launched a follow-up attack, but it again resulted in minimal damage and cost them three bombers. A retaliatory strike by 17 B-29s the next day also fell short: one squadron had to jettison its bombs into the ocean, while another dropped its load through a gap in the undercast. Between Japanese attacks, American aircrew inexperience, delays in constructing airfields in the Marianas, and the slow movement of B-29s to Saipan, the 21st Bomber Command was behind schedule in its planned offensive against Japan. By November 15, only half of the 73rd Bombardment Wing's authorized 180 B-29s had arrived, but by November 22, around 118 bombers were finally in place. At this point, General Arnold ordered Hansell to begin Operation San Antonio I, marking the first strike against Tokyo. The chosen target was Nakajima's Musashi Aircraft Engine Plant, which supplied 27% of Japan's combat aircraft engines. On November 24, 111 B-29s took off for Japan, collectively carrying 277.5 tons of bombs. However, 17 bombers aborted mid-flight, and six others couldn't bomb due to mechanical issues. For the first time, the B-29s encountered the Jet stream, which was a high-speed wind coming out of the west at speeds as high as 200 mph at precisely the altitudes at which the bombers were operating. This caused the bomber formations to be disrupted and made accurate bombing impossible. As a result, only 24 B-29s bombed the Musashi plant, while 64 hit nearby dock and urban areas instead. The Japanese fighter response was less intense than expected, with the Americans claiming to have downed seven fighters, likely destroyed 18 more, and damaged nine, losing just one bomber in return. Another B-29 was lost on the return trip after running out of fuel and ditching. Despite disappointing bombing results in the mission—only 48 bombs struck the factory area, causing damage to just 1% of the building area and 2.4% of the machinery, with 57 killed and 75 injured—the raid exposed the weaknesses in Japan's air defense and showed the six million residents of Tokyo that they were vulnerable to attack. Given the limited impact of the November 24 mission, Hansell decided to launch a second major strike, dubbed San Antonio II, targeting Musashi once more. However, in the early hours of November 27, two G4M bombers from Iwo Jima carried out a low-altitude raid on Isley Field, escaping after destroying one B-29 and damaging eleven others. Later that day, twelve bomb-equipped Mitsubishi A6M "Zero" fighters from the IJN's 252 Kōkūtai (252 Air Group) accompanied by two Nakajima C6N "Myrt" reconnaissance aircraft for navigation purposes departed Iwo Jima for Saipan. The attackers flew just above sea level to avoid US radar, and one of the A6Ms was forced to divert to Pagan after its propeller struck a wave; this aircraft was shot down by a USAAF Thunderbolt while attempting to land. The remaining eleven A6Ms arrived over Saipan at noon, shortly after XXI Bomber Command's second raid on Tokyo had departed. These aircraft strafed Isley Field destroying three or four B-29s and damaging up to two others. One of the Japanese pilots landed his fighter on Isley Field and fired on airfield personnel with his pistol until he was killed by rifle fire; this incident was witnessed by Brigadier General Haywood S. Hansell, the commander of XXI Bomber Command. None of the ten other A6Ms survived; four were shot down by USAAF fighters and six by anti-aircraft guns. The U.S. gunners also downed a USAAF Thunderbolt in circumstances which an official assessment later described as "inexcusable". Of the 81 bombers launched, 19 aborted, and those that reached Tokyo found the target covered by clouds, forcing them to drop bombs by radar over Tokyo's docks, urban areas, and the cities of Hamamatsu, Shizuoka, Numazu, and Osaka. Ultimately, for the loss of one Superfortress, the damage caused by this second strike was minimal. However, the strong Japanese response led Hansell to relocate some B-29s from Isley to safer Guam, strengthen Saipan's defenses and radar, and plan coordinated air-sea operations to neutralize Iwo Jima's staging fields. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Americans pressed through Leyte's treacherous terrain and fierce resistance, aiming to secure strategic positions. Typhoons, enemy reinforcements, and brutal battles tested them harshly, but they advanced steadily. Despite heavy losses and airstrikes from both sides, American forces captured Breakneck Ridge and pushed onward, inching closer to victory.
WHEN THE LEGEND BECOMES FACT, PRINT THE LEGEND. 3/4: Red Sky Morning: The Epic True Story of Texas Ranger Company F, by Joe Pappalardo https://www.amazon.com/Red-Sky-Morning-Ranger-Company/dp/1250275245/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr= Between 1886 and 1888, Sergeant James Brooks, of Texas Ranger Company F, was engaged in three fatal gunfights, endured disfiguring bullet wounds, engaged in countless manhunts, was convicted of second-degree murder, and rattled Washington, D.C., with a request for a pardon from the US president. His story anchors the tale of Joe Pappalardo's Red Sky Morning, an epic saga of lawmen and criminals set in Texas during the waning years of the “Old West.” Alongside Brooks are the Rangers of Company F, who range from a pious teetotaler to a cowboy fleeing retribution for killing a man. They are all led by Captain William Scott, who cut his teeth as a freelance undercover informant but was facing the end of his Ranger career. Company F hunted criminals across Texas and beyond, killing them as needed, and were confident they could bring anyone to “Ranger justice.” But Brooks's men met their match in the Conner family, East Texas master hunters and jailbreakers who were wanted for their part in a bloody family feud. The full story of Company F's showdown with the Conner family is finally being told, with long-dead voices being heard for the first time. This truly hidden history paints the grim picture of neighbors' and relatives' becoming snitches and bounty hunters, and a company of Texas Rangers who waded into the conflict only to find themselves over their heads—and in the fight of their lives. 1895 EL PASO
WHEN THE LEGEND BECOMES FACT, PRINT THE LEGEND. 4/4: Red Sky Morning: The Epic True Story of Texas Ranger Company F, by Joe Pappalardo https://www.amazon.com/Red-Sky-Morning-Ranger-Company/dp/1250275245/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr= Between 1886 and 1888, Sergeant James Brooks, of Texas Ranger Company F, was engaged in three fatal gunfights, endured disfiguring bullet wounds, engaged in countless manhunts, was convicted of second-degree murder, and rattled Washington, D.C., with a request for a pardon from the US president. His story anchors the tale of Joe Pappalardo's Red Sky Morning, an epic saga of lawmen and criminals set in Texas during the waning years of the “Old West.” Alongside Brooks are the Rangers of Company F, who range from a pious teetotaler to a cowboy fleeing retribution for killing a man. They are all led by Captain William Scott, who cut his teeth as a freelance undercover informant but was facing the end of his Ranger career. Company F hunted criminals across Texas and beyond, killing them as needed, and were confident they could bring anyone to “Ranger justice.” But Brooks's men met their match in the Conner family, East Texas master hunters and jailbreakers who were wanted for their part in a bloody family feud. The full story of Company F's showdown with the Conner family is finally being told, with long-dead voices being heard for the first time. This truly hidden history paints the grim picture of neighbors' and relatives' becoming snitches and bounty hunters, and a company of Texas Rangers who waded into the conflict only to find themselves over their heads—and in the fight of their lives. 1896 HOUSTON, TEXAS
WHEN THE LEGEND BECOMES FACT, PRINT THE LEGEND. 2/4: Red Sky Morning: The Epic True Story of Texas Ranger Company F, by Joe Pappalardo https://www.amazon.com/Red-Sky-Morning-Ranger-Company/dp/1250275245/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr= Between 1886 and 1888, Sergeant James Brooks, of Texas Ranger Company F, was engaged in three fatal gunfights, endured disfiguring bullet wounds, engaged in countless manhunts, was convicted of second-degree murder, and rattled Washington, D.C., with a request for a pardon from the US president. His story anchors the tale of Joe Pappalardo's Red Sky Morning, an epic saga of lawmen and criminals set in Texas during the waning years of the “Old West.” Alongside Brooks are the Rangers of Company F, who range from a pious teetotaler to a cowboy fleeing retribution for killing a man. They are all led by Captain William Scott, who cut his teeth as a freelance undercover informant but was facing the end of his Ranger career. Company F hunted criminals across Texas and beyond, killing them as needed, and were confident they could bring anyone to “Ranger justice.” But Brooks's men met their match in the Conner family, East Texas master hunters and jailbreakers who were wanted for their part in a bloody family feud. The full story of Company F's showdown with the Conner family is finally being told, with long-dead voices being heard for the first time. This truly hidden history paints the grim picture of neighbors' and relatives' becoming snitches and bounty hunters, and a company of Texas Rangers who waded into the conflict only to find themselves over their heads—and in the fight of their lives. 1920 COMPANY D TEXAS RANGERS
WHEN THE LEGEND BECOMES FACT, PRINT THE LEGEND. 1/4: Red Sky Morning: The Epic True Story of Texas Ranger Company F, by Joe Pappalardo https://www.amazon.com/Red-Sky-Morning-Ranger-Company/dp/1250275245/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr= Between 1886 and 1888, Sergeant James Brooks, of Texas Ranger Company F, was engaged in three fatal gunfights, endured disfiguring bullet wounds, engaged in countless manhunts, was convicted of second-degree murder, and rattled Washington, D.C., with a request for a pardon from the US president. His story anchors the tale of Joe Pappalardo's Red Sky Morning, an epic saga of lawmen and criminals set in Texas during the waning years of the “Old West.” Alongside Brooks are the Rangers of Company F, who range from a pious teetotaler to a cowboy fleeing retribution for killing a man. They are all led by Captain William Scott, who cut his teeth as a freelance undercover informant but was facing the end of his Ranger career. Company F hunted criminals across Texas and beyond, killing them as needed, and were confident they could bring anyone to “Ranger justice.” But Brooks's men met their match in the Conner family, East Texas master hunters and jailbreakers who were wanted for their part in a bloody family feud. The full story of Company F's showdown with the Conner family is finally being told, with long-dead voices being heard for the first time. This truly hidden history paints the grim picture of neighbors' and relatives' becoming snitches and bounty hunters, and a company of Texas Rangers who waded into the conflict only to find themselves over their heads—and in the fight of their lives. 1904 TEXAS RANGER REVIEW
PREVIEW: TEXAS RANGERS: Conversation with colleague Joe Pappalardo re his book "RED SKY MORNING," re the Texas Rangers, one particular Company F, and a day with the spectacular Belle Starr. More later. 1891 Fort Worth, Texas
Last time we spoke about the ongoing battles of Peleliu, Angular and Operation Ichi-Go. On September 23, Colonel Venable's regiment struggled to breach Lake Salome's defenses, leading to tactical changes and propaganda attempts to force Japanese surrender, which ultimately failed. The American command underestimated Japanese resolve, resulting in heavy bombardments and a strategic advance. By September 26, American forces had divided Peleliu and isolated Japanese defenders, facing fierce resistance but making significant progress. On September 27, 1944, Company F secured two ridges in Peleliu but struggled with Japanese forces entrenched in caves, halting progress. Despite controlling the northern shore, Marines faced persistent underground resistance from skilled Japanese miners. Meanwhile, the 5th Marines captured Hill 3, Ngesebus Island, and Radar Hill. In October, Japanese offensives continued against minimal resistance. This episode is the Japanese Triumph in China Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. In our previous episode, General Mueller's infantry on Angaur had driven Major Goto's isolated forces into the Romauldo Pocket by October 1. After this victory, it was decided to shift away from costly full-scale infantry assaults. Instead, tanks, mortars, and artillery were deployed to target the remaining enemy positions directly. On 6 October artillery and mortars undertook an especially heavy bombardment. From 0700 to 1030, 155-mm. howitzers fired at especially chosen targets, including a suspected Japanese observation post, while 105-mm. howitzers, 4.2-inch mortars, 81-mm. mortars, and 60-mm. mortars laid concentrations on the flanks and rear of the remaining Japanese-held area to prevent any Japanese from escaping. At 1030 the artillery and mortars switched to smoke shells to blanket the Japanese area and at 1035 these weapons ceased fire. Following the bombardment, two companies were dispatched to feint attacks on the Japanese flanks, aiming to force them out of their fortified positions. The defenders, deceived by the ruse, were then subjected to another intense artillery and mortar barrage, which inflicted significant casualties. Additionally, in the afternoon, a major concrete and steel emplacement, likely serving as Goto's command post, was uncovered and destroyed by direct fire. With the enemy defenses considerably weakened, infantry operations resumed, focusing on sniper teams, small patrols, ambushes, and booby traps to encircle the remaining Japanese forces and cut off their supply and escape routes. Over the next few days, the Americans also rescued 183 captive natives during the final stages of their assault. The Japanese had under their control in the final pocket a number of Angaur natives, three of whom had managed to make their way into the 322nd Regiment lines after a surrender broadcast on October 1. These related stories of hardships suffered in caves where the Japanese had kept them closely guarded and also told the 322nd that more natives were being held in the northwest pocket. First attempts by native volunteers to lead some of the others out were unsuccessful; but on October 8,137 more natives made their way out of the pocket to an area where elements of Company B, 306th Engineers, were working. The next day, three native volunteers led 90 more out of the pocket. About 1/5 of the total of 183 natives rescued from the Japanese needed extensive medical attention and all the rest were suffering from malnutrition. The healthier ones rebuilt their own village and some were ultimately used as labor on various projects at Angaur. On October 13, a coordinated attack was launched, with the 1st Battalion advancing from the west and the 2nd Battalion pushing from the north and northeast. Despite fierce resistance, by October 18 the Americans had successfully compressed the remaining Japanese into a pocket approximately 100 yards long and 50 yards wide. The following night, Major Goto was killed, and by October 21, the last pockets of resistance were eliminated. The engagement ended two days later when the Americans realized they had eliminated nearly all the Japanese troops, with only a few stragglers remaining. By the conclusion of the Battle of Angaur, approximately 1,300 Japanese soldiers had been killed, and 45 were captured. The Americans, on the other hand, suffered 264 men killed and 1,355 wounded, primarily from the 322nd Regiment. To be more specific the 321st Infantry's part in the operation had cost that regiment 26 men killed and 135 wounded. The 322d Infantry, which fought longer and against stiffer opposition, lost 211 men killed and 772 wounded. Despite the heavy losses, capturing Angaur proved crucial in securing the Palaus and removing the island group as a threat to Allied lines of communication across the western Pacific toward the Philippines. Airdrome construction on Angaur was begun on 20 September, F plus 3, by the 1884th and 1887th Engineer Aviation Battalions. The first plane, a C-47, landed on the field on F plus 28, 15 October. Four days later two 6,000-foot landing strips were completed and work on taxiways, gasoline storage, and other air-base installations was well along. Air-base construction on Angaur presented difficult problems. There was available no conveniently located Japanese airfield which the Allies could repair, improve, and expand. Instead, the work had to begin at the beginning. Jungle had to be cut away, swamps filled, and rough terrain leveled. There was no hope that an airstrip could be prepared in three or four days as had been the case on many other islands in the Pacific. The completion of two 6,000-foot runways by 19 October, F plus 32, represented a considerable accomplishment. In defending Angaur, the Japanese lost a well-equipped, highly trained, and well-led infantry battalion. While this force might have been more effectively deployed elsewhere in the Palaus, it succeeded in its mission of delaying the American advance. Meanwhile, General Ishii of the 32nd Division decided to reinforce the limited Japanese presence in Morotai to hinder the development of an enemy airbase capable of supporting an assault on the Philippines. Consequently, three temporary raiding detachments from the 10th Expeditionary Unit and the 211th and 212th Regiments were formed, with the 210th Regiment preparing a battalion as a follow-up force. On the night of September 26, Ishii's reinforcements began their movement to Morotai in barges, with two detachments successfully landing near Tilai and the other near Cape Posiposi despite interference from Allied PT boats. Enemy patrols around the island's perimeter blocked the use of coastal tracks, forcing the reinforcements to navigate through dense jungle. As the concealed Japanese raiders made their way toward Major Kawashima's main force in the Pilowo-Sabatai River area, the 3rd Battalion of the 210th Regiment landed in the Boesoboeso sector on October 9. The raiding detachments finally joined up with the 2nd Provisional Raiding Unit on October 20. Without waiting for the 210th battalion, Kawashima initiated a series of new infiltration raids, some of which reached the airfield itself. Although these reinforcements created some disruptions by harassing Allied outposts, they did not significantly impact the situation at Morotai. This was due to high disease rates among the reinforcements and the inability to deliver enough supplies through the Allied air and naval blockade. General Anami decided more decisive action was needed to prevent the enemy from utilizing their airbase effectively. He instructed Ishii to deploy as much force as possible to Morotai to destroy the enemy. In response, Ishii planned to send additional reinforcements, including the main forces of the 210th and 211th Regiments and the 18th Shipping Engineers. By November 16, approximately 1,900 troops successfully landed south of Wadjaboela, with Colonel Kisou Ouchi taking command of all Japanese forces on Morotai. Raiding activities intensified in December, but with the new year, American torpedo boats further tightened the blockade, making it impossible for the 32nd Division to supply the ammunition and rations needed for a major offensive. Unable to dislodge the enemy from Morotai, the Japanese eventually had to withdraw to the center of the island, where they remained until the end of the war. The most notable Japanese response to the Allied landing was a series of frequent but mostly ineffective air raids. The first raid occurred on September 16 when a solitary enemy aircraft dropped three bombs on the Red Beach area, causing no damage. Between September 15, 1944, and February 1, 1945, General Sudo's 7th Air Division conducted 82 raids on Morotai, involving 179 sorties. The initial 54 raids caused minimal damage, with only twelve Allied soldiers wounded by October 4. However, the later raids resulted in 42 Allied aircraft destroyed, 33 damaged, 19 men killed, and 99 wounded. Despite these efforts, Morotai was successfully developed into a crucial base for the return to the Philippines. In Bougainville, with General Griswold's 14th Corps initially slated for the Leyte invasion, efforts were made to replace it with the Australian 2nd Corps. Although Griswold's corps would not participate in the October 20 operation, advance elements of General Savige's headquarters landed on October 6 to facilitate the transition. By mid-November, the 7th Brigade had relieved the 129th and 145th Regiments, and on November 22, Savige officially took command of Allied operations on Bougainville. By December 12, the replacement of American frontline troops by Australians was complete, and with only a few service personnel remaining, all American troops had departed by February 1, 1945. Despite having 30,000 men—though always short on heavy equipment and shipping—Savige's forces were considered sufficient to continue monitoring the Japanese and defending the perimeter around the airfields from any potential counterattacks. However, General Blamey disagreed with this approach and preferred a more aggressive strategy. He wanted his troops to actively seek out and destroy the enemy by patrolling deep into Japanese-held territory, targeting supply areas and bases to starve and eventually annihilate the Japanese garrisons. This shift in strategy signaled the start of a new offensive phase in the Bougainville Campaign. At the same time, attention shifts to North Burma, where the Allied campaign continued after the victories at Myitkyina and Mogaung. However, the strained relationship between General Stilwell and Chiang Kai-Shek was approaching its breaking point. Confronted with the impending loss of Guilin, Stilwell persuaded President Roosevelt to issue an ultimatum to Chiang, threatening to cut off American aid to China unless Stilwell was given full command of all forces in China. Chiang, perceiving this as an attempt to dominate China, countered by demanding Stilwell's immediate replacement and welcoming any other qualified American general. As a result, on October 19, Stilwell was recalled and replaced by Major-General Albert Wedemeyer by the end of the month. The China-Burma-India Theater was then reorganized: Lieutenant-General Daniel Sultan took over the India-Burma Theater, while Wedemeyer assumed command of the newly established China Theater. However, Wedemeyer would only serve as chief of staff to Chiang, not taking effective command of the Chinese forces. Thus, no American officer would be held accountable for the loss of eastern China. Nonetheless, this represented another significant diplomatic victory for Chiang Kai-Shek, though it would be his last for many years. However, it also marked the end of his relationship with Roosevelt, who had previously championed China's and the Generalissimo's interests. Meanwhile, upon taking command, Wedemeyer faced open dissent among the Chinese Nationalists, with local commanders in eastern China on the verge of insurrection against Chiang's regime, as he had refused to supply arms to those defending against the Japanese advance in Operation Ichi-Go. There were many detailed reports that the east China commanders bitterly resented the Generalissimo's failure to support them. When Hengyang fell on August 8, Chinese claiming to be emissaries of these men presented to American authority a plan for a separatist regime and pleaded for American support. Unknown to the Americans, Chinese making identical representations had been negotiating with the Japanese since the winter of 1943-44. Intelligence reports were received at US headquarters to the effect that the Generalissimo's attitude toward the east China campaign reflected an understanding between him and the Japanese under which they would leave him undisturbed in southwest China if he in turn would not interfere while they took the airfields that presented so obvious a menace to the Japanese homeland. In 1951 a group of senior Japanese staff officers of China Expeditionary Army were interrogated on the question of Sino-Japanese relations in 1944. They denied that there had been any understanding between the Japanese and the Chinese Central Government. Two of them, Lt. Cols. Yoshimasa Okada and Yoshio Fukuyama, stated that an agreement was reached between the Japanese 23rd Army at Canton and the local Chinese commander, General Yu Hanmou, in February 1944 under which General Yu agreed not to disturb Canton when the Japanese marched north from it. Yu kept his word, according to Okada, even though the Generalissimo was ordering him to attack Canton. The Japanese officers agreed among themselves that there had been extensive contact with dissident Nationalist commanders in southeast China, and stated that through many channels they had sought to inform the Chinese that the east China drive offered no threat to them, but only to the US airfields. One of Wedemeyer's key objectives was to prevent China from fragmenting into warring factions. Additionally, he observed that air transport was delivering supplies to China at unprecedented rates, with 35,131 tons arriving in October 1944—four times the amount sent to support Stilwell in October 1943. The strength of the Allied forces in northern Burma and the weakened state of the Japanese meant that time was on Wedemeyer's side; each day China remained an active belligerent bolstered the prospect of significant American supplies soon being available. Consequently, his mission involved continuing support for General Chennault's 14th Air Force, General LeMay's 20th Bomber Command, and air transport over the Hump; further training and advising the Y-Force in Yunnan and the Z-Force in eastern China; and assisting the Generalissimo with military operations against the Japanese. Speaking of Chennault's 14th air force, by November 1944, they now had an average strength of 398 fighters, 97 medium bombers, and 47 heavy bombers. In that same month the Fourteenth received 13,578 tons of supplies flown in over the Hump, of which 9,357 tons were gas and oil. From the Kunming airfields, the China Wing of the ATC flew these supplies to Chennault's forward fields, this intratheater transport being of course a charge on Hump tonnage. The apparent crisis in east China made it seem advisable to use all available Chinese trucks for concentrating the Chinese for the defense of Kunming; the quartermaster truck companies of the SOS were not by themselves enough to support the Fourteenth Air Force. These resources of air power, unimpressive in contrast to what Allied commanders had in Europe or the Pacific, but a good deal more than the Japanese had in China, were divided among two composite wings--the 68th and 69th--the 312th Fighter Wing, the Chinese-American Composite Wing (CACW), and the 308th Bombardment Group (H). An example of Chennault's flexibility, the 68th Wing had three fighter squadrons assigned, with bombers attached as the mission required. The 69th had four fighter squadrons and three medium squadrons. With headquarters at Kunming, it was shifting its attention from the campaign in Burma to the defense of Kunming against a Japanese attack from the south or southeast. The Chinese-American Composite Wing, headquarters at Peishiyi, had two fighter groups and one bombardment group. The 312th had two fighter groups (50 P-47's, 60 P-51's, and 6 P-61's), a total of five squadrons, protecting the B-29 fields at Cheng-tu. After the air effort and the attempts to move tonnage to the airfields and to the troops, the remaining US project in China was liaison with and training and observation of Chinese troops. On the Salween front, liaison and technical advice was given in the forward areas, while troop training continued in the rear. In east China, the reluctance of the Chinese to attempt a stand after Hengyang's fall on August 8 led to the withdrawal of almost all the Americans who had tried since January 1, 1944 to train a second 30 Divisions in east China. The so-called Z-Force Operations Staff that remained comprised an observer group with the headquarters of the Chinese 9th War Area and a liaison team of 28 under Col. Harwood C. Bowman in the city of Liuchow. This handful of Americans, in the first months of Wedemeyer's command, sought to give technical aid to the Chinese defenders of Guangxi while sending a flow of information back to theater headquarters in Chongqing. They provided air-ground liaison, supervised demolitions, helped distribute the 500 tons of munitions flown into east China in late October 1944, and helped with administrative and logistical matters. The remaining 625 men of Z-FOS, including the headquarters, were in Kunming, their future mission dependent on Wedemeyer's estimate of the situation. While these events were unfolding, Allied forces in northern Burma were preparing to launch an offensive with six divisions to eliminate the remaining Japanese presence in the region and establish a new supply route to China. Following the capture of Myitkyina and Mogaung, efforts were underway to organize two new Chinese armies, while experienced Chinese divisions continued their rigorous training in anticipation of resuming their advance southward. As the new commander of the Northern Combat Area Command and the Chinese Army in India, Sultan had the New First Army, under General Sun Liren, included the 30th and 38th Divisions. The 38th Division had been engaged since 30 October 1943, and had previously taken a creditable part in the First Burma Campaign of 1942. The division had been trained, re-equipped, and brought up to strength at Ramgarh Training Center in Bihar Province, India. Its sister division, the 30th, was also Ramgarh-trained. Its 88th and 89th Regiments had fought at Myitkyina. There was also New Sixth Army consisting of the 14th, 22nd, and 50th Divisions, commanded by General Liao Yaoxiang. The 22nd Division had fought in the First Burma Campaign, then been rebuilt at Ramgarh. It had been in action since January 1944. Lastly there was General Festing's 36th Division, and the recently-formed 5332nd Provisional Brigade at his disposal. Current plans called for brigading the 1st Chinese Separate Infantry Regiment, which had been trained at Ramgarh in long-range penetration tactics, with two American regiments, the 475th Infantry and the 124th Cavalry. The combined unit would be the equivalent of a division, but would have the designation 5332d Brigade (Provisional). To carry out the project, the 5332d Brigade (Provisional), known later as MARS Task Force, was activated 26 July 1944. Brig. Gen. Thomas S. Arms assumed command the same day. The activating order provided for most of the brigade's subordinate units to be attached to it as they arrived in India or were activated--as of 26 July the brigade was still very much in the preparatory stage. Thus, the 475th Infantry Regiment (Long Range Penetration Regiment, Special), Lt. Col. William L. Osborne, was not activated until 5 August 1944. It included many survivors of the original American experiment in long-range penetration tactics--GALAHAD, or "Merrill's Marauders." Its companion regiment, the 124th Cavalry (Texas National Guard), Col. Milo H. Matteson, arrived in India on 30 August 1944. It did not reach the brigade's training area until 27 October. Also attached were the 612th Field Artillery Battalion (Pack), Maj. John W. Read, and six quartermaster pack troops. In mid-August 1944 the training area which had been set up about ten miles north of Myitkyina on the west bank of the Irrawaddy began receiving members of the 475th Infantry Regiment. The area was designated Camp Robert W. Landis in honor of the first member of GALAHAD to be killed in action. Unit after unit started moving into Camp Landis as the 5332d began to put on flesh and assume the likeness of a pair of regimental combat teams. Another battalion of pack artillery, the 613th under Lt. Col. James F. Donovan, the 18th Veterinary Evacuation Hospital, the 44th Portable Surgical Hospital, the 1st Chinese Separate Infantry Regiment, Col. Lin Kuan-hsiang, arrived during the fall. Unfortunately, after overseeing the 5332nd's organization and training, Arms was injured in a motor accident and was succeeded by Brigadier-General John Willey on October 31. In support of Operation Capital, it was agreed that Sultan's forces would advance through the Katha-Bhamo area towards Kunchaung, Sikaw, and Namhkam in mid-October, followed by a southern advance to the Mogok-Mongmit-Lashio line in coordination with General Slim's push towards Mandalay. Sultan planned a three-pronged attack south from Myitkyina into Japanese-held territory in northern Burma. The British 36th Division and the Chinese 50th Division would advance south along the Railway Corridor to secure the Katha-Indaw area; the Chinese 22nd Division would move southeast to capture the Broadway airstrip northeast of Katha and establish a bridgehead over the Irrawaddy at Shwegu; and the Chinese 38th Division, followed by the 30th Division, would move south from Mogaung to secure the Bhamo-Mansi area. By the end of August, Festing's forces had followed the 53rd Division to Pinbaw, then advanced cautiously until they secured Nanma in September. The British moved out on 15 October. At first, contact was light, but by the time they reached Mawlu on 31 October Japanese posts were stronger and closer together and their artillery and mortar fire was progressively heavier. However, at Mawlu the 36th was eighty miles south of Mogaung and very near the great bend of the Irrawaddy which was the goal for 15 December. The Japanese stiffened at Mawlu, and the 1st Battalion, Royal Scots Fusiliers, met artillery, mortar, and machine gun fire that took thirteen casualties. By evening the town was occupied. Road conditions were very bad, for the ground was still wet, and vehicles had trouble moving. After occupying Mawlu the division paused until 9 November. There were brushes with Japanese, snipings, patrol actions, but no heavy fighting. Festing used the lull to bring up the 72d Brigade, and so make his advance one of brigades in line, with the 72d on the east, the 29th on the west. The 72d would make the main effort. Moving down a dry-weather road parallel to the railway tracks, elements of the 72d Brigade on 10 November met stubborn resistance a few miles northwest of a railway station called Pinwe. It came from a cluster of bunkers, which together with heavy artillery fire and the identification of Japanese from a number of units all pointed to one conclusion for the 36th--it had met the Japanese main line of resistance in this area centering on Pinwe. The Pinwe area was well adapted to defense. Farther north the 36th had fought its way over rice fields, but here the bush made an impenetrable screen on either side of the jungle tracks. Flanking movements were so difficult that they were judged to be impossible. Frontal attacks after artillery and air preparations became the order of the day. The Japanese lines at Pinwe were held by the 119th Regiment, 53d Division. Pinwe was the hardest fighting the 53d had encountered, and the 119th received a diploma of merit for its work there. At night their infiltration parties harassed the British rear areas and sought to destroy their artillery. On one occasion, they thrust so deftly into the British positions as to cut off two companies of infantry, which had to be withdrawn at night. The fighting resolved itself into British attempts at prying the Japanese out of their strongpoints, while maintaining a close guard against Japanese raiding parties. In these days the 72d Infantry Brigade, which had been trying to force its way over the stream covering the principal Japanese positions, took heavy casualties and had to be relieved by the 29th Infantry Brigade. On 25 November the British did put a company across the stream, but found they could not reinforce or supply it. The 53d Division was also ordered to execute limited but bold attacks to its front. To relieve the pressure on the 53d Division, the 15th Division was directed to attack the right flank and rear of the enemy 36th Division along the Meza River. Although the attacks of the 15th Division and the counterattacks of the 53d failed to destroy the enemy, they were successful in checking the offensive of the 36th and enabled the 53d Division to hold the line for approximately three weeks. The order to the 53d showed the DiVision commanders the caliber and determination of the new Army commander and the 53d's success in holding bolstered the sagging combat spirit of the entire 15th Army. Pressure on the 53d Division increased as the weeks went by; and when enemy elements infiltrated into the gap between the 53d and 15th Divisions in late November, the 15th Army finally ordered the 53d to withdraw to Katha and the sector north of Tigyaing. The 15th Division was ordered to withdraw its right wing to maintain contact with the revised battle line of the 53d Division. The 15th Army finally issued orders to the 53d and 15th Divisions directing the commencement of the withdrawal movement to the Irrawaddy River line on 1 December. The 33d Division was directed to withdraw on 4 December, giving the Division additional time for disposal of munitions in its area. From positions in the Kamaing area, far behind the outposts held by the 36th Division in the Railway Corridor, the 22d began its march on 15 October. It was to move southeast toward Mogaung, but bypassing the town to save ten miles, then toward Pinbaw, then Hopin. As the march got under way it appeared that the long rest after combat had left troops and animals in poor condition. The troops were traveling as light as possible, but fatigue was evident when after three days the division reached Hopin. Predawn departures were ordered to keep to a minimum the time spent marching under the full sun, and a day of rest was spent at Hopin. At Hopin the division turned east, to take a route that would sorely test the marching powers of its troops, for the chosen trail led over the ridge that marked the eastern boundary of the Railway Corridor, down into a plain formed by a tributary of the Irrawaddy, where the old Chindit airstrip BROADWAY was located, and up again over a hill mass overlooking the Irrawaddy valley. On 26 October the division reached the airstrip, twenty-seven miles southeast of Hopin. General Liao Yueh-shang, commanding the New Sixth Army, of which the 22d Division was part, flew in to BROADWAY, and gave the division detailed orders for the final move to the Irrawaddy. The division was formed into two columns. On the west, the 64th Regiment was directed to take Shwegugale, which lay on the south bank downstream from Shwegu. The 65th and 66th were to move off as one column, then to split into combat teams just north of the Irrawaddy and cross on a broad front. Kachin irregulars and patrols reported there were no Japanese ahead, and after a three-day rest the division resumed its advance. On 3 November the division occupied the north bank of the Irrawaddy without opposition. The troops rested while commanders studied maps and waited for rubber boats and outboard motors to be airdropped. Three days later the 64th Regiment crossed the Irrawaddy and took Shwegugale against light opposition. Next day the 65th Regiment took Shwegu, and the division had its first objectives. Meanwhile, after the unsuccessful Dan offensive, General Honda reorganized the 33rd Army. The 56th Division resumed defending Longling and Mangshi, while the 18th Division took over the defense of Namhkam. Although the Yoshida Force and the Bhamo Garrison remained with the 33rd Army, the 2nd Division was reassigned to the area army and began relocating to the Pyinmana-Toungoo area by the end of October to be available for operations in central Burma. Unbeknownst to Honda, he was soon to encounter the full force of Sultan's renewed offensive. Major-General Li Hong's 38th Division had departed from Myitkyina on October 15, advancing cautiously along the road to Bhamo with minimal contact until October 28. On that date, they encountered Japanese patrols two miles north of the Taping River, which were quickly dispatched. At Myothit was the Japanese outpost line of resistance; the Chinese patrols speedily found that the Japanese meant to defend it. Strong Japanese positions were seen on the south bank, and the commander of the 38th Division, General Li Huang, saw that he would have to force a defended river line unless he could turn the Japanese position. General Li decided to use the 112th and 114th Regiments, which had been the main body of the 38th, as an enveloping force. Since they were some seven miles to the north the 112th and 114th were out of contact with the Japanese and well placed to make a wide swing to the east. The two regiments began their march through the hills, while the 113th made a show of activity around Myothit to keep the Japanese attention focused there. Once again envelopment proved its worth. The Japanese were too few to defend a long line, and the enveloping force was able to cross the Taping at an unguarded bridge upstream, go around the right end of the Japanese outpost line of resistance, and emerge on the Bhamo plain on 10 November. Pressing on west toward Bhamo, the enveloping force met a strong entrenched Japanese force at Momauk, which is eight miles east of Bhamo and is the point at which the Myitkyina-Bhamo road swings to the west for the last stretch into Bhamo. Here there was savage fighting between the 114th Regiment and the Japanese defenders. Heavily outnumbered, the Japanese outpost at Momauk was driven into the main defenses at Bhamo. The appearance of its survivors, some without rifles, others without shoes, depressed the Bhamo garrison. Hara's forces endured significant losses as they conducted a delaying action at Momauk, with the remaining reconnaissance units joining the defense of Bhamo by November 16. Meanwhile, the 113th Regiment moved west along the south bank of the Taping River and approached Bhamo from the north. However, instead of directly attacking the town, the 113th Regiment repositioned south and southeast of Bhamo. Concurrently, the 114th Regiment advanced west from Momauk to encircle the town from the north, creating a loose encirclement around the Japanese outposts in the Bhamo suburbs. This maneuver allowed the 112th Regiment to bypass the confrontation entirely and continue south towards Namhkam. By early November, Japanese patrols had also detected the presence of the 22nd Division in the region between Bhamo and Katha, apparently moving towards Mandalay. Fearing that this force might sever the Mandalay-Lashio rail line by advancing through Mongmit, Honda's staff decided to keep the 55th Regiment stationed at Namhkam and reassign the rest of General Naka's 18th Division to Mongmit to prevent the effective separation of the 15th and 33rd Armies. While the 64th Regiment remained to secure the crossing area, the 22nd Division advanced towards Man Tha along the main road south from the Japanese stronghold of Bhamo, which was captured without incident on November 14. Continuing along the Bhamo-Myitson road, the Si-u area was secured by late November, with Colonel Ernest Easterbrook's 475th Regiment also moving there after bypassing Bhamo successfully. Meanwhile, after a period of recovery due to heavy losses in September, General Wei's Y-Force was preparing to resume its Salween offensive. On October 29, Lieutenant-General Huang Jie assaulted Longling, defended by the 146th Regiment's main force with artillery support up to 1,700 rounds and 30-40 air sorties per day carried out by 37 P-40s of the 14th Air Force. Elements of the 200th Division attacked from the south and west, targeting positions behind Colonel Imaoka's defenses, while two divisions of the 71st Army exerted heavy pressure from the north. With many positions being devastated and numerous defenders killed or wounded, General Matsuyama ordered the 146th to retreat from Longling to Mangshi on November 3. Although the Japanese managed a midnight withdrawal, the Chinese succeeded in capturing their main objective. The Japanese respite, however, unsettled the Americans, who promptly urged Chiang to continue the offensive. Following the Generalissimo's orders to advance on November 9, Wei directed the newly arrived 53rd Army through the hills north of the Burma Road to Chefang, while the 2nd and 6th Armies moved south towards Mangshi, and the 71st Army proceeded down the road itself. Against the expected offensive, the 56th Division consolidated its defense around Mangshih with eight infantry and two artillery battalions on an established defense perimeter. The Yoshida Force, which was under the direct command of the Army at Wanting, was assigned the missions of protecting the rear of the 56th Division with its main force in the area north of Chefang and the 3d Battal- ion in the Menka area. At the same time, the 3d Battalion of the 146th Infantry Regiment was moved from Mangshih to join the Yoshida Force. A detachment of about 100 replacement troops was assigned to hold Chefang Pass. Although the 56th Division continued to be optimistic about its chances of holding against the expected Chinese attack, Army Headquarters took a less hopeful view. The Division was ordered to conduct a flexible holding operation north of Wanting and not cling too tenaciously to Mangshih. After a strong Chinese offensive on November 19, and following Colonel Tsuji's insistence, Matsuyama had no choice but to withdraw during the night to the Chefang Pass. General Matsuyama was strongly in favor of conducting a holding action in the Mangshi area and merely directed a partial withdrawal of his forces to be effected on November 22, 23 and 24. Col. Tsuji, of the 33rd Army headquarters, was present at the 56th Division headquarters and warned the chief of staff against over-optimism. Tsuji stressed the point that, once the withdrawal had been decided upon, the Division should withdraw simultaneously from the entire line to the south of Chefang Pass, preferably on the eve of the general attack or on the following night, at the latest. However, Col. Kawamichi, the Division chief of staff, would not change the order because it had already been passed down to the subordinate units. Subsequently, following an inspection of the front lines and an observation of enemy activity on the 18th, Tsuji came to the conclusion that the enemy would launch a general attack at dawn on the 19th or early on the 20th. He bluntly advised General Matsuyama to change his division order and at his insistence the order was changed to a withdrawal at midnight on November 19 to Chefang Pass. At dawn of the 19th, the Chinese launched a heavy attack in an attempt to envelop the entire line, just as Tsuji had predicted. All frontline units held in their prepared positions and inflicted heavy losses. Throughout the day they were able to check the enemy, but with the tremendous forces arrayed against the Division it is probable that many of the positions would have been overrun the following day. The Division, however, succeeded in withdrawing from the entire line at midnight on November 19.As a result, the strategic Mangshi airfield fell to Wei, enabling him to land supplies rather than relying solely on airdrops. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Despite the heavy losses, capturing Angaur proved crucial in securing the Palaus and removing the island group as a threat to Allied lines of communication across the western Pacific toward the Philippines. General MacArthur was getting closer to his ultimate goa
Last time we spoke about the battles for Peleliu and Angaur. Following the amphibious assaults on Peleliu and Anguar, US Marines under General Rupertus intensified their offensive. On September 17, Colonel Hanneken's 7th Marines advanced in Peleliu's southern sector, as the 1st and 5th Marines pushed north, confronting the fortified Umurbrogol Mountains, where Colonel Nakagawa's defenses stalled their progress. Despite reaching key positions by mid-morning, intense Japanese counterattacks continued, causing heavy casualties. On September 18, the 7th Marines, aided by armor, resumed their slow advance, securing the southern part of Peleliu by day's end. Meanwhile, the 1st and 5th Marines faced brutal combat in the central ridges, suffering significant losses. By September 21, the capture of nearby Ulithi Atoll provided a strategic base for future operations. Despite securing important positions, the Marines encountered severe resistance in the Umurbrogol Mountains, leading to high casualties and necessitating reinforcements. By September 23, the Americans secured footholds on Peleliu and Anguar, yet fierce fighting persisted in Nakagawa's fortified positions. This episode is the Japanese Triumph in China Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. This week we are picking up back over on Peleliu and Anguar where the Japanese are still providing stiff resistance. On September 23, Colonel Venable's 322nd Regiment had made little progress breaking into the Lake Salome bowl. With their commanding officer severely injured, a change in tactics was imminent. On the morning of September 24, propaganda broadcasts over a public address system were used to try and persuade the remaining Japanese to surrender. However, only two Japanese soldiers surrendered, reporting that over 300 defenders remained in the bowl under Major Goto. This accurate estimate was disregarded by the American command, who believed only about 150 defenders remained. Following this failed attempt, all available artillery bombarded the bowl in preparation for an attack from the north, altering the appearance of the bowl's interior and rims to aid the upcoming assault. Back at Peleliu, after heavy bombardment, Colonel Dark's 321st Regiment resumed its advance north along the coast on September 24, despite continued harassment from Japanese fire from the central ridges. By noon, they had secured the trail-road junction south of Garekoru. Some troops explored the trail to the east, encountering heavy resistance, while Company G advanced rapidly north through Garekoru, reaching the O-4 Line. Behind them, Dark's 3rd Battalion and Colonel Hanneken's 3rd Battalion also pushed northwards. Further east, the 7th Marines pressed against Colonel Nakagawa's main defenses on the Umurbrogol Mountains. By nightfall, having successfully resisted Japanese counterattacks on O-4, General Rupertus' northward drive had proven to be a significant success. He next planned to cut across the island on September 25 through the eastern trail to completely isolate the Japanese forces in the Umurbrogol ridges. At 07:00, Dark's troops began moving eastward, with Company E successfully reaching the edge of East Road against light opposition. They halted in front of Hill B, which dominated the eastern area. However, the 3rd Battalion encountered heavier resistance from pillboxes and emplacements protected by steep walls and sheer cliffs guarding the northern approaches to the Umurbrogol defense system, making little progress. Meanwhile, to the north, a strong tank-infantry patrol advanced about 1,200 yards, killing 30 Japanese and destroying four pillboxes and two large supply dumps before reaching the O-5 Line. The weak resistance encountered by the patrol suggested that remaining Japanese strength was concentrated in the Umurbrogol Pocket. Thus, at 10:30, Rupertus decided to commit the 5th Marines for a drive to the northern tip of Peleliu. Rapidly relieved by the 1st Marines on eastern Peleliu. Orders to move to the western portion of Peleliu found the 5th Marines in static positions on Eastern Peleliu, where the regimental mission had been to prevent enemy counterlandings. The 1st Battalion was deployed in the vicinity of the radio direction finding station near Ngardololok, the 2d Battalion was holding the islands north of the northeastern peninsula, while the 3d Battalion, less one company, occupied defensive positions along Purple Beach. The 1st Marines completed the relief of the 5th shortly after noon and assumed command of the 5th Marines sector at that time. In order to expedite movement of the regiment to the West Road, the battalions moved out on trucks at 1300, with 1/5 in the lead, followed by 3/5 and 2/5. By 1600, the 5th Marines had executed the passage of the lines, and the regiment passed through Phase Line O-4 near Garekoru. As 1/5 continued its advance up the West Road, it encountered erratic resistance from what appeared to be Japanese holdouts. The level terrain was devoid of the dense jungle growth abounding elsewhere on Peleliu and offered ideal conditions for the movement of tanks and LVT flamethrowers accompanying the advance battalion. Aside from occasional Japanese sniper and mortar fire, the advance continued for about 500 yards without interruption to Road Junction 15, where the West and East Roads met. This vital point was defended by a small Japanese force, which had installed itself on a ridge dominating the road forks. Around 1700, as the Marines approached this point, the enemy opened fire, which served only to delay the Marines. When the firefight ended the Japanese had lost 20 killed. The battalion continued its advance for another 100 yards and seized the Japanese radio station, whose towers the forward elements of RCT 321 had spotted on the previous day. Having secured this objective, the battalion established night defenses north of the radio station from the beach to the high ground east of the West Road. Upon reaching Road Junction 15 in the wake of the advance of 1/5, the 3d Battalion pivoted to the southeast and headed down East Road, where it established night defenses on the road and along the western slopes of Hill 80. The latter hill, in itself an isolated terrain feature, owed its importance to its location, for it was the only link separating the Kamilianlul ridges to the south from the Amiangal ridges, which formed the northernmost hill mass on Peleliu. Throughout the evening and night, the forward elements at the radio station were continuously and heavily attacked and bombed but managed to hold against the enemy onslaught. Meanwhile, at Angaur, after a heavy and prolonged artillery bombardment, the 3rd Battalion, 322nd Regiment pushed forward to launch its assault from the north. Finding no route south over the cliffs, they assembled near the northern end of the Milwaukee Railroad for an attack west the following day. At 07:30 on September 26, the infantry launched their assault on Lake Salome, quickly taking control of the eastern rim with minimal resistance. Facing increasing enemy fire, the Americans made their way down the eastern rim to the bowl floor. However, by the end of the day, they were halted by Goto's positions on the northern cliffs and "The Island," a gap between an overgrown coral mound and the eastern rim. To the south, the 2nd Battalion supported the attack by advancing north, capturing the southeast rim and clearing out several enemy cave positions. Back over on Peleliu the Marines had a very rough night full of Japanese infiltrator harassment. In fact our old friend Eugene Sledge wrote about the night of September 25th and what his unit of K Company, 3rd battalion, 5th marines went through. The Japanese who had come across the road in front of me were probably members of what the enemy called a “close-quarter combat unit.” The enemy soldier shot by Sam was not dressed or equipped like their typical infantryman. Rather he wore only tropical khaki shorts, short-sleeved shirt, and tabi footwear (splittoed, rubber-soled canvas shoes). He carried only his bayonet. Why he entered our line where he did may have been pure accident, or he may have had an eye on our mortar. His comrade angled off toward the right near a machine gun on our flank. Mortars and machine guns were favorite targets for infiltrators on the front lines. To the rear, they went after heavy mortars, communications, and artillery. Before Company K moved out, I went down the road to the next company to see what had happened during the night. I learned that those blood-chilling screams had come from the Japanese I had seen run to the right. He had jumped into a foxhole where he met an alert Marine. In the ensuing struggle each had lost his weapon. The desperate Marine had jammed his forefinger into his enemy's eye socket and killed him. Such was the physical horror and brutish reality of war for us. The 1/5 spent the early hours of 26 September in consolidating its positions around the radio station and preparing for continuation of its attack later in the day to the northern tip of Peleliu. Shortly after 0600, 3/5 jumped off for an attack against Hill 80 with Company K on the left and Company I on the right. The attack carried the hill and by 0830 the assault force reached a swamp bordering the east coast of Peleliu. This advance of the 3d Battalion was of major importance because it effectively cut the island in two. Late in the afternoon most of the battalion moved back from Hill 80 to a reserve position near the junction of East and West Roads. The unit's southern flank extended south from the junction along East Road to Hill 80, where Company I was stationed for the night. Between Company I, 5th Marines, and the 2d Battalion, 321st Infantry, at Hill B, lay a gap approximately 1,800 yards long through which only the 321st Infantry's Neal Task Force had passed. In this gap lay 1,500-yard-long Kamilianlul Mountain, held by an unknown number of Japanese and as yet not even reconnoitered by American units. The 5th Marines consolidated their positions and resumed their assault. The 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, ran into stiff opposition from the Amiangal ridges dominating northern Peleliu. The northern portion of the L-shaped hill system consisted of ridges running generally from northeast to southwest for about 1,000 yards; the southern leg extended from northwest to southeast. The southern leg of the ridges was not continuous but broken into four separate hills or knobs, designated from northwest to southeast as Hill 1, Hill 2, Hill 3, and Radar Hill, so named because it had at one time served as an enemy radar installation. These four knobs were to gain ill repute as Hill Row. The entire Amiangal ridge system was held in strength by the Japanese, particularly the portion paralleling the route of advance of 1/5. This part contained some of the most elaborate caves and tunnels on Peleliu. The battalion had barely started out along the West Road when the enemy in and on Hill 1 opened up on the Marines with 37mm and 75mm guns as well as automatic weapons and mortars. This curtain of fire from the Amiangal ridges was reinforced by heavy fire from Ngesebus Island. All forward movement soon halted. Attacking eastward from the West Road, Company B assaulted the second knob, Hill 2, but also encountered opposition. Through sheer determination the company was able to gain a firm foothold on the hill by early afternoon. This accomplishment in effect served to outflank the Japanese on Hill 1, but Japanese resistance on the last mentioned hill continued throughout the day. An attempt by Company C to seize all of Hill 1 during the remaining hours of daylight was unsuccessful, and continuation of the assault had to await the following day. During the bitter fighting in which 1/5 engaged during the night of 25-26 September and for most of the following day, 2/5 remained stationary on the southern flank of the regiment. At 1600 on 26 September, when it had become apparent that 1/5 could make no further progress, 2/5 was ordered to attack. The battalion advanced northward through the left wing of 1/5, carefully bypassing embattled Hill 1. In the course of its advance, the battalion drew heavy fire from Japanese emplacements in the plain, from the ridges on its right, as well as from Ngesebus. Enemy mortars proved especially troublesome. As a result of the heavy fire, Company F lost four of its supporting tanks before it had advanced very far beyond Hill 1. Attempts by the artillery to give all possible support to the battalion were largely ineffectual. "We fired frequent missions throughout the day on these mortars; the reported effect was that the mortars were neutralized while we fired but that they were not destroyed. The enemy apparently withdrew into the caves during the period of our fire." As evening approached, the 5th Marines occupied a jagged front line. The 1st Battalion, though out of contact with the 2d, was tied in with the 3d on the right. The mission of the 3d Battalion was to support either the 1st or 2d Battalion in the event of a major Japanese counterattack. Further progress of the 2d Battalion was impeded by a large antitank ditch, which blocked the approach to the remnants of the Peleliu phosphate plant. The Japanese had converted the reinforced concrete foundation of the otherwise demolished structure into a major defensive installation. Exposed to the enemy fire from Ngesebus Island and plunging fire from caves and defensive positions from the hills, 2/5 found itself in a very unenviable situation. Further south, after some necessary adjustments, Dark's forces assaulted Hill B with two battalions. Initially repelled, Dark then sent a task force led by Captain George Neal to attack from the north. After a complex maneuver north and then south, the Neal Task Force attacked Hill B just as other elements of the 321st fought their way to the top through challenging terrain. The hill eventually fell to the Americans, completing the isolation of the Umurbrogol Pocket. By the end of the day, the island was divided in two places, leaving Nakagawa's determined defenders isolated in two major pockets. On September 27, with the Umurbrogol Pocket now contained, the 5th Marines continued their operations against Amiangal Mountain. At the same time, the 1st Battalion, 321st Regiment advanced north from the Hill B area to close the long gap along East Road up to Hill 80. Dark's infantrymen secured Kamilianlul Mountain with minimal resistance and then moved towards the Marines' road junction. The 2d Battalion was to find progress extremely rough for the remainder of the day. First, the erstwhile phosphate plant, which the Japanese had turned into a blockhouse, had to be secured in an area that bristled with snipers. The problem confronting Colonel Harris was a formidable one. The blockhouse in front of 2/5 could not be taken until the antitank ditch blocking the approaches to it had been seized. This was a job that the infantry could not tackle without armored support. The regimental commander decided to utilize all arms available in reducing these obstacles. First of all, Colonel Harris called naval gunfire and artillery in on Ngesebus and any other targets suspected of harboring artillery or mortar positions. A medium tank, equipped with a bulldozer blade, was pressed into service to level the antitank ditch, and filled it by 0830. A LVT flamethrower then was able to come within effective range of the Japanese fortification. Moments later, when the flame and smoke had cleared, all resistance from this stronghold had ceased and more than 60 dead Japanese remained in the rubble. While this action was in progress, patrols from Company E seized a small, weakly defended ridge abutting the road from the east. The 2d Battalion thereafter resumed its advance northward along the road as well as over the adjacent ridge. Company F, at the head of the column, soon found itself embroiled in some of the most bitter and frustrating action of the entire campaign. Aside from receiving heavy Japanese artillery and mortar fire, the company faced a series of pillboxes and field fortifications on level ground, and layer upon layer of caves in the hillsides. Even though they were not aware of it at the time, the men of the 5th Marines had come upon the most skillfully constructed defenses on Peleliu. The Japanese Army had utilized all of the many natural caves possessing tactical value, adapting them for the emplacement of heavier weapons with great ingenuity. On the other hand, Japanese naval troops had preferred to construct their own caves with the help of the 214th Naval Construction Battalion, composed of men who had been professional miners and tunnel workers in civilian life. Since most of these Navy caves were located near the northern end of Peleliu, they proved a serious obstacle to the advance of the 5th Marines. Eugene Sledge faced these obstacles and saw firsthand the effectiveness of flamethrowers. Here is a passage from him: Burgin's order to us to continue firing into the opening interrupted my musings. We kept up a steady fire into the pillbox to keep the Japanese pinned down while the flamethrower came up, carried by Corporal Womack from Mississippi. He was a brave, good-natured guy and popular with the troops, but he was one of the fiercest-looking Marines I ever saw. He was big and husky with a fiery red beard well powdered with white coral dust. He reminded me of some wild Viking. I was glad we were on the same side. Stooped under the heavy tanks on his back, Womack approached the pillbox with his assistant just out of the line of our fire. When they got about fifteen yards from the target, we ceased firing. The assistant reached up and turned a valve on the flamethrower. Womack then aimed the nozzle at the opening made by the 75mm gun. He pressed the trigger. With a whoooooooosh the flame leaped at the opening. Some muffled screams, then all quiet. Even the stoic Japanese couldn't suppress the agony of death by fire and suffocation. But they were no more likely to surrender to us than we would have been to them had we ever been confronted with the possibility of surrender. In fighting the Japanese, surrender was not one of our options. Sheer courage and heroism in themselves proved inadequate for the task. In the course of the morning of 27 September, Company F seized the two ridges forming the northwestern anchor of the Amiangal system and established observation posts on the crests. But this did not solve the problem of what to do about the Japanese occupying the caves about half way up the hill. Marine casualties mounted steadily, and evacuation of the wounded became more and more difficult. Since the cave openings completely dominated the road leading past the northernmost ridge of Peleliu, the advance of the entire 2d Battalion ground to a halt. The first tank attempting to squeeze through the narrow gap between the hill and the northwestern shore was hit, and the Marines occupying the crest of the hill were powerless to cope with the caves underneath. Although the Americans now controlled the northern shore and blocked further enemy reinforcements, skilled Japanese miners continued their resistance underground. What the Marines did not know was that they were facing the most comprehensive cave system on Peleliu which was the underground home of the Japanese naval construction units who were, luckily for the Marines, better miners than infantrymen. The Japanese Army had utilized all of the many natural caves possessing tactical value, adapting them for the emplacement of heavier weapons with great ingenuity. On the other hand, Japanese naval troops had preferred to construct their own caves with the help of the 214th Naval Construction Battalion, composed of men who had been professional miners and tunnel workers in civilian life. Since most of these Navy caves were located near the northern end of Peleliu, they proved a serious obstacle to the advance of the 5th Marines. In the end, it would take weeks for the Marines to finally quash all resistance on Akarakoro Point, then only by blasting closed all the tunnel entrances, sealing the Japanese defenders inside to their fate. To the south, Harris' 1st Battalion pressed on with their attack on the mountain's southern leg, successfully capturing Hill 1. Meanwhile, the 322nd Regiment resumed its assault on the Lake Salome bowl, fighting to secure the base of the north rim but encountering less resistance in the south as most Japanese defenders had been evacuated towards Romauldo. The following day, despite a successful enemy mortar barrage that initially forced a temporary withdrawal and reorganization, the Americans cleared the entire bowl floor of Japanese troops, isolating Goto's remaining forces in the Romauldo area. This progress enabled the 322nd to launch a final coordinated attack on October 1, with its three battalions trapping the enemy in the Romauldo Pocket, though they were unable to penetrate Goto's final defenses. On September 28 at Peleliu, while Dark's 1st Battalion engaged Japanese infiltrators while mopping up the Kamilianlul Mountain area, Harris' 1st and 2nd Battalions continued their assault on Amiangal and successfully captured Hill 3. This action isolated the remaining Japanese forces at Radar Hill. Meanwhile, the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines executed a successful landing on Ngesebus Island with minimal resistance after a comprehensive artillery, air, and naval bombardment. The curtain on the drama of Ngesebus opened on the morning of September 28, when the massed fire of five artillery battalions from Peleliu, as well as heavy fire from warships and aircraft, blanketed the island. Near the northwestern shore of Peleliu, an impressive gathering of high-ranking officers had assembled to witness the operation. The group included such notables as Admiral Fort, and Generals Julian C. Smith, Geiger, Rupertus, Mueller, Oliver P. Smith, and Bell. The weather was cool and cloudy and interspersed with frequent rain squalls. For the Corsair pilots of VMF-114, air support for the Ngesebus landings represented a very interesting and original assignment. The operation marked the beginning of combat work for the squadron, which had reached Peleliu only two days earlier. At 06:30, the Corsairs hit the airstrip on Ngesebus with 500-pound bombs and strafed the entire island as well as Kongauru to the northeast. "Strafing runs were made just a few feet off the deck and a hail of lead laid all over the island." At 08:40, 20 Corsairs preceded the landing craft and gave the island another heavy strafing. In the course of this attack, Japanese mortar positions were spotted and one especially prominent square blockhouse with an iron door was fired on and neutralized. Whenever aircraft were not directly over the island, the artillery on Peleliu and naval guns offshore gave Ngesebus a heavy going over, starting at 07:00 and concluding at 09:05. Both quick and delay fuzes were used. Observers reported that the island was completely covered with fire. In the course of the preliminary bombardment, naval gunfire ships pounded the northern portion of Ngesebus and continued to fire on that part of the island throughout the landing. The Marines advanced inland, swiftly securing the airstrip and the eastern portion of Ngesebus. One platoon then landed on Kongauru and Murphy islands to secure them against light opposition. However, the attack to the northwest encountered strong resistance from Japanese forces entrenched in caves and dugouts, prompting the deployment of tanks to support the Marine assault. By 5:00 PM, nearly all of Ngesebus was under American control, with only a few hundred yards at the extreme northwestern tip remaining in Japanese hands and some caves on the ridges still needing to be cleared. The 3d Battalion spent a relatively quiet night on Ngesebus. On the morning of 29 September, Companies I and K resumed the attack. Progress was normal until the two companies had nearly reached the northern tip of Ngesebus, when a 75mm gun opened up at point blank range. The Marines quickly destroyed this weapon and went on to overcome the rest of the resistance on the island. At 1500, 29 September, Ngesebus was declared secure. An hour later, 2/321 relieved the Marines and completed mopping up. Having accomplished the mission on the island, 3/5 returned to Peleliu. The battalion had secured the island at a cost of 15 killed and 33 wounded. In return, the Marines killed or captured 470 Japanese. Infantrymen of 2/321 were to account for another hundred of the enemy during the ensuing mop-up. Eugene Sledge wrote this about the final capture of Ngesebus: The next morning, again with the help of tanks and am-tracs, our battalion took most of the remainder of Ngesebus. Our casualties were remarkably low for the number of Japanese we killed.* In midafternoon we learned that an army unit would relieve us shortly and complete the job on the northern end of Ngesebus. Our mortar section halted to await orders and dispersed among some open bushes. In our midst was the wreckage of a Japanese heavy machine gun and the remains of the squad that had been wiped out by Company K. The squad members had been killed in the exact positions to be occupied by such a squad “according to the book.” At first glance the dead gunner appeared about to fire his deadly weapon. He still sat bolt upright in the proper firing position behind the breech of his machine gun. Even in death his eyes stared widely along the gun sights. Despite the vacant look of his dilated pupils, I couldn't believe he was dead. Cold chills ran along my spine. Gooseflesh tickled my back. It seemed as though he was looking through me into all eternity, that at any instant he would raise his hands—which rested in a relaxed manner on his thighs—grip the handles on the breech, and press the thumb trigger. The bright shiny brass slugs in the strip clip appeared as ready as the gunner, anxious to speed out, to kill, and to maim more of the “American devils.” But he would rot, and they would corrode. Neither he nor his ammo could do any more for the emperor. The rest of the 5th Marines continued their operations on September 29, launching a full-scale assault on Radar Hill using flamethrowers, bazookas, and demolition charges, finally capturing the position by the morning of September 30. Following the completion of operations in northern Peleliu, the 5th Marines were relieved by the 321st Regiment. However, as the Army troops took over, the remaining Japanese, who had been hiding underground, reoccupied some positions, requiring two additional days of fighting to fully secure northern Peleliu. Nonetheless, the Japanese presence in Peleliu had now been reduced to Nakagawa's Umurbrogol Pocket, so Peleliu was officially secured. Total losses during this battle so far included 843 killed, 3845 wounded and 356 missing of the 1st Marine Division; 46 killed, 226 wounded and 7 missing from the 321st Regiment; and an estimated 9076 Japanese dead plus 180 prisoners of war. Yet that is all for today with Peleliu and Anguar as we now need to travel to China where the Japanese are still carrying out Operation Ichi-Go in an effort to capture Guilin and Liuzhou. As we last observed, General Yokoyama's 11th Army had taken control of Lingling Airdrome and Quanzhou by September 14. Following this, they reorganized their units in preparation for resuming their offensive in October. Meanwhile, the 34th Division was deployed towards Changning, and the 37th Division moved to capture Shaoyang, which fell by the end of the month. The 23rd Army also made final preparations for their offensive in early September. General Tanaka directed the Kawakami Raiding Unit in a wide flanking maneuver along the Zhukeng-Huaiji road towards Wuzhou, while the 23rd Independent Mixed Brigade embarked on a long march north to Guiping. On September 13, the 22nd Independent Mixed Brigade and the 22nd and 104th Divisions began their main advance towards Wuzhou. However, the Kawakami Raiding Unit successfully captured Wuzhou on September 22 and seized the Danzhuzhen airfield six days later. Each unit then continued its advance westward to Guiping, which fell to the 23rd Brigade on October 11. So far, Tanaka's forces had encountered little to no resistance, but this was about to change. After the war, in discussing the performance of the Chinese divisions supposed to defend Guilin and Liuzhou, the political situation in east China, and the attitudes of the east China commanders, Marshal Hata remarked that in his opinion Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi had kept their forces out of serious fighting in order to conserve them "for the future." At the time, there were rumors that these men were planning a coup against Chiang Kai-Shek. Chinese resistance was light, but with its supply situation improved the 14th Air Force again did its best on the Salween as well as in east China. In all September the force dropped 1897.6 tons of bombs and fired 1281382 rounds of machine-gun ammunition, some of the latter of course at aerial targets. In early September, Japanese fighter reinforcements from the homeland also entered combat. The Japanese were pleased at the performance of the latemodel fighters with one of the air regiments they sent to China. Thanks to the air cover thus supplied, for the first time in the east China campaign they found themselves able to move supplies regularly on the Xiang Jiang, which paralleled their line of advance, and so thought their prospects "brightened." At the beginning of the month, Yokoyama renewed his offensive, with the 58th Division successfully taking Xing'An and the 34th Division capturing Changning. The 37th Division was then deployed to Dao, and the 34th Division was sent to Xing'An in preparation for the final push toward Guilin. On October 20, this attack commenced as Yokoyama directed the 216th Regiment to advance to Lehecun, the 58th Division to assault the area north of Guilin, the 40th Division to move to Gaoshangzhen, the 13th Division to advance to Quanhuicun, and the 3rd Division to push toward Fuchuan. With minimal resistance from the retreating Japanese forces, most of these movements were completed by the end of the month. The 3rd Division pushed further to Pingle, while the 37th Division occupied Gongchengzhen and Yanshan to approach Guilin from the south. On November 3, the 3rd Division captured Lipu and began preparations for the advance towards Liuzhen, encircling Guilin and opening the route to Liuzhen. Meanwhile, on October 22, Tanaka ordered the reinforced 23rd Brigade to continue its advance toward Guigang, with the 104th and 22nd Divisions pushing toward Wuxuan. Their progress, previously unopposed, was now challenged by the Chinese 46th and 64th Armies, which launched daily attacks against Guiping with substantial air support. As a result, the 22nd Division was redirected to counter the Chinese forces, successfully forcing their withdrawal by October 29. Following this victory, the 23rd Brigade captured Guigang on November 3, and the 104th Division seized Wuxuan the following day. This allowed Tanaka's forces to begin a northern pursuit to support Yokoyama's assaults on Guilin and Liuzhen. After the third Anshan strike, General LeMay began implementing reforms within the 20th Bomber Command. These changes included reorganizing the command, enhancing the logistics system, adjusting target priorities, and improving coordination with Pacific operations. As a result, the frequency of missions increased each month, with each mission becoming more substantial and effective. Concurrently, following the successful completion of the newly renamed Isley Field on Saipan, the 73rd Bombardment Wing was redirected to the Marianas instead of the CBI Theater. There, it would join Major-General Haywood Hansell's 21st Bomber Command, tasked with executing high-altitude, daylight precision attacks to cripple Japan's aircraft industry. The XXI Bomber Command arrived on Saipan on October 12, 1944, and from the start General Hansell was beset by a host of serious command problems, the worst of which were continued teething problems with the B-29, tardy delivery of aircraft, aircrews untrained in high altitude formation flying, primitive airfield conditions, lack of an air service command for logistical support, no repair depots, a total absence of target intelligence, stubborn internal resistance to daylight operations by his sole combat wing, subordinates in the XXI Bomber Command who lobbied for his removal, and Hansell's inferiority in rank in dealing with other AAF commanders in the theater. Furthermore, Hansell was soon prohibited from flying combat missions with his command, possibly because of limited knowledge of the atomic bomb or the perception that he knew the existence of Ultra. As plans for a sustained bomber offensive against Honshu progressed, the strategic focus of Operation Matterhorn diminished. The 20th Bomber Command shifted to flying missions in direct support of other Pacific operations, with target priorities moving from coke ovens to the aircraft industry. In preparation for the upcoming invasion of the Philippines, the command was tasked with two closely spaced maximum missions against Okayama in Formosa, totaling 170 sorties, along with very-long-range reconnaissance missions. Yet now we have to travel over to the India-Burma theater. As the advance towards the Chindwin continued and the resilient 33rd Division finally crossed the river in late November, General Katamura was finalizing his plans for a withdrawal to the Mandalay sector, scheduled for December. This decision was driven by the intense pressure the British 36th Division was putting on General Takeda's defensive positions at Pinwe, forcing the defenders to prepare for a final retreat by the end of November. Meanwhile, General Slim was preparing for Operation Capital. He planned to stretch airpower to its limits to move four and two-thirds divisions across the Chindwin, along with two tank brigades. After establishing bridgeheads at Sittang, Mawlaik, and Kalewa, he intended to cross the Chindwin and confront General Kimura's forces between the Chindwin and the Irrawaddy. The 4th Corps, now under the experienced General Messervy, would break out from the Sittang bridgehead, advance east through the mountains, capture Pinlebu, and then approach the Shwebo plain from the north. Simultaneously, General Stopford's 33rd Corps would move from Kalewa, following the Chindwin southeast to Yeu and Monywa. Once the Japanese forces were pushed onto the open plain, Slim planned to exploit his overwhelming advantage in airpower and tanks to decisively defeat them, anticipating that the enemy would fiercely defend Mandalay. The combination of the defeats at Kohima, Imphal, Mogaung and Myitkyina meant that by the autumn of 1944, Kimura's role was reduced to defending southern Burma as the northern flank of their new ‘South-East Asia defense zone'. With few reinforcements or supplies to look forward to, Kimura had grim prospects. On paper he had ten divisions (2nd, 15th, 18th, 31st, 33rd, 49th, 53rd, 54th, 55th, & 56th), though this was really seven, since little remained of the three divisions that had been devastated at Kohima-Imphal. He also had the dubious support of Bose's INA and Aung San's seven-battalion Burma National Army, but the civilian population was increasingly going over to the side of the likely winners. Unexpectedly, Kimura received 30000 fresh troops in the period June–October, but his problem was more commissariat than raw numbers, since he was rapidly running out of supplies. Even those he had (45000 tons of food, 500 lorries and 2000 pack animals) were difficult to get to the front, and Kimura was painfully aware that the situation could only get worse. The South-East Asia zone was slowly being throttled by the Allied naval blockade, all approaches to Rangoon were mined, and in 1944 total Japanese shipping losses amounted to 2.3 million tons. Even those ships that ran the blockade would proceed no farther than Penang in Malaya. Kimura chose to deploy smaller units to delay the British-Indian forces while the main body of the 15th Army retreated across the Irrawaddy River. His strategy was to launch a counterattack once the British crossed the river, aiming to replicate a reverse Imphal by wearing down the British-Indian forces through attrition and then destroying them during their retreat in the May 1945 monsoon. Meanwhile, Admiral Mountbatten was also seeking a victory of his own. On November 8, he ordered an assault on Japanese positions in Arakan, with a deadline set for the end of January. This operation was assigned to General Christison's 15th Corps. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The fighting on Peleliu and Angaur raged asAmerican forces struggled against resilient Japanese defenses. Significant advances were made, including the isolation of the Umurbrogol Pocket and the capture of Ngesebus Island. Despite heavy casualties, Peleliu was eventually secured, leaving a small pocket of Japanese resistance.
Last time we spoke about the invasion of the Palau Islands. General Rupertus's 1st Marine Division was tasked with attacking Peleliu, while General Mueller's 81st Division would land on Angaur. Prior to the landings, extensive neutralization of Japanese airfields was carried out by Allied forces. On September 6, carrier-based aircraft attacked the Palaus, significantly damaging enemy targets but encountering minimal resistance. The invasion fleet, led by Admiral Fort, began landing operations on September 15. Despite strong Japanese defenses, especially around Peleliu's rugged coral ridges, the Marines made some progress but faced intense resistance. Notable figures such as Eugene Sledge, author of “With the Old Breed,” provided personal insights into the brutal conditions faced. The landing saw heavy casualties and challenges, including ineffective pre-landing bombardments and fierce counterattacks, but the Marines managed to secure key positions by the end of the first day. The 81st Division then proceeded with landings on Angaur on September 17, facing lighter resistance but difficult terrain. This episode is the Battles of Peleliu and Angaur Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. Last time we left off, Peleliu and Anguar had just been amphibiously assaulted by US Marines. While the landings on Angaur were underway, General Rupertus pressed on with the Peleliu offensive on September 17. In the southern sector, Colonel Hanneken's 7th Marines made headway against the isolated Japanese defenders. The 3rd Battalion cleared a minefield and captured the southeast promontory, while the 1st Battalion took on the southwestern promontory but only managed to secure half of it due to fierce enemy resistance. To the north, the 1st and 5th Marines advanced further, encountering the Umurbrogol Mountains for the first time, where Colonel Nakagawa had fortified his defenses. On the left flank, Colonel Puller's 1st and 3rd Battalions encountered minimal opposition as they moved along the relatively flat coastal plain but had to halt their advance when the 1st Battalion was impeded by a reinforced concrete blockhouse. On the right, Colonel Harris' 2nd Battalion progressed well while staying hidden from Japanese artillery and mortar fire. However, despite reaching their objectives by mid-morning, Harris' 1st Battalion faced difficulty when Puller's 2nd Battalion, after making initial gains, was halted by the Umurbrogol defenses. They fought hard to secure Hill 200 but were immediately met with fire from the next ridge. Additionally, Harris' 3rd Battalion was pinned down by heavy flanking fire from the left. That night, additional armor was sent to the 7th Marines to support the ongoing operations in the south. The next morning, Hanneken's 3rd Battalion launched a final assault. During the night of D+2, additional armor (tanks and 75mm gun-mounted halftracks) was brought up and at 10:00 on September 18 the advance was resumed. Again progress was painfully slow with many reserve elements being attacked by Japanese from bypassed caves and underground emplacements. At 13:44 elements of Companies A and C reached the southern shores, though the area being assaulted by Company B was still heavily defended. Tank support had withdrawn to re-arm and before Company B was in a position to resume the attack, a bulldozer was needed to extricate the gun-mounted half-tracks, which had become bogged down. At that time, several explosions were heard from the Japanese defenses and it was found that remaining Japanese defenders had finished the job for the Marines. The final handful leaped from the cliff tops into the sea in an effort to escape, only to be picked off by Marine riflemen. With the taking of the two promontories, the southern part of Peleliu was secured. 1/7 and 3/7 squared themselves away for a well-earned rest, while headquarters reported "1520 hours D+3, 7th Marines mission on Peleliu completed." Unfortunately, this was not quite the case. Despite the slow progress and intense Japanese resistance, the Marines managed to secure the southern portion of Peleliu by the end of September 18. At the same time, the 1st and 5th Marines continued their fierce and costly push north. On the right flank, Colonel Harris's 2nd Battalion faced only sporadic resistance as it cut through the dense jungle. The Americans eventually reached a causeway leading east to Peleliu's northeastern peninsula, a potentially dangerous obstacle to their advance. After a successful patrol, Harris opted to call in an airstrike before crossing, but the strike missed its target and hit the area while the Marines were crossing. Despite this, the bridgehead was established, though further casualties were incurred due to friendly artillery and mortar fire. With this new foothold, Harris redirected his 3rd Battalion eastward across the causeway to support the 2nd Battalion's advance. On the left flank, the 1st Marines, having sustained 1,236 casualties, were urged by Rupertus to "maintain the momentum." This led Colonel Puller to commit all available reserves, including engineers, support personnel, and Hanneken's reserve 2nd Battalion. The 1st Marines suffered about 240 casualties during the 17th and in Japanese counterattacks the ensuing night; the 3rd Battalion was reduced to about one third of its original strength; and two companies of the 1st Battalion were practically finished as fighting units. On the other hand, there was some reason for optimism. Progress on the 17th had been measured in hundreds of yards in the rough, high ground at the southern end of the central ridges and strong Japanese resistance had been overcome. Whatever optimism may have existed was not to last too long. On the 18th, in what the Marine Corps' history of the operation characterizes as "savage and costly fighting," elements of the 1st and 7th Marines managed to advance more than 500 yards in the center, principally along the ridge lines and hills oriented north and south. But the advance during the day was held up at a group of peaks which seemed at first to form a continuous ridge line that was oriented more east and west than the rest of the Peleliu ridges. Soon, the name Five Sisters came to be applied to a cluster of peaks forming the western side of the terrain feature. A towering hill at its eastern extremity, separated from Five Sisters by a saddle, was designated Hill 300, or Old Baldy. With the 7th Marines held up in the center, at Five Sisters, the units on both sides of the central ridges halted so as not to create exposed flanks. Puller's 3rd Battalion made progress along the coastal plains but had to pause to stay in contact with other units. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion struggled against the Umurbrogol Mountains, capturing Hill 210 before being forced to withdraw due to a fierce Japanese counterattack on Hill 200 behind them. At Anguar, following a three-hour artillery bombardment supported by aircraft, General Mueller's 321st and 322nd Regiments resumed their advance north and west with tank support. After linking their advances, Colonel Venable pushed west and reached the high ground where Major Goto had established his main defenses, while Colonel Dark made significant progress south until his forces encountered the formidable defenses at Green Beach. The night of 18-19 September was noisy and nerve-racking all along the front and few troops got much sleep. Minor Japanese attacks harassed the exposed salient held by the 3d Battalion, 322d Infantry, while bats and large land crabs helped the Japanese to create distraction and started troops firing on nonexistent enemy infiltrators. Apparently no casualties resulted either from Japanese action or indiscriminate small arms fire. Friendly artillery fire did, however, cause some casualties. About 2030, four or five 105-mm. shells from the 316th Field Artillery Battalion hit the lines of the 2d Battalion, 321st Infantry, killing 4 men and wounding 15 others. The artillery fire was stopped before further damage could be done. On September 19, following a night of numerous Japanese infiltrations and small-scale counterattacks, the 322nd Regiment swiftly secured Saipan Town and advanced to the north shore of Garangaoi Cove. Meanwhile, the 321st Regiment successfully attacked and captured the Green Beach fortifications from their vulnerable side. To manage the exposed Japanese forces on the beaches, Dark's 2nd Battalion, supported by tanks, maneuvered left and progressed down the southwest of the island, halting just short of the shoreline by nightfall. At Peleliu, Harris' Marines made headway towards the Ngardololok area, overcoming light resistance and quickly dispatching the few enemy stragglers they encountered, reaching Purple Beach by day's end. However, in front of the O-3 line, Puller's weary troops, having endured a grueling night of Japanese counterattacks, resumed their assault on the Umurbrogol Mountains. Despite some local advances, by evening on 20 September the 1st Marines had been stopped and, ". . . as an assault unit on the regimental level, had ceased temporarily to exist," having suffered almost 1,750 casualties, well over half its strength. Relief was absolutely necessary, not only because casualties were heavy but also because the survivors were physically exhausted from heat, lack of water, and continuous combat. Elements of the 7th Marines therefore relieved all 1st Marines units except those along West Road. While the 7th Marines took over from the exhausted 1st Marines on the right, the 5th Marines continued their advance through western Peleliu, securing its two peninsulas, including Island A and Ngabad Island, by September 21. General Mueller, concerned lest the Japanese reported on the south break through gaps or weak points in the forward lines, had special defenses in depth set up at RED and BLUE Beaches, utilizing Shore Party and antiaircraft troops. All units were alerted to expect Japanese attacks during the night. The division expected (and perhaps hoped) that the Japanese still believed to be located in southern Angaur might launch a suicidal desperation charge during the night or at dawn on the 20th. The night proved very quiet until, toward morning, some small, scattered Japanese parties infiltrated through the lines of both regiments. There was no banzai effort--rather, these Japanese troops were apparently attempting to escape to the northwest hill mass from positions in the mangrove swamp and GREEN Beach 3 areas. Action at dawn was limited to a mopping-up operation directed against four Japanese discovered in the headquarters area of the 2d Battalion, 321st Infantry. By 11:00 on September 20, Mueller reported to General Geiger that all organized resistance on Angaur had ended and that the island was secure. General Mueller's statement was probably prompted by his realization that the remaining Japanese were compressed into the northwest hills and by the reports that about 850 of the enemy had been killed through the 20th. This casualty figure was an overestimation. Probably fewer than 600 Japanese had been killed through the 20th, and Major Goto still had possibly 750 men with which to conduct an organized defense in the northwest. On orders from General Inoue, Goto planned no final banzai attack which would decimate his forces. Instead he withdrew over half his force to rugged terrain and emplaced them in natural or prepared fortifications. His lines of defense in the northwest were well conceived; many of his positions were mutually supporting; the amphitheater configuration of the bowl provided him with defensive areas whence heavy cross fires could be directed at attackers; the broken coral, with its crevices, fissures, caves, and ridgelets, gave him defensive advantages at least as good as those at the Ibdi Pocket on Biak; and he had available a number of artillery and anti-tank weapons, heavy and light mortars, and heavy and light machine-guns, most of them so emplaced as to give maximum support to his riflemen. In addition, he could still exercise effective control over the men he had gathered in the Lake Salome bowl. For whatever it was worth, Goto was ready to conduct a protracted defense, though the best he could hope for was to tie down the 322nd Regiment. Nevertheless, the real issue at Angaur--securing the prospective airfield area--had already been decided. To the north, while southern Angaur was being secured, Venable's men were probing the enemy's northwestern defenses with a series of company-sized attacks. These attacks allowed the Americans to gather crucial information about Goto's remaining positions, centered around the Lake Salome bowl. Venable discovered that organized resistance was still strong, prompting him to rearrange his units for a final push. Following a heavy artillery and air bombardment, the 322nd Regiment attacked the bowl with tank support, initially making some gains but soon encountering obstacles due to the terrain and enemy fire. By the end of September 21, Venable deemed the newly gained positions too exposed and decided to withdraw to the previous night's defenses. Meanwhile, the 1st and 7th Marines continued to face heavy casualties as they fought through the Umurbrogol Mountains, with the latter advancing less than 175 yards after two days of intense combat. Nakagawa's fierce defenders managed to halt the 1st Marine Division on the rough and well-defended terrain, resulting in a total of 4,000 casualties by this time. After visiting the front, Geiger decided to replace the battered 1st Marines with Dark's 321st Regiment, which had suffered minimal casualties and had completed its mission at Angaur. The 1st Marines by this time reported 1749 casualties. One Marine later described the fighting in the Umurbrogol, which attests to the level to which the 1st Marines had deteriorated: "I picked up the rifle of a dead Marine and I went up the hill; I remember no more than a few yards of scarred hillside, I didn't worry about death anymore, I had resigned from the human race. I crawled and scrambled forward and lay still without any feeling towards any human thing. In the next foxhole was a rifleman. He peered at me through red and painful eyes. I didn't care about him and he didn't care about me. As a fighting unit, the 1st Marines was finished. We were no longer human beings, I fired at anything that moved in front of me, friend or foe. I had no friends, I just wanted to kill." OnSeptember 19, he also dispatched Colonel Arthur Watson's reserve 323rd Regiment to secure Ulithi Atoll. After a successful reconnaissance mission, the infantrymen landed on September 22, discovering that the atoll's airfield and seaplane base had been abandoned by the Japanese. The Americans later established a major advanced fleet anchorage, a Marine airbase, and a Navy seaplane base there. Ulithi Atoll contained a 300-berth anchorage and a seaplane base. Occupation of these Western Caroline islands provided still another base from which future operations against the enemy could be supported. The construction of an airstrip on Ameliorate Island made possible fighter plane protection for the anchorage and afforded a base from which US aircraft could continue neutralization of the nearby Japanese bases on Yap. Together with Angaur and Peleliu Islands to the southwest and Guam, Tinian, and Saipan to the northeast, the capture of Ulithi Atoll completed a line of American bases that isolated Japanese holdings in the Central and South Pacific. The occupation of Ulithi Atoll further denied it to the enemy as a fleet anchorage, weather and radio station, and possible air and submarine base, in addition to precluding its use by the enemy to observe and report the activities of American forces in the sector. By September 25 the unloading of all the support ships had been completed and Vice Admiral John H. Hoover, Commander, Forward Areas Western Pacific, took over the task of developing Ulithi Atoll into an advanced fleet base. Within a month after its capture, more than 100 Navy craft from self-propelled types to lighters, floating drydocks, barges, landing craft, and seaplane wrecking derricks were en route to the island. During subsequent operations in the Philippines, the Pacific Fleet found Ulithi to be an extremely valuable base. Prior to the invasion of Okinawa, the island served as a staging area for fleet and amphibious forces. The atoll thus fulfilled a vital strategic role in the final phase of the Pacific War. On that day, Venable resumed his assault on the Lake Salome bowl. The coastal offensive faced little resistance, but the attack through the southern defile encountered heavy enemy fire. Despite this, the troops reached the shores of Lake Salome. However, Venable was severely wounded during the action and had to be evacuated, with his troops retreating to more defensible positions by nightfall. The main strength of the attack was placed on the right (southeast) section of the bowl, and tanks fired along the eastern rim about 200 yards in front of the leading elements. The mediums had been undisturbed by enemy fire all morning, but, apparently attracted by an incautious grouping of officers and men near the lead tanks and defile exit, a Japanese anti-tank gun opened fire from a hidden emplacement along the east rim. Three officers (including Colonel Venable, who was in the forward area to observe the new attack) and one enlisted man were severely wounded and had to be evacuated. During the retirement on the 22nd, one of the three forward tanks was so badly damaged by a mine or buried shell that it could not be moved through the defile. This tank blocked the defile's northern entrance and prevented the withdrawal of another medium, which had to be destroyed to keep it from falling into Japanese hands. In four days of fruitless effort to push into the bowl from the south, three tanks and two 75-mm SPM's had been lost. Heavier infantry losses also began to be sustained now that the Japanese, cornered, were fighting to the death. On that day, for instance, the 2nd Battalion lost 2 men killed and about 35 wounded. At 0730 on the morning of the 23d, the 2d Battalion, with Companies B, C, and E attached, continued the attack into the bowl from the south. Companies B and C worked up the east shore of Lake Salome. Companies I and G pushed toward the southwest and western shores, while Company F paid particular attention to caves along the southwest rim of the bowl. During the first part of the attack all companies moved forward rapidly, and Company I reached the northwest corner of the lake without much trouble. But Company B, pushing forward against increasingly heavy Japanese fire from the north, was pinned down by this fire when it reached the northeast corner of the lake. Company C was sent north on B's right to try to outflank the enemy machine gun and mortar positions from which the fire on Company B originated. The intention was to flush the Japanese from their positions and push them southwest and south against the main body of the 2d Battalion. But Company C could make little progress toward the northern section of the bowl, and its own position became precarious as Japanese mortar and machine gun fire increased and the 1st Battalion's own 81-mm. mortar ammunition ran out, making further mortar support impossible. Japanese fire continued to increase and the positions of all forward companies became untenable. A general withdrawal to the defile entrance was ordered. The withdrawal was painfully slow; companies were broken up; all units suffered more casualties. One small group of Company I, separated from its parent unit, worked over the cliffs and ridges at the bowl's western rim to the coast at BLACK Beach. Company B, retreating in small segments, lost men as it withdrew from the northeast corner of the lake. All told, the 2d Battalion and attached companies lost 18 men killed and over 75 wounded during the day. Concurrently, as the 1st and 7th Marines continued to struggle with the formidable Umurbrogol Mountains, Harris' Company G successfully secured the undefended Carlson Island, finally completing the 5th Marines' original mission. Despite concerns about a potential enemy attack on Koror and Babelthuap after the Peleliu operation, General Inoue decided to reinforce Nakagawa's beleaguered garrison. By 21 September effective Japanese infantry strength in the central ridges was down to 1,300 men. That, of course, does not paint a true picture of the situation in the central pocket. A trained soldier, well armed, can be tenacious on the defense in such terrain as the central ridges of Peleliu whether or not he be trained for infantry service. There were probably 4,000 Japanese troops (including the 1,300 infantrymen) still firmly ensconced in the central pocket as of 21 September, and there were at least 1,000 more troops in the Amiangal Mountain area at northern Peleliu. Nevertheless, Colonel Nakagawa, commanding the Peleliu Sector Unit, clearly needed reinforcements if he was to hold out much longer. There were perhaps 30,000 Japanese troops in the northern Palaus to draw from, including two battalions of the 59th Infantry, two battalions of the 15th Infantry, and four or five recently organized infantry battalions of the 53d Independent Mixed Brigade. The Japanese were not to reach their destination undetected. At 0535, the destroyer H.L. Edwards spotted seven enemy barges about 1,000 yards northeast of Akarakoro Point at the northern tip of Peleliu, obviously headed for the island. The destroyer opened fire, sinking one barge before the remainder reached the beach. A combination of bombing and strafing, naval gunfire, and artillery hit the barges on the beach, and by 0845 the cruiser Louisville reported all barges destroyed. The enemy version of this incident agrees only in part with the American account, adding that "despite receiving severe enemy air and artillery fire at a point two kilometers off the coast, they made a successful landing at 0520 hours under the command of 1st Lieutenant Murahori". Knowing that some Japanese forces had reached Peleliu, Rupertus decided to deploy his own reinforcements between the central ridges and the western shore, targeting the enemy's weak spot for an offensive up the western coast. The 7th Marines supported the Army by attacking enemy positions from the south and center, with Hanneken's 3rd Battalion advancing along the high ground to the right rear of the 321st. After relieving the 1st Marines, Dark sent patrols up the coastal flat to Garekoru, encountering little opposition initially. However, Dark's 2nd Battalion faced heavier resistance in the afternoon and had to retreat, postponing the northward advance until the next day. During the night, Inoue sent the remainder of the 2nd Battalion, 15th Regiment, and despite being shelled, most reinforcements reached Peleliu. By September 23, the Americans had secured important footholds on Peleliu and Angaur. However, intense fighting remained, with the 321st Regiment relieving the 1st Marines against Nakagawa's fortified positions, while the 322nd Regiment continued to attack Goto's defenses on the northwest hills. Yet that is it for the Palau's as we now need to turn to Mortai. General Persons' troops quickly secured and expanded the island perimeter, successfully repelling the enemy's night raids with little difficulty. An example of these raids is the September 18 attack. This is the Japanese report: “On 18 September the main body of the 2nd Provisional Raiding Unit, which had moved into position along the upper Tjao, launched a strong night infiltration attack with the objective of disrupting the enemy's rear area in the vicinity of Doroeba and Gotalalmo. Although deep penetration of the enemy lines was achieved and considerable casualties inflicted, the attack failed to reduce the beachhead or to interfere with the enemy's rapid preparation of Doroeba airfield.” In truth, the Americans easily repelled this attack, suffering very few casualties. These raids would continue throughout September and October. American engineers were busy constructing a new fighter strip at the Pitoe Drome area. This strip was scheduled to be ready for use by September 29 but was eventually abandoned and downgraded to an emergency field. A number of factors influenced the decision to abandon the site, which was renamed Pitoe Crash Strip. Japanese air reaction had been so ineffectual that the need for a fighter base on Morotai was not as urgent as had been expected. Aircraft based on escort carriers, some of which remained in the Morotai area for weeks, were able to keep away most of the Japanese planes, and their efforts were supplemented by long-range land-based fighters from Sansapor. Moreover, the line of approach which planes had to use to land on Pitoe Crash Strip interfered with that of the more important bomber base at Wama Drome. Finally, the terrain at the crash strip was by no means as well drained as that at other locations on the Doroeba Plain, and it was necessary to expend much engineer effort to keep the strip operational. The new field, which acquired the designation Pitoe Drome, was located about 1,200 yards north of Wama Drome. Construction proceeded slowly at Pitoe Drome because so much engineer effort had to be devoted to the completion of Wama Drome. By 4 October almost 7,000 feet at the new site had been cleared, but it was not until the 17th, D plus 32, that even one runway was surfaced, let alone taxiways and dispersal lanes. Meanwhile, the construction of a new bomber field at Wama Drome faced significant delays due to heavy rainstorms and a shortage of suitable surfacing material. Despite almost constant struggles with soggy ground and tropical downpours, engineers managed to make 4,000 feet of Wama Drome operational by October 4. However, the overall progress on building Morotai's new airbase, intended for the upcoming invasion of the Philippines, was slower than anticipated. Nevertheless, the Tradewind Task Force was disbanded on September 25, as the island was considered secure enough. General Hall then assumed command of the Morotai base as the commander of the 11th Corps. However, unbeknownst to the Americans, who believed the only possible Japanese response to the invasion was the ineffective air raids already carried out against them, troops in Halmahera were preparing to embark on a dangerous mission to reinforce Morotai and contest control of this key island. In the meantime, after the successful invasion of the Palaus, new developments were unfolding on the Philippines front following Admiral Mitscher's Task Force 38's recent successful strikes. These strikes had revealed an unexpected vulnerability in the enemy's air defenses, prompting Admirals Halsey and Nimitz to cancel the Yap operation, thereby freeing up many resources for the Philippines Campaign. Approximately 500 aircraft, or about 57% of the 884 believed to be in the Philippines, were rendered nonoperational or destroyed during these air attacks. Consequently, General MacArthur decided to cancel the preliminary Mindanao operations and instead make a direct jump from the Palaus-Morotai line to Leyte on October 20. Shortly after this change in schedule, MacArthur informed the Joint Chiefs that he could advance from Leyte to Luzon by December 20, two months earlier than planned. Meanwhile, the carrier raids on Mindanao and the Visayas strengthened the Southern Army command's belief that the Allies were preparing for an early invasion of the Philippines. As a result, Marshal Terauchi recommended accelerating the reinforcement of the Philippines, activating Operation Sho-Go, and authorizing the 4th Air Army to employ its main strength against enemy carrier task forces. This was in contrast to the current policy of not committing available air strength against enemy raiders, which was failing to conserve Japanese air power for a decisive battle. However, Tokyo denied these last two requests while also receiving concerning reports about General Kuroda's neglect of his duties as field army commander. In the middle of September, IGHQ decided to replace General Kuroda with General Yamashita. Not only did General Kuroda have a concept of the Philippine operations that differed from that of his superiors, but he was charged with neglecting his duty as field army commander. Lt. Col. Yoshie Seiichi of the Personnel Bureau of the War Ministry, who had been sent to the Philippines to investigate personnel matters in the Southern Army, said of the incident: “Stories reached the War Ministry that Lt. Gen. Kuroda was devoting more time to his golf, reading and personal matters than to the execution of his official duties. It appeared that his control over staff officers and troops was not sufficiently strong and that there was a good deal of unfavorable criticism of his conduct among the troops. There were also indications that discipline was becoming very lax. On September 4, I left Tokyo under orders . . . to investigate. As a result I obtained many statements substantiating the unfavorable stories in regard to Lt. Gen. Kuroda. The recommendations of all the staff was that Lt. Gen. Kuroda be relieved as soon as possible, and be replaced by Gen. Yamashita . . . who was a superb tactician and excellent leader.” Random note, for those interested, over on my personal podcast at the Pacific War Channel I did a single episode covering how Yamashita became the Tiger of Malaya and plan to do more pieces on him as I find him to be one of the more interesting generals of the Pacific War. Before an effective change in command could take place, the Japanese were about to experience a more dramatic display of Allied offensive power that they would soon encounter in the Philippines. On September 18, Mitscher's Task Force 38 was ordered to head back toward the islands for a major strike against Luzon, the heart of Japanese control in the Philippines. The American carriers achieved complete surprise and successfully attacked Luzon three days later. Despite the fierce defense by approximately 42 Zeros, between 09:30 and 18:00 on September 21, four waves of over 400 aircraft targeted the harbor area and airfields around Manila with bombs and strafing runs. The assault on the harbor and shipping along the west coast resulted in the sinking or severe damage of 34 vessels totaling over 100,000 gross tons, while the raids on the airfields inflicted significant damage on grounded aircraft. At 0610 the following day, 22 September, search planes discovered the enemy carrier groups still lurking off the coast of Luzon, and at 0730 a hit-and-run attack was carried out by 27 Japanese aircraft, with reported bomb hits on two carriers and one cruiser. Naval air units at Legaspi attempted to carry out a second attack on the enemy carriers during the late afternoon, but the attack force of 19 planes failed to locate the carrier groups. Following the failed Japanese hit-and-run counterattack, Mitscher continued his assaults on Manila, destroying an estimated 110 aircraft in the air and 95 on the ground, and sinking or damaging 44 vessels. After the apparent withdrawal of enemy carriers, the Japanese decided to relocate their remaining ships in Manila Bay to other anchorages, many of which were directed to the secure docks of Coron Bay. However, Mitscher's carriers returned on September 24 to launch further strikes against Luzon, including a raid by about 96 Hellcats and 24 Helldivers on Coron Bay, which resulted in the sinking or damaging of 10 more vessels. Additional attacks on other targets led to the sinking or damaging of 12 more ships. Despite the ongoing air attacks, the Imperial Japanese Navy still deemed it premature to fully activate Operation Sho-Go, believing the decisive battle would take place in or after late October. Meanwhile, the Imperial Japanese Army accelerated its preparations to defend the Philippines. The reserve 1st Division was ordered to move to the islands immediately, and plans were made to assign ten surface raiding regiments to the area. On September 26, as plans for air reinforcement to the Philippines were being approved, General Yamashita was confirmed as the new commander of the 14th Area Army. He arrived in the Philippines on October 6 and found the situation "unsatisfactory," with poor planning for the Leyte campaign and many of his staff unfamiliar with the conditions in the Philippines. Lt. Gen. Makino Shiro, now commanding the 16th Division, which was the major force on Leyte, had directed his efforts since April 1944 toward the construction of defensive positions on the island. The first line of defense, which was on the east coast in the Dulag area, was practically completed by the middle of October. The third defensive line was in the middle of Leyte Valley in the vicinity of Dagami. The second line of defense was between the two others, while the bulk of supplies was assembled in the central mountain range at Jaro. The distribution of the other troops at the time of the American landings was as follows: one battalion of the 9th Infantry Regiment in the Catmon Hill and Tanauan district, and the main strength of the 33d Infantry Regiment in the Palo and Tacloban area. The larger part of the 33d Infantry Regiment, which was less adequately trained than the other regiments, had arrived on Leyte in mid-September from Luzon. Its officers were unfamiliar with the terrain and did not fortify their positions. However, the supply situation was favorable, with Manila serving as the main Japanese depot in the region. Following established plans, he instructed his subordinates that the Area Army would "seek decisive battle on Luzon" while in the central and southern Philippines, the focus would be to delay the enemy's advance and prevent them from securing naval and air bases. However, the September air strikes had led to a noticeable increase in guerrilla activity and civil disorder due to widespread destruction and panic. Small Japanese garrisons were attacked, pro-Japanese Filipinos molested and intimidated, and communications disrupted. In central Luzon there were indications that some guerrilla units were planning a move to the Lamon Bay area in order to be the first to cooperate with an American landing force, and on Negros and Panay guerrilla raids on Japanese airfields became boldly persistent. The Fourteenth Area Army feared that, as soon as enemy forces landed, the guerrillas would not only give them direct assistance as scouts and guides, but seriously hamper Japanese operations by attacking rear communication lines. Consequently, martial law was declared across the archipelago in anticipation of enemy landings. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Despite fierce and costly combat, American forces made significant advances in the Palaus, securing critical islands and establishing bases. The battle for Peleliu was marked by high casualties and intense fighting, with heavy losses on both sides. The successful capture of strategic locations like Ulithi Atoll and the subsequent strikes on Luzon further demonstrated Allied dominance and strategic planning in the Pacific Theater.
Last time we spoke about invasion of Guam and Tinian. Japanese forces, led by General Obata on Guam and Colonel Ogata on Tinian, prepared defenses with trenches, pillboxes, and artillery. The Americans bombarded these defenses extensively. Despite resistance, they successfully landed on Guam and Tinian, securing beachheads. Intense fighting ensued, with Marines facing heavy casualties. Despite Japanese counterattacks, American forces gradually expanded their footholds, leading to the eventual containment of the Japanese on Orote Peninsula. The Japanese launched a fierce assault against Marine positions on Guam, engaging in close combat with heavy casualties on both sides. Despite initial success, the Japanese offensive was repelled by intense artillery and machine-gun fire, leaving the remaining enemy forces to defend Orote Peninsula. On Tinian, after extensive naval bombardment, Marines landed successfully, repelling Japanese counterattacks and establishing a beachhead. Despite heavy Japanese casualties, the Marines suffered relatively few losses, ultimately breaking the enemy's resistance. This episode is the Battle of Sansapor Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. Following the successful capture of Noemfoor and Biak, the Allies possessed ample air and supply bases to advance to the Vogelkop Peninsula, fulfilling General MacArthur's aim of establishing a vital airbase supporting further operations northwestward, potentially towards Mindanao or via Halmahera. Initially considering Manokwari as a non-critical objective, MacArthur's plan centered on seizing Sorong and Waigeo Island for crucial supply and air bases in New Guinea. However, the rapid pace of Pacific theater operations raised doubts about the feasibility of bringing the Klamono oilfields into production before the war's end, prompting the cancellation of exploitation plans by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs assumed responsibility for the direction and coordination of oil rehabilitation projects in the Dutch East Indies and undertook necessary liaison with British and Dutch agencies. By mid-February 1943 they had decided that military units would at least start all oil rehabilitation and exploitation projects in the Indies, although the final development of the oil resources might be left to civilian agencies. MacArthur was instructed to plan the location and timing details of oil rehabilitation projects in the Indies, and, subject to the Joint Chiefs' approval, execute those plans. At the same time, the Joint Chiefs directed that the organization of special military petroleum production and refining units begin. The requisite troops, most of them US Army engineers and many especially recruited from civilian pursuits, soon began to assemble and train in California. Orders were also placed with manufacturers for the special production and refining equipment, which was sent to California as it was obtained. While these steps were being taken to coordinate oil rehabilitation projects, it had become obvious that in accordance with MacArthur's plans the first significant oil producing region that could be recaptured in the Netherlands East Indies would be the Klamono district on the Vogelkop Peninsula. The Klamono oil was especially valuable in that it could be used as fuel for naval vessels without refining beyond a little "topping" to remove excess naphtha. With limited effort, the wells could be expected to bring in some 16000 barrels of crude oil per day; with additional development, about 25000 barrels. Such production would presumably save the Allies considerable shipping space and time, for, instead of the long haul from United States ports, navy bunker fuel could be produced and topped as necessary much nearer to the scene of combat. With the oilfields no longer a priority and aerial surveys indicating unsuitable conditions for airstrips on Waigeo, MacArthur opted for ground reconnaissance of the Mar-Sansapor area. This exploration revealed promising landing beaches and potential airfield sites, albeit requiring significant effort to develop. Consequently, MacArthur directed Alamo Force to secure the lightly-defended Sansapor-Mar area instead of Sorong-Waigeo, scheduling a landing for July 30. General Krueger tasked General Sibert's 6th Division with Operation Typhoon, designating the 20th Regiment at Wakde-Sarmi as reserve and arranging relief by Major-General John Persons' 31st Division. Admiral Fechteler's Task Force 77 had devised a strategy: to deploy Colonel Forbie Privett's 1st Regiment, consisting of the 1st and 2nd Battalions, onto the Red Beaches northeast of Mar. Concurrently, Sibert's 6th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop was tasked with securing Middleburg Island. Following the landings, airfields were to be constructed at these sites. The subsequent phase involved Privett's 3rd Battalion executing a shore-to-shore movement to establish a PT base on Sansapor's Green Beach, scheduled for the day after the initial landings. To set this plan in motion, the 31st Division commenced unloading operations at Maffin Bay on July 14 and successfully relieved Sibert's units four days later. The two regimental combat teams of the 31st Division, the 155th and the 167th, which operated at Wakde-Sarmi had no previous combat experience but received much valuable training in a series of patrol actions, company-sized scouting missions, and battalion reconnaissances in force. General Persons wanted to mount an offensive to drive the Japanese from a main line of resistance which they had established in the low hills between Metimedan Creek and Sarmi, but the demands for labor at the Maffin Bay staging area and the necessity for committing many troops to the defense of that area made it impossible to assemble sufficient strength for such an attack. Then, by the time the 6th Division's requirements had been met, the 31st Division itself had to begin preparations for another operation. The 31st Division therefore had to confine itself principally to its patrolling missions, both west and east of the perimeter. Patrols east of the perimeter were sent out to hunt down stragglers from the Japanese Hollandia garrison, and most of them, comprising armed natives of the Wakde-Sarmi area, were led by a Dutch officer, 1st Lt. C.J. Sneeuwjagt. Meanwhile, work went on at the Maffin Bay staging area; and during the period July 18-August 31 a daily average of 2,500 tons of various supplies was unloaded at the bay. During the same period the 31st Division lost 39 men killed, 195 wounded, 34 injured, and 3 missing. The division in turn killed 294 Japanese, found 497 dead, and captured 14 others. However, the deployment of the 6th Division faced delays due to heavy congestion in the Wakde-Sarmi area. It wasn't until July 27 that Sibert's combat units began departing from Maffin Bay towards Sansapor. Maintaining the element of surprise was paramount to General Krueger, hence no preliminary naval or air bombardment was conducted in the Sansapor-Mar area. Instead, General Kenney's aircraft targeted Japanese bases at Manokwari, Sorong, and the Halmahera-Ceram-Ambon region. To further deceive the Japanese, Fechteler's convoy took a circuitous route to approach Sansapor, apparently arriving undetected around 05:00 on July 30. As anticipated, no opposition was encountered, and the first wave successfully landed at 07:01. While Privett's troops swiftly unloaded on the mainland, one LST proceeded toward Middleburg Island. By 07:30, it began deploying the amtracs carrying the reinforced 6th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, which safely landed by 08:00. Encountering no resistance, the island was promptly secured, and the troop regrouped before setting sail for nearby Amsterdam Island, which was also secured unopposed by 11:30. Upon returning to the mainland, following the incident where three unarmed Japanese were killed, Privett's 2nd Battalion proceeded inland and eastward. They successfully established defenses along low hills roughly 800 yards from the shore. Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion encountered challenges navigating through dense jungle undergrowth. At 07:40, the 3rd Battalion landed and moved west along the beach to the Wewe River mouth, preparing for the next day's advance to Sansapor. By nightfall, all units were ashore, securing the desired beachhead perimeter. The following day, Privett's 3rd Battalion embarked for Green Beach at Cape Sansapor, meeting no resistance upon landing at 08:44. They then proceeded south along the beach to secure Sansapor Plantation and Village by 10:00. While Cape Sansapor proved unsuitable for the planned PT boat base due to reef-bound shorelines and poor beaches, Amsterdam Island emerged as a promising alternative location. Subsequent operations in the Sansapor-Mar area involved patrolling to eliminate scattered Japanese groups, expanding the beachhead, and safeguarding airfield installations. A significant event occurred on August 3 when 92 sick or wounded Japanese and Formosan troops were captured at a Japanese hospital near Cape Opmarai. Concurrently, General Anami acknowledged the untenable positions on the northeastern Vogelkop and General Ikeda's 35th Division abandoned Manokwari on July 16, embarking on a challenging overland march towards Sorong with limited supplies. Around the same time, General Teshima's headquarters at Manokwari and other small garrisons in the region commenced an overland journey to Windehsi. By August 15, as units of the 35th Division approached the Kor River, the 63rd Regiment moved into the vicinity, engaging in skirmishes with retreating Japanese forces. In these encounters, they eliminated 17 enemy combatants and captured 4. By August 31, the 63rd Regiment had further success, neutralizing 155 Japanese soldiers and capturing an additional 42, with minimal losses on their own side: 3 soldiers killed and 4 wounded. Similarly, patrols from the 1st Regiment on the western flank encountered retreating Japanese forces, resulting in the elimination of 197 enemies and the capture of 154, with only 4 soldiers wounded by the end of August. The total casualties for the Typhoon Task Force amounted to 14 killed, 35 wounded, and 9 injured, while they managed to account for 385 Japanese and Formosans killed and 215 captured. Ikeda's division remnants reached Sorong on August 25 after enduring a grueling 40-day march. Additionally, construction of the Middleburg strip was successfully completed by August 14, and the Mar Drome was slated to be operational by September 3 to accommodate Kenney's fighters and medium bombers. Transitioning to Tinian, following the successful landing on July 24 and the subsequent destruction of the Japanese counterattacking force, General Schmidt's primary objectives for July 25 included landing the 2nd Marine Division and expanding the beachhead. While General Watson's Marines disembarked swiftly, General Cates' 4th Marine Division initiated their advance at 10:00. Colonel Jones' 23rd Marines navigated through dense canefields and underbrush along the coast beyond the O-1 Line. Colonel Batchelder's 25th Marines executed an enveloping maneuver against Mount Maga, securing its summit after intense combat supported by mortars and tanks. Colonel Hart's 24th Marines swiftly moved south and eastward, reaching the O-2 Line. Upon arrival, Colonel Wallace's 8th Marines assumed control of the far left flank and proceeded slowly through the rugged coastal terrain and dense undergrowth toward Ushi Point. Following the successful capture of a Japanese stronghold, the Marines advanced unopposed, advancing 200 yards past O-2 swiftly. However, the day brought hardship for the 14th Marines, facing heavy counter-battery fire resulting in the loss of 13 soldiers killed and 22 wounded. Admiral Mitscher's Task Force 58 conducted a reconnaissance-in-force of the western Carolines and launched a third raid on the Volcano-Bonin Islands to thwart enemy bomber interference, resulting in the destruction of five ships, damage to others, and the loss of 13 enemy planes for only 16 aircraft lost. The next day, Schmidt's undermanned divisions, later reinforced with 1782 replacements to fill Saipan-related gaps, commenced the advance to the O-3 Line. While the 23rd Marines steadily advanced with minimal resistance towards the vicinity of the O-4 Line, the bolstered 25th Marines cleared Mount Maga and, securing the summit of Mount Lasso, advanced into the O-4A Line virtually unchallenged. Meanwhile, the 8th Marines rapidly secured the Ushi Point flats and its airfield, Colonel Stuart's 2nd Marines swiftly advanced eastward, securing Asiga Point upon reaching the east coast by 12:30, and Colonel Riseley's 6th Marines, after landing, pushed southward to establish a line abreast of the 2nd Marines. On July 27 and 28, encountering minimal opposition, the Marines advanced southward in a concerted effort, with riflemen in formation and skirmishers leading the way. The NTLF G-2 Lieutenant Colonel Thomas R. Yancey came to a conservative conclusion on July 27 that summarized not only that day's enemy situation but the entire operation's enemy situation as well: “Without saying so, he seemed to indicate the importance of all units conducting aggressive patrolling far to the front: To date there have been no indications that our front line units have encountered the 50th Infantry Regiment in force [since the first night's counterattacks]. It is believed that this unit is largely intact and it is known that they are well equipped and seasoned troops. They are capable of intervention at any time and may be expected to offer a strong opposition when encountered.” In the same report, Yancey noted that the "most likely enemy capability" was: "To fight a delaying action, withdrawing to, and organizing further defenses in, the high ground in the southeastern end of the island." Faced with this enigmatic enemy situation, General Schmidt formulated his scheme of maneuver and assigned his objectives on July 27 and 28 to facilitate an irregular "elbowing" advance. From the front lines held on the morning of July 27, Objective O-4 was near for the 4th Division, far for the 2nd Division; once Objective O-4 had been reached, the emphasis would shift--Objective O-5 would be near for the 2nd Division, far for the 4th Division. The Corps' attack on these two days, then, would find the 2nd Division carrying the ball on July 27, the 4th Division on the 28th. On the first day the 2nd Division would push forward at 07:30, the 4th Division at 10:00; on the second day the 4th Division would attack at 07:00, the 2nd Division at 10:00. Variations in these attack hours were consistent with plans to punch first with the left, then with the right. Principal advantage of this arrangement was that the bulk of the supporting fires could be allotted first to one division, then to the other. Not only did the 14th Corps Artillery mass its fires to support the main effort, but two 105mm howitzer battalions of the division executing the secondary attack were also made available to support the principal thrust in each case. Despite the gradual progress made by Cates' Marines as they secured key positions on higher terrain, they successfully reached the O-4 Line by the end of the first day. Simultaneously, Watson's Marines made significant strides on more favorable terrain, aided by tanks, covering a distance of 4000 yards to also reach the O-4 Line. The following day, amidst worsening weather conditions, the 2nd and 6th Marines quickly moved forward to secure the O-5 Line. The weather at Tinian had been unpleasant. Nearly every day featured rain squalls, gusty winds, and ominous clouds. And yet, for Jig-Day and three days following, the seas remained calm enough for reasonably convenient shore activities. The "three days of good weather" that Admiral Hill had considered vital had already expired. On the afternoon of 28 July the weather got worse--much worse. This condition resulted from the effects of a typhoon that built up west of the Marianas and sent its swells and winds against Tinian's west coast. The seas surrounding Tinian changed to a dirty gray-blue as the winds mounted and the waves boiled over one another and grew into larger, uglier masses. Surf roaring against the tiny WHITE Beaches and their rocky flanking shelves forced temporary suspension, at 1800 on 28 July, of all unloading over the beaches. On the left flank, after intense artillery bombardment, Cates' Marines swiftly advanced to the O-5 Line, then, supported by naval forces, resumed their march to secure Gurguan Point and its airfield, advancing to the intermediate O-6A Line, with Jones' 23rd Marines covering a total distance of 7300 yards. On July 29, with half of the island under control, Schmidt directed his forces to push beyond the O-6 Line. Accordingly, the 24th and 25th Marines advanced with minimal resistance and reached the O-6 Line. Although Watson's Marines faced initially light opposition, resistance intensified as they crossed the O-6 Line. The 6th Marines managed to secure advantageous positions just shy of the intermediate O-7A Line, while the 2nd Marines encountered opposition around the Masalog Point hill, halting their progress. The next day, Cates' Marines resumed their southward advance, encountering resistance from Japanese machine-gunners and riflemen entrenched in coastal caves. While tanks engaged the enemy, the 24th and 25th Marines surged forward, effectively securing Tinian Town and its airfield, and eventually reaching the O-7 Line. On the right flank, Watson's Marines also pressed southward, with the 2nd Marines swiftly securing Masalog Hill and advancing along the coast despite heavy machine-gun fire, reaching O-7, while the 6th Marines advanced against sporadic resistance, also reaching O-7. Additionally, the 8th Marines took position at the center of the corps' line. With the capture of four-fifths of the island and over 3000 Japanese either killed or captured, Schmidt's Marines successfully pushed the remaining Japanese forces under Colonel Ogata's command into an unnamed ridge between Lalo and Marpo Points at Tinian's southern end. On July 31, following a massive artillery, air, and naval barrage, the Marines launched another assault to the south. The 24th Marines made significant progress along the coast and on less steep cliffs, securing the road to the ridge top. The 23rd Marines faced stiffer resistance but advanced with remarkable discipline, aided by tanks, gaining high ground. On the right flank, the 2nd and 6th Marines advanced against light machine-gun and mortar fire, reaching the intermediate O-8A Line. In the center, the 8th Marines encountered stronger resistance but managed to establish a foothold on the zigzag road to the top. By nightfall, a 600-yard gap emerged between the 8th and 23rd Marines, which the Japanese could exploit. At 23:00, a banzai charge was repelled; however, at 01:00 on August 1, a 150-man force blocked Wallace's rear road and launched an attack. A counterattack force was quickly organized, driving back the enemy. Ogata's final banzai charge at 05:15 was directed at the left of Company E but failed to breach Marine defenses. Both Colonel Wallace and the enemy commander probably still Colonel Ogata had realized the tactical implications of the cliff-line penetration. Both knew that it provided a route over which thousands of Marines could move into the Japanese rear. The two commanders' reactions were classic. As soon as one of his battalions grasped a toe hold, Wallace exploited the success by committing his reserve there. The enemy commander, as soon as he received word of the penetration, ordered a counterattack to throw the Marines off the cliff and restore the position. Each selected a tactically sound course of action. Only one could be successful. At dawn, as the Japanese began to withdraw, Cates' Marines continued the attack southward, with the 24th Marines reaching the O-8 Line at Lalo Point, and the 23rd Marines, after encountering a sheer cliff, retracing their steps to reach the cliffline in front of O-8. On the right flank, the 8th Marines swiftly advanced to O-8A and moved alongside the 6th Marines toward the cliffs overlooking the water. Finally, the 2nd Marines secured the high ground to prevent enemy escape along the east coast. Despite not reaching Marpo Point, organized resistance crumbled, leading Schmidt to declare Tinian secure at 18:55. Organized resistance had ceased. But on the early morning of August 2, an enemy force–estimated variously from 100 to 250–struck headlong into the command post of the 3rd Battalion, 6th Marines. Headquarters personnel, armed for the most part with carbines and pistols (although two automatic rifles were also used), considered the enemy group very well "organized." Initially, personnel of the aid station bore the brunt, but soon everyone in the headquarters group–clerks, communicators, corpsmen, assault engineers, mortarmen, and staff personnel–rallied behind their commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Easley, to defend themselves. The Japanese, carrying rifles, grenades, and machine guns, hurled themselves at the Marines with characteristic violence. As soon as one fell, another took his place. In search of substantial assistance, Captain John R. Steinstra, Headquarters Company commander, dashed to the nearby Company F, 6th Marines, acquired a medium tank and a rifle platoon, and led them back to the fight. Here was welcome reinforcement to the 3rd Battalion Headquarters Group, which had fought the enemy at close quarters for over two hours. The machine barged into the battle with guns blazing, and the tide turned. The battalion executive officer later stated that he considered the tank's appearance "vitally important" to the outcome. Those enemy soldiers who remained on their feet hastily departed the area. Daylight made results of the enemy effort visible: 119 Japanese bodies lay almost side by side in and around the 3rd Battalion command post. But the Marines had also taken casualties, one of the dead being Colonel Easley. Nearly 400 Japanese perished in the week following the island's capture. From August 7 onward, the 8th Marines conducted cleanup operations on Tinian until January 1, 1945, eliminating an additional 542 Japanese at the cost of 38 killed and 125 wounded. Throughout the Battle of Tinian, a total of 5,745 Japanese were killed and 404 captured, while American losses amounted to 389 killed and 1,816 wounded. Similar to Saipan, around 4,000 civilians either took their own lives or were killed, but unlike Saipan, the majority—approximately 13,000 civilians—were interned. On April 15, 1944, there were 16,029 civilians residing on Tinian, out of which 1,658, primarily consisting of women, children, and the elderly, were relocated to Japan prior to the American invasion. Approximately 2,610 civilians lost their lives during the conflict. Journalist Robert Sherrod observed that most casualties occurred due to direct combat, as the Americans heavily utilized artillery, aerial bombardment, and naval attacks, often forcing civilians to seek refuge alongside soldiers. Some perished from diseases, thirst, or hunger. Tragically, some were also victims of atrocities committed by Japanese soldiers, such as being tied together and attacked with grenades. Instances of mass suicide occurred, notably at the "Suicide Cliff," where parents threw their children off the 120-foot precipice, and some civilians were pushed by Japanese soldiers. According to a captured Japanese soldier, a large group willingly perished in caves at the military's behest. By August 1, only 2,468 civilians had been documented, but within three days, this number surged to 8,491. The 2nd Marine Division established a camp for civilians at Ushi Point Airfield, while the 4th Marine Division set up another at the ruins of Churo village, which became a permanent settlement for all displaced civilians. By October 15, Camp Churo housed 10,926 civilians, comprising mainly Japanese and Korean nationals, with nearly half being children under 15 years old. The military administration struggled to provide adequate care due to shortages of relief supplies. Seabees oversaw the construction of temporary shelters initially, which were later replaced by more durable structures using salvaged materials. The internees also supplemented their provisions by salvaging food and cultivating gardens, with Seabees stepping in to provide improvised diesel stoves as firewood became scarce. In late 1945, Admiral Spruance, who succeeded Nimitz as CINCPOA, ordered the repatriation of all Japanese and Korean civilians, a process completed by late 1946. Shifting focus to Guam, by July 25, General Geiger's Marines had secured two beachhead areas, with General Turnage's 3rd Marine Division advancing on the Fonte Plateau and General Shepherd's brigade sealing off the Orote Peninsula. Despite a fierce enemy counterattack on both fronts, Japanese resistance was effectively shattered. On July 26, while mop-up operations continued in General Turnage's sector, General Shepherd's Marines prepared to assault Orote. Following coordinated air, naval, and artillery bombardment, the 4th Marines launched their attack at 07:00, making swift progress. However, the 22nd Marines faced delays due to enemy artillery fire, necessitating the 4th Marines to extend their line to cover the exposed flank. Although the mangrove swamp hindered Colonel Schneider's Marines, they successfully cleared the area by afternoon, establishing contact with Colonel Shapley's forces at RJ 15, albeit with a slight eastern bend in their line. Meanwhile, Shepherd's units encountered mines, pillboxes, and bunkers, halting their advance by nightfall. On the morning of July 27th, the offensive recommenced, yet the 4th Marines encountered difficulties in penetrating the robust enemy defenses without tank support. However, once the mines were cleared, the Shermans neutralized enemy positions, enabling the Marines to take control of the ridge ahead, although they couldn't advance further through the coconut grove. Meanwhile, the 22nd Marines, moving alongside Shapley's 3rd Battalion along the inland road, faced delays due to the swamp. They encountered numerous obstacles including pillboxes, trenches, dugouts, and mines near the old Marine Barracks. Remarkably, the determined enemy abandoned their fortified line around 5:00 PM after a substantial bombardment, allowing Schneider's Marines to swiftly advance ahead of the 4th Marines and seize strategic terrain by nightfall. Following another intense bombardment, Shepherd's forces prepared to attack on July 28th. Despite Japanese resistance, Schneider's tank-supported advance reached the O-4 Line by 10:05 AM, creating a significant gap between Marine regiments. Nonetheless, the 22nd Marines persisted, fighting through the Marine Barracks and halting just 100 yards east of Sumay. Meanwhile, the 4th Marines faced slow progress and fierce opposition, stopping within 150 yards of the airfield. On June 29th, Shepherd launched a final assault after yet another heavy barrage, with both regiments successfully advancing the entire length of the airstrip against minimal resistance, establishing a defensive line 150 yards beyond the strip by 2:00 PM. As the 22nd Marines redirected their efforts to clean up the devastated Sumay area, effectively eliminating the last remaining enemy stronghold the next day, the 4th Marines continued their advance northward, with a combined tank and infantry patrol reaching the tip of the peninsula. With the peninsula now under control, the American flag was once again raised over the ruins of the Marine Barracks.General Shepherd proclaimed “On this hallowed ground, you officers and men of the 1st Marine Brigade have avenged the loss of our comrades who were overcome by the numerically superior enemy three days after Pearl Harbor.” Orote saw over 2500 Japanese casualties, while Marine losses amounted to 115 killed, 721 wounded, and 38 missing. Moving northward, following a failed Japanese counterattack, Takashina's forces were preparing to retreat further into the island's interior, but the Americans were relentless in their pursuit. After regrouping and subjecting the enemy to heavy bombardment, battalions from Turnage's regiments launched an assault towards the Fonte Plateau on July 27, albeit encountering stubborn resistance from the still-active enemy. Meanwhile, Colonel Butler's 3rd Battalion successfully advanced to the D-2 Line on the same day. Following successful defense against several small-scale enemy counterattacks overnight, Turnage initiated the main push towards the objective beachhead line on the morning of July 28. The depleted 3rd Marines, with Colonel Craig's 2nd Battalion attached, launched another assault, encountering minimal resistance and securing the D-3 Line by afternoon, thereby completely controlling the abandoned Fonte area. Further bolstered by the 3rd Battalion, 307th Regiment, the 9th Marines made progress in their attack towards the strategic Chachao-Alutom-Tenjo ridgeline, marking a significant initial victory. Simultaneously, the 2nd Battalion, 307th Regiment, supported by units from the 305th Regiment, advanced towards Mount Tenjo from the south. Under the protective cover of artillery neutralization fire, Craig's 3rd Battalion effectively demolished a concrete emplacement at the center of Mount Chachao's summit and swiftly secured the beachhead line adjacent to Mount Alutom. Simultaneously, General Bruce's infantry units swiftly captured Mount Tenjo, with Craig's 1st Battalion joining them by day's end. The 21st Marines faced minimal resistance, eliminating remaining enemy pockets around the radio towers and reaching the designated beachhead line. Thus, Turnage's attack objectives were achieved, extending the beachhead line across the entire front. Additionally, the 21st Marines overran the 29th Division command post near the Fonte River, resulting in Takashina's demise as he supervised his retreating units. Consequently, General Obata assumed direct command of the remaining forces, adhering to Takashina's plan for a strategic withdrawal to Mount Santa Rosa, with delaying positions established at Finegayan and Mount Barrigada. The Japanese launched eleven localized counterattacks against Turnage's beachhead line on July 29, all of which were successfully repelled, inflicting 800 casualties on the attackers. The 3rd Marine Division then focused on consolidation and reorganization for the remainder of the day while rear areas were cleared of enemy presence. In the meantime, as the 306th Regiment secured the unoccupied Mounts Alifan and Taene, Bruce had also dispatched several patrols to the southern end of the island since July 27, successfully discovering by the end of July that the sector had been completely abandoned. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The allies chose to focus on the Vogelkop Peninsula over the Klamono oilfields, as MacArthur's focus shifted to the Mar-Sansapor region for airfield development. The Marines faced a horror show in Tinian but managed to secure her while progress was made on Guam. The Americans were clawing ever closer to the Japanese home islands.
GUNPLAY AND ORDER: 4/4: Red Sky Morning: The Epic True Story of Texas Ranger Company F, by Joe Pappalardo https://www.amazon.com/Red-Sky-Morning-Ranger-Company/dp/1250275245/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr= Between 1886 and 1888, Sergeant James Brooks, of Texas Ranger Company F, was engaged in three fatal gunfights, endured disfiguring bullet wounds, engaged in countless manhunts, was convicted of second-degree murder, and rattled Washington, D.C., with a request for a pardon from the US president. His story anchors the tale of Joe Pappalardo's Red Sky Morning, an epic saga of lawmen and criminals set in Texas during the waning years of the “Old West.” Alongside Brooks are the Rangers of Company F, who range from a pious teetotaler to a cowboy fleeing retribution for killing a man. They are all led by Captain William Scott, who cut his teeth as a freelance undercover informant but was facing the end of his Ranger career. Company F hunted criminals across Texas and beyond, killing them as needed, and were confident they could bring anyone to “Ranger justice.” But Brooks's men met their match in the Conner family, East Texas master hunters and jailbreakers who were wanted for their part in a bloody family feud. The full story of Company F's showdown with the Conner family is finally being told, with long-dead voices being heard for the first time. This truly hidden history paints the grim picture of neighbors' and relatives' becoming snitches and bounty hunters, and a company of Texas Rangers who waded into the conflict only to find themselves over their heads—and in the fight of their lives. 1892 Waco
GUNPLAY AND ORDER: 1/4: Red Sky Morning: The Epic True Story of Texas Ranger Company F, by Joe Pappalardo https://www.amazon.com/Red-Sky-Morning-Ranger-Company/dp/1250275245/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr= Between 1886 and 1888, Sergeant James Brooks, of Texas Ranger Company F, was engaged in three fatal gunfights, endured disfiguring bullet wounds, engaged in countless manhunts, was convicted of second-degree murder, and rattled Washington, D.C., with a request for a pardon from the US president. His story anchors the tale of Joe Pappalardo's Red Sky Morning, an epic saga of lawmen and criminals set in Texas during the waning years of the “Old West.” Alongside Brooks are the Rangers of Company F, who range from a pious teetotaler to a cowboy fleeing retribution for killing a man. They are all led by Captain William Scott, who cut his teeth as a freelance undercover informant but was facing the end of his Ranger career. Company F hunted criminals across Texas and beyond, killing them as needed, and were confident they could bring anyone to “Ranger justice.” But Brooks's men met their match in the Conner family, East Texas master hunters and jailbreakers who were wanted for their part in a bloody family feud. The full story of Company F's showdown with the Conner family is finally being told, with long-dead voices being heard for the first time. This truly hidden history paints the grim picture of neighbors' and relatives' becoming snitches and bounty hunters, and a company of Texas Rangers who waded into the conflict only to find themselves over their heads—and in the fight of their lives 1911 Fort Worth.
GUNPLAY AND ORDER: 2/4: Red Sky Morning: The Epic True Story of Texas Ranger Company F, by Joe Pappalardo https://www.amazon.com/Red-Sky-Morning-Ranger-Company/dp/1250275245/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr= Between 1886 and 1888, Sergeant James Brooks, of Texas Ranger Company F, was engaged in three fatal gunfights, endured disfiguring bullet wounds, engaged in countless manhunts, was convicted of second-degree murder, and rattled Washington, D.C., with a request for a pardon from the US president. His story anchors the tale of Joe Pappalardo's Red Sky Morning, an epic saga of lawmen and criminals set in Texas during the waning years of the “Old West.” Alongside Brooks are the Rangers of Company F, who range from a pious teetotaler to a cowboy fleeing retribution for killing a man. They are all led by Captain William Scott, who cut his teeth as a freelance undercover informant but was facing the end of his Ranger career. Company F hunted criminals across Texas and beyond, killing them as needed, and were confident they could bring anyone to “Ranger justice.” But Brooks's men met their match in the Conner family, East Texas master hunters and jailbreakers who were wanted for their part in a bloody family feud. The full story of Company F's showdown with the Conner family is finally being told, with long-dead voices being heard for the first time. This truly hidden history paints the grim picture of neighbors' and relatives' becoming snitches and bounty hunters, and a company of Texas Rangers who waded into the conflict only to find themselves over their heads—and in the fight of their lives. 1908 Ft Worth
GUNPLAY AND ORDER: 3/4: Red Sky Morning: The Epic True Story of Texas Ranger Company F, by Joe Pappalardo https://www.amazon.com/Red-Sky-Morning-Ranger-Company/dp/1250275245/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr= Between 1886 and 1888, Sergeant James Brooks, of Texas Ranger Company F, was engaged in three fatal gunfights, endured disfiguring bullet wounds, engaged in countless manhunts, was convicted of second-degree murder, and rattled Washington, D.C., with a request for a pardon from the US president. His story anchors the tale of Joe Pappalardo's Red Sky Morning, an epic saga of lawmen and criminals set in Texas during the waning years of the “Old West.” Alongside Brooks are the Rangers of Company F, who range from a pious teetotaler to a cowboy fleeing retribution for killing a man. They are all led by Captain William Scott, who cut his teeth as a freelance undercover informant but was facing the end of his Ranger career. Company F hunted criminals across Texas and beyond, killing them as needed, and were confident they could bring anyone to “Ranger justice.” But Brooks's men met their match in the Conner family, East Texas master hunters and jailbreakers who were wanted for their part in a bloody family feud. The full story of Company F's showdown with the Conner family is finally being told, with long-dead voices being heard for the first time. This truly hidden history paints the grim picture of neighbors' and relatives' becoming snitches and bounty hunters, and a company of Texas Rangers who waded into the conflict only to find themselves over their heads—and in the fight of their lives. 1865 Brownsville
Last time we spoke about the fall of Saipan. General Smith's coordinated attacks on June 27th led to significant progress, with the 4th Marine Division notably advancing. The 27th Division encountered resistance, and casualties rose. By early July, Americans gained ground, pushing toward Marpi Point. Japanese resistance remained fierce, but American forces steadily advanced, capturing strategic positions. The assault on Petosukara was swiftly countered, but intense action unfolded in the Makunsha region. The 3rd Battalion, 24th Marines faced a fierce enemy thrust, with over 200 attackers killed. Facing defeat, General Saito ordered a suicidal assault, resulting in a chaotic and desperate charge. Despite heavy losses, American forces repelled the onslaught. The battle lasted until midday on July 7, with sporadic skirmishes continuing. Efforts to persuade cave occupants to surrender intensified, yet many civilians chose mass suicide. Saipan was declared secured after extensive casualties on both sides. This episode is the battle of Noemfoor Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. General MacArthur unleashed a new offensive, seeing General Patrick's troops successfully landed on Noemfoor with little opposition, securing a beachhead. While the 3rd Battalion, 503rd Parachute Regiment was being airdropped on July 4, Colonel Sandlin's 3rd Battalion continued eastward through scattered minefields toward Kornasoren Drome, meeting no resistance. Simultaneously, the 1st Battalion crossed the Kamiri River and occupied Kamiri village without encountering any opposition. Moving out of Kamiri, the American forces followed a southeastern road to a sizable Japanese garden area, where they faced resistance on Hill 201. The Japanese garden area was about 600 yards long, east and west, and 350 yards across, north to south. The ground was devoid of large trees except for a few atop Hill 201, but thick, secondary jungle growth covered the eastern and southern slopes of the hill, while the rest of the garden area was overgrown with partially cultivated papaya, taro, and cassava, all averaging about eight feet in height. The trail from Kamiri village passed over the southern slope of Hill 201, and 300 yards away, near the eastern edge of the gardens, joined the main road from Kamiri Drome to Namber Drome, located about six miles to the south. Another trail ran along the eastern side of the hill, branching to the north and northwest at the northeastern corner of the low terrain feature. To counter this, a double envelopment tactic was initiated, with Company C seizing Hill 180 to the north while Company B pushed the Japanese southeast over Mission Hill, a lower terrain feature situated southeast of Hill 201. By 15:15, the battalion secured the ground on both flanks of Hill 201 and consolidated around the hilltop for the night, establishing a tight defensive perimeter. At 05:20 on July 5, the Japanese launched an attack along the southern and southeastern sides of the perimeter with mortar support. The American forces responded with a deadly barrage of mortar and artillery fire, driving the enemy back and neutralizing their machine-gun positions. Some Japanese managed to get through the mortar and artillery barrages and continued up the sides of the trail from the south through fire from Company D's machine guns. The enemy found cover behind a low, 150-yard-long log fence which led from the southeast toward the center of the 1st Battalion's defenses. While the fence afforded some protection, the attacking infantrymen were silhouetted as they tried to clamber over the top. The main body of the attacking force therefore kept down behind the fence, trying to crawl along it to the top of the hill. Advancing cautiously, the attackers encountered sustained machine-gun and rifle fire from the defenders atop the hill, as the fence did not extend beyond the outer defenses of the 1st Battalion. The assault quickly deteriorated into a sequence of small suicide charges carried out by groups of three to six Japanese soldiers. The 1st Battalion now sent patrols out over the battlefield. From prisoners it was determined that the attacking force had consisted of 350 to 400 men--the 10th and 12th Companies, 219th Infantry, reinforced by approximately 150 armed Formosan laborers. During the morning over 200 dead Japanese were counted around the 1st Battalion's perimeter, and the number of enemy dead found or enemy wounded captured on subsequent days along trails leading south from the hill indicated that virtually the entire original attacking force had been annihilated. By 06:30, the skirmish had concluded, with over 200 Japanese casualties tallied. Following this engagement, operations on Noemfoor transitioned into a series of patrol activities as Allied forces extended their dominance over the island and rapidly expanded the airfield facilities. On the morning of July 6, Sandlin's 2nd Battalion executed an amphibious landing on the deserted Namber Drome following a brief naval bombardment. By July 10, intensive patrolling had only encountered small Japanese groups, leading Patrick to conclude that no significant organized enemy presence remained on Noemfoor. To eradicate the remaining opposition, the 503rd Parachute Regiment was dispatched to the island's southern sector while the 158th addressed the northern half. By the end of August, Sandlin's efforts had resulted in the death of 611 Japanese soldiers, the capture of 179, the loss of 6 American lives with 41 wounded, and the liberation of 209 slave laborers. The Japanese had never brought the Melanesians of Noemfoor entirely under their control, for the natives had either offered a passive resistance or had faded into the interior to live off the land. A few were impressed into service by the Japanese, while others who were captured but still refused to cooperate were executed. The natives greeted the Allied landings with great enthusiasm and came out of hideaways in the hills carrying Dutch flags which they had concealed from the Japanese. Under the direction of the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration, the natives were gradually resettled in their old villages. Late in July the village chiefs gathered in formal council and officially declared war on the Japanese. Thereafter, native cooperation increased. Up to August 31 the natives had captured and brought to Allied outposts more than 50 Japanese and had killed another 50. One tale of horror concerns the Javanese on Noemfoor. According to information gathered by the NICA Detachment, over 3000 Indonesians were shipped to Noemfoor in late 1943, mostly from Soerabaja and other large cities on Java. The shipment included many women and children. The Japanese, without regard to age or sex, put the Javanese to work constructing roads and airfields almost entirely by hand. Little or no clothing, shoes, bedding, or shelter was provided, and the Javanese had to supplement their very inadequate allowance of rations by shifting for themselves. Driven by hunger, many attempted to steal Japanese rations but for their pains were beheaded or hung by their hands or feet until dead. Starvation and disease took a steadily increasing toll. The dead were periodically collected for mass burial, and survivors alleged that many of the sick were buried alive. It was considered probable that not more than 10 or 15 Javanese were killed accidentally by Allied forces. Yet only 403 of the 3000-odd brought from Java were found alive on Noemfoor by August 31. Meanwhile, Colonel Jones pursued the remnants of Colonel Shimizu's Noemfoor Detachment to Hill 670 in the south. From July 13 to 16, both sides engaged in fierce combat for control of the hill, with the Japanese ultimately managing to evade capture. Contact was reestablished on July 23 near Inasi, but Shimizu eluded capture once more. The primary Japanese force was finally located on August 10 near Hill 380, prompting Jones' 1st and 3rd Battalions to converge in an attempt to trap the enemy. However, on August 15, Shimizu once again evaded capture, slipping away towards Pakriki. Although the Japanese forces were either captured or eliminated by August 17, Shimizu evaded capture or death and remained at large by the operation's conclusion. Jones' forces endured 57 fatalities and 302 injuries, but managed to neutralize over 1100 Japanese soldiers and apprehend approximately 560 individuals, while liberating an additional 194 enslaved laborers. This brings the total casualties for the Battle of Noemfoor to 1730 Japanese casualties, with 740 taken prisoner, and 63 American fatalities, 343 wounded, and 3 missing, alongside the liberation of 403 slave laborers. Transitioning to the developments on the Aitape front post-Operation Persecution, significant changes occurred under General Gill's command starting May 4. The defensive setup in the Aitape region was revamped, and Colonel Howe's 127th Regiment bolstered its eastern positions, with the Nyaparake Force extending patrols to the Danmap River. However, General Nakai's advance forces arrived in early May. Shortly after 2:00am on 14 May, after a short preparation by grenades, light mortars, and light machine guns, 100 to 200 Japanese of the 78th Infantry, 20th Division, attacked from the east against the coastal sector of the perimeter. This assault was broken up by rifle and automatic weapons fire and by lobbing mortar shells to the rear of the advancing enemy group. The Japanese disappeared into the jungle south of the narrow beach. For the next hour Captain Fulmer's mortars placed harassing fire into suspected enemy assembly points east of the small stream. Meanwhile, the eight-man outpost reported that many small parties of Japanese were moving up the beach within 300 yards of the main perimeter and then slipping southward into the jungle. Such maneuvers seemed to presage another attack. The second assault came about 0330, this time against the eastern and southeastern third of the defenses. The Japanese were again beaten back by small arms and mortar fire, but at 5:00am they made a final effort which covered the entire eastern half of the perimeter. This last attack was quickly broken up and the Japanese quieted down. About 7:30am on the 14th, elements of Company A, 127th Infantry, began moving into the forward perimeter to reinforce Captain Fulmer's beleaguered units. The 1st Platoon of Company C and the 81-mm. mortar section also moved forward in preparation for continuing the advance. General Martin took charge of the East Sector on the same day, relocating all troops except the Nyaparake Force to the west bank of the Driniumor River. The East Sector forces were supplied by a variety of methods. Units along the coast were supported directly by small boat from BLUE Beach or by native ration trains moving along the coastal track. Supplies to the Afua area went south from the coast along the Anamo-Afua trail or, later, over the inland track from the Tadji fields through Chinapelli and Palauru. Wheeled transport was impracticable except along short stretches of the coastal track. In early June, when the Japanese ambushed many ration parties which attempted to reach Afua, experiments were made with air supply from the Tadji strips. Breakage and loss were heavy at first, but air supply rapidly became more successful as pilots gained experience and ground troops located good dropping grounds. A dropping ground cleared on the west bank of the Driniumor about 2200 yards north of Afua soon became the principal source of supply for troops in the Afua area. Communications during operations east of the Driniumor were carried out principally by radio, but between units along the river and from the stream back to higher headquarters telephone became the principal means of communication. Keeping the telephone lines in service was a task to which much time and effort had to be devoted. The Japanese continually cut the lines, or American troops and heavy equipment accidentally broke the wires. The enemy often stationed riflemen to cover breaks in the line, thus making repair work dangerous. Usually, it was found less time consuming and less hazardous to string new wire than to attempt to find and repair breaks. As a result, miles of telephone wire soon lined the ground along the trails or was strung along the trees in the Driniumor River area and back to the Tadji perimeter. Despite this adjustment, Nakai escalated pressure, advancing beyond Yakamul by month's end. In response, Gill replaced the Nyaparake Force with the 1st Battalion, 126th Regiment, which swiftly recaptured Yakamul and Parakovio. Despite initial success, Nakai's forces launched a heavy counterattack in early June, reclaiming Yakamul by June 5. In the meantime, additional Japanese units had been conducting exploratory missions inland against Afua since the beginning of the month. However, Howe's 1st Battalion ultimately succeeded in repelling them. This allowed Martin's forces to establish an outer defensive line along the Driniumor River. From there, they continued forward patrols toward the Japanese lines. While the 41st and 51st Divisions struggled to move personnel and supplies to the forward assembly area, Nakai efficiently organized a counter-reconnaissance screen along Niumen Creek to prevent East Sector troops from gathering intelligence about deployments farther east. On June 20, due to the increasingly dire situation in Western New Guinea, the 18th Army was suddenly transferred from 2nd Area Army control to the direct command of the Southern Army. Although General Terauchi's directive was to execute a "delaying action at strategic positions," General Adachi opted to adhere to his original plans for a westward offensive. He was determined to maximize the effectiveness of his forces while they still possessed fighting capability, aiming to divert as much enemy strength as possible away from the Western New Guinea battlefront. Sensing an imminent heavy enemy assault, Generals Krueger and MacArthur decided to reinforce Aitape with General Cunningham's 112th Cavalry Regiment, arriving on June 27, and Colonel Edward “Ted” Starr's 124th Regiment, expected to arrive in early July. They also expedited the shipment of the 43rd Division from its New Zealand staging area to Aitape, necessitating the establishment of Major-General Charles Hall's 11th Corps. Upon assuming command of the task force on June 29, Hall reorganized his forces and implemented several troop redeployments in preparation for the looming enemy attack. By June 30th, Adachi had completed concentrating his forces in the assembly area. Consequently, he swiftly initiated preparations for launching an attack against the Driniumor River line on July 10th. His strategy involved Colonel Nara Masahiko's 237th Regiment crossing the river and launching an assault westward towards Koronal Creek, and northwest to clear Anamo and other Paup villages. Meanwhile, the 78th and 80th Regiments were tasked with clearing the Afua area and advancing all the way to Chinapelli. Success in this endeavor would pave the way for Japanese units to advance towards the Tadji airstrips. Furthermore, a Coastal Attack Force was designated to carry out a diversionary maneuver along the coast, aiming to engage the enemy and constrain them with artillery fire. In early July, as the Japanese finalized their preparations, Hall and Martin made the decision to dispatch robust patrols east of the Driniumor to the Harech River. However, these patrols were only able to advance as far as Yakamul, where they encountered only the enemy's forward units. Consequently, on July 10th, Hall and Martin ordered the 1st Battalion, 128th Regiment, and the 2nd Squadron, 112th Cavalry to conduct a reconnaissance mission across the Driniumor. Subsequently, the infantry faced significant resistance as they pushed towards Yakamul, while the cavalry's progress was limited to about a mile due to the dense jungle terrain. Despite these efforts yielding disappointing results, a captured Japanese soldier disclosed that their attack was imminent that night. However, this critical piece of information was mistakenly disregarded by the American command, leaving Adachi and Nakai poised to launch their counteroffensive. Around midnight, the assault commenced with the 1st Battalion, 78th Regiment charging across the Driniumor River, facing Company G of the 128th Regiment along a narrow front. The Japanese attacked in two or three screaming waves, broadening the front after the first assault by throwing in the rest of the 78th Infantry and possibly elements of the 80th Infantry. Japanese reconnaissance had been good--the attackers knew the locations of company and battalion command posts all along the American defenses but not quite good enough. The enemy did not know that Company G had been reinforced during the afternoon of 10 July nor, apparently, had he discovered that the company's front was protected by low barbed wire. The attacks of the 78th Infantry were thrown back with heavy losses. Machine gun and mortar fire from the 2d Battalion, 128th Infantry, accounted for many Japanese, numbers of whom were caught as they tried to cross the barbed wire in front of Company G. According to Japanese sources, the results of American artillery fire were even more disastrous. As soon as the enemy attack had begun, the 120th and 129th Field Artillery Battalions had started firing previously prepared concentrations along the bed and east bank of the Driniumor. The Japanese units in or near the impact areas suffered heavy casualties. The 1st Battalion. 78th Infantry, was quickly reduced from 400 to 30 men, principally as a result of the American artillery fire, which also destroyed large numbers of artillery weapons, machine guns, and mortars. Despite this, the Americans, skillfully backed by artillery support, ultimately repelled them with significant casualties. Following this initial repulse, Martin concluded that a reconnaissance in force was unnecessary and ordered the units involved to retreat behind the Driniumor River. Confusion among many Japanese units, arriving late, had delayed the commencement of the 80th Regiment's attack, which was directed at Company E and was similarly pushed back. But a second wave of attackers, probably comprising the 237th Infantry and heretofore uncommitted elements of the Right Flank Unit, began pouring across the Driniumor toward Company E at approximately 0200. The new attackers overran the company command post and surrounded most of the unit's widely separated strong points. Fighting continued in the company sector for a little while, but the unit could not long withstand the overwhelming enemy pressure. Company organization and communications broke down. Worse still, the troops began to run out of ammunition. A general withdrawal commenced. By 03:00, the Japanese had breached a gap approximately 1300 yards wide in the American lines, physically occupying that territory. Fortunately, the following hours remained relatively calm as the 78th and 80th Regiments regrouped to the south to resume the offensive. This lull enabled Martin to dispatch the 1st Battalion, 128th Regiment to counterattack along the Anamo-Afua trail, aiming to reinforce the 2nd Battalion's positions. Initially encountering no resistance for the first 1500 yards, the Americans were eventually halted by intense enemy fire at 10:30, compelling them to retreat back to Tiver. This fierce opposition convinced Martin that the enemy could advance directly westward with minimal hindrance towards the Tadji strips unless he abandoned the Driniumor River line. He decided to reorganize his forces along the secondary delaying position at the X-ray River-Koronal Creek line, preparing for further counterattacks against the Japanese. Accordingly, while Company F maintained their position along the coast, the 128th Regiment began to fall back towards the creek. Further south, Cunningham opted to withdraw his cavalrymen in two stages, successfully reaching X-ray by midnight. However, communication issues delayed Howe's 3rd Battalion, with most of the unit arriving at the river the following day. A small contingent had to engage in combat with Japanese forces and couldn't reach X-ray until July 13. Despite this, Krueger and Hall disagreed with the decision to abandon the Driniumor, promptly deploying the 124th Regiment for a potential counterattack. Martin, who was instructed to hold his position, was replaced by Gill, assuming direct command of the divided covering force, now split into North and South Forces. However, before the American counterattack could commence, Nara's infantry launched an assault towards Tiver and Koronal Creek on July 12. The 128th Regiment successfully repelled them after a fierce confrontation. Meanwhile, Adachi dispatched the main body of the 41st Division and the reserve 66th Regiment towards the Driniumor, augmenting pressure on the Paup coast. To the south, Nakai's units gathered across the river near Afua and Kwamrgnirk, preparing for a final northward push. Finally, at 07:30 on July 13, the American counteroffensive commenced as the 1st Battalion, 128th Regiment swiftly moved from Tiver to Chakila, only to be ambushed by Japanese artillery. Nevertheless, precise artillery counterfire silenced most of the enemy artillery, enabling the Americans to advance eastward toward the mouth of the Driniumor. Meanwhile, the 124th Regiment under Starr's command advanced southward along the Anamo-Afua trail, facing strong opposition from the 237th Regiment. Despite encountering resistance, they managed to reach the river, although still positioned considerably north of their designated centerline. Cunningham's South Force began its eastward movement from the X-ray River at 10:00, successfully overcoming enemy positions along several stream crossings to reach the Driniumor near Afua. Consequently, all original crossing points on the Driniumor fell to the Allied forces, isolating the 20th Division and the 237th Regiment several miles west of the river's bank. By nightfall, Nara had regrouped his 237th Regiment for another assault on the 2nd Battalion, 128th Regiment. Company E demonstrated its combat effectiveness by holding firm and repelling the Japanese forces, with the rest of the battalion successfully defending against subsequent small-scale attacks, marking the conclusion of Nara's offensive actions. The following morning, Gill's forces consolidated their defensive positions along the reformed river line, albeit with a 1500-yard gap remaining in the center. Yet this all for today with Noemfoor as we now need to head over to the India-Burma theater. The final phase was coming for the Battle of Imphal. By the start of July, the reopening of the Imphal–Kohima Road facilitated the resupply of the 4th Corps, enabling them to launch an offensive against the fatigued and under-resourced troops under General Mutaguchi's command. Additionally, three brigades from General Stopford's 33rd Corps advanced from the north, swiftly joining General Gracey's 20th Division in an endeavor to reopen the Ukhrul Road. Under intense pressure, General Yamauchi's battered 15th Division units hastily abandoned Tongou and Sokpao, leading to the 80th Brigade occupying Lamu by July 2. The next day, the ailing general, who had long fallen out of favor with Mutaguchi, was carried from the battlefield on a stretcher and later died in a hospital at Maymyo. Lieutenant-General Shibata Uichi replaced him and promptly prepared the 51st and 67th Regiments to retreat. To cover their withdrawal, the newly arrived and utterly exhausted 60th Regiment was tasked with attacking towards Lamu, while General Miyazaki's troops assembled behind Ukhrul. However, the 60th Regiment was so weakened that its attacks were easily repelled, and the 67th Regiment retreated in disorder, leaving the 51st encircled. On July 8, Colonel Omoto's troops fiercely broke through the encirclement in three columns, allowing Stopford's brigades to finally overcome Japanese resistance at Ukhrul and capture the town. This forced Shibata to regroup his forces along a new line from Lungshong through Sangshak to Sakok, ultimately enabling the British-Indian forces to reopen the Ukhrul Road by July 10. With both supply roads reopened, the arrival of Stopford's brigades from the north, and the Japanese forces nearly routed, General Slim decided it was time to go on the offensive. Slim's plan involved the 33rd Corps taking over the Shenam Saddle and the Tamu–Palel Road while the 4th Corps cleared the Japanese from the Silchar Track and the Tiddim Road. On the other hand, Mutaguchi was still planning a combined attack on the Palel area involving the 15th Division, remnants of the 31st Division, and some units from the 33rd Division. Although he issued an attack order, the divisions were too battered to comply. The overall situation of the 15th Army went from bad to worse and the only hope remaining was to rally the 31st at Humine, give the troops a few days rest and then, after a reorganization, to dispatch them to the northern flank of the Yamamoto Detachment to capture Palel. In early July the 31st Division was concentrated in the area east of Myothit but discipline had disintegrated to the point that the Division could scarcely be termed a combat force. The Torikai Unit was organized with the 138th Infantry Regiment (less one battalion); the 2d Battalion, 124th Infantry Regiment and one artillery battalion to reinforce the Yamamoto Detachment. At the same time,the 15th Army ordered the 33rd Division to attack Palel from the south with the 214th Infantry Regiment. The newly formed Torikai' Unit, however, failed to join the Yamamoto Detachment and the order for the 33rd to attack Palel was never carried out. Consequently, on July 9, General Kawabe had no choice but to order preparations for a withdrawal to a line connecting the Zibyu Mountains, Mawlaik, Kalewa, and Gangaw. Mutaguchi intended to begin the retreat on July 16, directing the 15th Division towards Sittaung, the 31st Division to Thaungdut, and the 33rd Division to Tiddim, while the Yamamoto Detachment would hold the Shenam Saddle until July 24 and then retreat to the Kuntaung-Moreh line to cover the main Army's withdrawal from the Kabaw Valley. On the southwest front, General Tanaka's forces had already started retreating from the Bishenpur area, leaving a small covering force at Ningthoukhong to prevent a pursuit by the 17th Division. As a result, General Cowan's brigades made limited progress against the stubborn rearguard, ultimately securing Ningthoukhong on July 16 after heavy bombardment, coinciding with Mutaguchi's general withdrawal. By the middle of July, Japanese resistance centered on Ningthoukhong Kha Khunou. A small hamlet about 300 meters wide and 500 meters long, it lay to the immediate south of Ningthoukhong. Despite probing attacks by the 48th Indian Brigade's infantry and artillery firing on their defenses, the Japanese held on. Finally, in the early hours of 16 July, this small space was subjected to what some describe as one of the heaviest artillery concentrations yet in the Burma Campaign; in the space of an hour, approximately 9,000 shells were fired on Ningthoukhong Kha Khunou. Fortunately for the Japanese, they had withdrawn from the village just before the shelling began. By the time it ended, the village had been completely flattened and was pockmarked with waterlogged craters. And so the last Japanese stronghold in the Imphal Valley was taken. The 63rd Indian Brigade also reached and occupied the Laimanai area around the same time. The 5th Indian Division, the other division in the reconstituted IV Corps, now took over and commenced the chase of the Japanese 33rd Division down the road towards Tiddim. The 5th Division, now led by Major-General Geoffrey Evans, continued the pursuit while Stopford's brigades harassed the disordered retreat of the 15th and 31st Divisions. Despite their efforts, the 15th and 31st Divisions reached Thaungdut by early August, and the 33rd Division managed to assemble around Chikha by mid-August, under significant pressure and the serious threat of having their withdrawal route cut off. The 33rd Division distinguished itself by displaying almost superhuman fighting power and repeatedly launched counterattacks against the pursuing British-Indian 5th Division. The Yamamoto Detachment, however, had failed to cover the Yazagyo area and, in mid-August the 33rd Division found itself the vicinity of Chikha facing the serious threat of having its route of withdrawal cut by the enemy which was infiltrating into the Yazagyo area from Moreh and Shuganu through the Kabaw Valley. On the south-eastern approach to Imphal, the two armies continued to face each other on the Shenam Saddle. Yamamoto Force remained in place on these heights and the front line was still on Scraggy. It was in the second half of July that a final, concerted effort was made to evict Yamamoto Force and push it down the Tamu–Palel Road towards the India–Burma frontier. Led by the 23rd Indian Division , the operation involved five brigades in a three-pronged attack. The central thrust was by the 37th Indian Brigade on the Shenam Saddle, with the support of all available artillery and tanks; the 5th British Brigade was deployed behind it and readied to provide assistance. D-day was to be 24 July. The 1st Indian Brigade was sent through the hills on the right, to arrive behind the saddle. The two were to push the Japanese back on the road. It was hoped their withdrawal route would be cut by the 49th Indian Brigade, which would arrive on the road after looping in from the far left; the 268th Indian Brigade would be to its left, protecting its flank. Before the Japanese could retreat, the 49th Brigade had cut off General Yamamoto's withdrawal route by looping in from the far left. However, Mutaguchi had sent Colonel Sato Genpachi's reserve 61st Regiment to Tamu, which quickly counterattacked and reopened the route. Consequently, Yamamoto withdrew to Moreh, allowing Roberts to swiftly capture Nippon Hill and Scraggy. Within two days, the 23rd Division advanced down the road, forcing the Yamamoto Detachment to retreat toward Mawlaik on July 30. This marked the end of the Battle of Imphal and Operation U-Go, the Japanese Army's largest land defeat. Estimates vary, but about 30,000 Japanese soldiers died and 23,000 were injured during the operation, including 6,000 killed at Kohima and 16,000 at Imphal. Additionally, the INA lost about 2,000 dead and 2,000 wounded. On the other hand, the British-Indians suffered 16,000 casualties, with over 12,000 at Imphal. Though Mutaguchi's plan was initially effective and nearly succeeded in capturing Imphal, he underestimated the enemy's ability to resist his troops and quickly bring reinforcements. Slim's overall strategy for Imphal succeeded, as the Japanese overextended themselves from the Chindwin River to the Imphal Valley, just as he had predicted. A crucial factor in the British-Indian success was the air support, which kept the 14th Army supplied despite the road to Kohima being cut off. Ultimately, in an attempt to thwart a potential British-Indian advance into Burma, Mutaguchi's 15th Army was utterly decimated by the failed attempt to capture Imphal. This failure allowed Slim to seize the moment and launch a rapid offensive into Burma, countering the Japanese U-Go plan. The Allies thus gained the upper hand, marking the beginning of the end for Japanese control over Burma. As a final note for this week by late July, Admiral Somerville executed Operation Crimson, a coordinated naval and air assault on Japanese airfields in Sabang, Lhoknga, and Kutaraja. Departing Trincomalee on July 22, Somerville's Task Force 62, comprising two carriers and four battleships, arrived off Sabang on the morning of July 25, ready to commence the bombardment. On 5th July 1944 the carriers Victorious and Indomitable arrived in Colombo. The former sailed with Illustrious on 22 July for Operation ‘Crimson', a bombardment of Sabang by the battleships over which the carrier-borne aircraft were to provide cover and take photographs of the damage. Illustrious embarked the same aircraft as before with Victorious for a total of thirty-nine Corsairs; together they comprised 47 Naval Fighter Wing commanded by Lieutenant Commander Turnbull. The force assembled for the operation was designated TF 62 and the carriers were supported by Queen Elizabeth, Valiant, Renown, Richelieu, Nigeria, Kenya, Gambia, Ceylon, Cumberland, Phoebe, Tromp, Relentless, Rotherham, Racehorse, Raider, Roebuck, Rocket, Rapid, Quilliam, Quality and Quickmatch. The submarines Templar and Tantalus were deployed to ASR positions. The carriers operated only thirty-five miles north of Sabang, not far from the battleships, which approached their bombardment positions at 06:40. The initial launch was planned for thirty-three minutes before sunrise but this proved to be too early as the morning was exceptionally dark and the launch was delayed for five minutes. Even then it was too early and the form-up was clumsy and slow, delaying departure. The fighters were briefed to attack Sabang, Lho Nga and Kotaraja airfields but 1838 NAS made a bad landfall since maps lacked detail and no photographs were available. When the target airfields were found it was still too dark for accurate strafing but the enemy was alert and opened fire as soon as aircraft came within range. To aircrew accustomed to the excellent intelligence material by then available in the Home Fleet, this caused concern and it had to be accepted that it was difficult to obtain good targets without losing the element of surprise. At very low level on a dark morning, flying at 400 knots with flashes from antiaircraft gunfire all around, camouflaged aircraft in revetments were inconspicuous and the strafing runs were not a success. One Corsair was shot down but the pilot was rescued. Concurrently, the battleships targeted harbor facilities and military barracks at Sabang, while cruisers and destroyers shelled radar and wireless stations and engaged enemy shore batteries. After the main bombardment, the destroyers Tromp, Quality, Quickmatch, and Quilliam entered Sabang harbor, attacking Japanese positions and launching torpedoes, sustaining light damage from return fire. On the return journey, two enemy reconnaissance aircraft were intercepted and shot down by fighters. Additionally, ten Zeros attacked Somerville's convoy but were intercepted by 13 Corsairs, leading to two Zeros being shot down and another two damageFollowing this engagement, British pilots noted that the Japanese airmen were not as proficient as they had been in 1942. Although Operation Crimson's outcomes were not spectacular, Somerville's final offensive was still deemed successful enough. Due to health concerns, he was subsequently transferred to diplomatic duties at Admiral Mountbatten's request. Currently, Admiral Mountbatten was moving toward a complete rearrangement of the higher officers in SEAC. From the time of his arrival in the Far East, he had had trouble with his three commanders in chief. When the Imphal crisis arose, Mountbatten was dissatisfied with General Giffard's conduct of operations, and when he later found Giffard taking what Mountbatten considered a highly negative approach toward an aggressive conduct of operations he resolved to ask for Giffard's relief. Mountbatten's relations with Admiral Somerville had been equally difficult. Somerville had refused to treat him as a Supreme Commander and in Mountbatten's opinion tried to make him simply the chairman of a commanders-in-chief committee. As for the RAF commander, Air Chief Marshal Peirse, Mountbatten was not seeking his relief because he did not wish to change all of his principal subordinates simultaneously. After his relief, Somerville was placed in charge of the British naval delegation in Washington DC in October 1944 where he managed—to the surprise of almost everyone—to get on very well with the notoriously abrasive and anti-British Admiral Ernest King, the United States' Chief of Naval Operations. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Battle of Noemfoor was just getting started, seeing General Douglas MacArthur not giving the Japanese a moment to catch their breath. Meanwhile the battle for Imphal was finally coming to a bitter end as Mutaguchi's megalomaniac operation was clearly a disaster.
Last time we spoke about the fall of Mogaung. General Vinegar Joe's strategy against Myitkyina had turned into a brutal struggle. Stillwells forces were besieging the town while the Chindits battled for Mogaung, diverting Japanese reinforcements in the process. Despite heavy losses, the Chindits captured Naungkyaiktaw with the help of flamethrowers. Gradually Mogaung fell, but the credit was wrongly attributed to the Chinese while it should have gone to the Chindits. Mytikyina withstood endless attacks and at Biak the Americans repelled numerous Japanese assaults. The 2nd battalion, 162nd regiment tossed over to help, but this further complicated supply issues on the plateau. Progress was deeply hampered by water shortages, difficult jungle terrain and supply roads needing repairs. Lastly the battle for Lone Tree Hill saw absolute mayhem and horror, something the Americans and Japanese would never forget. This episode is the Invasion of Saipan Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. The use of US fleet and escort carriers during the landings on Hollandia and Aitape had convinced Admiral Toyoda's staff that the American naval force could be drawn into decisive naval battle off of New Guinea. On June 1st, however, a reconnaissance flight had discovered a major build up of enemy vessels at Majuro, suggesting that a new invasion was just days away. The Imperial General Staff reeled with shock in response to this, not knowing whether the Allied objective was Biak, Palau or Saipan. Aboard Toyoda's flagship Oyodo in Tokyo Bay, the naval staff debated, and the debate degenerated into argument. The truth was that no one had a “feel” for the American strategy except one lone staff intelligence officer, Commander Nakajima Chikataka. He said it had to be Saipan. But his fellow staff members scoffed at this. Even the Americans did not have such power that they could mount an operation the size of the three-pronged New Guinea strike as just a feint, they argued. They further argued that an enemy airfield at Biak would allow the Allies to bomb the Philippines and Palau with their long-range B-24 Liberators. And the American carriers were in evidence off New Guinea, unlike at Majuro. Thinking that Nakajima must be seeing things, Toyoda thus decided that Biak had to be the place. The Japanese unleashed Operation KON, diverting an enormous sum of their naval and air resources to bolster Biak in response to the perceived allied advance. However, in actuality, Admiral Spruance was gathering the largest Pacific force yet seen at Pearl Harbor, comprising approximately 535 ships, ranging from battleships to tugs, carrying a total of 127,500 personnel of Lt-General Holland Smith's 5th Amphibious Corps. They were going to hit Saipan, Tinian and Guam. Designated “Operation Forager” it was to be the end game of Admiral Nimitz Central thurst into the Pacific. Taking these would see strategic airfields only 1400 miles away from Tokyo in the hands of the allies. From there the US Army Air Force could begin their long wished bombing campaign against the Japanese home islands. For the Japanese, Saipan in particular was considered a “home island”. Japan had seized Saipan during WW1 from the German Colonial Empire and she heavily invested in “Japanizing” the island. The Japanese government had encouraged southern Japanese and Okinawans to colonize Saipan, introducing Japanese language and culture to the indigenous peoples there. It was more than just another Imperial asset, in many ways Saipan had become a home island. Part of the new operation would include Admiral Mitscher commanding the Fast Carrier Task Force 58 stationed at the Marshalls, along with Vice-Admiral Charles Lockwood overseeing 19 submarines and Rear-Admiral Ralph Christie leading 9 submarines operating across the Pacific and Southeast Asia. Operation Forager entailed Admiral Turner's Task Force capturing Saipan and Tinian sequentially with the 2nd and 4th Marine Divisions, followed by the 3rd Marine Division and the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade attacking Guam. The 27th Division was reserved for Saipan and the 77th Division for Guam. The outcome on Saipan would determine subsequent operations, with the Southern Landing Forces also held in reserve for the Northern Landing Forces until June 25. Lieutenant-General Holland Smith's strategy for the Saipan invasion involved landing four assault regiments simultaneously on four beaches in the Charan Kanoa area. Following three days of continuous air and naval bombardments, Major-General Thomas Watson's 2nd Marine Division's 6th and 8th Marine Regiments were to land north of Afetna Point on the Red and Green Beaches, while Major-General Harry Schmidt's 4th Marine Division's 23rd and 25th Marine Regiments would land south of Afetna Point on the Blue and Yellow Beaches. Thomas Watson was then going to seize the Charan Kanoa Airstrip, afterwards he would sing northeast towards Mounts Tipo Pale and Tapotchau while Schmidt secured Charan Kanoa village, the Aslito Airfield and the islands southern end before moving north to take part in clearing the remainder of Saipan. Alongside this, Smith planned to dispatch the reserve 2nd and 24th Marine Regiments of Lt Colonel Walter Stuart and Lt Colonel Guy Tannyhill over to Scarlet and Black Beaches in the north to divert enemy attention. Two innovations would be tried for Forager. The 4th Marine Division had recently and optimistically accepted the proposal to employ amphibian tanks inland. This was a large part due to the unit's experiences on low and level Roi-Namur, during the Kwajalein assault. The 2nd Marine Division on the other hand, having fought on rugged Guadalcanal and experienced the limitations of LVTs during the Tarawa assault, were more pessimistic. General Watson convinced General Smith that he would only allow the amphibian tanks to advance inland far enough to clear the immediate beach area and that only the first troop-carrying LVT wave would follow them to discharge their troops beyond the beach. All subsequent waves would discharge troops on the beach and not proceed beyond the Tractor Control Line. The reason for this pessimism was that the Marines expected the terrain to be rougher than some predicted. They feared control would be lost over troops embarked in LVTs, concentrated groups of men would be exposed to fire, and that more amtracs would be lost to enemy fire inland. They were needed to return to the Transfer Control Line on the reef's lip where support troops boated aboard LCVPs would be picked up and run to shore in the amtracs. Furthermore, LVTs are not designed for cross-country movement. They have comparatively narrow tracks and low ground clearance, making it easy for them to "belly-out" on rough ground, rocks, and stumps. Amphibian tanks are poor substitutes for medium tanks for the same reasons, and in addition they have very thin armor and a high profile. The Marine divisions commenced training for Saipan in March, conducting a significant rehearsal between May 14 and 20 off Maui. With all arrangements in place, Admiral Turner's invasion fleet was poised to depart Hawaii by late May. The slower LSTs were scheduled to set sail for Eniwetok on May 25, followed by the troop transports departing Hawaii five days later. Turner's vessels were slated to gather at Eniwetok on June 6, coinciding with the departure of Admiral Mitscher's carriers from Majuro for the Marianas. Between June 8 and 10, Turner then embarked from Eniwetok in echelons, experiencing a relatively uneventful voyage towards Saipan. Meanwhile, the Japanese expedited the deployment of 31st Army units to the Central Pacific, successfully positioning most of their line units at designated locations by the end of May. Additionally, certain disparate units of the 31st Army underwent reorganization into seven independent mixed brigades and five independent mixed regiments to enhance chain of command and troop cohesion. This, however, did not allow adequate time to prepare inland defenses in multiple lines, especially in the case of the Marianas. The larger elevated islands within the Marianas offered strategic advantages for establishing multi-layered defenses, creating strongholds on key terrain features, and positioning reserves centrally for potential counterattacks. However, the Japanese were unable to fully exploit these opportunities due to various factors. Insufficient troop deployments occurred until less than two months prior to the US assault, leaving limited time for comprehensive inland defense preparations. Many coastal defense and anti-aircraft guns were discovered still packed and alongside incomplete positions, due to a shortage of construction materials for fortified installations. Consequently, the high ground at the island's center remained unprepared for defense, and several beach defenses were unfinished. There was an overestimation of the natural ruggedness of the terrain to impede American advances. Despite this, some coastal defense guns were strategically placed within earlier reinforced concrete structures. While Saipan and Tinian lacked significant artificial underwater or beach obstacles, mines were sporadically utilized on their shores. The Japanese also suffered from a lack of anti-aircraft ammunition to counter the enemy air superiority. Over on Saipan, Lieutenant-General Saito Yoshitsugu commanded a significant military presence including the 43rd Division, the 47th Independent Mixed Brigade, the 9th Tank Regiment, the 1st Battalion of the 18th Regiment, and various support units totaling 25,500 personnel. Despite its apparent strength, a convoy carrying reinforcements for the 43rd Division was ambushed by two American submarines between June 4 and 6, resulting in the loss of five transports and nearly decimating the 118th Regiment. Saito, overseeing Saipan as commander of the Northern Marianas Army Group, was joined by Admiral Nagumo's Central Pacific Area Fleet headquarters, bolstering defense with an additional 6,200 naval personnel. Additionally, General Obata, stationed at Saipan's army headquarters, delegated authority to his chief of staff, Major-General Igeta Keiji, as he inspected defenses in Palau during the American landings. Saito organized Saipan's defense into five sectors, anticipating landings on the island's west and northwest coasts, Tanapag Harbor, and the north shore of Magicienne Bay. The Japanese strategy relied on tank-infantry counterattacks launched at night from designated positions to repel enemy landings. However, American bombardment of Saipan commenced before Saito's forces could fully fortify their positions. Large numbers of heavy weapons, ranging from 200mm mortars to 5-inch coastal defense guns and literally dozens of searchlights and antiaircraft guns still remained in naval depots or loaded on railroad cars or still packed in cosmoline near partially excavated gun positions. The high ground in the island's center had received little attention in the defensive preparations; and, indeed, beach defenses themselves were in many cases far from complete. In so far as training in defensive warfare is concerned, Japanese forces displayed a marked deficiency; there was little evidence of organization of the ground, the principal airfield (Aslito) was virtually undefended against ground troops, and their counterattack plans were poorly conceived. On the afternoon of June 11, Mitscher's Task Force 58, began a relentless three and a half day heavy bombardment against Saipan, Tinian, Guam, Rota, and Pagan. This onslaught, featuring a 225-plane fighter sweep, caught the Japanese off guard in the Marianas and resulted in the destruction of 150 enemy aircraft, securing air superiority for the rest of the campaign. On June 12th and 13th, 216 carrier bombers hit Guam, Saipan, and Tinian, while Admiral Hoover's B-24s started pounding the southern Marianas airfields. You might be raising your eyebrows, the B-24's belonged to Task Force 57, under Vice-Admiral John Hoover, which was currently formed by the 5th Air Force over on Cape Gloucester and New Guinea; the 7th Air Force and 4th Marine Aircraft Wing on the Marshall and Gilbert Islands; and the 13th Air Force on the Admiralty Islands. Concurrently, two Japanese convoys were intercepted, leading to the sinking of 16 enemy vessels. The first of these, was a formation of 20 ships, fleeing on a northerly course 125 miles west of Pagan Island. They were attacked on the afternoon of the 12th by planes of Rear Admiral William K. Harrill's Task Group 58.4. Further south, 135 miles west of Guam, the other convoy of six ships became the target for a special attack mission sent by Rear Admiral Joseph J. Clark, commanding Task Group 58.1. Between the two attacks 12 cargo ships, three submarine chasers, and one patrol-torpedo boat were sunk. Additionally, on June 13th, Mitscher's fast battleships shelled Saipan, though with limited success. The following day, Turner's fire support ships joined Task Force 58 in bombarding Saipan's beaches and installations, effectively neutralizing most of the Japanese coastal defenses and anti-aircraft positions. Despite some damage inflicted on the destroyer Braine and battleship California, Saito's defenses were not completely destroyed, indicating that the preliminary bombardment was not entirely effective. Meanwhile, underwater demolition teams surveyed the landing beaches, clearing them of mines and obstacles and creating gaps in the reefs for the amphibious approach. Smith's reserves staged a demonstration off Tanapag to divert Japanese attention, while carrier groups were dispatched to prevent enemy aircraft staging through the Bonins, successfully attacking Iwo Jima, Chichi-jima, and Haha-jima. To deter the Japanese from utilizing the Bonins in the north as a staging area for aircraft, two task groups led by Clark's 58.1 and Harrill's 58.4 set sail from Saipan on June 14th for an offensive. This marked the furthest advance into Empire waters by a carrier striking force at that time. Task Groups 58.1 and 58.4 refueled on June 14th and were then dispatched that night toward Chichi and Iwo Jima. Airstrikes on Japanese airfields in those locations commenced the following afternoon despite challenging weather conditions. Despite facing strong resistance from the Japanese, American fighter sweeps and bombing runs resulted in the destruction of 28 out of 37 Zeros engaged, with an additional seven destroyed on the ground, while only two American aircraft were lost. Adverse weather hampered morning strikes on the 16th, but the afternoon sortie of 54 American aircraft encountered Japanese planes on the runway, claiming 63 destroyed, though this wasn't confirmed by Japanese sources. Only two American aircraft were lost due to anti-aircraft fire and operational issues. Despite airborne opposition and unfavorable flying conditions, the mission achieved its objectives, significantly diminishing the Bonins' effectiveness as an aircraft staging area. After the afternoon raid, the two task groups headed south as per Mitscher's orders to position themselves off Saipan by the 18th. This operation proved successful, as around 100 Japanese aircraft that could have intervened in the impending battle were eliminated. On the morning of June 15, while the landing craft were lowered and began the complex assembly process, the Americans carried the last air and naval preparations on Saipan. At 8:12am, Turner finally gave the landing signal and the amtracs began to approach their assigned beaches under the cover of the LCI gunboats' rockets. Enemy fire was light until the LVTs reached the coral reef's lip, at which time artillery, mortar, and machine-gun fire increased drastically. Some control craft had drifted slightly to the north and coupled with a stronger than expected current some 2nd Marine Division units landed north of their intended beaches. The UDTs had not experienced this as the sea conditions and tides were different when they went to work the day before. Once over the reef lip some 400yds from shore, the swell made stationkeeping even more problematic. The swell increased through the day, making unloading and transfer difficult as well as capsizing landing craft and LVTs. The 2nd Marine Division had 31 of its 68 amphibian tanks hit or mechanically disabled before reaching the Tractor Control Line ashore. Nonetheless, in 20 minutes, some 8000 assault troops were ashore despite the strong Japanese artillery fire, albeit suffering heavy casualties. On the Red Beaches, Colonel James Riseley's 2nd and 3rd Battalions encountered stiff resistance from Hill 500 but still managed to secure a shallow beachhead, subsequently repelling a savage counterattack as the reserve 1st Battalion was landing. To the south, as Colonel Clarence Wallace's 2nd and 3rd Battalions had both come ashore on Green Beach 1, the 2nd would be sent south to seize Afetna Point while the 3rd advanced inland. Afetna Point was important for another reason than just denying the Japanese excellent positions for enfilading the American landing craft. Possession of the point would make Beach Green 3 available for landing of the tanks of both divisions. Because of an open channel off Green 3, LCM's carrying tanks could proceed directly to the beach without crossing the troublesome reef that fenced all other beaches. Once through the channel the craft could either move straight into Green 3 or fan out to the north or south and put the tanks ashore, wherever it was desired. The same channel could also be used for logistical purposes after tanks were ashore. As a result, the 2nd met strong resistance, progressing slowly and costly against a determined foe while the 1st Battalion was being landed; yet the 3rd managed to push inland against weaker resistance, finally halting about 900 yards from the O-1 Line. In the afternoon, the reserve 1st Battalion, 29th Marines was also landed and employed to fill the gap between Wallace's battalions. It's also important to note that the 4th Company, 9th Tank Regiment conducted piecemeal counterattacks on either side of Charan Kanoa with 14 tanks, losing all but three. Meanwhile, along the Blue Beaches, the 23rd Marines led by Colonel Louis Jones made headway through Charan Kanoa, facing occasional gunfire, and successfully advanced to the O-1 Line. Despite encountering challenging terrain and harassment from Japanese riflemen, their amtracs managed to secure Mount Fina Susu, albeit with significant losses. Upon reaching the O-1 Line, heavy artillery fire pinned down the Americans. Because of the concentrated mortar and artillery fire which had struck his troops throughout the day, the commander of the 23rd Marines, Colonel Jones estimated that the light forces on the O-1 line would be incapable of holding there for the night without being virtually annihilated. In addition, the regimental commander felt that “pulling back would allow our artillery and air to bring fire on the Jap batteries a short distance inland, better contact could be obtained on the right, and the exposed left flank could be better protected.” Dillon's 2nd Battalion and Cosgrove's 3rd Battalion were therefore ordered to establish a defense line generally 800 yards west of O-1 for the night. This involved a withdrawal under cover of darkness of the meager forces on O-1.Concerned about the exposed left flank between the 2nd and 4th Divisions, Colonel Jones directed the reserve 1st Battalion to fill the dangerous gap. Further south, Colonel Merton Batchelder's 1st Battalion faced fierce resistance from Agingan Point, repelling enemy counterattacks with the aid of air and naval support. Reinforcement from 3rd Battalion units allowed partial clearance of Japanese positions. The 2nd Battalion to the left encountered enemy concentrations but benefited from the heroic actions of the LVTAs, enabling them to advance inland. About half the assault Marines of this battalion were carried to a railroad embankment prior to debarkation from LVTs. Until it reached there, the battalion was subjected to frontal small-arms fire from Japanese behind the embankment. There the small arms fire ceased, but mortar and artillery fire continued. From the direction of Nafutan Point came shells which burst overhead, apparently from antiaircraft guns depressed to fire at ground targets. And, as if troubles to the front and flanks were not enough, two enemy mortars began firing on the Marines from positions 500 yards to the rear. Before a request for assistance could be made, friendly planes spotted the mortars, attacked, and silenced them. Much credit for the 2nd Battalion's success in pushing inland goes to the LVT(A)s of the Army's 708th Amphibian Tank Battalion, which, according to the Marine battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Hudson, took “more than their share of punishment diverted enemy attention from the amphibious tractors carrying troops ... I shall always re- member the excellent support given to my battalion by the Army LVT(A)'s”. Meanwhile, Marine tanks and artillery, under Turner's command, were successfully brought ashore, although some tanks and howitzers from the 4th Division were lost to fire and reef obstacles. By late afternoon, the bulk of the reserve 2nd and 24th Marines were landed, with the latter sustaining 400 casualties from accidents and artillery fire. Lieutenant Colonel Alexander A. Vandergrift, therefore, deployed his battalion and moved it on foot to an assembly area some 700 yards inland from Yellow 1, near a fork in the rail- road tracks. The men had no more than taken entrenching tools in hand when a barrage of well-directed Japanese artillery fire engulfed them. After the day's casualties were totalled, it was discovered that the unit had suffered heavily, though it had yet to enter the front line fighting: 25 killed, 72 wounded, 39 missing, mostly those lost on board the overturned LVTs. Other battalions had suffered more heavily, but the real significance of these figures lies in the fact that the 3rd Battalion did not arrive on the beach until 5:27pm. However, by nightfall, only the 25th Marines had reached the O-1 Line, constituting less than one-third of the planned beachhead, with casualties exceeding 2000 during the landings. After half an hour of the Saipan Invasion, Admiral Toyoda announced Operation A-Go proclaiming "The fate of the Empire rests upon this single battle. Every man is expected to do his utmost." The same Nelsonia words used by Admiral Togo at the legendary battle of Tsushima in 1905. He had created that statement taking Nelson's signal "England expects that every man will do his duty" at the Battle of Trafalgar. Toyoda planned to destroy the American fleet. Admiral Ugaki's battleships were to rendezvous with Admiral Ozawa's carriers in the Philippine Sea to attack the American fleet around Saipan. At 6:35pm on June 15th, the submarine Flying Fish reported that a force of Japanese battleships and at least three carriers had passed through the San Bernardino Strait. The submarines were under orders to report sightings before attempting to attack, so Flying Fish waited until nightfall, then surfaced to radio in its report. The sighting report from the submarine was monitored by the Japanese who knew they had been located. About one hour later, submarine Seahorse also sighted a Japanese force 200nm east-southeast of Surigao Strait. The exact composition of this force was unclear, but was thought to be Yamato and Musashi plus escorts. The submarine was not able to send a signal of its sighting until 4:00am on June 16th. Additionally, throughout the 15th, a growing body of signals intelligence indicated that a major IJN fleet action was underway. Receiving this intelligence on the enemy's intentions, Admiral Spruance made the decision to halt the Guam landings, instructed for unloading at Saipan to continue until June 17th only, and tasked Turner with preparing for an imminent decisive battle. However, that's a podcast for next week. General Saito was on the verge of initiating his counterattack. Throughout the night, there were various probes and minor counterattacks that were swiftly repelled. Nonetheless, the 2nd Battalion, 6th Marines faced a major assault at 3am when a Japanese bugler 75 sounded a loud, clear call on the tense night air, and with a waving of flags, loud screams, and a brandishing of swords, the attack was launched. Added to the din were the shouts of the 6th Marines for “flares.” Illumination shells, fired by the three destroyers, Halsey Powell, Coghlan and Monssen of Task Unit 52.17.3 began to burst over the area, clearly revealing the Japanese attackers. Men of Companies F and I opened with accurate, devastating lire. California joined with a tornado of salvos in front of the Marine lines. The Japanese, stripped by the illumination of the advantage afforded by their superior knowledge of the terrain (so helpful in night lighting), dropped before the Marines' fusillade. As Japanese fell, others replaced them in the determined onslaught. At one point in the fighting, it was feared that the enemy had effected a penetration of Company I, along the coastal road. To contain this Japanese prong, Colonel Riseley shifted one company of the 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marines, company L, into the area. The light of morning, however, revealed that no penetration had been made and that Company B had, in effect, formed a secondary line. By 5:45, the Japanese pressure reached a peak; two Marine 37mm guns near the beach were knocked out and their crews forced back. Although the main positions held, a false report reached the 6th Marines' command post to the effect that Company F's lines along the beach had been forced back about 50 yards. This erroneous report, probably fostered by the withdrawal of the two 37mm crews and the infiltration of small enemy groups to the regimental command post, had no basis in fact. Fortunately, five medium tanks arrived in the nick of time to halt the Japanese advance and thwart their assault. With the dawn of June 16th, the battlefield revealed approximately 700 enemy casualties strewn across the terrain. Meanwhile, as the 6th Marines consolidated their position and the remaining 2nd Marines landed, Colonel Wallace's 2nd Battalion resumed its offensive against Afetna Point, successfully eliminating enemy resistance and bridging the gap between Marine divisions. Further south, General Schmidt led his three regiments towards Fina Susu Ridge in a coordinated advance. Despite the 23rd Marines encountering formidable enemy opposition in the mountains and marshes, the 25th Marines managed to clear Agingan Point and extend beyond the beachhead, while Colonel Franklin Hart's 24th Marines in the center made significant progress towards the O-1 line despite facing fierce resistance. Meanwhile, Spruance opted to withdraw the unnecessary transports in anticipation of the impending naval confrontation. General Smith made the decision to deploy the reserve 27th Division for landing. Consequently, Major-General Ralph Smith's units, excluding the 106th Regiment, commenced landing operations in the afternoon. However, during the night, Saito initiated his second significant counterattack. The Japanese 136th Infantry (two battalions) and 9th Tank Regiments were to counterattack the center of the 2nd Marine Division sector at 17.00hrs. Yokosuka 1st SNLF was to attack the north flank from the Garapan area and “cooperate with the tanks to annihilate the enemy's front line and advance towards Oreai (Charan Kanoa) Airfield.” Vice Admiral Nagumo, Commander Central Pacific Fleet and 5th Base Force, was ordered to command the attack personally. The units were still disorganized from the previous night's action and the attack was not launched until 03.30hrs. The objective of the Japanese attack was modest enough: the Saipan radio station, a short 400 yards behind the 6th Marines' lines. This objective, in itself, represented a revision in Saito's pre-D-Day policy to “destroy the enemy, during the night, at the water's edge." Seizure of the radio station area would still leave 500—600 yards distance to the water. This resulted in an estimated 44 tanks and 500 infantry attacking the positions of the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, and 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marines. The attack began at about 3:30, and the brunt struck Lieutenant Colonel Jones' 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, and to a lesser extent the 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marines. The tanks advanced in groups of four or five with Japanese soldiers clinging to them. Poor and ineffective tactics reflected the inadequacy of Saito's order; some tanks cruised about in an aimless fashion, some bogged down in the swampy ground, some made an effort to break through the lines, still others stopped to let off their pugnacious passengers. The Japanese suffered heavy losses, including approximately 24 tanks and 300 men, while inflicting only 97 casualties. By the end of the initial two days, American forces had incurred roughly 3,500 casualties, approximately 20% of the total for the operation. Concurrently, General Obata had instructed the commanders of Guam, Truk, and Tinian to send reinforcements to Saipan via barge, although only two companies managed to land on Rota by June 22nd. On June 17th, the American offensive resumed, yielding significant progress, partly due to artillery support. General Watson expanded the beachhead area nearly twofold, with the 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marines, and 2nd Battalion, 6th Marines advancing northward to within 1000 yards of Garapan. Meanwhile, Colonel Riseley's remaining units secured the base of Mount Tipo Pale along the O-2 Line, and Colonel Wallace's Marines maneuvered around Lake Susupe to reach the O-1 Line. To the south, the 25th Marines led by Colonel Batchelder advanced in a column formation, making headway towards Aslito Airfield by approximately 1500 yards. They managed to secure advantageous high ground along the O-2 Line on the northwest perimeter of the airfield. Simultaneously, Colonel Gerard Kelley's 165th Regiment also moved towards Aslito, making gains of around 1200 yards despite encountering light resistance. By 2:00pm, the 2nd Battalion had moved to the southwest edge of Aslito Airfield, while the 1st Battalion had become involved in a fight for a dominating ridge line extending from the airfield's southwest corner to the vicinity of Cape Obiam. Infantrymen of the 1st Battalion led by Major James H. Mahoney inched slowly up the steep and open slope, so that, by 5:00pm, a toehold had been gained at the crest. At this point, however, the Japanese launched a counterattack and drove the soldiers back off the hill. Reorganizing and reforming the lines at the base of the ridge, the battalion dug in for the night. Amid heavy artillery bombardment, the 24th Marines reached and secured the O-2 Line, consolidating their position on the ridge. In contrast, progress for the 23rd Marines to the south of Lake Susupe's swamps was minimal as they faced entrenched enemy forces. With the expansion of the beachhead, additional Corps units landed, including General Smith's command post, advance parties of the Corps artillery, and Colonel Leonard Bishop's 105th Regiment. During the night, Saito launched another counterattack, deploying the 1st Battalion of the 18th Regiment to stage a counterlanding on the Marine beachhead. However, the intervention of LCI gunboats and Marine artillery thwarted the attempt, driving the enemy back to Tanapag Harbor. Shifting focus to the Battle of Biak, General Fuller's forces had previously seized Mokmer but now found themselves encircled by Colonel Kuzume's formidable positions in the East and West Caves. Despite progress in repairing the airdrome, intense Japanese fire prevented its use until the enemy cave strongholds were neutralized. In contrast, the Japanese had attempted twice to reinforce Biak but failed both times. However, Operation KON drew the Allied forces away from the island, allowing barges to discreetly bring reinforcements from the southwest to Biak without naval protection. As a result, most of the 2nd Battalion, 221st Regiment was successfully transported to the island by June 12, and General Numata was evacuated during this period. Following this success, the 2nd Battalion, 219th Regiment was loaded onto barges in Sorong and transported to Biak via Noemfoor Island, arriving successfully by June 16. Meanwhile, as Colonel Newman's 186th Regiment secured its positions on June 8, Fuller decided to send the rest of Colonel Haney's 162nd Regiment to the recently secured Parai Jetty. With the Ibdi Pocket contained, Haney made significant progress toward Mokmer. The next day, Haney continued his advance, successfully connecting with his 2nd Battalion despite heavy mortar fire. Newman faced multiple night counterattacks and was unable to expand his beachhead. On June 10th the 1st Battalion, 186th Infantry, sent two companies to the point on the low ridge where Company B had been halted the previous afternoon. Despite artillery support, the two units could make little progress and were themselves pinned down about 10:30. Japanese rifle and mortar fire was silenced by the 1st Battalion's 60-mm. mortars, but the Japanese continued to pour machine gun fire from a number of bunkers and pillboxes which proved impervious to bazooka and 75-mm. tank fire. The units withdrew while more artillery fire was placed along the low ridge. On the east flank, enemy fire from the East Caves had died down, and the 2nd Battalion, 162nd Infantry, was able to move on eastward. On that same day, as Admiral Toyoda ordered a third attempt for Operation KON, Admiral Ugaki's battleships were directed to support Admiral Sakonju's convoy, assembling at Batjan Island on June 11th. The start of the Marianas bombardment on that day forced Toyoda to suspend the operation and prepare for A-Go, ordering the battleships to rejoin Admiral Ozawa's command and sending the 23rd Air Flotilla to Palau to reinforce Admiral Kakuta's 1st Air Fleet. With two regiments now stationed at Mokmer, Fuller decided to resume his offensive by advancing westward towards Borokoe and northward towards the low ridge. The 163rd Regiment was assigned to hold the Ibdi Pocket and the East Caves. On June 11, the assault battalions began moving to the starting point in front of Menoebaboe. Haney's forces faced strong resistance and only reached the starting point by afternoon. The Americans then crossed the starting line, encountering minimal resistance along the coast but significant opposition on the low ridge. As a result, three battalions reached the 1st Phase Line, while Haney's 3rd Battalion couldn't move beyond the starting line. This forced Newman to pause his advance temporarily until Haney cleared enemy positions on the ridge. On June 12, Haney's 2nd and 3rd Battalions advanced on the low ridge. The 3rd Battalion fought doggedly forward during the afternoon, discovering an ever increasing number of Japanese pillboxes, bunkers, and hasty automatic weapons and rifle emplacements of all kinds, manned by 1st Battalion and 5th Company, 222nd Regiment. Dusk found the unit still some 100 yards short of the line of departure and about 1,300 yards east of the 2nd Battalion. The 1st Battalion, taking no part in the action during the day, moved forward to Mokmer Drome from Parai. Due to heavy Japanese resistance, their progress was slow. The next day, the Americans continued their attacks against enemy positions, but they couldn't close the gap between Haney's 2nd and 3rd Battalions. Fuller concluded that his troops were fatigued and that the Japanese had likely received reinforcements, so he requested an additional infantry regiment. General Krueger planned to send the 34th Regiment from Hollandia, scheduled to arrive on June 18. In response to recent setbacks, General Doe ordered the 1st Battalions of the 162nd and 186th Regiments to support the 3rd Battalion on June 14. These battalions positioned themselves on the terrace above the low ridge, facing the main Japanese strongpoint directly. In response to the enemy's aggressive action, Colonel Kuzume initiated a tank-infantry counterattack with his remaining forces to push back the enemy battalions, inflicting heavy casualties and disrupting the American advance. Despite this, the Americans managed to regroup and establish a continuous line, while the Japanese sustained significant losses and were unable to execute any further major counterattacks for the rest of the battle. Generals Krueger and MacArthur were unhappy with the progress of operations in Biak, which led them to relieve Fuller of his duties as task force commander. Whether General Fuller's relief as commander of the HURRICANE Task Force was entirely justifiable is a question which cannot be answered categorically. At the time of his relief, the task force had seized Mokmer Drome. Patrols sent westward to Borokoe and Sorido Dromes had found no enemy at those two fields, and General Fuller knew they could be occupied with ease. But he had not sent more troops beyond Mokmer Drome because he believed it more important to secure an overland line of communications to that field and to clear the low ridge so that repair work could continue and at least one strip could be put in service. By June 14th it was only a question of time before the West Caves area and the low ridge would be secured. Indeed, General Eichelberger, who took 3.5 days to acquaint himself with the situation at Biak, drew up new attack plans according to which the 162nd and 186th Infantry Regiments were to be employed in the same area and in much the same manner as General Fuller had been using them. General Eichelberger realized, as had General Fuller, that Borokoe and Sorido Dromes would be no safer than Mokmer Drome as long as the Japanese held the low ridge and West Caves positions. But, in the last analysis, the mission of the HURRICANE Task Force, quick seizure and rehabilitation of the Biak fields, had not been accomplished by mid-June. General Eichelberger then took command of Operation Hurricane on June 15. Although the initial plan was to keep Fuller in charge of the 41st Division, he felt unjustly treated and requested to be relieved of this role as well. Consequently, Doe was promoted to command the 41st Division in Fuller's place. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The invasion of Saipan was seeing tremendous casualties for both the Japanese and Americans. By the end of the initial two days, American forces had incurred roughly 3,500 casualties, approximately 20% of the total for the operation. This island was not going to be a cake walk by any measure, it would be paid for in blood.
Last time we spoke about the Siege of Myitkyina. General Vinegar Joe made huge gains in northern Burma. Myitkyina's airstrip was taken, now the main town was under siege. The Japanese resistance around Kamaing was greatly reduced. However setbacks were also seen, such as the Chindits abandonment of the Blackpool stronghold, prompting Stiwell to toss a new attack at Mogaung. Likewise American officers embedded with the Chinese units were sending reports of how the Chinese were suffering very heavy casualties and utilizing far too much ammunition for their objectives. Regardless, it seemed the Ledo Road to China was going to pan out. Calvert chose a new stronghold location, this time at Lakum, where his Chindits faced heavy resistance. Over on New Guinea, the allies were advancing west of their new beachheads to assault Lone Tree Hill. Soon assaults against Arare and Biak would also be made. This episode is the Landing against Biak Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. In the last episode, plans were made for an amphibious assault against Biak, yet there were some hiccups. The Hurricane Task Force staged at Humboldt Bay, were facing issues with terrain. Terrain considerations forced most of the task force to assemble on the southern of the two sand spits dividing Humboldt and Jautefa Bays. On this spit the beach had a steep slope which made it impossible for more than a very few LST's to be held against the shore line long enough to load bulk stores. The LST's had to beach on the northern spit, where clearing and salvage after the fires and explosions which had ravaged that beach during the early phases of the Hollandia operation had not been completed. In addition, the northern spit was being used to unload supplies destined to be used at Hollandia, to load supplies being sent to the Tornado Task Force at Wakde-Sarmi, and to unload cargo for the Hurricane Task Force. No road connected the northern and southern sandspits. Consequently, most of the supplies and equipment, as well as many of the troops, had to be transported by water from the southern to the northern loading area. There were only a few LCT's available for this work and only by working twenty-four hours a day, were all the troops and supplies transported to the loading beach in time for departure on the 25th. Finally, General Fuller's task force would depart the bay on the evening of May 25th, covered by Admiral Fectheler's cruisers and destroyers. Taking the most direct route, the convoy would be able to arrive off Biak on the morning of May 27th. At the time, Biak was held by the Biak Detachment, under Colonel Kuzume Naoyoki. It consisted of the 222nd Regiment; the 19th Guard Unit; and some rear echelon, service, and construction units. There were 10000 IJA personnel, 4000 were combat troops in total and 2000 IJN personnel, 125 were combat troops in total. In view of the intense enemy concentration on the Sorido-Mokmer airfield sector, Colonel Kuzume decided on May 22nd to shift the operational center of gravity of the detachment to the west. The 1st Battalion, 222nd Infantry, was relieved of its mission in the sector east of Opiaref and sent to replace the naval garrison unit in the Bosnek sector. The naval troops were, in turn, shifted westward into the Sorido airfield sector, while the tank company was brought over from Arfak Saba and assembled in the area northwest of Mokmer airfield. Although most of the Japanese efforts had been directed to the construction of airfields, Kuzume had ably managed to build a system of strong cave positions. In this amphitheater-like terrain and along the low ridge, both of which were covered with thick growth, the Biak Detachment emplaced many field artillery and antiaircraft weapons. There were also many automatic weapons and a few mortars. All these weapons were located within range of Mokmer Drome and most of them could also fire on Borokoe Drome. The key to Colonel Kuzume's defenses in this area was the West Caves area, located about 50 yards north of the low ridge and about 1200 yards north of the western end of Mokmer Drome. The West Caves were actually three large sumps, or depressions in the ground, which were connected by underground tunnels and caverns. The caves were ringed with pillboxes, bunkers, and foxholes, and an extensive system of coral and log emplacements was built along the spur ridge above Mokmer Drome. Biak naval headquarters was originally located in the West Caves, which could shelter 1000 men, and Colonel Kuzume planned to move Biak Detachment headquarters to the caves for the final defense of the airdromes. As long as the West Caves and the positions along the low ridge were occupied by the Japanese, Allied planes could not safely use the airfields. Chief of Staff of 2nd Area Army, Lieutenant-General Numata Takazo and Rear-Admiral Senda Sadatoshi, Commander of the 28th Special Base Force, with HQ at Manokwari had come to visit the garrison just as the Allies were preparing to invade, with Numata choosing to stay on the island to direct the battle alongside the resourceful Kuzume. Yet all of the Japanese at Biak were about to be caught with their pants down as many of their troops were scattered about the island. The Biak Detachment would not be in their defensive positions on Z Day but were apparently being held mobile. Detachment headquarters, the 1st Battalion of the 222nd Infantry about half of the 19th Naval Guard Unit, and miscellaneous service organizations were all located in a cave and garden area on the inland plateau about 3,000 yards north-northwest of Bosnek. Outposts at Saba and Opiaref were held by the 1st Company, 222nd Infantry, and a platoon of the 2nd Company was stationed along the main ridge behind Bosnek. The bulk of the 2nd Battalion, the rest of the naval guard unit, and some naval antiaircraft organizations were located at the East Caves. Naval headquarters, various naval service units, and the 6th Company, 222nd Infantry, were at the West Caves. Most of the army service units were at Mokmer Drome or disposed along the low ridge north of that field. The bulk of the 3rd Battalion was posted at the west end of the same airfield. One platoon of the 10th Company was at Sorido, guarding the southern terminus of a trail which led north across the island to Korim Bay. The tanks had not yet moved to Saba but were assembled on the terrace north of the eastern end of Mokmer Drome. On the morning of May 27, Fechteler carried out his naval fire support as planned and General Kenney's bombers also launched their air bombardment, receiving little answering fire from the surprised Japanese shore installations. Yet there was a westerly current off Biak that would push the transports over 3000 yards to the west, which would complicate the landings. A rocket-equipped LCI, which began firing on the beaches about H minus 4 minutes, led the first LVT wave toward the shore. The LCI fire, consisting of rockets and fire from automatic weapons, continued until H plus 2 minutes, when it was lifted because it began to endanger the troops who were unloading and pushing inland. The first waves of LVTs then formed rapidly and crossed the line of departure; but because of the westerly current and the smoke and dust raised by the preliminary bombardment, they would end up landing on a mangrove swamp almost 3000 yards west of Green Beach 4. Nevertheless, by 7:30, the 2nd Battalion, 186th Regiment had successfully landed and was pushing beyond the swamps to the main coastal road connecting Bosnek and the airfields. Five minutes later, Companies I and K of Colonel Newman's 186th Regiment also landed about 700 yards east of the 2nd Battalion. Realizing about the westerly current, Fechteler then started to turn succeeding waves eastward to the proper beaches, with the troops coming ashore in disorder for the next thirty minutes. With more than half of his regiment already far west of the proper landing beaches, and knowing that the landing had become disorganized and that the rest of the boat waves were being delayed, Colonel Newman asked the task force commander if the 186th Regiment should continue with its original mission or whether it might be feasible to switch missions with the 162nd Regiment and start moving west toward the airfields. General Fuller, the Task Force commander, ordered the 186th Regiment to continue with its original mission. As events turned out, it might have been better had the regiment continued west, and it is possible that a great deal of time might have been saved if the missions had been switched. In the first place, the maps with which the task force was supplied were so inaccurate that both regiments soon came upon terrain features that threw much planning out of gear. Secondly, most of the 186th Regiment had landed so far west that both it and the 162nd consumed much valuable time getting to their proper locations. Finally, an exchange of missions might have been executed without much difficulty, for, in amphibious training, the 41st Division had learned to switch missions when such mistakes were made. Luckily, the landings would face no opposition, though the confusion would give Kuzume time to prepare his defense. By 8:00, the rest of Newman's 3rd Battalion had landed to secure the jetties; and by 10:30, Companies I and K arrived to take their position west of Old Jetty. Entangled with the landed artillery and tanks, the 2nd Battalion would only be able to reach the area east of New Jetty by noon, then sending patrols to the north and east to secure the Bosnek perimeter. The face of the coral ridge behind Bosnek was found to be rough and honeycombed with small caves. Companies F and G, aided by elements of the Support Battery, 542nd Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, sent patrols along the steep slope and to the top of the ridge to investigate many of the caves, most of which proved to be unoccupied, though three Japanese were killed near caves directly north of New Jetty. The companies moved over the first slope to a second ridge line which was parallel to and about seventy-five yards north of the first. Company G started looking for a trail which was thought to lead over the ridges to the plateau north of Bosnek, but it was Company E which, shortly after noon, found the ill-defined track. A few Japanese from the 2nd Company, 222nd Regiment in a pillbox temporarily prevented the two companies from securing the trail, which was not cleared until 2:00 hours, after the pillbox had been destroyed. During the late afternoon, patrols were sent north of the ridges to the area which the Japanese had surveyed for an airdrome. A few Japanese , most of whom fled upon being sighted, were found at the airdrome site, but there were no signs of large organized enemy groups north, northeast, or east of Bosnek insofar as the 186th Infantry could ascertain. The only enemy action during this day would be an air attack by four Japanese bombers. A few enemy planes which flew over Biak around noon fled before anti-aircraft guns from ship or shore could be brought to bear. But all anti-aircraft crews were on the alert to expect further Japanese air action late in the afternoon. Because of the difference in time of sunset at the closest Allied and Japanese bases, Japanese aircraft could remain in the Biak area about half an hour after Allied planes had to leave. The expected attacks developed shortly after 4:00, when four Japanese two-engined bombers, accompanied by three or four fighters, approached the beachhead from the north, flying low over the ridge behind Bosnek and thus escaping radar detection. Some excellent targets were ready for the Japanese. Admiral Fechteler had permitted four LST's to tie up side by side at one of the jetties. Although he knew this move to be tactically unsound, he considered it justified because of the importance of the cargo aboard the LST's and because the jetty provided the only good spot for LST beaching. The Japanese bombing was accurate, but the LST's were lucky. None of the Japanese bombs exploded! Though the Japanese planes also bombed and strafed the beaches, none of the bombs dropped ashore exploded, while the strafing runs killed only one man and wounded two others. All four bombers were shot down by ground or ship-based antiaircraft, and the Japanese fighters were driven off by some Allied fighter planes which had remained late in the area. One Japanese bomber crashed into the water, sideswiping an SC which was standing offshore. Two of the ship's crew were killed and nine wounded. The SC had to be towed away for repairs, and a few other naval vessels suffered minor damage from strafing. There was negligible damage to supplies and equipment ashore. Total Allied losses as a result of the air raid were three killed and fourteen wounded, most of them naval personnel. Unloading also progressed satisfactorily, with 12000 men, 12 medium tanks, 29 artillery pieces, about 500 vehicles, and an estimated 3000 tons of bulk cargo being landed by 5:15. Meanwhile, Colonel Haney's 162nd Regiment had begun landing shortly after 9:00 and immediately started moving west along the main coastal road towards Biak's three airdromes. Moving with speed, the 3rd Battalion passed through Ibdi village at 10:30 and then began to traverse the difficult Parai Defile. At 11:15, the regimental Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon discovered an enemy position on the face of the cliff west of Ibdi, that the 162nd Infantry first learned of the existence of the Parai Defile. At 1:00 the 3rd Battalion, with six tanks of the 603rd Tank Company leading the advance, arrived at the eastern entrance to the defile. There was no large Japanese force stationed along the cliff, but the few Japanese had such a tactical advantage over troops moving along the coastal road that they were able to delay the 162nd Infantry's advance for some time. Meanwhile Company E, which had been attempting to advance along the ridge north of the rest of the regiment, had found that the terrain and thick vegetation made progress along that route next to impossible. Since the company was lagging far behind the rest of the advance and since strong enemy opposition had not yet been encountered either inland or on the coastal route, it withdrew to join the rest of the 2nd Battalion on the beach, and by the time that battalion had reached Parai, Company E was back in place. By 3:00, the 3rd Battalion had successfully pushed through the defile and had secured Parai and a large jetty at that village. Progress west of the Parai Defile was without noteworthy incident during the rest of the afternoon, so Haney's 2nd and 3rd Battalion would be able to dig in at Parai by nightfall. On the other side, Kuzume was surprised by the landings, but he was expecting the enemy to land exactly there, where the extreme narrowness of the beach and the few entrances inland would make deployment difficult. Deciding to seize this momentary advantage, he thus ordered his 1st and 3rd Battalions to carry out an attack all along the Bosnek beachhead during the night. On the 3rd Battalion front, after an unsuccessful raid against two batteries near Ibdi. Then the 3rd Battalion, 222nd Infantry , renewed the attack with grenades and rifle fire, some circling to the north around Battery C and a few others moving against Battery B, located 200 yards to the east. Attacks on Battery C continued until daylight, when the last Japanese withdrew. The action cost Battery C 4 men killed and 8 wounded, while a near-by antiaircraft detachment lost 1 man killed and 1 wounded. Over 15 of the enemy had been killed during the night and an unknown number wounded. The 1st Battalion also raided the beachhead, suffering many casualties as a result. On the morning of May 28th, the 162nd then resumed its westward advance, with its 3rd Battalion rapidly proceeding through Mokmer village without opposition. By 9:30, however, the Americans began to face stiff resistance at a road junction nearly 1500 yards west of Mokmer. Supported by artillery, Company K would be able to push to within 200 yards of Mokmer Drome; yet Kuzume would rapidly counterattack them with his 2nd Battalion. Charging repeatedly, the Japanese would eventually force the Americans to pull back by noon, with Lieutenant Yokoyama Hideo dying heroically during these attacks. Emboldened by this success, Kuzume then launched an all out assault from the East Caves area. On the main ridge north of Mokmer the Japanese had another strongpoint east of the West Caves, which was called by the Japanese the East Caves. Behind Mokmer the ridge rose to a height of 240 feet. It was not so steep a cliff as the Parai Defile barricade, but it could not be climbed without the use of hands. About three quarters of the way to the top was a flat ledge from which two large caverns, similar to those in the West Caves area, could be entered. The Japanese constructed pillboxes on the ridge both below and above the ledge, and in the caverns they emplaced mortars, 20-mm. guns, and heavy machine guns. Observation posts were also set up at the East Caves, from which an unobstructed view of the coast from Parai to the west end of Mokmer Drome could be obtained. The Biak Detachment used the East Caves principally as living quarters, supply dumps, and as a connecting link between the Ibdi Pocket and the West Caves. Continued Japanese occupation of the East Caves would endanger Allied troop and supply movements along the coastal road from Parai to Mokmer Drome. The enemy threw more troops into the battle from the East Caves area until the attackers were coming not only from the west but also from the northwest and north. The Japanese split the 3rd Battalion by driving a wedge along the cliff between the troops on the shore and those on the terrace. Companies L and M were cut off. The 2nd Battalion, attempting to get on the terrace to the north of the 3rd Battalion, was pinned down by Japanese fire from the East Caves and was unable to advance. Company G, on the terrace north of the main road and between the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, was also cut off. In response to the attacks, Haney ordered the 1st Battalion to move north from Parai onto the main coastal ridge to outflank the enemy positions, but efforts to do so were halted by enemy fire from the East Caves. Two companies patrolled in the broken terrain along the main ridge but were unable to move westward. Most of Company L and the Company M detachment which was also on the coral terrace managed to find a covered route back to the rest of the 3rd Battalion on the shore, but one platoon, initially surrounded, had to fight its way eastward into the lines of the 2nd Battalion, north of Mokmer village. Company G, on the terrace north of the main road and between the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, was also cut off and withdrew to the 2nd Battalion only with difficulty, and after it had suffered many casualties from Japanese fire. During the afternoon the 3rd Battalion stood off two more concerted enemy counterattacks, one at 12:00 and another shortly after 2:00, and suffered more casualties from the enemy mortar and artillery fire. During the latter attack, the Japanese began moving some light tanks forward from the Mokmer Drome area. The 3rd Platoon, 603rd Tank Company, engaged these tanks at a range of 1,200 yards and, with the aid of fire from destroyers lying offshore, drove the enemy tanks back into defilade positions. Three tanks of the 603rd were damaged by Japanese artillery fire and three men of the same organization were wounded during the action. Meanwhile, General Fuller had decided to reinforce the 3rd Battalion, 162nd Infantry. The 1st Platoon, 603rd Tank Company, moved west along the coastal road. At the same time small boats manned by the 542nd Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment were also sent forward with ammunition and medical supplies, both dangerously low. The small craft moved along the shore out of range of Japanese mortar and artillery fire until opposite the 3rd Battalion's position and then shot inshore at full speed, one by one. Supplies were replenished and the worst casualties evacuated despite continued shelling of the 3rd Battalion's position by the Japanese. The 1st and 2nd Battalions continued their efforts to clear the Japanese from the terrace behind the 3rd but met with little success. By late afternoon, just as the 3rd Battalion's position was becoming untenable, Fuller gave up plans for further attempts at reinforcement and ordered Haney to withdraw his 3rd Battalion. The withdrawal started slowly because communications difficulties still prevented concentration of supporting fires. However, at 5:00 the regimental commander finally ordered the 3rd Battalion to start moving back along the coastal road. Tanks were to act as point, and rear guard and close-in artillery fire was substituted for a disengaging force. The battalion was to continue eastward until it had passed through the 2nd, which was setting up a new defensive position east of Mokmer village. The men of the 3rd Battalion moved in small parties along the beach and main road, which was intermittently swept by Japanese mortar, machine gun, and rifle fire. Many troops were unable to use the main road, but had to drop down to the beach below the overhanging cliff. Four tanks brought up the rear and protected the north flank. Between 1830 and 1900 all elements of the 3rd Battalion reached safety beyond the 2nd Battalion's lines and began digging in for the night east of the latter unit. Casualties for the day, almost all of them suffered by the 3rd Battalion, were 16 killed and 87 wounded. Facing strong resistance, he also decided to commit his tank company to the attack. At around 8:00, new waves of Japanese infantry, now supported by four tanks, appeared west and north of the 2nd Battalion, thus beginning the first tank battle of the war in the Southwest Pacific Area. The 2nd Battalion, 162nd Infantry, with the 1st Platoon, 603rd Tank Company, in support, was astride the main coastal road 1,000 yards east of Mokmer. The battalion's left flank was on the beach while its right was against the coastal cliff and less than forty yards inland. Between the beach and the cliff was a coconut grove. The main coastal road crossed the rise of the cliff at a point about 475 yards west of the 2nd Battalion's lines. Shortly after 8:00 the Japanese tanks, followed by an infantry column, advanced down the incline where the main road crossed the cliff and deployed in echelon left formation in the coconut grove. The Japanese vehicles were light tanks, Type 95, weighing about nine tons, carrying a crew of three men, and armed with one 37-mm. cannon and two 7.7-mm. machine guns. They were opposed by two General Sherman M4A1 medium tanks, the heaviest armament on which was the 75-mm. Each Japanese tank was stopped by one round of 75-mm. armor-piercing ammunition, while the enemy infantry was literally mowed down by the machine guns and mortars of the 2nd Battalion, 162nd Infantry. Armor-piercing 75-mm. shells passed right through the Japanese light tanks, and the Shermans followed with a few rounds of 75-mm. high explosive, which tore holes in the Japanese vehicles and blew loose their turrets. During this action several hits scored on the Shermans by the Japanese 37-mm. guns caused no damage. About thirty minutes after the first attack the Japanese sent in a second wave of three tanks, which used the same route of approach and the same formation in the coconut grove. These three were quickly destroyed by three Shermans. One enemy 37-mm. shell locked the 75-mm. gun of one Sherman in place, but the American tank backed part way into a shell hole to obtain elevation for its weapon and, despite the damage, managed to destroy one of the enemy tanks. The Japanese tanks having been stopped and the leading elements of the second infantry wave killed, the attack disintegrated and the enemy withdrew. For an hour or so the Japanese were quiet, but late in the morning, under the cover of machine gun fire and mortar barrages, they began to circle north of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 162nd Infantry. New infantry attacks began about 12:00. The enemy was unable to dislodge the 162nd Infantry, but his mortar fire caused many casualties within the regimental perimeter and the Japanese managed to cut the coast road east of a large T-jetty at Parai. Company B and the Cannon Company counterattacked the Japanese roadblock behind close-in mortar support and succeeded in dislodging the enemy by fire and movement. During the afternoon of May 29, the 162nd thus moved back to Parai, where the 2nd Battalion and two companies boarded some amphibious craft back to Bosnek while the rest of the regiment moved overland through the Parai Defile and took up positions at Ibdi The 162nd Infantry's casualties during the day were 16 killed, 96 wounded, and 3 injured. The regiment estimated that it had killed over 500 Japanese during the day. Though Kuzume's forces had suffered massive casualties, they had heroically managed to stop the enemy advance and would subsequently push troops forward to Parai and into the cliffs along the Parai Defile. They would however also lose most of their armor during these attacks. Only five tanks survived and were withdrawn to the West Caves. Pending the arrival of reinforcements, General Fuller planned to use his available troops to hold the west flank at Ibdi and expand the beachhead at Bosnek. The 162nd Infantry was to establish a semicircular perimeter beginning on the beach west of Ibdi, reaching north to the main ridge, and returning to the beach at the village. The 1st Battalion, 186th Infantry, would maintain a perimeter around Mandom, where the Hurrican Task Force HQ was located, while the 3rd Battalion moved over the ridge behind Bosnek to set up defenses on the inland plateau. The 2nd Battalion, with part of the 3rd attached, would remain at the Bosnek beachhead. During this period, the 800 well-armed men of the 3rd Battalion, 222nd Infantry in the Ibdi Pocket, made only harassing attacks with small groups against the positions of the 162nd Infantry. On 30th and 31st of May the 162nd Infantry patrolled around the main ridge near Ibdi for a route over which large bodies of troops might move north to the inland plateau in preparation for the second attack westward. During the course of this patrolling, it was discovered that the main ridge from Bosnek to the Parai Defile actually comprised a series of seven sharp coral ridges, the crests of which were 50-75 yards apart and separated by gullies 50-100 feet deep. These separate ridges were honeycombed with small natural caves, potholes, and crevices. There was little soil on most of the coral, yet the area maintained a cover of dense rain forest containing trees 8-20 inches thick and 100-150 feet high. The 162nd Infantry discovered two native trails over the ridges. The most easterly of these, designated "Old Man's Trail," began on the beach road about 1,200 yards west of Mandom. It was a fairly well defined track which swung north over the seven ridges along a comparatively easy route. Another track began 1,200 yards to the west, near Ibdi. Called "Young Man's Trail," the latter followed a very difficult route over the ridges to the inland plateau. Both of these trails ran through the outer defenses of the Ibdi Pocket, into which the Biak Detachment, on 30 May, moved the 3rd Battalion, 222nd Infantry. On 30 and 31 May the 162nd Infantry's patrols along the ridges north of Ibdi and Mandom were harassed by the Japanese in the Ibdi Pocket, which had not yet been recognized as a major enemy strong point. On 30 May the 162nd Infantry located a water hole near the beach terminal of Old Man's Trail. A regimental water point established there was constantly harassed by Japanese rifle fire from the Ibdi Pocket area or by small enemy parties which moved down out of the ridges north of Ibdi and Mandom. The Cannon Company, 162nd Infantry, was therefore assigned the missions of clearing the enemy from the water point area and protecting that important installation from Japanese attacks. Halfway through the Parai Defile, a little over a mile west of the 162nd Infantry's main perimeter, an underground stream ran from the base of the cliff into Soanggarai Bay. At the point where the main road crossed the stream, the 162nd Infantry set up an ambush to prevent Japanese infiltration from the west along the beach. The ambush site was also used as a patrol base from which small parties reconnoitered along the cliffs of the Parai Defile to discover enemy dispositions in the area. Patrolling on 30th and 31st of May cost the 162nd Infantry 6 men killed, 17 wounded, and 4 injured. On the main coastal ridge between the village of Ibdi and the Parai Defile the Biak Detachment developed another center of resistance which came to be known as the Ibdi Pocket. The terrain in the area was a series of knifelike east-west ridges separated by depressions and crevices up to fifty feet deep. These ridges were connected in places by cross-ridges, and the entire area was covered with thick rain forest and dense jungle undergrowth which had found a foothold in the coral. Pillboxes of coral and logs, hasty emplacements of the same materials, small caves and crevices, and foxholes at the bases of large trees were all utilized by the enemy to defend the area. Back to the Wakde-Sarmi area, General Patrick was preparing to launch another assault on Lone Tree Hill. On the morning of May 27th at 7:00 two destroyers, firing on Lone Tree Hill and the Maffin Strip area, started scheduled fire support for the day's advance. Artillery and infantry action on this morning was much more closely coordinated than on the previous day. The destroyer fire lasted until 7:45, at which time the field artillery and all the 81-mm. mortars of the 158th Infantry laid concentrations on suspected and known enemy positions in the defile, on Lone Tree Hill, and on Hill 225. After this Colonel Herndon sent his 1st Battalion against the defile between Lone Tree Hill and the eastern nose of Mount Saksin and his 2nd Battalion against Hill 225. At 8:30 Company F, moving around Company E on the south flank, started its attack. Behind close artillery support, apparently controlled by artillery liaison planes for the most part, Company F pushed up a terrain feature initially believed to be Hill 225. It was not discovered until late the next day that F Company was actually on the eastern nose of Mt. Saksin and about 700 yards east of its reported location. Since artillery fire had knocked out two enemy machine gun nests which had been delaying the advance, patrols of Company F were able to reach the top of the eastern ridge. The rest of the company moved up the hill at 10:00; encountering scattered rifle fire from enemy positions to the southwest. Company E, just before noon, arrived atop the same hill on F's right. Company E had orders to secure the southern slopes of the defile between Hill 225 and Lone Tree Hill. Company B, still at the eastern entrance to the defile, was again unable to make any progress and during the morning was held up by machine gun and mortar fire from concealed enemy positions on the southern and southwestern slopes of Lone Tree Hill. No sooner had some of these positions been eliminated by American artillery and mortar fire than Company B was subjected to enemy machine gun and mortar fire originating from the northeast side of Hill 225, the reported location of Companies E and F. Actually, the artillery fire had not been entirely effective, because it had not reached into deep draws or caves in which many of the Japanese weapons were emplaced. Company E, attempting to move down the northern slopes of the eastern ridge to Company B's aid, was soon forced back by enemy rifle fire and infantry counterattacks from the west. At the same time small parties of Japanese, under cover of their own machine guns, started a series of minor counterattacks against Company B. Company F did not become engaged in this action. Instead, the company dug in on the ridge it was holding and sent patrols to the south and west to probe Japanese defenses. It was soon discovered that the combination of rugged terrain and Japanese machine gun and rifle fire limited patrolling to a very small area. North of Company B, Company A patrolled along the west bank of the Snaky River and on the eastern slope of Lone Tree Hill during the morning and early afternoon. About 4:30 the company moved in force up Lone Tree, finding the eastern slope of the hill to be unoccupied. Most of the fire that had harassed the company during the morning had apparently originated on the beach below the northern face of Lone Tree Hill. For the night the unit dug in at the crest of the hill. Again, little ground had been gained, although the eastern nose of Mr. Saksin and Lone Tree Hill had been at least partially occupied. At the same time, Patrick was informed that two battalions of the 163rd Regiment would be shipped to Biak to reinforce Fuller on June 1st, with General Krueger also preparing the 6th Division led by Major General Franklin Silbert to be dispatched to Wakde to replace the 163rd. Yet before this could occur, Colonel Matsuyama crossed the Tementoe River and launched a surprise night attack against Toem. During pitch-black night at 8:30, an estimated 100 Japs struck 1st Battalion's area. Divided into small groups, but in two major commands, they carried grappling hooks, knives, grenades, knee-mortars, and rifles. Their grappling hooks had two prongs, like anchors and were attached to long ropes by which they could pull to explode booby traps harmlessly. A knee mortar barrage began the attack. While their mortars drove the men to ground, their grappling hooks caught booby trap wires and exploded attached grenades. They struck from southeast and southwest, two different commands about 150 yards apart. First command shouted wildly and threw grenades. They fired a light machine gun down A Company's street and holed up their tents. But this command's howling rush with grenades was just a feint to cause confusion. The second command, around 35-40, made the main drive. Easily they broke through 1st Battalion's far-spread perimeter holes. An estimated 25 made the serious penetration. They were trying to reach the Regimental command post to kill the top officers. Some of the staff officers were actually cut off outside their holes in a tent and actually unarmed. Ten Japanese almost reached the command post before they were cut down. Such was the official report, but 163rd men said that they tried to blow up the motor poo, nearly 100 of them. From a slit trench, four blazing M-1s stopped them, from the motor pool chief Staff Sergeant Burton, Staff Sergeant Engbretson, T/4 Switzer, and T/5 Donakowski. They piled up 13 dead Japanese, the last just 20 feet away. On a whistle signal, all Matsuyama's men withdrew. The wild attack prompted Patrick to not to ship the 163rd towards Biak. The following morning, after another well-timed preliminary artillery bombardment, Herndon once again threw his forces against the Ilier Mountains, yet the result was the same as before. Nonetheless, his troops would be able to cover the amphibious arrival of two tanks to aid in further attacks; but with the situation soon becoming untenable because of strong Japanese counterattacks, all his companies ultimately had to withdraw to the Snaky River line. On May 29th, Krueger finally notified Patrick that the two battalions of the 163rd would have to leave for Biak the next day, so this would force Patrick to cease offensive action and withdraw the 1st Battalion, 158th Regiment back to Arare. Yet further Japanese counterattacks also forced Herndon to withdraw his remaining forces to the Maffin area as well, where he would form a new defensive line. Patrick ultimately disagreed with Herndon's decision to retreat, judging the withdrawal to be unwarranted and would relieve Herndon of his command, replacing him with Colonel Earle Sandlin. Colonel Herndon's fears of attack along his line of communications had been well taken, for the Right Sector Force had begun flanking movements designed to recapture the entire Maffin Bay area. However, the combat engineers quickly proved their versatility by driving off the enemy force with rifle, carbine, and machine gun fire. Five of the engineers were killed. Enemy casualties could not be estimated since the Japanese removed their dead and wounded during the night. The remainder of the night was more quiet, and the next morning the defenses along the Tirfoam were improved. There were a couple of minor attacks during the afternoon and desultory rifle and 70-mm. or 75-mm. artillery fire was directed against all American units still west of the Tor. The 147th Field Artillery Battalion, withdrawing to the east bank of the Tor late in the afternoon, was struck by some of this enemy artillery fire and lost one man killed. A new defensive line along the Tirfoam was being developed on May 30th as the bulk of the 163rd Regiment would depart for Biak. This left Patrick's forces spread out over almost twelve miles of coastline, just as Colonel Yoshino was about to launch his night attack. After the difficult river crossing, the 223rd Regiment had spent three days moving into the jungle southwest of Arara, from where they launched a series of simultaneous attacks against some anti-aircraft positions along the beach. A 6:05 on June 30th, a guard at B Battery's Position No 6 challenged two men in the jungle across the beach road. Other Japanese were moving west down the road. When they did not answer his challenge, he fired, and hit the ground. Instantly, Japanese machine guns, rifles, mortars, and even grenades hit the B-6 position. The anti-aircraft men killed 10 Japs, but one heavy machine gun jammed. The second gun became overheated and had to cease fire. The Japanese were hard to hit in the dark. They were heavily camouflaged with leaves and nets down to their hips. After one American was killed, the anti-aircraft men left their emplacement and fled 500 yards east on the beach road to Battery A's Position 7. Joined with the men of A-7 - they had already stopped one attack - the B-6 men helped fight about 15-25 Japanese. From 6:40 to 4:30 next day, the Japanese struck intermittently, but rifle and machine guns fire repelled them. About 500 yards west of the B-6 position where the first attack had occurred, Battery A-6 also endured harassment from Japanese mortar, rifle, and machine gun fire. At least twice, the gunners repulsed attacks. A fourth position, Battery B-8, which was 400 yards west of A-6, was assailed about 6:30 also. The anti-aircraft men's .50 multiple heavy machine gun became overheated and jammed. Rifle ammo was running out. Scurrying from the gun-pit, they took cover in the shore brush until the Japanese left at 4:30. All attacks began about the same time, about 8:30, and some men glimpsed a Jap officer with his saber who was giving orders. All Japanese dead had rolls of white gauze in their mouths, and the Japanese officer had completely covered his lower face. The Americans thought that they used these means to prevent them from shouting or screaming when they were wounded. While they attacked the anti-aircraft batteries, Yoshino's men also tried to storm 1st Battalion 158 Infantry protecting Task Force Headquarters and the supply dumps. About 7:00, rifle and machine gun fire began impacting 1st Battalion positions. A captured heavy machine gun fired also. At 10:00 came a furious suicidal attack against B Company - beaten off with rifles, grenades, bayonets, pistols, and even knives. They failed to fire the supply dumps with demolition charges and Molotov cocktails. In the end, the Americans miraculously only lost 12 killed and 10 wounded while inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy. But fearing more enemy attacks, Patrick would decide to reduce the number of separate perimeters along the beach, from 21 to only 8. The bulk of the 158th had to withdraw behind the Tor, leaving only its 2nd Battalion west of the river to secure the bridgehead. Facing little resistance, the Japanese recaptured Maffin, though they would be unable to push Sandlin's troops behind the river. Yoshino and Matsuyama were unable to coordinate their efforts however, allowing the Americans to continue to strengthen their defenses for the next few days, with the Japanese only able to launch nightly raiding attacks that were easily repelled. On June 5, the first units of Major-General Franklin Sibert's 6th Division then began to arrive, freeing up the 158th to continue with its offensive. Sandlin then launched an attack with his 1st and 2nd Battalions supported by tanks crossing the Tor to attack Maffin on June 8, meeting increasingly strong enemy resistance from a line of hastily-repaired bunkers and pillboxes. The tanks were able to reduce the Japanese defenses due to their strong firepower, but not before the Americans had to dig in by nightfall. The night passed without incident and early on June 9th patrols began to probe westward toward the Tirfoam. Scouts reported that the Japanese were holding another defense line, including reoccupied bunkers, on a slight rise at the west bank of the river. About 10:00, tank-infantry teams began to destroy the Japanese-held positions along the new line. While tank 75-mm fire was destroying bunkers or forcing the Japanese to seek cover, infantrymen crept forward to toss grenades into bunker gun ports or shoot down Japanese who tried to escape from the area. While these tank-infantry team operations were taking place, the rest of the two infantry battalions rested. Japanese 75-mm. fire, from a weapon emplaced on the beach between the Snaky River and Lone Tree Hill, harassed the 1st Battalion for a while, but this fire was summarily stopped when a 155-mm howitzer of the 218th Field Artillery Battalion scored a direct hit on the enemy piece. By 11:30 the enemy defensive positions had been cleaned out and the 1st and 2nd Battalions resumed the advance westward. Aided by fire from the 147th Field Artillery, which had supplanted the 167th in the close support role, the two infantry units probed cautiously forward, and it was not until 3:30 that both reached the east bank of the Tirfoam. Opposition was scattered, but the American units lost 6 men killed and 6 wounded. It was estimated that 50 of the enemy had been killed and one was captured. At this point, the 158th would have to stop its advance because they received new orders from Krueger, who planned to employ the regiment for an assault on Noemfoor Island, 300 miles northwest of Sarmi, in late June or early July. As such, advances west of the Tirfoam would be postponed until a second combat team of the 6th Division could arrive in the area to relieve the 158th in mid-June. General Sibert assumed command of the Tornado Task Force on June 12th. On 10 and 11th June the 158th Infantry limited its activities to patrolling, consolidating defensive positions, and driving Japanese outposts westward. One outpost, lying southeast of the 2nd Battalion, was manned by about a hundred Japanese and had to be cleared by tank fire and infantry assault. The Japanese, who were members of a 223rd Infantry company assigned to the Right Sector Force, fled toward Mr. Saksin, leaving behind 4 heavy machine guns, 1 light machine gun, 2 70-mm. howitzers, and 1 37-mm. antitank gun. On 14 June the 20th Infantry, 6th Division, relieved the 158th Infantry at the Tirfoam. The 158th recrossed the Tor and went into a defensive perimeter on the west bank of Tementoe Creek. Patrols sent south and east during the next week encountered a few stragglers from the Japanese garrison at Hollandia or from the Matsuyama Force. On the 22nd the entire regimental combat team was relieved of all combat responsibility in the Wakde-Sarmi area and began final preparations for the Noemfoor Island operation. During its operations in the Wakde-Sarmi area the 158th Regimental Combat Team lost 70 men killed, 257 wounded, and 4 missing. The unit took 11 Japanese prisoners and estimated that it killed 920 of the enemy. With their supply line compromised, Yoshino and Matsuyama would also decide to withdraw from their present positions about this time, which would allow the 36th Division to establish better defensive positions in the Ilier Mountains line. Yet that is all for Operation Tornado and Hurricane for now, as we now need to head over to the Imphal-Kohima front. By June, the situation at Manipur saw General Slim's 14th Army losing all of their advantages. Despite the extreme odds, with a slim chance of success, General Mutaguchi continued his wild attacks against Imphal. As it was, the two armies had been battling it out in difficult terrain and conditions. There were the steep and often jungle-covered hills, the heat for men not accustomed to it, the risk of tropical diseases like malaria and the leeches – not to mention the weeks and months of both physical and psychological strain from fighting a formidable enemy. The monsoon rains that began later in May only made matters worse. As the days passed by, the low-lying areas in the Imphal Valley would flood because of the downpours, while the streams and small rivers everywhere would become raging torrents. The water level of Loktak Lake would also rise, making it especially uncomfortable for the units of both sides dug in at some of the lakeside villages on the Tiddim Road. Dysentery and diarrhea became an ever-greater concern. Foot rot would start to set in for men in their flooded positions. The slopes in the hills became slippery and that much more treacherous to navigate. The incessant rains would dissolve stretches of ‘fairweather' roads and ‘jeepable' tracks into mud and slush everywhere, while triggering landslides in the hills. For the units on higher altitudes like the Shenam Saddle, Point 5846 and the Ukhrul area, the nights would become shockingly cold and damp, adding to their misery. Yet things were undoubtedly harder for the Japanese, who had carried few supplies and didn't expect to be strung out fighting for so long. To the north, General Sato's 31st Division were withdrawing from Kohima towards Ukhrul, defying Mutaguchi's orders, with General Miyazaki providing rearguard at Viswema, whileGeneral Grover's 2nd Division pursued them. Miyazaki's men held out at Visweman until June 12th, before withdrawing to Maosongsang. Then they held out at Maosongsang until June 16, before retreating to the last holding position at Maram. Over to the south, General Brigg's 5th Division was engaging Colonel Matsumura's 60th Regiment, fighting brutally for control over the Imphal-Kohima road. The battered Japanese defenders were fighting tooth and nail to prevent the opening of this vital supply line. The 9th and 123rd Brigades pushed on, they would only be able to capture the Zebra hill on June 7. The following day, the 3/14th Punjabis made a wide hook and arrived on the road behind Japanese lines by nightfall, where they would repel three heavy counterattacks. This would allow the 123rd to clear the hill positions near Modbung and link up with the Punjabis on June 11th. The 9th Brigade made great progress during these days, pushing on to Satarmaina by June 13th. General Gracey's 20th Division was also attacking towards the Ukhrul Road during this period, with the 80th Brigade advancing northwards from Kameng up the Iril River Valley on a wide encircling move towards Litan while the 100th Brigade attacked up the road towards Kasom. Though the 80th faced little resistance, the 100th would struggle to progress against the fierce counterattacks of the recently-arrived 67th Regiment. By mid-June, the 51st Regiment was also ordered to abandon its positions and support the 67th on the Ukhrul Road. Over in the southwest front, the arrival of reinforcements in the form of the 2nd Battalion, under the command of Colonel Yanagisawa Kanji at the end of May, gave General Tanaka a gleam of hope that he could launch another offensive in early June. On June 6th, four battalions under Colonel Sasahara attacked the 63rd Brigade's hill positions, applying such great pressure, General Cowan was forced to withdraw his brigade to Bishenpur the following day. On June 7th, Tanaka ordered his recently-arrived reinforcements to clear Ningthoukhong and retake Potsangbam, yet their first coordinated attack would end in failure. The attack was almost single-handedly held by Sergeant Hanson Victor Turner of the 1st West Yorks. Defending his platoon's position on the perimeter, Turner grabbed some grenades and charged forward, throwing them at the Japanese. He did this five times, going back to gather grenades each time and returning to the attack in the face of Japanese grenade and small-arms fire. He was killed on the sixth occasion while throwing a grenade. For his bravery, Turner was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross. The Japanese eventually captured some ground in North Ningthoukhong, but withdrew after being struck from the air and shelled. In the meantime, after the Japanese defeat at the Gibraltar Box, the Yamamoto Detachment would continue to harass the British-Indian positions from Nippon and Scraggy Hills in early June. On the evening of June 9, the Japanese put in their last major attack on Scraggy, starting with a heavy artillery bombardment. Artillery concentrations were directed at the Japanese and an airstrike was made on their part of Scraggy and Lynch. The Gurkhas followed up with an advance. Although some ground was recovered, the Japanese maintained their grip on Scraggy's crest. Having suffered many casualties and feeling that the Gurkhas' new position was sufficiently strong, General Roberts then decided to halt the counterattacks, thus leaving General Yamamoto in control of Scraggy up until the end of July. Concurrently, as a last hope to break through towards Imphal, Mutaguchi was planning to conduct a desperate offensive on Palel with some reinforcements that would fail to arrive in time. Due to these delays, he would end up sending some of Yamamoto's exhausted troops to recover Langgol and advance to the hill northeast of Palel. The Japanese managed to get beyond Langgol and attack some positions in the foothills near Palel Airfield, but were soon rebuffed. They finally sent in a commando raid on the airfield in early July, which succeeded in blowing up eight planes. Over in Ningthoukhong, Tanaka launched another heavy assault on June 12th. Though a salient on the other side was initially captured, a ferocious counterattack would ultimately evict them. This action was performed by units of the 48th Brigade, including reinforcements sent from Potsangbam. Rifleman Ganju Lama of the 1/7th Gurkha Rifles who earned a Victoria Cross in this action. To the west, Tanaka ordered the newly-arrived 151st Regiment of Colonel Hashimoto Kumakoro to attack the British picquets overlooking the Silchar Track. After a wave of assaults, Water Picquet would fall on June 21; yet the 32nd Brigade would respond immediately with a series of counterattacks that developed into confused fighting as positions were won and lost by both sides. On the night of 25 June, no less than a company of Japanese began attacking Mortar Bluff, a picquet position bereft of cover and a short distance away from Water Picquet. It was held by a small garrison of some 40-odd men of the 2/5th Royal Gurkha Rifles who had replaced the 7/10th Baluchis. In pouring rain, the Japanese first bombarded the position with mortars and guns at point-blank range. For the next few hours, the infantry repeatedly attacked the surrounded and dwindling garrison. Subedar Netra Bahadur Thapa defended the besieged position almost through the night, organizing counter-attacks with whatever ammunition and grenades his unit had left. The Japanese finally overran Mortar Bluff the next morning, with Netra Bahadur Thapa fighting to his death. He was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross. A few hours later, a company of the same unit formed for a counterattack on Mortar Bluff. In the face of heavy fire, Naik Agan Singh Rai led his section in charging a Japanese machine-gun post and killing its crew. It then recaptured Mortar Bluff and neutralized a 37mm gun position and crew. Rai now advanced on a Japanese bunker and killed its occupants, after which his company also recovered Water Picquet. For his actions that day, Rai won the Victoria Cross, the second for the 2/5th Royal Gurkha Rifles the same day. Faced with such counter-attacks and intense artillery fire from Gun Box, the last throw of the Japanese 33rd Division around the Silchar Track ended in failure. This left Hashimoto and Tanaka empty-handed for all the losses they had suffered. Tanaka was forced to withdraw units before they were annihilated. On July 2st the 214th Infantry, with only 400 effectives remaining, completed its withdrawal to the area south of Nouyangtek and the 151st was directed to move back to Laimanai. Having been decimated by sickness and straggling en route to the front, the strength of the entire 151st Infantry Regiment was, at that time, less than 100 men. Back in the north, Briggs' units continued to struggle for control of the Satarmaina area. The struggle over the next week centered on the main feature east of the road, the hill named Liver. The 3/9th Jats attacked repeatedly to try to dislodge the Japanese from this feature. One such attempt was made on June 15th, when Hurribombers strafed the hill, followed by heavy artillery concentrations from 25-pdrs, 3.7in howitzers and 3in mortars. A Jat company climbed the hill, but had to withdraw some 100 meters from its objective because of heavy machine-gun fire. At the same time, the 1/17th Dogras were sent off on a wide hook left of the road and the 3/14th Punjabis were able to secure the Octopus position by June 20. North of them, Grover's troops would also be able to break through Maram and continue south down the road on June 20, finally meeting the Dogras two days later. Beaten, Miyazaki had nonetheless fulfilled his task and could now withdraw east towards Ukhrul. Sato's rearguard fought determinedly. Often a few men with an artillery piece, grenades and a machine-gun would take up positions on the high ground above tracks, ambushing the British advance guards before melting away to repeat the performance a few km further back or, as was often the case, remaining obstinately in their positions until they were killed. Few were free from disease and fatigue, but surrender played no part in these men's vocabulary; they fought on till overtaken by a British bullet or bayonet or, more often, by starvation and exhaustion. But the 31st Division had literally fought itself to death. Exhausted men lay in pits unable to defend themselves, suicide squads with anti-tank mines tottered towards the advancing Lee Grants and Stuarts to be mown down by accompanying infantry, or obliterated by shellfire Although the battered 31st Division would manage to survive the Kohima disaster, General Sato would be relieved of his command as he had refused to carry Mutaguchi's orders numerous times. As a result, Miyazaki was promoted to Lt-General and given temporary command of the division by the end of June. Meanwhile, though his men had resisted like demons, Matsumura now had no choice but to abandon the road and retreat east towards Ukhrul with what remained of his command due to this new threat to the north. On June 21, the Liver position would fall at last. Again, the Japanese positions were bombed and strafed from the air, this time by three squadrons of Hurribombers for half an hour. The 4th and 28th Field Regiments, as well as a troop of the 8th Medium Regiment, fired a concentration on Liver that covered it in dust and smoke. Three companies of the Jats now went in, and yet this attack was also held by the Japanese on and around Liver. They had had enough, however, and by the next morning were found to have withdrawn from the feature. The Jats suffered around 150 casualties that week, including 33 killed. The 15th Division would adopt new defensive positions at Ukhrul to cover the withdrawal of Miyazaki and Matsumura. The main force of the 15th Division then went into defense positions in a line extending generally from Ukhrul through Tongou, Shongphel and Aishan to the 3524 Pass in order to be in position to cover and pick up the Right Assault Unit and the Miyazaki Detachment as they withdrew to the east. In order to hold the new defense positions, all available men, including all those in the rear service units, were thrown into the line. Finally the Imphal-Kohima road was reopened. Slim knew while the battle was not yet over, it had already been won. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The landings at Biak was another allied success. The first tank battle of the war in the Southwest Pacific Area saw the American Sherman's absolutely devastate Japanese Type-95's. Within the Burma front, General Slim had finally reopened the Imphal-Kohima road spelling doom for Mutaguchi's failed offensive.
Last time we spoke about the battle of Wakde. Operation Tornado, the amphibious assault of Wakde island faced many logistical challenges, but not as much Japanese resistance. The landing at Arare was a large success, seeing the allies secure a beachhead before advancing inland. Through a combination of air, naval and ground attacks, the smaller Japanese force was pushed back. Likewise the islands of Liki and Niroemoar were taken with relative ease as well. Over in the Burma-India theater, the battle for Kohima was gradually seeing the Japanese fail to meet their objectives. Without ammunition or provision supplies flowing to them, the Japanese at Kohima had no hope of holding back the allies. Thus the Japanese were beginning to fall back and now were setting up a defense to stop the allies from entering central Burma. Meanwhile a siege was being erected against Myitkyina. This episode is the Siege of Myitkyina Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. Last time we saw General Stilwell had managed to seize the Myitkyina airstrip. Now allied forces were gradually securing northern Burma, pushing further towards Mogaung. The Japanese 18th Division were absolutely battered and barely holding on around Kamaing. However when the American-Chinese forces seized Myitkyina's airstrip, they had failed to quickly attack the main town, which the Japanese were reinforcing heavily. Now they were being attacked from both ends. This prompted General Stilwell to dispatch General Boatner with the task force to try and turn things around. Simultaneously, Stilwell had just received word of the Chindits abandonment of the Blackpool stronghold, outraged by this he ordered them to advance northwards to support the attack on Mogaung. Three brigades, the 111th, 14th and the 3rd West Africans were to advance north to support Calvert's 77th Brigade to take Mogaung. The Chindits were incredulous. Nonetheless, Lentaigne, pressed by Stilwell, sought to have his 3rd West Africans, the 14th and 111th Brigades squeeze the Japanese along the western flanks of the Mogaung valley, in which Mogaung occupied the lowest point of an inverted triangle, with the other two points being Kamaing on the top left and Myitkyina on the top right. With any luck, his three brigades could capture Kamaing, which occupied an enviable place on the Mogaung River. The 111th Brigade was to move north-east and operate in the Pahok-Sahmaw area, destroying dumps and blocking enemy movement. Thebattered men of the 111th Brigade struggled to cope with the march north, to the hills east of Lakhren and west of Mogaung. Conditions were appalling on the three-day march to Lakhren village. From there, the best approach to Mogaung would be identified. They were making for a waterlogged, mosquito-infested area north east of the Lake. This area was also alive with Japanese units. They were required to support 77th Brigade's attack on Mogaung, by pushing from the west as Calvert's command advanced from the south-east. However, 111th Brigade was spent after Blackpool and many men were forced to return to Lakhren village. There was also a new task for 14th Brigade – the capture of Taungni. With the casualties evacuated, 14th Brigade abandoned the Kyunsalai Pass and headed north towards Mogaung. The steamy swamps continued to take their toll within the ranks of the York and Lancaster columns. Dysentery was rife. Animals collapsed and were shot where they dropped. They reached Mokso on June 25. This much-used rallying point, consisting of four huts, was a sea of mud and detritus, decorated with black clouds of flies. Rations were being consumed rapidly in an area devoid of drop zones. Brigadier Brodie, 14th Brigade's Commander, responded to the extreme circumstances. His men, despite their dangerously poor condition, were still expected to harass the Japanese along the railway and support 77th Brigade's assault on Mogaung. He formed his columns into “Light Battle Groups”, free of heavy weapons and the wounded and sick, now lying together in the mud. Meanwhile, some Nigerian units were now struggling on the road to Lakhren along the reailway, as were the York and Lancaster sick – around 300 in all, 200 of whom were dangerously ill. On May 25th, the same day the Chindits had quit Blackpool, Stilwell ordered the Morris Force to seize Waingmaw, across the river from Myitkyina. Unfortunately, the Japanese had entrenched themselves at the town and enjoyed the luxury of a natural moat after heavy rains flooded the fields on the approaches to the town. Morrisforce was not a proper brigade, having only two columns of troops, to which a third from the 111th Brigade had been added 1,500 troops in total. It had been conceived to harass the Japanese on jungle areas. Now, they were up against fortified positions. The result was a bloodbath. Morrisforce then began to rapidly deplete in strength. By July 14th, it was to consist of exactly three platoons, roughly 120 men. On May 31st, Boatner then launched his first coordinated attack against Myitkyina seeing the 42nd regiment reach the Waingmaw ferry road. Built up twelve feet above the neighboring paddy fields, the road gave the Japanese a magnificent defensive position, which they exploited cleverly. The Chinese recoiled from this natural fortification but were able to beat off a Japanese counterattack. The 150th Regiment reached the riverbank and drew up in an arc about a sawmill in which the Japanese had a strongpoint. Meanwhile Colonel Hunter's 2nd battalion reinforced with engineers advanced to Radhapur where they were heavily counterattacked by the 114th Regiment. The next day, the inexperienced 236th Engineer Battalion was sent against Namkwi. The motive behind the 236th's attack was to contain the Japanese in the Namkwi area and introduce the battalion to combat under relatively easy conditions. One company of the 236th did succeed in entering Namkwi but instead of promptly consolidating to meet the inevitable Japanese counterattack fell out for a break. The Japanese counterattacked and drove the unwary engineers right back out of the village. Both the engineers and the 2600 replacements of the Galahad Unit that had recently arrived lacked adequate experience fighting the Japanese and as such suffered badly when fighting against them. Colonel Hunter's veteran Marauders, however, had suffered ample casualties and thus needed these green replacements in order to continue existing as a fighting force. Boatner tossed a last ditch effort on June 3rd, but his Chinese forces had suffered 320 casualties and their ammunition was running low. While he waited for supplies to build up, he used his green american troops to give them some experience, the Chinese meanwhile tunneled towards the Japanese still suffering heavy casualties. This allowed more Japanese troops to break through and reinforce Myitkyina, with a huge relief force of the 52rd Division soon on its way. Meanwhile, Lieutenant-General Matsuyama Yuzo of the depleted 56th Division was facing a deadly offensive of his own on the Yunnan front. After a series of negotiations between Chiang Kai-Shek and the Americans, it had been agreed, General Wei Lihuang's Y Force would cross the Salween River to attack the Tengchong and Longling areas. This would effectively allow the allies to link the Ledo Road with China, bypassing the heavy Japanese concentration along the Burma Road. Although the Americans had supplied the Y Force with artillery and ammunition, the Chinese had failed to bring the Y Force divisions up to strength, and many questioned their training. Regardless, General Wei planned to have elements of the 20th army group cross the Salween at several points before initiating a full assault against Tengchong once reinforcements had been ferried through. Further south, elements of the 11th Army Group would also cross the Salween to launch attacks on Pingda and Longling. On the night of May 11th, the Chinese forces began to cross the Salween River against little Japanese resistance, since Matsuyama had decided not to defend the crossing sites, instead placing his main line of resistance along the ridge line some 10 miles west. The 198th Division was able to assemble in front of the Mamien Pass; the 36th division was successfully ferried through Mengka; the brand new 39th Division managed to secure the Hueijen bridge and the 76th and 88th Divisions were converging on Pingda for the attack. On May 12th, the 198th were making good progress against the Mamien Pass as the 36th had surrounded the Japanese outposts in the eastern end of the Tiantouzhai pass. However Colonel Kurashige Yasuyoshi had his 148th regiment launched two surprise night counterattacks. All that night, the Japanese quietly filtered down from a nearby ridge and assembled near the Chinese position. Attacking at dawn, they surprised the Chinese and almost wiped them out before aid came. When darkness came, the 36th were at their bivouac. That night, the Japanese attacked vigorously, overrunning the division command post and causing the flustered 36th Division to fall back to the Salween. At dawn, the 53rd Army commander, Maj. Gen. Chou Fu-cheng, pushed a regiment across the Salween and restored the situation by attacking the Japanese flank. General Chou was an aggressive and tenacious fighter, whom his Manchurian soldiers had nicknamed Old Board-Back, and who had the reputation of never having yielded an inch to the Japanese. But even Chou could not immediately restore the morale of the 36th Division, which for some weeks took no further part in the Ta-tang-tzu fighting, and the rest of the 53rd Army had to bear the burden of clearing the pass. In response to this, Lt General Zhou Fucheng of the 53rd Army pushed the 116th and 130th Divisions across the river to resume the advance towards Tiantouzhai. At the Mamien pass, the 592nd and 594th Regiments began clearing out the Japanese strongpoints while the 593rd Regiment moved west over mountain byways to emerge into the Shweli valley by the 16th, securing the western end of the pass and forcing Kurashige's men to withdraw into the fortified village of Shangzhaigongfang. To the south, the New 39th would be able to secure Hemushu by the 17th. Yet the Japanese under Colonel Matsui Hideji soon recovered from the initial surprise of the Chinese offensive and the 1st battalion, 113th regiment drove the Chinese from Hung-mu-shu. The Japanese exploited their success and pushed the entire New 39th Division back against the Salween. Further south, the 76th Division met outposts of the 1st battalion, 146th regiment and forced them back to the heights overlooking Ping-ka. Meanwhile the 88th Division from the north was fighting through a series of fortified villages as it headed south to join the 76th Division. By the 16th, thirteen villages were occupied in the area northeast of Ping-ka, but the Japanese, as they withdrew, received reinforcements. Strengthened by the 2nd battalion, 113th regiment, the Japanese did not attack the Chinese who were pursuing them, but moved south and hit the Chinese 228th Regiment south and west of Ping-ka. Sensing the imminent danger from the north, Matsuyama redirected the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 113th Regiment to reinforce Shangzhaigongfang, where Kurashige would continue to resist staunchly. Reports from the American liaison teams were not cheerful. Americans observing the Kaolikung Range actions found that Japanese fire was accurate and economical, and that the enemy's use of camouflage and concealment approached perfection. The Japanese revealed no disposition to surrender though they were heavily outnumbered, often surrounded, and had neither air support nor air supply. On the other hand, the Americans reported that the Chinese endlessly wasted manpower and ammunition in costly frontal attacks. They reported that relations with the Chinese were not always as friendly as had been hoped, and they believed there would have to be better cooperation between Chinese and Americans if the Japanese were to be defeated. The Chinese were described as merely tolerating the Americans' presence and as paying little attention to their advice. The liaison personnel freely admitted their own shortcomings, and by their reports suggested that patience was the most important quality for a liaison officer to cultivate when dealing with the Chinese. Matsuyama ha spread his forces widely, over a near 60 mile sector, thus he would be unable to perform mobile operations and was gradually shifting to a defense of the Kaolikung mountain range by the 20th. This allowed the 53rd Army to continue their advance and the New 39th to retake Hemushu. By late May, with the 198th Division apparently contained on the north, Kurashige then rushed with the 113th Regiment to reinforce the Tiantouzhai front, where they successfully stopped the 53rd Army on its tracks. Yet on June 1st, the 54th Army, emerged in the Shweli valley from Ta-tang-tzu pass to join the 593rd Regiment from the Ma-mien pass. Next day the Chinese occupied Chieh-tou village and began patrolling the Shweli valley. They took the advice of Y Force officers and donned Burmese clothes. So disguised, they found it easy to enter Japanese-held villages. When taken by surprise, the Japanese were willing to abandon many of their outer defenses. With TNT charges dropped by the 27th Troop Carrier's C-47's when the weather cleared, the 198th Division also blew up the last pillboxes at Chai-kung-tang on June 13th. When the last shots had been fired and the Chinese farmer boys of the 54th Army reported the area secure, there was bewilderment at finding only 75 Japanese bodies in defenses that must have been manned by at least 300 men, and shock and nausea when the Japanese kitchens revealed how the defenders had been able to prolong their stay. Pitiful and ghastly evidence showed that the Japanese had resorted to cannibalism when their rations failed. On June 14th the Japanese further quit Chiao-tou-chieh, leaving many stores to the 2nd Reserve and 36th Divisions. In the end, the Kurashige Detachment would pull back to Watien while the Inose Battalion retreated towards Kutungchieh. General Wei then ordered the 71st Army to cross the Salween, just below the Huitung Bridge to attack Longling while a containing force attacked the strong Japanese harrison at Lameng. 20,000 troops of the 71st would cross the river by June 5th. At this time the 76th division left a regiment to besiege Pinga while the bulk pushed on to attack Matsuyama's HQ at Mangshi, while the 9th Division crossed the Salween, cutting off Pingda's line of communication. On June 4th, the new 28th Division attacked Lameng and forced Major Kanemitsu Keijirous garrison to retreat into the Mount Song fortress where they would hold out for several months. While the New 28th held down Kanemitsu, the 87th Division continued towards Longling, joining up with the 88th on June 8th to begin a siege of the main Japanese position on the Yunnan front. The Japanese still held onto the Burma Road east of Lung-ling, but as of June 7th the 87th Division had covered about two thirds of the distance along the Burma Road from the river to Lung-ling. The Chinese had to deal with small Japanese tanks, which had some moral effect but failed to halt the Chinese advance. Indeed, the latter had been fairly swift, for the Chinese had surprised the Japanese, and had been able to ease their supply problems by the capture of some Japanese rice depots. To meet the new crisis, Matsuyama dispatched the 1st battalion, 119th regiment to stop the 2nd army at Xiangdaxiang and then attack Longling from the south. Matsuyama ordered Colonel Matsui Hideji to immediately relieve Longling from the north; and for the Yamazaki Composite Group to keep the Mangshi-Longling road open. Meanwhile, Lieutenant-General Song Xilian, had been making some progress against Longling's two outer heights, the stout defenders would manage to repel the uncoordinated Chinese assaults for about a week. Four days of un-coordinated infantry attacks, with little artillery support, failed to carry the three mountains inside Lung-ling, and there was nothing to show for the heavy drain on the 71st Army's ammunition stocks. This gave more time for Matsuyama's reinforcements to arrive by June 14th. On the 15th Matsui launched a heavy attack, in coordination with the besieged defenders, successfully defeating the 71st Army and consequently driving the Chinese from the vicinity of Longling. The Japanese had thus been able to drive back 10000 Chinese effectives by an attack with only 1500. Repeated attempts by American liaison personnel with the 71st Army to learn how a small Japanese garrison could drive back a Chinese army group only brought embarrassed smiles from Chinese officers. The Chinese finally related on June 25th that the 261st Regiment had bolted, and that the commanding general of the 87th Division had attempted suicide. When fuller details of the fighting around Longling were available, anger and annoyance spread from Y Force to the Generalissimo himself. Y Force personnel considered the Chinese decision to withdraw from Longling inexcusable because the 11th Army Group had sent forward no reinforcements to meet the initial Japanese counterattacks. Of 21 battalions in the Longling vicinity on June 14th, only 9 took part in the fighting. In describing the defensive attitude of the 259th Regiment, as an example of the conduct that had cost the chance of a speedy breakthrough into Burma, one American liaison officer wrote: "From the time that we crossed the river until we reached Longling, the regimental commander continually had his troops in the rear digging emplacements and trenches in the fear that they would have to retreat." Yet that is it for the Yunnan battle for now as we need to head over to the Kamaing area. General Tanaka's 18th Division were withdrawing with the 22nd and 38th division in hot pursuit. To the south the Seton Roadblock was being held by 112th Regiment, threatening to thwart Tanaka's plans. Coming to their aid, General Sun sent his 113th and 114th Regiments to descend upon Lawa, where General Aida began an unauthorized retreat on June 4th. The abandonment of Lawa severely affected the defense of Kamaing, thus General Aida was relieved of command and replaced with Colonel Imaoka Soshiro. Colonel Shoshiro immediately began to dig in at Lagawng. Meanwhile the bulk of the 55th and 56th regiments were holding onto the Nanyaseik area as General Liao's 65th regiment cut their withdrawal route off on June 1st. While the rest of the 22nd Division were applying pressure from the north, the heavily outnumbered Japanese had no choice but to quickly cut a trail southeast, finally withdrawing on june 7th. Their retreat was chaotic, both regiments lost contact with each other and with their subordinate units as they made separate ways towards Kamaing. It would only be the 3rd battalion, 56th regiment who would arrive at Kamaing by June 10th, most of the others would reach Lakatkawng in late june. While retreating, their artillery units were intercepted by the pursuing Chinese and the artillerymen chose to die with their guns. While the 22nd Division and 149th Regiment thus pushed towards Kamaing, General Sun had also sent the 113th Regiment to take Zigyun and the 114th Regiment to advance southwards and support the Chindit assault on Mogaung. The Chinese were able to encircle Kamaing from the west, north and east as the 149th Regiment then moving across the fields and into Kamaing to take the settlement on June 16th, pushing Tanaka's battle-weary troops to the hills south and west of Kamaing. Meanwhile Brigadier Calbert was able to reach the Mogaung area by the start of June. 12 miles from Mogaung, Calvert's forward troops began to run into Japanese patrols and snipers. Despite taking losses, the 3/6th Gurkhas led by Colonel Claude Rome, who in his previous incarnation had been overlord of “Broadway,” pushed on, seizing the western heights overlooking Mogaung on May 31. On June 1st, Calvert's South Staffords linked up with Rome and the Gurkhas at the village of Loihinche. Other elements of the brigade reached the southern foothills of the heights, three miles south of the town, on June 2 and went straight into the fray. That same day, the Lancashire Fusiliers and the South Staffords also attacked Lakum (held by some ordnance troops and a field hospital). The leading force of Fusiliers was soon pinned down by heavy fire, the impasse only broken when a Bren gunner in the leading rifle section went wild, and ran “straight up the hill, firing from the hip and screaming curses at the Japanese.” Softening up the Japanese with airstrikes from Air Commando Mustangs, troops of the 1st Lancashire Fusiliers and 1st South Staffordshires attacked and wrested Lakum village away from Japanese and occupied the summit of the range of hills overlooking the city, to the northwest. Calvert decided he would need to build a base akin to White City, where he could collect supplies and build an airstrip to take out the wounded. Calvert fixed his eye on the village of Lakum, occupying a strategic spot on the eastern foothills of the heights overlooking the Mogaung plain. Upon capturing the village, the Chindits would also find substantial ammunition, a field hospital and buildings which had obviously hosted several Japanese headquarters. The country leading up to Lakum, however, was hard stuff. It was in the midst of thick jungle intersected by deep ravines. The path proved difficult to follow as it sometimes wound along a ridge and sometimes went straight up or straight down. The place was a defender's paradise. “A handful of resolute men could hold successive hill-tops for hours against a large force such as ours overburdened with mules and heavy stores,”. In response to the new threat, Colonel Okada Hakuji rushed over with some units of his 128th Regiment to protect Mogaung, leaving his 1st Battalion to face the rapidly-approaching 114th Regiment and immediately recalling his 3rd Battalion from Seton. Alongside this General Honda ordered General Takeda to turn back from Myitkyina and instead secure the Moguang-Kameing area. Thus the chance to lift the siege of Myitkyina was lost. By June 3rd, the Chindits had built a new airstrip near the Tapaw Ferry, allowing airdrops of supplies and equipment to spill in. Calvert was now ready to launch his attack. Early on June 8th, the 1st South Staffords set off to secure the Pinhmi. The village was defended by elements of 3rd battalion, 128th regiment who were also protecting some ammunition dumps in the area. The Staffords routed the Japanese and destroyed the dumps, clearing the way to the bridge. By now it was afternoon, and they stepped aside to let the 1st Lancashire Fusiliers move on to capture the 150-foot-long bridge. All seemed well until a hail of gunfire shattered the silence, tearing into the Fusiliers. Two companies were pinned down in the ditch while another was in the jungle further down. At about 6 pm, Calvert arrived at the front to confer with Major David Monteith of the attacking company. It was decided that two platoons, under the cover of a mortar barrage would dash across the bridge and secure the other bank. Calvert's mind went to the 4.2” mortars. He intended to use them to deadly effect now. Two platoons of Fusiliers moved in on the bridge, with one platoon attempting to move along the ditch, only to struggle against the thick, waist-high grass, as the second slipped off the road into the jungle. The mortars, about 60 yards behind them, began firing, slowly at first, but then as fast as the men could drop bombs into the tubes. The men, with fixed bayonets, charged across the bridge. The Japanese waited until the British were halfway across before opening fire. Tracers filled that little space, bullets tearing into flesh. The Chindits toppled left and right. Some crawled in their bellies, trying to get just far enough to throw their grenades upon the enemy positions. By 6.15, it was all over, the retreat was called. Calvert summoned US airstrikes. Mustangs swooped in, bombing and machine-gunning the enemy emplacements, but one Mustang mistakenly bombed a group of Fusiliers unloading mules. Because of the unexpected opposition, Calvert would instead direct his forces to ford the Wettauk Chaung and take Mahaung and Ywathitgale, which successfully fell on June 9. The following morning, a Gurkha company attacked towards Kyaingyi and the railway to create the impression that the main attack would come from this direction while the bulk of the 3/6th Gurkhas made a wide right flank advance to attack the bridge from the rear. At dawn on the 10th, Shaw's Gurkhas moved forward, waist deep in marsh water and mud. The bridge assault party was under the command of Captain Michael Allmand, a one-time cavalryman commissioned into the Indian Army in 1942 after escaping from Singapore. Allmand moved his men forward warily. The approaches to the bridge were narrow with the road up on a high embankment with swampy, tree-heavy low-ground flanking both sides. Coming in from the marsh, the Gurkhas set upon the bunkers at the bridge with grenades and small-arms fire, but the Japanese held their ground. At 10 am, they tried again, shooting and hurling grenades from amid waist-deep mud of the Wettauk. Allmand, who was close to shore charged. Throwing grenades to scatter the enemy, he closed in to kill three with his kukri. Rallied by his heroism, the Gurkhas rushed the remaining defenders, capturing the bridge. About 35 Japanese were killed at the bridge and the Gurkhas captured one medium machinegun and two light machineguns. In return, Chindit casualties in the encirclement and capture of the Pinhmi Bridge came to about 130 killed and wounded. By mid-afternoon, Calvert had deployed two battalions up on the Mogaung-Pinhmi Road, while a third occupied the bridge area. Conquering the brigade saw the Chindits suffer 130 casualties, while Okada's troops had also suffered heavy casualties, yet they had successfully delayed the Chindit advance for four days, which allowed Takeda to bring the bulk of his forces back into Mogaung. Knowing full well that the Japanese had been able to reinforce Mogaung, Calvert decided to wait for the arrival of the Chinese troops that Stilwell had sent to reinforce him; but in the meantime, he launched a successful attack against the courthouse on June 11, followed by a failed advance towards the river. To secure his right flank, Calvert had decided to send a company of South Staffords under a new replacement officer, Major “Archie” Wavell Jr, son of the venerable Viceroy, to secure the area between the road and the Mogaung River. The Staffords made good headway, but near the river, they came under heavy fire from entrenched Japanese. Wavell was hit in the wrist, the bullet almost taking the hand off; and he was then pulled out of the line and walked back to the field hospital near Gurkha village, clutching onto his hand, which was now hanging on by a sinew. That night, the surgeons at Gurkha Village were to remove the hand entirely. Wavell Jr's war was over. In the end, the Staffords also had to pull back towards the road after the loss of their commanding officer. By June 15th, the Chinese had still not appeared, thus the Chindits ultimately had to withdraw to Pinhmi. Back over at Myitkyina artillery was arriving by air. Two batteries plus one platoon of 75-mm. howitzers; two 105-mm., and two 155-mm. howitzers, were landed. All except two pieces with GALAHAD were kept under headquarters control. During the siege they fired 600 tons of ammunition, very rarely with massed fire. Boatner renewed his offensive on June 13th, sending almost all his forces to attack the town from all directions. The American-Chinese forces would struggle to make much progress against General Minakami's defenses. Utilizing a system of night attack and daylight defense, heavy casualties were consequently inflicted on the enemy and large supplies of weapons and ammunition were captured and used in the defense of the city. On June 12th the Japanese hit a platoon of K Company, New GALAHAD, so hard that the company broke and re-formed on the L Company line. The portion of the Japanese thrust that hit the perimeter next to the river made most of the men "take off," but two stayed in place and repelled the Japanese with an automatic rifle and a machine gun. To the west of this little break the Japanese worked their way in close but were stopped by grenades and small arms fire. As a result of the attacks, however, the 3rd Galahad Battalion had cut the Maingna ferry road and reached the Irrawaddy north of Myitkyina by June 17th, with the 150th and 88th Regiments also gaining up to 200 yards. The allies needed to capture the Myitkyina-Mogaung-Sumprabum road junction; but for such few gains, Boatner had lost many men and thus had to stop his attacks on June 18th. Stilwell ordered the end of all infantry attacks. Boatner replied that he would stop attacking Japanese positions until ". . . our troops are steadied and a favorable opportunity presents itself." There was reason for the troops to need steadying. A and B companies, 209th Engineers, were cut off from their main body by infiltrating Japanese. Trying to close in on them, Company C and Headquarters and Service Companies were in turn halted by Japanese. The condition of A and B Companies became critical during June 14th, for they had only one meal with them. Two of their men managed to work their way back to the block on the Sumprabum Road with news of their plight, but enemy small arms fire prevented airdrops. The isolated companies finally made their way back in small groups to the rest of the battalion over 15 and 16 June. The 3rd Battalion of GALAHAD reported trouble in effecting reorganization and enforcing orders. The Americans were not alone in their problems. Two companies of the Chinese 2/42nd which had made a small penetration into the Japanese lines on 14 June were wiped out by counterattack that night. These setbacks emphasized the nature of the Myitkyina fighting. The Allies held a ring of battalion and regimental strongpoints enclosing a similar Japanese system. Though the Allied strongpoints were close enough for the troops in one to sortie to the aid of another should that be needed, they were not so close that interlocking fire could be put down to close the gaps. Consequently, there was plenty of room for maneuver and ambush, and the inexperienced engineers and New GALAHAD troops often suffered at the hands of General Minakami's veterans. On the other hand, the Myitkyina Garrison did not emerge entirely unscathed, as they too suffered heavily, losing approximately 1000 men during the month of June alone. But that is all for today with the CBI theater as we now need to head over to New Guinea to start the Battle of Lone Tree Hill. After the fall of Wakde, General Tagami had sent Colonel Yoshino Naoyasu's 223rd Regiment to cross the Tor River inland to attack Arare while Colonel Matsuyama Soemon's 224th Regiment attacked the Toem area from the other side. In the meantime, General Doe's 163rd Regiment patrolled across Tementoe Creek and the Tor River, encountering heavy Japanese resistance at Maffin but successfully repelling some enemy counterattacks. While the 163rd strengthened its defenses on the Tor and at Arare, Doe would also see the arrival of Colonel Prugh Herndon's 158th Regiment on May 21. General Krueger's plan was to use this regiment in a vigorous overland drive toward Sarmi, aimed at throwing the enemy into the defensive and therefore securing the Wakde area. This decision was based upon scanty and incomplete information concerning Japanese strength and dispositions. The Japanese had no intention of abandoning Sarmi and the two airstrips between the town and the Tor without a desperate struggle. The Americans were also finalizing their plans for an operation against Biak, codenamed Hurricane. General Fuller's plan was to land the 186th Regiment in the Bosnek area at 7:45 on May 27th to secure the Green Beaches and its two jetties. Once the two jetties were secured, LCI's bearing the 162nd Infantry, supporting troops, and the task force reserve were to move inshore and unload. LST's were also to move to the jetties when the beach area surrounding them had been cleared by the 186th Infantry. LCM's bearing artillery, tanks, and engineering equipment were to move to the beaches as soon as channels through the coral were found or made, or to the jetties in waves following the 186th Infantry's assault companies. As soon as it reorganized ashore, the 162nd Infantry was to advance rapidly west along the coast from Bosnek to seize the three airdromes. This drive was to be supported by eight tanks of the 603rd Tank Company and the 146th Field Artillery Battalion. The fields were to be repaired quickly to accommodate one fighter group and then expanded to receive an additional fighter group, a heavy bomber group, a reconnaissance group, a night fighter squadron, and one photo reconnaissance squadron. Mokmer Drome was to be the first field developed. Brigadier-General Edwin Patrick would also replace Doe in command of the Tornado Task Force, as the latter would resume its duties as assistant commander of the 41st Division. Admiral Fechteler's Task Force 77 was to provide naval support and cover the assault shipping. Naval fire support was to begin at H minus 45 minutes, 6:30. From that time until H Hour, cruisers and destroyers were to expend 400 rounds of 8-inch, 1,000 rounds of 6-inch, 3,740 rounds of 5-inch, and 1,000 rounds of 4.7-inch ammunition on targets in the airfield area west of the landing beaches. After H Hour the cruisers were to continue intermittent fire on the airfields, bombard targets of opportunity, and respond to calls for support from the forces ashore. Because there were many known or suspected Japanese gun emplacements along the south shore of Biak, counterbattery fire was to take precedence over all other types of fire. Bombardment of the landing beaches was also to begin at H minus 45 minutes. Five destroyers were to bombard the beaches and adjacent areas until H minus 30 minutes, when they were to move westward to join the cruisers firing on the airfield area. Then four other destroyers were to continue beach bombardment until H minus 3 minutes. Total ammunition allowance for beach bombardment was 4,900 rounds of 5-inch and 4.7-inch shells, while 40-mm. and 20-mm. ammunition was to be expended at the discretion of individual ship commanders. Rocket and automatic weapons fire from three rocket-equipped LCI's and two SC's was to provide close support for the assault waves. This fire was to begin at H minus 5 minutes and was to last until H Hour or until the initial wave was safely ashore. Meanwhile General Kenney would toss 52 B-24's to bomb the beaches just before the landings. Additionally, medium bombers and fighters from 5th Air Force would cover the force from the air; and from May 17th onwards, the bombings on Biak's airfields would increase sharply in violence to soften up its defenses. As elsewhere along the absolute defense zone perimeter, primary emphasis was laid upon the construction of airfields. Between December 1943 and the enemy invasion of Hollandia in April 1944, two of three projected fields on southern Biak were completed and put into operational use by planes of the Navy's 23rd Air Flotilla. Their usefulness ended almost immediately, however, when the enemy's vastly superior air forces began operating from Hollandia bases. As in the Wakde-Sarmi sector, the concentration of effort on airfield construction until the Hollandia invasion resulted in dangerously delaying the preparation of ground defenses against enemy amphibious attack. In the five weeks which elapsed between the Hollandia and Biak invasions, the Biak garrison forces, under able leadership and by dint of desperate effort, succeeded in organizing a system of strong cave positions, which proved highly effective after the enemy landing. However, time, equipment and manpower were so short that defensive preparations could not entirely be completed. Some 15-cm naval guns, brought to Biak immediately after the Hollandia invasion to strengthen the coast defenses, were still unmounted when the island was attacked. On May 23rd, the 158th advanced west from the Tor River Bridgehead. The advance of Company L met increasingly strong resistance. Japanese defenses were centered around three small, brush-bordered lakes near the beach about 1,800 yards west of the Tor. The rest of the 3rd Battalion, 158th Infantry, across the Tor before 1130, quickly moved forward to assist Company L, which had been pinned down along the main coastal track west of the lakes by Japanese machine gun and rifle fire. Company K pushed up to the left flank of Company L, while Company I moved toward L's rear. With the aid of mortar fire from the 81-mm. weapons of Company M, Companies K and L were able to push gradually forward during the afternoon, advancing on a front about 400 yards wide. Finding that the attack was not progressing as rapidly as he had expected, Colonel Herndon ordered his 1st Battalion across the Tor. The 1st Battalion did not start moving until 1400 and could not get far enough forward to join the attack before dark. Tanks would probably have been of great help to the 3rd Battalion, but by the time the mediums of the 1st Platoon, 603rd Tank Company, moved across the Tor, the forward infantry troops had already halted for the night. In the end, Companies L and K would dig in for the night across the main coastal track about 400 yards east of Maffin. The following morning, after an ineffective mortar and artillery bombardment, Herndon resumed the attack. Despite the lack of extended artillery support, Companies K and L moved out as planned at 7:30. Company L, on the right, advanced along the beach encountering only scattered rifle fire but Company K, on the main road, had hardly started when Japanese machine gun and rifle fire from concealed positions in a wooded area on the left front halted its advance. Unable to gain any ground, Company K called for tank support. Two tanks, together with a flamethrower detachment from Company B of the 27th Engineers, arrived at Company K's lines about 1000. With the flamethrowers and tanks blasting the way, the infantrymen overran the Japanese defenses, killing ten of the enemy and capturing two machine guns. The remainder of the Japanese force, probably originally some forty men strong, disappeared into the jungle south of the road, whence scattered rifle fire continued to harass Company K. Company L reached the outskirts of Maffin No. 1 about 1400. The movement had been slow, not as a result of Japanese opposition but because the battalion commander did not believe it prudent for Company L to advance far beyond Company K. Despite the return of two companies, most of Colonel Kato's engineers would have to withdraw behind the Tirfoam River against such heavy firepower. Captain Saito's reconnaissance unit, meanwhile, retreated to the jungles south of Maffin alongside one engineer company, which was under Kato himself. Over the Tirfoam River, however, the Americans were again stopped by the tenacious engineers, which again forced Herndon to request tank support. As the tanks moved into position elements of the Right Sector Force, comprising Captain Saito's men of the 1st Battalion, 224th Infantry and an engineer company, charged out of the jungle. The Japanese were under Colonel Kato, Right Sector Force commander, who was killed as he personally led a small detachment against the American tanks. The enemy was quickly thrown back with heavy losses by the combined fire of the four tanks and Company L's riflemen and machine gunners. However, under cover of their infantry attack, the Japanese had dragged a 37-mm. anti-tank gun forward out of the jungle. As the enemy infantrymen withdrew to the southwest after the death of Colonel Kato, the anti-tank gun opened fire. It was soon destroyed and its crew killed, but not before three of the American tanks had been so damaged that they had to be withdrawn for repairs. Facing such heavy resistance, Herndon then sent his 1st Battalion to carry out a deep envelopment to the south across the Tirfoam, yet these troops would similarly be unable to break through by nightfall. After killing 28 men and wounded 75 others, Kato's force allowed Tagami to dispatch the 2nd Battalion, 223rd Regiment to reinforce the Ilier Mountains line. On the morning of May 25, Major Matsuoka Yasake also arrived there with an infantry company to assume command of the remainder of Kato's forces. Meanwnhile Yoshino had crossed the Tor River, 3 days behind schedule and to the east, Matsyuama was assembling on the right bank of the Tementoe River. Herndon relieved his 1st Battalion with the 3rd and then pushed west with the 2nd Battalion following behind them. The next objective for the 158th was Long Tree Hill. Lone Tree Hill, known to the Japanese as Mt. Ilier, had been named for a single tree which was depicted on its crest by the map then employed by the Americans. Actually, the hill's coral mass was covered with dense rainforest and jungle undergrowth. Lone Tree Hill was about 175 feet high, 1200 yards long north to south, and 1100 yards wide east to west. The north side dropped steeply to a rocky shore on Maffin Bay. The hill's eastern slope was fronted by a short, violently twisting stream which was promptly dubbed the "Snaky River" by the 158th Regiment. The main road curved away from the beach to pass south of the Snaky River and Lone Tree Hill through a narrow defile. The southern side of this defile was formed by two noses of Mt. Saksin , a terrain feature about 100 feet higher than Lone Tree Hill. The more westerly of these noses was named "Hill 225", known to the Japanese as Mt. Sento after its height in feet. No name was given to the eastern ridge line, which pointed toward Lone Tree Hill from the southeast. There was a small native village at the eastern entrance to the defile and another at the pass's western outlet. Mt. Saksin was a name given to an indefinitely outlined hill mass which forms the northern extremity of the Irier Mountains, extending inland from the coast at Lone Tree Hill. The name Saksin was specifically applied to a prominent peak about 2,000 yards due south of Lone Tree. On or about May 23rd General Tagami had moved his headquarters into the Mt. Saksin area, apparently on the southwest side of the central peak. Herndon forces continued the advance through the abandoned enemy positions, albeit without tank support, for they could not cross the fragile Tirfoam bridge. In the afternoon, the Americans were finally halted below the southernmost bend of the Snaky River, subjected to heavy machine-gun fire and an intermittent artillery bombardment. General Patrick, who had succeeded to the command of the TORNADO Task Force during the morning, was informed of the opposition encountered by the 1st Battalion. He ordered the advance stopped for the night and instructed the 158th Infantry to remain well east of the Snaky River so that American artillery could register on the native village and the defile without endangering the forward troops. Harassed by a few artillery shells, which by now had been recognized as originating from Japanese 70-mm. or 75-mm. weapons, the 1st Battalion pulled back about 500 yards east of the Snaky. A perimeter was set up with the battalion's left resting on the road and its right on the beach. The 2nd Battalion established a series of company perimeters back along the road to the east. Casualties for the day had been 22 men killed and 26 wounded, almost all in the 1st Battalion, while about 50 Japanese had been killed. When the attack orders for the day had been issued, it had been hoped that the 1st Battalion could reach the top of Lone Tree Hill before nightfall. Since the unexpectedly strong enemy opposition had prevented the realization of this hope, plans were made to continue the advance westward on the 26th. The ultimate objective was the east bank of the Woske River, 2,000 yards west of Lone Tree Hill, and the intermediate objective was the native village at the eastern entrance to the defile. The advance was to be preceded by naval shelling of the northern slopes of Lone Tree Hill from 6:30 to 7:00. A fifteen-minute artillery preparation was also to precede the advance, and the infantry was to start moving at 8:45. The next morning, naval fire started ten minutes late. Two destroyers lying offshore shelled the northern slopes of Lone Tree Hill and the Maffin Bay area, firing on known or suspected enemy defensive positions and assembly points. After a twenty-minute bombardment the two support vessels withdrew. Artillery fire did not begin until 8:30. The time lag gave the Japanese ample opportunity to prepare for the infantry attack which had been heralded by the destroyer fire. The artillery, aiming its shells into the defile and against the eastern slopes of Lone Tree Hill, ceased firing about 8:45. A few moments later the 1st Battalion, 158th Infantry, Company B again leading, started moving westward. The infantry's line of departure was nearly 1,000 yards east of the village at the southeast foot of Lone Tree Hill, and the advance had to be slow because the road ran through heavily jungled terrain. The enemy therefore had sufficient time to reoccupy positions in the defile and on Lone Tree Hill which might have been vacated during the American artillery barrage. The value of both the naval and artillery bombardment had been lost. Herndon's 1st Battalion moved once again against Lone Tree Hill. Company B moved forward to the point at which it had been held up the previous afternoon and was again stopped--this time by fire from the southeastern corner of Lone Tree Hill. Company D's heavy machine guns were brought up to spray a densely wooded area in front of the point rifle platoon. The fire dispersed the Japanese riflemen, and Company B moved forward again. Less than 100 yards of ground had been gained when the company again encountered machine gun and mortar fire originating in the native village. Company A, initially off the road to the right rear of Company B, turned north to the mouth of the Snaky River. One platoon crossed at the river mouth at 1030 but was quickly forced back to the east bank by Japanese machine gun fire from the rocky beach below the north face of Lone Tree Hill. Artillery support was called for, supplied, and proved successful in stopping the enemy fire, and about 1:50 all Company A crossed the Snaky. Orders were to move down the west side of that stream to establish contact with Company B and to send one platoon up the eastern slope of Lone Tree Hill to probe enemy positions. Other efforts were meanwhile being made to scatter the Japanese opposing Company B. Company E moved up to the left flank of Company B and on the south side of the main road. The combined efforts of the two rifle companies proved insufficient to dislodge the Japanese from their positions at the eastern entrance to the defile, and the enemy fire forced the American units to seek cover. Company F was therefore ordered to pass through B's left flank and proceed to Hill 225 to take the Japanese positions from the rear. Company F's attack could not be started before dark and Company A, moving up the west side of the Snaky, was unable to relieve much of the pressure on Company B. Finally, Company A was forced for a second time to withdraw to the east bank of the river as a result of enemy fire from Lone Tree Hill. Tanks would have been of great help to Company B, but the bridge over the Tirfoam could not bear their weight, and the road west of the stream was in such disrepair that tanks probably could not have negotiated it. Only Company A would manage to cross the Snaky River through much effort, yet it would be unable to relieve the pressure from Company B's front and would have to retreat by the end of the day. To prevent further casualties from being inflicted by Japanese patrols, which were expected to roam around the flanks of the forward elements during the night, a semicircular perimeter was ultimately established. Although Herndon's attacks on May 26th had been completely unsuccessful, the 158th Regiment had located and probed some of the principal Japanese defenses in the area and could now be ready to launch a more effective assault. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. General Vinegar Joe was experiencing some major setbacks, but it looked like Myitkyina was as good as his. However the American officers' reports of how difficult the going was for the Chinese was quite disheartening. Over in New Guinea, the allies were yet again faced with a great obstacle, now in the form of One Tree Hill.
Last time we spoke about the Japanese defeats at Imphal and Kohima. General Mutaguchi's Operation U-Go was gradually falling apart. General Yamauchi faced defeat afte defeat and was forced to dig in around Sendgmai and Kanglatongbi. The allies then began tossing large counteroffensives while Mutaguchi was forced to change targets for Bishenpur, only to be repelled again. The allies' anvil-hammer strategy proved very effective, the Japanese lost their momentum and now the allies were seizing it. The battle for Kohima was fierce, seeing the Japanese struggle to seize key features upon it. Despite many victories in Kohima, it did not seem like the Japanese would be able to seize the entire area. Within the China theater, Operation Kogo saw the Japanese push into Luoyang, earning enormous victories over the Chinese forces. Out in the Pacific, the British eastern fleet launched a successful airstrike against Surabaya, gaining valuable experience despite minimal Japanese response. This episode is the Battle of Wakde Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. A new mission was afoot, Operation Tornado, the amphibious assault of Wakde Island. The nucleus of the force that would hit Wakde was to be General Doe's 163rd regiment of the 41st division. The war planners devoted a lot of time to the selection of a landing beach for Tornado. However the island was too small and her beaches were too limited to permit the landing of a reinforced regiment. Furthermore a landing on Wake would most likely be met by hidden Japanese artillery on the mainland. Thus to stop such a thing from occurring they would have to perform a landing against the mainland to eliminate artillery positions. It was decided that a landing at Toem, on the mainland directly opposite Wakde, would not be sensible. There the landing craft and cargo ships would be subjected to small-caliber fire from Wakde. In such restricted waters the enemy could place enfilade fire on the ships, but in more open waters to the west naval fire support ships and amphibious vessels would have freedom of movement and could maneuver to neutralize both Wakde and the Toem area while the TORNADO Task Force moved ashore and set up its artillery. After consideration of all these factors, it was finally decided that the initial beachhead would be at Arare, a native settlement on the coast about three miles west of Toem and four and one-half miles southwest of Wakde Island. Additionally, the Allied Air Forces desired that radar warning stations be established in the Wakde area. For this purpose, Liki and Niroemoar Islands, about fifteen miles off Sarmi, were to be seized. As such the Tornado Task Force was going to begin landing on the mainland opposite of Wakde island at Arare on May 17th. The next day the 1st Battalion, 163rd Infantry would assault Wakde island, covered not only by the task force artillery but also by the Provisional Groupment on Insoemanai and by naval fire support ships. After all of that, on the 19th, Liki and Niroemoar islands would be captured where radar stations would be constructed. Furthermore, in reserve would be the 128th and 158th Regiments, ready to reinforce Doe's troops if needed. Admiral Fechteler's Task Force 77 was going to take charge of the operations against Wakde and Biak, with Captain Noble's Eastern Attack Group providing fire support for Operation Tornado. Captain Noble divided his fire support ships into three groups: Fire Support Group A two heavy cruisers and four destroyers, Fire Support Group B three light cruisers and six destroyers, and Fire Support Group C, ten destroyers. These ships would begin firing on assigned targets at H minus 45 minutes and would continue bombardment until H minus 3. The bulk of the D Day fire was to be aimed at Sawar and Maffin Dromes, west of the landing beach. No resistance was expected at the beach and a light bombardment to be directed on it was purely precautionary. Some fire support ships were assigned counterbattery missions and others were to aim their shells at Wakde and Insoemanai Islands. Other ships assigned to participate in the landing phase were 3 submarine chasers, 2 destroyer-escorts, 4 minesweepers, 2 rocket-equipped submarine chasers, and 3 rocket-equipped LCIs. Rocket fire was to begin at H minus 3 minutes and was to be directed principally against the beachhead area. At H minus 1, all fire on the beach was to cease and the landing craft were to make their final dash to the shore. After the landing, the fire support ships were to shift bombardment to targets on the beach flanks and were to be prepared to deliver call fire upon request from the troops ashore. The landing on Insoemanai was to be supported by two LCI”G”s and two destroyers. Throughout the night of 17-18 May, cruisers and destroyers were to bombard Wakde and on the morning of the 18th they and the rocket-equipped vessels were to support the assault on that island. On the 19th a few destroyers were to support the landings on Liki and Niroemoar Islands. Admiral Crutchley's cruisers would shell the mainland around Sarmi and Sawar, while Admiral Berkey's cruisers would hit Wakde Island. On top of that, General Kenney's 5th Air Force would hit the Wakde-Sarmi area alongside other targets along New Guinea's northern coast. Special attention was given to enemy fields east of the Vogelkop Peninsula and on Biak Island. Japanese waterborne supply and reinforcement movements in the Geelvink Bay area were to be stopped insofar as weather, time, and the availability of aircraft permitted it. Insofar as range, weather, and time permitted, Australian bombers, aided by a Dutch squadron of B-25s, were to neutralize enemy air bases on the Arafura Sea islands and on other islands of the Indies southwest of the Vogelkop. On D minus 1 Fifth Air Force bombers were to attempt detonation of possible land mines on the mainland beach and subsurfaces mines in the waters surrounding Wakde. On the morning of D Day there was to be additional bombing west of the landing area, but there was to be no bombing or strafing of the beach immediately before the assault. Fighters were to be on air alert, weather permitting, over the Wakde area from first light to dusk on D Day. During part of the day A-20s would also be on alert over the area and were to strike Wakde. Such daily cover was to continue until aircraft could use the Wakde strip. To face this onslaught was a signal IJA company, the Japanese 9th Company of the 224th Infantry Regiment, reinforced with a mountain artillery platoon and a few mortar and both light and heavy machine-gun squads from other 224th Regiment units. The strength of this combat force was about 280 men. They would be assisted by the IJN's 91st Guard Unit of about 150 men and a battery of the 53rd Field Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, most of whose weapons had long since been demolished by the air attacks. Alongside miscellaneous airdrome engineers and other service personnel, both Army and Navy over on Insoemoear Island, this brought the total of Japanese strength on the island to nearly 800 troops. This was all the result of General Tagami's decision to concentrate the bulk of his division in the Maffin Bay-Sawar sector, leaving the coastal stretch east of the Tor River and opposite of Wakde pretty much unguarded. A series of untoward circumstances emerged which hampered the loading process. LSTs on which the Task Force units at Aitape were to be loaded were some eight hours late reaching the staging point. When these vessels finally reached Aitape, adverse surf conditions and congestion on the shore prevented their beaching until late in the afternoon of May 13th, and loading was delayed another twelve hours. There was also some trouble about units scheduled to take part in the Wakde operation. The Shore Battalion, 533rd EBSR, an important element of the Task Force, did not arrive at Aitape until the afternoon of May 12th. The battalion and its equipment could not be unloaded from the ships which had brought it to BLUE Beach from eastern New Guinea and be reloaded on LSTs of the Wakde convoy in time for the departure of the task force from Aitape, scheduled for no later than midnight on May 14th. In view of these logistic difficulties, General Doe was therefore forced to drive his troops to the limit of their endurance in order to get the loading finished on time. He solved the problem of the Shore Battalion, 533rd EBSR by substituting for that unit the Shore Battalion, 593rd EBSR, which was already stationed at Aitape. Finally at 1am on the 15th, Noble's ships departed Aitape, stopping at Hollandia to load the remainder of the task force, before assembling off Arare and Wakde by dawn of the 17th. The fire support ships successfully bombarded the Japanese targets against little resistance while as Troops aboard the assault ships arose early, ate the breakfast quickly, and by 5:30 began loading on their assigned landing craft. The sea remained calm and the rain gave way to the sun shortly after dawn. Men of the 3d Battalion, 163d Infantry, transferred from the APA's which had brought them from Aitape to the eight LCVP's of the first wave. The beach was clearly visible and its limits had been marked by colored smoke grenades dropped by cruiser-based seaplanes of the fire support units. Meeting zero opposition, the first American troops would hit the shore at 7:15, with succeeding waves rapidly arriving behind them. The 3rd Battalion then fanned out along the shore and quickly secured the Arare beachhead area, just as the remaining units were being brought to shore. Upon landing, Doe's 2nd Battalion passed through the 3rd and immediately moved eastward towards Tementoe Creek, successfully securing Toem against no opposition by 9:30. There, the 1st Battalion assembled for the assault on Wakde while Company E was transported from the mainland to Insoemanai Island, where the Americans would successfully establish a Provisional Groupment of heavy weapons to support the next day's assault. Within a few hours after the mainland beachhead had been secured, the Tornado Task Force was ready to execute the second phase of the D Day plan, the capture of Insoemanai Island, a little over 3,500 yards offshore. At about 10:45, under cover of fire from two destroyers and two rocket-equipped LCIs, a platoon of Company E, 163rd Infantry, was transported from the mainland to Insoemanai. There was no opposition to this maneuver and the islet proved to be unoccupied. Four LCMs, an LCVP, and two LCSs immediately took the rest of the company and the Provisional Groupment of heavy weapons to Insoemanai. The landing of the force was rendered difficult only by the fact that a coral fringing reef made it necessary for the troops to wade ashore from about seventy-five yards out. The mortars and machine guns of the Provisional Groupment were quickly set up and began firing on Wakde. The Japanese at Wakde responding to their first bombardments with machine-gun and mortar fire, which was the only noticeable resistance of this day. At the same time, elements of the 3rd Battalion had moved west to the Tor River, successfully reaching it during the afternoon. Thus, by the end of the day, the Americans had landed a total of 7000 men and had successfully secured a firm beachhead between the Tementoe and Tor Rivers at the cost of only 2 killed and 11 wounded. Once he received news of the landings, General Tagami ordered all his forces to prepare a counterattack to try and destroy the allied beachhead. He also ordered the Matsuyama Detachment, who were advancing towards Hollandia, to turn back to Toem as quickly as possible so they could launch and attack against the enemy from the east. Yet before the Japanese could begin their advances, General Doe's amphibious assault began. Shore-based artillery, the Provisional Groupment on Insoemanai, and some of the naval fire support ships unleashed harassing fire on Wakde throughout the night. 36 A-20s of General Kenney's Fifth Air Force bombed and strafed the Japanese defenses beginning at 7:15am on the 15th. Naval bombardment lasted until 8:57 when the gunfire was aimed at the proposed landing beach on the southern shore of Wakde, and was then to be lifted to the northern side of the island. The 191st Field Artillery Group fired for twenty-three minutes on Wakde, and this bombardment was supplemented by 20-mm. and 40-mm. weapons aboard naval support vessels upon completion of the latters' fire from heavier weapons. The Provisional Groupment on Insoemanai joined in. In addition, rocket-equipped LCIs threw 850 4.5-inch rockets on the island. Noble's warships expending a total of 400 rounds of 6-inch and 1950 rounds of 5-inch ammunition against Wakde's defenses. The Japanese had constructed many defensive positions on Wakde. There were about a hundred bunkers of various sizes and constructions. Some were made of coconut logs and dirt, others utilized cement in sacks, and a few contained concrete or lumps of coarse coral. There were many foxholes and slit trenches, and the Japanese had improved some of the bomb craters to make defensive positions. There were at least two well-constructed concrete air raid shelters and the Japanese were prepared to use the few coral caves on the eastern shore for both defense and storage. Many of the defensive positions were well camouflaged, and some were dug deep into the ground to present a low silhouette. Coconut trees toppled by pre-assault bombardments added more natural camouflage and protection to the enemy's defensive positions. The majority of the many bunkers were mutually supporting, but, on the other hand, some had been built with no apparent relationship to others. Some of the bunkers, most of the field and anti-aircraft gun positions, the airstrip, and many buildings had been severely damaged or destroyed by carrier-based aircraft during their attacks on the Wakde-Sarmi area in support of the Hollandia operation. By 9am, the first wave of LCVPS were surging forward under Japanese rifle and machine gun fire at around 300 yards range. They hit the beaches at Wakde at 9:10am. For the next 15 minutes, three rifle companies and two Sherman tanks landed against increasing fire from Japanese machine-guns and rifles in hidden positions on the flanks of the beachhead. Despite the resistance, the beachhead was quickly organized and the Americans soon began to expand the perimeter in all directions. The two tanks, with Companies B and F, started moving west to widen the initial hold. Company C struck north toward the airstrip and Company A pushed to the southeast along the small peninsula to destroy a troublesome machine gun nest on the little knoll. After destroying an enemy bunker, Company A cleared the eastern peninsula by 10:45 while Companies B and F, after meeting initial heavy resistance on the west flank, found that most opposition collapsed once the ruins of prewar plantation houses had been cleared by hand grenades and rifle fire. The two companies thereupon left the beach and swung north toward the airfield. Company C then encountered strong resistance in its drive up the center of the island, laboriously clearing a group of bunkers by 10:15 but then calling for tank support to destroy a second group in front of the airfield. At the same time, Companies B and F swung north towards the airfield, reaching its southern edge at 10:30 and then pushing eastwards. Just before 11:30 the tanks joined the infantry unit, which had now pushed halfway from the beach to the airstrip. With this added strength Company C reduced each bunker in a series of separate actions which included 75-mm. fire from the tanks, lobbing hand grenades into the bunkers' fire ports, and killing with rifle fire all Japanese who showed themselves. With Company B's aid and the continued support of the two tanks, Company C was able to push on to the airstrip. In the northeast corner of the island the Japanese forces maintained a fierce defense, and Companies B, C, and F were subjected to considerable small arms, machine gun, and mortar fire originating from positions at the eastern end of the airstrip. Movement eastward along the south side of the strip was slow, even though Companies B and F had been reinforced by Company D's heavy machine guns, which had arrived on Wakde from Insoemanai late in the morning. In the meantime, Company A was sent to aid in the mop up of the plantation houses, before turning northwest to clear the western end of Wakde. Company A pushed along the beach road and down a dispersal lane running off the southwest side of the strip. About 1245 the advance was held up by three Japanese bunkers on the right flank. Tank 75-mm. fire, delivered from as close as 20 yards, soon eliminated the Japanese defenders. Small groups of Japanese, originally hiding in foxholes behind the three pillboxes, attempted to assault the tanks with hand grenades and bayonets. Company A's automatic riflemen quickly dispersed or killed these men, and the unit pushed on around the west end of the airstrip. Little opposition was encountered in this movement and the company reached the north shore of Wakde Island about 1:30pm. Major Wing of the 1st battalion, decided to await the arrival of two more tanks from the mainland and the redisposition of Company D's weapons before attacking what promised to be the strongest Japanese defenses on Wakde. The two additional tanks were to be used wherever opposition proved heaviest, while the heavy weapons of Company D were to be equally divided between Companies B and F. Meanwhile Company C attempted to advance across the strip in support of Company A, but their movement would be delayed due to the ferocious enemy resistance. At 3:45, Company A finally restarted the drive eastwards while Companies B and F kept pushing along the airfield. Company A rapidly moved forward from the western end of the strip, passed through Company C at the halfway point, and pushed cautiously eastward. Movement after passing Company C was slowed by increasingly heavy machine gun and mortar fire from the northeast section of the island. At 6:00, when Major Wing ordered his men to dig in for the night, Company A had not quite reached the northeastern corner of the airfield. Meanwhile, south of the strip Company B had scarcely started its attack when fire from hidden Japanese machine guns held up the advance. Company F was immediately pulled out of its reserve role and committed to action on B's right flank. Two tanks were moved forward to Company B's front at the same time. Despite their best efforts and even with the tank support, Companies B and F were unable to progress more than 300 yards east of the lines of departure. Major Wing decided that since dusk was approaching it would be useless to continue the attack. The two companies were therefore halted and instructed to take up night defensive positions. Company A had set up its night perimeter about 100 yards short of the northeast corner of the airdrome. Company B was on the south side of the strip about 450 yards from the eastern end, and Company F was on B's right. Company C was pulled back to the southern side of the field and extended Company F's line to the southeast beach at the base of the small peninsula. The battalion command post was about 400 yards behind the lines of Company F. There was no connection across the strip between Companies A and B. The former was in a dangerously exposed position. However, Japanese fire against the company perimeter ceased before dark, and the Japanese did not attack. The night was fairly uneventful except at around 2:30 am on the 19th a small group of Japanese attacked a command post, defended by elements of Company D, and a half-hour fire fight raged in the darkness. Twelve Japanese were killed while three Americans, all of D Company, were wounded. This night battle did not delay the next day's attack which started, after an artillery and mortar preparation of one hour's duration, at 9:15am. Company C was the first unit under way on the 19th. Two tanks were assigned to the 3rd Platoon and one to the 2nd. The 3rd Platoon was on the left, the 2nd on the right, and the 1st and Weapons Platoons were in support. The 3rd Platoon pushed eastward up a slight rise, harassed by light rifle fire from the front and left flank. Once on top of the rise the platoon met heavy Japanese fire from behind fallen coconut trees and from a number of bunkers, bomb craters, and demolished buildings to the east. The 75-mm. guns of the tanks methodically destroyed each enemy position, and the few enemy that escaped from the bunkers were cut down by 3rd Platoon riflemen. The 2nd Platoon, followed by the rest of C Company, moved on toward the eastern beaches, and was slowed only by heavy brush near the shore. Upon turning north at the beach the company found that the Japanese had converted a number of small coral caves into minor strong points. These were slowly cleared by riflemen, tank fire, and flame throwers as the company pushed on. Meanwhile, Company B, moving east along the south edge of the airstrip, had also encountered many Japanese defensive positions. Progress was at a snail's pace. Company F, in reserve during the early part of the drive, was thrown into the fight on B's right flank about 11:30 and two tanks were sent from Company C's front to support Company B. The latter, with its zone of responsibility now nearly halved, was able to concentrate its forces for more effective operations. A rifle platoon was assigned to each tank and the remaining rifle platoon was in support. Some Japanese were found hidden in wrecks of aircraft, some of which covered bunkers, and others were in foxholes in heavy brush. This brush was difficult for soldiers afoot to penetrate but the tanks, spraying every likely hiding place with machine gun fire, rapidly broke paths through it. The advance, even with the tank support, was slow, because it was necessary to comb every square foot of ground for Japanese riflemen. It was not until 1400 that Company B reached the southeast corner of the strip. On B's right, Company F and one tank encountered similar opposition but managed to keep abreast of Companies B and C. During the late afternoon, Companies C and F turned north, while Company A advanced northeast to join up with Company B. At this point the eastern end of the field had been cleared out, the Japanese resistance began to collapse as remaining defenders formed a small triangle perimeter by 6pm. Meanwhile Liki and Niroemoar were captured by Companies E and I on the 19th. The two companies had been transported to the objectives by two APD's and two LCT's, protected by DD's. The islands proved to be unoccupied by the Japanese and the Fifth Air Force radar detachments were immediately set up. The only casualty was the native chieftain of Liki, who was wounded by the pre assault naval bombardment. Detachments of the 163d Infantry were left on both islands to protect the radar installations. The morning of the 20th, suddenly opened up with a banzai charge performed by 37 Japanese, who had slipped through Company C's lines during the night against engineer units at the beachhead. The attack began at7:30, leaving36 dead and 1 wounded Japanese, the latter was taken prisoner. At 9:00 Companies A, C, and F started patrolling in the northeast pocket. A few Japanese were killed, others were buried by demolition charges in coral caves along the northeast shore, and many committed suicide. During the afternoon Major Wing's men moved back to the mainland and turned over control of Wakde Island to the Allied Air Forces. The 836th Engineer Aviation Battalion began repairing the western end of the Wakde airdrome, with the strip being declared operational on May 21st. The first planes landed on the island that afternoon, two days ahead of schedule. Within a few more days the Wakde strip was sufficiently repaired and enlarged to furnish the needed base from which bombers could support the Biak operation on May 27 and Admiral Nimitz' advance to the Marianas in mid-June. The final count of Japanese casualties on Wakde was 759 killed and 4 captured, with an additional 50 being killed on the mainland. In turn, the Americans only lost 43 killed and 139 wounded. That is all for today on this front as we now need to cross over to the India-Burma front. Last time, we saw the forces of General Stopford managed to retake Kohima Ridge in mid May, tossing General Sato's 31st Division onto the defense. Stopford reorganized his forces for a final push. The 5th brigade led by Brigadier Michael West prepared to launch coordinated set-piece attacks against the remaining Japanese positions atop Naga Hill. An attack was made by the Cameron Highlanders on Hunter's Hill on the night of May 15th, but it was hurled back. After this bulldozers were sent to cut a track up Naga Hill to allow tanks to support an infantry assault. On the 19th, Brigadier West launched another attack, but this time terrible weather hindered them, allowing the Worcesters to only seize 9 bunkers before being halted by enemy fire, coming from a group of bunkers on the reverse slope. After this, General Messervy of the 7th division was given responsibility for taking Naga Hill. On May 23rd, he brought with him Brigadier Loftus-Tottenham's 33rd brigade. This switch allowed General Grover to concentrate the remainder of his tired division for an attack on the Japanese positions on Aradura Spur. On the other side, Sato was exhorting his men to “You will fight to the death. When you are killed you will fight on with your spirit.” Yet Sato knew full well he lacked the ammunition and provisions necesary to hold Kohima, he would have to withdraw in short order. Two sets of attacks were unleashed upon the Japanse, first on Japanese defences around Point 5120, known also as Church Knoll and Hunter's Hill by Messervy's 7th Indian Division on the left of the battlefield, and then of Aradura Spur by Grover's 2nd Division on the right. The 4/15th Punjab suffered a bloody reverse in these assaults, losing 18 officers and 443 casualties for not a single metre of ground in return. No combination of attacks from the air, artillery strikes, tanks, flame-throwers, infantry or mortars could dislodge Sato's men. On the Aradura Spur, Grover ordered simultaneous assaults to take place on 27th and 28th of May. On the right the Royal Scots and Norfolks were to attack the north-east end of Aradura Spur, while 6th Brigade were to take the south-west, where their objectives were named 'Matthew', 'Mark', 'Luke' and 'John'. When launched, however, 6th Brigade's attack on the 28th failed miserably. The weather was poor, the terrain atrocious and the morale of the exhausted 2nd Division the lowest it had been since its arrival. The attack by the Norfolks and the Royal Scots on the north-west spur met the same fate as the luckless 6th Brigade. The Norfolks were now down to 14 officers and 366 men, many exhausted and ill and, despite the remarkable leadership of Lt. Col. Robert Scott and above-average morale, the Japanese positions looked typically impervious to anything other than a direct tank round into each bunker, which of course was not possible in the steep, jungle-matted hillsides. Along with the intantry attacks, Naga Hill was heavily attacked by Hurricane bombers during the 24th and 25th, but the Japanese remained firmly entrenched and resolutely immovable. The only major result of these attacks would be more casualties and a further drop in morale for the British-Indian troops. Sato's was alianted from the HQ of 15th Army, but had no doubt that it was Mutaguchi's abject failure to send supplies through the mountains that had forced him to undertake the kind of passive defense in which his division was now engaged. On May 29th, Sato thus reported that his position was hopeless, and that he reserved the right to act on his own initiative and withdraw when he felt that it was necessary to do so, in order to save what remained of his battered division from inevitable destruction. Later that day he signaled Mutaguchi: “We have fought for two months with the utmost courage, and have reached the limits of human fortitude. Our swords are broken and our arrows spent. Shedding bitter tears, I now leave Kohima.” Apoplectic with rage and astonished at his subordinate's blatant disobedience, Mutaguchi ordered Sato to stay where he was. Sato ignored him and on receipt of Mutaguchi's threat to court-martial him, replied defiantly: “Do as you please. I will bring you down with me.” The angry exchange continued, with Sato the following day sending a final angry message to Mutaguchi in which he declared: “The tactical ability of the 15th Army staff lies below that of cadets.” Sato then ordered his staff to close down the radio sets, in a final act of defiance. During the back and forth screamfest, Sato had requested Mutaguchi permis him to withdraw to a position that would allowed the 31st division to finally receive supplies, Mutaguchi simply refused and demanded he hold on another 10 days. Sato could simply not keep letting his men down, he made plans to withdraw for May 31st. The Miyazaki detachment was given the task of covering the retreat for the 31st division. On May 27th, the 4/1st Gurkhas under the newly appointed 27-year-old Lieutenant-Colonel Derek Horsford, managed to capture the Gun Spur at the extreme eastern edge of Naga Hill via a night infiltration that took the Japanese entirely by surprise. This further allowed tanks to approach the Japanese positions and, by June 1st, an attack by the Queen's discovered that the Japanese were withdrawing. Grover then thrusted his troops from the newly captured Naga Hill south-east across a valley to cut off General Miyazuki's rearguard and the 124th regiment around the Aradura Spur from the road to Imphal just behind it. Recognizing the inevitable, Miyazaki then had to withdraw from Aradura on the night of June 4, planning to conduct further delaying actions at Viswema in protection of Sato's withdrawal. Yet that is it for the battle of Kohima as we now need to travel north to see how General Vinegar Joe's offensive is going. Last time we saw General Merrill's Marauders take the Myitkyina airstrip and prepare for a siege of Myitkyina. The Chinese forces of Generals Sun and Liao were pushing the 18th division towards the Kamaing area. As for the Chindits, Major Master's 111th Brigade contuined to repel numerous Japanese attacks against the Blackpool Stronghold, without the assistance of his floater Brigades. The Japanese artillery continued to take a killing toll on the camp with their near continuous fire. They had been reinforced with even heavier 155mm guns, which together with enemy mortars positions on a ridge 1,000 yards ahead, began to pummel them. Meanwhile allied aircraft were unable to supply them adequately because of the monsoons, and General Takeda's 53rd Division was furiously approaching to crush them. On May 16th Japanese troops penetrated the defenses and a counter-attack failed to eject them. Now many positions within the perimeter came under persistent sniper fire. Shelling that evening heralded another attack. It was beaten back, leaving 50 Japanese dead. This was followed by a night attack involving two companies. This was repulsed, the enemy losing another 70 men. Master's estimated his Brigade had killed about 800 Japanese, they had also suffered 200 casualties during the last few days. Luckily for them, however, the impending threat to Myitkyina and Kamaing, forced General Honda to redirect the 3rd Battalion, 114th Regiment to reinforce the Myitkyina garrison while the 2nd Battalion, 146th Regiment continued north to reinforce General Tanaka. At this point Masters wanted to withdraw deeper into the jungle, from where they could ambush the advancing Japanese and set up a new stronghold with the help of 14th Brigade and West Africans, who were probing the jungle ridges east of them. He signaled Lentaigne asking for permission to abandon the block at his discretion. But Lentaigne's authority had become reduced. He was forced to take the message to Stilwell, who having been thwarted at Myitkyina, had allowed the Hyde to his Jekyll to emerge. In scathing language, he called the British “a bunch of lily-livered Limey popinjays.” Lentaigne then let his Irish temper get the better of him, and a fierce argument erupted at Stilwell's headquarters. Then on May 22nd, General Takeda's 53rd Division reached the stronghold. They unleashed an all-out assault, the Cameronians of 90th Column, who held the southern perimeter, were being forced back, inch by inch, as the Chindit artillery engaged the Japanese assaulters over open sights. Soon the airstrip was in enemy hands, prompting the Bofors 40mm AA gunners to lower their quadruple barrels and blaze away at the enemy troops. The pyrotechnics took on a fantastic quality as night fell. At dawn on the 23rd, the Japanese withdrew to just beyond the airstrip, as 10 Japanese fighters swept in to strafe and bomb the British. Their attack proved almost leisurely compared to the artillery and infantry strikes. When the fighters departed, the Japanese artillery and machineguns resumed. Masters called for a supply drop of ammunition as the previous night's expenditure had been massive, but necessary. Eight RAF Dakotas appeared that afternoon, in light rain, low, just over the hills, twisting and turning over the forested peaks. Nearing Blackpool, they straightened out and flew level. Doors opened, parachutes streamed and crates of supplies came from the sky. A storm of fire erupted from the Japanese positions. The heavy AA guns joined in, the boom-boom-booms of their heavy fire becoming rhythmic in the distance. The wing of a Dakota vanished and plane fell like a twirling leaf, crashing into the jungle across from the “Deep.” Two other planes in their haste to evade fire nearly crossed streams; their payloads hurled far and wide, most of falling into Japanese hands. In all, four Dakotas were shot down. The defenders only managed to get a half an aircraft's load of ammunition. Despite this the Chindits continued to resist the furious Japanese assaults; but before dawn on May 24th, the Japanese would finally overrun a hillock known as the Pimple, held by Harper's 3/9th Gurkhas. Harper mounted an immediate counterattack. Harper's Gurkhas struggled to dislodge the Japanese from the “pimple,” but failed. The defenders threw machine-gun fire and hurled mortar bombs towards the hillock with little apparent effect. The failed counterattack would only see the Japanese secure the Silly Point positions and advance rapidly east and south as the defenses progressively collapsed before them. By May 25, Masters was forced to withdraw while his forces still had enough ammunition to defend themselves. There were 90 men that could not walk without help and another 30-40 that could not walk at all. A doctor summoned Masters to a group of 40-50 disheveled men, many wounded, but still standing, carrying stretchers from the Main Dressing Station. They were now on the evacuation path, now largely devoid of fighting troops. None of the walking wounded would look Masters in the eye. The stretchers and litters were also full of men with horrific wounds; 19 in all. To Masters' distress, the doctor said there were another 30 such cases ahead who could be saved if they were evacuated. He had given the 19 here full doses of morphine and said, under the thundering noise of the rain, that the men had no chance. It dawned on Masters that the doctor was suggesting that these men be put out of their misery. Master's said “Very well. I don't want them to see any Japanese,” The dotor cried “Do you think I want to do it?” But Masters was already seeking a way out. “Get the stretcher bearers on at once” he snapped. As he went back up the ridge towards what was left of the camp, he heard the carbine shots going off one by one along the line of casualties. He pressed his hands on his ears to blot out the sound, but couldn't. Masters and his subordinate commanders decided to withdraw in stages, with the forward line of defenders leapfrogging over a second line of the defenders covering them from a defensive position, known as a layback. This second line, were in turn, then to be covered by the troops now behind them, allowing them to leapfrog to the next covering position, a formula which could be repeated for as long as possible, and as long as the ground permitted it. The Chindits would have to begin a long and difficult hill climb away from Blackpool, towards the rallying point of Mokso Sakan. Luckily for them, Takeda decided not to pursue them, as he had been redirected to reinforce Myitkyina instead. The victory was very costly, however, as the 128th Regiment lost about 400 men; but at last the Mogaung-Indaw route had been reopened after a three month's blockade. On May 29th, the survivors of the 111th Brigade would finally reach Mokso Sakan, bringing with them 2000 men whom required immediate hospitalization. In the end, the Blackpool Stronghold, desired by Lentaigne and Stilwell, had been a costly endeavor for the Chindits. Meanwhile, over with the 22nd Division, a failed envelopment maneuver by Task Force Purple, consisting of elements of the 149th regiment and former Galahad evacess, prompting Liao on the 19th to send the 65th regiment to aid the 64th regiments right flank and cut a trail south towards the Mogaung valley. The chinese hastily advanced to Chishidu, pushing the Japanese 1st company, 56th regiment over to Nanyaseik. Further east, Tanaka's right flank in the Mogaung valley was beginning to crumble against the 38th divisions offensive. This prompted Tanaka to reinforce the 1st battalion, 55th regiment with the 146 regiment. Tanaka ordered Major General Aida Shunji, commander of the 18th infantry group to block the Chinese advance in the mountainous region north of Kamaing. Despite this, General Sun had sent his 114th regiment hooking west behind the Japanese strongpoints, soon they would link up with the 113th to clear the Japanese from West Wala, Maran and Sharaw. Simultaneously, the 112th regiment managed to secure Warang on the 20th. Thus despite all his efforts, Tanaka's right flank was going to collapse. At this point, the 18th Division's daily ration of staple food was only 100 grams of rice the regular quantity being 860 grams and there was no supply of auxiliary rations. Moreover, as the supply of ammunition was cut off, the use of ammunition was limited to only four rounds per day and, as there was no gasoline, vehicles could not be used. Cases of malaria and malnutrition occurred successively and the number of men to one company dropped to about 30. As an extreme case, there was even a company of about 15 men led by a sergeant. About this time, the officers of the 18th Division also learned that there was no chance of the Japanese counter offensive in the Hukawng Valley on which so many hopes had been staked, for the U operation was failing "miserably." Their morale began to sag, and in Tanaka's later opinion this realization marked the "turning point" for his division. In order to deliver a killing blow, Sun elected to dispatch the 112th regiment wide around the Japanse eastern flank to cut the Kamain Road south of Seton, while the 114th regiment advanced down the Kumon Range towards Tumbonghka and Mogaung. The 112th managed to slip past the Aida Detachment whom were holding a position at the village of Lawa and would emerge out of the jungle in the rear of Tanaka's lines on the 25th. The Chinese crossed the Mogaung river by the 26th and captured a supply center at Seton. The Chinese captured 35 Japanese trucks, a jeep, a sedan, 8 warehouses of food and ammunition, 100 horses, 4 pieces of artillery, a workshop, and a motor pool. They then set up a roadblock, prompting Tanaka to strip his divisional HQ and other servicable units to get a force together to hit the 112th as quickly as possible. At the same time Tanaka ordered the 4th regiment to hit the roadblock from the north while the recently arrived 2nd battalion, 146th regiment would hit them from the south. Tanaka also ordered his engineers to cut a secret escape route running from the Noidaw Bum to the Bumrawng Bum via Noidawyang. Takeda's 53rd division had just reached Mogaung as they dispatched a depleted 3rd battalion, 128th regiment towards Seton to relive Myitkyina. Seeing the enemy positions emerge at Chishidu and Seton, Tanaka finally decided to withdraw his division to the Kamaing area on the 28th, while his engineers vigerously were constructing fortifications. The Aida detachment would secure Lawa on the right flank, while the 55th and 56th regiments concentrated in the vicinity of Nanyaseik to cover the withdrawal of rear echlon units to Kamaing. Over at the Seton roadblock, the 112th regiment repeled relentless Japanese attacks, throuhg flood weather. Meanwhile, Myitkyina was seeing its first two days of siege. The 150th regiment were halted by heavy enemy fire at the railroad yards, suffering 671 casualties on May 20th. K Force took the suburban village of Charpate, north-northwest of Myitkyina, and the 88th Regiment extended its lines south to the railway tracks, which in this area run northwest before turning south to Mogaung. Unfortunately, K Force did not occupy a small height which dominated Charpate. M Force took the little settlement of Namkwi without opposition, in order to shield the Allies against any Japanese attempt to relieve Myitkyina by an attack from Mogaung. General Merrill's forces were now so placed that Japanese reinforcements could reach Myitkyina only from across the Irrawaddy River to the east or along the Myitkyina-Mankrin or Myltkyina-Radhapur roads from the north. The Allied troops were disposed in a semicircle covering all approaches from the northwest, west, southwest, and south. So far, enemy activity was slight in this area. Even at the airfield the continual sniping did not prevent the planes from landing with an ever increasing amount of supplies. If General Merrill retained these positions, he could make a coordinated attack on Myitkyina. For this purpose he was forming a Myitkyina Task Force, which involved reshuffling of all the units under his command. H and K Forces were dissolved; the Marauder battalions were once more combined under Colonel Hunter; and the Chinese regiments operated as separate units.The opportunity to swiftly overrung Myitkyina emerged, as many troops under Major General Minakami Genzo were rushing through enemy gaps during the night to reinforce the battered 114th regiment. On May 30th, Minakami took command over the 3000 man garrison and ordered Myitkyina be held for atleast 3 months to keep the allies from advancing south into central Burma. On the allied side, Merrill suffered a heart attack and had to be evacuated. Colonel John McCammon assumed commander of the Myitkyina Task Force. McCammon immediately ordered Colonel Hunter's 3rd battalion to seize the auxiliary airstrip north of Myitkyina, but the Marauders would be halted by stiff Japanese defenses. Gaps were numerous through which the Japanese could work their way into Myitkyina, and Minakami set up a regular ferry service across the Irrawaddy by which supplies and individual replacements could be brought in. The terrain was excellent for defense. The roads lay high above the surrounding rice paddies, and each was therefore an earthwall making a first-rate obstacle. Clumps of trees were all about, and there were plenty of houses on the outskirts of town which the Japanese used to advantage. The northern part of the Japanese perimeter was well shielded by a crescent-shaped depression which the monsoon rains quickly turned into a swamp. In effect, the Allies and the Japanese were committed to position warfare. Though the operation was called a siege, the Japanese received a steady trickle of supplies and replacements until Mogaung fell. Colonel Hunter and his men would be forced to withdraw back to Charpate the following day. At 10pm on the night of May 23rd a battalion of Japanese launched an attack on Charpate from the rise northeast of the town. Beach's force had been depleted by sickness, and some of his men were out on patrol. The Japanese attack penetrated the 3rd Battalion's position early in the action. From the south 75-mm artillery supported the battalion's defense. The Marauders, fighting stubbornly, repelled the attack, but they suffered severe casualties. On the morning of May 24th at 9:335, the 3rd Battalion had to face still another attack. The fight was going badly when Hunter ordered Beach to break contact with the enemy and move to the railroad, 22 miles to the south. The Japanese occupied Charpate and held it in force as soon as the 3rd Battalion withdrew. McCammon had also ordered the 88th and 89th regiments to attack Myitkyina, but the Chinese barely advanced that day. Two days later the Japanese, supported by mortar fire, attacked Namkwi heavily, and the 2nd Battalion pulled back to a ridge about halfway to Myitkyina. The Japanese then occupied Namkwi and fortified it strongly. They had now taken over two of the towns on the main approaches to Myitkyina. Depressed by these defeats, McCammon was relieved of his command and Stilwell replaced him with General Boatner on May 30. Stilwell was becoming desperate, resorting to sending reinforcements of any kind, with two engineer battalions and a group of replacements and evacuees of Galahad arriving between May 26 and June 1. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The landings against Wakde, while perhaps a bit overkill, saw the allies yet again showcase the prowess in amphibious assaults. Over in the Burma-India theater, the battle for Kohima was gradually becoming an allied victory and Vinegar Joe's first big foray against Myitkyina was painful but looked promising.
Last time we spoke about the beginning of Operation Ichi-Go, the war in the Burma front and the war in New Guinea. Hundreds of thousands of IJA troops stormed countless areas in China. Chiang Kai-Shek was caught somewhat with his pants down, his best men were in Burma, there was little his defenders could do against such raw power. Xuchang fell and soon the Japanese were marching upon Luoyang. Over in Burma the British, Indian, American and Chinese alliance was continuing to both attack and defend. In the north Stilwell led the offensive, while Slim led the defensive in the south. The Chindits fought like lions to defend White City, but ultimately would give up strongholds to seek out new ones. Over in New Guinea the Japanese continued their frantic retreat under heavy pressure from the Australians. As bad as the situation was, the Japanese were in for another nasty surprise in Green Hell. This episode is the invasion of Western New Guinea Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. Last week we saw the effective conclusion of the Eastern New Guinea Campaign. It was a colossal campaign beginning with the Australian defense along the Kokoda Track, then the blood battle of Buna-Gona, the drive upon Lae-Salamaua, the march north upon the Huon Peninsula and Finisterres, and after taking Madang it was finally over. Yet while the book was closing upon Eastern New Guinea, the book on Western New Guinea was just about to be opened. The pace of the offensive against the Japanese in New Guinea accelerated greatly in the first half of 1944. This was primarily because General MacArthur feared unless he made quick progress he would lose the reins over where the allies would drive upon the Japanese home islands. MacArthur of course sought to advance upon the Philippines, while the Joint Chiefs favored the Navy's central thrust more so. Despite MacArthur's continuous war against his colleagues and superiors and his continuous complaining he lacked support, he had been provided the means to carry out numerous amphibious assaults that could lead to his ultimate goal. MacArthur's operations against New Britain, Saidor, Los Negros and Manus clearly indicated allied superiority over the Japanese in terms of men, ships and airpower. By April of 1944, MacArthur had nearly 750,000 men under his command. His major components were 6 US infantry divisions, one cavalry division, 3 separate regiment combat teams and 3 special brigades. The Australians were gradually being relegated into a secondary role, but could still provide 5 additional divisions and enough separate brigades to form another 2 divisions. General Kenney's air force had grown so large, they could now mount 200 aircraft raids against a variety of targets with little fear of Japanese retaliation. What MacArthur needed was more and more forward airfields so he could hurl fighters and bombers deeper into the Japanese inner perimeter. In a lot of respects, the Japanese position in New Guinea was all but hopeless. Although they still had more than 350,000 troops in the Southwest Pacific area, many were isolated with little chance of receiving reinforcements or supplies. There was also an enormous amount of confusion amongst the various commands, made difficult by enormous distance and the lack of effective naval power. Overall command of Japanese forces as far as Wewak was technically under Lt General Fusataro Tshima, whose HQ was at Manokwari on the Vogelkop Peninsula. It was Tshima who ordered General Adachi to withdraw his 18th Army over to the Hollandia area. Fortunately for MacArthur, Adachi procrastinated heavily, believing a landing would be made at Hansa Bay. All of the heavy bombing by the 5th air force against the coast near Wewak supported his beliefs. Not too long ago we spoke about Operations Reckless and Persecution, the invasion of Hollandia and Aitape. Admiral Barbey had already departed the staging points and rendezvous northwest of Manus Island by April 20th. The large convoys sailed west from the Admiralty Islands until dusk, whence they turned southwest towards Hollandia. Admiral Mitscher's Task Force 58 was providing escort while also launching strikes against Wakde, Sarmi and Sentani airfields on April 21st. Over the next three days the carrier aircraft neutralized the remaining airpower in the Wakde-Sarmi area. Early on the 22nd, the two task forces separated, with the Persecution Task Force heading southeast towards Aitape and the rest, designated Reckless Task Force, proceeded to a point 20 miles offshore between Humboldt and Tanahmerah Bay. Now the allied troops were ready to hit the beaches, but awaiting them was a large concentration of Japanese…however it was mostly a concentration of Japanese personnel rather than combat troops. While initial attention was focussed on the Geelvink Bay area, the 2nd Area Army command was also concerned over the weak condition of the defenses of Hollandia, which lay just east of the 140th meridian in the 8th Area Army zone of responsibility. An order to dispatch an element of the 36th Division to that sector was issued but was quickly revoked on the ground that it would weaken the defenses of Geelvink Bay without appreciably strengthening Hollandia. A large section of the New Guinea coast between Wewak and Sarmi thus remained practically undefended. General Anami promptly dispatched a staff mission to 8th Area Army headquarters at Rabaul to press for reinforcement of the Hollandia area, and a similar recommendation was communicated to Imperial General Headquarters during December. Two battalions of the 6th South Seas Detachment, temporarily stationed on Palau, were dispatched by the High Command. This force arrived in Hollandia on March 4, but numbered only 240 men, since approximately 1000 men, including the detachment commander, had been lost en route to submarine attacks. No other action was taken, however, since both 8th Area Army and 18th Army, after the loss of Finschhafen, were more immediately concerned with checking further enemy penetration of the Dampier Strait region. Thus roughly 10,000 IJA and 1000 IJN personnel were at Hollandia, most support units led by Major-General Kitazono Toyozo and aviation units from General Inada's 6th air division. When Tsihima ordered Adachi over to the Hollandia area and he procrastinated, this prompted the leader of the 2nd Area Army, General Korechika Anami over at Davao to become concerned. Anami sent his chief of staff over to Wewak to convince Adachi to pull out, but when Adachi finally began withdrawing, he only had two regiment on the trail by the time of the American landings against Hollandia and Aitape. Major General Toyozo Kitazono only arrived in the area 10 days before the invasion and for an unexplained reason never officially took command. This is why Tshima's appointed air officers, Inada ended up being thrown the command. Inada only really had 500 effective combat troops, mostly from the 6th South Seas Detachment. These units belonged to General Anami Korechika's 2nd Area Army, which had been transferred recently from Manchuria to oversee the defense of the eastern Dutch East Indies and western New Guinea, and for the projected and later canceled invasion of northern Australia. Random note, I recently made a Youtube short mocking that canceled australian invasion on my youtube channel, it was a wild idea. Thus Anami's command was now formally around the 2nd, 18th and 19th armies. Lt General Kitano Kenzo's 19th Army had been garrisoning Timor, the Lesser Sunda Islands, Sumbawa, the Banda Sea Islands and some key points in Northwestern New Guinea with their HQ located at Ambon. Lt General Tshima Fusutaro's 2nd Army as I had mentioned was assigned overall defense of Western New Guinea, with Lt General Tagami Hachiro's 36th Division landing at Sarmi and Biak in early March and Lt General Ikeda Shunkichi's 35th Division preparing to come to Manokwari. The 14th Division originally part of the 2nd Army was diverted to defender Palau. Furthermore, to further support the 2nd Area Army was Vice-Admiral Endo Yoshikazu's 9th Fleet, three southern expeditionary fleets, and the 7th Air Division of Lt General Sudo Einosuke. At Hollandia, the headquarters of Admiral Endo and Generals Kitazono and Inada had arrived at the same time by mid April. Though General Adachi had placed Kitazono in formal command of all units there, the transport commander had no time, as to develop a comprehensive defense plan for Hollandia, thus as I previously mentioned, command really fell onto Inada and Endo. The Japanese would be woefully unprepared for what was to come. Over at Aitape, meanwhile, there were only a handful of replacements from the 20th Division, along with some naval and support personnel, so the situation looked even wrose for the 1000-man garrison. Preceding the amphibious assaults, Admiral Crutchley's surface fleet was going shell the Tanahmerah Bay area while Admiral Mitscher's carrier planes bombed the waters off the Tanahmerah beaches to explode possible mines, also finishing off the Hollandia airstrips and the remaining aircraft there. Crutchley's warships picked up their landmarks through the mist as best they could, and at 6sm the roar of 8-inch guns from the heavy cruisers HMAS Australia and HMAS Shropshire shattered the silence of the steaming tropical morning. To this din was added the sharper crack of 5-inch and 4.7-inch weapons from American and Australian destroyers. The fire continued until 6:45, by which time 600 rounds of 8-inch and 1,500 rounds of 5-inch and 4.7-inch ammunition had been expended. As for the aerial strikes, despite the unfavorable weather, Task Force 58 managed to maintain planes on air alert over the Hollandia area since dawn. No enemy aircraft flew up from the Hollandia fields, and the few apparently operational planes sighted on those strips were strafed. In general there were no indications that Japanese defenses or defenders existed in the Tanahmerah Bay area. Task Force 58's scheduled bombing and strafing missions for that region were therefore canceled. Meeting little opposition, LCVP's carrying the first wave of the 19th and 21st Regiment approached Red Beach 2. As the leading wave of LCVP's, approached RED Beach 2, which was obscured by smoke from the naval bombardment, a rocket barrage was laid on the landing area by one Seventh Fleet LCI and two landing craft,, of the 542nd Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment. Machine guns mounted aboard the leading LCVP's kept up a steady fire against the beach. There was no answer from the Japanese, and the only opposition to the landing was scattered small arms and light automatic weapons fire from points far on the flanks of the beach and from a small island in Tanahmerah Bay. This fire was so quickly silenced by supporting destroyers that the assault waves suffered no casualties before reaching shore. Thus tactical surprise was achieved in Tanahmerah Bay, as the Japanese had only a few lookouts in the sector. General Irving's 24th Division successfully landed and the 3rd Battalion, 19th Infantry, quickly secured the northern portion of the beachhead and immediately dispatched patrols east and north to probe suspected enemy positions. The 1st Battalion, following the 3rd ashore, went into an assembly area to act as local reserve and to make ready to aid in unloading supplies at the water's edge if that proved necessary. The 2nd Battalion, 21st Infantry, took the southern half of Red Beach 2 with similar ease. The 3rd Battalion of that regiment quickly followed the 2nd ashore and sent Company I south to look for the trail expected to connect with Red Beach 1 at Dépapré. Simultaneously, LVT's carrying Lt Colonel Thomas Cliffords 1st battalion, 21st Regiment crossed coral barrier reefs on their way to Red Beach 1. Cliffords men landed completely unopposed and would spend an hour trying to locate the road leading to Lake Sentani and her airfields. Clifford left A Company at the beach while the rest trekked it over the Dépapré-Lake Sentani trail at 8:37am, still encountering no enemy opposition whatsoever.Moving through fire lanes down which no bullets flew and past pillboxes in early stages of construction, the battalion column reached the village of Mariboe at 1047 hours. Only a few scattered enemy rifle shots had been encountered during this march and the village was secured without opposition. Over three miles by trail inland from Dépapré, Mariboe was the 24th Division's first inland objective. It was evident from scattered Japanese equipment in and around Mariboe that the Japanese had recently evacuated the village not long before the 1st Battalion's arrival. Colonel Clifford halted his men. Since radio communication with the division command post on Red Beach 2 had been lost, he sent messengers back over the tortuous trail to report progress to General Irving. At the same time patrols were sent toward Kantomé, nearly two miles southeast of Mariboe. They reported few signs of enemy activity along the trail beyond Mariboe. Colonel Clifford apparently did not wait to re-establish contact with higher headquarters but, acting on his patrols' reports, ordered the battalion to push on. Encountering little opposition along the main trail, the unit reached Kantomé about noon. When Irving arrived to Red Beach 2 at 9;30am, he found a major logistical problem had formed at his main beachhead. Behind the narrow beach, a wide, impassable swamp was discover, it covered most of the area that the men had planned to use for the bivouac and supply dump area. Thus supplies soon began to pile up on the beach. This was an especially serious circumstance, for the landing plans had called for moving almost all troops and supplies overland from Red Beach 2 to the road inland. Construction of a road between the two beaches was soon found impracticable and when, after a day and a half of hard work, engineers had succeeded in driving a few yards of road into the hills south toward Red Beach 1, the project was discontinued. The small completed stretch did serve some useful purpose. On D-Day two batteries of 105-mm. howitzers were dragged along the road as far as possible to a cramped position on a little ridge immediately south of Red Beach 2. From this site the howitzers could deliver some fire support for troops advancing inland from Red Beach 1, but the direction of this fire was limited by a number of hills nearby. The same stretch of road also provided dispersal space for a few of the many vehicles which had been unloaded at Red Beach 2 on D-Day. Additionally, a limited dispersal area, rendered inaccessible by a small stream and by an arm of the swamp, was discovered at the northern edge of the beach, and ultimately the 542nd Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment constructed a road into this space. Artillery, ashore within an hour after the initial landing, was emplaced there to deliver fire on inland targets. But the fill used to build this road stopped the flow of the little stream which had drained the swamp into Tanahmerah Bay. To prevent a rise in the swamp's water level, a drainage canal was cut directly through the center of the beach. This procedure speeded the outward flow of swamp water, lowered the water level a little, and created a small additional dry area behind the beach, but it did not provide sufficient dry land for dispersal of all the troops and supplies scheduled to land on Red Beach 2. Eventually Irvings men found some dry flat dispersal areas behind the beach, allowing the supply shuttles to continue their work uncongested. Colonel Cliffords battalion would make the main thrust for the division while the remainder of Colonel Charles Lyman's 21st Regiment moved over to Red Beach 1. Colonel Clifford possessed little or no knowledge of the situation to the rear other than the difficulties presented by terrain. Ahead, 10,000 Japanese were thought to be concentrated around the airfields. Jangkena was on flat, swampy ground and was not an easily defensible position. Should the 1st Battalion push on to Dazai, also on flat ground, Japanese troops might outflank the unit, cut its line of communications to Dépapré, and destroy it at leisure. If the Japanese bypassed the battalion they could cut off the advance of the rest of the 21st Infantry at any one of the many defiles over the first two or three miles of the trail inland from Dépapré. Colonel Clifford therefore decided to pull his men back to Kantomé for the night, leaving only outposts along the trail east of that village. Kantomé was located near the foot of the Takari Hills, which he thought would present a serious obstacle to any Japanese flanking maneuvers. It was a fortunate decision, as around midnight elements of the 22nd Airfield Battalion had advanced overland around his 1st battalions outposts, striking at their left flank. Meanwhile, General Heavey's landing craft carrying the leading waves of the 162nd and 186th Regiments, supported by rocket fire and by Rear-Admiral Russell Berkey's cruisers, likewise met no Japanese resistance as they landed General Fuller's troops on the White Beaches. Company A of Colonel Harold Haney's 162nd Regiment rapidly secured Cape Pie while Company I of Colonel Oliver Newman's 186th Regiment secured Cape Tjeweri. With Jautefa Bay in hand, Newman's 3rd Battalion was then landed on White Beach 4 in preparation for an advance towards Leimok Hill and Pim. The first objective, Leimok Hill, lay 1,800 yards northwest of Pim. Part of the battalion secured the hill by 1000, and other elements advanced southward toward Pim. That village and its usable jetty were secured, against light opposition, by 1645, while Suikerbrood Hill, on Jautefa Bay south of Pim, was cleared by 1800. The danger that enemy troops atop dominating heights near Pim might make White Beach 4 untenable was over. The 3rd Battalion then established a night perimeter at Pim, extending its defenses along a trail leading west from that village to the point at which the Pim-Hollandia track joined the main road inland to Lake Sentani, thus securing the roadhead from which movements to inland objectives had to begin. Over at White Beach 1, Haney's 3rd Battalion advanced quickly to take Pancake Hill at around 8am, only meeting sporadic rifle fire. After taking the hill, they began pushing up the shores of Humboldt Bay, encountering no resistance as they advanced upon Jarremoh Hill. It seemed clear to the Americans, the Japanese had been taken by complete surprise, not expecting an amphibious assault against Hollandia so quickly, so they had pulled back to the Sentani Lake Airfield sector. Now further south, Haney's 2nd Battalion were advancing to a track that connected Hollandia with Pim, trying to make contact with the 3rd Battalion over at Jarremoh Hill. Meanwhile Newman's 1st Batallion was advancing upon Leimok Hill. Though the men wanted to keep pushing towards Hollandia during the late afternoon, Fuller decided to dig in for the night while warships and artillery softened up the city. When General Anami over at his HQ in Manado heard of the invasion he immediately ordered the 23rd Air Flotilla of Rear-Admiral Ito Yoshiaki to toss whatever he could against the allied surface ships and force along the beaches. He also ordered the 18th army to break through Aitape to rush over and help the Hollandia garrison and for General Tshima to dispatch a regiment force as well to Hollandia. Thus General Tagami got his 224th regiment together for the advance to Hollandia, expecting to get there for early May, while General Nakai's 20th Division continued to close in on Aitape. Anami also wanted to send the main part of the 36th Division to perform a counterattack in Hollandia's direction as he thought it vitally important to delay the enemy as much as possible so a better defense of Western New Guinea could be organized. Yet General Terauchi Hisaichi of the Southern Army declined his request to do so on the basis a counteroffensive would simply denude the already weakened defenses of Western New Guinea. Meanwhile General Doe's Persecution Task Force was carrying out their landing against Aitape. The landings would be preceded by naval gunfire from Captain Albert Noble's Destroyer force, aerial bombardment from escort carriers of Rear Admiral Ralph Davisons Task Force 78 and from General Kenney's air force. Meeting zero resistance and under the cover of a rocket barrage, the LCPR's landed the men of Colonel Francis Mason's 163rd Regiment by 6:45. Despite the lack of resistance, an immense amount of smoke and poor visibility prevented the troops from landing at Beach Blue, and instead they came ashore at Wapil. Just like at Hollandia, they had achieved tactical surprise at Aitape as the Japanese fled in a panic under naval gunfire. Mason's got his 2nd Battalion to swing west and quickly seize the Waitanan Creek while the 1st battalion was being landed. Then the 2nd Battalion formed a defensive position at the Pro Mission while the 3rd Battalion sent patrols east to establish an outpost near the mouth of the Nigia River. Back over at the beaches, General Doe landed some Australian engineers who began repairing the Tadji Fighter airstrip. The No. 62 Works Wing, Royal Australian Air Force, had come ashore at Blue Beach during the morning and had been able to start work on Tadji Fighter Strip at 1:00pm. Repairs continued throughout the night under floodlights, the lack of Japanese opposition and the urgency of the task prompting General Doe to push the work. Although it had been hoped that the strip would be ready for use on D+1, terrain conditions were such that necessary repairs were not completed on schedule. Thus it was 9:00 on April 24th before the Australian engineers, who had worked without break for almost forty-eight hours, could announce that the airstrip was ready. At 4:30pm, 25 P-40s of No. 78 Wing, RAAF, landed on the field, and the balance of the wing arrived the next day. The ground on which the fighter strip was located was so poorly drained that it was not until April 28th, after steel matting had been placed on the field, that it could be used continuously. The works wing then moved to Tadji Bomber Strip to aid the 872nd and 875th Engineer Aviation Battalions. The latter two units passed to the operational control of Wing Commander William A. C. Dale of the RAAF, who, besides commanding the works wing, was Persecution Task Force Engineer. Extensive repairs were necessary at the bomber strip and that field was not ready for use by fighter and transport planes until May 27th and for bombers until early July. While the engineers worked, Colonel Merle Howe's 127th Regiment also landed, while Mason's man expanded the perimeter further west, securing the incomplete Tadji west airstrip and the mouth of the Raihu River by the end of the day. Simultaneously, Colonel Cliffords men continued their advance from Kantomé to Sabron, whereupon, Fuller finally decided to launch his assault on Hollandia, with Colonel Haney's 2nd and 3rd Battalions rapidly moving down the ridge to seize the abandoned town by 11:15am. To the south, Colonel Newman had his 1st Battalion pursue the fleeing enemy, and in the process rapidly secured Brinkman's Plantation and then repelled a very uncoordinated Japanese counterattackby the 6th South Seas Detachment and General Kitazono's 42nd independent motor car battalion. At 8:00am on the23rd the 1st Battalion left its night positions on Leimok Hill and started out over the main track, passing through the 3rd Battalion. The movement was supported by the 205th and 218th Field Artillery Battalions, set up near Cape Pie, and by aircraft from the carriers of Task Force 58. By 9am the 1st Battalion had reached Brinkman's Plantation, about 2,200 yards by trail southwest of Pim. So far, there had been no opposition. Now Companies A and C parted from the main body to patrol northwest up the Borgonjie River. Proceeding to a fork about 2,000 yards upstream, the two companies repulsed a series of unco-ordinated attacks which were launched against the right flank of the 186th Infantry during the afternoon by a Japanese force estimated at 150. The two companies remained at the stream-branching during the night of 23-24 of April, and on the latter day they moved overland southwest to rejoin the main force on the Pim-Lake Sentani trail. Meanwhile General Inada's aviation personnel already at the Sentani airfield alongside those currently retreating there were cut off from their ration and ammunition supplies which happened to be stored near the coast. Facing the hopeless situation of having to conduct a proper defense of the airfields with less than a week's worth of rations, little small arms and machine gun ammunition, no artillery at all and with two different enemy forces converging upon them, General Inada seized full command and led the weak garrison to retreat towards Genjem. Their rear guard was proved by General Kitazono's troops. During that same afternoon, two platoons of Cliffords Company B, leading the advance from Sabron, safely crossed a small stream but soon found themselves in the middle of a well-concealed Japanese ambush on the east bank. Rifle and heavy machine gun fire made the stream's steep banks untenable, and the forward platoons hurriedly withdrew to the west, leaving four dead men behind. In response to this, Irvings artillery and Admiral Mitscher's carrier aircraft began to bomb and strafe the area, but Cliffords B Company was nonetheless unable to break through. An artillery duel emerged during the night keeping the men of the 1st Battalion wide awake. They were also being supplies with great difficulty via hand-carry over the Dépapré-Lake Sentani trail. Fortunately the 24th Division's plans for the Hollandia operation had taken into consideration many of the potential logistic problems that might be encountered in the Tanahmerah Bay area. The division G-4 Section had made a detailed study which had shown that a full infantry regiment could be supplied by hand-carry from Red Beach 2 over the Dépapré-Lake Sentani trail inland as far as Jangkena. When no road connecting Red Beach 2 with Red Beach 1 had been found, the division moved the main supply point to Dépapré, from which the advance inland would be supported. With this change in plans, the G-4 Section undertook new computations and calculated that the hand-carry distance could be extended to Dazai. This conclusion was based on the assumption that adverse weather conditions would not make the Dépapré-Lake Sentani road nearly impassable. On 23 April heavy rains started to turn the road into a quagmire through which struggling men could scarcely carry their own equipment and food, to say nothing of extra supplies for the leading battalion. By evening on that day logistic support of the 21st Regiment had therefore become a major problem. There was no question but that the regiment would have to be supported by hand-carry, for it was estimated that at least two weeks' hard work by engineers would be required before the road from Dépapré as far as Mariboe could be made passable even for jeeps. But the 1st Battalion had already advanced east of Dazai, beyond which point, according to the G-4 estimates, support by hand-carry would be next to impossible. Because of the logistical issues, General Eichelberger decided to make the Humboldt Bay area the principal task force landing site, allowing the 41st division to drive further inland. On the 24th, Newman's 3rd Battalion passed through the 1st and seized the Koejaboe area, only stopping there until the 2nd battalion came over to reinforce the continued advance. During this action however, most of the Japanese continued their retreat towards Genjem unmolested. Over in the west, Irving ordered Clifford to consolidate his forward positions around Sabron and Dazai as he now realized the continued rapid advance inland was no long possible as a result of their hand-carry logistics scheme and the weather was taking quite a turn for the worse hampering air drops. Back over at Aitape, Mason's troops crossed the Raihu and by midday the 2nd Battalion secured the town. However General Doe was dissatisfied with the pace of the westward advance, and he therefore suggested to Alamo Force that the 163rd's commander, Mason be relieved. This step was approved by General Krueger, although the regimental commander remained in control of his unit until 9 May, only two days before the 163rd Infantry began loading for another operation. For the next few days, the 163rd patrolled further inland and would fall into a heavy engagement at Kamti on the 29th. At the Kapoam villages, about twelve miles up the Raihu, elements of the 3rd Battalion encountered the only signs of organized Japanese resistance found in the Aitape area to 4 May. At one of these villages, Kamti, some outpost troops of the 3rd Battalion were surrounded by an estimated 200 Japanese who made a number of harassing attacks on 28 and 29th. These skirmishes cost the battalion 3 men killed and 2 wounded, while it was estimated that the Japanese lost about 90 killed. On the 25th, Colonel Lymann's two forward battalion resumed their march, heading through some dense jungle being met by sporadic enemy small arm fire. They eventually dug in around the vicinity of Julianadorp. Meanwhile Colonel Newman had his 3rd battalion advancing west along the main road to Nefaar while some LVT's transported his 1st battalion over Lake Sentani to a point on the western shore of Nefaar. Neither force faced much opposition and together would perform some patrolling of the Cyclops Drome during the afternoon. Back over at Aitape, Colonel Howe's 127th Regiment finished their occupation of Tumleo, Seleo and the Ali Islands and now were beginning to send patrols east towards Afua. On the 26th, Colonel Newman had his 1st Battalion seize the Cyclops Drome while his 2nd Battalion took some LVTS to capture the Sentani Drome. Shortly after midday both Battalions rapidly secured the airdromes under light enemy resistance. Despite a serious supply situation, Lyman's 1st and 3rd Battalion resumed the advance, only encountering one enemy bunker at Ebeli Plantation. It had been impossible to drop supplies from the air on April 25 and even hand-carrying had been stopped late in the afternoon by heavy rains which had flooded many small streams. Parts of the Dépapré-Lake Sentani trail were now knee deep in water. The two forward battalions were low on ammunition, and they would have to go on half-rations if the supply situation were not quickly improved. But General Irving was again optimistic about the weather, believing that air supply would be successful on the 26th. Furthermore, he had received information which indicated that the Japanese were evacuating the airfield area. For these reasons he considered that a continuation of the advance would not be unduly hazardous. In ordering the advance, the division commander was knowingly pushing his men far beyond the limit at which they could be supplied by hand-carry. If the airdrop should again fail or if track conditions should not improve, one of the two forward battalions would probably have to be echeloned back along the trail to augment the carrying parties, and the advance would probably have to be halted. Should enemy opposition prove stubborn, the forward battalions might have to withdraw, perhaps as far as Dazai, to replenish their meager supplies of rations and ammunition. General Irving was taking a calculated risk which assumed the success of the airdrop and an absence of determined Japanese opposition. By the afternoon of the 26th, the Hollandia Drome was secured after a successful airdrop at Dazai. After this the objectives of Reckless had been achieved. Mop up operation would continue up until June 6th, as Fuller's 41st Division cleared out Cape Soedja and the Cyclops Mountain. They would end up flushing out Japanese on Hill 1000 and Irving's 24th Division sent out patrols west towards Marneda, Demta Bay and Gemjem. By 6 June the they had all killed 405 Japanese and had taken 64 prisoners in the Genjem-Demta region. Many more Japanese were found dead of starvation or disease along the trails in the same area. During the same time period, Eichelberger's task force would develop Hollandia into a major base from which future operations would be support. In the end casualties for Operation Reckless amounted to 124 deaths, 1057 wounded and 28 missing for the Americans. The Japanese suffered 3300 deaths, 661 captured. On April 30th, 7220 Japanese from Hollandia's garrison would assemble at Genjem where General Inada began a gradual withdrawal in 11 echelons towards Sarmi. By May 7th, all echelons departed Genjem for a very long march through some of the worst terrain in New Guinea. Two-thirds of the garrison reached the Tor River by June. It's estimated 93% of their strength would succumb to the deadly jungles, lack of provisions and rampant cases of malaria. Meanwhile to secure the Tadji airstrips against Japanese attacks from the direction of Wewak, Colonel Howe sent Company C by boat to Nyaparake on April 28th where they set up outposts further inland around Charov and Jalup. By May 4th, further patrolling by the 127th regiment had discovered no trace of organized enemy units, thus Operation Persecution was successfully completed. During the operation 525 Japanese were killed, 25 were captured while the Americans suffered 19 deaths and 40 wounded. That is all for the New Guinea front as we are now traveling over to New Britain. After the Battle of Talasea and the area was secured, Colonel Smith reached the conclusion that the enemy was withdrawing as rapidly as possible to Cape Hoskins. He decided to send patrols to Numundo Plantation. A reconnaissance patrol on March 10th found enemy positions at Bola and Santa Monica Plantation evacuated, but came upon entrenched enemy at Garilli. On 11th Captain Andrew Haldane's Company K left Bitokara with orders to proceed to Numundo on a three-day patrol, a time estimate that was to prove too optimistic. Company K reached Garilli to find it empty of the enemy, but just north of Patanga encountered Japanese small-arms, automatic-weapons and mortar fire. For four days the Marine patrol made slow progress, fighting an enemy who made a stand in the heavy vegetation approximately every 200 yards and then withdrew effectively before the advance guard flankers could close in. On the evening of the 16th the company entered Kilu where the Japanese made their final stand. While the two forces battled, a Marine landing craft appeared offshore and as it approached the beach the enemy diverted what apparently was a 75mm field gun from the ground action to the "naval force". In the boat was Lieutenant Colonel Deakin who had obtained permission from Colonel Smith to transport a section of 81mm mortars to Captain Haldane's assistance. Although the Japanese bracketed the craft, they failed to hit it and the weapons were landed without casualties. Shortly after the heavy mortars began lobbing shells toward the enemy, the Japanese broke contact and the Marines reached Numundo 48 hours later without finding the Terunuma Detachment again. The 1st Battalion also set up an ambush at Garu which was productive of enemy dead and prisoners for awhile. Company I replaced Company K at Numundo and in turn was replaced on 25 March by the 2nd Battalion. Inasmuch as the enemy continued to straggle eastward singly and in small groups with little or no communications, patrols were kept busy returning over and over again to the same villages and plantations in hopes of catching unwary Japanese. Such hopes frequently paid off. On the 30th the 2nd Battalion moved southeast from Numundo to San Remo Plantation, described by one Marine as "a very pleasant place." From that point patrols probed westward to the Kulu River and eastward into the Cape Hoskins area as far as Buluma. Overall the patrols saw 3 men killed with 8 wounded while accounting for 151 Japanese killed and 68 taken prisoner. Meanwhile, Matsuda, Komori and Terunuma;s Detachments all were performing withdrawals. Komori dispatched his force to the rendezvous point in successive echelons. He himself left Didmop with the rear guard, back on February 28th, reaching Augitni via Vakan on March 1st. The following morning he started his hospital patients along the evacuation route and sent a detail of 250 men to Bulawatni to help transport provisions. Yet the Marines at Iboki were becoming increasingly troublesome, though quite unaware that they faced anything more than starving stragglers. When Company A, 1st Marines entered Talawaga on the 5th, Colonel Sato felt the hot breath of pursuit on his neck and moved to the trail fork where he assumed command of the combined force. The next morning the Komori Group resumed its withdrawal in a northwesterly direction along the right prong of the trail fork, while Sato prepared to follow with his command on the 7th. At this point the ways of these two officers parted, and thenceforth each pursued his individual course toward the destiny that awaited him. On the 6th the Komori Group, with Major Tobuse's 1st Battalion, 141st Infantry in the lead, covered 16 km's on the trail running northeast from the fork toward the coast to reach what the Japanese called the "North Road." After the first day on the trail, Komori's progress becomes difficult to follow, owing to his use of place names occurring in no other reports or maps. It was slow and difficult at best, because of rain and mud, and the necessity for wide detours to find fords through deep streams and safe passages through or around extensive swamps. His immediate force numbered about 200, and on March 8th he recorded the Tobuse Battalion a half-day's march ahead. He sighted occasional enemy reconnaissance planes, and on the 12th U.S. landing craft fired upon his men as they attempted to cross the Kuhu River, obliging them to take to the jungle and swamps. The broad Via River stopped his force on the 14th. When improvised rafts refused to float, the major and 15 others swam across. The rest, through weakness or timidity, declined to follow this excellent example, and it took two days and a wide detour inland to get the whole group to the right bank. Then, on the 17th, provisions ran out. Thus the weakening men came by painful stages to Kometto (Eleanora Bay) and the welcome coconuts of Linga Linga Plantation on the 21st. But the wide Kapuluk River posed a formidable obstacle to further progress. They tried first to swim the Kapuluk near its mouth, but 18 men of the 2nd Company were swept away and 12 of them drowned, only the captain reaching the far bank safely. A patrol far upstream failed to find any fording point, so the troops spent the rest of the day building rafts. These managed to stay afloat, but broke apart so frequently that another two days were required for the passage. Then came the real heartbreaker on the 24th: they reached Kou only to find the provisioning post evacuated. On the 25th an officer patrol encountered a U.S. patrol, and once more the group had to detour. On the 26th Komori hired a native to guide him to Numundo Plantation, at the eastern base of the Willaumez Peninsula. But evidently the man had a change of heart, for the major recorded next day that, lacking a guide, "we advanced using a compass." They now entered a region of extensive swamps, intersected by another major obstacle: the two-pronged Kulu river. The column got across this stream on the 27th, but lost five more men in the swift current. The survivors emerged from the swamps on the 29th and followed the river southward. On the 31st Komori made his final diary entry, eloquent in its stark simplicity: "We are very tired and without food." Apparently at this point malaria laid the major low. Ordering his men to continue toward Cape Hoskins, he took refuge in a native village, accompanied only by his executive officer, his orderly and a corporal attached to his headquarters. For lack of further diary entries, obscurity shrouds the last week of his life. Most of the Japanese forces reached Malalia by the end of March, but Marine patrols were becoming increasingly troublesome. On the 11th, elements of the 1st Marines landed at Linga Linga, patrolling further inland. Company E landed at the Kulu River mouth at the base of Willaumez Peninsula. There the Marines encountered 4 enemy stragglers, killing three and taking one prisoner. Then they moved westward to Kandoka, where they were joined by two platoons of Company F, brought over by boat. There they established a roadblock, just in time to catch Sato's rear echelon. Second Lieutenant Richard B. Watkins was in command of the trail block. At 9am Watkins led his group inland from the village over some faint trails which he hoped the Japanese main body might be using. The Marines had proceeded about a mile and a half and were about to cross a stream in a sparsely wooded area when they sighted two Japanese standing with slung rifles, apparently resting. Watkins had about decided to dispose of these when they moved off in a northeasterly direction, followed almost immediately by a large body of their compatriots. Lying where the Japanese could easily have spotted them, the Marines counted the 73 enemy soldiers and noted the equipment cited above. Conspicuous among them was a tall, burly officer being carried on a litter. The Japanese were cutting fresh trail through the jungle, and fortunately were too intent on their work to discover the patrol. They made excruciatingly slow progress, however, and Watkins did not dare to move until the last man had disappeared. He then returned with all speed to Kandoka, sending a runner ahead with his report. At the village he met Major Brush who had come over from Yaluiai with one squad on what he had intended as merely a routine inspection. He promptly radioed his command post to send a rifle platoon and a 60mm mortar section to the scene and ordered Watkins to hold the trail block with one rifle squad, one machine-gun squad and two mortar squads while he himself set off with the rest of the troops available in an effort to overtake the Japanese from the rear. Before his own departure that morning, Watkins had sent a six-man patrol under Sergeant Frank Chliek to an inland village some two miles south of Kandoka, right where the Japanese appeared to be heading. The lieutenant promptly dispatched a native messenger there with a warning; then, when firing broke out in that direction, he surmised, correctly, that Chliek had become engaged and took the remaining rifle squad and hurried to his assistance. He arrived to find the sergeant and his men crouched on high ground by the east-west trail with dead Japanese all around them. The volume of fire was intense, the pattern not at all clear. As it turned out, Chliek had stumbled upon the column somewhere near its head and, taking advantage of his superior position, immediately opened fire. Major Brush's force, which had been closing rapidly, was on the opposite side of the valley at this time; hence, at sound of the first shots, had hastened to the scene and struck the Japanese column's other flank. In order to avoid becoming involved in a fire fight with that group, Watkins ordered Chliek's patrol back to Kandoka and followed with his own squad at a slower pace. Brush caught up with him shortly, whereat a counting of heads showed that, miraculously, the Marines had not sustained a single casualty. Here is the aftermath as Watkins recalls it: “On the following morning I took a 20 man patrol through the battle area. We counted 55 dead including 3 officers. It was quite easy to believe that perhaps 20 more died in scattered positions throughout the dense underbrush. The dead were all within a 100 yard stretch of trail. We encountered 2 more Japanese who had evidently just come upon the scene who were sitting side by side staring dazedly at the destruction and did not even turn their heads when we approached.” The burly officer previously observed on a litter proved to be Colonel Sato. Evidently Sergeant Chliek's patrol had struck the enemy column at precisely the point where he was being carried, for the colonel had only had time to leap to his feet and draw his sword to fight back before the Marines' fire riddled him. Seeing their leader fall, those Japanese farther forward took off in mad flight, while those behind were cut off by the converging of the two patrols. Thus perished one of the few Japanese to deserve much credit for the performance of the 65th Brigade on New Britain. Although the rear echelon attacked by the two patrols comprised less than half of Sato's total force, the group, as such, ceased to exist with the death of the leader who alone had held it together. Units split into components, these into smaller parties, straggling eastward over a variety of trails, often hacking their own way by compass azimuth. Throughout April, the 17th Division continued their retreat towards Rabaul, managed to repel multiple marine patrol attacks around Cape Hoskins. General Sakai's survivors finally got to Rabaul between April 16th and May 15th, erecting the last bulwark of defense for the South Pacific. On April 6th, the journey of another Japanese commander came to an end. The body of the already deceased Major Komori was captured at the San Remo Plantation by the 2nd Battalion, 5th marines. They came upon the outpost, suddenly face to face with a group of four bedraggled Japanese. It was one of those abrupt encounters that allow little time for reflection or deliberation. The flurry of fire that followed killed three of the enemy and wounded the fourth, who promptly surrendered. Komori had apparently died of malaria along the way. For the 5th Marines, too, was nearing its journey's end, so far as New Britain was concerned. With promotion of the regimental commander, Lieutenant Colonel Buse took over on an acting basis, and General Smith returned to Cape Gloucester to relieve General Shepherd as Assistant Division Commander. Units attached to the regiment followed, and representatives of the Army's 185th Infantry arrived to inspect positions preparatory to replacing the 5th, just as other 40th Infantry Division elements were doing in the Cape Gloucester area with a view toward relieving the entire 1st Marine Division. Last clash of the campaign occurred onthe 22nd of April, when a 2/5 patrol intercepted a party of Japanese, killing 20, including two officers, and suffering the regiment's last fatality on New Britain. Three days later the whole 185th RCT moved into Talasea and San Remo, and at 1530 command of the area formally passed to the Army. LCM's carrying the 1st and 3rd Battalions back to Borgen Bay cleared Talasea at 1630, followed by those carrying 2/5 from San Remo at 2000. The movement was reported complete at 1930 on the 26th, and men of the 5th learned that the 1st Marines had departed this island of evil memory the previous day and that they would follow as ships became available. Soon they would be relieved by Major-General Isaac Rapp Brush's 40th Division, which took responsibility for Cape Gloucester, Arawe and Talasea by the end of April. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Thus Operation Reckless and Persecution were both successful. Now MacArthur had a strong foothold in Western New Guinea seeing the Japanese continued their frantic retreat wherever allied forces seemed to pop up. Over in New Britain, the Japanese were losing formidable commanders as they too were on the retreat, things were simply disastrous for the empire of the rising sun.
Redtape, Drift Mine Satellite, Lethal Company, F-Droid - Podcast #370 - 20 mars 2024
Last time we spoke about the invasion of the Admiralty Islands and some action on New Britain and Bougainville. The last steps of operation Cartwheel would see the Bismarck-Solomon area sealed off with the capture of the admiralty islands. MacArthur was yet again trying to seize the initiative and force a drive upon the Philippines. A diversionary landing was made against Momote and Los Negros would cost 116 lives, 434 wounded by March 8th. On New Britain, General Rupertus began new amphibious assaults and other actions to cut off the retreat for the Japanese defenders. Then on Bougainville, under immense pressure from his superiors, General Hyakutake prepared to launch his main counterattack, codenamed Operation TA. He assembled 15,000 men who would hit the American defensive perimeter to dislodge the enemy from the island. Was this idea even feasible, or would it all end in a terrific disaster? This episode is the battle of Imphal Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. The war was not going well for the Japanese in 1944. They were on the cusp of being dislodged from the south pacific. Rabaul and Truk were effectively neutralized and the Americans were making enormous strides in the central pacific, seen in the Gilberts and Marshall campaigns. Even in Burma, a war front the Japanese had basically been winning every battle flawlessly, was now suffering defeats. The first defeats were found in the Hukawng Valley and Arakan region. In the face of these terrible defeats, the Japanese General Mutaguchi argued he had the answer. Mutaguchi, a victor over the Singapore campaign, had wargamed the possibility of invading India and won support of some of his superiors in Tokyo. His reasoning had been to brush past the British in Assam, to storm the gateway into the subcontinent, where hopefully the Indians would rise up to greet the Japanese as liberators. With Subhas Chandra Bose and his Indian National Army, the Japanese could rally the Indians to turn against the British. The collapse of India would be a killing blow against Britain's influence in Asia. Initially it was also believed, such a move would allow the Japanese to link up with the Axis forces in Persia. Such fantastical ideas were farfetched even for 1942 standards, but in 1944 these were laughable. Stalingrad and Kursk had effectively turned the Eastern Front completely around, the Germans were fighting for their survival. Yet this all did not dissuade Mutaguchi. Lt General Hanaya Tadashi was placed in charge of the Arakan region. Hanaya was tasked with deceiving the British into believing the counter attack in Arakan was an attempt to invade India, thus dragging units out of Imphal. The Operation was codenamed HA-GO, an intended feint, to mask another operation, U-GO to invade Imphal. To pull it off the assault in Arakan was made to be massive. Slim was forced to meet the enemy fiercely in Arakan, he had no choice but to pull his reserves out of Imphal. The Japanese were delivered a nasty surprise with the Admin Box tactic. For over 18 days the battle raged around the Admin Box, but the Japanese could not make a dent. The Japanese forces had expected once the British saw their lines of communications cut and were outflanked they would panic and flee. It was after all what had been occurring for years in Burma. The Japanese hoped to annihilate the 15th corp, but instead the British dug their heels in. Once again victory disease sprang its head force, the arrogant and overly confident Japanese, bit off more than they could chew. It was as if they were facing a brand new opponent. The Admin Box was hit by infantry and aerial attacks, the casualties were terrific, but the Admin Box never wavered. The Japanese had planned for a lighting battle, traveling light and seizing supplies on the go, but the British did not roll over. The Japanese began to run out of supplies, starvation loomed over the invaders. Casualties on both sides increased sharply, and Slim predicted the Japanese would not allow for defeat and instead would redouble their efforts. By February 13th, Slim was confident victory was in their hands as the 26th Indian division began to arrive to deliver a hammer blow with the Admin Box as the anvil. The Japanese fought desperately, but by the 24th they were withdrawing leaving 5000 dead. After defeating the Japanese Slim unleashed his own operation into the Arakan and while doing so his men captured some Japanese documents showcasing operation HA-GO in full. Slim now knew the Japanese were feinting him to draw resources away from Imphal Now Mutaguchi had sold Operation U-GO to his superiors in Tokyo as a pre-emptive strike to disable 14th Army, but in reality it was always to invade India. He also wanted to press the attack farther and take Dimapur, a major supply base through which ran the railway line to Ledo. Taking Dimapur would deal a major blow to the Allies and could potentially open the door to further operations deeper into India. Once they had broken through, the INA would rally local support, enabling them to extend the fight to the British in Assam, Bengal and beyond. For his Operation U-Go, Mutaguchi thought he could outsmart the British in terms of how he would approach Imphal. His plan called for the 33rd Division of Lt General Yanagida Motoso to begin an advance on March 8th attacking from the south. It was presumed the British would expect this and rush reinforcement when attacked. Meanwhile he planned to send the 15th division under Lt General Yamauchi Masafumi a week later to ford the Chindwin River and advance on Imphal from the north. Even further north the entire 31st division of Lt General Sato Kotoku would also ford the Chindwin between Homalin and Tamanthi, advancing northwest to block the main British supply route in the hills at Kohima. To pull all of this off, Mutaguchi needed to ensure his forces captured Imphal before the monsoon rains made the jungle tracks impassable. He did not have much in terms of supplies to give to his 3 divisions. By 1943, the supply route into Rangoon by sea through the Bay of Bengal had become too dangerous because of attacks by Allied submarines, so the supplies had to rely on the railway being constructed by forced labor and POWs from Thailand. Mutaguchi was well aware of these issues. He knew, however, from personal experience in Malaya and Singapore, that taking logistical risks against the British could bring great rewards. This was because the British, who were usually immeasurably better supplied than the Japanese, frequently left behind large quantities of what the latter referred to as Chachiru kyuyo 'Churchill Rations' in their haste to flee the advancing Japanese. Accordingly, the capture of British supply dumps around Imphal formed a key assumption in his planning. The essence of Mutaguchi's plan was speed - totsusbin ‘swift onslaught' - for if these vast depots were not seized as a matter of priority, the whole offensive would literally run out of fuel. He thought it would take no more than three weeks for his forces to fall on the British supply dumps. Without the capture of these supplies success could not be guaranteed, but it seemed increasingly inconceivable to Mutaguchi that a decisive, overwhelming attack against Imphal would not bring with it rapid and substantial rewards. At no time was he concerned that he might not capture the vast British depots needed to fuel his advance. Imphal needed to be taken by April 10th or it would all be a disaster General Slim planned for his 14th Army to make a stand at Imphal, taking the hit on the chin as they say, before pushing the enemy back. He needed to draw the Japanese in the Imphal Valley, in a tight circle so he could launch an effective counteroffensive. Lt General Geoffrey Scoones 4th corps would deploy the 20th Indian division led by Major General Douglas Gracey around Tamu and the 17th Indian Light Division of Major General David Punch Cowan around Tiddim. Both divisions had been aggressively carrying out patrols in the valley and along the banks of the Chindwin River. The 23rd Indian Division of Major General Ouvry Roberts was held in reserve at Imphal, with his 49th brigade in the Ukhrul area to the northeast. Once Mutaguchi's offensive kicked off, Slim planned for his two southern divisions to withdraw up the Tamu-Palel and Tiddim roads to go on the defensive around the Imphal Valley. The two divisions would have a short and more secure line of communications and supply behind them as they forced the Japanese to extend them self over the mountains. To counter losing the overland supply line from Kohima, Slim planned to use air supply to maintain his men during the long siege. Slim also expected Mutaguchi to send a single regiment to seize the defenseless Kohima, not an entire division that was further tasked with pouring down into the Brahmaputra valley. That last part would put his entire plan in jeopardy. On March 8th, Operation U-Go was kicked off with Lt General Yanagida Motoso's 33rd division beginning their advance in 4 columns. The left column was the 215th regiment led by Colonel Sasahara Masahiko who advanced south of Tiddim before swinging north towards the village of Singgel. They would come across the large supply deport between the milestones 109 and 110 around the Tiddim road. The central column consisted of the 214th regiment led by Colonel Sakuma Takayoshi, advancing up the Kabaw Valley to assault Tonzang. Following this column up was the Fort White Garrison unit led by Colonel Yagi Shigeru. Both columns would cut off the route of withdrawal of Major General David Cowan's 17th division and annihilate it. Lastly the right column consisting of the Yamamoto Force led by Major General Yamamoto Tsunoru. They would be advancing north up the Kabaw valley to assault Major General Douglas Gracey's 20th Division on the Tamu-Palel Road. There had been early reports from scouts that groups of Japanese soldiers were advancing west of the Tiddim road. This only sounded off the alarm bells for the 14th corps on March 12th, after a verified sighting report was made stating a large group of Japanese were just a few kilometers off the road at Milestone 109. Consequently, Scoones ordered Cowan to withdraw, so the 17th would begin to move from Tiddim on March 14, after laying mines and booby traps. But it was too late, as the Japanese had already cut the Tiddim Road earlier that morning, so Cowan would have to fight its way out to Imphal. That day, Yamamoto Force had also started attacking Gracey's southern front-line positions, with a particular tank-on-tank battle developing between a troop of M3 Lee/Grant tanks of the 3rd Carabiniers and some six light tanks of the 14th Tank Regiment. The latter were trounced in the end, with four tanks destroyed and two captured. Meanwhile on the 15th, Lt General Yamauchi Masafumi's 15th division began fording the Chindwin river at Thaungdut and Sittaung and would descend upon Imphal from the north. Lt General Sato Kotoku's 31st division also forded the river further north at Homalin, Kawya nad Tamanthi and were rapidly advancing towards Kohima and Ukhrul. Just as Mutaguchi had guessed, Scoones ordered his 37th and 49th brigades to advance to the Tiddim road to help Cowan's men. Cowan had sent his 63rd indian brigade to attack the 214th regiment at Tonang and Tiutum. Thai left Imphal and Ukhrul with little protection, so Scoones decided to dispatch the newly arrived 50th indian parachute brigade of Brigadier Maxwell Hope-Thomson to defend Ukhrul, but he did not expect them to find a real fight. Ukhrul would only have the lightest of garrisons and no real defenses. Forces in the area comprised two battalions of the newly raised and part-trained 50th Indian Parachute Brigade whose young and professional commander, 31-year-old Brigadier Maxwell 'Tim' Hope-Thomson had persuaded the powers that be in New Delhi to allow him to complete the training of his brigade in territory close to the enemy. At the start of March the brigade HQ and one battalion had arrived in Imphal, and began the leisurely process of shaking itself out in the safety of the hills north-east of the town. To the brigade was added the 4/5th Mahrattas under Lieutenant-Colonel Trim. Sent into the jungle almost to fend for themselves, it was not expected that they would have to fight, let alone be on the receiving end of an entire Japanese divisional attack. They had little equipment, no barbed wire and little or no experience or knowledge of the territory. On March 16th, Scoones ordered Gracey to withdraw, so the 20th Division could begin a controlled withdrawal up the Tamu-Palel Road, gradually moving into three defensive boxes. The first was to be at Moreh, held by the 32nd Indian Brigade; the second in the Khongkhang–Sibong area, held by the 80th Indian Brigade; and the third was to be on the Shenam Saddle, held by the 100th Indian Brigade. Luckily for the allies, Yamamoto had dispatch two of his battalions in a useless wide flanking maneuver towards Mombi and the Tamu-Palel road. Thus Yamamoto would lack sufficient troops to launch a full attack against the retreating allied forces. Meanwhile Hawker Hurricanes and heavy artillery bombarded as the 63rd launched a direct assault against Tuitum saddle, managing to break through to the Manipur River, leaving a rearguard at the bridge. During the following days, the rearguard would repel a series of intense assaults upon the saddle by the 214th regiment and Yanagida's Fort White column. At the same time the 37th brigade was fighting against the bulk of the 215th regiment around milestone 100. The fighting became very confused as the Japanese units became sandwiched between the allied units who in turn were surrounded by other Japanese units. On March 18th, the 3rd battalion ,215th regiment managed to capture the supply depot between Milestones 109 and 110 facing minor resistance. Then they were forced to repel a number of counter attacks by the 48th Indian brigade. On the 19th, Hope-Thomson received some panicked reports that his battalions were seeing heavy columns of Japanese advancing on their undefended camp at Sheldon's Corner. It was the 31st infantry of Major General Miyazaki Shigesaburo from the 58th regiment. Hope-Thomson made a last minute call to assemble his dispersed forces at the deserted Naga Village of Sangshak. His brigade, when concentrated, consisted of 1850 men. However, as the troops dug in they discovered to their discomfort that they were atop an ancient volcano, and the rock was impervious to their picks. All they could dig were shallow trenches, which provided ineffective protection from Japanese artillery. Like all Naga villages that at Sangshak was perched on a hill, and had no water; anything the men required had to be brought up from the valley floor, through the rapidly tightening Japanese encirclement. Its unknown why Miyazaki diverted his men to hit Sangshak rather than continue towards Kohima. By nightfall of the 22nd, the Japanese infantry overwhelmed Indian defenses without performed a detailed reconnaissance and lacking artillery support. This would prove to be a fatal mistake. 400 Gurkhas of the 153rd parachute battalion began mowing down wave after wave of Japanese troops using machine gun fire. The Japanese 8th Company of 58th lost 90 out of 120 men in the space of just 15 minutes. Suffering tremendous casualties, seeing entire companies decimated, Miyazaki decided to regroup and began tossing numerous frantic efforts to break up the defenders positions.Under heavy mountain artillery fire and unable to be supplied by air, Hope-Thomson's troops grimly held a position that was not even ringed by barbed wire until March 26, when they finally received Scoones' order to pull out. The Parachute brigade was being virtually destroyed in four battles at Sangshak, suffering 652 casualties. Yet in turn Miyazaki was served nearly 1000 casualties and his advance upon Kohima was held up for a week, severely delaying Sato's plans. Further to the south, Yamauchi's 60th regiment was also facing stubborn defenses at Sangshak. They actually had been waiting for the battle of Sangshak to conclude and only jumped in on the last day's assault. This prevented one of Yamauchi's columns from arriving in time north of Imphal, giving Scoones and Slim an extra few days to prepare Imphal's defenses. Meanwhile on March 23rd, the 48th brigade used their heavy guns and mortars to hit the Japanese positions and managed to force the 215th regiment to pull away from the valuable supply depot. To secure the depot however, they still needed to clear the road from the north. Gurkha's were sent in waves against the strongly defended Japanese bunkers, while the 37th brigade and Hawker Hurricanes hit the main defensive positions of the 215th regiment. At this point, General Yanagida, who had always felt that Allied capabilities were being underestimated, determined that his forces would not be able to hold on much longer and thus ordered them to pull back. Yanagida had received a signal from Colonel Sasahara about the critical situation his regiment was in. Sasahara, in turn, had been reacting to a signal from one of his battalion commanders, Major Sueki. Faced with rapidly depleting ammunition, mounting casualties and attacks on his position near Milestone 109, Sueki had signaled that he would not be able to hold on much longer. He indicated that he would destroy his codes and radio and fight to the end. Sasahara is said to have communicated this and the regiment's resolve to fight to the end to Yanagida. There is some mystery around this signal, some accounts suggesting the division commander received only the latter half of the message. Either way, Yanagida had had enough. All his reservations about the Imphal offensive came to the fore. He ordered the 215th Regiment to pull out and sent a signal to Mutaguchi about his decision. In this he noted the strength of their opponent, questioned the rationale of the operation and remarked on the impossibility of meeting the deadline. He is supposed to have gone so far as to suggest the suspension of the Imphal offensive. This all greatly pissed off Mutaguchi whose divisional commanders for the majority disagreed with his U-GO plan, and Motoso Yanagida openly derided him as an "imbecile". Irregardless, Mutaguchi sought to remove Yanagida from his command. Their relationship would not improve as more setbacks were on the way. With the Japanese dislodged, the 37th Brigade managed to reopen the Tiddim Road and the 48th Brigade finally secured the entire depot area around Milestone 109. Whatever supplies that could be recovered and transported back to Imphal were grabbed, while as many as possible that could be of potential value to the Japanese were destroyed. On the 26th, the 63rd Brigade's rearguard also withdrew, blowing up the Manipur River bridge behind them. Two days later, the 37th made first contact with Cowan's units near Milestone 102 and the 17th Division finally began their retreat towards Imphal. Their only obstacle would be a roadblock established by the 2nd Battalion, 213th Regiment around Khuadam. But that would be cleared out quite easily by Cowan's men who were able to reach Imphal by April 4th. In the meantime, Scoones had asked Gracey to send back one of his 100th indian brigade into the reserve on the 25th, leaving him with only two brigades to fend off the Japanese attacks. The next day, the 11th company, 213th regiment of the Yamamoto Force managed to advance past the main defenses at Moreh, defended by the 32nd indian brigade and captured Nippon Hill. Though they were not under heavy enemy pressure, the 32nd Indian Brigade finally withdrew from Moreh on April 1. It had set the dump on fire; by some estimates at least a million pounds' worth of supplies that had not yet been evacuated were destroyed. They arrived at the Shenam Saddle a few days later to join the 80th Indian Brigade in a fierce battle for Nippon Hill. Meanwhile, Slim had foreseen that reinforcements would be needed at Imphal and Kohima and had already requested them with great urgency. Slim was granted 30 Dakotas to fly the 5th Division from Arakan back on the 18th. By the 27th, the 9th and 123rd Indian Brigades had arrived at Imphal and the 161st Indian Brigade was being flown to Dimapur to reinforce Kohima. In addition, Slim was promised the 2nd British Division and the 23rd Long Range Penetration Brigade, should it be necessary. General Giffard also decided that once the airlift of the 5th Division was complete, the 7th Division would then be airlifted to Manipur. Yet that is all for the India-Burma front as we need to move over to New Britain. On March 5th, Colonel Smith's 5th marines began loading for an overnight run to the Willaumez Peninsula, departing Iboki by nightfall. The following morning the small convoy assembled off Volupai, waiting for air support to soften up their landing area, but they never showed up. Apparently having reason to believe that the Marines would attempt to land at Beach Red, the defenders constructed an intricate communications net between Talasea and Volupai, placed some mines on the beach, constructed defenses of a sort, sighted in 90mm mortars–and then inexplicably did not attempt to defend the beach as they could have done very well under the circumstances. Realizing the longer they waited the better the enemy could prepare, Smith ordered the first assault wave to hit the beaches at 8:25. LCM-tank gunboats raked the beach with machine-gun fire, as Smith's 1st Battalion successfully landed meeting enemy sniper and mortar fire. Some sniper fire was observed and 90mm mortar shells began splashing in the water, but Companies A and B drove on shoreward and within 10 minutes after crossing the line of departure about 500 Marines had landed. The two assault companies then pushed forward to establish a beachhead line through which the 2nd Battalion could pass and continue the attack in the direction of Bitokara Mission. Company A accomplished this with relatively little difficulty on the right, but on the left there existed a virtually impassable swamp, running north and south and extending to the edge of the Volupai track. As a result, Company B had to pass through a slot between Little Mt. Worri and the swamp in order to accomplish its mission, encountering and eliminating an enemy pocket of resistance before establishing its lines 200 yards inland. Meanwhile the reinforced platoon patrol that had gone after the bunker on Little Mt. Worri had run into difficulty. The retreating enemy joined other of their fellows and hastily manned defensive positions which had been prepared in the Volupai coconut grove. The platoon accounted for about a dozen of the Emperor's troops, losing one Marine killed and another wounded in the process. Finding he could not advance against the Japanese all-around defensive positions, the patrol leader requested assistance but was instructed to hold what he had until the 2nd Battalion arrived on the scene. As the advancing elements pushed their way through the coconut trees, rear echelon personnel on Beach Red suffered heavier casualties than the assault units. All during the day the Japanese lobbed 90mm mortar shells onto the beach, shells landing capriciously and inevitably taking their toll in the crowded, constricted area. Among the early victims was Lieutenant Commander Richard M. Forsythe, regimental surgeon, who continued working with the wounded until he was evacuated. The heaviest casualties that day were recorded in the 11th Marines and among medical company personnel. Both groups had to remain on the beach, there being no other place to go. On top of that, coral reefs were delaying the LCM's from fully landing the 3nd battalion until the early afternoon. Once Company E came ashore, the advance guard rapidly moved forward and began moving through the 1st Battalion's lines astride the Volupai Plantation track at 11:00. The Marines were brought to an abrupt halt 200 yards farther on where the Japanese had dug positions commanding the narrow trail. As Company E attempted to attack outside the plantation track, a medium tank commanded by Lieutenant John M. Scarborough moved up the trail to the company's assistance and knocked out a heavy machine-gun position. But suddenly two Japanese, one on each side of the trail and each armed with a magnetic mine, leaped out of the brush. The defending Marine infantry killed one before he could reach the tank, but the other succeeded in affixing the mine to the port side of the turret. The blast that followed killed the Japanese and the Marine who was trying to stop him, as well as jamming the turret so that it could not be operated and stunning the tank crew within. Simultaneously the rear of the turret was pierced by a missile, presumably an anti-tank grenade, which made a hole about three quarters of an inch in diameter. Supported by two more tanks and mortars, Company E finally began moving towards the coconut grove with increasing momentum during the afternoon, at the same time capturing a detailed map of Japanese positions in the Talasea-Bitokara-Waru area. As night approached, elements of the 2nd Battalion set up an all-around defense within the coconut grove while the 1st Battalion manned the beachhead. By the end of the first day, the Marines had penetrated approximately 2000 yards inland from the beach and killed 35 Japanese while suffering 13 killed and 71 wounded, most of them to the deadly mortar fire. More than half of these were incurred on the beach, and the figures for the day represented more than half the total casualties the combat team would suffer between March 6th and its departure on April 25th. 9 of the fatalities and 29 of the wounded were in the 11th Marines alone. At 2:00am on March 7th, a handful of Japanese attempted to infiltrate the lines of Company E, but the attack was so easily repelled that Smith considered that this wasn't even a counterattack. Actually, realizing that his forces were heavily outnumbered, General Sakai had ordered the defenders to leave a rearguard of about 100 men and withdraw at once towards Bola. During the morning, the 2nd Battalion advanced through the abandoned enemy positions without facing any opposition until they were stopped on Mt. Schleuther's northwest slope at 11:45. It became evident that the Japanese were attempting to turn the battalion's right flank. Luckily, Company F rushed forward and managed to extend the threatened flank and seize the high ground. At 3:00pm, the reserve 3rd Battalion was also landed at Volupai, thus relieving the 1st Battalion at the beachhead. The next morning, after a mortar barrage, the 2nd battalion soon discovered the Japanese had retreated past Bitokara. The Marines quickly captured Bitokara by 1:40pm. The Marines then dispatched scouts towards Mt. Schleuther and Talasea. The Mt. Schleuther scouting group reported that the Japanese were well dug in on a nearby peak, and at 3:00 a task force consisting of Company E and reinforcing elements began the ascent. A request for artillery fire on Scheuther brought several rounds dangerously close to the 2nd battalion, 5th Marines CP, and the battalion's 81mm mortars promptly took over the support missions. As the task force approached the enemy positions, however, it ran into concentrated fire from machine-guns and small arms, backed up by a 90mm mortar and a 75mm field piece. The Marines fought back for an hour and sustained 18 casualties before they were ordered withdrawn to the mission. The second scouting party had returned from Talasea, meanwhile, to report no indications of the enemy. As no enemy presence was found on the latter, Company F advanced to the airdrome and in less than an hour reported it secured. Meanwhile the 1st Battalion advanced to Liapo and then began to push over rough terrain towards Waru, finally digging in for the night just a bit short of its objective. After some artillery and mortar dueling during the night, Companies G, B and C launched a coordinated assault at 8:00am on the 9th. Once again, they found abandoned positions, successfully clearing the Waru area by 1:00pm. Also a patrol was landed on Garua Island at 11:47, reporting it deserted as well. By the afternoon, Smith moved his command post to Bitokara and informed the division that Talasea was secure and that his forces would now concentrate on mopping up and patrolling the Willaumez Peninsula. The 4 day campaign had cost the Marines 17 killed and 114 wounded, while estimating they had killed 150 Japanese. But now we need to jump over to Bougainville. The Japanese had begun earlier in the year to improve some trails, particularly the net leading from the Mosigetta-Mawaraka area. A rough road had been completed through the jungle to the jump-off positions for the infantry. Nevertheless, the movement of over fifteen thousand troops with all their equipment proved to be a major task that would have dampened the spirits of all but the most ardent warriors. Artillery units had a particularly difficult time pulling their heavy guns through the jungle to get them into position to support the attack. Their task was made even more difficult by the daily downpour that flooded the streams, washing away many of the makeshift bridges and making some trails veritable seas of mud. American intelligence by mid-February was aware of the large-scale movement toward the perimeter and Allied planes repeatedly attacked the trails. Despite all these difficulties, the Japanese soldiers displaying their tenacity and ability to overcome the most difficult obstacles, brought up the supplies and eventually had all the guns in place for the attack. All of this was done to support a major counteroffensive scheduled to begin on March 8th. On the 7th, the Iwasa unit has assembled behind Hill 1111; the Magata Unit behind Mount Nampei; the Muda Unit at Peko village on the East-West Trail, and the 17th Army Artillery Group, commanded by Colonel Saito Harumasa in place near Hill 600. Facing them, were the men of the 37th and Americal Divisions, who were on full alert in their foxholes and bunkers, waiting for the great Japanese counterattack. On the 8th General Hyakutake's counterattack began with a heavy albeit uncoordinated artillery bombardment. The Japanese artillery concentrated its fire on Piva Yoke instead of the forward areas of the perimeter, which would be the main initial point of attack. The artillery fire was delivered spasmodically and with poor coordination despite the high vantage points from which the Japanese surveyed the central segment of the American positions. The Japanese artillery did little damage. American corps and division artillery countered immediately, the 37th Division guns firing on the suspected hills to the northeast and the Americal howitzers concentrating on those to the east. The 6th Field Artillery Battalion and the 129th Infantry's cannon company were so situated that they could fire directly at the gun flashes. All other guns were directed by forward observers or spotter planes. Destroyers in Empress Augusta Bay also fired counterbattery missions. By midmorning marine dive and torpedo bombers were flying neutralization missions against Hills 250 and 600. Then in the afternoon 56 SBDs and 36 TBFs, guided by artillery smokeshells, struck the main concentrations on and around hill 1111. This all massively delayed the Japanese main assault. Only the 23rd Regiment would manage to assemble in place for the attack on Hill 700 by nightfall. Under drenching rainfall, the Japanese thus attacked the hill with some companies, yet their first assault was easily repelled by the experienced defenders. At 2:30General Iwasa launched his main assault, sending his 2nd and 3rd battalions, 23rd division against the saddle. Despite the heavy fire from the 145th Regiment, the Japanese stormed the hill en masse, screaming and screaming threats in English and even singing American songs, presumably in attempts to unnerve the defenders of the hill. According to the historian of the 145th "The enemy stormed the hill, clawing his way up the steep slope, yelling like a maniac, suicidally putting everything he had into a frontal attack designed to take the highest point on the hill. ... The 145th Infantry, defending the ridge, were somewhat taken aback by an enemy so unreasoning as to crawl up the 70-degree slope on all fours, rifles slung over their backs." Suffering severe losses, Iwasa's 2nd Battalion managed to blast their way through the protective wire and knock out one of the pillboxes. Through this gap, the Japanese moved onto the saddle and began to attack adjacent strongpoints, securing a penetration of the 145th's line 70 yards wide and 50 yards deep. Behind them, however, an effective artillery response would break up the attack of Iwasa's 3rd Battalion; yet the 2nd Battalion would continue to expand this perimeter until, by 12:00, they had captured seven pillboxes and had brought up machine-guns and mortars with which they could put McClelland Road, the only lateral supply road for the 145th, under direct fire. Supply of the forward troops became very difficult, since the three-quarter-ton trucks and half-tracks could not use the road. All supplies had to be hand carried. Evacuation of the wounded also became difficult and dangerous. Japanese machine guns on the crest of the hill were able to cover the ridge with accurate and deadly grazing fire. They had placed other machine guns in trees on the spur of the hill about a hundred yards to the rear of the ground-emplaced weapons, which could sweep the entire front. With the exception of a few scattered trees and shallow trenches, there was little cover for troops of the 145th who moved up the steep slopes attempting to retake the lost positions. All during the day the Japanese were also extending the trenches repairing the old pillboxes, and building new ones. In response to this breakthrough, General Beightler sent the 1st Battalion, 145th Regiment to counterattack. By noon, the Americans were attacking the newly-gained Japanese positions, successfully retaking five of the lost pillboxes against heavy fire and establishing a new line just south of the crest by nightfall. The first attempt to recapture Hill 700 was launched at noon on the 9th. Company C moved northward against the saddle in a direct frontal assault while two platoons of Company F attacked the saddle from the flanks. Company C was halted by devastating fire two-thirds of the way to its objective, and the men were forced to dig in and hold what they had gained. Meanwhile the riflemen of Company F had retaken five of the lost pillboxes, and the line, now reinforced, was solidly established by nightfall just south of the crest. Beightler had ordered two tanks forward late in the afternoon to take enemy targets under direct fire, particularly those that menaced McClelland Road, but the terrain proved too steep for them to be used effectively. Thankfully, Iwasa's breakthrough had been contained, with the 145th losing 23 killed and 128 wounded against an estimated 500 enemy dead. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Mutaguchi's insane Operation U-Go was not going the way he thought it would. General Slim was outsmarting his enemy and it seems the allies were going to make further gains in Burma. Meanwhile things were heating up on Bougainville as Iwasa continued his grand offensive.
Last time we spoke about Operation HA-GO, U-GO and some action brewing up on New Britain and Bougainville. Mutaguchi basically tricked his superiors at Tokyo into allowing him to attempt an invasion of India. Operations HA-GO and U-GO were simultaneously unleashed, the only problem was the allies were very ready to meet them. General Slim's men captured documents indicating the true nature of the operations and he acted accordingly. The new box defense systems were employed as the allies lured the Japanese into major traps thwarting their designs against Imphal. The Japanese were fighting tenaciously, but time and supplies would not be on their side. Over on New Britain the allies advanced and managed to seize Talasea. Meanwhile on Bougainville the Japanese were preparing a large counteroffensive, attempting to breach the American defensive perimeter. The operation had just kicked off last episode and today we will continue the story. This episode is the Bougainville Counteroffensive Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. The Marines departed Bougainville and were relieved by the Americal Division by the end of January 1944. Sporadic fighting emerged and through it Major General Griswold obtained intelligence indicating the Japanese would launch a major counter attack, most likely slated for early March. At the time Lt General Hyakutake was under extreme pressure to reduce the bombing against Rabaul. Rabaul as we know was smashed daily, suffering heavy losses. Admiral Koga had responded by taking away air units from Truk, but all this achieved was even more losses. Rabaul was neutralized, and Truk became vulnerable. The Americans had pummeled both so much, they were able to unleash a dramatic thrust into the central pacific aimed at the Gilberts, Marshalls and later the Carolines. Now it seems Hyakutake had been operating under some very bad intelligence, indicating to him the Americans were defending their perimeter with just a single division around the airfield. With the objective of destroying said airfield, Hyakutake did not know the actual number of defenders and would not enjoy movement by sea. The Americans had full control of the sea lanes, thus any IJN destroyers trying to move troops would run a risky gauntlet. By the first quarter of 1944, Rabaul had tossed meager attacks against the Americans, for example on January 23rd two bombers scored a direct hit over the living quarters of Brigadier General John Hodge and his senior staff officers. What Hyakutake had to work with was 4300 men of the 45th regiment led by Colonel Isashi Magata. These men were considered the crack troops on Bougainville and they included artillery, mortar and engineering battalions. They were further supported by 4125 men of the 23rd regiment led by Major General Shun Iwara and 1350 men of the 13th regiment led by Colonel Toyo Horei Muda. All three units would be led by Major General Masatane Kanda. The 3 units made an arduous trek through the jungles to reach their jump off points by the evening of March 7th. Hyakutake then sent them a resounding message “time has come to manifest our knighthood with the pure brilliance of the sword. It is our duty to erase the mortification of our brothers at Guadalcanal. Attack! Assault! Destroy everything! Cut, slash, and mow them down. May the color of the red emblem of our arms be deepened with the blood of American rascals.” Major General Kanda also added his own message “The cry of our victory at Torokina Bay shall resound to the shores of our beloved Nippon. We are invincible.” All of these troops received a large morale boost from such message, but on top of that there was something else incentivising them all. They had adequate food to last them until April 1st, they literally needed to overrun the Americans to steal their provisions. Such was the reality of the Japanese island hopping campaigns. Hyakutakes forces proved themselves far from invincible. Their artillery bombarded on the morning of the 8th, targeting the airfield at Piva Yoke. Their bombardment destroyed a bomber, 3 fighters, killed a single man, and forced a temporary evacuation of aircraft to New Georgia. It was now exactly the greatest of results. Artilleryman Stan Coleman vividly described the Japanese artillery attack “All of a sudden we heard a very different kind of ‘whoosh.' It was made by a shell at the end of its flight, not the beginning. It was ‘incoming mail.' All hell broke loose. In the rear some fuel dumps went up. Every American artillery piece in the perimeter went into action.” The American artillery counter-attack proved far more effective. The Japanese artillery units were forced to move positions constantly and then they were met by a new type of weapon. As Coleman recalled “Four blue Marine Corsairs came in with rockets. Rockets were a new ground-support weapon and I had never seen them … The rockets in flight made a fearful display. There was a tremendous concussion when they struck their target.” That same night the Iwasa Unit attacked Hill 700 during a heavy downpour. Yet by 2:30am the first attacks were beaten off. It seems the experience persuaded the Japanese not to attempt another night attack on March 9th. Instead, they used occasional machine gun and mortar fire to disrupt the fitful sleep of the Americans. Then at 6:45am on the 10th, Iwasa launched another attack in coordination with Colonel Muda's assault against Hill 260. Iwasa's men clambered up the steep 70 degree slopes screaming maniacally. They would shout confused threats in English. A prolific slaughter occurred against one group of Japanese soldiers who seized out a pillbox and set up a machine gun post on the saddle of the hill. It was dearly bought. General Griswold had brought up more reinforcements for the 145th that same morning. Engineers put together a bangalore torpedo 72 feet long by connecting sticks of dynamite like a long pipe. The object was to climb the hill and then snake the charge down the opposite side into one of the pillboxes. Unfortunately the Japanese spotted them and fired a knee mortar, hitting the torpedo and killing the engineers. Another ruse was attempted shortly after noon with the object of getting the Japanese on the saddle to surrender. A public address system was set up with speakers aimed at Hill 700, and one of the division's Japanese interpreters spoke to the defenders. He informed them of the odds against their success and told them that they could not be reinforced. If they surrendered, it would be considered honorable. To die needlessly was foolish. For the short time he spoke all was quiet, but seconds after he had finished the Japanese directed a mortar barrage on the section of the hill from whence he was broadcasting. The day ended in victory for the riflemen of the 37th Division. At 11:15 an air strike by 26 planes and continuous artillery fire had devastated the Japanese. The day's assault cost the lives of some 500 or more Japanese soldiers. Meanwhile further south, the 1st battalion, 13th regiment was knocked out by heavy artillery fire. Colonel Muda sent his 3rd battalion, 13th regiment to attack the southern positions of the 182nd regiment around Hill 260. Hill 260, a twin-peaked rise close to the west bank of the Torokina River approximately four miles north of its mouth, was covered with heavy vegetation. The hill itself measured only 850 yards along its north-south axis and at its widest a mere 450 yards, and it was shaped roughly like an hourglass, with the highest elevations to the north and south connected by a narrow saddle. The eastern slope of the hill was precipitous, steepest along the South Knob, where it was almost perpendicular. The South Knob, which was considered the most important part of Hill 260, had been occupied by men of 2nd battalion, 182th regiment since early January, and vigorous patrolling had also been carried on regularly along the saddle and on the unoccupied North Knob. The hill was about half a mile east of the 182nd's main line of resistance. Between Hill 260 and the main line of the Americal was a small stream named Eagle Creek, which provided a natural defensive barrier. There was but a single trail leading from the main perimeter to South Knob. A small bridge over the creek could take vehicular traffic. The last hundred yards to the top of South Knob was a steep stairway cut into the sides of the hill. Possession of this portion of the hill was important for both sides. The Americans had built a platform near the top of a 150-foot banyan tree from which forward observers could see any enemy-activity along the Torokina River or along the highlands to the northeast. Conversely, if the Japanese could seize the hill they could have good observation of the American-held Hills 608 and 309 and the area behind them. Under the cover of intense machine-gun and mortar fire, the Japanese managed to climb the steep slope of the South Knob and then burst in among the outnumbered Americans. The position was held by a reinforced platoon of Company G of the 182nd and a forward observer team of the 246th Field Artillery Battalion. The Americans were rapidly wiped out and dispersed as Muda's men established a defensive perimeter over the crest of South Knob. Hearing the dire news, General Griswold ordered General Hodge to hold Hill 260 at all costs, an order that surprised many of the Americal's staff since they had not expected to try to hold the hill in the face of a concerted Japanese attack. Companies E and F immediately advanced to occupy the North Knob and then attempted an encircling maneuver to counterattack the newly-established Japanese perimeter. Company E at 8:45 attacked South Knob from the southwest while Company F moved south. The company began its attack at 10:45 but halted after the troops had advanced a few yards into the cleared zone. The men took whatever cover was available and waited for flame throwers before trying to advance farther. At approximately 2:45 the commander, Lieutenant Colonel Dexter Lowry, ordered the attack resumed; Company E split and attempted an envelopment. The northern prong of the envelopment was halted but the infantrymen of the southern prong, using grenades and flame throwers, managed to gain a lodgment within earshot of the men of Company G who were still holding out in the pillbox. Meanwhile, the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 145th Regiment had been reorganized and launched a counterattack against Hill 700 at 5:00. The Japanese unleashed intense mortar and artillery ied, but gradually were dislodge from the crest of the hill, leaving just 4 pillboxes remaining under their control. After the reestablishment of the original resistance line, Iwasa prepared his men to storm Pat's Nose during the night. The Japanese had lost heavily during these attacks, which also cost the 145th three dead and 121 wounded. During the night, after a failed bayonet charge, the Japanese would reinforce their position on Hill 260. They then struck at Company E early in the morning of March 11th and although this attack was beaten off, the American situation in the lodgment had become desperate. Thus, after another Japanese flanking attack, the defenders would have to pull back towards North Knob. Company G was sent to relieve the beleaguered Company E but was halted by yet another Japanese flanking attack on Company E. General Hodge, fearful of reducing his main defense line, felt that he could send no more reserves to the hill and therefore decided to break off the action and pull Company G and what was left of Company E off South Knob. They retired, unimpeded by the Japanese, behind Eagle Creek. There they joined Company B and then proceeded to cut a new trail up to the crest of North Knob. At daybreak on 11 March, Iwasa launched another attack against the promontory called ‘Pat's Nose,' some 150 yards to the west of ‘Hill 700.' Flanking 37 mm guns cut the Japanese charge to shreds. Iwasa's rear echelons kept advancing over the dead bodies of those who had been leading the charge and eventually managed to break through the barbed wire, though they too were ultimately destroyed. After an hour of suicidal attack Iwasa's troops receded leaving some 84 dead behind them. The 37th Division's historian described this attack: "Brandishing their prized sabers, screeching 'Chusuto' (Damn them!), the Jap officers climbed up the slope and rushed forward in an admirable display of blind courage. The men screamed in reply 'Yaruzo' (Let's do it!) and then 'Yarimosu' (We will do it!). As they closed with the American doughboys, the leaders cried' San nen Kire!' (Cut a thousand men!). General Beightler, concerned over the inability of the 145th to reduce the Japanese positions on Hill 700, decided to send the 2nd Battalion, 148th Regiment to finally wipe out the enemy opposition. After a heavy mortar and artillery bombardment, two platoons of Company E advanced east from Pat's Nose trying to flank the saddle while a third attacked west from Hill 700. Thirteen men were killed before the momentum of the attack waned and the battalion dug in on the ground it had gained. Meanwhile, Companies F and B, now under the command of Brigadier-General William McCulloch, began a two-pronged attempt to drive the Japanese off South Knob. Supported by flamethrowers units from the 132nd, men of Company B got across the saddle and onto the knob, but were ultimately pulled because of the enemy's numerical superiority. Meanwhile, Colonel Magata Isashi's 45th Regiment had limited its actions to heavy patrol activity while the Iwasa Unit was attacking Hill 700. The terrain fronting the 129th Regiment, which was holding the center of the 37th Division line, was much more favorable for the Japanese than that encountered by either the Iwasa or Muda forces. The land was relatively flat, although cut by many gullies. The 129th's line, defended by two battalions, extended over two miles, curving slightly from just east of the Numa Numa Trail southwest to the right flank of the 148th Regiment. The Japanese had easy access to the 37th's lines, first via the Numa Numa Trail and then following the lowlands and gullies adjacent to the creeks. Colonel John Frederick, the regimental commander of the 129th, had recognized the potential vulnerability of this position and had organized a defense in depth during the two months prior to the attack. The position was anchored by a large number of mutually supporting earthen and log pillboxes and protected by a double apron of barbed wire, in front of which antipersonnel mines had been laid. Machine-guns had been sited to provide interlocking fire and additional barbed wire had been placed to channel potential attackers into the main machine-gun fire lanes. The 129th's cannon company of 75-mm pack howitzers, and its mortar sections had been augmented by 37-mm and 40-mm anti-tank guns, which could fire canisters in flat-trajectory direct fire. Thus although Colonel Magata's men did not have to climb up steep cliffs to get at the American positions, they would find the 129th's defenses near impregnable to relatively lightly supported infantry attacks, no matter how fanatically delivered. While patrolling, some documents were taken from dead Japanese bodies detailing Magata's plan, so Colonel John Frederick's 129th Regiment was expecting his thrust. On the 11th, the contact between Japanese and American patrols increased, as did the amount of incoming mortar fire, so the American supporting artillery was directed to fire intermittently into the areas where the Japanese were located.Colonel Frederick at 4:00pm ordered all his outposts back into the main perimeter and division artillery fired a ten-minute concentration along the 2nd Battalion front. At dusk, a heavy firefight then broke out as the Japanese opened up with machine-guns and mortars on Company G's area. During the exchange of fire, which lasted until 7:20pm, men in the pillboxes did not fire their machine guns, since they did not want to reveal their positions. The firing died down to only a few exchanges during the night, generally directed at Japanese infiltrators, who were attempting to cut through the barbed wire. Finally, at dawn on the 12th, Magata sent his 1st and 3rd battalions in column to strike Company G. Although the attacking Japanese suffered very heavy casualties from machine-gun fire, they penetrated the first line of defense by sheer weight of numbers. Moving up the streambed running into the sector, they captured one pillbox after another until they held a total of seven. Frederick then sent his reserve 1st Battalion to support Company G, while also launching a counterattack that managed to contain the enemy expansion and that also retook two pillboxes by late afternoon. Meanwhile, Companies E and F of the 148th were converging against Iwasa's remaining strongpoints. Using grenades, rifles, and flamethrowers, they finally reduced the pillboxes one by one, leaving the Japanese in possession of only one pillbox by 1:00pm. An historian of the 145th Regiment described the fight for this last strongpoint: “On the second day, the last held enemy pillbox was subjected to everything an infantryman has at his command. Hand grenades by the dozen were thrown at the emplacement. Still there was responding fire. Flamethrowers scorched the hidden Nip into silence. The searching parties entered the charred remains of the emplacement only to hear the click of a Japanese grenade being detonated. In the far corner they made out the dim outline of a Jap, eyes bloodshot, mouth bleeding, face seared, clothing burned. His clenched fist held a grenade. Even as the men dove for cover outside the pillbox, the Jap threw the grenade at them as in a dying gesture.” Despite a heroic resistance, this was cleared in the afternoon at last, thus completely restoring the original 145th's line. While this was going on, after a heavy artillery bombardment, McCulloch sent Companies B and F once again to storm the South Knob. Company B in a column of platoons with six flamethrowers attempted to storm the height from the northwest. The leading platoon was halted by machine gun fire from pillboxes dug in on the west slope. Once these were spotted a concentration of mortar and machine gun fire was directed against these Japanese positions, enabling the following platoon to reach the top of the knob. There, it was pinned down by heavy fire from machine guns sited east of the observation post banyan tree. American mortar fire, together with the work of the flamethrower operators, who were covered by BAR men of the 3rd Platoon, soon negated these positions. Although it appeared that the South Knob would soon be in American hands, ammunition for the attacking platoons was running low, there had been numerous casualties, there were no more reserves, and it was already late in the day. Despite this, Hodge sent Company A of the 132nd Regiment to reinforce the gained position. Company A of the 132nd tried to scale the height from the southwest to join Company B of the 182nd on the crest. A burst of machine gun fire killed the company commander, however, and disorganized the attack so much that under the best of conditions the men could not reach the top before dark. Hodge then reluctantly recalled his forces and, sensing the futility of further attacks, he requested permission to pull off South Knob. Yet Griswold refused the request and a new attack was ordered for the next day using two companies of the 1st Battalion, 132nd Regiment. After another heavy artillery bombardment, Company A attacked southward along the narrow saddle while Company B attacked up the southwest slope. Surprisingly, the two companies of the 182nd that had led the attack the day before had not been kept in immediate reserve but had been pulled back within the perimeter. Therefore there were no reserve troops available to help exploit the minor gains made during the afternoon. As night fell, Major Raymond Daehler, the battalion commander, reluctantly pulled his men off the knob and retreated to safer ground. Despite repeated attacks from 12 -16th, Magata had made no headway and finally withdrew his forces. After Iwasa's retreat, the men of the 145th had the dubious honor of policing the slopes of Hill 700 and burying the corpses left behind. In an area roughly 50 yards square, corpses that could be identified were counted. This count included only those within the barbed wire lines in front of the pillboxes. As one observer noted, the carnage was a sight to turn even the most cast-iron stomach: “Enemy dead were strewn in piles of mutilated bodies, so badly dismembered in most cases that a physical count was impossible. Here and there was a leg or an arm or a blown-off hand, all to show for the vanished and vanquished enemy. At one point, Japanese bodies formed a human stairway over the barbed wire. Five enemy were piled one on top of the other, as each had successively approached the location to use a predecessor as a barricade and then fall on top of him as he in turn was killed. Farther out from the perimeter, where a little stream wound its way parallel to it, Japs killed by the concussion of thousands of mortar shells lay with their heads, ostrich fashion, stuck under the least protection they could find”. What was left of Iwasa's shattered command to the relative safety of the Blue Ridge, Approximately two miles east of the American perimeter. During the day, as the Japanese were retreating, American planes dropped 123 tons of bombs on the intermediate areas, and destroyers off shore lobbed their five-inch shells into the high ground to the north and east of the perimeter. Further east, Magata launched a night attack at 4:00am, managing to gain another pillbox, so Griswold would decide to reinforce Frederick with a tank platoon. General Griswold agreed to send the 1st Platoon of Company C, tank battalion, forward, with the stipulation that they be used only to augment the infantry as they took back the lost pillboxes. 4 tanks supported a midmorning assault, which successfully retook two pillboxes. Another tank-infantry attack began at 1:15pm but was halted since the tanks were low on fuel and ammunition. They were replaced by tanks of another platoon, which assisted the infantry of the 129th in destroying all the other pillboxes held by the Japanese and in restoring the front line roughly to the positions held before the Japanese attack of the previous day. Alongside this, Griswold ordered the reconnaissance troop forward to occupy the right sector of the threatened area, with the 131st Engineer Regiment taking over the extreme left. General Hodge requested to be reinforced with tanks; but as they could not cross Eagle Creek, McCulloch and him reluctantly decided to cease any further attempt to drive the Japanese off South Knob. He thought that the three-day action against the Muda Unit had obviously so weakened it that it no longer posed a danger to the perimeter proper. Thus, it could be contained and continually harassed by combat patrols and neutralization fire. On the 14th, the fighting fell into just intermittent small-arms and mortar fire from the Japanese as Colonel Magata shifted some of his troops to more favorable positions and as he brought his reserve 2nd Battalion, 45th Regiment and 2nd Battalion, 13th Regiment to reinforce further attacks. Magata also received the 1st Battalion, 81st Regiment and the 3rd Battalion, 53rd Regiment from the north, tossing them into his new reserve. At 4:00am on 15th, the Japanese launched a heavy local attack against the right of Company F. By dawn, they had captured one pillbox and penetrated approximately 100 yards into the perimeter, where they were ultimately checked. A coordinated counterattack by Companies F and C in conjunction with a 36-plane strike against the Japanese positions, managed to retake the pillbox. Further tank-infantry attacks finally drove the entrenched Japanese out of the salient and successfully restored the line. Losses for the day were 10 dead and 53 wounded, while 190 Japanese were counted dead. The Japanese then repeated the attack the next morning at 4:00am on the high ground east of Cox Creek with a larger force of elements from three battalions. They penetrated approximately 75 yards before their momentum was halted. Then, Company B, supported by a platoon of tanks, counterattacked and restored the original line by midmorning. Finally, shortly after noon, the tanks moved beyond the wire and shelled the draws and ravines in front of Company F until their ammunition was exhausted. Once again the Japanese had paid heavily for no gain. 194 dead were counted and 1 prisoner taken, while the Americans only lost 2 dead and 63 wounded. Though the counter offensive is nowhere near done, that is all for this week as we now have to jump over to the CBI theater. General Merrill's Marauders had been given the task of cutting the Japanese supply line over the Kamaing road. At Merrill's disposal were the three battalions of GALAHAD, each in turn broken down into two combat teams. The teams bore the code names Red and White for the 1st Battalion; Blue and Green for the 2nd Battalion and Khaki and Orange for the 3rd Battalion. Each team included a rifle company, heavy weapons platoon, pioneer and demolition platoon, reconnaissance platoon, and medical detachment, with a combined strength of sixteen officers and 456 enlisted men. The marauders had been recruited from units in the south-west pacific and from Trinidad in the Caribbean. Many of the volunteers were notably seen as pure psychopaths. Their training in India was quite painful, a lot so for the military police nearby. 10 percent of the Marauders went AWOL, many of them amused themselves by shooting at catte, chickens and other birds, apparently even at the feet of locals to make them dance. One incident apparently had some of them aboard a train to Ledo firing out of the windows. They were seen as arrogant, psychopathic, gung-ho and they had many colorful catchphrases such as ‘My pack is on my back, my gun is oiled and loaded, and as I walk in the shadow of death I fear no sonofabitch.' The baptism of the Marauders did not impress their commander who was obsessed with speed and efficiency. The Galahad unit had departed on February 24th and on receiving orders to move to his forward assembly area, Merrill sent his three intelligence and reconnaissance (I & R) platoons to check trails as far as the Tawang Hka, the first of the three considerable streams that crossed the line of march. At 6:00am on the 24th, the 5307th moved out, screened by the I & R platoons. Next day two of them clashed with Japanese patrols and the point of one platoon, Pvt. Robert W. Landis of Youngstown, Ohio, was killed. Luckily radio communication between the 2nd Battalion, 56th Regiment and the 18th Division's headquarters broke down at this time, so General Tanaka was unaware that a semi-detached American unit was operating off to his flank. Stilwell fretted at the time it took them to cross the 130 miles over the Naga range to the battlefront. Part of the problem was that 5307th Composite was mule-based and had to bring 700 animals with them but none of them knew anything about muleteering. Whatever misgivings Stilwell had when he saw his reinforcements, he kept them to himself and addressed them simply and quietly, explaining that their new mission was to hit Walawbum. On the afternoon of the 28th, Merill received the new orders, calling for cutting the road on either side of Walawbum, the 2nd Battalion led by Colonel McGee to the west, the 3rd Battalion led by Colonel Beach to the south, and the 1st Battalion led by Colonel Osborne to patrol along the Nambyu Hka north of the Kamaing Road. Positions near Walawbum would be held until the 38th Division relieved the 5307th. Unfortunately the freak rains already experienced by Stilwell and his men continued, so that the Marauders' eight-day, 60-mile trek to Walawbum turned into something of a nightmare. On March 2nd, the Marauders crossed the Tanai Hka and arrived at their assembly area. With the last elements at hand, General Stillwell initiated his offensive. On the 3rd, Colonel Brown's tankers, with the support of a battalion from the 65th regiment advanced against Maingkwan. Facing light opposition, they managed to advance 5000 yards northeast of Maingkwan by 3pm when they were halted by heavy Japanese fire. Meanwhile, Merrill's marauders were clashing with Japanese at various places throughout the day. The 3rd Battalion had a sharp fight at Lagang Ga, killing 30 Japanese and seized the area needed for the building of a drop field. One of the battalion's two combat teams, Khaki, stayed at Lagang Ga to build and protect the dropping zone. Orange Combat Team kept on to the high ground east of Walawbum and dug in, its heavy weapons commanding the Kamaing Road. This saw them securing high ground east of Walawbum. The 22d Division, was also moving ahead, and so far was in step with the tanks and GALAHAD. On the 3rd, the 64th Regiment was near Ngam Ga, east of the Kamaing Road. The 66th to the west was in contact with the third regiment, the 65th, as it emerged from the Taro Plain. Tanaka's intelligence indicated the Americans were at Walawbum. The Chinese 22nd and 38th divisions were advancing slowly, so he believed his rearguard could hold them back so he could take the bulk of his strength to attack the americans. On the 3rd, the 55th and 56th regiment began retreating in order to launch an enveloping maneuver against Merrill's marauders. The next day, Brown found the enemy gone and his men were able to advance 3 miles southeast, getting his tanks in line with Maingkwan. Over at Walawbum, Merrills 3rd battalion were resisting against ferocious attacks from the Japanese. The drop field at Lagang Ga was attacked at dawn on the 4th but the garrison held. Orange Combat Team opened the battle in its sector with mortar fire on Walawbum, drawing mortar and 75-mm. fire in return from the 56th Infantry Regiment, which had been Tanaka's left flank, as it assembled for attack. When it moved, the 56th tried to cross the river and work around the Americans' flanks, where it met booby traps and ambushes thoughtfully prepared for just such a contingency. Some Japanese did cross to the east, but this failed to affect the course of the action, and 75 dead Japanese were counted, as against one American dead and seven wounded. These latter were evacuated by air the same evening. The 2nd battalion managed to get across the Kamaing road west of Wesu Ga where they established a roadblock. Finding out about the roadblock, Tanaka dispatched his forces to clear them out. On the 5th the Japanese appeared to be forming for an attack, but mortar fire seemed to be successful in breaking up such attempts. To the south, Allied aircraft could be seen bombing and machine-gunning what Orange Combat Team took to be Japanese reinforcements. One indication that the Japanese were increasing their strength in the immediate area lay in their being able to force Orange Combat Team's I & R Platoon back across the river about noon. Simultaneously, the 66th regiment liberated the abandoned Maingkwan and began advancing south over the Kamaing road. Brown's reconnaissance had found a good trail running south from Tsamat Ga, and on the morning of the 5th the tanks moved out through the jungle. After the engineers had prepared a small stream for crossing, the tanks broke into a freshly evacuated Japanese bivouac area. Jungle vines looping across the trail from either side, and connecting masses of vegetation and trees, made effective obstacles as they slowed down the tanks by catching their turrets; not until late afternoon did the armor break out on the trail running east and west between Maingkwan and Wesu Ga. Almost immediately the tanks encountered what seemed to be a company of Japanese defending a small but marshy stream. The stream did not seem fordable, so Brown attacked by fire alone. Unknown to him, his tanks were firing on Tanaka's division headquarters, and now lay squarely between the 18th's headquarters and its 56th Regiment. This understandably threw Tanaka's plan into chaos, as his forces who were unsuccessfully attacking Merrills marauders were becoming encircled. Tanaka decided to swing his force around the American roadblock, using a Japanese built trail that the Americans did not know about.The bypass road over which the 18th was to withdraw had been built by the Japanese engineers some days before and quote “The Engineer Regiment commander, Colonel Fukayama, had considered the possibility of reversals in our position and, in order to facilitate the withdrawal of the division, he had previously cleared a secret jungle trail about 20 kilometers long leading from the vicinity of Lalawng Ga to Jambu Hkintang on his own initiative. This trail was used in the withdrawal of the main body of the division.” By nightfall, Merrill's 2nd battalion had pulled out to Wesu Ga and were trying to link up with the 3rd battalion south of Walawbum. On the 6th after heavy artillery bombardment, at 5:15pm an estimated two companies of Japanese in line of skirmishers, with heavy supporting fire, crossed the river. The American mortars continued their work; the automatic weapons held back until the Japanese were within fifty yards. Two heavy machine guns, which had a clear field of fire along the river bank, were especially effective. The Japanese failed, leaving many dead on the open ground east of the river and on the river banks. Orange Combat Team found its ammunition low, and so sent a request for more to Khaki Combat Team, which was about one hundred yards downstream. This was however just a diversionary attack, as most of the 18th division were escaping unmolested. Meanwhile elements of the 113th regiment were beginning to arrive to Lagang Ga and unfortunately an incident of friendly fire would occur. The remainder of the 38th Division and an American patrol met near Walawbum on March 7th. The recognition signal had been arranged as three bursts of three rounds each. This necessarily meant there would be firing when the Chinese and Americans met. When the tops of the American helmets, which looked not unlike the Japanese pot helmet when their brims were invisible, appeared through and over the brush, there was a brief exchange of fire in which three Chinese were wounded before identity was established. Such is the nature of coordinating multiple nations' armies during actions. General Sun and Merrill's marauders made a withdrawal beginning on the 7th in order to circle south and cut the Kamaing road again, this time even further south than before. Brown in the meantime had advanced to Ninghku Ga where he secured support from a battalion of the 64th regiment and launched a coordinated tank-infantry attack against Kumnyen. At around 3pm, the tanks and infantry assembled across the Kamaing road in two places, establishing a roadblock while the tanks moved out aggressively along the road to east and west. On the 8th, Brown's tanks then moved along the Kamaing Road and onto a trail that showed signs of heavy traffic. This allowed them to discover Tanaka's evacuation route, finally occupying Walawbum by the end of the day. Brown later recalled, "swarming with people from the 64th Infantry and the 113th Infantry who, to the tankers' great disgust, disputed the latter's claim to have taken Walawbum”. Though the 18th division had managed to escape Stilwells traps, the American-Chinese forces had still scored a well-earned victory. The road to Myitkyina was not open. The cost for this first series of victories in the North Burma Campaign were 802 Chinese dead and 1479 wounded, plus 530 undifferentiated casualties from the fall of 1943 to March 18, 1944. But the temporary American-Chinese collaboration did not presage a wider Sino-American synergy, and the Marauders found operating with their allies a major problem. One issue was that of disease: the Americans caught dysentery in large numbers and attributed this to the insanitary habits of the Chinese, especially their refusal to boil their water, or to wash their hands after using the latrines. The American K-rations also proved unsatisfactory and unsuitable for jungle warfare, as the Chindits soon discovered. Yet that is all for burma as we now have to jump over to New Guinea. The advance and pursuit upon Madang resumed on March 12th as the 2/12th Battalion found Ward's Village unoccupied while the 57th/60th Battalion secured the abandoned Saipa 2. The 57th/60th Battalion advanced swiftly by night and finally concentrated at Yokopi two days later. On the 16th, Brigadier Hammer then received a rather ambiguous order. Chilton had redefined the division's role "in the light of the present situation". While the 18th Brigade was to watch the 15th Brigade's immediate left flank from the high ground between the lower Evapia and Mene Rivers, and the commando troop at Faita the far left flank, the 15th Brigade would garrison Kankiryo Saddle, keep contact with the enemy along the Bogadjim Road and patrol along the Kabenau River towards Astrolabe Bay to join the Americans. Finally, the 15th Brigade would "provide a firm base for patrolling, by employing at the discretion of the commander, a force not exceeding one battalion forward of Kankiryo up to and inclusive of Yokopi". The order was ambiguous as far as the local commanders were concerned, and managed to overcome the ban placed by higher authority on any advance across the Finisterres to the coast: Hammer could not go beyond Yokopi but, at the same time, he was to maintain contact with the enemy along the Bogadjim Road—and they were already farther back than Yokopi. At this point Hammer decided that the supply route from the Saddle to the 57th/60th had to be developed. While the battalion patrolled and the enemy positions were bombarded, Saipa, Yokopi and Daumoina were built into staging areas. In the meantime, patrols from the 2/2nd Commando Squadron were harrying the Japanese from the left flank, successfully establishing a new patrol base at Jappa by March 17th. From there, the Commandos patrolled towards Aminik, Oromuge and Mataloi, which they finally found abandoned. Further east, the 58th/59th Battalion patrolled from the Nangapo and Yangalum areas towards Arawum and Kul 2 as they searched for the Americans at the Kabenau and Kambara Rivers. An accidental meeting had already taken place between the patrols of the two Allies. An American reconnaissance patrol was being towed in a rubber boat by a PT boat with the object of landing at Male and seeing if the Japanese were at Bogadjim. Off Garagassi Point, the tow rope broke and the Americans rowed to shore in their rubber boat which they deflated and hid in the bush near Melamu. Moving inland for about a mile they turned west and nearing the Kaliko Track met Lieutenant Norrie's patrol of the 58th/59th Battalion and accompanied the Australians to Barum, where the Americans were given supplies and a guide; moving via Wenga, they reached Jamjam on the 18th and found no signs of the enemy. On this day at noon about 30 Japanese with three machine-guns and a mortar attacked Norrie's position at Barum. The situation would have been serious had it not been for Sergeant Matheson and his two men who had remained behind at Kaliko and managed to bear the first brunt of the attack and warn those at Barum. The Americans moved on the 20th to Yangalum and next day set out for Kul 2, along almost exactly the same route as that taken by Brewster, who had departed on March 20. Brewster reached Kul 2 on March 21, where he joined the Americans from Saidor and remained with them until the 26th. In this period he went to Saidor where he met General Gill, giving him information about the area east of the Kabenau River and learning of the American intentions and dispositions. Brewster then returned to Yangalum having carried out an important and lengthy linking patrol—35 miles each way. On the other side, General Adachi ordered his 51st division to continue withdrawing towards Wewak and for the 20th division towards Hansa. There he sought for them to reorganize and receive around 5000 replacements from Palau each. By the 9th, both divisions had reached Bogia and the 20th division had established a new defense of the Hansa area. By mid March the 51st reached Wewak and would be able to assemble at Hansa. On March 20th, the bulk of the 41st division was ordered to withdraw towards Hansa as well. As a result of the invasion of the Admiralty Islands, the 18th army and 4th air army were now cut off from Rabaul. Thus they were reassigned to the 2nd Area Army under the command of General Anami Korechika with his HQ at Ambon. They would be responsible for the defense of the eastern part of the Dutch East Indies and the western portion of New Guinea. General Teramoto would also have to move his command from Wewak to Hollandia. Back at Yokopi, Hammer anticipated that the constant patrolling and bombardment had forced the Japanese to withdraw from their positions. On March 28th, patrols of the 57th/60th moved past Daumoina and effectively found the enemy gone. The reality, however, was that General Nakai and Colonel Matsumoto had been ordered to pull back and follow its parent unit towards Hansa. The remainder of the 41st Division were following suit over the next few days. Only a 5000-men detachment, deemed the Madang detachment formed around the 239th Regiment, under the command of General Shoge, was left behind to hold Madang and cover the Japanese withdrawal. Hammer ordered the 57th/60th to move forward with speed towards Yaula, yet the Australians would be stopped at the Kofebi River on March 30. In response, a company would be sent in an enveloping maneuver across the river, successfully getting through to Mabelebu although they would be unable to draw away the defenders. During the night, the surrounded company would then have to resist a number of enemy counterattacks, though these weren't really counterattacks but the Japanese trying to retreat towards Madang. The following day, with the enemy gone, the Australian patrols would rapidly set out north towards Yaula. Meanwhile, the 2/2nd Squadron's patrols, after securing Mataloi 1, were also advancing towards Yaula with speed. Finally, the commandos would successfully enter Yaula on April 4, with the 57th/60th's vanguard arriving soon after and then occupying Kwato by nightfall. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Bougainville counteroffensive proved the Japanese could still unleash brutal offensives and meet some success. However the level of success was not going to win the war let alone the fight over Bougainville. Within Burma the mixed national armies of the allies were finding some difficult working together, but they were gradually pushing the Japanese back.
In their recent earnings call, Ford Motor Company, led by CEO Jim Farley, released an earnings report laying out transformational changes yet to be fully recognized. "I think the best example, Rod, of that Ford, and I think people are just starting to get their heads around it, is the transformation of our Pro business," Farley stated on the call, noting the traditional lack of focus on this aspect of their operations. According to Farley, the company's strategic shift toward the Pro business segment has had significant impact. "When we changed the segmentation ... I was at Toyota for 25 years. I failed with Tundra to compete against F-150. I knew what Ford was good at. So fast forward to become the CEO, John and I talked about it, I was like, what would happen if we ... double down on this work business. And it has been a transformation." In addition to this reorientation, Ford has revealed their exploration into new industries such as plumbing, suggesting a willingness to extend beyond their traditional automotive spectrum. This indicates a readiness to adapt and innovate, which is further demonstrated by their impending expansion into European markets via the launch of the 1-ton Transit. Regarding Ford's position in the competitive market, Farley stated on the earnings call, "We have a new F-150. How will our competitors react because we are not the Ford that people used to think we are. We are not in all the segments. Our average price paid is like $51,000 in the U.S. We have a different portfolio than we've had in the past. So you got to look at our pricing bet relative to those segments." In this rapidly evolving market, Ford's strategy of transformation and adaptation is but part of their commitment to maintaining a strong market position. While the company reports focus on diversifying revenue streams, venturing into electric vehicle technology, and cultivating strategic partnerships, investors must keep in mind that these plans and the drive for innovation carry inherent risks and uncertainties. To ensure a realistic view of the company's standing, it is suggested that investors engage with official financial reports and statements issued by Ford Motor Company. These documents offer a comprehensive understanding of their strategies to strengthen their market position, which shareholders should consider against external factors and wider market trends. F Company info: https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/F/profile For more PSFK research : www.psfk.com This email has been published and shared for the purpose of business research and is not intended as investment advice.
ORIGINAL TEXAS BORDER ENFORCEMENT: 4/4: Red Sky Morning: The Epic True Story of Texas Ranger Company F by Joe Pappalardo (Author) https://www.amazon.com/Red-Sky-Morning-Ranger-Company/dp/1250275245/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr= Between 1886 and 1888, Sergeant James Brooks, of Texas Ranger Company F, was engaged in three fatal gunfights, endured disfiguring bullet wounds, engaged in countless manhunts, was convicted of second-degree murder, and rattled Washington, D.C. with a request for a pardon from the US president. His story anchors the tale of Joe Pappalardo's Red Sky Morning, an epic saga of lawmen and criminals set in Texas during the waning years of the “Old West 1909 BILL MCDONALD, TEXAS RANGER
ORIGINAL TEXAS BORDER ENFORCEMENT: 3/4: Red Sky Morning: The Epic True Story of Texas Ranger Company F by Joe Pappalardo (Author) https://www.amazon.com/Red-Sky-Morning-Ranger-Company/dp/1250275245/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr= Between 1886 and 1888, Sergeant James Brooks, of Texas Ranger Company F, was engaged in three fatal gunfights, endured disfiguring bullet wounds, engaged in countless manhunts, was convicted of second-degree murder, and rattled Washington, D.C. with a request for a pardon from the US president. His story anchors the tale of Joe Pappalardo's Red Sky Morning, an epic saga of lawmen and criminals set in Texas during the waning years of the “Old Wes 1907 NICARAGUAt
ORIGINAL TEXAS BORDER ENFORCEMENT: 2/4: Red Sky Morning: The Epic True Story of Texas Ranger Company F by Joe Pappalardo (Author) https://www.amazon.com/Red-Sky-Morning-Ranger-Company/dp/1250275245/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr= Between 1886 and 1888, Sergeant James Brooks, of Texas Ranger Company F, was engaged in three fatal gunfights, endured disfiguring bullet wounds, engaged in countless manhunts, was convicted of second-degree murder, and rattled Washington, D.C. with a request for a pardon from the US president. His story anchors the tale of Joe Pappalardo's Red Sky Morning, an epic saga of lawmen and criminals set in Texas during the waning years of the “Old West 1905 GUAYMAS, MEXICO
ORIGINAL TEXAS BORDER ENFORCEMENT: 1/4: Red Sky Morning: The Epic True Story of Texas Ranger Company F by Joe Pappalardo (Author) https://www.amazon.com/Red-Sky-Morning-Ranger-Company/dp/1250275245/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr= Between 1886 and 1888, Sergeant James Brooks, of Texas Ranger Company F, was engaged in three fatal gunfights, endured disfiguring bullet wounds, engaged in countless manhunts, was convicted of second-degree murder, and rattled Washington, D.C. with a request for a pardon from the US president. His story anchors the tale of Joe Pappalardo's Red Sky Morning, an epic saga of lawmen and criminals set in Texas during the waning years of the “Old West 1891 RIO GRANDE
#PREVIEW: #TEXAS: From a longer conversation with author Joe Pappalardo of his new work, RED SKY MORNING, re the mission of Texas Ranger Company F as the open range closed and the ranchers struggled with weather and herds and wrestlers, needing the Rangers to enforce fences and boundaries. More later. 1920 Texas Rangers Company D
On Tuesday, February 6th, 2024, Ford Motor Company announced its latest earnings. The company's CEO, Jim Farley, stated during the call, "Last year was a foundational year for our company. The impact of choices made regarding power and powertrains is evident, particularly for the F-Series. Our global hybrid sales increased 20% last year, and we project a further 40% increase this year. In the U.S., we're the number one and two best-selling hybrid trucks, with Maverick taking the lead, making us the third top hybrid brand behind Toyota and Honda." Farley also spotlighted the company's progress with their technology, mentioning, "BlueCruise has surpassed 150 million miles of hands-free use, with quarter-over-quarter growth up by 25%, and the gross margins for both BlueCruise and Ford Pro Intelligence are at 70%-plus." He acknowledged the firm's success in work vehicle production, specifically the new Super Duty, Transit, and Ranger models. In 2023, Ford saw an 11% rise in revenue, reaching an adjusted EBIT of $10.4 billion. The company also presented a healthy financial state with nearly $29 billion in cash reserves and over $46 billion in liquidity, demonstrating its resilience against potential market uncertainties. In 2023, the standout was the Ford Pro division, which includes both hardware and software services. It achieved a doubling of EBIT to $7 billion, attributed to steady demand, a desirable product mix, and a focus on profitability. Farley discussed the division's potential, saying, "This is a robust profitability; we've never had 20% attach rates, 0.5 million units of software with 50% margins. We are only just beginning to concentrate on Pro aftersales, where 20% of the profit is coming from attached services." The earnings call indicated a customer preference towards environmentally friendly and fuel-efficient options, as seen in the strong sales of Ford's hybrid vehicles. Consumer interest in advanced technology and digital connectivity in vehicles is also evident in the popularity of Ford's services such as BlueCruise and Ford Pro Intelligence. Although Ford did not reveal specific future plans or investments, its financial results confirmed the company's dedication to fiscal discipline, shareholder returns, quality improvements, and further development of the Ford Pro business segment. Ford is looking at profitability and cost reduction, with a particular interest in the electric vehicle sector. However, while the company appears to be heading in a positive direction, future prospects can only be ascertained through action and results. For more comprehensive details regarding Ford's strategic direction and future initiatives, refer to the full earnings call transcript or other public company materials. F Company info: https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/F/profile For more PSFK research : www.psfk.com This email has been published and shared for the purpose of business research and is not intended as investment advice.
Last time we spoke about the fall of Shaggy Ridge, some hardcore patrolling on New Britain and major planning for the invasion of the Marshalls. The Australians seized the Kankeiri saddle, the Prothero's, Crater Hill and countless other features until finally at last the Japanese had been dislodged from the area. Meanwhile over on New Britain, the Americans were expanding their perimeter and unleashing wave after wave of patrols, trying to figure out where the Japanese were concentrating. It was tireless work, without any good maps in a horribly difficult climate with menacing terrain. The commanders of the central, south and southwest pacific all met to finalize big plans, that would now involved the invasion of the Marshall islands. It seems Dougey boy MacArthur was delivered some setbacks for his grand advance to the Philippines, as the Central Pacific was stealing the drivers seat. This episode is Operation Flintlock: The Invasion of the Marshalls Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. In spite of General Douglas MacArthur's attempted hijacking of the strategic control over the Pacific campaign, by trying to have the US Navy's Central Pacific campaign pretty much aborted, it did not pan out. MacArthur had made multiple arguments against their Central plans, stating Nimitz choice of route was “time consuming and expensive in our naval power and shipping” which was really a self-serving argument flying in the face of actual evidence. MacArthur pointed out all the problems faced during the invasion of Tarawa, such as the high casualty rates. The Marines had jumped 2500 miles from New Zealand to hit Tarawa at the cost of 4 days of fighting. Yet Australian soldiers and American GI's would take nearly a year and a half, through nearly continuously fighting to make the 300 mile journey from Port Moresby to Madang. Operation Cartwheel proved to be extremely laborious, time consuming and costly in terms of materials and men. But from MacArthur's point of view the lives lost were largely Australian and perhaps as some Historians might point out “were politically expendable to a person like MacArthur”. Kind of a hit point to make, that one came from Francis Pike's Hirohito's War, go after him not me folks. It was also self evident the supply lines of ships from the west coast of the US to Nimitz Pacific fleet and their Marines, some 5000 or so miles from San Diego to Kwajalein atoll, was shorter than the long route going from the US west coast to Australia then to New Guinea, a colossal 9108 mile trip. By mid 1943 the supply line to MacArthur was nearly double that of Nimitz in distance with increased dangers of IJN submarines prowling about, though as I have said numerous times, the IJN only really figured out the capability of merchant hitting in the late years of the war. Well in spite of all of that MacArthur gave Brigadier-General Frederick Osborn and MacArthurs trusty lackey Sutherland going to Washington to fight on his behalf against the Joint Chiefs of Staff, they elected to commit themselves to the Central Pacific thrust. It had been a strategic decision based on logistical and strategy…well logic? The 1943 Cairo conference ended just as Tarawa was captured, thus driving the nail in the coffin so to say. The next target on the way to the Marianas was thus the Marshall islands, way back in the old days they were property of the German empire, that Japan had stolen with ease. Ever since 1938, the Japanese banned any non Japanese ships from the region, thus US intelligence was pretty lax on them. MAGIC intercepts began to give clues as to how the Japanese deployed their troops on the Marshall islands however. This led the allied war planners to leave some “to wither on the vine” like Wotje. It was decided the main target would be Kwajalein. The 380 mile lagoon made it one of the largest in the world, quite beautiful also. Some like Rear Admiral Turner, questioned the risks of going straight into the heart of the Marshall islands, calling the move “too aggressive and dangerous and reckless!” But Nimitz and Spruance were adamant, well this was before Tarawa. The bitter lessons learnt on Tarawa prompted Spruance to determine that “Kwajalein would be struck with violent, overwhelming force and swiftly applied”. For the invasion of the Marshalls, codenamed Operation Flintlock, the first phase was to be the capture of Kwajalein, earmarked by General Corlett's 7th division against the southern group of islands in the atoll that included Kawjalein. General Schmidt's 4th marine division would capture Roi-Namur and the northern islands in the atoll. Furthermore prior to these attacks, Colonel Sheldon's Sundance Landing Force would hit Majuro Atoll. Because of the experiences gained during the invasion of the Gilberts, a far greater quantity and variety of amphibious equipment had been made available to the Central Pacific forces. Now the attack force commanders would not have to rely on the faulty communications systems of battleships to maintain proper radio liaison between ship and shore and ship and air. Two newly constructed headquarters ships, each equipped with the latest developments in radio and radar gear and unburdened by gunfire support duties, were provided for the operation. Several improvements were also made in the techniques of softening up the enemy defenses before the first troops touched shore. The US Navy changed their bombardment tactics based on the experience at Tarawa and now used armor piercing shells and fired from closer ranges. These all added would increase the quantity and accuracy of firepower to be delivered before the invasion. To provide a last-minute saturation of the beaches, two new, or rather modified, forms of older types of amphibious equipment were also introduced. The first of these was the amphibian tank LVT-A, which was just the standard amphibian tractor equipped with extra armor plating and mounting a 37-mm gun housed in a turret. The second was the LCI gunboat, an LCI converted into a gunboat by the addition of three 40-mm guns and banks of 4.5-inch rocket launchers. Admiral Turner's plan called for extensive pre-landing bombardment both from surface ships and from aircraft. Most of the Marshall's airfields had been successfully neutralized by Admiral Hoover's aircraft over the prior months. To complete preliminary operations, Admiral Mitschers Fast Carrier force launched a heavy strike on January 29 and 30th. On the 30th, eight of Mitschers battleships, accompanied by about a dozen destroyers, were to deliver a dawn bombardment against Kwajalein Island and Roi-Namur. The object was to destroy aircraft, coast defense guns, and personnel, and to render the airfields temporarily useless. At the same time, two advance units of cruisers and destroyers from Turner's task force were to bombard the airfields at Wotje and Maloelap. These dawn bombardments were to be followed by air strikes against each of the objectives. After the strikes were completed the surface ships would again take up the bombardment and maintain a steady fire until about noon. Then on the 31st, initial landings would begin against Carlson (Enubuj), lying northwest of Kwajalein Island; Ivan (Mellu) and Jacob (Ennuebing) Islands, lying southwest of Roi-Namur. For southern Kwajalein, three other small islands in addition to Carlson were to be captured during the preparatory phase of the operation. These were Carlos (Ennylabegan), Carter (Gea), and Cecil (Ninni) Islands, all lying north of Carlson. On some of these islands artillery could be emplaced for the main assault. On February 1st, battleships, cruisers and destroyers would conduct a monster bombardment in support of the main landings and air strikes would begin 45 minutes before the men hit the beaches. There would be a cease to the carnage 25 minutes before to allow the smaller islands to deploy their artillery to help support the main assault. With this tremendous bombardment by aircraft, surface ships, and artillery, all to be executed before the first troops hit the shore line, it was hoped that the bitter experience of Tarawa would not be repeated. For the attack on Kwajalein Island, Corlett decided to land on a narrow front on the beaches at the western extremity, as the reef and surf conditions were more favorable there. He had at his disposal 79 amphibian tanks and 95 amphibian tractors that would transport the first 4 waves to hit the southern beaches. The first with great secrecy would be a pre-dawn landing against Carter and Cecil islands, by one platoon of the 7th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop. The reconnaissance troop was embarked on two high-speed transports (APD's), along with two platoons of Company B, 111th Infantry. After this the 17th regiment led by Col. Wayne C. Zimmerman would land on Carlos and Carlson islands. The 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry, would hit Carlos while the 2nd Battalion, 17th Infantry, hit Carlson. The 3rd Battalion, 17th Infantry was to be held in reserve, ready to go to the aid of either landing team. While the capture of Carlson Island was in progress, the division artillery, loaded for the most part on amphibious trucks, was to debark and proceed to a rendezvous area offshore. Upon a signal from the commander of the Carlson landing force, the guns were to be moved ashore and into position. This was all done to secure General Arnold's artillery, whom on the night of the D-day along the 145th field artillery battalions would deliver interdictory fire from Carlson on all the principal fortified areas of Kwajalein Island and place counter-battery fire on any enemy artillery that might be emplaced on Burton. They were also to fire general support missions for the infantry. Finally, the 184th on the left and 32nd Regiment on the right would land abreast and advance up the axis of the island. If things looked like they were going well enough and the reserve 17th regiment would not be necessary, they would instead capture the remaining islands of Beverly (South Gugegwe), Berlin (North Gugegwe), Benson, and Bennett (Bigej) Islands in the eastern chain. There was a hell of a lot of fire power they would face as well. On Kwajalein, 4 12.7-cm, dual-purpose twin-mount guns were divided into batteries of 2, one located at each end of the island. Each battery was protected by 7.7-mm. and 13-mm. machine guns along the nearby beaches. Near each gun were 2 150-cm. searchlights. In addition, the northern end of the island was guarded by a twin-mount dual-purpose 13-mm machine gun on the lagoon shore. Several 7.7-mm. machine guns were in position on the western end and other heavy machine guns were scattered about the center of the island, some mounted on wooden sleds for easy movement to critical points. On the ocean shore were 6 8-cm. dual-purpose guns, divided into 2 batteries of 3 guns each. One battery was east of the tank ditch and the other was opposite the center of the airfield. The first had a 360-degree traverse and could fire either to seaward or landward. The other formed the nucleus of a strongpoint composed of a semicircle of rifle pits facing the beach supported by one heavy and one 13-mm. machine gun, and also included an observation tower, a range finder, and a 110-cm. searchlight. 2 other 8-cm. guns were in position on the lagoon shore, and the blockhouse on the main pier (Nob Pier), which jutted out into the lagoon near the northern tip of the island, had a 13-mm. dual-purpose gun on its roof and firing ports on the ground floor allowing machine guns to fire in all directions. For the attack on Roi-Namur, Schmidt's 1st phase was to capture the 5 islets near Roi-Namur. The Ivan Landing Group was commanded by Brig. General James L. Underhill, consisting of the 25th Marines under Col. Samuel C. Cumming; the 14th Marines Artillery and Company D of the 4th Tank Battalion. They would seize Jacon and Ivan islands to allow the 3rd and 4th Battalions of the 14th Marine Regiment artillery to deploy. Then they would hit Albert, Allen and Abraham islands where the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 14th Marine Regiment artillery would deploy. For the main landings Schmidt chose to perform a orthodox amphibious maneuver, simply landing two regiments abreast on a broad front over the lagoon shore. The 23rd marines would hit Roi's red beach 2 and 3 and the 24th marines would hit Namur's Green beaches 1 and 2. The 3rd and final phase would see the capture of the remaining islands in the northern Kwajaleins. Now that was all for the Americans, but what about the defenders? Admiral Akiyama had recently been reinforced with a number of IJA units such as the 3rd South Sea Garrison from Wake; the 1st South Seas detachment from Mille and Jaluit and the 1st Amphibious mobile brigade from Eniwetok. The reinforcements were deployed mostly on the periphery, as Kwajalien, Jaluit, Maloelap and Wotje had sizable naval garrisons already. The hub of the Japanese military in the Marshalls was at Kwajalein and its main air base at Roi. If you pull out a map, which I do hope many of you do during this entire podcast series haha, especially for Burma it gets really confusing, trust me I know your pain. You can see Kwajalein lies far to the west, with Jaluit, Mille, Maloelap and Wotje kind of acting as buffers. If you were a Japanese commander you would most likely assume any invasion attempt would hit outer islands first and leave Kwajalein as the last one. A quote from one commander, Chikataka Nakajima makes this point "There was divided opinion as to whether you would land at Jaluit or Mille. Some thought you would land on Wotje but there were few who thought you would go right to the heart of the Marshalls and take Kwajalein.” The three most heavily defended islands were Roi-Namur, Kwajalein and Burton in that order of strength. The defenses of Roi-Namur were organized around a series of seven strong points, 4 on Roi and 3 on Namur, all on the ocean side. Starting from the southwest tip of Roi, the first was located along the southern shore of the west coast. The second and third were to the south and north of the northwest taxi circle. The fourth was on both sides of the wire and stone barriers next to the northeast taxi circle. The fifth, sixth, and seventh were on the northwest, north, and east tips of Namur, respectively. From the lagoon side the approaches were covered mostly by nothing heavier than 7.7-mm. machine guns. Wire entanglements were found at two points—on the beach around the northeast taxi circle on Roi, and on the narrow bit of land connecting Roi with Namur. The beach around the northeast taxi circle also boasted a tank obstacle in the form of large rocks jutting out of a rock wall. Anti-tank ditches had been dug throughout the two islands. On Kwajalein, there was a concrete sea wall along most of the ocean shore and around the northern and western ends of the island. The section at the northern end had posts set into it, probably to act as a tank barricade. East of the area cleared for the airfield was a tank ditch extending halfway across the island, and three smaller tank ditches ran between the ocean shore and the road in the vicinity of the airfield. The lagoon shore was protected by a two-strand barbed-wire fence at the water's edge. The large tank ditch was supported by trenches, rifle pits, and machine guns. At this point in the war, the Japanese tactical doctrine still stressed beach-line defense that would hinder a proper defense in depth. The Japanese doctrine to fortify beaches would gradually change as a result of the Gilbert-Marshall campaign. IJA General HQ research groups abandoned beach defenses for internal defenses to thwart naval and aerial bombardments, but also to favor concealed positions to thwart flamethrower and grenade attacks. Actually to side track just a bit, there is a book I rather like “The Battle for Okinawa” by Colonel Hiromichi Yahara. If you are interested in how some of the Japanese commanders decided to change to defense in depth, Colonel Yahara was a good case study and the book is interesting. Akiyama had roughly 5000 men on Kwajalein. 930 of these were IJA units, the 1st Company, 3rd Mobile Battalion, plus 2nd and 4th Companies of the 2nd Mobile Battalion of the 1st Amphibious Mobile Brigade. The IJA forces were led by Colonel Asu Tarokichi, commander of the 2nd Mobile Battalion. There also was 250 SNLF of the Yokosuka 4th; 1150 naval troops from the 61st Guard Unit and Akiyama's headquarters. The rest were not considered combat effective, mostly comprising laborers and logistical units. Most of these units were at Kwajalein itself, with some 345 troops and over 2000 air personnel of the 24th Air Flotilla at Roi-Namur. Three lookout stations were also established on Bennett, Carter and Carlos Islands while an air unit of the 952nd and 160 men defended Burton. By January 20th, all the preparations were complete in the Hawaiian islands for the grand invasion of the Marshalls. 2 days later, the task forces departed. At dawn on the 29th, the 4 task groups of Task Force 58 and the Neutralization Group arrived to their first assembly positions Aircraft carriers Enterprise, Yorktown, and Belleau Wood successfully neutralized Taroa while while Essex, Intrepid, and Cabot bombed and strafed Roi-Namur. Aircraft from Essex, Intrepid, and Cabot bucked northeasterly winds to bomb and strafe once more the important airfield at that base. Ninety-two enemy planes were based on Roi airfield when the attack developed. Command of the air was seized by American planes at the outset and after 8am, no enemy planes were seen airborne over Roi-Namur. Numerous hits were made on runways, hangars, fuel dumps, and gun positions. Additionally, carriers Saratoga, Princeton, and Langley sent multiple strikes against Wotje, managing to neutralize its airfield. Finally Admiral Sherman's carriers Cowpens, Monterey, and Bunker Hill launched strikes against Kwajalein. Her airfield and buildings were bombed on the first strike, then she was subjected to strafing and bombing. During the evening Admiral Sherman's group moved northwestward toward Eniwetok to be in position to launch an attack at dawn of D minus 1. It was not just the navy that smashed the Marshalls, the Army also got a taste. At Kwajalein one flight of seven B-24s dropped fifteen tons of bombs on Roi-Namur and three more tons on Kwajalein Island during the morning and early afternoon. As the carrier planes retired at dusk another seven heavy bombers arrived for a night attack, dropping twenty tons of bombs on Kwajalein Island. At Wotje, flying through heavy overcast, one flight of three B-24s dropped seven tons of bombs, causing fires and damaging the runways. A few hours later a flight of nine B-25s dropped three tons of bombs on the island in a low-level attack and strafed and sank a small cargo vessel in the lagoon. During this late attack carrier planes from the task force mistakenly intercepted the B-25s and shot down two before it was realized they were American planes. Maloelap, Jaluit, and Mille also received land-based attacks during the day. At Taroa, two and a half tons of bombs were dropped by B-25s, which then joined carrier planes in strafing the island. At Jaluit, attack bombers and fighters dropped seven tons of bombs and afterwards strafed the island. Mille was covered all day by twenty fighters, flying in flights of four. Planes that had been scheduled to strike these targets but that were unable to get through because of weather or mechanical difficulty flew over Mille on the way back to American bases in the Gilberts and dropped their bomb loads on the islands of that atoll.The Neutralization group shelled Wotje and Maloelap, leaving the last operational airfield on Eniwetok. Sherman's fighters and bombers hit the atoll during the morning of the 30th, destroying nearly all its buildings and runways, though a few aircraft managed to escape. The rest of the day would see more carrier strikes and surface bombardments against the Marshalls' atolls while the landing forces made their final approach towards Kwajalein. Meanwhile, Admiral Hill's attack group detached from the main task force, heading for Majuro Atoll. At 11pm 1st Lt. Harvey C. Weeks led a recon platoon on rubber boats to Calalin island, becoming the first Americans to land on any territory the Japanese had possessed prior to WW2. The rest of the recon company led by Captain James Jones landed on Dalap, Uliga and Darrit Islands. Finally, Majuro Island itself. They would find the Japanese had abandoned the atoll perhaps over a year earlier. At the same time Sheldon's landing force occupied Darrit and Dalop without any opposition and the 1st defense battalion soon arrived to take up garrison duties. To the northwest, the Destroyer transports Overton carrying Troop A and Manley carrying Troop B raced past Turners task force to hit Carter and Cecil islands. Troop B successfully landed on Carter at 6:20am, rapidly securing the island after killing her 20 defenders. Troop A accidently landed on Chauncey Islet at 5:45am and upon realizing they had landed on the wrong island, they left a detachment of 61 infantrymen and then re-embarked at 9:29am. Finally, Troop A landed on Cecil at 12:35pm, finding zero opposition there. On Chauncey, however, the Americans discovered a force of over 100 Japanese hidden in the islet's center. Half of the enemy force was killed but the Americans would eventually have to withdraw after losing two men. The desperate Japanese would continue to resist until eventually being annihilated a few days later. With the lagoon's entrance secured, Colonel Zimmerman transferred his two assault battalions to amphibious tractors and sent them towards Carlos and Carlson Islands. While Kwajalein, Burton and everly islands were under heavy bombardment, the 1st battalion, 17th regiment landed on Carlos unopposed at 9:10am. From there they quickly attacked the 25 man garrison. To their south, the 2nd battalion landed on the northeastern end of Carlson at 9:12am under some heavy artillery fire coming out of Kwajalein that was quickly suppressed by air and naval bombardment. The men expected fierce resistance, but the Japanese fled, leaving 21 Koreans to be taken prisoner. Honestly pretty good outcome for those poor Koreans. Then General Arnold landed his 5 artillery battalions who got their guns ready by nightfall. Further north, Brigadier Generals James Underhill began operations against Ivan and Jacob islands to secure even more artillery positions. After the preparatory bombardment the marines got aboard their amtracs with a lot of difficulty. Before the operation, landing team commanders had estimated that their debarkation interval would be about sixty minutes, but this did not pan out. Once the troops were loaded in their assigned landing craft they had to make their way through choppy seas to the LST area for transfer to amphibian tractors. At this juncture all semblance of control broke down. Landing craft were about two hours late in reaching the LST area. Choppy seas and a headwind were partly responsible for the delays. Boat control officers left the tractors in frantic search for the landing craft and failed to return in time to lead the LVTs to the line of departure. Tractors were damaged or swamped while milling around their mother LSTs waiting for the troops to show up. Radios in LVTs were drowned out. One LST weighed anchor and shifted position before completing the disembarkation of all its tractors. The elevator on another broke down so that those LVTs loaded on the topside deck could not be disembarked on time. In short, almost every conceivable mishap occurred to delay and foul up what, under even the best of circumstances, was a complicated maneuver. Despite the issues, by 9:17 the amtracs were surging forward while LCI gunboats fired rocket barrages. B Company of the 25th marines hit Jacobs at 9:52, easily overrunning the island within 15 minutes. Ivan island had a much rougher surf alongside bad reef conditions that slowed down the amtracs. Company D, 4th light tank battalion managed to land at 9:55am, with Company C of the 25th marines landing on the opposite side of the shore at 10:15am followed by Company A. They linked up and began advancing inland, rapidly destroying a token defense force and securing the entire island by 11:45. During the early afternoon, the 3rd battalion, 14th marines landed at Jacob Island aboard LVT's, while the 4th battalion landed on Ivan aboard LCMs. At this point the lagoon entrance was secured, so the 2nd and 3rd battalions, 25th marines re-embarked to land on Albert and Allen. Rough seas delayed them, but the marines were once again on the move. LCI gunboats performed rocket barrages as the 3rd battalion landed on Albert at 3:12, while the 2nd battalion hit Allen 3 minutes later. Both islets were quickly cleared, while G Company landed on the unoccupied Andrew island. The 3rd battalion then assaulted Abraham island at 6:24, securing it by 7:15. With that, the Americans had secured a chain surrounding Roi-Namur and the first phase of the operation was done. Now the Americans would perform the main landings. Late during the night, Arnolds artillery and Turner's warships bombarded Kwajalein and Burton while 3 destroyers kept up a barrage upon Roi-Namur. Under the cover of darkness, frogmen of Underwater Demolition Team 1 scouted Roi-Namur and UDT 2 scouted Kwajalein's beaches. These men made sure there were no obstacles or mines in the way of their landing objectives. This was the first use of UDT's during the Pacific War. Early on February 1st Kwajalein was hit with an unprecedented bombardment. During one period two shells per second were hitting specific targets or areas in the path of the assault troops. The 14-inch naval shells of the battleships were most effective in piercing and destroying reinforced concrete structures. From the cruisers and destroyers, 8-inch and 5-inch shells ploughed into bunkers and tore up the thick growth of pandanus and palm trees. All together that day, nearly 7,000 14-inch, 8-inch, and 5-inch shells were fired by supporting naval vessels at Kwajalein Island alone, and the bulk of these were expended against the main beaches before the landing. The field artillery on Carlson also joined in the preparatory fire. Its total ammunition expenditure against Kwajalein was about 29,000 rounds. The results of all this expenditure of explosives were devastating. The damage was so intensive that it is impossible to determine the relative effectiveness of the three types of bombardment. The area inland of Red Beaches was reduced almost completely to rubble. Concrete emplacements were shattered, coconut trees smashed and flattened, the ground pock-marked with large craters, coral ripped to splinters. From the carriers Enterprise, Yorktown, Belleau Wood, Manila Bay, Corregidor, and Coral Sea eighteen dive bombers and fifteen torpedo bombers struck the western part of Kwajalein Island while as many fighters strafed the area with machine guns and rockets. All together ninety-six sorties were flown from the carriers in support of the troop landing on Kwajalein Island. As one observer reported, "The entire island looked as if it had been picked up to 20,000 feet and then dropped.” After 36000 rounds of naval gunfire and artillery, along with sizable air attacks, pummeled the island, LCI gunboats were on the move, tossing rockets into the mix. At 9am, Turner unleashing his landing force. Colonel Curtis O'Sullivans 184th regiment headed towards Beach Red 1, while Colonel Marc Logie's 32nd regiment hit Beach Red 2. Each beach was covered by a strongpoint, though these were mostly obliterated, with only a few pillboxes surviving. Both regiments landed at 9:30am, finding weak opposition, allowing their artillery support to start smashing 200 yards ahead of their positions. The americans were met with light mortars and automatic fire from some surviving pillboxes, but many were able to take shelter behind the wrecked ruins of a seawall. Meanwhile as more Amtracs pulled up they were hampered by wreckage and debris, causing a congestion. The reefs also hindered where they could approach, but by 11:22 the first four waves of both battalions were ashore, all with 15 minutes. They then began to advance inland against light resistance. Logie's 1st battalion managed to reach the western edge of the west area by 11:30. Meanwhile O'Sullivan's 3rd Battalion came face to face with a network of several pillboxes still containing live Japanese in spite of the heavy preliminary bombardment. These were silenced in short order in a series of almost simultaneous actions in which many varieties of weapons were used. Two infantrymen of Company K, Pvt. Parvee Rasberry and Pfc. Paul Roper had landed near the left of Red Beach 1 and had run about 25 yards inland when they came under fire from one of the pillboxes in the area. Quickly taking shelter in a shell hole, they started lobbing grenades at the enemy position about fifteen yards ahead. The Japanese merely threw the grenades back and the volley kept up until a flame thrower was brought forward. That, too, proved ineffective; the flames only hit the box and bounced back. Finally, Private Rasberry got out of his foxhole, crawled to within about five yards of the pillbox and threw in a white phosphorus smoke grenade. This flushed several Japanese from their cover into open positions where they could be taken under rifle fire. Those who weren't hit ran back to the pillbox. Rasberry threw white phosphorous grenades until he had none left, by which time about eight of the enemy had been killed. At this juncture, T. Sgt. Graydon Kickul of Company L was able to crawl up to the pillbox and on top of it. He emptied his M1 rifle into it, killing the remainder of the Japanese inside. To make doubly certain that the job was done, an amphibian tank was then brought forward to fire both its flame thrower and its 37-mm. gun into the aperture. Meanwhile Logie's 1st battalion got within 250 yards of Wilma road by 12:20. An hour later they fell upon a network of pillboxes. To the north O'Sullivan's 3rd battalion ran into tough resistance again, but managed to link up with Logie's men at Wilma Road by 2:50pm. Behind the battalions were follow up battalions who mopped up the area and the reserves secured the beachheads. Logie and O'Sullivans men then fought their way to Kwajaleins airfield. Lucky for them the Japanese had not established a defensive line across the width of the island, instead the bulk of them retired eastward, for their commander Admiral Akiyama had run into an early tragedy. Akiyama had left his bunker to observe the front line and was killed by an artillery shell. At 3:25, the 1st battalion was relieved by the 2nd battalion who began attack against the strongpoint at Canary Some of these positions, which extended along each side of Wallace Road, were defended by Japanese who ducked and crawled through rubble heaps and bunkers in such a way that Lt. John L. Young, commanding Company E, became convinced that they were using connecting tunnels. For an hour the fighting persisted, but not more than ten enemy dead could be counted above ground. Company E continued through a litter of small works, moving so slowly that it was necessary to commit Company F, which undertook a flanking movement at the left. The maneuver was intended to cut the strong point off, but the company promptly ran into fire that slowed its advance to about fifty yards in thirty minutes. It then became clear that the whole movement had been stopped. The attack was consequently broken off at 1800 and defensive positions were organized for the night. To the north, O'Sullivan's 3rd Battalion ran into large underground shelters and defenses. Their advance was temporarily blocked by a fuel dump ignited by artillery fire, but they eventually pushed on another 500 yards before halting at 18:00 for the night. Meanwhile Logie's 2nd battalion broke off their attack halfway up the length of an unfinished runway and dug in for the night. By the end of February 1st, approximately 450 of the dead Japanese were counted in the zone of the 184th, and this regiment also was responsible for the capture of ten of the eleven prisoners taken. A large share of the enemy casualties was attributed to the heavy bombardment from ships and aircraft and from artillery based on Carlson. Estimates made by assault troops and by others, including doctors following the assault, indicated that the preparatory bombardment caused from 50 to 75 percent of all Japanese casualties on Kwajalein Island. It truly was a colossal bombardment. The Americans suffered 21 deaths and 87 wounded. Over on Roi-Namur, Admiral Conolly's LSTs entered the lagoon at first light to provide the amtracs an easier ride. Naval ships, artillery and aircraft began smashing the island. The marines saw some delays, but Colonel Colonel Louis Jones' 23rd Marines began their run to Roi at 11:50. Covering them, amphibian tanks sought hull defilade positions and concentrated their 37mm fire on the Wendy Point blockhouse, which could deliver flanking fire on the assault waves. The 1st and 2nd Battalions hit the beaches at 11:57 landed and immediately began to push 300 yards inland. Meanwhile Colonel Franklin Hart's 24th Marines bound for Namur were assigned the tractors of the 10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion that had participated in the preceding day's actions. The troubles that had beset the 10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion on D-Day were titanic. They had been launched too far from the line of departure in the first place. They had to buck adverse winds and unexpectedly choppy seas. Radio failures had tremendously complicated the problem of control, causing still further delay and much unnecessary travel through the water. All of this spelled excessive fuel consumption and many of the tractors ran out of gas before the day was over. For an LVT to run out of fuel in a choppy sea was usually disastrous. This model, the LVT-2, shipped water easily and its bilge pumps could not be manually operated. Thus, when the gasoline supply was gone the vehicle could not be pumped out and usually sank. In addition, many of the tractors of the 10th Battalion had not been released from their duties on D-Day until after dark, were unable to get back to their mother LSTs for refueling, and had spent the night on various outlying islands. Thus, as the hour for descending on Namur approached, the 24th Marines could muster only 62 of the 110 tractors that had been assigned to them and a hurried call was sent out for LCVPs to make up the difference. After some scrambling, the 2nd and 3rd battalions were reorganized and on their way to Namur. Hart's 2nd battalion hit Beach Green 2 at 11:55. They faced anti-tank ditches across the narrow beach, causing a large congestion. Hart's 3rd battalion made it to Green 1 at 12 and his K and I companies immediately advanced north. Meanwhile Jone's battalions secured Wendy Point facing no opposition. Encourage by the lack of resistance, the Marines began a rather disordered dash across the island. The stormed across the runway without orders and all guns blazing. Tanks and infantry hastily charged in the disorder, successfully driving the surviving and terrified Japanese north. Jones managed to gain control over his units and brought them back to assembly points to coordinate further attacks. The “re-assault” of Roi kicked off at 3:30 against a dazed enemy still trying to recover from the first attack. The 2nd battalion pushed north towards Estelle point while the 3rd battalion hit Nancy point. Enemy resistance was being rapidly annihilated, Estelle point was secure by 5pm, while Nancy Point would be taken by 6pm. After Nancy point was secured, Jones declared Roi secure. Meanwhile Harts F company unknowingly breached a torpedo warhead bunker and began throwing satchel charges into the hole. The structure was obliterated by a massive explosion that would detonate two other ammunition bunkers nearby. Blocks of concrete, palm trees, wood, torpedo warheads, and other debris rained down over the island, covering most of the island with smoke and dust. 20 Marines were killed and 100 were wounded. The enormous explosion disrupted the 2nd battalions assault, causing a delay. Hart's 3rd battalion enjoyed more success, but heavier resistance as the Japanese defenders took advantage of all the rubble and dense brush tossed around to hide behind. By 7:30pm, Hart ordered his men to dig in and during the night the Japanese began their classic infiltration tactics. The green troops amongst the men began indiscriminately firing throughout the night. The next morning, light tanks broke a Japanese counter attack, as the Marines advanced 50 yards. Hart then launched his main attack at 9am,with the 3rd Battalion rapidly securing Nora Point by 11:00am. Tank support for the 2nd Battalion arrived an hour late, but they still managed to push towards Natalie Point by 12:15, where the two battalions linked up. Mop up operations continued in the rear, but the island was declared secure at 2:18. For their first operation, Schmidt's 4th Marine Division suffered 206 killed, 617 wounded and 181 missing. 3472 Japanese would be found dead, with 51 captured and 40 Korean laborers surrendered. To the south, after aerial, artillery and naval bombardment, Corlett launched a tank supported attack at 7:15am. O'Sullivans 2nd battalion advanced north against weak resistance while Logie's 2nd Battalion continued to fight through the Canary strongpoint. Advancing through destroyed pillboxes with tanks at the forefront, O'Sullivans men were able to reach Carl Road on the eastern end of the airfield by 10:40am. Meanwhile Logie's men reduced the Canary and advanced rapidly until they reached the deadly Cat strongpoint. Here they faced tiers of well-concealed defensive works, taking many lives until they also reached Carl Road at 10:40. The Americans were now facing the main defensive system of the island. In front of it lay a deep tank trap, connected to long rifle trenches. Beyond this was anti-tank ditches and an elaborate organized set of defensive positions called Corn strongpoint. They were in for a hell of a time. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Operation Flintlock went off with a terrifying bang seeing the combined firepower of land, air and sea tossed against the Marshall islands. The Americans had made easy and quick work of the smaller islands, but now we're face to face with a truly formidable defensive position that was sure to cause them real headaches.
WHEN LEGEND BECOMES FACT, PRINT THE LEGEND: 1/4: Red Sky Morning: The Epic True Story of Texas Ranger Company F by Joe Pappalardo (Author) https://www.amazon.com/Red-Sky-Morning-Ranger-Company/dp/1250275245/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr= Between 1886 and 1888, Sergeant James Brooks, of Texas Ranger Company F, was engaged in three fatal gunfights, endured disfiguring bullet wounds, engaged in countless manhunts, was convicted of second-degree murder, and rattled Washington, D.C. with a request for a pardon from the US president. His story anchors the tale of Joe Pappalardo's Red Sky Morning, an epic saga of lawmen and criminals set in Texas during the waning years of the “Old West.” 1920 DALLAS
WHEN LEGEND BECOMES FACT, PRINT THE LEGEND: 2/4: Red Sky Morning: The Epic True Story of Texas Ranger Company F by Joe Pappalardo (Author) https://www.amazon.com/Red-Sky-Morning-Ranger-Company/dp/1250275245/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr= Between 1886 and 1888, Sergeant James Brooks, of Texas Ranger Company F, was engaged in three fatal gunfights, endured disfiguring bullet wounds, engaged in countless manhunts, was convicted of second-degree murder, and rattled Washington, D.C. with a request for a pardon from the US president. His story anchors the tale of Joe Pappalardo's Red Sky Morning, an epic saga of lawmen and criminals set in Texas during the waning years of the “Old West.” 1943 DALLAS MORNING NEWS PROOFREADING
WHEN LEGEND BECOMES FACT, PRINT THE LEGEND: 3/4: Red Sky Morning: The Epic True Story of Texas Ranger Company F by Joe Pappalardo (Author) https://www.amazon.com/Red-Sky-Morning-Ranger-Company/dp/1250275245/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr= Between 1886 and 1888, Sergeant James Brooks, of Texas Ranger Company F, was engaged in three fatal gunfights, endured disfiguring bullet wounds, engaged in countless manhunts, was convicted of second-degree murder, and rattled Washington, D.C. with a request for a pardon from the US president. His story anchors the tale of Joe Pappalardo's Red Sky Morning, an epic saga of lawmen and criminals set in Texas during the waning years of the “Old West.” 1943 DALLAS MORNING NEWS LINOTYPE
WHEN LEGEND BECOMES FACT, PRINT THE LEGEND: 4/4: Red Sky Morning: The Epic True Story of Texas Ranger Company F by Joe Pappalardo (Author) https://www.amazon.com/Red-Sky-Morning-Ranger-Company/dp/1250275245/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr= Between 1886 and 1888, Sergeant James Brooks, of Texas Ranger Company F, was engaged in three fatal gunfights, endured disfiguring bullet wounds, engaged in countless manhunts, was convicted of second-degree murder, and rattled Washington, D.C. with a request for a pardon from the US president. His story anchors the tale of Joe Pappalardo's Red Sky Morning, an epic saga of lawmen and criminals set in Texas during the waning years of the “Old West.” 1943 DALLAS MORNING NEWS AP ROOM
Last time we spoke about the planning for operation Galvanic and the battle of Sattelberg. The Americans were finally going to make their thrust into the central pacific with operation Galvanic. Admiral Raymond Spruance was given command of the Central Pacific Force and began building his war machine. The Americans would be employing a arsenal of new toys to hit the Gilbert Islands. Meanwhile the Japanese did everything they could to fortify the Gilberts, Marshalls and Carolines for the incoming American offensives, they would make them pay with blood for every island. Over in Green Hell the Australians were advancing up the Sattelberg road seizing Green Ridge, Coconut Ridge and other features. General Katagiri was once again on the defensive and it was only a matter of time before Sattelberg was under siege. Today we are going to cover all of this and more! This episode is The Bloody Invasion of the Gilberts Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. Last week we went through in depth the planning behind Operation Galvanic. The time had finally come to invade the Gilberts islands. To soften up the islands, carrier-borne airstrikes were made against the Gilberts and Marshalls. One of the major impacts of the raids in September and October was the evacuation of aircraft from Tarawa. Just before the raids there had been three air installations in the 3rd Special Base Force area; two airfields at Nauru and one at Tara, with a seaplane base at Makin. One of the duties assigned to these installations was to maintain patrols in the southeast corner of the Central Pacific. Patrols from Nauru covered the area south of the island, patrols from Kain covered the east and patrols from Tarawa the southeast between the other two. Yet after the removal of so many aircraft from Tarawa, now Makin had to assume full responsibility for patrolling the Gilberts area. By November there were only four amphibious reconnaissance planes left at Makin and even worse they had the dual mission of reconnaissance and anti-submarine patrol. Thus in other words there were not enough eyes on lookout. On November 10th, Admiral Spruance led out his Central Pacific force from Hawaii enroute for Tarawa aboard his flagship the heavy cruises Indianapolis. The Northern attack force, northern carrier group and interceptor carrier group all departed from the Hawaiian islands simultaneously, but they would not be traveling together. The two carrier groups moved in a parallel course followed by the Northern attack force at around 300 miles to their northwest. The two routes of approach would change around 800 miles east of the Gilberts with the Northern attack force turning to meet them. As the force made its way, Spruance warned “If … a major portion of the Japanese fleet were to attempt to interfere with Galvanic, it is obvious that the defeat of the enemy fleet would at once become paramount … the destruction of a considerable portion of the Japanese naval strength would … go far towards winning the war …” Even within the Navy there were critics of Operation Galvanic. While Spruance was taking the 5th fleet along with 30,000 marines, Vice Admiral John Towers grumbled “Spruance wants a sledgehammer to drive a tack.” The battle for Tarawa would be one of the most controversial engagements of the Pacific war. Over at Efate, Admiral Hill's Southern force departed on November 13th to rendezvous with Turner by the 18th. On November 15th, the Relief carrier force consisting of two carriers, 3 cruisers and 4 destroyers departed Espirtu Santo and the New Hebrides. They were a last minute add-on, heading towards Nauru. Thus the southern carrier group and southern attack force moved parallel to another to rendezvous with the rest by the 18th. During the two days before the landings, both the navy and army aircraft delivered last minute airstrikes. At 3am on the 18th, Admiral Pownalls task force launched 18 fighters, followed 3 hour later by 20 more fighters then at intervals of 2-3 hours, dive bombers, torpedo bombers and more fighters. All day long these aircraft strafed and bombed Nauru. By the end of the day, 90 tons of bombs had been dropped. The pilots claimed the installations on the island were in ruins, a Japanese ship was a burning wreck and 3-4 medium bombers were destroyed on the ground. The next day saw the same carrier attack with the help of land based planes from the 7th air force bombers. The airfields on Nauru were hit, shipping as well and Nauru was thought to be neutralized. On the 19th, the interceptor carrier group of Admiral Pownalls task force launched a series of air strikes against Jaluit and Mille. Over 130 tons of bombs were dropped on them. Power stations at both atolls were destroyed, hangers burned down, buildings in ruins. The runways looked unserviceable at Mille and 3 vessels in her lagoon were heavily damaged, alongside 7 grounded aircraft destroyed. On that same day, 19 b-24's from Nukufetau and Funafuti dropped 10 tons of bombs on Tarawa causing fires and damaging her airfields. 12 more B-24s from Nanomea dropped 23 tons of bombs on Makin. Aircraft from the Northern and southern carrier groups added 95 tons of bombs on Makin and 69 tons on Betio island. One enemy plane was shot down and 3 were hit on the ground near Tarawa. Before noon on the 19th, Southern Carrier groups cruisers destroyers moved in closer to Tarawa to bombard the ground forces between the air strikes. One of the most important effects of the heavy air raids was getting the Japanese to waste a considerable amount of their ammunition against the aircraft. At Tarawa the Japanese expended an estimated 1437 rounds of 127mm AA, 1312 75mm, 51160 13mm, 46 8 inch and 104 14cm ammunition. At Makin it was perhaps nearly 10,000 rounds of 13mm. The loss of the 13mm machine gun ammunition would hurt the Japanese particularly hard since it was the base weapon for the ground defenses. Shortly before 11:30pm on the 19th the convoy entered the 17 mile wide channel between Maiana and Tarawa Atolls. The ships assumed positions west of Betio. Transports took up their debarkation positions and fire support ships moved into shore for another massive bombardment. At dawn on 20 November, the USS Maryland and Colorado, sister dreadnoughts from World War I of the Colorado Class, laid down a barrage of fire upon the defenders of Betio. It provided a measure of revenge for the USS Maryland, which had been damaged during the attack on Pearl Harbor. Their combined fire power of sixteen 16-inch guns was able to quickly knock out three of the four 8-inch guns defending Betio both from the lagoon-side to the north and the open sea to the south and west. A fortunate hit on one of the Japanese guns' ordnance stores sent up a massive fireball. Rear Admiral Howard Kingman, responsible for planning the bombardment of Tarawa, would tell the press aboard his ship, “Gentlemen, it is not our intention to wreck the island. We do not intend to destroy it. Gentlemen … we will obliterate it.” The air and naval barrage of the island would last 3 hours. Aboard the USS Ashland an officer boasted “They'll [the Marines] go in standing up. There aren't fifty Japs left alive on the island.” Lt Colonel Herbert Amey leading the 2nd battalion, 2nd marines boasted to his staff “As we hit the beach the planes will be strafing very close in front of you to keep the Nips down until you get in there and knock off what's left of them. I think we ought to have every Jap off the island—the live ones —by the night of D-Day.” Despite the incredible firepower, Colonel David Shoup leading the assault troops shared some concerns with Robert Sherrod working for the Time and Life magazine “What worries me more than anything is that our boats may not be able to get over that coral shelf that sticks out about 500 yards. We may have to wade in.” Colonel ‘Red Mike' Edsons went on to say of the upcoming battle “The enemy must endeavor to hold it and make sure its capture is as costly to us as possible. This will be the first attempt to defend an atoll … as it is our endeavor at seizing one.” Before dawn the Marines woke up to a last meal of steak and eggs with fried potatoes and coffee. They all gave a final check of their combat kits, their M-1 Garand's, bayonets, 3 days of rations, water, the bedding, grenades, 125 bullets, gas masks, toiletry items, 3 pairs of socks and underwear, their entrenching tool, first aid kits and the most important item, their cigarettes. As the marines moved to their debarkation stations, military chaplains passed through the troops offering last minute homilies. “God Bless you—and go out there and bring glory to our Corps,” . Father Francis Kelley from Philadelphia and veteran of Guadalcanal ended his service with, “God Bless you and God have mercy on the Japanese.” At 6:03am the transports began lowering their boats. At 6:15am the carrier borne Hellcat fighters, Avenger and Dauntless from the USS Essex and Bunker Hill began to strafed and bomb the western beaches. At 6:40 the aircraft began departing as the battleships, cruisers and destroyers opened fire. The damage from the aerial and naval bombardments was considerable. In the immediate region of the main beaches and eastward side, little real damage was inflicted. Coconut trees, native hurts and dummy gun positions took a lot of the hits. In the area of the west tank barrier, neither the ditches nor log barricades took much damage. Just east of the main tank trap was a trench system running to the beach, this area was smashed up pretty good. One trench received a direct hit from a 2000-pound bomb which, in the words of Admiral Turner, "considerably scrambled the trench, Japs and trees for some distance." 62 enemy dead were later counted in this one area, most of whom were the victims of a combination of concussion and air bursts. In the area south of Yellow Beach and east to the East Tank Barrier all buildings were reported destroyed. Three 80-mm. antiaircraft positions at the base of King's Wharf and two light tanks revetted to act as pillboxes were severely damaged. 41 enemy dead were counted, of whom 25 were apparently killed by concussion from heavy bombs. At 8:25 the naval bombardment ended and more aircraft came in strafing. While the aircraft strafed, the 165th regiment began loading onto LCVPS and amphibian tractors carried men of the 105th regiment. At 8:15 the tractors started to head for the beach while firing rockets and machine guns against what they assumed were enemy positions. At 8:31 the tractors hit the beach and the men began to scramble ashore. Beach red 1 and 2 were quickly occupied forming the first beachhead. Following the tractors were the first three waves of landing craft at about 5 minute intervals. They were met with unfriendly studded reefs and coral boulders about 40 yards offshore. Some of the landing craft were unable to slip past the larger boulders, some were broached, stranded or forced to pull back out to sea. The failures of these landings would lead Rear Admiral Richmond Turner to create the Underwater Demolition Teams (UDT) a precursor to the US Navy Seals. The tanks were waterproofed for the landings, and managed to roll off the ramps into water. The men struggled in swells sometimes over their heads and sought cover at the edge of the beach. At best, only three boats could be landed at one time, and the fifth wave was not able to get ashore until 10:00, over an hour behind schedule. Facing the marines was 798 men led by Lt Seizo Ishikawa, the commander of the 3rd Special Base force Makin detachment. 284 of his men were from his detachment, alongside them were 100 air personnel, 138 men from the 11th construction unit and 276 men of the 4th fleet construction department detachment made up mostly of Korean laborers. They had established 3 defensive areas. The aviation personnel took up the east, the 3rd special base men the middle and the Korean laborers the west. Thus only 284 combat troops with the rest being support staff would face the onslaught. Ishikawa had established a perimeter defense around the seaplane base on the lagoon shore. They had three dual purpose 8cm guns at King's wharf with a few machine guns. Running from the lagoon to the beach were two anti tank barriers. They were wide ditches with coconut log barriers going around 13 feet wide and 5 feet deep. Numerous anti tank guns were around them, behind were concrete pillboxes, machine gun positions, rifle pits and trenches. There were also trip wires with booby traps laid everywhere someone might creep up. Luckily for General Smith, Ishikawa's defensive positions were between the two tank barriers as the Japanese had predicted the invasion of the island would be made there. Over on Betio island were 4836 men led by Admiral Keiji Shibazaki. 1122 men were from the 3rd special base force, 1247 from the 111th construction unit, 970 of the 4th fleet construction department detachment and 1497 Sasebo 7th SNLF. The Sasebo 7th were known as the Rikusentai, elite marine paratroopers modeled on the German Luftwaffe paratroop brigades. During the Pacific war, 50,0000 Rikusentai troops were deployed. They work dark green uniforms modeled on the German paratrooper counterpart, dark-brown belts and harnesses with white anchor patches. Recruits were forced to learn by heart Emperor Meiji's 1882 Imperial rescript to soldiers. The war song Umi Yukaba was also their prophetic line “Across the sea, corpses in the water … I shall die for the Emperor.” As Marine historian, Colonel Joseph Alexander concluded in his work, Utmost Savagery, three days of Tarawa in 1995 “American expeditionary forces would not encounter a more sophisticated series of defensive positions on any subsequent island until they reached Iwo Jima in 1945. Yard for yard, Betio was the toughest fortified position the Marines would ever face.” The Americans were about to see Japan's “water edge” strategy. The directive was simply “concentrate all fires on the enemy's landing point and destroy him at the water's edge.” Rear Admiral Keiji Shibazai was an aggressive young officer who demanded his troops build defenses to “withstand assault by a million men for a hundred years.” Yet it was his predecessor Rear Admiral Sichero who had 50 pillboxes and bunkers constructed across an island that was just 800 yards at its widest points and two miles in length. Shibazaki added kettle mines to impede landing boats or direct them to his kill zones. Double barbed wire fences were dug into coral shallows encircling the island 50 to 100 yards from the shore. Yet as noted by Warrant Officer Kiyosha Ota the only Japanese officer to survive the battle for Tarawa, rear admiral Shibazaki could not get a cargo ship to bring over cement and steel to reinforce to build his planned 4500 tetrahedrons to surrounded the island nor reinforce countless pillboxes. Nonetheless Betio was bristling with a armada of guns. Betio held 4 8 inch guns, 4 14cm, 4 12.7cm, 6 8cm, 10 75mm mountain guns, 6 70mm howitzers, 8 7cm dual purpose guns, 9 37mm field guns, 27 12mm guns, 4 13 mm guns and 7 tanks with 37mm guns. Betio was a fortress full of steel, concrete and coconut log emplacements, the entire island was organized for battle. Within their defensive positions the Japanese had bombproof ammunition and personnel shelters in depth. The allies would be facing beach guns, anti-tank ditches, beach barrices, numerous obstacles and booby traps. Tarawa would be the most heavily defended atoll ever invaded by allied forces in the Pacific. H hour, the landing of the first wave had been scheduled for 8am on November 20th, but Admiral Hill's transports had run into some problems. They arrived to the scene around 5:50am and began lowering their boats, but it turned out they were too far south and in range of the enemy's coastal guns. The Japanese opened fire on them forcing them back to the designated positions at the lagoon entrance. American warships meanwhile began bombarding the Japanese coastal guns and positions. The airstrikes arrived a bit late to the scene to add their payloads to the mix. Meanwhile two minesweepers the Pursuit and Requisite and two destroyers, Ringgold and Dashiell fought their way into the Tarawa lagoon to sweep for mines. The Japanese coastal guns fired upon them, seeing Ringgold suffering moderate damage from 5 inch gunfire. The choppy seas delayed the arrival of the amphibian tractors, thus H hour was moved to 9am. In the meantime at least one 8 inch coastal gun and two 120mm anti-aircraft batteries had been neutralized by the naval gunfire, and just about everything above ground or in open pits, like personnel, bombs, trucks and munitions were mostly likely destroyed. The camouflage screens over dugouts were wiped away and Shibasaki's network of telephone wire, most laid above ground was obliterated, thus his system of communication was paralyzed. Despite all of this the damage was not nearly enough. Along the beaches were rows of pillboxes, some concrete, steel and coconut made. At Red beaches 2 and 3 there were at least 5 machine guns pointing towards where the troops would land over a reef towards the shore. As Admiral Hill put it, "that was five too many." By 8:55am the tractors were still late, but Hill ceased all naval gunfire anyway allowing them to begin their approach. The volume of intensity of fire grew as the boats motored in towards the landing beaches. Shibasaki's 75mm field guns and 37mm anti-tank guns were positioned perfectly to hit the incoming boats. Neither the amtracs nor the Higgin boats had enough armor to stop the shells. William Rogal's boat took a 37mm shell to her bow and Rogal recalled “the force of the explosion threw his body to the rear of the amtrac, showering everyone on the port side with blood and brains.” As Lt Lillibridges boat came under similar fire, the shells pierced their starboard and port sides simultaneously forcing the men to toss themselves on the flat bottom. Light mortars showered them all sending shrapnel into several marines. Most of the first wave boats headed towards Red beach 1, in a cove tucked between the pier and northwestern point of the island. The approached to red beach 1 held a significant amount of crossfire by weapons of various calibers. The men began to hit the beach at 9:10am. Landing ashore was the 3rd battalion, 2nd marines who were met with tremendous fire. The marines quickly ran into a log barricade. Some of their tractors were smashed up and burning dead in the water. If those inside them were still alive they climbed over the sides to try and wade ashore. The vehicles that made it onto land soon were halted by the log barricade seen marines jump over under machine gun fire. K Company took so many casualties they were unable to move past the log barricade and now had to lie in an exposed area under constant fire. By 11am K company would push a few men over the coconut barrier, but by this point the two leading companies had suffered 50% casualty rates. Reserve company L led by Major Michael P Ryan were just landing to the east and would lose 35% of their strength before even touching the each. A platoon of M4 Shermans attached to the 3rd battalion were tossed into the water but 4 of them got stuck in potholes in the coral reef and drowned out, only 2 tanks actually made it to the beach. Meanwhile at 9:22 the 2nd battalion, 2nd marines also landed in chaos and confusion at Red Beach 2. Company F was to hit the left while company E took the right and company G would act in support. Similar to Red Beach 1, a 4 foot high log barricade had been constructed to form a sea wall. Most of the barricade lay 20 yards from the waters edge, leaving a narrow open strip of deep coral sand for the marines to traverse. Numerous pillboxes and shelters lay around the barricade in intervals. Rogal's amtrac headed to Red beach 2 through mortar bursts that showered his men with shrapnel. When the boat grounded on the sand Rogal shouted “Lets go!” and the men went over the side through machine gun fire. Rogal rushed forward and could see above the seawall to the left a machine gun emplacement, it was one of the major strong points and it would kill roughly 300 marines that day. The amtracs drove onto the beaches and lowered their ramps with most of the first wave units making it to the seawall providing some shield from enemy fire. However going any further was near suicide, a few brave souls climbed over and were shot or wounded. Men sat crouched around the wall with their heads down waiting for tanks and air support. The volume of Japanese mortar, artillery and automatic fire was tremendous. F company was decimated, but managed to grab the left half of the beach near the pier, digging in on the coral sand. E Company suffered heavy casualties and the reserve G company landed in the center and immediately pinned down. As the men were huddled along the coconut barrier they began systematically eliminating enemy positions that jutted out onto the beach. Further to the east, at 9;17am the 2nd battalion, 8th marines of Major Henry Crowe began landing at red beach 3. They were backed up by 4 medium tanks of the 2nd tank battalion, 3 of the tanks would be put out of action within 2 hours. The marines at red beach 3 enjoyed more success than the other thanks to additional naval bombardment support that had lasted just until 7 minutes of their landing. They suffered just 25 casualties as the rapidly burst through the coconut barricade by driving LVTs through it. Company E led the way continuing as far inland as the triangle formed by the main airstrip and taxiways. Colonel David Shoups 2nd marines were in dire trouble at Red Beach 2 and had to commit the reserve 1st battalion who landed there and were ordered to work their way west towards red beach 1in the hopes of aiding the 3rd battalion. By 11am, two companies in amphibious tractors came over and suffered the same fire that had decimated the other waves, but managed to get their men ashore. When General Smith heard about Shoups call for reinforcements he also sent the reserve 3rd battalion, 8th marines to relief their right flank. Boated over in LCVPs, the battalion were halted by the reef line and forced to wade ashore under heavy fire during the afternoon. Supply barges were unable to reach the beaches, forcing the reserve troops to carry the most vital supplies. Colonel Shoup had radioed the transported intermittently throughout the day asking for more ammunition ,water and medical supplies, but these calls just caused more confusion amongst the shipping. The transport commanders had been tossing boat after boat carrying supplies, but they had no real picture of the situation between their boats and the beach. Captain Henry Knowles would end up sending Major Ben Weatherwax ashore just to determine what the supply situation was. It would literally take until dawn to get a complete picture, that picture being that Shoup had received virtually none of the supplies supposed to be dispatched to him. Additionally two M4 shermans were brought up to help the battered 3rd battalion, 2nd marines who were driving across the island towards the south shore. The marines hit shelter to shelter making steady progress. The tanks got within 300 yards of the south shore when 40mm gunfire knocked them both out. The progress allowed Major Michael Ryan to discover that part of Green Beach, on the western coast of Betio was available for landing reserves. Unable to relay this to Shoup, he ultimately had to pull out and dig in to form a defensive position. While the Americans were suffering communication problems, the Japanese had a much worse one. The naval bombardment had destroyed their communications lines to the Japanese HQ, preventing Rear Admiral Shibazaki to lead, but that problem was soon solved. It was solved when a 5 inch air burst shell fired from either RInggold or Dashiell hit his HQ killing him and all the senior officers. The last message Shibazaki received before his death was from Emperor Hirohito “you have all fought gallantly. May you continue to fight to the death. Banzai”. Shibazaki had planned to launch a counterattack, but now his forces were for the first critical two days of the battle leaderless, demoralized and uncoordinated. Concurrently the 8th marines were fighting to hold the triangle position they acquired under heavy attacks from the Japanese. F Company was in a brutal fight around the Burns-Philp Wharf facing a Japanese counterattack supported by tanks. The buildings were all ablaze as tanks and flamethrowers were firing upon everything they could. By nightfall the Japanese counterattack failed. To their right Shoups 2nd marines were unable to organize a proper attack because their forces were all over the place. They held a pinned down toehold around the beach, but many units had penetrated some 125 yards inland and no pockets were fighting all over. Throughout the night, men were frantically carrying supplies ashore, but few supplies were actually reaching the beaches. There was an enormous failure in communications. Aboard the USS Maryland, the only information General Julian Smith was receiving came from reports of observers in planes, intercepted radio messages and a few direct reports from Colonel Shoup. By 1:43pm Smith ordered General Hermle to go to the end of the pier and get an estimation of the situation ashore. At 3:10 Hermle tried the best he could to relay the information but couldn't get through. Hermle recommended the 1st battalion, 8th marines be committed to Red Beach 2, but this message never made it to Smith. Meanwhile Smith ordered Hermle to take command of the troops ashore, but this message never reached him. At 4:25 Smith ordered Colonel Hall, command of the 8th marines to land on the eastern beaches, but he also never received the message so most of his men spent the night floating. Luckily by 8:19pm Colonel Hall received a message and landed at Red Beach 2, whereupon he didn't receive any further orders. Over at Makin, Admiral Turner landed the 1st and 3rd battalions, 165th regiment. General Ralph Smiths plan called for the rapid capture of Flink point and Ukiangong Point, along with the occupation of the area east of Red Beaches to the first beachhead line around 1300 yards inland. The 1st battalion would hit Flink Point and the left half of the beachhead line. The 3rd battalion would hit Ukiangong village and Point and was responsible for the right half of the beachhead line. The 1st battalion advanced, overcoming some barbed wire, log barricades and an undefended observation tower. The3rd battalion made equal progress finding little resistance. By 10:30am the beachhead line was secured, Company A and Detachment Y had been dispatched northward to occupy Flink Point, L company with Detachment X were turning south to take Ukiengong Village and to clear the point beyond it. General SMith expected some resistance at Ukiangong, but it with the point were taken unopposed. Therefor Smith elected to establish artillery positions there. Flink Point was taken by 12:40, marking the operation quite an easy success. After receiving word at 8am that the Kotabu detachment had taken the island without opposition, Turner decided to go ahead with the landings on Yellow Beach. At 10:05am the landing forces advances towards Yellow Beach. The destroyers MacDonough and Phelps began a bombardment using their 5 inch guns. The first wave of 16 amphibian tractors began approaching as they fired rockets against the beach. Following up would in a minute was the second wave of 8 LCMS carrying medium tanks, followed two minutes later by the third wave, 7 LCMs carrying medium tanks, then another 2 minutes after was the fourth wave carrying two LCVPS with troops and 4 LCMS with light tanks. The next four waves would consist of LCVPS carrying the bulk of the assault troops and a bulldozer. At 10:25 the tractors were around 600 yards off the beach when the two destroyers ceased their firing to allow a last minute strafing run by carrier planes. As the approached, the men in the tractors crouched low to avoid the rain of bullets that began at around 500 yards. At 10:41 they hit the beaches and one amphtrack ran up the seaplane ramp on Kings Wharf. Enemy shellfire struck two amphtracks killing 5 men and wounding 12. One lone tractor lost control and drove straight across the island toward the ocean shore, directly through the main Japanese defenses. It ended up in a shell crater with two of its crew killed by enemy machine gun fire, but the others managed to jump into the brush. Upon jumping out of their tractors the Americans made their way inland by crawling along the western slope of the causeway. The pier was captured quickly, Detachment Z then divided into two groups, one to take King's Wharf, the other On Chong's Wharf. Kings Wharf was taken unopposed, but On Chong's Wharf would offer some tough resistance. The 105th regiment fought their way through dugouts and bomb proof shelters to get to the Wharf by dusk. They then began mass throwing grenades into the Wharf emplacements killing many Japanese. 35 Prisoners would soon be captured and by noon On Chong's Wharf was secured. Back over at the beach, 15 medium tanks landed on the beach with two becoming stuck in shell holes in the reef. The other tanks split up advancing east and west against the two tank barriers. Unfortunately they were not very well coordinated and began operating independently. Behind the tanks was the 2nd battalion, 165th regiment whose LCVPS grounded themselves on the reef. The landing troops had little to no opportunity to locate the incessant fire being poured upon them from the right flank. At the offset they believed the fire was coming from two battered and scuttled hulks resting near On Chong's Wharf. Their first effort to knock these out was made by a LCVP commanded by Joseph Kasper. The boat mounted three of its guns on the starboard side and ran for the hulks while firing all at once. Kasper was fatally wounded during the run and one of the guns jammed. The incessant fire was halting the men so at 11:25 and 12:50 carrier planes bombed and strafed the hulks. Alongside this the destroyer Dewey bombarded them scoring numerous hits, but by 12:07 was ordered to cease fire because a few hits hit friendlys. Finally at 12:57 Major Dennis Claire ordered a stop to the bombardments so he could lead E company to hit the eastern tank barrier. They met light resistance until they came to the area of Kings Wharf. There they ran into concealed pillboxes that would halt their advance for over 4 hours. The men tried rifle grenades, bazookas, artillery barrages, but the pillboxes kept returning fire. Then they tried a daring encirclement maneuver under artillery support. The men crawled and crept in a wide circle reaching the pill boxes 40 yards or so away. They attempted to use flamethrowers, but the defenders still fired back. Then some engineers brought over TNT which was tossed into the pillboxes and exploded just before some light tanks rolled up to fire using 37mm rounds. By 4pm the pill boxes finally ceased firing, 8 Americans had been killed taking them. E company advanced a bit before digging in for the night. F Company advanced across the atoll west to attack the west tank barrier. They did not encounter resistance, excluding the incredibly difficult jungle. By noon the reached the ocean shore where they reorganized their lines and made their way south alongside 5 Sherman tanks to assault the west tank barrier. F Company and the tanks ran into a tanktrap with underground shelters full of Japanese defenders. Some labor troops were also there armed with knives and a few rifles. F Company proceeded to use TNT pole charges to blow up the shelters and flame throwers which quickly became the preferred weapon to face Japanese underground defenses. During the fight F Company had 8 deaths and 6 wounded. By 1:30pm they reached the barrier. The 3rd Platoon of F Company were attacking a section due south of On Chong's Wharf where an enemy air raid shelter was. The shelter was around 30 feet long with blast proof entrances on either side. When they tossed hand grenades into the shelter the grenades were tossed right back at them. A sherman tank came up and started firing 75mm shells, but had no success. Then a flamethrower unit crept up and tried to fire, but the equipment was soaked from the landing and was not functioning. Thus they resorted to a TNT pole charge. The explosion did not collapse the shelter, but it killed all 12 Japanese inside it. Meanwhile countless units were dealing with machine gun positions aided by 3 shermans. The tanks gradually pierced the barrier and proceeded. Meanwhile the 1st battalion was advancing from the west passing Joan Lake by 2pm. From there they ran into some strong machine gun posts 150 yards west of the barrier. B Company of the 1st battalion rushed over to help F company from the east side of the west tank barrier. At this point the regimental commander, Colonel Conroy had taken a shot to the head and was dead leaving Lt Colonel Gerard Kelley, the commander of the 1st battalion in charge. Kelley's first orders were for C company to bypass the pocket in the front, while A company would reinforce B company. The Japanese defenders were now trapped in the center being gradually eliminated by the 4 shermans. By 5:55pm F Company finally destroyed the last of the enemy in the center of the line and contact was made between the two battalions. After suffering 25 deaths and 62 wounded, the 27th division had gained a good foothold on Butaritari; the West Tank Barrier had been reduced; but the enemy forces in the east still needed to be cleared. The night was a very uncomfortable one. Japanese snipers harassed the Americans the entire time; Japanese infiltrators were up to their old tricks calling out in english, throwing firecrackers and trying to jump into foxholes with knives in hand. Trigger happy Americans fired away indiscriminately, causing chaos. A man of the 152nd engineered ran along the lagoon shore at daybreak from the direction of On Chong's Wharf toward the 2nd battalions command post screaming “theres a hundred and fifty Japs in the trees!”. This caused a wave of hysteria. That morning Kelley ordered his 1st battalion to clear the remaining enemy pockets west of the barrier while the rear of the west tank barrier area was finally mopped up. To the east an air bombardment smashed the area before the eastward advance commenced. Supported by 10 shermans the Americans advanced slowly against stiff resistance, successfully overran every enemy position. Between 12-2pm they were fighting through one of the most heavily defended areas on the island. Machine gun emplacements supported by rifle pits with double apron barbed wire running back and forth were everywhere they looked. By 5pm they advanced 1000 yards at the cost of 18 deaths and 15 wounded. The next day starting at 6am the 3rd battalion advanced along the island highway towards Yellow Beach. As they reached Yellow Beach 13 medium and light tanks with some engineers fell in line with them and together they advanced towards Ukiangong Point. At 7am artillery bombarded Ukiangong Point, first targeting the east tank barrier. Until 8:20 the artillery fired nearly 900 rounds then the 3rd battalion began their assault upon forward defenses that had been abandoned during the night. By 9;15 the men seized the first 250 yards meeting only light resistance, after that it became fierce fighting. Meanwhile two detachments of the 105th regiment led by Major Herzog were dispatched to cut off the Japanese line of retreat. They performed an amphibious encirclement maneuver going through the lagoon. The men embarked on 6 LVTS and made a 3 mile dash across the lagoon to the northeastern point where they met up with friendly natives who notified them the Japanese were fleeing eastward across the reef to Kuma. They quickly seized Kuma and now the enemy on Butaritari was entirely cut off from their retreat. With artillery and tank support the 3rd battalion managed attacked the Stone Pier area. The tank commanders had learnt many lessons over the past two days and began using their big guns to reduce buildings ahead of them to infantry could toss grenades into the smaller shelters. Tank-infantry tactics were literally being developed ad hoc as the men learnt first hand lessons of war. Tanks opened up with 75mm shells knocking shelters and infantry stormed them with grenades. Soon the Stone Pier area was clear and now they began striking the east tank barrier. The east tank barrier was more heavily fortified than its western counterpart, yet the Japanese abandoned the barrier during the night. Only a few dead Japanese would be found, killed by earlier bombardments. The 3rd battalion continued past the barrier linking up with A company by 1:30pm finding no sign of the enemy. Together they advanced 2100 yards beyond the narrow neck of the island and dug in for the night. Each company created a separate defensive perimeter stretching across the width of the island in a line of about 300 yards in length. It was not long during the night when the Japanese got up to their old tricks. Following behind a group of friendly native guides, a group of Japanese infiltrators approached limiting the cries of babies. The ruse was recognized by a member of the engineer detachment who opened fire immediately killing 10 Japanese. For the rest of the night there was intermittent fire fights as infiltrators continuously attacked. The Japanese began to yell and sing songs, many sounding quite drunk. It was not just there the Japanese attacked, over on Kuma Island at around midnight 10 Japanese attacked the defense line set up by Major Bradt's men. Although certainly shaken by the night terror, over 60 Japanese would be killed by the morning of the 23rd. This nearly wiped out the remaining survivors allowing the Americans to have firm control over Makin. The Americans suffered 58 deaths, 152 wounded on Makin while the Japanese lost perhaps 800 men and the Americans captured 105 POW's. The Americans had held an unbelievable superiority during this battle. The ratio of American combat casualties to those of the Japanese though was remarkably high. With the battle concluded, most of the 27th division departed Makin on the 24th leaving Colonel CLesen Tenney to lead garrison forces. Tragedy hit that morning when the escort carrier Liscome Bay was sunk by the I-175 who had been hunting around Makin since the arrival of the Americans. This left the death toll at Makin 644, including Rear Admiral Henry Mullinnix. Back on Tarawa the marines were surprised the Japanese did not launch a major counterattack during the first night which was their typical strategy. General Smith landed his reserve 1st battalion, 8th marines on Red Beach 2, but they took some heavy casualties for this. Many of the men wading ashore were fired upon creating a scene of carnage. In central Betio Colonel Shoups marines unleashed a devastating artillery bombardment using delay fuzes in order to penetrate coral and log shelters to hit enemy positions around the triangle. A line just short of the taxiway on the airfield had formed, as the 1st battalion began to drive towards the south shore of Betio. The 1st battalion, 8th marines launched an attack against a strong defensive position at a juncture on the two right hand beaches to try and reestablish contact with the 3rd battalion 2nd marines. Other units of drove all the way across the island to secure Green Beach. The 8th marines were unable to make any progress against the strong Japanese positions. The major success of the day would be landing the reserve 1st and 2nd battalions, 6th marines at Green Beach and Bairiki island by the afternoon facing no opposition. At this point Colonel Edson landed at Red Beach 2 and took command of the marine forces until General Smith landed. Colonel Edson spent his first night consulting with Shoup and Hall before ordering a coordinated attack the following morning. Edson noted, until then air and naval gunfire had been ineffective because they did not have acute knowledge of american and enemy positions. So Edson ordered spotters to get a better picture of the area and for the 2nd battalion, 10th marines artillery to come over. The next morning the 10th marines began an artillery bombardment to aid the attack. At 8am the 1st battalion, 6th marines advance eastwards down a narrow hundred yard strip of heavily fortified ground between the airfield and south shore. They rapidly progressed and by 11:00a would reach an area held by the 1st battalion, 2nd marines. It was estimated they killed 250 Japanese during this action. After completing this action new orders were issued to continue the advance east to the end of the airfield. They began advancing at 1pm and hit strong resistance. It would take until the late afternoon to clear the way over. During the afternoon the 3rd battalion, 6th marines landed at Green Beach and began advancing up the rear to aid in the assault. Elsewhere on Betio the 8th marines were making progress reducing the strong Burns-Philp Wharf position. The 18th marine engineers helped explode portions of steel pillboxes to let their colleagues storm them. One of the positions was a large blockhouse and when captured suddenly a large Japanese counterattack emerged to retake it. The 1st battalion, 8th marines on the western beaches proceeded slowly with fighting going on well into the night. Colonel Maurice Holmes 6th marines then relieved the 8th marines on the frontlines. By nightfall on the third day of the battle, the Americans now possessed all of the western end of Betio, going as far east as the eastern end of the airfield, except for some pockets between Red Beach 1 and 2. General Julian Smith finally came ashore on Green Beach just before noon assuming command. Despite the substantial gains, it was estimated that at least 5 more days of heavy fighting remaining before Betio was subdued. Smith gave Holmes the command for the final drive to the eastern tip of Betio. With the new daunting task at hand, Colonel Holmes prepared his forces for the brutal final drive, when all of a sudden 50 Japanese launched a counterattack. By the night of the 22nd, most of the remaining Japanese, roughly 1000 men were squeezed on the eastern narrow tail of the island. At 7:30 a group of 50 Japanese began attacking American positions recently just established. The 1st battalion, 6th marines had just assumed responsibility for the whole cross island line and the Japanese managed to find a small gap in the line. The Japanese used grenades and bayonets trying to break through, but the Americans were able to quickly encircle and annihilate them. Thus the Japanese were forced to launch a second probing attack later that night bringing their artillery 75 yards near the Marine front lines in an effort to screen their charges. The second attack was a two pronged movement hitting B company on the right and A company on the left. Both Japanese groups were obliterated in what became a wild frenzy of hand to hand fighting. Then after this the heaviest counterattack was launched at around 3am. The Japanese made a frontal assault for over an hour. 300 Japanese troops hit both A and B companies and like their other comrades were obliterated come the morning. These three attacks were in effect banzai charges, last ditch efforts to break the Americans, it cost the entire Japanese garrison. Holmes plans would be unnecessary to reach the eastern tip of Betio island as little opposition was found. By 10am the 1st battalion, 8th marines and 3rd battalion 2nd marines joined together to form a semicircular attack upon the last enemy pocket. They were supported by 75mm guns that unleashed carnage upon the pillboxes before marines grabbed prisoners through burst open holes from their shelters. Tarawa saw an estimated 4690 Japanese and Korean killed, with 17 Japanese and 129 Koreans POWs captured. The Marines suffered 1009 deaths, 2101 wounded and 191 missing in action. Vandegrift would tell the New York Times on December 27th "Tarawa was an assault from beginning to end. We must steel ourselves now to pay that price". November 24th would see the rest of the Tarawa atoll get mopped up and by the 29th, Abaiang, Marakei and the Maiana atolls were occupied. On the 21st the 5th amphibious corp reconnaissance company landed on Apamama under naval gunfire support from their submarine and escorting destroyer. They would encounter resistance from 23 Japanese whom they neutralized by the next day. With this Operation Galvanic has successfully been accomplished. The operation as we will see in the future weeks provided dire lessons to the allies about what the rest of the war would look like. As Vandegrift would later remark “Tarawa was the first example in history of a sea-borne assault against a heavily defended coral atoll … In the final analysis … success at Tarawa depended upon the discipline, courage, and fighting ability of the individual Marine. Seldom has anyone been called upon to fight a battle under more difficult circumstances.” It was under these circumstances, where the de facto practice of taking no prisoners would easily become the norm. The Japanese soldiers were faking deaths, hiding grenades to take allied men down with them. Suicide attacks were increasing exponentially. Thus the age of phrase would be adopted by the marines “shoot first and ask questions later”. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Operation Galvanic had finally been accomplished. It cost countless lives and would be one of the major bitter lessons learnt by the Americans during the Pacific War. The enemy was going to defend every single inch of their territory until the last man. Would America have the stomach to drive it home?
Last time we spoke about the defense of Finschhafen. Finschhafen was a enormous staging camp for the allies now. The Japanese could not sit idly by allowing such a strategic location to be in allied hands. General Katagiri launched a major counter offensive, kicked off with signal fires from Sattelberg. He sent a force of raiders to try and neutralise some heavy allied artillery, but it ended in failure. Having not neutralised their big guns, the rest of the counter offensive fell to pieces. The Japanese would officially report 422 killed, 662 wounded. For the Australians they had 228 casualties of which 49 were dead. With the counter offensive done with, the allies now would go back on the offensive. The next large target was going to be the stronghold of sattelberg, but the Japanese were not going to make it easy on the allies. But today we are going to be jumping into some new places. This episode is the invasion of the treasury islands Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. For quite some time now we have been focusing on the New Guinea campaign, such as the offensives against Finschhafen and the Ramu valley. Today we are going to enter a new phase of the Pacific War. With the incoming invasions of the Gilbert and Marshall islands, the Northern Solomons and Western New Britain, General Douglas MacArthur and Admirals Hasley and Nimitz were going to turn up the heat. Admiral Halsey had just seized Vila, Barakoma, Munda and Rendova, gaining their valuable airfields for the forces of General Twinings AirSols to utilise. Within the central Solomons, Bougainville was finally within range of allied land-based aircraft. Lae, Salamaua and Finschhafen were taken, thus Operation Cartwheel would begin a new phase. Back in July, plans were formed for General Vandegrifts 1st Marine Amphibious corps to seize airfields sites at Buin and Kahili, the important Japanese anchorage at Tonolei Harbor, and the Faisi and Ballale islands in the neighboring Shortlands. That same month, the 43rd and 37th divisions were involved in the New Georgia campaign. Of the 5 divisions remaining under his control, Admiral Halsey planned to use the fresh and unblooded 3rd Marine division and the Army's 25th division for the invasion. He sought to keep the 2nd marine division and 3rd new zealand division in training for the conquest of Rabaul. Yet things had changed. Because of the intense resistance on New Georgia, the 25th division had to be committed. Then the decision to strike Makin and Tarawa in the Gilbert islands removed the 2nd marine division from Hasley's south pacific area. These changes ultimately dictated he would need a substitution, and it was to be the 37th division, whom had suffered 1100 casualties on New Georgia already. Nevertheless the 37th was in better condition than the 25th. The 3rd marine divisions task went unchanged. Major General Allen Turnage's 3rd Marine division was going to spearhead the invasion of Bougainville, with a launch date set for September. On top of this Halsey had received some reports indicating the Japanese were heavily reinforcing the Shortland Islands. He decided to bypass them and hit the Treasury island and Choiseul. It is also possible Halsey sought to perform these actions hoping to lure out the Japanese fleet into a major engagement. The treasury islands and Choiseul were lightly garrisoned, but held airfields that could be turned against Bougainville. Meanwhile , General MacArthur was planning the next stepping stone towards the Philippines. His overall plan was to break the Bismarcks Barrier through a series of aggressive leaps along the New Guinea-Mindanao axis. New Guinea as we are all quite familiar with by now, is a logistical nightmare. Lush jungles, raging rivers, cold mountains, every time of geographical nightmare was present. Thus to traverse the western landmass of it only on land was not exactly desired. What MacArthur's logistical team sought was to secure the 50 mile expanse of sea lying between New Guinea and New Britain. With that in hand Admiral Barbey's 7th Amphibious force would be able to transport troops along the coast, a significantly easier method than having the poor boys battle through the jungle. Rooke Island split the sea into the Vitiaz Strait and the narrower Dampier Strait. General Wootten's 9th Australian division were currently fighting for control of Vitiaz, but there had been no effort to date to hit the Dampier. MacArthur decided to capture Kavieng and the Admiralty Islands, because they represented enemy aerial threats against his westwards push through New Guinea. Closing in on the end of the year he also planned to amphibious assault Cape Gloucester, the northwestern point of New Britain which commanded the Dampier Strait. In hindsight the wisdom of landing at Cape Gloucester seems rather dubious. It was not necessary to seize the point in order to make use of the Vitiaz or Dampier strait. The Japanese did not have big artillery on the western end of New Britain to command the channel, the islands infrastructure was largely undeveloped. The only way the Japanese could interfere with the allied use of either strait was by torpedo boats, something they did not have many of. There of course was aircraft based on New Britain as well, but that would be neutralised by Kenney's AirSols. MacArthur planned to have the AirSols hit Rabaul continuously; to seize the Green Islands, the Admiralty Islands and Kavieng. The Western New Britain operation was codenamed Operation Dexterity which would be sub divided into Operations Lazaretto and Backhander. There would be a staggered attack first hitting Gasmata performed by the 2nd battalion, 228th regiment. They would establish an air base in the southern coast of the island, this was operation Lazaretto. Operation Backhander would be the invasion of Cape Gloucester. Some of the landings could be carried out in November, but MacArthur chose to wait until the new airfields were established in the Markham and Ramu valleys as they would provide close air support for the amphibious operations. On September the 10th, Admiral Hasley sent staff to present his plan for the invasion to Bougainville to MacArthur's staff. Halsey would be surprised to find MacArthur opposed using all their aircraft to strike Rabaul before the invasion of western New Britain. MacArthur proposed instead to continue heavy airstrikes against all Japanese airfields on Bougainville throughout October. Then in late October, Halsey's forces could occupy the Treasury islands and possibly northern Choiseul. Northern Choiseul could provide radar coverage and PT boat bases. On the 1st of November, Halsey's forces could then begin landing on Bougainville to form a beachhead before constructing a new airfield to host the AirSols so they could hit Rabaul just in time to take some pressure off MacArthur's troops advancing in New Guinea and New Britain. Thus MacArthur was determined to make the main goal of the operation not the securance over the entirety of Bougainville, but just a portion of it where an aerodrome could be established then used to batter Rabaul. Halsey was presented two options for his landing site: there was Kieta Harbor sitting on the northeast coast and Empress Augusta Bay on the southwest coast. Kieta seemed the better location from which to launch air strikes against Rabaul. Kieta also held a protected harbor, requiring Halsey's forces to move up the longer outside passage to secure Choiseul first. Empress Augusta Bay was on an exposed side of the island during an approaching monsoon season. It was closer to Rabaul and would only require the securing of the Treasury islands first. After further reconnaissance there was indications airfields could be constructed midway up the west coast of Bougainville at Cape Torokina on Empress Augusta Bay. Halsey chose it for the landing site stating on September 22nd “it's Torokina. Now get on your horses!” The operation against Cape Torokina was codenamed Cherryblossom and its task was handed to the hero of Guadalcanal, General Vandegrift who formed the plans but it would not be he who lead the operation. Vandegrit was promoted to commandant of the Marines, the first serving marine to become a four star general, he had to depart for Washington. His replacement was Major General Charles Barrett the former commander of the 3rd Marine division. Barret was given command of the 1st Marine Amphibious corps and the responsibility over operation Cherryblossom. His mission statement read “land in the vicinity of Cape Torokina, seize and occupy and defend a beachhead including Torata Island and adjacent island— 3,750 yards west of Cape Torokina—allowing approximately 2,250 yards inland from the beach and 3,600 yards east of Cape Torokina. To prepare and continue the attack in coordination with the 37th Infantry on arrival.” However the mission statement was to be his last major contribution to the war. On October 8th Barrett accidentally fell from the third floor of the officers quarters at Noumea and suffered a cerebral haemorrhage. He soon died afterwards and was recorded as an accidental death, but there was heavy speculation it was in fact a suicide. Thus the job fell to Major General Roy Geiger, the director of the marine aviation corp in washington. For the naval aspect of the mission Hasley had to do with what he had on hand. He would not be receiving any significant naval reinforcements, because Admiral Nimitz feared that any vessels lent to the 3rd fleet would not be able to come back in time to help with the invasion of the Gilberts. What Halsey could count on was task force 38 commanded by Rear Admiral Frederick Sherman built around carrier Saratoga and later joined by the Princeton; Admiral Merrills task for 39 comprised of cruiser division 12 and destroyer division 23; and Task force 31 commanded by Admiral Wilkinson consisting of three destroyer squadrons, transports and covering ships. It would be Admiral Wilkinson who would bring over the 3rd marine division, the 1st brigade and 3rd New Zealand division to invade the Treasury islands. Rear Admiral George Fort would take the reigns of the first offensive and Wilkinson would looked over the Torokina landings. Wilkinson would have 12 Attack transports and Amphibious cargo ships for the landings, just enough to get every echelon with their equipment over. The 3rd Marine division was reinforced with the 3rd marine defence battalion, the 198th coast artillery, the 2nd provisional marine raider regiment and the 1st marine parachute regiment. After landing at Cape Torokina they would later be reinforced by General Beightlers 37th division. The 29th, 34th and 36th New Zealander battalions of the 8th brigade group led by Brigadier Robert Row would hit the Treasury islands and help establish long range radar stations and a landing craft staging area. There was a final last minute change to the overall plan made by Halsey. They decided not to attempt seizing northern Choiseul but to instead send a marine raiding party around 656-725 men of the US 2nd Parachute battalion led by Lt Colonel Victor Krulak there to persuade the Japanese to divert forces to Choiseul from southern Bougainville. To support the operation General Kenny's 5th air force would smash the airfields in Rabaul while the AirSols 489 aircraft would hit airfields in and around Bougainville. General Twinning tactics were to harass the Japanese every day, so he launched a total of 158 flights in October, comprising 3259 sorties and land and naval targets in Hahili, Kara, Ballale, Buka, Bonis and Choiseul. The result of this incredible air campaign was 5 Japanese airfields pulverized, 136 enemy aircraft claimed destroyed at the cost of 26 allied aircraft shot down. Meanwhile on October 12th, Kenney launched a raid using 349 aircraft smashing airstrips, shipping and supply dumps. The 6000-ton IJN transport Keisho Maru was sunk alongside two smaller craft. On the 18th 54 B-25's took off from Dobodura, but only caused minor damage. On October the 23rd, 24th and 25th daylight raids consisting of 45 B-242's, 62 B-25's and 61 B-24's respectively managed to shoot down 9 enemy planes, destroyed 25 aircraft on the ground and damaged another 27. On October 29th, he tossed a raid at Vunakanau's airdrome using 41 liberators covered by 75 P-38's and managed to destroy around 10 aircraft. The enemies attention was certainly diverted away from Rabaul. Now the Japanese knew an invasion of Bougainville was coming. They believed the main target of such an offensive would be first against the Shortlands or Kahili. General Kanda's 6th division was deployed to reinforce these places. His 1st battalion, 45th regiment was placed at Kieta, the rd battalion and 4th south sea garrison was sent to reinforce Bougainville while the rest were sent to the Shortland islands. Bougainville was given north/south/east/west sectors garrisoned by numerous forces under Kanda. Admiral Koga also launched Operation RO, a plan devised to strengthen Rabaul. Koga's intelligence indicated the Pacific Fleet was on a warpath, so he decided to take the entire combined fleet from Truk to Eniwetok, which Koga considered a good advance position where he could sortie and annihilate the enemy in a decisive naval battle. The combined fleet stayed a week in the uncomfortable and lonely lagoon until they departed having not found the allied pacific fleet. By October 24th the combined fleet travelled back to Truk while the aircrews of carriers Zuikaku, Shokaku and Zuiho reinforced Rabaul. 82 Zeros, 45 D3As, 40 B5Ns and 6 Yokosuka D4Y reconnaissance planes. 192 trained air crews in total would be in Rabaul by November 1st. They were just in time to intercept one of Kenney's raids consisting of 75 b-25's and 80 p-38s. The Japanese airmen claimed to have downed 9 B-25s, 10 P-38s at the cost of 20 aircraft and 3 small vessels. Koga alerted the 12th air fleet who were in Japan to prepare to head over to Rabaul, but instead of also sending the 8th fleet, he kept them back, still thinking a decisive naval battle would be on the menu soon in the central pacific. General Sakai's 17th division were transported to New Britain in late september. Their first echelon comprising of the 53rd regiment arrived on october 5th and immediately began to move west to reinforce Cape Gloucester and the 3rd battalion went to northern Bougainville. The remainder of the 17th division would arrive between November 5th and 12th, though the auxiliary cruiser Kurita Maru caring the 1st battalion, 81st regiment was sunk by the USS Grayson. 1087 men, most of the battalion, were lost. The invasion of the Treasuries codenamed Operation Goodtime. They would establish a staging area, an advanced naval base at Blanche Harbor and a radar station on the north coast of Mono Island. It was hoped the assault on the Treasuries would confused the Japanese as to where the major effort would actually be. At this time there was a short supply of assault forces throughout the Pacific and the Bougainville invasion was mere days away. Thus it was difficult to comprehend why an entire brigade would be used to subdue a tiny enemy garrison on one small island. It has been theorised that Halsey and Vandegrift were reluctant to use some untried New Zealand troops in the more ambitious undertaking, but were also under pressure from their Anzac allies to see some action. For whatever reason the Treasury island operation would be one of the few examples of Allied overkill during the mid Pacific War. The 8th Brigade had limited shipping available to them. They would have eight destroyer transports, eight LCIs, two LSTs, eight LCMs, three LCTs and two APCs, under the command of Admiral Fort who was using the USS Raton as his flagship. The 34th battalion was going to land on the north side of Stirling Island to secure a nearby airfield; the 29th and 36th battalions would land abreast near Falami Point on southern Mono and Major George Logan D company of the 34th, designated Logan force would land at the mouth of the Soanotalu River to establish a radar station with the help of 20 seabees. The USS Pringle and Philip would perform a bombardment to help. The operation was set into motion on October 27th when the convoy departed guadalcanal and the Russells. George Fort's destroyers approached Blanche Harbor during a storm and began their bombardment. The assault waves raced through the harbor in two columns. As was suspected the 34th met zero resistance, they immediately went to work sending out patrols to make certain if there were any Japanese on the island they would not get to surprise them. Mortars were set up on the nearby Watson island, cool theres an island bearing my name to support the landings on Mono. The landings on Mono met very little resistance, basically just a bunch of surprised Japanese naval troops who offered some half hearted gunfire before withdrawing. The New Zealanders went to work establishing a perimeter as the Japanese began opening fire using mortars which managed to knock out two LST's killing 2 and wounding 30 men. Interesting to note this was the first amphibious assault launched by Kiwi's since the horrible Gallipoli campaign of 1916 and it was the second combat operation undertaken by Kiwi's during the Pacific War. The real resistance would come in the form of a air raid consisting of 25 vals who bombed the beachhead and support ships. The destroyers Cony took two hits; eight crewmen were killed and ten wounded. An allied fighter patrol managed to shoot down 12 vals during the raid. To their north, the Logan force faced no difficult landing at the mouth of the Soanotalu river. They quickly formed a 150 yard perimeter and began working on the radar station. By the end of the day, all but one LST had successfully unloaded and cleared Blanche harbor, however during the night the New Zealanders tossed back numerous counter attacks, particular around the Saveke river. By the 28th the Japanese survivors were retreating north in the hope of escaping to Bougainville, but along the way they ran into the Logan Force. On October 29th during the late afternoon, 20 Japanese attacked the western part of the Logan Forces perimeter. They were easily beaten off with mortars and rifle fire, leaving 5 dead Japanese behind. The next day saw some intermittent firing against concealed Japanese. Scouts eventually figured out there was a larger number of Japanese to the west of the perimeter, but the area between Soanotalu and Malasi was clear of the enemy. November began with the rest of the brigade coming over. The radar station was already up and running and the Logan Force had built themselves a small blockhouse near the landing barge. That said blockhouse immediately became the objective of the Japanese, since it represented the only hope of them escaping the island. As Brigadier Row's men began to occupy the central and northern parts of Mono, the Japanese began to infiltrate the Logan Forces perimeter. On the night of November 1st, the main breech was made across the News Zealanders line. A ton of Japanese had infiltrated the lines and managed to cut telephone wires from the blockhouse to the company HQ. Soon after this was accomplished a concerted attack was made against the blockhouse. 6 New Zealanders and 3 Americans defended it. They had automatic weapons, some 50 and 30 cal machine guns, but they were soon put out of action by the attacking Japanese who could have numbered between 70-100 men. The fight for the blockhouse would continue until dawn, with the surviving defenders beating off numerous attacks, mainly by tossing grenades. Captain Kirk, Sergeant DD Hannafin were both killed during the fight. Command of the blockhouse then fell to a cook of D Company, Private J.E Smith. By daybreak the Japanese finally were beaten off as the 3 remaining survivors were all wounded. 26 Japanese had been killed trying to overrun the blockhouse and seize the landing craft. Elsewhere across the perimeter the Japanese attacked throughout the night seeing another 15 dead Japanese in the western section and 9 in the east. It was to be there best chance at taking the blockhouse, for the next few days their attacks were much smaller and by November 4th, New Zealander patrols were fanning out and killing or capturing stragglers. The last significant action on Mono would be on November 6th when a dozen Japanese were routed from a cave during a two hour firefight east of Soanatalu. Operation Goodtime resulted in the annihilation of a Japanese garrison roughly 200 men strong, but it came at a cost. 40 New Zealanders and 12 Americans were killed with 174 wounded. The allies got their supply bases and radar station. Over on Choiseul, Operation Blissful was about to kick off. In an attempt to make the Japanese believe the Shortland islands were the target for their offensive, General Vandegrift tossed Lt Colonel Victor Krulaks 2nd Parachute battalion, roughly 656 men at a beach near the village of Voza. On October 27th the men and their equipment were loaded onto 8 LCMS and during the night the paratroopers were transferred over to four destroyer transports, the Kilty, Ward, Crosby and McKean, the same ships that had just been used to transport the New Zealanders for Operation Goodtime. Forts destroyers provided escort as the Paramarine landed at Voza shortly after midnight without any resistance. During the morning of the 28th they began unloading supplies from landing crafts that had been concealed on a smaller island offshore. Once landed they carried them up a narrow trail leading from the beach a mile northwest of Voza upon some high ground which would be their first base camp. Nearly a hundred friendly natives helped the marines carry the equipment up the beach and they also helped guide the men. Allied radio broadcasting finally alerted the Japanese to the imminent danger to southern Bougainville as Krulaks men began establishing their perimeter. The morning of the 29th brought an enemy strafing attack upon them and the native guides reported to Krulak that there was a barge staging base at Sangigai, the main Japanese position on Choiseul bay, garrisoned by around 150 men. Krulak decided that was to be the first objective, he sent out patrols going north and south. In the north Lt Averill with the help of native guides discover considerable evidence of the Japanese presence, abandoned equipment and rations, but no Japanese. In the south two patrols scouted the Japanese base near Sangigai. Krulak led one of the patrols personally and managed to surprise some Japanese who were unloading a barge. They killed 7 Japanese and sunk the barge before pulling out. The other patrol group ran into a Japanese platoon and got into a skirmish seeing another 7 dead Japanese. Thus Krulak got his confirmation there indeed was a Japanese base at Sangigai. Early on the 30th, Krulak requested an air strike at it arrived at 6am. 12 Avengers with 26 fighter escorts hit Sangigai. Unfortunately some of the planes mistook the marines at Voza for the enemy and strafed them as well. No marines were killed but one of their boats was sunk, that Krulak had planned to use. As a result of the boat getting sunk, Companies E and 5 departed Voza overland to hit Sangigai. A Japanese outpost along the Vagara river opened fire on the paratroopers, but was easily overwhelmed. Krulak then divided his forces to perform a two pronged assault. Company E led by Captain Robert Manchester would advance along the coastline to hit the Japanese from the north, while Krulak with Company F would move inland to hit them from the rear. Company E quickly advanced along the coast and began shelling the town with mortars and rockets during the afternoon, only to find out it was abandoned. The Japanese had taken up a new position on some high grounder in the interior. So the paramarines began destroying and looting the village. Meanwhile company F were advancing through rough terrain to try and secure some high ground near Sangigai where the retreating Japanese were just passing through. The Japanese literally walked right into F company and a hour long fight broke out. The Japanese outnumbered F company and as Krulak would later report “the outcome appeared to be in question, until the Japs destroyed their chances by an uncoordinated banzai charge which was badly cut up by our machine guns. Seventy-two Japs were killed and an undetermined number wounded. Marine losses were 6 killed, 1 missing and 12 wounded." The marines had 6 deaths, 12 wounded and one man missing. Krulak was wounded as well as F companies commander Spencer Pratt. The Japanese suffered a devastating 72 casualties Back over at E company after plundering the village they came across some documents and Krulak reported "The one that fascinated me, it was a chart that portrayed the minefields around southern Bougainville. When I reported this, the night after the Sangigai attack, I saw my first flash message. I had never seen one before. It came back and said, "Transmit at once the coordinates of the limits of the minefields and all channels as shown going through it." So we laboriously encoded the critical locations and sent them off. To an armada going into that area this is not incidental information. This is necessary information. Halsey in true Halsey fashion was not satisfied to know where the minefields were; he, before the Torokina landings, sent in a minelayer there and dropped mines in the entrance ways to those channels and they got two Japanese ships.” E company then retired to the Vagara river and was later evacuated by boat back to the Voza area. F company followed suite but was delayed by the heavy engagement they had. The men stayed to bury their dead. The friendly natives reported a Japanese concentration to the north near the Warrior River, so Krulak sent a strong patrol up by boat to check it out. On November 1, the large patrol of 87 paratroopers from Company G, led by Major Warner Bigger, headed north by landing craft towards Nukiki with orders "destroy the southern outposts of CHOISEUL BAY, and if possible to shell the Jap supply depot on GUPPY ISLAND." Major Bigger began an overland march along the eastern bank of the river and after crossing the warrior, their native guides became lost so they all had to bivouac for the night. In the early morning of November 2nd, Biggers men found themselves surrounded by Japanese who began infiltrating their perimeter from the rear. Bigger had the men continue north along the beach where the surprise attacked a small enemy outpost of 4 men. They managed to kill 3 of 4, but the last man ran away, thus the element of surprise was gone. Bigger knew the jig was up he could not hope to attack the main objective so instead he ordered the men to go shell Guppy island. G Company setup some 60mm mortars in the water and fired 143 rounds at the island setting up two large fires, one looked to have hit a fuel dump. The Japanese were taken by surprise there and only offered resistance in the form of some poorly directed machine gun bursts. On the way back G company had to fight their way through because of the infiltrators. Krulak was notified of the situation and alerted a PT boat base at Vella Lavella. Lt Arthur Berndtson had 5 PT boats under his command there, 2 were already assigned to other missions, another was under repair. PT 59 only had ⅓ tanks worth of fuel, but her commander, Lt John F Kennedy, yes he is back in action, agreed to rescue the boys. Kennedy believed he had enough fuel to get to Choiseul and another boat could tow them back to base. Despite overheating the engines, at around 9:30 PT 59 escorted a small convoy to Voza and Bigger's men were off loaded. The PT-59 ran out of fuel on the return trip down the slot and was towed back to Lambu Lambu Cove. By this point the landings at Cape Torokina had been carried out, so a diversion was not really needed anymore. Furthermore the Japanese were moving in on the base camp from all directions. On the night of November 3rd, just in the nick of time, 3 LCIs from Vella Lavella arrived to successfully load Krulaks paratroopers and got them out of there before dawn of the 4th. The Paratroopers had been outnumbered 6-1. They managed to kill an estimated 143 Japanese, destroyed a major staging base at Sangigai, sunk two barges and destroyed a considerable amount of enemy fuel and supplies on Guppy island. The cost was 13 dead and 13 wounded. Krulaks after action report mentioned evidence that the Japanese had sent reinforcements from the Shortland islands to counter the Choiseul operation. On November 1st, the day of the Cape Torokina landings, the Japanese had sent a large bomer force south to Choiseul hunting a reported Task Force. The Japanese found nothing, and by the time they diverted back to Empress Augusta Bay, the landings were done, American fighters were ready to deal with them. It seems the Japanese had been greatly confused from all the activity around Bougainville, particularly from many intercepted messages. Its hard to say how successful the Choiseul raid actually was. It's possible the Japanese fell for the diversion, but no one really knows. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The diversionary raids may or may not have had an effect on the landings at Cape Torokina. Regardless the multiple operations were all successful and the Japanese seemed none the wiser. Now the stranglehold over Bougainville would begin.
Welcome to a TBOnus a little look back at some of the dumb things tech companies did in the month of September.Podcast links: https://linktr.ee/TBOPODEmail: TFEPOD@gmail.comHost links:https://linktr.ee/frankcomstein
THE LAW: 2/4: Red Sky Morning: The Epic True Story of Texas Ranger Company F by Joe Pappalardo (Author) https://www.amazon.com/Red-Sky-Morning-Ranger-Company/dp/1250275245/ref=sr_1_1?crid=3LYPTU9SWQ97W&keywords=RED+SKY+MORNING&qid=1669241540&s=books&sprefix=red+sky+morning%2Cstripbooks%2C77&sr=1-1Between 1886 and 1888, Sergeant James Brooks, of Texas Ranger Company F, was engaged in three fatal gunfights, endured disfiguring bullet wounds, engaged in countless manhunts, was convicted of second-degree murder, and rattled Washington, D.C. with a request for a pardon from the US president. His story anchors the tale of Joe Pappalardo's Red Sky Morning, an epic saga of lawmen and criminals set in Texas during the waning years of the “Old West.” Alongside Brooks are the Rangers of Company F, who range from a pious teetotaler to a cowboy fleeing retribution for killing a man. They are all led by Captain William Scott, who cut his teeth as a freelance undercover informant but was facing the end of his Ranger career. Company F hunted criminals across Texas and beyond, killing them as needed, and were confident they could bring anyone to “Ranger justice.” But Brooks' men met their match in the Conner family, East Texas master hunters and jailbreakers who were wanted for their part in a bloody family feud. Photo: El Paso 1970 No known restrictions on publication. @Batchelorshow
THE LAW: 1/4: Red Sky Morning: The Epic True Story of Texas Ranger Company F by Joe Pappalardo (Author) https://www.amazon.com/Red-Sky-Morning-Ranger-Company/dp/1250275245/ref=sr_1_1?crid=3LYPTU9SWQ97W&keywords=RED+SKY+MORNING&qid=1669241540&s=books&sprefix=red+sky+morning%2Cstripbooks%2C77&sr=1-1Between 1886 and 1888, Sergeant James Brooks, of Texas Ranger Company F, was engaged in three fatal gunfights, endured disfiguring bullet wounds, engaged in countless manhunts, was convicted of second-degree murder, and rattled Washington, D.C. with a request for a pardon from the US president. His story anchors the tale of Joe Pappalardo's Red Sky Morning, an epic saga of lawmen and criminals set in Texas during the waning years of the “Old West.” Alongside Brooks are the Rangers of Company F, who range from a pious teetotaler to a cowboy fleeing retribution for killing a man. They are all led by Captain William Scott, who cut his teeth as a freelance undercover informant but was facing the end of his Ranger career. Company F hunted criminals across Texas and beyond, killing them as needed, and were confident they could bring anyone to “Ranger justice.” But Brooks' men met their match in the Conner family, East Texas master hunters and jailbreakers who were wanted for their part in a bloody family feud. Photo: 1970 El Paso No known restrictions on publication. @Batchelorshow
THE LAW: 2/4: Red Sky Morning: The Epic True Story of Texas Ranger Company F by Joe Pappalardo (Author) https://www.amazon.com/Red-Sky-Morning-Ranger-Company/dp/1250275245/ref=sr_1_1?crid=3LYPTU9SWQ97W&keywords=RED+SKY+MORNING&qid=1669241540&s=books&sprefix=red+sky+morning%2Cstripbooks%2C77&sr=1-1Between 1886 and 1888, Sergeant James Brooks, of Texas Ranger Company F, was engaged in three fatal gunfights, endured disfiguring bullet wounds, engaged in countless manhunts, was convicted of second-degree murder, and rattled Washington, D.C. with a request for a pardon from the US president. His story anchors the tale of Joe Pappalardo's Red Sky Morning, an epic saga of lawmen and criminals set in Texas during the waning years of the “Old West.” Alongside Brooks are the Rangers of Company F, who range from a pious teetotaler to a cowboy fleeing retribution for killing a man. They are all led by Captain William Scott, who cut his teeth as a freelance undercover informant but was facing the end of his Ranger career. Company F hunted criminals across Texas and beyond, killing them as needed, and were confident they could bring anyone to “Ranger justice.” But Brooks' men met their match in the Conner family, East Texas master hunters and jailbreakers who were wanted for their part in a bloody family feud. Photo: 1970 El Paso No known restrictions on publication. @Batchelorshow
THE LAW: 3/4: Red Sky Morning: The Epic True Story of Texas Ranger Company F by Joe Pappalardo (Author) https://www.amazon.com/Red-Sky-Morning-Ranger-Company/dp/1250275245/ref=sr_1_1?crid=3LYPTU9SWQ97W&keywords=RED+SKY+MORNING&qid=1669241540&s=books&sprefix=red+sky+morning%2Cstripbooks%2C77&sr=1-1Between 1886 and 1888, Sergeant James Brooks, of Texas Ranger Company F, was engaged in three fatal gunfights, endured disfiguring bullet wounds, engaged in countless manhunts, was convicted of second-degree murder, and rattled Washington, D.C. with a request for a pardon from the US president. His story anchors the tale of Joe Pappalardo's Red Sky Morning, an epic saga of lawmen and criminals set in Texas during the waning years of the “Old West.” Alongside Brooks are the Rangers of Company F, who range from a pious teetotaler to a cowboy fleeing retribution for killing a man. They are all led by Captain William Scott, who cut his teeth as a freelance undercover informant but was facing the end of his Ranger career. Company F hunted criminals across Texas and beyond, killing them as needed, and were confident they could bring anyone to “Ranger justice.” But Brooks' men met their match in the Conner family, East Texas master hunters and jailbreakers who were wanted for their part in a bloody family feud. Photo: 1970 El Paso No known restrictions on publication. @Batchelorshow
Talpra Magyar, Bekker Dáviddal • Bagossy Brothers Company - Fújj meg szél dalpremier • 2023/05/04 by MTVA Podcast
On June 19, 2014, President Barack Obama will award Corporal William "Kyle" Carpenter, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret), the Medal of Honor for conspicuous gallantry. Corporal Carpenter will receive the Medal of Honor for his courageous actions while serving as an Automatic Rifleman with Company F, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, Regimental Combat Team 1, 1st Marine Division (Forward), I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward), in Helmand Province, Afghanistan. Available in high definition.
Photo: No known restrictions on publication. @Batchelorshow 1911 #Texas: 1/4: Red Sky Morning: The Epic True Story of Texas Ranger Company F, by Joe Pappalardo Hardcover – Deckle Edge, June 28, 2022 https://www.amazon.com/Red-Sky-Morning-Ranger-Company/dp/1250275245/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr= Between 1886 and 1888, Sergeant James Brooks, of Texas Ranger Company F, was engaged in three fatal gunfights, endured disfiguring bullet wounds, engaged in countless manhunts, was convicted of second-degree murder, and rattled Washington, D.C., with a request for a pardon from the US president. His story anchors the tale of Joe Pappalardo's Red Sky Morning, an epic saga of lawmen and criminals set in Texas during the waning years of the “Old West.” Alongside Brooks are the Rangers of Company F, who range from a pious teetotaler to a cowboy fleeing retribution for killing a man. They are all led by Captain William Scott, who cut his teeth as a freelance undercover informant but was facing the end of his Ranger career. Company F hunted criminals across Texas and beyond, killing them as needed, and were confident they could bring anyone to “Ranger justice.” But Brooks's men met their match in the Conner family, East Texas master hunters and jailbreakers who were wanted for their part in a bloody family feud. The full story of Company F's showdown with the Conner family is finally being told, with long-dead voices being heard for the first time. This truly hidden history paints the grim picture of neighbors' and relatives' becoming snitches and bounty hunters, and a company of Texas Rangers who waded into the conflict only to find themselves over their heads—and in the fight of their lives.
Photo: No known restrictions on publication. @Batchelorshow 1908 #Texas: 2/4: Red Sky Morning: The Epic True Story of Texas Ranger Company F, by Joe Pappalardo Hardcover – Deckle Edge, June 28, 2022 https://www.amazon.com/Red-Sky-Morning-Ranger-Company/dp/1250275245/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr= Between 1886 and 1888, Sergeant James Brooks, of Texas Ranger Company F, was engaged in three fatal gunfights, endured disfiguring bullet wounds, engaged in countless manhunts, was convicted of second-degree murder, and rattled Washington, D.C., with a request for a pardon from the US president. His story anchors the tale of Joe Pappalardo's Red Sky Morning, an epic saga of lawmen and criminals set in Texas during the waning years of the “Old West.” Alongside Brooks are the Rangers of Company F, who range from a pious teetotaler to a cowboy fleeing retribution for killing a man. They are all led by Captain William Scott, who cut his teeth as a freelance undercover informant but was facing the end of his Ranger career. Company F hunted criminals across Texas and beyond, killing them as needed, and were confident they could bring anyone to “Ranger justice.” But Brooks's men met their match in the Conner family, East Texas master hunters and jailbreakers who were wanted for their part in a bloody family feud. The full story of Company F's showdown with the Conner family is finally being told, with long-dead voices being heard for the first time. This truly hidden history paints the grim picture of neighbors' and relatives' becoming snitches and bounty hunters, and a company of Texas Rangers who waded into the conflict only to find themselves over their heads—and in the fight of their lives.
Photo: No known restrictions on publication. @Batchelorshow 1908 Ft Worth #Texas: 3/4: Red Sky Morning: The Epic True Story of Texas Ranger Company F, by Joe Pappalardo Hardcover – Deckle Edge, June 28, 2022 https://www.amazon.com/Red-Sky-Morning-Ranger-Company/dp/1250275245/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr= Between 1886 and 1888, Sergeant James Brooks, of Texas Ranger Company F, was engaged in three fatal gunfights, endured disfiguring bullet wounds, engaged in countless manhunts, was convicted of second-degree murder, and rattled Washington, D.C., with a request for a pardon from the US president. His story anchors the tale of Joe Pappalardo's Red Sky Morning, an epic saga of lawmen and criminals set in Texas during the waning years of the “Old West.” Alongside Brooks are the Rangers of Company F, who range from a pious teetotaler to a cowboy fleeing retribution for killing a man. They are all led by Captain William Scott, who cut his teeth as a freelance undercover informant but was facing the end of his Ranger career. Company F hunted criminals across Texas and beyond, killing them as needed, and were confident they could bring anyone to “Ranger justice.” But Brooks's men met their match in the Conner family, East Texas master hunters and jailbreakers who were wanted for their part in a bloody family feud. The full story of Company F's showdown with the Conner family is finally being told, with long-dead voices being heard for the first time. This truly hidden history paints the grim picture of neighbors' and relatives' becoming snitches and bounty hunters, and a company of Texas Rangers who waded into the conflict only to find themselves over their heads—and in the fight of their lives.
Photo: No known restrictions on publication. @Batchelorshow 1908 #Texas: 4/4: Red Sky Morning: The Epic True Story of Texas Ranger Company F, by Joe Pappalardo Hardcover – Deckle Edge, June 28, 2022 https://www.amazon.com/Red-Sky-Morning-Ranger-Company/dp/1250275245/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr= Between 1886 and 1888, Sergeant James Brooks, of Texas Ranger Company F, was engaged in three fatal gunfights, endured disfiguring bullet wounds, engaged in countless manhunts, was convicted of second-degree murder, and rattled Washington, D.C., with a request for a pardon from the US president. His story anchors the tale of Joe Pappalardo's Red Sky Morning, an epic saga of lawmen and criminals set in Texas during the waning years of the “Old West.” Alongside Brooks are the Rangers of Company F, who range from a pious teetotaler to a cowboy fleeing retribution for killing a man. They are all led by Captain William Scott, who cut his teeth as a freelance undercover informant but was facing the end of his Ranger career. Company F hunted criminals across Texas and beyond, killing them as needed, and were confident they could bring anyone to “Ranger justice.” But Brooks's men met their match in the Conner family, East Texas master hunters and jailbreakers who were wanted for their part in a bloody family feud. The full story of Company F's showdown with the Conner family is finally being told, with long-dead voices being heard for the first time. This truly hidden history paints the grim picture of neighbors' and relatives' becoming snitches and bounty hunters, and a company of Texas Rangers who waded into the conflict only to find themselves over their heads—and in the fight of their lives.
Sergeant Henry Reams Campbell, Of Company B. By Richard B. Davis, Company B.Reverend Joseph Mateer, D. D., Chaplain. By Colonel John Ewing. Corporal George Bradley, Company F. Sergeant Thomas J. Marlin. By Rev. J. A. Thompson, President, Tarkio College, Missouri.Color Sergeant Thomas Wiseman.By Alexander Dempster. Support the showFind all of my social links at https://rebellionstories.com/
Links from the show:* Red Sky Morning: The Epic True Story of Texas Ranger Company F* Connect with Joe* Find Joe on Twitter* Find Ryan on Twitter* Support the showAbout my guest:Joe Pappalardo is the author of the critically acclaimed books Inferno: The True Story of a B 17 Gunner's Heroism and the Bloodiest Military Campaign in Aviation History, Sunflowers: The Secret History and Spaceport Earth: The Reinvention of Spaceflight. Pappalardo is a freelance journalist and former associate editor of Air & Space Smithsonian magazine, a writing contributor to National Geographic magazine, a contributor to Texas Monthly, and a former senior editor and current contributor to Popular Mechanics. He has appeared on C-Span, CNN, Fox News and television shows on the Science Channel and the History Channel. Get full access to Dispatches from the War Room at dispatchesfromthewarroom.substack.com/subscribe
Photo: No known restrictions on publication. 1892 Houston, Texas @Batchelorshow 3/4: Red Sky Morning: The Epic True Story of Texas Ranger Company F by Joe Pappalardo (Author) https://www.amazon.com/Red-Sky-Morning-Ranger-Company/dp/1250275245/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr= Between 1886 and 1888, Sergeant James Brooks, of Texas Ranger Company F, was engaged in three fatal gunfights, endured disfiguring bullet wounds, engaged in countless manhunts, was convicted of second-degree murder, and rattled Washington, D.C. with a request for a pardon from the US president. His story anchors the tale of Joe Pappalardo's Red Sky Morning, an epic saga of lawmen and criminals set in Texas during the waning years of the “Old West.”
Photo: No known restrictions on publication. 1892 Waco, Texas @Batchelorshow 4/4: Red Sky Morning: The Epic True Story of Texas Ranger Company F by Joe Pappalardo (Author) https://www.amazon.com/Red-Sky-Morning-Ranger-Company/dp/1250275245/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr= Between 1886 and 1888, Sergeant James Brooks, of Texas Ranger Company F, was engaged in three fatal gunfights, endured disfiguring bullet wounds, engaged in countless manhunts, was convicted of second-degree murder, and rattled Washington, D.C. with a request for a pardon from the US president. His story anchors the tale of Joe Pappalardo's Red Sky Morning, an epic saga of lawmen and criminals set in Texas during the waning years of the “Old West.”
Photo: No known restrictions on publication. 1907 Fort Worth, Texas @Batchelorshow 2/4: Red Sky Morning: The Epic True Story of Texas Ranger Company F by Joe Pappalardo (Author) https://www.amazon.com/Red-Sky-Morning-Ranger-Company/dp/1250275245/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr= Between 1886 and 1888, Sergeant James Brooks, of Texas Ranger Company F, was engaged in three fatal gunfights, endured disfiguring bullet wounds, engaged in countless manhunts, was convicted of second-degree murder, and rattled Washington, D.C. with a request for a pardon from the US president. His story anchors the tale of Joe Pappalardo's Red Sky Morning, an epic saga of lawmen and criminals set in Texas during the waning years of the “Old West.”
Photo: No known restrictions on publication. 1905 Austin, Texas @Batchelorshow 1/4: Red Sky Morning: The Epic True Story of Texas Ranger Company F by Joe Pappalardo (Author) https://www.amazon.com/Red-Sky-Morning-Ranger-Company/dp/1250275245/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr= Between 1886 and 1888, Sergeant James Brooks, of Texas Ranger Company F, was engaged in three fatal gunfights, endured disfiguring bullet wounds, engaged in countless manhunts, was convicted of second-degree murder, and rattled Washington, D.C. with a request for a pardon from the US president. His story anchors the tale of Joe Pappalardo's Red Sky Morning, an epic saga of lawmen and criminals set in Texas during the waning years of the “Old West.”
Historically Thinking: Conversations about historical knowledge and how we achieve it
What lover of American literature doesn't remember these haunting lines: “Tell about the Midwest. What's it like there. What do they do there. Why do they live there. Why do they live at all.” Of course that was, as some of you quickly recognized, a deliberate mangling of a famous passage from William Faulkner's Absalom Absalom. It's more than a little disconcerting, as I hope you noticed, to substitute Midwest for South. The South is haunted, and mysterious, and interesting. The Midwest…isn't. But the charge that Shreve McCannon laid upon Quentin Compson can be laid upon any historian of any place in any era. Even the Midwest, as Jon Lauck would certainly agree. He's the author of The Good Country: A History of the American Midwest, 1800-1900. The last time he was on the podcast was way back in Episode 13, when we talked about his manifesto The Lost Region: Toward a Revival of Midwestern History. For Further Investigation We haven't had that many talks about the Midwest, or its people; but recently we talked about South Dakota with Jon Lauck's friend and neighbor Ben Jones. Much farther in the rear view mirror is a conversation with Jane Simonsen about Black Hawk, chief of the Saux and Meskwaki tribes, which involved the forced removal of those people from the lands in the Midwest. The Midwestern History Association The Midwestern History Association has a journal, the Middle West Review; and a podcast, Heartland History Was the Midwest the American Boeotia? There's a comparative history question for you. Episode 294: Black Suffrage The Town That Started the Civil War was mentioned in the course of the conversation; the book for children or teens I was thinking of is The Price of Freedom: How One Town Stood Up to Slavery One book to read about Oberlin, Ohio as a utopian community that failed is Elusive Utopia, which focuses on Oberlin after the Civil War I was trying to remember Rick Atkinson's An Army at Dawn: The War in North Africa, 1942-1943, which focuses on Villisca's Company F (which is the only company in the Iowa National Guard to build its own armory with funds raised from the local community) as well as other units from southwest Iowa that served in the battles for North Africa. Know Your Memes: "This is Fine"
This week we would like to welcome back Dave Holland. Dave is a former United States Marine, owns and runs the facebook and youtube channel called Guadalcanal: Walking a battlefield, a Solomon islands battlefield guide, and most importantly, a Guadalcanal expert. Welcome back, Dave. We've been building up to this specific event for some time now, and so have the Japanese. As you will recall, the last several months on Guadalcanal have seen steadily larger Japanese assaults hit that Marines with intents on grabbing Henderson Field. The Japanese have tried and failed at Tenaru in August, tried and came very close at Edson's Ridge in September, tried a few smaller attacks here and there the next several weeks, all failures. Now we sit in late October and the Japanese have finally built enough forces on Guadalcanal for their almighty “decisive battle”. All the Japanese thrusts, both ashore and at sea, have led to this operation. This is the all or nothing, the decisive battle that the Japanese have clamored for and the Americans have been preparing for. This is the tipping point for better or worse. Talking Points: Preparations:The Japanese had been steadily sending troops and supplies, more troops than supplies, to Guadalcanal for several weeks in anticipation of this specific offensive. The IJN fully supported the operation in just about any way that they could. On October 14, two battleships, Kongo and Haruna, along with screening vessels shelled Henderson Field in what was easily, the worst bombardment of the entire campaign.For nearly an hour and a half the two battleships fired over 900 rounds of 14 inch ammunition into the Lunga perimeter to knock out both airfields and destroy the Cactus Air Force's aircraft.The shelling, known as “the Bombardment” by the Marines and soldiers ashore destroyed about half of the Cactus Air Force, and heavily damaged the two airfields, although one was back in operation in a few hours.This bombardment, as well as others in between, were all in conjunction with the large-scale offensive, all with plans to soften the defenses of the Americans. The Japanese had begun steadily moving troops into the attack area for many days, through the jungle (again), with the date of the main assault set for October 22, but would actually take place two days later. To distract the Americans attention from the main location of the attack, the Japanese set up a series of diversionary infantry assaults. The Japanese were under the assumption that only 10,000 Americans were ashore, when in actuality the number was over 23,000. The Americans, aware that a large scale assault was eventually coming, had been preparing their defensive perimeter for weeks.The addition of the Army's 164th Infantry Regiment gave Vandegrift a total of 13 infantry battalions to defend the perimeter in an almost continuous line. Prelude to the main event: The Japanese had been moving their main assault force through the jungle, along a trail blazed by their engineers, for days…completely undetected by American forces. At dusk on October 23, one of the diversion attacks under COL Nakaguma, alomng with 9 tanks, attacked Marine defenses at the mouth of the Matinikau river. The Japanese tanks advanced near the river under the cover of an artillery barrage, however, the Japanese tanks were either disabled or destroyed by Marine anti-tank weapons on the opposite side of the river. In response to the Japanese assault, and the Japanese artillery, 4 battalions of Marine artillery fired over 6,000 rounds at the Japanese inflicting heavy casualties and essentially stopping the assault at the river. In between the artillery detonations, Marines on the line could audibly hear Japanese screaming and moaning in pain. The artillery, yet again, was devastating.It should be mentioned that while this was happening, Vandegrift was in Noumea at the bidding of newly appointed head banana, Admiral Halsey. We'll get to Haley's installation as main man in another episode when we discuss the leadership, both good and bad, of the Guadalcanal campaign with buddy and friend of the show Jon Parshall. The Main Event October 24:At first light on October 24, Marines along the Matinikau caught sight of a long column of Japanese infantry on a ridge to the left rear of the American lines. COL Hanneken's 2/7 redeployed to the rear and loosely tied in with the Marines of 3/7, albeit with a gap in the line. With the departure of Hanneken's people, Chesty Puller was forced to stretch his single battalion over a regimental front.Only 700 men guarded an area designed for the protection from over 2,000.Puller, ever vigilant, personally walked the line inspecting each area, and each emplacement ordering improvements or movements as he saw fit in each area. As the Japanese under GEN Maruyama approached the area thought to be the correct position for attack, they began to get bogged down again by the jungle and now, also, heavy rain.The original kick off time for the attack, 1900, came and went as the Japanese continued to grope towards American lines. Finally, around 2200, elements of COL Shoji's people stumbled into the leading elements of puller's defenses.The fighting was short but fierce as Puller's men eventually drove off the attackers, making no progress and gaining no ground.Oddly enough, the Japanese sent a message back to 2nd Division HQ that stated that Japanese infantry were moving into the grassy area at the edge of the airfield, when in reality, they were nowhere near the airfield and had certainly not broken through any lines. COL Matsumoto called and stated that the airfield was now completely in Japanese hands. The 17th Army signaled “2300 Banzai-a little before 2300 the right wing captured the airfield.” This odd transmission is even stranger when one considers that the “right wing” had marginal, at best, participation in the event at all. Meanwhile, the left wing of the Japanese assault decidedly did attack.3rd Battalion 29th Infantry 11th Company under CAPT Katsumata reconned American lines in the area, found a soft spot between 2 MG emplacements and began a low crawl advance towards the American gap in the lines that was threaded with barbed wire. Japanese engineers began snipping the wire, unbeknownst to Americans, as the infantry low crawled through the grass to spring a surprise assault.Either due to delirium from the long march, fear, excitement or a combination of all 3, one lone Japanese let out a war cry that was soon picked up by many others alerting the Americans of their presence. Almost instantly American machine gun fire erupted as did mortars. The Japanese now knowing the surprise was gone, leapt up and charged. They began to get entangled in the barbed wire and were summarily annihilated by the Marines holding that area, which was Puller's A Company at about 0100. Shortly thereafter, Japanese of the 9th Company moved to the left in the wake of the now dead 11thCompany and prepared to attack.After giving a great Banzai, the men of the 9th Company charged Marine lines, running straight through the prepared machine gun position firing lanes of Puller's C Company. Within 5 minutes, the 9th Company was wiped out. John Basilone After the majority of the infantry were killed, American artillery began dropping, killing what was left of the Japanese. Puller was now aware that he was under attack from a large and well-seasoned Japanese force. He immediately fed 3 platoons from 3/164th into his lines to beef up the defenses.The National Guardsmen were led, sometimes by hand, through the torrential rain into the raging battle and fed piecemeal into the Marine lines, mixing with Marine units and holding their own in the fight. The only real success of the initial assaults came in the form of COL Furimaya's assault at dawn. Realizing he had little to work with, Furimaya assembled what he could and personally led an assault that partially pierced the American lines.About 100 Japanese broke through and held a salient in the Marine lines that was eradicated in the morning. The Main Event October 25:By mid-morning, it was obvious that the Japanese were not through with their assault. As a result, Marines and Army troops began to reshuffle their defenses and prepare for another night time assault. For over an hour after 2000, the Japanese fired artillery into the positions of Puller's 1/7 and LCOL Robert Hall's 164th IR. The majority of the assault fell on the soldiers of the 164th who held their ground again, all night long. With the main push coming through an artery between the 2nd and 3rd BTLN 164th. However, that artery was manned by a couple of Marine 37mm guns that were firing canister into the charging Japanese.A few Japanese parties broke the lines, but those were hunted down and killed by soldiers and Marines within hours. The return of Col Oka…His attacks concentrate on the area held by Hanneken's 2/7Just before midnight, the Japanese surged forward against the Marine positions, finally culminating in an all out assault at 0300.Company F bore the brunt of this assault…Mitch PaigeDespite Paige's heroics, Japanese scaled the slopes in front of F Company and ejected them from their positionsMAJ Odell Conoley led a group of Marines that counterattacked and eliminated the Japanese in the former positions of F Company. The Battle Over: Rough US casualties run about 90 KIA Japanese casualties are unknown in exact figures but estimates range in the neighborhood of 2,200 but probably more than that. The Japanese blamed the terrain, the march through the jungle, no air support, poor physical condition of the troops, inadequate supplies, faulty intel, etc, etc…all of which were accurate. While this isn't the last land battle on Guadalcanal, it certainly was the most crucial to the Japanese, and the most decisive for the Americans. For all intents and purposes, the land campaign, in terms of Japanese all-out assaults and large-scale operations, was over. While there were plans for yet another assault in November, as we shall see, this does not end well for the Japanese.
PHOTO: NO KNOWN RESTRICTIONS ON PUBLICATION. 1891 @BATCHELORSHOW 1/4: Red Sky Morning: The Epic True Story of Texas Ranger Company F by Joe Pappalardo (Author) https://www.amazon.com/Red-Sky-Morning-Ranger-Company/dp/1250275245/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr= Between 1886 and 1888, Sergeant James Brooks, of Texas Ranger Company F, was engaged in three fatal gunfights, endured disfiguring bullet wounds, engaged in countless manhunts, was convicted of second-degree murder, and rattled Washington, D.C. with a request for a pardon from the US president. His story anchors the tale of Joe Pappalardo's Red Sky Morning, an epic saga of lawmen and criminals set in Texas during the waning years of the “Old West.” Alongside Brooks are the Rangers of Company F, who range from a pious teetotaler to a cowboy fleeing retribution for killing a man. They are all led by Captain William Scott, who cut his teeth as a freelance undercover informant but was facing the end of his Ranger career. Company F hunted criminals across Texas and beyond, killing them as needed, and were confident they could bring anyone to “Ranger justice.” But Brooks' men met their match in the Conner family, East Texas master hunters and jailbreakers who were wanted for their part in a bloody family feud.
Photo: No known restrictions on publication. El Paso 1895 @Batchelorshow 2/4: Red Sky Morning: The Epic True Story of Texas Ranger Company F by Joe Pappalardo (Author) https://www.amazon.com/Red-Sky-Morning-Ranger-Company/dp/1250275245/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr= Between 1886 and 1888, Sergeant James Brooks, of Texas Ranger Company F, was engaged in three fatal gunfights, endured disfiguring bullet wounds, engaged in countless manhunts, was convicted of second-degree murder, and rattled Washington, D.C. with a request for a pardon from the US president. His story anchors the tale of Joe Pappalardo's Red Sky Morning, an epic saga of lawmen and criminals set in Texas during the waning years of the “Old West.” Alongside Brooks are the Rangers of Company F, who range from a pious teetotaler to a cowboy fleeing retribution for killing a man. They are all led by Captain William Scott, who cut his teeth as a freelance undercover informant but was facing the end of his Ranger career. Company F hunted criminals across Texas and beyond, killing them as needed, and were confident they could bring anyone to “Ranger justice.” But Brooks' men met their match in the Conner family, East Texas master hunters and jailbreakers who were wanted for their part in a bloody family feud.
Photo: No known restrictions on publication. Houston 1895 @Batchelorshow 3/4: Red Sky Morning: The Epic True Story of Texas Ranger Company F by Joe Pappalardo (Author) https://www.amazon.com/Red-Sky-Morning-Ranger-Company/dp/1250275245/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr= Between 1886 and 1888, Sergeant James Brooks, of Texas Ranger Company F, was engaged in three fatal gunfights, endured disfiguring bullet wounds, engaged in countless manhunts, was convicted of second-degree murder, and rattled Washington, D.C. with a request for a pardon from the US president. His story anchors the tale of Joe Pappalardo's Red Sky Morning, an epic saga of lawmen and criminals set in Texas during the waning years of the “Old West.” Alongside Brooks are the Rangers of Company F, who range from a pious teetotaler to a cowboy fleeing retribution for killing a man. They are all led by Captain William Scott, who cut his teeth as a freelance undercover informant but was facing the end of his Ranger career. Company F hunted criminals across Texas and beyond, killing them as needed, and were confident they could bring anyone to “Ranger justice.” But Brooks' men met their match in the Conner family, East Texas master hunters and jailbreakers who were wanted for their part in a bloody family feud.
Photo: No known restrictions on publication. Rio Grande River 1890 @Batchelorshow 4/4: Red Sky Morning: The Epic True Story of Texas Ranger Company F by Joe Pappalardo (Author) https://www.amazon.com/Red-Sky-Morning-Ranger-Company/dp/1250275245/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr= Between 1886 and 1888, Sergeant James Brooks, of Texas Ranger Company F, was engaged in three fatal gunfights, endured disfiguring bullet wounds, engaged in countless manhunts, was convicted of second-degree murder, and rattled Washington, D.C. with a request for a pardon from the US president. His story anchors the tale of Joe Pappalardo's Red Sky Morning, an epic saga of lawmen and criminals set in Texas during the waning years of the “Old West.” Alongside Brooks are the Rangers of Company F, who range from a pious teetotaler to a cowboy fleeing retribution for killing a man. They are all led by Captain William Scott, who cut his teeth as a freelance undercover informant but was facing the end of his Ranger career. Company F hunted criminals across Texas and beyond, killing them as needed, and were confident they could bring anyone to “Ranger justice.” But Brooks' men met their match in the Conner family, East Texas master hunters and jailbreakers who were wanted for their part in a bloody family feud.
A Country Boy In The Army.By Color-Corporal Arch. N. Euwer. Company C. Campaigning With Company A. By Private Nathan N. Fullerton. The Charge At Five Forks. By Orderly-Sergeant J. A. Mcdowell, Company F. Support the showFind all of my social links at https://rebellionstories.com/
Dirk Kreuters Vertriebsoffensive: Verkauf | Marketing | Vertrieb | Führung | Motivation
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Photo: No known restrictions on publication. 1920 @Batchelorshow 2/4 Red Sky Morning: The Epic True Story of Texas Ranger Company F Hardcover – Deckle Edge, June 28, 2022 by Joe Pappalardo (Author) https://www.amazon.com/Red-Sky-Morning-Ranger-Company/dp/1250275245/ref=sr_1_1?crid=3LYPTU9SWQ97W&keywords=RED+SKY+MORNING&qid=1669241540&s=books&sprefix=red+sky+morning%2Cstripbooks%2C77&sr=1-1Between 1886 and 1888, Sergeant James Brooks, of Texas Ranger Company F, was engaged in three fatal gunfights, endured disfiguring bullet wounds, engaged in countless manhunts, was convicted of second-degree murder, and rattled Washington, D.C. with a request for a pardon from the US president. His story anchors the tale of Joe Pappalardo's Red Sky Morning, an epic saga of lawmen and criminals set in Texas during the waning years of the “Old West.” Alongside Brooks are the Rangers of Company F, who range from a pious teetotaler to a cowboy fleeing retribution for killing a man. They are all led by Captain William Scott, who cut his teeth as a freelance undercover informant but was facing the end of his Ranger career. Company F hunted criminals across Texas and beyond, killing them as needed, and were confident they could bring anyone to “Ranger justice.” But Brooks' men met their match in the Conner family, East Texas master hunters and jailbreakers who were wanted for their part in a bloody family feud.
Photo: No known restrictions on publication. Captain Bill McDonald 1909 @Batchelorshow 3/4 Red Sky Morning: The Epic True Story of Texas Ranger Company F Hardcover – Deckle Edge, June 28, 2022 by Joe Pappalardo (Author) https://www.amazon.com/Red-Sky-Morning-Ranger-Company/dp/1250275245/ref=sr_1_1?crid=3LYPTU9SWQ97W&keywords=RED+SKY+MORNING&qid=1669241540&s=books&sprefix=red+sky+morning%2Cstripbooks%2C77&sr=1-1Between 1886 and 1888, Sergeant James Brooks, of Texas Ranger Company F, was engaged in three fatal gunfights, endured disfiguring bullet wounds, engaged in countless manhunts, was convicted of second-degree murder, and rattled Washington, D.C. with a request for a pardon from the US president. His story anchors the tale of Joe Pappalardo's Red Sky Morning, an epic saga of lawmen and criminals set in Texas during the waning years of the “Old West.” Alongside Brooks are the Rangers of Company F, who range from a pious teetotaler to a cowboy fleeing retribution for killing a man. They are all led by Captain William Scott, who cut his teeth as a freelance undercover informant but was facing the end of his Ranger career. Company F hunted criminals across Texas and beyond, killing them as needed, and were confident they could bring anyone to “Ranger justice.” But Brooks' men met their match in the Conner family, East Texas master hunters and jailbreakers who were wanted for their part in a bloody family feud.
Photo: No known restrictions on publication. Texas Ranger Review, Seattle. @Batchelorshow 4/4 Red Sky Morning: The Epic True Story of Texas Ranger Company F Hardcover – Deckle Edge, June 28, 2022 by Joe Pappalardo (Author) https://www.amazon.com/Red-Sky-Morning-Ranger-Company/dp/1250275245/ref=sr_1_1?crid=3LYPTU9SWQ97W&keywords=RED+SKY+MORNING&qid=1669241540&s=books&sprefix=red+sky+morning%2Cstripbooks%2C77&sr=1-1Between 1886 and 1888, Sergeant James Brooks, of Texas Ranger Company F, was engaged in three fatal gunfights, endured disfiguring bullet wounds, engaged in countless manhunts, was convicted of second-degree murder, and rattled Washington, D.C. with a request for a pardon from the US president. His story anchors the tale of Joe Pappalardo's Red Sky Morning, an epic saga of lawmen and criminals set in Texas during the waning years of the “Old West.” Alongside Brooks are the Rangers of Company F, who range from a pious teetotaler to a cowboy fleeing retribution for killing a man. They are all led by Captain William Scott, who cut his teeth as a freelance undercover informant but was facing the end of his Ranger career. Company F hunted criminals across Texas and beyond, killing them as needed, and were confident they could bring anyone to “Ranger justice.” But Brooks' men met their match in the Conner family, East Texas master hunters and jailbreakers who were wanted for their part in a bloody family feud.
Photo: No known restrictions on publication. 1885 @Batchelorshow 1/4 Red Sky Morning: The Epic True Story of Texas Ranger Company F Hardcover – Deckle Edge, June 28, 2022 by Joe Pappalardo (Author) https://www.amazon.com/Red-Sky-Morning-Ranger-Company/dp/1250275245/ref=sr_1_1?crid=3LYPTU9SWQ97W&keywords=RED+SKY+MORNING&qid=1669241540&s=books&sprefix=red+sky+morning%2Cstripbooks%2C77&sr=1-1Between 1886 and 1888, Sergeant James Brooks, of Texas Ranger Company F, was engaged in three fatal gunfights, endured disfiguring bullet wounds, engaged in countless manhunts, was convicted of second-degree murder, and rattled Washington, D.C. with a request for a pardon from the US president. His story anchors the tale of Joe Pappalardo's Red Sky Morning, an epic saga of lawmen and criminals set in Texas during the waning years of the “Old West.” Alongside Brooks are the Rangers of Company F, who range from a pious teetotaler to a cowboy fleeing retribution for killing a man. They are all led by Captain William Scott, who cut his teeth as a freelance undercover informant but was facing the end of his Ranger career. Company F hunted criminals across Texas and beyond, killing them as needed, and were confident they could bring anyone to “Ranger justice.” But Brooks' men met their match in the Conner family, East Texas master hunters and jailbreakers who were wanted for their part in a bloody family feud.
The big ole Episode 50! Can't believe I made it. The Battle Of Fredericksburg. By Henry F. Weaver, Corporal, Company B.Uncle John Mackin's War Experience. By Private Charles F. McKenna, Company F. Find all of my social links at https://rebellionstories.com/
Corporal Samuel W. Hill tells us about the men and boys who made up Company F in the 155th Pennsylvania Infantry Regiment and what became of some of them during the war.
The Texas Rangers in the late 1880s were a tough and colorful lot, especially the members of Company F. And while they made their livings hunting down outlaws, none proved more cunning than Willis Conner and his sons, a fugitive family accused of murdering two neighbors in a business dispute over pigs. My guest is Joe Pappalardo, author of "Red Sky Morning: The Epic True Story of Texas Ranger Company F". He not only shares details of the events leading to the showdown between the Rangers and the Conners, but talks about one of the most vaunted members of Company F, James Brooks, and a fatal gunfight that got him indicted for murder. More about the book and the author can be discovered here: https://www.joe-pappalardo.com/
Photo: 4/4: Red Sky Morning: The Epic True Story of Texas Ranger Company F, by Joe Pappalardo Hardcover – Deckle Edge, June 28, 2022 https://www.amazon.com/Red-Sky-Morning-Ranger-Company/dp/1250275245/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr= Between 1886 and 1888, Sergeant James Brooks, of Texas Ranger Company F, was engaged in three fatal gunfights, endured disfiguring bullet wounds, engaged in countless manhunts, was convicted of second-degree murder, and rattled Washington, D.C., with a request for a pardon from the US president. His story anchors the tale of Joe Pappalardo's Red Sky Morning, an epic saga of lawmen and criminals set in Texas during the waning years of the “Old West.” Alongside Brooks are the Rangers of Company F, who range from a pious teetotaler to a cowboy fleeing retribution for killing a man. They are all led by Captain William Scott, who cut his teeth as a freelance undercover informant but was facing the end of his Ranger career. Company F hunted criminals across Texas and beyond, killing them as needed, and were confident they could bring anyone to “Ranger justice.” But Brooks's men met their match in the Conner family, East Texas master hunters and jailbreakers who were wanted for their part in a bloody family feud. The full story of Company F's showdown with the Conner family is finally being told, with long-dead voices being heard for the first time. This truly hidden history paints the grim picture of neighbors' and relatives' becoming snitches and bounty hunters, and a company of Texas Rangers who waded into the conflict only to find themselves over their heads—and in the fight of their lives.
Photo: 3/4: Red Sky Morning: The Epic True Story of Texas Ranger Company F, by Joe Pappalardo Hardcover – Deckle Edge, June 28, 2022 https://www.amazon.com/Red-Sky-Morning-Ranger-Company/dp/1250275245/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr= Between 1886 and 1888, Sergeant James Brooks, of Texas Ranger Company F, was engaged in three fatal gunfights, endured disfiguring bullet wounds, engaged in countless manhunts, was convicted of second-degree murder, and rattled Washington, D.C., with a request for a pardon from the US president. His story anchors the tale of Joe Pappalardo's Red Sky Morning, an epic saga of lawmen and criminals set in Texas during the waning years of the “Old West.” Alongside Brooks are the Rangers of Company F, who range from a pious teetotaler to a cowboy fleeing retribution for killing a man. They are all led by Captain William Scott, who cut his teeth as a freelance undercover informant but was facing the end of his Ranger career. Company F hunted criminals across Texas and beyond, killing them as needed, and were confident they could bring anyone to “Ranger justice.” But Brooks's men met their match in the Conner family, East Texas master hunters and jailbreakers who were wanted for their part in a bloody family feud. The full story of Company F's showdown with the Conner family is finally being told, with long-dead voices being heard for the first time. This truly hidden history paints the grim picture of neighbors' and relatives' becoming snitches and bounty hunters, and a company of Texas Rangers who waded into the conflict only to find themselves over their heads—and in the fight of their lives.
Photo: 2/4: Red Sky Morning: The Epic True Story of Texas Ranger Company F, by Joe Pappalardo Hardcover – Deckle Edge, June 28, 2022 https://www.amazon.com/Red-Sky-Morning-Ranger-Company/dp/1250275245/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr= Between 1886 and 1888, Sergeant James Brooks, of Texas Ranger Company F, was engaged in three fatal gunfights, endured disfiguring bullet wounds, engaged in countless manhunts, was convicted of second-degree murder, and rattled Washington, D.C., with a request for a pardon from the US president. His story anchors the tale of Joe Pappalardo's Red Sky Morning, an epic saga of lawmen and criminals set in Texas during the waning years of the “Old West.” Alongside Brooks are the Rangers of Company F, who range from a pious teetotaler to a cowboy fleeing retribution for killing a man. They are all led by Captain William Scott, who cut his teeth as a freelance undercover informant but was facing the end of his Ranger career. Company F hunted criminals across Texas and beyond, killing them as needed, and were confident they could bring anyone to “Ranger justice.” But Brooks's men met their match in the Conner family, East Texas master hunters and jailbreakers who were wanted for their part in a bloody family feud. The full story of Company F's showdown with the Conner family is finally being told, with long-dead voices being heard for the first time. This truly hidden history paints the grim picture of neighbors' and relatives' becoming snitches and bounty hunters, and a company of Texas Rangers who waded into the conflict only to find themselves over their heads—and in the fight of their lives.
Photo: 1/4: Red Sky Morning: The Epic True Story of Texas Ranger Company F, by Joe Pappalardo Hardcover – Deckle Edge, June 28, 2022 https://www.amazon.com/Red-Sky-Morning-Ranger-Company/dp/1250275245/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr= Between 1886 and 1888, Sergeant James Brooks, of Texas Ranger Company F, was engaged in three fatal gunfights, endured disfiguring bullet wounds, engaged in countless manhunts, was convicted of second-degree murder, and rattled Washington, D.C., with a request for a pardon from the US president. His story anchors the tale of Joe Pappalardo's Red Sky Morning, an epic saga of lawmen and criminals set in Texas during the waning years of the “Old West.” Alongside Brooks are the Rangers of Company F, who range from a pious teetotaler to a cowboy fleeing retribution for killing a man. They are all led by Captain William Scott, who cut his teeth as a freelance undercover informant but was facing the end of his Ranger career. Company F hunted criminals across Texas and beyond, killing them as needed, and were confident they could bring anyone to “Ranger justice.” But Brooks's men met their match in the Conner family, East Texas master hunters and jailbreakers who were wanted for their part in a bloody family feud. The full story of Company F's showdown with the Conner family is finally being told, with long-dead voices being heard for the first time. This truly hidden history paints the grim picture of neighbors' and relatives' becoming snitches and bounty hunters, and a company of Texas Rangers who waded into the conflict only to find themselves over their heads—and in the fight of their lives.
Has Cathie Wood's fame come to an end? After riding Tesla and other hot tech stocks in 2020, Wood predicted a strong 20% return in 2021 for her flagship fund ARKK. That was not the case as the fund lost over 23% in 2021 and is down nearly 9% to start 2022. Labor Force Participation Boston Beer Company The 10-year note hit 1.8% Friday morning Stocks Discussed: International Business Machines Corporation (IBM) Starbucks (SBUX) Ford Motor Company (F) Live Nation Entertainment, Inc. (LYV)
In this series, we follow WWII Marine Corporal Harvey Hunt as Fire Team Leader in Company F of the 2nd Battalion 23rd Regiment of the 4th Marine Division as he invades four islands throughout the Pacific Theater. In this episode, Cpl Hunt describes his enlistment, training, adjustment to USMC life and his first battle: the invasion of Roi-Namur on the Kwajalein atoll. WARNING: Some listeners may find the content disturbing.Here is a link to our first video update for our podcast!https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Hb8Y9xXn_3Uhf_pxCqjXiITb6-b2Tn9S/view?usp=sharing
Urlaub, so lang man möchte? Und so oft man möchte? Immer mehr Unternehmen bieten ihren Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeitern unbegrenzte Urlaubstage an. In der Vergangenheit machten es unter anderem US-amerikanische Internetfirmen wie Facebook, Netflix und Dropbox vor, hierzulande haben Unternehmen wie der Matratzen-Fabrikant Casper und die Werbeagentur Serviceplan von sich Reden gemacht. Auch die Hamburger Belegschaft des Meinungsforschungsstartups Appinio zählen seit drei Wochen zu den Glücklichen. Gründer Jonathan Kurfess hat auf Linkedin die Neuregelung angekündigt und schrieb: „Das ist es, was ich gerne von meinem ehemaligen Arbeitgeber bekommen hätte.“ Doch was genau verbirgt sich hinter der Ankündigung? Sponsor-Hinweis (Anzeige): Der heutige Podcast wird gesponsert von LanguageTool. Language Tool ist ein intelligenter Schreibassistent für alle gängigen Browser und Textverarbeitungsprogramme. Unter anderem deckt das Tool verschiedene Funktionen wie Grammatik-oder Stilvorschläge sowie Synonymvorschläge in über 20 Sprachen ab. Mehr erfährst du unter http://languagetool.com/t3n.
On May 25, 1861, Emma Edmonds became Private Franklin Thompson and was mustered into Company F of the Second Michigan Regiment of Volunteer Infantry as a 3-year recruit. Fueled by love of her country and a see slavery's end, Emma, as Frank, volunteered to fight for the Union armies.
Kyle Carpenter is a medically retired United States Marine who received the United States' highest military award for valor, the Medal of Honor, for his actions in Afghanistan on 21 November 2010. On that day, Carpenter threw himself on an enemy grenade in order to save the life of a fellow Marine. Carpenter is the youngest living Medal of Honor recipient. Kyle's book: You are Worth it - Building a life worth fighting for Magic Spoon Feals Mint Mobile The president of the United States, in the name of the congress, take pleasure in presenting the Medal of Honor to Lance Corporal William "Kyle" Carpenter, United States Marine Corps, For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as an Automatic Rifleman with Company F, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, Regimental Combat Team 1, 1st Marine Division (Forward), 1 Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward), in Helmand Province, Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom on 21 November 2010. Lance Corporal Carpenter was a member of a platoon-sized coalition force, comprised of two reinforced Marine squads partnered with an Afghan National Army squad. The platoon had established Patrol Base Dakota two days earlier in a small village in the Marjah District in order to disrupt enemy activity and provide security for the local Afghan population. Lance Corporal Carpenter and a fellow Marine were manning a rooftop security position on the perimeter of Patrol Base Dakota when the enemy initiated a daylight attack with hand grenades, one of which landed inside their sandbagged position. Without hesitation, and with complete disregard for his own safety, Lance Corporal Carpenter moved toward the grenade in an attempt to shield his fellow Marine from the deadly blast. When the grenade detonated, his body absorbed the brunt of the blast, severely wounding him, but saving the life of his fellow Marine. By his undaunted courage, bold fighting spirit, and unwavering devotion to duty in the face of almost certain death, Lance Corporal Carpenter reflected great credit upon himself and upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.
Micheal Larson and John David Smith's Dear Delia chronicles life in the famed Iron Brigade as told through 155 letters home. Young's insights, often poignant and powerful, enable readers seemingly to witness the Civil War as he did. Few topics avoided Henry's careful eye. Bluntly honest with his emotions and opinions, he left little doubt as to where he stood on the questions of the day. His correspondence--candid, contemplative, thorough, and occasionally humorous--provides a clear window into everyday events, as well as into war, society, and politics. Young's letters reveal the perspective of a young officer from America's western heartland, giving a regional perspective generally omitted from Civil War-era documentary editing projects. Young's correspondence is uncommonly interesting, readable, and revealing, replete with astute insights. It covers many topics during the first three years of the Civil War, including innumerable details of military service: the brutality of internecine "hard war," camp life, camaraderie, pettiness, and thievery among the troops, equipage, and food shortages. Henry also addresses military leadership, maneuvers and tactics, rumored troop movements, and what he considered the strengths and weaknesses of African American soldiers. The letters provide invaluable glimpses into the fine points of building earthworks, ducking incoming artillery barrages, maintaining camp sanitation, and obtaining medical care. Henry's correspondence additionally documents his business affairs on the home front and wartime inflation. From newspapers he retained a firm grasp of Wisconsin and national politics, often noting incidents of graft and corruption and his pointed opinions regarding the 1864 presidential election. Dear Delia further contains gossip and information about other enlistees from Young's rural Wisconsin community who served in his unit, Company F. Above all, Henry's communication highlights his unflagging patriotism and his fierce determination to preserve the Union no matter the cost. Micheal J. Larson first unearthed Young's correspondence at the Wisconsin Historical Society as an undergraduate student at the University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire in 1985. Today he teaches history at an Eau Claire high school. John David Smith is the Charles H. Stone Distinguished Professor of American History at the University of North Carolina-Charlotte. He has published twenty-nine books, many on the topic of the Civil War, and has edited collections of letters, diaries, and other primary works on the war, race relations, and southern history.
Investment Analysis Of Ford Motor Company (F) Stock What you'll learn in this video... - My Thoughts On Ford As An Investment - Why It Has Too Much Debt - Why It Has Negative Book Value In A Real World Sense - Why Its Negative Book Value Is Around $120 billion by my estimates - Why I Don't Recommend Investing In It - And More To see our other investment analysis/case study videos you can go here - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QYSHyJd2rGk&list=PLfmorMVSKq1edLBLeG2-ESJkgc_q589aR Or you can use the following links to see our most recent videos in this series... Investment Analysis of Coty (COTY) - https://www.valueinvestingjourney.com/investment-analysis-of-coty/ Investment Analysis of Exxon Mobil (XOM) - https://www.valueinvestingjourney.com/investment-analysis-of-exxon-mobil-xom/ Investment Analysis Of AT&T (T) - https://www.valueinvestingjourney.com/investment-analysis-of-att-t/ Investment Analysis Of T-Mobile (TMUS) - https://www.valueinvestingjourney.com/investment-analysis-of-t-mobile-tmus/ Investment Analysis of IBM Before Its Spin Off (IBM) - https://www.valueinvestingjourney.com/investment-analysis-of-ibm/ Investment Analysis Of US Steel (X) For Cody S. - https://www.valueinvestingjourney.com/investment-analysis-of-united-states-steel-corp/ Learn The Top 7 Tips I've Developed Over The Last 12+ Years That Will Help You Find Great Stocks Faster by clicking the link below.. https://valueinvestingjourney.clickfunnels.com/optin-26253949 Download A Free Copy of My Acclaimed Value Investing Education Book How To Value Invest By clicking the link below… https://mastermind.valueinvestingjourney.com/vijfreebook39461373 Masterclass - https://www.valueinvestingjourney.com/value-investing-masterclass-lifetime-access/ Five Free Gifts - https://riveraholdings.activehosted.com/f/1 If you liked the video above, you can subscribe to our YouTube channel by clicking here - https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCPU_d18Co-t8Bhmuey33W-w?sub_confirmation=1 - so you're notified every time we release a new video. To listen to our podcasts, use the following links… • Value Investing In Your Car - https://anchor.fm/jason-rivera • I Love Value Investing - https://anchor.fm/jason-rivera2/ Also, make sure to check out our website – valueinvestingjourney.com – which has twice been named a Top 50 Value Investing Blog In The World. What’d you think of the topic above? Do you have any tips of your own you think I missed? Let me know in the comments below. #investing #business #finance --- This episode is sponsored by · Anchor: The easiest way to make a podcast. https://anchor.fm/app Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/jason-rivera/support
Ford Motor Company (NYSE: F) Q3 2020 earnings call dated Oct. 28, 2020 Revenues rose 1% year-over-year to $37.5 billion. Net income amounted to $2.4 billion, or $0.60 per share, compared to $0.4 billion, or $0.11 per share, last year. Adjusted EPS was $0.65 Corporate Participants: Lynn Antipas Tyson — Executive Director, Investor Relations James D. Farley — Chief Executive Officer John Lawler — Chief Financial Officer Marion Harris — President and Chief Executive Officer, Ford Motor Credit Company Analysts: John Murphy — Bank of America – Merrill Lynch — Analyst Rod Lache — Wolfe Research — Analyst Emmanuel Rosner — Deutsche Bank Research — Analyst Adam Jonas — Morgan Stanley — Analyst Ryan Brinkman — JP Morgan — Analyst Mark Delaney — Goldman Sachs — Analyst Brian Johnson — Barclays — Analyst Dan Levy — Credit Suisse — Analyst Joseph Spak — RBC Capital Markets — Analyst --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/earningspodcast/message Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/earningspodcast/support
This is Blurred Laws & Life with acclaimed lawyer & litigator Richard Busch. On this second episode, we discuss: The horrors going on in New York but staying positive, hearing from Adversaries in Law, Free Play Music, Jackie Gleason, Billy on The Street & The Night Of from a legal perspective, Mr. Deeds & John Turturro, Joel Martin being one of the people who discovered Eminem, The Bass Brothers, a landmark case that he represented, digital royalties being payable to artists, Best of Compilation Records, Licensing Provisions, Steve Jobs' thoughts on music & Deposing him, the position of the Record Labels, Aftermath Records & Interscope Records, The verdict of the case, how he became referred to the case, The first lawsuit on being paid for permanent downloads, representing James Taylor, almost being killed in a bicycle accident & more. Then it's an honor & a privilege to have renowned Producer & Engineer as our guest to discuss: Surviving COVID-19 in Detroit, 8 Mile, First meeting his partners, Meeting George Clinton, Producing when he was 18, Getting his own studio in 1984, Soul Intent in 1992, Discovering Eminem with Mark & Jeff Bass, Turning from Marshall Mathers to Slim Shady & if there was a noticeable difference, Aftermath entering the picture, Why it was desirable to have a major record label involved, Agreements with Interscope, Lawsuits they've been involved in together, What gave him the courage to file the lawsuit & alienate the record labels in the process, Filing the case & summary judgement, staring down millions of dollars in legal fees, one of the happiest days of their life, Deposing Steve Jobs, Controlled Composition clause, Suing Universal & Apple, It being important to be able to license directly to Apple, suing Apple for Copyright infringement, Suing Facebook & more. This episode is not to be missed! New Episodes air every Thursday at 6PM EST/3 PM PS Produced by www.DBPodcasts.com Music Provided by FreePlayMusic.com
What causes one man to jump on a grenade to save a fellow Marine when most of us would run the other way? That’s exactly what my guest today, Kyle Carpenter, did when attacked by the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2010. Through his actions, he was awarded the Medal of Honor as the youngest living Medal of Honor recipient. Today, Kyle and I talk about the days leading up to his heroic action, what exactly happened, his injuries sustained, his road to recovery, and his evolution as a human being since. We also cover his new book, You Are Worth It: Building a Life Worth Fighting For. SHOW HIGHLIGHTS Living life one day at a time Joining the Marines Always looking for a challenge Searching for the right path Preparing for the unknown Valuing those around you Learning from others Life after boot camp Helping the oppressed Getting mission-ready Surrounded by Taliban Accepting your fate A level of detachment Another day in Afganistan Going through rehabilitation A life well lived Living a bonus round KYLE CARPENTER Gentlemen, today I have the honor of introducing you to my friend and the youngest ever living Medal of Honor recipient, Kyle Carpenter. Kyle joined the Marine Corps at 19 and not long after was deployed with the 1st Marine Division to Afghanistan where he threw himself on a grenade to save a fellow Marine.This man is one of the most humble people that I know and I’m inspired by his experience, his life, and who is he as a human being.Before we get into the conversation, I’m going to read you his Medal of Honor Citation: For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as an Automatic Rifleman with Company F, 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines, Regimental Combat Team 1, 1st Marine Division (Forward), I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward), in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, in support of Operation Enduring Freedom on 21 November 2010. Lance Corporal Carpenter was a member of a platoon-sized coalition force, comprised of two reinforced Marine rifle squads partnered with an Afghan National Army squad. The platoon had established Patrol Base Dakota two days earlier in a small village in the Marjah District in order to disrupt enemy activity and provide security for the local Afghan population. Lance Corporal Carpenter and a fellow Marine were manning a rooftop security position on the perimeter of Patrol Base Dakota when the enemy initiated a daylight attack with hand grenades, one of which landed inside their sandbagged position. Without hesitation and with complete disregard for his own safety, Lance Corporal Carpenter moved toward the grenade in an attempt to shield his fellow Marine from the deadly blast. When the grenade detonated, his body absorbed the brunt of the blast, severely wounding him, but saving the life of his fellow Marine. By his undaunted courage, bold fighting spirit, and unwavering devotion to duty in the face of almost certain death, Lance Corporal Carpenter reflected great credit upon himself and upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service. MAINE EVENT Many of you already know that a couple of months ago we held our first-ever Maine Event. It was such a huge success, that I wanted to open it up again as soon as possible. So, with plenty of notice, we marked our calendars for May 29-31, 2020. Those initial seats have been sold out but we feel like we can facilitate a few more men so we’ve opened up 20 more spots – that’s it. This is a 2 ½ day event designed to help you forge new bonds with men on the same path as you and give you the tools and framework to accomplish more in a 90-day period that you have potential in your entire life. If you want to lock in one of the 20 remaining spots, head to www.orderofman.com/maineevent today, watch the video recap of our last event, and get registered quickly. I hope to see you there. Again, go to www.orderofman.com/maineevent. Connect with us on Instagram and Twitter Subscribe to our YouTube channel at www.youtube.com/orderofman Please leave us a rating and review Support Order of Man by picking up some new merchandise in our store
Not everyone can claim that they were born in Purgatory, but Andrew Tozier could, on February 11, 1838. Purgatory is a town near the Monmouth-Litchfield line in central Maine and is neither a heaven or a hell - like most towns, just somewhere in between. But during his life, Andrew Tozier would see more than his fair share of the landscape bordering Hell, even if it was all man-made. In fact, he would become one of the most interesting and least noted figures of the American Civil War. Tozier's family moved from Purgatory to the Plymouth, Maine area in 1848 when he was a mere ten years old. His father, was an abusive alcoholic who wrought his anger upon his children. We do not know exactly at what age Andrew ran away from home, but it is likely he was quite young. The fifth of seven children, his absence meant one less mouth to feed at the Tozier homestead, but it also meant that young Andrew was now penniless, and on his own in a largely agrarian state, with no real prospects and no plan for the future. In that, he wasn't alone. In the 1850s before the advent of the American Civil War, there were large numbers of ‘homeless' men moving from place to place in search of work, food, and warmth in the winter. Tozier likely took a common route - he may have made his way to the coast and became a sailor. He may have been a day laborer or worked from season to season, depending on the harvest. He may have found work in the lumber trade. Whatever he did, he was surely uneducated beyond a basic grammar school experience and he was certainly a wanderer, growing up rather quickly on his own, away from any home. We do know that he reconnected with the Tozier clan in 1861 when he returned to their Plymouth home. Lincoln had called the banners and it was time for twenty-seven year old Andrew Tozier to settle into a trade, of sorts. He signed up to fight for the Union, enlisting in Company F of the 2nd Maine Infantry. In those days, local groups of men could form units and fight together within the larger companies in the army.So it was in Maine, like it was everywhere else. Andrew would have received the basic training and drill that any of the soldiers of the newly formed Army would have received. In the early days of the war, the number of battles were few and far between, but the 2nd Maine saw action in one of the early ones. Andrew Tozier was in the thick of the Battle of Gaines Mill, also known as the Battle of Chickahominy River. In Hanover County, Virginia, on June 27,1862, General Lee made the largest advance of the confederate side thus far in the war, pushing the Union troops back over the Chickahominy River in retreat. Tozier was wounded in the battle almost a year to his date of enlistment, losing his middle finger to a minie ball, breaking one rib, and receiving what must have been a lifelong ailment for him - a bullet in his left ankle that went in but never came out. Captured as a prisoner of war by the South, he recuperated in two different Confederate prisons in Richmond. He was used to hard living and managed to heal while incarcerated. He was eventually paroled and allowed to return to the north, this time with Company I of the 20th Maine. In the early part of the war, nearly every soldier was inexperienced. A soldier like Tozier, already wounded, imprisoned, battle-scarred and now back to fight again, would likely have had some gravitas with the newer recruits as someone with at least a modicum of knowledge of how to fight.His experience in battle, brief though it was, set him apart from the rest of the men. It must have been an odd thing for him to experience - the respect and admiration of other soldiers for an ill-educated rambler from central Maine. The whole unit was a little like him -it was made up of men from other units, leftovers, remnants and the odd new recruit. That's how Tozier got in to the 20th Maine. Their leader was a scholar, an unlikely military strategist who knew his martial training from reading ancient texts in Greek and Latin. Andrew Tozier didn't know Joshua Chmaberlain, not then. He was his commander and that was all he needed to know. Like all of the men in the 20th Maine, he knew how to work, how to walk, how to make do. It was something that had kept him going when everything seemed like it was going against him. He had been wounded and captured, but here he was, back in the midst of the action. Events would conspiure so that in less than a month when another soldier's drunkenness reared its ugly head, it gave him the opportunity that changed his life forever. To be a bearer of the colors for a unit was an honor among the soldiers of the day. It was generally believed by the soldiers than the man bearing the colors was the bravest of them all. He was in the front. He was bold. A color bearer led the men into battle and gave the soldiers a focal point on the field when the fighting started and the fog of battle descended on them. A soldier looked to the color bearer and followed him - no other real communication was possible on the field once the guns began to fire. Hiram Maxim, another Mainer from Sangerville, had not yet invented smokeless gunpowder and in the heat of any Civil War battle, soldiers were often limited to being able to see only a few feet in front of themselves. The color bearer might be the only sight recognized in that field, once the bullets began to fly. Sergeant Charles Proctor was the color bearer for the 20th Maine as it marched towards Gettysburg. Imbibing too much liquor one night, Proctor became so riled up and intoxicated that he began to cuss out the officers of the regiment. Acknowledging that he was not in his right mind because of drink, the officers limited their response to him by taking the colors away from him, one of the greatest of insults one could give to a soldier. There was no time to let him sober up as they marched onward to battle. Three recruits in the rear tried to frog-walk him for awhile as they moved towards Gettysburg, but they found it impossible to keep up. He was eventually left there on the side of the road and was officially listed as A.W.O.L. Proctor had been the senior enlisted man in the unit prior to this, and the colors would now be given to the next most experienced man in the 20th Maine, which was...Andrew Tozier. Marching at night, in the rain and through the mud, Andrew led the men of the 20th Maine through the dismal Maryland countryside. He had been in the 20th Maine less than a month and was now in charge of her colors. He would take this task more seriously, perhaps, than any other task in his life. By the time they had made it to Unions Mills, they had marched nonstop and covered 25 miles of hard slogging. They were now only four miles from Pennsylvania. In another day they would make it to Hanover and then, finally to a little place called Gettysburg and a hill known as Little Round Top. The significance of the Union winning the Battle of Gettysburg is that it became the turning point of the war. It was decisive because there was no guarantee that the strategy and prowess of General Lee would ever fail. The South had won battle after battle with fewer men and fewer supplies. Up to this point in the Civil War, it was not at all clear if the North could eventually muster the kind of willpower, strategy and tenacity to take on Lee and his generals and gain the kind of ground needed to take back the South. The Battle of Gettysburg became the pivot around which the war turned, and a small Company from the northern state of Maine would be given a task that, if they failed, would have given the south its biggest victory yet and all but spell the end of the war within months, in favor of the Confederacy. Late in the afternoon of July 2, 1863, Colonel Joshua Chamberlain and his 386 infantrymen found themselves running desperately low on ammunition. The 20th Maine had been given the task of holding the left flank of the Army's line. The 16th Michigan held the right flank and the men from New York and Pennsylvania held the center. Earlier in the day, Chamberlain's commander, Colonel Vincent, had told him that the thin line that the Maine men held was the left of the Uinion army's line. “You are to hold this line at all costs!” he told Chamberlain and Chamberlain took him at his word. Earlier, 44 of his men from Company B were cut off by the enemy's flanking maneuver, leaving only 314 men from Maine to hold the main line. Early in the day, over 800 Texans under General Hood began their assualt on Little Round Top. Later, the 15th and 47th of Alabama began to hammer into the Maine line. The Maine men held the high ground, but they were vastly outnumbered and their supply of ammunition was running dangerously low. There was little hope of holding this hill for long. Something had to happen. Something had to change. There are times in battle when something unlikely happens, something unexpected and so unusual that it can change the course of events for everyone involved, stirring people to action they might not otherwise take. At such moments, it is all one can do not to simply stop and wonder, to gaze upon something so unlikely, so perfect. Things were looking bad for the 20th Maine. The Alabamans were moving up the hill and the Maine men had run out of ammunition. Company B was still nowhere to be seen and Colonel Joshua Chamberlain surveyed the scene at this terrible moment, only to see something that stirred his courage into even more action and caused him to make a decision that would alter the course of the battle, the war, and the fate of his country. As he stood there, his sword drawn, he observed for a long moment the state of his color guard. All were gone, either killed or wounded, with the exception of one man - Andrew Tozier. While all possibility of snatching a victory out of the jaws of defeat seemed lost, there was one man who seemed unfazed by the carnage and confusion around him - Andrew Tozier. With the colors still flying, held in the crook of one arm and steadied against his body, he stood fast, methodically and cooly loading and then firing a borrowed musket. Later, Colonel Chamberlain would put his memory to pen. He wrote: “I first thought some optical illusion imposed upon me. But as forms emerged from the drifting smoke, the truth came into view...in the center, wreathed in battle smoke, stood the Color-Sergeant, Andrew Tozier. His color-staff planted in the ground by his side, the upper part clasped in his elbow,so holding the flag upright, with musket and cartridges seized from the fallen comrade at his side he was defending his sacred trust in the manner of the songs of chivalry.” At that precise moment, is it reckoned, a total of over forty thousand bullets had been fired by combatants in the fray. With so many bullets, nearly everyone should have been hit in some way, either mortally or incidentally. Chamberlain remained unharmed. The Alabama men still lingered at the bottom of the hill. The Maine men still held it. But Chamberlain knew if the southerners rallied, the Maine men could not take another onslaught. Spurred on by Andrew Tozier's impossible coolness in battle, Chamberlain placed himself behind Tozier and ordered a right wheel maneuver. Some say he shouted ‘Bayonets' but it little mattered. They were out of ammunition anyway and if they were to move forward and down the hill, all they had were bayonets. Andrew Tozier led them down. The outcome of that battle remains one of the most decisive in American Military history. The south did not take the high ground. The left flank held. Because of this, the course of the war shifted in the North's favor. But there was something almost unworldly about Chamberlain and his fellow mainer, Andrew Tozier, at the Battle of Little Round Top. Chamberlain had been in plain sight to the enemy - he was a classical leader, a fighter, visible to all. Twice an Alabama soldier had taken aim against him and twice the soldier, inspired perhaps by Chmaberlain's bravery and boldness, decided against pulling the trigger. In another close call, a Southern officer's pistol misfired only feet from Chamberlain's face. By all acounts, he should not have survived that battle. And then there was Tozier. He stood his ground, against all odds, inspiring his own Colonel and all who saw him. That inspiration caused the sagging middle of the regiment to bolster - if they had not seen Tozier calmly firing, loading, and firing again as he held the flag slightly askew, there is little doubt that the Alabama men would have taken the hill. His courage gave Chamberlain the chance to order an unlikely attack that drove the confederates flying. It is fair to say that without Tozier, Chamberlain would not have held that hill. Andrew Tozier, son of an alcoholic, a drifter, with no place to call his home. After the battle Tozier was offered a field promotion by Chamberlain but he asked his Colonel to withdraw it. He had more in common, it can be assumed, with the common soldiers than he did with officers. He remained in action until May of 1864 at The Battle of North Anna, where he received a wound in the left temple. Months passed before surgeons removed as many of the fragments as they could, but there would always be pieces of the minie ball in his cranium. He was not unaffected by the wound, either. Dizziness, headaches and tinnitus remained for the rest of his life. Perhaps something else happened as a result of that wound, something that changed not only his health, but his perspective, his behavior, his future. In 1864, his term ended, and Andrew Tozier returned to Maine. He got married and became the proud father of a son. We aren''t sure what he did before the war, but we know that in 1865, Andrew Tozier, hero of the Battle of Little Round Top, began a life of crime. Along with his half-brother, Lewis Cushman, he began to steal cattle, clothing and sundry other items. He did not act with honor or courage. He did not step forward bravely. He stole. He lied. He cheated. In 1869, the law finally caught up with him and he was implicated in a heist at the clothing store in East Livermore. He was sentenced to five years hard labor at the Maine State Prison in Thomaston. It can be rightly assumed that Andrew Tozier probably suffered from what we would today call PTSD - post-traumatic-stress-syndrome. His head injury alone may have accounted for his behavior after his enlistment was done. But just after he was given his cell in the prison, he received a full pardon by the Governor of the State of Maine - none other than Joshua Chamberlain, his former commander. One might think that this was a kind of honor payment, a thank you for what had happened on the sweltering day in July in Pennsylvania, but Chamberlain was better than that. He asked Tozier to move in with him and his family and he promised Tozier that he would help him change the course of his life. He taught Andrew how to read and write and gave him the kind of attention few men would have received from their former commander. A convicted felon and his wife moved in and lived with the Governor of the State and his family. In the fullness of time, Tozier's wife gave birth to a daughter and they named her Gracie, after the Governor's teenage daughter. By all accounts, Andrew Tozier was lucky to have such a friend as Joshua Chamberlain. Eventually Tozier moved out and took up the straight and narrow, never again to turn to a life of crime. His health continued to falter and he found himself working odd jobs, enduring the pain of his many wounds from the war. He moved back to the area he was born and settled down to the life of a small farm - vegetables, milk, and a job in a broom factory. He had started out in Purgatory, left, took a detour into the hell that was war, and then was saved by Chamberlain, only to move back to the area of Purgatory, where it all began. In 1890, Chamberlain wrote to the War Department, suggesting that Tozier be awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor for his actions on Little Round Top in 1863. Eight years later, the award was given. It arrived in the mail at Tozier's door. The citation read, “At the crisis of the engagement this soldier, a color bearer, stood alone in an advanced position, the regiment having been borne back, and defended his colors with musket and ammunition picked up at his feet.” In this letter to the War Department, the Grand Old Man of Maine wrote, “He was an example of all that was excellent in a soldier” and is “one of the bravest and most deserving men. The war took the lives of so many men. But it is safe to say that it made some men, too. Joshua Chamberlain was such a man - before the war he was a professor of languages of Bowdoin, a self-made man who taught himself Latin and Greek by shutting himself up in a garret until he understood them. He lied to get out of his teaching contract so he could join the army. He was the hero of the Battle of Little Round Top. He accepted Lee's sword at Appomatix. He became the Governor of Maine. He became President of Bowdoin. Andrew Tozier was made by that war, as well. Before the war, he was no one in particular, one of the many with no real place to call home. But after the war, he became a wanted man, a criminal on a spree that lasted years before he was caught and sentenced, then pardoned and cared for by his old commander who so fondly recalled that one moment in all of his life (that we know of) when Andrew Tozier decided to stand fast and hold his ground, against all odds. That one act changed the course of history - not just his own, but ours, as well. A single act of courage in an otherwise unremarkable life, except for that time after the war, when he lived the life of a common criminal. Not many American realize that the actions of this one man turned the events of the Civil War in the North's favor. One man and a single show of outrageous courage set into action a chain of events at led to the inevitable conclusion of the south's surrender. One has to wonder, did he even realize what he had done for his nation? The bravery of Tozier has been immortalized in a song by the Ghosts of Paul Revere that has been officially recognized by the state legislature as Maine's official state ballad. It is told from the point of view of none other than Andrew Tozier,child of an alcoholic, drifter,common soldier and color-beaer, small time farmer and broom-maker, convicted criminal and Medal of Honor winner. He died on March 28, 1910. He was 72 years old. SOURCES Christian, James A."Sgt. Andrew J. Tozier, Medal of Honor Recipient of the Twentieth Maine". Gettysburg Magazine. University of Nebraska Press. Number 54. January, 2016. pp. 81-90. https://muse.jhu.edu/article/605540/pdf https://www.findagrave.com/memorial/3604/andrew-j_-tozier "Andrew Jackson Tozier," Litchfield Historical Society. http://www.historicalsocietyoflitchfieldmaine.org/AndrewJacksonTozier.htm "Andrew J. Tozier." Wikipedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andrew_J._Tozier Desjardin, Thomas (1995). Stand Firm Ye Boys From Maine. 2009. Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780195382310. https://www.amazon.com/Stand-Firm-Boys-Maine-Gettysburg/dp/0195382315/ref=sr_1_1?keywords=9780195382310&qid=1566070875&s=gateway&sr=8-1
30:53 - Company A says they are better because you can join for free. Company B says they are better because you can earn $100 on every new person who joins. Company C says they are better because you get a 30% discount. Company D says they are better because they have an awesome recruiting website. Company E says they are better because their products are unique and magical. Company F says they are better because they pay out 65% to members. Etc. etc. etc. What factors should you consider when comparing opportunities? Company background. Age? Experience? Unique Products? Compensation Plan? Support and Systems? Listen to this podcast to learn why none of these factors are as important as ...
This week's Medal of Honor citation reading was suggested by Veteranology listener and recent guest Jeff Fowler. All our citations will be read from the Congressional Medal of Honor Society website, CMOHS.org. Today's Citation: For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty as commanding officer of Company F in action against enemy aggressor forces. Assigned to defend a 3-mile mountain pass along the division's main supply line and commanding the only route of approach in the march from Yudam-ni to Hagaru-ri, Capt. Barber took position with his battle-weary troops and, before nightfall, had dug in and set up a defense along the frozen, snow-covered hillside. When a force of estimated regimental strength savagely attacked during the night, inflicting heavy casualties and finally surrounding his position following a bitterly fought 7-hour conflict, Capt. Barber, after repulsing the enemy gave assurance that he could hold if supplied by airdrops and requested permission to stand fast when orders were received by radio to fight his way back to a relieving force after 2 reinforcing units had been driven back under fierce resistance in their attempts to reach the isolated troops. Aware that leaving the position would sever contact with the 8,000 marines trapped at Yudam-ni and jeopardize their chances of joining the 3,000 more awaiting their arrival in Hagaru-ri for the continued drive to the sea, he chose to risk loss of his command rather than sacrifice more men if the enemy seized control and forced a renewed battle to regain the position, or abandon his many wounded who were unable to walk. Although severely wounded in the leg in the early morning of the 29th, Capt. Barber continued to maintain personal control, often moving up and down the lines on a stretcher to direct the defense and consistently encouraging and inspiring his men to supreme efforts despite the staggering opposition. Waging desperate battle throughout 5 days and 6 nights of repeated onslaughts launched by the fanatical aggressors, he and his heroic command accounted for approximately 1,000 enemy dead in this epic stand in bitter subzero weather, and when the company was relieved only 82 of his original 220 men were able to walk away from the position so valiantly defended against insuperable odds. His profound faith and courage, great personal valor, and unwavering fortitude were decisive factors in the successful withdrawal of the division from the deathtrap in the Chosin Reservoir sector and reflect the highest credit upon Capt. Barber, his intrepid officers and men, and the U.S. Naval Service.
Navy SEALs, Marcus Luttrell, David Rutherford and The Wizard are honored to welcome Medal of Honor Recipient, Kyle Carpenter, to this week’s special 4th of July edition of the show. Please join us as we have the privilege of hearing US Marine Carpenter’s incredible #NeverQuit story along with his profound insight on living a life of courage, responsibility and honor. His remarkable story will make you feel like there’s nothing that can defeat you. This is one of the TNQ Podcast’s most impactful shows dealing with selflessness and recovery. Kyle delivers tons of powerful messages that can be immediately implemented in your life today. Our team is immensely thankful to Kyle for coming on the show and sharing with our amazing listeners. Please help us spread Kyle’s message to as many people you know. God bless Kyle Carpenter, his family, the Marine Corps, and God bless America. Semper Fi! William Kyle Carpenter’s Medal of Honor Citation: For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as an Automatic Rifleman with Company F, 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines, Regimental Combat Team 1, 1st Marine Division (Forward), I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward), in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, in support of Operation Enduring Freedom on 21 November 2010. Lance Corporal Carpenter was a member of a platoon-sized coalition force, comprised of two reinforced Marine rifle squads partnered with an Afghan National Army squad. The platoon had established Patrol Base Dakota two days earlier in a small village in the Marjah District in order to disrupt enemy activity and provide security for the local Afghan population. Lance Corporal Carpenter and a fellow Marine were manning a rooftop security position on the perimeter of Patrol Base Dakota when the enemy initiated a daylight attack with hand grenades, one of which landed inside their sandbagged position. Without hesitation and with complete disregard for his own safety, Lance Corporal Carpenter moved toward the grenade in an attempt to shield his fellow Marine from the deadly blast. When the grenade detonated, his body absorbed the brunt of the blast, severely wounding him, but saving the life of his fellow Marine. By his undaunted courage, bold fighting spirit, and unwavering devotion to duty in the face of almost certain death, Lance Corporal Carpenter reflected great credit upon himself and upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service. Great Stories Ignite Legends. Support the show.
1980s New York: a perfect place to set Charles Dickens' story about a sad secretly high class boy (you can tell by how kind and goodlooking he is) is saved from being grouped with Those Dirty, Wicked Poors. Really though, have you read Oliver Twist lately? That book is fucked up. Chris introduces another of Disney's forgotten 80s films to a less than impressed audience, Vrai fights fiercely to talk about musicals instead, and Dorothy has feelings about Dickensian classism. And the alarming amount of dog murder in this movie (which is more than zero). ...Also it's possible we wound up talking about Evangelion for a while too. Somebody reset the counter. Kyle's New York Centricism Rant: https://youtu.be/0I29cBOVz68?t=4m52s Join us every two weeks on Soundcloud, iTunes or Stitcher - and if you’d leave a rating and review, so that more people can find their way to us, we’d appreciate it!
We were joined in the studio for Tourism Tuesday with Jenna & Kary from Shenandoah County Tourism Department. We talked about so many things happening this holiday season in Shenandoah County. Below is a recap of our conversation. Top Six Things to do in Shenandoah County to start the Holiday season and get everyone in the Spirit The first weekend in December is the best weekend to visit Shenandoah County to see how local businesses and attractions in small towns are kicking off the holiday season. From Galleries to Wineries, Antique Shops, Historic sites and cafes, there is something uniquely “Shenandoah” about celebrating community and the holiday spirit. Here are six different special events to warm hearts and welcome folks to Shenandoah County Holiday Homes Tour in Woodstock December 3 Featuring four private homes and four historical buildings, all within a few blocks of one another, decorated for the season and welcoming visitors on December 3, 2016 from 11am to 4pm. The event is sponsored by the Shenandoah County Chamber of Commerce with all proceeds going to support the Woodstock Museum and the Shenandoah Garden Club of Woodstock. The tour will originate at the Woodstock Museum's Marshall House where ticket-holders will receive a program and map. Admission is $15 in advance, and tickets are on sale at five different Locations: The Edinburg Mill, The Woodstock Café, PJ Designs, The Woodstock Brewhouse, and Jackson's Corner Café in New Market. Tickets will also be available on the day of the event for $20 at the Woodstock Museum only. (Inclement weather date December 4) Christmas on the Farm in New Market December 3rd At the Virginia Museum of the Civil War, visit with living historians at the historic Bushong Farm and discover how a family carries on in the face of a national crisis. There will be games to play, stories to hear, refreshments, singing and a visit from a special Christmas guest. Then, visit with the soldiers of Company F, 51st Virginia Infantry and bring them Christmas cheer from hearth and home. Lend a hand with chores or simply join in the holiday celebration. Tickets may be purchased at the Museum on the day of the event. For more information, call The Virginia Museum of the Civil War at 866-515-1864. Holiday Open Studio Tour December 3 & 4 As you travel the Shenandoah County Artisan Trail from New Market to Strasburg, Virginia, visit Six Potters with six unique styles, in six different studios. Come and see the dynamic quality of clay and fire from six different points of view. Five locations boast tours of the Artist's working space and sales of their collections of work plus refreshments from local farmers markets and restaurants. The Sixth potter will show her work at the Shenandoah County Artisan Trail location, Pot Town Organics, a shop that sells organic gardening supplies, hydroponics, lights, and canning and preserving supplies located in the heart of Downtown Strasburg Updates, progress and details about the Tour including addresses and contact information can be seen on our Holiday Open Studio Tour FACEBOOK PAGE or visit http://vastudiotour.wixsite.com/vastudiotour Special Vineyard and Winery events A tasting room at one of the eight different wineries in Shenandoah County is a great place to visit with friends and family to get the season started off in a festive way. Two of the vineyards are hosting special holiday events during the first weekend in December. In Toms Brook, North Mountain Vineyard keeps with the owner's German Heritage as they host a Bavarian Christkindl Market from 12-5 pm on December 3 where you can Shop for your German Specialties and they will be Serving Bratwurst and Glühwein. There will be Live music by Rick, Bill & Travelin' Jack from 2:00 – 5:00 pm. Then more live music by Bill Vaughan from 6:00 – 9:00 pm Shenandoah Vineyards is hosting their Holiday open house on Saturday and Sunday December 3 & 4 from 10am-5pm. welcoming the Holiday season in a cozy atmosphere with warm mulled wine, cookies and goodies. Route 11 Gallery Hop December 3 & 4 Visit three different Main Street gallery locations in a twelve mile stretch of Route 11 in Shenandoah County each holding demonstrations and special events. 7 East Gallery in Woodstock is offering weaving and Glass painting demonstrations as well as their current display of local artists work. Penelope's Café and Gallery in Edinburg will host a “Fido-Photo-OP” with Santa on Saturday, inviting visitors to bring their pets to have their photo taken with Santa. Then on Sunday from noon to 3 is a Book Signing with local artist and writer Tom Chipley. Penelope's café consistently displays local art and serves the most amazing fresh baked pastries, unique soups and creative sandwiches. In the next town, The Art Group Gallery in Mount Jackson is presenting gallery tours, and a variety of artist demonstrations throughout the weekend. 10am-5pm at all three locations. Small Town Parades and Tree Lighting Every year folks in the small towns of Shenandoah County gather for annual Christmas Parades and tree lighting ceremonies. Each town hosts their own version with children singing, lights twinkling, hot chocolate and sweets. Carols, dancing, games, stories and of course Santa. Immerse yourself in the joy of one, or visit them all! Edinburg: “Christmas in Edinburg” December 1st Parade begins at 6pm and tree lighting & festivities just after Woodstock: “Light up Woodstock” December 2nd begins at 545pm at the Courthouse in the center of town. Strasburg: “Home for the Holidays” December 3rd Parade and Tree lighting New Market: “Tis the Season” December 3 Parade at 5pm, and a tree lighting with festivities at the Town Hall just after. Toms Brook: Christmas Parade December 4 beginning at 5pm. Mount Jackson: December 10th Parade begins at 3:30pm on the North end of town and ends with an Open House from 4 to 5:30 at the town hall with Santa visiting and cookies & cocoa. Small-town holiday events in Shenandoah County to get you in the spirit! What better way to greet the Holiday season than with small town parades, twinkling lights on street lamps and carols of Children's' choirs? Are you ready for a Norman Rockwell picture of snowy decorations, cold air, and warm cocoa? Look no further than the towns of Shenandoah County whose historic Main Streets sparkle with a vibrant energy as they welcome the Christmas Season and the coming New Year, with many of the towns hosting special events for residents and guests alike. Here are just a few events that are sure to warm even the Grinchiest of bah-humbug hearts: CHRISTMAS IN EDINBURG Thursday, December 1, 2016 PARADE BEGINS AT 6:00 P.M. Please join us after the Parade for the lighting of the County's largest living Christmas tree and let the sounds of the Central High School Band bring you into the Christmas spirit. After the tree lighting Ceremony and Santa is in place, bring the kiddies inside the Volunteer Fire Department for crafts and games complete with prizes warm treats and everyone's favorite Santa!!! Click here for more information. LIGHT UP WOODSTOCK: Woodstock, December 2, 2016 From 11am-4pm the Town of Woodstock is hosting a Holiday Homes Tour. Beginning at 5:45pm, The Youth Choir will be singing on the Historic Courthouse steps to begin the festivities and at 6pm the parade begins from the shopping center at the North end of town to Indian Spring Street to the South. After the Parade, the Mayor and a special guest will light the Town Christmas Tree. Businesses will stay open late, entertainment on Court Square and Santa will make an appearance. Click here for more information. HOME FOR THE HOLIDAYS: Strasburg, December 3, 2106 Strasburg is the place to be on Saturday, December 3rd Breakfast at the Fire Department, a book sale at the library, Santa Claus at First Bank, multiple open houses with snacks and friendly faces, a children's shopping extravaganza at Lydia's Clothes Basket, a fun and festive Christmas Parade, a tree lighting ceremony, caroling, pictures in the gazebo and MORE! Visit www.strasburgvachamber.com for more information. TIS THE SEASON: New Market December 3, 2016 From Early morning to after dark, the town of New Market is pulling out all the stops beginning at 9am with Open Houses of many Local Businesses and Local Artists on Congress Street and a Book Sale at the New Market Library. Santa will be at the library too with goodie bags for the kids and face painting. Then at 5pm it's a Christmas Parade on Congress Street followed by a tree lighting Ceremony with the Stonewall Jackson Choir at the New Market Town Hall. There you can enjoy homemade cookies, and a warm beverage. Then top off the evening at 7pm with a showing of “It's a Wonderful Life” at the Rouss Center for the Performing Arts ($5 admission). Details and parade entry can be found here at the town website. CHRISTMAS PARADE & OPEN HOUSE: Mount Jackson December 10, 2016 Parade Line-up at 2:45 p.m. at Valley Fertilizer-Main St. Parade begins at 3:30 P.M. and travels south on Main St. ending at Native American. Entry fee for parade participants is 3 cans of non-perishable food to be donated to the Food Pantry. There will be an Open House at the Town Hall is from 4 to 5:30 at town hall with Santa visiting and cookies and cocoa donated by the SJHS Home Ec. Dept. Kids can stop by the town office to register their name for the drawing to help the mayor light the town Christmas Tree at 5 p.m. Visit www.mountjackson.com for more information. A few other wonderful Holiday Events in Shenandoah County include: Holiday Homes Tour in Woodstock Featuring four private homes and four historical buildings, all within a few blocks of one another, decorated for the season and welcoming visitors on December 3, 2016 from 11am to 4pm. The event is sponsored by the Shenandoah County Chamber of Commerce with all proceeds going to support the Woodstock Museum and the Shenandoah Garden Club of Woodstock. The tour will originate at the Woodstock Museum's Marshall House where ticket-holders will receive a program and map. Admission is $15 in advance, and tickets are on sale at five different Locations: The Edinburg Mill, The Woodstock Café, PJ Designs, The Woodstock Brewhouse, and Jackson's Corner Café in New Market. Tickets will also be available on the day of the event for $20 at the Woodstock Museum only. (Inclement weather date December 4) Holiday Open House at Hupps Hill Civil War Park Saturday December 10, 2016 from 9am-5pm Offering Free Admission to the Museum, Refreshments, and Gift Shop Specials. Christmas on the Farm in New Market December 3, 2016 At the Virginia Museum of the Civil War, visit with living historians at the historic Bushong Farm and discover how a family carries on in the face of a national crisis. There will be games to play, stories to hear, refreshments, singing and a visit from a special Christmas guest. Then, visit with the soldiers of Company F, 51st Virginia Infantry and bring them Christmas cheer from hearth and home. Lend a hand with chores or simply join in the holiday celebration. Tickets may be purchased at the Museum on the day of the event. For more information, call The Virginia Museum of the Civil War at 866-515-1864. Holidays at Bryce Resort December 24 – Christmas Eve Buffet – 5-8pm $26.95 Adults; $12.50 Kids ages 4 – 10. Kids 3 and under Free. Tip & tax not included. December 25 – Christmas Buffet - 5-8pm $26.95 Adults; $12.50 Kids ages 4 – 10. Kids 3 and under Free. December 31 - New Year's Eve Dinner – 6 – 10pm Restaurant. $40 Adults; $20 kids ages 4 – 10. Kids 3 and under free. Tip & tax not included December 31 – Rockin' New Year's Eve Celebration in the Copper Kettle, 9pm – 2am. $20 Cover until midnight; $10 after midnight. Includes party favors, snacks until 11pm, DJ Doug, Fireworks, and Torchlight ski-down (weather dependent) at 11:45pm. Must be 21 to attend Reservations are a MUST for The Christmas and New Year's Eve Dinners. Please contact nan@bryceresort.com or charity@bryceresort.com for reservations or more information.
In this episode, follow U.S. Marines with Company F, Battalion Landing Team 2nd Battalion 4th Marines, 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit and soldiers from the Japan Ground Self Defense Force as they conduct boat operations as part of the Japanese Observer Exchange Program. The JGSDF was integrated with the 31st MEU in order to better understand amphibious operations.
On June 19, 2014, President Barack Obama will award Corporal William "Kyle" Carpenter, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret), the Medal of Honor for conspicuous gallantry. Corporal Carpenter will receive the Medal of Honor for his courageous actions while serving as an Automatic Rifleman with Company F, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, Regimental Combat Team 1, 1st Marine Division (Forward), I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward), in Helmand Province, Afghanistan. Available in high definition.
A Kansas Memory: The Kansas Historical Society Library and Archives Podcast
In 1868, raids by hostile Indian bands on the western frontier increased as the white population of Kansas swelled after the Civil War and railroads were built father west. George Armstrong Custer and the 7th U. S. Cavalry were assigned to pursue the Indian tribes to their winter camps and force them to return to the reservations. In Kansas, Governor Crawford quickly raised a volunteer regiment, then decided to resign from office and lead the 19th Kansas Cavalry himself. They joined Generals Sheridan and Custer shortly after the attack on Black Kettle's Village. The troops accompanied Custer on his mission to retrieve two Kansas women, Anna Morgan and Sarah White, who had been abducted during the fall. George Jenness, the commander of Company F of the 19th Kansas, wrote this account of the winter expedition based on his diaries.
A Kansas Memory: The Kansas Historical Society Library and Archives Podcast
In 1868, raids by hostile Indian bands on the western frontier increased as the white population of Kansas swelled after the Civil War and railroads were built father west. That winter the U. S. Army, led by General Sheridan, decided to pursue bands of Cheyenne, Sioux and Comanche to their winter camps and force them to return to government reservations by destroying their food and horses. General Custer and the 7th U. S. Cavalry were chosen for this winter campaign. In Kansas, young governor Samuel Crawford, outraged by the continuing violence, received permission to quickly raise a regiment of Kansas men to assist the U. S. troops. At the last minute, Crawford decided to resign from office and lead 19th Kansas Cavalry himself. They marched southwest from Wichita to join Generals Sheridan and Custer. George Jenness, the commander of Company F of the 19th Kansas, wrote this account of the winter expedition based on his diaries.