Podcasts about Davao

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Best podcasts about Davao

Latest podcast episodes about Davao

Good Times with Mo: The Podcast Year 10
GTWM Year 14 Episode 45 "Hidden Cams, BFF Car Fun, and Titas on Tinder" with Alex Calleja

Good Times with Mo: The Podcast Year 10

Play Episode Listen Later May 17, 2025 131:06


The boys are back this weekend for another fun episode of GTWM the Podcast!  It's Year 14 Episode 45 and we have a nice variety of calls headed your way.  Let's check it out!Caller #1 is Anna who is 40yrs old from Davao. Anna's husband was a horrible guy with predatory behavior like installing a hidden camera in the househelp's room and cheating on her with prosti's.  Now they are in the middle of the annulment, how can she set boundaries to keep him away?Caller #2 is Didi who is 55yrs old from Seattle.  Didi is in her menopausal ho phase and her current guy wants her to move in his house but the problem is he has adopted 5 adult Chinese girls and she doesn't want to live with them.Caller #3 is Andrew who is 28yrs old from Pasig.  Andrew is struggling with sexual anxiety after his breakup but there is one girl that he can perform with, but she happens to be his bestfriend.  They've had some car fun but he wants to try other girls.Who doesn't want to have fun and enjoy exciting games kung boring ang oras mo?  Kung mahilig ka sa Tong-its at iba pa, tara na sa GameZone!  FUNbelivable sa GameZone dahil you play a REAL GAME of Tong-its with REAL PLAYERS, FOR FREE!You have a chance to split over thirty-four million pesos, at may chance ka pa to claim up to fourteen-thousand, six-hundred-forty pesos daily!The cash credits you get can be used to play kahit anong game.  You can even cashout! May dalawang event every single day!  G ka na ba? Visit GZone.ph and social media account on Facebook, Instagram and TikTok @taragamezone.G na sa Tong-its? Tara Gamezone!Remember, ang gaming dapat fun-fun lang!

UCA News Podcast
UCA News Weekly Summary, May 16, 2025

UCA News Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later May 16, 2025 10:29


Listen to news from and about the Church in Asia in a capsule of around 10 minutes.The former president was elected mayor of Davao by a landslide, despite his detention by the International Criminal Court. Listen to the story and more in a wrap-up of the weekly news from Asia.Filed by UCA News reporters, compiled by Fabian Antony, text edited by Anosh Malekar, presented by Joe Mathews, background score by Andre Louis and produced by Binu Alex for ucanews.com For news in and about the Church in Asia, visit www.ucanews.comTo contribute please visit www.ucanews.com/donateOn Twitter Follow Or Connect through DM at : twitter.com/ucanewsTo view Video features please visit https://www.youtube.com/@ucanews

METRO TV
Sara Duterte Disambut Pendukung di Davao Saat Hadiri Pemilihan - Headline News Edisi News MetroTV 5429

METRO TV

Play Episode Listen Later May 14, 2025 1:12


Wakil Presiden Filipina Sara Duterte disambut para pendukung saat tiba di tempat pemungutan suara di kampung halamannya, Davao City, dalam pemilu paruh waktu Filipina.

The Gist
Character Under Fire: Gen. Stanley McChrystal on the Costs of Conviction

The Gist

Play Episode Listen Later May 13, 2025 36:34


Retired General Gen. Stanley McChrystal joins to discuss his book On Character: Choices that Define a Life, and how real character transcends grit or discipline to include values that hold under fire. Plus, Trump touches the economic stove, recoils, and suddenly recession odds drop along with tariffs rates. And from The Hague, Rodrigo Duterte wins re-election as mayor of Davao in a landslide. Produced by Corey WaraEmail us at ⁠⁠⁠⁠thegist@mikepesca.com⁠⁠⁠⁠To advertise on the show, contact ⁠⁠⁠⁠sales@advertisecast.com⁠⁠⁠⁠ or visit ⁠⁠⁠⁠https://advertising.libsyn.com/TheGist⁠⁠⁠⁠Subscribe to The Gist: ⁠⁠⁠⁠https://subscribe.mikepesca.com/⁠⁠⁠⁠Subscribe to The Gist Youtube Page: ⁠⁠⁠⁠https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC4_bh0wHgk2YfpKf4rg40_g⁠⁠⁠⁠Subscribe to The Gist Instagram Page: ⁠⁠⁠⁠GIST INSTAGRAM⁠⁠⁠⁠Follow The Gist List at: ⁠⁠⁠⁠Pesca⁠⁠⁠⁠ ⁠⁠⁠⁠Profundities | Mike Pesca | Substack⁠⁠⁠⁠ Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

Noticentro
Sheinbaum firma convenio para mantener precios de la canasta básica

Noticentro

Play Episode Listen Later May 13, 2025 1:34


UNAM reasigna recursos para crear programa de apoyo alimentarioSemar rescata a cuatro náufragos en costas de HuatulcoDuterte gana alcaldía en Davao pese a estar encarceladoMás información en nuestro podcast

In the press
'Trump could stop the horror': Papers discuss Gaza aid blockade

In the press

Play Episode Listen Later May 12, 2025 6:32


PRESS REVIEW – Monday, May 12: US President Donald Trump is set to begin his tour of the Middle East on Tuesday, but is not yet scheduled to stop in Israel. Meanwhile, papers are discussing the humanitarian crisis in Gaza as the last soup kitchens are forced to close. Also, millions of voters head to the polls in the Philippines for crucial midterms opposing two dynasties. Next, papers debunk a claim that French President Emmanuel Macron had a cocaine party in Ukraine. Finally, a man completes the world's longest triathlon. Trump is set to start his tour of the Middle East tomorrow and will be going to Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates for negotiations, but what is more interesting is where he is not going: Israel. Trump's snub of Israel is on the front page of Lebanese paper L'Orient-Le Jour. The Israeli paper Haaretz tells us what it thinks really matters: it says the most important thing about the visit is the “undeniable rift” between Israel and the Gulf states. NBC News says that disagreements on Iran and Gaza are creating this rift between Netanyahu and Trump. The Guardian has an editorial exploring Trump's policy on Gaza, and how he could stop the horror.Meanwhile, the humanitarian situation in Gaza continues to worsen. NPR is discussing the US's proposed plan to get much-needed food into Gaza after Israel's 10-week ban on aid. The article says that aid groups believe the plan appears to be a way to gain control over vital supplies as part of a military strategy. Le Monde, meanwhile, is looking at the closure of several life-saving soup kitchens in Gaza as they run out of supplies. Finally, AP is reporting on the impact of Israel's blockade on hospitals which can no longer provide food for recovering patients. The article says that families now have to bring food to the hospital to care for their loved ones.Voting opens this Monday in the Philippines, where 24 Senate seats and 316 seats in the House of Representatives are at stake. The front page of the Philippine Daily Inquirer focuses on potential foreign interference in the election, but other news outlets are billing it as the battle of the dynasties. The Straits Times says the ruling alliance between President Marcos and Vice President Sara Duterte is now locked in a fierce battle for seats in the Senate. The New York Times says that it is not a prison cell that will stop her father, former president Rodrigo Duterte, for running for mayor of Davao. The paper says that despite being accused of crimes against humanity at the International Criminal Court, Duterte has maintained his popularity.European leaders were in Kyiv at the weekend to meet with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, but their trip created some unexpected headlines. Turkyie Today says: "Russia alleges Macron, Merz, and Starmer had cocaine party in Kyiv". The evidence is supposedly a white unidentified object which sent the internet into turmoil after a Telegram post by a spokesperson for Russia's foreign ministry. The French papers were quick to come out against the conspiracy – as was the French government, which reacted with a post on X, confirming that the supposed cocaine is actually a tissue.Finally, The Times reports that an ex-marine has completed the world's longest triathlon, after swimming across the English Channel, cycling across Europe and Asia, and climbing Mount Everest.You can catch our press review every morning on France 24 at 7:20am and 9:20am (Paris time), from Monday to Friday.

Ogie Diaz Showbiz Update
WAG NANG UMEPAL SA SOCMED SA PAGKAMATAY NI RICKY DAVAO!

Ogie Diaz Showbiz Update

Play Episode Listen Later May 6, 2025 35:53


Rufa Mae, nabunutan ng tinik!Si Bida, nangako ng rolex sa type na aktres, ang ending...Yung mga epal na nanguna pa sa mga kaanak ni Ricky Davao...

Ogie Diaz Showbiz Update
MAY NAPANSIN BA KAYO KAY DONNY?

Ogie Diaz Showbiz Update

Play Episode Listen Later May 5, 2025 53:47


Ricky Davao, paalam...Donny Pangilinan, nananadya ka ba?Archie Alemania, kawawa naman baket?

The Pacific War - week by week
- 180 - Pacific War Podcast - The Allied Invasion of Borneo - April 29 - May 6, 1945

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 29, 2025 30:57


Last time we spoke about the invasion of Mindanao. In April 1945, the US launched the invasion of Mindanao under General Eichelberger, focusing on Illana Bay. Initial assaults were swift, and American forces quickly captured vital areas due to the disarray among Japanese troops, who were struggling with low morale and supply shortages. The Japanese were under significant pressure, with commanders ill-prepared to mount a robust defense as American troops advanced toward Davao. Fierce battles unfolded, including attempts to seize key positions, but Japanese forces, that included remnants from earlier campaigns, faced overwhelming and relentless assaults. Despite stiff resistance in some areas, the Americans ultimately made considerable territorial gains, significantly weakening Japanese positions. This successful operation in Mindanao laid crucial groundwork for further advances in the Pacific theater, marking a decisive phase in the war as the tide turned heavily in favor of the Allies. As this chapter closed, it was evident that the end of Japanese resistance in the region was drawing near. This episode is the Allied Invasion of Borneo Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  A long time ago, in a galaxy far away we talked about the Japanese invasion of the Dutch East Indies. Now it is time to talk about how the Dutch strikes back. . . well not exactly, but I wanted to finish the star wars reference. For an extended period, the Australian forces that had valiantly fought on the island of New Guinea during a crucial phase of the Allied war effort had been assigned to garrison duties in remote areas, conducting minor offensives against a desperate enemy more concerned with obtaining food than engaging in battle. At the same time, General MacArthur deemed it politically unwise for Australians to take a prominent role in reclaiming the Philippines, an American territory, and he also found it politically unfavorable for American troops to participate in restoring Dutch and British authority in the Indies. Recognizing the urgent need to secure the oilfields of British and Dutch Borneo to supply accessible oil for the push toward Japan, Lieutenant-General Leslie Morshead's 1st Australian Corps was designated for the operation to retake Borneo, known as Operation Oboe. Should note that after a period of illness, suffering from malaria and a skin condition, the fighting General George Alan Vasey had finally recovered by February 1945. General Blamey, who still had doubts about his physical fitness despite Vasey being given an A by an Army medical board, reluctantly appointed him to command the 6th Division, then in action in the Aitape-Wewak campaign. Vasey then flew north to take up his new command. The aircraft Vasey was travelling in, RAAF Lockheed Hudson A16-118, took off from RAAF Station Archerfield on the afternoon of March 5, 1945. Due to a cyclone that was ravaging the Queensland coast at the time, the aircraft crashed into the sea about 400 metres out from Machans Beach, just north of the mouth of the Barron River, 2 kilometres short of the Cairns Airport. Vasey was killed in the crash along with all those on board. His body was recovered from the crash site and was buried with full military honours in Cairns cemetery along with those of Major-General Rupert Downes and Lieutenant-Colonel G. A. Bertram. Vasey's concern for his men outlived him. The men called him 'Bloody George', not after his casualties, but after his favourite adjective, and Vasey's personable style of command attracted immense loyalty from them. "Vasey owns the 7th," wrote a Melbourne journalist, "but every man in the division believes he owns Vasey." Thus now it fell to General Steven to retain command of the 6th Division at that time already engaged in combat at Aitape-Wewak, the initial plan was to land Brigadier David Whitehead's 26th Brigade at Tarakan on April 23 to establish an airstrip for supporting aircraft for subsequent operations, specifically an assault on Balikpapan by the remaining forces of Major-General George Wootten's 9th Division on May 18. Following that, ten days later, a brigade was set to land at Bandjarmasin to secure air support for the planned invasion of Java by the entire corps on June 27. Ultimately, the operations at Bandjarmasin and Java were cancelled; the Tarakan landing was postponed to May 1; the Balikpapan invasion would instead be conducted by Major-General Edward Milford's 7th Division on July 1; and the 9th Division was tasked with the invasion of Brunei Bay on June 10. Consequently, by the end of March, Morshead's headquarters and the entire 9th Division had relocated to Morotai, where they would prepare and rehearse for the impending invasion. In March 1944, General Doihara Kenji organized the 7th Area Army to establish a new defensive line across Malaya, Singapore, Sumatra, Java, and Borneo. Yes you heard that right, General Doihara Kenji. For those of you who listen to my Fall and Rise of China podcast, this guy is that infamous intelligence officer who worked on nearly all the significant false flag operations during the second sino-Japanese war. Working as an intelligence officer he played a key role in the orchestration of the Huanggutun Incident, Mukden Incident, kidnapping of Emperor Puyi and Marco Polo Bridge Incident, amongst countless other “incidents”. He was a bonafide mastermind behind numerous false flag operations and the Manchurian drug trade earning the moniker Lawrence of Manchuria.  Now, anticipating an impending enemy invasion, Lieutenant-General Yamawaki Masataka reorganized the Borneo Defence Army into the 37th Army in September, placing it directly under General Terauchi's Southern Army. This force gradually received reinforcements from the 56th and 71st Independent Mixed Brigades, the 25th Independent Mixed Regiment, and several smaller units. Despite this, the command was understrength and poorly equipped, as most of the available equipment and experienced troops were reassigned to more critical locations in the Southwest Pacific. By the end of the year, under the leadership of Lieutenant-General Baba Masao, the 37th Army had stationed the majority of Major-General Nozaki Seiji's 56th Independent Mixed Brigade at Tawau, Major-General Yamamura Hyoe's understrength 71st Independent Mixed Brigade at Kuching, most of Colonel Iemura Shinichi's 25th Independent Mixed Regiment on Tawi-Tawi Island, Rear-Admiral Kamada Michiaki's 22nd Naval Special Base Force at Balikpapan, along with three battalions in Sandakan, two battalions and a naval unit in Tarakan, and one battalion each in Kudat, Beaufort, and Miri. However, in 1945, both Baba and Terauchi recognized that the enemy was likely to first target strategic locations on the east coast before establishing a strong presence in western Borneo to prepare for an invasion of Malaya. Consequently, they decided that the majority of the 37th Army should be concentrated around Brunei Bay, leading to orders for the 56th Independent Mixed Brigade to march overland toward northern Borneo. The 370th Independent Battalion remained in Tawau, while the 369th Independent Battalion was sent to garrison Bandjarmasin. Additionally, half of the 454th Independent Battalion was dispatched to Balikpapan, and the other half to Bandjarmasin. This left only the 455th Independent Battalion and part of the 2nd Guard Unit at Tarakan. Early in April the strength of the Japanese force on Tarakan was estimated at about 4000 of whom 2500 were base troops. On the eve of the attack, however, largely because of information indicating that a battalion had been moved from Tarakan to Balikpapan, it was estimated that only 1500 to 2000 troops remained on the island. Aerial photographs showed five gun positions on the south-eastern tip of the island covering the channel along which ships normally entered Tarakan. Round Lingkas and Tarakan there seemed to be 15 anti-aircraft guns, and 9 medium and 5 light anti-aircraft guns seemed to be round the airfield. The whole of Lingkas beach was protected by parallel rows of posts, rails and pipes driven into the mud and extending into the sea to a distance of 125 yards from high-water mark; and between the beach and the road was an anti-tank ditch about 25 feet wide. A group of oil tanks was near the beach and, as it was possible that the Japanese might try to impede an attacker by flooding the oil over the sea and the swamp near the Pamusian River and setting it alight, the air force had taken pains to destroy these tanks. Field works could be seen; there were concrete pill-boxes built by the Dutch; and it was suspected that, here as elsewhere, tunnels had been dug into the hills.  Units stationed at Sandakan were also ordered to move toward Brunei, leaving the 554th Independent Battalion behind. Furthermore, due to the challenges in supplying Tawi-Tawi, the 25th Independent Mixed Regiment was withdrawn to Borneo in February and instructed to march toward Jesselton, where it was expected to arrive in May. During this time, little was done to enhance the island's defenses, and the overland marches took a significant toll on the soldiers' stamina. Meanwhile, enemy air raids intensified, severely disrupting communications. Between April 11 and 29, Air Commodore Arthur Harry Cobby's Australian 1st Tactical Air Force, along with Major-General Paul Wurtsmith's 13th Air Force, conducted several air assaults on Tarakan and Tawau, targeting oil storage tanks, artillery positions, radar stations, defenses, and various buildings. On April 27, Rear-Admiral Forrest Royal's Task Group 78.1 departed Morotai, carrying Whitehead's 26th Brigade, protected by Admiral Berkey's cruisers and destroyers. Over the next two days, this force executed a naval bombardment on shore targets while a minesweeping unit cleared and marked the approach route within 800 yards of the beach and Sadau Island. Early on April 30, the 2/4th Commando Squadron landed unopposed on Sadau, where they established an artillery battery to support the engineers in clearing obstacles from the invasion beaches. After successfully completing the task with just a few sniper and mortar attacks, the main convoy reached the southwest coast of Tarakan Island an hour before sunrise on May 1. Following a heavy air and naval bombardment prior to landing, Whitehead's assault waves began their approach to the shore, supported by rocket fire from the LCI gunboats. Around 08:00, the 2/23rd and 2/48th Battalions landed on Green Beach and Red Beach, respectively, without facing any opposition. However, once they moved inland, they encountered intense fire from Lingkas Hill and Roach. The 2/23rd Battalion launched an attack and captured both locations while the 2/48th took the Finch and Parks positions as they advanced to secure the Collins Highway ridge. Throughout the day, the remaining units of the 26th Brigade landed despite poor beach conditions and overcrowding, with the 2/24th Battalion held in reserve along Anzac Highway. By nightfall, the brigade managed to hold an area 2,800 yards wide at the base and up to 2,000 yards deep. Early on May 2, the 2/23rd seized Milko with minimal resistance, advancing further north to the Pages feature and Hospital Spur. Simultaneously, the 2/48th quickly secured Lyons and the junction with Burke Highway, while the 2/24th effectively attacked the Wills, Sturt, and Frank positions with support from aircraft and artillery. In the late afternoon, as one company moved up Anzac Highway toward the airfield, Lieutenant-Colonel George Warfe's other companies converged on the Essex feature, which was captured without opposition during the night. The next morning, the 2/24th attacked the airfield from the south and east; although they successfully took the airfield ridge at a high cost, their late assault on the Rippon position to the north was repelled by determined enemy defenders. At the same time, the 2/48th conducted reconnaissance towards the Peter and Sykes features, while the 2/23rd managed to secure the area between Gleneleg Highway and Pamusian. However, their assaults on Hospital Spur and Tarakan Hill were unsuccessful. Fortunately, Burke Ridge was found abandoned on May 4. By then, Whitehead had already instructed the 2/23rd to advance east and join the 2/24th in their attacks on the airfield, with the 2/3rd Pioneer Battalion and the 2/4th Commando Squadron taking over their positions in the west. The commandos then launched an attack on Tarakan Hill. Despite being initially held down by fierce enemy fire, they eventually forced the defenders off the high ground through sustained pressure, tank support, and a sweeping maneuver to the right. Simultaneously, the 2/48th advanced and successfully took control of the Evans feature, while a company from the 2/24th attacked the Peningkibaru stronghold after an intense artillery barrage, managing to secure the position just in time to fend off the Japanese who had retreated during the bombardment. Additionally, Warfe planned another assault on Rippon, but heavy Japanese shelling ultimately compelled him to call it off. On May 5, as the commandos and pioneers continued to diminish the remaining strongholds on Tarakan Hill, the 2/48th successfully cleared the road north to Otway, although they faced greater resistance near Sykes. Rippon was also discovered to be abandoned and was swiftly captured, though the Japanese still controlled the high ground to the north. Finally, on May 6, the 2/48th launched another attack on Sykes and successfully cleared the hill this time. While capturing the airfield and town accomplished Whitehead's primary objective, the Japanese continued to hold the rugged interior of Tarakan, indicating that much fighting lay ahead until the garrison was completely defeated. By the evening of 6th May fairly copious information obtained from prisoners and Indonesians and from captured documents indicated that the enemy had about 390 naval troops in the Mount Api area, about 400 troops and civilians in the Fukukaku headquarters area, 200 from Sesanip along Snags Track to Otway, 300 on Otway and in District 6, 300 in the Amal River area and 60 at Cape Juata. Having lost the airfield and the water-purifying plant and hospitals "the enemy at this time was displaying a decided disinclination to hold ground. In particular he was shunning any ground which could be subjected to heavy bombing, shelling, or attack by tanks; or against which large-scale attacks could be launched by our troops".The enemy was now directing his operations to delaying the attackers, particularly with mines, booby-traps, suicide raids, and isolated parties fighting to the death in tunnels and dugouts.  After the unsuccessful general attack on April 19, which yielded minimal gains, Generals Hodge and Buckner were preparing to push the offensive southward, fully aware that breaching the first Shuri defense ring would be a slow and costly endeavor. On the western front, the primary enemy positions on Kakazu Ridge had been entirely circumvented, with General Griner directing his troops to advance and focus on cleanup later. Consequently, on April 20, the majority of the 165th Regiment secured the coastal region before launching a southern attack that encountered immediate and fierce resistance in the rugged terrain north of Gusukuma, particularly around Item Pocket.  The center of the Japanese resistance lay in the I section of Target Area 7777, which came to be called "Item Pocket", in military terminology I is called Item. Actually, the pocket was the hub of the enemy position; from it, like spokes of a giant wheel, extended four low ridges, separated from each other by ravines and rice paddies. Potter's Ridge ran north from the hub, Charlie Ridge to the northeast, Gusukuma Ridge to the southeast, and Ryan Ridge to the southwest. Lying between Gusukuma and Charlie Ridges and sloping to the east was a cone-shaped hill called by Americans "Brewer's Hill." A gulch ran along each side of the hill Anderson's Gulch on the north and Dead Horse Gulch on the south. Both ran in an easterly direction, crossing Route 1 at small bridges just north of Gusukuma. The ground was superbly suited for active defense. Typical Japanese positions were connected by tunnels along the sides and under the crests of the ridges; Ryan Ridge, in particular, was honeycombed with such defenses. From Item Pocket the enemy had excellent command both of the coastal areas to the north and west and of the open land to the east where Route 1 ran north-south. The Japanese had long been aware of the defensive value of this position against either a beach landing on the northwest or an attack from the north. Months before the Americans landed, Japanese troops and Okinawan laborers were boring tunnels and establishing elaborate living quarters and aid stations. The area was held by two companies of the 21st Independent Infantry Battalion of the 64th Brigade, 62nd Division, supported by an antitank company, a machine gun company, and elements of antiaircraft, artillery, and mortar units. At least 600 Japanese occupied the Pocket, reinforced by several hundred Okinawans. Only through persistent effort was the 1st Battalion able to reach a position east of Gusukuma by nightfall, while the 2nd Battalion successfully took control of Potter's Ridge and Fox Ridge but failed in its attempts against Ryan Ridge and Item Pocket itself. The leading platoon was well up on the slope of Ryan when Japanese on top opened up with mortars, machine guns, and artillery, cutting off the rest of Company E. While the company commander, his clothes torn by bullets, and the rest of the company straggled back to Fox Ridge, the leading platoon continued doggedly ahead. Its leader, T/Sgt. Earnest L. Schoeff, managed to reach the top with eight of his men despite almost constant fire. He was ordered by radio to hold until relief came. The men hugged the ground as darkness slowly descended. Then from three directions from fifty to sixty heavily armed Japanese set upon the Americans. In wild hand-to-hand fighting the nine men beat off the attack. Pfc. Paul R. Cook fired four cases of ammunition into the enemy, shooting down at least ten before he was killed. With grenades, rifle butts, and the enemy's own weapons, Schoeff and his men killed another dozen before the Japanese withdrew. With two of his men killed, another missing, and two wounded, Schoeff led the survivors back to his company during the night. To the east, the 106th and 105th Regiments tried to advance south towards the village of Iso and the Pinnacles but were hindered by heavy enemy gunfire. In response, Colonel Winn dispatched his 2nd Battalion to maneuver around the East Pinnacle to reach the village of Natama, where Companies F and G were ultimately repelled by a strong Japanese counterattack. As they retreated in chaos, they faced an ambush from Japanese infiltrators, resulting in significant casualties. Despite these challenges, the 106th Regiment and Winn's 3rd Battalion managed to bypass the West Pinnacle and advance with relative ease, halting 200 yards southwest of Iso. Additionally, Winn's 1st Battalion fought its way to the western edge of Kakazu village and nearly cleared Kakazu Ridge to its eastern point before being ordered back to the escarpment to support the 2nd Battalion and halt any enemy breakthroughs. At the same time, General Bradley ordered the 381st and 382nd Regiments to advance toward Nishibaru Ridge and the Tanabaru Escarpment. In response, Colonel Dill's 3rd Battalion moved along Tombstone Ridge, clearing out the enemy from caves and tombs, and reached the southern end just in time to join Colonel Halloran's 1st Battalion for a surprise offensive against Nishibaru. They quickly captured the crest but were ultimately driven back by the determined defenders. However, this partial victory prompted Halloran to deploy the 2nd Battalion in the afternoon for another assault to the south. By day's end, the 381st was entrenched along the northern slope of Nishibaru Ridge, though at a significant cost. Further west, Dill's 2nd Battalion also pushed forward despite persistent fire from the Rocky Crags, where attempts by the 184th and 17th Regiments to attack were unsuccessful. They could not catch up with the 3rd Battalion. Meanwhile, General Arnold targeted Ouki Hill, but his initial assault was quickly halted by enemy mortar and machine-gun fire. Two armored flamethrowers successfully advanced 400 yards ahead of the infantry, neutralizing an enemy mortar position on Ouki Hill's west slope. Consequently, the Americans concentrated their mortars and smoke to cover the enemy positions, allowing a composite company to launch a surprise attack that secured the crest of Ouki Hill, although the isolated troops would soon have to fend off a series of fierce counterattacks. The next morning, the 32nd Regiment launched an attack down Skyline Ridge with two companies. However, they were quickly halted by mortar fire at a deep road cut in the middle of the ridge. Despite this setback, the troops persevered, largely due to Sergeant Theodore MacDonnell's efforts, and eventually gained control of the entire forward face of the ridge. When, east of the road cut, a man in the stalled third platoon, Company E, was killed, Sgt. Theodore R. MacDonnell, a gist Chemical Mortar Company observer, was impelled to drastic action. MacDonnell had frequently joined men on the line and shown qualities of a determined infantryman. Now, infuriated, he gathered up a handful of grenades and ran in the face of the machine-gun fire along the slope to a point underneath the spot where he believed the enemy gun to be located, and then started up the 20-foot embankment. When he looked over the crest he failed to spot the gun, but he did see three enemy soldiers and grenaded them. He made two trips to the bottom of the embankment for fresh supplies of grenades, but it was not until his third trip to the crest that he located the machine gun. MacDonnell then slid back to the bottom, grabbed a BAR, and mounted the embankment with it, only to have the weapon jam after the first shot. He skidded to the bottom, seized a carbine, and went back up for the fifth time. On reaching the crest he stood up and fired point-blank into the machine-gun position, killing the gunner and two covering riflemen. MacDonnell then hurled the machine gun down the slope behind him. A mortar that he found in the position was also sent crashing down the hillside. Sergeant MacDonnell was later awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his heroism on this occasion. Lt. Fred Capp, commanding Company E, sent troops to reinforce MacDonnell immediately, and the position was consolidated. Then Company F, on orders given as a result of this sudden development, pressed the attack down Skyline Ridge, and by 18:00 the entire forward face of the ridge was occupied and only a knob at the lower tip was causing trouble.  To the west, while Colonel Pachler's Company B attempted another attack on Rocky Crags, Dill's 3rd Battalion reorganized and encircled to reach Nishibaru Ridge via the 381st Regiment, launching an eastward assault that made good headway until they were met with fierce enemy counterattacks that forced them to halt. Simultaneously, Halloran coordinated an attack on Nishibaru, which was successfully repelled by the defenders. Colonel May's 3rd Battalion was then deployed to fill the gap at the gorge. Overnight, a large number of Japanese troops had moved from the Urasoe-Mura Escarpment to set up mortars and machine guns in the Kakazu Pocket, prompting the 27th Reconnaissance Troop to advance toward Kakazu, where they became pinned down at the village's edge. As a result, Colonel Stebbins' 3rd Battalion was ordered to position itself on Kakazu West. Looking west, the majority of the 105th and 106th Regiments were tasked with neutralizing the Pinnacles, but with little success. They did manage to clear the road to the escarpment's summit of mines and obstructions to facilitate tank movements. Finally, Colonel Kelley's 2nd Battalion launched another unsuccessful attack across the mouth of Item Pocket, while Company F attempted to advance along the coast using amphibious tractors but was likewise repelled by intense fire from Ryan Ridge. The 1st Battalion also pushed southwest into Gusukuma, but without armor support, they made minimal progress against the machine guns in the village and fire from Item Pocket attacking from the right rear. The enemy's defense was very effective on the east. Here the 1st Battalion had a major supply problem on its hands. Two blown bridges along Route 1 east of the Item Pocket were holding up vehicles of support units. During the previous night, fire from the Pocket had driven off an engineer platoon working at the site and killed the platoon leader. Early on the 21st Lieutenant Golden, the Bailey bridge expert, came up with ten truckloads of material. His engineers worked for an hour but had to stop in the face of almost ceaseless fire from the Pocket. Colonel Kelley then ordered scouts to find another stream crossing. A bulldozer cut a bypass around Anderson's Gulch near the railroad, but when, about 10:00, the operator nosed his machine out in the open, he was shot in the ear. General Griner, in Colonel Kelley's observation post at the time, ordered Lt. Col. Walter F. Anderson, commander of the 193rd Tank Battalion, to push the bypass through. Anderson himself climbed into his battalion's sole remaining "tank-dozer" and completed the bypass. A 47-mm. anti-tank gun, hitherto silent, scored a direct hit on Anderson's tank, killing him and a guide. The bypass was now blocked and had to be abandoned. This break-down in supply over Route 1 seriously affected operations east of Gusukuma. Colonel Mahoney's 1st Battalion attacked southwest early on the 21st into Gusukuma, but without tanks or cannon the troops made little ground against machine guns in the village and fire from Item Pocket on the right rear. Mahoney's left company did reach a point 400 yards north of the village of Yafusu, the farthest advance yet registered by 24th Corps since April 19, but here the troops were stopped by a network of enemy positions. Concerned about the significant vertical separation between his battalions, Kelley decided to deploy his 3rd Battalion in an effort to fill the gap and simultaneously penetrate Item Pocket. Consequently, the American forces advanced through Dead Horse Gulch, with Company K fighting nearly to the center of the pocket. However, they were ultimately compelled to retreat due to heavy losses and intense counterattacks. On April 22, Kelley opted to hold and enhance his current positions while conducting extensive patrols. Looking to the east, as the 105th Regiment regrouped following a night counterattack from Kakazu, Stebbins' 1st Battalion systematically located and neutralized enemy positions behind them along the escarpment. Brigadier-General William Bradford also took command in the Kakazu area, bolstered by the 3rd Battalion, 17th Regiment, and most of the 2nd Battalion, 165th Regiment, successfully containing the pocket. Further west, the 383rd Regiment replaced the weakened 382nd, while the 2nd Battalion advanced down Nishibaru Ridge to capture the village and higher ground facing Hill 143 to the south. Meanwhile, the 3rd Battalion made minimal progress toward the Gate of the Tanabaru Escarpment. Additionally, Pachler's Company B initiated another attack on the west side of the Rocky Crags, supported by howitzers, tanks, and armored flamethrowers. However, once again, they faced hand grenades and knee mortar shells raining down from above, resulting in heavy casualties and the need to retreat. Finally, the 32nd Regiment maintained control of the forward face of Skyline Ridge but made no attempt to advance, while patrols scoured extensive sections of the southern slope to reach the abandoned eastern face of Hill 178. That night, artillery provided cover to the beleaguered defenders as Colonel Yoshida's 22nd Regiment took over along Skyline Ridge. Following several days of inactivity, 41 kamikaze planes were once again launched on April 22. They successfully sank the minesweeper Swallow and one LCS, while also damaging two destroyers and another minesweeper, resulting in the loss of 25 aircraft. The next day, the 32nd Regiment remained stationed on the north slope of Skyline Ridge, except when conducting patrols or securing caves. This allowed the Japanese defenders to withdraw overnight from their remaining positions around Hill 178. With Company B worn out, the rest of the 1st Battalion, 17th Regiment joined the assault on the Rocky Crags, which fell with little resistance. To the west, medium tanks and armored flamethrowers finally launched a direct attack on Nishibaru Ridge and the Tanabaru Escarpment, successfully destroying most of the enemy positions, although few territorial gains were made. Further west, Winn's 1st Battalion executed a surprise attack on the East Pinnacle, managing to capture the position after fierce hand-to-hand combat. At the same time, the remaining defenders at West Pinnacle initiated a desperate banzai charge towards Iso, where they were ultimately overwhelmed. Kelley then ordered Company I to conduct a probing assault on Ryan Ridge and Item Pocket, while Company C ascended Brewer's Hill but was unable to descend the steep side to join the fight. On April 24, no new attacks were launched due to a confusing mix-up of orders, but preparations were made for an assault the following day. After an artillery barrage, Bradford's task force finally attacked the Kakazu Pocket with four battalions; however, they faced no enemy resistance, as the Japanese had abandoned their positions overnight. To the east, the beleaguered defenders in front of the 96th Division had also retreated, leading to the fall of the Tanabaru Escarpment, its village, Hill 143, and the rest of Nishibaru Ridge without opposition. In a similar manner, the 17th Regiment ascended Hill 178 with only a few scattered artillery rounds landing nearby. The Japanese forces had resisted fiercely for five days, but with the first ring of Shuri defenses breached at multiple points, they chose to withdraw under the cover of heavy mist and light fog the night before. Even so, this advancement was minimal, and it was clear that reaching Shuri would take considerable time given the rate of progress over the first three and a half weeks of the operation. Nonetheless, Buckner believed that any significant landing on the Minatoga beaches or between Machinato airfield and Naha could not be logistically supported and would be vulnerable to strong enemy counterattacks. Therefore, he dismissed proposals to deploy the 77th Division or the 1st Marine Division for these efforts. Instead, it was decided to move the 3rd Marine Corps and the 77th Division from northern Okinawa and Iejima to replace the 24th Corps in the Shuri area. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In April 1945, the Allies launched the invasion of Borneo, led by General Morshead. Swift assaults secured strategic areas against demoralized Japanese troops. Despite fierce resistance, American forces gained ground, crippling Japanese defenses. This victory marked a pivotal moment in the Pacific War, signaling the end of Japanese influence in the region.

The Pacific War - week by week
- 179 - Pacific War Podcast - the Invasion of Mindanao - April 22 - 29, 1945

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 22, 2025 31:06


Last time we spoke about the First Okinawa Counteroffensive. The US Marines launched a formidable assault on Okinawa, confronting the entrenched Japanese 32nd Army. This dramatic struggle culminated in Operation Ten-Ichi-Go, Japan's final counteroffensive, marked by the ill-fated mission of the battleship Yamato, which met its demise under relentless air attacks. As American forces advanced, they faced significant resistance, particularly at the Shuri fortified zone. Colonel Yahara voiced concerns over a night counterattack planned for April 12, predicting disaster and chaos for disoriented troops unfamiliar with the terrain. Despite his warnings, Japanese forces executed a counteroffensive that faced harsh setbacks. As the Americans consolidated their gains, pressures mounted on their adversaries. Nevertheless, the relentless nature of the battle highlighted the stark contrast between the courage of the soldiers and the emerging futility of their cause, underscoring the inevitable tide of defeat facing Japan at this pivotal moment in history. This episode is the Invasion of Mindanao Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  By April 18, significant progress had been made in the offensive operations against Iejima and the Motobu Peninsula, as seen in Iwo Jima; most notably, General Hodge's 24th Corps was prepared to launch a full-scale offensive to the south with three divisions in line. On the morning of April 19, following the successful initial advance of the 106th Regiment, the largest artillery concentration ever used in the Pacific War heralded the dawn attack. Simultaneously, the campaign's most extensive airstrike was carried out, bolstered by the naval bombardment from Admiral Spruance's fleet. The assault teams moved forward, optimistic that the heavy barrage had either destroyed the enemy or left them too dazed to fight back. However, they soon faced disappointment; the Japanese forces, sheltered in their caves, had emerged largely unscathed and quickly took up their positions. To the east, General Arnold's 7th Division launched an attack with the 32nd and 184th Regiments, targeting Skyline Ridge, Ouki Hill, and Hill 178. While most of the 32nd Regiment engaged the entrenched enemy on Skyline Ridge with support from armored flamethrowers, Colonel Finn's 2nd Battalion and Colonel Greene's 2nd Battalion advanced about 500 yards unopposed towards Ouki Hill, only to be halted by a fierce barrage of Japanese fire. As efforts to progress stalled throughout the day, they had to retreat, which also compelled Finn's beleaguered 3rd Battalion to withdraw. Meanwhile, the remainder of the 184th Regiment attempted to advance through the coral formations of the Rocky Crags but was quickly pinned down by the determined defenders. Two medium tanks and three armored flame throwers rumbled southward from the 7th Division's lines on the coastal flats, passed through Ouki, and quickly moved into position at the tip of Skyline Ridge. They poured shot and flame into the cluster of enemy-occupied tombs and emplacements at the lower extremity of the ridge. The long jets of orange flame probed all openings in the face of this part of Skyline, and dark, rolling masses of smoke billowed upward. This was a new spectacle for the waiting infantry, who watched fascinated. For the enemy who died in the searing flame inside their strong points, there was hardly time to become terror-stricken. This phase of the attack lasted fifteen minutes, and then, just after 0700, the infantry moved up. All the Japanese on the forward face of the tip had been killed by the flame, but there were others on the reverse side who denied any advance across the crest. The battle of the infantry quickly erupted and smoldered along the narrow knife-edge line of Skyline Ridge. American troops clung desperately to the forward slope through two Japanese counterattacks, in which the enemy crowded forward into his own mortar fire to hurl grenades and satchel charges. At the same time, General Bradley's 96th Division launched an assault with the 381st and 382nd Regiments advancing side by side, aiming for Nishibaru Ridge, Tombstone Ridge, and the Tanabaru Escarpment. The initial capture of several small hills west of Tombstone Ridge went smoothly, but the 382nd faced stiffer resistance on Tombstone itself, managing to maintain a fragile position along the northwest edge of the ridge and partway down its west slope by nightfall. Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion of the 381st Regiment successfully took Kaniku while pushing toward Nishibaru Ridge. However, most of the assault was executed by the 3rd Battalion, which advanced under heavy fire over the ridge crest to the upper part of Nishibaru village, where it was ultimately halted and forced to retreat by resilient defenders. In General Griner's 27th Division sector, the 106th Regiment had already cleared Machinato Inlet and secured a position at the western end of the Urasoe-Mura Escarpment. The 2nd Battalion attempted to push south following a successful night attack but encountered a series of caves, tombs, and tunnels west of Route 1, leading to a stalemate. This marked the beginning of what would later be termed the Item Pocket battle. Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion of the 105th Regiment conducted a frontal assault on Kakazu Ridge while Griner executed a sweeping tank maneuver around the east end of the ridge.  The only other 27th Division unit on the front line ready to join in the initial assault was the 1st Battalion of the 105th Infantry. This battalion was deployed along Kakazu Gorge, with Kakazu Ridge, immediately in front, its initial objective. Company C was on the left, next to the Ginowan-Shuri road; Companies B and A, in the order named, were to the west, the latter being initially in reserve. The attack of the 1st Battalion was planned to combine a frontal assault against the ridge with a sweeping tank attack around the east end of Kakazu Ridge. The two forces were to meet behind the ridge near the village of Kakazu and to join in a drive to the Urasoe-Mura Escarpment beyond. The Japanese had guessed that a tank-infantry attack would try to penetrate their lines between Nishibaru Ridge and Kakazu Ridge, and they had prepared carefully for it. Their plan was based on separating the infantry from the tanks. The 272d Independent Infantry Battalion alone devised a fire net of four machine guns, two antiaircraft guns, three regimental guns, and the 81-mm. mortars of the 2d Mortar Battalion to cover the saddle between the two ridges. The machine guns were sited at close range. In addition, two special squads of ten men each were sent forward to the saddle for close combat against the infantry. One group was almost entirely wiped out; the other had one noncommissioned officer wounded and three privates killed. The enemy defense also utilized the 47-mm. antitank guns of the 22d Independent Antitank Gun Battalion and close-quarters suicide assault squads. So thorough were these preparations that the Japanese boasted "Not an infantryman got through." It was here in the Kakazu-Urasoe-Mura Escarpment area that the most extensive reorganization of Japanese units had taken place just before the American attack. The remnants of badly shattered battalions were combined into a composite unit of about 1,400 men that consisted largely of members of the 272d Independent Infantry Battalion but also included elements of the 13th, 15th, and 23d Battalions. The 21st Independent Infantry Battalion stood ready to support the 272d. The 2d Light Machine Gun Battalion added its fire power. Although the infantry soon found themselves pinned down by intense Japanese fire, the tanks managed to reach Kakazu village, which was heavily damaged and set ablaze over the next three hours. Despite their efforts, the failure of the 1st Battalion eventually compelled the tanks to retreat, prompting the 2nd Battalion of the 105th Regiment to attempt an attack towards the eastern end of Kakazu Ridge without success. Meanwhile, the 3rd Battalion descended from Kakazu West, bypassed Kakazu village, and successfully reached the summit of the Urasoe-Mura Escarpment. This unexpected achievement led Colonel Winn to decide to reposition the remainder of the 105th around the western end of Kakazu Ridge to join the 3rd Battalion on the escarpment, effectively abandoning the main enemy front. In other areas of the escarpment, the 106th Regiment was unable to advance southward but managed to extend its lines eastward to connect with Winn's 3rd Battalion. Consequently, the major offensive on April 19 failed to produce any significant breakthrough, resulting in 720 casualties. To the north, General Shepherd initiated a final push toward the north coast on the same day, with the 4th and 29th Marine Regiments advancing through complex networks of caves and trenches facing minimal resistance, but they halted at the elevated terrain around Hill 302. Additionally, patrols from the 22nd Marines moved south from Hedo Misaki and successfully captured Aha on the eastern coast. On Iejima, General Bruce also persisted with his main offensive against the Japanese strongholds on Bloody Ridge, as the 3rd Battalion of the 305th Regiment advanced eastward against the northern section of Ie, while Colonel Hamilton's 2nd and 3rd Battalions attacked northward. Backed by artillery and mortars, the infantry engaged in fierce skirmishes marked by hand-to-hand combat, moving from one stronghold to another. Following another preparatory bombardment, Colonel Smith initiated a second assault at 14:30, effectively capturing the slopes of the Pinnacle through a series of rushes despite intense machine-gun and mortar fire. Leading elements of the 306th came under intense mortar and small-arms fire as they left the line of departure 600 yards northeast of the base of Iegusugu. The Pinnacle loomed above them, its slopes covered with masses of torn and twisted vegetation. Describing the Pinnacle on the morning of the 20th, General Randle, assistant division commander of the 77th, stated: "It is a damned highly fortified position with caves three stories deep, each house concrete with machine guns in and under. Whole area of village and circumference of mountain a maze of machine gun, mortar, and gun positions little affected by artillery fire we have poured on. Even as this message was on its way to the 77th Division command post, the 306th was winning a hold on the formidable position. By the end of the day, Smith's 1st Battalion was positioned across the northern slopes of Iegusugu; the 3rd Battalion had advanced to within 400 yards of the peak on the eastern side; and the 2nd Battalion had pivoted south to keep pace with the other units of the 306th. Meanwhile, Hamilton's 2nd Battalion succeeded in securing the buildings on Government House Hill; Coolidge's 1st Battalion regained control of the hill from the east; Hamilton's 3rd Battalion established a line at the base of Iegusugu extending to the recently captured Bloody Ridge; and Coolidge's 3rd Battalion made limited progress as it moved slowly eastward. However, during the night, over 400 Japanese troops, including women armed with spears, launched a fierce counteroffensive against Bloody Ridge, nearly forcing the Americans off Government House Hill. By dawn on April 21, as the counterattack diminished, resulting in heavy casualties on both sides, Hamilton's 3rd Battalion was dispatched to relieve the 2nd Battalion, starting the cleanup of the now-secured Bloody Ridge. Coolidge's 3rd Battalion also successfully repelled a strong counterattack from the north before resuming its advance eastward, destroying several enemy positions as it established a line extending south from a small lake at the southwest base of Iegusugu. In the meantime, the 306th Regiment strengthened its hold on Iegusugu throughout the morning, with the 3rd Battalion launching a successful assault on the eastern slopes, while the 1st and 2nd Battalions continued to clear caves and pillboxes on the northern and northwestern slopes. Shortly after noon, Hamilton's 3rd Battalion and Coolidge's 1st Battalion began advancing northward against light resistance to secure the southern slopes of Iegusugu. Simultaneously, Smith's 2nd Battalion and Coolidge's 3rd Battalion launched a coordinated assault to capture the southwest slopes, where they encountered stronger opposition. By mid-afternoon, all units at the Pinnacle were busy mopping up, systematically destroying and sealing the enemy's underground passages and strongholds over the next five days. By midafternoon of April 21 all units on the Pinnacle were engaged in mopping up. The exterior of the Pinnacle was secure, but Japanese still remained in subterranean passages and strongholds from which they made sallies against the troops. The openings were systematically blown out and sealed off. The 307th alone captured or destroyed during the day five 81-mm mortars, five knee mortars, one 75-mm howitzer, and two 47-mm anti-tank guns. These were some of the weapons that had held the Americans off Bloody Ridge for three days. For five days after Ie Shima was declared secure, elements of the 77th Division mopped up remaining groups of the enemy, sealed caves, destroyed pillboxes, marked or removed the thousands of mines that were still on the island, and buried the dead. During this period hundreds of Japanese were killed in and around the Pinnacle, in the town of Ie, and in caves along the coast line. Removal of mines on the airfield and on the roads feeding it was given priority in order to speed up airfield construction. The last noteworthy encounter on Iejima came during the night of April 22-23, when a group of Japanese soldiers and civilians, including women, all armed with rifles, grenades, and demolitions, rushed from caves on Iegusugu toward the lines of the 306th. They were all cut down without loss to American troops. Ultimately, during the six-day battle on Iejima, the Americans killed 4,706 Japanese soldiers and captured 149, suffering 172 killed, 902 wounded, and 46 missing. Meanwhile, on April 20, the 4th and 29th Marine Regiments reached the north coast after eliminating organized resistance on the Motobu Peninsula, resulting in over 2,000 Japanese fatalities, while Shepherd's Marines incurred 207 killed, 757 wounded, and six missing. The Fleet Marine Force Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion seized Yagachi Island on April 21 and occupied Sesoko Island on April 22, with the 6th Reconnaissance Company making the final landing on Kouri Island on April 23. Following a night reconnaissance in rubber boats, the battalion, transported by armored amphibians, seized Yagachi Shima on 21 April. A leper colony of some 800 adults and 50 children was located on this island, but no resistance was encountered. Because aerial reconnaissance had reported Sesoko Shima to be occupied and defended, it was decided to launch an attack on that island with one reinforced regiment. But preliminary to the attack, a native was captured during an amphibious reconnaissance of the objective who revealed that the island was probably not occupied. A successive physical reconnaissance confirmed his statements. Consequently, Major Jones' command was also assigned this mission, and the battalion occupied Sesoko Shima on 22 April. Although no opposition was met, the operation was interfered with by more than 100 civilians, moving by canoe from islands to the west where food was running low, and "considerable difficulty was involved in coralling and controlling" them. On 23 April the 6th Reconnaissance Company, also mounted on and supported by LVT(A)s, executed a daylight landing on Kouri Shima, likewise finding no resistance. Concurrently, while the 29th Marines remained on the Motobu Peninsula, the 4th Marines moved to their designated area in northern Okinawa to assist the 22nd Marines in mopping-up operations, searching the mountainous interior for remnants of the Udo Force and independent guerrilla groups. Finally, on April 28, Colonel Udo's final 200 surviving members were successfully intercepted and eliminated while attempting to flee to the east coast, effectively concluding the northern Okinawa operation. It's now time to leave Okinawa and return to the southern Philippines to oversee the continuation of General Eichelberger's operations. By the end of March, General Arnold's Americal Division had successfully taken control of Cebu City and Lahug Airfield, but was encountering stronger resistance in the northern hills. By the end of March the Americal Division had acquired a good idea of the nature and extent of General Manjome's principal defenses, and had learned that it had already overrun some of the strongpoints along the Japanese outpost line of resistance. On the other hand, the division had not been able to pinpoint the Japanese flanks. With the enemy firmly entrenched and having all the advantages of observation, General Arnold knew that the process of reducing Manjome's positions would be slow and costly no matter what type of maneuver the Americal Division employed. Lacking the strength required for wide envelopments and specific information about the Japanese flanks, Arnold hoped he might achieve decisive results with a single sledgehammer blow against the Japanese center. He therefore decided to use the bulk of his strength in a frontal assault into the hills due north of Cebu City. Consequently, on April 1, the 182nd Regiment, supported by Colonel Cushing's guerrillas, launched a direct assault on the Japanese center, while the 132nd Regiment advanced along the west bank of the Butuanoan River and then moved westward to flank General Manjome's left. Despite slow progress and heavy casualties, by April 11, the 182nd had diminished most of the significant defensive positions along the center of Manjome's second line, and the 132nd had managed to flank the Japanese left, reaching a crucial location on the far left of Manjome's final defensive positions. Additionally, the 164th Regiment had landed to bolster the offensive and was quickly advancing through the Mananga Valley to encircle the Japanese right and rear. By April 13, the 164th reached Babag Ridge, but its surprise attack was promptly repelled by the defenders. Meanwhile, the 132nd and 182nd Regiments resumed their assaults, with the latter capturing the last stronghold along the Japanese second line. Unbeknownst to the Americans, Manjome had already concluded that further resistance was futile and ordered a general withdrawal northward to begin the night of April 16. In the days that followed, Arnold's three regiments engaged in a series of costly small unit attacks, gradually gaining ground, inch by inch. On April 17, organized resistance in the Japanese stronghold began to falter as defenders retreated, and by evening, the Americal Division had neutralized all of Manjome's significant fortifications. In response to the Japanese withdrawal, the Americal Division quickly initiated a pursuit operation, successfully cutting off the retreat route to the remaining forces of the 1st Division in northern Cebu by the end of the month. By the first week of May, the 132nd Regiment launched an offensive to dismantle General Kataoka's organized resistance, aided by guerrilla forces, and largely achieved its objective in a campaign that lasted until the month's end. The Americans and Filipinos then focused on mopping up the remnants of Manjome's forces, effectively eliminating the last pockets of Japanese resistance on Cebu by June 20. Meanwhile, on April 11, the 3rd Battalion of the 164th Regiment landed unopposed on Bohol at beaches already secured by Major Ismael Ingeniero's guerrillas. Patrols soon located the Japanese garrison inland, leading to the battalion's assault on its main positions from April 17 to April 20, culminating in the overrunning of the last organized opposition by April 23. On April 26, the remaining elements of the 164th Regiment landed unopposed on southern Negros and moved inland to search for the Japanese garrison. By April 28, they discovered the 174th Independent Battalion, but their initial attacks were successfully thwarted by the defenders. Nonetheless, a coordinated offensive commenced on May 6, which successfully compelled the Japanese to retreat and disperse by the end of the month. The 164th then neutralized a final resistance pocket between June 7 and 12, effectively ending Japanese opposition on Negros and completing the 8th Army's campaign to reclaim the central Visayan Islands. Eichelberger's operations in the southern Philippines were far from over, as Major-General Franklin Sibert's 10th Corps, comprising the reinforced 24th and 31st Divisions, was preparing to launch the invasion of Mindanao, known as Operation Victor V. The initial strategy had Major-General Roscoe Woodruff's 24th Division landing on the shores of Illana Bay on April 17 to quickly secure the Malabang-Cotabato area, followed by Major-General Clarence Martin's 31st Division five days later for the final advance toward Davao.  Illana Bay lies nearly a hundred miles northwest of the main objective in eastern Mindanao, the Davao area, and only a poor road connects its beaches to Davao. Still, 8th Army had ample reason to select Illana Bay as the site of the initial assault. For one thing, the army knew that the Japanese had their main concentrations in the Davao region, where they seemed especially well prepared to repel an amphibious assault. It would be foolish to stick one's hand into a hornet's nest if there were no urgency for such action, and 8th Army could not, of course, avoid the long view that the eastern Mindanao operation was in essence a mopping-up campaign rather than an action of great strategic importance. Second, the Illana Bay area was relatively weakly defended--the 24th Division would have a much better chance to achieve tactical surprise there. Finally, 10th Corps would have to seize and rehabilitate an airstrip quickly so that land-based aircraft could provide proper support for subsequent operations in eastern Mindanao, other air bases being too distant. A reasonably good strip existed at Malabang, on the northwestern shore of Illana Bay. Given the estimate that the Japanese maintained a weak garrison at Illana Bay, Malabang seemed the spot for the main assault. However, by early April, Colonel Wendell Fertig's guerrilla forces had taken control of the entire Malabang region, forcing the Japanese garrison to retreat. Consequently, Sibert adjusted his plan, directing Rear-Admiral Albert Noble's Task Group 78.2 to deploy only one battalion at Malabang, with the remaining forces of the 24th Division landing near Parang. The Japanese forces in Mindanao numbered over 43,000, including troops from Lieutenant-General Morozumi Gyosaku's 30th Division, Lieutenant-General Harada Jiro's 100th Division, and Rear-Admiral Doi Naoji's 32nd Naval Special Base Force. General Suzuki of the 35th Army was in overall command of these troops, but he first needed to escape from Cebu to assert his authority. Thus, Suzuki and his staff departed northern Cebu on April 10, using five landing craft. Unfortunately, the boats became separated, leading to an emergency landing near Dumaguete before they could continue their journey on the night of April 16. Tragically, Suzuki's vessel was intercepted and destroyed by a PT boat off the southern tip of Cebu on April 17. Only his chief of staff, Major-General Tomochika Yoshiharu, managed to reach Cagayan on the night of April 20 after several days adrift. Nominal command in Mindanao rested with General Morozumi, who became de jure commander of the 35th Army after General Suzuki's death during the latter's voyage from Cebu. But Morozumi chose not to exercise his authority except insofar as to largely ignore advice from General Tomochika, 35th Army chief of staff, who reached Mindanao in late April. Beset with formidable communications difficulties, and realizing that most inhospitable terrain separated the main bodies of the 30th and 100th Divisions, Morozumi believed he could render his best service by staying with the 30th, leaving General Harada and Admiral Doi more or less to their own devices. Neither Harada nor Morozumi had any offensive missions. Rather, in accordance with Yamashita's December 1944 plans, the Japanese on Mindanao were to direct their efforts to pinning down as many American units as possible in order to delay the progress of the war. Harada and Morozumi had little hope of conducting organized, major defensive operations for more than two months. Once American forces had overrun their prepared defenses, the two planned to retreat into largely unexplored mountains of east-central Mindanao, organizing a last-stand area like Yamashita's in the Asin Valley of northern Luzon. The 30th and 100th Divisions were not in good shape to conduct a delaying, defensive operation either. Hopelessly isolated, short of artillery, small arms ammunition, transportation, and communications equipment, they had no chance of obtaining supplies. They had some stocks of food, but their transportation shortage, coupled with the poor condition of eastern Mindanao roads would make it most difficult for the Japanese to move their food from central depots to the mountains. The Japanese commanders thus knew that once an invasion of eastern Mindanao began they would enter upon a battle they could not win, and they definitely had no relish for a defense to the death in place.  After an uneventful journey, Sibert's 10th Corps began landing on Mindanao on the morning of April 17. Troops from the 533rd Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment went ashore on the small Ibus Island, while the 3rd Battalion of the 21st Regiment joined Fertig's guerrillas on the beach near Malabang. Company K secured Bongo Island without opposition. At 09:00, after an unnecessary two-hour bombardment by cruisers and destroyers, the 19th Regiment landed at Parang without encountering any resistance, followed by most of the 21st Regiment. That afternoon, the 19th Regiment secured the entire Parang area, and the 24th Reconnaissance Troop scouted the shores of Polloc Harbor and the northern entrance of the Mindanao River, finding them clear. On April 18, Sibert launched an assault towards Fort Pikit, with the 19th Regiment advancing along Route 1 and the 21st Regiment utilizing the Mindanao River. The 21st's advance was quicker, successfully reaching Paidu-Pulangi the next day. However, the 19th Regiment lagged due to poor road conditions and some enemy resistance, leading Woodruff to order the 21st to withdraw downstream for the night. On April 21, a battalion from the 34th Regiment arrived at Paidu-Pulangi, advancing both overland and along the river to reach Fort Pikit late in the afternoon. The isolated 166th Independent Battalion was ultimately destroyed, with the 19th finally arriving at Fort Pikit on April 23. Meanwhile, the 34th continued to push forward and secured the Kabacan junction of Route 1 and Sayre Highway. This quick capture of the junction effectively separated the 30th and 100th Divisions and opened two routes of attack: north along the Sayre and southeast towards Davao. Consequently, the newly arrived 31st Division was tasked with sending its 124th Regiment to assault the 30th Division's forces in northern Mindanao, while the 34th Regiment continued its advance along Route 1 towards Digos and Davao. In response, Morozumi dispatched reinforcements under Colonel Ouchi Koretake to block any enemy progress past Omonay, while fortifying the Malaybalay area. By this time, General Morozumi had swung into action in an attempt to stem the enemy advance before it moved north into central Mindanao. Colonel Ouchi, commander of the 30th Engineer Regiment, was ordered about April 22 to take command of operations along the southern approaches and to annihilate the enemy south of the east-west line running through Omonay. For this mission he was given command of the South Sector Unit, as well as his engineer units. On April 23, General Tomochika, Chief of Staff of 35th Army, arrived at the 30th Division command post at Impalutao from Agusan, where he had arrived on April 21 from Cebu. Tomochika immediately conferred with Morozumi regarding implementation of the Army policy of protracted resistance. As a result of this discussion, Morozumi concluded that it was necessary to strengthen the Malaybalay area. He therefore ordered the transfer of the 1st Battalion, 77th Regiment from the North Sector Unit to the Central Sector Unit and the movement of this battalion to new positions near Malaybalay. About the same date Morozumi ordered the Surigao Sector Unit to move from Ampayon to the Waloe area, where it was to assist in carrying out the division's self-sufficiency program. Although the 30th Division commander thus adopted measures to strengthen the area of final resistance, he still considered the landing near Parang a secondary invasion and estimated that the main enemy landing would soon be launched in the Macajalar Bay area. The preponderance of division strength was therefore retained in the north.  Led by the 24th Reconnaissance Troop, the 34th Regiment quickly departed from Kabacan on April 24. Although progress was hampered primarily by destroyed bridges and the poor condition of Route 1, the troops successfully arrived at the outskirts of Digos by April 27, where they faced approximately 3,350 enemy troops. The Japanese forces urgently prepared to defend against the 24th Division's assault but could only hold out until the early hours of April 28, when they retreated to the foothills of Mount Apo to the north. Elements of the 34th Regiment pursued the withdrawing Japanese, who maintained their position in the Mount Apo region until May 9, when they retreated north to regroup with the rest of the 100th Division. Meanwhile, other units of the 34th and the guerrilla 108th Division began patrolling the Davao Gulf coast, which they successfully cleared by May 12. Additionally, the 19th Regiment advanced from Kabacan to Digos, passed through the 34th, and started moving north towards Davao. Facing little resistance along Route 1, the 19th Regiment overwhelmed the last opposition in front of the city and successfully occupied Davao by May 3 with minimal opposition. Meanwhile, on the afternoon of April 27, the 124th Regiment departed from Kabacan and quickly confronted the 1st Battalion, 74th Regiment, causing it to retreat in disarray. The 124th then pressed on to the north, facing minimal resistance, and ultimately arrived in Kibawe by May 3. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The US invasion of Mindanao commenced under General Eichelberger. The initial assault targeted Illana Bay, with American forces quickly securing key areas. Japanese troops, suffering from low morale and inadequate supplies, struggled to mount an effective defense. The campaign marked a pivotal advance in the Pacific War, laying groundwork for further operations.

The Underworld Podcast
IS JUST ARRESTED PHILIPPINES PRESIDENT DUTERTE A DRUGLORD?

The Underworld Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 11, 2025 55:04


Sean Williams reports from the Philippines, where former President Rodrigo Duterte's brutal drug war cost up to 30,000 lives and tore Philippine society to shreds. But was it all cover for his family's own involvement in the drug trade? Reporting from Duterte's stronghold of Davao, where he ran a decades-long death squad, and capital Manila, which bore the brunt of that bloody blueprint, we expose the genesis of the war — and its longtime link to Triads and other criminal groups.  Duterte's connections to the drug trade have rarely been reported on in English and are just starting to make waves. This episode, backed by exclusive sources and firsthand accounts, challenges mainstream narratives and sheds new light on one of the most controversial anti-drug campaigns in modern history. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Mike of New York
Duterte ICC Arrest drug war impunity

Mike of New York

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 11, 2025 16:48


The arrest of former Philippine President Rodrigo ‘Rody' Duterte, I covered his time as major and in congress when he was in Davao. He was arrested on a ICC Warrant in Manila at the international airport named for a political leader who was a victim of a violent poltical murder. Arrests of former Presidents have happened before. Often during the terms of their successors. Often when poltical season si near. But, this is different it's an arrest for violence during a drug war where soem human rights groups say up to 3500 died. This is my opinion and reaction having covered this story for a long time and what I think may be coming. It is about accountability, and hopefully a shift away from the use of extreme violence and an end of what is often termed as impunity of those in power. But we shall see what comes next.The Philippines removed itself from the ICC during Dutertez time in office. New cases can be brought forward. Only from the time the Philippiens was in the ICC treaty.

The Richard Heydarian Podcast
Duterte, Davao & Dark Charisma

The Richard Heydarian Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 29, 2025 38:34


A Conversation with Father Albert Alejo.

The God Culture
NEW!!! Lost Isles of Gold LIVE Series. Part 7: Where Is the Garden of Eden? Philippines?

The God Culture

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 17, 2025 42:12


Recorded Live in front of a Live Studio Audience in Davao, Philippines, TGC is back!!! This 13-week series will explode on the scene as it is accompanied by a 13-week Small Group Study. It's your turn... Time to host a group of friends and family in your home. Feed them, play the video each week and avail of the Small Group Study Guide free in eBook, buy 1 and we release the copyright that you may even make copies, as long as it is free, or contact us for bulk copies and church or group programs including our slides for Pastors to teach in a class or even from the pulpit. It is time for this message to permeate not just the Philippines, but the world. This restoration of Bible geography leads to the restoration of prophecy and reveals the most important land in these Last Days. Many are asking and it is time to give them answers. We have already recorded this entire 13-week series and will release 1 per week on Friday evenings in Philippine time.https://www.ophirinstitute.com/For our other books including our new release, The Mystery of the Three Kings, all links are at this same site. Yah Bless.Support the show

The Pacific War - week by week
- 165 - Pacific War Podcast - South China Sea Raid - January 14 - 21 , 1944

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 14, 2025 46:02


Last time we spoke about the invasion of Luzon. As Operation Mike 1 commenced, General Swift's 1st Corps prepared to assault Lingayen Gulf while General Griswold's 14th Corps rehearsed at Huon Gulf. Despite successful diversionary strikes, Japanese forces anticipated an invasion. On January 2, enemy ships were spotted heading towards Luzon, confirming fears of a large-scale operation. Kamikaze attacks intensified, damaging Allied vessels, including the USS Long, which sank after being hit. Amidst bombardments, Filipino citizens demonstrated resilience despite the destruction, reflecting their loyalty and hope during the turmoil. As dawn broke on January 9, Kinkaid's amphibious convoys approached Lingayen Gulf, initiating a fierce assault. Preceded by heavy bombardments, American forces landed on the beaches, facing minimal resistance. The 14th Corps advanced toward key locations, while the 1st Corps secured strategic positions despite enduring sniper fire. By nightfall, they established a significant beachhead. Despite sporadic Japanese counterattacks, American troops pressed forward, and reinforcements were deployed to maintain momentum. The stage was set for a crucial campaign in Luzon. This episode is the South China Sea Raid Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As we last left off, the 1st and 14th Corps had just successfully established a beachhead on Lingayen Gulf. On January 11, General Krueger further reinforced his position by landing additional reserves, aiming to effectively confront the formidable enemy forces entrenched in the eastern hills. Concurrently, Admiral Halsey's 3rd Fleet units made their entrance into the South China Sea to execute an ambitious raid known as Operation Gratitude. This operation was prompted by misleading intelligence reports suggesting that the hybrid battleship-carriers Ise and Hyuga were stationed in Cam Ranh Bay. In response, Halsey ordered Admiral Bogan's Task Group 38.2 to launch an assault on these supposed targets. This task group was primarily composed of the battleships New Jersey and Wisconsin, which were directed to bombard the bay and eliminate any Japanese vessels that had sustained damage from prior airstrikes. To enhance their operational capabilities, Halsey established Task Group 38.5, specifically designed for night operations, which included the night-capable carriers Enterprise and Independence. On January 12, aircraft from these carriers were deployed for a predawn reconnaissance mission over Cam Ranh Bay and its adjacent waters in search of enemy targets. Despite their efforts, the search yielded no results, indicating that the earlier intelligence had been inaccurate. Nevertheless, all three carrier groups proceeded with their planned strikes at 07:30, while the surface action group advanced toward Cam Ranh. Halsey's strategic gamble proved to be remarkably successful. Although the Ise and Hyuga were not present in the bay, American aviators discovered a wealth of enemy shipping, including three significant Japanese convoys. Sherman's TG 38.3 encountered the most valuable target off Qui Nhon north of Cam Ranh. This was convoy Hi-86 with nine merchants and a heavy escort. The convoy had departed Cape St Jacques on January 9 and was headed north. The escort comprised light cruiser Kashii and five kaibokan. Late on January 11, it reached Qui Nhon Bay and anchored. After leaving Qui Nhon Bay, it was discovered by TG 38.3. In two large attacks, aircraft from Essex, Ticonderoga, Langley, and San Jacinto laid waste to the convoy. None of the nine merchant ships in the convoy survived this onslaught. Cargo ships Yoshu Maru and Eiman Maru (loaded with bauxite and raw rubber), along with tanker San Luis Maru, were sunk. The other six ships were damaged and forced to beach. Otsusan Maru (a cargo ship converted to tanker), passenger-cargo ship Tatebe Maru, cargo ship Kyokuun Maru, cargo ship Yusei Maru, ore carrier Tatsubato Maru, and cargo ship Banshu Maru No. 63 all became constructive total losses. The escort for this large convoy met a similar fate. Light cruiser Kashii was hit amidships by a torpedo in the early afternoon. This was followed by two bomb hits aft that detonated her depth-charge magazine. Kashii sank stern first with 621 members of her crew; only 19 survived. CD-23 was attacked north of Qui Nhon and sunk with her entire crew of 155 officers and men. CD-51 suffered the same fate. After she blew up and sank, her depth charges detonated with fatal consequences for any survivors; 159 men were lost. From the entire convoy, only kaibokans Daito and Ukuru, and corvette CD-27 survived, albeit in a damaged state. As a result, Admiral McCain's Task Force 38 conducted an impressive total of 984 strike missions throughout the day. This relentless assault led to the sinking of the light cruiser Kashii, two minesweepers, eight kaibokans, two subchasers, five transport ships, fourteen cargo vessels, and nine oilers. Additionally, four kaibokans, one subchaser, three transports, four cargo ships, and two oilers were damaged. This operation marked the highest number of ships sunk by airstrikes in a single day during the war, showcasing the effectiveness of the American air campaign and the critical role of intelligence in naval warfare. In addition to inflicting significant damage on Japanese shipping, the aviators under Admiral Halsey achieved remarkable success by claiming the destruction of 113 enemy aircraft, both in the air and on the ground, while sustaining the loss of 23 American aircraft. The impact of these operations extended beyond aerial engagements; critical infrastructure was also targeted. Airfields, docks, and oil storage facilities located between Tourane and Saigon suffered considerable damage. Notably, the railway station in Nha Trang and a vital bridge on the route connecting Saigon to Bien Hoa were also affected, disrupting transportation and supply lines.   Meanwhile, Bogan's surface strike group was unable to locate any Japanese vessels during their operations and instead focused their firepower on bombarding Cam Ranh Bay, further demonstrating the ongoing conflict's intensity. Turning to the situation in Luzon, the 1st and 14th Corps were poised to advance their offensives. To the west, the 185th Regiment and the 40th Reconnaissance Troop initiated a push toward the recently vacated Port Sual. The 160th Regiment maintained a watchful presence at Aguilar, while patrols from the 148th Regiment ventured into towns occupied by guerrilla forces, specifically Urbiztondo and Bayambang. In the eastern sector, the 6th Division was temporarily held back to prevent the creation of a potentially hazardous gap along the front of the 1st Corps. However, the reinforced 43rd Division continued its advance against the most formidable Japanese defenses encountered on Luzon to date. Along the coastline, the 158th Regiment dispatched patrols into Damortis, discovering the town largely deserted. The 172nd Regiment attempted an attack on Hill 580, which ultimately proved unsuccessful, while the 63rd Regiment was deployed to close the widening gap between the 158th and 172nd Regiments. The primary objective of these coordinated efforts was to defeat Major-General Sato Bunzo's 58th Independent Mixed Brigade and secure control of the Damortis-Rosario road. The Damortis-Rosario road, a 2-lane, concrete-paved section of Route 3, led east from the junction of Route 3 and the coast road at Damortis, about 8 miles north of San Fabian, to the junction of Routes 3 and 11, 8 miles inland and a mile east of Rosario. Seizure of the Damortis-Rosario stretch of Route 3 would present 1st Corps with an easy means of access to Route 11, in turn providing a 2-lane asphalt-paved axis of advance toward Baguio along the deep valley of the Bued River. Equally important, if the 1st Corps could quickly gain control over the Damortis-Rosario road and the Routes 3-11 junction, the corps could largely overcome the threat of counterattack against the 6th Army's beachhead from the north and northeast. The Damortis-Rosario road ran sometimes across wooded ravines and sometimes over ridge tops for 3/4 of the way to Rosario, and then continued across open farm land and through Rosario to a junction with Route 11. The road was dominated by broken ridges and steep-sided hills to both the north and the south for the first 5 miles inland. South of the road the hills and ridges were grass-covered; to the north many of the draws and ravines contained thick scrub growth. Bare, steep heights north, northeast, and east of Rosario controlled the Routes 3-11 junction. The 58th Independent Mixed Brigade, defending the Damortis-Rosario road, had all the advantages of observation, while the relatively soft rock and dirt mixture of the hills and ridges gave the brigade ample opportunity to indulge in what was soon to appear to the 1st Corps as the Japanese Army's favorite occupation--digging caves and tunnels. Achieving this would mitigate the threat of a counterattack against the 6th Army's beachhead from the north and northeast. With the security of its left flank assured, the 14th Corps could then accelerate its advance toward General Krueger's main objective: the Central Plains-Manila Bay region. This strategic maneuvering was crucial for consolidating American forces and ensuring a successful campaign in the Philippines. At the same time, the 169th Regiment faced ongoing challenges at Hill 318 and the southern part of the Japanese-held third ridgeline, while the 103rd Regiment made unsuccessful attempts to advance toward the Hill 200 complex, which was firmly defended by the 2nd Battalion, 64th Regiment. Meanwhile, General Tominaga executed his final large-scale kamikaze attack during the Philippines Campaign, successfully damaging two destroyer escorts, one destroyer transport, and five merchant ships. The final attacks were recorded on January 13. Only two suicide aircraft were dispatched, both IJA Ki-84 Franks. One surprised the crew of escort carrier Salamaua. Unengaged by antiaircraft fire, the Frank hit amidships. One of the aircraft's bombs exploded on the hangar deck and the second passed through the ship creating a hole near the waterline. The carrier was left without power while major fires took hold. Damage control was ultimately successful, but not before 15 were killed and 88 wounded. Salamaua was out of the war until April. Also on this day, attack transport Zeilin was hit by a probable IJN aircraft conducting an impromptu suicide attack. Ultimately, the 4th Air Army was scheduled to evacuate to Formosa on January 15, marking the end of the threat from Japanese air power in the Philippines, although the Allies were not yet aware of this. Since the initial kamikaze assault on the Mindoro-bound convoys on December 13, Japanese aircraft had sunk 24 vessels and damaged 67 others. Casualties from these air attacks aboard ships were approximately 1,230 men killed and 1,800 wounded, while the Allies estimated they had destroyed around 600 Japanese aircraft during the same timeframe. Back in Lingayen Gulf on January 13, the 172nd Regiment once again advanced up the grassy, steep slopes of Hill 580, successfully securing most of the area against fierce resistance. Simultaneously, the 63rd Regiment attacked north from Hill 247 and captured Hill 363, despite lacking artillery support. Artillery support was to have been provided by the 43rd Division's 155-mm. howitzer battalion, the 192nd Field Artillery Battalion, since the 63rd Regiment's own 105-mm. battalion had been sent south with the rest of the 6th Division. Unfortunately, the 192nd Field Artillery did not learn it was to support the 63rd until after dark on January 12, and could not start moving to good close support positions until daylight on the 13th, after the 63rd had started its attack. Unlike a 105-mm. battalion, the 192nd did not normally operate in direct support roles and lacked the forward observers and communications the lighter battalions possessed. The 192nd might therefore have been expected to take some time to prepare for its direct support mission, but the battalion reported it could have provided some support--with at least one battery--by noon on the 13th had not Colonel Ralph C. Holliday, commanding the 63rd Regiment, insisted that wire be laid for artillery liaison officers and forward observers, a job that was not completed for almost 36 hours. Colonel Holliday may have been influenced in his decision by the fact that the artillery's SCR-610 radio did not work efficiently in the broken terrain of the middle ridge line where the 63rd was attacking. It was not, indeed, until the 43rd Division had supplied the 192nd Field Artillery with infantry SCR-300 sets that the battalion was able to establish satisfactory radio communications. Then, on January 14, the first radio brought up to the battalion's forward observers was promptly destroyed by Japanese artillery, which also cut wire that had already been laid. Support was again delayed, so the entire battalion was not in position and ready to give the 63rd Regiment the support it needed until midafternoon on January 15. Meanwhile the 169th Regiment completed the clearing of the southern end of the ridgeline, while the 103rd Regiment continued its unsuccessful efforts to take Hill 200. To the west, the 6th Division established a fortified line extending from Malasiqui to Manaoag. They promptly dispatched reconnaissance units to the east and south to gather intelligence on enemy movements. The 185th Regiment achieved a significant victory by successfully assaulting Port Sual, while the 160th Regiment engaged in several skirmishes with the reinforced 23rd Reconnaissance Regiment, which had retreated from Port Sual at the onset of the conflict. Meanwhile, patrols from the 148th Regiment advanced into Wawa, strategically located between Bayambang and Urbiztondo. The following day, the 185th Regiment continued its momentum by capturing the crucial road junction town of Alaminos on the Bolinao Peninsula. Some of its elements also pushed northward toward Cabalitan Bay, where they discovered that Allied Naval Forces had already landed to establish a seaplane base, enhancing their operational capabilities in the region. Looking to the east, the 103rd Regiment made gradual but consistent progress along Hill 200, while the 169th Regiment executed a costly frontal assault to clear Hill 318, suffering significant casualties in the process. The 172nd Regiment advanced north along the third ridge, successfully seizing Hill 565 despite facing scattered resistance. The 63rd Regiment continued its slow advance northward, persistently harassed by Japanese artillery and mortar fire, which impeded their progress. Additionally, the 158th Regiment initiated an offensive toward Rosario but was quickly compelled to retreat due to intense Japanese artillery and machine-gun fire. In contrast, General Yamashita, while cautious about launching a major counteroffensive, recognized the necessity of limited offensive actions to regain the initiative. He believed that such actions would effectively disrupt the enemy's advance inland. Consequently, he ordered General Nishiyama's 23rd Division to conduct a robust raiding attack against the San Fabian-Alacan sector during the night of January 16. This strategic decision aimed to exploit the element of surprise and inflict damage on the enemy forces, thereby buying time for his troops to regroup and fortify their positions. In a strategic initiative aimed at maximizing the destruction of enemy weaponry, supplies, and critical base installations, the 58th Brigade, along with the 71st and 72nd Regiments, was instructed to assemble specialized "suicide" raiding units. These units comprised carefully selected soldiers, heavily armed with automatic firearms and supported by demolition teams trained for explosive operations. In addition, a fourth unit was to be formed from the Shigemi Detachment of the 2nd Armored Division, which had recently positioned itself on the southern flank of the 23rd Division. This unit would consist of a mobile infantry company and a medium tank company. The operational plan called for these units to breach the enemy's beachhead perimeter simultaneously at various locations on January 17. Their objective was to swiftly execute their missions and then withdraw to safety. As preparations for this limited counteroffensive unfolded, the American forces continued their own offensive operations, which had commenced on January 15. In this context, the 158th Regiment launched an eastward assault, successfully advancing approximately 1,000 yards. Meanwhile, the 63rd Regiment cautiously pushed forward over a mile and a half northward from Hill 363. The 172nd Regiment made a rapid advance to the Cataguintingan road junction, effectively establishing a battalion at the edge of Route 3, about a mile and a half west of Rosario. In contrast, the 169th Regiment encountered challenges during a two-pronged attack on Hill 355, leading General Wing to order the regiment to bypass the hill to the south and reposition overland to Route 3 at barrio Palacpalac. Conversely, the 103rd Regiment achieved significant success in their assault on the Hill 200 complex. Further to the west, patrols from the 185th Regiment advanced westward, successfully reaching Dasol Bay. Additionally, a battalion from the 129th Regiment crossed the Agno River at Wawa and continued south along a dusty gravel road toward Camiling. Other elements of the 160th Regiment also moved down from Aguilar to Camiling, consolidating their position in the area. After completing refueling operations over the previous days, Task Force 38 resumed its northern advance to launch an assault on Formosa on January 15. Despite Admiral McCain's recommendation to cancel the strike due to inclement weather conditions, Admiral Halsey opted to proceed with the operation. As a result, a series of airstrikes were executed against Formosa and the Pescadores Islands throughout the day. The 16 fighter sweeps conducted during this operation managed to destroy only 16 Japanese aircraft in the air and an additional 18 on the ground. However, the bombing missions targeting enemy shipping proved more effective, leading to the sinking of the destroyers Hatakaze and Tsuga, along with one transport vessel and two merchant ships, albeit at the cost of losing 12 American aircraft. Following these strikes, Task Force 38 redirected its course toward Hong Kong, which came under attack on January 16. Unfortunately, the American forces encountered severe weather conditions and faced intense anti-aircraft fire. This resulted in a limited success, with the Americans sinking just one transport ship, five oilers, one cargo vessel, and one guardboat. Additionally, they inflicted damage on the destroyer Hasu, three destroyer escorts, one corvette, one transport, and one oiler. The strikes also caused significant destruction to key infrastructure, including Kai Tak Airport, the Kowloon and Taikoo docks, the Aberdeen dockyard, the Kowloon-Canton railway, and the Macau Naval Aviation Center. In a broader campaign, the Americans executed secondary strikes against Canton and Hainan Island, as well as targeting several airfields along the Chinese coast, particularly between the Leizhou Peninsula and Swatow. However, this ambitious operation came at a steep cost, with Task Force 38 suffering a total loss of 49 aircraft—27 due to operational issues and 22 as a result of enemy action. With the South China Sea Raid concluded, Admiral Halsey directed his fleet toward the Luzon Strait, adhering to Admiral Nimitz's request. Ultimately, Halsey's aggressive campaign resulted in the destruction of approximately 300,000 tons of Japanese shipping and an estimated 615 Japanese aircraft, all at the expense of 201 American planes. Returning to the Lingayen Gulf, Wing's offensive operations persisted on January 16. The 63rd, 158th, and 172nd Regiments continued their assaults toward the town of Rosario. However, they encountered fierce resistance from the determined Japanese defenders, which significantly hampered their progress. In contrast, the 169th Regiment achieved a notable advancement by reaching Palacpalac, while the 103rd Regiment successfully captured the strategically important Hill 200 complex. From their newly secured positions, elements of the 103rd Regiment pursued the retreating Japanese forces toward Pozorrubio. Meanwhile, two reinforced companies advanced toward Potpot, and both towns ultimately fell into American hands on January 17. In a broader strategic context, General Krueger directed General Griswold to dispatch additional troops south of the Agno River in preparation for a decisive push toward Manila. By January 17, the 14th Corps had established outposts at key locations including Moncada, Nampicuan, Anao, and Paniqui, solidifying their control over the area. Simultaneously, Japanese General Nishiyama was preparing to initiate a local counteroffensive by nightfall on January 16. However, the 72nd Regiment's raiding unit was unable to participate due to enemy penetrations disrupting their plans. On the northern front, Sato's raiding unit conducted a minor raid against an artillery position held by the 158th Regiment, but this attack proved largely inconsequential. In contrast, the raiding unit from the 71st Regiment executed a more impactful maneuver by advancing down the Bued River valley. They successfully infiltrated the rear installations of the 172nd Regiment, where they ignited a gasoline dump, damaging several trucks in the process. This raid resulted in the deaths of two American soldiers and injuries to eight others. At Palacpalac, confusion reigned as the retreating 2nd Battalion of the 64th Regiment inadvertently engaged with the perimeter of the 1st Battalion of the 169th Regiment. This chaotic encounter cost the Japanese approximately 100 men before they retreated in disarray, further illustrating the tumultuous nature of the battlefield. In a dramatic turn of events, the tank raiding unit launched a surprise attack on the newly established outpost at Potpot. Initially, the first two tanks managed to breach the perimeter, unleashing a barrage of machine-gun fire in all directions as they sped away down the road toward Manaoag. However, the remaining tanks, along with their infantry support, encountered fierce resistance from determined defenders, leading to a sharp and intense fire fight that lasted two hours. Despite their initial success, the attackers were ultimately repelled. As dawn broke, the two tanks that had previously penetrated the defenses returned down the Manaoag road, but this time they met their demise, successfully destroyed by the defenders who had regrouped and fortified their positions. Since the onset of the invasion, the 1st Corps had suffered significant casualties, with approximately 220 men killed and 660 wounded. In stark contrast, Griswold's forces experienced far lighter losses, with only 30 killed and 90 wounded. With the enemy's counterattack thwarted, the 43rd Division managed to secure positions that effectively reduced the likelihood of another large-scale surprise offensive from the Japanese forces. However, to completely eliminate the remaining threats, Commander Wing recognized the necessity of securing control over the Rosario junction and establishing a solid hold on Route 3 to the south of this critical point. The challenge was considerable, as Japanese artillery, mortars, and machine guns positioned on the surrounding high ground commanded all approaches to Rosario. Consequently, Wing had no choice but to restrict the 172nd Regiment to a defensive holding action on its left flank while directing its right flank to seize the high ground immediately to the north and northwest of Rosario. In addition, the 63rd and 158th Regiments were tasked with neutralizing the enemy stronghold along the Rosario-Damortis road. To expedite the capture of the road junction, Wing also planned for the 103rd and 169th Regiments to launch an offensive drive north along Route 3. This coordinated effort aimed to strengthen their strategic position and diminish the Japanese threat in the region, ultimately paving the way for a more secure and stable front. In response to the evolving battlefield situation, General Krueger ultimately ordered General Mullins' 25th Division to secure the right flank previously held by Wing's forces. This strategic move prompted the 27th and 161st Regiments to begin the process of relieving the 103rd and 169th Regiments. By doing so, the 6th Division would be able to resume its advance, now directed towards Urdaneta and the Cabaruan Hills, critical areas for the ongoing campaign. To the west, Krueger aimed to maintain the 14th Corps along the Agno River line until General Swift's 1st Corps could effectively neutralize the enemy resistance stretching from Damortis to Urdaneta. This would enable Swift's forces to maneuver southward alongside Griswold's corps. However, General MacArthur was eager to initiate a southern advance toward Manila as soon as possible. Consequently, he instructed the 14th Corps to reposition its main forces back to their previous outpost line south of the Agno by January 20. Following this, the corps was to launch an offensive towards Tarlac and Victoria. Once they established a presence along the Tarlac-Victoria line, the corps would prepare to advance toward Clark Field, a vital objective necessary for the successful neutralization of Japanese strongholds at Iwo Jima and Okinawa. To bolster this offensive, MacArthur also planned to deploy the 11th Corps on the western coast of Luzon, just north of the Bataan Peninsula. This amphibious operation aimed to disrupt Japanese defensive strategies in the Clark Field area, thereby enhancing the overall effectiveness of the Allied campaign. In contrast, in reaction to the loss of the Hill 200 complex, Japanese General Yamashita ordered the 2nd Tank Division to advance immediately into the Tayug sector. There, Lieutenant-General Iwanaka Yoshiharu would take command of the 10th Division forces already stationed in the region. The armored units were tasked with positioning themselves along the trail north of San Nicolas and on both sides of the Ambayabang River, with the objective of containing any potential enemy advances to the east. Additionally, the Shigemi Detachment received orders to move its main forces from San Manuel to Binalonan, where they were to defend the town resolutely, prepared to hold their ground against any assault. In addition, General Okamoto was tasked with positioning his main forces to secure the immediate approaches to San Jose. Meanwhile, General Tsuda's 105th Division was instructed to advance northward through Cabanatuan as quickly as possible to establish defensive positions behind the 10th Division, specifically at Minuli and north of Carranglan. However, not all of these strategic plans could be effectively executed. By January 17, Yamashita discovered that the Villa Verde Trail was impassable for tanks and trucks, rendering it unusable for the planned armored movements. Furthermore, the terrain in the Tayug-San Nicolas area proved to be unsuitable for armored operations, complicating the situation further. On January 17 the 14th Area Army commander belatedly learned that the 10th Division had never concentrated at San Jose and that it had made no real effort to dispose itself along the entire Tayug-Umingan-Lupao-San Jose defense line for which it was responsible. General Okamoto, the division commander, had decided that he did not have sufficient strength to hold the relatively open ground assigned to him. Most of his 39th Regiment was with the Kembu Group; the bulk of the 10th Regiment, greatly understrength, was attached to the 103rd Division for the defense of northern Luzon; and, at least as late as of January 15, he had received no word as to when he might expect the attached Tsuda Detachment to arrive in the San Jose area from the east coast. He had therefore withdrawn most of his troops up Route 5 from San Jose and had started disposing them along the line Yamashita had intended the 105th Division to hold; leaving behind only a reinforced infantry company and two artillery battalions to secure the all-important railhead. Okamoto had directed the 10th Reconnaissance Regiment to remain in the San Nicolas area, and he stationed three or four rifle companies of his 63rd Regiment along the Tayug-Lupao line and in rising ground to the southwest. Confronted with these unexpected developments, Yamashita concluded that he had no choice but to accept the redeployment of the 10th Division as an established fact. Consequently, he ordered the 2nd Tank Division, which had already begun its movement toward Tayug, to concentrate its main forces southeast of Tayug to safeguard the immediate approaches to San Jose. Additionally, the 6th Tank Regiment was assigned to position itself in Muñoz to cover the southwestern approach to the area. To further bolster defenses, Tsuda was instructed to deploy two of his five advance battalions to San Jose. However, as these tactical adjustments were being made, it became necessary to shift focus away from Luzon and turn attention toward Leyte, where the final operations on the island were unfolding. It is important to note that the majority of General Suzuki's forces had successfully retreated to the Villaba-Mount Canguipot region, although some strong elements remained isolated further to the east. With General Eichelberger's 8th Army assuming control of the island, American forces commenced the final phase of operations to secure Leyte, methodically working to eliminate any remaining pockets of resistance. From January 1 to February 15, the 11th Airborne Division conducted patrols in the Burauen area, where they engaged and successfully eliminated a well-entrenched enemy force positioned on the southern slopes of Mount Majunag. Meanwhile, the 96th Division carried out extensive patrols in the eastern mountainous regions before taking over from the 11th Airborne Division. In the southern part of the island, the 7th Division launched numerous patrols and deployed a reinforced battalion that effectively neutralized all enemy forces in the Camotes Islands. Additionally, the 77th Division focused on clearing various pockets of enemy resistance located in northwestern Leyte. By late January, the Americal Division arrived to assist in the cleanup operations in Samar and Leyte, a mission that was successfully completed by February 24, with support from the 1st Filipino Regiment. However, during this time, Japanese General Suzuki was formulating his strategy for Operation Chi-Go. This operation involved the amphibious movement of several military units to different islands within the Visayas using large motorized landing barges. Suzuki's initial plan entailed deploying the majority of the 1st Division to establish a garrison on Cebu Island, while the headquarters of the 35th Army was to relocate to Davao. This strategic move would enable him to take direct command of military operations on Mindanao. Following this, he intended to dispatch the 41st and 77th Regiments to Mindanao, assign the 26th Division to the Bacolod area on Negros Island, and send the 5th Regiment along with units from the 102nd Division to Cebu. Furthermore, the 16th Division and the 68th Brigade, commanded by General Makino, were to remain in Leyte to engage in guerrilla warfare tactics.  The 102nd Division presented certain difficulties. There had been instances of 40 to 50 deserters fleeing to Cebu or Negros on boats they had built for themselves. Deserters that were apprehended were court-martialed. General Suzuki for some time had been out of touch with General Fukei, the commanding general of the 102nd Division, which was in the Mt. Pina area. By chance, one of Suzuki's officers learned that Fukei was planning to evacuate to Cebu. Suzuki was incensed since he and his staff felt that Fukei "was violating the military code in taking these steps without consent." He therefore ordered Fukei to remain at Leyte. Fukei did not answer but his chief of staff sent the following reply: "We appreciate the efforts of Army but at the present time we are very busy preparing for retreat. The division commander and chief of staff are unable to report to Army Headquarters." Suzuki was "entirely displeased" with the reaction of Fukei and sent his chief of staff, General Tomochika, to investigate the situation. When Tomochika arrived he found that Fukei, with his chief of staff and some headquarters personnel, had already left for Cebu. The sequel to these events was that Suzuki relieved Fukei of his command and ordered him to remain on Cebu until he received further orders. Upon the arrival of Suzuki in Cebu in the spring of 1945, Fukei was sentenced to confinement for thirty days. Suzuki asked IGHQ in Tokyo for authority to court-martial Fukei but no reply was forthcoming. In the end, Fukei was released and later returned to command of the 102nd Division. In the midst of ongoing military operations, Suzuki implemented measures to ensure that the forces stationed on Leyte could sustain themselves. He instructed his troops to make the most of local resources by utilizing available food and materials. This included directives to cultivate sweet potatoes and Indian corn, with the hope of sourcing all necessary provisions from the surrounding areas outside their operational base. However, the Japanese forces faced significant challenges due to relentless American air raids and mop-up operations, which severely hindered their ability to procure supplies. The hostile environment made it difficult for them to plant and harvest the crops they had intended to grow. Despite these obstacles, the Japanese managed to capitalize on the conclusion of the harvest season. They were able to secure substantial amounts of food that had been stored by local Filipinos, including a considerable quantity of coconuts and sweet potatoes. By early January, the 1st Division began its gradual movement toward Cebu, successfully transporting around 800 men to the island by mid-January. Unfortunately, the situation worsened as enemy PT boats established a stringent sea blockade, rendering maritime transportation impractical until mid-March. This blockade left approximately 2,000 men from the 1st Division, along with other units of the 35th Army, stranded on Leyte. Simultaneously, the Imahori Detachment, alongside the Mitsui Shipping Unit and the 77th Regiment, advanced to the southern Matag-ob area and subsequently moved toward Villaba, reaching their destination in early February. The majority of the 26th Division also made progress, arriving in the region north of Ormoc in mid-January before commencing a northwestward movement. By February, they successfully established contact with the rest of the 35th Army. Meanwhile, the remnants of the 16th Division could only reach the Valencia area in February, where they would remain until the end of the month. For the foreseeable future, the Japanese units left behind on Leyte faced the daunting task of defending against the advancing Americal Division and the 1st Filipino Regiment, which were steadily gaining ground.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Admiral Halsey launched Operation Gratitude, targeting Japanese shipping. Despite misleading intel, they decimated enemy convoys, showcasing the effectiveness of airstrikes and securing strategic advances in Luzon. American forces advanced through Luzon while Task Force 38 struck Formosa and Hong Kong. Despite fierce Japanese resistance and challenging weather, the Allies steadily gained ground, though both sides suffered significant losses in the campaign.

The God Culture
NEW!!! Lost Isles of Gold LIVE Series. Part 6: Mapping Sheba in the Philippines

The God Culture

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 10, 2025 29:25


Announcements at the end of this video! Be sure to like, subscribe, click the bell, and share. Find the ancient Isles of Gold – Ophir, Sheba and Tarshish in the Philippines. Recorded Live in front of a Live Studio Audience in Davao, Philippines, TGC is back!!! This 13-week series will explode on the scene as it is accompanied by a 13-week Small Group Study. It's your turn... Time to host a group of friends and family in your home. Feed them, play the video each week and avail of the Small Group Study Guide free in eBook, buy 1 and we release the copyright that you may even make copies, as long as it is free, or contact us for bulk copies and church or group programs including our slides for Pastors to teach in a class or even from the pulpit. It is time for this message to permeate not just the Philippines, but the world. This restoration of Bible geography leads to the restoration of prophecy and reveals the most important land in these Last Days. Many are asking and it is time to give them answers. We have already recorded this entire 13-week series and will release 1 per week on Friday evenings in Philippine time. https://www.ophirinstitute.com/ For our other books including our new release, The Mystery of the Three Kings, all links are at this same site. Yah Bless.KINGDOM COME WITH ANDREW NKOYOYOLearn how to experience Holy Spirit's power, healing, miracles. Subscribe/follow now belowListen on: Apple Podcasts SpotifySupport the show

The God Culture
NEW!!! Lost Isles of Gold LIVE Series. Part 5: Where is Sheba? In the Philippines

The God Culture

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 3, 2025 35:56


Announcements at the end of this video! Be sure to like, subscribe, click the bell, and share. Recorded Live in front of a Live Studio Audience in Davao, Philippines, TGC is back!!! This 13-week series will explode on the scene as it is accompanied by a 13-week Small Group Study. It's your turn... Time to host a group of friends and family in your home. Feed them, play the video each week and avail of the Small Group Study Guide free in eBook, buy 1 and we release the copyright that you may even make copies, as long as it is free, or contact us for bulk copies and church or group programs including our slides for Pastors to teach in a class or even from the pulpit. It is time for this message to permeate not just the Philippines, but the world. This restoration of Bible geography leads to the restoration of prophecy and reveals the most important land in these Last Days. Many are asking and it is time to give them answers. We have already recorded this entire 13-week series and will release 1 per week on Friday evenings in Philippine time. https://www.ophirinstitute.com/ For our other books including our new release, The Mystery of the Three Kings, all links are at this same site. Yah Bless.Support the show

Brave Dynamics: Authentic Leadership Reflections
Dave Overton: Philippines Humanitarian Commitment, Serendipity at Geeks On A Beach Community, Cebu Serial Founder - E517

Brave Dynamics: Authentic Leadership Reflections

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 1, 2025 32:44


Dave Overton, Founder of Symph.co & Geeks On A Beach, and Jeremy Au discussed: 1. Philippines Humanitarian Commitment: Dave recounts moving to the Philippines in 2003 with his wife, a midwife-turned-doctor, who co-founded a nonprofit delivering over 7,000 babies in the past two decades. What began as a temporary three- to five-year plan evolved into a long-term commitment to creating impact in Southeast Asia. Supporting the nonprofit's growth to a team of 50 medical professionals, Dave reflects on sustainable impact, sharing lessons learned about transforming lives and communities. 2. Serendipity at Geeks On A Beach Community: Co-founded by Dave and Tina Amper in 2012, Geeks on a Beach (GOAB) was inspired by 500 Global's Geeks on a Plane and aimed to unite startups, investors, and ecosystem players in a collaborative setting. Dave shares the financial hurdles faced during GOAB's early days and how the event became a platform for significant deals, including an investor funding five startups at a single event. He emphasizes the importance of creating “gravity” to foster collaboration and serendipitous connections within the startup ecosystem. 3. Cebu Serial Founder: He discusses his ventures: Symph.co, a software development company with 88 team members, and Flying Tigers Express, a logistics startup shortening delivery times from 12 days to just 24 hours in cities like Cebu and Davao. Dave also reflected on Cebu's IT Park evolution from a single building in 2003 to a thriving tech hub, illustrating the broader transformation of the local ecosystem. . They explored challenges of balancing Cebu's regional development with larger hubs like Manila and Singapore Dave and Jeremy also discussed the lessons learned from stepping back to let new leaders drive community growth, the importance of nurturing students into the next generation of founders and community vs. ego systems. === Watch, listen or read the full insight at www.bravesea.com/blog/geeks-on-a-beach Nonton, dengar atau baca wawasan lengkapnya di www.bravesea.com/blog/geeks-on-a-beach 观看、收听或阅读全文,请访问 www.bravesea.com/blog/geeks-on-a-beach Xem, nghe hoặc đọc toàn bộ thông tin chi tiết tại www.bravesea.com/blog/geeks-on-a-beach Get transcripts, startup resources & community discussions at www.bravesea.com WhatsApp: https://whatsapp.com/channel/0029VakR55X6BIElUEvkN02e TikTok: https://www.tiktok.com/@jeremyau Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/jeremyauz Twitter: https://twitter.com/jeremyau LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/bravesea Spotify English: https://open.spotify.com/show/4TnqkaWpTT181lMA8xNu0T Bahasa Indonesia: https://open.spotify.com/show/2Vs8t6qPo0eFb4o6zOmiVZ Chinese: https://open.spotify.com/show/20AGbzHhzFDWyRTbHTVDJR Vietnamese: https://open.spotify.com/show/0yqd3Jj0I19NhN0h8lWrK1 YouTube English: https://www.youtube.com/@JeremyAu?sub_confirmation=1 Apple Podcast English: https://podcasts.apple.com/sg/podcast/brave-southeast-asia-tech-singapore-indonesia-vietnam/id1506890464 Learn more about Nika.eco! Reach out to info@nika.eco if you are a geospatial data scientist or climate researcher who is interested to partner on a pilot or research opportunities

The God Culture
NEW!!! Lost Isles of Gold LIVE Series. Part 4: Mapping Ophir & Tarshish in the Philippines

The God Culture

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 27, 2024 46:14


Announcements at the end of this video! Be sure to like, subscribe, click the bell, and share. Recorded Live in front of a Live Studio Audience in Davao, Philippines, TGC is back!!! This 13-week series will explode on the scene as it is accompanied by a 13-week Small Group Study. It's your turn... Time to host a group of friends and family in your home. Feed them, play the video each week and avail of the Small Group Study Guide free in eBook, buy 1 and we release the copyright that you may even make copies, as long as it is free, or contact us for bulk copies and church or group programs including our slides for Pastors to teach in a class or even from the pulpit. It is time for this message to permeate not just the Philippines, but the world. This restoration of Bible geography leads to the restoration of prophecy and reveals the most important land in these Last Days. Many are asking and it is time to give them answers. We have already recorded this entire 13-week series and will release 1 per week on Friday evenings in Philippine time. https://www.ophirinstitute.com/ For our other books including our new release, The Mystery of the Three Kings, all links are at this same site. Yah Bless.Support the show

The Manila Times Podcasts
REGIONS: P3.2M shabu seized at Davao checkpoint | December 24, 2024

The Manila Times Podcasts

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 23, 2024 1:39


REGIONS: P3.2M shabu seized at Davao checkpoint | December 24, 2024Visit our website at https://www.manilatimes.netFollow us:Facebook - https://tmt.ph/facebookInstagram - https://tmt.ph/instagramTwitter - https://tmt.ph/twitterDailyMotion - https://tmt.ph/dailymotionSubscribe to our Digital Edition - https://tmt.ph/digitalSign up to our newsletters: https://tmt.ph/newslettersCheck out our Podcasts:Spotify - https://tmt.ph/spotifyApple Podcasts - https://tmt.ph/applepodcastsAmazon Music - https://tmt.ph/amazonmusicDeezer: https://tmt.ph/deezerStitcher: https://tmt.ph/stitcherTune In: https://tmt.ph/tunein#TheManilaTimes Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

The God Culture
NEW!!! Lost Isles of Gold LIVE Series. Part 3: Where Is Tarshish?

The God Culture

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 20, 2024 43:59


Announcements at the end of this video! Be sure to like, subscribe, click the bell, and share. Recorded Live in front of a Live Studio Audience in Davao, Philippines, TGC is back!!! This 13-week series will explode on the scene as it is accompanied by a 13-week Small Group Study. It's your turn... Time to host a group of friends and family in your home. Feed them, play the video each week and avail of the Small Group Study Guide free in eBook, buy 1 and we release the copyright that you may even make copies, as long as it is free, or contact us for bulk copies and church or group programs including our slides for Pastors to teach in a class or even from the pulpit. It is time for this message to permeate not just the Philippines, but the world. This restoration of Bible geography leads to the restoration of prophecy and reveals the most important land in these Last Days. Many are asking and it is time to give them answers. We have already recorded this entire 13-week series and will release 1 per week on Friday evenings in Philippine time. https://www.ophirinstitute.com/ For our other books including our new release, The Mystery of the Three Kings, all links are at this same site. Yah Bless.Support the show

The God Culture
NEW!!! Lost Isles of Gold LIVE Series. Part 2: Where Is Ophir?

The God Culture

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 14, 2024 44:22


Announcements at the end of this video! Be sure to like, subscribe, click the bell, and share. Recorded Live in front of a Live Studio Audience in Davao, Philippines, TGC is back!!! This 13-week series will explode on the scene as it is accompanied by a 13-week Small Group Study. It's your turn... Time to host a group of friends and family in your home. Feed them, play the video each week and avail of the Small Group Study Guide free in eBook, buy 1 and we release the copyright that you may even make copies, as long as it is free, or contact us for bulk copies and church or group programs including our slides for Pastors to teach in a class or even from the pulpit. It is time for this message to permeate not just the Philippines, but the world. This restoration of Bible geography leads to the restoration of prophecy and reveals the most important land in these Last Days. Many are asking and it is time to give them answers. We have already recorded this entire 13-week series and will release 1 per week on Friday evenings in Philippine time. https://www.ophirinstitute.com/ For our other books including our new release, The Mystery of the Three Kings, all links are at this same site. Yah Bless.Support the show

The God Culture
NEW!!! Lost Isles of Gold LIVE Series. Part 1

The God Culture

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 14, 2024 48:13


Announcements at the end of this video! Be sure to like, subscribe, click the bell, and share. Recorded Live in front of a Live Studio Audience in Davao, Philippines, TGC is back!!! This 13-week series will explode on the scene as it is accompanied by a 13-week Small Group Study. It's your turn... Time to host a group of friends and family in your home. Feed them, play the video each week and avail of the Small Group Study Guide free in eBook, buy 1 and we release the copyright that you may even make copies, as long as it is free, or contact us for bulk copies and church or group programs including our slides for Pastors to teach in a class or even from the pulpit. It is time for this message to permeate not just the Philippines, but the world. This restoration of Bible geography leads to the restoration of prophecy and reveals the most important land in these Last Days. Many are asking and it is time to give them answers. We have already recorded this entire 13-week series and will release 1 per week on Friday evenings in Philippine time. https://www.ophirinstitute.com/ For our other books including our new release, The Mystery of the Three Kings, all links are at this same site. Yah Bless.Support the show

The Pacific War Channel Podcast
The Dutch-Japanese Pacific Naval War

The Pacific War Channel Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 29, 2024 70:37


Craig and Gaurav go over the early naval engagements between the Dutch and Japanese during the Pacific War.   Two weeks after the Pearl Harbor attack, Japan accelerated its plans to invade the Dutch East Indies for vital oil resources, essential for its war efforts. As Japanese forces swiftly advanced in the Philippines, they captured strategic locations, including Mindanao and Davao, while Allied defenses crumbled. In late December 1941, Japan launched further assaults in Malaya, isolating Singapore and diminishing Allied naval power. By January 1942, Japanese forces targeted Balikpapan, a crucial oil hub in Borneo. The Dutch, determined to defend their territory, prepared for a guerrilla campaign and attempted to sabotage oil facilities. However, the Japanese invasion fleet approached Balikpapan on January 21, 1942. Despite Allied air attacks and submarine efforts, the Japanese landed on January 24, marking a significant step in their campaign to secure the East Indies, while the Allies faced overwhelming challenges and dwindling resources.   In the early hours of January 24, 1942, Talbot's destroyers stealthily approached the anchored Japanese fleet, illuminated by burning oil facilities. Utilizing torpedoes for surprise attacks, they struck swiftly, sinking several transports, including Sumanoura Maru. Despite their efforts, many torpedoes missed, and the Japanese fleet sustained fewer losses than expected. By dawn, the Allies had achieved a tactical victory, but nine of twelve transports survived, allowing the Japanese advance into the Dutch East Indies to continue. In February, an Allied strike force was formed, but they faced devastating air assaults, retreating to Surabaya after suffering heavy damage without losing ships.                                                                  

SBS Filipino - SBS Filipino
For Australians who love adventure, Davao offers a wide range of thrilling activities - PH Tourism department Davao region, target ang Australian market sa turismo at pamumuhunan

SBS Filipino - SBS Filipino

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 21, 2024 16:20


From its stunning landscapes to its rich cultural offerings, Davao is a destination that promises something for every type of traveller. Whether you're an adventurer, a foodie, or a culture seeker. - Mula sa mga kahanga-hangang tanawin hanggang sa mayamang kultura, ang Davao ay isang destinasyon na nangangako ng kakaibang karanasan para sa mga manlalakbay na mahilig sa adventure, pagkain at kultura.

The Howie Severino Podcast
[MINISODE] Discovering 40 kg of plastic in a whale's stomach

The Howie Severino Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 18, 2024 3:36


For animal bone collector Darrell Blatchley, whales and dolphins are the flagship animals of the Philippines. In this conversation recorded face to face in Davao last April 2024, Blatchley shares his frustration after discovering 40 kg of plastic waste in a whale's stomach.Date recorded: April 2024Listen to the full episode here: https://open.spotify.com/episode/00ljsM0w1wTPC9bxgktcJn?si=pvLK_-IkT8K5gz801IVzfw Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

The Howie Severino Podcast
[MINISODE] Discovering 40 kg of plastic in a whale's stomach

The Howie Severino Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 18, 2024 3:36


For animal bone collector Darrell Blatchley, whales and dolphins are the flagship animals of the Philippines. In this conversation recorded face to face in Davao last April 2024, Blatchley shares his frustration after discovering 40 kg of plastic waste in a whale's stomach.Date recorded: April 2024Listen to the full episode here: https://open.spotify.com/episode/00ljsM0w1wTPC9bxgktcJn?si=pvLK_-IkT8K5gz801IVzfw Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Balitang Pilipinas - Tagalog.com News
Tagalog.com News #315 (Oct 29, 2024)

Balitang Pilipinas - Tagalog.com News

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 29, 2024 8:47


Headlines: Dating Pangulong Duterte, hindi humingi ng paumanhin o nagpaliwanag sa giyera sa droga ng kanyang administrasyon; sinabi sa Senadong may death squad noon sa Davao noong siya ay mayor laban sa mga organisadong krimen | Isandaan at labinganim katao, patay sa Bagyong Kristine | Damit na lumalaki kasabay ng paglaki ng isang bata, naimbento ng isang batang designer sa LondonYou can also listen with Tagalog transcript and English translations here:  https://www.tagalog.com/podcast/play.php?podcast_id=323Listen to all our transcribed episodes here: https://www.tagalog.com/podcast/

The Richard Heydarian Podcast
DAVAO & DUTERTES: AN HONEST ANALYSIS

The Richard Heydarian Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 26, 2024 58:23


A special RRM x Chris Tan episode.

The Manila Times Podcasts
NEWS: Davao congress bets heed VP call for drug testing | Oct 24, 2024

The Manila Times Podcasts

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 24, 2024 2:13


NEWS: Davao congress bets heed VP call for drug testing | October 24, 2024Subscribe to The Manila Times Channel - https://tmt.ph/YTSubscribeVisit our website at https://www.manilatimes.netFollow us:Facebook - https://tmt.ph/facebookInstagram - https://tmt.ph/instagramTwitter - https://tmt.ph/twitterDailyMotion - https://tmt.ph/dailymotionSubscribe to our Digital Edition - https://tmt.ph/digitalSign up to our newsletters: https://tmt.ph/newslettersCheck out our Podcasts:Spotify - https://tmt.ph/spotifyApple Podcasts - https://tmt.ph/applepodcastsAmazon Music - https://tmt.ph/amazonmusicDeezer: https://tmt.ph/deezerStitcher: https://tmt.ph/stitcherTune In: https://tmt.ph/tunein#TheManilaTimes#KeepUpWithTheTimes Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

The Richard Heydarian Podcast
DAVAO: A POST-DUTERTE FUTURE!??

The Richard Heydarian Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 21, 2024 12:30


A special RRM Episode

Altri Orienti
EP.96 - Chi torna e chi non se ne vuole andare

Altri Orienti

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 17, 2024 32:16


Nelle Filippine l'ex presidente Rodrigo Duterte ha annunciato di volersi candidare al ruolo di sindaco di Davao. Una candidatura che nasce dalla rottura della famiglia Duterte con l'ex alleato, il presidente Marcos. In Indonesia Joko Widodo, Jokowi, lascia la presidenza al subentrante Prabowo. Ma l'ex presidente sta sistemando ovunque figli, parenti e amici, per creare una dinastia politica e minare fin da subito la nuova presidenza del Paese. Gli inserti audio di questa puntata sono tratti da: Ex-President Duterte to run as Davao City Mayor: I want to make Davao better than yesterday, Anc 24/7, 8 ottobre 2024; Thousands of Indonesians attempt to storm parliament to protest changes to election law, New York Post, 22 agosto 2024; Bagong Pilipinas Bagong Mukha, Dj Jurlan, 21 marzo 2022; Duterte warns Marcos of ouster like his father's if charter change pushes through, Rappler, 29 gennaio 2024; ASEAN Business and Investment Summit 2024, RTVMalacanang, 9 ottobre 2024; WOTL: Quiboloy, News5Everywhere, 1 marzo 2024; Indonesian Elections 2024: Prabowo Subianto set to reap rewards of an image makeover, say observers, CNA, 13 febbraio 2024; President Jokowi delivers angry speech to critics, The Jakarta Post, 10 aprile 2018. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

The Richard Heydarian Podcast
DUTERTE v NOGRALES: THE BATTLE OF DAVAO

The Richard Heydarian Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 15, 2024 24:30


A special RRM episode. 

The Richard Heydarian Podcast
BATTLE OF DAVAO: NOGRALESES TAKE ON DUTERTES

The Richard Heydarian Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 10, 2024 72:35


An analysis of latest twist in Philippine politics.

The Pacific War - week by week
- 151 - Pacific War Podcast - The Formosa Air Battle 10 - October 17 - , 1944

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 8, 2024 46:02


Last time we spoke about the conquest of Angaur and the Japanese Triumph in China. By October 18th, the remaining Japanese on Angaur were compressed into a small area, and by the 21st, resistance had ceased. The Americans suffered 264 killed and 1,355 wounded, while approximately 1,300 Japanese were killed. Over in China, Hara's forces suffered heavy losses during a delaying action at Momauk, with troops joining Bhamo's defense by November 16. The 113th Regiment maneuvered to encircle Bhamo from the south, while the 114th Regiment approached from the north, creating a loose encirclement. The 22nd Division's movement prompted concerns of severing key rail lines, leading Japanese forces to reposition defensively. Despite intense fighting, including a strong Chinese offensive on November 19, the Japanese withdrew from key positions, allowing Chinese forces to capture Mangshi and secure a strategic airfield for resupply, significantly impacting the campaign's dynamics. This episode is the Formosa Air Battle Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As we last saw on Peleliu, General Rupertus' 1st Marine Division, bolstered by Colonel Dark's 321st Regiment, successfully secured the island after approximately two weeks of intense fighting. However, Colonel Nakagawa's isolated and outnumbered garrison continued to resist in the Umurbrogol Pocket. As left by nature, the Umurbrogol Pocket was much like the Ibdi Pocket on Biak Island, but larger and rougher. Like Ibdi, the Umurbrogol originally had a thick cover of tropical trees and dense jungle undergrowth which, as the result of continued air, naval, and artillery bombardment (including extensive employment of aerial napalm strikes), was gradually knocked down or burned away. Again, as on Biak, the Japanese had improved upon nature. There were many artificial or semi-artificial caves which had been constructed to protect approaches to the inner sections of the pocket, and the Japanese had improved almost every natural cave. Where no caves were available or could be constructed, the defenders employed rock faults and crevices for defensive positions. Digging new entrances to existing caves or even cutting new levels within some caves, the Japanese were well prepared to execute a long and bloody holding action along the many ridges. These ridges, with the exception of the Five Sisters group at the southern side of the pocket, were generally parallel and oriented north-northeast to south-southwest. Steep-sided and fissured, many of them had razor-back summits upon which no cover could be found. The ridges were separated by deep draws, gullies, and wider valleys, the floors of which were strewn with coral boulders or coral outcroppings similar to stalagmites. Steep as they were, the sides of some ridges also were covered with such chunks and outcroppings. In late September, the exhausted infantrymen, who were tasked with containing the pocket while the Marines cleared northern Peleliu, made several heavy assaults. They only managed to reach the X-ray phase line, marking what was believed to be the northern edge of the core Japanese defenses, before being relieved by the 7th Marines. With Colonel Hanneken's 1st and 3rd Battalions now holding the X-ray line, Rupertus planned a strong attack southward while other Marine units maintained their positions on the western and southern sides of the pocket. On the morning of September 30, the attack was launched. However, fierce Japanese resistance, heavy rain, fog, and sickness hindered the 7th Marines' progress southward by October 2. On the following day, Hanneken's 2nd Battalion, supported by tanks, secured a foothold along the eastern side and top of Walt Ridge, while the 3rd Battalion finally captured the eastern slope of Boyd Ridge. By October 4, however, the 7th Marines had suffered such heavy losses and were so depleted that Rupertus was left with no choice but to relieve them as well. As a result, Colonel Harris's 5th Marines were once again thrust into action. On October 7, following an hour-long artillery and mortar barrage, the 3rd Battalion, along with six tanks, advanced into Mortimer Valley. However, Nakagawa's determined defenders continued to resist fiercely, successfully repelling two powerful tank-infantry assaults, causing heavy American casualties. Our old friend Eugene Sledge with K Company, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, wrote about fighting in this area, it is as follows  “Johnny led us on up through a jumble of rocks on Hill 140. Company K's line was emplaced along a rock rim, and we set up the mortars in a shallow depression about twenty yards behind it. The riflemen and machine gunners in front of us were in among rocks along the rim of Hill 140 facing east toward Walt Ridge and the northern end of the infamous Horseshoe. We had previously attacked that valley from its southern end. From the rim of Hill 140 the rock contours dropped away in a sheer cliff to a canyon below. No one could raise his head above the rim rock without immediately drawing heavy rifle and machine-gun fire. The fighting around the pocket was as deadly as ever, but of a different type from the early days of the campaign. The Japanese fired few artillery or mortar barrages, just a few rounds at a time when assured of inflicting maximum casualties. That they usually did, and then secured the guns to escape detection. Sometimes there was an eerie quiet. We knew they were everywhere in the caves and pillboxes. But there was no firing in our area, only the sound of firing elsewhere. The silence added an element of unreality to the valleys. If we moved past a certain point, the Japanese opened up suddenly with rifle, machine-gun, mortar, and artillery fire. It was like a sudden storm breaking. More often than not we had to pull back, and not a man in the company had seen a live enemy anywhere. They couldn't hope to drive us off by then or to be reinforced themselves. From that point onward, they killed solely for the sake of killing, without hope and without higher purpose. We were fighting in Peleliu's ridges and valleys, in terrain the likes of which most Americans could not even visualize, against an enemy unlike anything most Americans could imagine”. In response to this setback, Rupertus halted further offensive operations and ordered his forces to maintain pressure on the Japanese stronghold through sustained artillery fire and aerial bombardments. Over the next two days, this relentless bombardment cleared so much foliage and undergrowth that visibility across the ridges improved significantly. This allowed the attacks to resume on October 9, and although no ground was gained initially, Harris's 2nd Battalion succeeded in securing Wattie, Baldy, and 120 Ridges on October 10. They then pushed south to capture the tactically vital Hill 140. From this position, a Marine howitzer provided critical support to the 5th and 7th Marines as they cleared an area approximately 700 yards long and up to 200 yards east beyond the previous containment lines along West Road. However, on October 14, Dark's 321st Regiment began moving up to relieve the Marines, as General Geiger had decided to end Marine participation in the Battle of Peleliu.  Just before they were relieved, Eugene Sledge wrote a passage about moving through positions in October, finding numerous dead, stinking in the hot sun. One corpse he found made a significant impact on him, here is the passage. “As we moved past the defilade, my buddy groaned, “Jesus!” I took a quick glance into the depression and recoiled in revulsion and pity at what I saw. The bodies were badly decomposed and nearly blackened by exposure. This was to be expected of the dead in the tropics, but these Marines had been mutilated hideously by the enemy. One man had been decapitated. His head lay on his chest; his hands had been severed from his wrists and also lay on his chest near his chin. In disbelief I stared at the face as I realized that the Japanese had cut off the dead Marine's penis and stuffed it into his mouth. The corpse next to him had been treated similarly. The third had been butchered, chopped up like a carcass torn by some predatory animal. My emotions solidified into rage and a hatred for the Japanese beyond anything I ever had experienced. From that moment on I never felt the least pity or compassion for them no matter what the circumstances. My comrades would field-strip their packs and pockets for souvenirs and take gold teeth, but I never saw a Marine commit the kind of barbaric mutilation the Japanese committed if they had access to our dead. When we got back to the gun pit, my buddy said, “Sledgehammer, did you see what the Nips did to them bodies? Did you see what them poor guys had in their mouths?” I nodded as he continued, “Christ, I hate them slant-eyed bastards!” “Me too. They're mean as hell,” was all I could say.” About mid-October, a number of command changes occurred in the Palaus area. On the 12th, for instance, the 1st Marine Division was relieved of all responsibilities other than continuing the fight in the Umurbrogol Pocket. The 321st Infantry took over the defenses along the eastern arm, while the Island Garrison Force assumed responsibility for the area south of the pocket. On the morning of October 12, the command post of the 3rd Amphibious Corps moved ashore and General Geiger, the corps commander, declared that the assault and occupation phase of operations on Peleliu was ended. The exact meaning of this announcement is not clear, especially in relation to Admiral Fort's somewhat similar declaration of September 30, stating that Angaur, Peleliu, Ngesebus, and Kongauru had been captured and occupied. However, General Geiger's announcement seems to have been made in preparation for the 1st Marine Division's imminent departure from the Palaus. The statement also bears relation to the passing of control of operations in the Palaus from the 3rd Fleet and Admiral Halsey (as then represented by Admiral Fort's Western Attack Force headquarters) to the Headquarters, Forward Area Central Pacific (Task Force 57), under Admiral Hoover. On the 13th General Geiger issued orders alerting the 321st Regimental Combat Team to relieve the 1st Marine Division elements still at the Umurbrogol Pocket. The next day, control over all operations in the Palaus passed from Admiral Fort to Admiral Hoover's command. With the relief of the Marines at the Umurbrogol, the remainder of the battered 1st Marine Division then began preparations for leaving the Palaus. At the same time, the 1st Battalion, 323rd Regiment, fresh from operations at Ulithi Atoll, started preparations to relieve Marine units in the southwest corner of the pocket, with the rest of the regiment to follow. Consequently, the Marines prepared to depart from the Palaus, with Dark taking over responsibility for the reduction of Umurbrogol. Since September 29, the Marines had endured an additional 1,000 casualties, bringing their total to 1,252 killed and 5,274 wounded. In return, they estimated having killed between 850 and 1,000 Japanese soldiers, leaving roughly 1,000 defenders in the shrinking pocket as the 321st moved back in. After a failed local attempt to capture the northernmost peak of the Five Brothers Ridge on October 16, Dark launched a general attack the next day, which resulted in a modest gain of about 125 yards and the neutralization of some caves to the east. On the morning of October 18, the attack resumed, with Dark's 2nd Battalion successfully capturing three peaks of the Five Brothers, thanks to support from mortars, tanks, and LVT-mounted flamethrowers. However, undeterred by this overwhelming firepower, the Japanese immediately counterattacked and reclaimed the three peaks by nightfall. On the southwest side of the pocket, Nakagawa had also sent infiltrators through tunnels and connecting caves to raid the enemy lines, forcing Geiger to redirect elements of the 7th Marines and 323rd Regiment to address this new southern pocket. After much effort, most of the infiltrators were finally pushed north on October 23, though mopping up in the Southern Pocket wasn't completed until November 3. Meanwhile, on October 19, following a deadly napalm strike, Dark's 1st Battalion advanced up to 50 yards along the ridges west of Hill 140 with the help of howitzers and much-needed sandbags. The battalion's men, lying prone on the ground, inched their sandbags forward with rifle butts or sticks, laboriously expanding their hold and almost realizing the infantrymen's dream of portable foxholes. The next day, General Mueller formally assumed command of the Peleliu campaign. Following some reconnaissance and a napalm strike, the 321st resumed its assault on October 21, making significant progress by advancing over 100 yards and capturing the northernmost peak of the Five Brothers. On the subsequent day, Dark launched a coordinated attack with his 2nd Battalion securing the first three Brothers, the reinforced 1st Battalion struggling to breach Death Valley, and the 3rd Battalion sweeping through Mortimer Valley with tank support. After this achievement, while Colonel Watson was bringing the remaining 323rd Regiment to the Umurbrogol area, the only major progress was the capture of the fourth Brother on October 23. Two days later, the 323rd began relieving the weary 321st Regiment. By this time, Dark had lost 146 men killed and 469 wounded on Peleliu. As Watson took over, Nakagawa's forces had been reduced to about 700 effective troops, including those lightly wounded. The pocket's dimensions had also been compressed to an average north-south length of about 600 yards. Fortunately for the defenders, heavy rains, fog, and poor visibility significantly hampered Watson's operations in the Umurbrogol Pocket from October 26 to November 1. This period was used mainly for mortar barrages, napalm strikes, defense enhancements, and extending sandbag fortifications. Despite this pause, Nakagawa launched near-nightly counterattacks over the six days, primarily targeting the Five Brothers, which mostly resulted in further casualties for the defenders. To understand the eventual reduction of the Umurbrogol Pocket, we will need to shift our focus to the plans and preparations for General MacArthur's grand return to the Philippines. Previously, General MacArthur, along with Admirals Nimitz and Halsey, decided to abandon the preliminary operations for Mindanao and Yap in favor of a direct assault on Leyte. To be much more frank General MacArthur was having a turf war with Admiral Nimitz. After the Marianas campaign, the endgame of Nimitz island hoping across the Pacific forced the Joint Chiefs of staff to make a choice, to invade the Philippines, or leave it to wither on the vine and instead invade formosa. Admiral King, the joint chiefs of staff, Admiral Leahy and General Hap Arnold all favored the Formosa option. For quite awhile Nimitz got everyone onboard with this plan as Formosa was a logical choice being only 900 kms away from Japan and its seizure would cut off southeast asia from the home islands. With Formosa the Americans could even begin an invasion of southern CHina to aid their allies there and toss plenty of B-29s at the home islands from a much closer location. But then there was the force of nature that was Douglas MacArthur. MacArthur argued Formosa would be “a massive operation, extremely costly in men and shipping, logistically precarious and time consuming.” And he was willing to take his case straight to Washington. In July of 1944 he along with Nimitz went to Honolulu to meet with FDR. MacArthur bitterly protested the meeting, as he knew full well FDR was trying to get re-elected for a fourth term “humiliation of forcing me to leave my command to fly to Honolulu for a political picture taking junket.” So not to be outdone by FDR, MacArthur showboated, by landing early with. He went to a local shop in a limousine he borrowed, and had his staff place a 4 star general insignia upon. He wore khaki trousers a brown leather air force jacket and the cap of a Filipino Field Marshall, going out into public waving at crowds gathering to see the president. When he moved into a cabin to meet with FDR he refused to change into cooler attire stating to FDR , “you haven't been up there where I came from, and it's cold up there in the sky.” MacArthur then pretended Nimitz was not in the room and dominated the strategic discussions and attempted at every possible moment to impose his will on the rather ailing and sickly president, whose physical decline had become more apparent. During a private meeting between the two MacArthur said this to FDR “Mr. President, the country has forgiven you for what took place on Bataan. You hope to be re-elected president of the United States, but the nation will never forgive you if you approve a plan which leaves 17 million Christian American subjects to wither in the Philippines under the conqueror's heel until the peace treaty frees them. You might do it for reasons of strategy or tactics, but politically, it would ruin you” Rather ironic given it was his responsibility to defend those he was now blackmailing FDR to save. But the truth of the matter was, MacArthur had stolen the American press and American peoples hearts, his grand statement to return to the Philippines was a huge issue. There of course was the other issue, MacArthur could run on the Republican ticket against FDR. Some would allege FDR was bullied into an invasion of the Philippines because of this. To twist FDR's arm, MacArthur assured him the losses in retaking Luzon would be minimal “Mr. President, my losses would not be heavy, any more than they have been in the past … your good commanders do not turn in heavy losses.” Despite it being a slight against Nimitz, MacArthur's arguments did twist his wrist. That evening FDR spoke to his doctor Ross McIntire stating this “Give me an aspirin before I go to bed. In fact, give me another aspirin to take in the morning. In all my life nobody ever talked to me the way MacArthur did.” When leaving back on his plane, MacArthur turned to his aide and boasted, “We've sold it.” and when he returned to his South West Pacific Area Command HQ in Brisbane, MacArthur informed his staff, “the President has accepted my recommendations and approved the Philippines plan.” MacArthur was a bit too optimistic, although FDR agreed to invade the Philippines he did not do so without recommendations of his joint chiefs of staff. The Navy was to bear the brunt of furnishing air support in the early stages of the campaign. By arrangement with Admiral Nimitz, the Carrier Task Force from Admiral Halsey's 3rd Fleet was to strike northern Luzon and Okinawa or Formosa, or both, from A Day minus 10 to A minus 7. From A minus 4 through A Day, strikes were to be made on Luzon, the Cebu-Negros area, and the Leyte area in support of the landings. As soon as the Palau air base facilities would permit, shore-based air forces from the Central Pacific were to operate in the Bicol area. The Allied Naval Forces was to furnish carrier aircraft as protection for convoys and naval task forces and, supplemented by aircraft of the 3rd Fleet and the Allied Air Forces, to provide direct air support for the landings. In addition, it was to furnish protective air support and cover by carrier aircraft prior to A Day for the preliminary landings in Leyte Gulf and for the mine sweeping. On September 24, General Kenney issued his order for the Leyte operation and assigned missions to the Allied Air Forces. He designated General Whitehead's 5th Air Force as the Air Assault Force. It was to support the operation by intensified air activities against enemy installations, destroy hostile air and surface forces in the Celebes Sea and assigned areas in the Philippine Archipelago, and provide air defense for existing bases and forces in transit to Leyte within range of its capabilities. It was also to be prepared to establish, on order, land-based air forces on Leyte. The 13th Air Force was to support the missions of the 5th Air Force, while the Royal Australian Air Force Command was to destroy Japanese installations and sources of raw materials in the Netherlands Indies. Additionally, Halsey's 3rd Fleet was to be on standby to support the Leyte operation, with the objective of "destroying enemy naval and air forces in or threatening the Philippine Area." Submarines from both the Southwest and Central Pacific Areas would provide support through offensive reconnaissance of likely Japanese routes, maintaining observation and lifeguard services, and offering weather reports and strategic patrols. On the ground, General Krueger's 6th Army would lead the Leyte assault, taking over the operation after the disbandment of Alamo Force on September 25. With this force moving to the Philippines, General Eichelberger's 8th Army was assigned garrison duties in New Guinea, New Britain, the Admiralties, and Morotai. For King II, Krueger's forces included General Sibert's 10th Corps, consisting of the 1st Cavalry and 24th Infantry Divisions, totaling 53,000 men, and General Hodge's 24th Corps, comprising the 7th and 96th Divisions, totaling 51,500 men. The corps originally designated for the canceled Yap operation was reassigned to the 6th Army, replacing the 14th Corps, which was meant to carry out the initial Leyte landings after securing Mindanao. However, the 14th Corps was still in the process of being relieved at Bougainville. To further support the operation, Krueger kept the 32nd and 77th Divisions in reserve, totaling approximately 28,500 troops. Krueger's plan involved an advance team landing Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Mucci's 6th Ranger Battalion on the islands guarding the approaches to Leyte Gulf on October 17. As the Rangers took control of these small islands, Admiral Oldendorf's Fire Support Group would initiate a comprehensive bombardment campaign in preparation for the landings. Minesweepers and underwater demolition teams would also begin clearing natural and man-made obstacles from the gulf. On October 20, Admiral Barbey's Task Force 78 was to transport and land the 10th Corps, while Admiral Wilkinson's Task Force 79 was tasked with landing the 24th Corps. The reinforced 21st Regiment was scheduled to land at 09:30 near Panaon Strait, at the southeastern tip of Leyte, to secure control of the entrance to Sogod Bay. Further north, the 10th Corps was to land two divisions abreast in the Marasbaras and Palo areas at 10:00, while the 24th Corps would simultaneously land two divisions abreast in the Dulag area, about 15 miles to the south. Major-General Verne Mudge's 1st Cavalry Division was to capture Tacloban and its airfield and secure control of San Juanico Strait, while Major-General Frederick Irving's 24th Division seized Palo and advanced northwest through the Leyte Valley. The two divisions would then converge on Carigara at the northern end of the valley. Hodge's strategy involved Major-General James Bradley's 96th Division landing between Dulag and San Roque to secure a segment of Highway 1 within its operational zone, as well as Catmon Hill and the Dagami-Tanauan area. Since Bradley's task was relatively easier, the 381st Regiment was designated as Krueger's floating reserve. At the same time, Major-General Archibald Arnold's 7th Division was tasked with coming ashore in the Dulag area. One part of this division was to move south to capture the Highway 1 bridge and the Daguitan River crossings at Dao, while the main force advanced along the Dulag-Burauen road to take Burauen and then push on to Dagami. From there, Arnold's troops were expected to be ready to seize Abuyog and Baybay, eliminating enemy forces on the west coast and in southern Leyte. With the successful completion of these objectives, Krueger aimed to break the backbone of Japanese resistance. Consequently, with Leyte Valley and its airfields and base sites secured by the 6th Army, the 10th Corps would then advance south through the Ormoc Valley towards Ormoc, while the 24th Corps would move north from Baybay along the Ormoc Bay coast to link up with Sibert. Meanwhile, General Yamashita relied on General Suzuki's 35th Army, which consisted of four divisions and two independent mixed brigades dispersed across the central and southern Philippines. Specifically, Leyte was defended by Lieutenant-General Makino Shiro's 16th Division, experienced veterans of the initial Japanese invasion of the Philippines. Aside from minor forces left on Luzon and Samar, Makino commanded the full combat strength of the 16th Division, supplemented by 4th Air Division ground units, 35th Army service units in the area, and elements of the 36th Naval Guard Unit stationed at Ormoc and Tacloban. Anticipating that enemy landings would most likely occur in the Dulag-Tarragona-Abuyog sector, Makino strategically positioned the majority of his troops in fortified coastal positions between Abuyog in the south and Palo in the north, with the densest concentration around Dulag. By October, the 16th Division had completed three lines of trenches along the shoreline, but these defenses were weak and inadequately placed. The field positions were old-type long connecting trenches prepared in three echelons. These were difficult to defend and easily discovered from the air since camouflage was lacking. The only effective positions were the cave emplacements for artillery, which had been constructed on Catmon Hill. About 60% of the defenses constructed were completed by the time of the invasion. In the event of an enemy invasion, Suzuki kept the 30th Division and three battalions of the 102nd Division as a mobile reserve, ready to be deployed to destroy the enemy wherever they landed. This strategy was known as the Suzu Plan: if the enemy landed at Davao, the mobile reserve would reinforce the 100th Division; if they landed on Leyte, the main force of the 30th Division and three battalions of the 102nd Division were to land at Ormoc to support Makino's defenders. Meanwhile, back in September, Mitscher's fast carriers had conducted several strikes against the Philippines, leading to the near destruction of Japanese air forces and shipping in the region. To prevent air reinforcements to the Philippines, Halsey ordered Admiral Sherman's carrier-based aircraft to launch strikes against enemy aircraft staging areas in the Ryukyus, particularly Okinawa, on October 10. These strikes successfully destroyed an estimated 111 planes and sank or damaged 34 ships. Simultaneously, a cruiser force under Rear Admiral Allan Smith shelled Minami Torishima. The following day, the carriers under Admirals McCain and Davison carried out a feint attack on northern Luzon, sinking two more ships off Aparri. As the attack on the Ryukyus began, Admiral Toyoda was at Shinchiku in northern Formosa, returning to Tokyo after a command inspection in the Philippines intended to boost morale. Upon learning of the strikes, Toyoda believed that the American carriers in the northern Philippine Sea were vulnerable to his powerful land-based air forces. Over 1,800 aircraft were allocated for Sho in total, but they were widely dispersed across the four operation regions. About one third of them were not battle-ready due to casualties and a lack of parts or trained pilots. When the fighting began, Vice-Admiral Fukudome Shigeru (commander of the 2nd Air Fleet based in the Kyūshū-Okinawa-Formosa district) had approximately 700 planes ready in Formosa and Kyushu. 100 or so aircraft in the Seto Inland Sea was later added to his command. Over the next four days, an additional 690 or so planes flew in from bases in Japan and China. Toyoda saw this as a prime opportunity to deal a crippling blow to the enemy fleet and disrupt the Allied invasion timeline. Consequently, he decided to risk all available naval air power in a determined effort to destroy Mitscher's carrier forces, taking personal command of the battle operations in Formosa on October 10. As anticipated, Halsey planned to launch strong carrier-based strikes against Formosa on October 12 and 13. Mitscher's four task groups were assigned targets in southern, northern, and central Formosa, as well as the Takao area. Additionally, General LeMay's first two B-29 strikes of October were scheduled to support the attack, targeting the Okayama aircraft repair and assembly facility in Takao with 170 sorties. Originally set for October 11 and 14, these strikes were postponed to October 14 and 16 due to unfavorable weather forecasts. After a rapid overnight approach on October 11, Mitscher's carriers reached their positions off Formosa the next morning. All four task groups completed launch of predawn fighter sweeps by around 06:00 hours. Because the Japanese were on alert, Grumman F6F Hellcat fighters from all four groups were intercepted by enemy aircraft and moderate to intense anti-aircraft fire was universally reported. Air-to-air engagements were fiercest over northern and central Formosa, where aircraft from Rear Admiral Gerald F. Bogan's TG 38.2 and Rear Admiral Frederick C. Sherman's TG 38.3 operated. Sherman's USS Lexington and USS Essex claimed almost 50 enemy aircraft shot down between them. Bogan's task group contained three Essex-class carriers – USS Intrepid, USS Bunker Hill and USS Hancock. Intrepid and Bunker Hill claimed over 50 Japanese aircraft destroyed, making the combined claims for the two groups around 100. Many of Japan's more experienced pilots were killed during the first wave of American air raid. American carrier air groups had suffered minimal personnel losses with nine U.S. aircraft shot down with three pilots subsequently recovered by nearby ships or submarines. These lopsided results were in part due to a lack of experience among Japanese pilots. IJAAS fighters stationed to the north of the Philippines were still in training. The bulk of enemy fighter aircraft reported by U.S. aviators were Japanese Army types, primarily the Nakajima Ki-44 (Allied reporting name "Tojo"), Kawasaki Ki-61 ("Tony") and Nakajima Ki-43 ("Oscar") models. Even though there were some experienced Japanese naval aviators operating at this time, IJNAS Mitsubishi A6M Zero fighter units reconstituted after the Battle of the Philippine Sea were still learning to work together and did not execute the kind of section or division flying that yielded tactical advantage. By the third strike, the Hellcats had established air dominance over Formosa, with Admirals Bogan and Sherman each claiming over 50 Japanese aircraft destroyed at the cost of nine American planes shot down. This enabled the Americans to carry out four strikes during the day preceded by a fighter sweep. The Hellcats quickly gained air control over Formosa against the 230 Japanese fighters on the island. By the third strike of the day, the Americans faced no air opposition. A total of 1400 sorties were carried out on this day, sinking or damaging 24 vessels off the Pescadores and Takao.  This led Toyoda to order the activation of the air component of Operation Sho-Go at 10:30 on October 12. Although over 1,900 dispersed aircraft were assigned to Sho-Go, most did not arrive in the forward area for several days. Consequently, Vice-Admiral Fukudome Shigeru's 2nd Air Fleet began preparing up to 800 planes in southern Kyushu for an attack, supported by Admiral Ozawa's newly-reconstituted flying groups from the 3rd and 4th Carrier Divisions. Though the day's remaining carrier strikes by Hellcat fighters, Curtiss SB2C Helldiver dive bombers, and Grumman TBF Avenger torpedo bombers did significant damage to military installations on Formosa, they failed to completely neutralize Japanese air power based on the island. Lead aircraft on 14 October had made photos revealing Navy damage which included four buildings destroyed and nine damaged out of eighty at the assembly plant, and five hangars destroyed at the air base. Many surviving structures would be destroyed by B-29 raids during the later days of the battle, however.  The only Japanese attack that day involved about 45 torpedo bombers, which mistakenly reported two carriers as damaged. Meanwhile, the T Attack Force, a special unit for operations in adverse weather, conducted a strike within a sudden typhoon from 19:00 to 20:20 before landing on Formosan bases. Their efforts were largely ineffective as American ships used smoke screens and evasive maneuvers to avoid damage. Eight Japanese aircraft were shot down by ships' guns during the night, and three Mitsubishi G4M "Betty" bombers were claimed by night fighters from the USS Independence. USS Pritchett suffered damage from friendly fire, but no damage from enemy aircraft was incurred. On October 13, Mitscher's forces resumed strikes against Formosa and the Pescadores with up to 600 aircraft, encountering less opposition but achieving only minor damage due to poor weather. Despite this, Halsey reported the destruction of 520 Japanese aircraft, the sinking of 37 ships, and 74 probable sinkings over the two days. At dusk, the carriers came under attack from 32 planes of the T Attack Force. Despite Belleau Wood's combat air patrol shooting down 16 enemy aircraft, six G4M bombers managed to evade the interceptors and launched a series of determined attacks on Davison's carriers, releasing four torpedoes before all six were eventually downed by shipboard anti-aircraft guns. Fortunately, the torpedoes missed their targets. One torpedo ran just ahead of the USS Franklin, and another ran too deep and passed beneath the carrier. One of the Bettys attempted to crash into Franklin on its way down but glanced off the flight deck and slid over the starboard edge of the ship into the water. However, McCain's carriers faced more challenges as eight B6N2 bombers, evading radar by flying low, attacked the group. While six of the bombers were shot down by anti-aircraft fire, one successfully torpedoed the cruiser Canberra, killing 23 crew members and causing severe damage. The torpedo struck the cruiser in a vulnerable spot—under the main armor belt between both firerooms. The ship lost all power, laying just 90NM off Formosa. As a result, Halsey organized a unit to tow Canberra to safety, necessitating an additional day of protection for the damaged cruiser. On October 14, Mitscher launched early morning fighter sweeps to suppress enemy air power over Luzon and Formosa, while the newly-formed unit escorted Canberra. Japanese reports claimed two carriers were sunk and one was burning, leading Toyoda to believe the enemy retreating east had been severely damaged. Consequently, Fukudome ordered his full strength of 450 planes to launch from southern Kyushu, and Vice-Admiral Shima Kiyoshide's 2nd Striking Force was deployed to sweep the waters east of Formosa. However, before the Japanese could counterattack, 130 B-29s from Chengdu attacked Formosa in the afternoon, with 104 bombers successfully dropping about 650 tons of bombs on Okayama and 13 hitting secondary targets. A dozen planes made emergency landings at friendly fields in China, one crashed near Changteh whence its crew walked out, and one was listed as missing. This was a cheap price to pay for very severe damage done to Okayama installation. At 15:25, Fukudome's initial wave of 124 planes attacked Bogan's carriers. A formation of 25 Yokosuka D4Y "Judy" dive bombers, using cloud cover to evade detection, was intercepted by the group's combat air patrol. Only a few Japanese planes made it past the American fighters. The surviving bombers were able to put two bombs in the vicinity of the Hancock, and one hit the forward port side gun tube without detonating on impact. No serious damage was inflicted by this attack. At around 17:00 a large formation of enemies showed up on radar headed towards TG 38.3. As before, a great many of these were shot down by combat air patrol. The surviving enemy planes flew down to the water level to evade further radar detection. These planes – torpedo bombers and fighters – successfully ambushed the formation just minutes later. Evasive maneuvers, squall weather, and poor fighter cover on the part of the Japanese helped TG 38.3 escape without suffering any significant damage. The only bright spot for the Japanese was another twilight attack by the T Force by 52 aircraft against TG 38.1. Four Jills broke through to attack light cruiser Houston. Three were shot down, but the last succeeded in placing a torpedo in another vulnerable spot that flooded the engineering spaces and caused all power to be lost. As a result, Halsey was left needing to tow two cruisers to safety. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. By hook or by crook, General MacArthur bullied FDR into allowing an invasion of the Philippines. To soften up the new targets, strikes were unleashed against Luzon, Formosa and Okinawa. Despite a strong Japanese defense, American air superiority was achieved through aggressive carrier strikes, leading to the destruction of numerous Japanese aircraft and ships.

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The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Sep 3, 2024 46:02


Last time we spoke about the end of Operation Dan. In Yunnan, by late July, General Wei's Y Force worked to eliminate Japanese garrisons at Tengchong, Mount Song, Pingda, and Longling. The 33rd Army prepared for Operation Dan, anticipating resistance from General Honda's garrisons until September. The fall of Myitkyina prompted Honda to expedite his plans. Reinforcements were expected in Mandalay by September. General Matsuyama's forces, cut off and surrounded, provided support only through radio messages. At Tengchong, Colonel Kurashige vowed to defend against relentless attacks. Chinese forces, after intense fighting and bombing raids, breached the city's defenses. Despite heavy casualties, the Japanese resisted fiercely. Major Kanemitsu's garrison defended Moung Song with dwindling supplies. The Chinese forces employed siege tactics and underground mines to break Japanese strongholds. The Chinese launched coordinated attacks, capturing key positions and ultimately compelling Japanese retreats.  This episode is the Invasion of Morotai Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  After the Marianas fell and Sansapor was captured, the Allies set their sights on their next objectives: the Palaus and Halmahera, slated for simultaneous invasion by mid-September. The Japanese had stationed the 14th Division at Palau and the 32nd Division at Halmahera as their primary defenses. The Halmahera-Morotai area had not assumed much importance to the Japanese until early 1944, when they began to develop Halmahera as a focal point for the defense of the southern approaches to the Philippines. In addition to the 32d Division, the Japanese had on Halmahera innumerable service organizations, and they completed or had under construction nine airfields on the island, most of them in northern Halmahera. On that island they concentrated nearly 30,000 men, including at least 11,000 combat troops.  On Halmahera, General Ishii commanded approximately 11,000 troops to safeguard nine airfields, despite having already lost most of their air power. Meanwhile, Morotai Island was defended by around 500 Formosans of the 2nd Raiding Unit, led by Major Kawashima Takenobu. General Ishii planned to counterattack from Halmahera if the Allies landed on Morotai, but soon realized Allied air and naval superiority would foil these efforts. Following their defeat in the Marianas, Tokyo reassigned the Bonin Area Group directly under its command and placed the Palau Area Group under the Southern Army, leaving General Mugikura's 31st Army to defend Truk and other isolated outposts. General Inoue fortified Palau with elaborate defenses along the coast and inland, manned by 21,000 Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) troops, 7,000 Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) personnel, and 10,000 laborers.  The IJN had by 1944 constructed numerous reinforced concrete blockhouses and bunkers plus dug an extensive tunnel system near the end of the northeast peninsula as well as taking full advantage of Peleliu's natural caves. This elaborate, multi-level tunnel system could shelter 1000 troops. These defenses, tunnels, the airfield, and the many support facilities were built by the 204th, 214th, and 235th Construction Battalions, mostly manned by Koreans and Okinawans. Detachments of the guard forces manned eight 120mm dual-purpose, and about three 200mm coast defense guns. There was no ammunition for the 200mm short guns nor did any ships report being fired on by coast defense guns. The 114th and 126th Anti-aircraft Units manned single and twin-barreled 25mm automatic guns (estimated at 30) and 13.2mm machine guns. A dozen 20mm cannons, removed from destroyed aircraft, were set up on makeshift mounts, mostly around the airfield. His strategy emphasized prolonged attrition over suicidal charges, aiming to exhaust the American forces. In preparation for the intense pre-landing bombardment, Inoue instructed his troops to utilize natural terrain features like coral caves and sinkholes, tactics that proved effective against the advancing Allies.Based in Koror, the Japanese commander stationed Colonel Nakagawa Kunio's 2nd Regiment on Peleliu, the reinforced 1st Battalion of the 59th Regiment on Angaur, and deployed the 15th and 59th Regiments across Babelthuap and other islands. Major-General Yamaguchi Takeo's 53rd Independent Mixed Brigade defended the central islands, complemented by 4,000 personnel from the Imperial Japanese Navy on Peleliu.  Prior to General Inoue's arrival in the Palaus, the defense of the Palaus had been under the command of Vice-Admiral Ito Yoshioka. Upon his arrival on Koror, where he established his headquarters, Inoue appointed Colonel Nakagawa Kunio as Peleliu's new commander, with his 2nd Regiment (Reinforced). Nakagawa was a most able commander, possibly one of Japan's finest defensive tacticians, in the same league as General Kuribayashi on Iwo Jima. Nakagawa would make full use of all his defenses and troops on Peleliu, making the Americans pay dearly for every inch, as he had been ordered to do. Although a very capable commander, the appointment of an Army colonel over a Navy vice-admiral caused a great rift between the Army and Navy on Peleliu, which deteriorated into farce. To resolve matters and calm the Navy down somewhat, Inoue sent Major-General Murai Kenjiro from his headquarters on Koror Island to Peleliu to provide the Army with sufficient rank to satisfy the vice-admiral's honor, although the defense of Peleliu seems, to practical purposes, to have remained in the hands of Nakagawa. It appears that Murai, after inspecting Nakagawa's defensive works and battle plans for the defense of Peleliu, was content to let Nakagawa continue without interference from himself, lending only the weight of his rank to acquire the required cooperation of the Navy elements on Peleliu. Nakagawa, divided the island into four defense sectors, each manned by an infantry battalion. His 1st Battalion, alongside the 14th Division Tank Unit and Engineer Company, served as a mobile reserve for counterattacks against potential landings. Meanwhile, Admirals Nimitz and Halsey had been planning Operation Stalemate, targeting Palau since May 29. Originally slated for September 8, General Geiger's 3rd Amphibious Corps would assault Peleliu and Angaur, with General Hodge's 24th Corps landing on Babelthuap.  Intelligence was gathered by aerial reconnaissance photographs. Also, in June 1944 the submarine USS Seawolf (SS-197) carried out photographic reconnaissance of the invasion landing beaches. A further reconnaissance was carried out by the submarine USS Burrfish (SS-312) on Peleliu and Yap beaches. An 11-man reconnaissance group of underwater demolition team (UDT) frogmen landed on the Peleliu beaches from the Burrfish for closer investigation relating to water depth, location of potholes and sandbars, and obstacles. With thousands of Japanese on the island they understandably did not reconnoiter inland, and the rugged terrain of the interior would come as an unpleasant surprise to the Marines. A similar operation was carried out on the Yap invasion beaches, but this time only two of a five-man reconnaissance team made it back to the pick-up point. After several unsuccessful attempts to locate their missing comrades the remaining two men returned to the Burrfish. After this incident, Admiral Nimitz banned any further missions of this type. Given delays in the Guam operation, Operation Stalemate was canceled on July 7, replaced by Stalemate II.  An unusual staff arrangement was established to plan Stalemate II. IIIAC was committed to take Guam under General Geiger. The IIIAC staff would thus be unable to plan the Palaus operation, which it was to execute. Consequently, Major General Julian Smith, designated to command the Expeditionary Troops, was tasked to plan the operation using his own small staff augmented by some IIIAC staff officers. This temporary planning staff was designated X-Ray Provisional Amphibious Corps. It would plan the operation and IIIAC would execute it – an awkward arrangement, but necessary in order to maintain the increasing tempo of operations. As Commander, Expeditionary Troops, Smith was also to be in control of all ground action in the western Carolines; a position roughly analogous to that of General Krueger of ALAMO Force in the Southwest Pacific. X-Ray was finally dissolved on August 15, 1944. This revised plan scheduled Geiger's forces to land on Peleliu with the 1st Marine Division and on Angaur with the 81st Division on September 15, while the 77th Division remained in floating reserve and the 5th Marine Division in area reserve. Then, on October 8th, the 24th Corps planned to launch an assault on the islands of Yap and Ulithi in the western Carolines. This was aimed at securing an additional airfield and fully neutralizing Truk and the remaining islands in the group. For this operation, Halsey divided his 3rd Fleet into two main echelons: his Task Force 30, which included covering forces such as Admiral Mitscher's Fast Carrier Task Force (now Task Force 38), and Admiral Wilkinson's Task Force 31, the Joint Expeditionary Force. At Peleliu, General Rupertus' 1st Marine Division was to land with five battalions advancing over the White and Orange Beaches on the southwest coast. The 1st Marines were to land on the left, pushing up the western shore to clear Japanese forces from ridges overlooking the airfield; the 5th Marines would land in the center to secure the airfield; and the 7th Marines on the right to capture the southern end of the island. Meanwhile, at Angaur, Major-General Paul Mueller's 81st Division planned a two-pronged amphibious assault. The 322nd Regiment was to land on Red Beach on the northeast coast, while the 321st Regiment would land on Blue Beach about 2000 yards to the southeast. Both forces would then push inland to secure a first phase line approximately 300 yards from the beaches, before continuing their advance west and south. The reserve 323rd Regiment was tasked with a feint landing at Beach Black on the northwest coast, with potential deployment to Ulithi if the Palau operations proved successful. Meanwhile, General MacArthur aimed to establish an airbase in the Halmahera area, strategically positioned between the Vogelkop and Mindanao. This location would provide crucial flank protection against Japanese forces in the Dutch East Indies and support land-based operations for the upcoming invasion of Mindanao. Optimistically, in mid-June, MacArthur had tentatively scheduled the invasion of Mindanao for October 25. Nimitz, however, believed that MacArthur's hope of reaching Mindanao by October 25 was too optimistic. During conferences at Pearl Harbor in July, called at the suggestion of Nimitz to coordinate Southwest and Central Pacific plans for the Morotai, Palau, and Mindanao operations, Southwest Pacific planners learned that less amphibious craft and assault shipping could be made available to them than had previously been anticipated. Moreover, restudy of range and weather factors made it appear somewhat risky to depend upon the ability of Morotai-based aircraft to provide air support for Southwest Pacific forces on Mindanao after carriers had to leave the latter area and before airdromes could be developed there. To obtain adequate land-based air support for the Mindanao invasion force, MacArthur returned to discarded plans to seize air-base sites on the Talaud Islands, about equidistant from Morotai and Sarangani Bay, Mindanao, where the first landings in the Philippines were then scheduled to take place. The employment of amphibious means for the Talaud operation would delay preparations for Mindanao, as would the development of airdromes on the Talauds. Finally, to have the invasion of Mindanao take place much before the middle of November would involve a conflict in timing with anticipated employment of assault shipping and carrier support by Admiral Nimitz for the occupation of Yap and Ulithi in the western Carolines, an operation scheduled for the first week in October. MacArthur therefore revised his program to call for the invasion of Morotai on September 15, the Talauds on October 15, and Mindanao on November 15. As Allied carriers were engaged in the Palau operation, MacArthur needed a target within range of fighters and medium bombers stationed at Sansapor. Thus, Morotai Island was chosen for Operation Tradewind due to its perceived light defenses and ample space for airfield and light naval base facilities. General Krueger selected the 31st Division and the 126th Regiment, totaling approximately 28,000 troops under the overall command of General Hall's 11th Corps, for this operation. Admiral Barbey's Task Force 77, comprising 12 destroyers, 2 APAs, 5 APDs, 1 LSD, 39 LCIs, 12 LSTs, and 12 LCTs, along with a covering force led by Admiral Berkey and an escort carrier force under Rear-Admiral Thomas Sprague, facilitated the amphibious movement. Additionally, Vice-Admiral John McCain's fast carrier group provided support. Anticipating minimal resistance, the landings were planned near prospective airfield sites on the Doroeba Plain in southwest Morotai. General Hall's strategy involved the 155th and 167th Regiments landing on Red Beach on the southwestern coast to swiftly capture the abandoned Pitoe Drome and secure the new Pitoe Airfield site. Meanwhile, the 124th Regiment landed at White Beach, about 1500 yards to the south, to secure the Gila Peninsula and the Wama Airfield site. The reserve 126th Regiment was scheduled to land the following day, with its 1st Battalion initially supporting the 124th Regiment's operations at the beachhead. Both the Palau and Morotai operations were supported by a coordinated strategic air support program. Admiral Hoover's land-based aircraft were tasked with neutralizing Japanese airfields at various islands including Yap, Woleai, Truk, Ponape, Pagan, Bonin, and Marcus Islands. Concurrently, General Kenney's Allied Air Forces reinforced these efforts and targeted enemy air centers in Palau, Mindanao, western Dutch New Guinea, Halmahera, the Talaud Islands, the Moluccas, the Celebes, and the Arafura Sea islands. Additionally, Mitscher's fast carriers embarked on an ambitious campaign, launching strikes from the Bonin and Volcano Islands to the Palaus and Mindanao between late August and the start of the invasions.  This strike had a twofold objective: the temporary neutralization of Japanese airfields on those island groups and, more important, the creation of a diversion on the north preceding stronger attacks against targets in the Philippines and western Carolines. Carrier action in the latter area was to begin on 6 September, with strikes on the Palaus, Yap, and Ulithi. The bulk of the carrier forces was to leave the western Carolines on the afternoon of the 8th to take up positions off Mindanao. Japanese airfields on Mindanao presented difficult targets because they were scattered over that large island, but it was believed that the cluster of airfields and associated installations in the Davao area would provide profitable targets for carrier-based aircraft attacks. The Davao and Sarangani Bay areas, as well as Japanese shipping routes from Davao to Zamboanga and thence north toward Manila, were also expected to provide profitable targets. Strikes against airdromes and shipping in the Mindanao area were to be carried out on 9 and 10 September, while on the 10th and 11th part of the carrier force was to hit the Palaus and Yap-Ulithi again. Rear-Admiral Ralph Davison's carrier-launched aircraft struck Chichi Jima and Iwo Jima from August 31 to September 2. The Fast Carrier Task Force continued with strikes on Yap and the Palaus from September 6 to 8, and on Mindanao from September 9 to 10. Enemy air resistance was surprisingly weak throughout these operations, prompting Halsey to redirect plans for a follow-up attack on Mindanao to the Central Philippines. While the Japanese forces in the Philippines hastened to complete preparations against anticipated Allied invasion, enemy carrier-borne aircraft served sudden warning on September 9 that the date of this invasion was fast drawing near. In the first large-scale air operation by the Allies against the Philippines, an estimated 400 carrier planes staged a devastating ten-hour offensive against southern Mindanao, concentrating their attacks on Davao, Sarangani, Cagayan and Digos. Since Japanese air patrols had failed to discover the enemy task force, the attacks achieved complete surprise and inflicted widespread and severe damage to ground installations, airfields, anchorages, and lines of communication. Reconnaissance units of the 1st Air Fleet immediately flew off search missions, which revealed that the attacks originated from three enemy naval task groups boldly maneuvering in the waters southeast of Mindanao. As per the Sho-Go directives, however, the 1st Air Fleet withheld retaliatory action pending further developments. Ground and naval units in the Davao area were nevertheless ordered on the alert to meet the possible contingency that an invasion attempt would follow the air strikes, and the Japanese armed forces throughout southern Mindanao became tense with expectancy. A feeling of nervousness gripped the weak local forces at Davao and rapidly spread to the large Japanese civilian colony. A wave of wild rumors swept the city. On September 10, a second series of heavy enemy raids aggravated this state of alarm. The city and harbor were reduced to a shambles and communications paralyzed. Panic and civil disorder broke out.  Less than 48 hours after the termination of the raids on Mindanao, the enemy struck again; this time in the central Philippines. On the morning of 12 September, a navy radar picket station on Suluan Island, in Leyte Gulf, broadcast over the general air-warning net that a vast formation of enemy carrier planes was heading westward toward the Visayas. Since the Suluan Island lookout was only about twenty minutes' flying time from Cebu, the air forces there could not be alerted quickly enough to put up an effective defense. By 0920 the enemy planes were already swarming over the Cebu airfields, where the main fighter strength of the First Air Fleet was based following its transfer from Davao. Although the attacks extended over the entire Visayan area and later took in Tawitawi, in the Sulu Archipelago, the Cebu fields appeared to be the principal objective. In the three days over which this air offensive continued, the First Air Fleet suffered damage to 50 Zero fighters on Cebu alone, while in other areas 30 additional aircraft of all types were rendered non-operational. Flight personnel suffered numerous casualties, and training was disrupted. Heavy damage was also sustained by Army air units. The 13th Air Brigade, made up of Type I fighters, was so hard hit that it had to be ordered back to Japan for regrouping, while the 45th Fighter­bomber Regiment was reduced to half strength. In addition, 11 transports totalling 27,000 gross tons and 13 naval combat vessels were sent to the bottom of Cebu harbor.The unexpected weakness in enemy air defenses led Nimitz to reconsider bypassing Yap and Mindanao, instead focusing forces on an early invasion of Leyte. McCain's group continued with attacks on Zamboanga, the Talauds, and Menado en route to Morotai. Meanwhile, between September 1 and 14, Kenney's aircraft conducted heavy raids on Japanese air bases within range of Morotai, effectively isolating the island. Targeted locations included Halmahera, the northern Celebes, Ceram, western New Guinea, and Mindanao. After rehearsals and preparations were completed, Barbey's convoy departed Aitape on September 9. Two days later, they rendezvoused at Maffin Bay with the majority of General Persons' 31st Division. The entire convoy departed the area on September 12, joined the next day by the covering force and escort carriers. The voyage proceeded smoothly, and Barbey successfully reached Morotai on the morning of September 15. Meanwhile, McCain's carrier aircraft conducted a bombing and strafing mission over Japanese air bases in the Manado area, destroying 28 enemy aircraft. Kenney's bombers also struck Japanese air installations on Batjan Island, while Berkey's cruisers and destroyers shelled enemy positions along Galela Bay. Barbey's surface warships conducted a bombardment of the landing area. During the naval and air bombardment, assault ships moved into their assigned positions west of the landing beaches efficiently and without confusion. The initial waves formed quickly and landed the 155th and 167th Regiments on Red Beach at 08:30, followed by the 124th Regiment on White Beach one minute later. Encountering no opposition, the troops swiftly reorganized on shore and advanced toward their objectives inland. By 13:00, the 167th Regiment had secured Pitoe Drome, and by 15:00, Colonel Starr's 1st Battalion had secured Gila Peninsula. Other units also advanced inland, establishing the 2000-yard beachhead line. Although there were some minor skirmishes, the Japanese could not mount significant resistance against the overwhelming Allied force and retreated into Morotai's rugged interior. The day's action resulted in seven wounded among the 124th Regiment and the loss of twelve Japanese soldiers, with one captured. Beach conditions, however, proved unexpectedly poor, severely hindering the unloading efforts. Consequently, starting on September 16, all the LSTs, along with numerous LCTs and LCMs, had to be unloaded at Blue Beach, a favorable landing spot on Pitoe Bay's shores. Simultaneously, as the reserve 126th Regiment was disembarking, Persons resumed advancing inland against minimal opposition. Swiftly, they secured a perimeter around the Pitoe Drome area, spanning over 7000 yards wide and approximately 5000 yards deep. Following this, American patrols were dispatched to eliminate small Japanese groups, radar stations and observation posts were established on various offshore islands and Morotai's coastline, and efforts were made to expand the perimeter to the Sabatai River to accommodate additional bivouacs and supply installations.  Leaving Morotai behind, attention shifts to Burma to explore the aftermath of Operation U-Go. Following the decisive victories at Imphal-Kohima, General Slim opted to pursue retreating Japanese forces toward the Chindwin River, despite the need for rest among his weary British-Indian divisions. Consequently, the 23rd Division spearheaded the pursuit to Tamu, at the head of the Kabaw Valley, where Major-General Charles Fowkes' 11th East African Division took over in early August. Meanwhile, to the south, General Evans' 5th Division pressed toward Tiddim, encountering stubborn resistance from General Tanaka's 33rd Division. Slim's strategy aimed for both divisions to eliminate remaining Japanese forces west of the Chindwin and converge at Kalemyo. Subsequently, the Tiddim road would be abandoned as a supply route in favor of the Kabaw Valley and aerial resupply drops. As a result, the 31st Division, now led by Lieutenant-General Kawata Tsuchitaro, successfully reached Sittaung. Their mission was to cover the withdrawal of other units in the region. Meanwhile, the 33rd Division faced challenges as it conducted delaying actions along the Tiddim road, with the added threat of East African forces potentially cutting off their withdrawal route towards Yazagyo. Japanese delaying tactics were always the same, and the means of dealing with them was also always the same. A crater would be found beyond which the lead infantry would come under fire and would have to be filled or covered using a Valentine bridgelayer, while air strikes would break up the blocking position to allow tanks from 3rd Carabiniers forward to support them. To disrupt Tanaka's communications south of the road, an ad hoc light unit, the Lushai Brigade, was deployed. By mid-August, General Mutaguchi ordered his forces to commence withdrawal towards the Zibyu Range. The 15th and 31st Divisions were directed to cross the Chindwin River by August 25, despite shortages of small boats. At the beginning of the crossing operation, a serious setback was experienced. It had been planned to bring small boats upstream to the crossing area with supplies for the Army and to utilize the same boats to evacuate casualties and heavy weapons south to Kalewa. Because of the enemy air activity over the Chindwin River, it was impossible to bring the boats to the crossing points. As a result, approximately 3000 sick and wounded were forced to cross the river and continue to the rear on foot with increasingly heavy death losses. By August 31, they were expected to reach the eastern bank of the Chindwin, with the 15th Division consolidating along the Pinbon-Pinlebu line by the end of September and the 31st Division reaching Shwebo by mid-October. By the end of August, key command changes occurred following the setbacks of Operation U-Go. Lieutenant-General Katamura Shihachi replaced General Mutaguchi as commander of the 15th Army, while Lieutenant-General Kimura Heitaro took over from General Kawabe as commander of the Burma Area Army. Kimura Heitaro, noted for his strategic flexibility and acumen, subsequently directed the 33rd Army to secure a defensive line from Lashio to Mandalay, safeguarding the right flank of the 15th Army. The 15th Army, in turn, was tasked with holding the Irrawaddy River from Mandalay to Pakkoku, while the 28th Army was assigned to defend the Yenangyaung oilfields, the Arakan coast, and the Rangoon delta. Meanwhile, on September 12, the 33rd Division crossed the Manipur River and proceeded with their retreat towards the Kabaw valley. They left the 215th Regiment to guard the rear at Tonzang, while units of the 5th Division infiltrated the area between Tonzang and Kalemyo to disrupt Tanaka's withdrawal and mount significant attacks against the 215th. By September 20, the Japanese forces were forced back to Tiddim, where the 214th Regiment covered the retreat of the rest of the division. Simultaneously, the 26th King's African Rifles moved east from Tamu to Sittang, crossing the Chindwin River on September 8 to assess enemy strength across the river and prepare bridgeheads for a broader crossing. Encountering unexpectedly strong resistance, they were compelled to retreat back across the river. Under persistent pressure, the Japanese evacuated Tiddim on the night of October 6. Tanaka consolidated his division in the Kalemyo-Kalewa area by the end of October, while pursuing forces captured Fort White and Kennedy Peak. On October 10, the 4th King's African Rifles launched an assault on Leik Ridge, suffering significant casualties but ultimately securing the main hill twelve days later. Meanwhile, after withdrawing from Mogaung, the 53rd Division regrouped at Mawhun by September 10, where they successfully defended against enemy units until the end of the month. They then retreated towards Pinwe and came under the command of the 15th Army on October 5. Following the Quebec conference in September, a strategic overview of Burma emerged: the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved two plans. The first, codenamed Dracula, proposed an amphibious assault on Rangoon with a target date of March 15, 1945. The second plan, Capital, aimed at the conquest of north and central Burma, with General Slim suggesting an overland capture of Rangoon as part of the operation. Initially skeptical, the Americans reluctantly agreed to Dracula, contingent on ensuring that northern Burma received adequate resources. However, due to Allied setbacks at Arnhem and during the Battle of the Bulge, it became clear that reinforcements from the European theater could not be spared for the Rangoon offensive. Consequently, it was announced that the operation would need to be postponed until after the 1945 monsoon season. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. After intense Allied operations in the Pacific, including the capture of the Marianas and Sansapor, attention turned to the Palaus and Halmahera. Japanese defenses were formidable, with significant troop concentrations and elaborate fortifications. Despite setbacks, Allied forces meticulously planned and executed operations, paving the way for further strategic advances in the region.

The Halo-Halo Show
Mix #5.32 : BINIverse Pricing, Controversial Vlogs, and Corporate Rica

The Halo-Halo Show

Play Episode Listen Later Aug 22, 2024 68:44


Where you bean?!: JC talks about attending a wedding as a guest (03:37), and hosting in Davao (08:07), and the film 'It Ends With Us (16:06). Rica talks about her corporate girlie era (18:27), and the books 'The List of Suspicious Things' (26:10) and 'Wayward' (30:52)TT's: This week we talk about a Nursing Student's controversial Mini-Vlogs (37:49), and the reaction behind the pricing behind BINI's concert in November (49:47)Follow Rica & JC on IG:@ricaggg@itsmejayseeLeche-Fan Mail:thehalohaloshow@gmail.comRecorded using the ELGATO WAVE 1 Microphones, go get one! Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Conquer Addiction with Ken and Sonya Pounders
Passing on the Torch of Faith

Conquer Addiction with Ken and Sonya Pounders

Play Episode Listen Later Aug 20, 2024 24:47


In Episode 156 of the Conquer Addiction Podcast, Ken Pounders delves deep into the teachings of 2nd Timothy 2:12 and reveals how the apostle Paul's guidance to Timothy can provide a blueprint for overcoming addiction and living a life of grace. Listeners are invited to explore the powerful concept of spiritual generational growth and the importance of receiving and imparting God's grace, Word, mission, and acclamation. The episode includes inspiring real-life stories of transformation, emphasizing how faith and resilience can lead to profound personal recovery. This impactful message was originally preached at Lighthouse Christian Fellowship in Davao, Philippines. Tune in for profound insights and encouragement in your journey to conquer addiction. Website: https://omainc.org Email: OMADirector2017@gmail.com or priorityev@mac.com Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/165704310121828/ Website: https://priorityev.info Instagram: instagram.com/bro_ken   Outreach Ministries of Alabama, Inc., PO Box 98 Valhermoso Springs, AL  35775 Phone:  256-778-8096

SUIKA
Cities #650 - Davao [Deep Tech - Deep House]

SUIKA

Play Episode Listen Later Jul 22, 2024 60:05


TRACKLIST : Jungle Punk - Little helper 415-3 Max Jacobson - Shine Robsessive - Ocean water Cennamo - Yes Javi Bosch - Veneno Diego Olarte - Bad Elos & Vegas - Trip Fernando Rodd & PMAZII - Step Dmitri Saidi & Sunday Noise - Que fue H&A - Morning light Raphael Scemama - Siblings Chiara Manchia - Day and night (Naom remix)

cities deep tech davao tech deep house
Level Up with Lacey
Learning how to let someone go feat. Luz & Jess with Davao and Extended!!!

Level Up with Lacey

Play Episode Listen Later Jul 18, 2024 37:56


When I think of leaders who are bold, strong, and resilient, I think of Luz and Jess with Davao and Extended!!! I had the opportunity to dive deep into their business, in Jan of 2023, when we filmed an entire training academy for their two businesses! I was blown away with their leadership skills and servant hearts! Luz and Jess are incredible business owners, wives, mommas, stylists, and so many other roles not even listed here! Go give them a follow @hairytalelife @fixhairupper @davaohair @extendedbydavaohair  Listen now! Join The Assistant University now! ⤵️ https://lg-education.mykajabi.com/AUpresale Follow us on social! Instagram: @lacey_gebo Facebook: The New Era of Assistant Training

Grand reportage
« Le supplément du samedi » du 6 juillet 2024

Grand reportage

Play Episode Listen Later Jul 6, 2024 48:30


Dans le supplément de ce samedi, Grand reportage week-end vous emmène aux Philippines à propos de la répression violente du trafic de stupéfiants qui a été menée par l'ex-président Rodrigo Duterte. Un bilan de dizaines de milliers de morts, dont les familles réclament justice. Deuxième partie : Chypre est divisée en deux depuis 1974, écartelée entre la Grèce et la Turquie, une situation qui soulève des traumatismes au sein des minorités. Philippines : la quête de justice des victimes de la guerre contre la drogueEntre 20.000 et 30.000 morts. C'est le bilan estimé par les organisations des droits de l'homme de la guerre contre la drogue aux Philippines. Menée par l'ex-président Rodrigo Duterte, cette répression violente du trafic de stupéfiants a profondément traumatisé l'archipel. D'abord dans la ville de Davao, puis sur tout le territoire, à partir de juin 2016, des groupes armés abattent dans les rues des trafiquants ou consommateurs présumés hors de tout cadre légal.L'actuel chef de l'État Ferdinand Marcos Jr n'a pas totalement mis fin aux exactions extrajudiciaires et protège encore son prédécesseur malgré des désaccords politiques. Les familles des victimes placent leur espoir dans la Cour Pénale Internationale qui a ouvert un dossier pour crimes contre l'humanité contre l'ancien président.Un Grand reportage de Nicolas Rocca qui s'entretient avec François Ballarin.Chypre coupée en deux, les 50 ans d'un écartèlement1960 : les colons britanniques plient bagage et l'île de Chypre devient officiellement indépendante. Vite, la situation devient instable, des heurts communautaires opposent alors les habitants d'origine grecque, majoritaires, à la minorité d'origine turque. En juillet 1974, un coup d'État téléguidé par Athènes -pour réunir Chypre à la Grèce- entraîne l'invasion des troupes turques, au motif officiel de protéger la minorité turcophone. Depuis lors, l'île est divisée en deux. Une plaie qui, du côté des Chypriotes grecs, ne s'est jamais refermée.Un Grand reportage de Joël Bronner qui s'entretient avec François Ballarin.

Grand reportage
Philippines : la quête de justice des victimes de la guerre contre la drogue

Grand reportage

Play Episode Listen Later Jul 1, 2024 19:30


Entre 20.000 et 30.000 morts. C'est le bilan estimé par les organisations des droits de l'homme de la guerre contre la drogue aux Philippines. Menée par l'ex-président Rodrigo Duterte, cette répression violente du trafic de stupéfiants a profondément traumatisé l'archipel. D'abord dans la ville de Davao, puis sur tout le territoire, à partir de juin 2016, des groupes armés abattent dans les rues des trafiquants ou consommateurs présumés hors de tout cadre légal. L'actuel chef de l'État Ferdinand Marcos Jr n'a pas totalement mis fin aux exactions extrajudiciaires et protège encore son prédécesseur malgré des désaccords politiques. Les familles des victimes placent leur espoir dans la Cour Pénale Internationale qui a ouvert un dossier pour crime contre l'humanité contre l'ancien président.«Aux Philippines, la quête de justice des victimes de la guerre contre la drogue», un Grand reportage de Nicolas Rocca.

The Howie Severino Podcast
Protecting wildlife through dead animals — a convo with Darrell Blatchley

The Howie Severino Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Jun 27, 2024 31:02


Darrell Blatchley is a Bisaya-speaking American missionary's son with an unusual passion: he collects the bones of animals that humans have killed through pollution and displays them for education. The founder of the D'Bone Collector's Museum in Davao, Blatchley talks to Howie about bearing the stench of dead animals, cleaning the bones of whales and crocodiles, and how our plastic waste is causing the deaths of countless creatures. Producer: Eumer Yanga Researcher: Jenica Villanueva Editor: Jayr Magtoto Links: https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/balitambayan/talakayan/905155/darrell-blatchley-ang-bone-collector-sa-davao-na-pinagdalhan-ng-bungo-ni-mali/story/https://youtube.com/@uncleddbonecollector?si=-EcMjfC_8ZBEE3vX

The Howie Severino Podcast
[VIDEO] “Ano ba talaga trabaho mo?”

The Howie Severino Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Jun 8, 2024 48:04


27-year-old artist Renren Galeno's parents used to ask her that question. Not anymore, not after her illustrations were part of “Searching for Maura,” a ground-breaking investigative report in the Washington Post that was a finalist for the prestigious Pulitzer Prizes.  Discovered because of her comics on climate anxiety, the Davao native gave a unique Filipino perspective to a major American journalism project that unearthed a long-buried scandal involving the US government's Smithsonian Museum.  The project also blew open a hidden part of Philippine history that saw Filipinos displayed in a human zoo at the 1904 St. Louis World's Fair.  Galeno tells Howie Severino how she convinced her parents that art was a viable career choice and what it was like to collaborate with investigative journalists.  

The Pacific War - week by week
- 133 - Pacific War - Fall of Mogaung, June 4-11, 1944

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Jun 4, 2024 60:42


Last time we spoke about landings at Biak. General Fuller unleashed a amphibious assault against Biak that faced countless hurdles. The Hurricane Task force encountered a lot of terrain issues at Humboldt bay, leading to logistical headaches. Despite the disorganization, they shipped off and landed, forming a beachhead. Colonel Kuzume and his men were caught with their pants down, units were scattered all over the place. The first tank battle of the Southwest Pacific occurred, seeing American Shermans absolutely desolate Japanese Type 95's. General Fuller planned to consolidate his troops at Ibdi and Bosnek while reinforcements arrived, but the Japanese continuously lobbed surprise night attacks to horrible effect. Over in the Burma front, Mutaguchi's operation continued to unravel as his subordinate officers disregarded his orders and performed their own withdrawals. As Mutaguchi relieved men of command and replaced them, General Slim finally reopened the Imphal-Kohima road spelling doom for the Japanese. This episode is the Fall of Mogaung Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As General Vinegar Joe unleashed what he believed to be a masterstroke against Myitkyina, it soon turned out to be an absolute gruesome struggle. As we last saw, General Stilwell's men had begun a long and difficult siege of Myitkyina. The 22nd and 38th Chinese Divisions were now pinned down by General Tanaka's battered 18th Division south of Kamaing. To the south Brigadier Calvert's Chindits began a battle for Mogaung, which forced General Takeda's 53rd Division to suspend the relief of Myitkyina and rush back to reinforce the town. Though the Mogaung Garrison and the 1st Battalion, 128th Regiment to the north had been effectively destroyed by the Chindit and Chinese attacks, the Japanese had been able to maintain their hold on Mogaung by mid-June. To the east, General Wei's Y Force had opened a new offensive on Yunnan, gradually pushing Colonel Kurashige's 148th Regiment to Tengchong but failing to seize Longling against the tenacious resistance of General Matsuyama's forces. Along the Kamaing-Mogaung front, by late June, Tanaka had been able to assemble most of his depleted command at Lakatkawng, determined to keep the blockade on the Hukawng Valley. His main aim was to clear the Seton roadblock, which had been recently reinforced with General Sun's 113th Regiment; but once again, his attacks would fail to dislodge the tenacious Chinese defenders. Yet upon receiving orders from the 33rd Army commander to withdraw, General Tanaka reported that the 18th Division could continue to hold in the Kamaing area. This statement, inspired by Colonel Ohgoshi, the chief of staff, proved to be unwarranted optimism. The 18th had staged a desperate resistance in the vicinity of Kamaing for about a month and, for most of the period, had only 80 men for each mile of front. Supplies of ammunition and food were very low with only about 1400 rounds of rifle ammunition per day for the entire Division and 60 rounds per machine gun. The daily ration was about 2.5 ounces of rice per man. On receipt of the Army's message to withdraw, Colonel Ohgoshi had advised the Division commander that further resistance in the area was possible, but had not made it clear that this was his personal belief and did not reflect the opinions of the rest of the Division staff. Within a day or two the commander became aware of the fact that the other staff officers were convinced that further resistance in the Kamaing area was impossible. He therefore forwarded to the 33rd Army a revised report of the Division's actual situation. Upon receipt of the second message, on June 27 the Army directed the Division to retire to the Sahmaw sector. Tanaka believed he needed to stand his ground while the 53rd Division pushed aside the Seton Block and reopened his line of communications. Thus, he elected to continue to resist the attacks from the north while he himself attacked Seton for three more days; but failing to make any progress, he would finally comply with his orders to withdraw to the hills north of Sahmaw in early July.  While the 4th and 146th Regiments performed covering attacks, the remnants of the 55th and 56th Regiments destroyed their artillery and heavy equipment, and withdrew along an escape trail cut through the forest west of the Seton roadblock. On 2 July the 18th Division began its withdrawal, utilizing an obscure trail that ran directly south from Kamaing. Crossing the mountain range west of Seton, the Division completed its concentration near Sahmaw about 7 July. The Hukawng Operation was then considered concluded, ending a campaign that had been a miserable failure and had cost almost 8,000 casualties. By July 15th, the 18th Division would finally assemble in the Indaw area. Though only 3000 men from the elite 18th Division would survive the Hukawng Valley Campaign, Tanaka had effectively managed to keep intact the blockade to China for another year, something that would have profound repercussions later on in Chinese history. Further south, the 114th Regiment finally arrived at Gurkhaywa on June 16th, ready to reinforce the Chindits; yet Takeda had also brought most of his troops back to Mogaung, subsequently starting a deadly shelling of the Chindit positions. By when June 15th arrived, the Chinese still had not appeared, and Calvert pulled his troops back towards the bridge. At that moment, remarkable news arrived: The Japanese were abandoning their positions along the river. Calvert was exuberant. This meant he could move out of his bridgehead perhaps capture the town. Certainly, it meant a reduction of the shelling which was claiming at least 15 of his men a day. Yet, when the shelling did not die down and it quickly became apparent that Takeda was merely redeploying his troops along the railway, to get them out of flooding in low-lying areas. Chindit recce teams reported the area from the train station, in the heart of the town to the Mogaung Railway Bridge, further north, was heavily defended with eight bunkers dominating the landscape. Shelling from the village of Naungkyaiktaw, astride the road to Mogaung, set between fields of paddy, was persistent. Naungkyaiktaw had to be captured. Calvert estimated the village was held by a hundred Japanese. Because of this, on June 18th, Calvert ordered his forces to attack the apparent Japanese artillery encampment at Naungkyaiktaw after a heavy air and mortar bombardment. His troops outnumbered them, but unwilling to suffer needless casualties, Calvert directed the American fighter-bombers against the village, which was bombarded on the night of the 17th. Half an hour before dawn on the 18th, the Chindit mortars pummeled the place with 400 rounds for good measure. Calvert then sent in his assault force. Among the attackers was a company of 70 men from King's Liverpool led by Major Fred Reeman. This was a company that had stayed on with the 77th Brigade after the rest of the battalion had been transferred to the 111th Brigade. They were joined by 12 men of Blaine's Detachment, once evacuated to India but since returned, this time armed with about a dozen flamethrowers.  In the darkness, Blaine's Detachment was told to advance in front of the company of King's, and to “turn the fucking lights on.” As the detachment began to hurl flames far and wide, the Chindits behind them began cheering. The men had been told that the village had many bunkers, but never saw any at first. The scene soon turned fantastic. They went through the entire village “with twenty or thirty yards of flame shooting out in front.” They soon found the bunkers. The Japanese became crazed with fear especially after the British began yelling “put out the fucking lights,” and turning the flamethrowers their way. Many Japanese fled the bunkers, joined by those outside. They fled through the paddy fields, making for the railway station 400 yards away. Calvert's machine gunners had been waiting and blazed away, killing at least forty. Meanwhile, the rest of Fusiliers and the Kings walked up the paddy, picking off Japanese hiding or trying to crawl away in the ditches. Calvert, his mobile brigade-major Brash and his orderly Lance-Corporal Young decided to join the mop-up, shooting at Japanese while standing on chairs, as more Fusiliers began clearing the last of the bunkers, hurling grenades into them and blasting the insides with flamethrowers. As twilight set in that day, the most peculiar thing happened. The Fusiliers were cooking an evening meal in their newly-won positions, when a weary, seven-man patrol walked into their billet and began to take off their kit. The Fusiliers who looked up casually, noticed to their horror, that the new men were Japanese. The Japanese, for their part, had not noticed. The Fusiliers lunged for their weapons and opened fire. The Japanese patrol did not survive. In all, Calvert estimated that his troops had killed about 70 Japanese in the capture and holding of Naungkyaiktaw, while suffering 16 killed and 38 wounded. Major Reeman's King's company had become reduced to a platoon.  Calvert was considerably cheered on the evening of the 18th, when the much promised Chinese reinforcements finally arrived, guided over the river in motorized ranger boats by a towering Chindit officer, Captain Andrew. This was the 1st Battalion of the Chinese 114th Regiment led by Major P'ang, which quickly deployed in the positions pointed out by Calvert but left the Chindits a little flummoxed when they proclaimed that they were in no particular hurry to fight as they had been fighting for years. On the following day, another battalion of Chinese arrived under the personal command of the regimental leader, Colonel Li Hung, as did a battery of 75mm pack howitzers  the “6th Battery” under US Major Wayne Cook. The Chinese quickly assumed the defense of Mahaung, prompting an American liaison officer with the Chinese to send a press release that the Chinese had “captured” the village, which embarrassed Li. Cook's battery was deployed into position at Pinhmi village began operations on the 20th, hurling fire against the Japanese positions as the Chinese infantrymen consolidated their positions. Meantime, elements of the Chinese 113th Infantry, operating five miles north of Mogaung, surrounded a Japanese company, while Cook's guns hammered them. Fifty Japanese died from first blast alone. The Chinese finished off those who survived.The assault, was so ferocious that all the bunkers were overrun The reinforcements heartened Calvert for his own brigade was now a shell of its former self. The Lancashire Fusiliers and the King's Liverpool had only 110 men, the South Staffords had 180 and the Gurkha Rifles had 230. He planned a fresh advance, this time aiming for the hamlet of Natgyigon, on Mogaung's right flank, near the river. This area, Calvert believed, was the “key to Mogaung.” For the time, he chose the early hours of darkness on June 23rd a day which would go down in the annals of the 77th Brigade as the “stuff of legends.” The plan called for a mortar barrage of 1,000 bombs, in addition to shelling from the 75mm guns to cover the advance of the Chindits across the open ground towards Natgyigon. The Gurkhas were to move on the right, with the South Staffords on the left. Blaine's Detachment and the Lancashire Fusiliers were in reserve. The objective was to capture the entire stretch of ground from the Mogaung Bridge to the train station, the latter of which the Chinese were to secure. Once the area was in Allied hands, the troops were to dig in while the reserve troops mopped up. In addition, Allied aircraft were to bombard the area before the start of the assault, which itself was timed to launch at about 3.10 am. In the dark, section commanders could be heard telling their men: “We attack Mogaung tonight and once we've taken it the Brigadier says we are through!” Later, during the attack, Calvert discovered the Chinese infantry had not captured the all-important train station, even as their American liaison officer insisted that they had. Calvert angrily pointed out that no, the Chinese had not, because enemy fire from that direction continued to pick off his men at the railway embankment. The Gurkhas, moving along a wide right flank along the banks of the Mogaung River, headed for the railway bridge. Approaching the bridge, they came under heavy fire. Captain Allmand, by now suffering from trench foot as were most of the troops, moved forward to silence a machine gun firing on his men. He could barely run because of his affliction but advancing through the mud, he hurled grenades at the Japanese position. A burst of gunfire plunged into him. He fell, badly wounded. One of his Gurkhas, Sergeant. Tilbir Gurung pulled Allmand and another wounded NCO to safety. For this, Gurung was to get a Military Medal. Allmand's own valor was to be recognized by a Victoria Cross. The South Staffords swept into Mogaung town. Resistance was heavy. Lt Durant of the South Stafford deployed his machineguns to rake Japanese positions with fire. Meantime, the flamethrowers were brought up. As they moved up past Durant's positions, a shell burst exploded one, setting the man wielding it on fire. The man screamed and somehow shook off the flamethrowing unit from his back. Durant and some of his men rushed forward and rolled him into water in a nearby ditch. The Japanese had dug-in beneath the ruins of a brick house from where they were stubbornly holding the Staffords at bay. The rest of the flamethrowers moved in and sprayed the building. One Japanese, his clothes ablaze, leapt from his positions and tried to make a run for it. A scythe of gunfire cut him down. The rest valiantly held their positions and were burned to cinder. The Staffords, mopping up the, found the Japanese officer. He had shot himself with his revolver. The Japanese had entrenched themselves at a strategically important building known as the Red House, which was well-protected with machine-gun nests. The advancing Gurkhas consequently ran smack into this killing zone, getting caught in a murderous crossfire and suffering heavy casualties. In response, Calvert threw his reserves into the fray and the Chindits also began to pummel the Japanese positions with mortars and machine-guns, which allowed the infantry to reach the all-important train station. Inflicting some 120 casualties and losing 60 dead and over 100 wounded, the Chindits then successfully captured all their objectives by noon. For the rest of the day, heavy fighting would continue as the Chindits dug in on their gained positions; but during the night, the Japanese would finally pull out, leaving the town to the shattered remnants of the 77th Brigade. Mopping up then continued until June 27, when Mogaung was declared void of Japanese. Though this was the first major town to be recaptured in Burma, Calvert lost over 250 killed and 500 wounded at Mogaung, which was more than any Chindit formation was prepared to take. This was also a bittersweet victory for Calvert because Stilwell would claim that the town had been taken by his Chinese troops, even though the Chindits had done most of the fighting. Stilwill wrote in his diary on June 27th “Good news from Mogaung, We have it!” Then came a remarkable broadcast from Stilwell's headquarters via the BBC “The Chinese had captured Mogaung”. There was no mention of the Chindits. Calvert was incensed. Colonel Li was appalled and apologized profusely. “If anyone has taken Mogaung it is your Brigade and we all admire the bravery of your soldiers.” Calvert, his anger against Stilwell unmitigated, sent a message to US headquarters  “Chinese reported taking Mogaung. My Brigade now taking umbrage” this prompted Stilwell's staff to scour the maps for the location of Umbrage. Meantime, congratulations poured in from Lentaigne, from “Scottie” Scott, from John Masters, and the other brigade commanders. Among the lot, there was one, from Derek Tulloch, which struck Calvert's heart the most: “Wingate would have been proud of you.” After this defeat, and learning of the concurrent withdrawal of the 18th Division, Takeda's 53rd Division would withdraw to the Sahmaw River line in early July, where it was also reinforced with the recently-arrived 119th Regiment.  Meanwhile over at Myitkyina, General Boatner had to order a stop to the attacks after June 18th because of the heavy casualties. For the time being, tunneling would be used to close with the enemy. On June 25th, however, Boatner would have a severe recurrence of malaria that would force him to abandon the frontlines. This led General Stilwell to appoint Brigadier-General Theodore Wessels in command of the Myitkyina Task Force on June 26th. Luckily for Wessels the situation started to improve after the fall of Mogaung, as Chinese troops there could now move up the railroad to connect with Wessels' forces. This removed the recurrent menace of a Japanese drive from Mogaung, guaranteed reinforcements and the opening of a ground line of communications, and further eliminated one of General Minakami's two bases from which supplies had trickled into the Japanese perimeter. Despite this, the only gains in the week of June 25th were a few hundred yards taken by the 150th Regiment and the 236th Engineers. Alongside this, Stilwell ordered the 1st Battalion, 42nd Regiment to penetrate through the Japanese positions towards Sitapur on June 28. They would drive deep into the Japanese defense system, leading Stilwell to hope this was the turning point; on receiving Japanese fire, it halted and dug in. Air supply was necessary.In response, Wessels dispatched some Marauder reinforcements. F Company, unaware it had lost its way and under an inexperienced commander, proceeded with a small point almost directly ahead of the marching column. The company commander at the head of the point met a small group of Orientals whom he took to be Chinese and who greeted him affably. The strangers then suggested he and his party lay aside their guns. At this point the commander realized that he had been ambushed and gave the alarm. The Japanese machine guns opened on his trapped column, inflicting heavy casualties. Some of his men made their way back to the Allied lines, but the company was never reconstituted and was broken up and distributed among the rest of Galahad. For his constant gallantry during a stubborn eight-hour rear-guard action, which permitted the survivors to extricate themselves from ambush, Private first class. Anthony Firenze of New Galahad received the Distinguished Service Cross. Wessels then planning to launch a set-piece attack to capture a stretch of the Sumprabum Road.  Over in the Yunnan front, Colonel Matsui's 113th Regiment had successfully relieved the pressure from Longling by mid-June. General Matsuyama further ordered him to maintain the offensive while he continued to reorganize his forces. Though Matsui managed to seize the Tiechanghe pass on June 21st, most of his attacks would end up in nothing. In the north, the 20th Army Group launched simultaneous attacks against Qianshuang and Gudong on June 18th. This finally forcing the Japanese to retreat in disorder towards Tengchong by June 22nd. With the fall of Qianshuang, the Japanese had been forced to abandon the upper Shweli valley, and were now moving in some disorder toward Tengchong over three excellent trails. In Qianshuang, they left behind large quantities of ammunition and a few pieces of artillery, suggesting a disorganized withdrawal. 150 dead Japanese were found in Qianshuang itself; more than 300 Chinese gave their lives for the village. South of Qianshuang, the Japanese hastily destroyed their pontoon bridge to slow the Chinese pursuit. On reaching the Qianshuang-Baifen-Gudong line, the 20th Army Group had wrested 4000 square miles from Japanese control in forty days of fighting. The advance had been made over the precipitous ranges of the Kaolikung Mountains in an almost constant rain, a downpour sometimes heavy, sometimes light, rarely abating, and always turning to fog and sleet in the higher altitudes. More than 150 coolie supply porters fell to their deaths from the narrow, slippery trails that snaked precariously over the mountains. On June 25th General Wei received a personal order from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek to take Teng-chung. A few days later, th 20th Group Army, though delayed by the need to rebuild bridges over each of the swift mountain streams that crossed its advance, had pressed the Japanese rear guards back to the hills that surrounded Teng-chung at a distance of two to three miles from the formidable walled town itself. Meanwhile, the Fourteenth Air Force was trying to soften Teng-chung by daily attacks with bombs and machine-gun fire. The outer defenses of Teng-chung were pillboxes covering every avenue of approach, supported and covered by the 6,500-foot-high, fortified mountain peak of Lai-feng Shan, "The Place Where the Birds Come." Here were 600 or more Japanese with most of the garrison's artillery. Teng-chung itself was girdled by a massive wall of earth that in some places was forty feet high and sixty feet thick at the base, faced throughout with great slabs of stone. Chinese necromancers had carefully laid out the wall in a great square to cut the cardinal points of the compass. Each side had a gate, and each gate now had a Japanese command post, while Japanese machine guns and rifles swept the approaches to the wall, its face, and its parapets. Within the city were about 2,000 Japanese. In all, Colonel Kurashige, who had defended the Kaoli-kung mountains, had about 1,850 Japanese, a heavily reinforced battalion combat team built around the 2nd, 148th regiment. Kurashige's orders were to hold Teng-chung until the Chinese threat to Lung-ling passed Over at Longling, Matsui saw the arrival of some reinforcements on June 22nd that would allow him to continue his counteroffensive. Making repeated night and day attacks, the Japanese would be able to penetrate the enemy positions on June 24. Matsuyama then directed him to exploit towards Bengmiao and Huangcaobacum; yet a heavy raid by 24 B-25s and the arrival of the 1st Division would manage to halt the Japanese attempt to exploit their success, with Mitsui only securing the area northwest of Bengmiao by July 1st. The next day, Matsuyama then suspended the counteroffensive because of heavy casualties and he could see the enemy were strengthening their positions. In the meantime, Major Kanemitsu's Lameng Garrison was successfully holding off against a siege by three divisions since June 4th, though the Chinese would only launch unsuccessful attacks in regimental strength during this period; and to the southeast, the Pingda Garrison was also successfully repelling the small enemy attacks against them in spite of being cut off and disease-ridden. That is all for the Burma front today as we now need to head over to the Biak front. After the arrival of two battalions of the163rd Regiment for reinforcements, General Fuller planed a two-pronged attack against Mokmer Drome, with the 186th Regiment advancing west over the inland plateau while the 162nd Regiment resumed its attack west along the coast. On the morning of June 1, in preparation for the offensive, Colonel Newman's 3rd Battalion therefore left Bosnek and marched north over the coastal ridge, with the 2nd Battalion also moving from Opiaref to join them. By 11:00, both battalions successfully set up defensive perimeters; yet their preparations would be interrupted abruptly in the afternoon as Colonel Kuzume directed his 1st Battalion to attack the positions held by Company K. These Japanese, who were supported by machine guns and mortars emplaced northwest of the trail crossing, continued attacks until 5:00, when a platoon of Company K, by a flanking movement, forced their withdrawal northward. Company K and two platoons of the Antitank Company remained at the trail crossing for the night. Company I was moved forward to K's left and left rear, and Company L extended K's perimeter east along the main road toward the surveyed drome. Battalion headquarters and Company M stayed near the strip's western end. The 121st Field Artillery Battalion, the Cannon Company, the 2nd Battalion, regimental headquarters, the attached engineers, and the tanks remained near the center of the airfield.   Thankfully, the Americans would manage to repel the assaults and would ultimately force a Japanese withdrawal via a bold enveloping maneuver. But the Japanese would return after midnight. The first part of the night passed without incident, but at 3:30 the entire area held by the 3rd Battalion, 186th Infantry, flamed into action. About a company and a half of the 1st Battalion, 222nd Infantry, moved from the south against the semicircular perimeter held by Companies I, K, and L, having outflanked the 3rd Battalion on the west. Simultaneously, other elements of the 1st Battalion attacked from the northwest, attempting to drive a wedge between Companies L and K. Under the support of mortar and machine gun fire from both the northwest and southwest, the encircled Japanese desperately tried to fight their way north. Four hours of confused hand-to-hand fighting, marked by the use of bayonets, machetes, and grenades, ensued. At daylight a count revealed that 86 dead Japanese were within and around the 3rd Battalion's perimeter. The dead included the commander of the 1st Battalion, 222nd Infantry. Losses to the American unit were 3 men killed and 8 wounded.  After dealing with the threat, Newman resumed the westward advance at 9:00 on June 2nd. The 1st and 3rd Battalions, supported by five tanks and an antitank platoon, were to advance abreast, while the 2nd protected the right flank by patrolling north of the main road. The 121st Field Artillery Battalion was to provide continuous close support and was to displace forward with the infantry. Neither artillery nor air bombardment seems to have been provided for or delivered prior to the attack. However, both the 121st and 146th Field Artillery Battalions were registered on targets north and west of the 186th Infantry. Air support was available from Wakde Island upon call. The 1st Battalion, 186th Infantry broke camp at its beach defense area at 8:00 on June 2nd and moved north over the ridge to join the rest of the regiment. The 1st Battalion, 222nd Infantry, had made no serious attempt to stop the 186th Infantry's progress westward because the inland plateau was nearly indefensible and because the battalion would have been decimated in battle with the superior strength of the reinforced American regiment. The 1st Battalion was withdrawn from the surveyed drome area, initially in preparation for counterattack against the Bosnek beachhead. While no such counteroffensive was mounted, the withdrawal of the 1st Battalion at least had the advantage of keeping the unit intact. The American advance would thus be opposed by the 10th Company, 222nd Regiment; the 3rd Company, 36th Division Sea Transportation Unit and some other naval and engineer units.  The 1st and 3rd Battalions then advanced with two companies abreast against scattered but determined opposition from elements of the 1st Battalion, 222nd Infantry. Small enemy patrols aimed machine gun and rifle fire at the advancing American units and held their positions until killed or dispersed by tank or artillery fire. Most of the enemy parties were located on the north flank and apparently many of them had been driven westward out of the cave and garden area north of the surveyed drome by fire from the 121st Field Artillery Battalion, which destroyed Biak Detachment headquarters installations in that area. By nightfall the 186th Infantry had killed 96 Japanese and had itself lost 6 men killed and 10 wounded. The unit halted shortly after 1600 and began digging in at a point about 600 yards northeast of the day's objective. The advance had carried the regiment west until it was almost abreast and north of the 162nd Infantry, at the Ibdi Pocket. The latter had attempted to move west along the coast during the day, but it would be unable to dislodge the Japanese from the Ibdi Pocket, ultimately having to attach its 2nd Battalion to the 186th.  The addition of the 2nd Battalion, 162nd Regiment to the 186th Regiment helped to complicate the supply problems of the troops on the plateau. No water had yet been found inland. Heat and humidity were intense, and thick scrub growth, about 12 feet high, stopped any breezes. Despite the best efforts of Company B, 116th Engineers, the supply road could not be repaired fast enough to keep pace with the advancing infantrymen. Water had to be brought around from Bosnek via Opiaref to the forward units, and there were not enough water trailers nor 5-gallon cans available to supply all the water needed. At night each man received only one canteen of water for the next day, an inadequate amount under the conditions which prevailed inland. The water situation and the necessity for hauling all other supplies north through Opiaref did more to delay the 186th Regiment's progress westward than did the opposition of the 1st Battalion, 222nd Regiment. Meanwhile Kuzume's only support so far had been some air raids carried out by the depleted 23rd Air Flotilla and 7th Air Division. By late May, the 23rd Air Flotilla had only twelve fighters and six medium bombers at Sorong and the 7th Air Division had four large bombers, 20 medium bombers and three fighters. Both units threw what strength they could muster into attacks on the enemy landing force. On May 27th four Army heavy bombers and nine Navy fighters carried out a daylight attack against fierce air opposition, all but four fighters failing to return. Kuzume would need more than that to launch a determined attack that would succeed in pushing the enemy back into the sea. Consequently, on May 29th, General Numata and Admiral Senda had requested the immediate commitment of fleet and air strength into the Biak battle. They both relayed this message “The enemy apparently found the difficulty of rapid occupation of the airfield sector. The enemy will change, in all probability, its policy to occupy the whole island of Biak after the arrival of reinforcements, securing its present positions with landed units for a while. The officers and men on Biak Island are firm in their resolution to crush the enemy. However, our operations are severely restricted by the uncontested superiority of the enemy's feet and air units. The Biak Detachment, which is making every effort in destroying the confronting enemy, request for further support by the army and navy units concerned. We believe that the immediate commitment of our air forces and, if possible, some fleet units would give us a splendid opportunity to turn the tide of battle in the whole Pacific area in our favor.“ This finally convinced Admiral Toyoda to send reinforcements to the island.  To counter the Allied advance to Biak, the IJN dispatched from one third of its available naval land-based air strength from the Central Pacific to reinforce the 23rd Air Flotilla in western New Guinea. On May 28th 70 carrier-type fighters, 4 reconnaissance bombers, and 16 medium bombers were dispatched to western New Guinea. Another group of planes, comprising 48 fighters, 8 reconnaissance aircraft, and 20 bombers, were sent to western New Guinea and Halmahera from the Carolines on or about May 31st. On 29-30th May the flotilla carried out fresh attacks on the Biak landing force. On May 29th, sixteen medium bombers attacked the enemy fleet in the sea near BIAK Island before daybreak of that day, yet none of them returned. Furthermore, in a daylight attack on the same day, four Zero fighters strafed BIAK Island. None of them returned to the base either. On May 30th, the unit of the Zero fighters of the Navy again fired upon enemy ships in the sea off Mokmer. The damage on the enemy ships was not confirmed. However, the unit reported that they fought four P-38s and four B-25s of the enemy and shot down two B-25s above BIAK Island. Also as part of Operation KON, a huge task force under Admiral Sakonju, which included the battleship Fuso, four cruisers and eight destroyers, was to transport Major-General Tamada Yoshio's 2nd Amphibious Brigade towards Biak. Additionally, it was decided to move three infantry companies of the 35th Division from Sorong to Biak by barge. Sakonju's convoy finally left Davao on the night of June 2nd. In connection with KON Force's advance, the Japanese had planned heavy air strikes against Biak which were to be carried out by the recently reinforced 23rd Air Flotilla and the few army aircraft which remained at bases within range of Biak. Between 1645 and 1700 on 2 June, from eleven to fifteen Japanese planes bombed Allied positions on Biak, causing a few casualties and some light damage. Seven of these planes were shot down by shore-based anti-aircraft weapons, while guns aboard Seventh Fleet ships lying off Bosnek accounted for at least one more. Later during the same night, a few more enemy planes dropped some bombs harmlessly on and near Owi Island. Still more approached Biak during the night, causing many red alerts but not dropping any bombs. The next night, that of 3-4 June, no Japanese planes attacked Biak, although an unknown number bombed Owi Island without causing any damage or casualties. Again, however, enemy aircraft flew many reconnaissance flights around Biak, causing an almost continuous red alert until the early morning hours of 4 June. Early on the morning of June 3rd, at a point just east of the Talaud Islands, between Mindanao and Morotai, a 7th Fleet submarine sighted the Transport and 1st Screening Units and was in turn sighted by ships of the latter organization. Alongside this 7th Fleet PB4Y's, operating from Wakde Island, kept the Japanese vessels under surveillance the rest of the day, reporting that the course and speed of the enemy ships could bring them into range of Biak during the evening of June 4th. Their discovery by Allied aircraft so far from Biak apparently had not been anticipated by the Japanese, who later reported that they had not known Allied aircraft were capable of such long-range reconnaissance. Nevertheless, the three KON Force elements steamed on toward Biak, probably hoping that friendly aircraft might drive off the Allied reconnaissance planes and also protect the sea approaches to Biak. To further muddy the situation, Sakonju received false reports that a strong American carrier group was approaching the waters east of Biak. Admiral Kinkaid had indeed dispatched a special task force to deal with this threat, yet the warships could only arrive off Biak on the night of June 4th and didn't include any aircraft carrier. Nonetheless, knowing that he had been discovered and unwilling to risk so many ships under these circumstances, Sakonju would have to suspend the reinforcement run and turn back to Davao and Sorong.   When the Japanese called off KON on June 3rd, the Transport and the 1st and 2nd Screening Units were a little over 500 miles northwest of Biak and about 250 miles east-southeast of the Talaud Islands. At this point, the three forces were reorganized. The Transport Unit, accompanied by the three destroyers of the 1st Screening Unit, changed course for Sorong, while the 2nd Screening Unit and the two heavy cruisers of the 1st turned back toward Davao, which they probably reached late on June 5th. Of the ships moving to Sorong, the Fifth Air Force claimed to have sunk one destroyer and damaged at least two others. The Transport Unit and the 1st Screening Unit's three destroyers arrived safely at Sorong during the evening of June 4th. The Detached Unit, which had been moving toward Biak from Zamboanga on an independent course far to the west of the other three sections of KON Force, had also changed its direction during the night of 3-4 June, and reached Sorong sometime on the 4th. At Sorong the Transport Unit unloaded the 1,700 men of the 2nd Amphibious Brigade. The six destroyers of the Transport and 1st Screening Units then proceeded southwest to Ambon where they refueled. The Transport Unit's one heavy cruiser and one light cruiser sought shelter in Kaboei Bay, Waigeo Island, about 60 miles northwest of Sorong. On 6 June the heavy cruiser Aoba was attacked there by fifteen B-24's of the Fifth Air Force. First reports were that at least two hits were scored on the cruiser, but it was later learned that the ship suffered no damage. Instead, it was able to take part in a second KON Operation. Back over at Biak, Newman resumed the advance westward on the morning of June 3rd, making painfully slow progress because of the difficult terrain and lack of adequate supply lines. Meeting no opposition, they would finally dig in half a mile from the point at which the main ridge left the coast and turned inland near Mokmer. That day, however, Fuller learnt about the possible enemy naval attack, so he decided to halt any offensive actions for the moment. On June 4th, upon learning that no enemy carriers were in the Biak area, Sakonju was again ordered to prepare to run the American blockade, this time bringing the bulk of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 219th Regiment. There would be two naval groups, the first was the Transport Unit, containing three destroyers which had been part of the first KON Operation Transport Unit. The second section was the Screening Unit, also comprising three destroyers. For the second KON Operation there were two detached units, the 1st had one heavy and one light cruiser while the 2nd Detached Unit included the small craft and patrol boats which had put into Sorong at the end of the first KON. The three destroyers of the Transport Unit were each to embark 200 infantrymen at Sorong. In addition, the destroyers of either or both the Transport and Screening Units were each to tow to Biak one landing barge crammed with troops, probably 30 to 50 men to a barge. After two quiet nights, meanwhile, Newman decided to send three battalions forward toward the north-south section of the main ridge northwest of Mokmer on June 5th. Warned by the regimental commander that it was important to secure a foothold on the ridge before the Japanese could deny it to the 186th Infantry, the three assault battalions started westward about 8:00 on June 5th. Lack of water again slowed the advance. No water had been received in the forward area since the morning of the 4th, and Colonel Newman had ordered the troops westward against the advice of his staff and battalion commanders. About noon, however, a heavy rain fell. The regimental commander ordered all troops to halt, catch the rain in ponchos, and fill their canteens. "Had it not been for this lucky break, we would undoubtedly have had to halt in midafternoon." As events turned out, no Japanese opposition was encountered, and by 1500 the 3rd Battalion, 186th Infantry, was within 500 yards of the main ridge. Although Newman and General Doe then wanted to secure the dominating terrain north and northwest of the airfield, they would receive direct orders from Fuller to immediately seize Mokmer Drome and a beachhead on the coast directly south of that strip. Throughout the morning of June 6th the 186th Infantry directed most of its efforts to bringing supplies up to the forward units. Almost the entire 2nd Battalion was engaged in hand-carrying supplies to the 3rd Battalion atop the ridge, while the latter unit sent patrols toward Mokmer Drome seeking good routes of approach to that objective. About noon Colonel Newman reported to task force headquarters that no good route had been found and that supplies, especially the ever-needed water, had not been brought forward in sufficient quantities to allow a regimental attack to be launched that day, and he therefore recommended that the attack be postponed until June 7th. General Fuller approved this suggestion. The lack of supplies and water would delay the attack, however, though the 3rd Battalion would be able to move down the west side of the main ridge to take up positions along a line of departure for the next morning's attack. To support the infantry attack, on June 7th, a thirty-minute artillery concentration began at 7:00 that morning. The 146th, 205th, and 947th Field Artillery Battalions, from positions along the coast to the east, were registered on targets in the airfield area ready to support the advance, but most of the firing was undertaken by the 121st Field Artillery from its location behind the 186th Infantry. While the artillery fired on Mokmer Drome and along the low ridge between that field and the 186th Infantry, Fifth Air Force bombers attacked the Borokoe Drome area and also struck some targets along the low ridge. The airfield was only occupied by the 108th Airfield Construction Unit, which immediately fled the area because of the heavy bombardment. Newman's 1st and 3rd Battalions advanced south encountering no resistance as they crossed Mokmer Drome and reached the beach.  When, on 5 June, the 186th Infantry had reached the crest of the main coastal ridge, it had been on the left rear of the Japanese defenses on the low ridge and terraces above Mokmer Drome. Thus, the regiment had been in a favorable position to take these defenses from the rear. But in its move to the airfield, the 186th Infantry had bypassed the Biak Detachment's principal defensive positions. The bypassing had not been intentional. Colonel Newman had instructed both leading battalions to halt on the low ridge, reconnoiter along it in both directions, and report on Japanese defenses before moving on. According to Colonel Newman: "I received a negative report from both battalions, and ordered the movement to the airdrome. Evidently, the right battalion had failed in this patrolling effort." Instead, the 186th had captured its main objective, but now found itself surrounded by Kuzume's strongest defenses. The Japanese immediately began to pound the new American perimeter, with an artillery duel soon erupting. By nightfall, it had become impracticable to supply the 186th Regiment over the inland plateau road, which ended on the east side of the main ridge. From that point, all supplies would have to be hand-carried to Mokmer Drome and supply parties would be endangered by Japanese patrols, a few of which moved in behind the 186th as the regiment reached the beach, so the 3rd Battalion, 163rd Regiment would be dispatched to push over the inland plateau and protect the parties. Overwater supply was also attempted, yet as the first boats approached the shore they were greeted by machine gun and rifle fire from Japanese whom the 186th Infantry had not yet cleaned out of caves along the water line in front of Mokmer Drome. The small craft returned the fire, but were finally forced to withdraw. The 186th Infantry, according to Colonel Newman, was "glad to see them withdraw since they had our troops running for cover." At 2:00 another attempt was made to land supplies at Sboeria. The three LCM's managed to put their tanks ashore in the face of continuing Japanese fire, but accompanying LCT's were driven off by Japanese artillery. Two of the LCM's were so damaged by enemy fire that they could not fully retract their ramps and had to proceed the nine and a half miles back to Bosnek in reverse. Plans were made to effect all delivery of supplies and evacuation of casualties at night until the enemy fire on the Sboeria beachhead could be neutralized. The tanks which had been landed lumbered along the shore road fronting Mokmer Drome, destroying several small bunkers along the beach. Then they wheeled toward the low ridge north of the airfield, taking under fire a Japanese 75-mm. mountain gun and a 20-mm. piece which had opposed their landing. These two weapons were silenced. Moving cautiously northwestward from the field along a road which crossed the low ridge, the tanks destroyed two large pillboxes. Alongside this, Fuller sent two companies of Haney's 3rd Battalion to land on the Parai Jetty in order to outflank the Ibdi Pocket, which the 162nd had been unsuccessfully attempting to dislodge since the start of the month. But June 7th would also see the start of Operation KON's second attempt.  After rendezvousing off Misoöl Island that morning, Sakonju instructed his 8 destroyers to proceed to Biak. Air cover was to have been provided by planes of the 23rd Air Flotilla. But the cape area was being patrolled by Allied aircraft on June 8th and, about 1:30, the 23rd Air Flotilla cover of six planes was shot down or driven away by 5th Air Force P-38's.  Finding the air now free of enemy planes, American B-25's dived to the attack th convoy, reporting the convoy as 2 light cruisers and 4 destroyers. Initially, it was claimed that 1 destroyer was sunk, 2 were left sinking, and the fourth was damaged. A few days later, destruction was reassessed as 4 destroyers sunk and 2 light cruisers chased to the northwest. These claims were exaggerated. One destroyer, the Harusame, was holed by a near miss and sank rapidly, the bulk of its crew being saved. Another destroyer was damaged by a bomb and took some water; two others were slightly damaged by strafing. Neither speed nor navigation was impeded for any of the three. The two light cruisers reported by the Allied planes were, of course, the other two destroyers. These two might have taken some evasive action by heading northwest for a short time, but as soon as the Harusame crew had been rescued and the Allied planes had disappeared, the convoy reformed and continued on toward Biak. The convoy reformed and continued on toward Biak, undeterred by reports of strong enemy elements in the area. By nightfall, however, it was on a collision course with the cruisers of Admirals Crutchley and Berkey.  At about 6:00 on the 8th, the Transport and Screening Units received a report from a Japanese aircraft that an Allied naval force comprising 1 battleship, 4 cruisers, and 8 destroyers was moving west at high speed from an undesignated point east of Biak. This report was at least partially correct. The Allied task force which had been formed on June 3rd had again assembled on the 8th, having been alerted by reports of the air-sea battle off the Kaap de Goede Hoop. But the Japanese convoy commander apparently took this air reconnaissance report with at least one grain of salt--had not similar information received on June 3rd proved inaccurate? The Transport and Screening Units steamed on, despite the fact that the Kaap de Goede Hoop action had put the force behind schedule. At 11:30 the two enemy groups were approximately forty miles off the north coast of Soepiori Island, ready to turn southeast toward Korim Bay, on the northeast side of Biak. Minutes later a destroyer in the van sighted the Allied task force heading northwest around Biak. The convoy commander quickly realized that he was badly outnumbered and decided that discretion was called for. The Japanese convoy slipping towards the Mapia islands, seeing the allied destroyers failing to pursue them. Yet that is it for Biak for now as we now need to head over to the Wakde-Sarmi front.   General Sibert was preparing to resume the westward offensive. By June 14th, the 20th Regiment had relieved the 158th at the Tirfoam River; and although Sibert wanted to complete unloading of his remaining units before sending the 20th to push westward, General Krueger ordered him to start an immediate offensive on June 18th. Now, however, they were up against almost the full strength of General Tagami's 36th Division. Company B pushed on toward the village at the entrance to the defile between Lone Tree Hill and the eastern nose of Mt. Saksin. This advance was greeted by a hail of fire from Japanese automatic weapons emplaced in the defile--fire reminiscent of the opposition encountered by Company B, 158th Infantry, at the same place more than three weeks earlier. The 20th Infantry's Company B tried to outflank the enemy position to the south but was halted by intense Japanese machine gun fire. Tanks sent forward to aid the infantry were unable to reach the enemy guns because the terrain was impassable to tracked or wheeled vehicles, which could scarcely negotiate the rough road, let alone the thick jungle and rising ground to the south. Late in the afternoon Company A was sent forward to Company B's position, but both units encountered heavy fire and soon lost contact with the rest of the 1st Battalion. The two companies remained for the night in an isolated perimeter near the village and about 400 yards west of the main body. The 3rd Battalion had moved north off the coastal road during the morning, and late in the afternoon it had established a perimeter extending south 200 yards from the beach along the east bank of the Snaky River. The battalion had encountered little opposition during the day, but patrols which had crossed the Snaky before dark reported finding many Japanese defensive positions on the eastern slopes of Lone Tree Hill. A gap which existed between the 1st and 3rd Battalions was partially filled just before nightfall by elements of the 2nd Battalion, which were sent forward late in the afternoon. Casualties during the day were four killed and twenty-eight wounded. The 1st and 3rd Battalions, 1st Infantry, moved across the Tor River in the morning of June 20th and took over the positions in the vicinity of Maffin No. 1 vacated by the 20th Infantry. The 2nd Battalion, 1st Infantry, assumed responsibility for the protection of the bridgehead across the Tor.  The following morning, Sibert then directed his units to patrol extensively in order to locate enemy strong points on and around the hill. Thanks to the information gathered, the 3rd Battalion would attack towards Rocky Point in the afternoon. At the top of Lone Tree Hill was a stretch of rough but generally level ground lying mostly along the western part of the hill. This flat ground, about 700 yards long north to south, was shaped like a crude dumbbell. At its northern end, the level area was about 300 yards wide. It narrowed at the center of the hill to less than 100 yards but broadened again on the south to a width of about 250 yards. There were many coral outcroppings, potholes, and small crevices, while on the north the hill terminated in a very rugged prominence called Rocky Point. This terrain feature, which extended into Maffin Bay from the central mass of Lone Tree Hill, was about 300 yards wide east to west. Its northern face was not as heavily overgrown as the rest of Lone Tree Hill. Although Rocky Point's northeast slope was steep, foot troops could climb that face with more ease than they could approach the top of Lone Tree Hill from most other points. A deep ravine ran southwest into the central mass of Lone Tree Hill from a sandy beach on the east side of Rocky Point. The floor of the ravine varied from 20 to 30 yards in width and its nearly vertical western wall was 40 to 50 feet high. Both sides were honeycombed with natural or man-made tunnels, caverns, and small caves, most of which were connected with each other by underground or deeply defiladed passages. Some caves reached a width of 40 feet, a depth into the hillside of 50 feet, and a height of 20 feet. The ravine terminated on the eastern slope of Lone Tree Hill in a steep grade at the narrow central portion of the hilltop. At 1:45pm, after a fifteen-minute artillery and 4.2-inch mortar preparation, one company moved across the Snaky River, immediately finding the twenty-foot cliff along the eastern side of the shelf which lay between the Snaky River and the central mass of Lone Tree Hill. The morning patrols had not, apparently, reported the existence of this cliff, and naturally it was not known that Japanese defenses were established along it. Machine gun and rifle fire from the 1st Battalion, 224th Infantry, soon pinned down the 3rd Battalion's leading platoon. The company commander quickly sent part of his unit northward to find the Japanese left flank. Moving around the northeast end of the shelf, this group discovered the beach entrance to the deep ravine between the western side of the shelf and Rocky Point. Progress into or across the ravine was impossible in the face of the intense Japanese small arms fire which greeted the advancing American unit. Company B, 6th Engineers, then in the forward area to cut a road from the mouth of the Snaky River to Rocky Point, was brought up to the ravine to help clean out caves and crevices with flame throwers and demolitions, but could not reach the enemy positions through the continued machine gun, mortar, and rifle fire. Infantry bazooka squads also tried to blast the Japanese out of their caves but failed when their ammunition ran out. Since there was no time to bring additional rockets forward before dark, all elements of the 3rd Battalion and the engineer company were withdrawn to the east bank of the Snaky River for the night. The 20th Infantry was to continue the assault on the morrow with the 3rd Battalion moving against Lone Tree Hill from the northeast, the 2nd Battalion in reserve, and the 1st Battalion remaining in its holding position. On the morning of June 22, after a heavy air and artillery concentration on Rocky Point, the 3rd Battalion once again attacked northwest with Companies K and I, successfully driving the Japanese back into their caves to reach the top of Lone Tree Hill just south of Rocky Point. Meanwhile, another two companies had attacked southwest to force their way up the southeast slope of the hill; but subjected to heavy machine-gun fire, they would have to withdraw and march north to join Companies K and I. The 2nd Battalion also moved forward and took positions to the south of the 3rd Battalion. Worried about the American gains, Colonel Matsuyama personally led two companies in the afternoon to fall on the 3rd Battalion's perimeter with suicidal fury. Confused fighting, sometimes hand-to-hand, continued well into the night, with Matsuyama himself getting shot on the thigh. Yet this attack would successfully position the Japanese companies on the rear of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, thus cutting them off from regimental headquarters. Matsuyama also recalled his 2nd Battalion from the Maffin area, so he would employ these reinforcements to attack Sibert's 2nd Battalion on June 23. At dawn on the 23rd Japanese troops, some of whom were using American weapons and wearing parts of American uniforms, attacked the 2nd Battalion, 20th Infantry, from the deep ravine. The battalion initially held its fire, thinking that the enemy force might be a friendly patrol, and the Japanese were able to advance to within fifteen yards of the battalion lines before being recognized. It was an hour before the results of this error could be corrected--an hour during which both the 2nd Battalion and the Japanese suffered heavy losses. The hour ended with an enemy retreat. Isolated, the 2nd Battalion then decided to withdraw and march north towards the 3rd Battalion's perimeter at the top of the hill, getting harassed all the way by Matsuyama's forces. During the night, the Japanese launched a banzai charge against the perimeter, getting very close to retaking Lone Tree Hill but suffering heavy casualties in the end. Upon learning that his battalions were cut off, meanwhile, Sibert decided to outflank the hill by a shore-to-shore maneuver and then continue the attack from both west and east. Accordingly, Companies K and I of the 1st Regiment boarded ten LVTs on the morning of June 24th and moved to the beach just west of Rocky Point, under the protection of the 6th Reconnaissance Troop. Both companies would land successfully by midday against strong Japanese fire, though they would be rapidly pinned down on the narrow beach. Thankfully, Sibert also landed four tanks two hours later to secure the beachhead. This diversion would allow the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 20th Regiment to begin clearing the Japanese from the many caves and crevices on Rocky Point, the deep ravine east of the point, and the hilltop plateau, further securing the supply route up the hill.  By nightfall, no enemy counterattack developed, as Tagami had instead decided to withdraw the 224th Regiment to the Hill 255-Mount Saksin line while the 223rd Regiment retreated behind the Woske River. Thus Matsuyama's resistance in the area weakened and the Americans were finally able to clear Rocky Point. The next day the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 20th Infantry, continued clearing Rocky Point, the deep ravine, the northern part of the hilltop plateau, and the eastern shelf, where a few scattered Japanese still held positions along the twenty-foot-high cliff. Flame throwers, demolition charges, bazookas, and hand grenades all proved successful in eliminating Japanese resistance and sealing or clearing caves and crevices. The task was easier on the 25th, for the Japanese slowly gave up the fight and were killed or sealed off in their caves. Casualties continued to mount, the 2nd Battalion, 20th Infantry, had only about two hundred effectives by the end of the day but many of the losses were not due to Japanese action. Many men were evacuated over the now secured supply route to the top of the hill as they fell from exhaustion or became sick. On the beach west of Rocky Point Companies I and K, 1st Infantry, had little success in expanding their beachhead. The tanks proved useless in the area and were therefore withdrawn to Maffin No. 1. The two infantry companies, pinned down during the morning, kept up a continuous mortar barrage against Japanese positions in the swamp to the south, against the western cliff of Lone Tree Hill, and, when certain such fire would not endanger troops atop the hill, against the northwest corner of Rocky Point. This mortar fire, coupled with the operations on the plateau, began to have the desired effect during the afternoon, and Companies I and K were able to push their defenses beyond the narrow beachhead slightly southward and westward and toward the shore beneath Rocky Point. Once or twice during the afternoon, patrols were able to reach the top of Lone Tree Hill from the northwest corner of the point and established contact with 20th Infantry units. Late in the afternoon Company M, 1st Infantry, operating from the east side of the point, managed to push a patrol around the shore to establish contact with Company K. Though Companies I and K could find little tangible evidence of the results of their operations, they had actually wiped out the 223rd Infantry's defense force in the area just west of Lone Tree Hill. By dusk on the 25th, it had become obvious that the combined efforts of the 3rd Battalion, 1st Infantry, and the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 20th Infantry, had either cleared out the northern half of Lone Tree Hill or had forced the Japanese to withdraw. The latter conclusion was the more nearly correct. The 36th Division decided on 25 June to withdraw the bulk of the Center and Right Sector Forces west of the Woske River and establish new defensive positions, thereby keeping the 223rd Infantry, the bulk of which had not been committed to action in the Lone Tree Hill area, more or less intact. Only the remnants of the 224th Infantry were to remain east of the Woske, and they were to withdraw into rough terrain southwest of Mt. Saksin. At nightfall on the 25th, General Sibert estimated that his three forward battalions had lost approximately 140 men killed and 850 wounded and evacuated, including those who had to be sent back to the rear because of wounds, sickness, heat exhaustion, or psychoneurotic disorders. Known Japanese dead in the northern part of the hill numbered 344, but it could not be estimated how many more had been thrown over the west cliff, sealed in caves, or carried off by withdrawing remnants of the Japanese defense force. According to Japanese sources, the Japanese had lost about 500 men killed and another 300 wounded in the Lone Tree Hill-Hill 225-Mt. Saksin area.   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Chinese were accredited with the fall of Moguang despite the Chindits taking the lionshare of the fighting. Things were advancing very well for the allies in the new Biak front. As for the battle for Lone Tree Hill, it was a costly one, and not one the Americans or Japanese would soon forget.   

Good Times with Mo: The Podcast Year 10
GTWM Year 13 Episode 22 "Sexual Priorities" with Alex Calleja and Angelicopter

Good Times with Mo: The Podcast Year 10

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 2, 2024 68:15


The year is breezing right by! Welcome to April and GTWM is heating up just as the Philippine summer with a back-to-back AMA set fresh the Holy Week. It's Mo, Alex and Chopper taking calls from all over the world.  We have 4 female callers in this set and we are going to tackle the issues that are bothering them and see if we can find a sweet spot for solutions.  Let's go! Caller #1 is V who is 35yrs old from Denmark.  V is frustrated that she is always initiating sex with her husband but he is showing no interest in it.  It has been an ongoing problem but what can she do to satisfy her sexual needs while keeping the marriage intact? Caller #2 is Sam who is 28yrs old from Davao.  Sam met a celebrity on a dating app and they have agreed to have some casual fun.  While they havent met yet in person, she is already seeing some green flags in this guy that she might want to have more than just a sexual relationship with him. Powered by Spotify, we will see you on another episode of GTWM tomorrow. Thanks for the download and please support the podcast by donating as little as $0.99 cents via Spotify --- Send in a voice message: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/djmotwister/message Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/djmotwister/support

Amateur Traveler Travel Podcast
AT#890 - Travel to Mindanao, Philippians

Amateur Traveler Travel Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 30, 2024 80:57


Hear about tourist spots in Mindanao, the southernmost island in the Philippines, as the Amateur Traveler talks to Lonely Planet guidebook author Michael Grosberg and co-founder of LikeLocal.io about his many trips to Mindanao. Why should you go to Mindanao? Michael says, "Most people that go to Mindanao these days go directly to the island of Siargao, which is one of the hottest, most happening places in all the Philippines for people to travel to. We'll get to that and it's deservedly popular. However, there's so much more to see in Mindanao. Mindanao has one of the largest cities in the Philippines the city of Davao. Davao is in the far south of Mindanao. It's got a cosmopolitan culture, amazing, wonderful food. The mountains and the islands around Davao are incredible. You can spend a month there. The highest peak in the Philippines, Mount Apo, which you can climb, and people do is only a couple hours or so from Davao." "There are endless coastlines to explore. There is indigenous culture. There are surfing spots. The city of Zamboanga, also has its own unique culture, a combination of Muslim influence, Malaysian, and Spanish cuisine. The whole coastline, the north, the east, really all over, are dotted with incredible beaches, and a lot of them are not really traveled to by foreigners, but Filipinos love to travel, and so Filipinos that go to Mindanao go to all these places." For a one-week itinerary, Michael recommends a visit to Cagayan de Oro, Camiguin, and Siargao. ... https://amateurtraveler.com/tourist-spots-in-mindanao/

Jumpers Jump
EP.167 - CRAZY FILIPINO GHOST SIGHTINGS, DARK WALT DISNEY THEORY & MONKEY BITE STORY

Jumpers Jump

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 28, 2024 81:48


Jump in with Carlos Juico and Gavin Ruta on episode 167 of Jumpers Jump. This episode we discuss: Carlos' experience in the Philippines, Sense of community in the Philippines, Haunted university ghost sightings , Haunted washroom story in the Philippines, Monkey bite story, Sun Wokung monkey king myth, Davao's waving children sign, White lady sighting story, Filipino nurse ghost footage, 100th monkey theory, Super Bowl theory, Walt Disney cigarette theory, Representation in movies, Gen-Z humor, Drew Walls hate, Twilight zone accident on set, Ghost hunting tv show, Casino facts, being grateful after seeing kids in the Philippines and much more! Follow the podcast: @JumpersPodcast Follow Carlos: @CarlosJuico Follow Gavin: @GavinRutaa Check out the podcast on YouTube: https://bit.ly/JumpersJumpYT Thanks to our Sponsors: Rehydrate yourself for the New Year. Grab your Liquid I.V. Hydration Multiplier Sugar-Free in bulk nationwide at Costco or get 20% off your first order when you go to https://www.liquid-iv.com/ and use code JUMPERS at checkout Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices