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Do you get rid of your body hair? Do you hate your periods? Are you debating a nose job? Why? Writer and broadcaster Afua Hirsch has been tracing how we've become so loathing of our bodies. In this chat with Fearne, Afua explains where our modern, Western notions of beauty come from, and why she's advocating for us to celebrate how powerful our bodies are. She's rediscovering and reclaiming rituals her ancestors will have done before Western ideals became the norm, and points out that wanting to change your facial features to conform to beauty trends will erase your ancestry. Fearne and Afua chat about a desire for more fluidity around sexuality and identity, as well as why we should respect the wisdom that comes with age rather than fearing it. Plus, how to dig deep and ask yourself: “Do I think this, or have I been taught this?” Afua's book, Decolonising My Body, is out now. If you liked this episode of Happy Place, you might also like: Emma Dabiri Adele Roberts Rebel Wilson Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.
Chapter 1 What's Sacred Woman by Queen Afua"Sacred Woman: A Guide to Healing the Feminine Body, Mind, and Spirit" is a seminal work by wellness expert Queen Afua, aimed at empowering women to embrace their divine femininity and heal their bodies through holistic practices. The book integrates African spiritual traditions, herbal remedies, and spiritual principles, encouraging women to reconnect with their roots and cultivate self-love.In "Sacred Woman," Afua discusses various aspects of feminine health, including menstrual wellness, emotional healing, and the importance of community support. She provides practical tools, rituals, and exercises designed to foster personal growth and deepen the connection between mind, body, and spirit.The book emphasizes the significance of nurturing oneself and reclaiming one's power by acknowledging the sacredness of womanhood. Queen Afua also shares personal stories and testimonies, illustrating the transformative journey of women who have embraced these practices. Through her teachings, she inspires a holistic approach to wellness, inviting women to honor their bodies and elevate their spiritual beings.Chapter 2 Sacred Woman by Queen Afua Summary"Sacred Woman: A Guide to Healing the Feminine Body, Mind, and Spirit" by Queen Afua is a holistic healing manual aimed at empowering women by reconnecting them with their inner selves and the divine feminine. The book integrates spirituality, health, and ancestral wisdom to promote physical, mental, and emotional healing. Key Themes and Concepts:Spiritual Awakening: Queen Afua emphasizes the importance of spiritual growth and self-discovery as fundamental components of womanhood. She encourages readers to connect with their spirituality as a means to heal and empower themselves.Holistic Health: The book outlines a holistic approach to health, including nutrition, herbal remedies, and lifestyle changes that support women's physical and emotional well-being. Queen Afua emphasizes natural foods and practices that honor the body and promote vitality.The Divine Feminine: Afua celebrates the qualities of the feminine spirit, advocating for women to embrace their inherent power, intuition, and creativity. She discusses the significance of honoring femininity and the sacredness of womanhood in all its forms.Rituals and Practices: The author provides various spiritual practices, rituals, and affirmations designed to facilitate healing and transformation. These practices encourage women to cultivate self-love, self-care, and a sense of community with other women.Ancestral Healing: Afua highlights the importance of connecting with one's ancestry and the wisdom of female ancestors. She believes that understanding and honoring the past can lead to healing and empowerment in the present.The Sacred Woman Workbook: A practical component of the book includes exercises and activities that guide readers in applying the teachings to their lives. This workbook fosters personal reflection, goal setting, and the integration of the principles discussed in the text. Target Audience:"Sacred Woman" is aimed at women seeking to heal, transform, and reclaim their power. It appeals to those interested in alternative spirituality, holistic health, and the exploration of ancestral knowledge. Conclusion:Overall, "Sacred Woman" serves as a comprehensive guide for women to embark on a journey of self-discovery, empowerment, and healing, fostering a deep connection to their spiritual essence and the divine feminine.Chapter 3 Sacred Woman AuthorQueen Afua is a prominent author, holistic health practitioner, and spiritual teacher known for her work in the field of wellness, particularly focusing on women's health and spirituality. She gained significant recognition for her book "Sacred Woman: A Guide to Healing the Feminine Body, Mind, and Spirit,"...
(Airdate 1/9/25) Queen Afua, born Helen Robinson, is a renowned holistic health practitioner, wellness coach, and an accomplished author, who has been a trailblazer in the green foods movement for over four decades. Queen Afua has dedicated her life to fighting diseases by teaching people how to understand and utilize the power of food, self-care, and holistic healthy choices as an empowering lifestyle. On this podcast Afua shares healing advice for people impacted by the California fires, the impending inauguration and everyday stress. https://www.queenafua.com/https://www.instagram.com/queenafua/?hl=enhttps://www.instagram.com/diprimaradio/?hl=en
Peter and Afua go on the British Scandal podcast hosted by Matt Forde and Alice Levine to discuss the life and times of Charles Dickens. Behind the snowy scenes, jolly carols and festive cheer, the so-called “Father of Christmas” had a turbulent home life full of drinking, alleged extramarital relations and workplace fights. But can we truly call his life scandalous? Matt and Alice weigh in.Listen to Legacy on the Wondery App or wherever you get your podcasts. You can binge episodes early and ad-free on Wondery+. Join Wondery+ in the Wondery App, Apple Podcasts or Spotify. Start your free trial by visiting wondery.com/links/legacy now.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.
Think Dickens was all jolly carols and festive cheer? Not so. Behind the snowy scenes and spirit of goodwill, the so-called “Father of Christmas” was hiding a scandalous love life. Matt and Alice dive into the details with co-hosts of Wondery's Legacy podcast, writer Afua Hirsch and historian Peter Frankopan. Plus, did Britain's most famous novelist really "invent" Christmas? Afua and Peter weigh in.Listen to British Scandal on the Wondery App or wherever you get your podcasts. You can listen early and ad-free on Wondery+. Join Wondery+ in the Wondery App, Apple Podcasts or Spotify. Start your free trial by visiting https://wondery.com/links/british-scandal/ now.Do you have a suggestion for a scandal you would like us to cover? Or perhaps you have a question you would like to ask our hosts? Email us at britishscandal@wondery.comSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.
Joining Iain Dale on Cross Question this evening are Lib Dem home affairs spokesperson Lisa Smart, Conservative shadow housing minister David Simmonds, broadcaster Afua Hagan & Charlotte Pickles from the REFORM think tank.
Last time we spoke about the battle of the Driniumor River. In July and August, American and Japanese forces clashed near Afua in New Guinea. Troop A of the 112th Cavalry engaged Japanese units, pushing them back temporarily. Troop C replaced Troop A but was soon isolated by Japanese attacks. The American TED Force, including the 124th and 169th Infantry, launched a counteroffensive, facing heavy resistance. Despite supply and terrain challenges, TED Force advanced, forcing the Japanese to gradually withdraw. By early August, the Japanese launched fierce and desperate attacks, but American defenses held firm. TED Force continued its advance, encountering further fierce Japanese resistance but successfully disrupting their supply lines. The Japanese, suffering heavy losses, were finally forced to begin a general retreat, as the American forces consolidated their positions by early August. It seemed Green Hell was still living up to its dreadful nickname. This episode is Operation Dan Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. This week we are picking up with the action along the CBI theater. In Yunnan, by the end of July, General Wei's Y Force was still engaged in efforts to eliminate the resilient but small Japanese garrisons at Tengchong, Mount Song, Pingda, and Longling. Simultaneously, the 33rd Army was striving to accelerate preparations for Operation Dan, anticipating resistance from General Honda's main garrisons until September's end. Following the fall of Myitkyina in August, Honda recognized the need to expedite his offensive plans, despite delays in the deployment of the 2nd and 18th Divisions. Additional reinforcements from the 49th Division were expected in Mandalay by September, bolstering Honda's position. Meanwhile, General Matsuyama faced the challenge of isolated garrisons cut off from his 56th Division, surrounded by superior enemy forces. With his main forces focused on imminent offensive preparations, Matsuyama could only provide moral support through radio messages. Colonel Matsui's recent successes reduced Chinese activity on the Mangshi front, allowing for the rehabilitation of the 113th Regiment by August, despite occasional small-scale raids. At Tengchong, Colonel Kurashige resolved to defend the Walled City to the last man against relentless infantry assaults, air bombardments, and continuous enemy artillery preparations. Compared with the defenses of Lameng, the positions at Tengchong were much less effective due to the factors of disadvantageous terrain and the lack of time to make defense preparations. Tengchong Castle covered an area slightly over a half-mile square; and was surrounded by a rampart 16 to 20 feet in height and over six feet thick at the top. Although the rampart had a stone facing and was backed with clay, it was not proof against an artillery bombardment and considerable work was required to strengthen it. Concrete or stone pillboxes were constructed adjacent to all gates and at the four corners. Shelters were built to protect guns and machine guns mounted on the rampart as well as for the troops and supplies inside the wall. Other entrenchments were prepared within the castle itself. While these measures greatly strengthened the defenses, the castle was still not proof against an intensive air or artillery bombardment. Recognizing the southeast as the primary avenue of approach, General Huo directed his forces to concentrate their main efforts in that direction. On August 2, following another bombing raid by twelve B-25s that created a gap fifteen feet wide, the 36th and 116th Divisions initiated a new general assault. The Japanese quickly worked to repair the breach and fired machine guns to cover it. It was only after concentrating guns, rockets, and flamethrowers on the southwest pillbox, along with five waves of fighter cover fire, that the Chinese were able to position scaling ladders against the wall. Two companies then seized the top of the wall just east of the southern corner on August 3. Overnight, Kurashige led a successful counterattack that restored defenses along the rampart, except for one platoon that held its ground all night. This platoon's resilience allowed Chinese reinforcements to pass through the breach on August 4 and seize a pillbox inside the city. With the walls breached, the fall of Tengchong became inevitable, but the determined defenders continued to resist fiercely in the coming days, inflicting heavy casualties on the Chinese attackers. Meanwhile, Major Kanemitsu's Lameng Garrison defended Moung Song fiercely. After the Hondo Position fell, the 308th Regiment resumed the advance on 3 August it had flamethrowers which it used with devastating effect to take the crest of Kung Lung-po. There the Chinese found several Japanese tankettes, which had been dug in for use as pillboxes. Despite repelling enemy attacks with great effort, the Japanese faced dangerously low ammunition supplies. As a result, Kanemitsu decided to raid the 8th Army's artillery positions and supply dumps to replenish his ammunition stocks. Twenty-nine men, selected from the artillery battalion, were divided into two teams for the purpose. One team was to raid the artillery positions on Shirakabe and Haraguchi Hills as well as to attack motor vehicles on the road between Lameng and Huitung Bridge. The second team was to operate in the area to the south and west of the Gake and Hondo Positions. On the night of August 9, seven groups of Japanese volunteers launched a surprise attack, destroying several howitzers and seizing light weapons and ammunition. Despite Kanemitsu's initial success and his troops' resilient defense against Chinese infantry assaults, General Song opted to revert to conventional siege tactics starting August 11. His divisions began digging tunnels beneath key Japanese strongholds in the Mount Song triangle, each tunnel stretching 22 feet to accommodate two powerful mines aimed at enemy pillboxes.One mine held 2,500 pounds of TNT, the other mine held 3,500 pounds of TNT. The mines detonated on August 20, causing significant damage that engineers exploited swiftly with flamethrowers, capturing Kanemitsu's primary stronghold. In one pillbox forty-two Japanese were buried alive, of whom five were rescued. The prisoners stated that they had been asleep and had never suspected that they were being undermined. At 0920 the 3d Regiment against light opposition took the few strongpoints that remained on Sung Shan proper. In spite of particularly heavy pressure being exerted against the Sekiyama Position, the enemy had made little progress. However, on 19 August, following a heavy bombardment three tremendous blasts shook the Sekiyama Position. The Chinese, becoming discouraged with trying to storm the position, had tunneled under it, the defenders of the Sekiyama Position were virtually annihilated and the position fell to the enemy. On 23 August the Lameng Garrison regrouped to make final resist- ance in the Otobeyama, Nishiyama, Matsuyama, Yokomata and Urayama Po- sitions. The total number available for defense had been reduced to about 150 men, all of whom were wounded, some seriously. Even those who had lost an arm or a leg were propped up in positions where they could fire a rifle or sight a gun. The Lameng Garrison continued to resist in scattered pockets, launching futile counterattacks, Song recognized the battle's turning point. During the latter part of July and early August, the Yunnan Force made new troop dispositions and moved in three divisions to attack the town. The main force of the Chinese 87th Division was on the east front, with an element along the Tien-Mien Road; the New 28th Division was between the two elements of the 87th; elements of the 1st Honor Division were on the north front with the New 39th Division on the south and west of Longling. At dawn on 14 August, preceded by an intense concentration of artillery fire and air bombardment, the Chinese forces launched a coordinated attack from all sides. Hill 6 bore the brunt of the enemy attack for eight hours but managed to hold, as did the defenders on the main line of resistance. After the attack had ceased, the Garrison spent the entire night rebuilding defenses, using rubble and half-burned mate- rial from the town. However, five days later, Chinese forces captured the eastern hills, weakening the entire Japanese defensive line. Consequently, by August 23, the eastern front collapsed, compelling the Japanese to retreat from their main defensive positions to reserve positions within the town. Matsuyama was aware that under the current conditions, Longling would likely fall before September began. While the timely reinforcement of the 3rd Battalion, 148th Regiment would enable the garrison to hold out for a few more days, he understood the urgency of accelerating the Dan offensive to relieve Longling. Starting on 26 August, the 2nd Division began moving from Namhkam to Mangshih under cover of darkness, requiring three nights to complete the movement. Shortly thereafter, the headquarters of the 16th Regiment was called from Bhamo to Mangshih and Col. Hara Yoshimi, commanding officer of the 2nd Reconnaissance Regiment, succeeded Col. Sakai as commander of the Bhamo Garrison, which was placed under 18th Division control. On 30 August, the Division conducted a war game followed by a conference to brief subordinate commanders on the plans and missions of the Dan Operation. With the recent arrival of the 4th and 146th Regiments, Matsuyama planned to send Matsui's Task Force and the 146th Regiment northwestward to clear the western sector. Meanwhile, General Okazaki's 2nd Division would attack northeastward to defeat the main enemy force in the eastern sector, thus fully relieving Longling. Subsequently, the 56th Division would advance towards Tengchong, while the 2nd Division moved towards Lameng, to relieve both isolated garrisons. However, before this offensive could begin, new developments emerged from Tengchong. Realizing that assaults on the ramparts were too costly, Huo ordered his Chinese troops to start tunneling under the walls. Additionally, air attacks increased in intensity, and on August 13, several large bombs struck the headquarters, killing Kurashige and leaving the garrison nearly leaderless. The following morning, after a heavy artillery bombardment of about 20,000 rounds, Huo launched his second general attack. Despite the garrison's determined defense against Chinese attempts to breach or scale the ramparts, Huo reinforced his southern assault with the 198th Division, applying intense pressure. While defenders held against the combined attacks of more than two divisions, the 198th Division, which had made several ineffectual attacks in the northwestern sectors, was brought south to reinforce the units already there. Three divisions pitted against the badly damaged southern wall could not be held off and Chinese troops began infiltrating beyond the rampart. The garrison launched successive counterattacks and, while they were successful in driving the enemy out on the first two occasions, the third counterattack so exhausted the defenders that the enemy held the southwest corner of the compound. The Chinese were not, however, able to make any appreciable headway in breaching any other part of the castle's defenses. Three days later, following another heavy air and artillery bombardment that succeeded in making seven breaches in the southern rampart, the Chinese resumed the offensive and managed to force the garrison to relinquish all but the southeast corner of the southern part of the castle compound. On August 22, a fourth attack was then launched; and, in spite of valiant efforts by the defenders, the west gate of the castle was finally taken by the 198th Division early in the morning of August 24. The following day, about 500 grenades and medical supplies were dropped by 12 Japanese fighters, which bolstered the garrison's morale even though their fate was pretty much sealed already. Simultaneously, Matsuyama initiated Operation Dan on August 26, with Matsui's Task Force struggling for six days to secure control of Komatsu Hill before advancing towards Shuangpo on September 1. The Dan Offensive opened inauspiciously with an unsuccessful attack on Komatsu Hill, about three miles south of Lungling. Launched by the 1st Battalion, of the 113th Infantry (Takeda Battalion), on the morning of the 26th, the attack was thrown back and it was not until the following morning after the 3d Battalion, of the 113th (Murakami Battalion) had been thrown into the attack that the Takeda Battalion succeeded in seizing the western half of the hill. Upon achieving the objective, the Murakami Battalion was withdrawn and the Takeda Battalion was exposed to severe counterattacks which the enemy repeated for four days. The Takeda Battalion sustained extremely heavy losses, including the loss of three company commanders. The Inose Battalion attacked the hill from the northeast on 30 August and succeeded in making contact with the Takeda Battalion the following day but the northern part of the hill still remained in the possession of the enemy. Unable to hold up the advance any longer, the Inose Battalion was left at Komatsu Hill to clean out the remnants of the enemy and the main body of the Matsui Column advanced to Shuangpo on 1 September, fighting their way through enemy resistance. The 146th Regiment successfully bypassed Chinese forces blocking the Tien-Mien Road, reaching the ridge west of Shuangpo. The 113th and 146th Regiments continued their northwestward advance, reaching the Longling River line by September 6, where they nearly wiped out the New 39th Division. Meanwhile, Okazaki assembled his 4th, 16th, and 29th Regiments at Shuangpo, preparing for an offensive. To the south, the 76th Division persisted in defending Komatsu Hill despite heavy casualties. Okazaki directed the 4th Regiment to attack the enemy's northern positions on September 3, resulting in repeated assaults over the next three days. Despite suffering significant losses, the Japanese were compelled to halt their local offensive. In the meantime, the 16th and 29th Regiments moved northeastward. The 29th Regiment successfully breached enemy positions and linked up with the besieged garrison by September 6. Despite this victory at Longling, subsequent events at Mount Song and Tengchong rendered Operation Dan futile. On August 29, following the fall of the Otobeyama Position, Kanemitsu realized that resistance could only last a few more days. On September 5 Major Kanemitsu sent to the commander of the 56th Division a final radio message: “All of my brave officers and men have determinedly defended our position for 120 days since May 10 with a sublime spirit of self-sacrifice and an attitude of absolute obedience. However, our ammunition has been entirely expended and practically every officer and man is wounded. The final moment has come. We will burn the colors and code books and make a suicide stand with what strength remains. I do not have the words to apologize for the fact that, because of my unresourceful command, we have been unable to hold out as long as expected. We are deeply moved by your long and special consideration of our situation. I respectfully ask that everything possible be done for the bereaved families of the officers and men of the Lameng Garrison. Our souls will continue to pray for the eternal prosperity of the Imperial Throne and the final victory of the Japanese Forces.” Consequently, on September 5, he concentrated his remaining forces in the northernmost positions, which came under heavy enemy fire the next day. After Kanemitsu's death from a mortar shell, the Japanese burned their colors and euthanized their wounded. They launched a final suicide charge on September 7, resulting in the death of the remaining 50 survivors. Of the 1260 Japanese at Lameng Garrison, only 9 were captured and 10 believed to have escaped, with the rest perishing at the hands of Song's divisions, totaling approximately 41,675 troops. The significance of Mount Song lies in the four-month siege to clear the block from the Burma Road, during which the Chinese suffered 7675 casualties, including around 5000 from the 8th Army, leaving it with only two understrength regiments fit for further combat at Longling. Meanwhile, on August 31, Huo's fifth attack pressed with great enthusiasm, eventually succeeding in taking the southeast corner, which had withstood the onslaught of two divisions for over a month. The garrison was then pressed back to a line running from the east gate through the center of the palace grounds to the northwest corner of the castle grounds. The number of survivors had been reduced to approximately 350, virtually all of whom were wounded. Five days later, the Chinese attacked once again, successfully effecting a breakthrough of the defensive line which split the defending force into two groups. By September 9, the northwest corner had been completely overrun and only 70 men remained to hold the northeast corner. Realizing that the end was near, the Japanese burned their colors and on September 14 launched a last suicide charge in which the remainder of the garrison was finally cut down. In a valiant defense, rivaling that of the Lameng Garrison, the 2025 men of the Tengchong Garrison held off the Chinese 20th Army, numbering an estimated 50,000 troops, for approximately 80 days. Despite this, the capture of Tengchong marked a significant victory for Y Force, as it opened a viable route to Myitkyina known as the "Tengchong cut-off". Moreover, the fall of Tengchong and Lameng allowed the Chinese to deploy more troops to counter the Dan offensive. In the early hours of September 7, the 113th and 146th Regiments crossed the Longling River and launched an assault on the 1st Honor Division, entrenched in strong defensive positions. Although General Matsui's battalions were repelled by determined defenders, the 146th Regiment made notable progress on the left, gradually pushing the Chinese forces northward. By September 9, the western and northern sectors had been partially cleared, and the Longling Garrison was nearly completely relieved. Simultaneously, the 29th Regiment, supported by remnants of the 16th Regiment and the 2nd Field Artillery Regiment, advanced northeast towards the eastern hills, encountering difficulty in capturing them. By September 9, they had only secured one of the hills. With Honda growing impatient due to the slow progress of the 2nd Division. Okazaki directed increased attacks in the following days. An attack was launched on 11 September but did not succeed. Then an attack conducted on the 12th, y the 3d Battalion, 29th Infantry was successful in seizing the hill, however a counterattack by the enemy resulted in the annihilation of the Battalion and the retaking of the hill by the Chinese. Furthermore, Okazaki also noted that the Chinese were still holding their ground to the south. Consequently, orders were issued for the 1st Battalion, 16th Regiment to address this lingering threat. However, the battalion exhibited such limited initiative that Colonel Tsuji Masanobu of the 33rd Army staff assumed direct command of the frontline units. With the addition of another battalion, this proactive commander led his troops in a series of vigorous assaults, culminating in the capture of the southern hill by September 15. Meanwhile, to the north, Matsuyama successfully relieved Longling, yet a new challenge emerged. The formidable 200th Division had arrived from Kunming and launched immediate attacks against the 113th and 146th Regiments by September 9. Fortunately, Matsuyama received reinforcements in the form of the 3rd Battalion, 148th Regiment and the reserve 168th Regiment, effectively clearing the northern sector by September 11. Positioned defensively, Matsuyama's forces continued to fend off repeated counterattacks from the aggressive 200th Division, while the 168th Regiment moved westward to confront a significant element of the 36th Division advancing south from Tengchong. At this juncture, the Japanese had suffered approximately 1800 killed and 2500 wounded, while Honda estimated inflicting over 63,000 casualties since May. Despite the costly relief of Longling by mid-September, the 33rd Army had failed to reach the Nu Chiang River or rescue the Lameng or Tengchong Garrisons. Moreover, with Tengchong's fall, the entire 20th Army Group was mobilizing to reinforce Chinese forces engaged in the Longling campaign. Realizing that Operation Dan faced inevitable failure, Honda opted to halt the offensive. Instead, he directed the 2nd Division to undertake a defensive stance south of Longling. Simultaneously, the 56th Division and the 168th Regiment disengaged from the enemy, moving southwards to relieve the Pingda Garrison. On September 16, the divisions rotated smoothly: the 56th Division gathered east of Mangshi, while Colonel Yoshida Shiro's 168th Regiment initiated a covering attack to the east. This left the Longling Garrison vulnerable, prompting its commander to defy Honda's orders and withdraw during the night. Lt. Col. Komuro's action came as a shock to Army and Division headquarters and, although he later committed suicide to atone for his act, the commander and the Garrison were considered to have disgraced themselves and the Japanese Army. Lt. Col. Nagai, a staff officer of the 56th Division, when questioned in 1959 made the following statement: "The Longling Garrison had twice before made great and courageous stands against tremendous odds. They were all exhausted by their efforts and had expected to be relieved. It is understandable that the Garrison should bitterly resent being placed in a position where they might possibly be surrounded in Longling a third time. The defense line of the 2nd Division was so drawn as to leave Longling projecting and constituting a primary target for enemy attacks. It should also be borne in mind that the Garrison was not an organic unit but was, instead, a composite group composed of various elements without the esprit de corps of a regular unit. Although Lt. Col. Komuro was a respected officer, his tendency toward a philosophical approach to life may have made it impossible for him to hold out against the unanimous discontent and resentment of his subordinates." Fortunately, Matsui's 3rd Battalion arrived in Longling two days later without encountering Chinese forces. Despite being outnumbered, the 2nd Division managed to maintain its extended front by destabilizing the enemy and conducting nightly raids. On September 17, Matsui launched a successful relief operation, driving the 9th Division from the Sahngzhai area. Concurrently, the 146th Regiment embarked on a forced march towards Pingda; by September 22, it breached the enemy lines, reaching the besieged city. Having been isolated for nearly six months, there were scenes of wild rejoicing as the besieged Garrison welcomed the Imaoka Column. Carrying about 150 casualties on stretchers the combined forces of the Imaoka Column and the Pingka Garrison broke through the enemy lines at night and, on the 24th, reached Liangtzuchai where they were covered by the Matsui Column. Both units withdrew to Mangshih and, when the Yoshida Force subsequently pulled back from Isao Hill, the Pingka relief operation was concluded. Following the conclusion of the Pingda relief operation, Honda began preparations for the impending enemy offensive. Subsequently, the 56th Division was tasked again with defending Longling and Mangshi, while the 2nd Division relocated to Muse to prepare for a potential counterattack in the Shweli River valley. Meanwhile, the rested and reorganized 18th Division, now under Lieutenant-General Naka Eitaro, successfully concentrated at Namhkam by the end of September. The 33d Army expected that the main force would arrive prior to the end of the month, but the movement was executed very slowly and units were arriving in Namhkan throughout the month of September. Upon arrival of the Division at Namhkan, the units continued the work on fortification construction that had been started by the 2d Division. The main body of the Division moved via rail through Mandalay, while the 55th Infantry Regiment, with one artillery battalion and one engineer company advanced through Katha, Kunchaung and Sikaw on foot. The Division was gradually built up and, by the end of September, had achieved a strength of about 7,000 men. Since the replacements for the most part consisted of men recently discharged from hospitals, the complete recovery of the Division was understandably slow. The 18th Division finally managed to concentrate in Namhkam by 1 the early part of October. On 2 October, when Lt. Gen. Naka, who was replacing Lt. Gen. Tanaka, arrived at Namhkam, he found that the Division still had not fully recovered from the effects of the Hukawng Operation. However, abundant food supplies in the area, combined with excellent climate, enabled the division to make an unexpectedly rapid recovery during the month of October. By early November, the strength of the Division had been built up to about 9,000 men of whom about 3,000 were reinforcements from Japan. Some tanks and two 149-mm howitzers had been supplied and six mountain guns repaired. During this period of rehabilitation the Division engaged in the construction of defense positions on both sides of the Shweli River in the general area of Namhkam. This period allowed the Japanese ample time to strengthen their defenses, as Y Force had suffered significant casualties. General Wei found it necessary to retrain and reorganize his depleted divisions before resuming the offensive in Yunnan. Because all of his immediate reserves had been drawn into the fight for Longling, and considering that the Chinese Government had ignored his earlier pleas, Wei Lihuang asked General Dorn, chief of staff of the American personnel working with Y-Force, to present his further requests for 20000 trained replacements (Wei had not received one since the offensive began); for two more divisions; for permission to use the 5th Army's tank battalion; and for Baoshan to be developed as a supply base. Dorn, however, was only partially successful in that the National Military Council renewed its promises to send replacements. Shifting focus from Yunnan, we turn to the new operations of the 20th Bomber Command. Following the unsuccessful Yawata strike on August 20, Saunders continued planning for the return to Anshan, initially set for August 30 but postponed to September 8. On August 29, Major-General Curtis LeMay assumed command of the 20th Bomber Command. Despite the change in leadership, Saunders' plan remained unchanged: to deploy every serviceable B-29 aircraft. Saunders' plan was to dispatch every B-29 fit to fly; and so, by September 8, 115 bombers had gathered in the forward area and 108 successfully got off the runways. Of these, 95 reached Anshan to find good weather, with 90 of them dropping 206.5 tons of bombs at the Showa works and 3 bombing other installations while another 5 hit the Xinxiang Railroad Yards and 3 others hit various targets of opportunity. Total losses for the mission were four: a crack-up near Dudhkundi on the way up; two forced landings in China, one destroyed on the ground by enemy planes and one partly salvaged; and a plane listed as missing. The crew of this last plane later walked out with the loss of only one man. The Americans in turn claimed 8 kills, 9 probables and 10 damaged. The following day, a B-29 reconnaissance plane reported significant damage to the steelworks. Out of the sixteen coke oven batteries, three were estimated to be out of commission for a year, and another three for six months. Additional damage to related installations and the byproducts plant further compounded the impact. Overall, command intelligence officers calculated that the two attacks had reduced Showa's coking output by 35.2%, which in turn would decrease total Japanese rolled steel production by 9.3%. In response to the extensive damage, the Japanese launched their first counterattack against the 20th Bomber Command. Shortly after midnight, Japanese bombers came over Xinjin and attacked the American headquarters, storage areas, and the parked B-29s. Aided apparently by ground signals, the intruders made four runs, dropping fragmentation and high explosive bombs to inflict minor damage on one Superfortress and a C-46, and to wound two soldiers. Meanwhile, LeMay, who had accompanied the mission to Anshan, was encouraged by the promising results. Despite this, he had been tasked with implementing significant changes to the command. He began revising tactics, tightening and expanding formations, and enhancing training for greater bombing precision—effects that would become evident in the following months. Specifically, LeMay intended to substitute for the current 4-plane diamond formation a 12-plane formation similar to one he had used with his heavies in the ETO. He proposed further to follow 8th Air Force practice by subordinating night missions, so far numbering four of the command's eight strikes, to daylight precision attacks. This would not mean the abandonment of radar bombing, so vital in variable weather. LeMay's doctrine called for “synchronous bombing” in which both the bombardier and radar operator followed the bomb run in, with visibility determining who would control the plane during the crucial seconds before release. Precision bombing required training more sustained than the sporadic sessions which the command's crews had undergone, and fortunately new arrangements for nourishing strikes out of China would release B-29s and their crews from much of the Hump transport duty which had handicapped training. On September 5 LeMay had ordered each group to select 6 lead crews (later increased to 8) upon which other crews in a formation would drop. A week later a school was set up at Dudhkundi, occupied since early July by the 444th Group. Ground training and a simulated mission and critique on each of 10 successive days made the 11-day course at “Dudhkundi Tech” both strenuous and valuable. Meanwhile, the other crews of the 4 combat groups had been working with the 12-plane formation and had made some progress when training was interrupted for the ninth mission. Most of September was spent initiating LeMay's reforms, leaving time for only one major operation at the end of the month. Consequently, LeMay decided to finish off Anshan with another 100-plane strike. By September 26, he consequently had 117 B-29s forward, with 109 of them successfully getting airborne the following morning. Though take off had been improved since the last mission, bad weather and a cold front would see only 86 bombers reaching Anshan; 73 of them actually bombing the Showa works, all by radar. Subsequent photographic coverage, however, indicated absolutely no new darnage. In addition, two B-29s bombed Dairen, four Xinxiang, and nine bombed various targets of opportunity. Japanese opposition was likewise ineffective, with the Americans suffering no losses. but during the night, enemy bombers managed to sweep into the Chengdu area to drop three strings of bombs and damage five bombers, two of them seriously. The Chinese warning net had tracked the Japanese planes in from Hankow airfields and the 317th Fighter Control Squadron at Chengtu had ample time to alert command personnel. But the one P-47 up could not make contact. The 312th Wing had suffered with other China-based units from lack of supplies, and in the interest of economy of fuel one of its P-47 groups had been exchanged for the 311th Fighter Group, equipped with P-51B's. Chennault, reluctant to tie down two full groups for the static defense of Chengtu, had disposed part of the wing forward where the planes could take a more active part in the war, and events were to prove that this policy constituted no serious danger to the B-29 fields. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. By mid-September, intense battles in the CBI theater saw the Japanese forces grappling with diminishing supplies and overwhelming Chinese offensives. Despite heroic defenses at Tengchong and Lameng, Japanese positions fell after heavy casualties and strategic missteps. General Matsuyama's relief efforts at Longling achieved temporary success, yet the broader objectives of Operation Dan were unmet, marking a turning point in the campaign.
In this episode, Jeff sits down with Afua Bruce, a renowned author, engineer, and thought leader in the realm of public interest AI. Afua shares insights on how we can effectively train individuals on emerging technologies, regardless of their resources or access. Together, they tackle the complex issue of bias in AI, emphasizing the critical need to establish ethical standards for AI tools. The conversation also explores the concept of health, the vital role of community in sustaining well-being, and how technology can enhance these essential relationships.Follow: instagram.com/socialimpactleadersocialimpactleader.comFollow: instagram.com/plywoodpeopleplywoodpeople.comGet Afua's Book: The Tech That Comes NextThis Podcast is brought to you by WABE, part of the NPR Network.wabe.org/podcastsEdited By: DJ OP DiggyProduced By: LaTasha BrownMusic By: DJ OP DiggySee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.
Last time we spoke about the fall of Myitkyina. By late July 1944, the Japanese at Myitkyina in northern Burma were facing severe challenges. Despite holding out through a long siege, they were cut off from supplies and suffering heavy casualties. A leadership conflict between Colonel Maruyama and General Minakami further complicated things. Maruyama defended the city intensely, while Minakami aimed to deny Allied access to strategic roads. With depleted forces, including wounded troops trying to escape via the Irrawaddy River, the Japanese defense weakened. Allied forces, reinforced and ready, made significant gains, shrinking Japanese-held areas. On August 1, Minakami agreed to withdraw, and the remaining Japanese began escaping across the river. The Allies launched a final attack, securing Myitkyina on August 3. The 10 week siege resulted in substantial casualties on both sides. This victory allowed the Allies to improve logistical routes and marked a critical point in the Burma campaign. This episode is the Battle of the Driniumor River Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. Last time we were seeing action kick up at the Driniumor River. While the Japanese offensive had initially been successful, General Hall's forces managed to halt the enemy advance and reform their river line by July 15, despite a 1500-yard gap in the center. The Japanese were aware of this weakness in the American lines and exploited it, especially during the night. However, Colonel Starr's 3rd Battalion patrolled this area and occasionally engaged the enemy, killing 135 Japanese on the night of July 14. Despite this, General Cunningham claimed that his South Force had extended its lines nearly 1000 yards beyond its assigned sector without encountering any elements of the 124th Regiment. Consequently, on July 15, Starr concluded that his regiment had not advanced as far south as previously reported and ordered his units to adjust their lines southward and extend their defenses up the Driniumor towards Cunningham's Troop E. The following morning, Starr's 3rd Battalion began moving south to close the gap. As they reached the area by nightfall, Troop E was attacked by two companies of the 1st Battalion, 239th Regiment. While the cavalrymen sought cover, Starr's 3rd Battalion was also attacked by Colonel Nara's 3rd Battalion, which had turned south after its defeat at the Paup villages. This split the American forces in two, with Companies L and M pushing south through increasing opposition to reach South Force lines, while Companies I and K dug in for the night in their current positions. Despite the intense fighting, several Japanese were killed, and the gap was reduced to 500 yards. In the course of the day's fighting the Coastal Attack Force had lost all its artillery and had suffered heavy casualties. Additional losses were sustained on succeeding days, but Major Hoshino and his men were not completely removed as an irritant until the night of 16-17 July. During that night remnants of the Coastal Attack Force, about thirty-five men strong, attacked North Force and 124th Infantry command post installations at Anamo. At 23:00 the group charged out of the jungle southwest of the Anamo perimeter. Repulsed by machine gun fire, the enemy temporarily disappeared, only to reappear at 03:00 on 17 July moving west against Anamo along the beach. Machine gun fire from the American positions broke up this second attack, but about ten minutes later the Japanese tried again, this time moving on Anamo from the north by wading in from the sea. Once ashore, Major Hoshino's men broke up into small groups, attempting to destroy mechanized equipment, automatic weapons positions, and communications installations. The Coastal Attack Force remnants had apparently scouted well, for they were reported to have moved purposefully toward the most important installations and they easily found their way about in terrain they had vacated only four days previously. Whatever Major Hoshino's plans were, they were not realized. About forty of his men were killed and the rest dispersed. Behind them, Hall dispatched Colonel Howe's 1st and 2nd Battalions to clear the remaining enemy units west of the Driniumor River. Over two days of complex and sometimes uncoordinated company actions, the Americans successfully overran Nara's stragglers in the area. Further south, as Japanese troops were seen crossing the Driniumor at a fording point about 2,500 yards south of Afua, Cunningham sent Troop A south to high ground behind the Driniumor to halt the Japanese movements westwards. There, the 78th and 80th Regiments, under Major-General Miyake Sadahiko, were assembling for a renewed offensive. Adachi's new plan involved Miyake striking Afua from the south while the 239th Regiment prepared to move against the Kawanaka Shima area. Additionally, the retreating 237th Regiment and the reserve 66th Regiment were ordered south to join future attacks by the 20th Division, though they wouldn't arrive until July 25. As the Miyake Force maneuvered into position to the right and rear of Cunningham's 1st Squadron, Starr struggled to close the gap in the center, which was eventually sealed on the morning of July 18. That night, Miyake launched an attack with two battalions on the 1st Squadron's command post and the adjacent perimeter held by Troop A, successfully pushing them 250 yards to the northeast. Early in the afternoon of 19 July fresh Japanese units began to surround the Troop A position, moving in from the north, northwest, west, and southwest. The 1st Squadron commander called for artillery fire to break up this enemy maneuver. Upon cessation of the fire, Troop A attacked to the south and west for a second time. Driving at least a company of Japanese before it, the troop pushed 600 yards southwest of its original positions astride the Afua-Palauru trail and temporarily disrupted enemy plans to seize the position. About 140 Japanese had been killed during the two days' operation around Troop A. South Force, at the same time, lost 8 men killed and 29 wounded, all from the 1st Squadron, 112th Cavalry. There were strong indications that more attacks might occur in the 1st Squadron area, but Troop A was not destined to take part in any of these actions. It was replaced on the 21st by Troop C. Following this victory on July 21, Troop C relieved the battered Troop A, Howe's battalions successfully set up a patrol base on the East Branch of Koronal Creek, and Starr's 2nd Battalion moved to Palauru to provide additional outer security southwest of the airfield. On July 19, the first elements of General Wing's 43rd Division began landing at Aitape, with the 2nd Battalion, 169th Regiment subsequently taking over about 1,000 yards of the river line on the right of the 124th Regiment by July 22. Meanwhile, Adachi ordered the still-reorganizing Miyake Force to attack Afua from the north and west while General Nakai's 79th Regiment crossed the Driniumor and attacked from the south. On the evening of July 21, Miyake launched his attack on Troop C's position, successfully cutting it off from the rest of South Force. While the cavalrymen resisted heavy Japanese attacks, Miyake's units also repelled Cunningham's attempts to relieve the beleaguered troop over the next few days. Not knowing what other plans the Japanese might have in mind, General Cunningham was unwilling to pull any more troops away from the river defenses. Moreover, he now considered the position of his right flank untenable. He therefore withdrew Troop B north of Afua about 1,000 yards and used the unit to form a new defense line which ran westward about 500 yards from Troop A's right flank, anchored on the Driniumor. South Force's right flank was now refused and additional protection had been secured for medical, supply, and command post installations at the dropping ground banana patch. Troop C was left isolated behind Japanese lines, and Afua was again released to the enemy. It was not until the night of 21-22 July that the Japanese forward units were able to organize for any sort of attack. During that night, elements of the 124th Infantry received considerable mortar, machine gun, and rifle fire from east of the Driniumor. This fire increased the next morning, and about noon the 3d Battalion, 124th Infantry, was attacked from the west by elements of the 237th Infantry. The first Japanese attack was ". . . finally broken up by a bayonet charge . . ." conducted by elements of the 3d Battalion, 124th Infantry, but other attacks followed as troops of the 1st Battalion, 239th Infantry, tried to move across the Driniumor from the east, striking both the 124th Infantry's unit and part of the 2d Battalion, 169th Infantry. Before dark on the 22d, the 3d Battalion, 124th Infantry, counted 155 new Japanese dead in its area. That unit and the 2d Battalion, 169th Infantry, reported their own losses as five killed and twenty-five wounded. The 1st Battalion, 239th Regiment made further unsuccessful attempts to reopen the river crossing. By July 25, Adachi decided to send the 41st Division south to assist in the southern effort. After the fall of Afua, Hall ordered Howe's battalions to leave their East Branch base and reinforce Cunningham's South Force, arriving at the new line by July 23. With these reinforcements, Cunningham decided early in the afternoon to send Troops A and B to attack west toward Troop C while Howe's 2nd Battalion pushed southeast toward the isolated troop. Despite being uncoordinated, the infantry successfully moved into Troop C's perimeter from the northwest and helped repel a heavy Japanese attack from the southwest, while the cavalry troops reoccupied Afua and established new defensive positions. However, American attempts to break out on July 24 were unsuccessful due to the Japanese defending all tracks, trails, and ridgelines in the heavily jungled ground northeast of the perimeter. On July 25, Howe's Companies E and B unexpectedly established contact about 500 yards north of the besieged forces against light resistance, allowing the battered Troop C to withdraw. With Troop C relieved, Howe's units continued to attack south and west towards the Afua-Palauru trail, successfully pushing the Japanese into the Torricelli Mountains. Many Japanese troops remained positioned in a triangular area bounded by the dropping ground, Afua, and Company G's ridgeline position, where they continued to harass Cunningham's forces. Rifle fire, intensifying as darkness approached, harassed the rear and right flank of the two battalions, and the Japanese began intermittently to drop light artillery or mortar shells into the banana patch area, where the command posts of South Force, the 112th Cavalry, and the 127th Infantry were now located. Finally, Japanese patrols, coming in from the west, had scouted the banana patch area during the day, action which seemed to presage an enemy attack during the night. To get out of range of the enemy fire and danger of enemy attack, General Cunningham moved the command post installations 500 yards to the north before dark. Additionally, 127th Infantry patrols had found a Japanese map which indicated that the 66th Infantry, 51st Division, was concentrating in the Kwamagnirk area. Indeed, the 66th Infantry, which, with attached units, was at least 1,000 men strong, had crossed the Driniumor on or about 24 July. Bypassing the right flank of South Force, the regiment had moved into the heavily jungled high ground west of the banana patch and dropping ground. In addition, the remnants of the 237th Infantry, probably about 300 men strong, had finally arrived in the Afua area on 25 July and had passed to the control of the Miyake Force. Rear elements of the 20th Division, including additional men from the 26th Field Artillery and engineer units, had also crossed the Driniumor south of Afua. The number of Japanese troops in the South Force area by nightfall on the 26th of July was at least 2,500 and may have been over 3,000. On July 27, the battalion launched a successful southward attack, but ongoing Japanese movements to the west eventually necessitated an American withdrawal, despite other units under Cunningham managing to repel enemy advances. The following day, Cunningham consolidated his positions to bolster defenses in anticipation of potential large-scale Japanese assaults. However, on July 29, efforts by the 1st Squadron and the 2nd Battalion to attack south and west into the Triangle were thwarted by determined Japanese defenders led by Adachi. As a result, only localized patrol actions were conducted on July 30 and 31, as Cunningham devised plans for another offensive into the Triangle. Major combat activity revolved around the withdrawal of Company G, 127th Infantry, from its exposed outpost west of Afua. On the afternoon of the 29th the unit had been driven more than 400 yards east of its original position by Japanese attacks and had established new defenses on high ground about 300 yards west of Afua. On the 30th the company was surrounded and spent all day fighting off a series of small-scale attacks. The next morning it fought its way north to the dropping ground, where it arrived about 1330. Thence, it moved on to the Driniumor and joined the rest of the 2d Battalion, 127th Infantry, which had switched positions with the 3d Battalion. During the period from 13 to 31 July, South Force had suffered almost 1,000 casualties, of which 260 had been incurred by the 112th Cavalry. For the understrength cavalry regiment, this was a casualty rate of over 17 percent. The 2d Battalion, 127th Infantry, had also lost heavily and was in need of rest, reorganization, and re-equipment--needs which had prompted General Cunningham to change the places of the 2d and 3d Battalions, 127th Infantry. South Force casualties were as follows: 106 killed, 386 wounded, 18 missing, and 426 evacuated as a result of disease and sickness. South Force estimated that it had killed over 700 Japanese. By the end of July, with the arrival of most of the 41st Division, Adachi believed he had amassed enough reinforcements near Afua to launch a final offensive. The 238th Regiment, the 41st Mountain Artillery, and the 8th Independent Engineers were across the river in time by the 30th but the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 239th Regiment, had missed the crossing point on the Driniumor and were lost. Fortunately for the 18th Army, the South Force withdrawals on July 29 and 30 gave the 20th and 41st Divisions time to complete their organization. New orders were issued for the attack to start on August 1, with the 20th Division on the west and the 41st Division on the east. The strength that the 20th Division could muster for the attack was a little over 2000 men. Most of these troops had been without food for some time. They were suffering from starvation, malaria, and skin diseases, and morale was cracking. They were short of both ammunition and weapons. The 41st Division and its attached units, totaling nearly 1750 men by the morning of August 1, were in equally bad shape. Nevertheless, General Adachi was determined to make one last attack with the nearly 4000 troops now available to him in the Afua area. Despite sensing minimal Japanese resistance to the north, Hall was eager to mount a robust counteroffensive against the 18th Army. The 2d Battalion, 124th Infantry, which had been patrolling in the Palauru-Chinapelli area, was relieved from that duty by the 1st Battalion, 169th Infantry, and on the 30th joined its regiment at the Driniumor. The 2d Battalion, 169th Infantry, was already at the river. Tactical control of the counteroffensive was vested in Col. Edward M. Starr, commanding officer of the 124th Infantry, whose counterattack organization was to be known as TED Force. The 1st Battalion, 124th Infantry, was commanded by Maj. Ralph D. Burns; the 2d Battalion by Lt. Col. Robert M. Fowler; the 3d Battalion by Lt. Col. George D. Williams; and the 2d Battalion, 169th Infantry, by Maj. William F. Lewis. To avoid confusion, the four battalions were referred to by the last names of their commanders rather than by their number designations. Fowler's battalion, attacking along the coast, was to be supplied by ration trains moving along the coastal trail from Anamo. The rest of TED Force, pushing through trackless, dense jungle, was to be supplied by airdrop. The 149th Field Artillery Battalion, augmented by the Cannon Company, 124th Infantry, was responsible for artillery support, but when necessary the 129th Field Artillery was to add its fire to that of the 149th. All the artillery units were emplaced on the beach west of the Driniumor's mouth. The positions which the 124th Infantry and the 2d Battalion, 169th Infantry, left vacant on the Driniumor were to be occupied by the 2d and 3d Battalions, 128th Infantry. Colonel Starr had succeeded General Stark as commander of North Force on 18 July when the arrival of elements of the 43d Division at Aitape made it necessary for General Stark, the assistant division commander, to move back to BLUE Beach for administrative duties. General Stark apparently also reassumed command of the Western Sector, in place of General Hutchinson, Assistant Division Commander, 31st Division, who had rejoined his division when it, less the 124th Infantry, moved to a new operational area in western New Guinea. When TED Force was organized, North Force as such apparently ceased to exist, and the 128th Infantry took over the defensive functions previously assigned to North Force on the Driniumor. The name TED Force originated from the diminutive for Colonel Starr's first name. There were always so many units from different divisions and regiments operating along the Driniumor that the task force usually found it more convenient to use names rather than numbers for unit designations. The names, usually derived from the commanding officers, served not only to lessen confusion but also did double duty as code names. The attack was to be carried out with three battalions abreast along a front of 3,000 yards, and the fourth in reserve and in position to protect the right flank of the advancing force. The four battalions were to move east to the line of Niumen Creek, destroying all enemy found between that stream and the Driniumor within the 3,000-yard-wide zone of responsibility. Upon their arrival on the Niumen the battalions were to reorganize and prepare for further advances either east or south upon orders from General Hall. All three battalions of the 124th Infantry began crossing the Driniumor on schedule at 0800, 31 July, moving into terrain concerning which only incomplete and sometimes inaccurate information was available. The 1st Battalion faced delays from enemy delaying actions but eventually reached the creek by August 1, while the remaining battalions advanced inland, also reaching Niumen successfully. The 1st Battalion's advance company had been held up about 800 yards east of the Driniumor by elements of the 1st Battalion, 239th Infantry, which had been left along the river when the rest of that Japanese regiment had moved south to Afua on 26 July. Burns' men continued to encounter strong opposition from 239th Infantry elements throughout the day and did not break off contact until 1730, when the battalion bivouacked for the night still 800 yards west of Niumen Creek. Company A had become separated during the day and remained some 550 yards northwest of the main body for the night. Both sections of the battalion were out of touch with the rest of TED Force. The 3d Battalion, 124th Infantry (Williams), crossed the Driniumor at a point about 3,000 yards inland and reached the Niumen about 1400, having encountered only scattered rifle fire. Lewis' 2d Battalion, 169th Infantry, which followed Williams' command, made no contact with the enemy and bivouacked for the night about 500 yards west of Williams. All battalions spent the next day, 1 August, consolidating and patrolling along Neumen Creek, and Burns' unit moved up into line with the others. Meanwhile, Cunningham planned his own offensive aimed at dismantling the Triangle position following a reconnaissance mission along the Afua-Palauru trail. However, preliminary actions were disrupted when two companies launched a surprise attack from the southwest against Troop C's lines at 06:20 on August 1. General Cunningham immediately canceled the planned reconnaissance in force into the triangle area and turned his attention to this new threat. The first Japanese assault units were quickly reinforced, and the enemy moved forward against Troop C in massed waves along a narrow front. A bloody battle ensued as the enemy, apparently determined to commit suicide, continued his mass attacks. South Force called for artillery support, which was quickly forthcoming and which greatly helped Troop C to throw back the enemy assaults. By 0800 the Japanese had withdrawn and the battle area had become strangely quiet. Patrols were sent out from the cavalry perimeter to reconnoiter. These parties counted 180 dead Japanese in front of Troop C's lines, and it was considered probable that the enemy had carried off many more dead and wounded. Troop C, on the other hand, had lost but 5 men killed and 6 wounded. Examination of the enemy dead disclosed that elements of both the 80th and 238th Infantry Regiments had participated in the attacks. Thirty minutes later, Cunningham proceeded with his reconnaissance mission, encountering minimal resistance before returning in the afternoon. Despite capturing documents indicating an impending major assault, Cunningham deployed the 2nd Squadron as a mobile reserve at his command post. Although the movement of the 2d Squadron had apparently been well advised, the Japanese did not attack the command post area. Instead, at 1900, elements of the 41st Division struck the 1st Battalion, 127th Infantry, at its lines south of the dropping ground. This attack was preceded by fire from a 70-mm. or 75-mm. artillery piece which the Japanese had managed to sneak into the area within 150 yards of Company B, 127th Infantry. Following a few rounds from this weapon, Japanese infantry charged forward in four separate waves, employing perhaps 300 men on a very narrow front. Few of the enemy got near Company B's positions, for the attack was thrown back with artillery, mortar, and machine gun fire, which caused heavy losses among the enemy forces. By 2030, action in the dropping ground area stopped for the night. During the early hours of the next morning, 3 August, the 1st Battalion, 127th Infantry, again heard enemy activity to its front, and about 0730 a small Japanese party struck between Companies A and C. This attack was quickly repulsed, principally by mortar fire from 1st Battalion units. By noon all activity in the 1st Battalion area had ceased, and the Japanese had withdrawn to the southwest. Concurrently, Cunningham's 1st Squadron faced attacks from Nakai's 20th Division, but their suicidal charges were also turned back by resilient defenders. The 1st Squadron, 112th Cavalry, on the left rear of the 1st Battalion, was attacked by another group of Japanese at 1945. This action was probably meant to have been coordinated with the attack on Company B, but, if this were the enemy's intention, something had gone wrong. Apparently there had also been some mix-up in unit dispositions, for both enemy efforts had entailed the use of elements of the 78th, 80th, and 238th Infantry Regiments. After the day's action was finished, the combined effective strength of the first two units was probably not more than 250 men, and the 2d Battalion, 238th Infantry, was practically wiped out. The desperate attacks during the day had been carried out with a complete disregard for self-preservation, and had probably cost the Japanese 300 men killed and at least twice that number wounded. TED Force was subsequently directed to advance south along Niumen Creek toward the Torricelli Mountains foothills to disrupt Adachi's supply lines and flank the 18th Army. Supply challenges and dense jungle terrain initially delayed Starr's southern movement, with his northern battalions only linking up with the southern ones by day's end. The next morning, Starr launched a southward offensive, immediately encountering fierce resistance from the 1st Battalion, 239th Regiment, which held a stubborn defense throughout the day. In response, Starr ordered his 1st Battalion to bypass the engagement and move southwest, advancing unopposed for up to 1000 yards. August 3rd proved relatively calm for Cunningham, as the 1st Battalion, 169th Regiment arrived to bolster the South Force perimeter. However, vigilance remained high in anticipation of Mano's impending final assault. On 1 August General Adachi learned that American forces were active in the Yakamul area. It was erroneously reported to him that this was an amphibious operation, a maneuver which the 18th Army commander had feared for some time (actually, the report referred to patrolling by the 2d Battalion, 124th Infantry, along the coast from the mouth of Niumen Creek). He therefore ordered the remaining elements of the 237th Infantry to extricate themselves from the operations in the Afua area and hurry back to Yakamul to reinforce service units in that vicinity. Events moved so rapidly that the remnants of the 237th Infantry never got to Yakamul. Instead, the advance of TED Force made it necessary for General Adachi to change his plans and accelerate a general withdrawal. Communications within forward units of the 18th Army had so broken down that it was not until 3 August that General Adachi learned of the TED Force movement across the Driniumor, although the 1st Battalion, 239th Infantry, had been in contact with TED Force since 31 July. When General Adachi did hear of the American movement, he grossly underestimated the strength of TED Force. Thinking that the American operation was being carried out by only 400 troops, General Adachi merely changed the orders of the 237th Infantry and instructed that regiment to hold the 18th Army's crossing point on the upper Niumen Creek. On the same day, 3 August, General Adachi issued detailed plans for the withdrawal of all 18th Army units to the east side of the Driniumor, a withdrawal which was to begin on 4 or 5 August. The 66th Infantry, 51st Division, was to protect the 20th and 41st Division units as they crossed the Driniumor. The continued advance of TED Force on 3 August prompted General Adachi to change his plans and early on the 4th he ordered the 20th Division to start retreating at noon that day and the 41st Division to break contact on the 5th. The following morning, elements of the 238th and 239th Regiments emerged from the jungle southwest of the 1st Squadron in a final, desperate charge. Violent action continued in front of the 1st Squadron for about two hours, during which time nearly 200 Japanese were killed at the very edge of the squadron perimeter, principally by machine gun and rifle fire. How many more of the enemy were killed by artillery and mortar fire during the period cannot be estimated, but the banzai tactics undoubtedly cost the Japanese more than the 200 dead counted in front of the 1st Squadron which, in the same two hours, lost only 3 men killed and 4 wounded. By 0900 the last enemy attacks had ceased and the remaining Japanese had withdrawn generally to the south. Following the enemy withdrawal, Troop E pursued the retreating Japanese southward, encountering sporadic rifle fire as they eliminated remaining stragglers. The terrain encountered on August 4 and subsequent days during the operations of the TED Force east of the Driniumor proved next to impassable. Dense jungle undergrowth covered the ground; the area was thick with heavy rain forest; low but knifelike ridges, separated from each other by deep gullies, were encountered; and swampy spots were plentiful. To add to the difficulties, rain fell during the day--a downpour which turned much of the ground into a quagmire and flooded many dry stream beds. A few new, rough trails, recently cut by the Japanese, were found, but mud made them nearly useless as routes of advance. Low clouds coming in from the Torricelli Mountains to the south prevented ration and ammunition drops and increased communication difficulties. Battalions ran low on drinking water, for weather conditions prevented resupply of water purification tablets and the assault companies had neither time nor equipment to clean water by other means. Radio communication between battalions, from battalions to TED Force headquarters, and from the latter to higher echelons was nearly nonexistent, for the heavy jungle and the damp weather cut down the efficiency of all radio equipment. It had been hoped that the advance on the 4th would carry TED Force south to the main Japanese supply route, but the trail reached by Burns', Lewis', and Williams' battalions was another route which had not been used by military traffic for some time. Possibly, it was a section of the native trail to Afua and, as such, purposely avoided by the Japanese inasmuch as parts of it could be seen from the air. In any case, the track cut on the 4th lay about 1,200 yards north of the east-west trail which most of the Japanese forces moving to and from the Afua area had been using. Colonel Starr, realizing that the main Japanese supply route had not yet been severed, ordered his units to continue southward on the 5th, on which day the advance was resumed about 0800 hours with Williams leading and Lewis' battalion about 400 yards to the rear. Pushing south along now precipitous and mountainous banks of the upper Niumen, Williams' unit was opposed by only scattered rifle fire until 1100, when it was decisively halted by a strong Japanese force conducting a stubborn defense. On August 5, learning that TED Force was approaching the point at which the 18th Army's main line of communications crossed the upper reaches of Niumen Creek, General Adachi had also ordered the 8th Independent Engineers to aid the remnants of the 237th Infantry in holding the crossing point. It was this combined 237th Infantry-8th Engineers force that Williams' 3d Battalion, 124th Infantry, had encountered about 1100 on 5 August. The composite Japanese unit was dug in along a 1,000-foot high ridge across Williams' line of advance and threatened to outflank the battalion by occupying other high ground nearby. Despite artillery and mortar support, Williams' men were unable to advance. Colonel Starr ordered Lewis' unit to bypass the fight and continue south to locate and cut the Japanese main supply route. Fighting at Williams' front continued through most of the afternoon, and Colonel Starr realized that the Japanese force could not be dislodged that day. Fowlers' battalion was brought up to the rear of Williams' and late in the afternoon set up a new perimeter with the regimental command post. Before dark, Williams' men withdrew slightly from their most forward positions so that artillery concentrations could be placed along the front. Lewis' unit, which had moved off to the southeast to bypass Williams' fight, made little progress in very rough terrain and was cut off from the rest of TED Force before it could swing westward. Meanwhile, another battalion to the west encountered minimal resistance as it intercepted the main enemy trail east of the Driniumor, linking up with patrols from Cunningham's 2nd Squadron. Action on the 6th started earlier than TED Force expected. About 0300 approximately 400 Japanese attacked Williams' perimeter. This enemy force comprised elements of the 41st Division, supported by men of the 26th Field Artillery of the 20th Division and some remnants of the 8th Independent Engineers. Attacking under cover of fire from machine guns, mortars, and 75-mm. mountain guns, the Japanese force was attempting to secure fords over the upper reaches of Niumen Creek and protect the withdrawal of other elements of 18th Army units from Afua. Though surprised, Williams' men held back the initial onslaught. Reportedly, Japanese riflemen then climbed trees surrounding Williams' perimeter to pin down the American troops while other Japanese continued to attack on the ground. Fowler's unit, under orders to bypass Williams' fight and move around the enemy left, started moving about 0800 hours but soon found the terrain made it impossible to avoid contact with the Japanese opposing Williams. The Japanese, having control of most commanding ground in the area, stopped Fowler's leading company. Action was not rapid. The terrain made all movements slow and laborious, and much time had to be taken to co-ordinate artillery support fire properly. Under cover of artillery fire, another company of Fowler's battalion, creeping slowly through ravines and up an almost vertical cliff, worked around to unoccupied high ground on the Japanese left. The rest of the battalion was successfully disengaged to secure more commanding terrain in the same area. The Japanese, finding themselves outflanked and subjected to increasingly heavy artillery and mortar fire, began to withdraw southward in midafternoon, relieving the pressure on Williams' front. Fowler's battalion, in enveloping the Japanese left, had moved north and then westward and the maneuver had carried the unit by dark to a point just north of the main trail about 750 yards east of Burns' battalion. Williams' men withdrew to reorganize, after disengaging from the enemy forces late in the afternoon; at dark, having resumed the march westward, they secured high ground north of the trail. The ground covered during the day by Williams' battalion was little more than 500 yards west of the position it had occupied the previous night. The unit probably could have moved farther, but Colonel Starr halted it so as not to increase the distance from Lewis' battalion which was, in effect, lost. The unit had laboriously struggled over extremely rough and trackless ground during the day, fighting in the afternoon against a number of Japanese who had withdrawn from Williams' front. For the night, Lewis' men set up a perimeter about 800 yards south-southeast of the scene of Williams' fighting. With Adachi's escape route blocked, Starr's battalions advanced southwestward, achieving notable success by killing around 500 Japanese soldiers between August 6 and 7. In the interim, Cunningham's South Force completed operations in their sector, achieving a successful attack led by Howe that ousted the remaining disorganized Japanese presence from Afua on August 6. Two days later, the 124th Regiment advanced to the Driniumor, claiming to have eliminated approximately 1800 Japanese soldiers since the start of their counteroffensive, at the cost of 50 men killed and 80 wounded. With the rest of Adachi's 18th Army retreating towards Wewak, General Gill declared Afua secure by the evening of August 9. Following the conclusion of the Battle of the Driniumor River, the fatigued units of the 32nd Division, including the 124th Regiment and 112th Cavalry Regiment, were relieved by units from Wing's 43rd Division. From August 16 to 25, Wing's regiments conducted final combat missions in the Aitape region, encountering minimal Japanese resistance east of the Driniumor, except for delaying actions near the mouth of the Dandriwad River by patrols of the 103rd Regiment. Consequently, General Krueger declared the Aitape operation concluded on August 25, confident that the 18th Army posed no further threat to the Tadji airstrips. Adachi's forces had indeed suffered a decisive and costly defeat, rendering them incapable of posing a significant threat to Allied forces anywhere in New Guinea. The campaign to secure the Aitape area and defeat the 18th Army resulted in approximately 440 Allied soldiers killed, 2550 wounded, and 10 missing, while inflicting losses of around 8821 Japanese killed and 98 captured, including 2669 killed and 34 taken prisoner from August 2 to 9 alone. Adachi himself reported losing 9000 men and virtually annihilating seven regiments. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The American forces under Hall and Cunningham repelled multiple fierce Japanese offensives, inflicting heavy casualties. Despite a lot of setbacks and logistical challenges, TED Force advanced southward, disrupting Japanese supply lines and forcing their withdrawal by early August. Casualties were significant on both sides, underscoring the fierce nature of fighting on Green Hell.
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Last time we spoke about fall of Tinian and battle of Sansapor. Following the capture of Noemfoor and Biak, the Allies advanced to the Vogelkop Peninsula, constructing vital airbases. MacArthur initially focused on seizing Sorong and Waigeo Island, but operations accelerated, making Klamono oilfields non-viable, and oil rehabilitation projects in the Dutch East Indies were prioritized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. MacArthur planned reconnaissance in the Mar-Sansapor area. The 6th Division launched Operation Typhoon, and Task Force 77 executed landings on July 30, 1944. Airfields were built, and patrols eliminated Japanese forces. Meanwhile, Tinian saw intense fighting, with Marines securing key objectives by July 31. Following massive bombardments, Marines continued advancing, encountering heavy resistance but eventually declaring Tinian secure on August 1. Guam operations saw similar advances with coordinated attacks overcoming Japanese defenses. This episode is the Fall of Guam Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. This weeks podcast brings us back into the intense action in Guam. As we previously observed in Guam, General Shepherd's Marine brigade had effectively captured the Orote Peninsula, while General Turnage's 3rd Marine Division had reached the designated beachhead line, pushing back a weakened Japanese force retreating northward. Meanwhile, General Bruce's 77th Division maintained control of the southern beachhead line, preparing for a general eastward assault. An engineer battalion began constructing a supply road towards Yona, a project that ultimately failed to support the infantry's advance. On July 30, Turnage's Marines and the infantrymen sent patrols to gauge the strength of the Japanese forces, but dense foliage obscured enemy movements. Geiger eventually concluded that defensive positions were likely near the Agaña-Pago Bay Road. He planned an initial advance toward the general line of Agaña-Famja-Pago Bay, followed by a northeastward attack. Turnage's Marines were assigned to capture the capital, Agaña, and the strategic Tiyan Airfield on the left, while Bruce's infantry aimed to secure the Pago Bay area on the right. Following two days of intense artillery and naval bombardment, Geiger's offensive commenced at 06:30 on July 31. On the left, Turnage's units encountered minimal resistance. The 3rd Marines, now led by Colonel James Stuart, quickly occupied the ruins of the abandoned Agaña and moved beyond the O-1 Line to secure the main northbound roads. The 21st Marines advanced through dense underbrush, reaching O-1 after neutralizing an enemy pillbox near Famja. When Lieutenant Colonel Duplantis 3rd battalion, 21st marines brought his command post forward, a curious incident occurred which illustrated the confusion of the Japanese. Someone in the battalion command group sighted one of the bypassed enemy groups, estimated to be about 15-20, led by an officer, moving toward the new CP area. The Marines held their fire, and when the small unit got to within 150 yards of the waiting men, an interpreter called to the Nipponese to surrender. Apparently thinking they had finally reached friendly lines, they started forward, then stopped to hold a hurried conference. The chattering was interrupted by the interpreter urging them forward, but by this time the aggregation had decided they were in unfriendly territory. They broke and ran in all directions; the Marines opened fire, killing and wounding about half of the intruders. Those still alive escaped into the protecting foliage. The 9th Marines destroyed a delaying detachment at Ordot and two tanks during their successful push to O-1. Colonel Hamilton's 1st and 3rd Battalions, along with Colonel Tanzola's 3rd Battalion, advanced to the right, moving through steep slopes and narrow gorges in columns. They successfully reached Yona and the Pago River without encountering any opposition. With the Reconnaissance Troop protecting the south flank, General Bruce's 77th Infantry Division started toward the east coast of Guam at 7:00, 31 July. Elements of the 307th, with 3/305 attached, led the way in a column of battalions. Lack of enemy resistance permitted battalions to move with companies in column; even so, the march proved most difficult. The troops initially scaled steep slopes, slid down into narrow gorges, and followed along the foothills southwest of the central mountain range of Guam. For a time, vehicles followed, but soon the terrain became so rough that even jeeps could not traverse it. As one infantryman later wrote: “The distance across the island is not far, as the crow flies, but unluckily we can't fly. The nearest I came to flying was while descending the slippery side of a mountain in a sitting position. . . . After advancing a few yards you find that the [bolt] handle of the machine gun on your shoulder, your pack and shovel, canteens, knife, and machete all stick out at right angles and are as tenacious in their grip on the surrounding underbrush as a dozen grappling hooks. . . . The flies and mosquitos have discovered your route of march and have called up all the reinforcements including the underfed and undernourished who regard us as nothing but walking blood banks. We continue to push on. . . .” During this movement, Hamilton's Company L liberated 2,000 Guamanians from a concentration camp near Asinan. Soldiers willingly gave their rations and cigarettes to the undernourished men and women who were almost overcome with joy at once again seeing Americans. Men of the 77th Division soon forgot the long, tiresome cross-island march as the full realization of the expression, "liberation of enslaved peoples," came to the troops. Following the Orote operations, Shepherd's brigade was ordered to take over the southern half of the beachhead line from Inalas to Magpo Point, relieving the 305th and 306th Regiments. On August 1, Geiger's northward push continued, with the 305th moving to the Yona area and the 306th heading to Pago Bay. The 305th and 307th Regiments advanced slowly through rough terrain without opposition, reaching the O-2 Line by nightfall. On the left, Turnage began his advance with three regiments abreast, but the 3rd and 9th Marines eventually pinched out the 21st upon reaching the intermediate D-2A Line. At 15:00, these two regiments resumed their advance against slight resistance and reached O-2 by nightfall. The main challenge during this period was moving supplies forward, as both divisions relied on the same coastal road, heavily mined by the Japanese. With the rapid advance came the necessity to move supply distribution points closer to the front. Trucks began to roll over the already crowded coast highway to establish an advanced division dump in the Agaña Central Plaza area. Artillery units started to displace forward so that continuous direct support would be available to the assault units. This added traffic, plus the fact that the 77th Division would have to move supplies over the same road, presented a problem to the engineers. In an effort to alleviate the situation, the 25th Naval Construction Battalion and the 19th Marines put all available men to work improving existing roads and trails. Yet despite these efforts, by August 1, the problem of getting supplies forward was becoming more serious. The main coast road –and only one that ran from west to east on northern Guam– over which all traffic had to move had been heavily mined. The Japanese had placed aerial bombs and single-horned mines at road junctions and intersections in and around Agaña. In addition to being mined and heavily congested, the two-lane, hard-surfaced Agaña-Pago Bay Road was overused, poorly maintained and, with frequent rain, soon deteriorated badly. In the end, the engineers could not properly maintain the road and still allow the essential supply convoys through. On the morning of August 2, artillery and warships bombed the new positions General Obata was trying to establish around Mount Santa Rosa. Meanwhile, the Marines and infantrymen continued their pursuit northwards, aiming to reach the O-3 Line behind Japanese delaying positions at Finegayan and Mount Barrigada. On the left, the 9th Marines swiftly captured Tiyan Airfield, but their advance was hampered by dense jungle. Despite this, they managed to gain 1800 yards while the 21st Marines cleared the Saupon Point-Ypao Point area of small enemy groups. On the right, the 77th Division's advance was initially covered by a 14-tank patrol conducting reconnaissance in the Barrigada area, where they faced heavy resistance. The 307th Regiment quickly secured Price Road, but Tanzola's 3rd Battalion was halted by concealed machine-gun positions near Barrigada Well. Subsequently, the 307th, now led by Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Manuel, was also stopped near the village, with Manuel's 1st and 3rd Battalions becoming mixed up just as an enemy tank broke through their lines. After numerous failed attempts to dislodge the enemy, Companies G and E managed to penetrate the Japanese lines in the afternoon, although Company G had to be evacuated by nightfall. Meanwhile, the 305th moved up and consolidated its lines with the 307th. Since Bruce's infantrymen failed to link up with the Marines, Colonel Butler's 2nd Battalion was sent to fill the gap between the divisions. Following a reorganization, the 305th and 307th Regiments attacked again the next morning, encountering surprisingly little resistance as they moved through Barrigada and secured the vital well. The 77th Division had a special reason for wanting to reach Barrigada quickly. The reservoir and pump, located 100 yards northwest of Road Junction 306, could supply 20000 gallons of water daily to the troops. Until now, the men of the division had quenched their thirst by getting water from streams and creeks. But in the northern part of Guam there were no streams, and the reservoir would be the only source of supply. With tanks leading the way, Manuel's 3rd Battalion advanced quickly and reached the summit of Mount Barrigada, although the 2nd Battalion lagged behind. Meanwhile, the 305th Regiment engaged in several isolated skirmishes but still managed to link up with the 307th. To the left, Turnage had also resumed his advance toward O-3. Although the 3rd Marines encountered little resistance and reached their objective successfully, Colonel Craig's 1st Battalion was halted by heavy fire near Finegayan after destroying a Japanese stronghold. That night, the Marines faced mortar and tank attacks, but these assaults made little progress. Meanwhile, as the 22nd Marines patrolled southern Guam, the 4th Regiment was held in reserve at Toto. On August 4, the remainder of Shepherd's brigade began moving to Toto, leaving only Colonel Schneider's 1st Battalion and the 6th Defense Battalion behind. Following Turnage's orders, the 21st Marines were positioned between the other two regiments to reach O-3 near Dededo. At the same time, Craig's 1st Battalion made minimal gains toward Finegayan, while the rest of the 9th Marines advanced to O-3 and successfully severed the Finegayan-Barrigada Road. To the right, Bruce's infantrymen, following an artillery barrage, advanced to O-3, overcoming terrain difficulties and securing the objective line by nightfall. On August 5, Turnage's three regiments continued their advance, pushing past O-3. The 3rd Marines reached Amantes Point, and Craig's 1st Battalion finally overran the remaining Japanese positions at Finegayan. Behind them, Shepherd's brigade moved to Dededo, preparing to take over the left flank for the final push. Meanwhile, as the 306th Regiment relieved the exhausted 307th, Tanzola's men continued to fight through the dense jungle, with his 2nd Battalion reaching the O-4 Line by nightfall. During a nighttime raid, the 1st Battalion was targeted, resulting in 48 casualties. Following this, the 2nd Battalion encountered the tanks the next morning, eventually neutralizing them but suffering an additional 46 casualties. Bruce's regiments gathered at O-4 to prepare for an attack on Mount Santa Rosa, where Obata had concentrated his forces. Turnage's regiments also resumed their attack, advancing with minimal resistance. Geiger initiated the final push on August 7, with Turnage's Marines facing minor obstacles due to jungle terrain. Despite this, the 3rd Marine Division reached the O-5 Line by nightfall. Shepherd's brigade swiftly progressed along the coast, joining forces with the 3rd Marines. Meanwhile, the 306th and 307th Regiments prepared for a coordinated attack. Bruce's strategy involved the 306th securing ground north of the Japanese defensive lines, the 307th leading a tank-infantry assault on Yigo, and the 305th closing in on Mount Santa Rosa. Once each objective was secured, Santa Rosa would be encircled from Anao to Lumuna Point, leaving the enemy with no escape route except into the sea. By midday, despite facing delays from the narrow road and enemy sniper activity, Manuel's tanks surged ahead of the infantry, veering right to swiftly eliminate several Japanese machine-gun positions at the road's edge. However, their advance was halted by heavy Japanese fire from the left rear as they crested a slight elevation. In a wedge formation, commanded by Captain Seger from his tank at the right rear, the light tanks swept rapidly over the slight crest. As they pushed on there was an explosion to the left of the tanks directly in front of Seger. He radioed to Colonel Stokes: "There's a burst in front of me; could be mine or antitank gun. Call for the mediums." Just before the mediums came up more explosions sounded from the left. The tankers could not locate the source of the fire because of the dense woods to the left and the absence of flash and smoke. When the mediums reached the open area, their crews could tell that the light tanks were in trouble but they could not see where the fire was coming from. Only when they advanced up the slight rise and began themselves to have steel shrapnel and bullets smash on the left of their hulls and turrets did they turn and pour fire back into the woods at the left rear. Fifty yards behind the stricken tanks the infantrymen struggled to push through the positions by the road that the tanks had overrun. Japanese still fired from a pillbox that had been blasted by the medium tanks as they raced ahead. The troops put rifle and machine-gun fire into it. They threw six grenades before one landed inside the position. The enemy continued to fire from it. A flame-thrower man maneuvered cautiously up to the position and put the searing flame in through an opening. The heat was too much for the defenders; one of them scurried out and fell before the American guns. The enemy position, so skillfully concealed from the front but vulnerable from the rear, was built around two light tanks. Two antitank guns, two 20mm guns, six light and two heavy machine guns, plus about a makeshift battalion of infantry added their fire to make the Yigo defense formidable. One medium was hit in its gas tank. Flames shot out of the bottom and quickly enveloped the sides. The crew hastily clambered out of it just before the ammunition inside began exploding. Another tank stalled under the heavy fire. As bullets hit the vehicle, the tankers dashed for a shell hole. Some of the mediums moved on out of the area. One of them tried to sweep around to the right below the line of enemy fire and promptly threw a track. As more tanks came up, they swung their cannons and machine guns around for brief fire on the enemy positions to the left and then passed on to the objective ahead. The leading light tank had similarly been destroyed and another was destroyed shortly afterwards. The American armor suffered losses against this well-concealed enemy position. Fortunately, Colonel Smith's 3rd Battalion, encountering minimal resistance in the jungle, directed Company K to flank the Japanese from the rear, catching them off guard and eliminating them without casualties. This enabled the 307th to secure the Yigo area and the elevated terrain to the northeast in readiness for the Santa Rosa assault. Meanwhile, the 306th consolidated west and north of Yigo, while the 305th advanced to the Lumuna Point line. The day also witnessed the inaugural combat flights of Marine planes from the newly completed Orote airfield over Guam. By nightfall, Obata dispatched his remaining tanks on a futile infantry-tank raid against the 306th, which repelled the attack successfully. On August 8, as the 305th and 307th Regiments closed in on Santa Rosa, Smith's forces continued north towards Lulog to complete the encirclement. Although the 306th captured Lulog, the 307th encountered minimal resistance in capturing Santa Rosa. Consequently, Bruce instructed Smith to push north towards Salisbury, but progress was limited by day's end. On the left flank, Shepherd's brigade and Turnage's division continued their advance. The 22nd Marines progressed to Ritidian Point, establishing three roadblocks. The 4th Marines secured O-5 and advanced to RJ 462. The 21st Marines patrolled the Chaguian area, while the 3rd Marines fought through dense jungle to defeat a Japanese roadblock and reach the Salisbury-Tarague Road. Patrols returned late in the afternoon and reported few enemy contacts, but one such unit from 3/21 had discovered a Japanese truck containing the bodies of 30 native men who had been beheaded. According to the official account of the incident, the Guamanians, found near Chaguian, had not been dead more than 24 hours. The next morning another patrol found an additional 21 bodies in the jungle near the same village. The 9th Marines faced heavy resistance as they dug in around Salisbury, close to Obata's headquarters. A tank-infantry counterattack targeted Stuart's 2nd Battalion at night, dispersing the enemy but necessitating retreat due to the threat of Obata's remaining tanks. Stuart's 3rd Battalion and Butler's 1st Battalion attacked the next morning but found no sign of the tanks. Meanwhile, the 77th Division patrolled the Yigo-Salisbury area, and the 9th Marines advanced rapidly towards the northeastern coast before redirecting patrols to Savana Grande, where 3000 Japanese were suspected to be hiding. Following artillery bombardment, the Marines occupied Savana Grande and Pati Point but found little evidence of Japanese presence. Patrols from the 4th and 22nd Marines also reached the northern beaches, leading Shepherd to declare an end to organized resistance in the brigade zone. The last known resistance persisted in the 3rd Marines' sector, where Obata's tanks were last observed. Accordingly, on August 10th, Stuart's 2nd Battalion initiated an attack to the east, establishing contact with two tanks on the road. Swiftly disabling these tanks, the Marines pressed forward, swiftly overpowering the Japanese positions and successfully seizing a total of seven abandoned tanks. By 11:30, Geiger declared an end to organized resistance on Guam. American casualties up to this point totaled 1214 killed, 5704 wounded, and 329 missing, with 10971 Japanese reported dead. Despite this announcement, Obata persisted at Mount Mataguac, fending off Bruce's infantry patrols since August 8th. Finally, on August 11th, Smith's 1st Battalion launched a meticulously planned attack supported by tanks and mortar barrages, stunning the defenders and enabling soldiers to destroy cave entrances. When the caves were reopened four days later, more than 60 bodies, including General Obata's, were found inside the well-fortified command post. Following the battle, Major-General Henry Larsen's garrison forces maintained intensive patrols on Guam throughout the remainder of the year under close scrutiny from Island Command. Island Command, Guam under General Larsen, had taken command of Orote Peninsula and Cabras Island on August 2 to begin base development, namely the airfield and seaport. It then assumed formal command of Guam on August 15. Island Command grew rapidly as it took over all logistics, construction, and civil affairs tasks in stages. It included the 5th Naval Construction Brigade with the 27-29th Seabee Regiments with 12 Seabee, four Army, and one Marine engineer battalions plus "Lion 6", a Navy advance base force responsible for building and operating Naval Operating Base, Guam. Island Command was also responsible for the care of 21000 Guamanian civilians and built replacement housing for 15000. Both the 3rd and 77th Divisions maintained an infantry regiment and an artillery battalion in the north to deal with diehards. Up to 80 Japanese were killed each day during the first two weeks after Guam was declared secure. The nightmare would continue for the Japanese for some time to come. The 3rd Marine Division took over sole responsibility for island defense under Island Command on August 22. The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade then departed for Guadalcanal on August 31, where it would be expanded into the 6th Marine Division to fight on Okinawa. The 3rd Marine Division finally remained on the island to train for Iwo Jima, as did the 77th for Leyte and later Okinawa.An estimated 8500 Japanese soldiers remained scattered in the jungles of the north and the mountains of the south, engaging in guerrilla warfare until the war's conclusion. However, most were either killed or captured before then. The final tally for Guam by August 1945 included 18377 Japanese killed and 1250 captured, with American losses totaling 1407 killed, 6010 wounded, and 376 missing. By the conclusion of the Marianas Campaign, the Japanese suffered casualties exceeding 50,000, while the Americans solidified their control by positioning themselves strategically along the inner ring of Imperial defenses. This positioning enabled them to cut off the flow of supply ships and submarines that had previously supported remote enemy garrisons. Additionally, the Americans established a naval base with the capacity to support one-third of the Pacific Fleet, set up extensive forward supply depots, which posed a threat of swifter assaults on the Japanese home islands, and constructed several B-29 airfields. These airfields facilitated the unleashing of devastating aerial bombardments on Japan, bringing the full force of total war to its people through a relentless barrage of explosives and fire. That finishes up the story of the Marianas, now we need to travel back over to New Guinea. Despite the initial success of the Japanese offensive, General Hall's forces successfully halted the enemy advance and reorganized their river line by July 15th, although there remained a 1500-yard gap in the center. Aware of this vulnerability in the American defenses, the Japanese exploited it, particularly under the cover of darkness. However, Colonel Starr's 3rd Battalion actively patrolled this area and occasionally engaged with the enemy, such as the night of July 14th when they eliminated 135 Japanese soldiers. Nonetheless, General Cunningham reported that his South Force had expanded its lines nearly 1000 yards beyond its designated sector without encountering any elements of the 124th Regiment. Consequently, on July 15th, Starr concluded that his regiment had not advanced as far south as previously thought, prompting him to order his units to adjust their positions southward and fortify their defenses along the Driniumor River towards Cunningham's Troop E location. The next morning, the 3rd Battalion began its journey southward to close the gap. However, upon reaching the area by nightfall, Troop E came under attack from two companies of the 1st Battalion, 239th Regiment. As the cavalrymen sought cover from this assault, Starr's 3rd Battalion also faced fire from Colonel Nara's 3rd Battalion, which had redirected southward following its defeat at the Paup villages. This division split the American force, with Companies L and M encountering increasing resistance as they pressed southward towards South Force lines, while Companies I and K fortified their positions for the night. Despite the engagement resulting in the death of several Japanese soldiers and the narrowing of the gap to 500 yards, nightfall on the coast witnessed General Adachi's Coastal Attack Force launching suicide banzai charges towards Anamo, only to be swiftly repelled by the defenders' lethal machine-gun fire, resulting in the complete annihilation of the force. In the rear, Colonel Howe's 1st and 2nd Battalions were dispatched by Hall to eliminate remaining enemy units west of the Driniumor. Over the course of two days, in a series of complex and occasionally disjointed company maneuvers, the Americans successfully subdued Colonel Nara's remaining troops in the area. Meanwhile, further south, Japanese groups were spotted crossing the Driniumor at a fording point approximately 2500 yards south of Afua, prompting Cunningham to deploy Troop A to strategic high ground behind the river to halt westward Japanese movements. There, the 78th and 80th Regiments, led by Major-General Miyake Sadahiko, were gathering in preparation for a fresh offensive. Adachi devised a fresh strategy, envisioning Miyake's forces striking Afua from the southern front, while the 239th Regiment prepared to advance against the Kawanaka Shima area. Furthermore, the retreating 237th Regiment and the reserve 66th Regiment received orders to head south to reinforce future assaults by the 20th Division, although they wouldn't reach the destination until July 25. Meanwhile, as the Miyake Force gradually maneuvered into position on the right and rear of Cunningham's 1st Squadron, Starr faced ongoing challenges in filling the gap in the center, eventually managing to close it by the morning of July 18. That night, Miyake finally dispatched two battalions to launch an assault on the 1st Squadron's command post and the adjacent perimeter held by Troop A, successfully pushing them back 250 yards to the northeast. However, swift reinforcements enabled Cunningham to recapture the lost ground the following morning, prompting the enemy to retreat northwest into the jungles. By afternoon, fresh Japanese units had once again encircled the Troop A position; yet, after an effective artillery barrage, the cavalrymen thwarted Adachi's plans by pushing 600 yards to the southwest. Following this triumph, on July 21, Troop C relieved the battered Troop A; Howe's battalions successfully established a patrol base on the East Branch of Koronal Creek; and Starr's 2nd Battalion relocated to Palauru to enhance outer security southwest of the airfield. Concurrently, on July 19, the initial units of General Wing's 43rd Division commenced landing at Aitape, with the 2nd Battalion, 169th Regiment subsequently assuming control of approximately 1000 yards of the river line on the right flank of the 124th Regiment by July 22. Meanwhile, Adachi instructed the still-reorganizing Miyake Force to launch another assault on Afua from the north and west, while General Nakai's 79th Regiment crossed the Driniumor River to strike from the south. On July 21, in the evening, Miyake initiated an attack on Troop C's position, effectively isolating it from the remainder of South Force. Despite the cavalry's resistance against the intense Japanese onslaughts, Miyake's units successfully thwarted Cunningham's efforts to relieve the besieged troop in the subsequent days. Faced with the threat to his command post and reluctant to divert more forces from the river defenses, Cunningham ultimately opted to establish a new defensive line 1000 yards north of Afua, consequently abandoning the town and leaving Troop C stranded. It was not until the night of 21-22 July that the Japanese forward units were able to organize for any sort of attack. During that night, elements of the 124th Infantry received considerable mortar, machine gun, and rifle fire from east of the Driniumor. This fire increased the next morning, and about noon the 3d Battalion, 124th Infantry, was attacked from the west by elements of the 237th Infantry. The first Japanese attack was ". . . finally broken up by a bayonet charge . . ." conducted by elements of the 3d Battalion, 124th Infantry, but other attacks followed as troops of the 1st Battalion, 239th Infantry, tried to move across the Driniumor from the east, striking both the 124th Infantry's unit and part of the 2d Battalion, 169th Infantry. Before dark on the 22d, the 3d Battalion, 124th Infantry, counted 155 new Japanese dead in its area. That unit and the 2d Battalion, 169th Infantry, reported their own losses as five killed and twenty-five wounded. Despite further unsuccessful attempts to reopen the river crossing by the 1st Battalion, 239th Regiment, Adachi eventually decided on July 25 to dispatch the 41st Division south to reinforce the southern front. Following the fall of Afua, Hall directed Howe's battalions to depart from their East Branch base and reinforce Cunningham's South Force, successfully arriving at the new defensive line by July 23. With these reinforcements in place, Cunningham early in the afternoon of the same day decided to deploy Troops A and B to advance westward toward Troop C, while Howe's 2nd Battalion pushed southeast to support the isolated troop. Despite the lack of coordination in the attack, infantrymen managed to infiltrate Troop C's perimeter from the northwest, aiding in repelling a fierce Japanese assault from the southwest, while the cavalry troops reclaimed Afua and established new defensive positions. Despite an initial triumph, American efforts to advance on July 24 were thwarted by the resolute defense of the Japanese, who fiercely guarded all paths, trails, and ridges in the densely forested terrain northeast of the perimeter. However, on July 25, Companies E and B under Howe surprisingly made contact roughly 500 yards north of the besieged forces, encountering minimal resistance, which allowed the beleaguered Troop C to retreat. With Troop C relieved, Howe's units continued their assault southward and westward toward the Afua-Palauru trail, driving the Japanese forces into the Torricelli Mountains. Nonetheless, a significant number of Japanese troops remained within a triangular area delineated by the sloping ground, Afua, and Company G's ridgeline position, persistently harassing Cunningham's forces. Throughout the night, additional Japanese reinforcements, including the 66th Regiment, maneuvered behind Howe's 2nd Battalion, securing control over trails leading southeast through dense jungle from the banana patch to a point on the Afua-Palauru trail near the 2nd Battalion's command post. Consequently, on July 26, Howe's 1st Battalion was withdrawn toward the sloping ground, with the 2nd Battalion expanding its positions to the east to cover the vacated area. On July 27, the battalion launched a successful southward attack; however, menacing Japanese movements to the west compelled the American forces to withdraw, despite other units under Cunningham also repelling enemy advances. Subsequently, Cunningham reorganized his lines on July 28 to strengthen defenses, anticipating imminent large-scale Japanese assaults. Nonetheless, on July 29, the 1st Squadron and the 2nd Battalion renewed their offensive toward the south and west into the Triangle, yet this time Adachi's determined defenders successfully rebuffed them. Therefore, local patrol activity was the primary focus on July 30 and 31 while Cunningham devised plans for another offensive into the Triangle. Major combat activity revolved around the withdrawal of Company G, 127th Infantry, from its exposed outpost west of Afua. On the afternoon of the 29th the unit had been driven more than 400 yards east of its original position by Japanese attacks and had established new defenses on high ground about 300 yards west of Afua. On the 30th the company was surrounded and spent all day fighting off a series of small-scale attacks. The next morning it fought its way north to the dropping ground, where it arrived about 1330. Thence, it moved on to the Driniumor and joined the rest of the 2d Battalion, 127th Infantry, which had switched positions with the 3d Battalion. During the period from 13 to 31 July, South Force had suffered almost 1,000 casualties, of which 260 had been incurred by the 112th Cavalry. For the understrength cavalry regiment, this was a casualty rate of over 17 percent. The 2d Battalion, 127th Infantry, had also lost heavily and was in need of rest, reorganization, and re-equipment--needs which had prompted General Cunningham to change the places of the 2d and 3d Battalions, 127th Infantry. South Force casualties were as follows: 106 killed, 386 wounded, 18 missing, and 426 evacuated as a result of disease and sickness. South Force estimated that it had killed over 700 Japanese. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. With the capture of Guam, the Marianas campaign had finally come to an end. Yet it seemed apparent to the frontline commanders, the closer the island hopping got to the Japanese home islands, casualties were exponentially mounting. How much American blood was it going to take to end the Pacific War?
Last time we spoke about the fall of Saipan. General Smith's coordinated attacks on June 27th led to significant progress, with the 4th Marine Division notably advancing. The 27th Division encountered resistance, and casualties rose. By early July, Americans gained ground, pushing toward Marpi Point. Japanese resistance remained fierce, but American forces steadily advanced, capturing strategic positions. The assault on Petosukara was swiftly countered, but intense action unfolded in the Makunsha region. The 3rd Battalion, 24th Marines faced a fierce enemy thrust, with over 200 attackers killed. Facing defeat, General Saito ordered a suicidal assault, resulting in a chaotic and desperate charge. Despite heavy losses, American forces repelled the onslaught. The battle lasted until midday on July 7, with sporadic skirmishes continuing. Efforts to persuade cave occupants to surrender intensified, yet many civilians chose mass suicide. Saipan was declared secured after extensive casualties on both sides. This episode is the battle of Noemfoor Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. General MacArthur unleashed a new offensive, seeing General Patrick's troops successfully landed on Noemfoor with little opposition, securing a beachhead. While the 3rd Battalion, 503rd Parachute Regiment was being airdropped on July 4, Colonel Sandlin's 3rd Battalion continued eastward through scattered minefields toward Kornasoren Drome, meeting no resistance. Simultaneously, the 1st Battalion crossed the Kamiri River and occupied Kamiri village without encountering any opposition. Moving out of Kamiri, the American forces followed a southeastern road to a sizable Japanese garden area, where they faced resistance on Hill 201. The Japanese garden area was about 600 yards long, east and west, and 350 yards across, north to south. The ground was devoid of large trees except for a few atop Hill 201, but thick, secondary jungle growth covered the eastern and southern slopes of the hill, while the rest of the garden area was overgrown with partially cultivated papaya, taro, and cassava, all averaging about eight feet in height. The trail from Kamiri village passed over the southern slope of Hill 201, and 300 yards away, near the eastern edge of the gardens, joined the main road from Kamiri Drome to Namber Drome, located about six miles to the south. Another trail ran along the eastern side of the hill, branching to the north and northwest at the northeastern corner of the low terrain feature. To counter this, a double envelopment tactic was initiated, with Company C seizing Hill 180 to the north while Company B pushed the Japanese southeast over Mission Hill, a lower terrain feature situated southeast of Hill 201. By 15:15, the battalion secured the ground on both flanks of Hill 201 and consolidated around the hilltop for the night, establishing a tight defensive perimeter. At 05:20 on July 5, the Japanese launched an attack along the southern and southeastern sides of the perimeter with mortar support. The American forces responded with a deadly barrage of mortar and artillery fire, driving the enemy back and neutralizing their machine-gun positions. Some Japanese managed to get through the mortar and artillery barrages and continued up the sides of the trail from the south through fire from Company D's machine guns. The enemy found cover behind a low, 150-yard-long log fence which led from the southeast toward the center of the 1st Battalion's defenses. While the fence afforded some protection, the attacking infantrymen were silhouetted as they tried to clamber over the top. The main body of the attacking force therefore kept down behind the fence, trying to crawl along it to the top of the hill. Advancing cautiously, the attackers encountered sustained machine-gun and rifle fire from the defenders atop the hill, as the fence did not extend beyond the outer defenses of the 1st Battalion. The assault quickly deteriorated into a sequence of small suicide charges carried out by groups of three to six Japanese soldiers. The 1st Battalion now sent patrols out over the battlefield. From prisoners it was determined that the attacking force had consisted of 350 to 400 men--the 10th and 12th Companies, 219th Infantry, reinforced by approximately 150 armed Formosan laborers. During the morning over 200 dead Japanese were counted around the 1st Battalion's perimeter, and the number of enemy dead found or enemy wounded captured on subsequent days along trails leading south from the hill indicated that virtually the entire original attacking force had been annihilated. By 06:30, the skirmish had concluded, with over 200 Japanese casualties tallied. Following this engagement, operations on Noemfoor transitioned into a series of patrol activities as Allied forces extended their dominance over the island and rapidly expanded the airfield facilities. On the morning of July 6, Sandlin's 2nd Battalion executed an amphibious landing on the deserted Namber Drome following a brief naval bombardment. By July 10, intensive patrolling had only encountered small Japanese groups, leading Patrick to conclude that no significant organized enemy presence remained on Noemfoor. To eradicate the remaining opposition, the 503rd Parachute Regiment was dispatched to the island's southern sector while the 158th addressed the northern half. By the end of August, Sandlin's efforts had resulted in the death of 611 Japanese soldiers, the capture of 179, the loss of 6 American lives with 41 wounded, and the liberation of 209 slave laborers. The Japanese had never brought the Melanesians of Noemfoor entirely under their control, for the natives had either offered a passive resistance or had faded into the interior to live off the land. A few were impressed into service by the Japanese, while others who were captured but still refused to cooperate were executed. The natives greeted the Allied landings with great enthusiasm and came out of hideaways in the hills carrying Dutch flags which they had concealed from the Japanese. Under the direction of the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration, the natives were gradually resettled in their old villages. Late in July the village chiefs gathered in formal council and officially declared war on the Japanese. Thereafter, native cooperation increased. Up to August 31 the natives had captured and brought to Allied outposts more than 50 Japanese and had killed another 50. One tale of horror concerns the Javanese on Noemfoor. According to information gathered by the NICA Detachment, over 3000 Indonesians were shipped to Noemfoor in late 1943, mostly from Soerabaja and other large cities on Java. The shipment included many women and children. The Japanese, without regard to age or sex, put the Javanese to work constructing roads and airfields almost entirely by hand. Little or no clothing, shoes, bedding, or shelter was provided, and the Javanese had to supplement their very inadequate allowance of rations by shifting for themselves. Driven by hunger, many attempted to steal Japanese rations but for their pains were beheaded or hung by their hands or feet until dead. Starvation and disease took a steadily increasing toll. The dead were periodically collected for mass burial, and survivors alleged that many of the sick were buried alive. It was considered probable that not more than 10 or 15 Javanese were killed accidentally by Allied forces. Yet only 403 of the 3000-odd brought from Java were found alive on Noemfoor by August 31. Meanwhile, Colonel Jones pursued the remnants of Colonel Shimizu's Noemfoor Detachment to Hill 670 in the south. From July 13 to 16, both sides engaged in fierce combat for control of the hill, with the Japanese ultimately managing to evade capture. Contact was reestablished on July 23 near Inasi, but Shimizu eluded capture once more. The primary Japanese force was finally located on August 10 near Hill 380, prompting Jones' 1st and 3rd Battalions to converge in an attempt to trap the enemy. However, on August 15, Shimizu once again evaded capture, slipping away towards Pakriki. Although the Japanese forces were either captured or eliminated by August 17, Shimizu evaded capture or death and remained at large by the operation's conclusion. Jones' forces endured 57 fatalities and 302 injuries, but managed to neutralize over 1100 Japanese soldiers and apprehend approximately 560 individuals, while liberating an additional 194 enslaved laborers. This brings the total casualties for the Battle of Noemfoor to 1730 Japanese casualties, with 740 taken prisoner, and 63 American fatalities, 343 wounded, and 3 missing, alongside the liberation of 403 slave laborers. Transitioning to the developments on the Aitape front post-Operation Persecution, significant changes occurred under General Gill's command starting May 4. The defensive setup in the Aitape region was revamped, and Colonel Howe's 127th Regiment bolstered its eastern positions, with the Nyaparake Force extending patrols to the Danmap River. However, General Nakai's advance forces arrived in early May. Shortly after 2:00am on 14 May, after a short preparation by grenades, light mortars, and light machine guns, 100 to 200 Japanese of the 78th Infantry, 20th Division, attacked from the east against the coastal sector of the perimeter. This assault was broken up by rifle and automatic weapons fire and by lobbing mortar shells to the rear of the advancing enemy group. The Japanese disappeared into the jungle south of the narrow beach. For the next hour Captain Fulmer's mortars placed harassing fire into suspected enemy assembly points east of the small stream. Meanwhile, the eight-man outpost reported that many small parties of Japanese were moving up the beach within 300 yards of the main perimeter and then slipping southward into the jungle. Such maneuvers seemed to presage another attack. The second assault came about 0330, this time against the eastern and southeastern third of the defenses. The Japanese were again beaten back by small arms and mortar fire, but at 5:00am they made a final effort which covered the entire eastern half of the perimeter. This last attack was quickly broken up and the Japanese quieted down. About 7:30am on the 14th, elements of Company A, 127th Infantry, began moving into the forward perimeter to reinforce Captain Fulmer's beleaguered units. The 1st Platoon of Company C and the 81-mm. mortar section also moved forward in preparation for continuing the advance. General Martin took charge of the East Sector on the same day, relocating all troops except the Nyaparake Force to the west bank of the Driniumor River. The East Sector forces were supplied by a variety of methods. Units along the coast were supported directly by small boat from BLUE Beach or by native ration trains moving along the coastal track. Supplies to the Afua area went south from the coast along the Anamo-Afua trail or, later, over the inland track from the Tadji fields through Chinapelli and Palauru. Wheeled transport was impracticable except along short stretches of the coastal track. In early June, when the Japanese ambushed many ration parties which attempted to reach Afua, experiments were made with air supply from the Tadji strips. Breakage and loss were heavy at first, but air supply rapidly became more successful as pilots gained experience and ground troops located good dropping grounds. A dropping ground cleared on the west bank of the Driniumor about 2200 yards north of Afua soon became the principal source of supply for troops in the Afua area. Communications during operations east of the Driniumor were carried out principally by radio, but between units along the river and from the stream back to higher headquarters telephone became the principal means of communication. Keeping the telephone lines in service was a task to which much time and effort had to be devoted. The Japanese continually cut the lines, or American troops and heavy equipment accidentally broke the wires. The enemy often stationed riflemen to cover breaks in the line, thus making repair work dangerous. Usually, it was found less time consuming and less hazardous to string new wire than to attempt to find and repair breaks. As a result, miles of telephone wire soon lined the ground along the trails or was strung along the trees in the Driniumor River area and back to the Tadji perimeter. Despite this adjustment, Nakai escalated pressure, advancing beyond Yakamul by month's end. In response, Gill replaced the Nyaparake Force with the 1st Battalion, 126th Regiment, which swiftly recaptured Yakamul and Parakovio. Despite initial success, Nakai's forces launched a heavy counterattack in early June, reclaiming Yakamul by June 5. In the meantime, additional Japanese units had been conducting exploratory missions inland against Afua since the beginning of the month. However, Howe's 1st Battalion ultimately succeeded in repelling them. This allowed Martin's forces to establish an outer defensive line along the Driniumor River. From there, they continued forward patrols toward the Japanese lines. While the 41st and 51st Divisions struggled to move personnel and supplies to the forward assembly area, Nakai efficiently organized a counter-reconnaissance screen along Niumen Creek to prevent East Sector troops from gathering intelligence about deployments farther east. On June 20, due to the increasingly dire situation in Western New Guinea, the 18th Army was suddenly transferred from 2nd Area Army control to the direct command of the Southern Army. Although General Terauchi's directive was to execute a "delaying action at strategic positions," General Adachi opted to adhere to his original plans for a westward offensive. He was determined to maximize the effectiveness of his forces while they still possessed fighting capability, aiming to divert as much enemy strength as possible away from the Western New Guinea battlefront. Sensing an imminent heavy enemy assault, Generals Krueger and MacArthur decided to reinforce Aitape with General Cunningham's 112th Cavalry Regiment, arriving on June 27, and Colonel Edward “Ted” Starr's 124th Regiment, expected to arrive in early July. They also expedited the shipment of the 43rd Division from its New Zealand staging area to Aitape, necessitating the establishment of Major-General Charles Hall's 11th Corps. Upon assuming command of the task force on June 29, Hall reorganized his forces and implemented several troop redeployments in preparation for the looming enemy attack. By June 30th, Adachi had completed concentrating his forces in the assembly area. Consequently, he swiftly initiated preparations for launching an attack against the Driniumor River line on July 10th. His strategy involved Colonel Nara Masahiko's 237th Regiment crossing the river and launching an assault westward towards Koronal Creek, and northwest to clear Anamo and other Paup villages. Meanwhile, the 78th and 80th Regiments were tasked with clearing the Afua area and advancing all the way to Chinapelli. Success in this endeavor would pave the way for Japanese units to advance towards the Tadji airstrips. Furthermore, a Coastal Attack Force was designated to carry out a diversionary maneuver along the coast, aiming to engage the enemy and constrain them with artillery fire. In early July, as the Japanese finalized their preparations, Hall and Martin made the decision to dispatch robust patrols east of the Driniumor to the Harech River. However, these patrols were only able to advance as far as Yakamul, where they encountered only the enemy's forward units. Consequently, on July 10th, Hall and Martin ordered the 1st Battalion, 128th Regiment, and the 2nd Squadron, 112th Cavalry to conduct a reconnaissance mission across the Driniumor. Subsequently, the infantry faced significant resistance as they pushed towards Yakamul, while the cavalry's progress was limited to about a mile due to the dense jungle terrain. Despite these efforts yielding disappointing results, a captured Japanese soldier disclosed that their attack was imminent that night. However, this critical piece of information was mistakenly disregarded by the American command, leaving Adachi and Nakai poised to launch their counteroffensive. Around midnight, the assault commenced with the 1st Battalion, 78th Regiment charging across the Driniumor River, facing Company G of the 128th Regiment along a narrow front. The Japanese attacked in two or three screaming waves, broadening the front after the first assault by throwing in the rest of the 78th Infantry and possibly elements of the 80th Infantry. Japanese reconnaissance had been good--the attackers knew the locations of company and battalion command posts all along the American defenses but not quite good enough. The enemy did not know that Company G had been reinforced during the afternoon of 10 July nor, apparently, had he discovered that the company's front was protected by low barbed wire. The attacks of the 78th Infantry were thrown back with heavy losses. Machine gun and mortar fire from the 2d Battalion, 128th Infantry, accounted for many Japanese, numbers of whom were caught as they tried to cross the barbed wire in front of Company G. According to Japanese sources, the results of American artillery fire were even more disastrous. As soon as the enemy attack had begun, the 120th and 129th Field Artillery Battalions had started firing previously prepared concentrations along the bed and east bank of the Driniumor. The Japanese units in or near the impact areas suffered heavy casualties. The 1st Battalion. 78th Infantry, was quickly reduced from 400 to 30 men, principally as a result of the American artillery fire, which also destroyed large numbers of artillery weapons, machine guns, and mortars. Despite this, the Americans, skillfully backed by artillery support, ultimately repelled them with significant casualties. Following this initial repulse, Martin concluded that a reconnaissance in force was unnecessary and ordered the units involved to retreat behind the Driniumor River. Confusion among many Japanese units, arriving late, had delayed the commencement of the 80th Regiment's attack, which was directed at Company E and was similarly pushed back. But a second wave of attackers, probably comprising the 237th Infantry and heretofore uncommitted elements of the Right Flank Unit, began pouring across the Driniumor toward Company E at approximately 0200. The new attackers overran the company command post and surrounded most of the unit's widely separated strong points. Fighting continued in the company sector for a little while, but the unit could not long withstand the overwhelming enemy pressure. Company organization and communications broke down. Worse still, the troops began to run out of ammunition. A general withdrawal commenced. By 03:00, the Japanese had breached a gap approximately 1300 yards wide in the American lines, physically occupying that territory. Fortunately, the following hours remained relatively calm as the 78th and 80th Regiments regrouped to the south to resume the offensive. This lull enabled Martin to dispatch the 1st Battalion, 128th Regiment to counterattack along the Anamo-Afua trail, aiming to reinforce the 2nd Battalion's positions. Initially encountering no resistance for the first 1500 yards, the Americans were eventually halted by intense enemy fire at 10:30, compelling them to retreat back to Tiver. This fierce opposition convinced Martin that the enemy could advance directly westward with minimal hindrance towards the Tadji strips unless he abandoned the Driniumor River line. He decided to reorganize his forces along the secondary delaying position at the X-ray River-Koronal Creek line, preparing for further counterattacks against the Japanese. Accordingly, while Company F maintained their position along the coast, the 128th Regiment began to fall back towards the creek. Further south, Cunningham opted to withdraw his cavalrymen in two stages, successfully reaching X-ray by midnight. However, communication issues delayed Howe's 3rd Battalion, with most of the unit arriving at the river the following day. A small contingent had to engage in combat with Japanese forces and couldn't reach X-ray until July 13. Despite this, Krueger and Hall disagreed with the decision to abandon the Driniumor, promptly deploying the 124th Regiment for a potential counterattack. Martin, who was instructed to hold his position, was replaced by Gill, assuming direct command of the divided covering force, now split into North and South Forces. However, before the American counterattack could commence, Nara's infantry launched an assault towards Tiver and Koronal Creek on July 12. The 128th Regiment successfully repelled them after a fierce confrontation. Meanwhile, Adachi dispatched the main body of the 41st Division and the reserve 66th Regiment towards the Driniumor, augmenting pressure on the Paup coast. To the south, Nakai's units gathered across the river near Afua and Kwamrgnirk, preparing for a final northward push. Finally, at 07:30 on July 13, the American counteroffensive commenced as the 1st Battalion, 128th Regiment swiftly moved from Tiver to Chakila, only to be ambushed by Japanese artillery. Nevertheless, precise artillery counterfire silenced most of the enemy artillery, enabling the Americans to advance eastward toward the mouth of the Driniumor. Meanwhile, the 124th Regiment under Starr's command advanced southward along the Anamo-Afua trail, facing strong opposition from the 237th Regiment. Despite encountering resistance, they managed to reach the river, although still positioned considerably north of their designated centerline. Cunningham's South Force began its eastward movement from the X-ray River at 10:00, successfully overcoming enemy positions along several stream crossings to reach the Driniumor near Afua. Consequently, all original crossing points on the Driniumor fell to the Allied forces, isolating the 20th Division and the 237th Regiment several miles west of the river's bank. By nightfall, Nara had regrouped his 237th Regiment for another assault on the 2nd Battalion, 128th Regiment. Company E demonstrated its combat effectiveness by holding firm and repelling the Japanese forces, with the rest of the battalion successfully defending against subsequent small-scale attacks, marking the conclusion of Nara's offensive actions. The following morning, Gill's forces consolidated their defensive positions along the reformed river line, albeit with a 1500-yard gap remaining in the center. Yet this all for today with Noemfoor as we now need to head over to the India-Burma theater. The final phase was coming for the Battle of Imphal. By the start of July, the reopening of the Imphal–Kohima Road facilitated the resupply of the 4th Corps, enabling them to launch an offensive against the fatigued and under-resourced troops under General Mutaguchi's command. Additionally, three brigades from General Stopford's 33rd Corps advanced from the north, swiftly joining General Gracey's 20th Division in an endeavor to reopen the Ukhrul Road. Under intense pressure, General Yamauchi's battered 15th Division units hastily abandoned Tongou and Sokpao, leading to the 80th Brigade occupying Lamu by July 2. The next day, the ailing general, who had long fallen out of favor with Mutaguchi, was carried from the battlefield on a stretcher and later died in a hospital at Maymyo. Lieutenant-General Shibata Uichi replaced him and promptly prepared the 51st and 67th Regiments to retreat. To cover their withdrawal, the newly arrived and utterly exhausted 60th Regiment was tasked with attacking towards Lamu, while General Miyazaki's troops assembled behind Ukhrul. However, the 60th Regiment was so weakened that its attacks were easily repelled, and the 67th Regiment retreated in disorder, leaving the 51st encircled. On July 8, Colonel Omoto's troops fiercely broke through the encirclement in three columns, allowing Stopford's brigades to finally overcome Japanese resistance at Ukhrul and capture the town. This forced Shibata to regroup his forces along a new line from Lungshong through Sangshak to Sakok, ultimately enabling the British-Indian forces to reopen the Ukhrul Road by July 10. With both supply roads reopened, the arrival of Stopford's brigades from the north, and the Japanese forces nearly routed, General Slim decided it was time to go on the offensive. Slim's plan involved the 33rd Corps taking over the Shenam Saddle and the Tamu–Palel Road while the 4th Corps cleared the Japanese from the Silchar Track and the Tiddim Road. On the other hand, Mutaguchi was still planning a combined attack on the Palel area involving the 15th Division, remnants of the 31st Division, and some units from the 33rd Division. Although he issued an attack order, the divisions were too battered to comply. The overall situation of the 15th Army went from bad to worse and the only hope remaining was to rally the 31st at Humine, give the troops a few days rest and then, after a reorganization, to dispatch them to the northern flank of the Yamamoto Detachment to capture Palel. In early July the 31st Division was concentrated in the area east of Myothit but discipline had disintegrated to the point that the Division could scarcely be termed a combat force. The Torikai Unit was organized with the 138th Infantry Regiment (less one battalion); the 2d Battalion, 124th Infantry Regiment and one artillery battalion to reinforce the Yamamoto Detachment. At the same time,the 15th Army ordered the 33rd Division to attack Palel from the south with the 214th Infantry Regiment. The newly formed Torikai' Unit, however, failed to join the Yamamoto Detachment and the order for the 33rd to attack Palel was never carried out. Consequently, on July 9, General Kawabe had no choice but to order preparations for a withdrawal to a line connecting the Zibyu Mountains, Mawlaik, Kalewa, and Gangaw. Mutaguchi intended to begin the retreat on July 16, directing the 15th Division towards Sittaung, the 31st Division to Thaungdut, and the 33rd Division to Tiddim, while the Yamamoto Detachment would hold the Shenam Saddle until July 24 and then retreat to the Kuntaung-Moreh line to cover the main Army's withdrawal from the Kabaw Valley. On the southwest front, General Tanaka's forces had already started retreating from the Bishenpur area, leaving a small covering force at Ningthoukhong to prevent a pursuit by the 17th Division. As a result, General Cowan's brigades made limited progress against the stubborn rearguard, ultimately securing Ningthoukhong on July 16 after heavy bombardment, coinciding with Mutaguchi's general withdrawal. By the middle of July, Japanese resistance centered on Ningthoukhong Kha Khunou. A small hamlet about 300 meters wide and 500 meters long, it lay to the immediate south of Ningthoukhong. Despite probing attacks by the 48th Indian Brigade's infantry and artillery firing on their defenses, the Japanese held on. Finally, in the early hours of 16 July, this small space was subjected to what some describe as one of the heaviest artillery concentrations yet in the Burma Campaign; in the space of an hour, approximately 9,000 shells were fired on Ningthoukhong Kha Khunou. Fortunately for the Japanese, they had withdrawn from the village just before the shelling began. By the time it ended, the village had been completely flattened and was pockmarked with waterlogged craters. And so the last Japanese stronghold in the Imphal Valley was taken. The 63rd Indian Brigade also reached and occupied the Laimanai area around the same time. The 5th Indian Division, the other division in the reconstituted IV Corps, now took over and commenced the chase of the Japanese 33rd Division down the road towards Tiddim. The 5th Division, now led by Major-General Geoffrey Evans, continued the pursuit while Stopford's brigades harassed the disordered retreat of the 15th and 31st Divisions. Despite their efforts, the 15th and 31st Divisions reached Thaungdut by early August, and the 33rd Division managed to assemble around Chikha by mid-August, under significant pressure and the serious threat of having their withdrawal route cut off. The 33rd Division distinguished itself by displaying almost superhuman fighting power and repeatedly launched counterattacks against the pursuing British-Indian 5th Division. The Yamamoto Detachment, however, had failed to cover the Yazagyo area and, in mid-August the 33rd Division found itself the vicinity of Chikha facing the serious threat of having its route of withdrawal cut by the enemy which was infiltrating into the Yazagyo area from Moreh and Shuganu through the Kabaw Valley. On the south-eastern approach to Imphal, the two armies continued to face each other on the Shenam Saddle. Yamamoto Force remained in place on these heights and the front line was still on Scraggy. It was in the second half of July that a final, concerted effort was made to evict Yamamoto Force and push it down the Tamu–Palel Road towards the India–Burma frontier. Led by the 23rd Indian Division , the operation involved five brigades in a three-pronged attack. The central thrust was by the 37th Indian Brigade on the Shenam Saddle, with the support of all available artillery and tanks; the 5th British Brigade was deployed behind it and readied to provide assistance. D-day was to be 24 July. The 1st Indian Brigade was sent through the hills on the right, to arrive behind the saddle. The two were to push the Japanese back on the road. It was hoped their withdrawal route would be cut by the 49th Indian Brigade, which would arrive on the road after looping in from the far left; the 268th Indian Brigade would be to its left, protecting its flank. Before the Japanese could retreat, the 49th Brigade had cut off General Yamamoto's withdrawal route by looping in from the far left. However, Mutaguchi had sent Colonel Sato Genpachi's reserve 61st Regiment to Tamu, which quickly counterattacked and reopened the route. Consequently, Yamamoto withdrew to Moreh, allowing Roberts to swiftly capture Nippon Hill and Scraggy. Within two days, the 23rd Division advanced down the road, forcing the Yamamoto Detachment to retreat toward Mawlaik on July 30. This marked the end of the Battle of Imphal and Operation U-Go, the Japanese Army's largest land defeat. Estimates vary, but about 30,000 Japanese soldiers died and 23,000 were injured during the operation, including 6,000 killed at Kohima and 16,000 at Imphal. Additionally, the INA lost about 2,000 dead and 2,000 wounded. On the other hand, the British-Indians suffered 16,000 casualties, with over 12,000 at Imphal. Though Mutaguchi's plan was initially effective and nearly succeeded in capturing Imphal, he underestimated the enemy's ability to resist his troops and quickly bring reinforcements. Slim's overall strategy for Imphal succeeded, as the Japanese overextended themselves from the Chindwin River to the Imphal Valley, just as he had predicted. A crucial factor in the British-Indian success was the air support, which kept the 14th Army supplied despite the road to Kohima being cut off. Ultimately, in an attempt to thwart a potential British-Indian advance into Burma, Mutaguchi's 15th Army was utterly decimated by the failed attempt to capture Imphal. This failure allowed Slim to seize the moment and launch a rapid offensive into Burma, countering the Japanese U-Go plan. The Allies thus gained the upper hand, marking the beginning of the end for Japanese control over Burma. As a final note for this week by late July, Admiral Somerville executed Operation Crimson, a coordinated naval and air assault on Japanese airfields in Sabang, Lhoknga, and Kutaraja. Departing Trincomalee on July 22, Somerville's Task Force 62, comprising two carriers and four battleships, arrived off Sabang on the morning of July 25, ready to commence the bombardment. On 5th July 1944 the carriers Victorious and Indomitable arrived in Colombo. The former sailed with Illustrious on 22 July for Operation ‘Crimson', a bombardment of Sabang by the battleships over which the carrier-borne aircraft were to provide cover and take photographs of the damage. Illustrious embarked the same aircraft as before with Victorious for a total of thirty-nine Corsairs; together they comprised 47 Naval Fighter Wing commanded by Lieutenant Commander Turnbull. The force assembled for the operation was designated TF 62 and the carriers were supported by Queen Elizabeth, Valiant, Renown, Richelieu, Nigeria, Kenya, Gambia, Ceylon, Cumberland, Phoebe, Tromp, Relentless, Rotherham, Racehorse, Raider, Roebuck, Rocket, Rapid, Quilliam, Quality and Quickmatch. The submarines Templar and Tantalus were deployed to ASR positions. The carriers operated only thirty-five miles north of Sabang, not far from the battleships, which approached their bombardment positions at 06:40. The initial launch was planned for thirty-three minutes before sunrise but this proved to be too early as the morning was exceptionally dark and the launch was delayed for five minutes. Even then it was too early and the form-up was clumsy and slow, delaying departure. The fighters were briefed to attack Sabang, Lho Nga and Kotaraja airfields but 1838 NAS made a bad landfall since maps lacked detail and no photographs were available. When the target airfields were found it was still too dark for accurate strafing but the enemy was alert and opened fire as soon as aircraft came within range. To aircrew accustomed to the excellent intelligence material by then available in the Home Fleet, this caused concern and it had to be accepted that it was difficult to obtain good targets without losing the element of surprise. At very low level on a dark morning, flying at 400 knots with flashes from antiaircraft gunfire all around, camouflaged aircraft in revetments were inconspicuous and the strafing runs were not a success. One Corsair was shot down but the pilot was rescued. Concurrently, the battleships targeted harbor facilities and military barracks at Sabang, while cruisers and destroyers shelled radar and wireless stations and engaged enemy shore batteries. After the main bombardment, the destroyers Tromp, Quality, Quickmatch, and Quilliam entered Sabang harbor, attacking Japanese positions and launching torpedoes, sustaining light damage from return fire. On the return journey, two enemy reconnaissance aircraft were intercepted and shot down by fighters. Additionally, ten Zeros attacked Somerville's convoy but were intercepted by 13 Corsairs, leading to two Zeros being shot down and another two damageFollowing this engagement, British pilots noted that the Japanese airmen were not as proficient as they had been in 1942. Although Operation Crimson's outcomes were not spectacular, Somerville's final offensive was still deemed successful enough. Due to health concerns, he was subsequently transferred to diplomatic duties at Admiral Mountbatten's request. Currently, Admiral Mountbatten was moving toward a complete rearrangement of the higher officers in SEAC. From the time of his arrival in the Far East, he had had trouble with his three commanders in chief. When the Imphal crisis arose, Mountbatten was dissatisfied with General Giffard's conduct of operations, and when he later found Giffard taking what Mountbatten considered a highly negative approach toward an aggressive conduct of operations he resolved to ask for Giffard's relief. Mountbatten's relations with Admiral Somerville had been equally difficult. Somerville had refused to treat him as a Supreme Commander and in Mountbatten's opinion tried to make him simply the chairman of a commanders-in-chief committee. As for the RAF commander, Air Chief Marshal Peirse, Mountbatten was not seeking his relief because he did not wish to change all of his principal subordinates simultaneously. After his relief, Somerville was placed in charge of the British naval delegation in Washington DC in October 1944 where he managed—to the surprise of almost everyone—to get on very well with the notoriously abrasive and anti-British Admiral Ernest King, the United States' Chief of Naval Operations. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Battle of Noemfoor was just getting started, seeing General Douglas MacArthur not giving the Japanese a moment to catch their breath. Meanwhile the battle for Imphal was finally coming to a bitter end as Mutaguchi's megalomaniac operation was clearly a disaster.
Afua Ansong reads her poem "Light in Exile" from MQR's Spring 2024 special issue African Writing: A Partial Cartography of Provocations, guest edited by Chris Abani.
We have a jam-packed episode this week. First up, we're joined by award-winning journalist, broadcaster and friend of the pod Afua Hagan (she was with the Sussexes over the weekend), who gives us a first hand account of the couple's trip to Nigeria. Also, a fiery new portrait of the King, a joint engagement for William and his Pa, a flashback to the Sussexes' wedding day six year ago, and so much more! Grab a tomato martini and tune in!--Mentioned in this episode:David Beckham's "Chick Inn" - https://www.instagram.com/p/C65_6Fmo3VJ/?hl=enRachel Makes the Sussexes' Wedding Cake - https://www.purewow.com/food/prince-harry-meghan-markle-lemon-elderflower-cakeCliveden House Review - https://www.purewow.com/travel/cliveden-house-hotel-review--Presented by PureWow and Gallery Media Group. Follow all the royal news at purewow.com/royals. Follow us on Instagram at @RoyallyObsessedPodcast.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.
Send us a Text Message.In this episode, Afua talks about her parents' split and how that affected her outlook on marriage. We also explore themes around religion ie Jehovah's witness, marriage, broken homes, friendship, parenting, mental health etc. Follow @talkative_mom and @trulytalkative on Instagram.
Rounding off this miniseries on Bodies, the incredible journalist, broadcaster and bestselling author Afua Hirsch unpacks Eurocentric beauty standards and discusses unlearning some of the myths around women's bodies. Why do western cultures think body hair is bad? How do non western cultures treat puberty and aging? Can we change how we view our bodies from our ancestors? Certainly, what we think we know about women's bodies is very narrow.Afua Hirsch is at the forefront of discussions about race, history, and culture in Britain today. Her book ‘Brit(ish)' was an award winning Sunday Times bestseller and delves into the uncomfortable truth about race and identity in Britain today. Her latest book is called ‘Decolonising My Body: A Radical Exploration Of Rituals And Beauty'. It was a 2023 political book of the year for Waterstones, described as 'ground-breaking' by Bernardine Evaristo and makes her perfect for discussing Bodies and change. Originally training as a human rights barrister, since being a journalist, Afua has presented documentaries for the BBC, been a regular contributor to Sky News debate show The Pledge and current affairs programmes including Channel 4 News, Newsnight, Question Time, and CNN. She has also written for multiple prestigious publications including British Vogue where she interviewed Rihanna! In this incredibly enlightening episode, as well as covering different cultural views on bodies, Afua and Annie discuss Afua's view of her body as a young black girl and how that has changed, a life altering moment with Oprah and why she personally wanted to unlearn and then relearn everything when it came to understanding her body.Find out more about Afua Hirsch and order her book ‘Decolonising My Body' here:www.afuahirsch.comwww.amazon.co.uk/Decolonising-My-Body-radical-exploration/dp/1529908663Other books and people mentioned in this episode:Maisie Hill - Period Powerwww.maisiehill.comLaurence Moniassewww.moniasse.com/about-meGET IN TOUCHContact us at changespod@gmail.com with your emails and voice notes.Changes is a deaf friendly podcast, transcripts can be accessed here: https://www.anniemacmanus.com/changes Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.
Afua Ansong reads “Armor of Light” for the Michigan Quarterly Review's Spring 2024 issue “African Writing: A Partial Cartography of Provocations”. Read the text for this piece on the MQR website.
Last time we spoke about the beginning of Operation Ichi-Go, the war in the Burma front and the war in New Guinea. Hundreds of thousands of IJA troops stormed countless areas in China. Chiang Kai-Shek was caught somewhat with his pants down, his best men were in Burma, there was little his defenders could do against such raw power. Xuchang fell and soon the Japanese were marching upon Luoyang. Over in Burma the British, Indian, American and Chinese alliance was continuing to both attack and defend. In the north Stilwell led the offensive, while Slim led the defensive in the south. The Chindits fought like lions to defend White City, but ultimately would give up strongholds to seek out new ones. Over in New Guinea the Japanese continued their frantic retreat under heavy pressure from the Australians. As bad as the situation was, the Japanese were in for another nasty surprise in Green Hell. This episode is the invasion of Western New Guinea Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. Last week we saw the effective conclusion of the Eastern New Guinea Campaign. It was a colossal campaign beginning with the Australian defense along the Kokoda Track, then the blood battle of Buna-Gona, the drive upon Lae-Salamaua, the march north upon the Huon Peninsula and Finisterres, and after taking Madang it was finally over. Yet while the book was closing upon Eastern New Guinea, the book on Western New Guinea was just about to be opened. The pace of the offensive against the Japanese in New Guinea accelerated greatly in the first half of 1944. This was primarily because General MacArthur feared unless he made quick progress he would lose the reins over where the allies would drive upon the Japanese home islands. MacArthur of course sought to advance upon the Philippines, while the Joint Chiefs favored the Navy's central thrust more so. Despite MacArthur's continuous war against his colleagues and superiors and his continuous complaining he lacked support, he had been provided the means to carry out numerous amphibious assaults that could lead to his ultimate goal. MacArthur's operations against New Britain, Saidor, Los Negros and Manus clearly indicated allied superiority over the Japanese in terms of men, ships and airpower. By April of 1944, MacArthur had nearly 750,000 men under his command. His major components were 6 US infantry divisions, one cavalry division, 3 separate regiment combat teams and 3 special brigades. The Australians were gradually being relegated into a secondary role, but could still provide 5 additional divisions and enough separate brigades to form another 2 divisions. General Kenney's air force had grown so large, they could now mount 200 aircraft raids against a variety of targets with little fear of Japanese retaliation. What MacArthur needed was more and more forward airfields so he could hurl fighters and bombers deeper into the Japanese inner perimeter. In a lot of respects, the Japanese position in New Guinea was all but hopeless. Although they still had more than 350,000 troops in the Southwest Pacific area, many were isolated with little chance of receiving reinforcements or supplies. There was also an enormous amount of confusion amongst the various commands, made difficult by enormous distance and the lack of effective naval power. Overall command of Japanese forces as far as Wewak was technically under Lt General Fusataro Tshima, whose HQ was at Manokwari on the Vogelkop Peninsula. It was Tshima who ordered General Adachi to withdraw his 18th Army over to the Hollandia area. Fortunately for MacArthur, Adachi procrastinated heavily, believing a landing would be made at Hansa Bay. All of the heavy bombing by the 5th air force against the coast near Wewak supported his beliefs. Not too long ago we spoke about Operations Reckless and Persecution, the invasion of Hollandia and Aitape. Admiral Barbey had already departed the staging points and rendezvous northwest of Manus Island by April 20th. The large convoys sailed west from the Admiralty Islands until dusk, whence they turned southwest towards Hollandia. Admiral Mitscher's Task Force 58 was providing escort while also launching strikes against Wakde, Sarmi and Sentani airfields on April 21st. Over the next three days the carrier aircraft neutralized the remaining airpower in the Wakde-Sarmi area. Early on the 22nd, the two task forces separated, with the Persecution Task Force heading southeast towards Aitape and the rest, designated Reckless Task Force, proceeded to a point 20 miles offshore between Humboldt and Tanahmerah Bay. Now the allied troops were ready to hit the beaches, but awaiting them was a large concentration of Japanese…however it was mostly a concentration of Japanese personnel rather than combat troops. While initial attention was focussed on the Geelvink Bay area, the 2nd Area Army command was also concerned over the weak condition of the defenses of Hollandia, which lay just east of the 140th meridian in the 8th Area Army zone of responsibility. An order to dispatch an element of the 36th Division to that sector was issued but was quickly revoked on the ground that it would weaken the defenses of Geelvink Bay without appreciably strengthening Hollandia. A large section of the New Guinea coast between Wewak and Sarmi thus remained practically undefended. General Anami promptly dispatched a staff mission to 8th Area Army headquarters at Rabaul to press for reinforcement of the Hollandia area, and a similar recommendation was communicated to Imperial General Headquarters during December. Two battalions of the 6th South Seas Detachment, temporarily stationed on Palau, were dispatched by the High Command. This force arrived in Hollandia on March 4, but numbered only 240 men, since approximately 1000 men, including the detachment commander, had been lost en route to submarine attacks. No other action was taken, however, since both 8th Area Army and 18th Army, after the loss of Finschhafen, were more immediately concerned with checking further enemy penetration of the Dampier Strait region. Thus roughly 10,000 IJA and 1000 IJN personnel were at Hollandia, most support units led by Major-General Kitazono Toyozo and aviation units from General Inada's 6th air division. When Tsihima ordered Adachi over to the Hollandia area and he procrastinated, this prompted the leader of the 2nd Area Army, General Korechika Anami over at Davao to become concerned. Anami sent his chief of staff over to Wewak to convince Adachi to pull out, but when Adachi finally began withdrawing, he only had two regiment on the trail by the time of the American landings against Hollandia and Aitape. Major General Toyozo Kitazono only arrived in the area 10 days before the invasion and for an unexplained reason never officially took command. This is why Tshima's appointed air officers, Inada ended up being thrown the command. Inada only really had 500 effective combat troops, mostly from the 6th South Seas Detachment. These units belonged to General Anami Korechika's 2nd Area Army, which had been transferred recently from Manchuria to oversee the defense of the eastern Dutch East Indies and western New Guinea, and for the projected and later canceled invasion of northern Australia. Random note, I recently made a Youtube short mocking that canceled australian invasion on my youtube channel, it was a wild idea. Thus Anami's command was now formally around the 2nd, 18th and 19th armies. Lt General Kitano Kenzo's 19th Army had been garrisoning Timor, the Lesser Sunda Islands, Sumbawa, the Banda Sea Islands and some key points in Northwestern New Guinea with their HQ located at Ambon. Lt General Tshima Fusutaro's 2nd Army as I had mentioned was assigned overall defense of Western New Guinea, with Lt General Tagami Hachiro's 36th Division landing at Sarmi and Biak in early March and Lt General Ikeda Shunkichi's 35th Division preparing to come to Manokwari. The 14th Division originally part of the 2nd Army was diverted to defender Palau. Furthermore, to further support the 2nd Area Army was Vice-Admiral Endo Yoshikazu's 9th Fleet, three southern expeditionary fleets, and the 7th Air Division of Lt General Sudo Einosuke. At Hollandia, the headquarters of Admiral Endo and Generals Kitazono and Inada had arrived at the same time by mid April. Though General Adachi had placed Kitazono in formal command of all units there, the transport commander had no time, as to develop a comprehensive defense plan for Hollandia, thus as I previously mentioned, command really fell onto Inada and Endo. The Japanese would be woefully unprepared for what was to come. Over at Aitape, meanwhile, there were only a handful of replacements from the 20th Division, along with some naval and support personnel, so the situation looked even wrose for the 1000-man garrison. Preceding the amphibious assaults, Admiral Crutchley's surface fleet was going shell the Tanahmerah Bay area while Admiral Mitscher's carrier planes bombed the waters off the Tanahmerah beaches to explode possible mines, also finishing off the Hollandia airstrips and the remaining aircraft there. Crutchley's warships picked up their landmarks through the mist as best they could, and at 6sm the roar of 8-inch guns from the heavy cruisers HMAS Australia and HMAS Shropshire shattered the silence of the steaming tropical morning. To this din was added the sharper crack of 5-inch and 4.7-inch weapons from American and Australian destroyers. The fire continued until 6:45, by which time 600 rounds of 8-inch and 1,500 rounds of 5-inch and 4.7-inch ammunition had been expended. As for the aerial strikes, despite the unfavorable weather, Task Force 58 managed to maintain planes on air alert over the Hollandia area since dawn. No enemy aircraft flew up from the Hollandia fields, and the few apparently operational planes sighted on those strips were strafed. In general there were no indications that Japanese defenses or defenders existed in the Tanahmerah Bay area. Task Force 58's scheduled bombing and strafing missions for that region were therefore canceled. Meeting little opposition, LCVP's carrying the first wave of the 19th and 21st Regiment approached Red Beach 2. As the leading wave of LCVP's, approached RED Beach 2, which was obscured by smoke from the naval bombardment, a rocket barrage was laid on the landing area by one Seventh Fleet LCI and two landing craft,, of the 542nd Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment. Machine guns mounted aboard the leading LCVP's kept up a steady fire against the beach. There was no answer from the Japanese, and the only opposition to the landing was scattered small arms and light automatic weapons fire from points far on the flanks of the beach and from a small island in Tanahmerah Bay. This fire was so quickly silenced by supporting destroyers that the assault waves suffered no casualties before reaching shore. Thus tactical surprise was achieved in Tanahmerah Bay, as the Japanese had only a few lookouts in the sector. General Irving's 24th Division successfully landed and the 3rd Battalion, 19th Infantry, quickly secured the northern portion of the beachhead and immediately dispatched patrols east and north to probe suspected enemy positions. The 1st Battalion, following the 3rd ashore, went into an assembly area to act as local reserve and to make ready to aid in unloading supplies at the water's edge if that proved necessary. The 2nd Battalion, 21st Infantry, took the southern half of Red Beach 2 with similar ease. The 3rd Battalion of that regiment quickly followed the 2nd ashore and sent Company I south to look for the trail expected to connect with Red Beach 1 at Dépapré. Simultaneously, LVT's carrying Lt Colonel Thomas Cliffords 1st battalion, 21st Regiment crossed coral barrier reefs on their way to Red Beach 1. Cliffords men landed completely unopposed and would spend an hour trying to locate the road leading to Lake Sentani and her airfields. Clifford left A Company at the beach while the rest trekked it over the Dépapré-Lake Sentani trail at 8:37am, still encountering no enemy opposition whatsoever.Moving through fire lanes down which no bullets flew and past pillboxes in early stages of construction, the battalion column reached the village of Mariboe at 1047 hours. Only a few scattered enemy rifle shots had been encountered during this march and the village was secured without opposition. Over three miles by trail inland from Dépapré, Mariboe was the 24th Division's first inland objective. It was evident from scattered Japanese equipment in and around Mariboe that the Japanese had recently evacuated the village not long before the 1st Battalion's arrival. Colonel Clifford halted his men. Since radio communication with the division command post on Red Beach 2 had been lost, he sent messengers back over the tortuous trail to report progress to General Irving. At the same time patrols were sent toward Kantomé, nearly two miles southeast of Mariboe. They reported few signs of enemy activity along the trail beyond Mariboe. Colonel Clifford apparently did not wait to re-establish contact with higher headquarters but, acting on his patrols' reports, ordered the battalion to push on. Encountering little opposition along the main trail, the unit reached Kantomé about noon. When Irving arrived to Red Beach 2 at 9;30am, he found a major logistical problem had formed at his main beachhead. Behind the narrow beach, a wide, impassable swamp was discover, it covered most of the area that the men had planned to use for the bivouac and supply dump area. Thus supplies soon began to pile up on the beach. This was an especially serious circumstance, for the landing plans had called for moving almost all troops and supplies overland from Red Beach 2 to the road inland. Construction of a road between the two beaches was soon found impracticable and when, after a day and a half of hard work, engineers had succeeded in driving a few yards of road into the hills south toward Red Beach 1, the project was discontinued. The small completed stretch did serve some useful purpose. On D-Day two batteries of 105-mm. howitzers were dragged along the road as far as possible to a cramped position on a little ridge immediately south of Red Beach 2. From this site the howitzers could deliver some fire support for troops advancing inland from Red Beach 1, but the direction of this fire was limited by a number of hills nearby. The same stretch of road also provided dispersal space for a few of the many vehicles which had been unloaded at Red Beach 2 on D-Day. Additionally, a limited dispersal area, rendered inaccessible by a small stream and by an arm of the swamp, was discovered at the northern edge of the beach, and ultimately the 542nd Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment constructed a road into this space. Artillery, ashore within an hour after the initial landing, was emplaced there to deliver fire on inland targets. But the fill used to build this road stopped the flow of the little stream which had drained the swamp into Tanahmerah Bay. To prevent a rise in the swamp's water level, a drainage canal was cut directly through the center of the beach. This procedure speeded the outward flow of swamp water, lowered the water level a little, and created a small additional dry area behind the beach, but it did not provide sufficient dry land for dispersal of all the troops and supplies scheduled to land on Red Beach 2. Eventually Irvings men found some dry flat dispersal areas behind the beach, allowing the supply shuttles to continue their work uncongested. Colonel Cliffords battalion would make the main thrust for the division while the remainder of Colonel Charles Lyman's 21st Regiment moved over to Red Beach 1. Colonel Clifford possessed little or no knowledge of the situation to the rear other than the difficulties presented by terrain. Ahead, 10,000 Japanese were thought to be concentrated around the airfields. Jangkena was on flat, swampy ground and was not an easily defensible position. Should the 1st Battalion push on to Dazai, also on flat ground, Japanese troops might outflank the unit, cut its line of communications to Dépapré, and destroy it at leisure. If the Japanese bypassed the battalion they could cut off the advance of the rest of the 21st Infantry at any one of the many defiles over the first two or three miles of the trail inland from Dépapré. Colonel Clifford therefore decided to pull his men back to Kantomé for the night, leaving only outposts along the trail east of that village. Kantomé was located near the foot of the Takari Hills, which he thought would present a serious obstacle to any Japanese flanking maneuvers. It was a fortunate decision, as around midnight elements of the 22nd Airfield Battalion had advanced overland around his 1st battalions outposts, striking at their left flank. Meanwhile, General Heavey's landing craft carrying the leading waves of the 162nd and 186th Regiments, supported by rocket fire and by Rear-Admiral Russell Berkey's cruisers, likewise met no Japanese resistance as they landed General Fuller's troops on the White Beaches. Company A of Colonel Harold Haney's 162nd Regiment rapidly secured Cape Pie while Company I of Colonel Oliver Newman's 186th Regiment secured Cape Tjeweri. With Jautefa Bay in hand, Newman's 3rd Battalion was then landed on White Beach 4 in preparation for an advance towards Leimok Hill and Pim. The first objective, Leimok Hill, lay 1,800 yards northwest of Pim. Part of the battalion secured the hill by 1000, and other elements advanced southward toward Pim. That village and its usable jetty were secured, against light opposition, by 1645, while Suikerbrood Hill, on Jautefa Bay south of Pim, was cleared by 1800. The danger that enemy troops atop dominating heights near Pim might make White Beach 4 untenable was over. The 3rd Battalion then established a night perimeter at Pim, extending its defenses along a trail leading west from that village to the point at which the Pim-Hollandia track joined the main road inland to Lake Sentani, thus securing the roadhead from which movements to inland objectives had to begin. Over at White Beach 1, Haney's 3rd Battalion advanced quickly to take Pancake Hill at around 8am, only meeting sporadic rifle fire. After taking the hill, they began pushing up the shores of Humboldt Bay, encountering no resistance as they advanced upon Jarremoh Hill. It seemed clear to the Americans, the Japanese had been taken by complete surprise, not expecting an amphibious assault against Hollandia so quickly, so they had pulled back to the Sentani Lake Airfield sector. Now further south, Haney's 2nd Battalion were advancing to a track that connected Hollandia with Pim, trying to make contact with the 3rd Battalion over at Jarremoh Hill. Meanwhile Newman's 1st Batallion was advancing upon Leimok Hill. Though the men wanted to keep pushing towards Hollandia during the late afternoon, Fuller decided to dig in for the night while warships and artillery softened up the city. When General Anami over at his HQ in Manado heard of the invasion he immediately ordered the 23rd Air Flotilla of Rear-Admiral Ito Yoshiaki to toss whatever he could against the allied surface ships and force along the beaches. He also ordered the 18th army to break through Aitape to rush over and help the Hollandia garrison and for General Tshima to dispatch a regiment force as well to Hollandia. Thus General Tagami got his 224th regiment together for the advance to Hollandia, expecting to get there for early May, while General Nakai's 20th Division continued to close in on Aitape. Anami also wanted to send the main part of the 36th Division to perform a counterattack in Hollandia's direction as he thought it vitally important to delay the enemy as much as possible so a better defense of Western New Guinea could be organized. Yet General Terauchi Hisaichi of the Southern Army declined his request to do so on the basis a counteroffensive would simply denude the already weakened defenses of Western New Guinea. Meanwhile General Doe's Persecution Task Force was carrying out their landing against Aitape. The landings would be preceded by naval gunfire from Captain Albert Noble's Destroyer force, aerial bombardment from escort carriers of Rear Admiral Ralph Davisons Task Force 78 and from General Kenney's air force. Meeting zero resistance and under the cover of a rocket barrage, the LCPR's landed the men of Colonel Francis Mason's 163rd Regiment by 6:45. Despite the lack of resistance, an immense amount of smoke and poor visibility prevented the troops from landing at Beach Blue, and instead they came ashore at Wapil. Just like at Hollandia, they had achieved tactical surprise at Aitape as the Japanese fled in a panic under naval gunfire. Mason's got his 2nd Battalion to swing west and quickly seize the Waitanan Creek while the 1st battalion was being landed. Then the 2nd Battalion formed a defensive position at the Pro Mission while the 3rd Battalion sent patrols east to establish an outpost near the mouth of the Nigia River. Back over at the beaches, General Doe landed some Australian engineers who began repairing the Tadji Fighter airstrip. The No. 62 Works Wing, Royal Australian Air Force, had come ashore at Blue Beach during the morning and had been able to start work on Tadji Fighter Strip at 1:00pm. Repairs continued throughout the night under floodlights, the lack of Japanese opposition and the urgency of the task prompting General Doe to push the work. Although it had been hoped that the strip would be ready for use on D+1, terrain conditions were such that necessary repairs were not completed on schedule. Thus it was 9:00 on April 24th before the Australian engineers, who had worked without break for almost forty-eight hours, could announce that the airstrip was ready. At 4:30pm, 25 P-40s of No. 78 Wing, RAAF, landed on the field, and the balance of the wing arrived the next day. The ground on which the fighter strip was located was so poorly drained that it was not until April 28th, after steel matting had been placed on the field, that it could be used continuously. The works wing then moved to Tadji Bomber Strip to aid the 872nd and 875th Engineer Aviation Battalions. The latter two units passed to the operational control of Wing Commander William A. C. Dale of the RAAF, who, besides commanding the works wing, was Persecution Task Force Engineer. Extensive repairs were necessary at the bomber strip and that field was not ready for use by fighter and transport planes until May 27th and for bombers until early July. While the engineers worked, Colonel Merle Howe's 127th Regiment also landed, while Mason's man expanded the perimeter further west, securing the incomplete Tadji west airstrip and the mouth of the Raihu River by the end of the day. Simultaneously, Colonel Cliffords men continued their advance from Kantomé to Sabron, whereupon, Fuller finally decided to launch his assault on Hollandia, with Colonel Haney's 2nd and 3rd Battalions rapidly moving down the ridge to seize the abandoned town by 11:15am. To the south, Colonel Newman had his 1st Battalion pursue the fleeing enemy, and in the process rapidly secured Brinkman's Plantation and then repelled a very uncoordinated Japanese counterattackby the 6th South Seas Detachment and General Kitazono's 42nd independent motor car battalion. At 8:00am on the23rd the 1st Battalion left its night positions on Leimok Hill and started out over the main track, passing through the 3rd Battalion. The movement was supported by the 205th and 218th Field Artillery Battalions, set up near Cape Pie, and by aircraft from the carriers of Task Force 58. By 9am the 1st Battalion had reached Brinkman's Plantation, about 2,200 yards by trail southwest of Pim. So far, there had been no opposition. Now Companies A and C parted from the main body to patrol northwest up the Borgonjie River. Proceeding to a fork about 2,000 yards upstream, the two companies repulsed a series of unco-ordinated attacks which were launched against the right flank of the 186th Infantry during the afternoon by a Japanese force estimated at 150. The two companies remained at the stream-branching during the night of 23-24 of April, and on the latter day they moved overland southwest to rejoin the main force on the Pim-Lake Sentani trail. Meanwhile General Inada's aviation personnel already at the Sentani airfield alongside those currently retreating there were cut off from their ration and ammunition supplies which happened to be stored near the coast. Facing the hopeless situation of having to conduct a proper defense of the airfields with less than a week's worth of rations, little small arms and machine gun ammunition, no artillery at all and with two different enemy forces converging upon them, General Inada seized full command and led the weak garrison to retreat towards Genjem. Their rear guard was proved by General Kitazono's troops. During that same afternoon, two platoons of Cliffords Company B, leading the advance from Sabron, safely crossed a small stream but soon found themselves in the middle of a well-concealed Japanese ambush on the east bank. Rifle and heavy machine gun fire made the stream's steep banks untenable, and the forward platoons hurriedly withdrew to the west, leaving four dead men behind. In response to this, Irvings artillery and Admiral Mitscher's carrier aircraft began to bomb and strafe the area, but Cliffords B Company was nonetheless unable to break through. An artillery duel emerged during the night keeping the men of the 1st Battalion wide awake. They were also being supplies with great difficulty via hand-carry over the Dépapré-Lake Sentani trail. Fortunately the 24th Division's plans for the Hollandia operation had taken into consideration many of the potential logistic problems that might be encountered in the Tanahmerah Bay area. The division G-4 Section had made a detailed study which had shown that a full infantry regiment could be supplied by hand-carry from Red Beach 2 over the Dépapré-Lake Sentani trail inland as far as Jangkena. When no road connecting Red Beach 2 with Red Beach 1 had been found, the division moved the main supply point to Dépapré, from which the advance inland would be supported. With this change in plans, the G-4 Section undertook new computations and calculated that the hand-carry distance could be extended to Dazai. This conclusion was based on the assumption that adverse weather conditions would not make the Dépapré-Lake Sentani road nearly impassable. On 23 April heavy rains started to turn the road into a quagmire through which struggling men could scarcely carry their own equipment and food, to say nothing of extra supplies for the leading battalion. By evening on that day logistic support of the 21st Regiment had therefore become a major problem. There was no question but that the regiment would have to be supported by hand-carry, for it was estimated that at least two weeks' hard work by engineers would be required before the road from Dépapré as far as Mariboe could be made passable even for jeeps. But the 1st Battalion had already advanced east of Dazai, beyond which point, according to the G-4 estimates, support by hand-carry would be next to impossible. Because of the logistical issues, General Eichelberger decided to make the Humboldt Bay area the principal task force landing site, allowing the 41st division to drive further inland. On the 24th, Newman's 3rd Battalion passed through the 1st and seized the Koejaboe area, only stopping there until the 2nd battalion came over to reinforce the continued advance. During this action however, most of the Japanese continued their retreat towards Genjem unmolested. Over in the west, Irving ordered Clifford to consolidate his forward positions around Sabron and Dazai as he now realized the continued rapid advance inland was no long possible as a result of their hand-carry logistics scheme and the weather was taking quite a turn for the worse hampering air drops. Back over at Aitape, Mason's troops crossed the Raihu and by midday the 2nd Battalion secured the town. However General Doe was dissatisfied with the pace of the westward advance, and he therefore suggested to Alamo Force that the 163rd's commander, Mason be relieved. This step was approved by General Krueger, although the regimental commander remained in control of his unit until 9 May, only two days before the 163rd Infantry began loading for another operation. For the next few days, the 163rd patrolled further inland and would fall into a heavy engagement at Kamti on the 29th. At the Kapoam villages, about twelve miles up the Raihu, elements of the 3rd Battalion encountered the only signs of organized Japanese resistance found in the Aitape area to 4 May. At one of these villages, Kamti, some outpost troops of the 3rd Battalion were surrounded by an estimated 200 Japanese who made a number of harassing attacks on 28 and 29th. These skirmishes cost the battalion 3 men killed and 2 wounded, while it was estimated that the Japanese lost about 90 killed. On the 25th, Colonel Lymann's two forward battalion resumed their march, heading through some dense jungle being met by sporadic enemy small arm fire. They eventually dug in around the vicinity of Julianadorp. Meanwhile Colonel Newman had his 3rd battalion advancing west along the main road to Nefaar while some LVT's transported his 1st battalion over Lake Sentani to a point on the western shore of Nefaar. Neither force faced much opposition and together would perform some patrolling of the Cyclops Drome during the afternoon. Back over at Aitape, Colonel Howe's 127th Regiment finished their occupation of Tumleo, Seleo and the Ali Islands and now were beginning to send patrols east towards Afua. On the 26th, Colonel Newman had his 1st Battalion seize the Cyclops Drome while his 2nd Battalion took some LVTS to capture the Sentani Drome. Shortly after midday both Battalions rapidly secured the airdromes under light enemy resistance. Despite a serious supply situation, Lyman's 1st and 3rd Battalion resumed the advance, only encountering one enemy bunker at Ebeli Plantation. It had been impossible to drop supplies from the air on April 25 and even hand-carrying had been stopped late in the afternoon by heavy rains which had flooded many small streams. Parts of the Dépapré-Lake Sentani trail were now knee deep in water. The two forward battalions were low on ammunition, and they would have to go on half-rations if the supply situation were not quickly improved. But General Irving was again optimistic about the weather, believing that air supply would be successful on the 26th. Furthermore, he had received information which indicated that the Japanese were evacuating the airfield area. For these reasons he considered that a continuation of the advance would not be unduly hazardous. In ordering the advance, the division commander was knowingly pushing his men far beyond the limit at which they could be supplied by hand-carry. If the airdrop should again fail or if track conditions should not improve, one of the two forward battalions would probably have to be echeloned back along the trail to augment the carrying parties, and the advance would probably have to be halted. Should enemy opposition prove stubborn, the forward battalions might have to withdraw, perhaps as far as Dazai, to replenish their meager supplies of rations and ammunition. General Irving was taking a calculated risk which assumed the success of the airdrop and an absence of determined Japanese opposition. By the afternoon of the 26th, the Hollandia Drome was secured after a successful airdrop at Dazai. After this the objectives of Reckless had been achieved. Mop up operation would continue up until June 6th, as Fuller's 41st Division cleared out Cape Soedja and the Cyclops Mountain. They would end up flushing out Japanese on Hill 1000 and Irving's 24th Division sent out patrols west towards Marneda, Demta Bay and Gemjem. By 6 June the they had all killed 405 Japanese and had taken 64 prisoners in the Genjem-Demta region. Many more Japanese were found dead of starvation or disease along the trails in the same area. During the same time period, Eichelberger's task force would develop Hollandia into a major base from which future operations would be support. In the end casualties for Operation Reckless amounted to 124 deaths, 1057 wounded and 28 missing for the Americans. The Japanese suffered 3300 deaths, 661 captured. On April 30th, 7220 Japanese from Hollandia's garrison would assemble at Genjem where General Inada began a gradual withdrawal in 11 echelons towards Sarmi. By May 7th, all echelons departed Genjem for a very long march through some of the worst terrain in New Guinea. Two-thirds of the garrison reached the Tor River by June. It's estimated 93% of their strength would succumb to the deadly jungles, lack of provisions and rampant cases of malaria. Meanwhile to secure the Tadji airstrips against Japanese attacks from the direction of Wewak, Colonel Howe sent Company C by boat to Nyaparake on April 28th where they set up outposts further inland around Charov and Jalup. By May 4th, further patrolling by the 127th regiment had discovered no trace of organized enemy units, thus Operation Persecution was successfully completed. During the operation 525 Japanese were killed, 25 were captured while the Americans suffered 19 deaths and 40 wounded. That is all for the New Guinea front as we are now traveling over to New Britain. After the Battle of Talasea and the area was secured, Colonel Smith reached the conclusion that the enemy was withdrawing as rapidly as possible to Cape Hoskins. He decided to send patrols to Numundo Plantation. A reconnaissance patrol on March 10th found enemy positions at Bola and Santa Monica Plantation evacuated, but came upon entrenched enemy at Garilli. On 11th Captain Andrew Haldane's Company K left Bitokara with orders to proceed to Numundo on a three-day patrol, a time estimate that was to prove too optimistic. Company K reached Garilli to find it empty of the enemy, but just north of Patanga encountered Japanese small-arms, automatic-weapons and mortar fire. For four days the Marine patrol made slow progress, fighting an enemy who made a stand in the heavy vegetation approximately every 200 yards and then withdrew effectively before the advance guard flankers could close in. On the evening of the 16th the company entered Kilu where the Japanese made their final stand. While the two forces battled, a Marine landing craft appeared offshore and as it approached the beach the enemy diverted what apparently was a 75mm field gun from the ground action to the "naval force". In the boat was Lieutenant Colonel Deakin who had obtained permission from Colonel Smith to transport a section of 81mm mortars to Captain Haldane's assistance. Although the Japanese bracketed the craft, they failed to hit it and the weapons were landed without casualties. Shortly after the heavy mortars began lobbing shells toward the enemy, the Japanese broke contact and the Marines reached Numundo 48 hours later without finding the Terunuma Detachment again. The 1st Battalion also set up an ambush at Garu which was productive of enemy dead and prisoners for awhile. Company I replaced Company K at Numundo and in turn was replaced on 25 March by the 2nd Battalion. Inasmuch as the enemy continued to straggle eastward singly and in small groups with little or no communications, patrols were kept busy returning over and over again to the same villages and plantations in hopes of catching unwary Japanese. Such hopes frequently paid off. On the 30th the 2nd Battalion moved southeast from Numundo to San Remo Plantation, described by one Marine as "a very pleasant place." From that point patrols probed westward to the Kulu River and eastward into the Cape Hoskins area as far as Buluma. Overall the patrols saw 3 men killed with 8 wounded while accounting for 151 Japanese killed and 68 taken prisoner. Meanwhile, Matsuda, Komori and Terunuma;s Detachments all were performing withdrawals. Komori dispatched his force to the rendezvous point in successive echelons. He himself left Didmop with the rear guard, back on February 28th, reaching Augitni via Vakan on March 1st. The following morning he started his hospital patients along the evacuation route and sent a detail of 250 men to Bulawatni to help transport provisions. Yet the Marines at Iboki were becoming increasingly troublesome, though quite unaware that they faced anything more than starving stragglers. When Company A, 1st Marines entered Talawaga on the 5th, Colonel Sato felt the hot breath of pursuit on his neck and moved to the trail fork where he assumed command of the combined force. The next morning the Komori Group resumed its withdrawal in a northwesterly direction along the right prong of the trail fork, while Sato prepared to follow with his command on the 7th. At this point the ways of these two officers parted, and thenceforth each pursued his individual course toward the destiny that awaited him. On the 6th the Komori Group, with Major Tobuse's 1st Battalion, 141st Infantry in the lead, covered 16 km's on the trail running northeast from the fork toward the coast to reach what the Japanese called the "North Road." After the first day on the trail, Komori's progress becomes difficult to follow, owing to his use of place names occurring in no other reports or maps. It was slow and difficult at best, because of rain and mud, and the necessity for wide detours to find fords through deep streams and safe passages through or around extensive swamps. His immediate force numbered about 200, and on March 8th he recorded the Tobuse Battalion a half-day's march ahead. He sighted occasional enemy reconnaissance planes, and on the 12th U.S. landing craft fired upon his men as they attempted to cross the Kuhu River, obliging them to take to the jungle and swamps. The broad Via River stopped his force on the 14th. When improvised rafts refused to float, the major and 15 others swam across. The rest, through weakness or timidity, declined to follow this excellent example, and it took two days and a wide detour inland to get the whole group to the right bank. Then, on the 17th, provisions ran out. Thus the weakening men came by painful stages to Kometto (Eleanora Bay) and the welcome coconuts of Linga Linga Plantation on the 21st. But the wide Kapuluk River posed a formidable obstacle to further progress. They tried first to swim the Kapuluk near its mouth, but 18 men of the 2nd Company were swept away and 12 of them drowned, only the captain reaching the far bank safely. A patrol far upstream failed to find any fording point, so the troops spent the rest of the day building rafts. These managed to stay afloat, but broke apart so frequently that another two days were required for the passage. Then came the real heartbreaker on the 24th: they reached Kou only to find the provisioning post evacuated. On the 25th an officer patrol encountered a U.S. patrol, and once more the group had to detour. On the 26th Komori hired a native to guide him to Numundo Plantation, at the eastern base of the Willaumez Peninsula. But evidently the man had a change of heart, for the major recorded next day that, lacking a guide, "we advanced using a compass." They now entered a region of extensive swamps, intersected by another major obstacle: the two-pronged Kulu river. The column got across this stream on the 27th, but lost five more men in the swift current. The survivors emerged from the swamps on the 29th and followed the river southward. On the 31st Komori made his final diary entry, eloquent in its stark simplicity: "We are very tired and without food." Apparently at this point malaria laid the major low. Ordering his men to continue toward Cape Hoskins, he took refuge in a native village, accompanied only by his executive officer, his orderly and a corporal attached to his headquarters. For lack of further diary entries, obscurity shrouds the last week of his life. Most of the Japanese forces reached Malalia by the end of March, but Marine patrols were becoming increasingly troublesome. On the 11th, elements of the 1st Marines landed at Linga Linga, patrolling further inland. Company E landed at the Kulu River mouth at the base of Willaumez Peninsula. There the Marines encountered 4 enemy stragglers, killing three and taking one prisoner. Then they moved westward to Kandoka, where they were joined by two platoons of Company F, brought over by boat. There they established a roadblock, just in time to catch Sato's rear echelon. Second Lieutenant Richard B. Watkins was in command of the trail block. At 9am Watkins led his group inland from the village over some faint trails which he hoped the Japanese main body might be using. The Marines had proceeded about a mile and a half and were about to cross a stream in a sparsely wooded area when they sighted two Japanese standing with slung rifles, apparently resting. Watkins had about decided to dispose of these when they moved off in a northeasterly direction, followed almost immediately by a large body of their compatriots. Lying where the Japanese could easily have spotted them, the Marines counted the 73 enemy soldiers and noted the equipment cited above. Conspicuous among them was a tall, burly officer being carried on a litter. The Japanese were cutting fresh trail through the jungle, and fortunately were too intent on their work to discover the patrol. They made excruciatingly slow progress, however, and Watkins did not dare to move until the last man had disappeared. He then returned with all speed to Kandoka, sending a runner ahead with his report. At the village he met Major Brush who had come over from Yaluiai with one squad on what he had intended as merely a routine inspection. He promptly radioed his command post to send a rifle platoon and a 60mm mortar section to the scene and ordered Watkins to hold the trail block with one rifle squad, one machine-gun squad and two mortar squads while he himself set off with the rest of the troops available in an effort to overtake the Japanese from the rear. Before his own departure that morning, Watkins had sent a six-man patrol under Sergeant Frank Chliek to an inland village some two miles south of Kandoka, right where the Japanese appeared to be heading. The lieutenant promptly dispatched a native messenger there with a warning; then, when firing broke out in that direction, he surmised, correctly, that Chliek had become engaged and took the remaining rifle squad and hurried to his assistance. He arrived to find the sergeant and his men crouched on high ground by the east-west trail with dead Japanese all around them. The volume of fire was intense, the pattern not at all clear. As it turned out, Chliek had stumbled upon the column somewhere near its head and, taking advantage of his superior position, immediately opened fire. Major Brush's force, which had been closing rapidly, was on the opposite side of the valley at this time; hence, at sound of the first shots, had hastened to the scene and struck the Japanese column's other flank. In order to avoid becoming involved in a fire fight with that group, Watkins ordered Chliek's patrol back to Kandoka and followed with his own squad at a slower pace. Brush caught up with him shortly, whereat a counting of heads showed that, miraculously, the Marines had not sustained a single casualty. Here is the aftermath as Watkins recalls it: “On the following morning I took a 20 man patrol through the battle area. We counted 55 dead including 3 officers. It was quite easy to believe that perhaps 20 more died in scattered positions throughout the dense underbrush. The dead were all within a 100 yard stretch of trail. We encountered 2 more Japanese who had evidently just come upon the scene who were sitting side by side staring dazedly at the destruction and did not even turn their heads when we approached.” The burly officer previously observed on a litter proved to be Colonel Sato. Evidently Sergeant Chliek's patrol had struck the enemy column at precisely the point where he was being carried, for the colonel had only had time to leap to his feet and draw his sword to fight back before the Marines' fire riddled him. Seeing their leader fall, those Japanese farther forward took off in mad flight, while those behind were cut off by the converging of the two patrols. Thus perished one of the few Japanese to deserve much credit for the performance of the 65th Brigade on New Britain. Although the rear echelon attacked by the two patrols comprised less than half of Sato's total force, the group, as such, ceased to exist with the death of the leader who alone had held it together. Units split into components, these into smaller parties, straggling eastward over a variety of trails, often hacking their own way by compass azimuth. Throughout April, the 17th Division continued their retreat towards Rabaul, managed to repel multiple marine patrol attacks around Cape Hoskins. General Sakai's survivors finally got to Rabaul between April 16th and May 15th, erecting the last bulwark of defense for the South Pacific. On April 6th, the journey of another Japanese commander came to an end. The body of the already deceased Major Komori was captured at the San Remo Plantation by the 2nd Battalion, 5th marines. They came upon the outpost, suddenly face to face with a group of four bedraggled Japanese. It was one of those abrupt encounters that allow little time for reflection or deliberation. The flurry of fire that followed killed three of the enemy and wounded the fourth, who promptly surrendered. Komori had apparently died of malaria along the way. For the 5th Marines, too, was nearing its journey's end, so far as New Britain was concerned. With promotion of the regimental commander, Lieutenant Colonel Buse took over on an acting basis, and General Smith returned to Cape Gloucester to relieve General Shepherd as Assistant Division Commander. Units attached to the regiment followed, and representatives of the Army's 185th Infantry arrived to inspect positions preparatory to replacing the 5th, just as other 40th Infantry Division elements were doing in the Cape Gloucester area with a view toward relieving the entire 1st Marine Division. Last clash of the campaign occurred onthe 22nd of April, when a 2/5 patrol intercepted a party of Japanese, killing 20, including two officers, and suffering the regiment's last fatality on New Britain. Three days later the whole 185th RCT moved into Talasea and San Remo, and at 1530 command of the area formally passed to the Army. LCM's carrying the 1st and 3rd Battalions back to Borgen Bay cleared Talasea at 1630, followed by those carrying 2/5 from San Remo at 2000. The movement was reported complete at 1930 on the 26th, and men of the 5th learned that the 1st Marines had departed this island of evil memory the previous day and that they would follow as ships became available. Soon they would be relieved by Major-General Isaac Rapp Brush's 40th Division, which took responsibility for Cape Gloucester, Arawe and Talasea by the end of April. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Thus Operation Reckless and Persecution were both successful. Now MacArthur had a strong foothold in Western New Guinea seeing the Japanese continued their frantic retreat wherever allied forces seemed to pop up. Over in New Britain, the Japanese were losing formidable commanders as they too were on the retreat, things were simply disastrous for the empire of the rising sun.
Today, Trae is excited to connect with Afua Kouyaté. We'll get an update on the development project for the African Cultural Arts Center (ACAC). Next, Trae sits with Maria Falcon, Program Officer of KD Hall Foundation. She'll tell us more about their Girls on the Rise program and their upcoming leadership cohort.
Embark on an enlightening journey with the ever-inspiring Adrienne Afua Coddette, straight from Ottawa's vibrant heart. She brings a burst of energy to our latest episode, where she shares her personal revelations about morning rituals, intention setting, and the transformative power of self-expression. As the sun rises, we discuss the subtle art of balancing social ties and cherished moments of solitude, all while honouring our individual paths and the diverse ways we each pursue self-awareness.Adrienne's story is a tapestry woven with threads of music, culture, and advocacy, artfully connecting the dots between the pioneering days of hip-hop and the importance of community-based activism. We reminisce about the '83 to infinity' installation, the cadence of student-led protests, and the creation of empowering spaces for young black voices. Through Adrienne's experience, we learn how familial challenges and the quest for education not only shape our guest's resilience but also fuel her purpose as an educational assistant and community advocate.As we steer through the poignant narratives of loss, caregiving, and overcoming adversity during the pandemic, Adrienne's heartening stories underscore the significance of community in times of crisis. From the profound embrace of grief to the jubilant celebration of life, we are reminded of the enduring human spirit and the solace found in shared experiences. This episode promises not just a reflection on individual triumphs but also a collective journey of healing, growth, and joy that can be discovered even amidst life's most challenging chapters. Join us as we share in the laughter, the tears, and the wisdom that emerge from living life with intention and grace.Check out more about Adrienne "Afua" Coddette hereClick here Remember, the strongest thing you can do for yourself is to ask for help.Please help us grow by subscribing to and sharing the Lift OneSelf podcast with others.The podcast's intention is to dissolve the stigmas around Mental Health and create spaces of healing.I appreciate you, the listener, for tuning in and my guest for sharing.Our websiteHttps://.LiftOneself.comFind more conversations on our Social Media pageswww.facebook.com/liftoneselfwww.instagram.com/liftoneselfMusic by prazkhanalRemember to be kind to yourself.
Is it going to take over the world and make nonprofit work obsolete? Some peeps seem hyped, while others wanna unplug the mainframe, Office Space-style.
Tune in for an amazing conversation with Claire Afua Jorgensen, marriage and relationship coach, as she shares the key to saving your relationship during troubled times. She says, “A relationship is only as healthy as the two people in it” and believes that both partners have to be willing to do the work. Listen as … Read more "S6. Episode 10: Can our Relationship be Saved? with Claire Afua Jorgensen"
OPEN HEAVENSMATALA LE LAGI MO LE ASO LULU 13 MATI 2024 Manatu Autu: O le tulaga siitia e afua mai I le faitaulaga (With greatness comes sacrifice). Tauloto – 1 Korinito 15:10 ‘A o le alofa tunoa o le Atua ‘ua ‘ou fa‘apenei ai a‘u; o lona alofa tunoa fo‘i o ‘iā te a‘u, e lē fa‘alēaogāina lea, a ‘ua sili la‘u galuega ‘iā latou uma; a o le alofa tunoa o le Atua ‘ua ‘iā te a‘u... ' Faitauga - Tusi Paia: Faataoto 13:1-4 Upu FolafolaNa asiasi mai lo'u tama faaleagaga I lo'u fale I le 1975. Ua ma tatalo I lea po, ona o uma lea o tagata e momoe, o lou manatu lea na iai. Peitai ina ua ou alu I le faleletaua I le 10 I le po, ae ou vaaia lou Tama o lo'o tatalo. I le 5 I le vaveao ao ou tulai I le faleletaua, na ou vaaia o lo'o tatalo pea I ona tulivae. Ina ua malama le taeao, na ou talanoa I lo'u Tama pe iai se faafitauli aua o lou lava manatu a tatalo umi se tagata o lona uiga e iai se faafitauli. Na ataata ma faapea mai, ‘e leai se faafitauli, aua e te popole, o le a vave ona e malamalama I se taimi lata mai'. Ua matua faateia a'u ona o le leai o se faafitauli ae ua alu le po o tatalo. Ua ou iloa foi ua faapea mai le Atua ia te a'u ou te faataitai ia te ia. E iai se faifeau na sau ia te au ma faapea mai, ‘na amata faatasi la tatou savaliga, na tutusa lelei o tatou tulaga, ao lenei ua mamao a lau alu I luma, faasoa mai le mea lilo'. Ua ou fai atu iai, ‘e leai ma se mea ese o ou faia tou te le iloa, ou te anapogi, tatalo ma leoleo I le tatalo. Afai e te fia manao e pei o au, faataitai iai. E iai se tamaloa mai seisi Ekalesia na tatalo faapea, ‘le Atua, foai mai iai te au le 10% o mea o lo'o faia e Pastor Adeboye, ona ou malie lea'. Ona fai lea iai o le Atua, ‘fai le mea o lo'o faia e ia ona ou avatu lea o le mea ua ou foai ia Adeboye' Ua ia fesili I le Atua, ‘o le a lana mea o lo'o faia?'. Fai mai le Atua, ‘na ia amata I le tatalo ma le anapogi mo aso e 40'. Ona ia faapea mai lea, ‘Le Atua, ua lava ia a'u I le tulaga o lo'o iai nei'. Na o I latou e mafai ona faitaulaga e siitia maualuga. E le mafai ona siitia maualuga oe pe afai na o le fafaga lava o lou tino I meaai ma fafaga lou mafaufau I mea faafiafia, o mea na e faamalie ma faafiafia, e mo se taimi puupuu. O se tagata e tele faafitauli tau tupe e mafai ona matamata I ata tifaga malie ma ata ai, ma e ono foliga o se tagata fiafia, ae a uma le tifaga, e toe foi lava e faafesagai ma faafitauli. O mea faafiafia o le olaga e aunoa ma le faitaulaga, e mo se taimi pu'upu'u, tago e totogi le tau ina ia ausia le faamoemoega autu o lou olaga, ia faaeaina ma siitia maualuga. O le maualuga lava o se fale, o le loloto foi lena e tatau ona eli e le tufuga ina ia malosi ma mautu le faavae. O mea e siitia oe I luga I lenei olaga, o mea e te faia e leiloa mai e nisi. O le ala e te tatalo ai ma anapogi, aoga, faigaluega ae leiloa mai e tagata e fua iai le maualuga e siitia oe iai. Galue e totogi le tau ona e maua lea o le taui o le siitia maualuga, I le suafa o Iesu, Amene.
More chat with Afua Hirsch and her sister Ama, from their visit to Andi and Miquita's table. We hear more about Ama's work as a child and educational psychotherapist, why Roger Federer's parents were staying in Afua's old bedroom, and much more, including Miquita's specially prepared drink, and more on Andi's recipe. An Offscript Production, and YaYa Production. Produced buy Tayo Popoola. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.
Journalist, Author, Presenter and Academic Afua Hirsch is invited around to join Andi and Miquita for a Friday night feast of lamb, frigola, turnip puree, leek tops and lamb broth, from Andi and the team, and a delicious spring spritzer from Miquita. Afua brings her sister Ama, an educational and child psychologist. The two sisters discuss their close relationship, their upbringing in South West London, parenting, and embracing their Ghanaian heritage. Afua also talks about her book "Decolonising My Body" and her recent BBC series "Africa Rising". the conversation ranges from the importance of representation, paying it forward, embracing ageing, flirting with Donell Jones, the importance of Usher on Afua's career, and of course there is at least one mention of Oprah. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.
I lost my GWR login details - Afua on why she didn't disclose sing-a-thon outcome --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/ksspod/support
Meet our new non-resident podcast fellows! Tune in today to hear short introductions to our fellows: Ami Tamakloe and Afua "Fu" Asiedu, Gopolang Botlhokwane, Expédit Ologou, and Basil Ibrahim. We're looking forward to sharing their amazing episodes this spring - stay tuned! Find the books, links, and articles we mentioned in this episode on our website, ufahamuafrica.com.
Song: Fast Car which Tracy remarked, "It's not about a car." which I remember but can't find a citation. Showing my work: Continued to tweak and work over the Birth Prep Prenatal offering. What on your mind, fears, what don't you understand ex newborn medications Pelvic floor or personal anatomy specifics. Ex do you habitually always cross your legs one way? How has that affected your body balance? VBAC Assessment (hit this sooner rather than later) link to book (H-town peeps or virtual) Ancestor Shrine: I tend to use altar and shrine interchangeably, and while they aren't exactly the same, for me it's close enough. Growing up in El Paso, Ofrendas were a thing, and part of daily life both around 11/2 and all year around I've been super blessed with many teachers, and those who taught me the most about ancestor work have been Elena Avila, Woman Who Glows in the Dark, a curandera from my hometown. My Dutch grandmother Annekae, a professional wise woman. Afua Hassan, And FF (in the Ifa tradition.) I have a couple of altars in my spaces, in my workspace I have invited my grandmother to be with me and guide me. I also realized I had a low-key altar to Afua, and I wanted to snaz it up. A song that inspired me to dive deeper into understanding domestic violence and my privilege, and somehow connected me to Afua, and wanting to show up for pregnant people who may be low-resourced and in harm's way. A birth revolution and body autonomy are how I choose to represent, with Mama Afua on my mind. Wrap-up: As always, you know you best. Get your learn on from me and other teacher guides and community, and make the best decisions for you. Hopefully Helping, Rowan PS Join my love letter recipients. PPS Tracy Chapman newsletter --- Send in a voice message: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/pcbc/message Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/pcbc/support
Afua took advantage of her school's motto to 'Aim High', and was the first person from her school in 10 years to get into Oxbridge. Over the years, she has gone on to craft a career she loves. Through Sambamba Consulting and Coaching, she uses her professional training and experience in coaching, education and consulting to empower ambitious individuals to take action at critical points in their education, career and life, to craft their own destinies and honour their true selves. Her career coaching clients are typically women in the mid stages of their career, looking to pivot or progress, to get to where they really want to be. Her consulting work with schools helps students to make more informed career decisions, and high achieving students to increase their chances of success when applying to Oxbridge. Follow Afua on Linkedin: https://lnkd.in/e4d-pNxd Follow Sambamba on instagram:https://lnkd.in/ef2kXaGS Sambamba website: https://lnkd.in/eXfd-J3w Subscribe to our YouTube channel https://youtube.com/thesoundofaccrapodcast Listen to the podcast https://linktr.ee/thesoundofaccrapod Connect on Social Media TikTok: https://www.tiktok.com/@thesoundofaccra Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/thesoundofaccra Twitter: https://twitter.com/thesoundofaccra Linkedin: https://www.linkedin.com/company/the-sound-of-accra/ Facebook: https://facebook.com/thesoundofaccra Get in Touch Contact: https://thesoundofaccra.com/contact/ Website: https://www.thesoundofaccra.com Free Courses and Podcasters Community Free Podcast Course https://skl.sh/2TRY0fN Free Podcasters Community https://atozpodcasting.com/community Level up as an entrepreneur and creative https://skl.sh/35oWwj6podcast If you are interested in learning podcasting, head over to https://www.atozpodcasting.com where Adrian and his team conducts podcast training. If you have feedback for the season or would like to share what you would like to hear from The Sound of Accra Podcast, please email info@thesoundofaccra.com with the subject 'Podcast feedback'
Thursday Trae sits with Afua Kouyate, the Visionary for African Cultural Arts Center. She'll share the opportunity for the community to pour into the effort to open their doors. Next, it's another This 'N That Thursday with our Resident Stylist, Jerica T. Tune in to see what she's sharing today!
This week, we're thrilled to be joined by royal commentator and award-winning journalist Afua Hagan to discuss the U.K.'s reaction to the Charles and Kate health news, Fergie's diagnosis, the next time we might see the Prince of Wales and so much more. In other news this week, Prince Harry and Duchess Meghan pop up for a surprise appearance at the Bob Marley movie premiere in Jamaica. We also have an uplifting Princess Diana flashback, Princess Eugenie at Paris Fashion Week, John Travolta and so much more! Grab something with whiskey (that'll warm you right up!) and tune in!--Mentioned in this episode:Afua Hagan on Instagram - https://www.instagram.com/afuathescot/Princess Diana-esque Earrings - https://www.shopbop.com/cooper-earrings-jennifer-zeuner-jewelry/vp/v=1/1533889800.htmNYT Princess Diana article - https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/21/theater/diana-the-crown-spencer.html?unlocked_article_code=1.QE0.VG_a.OCCXMun3Om1V&smid=url-sharePrince Edward x the Turtle - https://people.com/prince-edward-meets-192-year-old-tortoise-who-met-queen-elizabeth-1947-8548335--Presented by PureWow and Gallery Media Group. Follow all the royal news at purewow.com/royals. Follow us on Instagram at @RoyallyObsessedPodcast. See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.
Learn how you can pivot and progress in your career and personal life, and turn your potential into performance, with Careers and Life Coach Afua Kudom. Afua Kudom is a certified personal performance and life coach, a Careers Consultant at Queen Mary University of London and founder of Sambamba Consulting and Coaching, where she specialises in coaching those seeking to pivot and progress in their careers. She took advantage of her school's motto to 'Aim High', and was the first person from my school in 10 years to get into Oxbridge. Over the years, she has gone on to craft a career she loves. Through Sambamba Consulting and Coaching, she uses her professional training and experience in coaching, education and consulting to empower ambitious individuals to take action at critical points in their education, career and life, to craft their own destinies and honour their true selves. Her career coaching clients are typically women in the mid stages of their career, looking to pivot or progress, to get to where they really want to be. Her consulting work with schools helps students to make more informed career decisions, and high achieving students to increase their chances of success when applying to Oxbridge. Follow Afua on Linkedin: https://lnkd.in/e4d-pNxd Follow Sambamba on instagram:https://lnkd.in/ef2kXaGS Sambamba website: https://lnkd.in/eXfd-J3w Subscribe to our YouTube channel https://youtube.com/thesoundofaccrapodcast Listen to the podcast https://linktr.ee/thesoundofaccrapod Connect on Social Media TikTok: https://www.tiktok.com/@thesoundofaccra Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/thesoundofaccra Twitter: https://twitter.com/thesoundofaccra Linkedin: https://www.linkedin.com/company/the-sound-of-accra/ Facebook: https://facebook.com/thesoundofaccra Get in Touch Contact: https://thesoundofaccra.com/contact/ Website: https://www.thesoundofaccra.com Free Courses and Podcasters Community Free Podcast Course https://skl.sh/2TRY0fN Free Podcasters Community https://atozpodcasting.com/community Level up as an entrepreneur and creative https://skl.sh/35oWwj6podcast If you are interested in learning podcasting, head over to https://www.atozpodcasting.com where Adrian and his team conducts podcast training. If you have feedback for the season or would like to share what you would like to hear from The Sound of Accra Podcast, please email info@thesoundofaccra.com with the subject 'Podcast feedback'
Joining Iain Dale on Cross Question this evening are Conservative MP and Defence Select Committee Chair Robert Courts, Labour's Shadow Environment Secretary Steve Reed, broadcaster Afua Hagan and comedian Geoff Norcott.
When Afua Hirsch hit forty years old, she had an encounter that made her rethink her own, and society's, attitudes towards body image and ancestry. That's now the basis of her new book Decolonising My Body, which follows her year-long journey through what she calls “Radical Unlearning”.In this episode of the Standard, Sagal Mohammed talks to Afua about her book, and we have an exclusive extract from the audiobook version involving a life-changing encounter with Oprah Winfrey. You can find the video of this interview on our Youtube channel and there's also a further extract from the book at standard.co.ukExtracted from ‘Decolonising My Body: a Radical Exploration of Rituals and Beauty', by Afua Hirsch, published by Square Peg at £20. Copyright Afua Hirsch 2023 Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.
Afua Bruce is a leading public interest technologist whose work sits at the fascinating intersection of technology, policy, and society. Afua has an impressive history of serving her country and her community through various roles, demonstrating the powerful impact that technology can have when used for the public good. Her career started in the tech industry at IBM as a software engineer. She then took her talents to the FBI, using her engineering and management skills to serve her country. From there, she moved to the White House, where she directed federal interagency coordination through the National Science and Technology Council. Subsequently, Afua led the Public Interest Technology program at New America, she served as the Chief Program Officer at DataKind, and currently, Afua is the Founder and Principal at ANB Advisory Group, an organization supporting responsible technology development. Afua co-authors "The Tech That Comes Next” alongside Amy Sample Ward. This book outlines how companies can deploy technology to improve people's lives and solve social problems.
Social Anxiety Solutions - your journey to social confidence!
In this episode... We explore a transformative insight from Afua, who, after a tapping session, has discovered the vital role of EFT Tapping in mediating the dialogue between our conscious and subconscious minds. Tune in to gain a new perspective as we shed light on subconscious resistance – a concept that could be a game-changer for anyone seeking social ease. To unravel the tools that can help overcome your subconscious resistance and lead you to a more socially confident you, get our FREE Mini course: “The 7 Secrets to Social Confidence” https://bit.ly/socialconfidencepodcast ______ Do you feel awkward in social situations? Do you struggle to be yourself around others? And do you fear being judged, being seen anxious, and embarrassing yourself? You're not alone. I've been there. It sucks. Big time. But there's hope. I've been fortunate enough to overcome my Social Anxiety... ... and I've helped hundreds of socially anxious clients overcome their struggles too. Thankfully, there's a gentle, powerful, and effective solution to beat it. It won't happen overnight, but with certain techniques and strategies, you can reduce your Social Anxiety quickly. And with persistence, you can become completely anxiety-free. Without needing to force yourself to awkwardly face your fears. Ready to get started on your journey to Social Confidence? Here are your first steps: 1.) Follow this Podcast and always get the latest episodes! 2.) Go to https://bit.ly/socialconfidencepodcast and receive access to a short transformational video to reduce your anxiety immediately. AND you'll also get my FREE “7 Secrets to Social Confidence” Mini Course. 3.) Let's connect! • SUBSCRIBE to my YouTube channel https://www.youtube.com/@Social-anxiety-solutions • FB https://www.facebook.com/socialanxietysolutions • IG https://www.instagram.com/socialanxietysolutions • Twitter https://twitter.com/socialanxietysb All the best on your journey to effortless social ease. Warm regards, Seb
Actress Olivia Colman is the patron of the arts charity Tender, having previously played a survivor of domestic violence in the film Tyrannosaur. She speaks to Woman's Hour alongside Tender CEO Susie McDonald about the work they're doing to try and prevent domestic violence. A special police unit used to spy on left wing political and activist groups was not justified and should have been disbanded in its early days. That's one of the conclusions of the first part of a judge led inquiry into undercover policing, which covers the years 1968 to 1982. Sir John Mitting, Chair of the inquiry said most groups infiltrated by the Met's Special Demonstration Squad posed no threat. His report details tactics such as forming sexual relationships while undercover and using dead children's names to create false identities. Hayley Hassall is joined by ‘Alison' who had a five year relationship with an undercover officer, and by Harriet Wistrich, who is Director of the Centre for Women's Justice and part of the legal team that represented women in the inquiry. The writer, editor and disability activist Lottie Jackson has written a memoir called See Me Rolling. In it, she discusses the way that society views disability and the innate prejudices that we have. She also talks about fashion and how important it is in letting her express her identity. She joins Hayley. The journalist Afua Hirsch has made a new series of Africa Rising for BBC 2, about an African cultural renaissance. Afua visits three very different countries; Morocco, Nigeria and South Africa, and interviews young creatives who are expressing new ideas which are gathering momentum across the continent. Afua joins Hayley to talk about the female artists she met and their inspiring visions.
Please subscribe! ToDiForDaily.com's Kinsey Schofield talks to royal commentator Afua Hagan about the reaction to Prince William's homeless initiative (13:00) - which has honestly been mixed! The entertainment and royals guru also observes how Prince William and the Princess of Wales' passion projects have recently intertwined. A true dream team! Visit ToDiForDaily.com for additional information. Kinsey Schofield is a Los Angeles-based royals expert and the host of the To Di For Daily podcast. The To Di For Daily podcast cover art was designed by famed pop artist, Analy Diego. You can now listen to these interviews wherever you find your favorite podcasts. Search To Di For Daily or Kinsey Schofield.
The stunning looks wrapped in a curated style is often a quizzing contrast to the reserved personality of top content creator and influencer Afua Rida. We try to crack the code to her other sides in this fun episode.Follow Us:IG - www.instagram.com/imld.podTwitter - www.twitter.com/imldpodFacebook - www.facebook.com/IMLDPodYoutube - https://www.youtube.com/@IfMoreLetsDivide
Ben Kentish sits in and is joined on Cross Question by journalist and LBC presenter Rachel Johnson, Cabinet Office Minister and Conservative MP Alex Burghart, broadcaster Afua Hagan and Liberal Democrat Chief Whip Wendy Chamberlain.
Social Anxiety Solutions - your journey to social confidence!
In this episode... Sebastiaan shares a comment from Afua, who participated in The 7 Day Social Confidence Challenge. Afua writes about feeling intense anxiety and frustration with her social anxiety, but she found relief and a shift in perspective after tapping along with a video. Sebastiaan explains that reality is just a perception and that our belief system influences our interpretation of events and circumstances. We can overcome Social Anxiety and live our lives the way we want by tapping into and changing our perspective. Are you looking for ways to shift your perspective? Get our FREE Mini course: "The 7 Secrets to Social Confidence" https://bit.ly/socialconfidencepodcast ______ Do you feel awkward in social situations? Do you struggle to be yourself around others? And do you fear being judged, being seen anxious, and embarrassing yourself? You're not alone. I've been there. It sucks. Big time. But there's hope. I've been fortunate enough to overcome my Social Anxiety... ... and I've helped hundreds of socially anxious clients overcome their struggles too. Thankfully, there's a gentle, powerful, and effective solution to beat it. It won't happen overnight, but with certain techniques and strategies, you can reduce your Social Anxiety quickly. And with persistence, you can become completely anxiety-free. Without needing to force yourself to awkwardly face your fears. Ready to get started on your journey to Social Confidence? Here are your first steps: 1.) Follow this Podcast and always get the latest episodes! 2.) Go to https://bit.ly/socialconfidencepodcast and receive access to a short transformational video to reduce your anxiety immediately. AND you'll also get my FREE “7 Secrets to Social Confidence” Mini Course. 3.) Let's connect! • SUBSCRIBE to my YouTube channel https://www.youtube.com/@Social-anxiety-solutions • FB https://www.facebook.com/socialanxietysolutions • IG https://www.instagram.com/socialanxietysolutions • Twitter https://twitter.com/socialanxietysb All the best on your journey to effortless social ease. Warm regards, Seb
In which, using Lorena Gale's play Angélique, we talk about the life and times of Marie-Joseph Angélique - a New France slave who was accused of burning down almost 50 buildings in Montreal in 1734. Get 2 months of free podcast hosting by going to: https://signup.libsyn.com/?promo_code=CANLIT --- Support: Patreon (https://www.patreon.com/historiacanadiana); Paypal (https://www.paypal.com/paypalme/historiacanadiana); the recommended reading page (https://historiacanadiana.wordpress.com/books/) --- Contact: historiacanadiana@gmail.com, Twitter (@CanLitHistory) & Facebook (https://www.facebook.com/CanLitHistory). --- Sources/Further Reading: Cooper, Afua. “Confessions of a woman who burnt down a town.” Utterances and Incantations: Women, Poetry, and Dub in the Black Diaspora, ed. Afua Cooper. SisterVision Press, 1999. Cooper, Afua. The Hanging of Angélique: The Untold Story of Canadian Slavery and the Burning of Old Montréal, The University of Georgia Press, 2007. Gale, Lorena. Angélique, Toronto: Playwrights Canada Press, 1998. https://archive.org/details/angelique0000gale/mode/2up (Can be borrowed with a free account) Torture and Truth: Angélique and the Burning of Montreal, Great Unsolved Mysteries in Canadian History Project, 2006, https://www.canadianmysteries.ca/sites/angelique/accueil/indexen.html
Hi Soothers! Soothe, my year-long mastermind for highly sensitive women, closes for enrollment on December 22. There are six spots left; is one of them yours? Book a call here to find out. And today, to help you learn more about past participants' experiences in Soothe, I have on Hilary and Afua, who were in a small group together in Soothe last year. We talk about the joy of finding other highly sensitive women and being in community for them in a year (or longer; like others, Afua and Hilary's small group continues to meet now); the relief and insight the Soothe program gave them; and we talk about the power of archetype work, including Hilary's archetype, a Soothe favorite, Diana Bowie - a mix of Diana the Huntress and David Bowie (trust me, it makes sense when you listen). Afua took a work sabbatical a few years ago, and Hilary started a work sabbatical while in Soothe, so we touch on quitting jobs too and what that's like. Enjoy this conversation!Wondering what it's like to join Soothe, the year-long experience, and what the small groups are like? This week's discussion will give you deep insight.Wondering if Soothe is right for you? Read more about Soothe at catherinedandrews.com/soothe and book your discovery call with me there. Soothe is open for enrollment until December 22.The Sunday Soother podcast is a spin-off of The Sunday Soother, a weekly newsletter that creates conversations around compassionate personal development and helps readers access their spirituality, magic and mindfulness in practical, actionable ways.You can find Catherine @candrews on Twitter and Instagram @catherineandrews, and her coaching website is catherinedandrews.com.
Emma and Nicole speak to Afua Hirsch, award-winning journalist and media stalwart on the fight for collective liberation, why the struggle is an undeniable part of us and how we need to lean into it to find home. Afua discusses the diasporic phenomenon of feeling the link to your culture is precarious, finding your mission, liberating us from our ideas of imperfection because we are mixed, and that discomfort leads to insight and energy to tackle the systems of oppression we live under. Preorder our book, The Half Of It: https://amzn.to/3rDq1qo Website: https://www.mixedup.co.uk/ Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/mixeduppodcastInstagram: https://instagram.com/mixedup.podcastAfua Hirsch: https://www.instagram.com/afuahirsch/ Brit(ish): https://amzn.to/3gLuIOF
My very Cool Friend Afua Richardson is hanging out with me for my birthday episode of JHCF and I couldn't be happier! On top of the fact that she's an accomplished artist in her own right (Marvel, Lovecraft Country), Afua is also an incredible multi-hyphenate, as she's a singer, dancer and even double-dipping at cons as a cosplayer. She's also recently found herself in the middle of a ridiculous gate-keeping controversy that united the majority of the comics community, and you bet your rump we talk about it. So enjoy, go follow Afua on social media, check out her art and enjoy!
Amy and Afua will be kicking off the Nonprofit Social Media Summit with their keynote: The Tech That Comes Next! Sign up here!Changing the way we use, develop, and fund technology for social change is possible, and it starts with you.My guests in this special bonus podcast episode are Amy Sample Ward and Afua Bruce, authors of The Tech That Comes Next: How Changemakers, Philanthropists, and Technologists Can Build an Equitable World . This important book outlines a vision of a more equitable and just world along with practical steps to creating it, appropriately leveraging technology along the way.AMY SAMPLE WARD (they/them), believes that technology should be accessible and accountable to everyone, especially communities historically and systemically excluded from the digital world. They are the CEO of NTEN, a nonprofit creating a world where missions and movements are more successful through the skillful and equitable use of technology. Amy's second book, Social Change Anytime Everywhere, was a Terry McAdam Book Award finalist.AFUA BRUCE (she/hers) is a leading public interest technologist who has spent her career working at the intersection of technology, policy, and society. Her career has spanned the government, non-profit, private, and academic sectors, as she has held senior science and technology positions at DataKind, the White House, the FBI, and IBM. Afua has a bachelor's degree in computer engineering, as well as an MBA.Connect with Amy and Afua:Twitter: @amyrsward @afua_bruceWebsite: https://thetechthatcomesnext.com/About Julia Campbell, the host of the Nonprofit Nation podcast:Named as a top thought leader by Forbes and BizTech Magazine, Julia Campbell (she/hers) is an author, coach, and speaker on a mission to make the digital world a better place.She wrote her book, Storytelling in the Digital Age: A Guide for Nonprofits, as a roadmap for social change agents who want to build movements using engaging digital storytelling techniques. Her second book, How to Build and Mobilize a Social Media Community for Your Nonprofit, was published in 2020 as a call-to-arms for mission-driven organizations to use the power of social media to build movements.Julia's online courses, webinars, and keynote talks have helped hundreds of nonprofits make the shift to digital thinking and how to do effective marketing in the digital age.Take Julia's free nonprofit masterclass, 3 Must-Have Elements of Social Media That Converts
Recorded by Afua Ansong for Poem-a-Day, a series produced by the Academy of American Poets. Published on October 13, 2022. www.poets.org
Nonprofits Are Messy: Lessons in Leadership | Fundraising | Board Development | Communications
Technology for nonprofits is often thought of as being external to the work that goes on inside the sector. In this episode, Amy Ward and Afua Bruce join me to talk about how equitable technology can help us build a more equitable world.
Nonprofits Are Messy: Lessons in Leadership | Fundraising | Board Development | Communications
Technology for nonprofits is often thought of as being external to the work that goes on inside the sector. In this episode, Amy Ward and Afua Bruce join me to talk about how equitable technology can help us build a more equitable world.